Fried's Theory of Political Evolution: An Empirical Test

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FRIED'S THEORY OF POLITICAL EVOLUTION:
AN EMPIRICAL TEST

by
Diana Battjes McKenna

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Submitted to the
Faculty of the Graduate College
in partial fulfillment
of the
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Diana Battjes McKenna
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STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

It is the purpose of this paper to test Fried's conceptualization of political complexity presented in *Evolution of Political Society*. This is basically a Marxian theory of the evolution of society in which Fried's concept of political complexity is based upon economic stratification, i.e., the ability of those in power to control the basic resources of the society. The paper will examine whether an operationalization of this theoretical approach realistically differentiates a sample of pre-industrial societies. A number of hypotheses dealing with the relationship of political complexity and certain societal characteristics are also tested. These tests are necessary because Fried uses only illustrations in justifying his hypotheses.

In contrast, one other approach to political complexity is also examined. This approach, referred to here as "administrative," assumes that political complexity is basically an increasing complexity of administration. As societies increase in complexity, there is a need for more political "organization" by increasing the number of levels and/or spheres of influence. After comparing the results
of the tests made here with an analysis of political complexity in an "administrative" approach, it will be possible to determine which definition of political complexity would be most fruitful for use in future research.

Julian Steward's theory (1955) is one example of an "administrative" approach to political complexity. The evolutionary sequence which he develops is based on "levels of sociocultural integration." Three of these levels --- the nuclear family, the folk society, and the state --- are discussed in relation to their predominant societal characteristics by Steward. The family level is considered to be a basic unit and an antecedent to multifamily forms. "Folk societies or multifamily sociocultural systems develop when activities requiring a suprafamily organization appear (Steward, 1955: 54.)" "... A state level of integration is marked by the appearance of new patterns that bring several multifamily, or folk societies, into functional dependence upon one another within a still larger system (Steward, 1955: 55.)" These definitions indicate that the levels are distinguished by their increasing organizational complexity, regardless of what new patterns might be causing any particular evolutionary shift. Therefore, the political
organization for each level must also deal with the increasingly complex administrative problems, making the political structures in turn more complex. Steward, then, must view political complexity as a function of "administration," and would operationalize political complexity in terms of the number of levels of government and/or spheres of influence.

The results of Abrahamson's study of political complexity (1969) suggest that the "administrative" operationalization of political complexity may be a fruitful one. In this study, the political complexity index is operationalized by four variables: 1) the presence of a political headman, 2) the number of sovereign organizations, 3) the number of non-sovereign organizations, and 4) the number of jurisdictional levels transcending the local community (Abrahamson, 1969: 695.) All four of these measures revolve around an "administrative" conception of political complexity. Abrahamson's study deals only with the emergence of formalized political systems, but his analysis has clear implications for Steward's more complete evolutionary theory. Using this conception of political complexity, Abrahamson has found a positive relationship between political complexity and social differentiation,
demographic complexity and socioeconomic development. He reports zero-order correlations of .65 between political complexity and social differentiation, .42 between political complexity and demographic complexity, and .45 between political complexity and socioeconomic development. All of these were significant at the .01 level. Abrahamson also reports partial beta weights for the relationships between political complexity and these variables. The beta weights indicate that societal differentiation has the largest impact on political complexity. Socioeconomic development, on the other hand, showed little impact on political complexity in the partial analysis. This indicates that there is no independent relationship between political complexity and socioeconomic development.

These relationships between political complexity and certain societal characteristics are also dealt with in Fried's theory. The difference lies in the operationalization of political complexity. Where Abrahamson and Steward define political complexity as a function of "administration" with political complexity being conceptualized as the number of levels and/or spheres of influence present in the society, Fried ties political complexity to the development of power over the basic resources needed to sustain life. Thus,
political complexity in Fried's definition is a function of social stratification.

**FRIED'S THEORY**

Fried has proposed a theory of the evolution of politics in society. In doing so he has described four ideal types of society which are states in the evolutionary sequence. Focusing upon those factors which he feels have the most bearing on the political organization of each type, he has identified egalitarian, rank, stratified, and state types of society.

"An egalitarian society is one in which there are as many positions of prestige in any given age-sex grade as there are persons capable of filling them (Fried, 1967: 33.)" Defining egalitarian societies negatively, Fried notes that they lack both ranking and stratification. In other words, egalitarian societies have no means of limiting the number of positions of prestige. Members of egalitarian societies live in bands composed of a number of families. They depend upon wild sources of food, that is, hunting and gathering, as a means of subsistence. Economic distribution is carried out by means of generalized reciprocity. Fried notes that while this form of economic distribution is present in all societies, in the egalitarian it is the only form of economic
distribution. Consequently, as noted in his definition of egalitarian society, Fried notes that class stratification is absent. Political organization in the egalitarian society is discussed in terms of leadership. There are a number of general patterns which can be used to describe leadership in egalitarian societies. For example, leadership

... rests upon authority and lacks connotations of power except as shall be noted below. Second, it tends to be displayed in transient fashion, moving from one competent person to another. Third, the shifts in the locus of leadership are less associated with persons than with situations. Fourth, the limited presence of power is associated with exceptionally small groups like families and vanishes as the scope of the group widens. Fifth, authority has a much wider range than power but also declines sharply with expansion of the group considered. Finally, variations in the effectiveness of the preceding five principles are related to variations in ecology and demography. Denser populations associated with more productive subsistence regimes have more extensive leadership areas and, to a lesser extent, more power underlying leadership (Fried, 1967: 83.)

Clearly, to understand Fried's ideas about leadership in egalitarian societies, familiarity with his definitions of power and authority is necessary. "Authority is taken here to refer to the ability to channel the behavior of others in the absence of the threat or use of sanctions. Power is the ability to channel the behavior of others by
the threat or use of sanctions (Fried, 1967: 13.)" In
general, then, leadership is based on authority rather than
power in egalitarian societies. Consequently, while
leadership positions do exist, they do not occur within
the framework of political organization. Political
organization, in Fried's system, relates to the management
of public policy and the appointment and action of individuals
or groups concerned with this policy. And since "some
sanctions are required to maintain even the simplest system
of public policy," the development and exercise of power is
the special province of political organization (Fried, 1967:
21.) From Fried's evolutionary perspective, then,
egalitarian societies are essentially pre-political.

"A rank society is one in which positions of valued
status are somehow limited so that not all those of suf­
icient talent to occupy such statuses actually achieve
them (Fried, 1967: 109.)" Rank societies are dependent
upon a domesticated food supply, and most of them are
agricultural. With a surer food supply, the settlement
patterns of rank societies are more permanent. Thus, the
basic settlement pattern in this societal type is the
village. As in egalitarian societies, economic distribution
in rank societies includes reciprocity. But rank societies
have another, more important, form as well. "In rank society the major process of economic integration is redistribution, in which there is a characteristic flow of goods into and out from a finite center. Invariably, that center is the pinnacle of the rank hierarchy or, as complexity mounts, the pinnacle of a smaller component network within a larger structure (Fried, 1967: 117.)"

Ranking refers to the distribution of prestige in these societies, and indirectly to the signs of prestige. It does not refer to the distribution of those basic strategic resources upon which life depends. Stratification in terms of these strategic resources may or may not occur in rank societies. Even when it does occur, it has no effect on the system of ranking. Analytically, ranking and stratification are separate. They are also separate in practice: "Accumulation of the signs of prestige does not convey any privileged claim to the strategic resources on which a society is based (Fried, 1967: 110.)"

Kinship is the basis for associations in rank societies. No particular form of kinship system, however, is prevalent. But whatever the specific form of the kinship system, the person of rank is a kinsman to those under his influence. Further, in contrast to the fluid authority
structure of egalitarian societies, in rank societies
"authority is regular and repetitive and extends into
various aspects of social life (Fried, 1967: 134.)" The
person of rank has several characteristic roles: feast
giver and host in inter-group celebrations, including the
direction of productive activities prior to the celebrations;
distributor of goods; and symbolic, religious leadership.

The individual of high rank is frequently also
of comparable religious standing. This is almost
automatically the case in societies dominated by
lineage organization. Given the value of the
nearness of relationship, recognizing the overlap
between the ancestors and the significant gods,
acknowledging the close tie between religious
ritual and episodes of feasting, it is under­
standable that rank and religious status would
be vested in the same individuals (Fried, 1967:
137.)

Political power, as such, is still undeveloped in rank
societies, however. Most of the influence commanded by
persons of rank stems from their prestige. What power they
command is limited or circumscribed into ritual areas,
stemming from their positions as ritual leaders (Fried,
1967: 141.) The marks of prestige are closely tied to
kinship, ceremonials and the productive activity connected
with them, economic distribution, and religious ritual.
These areas seem extensive, but the range of alternatives
for the leader is limited by the tradition of the group.
"A stratified society is one in which members of the same sex and equivalent age status do not have equal access to the basic resources that sustain life (Fried, 1967: 186.)"
The crucial element in Fried's evolutionary typology of societies is the development of stratification. Although Fried limits stratification to inequalities in economic resources (1967: 52,) the distinction between egalitarian and rank societies stems from institutionalized mechanisms of inequality in prestige. Rank societies may or may not have stratification along the economic dimension, so that dimension is not crucial in their definition. The presence of economic stratification is the crucial element in the emergence of stratified societies. Its importance stems from the fact that it demands the formation of political power, something lacking in both egalitarian and rank societies. As Fried develops this connection, "... the maintenance of an order of stratification demands sanctions commanding power beyond the resources of a kinship system ... (1967: 186.)" In fact, kinship relationships are usually much reduced once the level of stratification is reached because they get in the way of the order of stratification.

The stratified society is a transitional stage. Once stratification exists, the state very quickly must develop
in order for the stratification system to be maintained. If the society does not proceed to the state level, it must revert to a lower level of societal type (Fried, 1967: 225.)

The most important new feature in stratified society, then, is the order of stratification which is economically based. In other words, the person with rank has access to basic resources which the person without rank may not have. In relationship to this characteristic, the kinship system becomes less important and as it does so it becomes less and less able to deal with internal conflict. In this more complex society increasingly non-kinship mechanisms of political and economic power are used (Fried, 1967: 225.)

The decline of kinship as a basis for authority, and the emergence of economic power in stratified societies, stems from two processes of growing complexity. First of all, population pressure and density probably place strains on the integrating role of kinship. For example, the increasing population may place ever heavier burdens on the kinship based methods of administration in rank societies. This in turn may create the necessity for managerial roles where status hinges on expertise rather than kinship position.

Changes in postmarital residence patterns could also create a potential base of support for the economically advantaged
outside their own kinship alliances --- among those who have lost touch with their own kinship lineages.

A second possible reason for the move to stratified societies is based on changes in subsistence patterns. A contraction or basic alteration of natural resources, technological changes, or impingement of a market system would place additional strains on an already burdened kinship system. In the absence of a strong kin-based integration, these new opportunities could be taken over by any individual regardless of his kinship ties. In summary, in the stratified society economic and political powers first become tied to the order of stratification. In this way the institutions of the state are formed in embryo.

"The state . . . is a collection of specialized institutions and agencies, some formal and others informal, that maintains an order of stratification (Fried, 1967: 235.)" These institutions are the means by which stratified society becomes state society. The specific institutional problems which must be solved in the state are the following:

1) Some manner of controlling population, especially in the following areas:

   a) Identification of citizens.

   b) Definition of boundaries.
c) A means of determining the size of membership, such as a census.

2) The handling of internal conflicts.

3) The establishment and maintenance of sovereignty.

4) The development of a bureaucracy, i.e., a social sector beneath rulers acting as an agency of control.

5) The formation of a treasury or bursary with which the state can carry out its activities, and therefore, taxation.

Some other characteristics of state societies might be noted. First of all, presumably there is a much higher level of technological development in stratified and state societies. One effect of this technological advance is the larger population which makes many of the specific controls in these societies necessary. The larger population also makes for more complex settlement patterns, especially the development of large villages and even cities. The technological advance also makes possible the formation of the bureaucratic specializations in craft areas. Basically, it is no longer necessary for everyone to rely on direct means of subsistence. The forms of economic distribution present in the simpler forms of society also exist in state society. The needs of the state for wealth to carry out its
activities, however, promotes the use of a more fluid form of wealth --- money (Fried, 1967: 239.) Goods now have a monetary value and so does labor. In comparison to the form found in rank society, the political organization at the state level reaches beyond the boundaries of kinship. In fact, it tends to undermine the kinship system in order to make its power more effective.

These are Fried's four types of society. In this study, only three types --- egalitarian, rank, and state societies --- will be studied. Fried notes that "... stratified societies lacking political institutions of state level are almost impossible to find ... (Fried, 1967: 185.)" Thus, it would be difficult to test any hypothesis about stratified society. This is not to say that the stage of the stratified society is not important. It is at this point really that the inequalities with regard to basic resources are born. At this point, however, Fried's theory can be tested using only three of his evolutionary stages.

In examining Fried's definitions of egalitarian, rank, stratified, and state societies, two main aspects of society are evident --- the economic and the political. The economic aspect is determined by whether or not a society is
economically stratified (Fried, 1967: 52.) Thus, economic stratification is one dimension of Fried's types of society. Egalitarian and rank societies are not economically stratified and stratified and state societies are economically stratified.

The second dimension of Fried's types of society is the political one. In egalitarian and rank societies the political aspect is found in positions of prestige. Fried would prefer not to call these "political" leaders. He would agree, however, that positions of prestige are the forerunners of political leadership positions. Thus we shall use the term positions of political leadership as a general term when referring to the political aspect of the four types of society.

In egalitarian society positions of prestige are not limited. There are as many positions of valued status as there are persons to fill them. Age and sex are the only criteria. Although the number of positions may be limited by environmental factors such as small population, short life span, and so on, society itself has no means of limiting positions of prestige other than by age or sex.

In rank society positions of prestige are limited. Positions of prestige are most likely to be connected to the
kinship structure of the society, since kinship is the principle of association in rank society (Fried, 1967: 121.) Thus, certain positions of status in the kinship system would limit the number of prestige positions available, and not all persons of the same age and sex status would be allowed to achieve positions of prestige.

It would seem from the definition of stratified society that positions of prestige would depend upon the system of economic stratification. Also, in the co-residential group, stratified society shows a growing concern for class and territory (Fried, 1967: 121.) Thus, it seems most reasonable that economic class stratification should be a major source for positions of prestige or political leadership.

State society is based upon the establishment of institutions. Positions of political leadership would, therefore, be found within specialized institutions. The four types of society, defined by their economic and political dimensions, are illustrated in Table 1 for greater clarity.

A general hypothesis can now be made concerning Fried's four types of society:
Table 1: Definition of Ideal Types.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Political Leadership</th>
<th>Economic Stratification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age-Sex</td>
<td>--- Stratified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kinship</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class</td>
<td>Stratified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institution</td>
<td>State</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hypothesis A:

Egalitarian, rank, stratified and state societies are defined exclusively by their political and economic dimensions. All societies, when classified by these two dimensions, will fall into one of the four types.

Hypothesis B:

In the description of the four types of society several characteristics were noted. For this study, only three were chosen to be tested --- settlement pattern, means of subsistence, and forms of economic distribution. The form of economic distribution is especially important to Fried's theoretical framework. Settlement pattern and means of subsistence were also chosen as variables because they have been found to be important in theories of societal complexity.
Specifically, the hypotheses are as follows:

$H_{B1}$: Egalitarian societies will have unstable settlement patterns; rank societies will have stable settlement patterns; and state societies will have a complex settlement pattern.

$H_{B2}$: Egalitarian societies will rely mainly upon hunting and gathering as a means of subsistence; rank societies will rely upon a domesticated food supply; and state societies will have crafts and specialization present in addition to a domesticated food supply.

$H_{B3}$: Egalitarian societies will have generalized reciprocity as their form of economic distribution; rank societies will have redistribution; and state societies will have a money economy.

ANALYSIS AND METHODOLOGY

The categories "class stratification" and "succession to the office of local headman" from the Ethnology atlas were used to operationalize the four types of society. There are five types of "class stratification" listed in the atlas. They are defined as follows:

1) Absence of significant class distinctions among freemen, ignoring variations in individual repute achieved through skill, valor, piety, or wisdom.

2) Wealth distinctions, based on the possession or distribution of property, present and socially important but not crystallized into distinct and hereditary social classes.

3) Elite stratification, in which an elite class derives its superior status from, and thereby
perpetuates it through control over resources, particularly land, and is thereby differentiated from a propertyless proletariat or serf class.

4) Dual stratification into a hereditary aristocracy and a lower class of ordinary commoners or freemen, where traditionally ascribed noble status is at least as decisive as the control over scarce resources and may even determine the latter.


"Succession to the office of local headman" includes the following divisions:

Hereditary by a son, hereditary by other patrilineal heir, hereditary by a sister's son, hereditary by other matrilineal heir, nonhereditary through appointment by some higher authority, nonhereditary on the basis of seniority or age, nonhereditary through influence (wealth or social status,) nonhereditary through election or other formal consensus, nonhereditary through informal consensus, and absence of any such office (Barry, 1967: 16.)

Egalitarian societies, which have as many positions of prestige in any given age-sex grade as there are persons capable of filling them, would have no class stratification among freemen. Succession to the office of local headman would be determined by seniority or age, informal consensus, or there would be no position of local headman in the society. In rank societies, where kinship is so important as the basis of association, succession to the office of local
headman would be hereditary in nature. Fried mentions that stratification may or may not be present. When stratification is present in rank societies, however, it is not economically based. Thus, even though there is no class stratification, wealth distinctions would be present in rank societies. Stratified societies, in which members of the same age and sex do not have equal access to basic resources (Fried, 1967: 186,) would have an elite type of class stratification based on control of land or other scarce resources. Stratified societies could also have dual (hereditary aristocracy) or complex stratification in cases where succession to the office of local headman is through influence (wealth or social status.) This assumes that the category of "influence" does not imply an institutionalized basis for political offices. State societies are all those societies which are economically stratified and have institutions which support them. It is clear that the categories "nonhereditary through election or other formal consensus" and "nonhereditary (appointed by a higher authority,)") are institutionalized forms of maintaining an order of stratification. Also, societies which have economic stratification (elite, dual, or complex) and which have either elections, appointment, or kinship
bases for succession to the office of local headman were considered to be state societies. It was decided that in the case of hereditary aristocracy, hereditary succession to office could be considered to be an institutionalized means of maintaining an order of stratification.

The sample used in this study was taken from Udy's Organization of Work (1959) since Udy had operationalized and measured one of the crucial variables in this study (economic distribution.) From the 150 societies in Udy's sample, 117 were selected since they were also found in the Ethnology atlas. The information found in both sources could then be utilized for the study. There was no information on the political dimension for 16 of the 117 societies. From the 101 remaining societies in the sample, then, 79 are representative of the ideal types. Fifteen are egalitarian, thirty-one are rank, and thirty-three are state societies. There were no stratified societies present in this sample. This supports Fried's statement that stratified societies are very rare. The distribution of societies can be seen in Table 2.

Hypothesis A states that all societies should fall into one of the four ideal types. In the sample, 79 out of 101 societies are ideal types. In order to test this
Table 2: Frequencies of Societal Types.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Succession to Office of Local Headman</th>
<th>Absent Among Freemen</th>
<th>Wealth Distinctions</th>
<th>Elite</th>
<th>Dual</th>
<th>Complex</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age-Sex</td>
<td>15&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kinship</td>
<td>19&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>12&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1&lt;sup&gt;d&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>25&lt;sup&gt;d&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>2&lt;sup&gt;d&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influence</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election - Appointment</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1&lt;sup&gt;d&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1&lt;sup&gt;d&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>3&lt;sup&gt;d&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key:  
a) Egalitarian  
b) Rank  
c) Stratified  
d) State
hypothesis, a difference of proportions test was used. Thus, for each category (egalitarian, rank, stratified, and state) the proportion of societies in the ideal types is compared with the proportion which could be expected to fall into these categories by chance (Blalock, 1960: 151.) The Z-score used in the proportions test is computed as follows:

\[ Z = \frac{P_s - P_u}{\sqrt{P_u Q_u / N}} \]

\[ = 78.2 - 74.6 / \sqrt{(74.6)(25.4)} / 101 \]

\[ = .84 \quad (p = .30) \]

The significance level chosen for this study is .05, which is a common one in social statistics. The hypothesis must then be rejected at the .05 level. This sample of societies does not significantly depart from a chance distribution.

One main reason why Fried's hypothesis is not supported is evident in the distribution. According to Fried's typology, egalitarian and rank societies are quite well represented. There are only a few deviations from the ideal. For state societies, however, there are 13 cases in which societies with institutionalized forms of political activity --- formal elections or appointments --- are present which do not have any economic stratification. Also, there
are no stratified societies present in the sample.

There is also a problem with the 25 cases with hereditary means of determining succession and with dual stratification. It was decided that we could call these state societies even though the political organization is apparently based on kinship --- especially since leaders in an aristocratic society are determined by kinship criteria even though institutions are present to maintain the order of stratification. In this case it was determined that the presence of economic stratification was enough to determine its classification as "state." Even with these added "ideal" cases, however, the thirteen deviant cases were enough to cause the rejection of the hypothesis.

Even though Fried's main hypothesis has been rejected, we will proceed to test the ideal cases to determine whether they actually have the social characteristics which were predicted for them. The first hypothesis proposes that as the type of society changes from egalitarian to rank to state, the complexity of settlement patterns increases. Egalitarian societies have unstable settlement patterns, rank societies are stable, and state societies have complex settlement patterns. To test the hypothesis, the category "settlement pattern" from the Ethnology atlas
was used (Barry, 1967: 8.) It was coded as follows:

0) Insufficient information
1) Fully migratory or nomadic bands
2) Seminomadic communities
3) Semisedentary communities
4) Compact but impermanent settlements
5) Neighborhoods of dispersed family homesteads
6) Separated hamlets, forming a single community
7) Compact and relatively permanent settlements
8) Complex settlements.

Categories one through four were classified here as unstable settlement patterns, five through seven were defined as stable, and eight complex. The results of the cross-tabulations between egalitarian, rank, and state societies, as they are defined by their economic and political dimensions, and type of settlement pattern are presented in Table 3. This and the remaining hypotheses are tested using chi-squares. The chi-square for Table 3 is 16.1. Since the probability is less than .01, this hypothesis is supported. Thus, societies which do correspond to Fried's ideal types do increase in complexity of settlement pattern. Since it is well known that settlement patterns become more complex as the form of
society increases in complexity, this result only indicates that Fried's ideal types may represent some evolutionary pattern in society. However, if this is the only hypothesis which is supported, the result will not have much bearing on evolutionary theory.

Table 3: The Relationship Between Settlement Pattern and Societal Type.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Societal Type</th>
<th>Unstable</th>
<th>Stable</th>
<th>Complex</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Egalitarian</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rank</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-Square = 16.1 (Probability less than .01)

The second hypothesis deals with the means of subsistence in each of Fried's ideal types. Egalitarian societies should depend mainly upon hunting and gathering, rank societies on a domesticated food supply, and state societies should have intensive agriculture. This hypothesis was tested using the classification "subsistence
economy." In this classification (Barry, 1967: 11,) societies were coded according to their greatest source of economic subsistence:

1) Gathering --- dependence on gathering is greater than on hunting, fishing, or agriculture.

2) Fishing --- dependence on fishing is greater than on hunting, gathering, or agriculture.

3) Hunting --- dependence on hunting is greater than on gathering, fishing, or agriculture.

4) Pastoral --- dependence on animal husbandry exceeds agriculture and hunting, gathering, or fishing.

5) Incipient agriculture --- dependence on agriculture is greater than or equal to hunting, gathering, or fishing.

6) Extensive agriculture --- same as five, but also has shifting agriculture or horticulture (semi-intensive.)

7) Intensive agriculture --- same as five, but also has intensive agriculture on permanent fields or intensive agriculture largely dependent upon irrigation.

To test this hypothesis, gathering, hunting, and fishing are grouped together into one category. These should be the means of subsistence in egalitarian societies. Pastoral, incipient agriculture, and extensive agriculture were determined to be domesticated sources of subsistence. Extensive agriculture was included in this category because in this case agriculture is still not a very stabilizing
influence. It is semi-intensive or shifting agriculture. These domesticated sources of food should be most common in rank societies. Intensive agriculture, where there is intensive agriculture on permanent fields or a dependence on irrigation, should be a characteristic of state societies. The results of this test are shown in Table 4.

Table 4: The Relationship Between Subsistence Economy and Societal Type.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subsistence Economy</th>
<th>Hunting, Gathering, Fishing</th>
<th>Domesticated Food Supply</th>
<th>Intensive Agriculture</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Egalitarian</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rank</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-Square = 7.0  (Probability greater than .10)

With a chi-square of 7.0, this hypothesis is rejected at the .05 level of significance. Even though the hypothesis is rejected, we can see from the table that there
are some relationships present. There is a tendency for societies to move from hunting and gathering and fishing to domesticated food supply to intensive agriculture as they progress from egalitarian to rank to state societies. Looking at Table 4, we can see where most of the deviant cases lie. There are eight cases in which egalitarian societies have a domesticated food supply. Rank societies seem to follow the expected pattern, although there are twelve societies which are dependent on hunting, gathering, or fishing. For state societies, the highest number of cases have a domesticated food supply, which according to Fried's theory could not support the level of state societies. Although the relationships are in the right direction, the overall relationships are not high enough considering that only "ideal" cases were used in testing the hypothesis.

The third hypothesis states that egalitarian societies will have generalized reciprocity as its form of economic distribution; rank will have redistribution; and state societies will have a money economy. In order to test this hypothesis, we will use some information from Udy's sample (1959,) specifically the category "reward systems." A reward system is the pattern of allocation of
rewards among the members of a production organization (Udy, 1959: 97.) The two types of reward systems which are useful in testing this hypothesis are balanced and unbalanced reward systems. "Reward systems involving both accumulation and distribution . . . will be said to be balanced. All other forms of reward systems will be termed unbalanced (Udy, 1959: 98.)" Accumulation and distribution are differentiated in that in accumulation no transfer of right of possession takes place and in distribution it does. Thus, accumulation can only apply to produce and not money or goods in kind.

In a further discussion of balanced and unbalanced reward systems, Udy states that "... in balanced reward systems . . . reward items flow through the authority structure (Udy, 1959: 101.)" Relating this to Fried's hypothesis, it is clear that state societies should have balanced reward systems. Egalitarian and rank societies should be unbalanced since there is no authority structure present. Even in rank societies, the person who handles the redistribution does not have authority. Table 5 shows the results obtained in testing the hypothesis.

In this case the hypothesis is definitely rejected. The chi-square is only 0.1. This means that there is a
Table 5: The Relationship Between Economic Redistribution and Societal Type.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Societal Type</th>
<th>Unbalanced Reward Systems</th>
<th>Balanced Reward Systems</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Egalitarian</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rank</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-Square = 0.1 (Probability = .70)

seventy per cent probability that the distribution could have occurred by chance.

SUMMARY

Steward's theory (1955) is one example of the "administrative" approach to political complexity. His evolutionary sequence is based on "levels of sociocultural integration." For example, as the family moves into the level of folk society a suprafamily organization is necessary. State levels appear when lower levels become functionally dependent upon one another, and form a still
larger organization. Thus, as a function of both increasing societal size and complexity, the political organization for each successive level must deal with increasingly complex administrative problems. And these political structures in turn become more complex.

In contrast, Fried proposes a Marxian theory of the evolution of society. He defines each type in terms of "prestige," "status," and the relationship of these valued positions to the basic resources that sustain life. Therefore, political complexity from Fried's viewpoint must be a function of social stratification and should be operationalized in those terms. Fried, however, did not make such an operationalization. In fact, he has proposed a number of hypotheses, and built his theory on the basis of illustrations. The results of the tests reported here point out the inadequacies of this kind of theoretical argument. What seems to be obvious on the basis of a well-known example, or even numerous examples, may not be borne out in a statistical analysis. Thus, the importance of stating hypotheses clearly and testing them using a representative sample in order to build theory must once again be pointed out.
This study has attempted an operationalization of Fried's theory. Overall, the results of the study do not support Fried's theoretical approach. First, there were too many cases which did not fall into the "ideal" types, defined by "class stratification" and "succession to the office of local headman," for the typology to be statistically significant. Secondly, even for the cases which did fall into the ideal typical categories --- egalitarian, rank, stratified, and state --- only one hypothesis, that dealing with the relationship between settlement pattern and societal types, was statistically significant. The remaining hypotheses dealing with the relationships of societal types with economic distribution and subsistence patterns, which had greater significance for Fried's theory, were not supported.

Fried's theoretical approach is an essentially Marxian one in which political complexity is perceived fundamentally in terms of the stratification system. Steward, on the other hand, views political complexity in terms of the number of levels of government and/or spheres of influence. Abrahamson's study (1969) is one empirical investigation of this latter orientation to political complexity. His test of the "administrative" approach to
political complexity indicated that social differentiation had the largest impact on political complexity. Socioeconomic development was relatively unimportant. Although Fried's approach does not necessitate a strong positive relationship between political complexity and socioeconomic development, his definition of ideal type societies in terms of their economic and political aspects suggest a relationship between these two variables. The negative findings which were reported in this study, then, are consistent with the patterns indicated in Abrahamson's study. These results, as well as Abrahamson's finding that such a strong independent relationship exists between political complexity and social differentiation, suggest that the "administrative" approach is more fruitful in developing theories of societal evolution.
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