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## INTRODUCTION: WARFARE-WELFARE AS A SERIOUS SOCIAL PROBLEM FOR STUDY AND ACTION

by L. K. Northwood

Throughout the Journal reference will be made to "The Warfare/Welfare State." When the term is used by the editors it refers to activities and programs in the public (governmental) sector having to do with the growth, development, and interrelationship of two of the major institutional complexes of society, the military and the social welfare.

There are two major reasons for the term:

First of all, it signals the findings of current research, that nations having large military budgets also have large budgets for social welfare. Both welfare and warfare seemingly are necessary components of the modern industrial state.

Second, it embodies a central contradiction that exists for these nations: The goals and processes of social welfare are usually conceived as being in direct opposition to the goals and processes of warfare. Hence, attention is directed to many of the critical issues that are examined in this Journal. Some of the most important are: To what extent has there been growth in the military and/or social welfare institutions over time? What are the measurable effects of the growth and development of one institutional complex on the other, on the society at large? Who benefits and who suffers from such a development? Can typical social welfare services be provided under military auspices? What services, for whom and under what conditions? Above all, the imperative question is: Should the social, political, and economic development of the nation be directed toward the acquisition of overwhelming military power which will allow the state to enforce its will domestically and on the rest of the world, or should the state direct its efforts to the enhancement of the social welfare and to the equitable sharing of its national resources with less fortunate and "underdeveloped" nations of the world?

There are many popular characterizations of the United States and other major industrial nations: Warfare State, Garrison State, Pentagon Capitalism, Military Industrial Complex, Welfare State, Leading Imperialist Nation, Leader of the Free World, and so forth.<sup>1</sup> Our selection of the term, Warfare/Welfare State, in part, was motivated by the desire to avoid a polar typology which emphasizes one form of social development at the cost of minimizing the other.<sup>2</sup>

To be sure, there is a certain merit in emphasizing the difference between a Warfare State and a Welfare State. The social welfare can be defined positively in concrete terms which have a common meaning. Although there is no unanimity about the range of programs that are needed to provide for the social welfare,

most authors would agree that they include "government protected minimum standards of income, nutrition, health, housing, and education for every citizen, assured to him as a political right, not a charity."<sup>3</sup> The concept, Welfare State, can also be given an empirical context which is often lacking in the use of the ambiguous term "peace" which literally means the absence of war or freedom from public disturbances or quarrels. The Welfare State

. . . is a state in which organized power is deliberately used (through politics and administration) in an effort to modify the play of market forces in at least three directions--first, by guaranteeing individuals and families a minimum income irrespective of the market value of their work or their property; second, by narrowing the extent of insecurity by enabling individuals and families to meet certain "social contingencies" (for example, sickness, old age, and unemployment) which lead otherwise to individual and family crises; and third, by ensuring that all citizens without distinction of status or class are offered the best standards available in relation to a certain range of social services.<sup>4</sup>

In short, the social welfare is something that can be measured empirically in contrast to the ambiguous qualitative state of peace. It spells out the social media through which the conditions of peace can be defined. The Welfare State is a tangible model for some of the necessary functions of the Peaceful State.<sup>5</sup>

However, such a dichotomy obscures the reality of the vital interconnections between warfare and welfare. Warfare and welfare are the realities of the modern industrial nation. Through the use of the concept, Warfare/Welfare State, the analyst begins to get at the etiology of social conflict and warfare. Universal provision for the social welfare can reduce the likelihood of conflict domestically and internationally.

Moreover, it is sometimes forgotten that "The Welfare State" had its origins in times of war and, in fact, has been characterized as a "war strategy." The Parliament of Great Britain commissioned Sir William Beveridge to draw up a plan for the reform of social services in June, 1941, when the bombs were falling in the streets next to Westminster. The plan called for the maintenance of full employment, comprehensive free health care and rehabilitation services, and social insurance from the cradle to the grave. By 1945, the term "Welfare State" had achieved popular currency. Titmuss, the eminent welfare historian, characterizes this movement as "an imperative for war strategy . . . that the war could not be won unless millions of ordinary people, in Britain and overseas, were convinced that we had something better to offer than had our enemies--not only during but after the war."<sup>6</sup>

A similar movement occurred in the United States during and after World War II, based on broad social benefits to war workers and their families, and to the veterans. However, the outline of the "Welfare State" took shape somewhat earlier

and for somewhat different reasons. Romanyshin says that the "New Deal" measures of the 1930's

. . . were designed to preserve the capitalistic system from total collapse.

Establishing measures of income security, social legislation in this period also served to bolster a badly shaken economy and to preserve rather than dismantle the market system. One may indeed say that social welfare is, in part, the answer of liberal capitalism to the challenge of socialism.<sup>7</sup>

These welfare reforms during the war and shortly thereafter had vanished by the early 1950's when the New York Times reported: "It seems that apart from manifestations like social security, which have become so built into the structure that no one thinks of suggesting their elimination, we live under what might be described as a reluctant or emergency variety of the Welfare State."<sup>8</sup>

The broadening of social welfare programs is only one governmental response to unsettled conditions. Many nations have turned to other "solutions" which in effect lead to the aggrandizement of the military. The militarization of society may occur gradually and imperceptibly, rather than abruptly through such means as: maintenance of a part-time army or a large standing army as a "solution" to unemployment; increasing public investment in military hardware, the staffing of government offices with military personnel, including social services; the replacement by the military of institutions traditionally under citizen control; the exporting of the military goods and services, etc. All of these activities occur in the building of the warfare/welfare state.

Furthermore, it is evident that national goals are seldom set in advance with programs undertaken rationally step-by-step to achieve them. Rather, the goals gradually emerge as a residual product, as a characterization of the modal behavior of the society. Therefore, the modal behavior should be studied empirically together with a description of the types of activities and the processes that occur during institutionalization.

The residual product of the gradual institutionalization of military and social welfare programs and activities is The Warfare/Welfare State.

#### How This Issue Came Into Being

Every article in this issue is concerned with the effects of war on the growth and development of social welfare and/or the interrelationship of warfare and welfare institutions and is intended to serve as a continuing reference for social policy analysts, welfare professionals, and peace activists. The editors as well as many of the contributors have more than a detached interest in the warfare-welfare issue. They view warfare-welfare as a serious social problem, requiring continued

study, publication, and action.<sup>9</sup> Consequently, readers are encouraged to submit their comments and articles to the Journal for possible future publication.<sup>10</sup>

Moreover, in editing this special topical issue of the Journal, several steps were taken to encourage such a development.

First, several magazines and newsletters were requested to publish the "call for papers." Among those responding favorably were the editors of Society, Armed Forces and Society, and the newsletters of several professional associations representing sociologists, social workers, psychologists, problems analysts, and welfare historians.

Second, several dozen social policy analysts and peace and welfare activists were asked to comment about key issues in the warfare-welfare controversy. The findings are reported in the article edited by Kenneth Kirkpatrick and L. K. Northwood, in the following section.

Third, sponsorship of the Special Issue was requested of the Peace and Social Welfare Task Force of the National Association of Social Workers. The Task Force is an official body of the professional association comprised of the leaders of chapter committees engaged in pertinent local, state, and national affairs. Through its auspices several of the authors were encouraged to submit articles, and steps have been taken to publicize and distribute the topical issue. The Task Force is partially financed by the Institute for World Order, which is also collaborating on the project.

Fourth, a small editorial committee of three helped in all phases of the work and management of the project: Ann Blalock, Charles Maynard, and Kenneth Kirkpatrick. Blalock and Maynard are students in the University of Washington School of Social Work; Kirkpatrick is a leader in the peace movement, formerly a leading staff member of the American Friends Service Committee. Hubert Blalock, Roger Roffman, and Olga Northwood also served as readers of selected manuscripts.

Finally, a small grant was received from the Graduate School of the University of Washington to facilitate the project, and secretarial services were provided by Rexine Casey of the School of Social Work.

The format of the Journal is designed to implement its major purposes. In all, there are 39 contributors: 26 authors of 22 articles; poetry and graphics; and 18 respondents to the survey, five of whom are also authors.

## Summary of Contents of Journal

### I

The first section, "Crisis in the Warfare/Welfare State," largely provides documentation for the assertion that the warfare-welfare issue is a very serious social problem at a critical stage in its development.

We start with a review of the answers to the survey, edited by Kenneth Kirkpatrick and L. K. Northwood. The survey respondents find that the struggle between the "haves" and the "have-nots" over the maldistribution of the world's resources remains unabated and unresolved. This struggle takes many forms: between social classes and ethnic groups, among nations and groups of nations. Despite the growth of massive warfare as in the case of Vietnam, there is still subscription to violence and militarism as "solutions" to these conflicts. National budgets continue to expand and divert needed resources from economic development and enhanced social welfare. The experts are almost unanimous in the belief that increasing armaments do not guarantee national security, and for the most part they do not see how one nation--even the most rich and powerful--can afford both guns and butter in the long run.

The same themes characterize the position of the Hon. Elizabeth Holtzman, Congresswoman from New York. Her testimony is reproduced in part from the debate of the recommendations of the Congressional Budget Committee for Fiscal 1977. The Holtzman Amendment, introduced in the debate, asks for more flexibility in the budgeting process, for the direct transfer of funds from one appropriations category to another, in this case from the defense budget to certain social program budgets. Both Holtzman and Congressman Mitchell of Maryland, who supported her in the debate, warn of dire consequences if Congress continues to ignore rising inflation, unemployment, and the fiscal crisis of cities.

Joseph Harris details the facts and figures of the New York City fiscal crisis. New York City is not alone in facing financial difficulties. Harris inquires into the reasons and causes of urban fiscal crisis. It is not because of "high living" in the cities; it is not because of mismanagement of welfare programs. Rather, for Harris, the fiscal crisis is an inevitable consequence of a state dominated by giant corporations and rigged to pay off for them. The resources of cities are drained off in the form of federal taxes and privileges for the rich. To ease the crisis it will be necessary to restructure the economy and the political system. One of the needed first steps is demilitarization and transfer of the savings to domestic programs.

This is a theme that will be repeated over and over again in slightly different versions by many of the contributors; Adams, Dykema, Lo, Birchard, Dumas and Gil.

It is not simply an imbalance in warfare and welfare expenditures in the Warfare/Welfare State that brings about the crisis. The reasons pertain to the flawed principles that govern the production and distribution of the resources of the nation; they pertain to the fundamental nature of the capitalist enterprise.

## II

The second section of the journal describes "The Rise of the Warfare/Welfare State." Two major lines of development appear in the six articles that comprise this section.

The first three articles (Peroff, Miller/Clark, and Clayton) examine the existence and magnitude of the warfare-welfare tradeoff in the United States and other nations. The warfare-welfare tradeoff refers to the proportion of the national resources that are allocated to military and welfare expenditures.

Kathleen Peroff holds that there is a tradeoff: where there are large national expenditures for the military, there is an undermining of welfare expenditures. Public aid programs are most undermined by defense with a lesser effect on health and housing programs. Peroff bases her conclusion on a sample of one nation, the United States from 1929-1971.

James Clayton compares the United States with the United Kingdom during a similar time span. He concludes that both nations have similar defense spending patterns, whereas welfare effort in the United Kingdom exceeds that of the United States. There is no statistically significant correlation between defense spending and welfare spending over time in either country, Clayton states. "Both defense and welfare have a life of their own and neither grows primarily at the expense of the other. . . . The limits of declining defense budgets (relative to the GNP) seem to have been reached in the U.S., but not in the U.K."

Leonard Miller and Marleen Clark sample a broader time span, ask more questions of their data, and derive their answers from a larger sample of nations. Their tentative conclusions are: that it is inappropriate to characterize the United States as a "welfare laggard" performing below reasonable expectations; that military spending does erode welfare spending, but not to the extent that international comparisons might lead us to believe; that in the long run the proportion of the families in the nation that are female headed and the proportion of the persons age 65 and older are better predictors of the size of the welfare effort than either changes in the unemployment rates or changes in the amount of military expenditures.

The authors of these papers demonstrate that it is no simple matter to establish a general theory of warfare-welfare tradeoff among nations that vary in political, economic, social, and cultural development. They are characterized by careful

methodologies of statistical reasoning: the selection of social indicators of "known" reliability and validity; care in sampling; explicit assumptions for estimating parameters derived from time series data; caution in generalization--that is, specifying where findings are based on the research at hand and where they represent less documentation. In general, these are technically sound papers, assembling the existing statistical information, and reporting limited "hard" results.

However, the reader will be well advised to consider the stringent limitations which inhere in the research methodology employed. For example, where quantitative social indicators are compared for a sample of nations, the analysis must be limited to the data which are available for all of the nations in the sample. Each nation's indicators must be comprised of similar information for valid comparison. The reliability of each indicator must be assessed before it is adopted. When comparisons are made over time as well as among many nations, these problems are compounded. Although population and economic statistics on which the social indicators are based have been gathered for a considerable period of time in the leading industrial nations, they are frequently reported in a form that makes analysis difficult and dubious. Military statistics, for instance, are often state secrets. National statistics are sometimes "rectified" after the fact and to suit national purposes.

Once identified and collected, the analyst faces knotty problems of interpretation from limited data. What time periods should be used in the analysis? How can the statistics of a particular nation be provided with a valid social and economic context? Which data may be used to provide context for a particular nation which are not common to the sample of nations? How are these particular data to be selected and interpreted? What kinds of statistical averages should be used? Are there distortions produced by averaging, and how are these to be indicated? These are just a few questions that must be answered in quantitative comparisons, as well as those of a more qualitative order.

The balance of the articles in the section are concerned less with the warfare-welfare tradeoff and statistical methodology than with the societal context which affects the growth and development of warfare and welfare institutions.

Paul Adams proposed a framework in which the relationship between war, the state, and social policy can be examined, using a comparison of the United States and the United Kingdom as examples. He shows how warfare and welfare are both essential to the growth of modern capitalist society. According to Adams, social welfare policy is a function of the "needs of capital" and the "struggles of labor and/or specially oppressed groups such as blacks or women." The impact of war on social policy depends upon the demands it places upon the state, and upon the balance of the class forces.

This framework is substantially different from that of Richard Titmuss, who has made a similar analysis. Titmuss postulates that the aims and the content of social policy are determined by the extent to which the cooperation of the masses



is essential to the successful prosecution of a war--the critical variable being the percent of individuals in the society used militarily to prosecute the war. A high Military Participation Ratio (MPR) will tend to result in both equalitarian and totalitarian (statist) outcomes, whereas a low MPR will widen social inequalities. Adams feels that MPR is only one of the variables to look at, and that Titmuss' conclusions are based too narrowly on WWII, and on two particular societies. Titmuss also fails, he says, to take into account the similar effects produced by non-military "social crises," in terms of a new level of state intervention into the economy and other sectors of a society, and of the response of the state and the elites to pressures from below. He implies that the competitive nature of capitalism, which generates unusual social costs, forces the "capitalist class" to strengthen the state to solve the problems created by these dislocations.

Analyzed within Adams' framework, contemporary limited wars are considered likely to involve a low MPR and to be socially regressive, as compared with WWII. However, he agrees with Titmuss that ruling groups in a class society will try to benefit the health and welfare of subordinate strata when the latter's demands can no longer be ignored. (The existence of such needs, however, is not of itself of any real influence on social policy.) He disagrees with Titmuss that the "state" in a class society represents the collective interest of the society. In fact he claims that the opposite is true, that the "capitalist class" and the "worker class" are inevitably in conflict, that social policy reflects the needs of the capitalist class for a healthy, educated, secure work force and for social order. Providing social benefits through the state if necessary--even at a short-run sacrifice--is capital's way of assuring proper accumulation. Social crises--war being one variety--tend to negate the characteristic separation of the "political" and the "economic" in a capitalist society, accelerating new "corporatist" trends.

The differences between the U.S. and Britain in social policy spinoffs (health and family as the primary examples) dramatize the different distribution of class forces in society. In both instances war exposed the weakness of existing arrangements, elicited an unprecedented level of state intervention in economic and social life. The main differences in impact were that Britain experienced a more severe war threat, a higher MPR, more thorough and long-lasting state intervention, more vulnerability in the capitalist class.

Both Adams and Clayton use the United States and the United Kingdom as examples in their analyses of the warfare-welfare issue. Therefore, a comparison of their findings is productive.

Like Adams and Harris, the two remaining articles in the section draw heavily on Marxist theory. Both of the authors, Christopher Rhoades Dykema and Clarence Y. H. Lo, base their papers on a critique of the political economy of monopoly capitalism. The inner contradictions and shortcomings of capitalist society are seen to lie at the roots of the social problems they analyze.

Dykema attributes the growth of social welfare institutions in the United States largely to the recurrent depressions and the inability of the economy either to

consume the products it produces or to provide steady work at living wages to a large sector of the population. This creates functions which the warfare and welfare institutions are expected to assume: the control of the impoverished subproletariat through the provision of marginal subsistence and the creation of jobs in the public sector; the maintenance of control over domestic disorder; the development of new markets for the excess productivity; the consumption (waste) of vast amounts of men and material through defense and war expenditures, etc.

Lo, on the other hand, described how similar contradictions in monopoly capitalism led to the domination of conservative political regimes headed by Eisenhower, de Gaulle and Nixon during the Korean, Algerian and Vietnamese Wars. He shows how these regimes pushed for reduction in social spending and a reassertion of national military and economic power, and were somewhat successful in mobilizing public support around this program.

Lo, like Adams, is much concerned with the impact of war on social policy and the development of social welfare programs. Both authors view social policy as kind of an ideology. Whether a war encourages progressive social policy depends both on the nature of the war and on the balance of the class forces in society, according to Adams. The new element that Lo adds to this analysis is the thesis that anti-colonialist wars produce inflation and fiscal crisis for the colonialist motherland and provide the opportunity for conservative elites to come into power. The conservative response to fiscal crisis during and after warfare is to drastically slash social programs, expand military programs, and increase the public debt. Lo's article helps the reader to understand the political forces that underlie the warfare-welfare state.

### III

The third section of the journal contains four articles by social welfare scholars analyzing different facets of "Social Work and the Military." A recurring question is asked: can effective social services be provided under military auspices?

Ann Blalock and Charles Maynard in the lead article describe selected aspects of the military establishment in the United States and conclude that there are many problems intrinsic to the nature of military organization and its mission that prevent the full flowering of a "welfare state" under its auspices. There are serious shortcomings in the social security programs designed for servicemen and in military social services. They cite: inequities in income and occupational entitlements for minority and low income personnel, women and early retirees; difficulties in the provision of psychiatric and social services to military personnel and their families during and following wars. Many of the accepted professional standards for social and health workers are undermined and negated. In all, an uncertain future is predicted for any growth of the welfare state under military auspices.

George Ayers is similarly disillusioned with the social welfare efforts of the military establishment. His dissatisfaction stems from an analysis of two programs to facilitate the enlistment of military personnel, Project 100,000 and the Medically Remedial Enlistment Program, and one program, Project Transition, designed to provide educational, vocational and job counseling for enlisted personnel prior to release from active military duty. Ayers concludes that these programs were (a) unnecessary, (b) disproportionate in terms of resources expended to benefits received, (c) philosophically were not in keeping with either social welfare values or the values of the military establishment.

On the other hand, Walter Friedlander's article describing the origin and scope of social services for military personnel and veterans does not carry the negative connotations of the preceding articles. He points out that there are many opportunities for social and health personnel to ameliorate the conditions and problems of servicemen and veterans. There is also a substantial role for welfare organizations and agencies to assist in liaison, relief, and rehabilitation before, during, and after wars.

Quentin Schenk discusses a different theme. He examines the military presence of the United States in Ethiopia and some of its effects on the modernization of the economic and agricultural infrastructure of that country. He believes that the military presence was the single most important factor in accounting for the alienation of youth in Ethiopia, which in turn became the dominant factor for the current revolution in that country. U. S. military personnel were instrumental in helping to establish schools and a host of social programs. But they set a style of life and standards, which, Schenk asserts, were readily adopted by the elite youth with whom they were in contact. This in turn resulted in discontinuities and a rift in traditional patterns, and increasing opposition from the "old ruling class" to the entire program for modernization. Schenk raises several pertinent questions about the nature of military organization and whether it should or can become the advance agent for welfare reform.

#### IV

The 13 articles in the first three sections, taken in combination, document the first major thesis of the topical issue, namely: that moral, economic, and social crises are engendered when a predominant share of the resources of the society is allocated to military aggrandizement rather than to the amelioration of the social welfare. This deployment of resources is costly, wasteful, inefficient and self-destructive. It is impossible to sustain in the long run.

With the warfare-welfare problem thus defined, the final section of the journal is devoted to a second major theme, that there is much that can be done now and in the future by citizens, policy makers, social scientists, and social welfare

professionals to alleviate the situation. Four "Strategies for Defusing the Welfare State and Promoting the Welfare Society" are suggested in the final section and the articles grouped accordingly. The four strategies are: (a) converting the Military-Industrial Complex, (b) educating for non-violence, (c) imaging the future, and (d) legislative and political action.

The first article in the strategy section of the Journal is Bruce Birchard's "Human Security or National Defense: The Question of Conversion." Birchard undertakes the examination of five interrelated questions: (a) What is the scope of military spending in the United States? (b) What are the benefits of conversion from military to non-military? (c) What is the technical feasibility of conversion? (d) What are the obstacles to reconversion from a "liberal" point of view, from a "radical" point of view? (e) What strategies exist for change? Birchard is encyclopedic in his review of existing studies on the subject, many of which are entirely relevant but buried in hard-to-locate government documents. He indicates that there are many benefits in the conversion from military to non-military: money, production, and services are released for scientific and technological development and for meeting human needs; more jobs are provided; there is curtailment of waste and a lessening of inflation. Although the conversion to a peacetime economy is a complex, disruptive process, it is an entirely feasible one for which standby plans are already in existence. And there are already many documented cases of successful conversion experiences which are cited by the author. Birchard discusses conversion obstacles and strategies from the standpoint of "liberal" and "radical" ideologies. He gives several examples of these strategies.

Lloyd J. Dumas also deals with the nitty-gritty problems of conversion. He is particularly concerned with the technical and social aspects of the process: the retraining and reorientation of skilled workers and management; the retooling and relocation of selected industries to mitigate hardships; the need for advance planning, the mobilization of support services during the transition period; the nature of reeducation, publicity, and community organization programs that are required.

Dumas' paper also buttresses and goes beyond Birchard in its discussion of the economic effects of military spending. Military spending has contributed much to the economic deterioration of the United States in recent years, according to the author. Four interrelated factors account for this; the uneconomic nature of military goods; the wasteful nature of military procurement processes; the negative effect of military expenditures on the international balance of payments; and their baneful effects on technological development. It is for these reasons among others that Dumas advocates conversion to peacetime production immediately.

Both Birchard and Dumas, as well as Marion Anderson, whose paper appears in this section of the Journal, are keenly aware that without public support any conversion program is likely to fail. One of the major arguments used by the supporters of the military industrial complex is that it provides many jobs for American workers. It is this half-truth that Anderson coolly and rationally attempts to explore.

Through a detailed analysis of government statistics, she is able to demonstrate, state by state, that spending money on the military causes unemployment because fewer jobs are created for each billion dollars spent on the military than if the money were spent in any other way. It is through exposing such myths as this that Anderson believes the general public will come to accept peacetime conversion. Both Birchard and Dumas state the same theme in their papers, and Birchard, furthermore, describes a community action program for citizens concerned with this issue.

Another strategy for defusing the warfare state is the dismantling of armed forces and the proliferation of the philosophy of non-violence throughout society. Mulford Q. Sibley is an eloquent spokesman for this position. In his article, "Social Welfare and Some Implications of Non-Violence," Sibley postulates that the philosophy which guides social work is a non-violent one. He says: "Implicitly, the profession of social work is committed to the notion of non-violence in personal relations, else it denies its reason for being."

However, there are many sources in society which foster the practice of violence. One of these is the armed forces. Therefore, to build a non-violent, welfare-based society the armed forces must be reduced to a minimum. This can be accomplished by unilateral disarmament, if necessary. Sibley makes a strong case for unilateral disarmament and he indicates how the savings, thus realized, could be used for the social welfare and the improvement of the standard of living of people everywhere. The police would remain active as needed, though unarmed. Moreover, a nation could prepare itself for invasion by outside military forces by setting up a corps of community organizers and teachers of non-violent resistance who would instruct the citizenry how to cope successfully with invading or occupying forces.

Orabelle Connally provides a partial test for the viability of Sibley's general premise. She reports on non-violent resistance in the Navy during the Vietnamese War. To be sure, there are many differences between a ship's complement and the citizens in the open community. Connally has many questions about the feasibility and effectiveness of non-violent tactics for organizing resistance and promoting ameliorative change in this relatively restrictive setting.

The issue of non-violence appears in many different contexts. Elise Boulding deals with one of these in her article, "A Disarmed World: Problems in Imaging the Future." She refers to the relatively new field of future studies. The futurists, Boulding claims, have largely failed to deal with the issue of disarmament, and this draws into question any estimates of alternative futures they may make. Instead, images of the future appear in "the language of conquest: conquest of nature, of territories, of people, of ideas." Boulding proposes that a non-conquest imagery be incorporated in futurist models. She sees social welfare philosophy and practice as the source of non-conquest imagery and social welfare professionals as "Creators of Peaceable Futures."

David Gil has a much more pessimistic (and realistic?) view of the common roots of warfare and welfare. Warfare and welfare have "identical and complementary

functions, and both are rooted in identical societal values, institutions, and dynamics," according to Gil. Their underlying function is to serve as a balance wheel for social orders based on injustice, privilege, force, and structural violence. Consequently, there is no temporizing solution to the warfare/welfare state and its corresponding institutions. They must be abolished and replaced by

"a coordinated, egalitarian, cooperative federation of self-reliant, free communities, each directing its own affairs and life style through genuine democratic processes, each guaranteeing to its members equality of rights and responsibilities, and all participating in exchanges of raw materials and human-created goods and knowledge on fair, egalitarian terms."

The final articles return to the strategies of political and legislative action, a theme which receives much attention throughout the Journal. Bertram Weinert calls for "Social Work Skills and Political Action in the Current Crisis." Ann Blalock proposes that increasing numbers of social workers have the expertise and are in positions where they can influence warfare-welfare priorities through the new Congressional budgetary process. Both articles are realistic about the many obstacles that will have to be overcome to affect changes in the Warfare/Welfare State. They are also realistic in their estimate that such changes will not come about spontaneously. Social workers and their constituents have a vested interest in the provision of greater social welfare benefits. The authors believe that professionals can make a significant contribution to reform.

#### Toward Further Research on the Subject

At the time when the "call for papers" was issued, the editors of this Journal asked eighteen social policy analysts the following:

"What questions should be dealt with in order to put the warfare-welfare issue in proper focus? Given the broad scene of the subject, which aspects do you believe should be given priority in research, study, and action?"

We report the results of this survey. Our reason for doing this is to draw attention to some topics given insufficient attention in the Journal, and to encourage prospective authors to submit manuscripts for a future edition. First, the results of the survey are presented; then the topics receiving insufficient attention are identified.

Three priorities for research, study, and action on warfare-welfare issues are identified by the respondents:

1. On the militarization of the United States and its social consequences:  
The statement of Alfred McClung Lee permeates the commentary of many of those answering:

"War has been an integral part of our national life every year since the United States came into existence. It has long been the principal focal point of our Federal budget. Especially since we embarked on a series of thrusts towards international imperialism and even worldwide hegemony beginning with the Spanish-American War, the United States has come to resemble more and more a latter day Roman empire, adapted to the exigencies of our day's technology and world conditions. I should like to see research aimed at discovering steps of any sort that would reveal and offset the militarization and imperialization of our society."

Some respondents, such as Sanford Gottlieb and Albert Schreking, propose that the militarization of the United States should be measured in terms of the nature of the threats faced internationally and domestically. Schreking asks:

"What dangers to national and international security are inherent in continuing the "military-industrial-complex" values and policies guiding our national government, particularly since the end of World War II, particularly during the past decade?"

Gottlieb assigns first priority to research undertaken to determine the nature of the threats, their reality, and their societal consequences.

2. On the symbiotic relationship of warfare and welfare institutions:  
William Gamson, Mulford Q. Sibley, and Edward Snyder, and others propose that the highest priority in research be given to the kind of role the United States wants to play in the world and the kind of society we should develop at home.

"Is there a symbiotic or competitive relationship between the welfare system and military-industrial complex? What would be the implications of given reorientations of American military and foreign policy on the welfare system in the U.S.? In what way, if any, does the existing military and foreign policy of the U.S. place constraints on the welfare system other than those arising from consuming scarce resources? What would be the implications of given reorientations of the welfare system for the military and foreign policy of the U.S.?" (Gamson)

"Priorities should include: questioning the notion that military 'defense' defends; questioning whether, within the premises of the present economic system, we can provide enough 'welfare,' even if we cut military expenditures; efforts to study whether large military establishments give any kind of guarantee against invasion; serious consideration of non-violent resistance and of unilateral disarmament." (Sibley)

"The outlines and cost of various alternative foreign policies, including peace through law and the role of non-violent resistance, should be investigated. There should be a realistic examination of the concept of 'sovereignty' and the extent to which world interdependence is already an inescapable fact." (Snyder)

3. On strategies for change: Richard Levy, Lloyd Dumas, David Gil, Albert Schrekinger and others stressed that the focus of research, study and action be placed on strategies for change rather than upon the abstract analysis of the sources of abuse.

"The focus should be on developing strategies for change. Such a strategy can, of course, only begin with a clear understanding of the source of the problem, but it must also contain suggestions on ways to change the situation for it to be useful.

In terms of specific questions I would be interested in articles on: how to increase mass awareness of the costs of military spending (both economic and social); analysis of the position of unions in defense plants on changes in the defense budget and what types of arguments could be used to eliminate the dichotomy between the long and short term interests of these people, etc." (Levy)

"There are three key points: (a) to make clear the enormous cost of high levels of military spending in terms of goods and services foregone, and in terms of social and economic deterioration--'economic costs'; (b) to focus on the clear demonstration that the present size of the U.S. military is far in excess of what is required for national security purposes and may actually be counterproductive regardless of the size of the military forces of our adversaries--'military realities'; and (c) that conversion from military to civilian orientation of our economy is perfectly possible without generating serious economic and social difficulties--'conversion feasibility'." (Dumas)

"The foremost question is survival through restructuring our basic institutions of resource management, work organization, rights distribution and governance in accordance with genuinely democratic, egalitarian, and libertarian values. Within this question there are many details to be worked out. Beyond that question we have to deal with matters of strategy: How can people discover what their real interests are and how to move toward them." (Gil)

"What major changes need to and can be made in developing domestic U.S. priorities, particularly in regard to 1) reconversion of the economy from 'warfare' to purposes meeting human needs, 2) effective utilization of limited energy resources, and 3) protection of the environment." (Schrekinger)

In each of the priority areas, additional research is needed. A few examples are cited:

1. The warfare-welfare priorities of a nation are frequently expressed in its budgetary and fiscal policies. While the national budgetary and fiscal policies are referred to in many papers included in this Journal; nowhere is there a careful analysis and critique of the technical research shortcomings of



these procedures. Such an analysis should be grounded in the social organization of the national budgeting process. It should deal with how information actually flows in the system; who has access to the information and who does not; how the message is shaped and channeled at each stage; whom information is reported to or not reported to; how the information is used and with what effects. Such a social analysis could facilitate the assessment of the reliability and validity of information used in studies of warfare and welfare. And it could have strategic implications for ameliorative intervention. Those who control the flow of information in society become the shapers of existing myths and facts on which social policy is based. An open information system is one of the pillars on which scientific knowledge and representative democracy rests. Therefore, clarification of the technical and social processes which govern information flow is essential to knowledge of the warfare-welfare issue.

2. The Journal is also lacking in detailed papers concerning the psychological and social effects of war and the effects of war on the society and its members. Although many of the papers touch on this subject, there is need for more profound analysis. It is alleged that war and the threat of war have important social consequences for the existing norms of society, especially as concerns beliefs about violence, scapegoating, and ethnocentrism. Moreover, it is alleged that there has been a diffusion of military protocols and behavior into the civil order, particularly in the arena of law and justice, industrial organization and management, and the control or guidance of the mass media. It would be useful to have careful studies of the subject.

3. A valid social science depends upon a representative sampling of behavior in space and time. Detailed case studies are needed of nations and comparisons among nations of what happens to social welfare institutions when warfare results in the devastation of home territory as well as depletion of resources. We would hypothesize that national survival takes precedence and military expenditures dominate under such conditions. But what happens during the period of maximum devastation when war prevails? What happens in the post-war period? Is there a substantial difference for the "victors" in a costly devastating war than for the vanquished? What happens if there is a major transformation in the social, political, and economic structure of the nation? The proposal for investigation is that a sample of nations be selected and rank ordered according to the relative costs and consequences of the war for each nation. Then detailed case studies are made of the growth, development, and changes in the social welfare institutions, i.e., the warfare-welfare tradeoff. Such a strategy of research is needed to rectify or validate the findings of Peroff, Miller/Clark and Clayton which are based on a single (atypical) nation or a limited sample of relatively homogeneous nations, which employ statistical techniques that average out major differences within or among nations, and which fail to assign appropriate weights to the costs and consequences of wars on a particular nation's social development.

4. For the most part, the authors in this Journal believe that it will take at least a well organized political party or a politically conscious coalition of

citizen and welfare groups to change the warfare-welfare priorities of the nation. However, with few exceptions, notably Birchard and Anderson, they have little to say about the nitty-gritty of effective organizational strategies. Therefore, there is need for such research.

The editors invite you to join in the dialogue.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. A sampling of the literature might include these references: Richard Barnet, The Economy of Death. (New York: Athenium, 1969). Sidney Lens, The Military-Industrial Complex. (New York: Pilgrim Press and National Catholic Reporter, 1970). Milton Mankoff, "Power in Advanced Capitalist Society: A Review Essay on Recent Elitist and Marxist Criticism of Recent Pluralist Theory," Social Problems 17, 3 (Winter, 1970) pp. 418-430. Seymour Melman, Pentagon Capitalism, the Political Economy of War. (New York: McGraw Hill, 1970). Charles Moskos, Jr., "The Concept of the Military-Industrial-Complex: Radical Critique or Liberal Bogey," Social Problems 21, 4 (April, 1974) pp. 498-512. Gunnar Myrdal, Beyond the Welfare State: Economic Planning and Its International Implications. (Hartford: Yale U. Press, 1958). Marian L. Palley, The Coming Welfare State. Special issue of the American Behavioral Scientist, 17, 4 (March/April, 1974). Michael Tanzer, The Sick Society: An Economic Examination. (New York: Holt, Rinehart, Winston, 1971). Harold Wilensky, The Welfare State and Equality: Structural and Ideological Roots of Public Expenditure. (Berkeley: U. of California Press, 1975).
2. Eighteen social policy analysts were asked the following questions by the author: "There are many popular characterizations of the United States--as a warfare state, welfare state, warfare-welfare state, military-industrial complex, leading imperialist nation, leader of the Free World, and so forth. Do you see any utility in such characterizations? In your opinion, which one of these phrases best characterizes the U.S. today as a political, economic, and social entity?" Of those responding, 10 said they saw little utility in any of the characterizations. Several, however, indicated that they would consider the U.S. a warfare-welfare state (5 mentions), leading imperialist nation (4 mentions), advanced industrial society (1 mention), leader of the "Free World" (1 mention).
3. Harold L. Wilensky, "The Problems and the Prospects of the Welfare State," preface to the paperback edition of Harold L. Wilensky and Charles N. Lebeaux, Industrial Society and Welfare. (New York: Free Press, 1965), p. 9.
4. Asa Briggs, "The Welfare State in Historical Perspective," in M.N. Zald, Social Welfare Institutions. (New York: John Wiley, 1965). See also: N. Buzlyakov, Welfare, the Basic Task: Five Year Plan. 1971-1975. (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1973.)
5. Of course, the Peaceful State has other requirements than to provide for the social welfare, such as political democracy, productive efficiency, cultural enhancement, and so forth. See David Braybrooke, Three Tests for Democracy: Personal Rights, Human Welfare, Collective Preference. (New York, Random House, 1968).

6. Richard M. Titmuss, Essays on the Welfare State. (Boston: Beacon, 1969), p. 82. See also: Walter Friedlander and Robert Apte, Introduction to Social Welfare. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1974), Fourth Edition, pp. 41-44.
7. John M. Romanyshin, Social Welfare: Charity to Justice. (New York: Random House, 1971), p. 159. See also: Melville Ulmer, The Welfare State. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969), p. 27.
8. Saturday, August 21, 1954, p. 8.
9. Jerome G. Manis, "Assessing the Seriousness of Social Problems," Social Problems, 22, 1 (October 1974), pp. 1-15.
10. In fact, the present issue grew out of a paper presented at the annual meetings of the Society for the Study of Social Problems in San Francisco, 1975. See L. K. Northwood, "Warfare-Welfare as a Serious Social Problem for Study and Action," (unpublished).