A Conceptual Analysis of the Two Models of Power Distribution

Kolassa
A CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS OF THE TWO MODELS
OF POWER DISTRIBUTION

by

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Thomas E. Kolassa
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

There has been great attention given to the problem of pluralism versus elitism. The pluralist and elitist debates have continued with charges and counter-charges for many years, but there seems to be no possible resolution in sight. This can be seen when Dahl asks for more empirical proof of a power elite,¹ and Newton criticizes Dahl and the assumptions he makes about the pluralist model of power distribution.²

There have been numerous studies in the past proving the pluralist and elitist models of power distribution.³ But the question can still be asked, which model of power distribution is predominant in American society today? Since there is a never-ending debate on this question, a different kind of approach should be attempted in order to analyze the two salient models of power distribution. Then possibly this debate can be drawn to a close, or at


³David Truman's The Governmental Process is one of the main pluralist works. Community Power Structure by Floyd Hunter is an example of an elitist study.
least have a new dimension added to it.

These two models are both models of how power is distributed within society. But both seem to leave the concept power in a rather nebulous state, either by using it synonymously with other components of control, or not bothering with control or its components because they are of no major significance. Each study completed on the models of power distribution is mainly concerned with proving that that particular model is prevalent in a particular city or in society in toto. However, theorists of neither model attempt to analyze thoroughly the concept of control and its components to see whether they are related to their particular model of power distribution.

Although both models of power distribution assume or imply that some type of control is being exerted on certain groups in society, all fail to explicate thoroughly control and its components. For example, Truman states: "Significant amounts of power are wielded in American politics by those formations usually known as 'pressure groups.'"¹ This example shows how power is assumed to be known and therefore never explicitly explained.

Although Truman uses power as the dominant concept, he brings in other concepts that are forms of control, e.g., influence, manipulation, and propaganda, thus leaving

these concepts in a rather tenuous state. Truman also talks about another type of power, which is economic power. When Truman tries to explain this concept he leaves the reader entangled in a conceptual mess. Truman says: "Although movements toward monopoly and concentration have greatly centralized economic power, when monopolists attempt to convert such power into political influence, especially through propaganda, it is subject to a discount of varying sizes."¹ This example not only shows the vagueness of the concepts, but also shows how the concepts are narrowly construed. Truman categorizes power into economic and political, but leaves another form of control, i.e., propaganda, dangling by itself.

The elitist model of power distribution also assumes that some type of control is being exerted. For the elitist model it is usually manipulation, but other forms of control are present. An observation made of the elitist literature shows that any interaction between the elite and non-elite implies some kind of control relationship. This is mainly because there is the dichotomy of the ruler and the ruled.

The definitional problem, which creates the conceptual cloudiness that manifests itself in the models of power distribution, presents to the political scientist a

challenging and potentially fruitful area for future investigation. Although this problem would entail many types of studies and methods to find which of the two models of power distribution, if either, is truly representative of society, only one specific approach, a conceptual analysis of the two models, will be used in this study. However, in no way does this study claim to be "the" definitive critique of the elitist and pluralist models of power distribution.

Statement of Problem

In an attempt to explore an area of inadequate knowledge and to find a political element related to the two models of power distribution, the concept control and its components—i.e., power, influence, coercion, and manipulation—will be examined. Specifically, this research will be concerned with the tenuous conceptual base that revolves around control and its components in the two models of power distribution. This problem is narrow in that it looks at only one inadequacy of the two models of power distribution. But by analyzing control and its components in relation to the models of power distribution, more theoretical hypotheses can be tested to either reenforce one of the existing models of power distribution or possibly discover a new one.

An approach somewhat different than other studies
will be used to analyze the two models of power distribution. An analysis of the two models' concepts that are pertinent to control and its components will be completed by using a devised conceptual framework. The conceptual framework will consist of control being the dominant concept and power, coercion, influence, and manipulation as being types of control. By taking a conceptual approach to analyze the two models, each model may be scrutinized individually in order to gain a better perspective of its conceptual inadequacies, while each model may also be compared with the other model of power distribution for similar conceptual inadequacies.

It will be necessary to first show that some type of control is being or is assumed to be used in each model of power distribution. Once this is done, I will take the conceptual framework and show the conceptual inadequacies in each model. There have been conceptual frameworks in the past, the most notable being Power and Society, by Lasswell and Kaplan,¹ but applying the conceptual framework to the models of power distribution has only been done on a piecemeal basis. That is to say, studies have dealt with control or one of the components of control and a particular model of power distribution. But to take a conceptual approach dealing with all of the com-

ponents of control and apply it to the salient models of power distribution will add to the data thus far compiled and possibly give more or less credence to one of the models of power distribution.

There are many power theorists who claim that their concepts are more complete and more clearly defined than other power theorists. That claim is not made in this paper. Concepts to be used in the conceptual framework are not original, but in fact have been drawn from past power theorists. The conceptual framework devised in this study is not the only conceptual framework that could be used, but what is important is "... to elaborate a conceptual framework within which inquiry into the political process may fruitfully proceed. For, at bottom, it is only on the basis of such inquiry that political policy can be intelligently selected and applied."¹

Before explicating the two models of power distribution and the conceptual framework, a brief explanation as to the content of each chapter is needed. Chapter II will deal with a review of the relevant literature on the two models of power distribution. Studies by such men as Dahl,²

¹Ibid., p. x.
Truman,\(^1\) and Mills\(^2\) will be analyzed to set out the differences and similarities in the pluralist and elitist models of power distribution. An attempt will then be made to construct each model of power distribution to be used in the conceptual analysis. When looking at the pluralistic and elitist models of power distribution one finds many exponents of each theory; consequently, a general interpretation will be used to describe each of these models instead of one particular exponent of that theory of power distribution.

At the beginning of Chapter III the literature relevant to control and its components will be reviewed. This will start with such political philosophers as Machiavelli\(^3\) and Hobbes,\(^4\) and lead up to the more contemporary power theorists like Lasswell and Kaplan,\(^5\) and Bachrach and Baratz.\(^6\) Their concept of power, as well as other related

\(^1\)Truman, The Governmental Process.


\(^5\)Lasswell and Kaplan, Power and Society.

concepts, will be discussed in order to show the shortcomings and similarities of many of the power theorists' concepts.

Some power theorists use power or influence as the dominant concept in their conceptual scheme; we will point out why control is used and other concepts are considered components of control. The last part of the chapter will be concerned with the defining of control and its components and showing how each component of control is interrelated with the other components of control. Finally, to complete the conceptual framework it will be necessary to explain the basis of each component of control.

Chapter IV will develop the objectives for this study. Generally, this chapter will be an application of the conceptual framework discussed in Chapter III to the two models described in Chapter II. The following general hypothesis is the basic thesis of this study and will be attempted to be proved in this chapter. Also, the derived specific hypotheses will be included.

General Hypothesis

The pluralist and elitist models of power distribution are conceptually inadequate when analyzed by a conceptual framework revolving around the concept control and its components.
Specific Hypotheses

1. It is assumed in the elitist and pluralist models of power distribution that some form of control is being used on other groups in society.

2. The elitist and pluralist models of power distribution inadequately define the components of control.

3. Both models of power distribution use one specific kind of control more than any other kind, but no model of power distribution uses in equal proportions all the components of control.
PLURALIST AND ELITIST LITERATURE REVIEWED

Pluralist Literature

Before describing both models of power distribution it is necessary to analyze the relevant literature dealing with the pluralist model. One of the classic pluralist studies has been Truman's *The Governmental Process*.\(^1\) With close scrutiny most of the basic assumptions of pluralism can be found in this work.

Truman says: "We do not, in fact, find individuals otherwise than in groups; complete isolation in space and time is so rare as to be an almost hypothetical situation."\(^2\) In this we find a basic belief that runs throughout pluralist writings. This belief is that all individuals are found in groups. Truman goes on to elaborate why individuals form groups. Individuals, Truman says, have "shared attitudes" which bring them together to form an aggregate interest, but this does not necessarily make these individuals an organized group. This is what is more commonly called by Truman as a "potential group." Although Truman does not get into it, it seems as though there is an

\(^1\) David Truman, *The Governmental Process*.

implicit assumption that in order to change from a potential group to an association, i.e., an organized group, some type of energy must be used within the potential group in order for it to become organized.

Once the association is formed, Truman says that "the function of the association . . . is to stabilize the relations among their members and to order their relations as a group with other groups."¹ With the idea that associations are present in the same political system with opposing beliefs, conflict over those beliefs is inevitable. This leads to another of Truman's basic assumptions.

Truman contends that some type of conflict will take place among groups with opposing beliefs. Each group will be trying to make its basic beliefs generally accepted throughout society. Truman adds to this when he brings the government into the conflict as an arbitrator.

These groups must supplement direct action by making claims through or upon some mediating institutionalized group whose primary characteristic is its wider powers. In general, of course, the weaker the means of direct action available to an affected group, the more ready has it been to work through such mediating institutions.²

This implies a gravitation toward government, but not all groups will resort to the government to decide a conflict because each group may feel that it is powerful enough to make its own claims.

¹Ibid., p. 56. ²Ibid., pp. 104-105.
An implication can be drawn, which Truman does not deal with, from the idea of the government having more power than the other groups. When there is a conflict between two groups without the government stepping in, we see one group controlling another, i.e., one group's demands are accepted more than the other group's demands. Therefore a type of control has been exerted by the one group over the other. But when the government is brought into the conflict, Truman says it has the capability to exert more power. This implies that there are two levels of power. Truman fails to scrutinize this problem but more will be said concerning this problem in Chapter IV.

Truman goes on to view this conflict in a long run perspective. This extended conflict ultimately creates an equilibrium within society. Truman says:

When a single association is formed, it serves to stabilize the relations among the participants in the institutionalized groups involved. At the same time however, in the performance of its function it may cause disturbances in the equilibriums of other groups or accentuate cleavages among them. These are likely to evoke associations in turn to correct the secondary disturbances.¹

Therefore, Truman sees counter-groups being formed to put the system back into a state of equilibrium. This too has some implications vis-a-vis control and its components that Truman does not deal with. Briefly, Truman implies

¹Ibid., p. 59.
that all conflict in the long run is symmetrical and has a two-way relationship; i.e., at one time a group may be the controller and at a later time that same group will be the controlled having control on it, thus creating an equilibrium. Basically the early pluralists "... failed to take into account the political and economic structure within which the group process takes place."¹

Another basic point dealt with in The Governmental Process is the analysis of the basic unit of pluralism, i.e., the group. This too is important to the study because many of the explanations of the groups can also be examined vis-a-vis control and its components. Truman brings out the idea of the "democratic mold" within the group. This basically describes the formal structure of the group. The idea of the "democratic mold" "... usually involves approval of such devices as periodic elections of key officials, broad participation by the membership in the group's policy making, either directly or through a system of elected representatives, written constitutions, and the like."² This implies that the few are controlling the many. Truman deals with this but only by calling these controllers the "active minority." The "active minority"

² David Truman, The Governmental Process, p. 129.
are:

Those at the upper reaches of a large organization [who] develop a remoteness from the rank and file that, buttressed by the special managerial skills usually necessary in such positions, approximates insulation from the stresses that may operate at lower levels.¹

This gives further credence to the idea that there is a controller-controllee relationship within the group.

Truman goes on to say that there may be a conflict present between the leaders and the rank and file because of the overlapping of group membership. But, it is the leader's function to keep the group as cohesive as possible or the group will cease to exist.² The question can then be asked, how does the leader control the group? Truman attempts only a cursory explanation. He states:

In the course of maintaining cohesion and of perpetuating itself, the active minority can manipulate and exploit such aspects of formal organization. The services performed by the leaders, the forms of the group, and the characteristics of its members can be utilized by the leaders to modify hostility, to delay replacement, and to eliminate or postpone revolt.³

The case that conflict is present within the concept of pluralism, I feel, has been proven, but the kind of control that is used by the leaders on the rank and file still leaves an uncertainty in one's mind. Truman goes on to talk about influence and propaganda, which could be considered types of control, but does not clearly explain

¹Ibid., p. 141. ²Ibid., p. 188. ³Ibid., p. 194.
them. Other types of control are also implied in Truman’s
group theory, e.g., manipulation, but it is never examined
with any thoroughness.

One major problem that runs throughout all pluralist
writings is: How do you interpret the role of the indi-
vidual when society is based upon the group? Although
contemporary pluralists are dealing with the individual
in a less ambiguous way, Bentley’s only concern was the
group, and Truman only touches upon the problem. Truman
states:

The argument that the individual is ignored in
any interpretation of politics as based upon
groups seems to assume a differentiation or
conflict between ‘the individual’ and some
collectivity as the group. Those who propose
this difficulty often state or imply the view
that society is a series of individual per-
sons ‘each assumed to have definite independent
“existence” and isolation, each in his own
locus apart from every other.’ . . . ‘The indi-
vidual’ and ‘the group’ are at most merely con-
venient ways of classifying behavior, two ways
of approaching the same phenomena, not differ-
ent things. ¹

It is imperative to give a brief summary of the impor-
tant contributions Truman has made to the pluralist model
of power distribution. Probably the most succinct way to
summarize Truman is to quote a paragraph from his con-
cluding chapter.

Collections of individuals interacting on the
basis of shared attitudes and exerting claims
upon other groups in the society usually find

¹Tbid., p. 48.
in the institutions of government an important means of achieving their objectives. That is, most interest groups become politicized on a continuing or intermittent basis. In this respect, therefore, such organized groups are as clearly a part of the governmental institution as are the political parties or the branches formally established by law or constitution.¹

Other basic points of importance are the overlapping membership of the individual, the potential interest group, and the idea of an equilibrium in the political system created by competing groups. Also the basic unit of pluralism, i.e., the group and its internal happenings, is an important part of Truman's pluralistic theory. But to gain a clearer perspective of the pluralist model of power distribution it is useful to look at other pluralist writings.

An article entitled "The Group Basis of Politics: Notes For A Theory," by Latham, gives clarity to some of Truman's points and brings out some new dimensions in the pluralistic model of power distribution.² Latham basically agrees with Truman as to why groups form, that groups compete with each other, and that the state is more powerful than other groups in society, but Latham goes beyond Truman in describing the state. Latham states:

¹Ibid., p. 502.

... the state is not limited to that of referee in the group conflict. Established as custodian of the consensus, the state helps to formulate and to promote normative goals as well as to police the agreed rules. In the exercise of its normative function it may even require the abolition of groups or a radical revision of their internal structure. ¹

Latham not only expands the function of the state in the pluralistic model, but also views it as many interacting and competing groups—e.g., the congress, the executive, and the many agencies within the executive branch.

Latham adds to the pluralist model by bringing in the concept of officiality, which he considers the government as possessing. Latham says that "the designation 'official' is the sign which manifests that the bearer is authorized by the social understanding to exercise against all groups and individuals certain powers which they may not exercise against him." ² In other words the government, when it uses its powers, has a unilateral relationship with other groups. Latham sees this as a part of a "... political consensus—the understood and agreed conditions of life in a civil society—that certain groups will be permitted to act like badge-wearers. The group so privileged collectively make up the instrumentalities of the state." ³ With this idea of society agreeing that certain powers should be held above all others, certain

¹Ibid., pp. 383-84. ²Ibid., pp. 389-90. ³Ibid.
implications come out that are pertinent to control and its components.

Latham, therefore, has added to the pluralistic scheme a closer and more practical look into the intricate workings of the state, i.e., he views the state as many groups instead of one large powerful group. He also has provided the officiality the state possesses, which gives the state a different power relationship with groups in society than the groups have among themselves.

It is useful to now examine one of the most prolific writers in pluralist theory, Dahl. By scrutinizing past pluralist writings, Dahl has added many new concepts and what is to some extent an interpretation of what pluralism is. It must also be pointed out that Dahl has probably done the most in trying to show the connection between the concept power and the model of power distribution he espouses. However, only Dahl's contributions to basic pluralism will be analyzed because other pluralist writers make similar claims vis-a-vis the connection of the concept power and pluralism.

Dahl's first book of major significance to pluralism was Politics, Economics, and Welfare,¹ co-authored by Lindblom. The authors' basic concern, as with all other

contemporary pluralists, is whether democracy or a form of it is present or viable in a large and highly industrialized society. Therefore Dahl and Lindblom feel that the basic question to be asked is: "What are the conditions under which numerous individuals can maximize the attainment of their goals through the use of social mechanisms?" To answer this the authors start with basic empirical questions which ultimately lead them to their pluralistic conclusion.

One of the basic observations that the authors make is that a pure democratic state is not present in the United States. Therefore some people must control while others must be controlled. Obvious implications and problems arise throughout this study vis-a-vis control and its components that will be dealt with in Chapter IV.

Dahl and Lindblom say that "one of the most striking features of Western society today is the vital and ubiquitous role of hierarchical processes. This might not be striking at all if the fact did not run flatly counter to some of the ideology, and much of the ethos, of democracy." This may seem contrary to pluralistic thought, but actually this hierarchical type of control fits in quite well with pluralism. "Roughly, a hierarchical process of organization is one in which leaders exercise a very high degree

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1 Ibid., p. xxi. 2 Ibid., p. 230.
of unilateral control over non-leaders." The authors feel that this is not only inevitable but economical when looking at the basic unit of pluralism, i.e., the group. It is quite obvious that when groups or organizations are formed only a few can run the intricate dealings of that group. Earlier pluralists have mentioned or implied this same principle, but Dahl and Lindblom are the first to discuss it at any great length. The authors cite several examples as to why groups have hierarchical processes located in their structure, but basically the authors feel that such a process is more economical for the operations of the group.

The next and most important type of control present in society is the polyarchical form of control. This is basically where "... non-leaders exercise a relatively high degree of control over leaders." The best way to describe what polyarchy is, is to use an example that is cited by the authors. If leaders are competing with one another to gain control over the non-leaders, i.e., to gain their support, then a polyarchical organization is present. But the non-leaders must have the opportunity to change their vote or select another candidate besides the incumbent. This is what is generally called a representative democracy. Therefore Lindblom would agree with Dahl when

1Ibid., p. 227. 2Ibid., p. 275. 3Ibid., p. 283.
Dahl later writes, in *A Preface To Democratic Theory*, that 
"... the majority ... nearly always 'rules' in a polyarchical system. For politicians subject to elections
must operate within the limits set both by their own values
as indoctrinated members of the society, and by their expectations about what policies they can adopt and still be
re-elected."¹

However, Dahl and Lindblom do not accept the inevi-
tability of polyarchy in society. They feel that to have
a polyarchy not only requires that pluralism be present
in society,² but also "... social indoctrination and
habituation in the process of polyarchy and the desirabil-
ity of democracy ..."³ be present. There are definite
implications relating to control and its components when
indoctrination must be used on the masses to get them to
agree with the basic form of polyarchy. Two obvious ques-
tions come to mind. Who is doing the indoctrinating?—and
what type of indoctrination is being used? These questions
and others will be looked at in greater detail when the
models of power distribution are analyzed. Basically,
however, Dahl sees a social control that is separate and

³Ibid., p. 287.
different from the constitutional type of control that is present in our society. But Dahl feels that this social control is much more important because it is endemic to society and is more of a prerequisite for democracy than are the constitutional checks and balances.\(^1\)

Assuming that the masses are indoctrinated to agree with polyarchy, then there will be a basic agreement on policy and its formation. This, added to the forming of groups that are autonomous but also interdependent on the actions of other groups, bring Dahl's and Lindblom's pluralistic model into a clearer focus. In order to conclude their model the authors deal with a final type of control that they feel is present in a pluralistic society such as ours.

Bargaining is a type of control that Dahl and Lindblom see taking place among the many leaders of the organizations in society. The authors feel that bargaining is necessary and profitable in a large pluralistic society. The reason for this, the authors feel, is:

\[ \ldots \text{that most of these organizations are voluntary, or partly voluntary, therefore this means that leaders cannot push their unilateral control too far; if they do, they will lose their following. Hence the governmental process is not merely a matter of having these top leaders strike a bargain. They must bargain in turn with sub-leaders, who have their sub-leaders to bargain with,}\]

and so on down to the last echelon of activity.¹

Certain implications can be seen in this bargaining process that are relevant to control and its components; e.g., a certain type of control is present, but the type of control that is used is not dealt with by Dahl and Lindblom. Their tenuous conceptual scheme is again seen when they discuss how it is possible that bargaining can take place. They state:

Because individuals in different groups may also share membership in another group, compromise by bargaining is stimulated. Because individuals in different groups share some common values, bargaining is possible. And because different issues activate different combinations of groups, compromise by bargaining is continuous.²

Bargaining is a process that is used by leaders to control other leaders. But, what kind of control—i.e., power, coercion, influence, or manipulation—is being used by a leader to control another leader? Is the type of control that is being used between leaders the same kind that is being used in the hierarchical type of control? Although these specific questions will not be answered, it will be shown that the pluralist and elitist models of power distribution do have types of control that are more likely to be present in each particular model.

² Ibid., p. 333.
It will now be helpful to bring out the main principles in Dahl's and Lindblom's book and Dahl's later work, which is quite consistent with *Politics, Economics, and Welfare*.

One of the main tenets of pluralism, which was brought out in the above quote, is the idea of compromise. In Dahl's and Lindblom's pluralistic scheme, no one group gains all that it wants. Each group must compromise in order to gain any of the goals it is seeking. Another contribution that Dahl and Lindblom have made to the pluralist model relates to the power of groups and how groups become legitimized. Dahl and Lindblom say:

> The policy process tends to reflect the goals of the highly organized because organizations provide leaders with the negotiable rewards and deprivations that make control over other leaders possible.¹

Although the idea of organization is not new, Dahl and Lindblom have expanded on its implications to give pluralism some new dimensions. For example, only the highly organized will have power enough to control leaders. In the pluralist model only the most highly organized groups are present in a viable sense; i.e., only the most powerful can accept or reject other group demands as acceptable or not. I do not mean to imply with my interpretation of Dahl and Lindblom that only the same few groups will be the most powerful at all times, because Dahl and Lindblom basically

¹Ibid., p. 340.
see the control that a group exerts as taking an undulating pattern. That is to say, a group may be controlling at one time on an issue important to that group, but a different issue may come along which reduces that group's control over other groups while at the same time increasing the control of those other groups.

Also present in Dahl's and Lindblom's book is a different interpretation of the pluralist model of power distribution than the one Truman espoused. In Politics, Economics, and Welfare, all groups do not have the same amount of power at all times, whereas in Truman's The Governmental Process there is an implication that all groups, once they are organized, will have basically the same amount of power. This is an important change in the pluralist model and is one of the basic tenets of pluralist theory today. This point can be seen more clearly in Dahl's empirical study, Who Governs?.

Dahl's study, which takes place in New Haven, uses three broad research methods to show that pluralism is present in that community. Dahl uses historical analysis, case analyses of three policy areas, and a cross-sectional analysis of the distribution of resources among New Haven's citizenry. The three policy areas that were analyzed are political nominations, public education, and urban redevelop-

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Dahl looks at each policy area and analyzes the groups that were most influential. From this analysis, Dahl draws conclusions as to the type of political system New Haven represents. Dahl then analyzes the distribution of political resources—money, education, social standing, information, jobs, popularity—and shows how these resources are, or are not, used to influence political decisions in the New Haven community. What Dahl is trying to describe with these three methods is the distribution of political influence in the community. Although the concept influence is rather tenuously based, Dahl's empirical conclusions cannot be refuted when given the facts Dahl works with.

What Dahl has done in *Who Governs?* is to supposedly refute the elitist model of power distribution and give credence to his polyarchy. Dahl says, "An elite no longer rules New Haven. But in the strict democratic sense, the disappearance of elite rule has not led to the emergence of rule by the people." With this rather obvious conclusion Dahl is ready to show that his polyarchy is present in New Haven.

Dahl observes specific groups that take part in the designated policy areas. By doing this he is able to conclude that there are leaders and sub-leaders in each

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particular policy area studied that are more influential than the rank and file concerned with that particular area and more influential than the leaders and sub-leaders in other policy areas. Each group of leaders are, however, responsive to public pressure and open to public access.

The major significance of *Who Governs?* is that it brings pluralism and especially Dahl's polyarchy into a clearer perspective. Basically, this study adds nothing new to the pluralistic model of power distribution except greater clarity.¹

Rose is another well-known pluralist writer who tries to describe and add to the pluralist model of power distribution. In his book *The Power Structure*² Rose discusses three major points. Although only two—pluralism and power—will be dealt with here, elitism will be explicated when the major elitist exponents are analyzed.

Briefly, Rose tries to explain what pluralism is by drawing upon past and present pluralist theorists. Rose states:

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¹Robert Dahl has written other books that are not primarily concerned with pluralism, but do give mention to polyarchy and pluralism, e.g., *Modern Political Analysis* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963), and *After The Revolution?* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), but these will not be reviewed in this paper.

Throughout this book the thesis is advanced that: (1) There are many power elites, each of which is somewhat specialized in the area in which it exercises its influence. (2) Power elites interlock only temporarily and on limited types of issues, with some issues being determined in a 'democratic' fashion by the great voting public when it occasionally mobilizes itself with interest and action on those issues.¹

This is how Rose basically sees our pluralist society. This interpretation is similar to Dahl's, and therefore I will not dwell on Rose's interpretation of pluralism. However, Rose does bring out in greater detail some characteristics of the pluralist model that other pluralists have only touched on.

One of these is the group. Other pluralists have dealt with this, but mostly in the context of describing what the group is or how it interacts with other groups. Rose attempts to describe the group in relation to the power it exercises. Although Rose's usage of power and other related terms is nebulous, he does attempt to show how groups use power (his term). Rose says that "... it would take a very long list to cover all those who ever exercised real power on some occasion. Nearly every organization has some capacity for controlling situations outside of itself under certain circumstances, and nearly every member of an organization can move or sway it once in a while."² Rose does not imply, as other pluralists

¹Ibid., p. 89. ²Ibid., p. 153.
have done, that there is some kind of power being used to control other groups, but specifically states that real power is exercised at certain times. There are many problems that will be dealt with later with his concept real power, but pluralists are now agreeing that some kind of power is exerted, and as Rose later points out, the concept of power is now a problem to the pluralist.

Rose becomes more specific and tries to describe the type of power that a group would use. He states:

The American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) has a range of political interests at least as broad as that of the economic elite. . . . It uses the same technique as business does—lobbying, putting money into election campaigns and putting out publicity to mold public opinion.1

Rose classifies all these techniques as power, but it will be shown that problems evolve from such a loosely constructed conceptual scheme. Two apparent problems would be that these techniques are different kinds of control or possibly bases of particular types of control.

Another characteristic that Rose deals with in somewhat greater detail than other pluralists is the masses. Again Rose puts the masses in the context of a power relation. Rose mentions the power differences between them and the leaders of their respective organizations. Rose feels that even though power is dispersed throughout the

1Ibid., p. 153.
general population, "... it is true that more of the leaders have more social power than is to be found among the average members of the general population. ..."¹

This implies that the base of each leader's power is the organization he leads. Rose gives credence to this when he states how an ordinary citizen can gain power. He states:

Through the voluntary association the ordinary citizen can acquire as much power in the community or the nation as his free time, ability, and inclinations permit him to, without actually going into the government service, provided he accepts the competition for power of other like-minded citizens. ... ²

From this it can be concluded that people struggle with others within the group to obtain a type of control, and once this control is gained they will have more control over the masses than the masses have over them.

As was stated earlier, Rose shows by trying to use power that power is inherent in the pluralist model of power distribution. Rose feels that the "... failure to specify this concept [power] is at present a prime source of difficulty in the study of community power ...","³ and pluralism in general. (But Rose, like other pluralists, eventually decides "... to ignore the theoretical distinctions between influence and power." ⁴) This

¹Ibid., p. 179. ²Ibid., p. 247. ³Ibid., p. 43. ⁴Ibid., p. 302.
decision makes Rose's study and his notion of pluralism in general vague when using such concepts as power and influence. An example of this vagueness is:

Power is the major means used by a large heterogeneous society to effect or to resist change, and--except in simple face-to-face relations--power is structured, which is to say that there are different roles and role relationships, and a pattern into which these roles and relationships fit.

Rose implies that power can have many relationships instead of each relationship being a different kind of power or control. Excluding the vagueness, Rose has put the power relationship into the pluralistic model and has implied other types of control or power relationships. This, I feel, is Rose's major contribution to the pluralistic model of power distribution.

The Pluralist Model

Briefly, "... pluralist theory attempts to explain the formulation of public policy and the maintenance of public order in terms of the interplay among the contending group forces of society."\(^2\) But to get a clear picture of the pluralist model, I will discuss its major points separately. The points to be discussed are: (1) the

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\(^1\)Ibid., p. 484.


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individual; (2) the group; (3) the government; and (4) the problems with power in the pluralist model.

When viewing the individual in the pluralist model of power distribution he is always viewed as a member of a group. The pluralist sees the individual as having shared attitudes with some other individuals within society, subsequently, those with shared attitudes group together to reinforce their attitudes and try to get them accepted by others in society. However, pluralists feel that the individual is concerned with many attitudes and therefore has overlapping attitudes with members of society. Because of these overlapping attitudes the individual is a member of many groups instead of just one.

Once the individual is seen in the context of the group, pluralists view the individual as striving for power within the group of like-minded individuals. It is fair to say that all individuals strive for some kind of power, but some work harder to gain power than others. Since some gain more power than others, they become the leaders of their respective groups. Therefore there is a dichotomy of leaders, i.e., the ones holding the most power within the group, and the rank and file members of the group. Pluralists, however, do not exclude the possibility of the rank and file exerting some kind of power over the leaders of their organization. Pluralists feel that through voting and voicing their opinion to their leaders
the rank and file members do exert some control over them. Also, if the individual has the time, money, and experience he can gain power and become a leader of his organization. The individual is always seen in the context of the group, but there are many power conflicts and power positions in the group that confront the individual.

The group can be considered as the basic component of the pluralist model. As was mentioned above, groups form because of individuals having shared attitudes. But, most groups organize to become powerful in the public policy arena. Therefore to economize time and energy the group takes on an oligarchical structure, thus proving Michels' "iron law of oligarchy." When the group has taken this structure—in most cases—it is ready to compete with other groups. But it should be mentioned that each group is most powerful in its own domain; however, this does not hinder a group from competing with groups outside its domain or from temporarily joining with other groups to create a stronger and more powerful support for a particular issue.

The pluralist points out that all groups are not organized and therefore cannot compete on an equal basis with organized groups. These unorganized groups are commonly called potential interest groups by pluralists. That is to say, these groups do not have the leadership to compete with other organized groups, but they do have
the potential to become organized and make demands on other groups in the system. It then can be argued that the potential interest groups are less powerful than the already organized groups. This is not to imply that there are just two levels of power for all groups in society—those that are organized and those that are not—because there are many variances of power between groups in society.

The groups in the pluralist model become action oriented in order to formulate and originate public policy. But a multitude of groups are doing the same, therefore a conflict between groups is inevitable. From this conflict comes public policy. Each group is trying to create as many of its accepted attitudes as legitimate attitudes for the society, and at the least to try and preserve the attitudes that are central to the group. No group has enough control over all groups to gain acceptance by society for all its values; therefore no group has total control, or in other words, all the components of control at their disposal. However, it is at least implied that some control is exerted because some groups gain more than others. This control is either over other groups or over the government; e.g., the government favors one group's demands more than another's, therefore the group whose demands were favored has some control over the government. The pluralists do, however, contend that
there is one group that does have total control over policy formulation, and this is the government.

The government is conceived by pluralists as being one of the many groups in the pluralist model. However, the government is different than other groups by the amount of power it is potentially capable of wielding. Some pluralists may consider the government as having officiality; others may feel that it is the arena within which the group conflict takes place; and others may contend that the government is the umpire for the group conflict and makes the final decision in the conflict, but all generally agree that the government has more power than any other group in the pluralist model. Therefore, "... the role of government is one of ensuring access particularly to the most effectively organized, and of ratifying the agreements and adjustments worked out among the competing leaders and their claims."1 By ratifying the agreements made between certain groups, the government is actually letting them gain access to the group conflict, i.e., legitimacy. However, potential interest groups are not as well organized and therefore are not considered a legitimate group for making claims on the government.

By claiming that the government is more powerful than other groups in the pluralist model of power distribution,

many questions are raised about power itself. By looking at the actions of individuals within the group and looking at the interactions of the competing groups, more implications concerning power are apparent. Therefore, with it being apparent that some type of power is present in the pluralist model, a more thorough analysis of the model is imperative to gain further insight into the power implications. A first step in that analysis is to analyze the conceptual inadequacies of pluralism by using control and its components.

Elitist Literature

When trying to analyze elite theory, one is confronted with many classic as well as contemporary elitists who use various approaches to describe their elite. This paper will deal with certain well-known elite theorists and the approaches they use. From this I will construct the elitist model of power distribution.

Pareto is considered by many as one of the classic elite theorists of our times. One of his beginning assumptions is that certain individuals are superior to other individuals. He "... simply assumed that 'superiority' in individuals was something innate and undifferentiated."¹

Although there are certain obvious problems with this assumption, e.g., he fails to take into consideration any kind of training for the individual to make him superior, Pareto goes on to classify his elite. Pareto sees society as having many different classifications of elite. He forms each skill on a pyramidal ten-point scale with the best in a particular skill receiving ten points and the least skillful receiving zero points. Pareto therefore saw elites being present throughout society.

Pareto very astutely breaks his classification of elites down into a governing and non-governing elite. The non-governing elite play an unimportant role in governing decisions. Examples of a non-governing elite would be elite chess players and thieves. Although both are elites within their own skill group, we can see that the governing elite is more equipped to rule. The governing elite occupy the leading positions in society and "... play an important part in the manipulation of political power..."  

A problem arises when another of Pareto's assumptions is analyzed. Pareto assumes "... that superior individuals craved power...", but he would attribute this craving for power to the "residues," i.e., the state of


2 Hughes, Consciousness and Society, p. 254.
mind or instincts of the elite. The "residues" make some want and gain more power than others; e.g., if the elite chess player was vying for power with someone in the governing elite the individual in the governing elite would have this greater desire for power and be considered by others as the more legitimate power holder for society. However, Pareto and most analyses of Pareto do not deal with the power implications in this statement. Implied is that there are different bases of power for both the chess player and the individual in the governing elite, therefore by looking at the bases of power and what bases society accepts and rejects then a possible answer could be given to why some elites have more power. Even though Pareto tries to answer this through his "residues," the question is still not resolved.

By breaking down the governing elite into two classes Pareto has made his elite easier to visualize. Both Class I and Class II, says Pareto, act in either a logical or non-logical manner. For Pareto the non-logical action is predominant in society. Both classes are differentiated by the means they rule the masses, thus this is Pareto's way of classifying the elites. Class I are the sagacious manipulators who rule by manipulation and are comparable to Machiavelli's "foxes." Class II are the tough-minded who rule by force or coercion and respond to problems like Machiavelli's "lions." Therefore both
use some type of control to rule the non-governing elite and the masses.

Pareto uses a psychological analysis to explain the logical and non-logical actions of the two classes of elite. Pareto classifies the logical actions of both elite as "derivations" and the non-logical actions as "residues." Derivations are of lesser importance to Pareto than residues. The "residues" are considered the instincts or sentiments or state of mind of the elites in society. Consequently, Pareto concludes that "men have a predominance of either Class I residues—men of intelligence and cunning, 'foxes' in Machiavelli's language—or of Class II—men of strength, stability and integrity, 'lions.'"\(^1\) By taking this approach Pareto is able to give some type of an explanation for the actions of the two classes of elites. However, Pareto puts everything (even the logical moves by the elite) in a non-logical context, therefore he implies that all uses of the two types of control he talks about are instinctive and not logically thought out. Contemporary students of elitism may differ somewhat with Pareto on this point.

Pareto goes on to explain how elites circulate in their ruling of the masses. Basically, the elite that is not ruling gains over time the support of the masses and

overthrows the ruling elite. Since there must be some type of relationship between the ruling and non-ruling elite, there must be a power relationship when one elite takes over for the other. Burnham, in his book *The Machiavellians*, explains one possible way in which Pareto's circulation of elites will work.

The most evident and universal of the obstacles to free circulation is the aristocratic principle. The children of members of the elite are helped to a position in the elite regardless of their own capacities and at the sacrifice of individuals of greater capacity appearing among the non-elite. If this principle is carried far enough, if the elite becomes "closed" or almost so, degeneration is bound to set in. The percentage of weak and inferior persons within the elite necessarily increases, while at the same time superior persons accumulate among the non-elite. A point is reached where the elite will be overthrown and destroyed.¹

Therefore, seen in Pareto's elite system is no one elite dominating indefinitely, but, however, a cyclical process is present where one elite rules and eventually loses its power or power base and another elite takes over.

In order to gain a clearer perspective on classical elite theory it is also important to analyze Mosca. Mosca makes the same basic assumption that Pareto does when considering elites in society. Basically:

In all societies . . . two classes of people appear—a class that rules and a class that is ruled. The first class, always the less

numerous, performs all political functions, monopolizes power and enjoys the advantages that power brings, whereas the second, the more numerous class, is directed and controlled by the first, in a manner that is now more or less legal, now more or less arbitrary and violent, and supplies the first, in appearance at least, with material means of subsistence and with the instrumentalities that are essential to the vitality of the political organism.¹

Mosca takes an organizational approach when analyzing how elites form. But what makes an elite present in society? Mosca says that an elite is formed because some possess more of something that others desire.² But the major tenet to Mosca's theory is that this elite must organize and this, says Mosca, will be easier than the organization of the masses because of size alone. Here again, when using my concept control and its components it can be seen that Mosca implied a different kind of control than Pareto. Mosca goes on to say that "elite control . . . depends on the minority's capacity to weld itself into a cohesive force presenting a common front to the other forces in society."³ Therefore when this minority is a cohesive organization it becomes a controlling elite.

From proving that there is an elite, Mosca goes on to break this elite into an upper and lower stratum. The

¹The Ruling Class, quoted in Geraint Parry, Political Elites, p. 36.
²Ibid., p. 37. ³Ibid.
upper stratum is

... a very small group of 'top leaders,' who among themselves occupy the highest and key positions of the society, and a much larger group of secondary figures—a 'middle class,' as it could properly be called—who, though not so prominent nor so much in the limelight, constitute the day-to-day active directors of the community life.1

In other words the lower stratum of the elite are functionaries and keep a rapport going between the masses and elites. They communicate the needs of the masses to the upper stratum elites.

Mosca does not assume that elites in society automatically acquire legitimacy, therefore he explicates how legitimacy is gained. Mosca uses authority instead of legitimacy, but I interpret these two concepts as being synonymous and therefore will use legitimacy. There are ideally two ways for an elite to gain legitimacy, either by the autocratic principle or by the liberal principle. However, Mosca does admit that these are ideal ways and therefore in reality any mixture of the two is feasible.

In the autocracy legitimacy flows downward. That is to say, "In an autocracy officials are appointed and granted authority [i.e., legitimacy] by some higher official."2 In the liberal political system legitimacy flows upward, i.e., "... the rulers are authorized [i.e.,

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1 James Burnham, The Machiavellians, p. 102.

2 Geraint Parry, Political Elites, p. 38.
legitimized] by those ruled—usually by means of election.  

Any mixture is possible and one obvious example that even Mosca himself cites is the U.S. The chief executive gains legitimacy by the liberal principle, but most of the important functionaries below him gain legitimacy by the autocratic principle.

Finally Mosca deals with the recruitment process for elites. Here again Mosca is dealing with ideals, but he gives the recruitment process a more mundane appearance by allowing both means of recruitment to be present in society at the same time. The two means of recruitment that Mosca discusses are aristocratic and democratic recruiting processes. Basically the aristocratic process is one whereby elites replenish their forces from the descendants of the existing ruling class. The democratic process is where the existing elites renew their forces by assimilating the best of the ruled class. Both recruiting processes are present in society, but the aristocratic process of recruitment will generally prevail. Mosca's recruitment process has, in one form or another, become a basic tenet of elite theory. Contemporary students of elitism are in fact using both the aristocratic and democratic processes in describing how elites remain positionally intact in society.

1Ibid.
The positivist approach that both Pareto and Mosca took let them see a minority of people ruling over the rest of society. This "... minority ... undergoes changes in its membership over a period of time, ordinarily by the recruitment of new individual members ... and occasionally by the complete replacement of the established elite by a 'counter-elite ...'"\(^1\) In some cases this elite is representative of the social forces in society and in other cases it is not, but there is a controlling situation present.

The elites have certain attributes that the masses do not possess, e.g., in the Paretian sense performing different skills that society considers important better than anyone else. But the classical elitists feel that the elite of society do need the masses in order to have some kind of legitimacy for their rule. Therefore the classical elitists interpret society as having a ruling elite that rejuvenates itself by recruiting members from its own class or assimilating a few talented individuals from the class that is being ruled. Once the elite is formed it implements different means to gain the support of the masses, i.e., gain legitimacy.

However, there is another important aspect of the

classical elitist's position. Pareto and Mosca both divide the elite into a higher and lower stratum. The higher stratum is truly the ruling elite whereas the lower stratum performs functionary tasks for the ruling elite and somewhat takes the form of a quasi-bureaucracy. Such tasks may be performed as keeping the elite attuned to the masses' demands or helping the ruling elite to maintain their legitimacy.

Another elite theorist with a different approach than the elitists previously discussed is Burnham. In his book *The Managerial Revolution*, Burnham proposes that an economic elite will eventually rule society. The reasoning behind Burnham's analysis of society is economic; i.e., he sees society being oriented around its economy, therefore he analyzes the economy and the people who manage it. However, Burnham starts with some of the basic assumptions of classical elitism. These beginning assumptions are "... that politics is always a matter of struggle between groups for power and status and that in all societies a small group will inevitably control ultimate decision-making." From these basic assumptions Burnham proceeds with his own elitist interpretation of society.

Burnham begins by propounding that capitalism is

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declining in the U.S. and he expounds upon these reasons for this decline. "The first, and perhaps crucial, evidence for the view that capitalism is not going to continue much longer is the continuous presence within the capitalist nations of mass unemployment and the failure of all means tried for getting rid of mass unemployment."¹

This decline of capitalism, says Burnham, would produce a group of professional managers managing the economy. Burnham goes on to explain that in the past the capitalists were the managers, but by being too occupied with their wealth they have opted for a group of professionals to take their place. Therefore these managers gain social dominance by taking over the functions that the capitalists once performed.

By taking a closer look at Burnham's managerial elite we can see that they differ from the capitalists. A capitalist, says Burnham, is an individual that employs and pays workers for their time and is entitled to the finished product, therefore the capitalist has an ownership in the means of production.² On the other hand a manager is one that is actually managing the technical side of the process of production, no matter what form the production process takes.³ Implicit in these definitions is that a

¹James Burnham, The Managerial Revolution, p. 31.
²Ibid., p. 120. ³Ibid., p. 80.
cooptation process takes place among the old and new rich. (More will be said about this when discussing Domhoff.) Since the managers are actually the controllers of the economy this gives them a dominant position in society. But Burnham goes on to say those who do control will grant themselves preferential treatment when it comes to other goods and even other kinds of control. By looking at the theory behind the managerial elite it will be easier to understand some of the points that have been made thus far.

When analyzing the theory in strictly economic terms we can see that the managers are those who are managing the means of production. However, the economic framework that will assure dominance to the managers must be based on the state ownership of the means of production, therefore the managerial elite is not only an elite of professional or technical business men but also has a counterpart in the bureaucracies of government. Burnham's managerial elite can be viewed in a broader theoretical context as well. Burnham does this succinctly when describing the managerial elite in society.

... the theory of the managerial revolution asserts merely the following: Modern society has been organized through a certain set of major economic, social and political institutions which we call capitalist, and has

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1Ibid., p. 72.
exhibited certain major social beliefs or ideologies. Within this social structure we find that a particular group or class of persons—the capitalists or bourgeoisie—is the dominant or ruling class. . . . At the present time, these institutions and beliefs are undergoing a process of rapid transformation. The conclusion of this period of transformation . . . will find society organized through a quite different set of major social beliefs or ideologies. Within this new social structure a different group or class—the managers—will be the dominant or ruling class.  

Implicit in all of this is that by having economic control the managerial elite will obtain political power and social status. Therefore, it can be drawn from Burnham that all power in society is cumulative. The managerial or economic elite has also remained constant throughout contemporary elite literature. The name may have been changed, but contemporary students of elitism do allow for some type of technocratic elite in their theory.

One of the most prolific students of elitism is Mills. Mills has dealt with the concept power more than any other elite theorist or student of elitism and can be only considered tantamount to Dahl in the pluralist school of thought. In his book *The Power Elite*, 2 Mills discusses elites in society by looking at the different major institutions in society. Therefore Mills bases his elite theory

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around an institutional approach.

Mills expands elite theory by viewing the elite in the context of economic and social structures of society. With this interpretation he sets himself apart from the classical elitists and accepts Burnham only partially. Mills agrees with Burnham concerning an economic interpretation of elites, but he sees a wider set of institutions that are representative of an elite. This can be seen when Mills states:

The way to understand the power of the American elite lies neither solely in recognizing the historic scale of events nor in accepting the personal awareness reported by men of apparent decision. Behind such men and behind the events of history, linking the two, are the major institutions of modern society. These hierarchies of state and corporation and army constitute the means of power; as such they are now of a consequence not before equaled in human history—and at their summits, there are now those command posts of modern society which offer us the sociological key to an understanding of the role of the higher circles in America.¹

Mills not only discusses the political, military, and corporate institutions, but describes the men in these organizations, their cohesiveness as a power elite, and the power they wield. Each group is combined into what Mills considers the power elite of society. Therefore, "With Mills, the institution makes the man; the master institutions of a corporate economy and polity determine

¹Ibid., p. 5.
who shall wield the power."\(^1\)

However, another aspect of Mills' power elite is the cohesiveness of the group. Mills considers that by being more cohesive than other groups the power elite truly becomes a power elite. Certain characteristics of the power elite make it cohesive. For instance, many positions at the top of each hierarchy are interchangeable with positions of another hierarchy. Many military men once they leave the military take on top executive jobs with big corporations, as do many top political leaders; however, Mills stresses that they are not elected because they are friends or of the same socioeconomic class as the top political executive doing the appointing. Therefore a cohesiveness comes about not only by the interchangeableness of the top positions in each of the hierarchies, but also by being at least knowledgeable of other members in the same power and socioeconomic class. Mills goes on to talk about the unity of the power elite when he says:

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\ldots \text{we must pay attention to the psychology of its several members in their respective milieux. In so far as the power elite is composed of men of similar origin and education, of similar career and style of life, their unity may be said to rest upon the fact that they are of similar social type, and to lead to the fact of their easy}\]

intermingling.¹

This is, however, not to imply that this power elite is so unified that each member is a close friend and on a first-name basis. Mills does see misunderstandings and disagreements between the power elite, therefore he sees the power elite only coming together on certain basic coinciding points and only in time of crisis.²

By using the institutional approach for studying elites, Mills has used for the power base of his elite the respective institutions. Mills agrees with this interpretation when he says: "By the powerful we mean . . . those who are able to realize their will, even if others resist it. No one, accordingly, can be truly powerful unless he has access to the command of major institutions, for it is over these institutional means of power that the truly powerful are, in the first instance, powerful."³

Mills continues by showing that other, what he calls powers, can be gained by having institutional power, i.e., all power is cumulative.

Mills discusses some of his types of power that can


³Ibid., p. 9.
be gained once the institution is the power base. For the business elite section of the power elite money is more easily gotten by them than any other lower class in society, and money, for Mills, provides power to do what you want.\(^1\) Also, the business elite possesses power over people because they are able to control what goods are to be produced and how they will be produced. From all of this the business elite gains prestige and status, which Mills sees as still another type of power. Mills makes this same argument about the military and political elites. He says that both are taken from the high socioeconomic class and therefore have wealth and status, but once they are put into their institutional positions they gain more power by gaining more prestige and status. However, one major drawback to the cumulative effect of power is that Mills implies that the power elite has all power or at least the potential to have all power except for what they relegate to the lower levels of society.

When discussing the power structure Mills breaks it down into essentially three parts. Mills describes the top of the power structure as the power elite whereas the "... middle levels are a drifting set of stalemated, balancing forces. ... The bottom of this society is politically fragmented, and even as a passive fact increasingly

\(^{1}\text{Ibid.}, \text{p. 162.}\)
powerless . . ."¹ This implies that the power elite uses some type of power on the middle and lower levels of the power structure in order to keep them in line and to keep them from gaining more power than the elite. Mills also sees the middle level not a place where big decisions of national and international concern are discussed. Therefore Mills's power elite has power over what issues the middle level will discuss and consequently power over the middle level.² Another implication that the power elite has power over the middle level can be seen when Mills talks about no effective contervailing powers on the power elite.³ This, when observed from the power elite's position, implies that the power elite has more power over the middle level than the middle level has over it. Mills has not only broadened the elitist interpretation of society by using a more broad range approach, but has also tried to bring his concept of power and other related concepts into a more viable relationship with his elitist model of power distribution.

While Mills used the major institutions in society to prove his elitist position, Hunter takes a community

¹Ibid., p. 324.
and analyzes its power structure to attest to an elite being present in society. In his book *Community Power Structure*, Hunter empirically attempts to show that an elite is present in "Regional City." Although Hunter has been taken to task on his methodology, e.g., the questions asked to people to prove an elite being present in Regional City, this is not of major concern to us here. However, Hunter starts his book by trying to bring together and clarifying his concept of power and other related concepts, thus an important conceptual problem is present before his elite is described.

Hunter begins by stating that power "... is a word that will be used to describe the acts of men going about the business of moving other men to act in relation to themselves or in relation to organic or inorganic things."\(^2\) Up to this point Hunter's definition could fit in well when discussing an elite, but Hunter goes on to mention components of his concept power which consequently leads to confusion vis-a-vis his major concept. Hunter's cursory examination of his concept power gives him an unsophisticated way out when discussing the components of his concept power. Hunter essentially writes these components off when he states:

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This concept [power] can be talked about with some sureness, but there are elements of power about which one cannot speak so surely. These latter elements will be called, after the manner of the social scientist, 'residual categories,' by which is meant those ideas and conceptualizations which are related to power but fall outside the scope of the present study.¹

By doing this Hunter has categorized all means to move men under his concept power. This is not only nebulous and ambiguous when discussing the elite in Regional City, but it also detracts from the study in general. But by manifesting the problem that Hunter has with power does not mean to imply that all other elite theorists are free from the problem. Besides from this conceptual problem, Hunter's power is similar to Mills's idea of power.

Hunter describes his elite as the top men in the power hierarchy who make policy. These men are mostly drawn from the businessmen's class and therefore Hunter has construed his elite in a more narrow fashion than did Mills. However, Hunter has different groups of power elites vying for power over particular policy issues, thus the idea of competing elites is still present in contemporary elite theory. Another characteristic of Hunter's elite is that it is broken down into higher and lower levels with the higher level predominant on all issues but letting the lower level participate when extra support is needed. This lower level is also used to replenish the higher

¹Ibid., p. 3.
level. Therefore there is communication between the two
levels on some issues which approaches a one-to-one basis.
But there is an obvious power difference between the two
levels. Hunter makes this apparent when he states: "The
omnipresent threat of power sanctions used against recalcit-
trant underlings is recognized by the lower echelons of
power, and they generally go along with most decisions,
grumbling in private with close associates, if at all."¹

There is also a cohesiveness that exists in Hunter's
elite. This cohesiveness is basically similar to Mills's
cohesiveness except that Hunter allows for some kind of
force or coercion to take place if all other values that
the elite use for cohesive purposes fail.² Hunter's lower
level cannot possess the same social and personal attri-
butes that the higher level possesses because they would
then be in the higher level of the power elite. There-
fore Hunter felt it necessary to add force and coercion
to the other means that bring about a cohesive power elite.

In Hunter's community power study the same basic elite
tenets are brought out, i.e., one cohesive group possessing
more power than all others in society, within this elite
there is some kind of internal vying or circulation of
competing elites, and that the power each elite possesses
will accumulate more power. Therefore, Hunter has attempted

¹Ibid., p. 112. ²Ibid., p. 113.
to give us empirical proof of an elite in Regional City and has shown us that students of elitism do deal with the concept power.

The last student of elitism to be dealt with here is Domhoff. In Who Rules America and The Higher Circles, Domhoff proposes to show a governing class in society. In doing this Domhoff has taken a broader approach than have the other two students of elitism. Basically Domhoff looks at society by classes instead of institutions.

Domhoff says that he does not assume as Mills did "... a priori that any group is part of the power elite as Mills did in so designating the corporate leaders, military leaders, and political leaders..." Domhoff's assumption is that the upper class of society is a governing class. His basic scheme of elite starts off with the upper class which subsumes the governing class, which in turn subsumes the power elite. Domhoff mainly uses the social register, social clubs and prestigious schools to designate his upper class. He defines his governing class as part of the

... social upper class which owns a disproportionate amount of the country's wealth, receives a disproportionate amount of the

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country's yearly income, and contributes a disproportionate number of its members to positions of leadership. . . . The 'power elite,' on the other hand, encompasses all those who are in command positions in institutions controlled by members of the upper [governing] class.¹

For Domhoff's power elite it does not matter if they are members of the upper class or not, what does matter is whether or not the institution the power elite serves is controlled by a member of the upper class, thus making the controlling members a governing class.

The basic importance of all this is not so much Domhoff's elite theory as it is the similarity that Domhoff's theory has with other elite theorists. Domhoff uses a class of people, as did the early classical elitists, to separate his elite from the masses. He then uses something similar to Burnham's managers and Mosca's bureaucrats to discuss his power elite. The power elite is a functionary of the governing class, thus Hunter's lower level of elite comes into play here as well as Mills's elite, which controls the military, political and business institutions of society. Domhoff's approach creates a broad elite and therefore creates a problem of interpretation, but when elite theorists subscribe to one approach to describe society their study also creates problems of interpretation vis-a-vis the elite they are describing. Domhoff is the

¹Ibid., pp. 9-10.
only one to attempt to give empirical evidence to support his theory that an elite is present in society, therefore this alone is enough to make him worth considering. However, it is necessary to study his broad interpretation of an elite with narrow interpretations in order to get a satisfactory view of elite theory to help in constructing the elitist model of power distribution.

The Elitist Model

In constructing the elitist model of power distribution it will be useful to look at the structure the elite theorists and the students of elitism give society, and the power that is held by each level in the elitist's structure of society.

In the elitist model three salient levels of power distribution are present in society. The apex is made up of a small elite minority; the middle level consists of many competing interest groups; and the bottom level is made up of unorganized individuals. This structure takes a triangular form in relation to population, power and any other characteristics that are common for society to possess.

When analyzing the apex of this triangle it will be seen that the elite makes all of the major decisions. The elite theorists and students of elitism consider these decisions as being political because of the broad scope
that these decisions encompass.\textsuperscript{1} This elite gains its position other than by common election. However, if, per chance, that the elite is elected it is implied in most elite theory that some form of deception has been used to assure the elite of getting elected. Most elites gain their positions by their organizational abilities, i.e., they possess some characteristic that makes them cognizant of the fact that they have something that most people do not possess and, therefore, this makes it easier for them to organize around this particular characteristic.

There are, however, certain other traits that each member of an elite possesses, for instance, the desire to dominate over others and the ability to see problems arising from below and within the elite itself, i.e., being intellectually superior. But individuals can become part of the elite by a cooptation process that the existing elite uses. By this process the existing elite coopts the best of the members in the middle level once they have obtained most of the values that the elite already possesses. Some elite theorists feel that the people coopted come from a lower level of elite, while others imply that they come from the middle level of society; whatever, there is a process of cooptation. This cooptation can be considered a means for circulating the ruling elite, but not

\textsuperscript{1}Geraint Parry, \textit{Political Elites}, p. 30.
in the Machiavellian sense of the "lions" replacing the "foxes."

All that has been discussed thus far implies that the elite possesses what might be called a common consciousness. From this common consciousness the elite becomes a cohesive force. This cohesiveness is present because the entire elite has many shared goals, for instance, reenforcing their own elite positions. There are also basic values that the elite has in common which helps to create this cohesiveness. Such values as wealth, upper-class societal positions and possibly even the sense of eliteness makes the elite more cohesive. Because of these values many elite theorists and students of elitism contend that the elite only marries its own kind and goes only to the best schools, which creates an even greater sense of cohesiveness.

The counterpart to this small cohesive elite would be the two lower levels that elite theorists and students of elitism feel are present in society. The middle level is more populated than the elite level and therefore is less capable of organizing than the elite. This level is generally made up of many different interest groups, which is used by the elite when more support is needed on a particular policy, and for replenishing purposes. The lower level consists of the unorganized masses. This level has no control over the elite and consequently is unimportant
to the elite theorist.

Students of elitism consider the elite to be dominating over the other two levels of society, thus implying that the elite has a type of power over the other two levels of society. Therefore by becoming dominant it can be said that power is gained. However, there are bases of power that elite theorists and the students of elitism feel the elite must have in order to become dominant over the other two levels of society. Most common bases of power in elite theory are: positions held in a particular institution, wealth, social status, and skill. Elite theorists are nebulous on this point because they consider all of these as bases of power instead of being bases of different kinds of power. However, once the elite has gained power this power will bring them more power.

Also, in the elitist model power is asymmetrical. The elite is more organized and has more of everything that is desired by others in society, therefore giving them more power. One of the basic premises of elite theory is that there is no way for the two lower levels to control the elite, thus making power flow downward. However, it is necessary for the elite to make this as unobvious as they can, therefore the elite consciously or unconsciously constructs some kind of belief system or formula to make the lower levels give the elite legitimacy for their actions. By doing this the elite retains
its position by claiming to have authority for the actions it takes.
CHAPTER III

POWER LITERATURE AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Review of Power Literature

The concept power has been analyzed and explicated by many classical as well as contemporary political scientists; however, most analyses of the concept vary in differing degrees. Some deal with power by showing how it maintains order in society; but this leads to no clear definition of power and implies that power is multifarious. Other analyses show power as being oriented around one basic type of action. This action can take any number of forms but it is usually centered around force or coercion. Most contemporary studies are now dealing with power in a more laboratorial fashion; i.e., they are not making a case for what kind of power should be used in society, but are studying what factors go into making up power. Because of these differing analyses of power it is essential to look at some of the classical as well as contemporary writings dealing with it.

Classical sources

When looking at Hobbes's *Leviathan* it can be seen

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that power plays a salient role in it. Hobbes states:

... I put for a general inclination of all mankind, a perpetual and restless desire of power after power, that ceaseth only in death. And the cause of this, is not always that a man hopes for a more intensive delight, than he has already attained; or that he cannot be content with a moderate power; but because he cannot assure the power and means to live well ... without the acquisition of more.¹

For Hobbes, obtaining power is an instrumental drive that helps man gain his other desired goals. Hobbes sees this drive leading man into a state of nature where all men are equal in the sense that all are striving to obtain power to use on others. The reason for man to try and gain more power is to prevent himself from dying a violent death. This, says Hobbes, is man's biggest fear and therefore man will do anything to rid himself of it.

Man is rational in Hobbes's eyes and therefore he will eventually see the counterproductiveness of each gaining as much power as possible in order not to die a violent death. Man sees that he will be living in constant fear of the possibility of other men having more power, therefore he rationally comes to a mutual agreement to give all power to a sovereign. By doing this each man will live under the protection of the sovereign as well as abide by all laws the sovereign makes. Hobbes has therefore given this sovereign absolute power on the

¹Ibid., p. 80.
basis of man's rationality, but what is the make-up of the power itself?

Although it is never explicitly stated that the sovereign has the means to use coercion, influence, or manipulation it is assumed that the sovereign possesses all of these because he has given up none of the rights that he possessed in the state of nature. Therefore, since he is rational, the sovereign can use any skill available to him to control his subjects. Man in the Hobbesian sense would much rather suffer pain than death because it would be irrational to accept the latter of the two. As for the sovereign having influence over his subjects, Hobbes feels that even the "reputation of power, is power; because it draweth with it the adherence of those that need protection."\(^1\) Therefore just by having the reputation of being powerful persuades others to think of you as powerful, thus giving you power.

If people coming to a sovereign for protection makes the sovereign more powerful, it can be concluded that the basis of power is numbers. Hobbes would agree because he believes that the "... greatest of human powers, is that which is compounded of the powers of most men, united by consent, in one person ... that has the use of all their powers depending on his will. ... Therefore to

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 72.
have servants, is power; to have friends, is power; for
they are strengths united.\(^1\) Hobbes sees that the more
people under the sovereign the more power the sovereign
will have, but Hobbes also implies that to have riches
with liberality is power because it too makes one capable
of obtaining servants as well as more friends. The impor-
tance of this is not whether a person's reputation of
power or riches is the basis of power, but to show that
Hobbes felt a base for power was necessary before power
could be used. The idea of power having a base has gen-
erally remained constant throughout most writings on
power.

Another major classical political philosopher who
dealt with power is Machiavelli. In his major works, The
Prince and The Discourses,\(^2\) he deals with the use of power
in solving the political problems of Italy. However, from
these two works come two interpretations of Machiavelli
the power theorist. The first sees Machiavelli as only
being concerned with the use of force, and therefore force,
in this interpretation, is the dominant factor in solving
all problems. However, this interpretation of Machiavelli
seems to be based on a rather cursory examination of The
Prince and fails to examine closely other implications of

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\(^1\)Ibid.

\(^2\)Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince and The Discourses
(\(\text{New York: The Modern Library, 1950}\)).
power that Machiavelli dealt with in *The Discourses*.

The second interpretation views Machiavelli as dealing with other kinds of power. Although not precluding force this interpretation sees Machiavelli creating propaganda and influence as credible means to the desired ends. Even though Machiavelli dealt with different types of power he realized that some types of power were more predominant in certain political systems than other types of power. Therefore, Machiavelli felt "... that the masses who are coerced in a dictatorship have to be wooed and duped in a democracy ...". This implies two different kinds of power, although some might consider that being duped is coercion, thus resorting back to the "one type of power" interpretation of Machiavelli.

In order to gain a clearer perspective of the types of power that Machiavelli has dealt with it will be important to look at how Machiavelli uses force, propaganda, and influence. Machiavelli can be considered an advocate of force when one analyzes such a statement as: "... it is safer to be feared than loved ...", or if one discerns the importance that Machiavelli puts on the military and martial law. However, Machiavelli feels that force alone will not always suffice and therefore in some cases it would be wise to use sagacity. This cunningness

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or sagacity can be seen in Machiavelli's "foxes." They were the manipulators and users of ploys to gain more power or hinder others from obtaining power.

Machiavelli feels that any ruler-type is justified in using these manipulative or fraudulent practices. It is justifiable because the ruler-types are always seeking more power to strengthen their present position. Machiavelli considers the masses as being a passive, ignorant aggregate trying to live their lives on a day-by-day basis not concerning themselves with the more salient political issues. Therefore, however the ruler-types gain and retain their power is acceptable, but they must stay attuned to the masses' needs or they can conceivably lose their power.

Religion for Machiavelli, if used by the state, can be a great unifying device because of the masses being afraid of the omnipotent powers of God. Religion therefore makes it possible for the ruler to use this unseen power to his advantage while pretending to be benevolent. Machiavelli cites examples of how ploys can be used in military and everyday situations in order to gain the upper hand. Even though Machiavelli bases much of his power on brute force he feels that "... those princes to have done great things who have had little regard for good faith, and have been able by astuteness to confuse
men's brains . . . "¹ will prove just as powerful as if they had used some type of force.

Machiavelli explains influence as being a factor for strengthening one's power position. A man can gain influence from the influence his father had, from the company he keeps, or by some honorable act, but Machiavelli is convinced that gaining influence by some honorable act is the best and longest lasting. It is necessary, though, to repeat certain honorable acts in order to continue to be influential. These acts are of importance because they usually are based on the force or cunningness of the person performing the act. Therefore, when the person performs some act in an honorable fashion by using his force or cunningness he gains influence as well as followers who are impressed with his actions. By repeating other honorable acts he will gain more followers and thus gain power because the more followers he has the more he is potentially capable of using those followers to help in overthrowing the existing prince. Even though influence is not Machiavelli's most important type of power it does play an important role among the ruler-types that are not ruling, i.e., the "lions" and "foxes" cycle of one taking power from the other.

At this point it is imperative to look at some of

¹Ibid., p. 63.
the basic similarities and differences of Hobbes's and Machiavelli's notion of power. Both Hobbes and Machiavelli were writing about the type of power that should be used in order to counteract the problems that were present at the time of their writing. For Hobbes the sovereign had absolute power to protect the commonwealth and therefore could and would use any available means to do so. For Machiavelli it was different because although wanting equal portions of "foxes" and "lions" characteristics in the ruler, thus resembling Hobbes's sovereign, Machiavelli was too much of a realist and therefore dealt with power in a more pragmatic way. Machiavelli saw that using force could be counterproductive at times and therefore felt that deception or cunningness was necessary in order to hold onto power and to quell all rumblings from the masses. Therefore Machiavelli's ruler had to stay attuned to what was happening and be able to judge what would be the best type of power to use in a given situation. For Hobbes's sovereign the main objective was to protect the commonwealth and the people in it.

The sovereign was rational and therefore would use only the means necessary to alleviate problems in the commonwealth, however, if it were necessary to use force the sovereign would not hesitate because if he did he would lose the trust of his subjects and eventually lose power. This too can be seen in Machiavelli, but in a more
implicit way. When a ruler sees that all other means of retaining his power have failed then certain types of force are implemented as a last resort, e.g., martial law and dependence on the military which implies the use of force if there is noncompliance by the subjects. Although the ultimate use of force is more implied in Machiavelli than in Hobbes it would seem to be a logical conclusion for Machiavelli to follow.

Since Machiavelli's ruler is concerned with keeping power, while having the most followers at that time, it would be logical for him to use his followers against those who are trying to gain his position as ruler. The ruler may call for force to be used or may manipulate the masses to take it upon themselves to use force against those trying to take over; whatever, it seems that Machiavelli, like Hobbes, could conceivably resort back to force to vitiate any attempt to arouse the masses and jeopardize the stability of the political system as well as the power held by those who rule.

Machiavelli talks of at least two types of power when discussing the characteristics of the "lions" and "foxes." But if these are types of power to be used to obtain power, what is power? Must one possess both characteristics to have power or will one suffice? The concept power was not of major importance to either Hobbes or Machiavelli, but as more questions were asked more problems became apparent.
Therefore it is necessary to jump to the more contemporary analyses of power and show how they have dealt with the concept.

**Contemporary sources**

One of the most important studies dealing with power is Lasswell's and Kaplan's, *Power and Society*.¹ This book was a major breakthrough because it scientifically dealt with concepts instead of using the more normative approach so typical of Hobbes and Machiavelli. This approach can be seen when the authors state that their major concern is "... to elaborate a conceptual framework within which inquiry into the political process may fruitfully proceed. ... [Their] concern, moreover, is not with words but with concepts."² Therefore, by analytically looking at concepts instead of total society they attempt to explicate power and other concepts in a more scientific way.

The interpersonal approach that the authors use deals with the interactions of individuals. Therefore, by looking at the interactions of individuals Lasswell and Kaplan say that they can understand more about political decision-making and how power is used in the decision-making process. They begin by looking at the individual and his

²Ibid., pp. x-xi.
desire for certain values. A value for Lasswell and Kaplan is anything that is desired by an individual; therefore, the authors see individuals forming into groups over shared values as well as conflicts arising because of conflicting values. When conflicts do arise the values of one of the conflictees is usually altered in some way, thus making the other conflictee more powerful because of being able to alter the values of the other. From the idea of conflicting values being resolved by the use of power the authors go on to explicate the concept of power.

By having power, Lasswell and Kaplan feel that one would be able to gain more values and consequently become more influential. However, power is considered a value and therefore not everyone desires it, but, in the political sense, since having power can be used to attain other values it is the most sought-after value.

When scrutinizing their concept of power it is seen that power for Lasswell and Kaplan is the participating in decisions of other individuals, which makes power relational. What this means is simply that for power to exist there must be two individuals, one being the power exerter and the other being the recipient of the power. Therefore an individual does not have power unless he is able to use that power on another individual. The authors, because of their interpersonal approach, are not concerned with the possibility of an individual having potential power. They
have limited themselves conceptually by using this approach because even though a person does not use his power he still may have power and therefore the potential to use that power. The problem of potential power is dealt with by other power theorists who will be examined later in the chapter.

Lasswell and Kaplan go on to describe other aspects of their concept of power. One such aspect would be the measurement of power. For doing this they think it necessary to look at the scope, weight, and domain of power. By scope they mean the range of values affected by the individual exerting power. Weight is the degree of participation in decisions, e.g., if a decision was made by one hundred men then each man would have one one-hundredth amount of power, whereas if the same decision was made by one man that man would have more power than the one hundred men. The domain of power is the number of individuals that have had power exerted on them. These three means for measuring power must be considered together in order to gain a clear perspective as to the amount of power an individual has. Although other means are now being attempted to measure power, the scope, weight, and domain of power has basically stayed with most conceptual schemes based upon power and therefore will be used in the scheme to be presented in this chapter.

The bases of power is another important aspect that
Lasswell and Kaplan deal with. Hobbes and Machiavelli both implicitly dealt with the bases of power, but Lasswell and Kaplan consider that it is important to understand the bases in order to more clearly understand power. They feel that a "... power holder may owe his power to his wealth, ability, reputation, popularity, or, in general, favorable position with regard to any value."¹ However, the authors contend that power could be one of the bases of influence or influence one of the bases of power, but it is my contention that when talking about power or influence there will generally be different bases for each. It cannot be denied that if someone has power he will probably also have influence, but power is not the basis of that influence and therefore cannot be considered as such. Lasswell and Kaplan do not make this the major premise behind their theory of the bases of power, but the limitations are great enough to make it an important problem to be discussed. I do agree with the authors in relation to the possibility of influence and power having the same bases because given the values of some societies power and influence could possibly have similar bases.

Another important contribution of Lasswell and Kaplan is their classification of different kinds of power. They

¹Ibid., p. 84.
discuss force, domination, and manipulation as being different forms of power relationships, but they have implied something completely different from power. Even though each form is used in a decision-making relationship, thus making it still part of their definition of power, each contains a characteristic that differs from power. Basically force is physically impelling another person to do some action against his will and is non-relational; domination is the ability to make someone do something because of the authority or legitimacy that that person believes you have; and, manipulation is making someone do something without them being cognizant of the fact that you are making them do it and, it too is non-relational. Although they all tie into the concept of power, I see different characteristics in each and therefore have difficulty considering each a form of power.

My basic disagreement with Lasswell and Kaplan is that they have tried to lump too many means to make decisions for someone else under the concept power. Power and influence are extremely important concepts and should therefore stand alone and not be made nebulous and ambiguous by the many variations that Lasswell and Kaplan give them. However, these variations should also be clarified and be given major attention because they too are present in the political system as well as being related to power. To classify them as power relegates them to a secondary role.
when in many cases they play a predominant role in the interactions of political actors. Lasswell and Kaplan have explicated and analyzed the concepts power and influence more thoroughly than any other political scientist, but limitations in their conceptual scheme have stimulated more studies dealing with the problem of power.

A paradigm of the new types of studies being completed on the concept power can be seen in the two articles "Two Faces of Power" and "Decisions and Nondecisions: An Analytical Framework," by Bachrach and Baratz. In the first article the authors discuss a new approach for studying power. They show the inadequacies of both the elitist and pluralist approaches and go on to what they consider the other face of power that must be examined. The authors do not, however, preclude power as being the process of participating in decisions, but consider it to be only one of the two ways power should be explicated.

Basically the authors feel that the nondecision-making process should be examined in order to gain a complete understanding of power. This process is where power is "... exercised by confining the scope of decision-

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making to relatively 'safe' issues."\(^1\) This is done by reinforcing or creating social and political values and biases to limit the decision-making process. However, the authors feel that before this type of power can be examined it is imperative to study the values and biases that are built into the political system one is studying. From this it would then be necessary to examine the group or groups that benefit from the existing values as well as those who are handicapped by them. By doing this Bachrach and Baratz consider that a more thorough analysis could be made of the power distribution in a given community.

In the latter article the authors are trying to develop their own scheme for analyzing decision and nondecision-making. They feel that no broad-gauge model has been developed to use when analyzing the distribution of power. One of the basic reasons for this is the

\[\ldots\text{confusion about the nature of power and of the things that differentiate it from the equally important concepts of force, influence, and authority. These terms have different meanings and are of varying relevance; yet in nearly all studies of community decision-making \ldots\text{power and influence are used almost interchangeably, and force and authority are neglected.}^2\]

Therefore the authors attempt in this article to differentiate between these key concepts.

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\(^1\)Bachrach and Baratz, "Two Faces of Power," in Political Power p. 95.

For Bachrach and Baratz power means being able to affect policies of others with the help of severe sanctions if compliance is not gotten. The authors go on by explaining the other characteristics of power, e.g., that power is relational instead of possessive. Its relational characteristics are threefold. First, there must be a conflict of interest between two or more groups. Second, the one having power exerted on him must bow to the wishes of the one exerting power or no power relationship exists. Third, one must be able to threaten sanctions on the other before a power relationship is present.

However, the authors specify that certain conditions must be met vis-a-vis the threatened sanctions. These conditions can be categorized as rational conditions because each condition depends on the rationality of one of the two actors in the power relationship. The conditions that the authors set forth are as follows: The person being threatened must be cognizant of what is expected of him; the threatened sanctions must be regarded as a deprivation by the person being threatened; the person being threatened has more respect for the value that would be sacrificed if he disobeyed than for the value he would have to accept, therefore, he will comply with the person exerting power; and, the person being threatened must

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1Ibid., p. 102.
realize that the person who is threatening him will follow through with the threat.¹

The authors also state that the scope, weight, and domain of power must be considered in each power relationship as well as Friedrich's "law of anticipated reactions." By using Friedrich's rule to examine power relationships the authors feel that new light can be cast on what might be considered a normal power relationship. For instance, if B always complied with A's wishes the first interpretation of this relationship would be that A had power over B, however, A might tailor his demands to such things that B will accept. If this happens, then B actually has power over A in relation to what A demands of B.

The authors define force as the use of the threatened sanctions because "... in a situation involving force one's objectives must be achieved, if at all, in the face of non-compliance."² Other observations the authors make about force is that it is non-relational and non-rational. It is non-relational because when a person is shot in the back or hit by a fist there is a minimal relationship between the two individuals. Force is non-rational because once the bullet is fired the victim cannot choose between compliance or noncompliance because force has already been exerted. The authors show that problems are present when

¹Ibid. ²Ibid., p. 103.
force is used. One problem would be that once force is used the one using it has admitted defeat in the power relationship, which can lead to a loss of power.

Influence, they say, exists when a person is able to cause the other person to change his mind without using either an implied or overt threat. Therefore influence, like power, is relational as well as rational; however, the difference between power and influence for Bachrach and Baratz is the idea of a threat being used to gain compliance. They do confess that there is difficulty in distinguishing between power and influence and one reason for this is that at times they reenforce each other. In other words one can have influence and gain power from it or from one's power generate more influence for himself. This point is well taken, but this also implies that at some time power will be the base for influence or influence the base for power. This implication might have been alleviated if the authors would have dealt with the bases of each concept.

Authority for Bachrach and Baratz is based around reasoned elaboration. This is when A commands B to do something and B sees that command as being reasonable to his own position so he complies with A's command because that command can be rationalized. However, if A's communication does not allow for reasoned elaboration and B thinks it does, then this is false authority. If B becomes
cognizant of this false authority and further compliance is wanted then this relationship must resort back to a power or influence or some other kind of relationship. Therefore, authority for Bachrach and Baratz is like power in that it too is relational and rational. Bachrach and Baratz have at least attempted to explicate what authority is, but they have left the concept just as vague as those who consider it to be formal or institutional power.

The authors have brought out some excellent points as well as adding to some traditional ideas about power, but they have also left some obvious gaps in the general framework they were attempting to construct. Two major problems are present in their framework. First, they never discuss the bases of any of their concepts, except the implication that was discussed concerning influence and power. Secondly, I consider that a major concept was left out when they did not deal with manipulation. Although they did make reference to it when discussing force they did not accept it as one of the major concepts when studying decision and nondecision-making.

By looking at the power theorists presented in this chapter we have attempted to show how the concept power has evolved. However, by doing this it has also been shown that power and other related concepts are still somewhat nebulous. Therefore it will be necessary to draw from these and other power theorists to gain a clearer perspec-
tive of the concepts discussed above and to more clearly understand the two models of power distribution through these concepts.

Conceptual Framework

In previous conceptual frameworks there has been one main concept which all other concepts in the framework revolve around. Power has usually been this overriding concept; however, in this conceptual framework I consider the concept control to give more clarity to the framework and to be basically less ambiguous when dealing with it as the main concept.

The question can still be asked, why should control be used instead of power? There are three basic reasons for this decision: First, it gives more conceptual clarity to the conceptual scheme than concepts that have been used in the past; second, all forms of power that have been discussed separately can be worked into the dominant concept control; and, third, using control instead of other concepts will make it easier to observe degrees of control because of the clarity it brings to the conceptual framework.

Conceptual clarity is imperative when dealing with such nebulous concepts as power, coercion, influence, and manipulation; however, since these concepts are the concepts dealt with by most power theorists it is important
to find a concept that they all can be considered components of. When used to discuss some individual or group, all of these concepts are used to control a situation involving the environment of that individual or group. Therefore, by using control it is possible to keep all the concepts definitionally separate while making them components of an overriding concept that relates them to each other.

All forms of power that have been discussed in previous analyses have not been subsumable under one dominant concept. When using power most theorists have limited its forms to influence and coercion. However, when another form of power is discussed, e.g., manipulation, it is either considered a subcomponent of other important concepts or the basic definition of power is broadened in order to consider manipulation as a component tantamount to influence and coercion. In order to deal with power and manipulation on the same basis it is necessary to put all the important concepts discussed by past power theorists under the concept control.

Finally, by using control as the basic concept in the conceptual framework it will be easier to see who has the most rule in a specific social system. Control is not a specific kind of action, but is actually the product of all the components that go in to making it. To have total control, then, would be to have all the components at hand
to be used whenever needed, whereas for power it is generally described as a specific kind of action, which creates problems when trying to understand its components. If power is a specific action how should its components be construed? This is a problem that is eliminated by using control because to have total control is to have full use of all components, but it is also possible to observe people having degrees of control, i.e., having less than all the components of control. It is advantageous to define control this way because then the component which is the most beneficial in a particular society can be identified by scrutinizing the people with partial control that gain the most in different controlling situations.

It is my contention that the concept control is the best concept to use when discussing the ambiguous concepts that are to be discussed in this paper. It also has import when trying to observe who has more control in a society because defining control in terms of its components makes it easier to look at the components and not be troubled by a general definition of the main concept.¹

¹Some may consider my control as being authority, i.e., having plenary use of all kinds of control, or authority as one type of control, but I do not. Authority to me is a sense of legitimacy only gained by having others, i.e., the masses giving it to you. However, this is not to say that others do not want authority and may use any form of control to gain it. Therefore I consider authority to be different and beyond all types of control discussed in this paper. Although authority is an important concept, I do not consider it relevant vis-a-vis the two models of power distribution.
The first and one of the most important components of control is power. Power is defined as the threat or the ability to threaten severe sanctions in order to make someone do something he would normally not do at that time. The best way to explicate power is to give an example of it being used and then discuss certain characteristics that are inherent in its usage. Before giving an example it is imperative to point out that the definition of power can be broken down into two categories: the actual use of power and potential power. The first example will deal with actual power and potential power will be explicated later.

When power holder A makes B do something he would not normally do at that time because of threatening to use severe sanctions if compliance is not received, then A has power over B. However, certain conditions must be met in order for A to have actual power over B. First, B must be cognizant of what is expected of him; second, B must regard the threatened sanctions as a deprivation to him; third, B would have a greater affinity for the value he would give up than for the new value he would be accepting; and finally, B must realize that A will use the threatened sanctions if compliance is not gotten.¹ From these conditions it can be concluded that actual power is relational

and rational. Relational in the sense that A must communicate with B, i.e., create a relationship in order for B to comply with A's wishes. Actual power is rational because B makes the decision as to whether to comply with A's demands or resist them. However, when using actual power there is an asymmetrical power relationship between the power holder A and power recipient B. This is definitionally true because in order for A to make B do something he would not normally do he must have more power, i.e., more threatened sanctions than B would have over him. If this were not the case, then B could resist A's demand or possibly make A do something he would not normally do at that time, thus giving B power over A.

It is important for the power holder to take into consideration the responses and actions of the recipient of his power. If A exerts power on B and B does not comply with A's demands, the result is a loss of power for A. That is why A must take into consideration the responses of B, because A's alternatives are either to use another form of control if at all possible or accept the loss in actual power. Therefore A must take into consideration the costs of exerting power before he actually does so.

Potential power is a type of power that must be understood in order to understand power in its entirety. If B believes that A has power over him, i.e., the ability to threaten sanctions, and therefore does something that he
would not normally do, then A has changed B's position on a given value not by exerting actual power, but by his power potential. This type of power is rational because B makes the final decision as to whether to change or not; however, potential power is non-relational because no communication or relationship exists between A and B. As for potential power being symmetrical or asymmetrical it really is of no great importance because symmetry is dependent upon a relationship between A the power holder and B the power recipient.

The bases of power, both actual and potential, are the sanctions that the power holder has to threaten the power recipient. However, the basis of power depends on the situation at hand, i.e., the threatened sanctions that are the bases of one's power can vary from threatening to kill someone to threatening to repossess one's car. Therefore if a person does not have the sanctions with which to threaten he does not have power. If, per chance, a person does something that he would not normally do because of what he considers someone else's potential power, but in fact there is not potential power present, then this can be considered pseudo-power. Also if A threatens severe sanctions but does not really have the sanctions to threaten and B complies, this too is pseudo-power. However, it is only pseudo-power when B at any time becomes cognizant that A did not actually have the sanctions he
threatened.

Coercion can be defined as using the sanctions that have been threatened. From this definition it can be concluded that coercion is non-relational and non-rational as well as asymmetrical. When A coerces B there is little or no relationship between the two because A is using the sanctions he threatened in the power relationship. B cannot try to alleviate the sanctions when coercion is being used because, for example, the bullet has already been fired or some other sanction has already been used.

Coercion is non-rational because B the coercee makes no decision as to whether or not coercion will be used on him. In the power relationship B has the final decision to accept or reject the demand made on him; when coercion is used only the coercer makes the final decision. Since coercion is a one-way type of action performed by the one using the threatened sanctions, asymmetry is more present in coercion than in any other type of control.\footnote{What is meant by more asymmetrical is that some minor relationship may be present in any form of control, however, symmetrical is taken to be equal forces with one opposing the other.} The bases of coercion would be the sanctions used to coerce someone. An obvious conclusion that can be drawn from this is that the more sanctions one can exert the stronger one's coercive base will be.

However, it should be understood that the coercer
must take into consideration the actions that the coerced may take after being coerced. Coercion, in a society where it is normally not used, may possibly be counterproductive if used. The counterproductiveness comes from the possibility of losing more of different types of control than what was gained by using coercion. Here again the cost of exerting coercion must be taken into consideration by the coercer before coercion is actually used.

The concept of influence can be defined as having more of something that someone else desires, therefore, by having more of that something you can change the value position of that person. However, it is imperative for both individuals to be cognizant—at least subconsciously—of one person having more of something that the other desires. If this were not the case influence could not take place because there would be no knowledge of the inequality of values between the two men. It can be concluded that influence is rational because both are aware of the situation at hand and the influencee makes the decision as to whether or not to be influenced.

When someone has been influenced it can either be relational or non-relational. For example, if A asks B to do something and B complies because of A having more of something that B desires, then there has been a relationship between A the influencer and B the influencee. There may be a number of reasons why B complied with A's
wishes, but the important point is that there is a relationship between A and B. An example of B being influenced by A in a non-relational situation would be when B does z in hopes of pleasing A because A has more of something that B desires. A has not asked B to do z therefore no relationship is formed in this type of influence. However, B's motives for doing z may be entirely personal, i.e., to gain more of what he desires or gain access to what A has more of, thus gaining more influence over those who also desire what A has. However, there is a relational difference between influence and power. For a relational situation to exist when influence is used either the influencee or the influencer can be the initiator of the influence. In the power relationship the power holder takes the initiative to exert power, thus creating a relationship different from the one created when influence is used.

When influence is exerted it can be either symmetrical or asymmetrical. The asymmetrical type of influence is simply when the influencer exerts influence upon the influencee, who complies with the influencer's demands. When this type of influence is used the one doing the influencing knows that the influencee desires more of what the influencer has and has nothing in return to possibly influence the influencer. However, if A the influencer tries to influence B the influencee, but realizes that B has more of something that he desires, which is
not known by B, and therefore mitigates his demand on B, then B has influenced A's influence over B and a symmetrical influence is present. A more simple example would be when A gets what he wants by influencing B, but B is able to mitigate that influence over him because of having influence over A.

The bases of influence can vary, but to find who is influential in a given society it would be imperative to know what values are the most desired in that given society. For instance, if money or wealth were the most important value in a society, then those with the most wealth would be more apt to be influential. However, this is not to imply that one greatly desired value in a society will be the base of all influence in that society. As was stated earlier, the bases of influence can vary with the situation in which influence is being exerted, therefore, any one of the other components of control or even control itself can be the bases of one's influence.

With using influence to control someone you again must take into consideration the cost of exerting influence on the influencee. If the would-be influencee cannot be influenced or can be influenced only to a small degree, the influencer will realize that the gains made are less than the gains expected, therefore, it would be too costly for him to attempt to use his influence. The possible results of exerting influence that was too costly
are many, but two obvious outcomes could be the loss of some influence by the influencer or the gaining of some influence by the influencee. However, the outcome of exerting influence that is too costly for the influencer can be determined only by the amount of influence he had from the start, therefore, cost becomes an empirical question that can only be solved when looking at a particular society or individual situation.

The last and one of the most important types of control is manipulation. When trying to arrive at a definition of manipulation the concept becomes very difficult to understand. One basic reason for this is because it is empirically hard to prove. If someone is being manipulated then they are not cognizant of it, but once they do become aware of being manipulated then manipulation is no longer present.

Manipulation is the most nebulous of all the components of control. This is so, because manipulation is actually a deception by the manipulator of the environment around the manipulatee. The manipulator distorts reality in order to control an individual or group and thereby obtain his expected results. Therefore, manipulation is non-relational, non-rational, and asymmetrical. It is non-relational because the manipulator and the manipulatee create no relationship when manipulation is used. This is so because the manipulatee is unaware of being manipu-
lated. If there is no awareness of being manipulated, the manipulatee is not given the alternative to comply and therefore manipulation must be considered as non-rational as well. The asymmetrical aspect of manipulation becomes obvious when understanding that the manipulatee cannot in turn manipulate the manipulator because the manipulatee is not cognizant of the manipulation. However, this is not to imply that the manipulatee cannot be manipulating his manipulator at the same time concerning different expected results.

Sagacity is the basis of all manipulation. By sagacity I mean any shrewd act that will create a false consciousness for the individual being manipulated, thereby making that individual responsive to the person creating the false consciousness. Who is sagacious or not can only be determined when one has detected manipulation being used on himself or someone else. If manipulation is detected the cost for the manipulator can be the highest of all the components of control.

No one enjoys being deceived and therefore if the manipulator is detected he must either resort to another form of control to obtain the desired results, thereby running the risk of losing other means of control if his detector does not comply. But, if the detected manipulator does not attempt to use another type of control he also runs the risk of having a type of control exerted on
himself by the detector, or having it made known that he is a user of manipulation, thus making it harder for him to use manipulation in the future.

In order to get a better understanding of each of these concepts it is imperative to discuss a few points about the conceptual framework as a whole. When viewing any component of control being used in society the scope, weight, and domain of that form of control must be determined in order to get a better view of who is the most powerful, influential or etc. Basically scope is the number of values affected, weight is the degree to which the values are affected, and the domain is the number of people who are affected by the form of control. By taking these three important parts of any component of control it is possible to discern whether one having power can get someone who has influence or manipulation to do something he would not normally do if the person who has influence or manipulation is simultaneously exerting that type of control on the one exerting power. This type of paradigm is important to keep in mind when analyzing the two models of power distribution.

The last important thing to say about the conceptual framework before analyzing the two models of power distribution is that no one type of control is more important

or more useful than any other type. However, if an individual or group has all types of control at its command it will eventually resort to coercion if its demand is strong and all other types have failed. This does not mean that in every case when one form of control does not work coercion will be used. What it does mean is that the possibility is there and the individual or group could use it if it so desired; however, not all desire to use coercion even in a last resort situation because of the costs involved.
Chapter IV

Conceptual Analyses of the Two Models of Power Distribution

Pluralist Model of Power Distribution

Hopefully manifested in the analysis of the pluralist model of power distribution is that some type of control is being used. It will be imperative to ascertain this in order to more clearly show the conceptual inadequacies in the pluralist model. There are three basic ways to demonstrate this: first, by looking at the basic structure and the expected outcome from the model; second, by analyzing specific statements made by students of pluralism that show a type of control being present; and third, by showing how some form of control is implied in the pluralist model of power distribution. After this has been demonstrated we will then attempt to prove that all components of control are not operationally defined in the pluralist model of power distribution. This will be done by analyzing the pluralist model with the conceptual framework devised in Chapter III. Finally, it will be shown that since all components of control are not adequately defined there is one component of control that is used more than any other component.

Given the basic pluralist model of power distribution
some form of control would have to be used because public policy is the output of that model. In order for a group to obtain public policy that is favorable, support must be obtained from other groups. This gives the impression that this policy is favorable to the many groups that support the policy, as well as represent the general public, which gives the impression of public support. The basic question is, how is support gotten if in the pluralist model no one group is considered a dominant power at all times?

Taking this one premise of the pluralist model, i.e., that no one group is dominant at all times, we see that in order for a group to obtain support from other groups, that group must be controlling them in a given situation. This is so because as was stated earlier, each group is formed because of shared interests by its members, and therefore each group has a conflict of interest with other groups. Since there is this conflict of interest among groups, a group trying to gain support for public policy that it favors would have to control other groups in this particular situation in order to gain their support. However, looking at the basic model and the results that are to come from it, is not enough to convince one that a form of control is present in the pluralist model. It is necessary to analyze statements made by students of pluralism when discussing the model of power distribution they
Types of control that are specifically discussed can be seen in Truman's work. Truman says, "Perhaps the most significant feature of group politics is that it is a dynamic process, a constantly changing pattern of relationships involving through the years continual shifts in relative influence."\(^1\) Although Truman does not go on to explicate what "relative influence" is, he does consider influence to be present in the pluralist model of power distribution. It becomes more apparent that Truman considers influence to be present when he devotes one whole section in his book on "The Tactics of Influence."

Truman gives the impression that only influence will be dealt with in the section, but this is not the case. He deals with other types of control as well. He mentions that "... propaganda will be considered as any attempt, by the manipulation of words and word substitutes, to control the attitudes and consequently the behavior of a number of individuals concerning a controversial matter."\(^2\) Propaganda is the main topic of discussion and therefore it may possibly be considered a component of control, but controlling attitudes and the manipulation of words surely gives credence to the hypothesis that some form of control

\(^{1}\)Truman, *The Governmental Process*, p. 65.
\(^{2}\)Ibid., p. 223.
is present in the pluralist model. However, to be more representative, one other important student of pluralism should be examined vis-a-vis specific statements about some form of control.

In *Who Governs?* Dahl tries to analyze the groups that are influential in the political arena as well as how they influence political decisions in New Haven. He therefore bases a major portion of his study around the concept influence. This is clearly shown in the appendix when Dahl tries to explain this concept. He says, "One of the most serious problems in the study of influence arises from the fact that, no matter how precisely one defines influence . . . the data within reach . . . require the use of operational measures that are at best somewhat unsatisfactory." Elsewhere in his book he comments on how New Haven, which, like most pluralistic democracies, has a small group of individuals exerting influence over decisions, and how the system itself limits the influence exerted by all participants. Therefore, Dahl bases his whole study around at least one component of control.

One final proof to ascertain the presence of some component in the pluralist model is to analyze statements made by students of pluralism that imply a component of

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1Robert Dahl, *Who Governs?*.
2Ibid., p. 330.  3Ibid., p. 305.
control. This will give us a more complete and convincing proof that some form of control is present in the pluralist model.

Some students of pluralism, for instance Gable, imply, but do not specifically state, that some form of control is used in the pluralist model. This is seen when Gable says:

Ultimately, to gain its end a political interest group must gain access to the center of policy making in government while at the same time it attempts to prevent or limit competing groups from gaining a similar advantage.¹

It is implied here that the political interest group must use some means to gain access, while using that same or possibly a different means to limit the access of other interest groups. This means of control could range from power to manipulation, but there is some type of control that is implied in the statement made by Gable.

Another pluralist who implies some kind of control present in the pluralist model does this by discussing the resources that can be used to help in decision-making. Polsby considers that "... there are a great many different kinds of resources which can be turned to use in the process of community decision-making. ... One list, for example, includes: money and credit; control over

¹Richard W. Gable, "Interest Groups as Policy Shapers," The American Academy of Political and Social Science, CCCXIX (September, 1958), 89.
jobs; control over information of others; social standing . . . \textsuperscript{1} and many other possible resources. These resources could imply either some type of control, or possibly the bases of particular types of control. Here again, a student of pluralism does not specifically state any particular component of control that is used in the pluralist model of power distribution, but instead discusses the "resources" that can be helpful in gaining favorable decisions for the holder of these resources.

Is there some type of control present in the pluralist model of power distribution? Given the basic structure of the pluralist model, i.e., groups having conflicting values, thus resulting in some trying to gain more support than other groups who might vehemently oppose the policies favored by any given group, then some type of control would manifest itself when support is gained and opposition groups are defeated. This hypothesis gains credence when certain students of pluralism discuss either explicitly or implicitly possible components of control. Therefore, it may be concluded, some type of control is present in the pluralist model of power distribution.

Given that some component of control is present in the pluralist model, it is imperative to prove whether or

\begin{footnote}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1}Nelson W. Polsby, "How To Study Community Power: The Pluralist Alternative," \textit{Journal of Politics}, XXII, No. 3 (1960), 483.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnote}
not all or some of the components are inadequately defined. Before looking at the definitions of the concepts it must be shown that all components of control are either specifically used or their use is implied in the pluralist model of power distribution.

Again, when looking at the students of pluralism we can see all the components either being mentioned in passing or discussed at length. For instance, Dahl uses such concepts as coercion and manipulation in a limited manner while using power and influence much more extensively. Dahl has dealt with the concept influence in approximately half of the book *Who Governs?*. Other pluralists have also discussed the aspects of influence in the pluralist model of power distribution. By pluralists discussing influence vis-a-vis the pluralist model, this can only mean that these students of pluralism consider influence to be present.

However, a problem becomes apparent when trying to discuss the presence of the other components of control. Are these components present if they are not discussed but only mentioned by the students of the respective model? Given the fact that some conflict among groups is present in the model, it is conceivable that any component of control could be used to obtain favorable policies, even though the group using the component may suffer the consequences for the use of that particular component at some
later date. But, to add credence to my contention that all components are present in the pluralist model, the point can be made that even though these components are only mentioned, this does not mean that they are not present. The mentioning alone leads to conceptual confusion because it implies that this form of control is present and gives a more ambiguous connotation to the components of control that have been discussed.

In order to more clearly see how other components besides influence and power are mentioned, we can observe them in pluralist writings. Coercion, Dahl discusses as being a form of power. Although being a sub-component of power, it is implied that coercion is used in the pluralist model because power plays an important part in Dahl's conception of that model. Dahl states:

A particular ominous kind of power involves only the prospect of great loss. Suppose that A confronts B with the alternative 'Your money or your life!' In general terms, B must choose between something bad (P) or something very much worse (Q). . . . Coercion, then, is a form of power that exists whenever A compels B to comply by confronting him only with alternatives involving severe deprivation.¹

Therefore, since coercion is a form of power and power is present in the pluralist model of power distribution, it can logically be concluded that coercion is present and

can conceivably be used in the pluralist model.

As far as the component manipulation being present, two main students have used it, although sparingly. Dahl discusses manipulation as being a type of strategy that professionals can use to gain something else.\(^1\) Truman has used it in a similar connotation. While talking about the men that possess managerial skills and occupy the positions of authority, Truman says, "They are in possession of manipulative skills and tools not available to the uninitiated."\(^2\) Even though this concept is not considered important by pluralists, it does imply that some type of manipulation is performed in the pluralist model, thus creating conceptual havoc when trying to explicate the difference between either power and manipulation or influence and manipulation.

One major problem is now apparent. The definition of many and sometimes all components of control is assumed to be known. In some cases, as in Truman's work, the components of control are used, but not defined. More contemporary students of pluralism use one or two salient concepts throughout their work with emphasis put on the clarification of these concepts. Dahl, for instance, explicates influence and power and deals with coercion to a


limited extent, but bypasses manipulation even though mentioning it. It is imperative to now look at how the pluralist model of power distribution is conceptually inadequate because of failing to define all the components of control.

If we can agree momentarily that influence is one of the dominant components of control present in the pluralist model, then when students of pluralism describe the groups as being centers of power this implies that each group has available the threat of severe sanctions in the area it is concerned with.\(^1\) Then conceptually, no group would have any policy that would hinder its interest because it would or could threaten severe sanctions if another group tried to get a policy that would hinder the first group. The pluralists get around this by talking about group coalitions, which in fact implies that there are many degrees of power. However, when only looking at the concepts, the pluralist, by using this type of expression implies that a group would possibly resort to coercion if its power were ineffective. But to use coercion against another group is counterproductive because if the coercer does not have more of all of the components of

\(^{1}\)Although possibly not using the phrase "centers of power" pluralists do agree that there is something comparable to it. For example, Latham uses "structures of power," Galbraith uses "countervailing powers," and Rose uses "many power elites."
control it could conceivably suffer repercussions for its use of coercion by the coerced group. As the pluralist model is set up, all groups play the game according to the rules and if one group is not playing the game correctly the other groups will circumvent or possibly ostracize this particular group from participating in the pluralist game. An immediate response to this would be that possibly the use of coercion is not contrary to the accepted rules. If this were so, then another contradiction is apparent in the pluralist model of power distribution.

By experiencing coercion from another group, the coerced group would not want to experience coercion a second time. Therefore the most logical thing to do is try to gain more control than any other group. This may be done by coalitions with other groups or any other means, but eventually you would have a few groups subjugating all other groups, thus becoming structurally similar to that of the elitist model of power distribution.

Other problems can be seen when pluralists use the phrase "centers of power" or "influential groups" to describe their model of power distribution. By using one or two dominant concepts to describe the actions of groups operating in the decision-making process they imply that these concepts include all other components of control. The rationale behind this is that the dominant concept is
used as the primary controlling force in that model. It therefore takes on a broader connotation than the one given it in Chapter III.

This dominant concept, when defined thoroughly, can be construed as being synonymous with control. However, problems arise because it is not thoroughly defined and consequently many of its components go undefined. Whether the students of pluralism consider these components to be irrelevant or the definition to be known cannot be ascertainment, but, when these concepts are left undefined conceptual problems set in. Such concepts as real power and social power are mentioned as components of power, but yet they go undefined. An example should suffice to clarify the point being made here. Rose states:

... it would take a very long list to cover all those who have ever exercised real power on some occasion. Nearly every organization has some capacity for controlling situations outside of itself under certain circumstances.1

Elsewhere Rose writes:

It is true that more of the leaders have more social power than is to be found among the average members of the general population and they have a higher average class position.2

Is real power synonymous with coercion and social power with influence? Whether they are or not, there is doubt created by this conceptual unclarity.

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1Arnold Rose, The Power Structure, p. 162.
2Ibid., p. 179.
Still another problem has resulted from the dominant concepts that are usually discussed, i.e., power and influence. The problem is one of interchangeability. Rose uses as his main concept power, whereas Dahl uses influence. Both are trying to show how at different times different groups are able to control the decision-making process in order to gain favorable policies. But they use different concepts for the same thing. Although this may seem trivial, its importance lies in the fact that it is possible that some groups may have influence while others have power; and one may gain more favorable policies because of the type of control that it uses.

This interchangeability of concepts can be seen by looking at how Rose and Dahl deal with both concepts. Rose states that "... for the purpose of this study, we feel obliged to ignore the theoretical distinction between influence and power."¹ Rose will therefore not be able to consider whether there are groups with only power, groups with only influence, or groups with both influence and power. Dahl, on the other hand implies that influence and power are interchangeable. Dahl subtitles his book, "Democracy and Power in an American City," and begins talking about the power among citizens and the power to control one's government, but eventually tries to define

¹Ibid., p. 302.
influence and the part it plays in New Haven.

From all of this it may be concluded that certain concepts in the pluralist model of power distribution take on a broad connotation, which results in concepts being used interchangeably because of major concepts implying other undefined components of control.

The basic reason for the conceptual inadequacies of the pluralist model of power distribution is because the students of pluralism have defined or discussed all the components of control. Since all of the components of control are present then each group would have to possess them in order not to be subservient to any other group, because each group is basically equal in affecting policy.

If each group possesses each component of control, it would be necessary for the students of pluralism to discuss degrees or possibly the bases of each component in order to understand why some groups gain more favorable policies than do others. I am not claiming that each group possesses all of the components of control, but what I am doing is carrying the pluralist's interpretation of the pluralist model to conceptual extremes. That is to say, if all groups are basically equal, and all components are either implied or mentioned, then all groups would have the components of control that are in the pluralist model. By doing this it could be seen that each group does not have total control, as well as showing that
one component may possibly be more helpful in a particular case.

On the other hand, if this were done it could be demonstrated that only one or possibly a few groups have more components than all other groups. If this were proven to be true, it would disprove the pluralist ideal that all groups make policy instead of only a few. Also shown in this would be that power is cumulative, which is contrary to the pluralist model of power distribution.

From the above conceptual analysis it may be concluded that the conceptual inadequacies of the pluralist model of power distribution leave that model with some uncertainties that need further clarification. However, these uncertainties are based upon the rather tenuous conceptual framework that the students of pluralism use.

Because of the tenuous conceptual framework used by the students of pluralism the pluralist model of power distribution uses one specific component of control more than any other component. The conceptual inadequacies make this apparent. Possible reasons for this would be; that the students of pluralism use one or two salient concepts interchangeably as the main type of control present in the pluralist model, and that the students of pluralism fail to explicate all the components of control that are implied in the pluralist model.

Since the students of pluralism have failed to
explicate all the components of control, they resort to the one concept that best fits the pluralist model of power distribution. Because of the structural formation of the pluralist model, influence, as described in Chapter III, is used. Groups are constantly trying to control the government in order to gain a favorable policy, therefore these groups have something that the government wants, e.g., support for certain issues or possibly reelection support.

Given the pluralist model, all other components of control would in most cases tend to be counterproductive to the user.\(^1\) If coercion were used by a group on the government in order to gain favorable policy the government must have less coercive ability on this particular issue than the group doing the coercing. However, this is highly unlikely because of the government having more legitimacy than any other group, which gives the government the authority to use any means possible to not be controlled. But, the counterproductiveness becomes more obvious when it is understood that the group doing the coercing may still not gain the favorable policy it expected. This is so, because even though the government has been coerced, the group using coercion has created a

\(^1\) Absolutes cannot be determined here, therefore, it can only be said that these components would be counterproductive in most cases.
non-relational and non-rational situation, i.e., the government makes no decision as to accept or reject the sanctions. By doing this the group has made the choice to use the sanctions because it did not gain the favorable policy intended. The group has obviously not gained what it had expected and possibly will incur the wrath of the government or other groups for using coercion.

As far as a group using power or manipulation to control the government, it again is almost inconceivable. With the government's size and legitimacy it is highly unfeasible to consider any group or coalition of groups having more power. However, that is not to say that a coalition of groups may have a good deal of power which might influence the government's decisions. Manipulation is possible, but again it is totally illogical because of the possible consequences involved. With the government's size and legitimacy a group must keep an amicable relationship and being detected trying to manipulate would jeopardize that relationship.

When looking at intergroup conflicts and coalitions influence is again the component of control that is used most often. Conflicts among groups are usually mild and ephemeral because all groups are interdependent upon each other at some time. Therefore, to use sanctions, threatened sanctions, or deceptive means in a conflict of this sort would hurt the group's chances in other conflicts,
because those same components may be used on that group in these later conflicts. But to look at it in a different perspective it can be shown how influence would be the component used most often. If coalitions were formed by power, coercion, or manipulation, the coalition would be a rather tenuous one. These coalitions would be weaker than if the groups had taken it upon themselves to form a coalition because of the influence one or possibly two groups have. Therefore, the other groups support the influential group or groups in hopes of gaining something out of it. This not only creates a stronger coalition at the time, but makes it easier for coalitions to form at a later time.

Also, because of the piecemeal type of change and policies that come from the pluralist model of power distribution, influence is the component that would be the safest to use and still allow for incremental changes that are so basic to the pluralist model. Although other components of control could conceivably be used, influence would fit the best. Since students of pluralism consider incrementalism an attribute of their model, influence as the salient concept of the model is the most suitable. The reason for this being the relationship that exists when influence is used. This relationship is the least demanding and the least binding. Therefore, support for an issue when based on influence can be very vacillating,
which gives credence to the incrementalism present in the pluralist model of power distribution.

Is influence present only because it best fits the pluralist model of power distribution? The obvious answer to this is no, because the students of pluralism have also hindered the conceptual framework of the model. They have hindered the possibility that more than one concept could be present. One reason for this would be because of the implications that are involved. As was stated earlier, if all components were used, an eventual pyramidal structure would be formed, consisting of group or groups having the most control on down to those having the least amount of control, which is contrary to the pluralist model of power distribution.

However, there still may be a pyramidal structure based on influence, but the group or groups at the apex would continually be changing, which again fits the pluralist model. Whereas if all components were used it would eventually have to be resolved whether certain groups having all or specific components of control are gaining more favorable policies than groups having other components of control. Therefore the burden of truth comes to rest with the pluralists because only they have hindered the credence of the pluralist model of power distribution.

When analyzing the pluralist model of power distribution by a conceptual scheme it is seen that there is some
component of control present. Also shown is that not all components of control are clearly defined. From proving these two hypotheses it has been demonstrated that influence is the one dominant component of control present in the pluralist model. With each group having influence in its specific area of interest all groups will have an equal chance to gain favorable policy. The students of pluralism in describing the pluralist model of power distribution have possibly seen these inherent conceptual problems, but have apparently declined to deal with them since their model leads to this one component of control.

Elitist Model of Power Distribution

When analyzing the elitist model of power distribution it is again imperative to show that at least some component of control is present. This will be done as it was in the case of the pluralist model of power distribution. The model will be looked at in toto to see if some component is present as well as looking at the students of elitism and proponents of elitism for components specifically dealt with and implied.

Given the elitist model of power distribution some component of control would have to be used since policy is again one of the outcomes of that model. In the elitist model the elite make all important policy decisions as well as create a legitimacy for their policies by
gaining support from interest groups and the masses. Therefore, by being able to make important policy decisions and creating support for their policies, they are able to at least control important policy as well as the masses and certain interest groups that give their policies legitimacy.

However, since interest groups are present in the elitist model of power distribution this gives more credence to the hypothesis that some kind of control is present. The elite will let interest groups deal with issues that the elite consider to be unimportant to their interest. Therefore the conflict that these interest groups enter into that was discussed above is still present, but at a lower level. That is to say the elite will let these groups try to influence, threaten or use whatever means of control they use on the government and other groups when the issue is unimportant to the elite. Elites will let the conflict go on at lower levels of society, but will use some kind of control when an issue is relevant to them. Therefore, pluralism with its conflicts and controlling situations is present in society, but is subsumed by elitism.

When the students of elitism discuss and analyze the elitist model of power distribution they also discuss or mention specific components of control. When doing this, it must be considered that the component they have used
is present in the model or they would not have used it.

In Hunter's study of Regional City he discusses an elite who are "... persons of dominance, prestige, and influence. They are, in part, the decision-makers for the total community. They are able to enforce their decision by persuasion, intimidation, coercion, and, if necessary, force."\(^1\) Here Hunter mentions specific components of control as well as using concepts that could be considered synonymous with the components of control discussed in Chapter III. When Hunter discusses his men of power he considers this elite as having power-wielding methods which they can use at any time to produce the desired results.\(^2\) Hunter has used the concept power and mentions other methods of it, therefore, when taking Hunter at face value, he has used at least one component of control that must be in his elitist model of power distribution. In order to gain a more representative example of students of elitism dealing with the components of control, it is necessary to look beyond the community power studies and look at studies dealing with the elitist model in society in general.

Mills talks about the presence of a power elite in society. He states in his study that "... all means

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\(^2\)Ibid., p. 194.
of power tend to become ends to an elite that is in command of them. And that is why we may define the power elite in terms of the means of power—as those who occupy the command posts.¹ Mills gives the impression that his elite has power or at least some kind of control to use when it is needed.

In the article, "The Structure Of Power In American Society," Mills becomes more explicit about specific components of control when he says:

We cannot today merely assume that in the last resort men must always be governed by their own consent. For among the means of power which now prevail is the power to manage and to manipulate the consent of men. That we do not know the limits of such power, and that we hope it does have limits, does not remove the fact that much power today is successfully employed without the sanction of the reason or the conscience of the obedient.²

Here Mills is discussing manipulation, but also mentions that there are other types of power present. He too considers some type of control being present in the elitist model of power distribution.

In other instances both Domhoff and Mills talk about a power elite. The inference that can be drawn from this is that both are talking about a group that has more power

¹C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite, p. 23.
than any other group, and, therefore, this makes them an elite. From the examples cited above, it is safe to conclude that the students of elitism have analyzed the elitist model and consider that some type of control is present. This is credible, because of the ways in which they use the concepts we are analyzing.

To add further credence to the hypothesis that some component of control is present in the elitist model of power distribution it is imperative to look at the proponents of elitism. Although they do not specifically deal with the components of control, they do imply their presence in the elitist model. For instance, Mosca's "ruling class" is a minority ruling or controlling the majority of people in society. Just the expression "ruling class" implies a group controlling others.

Pareto as well sees a governing elite in society made up of the few who rule the many. What is important is that Pareto not only accepts the few controlling the many, but implies two types of control that the two competing elites use to regain from each other the governing or ruling position in society. The "lions" use force and the "foxes" use cunningness or it would be safe to say manipulation. What this implies is that when one is governing it is using the means it knows best to control and keep the potential governing elite from taking over as the governing elite. Therefore Pareto implies that there is not
only a kind of control being used by the elite, since it is governing the masses, but he also implies that the governing elite uses some component of control in trying to thwart the attempts of the elite not in the governing position.¹

By looking at the proponents of elitism, the students of elitism, and the basic elitist model of power distribution it may be concluded that some component of control is present in that model. However, to more clearly understand the components of control present in the elitist model it is imperative to see which components are or are not defined in order to gain a clearer comprehension of the model.

In order to show that the elitist model of power distribution fails to adequately define all the components of control it is imperative to show that all components are present in the elitist model. The components of control are either specifically used or implied in the model. One student of elitism uses all the components of control in his study of the power structure in Regional City. Hunter states that he will use power to describe the acts

¹Although most look at the means of gaining the governing position in society from the perspective of the elite that is not governing, I have reversed this in this particular instance in order to show the governing elite using some component of control on a group that is not governing.
of men moving other men.\textsuperscript{1} He states that the decision-makers have influence,\textsuperscript{2} and use manipulation to control the voters of Regional City.\textsuperscript{3} He also states that the elite itself is in some cases held together by coercion.\textsuperscript{4} Here each component is specifically stated and therefore intended to be used in the elitist model of power distribution. Other students of elitism as well as elite theorists also use specific components of control.

When looking at the elitist model of power distribution it is seen that the elite is meant to have total control pertaining to issues that involve them. Although all components are not specifically mentioned in the model, they are implied, which does not mean they are not present. For instance, in the elitist model the elite makes all important decisions that involve the elite. This implies any or all components of control being present. The elite could use power, coercion, influence, or manipulation in order to make these important decisions.

Another paradigm is that the lower levels of the elitist model of power distribution have no control over the elite when a particular issue is important to the elite. This also implies that the elite has total control, i.e., it is able to use all components of control. This is not

\textsuperscript{1}Floyd Hunter, \textit{Community Power Structure}, p. 2.
to say that the elite does not keep the other two levels in mind, but if both the elite and one or both of the lower levels were trying to control a certain issue or situation that was important to the elite, the elite would win out.

However, there are times when the elite and one or both of the lower structures work together, which implies all the components of control. In the elitist model of power distribution many times the elite try to gain more support for their policies by having the lower structures support them. The problem is that many times the issues the elite want supported are not beneficial for either of the lower structures, and in some cases contrary to what they may believe. But in order for this policy to gain more credence, support from the other levels is needed and, therefore, some deception, i.e., manipulation, is used in order to control these lower structures. But, these lower structures are using other components on each other to help build support for this policy, which shows that all components could conceivably be present. It is not meant to be implied here that every group and every person will be controlled at any given time, but only those that will give this particular policy more credence.

One other proof that all components of control are present in the elitist model of power distribution is implied in the idea of the elite being somewhat of a
cohesive force. Although this cohesiveness can come about by any component of control, and some students of elitism claim this, there is clearly implied at least one component of control that gives the elite this cohesiveness. This cohesiveness is based on shared attitudes, values, and goals and therefore each member of the elite does not want to give these attitudes and values up because he would no longer be a member of the elite. Influence is predominant here because each member of the elite has similar attitudes, goals, and values. If a member does not remain cohesive with the other elite members he will no longer be a member of the elite; and all other members of the elite will have more of those attitudes and goals that that member desires. This is a projected rationalization into the future by the single member that if he does not go along with the elite in the long run they will have more of what he desires. He is actually hypothesizing what will happen if he does not go along, which influences him to go along.

It may be concluded that by looking at the elitist model of power distribution and the students of elitism all components of control are either implied or specifically used and mentioned in the elitist model. It is now imperative to analyze these components in relation to the second hypothesis.

When trying to show how the components of control are not clearly defined in the elitist model of power
distribution it is imperative to look at the assumption made in the model. All components are present, but it is assumed that all definitions are known. This becomes apparent when looking at the explanation of the elite. The elite is considered to be the most powerful structure in society, excepting the government, and therefore those describing the elite explain the power of the elite through the position the elite hold in society, i.e., since the elite is an elite they have the most of everything including power. The elite theorists and the students of elitism have attempted to define all the components of control by the assumption that the elite is all-powerful, which leaves the components of control undefined. Elite theorists and students of elitism have not been concerned with the conceptual end of their model, but by being totally unconcerned with these concepts they have not laid to rest all doubt pertaining to the elitist model of power distribution.

In order to see more closely the failure of the elitist model to define all components of control it is imperative to use the components explicated in Chapter III to analyze the model. By using this conceptual framework it can be seen that by assuming the definition of the concepts contradictions are apparent, which could have possibly been alleviated if all components of control were thoroughly explicated. A paradigm that can clarify this point would
be that in the elitist model of power distribution the elite is constantly trying to maintain its position and still stay aloof to the structures below. Although neither the elite theorists nor the students of elitism explain to what degree this desire of aloofness is present in the elite or to what the elite would resort to in order to maintain its position, there are still apparent conceptual problems present.¹

Given then some form of democratic political system it would be counterproductive for the elite to use certain components of control, because it would become apparent that an elite is present in a type of political system which supposedly does not have an elite. Because it tries to stay aloof and maintain its position in society, the elite cannot use power, coercion, and influence. The reason for this is because each of these components of control have either relational ties or some kind of ties that make the user of a particular component come in contact with the recipient of that component. The component manipulation would be the only component that could really fit in this

¹Given the political system that most students of elitism were discussing and given the political system that elite theorists were discussing, it is apparent that some form of democratic political system was intended. This is not to say that other political systems were not dealt with vis-a-vis elite theory, but I am mostly concerned with the elitist model of power distribution as it pertains to a democratic political system.
example. Therefore, the elite, when using the conceptual framework explicated in Chapter III instead of assuming the definition of the components of control, does not have or use all the components of control, as is assumed.

However, a reply to the argument posed above would be that the elite may have these components, but does not use them, i.e., they have potential power or the potential to use any of the other components of control. This argument does not help clarify these concepts, but in fact creates further problems. Neither the elitists nor the students of elitism have explained whether this group with the potential to use all components is the elite at the apex of the elitist model of power distribution, or is another structure below the all-powerful elite, but above the other power structures in society. The conclusion can still be made then, that by assuming the definition of all components of control, conceptual problems are created, which raise doubt about the model itself.

Throughout the literature on the elitist model of power distribution the proponents and students of elitism have not used a salient concept. But in fact, as is the case in the pluralist model of power distribution, concepts have been used interchangeably. Most elite theorists use the concept power or coercion, whichever, does not matter because concepts such as these were definitionally insignificant. The students of elitism are becoming more
cognizant of the conceptual problems in the elitist model of power distribution, but thus far they have hindered the model with their desultory attempt at defining what they consider the main concept. For some students of elitism power is the main concept, while others consider power too ambiguous and therefore see it as not important enough to deal with.

However, those who attempted some kind of definition created further conceptual problems in the elitist model of power distribution. By attempting to define what they considered to be the major concept they mentioned forms or components of this major concept without defining these components. Therefore one is led to believe that all concepts used, pertaining to the dominant concept, have similar connotations with each other, as well as with the major concept that was being defined. This is seen in Hunter's work when he attempts to describe power and mentions that there are "residual categories" of power that cannot be explicated.\footnote{Floyd Hunter, \textit{Community Power Structure}, p. 3.} He goes on to use such concepts as influence, manipulation, and force without defining them. He therefore implies that these "residual categories" can be used interchangeably with power.

Mills does not explain what is meant by power, but does say that "By the powerful we mean . . . those who
are able to realize their will even if others resist it.\(^1\) Mills uses influence, manipulation, and coercion as forms of power, but assumes their definition to be known. One is led to believe then, that each of these concepts is a type of power. This is seen more clearly when Mills discusses hidden power as manipulation.\(^2\) By not defining all concepts, and by using concepts interchangeably, it is not clear if the power elite is powerful, manipulative, coercive, influential, or all of these.

The problem of interchangeability is less of a problem with the elitist model of power distribution than with the pluralist model. This is so because the interchangeability of these concepts could fit the elitist model better because of the assumption that the elite has total control, while all other structures of society have degrees of it. The students of elitism and elite theorists may have individually used this rationale in order not to be faced with the task of defining all relevant concepts that pertain to their elite's power; or, there may have been a mere oversight by these men when explicating and analyzing the elitist model of power distribution. A problem that the elitists and students of elitism could conceivably run into is that when all components of control are thoroughly

\(^1\)C. Wright Mills, *The Power Elite*, p. 9.

explicated they may find that the elite does not have bases for all components, thus not having total control and thus, either disproving or restructuring the elitist model of power distribution. Whatever the case may be, by not clearly defining all components of control the elitist model of power distribution is left open for attack along conceptual lines as well as along lines dealing with the basic structure of the model.

The basic structure of the elitist model of power distribution is in itself a reason why all components of control are not defined. Since there is an elite this elite must possess more of something than the levels of power below the elite. But, the elite controls all policy that pertains to them as well as controlling the lower power structures vis-a-vis the policies the elite support. It is implied that the elite, by possessing control over the lower power structures and policies relevant to the elite, possess all components of control. Therefore the elitist model of power distribution gives credence to the fact that all components of control are present. But, because of this the proponents of elitism as well as the students of elitism either consider it unnecessary to define all components, because they are all present and can be vaguely understood through the actions of the elite; or since they are present it is more imperative to explicate and show the model than to define concepts; or it may become
counterproductive to do so because of the possibility of disproving the elitist thesis.

The proponents of elitism and the students of elitism have assumed the definition of control and its components as well as use these concepts interchangeably. This leaves many of the components of control undefined. Added to this the basic structure of the elitist model of power distribution vis-a-vis the components of control and it may be concluded that all components are inadequately defined.

By analyzing the elitist model of power distribution with the conceptual framework used in this paper, it is seen that the elitist model of power distribution uses one component of control more than any other component. One apparent reason for this is the model's conceptual inadequacies. Control has been shown to be present, but it is not known what specific kinds. This is a result of not defining all concepts that are possible components of control.

Most proponents and exponents of the elitist model of power distribution deal with the concept power, but given the definition of power used in this paper it would be an inappropriate concept to use. This is so, because normatively speaking an elite is theoretically non-existent in a democratic system and if the usage of power is the means of that elite's control and position in society, the
elite would come to be known by the lower levels of society. Therefore power is not actually used the most, as conveyed by many students and proponents of elitism. However, the elite is said to be powerful in all areas that concern it, therefore it is very easily seen that the power used in elite literature was not meant to have the same connotation as the one used in this paper. But by looking at the structure of the elitist model one component would still have to be used more than all other components.

Although all components are present, the basic structure of the elitist model of power distribution makes manipulation more prevalent than all other components. This is seen when looking at the type of policies that are supported by the elite, and the type of policies that are produced by the elitist model of power distribution. These policies help the elite in some manner or they would not be concerned with them. But, if the lower levels of the elitist model were cognizant of this they would put pressure on the system to correct this injustice. Through these policies the elite maintains its elite position in society, which society would not allow if it were cognizant of an elite. But by the people not being cognizant of a controlling elite this also implies the use of manipulation by the elite on the lower levels of society. It may be safe to say that these lower levels present in the
elitist model are aware of socioeconomic differences, i.e., class differences, but they do not comprehend the idea of a controlling elite being present in their society.

By looking at the bases of manipulation, the elite would be more likely to possess these bases than would the lower levels of the elitist model. This is not to say that the elite does not possess or is not capable of possessing the bases of the other components of control, however, this is the same case for the lower levels of the model as well. Therefore each level is capable of possessing the bases of all components, except for manipulation. The reason for this being that the elite has in general better cultural upbringing and better education than does the lower levels. From this, the elite is more capable of being sagacious than are the lower levels of the elitist model of power distribution.

However, the argument may be made that there are individuals in the lower levels that do have a good cultural upbringing and do obtain a good education, comparable to that of the elites, and eventually show that they possess similar traits that the elite possess, including sagacity. These individuals are coopted into the elite structure of the elitist model of power distribution and are considered a viable part of the elite. Manipulation is not, therefore, some form of control that is preserved for only elites and their progeny, but can be found in
individuals coming from the two lower levels of the elitist model of power distribution. However, more elites possess the bases for manipulation than do members of the lower levels, but, if a member does possess the bases of manipulation that person will more than likely be coopted into the elite section of the elitist model. The purpose of cooptation is not solely based on the possession of the bases of manipulation, but also on preserving the elite as well as safeguarding it from possible detection by the lower levels.

One concluding way to show how manipulation is used more in the elitist model of power distribution than any other component of control, would be to look at the consequences if all components of control were used in equal proportions. The obvious problem is that this would create some type of contact or relationship between the elite and the lower structures, which the elite would disapprove of because of the need to remain aloof from the other two structures in the model. This could not be done if coercion, power, and influence were used in equal proportions with manipulation.

For instance, if coercion were to be used by the elite to maintain its position in society and control the lower levels of the model, some type of contact between the coercer and the coerced would take place. Although coercion has been shown to be non-relational there is a contact,
which would make it easier for the elite to be detected, thus jeopardizing its aloofness and possibly the elite status that it maintains. Therefore, for the elite to use coercion in a controlling situation would be counter-productive.

When looking at power and influence as a means for controlling the lower levels of society as well as for maintaining an elite position in society, they too seem to be an unfeasible means to an end, given the relational characteristics of these components of control. When being used both components require some kind of relationship between the user and the recipient. Therefore, if the elite used power or influence for the majority of their controlling situations they would be more likely to be detected, which again would jeopardize their elite position and possibly make them less able to control in the long run.

It may be concluded that by looking at the lax ways concepts have been defined, by looking at the basic structure of the elitist model of power distribution, and by looking at the consequences of using power, coercion and influence in the elitist model, manipulation is used more than any other component of control. By using manipulation the elite will be able to stay aloof and remote while still being able to control the policies that are important to it. Given the elitist model of power distribution,
it has been proven that the component manipulation is used more than the other components of control.

Conclusion

Both models of power distribution have been examined in relation to the conceptual framework devised in Chapter III. From this, the following general conclusions may be drawn:

1. Both models of power distribution perform some form of control.

2. Both models of power distribution fail to sufficiently define all the components of control.

3. Because of this failure the use of one component is more prevalent in each model than is the use of the other components of control.

Therefore, both models of power distribution have generally the same basic problems. Because they do not define all components of control, even though all are present, there is a lack of conceptual clarity in both models of power distribution. Resulting from this conceptual unclarity is the use or implied use of one component of control more than the other components of control. The major conclusion drawn from these general conclusions is that both the pluralist and elitist models of power distribution have failed to explicate all components of control, even though it has been shown that all components are present, thus resulting in conceptually inadequate models of power.
distribution.

Tentative conclusions can be drawn about both models of power distribution when looking at the problems that stem from the conceptual inadequacies in each model. When discussing the reasons why one component is used more in both models of power distribution than any other components, both the structure of each model and the unfeasibility of using certain components of control was discussed. It was argued that because of the basic structure of each model of power distribution one component of control worked best in most controlling situations. In the other paradigm all concepts were used in relation to each model and it was seen that specific concepts, if used, would produce fewer desired results in the long run and possibly be counterproductive for each model. For example, if a component of control were used that was not the component that was used most often, the desired policies may not be obtained or the goals of the group using the component may become jeopardized. Although not being able to conclusively state from this analysis that there are certain structural mistakes in each model, there is the possibility that both models of power distribution are structurally incorrect or the wrong concepts were used in explicating the models.

In spite of the great concern over pluralism versus elitism, the debates must continue in order to do away
with all uncertainties in each model. However, these debates must now concern themselves with a new dimension if credibility is to come to any one model of power distribution. This new dimension must be that of conceptual clarification since both the elitist and pluralist models of power distribution are conceptually inadequate. Subsequently, other problems in both models that have not been dealt with, but stem from the conceptual inadequacies, can be resolved.
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