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SOCIAL WELFARE AND SOME IMPLICATIONS OF NON-VIOLENCE

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A new journal has made its appearance. It is called Soldier of Fortune and is devoted to the concerns of "professional adventurers"--that is, to those who would like to become hired violent fighters in various parts of the world. The journal opens its columns to their advertisements: "Ex-marine seeks employment as mercenary, full-time or job contract, prefers South or Central America but all offers considered." "Experienced mature fighter/seeks assignment anywhere...." In defending his journal from the charge of encouraging brutality, the founder says: "After all, booze is brutal, cars are brutal, sex is brutal. There's a need for guns and explosives, and for adventure in foreign lands....Sure, some of the guys who buy it are flamboyant, devil-may-care people, and some are brutal, but life is brutal, isn't it?" The editorial board is composed of specialist heads of departments: thus there is a "knives editor," a "terrorism editor," and so on.¹

The new journal simply reflects a prevalent extensive commitment to violence throughout the world and particularly in the United States. Ruth L. Sivard, author of the recently published World Military and Social Expenditures, 1976,² dramatizes this devotion against a background of eroding education and social welfare and of poverty on a gigantic scale. Thus the world as a whole expends each year some \$300 billion on preparation for war and about 60 million persons throughout the globe owe all or a substantial part of their livelihoods to the military. During all the period of the SALT talks, armaments continued to increase. In two years of the negotiations, the United States added 2,000 nuclear weapons to its stockpile (the number went up from 6000 to 8000 strategic nuclear devices). In the same period, the Soviets escalated, too, although at a somewhat lesser rate. Total nuclear weapons in the world increased from two in 1945 to some 12,000 today. Even with such agreements as the nuclear test and non-proliferation treaties, armaments continued their upward climb.

In this country, two-thirds of all national government employees work for the Department of Defense. And the great bulk of the national debt was accumulated for warfare, not welfare.

The United States furnishes arms to a wide variety of countries--to both Jordan and Israel, for example; and the sales (perhaps \$12 billion during the current year) continue to mount, government authorities often defending them on the ground that they help correct the international "imbalance" of payments.

Domestically, of course, we need only remind ourselves of what is familiar to every well informed person. Police armaments have escalated during the past five years, crimes of violence show little indication of sharply declining, and the

kinds of subtle yet terrible violence reflected in the disintegration of cities have mounted. And social workers are thoroughly familiar with the increase in child abuse.

A variety of conditions, of course, contributes to these phenomena. The arms race, while it exacerbates violence, also reflects international social and political tensions. Police violence, although it probably does nothing to abate violent crime as a whole, reflects the genuine concern of citizens for the escalation of violence in general. The advertisements in Soldier of Fortune can perhaps be connected with a kind of distorted desire to find life exciting--an effort to break out of our bureaucratized civilization, an endeavor to discover in killing and intrigue the adventure so often lacking in a complex technological world.

The pioneers in social work were, of course, familiar with wounds inflicted by violence in their time and at the same time with the futility of utilizing violence to heal those wounds. Leaders like Jane Addams and Lilian Wald saw the poor and the powerless as victims of a violent world--a world which could be met, not on its own terms, but only under the guidance of a radically different ethic. They had a vision of humankind which was far in advance of the views prevalent in their generation. Thus Jane Addams refused to be deceived by the argument that World War I could in any way contribute to the cause of democracy and peace, even though she was often ridiculed for her position.

In our day, those devoting their lives to social welfare have a special responsibility to think through the implications of war and violence--and of non-violence--for individuals, for groups, and for nations. Among the questions they should ask themselves are: Why should we be expending 6 to 7% (and upwards of 10% a bit earlier) of our Gross National Product on the military, as against about 1% in the last days of Calvin Coolidge as President? What is the relation, if any, between the commitment to violence and the starvation of social services? Is there a connection between domestic violence and public commitment to the international arms race? What are the respective faiths of violence and non-violence?

It is to the latter question that this paper is centrally devoted, although in the process we shall be referring to several of the others as well. We maintain that while disintegrating institutions, conflicts within the psyche, and many other factors are, of course, important in accounting for the violence of our world, still that world would not exist without a profound if often unarticulated faith in the efficacy of violence. Likewise, while the achievement of a non-violent world will depend upon many institutional and psychological factors, it cannot be attained unless and until we think through and commit ourselves to a basic faith in non-violence. The issue, in other terms, is between two faiths--on the one hand, a devotion to certain myths which sustain violence; on the other hand, and in sharp contrast, confidence in a series of reverse propositions. We escalate the arms race because of a faith; and the only way in which we can

de-escalate it will be to develop a counter-faith from which a non-violent world will emerge.

What are some of the central elements of this faith in non-violence and its implications for the practical issues confronting society?

We deal with this question by first turning to a provisional definition of non-violence; then suggesting some implications of non-violence for personal relations; and finally, examining its meaning for the social and political world. Throughout, we shall be insisting that we cannot have it both ways: we cannot combine social welfare, in the long run, with reliance on violence; nor can we develop a non-violent society in the absence of an expansion of social welfare in its several dimensions. And we can no more usher in a world of social equity through violence than we can speak of "hot ice."

1.

As a kind of provisional or working statement, we may suggest that non-violence is a view, reflected in practice, which insists that in human relations--whether personal or socio-political--we respect human beings as ends in themselves and that we so intend and act that we do not seriously injure them in body, mind, or spirit. There are two basic elements in this statement: (a) that we do not intend to injure seriously or irremediably; and (b) that we seek intelligently to engage only in those actions which will in a particular situation not injure in fact. Gandhi used the word ahimsa, without harm or injury. We are suggesting that intentions are never enough; one also has a duty, insofar as one can, to select consciously and with knowledge only those methods which are likely to lead to the goal of "harmlessness." This implies that we have a broad and sophisticated awareness of what the often-complicated consequences of a given act are likely to be.

The statement, of course, bristles with ambiguities. So long as life exists, for example, and no matter how careful we are, our means may sometimes lead to violence. Does this mean that we should therefore give up the attempt to be non-violent? Of course not. For inaction, by seeming to tolerate the violence built into the status quo, might itself be encouraging a violence-prone society.

Then, too, the statement in itself says nothing about "force" and "coercion," which are themselves very ambiguous terms. Sometimes "force" and "violence" are equated. We are not doing so. Force and coercion of some kind--physical, intellectual, spiritual, economic, social--would seem to be inseparable from human existence, as are "individuality" and "conflict." But not all physical force or coercion, for example, is violent. When it is used under restrained and circumscribed conditions for the purpose of benefiting the individual involved or at least for ends which do not entail his serious injury, it may be legitimate: the context of the act is vitally important. When I forcibly pull a child from the pathway of an automobile, I am not being violent, any more than when I carefully

but forcibly keep a temporarily deranged person from slashing his wrists. When a policeman pushes two potential antagonists apart, he is not being violent but rather is endeavoring to prevent violence. Acts of these kinds are to be sharply differentiated from, let us say, the bombing of a city, the killing of a "criminal" by the State (euphemistically called "execution"), or the toleration of social conditions which lead to gross disrespect for human personality. Shooting a public official in order to reform society cannot be equated morally with refusal to co-operate with his illegitimate acts. Both torturing a prisoner and conscientiously boycotting a dime store may be regarded as coercive; but surely there is an important moral distinction.

Applying tests of these kinds, of course, is not always easy. But the drawing of lines in any application of ethical norms is never without its hazards. All we can expect of ourselves as rational beings is that we endeavor to be clear in our own minds about the standards we are seeking to apply and as well-informed and intelligent as possible in implementing those standards.

But it is extremely important that we have standards of some kind; and the quest for criteria of non-violence is one which seeks to recognize this importance. Violence itself may often be due to the fact that we have few if any standards, so that when we are confronted by a crisis situation we often succumb to the pressures of the moment which make for violence.

Both from a general viewpoint and particularly from the perspective of social welfare, it is important to recognize the significance of what is called institutionalized violence. Built into the structure of institutions themselves may be patterns of severe exploitation and inequity which undermine the norms we have sought to suggest. A revolutionist hurling a bomb may be protesting an institutional structure more violent than his own act. The advocate of non-violence must be fully aware of this; and while he will repudiate the methods of the revolutionist, he will sympathize with his objectives. Non-violence does not imply passivity. Indeed, it suggests constant activity against injustice, exploitation, war, and militarism but only by means which differentiate themselves from the spirit of these phenomena. Thus the worker against injustice will not employ methods which themselves tend to encourage injustice (perhaps of another kind); and the advocate of peace will not use war in a futile effort to gain his end. To wage war tends to produce more war; to kill or to threaten to kill (whatever the excuse) encourages the desire to kill, not the impetus to respect human life.

2.

Now it is with some such conception of non-violence that we approach the question in terms of personal relations. The ethic of non-retaliation is an exemplification of the notion of non-violence: I shall not reply in kind to your failure to show respect for me as a person. If we are seeking the "rehabilitation" of an individual, we ourselves must be impeccable by setting the standard for non-retaliatory action. We cannot teach a thief to be honest by stealing from him; a person to be loving by exemplifying hate; or a victim of an exploitative social sys-

tem to gain self-respect by treating him as if he were not worthy of respect. The only hope is to make a kind of leap of faith and to see in the thief a person who can transcend his past; in the person consumed by hatred an individual who has possibilities of exemplifying love; and in the victim of exploitation, one who can rise above his low self-esteem if only others treat him not so much as the man he is but as the man he can be. In all these situations, imagination is an important ingredient of non-violence and non-retaliation. The unimaginative individual is one who cannot see beyond the present to the potential. There will, of course, be failures if we act in this manner; but the failures will be far greater if we implement the reverse attitude.

One of the interesting but unsolved problems (at least it would seem difficult to subject to a scientific test) is the effect of public violence on the domain of personal violence. If the State and public officials are committed to an ethic of retaliation or of violence, is it not reasonable to assume that their prestige will affect the ways in which we treat one another in private relations? If the State threatens to wipe out Moscow under certain circumstances, why is not this a kind of moral license for me or my organization to threaten to obliterate my enemies under specified conditions? When a gang "rubs out" the leaders of an opposing organization, it may be reinforced in its action by the fact that the government "rubs out" its international supposed enemies. After all, what is the difference morally between a plan to kill Castro or thousands of Japanese in Nagasaki and a scheme of the "Cosa Nostra" to liquidate physically those who challenge it? During the Vietnam War, I remember asking a social psychologist whether there was a relation between the terror bombings and massacres being carried out in Vietnam under the auspices of the government and the seemingly increasing disrespect for human life within the United States. His reply was that he saw every reason for assuming this to be true. Confucius would apparently have given the same answer, for much of his political philosophy is rooted in the notion of the ruler as "exemplar." The Emperor in his official acts must set the example for his subjects in their private relations; for while institutional authority--that which goes beyond any given ruler--is important, still if the ruler himself sets the wrong example, how can one expect his subjects to act rightly?

At least this is a hypothesis worth considering.

To be sure, the incidence of public violence may also be affected by the prevalence of private violence. The police become more menacing in response to the growth of crime; and reliance on international weaponry is part and parcel of the ethos of private violence. We can admit all this and still plausibly contend, however, that the probability is that the influence is heavily weighted the other way. Rulers and political systems carry with them the prestige and the authority of a whole society and so there is a tendency on the part of private individuals to conclude that if a thing is permissible in public action, it must also be morally acceptable (if not legally so) in private affairs. There is some evidence, for example,--although it should not be considered conclusive--that, other things being equal, countries enforcing the death penalty encourage murders. We do know that the death penalty apparently does not discourage killing.

We might also observe that insofar as we already adhere to the ethic of non-violence in private relations, it is not primarily as the result of threats by the police but rather because, to a very widespread extent, even in a violent culture, most human beings have the faith, exemplified in habit patterns, that all human beings are capable of love and intrinsically worthy of respect. Generally speaking, if we trust the other person, he will justify that trust; and while there will be many exceptions to this rule, without its presence anything resembling a human community would be impossible. Insofar as the police are "effective," it is because a sufficient level of community exists to make them so.

Implicitly, the profession of social work is committed to the notion of non-violence in personal relations, else it denies its reason for being. Whatever the context might be, it, above all professions, should be anchored in the faith that there is that within each human being, however it may have been suppressed or concealed by institutionalized exploitation and violence or psychological factors or misfortune, which makes for the possibility of rationality, love, and non-violence. One way of uncovering this quality is for others to see it even before the individual is aware of it himself. The individual can regain his or her self-respect if others show their respect for him not as he apparently is in the existential situation but rather as he can become. When he is at length aware of others' respect and confidence, demonstrated through actions and not merely talk, he will eventually re-discover his own worth and rebuild his own respect. Whether the individual be a murderer, a welfare mother, a poverty-stricken child, or an individual distraught by psychological conflicts and guilt, a key factor in the philosophy of social work is the restoration of self-respect. And this can be accomplished only in close association with the principles of non-violence.

But so closely are public and private realms associated in the modern world that the very basis for non-violence and self-respect in personal relations is heavily conditioned on our attempting to implement the principle in the public realm as well. So long as we are strongly committed to the ethos of violence in politics and the organization of society, we shall be limited in what we can do to develop justice and non-violence in the private sphere. This is true first of all because, as we have suggested, the public example will tend to affect practices in the realm of personal conduct and, secondly, because heavy commitment to violence will, both financially and psychologically, deprive social welfare broadly conceived (social work, education, mental health, and so on) of indispensable resources of scarce goods and equally essential resources of spirit and morale.

3.

In a celebrated passage, the late R.H. Tawney comments, in the context of sixteenth century economic development, on the human race's proclivity for wasting its substance through violence and war:

Mankind, it seems, hates nothing so much as its own prosperity. Menaced with an accession of riches which would lighten its toil, it makes haste to redouble its labors, and

to pour away the perilous stuff, which might deprive of plausibility the complaint that it is poor. Applied to the arts of peace, the new resources commanded by Europe during the first half of the sixteenth century might have done something to exorcise the specters of pestilence and famine, and to raise the material fabric of civilization to undreamed-of heights. Its rulers, secular and ecclesiastical alike, thought otherwise. When pestilence and famine were ceasing to be necessities imposed by nature, they re-established themselves by political art.

The sluice which they opened to drain away each new accession of superfluous wealth was war.³

Tawney's observations about the sixteenth century are fully applicable to the past century and a half of modern history. We might even expand the analysis: not only does war drain away the "surplus" of wealth, but it also frustrates social reform and tends to promote social chaos. Violent revolutionary forces are released and family life is disrupted.

The problem of non-violence in the public order is whether we can reverse these historical trends. It will not be easy, for even the history of the United States, which we have often thought of as relatively immune from many of the main currents of world history, reveals the tendency.

Recall, for example, American experience in the twentieth century. The early part of the century was characterized by considerable expansion of the economy and, after 1913, by important social reform measures which, had they been continued, might have resulted in some genuine re-distribution of wealth and power. But these possibilities were frustrated when the country entered World War I, which greatly enhanced the resources and power of the wealthy and brought an end--as do most wars--to any desirable social reforms. Perhaps all this might have been justified, according to some, had the war accomplished much that was worth-while; but it did not: it neither made the world "safe" for democracy nor brought about a situation in which war was less likely in the future. And the resources destroyed by the war, whether in the United States or elsewhere, were staggering. A monetary world cost estimate of \$400 billion scarcely does justice to the fact that many of these resources were irreplaceable; and it speaks not at all of the tens of millions of human lives wiped out.

Or again, World War II came to the United States after a period of social reform--some of it surely desirable--which the war promptly halted while providing a facade of "war prosperity." The destruction wrought by World War II was far greater than that of World War I and the net benefit to the world or to the United States even more dubious. Psychologically, perhaps, American entry could be partly interpreted as an effort through war to counteract or plaster over the failure to take the United States out of the Great Depression without war. The war virtually eliminated unemployment, which was still 9 million at the end of 1939,

but at a fearful price.

But no more than World War I did it make the world "safe for democracy." While it appeared to destroy one "totalitarian" system--that of Nazi Germany--it did so at the price of greatly expanding the power of another--the Soviet Union. And its temporary solution for the problem of unemployed men and women--in the war the solution was that men were employed blowing other men and natural resources to bits--was followed by chaos and many smaller though often ferocious wars throughout the earth. While the violence of the war helped force Hitler's death, it left many of the basic issues confronting mankind unresolved or exacerbated. A tyrant died but tyranny proliferated. The war gave birth, moreover, to the atomic bomb, which has cast its shadow over the entire period since World War II.

During the period between 1961 and 1964, there seemed to be some promise again of using vast potential resources for human welfare, through the "war on poverty," the development of civil rights, and imaginative schemes like some of the housing programs. But again the potential was in considerable measure frustrated when the United States began its massive violence against Vietnam--at an ultimate cost of perhaps \$150 billion.⁴ And after the war--as has been usual in wars from ancient to modern times--came the inflation which eroded the savings of millions of the poor and middle classes and, accompanied by another "recession," severely restricted possibilities for social justice. And the Vietnam war, like its predecessors, gave no evidence that it had improved the lot of humankind in any significant ways.

During the Vietnam War, it was first believed that we could have both "guns" and "butter." But it soon became evident that, whatever the possibilities from a strictly economic and financial point of view, in terms of psychology it was difficult if not impossible to combine the huge commitment to violence with serious efforts for social welfare.

And now, in the post-war period, educational budgets do not keep pace with inflation, the war against poverty continues to be undermined, and social service work in many of its most vital aspects is curtailed. Moreover, numerous sections of the central cities remind one more and more of urban areas that have been bombed or otherwise destroyed in war. Yet the shopping list for armaments continues to grow.

To be sure, we are told that military violence and its threat promote "security." But the meaning of this statement is not at all clear. If it implies that once we have a certain level of "over-kill" (the ability, let us say, to wipe out the "enemy" five or six times over), we shall no longer be fearful and can halt the arms build-up, it would seem obviously to be a false proposition; for it would appear that the higher our arms levels, the more fearful we become that they are not high enough. Expansion of armaments, far from reassuring us, seems to stimulate still more expansion. The greater the "over-kill" capacity, the more we feel the need for additional and even more monstrous weapons. It is almost certain

that a citizen of the United States feels far more insecure with respect to external "enemies" than the citizen of a third or fourth rate "power" like Denmark.

Perhaps, though, possession of great arms in face of the enemy's escalation will deter from war. But this would seem very unlikely. While we can never prove beyond the shadow of any doubt that large armaments and arms races do not prevent war, since there are so many variables, the experience of the arms race before World War I is not reassuring. Far more plausible is the proposition that if a nation prepares for war through arms escalation, it will eventually be tempted to use those arms.

But if war does come, it may be urged, surely great armaments will tend to prevent invasion and to protect human beings. But there is little if any evidence to show this, particularly in the modern age. In World War II, for example, both Denmark and Norway, with tiny military forces, were invaded; but so were Germany, France, Poland, and the Soviet Union, with huge military establishments. As for protecting human life in time of war, even the best military "defense" cannot prevent millions of deaths: in the United States, for example, writers speak in terms of fifty or more millions.⁵ Under these circumstances, it is a mockery to speak of the military preserving human lives.

We argue, then, that build-up of armaments in today's context promotes fear and insecurity among citizens of Great Powers, including the United States; that large armaments will not deter from war but, on the contrary, will probably constitute a temptation to initiate it; and that once a nation enters war large armaments give no assurance whatsoever that the country will not be invaded or that millions of its citizens will not die. Armaments, in other words, have very little to do with "security." On the contrary, they probably exacerbate insecurity.

But if we reach this conclusion, it would seem to be useless to maintain military forces. If their existence does nothing to allay fear, probably cannot deter from war, and can neither prevent invasion nor protect human beings, it would seem unreasonable to retain them.

In other words, if we are convinced that public violence and its threat are not only immoral but inefficacious (in terms of worth-while objectives), then a nation is foolish to rely on them even if other nations choose to do so. Willingness and readiness to disarm unilaterally would seem to be a part of practical wisdom as well as a requirement of any commitment to non-violence as a moral principle.

Just what might unilateral disarmament imply in terms of details?

The policy might conceivably begin with a public announcement of what is contemplated. A government just elected on a platform of unilateral disarmament would state that it had lost all confidence in military violence and was determined during the course of, say, five years to divest itself of all military weapons. It would invite representatives of all countries to observe the process. Among the

first steps would be abolition of the CIA and other secret intelligence agencies. Then gradually, year by year, armaments in all categories would be reduced. Gradualness would be desirable to permit orderly economic and social adjustments.

Meanwhile, as part of the process, there would have been an announcement that the resources saved by unilateral disarmament would not lead to a reduction in taxes but rather to alternative expenditures on what might roughly be called "social welfare"--education, counselling services, exportation of skills to develop trained manpower in parts of the world requesting it, rehabilitation of cities, and the organization of a system of non-violent resistance to any invasion. There might be a pledge to devote approximately one half of all present military expenditures to international purposes (under the control of an international agency) and one half to domestic goals for a generation. This would mean that each year during the disarmament process, about 10% of existing "defense" expenditures (over \$10 billion) would be contributed for world purposes and 10% to rehabilitating a sorely disintegrating domestic society. At the end of five years, each segment would be receiving at least \$50 billion annually for a minimum of at least a quarter of a century.

If one attempts to spend \$50 billion for non-military purposes, even in an age of inflation, one is startled by what one can buy. For example, one could support 200 large universities; or provide 12 million full scholarships for college students; or establish some half a million to a million substantial day care centers; or pay the salaries of more than three million special education teachers to stimulate gifted children and assist the retarded; or furnish over three million social workers in such fields as psychiatric social work, family welfare, and many others; or finance between three and four million national park attendants; and so on. One can work out one's own calculations and no matter what they are, they must be astounding. And these are figures only for the domestic side; an equal sum would be available for the international and it would probably go even further.

Sometimes it is argued that without heavy emphasis on "defense" and on war preparation the unemployment problem would necessarily be much worse than it is today. But the fact is that, on the average, a given sum expended in the civilian sector will produce more employment than if used by the military. Moreover, civilian employment tends to be less inflationary than "defense" employment. Explains an economist who has studied the problem: "I think economists would generally agree that it is a misconception that defense creates more jobs.... Defense, particularly modern defense, is a high technology business. Defense production tends to require more highly skilled people but to employ fewer people per unit of output than civilian industry. It also puts pressure on prices. It creates buying power, but does not produce goods that can be bought in the market.... High defense spending for these reasons has an inflation-inducing effect."⁶

We cannot predict with any exactitude, of course, what reactions a program of unilateral disarmament by a major nation would provoke. But one thing would seem

to be certain: the situation of today, based as it is on competitive armaments and an almost irrational confidence in military might, would be drastically altered both psychologically and sociologically. In many parts of the world, including the Soviet Union, there would probably be strong domestic pressures to emulate the United States in its unorthodox actions; for it is notorious that the clamor for more consumers goods in Russia and elsewhere is already very strong. A unilateral initiative of this kind might, in fact, lead to competitive disarmament. But even if this response did not occur, the unilateral disarmament would continue, on the premise that it was soundly based, both in morality and in terms of practical efficacy.

Those with a deep commitment to the principle of non-violence would hold, of course, that a policy of this kind would be far more effective as a national defense measure than all the armaments we presently possess. But whether or not one agrees or disagrees with this conclusion depends in part on how one thinks of "national defense." Here we define it roughly as "The preservation and enhancement of human life and of the basic morally defensible institutions and practices of a nation." This definition would exclude from the term international economic exploitation, military power as an end in itself, or the quest for dominion over others. The new utilization of the resources formerly devoted to the military would defend in a number of ways: first, moral duties to mankind would be much more emphatically recognized than today and a by-product of this would probably be that any possible justification for invading the country (always a specter for those insisting on military national defense) would be reduced to the vanishing point; secondly, the new outlook would understand that perhaps the greatest menace to the life and institutions of a people comes from within rather than from without--from deteriorating cities, hopeless young people, absence of constructive challenges, unemployment, inadequate education, human alienation, and so on;⁷ thirdly, the policy, by confining "defense" to vindication of those things that are worth-while and excluding those objectives which make for injustice would clearly see that genuine peace and national defense depend on the establishment of justice.

Part of the policy, of course, would be provision for non-violent resistance to any possible invasion or occupation. Those committed to non-violence would believe that if other elements of the policy were implemented, the necessity for non-violent resistance would be remote. Nevertheless, provision would be made for it, as an aspect of the whole scheme.

Basically, non-violent resistance would be a program in which several thousand selected individuals would be highly trained to lead the population in campaigns of non-co-operation with invading or occupying forces. Strategies and tactics involving the strike, the boycott, and the withholding of moral support would be planned for; and training would be rigorous. No occupying force can long hold a country if non-violent non-co-operation is widespread and if human beings are willing to die (but not to kill) for their country. The whole training of non-violent resisters would be premised on such propositions. If one

leader were to be killed by the army of occupation, the "game plan" of non-violent resistance would provide for immediate succession of another. The professionals in non-violent resistance would, of course, guide the non-professionals in the tactics to be used. The budget would include an item of, let us say, \$5 billion a year for non-violent resistance training. One of the military service academies would be retained to help educate leaders of the new strategy.⁸

Does a policy of unilateral disarmament involve risks? Of course. But we contend that the risks are far fewer than those entailed by a commitment to violent defense. It could be that under a scheme of unilateral disarmament, some nation would become utterly irrational and seek to invade the country. But surely this is much less likely than with present policies. In an atmosphere of competitive armaments, irrationality is much more apt to erupt than in one where a prominent nation has renounced violent defense. What possible purpose would be served by a military invasion of the United States? After all, it would already be sharing its resources on a large scale, would have indicated its non-aggressive intent by unilateral disarmament, and would have opened all of its genuinely public business to world scrutiny. If under these circumstances another nation still contemplated invasion, it would have to weigh the costs of occupying a country in face of the most effective form of resistance, that of the non-violent type.

The notion of unilateralism is, we are contending, entirely compatible with hard-headed military and political realism. The unrealistic, in fact, are those who think that preparation for military violence has anything to do with national defense. After studying military history for a lifetime, the late Walter Millis, perhaps the United States' greatest twentieth century military historian, maintained that "a good theoretical case can be made for the proposition that a unilateral divestiture...would in fact redound more to the real security and welfare of the American people than any other course..."⁹ While Millis thought that the American people were not yet ready to accept such a policy, this did not detract from its soundness; and one might well ask Walter Millis why, if he could be convinced of its soundness, the American people could not be.

A policy of unilateral disarmament within the context suggested here would greatly strengthen the health, welfare, and spirit of the American people--surely one of the central objectives of genuine national defense. In a context where "defense" is largely identified with military violence, the tendency is to forget the limitations of military power and at the same time the possibilities of non-violence. The public mind, moreover, is split--on the one hand, it repeats that its objectives are peace and non-violence; on the other hand, it devotes a substantial proportion of its resources to means which are the antitheses of these objectives. This hardly makes for a state of public mental health. In a context of unilateralism, this split public personality would be eliminated and the very "nakedness" of the country in terms of possessing military weapons would tend to produce a psychology of security. Every encouragement would be given to non-violent solutions. Once faith in military violence had been completely eroded, the way would have been paved for a commitment not dependent on the shallow faith in violence.

In personal relations, we often say: "Jones was utterly disarming," meaning that he was not close-minded, not fearful, and not aggressive; instead, he opened the way to full communication with and understanding of others. A like principle might apply in the context of unilateralism. The nation would be literally disarmed and would therefore be disarming, with consequences not unlike those we think of in personal relations. This is not to equate personal with corporate relations in all circumstances but simply to suggest that in the context of disarmament a similar consequence would probably follow.

It should be emphasized, of course, that unilateralism is dependent on a basic change of attitudes and values in the country as a whole. It would not "work" if substantial segments of the population continued actively to commit themselves to violence. It would entail, in other words, a fundamental alteration of public opinion.¹⁰

To be consistent, too, it would need to be accompanied by other measures exemplifying non-violence in the public arena. For example, the police would have to be disarmed and individuals, too, would have to renounce their "right" to bear arms. Any thought of "capital punishment" or killing by the State would have to be eliminated; and some of the worst outrages going on under the name of "prison" would need to vanish. We should also have to reduce the gap between lowest and highest incomes. Not that all these transformations would need to come about immediately but rather that they would be seen from the beginning as essential if policies of non-violence were to be fully implemented.

Overly simplifying, we can say that there are two basic views of the State and of law. One thinks of them as repressive--as essentially existing to suppress the evil in man. Here the accent is on force and negation and even violence. The other view would see the State and law as potentially positive--as devices for helping to release the good in human beings and to organize the community in such a way that evil is overcome not by repression but by so accenting the constructive that the darker side of human nature fades into the background. The notion of non-violence would obviously fit into the latter paradigm, as would, if the interpretation of this paper is correct, the philosophical foundations of social work.

Obviously, both of these paradigms are present in the State and law of our day. When law facilitates the making of agreements, the organization of public enterprises for public benefit, and arbitration procedures, the second is obviously involved. When it sends a person to a prison which will obviously not "reform" him, the first is present. When the State provides an educational system, the second is predominant; when it orders me to kill, the first is ubiquitous.

The task of those committed to non-violence in the public realm is to explore all of the avenues open through the second paradigm and to insist that the conception of non-violence, contrary to writers like the late Reinhold Niebuhr, is applicable not only to personal matters but also to group relations and in politics.¹¹ In the process of attempting to implement the second paradigm

imaginatively, social workers and others strengthen not only the cause of non-violence but also that of social welfare in its broadest dimensions. But they should be consistent: non-violence is a philosophy which must be applied universally and not in such a way that some areas of human life are exempt from its impact. We cannot consistently promote it in personal relations and then attack it by supporting violence and its threat in the international sphere.

4.

We began by calling attention to some of the striking exemplifications of the modern world's faith in violence and suggested that non-violence implies a counter-faith. We then explored the elements of that counter-faith in terms of defining it; of suggesting its application to personal relations; and of outlining a few of its implications for the public sphere.

We have not denied that a gigantic leap is necessary to move from the faith in violence to the counter-faith of non-violence. Nevertheless, we stressed that in most relations of life, even today, there is at least a semi-commitment to non-violence. Our task, whether as social workers or as citizens, is to extend that faith into areas where up to now it has seemed unthinkable.

FOOTNOTES

¹See Simon Winchester, "The Death Dealers," Manchester Guardian, June 20, 1976, p. 1.

²Leesburg Virginia: WMSE Publications, 1976.

³R.H. Tawney, Religion and the Rise of Capitalism (N.Y.: New American Library, Mentor, 1960), pp. 69-70.

⁴Which does not include such "indirect" costs as war pensions, care for the war injured, and similar war-related expenses.

⁵Herman Kahn's older work, On Thermonuclear War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960) is still a useful source for projecting probable fatalities in any large-scale war.

⁶Ruth L. Sivard, in Transition, v. 3, No. 3, June, 1976, p. 2.

⁷Arnold J. Toynbee in his A Study of History stresses that the civilizations he studied disintegrated primarily from within rather than as a result of external pressures. Thus the main "enemy" of the ancient Greek cities consisted of internal factors rather than of a menace engendered by Persia. And Roman civilization was basically "overthrown" not by the "barbarians" but by such phenomena as internal political decay, alienation, social corruption, and rank injustice.

⁸See, for example, Mulford Q. Sibley, The Quiet Battle: Writings in the Theory and Practice of Non-Violent Resistance (Boston: Beacon, 1969); American Friends Service Committee, In Place of War: An Inquiry into Non-Violent National Defense (N.Y.: Grossman, 1967); Gene Sharp, The Politics of Non-Violent Action (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1973); and Adam Roberts, Civilian Resistance as a National Defense: Non-Violent Action Against Aggression (Baltimore: Penguin, 1967).

⁹"The Uselessness of Military Power," in Robert A. Goldwin, America Armed: Essays on United States Military Policy (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964), p. 41.

¹⁰For an elaboration of the idea of unilateral disarmament, see Mulford Q. Sibley, Unilateral Initiatives and Disarmament (Philadelphia: American Friends Service Committee, 1961). See also Mulford Q. Sibley, "Unilateral Disarmament," in Robert A. Goldwin, America Armed: Essays on United States Military Policy (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963), pp. 112-140.

¹¹Niebuhr tended to distinguish the possibilities for morality in personal relations from potentialities in group or political relations, particularly in Moral Man and Immoral Society (N.Y.: Scribner, 1932) but also in many other works. In terms violence and non-violence, his expectations for groups and nations were much lower than those for individuals. While he makes an important point in emphasizing that institutions and organizations are not persons and cannot be said to be capable of love, still it is also true that individuals (who admittedly are capable of love and non-violence) work within the frameworks of institutions and organizations and have the capacity for transforming the latter. There would be no groups if individuals did not exist; and while group life has an autonomy of its own, still, we may say to Niebuhr, the attitudes and convictions of individuals surely have an impact on the group, and their ideals, however "impossible," can change the nature of group relations.