Anti-War Work by Discouragement of Warriors: A Critique of Anti-War Tactics Used among Naval Personnel in the Vietnam War

Orabelle Connally

Everett Community College

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/jssw

Part of the Military and Veterans Studies Commons, Peace and Conflict Studies Commons, and the Social Work Commons

Recommended Citation
Available at: https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/jssw/vol4/iss3/22
"Wars will end when men have ceased to fight" was a popular slogan of the anti-Vietnam War movement. It sounded quite practical and almost true on its face. However, we now have considerable information about wars and how people have refused to fight, and the relationship between them is not well described by this phrase. The specific military technology in use, the social organization of military authority, and the division of labor in producing war, all make a difference in the possibility of stopping a war by many refusals to fight. Campaigns emphasizing this tactic may even strengthen the organization of military authority. This seemed to be the case in the anti-war campaigns directed at crewmen of attack aircraft carriers.

In 1971 and 1972 there were campaigns to stop the sailing for Vietnam of the USS Constellation, the USS Kitty Hawk and the USS Coral Sea. These were studied along with a later series of strikes of 130 Black sailors on the Constellation, a racial fight of over 200 on the Kitty Hawk and the anti-war movement defense of a sailor charged with sabotage on the USS Ranger (Connally 1976). The study was based on documents produced by people involved in maintaining authority as well as in resisting it. These accounts and analyses appeared in military journals, GI papers, campaign literature, daily newspapers and in a report of Congressional investigation of this resistance. Navy manuals and handbooks on ship organization and authority practice were also studied.

STOP THE SHIP CAMPAIGNS

The Kitty Hawk and Constellation campaigns in San Diego were directed at the community as well as the sailors on the ship and included a city-wide straw vote to "keep the Connie home." The organizers announced that they would use 'non-violence' as their method of resistance, and consistent with this, individual conscience objection to military participation was encouraged. A community peace group sponsored a project house as a campaign center and social gathering place. Another group offered para-legal counseling for enlisted people at a downtown store front and published a GI paper, Up From the Bottom. The campaigns involved months of organizing on and off the ships with meetings, rallies, folk and rock concerts, leafleting and publicity. Following the eventual ship departures, nine men in one case and eleven in the other took 'sanctuary' in local churches instead of returning to their ships. Each time they were arrested and flown to the ships. They were eventually discharged after some time in prison. Church sanctuary was used to make a moral statement against the war and encourage others to resist. It was also used to establish the sailors' claims to discharge as conscientious objectors.
The campaign literature, GI, and underground press gave a libertarian analysis of military authority and the Vietnam War. Along with the arguments against the war and the humanistic accounts of suffering, there was ridicule of named senior NCO’s and ship’s officers. Their insistence on deference, their regulation of haircuts and their officiousness at inspections were all complained of. Specific orders were cited as self-serving for the NCO or officer or as harassment of the men.

The Coral Sea Save (Stop) Our Ship Campaign (SOS) in the San Francisco Bay Area differed from the San Diego campaigns in that the early organizing was not publicized in the civilian community. The campaign literature was more anti-navy than anti-war, non-violence was not specifically approved as a method and cons- cientious objection and the use of church sanctuary were not encouraged. Soli-darity in action with other enlisted people was urged. It was expected that large numbers of the crew would simply not return to the ship when it was ready to sail. When the ship did sail, SOS people claimed over 250 sailors had purposely missed the ship. The Navy claimed there were only the usual number of UA’s (Unauthorized Absences), thirty-five.

BLACK UPRISINGS

The racial fight on the Kitty Hawk and the series of strikes on the Constellation happened without prior planning. On the Kitty Hawk the fight began while the ship was in action off Vietnam. Blacks were leaving a meeting where they had protested the handling of discipline related to a shore fight in the Philippines, and as they left some walked through the hanger deck where they were met by a line of advancing marines. Some picked up hardware and fought, others ran through the ship shouting "they're killing our brothers." This precipitated a general fight of over 200 sailors that lasted for a number of hours and produced serious injuries. The initial attack by marines was the result of a confusion in orders between the captain of the ship and his Black executive officer (House Armed Services Committee 1973). Many of the charges were reduced, when, much later defense attorneys and civilian groups protested.

The strikes on the USS Constellation developed after a series of meetings of Blacks to consider grievances including a rumor that undesirable discharges were to be given to certain Blacks. At the last of these meetings, representatives were sent to the Captain to ask him to meet with them. He refused, was asked by other representatives and continued to refuse. One hundred and thirty Black sailors stayed at the meeting place, the main mess decks all night. The ship was ordered into San Diego and in the morning the sit-in group agreed to go ashore, expecting to receive a hearing for their grievances. The shore discussions were not satis-factory to the 'strikers' and five days later they were ordered to return to the ship. One hundred and twenty-nine men met on the dock, held their own muster and flag salute and refused orders to board the ship, and instead sat down on the dock for six hours until the Navy promised to meet their conditions. In addition to the Captain, his superiors in the Pacific fleet and the Chief of Naval Operations and the Secretary of the Navy were involved in the decision. The men boarded busses
and expected to arrive at one base for settlement. They found instead that they had been separated into three groups and taken to three different bases where they were individually given hearings, charges and relatively mild punishments.

There was a Congressional investigation of these two Black uprisings and the report was soon made public. It blamed the Chief of Naval Operation's policy of "permissiveness" and the Blacks for the trouble. Reports from the Black participants and their supporters were carried in the daily press and in GI newspapers and underground papers. Their complaints were against institutional racism in the Navy. They identified certain of their respective captain's policies as adding to this but they located discrimination in the institutional system for assignments of specialties, training and punishments. They thought this happened as a result of the use of civilian records for decisions on punishment, promotions, assignment and discharge and was compounded within the Navy by racially biased personnel evaluations.

IDEOLOGIES OF AUTHORITY

Officers, who wrote articles and letters in their journals about these resistance events and the practice of military authority, used one of two well developed ideologies. Each ideology included prescriptions for practical actions thought necessary to establish and maintain authority; and each justified authority, that is, the right of a few to demand compliance of many (see Bendix 1960 for this definition of ideology). One of these was a militarist perspective similar to what Vagts has identified as militarism (1937) and the other resembled the managerial ideology of civilian corporate management (Janowitz 1960). It is necessary to consider how these two ideologies affected actual practice of authority on the ships to understand how the resistance actions, in turn, affected navy work.

The militarist ideology assumes that authority is manifested by an inferior's exact obedience to a superior's commands in a face-to-face setting such as the old navy sail ships. Heroes of the old sailing days are often quoted. The maintenance of caste differences are thought necessary for military discipline. Officers are believed to comply as gentlemen who value honor and who are devoted to their country and the Navy. Enlisted people, on the other hand, only cooperate because they are trained in obedience and fear punishment. Militarists think the differences in pay, quarters, personal services and privilege are appropriate and also necessary to maintain discipline. They complain of efforts to increase the "habitability" of enlisted quarters on the ships.

Senior NCO's, particularly chief petty officers, are set apart as more responsible and more deserving than lower rated enlisted people. They have direct authority over the crew although subordinates do most of the supervision. They are responsible for the living arrangements of the sailors as well as for the direction of work. For instance, there are detailed rules even about the way sailors' clothes are to be folded and stacked within drawers. The personal neatness and haircuts of sailors are also subject to navy standards. Militarists
expect chiefs to get compliance by being "tough." They worry that some chiefs may become "nice guys" in a mistaken effort to be liked by their crew.

Orders, coordination and information are expected to go through a chain of command. Appeals, protest or additional information from lower levels are to go up the chain step-by-step. The use of this chain is seen as absolutely necessary for the integrity of the authority of the particular officer at each level. Communications from level to level involve rituals of personal deference. Enforcement of these rituals are interpreted as evidence of the superior's authority. If there are lapses in deference or outright refusals or avoidance, then authority is thought to be in mortal danger: sailors will observe that the superior does not have absolute power to produce obedience and become disobedient themselves. Authority is thus a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy that only works so long as there is unanimous agreement that it does.

The managerial ideology is very different from this. It identifies authority as the administration of institutional processes so that they result in compliance of personnel. Control is essentially by manipulation of career opportunities and possibilities of unfavorable discharges. The relationship between ranks is to have the appearance of cordiality. "Teamwork" is often used to describe the social situation. The senior NCO's are expected to refrain from being authoritarian, but they are nonetheless held responsible for the administration of the work and control of the personal living behavior of enlisted people. There is a de-emphasis on military caste: both enlisted people and officers are thought to work on the same basis, career opportunity.

The actual control mechanisms are impersonal and do not rely on face-to-face interactions. Orders come as paper authorizations for work assignment, transfer, promotion, pay, leave and discharge. It is the content of each person's personnel file that is the key to opportunity or punishment rather than face-to-face negotiation. Each file includes evaluations by the immediate superior, past records of test results, training, experience, history of disciplinary actions and school and court records from civilian life. Compliant behavior is necessary if the enlisted person or officer wishes future promotions or to ward off unfavorable assignments, punishments or discharges. In addition to control by this channeling of behavior, counseling programs and group sensitivity workshops are used to reduce discontent or, "turbulence," as the managerial officers refer to it. The existence of covert surveillance is also publicized as a further persuasion to compliance.

Besides these two ideological 'recipes' for authority there is the actual organization of the work and living situations on the ship. The organization plan was originally based on the militarist organization of sailing ships, where there was face-to-face command (Melville 1850). As technological changes occurred, modifications were made in work organization. Some changes were informed by the managerial perspective, others were simply ad hoc efforts to solve problems presented by the new ship technology. Today work on the huge aircraft carriers consists largely of maintenance of complex machinery and electronic and electrical systems.
The skills for doing the various jobs are not widely understood or shared among the crew. On the old sailing ships each sailor had a well rounded understanding of the total work involved in sailing and the skill to accomplish much of it. An officer could give a general order and expect his men to know immediately how to do it. The work today is divided into simple tasks and job skill is acquired through training and from manuals and specifications by the manufacturer of the equipment. Technical bureaus off the ship also issue instructions. The actual work orders for an individual may be on a printed card which specifies what to do, where to get the tools and how to put them away. In this way many jobs are assigned and completed without direct person-to-person contact. There still are occasions for face-to-face commands on modern aircraft carriers, but these happen more often during the supervision of living arrangements such as in inspection of quarters or of person, than in the doing of the actual work.

**AUTHORITY VIEWED FROM THE RANKS**

Enlisted people often criticized the administration of navy authority; they pointed to arbitrariness and officious actions of NCO's and officers; they called career navy people "lifers" derisively; they considered many orders as exploitive and based on aggrandizement of the officer's career rather than for practical need for the work. They particularly objected to the controls on personal living, haircuts and deference etiquette. They saw all of these as humiliating; however, in spite of this libertarian critique their basic idea of how authority works was the same as the militarists! They assumed that power of navy authority depended on their use of the etiquette of deference and their obedience to face-to-face commands.

The Black movement sailors shared some of this anti-authority view but identified channeling by manipulation of career opportunity as the fundamental method of control. Their analysis developed as part of the identification of institutional racism. The Black movement sailors, then, clearly shared the managerial model of how authority was constructed.

**RESISTANCE PRODUCES CONFLICT BETWEEN MANAGERS AND MILITARISTS**

The anti-war campaigns, the Black movement action and the general anti-authoritarian mood of enlisted people had an indirect effect on authority. The Chief of Naval Operations at this time was Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, a strong spokesperson for the managerial ideology. There had been a serious drop in reenlistments in the Navy, and Zumwalt had ordered a series of reforms to make the Navy more attractive and to solve the "retention" problem. The reforms, which were labeled, Z-Grams, modified certain regulations known as "chicken regulations" that were generally considered harassing for enlisted people. The Z-Grams were not intended to encourage political expression of enlisted people or to make changes in the naval hierarchy. Several of the Z-Grams were explicitly directed against racist practices. These included establishment of race relations councils that could carry information up the naval hierarchy without going through the chain of command.
These reforms created problems with the traditional militarist practices of authority. Many militarist officers and NCO's were more alarmed at the occasional rudeness, grudging cooperation and frequent infraction of the rules of deference etiquette than they were by the direct anti-war actions. When a sailor failed to salute they viewed their authority as under attack. Their ideology of authority prescribed immediate and forceful action in response to these threats. When Zumwalt's policies prevented these responses, he and the managerial position of permissiveness that he represented to them, came to be seen as a serious threat to naval authority. The senior NCO's were in the position where there was the most pinch. They were responsible for seeing that their crews were prepared for inspections and that the many exact regulations were followed. Under the managerial policy of Zumwalt they were to continue to carry out these responsibilities but at the same time they were to avoid alienating the enlisted people. They were the last link in an authoritarian system as they passed on unwelcome orders from above for reasons unrelated to the immediate interests of the crew. It wasn't easy to get compliance by persuasion. They had depended on their own toughness and on its being backed by officers. Zumwalt's managerial policies threatened to deprive them of this support.

Black uprisings of themselves were not seen by militarists as a direct challenge to authority. The militarist ideology does recognize this kind of threat, but there are prescribed responses to it, that is, punishment. The really serious problem to them was the managerial leadership which prevented the punitive action they thought necessary. Militarist ideology does not recognize a valid basis for Black solidarity or a problem of injustice in how Blacks are treated by the Navy. Militarists interpreted Black resistance as evidence of the danger of permissiveness. They believed punishment would have worked both as prevention and as control. Because they were not in complete charge they were saved a test of this. Failures at ship level could be blamed on their hands having been tied by higher managerial authority.

The Kitty Hawk fight and the Constellation strikes had deeply alarmed the CNO (Chief of Naval Operations) and his managerial group. These events encouraged them in their view of the absolute necessity of eliminating racism. Zumwalt publicly blamed his top officers for not taking vigorous actions to eradicate it. Militarist admirals counter-attacked. They asked for support from Congress and got a Congressional investigation. The Congressional committee found in the militarists favor and declared that the problem was permissiveness not racism. Various recommendations from a militarist point of view were made such as to tighten dress codes, lengthen training and restrict recruitment (House Armed Services Committee 1973). In spite of this report and the eventual incorporation of these measures into the Navy, the managerial officers continued to be in charge of personnel policy where they made decisions on promotions, retirement and discharge for officers as well as enlisted people.

The practical results of this internal fight in terms of navy-wide insecurity of NCO's and officers and the effects of this on their work must have been considerable. There were many complaints from officers on the ships. The basic cause of
these tensions was the resistance of enlisted people, but they produced this quite unintentionally. Authority was shaken not by withdrawal of subordinates' participation in the construction of authority, but by uncertainty about the basis of authority among those who were expected to exercise it. This was the indirect impact of the anti-war and Black movements on the naval hierarchy.

**DIRECT EFFECTS OF ANTI-WAR TACTICS**

The anti-war movement in the Navy probably added strength to the civilian peace movement but produced virtually no direct effects on navy participation in the war. The direct purpose of the campaign had been to stop the ships from bombing Vietnam. The anti-war movement simply assumed that individual and group challenges to authority in face-to-face situations would lead to immobilization of the ships as enlisted people either left the Navy or refused to cooperate. How was this to be brought about?

**Quitting The Navy: Conscientious Objection**

Some non-violent resisters refused on grounds of conscience to continue work in the Navy. By doing this with the use of church 'sanctuary' they also managed to get excellent publicity for the civilian peace movement and civilians became supportive of UA's and deserters as well as the sailors who resisted openly. But when anti-war sailors applied for conscientious objector discharges they also were following the paper procedures established by the military. As more people applied for this status and as court cases developed, the procedures were formalized and widely recognized by ship officers. The steps for getting conscientious objector status usually involved disobeying a specific order followed by a sentence of one or more months in the brig. The paper history of this entire application, order refusal and acceptance of punishment were all necessary for the final discharge to be authorized. The managerial leadership did not really object to these people leaving the Navy. The conscientious objectors were thus very obedient as they followed the forms. This legitimized the navy procedures.

**Quitting The Navy: Walking Away**

Some servicemen went UA or deserted altogether. This may have been more of a practical problem for the Navy and a challenge to its legitimacy. Movement enlisted people and the ex-GI's in the movement debated these tactics. Going UA rather than taking sanctuary was encouraged in the campaign aboard the Coral Sea. Sanctuary offered good initial publicity but the later arrests and final disposal of the resisters could be manipulated for the Navy's benefit. This happened to the Kitty Hawk resisters. Navy negotiation convinced the movement people behind them to drop publicity in order to get the men discharged without extra punishment. Some of the movement people thought that large numbers of UA's might actually interfere with the ship's sailing; however, an excess of men are assigned to ships as part of military planning for battle losses and, in addition, extra personnel can be quickly sent from shore bases and other ships. Only if there were a widespread walk-out throughout the Navy could a ship be held up for lack of
personnel. Another problem with Unauthorized Absences is that reports of the number who are gone are questionable. It was impossible for the SOS people to know the total of UAs in the Coral Sea campaign. The Navy reported 35, they reported 250. Sailors on the ship would have certainly noticed if any of their buddies were missing, but they did not have communication networks across the ship to add this up to a perceived challenge to legitimacy of authority.

**Quitting The Navy: Getting an Early Discharge**

Other servicemen tried for an early discharge from the Navy. Discharges before a term of enlistment expires are allowed under certain conditions including conscientious objection. For instance, the Navy may give administrative discharges for physical or mental disabilities and "for the good of the service." Sometimes a sailor could qualify for a disability discharge or convince the Navy that he would be less harmful to them out than in. Doing this was rather tricky because certain transgressions could lead to a long jail sentence or a punitive discharge. Careful use of navy rules and knowledge of the Navy's options were necessary in order to avoid this. Anti-war groups regularly provided para-legal counseling to make it easier for enlisted people to confront the military and, hopefully, to get out. The counseling service was backed by consultation with civilian attorneys and was organized nationally with updating of materials, counselor training workshops and reports of recent court decisions. Counseling services were in continual demand, they were the most popular offering of the anti-war movement.

To some extent the counseling upheld the legitimacy of the Navy as counselors explained how to carefully follow regulations. As sailors learned their rights many became more 'uppity.' There was a proliferation of 'sea lawyers,' an increase in court cases and discharges. This alarmed the militarists, but not the managerial leaders, who themselves used discharges to get rid of political organizers and other troublesome persons. It did become necessary for the Navy to augment their legal personnel.

**Attacking Military Law**

In addition to helping servicemen to secure discharges, legal defense was provided to many anti-military GIs. The defense usually challenged the military for not following their own procedures or challenged the military code for denying the constitutional rights guaranteed to all citizens. When the Navy attempted to press charges as an object lesson to GIs, the movement made it difficult by skillful defense and sometimes by successfully appealing the case to civilian courts. However, in some cases, movement publicity and defense probably led to a more severe sentence than if the case had been defended quietly (Sherill 1970; Finn 1971).

The steady challenge to military practice and military law resulted in changes in practice and in the Uniform Code of Military Justice (the military law). Militarists were again alarmed by the court decisions that limited punishment and
procedures of charging and sentencing, but managerial officers simply worked out other ways to punish, for instance administrative procedures could accomplish the same result. The skillful use of "building a record" in a troublesome individual's personnel file could lead to a punitive discharge.

Raising Consciousness

The anti-war people capitalized on the widespread anti-lifer sentiments. They tried to build a stronger anti-military consciousness among enlisted people by publishing GI newspapers and establishing GI anti-military social centers. Although both militarists and the anti-war enlisted people reported an increase in anti-military consciousness together with a decline in observance of deference rituals in face-to-face interaction with officers, this did not interfere with navy authority. The militarists thought it would; however, and put more pressure on chiefs to get the sailors to act with proper humility and discipline.

No effort was made by the anti-war movement to gain the support of these chiefs. This may not have been a realistic possibility. In any case, it was not tried. Instead the anti-war tactics attempted to create opposition to them by face-to-face 'uppityness'; but this, apparently, did not affect the ability of the Navy to participate in bombing in the Vietnam War. What 'uppityness' did was to push senior NCO's toward stronger support of the militarist position in the inside battle between managers and militarists.

The managerial officers dealt with anti-war and anti-authority organizing on several levels. They avoided any acknowledgement of resistance or of libertarian criticism. The situation was referred to as "turbulence" in the fleet. The anti-war argument, not having been recognized, did not have to be dealt with. The anti-authority sentiments were expected to be reduced by the Z-Gram reforms, a quiet way of handling the problem; however, paper manipulation was the major tactic. As enlisted men or young officers were thought to be successful in organizing a ship, they would be transferred or discharged by paper authorizations without fuss and without risking the reaction of a solidary group. Through the control of channels of communication the administration could prevent any effective feedback to the resisters and isolate potential sources of trouble within the ships. In addition, personal counseling and police and secret service surveillance were increased.

THE BLACK CHALLENGE TO AUTHORITY

The Black movement presented a much more serious challenge to naval authority and particularly to managerial forms of control. It was much less readily handled by 'managerial' strategies than the anti-war movement. It took the form of a direct withdrawal of cooperation of a kind that the anti-war movement would have liked to achieve but never could. Black resistance did actually threaten naval authority directly and the Navy even found it necessary to slightly modify its plans for ship movement as a result. The fight on the Kitty Hawk was a situation temporarily beyond managerial control. A group of men actually fighting
throughout the ship had a potential for interrupting the bombing runs of the planes on the flight deck. The sit-down strike on the mess deck in the *Connie* and the later dockside strike in which the Blacks held their own muster and flag salute was even more challenging because of the solidarity of the group, and in the second strike because of their use of a parallel authority structure. Paper manipulation could not handle these immediate situations.

Furthermore the charge of racism in career administration was a direct denial of managerial legitimacy. The promise of career opportunity was not simply one among many rewards offered by the managerial system of control: it was its basis. The contingencies of career were what they manipulated. The promise to deliver job training or a career in the Navy on a basis of equal opportunity was their justification for authority. As Blacks openly and with much publicity insisted that they had not shared this opportunity, managerial legitimacy was brought into question. The measures available within the managerial system of authority were likely to confirm the Black critique of the Navy as discriminating against them. Direct measures of control of the kind that the militarist ideology would recommend tended to exacerbate the situation. A different response, to correct the situation directly by meeting Black demands for the elimination of racism in the Navy, was made difficult because of the entrenched racist position of the militarists. The managerial method of handling the situation was to promise, not to threaten, but later to divide the group. Solidarity was further weakened by separate trials and mild punishments. The latter tended to diffuse protest by the civilian Black community. But the potential for Black challenge to Navy authority continues.

RESISTANCE AND SOLIDARITY

Both Black and anti-war movements of enlisted people shared common problems of organizing. Enlisted people were dispersed throughout the ship as well as on different ships with little opportunity for contact. Communications were controlled by the naval authorities and there was continuous surveillance and active repression of potential trouble. In this situation, however, Black consensus was crucial to organization and coordinated action. Roberta Ash in her model of movement action has stressed the need to investigate the link between shared conditions and the emergence of collective actions (1972). Black individual experiences result in a shared interpretation common to members of the group. The effectiveness of the Black movement in coping with a highly controlled and repressive context can be understood in these terms. Black enlisted men already shared 'Black experience' as civilians. They shared the experience of having believed recruiters when they promised equal opportunity and they also had similar disillusionment as they found they were assigned to the least desirable jobs. When later on the ships the use of Black power gestures and Black haircuts were outlawed their indignation was shared. It was not necessary for them to talk to each other to find this out. Their recognition of their common situation included recognition of common understanding. As the stories of the shore fight of the *Kitty Hawk* crewmen and the punitive discharges of the *Constellation* reached Blacks, there was one response, anger. Neither long discussions, social gatherings, charismatic leadership nor persuasive argument were needed for action. The only question was what to do. On the *Kitty Hawk* even
this was not a question. The situation was perceived as attack, and self-defense was the common response.

What the Blacks did in both events was to create mutinous situations unprecedented in American naval history. The Navy was able to gain control but not until some hours and days of delicate management. I think this ability of Blacks to act together rested on the solidarity of common understanding as well as on shared identity. "Consciousness raising" occurs during recruitment to identity movements and may take considerable time, but once the new movement replaces the established ideology, the pieces fall into place. New situations can be correctly interpreted from the new view without consultation with other members.

This form of shared interpretation was not available to anti-war sailors. The anti-war position had not developed as part of a common civilian experience or even identical military experience. There were some shared elements of a positive expectation of life in the Navy followed by disappointment as military methods were encountered. The content of the expectations and the later re-orientation varied. There was a shared anti-military view but this was not interpreted as fundamental to their own life situations. The anti-war perspective centered on a concern for other people who were suffering and dying in Vietnam. Action was based on a recognition of complicity in harming them. Individual soul searching was necessary to produce this insight as well as imagination in making the connection between daily navy assignments and the bombing of people. This also required vicarious participation in others' oppression. All of this went on in individual imaginations rather than as a shared actual experience. Even though there was 'talking with each other' it couldn't approach the shared understanding available from common direct experience.

The anti-war sailors did not respond to attempts to block their organization with indignation and anger as did the Blacks. They were aware of some direct oppression but they felt this was as a consequence of their organizing and they didn't feel that it was extremely unfair. They protested their treatment and often took legal action on the basis of their constitutional rights, but they were not indignant nor surprised when the Navy made countermoves. There was even a minor sense of triumph because the Navy had noticed and been annoyed with their actions. People who had developed opposition to the war and were taking serious resistance actions had often experienced emotional anguish as they reached their decisions to act, but by the time of actual confrontation this was usually diffused. They were more likely to meet the events with a sense of tragedy than of anger.

To activate the anti-war resistance it had been necessary to do continual organizing, individual counseling and building of community support. The straw vote to keep the Constellation home included votes of twenty-two percent of the crew. The nine who took sanctuary were less than one percent of the crew. There were occasions when large numbers of anti-war protestors came together including meetings on the ship, but these did not develop into resistance. Even when arrests were made at the sanctuary churches there was not more than symbolic resistance. The anti-war appeal to conscience does not seem to be an adequate base for mass
resistance. It may prepare people for action as individuals on the basis of conscience, but spontaneous cooperative action can only be taken if there is social interaction continually supporting the mutuality of understanding. Such supportive interaction is not necessary for resistance based on common experience and shared identity.

CONCLUSION

In spite of an anti-authoritarian mood among enlisted people, individual resistance, absences without authorization, many applications for discharge and a large civilian peace movement, the anti-war campaigns were not successful in stopping or delaying carriers from returning to the Western Pacific theater and continuing their role in the bombing of Vietnam. Anti-war tactics that included use of legal and administrative channels did not challenge managerial control. The navy managers developed an administrative procedure for handling conscientious objectors which was effective in avoiding adverse publicity and at the same time was a means of removing potential sources of troublemakers.

A better understanding of the social construction of naval authority might have produced other, perhaps more effective, tactics. The anti-war protesters did not distinguish between the situation of enlistedmen on a modern aircraft carrier where their technical work was far removed from a battlefield and separated within the ship from face-to-face contact with superiors while working, and that of enlisted men in the infantry in Vietnam (Jay and Osnos 1971) or the long-ago sailors of the old navy (Melville 1850). The effect of resistance actions depends at least in part on the relevance of the specific tactic to the actual way that authority is constructed and maintained. As it was, the anti-war tactics probably tended to consolidate naval authority rather than produce more resistance.

LITERATURE CITED

Ash, Roberta -- 1972
Social Movements in America, Chicago, Markham.

Bendix, Reinhard -- 1960

Connally, Orabelle -- 1976

Finn, James -- 1971

House Armed Services Committee -- 1973
"Report by the Special Subcommittee on Disciplinary Problems in the US Navy of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, Ninety Second Congress, Second Session, January 2."

Janowitz, Morris -- 1960
The Professional Soldier, New York, Free Press.
Jay, Peter and Osnos, Peter -- 1971
"Fragging," Army in Anguish, Johnson, Haynes and Wilson, George C., New York, Pocket Books.

Melville, Herman -- 1850

Sherill, Robert -- 1970
Military Justice is to Justice as Military Music is to Music, New York, Harper and Row.

Vagts, Alfred -- 1937