The Military in the Politics of South Korea, 1961-1966: The Role of Political Institution-Building

Soo Young Auh
Western Michigan University

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THE MILITARY IN THE POLITICS OF SOUTH KOREA, 1961-1966:
THE ROLE OF POLITICAL INSTITUTION-BUILDING

by

Soo Young Auh

A Thesis
Submitted to the
Faculty of The Graduate College
in partial fulfillment
of the
Degree of Master of Arts

Western Michigan University
Kalamazoo, Michigan
April, 1971
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank my Advisor and Committee Chairman, Dr. C. I. Eugene Kim, for his guidance and many helpful suggestions, especially for his allowing me to have access to his own Korean materials which made this study possible. Many helpful comments and suggestions of my Thesis Committee, Dr. Lawrence Ziring and Dr. Jack C. Plano, were also very much appreciated. Thanks also go to my friends in Korea who supplied me with additional materials for this thesis. Finally, I wish to thank my wife, who has been most understanding of the life of a graduate student and who has untiringly typed so many revisions of this thesis.

Soo Young Auh
AUH, Soo Young, 1939-

Western Michigan University, M.A., 1971
Political Science, general

University Microfilms, A XEROX Company, Ann Arbor, Michigan
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INTRODUCTION

This thesis deals with the role which the military has been playing in creating political order and building political institutions in South Korea. In May 1961, a small group of military officers in South Korea successfully executed a coup and took control of the government. Many Asian countries have witnessed such military takeovers in the last two decades.

Given the number and importance of the military regimes in the new states, scholars have been drawn to study them and the result has been some important systematic and theoretical works on the military's political role in particular and civil-military relations in general. For long, however, most of the works in the field have been after the fashion of the Lasswellian "Garrison State" model. Reacting against the rise of totalitarian states in Europe, Lasswell in the 1930's formulated a concept of the "Garrison State." For him the garrison state is one in which the specialists in violence represent the most powerful group in the national decision-making process. In such garrison states as Germany (1933-1945) and Japan (1930-1945), the soldiers were able to dictate the national policies.\(^1\)

After the World War II Samuel P. Huntington and Morris Janowitz

moved away from the discussion of the Lasswellian model of civil-military relations, that is, the ideological orientation of anti-totalitarianism. In one of the first attempts to set up a theoretical framework of civil-military relations, Huntington argues that the officer corps is a professional body, the officer corps acknowledges a responsibility to society, is expert, and possesses a sense of corporateness which excludes outsiders. It has a distinctive outlook and role.²

According to Huntington, there are two models of civil-military relations: the objective control model, in which the military is small, exclusive, highly professional, indifferent to ideologies, and subject to civilian governmental control; and the subjective control model, which is characterized by the absence of clear lines between civilian and military groups and values. The military is integrated into society and supports dominant political ideologies and social values.³ Indeed, if Lasswell's "Garrison State" model explains a phenomenon of military involvement in the politics of totalitarian states, Huntington attempts, in his book The Soldier and the State, to explain the nature of the modern military profession oriented toward keeping the soldier out of politics.


Janowitz's approach to the military is from the vantage point of the sociology of organization. In his book, *The Professional Soldiers*, Janowitz argues that technological developments have produced major changes in the military establishments. The revolution in military technology has changed the patterns of organizational authority in the army. The "heroic leader," who is just as essential as ever, now shares leadership with the "military manager" and the "military technologist."\(^4\) Also, technical innovation has caused a narrowing of skills between the military and civil sector.\(^5\)

As the military officers have moved into a large managerial and political arena, Janowitz says they are forced to look beyond purely military affairs and therefore become concerned with politics both at home and abroad. The officers become politicized and show broad interests in political, social, and economic subjects.\(^6\) As a result of these changes and the new strategic realities of international politics, a "constabulary force" concept is emerging. Janowitz suggests a new framework for the operation of the military in modern times as a constabulary force.

The works of Huntington and Janowitz provide the social scientist with new tools of analysis and a conceptual framework for explanation. The study of the military in politics was further


\(^5\) Ibid., pp. 64-75.

\(^6\) Ibid., pp. 12-14. See also Chapter VI & VII.
enhanced by the rise of modern comparative politics. This time the focus has been laid on the role of the military in the politics of developing nations.

Among the first attempts at a comparative study of the military in modernizing states is a work edited by John J. Johnson. The book's theme is to explore the role of the armed forces in transitional societies. The military is considered an effective agent of modernization by most authors in the book.\(^7\)

Edward Shils writes the introductory essay, "The Military in the Political Development of the New States," which is the theoretical framework of the Johnson book. For Shils, modernization implies egalitarian democracy, representative government, technological and economic progress, efficient and honest administration, and national autonomy and status in the international system.\(^8\) Shils writes, when parliamentary democratic regimes falter, "military rule is one of several practicable and apparently stable alternatives."\(^9\) The modernizing military oligarchy is, he suggests, one


\(^9\)Ibid., p. 9.
of several political forms in the course of political development.\textsuperscript{10}

Following Shils, Lucian Pye, in his theoretical essay, "Army in the Process of Political Modernization," argues that the military is the most modern and rational organization in the traditional society. The army in the new nations has been modeled after "industrial-based organizations," and influenced by highly advanced Western military technology.\textsuperscript{11} The officers, who are constantly called upon to compare their organizations with foreign ones, become sensitive to the needs of modernization and technological advancement of their nation. The army contributes to the increase in social mobility of recruiters and provides considerable training both in technology and citizenship. Thus, Pye argues that the military plays a prominent role in the modernization process as a powerful modernizing instrument in the transitional society.\textsuperscript{12}

Since the Johnson book, scholars have turned to the study of the causes of military intervention in the politics of developing nations and the typology of military intervention. There are several approaches to the study of military intervention in politics. Morris Janowitz seeks the causes of military intervention in the "characteristics of the military establishment."\textsuperscript{13} In his

\textsuperscript{10} Ibid., pp. 42-62.
\textsuperscript{12} Ibid., pp. 78-89.
book, *The Military in the Political Development of New Nations*, Janowitz attempts to relate the ability and propensity of the military officers to intervene in politics to their control of physical power, their "ethos of public service," their skill structure, which "combines managerial ability with a heroic posture," their internal cohesion, and their middle and lower-middle class social origins.\(^{14}\)

The control of the "instruments of violence" by the military gives it a greater initial capacity to intervene in comparison with other civilian groups. Janowitz asserts that unique and specialized career opportunities help develop a group of officers who are more politically oriented than their colleagues. He distinguishes the military careers into two types: "prescribed" and "adoptive" careers.\(^{15}\) The prescribed career means the career of the officer who has ordinary military assignments and education but no special assignments. The adoptive career means, on the other hand, that the officer has unique educational or political-military assignments. Janowitz argues that those officers who belong to the latter category have broader knowledge on social and economic matters and become more political, while those officers of the former category tend to be less political and uninvolved in politics.\(^{16}\) Those officers who received overseas military education tend to be more

\(^{14}\)Ibid., pp. 27-30, 31-74.

\(^{15}\)Ibid., p. 45. See also his *The Professional Soldier*, p. 168.

interested in domestic politics.\textsuperscript{17}

The social origins of the officers, Janowitz asserts, have a strong influence upon their political behavior. The officer corps in the armies of new nations is recruited mainly from middle and lower-middle class groups. It has been characterized by a marked absence of feudal aristocratic and upper class personnel. As the technology of warfare developed, feudal aristocratic groups have been gradually replaced by rising middle class groups. In order to weaken the position of aristocratic groups, especially in Southeast Asia, the colonial powers disbanded the existing armed forces and created new armies.\textsuperscript{18}

The middle and lower-middle class social origins and professional military education, Janowitz insists, "do not produce a traditional conservative outlook but, in varying form, a modernizing and collective orientation."\textsuperscript{19} The absence of an aristocratic tradition in the army means the absence of a historical tradition


\textsuperscript{18}Ibid., pp. 49-50. See also Manfred Halpern, "Middle Eastern Armies and the New Middle Class," in Johnson, \op. cit., pp. 294-299. Halpern divides the middle class in the Middle East into two categories: one is the small merchant and bureaucrats and the other is salaried military men. The latter is labelled as New Middle class. The New Middle class (the military) is the first class in the Middle Eastern history which no longer depends on inherited status or existing opportunities and is composed of "separate" individuals.

\textsuperscript{19}Janowitz, The Military in the Political Development of New Nations, p. 56.
which limited it in its political involvement.  

The more cohesive the military officers are, Janowitz argues, the greater ability to intervene in politics they could have. Cohesion—the feeling of group solidarity and the capacity for collective action—conditions the political behavior of the officers. Lack of cohesion leads to unstable and fragmented involvements and to a high possibility of counter-coups after the seizure of power.  

In contrast to Janowitz, Samuel E. Finer and Samuel P. Huntington look for the causes of military intervention in politics in the political and institutional structure of the society rather than in the social and organizational characteristics of the military establishment. Finer's book, The Role of Military in Politics, attempts to link military intervention to what he labels the "political culture" of a country. By the political culture he means the strength of the "political formula" sustaining the rules of political conduct, the extent of popular consensus supporting civilian institutions, and the degree of public involvement in, and attachment to, civilian supremacy over the military.  

Finer argues that the more solidly established civilian supremacy, the less likely are the opportunities that the military will seek to intervene in politics. From this proposition he

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20 Ibid., p. 57.
21 Ibid., pp. 67-74.
23 Ibid., pp. 88-89.
classifies political culture into four different types: "mature," "developed," "low," and "minimal" political culture. These four types of political culture are determined by the following three criteria: (1) the legitimacy of the procedures for transferring power; (2) the degree of organization of the public; and (3) the existence of a wide public recognition as to who or what constitutes the sovereign authority. Where all these conditions are fulfilled the level of political culture is high; to the extent that they are not, it is correspondingly low.

The characteristic form of military intervention in a "mature political culture" is said to take the form of "influence"; in a "developed culture" it is "blackmail"; in a "low political culture" it is "displacement" of some civilian leaders by others regarded more favorable to military interests; and in a "minimal political culture" it is "supplement" of civilians by the military regimes.

Like Finer, Huntington seeks the causes of military intervention in politics in the political structure of the society. He strongly disagrees with Janowitz's approach to the study of military intervention. Huntington writes, "the most important causes of military intervention in politics are not military but political. ... Military explanations do not explain military interventions."
The reason is, according to Huntington, that "military interventions are only one specific manifestation of a broader phenomenon in underdeveloped societies: the general politicization of social forces and institutions."²⁷ "praetorian politics."

In the praetorian societies all sorts of social forces and group are directly engaged in political affairs and politics lacks autonomy, complexity, coherence, and adaptability.²⁸ Huntington argues that the causes of military intervention in politics lie not in the nature of the military establishment but in the structure of society. They lie in the "absence of effective political institutions capable of mediating, refining, and moderating group political action."²⁹

Huntington distinguishes the coups in the praetorian politics into three types: the governmental coup or palace revolution; the revolutionary coup; and the reform coup. By the governmental coup he means the change in the top leadership of the government without significant changes in the social structure or political institutions. The revolutionary coup implies fundamental changes not only in the governmental authority but also in the social and economic structure. The reform coup falls somewhere between these two. It


²⁸ Ibid., pp. 80, 94.

²⁹ Ibid., pp. 196, 197-198.
takes place to make reforms in the political, social and economic structure.\textsuperscript{30}

The above theoretical models and propositions which we have thus far observed deal mainly with overt military intervention in civilian politics. They attempt to explain the various causes of why the military, as professional as its ethos seem, get politicized and directly involved in politics. This type of analysis, however, seems to ignore a more indirect and subtle but nonetheless more constructive role the military has been playing in the nation-building process of developing nations. It is argued that the military, as a modern institution in the developing nation, has been able to provide an effective leadership in the nation-building process. Study of this subject is not entirely new, but the point is that it is generally unexplored and the literature therefore not extensive. One of the reasons could be the lack of data. In fact, a few military regimes, though a great number of military coups have taken place, could lay the foundation for supplying effective political leadership and create political order.

Politics is not warfare. The military has inherently two basic political weaknesses; the soldiers' technical inability to administer and their lack of legitimacy.\textsuperscript{31} In order to supply the

\textsuperscript{30}Ibid., pp. 201-208. See also S. P. Huntington, "Patterns of Violence in World Politics," in Huntington, ed., Changing Patterns of Military Politics, pp. 32-33.

\textsuperscript{31}Finer, op. cit., pp. 14-22.
effective national political leadership, Janowitz hypothetically suggests, the military regime "must develop a viable mass political apparatus outside of the military establishment but under its direct domination." Huntington asserts that the military possesses a capacity for generating political order in a praetorian society. During the 1920's Turkish and Mexican armies created effective political parties and consequently generated political order and stability. "In the two decades after World War II," Huntington writes, "the most notable effort by military men to duplicate the achievements of the Turkish and Mexican generals was made in Korea."

In this context, a close examination of the role of the military in politics of South Korea will provide empirical data for further model-building on civil-military relations. As stated earlier, the purpose of this thesis is to explore the role of the military as an institution-builder in creating political order and stability in South Korea.

In South Korea a military coup d'état took place in 1961 after a period of ineffective civilian parliamentary rule. The country

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33 Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, pp. 237-40.

34 Ibid., pp. 256-258. See also Dankwart A. Rustow, "Army and the Founding of the Turkish Republic," World Politics, Vol. 11 (July, 1959), pp. 513-552.

35 Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, p. 258.
had been ruled by a military junta for two and a half years and in 1963 civilian rule was restored. During the military rule, the junta prepared to transform itself into a civilian political institution by establishing the Democratic Republican Party (DRP). The military-created party won both elections of 1963 and 1967. The victory of the DRP in both elections provided a basis for the military leadership to continue the task of nation-building. The first Five Year Economic Development Plan (1962-1966) which was launched by the military junta was accomplished with 8.3 per cent annual GNP growth rate. The South Korean economy has been growing steadily.

This thesis is composed of four chapters and a conclusion. Chapter one deals with political, social, and economic problems for the background of the military coup of 1961. The pathological phenomenon of party politics and political parties which constituted the intermediate cause for the coup will be analyzed. Chapter two will be devoted to the analysis of the military's entry into politics as a modernizing force in contemporary Korean society. The immediate cause for the coup will also be discussed. In chapter three the following questions will be analyzed: (1) why

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did the junta leaders plan to build a political party?; (2) who built the party and on what principles?; (3) what are the characteristic forms of the party?; and (4) how did the junta leaders succeed in forming the party? Chapter four will discuss the problems which rose in the process of operation of the DRP and its adaptation.
CHAPTER 1
KOREA BEFORE THE COUP OF 1961

A. Colonial Heritage

With the end of the Second World War Korea was liberated from Japanese colonial rule. In order to disarm the Japanese army the American and Soviet armies landed on the Korean peninsula. The southern half of the peninsula was under the rule of the United States military government and the northern half was placed under Soviet military rule. After the three years of American military rule the Republic of Korea was established on August 15, 1948. Although the new republic was founded with a democratic constitution and numerous features of a representative government, South Korea faced a number of political and economic difficulties in the building of democracy.

Before Korea became a Japanese colony, Korean people had lived for centuries in an authoritarian political environment. For 518 years (1392-1910) before the fall of the Yi dynasty into Japanese colonial rule, Confucianism had constituted not only the guidance for the conduct of the government but also the ruling principle of social and familial life. Confucianism teaches the subjects to obey their ruler and the children to obey their parents, especially their fathers. The autocratic family environment of the Korean family system which had been based on strict hierarchical and
stern human relationship produced authoritarianism.¹

Such an authoritarian heritage was reinforced by thirty-five years of Japanese colonial rule. Japanese colonial rule in Korea was brief compared to other colonial rule in the newly independent nations, most of whom had been under Western Powers before 1900, but it was uniquely intense and despotic.² The Korean people had been ruled by Japanese governor-generals with a massive net-work of highly disciplined Japanese military and civilian police. It was a stern, centralized, and bureaucratic administration.³ Koreans were excluded from important political policy-making bodies and were dis­couraged from participating in any organized political activities.⁴


³Ibid., pp. 72-74.

Table 1 shows that the Japanese held almost all the key decision-making posts in the government.

**TABLE 1**

**COMPARISON OF OFFICIALS IN EACH RANK IN 1943**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Korea</th>
<th></th>
<th>Japanese</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of Officials</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Number of Officials</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chokunin</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>95.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sonin</td>
<td>627</td>
<td>13.9%</td>
<td>3,888</td>
<td>86.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hannin</td>
<td>29,058</td>
<td>37.6%</td>
<td>48,156</td>
<td>64.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employer</td>
<td>51,061</td>
<td>64.9%</td>
<td>27,508</td>
<td>35.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Chokunin is roughly American equivalent of G.S. 14; Sonin is G.S. 9; Hanin is G.S. 5.*


While Korea was under Japanese colonial rule, furthermore, the political infra-structure prerequisite to a representative government, that is, political parties and interest groups, could not grow at all. The Japanese authoritarian rule totally rejected and suppressed any political activities by voluntary organizations. Even religious organizations, especially the Christian church, were forced to close down during the last period of Japanese colonial rule.5

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When Korea was liberated from Japanese rule, she also experienced many grave economic problems. Korea faced a serious lack of skilled, qualified personnel because few Korean had been permitted technical and managerial training. Korean industries had been developed and supervised by the Japanese, not by Koreans. Korea was developed as a part of the Japanese economy, not as a self-supporting unit. Japanese technicians and managers held the key positions in industry and trade. Korean agricultural products went to the Japanese markets; industrial plants were developed to support the Japanese economy.

The division of Korea into north and south by the 38 parallel imposed additional serious obstacles to the Korean economy. North Korea is the industrial producer, supported by mineral deposits and by well-developed hydroelectric power plants. South Korea is a rice-and-grain producing region but poor in minerals and industrial productivity. South Korean agriculture had depended upon the chemical fertilizer produced in the north, and southern industries had operated on northern power and coal.

Besides these difficulties, the South Korean economy had been

6 In 1939, only 2.6 per cent of the Koreans were industry and 6.5 per cent in commerce, while 75.7 per cent were in agriculture. See Andrew J. Grajdanzev, Modern Korea (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1944), p. 79.

burdened with an influx of refugees from Communist North Korea and repatriates from other parts of Asia. The largest number of repatriates, about 1,000,000, came from Japan. By the end of 1945, 500,000 refugees had come from North Korea; more than 3,000,000 refugees from the north have entered the south since 1945. To make things worse, the annual population growth rate continued at 3.1 per cent at the time of liberation.\(^8\)

The three years of American military rule were no help for ameliorating these problems. The American army was hurriedly dispatched to Korea to disarm the Japanese troops stationed in South Korea. The American occupation army had neither a plan nor trained personnel to cope with the chaotic post-war political situation.\(^9\)

Guided by lofty principles of American democracy, the Military Government introduced all the features of a free and democratic system in South Korea.\(^10\) The result of this policy was a

\(^8\)Henderson, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 137.

\(^9\)Ibid.


proliferation of political parties and social organizations of various ideological spectrum, vying for the control of the government.

B. The First Republican Era

When the Republic of Korea was proclaimed in 1948, what South Korea needed most was effective leadership, but no political leader had been able to mobilize the diverging efforts of the people toward nation-building. Syngman Rhee, a lifelong fighter for Korean independence, could have provided a strong and effective political leadership. But he had no experience in government and had been away from his native land for thirty-three years.

When Rhee was elected as the first President of the Republic of Korea, he saw, as a politician, that his first task was that of securing his regime. He recognized that he faced opposition from various directions. As the first step in consolidating his power, Rhee frequently reshuffled his cabinet members. Any minister "who had shown any indication that he was politically unreliable from Rhee's standpoint was immediately dismissed." Under such a condition few cabinet members dared to argue with Rhee or even make any positive suggestions.

Rhee gradually isolated himself from the people by surrounding himself with a screen of secretaries, guards, and his Liberal Party

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officials, who tended to distort information as well as the voice of the people. Thus Rhee's leadership was further crippled by a lack of viable and able advisers.

Rhee's criterion for the cabinet appointments was based on personal devotion to him rather than on the necessary qualifications. With personal devotion and loyalty being the deciding factors, rather than performance of duties, Rhee's appointments of cabinet and sub-cabinet members lasted approximately six months. Due to this unstable manner of selection, Rhee's government was unstable and inefficient.

History makes it clear, furthermore, that Rhee was ready and capable of any action that would allow him to retain his hold on the presidency. In order to further maintain his position as president, Rhee did not hesitate to amend the constitution by resorting to violence.

When the results of the election of May, 1950, for the second National Assembly offered dim prospect for Rhee's re-election by a National Assembly vote, the Rhee regime proposed amending the constitution to elect the President through popular election. However, when the Assembly rejected the government's motion, the government resorted to physical pressure on the assembly

14 Ibid., p. 16. See also Oh, op. cit., p. 25.
15 Chung, op. cit., p. 16.
members. On the pretext that the law-makers failed to respond the "popular will" desiring Syngman Rhee's continued rule, the government mobilized hoodlums to encircle the capitol building and demanded the disbandment of the Assembly. The government also issued martial law. Under the martial law many opposition assemblymen were arrested on charges that they had been connected with the international Communist movement. Rhee also threatened to dissolve the Assembly. It was only under such pressure that the Assembly was finally forced to pass the constitutional amendment for the popular election of the President.\(^6\)

The Rhee regime undermined the very foundation of constitutionalism and ended the hope and dream of establishing a representative and constitutional government, and grew increasingly authoritarian. The rule of law was replaced by the rule of one man. In 1954, another major constitutional amendment was made. This time Rhee abolished the two-term presidential limit. This action virtually assured him a life term in office.\(^7\)


\(^7\) For detailed information on the tactics which the Rhee regime used in carrying out this amendment, see Suh Byong-cho, *op. cit.* , pp. 182-87; Oh, *op. cit.*, pp. 48-50; also Republic of Korea, Committee for the Compilation of the History of the Revolutionary Trials in Korea, *Hanguk hyongmyong chae p'ansa* [History of the Revolutionary Trials in Korea] (Seoul, 1962), Vol. I, pp. 53-64. Hereafter cited as *Hanguk hyong-myong chaep'ansa*. 

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The Rhee regime governed the people through the employment of a repressive 300,000-man police force. In 1958 the so-called National Security Law was promulgated. The new law empowered the police with almost unlimited authority to arrest and imprison anyone by vaguely defined anti-state activities.

Because of the declining popularity of Rhee and his Liberal Party, his regime had to resort to suppression of the opposition and election riggings in order to maintain power. The National Security Law employed to repress the opposition parties, especially during election periods. The police and professional hoodlums were used to disrupt the campaigning of the opposition parties. Economic blackmail was used on farmers to force them to vote for Rhee's Liberal Party candidates. When Rhee's party was unable to acquire sufficient votes to pass his bills, his party purchased openly the votes of legislators. When the party was unable to effectively use bribery, it resorted to violence.

While politics was gravitating toward autocracy, the economy under Rhee's government remained almost stagnant. As mentioned earlier, the Korean economy faced a number of problems. To make

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things worse, the Korean peninsula went through one of its most tragic wars in history. Due primarily to substantial post-war economic aid from the United States, in excess of two billion dollars, the Rhee government had made progress in stabilizing and re-habilitating the war-ruined Korean economy. However, the annual growth rate of per capita income during the years 1953-1957 stagnated at an average of 2.6 per cent.21

During the years 1945-1958, the Rhee government received a total of 2.47 billion dollars in economic aid, but the government had no long-range economic development plan. Foreign aid was often misused by corrupt politicians to provide political funds.22 No single basic industrial plant was built by private or public funds except a few U.S. financed industrial plants such as two cement factories, one plate-glass factory and a fertilizer plant.23 The average citizen's life showed no improvement, while the privileged became rich by collusion between the politicians and businessmen.24

In the midst of political corruption and economic stagnation the Rhee regime was toppled by the April student uprising. For a long time the Korean students had been confused and frustrated by the apparent disparity between what was preached in the schools and

22 Chung, op. cit., pp. 18-19.
24 Ibid., pp. 62-63.
what they found in the corrupt and undemocratic practices. The immediate cause of the 1960 student uprising was the irregularities in the election held on March 15, 1960.\textsuperscript{25}

Just before the election, Dr. Cho Pyong-ok, the opposition presidential candidate of the Democratic Party, suddenly died of heart failure at Walter Reed Hospital in Washington, D.C., where he had been sent for treatment. Because of the absence of an opposition candidate Syngman Rhee's re-election was assured. But the election of the vice-president was uncertain. (The president and vice-president were elected on separate tickets.) The focus of the contest in the election became the vice-presidency. Rhee's running-mate, Lee Ki-pung, was a weak candidate against his opponent, Chang Myon, a popular political figure, who was elected vice-president over Lee in an election held four years ago.\textsuperscript{26} To make

\textsuperscript{25}For analysis of the April 1960 Korean student uprising, see C. I. Eugene Kim and Ke-soo Kim, "The April 1960 Korean Student Movement," *The Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. XVII, No. 1 (March, 1964), pp. 83-92. This empirical study, based on a sample of 231 university students, shows that the major reasons for the student uprising were the corruption in government, economic depression, and election rigging. See also Kim Sung-tai, "Sawol sipkuil Seoul haksaeng ui hyongmyong donggi" [Study of the Motivating Factors of the April 19th Student Upheaval in Seoul], *Sungkyunkwan taihakkyo nonmunjip* [Collected Essays of Sungkyunkwan University], No. 5 (1960), pp. 80-106. This survey study, based on the interview of a sample of 570 students in Seoul, indicates that the major factors for participating in the demonstration were: dissatisfaction with the lawless and corruption of the Rhee regime; dissatisfaction with arrogance of the privileged class and attempt at supporting organizations defending democracy.

sure of Lee's election, Rhee's regime suppressed the campaigning by Chang's supporters and interfered in the election. Korea Report states:

Democratic rallies were prohibited throughout the nation. Specific instructions were sent by the Home Ministry to police chiefs throughout the nation specifying the exact plurality by which Dr. Rhee and Mr. Lee were to be elected. Hundreds of thousands of pre-marked ballots accompanied these instructions, and these were dutifully stuffed into the ballot boxes on election day. Hoodlums smashed up Democratic Party offices and beat up Democratic election workers and sympathizers.27

Such irregularities and violence against the opposition, which were practiced throughout the nation, angered the people. On election day the citizens of Masan, a stronghold of the opposition, waged demonstrations against the election rigging. In breaking up the demonstrators with tear gas and gun fire, the police killed at least seven people and injured seventy-two. Several were missing. It was thought that the police might have hidden their bodies to lessen the death toll.28 On April 11, three days after the election, the mangled body of a sixteen-year-old high school student was picked up by a fisherman. The body was identified as one of the missing persons.

With this discovery, all Masan went out of control; police stations and the Liberal Party building were smashed. There followed a chain of reaction, culminating in a nation-wide student

28 Oh, op. cit., p. 61.
uprising on April 19. On that day over one hundred-twenty students were killed and more than a thousand were wounded by police fire.\textsuperscript{29} In the end, Rhee was forced to resign from the presidency, and Lee Ki-pung and his family committed suicide.

C. The Second Republican Era

Many Koreans believed that the degeneration of the Rhee regime into autocracy was due, to a large extent, to the presidential system. Those who initially favored a cabinet form of government in 1948 strongly advocated the amendment of the constitution. With strong support from the public a responsible cabinet system was adopted.\textsuperscript{30} However, the new system could not function properly because of severe factional strifes within the ruling party.

The newly adopted parliamentary system should be based on sound and stable party politics for proper functioning. The ruling Democratic Party suffered from factionalism. The Democratic Party, which had long fought Rhee's authoritarian rule, polled an absolute majority vote in the election held after the downfall of the Rhee government. When the party became the ruling party, the old factional struggle was reintensified.

\textsuperscript{29}C. I. Eugene Kim and Ke-Soo Kim, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 83-92. For the chronological events of the student uprising and the documentation of domestic and international reactions to the collapse of the Rhee regime, see Cho Duk-sŏng, ed., \textit{Sawol hyongmyông [The April Revolution]} (Seoul: Changwon sa, 1960). The list of student casualties is in the appendix.

\textsuperscript{30}Oh, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 73.
The so-called "Old Faction" and "New Faction" within the party had been more or less dormant during the days of hardship. These two factions had basically no difference in terms of policy, and were both conservative in nature. The only difference was that the New Faction was somewhat more progressive.

The overwhelming election victory intensified the power struggle between the Old and New, especially on the question of which faction would occupy the presidency, premiership, and cabinet posts. After intensive competition for posts, the premiership went to the New Faction with the presidency going to the Old Faction.\textsuperscript{31}

The severe factional strife split the Democratic Party into two parties. The Old Faction was transformed into the New Democratic Party. The factional feud did not stop here, however. Within the New Faction the so-called "Young Group" and "Old Group" were formed. The former became openly critical of Premier Chang Myon and were equally critical of the Old Group due to a dissatisfaction with post appointments.\textsuperscript{32}

Premier Chang used the reshuffling of cabinet posts as a means to mollify different factions and groups. He reshuffled the cabinet three times within his nine-month rule. The average tenure of Chang's ministers was six months. Home Ministers were the most frequently ousted; their average tenure was less than two months.\textsuperscript{33}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[31]Ibid., pp. 77-78.
\item[32]Ibid., pp. 80-82.
\item[33]Ibid., p. 82.
\end{footnotes}
The unity, viability, and stability of the Chang government were gone. It was almost a miracle for the Chang government to cure major social and economic evils of the Rhee regime. With the downfall of the corrupt and autocratic government, the people expected that their daily lives would somewhat be improved. According to one survey, which was conducted during the Chang government, over 70 percent of those surveyed indicated the most urgent request to the government is the solution of economic problems.34

Because of extreme political instability and inflation the economic situation went from bad to worse. Under the agreement between the Chang government and the United States to adjust the official exchange ratio corresponding to "reality," the foreign exchange ratio jumped from 650 hwan to 1,300 hwan to one dollar.35 The Korean economy, which had been dependent on American aid for a decade and a half, showed immediate effects. Prices of all goods skyrocketed. The price of rice, which is an essential item for

34 In November 1960 a survey group from eight South Korean Universities asked three thousand Koreans about the "most urgent request to the government." The top items in the response to the question are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Requests</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relief measures for the unemployed</td>
<td>20.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Price stabilization</td>
<td>17.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjustment of price of farm products</td>
<td>13.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liquidation of usurious loans to farmers and fishermen</td>
<td>11.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime control and maintenance of order</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equal taxation</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Dong-A Ilbo, December 28, 1960, quoted in Oh, op. cit., p. 83.

35 Ibid., p. 84.
daily life in Korea, went up sixty per cent from December 1960 to April 1961.  

Many small and medium businesses almost went bankrupt. During the period from November, 1960, to February, 1961, industrial production declined more than twelve per cent. In 1960 there was rising unemployment and it was estimated at one-fifth of the total labor force, some 2 million people.  

Along with such grave economic problems other social problems haunted the unstable and inefficient Chang government. As an aftermath of the popular uprising against autocracy, there was a new tendency that anything could be achieved by demonstrations. This tendency brought people into the streets on every conceivable issue. Until February, 1961, hardly a day passed without demonstrations. There were some 2,000 demonstrations in a year between the student uprising and the military coup, involving over 900,000 participants.  

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36 Se Jin Kim, op. cit., p. 74.

Price Index (1955-100)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1st. Qt.</th>
<th>2nd. Qt.</th>
<th>3rd. Qt.</th>
<th>4th Qt.</th>
<th>1st. Qt.</th>
<th>May</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


37 Ibid., p. 75.


39 Stephen Bradner, "Korea: Experiment and Instability,"
A number of students who had been wounded in the April student uprising seized the rostrum in the National Assembly and demanded revolutionary legislation that would impose stiffer penalties on the officials of Rhee's regime. The Assembly hurriedly enacted the most far-reaching ex post facto laws to dispose of the "traitor to democracy."^40

A group of young students, many in the Political Science Department of Seoul National University, voiced a strong demand for national unification. They blamed the older generation for the division of the country and the creation of the political and economic chaos since 1945. Also, they charged the great powers responsible for the division of the nation. The students ascribed all the ills and woes to the division of the nation, and began to seek remedy for themselves. This new nationalism was expressed in a form of "neutralist" unification of Korea.41

The students organized the Mint'ong, the National Student Federation for National Unification. Its membership was small but growing. Some adult groups began to echo the student demands. The leaders of the Mint'ong advocated peaceful unification and tried to arrange a debate with North Korean students at P'anmunjôm, where both the North Korean and U.N. military delegates have met to

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40 Oh, op. cit., p. 85.
41 Se Jin Kim, op. cit., pp. 81-82.
negotiate armistice problems.

The North Korean regime enthusiastically welcomed the movement of the South Korean students. Many of the slogans of the student movement were similar to those used by Radio P'yongyang in North Korea. 42 Many people feared Communist penetration of the movement. Those who had undergone personal suffering from the Communists were especially alarmed by such a development. The student movement aggravated already tangled political and social problems and brought fear of Communist penetration of South Korea. Most importantly, such as alarming and dangerous development provided a justification for the overthrow of the Chang government which the military considered too soft on the Communists.

However, it was true that the people, with the exception of the ex-Liberals, enjoyed more freedom under the Chang government than at any other period in Korean history. However, this freedom tended to be abused. Under the constitution of the Second Republic it was impossible for the government to restrict the freedom of the press. Newspapers and periodicals suddenly rose in number from around 600 to nearly 1,600 by April, 1961. Few of them had printing facilities; some had no fixed place of business. The majority of them had no notion about a responsible press. 43

To cope with the deteriorating economic and social situation a

42 Oh, op. cit., p. 89. See also Bradner, op. cit., p. 414.

viable political leadership was urgently needed. But the Chang government failed to generate an effective and strong political leadership, mainly because of the extreme factional strife within the ruling party. People tended to become more confused and indifferent to politics and politicians than ever before.

In the elections of the Mayor of Seoul and Governors of the nine provinces held on December 29, 1960, an average of only 38.2 per cent of the qualified voters cast their ballot. This was a surprising drop in voter participation. Again, in a by-election in the Mapo district in Seoul held on February 10, 1961, only 40,439 citizens out of 113,803 qualified voters (34.1 per cent) cast their ballots. This was the lowest since the establishment of the Republic of Korea in 1948.

This indifference to election was possibly because the political changes had failed to improve people's own lives and had merely resulted in frustration and exasperation. The people became apathetic. The failure of the Chang regime created the phenomenon of "escape from politics." Political instability caused by factional feuds, deteriorating economic and social situations, and rising fears of Communism opened the way for the military to intervene in politics.

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44 Yi Kuk-ch' an, "Ch' o n g ch i j ō k m uk w an s im k wa m in ju j ui ui w i g i" [Political Apathy and the Crisis of Democracy], Sasangge, Vol. IX, No. 4 (April, 1961), p. 62.

D. Nature of Political Parties

So far we have discussed the development of the corrupt and undemocratic rule of the Rhee regime and the inefficient and unstable rule of the Chang regime. A close examination of the political parties under these two regimes will provide better understanding of the causes of military intervention in politics.

Since the liberation, political parties had mushroomed, and no less than 500 appeared and disappeared in South Korea's 22 year history.\(^4^6\) When a general election for the Constituent Assembly was held on May 10, 1948, as many as 48 political parties contested. There were 39 parties at the time of the general election for the second National Assembly (1950-1954), and 14 parties at the general elections for the third, fourth, and fifth National Assembly (1954-1958, 1958-1960, 1960-1961).\(^4^7\)

None of these political parties were able to perform the four functions described by Sigmund Neumann as the "modern mass political party." The four functions are: to organize the chaotic public will; to educate the private citizen to political responsibility; to represent the connecting link between government and public opinion; and to select leaders.\(^4^8\) These mushrooming parties

\(^4^7\) Ibid.

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rarely organized and aggregated the chaotic public opinion. They never educated the citizen in their political responsibility. They worked only at election time and were dormant between election periods.

Most of the political parties were formed and functioned in the following manner: the politicians gathered under a charismatic leader and set up a headquarters; constituent branches were created by mobilizing those who were willing to help them during election times in the districts where they had geographic affinity and family background. Party politicians built their own small kingdoms on the basis of kinship and academic cliques.

Political parties in South Korea lacked diversity of political ideologies. The ideological struggle of anti-Communism was designated as the primary political goal. Anti-Communism has remained the highest guiding principle for the nation since the Korean War. In such a political milieu the ideology of even middle-of-the-road groups has hardly been permitted. Only political parties which belong to the conservative rightist camp have been allowed to exist.

The lack of diversity of ideology in Korean parties constituted one of the main causes for politicians changing their party affiliation at will in accordance with changes in political power and in pursuit of personal gains. In other words, there was no

\[49\text{Ko, op. cit., p. 15.}
\]

\[50\text{Ibid., p. 14.}
\]
serious difficulty in terms of ideology to shift from one party to another because all parties were almost the same in ideology. Thus the joining and leaving of parties by politicians took place very frequently and easily. Also, it occurred without difficulties because their bases of organization lay in their own private organizations such as kinship groups and academic circles.

Generally, Korean political parties suffer from severe factionalism. In the long tradition of a Confucian culture, the "bargaining attitude associated with full secularization" could not develop. Deviation on even peripheral issues is regarded as a sign of defection or betrayal. A disagreeing friend becomes an enemy. A trivial difference of personality causes the rise of a faction. A cultural heritage that allows the birth of these factions is hardly conducive to compromise.

As noted earlier, due to the lack of ideological diversity a faction within a party rises on such differences in human relations as personality, consanguinity, geographical affinity, and academic cliques, rather than the difference of policies and ideologies. That very fact makes it difficult for factions within parties to compromise, and factional feuds usually lead to a split of a party.

Let us now examine more closely the two major parties, Syngman Rhee's Liberal Party and the opposition Democratic Party.

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52 Ko, op. cit., pp. 11-17.
The Liberal Party is the best example of a boss-centered party in Korea. When Syngman Rhee returned to Korea in 1945, he had no political organization. He declined to join any particular political party, presenting himself as a national leader above all political parties. However, Rhee needed his own political organization for mobilizing the support of the people. According to the 1948 constitution, the National Assembly had the power to elect the president. But the political alignment of the Second National Assembly was highly unfavorable to Rhee's re-election. Hence, as mentioned earlier, Rhee proposed to amend the constitution from indirect election of the president by the National Assembly to direct popular election, and started to organize a new political party. Rhee announced his intention to organize a party in his Independence Day speech on August 15, 1951. He said:

So far I have considered it premature to install a party system until the people can fully understand the meaning of a political party. . . . But the time has come to organize a large party covering the whole country on the base of farmers and working people. . . . We shall have to make such a political party.53

Rhee's intention to organize a party brought about the inauguration of the Liberal Party on December 23 of the same year. Ready-made organizations such as the National Society, the Korean


Youth Corps, the Korean Women's Association, and the Federation of Korean Trade Unions quickly transformed them into the foundation of Rhee's Liberal Party. Their friendship circles became the local branches of the Liberal Party.\textsuperscript{55}

The purpose of the Liberal Party was unmistakably to prolong Rhee's rule. The internal function of the party was to build blind loyalty to Rhee, and the external one was to defend the executive from opposition and public discontent. Although the organization of the party was tight and impressive, the party did not employ its organization for communication, policy-making or debate. Its organization was a control mechanism, established to monopolize the political powers of the state.\textsuperscript{56}

When political means failed to accomplish its proposed ends, the Liberal Party employed non-political methods. The locking of the opposition assemblymen by force in the Assembly basement on December 24, 1958, in order to pass the controversial National Security Law was a good example.\textsuperscript{57} When force was not used, political corruption was employed. The Liberal Party purchased not only "independent" legislators but also opposition Democrats.

\textsuperscript{55} Yi Ki-ha, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 219-220. See also Henderson, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 294.


\textsuperscript{57} For the detailed information on tactics and maneuvers employed by the Liberal Party, see Oh, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 55-56, and Chung, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 37.
The sale price was said to depend upon the value of an individual legislator.  

The Liberal Party also used the police force to supervise voting in rural areas on every election. In villages people were forced to vote in a group of three or five under the guidance of a police-supervised "group leadership" system.

If the Liberal Party emerged as a mono-functional group, dedicated to the perpetuation of Rhee's rule, its opponent, the Democratic Party (1955-1960), was created for the sole purpose of ending Rhee's autocratic rule. The formation of the Democratic Party was sparked by the notorious constitutional amendment of November, 1954. The amendment, exempting President Rhee from two-term restriction was defeated by a vote of 135 to 60, one vote short of a two-thirds absolute majority of the 203 seats. But the next day an official government spokesman stated that, according to the government's interpretation, the measure had passed (since there were 203 assemblymen, only 135 votes—not 135.33—were required to have a two-thirds majority) and announced its immediate promulgation.

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60 Oh, op. cit., pp. 48-50.
The forced passage of the amendment enraged the anti-Rhee elements in the Assembly, and led them to form the Comrades for Protection of the Constitution. The sixty legislators who initiated this movement succeeded in establishing the Democratic Party. The leadership of the Democratic Party was composed of leaders from various political parties: some were from the Korean Democratic Party and the Democratic National Party; and others were seceded Liberals and those legislators without previous party affiliation. The Korean Democratic Party was the first party to rebel against Rhee when its leader, Kim Sŏng-su, was not selected as the first premier in 1948. Those legislators who had earlier ties with that party were most numerous in the new Democratic Party. They were soon labelled the "Old Faction," while the new recruits made up the "New Faction" under the leadership of Chang Myon.61

The Democratic Party, the major opposition party, had grown by fighting against the tyranny, political corruption, and election riggings of the ruling Liberal Party. People had given support to the Democrats as a means to fight against a dictatorship by Rhee.

The opposition party had been severely suppressed by Rhee's regime. Its leader, Cho Pyong-ok, who later became a strong rival to Rhee in the presidential election of 1960, was arrested for supporting the American armistice stand.62 His house was destroyed by

61 Yi Ki-ha, op. cit., pp. 305-309.
62 Henderson, op. cit., p. 299.
thugs. Businessmen declined to donate political funds to the opposition party in fear of political retaliation by the ruling party. The Democratic Party severely suffered from a lack of funds, especially in the latter part of Rhee's regime.

Because of a lack of funds and suppression by the police, the party did not function properly. Party activities were possible only in Seoul and other big cities. In the countryside the party maintained only offices. Though the organization of the party existed, they could hardly work. The main activity of the party was to fight the autocratic rule of the Rhee regime in the Assembly. The growth and strength of the Democratic Party was the result of reaction against repression, corruption, economic hardship, and sympathy for the opposition party, rather than its organizational growth or strength.

In addition to the weakness of its organization, the Democratic Party suffered from severe factional strife from the outset. Within the party the factional struggle between the Old Faction and the New Faction for the control of the party was intense. The power struggle focused on the choice of presidential and vice presidential candidates. The rivalry between the two factions also extended to the choice of Supreme Council members, the ruling body of the party, and to the choice of chairmen of provincial committees and of the chairman of the presidium of the central committee. The factional struggle within the party was not for

policies or platforms but solely for the control of hegemony.\textsuperscript{64}

Rhee's repression and violence against the opposition party brought cohesiveness to the fragile unity of the Democratic Party. With the collapse of the Liberal Party and Rhee's government the mainspring of this cohesion disappeared. The factional feud between the Old Faction and the New Faction became increasingly intense. The base of the party was a marriage of convenience between the two groups to oppose the Liberal Party and Rhee, not a unity of belief and loyalty. This fragile base now began to collapse. The Democratic Party was merely a strong opposition party, rather than one offering programs.

The absence of viable civilian political institutions, which are the backbone of a representative democracy, brought about the intervention of a more stable, organized institution into politics. This was the military.

\textsuperscript{64}Yi Ki-ha, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 305-312, 321-324, and 379-391.
CHAPTER II

MILITARY INTERVENTION IN POLITICS

A. The Growth of the Korean Armed Forces as a Modern Military Institution

The previous discussion of political, social, and economic factors which are directly and indirectly related to the downfall of the civilian government explains the environmental conditions for the military intervention in politics. The military entry into politics could also be explained, however, by examining the problems which rose within the military establishment. The immediate and underlying causes for the coup of 1961 were related to the emergence of a group of officers who engineered the so-called "purification" movement within the military. In order to understand the problem properly, a brief survey of the rapid expansion and modernization of the Korean military is necessary.

The growth of the Korean Armed Forces can be seen as taking shape roughly in the following three phases: (1) the initial organizational phase from 1945 to 1948; (2) the expansion of forces and facilities from 1949 to 1953; (3) the modernization of the strategic and managerial units from 1954.¹

¹For detailed information of the organizational growth and training of the Korean army, see Major Robert K. Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea: KMAE in Peace and War (Washington, D. C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1962), Chapters 1, 4, 7, and 9.
The embryo of the modern Korean Armed Forces was formed during the period of the American military occupation. In November, 1945, the National Defense Guard was established within the United States Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK) to undertake the task of establishing a Korean defense force capable of performing constabulary functions when the U.S. occupation ended and to eliminate paramilitary groups which sprang up after the Japanese surrender.\(^2\)

On January 15, 1946, the American military government disbanded all existing private armies and established the South Korean National Constabulary. This was the birth of the Korean defense force. Thereafter, companies, battalions, regiments, and brigades were soon created. When the Republic of Korea was established on August 15, 1948, this constabulary force was renamed as the Republic of Korea Army (ROKA).\(^3\)

The cradle of the officer corps of the Korean Army was the Military English Language School, which was created in December, 1945, by the USAMGIK. This school started with an enrollment of about 200 students who had past military experiences in Japan, Manchuria, and China.\(^4\) In 1946 the school was replaced by the South Korean National Constabulary Officer Training School, which was later succeeded by the Korean Military Academy in 1948, when

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\(^2\)Ibid., p. 13.


\(^4\)Ibid., p. 199.
the Korean government was established.

The training period for officer candidates in these initial schools was no more than six months (TABLE 1). Such shallow and inadequate military training for the future generals and colonels posed a problem for the quality of the military, but a more serious problem for the future national army was the social characteristics of the initial cadre. The initial corps members were composed of men with various different military backgrounds. There were three major categories: (1) Korean officers and patriotic fighters who fought for Korean independence against the Japanese in China and Manchuria either within the regular Chinese Army or in the independent guerrilla force; (2) those who were former officers and non-commissioned officers in the Japanese Army; and (3) Korean officers from the Manchurian Defense Force established by the Japanese in Manchuria. This heterogeneous military background of the corps members had a significant impact upon the Korean military, and constituted the basis for various factions within it.

When liberation came in 1945, there was a traditional cultural bias against the military profession. Traditionally, the military profession had been regarded as inferior to civilian "letteredness." In such a social milieu, a military career was seldom chosen, while careers in politics, bureaucracy, and business were popular among many young men. Nevertheless, some ambitious

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6 C. I. Eugene Kim, "The South Korean Military Coup of May, 1961:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Month and Year Recruited</th>
<th>Number of Commissioned</th>
<th>Length of Training</th>
<th>Rank as of 1960</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st</td>
<td>June 1946</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>1 1/2 months</td>
<td>Maj. Gen. to Gen.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th</td>
<td>July 1948</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>6 months</td>
<td>Full Col. to Brig. Gen.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th (special)</td>
<td>Oct. 1948</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>6 months</td>
<td>Full Col. to Brig. Gen.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th</td>
<td>Nov. 1948</td>
<td>564</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th (special)</td>
<td>Mar. 1948</td>
<td>456</td>
<td>6 months</td>
<td>Lt. Col. to Full Col.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th</td>
<td>May 1949</td>
<td>1,262</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th</td>
<td>Mar. 1950</td>
<td>578</td>
<td>6 months</td>
<td>Major to Lt. Col.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

young men foresaw the politically advantageous position of the army in a new nation and joined the service.\footnote{Hahn-been Lee, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 145.}

A large portion of initial recruits for the officer corps were also young refugees who had left North Korea after 1945. These refugee-recruits came generally from middle or lower class families. Under the Communist regime, most had suffered deprivation, and in South Korea, they were handicapped socially in comparison to their peers embarked upon civilian careers.\footnote{Ibid., p. 146.} Their military career choice was strongly motivated with professional, political, and social achievement goals in mind under the South Korean military system.

Until the outbreak of the Korean War in June, 1950, the Korean Armed Forces was a fragile structure composed of fewer than 100,000 men and was poorly equipped (TABLE II). During the war the ROK Army grew rapidly. The South Korean mobilized all eligible men from the ages of 17 to 40. By 1952, the Korean Armed Forces numbered 250,000 men.\footnote{Office of Information, H. Q., ROK Army, \textit{Republic of Korea Army} (Seoul: ROK Army, 1956), Vol. II, p. 167.} The number of American military advisors...
TABLE II

COMPARISON OF STRENGTH AND EQUIPMENT
(at the outbreak of the Korea War)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Republic of Korea</th>
<th>North Korea</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>94,974 men</td>
<td>148,680 men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>6,956 men</td>
<td>13,700 men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>1,897 men</td>
<td>2,000 men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guardship</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


went from 472 at the end of 1950 to 1,953 in early 1952. The American military advisors played an important role, not only in upgrading the combat capabilities of the ROK Army, but also in training its personnel. A huge amount of the U.S. military aid contributed greatly to the growth and maintenance of the Korean military. The Korean Army was equipped with modern weapons from the United States. Various training schools were reopened. In 1952, a four-year Military Academy, which had been established less than three weeks before the war, was reopened. A comprehensive


training center (the Korean Army Training Center) was established, consisting of three units: the Infantry, Artillery, and Signal Schools.  

During the three years of the Korean war, the ROK Army became one of the largest armies in the world. By 1954, the Korean Army reached a peak of 650,000 men, organized into twenty full combat divisions and ten reserve divisions. Since 1954 South Korea has maintained an army of 600,000. The rapid expansion in number was also accompanied by a change in the organizational structure of the ROK Army and an increase in various educational institutions. In 1954 the First Field Army was organized; the Second Army was established for rear-line supply and administration. An elaborate programming and planning system was introduced throughout the Armed Forces. The pyramid of the military school system was completed when the Army Logistic School and the National Defense College were opened in 1955.

The various school systems were revamped by sending selected officers to the United States for advanced training at the military education centers. These schools were the Infantry School at Fort Benning and the Artillery School at Fort Sill. An initial group of 250 officers were sent to the Staff and Command College at Fort

12 Hahn-been Lee, op. cit., p. 147.
14 Hahn-been Lee, op. cit., p. 148.
Leavenworth for additional training. By 1961, approximately six thousand of Korean officers had had some military training in the United States. Upon returning to Korea, they became either instructors at various training institutions or senior commanders and staff officers of higher echelon commands.

The American impact on the Korean military has been significant. The Korean Armed Forces was created by American military personnel, maintained by U.S. military aid, and equipped with U.S. weapons. Also, the organizational structure of the Korean military was modeled after its U.S. counterpart. A number of American military advisors played a vital role in training personnel as well as in introducing the advanced American military system. With the infusion of scientific rationale through American military advisors and the training of officers in the United States, the Korean military became the most westernized sector in Korean society.

Through various training both in Korea and in the United States, the military officers acquired not only tactical and operational skills but also modern managerial and organizational skills. The Army Logistics School provided field-grade officers with the skills of logistics. They were exposed to the problems of logistics

15 Ibid., pp. 147-148.
17 Hahn-been Lee, op. cit., pp. 149-150.
and supply management besides those of planning and programming. A series of one-week courses for all generals of the army were provided.\textsuperscript{18}

The one-year course at the National Defense College gave field and general class officers of the three services entree into the fields of economics, political science, and national development besides a basic knowledge of military operation and strategy. The interrelationship between military and non-military factors, particularly political and economic factors, in the process of the national policy formulation was emphasized.\textsuperscript{19} Trainees became aware of South Korea's potential as well as its limitations under the existing political system. Many felt that the civilian governments of South Korea were performing inadequately.\textsuperscript{20} Their extensive training beyond purely military affairs helped the trainees to become politicized.

B. The Development of the Coup of 1961

While the Korean Armed Forces grew into a modern military institution within a short period of time, it had many internal problems. To construct a modern military was one thing; to maintain and run it smoothly was another.

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., pp. 148-149.


\textsuperscript{20} Henderson, op. cit., pp. 105-106.
As mentioned earlier, the initial officer corps was composed of men with different military backgrounds—Chinese, Manchurian, and Japanese. This mixture of different military backgrounds became a source of conflict and feuding within the officer corps. Various factions were formed based on different military background and geographical affinity. The factional feud was skillfully used by President Syngman Rhee to control the military.

While anti-Japanese sentiment was strong after the liberation, the officers who had had Chinese military background were influential in the newly born military. But they were soon eliminated from the intra-military power struggle. They were handicapped because of old age and a lack of modern military training. Although they were lifelong fighters for Korean independence, they were ill-equipped to meet the demands of the American military advisors. The military advisors looked for young, progressive, and western-oriented officers, especially those who had a working knowledge of English.21

When Syngman Rhee rose to power, he sought to assure himself of the loyalty of the officer corps by installing young and more malleable officers in key posts. He named former Japanese Colonel Yi Ung-jun as the first Army Chief of Staff in November, 1948, deliberately bypassing Ryu Dong-yul and Song O-sŏng, the first and second commanding officers of the Korean Constabulary. Both of

these men had Chinese military backgrounds.22

This was because those officers with Chinese backgrounds rendered their overwhelming loyalty to Kim Ku, who was a strong rival of Rhee. Kim Ku was the leader of the Korean independence struggle in China. Under his arrangement with the Chinese Nationalists, most of these officers were trained either at the Loyang Military Academy or at the Chinese Central Military Academy during the latter part of the 1930's.23 When Kim Ku was assassinated by an army officer, the influence of the "Chinese general" was rooted out. Thereafter, those officers with Manchurian and Japanese military backgrounds dominated the Korean Army (TABLE III).

Among the officers with Manchurian and Japanese military backgrounds, those officers who had come from North Korea were favored by the rightist President Rhee. These officers, who had suffered directly or indirectly from the Communists in the North, constituted strong anti-Communist elements in the Army, and were willing to serve the right-wing cause.

Syngman Rhee, who knew the importance of the political support of the officer corps, lost no time in taking advantage of this opportunity. During the years of 1948-1958, Rhee installed young officers who had North Korean origins at the post of the Army Chief

22Se Jin Kim, op. cit., p. 108.

### TABLE III

**THE ROK ARMY CHIEFS OF STAFF: THEIR SERVICE BACKGROUNDS AND YEARS IN COMMAND**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Officer</th>
<th>Background</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>Ryu Tong-yol</td>
<td>Regular Chinese Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>Song O-sŏng</td>
<td>Korean Independence Fighters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>Ch'ae Pyong-dŏk</td>
<td>Former Japanese Major</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>Ch'ae Pyong-dŏk</td>
<td>Former Japanese Major</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>Ch'ong Il-kwŏn</td>
<td>Graduate of Manchurian Military Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>Yi Ch'ong-ch''an</td>
<td>Former Japanese Major</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>same</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>Paek Sŏn-yŏp</td>
<td>Graduate of Manchurian Military Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>Ch'ong Il-kwŏn</td>
<td>Graduate of Manchurian Military Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>same</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>Yi Hyong-gun</td>
<td>Former Japanese Lt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>Paek Sŏn-Yŏp</td>
<td>Graduate of Manchurian Military Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>same</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>Song Yo-ch'an</td>
<td>Former Japanese Non-Commissioned Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>Ch'oe Kyong-nok</td>
<td>Former Japanese 1st. Lt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>Chang To-yŏng</td>
<td>Former Japanese 2nd Lt.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Among these officers two generals' promotions and assignments illustrated Rhee's skillful...  

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control of the military. They were: General Chŏng Il-kwon and Paek Sŏn-yŏp. These two generals came from different geographical areas: General Chŏng was from the northeastern area and General Paek the northwestern area. Rhee deliberately abetted factional struggle between these two generals by manipulating the promotions and assignments, avoiding the domination of the army by one man or by one group. As Table IV shows, General Chŏng became the first Three-Star General as well as the Army Chief of Staff at the age of 33 in 1951. But General Paek was promoted to the first Four-Star General at the age of 33 in 1953. These two generals alternated in the post of the Chief of Army Staff until 1959.25

In order to control these two generals, Rhee nurtured mutual suspicion and distrust. "Rhee would call in one general and treat him with paternal affection, praising him for his well-performed service to the country and the Rhee government. Then just before leaving the president's mansion, this overwhelmed general would be given a grandfatherly admonition for not getting along with the other general."26 Rhee resorted to the same tactics with the other general. The result of Rhee's Machiavellian control over generals was the severe power struggle between the "Northeastern" faction headed by General Chŏng and the "Northwestern" faction headed by General Paek. The power struggle between these two factions resulted

25 Ibid., p. 128.

### TABLE IV

**PROMOTIONS AND ASSIGNMENTS OF TWO GENERALS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>General Paek Son-yop</th>
<th>General Chong Il-kwon</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>Colonel (28)</td>
<td>Brig. General (31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>Brig. General (29)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>Major General (31)</td>
<td>*Major General (32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>*Lt. General (33)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>*Lt. General (32)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>*Four-Star General (33)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>*Four-Star General (36)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>*Four-Star General</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>*Four-Star General</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>*Four-Star General</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Asterisks denote the position of the Army Chief of Staff. The figures in parentheses mean the ages of the generals.


In the retirement of General Chong in 1956 and he was sent to Turkey as the Korean Ambassador. He was charged with being involved in the assassination of Major General Kim Chang-yong, the Director of the Counter-Intelligence-Corps (CIC). The second man in the Chong faction, Lt. General Kang Mun-bong, was sentenced to death. Later the sentence was commuted to life imprisonment.²⁷

Similarly, Rhee gave much power to the military investigation agencies to control the military. The Joint Provost Marshal

General Command (JPMGC) under Lt. General Wŏn Yŏng-dŏk was very powerful, having jurisdiction over both the entire military branches and civilians. During the 1952 political incident in which Rhee passed a constitutional amendment under martial law, General Wŏn faithfully carried out Rhee's orders as the Commander of the Marshal Law Administration. While General Wŏn's military police unit was emerging as a formidable political tool, Rhee increased the power of the Counter-Intelligence-Corps as a rival to this unit, allowing it direct access to the President. The CIC, the JPMGC, and the Chief of Staff, none of these being fully controlled by the other, set up a triangular power struggle among themselves. In 1956 the severe power struggle among the various groups led to the murder of the Director of the CIC, Maj. General Kim Chang-yong, who was Rhee's right hand man.  

Under such circumstances, blind loyalty to Rhee and his Liberal Party was required for promotion and better assignments. Some generals became subservient to Liberal Party politicians for personal gains. They delivered their men's votes for the Liberal Party candidates. One Chief of Staff was appointed partially because the percentages of pro-government vote in the area he had commanded were very high.  

Under political pressure, the soldiers were forced to vote for Liberal Party candidates.

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29 Ibid., p. 355.
In addition, the Army had been asked by corrupt politicians to provide political funds. Since the Korean military received over forty per cent of national budget during the 1950's and had its own financial sources through American military aid, the Army became an important source of political funds for Rhee's vast political machine. An alliance between politics and the military was formed to provide funds.\(^{30}\)

U.S.-imported cotton was sold illegally. Commercially valuable war materials such as gasoline, automobiles, and their parts were put on the market.\(^{31}\) Key income-producing posts had to be assigned to the trustworthy; financial communication required full confidence. Corruption and factionalism went hand in hand.

Besides such collusion between politics and the military, low salaries constituted one of the important reasons for corruption of the military. Table V shows the monthly salary scales in hwan for various selected ranks in the ROK Army in 1959. At that time, the living cost for an average family was about 127,000 hwan a month. A general's salary after numerous deductions was only 73,252 hwan.\(^{32}\) In order to make extra money illicit activities among enlisted men and officers within the military grew. One's expenses were not met

\(^{30}\)Ibid., p. 349.

\(^{31}\)Se Jin Kim, op. cit., p. 149.

TABLE V

ROK ARMY MONTHLY PAY SCALES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Before Deduction</th>
<th>After Deduction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General</td>
<td>87,300</td>
<td>73,252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>63,122</td>
<td>54,352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>45,762</td>
<td>40,156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Lt.</td>
<td>40,066</td>
<td>35,456</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Master Serg.</td>
<td>36,082</td>
<td>32,170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporal</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


by his pay. Corruption went unchecked and became a way of life.\textsuperscript{33}

When the growth of the Korean Armed Forces toward professionalism was impeded by such factors as the political use of the military by politicians, low pay, factionalism, and corruption, promotion became an additional serious problem. After the armistice of the Korean War, a problem of "promotion freeze" emerged. As described earlier, the Korean military was established in 1945 and expanded rapidly thereafter within a very short period. The officer corps was filled with men of roughly the same age, especially during the formative period of 1946-1950. Those who first joined the military became generals at the very young age, while later arrivals

filled the junior ranks. Because all high posts in the military echelons had been occupied by young generals, the opportunities of promotion for lower-ranking officers were very dim.  

This situation especially troubled the junior officers at the ranks of Lt. Colonel and Full Colonel, and frustration occurred among these officers. The ranks of the junior officers were filled mainly by the graduates of the eighth class of the Korean Military Academy in 1949 (TABLE 1). This eighth graduating class was the largest in the history of the Academy. This class was composed of two groups of candidates. One group of candidates was recruited from civilians, and the other came from enlisted men. Those who had had no military experience entered the Academy in December, 1949, and received six months training. Those who had had military experience entered the Academy three months later and received three months training. The average age of the candidates was 22 or 23 years old. They had high educational backgrounds, compared with previous classes. All were graduates of high schools;

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35 Kang In-soo, "Yuksa P'algisaeng" [The 8th Graduating Class of the ROK Military Academy], Sindonga (September, 1964), pp. 173-174. There was a special squad of 456 men. They had served in the Chinese, Manchurian or Japanese Army and received only a couple of weeks of training. They were graduated from the Academy in March 1949 and commissioned Second Lieutenants. They were classified the special squad 8th graduating class. See also Table 1.
some had a college education. These two groups graduated from the Academy at the same time in May, 1949, and were commissioned second Lieutenants. There were 1,292 men in this class.

When the Korean War broke out in 1950, they held important positions as leaders at the company level. During the war many of them lost their lives. The rest rose to the ranks of either Colonel or Lt. Colonel after the war. Once the army expansion was over, promotion was slow. These junior officers looked upward, but their access to higher rank was blocked by the young generals who were only two or three years their senior. Their discontent and frustration grew.

With the outburst of the April student uprising of 1960 against the corruption and election irregularities of the Rhee regime, the so-called "young Turks" movement against corrupt, political, and incompetent generals emerged within the Korean military. Immediately after the downfall of the Rhee regime, Major General Park Chung Hee was said to have recommended the retirement of the then Army Chief of Staff for his collaboration with the government on rigging the election. On May 8, 1960, eight Lt. Colonels from the eighth graduating class of the Korean Military

36 Ibid.
37 Ibid., pp. 176-177.
Academy secretly organized a "military purification" movement to eliminate corrupt elements within the Army. They were to propose:

1. Investigation and punishment of those high ranking generals who had collaborated with the Liberals in rigging the March 15 presidential election.

2. Punishment of those officers who had amassed an illicit fortune.

3. Elimination of all incompetent and corrupt officers in commanding positions.

4. Political neutrality of the military and elimination of all the elements which had caused factionalism.

5. Improvement of treatment of military personnel.

They decided to launch a petition drive and to recommend these measures to the Chief of Staff. But the plan failed. The movement was detected, and the key figures were arrested under the charge of "plotting to overthrow the government."

Shocked by this incident, all top generals above the level of corps commander held a meeting to discuss the problem. In the meeting General Park openly supported the young officers, but the sentiment among the other generals was that the generals alone were not responsible for the corruption because not only the generals but also the entire army were corrupt. One general said:

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39 Ibid.


I don't see why we generals alone should be held responsible. Isn't it true that we soldiers cannot live on our salaries alone because we are also human beings? Therefore, I believe that not only generals but also officers and even men should be held responsible for the corruption. I think no one in the entire army who has not been corrupted enough to steal. Privates stole on foot, officers in their jeeps, and generals by truck.42

After two days of heated discussion, however, the young officers were released without any formal disciplinary action. As a result of this incident, however, the Army Chief of Staff resigned from his post on May 20, 1960, but no purification measures were instituted in the military.

Following the establishment of the new government of Premier Chang Myon of the Second Republic of Korea, those officers who initiated the "purification" movement expected the new government to undertake a major reform of the military. The caretaker government of Hồ Chí Minh, which was set up after the downfall of the Rhee regime, was powerless to institute major reforms in the military and the government. Contrary to the expectations of these officers, the Second Republic was no better. As discussed earlier, the Chang cabinet itself was unstable due to severe factional struggles within the ruling party and lacked viable leadership.

On September 10, 1960, eleven Lt. Colonels, including Kim Chong-p'il, Kim Hyong-uk, Kil Chae-ho, Oh Chi-sŏng, and others—eight of whom had been previously involved in the May "purification"

movement—called on the civilian Defense Minister, Hyon Sok-ho, to express their views on "purification" of the military and to urge its immediate undertaking. The minister did not even receive them. These officers were taken to the provost marshal's office and severely reprimanded for their conduct.

In the same evening, the indignant nine Lt. Colonels met with Major General Park Chung Hee at a Seoul restaurant and they unanimously decided to execute a coup. They all agreed that a major reform of the Army through peaceful means was impossible, and that a drastic reform was urgently needed, both in the government and the military. What had begun as a "house-cleaning" attempt within the military developed into a coup to overthrow the Chang government which had failed to meet the purification demands from within the military.

A nucleus of a revolutionary movement grew with the outbreak of the so-called "Haguksang" incident, which literally means the "challenge of the seniors by the juniors." On September 25, 1960, a group of sixteen junior officers, most of whom were members of the eighth graduating class, forced Lt. General Choi Yong-hi to resign as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It was said that Lt. General Choi had been a target of the "purification" movement for

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43 Hanguk kunsa hyongmyongsa, Vol. 1, p. 196.
44 Ibid., pp. 196-197.
45 Hanguk kunsa hyongmyongsa, Vol. 1, p. 196.

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his alleged financial irregularities. Unlike the previous cases, all sixteen officers were, at this time, turned over to the military court martial on the charge of rebellious conduct. After a prolonged trial, Colonel Kim Dong-bok was sentenced to three months in prison. The other key figures of the incident, Kim Chong-p'il, Sok Chong-sun, and Kim Hyong-uk, were put on reserve status. This incident marked the end of the "purification" movement by this group of junior officers, but their views were listened to and their voice of dissent was heard. In this sense, the incident helped to expand the coup organization to those officers who shared the views of this group of officers in the "purification" of the military.

C. The Leaders of the Coup

The Korean military coup of 1961 was planned and organized by nine junior officers under the leadership of Major General Park Chung Hee. In light of their key role in the planning of the coup, it is important to know their personal and career backgrounds.

Among the core members of the coup planning, the first personality who commands special attention is Lt. Colonel Kim Chong-p'il. Since the downfall of the Rhee regime, Kim was de facto leader of junior officers in their "purification" movement. As one of the rare college educated men who had become military officers, he had

\[46\] Ibid. See also Se Jin Kim, op. cit., pp. 168-170.

\[47\] Hanguk hyongmyong chaep'ansa, p. 917.
been known for his political ambition.48

He was born in 1926 in the rural district of south Ch'ungs'ŏng province in South Korea. Finishing his primary and secondary schooling there, he entered the College of Education of Seoul National University. After two years in college, he entered the Korean Military Academy in 1949, and graduated in June, 1949, as a member of the eighth graduating class of the Academy. He was assigned to the intelligence section of the Korean Army. In 1952, he rose to the head of the North Korean Section in the Korean Army Intelligence Bureau. He received officer training in the United States. He was placed in the reserve at the rank of Lt. Colonel in February, 1961, because of his involvement in the Haguksang incident, and was returned to active status immediately after the coup of 1961.49

His intelligence background gave Lt. Colonel Kim several advantages for his cardinal role not only in engineering the "purification" movement but also in planning and executing the coup and later organizing clandestinely a political party after the takeover of power. Unlike other infantry officers with front-line duty, he was less restricted in terms of time and movement. This gave him an

48 Se Jin Kim, op. cit., p. 179.

opportunity to maintain a close contact with other officers. As an intelligence officer, he had access to the personal files of the high ranking officers. He became aware of the personal life and military records of the senior officers. As a counter-intelligence officer, he had to master the art of espionage. Thus his career background was well fitted to carry out such a top secret task as a coup d'etat.

Equipped with information on the personal and military lives of the senior officers, and armed with the technique of espionage, Kim Chong-p'il played a leading role in instigating the "purification" movement within the military and later the Hagúksang incident.

His prime motive to instigate such incidents could be explained by his resentment against his rank and position in the army. As an officer with a college education on the intellectually barren Korean Army, he might resent the high ranking officers who had no more than a middle school education. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, the members of the eighth graduating class of the Korean Military Academy received much less benefit from the expansion of the Army. These class members rose to no higher rank than colonel. Thus he could have instigated the "purification" movement partly to make room at the top of the military hierarchy for the junior officers. 50

Major General Park Chung Hee, the chosen leader of the coup by the group of the junior officers, was born in 1917 in a small farm

50 Se Jin Kim, op. cit., p. 181.
village in north Kyongsang province in South Korea. He attended Taegu Normal School. After graduating from the school he taught for a while at a country primary school. In 1940 he entered the Manchukuo Military Institute. Upon his graduation in 1942, he entered the regular four-year Japanese Military Academy for additional training. Graduating from this Academy with honors, he was commissioned as an officer of the Japanese army. 51

After the liberation of Korea, he entered the Korean Military Academy in 1946. In the same year, he was commissioned as a captain. He was at one time involved in the 1948 uprisings of the Communist elements in the Army in Yosu and Taegu, and was sentenced to death at a military court martial. He was later fully pardoned and reinstated to the army with his previous rank. 52 It was reported that his life-time colleague, General Чонг Il-kwon, a close confidant of Syngman Rhee, saved Park's life. Park and Чонг were alumni of the Manchurian Military Institute. 53 Park advanced rapidly during the Korean War, and in 1953 he rose to the rank of Brig. General. In 1955, he was sent to the United States to received advanced military training at the Army Artillery School in Fort Sill. In 1957, he attended the Command and General Staff School of the ROK Army.


52 Ibid.

53 Ibid., p. 17.
During his fourteen years of military service, before the coup of 1961, he was transferred twenty-six times. He was literally pushed and kicked around by the army. His involvement in the Communist-led military mutinies of 1948 had haunted him. For example, General Park was relieved of his logistics command post in Pusan on July 30, 1960, and transferred to an insignificant post in south Cholla province as Commanding General of the First Military District Command. The immediate cause of his transfer was, according to a reporter for Pusan Ilbo, a distorted report by a local CIC chief in Pusan that General Park had maintained close connections with the pro-Communist Federation of Korean Residents in Japan.  

General Park is physically small and rustic both in his manner and in his look. He seldom mingled with the golf-playing generals who were friendly with American generals. He had never played a game of golf with American military personnel in Korea. He was hardly a "political" general. He was one of the few generals in the ROK Army whose poor English was a handicap in a policy-making position in which close communication with American officials was required.

General Park was well known for his quiescence and a strong sense of righteousness. He was openly against the 1960 rigged

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elections and welcomed the Student Revolution. He was regarded as their "exemplar general" and leader by the group of the junior officers who engineered the "purification" movement. General Park is related to Lt. Colonel Kim Chong-p'il through marriage. This was an important link and basis for mutual trust and dependence, which was necessary for any conspiratorial task.

Lt. Colonel Kil Chae-ho was born in 1923 in north P'youngan province in North Korea, and graduated from Osan Middle School there which produced many Korean nationalists. In 1949 he entered the Korean Military Academy (KMA) and graduated from it as a member of the eighth graduating class. He earned a law degree from Kukmin University in Seoul in 1953. He was the Deputy Commander of the ROK First Combat Force in 1959. He participated in the "purification" movement. In the coup planning he was in charge of legal affairs.

Lt. Colonel Kim Hyong-uk was born in 1925 in Hwanghae province in North Korea. He too was a member of the eighth graduating class of the KMA. In 1958 he attended the Army War College, and graduated from Kyonghui University in Seoul in 1956. He was an intelligence officer and participated in the "purification" movement. In the coup planning he was in charge of intelligence.

56 Ibid., p. 88.

57 Hyondae hanguk inmyong sajon, p. 15. The sources on the role of core members in the coup planning are drawn in Hanguk kunsa hyongmyongsa, p. 197.

58 Hyondae hanguk inmyong sajon, p. 59.
Lt. Colonel Kim Tong-hwan was born in 1927 in Seoul. He was also a member of the eighth graduating class of the KMA. In 1954 he received officer training in the U.S. He earned a degree in political science and international relations from Kyonghui University in Seoul in 1957. He participated in the "purification" movement and took charge of the financial and economic affairs in the coup planning.\(^{59}\)

Lt. Colonel O Chi-s\'ong was born in 1927 in Hwanghae province in North Korea. He graduated from Haeju Teacher's School. He also was a member of the eighth graduating class of the KMA. In 1957 he received a degree in law from Tongguk University in Seoul. He was an officer in the personnel section within the ROK Army Headquarters prior to the 1961 coup, and participated in the "purification" movement. In the coup planning he took charge of personnel and recruitment.\(^{60}\)

Lt. Colonel Sin Yun-ch'ang was born in 1926 in north P'yongan province in North Korea. He also was a member of the eighth graduating class of the KMA, and received a degree from Kukhak University while he was in active service. He was Commander of the Capital Defense Force before the coup. He participated in the "purification" movement and was in charge of the operational aspects in the planning of the coup.\(^{61}\)

\(^{59}\)Ibid., p. 22.

\(^{60}\)Ibid., p. 118.

\(^{61}\)Ibid., p. 105.
Lt. Colonel Ok Ch'ang-ho was born in 1927 in Manchuria. He graduated from P'yongyang Normal School in 1945. He also was a member of the eighth graduating class of the KMA and was an officer in the anti-Communist defense planning section in the Office of the Chief of Staff for War Planning in the ROK Army Headquarters in 1959. He participated in the "purification" movement. He was in charge of the operational aspects of the coup planning.62

Lt. Colonel Ch'ong Mun-sun was born in 1925 in north P'yongan province in North Korea. He too was a member of the eighth graduating class of the KMA and received officer training in the U.S. in 1954. He graduated from the ROK Army War College in 1960. He participated in the "purification" movement. In the coup planning he was in charge of intelligence.63

These core members of the coup organization had some interesting common characteristics. They were born in rural areas in Korea and finished their primary and secondary education before the liberation of Korea. Most of them received additional military training either in the United States or in Korea, and studied in colleges while they were serving in the army. Except for General Park, they all were members of the eighth graduating class of the Korean Military Academy. Their common educational experience at the Academy helped bring them together. They shared a concern for political as well as personal problems. A close comradeship

62_1bid., p. 118.
63_1bid., p. 177.
developed among them.

The organization for the 1961 coup was rapidly expanded by these core members. From late 1960 to early 1961, the coup organization network expanded to the officers of the various military units stationed in the Seoul area, the First Army, and many reserve divisions. The Marine Corps, which had its own plan to stage a coup, joined the army officers. By April, 1961, the organization of the coup force was completed. A small nucleus of nine core members under the leadership of General Park expanded to a coup force of about 250 officers of all ranks.

D. The Junta Government

At pre-dawn of May 16, 1961, the coup forces of about 3,600 men rolled in the capital city, Seoul. The key targets such as radio stations, power plants, government buildings, and police stations were easily secured. At 5 A.M. the military takeover of the government was announced. The Seoul Central Radio Station broadcasted that the Second Republic was overthrown and that "the military authority" had taken over the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the state and organized a "Military Revolutionary Committee." After this formal announcement of the

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government takeover, six "revolutionary pledges," the basic policies of the military revolution, were declared. They were:

1. Positive, uncompromising opposition to Communism is the basis of our policy.

2. We shall respect and observe the U.N. charters, and strengthen our relations with the United States . . . .

3. We shall eliminate corruption, and eradicate other social evils . . . .

4. We shall . . . devote our entire energies toward the development of a self-sustaining economy.

5. We shall foster strength for national unification. . . .

6. After we have completed our mission, we shall restore the government to honest and conscientious civilians and return to our proper military duties.67

As the military takeover became a firmly established fact after two days of uncertainty, the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction (SCNR) was set up by the Military Revolutionary Committee as the nation's supreme governing organ. It was to have authority over all three branches of the government. The Supreme Council was to be a compact, tightly regimented, powerful nucleus of the military government. The number of the supreme councilors was to be neither more than thirty-two nor less than twenty. They were to be elected from among military officers on active duty "who are deeply imbedded with the cause of the May 16 Military Revolution."68

67Military Revolution in Korea, p. i.
All the executive functions were to be performed by a cabinet under the control of the Council. The Prime Minister was appointed by the Council. The cabinet members were appointed by the Premier with the consent of the Council. The Council could remove a cabinet member by a single majority vote. 69

A Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was established by the Supreme Council to provide information for the decision-making of the SCNR and to curb possible counter-coups. It was headed by Kim Chong-p'il, the second most powerful man, only next to General Park, among the coup leaders. The CIA became a powerful organization, having the power to investigate and supervise all of the activities of government ministries as well as those of the Armed Forces. 70

Immediately after success of the coup, the military junta dissolved the National Assembly and the provincial councils throughout the nation. All political and social activities were banned. The press was brought under control of the military junta. Gang leaders, hoodlums, and Communist suspects were arrested. 71

The junta initiated a strong reform measure to eliminate corruption. On May 28, a committee for inspection of illicit wealth was set up to wipe out favoritism and corrupt government employees.

69 Military Revolution in Korea, pp. 26-27.
70 Ibid., Vol. II, p. 610.
71 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 246. See also Military Revolution in Korea, pp. 28-29.
The junta confiscated the amassed wealth of 59 companies which had prospered illegally through tax evasion under the Rhee and Chang regimes. Ten former high government officials and five military officers were arrested on charges of amassing illicit wealth. Thirty-four former government officials and assemblymen were ordered to pay a total of $5.5 million for the illegal fortunes acquired under the previous regimes. Six retired generals and one retired admiral were included. Steps were taken to eliminate the "corrupt elements" in the government. Forty-one thousand of 240,989 civil servants were charged with securing their sinecures through nepotism, favoritism, and bribery, and dismissed.

Under the slogans of "elimination of the old evil" and "responsibility of free press," a new policy for the press media was issued. The new policy specified that the publishing of newspapers be limited to those with complete printing facilities for the production of newspapers, and that news services be limited to those with complete wire service facilities for transmission and reception. As a result, 1,230 out of a total of 1,573 press and news services were closed down because they failed to meet the standards. Most of them were those which had mushroomed after the April student

revolution of 1960.\textsuperscript{75}

One of the urgent problems which the junta government faced was how to solve the deteriorating economy. In order to cope with this situation, the junta launched various short and long-term economic measures immediately after the coup. As a short-term measure, a series of rural programs, such as liquidation of rural usury debts and agricultural price support measures were launched. To prepare long-term measures an Economic Planning Board was established. A five-year economic development plan (1962-1966) was announced in July, 1961.

The plan was to be effective from January, 1962. Throughout the planning period, the government would participate directly and render guidance indirectly in developing basic key industries and other important projects. The plan envisioned an average annual growth rate of 7 per cent in GNP, of 15 per cent in secondary industries, and of 6 per cent and 4 per cent respectively in primary and tertiary industries. Also, the plan aimed to reduce the rate of unemployment from 24 per cent in 1960 to 15 per cent in the final year of 1966. The capital for the plan was to come mainly from foreign investments.\textsuperscript{76}

The military which overthrew the inefficient government that had failed to meet the repeated demands for its purification

\textsuperscript{75}Se Jin Kim, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 214.

\textsuperscript{76}Reeve, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 165.
succeeded initially in restoring law and order and in launching puritanical reform measures to wipe out irregularity and corruption in every sector of society. The Korean military which acquired modern managerial and executive skills began to devote its energy and knowledge to nation-building.
CHAPTER III

PARTY BUILDING

A. The Decision to Transfer the Government to Civilians

The coup of 1961 in Korea, like all other coups, was an unconstitutional and illegitimate takeover of the government. To justify it, therefore, the military junta asserted that its rule was an urgent and transitional measure to remedy the malpractices of the existing, civilian regime, and promised in its public pledges that it would turn over the government to "honest and conscientious civilians" after finishing its revolutionary missions.

After the military junta consolidated its power, it launched various reform measures and an ambitious economic program, and on August 12 the junta government declared that the restoration of civilian rule was planned for the summer of 1963. This early decision of the military junta to return the government to civilian politicians was influenced by the strong reaction of the United States to the military coup of 1961 from the outset. Although it promised in its "revolutionary pledges" that civilian control would be restored after its missions had been completed, it appeared that it had no definite plans concerning the period of military rule and a timetable for the turnover of the
government to civilian hands.¹

When the coup took place on May 16, 1961, the United Nations Commander, U.S. General Carter B. Magruder and Minister Marshall Green, the American charge d'affaires, were busily attempting to evaluate the situation and character of the coup. The picture was unclear. After long deliberations, they reached a decision to initiate a move aimed at restoring the status quo ante in South Korea, although they received no advice from Washington. They issued separate strongly worded statements supporting the constitutional democratic government headed by Premier Chang. Minister Green's statement, for instance, read:

The position taken by the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Command in supporting the freely elected and constitutionally established Government of the Republic of Korea is one in which I fully concur. I wish to make it emphatically clear that the United States supports the constitutional Government of the Republic of Korea as elected by the people of the Republic last July. . . .²

General Magruder and Minister Green then visited President Yun Po-son, who remained at that time the constitutional head of the state. They asked President Yun to agree with the launching of a counter-revolution as the chief of state and commander-in-chief of the Korean Armed Forces. General Magruder wished to order the

¹Although the leaders of the coup prepared detailed programs for governmental structures and socio-economic policies during the military rule, it was believed that they had no definite plans for future politics. See Hanguk kusa hyongmyongsa, Vol. 1, pp. 171-173. See also Kim Young-su, "Minju kongwhadang sajon chojik" [The Advance Organization of the Democratic Republican Party], Sindonga (November, 1964), pp. 171-172.

mobilization of 40,000 men to force the revolutionary army to return to its post. Minister Green emphasized that the coup was unconstitutional and declared that the United States could not support it. He predicted that the coup would be followed by second and third coups.  

Korea was on the brink of civil war. A prolonged civil war was a possibility. President Yun declared that he could not agree to their plan to mobilize the Korean Army to crush the coup. President Yun viewed the military revolution as inevitable, though not desirable, because the Chang regime had lost the people's confidence. In fact, when the leader of the coup, General Park, asked for President Yun's support, President Yun stated that he "had believed revolution inevitable." Yun agreed, furthermore, to write personal letters to all Army Corps commanders urging them to restore national order without bloodshed.

Relations between the military junta and the Government of the United States grew tense. For nearly two days after the coup, the U.S. government refused to comment officially on the Korean situation on the grounds that it was still a "fluid" condition. It

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3 Ibid., pp. 111-112. See also his "Role of the United States in South Korea's Democratization," Pacific Affairs, Vol. XLIII, No. 2 (Summer 1969), pp. 169-175.


5 Oh, Korea: Democracy on Trial, p. 108.

6 Ibid. See also Hanguk kunsa hyongmyongs, pp. 247, 260.
was reported that Under Secretary of State Chester Bowles said that the coup leaders were mainly concerned with clearing up corruption and not with setting up a permanent military dictatorship. On May 18, the chairman of the Military Revolutionary Committee, General Chang To-yong, sent a special message to President Kennedy. This message contained explanations of the inevitability of the coup, the pledge of restoration of civilian control, and the junta's desire to maintain friendly ties with the United States.

On May 19, an official statement was issued by the Department of State. It stated:

It has been our purpose in Korea to help the Korean people achieve, through democratic process, stability, order, constitutional government. . . .

This continues to be our purpose.
We are encouraged by the strong intent of the military leaders in Korea to return the government to civilian hands.

A formal response to General Chang's message to President Kennedy on May 18 was made more than a week later, not in the name of the President, but only in the name of Minister Green. The message said that the United States government "notes with satisfaction the expression of intention to return the Government to civilian control."
This strong negative U.S. reaction to the coup, and America's concern over the junta's promise to turn over the government to civilian hands had a significant influence on the junta's policies for the early restoration of civilian rule. Since her liberation from Japanese colonial rule in 1945, Korea had been heavily dependent upon both military and economic assistance from the United States. When the military junta planned to launch a Five Year Economic Development Plan, they knew that they had to rely heavily upon American economic assistance.

The junta economic development plan called for a $2,500,000 investment from domestic, foreign, public, and private sources. To finance such an enormous investment required for the plan, the junta had to rely on United States economic aid and private donations to the extent of 42 per cent of the total, on government and private borrowings from abroad for 16 per cent, and on domestic resources for the remaining 42 per cent. More than one half of the required capital investment depended upon sources over which the junta had little control. Thus, foreign, especially American, resources became crucial for the implementation of the plan. Because the successful implementation of the plan was vital not only to the


development of the Korean economy, but also to the political life of the military junta, ties with the United States was absolutely necessary. In this sense, it was apparent that the United States' strong reaction against the junta became a pressure upon it to restore promptly civilian rule.

On August 12, 1961, three months after the coup, General Park, the new chairman of the SCNR replacing General Chang, announced a timetable for the turnover of the government to civilian hands. According to the timetable, a new constitution was to be promulgated by March, 1963, and a general election was to be held the following May. By that summer, the government was to be completely returned to civilian hands, and a third Republic of Korea was to be established.\(^13\)

The military junta, furthermore, reaffirmed that the military revolution was a temporary suspension of democratic processes and that the nature of their rule was transitionary. General Park claimed in his book, Chidoja do [The Ways of a Leader], that the purpose of the coup was "to overthrow the anti-democratic system and to lay down the foundation for a true, free democracy" in South Korea. He declared that the coup was "certainly not for the establishment of new dictatorship and totalitarianism."\(^14\) He asserted metaphorically that the military was to play the role of a


doctor in curing the evils which hindered democratic nation-building. He stated:

The Military Revolution is not the destruction of democracy in Korea. Rather it is a way for saving it; it is a surgical operation intended to eradicate a malignant social, political and economic tumor. The revolution was staged with the compassion of a benevolent surgeon who sometime must cause pain in order to preserve life and restore health.¹⁵

B. The Formation of the Democratic Republican Party (DRP)

The military junta's decision to turn over the government to civilian hands in the summer of 1963 raised the following crucial questions: (1) who would carry out its revolutionary mission?; (2) who would be the "fresh and conscientious politicians" to take over the government?; (3) what would be the future status of General Park and other military revolutionaries when civilian rule was restored? The answers to these questions by Kim Chong-p'il and his "brain trust" led to the formation of a new political party. Before Park's announcement regarding the restoration of civilian rule, Kim Chong-p'il, as the director of the CIA, had established a brain trust with the title of a Research Center for Domestic and Foreign Affairs within the CIA. Kim's brain trust consisted of a group of young political science professors, including some experts in the field of political parties.¹⁶

¹⁶Kim Yong-su, op. cit., p. 171.
Park's aforementioned announcement, according to one informant, Kim Chong-p'il asked his brain trust to study the future status of General Park Chung Hee in a new civilian government. 17

Several alternatives seemed to have been considered concerning the future status of the military revolutionaries in a new civilian government. All military revolutionaries would return to their military duties. Their returning to the barracks would mean that they had to resume to contend with their superior officers within the military hierarchy. Most of the military revolutionaries were still young and field grade officers. General Park would be forced to retire soon after his return to the barracks. There was also a possibility of repeated coups. Such a possibility should be prevented. There was another alternative. The military revolutionaries would retire from the military and assume a special status in a new government. It was hoped that the privileged status in a new government was guaranteed for them and that a special status could be provided for General Park to control the government even after civilian rule was restored. The Kim brain trust could not reach a suitable solution to their demands. 18 There was a last alternative.

The last alternative was that the military revolutionaries


18Ibid. See also Kim Yong-su, op. cit., p. 173.
would take off their military uniforms and assume direct control of
the government as either elected or appointed officials. The idea
for the formation of a new political party was thus conceived as a
vehicle for the military revolutionaries to assume political power
in a new civilian government. 19

After a series of studies, Kim's brain trust formulated a
blueprint for the new political party. It was called the "Kim
plan." The new party was to be tightly organized, based on a
strong administrative or secretarial structure that would control
all party affairs and finances. The party organizations were to
operate under a single command system. The party was to be led by
a new elite consisting of young professors, writers, and middle
level civil servants who were dedicated to the revolutionary
missions. The party cadres were to be carefully chosen, well
trained, and disciplined. 20

The work of the party formation started as early as January,
1962, only six months after the coup, and a year before political
activities were permitted. The initial work of the party organi-
zation had been carried out by a group of CIA members, whose duty
was to screen core organizers from civilians in accordance with the
Kim plan. Six or seven civilians were persuaded by Kim Chong-p'il
to join the organization. They were: Lee Ho-bum and Lee Yong-nam,

19 Ibid.
20 Ibid. See also Kim Yong-su, op. cit., pp. 171-173.
who were young professors; Suh In-suk, who was a correspondent for The New York Times in Seoul; and some others. 21

These core organizers took charge of broadening the organization. They screened recruits on the basis of their education, occupation, and commitment to the revolutionary ideology, and then persuaded them one by one to join the movement. By the end of March, 1962, the organization had acquired a solid nucleus. The recruits numbered almost seventy. By October, 1962, the recruitment of members of the secretariats on a large scale who were to take charge of running the party had almost been completed through methodical screening. They included some one thousand highly educated people recruited from every segment of society. There were young teachers, professors, journalists, and rank and file government officials. 22

All of them received special secret training at the Training Center. It was reported that the contents of this training consisted of a series of lectures on various topics: analysis of Korean politics, political parties, the inevitability of the coup of May 16, and the principles of the new party. 23 The trainers in the center were the professors from Kim's brain trust.

When the "political curfew" which immobilized the so-called

21 Kim Yong-su, op. cit., p. 170.

22 Ibid., pp. 180-182.

23 Ibid., p. 176.
old politicians under the Political Activities Purification Law was lifted on January 1, 1963, the preparation for the launching of a new political party had already been completed except for the nomination of officials for key posts. On January 21, a Secretary General of the central secretariat, along with nine provincial chiefs and two special city chiefs—Seoul and Pusan—were appointed. By January 27, the heads of 131 district party branches and their officials were appointed.\textsuperscript{24}

On February 26, 1963, the formation of the Democratic Republican Party (DRP) was officially proclaimed. Once the DRP was launched officially, intensive membership drives were begun. The goal was 500,000 members before June. Its membership increased with great speed. By March 5, only two weeks after the official launching of the party, the membership was reported to be 154,982.\textsuperscript{25}

C. Principles of the DRP's Organization and its Characteristics

The organizational principles of the DRP resulted from a critical review of the weaknesses of previous Korean political parties. As observed earlier, the DRP was formed in accordance with the Kim plan. When Kim Chong-p'il asked his brain trust to


design a blueprint for a new political party, they undertook to analyze the parties which Korea had had and found the following weaknesses: (1) The district charters of the parties were not organized like party organizations but rather as private organizations. The constituent branch organizations were merely gatherings of followers or kinship groups of the regional political figures; (2) the political parties of the past were "cliques" rather than political parties. All party activities were centered around factions, and political funds were independently provided by these factions; and (3) the parties lacked an executive or administrative organization to take charge of their activities. 26

in order to avoid these weaknesses, Kim's brain trust concluded that the DRP should be based on the following principles of organization:

1. The Principle of Public Organization—the party organization should not be centered around political figures. It must be independent of candidates for National Assembly. Loyalty should be shifted from the political figures to the public, common cause.

2. The Principle of Chom chojik [Point Organization]—the principle of independence of each member and elimination of factionalism.

3. The Principle of Haek sim chojik [Core Organization]—the principle of continuity of party activity. The party organization should be designed to maintain continuous party activities by members not only during elections but also during off-election years.

4. The Principle of Single Command—the party organization should be based on a chain of command with one head to which all small units are responsible. 27

In order to implement these four principles, the brain trust set up three internal organs; the secretarial structure, the representative structure, and the policy research structure. What was noteworthy among the DRP organizations was the introduction of a secretarial structure. It was organized hierarchically and run by paid party members. The secretariats were to control all party affairs and finances. The following is a detailed discussion of the internal organs of the DRP.

i. The Representative Structure

The representative structure is organized hierarchically. The primary unit is the District Party Committee. It is composed of representatives selected from towns and townships. It has a Standing Committee to be in charge of its affairs. Above the District Party Committee are the City and Provincial Branch Committees, which also have their Standing Committees to be in charge of their affairs. The highest representative organization is the Party Convention (Chart 1). The Central Committee is responsible for the affairs of the Party Convention. The Central Standing Committee aids the Central Committee. The Central Standing Committee has twelve sub-committees. 28

27 Ch'oe Suh-yŏng, op. cit., p. 82. See also Dangwŏn Kyŏbon, pp. 181-182.

28 Minju kongwha dang, Minju kongwha dang sa nyon sa [The Four
Chart 1 The Representative Structure

Source: Minju konghwa dang sa nyon sa, p. 680.
The function of the representative structure is mainly advisory. It is to suggest changes of policies and party charters and to recommend a party candidate for the presidency. The main function of the party convention is to nominate a party candidate for the presidency.

ii. The Secretarial Structure

Of all DRP organizations, the secretarial structure is most important. It controls all party affairs and finances. The secretarial structure is the executive and administrative organization which is organized from top to bottom, based on the principle of a centralized bureaucratic system.

The hierarchy of the secretarial structure includes in the order of importance, the Party President, the Party Chairman, the Party Council, and the Secretary General. The Party President is the highest commander of the party. Under his direction, the Party Chairman controls and executes all Party affairs. The Secretary General, under the Party Chairman, controls party affairs and the secretariats, and he is aided by two Deputy Secretary Generals. The secretariats are composed of the Central Office, ten City and Provincial Branch Offices, and 131 District Party Offices.29

The Central Office has five departments. These are the

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29Dangwon kyobon, p. 151.
Planning and Research Department, Organization Department, Publicity Department, Training and Education Department, and General Affairs Department. Each department is sub-divided into three or four sections. All party affairs are executed by these departments and their various sections. Each City and Provincial Branch Office has three departments. These are the Organization Department, Publicity Department, and General Affairs Department. Each District Party Office has these three departments that the City and Provincial Branch Offices have (Chart 2).

In order to maintain a close cooperation between the representative and the secretarial structures, the DRP intermixes personnel between these two structures at various levels. The chairman of the Central Committee, for instance, becomes a member of the Party Council, and department heads are put on the Central Standing Committee.30

Under the party chairman is the Party Council, a supreme decision-making body, and it is comprised of 15 members. Its main functions are: (1) the adoption or rejection of party platforms and charters; (2) control of the party budget; (3) recommendation of a candidate for the party presidency; (4) selection of a party candidate for the presidency and selection of candidates for the legislature; and (5) the punishment and rewarding of party members.31

30 Ibid.

31 Ibid., p. 152.
Chart 2  The Secretarial Structure

Party Chairman

Secretary General

Deputy Secretary General

Deputy Secretary General

Central Office

Planning and Research Dept.

Planning Management Sect.
Public Opinion Sect.
Investigation Sect.
Party Disciplinary Sect.

Organization Dept.

Provincial Sect.
Organization Sect.
Youth Sect.
Women's Sect.
Steering Sect.

City/Provincial Branch Office

Publicity Dept.

Public Information Sect.
Campaign Sect.
Public Relations Sect.
Publication Sect.

District Party Office

Instruction Sect.
Training Sect.

Organization Dept.

General Affairs Sect.

General Affairs Sect.

General Affairs Sect.

General Affairs Sect.

Personnel Sect.
Accounting Sect.
Parliamentary Sect.

Organization Dept.
Publicity Dept.
General Affairs Dept.

Organization Dept.
Publicity Dept.
General Affairs Dept.

Training & Education Dept.

Source: Minju konghwa dang sa nyon sa, p. 682.
The secretarial structure constitutes the most significant characteristic of the DRP organization. It is the most unique feature in Korean Party politics and has become very controversial. The DRP organization is called the "dual organization," because the basic party structure is divided into the representative and secretarial structure. Previous political parties did not have secretariats to conduct party affairs.

By the adoption of a secretarial structure, Kim's brain trust attempted to overcome one of the crucial weaknesses of Korean political parties--their local organizations tended to be private organizations, that is, gatherings of followers and kinship groups of the regional political figures. According to the brain trust, the secretarial structure was to foster the growth of a "public" party organization which would be independent of local political bosses. The head of a District Party Office was to have an independent control of finances and personnel. He was to be responsible only to the Central Office. The brain trust insisted that only through such an organizational device could the establishment of a permanent local constituency be accomplished without a reliance on regional political bosses.

Kim's brain trust attempted, furthermore, to make the party the center of political activity. In the election the electors would be mobilized by the party organizations, not by the police.

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Ch'oe Suh-yong, op. cit., p. 82. See also Yu Hyok-in and Yi Chin-ui, "Minju kongwha dang" [The Democratic Republican Party], Sindonga (August, 1968), p. 102.
organization. In the National Assembly the assemblymen would be
guided by the directions of the various secretariats. The brain
trust believed that this was one of the means to realize party
politics in Korea.\(^{33}\)

When the whole scheme of the party structure was revealed,
many junta members strongly opposed the idea of the secretarial
structure. A severe controversy over the dual organization de­
veloped among the military revolutionaries, and the strong oppo­
sition against the secretarial structure resulted in the curtail­
ment of the powers and functions of the secretariats. The trans­
formation of the dual organization as a result of this controversy
will be discussed in detail in a subsequent chapter.

iii. Policy Research Structure

The DRP organization included a Policy Committee. Its func­
tion is to provide counsel on matters of policy for the Party
Council. It is composed of elected party legislators, party
ministers, and others appointed by the Party President. Under the
Policy Committee's control are the Policy Review Board, ten Sub­
Committees, and the Policy Research Office (Chart 3). The Policy
Research Office is composed of three departments: Research Depart­
ment-1, Research Department-2, and the Administrative Department.\(^{34}\)

\(^{33}\)Yu Hyok-in and Yi Chin-ui, op. cit., p. 102.

\(^{34}\)Minju Kongwha dang sa nyon sa, p. 682.
Chart 3 The Policy Research Structure

Policy Committee, Chairman

Policy Review Board

Policy Research Office

Research Department-1

Research Department-2

Administration Department

Legislation & Justice Sub-Committee

Foreign Affairs Sub-Committee

Home Affairs Sub-Committee

Finance & Economy Sub-Committee

National Defense Sub-Committee

Education & Public Information Sub-Committee

Agriculture & Forestry Sub-Committee

Commerce & Industry Sub-Committee

Public Health & Social Affairs Sub-Committee

Communication & Transportation Sub-Committee

Construction Sub-Committee

Source: Minju kongwha dang sa nyon sa, p. 681.
D. Reasons for the Success in the Formation of the DRP

In the building of the DRP, one man's role was crucial. Had not it been for the role of Kim Chong-p'il as the director of the CIA in the formation of the DRP, it could not have been formed. Kim played a vital role in planning, executing, and financing the "underground organization" of the DRP.

When the coup of 1961 was planned by the nine core members, Kim Chong-p'il took charge of general affairs in the planning. He seemed to have been concerned with long-term political implications of the coup. He was more concerned with the revolutionary policies which the junta would pursue after the success of the coup, rather than the immediate problems of securing revolutionary troops and recruiting supporters for the coup. It was said that he read on various military revolutions. He wrote the Six Revolutionary pledges which constituted the basic policies of the military junta.\(^{35}\) The title of the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction, which was somewhat an auspicious name for the junta government, was his idea.\(^{36}\) Kim gave the first press interview two days after the coup, representing the military junta. At the press conference, he outlined junta policies.

When the CIA was founded on June 10, and Kim became its first director, his power and sphere of activities within the junta power


\(^{36}\)Ibid.
structure greatly increased. The CIA was established by the SCNR within one month after the coup to deter counter-revolutions and the indirect aggression of the Communist forces. It was an extremely powerful organ, which was "to supervise the activities of government ministers, including the armed forces, concerning the information and investigation of matters at home and abroad related to the ensuring of national security." Kim Chong-p'il, a nephew-in-law of General Park, wielded an awesome power as the director of the CIA. He was also a favorite lieutenant of Park and a member of the eighth graduating class of the Korean Military Academy, which made up the main part of the military revolution.

We do not know whether or not Kim Chong-p'il planned to create the DRP before the coup. However, as noted earlier, within his own power domain Kim had established his secret brain trust, composed of a group of professors including some experts in the field of political parties, before Park's announcement of August 12 on the restoration of civilian rule. With the help of these experts, he formulated a master plan to create a new political party. Once he had a blueprint for a new party, he carried it out secretly through his powerful CIA organization, with the understanding of top level junta leaders—especially Park himself.

Because he exercised awesome power as the director of the CIA, Kim was able to avoid serious obstacles in the secret execution of

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the blueprint, and managed to form a large political funding, and mobilize the CIA; the recruitment and training of members of the secretariats, the backbone of the DRP organization, were carried out under the auspices of the CIA. In this respect, Kim's directorship of the CIA was crucial. It is hard to know whether he himself planned to establish the CIA and assumed intentionally the directorship to carry out the plan to create a party. Whatever his intentions, without Kim's role in the planning and execution of the blueprints for the DRP as the director of the CIA, the party would not have been formed.

Enormous funds for the formation of the DRP were also provided for by Kim and his followers. It was said that a great amount of funds was used in the building of the DRP, especially during the period of its underground organization. It was estimated that the party spent 7,000,000 won during the initial five month period. The party paid salaries for some one thousand three hundred secretariat members, and maintained a number of offices. Besides these ordinary expenses, the party had miscellaneous expenses spent in the process of secretarial recruitment.

Through various channels Kim and his followers raised huge amounts of political funds. Although it is hard to find out the correct sources and the exact amount of funds, it has been charged that they even resorted to irregular methods to raise funds. These

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38Kim Yong-su, op. cit., p. 183.

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were: (1) the irregular manipulation of stocks and bonds; (2) the importation of 1,642 duty-free automobiles from Japan and their sale at more than double the original price; (3) the importation of 880 duty-free pin-ball machines; (4) the construction of the Walker Hill Hotel complex, at a cost much higher than normally would have been required.³⁹

In addition, the ability of Kim Chong-p'il to recruit a new elite from every segment of society contributed greatly to the successful formation of the DRP. The master plan produced by his brain trust was to recruit and train "modernizing elites," composed of young professors, teachers, journalists, and rank and file civil servants to become the secretarial officials of the DRP. Kim Chong-p'il succeeded in persuading six or seven intellectuals to join the party-building. Also, Kim and his core organizers were able to recruit one thousand highly educated civilian figures.

Those who participated in the formation of the party had various reasons for joining the party. Some may have been persuaded by Kim, and others believed that the image of the party was new and fresh.

The DRP was able to create an image that it was different from past political parties, in its personnel as well as party platform. It aimed at the modernization of the country. Once the DRP was inaugurated in February, 1963, its membership increased

³⁹Ibid., pp. 183-184. See also Hanguk Ilbo, September 25, 1963, p. 2.
rapidly. Only two weeks after the official launching of the party, its membership ranks swelled to 154,982.

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40 *Minju kongwha dang i nyon sa*, p. 45.
CHAPTER IV

THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLICAN PARTY IN OPERATION

A. The DRP and the Elections of 1963

Within nine months after the inauguration of the DRP, two general elections were held: the presidential election on October 15, 1963, and the National Assembly election on November 26 of the same year. These two general elections were significant ones. They terminated two and one half years of military rule and restored civilian government. Because the elections were to be administered by military revolutionaries themselves who were running for offices, it became a keen concern not only of the Korean people, but also of Western observers whether the coming elections would be fair and honest. For the newly formed DRP, these elections were also of particular importance, because they were the first contests for power and a test of its viability.

On May 27, 1963, the DRP unanimously nominated the chairman of the SCNR, Park Chung Hee, as its presidential candidate and immediately launched a campaign. General Park resigned from active military service on August 30 for the preparation for the forthcoming presidential election. He joined the DRP on the same day.

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and accepted the presidential nomination by the party on the very next day. With the formal acceptance of Park as the DRP's presidential candidate, the tempo of the election campaign gained full momentum. The election was scheduled for October 15.

In opposition to Park's DRP, six opposition parties emerged and nominated their presidential candidates respectively. The Civil Rule Party, which had emerged as a major rallying point for a large number of conservative ex-politicians, nominated former President Yun Po-sŏn as its presidential candidate. The Party of the People nominated Hŏ Chŏng, who had been the premier of the interim government after the downfall of Rhee's government. Retired General Song Yo-ch'ŏn, the first premier of the military government, became the presidential nominee of the Liberal Democratic Party. Among the six opposition parties, the Civil Rule Party, under the leadership of Yun provided the major opposition to the DRP. When two prominent candidates, Hŏ Chŏng and Song Yo-ch'ŏn, withdrew from the presidential race in the midst of the campaign in order to form an united opposition front against the pro-government DRP, the presidential election of 1963 became a contest between Park Chung Hee and Yun Po-sŏn.  

As its campaign strategy, the DRP attempted to identify Park Chung Hee with the people in agricultural areas who constituted a majority of the voters, emphasizing his humble origin from a

\[\text{Ibid.}, \ p. \ 165.\]
farming village. The party declared as its campaign slogan, "Let's cast a ballot for the new worker and set him to work like an ox." The party set up its election pledges: (1) the implementation of the first Five Year Economic Plan; (2) an early conclusion of the Korea-Japan diplomatic normalization talks; (3) salary increases for servicemen and public officials; (4) the creation of a study center for unification policies; (5) the increase of industrial centers such as the Ulsan Industrial Complex; and (6) the electrification of rural areas and lowering the price of fertilizer.

The DRP tried to create an image of the election as a contest between a new progressive force and the conservative force of the opposition. The party organized campaign teams for public rallies and divided them into four categories: the main team, including presidential candidate Park; the special team; the city team; and the county team. The DRP designated 36 campaign speakers to the main team, 69 to the special teams, 69 to the city teams, and 557 to the county teams.

Yun's Civil Rule Party, on the other hand, promised as its program: (1) the neutralization of the military from politics; (2) the guarantee of freedom of speech; (3) the abolition of the CIA; (4) the fostering of middle and small businesses; and (5) the

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5 Ibid., p. 117.
realization of local self-government. The party's campaign slogan was "Let's heal ailing military government with a civilian government." The party attacked the rise of corruption within the military government and the abuse of CIA power in politics. The Civil Rule Party appealed to the people with attacks on the various failures of the military government and prolonged military rule.

The Park and Yun contest developed into the so-called "ideological dispute." In a campaign speech Yun criticized Park's political ideology, stating that "this election is a confrontation between a democracy [of Yun] and a distorted democracy [of Park]." His intention was to attack the "administrative democracy" which Park advocated as his political ideology. Park meant by administrative democracy a "Koreanization of democracy" based on a strong political leadership. In response to Yun's charge, Park challenged Yun by declaring in a campaign speech on September 23 that "these elections are ideological contests between [Yun's] hypocritical democracy and [his] national democracy." In rebuttal, Yun stated

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8 Park Chung Hee, Uri minchokui nagalkil [The Path for Our Nation] (Seoul: Tonga ch'ulp'ansa, 1962). It was published in English under the title Korean Political Philosophy: Administrative Democracy.
9 "Nationalistic democracy" is the basic ideology of the DRP. The term has been controversial and vague. The party argues that there is no difference between nationalistic democracy and liberal democracy in terms of fundamental principles and formulas but the two differ from each other 'when it comes to the matter of attitudes,
on the following day that "there are in the government those who were involved in the rebellions in Yosu and Sunch' on" (the Communist-led military mutinies of 1948).\textsuperscript{10} This charge was an obvious attempt to attack Park's involvement in this incident some fifteen years ago, and to throw serious suspicion on his suitability to be President of South Korea. Yun further charged on October 9 that the "Democratic Republican Party was organized long before the elections owing to the political funds made available by the Communist Party (of North Korea) and that Kim Chong-p'il had contacts with Hwang T'ae-sŏng," a top level espionage agent of North Korea.\textsuperscript{11}

In reply to such attacks by his rival, Park and his DRP denounced them as "unfounded charges." The DRP, on the other hand, concentrated its campaign on the enunciation of "constructive policies and proposals."\textsuperscript{11} This strategy seemed to have paid off in winning the sympathy of the people, who were tired of campaign invectives. Although Yun's party rendered many attacks on the ideological background of Park, its strategy appeared to be shortsighted and motivated by a type of McCarthyism.\textsuperscript{12}

\textsuperscript{10}Oh, op. cit., p. 166.

\textsuperscript{11}Ibid.

Following a bitter and intensive two-month campaign, the elections were held on October 15 in an atmosphere later described by an U.N. observer as being "the most honest and peaceful election in fifteen years of Korean history."\(^{13}\) Out of 12,985,015 qualified voters, 11,036,175 (84.99 per cent) voted in the presidential election. The race remained a seesaw battle until the results were announced. Park narrowly defeated Yun by a margin of 181,126 votes: Park polled 4,702,642 votes (46.7%) and Yun 4,546,614 votes (45.1%).\(^{14}\)

As Table I shows, Park lost heavily in Seoul, where he received only 371,627 votes (30.2%) whereas Yun received 802,952 votes (65.1%). In the urban areas, Park received only 27 per cent of the valid votes as against Yun's 63 per cent. On the other hand, in the rural areas, where about 65 per cent of the people live, Park polled 59 per cent of the votes, whereas Yun only 41 per cent.\(^{15}\)

A significant factor in Park's victory of the presidential election was his regional strength in the southern rice producing areas of north and south Kyongsang, and south Cholla provinces, which were usually regarded as strongholds for the opposition Civil Rule Party. In Pusan, the capital city of south Kyongsang province and the second largest city in South Korea, Park won, although his winning margin was very narrow, receiving 242,799 votes (48.2%) as

\(^{15}\) Ibid., p. 769.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Special Cities</th>
<th>Per Cent of Total Valid Votes</th>
<th>Per Cent of Total Voting</th>
<th>Total Registered Voters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pak</td>
<td>Yun</td>
<td>Others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seoul</td>
<td>30.2%</td>
<td>65.1%</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pusan</td>
<td>48.2%</td>
<td>47.5%</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provinces</th>
<th>Per Cent of Total Valid Votes</th>
<th>Per Cent of Total Voting</th>
<th>Total Registered Voters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pak</td>
<td>Yun</td>
<td>Others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyonggi</td>
<td>33.1%</td>
<td>56.9%</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kwangwon</td>
<td>39.6%</td>
<td>49.1%</td>
<td>11.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch'ungch'ong (north)</td>
<td>39.8%</td>
<td>48.9%</td>
<td>11.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch'ungch'ong (south)</td>
<td>40.8%</td>
<td>49.4%</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch'olla (north)</td>
<td>49.4%</td>
<td>41.5%</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch'olla (south)</td>
<td>57.4%</td>
<td>35.9%</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyongsang (north)</td>
<td>55.7%</td>
<td>36.1%</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyongsang (south)</td>
<td>61.7%</td>
<td>29.9%</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cheju</td>
<td>69.9%</td>
<td>22.3%</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>46.7%</td>
<td>45.1%</td>
<td>9.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Invalidated votes are included in total voting percentage figures.

Source: Compiled from the figures given by Central Election Management Committee on October 17, 1963. Cited in C. I. Eugene Kim, op. cit., p. 770.
against Yun's 239,083 votes (47.5%). Also in Taegu, the capital city of north Kyongsang province, Park obtained a slight plurality, receiving about 133,000 votes as against about 114,000 votes for Yun.

The junta's rural policies for the improvement of the economic lot of farmers and fishermen appeared to have paid off. The military government had given large agricultural funds to the rural areas, and had built a huge fertilizer plant. Various projects had benefitted farmers directly in these areas. Yun's severe accusations on Park's background, that is Park's involvement in the Communist-led rebellion, seemed also to have helped Park among voters in the southern part of Korea, because many of them had unjustly suffered from the indiscriminate investigation by the government after the incident.

Unlike Syngman Rhee and his Liberal Party, the military junta and the DRP did not suppress the opposition parties during the campaign and the electoral process. They maintained a generally free atmosphere. The United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, which had dispatched observation teams to eight of the nine South Korean provinces, reported to the United

16 ibid.


18 ibid., pp. 40-42.
Nations General Assembly that the presidential election of October 15 was held "in a free atmosphere and in an orderly, calm, and proper manner." Assessing the presidential election in Korea, an editorial in *The New York Times* of October 19, 1963, remarked:

> The Government apparently did permit free and orderly balloting; there was less disorder reported than in a comparable national election in this country. Despite the short campaign and limited means of communication, the turnout of some 10,500,000 voters of approximately 12,500,000 eligible is an example of democratic responsibility which many Western nations with much older traditions might envy.

Many Korean observers also agreed with the views of foreign observers that the election was generally an honest and fair contest, with a minimum of irregularities.

A little over a month after the presidential election, the election for the National Assemblymen was held on November 26. The tight presidential race prompted the DRP to wage an even more vigorous election campaign for securing a majority in the National Assembly. The party nominated one carefully chosen candidate in each constituency, and supported them with its efficient organization and abundant political funds. In the opposition camp, on the other hand, there were four major parties running candidates in almost all

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districts, and seven minor parties running a sizable number of candidates in many constituencies. The ratio of one candidate from the DRP and those from the opposition parties was 1 to 6.4. The opposition parties were never able to unite behind a single candidate in each area.

In the National Assembly election, the DRP won an overwhelming majority. Out of a total of 175 seats, the DRP won 110 seats while the four major opposition parties took the remaining 65 (TABLE II). Out of 110, 88 were directly elected in single member districts and the remaining 22 were elected on the basis of a proportional representative system. The seven minor parties who had over two hundred candidates failed to win a single seat. The DRP held 62.4 per cent of the Assembly seats with only 33.5 per cent support of the voters, while the opposition camp won only 37.6 per cent of seats with 66.5 per cent support of the voters.

In the Assembly election, the DRP demonstrated its organizational strength much more than it had during the presidential election. Its candidates for the assembly seats could win even areas where its presidential candidate had lost. Two assembly candidates of the DRP won in Seoul where its presidential candidate Park had lost. The DRP candidates won in the provinces of Kyonggi, Kwangwon, and north and south Ch'ungch'ong, where Park had made a poor showing.23

22 Oh, op. cit., p. 169.
23 C. I. Eugene Kim, op. cit., p. 772.
TABLE II
RESULTS OF THE 1963 NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ELECTION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Elected</th>
<th>At Large</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DRP</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Rule Party</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Democratic Party</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party of the People</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>131</strong></td>
<td><strong>44</strong></td>
<td><strong>175</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In the new Assembly, 108 Assembly members out of the total of 175 were newcomers. Only 38.2 per cent of the previous members had been re-elected to the Assembly. Out of the 108 newcomers, 82 were from the DRP. A significant fact of the Assembly was the entry of a substantial number of former military officers into it. Thirty legislators were retired military officers. They had been key figures in the military junta. Among these thirty, 28 belonged to the DRP and two to the opposition. The DRP was the main channel for the military revolutionaries to come to power. The victory of the DRP in both elections made it possible for the military revolutionaries to continue to carry out their revolutionary policies.

in the new civilian government. The election of the overwhelming majority of the DRP assembly candidates provided a basis for political stability within the National Assembly for President Park to pursue his policies.

On December 17, 1963, Park Chung Hee took the oath of office as the third President of the Republic of Korea, and the Third Republic of Korea was officially established. Park vowed to free the nation "from century-old yokes" and to "reform the nation with sweat, blood, and work." The military rule for two and one half years by the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction came to an end.

B. Recruitment and Training of the Members

During the presidential and Assembly elections, the DRP played a vital role in winning both elections. The party mobilized its vast organization and members to support its candidates. The DRP held mass rallies and penetrated into the lowest administrative units, such as ri, tong, and ban, to publicize party policies and programs and the achievements of the junta government. These kinds of vote-getting activities during the election times were common activities of political parties in South Korea. What differentiates the DRP from previous political parties was its continued activities not only during the election periods, but also during the off-year election times. Unlike previous political parties, the DRP has continued party activities of publicizing its policies and recruiting and educating its members even during off-year election times.
The DRP has currently about 1.5 million members. Membership requires no special qualifications. However, the member's past behavior must be honest and reflect the public interest. An application form for membership is reviewed by the Committee of Examination for Party Membership within each district charter.

The Training and Education Department of the Central Office had trained, from November, 1964 until the end of 1966, 11,000 recruits for the positions of district charter chairmen, policy committeemen, and central standing committeemen. The DRP has recruited its secretarial officials periodically by a process of examination and interview. For example, it was reported that out of 580 applicants, 13 were selected as secretarial officials in 1968. After intensive training for two weeks, they were assigned to the central and provincial secretariats of the party.

From October, 1965, to June, 1966, the DRP trained 2,983 party members, who took charge of party activities within each district. This was a significant characteristic of the DRP's training program, because previous political parties had never trained their members for front-line political duty.

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26 Ibid., p. 337.
29 Minju kongwha dang sa nyon sa, pp. 328, 474.
In 1966, a new training program was planned by the Training and Education Department of the Central Office. It was hoped that 35,000 party members would be trained by 1971, either in a short-term course of one week, or in a long-term course of two or three weeks. The trainees of the long-term course were selected from district charters and screened by the provincial charters. The requirements were: loyalty to the party, a high school education, a mature age—between 25 to 45—and moral integrity. Also, candidates must be employed.  

In Seoul, the DRP Training Center has a two-story main building and auditorium, and a dormitory with 20 beds. The main building was constructed in 1966, and the dormitory in 1968. The Training Center has a stadium consisting of a football ground and an area for volleyball and basketball courts.  

The purpose of party training is to encourage the members' faith in party ideals, and aid the members in acquiring the proper knowledge for the performance of the party's activities. The training tries to establish a burning sense of mission in each of its members as the vanguard for "the modernization of Fatherland." The ideals of the party are "freedom and equality of individuals, the unification of Korea, and the prosperity of the Korean people."

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31 Ibid., p. 22.
32 Ibid.
Realistically, the party hopes to achieve the modernization of South Korea as its "intermediate goal."\(^{33}\)

In order to achieve the purpose of training, the following curricula are provided for the trainees: (1) ideological and political subjects, such as the ideal of the party, a criticism of Communism, problems in modernization, and economic policies; (2) practical subjects, including principles of propaganda and organizational skills; and (3) general subjects, including community development, principles of leadership, and comparative studies of political parties.\(^ {34}\)

A total of 76 hours of lessons are assigned for these subjects over a two-week period. Besides daily, regular training hours, the trainees have an hour of extra-curricular activity in which they discuss and apply what they have learned in their regular lessons.\(^ {35}\)

In addition to such training courses given by the central training center in Seoul, a similar program has been launched by each of the district party headquarters throughout the nation. This training program is conducted by those party members who have previously undergone training at the central training center. It is designed for those members who are not eligible for training

\(^{33}\)Dangwon kyobon, p. 24.


\(^{35}\)Ibid.
at the central training center because of too stringent qualification requirements. The training has been given to those party members such as "campaign chiefs," "liaison workers," and other cadres.36

As we have observed, the DRP tries to fulfill one of the four functions of the "modern mass political party" described by Sigmund Neumann. These functions are: (1) to organize the chaotic public will; (2) to educate the private citizen to political responsibility and make him a zoon politikon; (3) to represent the connecting link between government and public opinion; and (4) to select leaders.37 Through constant party activities, the DRP has educated the citizens politically. Not only by direct training, but also by various publications, it helps increase the political awareness of the people.

Since August, 1963, the DRP has published a weekly, the Minju kongwha bo [Democratic Republican News], as an organ of the party. It has four pages and is sold at 10 won (about 3 cents in U.S. currency). It aims to help ordinary readers understand current issues and party policies in simple language. The DRP has also published two periodicals since 1965. One is the Ch'ong chaek kyebo [Policies Quarterly], written in Korean. It is issued by the Policy Research Office, which studies and formulates party policies,

36 The Democratic Republican Party, This is DRP (Seoul, 1970), p. 68.

and carries scholarly articles on various fields expounding party policies and programs. The other is the DRP Bulletin written in English for overseas Koreans. The party also publishes a DRP yearbook and textbooks for the education of its members. Besides these regular publications, there are other various pamphlets and handbooks, published occasionally, which contain the party's platform.

C. The DRP in Transition

As we have observed, the constant activities of the DRP in the recruiting and training of its members and the publicizing of its policies have been carried out by its secretariats. Yet, the secretarial structure has received much criticism, and brought about controversies among the military revolutionaries as soon as the whole scheme of the DRP organizational structure was revealed to the members of the SCNR. The plan of the secretarial structure was not fully accepted by all of the military revolutionaries. Strong opposition occurred against the plan. The controversies over the secretarial structure developed into a severe factional feud, and resulted in its substantial modification.

As noted earlier, a highly centralized secretarial structure, which could control all party affairs and finances, was designed to ameliorate what was found wrong with the organizational structures of previous political parties in Korea. Although previous political parties were organized hierarchically, they were active only at the centers of their structures, and their local organizations
were almost nonfunctioning. In case of a ruling party, the local
government and police organizations were mobilized. For others the
organizations which could be mobilized during election times were
largely private organizations of each candidate, such as kinship
groups. Most opposition candidates had no party support. They
often ran for office without party nomination.\(^{38}\)

Another organizational weakness of previous political parties
had to do with the organization of their headquarters. There were
no permanent administrative organ to take charge of the vast party
activities which required special knowledge and techniques. All
important posts in the party were occupied by party assemblymen.
There was no efficient coordination and systematic execution of
party affairs.\(^{39}\)

In order to overcome these weaknesses of Korean political
parties, the DRP organizers adopted a highly centralized party
bureaucracy, the secretarial structure, which was independent from
the representative structure. In every constituency, a permanent
administrative secretariat was set up. The head of the district
party office was to be responsible only to the central secretarial
office, not to the chairman of the district party. The head of the
district charter office was to control district party affairs and
personnel. He was to be a career official, and was appointed by

\(^{38}\)Minju kongwha dang, *Sonchon kyo yang charyjip* [Publicity Edu-

\(^{39}\)Ibid.
the central office. In the headquarters of the party, Kim's brain trust set up a central secretarial office for efficient execution and coordination of party affairs. A secretary general was given extensive powers, not only to control personnel, but also finances.

For the efficiency of party affairs, a single command system was adopted. The party president was supreme commander. Under him there were the party chairman and the secretary general.

Kim's brain trust hoped that future party politics would be centered around political parties. They viewed the assemblymen not only as representatives of the people, but also as the delegates of a party who had to carry out its policies and programs. In this sense, the brain trust seemed to believe that their party assemblymen should be guided, and, if necessary, controlled by the secretariats, who were to take charge of all party affairs. The center of power within the party was to lie in the secretariats, not in the parliamentary group of the representative structure.

When such a scheme for a new party was made public, many military revolutionaries strongly opposed it. The direct attack came from those junta members who had been alienated in the initial process of the party formation. They had been neither informed nor consulted on the formation of the party. The building of the party

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in its early stages was a top secret project. Only key people within the CIA were aware of the party's early existence. Kim informed only a few members of the junta leadership about the party formation. It was not entirely clear why Kim did not consult the other junta leaders on the organization of the party. Two possible reasons could be presented: his party activities were illegal under the existing military rule; and he was aware of his power rivals within the junta.

The opponents of Kim's plan charged that if the party were set up solely in accordance with his plan, it became Kim's party. They further charged that if the central secretarial office was controlled by the Kim faction, the assemblymen would be under Kim's control. The secretariats of assemblymen's constituencies were to be responsible only to the central secretarial office, and assemblymen were given no power to appoint members of the secretariat in their constituencies.

The opponents insisted that the secretarial structure would not be consistent with the principles of a liberal democracy. They argued that the congressmen should not be subject to the control of the paid secretariats of the party and that party politics should be centered around the Assembly, not the secretariat.

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42 Ch'oe Soh-yŏng, op. cit., p. 82.
43 Ibid. See also Yu Hyok-in and Yi Chin-ui, op. cit., pp. 101-102.
Behind these controversies there lay a deep-seated personal enmity against Kim Chong-p'il among the military revolutionaries, and a fear about the monopoly of power by Kim and his followers in a new civilian government. The secretarial structure could be a powerful instrument of control by one man, similar to that found in some totalitarian political system. 44

Those who opposed the Kim plan threatened to leave the party. On January 21, 1963, just one month before the inauguration of the DRP, General Kim Tong-ha, a key member of the junta government, tendered his resignation both as a member of the SCNR and as a member of the preparatory committee of the formation of the party. General Kim charged that "the system of powerful secretariats could not be compatible with democratic institutions." Furthermore, he charged that "the sources of funds used in the process of formation of the party were not acceptable." 45 The other members of the SCNR demanded the resignation of Kim Chong-p'il from his party post and a simplification of the party structure. Kim was forced to resign from the chairmanship of the preparatory committee for the formation of the party, and left for exile abroad on February 25, 1963, the eve of the DRP's inauguration.

In spite of such strong opposition against the secretarial


45Kim Yong-su, op. cit., p. 185.
structure, those who supported Kim Chong-p'il succeeded in launching the DRP in accordance with the original plan of Kim's brain trust with minor modifications. This was partly because the coming general elections were urgent. After the general elections, furthermore, Kim Chong-p'il was able to resume the chairmanship of the party. In the process of this severe controversy over the secretarial structure, however, there emerged two factions within the party. Those who supported the Kim plan were labeled the "mainstream," whereas those who opposed it were called the "non-mainstream." The mainstream faction was composed of many of the eighth graduating class of the KMA and civilian officials of the secretariats. The non-mainstream faction was composed of anti-Kim groups that existed among the military revolutionaries and most of the civilian politicians who had been recruited from various political parties.

Although those military revolutionaries who opposed the Kim plan failed to destroy the dual organization of the party, they continuously attempted to abolish the secretarial structure by realigning their forces with the newly recruited civilian politicians. When the nation-wide student demonstrations took place in March, 1964, against the Korean-Japanese negotiations for normalization of relationship, the non-mainstream faction capitalized on the occasion to fight against Kim. The spark of the nation-wide demonstrations was the report from Japan on March 23 that Kim Chong-p'il, who was in Japan on his way back home from a good-will tour to Southeast Asia, agreed with Japanese
Foreign Minister Ohira Masayoshi on the means and terms of an early conclusion of the talks. It was disclosed that a secret memorandum had already been exchanged between the two when Kim was the director of the CIA under the military government. It was also reported that the secret memorandum had fixed the Korean property claim, which was a key issue of the talks. 46

When popular hostility arose against Kim, the anti-Kim groups strongly demanded his immediate withdrawal from the negotiations, and his resignation from the chairmanship of the party. Faced with severe criticisms from his party, he had to leave for exile abroad once again.

While Kim was absent, the non-mainstream faction boycotted the party leadership and threatened to refuse their party posts unless the party structure was reorganized to reduce the powers of the party secretariats, the bastion of the mainstream faction. The non-mainstream faction proposed a revision of the party charter, calling for the abolition of the post of the secretary general, the curtailment of the powers of the secretarial structure, and the adoption of an elective system for party posts, from the district charter chairmanship on up to the party presidency. 47

46 Korea Annual, 1965 (Seoul: Hapdong News Agency, 1965), pp. 15-16. It was said that the memorandum had fixed the Korean property claims against Japan at $300 million in grant, $200 million in government loans and $100 million to be given through civilian channels.

47 Korea Annual, 1966, p. 44.
In January, 1965, an eleven-man committee for the study of the revision of the party charter was organized. Secret bargaining and negotiations continued for months between the leaders of the two factions. The prolonged negotiations between the two factions reached an accord when the mainstream faction made major concessions to the non-mainstream faction's demands. The agreements were:

1. The executive power in party affairs was transferred from the Secretary General to the Party Chairman.

2. Power over personnel and finances was transferred from the Secretary General to the Party Chairman and the Finance Committee respectively.

3. The district party chairman was given the prerogative of nominating district office cadres.48

With these agreements, the long, severe controversies over the dual organization of the party were finally settled. This revision of the party charter brought about the division of powers and partial decentralization of the party power structure. The excessively monopolized powers over personnel and finances by the secretary general were divided. Subsequently, the powers and functions of the key post of the secretarial structure were greatly reduced.

The most significant change was the strengthening of power of the district party chairmen by giving them the prerogative of appointing district office cadres. District party affairs were put under the exclusive control of the district party chairmen. The

prerogative of the district party chairmen over personnel meant that the power and position of the party assemblymen vis-à-vis the central secretarial office were greatly strengthened, because they--the district party chairmen--were no longer under the control of the central office in appointing the members of the secretariat in their constituencies. This change meant that the idea of the party organizers to put the secretariats over the party congressmen was broken down. The powers and functions of the secretarial structure were greatly reduced, and consequently the number of paid officials of the secretariats was also reduced from over one thousand at the time of inauguration of the party to about half of that size.\footnote{Yu Hyok-in and Yi Chin-ui, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 110-115.}

The exclusive power of the assemblymen over personnel in their constituencies also meant a partial collapse of the principles of the DRP organization, which had been adopted by the party organizers to overcome the various weaknesses of past Korean political parties. Since a party congressman was given the prerogative to appoint the members of the secretariat in his constituency, it became hard to maintain "the principle of public organization," which was one of the four principles of the DRP organization. This principle meant that the party organization must be independent of a candidate for the National Assembly, and that the party organization should not be centered around political figures. Loyalty would be shifted from political figures to the
public and common cause. Although Kim's brain trust tried to foster the growth of a "public" party organization, especially at the local district level, their efforts seemed to have been in vain.

The collapse of the ideas of the party organizers could be attributed to several reasons. First, their ideas of the secretarial structure became entangled with a factional struggle between the Kim forces and anti-Kim forces. The military revolutionaries were not a homogeneous body. There existed various factional interests within the junta government. They were hardly united as to their future role in a civilian government. There was a group of military revolutionaries who strongly insisted on returning to their military duties as they promised initially. These military revolutionaries were "pure military type." Among them there were many junta leaders who returned to their barracks. There were also those who strongly determined to participate directly in a future civilian government as a necessary step to continue their revolutionary tasks and as a means to satisfy their personal ambitions. They were "para-military type."

Among the "para-military type" revolutionaries, Kim Chong-p'il's dominant role in the DRP building has been jealously watched by the forces against him. Although Kim became a de facto

50 Dangwon kyobon, pp. 180-181.
52 Ibid.
number two man in the hierarchy of the junta government as the director of the CIA, his leadership was not easily accepted by those military revolutionaries who were senior in military rank, especially generals. The forces against Kim were largely composed of generals and senior officers who had to be cooperated by the original coup planners. The core of Kim's forces was many of the original coup planners and his followers within the CIA. When the party organizers had designed the secretarial structure to be the center of power, the anti-Kim forces opposed it from the outset because it could be the bastion of power of Kim's forces.

Secondly, the influx of the old political forces into the DRP was another important reason. In order to secure a majority in the Assembly, the DRP had to recruit a large number of the so-called "old politicians," largely the ex-Liberal Party politicians who had political resources such as name value, money, and regional tie as a prerequisite for the winning of an election. However, many among these old politicians were elected under the DRP label. These newly elected old politicians who had no strong voice within the party soon joined the discontented elements of the military revolutionaries in the Assembly in order to weaken Kim's forces in the party.

When the military leaders became dependent upon the existing economic forces for their political funds, the power of the old politicians within the party began to increase. They were closely connected with such economic forces. The old political forces

53 Y. C. Han, "Political Parties and Political Development in

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which had their power base in the Assembly challenged, by allying with the anti-Kim group among the military revolutionaries, the dominant position of Kim's faction who occupied the key post of the secretarial structure. These combined forces made every effort to destroy the secretarial structure and to modify the party structure to be run by the assemblymen, not by the paid party cadres.

Thirdly, the self contradiction of the party organizer's ideas became a rationale for the anti-Kim groups to abolish the secretarial structure. While the party organizers pursued parliamentary democracy in which politics was centered around the Assembly, on the one hand, they introduced a strong party system in which the center of politics was to lie in the party, especially the secretariats, on the other. This contradiction of the party organizer's ideas became a pretext for destruction of secretarial structure.

Fourthly, when the blueprint for the DRP was made public, it did not receive warm support from the academic circle. Some scholars even criticized the DRP organization for having totalitarian characteristics. Some people cast doubt upon the character of the DRP because they were not familiar with the new terms, such as the "dual organizations," "secretariat," "chǒm chŏjik" (point organization), and "haeksim chŏjik" (core organization).

Finally, Kim's continuous suffering of political adversity


Yu Hyok-in and Yi Chin-ui, op. cit., p. 103.
gave his political opponents a chance to demand the modification of the party structure. With a cool reaction towards the secretarial structure from the public and sharp criticism both from the public and the party on Kim's role in the Korean-Japanese talks, the supporters of the new system had to yield to the vehement demands of the anti-Kim groups.

Although the Korean military had enormous political resources and a strong sense of mission to ameliorate the party politics of Korea, it was unable to overcome the "traditional working reality" of the Korean society. The military-created DRP has failed to become a truly institutionalized party. The DRP does not fully meet the criteria of institutionalization of a political party advanced by Samuel P. Huntington. The criteria of institutionalization of a political party are its adoptability to environmental changes, its organizational complexity, autonomy, and cohesion.\footnote{Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1968), pp. 12-22.} The DRP has lacked, for instance, its internal coherence. As we have observed, the party has greatly suffered factionalism from the outset. In spite of the party organizer's every effort to eliminate factionalism in the DRP through organizational devices, the party cannot get rid of factional strifes. The junta itself had already suffered factional feud among the military revolutionaries. The factional struggle for power continued in the new party. The strife between the mainstream and non-mainstream factions has been severe. The
power struggle between these two factions appeared with the nomination of National Assembly candidates, the choice of the Speaker, majority leaders, and selection of committee chairmen in the National Assembly.

The most crucial example of the power struggle between the two factions was the sudden resignation of Kim Chong-p'il from the chairmanship of the DRP on May 30, 1968. At that time the most critical issue facing the party was the choice of a candidate for the 1971 presidential election. Under the constitution which the military government had formulated, President Park could not run for a third term without a constitutional amendment because it limited more than two terms of presidency. The man most prominently mentioned as a possible candidate was Kim Chong-p'il, organizer of the DRP and leader of the mainstream faction. The ultimate purpose of the Kim faction was to run Kim for president when Park's second term expires in 1971, while that of the anti-Kim faction was to prevent him from doing so. Since the general election of 1967, there had been increased factional strife between the two factions over selection of a presidential candidate for 1971. At last the quarrel outburst. In May 1968, the anti-Kim faction expelled a National Assemblyman, one of Kim's closest lieutenants, for having joined a secret organization which was formed by some of the Kim

56 On September 14, 1969 the National Assembly passed a constitutional amendment bill to exempt incumbent President Park from the limitation of two consecutive four-year terms. The bill was approved in referendum on October 17, 1969.
faction members to preserve the constitutional time limitation on the presidential office. Within a week after the incident, Kim Chong-p'ii] resigned for a third time from all party posts. He also resigned from his position in the Assembly. 57

Undermining the decision-making role which the DRP was to play was not only these internal disputes within the party, however, but also President Park's inclination to concentrate power in the presidential secretariat and the cabinet. Since his inauguration as President, Park has adopted a policy to separate the party and administration as a means to maintain a balance between the two factions. Park let the Kim faction dominate the party organization, while the anti-Kim faction control the administration. When a conflict developed between the party leaders and the cabinet members, President Park usually stood with his cabinet members, minimizing the role of the party. 58 For example, when the chairman of the DRP recommended reshuffling of the cabinet in August 1965 as a means of breaking a political deadlock which developed after the ratification of the Korean-Japanese treaty for normalization of relations, President Park vetoed it. Again, President Park, in spite of strong urging by party officials, refused to dismiss the chairman of the Economic Planning Board, Chang Ki-yong, whose ideas had

57 Dong-A Ilbo, May 27, 28, 29, 1968, articles by a reporter, Yi Chin-hui.

58 Pak Kyong-sok and Nam Si-uk, "Hanguk chongdang ui p'abol" [Factionalism of Political Parties in Korea], Sindonga (February, 1967), p. 205.
conflicted with party policies. Until very recent date President Park had retained his chief Blue House secretary despite widespread party opposition.\textsuperscript{59}

Since the President has constantly strengthened and expanded the role of his own secretariat and relied on the executive branch for policy formation, the influence of the party on choosing personnel and dictation of policies of the government has been greatly reduced. Furthermore, the president's secretariat and executive branch have been dominated by the anti-Kim faction. As a result, the DRP has been unable to play a major role in the decision-making process as a government party. At the present time, the idea of the party organizers, that is the party to be the center of politics, seems to have come to disrepute.

\textsuperscript{59}ibid.
CONCLUSION

We have observed the role of the military in the modern institution-building process in South Korea. Since the liberation from the Japanese colonial rule the civilian politicians had failed to build viable political institutions. Both the first Republic of President Syngman Rhee and the second Republic of Premier Chang Myon were overthrown by the student and military respectively.

To sum up, the military intervention into politics resulted from the failure of the civilian government to provide dynamic leadership and to meet the demand of major reforms in the government and the military. Once in power, the military revolutionaries took wide reform measures to sweep corruption and irregularities from every sector of society. The junta government laid a foundation for rapid economic development by launching a long range economic development plan. After a brief period of military rule the military revolutionaries restored civilian rule. They have succeeded in maintaining for themselves the position of decision-makers as military-turned-civilian politicians.

As a vehicle to assure political power and continue their revolutionary tasks in a civilian government, the military revolutionaries needed a political party. The formation of a modern mass party was possible due, to a great extent, to Lt. Colonel Kim Chong-p'il's dynamic leadership. Kim Chong-p'il, number two man in the hierarchy of the junta government as the director of the CIA,
played a vital role in planning, executing, and financing the DRP during its early formative period. A group of scholars and specialists in the field of political parties who constituted the brain trust of Kim Chong-p'il formulated a blueprint for a new party.

The organizers of the DRP made every effort to introduce modern features into the party and attempted to remedy what had been wrong with the organizational structures of the past political parties. The organization of the DRP was designed on a centralized, permanent administrative structure—the secretarial structure. This was an entirely new party organization in the Korean political party system. This secretarial structure was to control all party affairs and finances. The party organization was designed to be independent from political figures, especially at the local level, through organizational devices. A local secretariat was set up in every constituency and was to be responsible only to the central secretariat in the party headquarters. It was hoped that the party would be the center of political activities. In the election the voters would be mobilized by the party organization, not by the police and administrative power.

The DRP succeeded in recruiting a large number of modernizing elites from every segment of society who were in charge of party affairs. The DRP was proven to be an efficient and well organized party by winning general elections. The party provided a basis for political stability for the military revolutionaries to continue their revolutionary tasks in a civilian government by securing a working majority in the National Assembly.
Unlike the previous political parties, the DRP has continued to organize and articulate the public will through the constant publicizing of its policies and platforms, not only during the election periods but also during the off-year election times. The DRP has educated citizens by direct political training and various party publications. The party has been a channel for a new elite who had been outside politics to have access to politics. In this context, the military played a significant role as a political institution-builder and have increased political awareness of the Korean citizens while broadening political participation.

Soon after its launching the DRP had to undergo major modifications of its organizational structure, however. The party organizer's effort to build a public party organization could not last long. The power and function of the secretarial structure were greatly reduced. The modification of the party structure meant a partial collapse of the principles of its organization. The destruction of the party organizer's ideas was in part caused by a power struggle among the military revolutionaries. The military revolutionaries could not unite on their future role in a civilian government. Among those who wanted to participate in a civilian government, some had jealously watched Kim's exclusive role in the formation of the DRP. Since the secretarial structure was designed to be the center of power in the party, it became the focal point for a power struggle between the Kim forces which occupied key party posts and the anti-Kim forces which had been alienated in the party formation process.

Another important reason for the collapse of the party
principles was the recruitment of the old politicians in order to win the National Assembly election. At the time of the inauguration of the party their power was weak, but they gradually increased their power and position within the party by allying with the discontented elements among the military revolutionaries. When the military leaders increasingly relied on the existing economic forces for their political funds, the old political forces could increase greatly their influence within the party. The combined forces between the old politicians and the anti-Kim group among the military revolutionaries constantly attempted to destroy the secretarial structure which was the bastion of power of the Kim group.

In addition, the self-contradiction of the party organizer's ideas in pursuing a parliamentary democracy in which politics was centered around the Assembly and a strong party system in which the center of politics was to lie in the party, especially the secretarial structure, became a rationale for the destruction of the secretarial structure. With a cool reaction of the public and the academic circle toward the secretarial structure, the supporters of the secretarial structure had to yield to the demands of its opponents.

This Korean case seems to support one of the propositions offered by Janowitz regarding the role of the military in the political development of new nations. As noted earlier, Janowitz states: "After 'takeover', the military regime faces the task of supplying national political leadership and of developing mass support for its programs. . . . if the military is to succeed in this
political goal, it must develop a political apparatus outside of the military establishment but under its direct domination.\textsuperscript{1} The experience in South Korea, like that, for instance, in Turkey and Egypt, shows the above proposition to be the case.

This study, however, shows certain limitations of the Korean military in providing effective political leadership as a political institution-builder. The Korean military could not build a truly institutionalized political party. Although the DRP is a hierarchically organized and functionally differentiated organization, it does not meet fully the criteria of institutionalization of a political party advanced by Samuel P. Huntington. The DRP is far from a truly institutionalized political party. The party manifests severe factional strife between the mainstream and the non-mainstream.

The most crucial factor which limits the capacity of the military for effective political leadership is internal dissension within the military itself. The more the military took on a political role, the more vulnerable and disunited it became. Another important factor was the fact that the military cannot rule the country alone. Although the military had enormous political resources and a strong sense of mission for reforms and modernization of the country, it cannot govern the people alone. The military could not stand aloof from the existing political and economic forces. The military revolutionaries eventually cooperated with the old political and

economic forces in spite of their initial abhorrence toward them. In this process their original standards to reform and modernize the country were compromised. They began to lose their zealous sense of mission. They were absorbed by the traditional working reality of the Korean society.
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