Towards the Study of Imperialism as an Ideology: The Particular Case of Victorian England

Comando

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TOWARDS THE STUDY OF
IMPERIALISM AS AN IDEOLOGY:
The Particular Case of
VICTORIAN ENGLAND

by

John E. Comando

A Thesis
Submitted to the
Faculty of The Graduate College
in partial fulfillment
of the
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PREFACE

It was while doing research for several papers on imperialism that the idea for this study was developed. It became evident to me that there was a gap in the literature concerning imperialism. I observed that imperialism had never, to my knowledge, been studied as an ideology. It was always studied as a manifestation of some ideology. This observation led me to pose two questions. First, can imperialism be studied as an ideology in its own right? Second, if so, what degree of centrality did it possess as an ideological spur to the growth of empire? In other words, to what extent and in what ways might the thought and/or rhetoric of the Victorians regarding the empire be considered an ideology with a greater degree of centrality than other ideologies to which it is usually attributed to be a manifestation?

There have been many volumes written on the nature of ideology and many volumes on the nature of imperialism. There have been no studies yet, to my knowledge, which give imperialism a central ideological position. Some have come close to doing this. They fail, however, due more to their approach rather than to their content. This is, in part, because 1) there is no conscious attempt to understand the nature of ideology; and 2) imperialism is generally considered to be a manifestation of
some ideology as opposed to performing an ideological function itself. This is not to say that the concept of ideology is not present among such studies, but that, because a conscious effort was not made to understand it, scholars of imperialism have overlooked the implications of the application of the concept to the study of imperialism.

Several authors have approached an understanding of the ideological nature of imperialism. Lichtheim recognizes imperialism as an ideology of central dimensions. He has not, however, constructed a suitable framework to test his assertion. Thornton, on the other hand, has constructed a loose model of ideology in the context of imperialism in *Doctrines of Imperialism*. He, however, does not identify his "model" as one of ideology even though it could well be. His study attempts to reduce many imperial ideas into a few dominant doctrines. These doctrines which make up a loose framework he identifies as power, profit, and civilization. The relation between these doctrines and the manner in which they might be considered part of or the whole of a more inclusive ideology is still missing. Also, Agnes Murphy has done a study of the ideology of French imperialism from 1871-1881. Her study, once more, is devoid of any conscious attempt to explain what exactly ideology is. One is exposed to the outward manifestations of the ideology--the polemics and rhetoric--
from which the concept of ideology must be inferred.

I have chosen Victorian imperialism as the subject of my study. The reason for this is one of convenience: there is an abundance of easily accessible material on the subject. It is possible that some other country may have provided a more clear-cut example of imperial ideology.

In Chapter I, I will construct a theoretical model of ideology which it is hoped will lead to a better understanding of the concept. In Chapters II through V, I am going to examine one way in which the thought in Victorian England regarding the empire might be made to fit the model. The chapters will deal respectively with psychological, social and value influences. Chapter VI offers some concluding observations on the model and its relation to Victorian imperialism.

This study is not assuming that there is some consistent body of knowledge which will easily fit into such a framework. It is this realization—that there is no consistent pattern in Victorian imperialist thought, but rather a continually changing pattern—that presents a most difficult problem. Reasoning for and against the empire changed several times during the period this study will cover. Ideas concerning various parts of the empire were different. The intensity and influence of such ideas varied also. Inconsistency, while presenting problems,
does not, however, render a study of Victorian imperialism in an ideological context unrealistic. The same problem also exists with the study of other ideologies.

It is the contention of this study that 1) there was a large body of thought and ideas regarding the empire in Victorian England that was diverse and reflected a diversity in factors; 2) these ideas were influenced by factors in the environment and were, in part, reflective of them; 3) these ideas played a symbolic role which did not impede the growth of empire but tended to rationalize its growth and maintenance; 4) these ideas and the phenomena they reflected could be placed in the context of an ideology using a model.

This study is not assuming that ideology can conclusively explain imperialism. Moreover, this study will not draw any causal link between the ideas about the empire and its growth.

It should be understood that this study will deal specifically with the case of Victorian imperialism emphasizing phenomena primarily found with England at the time. Any conclusions or speculation asserted about the ideological nature of Victorian imperialism may or may not be applicable in part or in full to the imperialism of other nations or at other times.
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A MODEL FOR THE STUDY OF IDEOLOGY

It might be appropriate to begin a study on the ideology of British Imperialism with a discussion of the concept of ideology. An objective discussion of such a concept presents several difficulties for it is one often charged with emotion. The discussion of ideology is made more difficult because, as with most definitions in the social sciences, there is some difference of opinion regarding what exactly ideology is. What I hope to do in this chapter, then, is to look at the concept of ideology as objectively and as broadly as possible. Since ideology is not a simple concept to understand, no simple definition or explanation is forthcoming. I will look at what ideology is, how it works, its social significance, the types of ideology, and the ways in which the thought regarding the British Empire might be regarded an ideology.

When one thinks of ideology, one commonly thinks of a set of beliefs embodied in theories of varying degrees of articulation. One associates the emotional or non-rational with such beliefs. The ideology, then, is seen as structuring the emotional or non-rational for social purposes. In western culture, where empiricism influences our conception of the truth, where empirical demonstrability is the largely accepted test of validity, ideology, according to the common definition is, no doubt,
held in low esteem. Where truth is demonstrated through rational endeavors, observable through human experience, where emotional detachment or disinterestedness is of utmost importance in the quest for truth, there is no pedestal on which to place the emotional or non-rational or a belief system based on them. The common conception of ideology, therefore, has a negative connotation.

The general knowledge that ideologies embody the non-rational and the emotional, however, tells us very little. What is more important for us to understand about ideologies is their employment in the cultural context for the achievement of social ends. The non-rational and the emotional are powerful social forces and we want to study how they are used for social ends and what, if any, social value they possess.

The age of ideology, many scholars would agree, has its roots in the thought of the enlightenment. Most of


the ideologies we consider important have arisen and matured in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Paradoxically enough, ideologies, which employ the emotional and non-rational, stem from beliefs which are adverse to the utilization of such forces: the power of man's reason to overcome nature; the belief that man, through the use of his rational powers, can make the world over in a desired manner; the belief that the conditions of the world can be bettered. Such beliefs arose out of changing social conditions which were brought about, to a great extent, by changes in science and technology. These changes were manifested in the differing nature of living conditions, working conditions, and values concerning religion, nature, man's relation to man, etc. Great masses of people had become displaced from traditional social patterns; patterns in which they had felt secure. There was also widespread disillusionment with established elites and a desire for order out of institutional and societal chaos. New elites, then, replaced the old. In France, for example, this process of elite displacement and replacement continued for nearly a century.¹

¹Elite displacement occurred in 1789, 1799, 1815, 1830, 1848, 1871.
was, then, to a great degree, in response to this acutely felt insecurity that men began turning to ideologies. Ideologies offered a form of security. They either justified present conditions by offering people a belief that they belonged to and had a stake in the established order; or they offered them a belief that, as bad as conditions might be, there was a manner in which the situation could be bettered. Ideologies helped to cure a psychological need for security stemming from insecure social conditions. They performed, then, two functions which Apter\(^1\) identified as social—-that of binding the community together; and individual—organizing the role personalities of the maturing individual. Aron states that where ideology arises there is a "longing for a purpose, for communion with the people, for something controlled by an idea or a will."\(^2\) In other words, there is a tendency to "create a world image convincing enough to support the collective and individual sense of identity." Ideologies do this by making facts amenable to ideas and ideas amenable to facts.\(^3\) In doing this, ideologies are often very selective in those symbols they use to convey

\(^1\)Apter, D., "Ideology and Discontent" in Apter, op. cit., 18.

\(^2\)Aron, op. cit., 323.

facts or ideas. Through selectivity in the use of symbols, they often distort reality. It is in the manner of selectivity of symbols and distortion of reality that ideologies often operate in a manner similar to the literary device of metaphor.¹

Metaphor possesses a descriptive quality which is acquired through the uniting of often conflicting symbols. It is through an almost dialectical use of such symbols that a new symbol arises. In the synthesis, the meaning of both elements undergoes a change. As a unity they represent a new symbol. "The meanings of all other symbolic elements that compose a larger, articulate symbol are understood only through the meaning of the whole, through the relations within the total structure."²

Geertz³ notes that

"the power of a metaphor derives precisely from the discordant meanings it symbolically coerces into a unitary conceptual framework and to the degree to which that coercion is successful in overcoming the psychic resistance such semantic tension inevitably generates in anyone in a position to perceive it. When it works metaphor transforms a false identification into an apt analogy; when it misfires it is a mere extravagance."

¹The link between ideology and metaphor was first brought to my attention in an article by Geertz, C., "Ideology as a Cultural System" in Aoter, loc. cit., 47-76.


³Geertz, op. cit., 58-59.
The union of conflicting symbols gives rise to a false conception of the literal meaning. This false conception conveys, however, a new symbol which is wrong in a literal sense. Metaphor, says Percy, \(^1\) "asserts of one thing that it is something else." It tends to be most effective when it is most "wrong." It is, however, this tension which produces a false conception from which the "essence of metaphorical truth," as Percy puts it, arises. "There must be space between name and thing, for otherwise the private apprehension is straightened and oppressed. What is required is that the thing be both sanctioned and yet allowed freedom to be what it is . . . .

The essence of metaphorical truth is . . . to name unmistakably, and yet to name by such a gentle analogy that the thing beheld by both of us may be truly formulated for what is is." \(^2\) "Quite often," Hester\(^3\) suggests, "the motive for using a metaphor instead of a concrete type of description is that only through the metaphor, or perhaps most economically through the metaphor can the abstract subject be given concreteness."

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\(^1\) Percy, W., "Metaphor as Mistake." *Sewanee Review*, LXVI (1958), 89.

\(^2\) Ibid.

Take, for instance, the metaphor "glassy road." It is an expression one would use to describe a road after a rain or one on which water had frozen and turned to ice. An illusion is created that the road appears as glass. Literally, glassy road could mean a "road made of glass" or a "road on which glass was strewn." However, the two symbols used as a metaphor convey only the conception of a road which appears to be of glass. The symbol representing the synthesis of the conflicting elements—the resulting metaphor—is wrong. There is, in fact, no such thing as a glassy road—at least not one on which one would want to walk barefoot or drive an automobile. While the metaphor is wrong, the use of the two symbols together is effective in conveying the idea of slick or slippery road conditions. The result of combining two conflicting symbols for more illustrative, economical, or simple word usage is effective. The symbols in synthesis are successful in conveying the proper conception.

Geertz\textsuperscript{1} states the difficulty of the problem: "not only is the semantic structure of the figure a good deal more complex than it appears on the surface, but an analysis of that structure forces one into tracing a multiplicity of referential connections between it and social reality, so that the final picture is one of a

\textsuperscript{1}Geertz, op. cit., 60.
configuration of dissimilar meanings out of whose interworking both the expressive power and the rhetorical force of the final symbol derive. The effectiveness of metaphor, therefore, depends on the proper selection of symbols to distort reality in such a way as to change the resulting conception of those symbols in the desired manner. It is these two elements--selectivity and distortion of reality--which are the devices of metaphor. It is in connection with these devices that the similarities between ideology and metaphor become perceivable.

"It is, in turn, the attempt of ideologies to render otherwise incomprehensible social situations meaningful, to so construe them as to make it possible to act purposefully within them, that accounts for both the ideologies' highly figurative nature and for the intensity with which they are held. As metaphor extends language by broadening its semantic range, enabling it to express meanings it cannot or at least cannot yet express literally, so the head-on clash of literal meanings in ideology . . . provides novel symbolic frames against which to match the myriad 'unfamiliar somethings' that, like a journey to a strange country, are produced by transformation in political life."

Ideology, then, is the manipulation of symbols to bring about desired forms of action among collectivities. As Bell put it, "ideology is the conversion of ideas into social levers."

1loc. cit., 64.
2Bell, op. cit., 371.
Furthermore, it should be noted that the manipulation of symbols need not be contrived. There are within different cultural contexts cues for action which serve the same purpose as man-derived symbols. These cues may range from the simplest biologically useful stimulus to the informal sanctions imposed through the evolution of culture and the continuance of tradition. These things help fashion patterns of behavior which enable man to live in a social environment. They need not be contrived but they do put limitations on the scope of actions acceptable. In the context, then, that such cues do bring about desired forms of collective action, they can in the social context have an ideological function. These cues by virtue of their survival value in an evolutionary sense have been subject to a degree of selectivity. As selective remnants of cultural prerogatives, they may, in fact, distort.

The selectivity and distortion of reality is often not a conscious act. Several scholars have asserted that such phenomena often arise from social or psychological malintegration which leads individuals to perceive their situation wrongly.\footnote{Beliefs like other elements of culture are parts of the personality of the actor who holds them. That there should be a common shared by the ego and alter is in certain respects as important as that the beliefs should be adequate to their reality outside of the particular interaction system. Because of this duality of}
Parsons\(^1\) that "the culture provides standards of selective orientation and ordering." While the culture supports a belief system and ideology and vice versa, failure or inability of individuals to integrate their behavior with accepted standards within the culture, a manner of acting on the symbols of the culture, often results in wrong perceptions of those symbols. Take, for example, the symbol of equality in the United States. Equality is a system sustaining symbol. Equality is basic to the supporting doctrine of the American social and political system. The symbol arouses certain conceptions which justify, in part, the existence of the system. Those who use equality in ideological ways often purport that it is part of the system while, in reality, equality does not exist. The perception of equality as part of the system is wrong. The "truth," however, is embodied in

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1Parsons, loc. cit., 327.

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its utility as a symbol.\textsuperscript{1} The perception serves to help sustain the system.\textsuperscript{2} A true perception might lead to societal dysfunctions and propagate new ideologies based on different conceptions and perceptions of equality.

"Hence where there is an element of malintegration in the actual social structure," states Parsons,\textsuperscript{3} "there will be the tendency for the ideology to 'gloss it over' and 'play it down.' Fully to 'face up' to the reality of the importance of the conflicting elements in the value system and in the realistic situations would be a threat to the stability of the society. In these respects, relative to conflicting elements within the social system, ideologies have functions directly homologous with those of rationalization in the personality system."

Bergman\textsuperscript{4} contends that the wrong perception is one of taking a value judgment as a statement of fact. The value judgment's emotive power is increased in that manner.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1} "The primary question is no longer that of interest in whether a proposition is 'true,' but in addition to that, in a commitment to its implications for the orientation of action as such." loc. cit., 332.
\item \textsuperscript{2} This is only one function of ideology. Ideologies can be used to foster system change. The functions of ideologies will be discussed later in this chapter.
\item \textsuperscript{3} loc. cit., 356.
\item \textsuperscript{4} Bergman, G., "Ideology." \textit{Ethics}, LXI (April, 1951), 210.
\end{itemize}
"There appears to be a problem," he states, \(^1\) "only as long as one fails to distinguish between value judgments and statements of fact, treating some of the former like statements of perceptual error or, more significantly, like systematic delusions due to one's social circumstances." With reference to Marx, Lichtheim\(^2\) says that the "ideological" mode of thought is one in which "the participants fail to comprehend the situation in which they are involved. . . . . The only difference between 'objective' and 'ideological' thinking appears to lie in the capacity of the critical intellect to comprehend the particular determinations which condition each successive phase of human activity." We might then say, as Geertz\(^3\) has, that "it is thus not truth that varies with social, psychological, and cultural contexts but the symbols in our unequally effective attempts to grasp it."

Characteristically, then, ideology operates in the preceding manner to accomplish one of two things. First, it may perform a system maintenance function. Second, it may perform a system change function.

In its role as a system maintainer, the ideology builds upon the prevailing attitudes and beliefs using

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\(^1\) loc. cit., 212.

\(^2\) Lichtheim, op. cit., 176.

\(^3\) Geertz, op. cit., 59.
the symbolic structure already present in the culture. It seeks to justify the existence of present institutions and behaviors. It is often very subtle in its operation. Those on whom the ideology is designed to operate often do not even perceive its existence, while, at the same time, challenged to action or inaction by it. For, the ideational forces within a culture which spur men to action in defense of that system are often not regarded as ideological due to the previously discussed negative connotation of ideology. The forces that challenge that system are the ones that are perceived as being ideological. Since the system maintaining ideology is subtle, the wrong perception of system symbols is not as glaring.

As a system maintainer, the ideology often acts to rationalize strains on the system which threaten the stability of the system. The importance of the strains upon the system may be lessened by refocusing attention on visible symbols which reduce the visibility of the initial strain. In this manner a new strain can be fabricated which is less of a threat to system stability than the first.

For instance, imagine the appearance of strain A in a given system. For our purposes, we will assume that strain A poses a serious threat to societal stability by its potential ability to force a mobilization of large masses of disenchanted people into action against the
prevailing system. The resources of the system are, at present, inadequate to ameliorate the present source of strain. Those in policy-making positions within the system might minimize the adverse effects of strain A by reducing its visibility. They may try to do this by channeling attention elsewhere; by calling upon the prevailing symbolic orientation of the value structure and/or fabricating strain B. Channeling attention elsewhere can buy time to effect a bettering of the situation or it may effectively delay the amelioration indefinitely. The rechanneling or fabrication may also act to renew confidence in the system. This confidence can be maintained as long as the real strains on the system can be kept at a low level of visibility and the prevailing symbols of the system appear to be operating.

One of the purposes of system maintaining ideologies is to build solidarity among a collectivity at times of strain and societal fragmentation and dislocation. In doing this, ideology implies a common purpose to accomplish common goals. It tries to maintain the value of concerted action in meeting the strain on the system. "In the case of ideology," Parsons\(^1\) states, "there must be an obligation to accept its tenets as the basis of action. As distinguished from a purely instrumental

\(^{1}\)Parsons, op. cit., 349-350.
belief, there must be involvement of an idea that the welfare of the collectivity and not merely attainment of a particular goal hinges on the implementation of the belief system."

Ideologies that support system change are somewhat different. They work in much the same way that a system maintaining ideology works. The major difference is in their goal orientation. System changing ideologies aim at breaking down old values and institutions and building new ones in their place. While the system maintaining ideology calls upon and uses prevailing values to reinforce those same values, the system changing ideology generally uses those values against themselves or against competing values, seeks to destroy them and the institutions they reflect and which reflect them. It offers a new and different system in exchange.

Ideology, as Geertz\(^1\) points out, has several social roles: defining or obscuring social categories; stabilizing or upsetting social expectations; maintaining or undermining social norms; strengthening or weakening social consensus; relieving or exacerbating social tensions.

Types of ideologies may be distinguished on the basis their articulation of content, the degree of

\(^1\)Geertz, op. cit., 53.
symbolization, and function. For our purposes in this study, ideologies will be distinguishable as two general types I will arbitrarily call narrow and broad ideologies.¹

The narrow type of ideology has several characteristics. It almost always serves a system maintenance function. It is often a reaction to strain within a system. In this respect, it acts as an equilibrating mechanism which aims at the correction of societal disequilibrium by bringing about only that change necessary to relieve the strain on the system. Ideologies that serve a system maintenance function are not necessarily adverse to change nor are they necessarily reactionary in nature. Although they may be either of the above, they are more likely to present attitudes of piecemeal change of a minimal nature. In this way, they act to keep the system intact while presenting room for necessary adjustments as needed due to changing social conditions within the broad and acceptable limits of the system's value structure. The object where change is pursued is one of making the system responsive to changing conditions without destroying the system; or changing the system where that change is at a low level of visibility. In this way, this type of ideology is, at best, ameliorative.

¹Dividing ideologies into categories is a subjective exercise. I am aware that my categorization might not necessarily coincide with those of someone else.
In the narrow type of ideology, there is no high degree of articulation. Since this type arises at specific times of strain or might be part of a constant orientation toward incremental change, it may be of a pragmatic nature. Its effectiveness usually requires the use of a great deal of symbolization: employing the prevailing symbols in an effective manner to achieve short-range goals. There is no highly organized body of theory to this type of ideology. The theory is often implicit through the manipulation of the symbolic structure.

Take, for example, a case of narrow ideology regarding the British Empire. The issue of Empire was a relatively low-key issue prior to the 1890's. It attracted little public attention. In 1868, there were basically two schools of thought regarding the Empire. On one side were the separatists who felt that it was inevitable or desirable that the Empire split up. The colonies would attain a level of self-rule which would eventuate their cutting the ties with Great Britain. The separatists primarily belonged to the school of laissez-faire Liberals favoring free-trade. Although preferential trade had been abandoned almost twenty years earlier, they viewed the Empire as more of a liability than an asset. On the other side were those who were for the retention of the Empire or at least maintaining close
ties with the colonies. Their support came mostly from
the upper classes, the conservative sectors of the Civil
and Colonial Services which had a stake in the maintenance
of the Empire, the military and power-conscious who sup­
ported them, and loyal colonists who felt a sentimental
tie with Britain.

A narrow ideology arose in reaction to Gladstone's
imperial policy regarding the New Zealand Maori Wars.
Gladstone's first government came to power in 1868. It
was the first Liberal government in England's history.
When he took power, there were many preconceptions regard­
ing the kinds of policies he would initiate. There were
widespread expectations of a radical shift in colonial
policies, and it was believed among certain circles that
Gladstone would begin to dismantle the Empire. With
respect to the Empire, Gladstone was a separatist. He
and many Liberals saw no intrinsic value in maintaining
a costly empire which did not support itself and which
greatly overextended British commitments around the
world.¹

The New Zealand government had been at war intermit­
tently with the Maori tribes for many years. When war
once more broke out in 1868, Gladstone took measures to
try to reduce the involvement of British troops. He

¹Thornton, A. P., The Imperial Idea and Its Enemies.
began to remove the British garrison from New Zealand and rejected a request for a loan to New Zealand for defense purposes. After all, did not self-defense go along with self-rule? The British could not be expected to fight every local war which broke out. By the manner in which Gladstone's opponents reacted to this policy, it must have seemed apparent to them that their fears were being confirmed. The anti-separatists perceived this policy as an abandonment of the colonies and they sought to change the policy. The system had become strained and to counter the strain efforts to effect a collective action toward a desired goal were undertaken.

It should not be construed that this reaction caused any great dysfunction. Discussion of colonial policy had always been on a low key. The opposition to Gladstone's policy did not have people marching in the streets. Through more subtle means, the opposition informed the government of the feelings of certain segments of the population.

Reaction to the government policy increased. Imperial affairs began to receive more press coverage. Newspapers began to appeal for the retention of the Empire. Some made emotional appeals about the greatness of the Empire; the sentiment which bound the colonies to the

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mother country. They attacked Gladstone's "policy of drift." The Spectator, for instance, claimed that imperialism was a virtue shunned by the Radicals but which Britain needed. What was needed was a sacrifice of blood and money for the sake of national honor. Organizations favoring retention of the Empire arose. The Royal Colonial Institute, whose motto was "United Empire," was formed in 1869. Its propaganda saw Gladstone's New Zealand policy foreshadowing the dissolution of the Empire. The Empire, stated Labillier, in 1869, was a "sacred principle." That same year Queen Victoria warned the Foreign Secretary Carendon "that the argument that England's only duty was to lend moral support alone to great causes was one that, if we held to it, would lose us our position in Europe." In the summer of 1870, an article in the Westminster Review called the government's imperial policy "the narrowing and debasement of national aspiration, the recognition of a lower standard of

2Ibid.
3Koebner and Schmidt, op. cit., 25.
4Bodelsen, op. cit., 99.
5Thornton, op. cit., 85.
6cited in Bodelsen, op. cit., 113.
patriotism . . . the sacrifice of national honour and good faith to false and fatal economy."

It seems, however, that a change in government policy was perceptible in 1870. The government had become sensitive to the imperialists' attacks. Press coverage of the times portrays the anti-government measures as being successful.¹ Even the direction of the imperialists' propaganda efforts began to change by 1871. Having felt that they had successfully stemmed the tide of the dissolution of the Empire, the imperialists began to concentrate their efforts at bringing about closer ties with the colonies. The Standard could report in 1872, that "everybody, it seems, is now opposed to the idea of disintegration."²

When what appears to have been a strain on the system occurred, a significant movement arose to try to remove the strain. It employed an ideology to try to bring about changes in public policy. When the strain disappeared through effecting public policy in the desired manner, the movement changed and focused its attention elsewhere. The ideology for that specific goal was not necessarily the one which would bring about change warranted by new goal orientation: closer ties with the colonies.

¹loc. cit., 119.
²loc. cit., 120.
The distinctions between broad and narrow types of ideologies should become clearer after a discussion of the broad type.

The broad type of ideology is generally associated with system change. This change is often of a complete and sweeping nature. In that case, the ideology aims at making over the institutions and changing the values within a society. It tends to arise from strains in the system but it retains its force long after those strains have disappeared. Rather than aiming at short-term, piecemeal, or pragmatic types of change, this type of ideology must necessarily look toward change carried out over a long period of time. This kind of change involves more than one issue; more specifically, it involves the manner in which the system handles all issues: the way in which the system handles feedback and produces outputs.

The broad type of ideology generally involves a high degree of articulation. In other words, there tends to be a large body of theory concerning the plans for change. This body of theory may or may not be cohesive. Take, for instance, Marxism. The body of Marxist theory is a cohesive formulation of sociological and economic conditions and sweeping plans for system change. The entire body of theory was written by primarily two individuals—Marx and Engels. On the other hand, the ideology of socialism, while in a broader context presents an articulate formula-
tion of sociological and economic conditions and plans for system change, is in no way as consistent or cohesive as Marxism. Among the contributors to the socialist body of theory were such diverse individuals as Saint-Simon, Moses Hess, von Stein, Feuerbach, Marx, Bakunin, and George Bernard Shaw. From among all the diverse views of these men, however, we are able to extract common elements which enable us to construct a broad body of theory we can identify as being socialistic in nature. By a high degree of articulation, when talking about the broad type of ideology, we are referring to an attempt at organizing ideas, observations, and thoughts to construct a body of theory for the purpose of bringing about desired social goals.

Among the general strains of theory of an ideology of the broad type one usually finds several types of sub-theory. Among these are a psychological theory, a sociological theory, a value system, an end to be reached, and a plan or a means to reach that end.

The psychological subtheory of an ideology usually makes assumptions about the behavior of man. It seeks to explain how man acts and why he acts the way he does. The sociological subtheory explains the environment in which man finds himself; the arena in which he acts. The value system makes assumptions regarding how man should act. In this way, it may integrate both the psychological and
sociological theory into a prescription for achieving proper behavior—in particular sociological conditions. The ends of the ideology are the goals for which it strives through action. This might entail, as in the case of Marxism, visions of what society might ultimately be like after the system has been changed. The means of an ideology are a prescription for reaching the desired end: the kinds of action to be invoked to produce the necessary changes in the system.

The degree to which any of these types of subtheory are stressed varies from ideology to ideology. Thus, in Marxism, we find a quite well-developed sociological theory while its psychological theory is relatively anemic. In classical nineteenth century Liberalism, the opposite is more perceivable. There is both a quite well-developed psychological theory and sociological theory. The psychological theory would most likely be the more important, for it provided the assumption on which the sociological theory is constructed.

1The ideology in this sense might be different from party dogma of, for example, the Communist Party whose origins are found in a broad type of ideology. The dogma, however, may represent an attempt at institutionalizing and operationalizing the ideology in order to meet changing circumstances and/or achieve stability. For this reason, party dogma changes within the context of the ideology according to the practical dictates of particular situations and thus would be better identified as a representation of a narrow ideology.
The psychological, sociological, and value assumptions are antecedent to any desired goal or means to reach it. These assumptions necessarily bias one's perceptions of the system and act as normative guides in projecting one's goals into the future. When looking at ideologies, usually the most visible aspect of them is their goals and program of action. Yet, behind these aspects, there are certain assumptions. In order to fully understand the nature of any ideology, these assumptions cannot be ignored.

So far, we have been talking about the broad type of ideology as a system changing ideology. The broad type, however, may, at times, serve a system maintenance function. Once the goals of the ideology are reached, it tends to cease to promote change. It tends to entrench itself and even become reactionary. The changes in the system it has brought about now become the system. Classical Liberalism, for example, was the ideology of the European bourgeoisie. Once this class attained political power and effected its program—most notably, extension of the franchise to the middle classes and the implementation of laissez-faire economics as public policy—it tended to resist changes in the system in order to maintain the changes accomplished to that time.

The model of ideology I have constructed will be used in the analysis of Victorian imperialism. Whether
or not Victorian imperialism fits the model is what this study hopes to show. What I intend to show is what ways the ideas regarding the British Empire might be construed to fit the model.

For this reason, this study will be somewhat different from other studies on the same subject. First, I will be employing a model designed to test the centrality of an ideology of Victorian imperialism. Other studies have, for the most part, viewed imperialism, in part, as a manifestation of other particular ideologies. Where they have stressed the ideological aspects of imperialist phenomena, then, the central role of ideology has been focused away from imperialism itself and instead has been given to some other ideology such as capitalism or nationalism. In most studies of British imperialism, ideology occupies a secondary position alongside historical phenomena. What this study intends to do is suggest a way in which historical phenomena might be used to demonstrate an ideological system. By focusing on imperialism as a demonstration of an ideology, I hope to show how imperialism itself might have played a more central ideological role as opposed to a peripheral one.

Second, it will be noticed that in this study, there is a stress on the internal politics of England rather than on foreign politics. This is not to lessen the importance of foreign considerations of the phenomena.
surrounding imperialism. Many other studies have shown that. The difference in this one, however, is that imperialism as an ideology will be looked at as an intra-system force rather than an inter-system force. Ideologies can have different manifestation and functions depending on whether they are projected outward or inward to influence the environment. This study, however, will not ignore foreign influences for they definitely affected the particular nature of Victorian imperialism. The primary concern will be with how such foreign influences affected the internal politics of Great Britain and vice versa.

As an ideology, then, where does the theory regarding British imperialism fit into the picture? We will, in this study, be looking at the ideas about the British Empire present in Great Britain between about 1840 and 1900. During this period, the predominant ideas toward the Empire changed considerably from time to time. There are, in fact, three fairly discernible periods of imperial attitudes. There was the period of free-trade imperialism which reached its zenith with the advent of the first Gladstone government in 1868. There was the period when imperial federation dominated imperial thought. Finally, there was the "jingoist" period which began in the late 1880's and reached its highest point during the Boer War in 1898. The predominant ideas about the Empire were
significantly different during each period.¹

Needless to say, there is no clear, cohesive body of thought presentable as the ideology of British imperialism. Imperialist thought, however, is highly articulated. There are, moreover, common strains of ideas which can be gathered from the many diverse writings on the Empire. There are general assumptions forming an undercurrent within the literature which at close examination are perceivable. This study will suggest what these common strains might be and how they might be classifiable into the subtheories of the broad type of ideology.

There were, during the period which this study will embrace, narrow ideologies which were employed for the implementation of imperial policy at various times in response to various strains.² In a narrow study pertaining to a specific public policy, it might be helpful to study such ideologies such as the previously described reaction to Gladstone's New Zealand policy. In this study, however, we will look at imperialism as a forceful movement over a long period of time about which a significant

¹"Imperialism was a faith and emotion before it became a political programme; and even when its enemies had successfully overturned the political programme, the faith and emotion survived." Thornton, op. cit., x.

body of theory has been built. This body of theory is very diverse and broad in scope, makes important assumptions, and presents goals similar to those common to all broad ideologies. Over time, these assumptions and goals became a part of the culture of the British. They took on a significant symbolic function and acted as powerful social forces in effecting public policy actions and policy goals—or, as we defined ideology, brought about desired forms of collective action. These observations suggest that the theory, journalism, rhetoric, etc., of the period are amenable to analysis as part of an ideology.

The question might arise why Victorian England was chosen for an attempt to articulate an ideology of imperialism. The objection to this example might be that the British are not a particularly ideologically oriented people and that the French or German example might have made a more convincing argument. Aside from the factors of language ability, the study of Victorian England can be defended on several grounds. First, the British are no less susceptible to ideologies than the French or Germans. During the nineteenth century, we find many ideologies flourishing in Great Britain which had similar counterparts on the continent: capitalism, socialism, Marxism, anarchism, nationalism, among others. Second, while the British were just as susceptible to ideology as other European countries, in other countries such as
France and Germany, ideological beliefs tended to be held much more passionately. The British were more subdued in the outward adherence to ideological beliefs. This may be because, thirdly, until the late nineteenth century, ideology on an articulate level was basically an elite rather than a mass phenomenon. It was not until that period that education had spread wide enough and popular journalism was aimed at mass readership. To that point, articulated ideology was out of the reach of the common man.

This raises an important distinction which we should make in this study. It should be realized that imperialism as it existed as an ideology was, for the most part, an elite phenomenon until the 1890's. This is to say that the empire debate of about fifty of the sixty years this study covers was carried on by a minority of educated individuals and groups to the exclusion of the masses. This is substantially different from the mass use to which imperial debate was put in other countries during and after that period.

The rest of this study will not be similar to other studies of imperialism. It will deal with the subtheories of the British imperial ideology with the hope of articulating a distinct and self-contained ideology. Each chapter will deal with a certain set of assumptions found in a broad ideology: psychological theory, sociological
theory, value system, ends, and means to reach those ends. In this manner, the study will be one of British imperial ideology as extracted from the ideas about the British Empire.
CHAPTER II

PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS INFLUENCING VICTORIAN IMPERIALISM

In this chapter, I will discuss some of the psychological factors which, while not direct causes of the growth of Victorian imperialism, certainly did not impede its growth. To what degree the factors I emphasize were more prominent than others is only conjecture. I can only venture to say that the ones I discuss were significant if not conclusive. I will also try to show how these factors, in some instances, were manifested in the thought regarding empire. Psychological factors are not necessarily causes, since there is no direct causal link between a particular broad psychological category and actual behavior, but they did in some ways influence the perceptions of events which in turn influenced behavior. Once more, I should state that these psychological factors do not represent a complete picture. They are selective; chosen for importance. Moreover, it should not be understood that these psychological factors are particular to Victorian England. It is possible that, to some extent, they are influential to greater or lesser degrees in the behavior of other nations and "imperialistic" nations in general during the same period and/or at different times in history.

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The Victorian Desire for Security

The desire for security is a very significant element in the psychology of Victorian imperialism. Although it is, to some extent, present in all social systems, this desire pervaded all social classes in England.\(^1\) It was perhaps more intense in England. This desire was, for the most part, a reaction to the conditions in which the nineteenth century Englishman found himself.\(^2\) Nowhere in Europe were the phenomena particular to the industrial revolution more manifest than in Great Britain. While the great urban masses greatly felt the insecurity which arose from these conditions, they were not the only class to experience insecurity. Moreover, the importance of the insecurity of the lower classes as an influence of the rise of imperialism is of less importance than the insecurity of the other classes. For most of the century, the lower classes were excluded from participation in policy-making—even at a mass level. Imperialist ideology as a manifestation of insecurity arose more from the perceptions of the upper classes.

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\(^2\)The effects of these conditions on the masses were discussed in Chapter I. Infra, 3.
The new stage of technology gave rise to a middle class which found itself playing a new role in a new cultural context. It possessed a growing economic power which was not based on ascriptive wealth as that of the aristocracy. Rather, it was based on the acquisition, employment, and creation of new capital. It used the new stage of technology as a tool for the acquisition of economic power.

This economic power, moreover, led to the desire for political power. The middle class had a vested interest in the political decisions which affected its property. Until 1832, these decisions were made by a primarily hostile landed aristocracy which viewed the new bourgeois class with its growing economic power as a threat to its own "secure" position. Even once the new middle class attained political power, they were constantly striving to resist its diminution against the proletariat and its leaders whose political awareness was maturing. The attainment of political power, then, did not increase the security of the middle class in a concrete sense. In a relative sense, it did give them more power with regard to their own political destiny. This was more than they had previously possessed.

The aristocratic class had no reason to feel secure either. They saw their basically agrarian economic position undercut by a more mobile and industrially centered
middle class. Moreover, they had to share political power—first with the middle class in 1832; then, with the proletariat in 1867 and again in 1884. The nineteenth century witnessed the power of the landed aristocracy in relative decline as opposed to that of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat.

The physical realities of the period propagated intellectual and ideological currents which profoundly reflected the psychological insecurity of the period.\(^1\) We see this evident in such seemingly different movements as that of rationalism and idealism. Rationalism sought order in the mechanical nature of the universe and the ability of man's reason to surmount his physical condition. Idealism sought security in some higher order which transcended man's physical condition. Both, in part, attempted to give meaning to new and perplexing social relations. Both tended to act as a surrogate for religious faith which, during this period, was undergoing a crisis.\(^2\)

The rationalist position in England was maintained, during the early nineteenth century, by the proponents of


Liberalism and supporters of the economic system explained by Adam Smith. Among other works, Smith's Wealth of Nations laid the groundwork for a rational model of social and economic relationships. The social and economic realms were characterized by a set of orderly relationships. Smith envisioned a model of the economic system which operated in an almost quasi-mechanical manner. The market place, left free from regulation, would be guided as if by an "invisible hand." The market place adjusted itself so that capital resources and products were employed in the most efficient manner. In social relations also, man would act rationally to maximize his own self-interest.

The rationalist assumptions were also present in the ideas of the nineteenth century positivists. The positivists, however, were more disposed to rely on tested experience rather than on undisciplined speculation. The positivists attempted to reinstitute some form of certainty into the relationship of man to his environment. They tried to erect a new faith based on

1James Mill and Jeremy Bentham and their utilitarian colleagues were influential in this pursuit. Also see Hume's, A Treatise of Human Nature.

2Models are often taken for reality. The model, however, only serves a representational role. Where the discrepancy between the model and reality is not perceived, psychological malintegration takes place. See: Geertz, op. cit.
the methods of scientific demonstrability. This new faith would provide some standard of objective truth with regard to man's milieu.

The idealist school arose, in part, in reaction to extreme rationalism. To some extent, the idealists were disturbed by the rationalist’s denial of the role of emotion and sentiments in social relations. Where the rationalists tended to view anything not empirically demonstrable as being unimportant in the pursuit of truth, the idealists recognized certain forces which were above man's ability to comprehend. There was a purpose to everything which unveiled itself in the organic process of the universe. The world, through continuous evolutionary change moved toward some ultimate destiny. Man was merely a part of the process. He was put on earth to fulfill his role in that destiny. The system was orderly—each person given an allotted position in the hierarchy of the organic system. The virtuous man fulfilled his role in the system. In fulfilling his proper role, man aided society as a whole.

While the origins of this idealist school were to be found, to a great extent, outside England—namely, in the work of such men as Kant and Hegel—these ideas found expression in Great Britain, first in Coleridge and some of the writings of J. S. Mill and later in the works of T. H. Green, F. H. Bradley, and Bernard
Bosanquet. These men were instrumental in the replacement of the extreme individualism of the early nineteenth century with the growing collectivist orientation of the latter part of the century.¹

Security and Order

While the premises of the rationalists and the idealists were different, both sought to impose order on a not yet understandable universe. In the process, they tried to render it more understandable. "In all human relations," Carlyle² wrote, "permanency is what I advocate; nomadism, continual change is what I perceive to be prohibitory of any good whatsoever." Every man's mission, he³ claimed, was "to make what was disorderly, chaotic into a thing ruled, regular."

Thornton⁴ points out that the statesmen of the eighteenth century, like those of the twentieth century, "were accustomed to a world in disorder. The statesmen of the intervening century were not. They believed in


progress. They believed that they had made progress and that they would certainly make more. They thought disorder a phase, an obstacle that intelligence could, and certainly would, remove. "Progress, to the Victorian, "was not equated with increased and increasing comfort, but the essence of it was something non-material; an increase in intellectual control of the environment."\(^1\)

Whether progress was a product of human intelligence or part of the Grand Design of Providence, it represented an important idea for the Victorians. This progress was to be shared. It would reshape the world. Woodward\(^2\) observes that "the novelty of the Victorian Age was not its misery, but the realization that urban and rural misery could be prevented by positive effort and not merely alleviated by private charity."\(^3\)

The desire for order manifested itself in the thought about the empire in two ways: a desire for


\(^2\)loc. cit., 57.

domestic order, and a desire for order on an international scale. It is not my point to defend an economic interpretation of imperialism, but economic factors played a large part in the thought reflecting the desire for security. Smith and the classical economists that followed him promoted an economic internationalism. While the domestic economic system, left alone, could be depended upon to operate at a maximum level beneficial to all, so, likewise, on an international scale, nations could benefit most if the trade between them were free. In this way, each would provide the other with needs and wants as far as it was able. It would lead to a specialization of nations regarding the supply of world resources.\(^1\) Commercial relations, then, were viewed as an important agent for the promotion of progress.

While domestic industry demanded order, so did international trade. Order and stability were thought, then, an important part of maintaining the international trade on which England, a small country with limited resources, depended so heavily. Much of the British expansion resulted from an attempt to establish order in countries with which England had significant commercial

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\(^1\)D. K. Fieldhouse attempts to show that there was a body of theory demonstrating that the export of surplus goods and capital was a necessary means of maintaining the capitalist system. *The Theory of Capitalist Imperialism*. New York: Barnes and Noble, 1967.
relations. Annexation was rarely the motive for establishing order.

To the British, the establishment of order meant the presence of law and the power to back it up. Thornton\textsuperscript{1} points out that "the first task of the English anywhere they went was to establish law and order . . . security of life and persons within the bounds of an organized imperial control was at once a symbol of a disciplined civilization and a hope expressed for greater things to come." What the British saw as their trade developed around the world was many strange peoples insulated from Western civilization. They viewed these peoples as uncivilized and inferior.\textsuperscript{2} The conduct of trade with such people was not expected to be of a stable nature.

There was, however, a certain hypocrisy in British attitudes toward non-Western peoples. The instability and disorder they saw abroad was present, yet, to a great extent, rationalized at home. Sympathy for the impoverished conditions of these different peoples, while it added altruistic fuel to the imperial fire, offered little consolation for the thousands who still starved in England and Ireland.

\textsuperscript{1}Thornton, Doctrines, op. cit., 63.

\textsuperscript{2}loc. cit., 159ff.
Other than the overt claims of racial superiority, there was some altruistic pretense in the British imperial pressure. It was, for a long time, a prevalent justification by Whitehall that the imposition of British colonial rule was for the distinct protection of the alien population—not necessarily protection of themselves from their own violence against each other, but rather, their protection from the violence of the Europeans. Colonial government was one way of checking the activities of British citizens in their dealings with the colonial peoples and minority groups. Writing in 1843, about the settlement colonies, George Cornwall Lewis viewed the protective aspects of the imperial arrangement somewhat differently.

"The most obvious of these advantages [to a dependency] is protection; since the relation between the two communities is owing to the comparative strength of the one and the comparative weakness of the other, and it is in the interest of the stronger community to protect the weaker against foreign aggression."

Much later, in an appeal for imperial unity, Milner exclaimed that if the empire did not stand together:

"... it would mean dereliction of duty. For the British race has become responsible for the peace and order and the just and

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humane government of three or four hundred millions of people, who . . . do not possess the gift of maintaining peace and order for themselves. Without our control their political condition would be one of chaos, as it was for centuries before that control was established. The Pax Britannica is essential to the maintenance of civilized conditions of existence among one-fifth of the human race."

Moreover, with regard to the extension of liberty to colonial peoples, the British, on the one hand, called themselves the torchbearers of liberty: exporting this "unique" institution around the world. On the other hand, they were often the suppressors of national aspirations and ruled their colonial possessions by dictatorial means. No doubt, this somewhat disturbed the defenders of imperial expansion. Also, there was strong sentiment—even with regards to the settlement dependencies of the early Victorian period—that liberty was a function of power and was something that must be earned through the ability to govern.¹ Carlyle² could claim that "I never thought the 'rights of Negroes' worth much discussing, nor the rights of men in any form; the grand point, as I once said, is the mights of men . . . ." As colonial governments became more fit to govern themselves, the reasoning went, the grant of liberty would be forthcoming accordingly.

¹Thornton, Doctrines, op. cit., 117.
Paternalism and the Maintenance of Order

The establishment of law and order as a means of achieving stability is a constant Victorian theme. This resulted from the belief that these non-Western peoples did not know how to govern themselves. The Victorians believed that those people would accept British government and justice as a "blessing." The folly in the reality of this type of thinking often only became apparent after colonial rule became established and the dysfunctions resulting from the clash of two cultures began to present unexpected problems.\(^1\) George Cornewall Lewis\(^2\) realized this in 1843, when in his influential Government of Dependencies he observed that customs, laws, language, and religion may not be appropriate to all peoples. The native populations had little, if any, understanding of British law. The colonials, remote from the watching eye of the Colonial Office, often dispensed with justice in an uneven manner. There was little that the Colonial Office could do. It depended, for its decisions, on

\(^1\) This problem was first evident in India. Robinson, Gallagher, and Denny pointed out that it was enough to lessen British interest in acquiring non-Western territories for the remainder of the century. Where such acquisitions occurred, they were, for the most part, undertaken with reluctance. \textit{oo. cit.}

information supplied by the colonial governments. This gave the colonial governments a great degree of freedom to deal with matters as they saw fit. When discrepancies between the ideal behavior which was expected of colonial government and its actual behavior became known in London, the colonial government could still continue its practices. The colonials frowned on the London bureaucrats telling them what to do. Those in London, it was felt, had no grasp of the real situation in the field. They were ignorant of the pragmatic necessities involved in ruling alien races. However, Thornton¹ states that:

"It was a matter of priorities, a matter of necessity. And here the two views of power, the view from the metropolis and the view from the frontier, tend to converge when faced with emergency either moral or secular . . . both the statesman and the frontiersman saw virtue and utility in the policy of force. Both when put to it expressed the ultimate confidence of their race and situation. Both obeyed the doctrine of necessity and did what they had to do."

The attitude of the British ruling class about the ability of colonial people to govern themselves, however, was not much unlike their attitudes toward their own people's ability to govern and their attitudes toward

democracy in general. Edmund Burke, representing a more radical outlook, illustrates this attitude well where he reacts to the French Revolution.

"Government is a contrivance of human wisdom to provide for human wants . . . among these wants is to be reckoned the want, out of civil society, of a sufficient restraint upon their passions. Society requires not only that the passions of individuals should be subjected, but that even in the mass and body, as well as in the individuals, the inclinations of men should frequently be thwarted, their will controlled, and their passions be brought into subjection. This can only be done by a power out of themselves; and not, in the exercise of its function, subject to that will and those passions which it is its office to bridle and subdue. In this sense the restraints on men, as well as their liberties are to be reckoned among their rights."

The Tory position, while more liberal, was similar. The Radical Wilfred Lawson, in the 1890's, described the Tories as never having believed that people could govern themselves. They always thought it was necessary for some superior class to take the reigns. With this attitude, they could not help but be imperialists. Likewise, the utilitarians put a higher value on security then they did on equality.3

1Williams, op. cit., 9, citing Burke, E., Reflections on the Revolution in France.


Paternalistic colonial policies, then, were merely an extension of paternalism at home. Rule by the few over the many had always been part of the English social system. Even with the granting of English liberties in the Magna Carta, in 1215, it was an aristocratic few that benefited. The Glorious Revolution in 1688, benefited the same class. The Reform Bill of 1832,--the triumph of the new bourgeois class--moreover, failed to benefit the great majority of English citizenry.

The newly enfranchised middle class expressed the belief that it would use its new power in the best interests of the workingman. This class had misgivings about the efficacy of extending the franchise to the lower classes. The interests of employers and employees, they felt, were the same. For example, the reaction of Robert Peel as late as 1842 to the Chartists second petition was not untypical. He viewed the demands that government be responsible to the people--as opposed to responsible for the people--as revolutionary.¹

The Reform Bill of 1867, which extended the franchise to a greater number of workingmen, likewise, failed to significantly change the paternalistic nature of British politics.² The style of politics did change,

¹Thornton, Habit, op. cit., 188.
²loc. cit., 225-228.
however, because of the necessity to appeal to the new electorate. The workingman, nevertheless, continued to have only token representation in Parliament for the remainder of the century. The Reform Bill of 1867, Thornton\(^1\) points out, did result in a hardening of class lines. The aristocracy felt more of a need to assert its authority and began to close its ranks in an effort to prevent an incursion by the new political and social arrivistes. The prevalent attitude of the ruling class changed from one of not only trying to remove popular grievances, but preventing their formation. This resulted in the great amount of social welfare legislation passed in the last quarter of the century—social welfare measures necessarily paternalistic in nature.\(^2\) "Paternalism in England, therefore far from suffering marked defeat as a sturdy and independent democracy came pouring through the gaps in the pale of the constitution, took on a new lease of life."\(^3\)

British paternalism, usually viewed as being manifested politically in the Tory Party, also became a marked

\(^1\)ibid.


\(^3\)Thornton, loc. cit.
part of the politics of the Liberals. Faber\(^1\) makes the point that, during the last decades of the century, support for the empire cut across party lines. The paternalism of Toryism, then, became a general political phenomenon of the period.

**Paternalism and the Empire**

The connection between paternalism at home and the empire was evident in Fabian socialist thought. The empire and domestic conditions were thought to be inextricably intertwined. The empire could not be maintained and defended by a people impoverished and weak, caught in the web of capitalism and private interests, and living in an atmosphere of class strife. Conditions at home, they felt, must be improved. "The paternalism that had for so long been wasted on the colonies abroad must be brought home.\(^2\) They, however, defended the colonies because the commerce with them helped to provide the Englishman with work.\(^3\)

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\(^{2}\) Thornton, *Doctrines*, op. cit., 112.

Likewise, attempts at tariff reform, at the turn of the century, were not a particularly Tory phenomenon. Tariff restrictions, including preferential agreements with the colonies, was also backed by many socialists. The depression of the 1880's brought about dire economic problems for both the middle and the working classes. The industrial competition of Germany and the United States had begun to be felt. Protection, for the Fabian socialists, was a means of protecting the jobs of the working class. For the businessman, it was an attempt to find security in a world of economic instability—a measure of frustration and desperation.\(^1\)

The paternalism of the British, then, lent itself easily to the colonial situation. The traditional ruling class found it hard to accept sharing political power with the lower classes at home. A transferral of this attitude in their dealings with other races thought to be culturally, physically, and intelligently inferior was only natural for a class which had always isolated itself from the "common man."

The extension of paternalism to the imperial situation was justified in many ways at different times. Carlyle was opposed to democratic rule and feared the

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tyranny of the "mob." To him, there was a social hierarchy at whose higher levels were those, who, by station of their birth and breeding, were most fit to govern. In extending this concept to the imperial situation, there was, to Carlyle, a hierarchy of races with some races more fit to govern than others. Rule and obedience were important to this relationship.

"There is no act more moral between men than that of rule and obedience. Woe to him that claims obedience when it is not due; woe to him who refuses it when it is! God's law is in that, I say, however the Parchment law may run; there is a Divine Right or else there is a Diabolical Wrong at the heart of every claim that one man makes upon another."¹

In this paternalism, then, there was a quest for security in the divine sanction of the imposition of rule. In his defense of slavery in the West Indies, in "The Nigger Question,"² Carlyle developed the relationship of the ruled to the ruler further; but here it was in reference to the colonial situation and native races. "Except by Mastership and Servantship," he³ exclaimed, "there is no conceivable deliverance from Tyranny and Slavery."

¹Carlyle, On Heroes, op. cit., 199.
²"The Nigger Question" is one of Carlyle's few writings which pertain specifically to colonial issues. It is probably his best known and most controversial. Bodelsen disputes Carlyle's influence on imperial thought. Carlyle's role, he feels, is often exaggerated, op. cit., 22-23.
Later, he says:

"My friends, it is not good to be without a servant in this world; but without a master, it appears, is still a fataler predicament for some . . . . Hapoy is he who has found his master, I will say; if not a good master, then some supportable approximation to a good one; for the worst, it appears, in some cases, is preferable to none!"

Thus, colonial rule, good or bad, was preferable to none.

James Anthony Froude, a journalist of the mid-Victorian period, a prolific writer on imperial affairs, and close friend of Carlyle, expressed much the same sentiment. The British, he wrote, were a race best suited for colonial rule. It was their duty in history to fulfill this role. In 1888, he explained:

"The sections of men on this globe are unequally gifted. Some are strong and can govern themselves; some are weak and are prey of foreign invaders or internal anarchy; and freedom which all desire, is only attainable by weak nations when they are subject to the rule of others who are at once powerful and just. This was the duty which fell to the Latin race two thousand years ago. In these modern times it has fallen to ours, and in the discharge of it the highest features of the English character have displayed themselves."

With regard to India, he wrote, in England and the West

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1 loc. cit., 367.


3 Faber, op. cit., 92, citing Froude.
In days, that "most Asiatics, do not desire liberty and prosper best when they are led and guided."

Imperial paternalism was expressed in other ways also. Trollope\(^1\) in 1872, viewed colonial rule of the settlement colonies as a sacrifice by the British as, for example, a father's sacrifice for his son. His motives for maintaining the empire were altruistic.

"We are called upon to rule them, the colonies—as far as we do rule them, not for our own glory, but for their own happiness. If we keep them, we should keep them—not because they add prestige to the name of Great Britain, not because they are gems in our diadem, not in order that we may boast that the sun never sets on our dependencies, but because by keeping them we may assist them in developing their own resources. And when we part with them, as with them we shall, let us do so with neither smothered jealousy nor open hostility but with a proud feeling that we are sending a son into the world to take his place among men."

In *The Dual Mandate*,\(^2\) Lugard wrote that Britain had a double role regarding her imperial possessions. On the one hand, England was to maintain a trusteeship towards subject peoples and, on the other, it possessed a mandate of responsibility to the civilized world.

Finlay, the "poet-laureate" of the late Victorian period, based his political philosophy on the concept of

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\(^1\)Davidson, W., *The Idea of Empire*, in British Broadcasting Corporation, op. cit., 326, citing Trollope.

"The Law." The paternalism in Kipling's work, however, needs little explanation. In Song of the English, in 1893, he expressed his attitude toward the proper role of government and justice in British rule.

Keep ye the law—be swift in all obedience  
Clear the land of evil, drive the road and bridge the ford,  
Make ye sure to each his own  
That he reap where he have sown,  
By the peace among our peoples let men know we serve the Lord

Government, in this poem, is seen fulfilling its providing role through public works and the administration of justice, while the condition for government is obedience. Kipling draws a picture of peace, order, justice, and public works combining in the exercise of colonial rule.

Fear of Losing the Empire

The desire for security, then, manifested itself in several ways. It led, in part, to paternalism at home and to an extension of that paternalism to colonial affairs. This desire for and maintenance of security, once

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1Fabér, op. cit., 100.  
2Fabér goes into quite a lot of detail. loc. cit.  
4Fabér, op. cit., 101.
established, was not without its consequences in British foreign relations. The British, for many reasons, had a right to feel secure during the third quarter of the nineteenth century. During the last quarter, however, this security began to be threatened. The British, however, throughout the century, were sensitive about foreign intentions. This was due, partially, because of the threat which was posed by alien ideas and foreign policies during the early Victorian period and partially out of fear of losing their security during the late Victorian period. This general reaction manifested itself as xenophobia. This xenophobia, the fear of an outside threat, went hand in hand with the desire for security.

At the beginning of the Victorian period, the British already possessed extensive colonial holdings. While expansion did take place during the early Victorian period, the main emphasis during this time was not in that direction. The preoccupation of the British regarding imperial matters during this period was with the colonies of settlement. The great majority of British territorial holdings were such settlement colonies. They were settled, for the most part, by Englishmen who had emigrated. Where they settled, these Englishmen set up governmental and societal institutions similar to those they had left in England.

During the early period, these colonies began to stir. They began to demand a greater amount of autonomy with
respect to their own domestic affairs. A push for a separate foreign policy was not as strong. London has a strong desire to preserve the empire in some form—to keep the ties close which bound all Englishmen as members of a gifted race. Therefore, the British most feared a violent break with any of them as had happened with the United States. British efforts, then, were to loosen the reigns of imperial control while still managing to retain some.

It appears that efforts to insure the continuance of the empire by effecting favorable policies toward its constituents was, to some extent, a reaction from fear of losing it. During the tariff reform debates of 1842, for example, Peel and the Colonial Secretary, Stanley, staunchly supported the principles of colonial preference. They feared that the removal of colonial preference would prejudice colonial loyalty and hurt the preservation of the empire. Why, they reasoned, would colonial merchants need to value trade with England? Colonial trade

"employed our shipping, consumed the produce of our manufacturers, and gave encouragement to native and colonial industry . . . . Depriving the colonies of a mutual commercial advantage would be ruinous to the ties of union power and glory relegating England to the ranks of a 'second-rate power.'"^2

^1 Koebner and Schmidt, op. cit., 60.

^2 Ibid., citing 3 Hausard 68, March 1842, 533, 535.
The result would be an upset of stable and secure relationships.

Free trade, however, prevailed. Colonial preferences were removed in 1846, and were followed by the removal of commitments binding settlement colonies to Great Britain. The colonies then turned right around and slapped tariffs on imported British goods. The gradual appeasement of colonial sentiment for self-government did not always work to the advantage of the British.

With the gradual granting of self-rule, however, there was strong sentiment among certain circles in England that self-government implied self-defense. There were others who felt that, due to the world situation, colonial self-defense was not yet a feasible policy. It would threaten colonial existence. Nevertheless, a Select Committee on Colonial Military Expenditures recommended in 1860, that the commitment of troops in the colonies be reduced except for times of war. It was also recommended that the colonies undertake the major part of their self-defense.¹ These recommendations, however, were not to be extensively administered until after Gladstone became prime minister in 1868.

Grey, in 1853, feared, as Peel and Stanley previously, the loss of the colonial empire because it would reduce England’s power.

"I certainly am not prepared to say that the loss of our Colonial Empire must necessarily be fatal to our national greatness and prosperity--still I should regard such an event as a grievous calamity, and as a lowering by many steps the rank of this country among the nations of the world. You . . . will feel no less strongly than myself the desire that the great British Empire may to a long futurity be held together, and preserve its station among the principal Powers of the earth."

An article in Spectator in 1862, once more, saw the loss of power tied to the loss of the empire. The fear though was more pronounced and emotional.

"The colonial system yields us in every part of the globe strong and faithful allies, united to us by a tie which, by singular felicity, gives us at all times and under all circumstances their assistance without, in any corresponding degree, embarrassing our councils . . . with the loss of our colonial empire . . . our politics would be those of a vestry; our projects would cease to be world-wide; our trade would be dwarfed by the thought that nowhere out of England could the Englishman feel secure of the protection of his flag."

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2 Morrell, op. cit., 10 citing Spectator, I (February, 1862).
The Changing World Order and the Renewal of the Empire

Starting in the late 1860's, the threat to British superiority became more acute. Moreover, the threat and reaction to it became more pronounced. This trend continued to the end of the century. It was during these years that the superiority of the British, both militarily and industrially, began to slip away. Changes were beginning to take place in the European balance of power and in England's industrial capacity relative to other countries. Industrial technology began to mature in Germany and the United States. By the end of the century, both countries were out-producing England.

In certain respects, this changing relationship brought about changes in the character of imperialism. If one had to choose a year as a watershed for this change in policy, it might be 1870. The industrial ascendency of other European powers had been a gradual phenomenon. However, the diplomatic and military situation changed rapidly that year. European diplomacy, since 1815, was for the most part, an effort to maintain an international status quo. The unification of Germany in 1871 upset that balance of power. A cognizance of this situation began to be more evident in the political rhetoric and the policy decisions of the British.
The change in the European balance of power put doubts in the minds of the British about their ability to maintain "free-trade." The British had been a free-trading nation since tariff reform in 1846. The years of free-trade had been the apotheosis of Liberal ideology. British commerce depended on the strength of the British Navy. Where British seapower was challenged, British commerce was threatened. England could not allow its commerce to be hurt, so it thought, without dire domestic consequences. "Power," it became the belief after 1870, "increases and power is enhanced in proportion to the extent of territory that a nation exclusively commands." Security at home was to be found in the British presence abroad.

The fear of decline is evident in a pamphlet by W. M. Thorburn, The Great Game. Thorburn was concerned for the future of the empire. He called upon Disraeli, whose policies he admired, to take positive measures to maintain Britain's superior position.

1Thornton, The Imperial Idea, op. cit., xiv.
2loc. cit., 18-19.
4loc. cit., 17.
"Her body will only grow stronger by growing larger. Temporary industrial pre-eminence has been designed only to give a start in the race for empire which he [Disraeli] must finish in reliance on means of another sort. The alternatives before him are a struggling increase to be The Great Power, or a sleepy decrease to be one of the smallest powers. He must look beyond the British seas for sources of new strength . . . England may hope to hold the first place in the world but never by his [Disraeli's] own insular and insulated strength."

The situation in which Great Britain found itself after 1870, has been aptly summarized by Thornton.\(^1\)

"The fall of foreign investments in the 1870's, the intermittent depression of the 1880's, the passing of industrial leadership to the United States and Germany, had made Englishmen conscious . . . that their lead was after all not secure, that a glorious destiny must be worked for, not simply awaited." Even after the Boer War, in an article in Contemporary Review, in 1899, J. L. Walton\(^2\) saw an aggressive policy as the best means to peace.

"Clearly defined views, strong purposes, resolute aims, are the characteristics of the statesmanship which avoids complications and emerges successfully from conflict; while the most fatal path to the calamity of war finds its way down the broad and easy gradient of pusillanimity, timidity, and the nerveless diplomacy of drift."

\(^1\) Thornton, The Imperial Idea, op. cit., 67.

The conditions which led to the increased xenophobia after 1870, had been established earlier in the century. These conditions added to the distrust of other European powers and spurred national sentiment.

The reaction toward these changes in the European situation became more evident after 1870. Disraeli's Crystal Palace Speech in 1872, is an often cited landmark in the reawakening of empire spirit in England. It was more likely a reflection of popular opinion, however, than an attempt to form public opinion. In this speech, the upholding of the empire, for the first time, became an explicit part of the Tory program. "The greatness of England was a duty laid upon her. It was England's role to play a moderating and mediatiorial role in the world's affairs." The Liberals, Disraeli claimed, were leading the country into decadence. Liberal policy was cosmopolitan and continental in outlook; the Tories were national in outlook.

When Disraeli became prime minister in 1874, he undertook an aggressive, nationalist attitude toward the

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1Morrell, op. cit., 40.

2Disraeli, B., Speech at the Banquet of the National Union of Conservative Constitutional Associations, at the Crystal Palace, on June 24, 1872. Weisbad: F. Steiner, 1968, 2.


4Disraeli, op. cit., 2.
maintenance of the empire. His foreign policy became a continuous commitment. "It was in the interest of England to limit herself to a minimum of international engagement to insure the maintenance of peace."¹ In their pursuance of this policy, the British government worked on an assumption of power "which was forever to infuriate Russians, Frenchmen, Germans, and Americans alike: that what England did in a particular situation beyond her own shores was bound to be just and proper. What everyone else was up to was foreign intrigue."²

C. G. Jung,³ the noted psychiatrist, has pointed out that the self-righteous attitude of one country with regards to another, as with England, can have dangerous consequences. If the rival of one country is seen as the repository of all evil, then the guilt and anxiety one represses tends to be projected upon the antagonist. For this reason, it is not uncommon for any means employed by one side to be justified as a consequence of the evil performed by the other party. The pursuit of virtue pushed to extremes, he warns, can be dangerous.

¹Thornton, The Imperial Idea, op. cit., 34.
²Thornton, Doctrines, op. cit., 72.
Schumpeter,\textsuperscript{1} moreover, has characterized this assertive, aggressive self-righteous behavior as constituting the impact of nationalism and satisfies the need for surrender to some high ideal, the need for self-glorification and violent self-assertion.

In summary, the insecurity of the British had basically two aspects. First, up to approximately 1870, it was manifested in a fear of losing the settlement colonies whether it be through the initiative of the colonists themselves or through the initiative of the politicians at home. The second aspect appears, for the most part, after 1870. It is a fear of losing superiority—economic and military—to other European powers which began to challenge Britain's heretofore secure position.

The Illusion of Superiority

Earlier in this chapter, we discussed British paternalism in relation to the protection of colonial peoples. Such sentiment was prevalent in the ideas of the missionaries. Aside from their desire to spread the gospel, they felt a need, somewhat, to atone for the sins of the white men who had preceded them. Those who came earliest to these non-western lands, through misunderstanding and

downright barbarous cruelty, subjected both hostile and friendly peoples to their superior power: spears were no match for gunpowder.

The barbarities were often viewed as heroic. In the 1890's, Goldwin Smith could speak of the conquest of India as

". . . no accident, yet was it marvellous. The native armies enormously outnumbered the British . . . The British soldier had to fight and march in pursuit of a nimble enemy beneath the Indian sun, without the palliatives which he has now. Most Englishmen still know little of the achievements of the heroes."

The acceptance of the realities of those achievements and the atrocities which passed for heroics would probably have not been easy. The atrocities were committed in the name of Christianity but they were definitely not Christianlike. William Howett, writing in 1838, described the rapacity of the so-called civilized Westerners. He observed it as a phenomenon more barbarous than anything these non-western peoples had ever experienced.

Howett's guilt was very real. He felt that the predecessors of the nineteenth century missionaries made it

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3Some might choose to challenge this allegation.
very difficult for those who wanted to spread the gospel.
The missionary had difficulty reconciling the hypocrisy of the white man's religion. Speaking about the European nations, Howett\(^1\) accused that

"On them lies the guilt, the stupendous guilt of having checked the gospel in its career, and brought it to a full stop in its triumphant progress through nations."

Who are the more "civilized," he\(^2\) asks?

"We pride ourselves in our superior knowledge, our superior refinement, our higher virtues, our nobler character. We talk of the heathen, the savage, and the cruel, and the wily tribes that fill the rest of the earth; but how is it that these tribes know us? Chiefly by the very features that we attribute exclusively to them. They know us chiefly by our crimes and our cruelty. It is we who are and must appear to them the savages. What indeed are civilization and Christianity? The refinement and ennoblement of our nature! The habitual feeling and habitual practice of an enlightened justice, of delicacy and decorum, of generosity and affection to our fellow men. There is not one of these qualities that we have not violated forever, and on almost all occasions, towards every single tribe with which we have come in contact. We professed, indeed, to teach Christianity to them; but we had it not to teach, and we have carried them instead, all the curses and the horrors of a demon race."

The claims of moral superiority of the Christian European and the labeling of non-Westerners as savages and barbarians were, in part, due to the European's inadequacy to live up to the expectations of his own

\(^1\)Howett, op. cit., 8.

\(^2\)loc. cit., 7-8.
moral code. If he could not live up to his moral code, then the native should. Cromer explained that imperial power should establish a system to insure that subject people were ruled by a code of Christian morality. The desire to plant British civilization on the four corners of the globe, then, may, in part, have come from an unrealized desire to remake, somewhere else, an ideal that had been perverted by European civilization. "Divine Providence," wrote Thorburn, "seems to have made a special disposal of historic conditions, mental and material, to cultivate in Englishmen those special qualities which justly command the allegiance of inferior races." The English, thought Bright, were "bringing enlightenment to a dark place on the earth." "The basis of imperialatism," wrote Walton, "is race." Carlyle could say to the West Indian Negro that "... you have to be servants to those who are born wiser than you; servants to the Whites, if they are (as what mortal can doubt they are?) born wiser than you." What few Englishmen in the nineteenth century asked themselves was whether indeed they

1Thornton, Doctrines
2Thorburn, op. cit., 66.
3Thornton, Doctrines, op. cit. 39.
4Walton, op. cit., 306.
were wiser and more enlightened or whether it only seemed that way because of the way they perceived things that they did not understand. "Men," Thornton¹ says, "do not allocate a secondary or subordinate place to other men without developing contempt for them. They can justify their dominance only on the assumption that these others are not worthy to share it." The imperial rulers failed to credit the native population with any of the character they felt was becoming only to the white race. The behavior of the natives reinforced these feelings. "The rulers despised the ruled because they lacked character. But the system of government that the rulers imposed was such as to prevent the ruled from expressing any character worth the name. A mutual bewilderment and exasperation thus existed."²

¹Thornton, The Imperial Idea, op. cit., 158.

²loc. cit., 181; Mannoni has offered a psychoanalytic theory regarding this behavior in which he suggests that the European misunderstood the colonial situation. This was, to some extent, because he perceived relationships not as they existed but as he thought they existed. This happened, first, because he did not understand himself; second, because he was unable to make the adjustment between his subjectivity and the real situation; third, because the conditions of the colonial situation were amenable to those traits of his personality. Mannoni, O., Prospero and Caliban: The Psychology of Colonization. New York: Praeger, 1964.
Second Thoughts on Imperial Morality

Whether or not the British acknowledged their previous barbarities or repressed them, there is certain evidence in imperialist thought that would lead one to believe that the imperialist at home was rationalizing because of the misdeeds taking place in the colonies. The "ideal" was that the colonial situation should benefit the native population. It was the inability to live up to the ideal which led many to question the efficacy of the empire in terms of their own moral code.

In his book on Viscount Milner, Crankshaw has observed that:

"Increasingly aware of our own immense hypocrisies and treacheries, caught up by the sense of guilt and harassed by the buffetings of a new, unpracticed imbalanced conscience, we found ourselves unable to condemn the sins of others."

This was bothering Gladstone, when in a speech in Commons, in 1878, he recognized that "the phrase 'British interests' was a pretext for a policy of expansion which knew no bounds." He repudiated the concept of empire which had grown up during Disraeli's administration of the empire as a massive military power centered in

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2Koebner and Schmidt, op. cit., 130.
England. Robert Lowe,\(^1\) in 1876, also tried to come to grips with the reality of the empire. Imperialism, to him, was a policy devoid of moral principles. It was the

"assertion of absolute force over others . . . if we can by our abating somewhat of our extreme right, or even by larger concessions, avert the calamities of war, that is utterly repugnant to Imperialism. But if by the menace of overbearing force we can coerce a weaker state to bow before our will, or if, better still, we can, by a demonstration of actual force attain the same object, or best of all, we can conquer our adversary in open fight, and impose our conditions at the bayonet's point, then as Dryden sings, 'these are imperial arts and are worthy of thee' . . . the triumph of imperialism is most complete when power is most clearly manifested."

By 1900, the Liberals were still complaining that the true purposes of imperialism had been perverted. The aims and deeds of imperialism were too far apart. They claimed, in 1904, that imperialism as it was practiced was "a most bastard order, vulgar in its conception, dangerous in its growth, destructive of the love of liberty, scornful of the just claims of other races, indifferent to bloodshed. It was fatal...to virtue, and could only end in financial ruin, political corruption, decay and death."\(^2\)

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\(^1\)loc. cit., 149, citing Lowe, R., \textit{Fortnightly Review}, XXIV (October 1, 1878), 458-459.

Milner,\(^1\) an imperialist of considerable influence, felt, however, that such ambivalent feelings could not be relieved by dismantling the empire. He "was responsible for his own sins, but not for those of his fathers—which in any case could not be atoned for by the simple and effortless process of undoing their work. One might as well say that the whole world should commit suicide because of original sin."

There were four different ways imperialists reacted to disparities between ideals and deeds.\(^2\) The imperialist might have reconciled such beliefs with Liberal beliefs. The empire was perceived as preparation for independence. It actually gave the colony more freedom and enlightenment. Then, again, the imperialist might have suppressed his scruples in deference to the view that national safety or greatness required the empire and the resulting imperial policies. He might also have reasoned that the principles of equality did not extend to inferior races. Lastly, the imperialist might have abandoned the assumption of Liberalism. This, he usually did with a sense of guilt. The British, then, were able to rationalize their granting of or refusal to grant liberties by a number of means.

\(^1\)Crankshaw, *op. cit.*, 36.

\(^2\)Faber, *op. cit.*, 130.
We have discussed some of the psychological factors present in Victorian England which were amenable to the growth of imperialism and their manifestations in imperialist thought. The insecurity of the changing elites, a traditional desire for order, and paternalism were parts of the domestic character of the makers of imperial policy and those who tried to affect the continuance or growth of the empire. These factors combined with the situation of the world order and perceptions of it tended to influence policies which directly or indirectly aided the growth of empire and justify and perpetuate its existence once established.
CHAPTER III

The Empire and the Social Conditions
of Victorian England

As was pointed out earlier, the body of sociological subtheory will include observations of the environment which affected imperialist thought. It is generally conceded that the environment plays an important role in the way men perceive their social situation and in the way they act. I will survey a few of the observations of the Victorian environment offered by those living at the time. These observations will come from men from various walks of life and various ideological orientations and reflect schools of both pro-empire and anti-empire sentiment.

It is realized that an analysis along these lines has limitations and that a sociological analysis could take many forms. This analysis, however, should lead us to several useful observations. We shall observe how social conditions were perceived and the relation these conditions had to imperialism. The nineteenth century, to say the least, was a dynamic era. The changes which took place were extraordinary in the history of mankind. A comprehensive study of them would be beyond the scope of this chapter even though a more thorough study might yield deeper insights. The problem is one of constructing
this study in such a way that a sufficient survey is presented to satisfactorily integrate observations of the social order with imperial thought and sentiment. The problem is compounded further by the realization that it is still difficult for the social theorist to assert, in any concrete manner, which aspects of the environment affect ideology and how.

Much of what could be construed as sociological analysis has been brushed on in Chapter II and will be explored in later chapters. For example, if we take the previously discussed issue of democracy in relation to the paternalistic tradition in England, we find that it is somewhat influenced by social conditions. The great masses of the uneducated lower classes could not be expected to exercise wise choice in the democratic process. Their participation, therefore, was not desired. Many saw them as being prone to radical and irrational politics in the Jacobin tradition. This sentiment still managed to persist into the mid-nineteenth century.

There were others, however, Cobden and Disraeli among them, who saw the lower classes as being more conservative.¹ These latter observations proved to be more true. After passage of the Reform Bill of 1867, a

significant increase in the working class vote failed to produce any substantial parliamentary leadership or parliamentary representation for the working man who tended to become attached to one of the two major parties.

It is also interesting to note that the average British subject cared little about the empire. He was much more affected by domestic policy and, therefore, tended to take more of an interest in it. Moreover, the great majority of the British had little access to any of the journals and newspapers of the day until the 1890's. It was there that many of the ideological battles surrounding the empire were fought. Interest in the empire tended to be stronger, however, among the wealthier classes.

It is merely conjecture, but it could be possible that earlier participation of the lower classes in politics could have changed the direction which the empire took. Given their predisposition to lower taxes and the cheap loaf of bread, it is possible that the priorities

1 Thornton, Doctrines, op. cit., 90.


3 An interesting essay pursuing this idea is: Schumpeter, op. cit.
of Parliament might have been reordered and that the extravagance of the empire foregone.

While, in this chapter, I will not cover all social comment in England during the nineteenth century, I will portray some of the various ideological positions of the time. Most social commentators had several things in common. They were aware that the nature of society was changing and they all began to feel class consciousness. Where they differed, was in their reaction to their perceptions. They were witnessing the rise of a large urban working class—a new phenomenon in western civilization. None, however, were members of that class. For this reason, some were sympathetic to the plight of the worker while others were not. Some felt that the misery they saw was a necessary part of society—a stage in the organic process. Others saw, in the misery, the seeds of societal instability for which the remedy, to some, was force; to others, reform. Others, still, saw the misery of industrialism as unnecessary and advocated change. All in all, the belief of these critics was in progress toward a better age; their disagreement arose over the means to achieve it.

Tracing the beginnings of the influence of the social conditions in Victorian England upon imperial thought is a near impossible task. For the antecedents of the British case, though, one might start with the early
classical economists\textsuperscript{1} or with Burke's writings on colonial affairs. It is more worth our while, however, to look directly at the Victorian period.

The Liberals were one school which drew connections between the condition of England and the colonies. Important to their conception of these phenomena was their idea of freedom. They recognized only political freedom. Freedom, then, was a function of the degree to which the government was absent from the affairs of individuals. The socialists, however, drew a distinction between political freedom and other freedoms such as economic freedom, the concept of which presumed governmental interference in economic matters in order to affect a more equitable distribution of property. But, even within the Liberal school, there were different degrees to which the maxims of political freedom were applied. At one point, you might find Herbert Spencer, and at another, Richard Cobden.

Spencer's attitude on social reform was extreme. Efforts to better social conditions were merely expedient and violated the laws of nature. Man's part in the world, he\textsuperscript{2} wrote,

\textsuperscript{1} supra, Chapter V.

\textsuperscript{2} Spencer, H., \textit{Social Statics}. London: Williams and Norgate, 1868, 64.
"is to conform to the Laws of the Whole and in devout silence follow that not questioning it, obeying it as questionable..."

"...to think we can better ourselves by deserting the road marked out for us, is an impious assumption of more than divine omniscience."1

There were, however, a great number of Liberals represented by Cobden, Bright, and others whose attitudes toward social reform were more moderate if not still radical. They were based on Liberal ideology which somewhat influenced their imperial attitude. They became entwined in the discussion of colonial affairs and in the arguments of both the nature and the efficacy of the empire. The economic attitude of these Liberals was very cost conscious. Whether it regarded domestic or foreign affairs, the expenditure of money was something to be carefully scrutinized. Their attitudes toward political reform were even tainted with economic considerations, for political reform, they felt, would be useless without financial reform and an end to Britain's regressive tax system.2

The colonies, then, were viewed on a cost-benefit basis. The Liberals found that the possession of a colonial empire which did not pay for itself was an unjusti-

1loc. cit., 65.

2Read, op. cit., 152
fiable extravagance. They were anti-militaristic for the same reason. The colonial empire merely necessitated a greater expenditure for the military establishment. The larger the empire, the greater would be the military expenditure.

The spending of money on such matters, moreover, was a detriment to the condition of the working men whose problem, they felt, could be ameliorated by keeping taxes low and the price of bread cheap. The maintenance of colonies and a large military establishment put an unnecessary tax burden on the working man. Moreover, the Corn Laws and Navigation Acts unnecessarily raised the prices of the imported goods which they had to buy. It is no surprise, then, that the early Victorian Liberals were free-traders opposed to tariffs on grains and the creation of artificial monopolies which excluded competition and drove prices up.

The colonies could not be justified as being economically feasible if trade with them was monopolized. On the other hand, if trade with the colonies was to be free, the need to retain colonies for the supposed advantages of monopoly was no longer a valid argument. The colonies without preferential trade were no more advantageous commercially than trade with any other country. Therefore, the expenditure of money for the purpose of retaining them as colonies posed itself as more of a financial
liability than asset.

Moreover, once the colonies were given the power to govern their own trade, some, such as Canada, put tariffs on British goods. This ironical situation was decried by J. E. Cairnes,\(^1\) who in 1864, said:

"We have abandoned all the objects for the sake of which our Colonial Empire was founded. We are unable to impress our will upon our colonies in any particular... wholly irrespective of our wishes, they enter into alliances, unite and separate, dispose of their lands, recast their constitutions and even combine for the avowed purpose of thwarting our designs. When things have reached this pass, it seems rather idle to ask--Are we to retain the colonies? Retain our colonies? What is there left to retain? Retain the privilege of spending nearly $4,500,000 sterling on their protection and receive in requital prohibitive tariffs and ironical allegiance."

At this point, it should be pointed out that all Liberal opinion was not adverse to the retention or expansion of empire. Mill,\(^2\) for example, while realizing the financial liability of the colonies, defended their retention on the more emotional grounds that the British provided moral leadership for a good part of the world and fostered peace and cooperation. Moreover, some of the Liberals at the end of the century were imperialists.


\(^2\)loc. cit., 155-156.
One need only look at some of the rhetoric of Joseph Chamberlain to ascertain the importance some viewed the imperial connection for the condition of England. If Britain were to lose her leading imperial role, he warned, in 1903, the working man would be the first to suffer from the chronic economic "distress" which would be caused. For, England was unable to support her population without her foreign trade. The imperialists were "carving out new dominions for Britain, and are opening fresh markets for British commerce and laying out fresh fields for British labor." It need not be said that the ideals of the Liberals had undergone a change. There were even some Liberals in Chamberlain's time who supported preferential tariffs. The jingoists of the Liberal Party who rallied to Chamberlain's cause are more reflective of Fabian thought than the majority of the Liberals of the day. Free-trade, after all, had become so ingrained as a public policy that it was to remain so until 1939.

While the Fabians were socialists, they were not necessarily representative of the mainstream of socialist thought. While European socialism was working for an international unity among the workers of the world, the Fabians were strongly nationalistic and were, more accurately, predecessors of the right-wing socialist movements.

\[1\text{Snyder, op. cit., 126.}\]
of the 1920's and '30's than of the left-wing with which we usually identify socialism. Although they opposed the capitalist system, they felt the need to export capital, which they saw to be an integral part of that system, helped the working class by providing work. Therefore, they were not hostile toward the export of capital. Their main interest was with the working man in England and not so much with the benefit of some colonial population. The empire, then, was a means of improving social conditions in England.\(^1\) This was patriotic since the strength of the nation, as did the strength of the empire, depended on the strength of the people.

Marx, however, was a socialist of a quite different order. Even though Marx's thought was not distinctively British, he is important to the discussion of social conditions in England. Britain represented the industrial society at its highest development to that time. It was this stage of industrial society that brought out Marx's scathing analysis and vehement criticism. Moreover, the force of his work, greatly unrealized in his own time, was to become powerful in Europe and England by the end of the nineteenth century and it would shape the course of political thought and sociology in the twentieth.

\(^1\)Semmel, \textit{op. cit.}, Chapter V.
Although he was an under-consumptionist, Marx did little to link under-consumption to the rise of empire. That was left to those who followed him.¹ Where Marx talked about the empire, it was often an analysis in developmental terms which had little connection to the condition of England. The interest he had in colonial affairs was the role empire played as a catalyst in the working of the dialectic on a world-wide scale. The exportation of bourgeois society led to a uniformity of culture after the image of England.² Although vehemently adverse to that type of system, the creation of it was a necessary evil. While Marx condemned bourgeois society and the phenomena which led to over-population and the export of surplus, he could defend the attempt to create similar societies. Even despite his humanism, it is also ironical that in order for man to be free, he had to experience the pain of urban industrial society. The conditions in England, then, as deplorable as Marx believed them to be, were justifiable in terms of bringing about the world socialist revolution.

The connection between the colonial empire and the conditions in England is more evident in the writings of

¹For example: J. A. Hobson and Lenin.

men like Wakefield, one of the most influential and important early Victorian writers on imperial affairs.

As an economist, he wrote much about the relation between land, labor, capital, and production. One of the reasons for colonization, he believed, was economic. As an under-consumptionist, he saw the colonies as an outlet for over-production. Thus, the colonies and the home country were tied through the need for economic cooperation.

The presence of under-consumption could aid in the amelioration of social conditions in England.

"The objects of an old society in promoting colonization seem to be three: first, the extension of the market for disposing of their surplus produce; secondly, relief from excessive numbers; thirdly, an enlargement of the field for employing capital . . . These three objects come under one head; namely, the enlargement of the field for employing capital and labor."  

His conclusions were drawn from observations of overcrowding in the cities, unemployment, idle capital, and class polarization. These threatened societal stability and he warned that

"for a country like England in which the ruling and subject orders are no longer separated by a middle class, and in which the subject order, composing the bulk of

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2loc. cit., 518.
the people, are in a state of gloomy discontent arising from excessive numbers; that for such a country, one chief end of colonization is to prevent tumults, to keep the peace, to maintain order, to uphold confidence in the security of property, to hinder interruptions of the regular course of industry and trade, to avert the terrible evils which, in a country like England, could not but follow any serious political convulsion."

Wakefield's fears were greatly unwarranted. They do, however, reflect the opinions of many of his own class which, among other things, were probably unduly influenced by Malthusian economics. I think it is safe to say that Cobden and Disraeli better understood the working class.

Wakefield supported planned emigration to relieve population problems at home and supply employment for the indigent. The availability of labor would attract capital and vice versa.¹ Moreover, the reduction in the number of poor at home would lead to a reduction in the poor rate, thus, benefiting those employed. Transportation of convicts was another method of ridding England of detrimental elements.

The connection of empire and the condition of England was also discussed by literary figures of this era. Overpopulation and the "condition of England question" were

also concerns of Carlyle. In Chartism he contrasted the over-populated regions of western Europe with the empty lands around the world which called out to England to "come and till me, come and reap me!" George Cornwall Lewis also pointed to the advantages a dependency could bring to the "dominant" country by offering employment opportunities for labor and capital and an outlet for emigration. He, however, observed that the possession of dependencies tended to lower the standards of political morality in the dominant country. This arose from the official patronage the possession of dependencies generated.

Dickens, a powerful critic of industrial England, while hostile towards Radical reformers, agreed with them that the costs of maintaining an empire was not worth the benefit derived from it. The money spent for reform in the colonies, he felt, should be spent on reform at home. In Bleak House, he wrote that "the work at home must be

1For a discussion of Carlyle and emigration, see: Bodelsen, op. cit., 22-32.

2Bodelsen, op. cit., 27, citing Carlyle, T., Chartism. Everyman's Library, 1839, Chapter X.

3Lewis, op. cit., 136-137.

4loc. cit., 150.

completed thoroughly, or there is no hope abroad." The "circle of enlightenment," he continued, was like concentric circles formed in water and emanating from the inside (England) outward and not from the outside (the colonies) inward. Asians and Africans, he thought, were inferior. Thus, if they were not potential equals or superior to the British, it seemed a crime to consider their welfare before that of the Englishman who could derive more benefits from reform.

Froude and Hobson represent two different journalistic views of the link between Victorian social conditions and the empire. Froude was one of the most prolific critics of the Radical stand against imperialism. He particularly emphasized the relation between the colonial question and the social condition of England. In the evils of industrialism, he saw a threat to societal stability which could bring about the lowering of England's position in the world. Moreover, these conditions were leading to the deterioration of the morality of the working man and the degeneration of the race. He advocated a social regeneration through a planned system of emigra-

1 loc. cit., 91.
2Thornton, The Imperial Idea, op. cit., 22.
tion of paupers and undesirable characters. In this respect, he saw emigration as a patriotic duty for the maintenance of the good qualities of the race.¹ Without calling the Liberals unpatriotic, he scored them on their opposition to emigration. The Liberals were against state aided emigration because, as Froude felt, this interfered with the market system which benefited the rich.² The overcrowding in England, he observed, benefited only the wealthy classes who were able to procure cheaper labor and charge higher rents. In a revival of imperialism, he foresaw the destruction of Liberalism. Democracy and imperialism were simply incompatible.³ Froude's reaction against the Liberal imperial policies and the connection of social reform with the colonial question are his main contributions to imperialist thought.⁴

Among the later critics to connect domestic conditions with imperialism was J. A. Hobson,⁵ a journalist concerned with the economics of empire. Imperialism, he

¹Bodelsen, op. cit., 198.
²Froude, op. cit., 279.
³Bodelsen, op. cit., 201.
⁴loc. cit., 204.
felt, grew out of certain economic conditions which were part of the capitalist economy in England.\(^1\) In order to end imperialism, one did not have to destroy the capitalist system as many socialists believed. One only had to remove those faults in the system which caused imperialism. These he identified as the excesses and abuses of production.

The nature of these excesses and abuses was to be found in Hobson’s theory of surplus value,\(^2\) which differed from that of Marx. Where Marx felt that surplus value was an exclusive product of labor, Hobson observed that surplus value arose from the existence of inequality in the bargaining power of land and capital. Some classes and groups held a superior position. This caused what he called “forced gains.”\(^3\) It was the forced gains which lay at the root of the economic evils causing imperialism. Forced gains were an exploitation of the weaker members of society by those who were economically more powerful.

It was the financial interests which sought forced gains and fueled the patriotic forces of imperialism. These forces were generated by politicians, soldiers,

\(^1\)Economic motives were only part of the picture. There were also political, military, philanthropical, etc., motives. Winslow, op. cit., 94.

\(^2\)loc. cit., 95.

\(^3\)loc. cit., 97.
philanthropists, and traders.¹ In this sense, he viewed imperialism as an atavism. He came to the conclusion that imperialism could pay only if it benefited certain groups at the expense of others. If the forced gains of financial interests were eliminated, the fuel for patriotic endeavors would disappear.

Hobson, moreover, revealed what he thought to be a fallacy in the economic thinking of his time. Many felt that industrial progress depended on the expansion of markets. Hobson saw that this was not the problem. Progress could be maintained by better utilization of those that already existed. The remedy lay in the distribution of purchasing power in a way that demand could absorb supply.² This also meant the elimination of forced gains.

Viscount Milner, a long-time public servant in the Colonial Service, reflects a different view—one which would be more representative of the colonial establishment itself. He³ wrote on imperial matters about the same time as Hobson, but was more disposed toward the "virtues" of the empire and viewed the imperial connection with social conditions differently. On the one hand, Milner called

¹loc. cit., 98.
²loc. cit., 99.
³Milner, op. cit., xxxiii.
for a separation of policy regarding domestic and imperial matters. Imperial policy should not be subordinated to local politics. The problems were different and required different policies. Moreover, imperial politics should be free from party politics. Party struggle only worked to the detriment of the empire. In this respect, he reflected the philosophy of the Colonial Service of which he was, to a great extent, a product.

On the other hand, he felt that the health of the heart of the empire, Great Britain, should be an important as that of the empire. The greatness and power of a nation ultimately depended on the welfare and contentedness of the masses. Social reform at home was admirable, but not at the cost of national strength. He still felt strongly that

"The greatest danger that I foresee is that the ideas of national strength and imperial consolidation on the one hand, and of domestic reform and social reform on the other, should become dissevered and that people should come to regard as antagonistic objects which are essentially related and complimentary to each other."

The connection between the social conditions in England and the empire had two sides. Both were functions

\[1\text{loc. cit.}, \text{"Introduction."}\]
\[2\text{loc. cit.}, \text{"Imperialist Creed" and "Imperialism and Social Reform."}\]
\[3\text{loc. cit.}, \text{249-250}.\]
of the same principle—the strength of Great Britain. Some, as we have seen, believed that the possession of the empire benefited England economically and socially by offering a safety value for the relief of domestic pressures. This was visualized in the form of useful employment of capital, the creation and maintenance of jobs, the supply of vital resources, the relief of excessive population. The empire, it was believed by these people, made social reform possible.

There were also those who regarded the empire as a hinderance to the amelioration of social conditions at home. The empire, it was felt, drained England of her resources which could be better used at home. It was reasoned that a vast world empire was an extravagance which could not be afforded while social conditions in England needed improvement. The empire was a diversion of human, economic, and material resources which could be put to better use by other means.

What seems to be evident in most of the thought of these men is that the link between the social conditions of Victorian England and the empire is indirect. Whether the link was used to justify or deprecate the possession or expansion of empire, the reasoning tended to play down direct causes and dwell on peripheral circumstances which may or may not have had a bearing on the actual growth of empire but which were, nevertheless, used to explain it.
CHAPTER IV

VICTORIAN VALUES AND THE EMPIRE

Where does one start to trace the values of any cultural system? The roots of such values penetrate deep into the historical past of those we study. For this reason, our discussion of Victorian values can in no way be comprehensive. I will trace certain components of that value system which affected attitudes and policies during the period of this study. What makes this task more difficult is that the Victorian period was one of transition. The changes in the social system were perpetrating changes in values. The extremely individualistic values of the earlier period passed and evolved into a more collectivistic system during the later period.

In this chapter, we will be discussing two schools of thought—utilitarianism and idealism—whose premises were somewhat different. It should be realized that these two were by no means the only two philosophical schools in nineteenth century England which could directly or indirectly be connected to imperialism. They were chosen to illustrate how some philosophical positions might be viewed in relation to empire. They were not necessarily examples of thought on the empire. The principles which they represented, however, were manifested in various
ways in not only the thought about the empire but also the administration of the empire.

Utilitarianism and the Empire

Utilitarianism is a philosophy which had its origins in extreme rationalism. It was grounded on the belief that man could and did act rationally to achieve desirable ends. The measure of desirability was the maximization of pleasure and the minimization of pain. The good society was one in which pleasure was maximized. The collective good was the aggregate of individual pleasures.

The utilitarians constructed a complicated calculus to measure these values. Their writings are prolific and comprehensive on the social issues of their day. They include numerous prescriptions for the maximization of utility in an exhausting number of socially related areas. They tended to be almost overly programatic in their advocacy of reform for the achievement of their values.

The colonies became the testing ground for utilitarian aims. Many utilitarians and many influenced by them believed, for the most part, that human nature was the same everywhere.¹ The evident optimism they showed

¹See the account of James Mill in Winch, op. cit., 160.
in the ability to raise the scale of civilization of backward peoples has its roots in this assumption. The vast administrative network constructed in India was one of its products.¹ The vast amount of public works, the revision of the criminal codes, and the establishment of institutions of justice were measures designed to increase the stability of Indian society and raise the level of its culture. British paternalism was also present in claims that utility derived from British rule surpassed what India would experience at the hands of some other power. The loss of India would leave it prey to either the tyranny of some barbarian ruler or else some other less beneficial European power.²

Many of the British reforms were disastrous in their implementation and gave them more trouble than they had anticipated. These "tests" in India provided the empirical verification of the disutility of England's

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²This enlightened despotism, even to Mill, was the only satisfactory means of governance until the population was able to handle representative government. "This mode of government is as legitimate as any other if it is the one which in the existing state of civilization of the subject people most facilitates their transition to a higher stage of improvement . . . under a native despotism, a good despot is a rare and transitory accident, but when the dominion they are under is that of a more civilized people it ought to be able to supply it constantly." Mill, Representative Government, cited in Winch, op. cit., 163.
handling of alien races. The attempt of the British to break up the old communal way of living under which India had existed for centuries and replace it with a semi-feudal system and the establishment of the landlord-tenant basis of property as in Ireland met with little success. The rulers in India failed to heed the warnings which preceded even Burke about the effects of making dramatic changes in the social structure of any civilization and the dysfunction which would arise at the imposition of one culture on another. The British, however, felt themselves to be the new Romans leaving a legacy of British justice which would be felt for centuries to come. Even Marx\(^1\) condoned this utilitarian, as opposed to the mercantile, type of imperialism. The British, he\(^2\) claimed, were unknowingly carrying out the first revolution on the Asian continent and it was right, in terms of the dialectic, that it take place regardless of the "bitterness" it entailed.

While the evangelical spirit played an important part in the motivation of the missionaries, the utilitarian calculus could be figured into their work. In the early Victorian period, the missionaries pressed for the suppression of the slave trade. During the late Victorian

\(^1\)Marx, op. cit., 83-87.
\(^2\)loc. cit., 89.
period, the missionaries contributed little to the expansion of the empire. Where they did become a force for expansion, they were more concerned, however, with the protection of uncivilized peoples than with proselytization.\(^1\) "Cromer's principle" for ruling colonial populations was also a reflection of the desire to bring benefit to the colonies. Cromer\(^2\) felt that the colonial government should rule in the interest of the colonial peoples and respect their interests. The colonizers, on the other hand, should only expect a "cosmopolitan allegiance" from them. The main justification for imperialism was the use that was made of imperial power. Goldwin Smith\(^3\) expressed similar thoughts.

"The religion of the Englishman was political. If he persecuted Papists or Dissenters, it was on political grounds. He was willing, like the Roman, to respect the religion or superstitions of other races so long as they did not rebel against his rule."

Milner\(^4\) thought that imperialism gave more than it took away with regards to the character, language, and traditions of the alien races. Kipling,\(^5\) writing in *Spectator*,

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\(^1\)Faber, *op. cit.*, 61.

\(^2\)Thornton, *Doctrines*, *op. cit.*, 211-212.

\(^3\)ibid.

\(^4\)Koebner and Schmidt, *op. cit.*, 218.

\(^5\)loc. cit., 104-105.
in 1899, also saw imperial rule as bringing about changes necessary for the benefit of the colonized. The white man conquered and controlled the dark peoples of the world in order to bring them the benefits of civilization.

Within all this talk of imperial altruism, there was an inability among many imperialists to look deeper at their motives. They tended to rationalize their selfish interests and hide their guilt in rhetoric which was acceptable to their moral code. The economic motives of imperialism were often repressed. "The devotees of the cause of commercial empire [circa. 1890]," states Thornton,¹ "sought to convince people that they . . . did not seek to live by bread, stocks and cotton, or gold-mine dividends alone, but wished to use whatever profits their skill brought them to fulfill a beneficent, a civilising mission in the world."

The Crown Colonies were not the only colonial testing ground for utilitarian ideas. The settlement colonies were also a target for a variety of schemes which were aimed at instituting a new liberal order to replace the old mercantilist colonial policies. Many wanted to change these settlements from military outposts, convict settlements, and trade monopolies into examples of wise and just government based on representative institutions and

¹Thornton, Doctrines, op. cit., 34.
as showplaces of utilitarian achievement. We have already discussed the schemes of Wakefield.\textsuperscript{1} During the 1830's and 1840's, however, there were a large number of colonial reformers.\textsuperscript{2} These reformers desired to make little Englands around the world based on a middle class model of society. They, therefore, went into great detail in their schemes to outline the exact and proper manner of colonization. In this way, they hoped to maintain a balance between population and resources which would yield the greatest benefit. This, in several cases, entailed comprehensive plans of settlement and popular representation to insure not only the presence of a substantial number of the middle class in the colonies but that the middle class, in the paternal tradition, would prevail in the process of government. Wakefield, to insure the implementation of these principles, even went so far as to suggest that each colony should have at least one political economist. The colonies were not merely to be great agricultural estates designed to feed Great Britain. They were to be the repositories of British civilization which would be passed on to future generations. The absence of a viable middle class, the reformers felt, would result

\textsuperscript{1}Infra, Chapter III.

\textsuperscript{2}Some of the more prominent were Charles Buller, Sir William Molesworth, and J. A. Roebuck.
in a lapse into barbarism by the lower classes in the colonies due to a lack of culture. The reformers viewed a "total" colonial culture based on Liberal principles. Wakefield\(^1\) asserted that:

"Political economy is not, as it has been termed by a modern poet and novelist of reputation, a 'material' science. It is a science which relates to the intellectual and moral conditions of nations, as well as to their physical enjoyments; to philosophy in general, as well as of manufactures, to the character of men and of governments, as well as to objects of a purely material kind."

The reformers, then, did not see the achievement of utilitarian aims in the colonies solely in terms of commercial advantage. There were, among their ideas, a strong sense of mission of achieving significant reform in distant parts of the globe. And, where it was deemed desirable, they encouraged self-reliance.\(^2\) A Parliamentary report of 1835\(^3\) asserted that it was the government's duty to help all schemes of colonization. It was evident to its authors that Providence had blessed the British Empire with advantages to be used "for some higher purpose than commercial prosperity and military

\(^{1}\)Winch, op. cit., 152, citing Wakefield.  
\(^{2}\)Koebner and Schmidt, op. cit., 61.  
\(^{3}\)Thornton, The Imperial Idea, op. cit., 37.
renown." Gladstone, in 1878, claimed also that imperial
ties should yield more than merely "food for powder," for
the connection went deeper than material concerns.

The utilitarian influence on imperialist thought was
not limited to the earlier Victorian period. Carnarvon, after breaking with Disraeli in 1878, accused Disraeli of
ignoring the true aims of imperialism which were, among
other things, a service of keeping peace between hostile
tribes, developing backward countries, and relieving
famine. Kipling, in 1901, in The Reformers, kept alive
the idea of the imperial reformer selflessly working to
achieve the utilitarian (although he would probably not
put it in those terms) ideal.

With great things charged he shall not hold
Aloof till great occasion rise,
But serve, full harnessed, as of old,
The Days that are the Destinies.

He shall forswear and put away
The idols of his sheltered house;
And to necessity shall pay
Unflinching tribute of his vows.

He shall not plead another's act,
Nor bind him in another's oath
To weigh the Word above the Fact,
Or make or take excuse for sloth.

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1 Gladstone, W., "England's Mission," Nineteenth
Century. September 4, 1878, 572.

2 Koebner and Schmidt, op. cit., 154.

The yoke he bore shall press him still,
And long-ingrained effort goad
To find, to fashion, and fulfill
The cleaner life, the sterner code.

From Mission to Duty

The idea of the mission of Empire, Thornton\(^1\) points out, had a longer history than political imperialism. It not only preceded political imperialism as a powerful emotion but was to remain a powerful idea long after the political program had died. The Radicals who reduced the empire to the level of self-interest and who assumed no other motives were not only inaccurate in their analysis but offensive to those who saw more in the cause of the empire.

The sense of mission gave the British a sense of duty which was an integral part of the imperial value system. We have seen that the active promotion of utilitarian ends led to the idea of mission. While not its only manifestation, this utilitarian mission became a duty; there was also a more sentimental basis of the sense of duty. This latter basis was less rational and more emotional and was most prevalent during the late Victorian period among the aristocratic and military supporters of the empire. Upon witnessing the severing

\(^1\)Thornton, *The Imperial Idea*, op. cit., x, 38.
of ties with many of the settlement colonies and finding it increasingly more difficult to justify the hypocrisies in the Crown Colonies in utilitarian terms, they turned to other means.

The duty of the British to maintain their empire was part of the White Man's Burden. The burden of empire the British had undertaken could not easily be put down. The trusteeship and protection of such a large segment of the world's population could not be relinquished, it was felt, without dire consequences for the colonies themselves in terms of external threats and internal dysfunction but also of what other world powers would think of British power. The mission was to spread British civilization but the duty was to insure the safety of its accomplishments. Abandonment of the colonies meant betrayal of and dereliction of the duty to fulfill the mission. It was not exactly clear, however, to whom this duty was due. There were the more practical forms of duty such as duty to the colonial inhabitants, and there were more sentimental forms of duty such as duty to the founders of the empire and duty to future generations. There was a duty placed on England due to its high state of civilization and technology; and there was a duty placed on England by Providence.

The more utilitarian ideas of duty rested on the practical accomplishments of the empire and the good that
was being done around the world. It was the duty of the British to insure the maintenance of and increase utility in the colonies. It was through British civilization that the greatest good could come about. The civilization in India and the Crown Colonies had not yet reached a stage where they might be able to make the conscious decisions deemed necessary to maximize utility. It was in their interest, then, that the British should undertake the duty of making those decisions. "Only the noble," Carlyle\(^1\) said, "lift unwittingly their whole strength at the general burden."

We have already seen how the utilitarians viewed their mission and duty. By the last third of the century, however, utilitarian values had subtly become an integral part of the cultural system. There are many whom we do not identify as utilitarians yet who consciously or unconsciously used such ideas in their appeals to the duty of the people.\(^2\)

Carlyle\(^3\) wrote of the two tasks of the English people in this "English People in World History:"

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\(^1\)Carlyle, "Nigger Question," op. cit., 359.

\(^2\)This does not mean that there was necessarily a causal relationship between utilitarian values and such appeals. It is merely a recognition of certain elements within them which bore a similarity to utilitarian thought on the subject. Those who used utilitarian values in this manner were, no doubt, subject to many other influences.

\(^3\)Cited in Bodelsen, op. cit., 28.
"... the grand industrial task of conquering some half or more of this terraqueous planet for the use of man; then secondly, the grand Constitutional task of sharing in some pacific endurable manner, the fruit of said conquest, and showing all people how it might be done."

This was not much different than Thorburn\(^1\) who viewed it:

"The duty of Britain to take a large part of the outer world under her management . . . the more she has the more good she will be able to do."

Many Radicals questioned the advantages of such a policy. To many, however, the question of duty outweighed questions of advantage. Earl Grey\(^2\) remarked that

"by the acquisition of its colonial dominions, the Nation has incurred a responsibility of the highest kind, which it is not at liberty to throw off. The authority of the British Crown is at this moment the most powerful instrument, under Providence, of the earth, and thereby assists in diffusing amongst millions of the human race, the blessings of Christianity and civilization. Supposing it were clear (which I am far from admitting) that a reduction of our national expenditure (otherwise impracticable), to the extent of a few hundred thousand a year, could be effected by withdrawing our authority and protection from our numerous Colonies, should we be satisfied, for the sake of such a saving, in taking this step, and thus abandoning the duty which seems to have been cast upon us."

In England in Egypt, Milner\(^3\) stated that British involvement in that country was to help the Egyptians help them-

\(^1\)Thorburn, op. cit., 64-65.


\(^3\)Crankshaw, op. cit., 29.
selves. British influence was "a force making for the triumph of the simplest ideas of honesty, humanity, and justice . . . ." Chamberlain,\(^1\) in 1897, felt "that our rule over these territories can only be justified if we can show that it adds to the happiness and prosperity of the people." It was Britain's "manifest destiny," he thought, to be a great colonizing and civilizing power and he did not understand the measurement of duty in material terms.\(^2\)

Grey,\(^3\) however, argued that there was utility in the material benefits to be derived from the assumption of imperial duty. Britain's retirement from the empire would mean the destruction "of lucrative branches of commerce" on which it was dependent. Moreover, there was a

"duty which I conceive to be no less obligatory upon nations than upon individuals, of using the power and advantages entrusted to them by Providence to advance the welfare of mankind . . . ."

If the road leading away from imperial connection was often viewed as rough, the road which led to empire was not easy either. The ultimate end, asserted Thorburn,\(^4\)

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\(^1\) Koebner and Schmidt, op. cit., 210, citing Speech at the Royal Colonial Institute, March 31, 1897.  
\(^2\) Thornton, *The Imperial Idea*, op. cit., 83.  
\(^3\) Knorr, op. cit., 369.  
\(^4\) Thorburn, op. cit., 65.
however, was worth any price which had to be paid.

"To squander the energies of an imperial people in petty local work would be an unpardonable outrage on the divine order of nature. Lives sacrificed to duty are not lived in vain. They cannot be better spent than in leading the forlorn hoes of humanity, in reclaiming savage men and dangerous lands, in sowing broadcast the seeds of good, and watering them, even though it be with English blood . . . On some men must lie the duty of developing the greatest happiness of the greatest number."

Chamberlain\(^1\) also viewed the means to the Pax Britannica and its blessing of happiness as secondary to the manner in which it was obtained.

"... whatever may be the destruction of life in an expedition which brings about this result, it will be nothing if weighed in the balance against the annual loss of life which goes on so long as we keep away."

Kipling,\(^2\) in Kitchener's School, described the contrast of ends and means thus:

They do not consider the Meaning of Things; they consult not creed nor clan
Behold they slap the slave on the back, and behold he ariseth a man!
They terribly carpet the earth with dead, and before their cannon cool,
They walk unarmed by twos and threes to call the living to school.

\(^1\)Koebner and Schmidt, op. cit., 210, citing a quotation from Powell, E., The Downfall of Prempeh, 18, 19.

\(^2\)Kipling, op. cit., 114-115.
The sacrifice of blood for the good of the world became sentimental almost to the extent of a religious faith. Curzon described Rosebery's\(^1\) attitude "the faith of a nation." The empire had become to him

"The dominant passion of my public life . . . a cause for which anyone might be content to live; it is a cause for which, if needs be, anyone might be content to die."

The evangelical manner, as it had become in many instances, for Britain "to continue to fulfill its distinctive mission in the world" was aptly described by Milner. Imperialism, he\(^2\) stated, in 1913, "has all the depth and comprehensiveness of a religious faith. Its significance is moral even more than material." It might be interpreted that the wars of conquest had become the "holy wars" of the imperial creed. While economic motives were strong, the emotional fervor attached to imperialism by the end of the century had become powerful in the movement of colonial expansion.

Walton,\(^3\) in 1899, described imperialism as a complex formula which had both practical and sentimental components. The imperialist was emotionally attached to the empire by the heritage which had been won by his ancestors.

\(^{1}\)Faber, op. cit., 69.

\(^{2}\)Milner, op. cit., xxxii.

\(^{3}\)Walton, op. cit., 306.
There was a conviction that the discharge of imperial duties had an educational and moral influence on the British people; and that British rule extended "just law, tolerant trade, considerate government." There was a determination to accept the burden which had been put in their hands. Finally, there was the creed that the strength of the British race was equal to the weight of the obligation it undertook.

The imperialist's duty, it should be made clear, did not change. The emphasis placed on that duty changed from a more rational one to a more emotional one. Earlier examples of the imperial obligation and its relation to duty were not, however, devoid of emotional content. The use of such an emotional strategy was not practical with respect to the conditions at the time: Britain was relatively secure both domestically and internationally. During the later period, however, the situation was more amenable to emotional appeals. Britain's world position was slipping and there was a greater sense of urgency.

The Rise of Nationalism and Imperial Patriotism

In Chapter II, we observed some of the reasons for the aggressiveness of imperialism in the late Victorian period. The international conditions of the time made the British defensive almost to the point of being of-
fensive. There was a growing enmity which was exploited to provide the basis for a greater amity in England. Psychologists tell us that an outside threat to a group produces greater internal cohesion within the group. The roots of late nineteenth century English nationalism, to some extent, lie in these causes. Moreover, the increasing difficulty the British experienced in fulfilling their mission in the world became harder to reconcile as the emotion attached to that mission became stronger.

It was during the late Victorian period, then, that an extensive emphasis was put on enlisting support for the empire at home and throughout the settlement colonies—past and present. Appeals were made not only on the basis of the practicality of the mutual advantage to be derived from the closer connection between all countries of Anglo-Saxon origin, or on the value of congenial relations, but also on the necessity of maintaining the position and purpose of the race in world history.

It was during this period that there was a reaction against Liberalism. This fashioned itself philosophically in the neo-idealistic school which had its foundations in Kant, Hegel, Burke, and Hume. The resurgence of idealism, led by T. H. Green,¹ was coexistent and amenable to the

rise in national and patriotic sentiment. It should be pointed out, however, that Green is not the best example of this phenomenon. If anything, he was hostile to militarism and patriotic display. Bradley and Bosanquet who followed him are better examples.

What Green propagated was, to some extent, an accommodation of Methodist values to the social order. By the time he was writing, these values had become ingrained in the Victorian middle classes whose main concerns were with earning money and achieving personal salvation. This attitude coupled with the crisis of faith fostered by science and extreme rationalism aided the acceptance of philosophical idealism by the middle classes and intellectual community which in England had traditionally been antagonistic toward metaphysics. Idealism, then, served as a surrogate faith. It was acceptable to many who were ambivalent toward religion. Idealism lay somewhere between atheism and agnosticism on the one hand and extreme religious dogmatism on the other.


1Richter, op. cit., Chapter I.
2loc. cit., 23.
Green was probably one of the most liberal of the idealists. There were, however, elements in all their writings which are similar.\(^1\) The organic community was one. The formulation of that community was different for each one, however. All recognized some form of general will which was the basis for community. For Green, the general will was the "hopes and fears of a people bound together by common interests and sympathy." For Bradley the general will was found in the historical process in which the laws and claims which guided men were reinforced. Bosanquet drew from the philosophy of both men. His idea of "authoritative suggestion" was a type of social control in which the general will was made known through the routinization, organization, and customs of everyday life. Some type of general will or concensus was felt to be necessary by all for the continuance and well-being of the community. The concensus was derived from the organic process.

This type of organic concensus is important for the understanding of the idealists conception of social responsibility. A sense of social responsibility was necessary for the good of the community. Its origins might be traced to the Methodist teaching which we mentioned. The Methodist believed not only in the virtue of hard work, personal

achievement, and prosperity, but also in the sharing of that prosperity. In other words, private philanthropy was encouraged as a virtue. Man had a duty to work hard and, at the same time, to share his prosperity.

It is, to some extent, from the concept of social responsibility that patriotism and nationalism are derived from philosophical idealism. As I said, this is not as prominent in Green as in Bradley and Bosanquet. It was through the fulfillment of duty that the organic process was carried out and man attempted to achieve good. According to Green, since the will of the community was bound to common interests and since man was one with the community, it was the duty of the state to secure the conditions in which the common interest could be pursued. The common interest was the basis of man's morality. The moral improvement of man was dependent on the improvement of the environment. Green's many activities in the area of social reform are a reflection of his belief in the duty of government to initiate environmental improvement. The means of improvement in the hands of the state was not enough. The use of community wealth to pursue the common interest was more than an alternative; it was a duty.

Bradley was a bit more conservative. Once more, good was achieved through the fulfillment of duty. His idea of duty, however, was different. The world was made up of
different communities each having their own common history and traditions. This is what set one nation apart from another and made them different. It was in these differences where the social responsibility was to be found. It was in the maintenance of community where duty lay. This was present in the concept that man as an historical product had a place in relation to the community. It was in the fulfillment of his role that the social good was achieved. Man's duty, therefore, was to fulfill his role thus, aiding the community and exercising social responsibility.

In Bosanquet, also, the idea of social responsibility is present. This concept is derived from the idea of "authoritative suggestion." Man fulfills his responsibility by conforming to community values and out of fear of sanctions. It is through such conformity that the community is maintained, man performs his duty, and the purposes of man and the community become one. Later, writing on international affairs, Bosanquet felt that what is common to all humanity is not necessarily best. Moreover, there is no common purpose inherent in all mankind. That which is worth sharing with the rest of mankind comes from the great civilizations--depositories of the best qualities as opposed to the common. Then, loyalty to the state supposes loyalty to mankind in looking for what is best. Patriotism becomes based not only on loyalty to the nation,
but to the nation as a representation of human values which are present for mankind to embrace even though few do.

Some of the idealist's position lent itself easily to the prominent ideological imperialist emphasis of the day. The idea of the mission of the state was reinforced by the reasoning that the state's actions had some higher purpose in the nature of the universe. The idea of organic community justified strong racial feelings involved with movements for imperial federation which sought to strengthen the bonds of the Anglo-Saxon race scattered all over the world. The idealist philosophy gave meaning to the position of the Englishman and his community in the order of nature. The British Empire was a product of the organic process, and thus, the empire was her duty.

Speaking in a different context, Bradley displayed the kind of reasoning which made idealist thought amenable to imperialism. We must look, he wrote,

"at our work and our life, and say to ourselves am I fulfilling my appointed station or not? Fulfill it we can, if we will; what we have to do is not so much better than the world that we cannot do it; the world is there waiting for it; my duties are my rights."

Bosanquet is similar where he writes that the state is

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1 Bradley, loc. cit., 181-182.

2 Bosanquet, B., Philosophical Theory of the State, 2nd ed., 140.
"a conception of which every living member of the commonwealth is enabled to perform his function." The state becomes a working conception of life. The fulfillment of duty comes through willing oneself with the organic whole. Even in this process, according to Bradley, one does wrong things because man retains bad habits which at times become manifest.

". . . in education, myself by habituation has been growing into one with the good self around me, and by my free acceptance of my lot hereafter I consciously make myself one with the good, so that, though bad habits cling to and even arise in me, yet I cannot but be aware of myself as the reality of good will."¹

It was in this type of philosophy that the individual identified with the nation and what was construed to be the nation's duty. This duty, at the same time, became the individual's. It helped provide a fulfillment of purpose and acted as an ethical basis for patriotism.

Nationalistic patriotism, however, did not arise as a result of neo-idealism. The roots of national feeling preceded Green's introduction to Hume's Treatise of Human Nature. Nationalism was present in the anti-separatist movement prior to 1870 and began to grow into a significant force as efforts to strengthen the bonds with Anglo-Saxons of the settlement colonies increased during

¹Bradley, op. cit., 183.
Gladstone's first administration. It was Disraeli, in 1872, who raised the issue of empire with regard to the Conservative Party, discredited the Liberals for their cosmopolitanism, and proclaimed the nationalistic aims for which his party should work. The Liberals, through "rash and experimental legislation" were "lounging" the empire away and discrediting the "energies of your fathers." ¹ Spectator, ² in 1868, had called imperialism a virtue and called for a sacrifice of blood and money for the sake of national honor. Disraeli ³ further appealed to the sentiments of his party and their national duty in proclaiming that

"... no minister in this country will do his duty who neglects any opportunity of reconstructing as much as possible our Colonial Empire, and of responding to those distant sympathies which may become the source of incalculable strength and happiness to this land."

Under Disraeli, the government undertook nationalistic policies so that by 1880, the Liberals connected the term imperialism with Disraeli's policies. Imperialism was thus identified as opposed to Liberalism and was characterized as "subversive parliamentary authority, connivance at reckless expenditure for purposes of vain

¹Koebner and Schmidt, op. cit., 46.
²loc. cit., 25.
ambition and military adventures, boisterousness, vain over-commitments, and centralization of imperial control."\(^1\)

Gladstone, then, upon assuming office again in 1880, became the repository for the rath of the nationalists. For Gladstone was walking a thin line between his Liberal principles and the dictates of the world situation he had inherited. It was obvious to the imperial patriots that the world situation demanded action. Gladstone, however, was not ready to submit so easily to the dictates of expediency. The result was a foreign policy of vacillation for which he was accused time and time again of "dereliction of duty." This was particularly evident in his handling of the Egyptian affair in 1881-82, and the Gordon affair in the Sudan in 1885. In the Sudan, the Liberals were accused of paying lip service to the interests of the empire and the mission and courage of the British. It was a sign that the honor and security of Great Britain were not safe in Liberal hands.\(^2\) If the British Army were to be allowed to suffer defeat at the hands of the Sudanese, what would Europe think? Joseph Cowden,\(^3\) editor of the Newcastle Chronicle, remarked in Parliament that

\(^1\) Koebner and Schmidt, op. cit., 164.

\(^2\) Thornton, The Imperial Idea, op. cit., 61.

\(^3\) Koebner and Schmidt, op. cit., 180-181.
"Englishmen may not have mastered the philosophy of Imperial expansion, but their instincts and impulses will prompt them to oppose a spiritless surrender of lands that have been watered by the blood of their best and their bravest."

This was not much different than Thorburn's¹ scathing criticism, ten years earlier, of the Manchester School and those opposed to imperial policy.

"Against the mawkish and sordid delusions still stifling the English people, it is the duty of every man who has a spark of the enthusiasm of humanity to raise his most energetic protest. He is bound to make some effort to rouse his countrymen from their paralysis of public spirit--their stupor of complacent self-degradation."

British imperialism, then, was a breeding ground for patriotism rather than an extension of it. It provided the impetus for the British counterpart of the nationalist movements in Europe.²

While some authors³ have pointed out the absence of racism in English nationalism, racial aspects were discernible in the imperial federation movements which attempted to unite the British nation (or Anglo-Saxon race) around the world and to form some type of closer union, or merely to increase interaction between and awareness of commonality among those of a common racial heritage.

¹Thorburn, op. cit., 14.
²Thornton, Doctrines, op. cit., 87-88.
³See, for example: ibid.; and Thornton, The Imperial Idea, op. cit., 209.
Imperial Federation as a Nationalist Movement with Racial Overtones

For this discussion, I would like to make a distinction between a state and a nation. The state for our purposes is a political entity; a nation is a community which is held together by common racial or ethnic elements. Therefore, as was the case of nineteenth century Europe, there were often several nations within the boundary of one state. Nationalist movements, in general, strove for the unification of members of one nation into one state or the separation of nations into states which would reflect national composition. Where this proved impossible, nationalist movements attempted to form a closer bond with members of the same nation in several states. In order to look at movements which attempted to bring about imperial federation, we must view them in this respect.

The imperial federation movement, which grew up in the 1870's and 1880's was, in part, an attempt to ameliorate some of the shortcomings which had evolved from the days of the earlier Colonial Reform Movement in the 1840's. It was also a result of the desire of zealous imperialists to find a viable symbol for the empire.¹ The federalists felt that if the empire kept heading in the same direction,

¹Bodelsen, op. cit., 120.
it would eventually break up. Something new had to be done to forestall the trend. The empire would have to draw closer together or separate. The watchword was "confederate or separate."¹

The movement gave birth to numerous schemes for achieving a closer empire. These will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter. Cromer, in 1912, however, explained the perpetual problem with which the British had to contend; a problem within their own culture. They were constantly trying to reconcile two mutually destructive ideals—the ideal of good government and the supremacy it required; and the ideal of self-government which required them to give up their supreme position.² Another problem which the British had was their inability to recognize that colonial allegiance to the empire was not bound by the same sentiment which reflected Great Britain's allegiance to the colonies. By the 1880's the colonies began thinking of themselves as separate nationalities.³

Nevertheless, the feeling that there was some sort of organic connection between men of British stock was an

¹ Ibid.


³ Bodelsen, op. cit., 207.
underlying and sometimes manifest assumption of imperial federalists.

In 1870, one of the founders of The Royal Colonial Institute, one of the early organizations identified with the movement, F. P. Labilliere,\(^1\) felt that the future of the empire was bright: "The union of the empire is a sentiment or rather a sacred principle, in devoted loyalty to which we should all vie with one another." He\(^2\) felt that a strong British union would fulfill the role "which Providence seems to have destined the Anglo-Saxon race to accomplish." Charles Dilke, in his influential Greater Britain, cast the great mission for which the English race was destined. The book, an account of his travels throughout the empire and the United States, expressed great hope and faith in the common racial ties between Anglo-Saxons around the world. He was skeptical, however, about the possibilities of ever including the United States and Canada, due to her close proximity to the United States, in any political union of the race.

The racial aspect of a united empire was discussed by J. S. Little in an essay published in 1879. It has been pointed out\(^3\) that had the imperial climate not

\(^1\) Koebner and Schmidt, op. cit., 98.
\(^2\) loc. cit., 141.
\(^3\) loc. cit., 132.
changed, it would have been unlikely that the essay could have been published. While Dilke felt that the separate Anglo-Saxon states could maintain racial ties and their independence, Little\(^1\) felt that "an Anglo-Saxon world empire in which there was no room for separate English nations was the decree of history. A United Britannic Empire, based on the superiority of race and power, would impose peace on the world." Seeley's\(^2\) idea of the empire was similar to the United States: it should be thought of as one nation.

"When we have accustomed ourselves to contemplate the whole empire together [excluding India] and call it all England, we shall see that here too is a United States. Here too is a great homogeneous people, one blood, language, religion, and laws, but dispersed over a boundless space."

While Seeley's observations about the people of the empire were all erroneous except for the commonality of language, it served as the basis for what he\(^3\) termed at the founding of the Imperial Federation League in July, 1884, "some sort of pan-Anglicanism."

At the end of the century, Milner, an ardent supporter of a united empire, toured Canada to campaign for his principles. His ideas, however, were rather radical

\(^1\)Ibid.

\(^2\)Bodelsen, op. cit., 167.

\(^3\)Ibid.
for the mood of the colonies at the time. Talking about the possibilities of a Federal Imperial Council, he asserted that:

"When we who call ourselves imperialists talk about the British Empire, we think of a group of states, independent of one another in their local affairs, but bound together for the defense of their common interests and the development of a common civilization; and so bound, not in an alliance—for alliances can be made and unmade, and are never more than nominally lasting—but in a permanent organic union."

And so, the British race, spread over the surface of the earth

"are not foreigners to us, or to one another, but fellow citizens; and such we want them to remain. One throne, one flag, one citizenship. These are existing links of inestimable value."  

Kipling, in *England's Answer*, talked about the ties of blood which—although the colonies, as sons, had parted from their mother, England—would endure for "Our House stand together and the pillars do not fall." "So long as The Blood endures" they would share each other's strengths "Because ye are Sons of The Blood and call me Mother still." Moreover, these sons of England were destined to take their place in the world and assume the responsibilities of the race.

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1 Milner, op. cit., 90-91.
2 loc. cit., 141.
3 Kipling, op. cit., 93.
In review, then, the racial nature of the nationalism of which the imperial federation movement was a manifestation was not based solely on law and language. Such a basis would have had little, if any, racial grounding. Where racial aspects were evident was in the appeal to tribal instincts and common origins based on blood relationships. Race was a means of forming unity out of a common origin. A lack of common history was rationalized in the naturalistic concept of the organic union which was able to explain what political reality would never bring about.

Other Manifestations of Nationalism

Toward the end of the nineteenth century changes took place in the educational system which were designed to instill empire patriotism in English youth—especially those of the upper classes. This was done partially by attempting to form a type of character in British youth which would be worthy of an imperial race. The system concentrated on physical education, obedience, and fulfillment of responsibilities. Some schools at this time even became military schools because of the virtues of


2 loc. cit., 49.
the tighter discipline they were able to maintain. The critics of the schools called the products of the system "healthy, well-mannered, philistines."¹ Kipling, however, criticized the schools for being too lax in their duties. The Boer War was lost, he stated, because English schoolboys spent too much time playing useless games when they should have been taught to ride and shoot. At any rate, the type of educational system which bred individuals would be useless to an empire which required "teamwork, the code, the honour of the side, and playing the game."²

The Colonial Service was another manifestation of patriotism. It was a place where the children of the upper classes went to fulfill their duty to the empire. The products of the school system found the fruition of their education in situations such as India. It was there that the virtues they had learned were realized in military arrogance and dutiful self-righteousness.

It is no doubt then that the patriotism in the India Service should have been strong. The feeling had been present for a long time and was constantly being reinforced that the rule of India should be free from party influence. Ever since the days of the colonial reformers, India had

¹Thornton, The Imperial Idea, op. cit., 90.
²loc. cit., 91.
been a testing ground for impartial and efficient administration.\footnote{Stokes, op. cit., 306.} Grounded in this conviction was the idea that loyalty in the Service was to the nation and to the Crown. The Indian Service, like the Civil Service, remained intact regardless of the party in power and thus found that its allegiance was possible only to something higher than political whim.\footnote{Thornton, The Imperial Idea, op. cit., 94.}

The emotion involved with the empire at the outset of the Boer War was so high that it was difficult to consider the empire and empire patriotism in rational terms. The Boer War was not a popular war. Sentiment was strong on the part of those who both supported it and those who opposed it. In England, it came to be a fight for honor—a patriotic duty—and those who opposed it were unpatriotic. The opposition viewed the war in terms of interest. Patriotism had reached such an emotional pitch at the time, however, that it was difficult, at best, to argue the war in terms of interest. This emotion was reflected in the teaching of history in the universities. J. A. Cramb,\footnote{Cramb, J. A., The Origins and Destiny of Imperial Britain and Nineteenth Century Europe. New York: Dutton, 1915; and also Thornton, loc. cit., 102.} Professor of History at Kings College, London, published a set of lectures given in 1900, which are a testament...
to the absence of reason indicative of the age. Reading the lectures might remind one of the utterances of Mussolini and the fascism he espoused. To Cramb, patriotism was a manifestation of universal humanity. England's position in the world was hated because of phthomos, or Immortal Envy. The nation, however, had to fulfill its destiny. He viewed conscription as national service, war the intensification of life, and the battlefield an alter. Universal peace, therefore, was undesirable.

The jingoist fever had reached such a pitch that those of a more sane mind felt it "madness" that the duty of England made it necessary to fight everyone and quarrel over every difference of opinion.¹

¹Thornton, loc. cit., 103.
CHAPTER V

Strategies for Action

To this point, we have observed the psychological antecedents of the Victorian imperialists, the social conditions in which they lived and their reactions to them, and the predominant values which underlay their actions. It is at this point, then, that we are ready to discuss these phenomena in relation to the change in both the size and the character of the empire during the approximately sixty-year period which this study covers. In this chapter, we will look at the specific theories of action which appeared at one time or another during this period with reference to their implications for the total change which took place. The contents of this chapter, it might be noted, could have been included in other parts of this study. Their inclusion as a separate chapter is, however, intentional. This chapter is designed to draw specific attention to various strategies. As I stated earlier, it is such strategies which are the most visible manifestations of an ideology. The theory presented here is, to a great extent, influenced by the antecedents discussed in the previous chapters. It is difficult to draw distinct lines of influence from, for example, one social condition or set of values and a
particular strategy. The interrelation is complicated. The selection of these particular strategies is arbitrary; there are others. They are representative illustrations. Also, it should be understood that it is very likely that, given different psychological, social, and value premises, different strategies may have evolved out of Victorian England.

In this chapter, we will attempt to answer questions which are extremely important in the theory of imperialism and questions often overlooked by mono-causal explanations of imperialist phenomena. They relate to the nature of change and importantly to action as a function of ideological activity. The first question we must ask is: to what extent was imperialism the product of a conscious policy; is there in imperial activities both expansionary and establishmentarian, a coherent, comprehensive, conscious, and calculated strategy which in the case of England brought them to rule one-fifth of the world's population? Secondly, we must ask: to what extent was imperialism the product of an "unconscious" policy; to what extent and in what ways did the imperialists not realize the consequences of their actions? Thirdly, we must ask: to what extent was imperialism the product of both conscious and unconscious factors; what role did each play in affecting the other?
To arrive at the answers, we need an explanation of empirical circumstances which surround each question with the hope of arriving at some acceptable means of disinterestedly approaching the problem. It should be obvious to anyone who approaches the study of imperialism in a "disinterested" manner—no matter what his ideological predispositions be—that imperialism, in the British case, at least, was not the product of any over-all strategy. One might discern patterns of action in the form of strategies, but bias in the study of imperialism results in the stress being put on various patterns. Thus, we see that Lenin tended to dwell on patterns of finance in his explanation of imperialism to the exclusion of other factors. This distorted the nature of imperialism. Hobson, by whom Lenin was influenced, while stressing the financial patterns of imperialism, accounted for the presence of other factors. It should be obvious after reading this far that an explanation of imperialism as anything less than the product of a multiplicity of causes is inadequate. The more balanced the stress put on the causes, the more real must the resulting picture of imperialism be.

There were, in Victorian England, various strategies with regard to the empire. Many of these were calculated and well articulated such as plans for colonial reform, imperial federation and, as Fieldhouse\(^1\) has attempted

\(^1\)Fieldhouse, op. cit.
to demonstrate, capitalist expansion. Many interpreters of imperialism have relied on articulated strategies for their explanation of the phenomenon of imperialism. This has often resulted in the theoretical formulation substituting for the real situation. The explanation of historical events in terms of pre-existing theory is misleading. For, when the theory is applied to real situations, it is often perverted for more pragmatic ends.

On this note, we might be able to answer the first question: there were conscious, calculated, and coherent strategies. But it is here, also, that we must qualify our answers and look to the second question. It is debatable whether strategies resulted in the ends they were intended to have.

It is the pragmatic considerations which are involved in the implementation of strategy which provide us with the idea of an unconscious element working in the interest of imperialism. While pragmatic actions are often consciously undertaken, their ultimate outcomes are often not formulable until they have occurred and in this sense are not conscious in relation to ends. By looking at imperialism, then, as a result of pragmatic actions which followed no conscious plan, we get another picture of imperialist phenomena. This view of imperialism could present it as a haphazard occurrence which, in essence, is devoid of any strategy at all. This explanation, however, is not suitable either for it ignores circumstances where
policy is made of necessity but yet has definite long-range goals which may or may not be expedient.

With this explanation then, we must look to our third question in which we recognize both the conscious and the unconscious motives and consequences of imperialism. This question is more reasonable because it accounts for a more true picture of history. It accounts for the intended and unintended in the formulation, implementation, and consequences of policy. While there may have been definite strategic purposes involved in the making of policy—purposes calculated and articulated—when one looks at imperialism over a sixty-year period, these strategies fit no over-all, rational design which the originators of those strategies could have foreseen.

For example, the buying of Egyptian bonds was a matter quite different from the circumstances which led Britain to help Egypt straighten out her finances. The interference in Egyptian domestic policy in this manner was not undertaken with an intention of acquiring Egypt as a colony—but it led to that. Once Egypt had become a colony there was no intention of further extension, but the events which followed the acquisition eventually necessitated, for expediency's sake, the extension of British rule up the Nile to Uganda in order to strategi-

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call protect Egypt from the adverse actions of other European countries bent on expansion in Africa. If such an expansion had been foreseen at the time of the Egyptian acquisition, it is very unlikely whether the move would have occurred. The result was similar in India where pragmatic consideration led to the extension of British influence and control of Afghanistan and Burma and a constant tension with Russia. What appears to have been a calculated policy of expansion, appears so only after the act not in the prosecution of policy when it occurred.

Once, however, the imperial design had taken shape—for example, a territory was painted red on the map—this territory then became part of a more or less overall plan of imperial governance and a part of the British Empire. In the governance of dependencies, there was a conscious policy which, in the case of the Crown Colonies, had been tried and tested in India. Circumstances of acquisition were a different matter. One thing, then, that we should be aware of in this chapter is a distinction between what may be called "formal" and "informal" policies. In other words, this chapter will deal with policies specifically the product of government decisions and with policies made within the context of government decisions without actually being products of government action. For example, with the case of free-trade, to be discussed later, formal government policy, as will be seen, was, to some extent, influ-
enced by the world environment. But also, it will be
noted that a series of actions took place which consti-
tuted a policy but which were made independently of the
government but yet, within the context of the policies
advocated by the government.

Colonial Reform

Colonial reform was one of the more articulate impe-
rial strategies. We have discussed various aspects of it
throughout this study. The colonial reformers were, for
the most part and most importantly, concerned with the
settlement colonies—colonies already established at the
outset of the Victorian period. In this respect, the
strategy was not expansionary. The strategy was almost
reactionary while at the same time being progressive. It
was reactionary in the sense that it was designed to insure
the perpetuation of colonial dependence on British rule
and progressive in that in order to do this, it had to
allow for experimentation in colonial governance and
policy formation on a scale unapproachable in Great Brit-
ain. The reformers,¹ in general, advocated more change
than could have been allowed by Parliament. For example,
planned emigration, which was advocated by many reformers,

¹See, for example: Wakefield, op. cit.; Lewis, op.
Parker, 1849.
was a political issue for over forty years, yet no such plan was ever enacted. It would be inaccurate to say that any plan was instituted in full or that a significant part of any one plan became policy at any one time. Most plans, once instituted, were often watered down versions of the original designed to expediently meet specific situations. The removal of the Corn Laws and the Navigation Acts were such a situation. The granting of self-government and the sharing in the defense of the empire were other measures granted to various dependencies at times when it was in England's best interest to do so.

These measures were a product of a debate which had been going on for years and whose backers had been vocal in Parliament and prolific in print. Roebuck was one who viewed the value of the empire in typical underconsumptionist terms but realized the limitations imposed by colonial rule of Englishmen by Englishmen at such a great geographical distance. He rejected the idea that the Colonial Office could govern properly since it had inadequate means of assessing colonial problems or was, most of the time, ignorant of them. While he felt there should be parliamentary controls put on the settlements, the colonists had to be allowed to exercise their own

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1 Roebuck, loc. cit.
judgment on matters which directly affected them, for the colonists ultimately knew what was best for themselves.

Wakefield also, as we have seen, devised a very comprehensive plan designed to insure that unsettled land in the colonies was used properly and that the best use was made of all resources. Wakefield spent much time in Canada developing a scheme of proper use of resources which resulted in a contribution to the Durham Report of 1839,\(^1\) considered a landmark in colonization theory. The report encouraged the development of a Canadian nationality to counter American influences; advocated the combination of upper and lower Canada to lessen French Canadian influence; sought to grant self-government to a predominantly "British" legislature. Along with these recommendations, however, were reservations regarding constitutional authority, control of foreign policy, trade regulation, and administration of Crown lands. Wakefield's imperial theory, however, went beyond the Durham Report.

He was one of the first to view capital not as a thing but as a social relation. In this respect, he was attributed by Marx to have discovered the true nature of colonization. Colonies could be profitable if properly managed. The amount of land regulated the amount of employment; a certain amount of land could only support so many

\(^1\)For Wakefield's contribution, see: Wakefield, op. cit., 637-718.
people. The price of land was dependent on the ratio of the number of people to the amount of land. Wakefield was novel because he questioned the impossibility of overproduction and advocated colonization as a remedy for such a situation.

Wakefield is a good jumping point to the second strategy of imperialism—capitalist theory. For there is quite a body of theory in political economy related to uses of capital, expanding markets, and overproduction. Wakefield drew from this body of theory and Marx and his followers used it to indict capitalism as a necessarily expansionistic and parasitic system.¹

Capitalist Theory

The following discussion does not by any means exhaust the body of capitalist theory. It is only a very small part of it.² The theory was formed out of many of the writings of political economy which had their roots in Adam Smith and Say. Imperialism arose, so the interre-

¹See Fieldhouse, op. cit., for a development of the theory.

tation went, because of the tendency for capital to find its most profitable employment. The general theoretical argument was that capitalist societies tended to save and invest savings as a form of capital as a lien on the future. Progress was dependent, therefore, on the accumulation of capital. Failure to accumulate it led to stagnation. Accumulation, however, was dependent on the ability of new investments to provide sufficient reward or profits large enough so that capitalists would rather invest their savings than consume them. Fieldhouse\(^1\) points out that this much was generally agreed on but that the vital question concerning capitalist theory was whether or not the rate of profit tended to rise or fall. Naturally this would affect the rate of investment. The general consensus, but by no means the unanimous agreement, was that profits tended to fall over a long period of time. The declining rate of profit and colonization were tied together by most of these theorists because by investing some savings abroad, the capitalists could postpone the moment when the rate of profit would fall below the minimum needed to encourage investment.\(^2\) There was no necessary connection why the investment should be made in the colonies. There were various other alternatives.

\(^1\) loc. cit., xvii.
\(^2\) ibid.
The basis for the capitalist theory dates back to before Adam Smith. Winch\textsuperscript{1} points out that, in the economic theory regarding the colonies, Smith was still influenced by the mercantilists. Smith implied that exclusive colonial outlets for British capital could raise the level of profits in Britain. He realized, however, that the high profits to be found in colonial ventures were disadvantageous for the mother country. Foreign investment of that nature lured capital away from ways in which it could be more advantageously employed at home.\textsuperscript{2}

The Ricardians took a somewhat different outlook than Smith. They based their theory on Say's Law which held that the demand for commodities in general extends in proportion to their supply. In other words, capital accumulation was self-regulatory; there was no excess accumulation or overproduction. This theory anticipated an equilibrating mechanism.\textsuperscript{3} Many Ricardians, contrary to Say's Law, used Smithian arguments to support the view that colonies and new markets were necessary to provide investment opportunities at home. This was somewhat different from Ricardo himself who saw home markets able to supply the necessary fields for new investment opportunities.

\textsuperscript{1}Winch, \textit{op. cit.}, 40-41.
\textsuperscript{2}\textit{loc. cit.}, 43.
\textsuperscript{3}\textit{loc. cit.}, 75.
Capital provided employment for labor and any waste of capital, export included, was to be deplored. It would only be detrimental to the exporting country and lead to a clash of private and national interests.\(^1\) A monopolized colonial trade, he thought, had to be disadvantageous to at least one party. It was usually the colony. There were also disadvantages for the home country because of the tendency of a restricted foreign trade to raise the costs of production and thus the prices for the consumer and the creation of an unnatural market condition.\(^2\)

Wakefield took Ricardo to task. He believed, contrary to Ricardo, that the home country could not generate a sufficient field of investment—Say's Law was equivocal. The economic problem in Great Britain during the 1830's, Wakefield\(^3\) pointed out, was that there were not enough "fields of employment" for capital and that there was a general glut of capital waiting to be invested. The conclusion he reached, then, was that if capital did not create its own field of employment, then the process of accumulation was not self-regulatory and stagnation was

\(^1\)loc. cit., 76.

\(^2\)Knorr points out that most of Ricardo's colonial theory is to be found in his doctrine of the comparative cost of production, op. cit., 251. This doctrine may be found in Ricardo, D., The Works and Correspondence of David Ricardo, Vol. 1. Cambridge: University Press, 1951, 338-346.

\(^3\)loc. cit., 77.
possible. This led him and another reformer, Torrens, to the belief that colonization provided the best means of relieving pressure from the accumulation of capital in Great Britain.

It is possible to discern how later writers might have been able to use the foregoing body of theory in their interpretation of historical events involved with imperialism by demonstrating the necessity of capital investment in advantageous adventures abroad in order to prevent economic stagnation at home. It is hard to ignore even some of the later exponents of capitalist theory with regards to capital accumulation. J. S. Mill was widely quoted that

"Colonization, in the present state of the world, is the very best affair of business in which the capital of a very old and wealthy country can possibly engage."

As late as 1895, the theory was used as justification for policies. Lugard thought that new markets would stimulate trade—a necessity in light of increased commercial rivalry. Moreover, Spectator in 1895, viewed tropical Africa as the cure for British economic woes.

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1 loc. cit., 80-81.
2 ibid.
3 Mill, loc. cit., book V, Chapter XI.
4 Koebner and Schmidt, op. cit., 208.
5 loc. cit., 207.
"... in respect of the opening up of new resources of demand for British manufactures. Mr. Chamberlain's large schemes for the development on business lines of the Crown Colonies in the tropics are full of promise of employment, not only for the present industrial population of Great Britain, but for much of that increase which in any case we must anticipate."

What implications, we must now ask, did this theory have for what one might call the "practice" of imperialism? For, all the foregoing discussion is just theory. This theory, however, is connected to the theory of free-trade. In order to answer the question, I will discuss some of the free-trade arguments and then look at some of the results of the capitalist theory and free-trade theory in practice.

Free-Trade

During the Victorian era, Great Britain became the financial and trade capital of the world. Much of the reason for this can be attributed to the institution of a free-trade policy. The road leading to free-trade was a long one which necessitated a revolution in the ideas about wealth and its accumulation. Free-traders, to a great extent, displaced the mercantilist school of thought which viewed the amount of wealth in the world as fixed: each country's wealth depended on the portion each abrogated to itself at the expense of another. The possession of colonies, thus, increased that proportion of the world's wealth a country possessed. The free-trade school, however,
found fault with the idea that wealth was fixed and demonstr-ated that wealth could be created. In other words, the market was capable of indefinite expansion. Restrictions of trade, such as the mercantilist system perpetrated, limited rather than increased the wealth of a nation. The remedy was trade, free from restrictions, which would facilitate the expansion of markets and the creation of new wealth.

The views regarding the abandonment of mercantilism were varied. The consequences for the empire were uncertain. Stanley¹ felt that the end of protection would destroy the basis on which the colonial system rested. Roebeck,² however, felt that only through free-trade and local self-government could the colonial system be maintained and made economically feasible. The free-traders, moreover, argued that the removal of restrictions on trade would produce markets for British goods which, in turn, would increase the buying power of foreign countries by allowing them to export freely to Britain.³ The price differential between foreign producers and the British consumer would also be lowered thus strengthening the

¹loc. cit., 65.
²Roebeck, op. cit., 9.
foreign purchasing power for British goods and services.¹ Semmel,² however, has asserted that free-trade for England was actually not much of a departure from mercantilism. For Britain, as "workshop of the world," could trade on advantageous terms with anyone. The whole world could become England's "colony" in the perpetration of industrial predominance.

Free-trade, in part, aided in the dissolution of the empire but it was also instrumental in spurring an unprecedented economic growth in England and an impressive economic development in the colonies. It was free-trade which, to a great extent, made England the trading center of the world and it was the export of capital to raise the buying power of foreign countries which brought the center of world financial activity to Great Britain. There was a well-sustained growth in both exports and foreign investments between 1842 and 1872. This, however, slumped between 1873 and 1899 when the rate of world development slowed and England found itself in the midst of "The Great Depression." Between 1842 and 1872, the rate of growth of exports was 11% per annum as contrasted to 7% per annum between 1816 and 1841, the years of restricted trade, and


2\% per annum between 1873 and 1899. The large growth in exports during the middle period was due, in part, to the large infusion of British capital into the world market after the removal of trade restrictions and a growth in the confidence of investing abroad and the potential for return on investments. During those years, England exported £787 million of new capital—five times the amount accumulated prior to 1842. These must be construed as signs of remarkable economic development, for Great Britain not only managed to supply its demands for home consumption but also the demands of the export trade without much inflation. Imlah cites the reasons for this to be that money remained cheap in periods of high demand due to 1) a sufficiency and regularity of new capital; 2) competition between investment agencies; 3) a reduction of risks. These greatly stimulated the growth in Great Britain.

It is not easy to pinpoint exactly where the exported capital went. The pattern of investment varied. Much went to the development of railroads and industry in the United States and Europe. Railroads were also built in India for a variety of reasons; the steamship and new refrigeration techniques spurred investment in Australia and New Zealand.

1Imlah, op. cit., 163-164.
2loc. cit., 178.
3ibid.
The United States, however, remained Britain's best all-around buyer and supplier. It was followed after 1870 by Germany, India, and France. The reverse order was true for her sources of imports.\footnote{loc. cit., 11-12.}

Investments depended on and were partly reflected by external forces and partly by internal conditions and pressures within particular areas.\footnote{loc. cit., 209.} At any rate, British capital played an initiative role by breaking down barriers and setting the mechanism of accumulation in motion. Lending created the conditions which facilitated repayment.\footnote{loc. cit., 212.} It should be pointed out, however, that while investment in foreign countries and settlement colonies was often viewed favorably, Africa was viewed as a very high risk investment and a waste of time and money. Capitalists, in general, were hard to convince to invest their money in Africa until the twentieth century. Moreover, the governing class viewed the development of the empire as leading to economic patronage benefiting the few who were already rich.\footnote{Thornton, The Imperial Idea, op. cit., 16.} The economic motives for the partition of Africa were most likely secondary for the economic development which took place there occurred, for the most part, after a
stable government had been established. Except for certain instances, the extension of British rule was little influenced by existing investments.

Lichtheim\(^1\) pointed out that:

"The system rested on the presupposition that a global economy centered upon Britain, and secured by British control of the seas, offered all countries—developed and undeveloped alike—an optimal chance for exploiting their domestic resources and their foreign trade opportunities."

Saul\(^2\) has pointed out, however, that exploitive investment was not commonplace. It was a phenomenon mostly found in mining and extractive industries. Moreover, where such exploitation did take place, as in South Africa, it worked to retard trade with Great Britain. Investors, interested in long-range development, were wary to invest in areas where exploitive industries, often through tax exemption, did not take part in the capital accumulation of the region which was needed for economic growth.

The colonies played an important part of maintaining Britain's balance of payments throughout the Victorian period. Much of the colonial products imported in England were re-exported, thus reducing the importance of the home markets.\(^3\) The most outstanding examples, in 1913, were

\(^1\)Lichtheim, G., "Imperialism I." Commentary. (April, 1970), 65.

\(^2\)Saul, op. cit., 212-213.

\(^3\)loc. cit., 225.
70% of the imports from the Straits Settlements and 44% of the imports from Ceylon.¹ Time and time again, during crisis periods, Britain was able to switch the direction of her capital exports from foreign countries to the empire in order to maintain her level of world trade.² Not all the exports of the colonies, however, found their way to England. In 1913, the West African colonies had a £3 million export surplus with the rest of Europe.³

The tremendous growth in trade and capital exportation was, for the most part, the initiative of the private sector. The institution of free-trade was accompanied by a hands-off attitude by the government so that private finance capitalists were free to employ their capital where they wished and under the most favorable circumstances. Capital investment in private hands removed financial pressure as an instrument of state policy. The government knew about foreign loans but chose neither to promote them, control them, or use them to pressure foreign governments.⁴

This, however, did not mean that Britain did not use force to protect her trade or open new markets. It was a

¹Ibid.
²Loc. cit., 221.
³Loc. cit., 227.
⁴Imlah, op. cit., 10.
force of a different nature than financial pressure.\textsuperscript{1}

Nevertheless, as free-trade became more and more ingrained as both an ideology and public policy, there arose a moral conviction that wherever trade was not free, it should be made free regardless of who objected.\textsuperscript{2} The epitome of such policy was the "open door" measures in China. This type of beligerent activity in the name of free-trade was more common after the nations of Europe abandoned free-trade in the late 1870's to protect their agriculture from cheap American grain imports. After 1879, England was the only free-trade country west of Russia and thus took on added significance as the center of world trade in a period of intense international competition. It was the increases competition brought on, in part, by the revival of mercantilist practices which was somewhat responsible for the indiscriminate partitioning of the global map by the European powers.

Free-trade theory, like capitalist theory, was well articulated. As a policy or in practice, it contributed toward economic development on a world scale. Whether or not this policy was cohesive or well articulated is another

\textsuperscript{1}It is true that intervention in Egypt, which eventually led to British domination, was done for financial reasons. There was a difference, however. The intervention there was to protect investments of the government which held Egyptian bonds rather than as a pressure put on Egypt on behalf of private investors.

\textsuperscript{2}Thomton, Doctrines, op. cit., 116.
matter. For, as we have seen, it was not always consistent. In the case of "beligerent" free-trade, it was most often the consequence of expediency. The expansion of capital was also undertaken in a pragmatic manner rather than as part of a general scheme for local conditions and the world situation weighed heavily in any financial decision regarding foreign investment. Moreover, it should be noted that during the period often attributed as being the heyday of financial imperialism, 1872-1899, a period of comparative economic stagnation, there was an average reduction in the rate of the exportation of capital and an overall increase in the investment of capital at home.

Taken as a whole, the general export of capital from England was impressive and raises serious questions about British government involvement with financial interests. It should be noted, however, that statistical trends evaluated after the decisions those statistics measure are not a substitute for those decisions and one should be cautious in the analysis of aggregate figures not to forget the short-term figures which may present a picture of the situation which is considerably different.

Imperial Federation

There was no one theory of imperial federation. There were many and they were diverse. It is possible, 1

1Almost all of the schemes for federation dealt exclusively with the colonies settled by whites. There
however, to break them down into four different categories,\textsuperscript{1} which will facilitate our discussion of them. The most popular types of schemes were 1) the admission of colonial representatives to Parliament; 2) a type of federal constitution in much the fashion as that of the United States; 3) a council of advice consisting of colonial representatives; and 4) informal cooperation.

Discussion about admitting colonial representatives to Parliament dated back to before the American Revolution. During the nineteenth century, these schemes were debated, for the most part, prior to 1869, after which they were not well suited for imperial debate. They were inadequate solutions to colonial reform for many of the same reasons that token representation in Parliament would have been to the American colonies. Representation in Parliament, however, would have given the Americans some say over their own taxation. After the 1860's the settlement colonies had the power over local taxation and did not need Parliamentary representation to accomplish it. Representation to them would have meant giving up that power.

The schemes for effecting some kind of formal constitution became most prominent after 1869, and the founding were several schemes which attempted to deal with India. Bodelsen, op. cit., 131, has found 150-200 schemes or variations of schemes.

\textsuperscript{1}Discussed by Bodelsen, loc. cit., 132-145.
of the Royal Colonial Institute. Although there had been numerous schemes put forth before that date, the idea was, in part, popularized by two articles by Jenkins in 1871. The theme was picked up quickly by others and was to dominate imperial thought for about the next fifteen years. Most of the schemes were quite elaborate, spelling out the type of federal relationship that should exist, the types of institutions the government would have, the manner of representation, and numerous other picayune details. With all this theory being offered, however, there was an aura of unreality, for the authors of the schemes which were so neatly put together were often not cognizant of the considerable differences which existed between England and her colonies and the necessity in any such plan for compromise.

The assumptions of the federalists were based on the feeling of a loss of power. Federation was an attempt to regain some of the power abdicated through the granting of self-rule. Most schemes, then, were designed not to the advantage of the colonies but to the advantage of Great Britain. Bodelsen quotes Howe, in 1870, as stating that "when Englishmen within the narrow seas consent to share

1 loc. cit., 133-134.
2 loc. cit., 134.
3 loc. cit., 136-137.
4 loc. cit., 137.
their power and responsibilities and duties of Empire with Englishmen outside, we can hold the whole together and defy the world; but they won't do that . . . ." Wesgarth, speaking before the Royal Colonial Institute in 1872, posed the question: "Are we, who are in the possession of a united and centralized Government, to disintegrate ourselves into the looser tie of a federation?" This was indicative of the skepticism which, along with the optimism, attended the discussion of imperial federation.  

Not only was federalism scrutinized in England, but it is likely that any general acquiescence toward such a policy in England would have been met by resistance in the colonies. The British contact with loyal colonial federationists was not an accurate indication of colonial sentiment. Many federationists from the colonies had been born in Britain and were loyal to England before they were to the colonies. They viewed themselves to be almost exiles from Britain. The colonial loyalty found in the federation movement was adverse to the colonial nationalism growing in the colonies among the native-born. The constitution question was made to seem as if it involved merely the uniting of people with the same nationality. The psychological barriers, however,

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1ibid.

2For numerous sources regarding both outlooks, see a very informative footnote: loc. cit., 142.

3loc. cit., 141.

4ibid.
proved much harder to overcome than the physical ones might have been.

The actual formation of a society to promote imperial federation did not come about until 1884 when a conference was held at the Westminster Palace Hotel. The outcome of the meeting was the Imperial Federation League whose object was to secure a "permanent unity of the Empire" through federation which would provide for local self-autonomy and equitably combine the resources of the empire for common purposes. It was well received by many colonial and governmental officials and prominent figures.

Inherent in the formation of the league, however, were the seeds of its destruction. Among its ranks, there were men who held different opinions regarding the nature of federation. The league could be held together and was successful as long as the opposing forces within the organization were not forced into a clash with each other. This means that the continuance of the league and league policy necessitated that it be noncommittal toward any specific scheme. The most important accomplishment of

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1 loc. cit., 206.
2 loc. cit., 207.
3 loc. cit., 206.
4 loc. cit., 208.
the league was the calling of the first Colonial Conference in 1886. When, however, they sought to summon another conference, the league's doom was immanent.\(^1\) In order to receive governmental endorsement; that is, for Lord Salisbury to summon colonial representatives from all over the world, he demanded that the agenda for such a conference be more specific than the general proposal with which the league had approached him. It was this demand which forced the league to commit itself to a definite scheme and eventually led to its slow death with its recommendations in the hands of Gladstone's unsympathetic government.

The Council of Advice was another means advocated to bring about a closer unity within the empire. The council generally amounted to little more than an advisory body on which colonial representatives would sit in consultation with the colonial secretary. It would, in effect, have no power. Some, however, saw it as an intermediate stage toward a firmer union.\(^2\)

Once more, the schemes were varied. T. C. Haliburton\(^3\) proposed such a scheme as early as 1844. Wesgarth proposed a Colonial Committee of the Privy Council in 1871 which

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\(^1\)loc. cit., 210-211.

\(^2\)loc. cit., 142.

\(^3\)Haliburton, T. C., *The Attache or Sam Slick in England* (1844), 52.
later received wider support at the Westminster Conference. As imperial federation became more and more unlikely, the schemes for councils of advice became more popular.¹ Such councils would, it was felt, be easier to institute since they would entail only administrative reform instead of constitutional reform.

Informal cooperation, on the other hand, had been going on for years. Those who advocated this policy were, in effect, favoring no specific program at all. This was not well liked by many imperialists who felt that constitutional reform was the only alternative to separation. In a Review of the Colonial Policy of Lord John Russell's Administration by Earl Grey, Adderly,² however, proposed that "between the alternatives of independences and separation lies the real secret of lasting connexion—that of common partnership." Torrens³ went so far as to assert "that the colonies should be put upon the same footing as Belgium."

The schemes, then, for imperial federation were well articulated and some did, in various ways, affect, either directly or indirectly, governmental policy. But the effect that any type of scheme had on policy or, for that

¹Bodelsen, op. cit., 144.
²cited in Morrell, op. cit., 38.
³Bodelsen, op. cit., 145.
matter, the popularity any scheme enjoyed was dependent, in general, on factors both domestic and foreign quite removed from the theorists themselves. As with any theory, implementation proved to be more difficult than originally thought. Whether or not these diverse theories can be taken together to form a perceivable whole is a debatable assumption. One thing common to all, however, was the desire to maintain or bring closer the relation of Great Britain to her colonies and former colonies.

The Military and Defense Strategy

Thinking about the military and imperial defense began to change somewhat during the 1850's. This happened in two ways. First, a movement was afoot in England to bring efficiency to government. This also reached the military—especially after the Crimean War, when the shortcomings of the army became glaringly apparent. The second was the appearance of a new approach to definite strategy which was spurred by the advent of steam power.

The reform of the military was aimed at ridding it of the patronage system and the purchase of commissions and making military rank, especially that of officers, competitive like the Civil Service where reforms were taking place during the same period. This reform resulted in the attainment of officer rank for many middle class
and lower class soldiers to whom it had previously been closed. The military system, then, took on a new social significance for it was a way in which one might raise his social station. The military service as a social lever affected the empire. The easiest way for one to advance in the military was in times of war. It was the soldier's job to fight. The military, then, especially in the Indian theater, was constantly agitating for war. These subaltern wars\(^1\) were frowned upon by the Colonial Office, but in the field they were viewed as the soldier's duty and as the ladder to a higher rank. These subaltern or colonial wars were often no more than skirmishes with hostile tribes and were often exaggerated by the press. Yet, it was through them that much of the Eastern empire was acquired, thus making the feats of these wars much more impressive in the public eye and increasing military prestige. The military, moreover, pressed its case in Parliament by lobbying for an extension of empire. Conquests meant more heroics, more opportunity, better rank, and more prestige.

In much the same way, the attitude of the Indian Service was similar to that of the military; they pressed for extension of the empire in the East. For, the larger the empire, the more posts would be established and the

\(^1\)Thornton, *The Imperial Idea*, op. cit., 96.
better would be the opportunities for advancement. The Indian Service replaced the East India Company in the governance of India. From it grew an immense bureaucratic system which like all such systems tended to gather unto itself all the authority and prestige that it could while it continually became more insulated from the real situation it administered. The larger the system grew, the more difficult it was to reform.

Moreover, the Colonial Services thought themselves above politics and developed an ideology to justify it. Seeking to implement clear-cut principles and discipline, they viewed British policies, where neither was possible, as inept and hypocritical.¹ This, however, led to an esprit de corps among the Services which tended to over-rate the advantages of civilian administration.²

The advent of the steamship brought about a rethinking of defense strategy. Until the late 1850's, Britain's defense was based on an eighteenth century idea. Those who maintained the efficacy of the continuance of this policy were the "blue water school."³ Control of the seas was the basis of Britain's power and kept the

¹loc. cit., 98.
²loc. cit., 96.
islands safe from invasion. The seas were also the vital link between her and the colonies. A strong navy thus maintained the defense of the empire. A large standing army was not necessary. Efforts to expand or re-equip the army were resisted; the navy took precedence.

It was during this period, moreover, that England, for the first time, was not able to feed itself. It became more and more dependent on food imports. The "blue water school" argued that this necessitated an even greater reliance on a strong navy to protect trade routes. England was faced with the possibility, in the event of war, of merely being starved into submission.

The steamship spurred the development of another school: the "fortress England school." This technological development coupled with the presence of Louis Napoleon on the other side of the channel caused a scare among certain circles. Palmerston and the Duke of Wellington felt that England was now open to a swift invasion and that she should fortify herself for protection. The navy could no longer be depended upon. If the navy should fail, a second line of defense would be necessary. Not only did the members of this school agitate for the construction of shore batteries but also for a larger standing army.

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When it came to financial matters, however, neither service, army or navy, was in a position to demand much for renovation or expansion. Financial control was maintained by the Treasury which, throughout this period, was extremely economy-minded. To the Treasury, the national interest was equated with what was economical.¹ It was always trimming the budget and military matters suffered except when a vociferous opposition of vested interests and imperialists managed to exert sufficient pressure.² Yet, Treasury ideology on this matter was not that much different from the predominant economic attitudes. The Liberals and Radicals were, for the most part, anti-militaristic and constantly pressing for economy in government. It was this type of thinking which also fashioned Gladstone's moves to reduce the colonial troop garrisons in pursuance of a commission report of 1861.

This attitude was also evident with respect to the defense of the colonies—one of the main reasons used for maintaining the imperial connection. It was felt that the colonies were not able to defend themselves. Yet, Goldwin Smith³ pointed out that

¹Johnson, op. cit., 14.
²Ibid.
"Dependencies widely scattered and which you have no adequate force to guard must be military weakness, of which your enemy cannot fail to be aware."

"Could Great Britain, in case of a war with a maritime power, afford fleets and armies for her distant possessions?"\(^1\)

Opposed to men like Smith, however, were men like Palmerston\(^2\) who believed that power was not merely to be passively enjoyed; it should be actively used; or Disraeli\(^3\) who believed that if England were to remain a great power, she must act like one. Also, Chamberlain believed that power was vital—especially with regard to imperialism. Imperialism was dependent upon control.\(^4\) Britain's world position must be maintained and imperialism was the method. A "little England" would starve; thus, the empire was a form of survival.\(^5\)

All throughout the century, British defense policy suffered from a lack of cooperation between departments.\(^6\) The army and navy did not cooperate with each other; the Treasury was adverse to both; for the most part, there

\(^1\)loc. cit., 169.


\(^3\)loc. cit., 19.

\(^4\)loc. cit., 104-105.


\(^6\)Gibbs, op. cit., 8; Johnson, op. cit., 12.
was little interest in defense matters at the cabinet level either. The Russian war scare in 1878, however, sent ripples through the official sea of apathy. British defenses, it was realized, were caught off guard. There were no preparations for defensive action in the event of a sudden outbreak. In March of 1878, the Colonial Defense Committee\(^1\) was set up to inquire into the readiness and state of colonial defenses and to consider how to provide for colonial defense in case of a sudden outbreak of hostilities. This committee marked the first attempt to plan for defense but it lasted only a year.

It was followed in 1879 by the Commission on the Defense of British Possessions and Commerce Abroad. The work of this commission was neglected by Gladstone who came to office in 1880. A committee to effect better departmental cooperation was set up again in 1885, after he left office. The significance of these committees was that they were the first efforts to establish a regular system concerning imperial defense.\(^2\)

Numerous other commissions and committees at both the interdepartmental and cabinet level were set up. The Boer War, however, provided the realization that they were inadequate. For, in the Boer War, it was evident that

\(^1\)Gibbs, loc. cit., 9.

\(^2\)loc. cit., 11.
there was no coordination of policy or coherent military strategy. The Esher Committee in 1904 called for a revamping of the War Office and defense committee to provide for more coordination, better intelligence, and continuity of planning. The resultant Committee on Imperial Defense was to fulfill the recommendations until 1939.

For the most part, we see that during this sixty year period, there was no overall policy of imperialism. There were many and they were diverse—even those which pertained to the same subject. There was no general consensus regarding which policy was right and the popularity of any one was usually transitory. For this reason, policy was inconsistent and uncoordinated.

While one might question this assertion as it regards free-trade, it should be remembered that it was a commitment to no government policy at all. The international effects of this lack of policy must be viewed, in general, as a result of the uncoordinated work of many individuals and groups in the private sector. This was hardly a conscious national policy of economic exploitation.

Referring back to the questions posed at the beginning of this chapter, we see that: 1) there were definite imperial strategies which were well articulated; 2) these strategies did, to some extent, affect policy; 3) no one strategy was predominant, although some were
more important than others at various periods; 4) these strategies were not part of any grand design—even though they may have been in the form of one—but had results in limited consequences; and 5) the limited consequences, taken as a whole, comprise a result which was unintended although appearing to be a part of an overall strategy.
CHAPTER VI

Towards the Concept of
Imperialism as an Ideology

Let us return to the first chapter and our framework of ideology. Ideology, we said, employed two devices which made it a useful social tool. These were identified as the distortion of reality and the selectivity of symbols. These devices use symbols to restructure reality in such a way that, while they themselves do not represent real situations, they are useful for real situations. In this process, they become a means of inhibiting or inducing collective action. Ideology, in this manner, becomes a dynamic social tool.

For this reason, the study of ideology which merely looks at the system of cultural symbols is inadequate. One needs to go beyond the symbolic system and investigate the meaning of symbols in the context of the relation between individual or collective action and the social milieu in which one acts.¹ For, symbols by themselves are meaningless. Their relevance is discernible only in reference to real situations.

It should be noted that the model used in this study by no means claims to be conclusive. Someone else using

¹See Geertz, op. cit., 49.
the same model may have reached different conclusions. Moreover, ideology is only one factor which led to the growth of imperialism. An ideological explanation is only one way of looking at the problem. It has its advantages in that it takes under its wing various other aspects of the cultural system in its explanation. It has a disadvantage in that the ideas of which it is a manifestation often have no more than an indirect link to the phenomena they explain.

Ideology as a Cultural System

According to our framework, we said that Victorian imperialism as an ideology was of the broad type. The framework of a broad type of ideology included several subtheories. These we classified as psychological assumptions, sociological theory, a value system, and a system of action dependent, to some degree on the antecedent conditions established by the other subtheories. An ideology of imperialism viewed specifically in this manner, then, includes many aspects of cultural systems.

The psychology, the social conditions, and the values discussed provided a basis for action articulated in various strategies of imperialism. What we have not yet accomplished, however, is an explanation of the processes by which symbols become synthesized into action. The question we must now ask is: how did Victorian imperialism
as an ideology and as a cultural system work? How was the integration of the symbolic situation with the real situation accomplished in this case?

The actions which are the outward manifestation of the implementation of the ideology result from an interplay of both psychological and sociological factors. It is hard to determine—as with the chicken and the egg—which factor came first. At any rate, it is of relatively minor concern. It is likely that social conditions which were in flux had an effect on the psychology of individuals and that the resultant psychological integration or malintegration affected perceptions of the social environment. This was likely with regard to both domestic and foreign circumstances and also where the two were connected. Values and cognitive patterns were in transition. In reaction to this condition, the Victorian looked for symbols with which he could relate; a form of security to remove his doubts. An empire was one such symbol. The empire, in reality, was not security at all. The melange of symbols and myths which grew from it, however, provided psychological reassurance that the real situation could be faced even though in an unreal manner. The empire as a symbol was a rationalization.
Is Victorian Imperialist Ideology Unique?

Some of the phenomena we have been discussing are not unique to the growth of an ideology of Victorian imperialism but are inherent in most ideologies. Where these phenomena differ is in their substance. Their manifestation in Great Britain was to a great extent influenced by the social and political conditions, both domestic and foreign, of the times. One such factor was insecurity. The factors which affect security and influence the development of ideology might be different for different ideologies. The conditions which give rise to an imperialist ideology may be different than those which foster the development of some other ideology such as fascism. The desire to impose order on a puzzling environment and the role played by the ideology as a surrogate faith are two more factors which are common to most ideologies but which differed with Victorian imperialist ideology with regard to substance.

There were, however, certain components of Victorian imperialism which were unique. First, we might look at the social conditions. There is no one pattern of social conditions which gives rise to ideologies. Ideologies arise and persevere when social conditions are both relatively bad and relatively good. The attempts to connect the empire with the condition of England, as we have seen,
viewed the connection as both beneficial and detrimental. They were influenced, somewhat, by the political and economic conditions of the time and the value orientation of the particular analyst.

Similar conditions as those existing in England existed in other industrializing countries. Whether or not the same factors were present in or were used for drawing a connection between the mother country and the colonies is a subject for further research. At least, with the French example, \(^1\) there was an effort to link the condition of France and its revitalization to the necessity for colonial expansion. The French case was dissimilar in other aspects. France, in the 1870's was suffering from the general economic decline throughout Europe, but moreover, was demoralized after its defeat by Germany in 1870. France was being encouraged, during the 1870's, by forces from within, to expand not only for a recovery of national morale and prestige, but to stem what was felt to be an economic decline and to revitalize the old commercial system. The motives for the revival of French imperialism, during the late nineteenth century, however, were, by no means, as simple as the above explanation might presume.

Other unique elements of the ideology of Victorian imperialism would be the outward manifestations as witnessed in some of the imperial strategies. These strategies were reflective of specifically English institutions. The Colonial Reform Movement, the Imperial Federation Movement, and the internally debated formulation of defense strategy are examples which find parallels almost nowhere. These components of the ideology are important also because they show a certain orientation toward colonies which had no opportunity for exposition in the imperialism of other countries. For Britain, aside from possibly Spain, was one of the only countries which maintained colonies which were almost exclusively inhabited by whites who traced their heritage back to Europe (i.e. Australia, New Zealand, and Canada). The expansion of other European nations yielded them territories which were analogous to Britain's Crown Colonies. Victorian imperialism, then, is unique because such a large part of the empire was settled by whites. Attitudes and strategies toward colonial possessions, then, in some instances, were different.

The Function of Victorian Imperial Ideology

Victorian imperialist ideology as discussed in this study was, for the most part, a system maintainer. From the transition of the colonial empire to the nineteenth
century value structure, to the establishment and maintenance of free-trade, to the carving-up of the map of the world, to the agitation for closer colonial ties, the focus was on the maintenance of Britain's power relationship with the rest of the world and the continuance of the "myth of the Englishman." The implications of this ideology became more explicit in times of stress. The more aggressive actions it perpetrated at such times might be construed as aiming at system change and the upsetting of power relationships and the status quo,\(^1\) but a more accurate assessment might show otherwise. We cannot, however, absolve Victorian imperialism from any part in changing power relationships and upsetting the status quo. For, that did indeed happen. In the process of attempting to achieve stability, the British greatly increased their own commercial power and that of others. Whether one would consider that they relatively increased their overall power would depend on whether one considered

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\(^1\) Such an analysis would challenge the observations of Morgenthau who states that the end of imperialism "is always the overthrow of the status quo; that is, the reversal of power relations between the imperialist nation and its prospective victims." Morgenthau, H. J., *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. 3rd ed. New York: Knoof, 1960, 58. Such an explanation is oversimplified; thus, misleading. It fails to sufficiently cope with the particular situations in which nations find themselves and the forces which make such policies feasible. It is a deductive explanation formulated on the visible results of those forces.
the vast territorial holdings of a world empire as more or less of a strategic power advantage. The British felt that it did. The ideology of Victorian imperialism, then, while a system maintaining ideology, was a significant force of change. In this manner, it played a dual role—one on a motivational level and one on a consequential level. We might then conjecture that ideologies which serve an integrative function on an intra-system level may, at times, have a different function on an inter-system level.

If there is one thing clear which comes out of this study, it should be that it is not possible to entirely isolate the motivations behind imperialism. There were various motives during the Victorian period. Some were more prominent at times than others. The reform motive was an early incentive in the revival of empire sentiment. It was somewhat designed to combat what were viewed as bad conditions in England and at the same time, to better the administration of colonial dependencies. Economic motives were always present to some extent. Their articulation, however, was relatively subdued until the late Victorian period. Economic factors, for a while, tended to work against the expansion of empire. Strategic motives were also common. These motives became increasingly more significant after 1870. Military motives as well as bureaucratic motives were self-
generating. They were primarily manifestations of the tendency for bureaucratic organizations to attempt to beget power after power. Sentimental motives became mixed with patriotic motives. Such motives gave rise to much of the unrational discourse of the time. Even though there was amazingly rational discussion about the empire until the later period, it was from sentimentalism and patriotism that popular emotion was channeled and discussion of empire reached the common man. After the 1850's and the acquisition of India, the civilizing motive was strong. It was present with regard to possessions in the West Indies to a lesser extent beforehand. The civilizing motive was also very important in the maintenance of the colonies after acquisition.

The presence of all these motives, alone or in combination, at various times in Victorian England, should throw some doubt on the efficacy of studies which attempt to explain imperialism as a manifestation of primarily one motive. The reliability of such studies can be tested only by acknowledging their relative importance with respect to other competing or complimentary motives. Failure to do so could result in distortion of the generating forces behind imperial expansion.

Imperialism as a "Self-contained" Ideology

What this study has attempted to do is show, by using the Victorian example, that there can be a self-contained
ideology of imperialism. To my knowledge, no one has articulated such an ideology using a specific model.¹ This study was done on the assumption that imperialism need not be a manifestation of some other ideology but that behind the forces of imperial expansion, there was, given an adequate model, sufficient evidence to demonstrate that imperialism can be viewed as an ideology itself. It was intended to show that the ideas about the empire and England's connection with it were influential aspects adding to the growth of the empire, even though they were not the only phenomena affecting its growth. This issue, then, is one of centrality. Upon close scrutiny, we find that the ideas regarding the empire, as a social force, played a more important role in affecting public policy than the peripheral role to which they are most commonly assigned. This, however, has not resulted in the belief that the study of other ideologies in a more central relation to imperialism is equivocal. To the contrary, it aids in the articulation of an imperi-

¹Murphy, op. cit., gives an explanation of French imperialism as an ideology. She, however, never explicitly deals with the concept of ideology; never formulates a model. Certain students of imperialism have identified imperialism as an ideology in its own right but have not specifically articulated it: See Lichtheim, G., "Power and Ideology," Partisan Review, XXX (Summer, 1963), 241-255. Still others have developed their studies in a manner which might conform to a model of ideology which is articulates but have not identified the study as representing an ideology: Thornton, Doctrines, op. cit.
alistic ideology of the broad type when viewed in such a central role.

We have found that ideology is no simple concept and that its operation and make-up are dependent on a wide variety of cultural factors. Ideologies such as capitalism, socialism, and nationalism are not necessarily antagonistic to or exclusive of imperialistic ideology. If anything, such ideologies are complimentary, for, as with England, they all existed as part of the same culture. Thus, it would be impossible to say that Liberalism, socialism, or nationalism developed completely without even being indirectly influenced by the possession of or expansion of the empire. As nationalism had an imperialistic component, as did socialism and capitalism, so imperialism in the Victorian case had its reciprocal components. The reaction within any one of the ideological schools toward these other forces, however, took many forms--some subtle, others not.

What this study attempted to do, among other things, was to articulate that part of other ideologies which were applicable to imperialism. These other ideologies were present in varying degrees of articulation. Thus, we find everything from philosophical tracts, to popular journalism, to political rhetoric as expressions of an ideology of Victorian imperialism. In constructing the articulated ideology, then, it was necessary to sift out
what was relevant and place it in a context in which, while still separate from the resulting whole, it became part of the resulting whole.

This may, in part, explain the segmented nature of the study and the reason for placing some concepts in one chapter rather than another. It may be possible that the segmentalism itself is distorting. One cannot completely divorce psychological factors from others and vice versa. For example, a piece of evidence used to illustrate the desire for order, at the time of its first articulation, was a product of a multiplicity of factors. In attempting to integrate an ideology of the broad type, compartmentalization, while useful, is not completely accurate.

If we view an ideology imperialism as a powerful social force which arises in certain cultural contexts, we will look at cultural systems where such a force arises to find the elements within them which help account for the phenomena. It is difficult to say whether or not a certain cultural system will support a broad or narrow ideology for, within each system, there are different degrees of articulation and symbolization. In Victorian England we discerned various strains of thought which formed patterns from which we were able to reconstruct some dominant motivational factors. Psychological factors were complex. Industrial society and perceptions of it were important social factors. Utilitarianism and
idealism were important to Victorian values. Where cultural systems are similar, we might expect similar motivational factors. For example, in late nineteenth century American imperialism, we might expect different motivational factors due to a different historical background and social conditions. The ideology of imperialism may be different for each different culture to which we apply the model. If imperialism, indeed, differs according to culture, viewing it in these terms may lend a better understanding to the conduct of international relations and its study. The specific application of this criterion, however, still awaits theoretical development. The study of comparative imperialisms with a model of ideology might lead to more understanding of the motivational forces behind the conduct of nations.

The Victorian Example

We have seen that in England there was a tradition of paternalism. The social system at the turn of the nineteenth century was changing and thus, patterns of paternalism were also. The aristocratic elite was being replaced by the bourgeois elite. The "paternal" system of property was changing and urbanization took place. The masses of displaced and insecure were to be found in the urban centers. The growing middle class, attaining political power, professed to rule in the interest of
the lower classes. Thus, what we see in England is a displacement of symbolic reference. Perceptions of and real power changed from the landed class to the industrial class.

The change from agriculture to industry also brought a change in the dominant symbols of societal stability. An ideology which was designed to perpetuate this change, Liberalism, was internalized and legitimized. The market, the factory, wages, and progress became some of the symbols of the new order. With the progress of industry, it was believed that civilization advanced. Moreover, the concept of social progress was accepted. Parliament, also, slowly changed from a symbol of the aristocratic order to one of an instrument of social change and progress. There was a belief that in the stability of the prevailing industrial order, society would move ahead. There was at the same time a sense of order and paradoxically a sense of dynamism.

The industrial society which was first to evolve in England brought her to a manufacturing and commercial pre-eminence in the world. For a good part of the century she was the “workshop of the world.” With this pre-eminence, however, a whole myth system was built up about the nature of British power. As a country which had a commercial and financial advantage in world trade, the concept of power began to broaden beyond into a
belief in not only naval and military superiority—real or unreal—but the belief that Britain's power could be used for the advantage of others. Was she not doing something right? Progress had won her this position; could progress not raise the level of civilization for others also? And so, the symbol was established of the British as a gifted race whose duty it was to share its benefits with others. As a consequence, the myth arose characterizing the Englishman as industrious, orderly, just and humane. This myth, as we have seen, was, to some extent, false. It was built on an idea of how they desired to act and not on the realities of their actions. The British were not always as just and humane as they thought themselves to be—even with regard to their own citizens. The conception of the Englishman as such a symbol, however, did much to legitimize imperial expansion. It was a useful symbol for inducing action—especially in circumstances where rule was often contrary to articulated principles as in India and Africa. The concept of the ought substituted for the reality of the is.

During the early Victorian period, the existing colonial system came to clash with the new symbolic structure of industrial Britain. The old colonial system had been built on and had given rise to a different set of legitimizing symbols which were becoming obsolete. The antag-
onism arising from the conflict of the two symbolic systems brought about the dislocation of the old system without destroying completely the symbol of colonial empire. The symbol of empire, however, took on a new meaning based on the change in values occurring in the nineteenth century. The new symbolic system in England was strong enough to change the ideas toward colonies but not the sentiment which supported them. The Colonial Reform Movement was an attempt to build and legitimate a new symbolic reference toward the colonies which was adaptable to the "myth of the Englishman." Moreover, we see that every movement for imperial consolidation, whether it be in the acquisition of India or the imperial federation movement, was an effort, through the "myth," to manipulate symbolic references. Once colonial rule was established, as with the case of India, Egypt, and other Crown Colonies, this "myth" acted to sustain and legitimate the system—at least in the eyes of Englishmen.

The principles of free-trade were also built on the symbol system of industrial society. The institution of free-trade as public policy elevated that symbol system to an international status. Free-trade, itself, became at once both a symbol of the commercial pre-eminence of Great Britain and a symbol of the stability in international commerce. Free-trade not only extended her commerce to new areas but also acted as a means of spreading the tenets
of British civilization. Britain's strength and relative security were instrumental in enabling her to do this. The British prevailed in the world order, they believed, for two reasons: the superiority of their system and the inherent superiority of their race. Both concepts were clothed in a system of symbols which, though, to a great extent, "wrong," was maintained by real conditions in the environment. Britain's strength during the mid-Victorian period was constantly reinforcing the symbolic context in which she acted.

This situation, however, began to change around 1870. Britain began to lose her manufacturing and commercial pre-eminence, power relations in Europe changed, the free-trade era began to die, and domestic depression became the economic reality for almost twenty years. It became harder for the British to maintain their position. Moreover, the colonial empire as the symbol constructed by the reformers had been challenged so that the colonies were beginning to become an antagonistic symbol in the eyes of many Englishmen and the status of dependency became unpopular in the eyes of the colonies. The usefulness of colonial empire as a symbol began to wane. It is no doubt, then, that the prevailing symbolic structure began to undergo a considerable strain.

What we see happening in Britain, then, after 1870, is a reaffirmation of the symbolic structure of the culture.
in the aggressive actions which came to be associated with imperialism. One could no longer be content to be powerful or believe himself to be so; for, such a claim was not as certain; one had to act on that claim. Thus, the claim became the catalyst and the justification for action. In other words, the British, as the great race and commercial and military power they claimed to be, had to act like one. The symbolic structure on which the myths of race and power were built became the means by which the ideas of empire could be transformed into collective action.

The aggressive policies in the East, the acquisition of Egypt, and the partition of Africa could not have been accomplished by themselves in an ideological vacuum. There would have been too much opposition to the expenditure of money and the troop commitments such actions entailed. The British probably could not have been induced to undertake such ventures or maintain the empire afterwards if there had not been some groundwork beforehand which prepared them for it. The imperialists felt very strongly that what they were doing was right because they were acting on symbols which led them to believe so.

Their symbols, however, distorted the real situation. As long as empire was a virtue in which the mission of the British could be fulfilled—that industry, order justice, and humanity would prevail—there would be room allowable in the world order for the hypocresses that
existed. The hypocrites, the elements which were dysfunctional to the symbolic order, were "played down" or "glossed over" and viewed as distortions of British intentions. There was little attempt by imperialists to look at the colonial system objectively for such a perception, as with most systems with established ideological bases, might be dysfunctional; the symbolic structure would be discredited and the "myth of the Englishman" would crumble. In this way, the ideology was a rationalization. The manipulation of symbols acted in such a way as to distort perceptions of reality and channel actions toward desired goals. As the individual will rationalize his actions—failing to face reality—so will collectivities. There must, however, be some point of reference for the rationalization. The point of reference is supplied by appropriate symbols acceptable in the social context.

In conclusion, this study has shown several things. First, there was a large body of thought and ideas regarding the empire in Victorian England that was diverse and reflected a diversity of factors. Second, these ideas were influenced by factors in the environment and were, in part, reflective of them. Third, these ideas played a symbolic role which did not impede the growth of empire but tended to rationalize its growth and maintenance. Fourth, these ideas and the phenomena they reflected could be placed in the context of an ideology by using a model.
There are, however, several things, among others, this study has not done. First, it has not shown that ideology can completely explain imperialism. Ideology is one, though very important, factor. Second, it has not drawn any causal link between the ideas about the empire and its growth. It has merely suggested ways in which ideas appeared to affect and reflect the empire. Thought and action may or may not be linked. The best we are able to do is establish reasonable grounds to demonstrate the possibility.
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