British and American Strategy in the European Theater of Operations December 1941 to August 1944

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IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS
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by

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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

In 1941, the United States and Great Britain formed a military alliance with the primary purpose of defeating the Axis powers. Infringing upon and conquering vital interests of the two nations, Germany's aggression in Europe and Japanese expansion in the Pacific expeditiously initiated the military and political alliance. Both nations concurred that Germany, rather than Japan, should be defeated first; but their past experiences, traditions, and heritage as sovereign nations brought forth ostensibly conflicting strategic plans for the defeat of Hitlerite Germany.

Critical military proposals were discussed, planned, and initiated by the Allies from December 1941 to August 1944. Since this period, numerous contemporary historians have analyzed and interpreted the grand strategy proposed by the British and American military architects. Representative of the various schools of military history are: Hanson Weightman Baldwin, Richard M. Leighton, Kent Roberts Greenfield, and John Ehrman.

Baldwin in his book, Great Mistakes of the War, stressed that the British and American strategists developed antagonistic views for conducting the war. Guiding the American strategy were the principles of mass firepower and the concentration of force, while the British emphasized flexibility and economy of force. In lieu of their emphasis upon conflicting principles of war, Baldwin maintained that the
strategy ultimately undertaken by the Allies was not a compromise. On the contrary, the strategy they pursued was the direct result of American political and military pressure upon Great Britain. Referring to the cross-Channel invasion, Baldwin stated:

... The British, despite the great eloquence of Churchill and the reasoned logic of his staff, had failed; the American strategy—heartily endorsed by the Russians—was the pattern of conquest.

Thirteen years later, Leighton wrote an article maintaining that the British had significant cause to be dubious of American intentions in Europe. As previously indicated, the Allies had agreed to defeat Germany first and then turn their attention to the Pacific. Basing his interpretation on the logistical deployment of supplies and personnel, he noted that during 1942 and 1943 more material and troops were sent to the Pacific than to the European theater of operations.

The thesis is maintained by Greenfield in his book, American Strategy in World War II: A Reconsideration, that the grand strategy undertaken by the Allies was accomplished by continued negotiations and compromises. The strategy developed by the Allies was not purely British or American in nature, but an amalgamation of the strategic views of the two nations. Greenfield wrote:

Thanks to their determination to stick together and to move only by steps on which they could agree, the strategy they actually pursued reflected the concepts of both.

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It is not the author's intention to present an original or startling interpretation of the Allied grand strategy in Europe during World War II. The purpose in writing this dissertation is to assist in clarifying, analyzing, and interpreting the grand strategy in the European theater from December 1941 to August 1944. The period embracing this study is significant, for in December 1941 the Allied coalition was formed and by August 1944 the grand strategy in Europe was achieved.

Absolute agreement with the observations, interpretations, and conclusions without constructive criticism or analysis is not desired. Complete satisfaction implies that the controversy is resolved and the need for further research, analysis, and interpretation is not required. History, as with all social sciences, is not objective and is constantly subject to change or interpretation. Scientific methods are employed by the historian to substantiate a thesis, but the results are not infallible. Consequently, it is the author's expectation to assist the reader in understanding the Anglo-American controversy and simultaneously to stimulate further research and interpretation.

The following interpretation of the Allied grand strategy in the European theater emphasizes the congeniality of the coalition. Guided by distinct traditions and unique experiences, conflicts and differences of opinion were inevitable. Nevertheless, by negotiating and compromising, the British and Americans were able to resolve their disputes without disrupting their solidarity. Referring to the
relationship of the Anglo-American alliance, Ehrman stated:

This difference in background fostered a certain difference in outlook that already existed between the two great Western Allies... For there is perhaps always a danger that disagreement, which may breed discussion, will bulk larger than agreement in an account of this sort; and where the disagreements, as sometimes here, were profound, the danger is disproportionately greater. It is therefore as well to remember that the area of consent remained larger than the area of dispute, and that even when the partners differed they remained close partners... One or other of the Allies always gave way, or both reached a compromise favourable to one, before it was too late.¹

CHAPTER II

DIFFICULTIES IN IMPLEMENTING THE PRINCIPLES
OF THE ARCADIA CONFERENCE

The American-British Conference

General Marshall and Admiral Stark sent the following memorandum, dated December 16, 1941, to the British assuring them that the military strength of the United States would be directed toward defeating Germany first.

1. At the A-B [abbreviation for American-British] Staff Conversations in February, 1941, it was agreed that Germany was the predominant member of the Axis Powers, and consequently the Atlantic and European area was considered to be the decisive theatre.

2. Much has happened since February last, but notwithstanding the entry of Japan into the War, our view remains that Germany is still the primary enemy and her defeat is the key to victory. Once Germany is defeated, the collapse of Italy and the defeat of Japan must follow.¹

Although the Arcadia Conference (December 1941) marked the beginning of the joint Allied coalition, deliberate cooperation between the Allies was first established during the summer of 1941. Scientific information including radar and atomic energy data was exchanged between the two nations. The Federal Bureau of Investigation and British Security Agencies assisted one another in detecting and preventing espionage and sabotage in the Western Hemisphere. American military personnel and civilian technicians were sent to

Great Britain to study British weapons, as well as instruct the British in the proper utilization of American weapons. Direct military assistance was furnished to the British by repairing damaged warships and providing extensive combat training to selected pilots and air crews.

Forming the core of the Allied coalition were the decisions agreed upon at the American-British Conference. Commencing on January 29th and concluding on March 29, 1941 the delegates agreed to exchange military missions, as well as prepare a prearranged plan to be implemented if the United States entered the war. Nucleus missions or Special Army Observer Groups were formed to facilitate the exchange of strategic information and assist in developing a workable partnership. Representing the United States in London were: Major General James E. Chaney and Admiral Ghormley; Sir Charles Little, Lieutenant General H. Weyss and Air Marshal A. T. Harris were the British counterparts residing in Washington.

While the technical details of the nucleus missions were being drafted, the British strategists presented an outline of their strategic views to their American colleagues.

1. The European theater is the vital theater where a decision must first be sought.
2. The general policy should therefore be defeat Germany and Italy first, and then deal with Japan.
3. The security of the Far Eastern position including Australia and New Zealand, is essential to the cohesion

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of the British Commonwealth and to the maintenance of its war effort. Singapore is the key to the defense of these interests and its retention must be assured.¹

The first two propositions were readily accepted, but the American strategists were reluctant in accepting the third tenet. They maintained that the retention of Singapore was desirable only for preserving the prestige of Great Britain in the Far East. As a military objective, the area was of secondary importance. The diversion of troops and ships the Americans argued, would impede operations in the European theater. Firmly upholding the view that all military efforts be directed upon Germany, they urged that defensive operations be waged against Japan until Germany was defeated.

The Unification of Allied Forces

Two weeks after Pearl Harbor was attacked the first joint Allied conference, the Arcadia Conference, convened in Washington, District of Columbia. The unprovoked attack by the Japanese armed forces on December 7th released the United States from the bonds of neutrality. As the Prime Minister prepared to depart for the Arcadia Conference, he attempted to surmise in which theater of operations the United States would concentrate its efforts. The Prime Minister was aware that American public opinion was acutely focused upon Japanese aggression in the Pacific. Traditions, loyalties, and historical heritage linking America to Western Europe hindered the unification

¹loc. cit., p. 34.
of public opinion and sentiment against the European aggressors. Conversely, lacking national identity with the Japanese, public opinion was unanimous in condemning and coming to grips with the Pacific aggressors.

As an experienced politician, Mr. Churchill realized the importance of public opinion upon a government's political and military policies. For this reason, he suspected the United States might reverse the ABC-1 agreement.\(^1\) Writing of the earnestness of the situation, the Prime Minister recorded in his impressions of World War II, "We were conscious of a serious danger that the United States might pursue the war against Japan in the Pacific and leave us to fight Germany and Italy in Europe, Africa, and in the Middle East."\(^2\)

The Minister of Defence, Winston Churchill, was relieved of his fears by the opening statement of General Marshall and Admiral Stark at the Arcadia Conference.\(^3\) They reiterated the importance of public sentiment, but militarily evaluating the situation, they agreed Germany was indubitably a greater threat than Japan to the security of the Western Hemisphere. (1) Germany possessed greater potential and actual productive power and scientific knowledge than Japan. (2) By controlling the west coast of Europe, Germany directly threatened the sea communications of North and South America. (3) The security of

\(^1\)See page 1.


\(^3\)See page 1.
the United States, of the Western Hemisphere, and of Great Britain would be strengthened by placing the military and economic resources of the United States first against Germany and then Japan. The fundamental basis of joint strategy agreed upon at the ABC Conference was reaffirmed and revitalized.

The creation of the Combined Chiefs of Staff comprised the second major agreement at the Arcadia Conference. As the chain of command governs the relationship of individuals within the military service, unity of command regulates the strategic relationship of Allied nations. In order to achieve coordinated and balanced operations within the European theater, the Allies agreed to amalgamate their economic and military resources. Restricting the membership to the United States' Joint Chiefs of Staff and to Great Britain's Chiefs of Staff enhanced the unification of strategic planning. Representing the United States on the Combined Chiefs of Staff were: General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff of the Army; Admiral Ernest King, Chief of Naval Operations; and Commanding General of the Army Air Force, Henry H. Arnold. Admiral Leahy, Chief of Staff to President Roosevelt, the Commander-in-Chief, was Chairman. Members to the bilateral body from the United Kingdom were: General Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff; Admiral Sir Dudley Pound, First Sea Lord and Chief of the Naval Staff (succeeded by Admiral Lord Cunningham); and Marshal Sir Charles Portal, Chief of the Air Staff.

General Marshall reported that it was:

1Sherwood, op. cit., p. 446.
the most complete unification of military effort ever achieved by two allied nations. Strategic direction of all the forces of both nations, the allocation of manpower and munitions, the coordination of communications, the control of military intelligence and the administration of captured areas all were accepted as joint responsibilities.¹

Principle Approaches to the European Continent

Wholeheartedly accepting the tenet that Germany should be defeated first, the Allies proceeded to discuss specific offensive operations in the European theater. The British Chiefs of Staff offered the following guidelines:

15. In 1942 the main methods of wearing down Germany's resistance will be:
   a. Ever-increasing air bombardment by British and American Forces.
   b. Assistance to Russia's offensive by all available means.
   c. The blockade.
   d. The maintenance of the spirit of revolt in the occupied countries, and the organization of subversive movements.

16. It does not seem likely that in 1942 any large scale offensive against Germany except on the Russian front will be possible. We must, however, be ready to take advantage of any opening that may result from the wearing down process referred to in paragraph 15 to conduct limited land offensives.

17. In 1943 the way may be clear for a return to the Continent, across the Mediterranean, from Turkey into the Balkans, or by landings in Western Europe. Such operations will be the prelude to the final assault on Germany itself, and the scope of the victory program should be such as to provide means by which they can be carried out.²


²Sherwood, op. cit., p. 459.
The ensuing discussions were immediately restricted to two principal approaches to the European Continent—via the United Kingdom or Northwest Africa. The British proposed operations in Northwest Africa as they were presently combating Italian and German forces in the area. The American military delegation was keenly aware of the significance of a successful operation in the area. In September 1941, the Joint Chiefs of Staff prepared a paper noting the advantages of securing the area.

Prevention of Axis penetration into Northwest Africa and the Atlantic Islands is very important, not only as a contribution to the defense of the Western Hemisphere but also as security to British sea communications and as a potential base for a future land offensive. In French North and West Africa, French troops exist which are potential enemies of Germany, provided they are re-equipped and satisfactory political conditions are established by the United States.¹

Nevertheless, the American strategists brought to the attention of the British the following shortcomings in initiating a campaign in North Africa. If an offensive was undertaken, (1) the Allied lines of communication would be exposed through Spanish Morocco, and (2) the lack of railroads, roads, and ports in Africa would hinder the logistical support of the operation. General Embick, General Marshall's senior advisor, opposed the operation on the premise the British were "motivated more largely by political than by sound strategic purposes."²

Whereas American military strategists opposed operations in North

¹Matloff and Snell, op. cit., p. 103.
²loc. cit., p. 104.
Africa, the President did not eliminate the area as a point of departure for commencing an offensive against the Axis. Perceiving the situation from a viewpoint other than that of the military, General Marshall explained that the President "considered it very important to morale, to give this country a feeling that they are in the war, to give the Germans the reverse effect, to have American troops somewhere in active fighting across the Atlantic."  

Deadlocked over the proposed operations in the European theater, the Allies turned their attention to the Pacific and unanimously agreed to reinforce their defenses. The British were in favor of strengthening the area for New Zealand and Australian troops stationed in North Africa would remain, if their countries were adequately protected against Japanese aggression. To facilitate the concentration of troops and supplies in the Pacific theater, the deployment of combat forces to the European theater was curtailed. Troops scheduled to depart for Iceland and Ireland were reduced, enabling 21,800 troops and supplies to be transported to the southwest Pacific.  

The Arcadia Conference concluded with a note of despair. Two noteworthy agreements were achieved, but the essential basis of joint strategy was obscured by the massive buildup in the Pacific theater.  

Reappraisal of Operations in the Pacific Theater  

By the middle of March 1942, 90,000 troops were defending the

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1 loc. cit., p. 105.
2 loc. cit., p. 117.
Hawaii-Australian line, while a token force of 20,000 troops were deployed in Iceland and northern Ireland. Fleet Admiral King viewed the buildup as significant, but maintained that additional troops were required to prevent Japanese expansion into the south Pacific. After receiving permission to garrison several islands in the Pacific in February, Admiral King requested, in March, that he be permitted to expand the perimeter to include the islands of E fate and Tongatabu.

The request was subsequently approved, but it attracted severe criticism from American strategists who objected to expanding the defensive boundary in the Pacific. General Hull, a member of the General Staff, reiterated that General Marshall had stipulated operations in the Pacific were to be restricted to defensive measures.

The Navy wants to take all the islands in the Pacific—have them held by Army troops, to become bases for Army pursuit and bombers. Then! the Navy will have a safe place to sail its vessels. But they will not go farther forward than our air (Army) can assure superiority.

The amount of air required for this slow, laborious and indecisive type of warfare is going to be something that will keep us from going to Russia's aid in time.1

Observing that operations in the Pacific were siphoning resources and troops from the European theater in defiance of the Arcadia agreement, General Eisenhower contended:

[1.] . . . in the event of war involving both oceans, the U.S. should adopt the strategic defensive in the Pacific and devote its major offensive effort across the Atlantic.

[2.] . . . we must differentiate sharply and definitely between those things whose current accomplishment in the several theaters over the world is necessary to the ultimate defeat of the Axis Powers, as opposed

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1loc. cit., p. 154.
to those which are merely desirable because of their effect in facilitating such defeat.

[3.] The United States interest in maintaining contact with Australia and in preventing further Japanese expansion to the Southeastward is apparent. . . . they are not immediately vital to the successful outcome of the war. The problem is one of determining what we can spare for the effort in that region, without seriously impairing performance of our mandatory tasks.¹

The General defended the first statement of his memorandum with the strategic axiom that the Commander should defeat the weaker enemy first. Conceding that Germany and her satellites possessed greater strength than Japan, the General qualified his statement by noting Japan was not at war with Russia. Therefore, Japan was actually stronger than Germany. It would also require three or four times as many ships to transport and maintain extensive offensive operations in the Pacific than in the Atlantic. Thus, Eisenhower concluded, "logistic reasons, as well as strategic axiom, substantiate the soundness of the decision to concentrate against the European Axis."²

Second, the distinction between necessary and desirable undertakings was clarified. The security of the United Kingdom and the Atlantic sea lanes, the retention of Russia in the war, and the support of the Middle East and India in preventing the union of Japanese and German forces were vital interests and necessary according to General Eisenhower. Secondary interests included the security of Alaska, Australia, Burmese bases, the west coast of Africa, and the trans-African air route. It was desirable to continue the lend-lease

¹loc. cit., p. 157.
²ibid.
program in order to directly assist Russia. In addition, offensive operations in Europe were imperative if German forces were to be withdrawn from the Russian front.

We should at once develop, in conjunction with the British, a definite plan for operations against Northwest Europe. It should be drawn up at once, in detail, and it should be sufficiently extensive in scale as to engage from the middle of May onward, an increasing portion of the German Air Force, and by late summer an increasing amount of his ground forces.¹

The Marshall Memorandum

General Eisenhower's proposals were readily accepted by several military groups. Fearing operations in the Pacific would curtail action in the European theater, without significantly reducing the actual or potential strength of the Japanese, the War Department supported General Eisenhower's proposals. The Joint United States Strategic Committee favorably reviewed the General's study and utilized it as the foundation for future offensive operations.

Independent of General Eisenhower's study, General George Marshall arrived at conclusions similar to those of his colleague. On March 25, 1942, General Marshall presented his findings to the President; entitled The Marshall Memorandum, the plan outlined an invasion of Europe, including the required strength and timing of the operation. The long range plan of concentrating troops and supplies on Great Britain was coded BOLERO. The plan envisioned a landing on the European Continent during 1943 which was coded operation ROUNDUP. A significant provision of the plan was an emergency landing in Europe

¹loc. cit., p. 159²

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during 1942, operation SLEDGEHAMMER, if German morale in the west deteriorated or if the Russian front was in immediate danger of collapsing.

The same day General Eisenhower presented a report to General Marshall listing the advantages of concentrating Allied forces in Great Britain for an assault against the Atlantic Wall. These advantages were: (1) It was the shortest sea route with the minimum difficulty of co-ordinating ships; (2) the mere threat of an attack would divert Germany from concentrating in depth their forces against Russia; (3) the offensive would be a direct approach to Germany using superior land communications; (4) air bases were presently operational within the immediate range of German forces; (5) the major portion of British land forces could be used without stripping the home base of their defenses; (6) the lines of communication to England had to remain open; (7) an invasion in Western Europe would facilitate the coordination of air, land, and naval forces; and (8) Germany would be attacked while simultaneously preoccupied in Russia, the Balkans, and the Middle East.¹

Elated over General Marshall's plan and supporting evidence of General Eisenhower, the Commander-in-Chief instructed General Marshall and Harry Hopkins, his diplomatic representative, to depart for London and present the plan to the British strategists. Arriving in London on April 8th, the United States' delegates met with the Defence Committee of the British War Cabinet, the Prime Minister and the British

¹loc. cit., p. 181.
Chiefs of Staff. After six days of continuous discussions the British accepted the memorandum in principle, but emphatically maintained that SLEDGEHAMMER be deleted.\textsuperscript{1} The Prime Minister recorded in his memoirs that his readiness to accept the memorandum arose from his anxiety that the United States would concentrate its efforts in the Pacific, if the plan was vetoed.\textsuperscript{2} Reporting to the President, General Marshall informed him everybody agreed in principle, but reservations were held by numerous strategists.

The Effect of Landing Craft Upon the Invasion of Europe

Theoretically, General Marshall's plan was strategically sound, but the logistical resources required to initiate the plan were limited. In order to facilitate the immediate execution of the plan, the President ordered the construction of 2,500 landing craft for SLEDGEHAMMER and 8,200 craft for ROUNDUP.\textsuperscript{3} Immediately after the construction began the British objected to the mass construction of small landing craft. They pointed out that the small craft would have to be transported across the Atlantic and would cause an increase upon the demands of shipping. The British urged the United States to construct vessels that could cross the Atlantic under their own power, and emphasized that ships of this type would be required


\textsuperscript{3}Matloff and Snell, op. cit., p. 192.
in crossing the Channel and establishing beachheads.

It was not until the 8th of May that the United States was convinced of the British arguments for constructing landing craft capable of crossing the ocean. The construction of large numbers of landing ship, tanks (LST) and landing craft, tanks (LCT) would only be accomplished by granting it priority over the construction of hulls, engines, destroyer escorts, and air craft carriers. The threat of German submarines in the Atlantic, on the other hand, forced the Navy to emphasize naval construction for the defense of the Atlantic convoys. Consequently, during the first quarter of 1942 escort carriers were number one on the Navy's Shipyard Precedence List, while the construction of landing craft and vessels were tenth. From April to October the production of landing craft steadily climbed to second place, but the following month plunged to the twelfth position.¹

Areas in Contention with Northwest France

In March 1942, President Roosevelt sent two divisions to the southwest Pacific enabling an Australian and New Zealand division to remain in the Middle East. The President also agreed to place at the disposal of the British sufficient tonnage to transport 40,000 troops to the Middle East. Writing of the military significance of the Middle East, General Eisenhower advised:

For many reasons the combat units in this region should be British, but our interest in the whole matter is such that we should give the British every possible encouragement and

¹Sherwood, op. cit., p. 554.
assistance in building up the defenses now. For example, I would go as far as to strip American mechanized units down to bare training requirements, and to find every possible pursuit and bomber airplane that could be dispatched to the area without damaging our ability to expand, provided only the British will guarantee to have the trained units there to operate this equipment effectively.\(^1\)

The second area in contention with BOLERO and SLEDGEHAMMER was the lend-lease program with Russia. In March, the President directed the Secretary of War to continue and expand military assistance to Russia, for the results were of vital interest to the nation. Writing of the military value of assisting Russia, President Roosevelt penned:

> I understand that, from a strategical point of view, the Army and Navy feel that aid to Russia should be continued and expanded to the maximum extent possible, consistent with shipping possibilities and the vital needs of the United States, the British Commonwealth of Nations and others of the United Nations. I share such a view.\(^2\)

In response to the directive, 450,000 short tons of supplies were sent to Russia during April compared to 200,000 short tons in March, and 375,000 short tons between October 1941 and March 1942. More than 1,000,000 short tons of supplies had been transported to Russia, but it was only one-half of the supplies the United States pledged to transport by June 1942.\(^3\)

\(^1\)Matloff and Snell, op. cit., p. 199, citing Memo, OPD for C of S, 16 Mar 42, sub: Atchd ltr from Sir John Dill, OPD 381 Middle East, 1. The attached letter is not in this file. It is perhaps the letter of that date in WDCSA 381 War Plans (S).

\(^2\)loc. cit., p. 206, citing Ltr, President to SW, 24 Mar 42, with JPS 28/D in ABC 400.3295 Russia (19 Apr 42), 1.

\(^3\)ibid.
The third source of conflict with the Marshall Memorandum was China. Initial allotments of military supplies were established at 50,000 tons monthly, but due to physical difficulties encountered in transporting the goods, the tonnage decreased from 7,500 tons in May to 3,500 tons in July 1942. Nevertheless, the limited assistance to China also led to the difficulty of concentrating troops and supplies in Great Britain.

Ninety thousand troops were sent to the Pacific theater of operations during the first three months of 1942, while a token force of 20,000 men were sent to the European theater. Evaluating the importance of the Pacific, General MacArthur on the 8th of May urged that the Allied second front be initiated in the Pacific rather than in Europe. An offensive operation would assist Russia by enabling troops stationed in Manchuria to be deployed to the battlefields in the west. The Pacific theater Commander also contended that a second front in the Pacific "would have the enthusiastic psychological support of the entire American Nation," as well as providing additional security to Australia and India.

The Navy upheld the assumption that the Japanese were capable of striking the Allied lines of communication in the Pacific at will. With this in mind, General MacArthur urged the development of a defense network in depth. This would enable the Allies not only to contain the Japanese, but also to initiate offensive operations against the aggressor. The Army and Air Force, on the other hand, insisted

1 loc. cit., p. 215.
that bomber and fighter planes be stationed only in Hawaii and Australia. The defense would not be in depth, but it would centralize resources and troops in the Pacific and facilitate the control of operations.

In lieu of the widening conflict between the armed services, the Joint Chiefs of Staff deliberated the ensuing problems. At the discussions, General Marshall emphasized that further diversions of resources in the Pacific would hinder BOLERO. Admiral King did not deny the desirability of an early offensive in Europe, but compared the buildup of troops and supplies in Great Britain as important as reinforcing the Pacific with Allied troops. "We must not permit diversion of our forces to any proposed operation in any other theater," Admiral King urged, "to the extent that we find ourselves unable to fulfill our obligations to implement our basic strategic plan in the Pacific theater."1 Deadlocked, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed to present their views to the Commander-in-Chief. Shortly thereafter, the President implicitly replied that he did not desire operations in the Pacific to handicap BOLERO.

The Marshall Memorandum remained the only strategic plan agreed upon by the coalition, but both nations interpreted the contents from a dissimilar perspective. Fearing increased American involvement in the Pacific the British agreed to the plan in order to direct America's attention to Europe and to simultaneously bolster their defenses.

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The United States military strategists viewed BOLERO as the first step for an Allied cross-Channel invasion in 1943 and insisted on retaining SLEDGEHAMMER, to which the British disagreed profoundly. Viewing the proposed program from different perspectives, the British and American strategists formed conflicting conclusions and interpretations which stimulated misunderstanding and unrest.
CHAPTER III

DIFFERENCES IN ALLIED STRATEGY ARE OVERCOME THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS AND COMPROMISES

The British Refuse to Execute SLEDGEHAMMER

President Roosevelt was extremely dissatisfied with the lack of initiative and imagination of the Allied powers. At the Arcadia Conference he had emphasized the need for action in 1942, but during the first six months American troops had not engaged German forces.

I have been disturbed by American and British naval objections to operations in the European Theatre prior to 1943. I regard it as essential that active operations be conducted in 1942. I fully realize difficulties in relation to the landing of armed forces under fire. All of us would like to have ideal material to work with. Material is never either ideal, or satisfactory, or sufficient. We have to use "any old method of transportation which will get us to our destination."

Immediate action on the Continent, Franklin Roosevelt urged, was necessary to relieve the Russian front of relentless German land and air assaults. He continually reiterated to his military strategists that more German troops were being killed and Axis material destroyed by the Russians than by the combined forces of the twenty-five Allied nations.

While the President was advocating a second front, the Russian Foreign Minister was pleading for the identical objectives in London. Instead of supporting the Russian proposals, the British discreetly

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1 loc. cit., p. 221.
discussed preparations for an invasion, without specifically naming the time or place of execution. Prime Minister Winston Churchill parried:

We are making preparations for a landing on the Continent in August or September, 1942. . . . Clearly however it would not further either the Russian cause or that of the Allies as a whole if, for the sake of action at any price, we embarked on some operation which ended in disaster and gave the enemy an opportunity for glorification at our discomfiture. It is impossible to say in advance whether the situation will be such as to make this operation feasible when the time comes. We can therefore give no promise in the matter, . . . 1

In June, the Prime Minister wrote Franklin Roosevelt and curtly informed him that he had no intention of allowing the British to execute SLEDGEHAMMER. Mindful of the President's desire to place American troops in action during 1942, the Prime Minister stated he was sending General Mountbatten to the United States to discuss alternative operations. The Minister of Defence proposed Norway as a possible stepping stone to the European Continent, but concluded the message by stating, "We must never let GYMNAST pass from our minds." 2

Arriving in June, General Mountbatten elaborated upon the British reluctance to execute SLEDGEHAMMER. The primary reason presented for canceling the operation was the limitation of landing craft and vessels. With an insufficient number of landing craft, an emergency landing on the Continent would not have sufficient strength to force German divisions to withdraw from the Russian front. The twenty-five

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1 Churchill, The Hinge of Fate, op. cit., p. 342.
2 Sherwood, op. cit., p. 556.
German divisions fortifying the Atlantic Wall could easily contain, repel, and annihilate an Allied assault.¹

After allowing General Mountbatten to prepare the groundwork for strategic discussions, the Prime Minister and his staff came to the United States to discuss specific offensive operations in 1942. The British Chiefs of Staff reemphasized that operations staged against Northwest Europe could not be undertaken in 1942. Nevertheless, they upheld the view that BOLERO should be continued expeditiously with the primary objective of invading the Continent in 1943. Guided by Winston Churchill the British proposed that an offensive operation be initiated to relieve direct and indirect pressure upon Russia. "It is in this setting and on this background that the operation GYMNAST should be studied."²

The Joint Chiefs of Staff immediately opposed the Prime Minister's recommendations, maintaining that a diversion of troops and resources from operation SLEDGEHAMMER or BOLERO would automatically cancel ROUNDUP in 1943.

General Marshall said that large scale operations on the Continent in 1943 would clearly not be possible unless all efforts were concentrated now on their preparation. If we changed our plan now, and opened up another front, we should probably achieve nothing. If we went ahead, we should at least ensure the safety of the United Kingdom, whatever happened in Russia, and any change of plan would be made in about September when we knew what the situation on the Eastern front was going to be.³

¹Bryant, op. cit., pp. 317-18.
²Matloff and Snell, op. cit., p. 240.
The "Pacific Alternative"

The Prime Minister's interest in North Africa was intensified with the announcement on June 21, 1941 that the British forces at Tobruk had capitulated. Over 30,000 troops were captured and 30,000 cubic meters of petrol seized, which would undoubtedly contribute in sustaining Rommel's offensive toward the Suez Canal. British anxieties were heightened in that the Pacific and European aggressors could conceivably unite their forces. Realizing the acute danger that faced the British, President Roosevelt offered 300 Sherman tanks and 100 self-propelled guns to strengthen the British 8th Army. The Prime Minister gratefully accepted the President's offer.¹

On June 24th, the Washington Conference concluded without clarifying the relationship of Northwest Europe to North Africa. Tactfully postponing a direct conflict of interests, the Allies agreed to support BOLERO until the 1st of September.

Two weeks later the British War Cabinet declared in a memorandum:

(a) We should not attempt any major landing on the Continent this year unless we intended to stay there;
(b) All plans and preparations for "Sledgehammer" should be pressed forward with the greatest vigour, on the understanding that the operation would not be launched, except in conditions which held out a good prospect of success;²

Upon reading the message, General Marshall became infuriated.

²Matloff and Snell, op. cit., p. 266.
Confronted with the President's desire for action in 1942 and the refusal of the British to support SLEDGEHAMMER, he realized his opinions and proposals were not to be fulfilled. Vigorously he opposed operations in North Africa, claiming they would reduce Allied resources and jeopardize a cross-Channel assault in 1943.¹

Contradicting his earlier proposals, General Marshall countered the British refusal of undertaking SLEDGEHAMMER by threatening to initiate an offensive in the Pacific. He noted that the move would win the resounding support of the United States populace, and would, aside from the emergency landing, be the preponderating method of assisting Russia. Admiral King, who had always placed considerable emphasis upon the Pacific, rather than the Atlantic, staunchly supported the plan. Attempting to increase tensions between the Allies, Admiral King declared that "in his opinion, the British had never been in wholehearted accord with operations on the continent as proposed by the U.S."² The two staff members proceeded to compose in detail the Pacific Alternative.

If the United States is to engage in any other operation than forceful, unswerving adherence to full Bolero plans, we are definitely of the opinion that we should turn to the Pacific and strike decisively against Japan; in other words assume a defensive attitude toward Germany, except for air operations; and use all available means in the Pacific. Such action would not only be definite and decisive against one of our principal enemies, but would bring concrete aid to the Russians in case Japan attacks them.³

¹ibid.

²loc. cit., p. 268.

³loc. cit., p. 269, citing Memo, C of S, COMINCH, and CNO for President, 10 Jul 42, no sub, OPD 381 Gen. 73.
The memorandum was presented to the President for consideration on July 12th. Two days later, the Commander-in-Chief replied to General Marshall that he refused to support increased operations in the Pacific. Formally presenting his views on July 16, the President stated:

9. I am opposed to an American all-out effort in the Pacific against Japan with the view to her defeat as quickly as possible. It is of the utmost importance that we appreciate that defeat of Japan does not defeat Germany and that American concentration against Japan this year or in 1943 increases the chance of complete German domination of Europe and Africa. On the other hand, it is obvious that defeat of Germany, or the holding of Germany in 1942 or in 1943 means probable, eventual defeat of Germany in the European and African theatres and in the Near East.¹

Unequivocally refusing to support operations in the Pacific, the President ordered General Marshall and Admiral King to proceed to London and secure a definite military objective for 1942. His representatives were given the opportunity of persuading the Prime Minister of the strategic value of operation SLEDGEHAMMER. If the British remained steadfast, the delegates were ordered to secure an agreement placing United States troops in action. Reiterating his desire for an offensive operation in 1942, the President instructed:

10. Please remember three cardinal principles—speed of decision on plans, unity of plans, attack combined with defense but not defense alone. This affects the immediate objective of U.S. ground forces fighting against Germany in 1942.

ll. I hope for total agreement within one week of your arrival.¹

Operation TORCH

On July 18th, General Marshall and Admiral King arrived in London and vigorously presented their arguments in favor of operation SLEDGEHAMMER. The British unanimously opposed the operation and countered the American arguments by maintaining that the threat of a cross-Channel invasion was presently idling forty German divisions in the coastal regions. They contended that the German troops would be forced to remain in the area due to the Allies staging commando raids, deceptive shipping movements, and air attacks.

After continued negotiations without agreement, General Marshall and Admiral King conceded to the British proposal of initiating GYMNAST as the major Allied operation of 1942. Although the operation conflicted with their views, the American delegation realized that the Commander-in-Chief and Minister of Defence would wholeheartedly support the operation. Prior to the conference, President Roosevelt had noted that an offensive operation in North Africa would (1) secure Western Africa, (2) deny ports to the enemy, (3) be the shortest supply route for an operation against the Axis powers, (4) open the Mediterranean to Allied convoys, and (5) help to relieve Malta.²

¹loc. cit., p. 278, citing (1) Memo cited n. 23. (2) For the President's opposition to the Pacific alternative see paragraph 9, quoted above, pp. 272-73.
²Sherwood, op. cit., p. 603.
On July 25, 1942, the American representatives conditionally agreed to initiate operation TORCH, the invasion of North Africa, if the final approval was postponed until September 15th. Providing the Russians successfully repelled the German offensive, operation ROUNDUP would retain priority over all operations. On the other hand, if the Russian front continued to deteriorate, the Allies would invade North Africa by December 1942, in hopes of diverting German forces from the eastern front. Memorandum CCS-94, containing the agreements was unanimously approved by the Prime Minister and American Joint Chiefs of Staff.¹

Returning to the United States, General Marshall reported that the conflict between operation TORCH and ROUNDUP was not resolved. He contended that the two operations were not compatible. If TORCH was undertaken in 1942, it would simultaneously cancel ROUNDUP for 1943. Admiral King spirited the controversy by asserting it was "his impression that the President and Prime Minister had not yet reached an agreement to abandon ROUNDUP in favor of TORCH."² BOLERO-ROUNDUP, Admiral King continued, would strengthen the security of the United Kingdom, while TORCH would reduce the strength of the Nation. The President was acutely aware of his Chiefs of Staff opposition to a campaign in North Africa. Nevertheless, the political necessity of initiating positive action against German forces compelled the President to order the execution of operation TORCH no later than October

¹Meyer, op. cit., pp. 142-43.
²Matloff and Snell, op. cit., p. 283.
30th. General Marshall reported that the President:

... as Commander-in-Chief had made the decision that TORCH would be undertaken at the earliest possible date. He considered that this operation was now our principal objective and the assembling of means to carry it out should take precedence over other operations.¹

The Dieppe Raid

Fearing the British would expand operations in the Mediterranean, General Marshall warned that "the decision to mount the operation has been made, but it is still subject to the vicissitudes of war."² Illuminating and kindling the controversy were the military agreements approved at the Arcadia Conference and the London Conference. The British maintained that CCS-94 complemented the agreement made at the Arcadia Conference, whereas the United States strategists contended that the agreements contradicted one another. Operation TORCH, the British argued, was consistent with the agreements signed at Washington which called for "tightening and closing the ring round Germany."³ General Marshall countered quickly by pointing out that the Arcadia Conference called for "the wearing down of Germany's resistance by ever-increasing air bombardment by British and American forces."⁴ However, CCS-94 had called for the withdrawal of fifteen

²Matloff and Snell, op. cit., p. 294.
³loc. cit., p. 295.
⁴loc. cit., p. 296.
groups of aircraft from the United Kingdom to the Pacific theater.

General Marshall's opinion of the British strategic policy did not significantly alter after the British staged a major commando raid against Northwest France. Landing on August 19th a British-Canadian force of 5,000 troops vigorously attacked Dieppe. Courageously fighting Allied troops were repulsed by German forces blotting out the lives of more than 3,000 soldiers, as well as capturing numerous troops. The raid demonstrated the overwhelming strength of the Atlantic Wall and clearly demonstrated the futility of launching an invasion on the Continent without adequate landing vessels or means of supporting the troops. Providing invaluable data for assessing and analyzing the quantity and type of equipment required to conduct a successful invasion, the Dieppe raid was a fundamental but costly epic of Allied strategy in Northwest Europe.¹

Threatened by an ever-widening breach in Allied unity Field Marshal Sir John Dill, British representative in Washington, appealed to General Marshall for continued solidarity of the coalition.

I am just a little disturbed about TORCH. For good or for ill it has been accepted and therefore I feel that we should go at it with all possible enthusiasm and give it absolute priority. If we don't it won't succeed.

From what our Planners tell me, there are some of your people who feel that TORCH is not a good operation. That, of course, must be a matter of opinion but those who are playing a part in mounting the operation must be entirely whole-hearted about it, or they cannot give it all the help it should have and overcome all the difficulties that will arise.

All I aim at is to ensure that we all think alike—and enthusiastically.²

¹Bryant, op. cit., pp. 396-97.
²Matloff and Snell, op. cit., p. 295.
CHAPTER IV

INTERLOCKING RELATIONSHIPS OF THE PACIFIC, MEDITERRANEAN,
AND NORTHWEST THEATERS OF OPERATION

The Casablanca Conference

With the wholehearted support of President Roosevelt, Operation TORCH was launched on November 8, 1942. Landing simultaneously at Algiers, Oran, and Casablanca, the Allied forces steadily pushed the Axis powers toward Tunis.

Reviewing the deployment of troops in December, it was brought to the attention of the Combined Chiefs of Staff that 170,000 United States soldiers were stationed throughout the British Isles. 141,000 combat troops were deployed to North Africa compared to 345,000 troops in the Pacific.\(^1\) The United States Joint Chiefs of Staff analyzed the statistics and claimed that operations in the Mediterranean theater were curtailing the buildup of BOLERO. The British viewed the identical statistics and maintained that the deployment of American troops in the Pacific threatened to restrict operations in Europe. Numerically, 34,000 more troops were stationed in the Pacific than in the European theater.

On the eve of the Casablanca Conference, the Allies were acutely suspicious of each other's intentions. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were highly critical of North Africa, but they could not overlook the

\(^1\)loc. cit., p. 358.
strategic value of controlling the area. Opening the Mediterranean would permit Allied shipping in the area and double the perimeter of the occupied territory in Europe the Axis Powers would have to defend. Diversified attacks could be mounted against Germany forcing her to disperse her troops, thereby attenuating her strength.

Recognizing the value of maintaining the offensive, the Combined Chiefs of Staff unanimously agreed to continue the offensive after the Axis forces were defeated in North Africa. The fundamental problem confronting the Allies arose in determining where the operation should be staged. In November, the Prime Minister had cabled the President suggesting that operations in the Mediterranean be continued after the North African venture. Utilizing the available resources in North Africa, the Allies could "strike at the underbelly of the Axis . . . in the shortest time." Speaking for the Chiefs of Staff, Sir Lord Alan Brooke cautioned the Allies that they could not successfully attack Northwest France until Germany was incapacitated. To help fabricate the necessary conditions for a victorious invasion, the Allied nations should defeat Italy and entreat Turkey to join the Allies. Operations in the Mediterranean would force Germany to further disperse her troops, thereby indirectly weakening the German offensive in Russia and influence in the Balkans.

General Marshall, chief spokesman for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, accentuated the importance of continued support and implementing

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1Sherwood, op. cit., p. 674.
BOLERO-ROUNDUP at the earliest opportunity. Further diversions in the Mediterranean, he charged, could only impede the concentration of troops in the British Isles positioned for the cross-Channel invasion. Studying the requirements of a global war, the strategic planners concluded that eventually "we must prepare to fight Germany by actually coming to grips with and defeating her ground forces and definitely breaking her will to combat."¹

The British Chiefs of Staff, however, cautioned that resuming ROUNDUP would delay offensive operations, as well as curtail the relief of the Russian front. Conducting a cross-Channel invasion in 1943 would postpone all operations until summer and the success of the invasion would be doubtful due to the limited number of landing craft and vessels. During the period the Allies would be preparing for an offensive, the Germans would be able to regroup and strengthen their forces. The British deducted that the Allies should exploit the victory in North Africa by continuing the offensive in the Mediterranean with the dual objective of knocking Italy out of the war and persuading Turkey to join the Allied coalition.

The controversy between the Mediterranean and Northwest Europe was complicated by military operations in the Pacific. Countering the British proposal of advancing in the Mediterranean, the United States' strategists suggested that the Allied resources be divided between the two theaters: 30% to the Pacific and 70% to the European

theater. New operations in the Pacific were proposed, including the neutralization of the Islands of Solomon and New Guinea in the Central Pacific. Appalled by the American proposals the British insisted that operations in the Pacific be confined to Rabaul and Burma. If additional operations were deemed necessary, the British contended that the Americans submit detailed plans to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for subsequent approval.

The United States' strategists found the British rebuttal unacceptable. The implication that operations in the Pacific, presently the sole responsibility of the United States, could only be undertaken with the approval of the British was unsatisfactory. Admiral King commented that the Combined Chiefs of Staff only had the authority of deciding "the balance between the effort to be put against Germany and Japan."¹

To assuage American concern regarding the Pacific and focus American attention upon the European theater, the Prime Minister pledged to assist their associates in the Pacific after Germany was overpowered. On January 23, 1943, the Allies agreed at Casablanca that:

operations in the Pacific shall continue with the object of maintaining pressure on Japan. . . . these operations must be kept within such limits as will not, in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, jeopardise [sic] the capacity of the United Nations to take advantage of any favourable opportunity for the decisive defeat of Germany in 1943.²

The Pacific theater remained an obstacle to operations in Europe,

¹Morton, op. cit., p. 384.
²Wilmot, op. cit., p. 121.
since the United States was free to dictate strategy within the Pacific without British approval. On the other hand, the controversy between the Mediterranean and Northwest Europe highlighted the drama within the European theater. The British Chiefs of Staff, bound by a common goal and guided by the Prime Minister, accentuated the importance of continuing operations in the Mediterranean. Conversely, the members of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff were divided in purpose at Casablanca. They were influenced by the British, who stressed specific advantages to their respective branches of service by continuing operations in the Mediterranean.

Admiral King was convinced of the credibility in continuing operations in the Mediterranean when the British declared that more ships could be diverted to the Pacific after the shipping lanes in the Mediterranean were secured. General of the Air Force, Hap Arnold, also recognized the strategic value of the British proposal since forward air support could strike at southern Germany. General Marshall, the staunch proponent of the cross-Channel invasion, was not oblivious to the advantages of further operations in the Mediterranean.

In Marshall's words, this decision was made "because we will have in North Africa a large number of troops available and because it will effect an economy in tonnage which is the major consideration. It is estimated that possession of the North coast of Africa and Sicily will release approximately 225 vessels which will facilitate operations in Burma, the Middle East, and the Pacific."1

Failing to unite and reconcile their differences prior to the

1Sherwood, op. cit., p. 675.

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conference, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were thoroughly satisfied by specific military advantages to their branch of service as outlined by the British. Unable to propose an alternate plan, the Americans agreed to continue operations in the Mediterranean by undertaking HUSKY, the invasion of Sicily, after securing North Africa.

The conference, however, was not entirely dominated by the British for the Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed to continue BOLERO and execute "an invasion in force in 1944." Preparation for the cross-Channel invasion was strengthened by the Allies agreeing to initiate a combined command to formulate a plan for the reentry into Europe. Entitled, Combined Chiefs of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (COSSAC) the committee was located in London and headed by Major General Morgan, a British officer. In effect, the conference resulted in a compromise between the Mediterranean, Western Europe, and Pacific theaters of operation. Operations in the Mediterranean and Pacific continued while COSSAC was given the task of formulating the plan for an Allied invasion in Northwest Europe.  

The American Strategists Refine Their Techniques in Negotiating

Returning to the United States, the American military strategists reviewed the results of their negotiations at Casablanca with


2See Bryant, op. cit., pp. 442-56 for a comprehensive account of the Casablanca Conference by Lord Alanbrooke.
dismay. Instead of interpreting the results as a valid compromise, the Americans resentfully depicted the results as a victory for the British strategists. General Wedemeyer, Chief of the Strategy and Policy Committee wrote:

They swarmed down upon us like locusts with a plentiful supply of planners and various other assistants with prepared plans to insure that they not only accomplished their purpose but did so in stride and with fair promise of continuing in their role of directing strategically the course of this war. I have the greatest admiration, . . . and if I were a Britisher I would feel very proud. However, as an American I wish that we might be more glib and better organized to cope with these super negotiators. From a worm's eye viewpoint it was apparent that we were confronted by generations and generations of experience in committee work and in rationalizing points of view. They had us on the defensive practically all the time.\(^1\)

Recognizing their inconsistencies in negotiating, the American strategists proceeded to rectify their shortcomings. Noting the unity of purpose exhibited by the Prime Minister, the Chiefs of Staff, and the British War Cabinet, the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff sought to achieve political and military solidarity. Not only did the strategists agree to formulate plans they deemed vital, but they also prepared plans they anticipated the British would declare essential. Thus, they would be aware of potential British proposals and be able to prepare logical and rational rebuttals.

The Battle of the Atlantic

Turning their attention to the Atlantic, the Combined Chiefs of

\(^1\)Matloff, Maurice, United States Army in World War II, VI: Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1943-44. Washington, D.C., Office of the Chief of Military History, 1959, p. 107, citing Pers ltr. Wedemeyer to Handy, 22 Jan 43, no sub, Case 5, Item Ia, Exec. 3.
Staff emphasized that "the defeat of the U-boat must remain a first charge on the resources of the United Nations." They recommended on 19 January 1943 that the President and Prime Minister authorize top naval priority to achieve "security of sea communications." The significance of the agreement was magnified by the fact, cited by the Allied military and political leaders, that a cross-Channel invasion was not feasible until the U-boat menace was nullified.

By April 1943, the countermeasures proposed by the Allies at Casablanca were implemented. Escort vessels were constructed to provide maximum protection of the convoys, and support groups were formed to protect the flanks of transport ships. Air support from Newfoundland, Iceland, and Ireland patrolled the mid-Atlantic which was previously unprotected. The innovation of radar enabled Allied air patrols and naval vessels to detect U-boats without revealing their positions. The results of the novel scientific developments and tactics were enlightening. Allied shipping losses were reduced from 523,000 tons in March to 260,000 tons in April. In May 1943, 187,000 tons of Allied shipping was destroyed in the Atlantic by the German naval forces at their cost of forty-one U-boats. Thus, for each 4,500 tons of Allied shipping destroyed in April 1943, the Germans lost one U-boat, compared to 60,000 tons of shipping per U-boat in 1942.

1Wilmot, op. cit., p. 124.
2Ibid.
TABLE 1

ALLIED MERCHANT SHIPPING LOSSES DURING THE WAR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Vessels</th>
<th>Tonnage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>775,237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>1,059</td>
<td>3,991,641</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>1,299</td>
<td>4,328,558</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>1,664</td>
<td>7,790,697</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>597</td>
<td>3,220,137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>1,045,629</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>438,321</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The Trident Conference

Prior to the Trident Conference, a goal was formulated, approved, and wholeheartedly supported by the President and Joint Chiefs of Staff.

It was determined that the principal objective of the American Government would be to pin down the British to a cross-Channel invasion of Europe at the earliest practicable date and to make full preparations for such an operation by the spring of 1944.¹

The Trident Conference convened on May 12, 1943 with an air of optimism. General Eisenhower had announced that the final organized resistance in North Africa ceased with the capture in Tunis of

¹Matloff, op. cit., p. 124.
160,000 German and Italian troops. Analyzing the significance of the victory, Prime Minister Winston Churchill called for continuing the offensive in the Mediterranean, thereby forcing the Germans to remain on the defensive. Eliminating Italy, he attested, would (1) reduce the Axis strength and their ability to defend their conquered territories, (2) force Italian troops to withdraw from the Balkans, (3) result in the demobilization of the Italian fleet, and (4) perhaps induce the Turkish government to join the Allied powers.¹

The President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff announced that ROUNDUP could not be undertaken in 1943, but emphasized that definite plans be implemented to invade the Continent in 1944. Constant pressure must be exerted upon German forces to relieve the Russian front and prevent the Axis from regrouping and reorganizing their forces. Contending that large scale ground operations in Italy would jeopardize a cross-Channel operation, they vigorously supported offensive air operations in the Mediterranean. Thus, a maximum number of Axis troops would be required to defend the area against a minimum number of Allied forces.

The British replied that land operations on the Italian Peninsula were necessary to insure total defeat of the Italian Armed Forces. Articulately phrasing their arguments, the British claimed that eliminating Italy would facilitate the cross-Channel invasion by diverting German troops from the western coast. The balance of power in Northwest Europe would change significantly in favor of

the United Nations, Air Marshal Portal stated, if operations in the Mediterranean were undertaken before launching ROUNDUP.¹

Fearing the dispersal of Allied troops in the Mediterranean, the Americans countered the British rebuttal by threatening to initiate large scale operations in the Pacific. Fully aware of the British determination to prevent large scale operations in the Pacific, the Americans hoped to force the British into accepting the cross-Channel invasion in 1944. Tactfully and diplomatically, the Prime Minister replied that he favored an invasion against Northwest Europe provided "reasonable prospects of success could be made."²

The ensuing results of the Trident Conference were a series of compromises between the two Allies. Operations in the Mediterranean and Pacific would be expanded, with the possibility of executing the cross-Channel invasion in 1944. General Eisenhower was directed to exploit HUSKY by undertaking operations "calculated to eliminate Italy from the war and to contain the maximum number of German forces. Which of the various specific operations should be adopted, and thereafter mounted, is a decision which will be reserved to the Combined Chiefs of Staff."³ It was further stipulated that four American and three British divisions would be transferred from the Mediterranean to England to participate in the cross-Channel task force. Additional offensive operations in the southwest Pacific would be mounted

¹Matloff, op. cit., p. 129.
²loc. cit., p. 128.
³Churchill, The Hinge of Fate, op. cit., p. 810.
simultaneously with operations in the Central Pacific to keep the
Japanese off balance. Highlighting the Trident Conference was the
decision to concentrate "forces and equipment, [in Great Britain]
with the object of mounting an operation with target date 1 May 1944
to secure a lodgement on the Continent from which further offensive
operations can be carried out."^1

^1Harrison, op. cit., p. 69.
CHAPTER V

TIMELY COMPROMISES ENABLE THE ALLIES TO STAGE CONTINUOUS OPERATIONS IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER

Operation OVERLORD

The British considered "not only the program of preparation approved by Roosevelt and Churchill but also the target date and the ultimate decision to invade, [Northwestern Europe] . . . as within the realm of discussion."¹ In order to successfully breach the Atlantic Fortress, the British argued that operations in the Mediterranean must be undertaken.

Numerically limited in manpower and natural resources, the British sought to achieve victory by maneuver, mobility, economy of force, and flexibility. Effectively utilizing Allied naval and air superiority, German forces throughout Europe could be weakened by dispersing their troops. Only when Germany's resistance was abated could the main assault upon Northwestern Europe be undertaken. To the British, success in the Mediterranean was the key in exploiting Allied operations in Western Europe.

Permeated by centuries of maintaining the balance of power in Europe, the British were acutely aware of the relationship of political, economic, and military objectives in the Mediterranean. These

objectives, well defined and discernible, "must always be kept in
view by the directors of grand strategy. Otherwise, as has so often
happened, the war may be won but the peace will be lost."¹ Support­
ing the British view of operations in the Mediterranean were ranking
officers of the United States, who openly spoke against the cross­
Channel invasion. Lieutenant General Hull, Chief of the Operations
Division Theater Group, disclosed the following reappraisal of the
military policy of the United States in the Mediterranean:

Although from the very beginning of this war, I have felt
that the logical plan for the defeat of Germany was to
strike at her across the channel by the most direct route,
our commitments to the Mediterranean have led me to the be­
lief that we should now reverse our decision and pour our
resources into the exploitation of our Mediterranean opera­
tions. . . . As to Germany, in my opinion, the decision
should be an all-out effort in the Mediterranean.²

On July 25th, Colonels Bessell and Lindsay belittled the cross­
Channel invasion by claiming the Allies were "long on lip service
but short on results."³ They reported that operation ROUN­
DUP called
for over one million troops in Great Britain by April 1943, but only
109,137 troops were stationed at that time on the British Isles. The
Colonels noted further that there were presently 185,532 men in uni­
form in Great Britain, compared to an unprecedented force of 520,087

¹Wilmot, op. cit., p. 130.

²Matloff, op. cit., p. 165, citing Memo, Hull for Handy, 17 Jul
43, no sub, with Tab SS 111 in ABC 381 SS Papers, Nos. 96-126/3
(7 Jan 43).

³loc. cit., p. 166.
American troops in the Mediterranean.\textsuperscript{1} Based on the overwhelming numerical superiority of troops strategically positioned in the Mediterranean, the Colonels proposed that operational plans for BOLERO be continued, but not at the expense of disrupting operations in the Mediterranean. They recommended that an all-out offensive against Italy be undertaken immediately.

Challenging the strategy of mounting sustained operations in the Mediterranean was COSSAC, directed by General Morgan. After six months of intensified strategic research, the joint committee issued a recommendation on August 5, 1943. They unanimously agreed that an invasion staged against the Atlantic Wall would be the only means of decisively defeating Germany.

Reviewing the proposed assault with rejuvenated spirit, General Marshall openly opposed the allocation of additional resources to the Mediterranean theater for: (1) a decisive victory against Germany could not be achieved; (2) the Russian front could not be directly relieved of the German offensive; (3) the mountainous terrain in Italy offered defensive, rather than offensive, tactical and strategic movements; (4) large scale amphibious operations could not be undertaken; and (5) operations in the Mediterranean would not force the Germans to expose its air force. Continued operations in the Mediterranean, General Marshall reiterated, could only result in a "strategic stalemate"\textsuperscript{2} in Europe. An assault on the Normandy coast,

\textsuperscript{1}ibid.

\textsuperscript{2}loc. cit., pp. 177-78.
he persisted, would directly lead to the ultimate victory of the Allied powers. Combined land, sea, and air operations could be co-ordinated in depth from Great Britain against the Axis power.

Exploiting the Collapse of Benito Mussolini

The decision to launch an assault upon Sicily was carried out on 10 July 1943. The offensive was executed simultaneously with the British 7th and 8th Armies, directly coordinated with the United States 1st, 3rd, and 45th Infantry Divisions and the 2nd Armored Division. Primary military objectives in Sicily were secured within a month and a half. A secondary effect of the operation was the shift of German reserves from the Russian front to the vacuum in the Balkans, created by the withdrawal of Italian troops.

An intelligence report released on July 15th, five days after Sicily was invaded, cited that the Allies could assume calculated risks in dealing with Italy. After thoroughly evaluating this report, General Marshall proposed on July 16th that an amphibious assault upon Naples be undertaken to exploit the deteriorating Italian Army. The proposal by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was enthusiastically received by the Prime Minister and Sir John Dill.

Hopeful of fully exploiting the situation, the British ordered their military forces to stand fast and prepare for an all-out offensive in Italy. The unqualified British support startled the American strategists. Operations in Italy were designed to expedite the execution of OVERLORD, not to commence protracted operations in the Mediterranean. Aggravated by the British actions, General
Marshall stoutly maintained that General Eisenhower had ample resources to capture Naples, without retaining resources delegated to other theaters of operations. Disputing over the distribution of troops and resources in the Mediterranean ceased with the announcement of the collapse of Benito Mussolini.¹ No longer was an amphibious assault on Naples deemed a calculated risk, it was proclaimed a "conservative and orthodox"² operation by General Marshall. Under the ensuing circumstances the President and his Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed to increase General Eisenhower's force by 60,000 more men than originally allocated at the Trident Conference.³

The Quebec Conference

Coupled with the eminent political and military collapse of Italy were noteworthy military victories throughout the military theaters of operation. On the eastern front the Russians had seized the offensive; in the Atlantic the tide of battle was turning in favor of the Allies; and in Western Europe the combined bomber offensive against Germany had commenced. On the opposite side of the globe, the Japanese were forced to assume the defensive. In the northern Pacific, the Japanese had evacuated the Aleutian Islands; in the southwest, the Allies were preparing to advance on New Guinea;

¹King Victor Emmanuel appointed Marshal Pietro Badoglio Prime Minister of Italy.
²Matloff, loc. cit., p. 160.
³Ibid.
and operations were planned in the central Pacific for an invasion against the Gilbert, Truk, and Palau Islands. The Allies agreed to neutralize Rabaul, rather than capture the Island which "marked the first official pronouncement of a policy of bypassing strong centers of resistance and foreshadowed the gradual replacement of the earlier conservative step-by-step method of operations in the Pacific."¹

Offensive operations in the Pacific and Mediterranean theaters were turning the Axis forces toward their homeland. Nevertheless, the American strategists charged that the British were procrastinating; operations in Northwest Europe, which would crush Hitlerite Germany, had not commenced.

At the opening session of the Quebec Conference, the American delegation proposed to the British that OVERLORD be declared the supreme operation of 1944. Replying for the British, General Sir Alan Brooke agreed that the primary Allied offensive should be directed against Northwest France. However, he stipulated that (1) Germany's air force must be crushed, (2) Germany's ability to reinforce the proposed beachhead for the first two months after the invasion had to be nullified, and (3) the Allies must solve the logistical problem of beach maintenance.² The Chief of the Imperial Staff reemphasized the advantage of advanced penetrations in the Italian peninsula. The Germans would be forced to divert their troops from the Western and Eastern front enhancing the successful

¹loc. cit., p. 235.
execution of the cross-Channel invasion.

Replying for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Marshall contended that operation OVERLORD could not be undertaken if operations were expanded in the Mediterranean. The mountainous terrain in Italy facilitated defensive operations which enabled the Axis powers to contain a numerically superior force with a minimum number of troops. If operations continued in Italy, the cross-Channel invasion would be in direct competition with the Mediterranean theater for supplies, troops, and resources. The following principles of war would thus be violated: (1) the concentration of force, and (2) mass firepower.

Supporting his military colleagues, the Prime Minister stated that he strongly favored OVERLORD in 1944. In accord with that policy, he contended that operations in the Mediterranean must be continued to ensure the success of the cross-Channel invasion. In addition to General Sir Alan Brooke's reservations, Winston Churchill stipulated that no more than twelve mobile German divisions were to be stationed in northern France at the time of the invasion.

Unable to agree upon an appropriate relationship between the Mediterranean and Northwest Europe, the Allies concluded the conference on August 24th with the Combined Chiefs of Staff advocating:

The progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic system, the disruption of vital elements of lines of communication, and the material reduction of German air combat strength by the successful prosecution of the Combined Bomber Offensive from all convenient bases is a pre-requisite to 'Overlord' (barring an independent and complete Russian victory before 'Overlord' can be mounted). This operation must therefore continue to have highest strategic priority.1

1Ehrman, op. cit., pp. 8-9.
The British refused to accord overriding priority to the Normandy Invasion, but they warmly approved General Morgan's concept of the operation. General Morgan's staff was instructed to prepare detailed blueprints for the forthcoming operation. The Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed to conduct further operations with the troops allotted at the Trident Conference. However, operations in the Balkans would be limited to supplying rifles and ammunition to guerrillas, commando raids, and bombing strategic objectives.

The Quebec Conference did not resolve the relationship between the Italian campaign and the cross-Channel invasion.

In these circumstances, it seemed to the British that 'Overlord' was to be regarded as only one, even if the most important, of the operations to be undertaken in Europe; for only by action on other fronts could Cossac's demands be fulfilled [sic]. But such operations in turn must not attract Allied forces which might otherwise be devoted or added to 'Overlord' itself. A careful balance must be struck, . . . between the various possibilities. It was on this question that the main argument turned for the rest of 1943.1

The invasion of the Italian mainland was initiated on September 3rd. On the same day, an armistice was signed at Cassibile (near Syracuse) by Marshal Badoglio for Italy, and General W. B. Smith, in behalf of General Eisenhower and Brigadier General Giuseppe Castellano. On September 9th, operation AVALANCHE was launched with the United States' 5th Army spearheading the attack. On October 1st, the Allied forces triumphantly entered Naples and the Germans assumed a defensive posture at the Volturno River. The movement northward became

1loc. cit., p. 57.
progressively more difficult. Instead of rapidly advancing toward Rome, German counter resistance forced the Allies to lose the initiative. A military stalemate developed with the Allies fighting a dogged German force entrenched in formidable natural defenses.

Secondary Operations in the Mediterranean

Jubilant with the surrender of Italy on 3 September 1943, the Prime Minister suggested on September 9th that secondary operations in the Mediterranean be expanded. The Minister of Defence proposed that operations in Corsica, Sardinia, Rhodes, or the Balkans be given immediate consideration for offensive operations. The British leader was quick to inject the possibility of a drive into the Dodecanese Islands for they were garrisoned by a majority of Italian troops.

The same day the Prime Minister cabled General Wilson and ordered him to attack Rhodes; "This is the time to play high. Improvise and dare."¹ That evening Major Lord Jellicoe landed on Rhodes with a small detachment of troops prepared to achieve a swift victory. Their expectations were short-lived for they encountered heavy resistance and were forced to withdraw. Nevertheless, the Islands of Khios, Samos, and Lesvos were rapidly conquered the following week by the British.

The British victories aggravated the Allied solidarity rather than reducing friction. The captured Italian forces were not willing

¹Matloff, op. cit., p. 254, quoting Churchill, Closing the Ring, p. 205.
to fight with the Allies and refused to cooperate. Thus, the Islands had to be garrisoned by Allied troops, reducing the number of troops allocated for combat. Second, the British maintained that offensive maneuvers against the Dodecanese were strategically and politically important. As long as the Germans controlled the Islands, they governed the Aegean Sea—the gateway to southeast Europe. On the other hand, Allied control of the Aegean would enhance unrest in the Balkans and force Germany to deploy a significant number of troops to the area. It was also conjectured if Turkey was induced to join the Allied powers the Dardanelles would become a major supply route to Russia. The key to the proposed objectives was Rhodes, the capture of which would facilitate the reality of Churchill's plan. Influenced by the Minister of Defence, the British Chiefs of Staff called for the invasion of Rhodes on October 3rd.

General Eisenhower reported in writing to the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the War Department that if an aggressive policy in the Aegean was pursued the Italian operation would be jeopardized. He stated that the most desirable means of supporting OVERLORD would be by pushing northward into Italy and capturing the Po Valley. There the Allies could stage diversionary operations and threaten Southern France, Austria, and Yugoslavia. Focusing attention upon the difficult problems facing him at the Winter Line and need of additional air support, he reiterated his plea that Rhodes be spared from attack.

The War Department welcomed General Eisenhower’s view and reaffirmed their contention of remaining aloof of offensive operations in the eastern Mediterranean. The conflict between Rhodes and Italy
was resolved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff acquiescing to General Marshall's proposal that "such assistance be given to the Middle East Command as in General Eisenhower's view could be spared from the Italian campaign."

On October 9, 1943, operations in the eastern Mediterranean and Italy were thoroughly discussed by the British and American field commanders at LaMarsa, Tunis. The primary argument for attacking Rhodes was weakened by reports that the Germans were reinforcing their army and planning to stage a major campaign south of Rome. Also, the Island of Khios, containing the only airfields from which fighter aircraft could operate effectively against Rhodes, was recaptured by the Germans. To ensure the buildup of forces in Italy, the Allied commanders unanimously agreed that they could not afford the risk of diverting landing craft or planes into the Aegean.

In Washington, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were satisfied with the decision; however, in Great Britain the Prime Minister was pungent and bitter. In retrospect, Winston Churchill claimed that this decision caused him "... one of the sharpest pangs I suffered in the war. ..." 2

Allied Overtures to Turkey

The Prime Minister was thwarted in his attempt to expand military

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1loc. cit., p. 257.


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operations in the eastern Mediterranean. The immediate loss of Turkey
was a disheartening personal defeat, for his interest in the area was
stimulated by his experiences dating from World War I. At a War
Council meeting on January 13, 1915 Winston Churchill had enthuasi-
tically revealed Vice-Admiral Carden's suggested plan for a naval at-
tack upon the Dardanelles. The deadlock on the Western Front precip-
itated the need of an alternate plan. Captain Hankey of the Royal
Marines related:

The idea caught on at once. The whole atmosphere changed.
Fatigue was forgotten. The War Council turned eagerly from
the dreary vista of a 'slogging match' on the Western Front
to brighter prospects, as they seemed, in the Mediterranean.
The Navy, in whom everyone had implicit confidence and whose
opportunities had so far been few and far between, was to
come into the front line. . . .\(^1\)

Winston Churchill was not the architect of the plan, but by his
continuous enthusiasm and forcefulness as an ardent supporter action
in the Mediterranean became synonymous with the British leader.
Prominent techniques of British military strategy: maneuver, decep-
tion, mobility, and economy of force were not applicable on the
Western Front. Forced into trenches, suicidal frontal assaults typi-
fied the mode of warfare. Casualties steadily mounted. Petitioning
his countrymen, Winston Churchill exclaimed, "Undertake no operation
in the West which is more costly to us in life than to the enemy; in
the East, take Constantinople."\(^2\) Nevertheless, the attack upon the
Dardanelles or Gallipoli was not successful. Repulsed by the Turks,

\(^1\) Higgins, Trumbull, *Winston Churchill and the Dardanelles*. New

\(^2\) loc. cit., p. 231.
offensive operations in the area ceased. Speaking of Gallipoli during
World War II, Labour Deputy Prime Minister Clement Attlee remarked
that it was "an immortal gamble that did not come off. . . . Sir Win-
ston . . . had the one strategic idea in the war. He did not believe
in throwing away masses of people to be massacred."\(^1\)

The Prime Minister's present interest in the eastern Mediterrane-

an was not lessened by the decision not to attack Rhodes. Turkey,
the key to the Balkans, was a neutral nation under the immediate
threat of German aggression, and the indirect political pressure of
Great Britain at the onset of World War II. Using the Mutual Assis-
tance Pact of 1940 as the foundation from which to build and strengthen
relations with Turkey, the Prime Minister attempted to pursue the
Balkan nation to join the Allied powers. Turkey's neutrality, an
asset to the Allies while they were on the defensive, was not the
most expedient method of assisting the Allies, since they had assumed
the offensive. The Prime Minister maintained, "If they assumed the
status of belligerency, they would keep the Germans occupied in the
eastern Mediterranean while the Allies prepared their European inva-
sion."\(^2\)

In pursuit of this objective, Winston Churchill traveled to
Adana, Turkey early in 1943 and urged President İnönü of Turkey and
his Prime Minister to join the Allied powers. As a means of inducing
Turkey to support the British, the Prime Minister pledged to furnish

\(^1\)loc. cit., p. 248.

\(^2\)Fox, op. cit., p. 33.
military aid to Turkey if they were willing to join the United Na-
tions.¹ However, the Turkish government refused to commit themselves
fearing German military reprisals. In addition, they did not trust
the Allies' eastern partner, Russia, and feared that Russia would at-
ttempt to occupy their country if afforded the opportunity.

At the Quebec Conference, the Allied powers contracted that
Turkey should not enter the war; for the diversion of supplies re-
quired to sustain the Turkish army would hinder operations in Italy,
as well as preparations for the cross-Channel invasion. In October,
the question of Turkey joining the Allies was rejuvenated by the
Russians. Turkey's belligerency was urged by the Eastern Ally at the
Moscow Conference so that an estimated fifteen German divisions would
be diverted from the Russian front. The British supported the Russian
proposal figuring Turkey could assist the British in capturing the
Dodecanese Islands.

Germany was not oblivious to the Allied diplomatic and military
pressure upon Turkey. To prevent Turkey from joining the Allied
powers, Germany waged an intensive psychological war against the
Dardanelles power. The Turkish government and citizens were indoct-
trinated by Germany impressing upon them their invincible strength.
Stories of British and Russian duplicity in Moscow were circulated to
the populous which raised uncertainty in the minds of the people as
to the sincerity of the Allied proposals. Simultaneously, the Nazis
assured Turkey that military movements in southeast Europe would not

¹Ehrman, op. cit., p. 90.
endanger them unless direct military assistance was rendered to the Allies.

In determining a foreign policy, Turkey was acutely aware of (1) a potential invasion by Germany, (2) Russian ambitions in the Dardanelles, and (3) the reluctance of the United States to support offensive operations in the eastern Mediterranean. Without adequate political and military guarantees to protect their national interests, the Balkan power strictly adhered to a policy of neutrality.

Turkey's reluctance to join the Allied powers forced the British military strategists to critically reevaluate their proposed strategy in the eastern Mediterranean. The Allies turned their attention to Italy and decided that southern Germany could be attacked relentlessly by air strikes directed from Italy. On February 7, 1944, the Combined Chiefs of Staff declared, "We attach considerable importance to the maintenance of threat against Germany in South-East Europe and are discussing with Foreign Office the policy we should pursue in this area in view of virtual abandonment of effort to get Turkey into the war as soon as possible."

The Inequitable Distribution of Landing Craft

During the second half of 1943, the United States military strategists feared that operations in the eastern Mediterranean would hinder the cross-Channel invasion. Likewise, the British theorized that the limited number of landing craft delegated to the cross-Channel

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1 loc. cit., p. 221.
invasion would postpone the Normandy Invasion.

By August 1943, the submarine menace in the Atlantic was checked and the requirement for constructing additional escort and antisubmarine vessels was no longer applicable. The British strongly urged the United States to direct its industrial production to the construction of additional landing ship, tanks to ensure that the cross-Channel assault would be flexible and unassailable.

Mass construction began in American shipyards during August, but the majority of landing craft were allocated to offensive operations in the central Pacific. Only the production during November, December, and January were delegated to the European theater. On November 5, 1943, Admiral King offered to transfer twenty-one landing ship, tanks from the Pacific to the European theater, but only because these ships were in excess of his requirements. As late as December 1943 the Pacific theater contained 125 landing ship, tanks, while the European theater was allotted only ninety-two. The British were acutely aware of the unequal distribution of resources, and feared that the lack of vessels in Europe would impair the success of the cross-Channel invasion.¹

The United States' strategists viewed the operations in the eastern Mediterranean as a direct threat to OVERLORD. The additional supplies and troops required to sustain an operation would impede the buildup of OVERLORD, as well as threaten the immediate success of

the campaign in Italy. On the other hand, the British feared that the limited supply of landing craft would hinder a successful assault upon the Atlantic Wall. Landing craft, essential to the success of an amphibious landing and ultimate defeat of Germany, were retarding the operation due to the unequal distribution between the two theaters of operation.

The problem was allocation, not production. The difficulty was to extract the craft from the tight-fisted hand of Admiral Ernest King. On May 1st, 1944, King had at his disposal 31,123 landing-craft of which he had allocated to OVERLORD no more than 2,493, and these reluctantly.¹

¹Wilmot, op. cit., pp. 176-77.
CHAPTER VI

THE SANCTITY OF OVERLORD

The Cairo Conference

Preparing to depart for Cairo, General Morgan observed the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff:

... muttering imprecations about the adjectiveal British and their perfidy particularly in relation to their Mediterranean ambitions. I had reached London in time to see the British Chiefs of Staff before they set off equally pugnacious and determined to put the Americans straight once and for all over this strategy business.\(^1\)

The precarious stalemate in Italy and British attempts to persuade Turkey to join the Allied powers constituted an ominous threat to the cross-Channel invasion.

Discouraging as the British strategy appeared to the Americans, negotiations with the Russians were of a more serious nature. In October, American and British diplomatic and military tacticians assembled in Moscow. When informed of the Normandy Invasion, the Russians acted unduly passive and unconcerned. General Deane, an American military representative, found the attitude of the Russians extremely disturbing. Previously, the Russians had encouraged an invasion on the Western Front, in order to divert German troops from the east. Dismaying the American representatives, Marshal Klimenti E. Voroshilov and Vyacheslav M. Molotov, the Russian Foreign Minister,

\(^1\)Feis, op. cit., p. 259.
"complained that Allied pressure in Italy had been insufficient to prevent the Germans from moving divisions to the Eastern Front."

Displaying indifference and complacency toward the proposed cross-Channel invasion, General Deane was convinced the Russians were not in favor of a major assault against Western Europe. He was confident the Russians advocated protracted operations in the Aegean and Balkans and favored intensifying operations in Italy. On November 9th, General Deane cabled the Joint Chiefs of Staff and somberly informed them of his observations.

The Cairo Conference convened on November 23rd with the American strategists apprehensive of incessant operations in the Mediterranean. Their speculations were confirmed by the Prime Minister insisting upon elasticity in the Mediterranean, while simultaneously reconfirming his support of OVERLORD. Winston Churchill contended that the timing of operation OVERLORD "depended more on the state of the enemy than on the set perfection of preparation." Retaining landing craft in the Aegean, amphibious assaults could be carried out behind German lines. Summarizing his views, the Prime Minister sought to (1) secure Rome in January, (2) Rhodes in February, (3) increase supplies to Yugoslav partisans, and (4) open the Aegean. OVERLORD in 1944, he pronounced, "should not be such a tyrant as to rule out every other activity in the Mediterranean." The British Chiefs of Staff displayed

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1Harrison, op. cit., p. 121.
3loc. cit., p. 409.
solidarity and unity in support of the Prime Minister's proposals.

On November 25th, the British Chiefs of Staff dispatched a note to the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff expounding their judgment of the relationship of OVERLORD to the Mediterranean.

1. For some time past it has been clear to us, and doubtless also to the United States Chiefs of Staff, that disagreement exists between us as to what we should do now in the Mediterranean, with particular reference to the effect on future action on OVERLORD. The point at issue is how far what might be termed the 'sanctity of OVERLORD' is to be preserved in its entirety, irrespective of developments in the Mediterranean theater.

3. We emphasize that we do not in any way recoil from, or wish to sidetrack, our agreed intention to attack the Germans across the Channel in the late spring or early summer of 1944, or even earlier if RANKIN conditions were to obtain. We must not, however, regard OVERLORD on a fixed date as the pivot of our whole strategy on which all else turns. . . . This policy if literally interpreted, will inevitably paralyze action in other theaters without any guarantee of action across the Channel.

4. With the Germans in their present plight, the surest way to win the war in the shortest time is to attack them remorsefully [relentlessly] and continuously in any and every area where we can do so with superiority. . . .

5. If we pursue the above policy we firmly believe that OVERLORD will take place next summer. . . . It is, of course, valuable to have a target date to which all may work, but we are firmly opposed to allowing this date to become our masters, and to prevent us from taking full advantage of all opportunities that occur to us to follow what we believe to be the correct strategy. 1

In accord with the above proposal, the British Chiefs of Staff recommended on November 25th that the Allies: (1) continue the offensive in Italy to the Pisa-Rimini Line, (2) persuade Turkey to join the Allies, (3) open the Dardanelles, (4) systematically

1loc. cit., pp. 409-10.
transport military supplies to Yugoslavian and Albanian partisans, and (5) undermine German resistance in the Balkans. Above all, the Allies should continue to concentrate supplies and troops in Great Britain for the sole purpose of invading Northwest Europe when German strength in the region is abated.

The United States military strategists contended that the immediate military situation required a definite date be established for the cross-Channel invasion. Contrary to the British proposal of simultaneously threatening several areas in the Mediterranean, the United States strategists held that only operations in Italy be expanded. The maximum number of troops should be concentrated against the Atlantic Wall, while the remaining troops be massed against Italy. By extending offensive operations to include the eastern Mediterranean, the Italian campaign, as well as the Normandy Invasion, would be impaired.

Although the Americans were not in complete accord with the British proposal, they conditionally agreed to uphold the British plan of action. The conference enabled the strategists of the two nations to present and discuss their views prior to the Tehran Conference where they would be joined by the Russians in secret deliberations. The Cairo Conference terminated without resolving the conflict in grand strategy. However, the views of the two nations were clearly presented and each benefited by a greater understanding and appreciation of the other's strategy.
The Tehran Conference

The deliberations between the three major Allies commenced at Tehran on November 28, 1943. President Roosevelt speaking to Marshal Stalin, Winston Churchill, and their staffs, presented to date the general outline of American strategy. Briefly discussing the Pacific theater the President pointed out that the United States was bearing the major share of operations. Turning to the European theater, President Roosevelt emphasized that all operations and military plans revolved upon reducing German military pressure upon the Soviet front. "Due to the difficulties of sea transport"1 the President explained, it was not possible until the Quebec Conference to establish a definite date for the cross-Channel operation. Asking the rhetorical question of how the troops in the Mediterranean could assist the Russian armies on the Eastern Front, the President suggested that operations in (1) Italy and the Adriatic and Aegean Seas be continued, and (2) Turkey be persuaded to join the Allies. In conclusion, the United States Commander-in-Chief emphasized that the cross-Channel invasion must not be delayed in 1944 by auxiliary operations.

The Prime Minister agreed in principle to the President's proposals, but challenged the basic method of defeating Germany. Before presenting his views in detail, the Prime Minister invited Marshal Stalin to expound his views of the Anglo-American grand strategy.

Proceeding to examine the Allied strategy in the West, Marshal

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1loc. cit., p. 488.
Stalin acknowledged that the Italian campaign had opened the Mediterranean Sea to Allied shipping and diverted German troops from the East. Nevertheless, the value of a Mediterranean campaign was limited for the Alps "constituted an almost insuperable barrier" in staging a direct attack upon Germany. The Soviet Marshal, as well as his military subordinates, emphasized that Hitler was attempting to retain as many Allied divisions in Italy as possible to create a stalemate. With the mountainous terrain dictating defensive warfare, a minimum number of German troops could contain a maximum number of Allied forces enabling Germany to strengthen its defenses in the East and West.

Answering the Prime Minister's question of how the Allies could directly assist Russia, Marshal Stalin urged that the cross-Channel invasion be undertaken speedily.\(^2\)

Winston Churchill candidly revealed that he never considered operations in the Mediterranean more than a stepping stone for the main thrust across the Channel. He reiterated to the President and Joseph Stalin that it was not possible to launch the cross-Channel invasion immediately. If an invasion from the northwest was granted overriding priority, he declared that (1) Hitler would be able to reinforce the Western Front with a substantial number of troops, and (2) the Allies would not be able to relieve pressure upon the Russian front. In conclusion, he conceded that continuing operations in the

\(^1\)loc. cit., p. 490.

Mediterranean would ultimately postpone the cross-Channel invasion two or three months.

Marshal Stalin replied that operations in the Aegean and Balkans would scatter Allied forces and would not contribute to the success of operation OVERLORD. He proposed that operation OVERLORD be complemented by a second invasion staged against Southern France. Marshal Stalin "pointed out that the Russian experiences had shown that an attack from one direction was not effective and that the Soviet armies now launched an offensive from two sides at once which forced the enemy to move his reserve back." \(^1\)

The Prime Minister responded to Joseph Stalin's proposal by maintaining it would be a psychological victory for the Axis powers if the Allies did not capture Rome. Further developing his argument, Winston Churchill voiced the opinion that it would not be strategically sound to leave twenty British divisions idle in the Mediterranean, merely for the sake of avoiding a delay in OVERLORD. The meeting of November 28th terminated with Winston Churchill's strategy being strongly opposed by the Russians. The Americans were elated by the Russian support of the cross-Channel invasion and their staunch opposition to the British proposals.

The military discussions resumed on November 29th with Marshal Klimenti Voroshilov joining the Combined Chiefs of Staff. General Sir Alan Brooke expressed the opinion that the Allies must continue to...

\(^1\)Foreign Relations of the United States, op. cit., p. 495.
engage the Germans during the buildup of OVERLORD. Forces in the Mediterranean should be assigned the mission of continuing to detain the maximum number of German troops. The British General continued by stating that it was necessary to (1) continue operations in Italy to secure northern airfields, (2) support Yugoslavian partisans with arms and supplies, (3) capture the Dodecanese Islands, and (4) persuade Turkey to join the Allies. The success of the proposed operations, General Brooke maintained, depended on the availability of landing craft.

Listening captiously to General Brooke present the British strategic views, Russian Marshal Voroshilov responded by questioning British sincerity in support of operation OVERLORD. He inquired if "General Brooke as Chief of the Imperial Staff, considered OVERLORD as important an operation as General Marshall had indicated that he did. He would like General Brooke's personal opinion."¹ General Brooke replied that he viewed OVERLORD as vitally important, but unless operations in the Mediterranean were undertaken the invasion would not be successful. Marshal Voroshilov promptly criticized the British strategist by declaring that operations in the Mediterranean must be viewed as secondary and not essential to the success of OVERLORD. Assenting with the British contention that limited operations in the Mediterranean were necessary to divert German troops from the eastern and northwest front, he reasserted that operations

¹loc. cit., p. 524.
must directly assist OVERLORD, not hinder the operation. Whereas the British were prone to expand operations into northern Italy, the Russian delegate insisted that Italy should be defended with a minimum number of Allied forces. The troops not actively deployed in defensive positions would be available for amphibious assaults against Southern France. Russian and American opposition to the British strategy thwarted the British attempt to continue offensive operations in the Mediterranean. The unity of purpose exhibited in prior conferences by the British lessened, while opposition within the British military ranks grew in intensity. "British doubts concerning the feasibility of OVERLORD, for instance, were never shared by General Morgan and his staff."¹

Confronting a determined and united opposition, coupled with increased skepticism among themselves, the British strategists reluctantly approved the cross-Channel invasion. On November 29th, the Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed to (1) launch OVERLORD during May 1944, (2) mount an operation against Southern France, (3) continue operations in Italy to the Pisa-Rimini Line, and (4) retain sixty-eight landing ship, tanks, in the Mediterranean until January 15, 1944. Allied disagreements abated as a result of the conference. The recommendations agreed upon by the Anglo-American coalition were sent to the Prime Minister and the President and subsequently approved on November 30th.² The agreement was warmly received by

¹Harrison, op. cit., p. 91.

Joseph Stalin who pledged to initiate a spring offensive on the Eastern Front coinciding with the major offensive in the West. The President agreed to appoint a Supreme Commander for the northwest invasion within the following four days as requested by Joseph Stalin. In addition to the recommendations set forth by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the Allies agreed on December 1st to (1) support Yugoslavian partisans with supplies and equipment, (2) continue efforts to induce Turkey to join the Allied powers before the end of the year, and (3) maintain closer relationships between the three nations.¹ Operations in the Mediterranean were not completely eliminated for the Prime Minister persuaded his associates to continue offensive missions in Italy.

The Second Cairo Conference

Returning to Cairo the Western Allies continued their discussions in the light of the decisions agreed upon at Tehran. The Prime Minister, aware and fearful of the strength of the German forces on the Atlantic Wall, argued for strengthening OVERLORD and ANVIL.² On December 3rd, the Prime Minister suggested that BUCCANEER³ be canceled and the landing craft be diverted to the Mediterranean. Heeding the suggestion, President Roosevelt overruled the operation on December 5th. The same day the Commander-in-Chief of the United

¹Matloff, op. cit., pp. 379-80.
²Code name for the invasion of Southern France.
³Code name for amphibious operation in the Andaman Islands.
States appointed General Eisenhower as the Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces. His mission, as defined by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, was as follows: "You will enter the continent of Europe and in conjunction with the other Allied Nations, undertake operations aimed at the heart of Germany and the destruction of her armed forces."\(^1\)

After debating the proposed operations within the European theater during the first two conferences, the Allies turned their attention to the Pacific theater. At Tehran, the Russians promised to actively engage in offensive operations against Japan after Germany was defeated. With this in mind, the Combined Planning Staff recommended that the main thrusts against Japan be concentrated in the central and southwest Pacific. To achieve victory over Japan, the Combined Planners maintained that the Allies:

- Insure that the sequence of operations remains flexible and that preparations are made to take all manner of short cuts made possible by developments in the situation.
- Take advantage of the earliest practicable reorientation of forces from the European Theater.\(^2\)

As the British desired flexibility, mobility, and economy of forces in the European theater, similar principles of war were implemented by the Americans in the Pacific theater. The advantages of a dual thrust were obvious, for at any moment the Allies could keep the Japanese off balance by committing their reserve forces or diverting

\(^1\)Wilmot, op. cit., p. 142.

\(^2\)Matloff, op. cit., p. 374, citing CCS\#17, 2 Dec 43, title: Over-All Plan for the Defeat of Japan.
troops from one offensive axis to the other.

The Allied conference concluded on December 7, 1943 with President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and their staffs returning to their respective countries. Operations in the Mediterranean and Pacific were defined as being secondary, while the cross-Channel invasion was granted overriding priority. The conflict between OVERLORD and Italy was resolved at the Cairo-Tehran Conferences, but the compromise gave birth to a new controversy; that of the relationship of Southern France to the Italian campaign. Politically and militarily orientated, a sharp and terse argument between the British and American military strategists and political leaders undermined the planning, preparation, and execution of the Normandy Invasion.
CHAPTER VII

ALLIED GRAND STRATEGY IN EUROPE IS CONSUMMATED

Operation SHINGLE: a Stranded Whale

At Tehran the Allies agreed:

(1) That OVERLORD will be launched during the month of May 1944.
(2) That there will be a supporting operation in Southern France on as large a scale as possible, depending on the number of landing craft available for this operation.¹

The first reevaluation of the cross-Channel invasion in relation to operation ANVIL was undertaken by COSSAC. On January 6, 1944, the Staff reported that it would be strategically sound to divert resources delegated to Southern France to the direct support of OVERLORD. By delaying operations in Southern France the Allies could stage diversionary threats against the coast of France. In support of their convictions they theorized that the Southern offensive would only divert two or three German divisions from Northwest France. A diversionary threat, the Staff continued, would be as effective as an assault with the additional advantage of strengthening OVERLORD.

General Eisenhower, the Supreme Commander of the cross-Channel invasion, was aware of British apprehensions about the Normandy Invasion. The British believed the present Allied task force was not strong enough to breach the Atlantic Wall. The Normandy plan

¹Foreign Relations of the United States, op. cit., p. 526.
introduced by COSSAC in July 1943 required an initial assault by three divisions followed by two additional divisions. This plan was revised in January 1944 by increasing the initial force to five divisions.

In strengthening OVERLORD, landing craft became critical to the ultimate success of the invasion. Additional landing craft and vessels would have to be transferred from the Pacific or Mediterranean to fulfill the requirements created by increasing the task force. If the landing craft were allocated from the Mediterranean, operation ANVIL would have to be canceled. Transferring assault vessels from the Pacific would deem it necessary to receive the approval of Admiral King who was only concerned with the needs of his theater of operations.

General Eisenhower reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the British were willing to strengthen OVERLORD only by delaying ANVIL. The American strategists and General Eisenhower were not willing to abandon the operations before all means of acquiring additional craft were explored. They were determined not to renege on their pledge to Russia that ANVIL would be conducted simultaneously with OVERLORD. Forced to decide between transferring landing craft from the Pacific or postponing ANVIL, the American strategists tactfully evaded the conflict by requesting that OVERLORD be postponed from May 1st to May 31st. The pause would enable the Americans to construct additional craft and thereby strengthen the assault, without interfering with affiliated operations in the Mediterranean or the Pacific. Postponing the operation would also allow preparatory
attacks by the Allied Air Forces against Western Europe to be extended. On January 31st, the British Chiefs of Staff agreed to the American proposal.¹

In February, British anxieties about the consequences of the proposed assault in Southern France increased with the continued stalemate in Italy. Victory in Italy was not as immediate or decisive as previously anticipated. By the end of December 1943, the Allies were bogged down above the Volturno and Sangro Rivers in the midst of rugged terrain, inclement weather, and a formidable enemy. Instead of withdrawing to the north, the Germans reinforced their defenses south of Rome. The British Chiefs of Staff insisted that the Allies continue their offensive in Italy. By doing so, they would be able to divert a larger number of German troops than previously anticipated and thereby assist OVERLORD to a greater extent than ANVIL.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsed the Southern invasion of France for it would facilitate the immediate deployment of French troops positioned in North Africa. If the assault was not undertaken, it would not be possible to transport the French to Normandy without disrupting shipping. Under these circumstances the French would not be able to participate in the initial phase of their country's liberation. In rebuttal, COSSAC acknowledged that it would be a psychological disappointment to the French, but all efforts would be made to infiltrate their forces into northern France.

Following the appointment of General Sir Henry Wilson as Allied

¹Matloff, op. cit., p. 414.
Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean, Prime Minister Churchill was able to play a significant role in directing strategy within the Italian campaign. Determined to breach the stalemate, operation SHINGLE\(^1\) was introduced by the Prime Minister at a meeting of the Allied Commanders at Carthage on December 26th. It was subsequently approved in consultations held on January 7 and 8, 1944.\(^2\) 

The operation

was designed as an end run around the right flank of the German Winter and Gustav Lines. The hope was that the Germans facing the Allied Fifth Army at the Gustav Line would be forced to fall back and leave the road to Rome open.\(^3\)

The success of SHINGLE hinged upon the one hundred and four landing ship, tanks, stationed in the Mediterranean. It was agreed to immediately withdraw twenty to England and earmark the remaining eighty-four for SHINGLE. After the assault, thirty-three were scheduled to arrive in England early in March and the balance would remain in the Mediterranean, preparing for the attack on Southern France.\(^4\)

On January 21st, 50,000 combat troops embarked from Naples with 5,000 vehicles and descended upon Anzio. By the 23rd, ninety per cent of the cargo was unloaded and the port of Anzio was secured.\(^5\) The initial success was countered by heavy German reinforcements

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\(^1\)Code name for amphibious operation at Anzio, Italy. 
\(^2\)Matloff, op. cit., p. 415. 
\(^3\)ibid. 
\(^4\)Ehrman, op. cit., p. 218. 
\(^5\)loc. cit., p. 230.
directed by General Kesselring. Instead of the Allies advancing to Rome, the Fifth Army was contained on the Gustav Line and the United States' Sixth Corps was sealed at Anzio. Evaluating the results, Winston Churchill quipped, "I had hoped that we were hurling a wildcat onto the shore, but all we got was a stranded whale."¹

Preventing the capture of Rome was a psychological victory for Germany, and a disheartening setback for the Allied powers. Reviewing the dilemma, General Eisenhower postponed operation ANVIL, enabling the Allies to utilize the resources and personnel delegated for ANVIL in Italy. General Marshall wrote General Eisenhower regarding his decision: "Judging from the discussions and differences of opinion at the present time the British and American Chiefs of Staff seem to have completely reversed themselves and we have become Mediterraneanites and they heavily pro-OVERLORD."²

The quest of locating sufficient landing craft for OVERLORD and ANVIL, coupled with additional resources required to initiate the offensive in Italy continued, but to no avail. The President became apprehensive of his recent accord with Joseph Stalin and feared reprisals if the Southern assault was canceled. The British charged that by undertaking two offensives in France with a limited number of landing craft, the effectiveness of the dual thrusts would be jeopardized. The conflict was temporarily resolved on February 24,

¹Churchill, Closing the Ring, op. cit., p. 488.
1943. The British and American strategists agreed that operations in Italy would have priority over existing and future operations in the Mediterranean until March 20th. Simultaneously, General Wilson was directed to prepare detailed plans for the execution of ANVIL.

March 20th steadily approached with the stalemate continuing to besiege Allied operations in Italy. The Anzio bridgehead merely threatened the German defenses and the ominous gap between the Sixth Corps and Fifth Army remained. General Wilson predicted that the isolated forces would not be united before May 15th. Confronted by the logistical necessity of landing craft for OVERLORD and the stalemate in Italy, the Allied Commanders agreed in late March to postpone ANVIL.

The U.S. and the British Chiefs remained in agreement that the Anzio bridgehead must be joined with the main battle line in Italy. Prolonging the stalemate threatened not only to jeopardize the safety of the forces on the beachhead but also to upset the timetable for OVERLORD.¹

Resolving the Relationship of ANVIL to the Italian Campaign

The British Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Chiefs of Staff unanimously agreed that the divided forces in Italy must be united. Once the forces were amalgamated, American and British strategists disagreed as to future operations in the Mediterranean. Should the Allies continue the offensive in Italy or stage an amphibious assault upon Southern France in conjunction with the Normandy Invasion? The

¹loc. cit., p. 424.
British supported operations in Italy, while the Americans supported ANVIL. Summarizing the American arguments for ANVIL, General Roberts rationalized:

If we cancel ANVIL completely, the following will be true:

(a) We get into political difficulties with the French.
(b) OVERLORD will lose at least ten fighting divisions.
(c) Our service forces continue to support the western Mediterranean.
(d) Our divisions and the French divisions will be committed to a costly unremunerative, inching advance in Italy. The people of both the United States and France may or may not take this indefinitely.
(e) Once committed to Italy, we have our forces pointed towards Southeastern Europe and will have the greatest difficulty in preventing their use for occupation forces in Austria, Hungary and southern Germany.¹

The British strategists countered by declaring the Italian campaign had compelled the Germans to divert eight divisions to the Italian Peninsula. Additional offensive actions would force the Germans to divert additional troops or the Allies could exploit the situation. If Allied operations were suspended or discontinued, the Germans could contain the Allies in Italy with a minimum number of combat troops. Their remaining forces could then be committed to the western or eastern front. A continued stalemate in the Mediterranean theater while OVERLORD was in the final phase of preparation would be disastrous; the British strategists theorized the Allies would suffer heavily in Italy as well as in Northwestern France.

Hoping to terminate the controversy, the British Chiefs of Staff presented to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on April 3rd a compromise they

felt would be acceptable to all.

2.

(a) Launch as soon as is practicable a co-ordinated, sustained all-out offensive in Italy so as to join the beachhead with the main line. Thereafter through offensive action contain the greatest number of German formations in Central Italy.

(b) Develop a positive amphibious threat against the French Mediterranean coast and employ air forces as though in preparation for an amphibious assault so as to delay the movement of German forces in the Mediterranean towards 'Overlord.' . . .

(c) Prepare plans for 'Anvil' on a basis of at least a two divisional assault to be launched at the earliest practicable date. Target date 10th July.

(d) 'Anvil' is the most ambitious operation that can be undertaken in the Mediterranean theatre, and plans for this operation should be pressed forward vigorously and wholeheartedly, together with all operations that do not prejudice the operations specified in (a) above. The undertaking of these preparations for 'Anvil' will in no way preclude a change of plan by the Combined Chiefs of Staff if an undeniably better course of action should be presented by changing circumstances.

The American strategists reviewed the proposal and insisted the draft proposal be changed as follows:

2. (a) last sentence:
   Insert "maintain pressure to" after "thereafter".
   Delete "through offensive action".

2. (c) first sentence:
   Insert "and preparations" after "plans".

2. (d) Delete "together with all preparations that do not prejudice the operations specified in (a) above".

On April 7th, the British replied that the modifications were unacceptable. The counter-proposal offered by the Americans would place unwarranted strain upon ANVIL without adequately compensating for

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1 Ehrman, op. cit., p. 254.

2 ibid.
operations in the Mediterranean. With pertinacity, the British strategists upheld their initial proposal. The attempt by American strategists to restrict operations in Italy were unsuccessful, and on April 18th the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff yielded to the British proposal.

The Normandy Invasion

On May 11, 1943, the Italian offensive was initiated by the United Nations. Approximately twenty-eight Allied divisions participated in the campaign, including troops from Great Britain, New Zealand, Canada, South Africa, India, France, Poland, and the United States. German resistance in Italy collapsed by the end of May. The United States Fifth Army penetrated beyond the Winter and Gustav Lines. Adjacent to the Fifth Army, the British Eighth Army occupied the Lire River Valley. The United States Sixth Corps, contained at Anzio (only thirty miles south of Rome) for over four months, broke its encirclement and consolidated with the United States Fifth Army. The Allies triumphantly entered Rome on June 4, 1944.

Two days later, the cross-Channel invasion became a reality. Shortly after midnight on June 6th, two American airborne divisions and one British division were parachuted onto the Cotentin Peninsula. Their mission was to (1) disrupt enemy fortifications and defenses, (2) seize river crossings, and (3) cut enemy communications and seal the area from German reinforcements.

At daybreak, amphibious landings stretched from the mouth of the
Caen Canal to the village of Quineville, a distance of seventy miles. Five divisions landed simultaneously with the British composing the left flank in the Bayeux-Caen region, and the Americans forming the right flank.

The three military Graces—strategic deception, tactical surprise and technical ingenuity—were present in liberal mood to make good the natural disadvantages under which the Allies laboured and to lead the enemy into serious and fundamental misconceptions.¹

No longer do the names of General Eisenhower, Montgomery, Bradley, Bedell Smith, Admiral Ramsey or Air Chief Marshall Tedder capture the spotlight. In their place privates, corporals, sergeants, lieutenants, captains, and majors—whose names are not known, or remembered—fill the unwritten pages of history.

The Normandy assault was perhaps as thoroughly planned as any battle in the history of war. Nevertheless the fighting men went in trained to improvise battlefield solutions to the immediate problems facing them—how to take an unseen machine gun in the hedgerows, how to outflank an enemy holed up in a farmhouse. The fighting in these terms proceeded not according to plan but according to the trial and error of battle.²

By the eighth day, the Allied forces secured control of the beachhead. The Allied front extended for eighty miles with a maximum penetration of twenty miles. The 27th of June, Cherbourg, a major French port, fell to the American forces. Flanked by the Russian army in the east, and the Allied forces in Normandy and the Mediterranean, the German forces were steadily strangulated by the

¹Wilmot, op. cit., p. 294.
²Harrison, op. cit., pp. 274-75.
combined efforts of the United Nations.

France's Controversial Front

One week after the Allied forces landed on the Normandy coast, the Combined Chiefs of Staff gathered in London. Fearing an intense counterattack, the military strategists deemed it necessary to be present if the decision for a strategic withdrawal was required. The counterattack failed to materialize, and the ensuing discussions reverted to the proposed operations in the Mediterranean.

Attempting to divert American interests from ANVIL to other areas of the Mediterranean, the British proposed three alternatives. They suggested: (1) strengthening operations in western France, (2) an operation at the head of the Adriatic, or (3) continuing the Italian offensive into the Lombard Plain to Yugoslavia, toward Austria and west into France.¹

After examining the British proposals, the American strategists urged that ANVIL be retained. Ports essential to the logistical support of the operation would be opened, enabling the French to be immediately deployed against the Germans. To rebut the British arguments for further advances north of Italy, the strategists declared that (1) General Wilson did not have enough troops to carry out the operations, (2) weather conditions in winter and poor lines of communication would make it difficult to support operations, (3) French leaders and troops would not support an operation of this nature, and

¹Matloff, op. cit., pp. 466-75.
(4) the relief of pressure upon OVERLORD would be slight.\(^1\) Colonel Billo, Chief of the Operation Planning Division's Strategy Section warned:

Had we adopted a strategy to defeat Germany politically and economically then the suggested operation [advance into Austria] might be considered. Remember, too, the Austrians held off the Italians for 4 years in World War I.\(^2\)

Countering the military arguments for operations against Southern France, Winston Churchill accentuated political, as well as military objectives, for continuing operations in Italy. Ten German divisions were idle on the Mediterranean coast of France by the mere threat of an assault by Allied forces. Tentative plans called for the invasion of Southern France during the first half of August. By that time the operation might not be necessary to facilitate the success of OVERLORD and "would, in any case, be too late to have any major influence on the outcome of the summer fighting."\(^3\)

The end of September and continuing into early October weather conditions would favor defensive operations.

Since this was the prospect, it was essential that during the short summer months of '44 all the Allies should maintain (by threat or action) the maximum pressure against Germany in those areas which were of such importance to her that Hitler could not afford to yield ground in order to gain time.

Italy was such an area and (in the opinion of


\(^2\)Matloff, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, op. cit., p. 469.

\(^3\)Wilmot, op. cit., p. 449.
Alexander, the commander on the spot) it now afforded 'a golden opportunity of scoring a really decisive victory.'

The British Chiefs of Staff proclaimed that it would be profitable to apply constant pressure north of the Pisa-Rimini Line, rather than stage ANVIL and reduce General Alexander's force. The value of Southern France, compared to northern Italy and Yugoslavia, was minute. Strategically situated, the Allies could strike from the air key industries in central Europe and southern Germany, whereas in Southern France the Allies could not nullify the area. "The Balkans were so rich in raw materials vital to the German war economy that Hitler dared not leave them exposed to Allied invasion."  

Complementing strategic arguments for continued operations north of the Pisa-Rimini Line were political factors first revealed by Winston Churchill in the late spring and early summer of 1944. Anxiety about Western influence and prestige in central Europe and concern about Russian domination of the area precipitated the Prime Minister's interest. Writing to the President of the United States on July 1, 1944, the Prime Minister admonished:

1. The splitting up of the campaign in the Mediterranean into two operations neither of which can do anything decisive, is in my humble and respectful opinion, the first major strategic and political error for which we two have to be responsible.

2. No one involved . . . has ever thought of moving armies into the Balkans; but Istria and Trieste in Italy are strategic and political positions, which as you saw yourself very clearly might exercise profound and widespread

1 Ibid.

2 loc. cit., p. 452.
reactions, especially now after the Russian advances.

7. I have considered your suggestion that we should lay our respective cases before Stalin. . . . I do not know what he would say if the issue was put to him to decide. On military grounds he might be greatly interested in the eastward movement of Alexander's Army, which, without entering the Balkans, would profoundly affect all the forces there and which, in conjunction with any attacks he may make upon Rumania or with Rumania against Hungarian Transylvania, might produce the most far-reaching results. On a long-term political view, he might prefer that the British and Americans should do their share in France in this very hard fighting that is to come, and that East, Middle and Southern Europe, should fall naturally into his control. However it is better to settle the matter for ourselves and between ourselves.¹

The President of the United States was unmoved by the Prime Minister's admonition and refused to support operations north of the Pisa-Rimini Line. President Roosevelt replied to the Prime Minister on July 2nd, "I am compelled by the logic of not dispersing our main efforts to a new theatre to agree with my Chiefs of Staff. . . . I always think of my early geometry--'a straight line is the shortest distance between two points.'"² Concluding, the President asked Winston Churchill to issue a directive to General Wilson to plan for an early assault against Southern France.

The President's decision was motivated by multiple political and military factors. A memorandum recorded by the War Department in August 1943 summarized the President's views:

Since Russia is the decisive factor in the war, she must be

¹Ehrman, op. cit., pp. 355-56.

²Matloff, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, op. cit., p. 472, Quoted in Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, p. 56.
given every assistance and every effort must be made to obtain her friendship. Since without question she will dominate Europe on the defeat of the Axis, it is even more essential to develop and maintain the most friendly relations with Russia.¹

Ever mindful of the agreements at Tehran where the Allies agreed to launch an attack against Southern France, the President was steadfast in his determination to fulfill his promise. Refraining from antagonistic actions, the President sought to win the confidence and friendship of the Eurasian nation by respecting the wishes of Marshal Stalin.

The President was also conscious of the Presidential elections to be held in November 1944. He realized his opponents would challenge the strategy of the war by insinuating American troops were deployed in the Balkans for the sole purpose of facilitating Great Britain's political ambitions. A campaign in the Balkans would initiate criticism of the President, while an assault upon Southern France would be received enthusiastically by the American people. Characteristic of the image focused in the minds of Americans were the propaganda leaflets dropped over France in 1942 which read: "To you who gave us liberty, we will restore liberty."²

Political factors played an important role in influencing the President's decision, but the Commander-in-Chief was also aware of military advantages in implementing ANVIL. He supported General Eisenhower's and General Marshall's views that the operation was "an

¹Wilmot, op. cit., p. 447.
²loc. cit., p. 453.
integral and necessary feature of the main invasion across the Channel.\textsuperscript{1} He called attention to the need of southern ports, particularly Marseilles, where forty to fifty divisions could be rapidly deployed. The second front in France would force Germany to disperse their forces and weaken their defense in the west proportionately. Unable to convince the President of the political or military value of operations north of the Pisa-Rimini Line, the Prime Minister reluctantly agreed on August 8th, to implement ANVIL in the near future.\textsuperscript{2}

The controversy between an assault upon Southern France or of continuing the offensive operation beyond the Pisa-Rimini Line was resolved. Led by the United States and Great Britain, the Allies forced the Germans eastward; simultaneously, the Russians drove the Germans westward. In the south, the Allies continued to contain German forces. The grand strategy undertaken by the Western powers was consummated. Hereafter, tactical operations within the European theater governed the ultimate fate of Germany.


\textsuperscript{2}Matloff, \textit{Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare}, op. cit., p. 474.
CHAPTER VIII

RECAPITULATION OF THE ALLIED ALLIANCE

Controversies illuminated by distinct traditions, heritages, and vital interests were inherent in the Anglo-American military coalition. It is ironic that after all the debates, charges and countercharges, proposals and counterproposals from 1942 to 1944, the United States and Great Britain adhered to the grand strategy initially agreed upon at the Arcadia Conference in January 1942. At that time, they agreed to create a

potential front of attack . . . so wide that the German forces holding down these different countries cannot be strong enough at all points. . . . The main body would come direct across the ocean.1

Pursuing this objective, the Allies agreed by compromise to supply arms and ammunition to the Yugoslavian partisans, stage commando raids in the Mediterranean, and initiate operations in North Africa and Italy to divert and weaken German forces. Two years later, the Allies agreed at Tehran to initiate the main thrust against Germany by staging the cross-Channel invasion in Northwestern Europe during May 1944.

The British supported operation OVERLORD, but their reluctance was due to the fear it would not be strong enough to breach the Atlantic Wall. Losing a generation of British youth in France during

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World War I where the battlefield had become stagnant was not easily forgotten. Writing of the first World War Winston Churchill stated, "Memories of the Somme and Passchendaele and many lesser frontal attacks upon the Germans were not to be blotted out by time or reflection."¹

Concerned with the irreplaceable loss of manpower the Prime Minister stressed flexibility, mobility, and economy of force as the guiding principles of war. Emphasizing victory the British endorsed a military policy of

sea-power, blockade, strangulation, and 'closing the ring,' and think of armies, . . . to be applied sparingly, here and there, and not committed en masse in any one place until, as in the Peninsular War in 1813, the opportunity for a decisive intervention had matured.²

In contrast to the United States the British economic system was not centrally located. Great Britain served as the industrial center of the Commonwealth of Nations, while India and the Far Eastern Dominions supplied raw materials. Linking the two areas was the Mediterranean, the controversial nerve center of the European theater from 1942 to 1944. To the British the Mediterranean was a vital interest, while the United States, a self-sufficient nation, viewed the area as a secondary interest. Possessing vast stores of potential and actual resources the United States emphasized the importance of winning the war, but failed to recognize the political and economic

¹Churchill, Closing the Ring, op. cit., p. 582.

consequences of their actions.

Not only was the Mediterranean area a secondary interest to the United States strategists, but also the Balkans and Central Europe. On the other hand, Great Britain was directly concerned with the balance of power in Europe. The nation which controlled the Continent had a definite influence upon England, and the British were acutely aware of the consequences of Russian domination after Germany was defeated.

Viewing the consequences of the war from a military perspective the Americans were only concerned with defeating Germany. Conversely, the Prime Minister envisioned during the last days of spring and summer of 1944 the direct challenge of communism in the eastern Mediterranean and Central Europe if the Allies did not pursue an offensive in these areas. May 4, 1944 Prime Minister Churchill wrote to the British Foreign Secretary:

Broadly speaking, the issue is, Are we going to acquiesce in the Communisation of the Balkans and perhaps of Italy? Mr. Curtin touched upon this today, and I am of opinion on the whole that we ought to come to a definite conclusion about it, and that if our conclusion is that we resist the Communist infusion and invasion, we should put it to them pretty plainly at the best moment that military events permit.¹

After the capture of Rome, British military strategy was "directed against Communist policy throughout the Mediterranean, if not in Eastern Europe."²

¹Churchill, Closing the Ring, op. cit., p. 708.

On June 28th the Prime Minister expounded his new Mediterranean strategy to the President of the United States. In part he stated, "political considerations such as the revolt of the populations against the enemy or the submission and coming over of his satellites are a valued and important factor."¹

Divergent political and economic views, as well as distinct national traditions and heritages, characterized the United States and Great Britain. United, when Germany threatened their common vital interests, the Anglo-American military coalition became the foundation and backbone of the Allied Nations. Their inherent differences and interests created conflicts and misunderstanding, but throughout the war the Allies were able to pursue a strategy which compromised and merged their differences. Flexibility, economy of force, and mobility as professed by the British were employed in Italy and North Africa; while concentration of forces adhered to by the United States strategists was exemplified by the Normandy Invasion.

To the British, nurtured and confirmed in the experience, and largely governed by the forms, of maritime warfare, strategy implied an economy of effort, best achieved, if circumstances allowed, by a careful distribution of strength between a number of complementary targets. Such a mode of warfare was pragmatic, for it must develop largely as opportunity offered; and the British placed a correspondingly high value on strategic flexibility, in preference to a rigid adherence to a long-prepared plan. To the Americans, on the other hand, strategy implied concentration of effort, in the Napoleonic sense. Unused to long wars against numerically superior Continental powers, and rightly confident in their application of ingenuity to unparalleled strength, they had no need for or experience of the devious approach. Their strategic resource and tac-

¹Ehrman, op. cit., p. 355.
tical boldness, the former already displayed in the Pacific, the latter soon to be displayed in north-west Europe, were accordingly exercised in the service of a single strategic target and of a single well-prepared design; and they were quick to note and to fear any sign of an apparent dispersal of force, or of a departure from plans already agreed.

The Americans thus disliked the 'side-shows' which to the British were an inherent element of warfare; and the Mediterranean had always seemed to them to bear all the marks of the 'side-show'. . . . Thus, where the British feared that 'Overlord' would fail without larger diversionary operations in the south, the Americans feared that those operations would grow so large that 'Overlord' would fail.¹

The conflicting views held by the American and British strategists regarding strategic plans and decisions were generated by their national traditions, experiences, and goals, but were not strong enough to destroy or thwart the Allied coalition. Compromises were made throughout the war enabling the Allies to apply unrelenting pressure upon the Axis powers. In essence the strategy the Allies employed and battles they fought were successful due to the willingness of each man to sacrifice his life in order to obtain freedom and peace for all peoples of the world.

¹Ehrman, op. cit., pp. 115-16.
APPENDIX A

Reference List of World War II Military Code Names

ANVIL: Plan for invasion of Southern France.


AVALANCHE: Invasion of Italy at Salerno.

BOLERO: Buildup of U.S. forces and supplies in the United Kingdom for the cross-Channel invasion.

BUCCANEER: Plans for amphibious operations in Andaman Islands.

BUREKA: International Conference at Tehran, November 1943.

GYMNAST: Early plan for invasion of North Africa, referring to either the American plan for landing at Casablanca or the British plan for landing farther eastward on the Mediterranean.

HUSKY: Allied invasion of Sicily in July 1943.

OVERLORD: Plan for invasion of Northwest Europe in 1944.

QUADRANT: U.S.-British Conference at Quebec, August 1943.

RANKIN: Plans for return to the Continent in the event of the deterioration of the German position in late 1943 or early 1944.

ROUNDUP: Plan for major U.S.-British attack across the Channel in 1943.

SEXTANT: International Conference at Cairo during November and December 1943.

SHINGLE: Amphibious operation at Anzio, Italy.

SLEDGEHAMMER: Plan for limited cross-Channel attack in 1942.


TORCH: Allied invasion of North and Northwest Africa, November 1942.

APPENDIX B

Northwest Africa

Scale: 1: 1,400,000
APPENDIX C

Allied Advance Into Sicily and Southern Italy

Gustav Line
Nov-Dec '43

ADRIATIC SEA

5th Army
British 10th Corps
U.S. VI Corps

5th Inf Div
50th Inf Div
231st Brigade

1: 3,500,000
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Primary

Public documents


The book contains numerous documents describing the background of the Joint Allied Conferences and a day to day account of the proceedings at Tehran and Cairo. The documents provide excellent material in assisting the historian in interpreting the relationships of the British, American, and Russian military and political strategists.

Books


This book is based upon the diary of Field-Marshall Lord Alanbrooke, describing in detail the British grand strategy from 1939 through 1943 which he helped to formulate. The numerous excerpts from Lord Alanbrooke's diary describe the strategic and personal conflicts between the Prime Minister, the American Joint Chiefs of Staffs, and Lord Alanbrooke. The use of the diary enhances the spontaneous reactions of Lord Alanbrooke's experiences, creating realism and enabling the reader to vicariously experience the events of World War II.


Bryant's book is based upon the notes of Lord Alanbrooke, Chief of the Imperial Staff, which he wrote during World War II. Throughout the book the notes of Lord Alanbrooke not only present the strategic views of the British, but also criticism of the American strategists in their failure to fully realize and appreciate the strength of the German forces. The author clearly presents the British conviction of adequate preparation and coordination of forces prior to a cross-Channel landing. Through the eyes of the British General, the reader is able to appreciate not only the opposing views of the British strategists, but also
to recognize compromises agreed upon by the British to insure a continuous and united offensive against the Axis powers.


The above volumes describe a portion of World War II as experienced by Winston Churchill and are documented with personal letters, messages, agreements, telegrams, and significant correspondence between the Allied political leaders, military strategists, field commanders, and officials. Of particular importance is the Prime Minister's self-appraisal of the significance of the Allied grand strategy which he directly assisted in formulating from 1940-1944. The military strategy which he supported in Italy during the spring of 1944 was based upon the realization of the need to counter the Communization of Eastern Europe and the Balkans. In addition, the Italian campaign would divert numerous German forces into the Mediterranean area weakening the Atlantic Fortress prior to the Allied cross-Channel invasion.


The author describes the difficulties encountered in implementing the grand strategy within the North African and Italian campaigns. In Italy General Clark served as the Commanding Officer of the United States Fifth Army. Utilizing facts and figures known only after the war, the author maintains he had ample strength to defeat the German forces in Italy and successfully advance into the Balkans. The strategic decision to defend Italy was declared a "political blunder" by the General, but only at the conclusion of World War II. The book is not footnoted and its primary value is for those individuals evaluating tactical situations and battles within the North African and Italian campaigns.


The work by this British military historian is an excellent study in depth of the grand strategy of the Anglo-American coalition throughout World War II. The strategic viewpoints of the Americans and British are explained concisely and objectively by the author. In addition, Ehrman utilizes the historical background, culture, traditions, and unique political and economic situation of each nation in
explaining their basic strategic doctrine. However, in describing the differences of opinions held by the British and Americans, Ehrman also notes that differences of opinion were held by strategists within each Allied nation. Consequently, the grand strategy which the Allied nations pursued in defeating the Axis Powers was the amalgamation of the ideas of each person involved in formulating this strategy.


General Eisenhower describes in detail the tactics and strategy he utilized in defeating the German aggressors. Only the conflicts between the British and American field commanders such as General Montgomery and General Eisenhower are discussed. The strategic planning of the war and conflicts of grand strategy are ignored in his dissertation.


Garland and Smyth maintain that the Allies did not formulate a prearranged strategy prior to the defeat of the Axis forces in North Africa. The continuation of a Mediterranean offensive was the result of logistical and military circumstances making it the most logical approach to the continent. In pursuing the offensive in the Mediterranean, the authors emphasized purely military motives rather than political for initiating the Allied assault on Sicily. The political effects of the offensive are only acknowledged after the campaign in Sicily terminated. The conflict between the Mediterranean and Northwest Africa is discussed by the authors; however, they emphasize the tactics utilized by the Allied Commander in defeating the Italian-German forces.


The controversy between the conflicting British and American strategic views over the Normandy Invasion is touched upon, but not discussed in depth by Harrison. Only the military arguments for establishing the second front are considered by the author and political consequences of the action are not deemed significant. The author describes the strategic views of General Eisenhower, General Marshall and the strategic plans of C.O.S.S.A.C. as background material to the Normandy Invasion. Emphasis upon the tactics and strategy employed by the United Nations in establishing and maintaining the beachhead and the initial breakthrough is stressed by Harrison.

The book is a military history of the North African Allied campaign, stressing the tactics and battles fought by the Allies. The President's strategic decision of sending American troops to North Africa is not discussed in detail by Howe. He contends that the principal results of the campaign were (1) the Axis positions in Sicily, Italy, the Balkans, Crete, and the Dodecanese Islands were threatened, (2) the Axis partnership suffered a severe strain while the Allied coalition was strengthened by the victory, and (3) air reconnaissance would be expanded to protect convoys in the Atlantic and Mediterranean.


This book is a controversial work whose author attacks the manner in which the Allied Air Forces were employed and constructively criticizes Winston Churchill and Dwight D. Eisenhower. For example, Hanson Baldwin who wrote the introduction stated, "Kennedy believes most of Churchill's inspirations were profoundly impractical and wrongheaded." The author evaluated General Eisenhower by asserting his "comments at the meeting showed at once his weakness and his strength—his weakness in lack of real knowledge of his plans and overdelegation to subordinates, and his strength in avoidance of friction." The author also discusses the complex interweaving of military, political, and inter-Allied relations during World War II.


Leahy was the American ambassador to Vichy, France as well as serving as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during World War II. He admitted that he did not record notes of the meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and did not concern himself with the conflicts involved in grand strategy between the British and Americans. The book is primarily an autobiography of his experiences as ambassador to Vichy, France and does not contain significant interpretations or evaluation of the Allied grand strategy.


Leighton and Coakley discuss the relationship of logistical support to proposed and actual operations within the European and Pacific Theaters of Operations. The
administrative difficulties in transporting supplies across oceans and continents coupled with the lend-lease program with Russia is clearly presented by the authors. Of particular importance is their appraisal of the effect of a limited number of landing craft available for a cross-Channel invasion from 1942-1944.


The authors develop in detail the conflicting grand strategy as proposed by the British and American strategists from 1941 to 1942. Of particular interest is the primary material presented by Matloff and Snell, the Marshall Memorandum, the Eisenhower studies, and the Joint Allied Conferences held periodically during the first two years of the war. In describing the interrelationships of the Pacific, Mediterranean, and European theaters of operation, the authors assist the reader in understanding the complexity of political, economic, social, and military factors in formulating and implementing a united coalition strategy.


In analyzing the grand strategy pursued by the Allies during 1943 and 1944, Matloff relies heavily upon American resources. British resources are utilized but not in depth. Consequently, Maurice Matloff does not vividly describe the working relationship between the British and American strategists. The author presents an excellent military interpretation of the grand strategy pursued by the Allies, but does not evaluate social, economic, and political factors affecting grand strategy. The author's interpretations of the Allied conferences held during 1943 and 1944 emphasize the unity of the Allies in reaching decisions in order to ensure the solidarity of the coalition.


Strategy and Command: The First Two Years is a detailed study by Morton of the Pacific theater of operations. At the Arcadia Conference the Allies agreed that the Pacific would be secondary to the European theater of operations. The author examines Admiral King's and General MacArthur's "Pacific Alternative" granting overriding priority of material and men to the Pacific theater. In doing so the author presents a
vivid account of the serious conflict in grand strategy
between the American strategists, as well as relating
the effect of the controversy upon the British strate-
gists.

Playfair, Major General Ian S. O. *History of the Second World
War, United Kingdom Series. IV: The Mediterranean and
Middle East.* Edited by Sir James R. M. Butler. London:
The author discusses the military and political rela-
tionship of the British in North Africa and the Middle East
from 1940 to 1942. However, emphasis is placed upon evalu-
ating the battles and tactics utilized in implementing the
British grand strategy in North Africa. Major General
Playfair accuses American strategists of not having "experi-
ence in weighing what was desirable against what was practi-
cal with available resources." This statement is in refer-
ence to the reluctance of the United States in executing
Gymnast and their desire to cross the Channel in coming to
grips with the Germans during 1942.

Pogue, Forrest. *United States Army in World War II. IV: The
Supreme Command.* Washington: United States Government
The book is a study of the immediate events preceding
the Normandy Invasion and climaxing with the surrender of
the German Forces in 1945. The difficulty which beset Presi-
dent Roosevelt in choosing a supreme Allied Commander for
the Normandy Invasion is thoroughly discussed by the author.
In addition, the controversy between the invasion of South-
ern France, Northwest France, and the Italian campaign
during the spring of 1944 is analyzed by Pogue. However,
the political motivations of the British during this period
are not developed by the author. Numerous charts are uti-
лизed in clearly presenting the Allied Chain of Command and
physical structure of the British and American armed forces.

Sherwood, Robert E. *Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History.*
This book is based upon the notes and recollections by
Harry Hopkins during World War II. Written by Sherwood this
book is documented with primary and secondary sources. Of
particular importance is Harry Hopkins' opinion that the
Allies execute Bolero-Roundup and avoid a strategy of
actively engaging Axis forces in the Mediterranean. In pur-
suit of this controversial strategy, Harry Hopkins' notes of
the Allied conferences describe in detail the American and
British conflicts in planning a unified and coordinated
strategy designed to defeat the Axis Powers.

During World War II Stimson was the United States Secretary of War. Of particular importance was a chapter entitled, "Army and Grand Strategy." In respect to the grand strategy undertaken by the United States during World War II, Stimson did not favor the North African and Mediterranean campaign. He preferred a massive concentration of troops and supplies in Great Britain for a cross-Channel invasion. The Anglo-American strategy pursued during the first two years of war were secondary operations which he maintained only delayed the Normandy Invasion. However, his opinions were not strong enough to prevent him from admitting that "The two nations fought a single war and their quarrels were the quarrels of brothers."

Secondary

Books


Baldwin asserted that the United States and British strategists were in constant disagreement and conflict. The author maintained that the British emphasized a strategy based upon flexibility and tightening the ring round Germany, while the Americans emphasized the concentration of troops and mass firepower for a cross-Channel invasion. Consequently, the cross-Channel invasion was only achieved when United States strategists threatened to deploy troops and war material to the Pacific theater.


Of the eleven battles described by Baldwin, the descriptions of the battles of Sicily and Normandy provided the most pertinent information for this thesis. The author claims that Churchill had "envisioned the ultimate defeat of Germany in terms of the Napoleonic era;" that is a peripheral strategy based upon political aims. He also asserts that the British dominated the Allied grand strategy from 1941 to 1943. The controversial thesis is set forth that the Allied campaign in Italy diverted American troops into Italy rather than accomplishing its objective of diverting German forces into this area.

Feis describes in detail the political motivations and military grand strategy undertaken by the Allies during World War II. The political-military interpretation set forth by the author clearly presents the controversies that arose between the British and American military strategists and political leaders from 1942 to 1945. The Joint Allied Conferences are discussed in detail, enabling the reader to gain an insight into and appreciation of the conflicting views of the two nations. These views in turn resulted in compromises in which each nation had to sacrifice a portion of their ideas to maintain solidarity and unity of purpose.


The book is a study of five neutral states (Turkey, Finland, Norway, Sweden, and Spain), depicting how their governments resisted the political and military pressures of stronger nations. The author develops the political background of each nation, and then discusses in detail the various techniques utilized by each nation in thwarting the pressures of greater nations. In particular, I found the chapter on Turkey to be extremely useful. The author noted that the Allied Powers as well as the Axis Powers attempted to persuade Turkey to join their coalition. Generally speaking, Turkey's neutrality aided the Allies during the first stages of the war; but as the war progressed Turkey's neutrality thwarted the Prime Minister's ambitions in the Mediterranean.


Of particular importance is a section devoted to the social, political, and economic heritage of Great Britain. Examining the past experiences and traditions of the Island nation directly assists the reader in understanding the motivation of the grand strategy pursued by Great Britain. By discussing the conflicting or opposing national background of the United States, Greenfield is able to set forth the significance of a united Allied coalition from 1941 to 1945.


Various schools of military history are discussed showing the numerous differences between the American and British strategists throughout World War II. After present-
ing the various conflicts and differences of opinion, the author notes the areas of agreement between the two Allies as demonstrated by their unity throughout the war. Greenfield analyzes the strategy which the Allied Nations employed against the Axis in terms of their knowledge of the enemy, resources available, and logistical support requirements for proposed operations. He asserts, supported by documentary evidence, that Allied strategy utilized a combination of British and American proposals.


The author maintains that the Prime Minister upheld "The subordination of the military point of view to the political." Higgins discussed not only the second front but also the relationship of the Mediterranean, North African, and Pacific theaters of operations to Operation Overlord. The British grand strategy is reviewed with consideration given to the past culture, heritage, and geographic position of Great Britain.


Higgins meticulously develops Winston Churchill's activities in the Mediterranean from the Gallipoli Incident of World War I to his political overtures toward Turkey in World War II. The author describes in detail the reasons why Gallipoli was undertaken by the British. In essence, the stalemate on the Western Front, coupled with suicidal frontal attacks, proved extremely costly to the British. Utilizing their naval forces in creating mobility, dispersing the enemy's forces, and the opportunity for seizing the initiative in the East directly influenced Winston Churchill's interest in the Dardanelles. In developing his ideas, the author utilized numerous primary and secondary resources which increased the validity and historical significance of the work.


The author describes in detail Allied grand strategy in the Mediterranean from 1939 to 1945. The political, military, economic, social, and historical experiences of the British and American strategists are discussed in relation to their proposed strategy in the Mediterranean. In addition to evaluating the Allied strategy during this period, the author constructively appraises the Axis strategic policies in the
Mediterranean. Higgins also presents the reader with thought provoking questions, such as the one asked by Captain Liddell Hart, "Of what use is a decisive victory in battle if we bleed to death as a result of it?" The author concludes his appraisal of British strategy by maintaining the Mediterranean campaign was fought in three distinct phases. "Great Britain's was was a war fought first for the defeat of Italy until September 1943; then a war waged essentially for reasons of national prestige until the capture of Rome in the summer of 1944, and thereafter increasingly it became a war directed against Communist policy throughout the Mediterranean, if not in Eastern Europe, until May 1945."


The author reveals that the British strategy during World War II was not based upon historical experiences or insight into post World War II Europe. The strategic policy which dominated British thought was that of opportunism in light of existing circumstances. In evaluating grand strategy, the major decisions of the Allies were based upon criteria such as (1) the availability of shipping and landing craft, (2) the Russian front, (3) air superiority, (4) troop concentration, (5) political considerations, and (6) the enemies' situation.


Strategy and Compromise is a short concise account of Allied grand strategy during World War II. The interrelationships of the Pacific, Mediterranean, and European theaters are skillfully analyzed by the author. Morison supports the school of military history which professes that the strategic decisions governing World War II were a series of compromises between the Allied nations.


In his book Wilmot emphasizes that the Western Allies won the war, but suffered political defeat. The style in which the author wrote resulted in a clear presentation and adequately documented book. By skillfully utilizing German, American, and British primary material, the author recreated with realism the diplomacy, grand strategy, and tactics of World War II. The interrelationships of the Pacific, Mediterranean, and Northwest European Theaters of operations demonstrated his awareness of the significance and interplay of the strategic areas of contention among the Allies. Wilmot's research resulted in a controversial interpretation of Allied grand strategy in the European theater of operations.
He challenged the wisdom of President Roosevelt's ultimatum of unconditional surrender of German forces. Also, the American strategy of relentless military force resulted in the "neglect of opportunities which developed in the Mediterranean and the Balkans." The author considers the disregard of political and diplomatic factors by the American strategists as a significant error in their grand strategy.

Articles and periodicals


The author is an ardent supporter of President Roosevelt's military policies throughout World War II. However, Bolte does not attempt to objectively or constructively analyze his reasons for supporting the President's decisions. The article is not documented and therefore is not an acceptable historical record.


Carleton adheres to the thesis that the "post-war world was largely shaped by the way in which the war had been waged." The change of the role of the United States from an isolationist nation to a world power and leader of diplomatic and military strategy is discussed. The strategic and political decisions agreed upon by Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin at Tehran and Yalta are also discussed by the author.


The article was written after the British and American coalition was thoroughly established for over a year and a half. Differences of opinion between the Allies, Chamberlin professes, were only natural due to the unique economical, social, and political background of the two nations. The author further noted that throughout history coalition powers have always had differences of opinion. For a coalition to be successful, each side must compromise or yield secondary interests in order to maintain their primary objective.

Jacob, Sir Ian. "Statesmen and Soldiers in War." Foreign Affairs, XXVIII, No. 4 (July 1960), 656-64.

The author compares and contrasts the political-strategic leadership of Winston Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt.
during World War II. He maintains that the British Prime Minister exercised greater control of his field commanders and strategists in order to facilitate the political objectives of the future of Europe than did President Roosevelt.


In reevaluating the grand strategy of the Americans and British during World War II, Leighton maintained that the British had more reason to be dubious of American intentions in the European theater, than the Americans of British intentions in the same area. The author based his interpretation upon the American logistical support of the European theater during 1942 and 1943. He noted that more troops and supplies were sent to the Pacific than to the European theater during this period, while the Americans claimed to be pursuing the goal of defeating Germany first. The article is clearly written and adequately documented in support of his thesis.


Leighton discussed in detail the conflicts in grand strategy between the Americans and British over the Mediterranean and Northwest-Europe theater of operations in 1943. The effects of a shortage of landing craft upon an assault in Northwest Europe is elaborated upon by the author. Of particular significance is the thorough discussion of the Cairo-Tehran Conferences, where Marshal Stalin joined President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill in joint deliberations of Allied strategy. At Tehran, Marshal Stalin stressed the importance of a cross-Channel invasion as the primary means of jointly defeating the Axis powers.


The author describes in detail the Allied controversy, whether to advance deeper into the Mediterranean or execute an invasion against Southern France. Matloff presents the British political, social, and military reasons for the Mediterranean advance. The military arguments for initiating a second front against German forces in Southern France by the Americans are also presented. The author does not attempt to resolve the controversy between the Allies; rather, he describes in detail the motives of the strategists
of each country and maintains that the controversy will never be completely resolved.


The task of determining where the Allies should first oppose German forces is thoroughly discussed by the author. The United States' strategists were in favor of conducting an assault against the European mainland. However, the limitation of landing craft, commitments to other areas, a shortage of shipping, as well as the British presently engaging the Axis powers in North Africa, hindered the effectiveness of their arguments. The efforts of the American strategists to undertake a cross-Channel invasion was finally subdued by the President reaching the decision to execute an invasion of North Africa. Meyer presents the British and American controversy clearly and objectively. The reader is able to fully appreciate the sincerity and desire of the military tacticians who proposed the strategies for defeating Germany.


Morton describes in detail the historical background of the United States' decision to defeat Germany first. The article is clearly written and adequately documented with supporting primary material. The author concludes by noting that throughout the war the United States and its Allies upheld under all situations the basic decision to defeat Germany first.


Pogue describes the difficulties that General Dwight D. Eisenhower faced in maintaining unity between military commanders of Great Britain and the United States during World War II. The problems encountered by General Eisenhower and the techniques he employed to resolve the differences are an indication of the difficulties faced by SHAPE, and guidelines that might be used to resolve the various conflicts.


The author criticizes without documentation the Allied delays in executing operation OVERLORD, the limitation of United States Forces in the Pacific, and the policy of not assuming the initiative in the Balkans. In developing his
premise he fails to consider the logistical limitations of the Allied nations as well as manpower.


The difficulties in establishing a second front are enumerated by the British officer. His basic arguments are that the British empire is not geographically centered and its subjects are located in pockets scattered throughout the world. Combating a formidable enemy in North Africa and in the Atlantic weakened the island power and aid from the United States was not able to completely counter the German threat of invasion.


The major conflicts in grand strategy between the United States and Great Britain are outlined by Wedemeyer. He maintains that the British strategists completely dominated the Allied grand strategy during the first two years of the war. The author completely ignores the unity of purpose and joint undertakings displayed by the coalition powers from 1941 to 1945.


Werner believed that Hitler wanted the United States to fight the Japanese aggressor in the Pacific first. This would have allowed Germany to conquer the Atlantic, Mediterranean, North Africa, and Eastern Europe with relative ease. Thus, the author maintains the United States should fight Germany first, while China and Russia limit the Japanese offensive in Asia.