Value Orientation and Game Theory

David Lloyd Andrews

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I wish to thank Dr. Alan Isaak for joining my thesis committee on short notice at a time when mind and body must have preferred enjoying the waning days of summer to a hot, stuffy office and, hopefully, a not-quite-so stuffy graduate paper.

Mr. Maurice Alberda read most of the paper and his suggestions and criticisms prevented some glaring grammatical errors from appearing in the rough draft version. My wife Sally Hopkins Arman was an expert copyreader, statistician, proof reader, and a source of inspiration during the gloomy moments when completion of the paper seemed impossible. In the final copy especially, Miss Lucille R. Bartos contributed editorial expertise, typing, statistical proofing, and general proofing. Delta College provided access to, and instructions in, the operation of the school's computer.

To all of the above people, I acknowledge my gratitude while accepting full responsibility for any errors that may remain in the final paper.

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MASTER'S THESIS M-1725

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A REAPPRAISAL OF SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS OF NONPARTISAN ELECTIONS.

Western Michigan University, M.A., 1968
Political Science, general

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary History: Nonpartisanship in the United States</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factors Inhibiting City Problem-Solving</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Reform Movement in City Government</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justifications for Nonpartisanship</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criticism of Nonpartisanship</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acceptance of Nonpartisanship in Cities</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contemporary Related Research</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antipathy to Political Parties</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenure and Conservatism in Legislative Bodies</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avoidance of Policy Debates</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HYPOTHESES AND METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partisanship Bars Certain Individuals from City Office</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenure and Conservatism</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issueless Campaigns</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER</td>
<td>PAGE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methodology</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Variables</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Differences among Nonpartisan Systems</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III ANALYSIS OF THE RESEARCH FINDINGS</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupations of Nonpartisan and Partisan Officeholders</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income of Nonpartisan and Partisan Officeholders</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partisan Activity Record of Nonpartisans and Partisans</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partisan Identification of Nonpartisans and Partisans</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior Partisan Officeholding of Nonpartisans and Partisans</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Group Memberships of Nonpartisans and Partisans</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aspirations for Higher Partisan Office</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Would Respondents Have Sought Office in Different Electoral System?</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Affiliation Required by Law</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV TENURE AND CONSERVATISM</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age of Respondents</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenure in Office</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER</td>
<td>PAGE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservatism among City Officials</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVOIDING ISSUES IN CITY CAMPAIGNS</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Issues in City Campaigns</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONCLUSIONS OF THE STUDY</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDICES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Political scientists attempting to evaluate the institutions of local government encounter a twofold problem: an array of facts exist without a theoretical framework, and, at the same time, theories exist which have not been tested empirically. Typical of the latter is the proposition that removing national parties from city politics will result in better city government.

The method of ending national party influence in city elections suggested most often is the removal of party labels from city ballots. This practice (nonpartisan elections) is offered as a means of ridding city government of unsavory politicians and returning control of the city to elected officials committed to the promotion of the common good.

Despite the volume of materials written about nonpartisanship, systematic attempts to judge the effects of the removal of party labels in city elections have been neither numerous nor conclusive. In 1952, Adrian surveyed the literature


in an effort to describe the characteristics of city government in localities using nonpartisan elections. His article represented a synthesis of the information on the subject to that time. Lee, after perusing the literature in 1960, found that little had been done in the interim. Adrian's article presented eleven separate characteristics of nonpartisan government: far too many to examine carefully in a paper such as this. The literature on this subject is sufficiently replete with studies that do not exhaustively examine selected portions of the subject as to make another such study unnecessary and, perhaps, undesirable.

In this study, three of Adrian's hypotheses were subject to reappraisal by means of questioning elected city officials in localities using either partisan or nonpartisan elections. The characteristics studied were as follows:

1. Nonpartisanship encourages a limited number of candidates to seek office who would not do so if partisan affiliation were required.
2. Nonpartisanship encourages long tenure in city office and, thus, conservatism in city legislative behavior.
3. Issues (both national and local) are avoided in nonpartisan campaigns.

\[\text{\textsuperscript{1}}Eugene Lee, The Politics of Nonpartisanship, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1960), 3.\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{2}}Adrian, op. cit., 771.\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{3}}loc. cit., 774.\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{4}}loc. cit., 772.\]
These hypotheses have relevance to the study of local government, for they suggest several important questions regarding the electoral institutions of cities:

1. Does the electoral arrangement of a city affect who will run for city office?
2. Does the electoral arrangement of a city affect the re-election prospects of city officials?
3. Does the electoral arrangement of a city affect the ideological commitment of officials?
4. Does the electoral arrangement of a city affect the discussion of issues in a campaign?

In the sections to follow, a summary history of nonpartisanship will be presented, followed by a discussion of recent research in subjects related to the individual characteristics of nonpartisan elections. Following those sections, the hypotheses of the study will be presented.

**SUMMARY HISTORY: NONPARTISANSHIP IN THE U.S.**

Historical generalizations are difficult in political science; attempts to generalize about city governments are especially suspect because of the variety of institutions and practices used in diverse cities over time.

It is possible to suggest that cities have had varying degrees of success in creating institutions responsive to the public will, developing honest and efficient

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1Cities will be defined during the early sections of this paper as any incorporated village, town, or city. This definition will be narrowed considerably in a later footnote.
administrative practices, and recruiting public officials with high levels of integrity and character.

The experience of city dwellers during the years immediately following the writing of the Constitution in 1789 was that city governments had little difficulty in successfully meeting the above criteria.

The task of governing the early American town was simple enough. In 1790 New York, Philadelphia, Boston, Baltimore, and Charleston were the only towns in the United States of over 8,000 inhabitants... Their populations were homogeneous; their wants were few; and they were still in that happy childhood when every voter knew nearly every other voter and when everybody knew his neighbor's business as well as his own, and perhaps better.¹

A host of factors caused city populations to grow rapidly during the nineteenth century. A few of the factors pertinent to this study will be discussed in subsequent paragraphs, but it is important to note at this point that population growth in cities paralleled the growth of city problems.

The inability of city governments to solve the problems concomitant to growth became evident to city dwellers and serious scholars by the middle of the nineteenth century. Reports of city problems and the lack of workable solutions were widely distributed and read. Representative of the tone of these reports was the observation by Bryce² in 1888 that city government was the "one conspicuous failure"


of the American system. Somewhat stronger in tone, but still fairly representa-
tive, was the statement by White in 1890 that "with very few exceptions, the
city governments of the United States are the worst in Christendom—the most
expensive, the most inefficient, and the most corrupt."

Explanations of why city governments were unable to keep pace of politi-
cal, social, and technological developments during the nineteenth century are
numerous. Students of urban history have written extensively on the topic. In
the section to follow, a few explanations will be discussed that are related to
later arguments used to support the advocacy of nonpartisan elections.

Factors Inhibiting City Problem-Solving

Businessmen out of city politics

As cities grew in size and their problems increased, a corresponding need

(December 1890), 357.

2 See, for example, Charles N. Glaab and A. Theodore Brown, A History
of Urban America (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1967); Arthur M.
Schlesinger, The Rise of the City, 1878-1898 ("A History of American Life;"
New York: The Macmillan Company, 1933); Constance McLaughlin Green, The
Rise of Urban America (New York: Harper & Row, 1965); Constance McLaughlin
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1957); Harold U. Faulkner, The Quest for Social Justice ("A History of American
Life; " New York: The Macmillan Company, 1931); Frank M. Stewart, A Half
Century of Municipal Reform (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1950);
Landon Warner Hoyt, Progressivism in Ohio: 1897-1917 (Columbus: Ohio State
University Press, 1964); Oliver P. Williams and Charles Press, Democracy in
Urban America (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1961), particularly Chapter
II.
arose for competent candidates. By the middle of the nineteenth century, one group of citizens (businessmen) refrained from seeking city office.

During the unsettled years immediately following the (Civil) war, individual and corporate entrepreneurs, lawyers, and doctors, preoccupied with their private affairs, and, if politically ambitious, interested only in careers in the state or national arena, preferred to leave the increasingly onerous chores of local administration to anyone willing to undertake them. So incompetents and scallywags moved into public office.¹

Businessmen were not entirely absent from the political arena of city government during the latter half of the nineteenth century. As Steffens² indicates, some businessmen were happy to deal with city governments to secure lucrative franchises for municipal services. Steffens and Green were indicating the absence of businessmen of unquestioned character and integrity from political activity in cities.

**Bosses and political machines**

The influence of bosses and political machines in city politics has also been suggested as the reason for city governments' inability to solve problems. Bosses and political machines were not an isolated feature of city government. "Bossism, machine government, and corruption of public officials were typical in American

¹Green, *Rise of Urban America*, op. cit., 111. The same point is made in Glaab and Brown, op. cit., 171-72.

cities during most of the nineteenth century. The rapid growth of cities contributed to, and prolonged the existence of, city bosses.

From 1870 to 1930 the working class, especially immigrants, were the mainstay of the machine. They gave freely the one thing they had to offer—the vote. In return they received both material rewards and nonmaterial inducements, the latter mainly in the form of friendship and a feeling of acceptance extended them by the precinct workers.

Bosses and political machines did make a contribution to lessening the myriad problems of large numbers of new arrivals in cities. However, "the parties frequently mismanaged urban growth on a grand scale."3

Structure of city government

The blame for poor performance from city government was also attached to the governmental institutions used by cities. Childs,4 a leading exponent of the view that institutional change would end political excesses, indicated that he was "always trying to get rid of such things as bosses and machines by fixing up the mechanism of democracy to work without such undemocratic interlopers."

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1 Glaab and Brown, op. cit., 211.


Presence of national political parties in local politics

City governments' inability to solve local problems has also been attributed to the effect of combining national, state, and city elections by means of national party symbols at each level of government. Representative of this view is Binkerd's contention that partisanship enabled our national parties to make our cities, with their contracts and their treasures, and their administrative machinery, the great feeding trough of their organized political appetite.

The Reform Movement in City Government

Reforming city government has been a popular subject for journalists, ministers, patriotic speakers, and other concerned citizens. Civic reform groups have sprung up in numerous cities for varying causes and remained operative for varying lengths of time. Reform groups have demonstrated an inability to sustain themselves or to consistently control elected city office.

A crusading, evangelistic spirit has accompanied many of the reform efforts.

---


2 Greenstein, op. cit., 7.

From the Rev. Charles H. Parkhurst, who in 1892 donned checked black and white trousers in order to penetrate New York's saloons and brothels on behalf of the City Vigilance League, to the scholarly young women in toreador pants who now do battle with the remains of Tammany Hall, reform has exhibited a variety of types and forms.¹

Local politicians have ridiculed the boisterous advocacy of institutional changes by reformers, as have some serious students of city government.²

The changes in governmental structure proposed by reformers have included the following: civil service reform,³ adoption of the commission form of city government (now largely abandoned),⁴ the short ballot,⁵ proportional representation,⁶ and the council-manager form of city government.⁷

¹ibid.


³For a description of the civil service reform movement, see Ari Hoogenboom, Outlawing the Spoils, a History of the Civil Service Reform Movement, 1865-1883 (Urbana, Illinois: The University of Illinois Press, 1961).

⁴For a description of the commission form of city government, see Clinton R. Woodruff, City Government by Commission (New York: Appleton & Company, 1914).

⁵For a description of the short ballot movement, see Richard S. Childs, Short Ballot Principles (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1911).

⁶For a description of proportional representation, see Ralph A. Straetz, PR Politics in Cincinnati (New York: New York University, 1958).

In 1894, the National Municipal League was formed as a national voice seeking civic reform.\(^1\) The League continues to be an influential force in the fight for "good" government. The League and other civic reformers have sought, in addition to the above list of structural changes, the widespread adoption of the nonpartisan election system in city government.\(^2\)

Justification for Nonpartisanship

The virtues of nonpartisan elections as a means of improving governmental performance have been the subject of soaring oratory.

No single reform would do more for the purity and honesty of national as well as local politics than the complete elimination of parties from the local, municipal, and county scene.\(^3\)

More restrained authors have presented a variety of arguments to support their advocacy of nonpartisanship.

Development of local issue-oriented politics

The introduction of nonpartisan elections would, Jones\(^4\) contended, create

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\(^1\) Lee, op. cit., 31.

\(^2\) ibid.

\(^3\) "What Can an Angry People Do?," National Municipal Review (editorial), XL (May 1951), 242.

"more clear-cut issues in municipal politics," not possible when national issues are brought into the cities' political arena. The introduction of campaigns based on city issues would assure that every issue would be fully discussed and candidates for city office would be elected or defeated on their proposals for solving city problems.¹

Encourage better men to run for city office

The removal of party labels from city ballots "encourages candidates to stand for office who would not otherwise engage in politics..."² This argument is based on the assumption that good citizens and politicians do not, and could not, have anything in common.

Typical of the hostility with which politicians are viewed is the statement by Clark.³

The means and methods by which almost (any) public station can now be attained are repulsive to high-minded men. Self-respect hesitates to descend to the companionship of the Caucus and the Convention; integrity scorns their devious courses; and independence refuses their slavish environment.

This argument continues with the view that, to gain nomination for public office, it would be necessary for qualified men to put in an apprenticeship doing


²Lee, op. cit., 170.

the menial tasks of political parties. Such a requirement would effectively dis­
courage many capable citizens from becoming involved in the quest for public
office.

Better government in nonpartisan cities

Advocates of nonpartisanship contend that administrative behavior will be
altered as a result of removing party labels. They suggest that the response to
problems by city government will be more rapid.

Commentators generally concede that municipal government im­
provements have come faster in communities with a nonpartisan
practice than in those with a party labeling practice.¹

The validity of this argument is very difficult to investigate. Little or no
evidence is given to support this view; however, it is a common line of argument
in the writings of civic reformers.

Local policy decisions not political

Advocates of nonpartisanship have long argued that city government differs
markedly from other types of political institutions.

My fundamental contention is that the city is a corporation; that as
a city it has nothing to do with general political interests...The
questions in a city are not political questions. They have reference
to the laying out of streets (and such matters).²

¹Ludwig, op. cit., 238.
²White, op. cit., 213.
Bringing political labels into the governmental picture, the argument continues, only serves to divide the voters on meaningless party lines, for "there is no such thing as Democratic sewer pipe or Republican pavement."\(^1\)

**Criticism of Nonpartisanship**

Students of city government have not unanimously endorsed nonpartisan elections. Beard\(^2\) entered strong reservations about the system in 1917.

I am prepared to defend the thesis that nonpartisanship has not worked, does not work, and will not work in any major city in the United States.

In the same article, Beard\(^3\) presented three major reasons for his antipathy to nonpartisan elections:

1. The causes of parties lie deeper than election laws.
2. The causes of parties are social and economic conditions and their continuance can be expected for the same reasons.
3. The true task of the civic reformer is to accept parties and work to make them responsive to public opinion and the common good.

Beard's article had no noticeable effect on the continuing debate over the role of national parties in city elections.

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\(^1\) Ellen D. Ellis, "National Parties and Local Politics," *American Political Science Review*, XXIX (February 1935), 62.


\(^3\) ibid.
Writing in 1964, Friedland\textsuperscript{1} suggested another argument in opposition to nonpartisan elections. In his study, he contended that city bosses and political machines were a blessing to businessmen. Businessmen had great influence in the machines and made great profits from their cooperation with bosses. When circumstances ended boss control of city government, businessmen were forced to search for a new means of exerting influence. Friedland suggests that the vehicle utilized was nonpartisanship. Background for this argument will be presented in subsequent paragraphs.

A second contemporary criticism has been directed to the conclusion that nonpartisanship is possible because policy decisions in cities are non-political. Lee\textsuperscript{2} rejects this contention as unrealistic. He further holds that, if political decisions are not made in cities, election of city officials is unnecessary. In Lee's view, the purpose of elections is to allow the voter to choose between policy alternatives as articulated by competing political candidates. If political decisions are not made in cities, but rather by a higher political body (such as the township, county, or state), that body would be in the best position to judge the way its policy decisions are being administered and, thus, should have the power to appoint city officials.

\textsuperscript{1}Friedland, op. cit., 45.

\textsuperscript{2}Lee, op. cit., 173.
Acceptance of Nonpartisanship in Cities

The movement to institute nonpartisan elections in American cities has been quite successful. The first major city to remove party labels was Boston in 1909. In the years since Boston's adoption of the nonpartisan ballot, the percentage of cities conducting nonpartisan elections has steadily increased.

TABLE I

CITIES OVER 5,000 POPULATION USING NONPARTISAN ELECTIONS 1934-1967*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1934</th>
<th>1940</th>
<th>1950</th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>1967</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>58.6</td>
<td>55.6</td>
<td>58.3</td>
<td>61.0</td>
<td>64.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The first year for which accurate data is available is 1934. All data from The Municipal Yearbook, 1934, 102, 107-112; 1940, 23, 28-60; 1950, 43; 1960, 86; 1967, 108.

CONTEMPORARY RELATED RESEARCH

Many of the earliest arguments supporting nonpartisanship were based on little or no empirical data. Adrian and Lee were faced with a similar lack of detailed research. Questions inherent in the earliest arguments, as well as Adrian and Lee's writings, remain virtually unanswered by modern research standards.

1loc. cit., 22.
Since 1952 a limited amount of research has been completed in related subjects which is pertinent to the generalizations compiled by Adrian which are under investigation in this study. In the paragraphs to follow, that research will be discussed in relation to each of the individual characteristics.

Antipathy to Political Parties

Since World War II a virtual flood of research has been reported which investigates the relationship between individual behavior and the political process. These diverse studies provide useful guidelines for judging the efficacy of the view that certain individuals reject partisan office due to the presence of political parties.

Party identification

Individual identification with a political party does not indicate an individual's willingness to participate in partisan political activity. It simply suggests that, over time, individuals think of themselves as being somewhat sympathetic to one of the political parties. "Most Americans have this sense of attachment."¹ The extent of this attachment is discernible from various research undertakings.

Milbrath² found that about 75% of citizens of the United States identify

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with a political party. Campbell and associates\(^1\) found over a six-year time span that the maximum portion of the sample that identified themselves as independents was 9%. The maximum portion of their sample that considered themselves to be apolitical or did not respond to the question was 10% over the same time period.

From this data it is possible to generalize that party identification is an overwhelming fact of American life. The data does not rule out the possibility that a small segment of the population has strong negative attitudes toward political parties, making candidacy unconscionable.

**Partisan political participation**

Individuals having an attachment to a political party may do nothing more than sympathize with their party's viewpoint, as expressed by its spokesmen. Other avenues of activity are open to the citizens who seek more active political involvement. The list of political activities in Table 2 is arranged in a descending order of involvement. As the reader follows down the list, the amount of time, energy, money, and personal willingness to publicly identify with a political party decreases. The hierarchy of involvement in Table 2 may vary slightly from election to election, but not more than a rank or two.\(^2\)

\(^1\) Campbell, op. cit., 69.

\(^2\) Milbrath, op. cit., 19.
TABLE 2
HIERARCHY OF POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTIVITY</th>
<th>% OF ADULT POPULATION PARTICIPATING</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Holding Public and Party Office</td>
<td>Less Than 1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Being a Candidate for Office</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soliciting Political Funds</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attending a Caucus or Strategy Meeting</td>
<td>4% to 5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Becoming an Active Member in a Political Party</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contributing Time in a Political Campaign</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attending a Political Meeting or Rally</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Making a Monetary Contribution to a Party or Candidate</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contacting a Public Official or a Political Leader</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wearing a Button or Putting a Sticker on the Car</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attempting to Talk Another into Voting a Certain Way</td>
<td>25% to 30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initiating a Political Discussion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voting</td>
<td>40% to 70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exposing Oneself to Political Stimuli</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>


In summary, this data indicates that, while large percentages of the voting population make the decision to vote in partisan elections, relatively few are sufficiently committed to partisan affairs to engage in more strenuous or time-consuming political activities. The willingness to seek and hold public political office is the apex of political involvement. The overwhelming number of citizens who do not seek office indicates that limiting factors are at work, conceivably
"Success" and political participation

The early supporters of nonpartisanship suggested that the successful, highly qualified citizen demurred from political candidacy in a partisan electoral arrangement. The same argument is restated in the text of Adrian's article.

The terms "successful" and "highly qualified" are value-laden and imprecise. The conventional wisdom suggests that these terms are synonymous with such sociological indices as high educational level, upper income, high socio-economic status, and high occupational status.

Milbrath's investigation of the pertinent literature indicated the following: of individuals measured on the basis of socio-economic status, income, education, and occupational indices, the upper levels of each were more inclined to be active political participants than those people in the lower level. In each case the numerical possibility remains that individuals may refrain from political participation, contrary to the more pervasive pattern.

Summary

The above data suggests the following relationships between individual behavior and political participation:

(1) Identification with a political party is a normal arrangement for American citizens.

(2) The more strenuous types of political activity such as office seeking and officeholding are engaged in by a very limited number of individuals.

(3) The more successful (upper income and high occupational status) individuals are more inclined to be active political participants than the less successful.

(4) The possibility that certain successful citizens are sufficiently repulsed by partisan politics as to avoid party identification and partisan participation is not eliminated but is rendered suspect.

The arguments supporting nonpartisanship cited earlier indicated that removing party labels from city ballots encourages the candidacy of certain citizens who would not seek office in a partisan system. The argument suggests that the electoral system of cities is a major determinant of who seeks city office, the attitudes of political aspirants, and the socio-economic background of candidates and officeholders.

The apparent conflict between the research cited above and the arguments favoring nonpartisanship were thought to be sufficiently important to warrant the present study. If the election system is as important a variable as the early arguments for nonpartisanship suggest, the data from this study should clearly indicate that nonpartisans come from higher status occupational and income groups, partisans have been more active in partisan affairs than nonpartisans, and nonpartisan officeholders would not occupy their current position if affiliation with a political party were required.

Tenure and Conservatism in Legislative Bodies

It will be recalled that Adrian suggested that nonpartisanship encourages long tenure in city legislative office, and that long tenure produces conservatism
in city legislative bodies. Thus, two separate phenomena are indicated, with the former causally related to the latter.

Conservatism, as commonly used in the American political arena, is an imprecise term. For the purpose of this brief discussion, conservatism will be reviewed as the disposition to oppose any substantial change which might conceivably produce dislocation, discomfort, or dispossession in the society. 1

If a discussion of research on legislative tenure and legislative attitudes is to be undertaken, clarity demands that types of legislative bodies be categorized to insure that research completed in one area is not attributed to vastly different legislative structures and environments. Because of the diversity of legislative institutions, it may be helpful to briefly examine recent research on legislative tenure and conservatism in national, state, and local legislative bodies.

The national congress

In the national Congress, turnover of members is small and long tenure is common. 2 Long tenure is particularly characteristic of legislators from states or districts without intense inter-party competition. The Congressmen with long tenure from "safe" districts are predominately conservative. 3

---


The Congressional patterns suggest that where inter-party competition is lacking, long tenure results: a modification of Adrian's proposition. As indicated by Vinyard, in those areas where inter-party competition is virtually nonexistent, intra-party competition becomes crucial in the quest for partisan nomination. The presence of competition of a partisan nature within the party structure prevents comparisons of the election prospects of legislators at the national level with the local level on the basis of Adrian's original proposition.

The relationship between tenure and conservatism suggested by Adrian appears initially to be verified in the national Congress by the research cited above. This surface validity does not bear up under closer scrutiny. Were Adrian's suggestion of causal relationships between tenure and conservatism to apply to the national Congress, new members would be overwhelmingly liberal and members with long tenure, conservative. A cursory examination of the voting records of Congressmen indicates this is not the case.

State legislative bodies

In state legislative bodies, membership turnover has traditionally been very high; almost half of the members of the nation's state legislatures are new at the

1loc. cit., 48-9.

start of each session. A variety of factors are relevant to this high attrition rate; one of the least important is defeat at the polls.

Members of 48 of the 50 state legislatures are elected on partisan ballots. Minnesota and Nebraska utilize nonpartisan ballots in the elections of their state legislators. Since 1965 the political parties in Minnesota have "endorsed" candidates for the state legislature. In Nebraska, political parties, elected officials, and interested citizens have advocated the inclusion of party labels on state legislative ballots.

Attempts to judge the relationship between nonpartisanship and legislative turnover in those states where party labels are omitted are hindered by a lack of research. The most recent data available was compiled by Adrian, pointing to his original conclusion.


4loc. cit., 166.


6Adrian, op. cit., 774-75.
In states which include partisan labels on the ballot, it is equally difficult to investigate relationships between partisanship and tenure because of a lack of current data. Compounding the problem is the introduction of judicial reapportionment rulings which have often dramatically altered the legislative districts of individual legislators. Such rulings make it difficult, in lieu of recent research, to determine the causes of long tenure or the absence of tenure.

The strength of conservatism in state legislatures has traditionally been thought to be high. Unequally populated legislative districts, arranged to favor legislators from rural areas, were thought to be an important cause of state legislative conservatism. Studies of state legislative output after apportionment tentatively indicate that more liberal and progressive legislation has not increased substantially.¹

In summary, insufficient data exists to evaluate the relationship between the presence or absence of party labels and tenure in state legislative bodies. A similar lack of research inhibits the evaluation of relationships between tenure and conservatism in state legislatures.

City legislative bodies

In city legislative bodies, a few studies indicate that long tenure is

¹For a summary of relevant studies, see Frank Trippett, The States: They Fell (Cleveland: World Publishing Company, 1967), 186-97.
associated with nonpartisanship.1 These studies cannot be considered authorita-
tive because of their design: case studies in individual communities.

The same studies indicate that conservative members of city legislative
bodies are able to retain their positions for long periods of time. Adrian sugges-
ted that tenure produced conservatism. These studies suggest that conservatism
produces long tenure. It should be noted again that the studies mentioned
previously were individual case studies, and attempts to generalize from them should
be avoided.

In the very largest cities, members of legislative bodies display a conserva-
tive commitment. This trend does not appear to be related to length of tenure on
the legislative body, but rather to the influence of high city taxes on the voting
behavior of city residents. In other words, conservatives are elected to city
office; they are not created by prolonged officeholding.2

Summary

The limited amount of current research on the relationship between
nonpartisanship and tenure, and the further relationship between tenure and

---

1See, for example, Warner E. Mills, Jr., and Harry R. Davis, Small City
Government (New York: Random House, 1962), and Gladys M. Kammerer, et

2Edward C. Banfield, Big City Politics (New York: Random House, 1965),
12–3.
legislative conservatism suggests the following points:

(1) At the national, state, and city levels, insufficient data exists to judge the relationship between tenure in office and type of election system.

(2) A limited number of studies in individual communities suggest conservatism and tenure are related, but not as Adrian originally suggested; insufficient data and/or markedly different election methods prevent the development of generalizations about state and national legislative bodies.

(3) The scarcity of research on the topic, particularly at the city level, does not preclude the propositions Adrian presented nor does it support his contentions.

Avoidance of Policy Debates

Adrian suggested that policy debates are minimized in cities using nonpartisan electoral systems, with local as well as national issues avoided by competing candidates. Early supporters of nonpartisanship contended that the removal of party labels would eliminate national issues while increasing the political discussion of city policy questions. Recent research provides an equally ambiguous picture of the role of issues in city elections.

The politics of suburbia have been characterized by Wood\(^1\) and Greer\(^2\) as "no-party" politics. The term means more than the absence of party structures; it suggests that divisive issues are absent. No national issues are introduced into the political arena and no local issues are sufficiently important to merit

---


\(^2\) Scott Greer, Governing the Metropolis (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1962), particularly Chapter V.
policy debates.\textsuperscript{1}

In the large core cities of the nation, no clear pattern emerges. In Boston racial and ethnic issues of the city are the focus of political debate.\textsuperscript{2} In Minneapolis, pressure groups contend for city office, developing campaign issues which are pertinent to group members.\textsuperscript{3} In Wichita, nonpartisanship has produced issueless politics with no discussion of either national or local issues in city campaigns.\textsuperscript{4}

From this brief discussion it seems clear that campaigns for city office produce sporadic debates in diverse cities, with less chance of meaningful dialogue in the suburbs than in core cities. The extent to which national issues enter city elections in large cities is also uneven and subject to wide diversity.

It should be noted that recent research has indicated that issues in partisan campaigns are not the major determinant of voter selection.\textsuperscript{5} Such factors as

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1}Wood, op. cit., 216.
\item \textsuperscript{2}David Stoffer, "Parties in Nonpartisan Boston," \textit{National Municipal Review}, XII (February 1923), 89.
\item \textsuperscript{3}Robert Morlan, "City Politics: Free Style," \textit{National Municipal Review}, XXXVIII (November 1949), 487.
\item \textsuperscript{4}Marvin A. Harder, Nonpartisan Elections: a Political Illusion (Monograph; Rutgers, the State University; Eagleton Institute of Political Studies in Practical Politics, 1960), 24-5.
\item \textsuperscript{5}David A. Leuthold, Electioneering in a Democracy (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1968), 14.
\end{itemize}
party loyalty and the personality of a candidate are more important to the voter in determining the recipient of his vote. No doubt, issues play a part in party selection and perception of candidates, but conscious selection is based overwhelmingly on the latter two factors.
CHAPTER II

HYPOTHESES AND METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY

The three hypotheses selected for investigation in this study collectively suggest that the electoral arrangement of cities has a major impact on the city's political processes. The hypotheses suggest that the system of elections greatly influence who will seek city office, the type of campaign they undertake, their prospects for re-election, and their political ideology.

The literature does not provide the data to refute this expansive interpretation. A degree of caution suggests that the electoral arrangement of a city may not be the analytical tool for thoroughly piercing the Gordian knot of city government. The present study was undertaken to test the broad interpretation described above. Following the presentation of the results of this project, modification in the general characteristics of nonpartisan government will be suggested where appropriate. In the paragraphs to follow, the specific hypotheses of the study will be presented, followed by a discussion of the methodology used.

Partisanship Bars Certain Individuals from City Office

Adrian indicated that nonpartisanship encourages a limited number of candidates to seek city office who would not do so if partisan affiliation were required. This argument was separated into several sub-statements on the basis of arguments supporting nonpartisanship cited earlier.
The citizen that refrained from seeking partisan office was identified by proponents of nonpartisanship as the successful and highly qualified. If this contention is accurate, it would be expected that the data would reveal that nonpartisan officeholders come from higher income and occupational status groups than partisans.

Proponents of nonpartisanship contend that the necessity of becoming involved in partisan affairs is a major obstacle to the candidacy of some citizens. If this argument has merit, the data should indicate that nonpartisan officeholders are strangers to partisan activity. Specifically, the data should suggest that partisan officeholders have been more active in partisan political activity than have nonpartisans, have a stronger identification with political parties than do nonpartisans, have held other partisan office more frequently than have nonpartisans, belong to more political groups than do nonpartisans, and are more interested in seeking higher partisan office than are nonpartisans.

The final tests of antipathy to political parties suggested by the literature are to discover if nonpartisan officeholders would have sought their position if partisan labeling were required, and if they would favor city or state laws requiring political labels on city ballots. Adrian's article leads to the speculation that nonpartisan officeholders would not have sought their position if partisan affiliation had been required. The article further suggests that nonpartisan officeholders object sufficiently to partisan labeling to oppose a state or city law requiring party symbols on the city ballot.
Tenure and Conservatism

Adrian indicated that nonpartisanship encourages long tenure in city office which leads to conservatism among nonpartisan officeholders. The data should indicate that partisan officeholders are drawn from younger age groups than are nonpartisans and that nonpartisans have longer tenure in office than partisans. Nonpartisans should also classify themselves as conservatives more frequently than do partisans.

Issueless Campaigns

Adrian contended that issues are avoided in nonpartisan campaigns. Earlier advocates of nonpartisanship argued that the removal of party labels would diminish the importance of national issues in city campaigns. The data should suggest that national issues are more important in partisan than in nonpartisan campaigns, and that both national and local issues are less important in nonpartisan than in partisan campaigns.

For convenience, the specific hypotheses of the study are presented below in summary form:

1. Nonpartisan officeholders come from higher income and occupational status groups than do partisans.
2. Partisan officeholders have been more active in partisan politics than have nonpartisans.
3. Partisan officeholders have stronger partisan identification than do nonpartisans.
4. Partisans have held more partisan offices before election to their current position than have nonpartisans.
(5) Partisans belong to more political groups than do nonpartisans.

(6) Partisans are more interested in seeking higher partisan office than are nonpartisans.

(7) Nonpartisan officeholders would not have sought their current position if partisan labeling were required.

(8) Nonpartisan officeholders would oppose a state or city law requiring party designations on city ballots.

(9) Partisan officeholders are drawn from younger age groups than are nonpartisans.

(10) Nonpartisans have longer tenure in office than have partisans.

(11) Nonpartisan officeholders are more likely to classify themselves as conservatives than are partisans.

(12) National issues play a more important role in partisan than in nonpartisan campaigns.

(13) Issues are less important in nonpartisan than in partisan campaigns.

**Methodology**

The hypotheses were tested by the use of a questionnaire, mailed to all councilmen and mayors of Ohio cities with populations of, or greater than, 25,000. The questionnaire (Appendix I) included items which were intended to elicit responses which would relate directly to the hypotheses of the study. In the analysis sections to follow, each discussion of the individual hypotheses commences with a brief explanation of the questionnaire item which produced the responses. This organizational procedure has the advantage to the reader of permitting
immediate comparisons of the question asked and the responses received.

At an early stage in the formulation of the project, problems were envisaged because of the size of the research sample, the coding of responses, and the processing of data. To make the project manageable, open-ended questions were not included in the questionnaire. The majority of questions required respondents to check the responses appropriate to their circumstances. In those few instances where written responses were required, the information being sought was very specific in nature.

Ohio was selected as the site of the research project because of the presence of numerous cities, with enough cities using either nonpartisans or partisan elections to permit comparisons to be made. The number of cities in Ohio having populations of 25,000 or more assured that the sample of councilmen and mayors would be sufficiently large to inspire confidence in the findings. Many of the hypotheses of the study require that a comparison be made between the responses of nonpartisan and partisan officeholders; and, in those instances where comparison is not suggested, the responses of officials from another election system provide useful control data.

1Hereafter defined as municipalities containing 25,000 or more people.
TABLE 3

ELECTORAL SYSTEMS IN OHIO CITIES
BY POPULATION*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CITY POPULATION</th>
<th>PARTISAN</th>
<th>NONPARTISAN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>25,000 to 49,000</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50,000 to 99,000</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100,000 to 249,000</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250,000 to 499,000</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500,000 to 1,000,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


TABLE 4

NUMBER OF COUNCILMEN AND MAYORS IN OHIO CITIES
BY CITY POPULATION*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CITY POPULATION</th>
<th>NUMBER OF COUNCILMEN AND MAYORS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>25,000 to 49,000</td>
<td>204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50,000 to 99,000</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100,000 to 249,000</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250,000 to 499,000</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500,000 to 1,000,000</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>398</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 5
NUMBER OF COUNCILMEN AND MAYORS ELECTED IN PARTISAN AND NONPARTISAN ELECTIONS IN OHIO CITIES BY CITY POPULATION*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CITY POPULATION</th>
<th>PARTISAN</th>
<th>NONPARTISAN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>25,000 to 49,000</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50,000 to 99,000</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100,000 to 249,000</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250,000 to 499,000</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500,000 to 1,000,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


A preliminary draft of the questionnaire was sent to the councilmen and mayors of South Bend, Indiana (partisan elections) and Kalamazoo, Michigan (nonpartisan elections). The returns from officials from both cities resulted in minor modifications of some of the directions and clarification of certain terms which the respondents found confusing. An examination of the returned questionnaire indicated that the information requested was willingly supplied by the respondents with no indication that respondents considered the information so politically or personally confidential as to make completion of the form impossible.

The revised questionnaire was sent to every councilmen and mayor of Ohio cities having a population of 25,000 or more. After a three-week waiting period, a second mailing was posted. Returns from the first two mailings resulted
in a sufficiently high percentage of the total number of officials contacted to make a third planned mailing unnecessary.

### TABLE 6


table of returns of mailed questionnaire

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mailing</th>
<th>Returned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First</td>
<td>42.9% (171)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second</td>
<td>24.6% (98)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>67.5% (269)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 7


table of pattern of returns of mailed questionnaire

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% of total returns</th>
<th>% of sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nonpartisans</td>
<td>42.8% (115)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partisans</td>
<td>55.0% (148)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Failed to indicate</td>
<td>2.2% (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0% (269)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It became obvious that differences existed in the return rate of the two samples at a time when circumstances prevented an additional mailing to non-partisans to attempt to equalize the percentages. A certain amount of caution should be exercised in the final evaluation of the research findings because of the differences in percentages of each sample which responded to the request for
information.

A possible explanation for the lower rate of returns from nonpartisans is suggested in the writings of East. He indicates that civic reformers have expended great amounts of time and energy in the development of a system of local government which they consider to be a model of efficiency and responsiveness. The system, once designed, is virtually closed to alteration. Data which conflicts with the assumptions of how the system is supposed to operate is viewed with grave suspicion. The respondents from nonpartisan cities may have been unwilling to cooperate with a research project which questions an important plank in the reformer's platform.

The population groupings in the three previous tables were devised by the editors of The Municipal Yearbook. The number of groupings with small frequencies required that the classifications be collapsed to permit meaningful analysis. The population classifications used in the analysis section provides for three groups of cities: 25,000 to 49,000; 50,000 to 99,000; and 100,000 or more. Alford and Scoble suggest 25,000 or more population as a lower limit for comparing city

1 John P. East, Council-Manager Government (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: The University of North Carolina Press, 1965), Chapters IV and V.

data. Lineberry and Fowler\(^1\) have used the population group of 50,000. The third classification, 100,000 or more, was selected in part because of the precedence set by Lee\(^2\) for handling data in this way.

Other Variables

In the analysis sections to follow, two additional variables were introduced when significant differences were noted between the responses of nonpartisans and partisans. The purpose of controlling for additional variables was to attempt to discover if the differences in responses of the two samples are the result of the election system or are related to the size of city and/or type of city in which respondents reside. When controlling for city size, the population classification described above will be used. The assignment of city types followed the Census Bureau definitions.

Central cities generally have 50,000 inhabitants or more and are dominant in the SMSA's (Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area). Suburbs are all other cities, towns, and other incorporated places in SMSA's. Independent cities are all cities, towns, and other incorporated places outside SMSA's.\(^3\)

In the analysis of the data collected to test the specific hypotheses of the study, the .05 level was established as the critical point for determining the

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\(^1\)Robert L. Lineberry and Edmund P. Fowler, "Reformism and Public Policies in American Cities,"  The American Political Science Review, LXI (September 1967), 703.

\(^2\)Lee, op. cit., 95ff.

\(^3\)The International City Manager's Association, The Municipal Yearbook, 1967 (Chicago: The International City Manager's Association, 1967), XII.

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significance of the results where no direction was predicted in the hypotheses. If
direction was predicted in the hypotheses, the confidence level used was .10.

Differences Among Nonpartisan Systems

After removing party labels from city ballots, it does not necessarily follow
that political parties will cease their activities in city elections. Parties may con­
tinue to operate in city politics in a clandestine manner or, as in Chicago, quite
openly. Adrian¹ has suggested that there are four general types of nonpartisan
elections:

TYPE I: Elections in which political party endorsement is an essen­
tial prerequisite to success.

TYPE II: Elections in which one or both political parties play
limited and behind-the-scenes roles.

TYPE III: Elections in which national parties play no part, but
local groups organize slates or actively support one or
more candidates.

TYPE IV: Elections in which neither national parties nor local groups
are active; candidates select themselves and rely on per­
sonal friends for campaign assistance.

It appeared immediately imperative to determine the type of nonpartisan elec­
tions conducted in the cities surveyed to insure that comparisons between officials
from nonpartisan and partisan cities would truly be a comparison of officials from

¹Charles R. Adrian, "A Typology for Nonpartisan Elections," Western Political
Quarterly, XII (June 1959), 449-58.
cities using different election systems, and not a comparison between systems whose differences were only semantic.

The questionnaire contained a four-part item, virtually identical to Adrian's typology presented above. Each respondent was asked to check the description which most closely approximated his city's election system. Of the nonpartisan respondents, 40% (46) felt their city's system was either Type III or IV, analogous to the nonpartisan ideal.

To deal with the remainder of the responses, an arbitrary figure was selected (75%) as a unanimity baseline. If 75% of the councilmen and mayors of a given city who responded to the questionnaire classified their city as conducting Type I or Type II elections, the responses would have been handled separately. Councilmen and mayors from no city displayed sufficient agreement to require that their data be reported separately; which is to say, individual or small groups of councilmen and mayors may have perceived that political parties played either an open or clandestine role in their city politics, but that view was not shared completely by other councilmen or mayors of the same city. These findings add support to a national survey conducted by the City Charter Commission of Cincinnati\(^1\) which found that 63% of the 308 cities in the nation with populations of 50,000 or more which conduct nonpartisan elections reported no national party activity. Of those cities which did report partisan activity, a strong majority were located along the Eastern seaboard.

\(^1\)City Charter Committee of Cincinnati, National Parties: Blight on City Hall (Monograph; Cincinnati: City Charter Committee, Undated).

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The differences between perception of the role of political parties in the local situation may be explained by differing political situations in individual councilmanic districts. In districts with a great deal of homogeneity, political party endorsement may be essential for electoral success. In the city at large or in other districts, endorsement by political parties may be unnecessary or undesirable. In view of the responses to the question of type of nonpartisan election system, classification of cities was limited to the formal election system utilized.
CHAPTER III

ANALYSIS OF THE RESEARCH FINDINGS

The major purpose of this study is to determine the effect of election systems on certain characteristics of city officials. The pertinent literature suggests that the election system of a city is an important determinant of the socio-economic characteristics and political attitudes of officeholders. At the end of the analysis, if the general proposition has been properly tested, a limited predictive capability should result. Put another way, the study should permit limited conclusions to be drawn about certain characteristics and attitudes of winning candidates in nonpartisan elections.

The general hypothesis has been separated into several specific hypotheses. In the sections to follow, the responses to questions designed to test the specific hypotheses will be reported. The larger question in the analysis of each area will be, however, "Does removing party labels affect the characteristics and attitudes of successful candidates?"

Occupations of Nonpartisan and Partisan Officeholders

Recipients of the questionnaire were asked to indicate their occupation with ample room provided to supply any additional description of their occupation they desired. This information was then classified into occupational groupings devised by the Census Bureau (Occupations within each classification are contained in
Respondents comprised a wide range of occupational groups. The spectrum of occupational pursuits and the frequencies within classifications are presented in Table 8.

**TABLE 8**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OCCUPATION</th>
<th>NONPARTISANS</th>
<th>PARTISANS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professional and Technical Workers</td>
<td>61.0% (64)</td>
<td>42.0% (55)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managers, Officials, and Proprietors</td>
<td>7.6% (8)</td>
<td>13.7% (18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers</td>
<td>1.0% (1)</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical Workers</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.8% (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sales Workers</td>
<td>19.0% (20)</td>
<td>14.5% (19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craftsmen and Foremen</td>
<td>6.7% (7)</td>
<td>16.8% (22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operatives and Kindred Workers</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>3.1% (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Workers</td>
<td>1.0% (1)</td>
<td>1.5% (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housewives</td>
<td>2.9% (3)</td>
<td>1.5% (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired</td>
<td>7.8% (9)</td>
<td>12.2% (8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><em><em>100.2%</em> (105)</em>*</td>
<td><strong>100.0% (131)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Maximum Difference Between Proportions, \( D = 19.9\% \)

\( D \) significant at .025

*Does not total 100.0% because of rounding
As the test statistic indicates, differences exist between the occupations of nonpartisan and partisan officeholders. The large number of cells in Table 8 having small frequencies suggested the necessity of discerning the relationship, if any, between the occupational classes that encompass the largest portions of both samples. Arbitrarily, classifications with frequencies of less than 5 were omitted and the data was recomputed using the formula for Chi-Square, made possible because of the larger cell sizes. Table 9 presents the most common occupational classifications of respondents.

**TABLE 9**

**MAJOR OCCUPATIONAL CLASSIFICATIONS OF NONPARTISAN AND PARTISAN COUNCILMEN AND MAYORS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OCCUPATION</th>
<th>NONPARTISANS</th>
<th>PARTISANS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professional and Technical Workers</td>
<td>64.6% (64)</td>
<td>48.2% (55)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managers, Officials, and Proprietors</td>
<td>8.1% (8)</td>
<td>15.8% (18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sales Workers</td>
<td>20.2% (20)</td>
<td>16.7% (19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craftsmen and Foremen</td>
<td>7.1% (7)</td>
<td>19.3% (22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0% (99)</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0% (114)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ X^2 = 11.311 \text{ with 3 degrees of freedom} \]

Significant at .02

The differences between nonpartisans and partisans are particularly apparent in the Craftsmen and Foremen classification, with partisans almost three times more
prevalent than nonpartisans. Craftsmen and foremen are considered blue-collar jobs with less prestige than the first three white-collar groups in Table 9.¹

Nonpartisans are more heavily represented in the higher status occupations.

The data in Tables 10 and 11 indicates that the differences between the occupations of nonpartisan and partisan officials disappear when controlling for city size and city type. The pattern noted in the total responses of nonpartisans and partisans continues after controlling for the two variables; however, the differences are not sufficiently large to produce statistically significant results.

Controlling for the city size and city type variables results in a reduction of individual cell frequencies. Tests of statistical significance are influenced by this type of reduction. In a small sample, patterns of responses might reflect an unusual distribution which would not be found if more responses were tabulated. As a consequence, statistical tests are designed to be more conservative when dealing with small frequencies. A group of responses which appear to definitely be skewed in an observable direction are often found to be lacking statistical significance if the number of responses is small.² In the case of Tables 10 and 11, the above explanation appears pertinent.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Nonpartisans 100,000 or more</th>
<th>Partisans 100,000 or more</th>
<th>Nonpartisans 50,000 to 99,000</th>
<th>Partisans 50,000 to 99,000</th>
<th>Nonpartisans 25,000 to 49,000</th>
<th>Partisans 25,000 to 49,000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professional, Technical, and Kindred Workers</td>
<td>61.3% (19)</td>
<td>35.0% (7)</td>
<td>61.5% (16)</td>
<td>54.3% (19)</td>
<td>62.2% (28)</td>
<td>42.0% (29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managers, Officials, and Proprietors</td>
<td>9.7% (3)</td>
<td>20.0% (4)</td>
<td>3.9% (1)</td>
<td>5.7% (2)</td>
<td>8.9% (4)</td>
<td>17.4% (12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sales Workers</td>
<td>25.8% (8)</td>
<td>15.0% (3)</td>
<td>19.2% (5)</td>
<td>14.3% (5)</td>
<td>15.6% (7)</td>
<td>15.9% (11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craftsmen, Foremen, and Kindred Workers</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>20.0% (4)</td>
<td>11.5% (3)</td>
<td>17.1% (6)</td>
<td>8.9% (4)</td>
<td>17.4% (12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housewives</td>
<td>3.2% (1)</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>3.9% (1)</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>2.2% (1)</td>
<td>2.9% (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>10.0% (2)</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>8.6% (3)</td>
<td>2.2% (1)</td>
<td>4.4% (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>100.0% (31)</td>
<td>100.0% (20)</td>
<td>100.0% (26)</td>
<td>100.0% (35)</td>
<td>100.0% (45)</td>
<td>100.0% (69)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Maximum Difference, D, between partisans and nonpartisans from cities of 100,000 or more = 26.8%, which is not significant

Maximum Difference, D, between partisans and nonpartisans from cities of 50,000 to 99,000 = 10.3%, which is not significant

Maximum Difference, D, between partisans and nonpartisans from cities of 25,000 to 49,000 = 20.2%, which is not significant
TABLE II

OCCUPATIONS OF NONPARTISAN AND PARTISAN OFFICEHOLDERS
BY CITY TYPE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Central Cities</th>
<th></th>
<th>Suburbs</th>
<th></th>
<th>Independent Cities</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nonpartisans</td>
<td>Partisans</td>
<td>Nonpartisans</td>
<td>Partisans</td>
<td>Nonpartisans</td>
<td>Partisans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional, Technical, and Kindred Workers</td>
<td>59.6% (28)</td>
<td>45.2% (19)</td>
<td>71.0% (27)</td>
<td>64.9% (24)</td>
<td>75.0% (3)</td>
<td>26.1% (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managers, Officials, and Proprietors</td>
<td>8.5% (4)</td>
<td>14.3% (6)</td>
<td>5.3% (2)</td>
<td>10.8% (4)</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>21.7% (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sales Workers</td>
<td>27.7% (13)</td>
<td>11.9% (5)</td>
<td>13.2% (5)</td>
<td>16.2% (6)</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>26.1% (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craftsmen, Foremen, and Kindred Workers</td>
<td>4.3% (2)</td>
<td>28.6% (12)</td>
<td>10.5% (4)</td>
<td>8.1% (3)</td>
<td>25.0% (1)</td>
<td>26.1% (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100.1%* (47)</td>
<td>100.0% (42)</td>
<td>100.0% (38)</td>
<td>100.0% (37)</td>
<td>100.0% (4)</td>
<td>100.0% (23)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Does not total 100.0% due to rounding

Comparing nonpartisans and partisans from central cities, maximum difference, $D = 24.3\%$, which is not significant

Comparing nonpartisans and partisans from suburbs, maximum difference, $D = 37.6\%$, which is not significant

Comparing nonpartisans and partisans from independent cities, maximum difference, $D = 48.9\%$, which is not significant
Isolating nonpartisan and partisan mayors from the two samples disclose a slightly different pattern. All nonpartisan and partisan mayors occupy positions which are white collar with a single exception; one partisan mayor is retired.

Income of Nonpartisan and Partisan Officeholders

As with occupations, differences exist between the income distribution of nonpartisan and partisan officeholders. As Table 12 indicates, almost 60% of partisan officeholders have a personal income of less than $11,000, whereas over 70% of nonpartisans earn more than $11,000.

**TABLE 12**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEARLY INCOME</th>
<th>NONPARTISANS</th>
<th>PARTISANS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$3,000 to 6,999</td>
<td>8.4% (9)</td>
<td>13.6% (18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7,000 to 10,999</td>
<td>20.6% (22)</td>
<td>45.0% (59)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11,000 to 14,999</td>
<td>17.8% (19)</td>
<td>22.7% (30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15,000 or over</td>
<td>53.3% (57)</td>
<td>19.1% (25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100.1% (107)</td>
<td>99.9% (132)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Maximum difference, D = 33.9%, significant at .02

One of the basic functions of political parties is fund raising to finance campaigns. The elimination of political parties results in the loss of an important function.  

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source of campaign money for candidates. Candidates deprived of financial sup-
port from parties must rely on either contributions or personal income.

Because of the expense of conducting election campaigns in large cities, and
the loss of party campaign funds under nonpartisanship, it would appear plausible that
as city size increases, the personal income of nonpartisan officeholders would, of
necessity, also have to increase.

As Table 13 indicates, the relationship between city size and nonpartisan in-
comes suggested above is not supported by the data. On the contrary, the highest
percentage of nonpartisans with incomes of $15,000 or more was observed among
nonpartisans in the smallest cities surveyed. The data also indicates that differences
between the incomes of nonpartisans and partisans increase as city size decreases.
Nonpartisan and partisan respondents from the largest cities surveyed exhibited no
significant differences in income distributions. In the 50,000 to 99,000 group of
cities, nonpartisans were more frequently represented in the higher income groups
than were partisans. In the 25,000 to 49,000 group of cities, 80% of nonpartisans
earned $11,000 or more per year, whereas only 38% of partisans' incomes reached
that figure.

The income total reported above may have been affected by the wording of
the question dealing with incomes. Respondents were asked to report their yearly
income less compensation for public office. The question was designed to gather
data on actual personal income without having to subtract income from public office
for each respondent. Gross income for officials from the two larger classes of
cities may be substantially higher than reported due to higher salaries paid city officials in larger cities. Proportionally, this additional source of income should not influence the comparisons of nonpartisans and partisans, however, for within population classifications, the amount of public salaries should be roughly equivalent.

Observing only nonpartisan and partisan mayors reveals little differences in the income pattern suggested above. Nonpartisan mayors earning $15,000 or more are almost twice as prevalent as partisan mayors.

Table 14 reports the results of controlling for city type. Significant differences were observed between the pattern of income distribution of nonpartisans and partisans from central cities. Half of the nonpartisans from central cities earn $15,000 or more per year, as compared with 11% of partisans. In suburban cities, the differences between the income distribution of respondents from the two different election systems are less wide but still significantly different. No differences were observed between the pattern of incomes of respondents from independent cities.

It was suggested in the pertinent literature that the presence of partisan labeling would discourage "successful" individuals from seeking city office and, as a result, those individuals elected to city office in nonpartisan systems would be drawn from higher status occupational and income groups. The data collected in this project indicates that the more successful person is able to be elected to city office more frequently in nonpartisan cities. The data indicates that differences between incomes of nonpartisans and partisans are more evident in central cities than in the other two city types.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEARLY INCOME</th>
<th>100,000 OR MORE</th>
<th>50,000 TO 99,000</th>
<th>25,000 TO 49,000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NONPARTISANS</td>
<td>NONPARTISANS</td>
<td>NONPARTISANS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$3,000 to 6,999</td>
<td>11.1% (3)</td>
<td>17.2% (5)</td>
<td>2.0% (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7,000 to 10,999</td>
<td>18.5% (5)</td>
<td>27.6% (8)</td>
<td>18.0% (9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11,000 to 14,999</td>
<td>18.5% (5)</td>
<td>3.5% (1)</td>
<td>24.0% (12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15,000 or over</td>
<td>51.9% (14)</td>
<td>51.7% (15)</td>
<td>56.0% (28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100.0% (27)</td>
<td>100.0% (29)</td>
<td>100.0% (50)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comparing nonpartisans and partisans from cities of 100,000 or more, maximum difference, $D = 31.9\%$, which is not significant.

Comparing nonpartisans and partisans from cities of 50,000 to 99,000, maximum difference, $D = 32.3\%$, which is significant at .10.

Comparing nonpartisans and partisans from cities of 25,000 to 49,000, maximum difference, $D = 41.8\%$, which is significant at .001.
TABLE 14

YEARLY INCOME OF NONPARTISAN AND PARTISAN OFFICEHOLDERS
BY CITY TYPE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEARLY INCOME</th>
<th>CENTRAL CITIES</th>
<th></th>
<th>SUBURBS</th>
<th></th>
<th>INDEPENDENT CITIES</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NONPARTISANS</td>
<td>PARTISANS</td>
<td>NONPARTISANS</td>
<td>PARTISANS</td>
<td>NONPARTISANS</td>
<td>PARTISANS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$3,000 to 6,999</td>
<td>13.0% (6)</td>
<td>13.3% (6)</td>
<td>6.9% (3)</td>
<td>12.2% (5)</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>19.2% (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7,000 to 10,999</td>
<td>21.7% (10)</td>
<td>48.9% (22)</td>
<td>16.3% (7)</td>
<td>41.5% (17)</td>
<td>62.5% (5)</td>
<td>42.3% (11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11,000 to 14,999</td>
<td>15.2% (7)</td>
<td>26.7% (12)</td>
<td>13.9% (6)</td>
<td>19.5% (8)</td>
<td>12.5% (1)</td>
<td>23.1% (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15,000 or more</td>
<td>50.0% (23)</td>
<td>11.1% (5)</td>
<td>62.8% (27)</td>
<td>26.8% (11)</td>
<td>25.0% (2)</td>
<td>15.4% (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>99.9%* (46)</td>
<td>100.0% (45)</td>
<td>99.9%* (43)</td>
<td>100.0% (41)</td>
<td>100.0% (8)</td>
<td>100.0% (26)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Does not total 100% because of rounding

Comparing nonpartisans and partisans from central cities, maximum difference, D = 38.9%, which is significant at .005

Comparing nonpartisans and partisans from suburbs, maximum difference, D = 36.0%, which is significant at .01

Comparing nonpartisans and partisans from independent cities, maximum difference, D = 19.2%, which is not significant
This data suggests the following characteristics of nonpartisan officeholders:

(1) Nonpartisans occupy white-collar positions, regardless of city type.
(2) Nonpartisans earn high income, particularly those officials in small cities.
(3) Compared with partisan officeholders, nonpartisans are more successful.

The larger question inherent in the above research findings is, "Does the successful citizen run for office more frequently in a nonpartisan arrangement or is he able to win more frequently?" It is impossible to answer the question because of the design of the project: no losing candidate was surveyed. The data indicates that the successful citizen is able to win elections in nonpartisan systems more frequently than in partisan systems. Further research is needed to determine if income and occupational success are related to winning in nonpartisan systems.

Partisan Activity Record of Nonpartisans and Partisans

The early contentions that removing party labels from city ballots would attract certain individuals who would not choose to become involved in city government if partisan affiliation were required implied that those same individuals were strangers to partisan activity. That argument prompted the inclusion of a series of questions regarding the record of partisan political activity of nonpartisan and partisan councilmen and mayors prior to election to office.

The specific political activities were drawn from Milbrath's hierarchy of political involvement (Table 2). Respondents were asked to indicate which partisan

---

1Milbrath, op. cit., 18-9.
political activity they had participated in (on at least one occasion) prior to
election to office. The activities listed included the following:

(1) Talked with friends about the qualifications of one or more candidates.

(2) Gave money or bought tickets to help the campaign of a candidate or one of the major parties.

(3) Went to a political meeting, rally, dinner, or things of this sort.

(4) Worked (made phone calls, passed out literature, addressed mailed campaign literature, etc.) for a candidate or party.

(5) Belonged to a political club or organization.

(6) Wore a campaign button or put a campaign sticker on your car.

The responses to these questions were sorted for partisan and nonpartisans and 2 x 2 tables were constructed for each item (nonpartisans who had engaged in the activity, nonpartisans who had not; partisans who had engaged in the activity, partisans who had not). The six separate tables were combined into Table 15.

Two patterns are immediately apparent in the data in Table 15.

(1) Councilmen and mayors, regardless of their city's election system, are very active political participants.

(2) Nonpartisans and partisans display no differences in the extent to which they have been active in partisan politics in the past.

The knowledge that city officeholders are very active in politics is not particularly revealing. Milbrath\(^1\) indicates that office-seekers and officeholders constitute

\(^1\)Milbrath, op. cit., 18-9.
### TABLE 15

PARTISAN POLITICAL ACTIVITY RECORD OF NONPARTISAN AND PARTISAN COUNCILMEN AND MAYORS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POLITICAL ACTIVITY</th>
<th>NONPARTISANS*</th>
<th>PARTISANS**</th>
<th>X² SCORE AND DECISION***</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conversational Endorsement</td>
<td>89.6% (103)</td>
<td>93.9% (138)</td>
<td>1.627, which is not significant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Contributions</td>
<td>82.6% (95)</td>
<td>74.1% (109)</td>
<td>2.678, which is not significant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Meeting Attendance</td>
<td>84.3% (97)</td>
<td>89.8% (132)</td>
<td>1.739, which is not significant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worked in Partisan Campaign</td>
<td>69.6% (80)</td>
<td>72.1% (106)</td>
<td>0.203, which is not significant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belonged to Political Club</td>
<td>71.3% (82)</td>
<td>74.8% (110)</td>
<td>0.409, which is not significant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wore Button or Sticker on Car</td>
<td>70.4% (81)</td>
<td>74.1% (109)</td>
<td>0.449, which is not significant</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*All nonpartisan percentages computed on sample of 115

**All partisan percentages computed on sample of 147

***All Chi-Square decisions reached with 1 degree of freedom
less than 1% of the adult population. His hierarchy of involvement (Table 2) pur-
ports to possess transitivity, which means in this discussion that individuals
involved in the more strenuous and time-consuming political activities are also
involved in the less strenuous. That appears to be a sound assumption in the
present case.

In view of the previously cited justifications for nonpartisanship and Adrian's
acquiescence, it is somewhat more interesting to note that partisans and nonparti-
sans have similar histories of partisan activity. It was hypothesized that partisan
officials were more active in partisan activities than nonpartisans. No differences
were observed in the records of partisan activities of the two samples. Adrian
theorized that nonpartisanship encourages the candidacy of apolitical citizens.
The data indicates that nonpartisan officeholders are as politically involved as
partisans. The question that again appears pertinent to the discrepancy between
theory and the findings is, "To what extent are the findings the result of surveying
only winning candidates?" Put another way, "Does nonpartisanship affect who
runs for office or who wins?" Regardless of the answers to be found in this project,
it appears clear that Adrian's hypothesis is inadequate to judge the point at which
nonpartisanship becomes operative in the candidate selection process.

Partisan activity is the only one indicator of the inclination of nonpartisans to
refrain from political candidacy because of rejection of political parties; a second
measure was suggested as the extent to which nonpartisans identify with a political party.

Partisan Identification of Nonpartisans and Partisans

The questionnaire included a five-part question which was designed to record three separate pieces of information about each respondent:

1. Partisan identification, if any
2. Political party identified with
3. The strength of party identification

Respondents were asked to indicate their normal voting behavior in partisan elections from the following list of alternatives:

1. A straight Democratic ticket
2. A split ticket, but for more Democrats than Republicans
3. A split ticket, equally divided between the two parties
4. A split ticket, but for more Republicans than Democrats
5. A straight Republican ticket

Alternatives 1, 2, 4, and 5 were considered to be indications of identifications with a political party. The extent to which partisans and nonpartisans identify with a political party, as measured by their voting record in partisan elections, is reported in Table 16. Quite clearly, no differences are apparent between nonpartisan and partisan city officeholders with regard to party identification.
TABLE 16

PARTY IDENTIFICATION OF NONPARTISAN AND PARTISAN COUNCILMEN AND MAYORS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IDENTIFICATION</th>
<th>NONPARTISANS</th>
<th>PARTISANS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Identify with one party</td>
<td>91.3% (105)</td>
<td>94.6% (139)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allegiance to neither party</td>
<td>8.7% (10)</td>
<td>5.4% (8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100.0% (115)</td>
<td>100.0% (147)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$X^2 = 1.067$ with 1 degree of freedom, which is not significant

Little is known about the partisan affiliation of nonpartisan officeholders; however, Adrian and Williams\(^1\) speculate that nonpartisan candidates who identify with the Republican party fare better than their Democratically inclined rivals in local elections. That assumption was supported by the responses gathered in this project.

Party labels were attached to respondents that indicated a normal partisan voting choice of either a straight ticket or split ticket favoring one party. Table 17 reports the party affiliation of the councilmen and mayors surveyed.

Nonpartisans have much different patterns of party preference than do partisans. Where party labels are on city ballots, Republicans and Democratic respondents have similar electoral success; in those cities where party labels are absent, Republican respondents are more successful than Democrats.

\(^1\)Oliver Williams and Charles Adrian, "The Insulation of Local Politics Under the Nonpartisan Ballot," American Political Science Review, LIII (December 1959), 1059.
TABLE 17

PARTY AFFILIATION OF NONPARTISAN AND PARTISAN COUNCILMEN AND MAYORS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AFFILIATION</th>
<th>NONPARTISANS</th>
<th>PARTISANS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democrats</td>
<td>39.0% (41)</td>
<td>53.2% (74)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republicans</td>
<td>60.9% (64)</td>
<td>46.8% (65)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>99.9% (105)</td>
<td>100.0% (139)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$X^2 = 4.833$ with 1 degree of freedom, which is significant at .05

Party identification appears to be related to demographic variables such as size of city\(^1\) and the type of city.\(^2\) Table 18 reports the party preference of councilmen and mayors by city size; in Table 19 the same information is presented after controlling for city type.

Across population groupings, the electoral prospects of Democrats decline with declining city size. Republicans are more successful in smaller cities. Within population classes, there are no differences in the party preferences of nonpartisans and partisans with the single exception of the 25,000 to 49,000 classification. In cities with less than 50,000 people, almost 3 out of 4 nonpartisans are Republicans, whereas cities within that grouping which require candidates to publicly identify with a party elect almost an equal percentage of Republicans and Democrats.

---


\(^2\)Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson, City Politics (New York: Random House, 1963), 16.
TABLE 18

PARTY PREFERENCE OF NONPARTISAN AND PARTISAN COUNCILMEN AND MAYORS
BY CITY SIZE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARTY PREFERENCE</th>
<th>100,000 OR MORE</th>
<th>50,000 TO 99,000</th>
<th>25,000 TO 49,000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NONPARTISANS</td>
<td>PARTISANS</td>
<td>NONPARTISANS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrats</td>
<td>60.0% (18)</td>
<td>60.9% (14)</td>
<td>35.5% (11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republicans</td>
<td>40.0% (12)</td>
<td>39.1% (9)</td>
<td>64.5% (20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100.0% (30)</td>
<td>100.0% (23)</td>
<td>100.0% (31)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comparing nonpartisans and partisans from cities of 100,000 or more, $X^2 = 0.04$ with 1 degree of freedom, which is not significant.

Comparing nonpartisans and partisans from cities of 50,000 to 99,000, $X^2 = 1.464$ with 1 degree of freedom, which is not significant.

Comparing nonpartisans and partisans from cities of 25,000 to 49,000, $X^2 = 7.733$ with 1 degree of freedom, which is significant at .01.
TABLE 19
PARTY PREFERENCE OF NONPARTISAN AND PARTISAN OFFICEHOLDERS
BY CITY TYPE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARTY PREFERENCE</th>
<th>CENTRAL CITIES</th>
<th>SUBURBS</th>
<th>INDEPENDENT CITIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NONPARTISANS</td>
<td>PARTISANS</td>
<td>NONPARTISANS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrats</td>
<td>52.9% (27)</td>
<td>62.7% (32)</td>
<td>28.9% (11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republicans</td>
<td>47.1% (24)</td>
<td>37.3% (19)</td>
<td>71.1% (27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100.0% (51)</td>
<td>100.0% (51)</td>
<td>100.0% (38)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comparing nonpartisans and partisans from central cities, $X^2 = 1.005$, which is not significant.
Comparing nonpartisans and partisans from suburbs, $X^2 = 10.570$, which is significant at .01.
Comparing nonpartisans and partisans from independent cities, $X^2 = 0.046$, which is not significant.
The larger number of partisan and nonpartisan Democrats in larger cities suggest that party preference is related to successful candidacy. In the cities of less than 100,000, nonpartisan success appears to be related to Republican preference. These findings support the view of Banfield and Wilson cited earlier that party preference is related to city size and that larger cities are more inclined to elect Democrats, and smaller cities are served by Republican officials even though party labels are not attached to city ballots.

Democrats running on either nonpartisan or partisan ballots are almost equally successful at winning elections in central cities. In the suburban cities, partisan Democrats also fare well, but nonpartisan Democrats do very poorly. In independent cities, Republicans elected on either nonpartisan or partisan ballots are more likely to be elected to office than their Democratic rivals.

These findings indicate the following points:

(1) Nonpartisan officeholders are likely to be Republicans; partisans divide almost equally between the two parties.

(2) In larger cities, regardless of election type, Democrats are elected to city office.

(3) In central cities, regardless of election system, Democrats are elected to city office.

(4) In smaller cities, regardless of election system, Republicans are elected to city office.

(5) In suburbs, regardless of election system, Republicans are elected to city office.

The responses reported above, again, suggest the question, "Does the
electoral arrangement of a city affect who runs for office or who wins?" Do Republicans choose not to run for office in large cities, or are they unsuccessful in their attempts? Do Democrats decide not to seek office in nonpartisan suburbs, or are they defeated when the attempt is made? The electoral arrangement appears to affect who gets elected, but when does the electoral system become operative... on election day or the day when the decision is made to either attempt or not attempt city office? The answers to the above questions are particularly important in a discussion of the party affiliation of officeholders. If the electoral arrangement of a city causes supporters of one party to be unsuccessful at the polls, the presence or absence of party labels becomes a critical element in local government. Under nonpartisanship, if the preceding line of argument has merit, not only are parties removed from local government but supporters of one of the parties are removed as well.

The data also revealed the strength of party identification of respondents. The measures of strength of party identification were as follows: straight ticket voters were considered strongly identified, split ticket voters favoring one party were considered to be identified with a party, and respondents dividing their voting choices equally were not considered as identified with a party. Omitting the respondents who did not display partisan identification, Table 20 reveals that there is a difference between party identification of nonpartisans and partisans.

Partisans identify with their political party slightly more than nonpartisans identify with their party. In the case of both partisans and nonpartisans,
identification with a political party is virtually unanimous.

### TABLE 20

**STRENGTH OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION OF NONPARTISAN AND PARTISAN OFFICIALS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IDENTIFICATION</th>
<th>NONPARTISANS</th>
<th>PARTISANS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Identified</td>
<td>21.9% (23)</td>
<td>33.1% (46)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identified with a Party</td>
<td>78.1% (82)</td>
<td>66.9% (93)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100.0% (105)</td>
<td>100.0% (139)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

X² = 3.692 with 1 degree of freedom, significant at .10

The small number of mayors that returned questionnaires prohibits the inclusion of tables detailing their responses. It is interesting to note, however, that nonpartisan and partisan mayors have similar party identification, as measured by straight ticket voting. Nonpartisan mayors are overwhelmingly Republicans (10 to 1).

It was originally hypothesized that partisans identify more strongly with political parties than do nonpartisans. The data in this section reports the following results of testing the hypothesis:

1. Nonpartisans and partisans identify equally with political parties.
2. Partisans are stronger in their identification with their party, as measured by straight ticket voting; however, the difference is not great.
3. Nonpartisans are more likely to be Republicans than are partisans.
4. City size and city type appear related to the party preference of successful candidates.
Prior Partisan Officeholding of Nonpartisans and Partisans

Respondents were asked to indicate if they had ever been elected to partisan public office before election to their current position. If the answer was affirmative, they were requested to list the partisan offices in which they had served. It was hypothesized earlier that partisans have held more partisan offices than nonpartisans prior to election to their respective offices. Table 2 reports the officeholding history of the nonpartisans and partisans surveyed.

TABLE 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OFFICES HELD</th>
<th>NONPARTISANS</th>
<th>PARTISANS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>City, County, Township, or State Office</td>
<td>5.1% (6)</td>
<td>10.8% (16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>94.9% (110)</td>
<td>89.2% (132)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100.0% (116)</td>
<td>100.0% (148)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$X^2 = 2.706$ with 1 degree of freedom, which is not significant

Two facts are readily apparent in the above table:

(1) Nonpartisan and partisan city officeholders do not differ in the extent to which they have held partisan public office in the past.

(2) City officeholders collectively have not had experience in other partisan offices.

One of the arguments used to support nonpartisanship cited earlier noted that removing party labels would discourage the candidacy of individuals desirous of a city position as a stepping stone to higher partisan office. That argument will be

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examined in a section to follow. In the present discussion, it might be noted that partisan office is certainly not considered a stepping stone to city office, nonpartisan or partisan.

It was hypothesized that partisans would have more experience in holding partisan office, other than their current position than would nonpartisans. The research findings indicate that there are no differences in the partisan officeholding records of the two samples. Respondents from the two samples possess little experience in partisan officeholding. It is a simple matter to dismiss previous experience as either a positive or negative factor in the election of the respondents. It is, however, still not known if the experience of winning and losing candidates differed or to what extent the electorate viewed prior partisan officeholding negatively or positively.

Political Group Memberships of Nonpartisans and Partisans

Respondents were asked to list the groups to which they belonged. Separate categories of groups were established in the questionnaire, including fraternal groups, political groups, civic groups, business groups, social groups, and religious groups. It was hoped that respondents faced with six categories of groups would be forced to consider the nature of each group to which they belonged more carefully than if they had simply been requested to indicate the number of political groups in which they held memberships.

It was hypothesized that nonpartisans and partisans differ in the number of political groups to which they belong. The hypotheses were formulated on the basis
of the argument that nonpartisanship encourages the candidacy of certain apoliti-
cal individuals who would not consent to seek city office in a partisan setting.

Table 22 discloses the political group membership record of the respondents.

TABLE 22

NUMBER OF POLITICAL GROUP MEMBERSHIPS OF NONPARTISAN
AND PARTISAN COUNCILMEN AND MAYORS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NUMBER</th>
<th>NONPARTISANS</th>
<th>PARTISANS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>30.2% (35)</td>
<td>12.2% (18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>43.9% (51)</td>
<td>58.1% (86)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>18.9% (22)</td>
<td>20.3% (30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 or more</td>
<td>6.9% (8)</td>
<td>9.4% (14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>99.9% (116)</td>
<td>100.0% (148)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

D = 18.0%, which is significant at .05

The data indicates that nonpartisans and partisans do have a differing number
of political group memberships. The most apparent difference between the two
patterns of responses is in the number of partisans who do not belong to any poli-
tical groups. In an attempt to isolate the source of the differences more
completely, the respondents were separated into the population groupings used pre-
viously. Table 23 reveals the effect of controlling for city size in the two samples.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NUMBER</th>
<th>100,000 OR MORE</th>
<th>50,000 TO 99,000</th>
<th>25,000 TO 49,000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NONPARTISANS</td>
<td>PARTISANS</td>
<td>NONPARTISANS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>18.8% (6)</td>
<td>8.3% (2)</td>
<td>19.3% (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>37.5% (12)</td>
<td>54.2% (13)</td>
<td>64.5% (20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>31.2% (10)</td>
<td>25.0% (6)</td>
<td>12.9% (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 or more</td>
<td>12.5% (4)</td>
<td>12.5% (3)</td>
<td>3.2% (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100.0% (32)</td>
<td>100.0% (24)</td>
<td>99.9% (31)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comparing nonpartisans and partisans from cities of 100,000 or more, maximum difference in proportions, $D = 10.4\%$, which is not significant.

Comparing nonpartisans and partisans from cities of 50,000 to 99,000, maximum difference in proportions, $D = 14.6\%$, which is not significant.

Comparing nonpartisans and partisans from cities of 25,000 to 49,000, maximum difference in proportions, $D = 29.8\%$, which is significant at .01.
### TABLE 24

NUMBER OF POLITICAL GROUP MEMBERSHIPS OF NONPARTISAN AND PARTISAN OFFICIALS BY CITY TYPE

| NUMBER | CENTRAL CITIES | | SUBURBS | | INDEPENDENT CITIES | |
|--------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
|        | NONPARTISANS   | PARTISANS      | NONPARTISANS  | PARTISANS      | NONPARTISANS  | PARTISANS      | NONPARTISANS  | PARTISANS      |
| None   | 20.8% (11)     | 7.7% (4)       | 33.3% (15)    | 11.4% (5)      | 37.5% (3)     | 10.7% (3)      |                 |                |
| 1      | 47.2% (25)     | 65.4% (34)     | 44.4% (20)    | 52.3% (23)     | 25.0% (2)     | 64.3% (18)     |                 |                |
| 2      | 24.5% (13)     | 19.2% (10)     | 15.5% (7)     | 29.5% (13)     | 25.0% (2)     | 7.1% (2)       |                 |                |
| 3 or more | 7.5% (4) | 7.7% (4)       | 6.7% (3)      | 6.8% (3)       | 12.5% (1)     | 17.9% (5)      |                 |                |
| TOTAL  | 100.0% (53)    | 100.0% (52)    | 99.9%* (45)   | 100.0% (44)    | 100.0% (8)    | 100.0% (28)    |                 |                |

*Does not total 100.0% because of rounding

Comparing nonpartisans and partisans from central cities, maximum difference, $D = 13.1\%$, which is not significant

Comparing nonpartisans and partisans from suburban cities, maximum difference, $D = 22.0\%$, which is not significant

Comparing nonpartisans and partisans from independent cities, maximum difference, $D = 26.8\%$, which is not significant
The number of political group memberships of nonpartisan respondents from cities of 25,000 to 49,000 differ markedly from those of partisans from the same size cities. The most readily noticeable difference between the groups is in the number of respondents who belong to no political groups. Nonpartisans are three times more likely to have no membership in political groups than are partisans from similar size cities. The number of nonpartisans without political group memberships in the 25,000 to 49,000 population group differs from every other population grouping of both partisans and nonpartisans, although the statistical analysis was not pursued across population or election groupings.

The effect of controlling for city type is recorded in Table 24. After comparison of officials within city types, no differences were noted in the patterns of responses of councilmen and mayors.

The data reported in this section indicates that differences exist in the number of political groups to which nonpartisans and partisans belong. The data further suggests that the differences between nonpartisans and partisans are most apparent in cities of 25,000 to 49,000. The differences between the two samples disappeared when controlling for city type.

Aspirations for Higher Partisan Office

Respondents were asked if they had any intention of seeking higher partisan office in the future. The responses to the question must be viewed with a certain amount of caution because of the uncertainty of any long-term plans in the political
arena. The responses should be viewed as an inclination to seek or not attempt higher office, rather than a final decision.

It was hypothesized that nonpartisans and partisans would have differing aspirations for higher partisan office. The hypotheses reflected the argument mentioned in the previous section dealing with the partisan officeholding records of city officials. The argument cited in that section suggested that nonpartisanship in city elections discourages the candidacy of individuals interested in city office only as a stepping stone to higher office. Table 25 reveals the political aspirations of nonpartisan and partisan councilmen and mayors.

**TABLE 25**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INTENT</th>
<th>NONPARTISANS</th>
<th>PARTISANS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>28.6% (32)</td>
<td>37.4% (52)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>71.4% (80)</td>
<td>62.6% (87)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100.0% (112)</td>
<td>100.0% (139)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[X^2 = 2.176\] with 1 degree of freedom, which is not significant

Nonpartisan and partisan mayors differed somewhat from the pattern above. Only 15% of nonpartisan mayors considered partisan office to be a possibility for them in the future, whereas 45% of partisan mayors thought that they would attempt to gain higher partisan office.
The responses of nonpartisan and partisan councilmen and mayors reveal no differences in their intention of seeking higher partisan office. The large number of respondents from both samples who are not considering higher office, and the earlier observation that neither nonpartisan nor partisan officials have extensive experience in other public offices suggest that the two offices which were studied in this project are filled by political amateurs without political ambitions.

Would Respondents Have Sought Office in Different Electoral System?

The final indicators of antipathy to political parties suggested by the arguments for nonpartisanship and subsequently formulated into hypotheses are an unwillingness on the part of nonpartisans to seek city office in a partisan election system and a desire to include party labels on city ballots by means of state law or city ordinance. In this section the question of willingness to run for city office under a different election system will be examined. In the section to follow, the reactions to a state or city law requiring party labels on city ballots will be reported. Following those two sections, an attempt will be made to summarize the findings regarding party identification and nonpartisanship.

The question of willingness to seek city office under a different electoral system involves personal conjecture on the part of the respondents. Respondents faced with the real decision at some time in the future might react differently than their present responses indicate. For that reason, the responses should be
viewed as a general inclination, rather than a firm commitment.

The questionnaire contained two items, one to be answered by nonpartisans and the other by partisans, which was intended to elicit responses which indicated the willingness of city officeholders to seek election under a different election system. Nonpartisans were asked if they would have run for their office if their city used a partisan ballot. Partisans were asked if they would have run for their office if their city used a nonpartisan ballot. For purposes of comparison, the responses were combined in Table 26 and a Z test of proportions computed.

TABLE 26

WILLINGNESS OF NONPARTISAN AND PARTISAN COUNCILMEN AND MAYORS TO SEEK THEIR OFFICE IN A DIFFERENT ELECTION SYSTEM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RESPONSE</th>
<th>NONPARTISANS</th>
<th>PARTISANS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>86.2% (94)</td>
<td>90.6% (126)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>13.8% (15)</td>
<td>9.4% (13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100.0% (109)</td>
<td>100.0% (139)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Z = .018, which is not significant

The responses overwhelmingly indicate that nonpartisan and partisan officeholders are perfectly willing to run for city office in a different election system. Responses from both samples indicate that almost 9 out of 10 officials are not sufficiently concerned with the presence or absence of party labels on city ballots to deter them from seeking city office. This pattern of responses is quite different from the results suggested by the literature and the hypotheses of the study.
It was hypothesized that nonpartisan officials would object sufficiently to the presence of political parties as to refuse to run for city office in a partisan system. Earlier data from this study indicated that winning candidates in nonpartisan elections are partisan activists. Because of the familiarity of nonpartisan officials with partisan affairs revealed by the study, it is not altogether surprising that nonpartisans have no particular fear of bringing political parties into local elections.

The question of differences between winning and losing candidates in nonpartisan elections again becomes appropriate. The data indicates that winning candidates want to continue in office, regardless of changes in election procedures. Is party affiliation equally unimportant to losing candidates? The design of the project does not permit the question to be confronted. The results of this survey simply indicate that nonpartisans do not object to partisan labeling sufficiently to refuse to run for city office in a partisan arrangement.

Observing the responses of nonpartisan and partisan mayors singly revealed no differences from the general pattern of the larger samples. All partisan mayors would have run for their office under a nonpartisan system and only one nonpartisan mayor would have refrained from seeking his office in a partisan setting.

Party Affiliation Required by Law

It was proposed in the questionnaire that a state or city law be passed which required the party affiliation of every city candidate to be entered after his name.
on the ballot. Respondents were asked if they favored such a requirement. Their responses to the proposal are recorded in Table 27.

### TABLE 27

**REACTIONS OF NONPARTISAN AND PARTISAN COUNCILMEN AND MAYORS TO PROPOSAL TO REQUIRE PARTY AFFILIATION ON BALLOT**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REACTION</th>
<th>NONPARTISANS</th>
<th>PARTISANS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Favorable</td>
<td>31.5% (34)</td>
<td>69.6% (96)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unfavorable</td>
<td>68.5% (74)</td>
<td>30.4% (42)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100.0% (108)</td>
<td>100.0% (138)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ \chi^2 = 35.263 \text{ with 1 degree of freedom, which is significant at .001} \]

The responses from the two samples present an interesting pattern. The nonpartisan and partisan replies are almost exactly inversely proportional. In both samples, slightly more than two-thirds of the respondents prefer to continue with the election system in which they were elected.

In an effort to isolate the sources of opposition and support of the proposal, analyses were completed, controlling for city size (Table 28) and city type (Table 29).

Nonpartisan support for party identification on the ballot is strongest in the population grouping of 100,000 or more. The strongest opposition was found among nonpartisans residing in cities of 25,000 to 49,000. All partisan groups supported the measure; but as city size decreased, support for partisan labeling also decreased.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REACTION</th>
<th>100,000 OR MORE</th>
<th>50,000 TO 99,000</th>
<th>25,000 TO 49,000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NONPARTISANS</td>
<td>PARTISANS</td>
<td>NONPARTISANS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favorable</td>
<td>41.4% (12)</td>
<td>85.7% (18)</td>
<td>36.7% (11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unfavorable</td>
<td>58.6% (17)</td>
<td>14.3% (3)</td>
<td>63.3% (19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100.0% (29)</td>
<td>100.0% (21)</td>
<td>100.0% (30)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comparing nonpartisans and partisans from cities of 100,000 or more, $X^2 = 9.975$ with 1 degree of freedom, which is significant at .01

Comparing nonpartisans and partisans from cities of 50,000 to 99,000, $X^2 = 14.873$ with 1 degree of freedom, which is significant at .001

Comparing nonpartisans and partisans from cities of 25,000 to 49,000, $X^2 = 16.229$ with 1 degree of freedom, which is significant at .001
TABLE 29

REACTION OF NONPARTISAN AND PARTISAN OFFICIALS TO REQUIRING PARTISAN AFFILIATION ON CITY BALLOTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REACTION</th>
<th>CENTRAL CITIES</th>
<th>SUBURBS</th>
<th>INDEPENDENT CITIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NONPARTISANS</td>
<td>PARTISANS</td>
<td>NONPARTISANS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favorable</td>
<td>38.0% (19)</td>
<td>74.0% (37)</td>
<td>21.9% (9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unfavorable</td>
<td>62.0% (31)</td>
<td>26.0% (13)</td>
<td>78.1% (32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100.0% (50)</td>
<td>100.0% (50)</td>
<td>100.0% (41)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comparing nonpartisans and partisans from central cities, maximum difference, $D = 36.0\%$, which is significant at .005
Comparing nonpartisans and partisans from suburban cities, maximum difference, $D = 50.1\%$, which is significant at .001
Comparing nonpartisans and partisans from independent cities, maximum difference, $D = 15.4\%$, which is not significant
These patterns suggest that partisan labeling is not considered a political or moral evil in the largest cities surveyed. In the smaller cities, nonpartisans object strongly to party labels, and more partisans share the objection than in any other population group.

Partisans from every type of city favor including the party affiliation of candidates on city ballots. Nonpartisans from central and suburban cities object to party identification. Nonpartisans from independent cities divide equally on the question; however, the small number of respondents in that category raises questions about the reliability of the results. In more general terms, it appears that neither sample is eager to change the election system in which they sought and won city office. The respondents may have felt that changing the system could result in election losses. As indicated in the previous section, respondents desire to continue in office. Changing the system could cause them to lose; however, the previous section indicates that they would seek office in a different election system.

Summary

The purpose of this rather long chapter has been to investigate the attitudes of nonpartisans toward political parties. It was hypothesized that certain individuals are willing to seek city office in a nonpartisan setting who would not do so in a partisan arrangement. The reason for those individuals reluctance to seek city office was suggested to be antipathy to political parties. Various indicators of attitudes toward parties were suggested by the arguments used to advocate the adoption of nonpartisan elections.
The specific hypotheses tested in this chapter and the decisions reached follow:

(1) Nonpartisan officeholders come from higher occupational status and income groups than do partisans (accepted).

(2) Partisan officeholders have been more active in partisan politics than have nonpartisans (rejected).

(3) Partisan officeholders have stronger partisan identification than do nonpartisans (rejected).

(4) Partisan officeholders have held more partisan offices before election to their current position than have nonpartisans (rejected).

(5) Partisans belong to more political groups than do nonpartisans (accepted).

(6) Partisans are more interested in seeking higher partisan office than are nonpartisans (rejected).

(7) Nonpartisan officeholders would not have sought their current position if partisan labeling were required (rejected).

(8) Nonpartisan officeholders would oppose a state or city law requiring party designations on city ballots (accepted).

The data reported in this chapter indicates that nonpartisans do possess higher occupational status and income than do partisans. Successful individuals are more likely to be elected in nonpartisan cities. The data permits the following conclusions to be drawn; partisans and nonpartisans have been equally active in partisan affairs, identify equally but with differing parties, are equally inexperienced in holding partisan office and uninterested in higher partisan office, are willing to seek office under a different election system but would prefer that their system remain unchanged. Nonpartisans were likely to belong to fewer political groups.
than were partisans.

One of the reasons for surveying both partisan and nonpartisan cities was to

gather control data. In earlier sections, partisanship was condemned for attracting voters to candidates because of party labels. It has been suggested that voters are attracted to nonpartisan candidates on more reliable indicators of competence such as political attitudes and personal competence (measured by success). Using the partisan sample as a control group, the question of differences between the samples again is asked. How does the test sample differ from the control sample? The only major differences observed were in the degree of success of nonpartisans. Put another way, voters in nonpartisan cities, forced to use a criterion other than party affiliation in evaluating candidates, appear to rely on income and occupational success as the basis for voting judgments. The data examined to this point implies that socio-economic status replaces party labels as determinants of voter selection in nonpartisan systems. Without data from losing candidates in nonpartisan elections, it is impossible to offer that finding as a characteristic of nonpartisan elections. Further research is needed to explore the relationship.
CHAPTER IV

Age of Respondents

The age of respondents is reported in this paper because it relates to the second general characteristic of nonpartisan elections under investigation in this study. Adrian indicated that nonpartisanship encourages long tenure in city office, which produces conservatism among nonpartisan officeholders. In this section and the one to follow, data collected to test the first part of the above claim will be reported. It should be noted that no claim is being made in this section that age is related to conservatism. The conventional wisdom suggests that such a relationship exists, but research has had difficulty confirming the relationship.1

Age is introduced in the present discussion because of its obvious relationship to tenure; long tenure is impossible among very young officeholders. However, increased age should not be considered as an indication of many years of service in city office. Age will be considered as only one small segment of the total consideration of tenure in nonpartisan cities. The age distribution of respondents is reported in Table 30.

The distribution of ages reveals that nonpartisans are older than partisans. Slightly less than 85% of partisans are under 55 years of age, as compared with

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1Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1960), 267.
less than 75% of partisans. Partisans are represented more frequently in the younger age groups; however, neither partisans nor nonpartisans are sufficiently represented in the youngest age groups to permit any conclusions to be drawn about tenure. For that reason, the customary analysis by city size and city type has been omitted.

TABLE 30

AGES OF NONPARTISAN AND PARTISAN COUNCILMEN AND MAYORS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AGE</th>
<th>NONPARTISANS</th>
<th>PARTISANS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under 35</td>
<td>8.6% (10)</td>
<td>10.2% (15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35 to 44</td>
<td>26.7% (31)</td>
<td>42.2% (62)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45 to 54</td>
<td>37.9% (44)</td>
<td>32.0% (47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55 to 64</td>
<td>22.4% (26)</td>
<td>10.2% (15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65 or older</td>
<td>4.3% (5)</td>
<td>5.4% (8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>99.9% (116)</td>
<td>100.0% (147)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$X^2 = 11.583$ with 4 degrees of freedom, which is significant at .05

Tenure in Office

Adrian suggested that nonpartisanship encourages long tenure in city office. The data collected in this study does not support that conclusion. No differences were noted in the number of years that nonpartisan and partisan councilmen and mayors have held office (Table 31). The data indicates that city officials
from cities using both types of elections have not enjoyed long tenure in office. Over half of the officials contacted have served for five years or less. The survey did not include former officeholders, eliminating the possibility of determining the reasons for councilmen and mayors not continuing in office.

The conclusions to be drawn from the data reported in this section are that nonpartisans are older than partisans; however, there are no differences in the number of years that respondents from both samples have served in city office. The first part of Adrian’s conclusion (Nonpartisanship encourages long tenure) is rejected by the findings of this survey. The second part of his conclusion will be investigated in the section to follow.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEARS IN OFFICE</th>
<th>NONPARTISANS</th>
<th>PARTISANS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 to 5</td>
<td>51.3% (59)</td>
<td>58.1% (86)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 to 10</td>
<td>33.0% (38)</td>
<td>31.1% (46)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 to 15</td>
<td>6.1% (7)</td>
<td>6.8% (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 15</td>
<td>9.6% (11)</td>
<td>4.0% (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100.0% (115)</td>
<td>100.0% (148)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$X^2 = 3.707$ with 3 degrees of freedom, which is not significant

Conservatism Among City Officials

Devising a means of ascertaining the ideological commitment of respondents

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to a mailed questionnaire is a tedious assignment that produces results which are suspect at best. Unanswerable questions dealing with definitions of terms, applicability of one ideological position (such as liberalism) to a broad range of social and economic questions, etc., become increasingly important as attempts are made to analyze the responses.

In the present study, respondents were asked to indicate their ideological commitment on a political continuum ranging from liberal to conservative. The continuum was divided by lines, and respondents were classified on the basis of their indication of position. This procedure has the advantage of permitting the respondents to classify themselves. It does not, however, offer any assurance that the classification accurately represents the beliefs of the respondents or that the perception of each classification are consistent. The data should be viewed as a general ideological persuasion of each group of respondents, rather than a firm ideological commitment, accurately depicting the beliefs of each individual respondent on every political issue.

No significant differences were observed between the political ideologies of nonpartisans and partisans. Nonpartisans were slightly less inclined to be liberals than were partisans, but the difference is not sufficiently large to rule out the possibility of the difference having occurred by chance.

The difficulties of analyzing the pattern of responses discussed above precludes the rejection of Adrian's conclusion that nonpartisanship produces conservative city officials. More sophisticated techniques would be necessary to fully explore the
ideological commitment of city officials than have been used in this project.

The patterns of responses found in this survey should not, however, be completely discarded. The responses indicate that officials elected under both systems do view their political ideologies similarly. This finding is at variance with the accepted view.

TABLE 32

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IDEOLOGY</th>
<th>NONPARTISANS</th>
<th>PARTISANS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>8.8% (10)</td>
<td>16.4% (24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>71.9% (82)</td>
<td>65.8% (96)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>19.3% (22)</td>
<td>17.8% (26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100.0% (114)</td>
<td>100.0% (146)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ X^2 = 3.311 \text{ with } 2 \text{ degrees of freedom, which is not significant} \]

The data reported in this and the preceding section indicates that nonpartisanship does not encourage longer tenure than partisanship. It further indicates that nonpartisanship does not produce more conservative city officials than partisanship. This pattern differs from the hypotheses of the study, which are presented below for comparative purposes.

(1) Partisan officeholders are drawn from younger age groups than are nonpartisans.

(2) Nonpartisans have longer tenure in office than have partisans.

(3) Nonpartisan officeholders are more likely to classify themselves as conservatives than are partisans.
The findings indicate that nonpartisans and partisans do not differ on tenure in office and ideology. Voters in both types of cities appear to attach similar importance to those variables. The two variables can be discarded as indicators of differences in the two election systems. It remains to be tested if those variables can be similarly discarded as indicators of differences when looking only at nonpartisan office-holders and office seekers.
CHAPTER V

Avoiding Issues in Campaigns

The final characteristic of nonpartisan elections under investigation in this study is concerned with the role of issues in city election campaigns. Adrian suggested that nonpartisan elections produce issueless campaigns. The literature suggested that national issues are more important in partisan than in nonpartisan elections. It was hypothesized that national issues play more of a role in partisan than nonpartisan campaigns and that issues (national and local) are less important in nonpartisan than in partisan elections.

Recipients of the questionnaire were confronted with a list of seven issues and asked to indicate the importance of each in their campaigns. The procedure for indicating the importance of an issue was to check one of a series of alternatives which ranged from "very important" to "not an issue." The issues selected included the following:

1. Urban renewal
2. Freeing Eastern European nations
3. Unemployment
4. Growth of Federal government
5. Minority representation in government
6. Passage of national civil rights legislation
7. Public housing
Three of the issues are clearly outside the jurisdiction of city officials: freeing Eastern European nations, growth of Federal government, and passage of national civil rights legislation. Those issues were considered national, and the remainder were viewed as local issues.

The specific issues were selected either because of their obviously national character or because they are common points of controversy in city elections. Individual cities, particularly the smaller cities surveyed, may not have had to consider one or more of the local issues such as public housing or urban renewal as yet. It was surmised that city size would be an important variable in this discussion, making necessary an analysis controlling for city size even where differences between the two samples were not observed. It is hoped that this procedure correctly anticipates at least one reservation about the methodology used in this section. Additionally, each issue was analyzed individually. This method provides a control on the applicability of each issue to the cities surveyed. In other words, if one or more of the issues were inappropriately selected, analysis should reveal that it is uniformly inappropriate by city size or by method of election of respondents.

The importance of national issues in nonpartisan and partisan election campaigns are reported in Tables 33, 34, and 35. The pattern of responses indicates quite clearly that national issues are not important in city elections, regardless of the election system used.
TABLE 33
IMPORTANCE OF FREEING EASTERN EUROPEAN NATIONS IN THE CAMPAIGNS OF NONPARTISANS AND PARTISANS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IMPORTANCE</th>
<th>NONPARTISANS</th>
<th>PARTISANS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very important</td>
<td>1.9% (2)</td>
<td>0.8% (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quite important</td>
<td>0.9% (1)</td>
<td>3.1% (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not very important</td>
<td>2.8% (3)</td>
<td>5.3% (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not an issue</td>
<td>94.3% (100)</td>
<td>90.8% (119)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>99.9% (106)</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0% (131)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[X^2 = 1.023 \text{ with 1 degree of freedom, which is not significant}\]

*Chi-Square score computed by combining all categories where issue had any importance and comparing with "not an issue" category in 2 x 2 table.

TABLE 34
IMPORTANCE OF GROWTH OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IN THE CAMPAIGNS OF NONPARTISANS AND PARTISANS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IMPORTANCE</th>
<th>NONPARTISANS</th>
<th>PARTISANS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very important</td>
<td>6.7% (7)</td>
<td>9.0% (12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quite important</td>
<td>15.2% (16)</td>
<td>12.0% (16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not very important</td>
<td>19.0% (20)</td>
<td>20.3% (27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not an issue</td>
<td>59.0% (62)</td>
<td>58.6% (78)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>99.9% (105)</strong></td>
<td><strong>99.9% (133)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[X^2 = 0.905 \text{ with 3 degrees of freedom, which is not significant}\]
TABLE 35

IMPORTANCE OF PASSAGE OF NATIONAL CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION
IN THE CAMPAIGNS OF NONPARTISANS AND PARTISANS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IMPORTANCE</th>
<th>NONPARTISANS</th>
<th>PARTISANS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very important</td>
<td>9.3% (10)</td>
<td>7.5% (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quite important</td>
<td>6.5% (7)</td>
<td>12.7% (17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not very important</td>
<td>17.8% (19)</td>
<td>12.7% (17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not an issue</td>
<td>66.4% (71)</td>
<td>67.2% (90)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0% (107)</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.1% (134)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\( \chi^2 = 3.539 \) with 3 degrees of freedom, which is not significant

Freeing Eastern European nations was clearly not an issue in either sample. A computation was made of responses to the issue for each city size. In no city population group was the issue important or comparisons between election system significant. Reporting the computation would do little to further the analysis of the role of national issues in city elections. It certainly indicates that one issue can be rather authoritatively dismissed as being pertinent to city elections.

In Tables 36 and 37 the patterns of responses to the question of importance of the two remaining national issues (growth of Federal government and passage of national civil rights legislation) are reported. In both tables the frequency of responses to the first three alternatives was small, which necessitated collapsing the categories into either "was an issue" or "was not an issue" groups.

No differences were observed in the extent to which growth of the Federal
government was an issue in nonpartisan and partisan responses within population groups. Even after collapsing the categories, the issue was not relevant to at least 40% of the respondents' campaigns. The issue was particularly unimportant in the smallest cities surveyed.

Passage of national civil rights legislation was not a particularly important issue in either election system sample. As with the previous issue, as city size decreased, the importance of the issue also decreased, irrespective of election system.

The data in this section indicates that national issues are not important in city elections, and that no differences were observed in the extent to which national issues are important in either election system. It was hypothesized that national issues would be more important in partisan than in nonpartisan elections. The findings necessitate rejecting that hypothesis.

Local Issues in City Campaigns

The importance of the following local issues in the campaigns of nonpartisans and partisans were observed:

(1) Urban renewal
(2) Unemployment
(3) Minority representation in government, and
(4) Public housing
### TABLE 36

**IMPORTANCE OF THE GROWTH OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IN THE CAMPAIGNS OF NONPARTISANS AND PARTISANS BY CITY SIZE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IMPORTANCE</th>
<th>100,000 OR MORE</th>
<th>50,000 TO 99,000</th>
<th>25,000 TO 49,000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NONPARTISANS</td>
<td>NONPARTISANS</td>
<td>NONPARTISANS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PARTISANS</td>
<td>PARTISANS</td>
<td>PARTISANS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Was an issue</td>
<td>44.4% (12)</td>
<td>59.3% (16)</td>
<td>33.3% (18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>50.0% (11)</td>
<td>41.2% (14)</td>
<td>38.2% (29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Was not an issue</td>
<td>55.6% (15)</td>
<td>40.7% (11)</td>
<td>67.7% (36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>50.0% (11)</td>
<td>58.8% (20)</td>
<td>61.8% (47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100.0% (27)</td>
<td>100.0% (27)</td>
<td>100.0% (54)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comparing nonpartisans and partisans from cities of 100,000 or more, $X^2 = 0.150$ with 1 degree of freedom, which is not significant.

Comparing nonpartisans and partisans from cities of 50,000 to 99,000, $X^2 = 1.969$ with 1 degree of freedom, which is not significant.

Comparing nonpartisans and partisans from cities of 25,000 to 49,000, $X^2 = 0.318$ with 1 degree of freedom, which is not significant.
### TABLE 37

**IMPORTANCE OF PASSAGE OF NATIONAL CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION IN THE CAMPAIGNS OF NONPARTISANS AND PARTISANS BY CITY SIZE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IMPORTANCE</th>
<th>100,000 OR MORE</th>
<th>50,000 TO 99,000</th>
<th>25,000 TO 49,000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NONPARTISANS</td>
<td>PARTISANS</td>
<td>NONPARTISANS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Was an issue</td>
<td>51.7% (15)</td>
<td>42.9% (9)</td>
<td>40.7% (11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Was not an issue</td>
<td>48.3% (14)</td>
<td>57.1% (12)</td>
<td>59.3% (16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100.0% (29)</td>
<td>100.0% (21)</td>
<td>100.0% (27)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comparing nonpartisans and partisans from cities of 100,000 or more, $X^2 = 0.384$ with 1 degree of freedom, which is not significant.

Comparing nonpartisans and partisans from cities of 50,000 to 99,000, $X^2 = 0.086$ with 1 degree of freedom, which is not significant.

Comparing nonpartisans and partisans from cities of 25,000 to 49,000, $X^2 = 0.113$ with 1 degree of freedom, which is not significant.
In Tables 38, 39, 40, and 41 the responses of the importance of each issue are reported.

**TABLE 38**

IMPORTANCE OF URBAN RENEWAL IN THE CAMPAIGNS OF NONPARTISAN AND PARTISAN OFFICIALS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IMPORTANCE</th>
<th>NONPARTISANS</th>
<th>PARTISANS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very important</td>
<td>28.2% (31)</td>
<td>24.3% (34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quite important</td>
<td>15.5% (17)</td>
<td>26.4% (37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not very important</td>
<td>17.3% (19)</td>
<td>17.1% (24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not an issue</td>
<td>39.1% (43)</td>
<td>32.1% (45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>100.1% (110)</td>
<td>99.9% (140)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$X^2 = 4.639$ with 3 degrees of freedom, which is not significant

**TABLE 39**

IMPORTANCE OF UNEMPLOYMENT IN THE CAMPAIGNS OF NONPARTISAN AND PARTISAN OFFICIALS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IMPORTANCE</th>
<th>NONPARTISANS</th>
<th>PARTISANS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very important</td>
<td>11.9% (13)</td>
<td>9.7% (13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quite important</td>
<td>12.8% (14)</td>
<td>18.7% (25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not very important</td>
<td>20.2% (22)</td>
<td>11.9% (16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not an issue</td>
<td>55.0% (60)</td>
<td>59.7% (80)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>99.9% (109)</td>
<td>100.0% (134)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$X^2 = 4.381$ with 3 degrees of freedom, which is not significant
TABLE 40

IMPORTANCE OF MINORITY REPRESENTATION IN GOVERNMENT IN THE CAMPAIGNS OF NONPARTISAN AND PARTISAN OFFICIALS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IMPORTANCE</th>
<th>NONPARTISANS</th>
<th>PARTISANS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very important</td>
<td>18.9% (20)</td>
<td>7.5% (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quite important</td>
<td>18.9% (20)</td>
<td>11.9% (16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not very important</td>
<td>16.0% (17)</td>
<td>20.9% (28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not an issue</td>
<td>46.2% (49)</td>
<td>59.7% (80)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100.0% (106)</td>
<td>100.0% (134)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$X^2 = 10.796$ with 3 degrees of freedom, which is significant at .02

TABLE 41

IMPORTANCE OF PUBLIC HOUSING IN THE CAMPAIGNS OF NONPARTISAN AND PARTISAN OFFICIALS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IMPORTANCE</th>
<th>NONPARTISANS</th>
<th>PARTISANS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very important</td>
<td>14.4% (16)</td>
<td>16.1% (22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quite important</td>
<td>14.4% (16)</td>
<td>18.2% (25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not very important</td>
<td>22.5% (25)</td>
<td>16.1% (22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not an issue</td>
<td>48.6% (54)</td>
<td>49.6% (68)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>99.9% (111)</td>
<td>100.0% (137)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$X^2 = 2.017$ with 3 degrees of freedom, which is not significant

Three of the local issues were equally important in nonpartisan and partisan campaigns. Combined with the three national issues previously discussed, the findings suggest that issues in partisan campaigns are not more important than in

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nonpartisan campaigns. It was hypothesized that issues would be more important in partisan than in nonpartisan campaigns. The findings tentatively indicate that the expected pattern has not emerged.

Tables 42, 43, 44, and 45 reveal the results of controlling for city size for each of the local issues. Once again it was necessary to collapse categories to permit statistical analysis; in this instance, the first two categories were combined to form the category, "Very to quite important."

An interesting pattern emerges from the data reported in the four tables. On every issue, the respondents from cities of 25,000 to 49,000 exhibit differences in the extent to which the issues were important in their campaigns. On three of the four issues, partisans indicate that the issues were more important in their campaigns than in the campaigns of nonpartisans. The exception to the rule was the issue of minority representation in government, which was also the issue on which significant differences were noted between the responses of the total samples.

The local issues, as was the case in the discussion of national issues, decrease in importance as city size decreases. From the many analyses presented in this section, it appears that in all but the smallest cities surveyed, issues play comparable roles in the campaigns of nonpartisan and partisan candidates. It was hypothesized that issues would be more important in partisan than in nonpartisan campaigns. The data tentatively indicates that the hypothesis should be rejected.

A persistent exception to the above pattern is the issue of minority representation in government. In the smallest cities surveyed, as well as the total
### TABLE 42

**IMPORTANCE OF URBAN RENEWAL IN THE CAMPAIGNS OF NONPARTISAN AND PARTISAN OFFICIALS**

**BY CITY SIZE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IMPORTANCE</th>
<th>100,000 OR MORE</th>
<th>50,000 TO 99,000</th>
<th>25,000 TO 49,000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NONPARTISANS</td>
<td>PARTISANS</td>
<td>NONPARTISANS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very to quite important</td>
<td>61.3% (19)</td>
<td>33.3% (8)</td>
<td>17.9% (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not very important</td>
<td>22.6% (7)</td>
<td>33.3% (8)</td>
<td>17.9% (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not an issue</td>
<td>16.1% (5)</td>
<td>33.3% (8)</td>
<td>64.3% (18)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Comparing nonpartisans and partisans from cities of 100,000 or more, $\chi^2 = 4.421$ with 2 degrees of freedom, which is not significant**

**Comparing nonpartisans and partisans from cities of 50,000 to 99,000, $\chi^2 = 2.975$ with 2 degrees of freedom, which is not significant**

**Comparing nonpartisans and partisans from cities of 25,000 to 49,000, $\chi^2 = 5.646$ with 2 degrees of freedom, which is significant at .10**
TABLE 43

IMPORTANCE OF UNEMPLOYMENT IN THE CAMPAIGNS OF NONPARTISAN AND PARTISAN OFFICIALS
BY CITY SIZE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IMPORTANCE</th>
<th>100,000 OR MORE</th>
<th>50,000 TO 99,000</th>
<th>25,000 TO 49,000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NONPARTISANS</td>
<td>PARTISANS</td>
<td>NONPARTISANS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very to quite important</td>
<td>54.8% (17)</td>
<td>50.0% (11)</td>
<td>25.9% (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not very important</td>
<td>22.6% (7)</td>
<td>22.7% (5)</td>
<td>25.9% (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not an issue</td>
<td>22.6% (7)</td>
<td>27.3% (6)</td>
<td>48.2% (13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100.0% (31)</td>
<td>100.0% (22)</td>
<td>100.0% (27)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comparing nonpartisans and partisans from cities of 100,000 or more, $X^2 = 0.173$ with 2 degrees of freedom, which is not significant

Comparing nonpartisans and partisans from cities of 50,000 to 99,000, $X^2 = 2.417$ with 2 degrees of freedom, which is not significant

Comparing nonpartisans and partisans from cities of 25,000 to 49,000, $X^2 = 6.575$ with 2 degrees of freedom, which is significant at .05
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Importance</th>
<th>100,000 or more</th>
<th>50,000 to 99,000</th>
<th>25,000 to 49,000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nonpartisans</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very to quite important</td>
<td>53.6% (15)</td>
<td>37.0% (10)</td>
<td>28.9% (15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not very important</td>
<td>28.6% (8)</td>
<td>22.2% (6)</td>
<td>17.1% (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not an issue</td>
<td>17.9% (5)</td>
<td>40.7% (11)</td>
<td>65.4% (34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PARTISANS</td>
<td>33.3% (7)</td>
<td>17.1% (6)</td>
<td>16.9% (13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0% (28)</td>
<td>99.9% (27)</td>
<td>100.1% (52)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comparing nonpartisans and partisans from cities of 100,000 or more, \( \chi^2 = 2.042 \) with 2 degrees of freedom, which is not significant.

Comparing nonpartisans and partisans from cities of 50,000 to 99,000, \( \chi^2 = 4.274 \) with 2 degrees of freedom, which is not significant.

Comparing nonpartisans and partisans from cities of 25,000 to 49,000, \( \chi^2 = 6.913 \) with 2 degrees of freedom, which is significant at .05.
TABLE 45
IMPORTANCE OF PUBLIC HOUSING IN THE CAMPAIGNS OF NONPARTISAN AND PARTISAN OFFICIALS
BY CITY SIZE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IMPORTANCE</th>
<th>100,000 OR MORE</th>
<th></th>
<th>50,000 TO 99,000</th>
<th></th>
<th>25,000 TO 49,000</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NONPARTISANS</td>
<td>PARTISANS</td>
<td>NONPARTISANS</td>
<td>PARTISANS</td>
<td>NONPARTISANS</td>
<td>PARTISANS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very to quite important</td>
<td>35.5% (11)</td>
<td>21.7% (5)</td>
<td>27.6% (8)</td>
<td>33.3% (12)</td>
<td>9.6% (5)</td>
<td>27.3% (21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not very important</td>
<td>25.8% (8)</td>
<td>39.1% (9)</td>
<td>24.1% (7)</td>
<td>22.2% (8)</td>
<td>17.3% (9)</td>
<td>12.9% (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not an issue</td>
<td>38.7% (12)</td>
<td>39.1% (9)</td>
<td>48.3% (14)</td>
<td>44.4% (16)</td>
<td>73.1% (38)</td>
<td>59.7% (46)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100.0% (31)</td>
<td>99.9% (23)</td>
<td>100.0% (29)</td>
<td>99.9% (36)</td>
<td>100.0% (52)</td>
<td>99.9% (77)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comparing nonpartisans and partisans from cities of 100,000 or more, $X^2 = 1.587$ with 2 degrees of freedom, which is not significant.

Comparing nonpartisans and partisans from cities of 50,000 to 99,000, $X^2 = 0.249$ with 2 degrees of freedom, which is not significant.

Comparing nonpartisans and partisans from cities of 25,000 to 49,000, $X^2 = 6.043$ with 2 degrees of freedom, which is significant at .05.
samples, this issue was more important in nonpartisan than in partisan campaigns. To attempt to analyze further the differences in responses, Table 46 was devised to present the importance of minority representation in government after controlling for city type. Independent cities were omitted because of insufficient replies to permit statistically relevant analysis.

The issue of minority representation in city government was important in the campaigns of nonpartisan respondents from central cities. Over half of the respondents from partisan central cities also considered the issue to have played at least some part in their campaigns. In the comparison of respondents from suburban cities, the issue was generally less important; however, nonpartisans again reported that the issue was more of a factor in their campaigns than did partisans.

The issue of minority representation in city government was discussed more frequently in nonpartisan campaigns. Unfortunately, the questionnaire was not designed to determine the positions respondents took on the issue.

In this chapter the following hypotheses were tested:

(1) National issues are more important in partisan than in nonpartisan campaigns (not supported).

(2) Issues are more important in the campaigns of partisans than of nonpartisans (not supported).

The data suggests that nonpartisans are not elected by their discussion of either local or national issues. Using the partisans as a control group, it appears that nonpartisanship results in no major issue discussions. In the chapter to follow, an attempt will be made to bring this and the earlier findings of the study into focus.
TABLE 46

IMPORTANCE OF MINORITY REPRESENTATION IN GOVERNMENT IN THE CAMPAIGNS OF NONPARTISAN AND
PARTISAN OFFICIALS
BY CITY TYPE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IMPORTANCE</th>
<th>CENTRAL CITIES</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>SUBURBS</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NONPARTISANS</td>
<td>PARTISANS</td>
<td>NONPARTISANS</td>
<td>PARTISANS</td>
<td>NONPARTISANS</td>
<td>PARTISANS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very to quite important</td>
<td>48.9% (23)</td>
<td>25.5% (12)</td>
<td>23.3% (10)</td>
<td>7.3% (3)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not very important</td>
<td>27.7% (13)</td>
<td>29.8% (14)</td>
<td>4.7% (2)</td>
<td>14.6% (6)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not an issue</td>
<td>23.4% (11)</td>
<td>44.7% (21)</td>
<td>72.1% (31)</td>
<td>78.1% (32)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100.0% (47)</td>
<td>100.0% (47)</td>
<td>100.1% (43)</td>
<td>100.0% (41)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comparing nonpartisans and partisans from central cities, $X^2 = 6.619$ with 2 degrees of freedom, which is significant at .05.

Comparing nonpartisans and partisans from suburban cities, $X^2 = 5.741$ with 2 degrees of freedom, which is significant at .10.
CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS OF THE STUDY

This study was initiated to test three hypotheses relating to nonpartisan elections suggested by Adrian. The hypotheses were as follows:

(1) Nonpartisanship encourages a limited number of candidates to seek city office who would not do so if partisan affiliation were required.

(2) Nonpartisanship encourages a long tenure in city office and, thus, conservatism in city legislative behavior.

(3) Issues (both national and local) are avoided in nonpartisan campaigns.

The three hypotheses collectively suggest that nonpartisanship is a major factor in city government. They suggest that the election system that a city employs is a major determinant of who seeks city office, who is re-elected, the ideology of those elected, and the kinds of campaigns conducted in a city. It was intimated early in the study that this broad interpretation may be overstating the importance of elections.

Hypotheses were developed and tested to determine if the role of elections is as pervasive as indicated above. The findings of this study indicate generally that election system does not produce officials with different characteristics. Little evidence was found to support the hypothesis that removing party labels causes officials to stay in office longer or that nonpartisan officials are more conservative than partisan officials. Little evidence was found to support the hypothesis that nonpartisan campaigns are less issue-oriented.
The major differences that were found between nonpartisan and partisan officials were in occupations, incomes, and party preferences. Nonpartisans have higher status occupations and receive higher incomes. In addition, nonpartisans are likely to support the Republican party.

In cities which use nonpartisan elections, the voters are denied the use of party labels as a means of evaluating candidates. Voters must rely on other types of information to make electoral decisions. Much of the data gathered in this project is readily available to residents of the respective cities through the mass media, campaign literature, and personal acquaintance. Voters in both nonpartisan and partisan cities have selected officials who do not differ on the extent to which they discuss issues, tenure in office, ideology, experience in public office, political ambition, and records of partisan activity. Voters in nonpartisan cities selected men with higher incomes, better jobs, and an inclination to support the Republican party. It is not possible because of the design of the project to determine if voters in nonpartisan cities rejected men with middle and low income, less prestigious jobs, or supporters of the Democratic party.

Regardless of the outcome of further research in this subject area, the research theory on the subject must be revised. This research project has clearly shown that Adrian’s conceptualization fails at several critical points to explain the characteristics of nonpartisan government. The most critical point at which the current theory is inadequate is in explaining the two phenomena which have been illuminated in this project, the similarities of officials in the two election systems,
and those few differences found between officials with regard to income, occupation, and party preference. The implications for Democratic theory suggested by the areas of differences between officials elected under the two systems necessitate an immediate reconsideration of the characteristics of nonpartisanship.

If subsequent testing of the role of income, occupation, and party preference between winning and losing candidates in nonpartisan elections confirms that the system does result in lower status Democrats being excluded from city office, the entire city electoral process must be re-examined. The trend in city government is to accept nonpartisanship. If a relationship can be found within the system on the above points, removing party labels has not eliminated political parties; it has simply removed supporters of one party.
APPENDIX I: QUESTIONNAIRE

1. Position ( ) COUNCILMAN ( ) MAYOR

2. City ________________________________

3. Age  ( ) 20 to 24  ( ) 25 to 29  ( ) 30 to 34
   ( ) 35 to 39  ( ) 40 to 44  ( ) 45 to 49
   ( ) 50 to 54  ( ) 55 to 59  ( ) 60 to 64
   ( ) 65 or over

4. Occupation ____________________________

5. Yearly income (less compensation
   for public office)  ( ) $3,000 to 4,999  ( ) $5,000 to 6,999
   ( ) $7,000 to 8,999  ( ) $9,000 to 10,999
   ( ) $11,000 to 14,999  ( ) $15,000 or over

6. How long have you held your seat on the council? ______________________________

7. In PARTISAN elections, do you normally vote:
   ( ) a straight Democratic ticket?
   ( ) a split ticket but for more Democrats than Republicans?
   ( ) a split ticket equally divided between the two parties?
   ( ) a split ticket but for more Republicans than Democrats?
   ( ) a straight Republican ticket?

8. Please place an X on the scale below which you think best demonstrates your
   political beliefs:

   ____________________________ Liberal          Moderate          Conservative

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9. Were you elected on a partisan or nonpartisan ballot?
   ( ) Partisan  ( ) Nonpartisan

10. If you were elected on a partisan ballot, were you elected as a Republican or Democrat?
    ( ) Republican  ( ) Democrat

11. Please check the importance of the following issues in your campaign:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Very Important</th>
<th>Quite Important</th>
<th>Not Very Important</th>
<th>Not An Issue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Urban Renewal</td>
<td>( )</td>
<td>( )</td>
<td>( )</td>
<td>( )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freeing Eastern European Nations</td>
<td>( )</td>
<td>( )</td>
<td>( )</td>
<td>( )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth of Federal Government</td>
<td>( )</td>
<td>( )</td>
<td>( )</td>
<td>( )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority Representation in Government</td>
<td>( )</td>
<td>( )</td>
<td>( )</td>
<td>( )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Housing</td>
<td>( )</td>
<td>( )</td>
<td>( )</td>
<td>( )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passage of National Civil Rights Legislation</td>
<td>( )</td>
<td>( )</td>
<td>( )</td>
<td>( )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

12. How often does the local press support or endorse candidates for city office?
    ( ) Every election  ( ) Many elections  ( ) Few elections  ( ) Never

13. Did you receive support or endorsement from the local press?  ( ) Yes  ( ) No

14. Please check the statement appropriate to your city in the following list:

   ( ) To be elected to city office, endorsement by one of the major political parties is essential.

   ( ) One or both of the major political parties play limited and behind-the-scenes roles in local election. They are not dominant, but neither are they entirely absent.
Neither national party plays any part in local elections, but local organizations and groups exist to put forward candidates regularly or on occasion. In some cases, slates are drawn up listing several candidates; on other occasions, groups are organized for one candidate or an issue.

No activity by either the Republican or Democratic party or local parties or organizations. Candidates select themselves and have friends assist in their campaign.

15. To what groups do you belong? (Please list under appropriate headings.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FRATERNAL</th>
<th>POLITICAL</th>
<th>CIVIC</th>
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<tbody>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BUSINESS</th>
<th>SOCIAL</th>
<th>RELIGIOUS</th>
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<tbody>
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</tbody>
</table>

16. Which of these groups helped you in your campaign?
17. Which one group gave you the most assistance? _________________________

18. What type of assistance did that group give? (Check as many as applicable.)

( ) Talked with friends about your qualifications.

( ) Organized phone call campaigns on your behalf.

( ) Wrote letters to the newspaper(s) on your behalf.

( ) Took out advertisements in newspaper(s) on your behalf.

( ) Passed out campaign literature on corners or in neighborhoods.

( ) Put stickers on cars or signs on their lawns.

( ) Provided cars for voters to get to the polls.

19. Would you estimate the range of cost of a typical successful campaign:
   For Mayor $ _______________________________
   For Councilman $ __________________________

20. Were you ever elected to any PARTISAN public office prior to election to your current position? ( ) Yes ( ) No

21. If so, what office(s)? ________________________________________________

22. Have you any intention at this time of seeking higher PARTISAN public office in the future? ( ) Yes ( ) No

23. Below is a list of PARTISAN political activities a person could take part in without holding public office. Would you please check those PARTISAN activities you participated in (on at least one occasion) PRIOR to election to your current office:

   ( ) Talked with friends about the qualifications of one or more candidates.

   ( ) Gave money or bought tickets to help the campaign of a candidate or one of the major parties.

   ( ) Went to a political meeting, rally, dinner, or things of this sort.
( ) Worked (made phone calls, passed out literature, addressed mailed campaign literature, etc.) for a candidate or party.

( ) Belonged to a political club or organization.

( ) Wore a campaign button or put a campaign sticker on your car.

24. If you were elected on a nonpartisan ballot, would you have run for your office if your city used a partisan ballot? ( ) Yes ( ) No

25. If you were elected on a partisan ballot, would you have run for your office if your city used a nonpartisan ballot? ( ) Yes ( ) No

26. Finally, would you favor a state or city law requiring that the political affiliation, if any, of candidates for city office be entered on the city election ballot following the candidate's name? ( ) Yes ( ) No
APPENDIX II: OCCUPATIONAL CLASSIFICATION

1. Professional, technical, and kindred workers. Includes Accountants; Actors; Airplane pilots and navigators; Architects; Artists; Athletes; Auditors; Authors; Chemists; Chiropractors; Clergymen; College presidents, professors, and instructors; Conservationists; Dancers; Dentists; Designers; Dietitians; Draftsmen; Editors; Embalmers; Entertainers; Farm management advisors; Foresters; Funeral directors; Healers; Home management advisors; Judges; Lawyers; Librarians; Musicians; Natural scientists; Nutritionists; Optometrists; Osteopaths; Personnel workers; Pharmacists; Photographers; Physicians; Professional nurses; Radio operators; Recreation workers; Religious workers; Reporters; Social scientists; Social workers; Sports instructors and officials; Student professional nurses; Surgeons; Surveyors; Teachers; Technical engineers; Therapists; Veterinarians.

2. Farmers and farm managers. Includes tenant farmers and share-croppers.

3. Managers, officials, and proprietors, except farm. Includes Buyers; Building superintendents; Credit men; Lodge officials; Postmasters; Public administration officials; Purchasing agents; Railroad conductors; Ship officers, pilots, pursers, and engineers; Shippers of farm products; Union officials.

4. Clerical and kindred workers. Includes Bank tellers; Bill and account collectors; Bookkeepers; Cashiers; Dentist's office attendants; Express agents; Express messengers; Library assistants and attendants; Mail carriers; Messengers; Office boys; Office machine operators; Physician's office attendants; Railway mail clerks; Receiving clerks; Secretaries; Shipping clerks, Station agents; Stenographers; Telegraph messengers; Telegraph operators; Telephone operators; Ticket agents; Typists.

5. Sales workers. Includes Advertising agents and salesmen; Auctioneers; Demonstrators; Hucksters; Insurance agents and brokers; Newsboys; Peddlers; Real Estate agents and brokers; Stock and bond salesmen.

6. Craftsmen, foremen, and kindred workers. Includes Annealers; Bakers; Blacksmiths; Boilermakers; Bookbinders; Brickmasons; Cabinetmakers; Carpenters; Cement finishers; Compositors; Concrete finishers; Coppersmiths; Cranemen;

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Derrickmen; Diemakers; Die setters; Electricians; Electrotypers; Engravers; Excavating machinery operators; forgemen; Glaziers; Goldsmiths; Grading machinery operators; Heat treaters; Hoistmen; Lens grinder and polishers; Lithographers; Locomotive engineers; Locomotive firemen; Log and lumber scalers and graders; Loom fixers; Machinists; Mechanics; Metal molders; Metal rollers; Metal roll hands; Millers; Millwrights; Motion picture projectionists; Opticians; Organ tuners; Painters (construction and maintenance); Paperhangers; Photoengravers; Piano tuners; Pipe fitters; Plasterers; Plate printers; Plumbers; Power linemen and servicemen; Garage laborers; Groundskeepers; Longshoremen; Oystermen; Shoemakers, except in factories; Silversmiths; Slaters; Stationary engineers; Stereotypers; Stone carvers; Stone cutters; Stone masons; Structural metal workers; Tailors; Telegraph and Telephone linemen and servicemen; Tile setters; Tinsmiths; Tool makers; Typesetters; Upholsterers; Watchmakers; Window dressers.

7. Operatives and kindred workers. Includes Apprentices; Asbestos workers; Auto service attendants; Blasters; Boatmen; Bus conductors; Bus drivers; Canalmen; Chauffeurs; Deck hands; Deliverymen; Dressmakers; Dry cleaning operatives; Dyers; Fruit, nut and vegetable graders and packers; Furnacemen; Insulation workers; Laundry operatives; Meat cutters; Metal fitters, grinders, and polishers; Metal heaters; Milliners; Mine operatives and laborers; Motormen; Painters (except construction and maintenance); Parking lot attendants; Photographic process workers; Powdermen; Power station operators; Railroad brakemen and switchmen; Routemen; Sailors; Sawyers; Seamstresses; Smeltermen; Stationary firemen; Street railway conductors; Surveying tenmen, rodmen, and oxmen; Taxicab drivers; Textile spinners; Textile weavers; Tractor drivers; Truck drivers; Welders.

8. Private household workers. Includes housekeepers and laundresses in private households.

9. Service workers, except private household. Includes Attendants and ushers in amusement places; Bailiffs; Barbers; Bartenders; Beauticians; Boarding house keepers; Bootblacks; Bridge tenders; Charwomen; Cooks, except in private households; Detectives; Doorkeepers; Elevator operators; Firemen (fire protection); Fountain workers; Guards; Hospital attendants; Janitors; Lodginghouse keepers; Manicurists; Marshals; Midwives; Policemen; Porters; Practical nurses; Sextons; Sheriffs; Stewards; Waiters; Watchmen.

10. Farm Laborers and foremen. Includes both paid and unpaid family farm laborers, and self-employed farm service laborers.

11. Laborers, except farm and mine. Includes Car washers; Fishermen; Garage laborers; Groundskeepers; Longshoremen; Oystermen; Raftsmen; Stevedores; Teamsters; Woodchoppers.
12. Students.
13. Housewives.
14. Retired, unemployed, and widows.
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