Yugoslav Ideology and Its Importance to the Soviet Bloc: An Analysis

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YUGOSLAV IDEOLOGY AND ITS IMPORTANCE TO THE SOVIET BLOC:
AN ANALYSIS

by
Christine Deichsel

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Christine Deichsel
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On June 28, 1948, a special session of the Cominform passed the resolution which expelled the Yugoslav communists from the international communist movement. The break between the Soviet Union and the relatively small Balkan nation left Western observers undecided about its significance. Some saw in it nothing but a squabble between two gangs of communists that could and would easily be resolved. Others regarded it as a senseless act of David and Goliath defiance without greater significance.

In retrospect, however, it seems clear that the break was of greater importance than either one of these interpretations suggested at the time. The Yugoslav dissent, the existence of an independent ex-satellite, could not but have an impact upon the centralized monolithic communist movement.

After 1948 Yugoslavia slowly developed its own institutions and an ideology different from that of the U.S.S.R. The Balkan nation took, as the Yugoslavs would call it, its own path to socialism. I would like to concentrate my examination of Yugoslavia mainly on its ideology. The paper seeks to examine this ideology in the light of its development and consequences and to
form conclusions as to the evolution of the Yugoslav path and its significance to the developments within the Soviet Bloc.

The subject will be discussed in four chapters which are topically arranged. Chapter one considers the problem of internationalism and national communism; chapter two discusses the evolution of the Yugoslav system; chapter three examines the Yugoslav ideology in detail; and chapter four reflects on the significance of the Yugoslav experience to developments within the Soviet Bloc. The concluding remarks will be presented in the last chapter.
CHAPTER I

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM - UNIFORMITY AND DIVERSITY
THE PROBLEM OF NATIONAL COMMUNISM

Today national Communism is a general phenomenon in Communism. To varying degrees all Communist movements, except that of the U.S.S.R. against which it is directed, are gripped by national Communism.¹ No single form of Communism, no matter how similar it is to other forms, exists in any way other than national Communism. In order to maintain itself, it must become national.²

Whatever the communist world might think of Milovan Djilas' reasoning, national communism is a reality today. After the Soviet-Yugoslav break in 1948 and the Polish and Hungarian revolutions of 1956, national communism appeared as a force that had to be reckoned with. Two different streams of thought had evolved; one that supported the idea of a monolithic communist movement under the control of Moscow and another which favored a poli­centric movement bound together by the common adherence to Marxist ideology.

The Internationalism of Marx and Engels

It has been over a century ago that Marx and Engels appealed to the world proletariat to unite. Their

²Ibid., p. 174.
stirring exclamation: "Workers of the world unite" has never since ceased to inspire their followers. The fathers of scientific socialism uttered these words in the conviction that "the working men have no country," that "national differences and antagonisms between people are daily more and more vanishing," and that "the supremacy of the proletariat will cause them to vanish still faster." Indeed, Marx and Engels had no favorable conception of either a state or a nation. Instead, they proposed a doctrine of internationalism. They regarded nationalism as a relic of feudalism. As economic determinists, Marx and Engels perceived nationalism just like religion, as part of the false ideological consciousness which favored the retention of conservative economic and social forces and thus aided the retardation of progress. From the standpoint of Marxist social philosophy, socialism and nationalism are incompatible with one another.

As an outgrowth of Marxism, communism retained the idea that by definition communism and nationalism are opposites. The term, national communism, is then, at least as far as communist theory is concerned, a logical absurdity. Even Tito, generally regarded as the apostle

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of national communism, denies its existence. He refutes the constant charges which refer to the Yugoslav communists as bourgeois nationalists and asserts that the Yugoslav communists too are internationalists. Given the Yugoslav conception of communist internationalism and intercommunist relations, Tito's stand can indeed be justified.

Communist Uniformity, 1917 - 1945

The Russian Revolution of 1917 and the development of socialism in Russia did strange things to the Marxian doctrine of internationalism. For nearly thirty years Soviet Russia was the only communist country on the globe. After the October Revolution, Lenin and the Russian Bolsheviks in general believed that their revolution could not survive without successful proletarian uprisings elsewhere. As the hopes for immediate world revolution came to naught, the attention of the communist leadership was drawn more and more toward Russia and Russian problems. The idea of world revolution was not abandoned but rather relegated to the indefinite future.


In a communist Russia, surrounded by enemies, nationalism came to have a considerable impact upon the policies of the Soviet leadership. The adoption of Stalin’s policy of socialism in one country as against Trotsky’s doctrine of permanent revolution reflects these tendencies. From now on Russia, rather than world communism, found itself in the center of importance. With the rise of fascism in Europe, the task of world communism became more and more the defense of Soviet Russia rather than the instigation of proletarian uprisings. The success of Soviet Russia became equated with the success of world communism.

The Communist International which had been established to further world revolution was now used as a tool for Soviet foreign policy aims. Revolutionary attempts were staged or recalled in accordance with Soviet interest. The communist parties of the world were so molded by the Comintern and so fearful of the military threat to the base of world revolution that their primary loyalty was extended to the Soviet Union and Stalin rather than to the international proletariat. Anyone who did not give his complete love and devotion to Soviet Russia was in the eyes of the Comintern nothing but a bourgeois


nationalist. By a strange turn of events, Marxian internationalism had become some kind of nationalism, loyalty to the one existing communist community.\(^9\)

The emergence of nationalism within the communist international movement could be prevented as long as the U.S.S.R. remained the only communist state. Aided by the rise of fascism, Stalin was able to maintain a monolithic movement by employing two main devices. For one he implemented the deification of Lenin on grounds of which Stalin claimed infallibility for himself. For another he used the Comintern as a means of control over the national communist parties.

The cult of Leninism was carefully instituted. Against the wishes of Krupskaja, Lenin's widow, the dead man's body was embalmed. It was then put on display in the mausoleum which Stalin had erected in Lenin's honor. The religion of communism now had its saint - the demi-god Lenin.\(^{10}\) Along with the institutionalization of the Lenin cult, Stalin launched a campaign designed to prove that he and only he was the dead man's true disciple. This effort necessitated the revision of historic events.

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\(^9\)This view is expressed by Djilas, _op. cit._, p. 181.

On Stalin's orders history was rewritten. The new version of early Bolshevik history portrayed Stalin as the one chosen to carry on the mission of the master.\textsuperscript{11}

As the living disciple of the dead Lenin, Stalin's word became the ultimate truth. Stalin became infallible; the sole interpreter of Marxism - Leninism. He laid down the line of strategy and tactics in theory and practice for the entire movement. Deviationism on the left and right was not tolerated. The communists everywhere had to accept Stalin's policy line or suffer penalties of one sort or another. The least they could expect was expulsion from the respective communist party.

The Comintern was employed to safeguard the monolithic interpretation of theory and practice. The meetings of the Comintern organs were used to determine the policy line and the leadership of the entire movement. Due to the fact that this institution had ever since 1930 been firmly controlled by the Soviet Party, it served as a means to assure compliance to Stalin's interpretation of truth. Whenever deviationist tendencies were detected, Stalin threw his support to those who were supporting his version of the party line. When it was deemed

\textsuperscript{11}Eugene Lyons, Stalin, Czar of All Russians (Philadelphia: J. P. Lippincott Company, 1940), p. 151.
necessary a whole party was dissolved, as was the case with the Polish Communist Party.\footnote{Adam Ulam, Titoism and the Cominform (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952), p. 42.} Short of this, other national parties were purged of their leadership. Those who displaced the fallen leaders were communists trained by the Comintern in Moscow and regarded as loyal followers of the Stalinist regime. Stalin was thus able to keep his movement clear of potential threats to its monolithic unity.

In regard to the coming world revolution, Stalin proclaimed the doctrine of one single path to socialism. This doctrine asserted that all nations establishing socialism were to follow the path traveled by Soviet Russia. Proletarian revolutions everywhere were to follow the pattern established by the October Revolution.

The Problem of Diversity

As long as there existed only one communist state, deviationism within the communist movement had been prevented by Stalin's claim to infallibility and by the control exercised by the Comintern. With the emergence of communist nations in East Europe and Asia, communism took various forms. Conditions and circumstances in these countries differed widely from those encountered by Bolsheviks in Russia. These different conditions...
demanded corresponding responses. The methods and institutions developed in the U.S.S.R. were not necessarily applicable to the situation faced by communist regimes elsewhere. The communists in the East European People's Democracies were faced with the alternative of either following the Soviet example or to respond to the need of their respective countries. For some time after 1945 Stalin tolerated minor variations from the Soviet path.\textsuperscript{13} By 1947 he, however, believed that the reigns ought to be tightened and the monolithic unity retained.\textsuperscript{14}

In order to assure conformity to the Soviet approach to socialism within the Communist Camp, Stalin returned to his previous method of control. The Comintern which had been abolished at the end of World War II as a gesture to the allies was now reborn as the Cominform. This method of control, however, proved unsuccessful under the changed conditions. Its failure became explicit when the Cominform was unable to discipline the Yugoslav Communist Party.

The leadership of the Yugoslav Communist Party did not wish to subordinate its Party completely to the wishes and dictates of the Soviet Party. It was not


\textsuperscript{14}Ibid., p. 67.
willing to follow blindly the Soviet road to socialism. Rather, the Yugoslav leaders intended to develop institutions and employ methods beneficial primarily to the Balkan nation. This demand clashed with Stalin's doctrine of one single path to socialism. With the Yugoslav insistence on its own path to socialism, national communism was born. Within the rest of the Soviet bloc, uniformity was reasserted.

Yugoslav National Communism

As the term suggests, national communism contains elements of nationalism (other than Soviet) and communism. Nationalism, just as communism, is one of our modern day ideologies.\(^\text{15}\) That nationalism represents a force in today's world goes without saying. To pinpoint what a nation is, is much harder. Tribal and professional loyalties are easy enough to explain. People who have a common background always tend to regard themselves as a group. Why diverse groups of people who do not

\(^{15}\)Carl J. Friedrich regards ideologies as syndromes of action-oriented ideas which typically contain "a program and a strategy for its realization . . . Their key function is to unite or at least integrate organizations that are built up in response to them, whether movements, parties, interest groups, or other . . . An ideology is a set of literate ideas - a reasonably coherent body of notions concerning practical means of how to change and reform (or, indeed, how to preserve) a given body politic and society which it orders. It embodies a more or less elaborate criticism (or the criticism of such criticism) of what is wrong with the existing or antecedent society and its political order." ("Ideologies in Politics: A Theoretical Comment," \textit{Slavic Review}, Vol. XXIV December 1965 pp. 612-613.)
necessarily share a similar background feel as one is much harder to say.

The causes of nationality are not easily detectable, and it is therefore difficult to define nationality in relation to its causes. Whatever the causes of nationalism, its consequences can be seen more readily. Nationalism manifests itself when, for whatever reasons, a group of people is so conscious of its distinctiveness that it rejects being dominated by foreigners.¹⁶ In the case of communist Yugoslavia, nationalism found its manifestation in the occurrences of 1948.

For whatever reasons, the Yugoslav communist leadership resented Soviet domination and exploitation of its country. Tito and his associates insisted on directing their country's affairs without outside interference. They wished to develop those institutions and procedures most beneficial to Yugoslavia. In this sense the Yugoslav leaders were nationalists, but they were communists as well. They adhered to the doctrine of Marxism-Leninism and were loyal to the country of socialism, the U.S.S.R. Their loyalty, however, was split. The Yugoslav communists were devoted to the Soviet Union and its Party, but they also loved their country. When the

time came to choose between loyalty to the Soviet Union and love for their nation, the Yugoslav communist leadership chose the latter. Tito gave a classical utterance to his nationalism when he stated: "However much affection any of us may cherish toward the country of Socialism, the U.S.S.R., in no way should have less affection for his own country . . ."¹⁷

No matter how strong their nationalism, the Yugoslavs did not wish to break with the Soviet Union. Stalin's monistic conception of world communism under Soviet domination, however, remained inflexible. As the crisis between the leadership of the Communist Parties of the two nations deepened, the rank and file as well as the Yugoslav people rallied around its leadership. The Cominform resolution which expelled Yugoslavia from the communist world found the nation's leadership shocked but not unprepared.¹⁸

As time went on, Yugoslav communism became increasingly more national. For one, the Balkan state gained and retained complete independence from the U.S.S.R.


For another, it developed its own ideology, its own procedures and institutions which differed from those of other communist states.

Communist Internationalism - The Monistic and the Pluralistic Conception

Two interpretations of world communism developed after Yugoslavia's expulsion from the communist world: a monistic conception pronounced by Stalin and a pluralistic one advocated by the Yugoslav communists. Even though there existed now about a dozen communist states, Stalin's conception of inter-communist relations had remained essentially unchanged from his pre-war position. He regarded communism as one and indivisible. Communism was to be characterized by monolithic unity. The policy-line in theory and practice as pronounced by the one authorized person - Stalin himself - was to be followed by all communist parties. The world communist movement was to be united under the leadership and supervision of the most important and most advanced communist nation, namely the U.S.S.R. There was to be only one path leading to socialism - the Soviet one - which was to be traveled by all nations in their quest for socialism. Proletarian revolutions everywhere were to follow the Soviet pattern.
The Yugoslav communists, on the other hand, saw the communist movement as a house with many mansions. The ideology of Marxism would be common to the whole movement. Apart from this, however, each nation should develop its own brand of socialism and communism free from Soviet mastery. In short, each communist country, according to the Yugoslav conception, should develop its own road to socialism. This pluralistic interpretation of world communism represented an ever present threat to Stalin's monistic and centralistic view.

As long as Stalin held the reins of government in the Kremlin, the response to the Yugoslav threat was conventional. He insisted that Yugoslavia be disregarded. Stalin pronounced that only the Soviet Union and the other Bloc countries were truly socialist and accused the Yugoslav Communist Party of bourgeois nationalism. Once Stalin had left the scene, a different and more flexible approach to the problem of inter-communist relations became possible.

The Post-Stalin Era

When Krushchev ascended to a leadership position, the policy of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. proved to be different than it had been under Stalin. Two main occurrences marked the beginning of a new era in inter-communist relations. The first was Mr. Krushchev's and
Mr. Bulganin's visit to Belgrade where the Soviet leaders tacitly accepted the Yugoslav doctrine of many roads to socialism. Following this visit to Belgrade, the Cominform was dissolved. The second event that rocked the communist world was Krushchev's secret speech at the Twentieth Party Congress in which he openly denounced the features of Stalinism.

What Krushchev opted for was a more realistic approach to inter-communist relations. He wanted to rid the communist world of some of the abuses of Stalinism. The Kremlin leader tended toward a more liberal Communist Bloc where each nation could, within limits, adopt a policy most suited to its conditions. It seems likely, however, that Krushchev never intended to grant to the so-called Soviet satellites independence on the model of Yugoslavia or Red China. Rather, he hoped that the leadership of the communist nations of Eastern Europe would subordinate themselves voluntarily to Soviet leadership. Although he was willing to grant each nation within the Camp equality of status, he did not necessarily plan to extend equality of function.  

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What the Kremlin leader expected to be a controlled thaw developed into an uncontrollable flood. The revolutions in Poland and Hungary were its manifestations. The Soviet intervention and the crushing of the Hungarian uprising seemed to mark the end of the liberal era in the field of inter-communist relations. Tito, as the spokesman of pluralism, bitterly criticized Soviet intervention in Hungary; as the communist, he reluctantly justified it.\footnote{For Tito's Pula Speech on November 11, 1956, see: National Communism and Popular Revolution in Eastern Europe, op. cit., pp. 516-541.}

Out of this period of relaxation and revolt evolved a new interpretation of inter-communist relations, which was made explicit at the Moscow Conference of Communist Parties in December, 1957. The statement of the Conference attempted to tighten control and to re-establish communist unity without returning to the previous dogmatic monistic interpretation of communist internationalism. Under the new policy, the communist nations of East Europe were granted some autonomy of decision but only within the voluntary solidarity of the Bloc. Common action of the Bloc was to be maintained, but a certain degree of policy differences was declared permissible so that national peculiarities could be taken into account. The boundaries of diversity were to be set by Moscow. Perhaps one could call this approach to
inter-communist relations laid down by the Moscow Conference one of pluralistic monism.

All communist states, with the exception of Yugoslavia, voluntarily accepted this new pattern of inter-communist relations. Following the proclamation of this new policy-line, Yugoslavia was again heavily attacked. The publication of the Program of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia did little to better the relationship between the Balkan nation and the Bloc countries. In the early sixties the relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union became again more cordial.

The pattern laid down by the Moscow Conference proved to work reasonably well until, in the early sixties, Rumania refused to accept its economic assignment within COMECON. Rumania asserted that, according to the Moscow resolution, it did not need to accept an assignment not beneficial to its national interests.

Today the Soviet Bloc is not characterized by complete unity. Within limits each nation goes its separate way. The communist parties of the East European states no longer doggedly accept the dictates of Moscow. Nevertheless, as far as broad foreign policy is concerned, the Soviet Bloc accepts the leadership of Moscow. Yugoslavia remained the only nation which once a "Soviet satellite" gained complete independence from Moscow. The policy-line of the Yugoslav communists, as well as the
Yugoslav reforms, might have had some impact upon the communist countries of the Bloc. The Yugoslav path of national communism proves that the existence of a communist nation completely independent from Soviet Russia is possible. Thus, Yugoslavia remains a challenge to the Soviet conception of pluralistic-monistic inter-communist relations.
CHAPTER II

THE EVOLUTION OF THE YUGOSLAV SYSTEM

The unique features of the Yugoslav system evolved after the nation's excommunication from the Communist Bloc in 1948. Before this time the communist government of Yugoslavia closely followed Stalinist doctrine and practices in the establishment of socialism in its country. In the immediate post-war years, many outside observers considered Yugoslavia Stalin's closest ally. In retrospect it is clear that conflict between the two Communist Parties existed even during the war years. Many features which later found their place in the Yugoslav ideology can be recognized in their embryonic form as early as the years following the War of Liberation.

The Soviet Yugoslav Conflict

Disagreements between the Yugoslav and the Soviet communist leadership extend back to the days of 1941. President Tito said in 1951 that "as early as that, the Soviet leaders revealed the tendency to steer our whole uprising . . . in a way that best suited the interests of the Soviet Union as a state and their Greater Russian policy." Yet, during the days of the uprising, Moscow

1Dedijer, op. cit., p. 256.
was for the Yugoslavs "not only a political and spiritual center but the realization of an abstract ideal - the 'classless society' - something that not only made their sacrifice and suffering easy and sweet, but that justified their very existence in their own eyes." The Yugoslavs considered at that time that all the divergencies between them and the Soviet Union were mere misconceptions on the part of their Soviet comrades which grew out of their lack of knowledge of conditions existing in Yugoslavia.

The differences that arose between the nations from 1945 to 1948 were mainly of political nature. Stalin later put the issues of the dispute in ideological terms. At the basis of the Soviet-Yugoslav frictions, however, a difference of conception regarding the relations between communist parties and states can be detected. Stalin's principle of socialism in one country as applied to the international sphere clashed with the Yugoslav view that "our first duty is to look after our own country." Stalin attempted to control the Yugoslav government and the Yugoslav Party by various economic and political measures. The Yugoslav communists,

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3Ibid., p. 10.
however, wished to maintain the nation's and the Party's independence and identity.

In the economic field the Soviet Union was not much interested in Yugoslavia's developing heavy industry nor in helping it to do so. Heavy industry was, however, in the Stalinist view, the basis for the industrialization of a country and for the development of socialist relations. The Yugoslavs who at that time adhered to this view proclaimed a far reaching industrialization program of their own.

Friction between the two governments also arose over the establishment of mixed companies which had been instituted in most of the other Soviet Bloc countries. The controlling interest in these companies was usually Soviet while the recipient of the "aid" put forth the bulk of the capital.\(^4\) When the Yugoslavs brought these matters to Stalin's attention, he usually conceded to their demands acknowledging reluctantly Yugoslavia's special status within the Bloc.

Serious friction between the governments of the two nations arose over the status of the Soviet "advisers," many of whom were connected with the Soviet secret police. These "advisers" did not approach the government or party leaders for the information they wished to gain, i.e.,

\(^4\)Dedijer, op. cit., p. 269.
they did not use the official channels of information but requested it from any official along the line. The Yugoslav leaders resented this snooping in their internal business and placed the offenders under supervision. With these and similar methods, the Yugoslav communists asserted their national integrity and independence. The Soviet leadership did not treat these assertions with much humor; more so because it realized that the other East European communists began to resent the special treatment and the concessions the Soviets made to the Yugoslavs.

Although these incidents formed much of the substantive material of the break, the final cause seems to have evolved around the ultimate organization of East Europe. The idea of consolidating the East European states into new entities is not a novel one. The otherwise economically and military non-viable states could by means of federation or confederation solve these and other problems.

During the years following the war, two federations were talked about in communist circles. One was to include Poland and Czechoslovakia; the other, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Rumania and Albania. The latter federation, in all likelihood, would have been led by the Yugoslav Communist Party due to the Party's strength and unity.

\textsuperscript{5}Ibid., p. 313.
as well as the prestige its leaders had gained throughout the area. In fact, Marshall Tito was at that time the second most prominent figure in the communist world and the only communist leader who could rival Stalin in "popularity."

Stalin realized that a federation between Bulgaria, Rumania, Albania and Yugoslavia under the latter's leadership could lead to a second center of gravity in the Communist Bloc. Due to his obsession for absolute unity, Stalin could not allow this to happen. To forestall the rise of the much dreaded policentrism, Stalin proposed - and his proposals were orders - an immediate federation between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria as well as the merging of the two Parties. The Bulgarian communist leadership had always faithfully followed Stalin's orders. By combining the two political organizations, Stalin would have succeeded in weakening the Yugoslav Party considerably. The Yugoslav communists realized this danger and rejected the proposal arguing that a federation between two established states and parties should be a slow process.  

Following the Yugoslav rejection of the proposal, Stalin ordered the withdrawal of all military advisers from the Balkan nation. Through this and similar

6Ibid., p. 328.
measures he hoped to pressure the Yugoslav communists into conforming to his wishes. Furthermore, by withdrawing his recognition of Tito, the Kremlin leader hoped to isolate the latter from his party and make possible a take-over by the pro-Stalinist wing. After these attempts failed Stalin decided to isolate Yugoslavia from the communist world by repudiating Tito and his followers. The expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Communist Bloc could only be effected on ideological grounds; in order to be deserving of excommunication, Tito had to be accused of heresy against fundamental doctrine.

The ideological as well as the political charges were brought against Yugoslavia in an exchange of letters between the Central Committees of the two Parties.\(^7\) The first Soviet letter, which was an answer to the Yugoslav note concerning the withdrawal of the Soviet advisers, was extraordinarily crude and commanding in tone. It began with the words: "We consider your answer untrue and, therefore, utterly unsatisfactory."\(^8\) Many of the ideological accusations hurled against Yugoslavia were fabricated.

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For one, the Yugoslav Communist Party (YCP) was charged with the absence of inner-party democracy as well as self-criticism. In addition the Soviet communists accused the Yugoslavs of co-opting rather than electing members into the Central Committee. Even if these charges were true, the Soviet Party could hardly be classified as a model of democracy. Co-option into the higher organs of the party apparatus had been perfected by Stalin himself.

Furthermore, the Soviet communists contended that the Yugoslav communist leadership had deprived the Party of its role as the leading force in Yugoslavia by merging it with the People's Front. This again did not coincide with the facts. The YCP never merged with any other party, as did the communist parties of Eastern Europe, nor was it dominated by the People's Front; rather, the opposite was true.

The Yugoslav leadership was further accused of reintroducing the capitalist order into the villages. Yet, Yugoslavia was at that time the communist country that had carried out the collectivization of agriculture to the furthest degree in Eastern Europe.

On top of all these accusations, the Soviet letter classified most of the Yugoslav leaders as dubious Marxists and attempted to threaten them into compliance by recalling the case of Trotsky.
One should not disdain to recall that Trotsky, when he intended to declare war on the A.-U.C.P. (B), also began by accusing the A.-U.C.P. (B), of decadence, of limited national spirit, of Great Power chauvinism . . . . Nevertheless, as is known, Trotsky himself was a degenerate and afterwards, once he had been proven for what he was, he openly joined the camp of the sworn enemies of the A.-U.C.P. (B) and the Soviet Union.

We imagine that the political career of Trotsky is sufficiently instructive.9

The Soviet charges were discussed in a Central Committee meeting of the YCP which rejected the Soviet letter and its accusations. In the words of Tito,10 it would have been contemptible to accept the letter because the accusations were untrue. He added: "We are entitled to speak on an equal footing with the Soviet Union." Furthermore, Tito was of the opinion that the charges had to be rejected because the Yugoslav people would not stand by a leadership that proved unworthy of the people's sacrifices during the War of Liberation. Again, he put his country above the Soviet Union when he stated:

Comrades, our revolution does not devour its children. The children of this revolution are honest . . . . No one has the right to love his country less than the Soviet Union. That is treason.11

9 Ibid.
10 Dedijer, op. cit., p. 242.
11 Ibid.
From Tito's comments it became obvious that Stalin could not build his monolithic empire with Yugoslavia. So that unity in the rest of the Bloc could be maintained, Yugoslavia had to be excluded from the communist world. To the Soviet Union the loss of Yugoslavia was bitter, but to Stalin it appeared to be the lesser of two evils. In the interest of a monolithic Soviet Bloc, the sacrifice was made.

The charges against Yugoslavia grew increasingly worse as the YCP refused to take the proper attitude toward Soviet criticism, i.e. to accept it. These accusations were the prelude to the nation's excommunication from the Cominform on June 28, 1948.

From 1948 Onward - Decentralization, The New Formula

For an initial period following the break with Moscow, the struggle for survival consumed all the energies of the Yugoslav government. The Yugoslav communist leadership needed the loyalty of the whole nation to overcome the crisis and to forego a coup within the Party. Another problem that had to be coped with was the extremely serious economic and financial situation that the country faced after the Soviet Union and the other Bloc countries withdrew aid and advisers in addition to canceling all trade agreements. The Yugoslav Communist
Party reacted to these difficulties with reforms designed to pacify the discontented non-communist element in the country. The regime also sought cooperation with the Western capitalist nations in order to overcome the nation's economic difficulties.

The years, 1948 and 1949, were a waiting period in which the Yugoslav communists hoped to be readmitted into the fold, while the Soviet communists still thought that their economic and military maneuvers might overthrow Tito and his followers. By 1950 the battle-lines were clearly drawn, and both factions knew that they would have to live with the rift in the communist world.

The reforms that had been and were to be instituted centered around the idea of decentralization. Ideologically, decentralization was justified by the Yugoslavs as a step further in the direction of the Marxian thesis predicting the withering away of the state. Yugoslavia proclaimed itself a leader in advancing the disappearance of government and thereby claimed a place ahead of the Soviet Union in terms of the stage of socialism achieved.12

Decentralization of the Party

The organization of the Yugoslav Communist Party was originally patterned after the Soviet counterpart with strong central control and direction. In the early 1950's the Yugoslav communists asserted that, if the state were to wither away, the Party had to do likewise. This meant a change in the position of the party membership and of the Party's task. It also meant the decentralization of its functions and of its administrative apparatus.

One of the first measures that were taken in this direction was the relaxation of democratic centralism. Furthermore, the special privileges of party members were abolished. The Yugoslav communists were reminded that their legal position was the same as that of other Yugoslav citizens.

Prior to the decentralization movement, membership in the Communist Party was termed a private and secret matter. The members of the Party were urged to play their roles incognito and be the eyes and ears of the regime in all phases of life. The effort of broadening the base of Yugoslavs who would play a role in the governing of the country did not support this concept of

the Party. The role of the party membership was now directed toward the task of educating and propagandizing the masses, i.e. it was to be active in backing Party and governmental programs to the broad public. A greater amount of autonomy was delegated to the grass root levels of the Party. The party apparatus was reduced considerably, and many of its functions were turned over to the Socialist Alliance.

To provide the Party with a new start, it was re­named the League of Communists of Yugoslavia in November, 1952. From 1948 to 1952 the Party's membership increased by 70 per cent.14

The delegation of various functions to the People's Front which were formerly carried out by the Party meant a greater reliance on this broader political organization, which was renamed the Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Yugoslavia. Mr. Edvard Kardelj15 defined the functions of the Socialist Alliance as follows:

1) It is becoming a mass public platform of socialist policy and thought, an organizational form of unhampered exchange of views upon a general socialist platform;

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2) It should be a political foundation for all state and social self-governing bodies; in extensive discussion and criticism these bodies will here be under the supervision of the masses;

3) It should be sufficiently broad in its political platform so as to enable the participation in it of every citizen who comports himself honorably towards the social community and accepts the general aims of socialism - regardless of ideological or other differences in opinion;

4) With its methods of work, it should function as an all-national parliament which is constantly in session, in which every well intended citizen may always advance his views, his proposals and his criticism on any question of socialist life.

Within this organization the communists were to maintain the leading positions. They were to influence and guide the Socialist Alliance as individuals rather than dominate it through their status as members of the Communist Party.

Although the Party's tasks had been changed and its organization decentralized so as to be in harmony with the ultimate withering away of the organization, it was maintained that the Party must retain its leading position in society as well as its purity and unity. These somewhat contradictory views resulted in confusion within the ranks of the Party. The party leadership decided to check this confusion by tightening party discipline and by putting a greater emphasis on democratic centralism.
Milovan Djilas, a leading communist, rejected this new tendency and set out to write a number of articles in *Borba*. These articles contained ideas which no other party leader had ever before publicly expressed. Djilas argued that the Party was no longer necessary in Yugoslavia. In addition he stated in his article dated December 6, 1953, that

... the goal of communism is too distant to be meaningful ... but that the goal today is the increasing rapid and painless progress of socialism and democracy through concrete, realizable goals and not goals like communism and things of that sort.\(^1\)

Furthermore, Djilas continued his attack against bureaucratism which was climaxed by a bitter and satirical article against the inner circles of party bureaucrats with obvious reference to a prominent Yugoslav communist.\(^2\)

Djilas' ideas, which did not coincide with the official party-line, added further confusion to the already confused rank and file. They had to be checked in order to maintain unity in the Party. Milovan Djilas was not willing to change his views and was stripped of his party posts. Later he resigned his party membership.


\(^{17}\)For the article see *Ibid.*, pp. 145-176.
After the Djilas affair party discipline received still greater emphasis. Moves were made to strengthen the Party's control over the economy and social institutions. This, however, was achieved through communists working through the unions, the Socialist Alliance and the government bodies rather than through direct control by the party apparatus. The communist power position remained intact although the Party had been decentralized.

**Decentralization in the economic and government spheres**

Decentralization in the economic sphere was first instituted in 1950 with the establishment of the workers' councils. The councils were elected in all enterprises by workers. In turn they set up the management board of three to eleven members. The management board acts as the executive committee of the workers' council and is responsible to it. The executive committee of the council, in turn, appoints the plant manager.

The workers' councils do much of the planning of the enterprise. Within the limits set down by law and the federal plan, these councils determine what is to be produced and how much; they set the prices and wages and determine the investment. They also have the authority to dispose of their net profit as they see fit. A certain degree of control is exercised over these bodies
through the individual communist who is a member of the workers' councils and through trade union organizations.

The various federal planning agencies, which until 1950 directed the Yugoslav economy, were progressively abolished until the Federal Planning Institute became little more than a data compiling agency. A federal plan still exists, but it has no binding authority. The government controls the planning of the workers' councils only so far as it fixes the "basic proportions" according to which each factor of production should be rewarded in wages, investments, etc. ¹⁸

The Fundamental Law of 1953 integrated the workers' councils into a comprehensive structure which was designed to give the "working organizations" representation on all levels of government. On the federal level this was accomplished by adding the Federal Council of Producers to the Federal Assembly. The membership of the Council of Nationalities was merged with the Federal Council and retained the latter's name. The Federal Council of Producers became the upper chamber of the Assembly. Comparable reorganization took place on all levels of government.

The Federal Council was composed of deputies elected by the citizens in the districts and towns on the basis

¹⁸Neal, op. cit., p. 128.
of universal and equal suffrage and of People's Deputies elected from amongst the members of the respective Republic Councils of the respective assemblies and of the respective bodies in the autonomous regions. The Federal Council of Producers was elected by means of a complicated electoral system in which the workers' councils elected representatives to the next higher body. Thus, the regional Producers' Councils sent representatives to Republic Councils, and these in turn elected the Federal Council of Producers. The deputies to the Council of Producers were elected as representatives of their economic units by the workers and employees of the economic enterprise and by members of agricultural cooperatives as well as by craftsmen and handi-craft workers. Each production group is represented in the Council of Producers in proportion to its contribution to total social product of the nation.

The organization of the Federal Assembly was changed considerably by the Constitution of 1963. On the federal level the Council of Producers was abolished and a pentacameral legislature was established. The Federal

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20 Ibid., Art. 28.

Assembly comprises the Federal Chamber

... as a chamber of delegates of the citizens in the communes and republics, the Economic Chamber, the Chamber of Education and Culture, the Chamber of Welfare and Health, and the Organizational-Political Chamber as chambers of delegates of the working people in the working communities.22

The election and composition of the Federal Chamber remained essentially the same. The chambers which represent working communities are elected by the Communal Assemblies. Elegibility for election to these chambers is determined by the Constitution.23

Reforms in local government

A series of laws since 1948 reorganized the local government in Yugoslavia and gave it increased autonomy. As instituted by the Fundamental Law, the People's Committees became the basic organs of state authority. They represented the highest organs of state authority in the municipality, town and district. Committees at the latter two levels were bicameral bodies, each composed of a General Council and a Council of Producers.

The Constitution of 1963 set down the commune as the basic social-political community. By the concept of the


23Ibid., Art. 168.
"commune" is understood "a specific self-government of an economically integrated territory. It indicates the process of consolidation of local communities."\(^{24}\) The Communal Assembly which constitutes the governing body of this unit is a bicameral organ comprised of the Communal Chamber and the Chamber of Working Communities. Members to the former are elected directly by the citizens of the commune; members to the latter are chosen by the working people engaged in working organizations, state organs, social-political organizations and associations by the farmer members of the cooperatives and other working organizations.\(^{25}\)

The communal governing bodies have become a major source of administrative control. They are the basic administrative units for police and security activities except, of course, the secret police. Investment has become more and more the responsibility of these bodies. Through their authority to levy taxes, the communal governing organs have some power to regulate the enterprises.

Again, the League of Communists exercises indirect, though adequate, control over the local governing bodies


through its individual members. However, the local level of government does exercise a considerable amount of authority and gives evidence of independent action.

Decentralization in agriculture

Decentralization was also carried out in the field of agriculture. After 1951 the regime openly conceded that the farmers were not satisfied with the collective system. When a reconciliation with the Soviet Union seemed out of the question, the Yugoslav regime needed the loyalty of this numerically most important segment of the population and thus had to make corresponding concessions. In 1951, following a crisis in agriculture, the government ushered in a more cautious policy. The regime first decided to dissolve the unprofitable collective farms, which affected about one-third of the Yugoslav farmers.\(^26\) The year, 1952, saw the further reduction of the collective farms; and by the spring of 1953 a government decree spelled out, for all practical purposes, the end of collectivization of agriculture in Yugoslavia.\(^27\) The government called the farmers to form cooperatives on a voluntary basis. The maximum of individual landholdings had been restricted to ten hectares

\(^{26}\)Neal, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 192.

\(^{27}\)The Law of March 28, 1953.
and that of family farms to fifteen hectares. Despite their very small landholdings which averaged three to four hectares the peasants preferred to strike out on their own. Within a year about 1,000 of the 6,904 collective farms were still in existence.28

Relaxation of the totalitarian features

After the Cominform break Yugoslavia was characterized by the doctrine and the practice of decentralization, as well as by a relaxation of the totalitarian features of the regime. The activities of the secret police were curbed as were its powers. Furthermore, legal guarantees for the accused were devised, and an increase in the independence of the courts became observable. Although all attempts to establish a multi-party system have come to naught, non-party candidates are allowed to run for office although they are seldom successful. The government has indicated its willingness to pursue a live-and-let-live policy toward the churches as long as the clergy keeps away from political matters. However, the regime has not altered its official policy of opposition to religion.

The Djilas affair showed the extent of this relaxation as well as its limits. The treatment Djilas

received for his "heretical" views was extremely mild when compared with that previously accorded to individuals for similar transgressions. After the publication of his articles in Borba, which included ideas out of harmony with the official party-line, Milovan Djilas was expelled from the Central Committee but was permitted to maintain his party membership which he later resigned. Only after he further antagonized the communist leadership by giving an interview to the New York Times, in which he advocated a two-party system and claimed that there existed no freedom of discussion in the Party, did he receive a suspended eighteen-month prison sentence. Djilas, however, did not cease to embarrass the regime and was finally made to serve a three-year sentence after criticizing Tito's stand concerning the Hungarian revolution in an article published in the New Leader. Had Milovan Djilas not dared his erstwhile comrades, he might have been permitted to lead a reasonably free life and might have been assigned a non-political position as was his former associate, Vladimir Dedijer.

The totalitarian aspects of the regime were reduced but not to the extent of bringing the state of freedom to par with that enjoyed by the citizens of the Western countries.
CHAPTER III
THE YUGOSLAV IDEOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

After Yugoslavia's excommunication from the Cominform, it became necessary for the Yugoslav communists to abolish those features of the system that were most obnoxious to the population in order to gain or maintain, if not its support at least its toleration. The serious economic and financial difficulties that Yugoslavia faced after its separation from the Communist Bloc made qualified cooperation with the Western nations necessary.

Due to the fact that in a communist system all important moves require ideological qualification, the Yugoslav policy had to be justified ideologically in accordance with Marxian, and to a certain extent, Leninist principles. The Yugoslav ideological framework had to explain the Yugoslav position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. It had to provide legitimization for the internal reforms as well as for the Yugoslav policy toward the Western capitalist nations.

The Yugoslav ideology is, as is the case with most modern socialist thought, deeply rooted in Marxism. This is true of historic analysis, ultimate goals, the method of reasoning and the concept of man. It involves such concepts as materialism, the law of capitalist development.
and the inevitability of the triumph of communism. In these factors the Yugoslav framework differs little from the Soviet model.

As far as the final goal of the League of Communists is concerned, the Draft Program . . . proceeds from the scientific premise that the final disappearance of capitalism and its vestiges from history is inevitable for society to undergo a revolutionary transfer to socialist relationships, to gradual and continual development of the latter toward higher forms until the achievement of Communism, as a form of relationship among people where, on the basis of highly developed productive forces every one works according to his ability and receives according to his needs. This historical evolution of society simultaneously is the final aim of the ideological, political and economic activity of Communists.

Yugoslav ideologues also incorporated into the new ideological framework theories advanced by Lenin; but, contrary to the Soviet case where Marxist theory and Leninist doctrine came to form a single doctrine - Marxism-Leninism, the Yugoslavs have incorporated into their theory only part of Lenin's teachings. Much of Lenin's contributions to Marxist theory were concerned with ways and means of establishing socialism in Russia. Some of these doctrines have been repudiated or recast in Belgrade. It is primarily in the realm of interpretation of the original Marxist text and of operational ______

theory that the Yugoslav ideology differs from its Soviet model.

The Pragmatic and Negative Character of Yugoslav Ideology

The new Yugoslav theories emerged slowly. As the hope for a detente with the Soviet Union decreased, the Yugoslavs had to build a workable system; workable without the powerful backing and approval of the Soviet Union. This new system had to be justified ideologically.

For a long time the Yugoslavs expressed what they were against, rather than what they were for. The necessity to find new approaches and the Yugoslav criticisms of Soviet theory and practice resulted in the development of a set of doctrine which in turn acted as the basis for new reforms. Given this development it is not surprising that the theoretical framework came to have a highly pragmatic character. The Program of the League of Communists declares to this effect:

Marxism is not a doctrine established forever or a system of dogmas. Marxism is a theory of the social process which develops through successive historic phases. Marxism therefore implies a creative application of the theory and its further development, primarily by drawing general conclusions from the practice of socialist development and through attainments of scientific thinking of mankind.\(^2\)

\(^2\)Yugoslavia's Way, op. cit., p. 133.
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²Yugoslavia's Way, op. cit., p. 133.
As justification for this opinion, the Program cites Lenin approvingly as follows:

We do not at all look on Marx's theory as something finished . . . We do not pretend that Marx or Marxists know the road to socialism in all its concrete aspects. This is nonsense. We know the direction of that road, and we know which class forces lead the way; but concretely, practically, only experience of millions will tell, when they get down to work.\(^3\)

Due to the pragmatic character of the ideology, the Yugoslav system is in constant flux. Although it is stated in the introduction to the Program of the League of Yugoslav Communists that this document is the foundation for future activity and struggle, it goes on to state that due to the fact that practice is regarded as the final judge of the correctness of theoretical propositions, the Yugoslavs will change those features that practice designates as obsolete or untenable.\(^4\)

The Yugoslav communists had always considered themselves true disciples of Marx and Lenin. The only explanation for their expulsion from the Communist Bloc was that Stalin himself had deviated from the true path of Marxist and Leninist theory and that the Yugoslavs were the true heirs of the "founding fathers" of scientific socialism. The next step the Yugoslav

\(^3\)Ibid.
\(^4\)Ibid., pp. xxi-xxii.
ideologues undertook was to determine where the Soviet errors lay, where the Soviet Party had deviated from the principles of Marx, and to rectify these errors in Yugoslavia.

The Yugoslav leaders acknowledge the debt of all socialist movements to the October Revolution. Yet, since that time and especially since the time of Lenin, the Soviet communists have strayed from the true path; bureaucratism and centralism were the two snares in which the Soviet Union became entangled. Whereas the early crises made the concentration of power in the hands of the state and the Party necessary, this concentration of power grew at an increasing tempo even though the situation had changed. Ultimately, it became institutionalized in the Soviet forms of bureaucratism and centralism. The state apparatus succumbed to self-aggrandizement, and the links with the working people were broken.

Connected with bureaucratism and stateism, so argue the Yugoslav communists, are tendencies toward ideological monopoly which attempt to turn Marxist thinking into a static list of dogmas and abstract verities accommodating the transient needs of one country.

The Yugoslav leadership argued that bureaucratism and stateism, which were perfected under Stalin, and the other evils that followed in their trail were contrary to
Marx's teachings. According to Marx, the power of the state is to be at its highest during the period following the revolution. However, according to the Yugoslav communists, Marx did not intend this period to last past the expropriation of the expropriators and the nationalization of the means of production. As soon as these things were accomplished, the state was to "wither away." Yet, Stalin insisted that the power of the state would increasingly grow in strength until there did not exist any hindering circumstances for the achievement of socialism and communism, both nationally and internationally. Simultaneously with the attainment of communism, so contended Stalin, the state would disappear. This, so believe the Yugoslavs, is a fatal departure from Marx's theory.

On and around this criticism and their insistence on independence and equality, both as a nation and a party, the Yugoslav communist theoreticians built an ideology which embodies certain unique characteristics.

Different Approaches to Socialism

The Yugoslav ideological framework had to justify, above all, the Yugoslav insistence that different roads to socialism were a valid deduction from Marxist and Leninist theory and that Stalin, in his quest for monolithic unity in theory and practice throughout the
The Yugoslav leadership, according to the Yugoslavs, have always been a hinderance to the advancement of communism. The correctness of an ideology or of certain forms of socialist construction, so the Yugoslav leaders hold, depend solely upon their vitality and upon verification by practice but not upon the approval of an international forum.

The Yugoslavs agree that, as long as there existed only one socialist nation, Soviet Russia, all other national communist parties had the responsibility to support this nation and its regime to the best of their ability. After the establishment of different socialist

5 Ibid., p. 140.
nations led by communist governments, however, the primary responsibility of the communist parties concerned was to be towards its own people and its specific strivings and needs, rather than toward the Soviet Union and its ambitions.6

The Yugoslav communists criticized and repudiated Stalin's doctrine of socialism in one country as applied to the international sphere. This doctrine was used to achieve and maintain ideological unity of action within the communist world by imposing Stalin's ideological interpretations upon other communist parties and by directing their actions in the best interest of the Soviet Union.

The Yugoslav leadership contends that in order to ensure the most successful development of any given country the communist party of the nation concerned must take into account the specific internal conditions of that country. Different practices will result in different nations. This, however, does not represent a contradiction to proletarian internationalism. In the words of President Tito,


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internationalism does not start where autonomy and independence end. Real revolutionary unity and socialist solidarity must be based on such a community of interests and views as arises from the full independence and responsibility of each party. Today, more than ever before, the international workers' movement needs such unity as does not conceal differences; but, on the contrary, recognized them. After all, total unity in the international workers' movement has never existed.

The goals of socialism, so argue the Belgrade theoreticians, are the same in every country. Yet, for a variety of reasons, various nations achieve them in different ways. The experience of the socialist forces in one country becomes the experience of the international workers' movement as a whole. Due to this fact the experiences of one country are shared with that of all other nations. This strengthens the socialist forces in the world and will influence each particular country in its further development toward socialism.

The Yugoslav concept of proletarian internationalism means solidarity between equal socialist nations each walking its own chosen path toward socialism. This interpretation is contrary to Stalin's conception of internationalism which required unity within the Communist Camp under the leadership of one party which was committed to the interest of one country, the Soviet Union.

7 Ibid.
The exchange of experience and the cooperation between the different communist parties can, so state the Yugoslavs, be carried out in both bi-lateral and multi-lateral agreements provided these agreements are always based upon full equality, with no imposition of attitudes and no interference in the internal affair of the parties concerned. This cooperation is to be in the interest of both peace and socialism.

Proletarian internationalism, as defined in the Program of the League of Yugoslav Communists, has three distinct yet interconnected meanings. First of all, it connotates the determination of the labor movement to develop in its respective countries a persistent struggle for socialism and the daily interest of the working people; to prepare for taking over power and to be ready for the construction of socialism in accordance with the interests of the working people of the world. Secondly, the principle implies the responsibility of the communist parties and governments to support the struggle for socialism in all other countries; and thirdly, when applied to Yugoslavia, the concept of proletarian internationalism demands the communists to work for the strengthening of the brotherhood amongst the Yugoslav peoples and to provide for their equality as well as their material and cultural progress.

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The Transition from Capitalism to Proletarian Socialism and Its Implications

The Yugoslavs accept Lenin's theory concerning the further development of capitalism during the imperialist phase. Yet, they maintain that the capitalist social system in its classical form belongs to the past. They argue that capitalist governments have, by interfering with the economy, changed the nature of capitalism. Social security, government control of business and labor unions are manifestations of this tendency.

The capitalist social system in its classic form belongs to the past. In the period of free competition, capitalism developed productive forces and techniques of production; but at the same time it created conditions and forces which in one way or another exerted a growing pressure upon it, sharpened its internal contradictions and demanded its change as a system.9

Today all forms of capitalism embody a number of socialist tendencies as well as socialist forms. Pure capitalism does not exist, nor can there be found pure socialism because, so the Yugoslavs argue, social systems do never appear in pure form.

Contemporary socialism is not and cannot be homogeneous. Vestiges of the old system intermingle and laws of commodity production operate in it. Certain contradictions and

9Ibid., p. 11.
The antagonisms of the last phase of capitalism are carried over into the first phase of the construction of the socialist society. 10

Due to the fact that capitalism embodies socialist tendencies and forms and socialism contains certain characteristics of capitalism, a peaceful transition from one social system to the other is under certain conditions feasible.

The working class has forged its way as the leading social force both in sharp revolutionary and anti-imperialist conflicts and in parliamentary and other relatively peaceful forms of struggle. While under certain conditions the working class through evolutionary action razes the old system to its foundations, under some other it is willing or compelled to compromise to accept mutual concessions to be content with reforms . . . 11

The working class will become in certain countries and under certain conditions the leading force in society by means of a relatively peaceful struggle . . . ensuring . . . the birth and growth of socialism. 12

The Yugoslav Communists thus repudiated the Soviet opinion that the transition from capitalism to socialism can only come about through a violent revolutionary struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. The Yugoslavs have justified their argument by citing various statements of Karl Marx, who also thought a

10 Ibid., p. 24.
11 Ibid., p. 36.
12 Ibid., p. 38.
peaceful transition from capitalism to socialism under certain circumstances possible, although not likely.

In Belgrade it is believed that although there exists a fundamental conflict between the two social systems, this conflict does not have to take the form of a violent struggle between nations.

In the present day attitude toward social and political events in the world, one cannot overlook the fact that the differences in social systems and ideological concepts are the result of an inevitable development of society, that they are an expression of already existing relations and, thus, represent the conditions for society's further progress. It is illusory then to consider that these differences may be solved by military means.\(^\text{13}\)

At this particular stage of historic development, wars between nations adhering to different ideologies are no longer inevitable. This does not, as the Yugoslavs contest, refute the Leninist thesis that imperialism gives birth to wars and crises but rather that the power and the role of the imperialist factors have weakened, especially when compared to the development of the socialist forces. Furthermore, in the days of nuclear weaponry, a war might prove to be the destruction of mankind and would thus be in the interest of neither system.

Peaceful coexistence

In order to avoid the disaster of a nuclear war, so the Yugoslavs insist, peaceful coexistence between all countries, regardless of their social system or ideology, becomes necessary. The principle of coexistence should not mean the

. . . living of peoples and states side by side, but rather . . . international relations based on completely new modern principles, enabling lively peaceful activities between states with different social systems.  

Hence, this policy is not identical with the traditional concept of neutralism. Neutralism, by keeping aloof, does not seek to reduce tensions in international affairs; whereas active cooperation is an idea of universalism opposed to all withdrawal into isolation.  

In the words of President Tito:

Only the policy of coexistence is by its very nature, although this is not always understood and active policy, it is a policy of active and constructive international cooperation with a view of finding ways and

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means for settling all outstanding international problems and eliminating the sources of international tensions. 16

Only active cooperation, so insists Edvard Kardelj, will make possible an accelerated economic development of the underdeveloped areas of the world. 17 Peaceful cooperation will thus reduce the gap between the rich and the poor countries and eliminate one of the major sources of strain and instability in economic and political international relations.

Furthermore, coexistence is also viewed as a policy which will hasten the change from capitalism to socialism.

There is no need for ideological wars now. Socialism needs no Napoleonic wars. The forces of socialism will grow quicker in as much as peace is strong and international tension is relaxed. For under these conditions the eyes of the people . . . will turn to the internal problems of their countries. The aggressive imperialist quarters . . . are weak today . . . There is no reason to doubt that their influence will continue to weaken side by side with the strengthening of political coexistence. 18

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The Yugoslav communists do not view the concept of active peaceful coexistence as a temporary phase in which one social system waits for the moment when it becomes strong enough to impose its will on other nations adhering to a different ideology. Therefore, peaceful coexistence is to be based on the respect of such principles as a nation's independence, its sovereignty, its equality and territorial integrity as well as on non-interference into its internal affairs. Furthermore, the right of a people to live and work according to its own precepts has to be recognized if peaceful coexistence is to succeed as a workable policy.

The principle of peaceful coexistence as perceived by the Yugoslavs has changed from one which espouses non-interference as interpreted during the era of Lenin and Stalin to actual peaceful cooperation between nations of different social systems.

Peaceful coexistence and power blocs

Peace can only be attained, according to the Yugoslavs, through peaceful coexistence based upon the principles mentioned above. The various power groupings, commonly known as blocs, do not respect these principles.

in their internal structure and organization. All blocs, so the Yugoslav communists contend, inescapably rest on centralism and subjugation of the weaker to the stronger and the smaller to the larger. A bloc stands for a system of force signifying subordination to the mechanism determined and actuated by the power heading the bloc. For one, therefore, blocs are rejected because they do not grant to the member nation full equality and independence.

For another, military blocs also represent a threat to peace. Blocs, although pronouncing the necessity for peace, accelerate their preparations of war materials and destructive weaponry and are therefore a latent but ever present force toward world destruction. Blocs desire peace and prepare for war and thus prove the ancient principle of si vis pacem para bellum to be the underlying principle of bloc policies even in the days of nuclear weaponry.

According to the Yugoslavs, agreements such as the ban on nuclear weapons represent an important contribution to world peace. Unfortunately, such treaties attempt to cure symptoms rather than causes viz. the various power groupings. The way to achieve lasting

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peace, so the Yugoslavs contend, will lead from the destruction of the power blocs to active peaceful coexistence between peoples.

Not only do military blocs threaten world peace, but the economic groupings which have emerged in Western Europe and in the communist orbit perpetuate in the same direction. The Yugoslavs are well in favor of economic cooperation as long as the regional economic organizations will be capable and willing to contribute to the process of integration of the world economy and to the mutual assistance of nations in the coordinated planned development of their productive forces. Due to the enactment of discriminatory measures, which resulted in increasingly closed markets, the economic regional organizations have not advanced in the direction. Instead, they have spread beyond their criterion of regionalism and complimentary economy toward political power groupings on the basis of ideological similarity. These organizations have become a tool for economic struggle against other countries.

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Non-alignment

Based on the opinion that peace can only be attained through active cooperation and that power groupings are incongruent with this policy, the Yugoslavs champion a policy of non-alignment. The Yugoslav leaders have, amongst others, attempted to loosely organize all those nations which regard active peaceful cooperation a pre-condition for a lasting peace and which are not aligned with any of the power blocs. These countries wish to act as a peace-promoting force in international politics. They are, however, not organized nor formally aligned to one another as to not represent a third bloc. Miso Pavicevic, the permanent representative of Yugoslavia to the United Nations, states to this effect:

I am in full agreement . . . that there is no 'neutral' bloc. The non-aligned countries do not intend . . . to create a bloc of their own for the simple reason that they are against blocs in general and that they believe that the creation of a new bloc . . . could only increase threats to the peace, which are already disturbing enough and which are the consequence of conflicts and actions of the two existing blocs.\(^3\)

President Tito agrees that the non-aligned nations represent a third force in world politics if one understands

by a "third force" all those nations which, "irrespective of where they are located, desire a lasting affirmation of the policy of peaceful coexistence of states regardless of all differences in their ideologies and social systems."\textsuperscript{24}

The aim of the policy of the non-aligned nations, according to the Yugoslav leadership, is the peace and development of the world community. This policy is to represent a creative force in world affairs. It stresses the progressive transformation of the world and international relations on the basis of equality of all nations and on democratic universal international cooperation.\textsuperscript{25}

It should be noted that the Yugoslav insistence of active peaceful coexistence and non-alignment is widely of pragmatic nature. Expelled from the Communist Bloc in 1948 and unable to join the capitalist power groupings due to ideological conceptions and political considerations, the Yugoslav leadership had to attempt to walk the small path between the two power blocs accepting favors from both while being dependent on neither. This


fact is also recognized in Yugoslavia. In 1959 Mr. Kozarac writes:

The past decade has adequately shown that this (policy) has been no sheer platonic determination on Yugoslavia's part, but a most resolute struggle for national survival, in which the principles of consistent anti-bloc policy have definitely triumphed.  

The Role of the State

The Yugoslav conception of the role of the state represents a reinterpretation of the Stalinist concept. Stalin insisted that the state increase its power during the socialist phase of development and only diminish in authority after communism was attained. In the Soviet Union the increasing power of the state apparatus had led to the emergence of such tendencies of bureaucratism and centralism which became increasingly institutionalized during the Stalinist period. This development, contend the Yugoslav ideologues, represents a deviation from Marxist theory as expressed in Anti-Duehring in which Fredrich Engels states:

The first act by virtue of which the state really constitutes itself the representative of the whole of society - the taking possession of the means of production . . . this is at the same time its last independent action as a state. States' interference in social relations becomes . . .

26 Kozarac, op. cit., p. 3.
superfluous and then withers away by itself. The government of persons is replaced by the administration of things and by the management of the processes of production. The state is not 'abolished.' It withers away.27

In connection with Engels' statement on the withering away of the state, the Yugoslavs agree that the state immediately following the revolution is an indispensable force for the establishment of socialism. The Program of the League of Communists states this:

In the transition period, therefore, the state should be an instrument of liberation of the socialist forces from capitalism; an instrument of protection of their free development in economic conditions of socialization of the means of production; and an instrument of democratically organizing and politically and economically strengthening these socialist forces.28

Once the initial period is passed the state must, so argue the Yugoslavs, diminish its function even though the class struggle has not completely ceased. Milovan Djilas, who was later expelled from the Party due to his ideological view which in the mid-fifties came to differ substantially from that of the Party's membership, appears to voice the party line in this instance. He states that

... the bourgeois is in every respect a vestige of the former class, and in the big cities even the petty bourgeoisie is gone. Continuing the struggle against the bourgeois reactionaries exclusively on a theoretical basis must now deviate into bureaucratism...

The Yugoslav communists thus repudiated the Stalinist doctrine that the class struggle becomes sharper the closer a nation approaches socialism.

Under socialism "the form of the State has to be modified to such an extent that the State becomes 'absorbed by the State,' that it alienates and socializes the functions gradually and definitely." The state must disappear even while the productive forces are still rather backward and the material conditions for full socialism have not yet been reached. In effect, the Yugoslavs do not consider any state socialist unless its power is diminishing. However, while being in the process of withering away, the state exists in its essential elements and does play a certain indispensable role in society.

During the era of socialist construction, two tendencies have to be avoided. On one hand the tendency to underestimate the role of the state by putting the

29Djilas, Anatomy of a Moral ..., op. cit., p. 113.

individual interest above that of the general population has to be fought. On the other hand the tendency to deny the existence of the personal interest by substituting for general property state property and for free social relations administrative relations and for socialist development government authority has to be avoided also because this tendency will lead to the emergence of etatism and bureaucratism.  

In the Yugoslav conception the dictatorship of the proletariat ceases to be an expression of force after the socialization of the means of production has taken place. It becomes a phase of socialist development in which the working class represents the leading force in the social and political system.

By the dictatorship of the proletariat, we do not mean an external form of state or a method of organization of the political system during the period from capitalism to socialism, and later to communism, but social or rather class-political substance of such a government and political system where the undisputed leading role belongs to the working class.

During the period of socialist construction, the state is to wither away. It is to appear less and less as an instrument of force and more and more as an instrument of social self-management. This disappearance


of the state, which is depicted as a slow and evolutionary process, is to be achieved through the de-etatization of the state. "It begins," stated Milovan Djilas in 1951,

where the real strength of the state is to be found, in the national economy, in its management, in the right which the state has assumed to decide exclusively, how to distribute the product of social labor. 33

In accordance with these conceptions, the Yugoslav state has to a degree been divested from management and direct control in the fields of economy, social affairs, education, and government.

The doctrine and the practice of decentralization of administration and government authority have been justified by the Marxist concept of the withering away of the state. The Yugoslavs hold that they did not only interpret Marx correctly but that they, through their practice of decentralization, came closer in advancing socialism than any other nation including the Soviet Union.

Ownership of the Means of Production

Socialist theory holds that the transformation of society is impossible without a radical change in social relations, especially in those relations pertaining to production. The socialization of the means of production

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the state has to assume ownership, management and control
over the socialized economy.

... keeping in mind that socialism cannot
be built in an industrially backward country
such as ours ... without creating the
material conditions for it, we took the
means of production into our hands and be­
gan creating the conditions for the victory
of socialism in our country.34

Professor Radomir Lukic35 argues that it should theore­
tically be possible to retain a system of state ownership,
control and management and yet achieve economic demo­
cracy; economic democracy being defined as "an economic
system, i.e., a system of property over the means of
production in which the economic power is enjoyed by the
people, viz., by the majority and not by the minority."
Economic democracy under state control should be possible
because a state that is organized on a democratic basis
should also be able to exercise its economic power in a
fashion as to express the will of the people.

However, so argue the Yugoslavs, great economic
power vested in the state leads to an ever increasing
administrative apparatus and to the bureaucratization of
the state organs. This tendency is said to have been

34Josip Broz Tito, Workers Manage their Own Factories,
Speech delivered before the Yugoslav Federal Assembly,

35Radomir Lukic, "Economic Democracy," Review of
amply manifested in the Soviet Union during the Stalin era and thereafter. Ultimately, the bureaucrats will develop the distinct features and interests of a new class - the bureaucracy.

The control over the economy by the bureaucracy has created a form of state capitalism where the bureaucracy administers and distributes the surplus value in a way as to enhance its own position and interests. The position of the producer has, in effect, become similar as under capitalism where surplus value was appropriated in accordance with the interests of the capitalist minority.

Under such a system the socialization of the means of production does not constitute the first step toward making man an independent and creative worker and master over his own fate in a democratic community of toilers but left him a hired laborer, not of the individual capitalist but of the administrative class. This, so argue the Yugoslavs, is contrary to socialist theory and Marxist doctrine.

In order to avoid the danger of state capitalism, the control over the means of production cannot be left exclusively to the state but must be vested, within certain limits, in the workers themselves.

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By turning over the factories, mines, etc., to the workers to manage, we will make it impossible for an infectious disease to take hold there, a disease bearing the name of bureaucracy. This disease is easily and rapidly carried over from bourgeois society, and it is dangerous in the transition period . . . Bureaucracy is among the biggest enemies of socialism precisely because . . . people are not conscious of it in the beginning. It would be erroneous to think that bureaucracy has not taken roots in our country, too.37

The problem of a society based on self-management is the avoidance of the reemergence of private ownership under the guise of local collective ownership on one hand and the danger of establishing a de facto pattern of state capitalism on the other. To solve this problem a definite amount of economic power is to be given to the workers' councils which are to a great extent able to plan their production and to appropriate surplus value. The state, however, exercises its regulatory powers over the workers' councils at various levels.38 Under this system of direct democracy, the economic plan ceases to have binding authority and becomes a guiding measure and an overall coordinating mechanism of the national economy within a market situation.

In the economic system of Yugoslavia and in accordance with the new relations in production and distribution, all socialist

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37Tito, Workers Manage Factories, op. cit., p. 36.
forces - from the individual and working collective to society as a whole - participate directly in the distribution and dispose independently of that part of the product which belongs to them by law and social plan, depending upon the results of the work and operations of the economic organization. 39

According to Professor Jovan Dordevic, 40 the difference between state capitalism and the system of socialist property and producers' self-management lies in the relationship of the producer toward the means of production, the management of these means and the products of social labor.

This system of social and economic self-management is held to have two major advantages. First, the state has, by divesting itself from some control over the economy and by diminishing the state apparatus, taken a step further toward its disappearance. Secondly, it was argued that the system should reap practical economic results.

The Yugoslav formula of the management of the production to the workers resembles syndicalist and guild socialist principles rather than those of Marx and Lenin. Whatever the origin of the formula, it was conceived of by criticism of the state capitalist system of the


U.S.S.R. and was justified by Marxist theory. "After all," in the words of President Tito, "we are not using any kind of stereotype but are rather being governed by the science of Marxism and are going our own way . . . ."41

The Role of the Party

In accordance with the general decentralization of the functions of the state and with the establishment of social self-management, the role of the Party had also to be changed to a certain degree. Milovan Djilas did not appear to contradict the party-line when he stated in 1953:

Under present conditions of social property, every reinforcement of the role of political movements . . . leads to delay and exploitation. The times require instead a weakening of his role . . . especially in our country, under socialism.42

In a society organized on the basis of social self-administration, an extension of the power of the Party would not only be unnecessary, so argue the Yugoslav leaders, but also represent a dangerous obstacle to the growth of self-management. The decline in the political role of the League of Communists is forecast as a lengthy process which will gain momentum as the forces of socialist

41 Tito, Workers Manage Factories, op. cit., p. 11.
42 Djilas, Anatomy of a Moral . . ., op. cit., p. 88.
democracy become stronger, develop and expand. This regress of political power of the League will proceed parallel to the decreasing social antagonisms and conflicts.\textsuperscript{43}

Under these circumstances the tasks of the communists and their organization have changed considerably. While once their work was required to center on the state administration on organizing and operating the state organs, now with the strengthening of socialist relations these tendencies would lead to the bureaucratization of both the state and the party. It became, therefore, necessary to separate the tasks of the Party from that of the state and its administration.

The League of Communists should not perform tasks which should be performed by other bodies, neglect their principle task which is to be abreast of general trends, to give impetus to the practice of self-administration rights of the working people and to do their utmost to that end by political and ideological means.\textsuperscript{44}

Where the Party was once the eyes and ears of the regime, the sole arbitrator of what constituted right or wrong,

\textsuperscript{43}For examples see Yugoslavia's Way, op. cit., pp. 122, 165, 167, 235.

the judge of trends, schools and styles in science and art; the League today is to be less and less a factor of authority and to become more and more a factor of forming and developing the socialist consciousness of the working masses. The League has become the educator of the people.

The Yugoslavs reject the idea that the elite party represents the whole proletariat but emphasize that the whole nation must judge what constitutes happiness for it. The Party is to speak through the working class rather than for it. Rather than playing the leading role in society it is to play one of the leading roles maintaining, however, indirect influence over the other institutions.

Nonetheless, the Yugoslav leadership regards the League of Communists as the vanguard of the working people. The Party embodies those working people who are embued with social consciousness. It is the task of these chosen individuals and of the Party as an organization to transfer this consciousness through education upon the working masses. The communists as individuals and as an organization are, through their training and experience, able to perceive and register various phenomena. They are to evaluate, relying as far as

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possible upon their practical work and the scientific analyses provided by various institutions. Accordingly, the communists will formulate decisions and guide the working people toward the desired goals.46

According to the principles of decentralization, the communists should act more and more as individuals influencing the administration in various fields of Yugoslav life rather than an organization. The individual member of the communist organizations is to become, within the framework of social self-administration, a person who takes an independent attitude toward concrete problems within the field of his activity. At the same time he bears full responsibility for his attitude and its implementation. Hence, the Yugoslavs have attempted to reduce the direct influence of the League of Communists in various fields such as governmental, social, educational and others and have substituted for it the influence and persuasion of the individual communist. In addition the League of Communists has reduced its professional staff and delegated a greater amount of power and responsibility to the republican and grass-root levels of the organization.

Notwithstanding these changes the doctrine of democratic centralism remains as the base of the

46 Rankovic, op. cit., p. 119.
League's internal life and work. Veljko Vlahovic states that the

... abandonment of the principle of democratic centralism in the League of Communists would mean breaking it up into various factions guided by diverse interests and conceptions springing mainly from contradictions in socialist development. In effect, this would amount to the liquidation of the League of Communists and consequently to the surrender of socialist social development to blind forces.

However, this unity of action and ideology is not to be achieved by pronouncements from the highest ranks of the League but rather through democratic battles of ideas and constructive criticism which should not only point out the negative features but also guide toward and stimulate what is progressive and positive in any given state of affairs. In addition the leadership of the League is responsible to its membership for its decisions and its work as it is responsible to the whole people. Furthermore, the introduction of the rotation system and the principle of limited re-election point toward the increasing democratization of the Party.

Notwithstanding these changes hopes that the Party might decrease its power immediately and to a considerably

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greater extent have not been fulfilled. In addition any aspiration that other parties might be allowed to express their political opinions has come to naught. The League of Communists and the Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Yugoslavia, in which the communists play a decisive and guiding role, remain the only two organizations through which the political opinions and aspirations of the people can be expressed.

Agricultural Aspects in Yugoslavia

Pragmatic considerations can be regarded as the key factor for the change in Yugoslav ideology regarding agriculture. Prior to 1954 collectivization in agriculture was regarded as prerequisite for the achievements of socialism in the country. This was exemplified by the collectivization drive the Yugoslav government undertook from 1945 to 1950. During this period the peasants were forced by various measures such as financial policy and artificially low food prices to join Peasant Work Cooperatives, a collective farm organization closely resembling the Soviet kolchoz pattern.

By 1950 it became apparent that the forced collectivization of agriculture had been an economic failure. Approximately one-third of the collective farms reaped profits, another third broke even and the rest were unprofitable. Groping for new formulas everywhere
and recognizing the necessity for the support of that part of the population engaged in agriculture, the Yugoslav leadership decided to abandon the collectivization of agriculture at all cost and to set out on a new road.

Instead of forcing the private peasants in collective farms, the Yugoslav government advocated cooperatives of a general type where the farmers maintain ownership over their land as well as over the means of production.

... the organization of this cooperative farm and the mode of operation coordinates the deep seated ownership mentality of the Yugoslav peasant with the gradual introduction of socialist elements in agriculture. 48

Discrimination against the private peasant has subsided, and his status has been recognized. Furthermore, the government advocates institutionalized cooperation between the private peasants and the general cooperatives.

Private ownership in agriculture and the concept of socialism are not regarded as contradictory during the present stage of Yugoslav development. The land holdings have been limited to a maximum of ten to fifteen hectares depending on whether the land is tilled by an individual farmer or by a peasant family. In reality the private plots average four to five hectares only. This size

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plot can be cultivated by the individual peasant family without making the employment of additional labor power necessary. Hence, according to the Yugoslavs, exploitation of man by man has been abolished in the agricultural sphere. This is regarded as an important step toward the establishment of socialist relations in agriculture.

Considering that land holdings in Yugoslavia are almost exclusively small or medium sized, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia believes that the process of socialization of land will not consist in a forced general nationalization of similar means but primarily in socialization of agricultural production based on increasingly stronger forces of production in the economy and especially in agriculture; in gradual socialist transformation of the village; in uniting the peasants through cooperatives or in cooperation of the peasants with the social sector of agricultural production.\(^4^9\)

This policy, however, should not be regarded as the ultimate solution.

The general type of peasant cooperative . . . presented a kind of practical school in which the cooperative consciousness of the peasant was fostered. Their function would cease once this consciousness reached a certain level and be integrated into a more advanced cooperative organization . . . \(^5^0\)

The Yugoslav concept regarding the achievement of socialism in the villages has been termed socialism by osmosis.\(^5^1\) According to this concept the Yugoslavs

\(^4^9\) *Yugoslavia’s Way, op. cit.*, p. 130.

\(^5^0\) *Rasic, op. cit.*, p. 35.

proceed with socialism in the economy while allowing the peasants to maintain the ownership of their land. As socialism develops, so the Yugoslav ideologues hope, the whole country will be permeated by the socialist spirit, and the peasants will ultimately lose their individualistic outlook and accept cooperatives of some sort.

It should be noted that the Yugoslav government is not satisfied with the existing situation in agriculture. The small privately owned plots do not lend themselves to the use of technological innovation. The use of modern machinery on land holdings of such size is economically inefficient. Furthermore, the small plots do not produce enough foodstuffs over and above the need of the individual peasant so as to sustain the needed food supplies for the population as a whole. In addition too many people who could be used in other fields of the economy are tied down in agricultural production. The cooperatives and the cooperation between the private peasants and the social sector of agriculture have not, up to now, been able to solve the existing problem. Ideologically committed to keep the capitalist element from reoccurring in the agricultural sphere and being confronted with the failure of collectivization, the Yugoslavs are groping for novel paths to solve their agricultural predicament.
The Nationality Question and Federalism

Yugoslavia is a country composed of various nationalities and national minorities who differ from one another in language, cultural and historical background, religious beliefs and economic development. The nationality question has constituted a major problem ever since the formation of Yugoslavia as a nation.

"Old Yugoslavia" was organized as a unitary state dominated by the Serb nationality. The peoples from the former Austro-Hungarian Empire as well as the non-Slav minorities had little if any say in the government of the country.\textsuperscript{52} Serbian hegemony, the denial of autonomy to the other peoples as well as the suppression of all opposition to the regime, left the South Slavs with hatred and disgust for a centralized unitary state. These factors in addition to the atrocities that were committed between the nationalities during the war made a return to a unitary form of government impossible if Yugoslavia was ever to emerge as a viable nation.

In order to solve the nationality problem, "new Yugoslavia" was proclaimed a federal state comprised of six socialist republics, each of which covers the territory inhabited by one or more of the Yugoslav nationalities and is founded on the principle of nationality.

\textsuperscript{52}Muriel Heppek and Frank B. Singleton, Yugoslav (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961), p. 156.
Unity of Yugoslavia is possible only on the basis of national development and full equality of the Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians and Montenegrins, as well as the national minorities. For this reason socialist Yugoslavia was born a federal state of equal peoples. It could not have been created otherwise.53

In order to ensure the free development of the minorities, two autonomous regions were organized in the Socialist Republic of Serbia. Unity of the Yugoslav peoples, according to President Tito, does not mean the elimination of the nationalities, their heritage and custom and the establishment of a single Yugoslav nation but rather a "new type of social community in which the common interests of all nationalities find expression."54

All nationalities and national minorities are accorded all citizens' rights; they are guaranteed equal political as well as cultural rights. The minorities enjoy the right to cultural development and the free use of their language. In some ways, however, the Yugoslav policy exceeds these "classic" rights of minorities. Real equality amongst people, so contend the Yugoslavs in accordance with Marx's teachings, must also include economic equality. In order to achieve this equality, economic aid is offered by the more developed

54Tito, Practice and Theory of Socialist Development in Yugoslavia, op. cit., p. 36.
parts of the country - through the Federation - to the less-developed ones. This effects, to a large extent, the minorities who occupy the least-developed areas of the country.

Each of the Socialist Republics enjoys cultural autonomy and the right to determine its internal affairs unless otherwise provided for by the Constitution. The Constitution of 1963 states:

The working people of the republic shall exercise social self-government, regulate social relations, determine the course of economic development and of the development of the social services . . . and discharge all social affairs of common concern for the political, economic and cultural life and social development in the republic, with the exception of the affairs determined by the Constitution, to be the rights and duties of the Federation.\(^55\)

Especially after the decentralization of the functions of the state, federalism has emerged in Yugoslavia as a system where duties and rights are divided between the central government and the governments of the republics. The federal system has to a great extent solved the nationality problem by guaranteeing to the republics and autonomous regions, which are founded on the basis of nationality, the right to cultural self-determination. Due to the establishment of the federal

system no nationality has been able to dominate the nation, and the hatred between the Yugoslav people has decreased considerably.

Yugoslavia's nationality problem was faced by the Soviet Union on a larger scale. Both multi-national states sought to solve it by similar constitutional means; in both cases federalism was used as a solution. However, the Yugoslavs criticize the Soviet conception of federalism and the harsh treatment of the nationalities during the Stalin era. The nationalities in the Soviet Union had, contend the Yugoslavs, little if any of the cultural autonomy guaranteed by the Constitution. Instead, Stalin's policy of russification attempted to force the nationalities to conform to the Great Russian tradition and to learn the Russian language. Even worse various nationalities were destroyed by uprooting them from their territories. This cruel treatment of the nationalities and the policy of Great Russian chauvinism, so argue the Yugoslavs, were not in the spirit of Marx's and Lenin's teachings but were similar to the Serbian hegemony during the bourgeois period of Yugoslavia's development.

Although the establishment of federalism in Yugoslavia has solved various problems, it has not been, especially after the decentralization of the state's functions, an unmixed blessing. Here and there particularism has raised its head. Regions and republics are concerned with their own well being rather than with that of the entire nation. The industrialized areas do not feel much responsibility for the industrialization of the lesser-developed regions, and they resent the fact that some of their capital is used to further the development of these areas. Finally, dislike and hatred between the various groups still linger on.

Yugoslavia today does not present a picture of national unity but rather a country with various centers of gravity each more concerned with its own powers and rights while disregarding to a certain extent the needs and rights of other areas. In this respect Yugoslavia appears today as the Communist Camp en miniature where poli-centrism proves to be an obstacle to further unity. These tendencies amongst the Yugoslav peoples, so hope the communists, will decline with the further development of socialist consciousness.

Socialist Democracy

To the Yugoslavs the decentralization of the functions of the state also involves democracy. The
withering away of the state must be concerned to some degree with freedom and human rights. Djilas did not seem to be in opposition to the Party's official view when he wrote:

A free socialist economy calls for an appropriate form; socialist democracy . . . The task (of deciding how and where means should be spent) belongs to the representatives of those who have created the means. Discussion and controversy is inevitable. Other conflicts arise as well . . . This is what is called socialist democracy; free and open discussion within the framework of socialist forces.57

Although freedom and human rights are necessary for realization of socialist democracy, this type of democracy differs from bourgeois democracy. While it takes from the latter those achievements that are positive and lasting in the field of individual rights and those organizational political forms which remain valid under socialism, it adapts itself to the rights, interests and needs of the free activities of the forces and factors of the social and economic movement of socialism.58 Socialist democracy, contend the Yugoslavs, is direct or mass democracy where workers manage their own factories, where working people manage the basic units of society - the communes - and where interested citizens and

57Djilas, Anatomy of a Moral . . ., op. cit., p. 49.
organizations take part in the management of social
organizations. Bourgeois democracy, on the other hand,
is said to be both in theory and in practice indirect
democracy where power is wielded by the elite via the
party leadership. Socialist democracy will develop into
a "democracy of all and for all, a complete system of
free, social government.\(^5\) Professor Dordevic defines
socialist democracy as:

\[\ldots\text{ a political system in which, first, the}
\text{working people play the decisive role in the}
determination of policy; second, this decisive
role of the working people is assured by a
system of political, socio-economic and indi-
vidual rights such as not only to allow but
also organize self-government by the people
and the rights of individuals at all levels;}
third, political and other decisions adopted
 correspond to the interests and aspirations
of the socialist community. In addition,
there should be added a fourth condition;
those who work \(\ldots\) not only determine
policy but to the greatest possible extent
themselves obligarily put it into execution.\(^6\)

In connection with the conception that individual
rights are necessary in a socialist democracy, the
Constitution of the Federal People's Republic of Yugo-
slavia guarantees amongst others freedom of the press
and freedom of speech and of public expression. These
freedoms are guaranteed only as long as they are not

\(^5\)\text{Ibid., p. 162.}

\(^6\)\text{Jovan Djordjevic, "Some Principles of Socialist}
\text{Democracy in Yugoslavia," New Yugoslav Law, No. 3-4}
\text{(July-December, 1952), p. 19.}
used "by anyone to overthrow the foundations of the socialist democratic order . . ."

Freedom of speech and public expression are only possible to a limited degree. The Djilas affair is a clear example of how far this freedom may be carried and what represents an overthrow of the socialist foundations of the country.

Milovan Djilas' advocacy of a multi-party system represented an attack on the socialist foundations of Yugoslavia. The institution of a multi-party system, so insisted Edvard Kardelj, would inevitably destroy the socialist foundation of Yugoslavia as well as the nation's independence. In the event that Yugoslavia adopted a multi-party system, it is questionable that truly national parties would emerge. Probably most parties would be ethnic (Serb, Croat, or Slovene) as they were before World War II. In this case the smoldering hatred between the ethnic groups might make a workable government impossible. Furthermore, the bourgeois element might again emerge and destroy the foundations of the socialist state. Given the premises that parties reflect different economic interests, Yugoslavia does not need more than one party, so the

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communists believe, because there is no fundamental difference in the economic interests.

The freedom of expression is limited

... in a way that criticism against Stalinism is permitted, not, however, against Communism as such. Whoever crosses the boundary of communism in the direction of democracy has to discover the limits of freedom of speech. 63

In conclusion criticism against the governments and the League of Communists may be voiced by individuals only. This criticism may not advocate anti-socialist principles. Within these limits, however, the Yugoslavs as individuals are free to air their grievances, to criticize the government and to suggest improvements. 64

63 Gunther Bartsch, "Djilas and Kowalkowski," Osteuropa, Jahrgang 15, No. 5.

Yugoslavia's experience has had an impact upon the
communist movement as a whole, upon the relations between
the Soviet Union and the other members of the Warsaw
Pact, as well as on the reforms that were instituted by
most of the Soviet Bloc countries including the
U.S.S.R. itself.

The Yugoslav path has been of historic significance
as a movement of revolt against Stalinism and Moscow
domination. Yugoslav criticism and Yugoslav ideology
have pointed out the essentially Russian interpretation
of Marxism as applied by Lenin and Stalin. They have
also broken the connection between Russian nationalism
and communism. Those dogmas of pre-1948, namely that
communism implies giving support to the Soviet Union and
that the Soviet pattern must remain the example for the
rest of the communist world, lie shattered. Without the
acceptance of these dogmas, Soviet hegemony over other
communist nations becomes untenable. Under such circum-
stances it becomes questionable whether a new communist
nation somewhere in the world would mean an increase in

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the power of the Soviet Union. The monolith has been destroyed, and Yugoslavia administered the first blow.

Canossa in Reverse and the East European Scene

Elements of "Titoism," viz. nationalist opposition within the communist ranks against the Stalinist policies existed within most of the states of East Europe. This nationalist opposition grew out of the dual tasks the communists had to perform: on the one hand they were to serve the Soviet Union, and on the other hand they were to stay in power and build communism to the best of their abilities. The two interests did not always coincide. Whenever Moscow insisted on economic policies that were benefiting the Soviet Union but of disadvantage to the East European nation concerned, whenever Stalin forced the East European nations to conform to Soviet practices which did not fit the different conditions, the communist leaders of the nations of the Eastern Bloc were somewhat compromised. These nations had little choice but to swallow the bitter pill while Belgrade was pursuing its independent road.

In the initial period following Yugoslavia's expulsion, the country's impact on East Europe was almost entirely negative. Yugoslavia was, after all, collaborating with the "imperialist forces" and made concessions

\[1\text{Brzezinski, op. cit., pp. 58-59.}\]
to its farmers. In addition the early economic troubles the Balkan nation faced, partly due to the withdrawal of Soviet and East European aid and the cancellation of the trade agreements, were extolled by the Soviet and East European press. The communist press attempted to show that a communist country outside the Bloc could not survive without becoming a traitor to communism.

After Stalin's demise the need to effect a reconciliation with Yugoslavia was not only the result of a decision to terminate the liability of an internationally unpopular external policy but also a necessary precondition for any scheme of domestic reform. Krushchev put forth a huge program of domestic reforms to improve the economic situation of the Soviet peoples. In order to carry out these reforms, he had to remove the stigma of "Titoism" from such activities. In the international realm the Soviet Union had difficulty advocating a policy of peaceful coexistence while pretending that Yugoslavia, a socialist nation, was the embodiment of all evil. Furthermore, Yugoslavia enjoyed good relations with most of the developing nations of Africa and Asia. If the Soviet leaders wished to improve the relations with these nations, it was advisable that they also improve their relations with Yugoslavia.

Bulganin's and Krushchev's visit to Belgrade was the outcome of such considerations. The humiliating
visit signaled a shift in the Soviet policy line. To some of the East European nations, "Canossa in reverse" represented the acceptance of the Yugoslav position that each country has a right to determine its own path to socialism. This, in turn, meant the negation of Stalin's doctrine that communism was to be primarily in the interest of the Soviet Union. The rehabilitation of Tito and of the victims of the Titoist purges in the satellite countries could not but discredit the most loyal exponents of Soviet supremacy within these nations. Furthermore, the revelations of the 20th Party Congress fostered the opinion that the Soviet Union, after having displayed clear signs of degeneration, could no longer be regarded as the sole model of communist practice and theory.

Subsequently, a revolt against Soviet tutelage broke loose ranging from the Baltic to the Black Sea. The communist governments of East Europe made known their desire to serve the national interest rather than that of the Soviet Union and to loosen the rigid totalitarian pattern.

How far the Soviet leadership intended the thaw in the relationship between itself and the other Warsaw Pact nations to last is hard to ascertain. It seems clear, \[\footnote{Richard Lowenthal, "Revolution over Eastern Europe," Twentieth Century, Vol. CLX (December, 1956), p. 484.}\]
however, that Moscow did not intend that the national independence which has been recognized as inevitable for the regimes of Mao and Tito should apply fully to the other East European nations. All the Soviet leadership meant to grant was the replacement of detailed control through mixed companies, Soviet police agents and "advisers," by military, economic and party ties at the top.

With Krushchev's visit to Belgrade, the relations between the East European nations and the U.S.S.R. had, if only symbolically, entered into a new phase. This new era was characterized by the abolition of the Cominform. The revolutions in Hungary and Poland were the dramatic manifestations of the period. The violent, to a degree anti-communist but certainly anti-Soviet, outbreaks resulted in the Soviet attempt to restore a degree of block solidarity. Nevertheless, the nations of East Europe have obtained by far a greater amount of freedom than formerly; Soviet hegemony over East Europe has not been the same ever since.

The developments of the East European countries during the period of the thaw revealed some impact of Yugoslav practice and ideology. Some decentralization was carried out in almost all the countries, and all attempted to shake to some degree the Soviet yoke. No country, however, has been able to introduce the Yugoslav system as a whole.
The Struggle Against Soviet Domination

Mr. Krushchev's visit to Yugoslavia, the rehabilitation of those East European leaders sentenced for their nationalistic tendencies during the Stalin era and the revelations of the 20th Party Congress of the C.P.S.U. made the nations of East Europe hope for greater independence from the Soviet Union. The struggles of Poland and Hungary against governments dedicated to a Stalinist policy represent the landmarks of this period. The Stalinists were overthrown by the faction of the Party which had gained popular support. In both cases the new leadership was committed to national independence and to economic and political reforms.

Poland

In Poland Wladislaw Gomulka, a member of the Communist Party, formerly condemned for his nationalistic tendencies, took over the reins of the government. Mr. Gomulka had the personality of a leader. He was also a long-time communist. He was able to control the Polish people and to translate their wishes into concessions obtained from the Soviet Union. Mr. Gomulka never wanted to leave the Socialist Camp; yet, immediately following the "Polish October," he attempted to become an independent member of the Communist Bloc having relations
with both East and West. Poland attempted to follow a foreign policy line similar to that of Yugoslavia without endangering its relationship in the socialist family.³ Soviet reassertion of its claim on bloc leadership following the Hungarian revolution made the Polish government abandon its desire for an independent foreign policy. Domestic freedom was purchased with diplomatic and ideological conformity.⁴

The rigid totalitarian pattern was loosened. For two years following the "Polish October," freedom of expression and public criticism of the regime was possible. At a time when Milovan Djilas was sentenced and resentenced to prison terms, party discipline in the Polish Workers' Party was lax. The Polish election was freer than those in Yugoslavia in a sense that, despite the single ticket, several parties ran candidates. In addition the number of candidates far exceeded the number of seats available.

In retrospect these concessions appear to have been adaptations to necessity rather than reflections of changes in principle. When Mr. Gomulka had defeated the Stalinist wing of the Party, he turned against the

³Hoffman and Neal, op. cit., p. 457.
"revisionists," i.e., those members of the Party who wanted greater liberalization. By 1958 the criticism against the Polish government and the Soviet Union was brought under control.

Poland has undergone some of the hoped-for political and economic changes, and it has also maintained a special place amongst the countries of East Europe in relation to the Soviet Union. However, ideological changes have not been permitted in Poland. Ideological departures from the Soviet interpretation of Marxist and Leninist doctrine are almost completely absent. The various reforms that were instituted in Poland following the "Polish October" never received an ideological justification as had the reforms in Yugoslavia. It is, therefore, not surprising that several of the reforms that were legalized by the Gomulka government after the revolt were curtailed after an initial period had elapsed and the situation had changed as to allow such curtailment.

Hungary

Yugoslav influence became visible in the Hungarian policies of the New Course put forth by the government.
of Imre Nagy, 1953 to 1955. The policies and policy aims of this government closely resembled those of the Yugoslav government. Mr. Nagy, amongst others, criticized the terrible state of the Hungarian economy which in his opinion had resulted from the adoption of Soviet policies without making allowances for the needs of Hungary. He also insisted that a people cannot be free as long as the nation is not independent and as long as it lacks complete sovereignty. In addition Imre Nagy professed the belief that the proper evolution of a socialist society is based on the principle of coexistence amongst nations traveling different roads under particular national conditions free, independent and equal.

The relaxations of the totalitarian features of the regime and the wish to curb the power of the bureaucracy were some of the objectives of the New Course. In order to realize these objectives, Mr. Nagy argued, as did the Yugoslavs, for the participation of the working masses in the exercise of power and administration and for their control over the government. 8


8Ibid., p. 215 and p. 221.
Mr. Nagy did not gain complete control over the Party and never received the full backing of the Soviet leadership which would have been necessary to carry out changes of such dimensions. In 1955 the government of Imre Nagy fell into disrepute with the Hungarian Stalinists and the Soviet leadership due to its nationalistic tendencies. Its successor government was led by the Stalinist faction of the Party which doggedly followed Soviet policies.

To the extent that the Yugoslav experience contributed to the Hungarian revolution, it had its greatest impact in 1956. In the first part of the revolution, Yugoslav influence was clearly manifested. The nationalist wing of the Party wished to stress the independence of Hungary and to institute reforms under the guidance of a liberalized Communist Party. This policy was at that time supported by the population which accepted the return to Leninism as the creed of the new system.9

The Soviet Union, faced for the second time with an upheaval in the Bloc, might have accepted such a policy as long as Hungary would have remained under communist rule and maintained its membership in the Warsaw Pact. The government of Imre Nagy, carried by the mood of the population, however, overstepped the boundaries within

which the Soviet Union was willing to make concessions by announcing the abolition of the one-party system, by reconstituting the democratic parties and by pledging free elections. In addition Mr. Nagy no longer opted for a Hungary within the Socialist Camp but for an independent nation outside the Warsaw Pact.

The Hungarian people and the Hungarian National Committee denounces the Warsaw Pact as being contrary to the Hungarian peace treaty and the Covenant of the UNO. At the same time it places Hungary under the defense of the Security Council of the UNO from any kind of aggression.

On the pattern of Austria, Hungary declares her neutrality. She wants good relations with all the peoples of the world on the basis of equality.\(^{10}\)

By advocating a Western type parliamentary democracy, Hungary went further than even Yugoslavia and brought upon itself the second Soviet intervention.

**Rumania**

It was in the early 1960's when the Rumanian communist leadership revolved against Soviet dominations. The new road that was taken by the Rumanian communists was partly facilitated by the Sino-Soviet dispute.\(^ {11}\) The Soviet leadership was so engulfed in its polemics with the Chinese communists that it failed to take a


strong stand against Rumania when the latter refused to accept its economic assignment within the East European common market, viz. the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON). Rumania's insistence to continue to build its heavy industry, notwithstanding the fact that the international division of labor within East Europe did not at that stage warrant the nation's position, challenged the principle that community interest should prevail over the interests of each national unit.

Although the Rumanian leadership insists upon the priority of its national interest, Gherghii-Dej, the First Secretary of the Rumanian Workers Party, declared that he would accept the principles of the socialist international division of labor if it be based upon "the spirit of the principles proclaimed by the 1960 Moscow statement of observance of national independence and sovereignty, of full equality of rights, comradely mutual aid and mutual benefit." In accordance with these principles, Rumania insisted upon its independence in foreign trade relations regardless of the criticism that was brought to bear upon the country by the Soviet Union and the other COMECON nations.

Regarding the relationships between socialist nations and communist parties, the Rumanian leadership professes

ideas resembling those of the Yugoslavs.

. . . the socialist countries can achieve their unity of action in all domains . . . by reciprocal consultation and joint elaboration of certain common stands as regards the major problems of principles and not by establishing . . . some superstate solution.13

In addition the Rumanian communists contend that no party has or can have a privileged place so as to allow the imposition of its opinions on other parties but that "each party makes its own contribution to the development of the common treasure of Marxist-Leninist teachings . . . prudent. These opinions indeed come close to the Yugoslav interpretation of the concept of communist internationalism.

In regard to the problem of peaceful or non-peaceful transition from capitalism to socialism, the Rumanians support the position that this factor can only be determined by the concrete historical conditions of each country and that although not very likely peaceful transition is indeed possible. Furthermore, the Rumanian communists are advocates of peaceful coexistence, the banning and liquidation of nuclear armaments and agree with the Yugoslavs that all military


14Ibid.
blocs represent a threat to world peace and ought to be abolished.\textsuperscript{15}

Rumania has been determined to retain the achieved independence from Moscow and has troubled the Soviet leadership with its attitude concerning the Sino-Soviet dispute in which the East European nation took upon itself the position of a mediator.

Rumania has tacitly accepted important parts of the Yugoslav ideological framework and continues to build its national independence Yugoslav style. In the domestic sphere, however, Rumania has seen little of the reforms that swept over East Europe and that had certain features in common with those previously instituted in Yugoslavia. The ideological similarities between the Yugoslav framework and that of the Romanian's extend to the international political and economic spheres.

Yugoslav Impact upon East European and Soviet Reforms

Almost all of the East European nations, as well as the Soviet Union, have experienced some reforms and decentralization of the economy in the post-Stalin period. In the case of Poland and Hungary, several reforms which have certain features in common with those undertaken

in Yugoslavia grew out of the respective revolutions. The Gomulka government retained most of these reforms which were legalized by the government ex post facto, although they were ridded of some of their significance in the decade following the "Polish October." In the case of Hungary, many of the reforms which were established during the revolutionary period were abolished by the post-revolutionary government of Janos Kadar.

Czechoslovakia also experienced significant economic reforms which were caused, like those in the Soviet Union, by the inefficiency in management due to over-centralization. In both cases the reforms were not modeled after the Yugoslav pattern although similarities can be found. All Warsaw Pact members that instituted significant reforms profited from Yugoslav experience and criticism; and if only in this fashion, Yugoslavia's way has had significant impact upon those countries. It should be noted, however, that in the case of all these nations no attempt has been made to justify the established reforms ideologically. Due to the fact that the reforms never completely destroyed the old system, this perhaps was not necessary.

Poland

Several of the reforms instituted in Poland after the crisis of 1956 show similarities with those undertaken
in Yugoslavia. One of these was the establishment of workers' councils in the Polish enterprises.

During the widespread labor unrest in Poland, working crews in several factories elected workers' councils. These incidences make it clear that even under the pre-Gomulka government which was committed to Stalinist policies Yugoslav influence and Polish support for a similar system were present. This influence, as well as the support, remained "underground" until the circumstances allowed an open acknowledgment.

The law on the workers' councils of 1956 represented a recognition of already existing conditions. The organization of the workers' councils in Poland is similar to their Yugoslav counterpart; their powers, however, differ widely. In Poland the councils share authority on the question of wages with the shop committees, a trade union organization heavily dominated by the United Workers Party, the Polish Communist Party. In certain other areas such as social welfare, social security and working conditions the control of the shop committee is predominant.

Convinced that centralized planning in the economic system represents a law of socialist development, the

Party defined the function of the workers' councils to cover the struggle against lack of discipline and squandering, organization of work and better utilization of the producers' capacity. In essence the workers' councils are competent to deal with economic policy on the enterprise level which is not covered by the plan directives and does not fall under the competence of the state organs dealing with the economy.

Although centralized planning of wages, prices and investments is in effect, a certain amount of decentralization of the administrative apparatus below the level of ministries has been carried out. But where in Yugoslavia decentralization of the machinery went hand in hand with the decentralization of authority, Poland has seen little of the latter. This feature is pointed out by a critic who stated that:

If in the near future the system of economic decentralization is not radically changed, workers' councils may become one more of the Stalinist fictions which make the pretense of the government of masses . . . the law on the workers' councils as we read it in the Law Gazette impresses the


reader not as an act of victory of the working masses but as an act of self-defense of the bureaucracy. 19

The greater extent of the prices and investment funds are centrally determined. Production quotas are assigned to the various branches of the economy and ultimately to the individual enterprises. However, profits achieved in excess of the central plan in addition to profits planned by the enterprise exceeding the output determined by the central agency are not in their entirety taken by the government but are partly left to the administration of the enterprise which may decide on their use. 20

Whereas in Yugoslavia the establishment of the workers' councils represented a step toward the decentralization of the administrative apparatus and its authority and thus toward the withering away of the state, no such ideological aim was present in Poland. Decentralization here did not mean a step further toward the disappearance of the state, it represented only a concession to popular demand which could be retraced, at least to a degree, under changed conditions. Indeed the powers of the workers' councils were further curtailed


in 1958 following the attack of the Party against further liberalization.

Another feature of the Yugoslav system that was to a degree adopted in Poland was the delegation of authority to local governing bodies. The reforms did not give to the Polish People's Councils independence comparable to their Yugoslav counterpart. Most of the increased powers were delegated to the district or the province.21 A strict hierarchical pattern of organization is adhered to; each People's Council being subordinated to the next higher body with the State Council in Warsaw retaining the power of dissolution.22

The local government organs in Poland have little economic independence when compared with those of Yugoslavia. They lack the authority to determine taxes as well as investments. However, their local economic activity has reached a considerable degree since certain sources of revenue were placed under the control and administration of local government.23

In the field of agriculture the Polish reforms have certain features in common with those previously


23 Ibid., p. 459.
instituted in Yugoslavia. Following the upheavals of 1956, the forced collectivization of agriculture was ended; and the joining of agricultural collectives was made entirely voluntary. As a result, a large proportion of the peasants left the artificially created collective farms. In Yugoslavia the decollectivization of agriculture was accompanied by the recognition of the status of the private peasant and the abolition of compulsory deliveries of produce. This was not the case in Poland although compulsory delivery of grain was reduced by one-third.24

Whereas the Yugoslavs are confident that they can build socialism without collectivization of agriculture and that socialism in the rest of the country will produce socialism in agriculture, the Poles insist that ultimately collectivization of agriculture is essential for the establishment of socialism.25 In the near future this goal is not to be pursued by force or coercion.

Hungary

Various changes that were introduced in the Hungarian system during the days of the revolution showed the


Yugoslav impact. One of the first moves of the revolutionaries was the establishment of workers' councils which had at this period considerable power, not unlike those in Yugoslavia. The National Council of Trade Unions called for the establishment of such councils on October 26, 1956.

In every producing factory a labor council is to be set up in cooperation with the technical intelligentsia . . .

Workers! Factory intellectuals! Take the management of your factories in your own hands. Form labor councils forthwith.

The workers' councils proved to be so popular that Janos Kadar maintained this institution for an initial period following the revolution. Mr. Kadar's post-revolutionary government made less of a gesture regarding the economic and political decentralization than that of Mr. Gomulka. Without this decentralization, however, a meaningful function of the workers' councils is not possible. Late in 1957 the Hungarian government abolished the councils and replaced them by so-called shop councils in which the workers have little say.

Another spontaneous action growing out of the Hungarian revolt was the temporary decollectivization of agriculture. The Kadar government started new

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26 "Documents from Budapest," op. cit., p. 175.
27 Ibid., p. 173.
collectivization drives following the failure of the revolution. According to Hungarian officials neither force nor coercion has been employed in the recollectivization drive. By 1963 almost 95 per cent of the countryside had been organized into collective or state farms.29

Despite the tendencies to curtail the changes instituted during the revolution, the government of Mr. Kadar has relaxed the police control, provided more consumer goods and has to some degree decentralized the administration. Since the early sixties Mr. Kadar has avoided no troubles in his attempt to stir a middle course government by foregoing the extremes of the Rakosi regime and the excess of the "counter revolutionaries" of 1956.

Czechoslovakia

Czechoslovakia, the one nation in which Soviet-type socialism seemed to work reasonably well until the late 1950's, experienced economic reforms during the last two years. Since 1960 the rate of industrial growth had fallen drastically, and the planners were unable to

cope successfully with the situation.\(^{30}\) In 1963 a number of Czech economists launched an attack against the "cult of the plan." Dr. Ota Sik, the main architect of the later-adopted economic reforms, stated that "ideological prejudices implying that socialist production cannot be regulated by the market must be overcome."\(^{31}\)

Driven by economic necessity the principles of the economic reform were reluctantly accepted by the Central Committee of the Party early last year. Under the new system central planning will remain, but it will concern itself with long-range drafts for a ten to fifteen-year period. From these long-range aims more detailed five-year plans will be derived. According to the Czech Premier Lenart, capital investments, relationships between the various branches of the industry and the balance of various regions of the country are to be determined and ensured by the central plan.\(^{32}\) Prices for raw materials and for the basic necessities of life will also be fixed by the central authorities. Other produce, however, is to be exempted from detailed planning as to make it more responsive to the "laws" of supply and demand.


Enterprises are regarded as the basic industrial units, and their initiative is sought. Unproductive plants are to be closed, and the performance of the enterprises is to be measured by their profitability rather than by their ability to meet the production quotas. Due to the fact that workers' participation in management of the enterprise is not instituted by the reforms, the enterprise director will gain a considerable amount of power and responsibility concerning the performance of his shop.

The Soviet Union

The Soviet Union, like most of the Warsaw Pact nations, experienced reforms that are to a degree similar to those previously instituted in Yugoslavia. A general relaxation of the totalitarian features represented by the curbed powers of the MVD took place in the U.S.S.R. In the agricultural field the machine tractor stations were abolished. In the economic sphere decentralization of the administration was experienced; and permanent producer councils, Party-union-management troikas, were instituted in the factories to advise on problems of planning and operation.

The over-centralization of the economic management was recognized as extremely inefficient at the present stage of economic complexity. In the quest for a solution
the Soviet leadership instituted reforms which, in their first stage, aimed at regional economic management and later at the partial establishment of a market economy.

The first stage of reforms represented a change from central to regional planning. The central ministerial organization was replaced by 105 economic units which were later reduced in number. In each of these regions, economic councils were set up which through their subsidiary departments managed the individual enterprises located within their jurisdiction except those otherwise designated. This we would call a change from central to regional planning. The councils were not exclusively composed of professional administrative employees but a certain number were delegates from social organizations.

Although the newly created regional entities had received a certain amount of power, centralized control was maintained by central planning and financing. U.S.S.R. Gosplan, the central planning agency, exercised


great power over economic units in regard to planning, technological policy and the allocation of materials.

It was hoped that by bringing the management closer to the production units the efficiency of the management would be maximized which in turn would increase the production of the individual enterprise. By mid-1957 nine thousand employees had been transferred from the central administration to the economy.\(^{35}\) This also represented a step further in the direction toward a reduction of the power of the bureaucracy.

The administration of the economy on a regional basis resulted in the emergence of regionalism which could not be tolerated by the Soviet leadership. Most of the powers were taken away from the regional economic councils and returned to the central administration with the exception of those branches of the economy which fell under the second set of reforms.

In accordance with the proposal of Professor Liberman which was discussed by the Central Committee of the Communist Party in November, 1962, certain enterprises were released from the established planning procedure. The majority of the clothing and footwear enterprises were placed within a market situation where production is determined by the demands of the consumer

\(^{35}\text{Ibid.}, p. 6.$
rather than by bureaucratic decision and where profitability becomes the measure of performance. The same operation is also tried in textile mills, tanneries and other branches of the light industry. It is also planned to extend this system so as to include some branches of the heavy industry.

With the exception of the industries subjected to the market situation, the decentralization of government authority in the economic sphere has not been as far reaching as in Yugoslavia. The central planning apparatus remains intact; and the economy, save those enterprises designated to operate in a market situation, is still administered from the center. The factories are still essentially ruled by the director of the enterprise. The workers have only an indirect say in the running of the shop through the unions in the permanent producer councils which have been denied the function of management but act as advisory bodies only.

The Soviet leadership has not made concessions to the Yugoslav ideological framework save the recognition of the concept of "independent roads to socialism." The Yugoslav ideas concerning the withering away of the state indeed have been derided by Moscow.


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The Soviet leaders probably did not and never intended to copy aspects of Yugoslav reforms, but while moving toward new directions the Yugoslav experiment and Yugoslav criticism of the Soviet system had had some effect on the Soviet Union and the reforms that were instituted in the post-Stalin period. Viewing the East European scene, it can be concluded that Yugoslavia's insistence on the necessity of different paths to socialism has had considerable impact. The influence of Yugoslav ideology seems to have been the strongest during the period of the New Course and the initial period of the Hungarian uprising. In addition the Rumanian communists voice some opinions similar to those of the Yugoslavs as regards the relationships between communist nations and parties and other ideas dealing with the international scene. Yugoslav impact can be recognized in most of the economic reforms that swept East Europe and the Soviet Union although this influence may be more apparent than real. Within the framework of a reasonably centralized system, the East European nations as well as the Soviet Union have been willing to integrate certain features of the Yugoslav system into their system without, however, adopting the Yugoslav ideological justifications.
Conclusions

1. Yugoslav ideology partly developed out of pragmatic responses to pressing national and international conditions. Without the backing of the Soviet Union, Tito's regime had to fall back on its own resources. In order to gain the support of the Yugoslav people, the regime had to satisfy both the communist and the non-communist elements in the country. The internal policies which were followed after the break mirror these considerations. The regime guaranteed the communists the continued political dominance of their Party. The non-communists were assured of the relaxation of oppressive measures in the political and economic realms.

The economic approaches prescribed by Soviet Russia as the only path leading to socialism had brought the Yugoslav state serious economic problems. In the international sphere the Yugoslav communists were faced by the necessity of concluding trade and aid agreements with the Western capitalist nations if Yugoslavia were to survive the Cominform blockade. It was from these considerations that the Yugoslav ideology received its direction and its impetus.

2. The ideological justifications for the novel Yugoslav approaches were found in Marxist theory and
were arrived at by way of criticizing the Soviet model. Tito and his followers regarded their expulsion from the Communist Bloc an unjust act. Since they believed themselves to be true followers of Marx and Lenin, it had to be Stalin who had erred from the correct path. The Yugoslav ideologues set out to find where Stalin's interpretation was at odds with the basic tenents of Marxism and Leninism. The Yugoslav criticism of the Soviet model concentrated on those features of the Soviet system which the Yugoslavs had already or were willing to change in accordance with political and economic requirements. The Yugoslav criticism was, of course, supported by quotations of Marx, Engels and Lenin so as to give it validity.

3. By incorporating Yugoslav nationalism into the new ideological framework, the regime created considerable internal cohesion. The regime was highly aware of the rifts and divisions among the nationalities of Yugoslavia. These were just beginning to heal. By using Yugoslav nationalism against the Soviet Union and by incorporating it into the new ideology, the regime had created internal unity. Furthermore, the fostering of Yugoslav nationalism generated support for the communist regime among the non-communist elements in the country.
4. The liberalized version of communism will not be reversed in Yugoslavia, yet communism will not be abandoned as the official doctrine. A reversion to harsh communist policy would only be possible with the backing of the Soviet Union since this policy would result in the loss of support from those elements in the country which the regime had gained during its liberalization campaign. The Soviet Union has retreated from the Stalinist interpretation of communism. Under these circumstances it is questionable whether the Soviet regime would support a reimposition of a rigid Stalinist system in Yugoslavia. From this it can be concluded that a reversion to a harsh and dogmatic communist policy in Yugoslavia is highly improbable.

However, the regime cannot abandon communist policies since most of the key positions within the country are occupied by party members on whose loyalty it must depend. Hence, the regime can only go so far as to revise communism; it cannot abandon it.

5. Given Yugoslav ideology and Yugoslav practice, the nation will neither rejoin the Soviet Bloc nor become a full member of the Western alliance. As far as Yugoslav ideology is relevant to political action, it precludes Yugoslavia's joining either one of the present
power constellations. By condemning any type of power bloc, the ideology commits the regime to a policy of non-alignment.

The regime will not rejoin the Soviet Bloc because this would mean to forfeit genuine domestic support for hazardous Soviet backing. It was, after all, the domestic support which allowed the regime a substantial area of flexibility in the international sphere. Moreover, the regime withstood Soviet wooing to rejoin the Soviet Bloc in the spring of 1955. It is questionable whether the Soviet Union has become more attractive to the Yugoslav regime after the uprisings in Eastern Europe and Yugoslavia’s new expulsion from the inner councils of the Eastern Bloc.

On the other hand, Yugoslavia cannot become a full-fledged member of the Western Bloc because this action would antagonize and frighten the Yugoslav communists on whom the state machinery depends. It would also mean that the regime would open itself to the charge of having sold out communism, and this it cannot afford to do. Furthermore, it is not certain that Yugoslavia, if willing, would be a welcome addition to the Western alliance as long as combatting communism per se remains one of the objectives of Western policy.

6. Yugoslav ideology and Yugoslav practice have had, and are likely to continue to have, an impact on
the policies of the Soviet Bloc. Yugoslavia's formulation of the doctrine of different roads to socialism and the Yugoslav example of a communist nation independent from the U.S.S.R. was partly responsible for the uprisings in Eastern Europe in 1956. Yugoslav influence becomes clearly observable in the case of Rumania. The Rumanian regime justified its refusal to follow the dictates of COMECON in a manner which closely resembles those items of Yugoslav ideology concerned with inter-communist relations.

Yugoslavia was the first bloc member which, excluded from the communist world, responded to existing internal and international conditions in a pragmatic manner. Some of the problems which the regime faced existed in the other East European nations as well. By studying the Yugoslav approaches, the governments of the East European countries selected those features of the Yugoslav system which seemed appropriate to their own situations.

7. Yugoslavia will not be able to exercise sufficient pull on the East European countries to effect their defection from the Soviet Bloc. In a liberalized Soviet Bloc, where policy differences are permitted and where the interests of the countries involved are given consideration, the price the East European regimes might have to pay for a defection is hardly worth the try.
Hungary serves as an example for all those who wish for complete independence from the U.S.S.R.

Another reason why some East European nations, especially Poland and Czechoslovakia, will not defect from the Soviet Union is their common fear of the revival of German power. Since Germany is a key-stone in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the logical counterbalance for the East European countries is the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union. The German insistence of keeping the issue of the Oder-Neisse line alive has been one of the greatest booms to Soviet policy making in defeating the aspirations of Tito's national communism in East Europe and will continue to be so.

The countries not directly effected by the German "threat" such as Bulgaria and Rumania might not wish to exchange Soviet domination for a Yugoslav Balkan federation. Furthermore, it is questionable whether the Soviet Union would allow one of the East European nations to separate itself completely from the Warsaw Pact and COMECON.

8. The Soviet Bloc is not today and will never again become a centralized monolith. Within limits each of the East European countries goes today its own road to socialism. Several of these nations have trade agreements with the Western nations. Soviet dictates are not taken in silence whenever they are considered
hazardous to the well-being of the nation concerned. Rumania's refusal to accept its economic assignment in COMECON provides an example of the relative independence of the East European nations today.

What holds true for the Soviet Bloc holds true for the communist world as a whole. Given the existence of a policentric communist movement it becomes questionable whether a new communist nation somewhere in the world represents an increase in power for the Soviet Union.

The foregoing conclusions are the result of the previous evaluation of the Yugoslav ideology, the development of the Yugoslav system and its impact upon the nations of the Soviet Bloc. The writer hopes that the previous analysis has shed a clearer light upon the Yugoslav system, its ideology and the impact of the Yugoslav position upon the East European nations and the U.S.S.R.
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