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Voting Patterns in Kalamazoo County, Michigan

Donald R. Holt Jr.
Western Michigan University

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VOTING PATTERNS IN
KALAMAZOO COUNTY, MICHIGAN

by

Donald R. Holt, Jr.

A Thesis
Submitted to the
Faculty of the School of Graduate
Studies in partial fulfillment
of the
Degree of Master of Arts

Western Michigan University
Kalamazoo, Michigan
August 1967
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I am grateful to many people who encouraged the interest which resulted in this thesis; and especially for the friendship of many members of the Political Science faculty of Western Michigan University. I particularly thank Professors Chester Rogers and Richard Richardson for the detailed criticism of the manuscript which added greatly to its quality. Responsibility for what is written herein, however, remains mine and cannot be laid at their doorstep.

Donald R. Holt, Jr.
MASTER'S THESIS

HOLT, Jr., Donald R.
VOTING PATTERNS IN KALAMAZOO COUNTY, MICHIGAN

Western Michigan University, M.A., 1967
Political Science, general

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I
THE PROBLEM

Introduction

What are the possibilities for a minority party in a one-party district to become competitive? Have the possibilities changed over time? It is out of this concern that this paper arises.

The questions have ramifications that go beyond the arena of partisan combat. It is obvious that a nation or a state can have competitive party democracy without requiring that every district within the larger unit be characterized by a competitive two-party polity. A one-party urban district can balance and compete with a one-party rural region of different political coloration. If one assumes, however, that competitive party democracy is a "good thing;" that it results in more adequate representation of, and responsibility to, the citizenry, then it is important to have it at local levels as well as state and national levels. The possibilities for a minority party to become competitive within its local district bear on the possibilities of improving the quality of democracy practiced therein.

The raison d'etre of the American political party is the winning of elections. As Sorauf puts it,

"The major American parties...are dominated by the electing function. They are, indeed, great and overt conspiracies for the capture of public office....For the major parties it is virtually the Alpha and Omega. The cycle and seasons of their activity depend almost completely on the calendar of elections." ¹

If, therefore, the possibility of election victory is non-existent, a party loses its reason for being. Without hope of gaining office, a party will not be able to find the finances, the candidates, the workers or the morale necessary to present a credible alternative to the party in power. Because it can offer no effective challenge to the majority party, that party loses its fear of retribution at

the polls; it is free, if it chooses, to lose touch with its constituency, and to represent it less well than it could if spurred by the prick of competition.

The minority party's hope of eventual success at the ballot-box, then, is important not only to those partisans directly concerned, but to the democratic process as a whole. Within a given district, there are three ways by which the political David may grow to the point where he can effectively challenge Goliath. A nation-wide cataclysm may affect the district in such a way as to realign its partisan loyalties; fellow-partisans may emigrate from other parts, and take up residence within the districts boundaries; or by hard work and good luck, the minority may be able to weaken the bonds that hold the voter to the majority party until he becomes an independent. Perhaps it can even succeed in severing those ties, and convert former enemies into present friends. If any of these events are likely, the minority party can live and work on the bread of hope. This paper will examine the election records of Kalamazoo County, a one-party county, and the findings of other studies of voter behavior, in an effort to assess the possibilities that offer themselves to the minority party of the county, and by implication, to other minority parties in similar districts.

The Extant Information

Large numbers of studies of voter behavior are available. Eldersveld classifies them into six categories.

1. The Hypothesis-Testing Exploratory Study. In this type of study "...the investigator assumes the significance of a proposition on the basis of mere hunch, for the most part, and collects and orders data in a manner designed to demonstrate the truth or falsity of his proposition."

As he defines this classification, the studies included in it suffer from a lack of exploration of the proposition in different time periods, and from the absence of consideration of other hypotheses which might explain the same data.

2. The Mass Tabulation Case Study. These are characterized by concentration on a single election district, and operate without an explicit hypothesis. They are primarily exercises in data-gathering and have the value of making available data in a variety of combinations which may be useful in later, more focused research. However, they

"...have only a local application, do not permit of generalization, and have only specific descriptive value for a single community in one historical span of time."

3. Comparative Statistical Study. These are investigations "...in which an attempt is made to describe differentials in voting behavior trends in counties, states, or nations." Eldersveld finds them of limited usefulness for hypothesis testing and theory construction. Invariably they seem to find that their generalizations are conditioned by a great many exceptions which cannot be explained, or accounted for. Generalizations diluted in this way are difficult to test and contribute little to understanding voting behavior.

4. Single-Hypothesis Trend Study. In these, "...the investigator, advancing a single proposition or an interpretation of one aspect of voting behavior, explores its validity over a considerable span of elections and in many different electoral units." Although the studies of this type have neither demonstrated a high degree of probability for their conclusions, nor entertained or explored alternative hypotheses that might explain their findings, the method is "...essentially valid, given hypotheses which are based on some objective facts and systematically pursued in a variety of research situations, with a rigorous technique."

5. Hypothesis-Testing Factorial Analysis. This type of investigation probes specific factors in a single community at a single point

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1 loc. cit., p.74.
2 loc. cit., p.76.
3 loc. cit., p.77.
4 loc. cit., p.78.
This differs from the exploratory study in that it is an intensive, sustained, systematic effort. It contrasts with the case study in that it proceeds with a definite hypothesis or set of hypotheses, and collects data relevant particularly to that set of hypotheses. It differs usually from the trend study in that it is limited to one point in time, or one community."

6. The Community Dynamics Type. These are

"...attempts to explore and quantify as far as possible the dynamic interaction of many factors and variables, social, political, economic, religious, and so on."  

There have been seven major studies of this type of American voting behavior; results of six of them have been published. 3 There have been two local-sample studies, one of the 1940 and one of the 1948 election; four national-sample studies of the 1944, 1948, 1952 and 1956 elections; and one study of a non-presidential election in 1954.

1 loc. cit., p.79.
2 loc. cit., p.80.
3 A study of Erie County, Ohio, in the 1940 election, by Paul Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet, reported in The People's Choice, N.Y., Columbia University Press, 1948; a study of Elmira, N.Y., in the 1948 election by Bernard Berelson, Paul Lazarsfeld, and William McPhee, reported in Voting, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1954 (a sequel to The Erie County survey); a study of a nation-wide sample in the 1944 election by the National Opinion Research Center (no published report); a nation-wide sample study of the 1948 election by Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin, and Warren Miller, reported in The Voter Decides, Chicago, Row-Peterson, 1954; a study of the 1956 election in a nation-wide sample by Angus Campbell, Philip Converse, Warren Miller, and Donald Stokes, reported in The American Voter, N.Y., John Wiley and Sons, 1964 (a sequel to The Voter Decides and a summarization of the state of the discipline to date); a study of a congressional election in 1954 by Angus Campbell and H. C. Cooper, reported in Group Differences in Attitudes and Votes, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan, 1956.
The data gathered in these surveys has been reported and interpreted in a variety of books and articles.

The present paper can be classified as a Single-Hypothesis Trent Study, being an examination of vote patterns in twenty elections from 1928 to 1966, and including a limited degree of comparison between county and state constituencies. An early example of this type of research is Holcombe's study of the importance of the middle class in electoral decision. Later examples are Ewing's examination of the relation of presidential coat-tails to congressional elections and Bean's exploration of a "wave theory" of partisan victory.

The use of voting statistics in analyzing changes in voting behavior suffers from severe limitations. The constituency examined represents nothing except itself. In contrast to a probability sample, its findings can only be generalized with difficulty to other constituencies. Nor will voting statistics reveal the absolute magnitude of shifts from one party to another, or of split-ticket voting, nor the movements of specific voters into and out of the electorate. Whenever there are self-canceling shifts--Democrats voting Republican and Republicans voting Democratic; older people leaving the electorate and younger people entering it; Democrats splitting their ticket for Republican candidates, and vice-versa--these will not be registered in election records. Therefore, this paper will attempt to compare the findings gleaned from the study of election records with the findings gathered by the Community Dynamics Type of investigation, which do not suffer from these same weaknesses.

The community-dynamics type of investigation represents the most ambitious attempts at voter behavior research to date; and as such have proved to be the most useful for this paper. Although they have focused on different locales and different hypotheses, they use a common

---


method—that of the panel-survey. In this method a random sample of citizens is selected for repeated interviews, in an attempt to measure changes in political behavior over time during an election campaign and to determine the effects of demographic situations and political issues and images on the voting decision. A more detailed discussion of the results gained by this method will be offered in Chapter 2. Here it is appropriate to consider the limitations of this type of study. All of them are heir to the weaknesses inherent in the interview method.

Interviews are a reactive instrument of research. They add to the research situation, a variable which was not present in the original situation to be studied. This variable, in the person of the interviewer and the questions asked, may elicit a reaction from the subject, which may shape the information given, which in turn may bias the findings of the research.

"Interviews and questionnaires intrude a foreign element into the social setting they would describe, they create as well as measure attitudes, they are limited to those who are accessible and will cooperate, and the responses obtained are produced in part by dimensions of individual differences irrelevant to the topic at hand."

The authority cited above describes three sources of error that plague the interview method—the error from the respondent, the error from the interviewer, and the error in sampling.

Error from the respondent may take several different forms. His awareness that he is being tested, the "guinea pig effect," may arouse defensive or exhibitionistic behaviors that will distort the information given.

"The measurement process used in the experiment may itself affect the outcome. If people feel that they are 'guinea pigs' being experimented with, or if they feel that they are being 'tested' and must make a

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good impression, or if the method of data collection suggests responses or stimulates an interest the subject did not previously feel, the measuring process may distort the experimental results."

Similarly, the respondent's awareness of being a subject of research may lead to a role selection on his part. Having been placed in an unfamiliar situation, he must decide how to behave. The fact that he is faced with a role-selection decision may change the responses given from those which he would give to the same stimuli if he were in a "natural" situation which did not require this decision, or which required selection of a different role from the one chosen in the research setting.

"Validity decreases as the role assumed in the research setting varies from the usual role present in comparable behavior beyond the research setting." ²

Another type of respondent error results from the fact that measurement itself is a change agent. If a researcher is interested in what the respondent thinks or knows, the respondent is likely to become more interested himself in what he thinks or knows about the area under consideration. Those who have no opinion are stimulated to form an opinion simply because they have been asked. ³ Thus, even with complete honesty and role-representativeness on the part of the respondent there are reactive effects from interview situation.

A fourth type of respondent error is described by Webb et al. as "response sets." ⁴ Subjects have been shown to respond to certain styles of questions or statements in certain ways, regardless of the subject matter. Respondents are more likely to agree with a statement than disagree with an opposite statement. ⁵ They will prefer decisive statements to indecisive ones. ⁶ Series of questions in

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¹ loc. cit., p.13.
² loc. cit., p.16.
³ loc. cit., p.18.
⁴ loc. cit., p.20.
⁵ ibid.
⁶ ibid.

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similar formats have a tendency to produce stereotyped responses.\(^1\)

Thus, the interview method is subject to error on the part of the respondent. It is similarly subject to error on the part of the interviewer. The race, age and sex of the interviewer affect the responses he receives.

"The evidence is overwhelming that a substantial number of biases are introduced by the interviewer."\(^2\)

Further error results from changes in the interviewer as a research instrument. Fatigue may decrease perceptiveness. Increasing skill may increase it. The interviewer may either improve or deteriorate, but it is unlikely that he will act identically toward all respondents. These changes in the instrument will affect the data collected.

A third type of error comes from sampling techniques. Different methods of sampling are subject to different restrictions but all are limited in their ability to achieve samples completely representative of the universe under study.

"Under modern probability sampling with callbacks and household designation, perhaps only 15 percent of the population is excluded...a 20 per cent figure was found in the model Elmira study in its first wave (Williams, 1950), although other studies have reported much lower figures."\(^3\)

Thus, there are probabilities of error in the survey method, stemming from the respondent, the interviewer, and the relative unrepresentativeness of the sample. It is not my purpose, nor within my competence, to judge the adequacy of the data of the various voter-behavior studies that are used in this paper. I merely raise a caveat emptor to those who would use their findings.

The usefulness of these studies to the purposes of this paper is limited in two other ways. They use random samples; this paper uses voting records for a whole county. To the extent that the Kalamazoo County electorate does not represent a cross-section of the national,

\(^{1}\) ibid.
\(^{2}\) loc. cit., p.21.
\(^{3}\) loc. cit., p.24.
or the Erie County, or the Elmira, electorate, direct comparisons cannot be made. Also, the studies are primarily concerned with voter behavior as it relates to Presidential voting. They deal with voting for lesser offices only peripherally. This paper is concerned with the voting patterns as they reveal themselves in the proportion of votes cast for all candidates on the ballot. Whether it can be assumed that the dynamics that shape the voting decision for president are the same as those that shape the voting decision for state representative and county clerk is questionable.

In their criticism of interviews and questionnaires, Webb et al. do not object to their use so much as to the fact that their findings are not verified by non-reactive research measures.

"But the principal objection is that they are used alone. No research method is without bias. Interviews and questionnaires must be supplemented by methods testing the same social science variables but having different methodological weaknesses.... the issue is not choosing among individual methods. Rather it is the necessity for a multiple operationalism, a collection of methods combined to avoid sharing the same weaknesses. The goal of this monograph is not to replace the interview but to supplement and cross-validate it with measures that do not require the cooperation of a respondent and that do not themselves contaminate the response."

It is the intention of this paper to use the non-reactive measure of election records to attempt to "supplement and cross-validate" some of the findings of survey studies.

A Preliminary Observation

Kalamazoo County is a heavily Republican County. Prior to 1964, it had elected only one Democrat to public office (a county sheriff in 1930) since the Civil War. At no time since 1936 had any Democratic candidate received more than 45 per cent of the vote, and usually Democratic candidates fell heir to considerably less.

1 loc. cit., p.1.
In 1964, however, the Democratic candidate for president carried the county, and carried it handily, receiving 60 per cent of the vote. The county, in addition, gave a majority to four other Democrats. Obviously, something different happened in 1964. But what?

Did the events of 1964 presage the rise of the minority party from impotence to a competitive position? Or was it merely a single-election aberration which would not affect the partisan balance over the long run? And granted that something changed, what kind of a change was it? Had this sort of aberration occurred before, or was it unprecedented? Did the sudden success of the head of the ticket bring good fortune to the tail? Did the changes represent a massive shift of partisan loyalties, an influx of independents? The election results of 1964 stimulated these kinds of questions, and led to this monograph.

Hypotheses

In order to shed some light on these questions it was necessary to compare the 1964 election with those which had preceded and followed it. The comparison was undertaken of the twenty elections between 1928 and 1966. The 1928 election was chosen as a starting point because it was the last election prior to the great partisan realignment that took place during the Depression of the 1930's. The 1966 election is the terminal one because no other post-1964 elections have yet been held.

By means of this comparison of the voting patterns over these twenty elections, the following hypotheses will be explored:
1. That at some point in this time span, the relative size of the straight party vote began a consistent decline, reaching a low point in 1964.
2. That at some point in this time span, the relative size of the partisan vote began a consistent decline, reaching a low point in 1964.
3. That at some point in this time span, the relative size of the split-ticket vote began to increase and reached a high point in 1964.
These hypotheses are obviously inter-related. If the proportion of one type of vote declines, the proportion of another type of vote must rise.

The straight-party vote is defined as that vote which is cast for all candidates of one party, and for no candidates of the opposing party.

The partisan vote is defined as that vote which is cast for all but two of a party's candidates. This will be represented by the "middle-dispersion" in Chapter III.

The split-ticket vote is that vote which is cast for at least one candidate from each party (thus a split-ticket vote may or may not be also a partisan vote, depending on the number of candidates from each party for which it is cast). This will be represented by the "total dispersion" in Chapter III.

The assumption underlying these hypotheses is that the changes of patterns in the 1964 elections were made possible by a gradual decline in partisan loyalty. V. O. Key has suggested that increases in split-ticket voting are the result of a coincidence in time of a decreasing party loyalty and an increased stimulus to split the ballot.\(^1\) Granting that the presidential campaign of 1964 was an extraordinary stimulus, this paper will examine the voting records prior to that election in a search for traces of a declining party loyalty. A gradual decline in the straight party and partisan vote, and a gradual increase in the split-ticket vote, would indicate that party affiliation was becoming a less dominant factor in the voting decision.

If this is the case, it would be a source of encouragement to a minority party. If more voters were more often reaching their decisions on bases other than partisan affiliation, the minority party would be less and less handicapped by its label, superior effort and superior candidates would be more likely to receive their just reward of victory at the polls.

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The Format of the Paper

Chapter II of this paper will be devoted to an examination of the voting studies mentioned above in an attempt to gather information from them on the size of, and the changes in, the straight party, partisan, and split-ticket vote. Chapter III will examine the election records of Kalamazoo County and describe the voting patterns and their changes over the last twenty elections, and will compare the findings with those taken from the other studies. Chapter IV will draw some conclusions about which electoral shifts best explain the election of 1964, what the prospects are for the permanence of this type of voter behavior, and what bearing this has on the hopes of a minority party.
II
DATA FROM PRIOR STUDIES
The Concept of the Independent Vote

Studies of voting behavior have invariably examined the size, the nature, and the trend of the "independent" and the "partisan" vote. These common labels, however, have not always been used with a common meaning. In some studies, "independent" has referred to those voters who act in a certain way at the ballot box; splitting their ticket, shifting from one party to another party in succeeding elections, voting for third parties, and changing from non-voting to voting and back again. "Partisan" has referred to those who act in a different way, e.g., who cast their ballot for all of a party's candidates and who consistently vote in every election for the same party.

Other studies have used "independent" and "partisan" to describe the voter's self-perception. Voters who identify themselves as independents or partisans are so classified by the researcher. Thus, the characteristics of the independent (or partisan) vote depend on which kind of independent (or partisan) is being examined; those whom the researcher classifies on the basis of their voting act, or those whom he classifies on the basis of their self-perception.

The first part of this chapter will examine those studies which sort the voters on the basis of their act. The second part will examine those who classify voters on the basis of self-perception.

Independence, Partisanship, and Voting Action

The majority of the studies which have used the voting act as their method of classification have been concerned with an analysis of voting records in an attempt to get at the aggregate size, and changes, of political independence.

One of the earliest studies of voting behavior was Allen's investigation of the relation of split-ticket voting to ballot form. In order
to determine the amount of ticket-splitting, he measured the percentage difference between four categories of candidates; between the president and governor, between the state offices, between the state offices excluding the governor, and between the most and least successful candidates on a party's ticket. He found that ballots consciously designed to promote "independent" voting resulted in greater amounts of ticket-splitting, as determined by his method of measurement. As he points out, however,

"It is of course true that the states in which a strong sentiment of non-partisanship exists are the ones likely to adopt ballot laws which will encourage independent voting and vice versa, so that what appears as the effect may be in reality partly cause." 1

Be that as it may, the fact that ballot forms designed to encourage ticket-splitting have that result, tends to validate Allen's method.

Another early study was made by Chapin in 1912. He analyzed the presidential elections from 1856 to 1908, computing the standard deviations of the partisan vote for each state in each election from the mean of the partisan vote in all states. Finding that there had been a steady increase in the standard deviations over the years examined, he concluded that

"It is a statistical fact that the variability of the popular vote for president, between the states of the Union is on the increase." 2

This variability represented the proportion, or the "margin," of the electorate which was made up of independent voters. Thus, if the variability increased, an increase in the size of the independent vote and conversely, a decrease in the partisan vote, was indicated.

Having discovered that variability was increasing from election to election, and that this increase was due to extra-statistical causes, Chapin went on to show that

"...the increased variability is due to increased percentage voting, which in turn is evidence of


increasing political intelligence."\(^1\)

Further, the shift in the sizes of party pluralities also pointed to an increasing margin of independent and rational voters.

"But it is the very change in the size and allegiances of pluralities that is indicative of a shifting margin of intelligent voters."\(^2\)

Thus, the changes in the differentials of the states between 1856 and 1908 convinced Chapin that the margin of independent voters was increasing. He assumed rather too easily that such "independence" equaled intelligence.

Millspaugh, in his 1918 study of "irregular" voting in the presidential elections from 1892 to 1916, used election records to determine two types of independent voting. The differential between the vote gained by a party in one election and its share of the vote in either the preceding or succeeding election

"...will roughly represent the 'swing' either to or from that party."\(^3\)

This differential represents those who "flopped," that is, whose independence was expressed by changing from one party to another.

A second type of independence is represented by the ticket-splitter. In order to find the size of the split-ticket vote

"...the investigator must perform a somewhat uncertain operation upon the election returns."\(^4\)

The difference between the party candidate receiving the highest vote and the one receiving the lowest vote in a single election was divided by 2 and that result was converted into a percentage of the total vote cast. Millspaugh admits that

"The method is inexact in that it takes no account of interchanges of votes between parties, of votes given to third parties, and of those who do not vote at all...."
The actual percentages would always be much larger than the computed percentage. In Rhode Island (which counted the instances of ticket-splitting) in 1916 the Republican and Democratic straight tickets were 68.3 per cent of the total vote of the two parties; that is, 31.7 per cent of the voters split their tickets. The statistical method gives 14.4 per cent. Our figures do not lie, but evidently they tell only a half-truth.¹

He draws no conclusions as to the growth or shrinkage of the "irregular" vote over the time span of his study. He is careful, however, to indicate the impossibility of equating irregularity of voting behavior with intelligence.²

A more recent study, similar to Millspaugh's, was made by Gosnell and Colman. In 1940 they reported that

"...in spite of its reputation for loyalty to the Republican Party the state of Pennsylvania has been a hotbed for independent voters."³

They made this judgment on the basis of a comparison of the mean Democratic vote for president of Pennsylvania's counties in the elections of 1924 through 1936. Finding a variation from 24 per cent to 52 per cent, they state:

"Such a turnover might involve a shift on the part of one-quarter of the voters....For the period under discussion it might be assumed that three quarters of the voters clung to their parties consistently.

¹Ibid.

* I do not understand why the vote difference between the top and bottom candidates is divided by 2 in Millspaugh's computation. If it were not, if the total vote difference were divided by the total vote cast, the percentage for Rhode Island in 1916 would be 28.8%, very near to the percentage found by actual count. Thus, the Rhode Island count would tend to confirm the accuracy of his method.

²loc. cit., p.241.


⁴Ibid.
Thus the authors measured independence as revealed by the shift from one party to another, a procedure similar to that used by Millspaugh.

A somewhat different method of approaching the same phenomenon was developed by Bean under the rubric of "political flexibility."^1 On the basis of prior elections a calculation is made as to how much of a shift in the party vote in states (or regions) A, B, and C, etc., will result from an "x" percentage shift in the national vote. He shows that certain states are more flexible than others, e.g., a 10 per cent change nationally will be accompanied by a 4 per cent change in Vermont, but a 19 per cent change in North Dakota.^2 Thus he suggests that party-shifting voters are more prevalent in some places than others.

By simply comparing the shrinkage and expansion of the Democratic vote in the elections from 1876 to 1932, Ogden and Jaffe concluded that

"There was little change in independent party voting during the last quarter of the nineteenth century, if the fluctuations of the percentage of people voting one party ticket be taken as the index of independent voting. But during the twentieth century the trend has been one of considerable increase.

These authors, however, make no attempt to explain or defend their method of measurement, nor do they attempt to break down the gross changes which they find into different types of independent voter.

Hecock, in his study of election records in the city of Detroit, collated data that bears on the ticket-splitting variable of voting behavior. Discussing this variable, Hecock states:

"Party loyalty is ordinarily expressed by voting a straight ticket....In this study, the percentage of voters splitting their tickets was considered to be an index of independence from party control."^3

^1 Bean, Louis, op. cit., p.74.
^2 ibid.

^4 Hecock, Donald S., Detroit Voters and Recent Elections, Report No. 150, Detroit Bureau of Governmental Research, Inc., Detroit, p.10.
His method of determining the percentage of split-tickets seems to have been to make an actual count of the straight-party ballots cast in each precinct and to compute this total as a percentage of the total vote cast, and then to subtract that percentage from 100 to get the percentage of split-tickets. Information was only available for the judicial elections in the spring of 1935, and the general elections of 1936. For these elections, his data is as follows:¹

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Vote</th>
<th>Split Tickets</th>
<th>Per Cent of Total Vote Split</th>
<th>Per Cent of Total Vote Straight</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>243,357</td>
<td>120,032</td>
<td>49.3</td>
<td>50.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>514,003</td>
<td>172,028</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>66.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

He concludes that

"Party influence was evidently considerably less in the spring election than in the presidential elections."²

It should be noted also that the voter turnout in the spring election was 50 per cent of the 490,000 registered voters; in the 1936 election it was 77 per cent of the 663,000 voters.³ There appears to be a relationship between the changes in split and straight ticket voting, and the changes in voter turnout.

Gosnell and Gill in their study of the 1936 election in Chicago, recorded that 37 per cent of the ballots cast were straight Democratic, 21 per cent were straight Republican, and 42 per cent were split.⁴ This is a sizeable variation from Hecock's findings for Detroit.

Concerning another aspect of ticket-splitting, ballot completion, Hecock collated data showing that a substantial number of voters failed to vote for all the offices and propositions on the ballot. There was marked and progressive decline in participation as the voter moved down the ballot.

¹Ibid.
²Ibid.
³loc. cit., p.5.
In the 1936 election, 514,000 ballots were cast; on .5 per cent of these, no vote had been cast for president; 4.1 per cent failed to vote for governor; 11.2 per cent did not vote for secretary of state; 16.6 per cent failed to vote for sheriff; 16.0 per cent did not vote for county surveyor; 23.5 per cent skipped voting on Proposition No. 2.\(^1\) This aspect of non-voting "...may, of course, indicate finer discrimination of recognition of one's own ignorance rather than a lack of interest. When one realizes that there were 47 offices to be filled at this 1936 election besides six propositions to be considered, he may well inquire how as many people were able to make these decisions as the vote indicated."\(^2\)

As one aspect of his study of congressional elections, Cummings has collected data on split-ticket voting for presidential and congressional candidates. This data indicates a substantial increase in the proportion of ticket splitting in the elections from 1920 to 1964.\(^3\)

The number of Congressional districts which have given a majority to a presidential candidate of one major party and a congressional candidate of the other major party has risen from 11 (3.2 per cent) in 1920 to 145 (33.3 per cent) in 1964. This increase has been fairly consistent, also. The table below summarizes it.\(^4\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Districts</th>
<th>Split Districts</th>
<th>Per Cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>345</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>356</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>358</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>18.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>358</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>362</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>366</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>422</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>17.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>435</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>18.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>435</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>29.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>437</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>25.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>435</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^1\)loc. cit., p.9.  
\(^2\)ibid.  
\(^4\)ibid.
Another indicator cited by Cummings is the percentage spread between the vote garnered by the presidential candidate and that received by his congressional running mate. He summarizes the number of districts (in percentage terms) in which the spread is less than 2.5 per cent, less than 5 per cent, and more than 10 per cent, in districts offering a single-choice type of ballot, and in districts offering a multiple-choice ballot. His data reveal a relative stability between 1932 and 1952 and a decline in the number of districts with a narrow spread and an increase in the number of districts with a wide spread from 1952 to 1964. This holds true for both types of districts; those using multiple-choice ballots, however, show a much greater incidence of ticket-splitting. His findings are reproduced below (See Appendix, Table 1, page 62). Both of Cummings' tables clearly show an increase in split-ticket voting.

Summary

These studies of voting behavior using elections' records reveal a variety of methods. Their results are, therefore, not directly comparable. A summarization of them, however, will indicate some areas of agreement and disagreement, and will direct attention to questions that may or may not be illuminated by the findings of the voter survey method.

It is clear that the concept of the "independent voter" has a variety of meanings. Four types of "independence" have been discussed; ticket-splitting independence, party-shifting independence, independence expressed by entrance into and exit from the electorate, and ballot completion independence.

There is no agreement on the trend over time of party-shifting. Chapin believed there had been an increase between 1856 and 1908; Ogden and Jaffe held that there had been little change prior to 1900, but a considerable increase between 1900 and 1932.

1 loc. cit., p.176.
2 Chapin, op.cit.
3 Ogden and Jaffe, op.cit.
Gosnell and Coleman\(^1\) were not convinced that there was a noticeable increase in the 1924-1936 period; they were willing to say only that there was substantial fluctuation in the degree of partisan and independent voting during this period, and to hazard the guess that roughly 25 per cent of the voters shifted party, and 75 per cent did not.

These conflicting conclusions may not only be explained by differences in method, but also by differences in locale. Both Hecock\(^2\) and Bean\(^3\) indicate that the proportion of the party-shifting and ticket-splitting electorate varies with geographical area. In the studies cited above, two used national election results, one used only selected states.

The discussion of the second type of voting behavior, ticket-splitting, reveals more agreement among the commentators, but it is superficial. Millspaugh\(^4\) points to approximately a 30 per cent proportion and Hecock\(^5\) finds that one-third of the voters in the one general election for which he has data. Cummings\(^6\) found, using the congressional districts of the entire country, that there has been marked increase in the amount of ticket-splitting, although the 30 per cent level is approximated only in the last three elections. The data from the first two studies are from different elections (1916 and 1936) in different parts of the country (Rhode Island and Detroit) and are not comparable. Cummings' study, however, by surveying the whole nation over a thirty-two year period, presents persuasive evidence for a gradual and steady increase in split-ticket voting.

The information about voter participation and ballot completion to be gleaned from these studies is slight. Only Hecock\(^7\) deals with these problems. His data show that there has been a consistent decline

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\(^1\) Gosnell and Coleman, op.cit.
\(^2\) Hecock, op.cit.
\(^3\) Bean, op.cit.
\(^4\) Millspaugh, op.cit.
\(^5\) Hecock, op.cit.
\(^6\) Cummings, op.cit.
\(^7\) Hecock, op.cit.
in voter participation in presidential elections from 1920 to 1936, and that in the 1936 election, about 16 per cent of the voters chose not to complete the partisan part of their ballots.

Independence, Partisanship
And Self-Perception

The analyses of election records reveals no conclusive evidence on the incidence or the trends of the four types of voter behavior thus far identified. We turn now to those studies which have used data based on the voter's self-perception of his political allegiance. These will be examined for whatever light they may shed on the incidence and trends in party-shifting and ticket-splitting on the part of the American voter.

The elections of 1940, 1948, 1952, 1954 and 1956 have been investigated via the interview-survey method. The first two of these surveys have been samples of two different localities; the last three have dealt with national samples. Within the latter group, therefore, it is at least theoretically possible to identify trends, and this will be attempted. Comparisons of the first two with each other, or with the latter three, is not likely to be useful, due to the difference in the samples used.

Party shifting

The first of these studies, by Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet, is concerned primarily with why people voted the way they did, rather than how they voted. The authors collected minimal information on the nature of the partisanship of the voters they interviewed, focusing instead upon demographic factors and the effect of campaign activities. Partisanship was measured solely by presidential-vote intention; those intending to vote Republican were classed as Republican, those intending to vote Democratic were classed Democratic, and those without a specific vote intention were regarded as neutrals.

Defined in this way, the authors found that
"In Erie County, in 1940, changes in vote intention during the campaign were much fewer than changes in vote intention during the preceding three-and-a-half years."

Comparing the 1936 election with that of 1940, they found that 1 per cent of the 1936 Republicans had become Democrats, and 21 per cent of the 1936 Democrats had become Republicans. These percentages refer to only those who actually voted. If they are converted into percentages of the total sample, the non-voters equal 19 per cent. 63 per cent did not change their vote, and 18 per cent did. The "between-campaign" party-shifting thus amounted to 22 per cent of the actual voters. The within-campaign party shifting was of a different order. The total change was 8 per cent, 2 per cent changing from Republican to Democrat, and 6 per cent changing from Democrat to Republican. Thus the bulk of the party-changing occurred prior to the campaign period; but the campaign served to accelerate the rate of change, roughly one-third of the shifts coming in one-eighth of the four-year time span.

There was, however, another dimension to party-shifting which does not reveal itself in the election records. These are the shifts made by two types of changers labeled by the authors as "crystallizers," and "waverers."  

2 loc. cit., p.66.
3 ibid.

*The table on page xi shows 392 of 483 cases voting, or 81 per cent of the sample. By multiplying 392 by 78 per cent, we find the number of non-changing cases--306; by multiplying 392 by 18 per cent, we find the number of changing cases--86. Dividing these two results by 483, the total cases in the sample, we find the percentage of the total sample which did not change, and did change, respectively 63 and 18.
The former category includes those who had no vote intention in May but later acquired one; 28 per cent of the sample belonged to this group. The latter embraced those who began the survey period with an intention, later changed their mind, and then still later returned to their original choice; 15 per cent belonged in this category.

To summarize: 30 per cent of the sample changed their party vote between November, 1936 and November, 1940; the voting decision of 43 per cent was affected by the campaign.*

The major study of the 1948 election was done by Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee, as a sequel to their 1940 investigation of voting behavior in Erie County, Ohio. They were again primarily interested in exploring the relationships of demographic factors to the voter intentions and decisions of the citizens of Elmira, N.Y. Concentrating entirely on the presidential vote, they ignore split-ticket voting completely. Their concern for the effects of partisanship on the voting decision is peripheral; most of their attention is centered on the effects upon the voting decision of economic and social status, religious affiliation, educational level, communication media, and the campaign issues and personalities. At this periphery, however, they do record certain shifts of voting intentions during the campaign.

The authors use the self-identification method of determining partisan affiliation. Respondents were asked

"...whether they planned to vote at all; if so, for which party; and finally, how strongly they felt about their choice."1

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* To what extent the 43 per cent are also counted in the 30 per cent is unclear. It appears that those who went from a neutral to a partisan position, and those who went from one party to the other and then back again, are double-counted.
On the basis of the answers given, they were then separated into strong Republicans, moderate Republicans, Neutrals, moderate Democrats and strong Democrats. The Neutral category consisted of those who were undecided or did not intend to vote. The information was gathered in four interviews, conducted in June, August, October and November.

It was found that most voters did not change their voting intention during the campaign.

"...about two-thirds of those who voted in November had not shifted position at all—had not so much as wavered to a neutral viewpoint from June (before the conventions) to November. Voters do not change easily, at least during a campaign."\(^1\)

One-third of the voters, therefore, signified one intention in June and then changed it sometime between June and November. Many of these changes, however, reflect the forces that lead to stable voting behavior. Of those who were undecided in June, three-fourths changed from "indecision" to the party for which they had voted in 1944.\(^2\)

Of those who had a different vote intention in June from the vote that they had cast in 1944, 40 per cent changed back to their 1944 loyalty.\(^3\)

It appears that the total number of waverers between "indecision" and party was 70, or 13 per cent of the sample; the number of waverers between parties was 86, or 16 per cent of the sample. This inference is made on the assumption that in the authors' Chart II, page 17, the category "wavered between party" is the same as those who had a different vote intention in June from the vote that they cast in 1944, and that the category "wavered between party and neutral" is equated with those who changed from indecision to party. If this assumption is correct, then this latter "three-fourths" represents 52 cases, and the former represents 34 cases, of a total sample of 538. 6 per cent of the sample wavered and returned to their party; conversely, 10 per cent wavered and changed parties (52 of 538 cases). Likewise, of the 13

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\(^1\) loc. cit., p.19.
\(^2\) ibid.
\(^3\) ibid.

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per cent of the sample who were undecided, 10 per cent returned
to their original loyalty, and 3 per cent (24 of 538 cases) did
not; it is not possible to determine whether they changed parties,
or became non-voters. A large proportion of change during this
campaign represents lost sheep returning to the partisan fold.
The effect of the campaign was to reduce the number of party-
shifters, to retrieve those partisans who had wandered off after
the 1944 campaign and return them to their earlier loyalty in time
for the 1948 vote.

When the electorate was divided into the five categories of
strong and moderate partisans, and neutrals, it was found that the
campaign had two effects. One tended to reinforce previously held
loyalties. The percentage of strong Republicans increased from 30
per cent to 34 per cent; that of strong Democrats increased from 8
per cent to 10 per cent. The percentage of moderate Republicans
decreased from 32 per cent in June to 26 per cent in August to 19
per cent in October; that of moderate Democrats was less dramatic,
being 14, 16, and 13 per cent, respectively. The changes in the
moderate partisan proportions brings us to the second change. The
neutrals category increased from 16 per cent in June to 18 per cent
in August to 24 per cent in October. Thus the campaign gradually
forced the voter to one of two positions; either a more extreme
partisanship, or non-participation.

If only those voters with vote intention are taken into
account, the proportion with "strong" feelings for their
candidate rises from 45 per cent in June to 49 per cent
in August and 57 per cent in October. The increase in
the neutral category is mainly a rise in non-voting,
not indecision.

This data suggests that there are a good many more party-changers,
or "independents," between campaigns than at elections. The campaign
forces voters toward one party or the other, or out of the electorate,
and more often than not, in the direction of their previous partisan
choice. Although this study does not present any statistics which can

1loc. cit., p.22.
be compared with confidence to election-record data, it warns that there are likely to be many more changes in the electorate than will be revealed in the election results.

A survey of a small national sample in the 1948 election by Campbell and Kahn suggests a partisan division of 35 per cent Democratic, 35 per cent Republican, 20 per cent undecided, and 5 per cent oriented toward minor parties. This division is based on the respondents' self-perception of their partisan loyalties. Because this study reports the partisan vote only as percentages of those who actually voted, it is impossible to compare the actual vote with the self-perceived party allegiance, and thus to describe shifts to and from that allegiance. The authors do indicate, however, that 37 per cent of the actual voters "knew all along" how they would vote, and that another 28 per cent had decided immediately after the party conventions. It may be inferred that the remaining 27 per cent* were involved in some kind of shifting between candidates.

Eldersveld, rejecting self-perception of partisan identification, but making his division of the sample on the basis of past voting history, disagrees with Campbell and Kahn. He divides the 1948 sample into 43.7 per cent definite Democrats; 36.7 per cent Independents, and Democratic and Republican Independents; and 19.6 per cent definite Republicans. If the independent partisans are added to the definite partisans, the breakdown is as follows: 59.4 per cent Democrats, 14 per cent Republicans and 7.2 per cent Independents. In neither case do his findings support those of Campbell and Kahn.

The most thorough-going analysis of American Voting behavior has

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2 *loc. cit., p.9.*


4 *ibid.*

*8 per cent were not ascertained.*
been done by Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes. Their interviews classify voters in seven categories: strong, weak, and independent Democrats and Republicans, and Independents. They find that there has been little change in the relative size of these groups over the six years from 1952 to 1958.¹

"Moreover, Table 6-1 documents the stability of this division of party loyalty in a period whose electoral history might suggest widespread change. Except for the shifting size of the group of respondents refusing to be assigned any position on the party scale, there is not a single variation between successive distributions of party identification that could not be laid to sampling error."

They further show that partisan self-identification is closely correlated to voting for president. In 1956 82 per cent of the strong partisans, 60 per cent of the weak partisans, 36 per cent of the independent partisans, and 16 per cent of the independents reported that they "voted always or mostly for the same party."³ Thus, the stronger the partisanship, the more stable is the voting behavior over the time period. By performing a conversion operation* on this data, it is found that 62 per cent of the sample "voted always or mostly for the same party," and 38 per cent shift between parties.

The fact that there has been little change in the percentages of various kinds of partisan affiliation does not prove that there has in fact been little change, but it strongly suggests it. As the authors point out,


² loc. cit., p.127.

³ loc. cit., p.125.

* The percentage in each category is converted into the number of cases. The total number of cases cited as "always or mostly voting for the same party" is then figured as a percentage of all cases in the sample, and cited above.
"...the percentages of Table 6-1 show only the absence of net change. The similarity of these distributions may conceal a substantial volume of compensating change."

They believe, however, on the basis of unreported data concerning change of party allegiance that

The responses give impressive evidence of the constancy of party allegiance.  

The partisan allegiance of voters is remarkably stable; but within this context of stability, nearly 40 per cent of the voters are willing to change their vote from one party to another in presidential elections.

Janowitz and Marvick, in their investigation of the 1952 election, have used the same basic data as Campbell et al., but have used it in a slightly different way. Rather than depending only on self-perception to determine partisan allegiance, they combined self-assignment with the direction of the voter's first vote, and his parents' partisan allegiance. Respondents showing agreement between the first two, or among all three of these measures were classified as partisans, either Republican or Democratic, and those exhibiting disagreement between the first two were assigned to the "uncommitted" category. Sorting the sample in this way, they found that 20.2 per cent of the sample were Republicans, 39.4 per cent were Democrats, and 40.4 per cent were uncommitted. This division of the electorate differs substantially from that made by Campbell et al. They found, on the basis of self-perception only, that 27 per cent of the sample fell into the combined categories of strong and weak Republicans, 47 per cent into the strong

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1 loc. cit., p.127.
2 ibid.
and weak Democrat classification, and only 22 per cent into the independent and independent partisan category.  

Comparing the 1948 and the 1952 elections, Janowitz and Marvick show that 29.6 per cent switched parties, 46.5 maintained their partisan loyalties in both elections, and 16.1 per cent were persistent non-voters.  

The group of voters who shifted did not by any means all come from the uncommitted sector of the electorate. 7.4 per cent of the Republican partisans switched (2.4 per cent from a Democratic vote in 1948 to a Republican vote in 1952, 5 per cent from non-voting to a Republican vote); 16.6 per cent of the uncommitted changed (8.7 per cent from a Democratic vote to a Republican one, and 7.9 per cent from no vote to a Republican ballot); 13.4 per cent of the Democratic partisans shifted their vote (6.5 per cent from Democratic to Republican, and 6.9 per cent from non-voting to Republican).  

Of the 959 partisan cases 109 changed their vote between 1948 and 1952, a percentage of 11.4. Thus the uncommitted change more readily (16.6 per cent) than the partisans, but not dramatically so.  

An analysis of the 1960 elections indicates that the net shift between 1956 and 1960 of 8 per cent in the voting statistics expands to 11 per cent when the "fringe groupings" (those who were too young to vote in 1965 but not too young in 1960; the elderly, who voted in 1956 but could not do so in 1960 because of death or disability) are removed. Among those who could vote in both elections, and did, an 11 per cent net shift occurred.

"However, that...net shift of 11 per cent in the vote of the active 1956-1960 electorate in fact derived from a gross shift of 23 per cent, over half of which

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1Campbell, et.al., op. cit., p.124.
2Janowitz and Marvick, op. cit., p.16.
3loc. cit., p.15.
was rendered invisible in the national total because counter-movements canceled themselves out.\[^{1}\]

About 17 per cent of the electorate shifted from an Eisenhower vote in 1956 to a Kennedy vote in 1960, and 6 per cent of the voters who chose Stevenson in 1956 switched to Nixon in 1960. Thus the total shift was 23 per cent. This is not a dramatically smaller proportion than the 29.6 per cent which Janowitz and Marvick found changed parties between 1948 and 1952.

The studies cited above all concerned themselves with Presidential elections. Only one survey study has concerned itself with a Congressional election, that of Campbell and Cooper\[^{2}\] in 1954. This study was limited by necessity to determining intention to vote, rather than actual vote cast. The authors, however, attempted to correct for the probable error that would result from good intentions not fulfilled by measuring the persistence of the respondents in voting in previous elections.\[^{3}\]

The respondents were divided into three categories. Those who had voted in all or most past elections and intended to vote Democratic for Congress were classified as probable Democratic voters. Those with the same kind of past practice, who intended to vote Republican, were classified as probable Republican voters. Those who had voted in some or none of the previous elections; or who had not decided to vote; or had decided not to vote; or had not decided for whom to vote; all these were classed as probable non-voters.\[^{4}\] These definitions

"...divided the sample into 24 per cent probable Democratic voters, 22 per cent probable Republican voters, and 54 per cent probable non-voters. The division among voters alone was 52 per cent Democratic and 48 per cent Republican."\[^{5}\]

\[^{1}\] loc. cit., p.272.
\[^{2}\] Campbell, Angus and Cooper, Homer C., Group Differences in Attitudes and Votes, Ann Arbor: Survey Research Center, Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, (1956), p.2.
\[^{3}\] loc. cit., p.8.
\[^{4}\] loc. cit., p.9.
\[^{5}\] ibid.

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A comparison with actual voting results confirmed the essential accuracy of the proportions determined in the survey.\footnote{1}

The specific vote intention of the voters was related to their partisan classification. In 1952, 61 per cent of the voters followed their partisan inclination; 14 per cent voted against their party; and 24 per cent did not vote. In 1954, 45 per cent voted for their parties' candidate for Congress; 5 per cent voted against their party allegiance; 52 per cent did not vote.\footnote{2} (See Appendix, Table 2, page 63).

The findings of this section are difficult to summarize, partly because of the different methods used by the various authors, and partly because the findings are described in different contexts. The 1940\footnote{3} and 1948\footnote{4} studies both described changes that took place during the campaign periods among the actual voters. The former found that 43 per cent of the actual voters changed, 8 per cent changing parties; the latter found that 33 per cent of the voters changed, 10-13 per cent changing between parties. These studies were made in different locales. A second study\footnote{5} of the 1948 election suggests that 27 per cent of those who actually voted were involved in some kind of vote-changing behavior.

The 1948 study also reveals the changes that occurred between elections. About 18 per cent of the total sample changed parties, 63 per cent continued their partisan allegiance, and 19 per cent remained non-voters. This can be compared with the 1952\footnote{6} study of a national sample, which shows 29.6 per cent changing parties, 46.5 per cent not changing parties, and 16.1 per cent remaining non-voters. The latter study indicates also that change occurred nearly as often among partisans as among the uncommitted voters.

A second kind of comparison can be made in terms of party identi-
fication. Campbell and Kahn found in 1948 that the electorate divided into 35 per cent Democrats, 35 per cent Republicans, 20 per cent undecided, and 5 per cent minor-party oriented.\(^1\) Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes, surveying partisan identification from 1952 to 1958, found its stability to be its most prominent feature. The Democrats never had less than 44 per cent, nor more than 47 per cent; the Republicans ranged from a low of 26 per cent to a high of 30 per cent; and independents claimed from 18 to 24 per cent.\(^2\) Different classification methods, however, bring different results. Janowitz and Marvick, using the same survey data, but different classifications of partisan and non-partisan, find that in 1952, 20 per cent of the sample were Republicans, 39 were Democrats, and 40 per cent were uncommitted,\(^3\) a considerably different conclusion than that drawn by Campbell, \textit{et al.}.

A third comparison can be made between the vote cast and party identification in different elections. Only two authorities deal with their data in this way. One finds that in 1952 61 per cent of the sample voted in accord with their party affiliation and 38 per cent did not (14 per cent voting against their party, and 24 per cent not voting at all).\(^4\) The second confirms this finding; in 1956, 62 per cent of those interviewed said they consistently voted for their party's candidates; 38 per cent indicated that they switched parties.\(^5\)

When the light from this data is focused upon the situation of a minority party, two things can be said. First, the minority party can take little comfort in hopes for changes in party identification. The evidence consistently points to the conclusion that there is no national trend toward either party, nor toward voter independence. Second, the minority party can be optimistic about its presidential

\(^{1}\)Campbell and Kahn, \textit{op.cit.}\n\(^{2}\)Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes, \textit{op.cit.}\n\(^{3}\)Janowitz and Marvick, \textit{op.cit.}\n\(^{4}\)Janowitz and Marvick, \textit{op.cit.}\n\(^{5}\)Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes, \textit{op.cit.}
chances. It appears that approximately one-third of the voters can be persuaded to cast their ballot against their party's presidential nominee; it is also worth noting that the data suggests that a large share of this kind of shifting occurs prior to campaigns. The effect that this shifting in presidential voting behavior has on the fortunes of local party candidates will next be examined, as we turn to the subject of split-ticket voting.

**Split-ticket voting**

Because the survey type of investigations into voter behavior have been primarily concerned with the presidential vote, and therefore have not paid much attention to what the voter does after he votes for president, there is less data on split-ticket voting than on party-shift voting.

In 1948, Campbell and Kahn report that 25 per cent of those voting split their tickets, 65 per cent voted a straight ticket, and 10 per cent were not ascertained.¹

In a resume of the problem of the independent voter, Eldersveld criticizes the use of either election records ("too narrow and rigid") or self-perception of respondents ("which...may not reveal who actually are independents.") He used instead both

"...official data on split-voting and computations based on responses to survey questions concerning voting behavior..."²

but eschewed self-classification completely.

In a 1948 sample of 662 cases, 243 or 36.7 per cent were classed as independents on the basis method described above. Of the actual voters among these 243 cases, 56.5 per cent split their ticket; 43.5 per cent did not. But this was not the only way they demonstrated their independence. About 31 per cent stated that they shifted between parties occasionally, 37 per cent claimed to do it regularly and 5 per cent

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¹Campbell and Kahn, op. cit., p.9.
shifted regularly to minor parties.¹

Since the author does not specify how many of the 243 independents actually voted, it is impossible to determine the number of ticket-splitters, and thus the proportion they make up of the population.

DeGrazia, studying the 1952 election in the Western states, discovered a substantial difference in the degree of ticket-splitting in different sections of the country.

"Of all those who cast ballots in the West, 58 per cent voted a straight ballot. In contrast, 55 per cent of the Midwesterners voted straight tickets, 79 per cent of the Southerners, and 83 per cent of the Northeasterners. The difference stands out with a special sharpness when it is recalled that the people of the West distributed their party affiliations much like Midwesterners and Northeasterners."²

The percentage of ticket-splitters is, of course, the reverse of the straight ticket percentages cited—42, 34, 31 and 17 per cent, respectively, for the various regions. The author does not present the data necessary for calculating the percentage of the national sample which split its ballot.

There are, of course, as many ways to split a ticket as there are candidates on the ballot. Campbell and Miller divided a 1956 sample into five categories.

1. Those who voted a straight ticket except for President.
2. Those who voted a straight ticket except for congressman or senator.
3. Those who voted a straight national ticket for one party and a straight state and local ticket for the opposite party.
4. Those who voted a straight national ticket and split the state and local ticket.
5. Those who split their ticket at all levels.³

¹loc. cit., p.738.
They also included the percentage of those who did not split their ballot and divided the sample by geographical region. The results are summarized below 1 (See Appendix, Table 3, page 64).

This table indicates that the bulk of ticket-splitting is done at all levels of the ballot (Type 5), and that about 35 to 40 percent of the voters split their vote in the 1952 and 1956 elections. There appears also to be a trend toward increased ticket-splitting, but a two-election span is too short a period to be anything more than suggestive. The different practices of South and North point to the difficulty of applying findings from a national sample to any specific locality.

Data from the same survey was used by Cummings to project the degree of ticket-splitting between presidential and congressional candidates. His estimates for 1952 are that 84 per cent of the voters supported presidential and congressional candidates of the same party and 16 per cent split their ticket. In the 1956 election, only 79 per cent voted a straight ballot for these two offices and split-ticket voting increased to 21 per cent. 2 The conclusions which he draws on the basis of election data* are mildly confirmed by the data gathered by interviews.

Using a sample of 939 cases in 1956, Campbell et al. charted the difference in split-ticket voting between urban voters and non-Southern rural voters. By converting their sub-sample percentages to total sample percentages +, we find that 43.6 per cent of the total were ticket-splitters. Rural voters were much more likely to split than were their urban counterparts; the proportions were 51.7 per cent for farm and rural non-farm respondents, and 32.7 per cent for urban dwellers. 3

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1 loc. cit., p.295.
2 Cummings, op. cit., p.13.
3 Campbell, Converse, Miller & Stokes, op. cit., p.407.
* It is unclear whether or not the survey used here is the same as the one used as the basis for the article cited on page 35. The number of cases reported differs.
+ See explanatory note, page 23.
Cox also believes that there is an increasing trend toward split-ticket voting.

"...33 per cent of those voting in the presidential race in 1952 split their tickets; in 1956 the percentage climbed to 43."

He suggests that split-ticket voting can be measured by comparing the average number of votes, for two different offices within one election, for different parties. Over a series of elections from 1932 to 1956, he finds that the

"...rate of ticket splitting in the 1950's is over twice that of the previous two decades, and apparently is steadily increasing. Even in off-year elections—normally with less "splitting" due to the absence of as many opportunities—recent figures (4.78 per cent in 1954, 4.69 per cent in 1958) are considerably higher than the earlier presidential-year percentages."  

His percentages differ drastically from those cited by other authorities, but he agrees that there is an upward trend.

Bringing this data together reveals that all those investigators that compared the incidence of split-ticket voting over a series of elections agree that it has increased. This finding is confirmed also by the fact that the earliest (1948) percentage of ticket-splitting is also the lowest (25 per cent). There is also substantial agreement on the degree of split-ticket voting—about 35 to 40 per cent of the electorate.

These agreements, however, may be spurious. The most thorough of the investigations all seemingly use the same basic data—the sample survey by the Michigan Survey Research Center during the 1950's. The independent conclusions may be similar because they are based on identical data.

The commentators also make clear that the degree of split-ticket voting varies from one geographical region to another, and depends upon the offices under consideration. Thus, the degree of splitting between president and congressman is considerably less than the splitting

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2ibid.
for all offices; and the degree of splitting is quite different between West and South, and between urban and rural areas.

In general, the amount and upward trend of this phenomenon augurs well for the party heretofore trapped in a minority status. It suggests that more and more voters will discriminate between more and less attractive candidates, and that their voting decisions are susceptible to candidate-oriented influences.

We turn now to an examination of the voting records of a one-party county.
III
VOTING PATTERNS IN KALAMAZOO
COUNTY

As he watched the returns come in at the County Court House on election night, 1964, one of the party faithful muttered, "This is the craziest election I ever saw; you can't tell nothin' from these returns." This chapter is an attempt to be able to "tell something" from those election returns.

The voting patterns of 1964 in Kalamazoo County were unusual in three respects. The Democratic party garnered its highest vote totals in the county's history; the dispersion pattern was unique; and the election was characterized by an unusually low turnout. Do these changes in the voting pattern indicate changes in partisan allegiance, or only temporary aberrations from the basic party loyalties? What specific changes did occur, and what do they mean? This chapter will describe the shifts which the election records indicate took place; Chapter IV will attempt to illuminate their significance.

Voting Patterns

The pattern of voter turnout

The population of Michigan has grown from 3,688,412 in 1928 to 8,220,000 in 1966, a 225 per cent increase and an average growth of 455,158, or 22 per cent each four year election period—the period from one presidential election to the next, or from one non-presidential election to the next.

As is to be expected, the Michigan vote has also grown (See Appendix, Table 4, page 65) for the leading office (the office receiving the most votes). The vote in presidential elections has grown from a low of 1,372,082 in 1928 to a high of 3,318,097 in 1960, a 240 per cent increase and an average increase of 194,602, or 24 per cent per presidential election period. Thus, changes in the size of the state vote closely approximate the changes in the size of the population. The growth pattern of the vote, however, has not been as
regular as the population growth pattern. Whereas the population has steadily increased, the total vote pattern is marked by two major irregularities; in both 1948 and 1964, the total vote cast for president was less than the vote cast in the preceding presidential elections.

A similar pattern is found in the non-presidential elections. The low of 850,892 was recorded in 1930; the high of 2,764,839 in 1962. This represents an increase of 325 per cent, an average of 191,397, or 32 per cent per election period. The percentage increase is substantially higher than the percentage increase in presidential election years because 1930 had an unusually low turnout. If the percentage is based on 1934 instead of 1928, the total increase is 226 per cent for an average increase of 25 per cent per election period, a growth that is nearly identical to that of the presidential periods. The non-presidential periods also reveal two irregularities in the growth pattern, but only one of them matches the presidential irregularities. The first decline in the non-presidential pattern came between 1938 and 1942, rather than in the 1944-1948 period of the presidential elections. The second decline, however, roughly matches the time-span of presidential deviation. It embraced the elections of 1962 to 1966, and is thus comparable to the presidential elections of 1962-1964 in which a decline of roughly the same size occurred. It is worth noting also that neither the presidential nor the non-presidential deviations correspond to the modest deviations from the upward trend of population growth.

The patterns of voter turnout in Michigan represented by the total vote for the leading office in both presidential and non-presidential elections follow the population growth pattern, except for two significant deviations.

The patterns of voter turnout of Kalamazoo County are very similar to those of the state in which it lies (See Appendix, Table 5, page 66). Its population has grown from 71,225 in 1928 to 169,712 in 1960, a 240 per cent increase and an average growth of 10,943, or 27 per cent per election period. Its vote in presidential elections has risen from 29,830 in 1928 to 67,434 in 1964, a 226 per cent increase and an average increase of 4,178, or 25 per cent per election period.
In non-presidential elections, the county vote has risen from 16,486 in 1930 to 50,992 in 1962, a gain of 310 per cent and an average increase of 3,834, or 34 per cent.

The county's election deviations from the normal growth pattern, however, are different from the deviations seen in the state pattern. In presidential elections, the total county vote declined roughly 2,000 votes from 1940 to 1944, and an additional 137 votes in 1948. The decrease for Michigan as a whole occurred only from 1944 to 1948. Also, there is not a decrease between 1960 and 1964 to match the state decrease in that period. The county vote for president increased slightly despite the 100,000 vote decline for the state. The non-presidential election pattern follows that of the state as a whole in the first instance; there is a substantial decrease in the county vote from 1938 to 1942. The county departs from the state pattern in the second instance; there was an increase from 1962 to 1966 of nearly 3,000 votes.

In summary, then, the voter turnout pattern of Kalamazoo County is basically parallel to that of the state of Michigan. The most noticeable diversion occurs in the 1960-1966 elections. In the presidential elections of that period, the state vote declines 3 per cent, the county vote increased .5 per cent; in the non-presidential elections, the state vote declined 12 per cent, while the county vote rose 5 per cent.

**Presidential and non-presidential elections - "fall-off"**

When presidential and non-presidential elections are compared, the most notable difference is in the size of the voter turnout (See Appendix, Table 6, page 66). The total vote in non-presidential years is invariably less than that in presidential elections. This "fall-off" is illustrated by the vote, stated as a percentage of the total population, cast for the "leading" office.*

*The "leading office" is that office for which the most votes were cast in the election. In most cases, it is either the presidency or the governorship, but there are a few exceptions.
At the state level in presidential elections, the highest vote level was 42 per cent (in 1952 and 1960); the lowest was 39 per cent (in 1964). In non-presidential years the highest vote was 35 per cent (in 1962); the lowest was 18 per cent (in 1930). The median level of the ten elections from 1928 to 1964 was 40 per cent in the presidential years; for the ten off-year elections from 1930 to 1966 it was 30 per cent. The "fall-off," the difference between the percentage level of a presidential election and the following non-presidential election ranged from a high of 19 per cent to a low of 5 per cent; the median "fall-off" was 10 per cent.

The same pattern is observable in Kalamazoo County. In presidential elections the highest vote level was 44 per cent; the lowest was 36 per cent. In the off-year elections, the highest level was 32 per cent and the lowest 18 per cent. The median percentage level for the ten presidential elections was 41 per cent; the median for the off-year elections was 28 per cent. The "fall-off" ranged from a high of 24 per cent to a low of 8 per cent; the median level was 11 per cent.

This variation of vote-level from presidential to non-presidential election is important because of its affect upon partisan fortunes. Its affect on Democratic party vote levels will be examined shortly. But before we turn to that, it is worth noting a sub-pattern within the main pattern of "fall-off." Although there is no recognizable pattern in the vote-levels in presidential elections, there is one in the non-presidential elections. Both state and county totals show a gradual rise in the percentage of the population participating in the off-year elections. (See Appendix, Table 6, page 67). Beginning in the 1946 election, the percentage climbs from 29 per cent in that year to a state high of 35 per cent in 1962, and to a county peak of 32 per cent in 1966. The increase is too slight to do more than suggest that perhaps a growing proportion of the electorate is developing an interest in the off-year balloting.

The significance of this sub-pattern is increased somewhat when it is set in the context of the effect of the "fall-off" on Democratic party fortunes. It is a political commonplace that Democrats do not turn out for the off-year elections. An analysis of the Democratic vote...
from 1928 to 1955 dictates a certain caution in making that assertion. (See Appendix, Table 7, page 68). If the median Democratic vote in each election is computed as a percentage of the total vote, we find that from 1932 to 1950, the median Democratic candidate receives a smaller percentage of the vote in an off-year than does the median candidate in a presidential year. The "fall-off" pattern inflicts greater damage on the Democrats. But beginning in 1952 and extending through 1962, the pattern is reversed. On both state and county levels, the median Democratic candidate receives the same, or a larger share, of the total vote in the non-presidential year. It would seem that in these years it was the Republicans rather than the Democrats who stayed home. The combination of the gradual rise in participation in the off-year election, and the ability of the lower-class party to bring its supporters to the polls without the spur of the drama of the presidential contest, point to an important change in a pattern of at least twenty years standing.

Whether this is a permanent change is open to debate; the 1964-1966 elections return to the older configuration.

The pattern of the straight party vote

The straight party vote is defined as that vote which is cast for all the candidates of one party on the ballot. A split-ticket is one in which some votes are cast for candidates of one party, and some for candidates of another party; or, one in which votes are cast for some candidates of a party, but not for all candidates. The numbers of voters who vote a straight party ballot or split their ballot is difficult to determine without interviewing them. For purposes of this paper, it is assumed that the vote received by the candidate getting the lowest number of votes represents the straight party vote.

The straight party vote cannot be less than the vote garnered by the party's lowest candidate. All straight party ballots are credited to the account of all party candidates. Therefore, the lowest candidacy must include all straight ballots cast. A straight party ballot, by definition, cannot exclude any candidate, and therefore the lowest candidate's total must represent at least the number of straight party ballots.
It cannot be demonstrated, however, that the straight party vote cannot be more than the total vote received by the lowest candidate. A person could conceivably vote for Senator Goldwater (the lowest Republican candidate) and for no other Republicans in 1964. Thus, the Goldwater total would represent at least one split ticket. The assumption that the straight party vote is not substantially greater than the lowest candidate's total rests largely on the hypothesis that people who will vote for the least popular party candidate are likely to vote for the other more popular candidates, and therefore will vote a straight ticket.

There is some evidence that bears on this assumption. James Q. Wilson, in his book, *Negro Politics*, seems to share it in his discussion of Negro straight party voting. Although he does not discuss his method of determining the straight party vote, he indicates that a small "spread" between the top and the bottom of the ticket represents a large straight party vote. The bottom of the ticket, therefore, represents the straight party vote, and the very small deviations (1-2 per cent) in the cases he cites represent the split-ticket ballots. This seems to be his assumption, although he does not explicitly say so.

In a study of the 1948 election, *The People Elect a President*, the authors determined the number of straight party votes by interviewing techniques. They conclude that 75 per cent of the electorate voted a straight party ticket in 1948. A study of the 1952 election, using the same methods, indicates that 66 per cent of the Midwestern electorate voted a straight ticket in that election. These percentages were representative of national samples. The lowest-vote method of determining the straight party vote shows that in Kalamazoo County in those two elections, the straight vote was 93 per cent in both elections. Thus, there is an 18 per cent and 27 per cent deviation. Insofar as Kalamazoo County was less representative of the nation as a whole,

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2Campbell and Kahn, op. cit., p.12

3DeGrazia, Alfred, op. cit., p.162.
than these random samples cited, that might explain the deviation. It may also be that the lowest-vote method is simply an inaccurate way of measuring the straight party vote.

We will assume, however, that the difference between the lowest vote total and the straight party vote remains relatively constant over time and is, therefore, usable for comparative purposes.

The movement of the Democratic straight party vote can be divided into four patterns; a rising pattern from 1928 to 1932, a "zig-zag" pattern from 1932 to 1950, a level pattern from 1950 to 1962, and a consistent decline from 1962 to 1966. (See Appendix, Tables 8 and 8A and Chart 8, pages 69, 70, and 70A).

In the first of these periods, the low vote on the Democratic ticket rose from 20 per cent of the total vote in 1928 to 22 per cent in the off-year election of 1930 and to 39 per cent in 1932.

The second period shows two characteristics. First, the percentile straight party vote follows a "zig-zag" pattern, rising in presidential years, falling in non-presidential years. The single exception to this movement occurred in 1940, when in spite of a 3 per cent gain for the ticket as a whole, the lowest candidate slipped 5 per cent. The "zig-zag" follows closely the "fall-off" pattern of voter turn-out described earlier. In this period the mean "fall-off" of the Democratic straight party vote was 7 per cent; the mean "fall-off" in voter turn-out was 10 per cent. Second, the percentile Democratic straight party vote shows a long term decline. From the 39 per cent reached in 1932, it rose to 41 per cent in 1936, and then consistently decreased until 1946 when it reached 22 per cent. Again, there is one major exception to this pattern during the 1932-1950 time span. The party recouped most of its straight-vote losses in 1948, rising from the 22 per cent of 1946 to 37 per cent. The pattern of the straight party vote from 1932-1950 is generally a "zig-zag" downhill.

During the third period, from 1950 to 1962, the Democratic straight party vote falls into a single pattern. In contrast to the long-term decline of the prior period, the percentage level of the straight party vote remains essentially the same. In 1950 it claimed 33 per cent of the total vote; in 1962 it claimed 34 per cent. In six of the seven
elections in this period, it varied only 2 per cent, from 33 per cent to 35 per cent. In only one of them did it drop to 29 per cent. The long-term pattern, therefore, can be said to be a level one.

A change worth noting is the abandonment of any kind of percentage variation from presidential to non-presidential election. In 1950, 1952, 1954, 1958, 1960 and 1962 the straight party vote claimed 34 per cent of the total vote. Even though there were substantial changes in the number of votes cast, the percentages stayed the same, with the single exception of 1956, when it fell to 29 per cent.

The fourth pattern, from 1960 to 1966 exhibits a consistent decline in the straight party vote, from 34 per cent to 29 per cent to 27 per cent. The period is too short to say much about the longevity of this trend.

Turning now to the Republican straight party vote (See Appendix, Table 9 and Chart 9, pp. 71 & 71A), we find as is to be expected, that the Republican patterns are generally the inverse of the Democratic patterns. From 1932-1950, the Republican straight party vote shows a "zig-zag" pattern similar to that of the Democratic vote; the Republican vote, however, rises in the off-year elections and declines in the presidential years; and its long-term movement is upward rather than downward as was the Democratic movement. From 1950 to 1962, the Republican vote levels off at 60 per cent and remains within the 59 per cent to 62 per cent range from the seven elections in this period. A further difference is found in the 1960-1966 period; whereas the Democratic vote consistently declined, the Republican vote returned to the earlier "zig-zag" pattern, falling to 40 per cent in the presidential election of 1964, and rising to 51 per cent in the following non-presidential year.

In summary, the straight party votes of both parties have different patterns during the time-span under consideration. In the period just preceding the 1964 election, both parties show a leveling of the straight ticket vote. The absence of one pattern may also be noted. There is no consistent decline in the level of straight party voting for either party. If there has been a steady increase in the proportion of voters splitting their tickets in recent years, as some commentators suggest, it does not appear in the Kalamazoo County elections prior to 1964.
The pattern of dispersion

Vote dispersion refers to the difference in the percentage of votes received by a higher candidate on a party's ticket and the percentage received by a lower candidate. It is a measure of the "distance" between the two candidates in terms of the percentage of vote received.

The degree of dispersion is also an index of the minimum level of ticket-splitting. Dispersion can only exist if some voters split their tickets; a complete absence of ticket-splitting would result in a zero percentage of dispersion since all candidates on the ballot would receive exactly the same number of votes. Dispersion is not, however, an index of the maximum level of ticket-splitting. It does not reveal the split tickets which cancel each other. A Democrat splitting for the Republican presidential candidate, and a Republican splitting for the Democratic presidential candidate will cancel each other out and their ticket-splitting will not show up in the election records. It will not, therefore, be measured in the dispersion percentages.

Although the dispersion measure cannot be relied on to show the absolute amount of ticket-splitting, it can indicate the relative amount over a series of elections. Drastic changes in the dispersion indicate drastic changes in ticket-splitting; stability in the dispersion points to stable levels of ticket-splitting, assuming that the percentage of self-canceling split-tickets also remains stable. Thus the dispersion can be used to measure relative changes but not absolute changes in split-ticket voting.

I will distinguish between two kinds of dispersion. The first, the total-dispersion, refers to the distance of the highest party candidate from the lowest. Dramatic changes in this dispersion are not uncommon. The second, the middle-dispersion, refers to the distance between the second-highest and the second-lowest candidates.

This distinction between two types of dispersion is made in an attempt to describe the distribution of the party vote around the median party candidate. If the highest and lowest candidates run well ahead and behind their tickets, the total-dispersion would suggest that
there is a wide distribution of the vote around the median. Computation of the middle-dispersion will show whether this is in fact the case, or whether the bulk of the candidates are clustered within a few percentage points of each other, and only the top and bottom candidates distributed some distance from the median.

Further, the middle-dispersion distribution points to the degree of partisan solidarity. If all of a party's candidates received about the same percentage of the vote, it implies that party attractiveness was the most potent influence on the electorate. If one or two candidates depart from the median party vote, it implies that partisan attraction was diluted by factors peculiar to the deviating candidates. If most of the candidates depart in differing degrees from the median, this suggests a still greater dilution of partisan loyalties. In short, the degree of dispersion, and particularly of the middle-dispersion, is an index of the effect of partisan loyalty on voting behavior.

Since one party's dispersion is the inverse of the other party's, only the vote dispersion of the Democratic party will be discussed.

In discussing the dispersion, a given election will be related to the one preceding it. This relationship will be described in terms of four "shapes" (See Chart 8, page 70A); a parallel shape (vote levels for both high and low candidates move in the same direction, either up or down—see 1944-46); a converging shape (vote level of high candidates decline, vote level of low candidates increase—see 1930-32); a diverging shape (vote level of high candidate rises, vote level of low candidate falls—see 1962-64); and a tangential shape (vote level of high candidate remains the same, vote level of low candidate declines, or vote level of low candidate remains the same, and the vote level of the high candidate rises—see 1950-52).

The broadest total-dispersion of the Democratic ticket came in 1930, when the Charles Struble, candidate for sheriff, became the first Democrat to win in Kalamazoo County, gaining 55 per cent of the vote, and the Democratic nominee for U.S. Senator went down to disastrous defeat, receiving only 22 per cent. The total-dispersion was 33 per cent. The narrowest total-dispersion was 4 per cent, occurring in 1928, 1958 and 1960. In thirteen of the eighteen elections (excluding
1964 and 1966), the total-dispersion was 7 per cent or less; in four of the elections it ranges between 10 per cent and 14 per cent; in only one did it exceed 14 per cent. Thus, in more than two-thirds of the elections the total dispersions were very similar; in one-third they varied more widely.

Further, in all but two elections of this latter one-third, the expansion of the dispersion forms a tangential shape due to a "one-way stretch." The clearest instance of this "one-way stretch" is the 1956 election. Mr. Stevenson's share of the vote dropped markedly from 1952; the dispersion stretched downward. But Governor Williams, the highest candidate, maintained the same percentage level as he had received in the previous election; there was no "stretch" upwards. This "one-way stretch" was characteristic of all except the 1940 and 1946 elections. In 1940 the total dispersion exhibited a "two-way stretch." The vote share of the highest candidate rose from that received in the previous elections; the vote share of the lowest candidate declined. The size of the dispersion is the result of a diverging shape. The 1946 election had a basically parallel pattern, both high and low candidates declining from the previous election.

In contrast to the total-dispersion, the middle-dispersion is much more stable, and generally smaller. The narrowest middle-dispersion was 1 per cent in 1928, the widest (excluding 1964 and 1966) was 10 per cent in 1934. Of the eighteen elections from 1928 to 1962, in only one was the middle-dispersion more than 7 per cent. There is a pattern then of consistently narrow distances between the second-highest and second-lowest party candidates. Even in elections in which the total-dispersion expands dramatically, such as 1928, 1940, and 1956, the middle-dispersion remains about the same as it was in the previous elections.

The shapes of the various middle-dispersions are parallel in all elections prior to 1950. The 1950-52 exhibits a slightly tangential shape, 1952-54 a slightly converging shape, and 1958-60-62, slightly tangential shapes. But the changes are modest.

In summary, a comparison of the elections in which there was a broad total-dispersion with the elections which follow them reveals
that the "stretch" of the one year has little effect on the fortunes of the next. The broad, downward dispersion of 1934 was followed by a rise to a narrow upward dispersion in 1936. The 14 per cent diverging dispersion of 1940 was followed by a narrower, downward dispersion in 1942. It might be expected that disaster in one year might foretell disaster in the next; or that now, conversely, success in one election might herald subsequent triumphs. The patterns show nothing that would support these inferences.

Having discussed the voting patterns from several different perspectives, it is now time to move to the 1964 election.

The voting pattern of 1964

The 1964 pattern is unusual in three respects. First, Democratic candidates reached unprecedented heights. Second, the dispersion broadened dramatically. And third, all this happened in a year of subnormal voter turnout.

In 1964, President Johnson received 60 per cent of the total vote. The previous high was 55 per cent registered for the sheriff in 1928, a result which was obviously due to local factors. The previous high reached by a presidential candidate was 41 per cent, received by President Roosevelt. Johnson's total represents a unique departure in Kalamazoo County's voting pattern.

The upward, (or downward) surge of individual candidates, however, has been shown to be a "sometime thing:" a splash in the political water whose ripples soon diminish and disappear. The victory of President Johnson may have been due to temporary factors that, having had their day, rapidly lose their effect. There is, however, some evidence that this is not the case.

The rise in the vote level of the rest of the Democratic ticket, though not unique, was nevertheless unusual. Never before had a Democratic candidate received as much as 45 per cent of the vote; in 1964 nearly half of the candidates corralled 45 per cent or more, and two of them exceeded 50 per cent.

In addition to this increase, there was an unprecedented change in the dispersion pattern. The total-dispersion expanded to 31 per cent.
the highest previous pattern (if we exclude Sheriff Struble) was 14 per cent. The shape of the dispersion pattern was a diverging one, the highest candidate rising, and the lowest candidate falling; this shape had not occurred since 1938. The middle-dispersion expanded to 11 per cent; in the preceding fourteen elections it had never been wider than 7 per cent, and had attained that percentage only in 1946.

It may be that the middle-dispersion patterns are only temporary deviations. There is no earlier broad middle-dispersion in a presidential election with which to compare it. The only earlier elections with relatively wide middle-dispersion patterns are 1930 (7 per cent), 1934 (10 per cent) and 1946 (7 per cent), all non-presidential years (See Appendix, Table 8, page 69). In the elections following each of these, the party's percentage of the vote rose dramatically; 21 per cent to 41 per cent, 38 per cent to 44 per cent, and 28 per cent to 39 per cent. For whatever it is worth, the expanded middle-dispersions of previous years were consistently followed by a larger share of the vote in the next election. The implication is that changes in the middle-dispersion are indicators of a voter realignment of some longevity.

**Party shifts in the 1964 election**

On the basis of the election records, the kinds of party shifts which occurred in 1964 can be broadly outlined. The accuracy of such an outline may be dubious, in that the data does not permit the discovery of self-cancelling shifts. Inasmuch as 1964 exhibits unprecedented patterns in other types of voting, it may also be characterized by an unprecedented amount of party shifting. Only interview survey studies not yet available can furnish information on this variable. With this caution, however, it is worth pushing the data available to its speculative limit. To do this, a hypothetical election will be constructed, based on a normal voter turnout.

The average increase in the total vote in presidential elections from 1948 to 1960 was 5,305. The 1964 total vote increased only
Adding 5,305 to the 1960 total vote of 67,434 results in a "normal" 1964 vote of 72,739.

The "normal" Democratic expectation would be to receive about 36 per cent of those 72,700 votes, or 26,200, for its median candidate. The "normal" Republican expectation would be 64 per cent, or 46,500. The contrast between these normal expectations and the 1964 realities is summarized in Table 10 (See Appendix, Table 10, page 72). Approximately 4,600 persons who normally would have voted did not; and 4,300 persons who normally would not have voted Democratic did so. These figures suggest the following party shift; 4,600 Republicans shifted from a Republican vote to non-voting and 4,300 Republicans shifted to the median Democratic candidate. About 6.3 per cent of the voters shifted out of the electorate and about 6 per cent changed parties. This, no doubt, over-simplifies the actual shifts that took place; it is, however, the best inference that can be made on the basis of the election records alone.

If the hypothetical reconstruction is continued, we find that it does not make any substantial difference in the voting patterns. Adding the missing 4,600 votes to the total vote, and to the Republican candidates, reduces the percentage heights reached by the Democrats by approximately 4 per cent, and shrinks the total dispersion by 3 per cent (See Appendix, Table 11, page 73). But the Democratic heights and the breadth of the dispersions are still unprecedented; the voting patterns remain substantially the same.

The major features of the new pattern are the rise in Democratic party voting levels, and the width of the voter dispersion. This latter development indicates a dramatic increase in the number of voters willing to split their ticket. Whether these changes are likely to be permanent is hard to assess. The only evidence available is that of the 1966 election. To that I now turn.

The 1966 election

In 1966 the median Democratic vote declined from the heights of 1964 to 34 per cent. This represents a return to normal; the Democratic
median for the preceding eight elections was invariably within the 34 per cent to 36 per cent range. The upward surge of party strength in 1964 would seem to be a temporary phenomenon. The width of the dispersion, however, is a different story.

The total-dispersion, although it declined from the 31 per cent of 1964, still was wider than that of any other election. It was 21 per cent; the widest earlier dispersion was only 10 per cent. The same can be said about the middle-dispersion; it was 12 per cent and the widest earlier middle-dispersion was 10 per cent. The continuance of this uniquely broad dispersion suggests that it may be more than a one-election aberration in Kalamazoo County voting behavior.

However, 1966 was also characterized by an unusually low voter turnout. The average increase from one off-year election to the next is 5,018. The 1966 election saw an increase of only 2,913. Performing the same operation on the 1966 election records as was done on those of 1964 will permit some speculation on the shifts which took place in 1966. The "normal" total vote would have been approximately 56,000. The median Democratic expectation would have been about 20,200 (36 per cent), the Republican expectation would have been 35,800 (64 per cent). The actual Democratic share was 18,200 (34 per cent) and the Republican share was 35,600 (66 per cent). These figures suggest that the Republican turnout was about normal, whereas the 2,900 voters who shifted out of the electorate were primarily Democrats.

Even if the voter turnout had been of normal proportions, the dispersion pattern would not be substantially affected. The 1966 election suggests that the dispersion patterns of 1964 are more than a temporary aberration. The partisan allegiances, as reflected at least in the acts of voting, returned to the pre-1964 patterns. But the dispersion patterns, and their implications for ticket-splitting, did not. The continuance of uniquely broad dispersion may well mean that a minimum of 20 per cent to 30 per cent of the county electorate has adopted the split-ticket as a way of political life.
IV
CONCLUSIONS

This paper began with three purposes: to verify the findings of other survey interview studies concerning straight-party and split-ticket voting; to confirm three specific hypotheses about voting patterns; and to examine the implications of these for majority party prospects. It remains to summarize the results.

The Hypotheses

The first hypothesis was that at some point in the time period examined, the relative size of the straight party vote began a consistent decline, reaching a low point in 1964. We find that the data does not support this hypothesis. The straight party vote for one party consistently declined, and for the other party consistently rose, from 1932 to 1946. It remained substantially the same for one party, and fluctuated for the other, between 1948 and 1962. It did, however, reach a low point in 1964, but not as the culmination of a trend as was expected, but rather as a dramatic aberration from previous stability.

The second hypothesis was that at some point in the time period examined, the relative size of the partisan vote (represented by the middle-dispersion) began a consistent decline, reaching a low point in 1964. The data does not confirm this hypothesis, either. A consistently declining partisan vote would be represented by a consistently broadening middle-dispersion. If partisanship declined it would be indicated by an increasing "vote spread" between candidates on the same party ticket. The middle dispersion maintained consistently narrow limits, ranging from 4 per cent to 7 per cent in the elections from 1934 to 1962. In 1964 it broadened dramatically to 22 per cent, but again, not as a culmination of a long-term trend, but rather as an aberration from normal.

The third hypothesis was that at some point in the period under consideration the level of ticket-splitting (represented by the total
dispersion) would begin to increase, and reach a high-point in 1964. We find that there was no identifiable trend in ticket-splitting, as measured by the total dispersion, although it reached its peak in the 1964 election.

These three negative results point to the conclusion that there has been no gradual change in these three variables of voting behavior in Kalamazoo County, over the past twenty elections. The changes that occurred in 1964 were not the end-points of a process, but were instead either an aberration, or a beginning of a new pattern of voting behavior. Until further elections are held, it is impossible to say which of the last explanations is the best.

Confirmation of Interview Survey Studies

This monograph develops data that can be compared with the findings of previous survey studies in two areas. The election records examined here can be compared with the partisan identification data developed by interviews. Ticket-splitting, identified via interviews, can also be compared with the proportion of split ballots extracted from the election records.

Party identification

Some authorities believe that major shifts of partisan identification occur only in response to some economic, political and social cataclysm. The loyalties developed in such crises then endure until the next upheaval and form the foundation of the voting behavior of the electorate. From this enduring base, the voters will occasionally depart, only to return in a subsequent election. Thus, Campbell, et al., classify presidential elections into four types: "maintaining," in which the dominant party continues in power; "deviating," in which temporary influences result in the displacement of the dominant party by the minority party; "reinstating," in which the dominant party, having been displaced earlier, is returned to power; and "realigning," in which basic partisan identifications shift, and the dominant party
becomes the minority party, and the minority party is elevated to supremacy.\footnote{Campbell, et.al., op. cit., p.531.}

The election records support this theory in part. The 1930-32-34 elections clearly show a realignment of the partisan vote. In these elections the party cleavage which dominates the remainder of the period was established.

The elections from 1948 to 1962 also fit easily into the category of "maintaining" elections. The partisan margins remain stable. This stability in voting levels parallels the stability in party identification revealed in the survey studies. The Survey Research Center's interviews during the years 1952-1958 show that the Democratic identifiers varied only 3 per cent and the Republicans only 1 per cent. Kalamazoo County election statistics show that the partisan vote, as measured by the middle-dispersion, varied almost identically. The second-highest candidate's vote changed only 3 per cent, the second-lowest candidate's vote only 4 per cent. The variation of the median party candidate was even less, only 2 per cent. Partisan identification in national samples and partisan vote in Kalamazoo County show the same patterns of stability in the 1950's.

Between 1936 and 1946, however, a different pattern obtains. The Democratic vote, both partisan and straight party, begins a gradual and consistent decline, reaching a low point in 1946. On the state level, the 1936 height of 49 per cent is not reached again until 1954. In the county, the peak of 44 per cent is never achieved a second time. These elections do not fit easily into any of Campbell's four types of elections. The voting records suggest that there was a gradual change in party identification in these years: Democratic adherents decreased by 4 per cent state-wide, and by 16 per cent in the county.

Such a shift can be explained, of course, as a function of population shifts. Perhaps 4 per cent more Republicans than Democrats moved into Michigan, and 16 per cent more Republicans than Democrats moved into the county during the late 1930's and early 1940's, and the voting records reflect this immigration rather than a shift in party identifi-
cation. By the same logic, the stability of partisan allegiance of the 1950's may be spurious. A politically unbalanced immigration may have served to cancel a shift in party allegiance in the opposite direction on the part of the natives. Residents of the county, for example, may have been shifting toward the Republican party. At the same time, an equal number of Democrats may have moved into the county, thereby maintaining the prior partisan balance. The absence of data on the partisan loyalties of immigrants to Michigan precludes definitive explanations.

If it can be assumed that there has been no substantially unbalanced migration, then the election data clearly confirms the stability of party identification found in the 1950's by the survey studies. It also suggests, however, that such stability was not present during the preceding decade, and that stable levels or party identification cannot be generalized to other epochs.

Ticket-splitting

The trend toward increased ticket-splitting discussed in Chapter II is not supported by the data from Kalamazoo County. The county records instead indicate changes from election to election but in no identifiable direction. The authorities examined earlier agree that about 35 per cent to 40 per cent of the voters split their ticket. The election records suggest that prior to 1964 no more than 14 per cent and usually about 7 per cent of the Kalamazoo County electorate engaged in this practice.

In 1964 and 1966, however, the county elections show a minimum of 31 per cent and 22 per cent, respectively, of the voters split their ticket. This begins to approximate the national average. Two explanations may be offered. The first is that the voters of Kalamazoo County have always done a substantial amount of ticket-splitting, but that the splits have been self-canceling and, therefore, have not appeared in the election records. The second is presented by V. O. Key. He states that increases in split-ticket voting are the result of the coincidence of a decreasing party loyalty and an increased stimulus.
to split the ballot. A gradually increasing proportion of the county electorate may have become willing to split their vote over the years but have had no reason to do so. In 1964, the nature of the candidates, the campaigns and the issues were such as to give them a reason to do then what they had been willing to do for several years before. In short, the 1964 and 1966 elections transformed potential ticket-splitters into actual ticket-splitters. What may have been a gradually developing change in partisan loyalties appears to be a sudden change only because the stimuli to break party ranks appeared suddenly. Such speculation, however, cannot be supported solely on the basis of the votes cast. The election records neither confirm nor deny the findings of the interview surveys.

**Party Shifts**

A comparison of the voter shifts from one party to another between elections is of limited usefulness. Election records show a 10 per cent shift in the vote for president from 1944 to 1948; interview data shows a change of 18 per cent. From 1948 to 1952, the shifts were 7 per cent according to the election records and 29 per cent according to the interviews. Between 1956 and 1960, the changes were 7 per cent and 23 per cent. The discrepancies between the findings from the two kinds of data are 17 per cent, 23 per cent, and 16 per cent. If there were survey data available for more elections, it might be found that the discrepancy between the two measuring methods remains relatively constant, and that voting records might, therefore, be used to determine shifts within fairly accurate limits by discounting them by a certain percentage of standard error. Until such information is available, however, no very trustworthy conclusions can be drawn on the basis of election returns alone.

The election records do reveal one change in party shifting quite conclusively. The pattern of entrance into and exit from the electorate between presidential and congressional elections clearly changed in 1950.

---

Prior to that time, the Democrats increased their percentage of the vote in presidential years, and decreased it in the off-year elections. Beginning with 1950 this "zig-zag" pattern ceased. It appears that the supporters of both parties have turned out in equal proportions between 1950 and 1962. 1964 and 1966 saw a reversion to the older pattern.

It also appears that a growing proportion of the electorate participates in both kinds of elections. The percentage of "fall-off" from presidential to congressional elections from 1928 to 1946 averaged 12 per cent in Michigan, and 18 per cent in Kalamazoo County. The "fall-off" from 1948 to 1966 averaged 9 per cent in the state and 8 per cent in the county. There has been a 3 per cent and 10 per cent decrease in the proportion of voters who will vote for president but not for congressmen.

The use of election records to confirm interview data has proved relatively inadequate, due to the differences in the nature of the samples examined, and the fact that election data will not reveal the amount of self-canceling changes.

The Prospects of a Minority Party

The future of a local minority party clearly depends on events that transcend the boundaries of its district. The fundamental shift in partisan allegiance in Kalamazoo County, and in Michigan, occurred in response to the depression of the 1930's. This division has remained constant and controlling until 1964. The dramatic change in that year was also clearly the product of the national presidential campaign. The results in Kalamazoo County closely paralleled those for Michigan as a whole; the local Democrats' success was not the result only of their own efforts.

Having said that, however, it also seems probable that local party fortunes are not as completely dominated by extra-local events as they were two decades ago. The apparent national trend toward increased ticket-splitting seems to include our sample county. The gains made in 1964 under the impetus of the presidential contest were not completely lost in 1966 when that impetus was not present. The efforts of a minority
party to present outstanding candidates in well-financed and well-organized campaigns are more likely to be rewarded in the 1960's than they would have been in the 1940's.

A Final Note

The last substantial realignment of party allegiances occurred in 1932 when the median Democratic vote jumped 21 per cent. The division of the electorate established in that period remained constant until 1964, and dominated voter behavior in Kalamazoo County for 32 years.

In 1964 the median Democratic vote increased by 7 per cent. But more important, the total dispersion increased by 24 per cent and the middle-dispersion by 6 per cent. Thus there was a change of greater magnitude, though of a different type, in 1964 than in 1932. In terms of voting patterns alone, the change in the former was as dramatic as the change in the latter.

Is 1964, then, a "realigning" election? Does it reveal the beginning of a permanent shift away from the two partisan extremes toward an "independent," ticket-splitting, middle? Is it perhaps an electoral response to a kind of crisis, the nature of which is still unclear, as 1932 was a response to an economic crisis? The pattern of the election, and the continuation of those patterns at a reduced magnitude in 1966, suggest that this is at least a possibility.
APPENDIX

TABLES 1 THROUGH 11
TABLE I.

**Single-Choice Districts**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Less Than 2.5%</th>
<th>Less Than 5%</th>
<th>More Than 10%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>64.9</td>
<td>80.7</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>57.3</td>
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<td>57.2</td>
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<td>9.9</td>
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<td>1944</td>
<td>58.8</td>
<td>84.5</td>
<td>4.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>57.2</td>
<td>80.0</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
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<td>57.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>45.4</td>
<td>33.0</td>
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**Multiple-Choice Districts**

<table>
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<th>Less Than 2.5%</th>
<th>Less Than 5%</th>
<th>More Than 10%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>56.6</td>
<td>25.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>1936</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
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<td>53.0</td>
<td>19.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>39.5</td>
<td>58.9</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>65.9</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>40.3</td>
<td>33.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>49.0</td>
<td>24.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>40.2</td>
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### TABLE 2.

#### 1952 Election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strong Party Identifiers</th>
<th>Weak Party Identifiers</th>
<th>Independent Partisans</th>
<th>Independents</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% No. of Cases</td>
<td>% No. of Cases</td>
<td>% No. of Cases</td>
<td>% No. of Cases</td>
<td>% No. of Cases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voted for Own Party</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>418</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voted for Opposite Party</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did not Vote</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Cases</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>568</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>624</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 1954 Election

| Voted for Own Party | 61 | 242 | 35 | 138 | 31 | 51 | -- | -- | 45 | 451 |
| Voted for Opposite Party | 2 | 8 | 8 | 34 | 8 | 13 | -- | -- | 5 | 55 |
| Did not Vote | 36 | 143 | 57 | 255 | 61 | 101 | 61 | 101 | 52 | 563 |
| Total Cases | 99 | 394 | 100 | 447 | 100 | 165 | 165 | 102 | 1006 | Partisans 1088 Total Sample 63 |
TABLE 3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>North</th>
<th>South</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Voted straight ticket</td>
<td>66% 56% 70% 68%</td>
<td>17% 34% 95% 96%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voted straight except for Pres.</td>
<td>1 6 * *</td>
<td>39 31 --- ---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voted straight except for senator or congressman</td>
<td>2 3 4 3</td>
<td>4 2 3 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voted straight at national level, straight for opposite party at state and local level</td>
<td>* * * *</td>
<td>--- 6 1 ---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voted straight at national level, split at state and local level</td>
<td>23 20 18 21</td>
<td>4 6 1 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voted split ticket at both levels</td>
<td>8 15 8 8</td>
<td>36 21 --- ---</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The asterisk is used in these tables to denote frequencies of less than one per cent.
---The dash is used in these tables to denote a zero frequency.
TABLE 4.

Vote for Leading Office
Michigan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Total Vote</th>
<th>Republican Vote</th>
<th>Vote Per Cent of Total Vote</th>
<th>Democratic Vote</th>
<th>Vote Per Cent of Total Vote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>3,668,412</td>
<td>1,372,082</td>
<td>965,396</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>396,762</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>4,842,325</td>
<td>850,892</td>
<td>483,990</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>357,664</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>4,925,081*</td>
<td>1,664,766</td>
<td>739,894</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>871,701</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>6,007,837*</td>
<td>1,258,925</td>
<td>659,743</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>577,044</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>5,090,593*</td>
<td>1,805,098</td>
<td>699,733</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>1,016,799</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>5,173,349*</td>
<td>1,605,241</td>
<td>847,245</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>753,752</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>5,256,106</td>
<td>2,085,929</td>
<td>1,039,917</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>1,032,991</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>5,538,857</td>
<td>1,226,774</td>
<td>645,335</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>573,314</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>5,377,329</td>
<td>2,025,223</td>
<td>1,084,423</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>1,106,899</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>5,708,415</td>
<td>1,665,475</td>
<td>1,003,878</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>644,540</td>
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<tr>
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<td>6,195,000</td>
<td>2,109,609</td>
<td>1,308,595</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>1,003,448</td>
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<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>6,371,766</td>
<td>1,879,382</td>
<td>933,988</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>935,152</td>
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<td>1952</td>
<td>6,708,000</td>
<td>2,789,592</td>
<td>1,551,529</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>1,203,657</td>
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<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>7,024,000</td>
<td>2,187,027</td>
<td>963,300</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>1,216,308</td>
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<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>7,516,000</td>
<td>3,080,468</td>
<td>1,713,647</td>
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<td>1,359,898</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>7,804,000</td>
<td>2,312,184</td>
<td>1,078,089</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>1,225,533</td>
<td>53</td>
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<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>7,823,194</td>
<td>3,318,097</td>
<td>1,620,428</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>1,687,269</td>
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<td>1962</td>
<td>7,924,000</td>
<td>2,764,839</td>
<td>1,420,086</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>1,334,513</td>
<td>48</td>
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<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>8,154,000</td>
<td>3,203,102</td>
<td>1,060,152</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>2,136,615</td>
<td>67</td>
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<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>8,820,000</td>
<td>2,462,026</td>
<td>1,490,547</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>963,383</td>
<td>39</td>
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</table>


*Estimated
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Total Vote</th>
<th>Republican Vote</th>
<th>Republican Vote Per Cent of Total Vote</th>
<th>Democratic Vote</th>
<th>Democratic Vote Per Cent of Total Vote</th>
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<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>71,225</td>
<td>29,830</td>
<td>23,626</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>5,946</td>
<td>20</td>
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<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>91,368</td>
<td>16,486</td>
<td>11,178</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>5,205</td>
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<td>1932</td>
<td>93,111*</td>
<td>33,785</td>
<td>18,584</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>13,974</td>
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<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>94,854*</td>
<td>25,003</td>
<td>15,803</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>8,554</td>
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<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>96,597*</td>
<td>37,380</td>
<td>17,824</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>17,870</td>
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<td>1938</td>
<td>98,340*</td>
<td>28,890</td>
<td>18,816</td>
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<td>1940</td>
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<td>17,733</td>
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<td>57</td>
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<td>1950</td>
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<td>21,220</td>
<td>59</td>
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<td>38,847</td>
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<td>18,976</td>
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<td>71</td>
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1964, p. 564. *Results of General Elections, 1966* 
Michigan Secretary of State

*Estimated*
<table>
<thead>
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<th>Year</th>
<th>Percent of Population</th>
<th>&quot;Fall-off&quot;</th>
<th>Percent of Population</th>
<th>&quot;Fall-off&quot;</th>
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<td>1930</td>
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TABLE 7.
Median Democratic Vote as a Percentage of the Total Vote

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<td>------------------</td>
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TABLE 8A.
Number of Votes Cast - Kalamazoo County, 1928-66
(Rounded to Nearest Hundred)

Vote for Democratic Candidates
Presidential Election Years

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<th>Year</th>
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<th>Next Lowest</th>
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Non-Presidential Election Years

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<td>18,400</td>
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DEMOCRATIC VOTE AS PERCENT OF TOTAL VOTE
KALAMAZOO COUNTY, 1928-1966

Highest Candidate

Lowest Candidate

The Middle Dispersion
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CHART 9.

REPUBLICAN VOTE AS PERCENT OF TOTAL VOTE
KALAMAZOO COUNTY, 1928-1966
# TABLE 10.

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<th>Democratic Median Vote</th>
<th>Republican Median Vote</th>
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TABLE 11.

Democratic Vote

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<th>Middle Dispersion</th>
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Republican Vote

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<th>Middle Dispersion</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>31</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964 (Hypothetical)</td>
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<td>44</td>
<td>27</td>
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Chapin, Stuart F. "The Variability of the Popular Vote at Presidential Elections." American Journal of Sociology, XVIII (September 1912), 222-240.


