Constant Elements of Soviet Inspection Proposals for Disarmament

Lewis

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Philip Clifton Lewis
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CONSTANT ELEMENTS OF SOVIET INSPECTION PROPOSALS FOR DISARMAMENT

Preface

We assume that the Soviet Union is sincerely interested in arms limitation on an international basis, and that she, in establishing such a program, accepts as necessary some system of inspection. In disarmament negotiations the Soviet Union's position has been vague, and often inconsistent; but even in her positions of inconsistency a pattern of emphasis does exist. Given the initial assumption of Soviet sincerity in disarmament negotiations, and her apparent vagueness and inconsistency when presenting inspection proposals, this thesis seeks to discover if there is any pattern of emphasis. To locate and define this pattern of emphasis can aid negotiators to understand what the Soviet Union demands in any inspection system.

Establishing the Soviet pattern of emphasis does not define what they consider essential in an inspection system. Perhaps some, or even all, of these constant elements are merely bargaining tools to gain what she really demands, but they indicate one area from which disarmament negotiations can begin to build a comprehensive inspection system. The significance of defining a pattern of consistency is that it emphasizes the particulars with which the Soviet Union has been negotiating.
A two pronged method is used to locate and define the Soviet pattern of emphasis. First, the nature and technical issues of inspection are presented and examined; and in order to discover the Soviet interpretation and position on inspection, her inspection proposals are compared to the issues of inspection. Second, Soviet inspection proposals since 1946 are compared to determine if there are patterns of emphasis; and if there are, what they consist of in particular. Thus, from the Soviet interpretation of the nature and issues of inspection, and the comparison of Soviet proposals to one another; we will establish the Soviet elements of consistency in inspection negotiations.

Two assumptions are made throughout the presentation. First, even though the Soviet Union's stated objectives in disarmament may be sincere, the specific elements of her inspection proposals may not be related to what she actually requires in an inspection system. Second, the defining of the constant elements in Soviet inspection proposals cannot be separated from her internal political circumstances, the international environment, available alternatives, or the positions of other nations in actual inspection negotiations.

Sources used in the study include U.S. State Department materials, studies by the U.S. Senate Disarmament Subcommittee, monographs and journal articles, with a heavy emphasis on the records and documents.
I. THE NATURE OF INSPECTION

Before determining the Soviet interpretation and position on inspection and comparing the Soviet inspection proposals to one another, an examination of the nature and issues of inspection is in order. Specifically, in this overview, inspection is defined in terms of its role in the contemporary world; and the problems of making an inspection system operable are analyzed.

Two major areas must be considered in developing a practical inspection system. First, inspection proposals must come to grips with the technological labyrinth found at the heart of any inspection system. The lack of solutions in this area may mean that any inspection system is predestined to fail. Second, related to this problem is one concerning the manner in which inspection affects and is affected by the state system. A successful inspection system may require a general attitudinal change in the traditional interpretation of sovereignty and the role of sovereign state.

Finally, the question of whether a foolproof inspection system can be developed is entertained. Throughout, inspection will be examined within the context of "general and complete disarmament," since it has been the focus of disarmament negotiations since 1959.
Inspection: Why?

A basic challenge today is whether the community of nations can develop a stable environment for international relations before the accidental or intentional holocaust of nuclear war. It must be recognized that in a disarmament program all states are confronted with sacrificing their sovereignty in a most serious area - providing national self-defense. Since disarmament dictates that state initiative be restricted in providing the elements of national defense, states demand security through some other means; and in disarmament negotiations inspection is the "other means" for providing security. Thus, because inspection is an encroachment on state sovereignty, it must be capable of providing security both to the international community and to the individual state.

The primary obstacle to overcome in disarmament negotiations is the inherent distrust and fear nations have for one another. Every state demands a guarantee that at any stage of disarmament no other state will have an advantage over it, since all states are potential violators. Inspection can be construed as a substitute for the lack of harmony and trust in the present international atmosphere, but in point of fact there is no substitute for confidence in a nation's integrity in disarmament matters. Inspection, to be acceptable, must be a broad concept that can tolerate several opposing nations seeking a common interest.
Rather than being a substitute for trust, inspection is intended to be a means for bringing about that environment of cooperation and trust previously lacking. Therefore, inspection becomes a "vehicle for the hope that some simple bridge can be found across the abyss of distrust inherent in the contemporary power struggle." Conversely, it should be obvious that some degree of confidence and trust is necessary before an inspection system can begin to operate.

Any step toward partial disarmament or general and complete disarmament by international agreement can be acceptable only if there is mutual assurance of compliance among the parties involved. Inspection has the primary propose of assuring the necessary flow of accurate information concerning the adherence of the parties to the commitments of the agreement. More precisely, inspection serves to supplement the information gained through intelligence and increases the reliability of what is already known. According to Finkelstein\(^1\) an international inspection agreement should, minimally, be


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...ensure the availability of an adequate flow of information, as unambiguously as possible, to a selected number of governments which need to be assured that obligations undertaken under arms agreements are being fulfilled, that the apparatus of inspection is functioning as it should, and that the governments will know it, should either no longer be true.

The basic objective of reassurance is to disclose the intentions of a nation and her actions, and to uncover the capabilities of the evader. It is essential to the existence of an inspection system to communicate intentions accurately, because discovery of a violation does not necessarily mean that a surprise attack will inevitably follow.¹

To carry out its primary purpose of reassurance, inspection entails two functions: 1) to help deter violations, and 2) to detect violations that have occurred. The function of deterring violations is only feasible so long as all parties to the agreement believe it is to their mutual advantage to adhere to the

commitments of the agreement. Adherence to the agreement is directly related to whether the inspection system seems to be leading to a condition of greater or lesser security. It is not the fear of detection, but rather national self-interest that will remain the principal inducement for compliance. Detecting violations is further complicated because it involves an avalanche of technical problems. Detection must include the ability to demonstrate clearly and convincingly that violations have occurred so that each nation can, if required, protect herself from the advances of the violator.

The ultimate objectives of inspection are to bring stability to the international environment, reduce the world's tensions, and create a mutual respect and trust throughout the world.¹ Inspection serves as the guard against disarmament violations, and becomes the stimulus for encouraging the development of these objectives.

Inspection: What?

In a world that is witnessing a technological explosion, it

is not surprising that one of the issues in disarmament negotiations has involved the problem of defining what will be inspected. Of course, what is to be inspected would depend on the nature of the disarmament agreement. Partial disarmament measures might provide for mere aerial surveillance or electronic checking. A disengagement or denuclearization agreement, for example, might be reached with agreement on a very limited inspection system. General and complete disarmament, on the other hand, would necessarily involve extensive inspection of all potential sources of military power.

Definition of a weapon

As yet, attempts to define precisely what a weapon is have failed. Disarmament proceedings often divide weapons into defensive and offensive categories, indicating that it is the latter that will be eliminated or reduced. Since many weapons serve in both capacities, defining exactly what an offensive weapon is borders on the line of foolishness. However, establishment of the definition of a weapon is essential to an inspection system, because without it a nation which arms herself defensively may by another nation's standard have broken the disarmament agreement.

The nuclear emphasis

Disarmament negotiations have also differentiated between
"conventional" and "nuclear" weapons, with main emphasis placed on the elimination or reduction of nuclear weapons. Disarmament negotiations have focused upon instituting a program of general and complete disarmament, and it could be misleading to place a heavier emphasis on nuclear weapons in such a program. Since all nations are equally interested in protecting their sovereignty and establishing an inspection system that provides maximum security for themselves, it would seem that inspection measures would apply to both kinds of weapons with equal emphasis. Perhaps there is a strong inclination to eliminate those weapons that are most destructive, and that is why disarmament negotiations have considered nuclear weapons separately. The assumption that eliminating the most destructive weapons builds stronger international security may be erroneous since nations fight wars with whatever weapons they have at their disposal. On the other hand, it is the nuclear weapons that threaten mutual annihilation and thus by their nature give urgency to demuclearization discussions.

**Weapons inspection and security**

In the 1960's a debate has arisen between the Eastern and Western disarmament negotiators over just which weapons must be inspected to provide security for all signatories to a disarmament treaty.
It can be contended that inspection is necessary over both weapons that are eliminated or reduced, and those weapons that are kept by the individual state for security measures. The lack of comprehensive inspection of both weapons destroyed and retained can seriously jeopardize the chances for maintaining a balance between disarming nations. Nations that are fearful that others are producing and storing large amounts of weapons may in turn violate the disarmament balance to provide themselves with what they believe to be greater security. Thus, a disarmament program could be destroyed because the inspection system was not comprehensive enough to provide all states the assurance they need.

Obviously, an attitudinal change in the traditional interpretation of sovereignty is suggested when instituting a practical inspection system. The concept that any state can use any means to provide itself with maximum security in an uncertain situation does not adapt itself to a disarmament program. A viable inspection system must be capable of assuring states that a military balance is being established so that no nation will gain a military advantage during the disarmament process.

Objects of inspection

The complex nature of any inspection system, and its encroachment into vital areas of national security can easily be seen by
surveying the objects of inspection. The following objects are not intended to be an all inclusive listing, but they indicate the wide variety of materials that will be covered even in limited forms of inspection. At least three general areas exist where inspection can be regarded as indispensable to security. First, it would be necessary to inspect production facilities that are producing, or have the capacity to produce strategic weapons. A minimum list would include production facilities for nuclear materials, missiles, and aircraft, ships and submarines, missile defense systems, ground force equipment, and chemical and biological warfare units. Second, the exact numbers of ground forces and equipment, missiles, aircraft, ships and submarines, and nuclear weapons would also have to be made known to insure a balance while disarmament took place. Even more serious in nature would be the necessary, unhindered inspection of military research, development, and testing activities, which have long been the guarded secrets of all governments.

The complexity of the inspection problem can be illustrated by examining the problems of controlling only one element - ballistic missiles. Effective control would involve minimally some combination, or all, of the following: ground-based conventional radar, ground-based high frequency radar, airborne infra-red detection, acoustic detection, detection of fuel products, radio beacons or
transpondors on authorized vehicles, and satellite-based infra-
red detection.¹ The engineering projects alone to cover one
item for inspection indicate a major weakness for any inspection
system to overcome, and perhaps all of these instruments are ne-
necessary to maintain the constant flow of information that would
give the assurance some nations might demand.

Inspection: When?

The number of inspections required to establish compliance
is an unresolved, highly controversial issue. It is a particular-
ly difficult issue to resolve because it involves a most sensitive
area for every nation; the abridgement of sovereignty to permit
an unrestricted "invasion" of national territory by "foreigners"
for the purpose of obtaining full information concerning the na-
tion's military posture. For the inspectorate to best provide
assurance of compliance there should probably not be a specified
number of inspections, but rather inspection teams should be al-
lowed to make as many inspections as they consider necessary to
fulfill their responsibilities. It seems the impasse may be over-
come only when technology develops to reduce to a minimum the

¹Bull, Hedley, The Control of the Arms Race - Disarmament and
Arms Control in the Missile Age. New York: Frederick A. Praeger,
1965. P. 125.
necessary number of "on-site" inspections made by foreign personnel.

Proposals advanced by Eastern and Western negotiators for general and complete disarmament have been broken into three stages, but what should take place in each stage is a matter of debate. As yet, no list of priorities has been established. The issue of timing involves the questions: Should the inspection system to set up and tested before any disarmament is undertaken, or should agreement be reached on disarmament first, followed by joint establishment of an inspection system? If the sovereignty of the state is to be protected, it seems that agreement should be reached on disarmament first before any state subjects itself to inspection by foreign personnel. However, to develop the assurance states might demand during a disarmament program, it might be necessary to establish the inspection system first and test its operation ability.

Inspection: By Whom?

Numerous issues are involved in the organization of an inspection agency. For example, should the inspection system function through a reciprocal arrangement or be implemented by an international organization? Opposing sides would probably prefer that their own personnel inspect the other parties to the agreement.
At the same time it seems to each nation's interest to allow impartial, trained personnel to inspect their own national territory. If the latter, who is to select and train them? What guidelines can be developed to qualify an individual as an impartial inspector? The inspectorate should be free of national intimidation and have something other than a national government to report to, but there has been no clear definition of what relationship an inspection agency would have to an international organization. Should the inspectorate report violations to the United Nations? Would the Security Council's permanent members have a veto over action proposed against violators? No agreement as yet exists concerning the degree of control an international inspection organization should exercise - i.e., the scope of its authority in relation to national governments. Also unresolved, and critical to the effective operation of any inspection system, is the manner in which the agency would handle violations that are discovered.


2Luard, Evan, "Conventional Disarmament." World Politics, XVI (January 1964), 192. Luard offers a brief discussion of the scope of any inspectorate's authority in relation to national governments. His point is: "who will control the inspectors," an issue which he believes will be the primary obstacle to overcome in establishing an inspection system.
The significant aspect of the organization of the inspectorate is that nations are selecting the method that will be used to choose and train the "foreigners" that will later affront sovereignty by inspecting those areas formerly classified from outside observance for reasons of national security. Such a decision is of critical importance as the inspectorate must meet with both the national interest of each state, and provide security to the international community as well.

Inspection: How?

Generally, there are three recognized techniques for carrying out inspection: physical inspection, records inspection, and nonphysical inspection. Physical inspection is the primary technique debated in negotiations because it is assumed that "on-site" investigations are the greatest assurance of compliance with the disarmament treaty, and the most difficult method for a state to evade. This method is also the most severe abridgement of sovereignty because "foreigners" are employed in "on-site" investigations of vital national areas to determine the compliance of the inspected state.

Records inspection includes budget-expenditure inspection and production-inventory inspection. Although it can be effective, the chances of it being misleading through improper bookkeeping make it less desirable. A newer technique, nonphysical
inspection,\(^1\) has been applauded as an extremely profitable method of discouraging violations. It suggests the unhindered questioning of any individual by impartial teams and the encouragement of giving voluntary information about known or suspected violations - even if against one's own nation! Individual states could be checked by their own nationals who could be encouraged by several inducements to report violations of the disarmament treaty, thus saving nations from damage to their national egos occasioned by the presence of "foreign" inspectors on national territory.

Actual physical inspection proposals have relied on two basic elements: ground inspection and aerial reconnaissance. Both are deemed necessary for checking personnel and production facilities if a violation is suspected, and both abridge state sovereignty. Nations, however, have for centuries accepted self-imposed limitations on their sovereignty when such agreements are considered to fall within the scope of their national interest. Regardless of what types of inspection techniques are employed, they are aimed at accomplishing three things: identification, verification, and response to evasion.

Identification and verification

In disarmament, identification is the procedure by which the inspection agency detects violations. The engineering problems that can arise in one area were sketched briefly in the example of ballistic missile control. The inspectorate must have the authority and equipment to detect violations clearly so that states are assured the inspection system is operating properly. Verification is infinitely more complex as it involves the synthesis of identification with the intentions of the violator. The question of the intent of a state's decision-makers concerns the issue of whether a violation involved a planned or accidental disregard of the disarmament treaty. Therefore, an inspection agreement must define specifically the methods to be applied and the procedure to be followed when a violation is suspected, with the inquiry aimed at seeking to disclose not only facts but the underlying objectives, if any, which led to the violation.

Response to evasion

A serious problem is posed by trying to determine the method for responding to an identified violation. The response is naturally conditioned by the nature of the verification. Obstruction of

1See P. 9, beginning: "Effective control...

verification itself may require response, but the main dangers lie either in over-response or the lack of response. The kind of responses most often considered are the reactions of world opinion, the reactions within a state, or political and military sanctions by an international organization. Unfortunately these responses may be too weak to deter violations; because the stronger the response, the less likely violations will occur. Although an international agency with the power to take effective action seems to be the practical solution, there are serious questions as to the scope of the inspectorate's power and the organization and control of those who carry out response action.

Defining the response action available to an inspection system is probably the most serious abridgement of sovereignty that parties to a disarmament treaty must consider. What the individual state is recognizing is the authority of the agency to take severe action, including military sanctions, under conditions that define a violation. That the inspectorate's responsive action may apply in the future to the state now approving the system is of critical concern to every signatory. The problem is how the system can protect each individual state's sovereignty, and at the same time provide security to the international community. In any disarmament program states are sacrificing their sovereignty in

\[\text{\textsuperscript{1}}\text{ibid.}\]
military affairs to a nonnational organization which in turn must provide security for all nations.

Other issues

It seems essential that inspection teams be guaranteed free access when entering and leaving any nation, including unhindered travel once inside a state. Unhindered access insures the inspection system of freedom of action when entering those areas where violations are considered to be most likely. Without this capability the inspection system cannot produce the comprehensive information necessary to indicate compliance by the inspected state. The problem is that freedom of access is a violation of individual state sovereignty, especially when "foreign" personnel can enter national territory at will and inspect those areas of vital national concern.

Related to this is the problem of notification which involves the question of whether or not a state should be informed about such inspections. The concept of sovereignty seems to dictate that the state being inspected has a right to be informed of inspections that are planned or are taking place; but advance warning of a planned inspection gives any potential violator the time to "cover his tracks," thus hampering the inspectorate's ability to detect attempted or actual violations.
Inspection: A Foolproof System?

The very nature and issues involved in formulating a practical inspection system lend a pessimistic outlook for reaching any kind of agreement. It can be seriously questioned whether inspection is of any value, because what is demanded by states is warning of a surprise attack or disarmament violation, an almost impossible feat in today's missile era. Several authors contend that inspection is an impossibility, and that a foolproof system can never be developed. Bull feels that the establishment of an inspection system may undermine military development that could rid the world of surprise attack through the development of retaliatory forces that are invulnerable because their whereabouts are unknown.

A critical problem of inspection is that no practical method has been developed to enforce sanctions against a violator. Previous attempts by organizations like the League of Nations and the United Nations have not always been successful in molding international sanctions against a state that has breached international peace and security. Under a disarmament program states demand the assurance that action will be taken against a violator because they

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2 Bull, loc. cit.
may lack the individual capacity to provide themselves comprehensive security.

There is also the discouraging problem of what can be done with that portion of the economy - industrial facilities and the labor force - that presently shares the greatest portion of the nuclear powers' annual budget. Thus a disarmament program must not only provide security for the international community, but it is also faced with serious economic and social problems that come with the death of a significant industry.

It must also be acknowledged that it is the violator in a disarmament program that gains the advantage. Those nations that have adhered to the disarmament treaty will be behind in military technology and equipment; and, thus, be the underdogs in bringing the violator to account for his wayward methods.

The massive growth of technology also provides an obstacle to developing a foolproof inspection system. As technology increases it becomes easier for the individual state to develop deceptive methods for producing and hiding their weapons. Since scientific advancements are focused on providing the individual state with security, it stands to reason that advancements for uncovering weapons that are hidden lags behind. The technological emphasis on hiding weapons must be turned to uncovering what is hidden, and studies and research in this area should take place.
before an inspection system goes into effect.\(^1\) The longer it
takes to reach a suitable inspection agreement, the less likely
it is that any inspection system can be developed to uncover those
weapons that are already hidden.

Melman\(^2\) has concluded that, to establish an inspection system
for general and complete disarmament, the annual cost would run
$1,489 million. Although the cost is not inconsequential, it is
a mere fraction of present day defense expenditures. The poten­
tial obstacle is in what manner the cost is to be divided among the
parties to the disarmament treaty. Even more serious is the problem
of whether a nation will be required to pay for responsive action
taken against itself, especially if the inspectorate made an er­
ror in its judgment and the action was unnecessary.

Furthermore, the nature of inspection is bound to the complex
variety of technical issues that must be solved in establishing an
inspection system. Failure to resolve these problems can mean the
ultimate failure of any inspection system. Another problem is that

\(^1\)Foster, William C., "Risk and Security in the Age of Nuclear
Weapons." Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 48 (January 1963),
130.

\(^2\)Benoit, Emile and Boulding, Kenneth E. (Eds.), Disarmament
article entitled "The Cost of Inspection for Disarmament," Seymour
Melman presents a comprehensive analysis of the cost factors involved
in establishing and operating a comprehensive inspection system.
Melman is Associate Professor of Industrial and Management Engineer­
ing at Columbia University, editor of Inspection for Disarmament,
and author of The Peace Race, and other publications.
the more comprehensive the disarmament program the greater the chances are for a violation unless the inspection system is equally comprehensive. Bull\(^1\) has stated the problem in this manner:

...In a general and comprehensive system of disarmament, the multiplicity of objects and techniques of inspection reinforce one another, so as to increase the strength of controls in each particular department. If there is inspection of the whole field of military activity, if military expenditure, research, the manufacture of armaments, the training of troops, storehouses, all types of weapons and forces are controlled, then the number of points at which an attempt at evasion might be apprehended is to that extent increased, and the risks of evasion multiplied.

Again it is emphasized that each of the above named technical areas is a significant encroachment on the individual state's sovereignty in providing national security, and the very concept of inspection suggests the need for a revision of the traditional interpretation of sovereignty and the role of the state.

Finally, it must be remarked that no disarmament or inspection system can be regarded as foolproof unless all nations of the world are involved in the conception. As long as any nation refuses to participate or is not invited to participate, inspection becomes meaningless.

\(^1\)Bull, Hedley, op. cit., p. 140.
The Disarmament-Inspection Bond

Although a barrage of problems and issues arise from the very nature of inspection, negotiations continue towards an eventual solution. Inspection occupies a position of real significance simply because it is the sine qua non of any effective disarmament system, and disarmament discussions themselves are meaningless unless they include consideration of inspection proposals.

Since the mid-1950's both the United States and the Soviet Union have recognized the primary position inspection occupies. President Eisenhower,¹ at Geneva on July 12, 1955, expressed the following view:

No sound and reliable agreement can be made unless it is completely covered by an inspection and reporting system adequate to support every portion of the agreement. The lessons of history teach us that disarmament agreements without adequate reciprocal inspection increase the dangers of war and do not brighten the prospects of peace...

Marshall Bulganin,² speaking before the Supreme Soviet on August 4, 1955, noted that "the President of the United States justly remarked that each disarmament plan boils down to a

²Ibid.
question of control and inspection." Acceptance of inspection has become a minimum condition to any disarmament system, as secrecy and disarmament are incompatible. Thus the critical aspect of inspection proposals concerns whether great powers are willing to consider seriously modifying their traditional conceptions of sovereignty, as related to the area of national defense, to provide security for each nation by limiting their authority to make and use arms.
II. THE SOVIET INTERPRETATION
OF INSPECTION

This chapter seeks to identify the "why" of Soviet inspection proposals and what role she feels inspection should play in a disarmament program. Analysis will focus upon the interpretation and position the Soviet Union has for inspection in general, by relating the Soviet proposals to the nature and issues of inspection presented in the previous chapter. Also, Soviet inspection strategy will be related briefly to factors outside disarmament that seem to have a bearing on Soviet policy at that time.

The Soviet inspection proposals and her strategy are presented in three chronological phases: Stalin's postwar rule from 1946 to 1953, the "partial disarmament" phase of 1954 to 1958, and the "general and complete disarmament" strategy of 1959 to present. Finally, the present Soviet interpretation and position on inspection will be presented and analyzed.

The Postwar Phase

The initial Soviet reaction to the American proposal for the international control of atomic energy was to criticize the emphasis on controlling atomic power through an inspection system. The Soviet Union contended that the primary action in
beginning any disarmament plan must be the prohibition of the production and use of atomic weapons. Once an agreement prohibiting the use and production of atomic weapons was in effect, it could then be followed by measures structured for observance and control.\(^1\) Another area of dispute was the effort to eliminate the veto in the inspection agency, and it was this issue that finally forced Soviet rejection of the American proposal. The Soviet Union indicated that the elimination of the veto on questions of sanctions was an affront to her national sovereignty and that the meshing of the proposed international agency's powers with sovereignty was impossible.\(^2\)

**Early Soviet proposals**

On June 19, 1946, the Soviet Union introduced a two phased disarmament proposal.\(^3\) The first phase called for an international agreement which would ban all nuclear weapons, prohibit atomic production and storage, and destroy all accumulated stocks within three

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\(^2\) loc. cit., p. 45.

months of the signing of the treaty. Within a six month period the parties were to adopt legislation that would penalize the violators. The second phase called for the establishment of two subcommittees under the Security Council. One committee would study recommendations for exchanging scientific information, while the other would structure an inspection and control system for atomic energy production. The United States rejected the proposal because she feared the Soviet Union might use the veto to block effective agency action, especially if the action were against a communist state. The Soviet Union in turn denounced the Western interpretation of the veto and expressed the view that it was improper to conclude that since a permanent member can use the veto in the Security Council that it would also apply to the inspection system. Molotov\(^1\) later stated that "the rule of unanimity on the Security Council has nothing to do with the work of the control commissions."

The Soviet Union also indicated that it preferred inclusive negotiations on disarmament, thus combining both conventional and atomic weapons inspection together. The United States declared that she preferred that atomic weapons negotiations be reserved to the

\(^1\)UN, ORGA, First Session, Part II, First Committee, Summary of Meetings, 2 November - 13 December 1946. P. 257.
Atomic Energy Commission and won the dispute when it was brought to a vote.¹

On July 11, 1947, the Soviet Union added to her original proposal.² Prohibition of the production and use of atomic weapons was still the primary demand; but once it was agreed to, it would be followed by control inspection, inventory checks, and studies of outputs in mining and manufacturing facilities. Personnel for the inspectorate would be selected on an "international basis."

In 1949 when the Soviet Union presented her Minority Plan³ to the Atomic Energy Commission, she clarified her procedure for establishing an inspection system. A set of rules would be adopted as the disarmament procedure which would then be adhered to by the voluntary action of each member state. Again, supervision of compliance was to be placed in an international agency operating under the Security Council. Under this plan there would be two conventions; one would prohibit atomic weapons, and the other


would establish an international control system. Both conventions were to be worked out and brought into effect simultaneously.

Throughout the postwar phase there was little change in these initial Soviet proposals. The Soviet Union later indicated that inspection could be on a continuous basis without interference, but the declaration was vague and never clarified.

**Early Soviet interpretation**

The early Soviet indifference to Western disarmament proposals was probably due to her lack of technical information on precisely what kind of weapon the U.S. had developed. A fundamental determining influence to early Soviet negotiations seems to have been her military inferiority to the West.\(^1\) Her early proposals consistently relegated inspection to a secondary position and stressed the limiting of U.S. military power by depriving her of her monopoly in atomic weapons. Thus the Soviet Union's primary goal was to establish a military balance between herself and the United States, rather than the control of a disarmament program.

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The defensive characteristic of her disarmament strategy was further underlined by her insistence that the inspection agency be established under the framework of the Security Council. The idea of an international inspection agency affected Soviet strategy in two ways. First, the recognition of an international inspection agency with comprehensive powers meant acceptance of the status quo and the willingness to defend it. Second, the Soviet Union feared that submitting to an inspection system would compromise and endanger her sovereignty. The demand for a veto indicates that the Soviet Union considered herself in a minority position and that she feared ideologically opposed Western nations would use the inspection agency as an excuse to interfere internally in Soviet affairs. Therefore, the Soviet Union continually asked who will control the inspectors? Gromyko\(^1\) stated the Soviet distrust of control and inspection in this manner:

\[\text{It is easy to understand that the granting of such rights to control organs would mean a complete arbitrariness of these organs and, first of all, of those who would be in a position to command a majority of these organs...The Soviet Union is aware that there will be a majority in the control organ which may take one-sided decisions, a}\]

\(^1\)UN, SCOR, Second Year, No. 22, 115th Meeting, 5 March 1947. P. 453.
majority on whose benevolent attitude the Soviet people cannot count. Therefore, the Soviet Union, and probably not only the Soviet Union, cannot allow that the fate of its national economy be handed over to this organ.

Partial Disarmament

The shift to "partial disarmament" in Soviet disarmament strategy and proposals was the result of two things. First, there was the Soviet explosion of a hydrogen bomb in 1953. By becoming a member of the nuclear club, the Soviet Union bolstered her military position; and psychologically she no longer felt in the position of the underdog. Second, Stalin died in 1953 and was succeeded by Malenkov and later Khruschev. Realizing the destructive power of the hydrogen bomb, Malenkov warned that any was fought with nuclear weapons would mean total destruction, "not only of capitalist societies," but all of civilization.¹ Finally, when Khrushchev assumed power, the result was to relieve military thought, in general, from the restrictions of the Stalin era. These two factors forced a new Soviet attitude towards disarmament and resulted in the introduction of a new proposal.

Soviet proposal of 1955

The 1955 Soviet proposal² offered disarmament in two stages.

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¹Bechhoefer, Bernhard G., op. cit., p. 46.
²UN Doc., DC/SC.1/26, Rev. 2, 10 May 1955.
All nations would comply with a complete freeze of armaments and forces in 1956, followed by weapons and troop reduction in 1957. The reductions of weapons and troops would be drawn up by a world conference to be held in the summer of 1956.

In 1956 the inspection agency would station observers at large ports, railway junctions, and airports to prevent any chance of surprise attack by one state on another. The inspection agency would have the authority to demand progress reports on the disarmament plans of each country, as well as having free access to national records of military expenditures.

In the second stage the inspection agency would inspect on a "continuous basis" all prohibited or restricted activities to insure implementation of the convention. Inspectors would be stationed in each country and have unimpeded access to what the proposal called "all objects of control." However, the inspection agency was denied any right of independent action and would report all violations to the Security Council for action.

The Soviet interpretation changes

Although the Soviet Union was now a member of the nuclear club, U.S. flying and bombing power still exceeded the Soviet's capacities. Therefore, Soviet disarmament strategy reflected her basic military posture. Basic Soviet strategy consisted of two
features: 1) She felt she must be prepared to receive and sustain a surprise attack at any time, and 2) her military organization must be capable of reorganizing and responding effectively to continue the war.¹

The 1955 Soviet proposal intended to place the Soviet Union in a stronger position by allowing her the retention of large numbers of conventional forces and severely limiting the superior air power of the United States.² The Soviet proposal emphasizes the defense of each nation's territory from surprise attack, while the maintenance of conventional forces could be used to retaliate if confronted with a violation.

Inspection in this "partial disarmament" era was no longer rejected by the Soviet Union, but rather looked upon as a tool to gain an advantage. Obviously inspection was coordinated to the Soviet military needs of the day, but she meant it to accomplish more. Inspection was to be just broad enough to provide warning of a surprise attack and to supervise the implementing of the


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convention to provide some security to nations in the disarmament program. Yet, inspection would be limited by refusing the agency comprehensive powers or response action so that each nation's sovereignty was protected from outside interference. That this proposal can provide both these elements is dubious, because any supranational organ with the most limited authority affects the traditional concept of sovereignty. However, it is at this point that the Soviet Union embarks upon a path to develop an inspection system that provides security to the international community while simultaneously protecting the sovereignty of the individual state and its role in the state system.

General and Complete Disarmament

The "partial disarmament" phase lasted until 1959 when it became apparent that there were some sharp changes taking place in Soviet strategic thought. The tremendous progress of the Soviet Union in developing nuclear warhead rockets and building a long-range bomber force seemingly encouraged a new stability and sense of security that had not existed before. The bolstered military position of the Soviet Union and her fear of nuclear destruction can be seen in the following statement of Premier Khrusnchev.\(^1\)

The strength of the socialist world, combined with the rapid breakup of the colonial system under the impact of national liberation movements, and the development of peace movements in the capitalist states, makes it possible to force governments to disarm even if they don't want to.

The Soviet Union now felt her military force was equal in capabilities with the United States. This new stability and equality to American military power allowed the Soviet Union to transfer her disarmament proposals from their coordination with her basic military needs to the higher realm of international politics and the humanitarian objective of population survival. Thus the emphasis of Soviet disarmament proposals turned to the "general and complete disarmament" of all nations.

The 1959 proposal

In September of 1959 the Soviet Union introduced into the United Nations General Assembly her declaration for "general and complete disarmament." The four year disarmament plan was to be supervised by an international control and inspection agency.\(^1\) The extent of the inspection and control would "correspond to the stage reached in the phased disarmament." To insure confidence, the

\(^1\)UN, GAOR, 14th Session, Annexes, Agenda Item 70, Doc. A/4219, 19 September 1959. Pars. 71-76.
powers and responsibilities of the international inspection agency were to be expanded gradually as implementation of the proposal took place. Following complete disarmament, the inspection agency would have "free access to all objects of control," and then could establish an international aerial inspection system.

The 1960 proposal

In the 1960 Soviet proposal, "general and complete disarmament" was to take place within the framework of a United Nations Inspection Organization. The inspection agency would elect a control council consisting of the three major groups of nations - "socialist," Western, and nonaligned. The council would make all decisions by a two-thirds majority vote on questions of substance and by a simple majority on procedural questions, except for specially provided cases. Also, permanent inspection teams would be assigned at some installations.

The 1960 proposal divided disarmament into three stages. In the first stage the inspection agency would verify the elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles, the ban on nuclear manufacturing, and the demilitarization of all launching sites. In the second phase the agency would inspect all atomic enterprises, destroy stockpiles, and

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1For a comprehensive description and analysis see: Forbes, op. cit., p. 120.
and have unhindered access to budgetary records. The agency would also supervise the destruction of chemical and bacteriological weapons, as well as the disbanding of troops. The Control Board would study measures and make recommendations for adopting legislation to enforce the disarmament treaty. In the final stage the inspection agency would be responsible for the implementation of the final disarmament measures. Aerial inspection and mobile ground inspection teams would be used to verify that all parties were complying to the disarmament agreement, and mobile inspection teams could go "to any point" to carry out their responsibilities.

The present Soviet proposal

The original 1962 Soviet proposal provides for "general and complete disarmament" in three stages over a four to five year period.\(^1\) In the first stage the testing and placing in orbit of any nuclear weapons is forbidden. All parties to the disarmament treaty would liquidate any foreign military bases they had and destroy all nuclear delivery systems. The Soviet Union also included reductions in both conventional forces and military budgets. The second stage proposes the abolition of all weapons of mass destruction and the prohibition of nuclear weapons production. At this stage there is a second reduction in conventional forces and mili-

\(^1\)UN Doc. DC/203, 5 June 1962, (ENDC/2, 19 March 1962).
tary budgets. In the third and final stage, all forces and armaments would be destroyed and prohibited, except for internal police forces necessary to maintain order within the state. In case of a violation of the disarmament agreement the internal police forces would come under the command of the United Nations Security Council.

The Soviet plan specifies that all parties "solemnly undertake to carry out all disarmament measures from beginning to end, under strict international control."¹ Each segment of the agreement would be accompanied "by such control measures as are necessary for verification of that measure."² The inspection agency would operate as part of the International Disarmament Organization and consist of a general conference representing all parties to the disarmament treaty. The Control Council would be representative of "the three principal groups of States existing in the world"³ and make decisions by a two-thirds vote. At all times the present nuclear powers would be permanent members of the Control Council.

¹ loc. cit., Part 1, Article 2, par. 2.
² ibid.
³ loc. cit., Part 5, Article 42, par. 1.
Inspection for general and complete disarmament

Two new elements stand out in the Soviet move for "general and complete disarmament." First, the Soviet Union supported the concept that an international inspection agency should be established before disarmament began and that the agency would supervise the disarmament proceedings. Second, she offered both measures of reassurance and verification by defining the power and authority of the inspection agency and endorsing aerial reconnaissance.

Although the Soviet Union modified her attitude towards inspection, she did not change her interpretation of sovereignty. To the Soviet Union no inspection system offers a perfect control network; and the delay of disarmament, because of the lack of a perfect system, is interpreted as a cloud for economic and scientific espionage.1 She continues to stress that states will have to rely mainly on the voluntary compliance of each nation in any disarmament agreement. For the Soviet Union the main principle underlying inspection negotiations at all times must be "respect for the full sovereign rights of the countries on whose territorial ground control posts and aerial photography will be established."2

Although inspection is important in verifying that all parties are adhering to the disarmament agreement, it is not the major area


of Soviet concern. What is important is that states, in fact, disarm. The Soviet strategy seems not to be concerned with surviving or winning an all-out war but to rule out completely the chances of a nuclear holocaust in terms favorable for the further growth of the communist movement.

The Present Soviet Position on Inspection

That the Soviet Union has accepted inspection as an integral part of disarmament can be stated as a fact, but it must be remarked that the Soviet interpretation of inspection makes some critical qualifications necessary. The Soviet Union's major concern in a disarmament program is the clandestine violation of the disarmament treaty; and, for her, inspection is the method of preventing any such occurrence. Acceptance of inspection in these terms is indicated in the following statement of Andrei Gromyko\(^1\) at the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference in March of 1962:

The Soviet Union wishes to have the necessary guarantees that the disarmament obligations that have been agreed upon will be strictly carried out and that there are no loopholes which will permit the clandestine production of aggressive armaments once the process of general and complete disarmament has begun. Our country does

\(^1\)UN Doc. ENDC/PV.2, 15 March 1962, p. 11.
not intend to take anyone at his word...nor
do we expect others to take us at our word.
The Soviet Union is a firm advocate of
strict control over disarmament.

However, as recently as May of 1965 the Soviet Union still
condemned any comprehensive inspection system as an affront to
sovereignty and accused nations that supported such measures of
trying to expand their intelligence system for espionage purposes.\(^1\)
Especially obnoxious to the Soviet Union are Western proposals
that demand unlimited or large numbers of "on-site" inspections.
The U.S.S.R. has continued to emphasize that in order to protect
a nation's sovereignty any disarmament program must be built from
a foundation of trust and that inspection is applicable only to
the essential elements of the disarmament program. Soviet denial
of comprehensive inspection measures was emphasized when Premier
Khrushchev\(^2\) stated that limited inspections would be accepted by
the Soviet Union merely for the sake of reaching agreement.

It seems plausible that the Soviet Union would like to elimi­
nate the burdens of the arms race, but she is not prepared to endorse
methods that could endanger or weaken the Soviet bloc or expose es­
tablished communist regimes to political dangers.\(^3\) Thus, Soviet

\(^{1}\) UN Doc. DC/PV.87, 24 May 1965, pp. 8-15.

\(^{2}\) Mackintosh, J.M., Strategy and Tactics of Soviet Foreign Policy.
sovereignty and her desire for protecting the Communist bloc are her first concerns in any disarmament program. Comprehensive inspection can be said to be rejected by the Soviets mainly for its incompatibility with national sovereignty chiefly "because it reduces political control that communist leadership could exercise in its own territory."¹ The problem is that the mission of the international inspection agency could be adverse to the goals of the Soviet national government.

There are other reasons that must also be considered in the Soviet rejection of a comprehensive inspection system. First, there is the fear that disclosure of all military facilities will provide significant targets to a state that does develop a method to evade the inspection system. Second, secrecy has always been regarded as an asset by the Soviet Union when dealing with other nations in the state system. The fear here is that inspection might develop into a method of political intelligence that will be used to interfere internally with the Soviet government. Third, inspection requires self-confidence for any government; self-confidence both in the stability of the state and in the ability of the inspection system to provide security to the international community. The question here is whether the Soviet Union has yet

attained this confidence and whether she can retain it after entering a disarmament program. Rejection of comprehensive inspection suggests that the Soviet Union does not have the full measure of confidence she needs. Fourth, the exclusiveness of party control is a tenet of Soviet theory; and the authority of an international agency to challenge this claim is a problem in itself. Fifth, the Soviet Union indicated that she feels that she is in a minority position and that she cannot trust a powerful international agency that is controlled by others to always make decisions in the Soviet interest. In overcoming this realization the Soviet Union has either refused a comprehensive inspection system or demands some measures of parity to control the inspection agency. Finally, all governments have relied on intelligence systems to supply information on what other nations are doing, and it is questionable whether an international inspection agency can provide the same quality of information during a disarmament program.

Obviously, each one of the above reasons for Soviet rejection of comprehensive inspection can be considered a primary question that all nations must consider if they are going to accept inspection. Each question forces all nations to review their interpretation of sovereignty and the role their state is playing in the
contemporary world.

The Soviet Union thus accepts inspection as a necessary element of disarmament but insists that a comprehensive system meant to replace the lack of trust and cooperation is not the answer. The Soviet Union's interpretation of inspections is perhaps best defined by Nogee and Spanier's statement that:

"...No control system can substitute for the absence of mutual trust; a reliable instrument for the detection of violations and enforcement of disarmament obligations cannot eliminate reliance upon the good faith of both parties."

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III. THE CONSTANT ELEMENTS IN SOVIET INSPECTION PROPOSALS

We now turn from the previous examination of the "why" of Soviet inspection strategy to a determination of the constant elements that have appeared in Soviet inspection proposals since 1946. The knowledge that the Soviet Union refuses to endorse the concept of a strong, comprehensive inspection system may partially explain the vagueness that seems to permeate her inspection proposals during disarmament negotiations. However, by comparing Soviet inspection proposals to one another, constant elements appear that the Soviet Union has consistently introduced during negotiations. Therefore, it would seem that these constant elements are what the Soviet Union wishes to negotiate with in order to develop a viable inspection system that meets her requirements.

Whether these constant elements are the result of the Soviet interpretation of disarmament or whether they represent a practical embodiment of Soviet foreign policy is not ascertained here. Nor is it suggested that these constant elements reflect what the Soviet Union actually wants included in an inspection system. What is stressed is that the determination of these elements represents what the Soviet Union has been most consistent about during negotiations and probably reflects major areas of Soviet concern in establishing an inspection system.

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In moving from a general analysis of Soviet inspection strategy to defining the particulars of Soviet inspection proposals, several questions arise which serve as a basis for determining and analyzing the constant elements of Soviet inspection proposals. What, for example, should be included in inspection surveillance? How frequently should inspections be carried out? What should be the means through which inspection will be carried out? How will the inspectorate be organized, and who will fill the role of inspector? Questions like these reflect the heart of the inspection controversy. Answers to them, supplied through an analysis of Soviet proposals during negotiations, are significant when developing an understanding of the Soviet position from a technical as well as national point of view. Therefore, through a comparison of Soviet inspection proposals, we are defining the constant elements of "what, when, how, and by whom" that the Soviet Union has presented in disarmament negotiations since 1946.

Soviet Inspection Proposals: What?

In determining what will be inspected by Soviet inspection proposals, three elements supersede all others simply through repetition: 1) a ban on the use of nuclear weapons, 2) prohibition of nuclear weapons production, and 3) inspection of
disarmed elements only. All three points receive a priority rating of 100% on the consistency scale,\textsuperscript{1} thus indicating what the Soviets think should be covered by inspection surveillance.

**Bans on nuclear weapons**

The Soviet consistency in proposing bans on the use and production of nuclear weapons seems to be indicative of her interpretation of the nature of inspection. The Soviet Union has professed a willingness to accept international inspection during general and complete disarmament\textsuperscript{2} but refuses to tolerate inspection probes without corresponding reductions in armaments or forces. The Soviet position appears to be that, "after the accomplishment of general and complete disarmament, control will become unrestricted and comprehensive because then States will no longer have anything to hide from one another."\textsuperscript{3} Therefore, a ban on the use and production of nuclear weapons must take place before the disarmament program itself is enacted. To the Soviets a ban provides the legal foundation for developing an international

\textsuperscript{1}Appendix I, p. 88.

\textsuperscript{2}Appendixes VI and VII, pp. 96-98.

\textsuperscript{3}UN Doc. DC/203, 5 June 1962 (ENDC/3, 19 March 1962), p. 8.
system that verifies compliance of the participants and provides
punishment to violators. The emphasis of providing a nuclear
ban first came early in 1946 when Gromyko\(^1\) stated that:

> I set myself the task of emphasizing the extreme importance of the proposal for the conclusion of the...convention prohibiting the production and employment of atomic weapons. The conclusion of such a Convention would constitute an important practical step toward the fulfillment of the tasks that lie before the Commission.

The Soviet Union seemingly indicates that acceptance of this element would verify that participating states were sincere in their avowal to abide to the disarmament program. Perhaps the demand is out of place because without a previously established inspection system nations have no guarantee that others might not violate such a ban when it seems in their interest to do so.

However, the Soviet Union has given this element priority status in every proposal\(^2\) by demanding it before the inspectorate is given the authority to verify disarmament measures. Regardless

\(^1\) See: Appendix II - Article I, para. a, p. 89; Appendix III - Disarmament Convention, par. 1, p. 91; Appendix IV - Stage II, par. b, p. 92; Appendix V - Article I, par. 1, p. 93; Appendix VI - 3rd Stage, par. 3, p. 96; Appendix VII - Part 2, Chapter I (A) Means of delivery, p. 98.

\(^2\) See: Appendix II - Article I, para. a, p. 89; Appendix III - Disarmament Convention, par. 1, p. 91; Appendix IV - Stage II, par. b, p. 92; Appendix V - Article I, par. 1, p. 93; Appendix VI - 3rd Stage, par. 3, p. 96; Appendix VII - Part 2, Chapter I (A) Means of delivery, p. 98.
of how elaborate a disarmament program the Soviet Union has introduced, she has made it clear that she will accept control only after the prohibition is initiated. So adament has the Soviet Union been on this element she has even denied that it is possible to continue disarmament negotiations for developing any "reliable system for preventing surprise attacks without a prior ban on the use of nuclear weapons."¹

Since 1962, however, the Soviet Union has indicated that there could be an exception to this comprehensive ban. As a security measure during disarmament, nations would be allowed to compromise the comprehensive ban...

... for an agreed and strictly limited number of intercontinental missiles and anti-aircraft missiles in the 'ground-to-air' category, to be retained by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, exclusively in their own territory, until the end of the second stage.²

This exception was revised in 1963 to allow the Soviet Union and the United States to keep "limited numbers" of intercontinental missiles "in their own territory" until the end of Stage III.³

It must be remarked though that these exceptions in no way undermine the significance the Soviet Union places on the ban.

¹UN Doc. A/4078, 5 January 1959, Annex 8, p. 2.
³UN Doc. A/PV.1208, 19 September 1963.
That the Soviet emphasis for a ban on nuclear weapons still exists was emphasized when, in April of 1965, the U.S.S.R. called for the convening of a conference to sign:

...an international agreement (convention) banning the use of nuclear weapons...The conclusion of such an agreement would lead to the further relaxation of international tension, would be a measure for checking the nuclear arms race, and would be a substantial contribution to the consolidation of confidence in relations among States.\(^1\)

Even as recently as 1966 the Soviet Union reiterated her desire for a ban on nuclear weapons when Premier Kosygin\(^2\) declared that:

The time has come to outlaw the use of nuclear weapons...The Soviet Union is prepared to assume immediately an obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, provided that the other nuclear Powers do likewise.

Several reasons can be surmised for the Soviet emphasis on a nuclear ban. First, the Soviet Union might fear that the premature establishment of an inspection system might develop into a means of political intelligence, thus creating a system of espionage to be used against her.\(^3\) Second, the strong emphasis on a nuclear ban may indicate that the Soviet Union wishes to scale

\(^1\) UN Doc. DC/213 Add.2, 28 April 1965, p. 4.
\(^2\) UN Doc. ENDC/167, 3 February 1966, pp. 3-4.
\(^3\) UN Doc. DC/PV.87, 24 May 1965, pp. 8-15.
down or halt the arms race at its present rate. It might even be possible that the Soviet Union would prefer checking the arms race to participating in any comprehensive disarmament program. Finally, the Soviet Union's announced support of a comprehensive nuclear ban may have propaganda overtones in that it encourages the active support of the masses of the world.

Inspection of disarmed elements

The other consistent element of Soviet inspection proposals is often designated as a dispute between "control of disarmaments or over armaments." Soviet representatives attack Western proposals as "control over armaments," while labelling any powerful international inspectorate as a "legalized system of international espionage."\(^1\)

Soviet proposals stipulate that only those armaments and forces being reduced or eliminated by the disarmament treaty are subject to inspection. Retained forces and equipment fall outside the perspective of the disarmament program and therefore come under the jurisdiction of the individual national governments. Soviet reasoning against inspection of retained armaments and forces was

\(^1\)UN Doc. ENDC/PV.26, 24 April 1962, p. 21.
explained by Gromyko\textsuperscript{1} in the following manner:

The contentions, sometimes made, that there can be no certainty that States are honouring their disarmament obligations if only the fact of the reduction of armed forces and armaments is verified, are completely groundless. Actually, even today one side does not know for sure the quantities of armaments and armed forces possessed by the other side. In the course of disarmament both sides will at each stage reduce their armed forces in agreed proportions, which will, without question, diminish the danger of a military conflict, even though the quantities of armed forces and armaments retained by states will not be verified.

Furthermore, the Soviet Union has consistently argued that inspection over armaments becomes a dangerous threat to national security against which all nations must guard. To quote Mr. Zorin\textsuperscript{2},

\begin{quotation}
From such control, which is essentially not control over disarmament but control over armaments, the only ones who would gain would be those who are fostering aggressive plans, who are interested in developing intelligence activities in order to obtain information about the vital centres and defense system of a country which they regard as a potential enemy.
\end{quotation}

The Soviet Union has also warned that there might be struggle

\begin{footnotes}
\item[1] UN Doc. DC/203, 5 June 1962 (ENDC/3, 19 March 1962), Appendix D. par. 32.
\item[2] UN Doc. ENDC/PV.26, 24 April 1962, p. 28.
\end{footnotes}
and stalemate if the nations of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Commission did not limit themselves to negotiations concerning control of disarmed elements when Gromyko\textsuperscript{1} stated:

The Soviet Government is convinced that if all members of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament seek agreement on general and comprehensive disarmament under strict international control, and not the establishment of control over armaments, the Committee would not find it difficult to agree on controls.

Expansion of negotiations beyond this element seems to mean that the Soviet Union will only reject what is proposed and perhaps terminate disarmament negotiations entirely.

Whatever her reasoning for objecting to inspection of retained armaments and forces, the Soviet Union has continually overlooked one serious limitation to this element. When reductions are calculated as proportions of existing forces at the initial stage, then in order to verify that nations are adhering to their commitments there must be inspection of the original forces and those remaining after the reduction is completed. Since the latest Soviet proposal\textsuperscript{2} relies heavily on proportional reductions from stage to stage, she has undermined the ability of her own proposal to accomplish disarmament. That the Soviet Union does

\textsuperscript{1}UN Doc. DC/203, op. cit., Appendix D, par. 42.

\textsuperscript{2}See Appendix VI, p. 96.
not intend to tolerate inspection of retained forces can be seen by examining her proposals in detail because nowhere are there allowances made for verifying retained forces and armaments.

**Other elements**

Two other elements also appear in "what" the Soviet Union wishes to have inspected, but they do not have the significant consistency of the previous elements. The Soviet Union would also assign the international inspectorate the responsibility of verifying reductions in conventional forces and armaments. On the consistency scale this element received an 83.3% because early negotiations (1946-1953) considered only the control of atomic energy rather than partial or comprehensive disarmament.

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1 See Appendixes II-VII, pp. 89-103.

2 See: Appendix III - Disarmament Convention, par. 2
Disarmament Program, par. a, p. 91.
Appendix IV - Stage I, par. a, p. 92.
Stage II, par. a, p. 92.
Appendix V - Article I, par. 2, p. 93.
Article II, pars. 1 & 3, p. 93.
Article III, par. 2, p. 94.
Appendix VI - 1st Stage, pars. 1-3, p. 96.
2nd Stage, par. 1, p. 96.
Appendix VII - Part 2, Chapter II, p. 98.
Part 3, Chapter VI, p. 99.
Part 4, Chapter IX, Article 31, p. 100.

3 Appendix I, p. 88.
Several remarks can be made so as to clarify the nature of this element. First, reductions are based on percentages of total forces, usually with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States of America, and the People's Republic of China maintaining equal numbers. Second, reductions are gradual - stage to stage - so as to maintain an equity among the disarming nations. Finally, the Soviet Union specifies that the end result is that nations should have only enough armed forces and armaments "necessary to maintain internal security and fulfill the obligations of the United Nations Charter." The major obstacle to this Soviet proposal is the lack of provisions for inspecting production facilities of conventional armaments. The inspecting agency is merely responsible for verifying the reduction of a specified number of armaments, but nations have no way of ascertaining whether a violation has occurred because the violator may be producing armaments as fast as the disarmament treaty is reducing them.

Also obtaining some amount of consistency (66.7%) were Soviet proposals for the liquidation of foreign bases. The Soviet Union has frequently contended that "foreign military bases and the

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1See footnote 2, p. 53.
2Appendix V, Article III, par. 9, p. 94.
3Appendix I, p. 88.
stationing of troops in the territory of other States constitute one of the principal sources of international conflict and tension.¹ The desire of the Soviet Union to eliminate foreign bases has been mentioned in almost every Soviet proposal² and emphasized in her latest proposal by making it the second element of the first stage. Western nations have generally rejected this effort because it would eliminate a major portion of their military sites before Eastern European nations reduced the number of active troops they maintained. However, in 1962 the Soviet Union made a significant revision in her usual interpretation of the authority of the inspecting agency by proposing that the inspectorate not only verify, but supervise, the dismantling of foreign bases.³ Evidently the Soviet Union does not feel that national sovereignty would be endangered, or the chance of interference in domestic affairs increased, because the agency would be supervising outside of national territory.

¹UN Doc. DC/PV.72, 26 April 1965, p. 28.

²See: Appendix III - Disarmament Program, par. c, p. 91; Appendix V - Article II, par. 8, p. 93; Appendix VI - 2nd Stage, par. 2, p. 96; Appendix VII - Part 2, Chapter I (B) Foreign military bases and troops in alien territories, p. 99.

³UN Doc. DC/203, op. cit., Appendix C, Part 2, Chapter I (B).
Soviet Inspection Proposals: When?

It is in the area of inspection timing that the Soviet Union has been most specific during disarmament negotiations. Generally speaking, her more recent proposals have included defined time lengths for each stage and automatic shifts from stage to stage. However, these automatic shifts from stage to stage sometimes take place without complete verification of the elements provided in the previous stage. The Soviet contention here is that inspection can't verify every element in a disarmament program, and at some point nations must trust one another to carry out their commitments. Throughout disarmament negotiations two major elements stand out in the timing of Soviet inspection proposals: 1) inspection and disarmament must be initiated simultaneously, and 2) inspection is progressively based on the elements that must be verified.

When inspection is initiated

Closely related to Soviet demands for a ban on the production and use of nuclear weapons prior to disarmament are Soviet proposals

\[1\] loc. cit., Appendix C - Part 2, Chapter IV; Part 3, Chapter VIII; and Part IV, Chapter XI.

\[2\] See discussion on pp. 42-43.
calling for inspection and disarmament to be initiated simultaneously. The argument for both these elements is the same: "There can be no more control than there is disarmament." In her 1962 proposal the Soviet Union specifically stated that the International Disarmament Organization "shall begin operating as soon as disarmament measures are initiated."^2

Two reasons may be given for the Soviet interest in tying disarmament and inspection measures together. First, as inspection measures get underway disarmament measures are also initiated, thus reassuring states that nations are adhering to the disarmament treaty. The fact that disarmament measures are being carried out may make it easier for individual nations to accept the probes of an international inspectorate. Second, the Soviet Union may actually fear that the early establishment of an inspection system will become a threat to her national sovereignty. On the consistency scale this element receives an 83.3%^3 and remains something that disarmament

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^1See: Appendix III - Disarmament Convention, pars. 1 & 3, p. 91; Appendix IV - Stage I, pars. a & b, p. 92; Appendix V - Article I, pars. 1 & 3, p. 93; Appendix VI - 1st Stage, par. 1, p. 96; Appendix VII - Part 1, Article 1, and Article 2 - pars. 3 & 4, p. 98.

^2UN Doc. DC/203, op. cit., Appendix C, Part 1, Article 2, par. 3.

^3Appendix I, p. 88.
negotiations will continue to be confronted by.

Progressive inspection

The Soviet Union has also consistently proposed a system of progressive inspection\(^1\) that complements the phase of disarmament in progress. On the consistency scale this element receives a \(66.7\%\)\(^2\), and it should be noted that progressive inspection has been emphasized only since 1954 in terms of partial or complete disarmament. Both the Soviet Union and the United States have agreed that there should be reductions in conventional armaments and forces as well as abolition of nuclear weapons and that this approach should take place in stages. This approach was endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly on November 4, 1954 with the concurring vote of the Soviet Union.\(^3\)

Furthermore, the Soviet Union has consistently specified that

\(^1\)See: Appendix IV - Stage I, par. b, p. 92.
   Stage II, par. c, p. 92.
Appendix V - Article II, par.9, p. 94.
   Article III, par. 7, p. 94.
Appendix VI - 3rd Stage, par. 9, p. 97.
Appendix VII - Part I, Article 2, par. 2, p. 98.

\(^2\)Appendix I, p. 88.

"the extent of the control and inspection exercised shall correspond to the stage reached in the phased disarmament of States."\textsuperscript{1}

Again in 1962 the Soviet Union stipulated that "each disarmament measure shall be accompanied by such control measures as are necessary for verification of that measure."\textsuperscript{2} Andrei Gromyko, Soviet representative to the United Nations, explained this method by saying:

The draft treaty prepared by the Soviet Government provides for the extent of international control - stage by stage - to those elements of the military machinery of States which are subject to elimination at the corresponding stages of disarmament.

The Soviet Union has never endorsed an inspectorate that would begin with comprehensive powers and authority to make it a primary force in any disarmament program. Rather, she has contended that the authority of the inspectorate should be extended from stage to stage depending on what the agency is expected to accomplish. Throughout the disarmament program the inspectorate cannot inspect just any subject at their determination, but rather it follows a format established by the disarmament treaty itself. Thus, the

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{1} Appendix VI, 3rd Stage, par. 9, p. 97.
\item\textsuperscript{2} UN Doc. DC/203, op. cit., Appendix C, Part 1, Article 2, par. 2.
\item\textsuperscript{3} loc. cit., (ENDC/3, 19 March 1962), Appendix D, Par. 33.
\end{itemize}
timing of inspection is directly related to the elements specified in the disarmament treaty; and the scope of the inspectorate's authority is defined by the element being inspected. That the timing of inspection can be directly related to the phase of disarmament in progress is debatable, but the Soviet Union has indicated that an unscheduled program becomes a dangerous instrument that might violate state sovereignty.

**Timing of physical inspections**

There remains one other area that has received some emphasis in Soviet proposals - the timing of physical inspections. Western proposals have generally proposed eight to twelve inspections annually, plus allowing all those inspections the international agency finds necessary to verify suspicious evidence. The United States has declared that acceptance of physical inspections is a minimum condition in creating a viable disarmament program.

However, the Soviet Union has indicated that serious problems could arise if the inspection agency is endowed with such generous

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1. _loc. cit., (ENDC/2, 19 March 1962), Appendix B._
authority. In earlier proposals the Soviet Union stated that an international control organ could carry out verification measures but only "without the right to interfere in the domestic affairs of states."¹ Numerous physical inspections were considered a serious affront to national sovereignty. In her 1955 proposal the Soviet Union was more subtle by declaring that inspection teams should have freedom of access at all times but only "within the supervisory functions they exercise."² In 1959, Premier Khrushchev³ clarified the Soviet position by explaining:

... that it would be possible to agree to carry out each year a certain previously determined number of inspections on the territory of the Soviet Union as well as the territories of the United States of America, Great Britain, and their possessions if the reports of control posts would indicate... phenomena...suspected of being nuclear explosions. It is understood that such inspections would not be numerous. I consider that, strictly speaking, it would not be necessary for many trips to be made in each country.

The Soviet Union seems to be indicating that several months between inspections is not enough time for one nation to seriously violate

¹Appendix III, Disarmament Convention, par. 3, p. 91.
²Appendix V, Article III, par. 7(b), p. 94.
the disarmament treaty. The clearest statement made on physical inspections was made by Premier Khrushchev\(^1\) in 1963, when he stated:

> We believe and we continue to believe now that, in general, inspection is not necessary and if we give our consent to an annual quota of 2-3 inspections this is done solely for the sake of reaching agreement.

On the whole the Soviet Union would probably prefer that territorial inspections be abandoned and replaced by mechanized installations monitored by an impartial staff. Since these technological advances have not yet been made the Soviet Union accepts two or three annual inspections as an undesirable necessity.

Soviet Inspection Proposals: How?

Three methods of inspection were previously discussed and analyzed.\(^2\) Of the three, the Soviet Union has consistently proposed (100\%)\(^3\) only one - physical inspection.\(^4\) In her 1955 proposal


\(^2\) See pp. 13-14.

\(^3\) Appendix I, p. 88.

\(^4\) See Appendixes II - VII. Refer especially to: Appendix V - Article I, par. 3, p. 93; Appendix VI - 3rd Stage, par. 9, p. 97; and Appendix VII - Part 1, Article 2, par. 6, p. 98.
the Soviet Union declared that the control organ would have "rights, powers, functions adequate to guarantee effective observance by all states of agreed prohibitions and reductions."¹ More specifically, concerning physical inspection the international control organ would be allowed to "set up control posts on territory of all states concerned"² in order to verify the compliance of the participating states. However, the Soviet Union agreed to the establishment of control posts only "on a basis of reciprocity, for the purpose of supervising the fulfillments of States of their obligation."³ It must be noted that the Soviet Union specifically assigned the inspecting agency the responsibility of verifying the reports of the individual states. Once the program of general and complete disarmament had been completed, and only then, would the International Disarmament Organization assume supervisory authority "over the implementation by States of the obligations they have assumed."⁴ Acceptance of physical inspection is limited by several factors. For

¹Appendix V, Article I, par. 3, p. 93.
²loc. cit., Article II, par. 9, p. 94.
³UN Doc. DC/112, 1 August 1954, Annex 12, p. 2.
⁴Appendix VII, Part 1, Article 2, par. 6, p. 98.
example, the Soviet Union has never supported unlimited amounts of "on-site" inspections,\(^1\) nor have the Soviets supported the right of inspection teams to investigate facilities of their own choosing. Physical inspection is acceptable only at those sites approved by the states or at those facilities specifically designated by the disarmament treaty.

To the Soviets, physical inspection is seen as a supplement to distant monitoring if there is to be assurance that underground explosions can be identified as such. To carry out this interpretation the Soviet Union has endorsed the concept of mobile inspection teams. This endorsement is limited, however, by Soviet declarations that inspection teams have free access at all times "within limits of supervisory functions they exercise, to all objects of control."\(^2\) The confusing point is that the Soviet Union does not usually assign the inspectorate supervisory authority until after the completion of an entire stage of disarmament. Also vague in this proposal is the phrase "objects of control" because the Soviet Union has yet to define what they are. Because of this vagueness it is questionable whether the inspectorate can provide the verification it should.

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\(^1\)See discussion on timing, pp. 59-61.

\(^2\)Appendix V, Article III, par. 7(b), p. 94.
the verification it should.

The Soviet Union has also endorsed the right of the inspection agency to establish "aerial photography over the territories of States"\(^1\) as a method of verification. Once again, however, this element does not come into being until after the program for disarmament has been completed. Whatever the conditions placed on physical inspection by the Soviet Union, it remains the primary method proposed in negotiations for establishing a working inspection system.

**Records inspection**

Rating an 83.3% on the consistency scale,\(^2\) records inspection has often been proposed by the Soviet Union as an acceptable means of control over the disarmament program.\(^3\) The Soviet Union first proposed it in 1954 when she declared that the international control organ should be allowed to "collect and compile data on extraction, production, and utilization of atomic materials and energy."\(^4\) Furthermore, the control organ would be allowed to call

\(^1\)Appendix VI, 3rd Stage, par. 10, p. 97.
\(^2\)Appendix I, p. 88.
\(^3\)See: Appendix III - Disarmament Convention, par. 3, p. 91; Appendix IV - Stage I, par. b, p. 92; Appendix V - Article II, par. 9(c), p. 94 and Article III, par. 7(c), p. 95: Appendix VI - 3rd Stage, par. 10, p. 97; and Appendix VII - Part 1, Article 2, par. 5, p. 98 and Part 2, Chapter II, Article 13, p. 99.
\(^4\)Appendix III, Disarmament Convention, par. 3, p. 91.
for information on the forces and armaments of participating state. But it must be recognized that such information was to be given voluntarily by the participating states and could not be forced from a state who refused to conform to the general policy. In 1955 the Soviet Union proposed that the international control organ:

...have unimpeded access to records relating to budgetary appropriations of states for military purposes including all decisions of their legislative and executive organs.¹

States would not deliver all their records at once for investigation, but rather submit...

...such information about their armed forces, armaments, military production and military appropriations as are necessary to carry out the measures of the corresponding stage.²

Thus, states would open their records for inspection in partial segments that would complement the phase of disarmament taking place. It seems "unimpeded access" would come only when general and complete disarmament had been completed. Perhaps, records inspection would be more seriously considered by the Soviet

¹ Appendix V, Article 2, par. 9(c), p. 94.
² UN Doc. DC/203, op. cit., Appendix C, Part 1, Article 2, par. 5.
Union if it were linked to the ban on nuclear weapons production that she has continually stressed. While military budget inspection has been the subject of most Soviet proposals, the Soviet emphasis on a ban for nuclear weapons production indicates that inspection of inventory records may be more desirable.

Nonphysical inspection

Nonphysical inspection, where trained personnel question civilians or government employees at will, has never been endorsed by the Soviet Union. By scanning the proposals included in the appendixes it can be seen that this method is never mentioned by the Soviets. Nor has the Soviet Union issued any statements about verification by this method and so has ignored the subject entirely. It would seem that the Soviet Union regards nonphysical inspection as too great an infringement on her national sovereignty and something that could too easily encourage interference in domestic affairs. Therefore, it seems extremely doubtful whether she would ever support such a measure. In fact, it is questionable whether Western nations could see this method used to their advantage!

Soviet Inspection Proposals: By Whom?

From the onset of disarmament negotiations in 1946, the Soviet
Union has consistently stressed two elements in the organization of an international inspection agency. First, the Soviet Union has consistently proposed that any international inspection agency should be established within the framework of the United Nations. Second, enforcement action that involves the use of military or economic sanctions is the responsibility of the United Nations Security Council and not the inspection agency.

**Within the framework of the U.N.**

In 1946 the United States proposed that an independent international agency be established and given broad powers to control the production and use of atomic energy. The Soviet Union reacted negatively to such a proposal, declaring that the American proposal was:

...of such a character that in reality such an authority would be independent of the Security Council and would have almost full autonomy. This cannot be reconciled with the Charter of the United Nations.¹

The Soviet Union further clarified her position in 1947 when she let it be know that she objected to an independent agency that was not subject to the supervision of the permanent members of the

¹ The Control of Atomic Energy, op. cit., p. 337.
Security Council. Gromyko\(^1\) explained the Soviet position on the American proposal in the following manner:

...These recommendations undermine the foundation of the effective activities of the Security Council, in the framework of which an international system of control of atomic energy should be established, since they provide that the principle of unanimity of the five great powers in the Security Council should not be applied while taking decisions on sanctions in cases when violations of the control segments is determined.

Therefore, the Soviet Union has consistently proposed (100\%)\(^2\) that the establishment of an inspection agency must be within the framework of the United Nations,\(^3\) preferably under the direction of the Security Council. In her 1954 proposal\(^4\) the Soviet Union declared that the "international control organ shall be set up under the Security Council." But Western nations rejected this proposal because they felt a permanent member would veto effective action by


\(^2\) Appendix I, p. 88.

\(^3\) See Appendix III - Disarmament Convention, par. 3, p. 91; Appendix IV - Convention, p. 92; Appendix V - Article II, par. 5, p. 93; and Appendix VII - Part I, Article 2, par. 3, p. 98.

\(^4\) Appendix III - Disarmament Convention, par. 3, p. 91.
the Security Council if the action did not mesh with their particular national interest. In her present proposal the Soviet Union has sidestepped this dispute by proposing that the International Disarmament Organization "be established within the framework of the United Nations." The Soviet Union has simply refused to support an independent agency that would be endowed with such comprehensive authority that it might eventually interfere in the domestic affairs of the state.

The enforcement authority

The Soviet position can be further clarified by looking at one element - who will carry out the sanctions of an inspection system? The Soviet Union has been adamant in declaring that sanctions involving military or economic sanctions are singularly the responsibility of the Security Council. Thus, Soviet inspection proposals have given the inspectorate identification and verification authority; but they specifically stipulate that reactions to violations are the jurisdiction of the Security Council. The Soviet Union made her position clear in 1946 when Gromyko

1Appendix VII, Part 1, Article 2, par. 3, p. 98.

2See: Appendix V - Article III, par. 8, p. 95; and Appendix VII - Part 5, Article 42, par. 2(c), p. 102.


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explained:

I should like to make it again clear the position of the Soviet Union that we cannot accept any proposal that would undermine any degree the principle of unanimity of the permanent members of the Security Council in the maintenance of peace and security.

In 1959 the Soviet Union proposed a list of items that she considered should be covered by a veto or permanent member agreement. The following list is so comprehensive in nature that it virtually destroys the independent agency Western powers hoped to establish. The list of items subject to veto included the following:

1. amendments to the treaty
2. all matters relating to treaty violations.
3. the dispatch of inspection teams to investigate events which might be nuclear explosions
4. the findings of such inspection teams
5. improvements to the control system
6. positioning of control posts
7. establishment of aircraft sampling routes, and all fiscal, administrative, logistics, and personnel questions

It would seem that the Soviet Union does not intend to sacrifice her right of veto in anything that would change the nature of the inspection system or involve facilities pertaining to her national

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1 The Control of Atomic Energy, op. cit., p. 378.

interest.

The Soviet Union's basic position on this element has not changed throughout the 1946-1966 disarmament negotiations. In 1962 the Soviet Union again emphasized the right of permanent members to exercise a veto over sanctions of the inspection system by declaring:

It goes without saying that the international disarmament organization will not and cannot be entrusted with any functions involving the execution of preventive or enforcement measures in regard to States. The business of the international organ is to establish facts. If in connection with those facts the need should arise of taking action to safeguard peace and security, this would, as heretofore, be exclusively within the competence of the Security Council which is the sole body empowered by the United Nations Charter to take such action.\footnote{UN Doc. DC/203, op cit., Appendix D, par. 30.}

Therefore, the Soviet Union denies any international inspectorate the role of enforcement authority and assigns it only that authority necessary to verify known or suspected violations.

A search for parity?

There is some evidence to indicate that the Soviet Union is looking for an inspection system that gives her a stronger sense of equality with Western nations. Her feeling of insecurity seems to lie in the fact that any board or agency where nuclear powers
had equal voting power would put her in a minority position.¹
The early emphasis on establishing the inspection agency under
the Security Council would have given the Soviet Union effective
veto power over any decision.

Today, however, the Soviet Union has proposed new organs²
that deny her the use of the veto (except in cases involving
sanctions) but give her a better sense of representation. In
her 1962 proposal, it is the Control Council which would super­
vise and verify the implementation of the disarmament treaty.
The Soviet Union has stipulated that its composition must ensure
"proper representation of the three principal groups of states
existing in the world"³ - Western, "socialist," and nonaligned.
Thus, the Soviet Union seems to feel that her influence in this
case would be at least as great as the more numerous Western na­
tions that have nuclear weapons. This element - control of the
inspectorate either by the Security Council or the newer Control
Council - rates 100% on the consistency scale.⁴ At the very least,
this kind of emphasis indicates that the Soviet Union considers

¹See quote, pp. 29-30.
²Appendix VII, Part 5, Articles 40-42, pp. 101-103.
³UN Doc. DC/203, op. cit., Appendix C, Part 5, Article 42,
par. 1(b), p. 129.
⁴Appendix I, p. 88.
the voting procedure in the inspectorate a significant element for further negotiation.

Other elements

Two other elements also appear consistent in Soviet proposals for organizing an international inspectorate. First, inspectors for the international organization would be selected on an "international basis." Although this statement has never been explained in detail, the Soviet Union seems to be implying that all nations would be represented and that the inspectors would be selected on their impartiality and training. But, in her latest proposal, the Soviet Union has also stipulated that inspectors must be selected in a manner adequately representative of "the three principal groups of States existing in the world."¹

Second, the Soviet Union has also endorsed the concept that some "permanent observers" can be stationed in each nation on a reciprocal basis. However, in 1955 the Soviet proposal limited permanent observers to the "objects of control" that fall within their supervisory functions.² Her latest proposal seems even more confusing, as permanent observers can be used either on a

¹UN Doc. DC/203, op. cit., Part 5, Article 42, par. 2(3), p. 129.
²Appendix V, Article III, par. 7 (b), p. 94.
temporary or permanent basis.\textsuperscript{1} Whether observers are temporary or permanent depends on the nature of the disarmament measure being carried out. If constant supervision is necessary to assure compliance of a specified measure, then observers become permanent for that purpose. A permanent staff that continually verifies the whole of the disarmament program comes into being only after general and complete disarmament is completed.\textsuperscript{2}

\textsuperscript{1} Appendix VII, Part 1, Article 2, par. 4, p. 98.
\textsuperscript{2} loc. cit., par. 6, p. 98.
IV. THE PATTERN OF EMPHASIS IN
SOVIET INSPECTION PROPOSALS

Even though the Soviet Union seems to be hazy and unclear in the proposals she submits during inspection negotiations, there is a pattern of emphasis that emerges. The pattern of emphasis developed here is based on the constant elements the Soviet Union has proposed in inspection proposals from 1946 to present, which were outlined in the previous chapters. The remaining objective of this thesis is to define the specific elements reflected in the Soviet pattern of emphasis and analyze them for what they may or may not mean in developing an inspection system.

The following list summarizes the constant elements that were found in the Soviet inspection proposals from 1946 to date:

1. a ban on the use of nuclear weapons prior to the initiation of any disarmament program or the establishment of an inspection system
2. a ban on the production of nuclear weapons, verified by an inspection system
3. inspection of only those forces and armaments reduced or eliminated by the disarmament treaty and not those weapons, installations, and forces retained by the individual states
4. verification of reductions in conventional forces and armaments
5. verification and supervision of the liquidation of foreign bases and the withdrawal of foreign troops
6. the initiation of the disarmament program simultaneously with the establishment of an inspection system

1Appendix I, p. 88.
7. endorsement of a system of progressive inspection, where the inspectorate's powers and authority correspond to the phase of disarmament in progress
8. a limit of 2-3 "on-site" inspections per year in each nation's territory
9. endorsement of physical inspection as a method of verification
10. endorsement of records inspection as a method of verification
11. establishment of the inspection organization within the framework of the United Nations
12. economic or military sanctions resulting from the identification and verification of a disarmament violation remain the responsibility and prerogative of the United Nations Security Council.
13. concern over who controls the inspection agency and the voting procedure to be used in the organization
14. inspectors for the International Disarmament Organization to be selected on an "international basis"; in the 1960s an added stipulation that inspectors equally represent Western, socialist, and non-aligned nations
15. endorsement of some permanent observers at "points of control"

These constant elements seem to reflect the basic Soviet interpretation of inspection and disarmament in general. Each element seems to be based on broader tenets of Soviet disarmament policy, stressing a pattern of emphasis which includes: 1) defense of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Soviet state and its allies against international control that might lead to subversion, and 2) the establishment of parity within the inspection system.
so as to neutralize the numerical advantage enjoyed by Western powers.

Defense of Sovereignty

Since all nations show concern with protecting their national sovereignty when entering something that is supra-national in character, it should be no surprise that the Soviet Union apparently believes the establishment of an inspection agency may be a threat to the nature of her governmental system. Obviously, acceptance of inspection further opens Soviet society to the observation of outsiders which might endanger the existing hegemony of the regime. The Soviet decision-makers apparently believe that inspection will inject "heretical influences" and pose a threat to their undisputed control. The problem becomes unsolvable especially when the goals of any international inspection agency are adverse to the goals of a major power.

Furthermore, if it can be contended that there is evidence of bad faith by some governments, why not acknowledge that such bad faith can also be shown by the staff of an inspection agency? It would seem that the Soviet Union does have some significant reasons for objecting to the establishment of a comprehensive inspection system.
The foundation for inspection

The Soviets have built the basis for an inspection system in their proposals for bans on the use and production of nuclear weapons. The conventions prohibiting the construction and employment of nuclear weapons becomes the legal focus of what an inspection system should verify. The Soviets also find this approach desirable because disarmament begins first, thereby serving as a determining factor that nations are really interested in disarmament. Participants would prove their interest by disarming, in fact, not by holding up disarmament measures until other obligations have been satisfied. The prior establishment of an inspection system is a threat to the Soviet Union because there is no assurance that Western nations will adhere to the disarmament program even after the inspection agency is established. Also, there is no reason to believe that the premature establishment of an inspection system will not become a legalized system of international espionage.

Acceptance of this element could also mean a halt to the arms race while allowing nations to maintain the weapons they already have. Obviously, this approach also serves Soviet propaganda as it is the Soviets that are calling for disarmament now while other nations are delaying the process for complex reasons. Because the bans on the use and production of nuclear weapons would limit the focus of future agency action, the Soviet Union apparently feels
that national sovereignty would be protected from possible unlimited probes by an inspection organization.

**Timing of inspection**

To the Soviets the inspectorate's responsibilities and authority are directly related to the phase of disarmament in progress. Inspection is thus defined by the armaments and forces being reduced or eliminated in the current phase. Only when the phase of disarmament in progress has been completed, does the inspecting agency take on supervisory functions over all the areas of the disarmament treaty. To do otherwise, the Soviets contend, could seriously jeopardize the sovereignty of each state. If the authority of the inspection agency is not limited to the elements of the disarmament program, the Soviets feel that nations are offering an open opportunity for the inspectorate to expand its powers at its discretion. Thus, the chances are increased for the inspectorate to involve itself at will with the domestic and nondisarmament affairs of a state. To avoid this possibility, the Soviets project a system in which disarmament and inspection are initiated simultaneously. Sovereignty is therefore protected from unwarranted inspection probes by the confinements of the disarmament treaty.

The critical problem with this Soviet interpretation is whether the inspection agency can accomplish its responsibility when viewed in such a limited manner. For the inspection organization to assure
compliance of the involved participants in a disarmament program, the agency should be established and working prior to each disarmament phase. In this way, all nations are confident the agency can accomplish its assignment. However, in the Soviet interpretation the inspection agency is denied the authority to work in any area until disarmament has begun within the particular field. Under these circumstances the inspection system is weakest exactly at the time when it should be operating at its full strength - the beginning of a new phase of disarmament. Each nation's sovereignty may be protected from interference by the inspectorate before disarmament begins, but comprehensive knowledge of whether all nations are adhering to the beginning phases of disarmament is denied. Although the Soviet Union does have a point, it is questionable whether her proposed method is conducive to developing a workable inspection system.

Method of inspection

Physical "on-site" inspections have been consistently proposed by the Soviet Union as a method for the inspecting agency to carry out its activities; but it is unlikely, to say the least, that the Soviet Union will ever allow the inspectorate unlimited prerogatives in the use of this measure. Since the inspection system verifies the results of the disarmed elements, it would seem "on-site" inspections would take place only when the state announces the element is
completed. The Soviet Union has endorsed permanent observers - but only at "points of control." Although this measure has yet to be clarified, it would seem this means at installations from which a surprise attack can be initiated. This limited interpretation would exclude vital areas, like production facilities, that provide positive assurance that states are adhering to the obligations of the disarmament treaty.

The Soviet Union has also limited physical inspections to two or three per year because she contends that the few months between inspections are not enough for nations to seriously violate the disarmament treaty. This approach denies the inspectorate the authority to check suspicious activities when they occur; and if the delay is too long, states might even be able to cover their violations before detection. Indeed, this approach denies the inspectorate the capacity to provide knowledge of what has happened precisely at the time when most nations would need the assurance that a serious violation has not been committed. The Soviets have inferred that inspections can be allowed, perhaps on a reciprocal basis, at some installations if staffed by impartial teams. Such concessions are acceptable if one desires disarmament at any cost; but they hardly provide the barest format on which a viable, acceptable arrangement can be based.
The Soviets have also endorsed records inspection as an acceptable method of verification. But it has long been recognized that this method has serious defects because bookkeeping can be juggled to cover errors. Despite the fact that military budget inspection has often been proposed, it just lacks the positive assurance that an inspection system must be capable of giving. Inventory inspection seems to offer clearer evidence of each nation's compliance, but as yet it has not been a method the Soviets have often proposed.

Soviet concern over sovereignty

The flaw in what seems to be the Soviet reasoning in inspection is that there is no way to assure all these elements - bans on the use and production of nuclear weapons, inspection of disarmed elements, initiation of disarmament and inspection simultaneously, progressive inspection, physical and records inspection as methods of verification - are being carried out without verification throughout the disarmament program. No nation would reduce or eliminate strategic weapons without absolute assurance that at the end of the phase in progress the other participants have already done likewise. Verification of the result is not enough in disarmament; there must be assurance that nations are complying during each phase.
There are standard assertions that the Soviet Union is mellowing or in a state of transition and that, because of this change, she might liberalize her views on establishing an inspection system. However, it appears that the Soviet leadership is equally concerned with maximizing the existing power structure while facilitating change. As early as 1947 the Soviet Union established her concern for protecting her sovereignty when Gromyko stated:

Strict international control and inspection of atomic energy should be established. At the same time this strict international control and strict inspection should not develop into interference with those branches of industry which are not connected with the production of atomic energy...I deem it necessary to emphasize the granting of broad rights and powers of such a kind to the control organ is incompatible with State sovereignty. Therefore, such proposals are unacceptable and must be rejected as unfounded.

Establishment of Parity

For any nation to enter a disarmament program requires self-confidence. First, a nation must have self-confidence in her own stability as a nation and the self-assurance that her system will not be challenged, altered, or destroyed while participating in a disarmament program. Second, a nation must have confidence in the

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disarmament program itself; the assurance that it will work and yet not undermine her influence and position as a nation. Throughout inspection negotiations the Soviet Union has displayed significant concern about how an International Disarmament Organization will be organized and the voting procedure to be used when making decisions. It would seem that the Soviet Union presently regards herself in a minority position when opposed by the more numerous Western nations. The Soviet fear seems to be that the Western nations would have the controlling votes and that decisions taken by these nations could be prejudiced against the Soviet Union. To avoid this sense of insecurity the Soviet Union has usually proposed that significant decisions should be made by the United Nations Security Council. As a permanent member of the Security Council, the Soviet Union could preserve her influence through the use, or threat of use, of the veto. However, Western nations rejected this measure because any one of the permanent members could veto action that seemed against their best interest. More recently, the Soviet Union has introduced and supported the Control Council. Since Western, socialist, and nonaligned nations would be equally represented, any split between Western and socialist nations would

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1 See quote, pp. 29-30.

2 Appendix VII, Part 5, Article 42, p. 102.
place the decisive power in the hands of nonaligned nations. Evi-
dently the Soviet Union feels that in this system both Western
and socialist nations would have equal influence as they bargained
for nonaligned votes.

However, the Soviet Union still denies the right of the in-
spectorate to take responsive action when a violation has been
determined. The international inspectorate is assigned the re-
sponsibility of establishing facts in regards to the compliance of
the participants. If, in connection with the established facts, a
need arises for taking action to safeguard peace, any responsive
measure would be "exclusively within the competence of the Secur-
ity Council which is the sole body empowered by the United Nations
Charter to take such action." In this way the agreement of all
the permanent members would be necessary before economic or mili-
tary sanctions could be employed against a violator. Thus, permanent
members of the Security Council would maintain their power and
influence through the veto.

Is Inspection Possible?

Whether or not an acceptable inspection system can ever be
developed is debatable because as yet there is no proof that na-
tions are sincerely interested in establishing a disarmament program.

1 Loc. cit., Article 42, par. 2 (c), p. 102.
2 UN Doc. DC/203, op. cit., Appendix D, par. 30.
However, any final program might resemble and reflect some of those elements that the major nuclear powers have stressed during negotiations. Although the constant elements discussed here may not reflect the ultimate goals of the Soviet Union, they are indices for negotiation. The fact that there is a pattern of emphasis may increase the chances for developing an acceptable inspection program. Obviously, these constant elements cannot really be divorced from the whole of Soviet foreign policy, the international environment, the positions of other nations, or the nature of inspection itself. Simultaneously, each element must be reviewed in terms of the Soviet interpretation of sovereignty and her role in the contemporary world. It must be noted that a change in any one of these facets could easily delete some, or even all, of these "constant" elements. However, these elements have withstood several changes in Soviet strategic thought as well as two decades of disarmament negotiations. Therefore, we offer them not as a remedy or interpretation of inspection, but rather they are offered as an approach through which inspection negotiations can be continued.
## APPENDIX I
Consistency Scale*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INSPECTION ELEMENTS</th>
<th>YEARS</th>
<th>PERCENTAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. ban on use of nuclear weapons</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. prohibit nuclear weapons production</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. inspection of eliminated or reduced forces and armaments only</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. liquidation of foreign bases</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. inspection of reductions in conventional forces and armaments</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. inspection and disarmament go into effect simultaneously</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. progressive inspection system</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. physical &quot;on-site&quot; inspection</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. records inspection</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. nonphysical inspection</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. response action by Security Council</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. inspection agency established under framework of the United Nations</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. inspectors selected on an &quot;international basis&quot;</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. some permanent observers</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. inspectorate decisions; agreement of nuclear powers Control Council</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. verification by mobile inspection teams</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. verification by aerial reconnaissance</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Information for this chart is taken from the Soviet inspection proposals presented in Appendixes II - VII, pp. 89-103.
APPENDIX II
Draft International Convention To Prohibit the Production and Employment of Weapons Based on the Use of Atomic Energy for the Purpose of Mass Destruction (1946)

Article 1. The high contracting parties solemnly declare that they are unanimously resolved to prohibit the production and employment of weapons based on the use of atomic energy, and for this purpose assume the following obligations:

(a) not to use atomic weapons in any circumstances whatsoever;
(b) to prohibit the production and storing of weapons based on the use of atomic energy;
(c) to destroy, within a period of three months from the day of entry into force of the present convention, all stocks of atomic weapons whether in a finished or unfinished condition.

Article 2. The high contracting parties declare that any violation of Article 1 of the present convention is a most serious international crime against humanity.

Article 3. The high contracting parties shall, within a period of six months from the day of entry into force of the present convention, pass legislation providing severe penalties for violators of the statutes of the present convention.

Article 4. The present convention shall be on indefinite duration.

Article 5. The present convention shall be open for the adhesion of any State whether a Member or nonmember of the United Nations.

Article 6. The present convention shall come into force after its approval by the Security Council and after the ratification and delivery of ratification documents to the Secretary-General for safekeeping by one half of the signatory States, including all the Member States of the United Nations named in Article 23 of the Charter of the Organization.

Article 7. After the entry into force of the present convention it shall be binding on all States whether Members of nonmembers of the United Nations.

Article 8. The present convention, of which the Russian, Chinese,
French, English, and Spanish texts shall be authentic, is drawn up in one copy and shall be kept in the archives of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. The Secretary-General shall communicate certified copies to all parties to the convention.

Concerning the Organization of the Work of the Atomic Energy Commission

I. Establishment of Committees of the Commission - Committee for the Exchange of Scientific Information... - Committee for the Prevention of the Use of Atomic Energy to the Detriment of Mankind

This committee shall be set up to carry out the aims set forth in points (b), (c), and (d) of item 5 of the resolution of the General Assembly.

The task of the committee shall be to elaborate recommendations:

(1) concerning the drafting of an international convention for outlawing weapons based on the use of atomic energy and prohibiting the production and use of such weapons and all other similar kinds of weapons capable of being used for mass destruction;

(2) concerning the quest for and establishment of measures to prohibit the production of weapons based on the use of atomic energy and to prevent the use of atomic weapons and all other main kinds of weapons capable of being used for mass destruction;

(3) concerning the measures, systems, and organization of control over the observance of the terms of the above-mentioned international convention for the outlawing of atomic weapons;

(4) concerning the elaboration of a system of sanctions to be applied against the unlawful use of atomic energy.

II. Composition of the Committees...

III. Rules of Procedure of the Committees...

**Convention taken from:**
Disarmament Convention should include:

(1) Unconditional prohibition of use, production, conservation of atomic, hydrogen, and other types of weapons of mass destruction.

(2) Major reductions in all armed forces and conventional armaments.

(3) International control organ shall be set up under Security Council to carry out measures of control over atomic undertakings and conventional armaments. With regard to undertakings for extracting atomic crudes and producing atomic materials and energy, organ shall: 1) inspect without the right to interfere in domestic affairs of states; 2) collect and compile data on extraction, production, and utilization of atomic materials and energy. Organ shall call for, and verify when submitted by states information on armaments and armed forces; make recommendations to government and Security Council on matters relating to production, conservation, and utilization of atomic materials and energy, and the reduction of armaments and armed forces of states.

World Conference on general reduction of armaments and prohibition of atomic weapons to be convened in 1955.

Convention to be submitted for approval of Security Council. To enter into force upon ratification by the five permanent members of the Security Council.

Disarmament Program:

(a) 1/3 reduction during the year following entry into force of convention of all armaments, all land, naval, air force;

(b) 1/3 reduction within one year of military expenditure to 1953-1954 level:

(c) obligation of states parties to Convention not to maintain military air, or naval bases on the territories of other States and to liquidate any such existing bases within one year.

APPENDIX IV


Stage I. Simultaneously:
   a. reduction in course of 6 months (or 1 year) of armaments, armed forces, and budgetary appropriations to extent of 50% of agreed levels - (those existing 31 December 1953).
   b. temporary international control commission to be established under Security Council with right to require states to provide necessary information on measures taken by them to reduce armaments and armed forces. Commission to take necessary steps to supervise fulfillment by states of these obligations. States to supply commission at established intervals with information concerning implementation of measures in Convention.

Stage II. Simultaneously:
   a. reduction of second 50% in course of 6 months (or 1 year).
   b. complete prohibition of atomic, hydrogen, other weapons of mass destruction, production to be discontinued and weapons eliminated from armaments of states; all existing atomic materials to be used only for peaceful purposes. These measures to be completed not later than carrying out of (a).
   c. standing international supervisory organ to be set up for supervision of implementation of Convention; to have full powers of supervision.

Disarmament Commission to study "proposal concerning prohibition of use of nuclear weapons except in defense against aggression" in Anglo-French Memorandum of 11 June 1954.

Draft resolution taken from:
APPENDIX V
Soviet Proposal - 10 May 1955

Convention shall provide:

I. General:
   1. Complete prohibition of use, production both of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction, and conversion of existing stocks of nuclear weapons for peaceful purposes.
   2. Major reduction in all armed forces, conventional armaments.
   3. Establishment of control organ with rights, powers, functions adequate to guarantee effective observance by all states of agreed prohibitions, reductions.

II. Measures to be taken in 1956:
   1. No increase in armed forces, conventional armaments, or level of military expenditures above level of 31 December 1954. Measures to be carried out within 2 months of entry into force of Convention.
   3. Reduction of armed forces of China, U.S.S.R., U.S. to 1-1.5 million; France, U.K. to 650,000...corresponding reduction of conventional armaments. Reduction to take place in course of 1 year by 50% of difference between levels of 31 December 1954 and reduced level specified above. Corresponding reduction of appropriations.
   4. Size of reduction of armaments of states, including that of Great Powers to be established on basis of simple agreed criteria.
   5. International Commission to be set up to report to the Security Council and General Assembly on fulfillment of pledges by states.
   6. With initiation of measures to effect first 50% of reduction of armed forces and armaments, and before entry into force of complete prohibition of atomic weapons, states to pledge themselves not to use nuclear weapons except for purposes of defense against aggression.
   7. As one of the first steps in reduction states will discontinue tests of atomic weapons.
   8. States possessing military, naval, and air bases in territories of other states to pledge themselves to liquidate
these bases. The bases to be liquidated to be dealt with in supplementary agreement.

9. International control organ to be set up by General Assembly with following rights and powers:
   a. set up control posts on territory of all states concerned, on basis of reciprocity;
   b. require from states any information on execution of reduction measures;
   c. have unimpeded access to records relating to budgetary appropriations of states for military purposes including all decisions of their legislative and executive organs. Information on execution of measures to be provided periodically by states.

Measures to be taken in 1957:

1. Production of atomic and hydrogen weapons to be discontinued immediately, budgetary appropriations reduced correspondingly.

2. China, France, U.K., U.S.S.R., U.S. to reduce armed forces and armaments by remaining 50%, as well as appropriations for armed forces and conventional armaments. During this stage measures for reducing armaments and armed forces of other states to levels set at Disarmament Conference to be completed.

3. After completion of one-half of remaining reduction, complete prohibition of use of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction go into effect. Elimination of these weapons to begin with final 25% of reduction of armaments and armed forces - both processes to be finished by end of 1957. All atomic materials to be used for peaceful purposes.

4. All states to promote cooperation in peaceful uses of atomic energy. Special attention to under-developed countries.

5. Measures for liquidation of foreign military, naval, and airbases in territories of other states to be completed.

6. Questions of obligations of China under this Convention to be discussed with participation of People's Republic of China.

7. Control organ shall have rights and powers to:
   a. exercise supervision, including inspection on a continuous basis;
   b. have in all signatory states a permanent staff of inspectors, having access at all times, within limits of supervisory functions they exercise, to all objects of control;
c. unimpeded access to records of budgetary appropriations of States for military purposes including all legislative and executive orders. Information on execution of measures to be provided periodically by states.


9. On completion of all measures enumerated above, it would be desirable if the Great Powers further reduced their armed forces and armaments to levels strictly necessary to maintain internal security and fulfill obligations of the United Nations Charter.

**1955 Soviet Proposal taken from:
1st Stage -
1. The reduction, under appropriate control of the strength of the armed forces of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States of America and the People's Republic of China to the level of 1.7 million men, and of those of the U.K. and France to the level of 650,000 men;
2. The reduction of the strength of the armed forces of other states to levels to be agreed upon at a special session of the United Nations General Assembly or at a world conference on general and complete disarmament;
3. The reduction of the armaments and military equipment at the disposal of the armed forces of the States to the extent necessary to ensure that the remaining quantity of armaments corresponds to the level fixed for the armed forces.

2nd Stage -
1. The completion of the disbandment of the armed forces retained by States;
2. The elimination of all military bases in foreign States. Troops and military personnel shall be withdrawn from the territories of foreign States to within their own national frontiers and shall be disbanded.

3rd Stage -
1. The destruction of all types of nuclear weapons and missiles;
2. The destruction of air force equipment;
3. The entry into force of the prohibition of the production, possession and storage of means of chemical and bacterial weapons in the possession of States shall be removed and destroyed under international supervision;
4. Scientific research for military purposes and the development of weapons and military equipment shall be prohibited;
5. War Ministries, general staffs and all military and paramilitary establishments and organizations shall be abolished;
6. All military courses and training shall be terminated. States shall prohibit by law the military education of young people.
7. In accordance with their respective constitutional procedures, States shall enact legislation abolishing military service in all its forms - compulsory, voluntary, by recruitment, and so forth, and prohibit the re-establishment in overt or covert
form of any military or para-military establishments and organizations;

8. The appropriation of funds for military purposes in any form, whether from State budgets or from public organizations, shall be discontinued. The funds made available as a result of the implementation of general and complete disarmament shall be used to reduce or abolish taxation of the population, to subsidize national economies and to furnish extensive economic and technical assistance to underdeveloped countries;

9. For the purpose of supervising the implementation of the measures of general and complete disarmament, an international control organ shall be established. The extent of the control and inspection exercised shall correspond to the stage reached in the phased disarmament of States;

10. Upon the completion of general and complete disarmament, which shall include the disbandment of all services of the armed forces and the destruction of all types of weapons, including weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, rocket, chemical, bacterial), the international control organ shall have access to all objects of control. It may institute a system of aerial photography over the territories of States.

1959 Proposal taken from:
UN Doc. A/4219, 19 September 1959, Annexes, Agenda Item 70, pars. 71-73.
APPENDIX VII
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: draft treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict international control

Preamble...

Part 1. General
Article 1 - Disarmament obligations
Article 2 - Control obligations

1. The State Parties to the Treaty solemnly undertake to carry out all disarmament measures, from beginning to end, under strict international control, and to ensure implementation in their territories of all control measures set forth in Parts 2, 3 and 4 of the present Treaty.

2. Each disarmament measure shall be accompanied by such control measures as are necessary for verification of that measure.

3. To implement control over disarmament, an International Disarmament Organization including all State Parties to the Treaty, shall be established within the framework of the United Nations. It shall begin operating as soon as disarmament measures are initiated. The structure and functions of the International Disarmament Organization and its bodies are laid down in Part 5 of the present Treaty.

4. In all countries parties to the Treaty the IDO shall have its own staff, recruited internationally and in such a way to insure the adequate representation on it of all three existing groups of States. This staff shall exercise control, on a temporary or permanent basis, depending on the nature of the measure being carried out, over the compliance by States with their obligations to reduce or eliminate armaments and their production and to reduce or disband their armed forces.

5. The State Parties to the Treaty shall in good time submit to the IDO such information about their armed forces, armaments, military production and military appropriations as are necessary to carry out the measures of the corresponding stage.

6. Upon completion of the program of general and complete disarmament the IDO shall be kept in being to maintain supervision over the implementation by States of the obligations they have assumed, so as to prevent the re-establishment of the military potential of the States in any form whatsoever.

Article 3. - Obligations to maintain international peace and security

Part 2. First Stage of General and Complete Disarmament
Article 4 - First Stage tasks

Chapter I - Elimination of the means of delivering nuclear
weapons and foreign military bases on alien territories, and withdrawal of foreign troops from those territories. Control over such measures.

A. Means of delivery

Article 5 - Elimination of rockets capable of delivering nuclear weapons

Article 6 - Elimination of military aircraft, capable of delivering nuclear weapons

Article 7 - Elimination of all surface warships, capable of being used as vehicles for nuclear weapons, and submarines

Article 8 - Elimination of all artillery systems, capable of serving as a means of delivering nuclear weapons

B. Foreign military bases and troops in alien territories

Article 9 - Dismantling of foreign military bases

Article 10 - Withdrawal of foreign troops from alien territories

Chapter II - Reduction of armed forces, conventional armaments and military expenditures. Control over such measures.

Article 11 - Reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments

Article 12 - Reduction of conventional armaments production

Article 13 - Reduction of military expenditures

Chapter III - Measures to Safeguard the Security of States.

Article 14 - Restriction of displacements of the means of delivering nuclear weapons

Article 15 - Control over launchings of rockets for peaceful purposes

Article 16 - Prevention of the further spread of nuclear weapons

Article 17 - Prohibition of nuclear test

Article 18 - Measures to strengthen the capacity of the United Nations to ensure international peace and security

Chapter IV - Time-limits for Measures of the First Stage.

Transition from First Stage to Second Stage.

Article 19 - Time-limits for measures of the first stage

Article 20 - Transition from first to second

Part 3. Second Stage of General and Complete Disarmament

Article 21 - Second stage tasks
Chapter V - Elimination of nuclear, chemical, biological and radiological weapons. Control of such measures.

Article 22 - Elimination of nuclear weapons
Article 23 - Elimination of chemical, biological, and radiological weapons

Chapter VI - Further reduction of armed forces, conventional armaments and military expenditures. Control over such measures.

Article 24 - Further reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments
Article 25 - Further reduction of conventional armaments production
Article 26 - Further reductions of military expenditures

Chapter VII - Measures to safeguard the security of States.

Article 27 - Continued strengthening of the capacity of the United Nations to ensure international peace and security

Chapter VIII - Time-limits for measures of the second stage. Transition from second to third stage.

Article 28 - Time-limits for measures of the second stage
Article 29 - Transition from second to third stage

Part 4. Third Stage of General and Complete Disarmament

Article 30 - Third stage tasks

Chapter IX - Completion of the elimination of the military machinery of states. Control over such measures.

Article 31 - Completion of the elimination of armed forces and conventional armaments
Article 32 - Complete cessation of military production
Article 33 - Abolition of military establishments
Article 34 - Abolition of military conscription and military training
Article 35 - Prohibition of the appropriation of funds for military purposes

Chapter X - Measures to safeguard the Security of States and to maintain international peace.

Article 36 - Contingents of police (militia)
Article 37 - Police (militia) units to be made available to the Security Council
Article 38 - Control over the prevention of the re-establishment of armed forces

Chapter XI - Time-limits for measures of the third stage
Article 39- Time-limits for the third stage

Part 5. Structure and Functions of the International Disarmament Organization

Article 40- Functions and main bodies

The International Disarmament Organization, to be set up under paragraph 3 of Article 2 of the present Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the "Organization," shall consist of a Conference of all States Parties to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the "Conference," and a Control Council, hereinafter referred to as the "Council." The Organization shall deal with questions pertaining to the supervision of compliance by States with their obligations under the present Treaty. All questions connected with the safeguarding of international peace and security, which may arise in the course of the implementation of the present Treaty, including preventive enforcement measures, shall be decided on by the Security Council in conformity with its powers under the United Nations Charter.

Article 41- The Conference

1. The Conference shall comprise all States Parties to the Treaty. It shall hold regular sessions at least once a year, and special sessions which may be convened on decision by the Council or at the request of a majority of the States Parties to the Treaty with a view to considering matters connected with the implementation of effective control over disarmament. The sessions shall be held at the Headquarters of the Organization, unless otherwise decided by the Conference.

2. Each State Party to the Treaty shall have one vote. Decisions on questions of procedure shall be taken by a simple majority, and on all other matters by a two-thirds majority. In accordance with the provisions of the present Treaty, the Conference shall adopt its own rules of procedure.

3. The Conference may discuss any matters pertaining to the measures of control over the implementation of general and complete disarmament, and may make recommendations to the State Parties to the Treaty and to the Council on any such matter or measure.

4. The Conference shall:
   (a) Elect non-permanent members of the Council;
   (b) Consider the annual, and any special, reports of the Council;
   (c) Approve reports to be submitted to the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations;
(d) Approve the budget recommendations of
the Council;
(e) Approve amendments to the present Treaty
in accordance with Article 47 of the present Treaty;
(f) Take decisions on any matter specifically
referred to the Conference for this purpose by the Council;
(g) Propose matters for consideration by the
Council and request from the Council reports on any matter relat­
ing to the functions of the Council.

Article 42 - The Control
1. The Council shall consist of:
   (a) The five States permanent members of the
   United Nations Security Council;
   (b) ...(number) other State Parties to the
   Treaty elected by the Conference for a period of two years. The
   composition of the Council must ensure proper representation of
   the three principal groups of states existing in the world.
2. The Council shall:
   (a) Direct in practice the measures of control
   over the implementation of general and complete disarma­ment; set
   up such bodies at Headquarters of the Organization as it deems ne­
   cessary for the discharge of its functions; establish procedures
   for their operation, and devise the necessary rules and regula­
   tions in accordance with the present Treaty;
   (b) Submit to the Conference annual reports
   and such special reports as it deems necessary to prepare;
   (c) Be in constant touch with the United Na­
   tions Security Council as the organ bearing the main responsibil­
   ity for the maintenance of peace and security; periodically in­
   form it of the progress achieved in the implementation of gener­
   al and complete disarmament, and promptly notify it of any infri­
   ngements by the States Parties to the Treaty of their disarmament
   obligations under the present Treaty;
   (d) Review the results of the implementation
   of the measures included in each stage of general and complete
   disarmament with a view to reporting on them to the States Parties
   to the Treaty, and to the Security Council and the General Assembly
   of the United Nations;
   (e) Recruit the staff of the Organization on
   an international basis so as to ensure the three principal groups
   of States, existing in the world, are adequately represented. The
   personnel of the Organization shall be recruited from among those
   persons who are recommended by the Governments and who may or may
not be citizens of the country of the recommending Government;

(f) Prepare and submit to the Conference the annual budget estimates for the expenses of the Organization;

(g) Elaborate instructions by which the various control elements must be guided in their work;

(h) Make timely analysis of incoming reports;

(i) Request from States such information on their armed forces and armaments as may be necessary for control over the implementation of the disarmament measures, provided for by the Treaty;

(j) Perform such other functions as are envisaged in the present Treaty.

3. Each member of the Council shall have one vote. Decisions of the Council on procedural matters shall be taken by a simple majority, and on other matters by a two-thirds majority.

4. The Council shall be so organized so as to be able to function continuously. The Council shall adapt its own rules of procedure and shall be authorized to establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions.

Article 43- Privileges and immunities
Article 44- Finances
Article 45- Preparatory Commission

Part 6. Final Clauses
Article 46- Ratification and entry into force
Article 47- Amendments
Article 48- Authentic texts

**Draft treaty taken from: UN Doc. DC/203, 5 June 1962 (ENDC/2, 19 March 1962), Appendix C, pp. 115-131.**
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