The Struggle for Counterhegemony: Pashtun and Baloch Nationalism in Pakistan

Dervaish Khan
Western Michigan University, dervaishazad@gmail.com

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THE STRUGGLE FOR COUNTERHEGEMONY: PASHTUN AND BALOCH NATIONALISM IN PAKISTAN

by

Dervaish Khan

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate College
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
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Doctoral Committee:

Jim Butterfield, Ph.D., Chair
Jacinda M Swanson, Ph.D.
Mahendra S Lawoti, Ph.D.
Alisa M Perkins, Ph.D.
THE STRUGGLE FOR COUNTERHEGEMONY: PASHTUN AND BALOCH NATIONALISM IN PAKISTAN

Dervaish Khan, Ph.D.

Western Michigan University, 2018

Drawing on a Gramscian conception of the state, I argue in this study that the Pakistani state has established a religion-based hegemonic civic identity discourse intended to de-naturalize and suppress ethno-nationalist centrifugal tendencies among the marginalized ethno-national communities, including Pashtuns, Balochs and Sindhis. I compare the Pashtun and Baloch nationalist movements that aspire to secede from (or secure more autonomy within) Pakistan by confronting the state with counterhegemonic, ethno-nationalist, discourses. This study addresses the question of why Pashtun nationalists, compared to their Baloch counterparts, have failed to establish a vigorous counterhegemonic discourse that could have helped them launch a movement for autonomy or separation. I hypothesize that various factors have influenced the trajectories of the Pashtun and Baloch nationalist movements in Pakistan: the socio-economic conditions of Pashtuns and Balochs; their respective ethno-nationalist framing strategies; their exposure to the ideological apparatuses of the state; and the political opportunity structures surrounding each movement.
I use mixed-methods to study the effects of these variables on the ethno-nationalist movements. Interpretivist methods are triangulated with inferential statistical analysis to compare the difference between the two populations in terms of the selected variables. Data were collected through several methods: elite interviews, participant observation, public speeches by and interviews with political elites, content analysis of textbooks, data from district-wide Indices of Multiple Deprivation published by Pakistan Social and Living Standards Measurement Survey (2010-11), and district level voting for political parties in the 2008 and 2013 elections.

I conclude that Balochs are more socio-economically deprived than Pashtuns; the Baloch nationalists have politicized their ethnolinguistic identity and deprivation more consistently than their Pashtun counterparts; that Pashtuns are more exposed to the ideological apparatuses of the state; and that Baloch nationalists have more political opportunities than their Pashtun counterparts to mobilize support for their cause.
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<tr>
<td>BNP</td>
<td>Balochistan National Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCI</td>
<td>Council of Common Interests</td>
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<td>CDA</td>
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<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>JUI</td>
<td>Jamiat Ullama-e-Islam</td>
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<tr>
<td>NP</td>
<td>National Party</td>
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Communication in an authoritarian regime tends to be nearly monologic and, therefore, distorted. In other words, the near-monopoly of the modern (semi-)authoritarian state over the sources of information and means of cultural production helps the state to efficiently propagate and maintain the ruling ideology. Consequently, in the absence (or the fragility) of alternative discourses, the majority of people are prone to accept the official worldview and narratives without pondering at the logic and consequences of what they hear. As a result, those individuals or groups who challenge the official wisdom within the available communicative space are likely to be considered by the populace as deviant characters – purportedly having some psychological and/or moral deficiencies. The challengers are even more marginalized, or even suppressed, when the dominant political discourses they question are consecrated as divinely inspired.

Thus, the conception of the state as nothing more than an instrument of coercion – an entity having monopoly over the coercive apparatuses of the society – is flawed. The state, besides being the ultimate source of coercion, also educates and indoctrinates. It acculturates (and sometimes deculturates) society at large. The state’s laws not only repress “deviant” behavior, but also naturalize and normalize thoughts and actions (Gramsci 1971). The state (and its ideological apparatuses) establishes “regimes of truth” (Foucault 1980, 93 & 102), which rationalize its existence and legitimate its structures of authority. As an ethico-political entity, the

---

1 By ‘deculturation’ I mean systematic efforts to efface a people’s cultural stock and collective memory. This argument is based on the theoretical insights of Gramsci (1971), Althusser (1971), Mugane (2005), and Foucault (1980). I also draw on Khan’s (2015) case study of Pashtun’s in Pakistan.
state creates (and maintains) a specific ideology/ies and marginalizes or causes to decompose 
other worldviews.

Pakistan is no exception to the rule. This study argues that the state in Pakistan has created a discursive hegemony, by either suppressing or making acquiescent other potential competitors capable of disseminating information and generating discourses (Mustafa 2006; and, Nasr 1992). The most important and the most dominant discourse in Pakistan which this study examines is the state’s religion-based civic identity discourse, which informs its internal and external security concerns and its socio-political dynamics (Shaikh, 2009). The civic identity discourse of the state informs its foreign policy, media, educational and national language discourses, which help the state to establish and reproduce its hegemony. The hegemonic discourses are devised to marginalize ethno-linguistic and historical identities of ethno-national communities constituting Pakistan which impede the construction of a common Pakistani civic identity.

However, hegemony does not imply a perfect cultural homogeneity, as it is implicit in Gramsci’s conceptualization of the term and in his analysis of the state-civil society relationship. Sub-cultural and counter-hegemonic discourses have not been obliterated altogether by the state in Pakistan. In other words, the official wisdom does not remain unquestioned. Democratic and leftist forces in Pakistan have been challenging the state’s hegemony. Yet, the most organized and unrelenting counterhegemonic voices are arguably raised by ethno-nationalist forces representing

---

2 The concept of hegemony refers to a complex of constructed and generally accepted socio-political and economic values and practices which structure and justify socio-political and economic relations among socio-political groups (see Raymond 1977; and Blommaert and Buclaen, 2000, 449). The concept of hegemony and the state-civil society relationship will be discussed in details later in this chapter. In addition, the concept of discourse is used in this study to signify the practices of assigning meanings to things and events in a communicative event – both linguistic and non-linguistic (see Laclau and Mouffe 1990 and 2001). However, I use the term to refer (primarily, but not exclusively) to the linguistic (particularly, verbal and verbal) practices and systems of signification. A specific discourse, once accepted as partly true, constitutes individuals as subjects, who in turn reproduce them.
the marginalized ethno-national communities (Pashtuns, Balochs, and Sindhis). They highlight their respective ethnicities, languages and histories as the primary sources of their identities. Some of them (e.g., some of the Baloch nationalist organizations) demand secession from Pakistan, while others struggle for democratic federalism – civilian supremacy and institutionalized recognition of ethno-national identities and rights within a loose federation of Pakistan.

This study is a comparative analysis of Pashtun and Baloch ethno-nationalists’ challenge to Pakistani state’s hegemony. These ethno-nationalist movements have taken relatively diverse trajectories, or they are at least passing through different evolutionary phases. Baloch nationalism is relatively more assertive: some Baloch nationalist factions demand separation from Pakistan and have launched an armed assault on the state. On the other hand, Pashtun nationalists insist on institutional recognition of ethno-linguistic diversities and national rights within a federal and democratic Pakistan.

Hence, my units of analysis are Pashtun and Baloch nationalist movements in Pakistan.

Both Pashtun and Baloch nationalist movements are divided into factions. Baloch nationalists can

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3 The terms ‘nation’ and ‘nationalism’ are not self-explanatory concepts. Nationalism is a feeling of commonality among a people and common urge to have and/or maintain political autonomy or sovereignty. However, the concept of nation, which forms the basis of nationalism, is an elusive and much debated concept. Prominent scholars of nation and nationalism (like Anderson 1983, Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983, Hobsbawm 1990, and Smith 2000) argue that nation (and the concomitant feelings of oneness) is partly constructed through hegemonic discursive practices. However, I argue in this study that the construction of nation (and nationalism) requires some common existential indicators, such as ethnicity, language, religion, common history, common enemy and political system. Broadly speaking, a nation constructed on the basis of common ethnicity and/or language is called ethnic nation, whereas a nation based on ‘common’ political system is called civic or territorial nation. In this study, the word nation (and nationalism), if preceded by proper noun of an ethno-linguistic community, signifies ethnic nation. If the word nation is used along with the name of the country (Pakistan), it refers to civic nation (and nationalism). For a detailed discussion on nation and nationalism, see Chapter 2. In addition, Baloch is sometimes spelled as Baluch. I spell it as Baloch, if not spelled otherwise by a writer quoted in this study. Similarly, Pashtun is spelled as Pakhtun in the northern parts of Pashtun region in Afghanistan and Pakistan. I write it as Pashtun. Pashtuns are also called Afghans and Pathans. For the ethnic division of Pakistan, see Appendix 1.

4 Pashtuns (also Pakhtuns), an ethnonlinguistic group in the north-west of Pakistan and (mostly) in south-east of Afghanistan, are also called as Afghans and Pathans.
be broadly categorized as the separatists and the federalists: the former are struggling for an independent Balochistan (also spelled as Baluchistan); the latter seek greater autonomy within the federation of Pakistan. Baloch separatist organizations, which this study takes into account, include the Baloch militant organizations such as the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), the Baloch Republican Army and the Baloch Students’ Organization – Azad (BSO-Azad). The federalist Baloch political organizations studied in this research are National Party (NP), which was part of the previous coalition government in Balochistan (May 2014 - December 2017), and Balochistan National Party (BNP). It is noteworthy that the federalists, too, especially the BNP, give political support to the separatists’ demands, or at least they do not openly repudiate separatism. Like Baloch nationalism, Pashtun nationalist movement is divided into factions too. My focus is on the Awami National Party (ANP) and Pashtunkhwa Mili Awami Party (PMAP), representing Pashtun nationalist movement. What is common among them is that apparently none of them seek independence from Pakistan. Rather they are struggling for greater autonomy within the federation of Pakistan.

Hence, this study addresses the following questions: What are the most significant hegemonic discourses that are created and propagated by the state in order to construct a common civic identity? How has the state of Pakistan managed to maintain its hegemony? What are the strategies adopted by Pashtun and Baloch nationalists to challenge the state and destabilize the dominant discourses? What are the avenues open to the dissenting voices, Pashtun and Baloch nationalists? What are the hurdles faced by the ethno-nationalists while challenging the state’s hegemony? And finally, do the challengers have chances of winning (if they have not yet won) their “war of position”\(^5\) against the state?

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\(^5\) War of position, according to Gramsci, is fought by the challengers in the arena of civil society to counter the state’s hegemony. However, it refers to both just linguistic articulatory practices and non-linguistic political practices such as organizational, economic and agitative activities.
What is puzzling is that Pashtun nationalists, as compared to their Baloch counterparts, have not been able to create as vigorous a counterhegemonic discourse as to launch a frontal attack\(^6\) on the state or to successfully engage in contentious politics, although Pashtuns are better positioned to challenge the state of Pakistan. Because of their greater population and higher level of urbanization and the existence of a more organized nationalist movement even before the creation of Pakistan, Pashtuns in Pakistan were/are apparently in a better position to launch frontal attack on the state. To address the question, I hypothesize that the current situation, or trajectories, of the two movements are overdetermined.\(^7\) They are determined by a variety of factors such as their respective political strategies at the critical historical junctures, the relative socio-economic and political stakes of Pashtuns and Balochs in the state (Jafferlot, 2002; Laif and Hamza, 2009; and Rettinberg, 1988), their relative exposure to the state’s cultural/ideological apparatuses (Althusser, 1971) and the political opportunities (and constraints) structures in which the two ethno-nationalist movements have been situated (Titus and Swidler 2000; Bresseeg 2004; McAdam 1996; and Rucht 2008, for instance).

So, my research is a “structured, focused comparison” (George 1979), employing both qualitative and quantitative methods.\(^8\) It is important to note that the findings of a small-N study, such as this one, are not conducive to theory-generation (George 1979; Przeworski and Teune 1970; and Skocpol and Somer 1980). Nonetheless, it is not merely heuristic in nature either. As a deductive study, it tests the existing theories of social movements, while closely examining the

\(^6\) Frontal attack here refers not only to armed assault but also to contentious political activities like peaceful protests, shutter-down strikes, aimed at obstructing the state and challenging its authority. Furthermore, drawing on Gramsci, I argue that the challengers cannot launch a successful frontal attack on the state until they have established a counterhegemony, i.e., until they have won the war of position.

\(^7\) Overdeterminism means that every social phenomenon is determined by each and every social process and entities surrounding it (Resnick and Wolf, 1987, 2).

\(^8\) The qualitative methods used in this research are the Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and analysis of historiographical accounts. In addition, I utilize t-statistics to compare the statistical significance of various independent variables examined in this study.
causal mechanisms and development trajectories of Pashtun and Baloch nationalist movements in Pakistan.

The time-period which this research takes into account is since the mid-1940s till 2017. As the creation and consolidation of hegemony/counterhegemony is a complex and prolonged process, we have to go back in time to see how the state in Pakistan has created and maintained its hegemony, and how the opposition has attempted to counter its hegemony.

In this chapter, I briefly discuss the historical and socio-political dynamics of Pakistan, for context, followed by a review of the literature that informs my theoretical framework to evaluate Pashtun and Baloch nationalism in Pakistan. The literature is broadly categorized into two parts, highlighting various aspects of this study: the concept of the state as a politico-ethical entity; and social movements and their socio-political dynamics. The literature review segment of the chapter is followed by a brief discussion of the research design, methods, and data sources. Finally, this chapter describes the organization of the study.

**Political Dynamics of Pakistan**

Pakistan’s identity discourses, its self-image as the ‘fortress of Islam’ and its mirror-imaged perception of others (especially, its neighbors) have resulted in relative ‘national-integration’ among erstwhile diverse ethno-national communities constituting Pakistan. Yet, its emphasis on religion (Islam)-based civic\(^9\) identity and its perception of, and behavior towards, its

\(^9\) Pakistan has partly constructed a civic-nation based on the religious identity (Muslimness) of the majority of Pakistanis. Nevertheless, the word ‘civic’ is misleading in case of Pakistani nationalist construct as citizenship rights are contingent upon the religious affiliations of ‘Pakistanis’. The non-Muslim minorities have been constitutionally excluded from having certain political rights, like holding the office of the Prime Ministry and Presidency. Pakistani nationalism cannot be clearly categorized as religious nationalism either. Although Pakistani nationalists use pan-Islamic rhetoric very frequently to emphasize
neighbors have invited a plethora of socio-economic and political problems – poverty, religious extremism and violence, resentment among smaller nations, political instability and authoritarianism, and a tarnished global image. The roots of Pakistan’s current dilemmas and its troublesome situation can be traced back to its origin and its *raison d’être* (Shaikh, 2009).

The so-called ‘Two-Nations Theory’ (which constituted the ideological basis of Pakistan Movement) was the “original sin” which the state of Pakistan consecrated and institutionalized in order to justify its existence. The theory highlighted religion as the primary source of identity of the Muslims of the then British India.\(^\text{10}\) It maintained that the interests of Muslims were seriously undermined by the Hindu majority in united India. Accordingly, Muslims became united under the auspices of All-India Muslim League (henceforth the League), led by Muhammad Ali Jinnah (popularly known as the Quaid-e-Azam – the great leader – in Pakistan) to have a separate homeland of their own (Ahmad, 1997). Jinnah and his colleagues strategically appealed to the religious sensitivities of Muslims from Muslim-minority districts of north India. They invoked religious symbols and vocabulary to mobilize support to get some constitutional guarantees for the politico-economic interests of Muslim elite, who felt threatened by the Hindu majority (Hassan, 2009 162; Ahmad 2009, 29; and Alvi 1983, cited in A. Khan, 2005, 69).

Nevertheless, the question arises: was Jinnah’s anticipated Pakistan supposed to be an Islamic state, or was it meant to be a secular democratic state for the Muslims of India? Neither Jinnah nor his successors and supporters had a clear answer to it (Khan, 71; Sheikh, 3). After its

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\(^{10}\) British India should be distinguished from continental India. The British India included territories that were not parts of continental India, such as Burma and Afghan and Baloch territories. The latter has historical, political and (to some extent) cultural continuity, whereas the former (the rest of the parts of British India) had distinct and independent historical, political, and cultural existence – distinct from continental India.
birth, Pakistan needed a *raison d’être*, an ideology to justify its existence and to integrate the historically and ethno-linguistically diverse nations of British India. The ruling elite chose religion to legitimize the creation and existence of Pakistan. Islam was declared the state’s religion, and citizenship was virtually made contingent on religious affiliation.

Pakistan’s officially endorsed identity discourse has created cognitive and moral structures that foster a religion-based *us-versus-them* mentality. Besides setting the standards of right and wrong behavior domestically, the dominant official discourse is instrumental in shaping its external threat-perception as well. In other words, religious symbols and vocabulary are invoked to describe internal as well as external security threats (Nizamani 2000; Ahmad 2009, 29-38). On the one hand, Pakistan’s identity discourse is exclusive, i.e., denying the non-Muslim minorities free and equal treatment. On the other hand, it is inclusive in the sense that all officially-recognized Muslims are considered as one and equal, irrespective of their ethnolinguistic, class, and racial differences. Thus, the official discourses neglect the manifold and crosscutting identities and interests which fall beyond the religious identity/ies.

Consequently, the monolithic, religion-based, categorization of Pakistanis undermines the ethnolinguistic identities and politico-economic interests of the smaller nations comprising Pakistan. Religion and the perceived Hindu-Indian threat were (and are) used to deemphasize internal differences and minimize the conflict of interests among the nations comprising Pakistan. Nevertheless, Bengali, Pashtun, Sindhi, and Baloch nationalists resisted (and continue to resist) the Punjab-dominated state’s hegemony, which they conceive as an instrument to legitimize their politico-economic exploitation. At the very outset, in 1948, Balochs reacted violently, launching an armed movement against Pakistan (see Titus and Swidler 2000; and Breseeg 2004, for instance). Bengalis protested against the declaration of Urdu as the “national” language of Pakistan – the language spoken by the 3.5% Mahajir minority which had migrated from north India. In addition, Bengalis also rejected separate electorate for minorities because they conceived
it as a plot to divide them along religious lines – almost 22% of Bengalis living in East Pakistan, now Bangladesh, were Hindus (Adeney 2002, 22 & 26). In short, Bengalis’ disenchantment with Pakistan and their ever-growing sense of deprivation convinced them to secede from Pakistan in 1971. Pashtun nationalists were against the division of India and the creation of Pakistan, to begin with. After the creation of Pakistan, they started struggling for Pashtunistan – ostensibly, an autonomous state for Pashtuns within the Pakistani federation (see Shah 1999; Rittenberg 1988; and Jafferlot 2002). Likewise, Sindhi leadership was disillusioned with the newly created homeland for ‘Muslims,’ and started a separatist movement (Khan, 2002).

To rally support, the ethno-nationalists tactically resorted to their respective cultural symbols and languages (Jafferlot 2002) in response to the officially propagated religious symbols and myths. Most of the literature on ethno-nationalism in Pakistan argues that ethno-nationalists strategically utilize cultural symbols in order to challenge the existing politico-economic injustices (Jafferlot 2002; Samad 2002, for instance). Nevertheless, preservation of cultural myths and symbols may also be an end in itself, given the human urge to preserve collective memories and cultural diversity (Gellner 1983, 2). For instance, some cultural and literary societies in the Punjab have become conscious of the fact that their cultural and linguistic stock has been threatened by Urdu and Arab culture in the garb of Islam. Therefore, they have made concerted efforts to revive their culture and language despite the fact that both Urdu and political Islam are significant elements of the state’s hegemony that strengthens Punjab’s politico-economic monopoly in Pakistan (Ayers 2009).

Thus, the ethno-nationalists in Pakistan tactically bring into play their cultural symbols as well as strive to preserve them as an end, in and of itself (this point is elaborated later). Yet they have very limited opportunities to promote their respective languages and cultures. Dissention and opposition to the state’s identity discourse is equated with treachery and infidelity by the state. The challengers are tagged as the enemies of Islam and agents of “others” – Hindu India or
Afghanistan, for instance (Nizamani, 14). The state has employed both its coercive and ideological apparatuses to suppress and marginalize opposition. The most lethal coercive apparatus which the state has conjured to suppress opposition is its military and spy agencies.

Hence, the origin of authoritarian practices and the political preponderance of the military can be attributed to Pakistan’s troubled origin and its unpopular raison d’être – unpopular among smaller and marginalized nations constituting Pakistan during its formative phase. Yet another supplementary argument is that soon after the creation of Pakistan the League, the flag-bearer of the Pakistan Movement, was losing ground to the emerging Bengali ethno-nationalist feelings in East Pakistan, while in West Pakistan (present-day Pakistan) it was not capable to respond efficiently to the socio-political challenges faced by the newly created country. The League could neither become a cementing force, nor could it cope with the socio-economic and political challenges faced by Pakistan. Conversely, the civil and military bureaucracies were relatively sturdy and capable of propping up the shabby structure of the infant Pakistan. Although Jinnah and his immediate political successors resorted to authoritarianism and centralization, they could not match the civil and military bureaucracies’ prowess to ensure the existence and administration of Pakistan. However, it should not lead us to believe that there was necessarily a tug of war between the League’s leadership and the civil and military bureaucracies, as both of them protected Punjabi and Mahajir monopoly. Thus, there was a perfect symbiosis and coincidence of interests between the political and bureaucratic elites of Pakistan – predominantly Punjabis and Mahajirs. Democratic institutions and practices could have seriously threatened the Punjabis and Mahajirs’ political preponderance, which was proved later in the 1970s elections: the threat came primarily from the Bengali majority in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh). In addition, Pashtun,

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11 The British Raj in India had created a very strong and well organized civil and military bureaucracies designed to control the indigenous population.
Sindhi, Baloch nationalists joined hands to counterbalance the Mahajir-Punjabi monopoly in West Pakistan.\textsuperscript{12}

However, after the secession of East Pakistan in 1971, the Punjabi elite have successfully managed to maintain their hold in the remaining Pakistan. To maintain the Punjabi monopoly, the state has made use of the ideological apparatuses of the state – particularly, education, religious establishment, and media – besides brutally repressing the opposition through its repressive apparatuses, such as the Parliament, judiciary, police and military.\textsuperscript{13} The textbooks distort historical facts to legitimize Pakistan’s creation and the existing political structures (Aziz 2010; Ali 2011, 65-86). Likewise, the state has co-opted and encouraged the religious establishment, including the militant extremists (see, for instance, Mustafa 2006; Taj 2011; Iqtidar 2011; Ahmad 2009, 29-38). The religious organizations, both violent and non-violent, serve Pakistan’s domestic and global agendas. They complement the state to propagate hegemonic discourses and to violently suppress political dissension at home. In addition, they have been used as strategic assets to achieve foreign policy objectives. For instance, Pakistan has been supporting the Taliban to destabilize the current Afghan regime which it views as anti-Pakistan, as admitted by the former army chief and the self-appointed President of Pakistan, General Musharraf (1999-2008) (in The Guardian, February 13, 2015).

Finally, the media, an ideological state apparatus, has historically been under the thumb of the state. Though General Musharraf created a conducive environment for the growth of a relatively free media, resulting in the emergence of dozens of private TV channels, media in

\textsuperscript{12} It is worth noticing that once the military stepped into politics, it needed support from civil society: the right-wing political parties (including the religious political parties) were a better – rather only – option: because religion was Pakistan’s raison d’être and the military could not afford to abandon it (Haqqani 2005). After consolidating its political control, the military not only engaged in entrepreneurial activities (Siddiqi 2007), it has also successfully portrayed itself as the sentry of Pakistan’s national interests and its ideology, which renders democracy and civilian supremacy unlikely in the near future (Fair 2011).

\textsuperscript{13} The ideological state apparatuses (ISAs) also function as the repressive state apparatuses (RSAs), and vice versa (this point is elaborated in Chapter 6).
Pakistan still has not reached the level of maturity to provide quality information (Ganguli and Fair 2013, 135) and a space for the dissenting and marginalized voices. Besides, most of the media personnel are still either under pressure from, or are believed to be on the payroll of, the military establishment, rendering free and unbiased reporting either impossible or quite risky (16). It is worth noting that journalists and reporters are threatened not only by the formal coercive apparatuses of the state but also by the so-called non-state extremist organizations.

Like the mass media, the rest of the civil society is either co-opted or suppressed (Mustafa 2006). Nevertheless, one should not assume that liberal civil society is almost absent in Pakistan. It is growing. The state is gradually losing control over the means of cultural production and distribution because of the relatively diverse and free mass media and, beyond all, the existence of social media outlets that play a significant role in voicing grievances, including the voices of the ethno-nationalists.

To sum up, because of the variegated ethno-national makeup of Pakistani society and the ethno-nationalist centrifugal tendencies, the state in Pakistan tries to forge a sense of a religion-based civic identity, which could possibly bridge the ever-present ethnolinguistic cleavages. It demonizes “others” and exaggerates the external security threats to bridge internal rifts – a fairly Machiavellian strategy. To secure its ends, the state has employed both its coercive and ideological apparatuses. However, the challengers, especially the ethno-nationalists, have proved to be equally adamant in opposing the logic and structure of the system, within the limited political space they are left with to maneuver.

\[14\] I have observed for the last five years or so that some previously marginalized voices can be heard in civil society and some media houses, too, are trying to assert their independence, or at least have been airing voices which were previously in political obscurity.
The State: A Politico-Ethical Entity

In order to evaluate the state’s hegemony in Pakistan and its relations with civil society, I employ a Gramscian model. Gramsci’s political theory also helps me to understand the situation and strategies of Pashtun and Baloch nationalists to challenge the institutionalized structures of control and subordination, which protect the interests of the dominant ethno-national group – the Punjabi. What is insightful in Gramsci’s political thought is his repudiation of the conventional (or, rather Weberian) conception of the state – that the state is simply a monopoly over the legitimate use of force.\(^{15}\) His refutation of orthodox Marxist theory of ideology is equally innovative and intellectually enlightening for understanding modern political and cultural phenomena. Gramsci does not believe that civil society is simply a reflection of the relations of production; nor does he agree with orthodox Marxist notion that ideas are superstructural element, resulting from the conditions of production.\(^{16}\)

For Gramsci, the state is more than a monopoly over the coercive apparatuses of society. It is a politico-ethical entity. It is a suppressor/policeman that suppresses alternative worldviews and behavior by enacting laws that “naturalize/normalize” thought and actions. In addition, it is an educator and innovator. It creates new ideology and maintains old one to justify its own existence (Gramsci, 258 and 246-7). The courts, according to Gramsci, perform the negative educative function by punishing transgression against what is “normal” and legal. On the other hand, the schools carry out the positive educative function by propagating a specific worldview

\(^{15}\) According to Max Weber, the state is the monopoly over the legitimate coercive apparatuses of society (in Girth and Mills 1946, 77-128).

\(^{16}\) While refuting the Hegelian conception of ideas and civil society, orthodox marxists argue that both civil society and ideas reflect the relations of production. Thus, for them, ideas are superstructural element based on the mode of production – the structure (in Tucker, 1978, 26-52, and 146-202).
However, it is not just the formal educative institutions like schools that secure popular consent in favor of the state but also the civil society, what Gramsci calls the private initiatives and activities such as church, family and the media “… which form the apparatus of the political and cultural hegemony of the ruling classes” (258).

The concept of ‘hegemony’ is central to Gramsci’s political theory which I use as a starting-point of this study. It signifies not only abstract notions of existence and ontological claims that are deliberately formulated and circulated by the ruling political elite to ‘naturalize’ the extant structures of dominance and subordination, but is also lived identities, concrete and normalized social practices, and perceptions of realities and social expectations (Raymond 1977, 109-10). In other words, hegemony is a complex of dominant socio-political beliefs, semiotic structures and symbolic practices consciously or unconsciously constructed and maintained by the ruling elite through the ideological apparatuses of the state. Hegemony shapes popular cognition of ‘reality,’ their mutual relations and expectations, social behavior. To elaborate his concept of hegemony, Gramsci sometimes uses the term ‘cultural hegemony’ to distinguish it from what he calls ‘political hegemony’ – monopoly over institutionalized power-structures. The former is more than cultural – as conceptualized in anthropological parlance. Hegemony is also more than what is commonly conceived as ‘ideology’ – a consciously and formally articulated system of beliefs and ideas. It is worth noticing that hegemony is created and maintained not

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17 Negative educative function of the state is positive as well, in the sense that it perpetuates and maintains certain norms, laws, and worldviews, while suppressing other worldviews and actions. Likewise, the positive educative function of the state becomes negative by disciplining and marginalizing some ideas and behavior, while propagating and maintaining others.

18 Gramsci uses the term ‘political hegemony’ to signify the control of ruling class over the coercive apparatuses of the state, whereas the term ‘cultural hegemony’ is used to mean what has been defined above as hegemony – i.e., the ruling ideology created by ruling elite and propagated through the ideological state apparatuses, which is largely accepted and practiced by the masses as ‘true.’

19 Ideology, as elaborated by Althusser (1971) is not essentially different from Gramsci’s concept of hegemony, however. Althusser’s conceptualizes ideology as not only the consciously articulated set of ideas but also the normalized behavioral patterns followed by the populace. He believes that individuals are constituted by ideology as subjects as well as they constitute ideology by practicing it. The concept of ideology is further elaborated in chapter 6.
only through formal and conscious discursive practices, it is also created (and maintained) through mundane activities and commonplace socio-economic and political practices. For instance, standing in honor of national anthem played at public ceremonies, or the media hype given to the victory of the national football team, or public military parades and public display of arms, or the display of national icons’ portraits in public offices legitimizes the state and its repressive apparatuses.\(^{20}\)

As a system of signification, lived identities and social expectations, hegemony is \textit{constructed} through a protracted and constantly evolving struggle for the normalization of meanings and social practices. Once established, hegemony has to be rejuvenated and rehabililated by reinterpretation of ‘reality’ and constant renovation of cultural myths and practices, in order to counteract new politico-economic and ideological challenges (see Hall 1988b, 53-54, for instance).

However, relative power relations play a central role in the struggle for hegemony between/among different discursive communities. Having a (near-)monopoly over the coercive apparatuses of society and the means of cultural production, a semi-authoritarian regime, like Pakistan, holds sway over its competitors who arecompeting with the state for some share in positive power.\(^{21}\) In short, the state protects its hegemony by “the armour of coercion” (such as police, military, prison, and courts), on the one hand. On the other hand, it secures the consent of the governed through its ideological apparatuses, like education, church, family, and media etc. (Gramsci, 258 and 263; also see Althusser, 1971).

I argue in this study that the state in Pakistan has created (and vigorously maintained) hegemony through both coercive and co-optive tactics to legitimize and prop up the

\(^{20}\) I am indebted to my friend Taimur Khan who drew my attention to this point during our discussion.

\(^{21}\) Positive power, as conceptualized by Gramsci and Foucault, refers to the capacity to create and maintain regimes of truth and worldviews (for details, see Antonio Gramsci 1971, 206-276; and, Foucault 1980, 78-108 and 175-177).
institutionalized structures of subordination. In other words, in order to buttress its hegemony, the
state in Pakistan has tailored some institutions and civil society organizations (such as education,
mass-media and religious establishment) in such a manner as to make them complementary to the
state, while those who challenge the state on behalf of the officially marginalized doctrines and
interests are suppressed.

Nevertheless, it goes without saying that Gramsci’s idea of the “war of position” implies
that cultural hegemony precedes what he calls political hegemony, i.e., hegemony over civil
society paves the way for a new form of political society. In other words, the relations between
civil society and the state are reciprocal. To rationalize and legitimize itself, the state tries to
shape civil society organizations and institutions. Likewise, civil society, too, influences political
society, more often than not. For instance, Gramsci’s anticipated socialist revolution (in Western
Europe), would be the outcome of new political culture and new civil society.

In order to launch a successful war of maneuver – armed assault or electoral victory – on
political society (the state), the challengers have to win the war of position in the arena of civil
society. As an ideological/cultural edifice erected by (and around) the state, civil society props up
political society during political and economic crises. According to Gramsci, it represents a web
of fortresses erected around the state (235). It is not likely to disappear with the disappearance of
(or a sudden change in) the state. Therefore, the war of maneuver against the state can be
counterproductive before winning the war of position, i.e., without dismantling the already
existing civil society structures. In other words, without having civil society on its side, a
premature direct assault on political society by the opposition may invite greater repression and
de-legitimization. Gramsci’s notion of ‘war of position’ emphasizes an assault on the cultural and
ideological basis of the state (represented by civil society) to create a counterhegemony, before
launching a frontal assault on the state.
The defeat of the progressive forces, socialist revolutionaries, in Western Europe convinced Gramsci that they could not dismantle the bourgeois state until they were able to win civil society to their side. Accordingly, the war of maneuver could not be won before they won the war of position. Gramsci believed that the conditions in Western Europe were quite different from those in Russia: in Russia the civil society was “primordial and gelatinous,” whereas it was a strong ally of the state in Western Europe (238). Moreover, civil society in Western Europe, as a cultural and discursive arena, was more sturdy and resistant to shock. Therefore, it had to be the first battle field for the socialist revolutionaries where the war of position was to be fought. Hence, Gramsci does not neglect the possibility or the necessity of waging a war of maneuver against political society. Yet, it is not possible for the challengers to achieve political hegemony without establishing counterhegemony in civil society. Gramsci’s political strategy in the Western Europe applies to the challengers in Pakistan as well, where the state has established hegemony and civil society is its ally. In short, conceived as a manifestation or arena of cultural/ideological warfare, civil society becomes a battlefield of the ideological warfare. Therefore, cultural hegemony precedes the establishment of political hegemony.

It is noteworthy that the idea of establishing counterhegemony implies that there can be more than one culture, more than one discourse, in any given society. However, one (or some) of them may be more dominant. In “the Philosophy of Praxis,” Gramsci emphasizes that “Philosophy in general does not exist. Various philosophies or conceptions of the world exist, and one always makes a choice between them” (326). This means that civil society is not a monolithic and coherent structure. It is a polymorphous entity which represents mutually conflicting interests and worldviews. The potential opposition to the state confronts the political society as an antagonist in the form of the dominant/ruling ideology within civil society before it launches a frontal attack on political society to replace it. Thus, in the last analysis, civil society has reciprocal relations with the political society. Most of it (civil society) may or may not be in
opposition to the political society, depending on the relative strength of competing
discourses/ideologies in civil society at a specific time.

I complement Gramsci’s theoretical model of the politics of hegemony and resistance
with the contemporary theoretical and analytical models of social movements in order to
investigate my query into why the Pashtun nationalists could not launch as vigorous a frontal
attack on the state as Baloch nationalists have done. The following is a brief review of the
relevant literature on social movements that complements my theoretical model.

The Social Movements’ Dynamics

Social movements are complex phenomena. This complexity arises from a variety of
causal factors: ranging from the psycho-cultural orientations of participants to organizational
resources to sociopolitical specificities. Therefore, the scholarship on social movements tends to
adopt a variety of theoretical paradigms and empirical tools. Some scholars (like Downs 1957;
and Olson 1965, for instance) see social movements and collective action as calculated efforts by
rational individuals in the pursuit of their strategic interests. Other social movements’ theorists
(Jenkins 1983, for example) consider organizational resources as a crucial element in articulating
and pursuing common interests. Yet, some scholars (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1996;
McAdam 1996) consider sociopolitical milieu as a determinant factor in the success or failure of
social movements. In short, social movements depend on the structures of political opportunities
and constraints that the insurgents have to survive and thrive in; the organizational resources
(both formal and informal) available to the challengers while pursuing their agendas; and finally,
the interpretive and symbolic tools which they employ to mobilize support (McAdam, McCarthy
and Zald 1996, 2). However, these diverse theoretical instruments are not mutually exclusive. The
factors influencing social movements such as mobilizing structures, political opportunities, and
framing processes have a symbiotic relationship, though one factor may be more decisive than the other in a given context.

The contemporary literature on social movements tends to deemphasize the traditional model of collective action – i.e., the role of grievances and incentives in mobilizing collective response (see Zald 1996; Tarrow 1996; Tarrow 1998; Jenkins 1993; Snow et al 1986; and Benford and Snow 2000, for instance). In this study, I make use of both contemporary and traditional models of collective enterprise in comparatively evaluating Pashtun and Baloch nationalist movements. I argue that a sense of relative deprivation and grievances (real or perceived) are a launching-pad for social movements; they help to get the show on the road.

Traditional theories of group behavior and social movements consider rationally-conceived interests as the core of collective action. In other words, a social movement results from the grievances emanating from repressive and marginalizing structural arrangements (Olson 1965; Ostrom 1990; Rittenberg 1988; and Jafferlot 2002). According to Jenkins’s (1983) characterization of traditional theory, social movements are noninstitutionalized collective action to pull off some alternative institutional change.

Most of the literature on Pashtun and Baloch nationalist movements defines grievances narrowly – a sense of politico-economic deprivation and marginalization in an ethno-linguistically specified segment of society (see Rittenberg 1988; A. Khan 2005; Jafferlot 2002; Laif and Hamza 2009; Titus and Swidler 2000, for instance). It argues that ethnolinguistic symbols and national myths and memories are used by ethno-nationalist elites as instruments of forging unity among the politico-economically marginalized and suppressed groups. The concept of grievances in this dissertation includes a sense of not only politico-economic deprivation but also of cultural and linguistic suppression. Drawing on Ayres argument, I argue that besides the instrumental utility of language and culture, the preservation of a group’s symbolic capital and
myths and memories can be an end in and of itself. One of the urges that can be found in human collectivity is the urge to preserve cultural diversity and collective values and memories (Gellner 1983, 2). Second, politico-economic interests and cultural myths and memories of a collectivity interact and reinforce each other (Rittenberg 1988). In other words, a common language and cultural stock are instrumentalized, more often than not, so as to generate consensus and mobilize action to accomplish certain politico-economic interests of a people, on the one hand. On the other hand, political monopoly – in the sense of having control over institutionalized structures of power-relations – allows a people to preserve their cultural and linguistic legacies. Thus, I treat deprivation (and interests) broadly – encompassing not only politico-economic but also ethno-linguistic deprivation of a people.

Traditional theories of social movements are challenged by resource mobilization model. In the latter, social movements are institutionalized collective efforts to achieve some collective end. Although resource mobilization theory does not completely ignore grievances, its emphasis is more on organizational aspect of social movements. A social movement is formed and carried on through institutionalized rules of behavior and a division of labor in order to achieve some specific sociopolitical goal(s) within the limits imposed by its resources (Jenkins, 530). Accordingly, social grievances are secondary in importance to the organizational structure and resources of a sociopolitical movement. Social grievances and interests cannot assume the form of a movement in the absence of mobilizing structures. Resource mobilization theorists go so far as to assert that grievances are, more often than not, generated by organizations. What follows in this approach is that grievances or interests cannot assume the form of a movement without

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22 Mobilizing structures, according to McAdam, McCarthy and Zald (1996,) refer to the “... collective vehicles, informal as well as formal, through which people mobilize and engage in collective action” (Italics in original, 3). Formal mobilizing structures refer to formally articulated rules, assigning responsibilities and roles to those engaged in collective action; whereas, informal mobilizing structures refer to (according to McAdam, McCarthy and Zald, and whom I draw on) the informal societal networks, like peer groups, workplace relations, church, and college, which can be conducive for social communication and collective action (see McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1996, 3-4).
rationally articulated rules, formally distributed roles and sufficient resources. It is worth mentioning that McCarthy (1996), and McAdam, McCarthy and Zald (1996) treat informal social networks – church, school, family, and workplace – which facilitate communication and shapes collective behavior, as parts of what they call mobilizing structures.

The resource mobilization model is undermined by the ‘structures of political opportunities (and constraints)’ theory. The latter assumes that a social movement emerges and evolves within a political context that determines its breathing space, its organizational structure, its discursive strategies, and its bargaining capacity. In view of that, a social movement organization will find it difficult to mobilize its resources without of a conducive political environment, i.e., without favorable structures of incentives (Jenkins and Perrow 1977). Nevertheless, the concept of the structures of political opportunities (SPOs) does not lend itself easily to a precise definition. In the first place, the SPOs signify the degree of openness of political institutions (both formal and informal), i.e., how open and tolerant the regime is to dissension and opposition. In other words, SPOs are conceptualized, in the first place, as the institutionalized apparatuses and practices of coercion (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald, 1996, 3).

Second, the SPOs refer to the configuration of governing elite, i.e., the elite alignment, such as the splits within the regime – hardliners and soft-liners constellations within a regime. Fourth, the political opportunities suggest the international political structures and agendas, which can

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23 The extralegal coercive apparatuses and practices here refer to the “un-noticed” and non-institutionalized repressive tactics and practices of the state, i.e., the repressive behavior and coercive practices of the security apparatuses of the state that fall beyond the formal institutional arrangements and legality. For instance, the Pakistani military has transgressed the legal (formal) constraints while repressing Baloch nationalists. Likewise, Pashtun nationalists are the prime target of the terrorist organizations that are sponsored by the Pakistani military in the pursuit of the strategic interests of the state.
significantly influence a regime’s domestic policies and behavior towards the opposition at home (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald, 1996, and McAdam 1996). Last, but not the least, the SPOs emphasize the significance of countermovement. In Rucht’s (1996) words, a countermovement refers to the conflict structure – “… the configuration of opponents which have the capacity to limit, undermine, or repress social movement mobilization” (191).

In this study, the SPOs are operationalized to signify the institutional configuration and tools of coercion, the state’s capacity and propensity for repression, the structures of conflict (countermovement), and structures of allies. I argue that the Political Opportunity Structures that surround Pashtun and Baloch nationalist movements play a central role in determining their mobilizing capacities and strategies.

Finally, recent scholarship on social movements highlights the centrality of framing processes to analyze collective behavior. Frames are “… the specific metaphors, symbolic interpretations, and cognitive cues used to render or cast behavior and events in an evaluative mode and to suggest alternative modes of action” (Zald 1996, 262). In Benford and Snow (2000)’s words, frames are a set of beliefs and ideas that motivate people and legitimize collective behavior (614). Framing processes of social movements are the symbolic representation of “reality” and interpretive practices to specify grievances and articulate collective responses. Without frames, masses may fail to realize injustices and contradictions in the system; they may suffer from what Gramsci calls “contradictory consciousness,”24 thereby impeding collective response. Frames diagnose the situation that represses a particular segment of society, attributing their plight to the prevalent repressive structures and marginalizing

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24 Contradictory consciousness here refers to a tension between the lived experiences and identities and the received and taken for granted notions of existence and social relations. According to Gramsci, contradictory consciousness means two theoretical consciousnesses – “… one which is implicit in his [individual’s] activity and which in reality unites him with all his fellow-workers in the practical transformation of the real world; and one, superficially explicit or verbal, which he has inherited from the past and uncritically absorbed” (333).
mechanisms in a given society. In addition, frames also suggest an alternative course – prognostic frames (Benford and Snow 2000) to surmount the suppressive and marginalizing power mechanisms. The frames of resistance specify the ways and means to fight injustices. They challenge the logic of the existing institutional structures and power-relations by pinpointing the internal contradictions in them and their repressive nature as well as propose new meanings and different outlook. In short, while engaging in framing processes, the challengers endeavor to counter the hegemonic worldviews through what Gramsci would call the war of position.

The current Pashtun and Baloch nationalists’ strategies to frame their relative deprivation are indeed crucial to mobilize their resources and popular support. However, I argue that their initial frames have significantly influenced their later discursive practices. I draw on McAdam, McCarthy and Zald’s (1996) argument that the “… later framing efforts tend to be heavily constrained by the ideas, collective identities, and world views adopted previously” (16), provided that the Political Opportunity Structures remain constant. McAdam, McCarthy and Zald hypothesize that at the early stage the “… political establishment is apt to be either unaware or amused and unconcerned by initial framing efforts …” (17) of the challengers. However, it becomes alert when it realizes that the challengers are establishing themselves as a serious threat to the status quo (17). Besides, the initial frames and discourses of a movement gets established and consolidated within the movement, down the road, in a path-dependent fashion, through cognitive channels (intellectual networks) and discursive practices within the movement.

To conclude, social movements are complex and overdetermined phenomena. If we assume that a movement’s resources and political structures are more important than psychocultural milieu in which it operates, it would be an internally contradictory argument since a movement’s mobilizing capacity is dependent on its audience’s socio-cultural orientations. In other words, the more a social movement’s frames take into account and politicize the socio-cultural orientations of masses, the more likely it is to mobilize support. Likewise, a regime type
is correlated to the socio-cultural context. In short, grievances, mobilizing structures, political opportunities and framing processes interact and reinforce each other, although one may play more important role than the other in a given context. This study argues that Political Opportunity Structures, grievances, framing processes and exposure to the state’s ideological apparatuses play more significant role than the resource mobilization model in determining the relative momentum and/or trajectories of Pashtun and Baloch ethno-nationalist movements, for instance.

**Hypotheses**

In the light of the above discussion, I hypothesize:

**H1:** *The more a people are deprived (in relative terms), the easier it is for the challengers to counter the state’s hegemony.*

Drawing on conventional theories of collective action, which emphasize grievances and sense of relative deprivation, I argue that Balochs are relatively more deprived – economically, politically, and culturally – than Pashtuns. Therefore, Baloch nationalists’ agenda is more appealing to Balochs than Pashtun nationalists’ agenda is for Pashtuns.

**H2:** *The clearer, the more consistent, and the more frequent a movement’s frames are, the easier it is to establish counterhegemony and mobilize popular resistance.*

**H2a:** *Other things being equal, the initial framing strategies of a movement influence its consequent framing processes.*

Drawing on McAdam McCarthy and Zald’s (1996), this study asserts that the current discourses and strategies of Pashtun and Baloch nationalism are dependent on their previous
discourses and strategies, path-dependently. Their early discourses and their strategies have not only determined their respective future paths, but have also contributed to their respective mobilizing capacity.

**H3:** *The more a society is exposed to the state’s cultural/ideological apparatuses, the more the challengers find it difficult to counter the state’s hegemony and mobilize support.*

Making use of Gramsci’s and Althusser’s theories, I argue that the ideological apparatuses of the state (education, mass media, and religious establishment) propagate hegemonic discourses, thereby taking the edge off a movement’s counterhegemonic discursive endeavors.

**H4:** *The capacity of the challengers to establish counterhegemony is proportionate to the degree of openness (or closure) of the Political Opportunity Structures.*

Besides, the institutionalized tools and practices of suppression, Political Opportunity Structures signify the state’s apparatuses and acts of repression. Among its apparatuses of repression, I demonstrate that state has used (and continues to use) terrorist networks to suppress nationalism, which are active more in Pashtunkhwa than Balochistan. Political opportunities also include the structures of conflict (countermovement) in the form of religious political parties, which promotes hegemony, thereby demobilizing ethno-nationalists’ popular support.

**Research Design**

To understand Pashtun nationalist challenge to the state’s hegemony in comparison with Baloch nationalist movement, I attempt to conduct an empirical, in-depth and detailed study of a contemporary phenomenon – the struggle for counterhegemony. Although this research – a small-
N design – does not allow us to generalize its outcomes (see George 1979, Przeworski and Teune 1970; and, Skocpol and Somer 1980), it is a better tool to find out “equifinality, complex interaction effects, [and] path dependency” (George and Bennett 2005, 22). In other words, a small-N research design is best suited to explore causal mechanisms. It has the capacity to deeply “explore the intervening variables or the conditions under which the dependent and independent variables interact” (21).

I have excluded Sindhi nationalist movement from my study, while comparing Pashtun nationalist movement to Baloch nationalist movement in Pakistan. As compared to Balochs (and their nationalist movement), Sindhi nationalism does not have as much resemblance to the Pashtuns nationalist movement. Moreover, Sindhi nationalism has apparently dwindled since the 1970s (Khan, 2005). The emergence of the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), with a strong support-base in rural Sindh, has successfully replaced Sindhi nationalist parties to represent Sindhi national sentiments and interest. Sindhi nationalists had to counter the political preponderance not only of the Punjab at the center, but had to face (and overcome) the Mahajirs’ socio-economic and political monopoly in urban Sindh that undermines Sindhis’ interest. The PPP, after coming into power in 1972, could rein back in the Sindhi nationalist parties by protecting Sindhis’ interests vis-à-vis the Mahajir-based Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM).

Sociopolitical phenomena are complex. This complexity may arise from a situation where a phenomenon is determined by more than one variable or when the interaction between/among different independent variables will take different causal paths (equifinality). In George and Bennett’s words, “… different instances of the phenomenon under investigation have alternative determinants – what Mill referred to as the problem of Plurality” (italics in original, 157). The writers further add that “the same type of outcome can emerge in different cases via a different set of independent variables” (italics in original). Besides, we are not always certain that whether or not the variables not included are necessary and sufficient causes (157).

However, the PPP is not a Sindh-specific party. It has established itself elsewhere in Pakistan too, especially in the Southern Punjab (Saraiki-speaking areas of the Punjab). Although sympathetic towards ethno-national interests, it has at times (when in power) suppressed nationalists even more brutally than the Punjab-based parties.
Conversely, Pashtun and Baloch nationalists do not face as acute internal ethnic tensions as to divert their movements, given their relative ethnic homogeneity in Pashtunkhwa and Balochistan, respectively. Although Pashtuns in Balochistan have to infrequently compete with Balochs over the crumbs from the central government, their differences are neither so deep nor so intense as to push them into an importunate headlock-competition. It is worth mentioning, though, that Pashtuns have to compete with a more vibrant religious establishment and right-wing parties than the Baloch and Sindhi nationalists have to in their case.

Pashtun and Baloch societies are relatively tribal, whereas Sindhi society is mostly feudal. Moreover, common geopolitical situations have forged sociopolitical understandings between Balochs and Pashtuns of southern Pashtunkhwa (now part of Balochistan), notwithstanding their mutual political differences – though manageable. Above and beyond, because of their geopolitical situation and their geographically concentrated ethnic homogeneity, Balochs and Pashtuns – compared to Sindhis – pose a greater threat to the existence of Pakistan, and therefore have invited greater retribution from the state too. In addition, both Pashtun and Baloch nationalist movements are what Tarrow (1994) calls the ‘early risers,’ who questioned the creation and existence of Pakistan. However, despite greater geopolitical semblance and sociocultural understanding between Pashtuns and Balochs, their respective nationalist movements

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27 Pashtunkhwa (or Pakhtunkhwa) is a generic name signifying Pashtun Homeland, encompassing Pashtun areas in both Pakistan and Afghanistan. In this research, Pashtunkhwa refers to the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), bordering Afghanistan, Pashtun areas of Balochistan province and Attock and Mianwali districts of the Punjab province – which Pashtun nationalists claim to be integral part of historical Pashtunkhwa. The total area of Pashtunkhwa in Pakistan is about 167,477 km², roughly 21% of the total landmass of Pakistan. Like Pashtunkhwa, historical Balochistan – Baloch Homeland – is divided among Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan. In this research, Balochistan means Baloch areas of Balochistan province in Pakistan – about 271,190 km² (about 34% of the total landmass of the country.

28 Balochs and Pashtuns in Balochistan have some conflicting territorial claims. Besides, Pashtuns resent against the merger of Pashtun areas in Balochistan, making Pashtuns disempowered vis-à-vis Balochs. Pashtun nationalists from Balochistan have been demanding either a separate province or to be made part of Khyber Pakhunkhwa. Although Baloch nationalists are not against Pashtuns’ demand of separation from Balochistan, they are against Pashtuns’ demand to be treated equally as far as they are part of Balochistan. However, I think that the differences between Pashtuns and Balochs can be easily resolved through democratic means, if the state of Pakistan is willing.
have taken different trajectories – or, are at different developmental stages. Thus, a comparison of the two ethno-nationalist movements makes my research design a ‘most-similar cases design.’

**Operationalization of the Variables**

In order to analyze the relative deprivation of Pashtuns and Balochs (H1), I compare their socio-economic conditions and their share in the legislative and administrative machinery of the state. Their socio-economic conditions are measured in terms of five composite variables, indicating deprivation in various socio-economic sectors, education, health, housing quality, housing services, and economic deprivation with regard to household assets.

To test the second hypothesis (H2), I analyze the discourses of Baloch and Pashtun nationalist leadership during (and after) the formative phase of Pakistan. Besides, I evaluate the means (strategies that constitute ethno-nationalist discourse) that the two movements have employed to promote and maintain their respective counterhegemonic struggles. The most significant frames pertaining to issues of ethno-nationalist significance are the politicization of ethno-linguistic and historical identities, the foreign policy of Pakistan, deprivation, and democratic freedoms and civilian supremacy. Counterhegemonic frames related to the said issues are important to counter hegemony in Pakistan, as I argue in Chapter 5.

In this study, exposure to the ideological apparatuses of the state (H3) is measured by the literacy rate in Pashtunkhwa and Balochistan, access to print and electronic media, and exposure to the religious establishment, which complements the state and counters the ethno-nationalist agenda. Exposure to the religious establishment is measured by the vote totals of religious political parties, which constitute countermovement in Pashtunkhwa and Balochistan. This is
worth noting that religious political parties also make up the political opportunities (and constraints) structures – countermovement – of ethno-nationalism in Pakistan.

Political Opportunity Structures (H4) indicate not only the formal legal instruments of coercion, but also the state’s willingness and capacity to repress dissention. It also includes the countermovement existing in Baloch and Pashtun regions in Pakistan, as noted above. The countermovement is signified (primarily, but not exclusively) by the Jamat Islami (JI), Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam (JUI). The JI and JUI are Islamist political parties struggling for Shariah, Islamic legislation, through electoral politics. More importantly, the countermovement in my research also includes the Islamist militant organizations that operate in Baloch and Pashtun areas. In addition, I operationalize political opportunities to include the structures of allies – signified by political/electoral alliances, supporters and sympathizers of Pashtun and Baloch nationalist movements within the state’s institutions.

Research Methods and Data Sources

This study employs qualitative methods, primarily, which are appropriate to a small-N study. For instance, I analyze the hegemonic (and counterhegemonic) discourses and the content of Pakistan Studies textbooks taught in schools and colleges by using a critical discourse analysis (CDA) model. Similarly, I qualitatively evaluate the impact of the institutional constellation and the repressive behavior of the state on Pashtun and Baloch nationalism. In addition, I triangulate the qualitative methods with quantitative analytical tools to improve the analytical vigor of the study. I have used t-statistics to compare the socio-economic situation of Pashtuns and Balochs, their access to mass-media, and the electoral support of the countermovement in Pashtunkhwa and Balochistan. In addition, I quantify Pashtun and Baloch nationalist framing processes to
statistically compare how frequently they have politicized the issues of ethno-national significance while struggling for counterhegemony.

To say the obvious, research outcomes are substantially influenced by the data-sources that a researcher utilizes in her project. “The delightful freedom to play pick-and-mix in history’s sweetshop’ that historiographers sometimes feel inclined to enjoy” (Lustick, 1996, 608) may result in invalid inferences. In order to overcome selection bias in the sources of evidence, I triangulate several sources of data collection: ranging from an analysis of formal institutional structures of Pakistan to participant observation of public rallies to elite interviewing to archival resources. I juxtapose and evaluate competing evidences and narratives.

First, I conduct open-ended elite interviews with Pashtun and Baloch nationalists, journalists, university teachers, and civil society activists to assess the opportunities they have to voice their stance and grievances. It is worth noting that I had an easy access to Pashtun nationalist leaders and activists to learn their views about Pakistan state and politics (including ethno-nationalism). However, it was too risky to approach Baloch militant separatists. Therefore, I make use of their online interviews and speeches circulated through social media outlets – Facebook and YouTube. On the other hand, I interviewed 15 Baloch federalist activists of the National Party (NP) and Balochistan National Party (BNP). I also rely on the online speeches and interviews of Baloch nationalists to evaluate their political stance and strategies.

While interviewing the journalists reporting from Pashtun and Baloch areas, my focus was on their freedom to report and the risks involved if they try to challenge the state’s policies. However, the journalist community has been deeply penetrated by the state; therefore, I felt it was too risky to contact them directly. University teachers are no exception to the rule. Therefore, I rely on informal interactions with the civil society activists I suspected to be on the payroll of the
military establishment. Furthermore, I triangulate my interviews and informal discussions with civil society activists with secondary sources on civil society in Pakistan.

Second, secondary sources on Pakistan’s socio-political dynamics and on Pashtun and Baloch national movements and countermovement are evaluated to supplement primary sources of evidence.

Third, the data published by Pakistan’s Election Commission is utilized to measure the strength of the countermovement (represented primarily by the Islamist political parties) in Pashtunkhwa and Balochistan.

Fourth, to examine the nature of the Pakistani regime and its institutional structure, I examine the formal state institutions, particularly the constitution of Pakistan. An analysis of the formal institutional structure in Pakistan helps to understand not only the nature of the regime and the power-relations among different ethnic entities in Pakistan, but is also helpful in assessing the relationship between the state and civil society. It is also helpful in understanding the dissenting voices – the grievances of the opposition against the formal structures of subordination.

Fifth, to evaluate the formal Political Opportunity Structures, I analyze elite memoirs and biographical/historical accounts of Pashtun and Baloch nationalist leaders and activists. This study also scrutinizes printed and visual interviews and speeches of nationalist leaders. Besides providing an idea of the political situations they had to work in, these memoirs and interviews help me to evaluate ethno-nationalist discourses and strategies.

Sixth, this study examines the content of officially approved textbooks. My focus is on Pakistan Studies, an amalgam of Indo-Pakistan history and civics taught in high schools and colleges. The content analysis of officially approved textbooks, in addition to my interactions with teachers, helps to me to evaluate how the state has been reproducing hegemonic discourses through education.
Seventh, to analyze the relative socio-economic stakes and/or relative deprivation of Balochs and Pashtuns, and their exposure to the state ideological apparatuses (particularly, education), I used the data published by Pakistan Social and Living Standards Measurement Survey (PSML, 2010-11), which is more comprehensive and reliable than other available datasets. The data covered district-wide Indices of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) in Pakistan.

Lastly, this study depends on my own observation of how the state has been treating civil society and its challengers. I draw on what I have seen and heard in Pakistan, especially in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), with respect to the state’s role in supporting and collaborating with extremist organizations (like the Taliban). Also, I have strong personal relations with the challengers (especially Pashtun nationalists), which help me understand their counterhegemonic politics. In addition, I have acquaintanceship with countermovement activists and have been observing their activities that further informs this study. Additionally, I attended the rallies, seminars, and meetings of both Pashtun nationalists and the religious political parties (the countermovement) to see how they generate consensus and mobilize action for their respective causes.29

**Organization of the Study**

The next chapter of this study elaborates two important, yet much debated, concepts, discourse and nationalism, which constitute its theoretical and analytical frameworks, in addition to analyzing the hegemonic civic-nationalist discourses of the state. Chapter 2 examines the

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29 It is worth mentioning, as Ahmad (2009) opines, personal biases are likely to creep in while doing ethnographic research. Let me acknowledge my sympathies with the nationalist movements and my grudge against the countermovement. It was not easy to abandon my biases during my research. However, I tried to check my personal biases through the triangulation of my data sources: I juxtapose my personal experiences and observation with both primary and secondary sources discussed above.
speeches and interviews of both Founders of Pakistan and the contemporary Pakistani nationalist leadership that promote hegemony. It concludes that the hegemonic identity discourses of the state are so devised as to suppress the ethnonational communities of Pakistan. Chapter 3 outlines the contemporary Pashtun and Baloch nationalist movements, their aims and strategies, after briefly describing the land, resources and political histories of Pashtuns and Balochs in Pakistan. It traces the origins and development trajectories of the two movements so that readers get a preliminary view of the current Pashtun and Baloch nationalist struggle in Pakistan. Chapter 4 comparatively examines the stakes of Pashtuns and Balochs in the state, to see how relative deprivation contributes to radicalizing a people. Deprivation is broadly defined to include the economic, politico-institutional and cultural deprivation. Drawing on the traditional theories of social movements, this chapter establishes that the more a people are deprived, the easier it is for the challengers to solicit their support against the state in their struggle for counterhegemony. Chapter 5 analyzes and compares the discourses of Pashtun and Baloch nationalists, in a historical perspective. In this chapter I utilize both qualitative and quantitative methods to analyze both earlier and contemporary Pashtun and Baloch nationalist framing processes. After quantifying their respective frames, having counterhegemonic undercurrents, I compare them using t-test to see the statistical significance of Pashtun nationalist framing processes in comparison with Baloch nationalist frames. Using the CDA analytical model, the statistical analysis is followed by qualitative discussion of the frames studied in this chapter. In Chapter 6, I argue that the state in Pakistan has control over the traditional means of cultural production and dissemination. This chapter analyzes only two of the most important ideological apparatuses of the state: education and mainstream media (both electronic and print media outlets). After statistically comparing their pervasiveness, I qualitatively evaluate the hegemonic discourses propagated by the above mentioned ideological instruments of the state. Chapter 7 evaluates the political opportunities (and constraints) structures that facilitate or obstruct the politics of counterhegemony in Pakistan. The political
opportunities studied in this chapter include formal institutional structures of coercion, the structures of allies, the state’s capacity and propensity to repress counterhegemonic political activities, and the structures of conflict – countermovement. The final chapter of this study concludes the debate by briefly discussing the major findings of the study and its implications for future research.
CHAPTER 2

HEGEMONIC DISCOURSES IN PAKISTAN: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS

As I have argued in Chapter 1, Pakistan has produced and maintained hegemonic identity discourses in order to naturalize its existence and to marginalize centrifugal ethno-nationalist voices, besides violently suppressing the opposition. Therefore, the ethno-nationalist opposition has to counter the state’s (multi-faceted) hegemony in order to launch a successful frontal attack on the state. Before exploring the ethnonationalists’ strategies of resistance, it is pertinent to evaluate the states’ discourses, which is the theme of this chapter.

In this chapter I argue that discourses are not just denotative or indexical social categories, but are also significant instrument to structure and naturalize socio-political relations. In other words, discourses are indicative of the respective subject-positions of those engaged in social practices (both linguistic and non-linguistic), on the one hand. And on the other, they position subjects within aggregated social structures. Therefore, discourses are constitutive

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30 Drawing on Laclau and Mouffe, I use the word ‘discourse’ to refer to a constructed structure of signification wherein a social practice, objects and events are assigned meanings. As we will see later in this chapter, Laclau and Mouffe (1990) use the term in a broader sense to signify not only the linguistic aspect of a discourse but also the non-linguistic, i.e., social formations, objects and events that have acquired a specific meaning within a discourse. Nevertheless, I use the word in a narrow sense to refer only to its linguistic and textual aspects, unless otherwise used by the writers who I cite in this study.

31 They are indexical or denotative in the sense that they are the symbolic representation (and/or reflection) of the prevailing social structures and relations of power.

32 A vintage point wherefrom an individual sees and interprets their situation in terms of specific metaphors, images, concepts and responses (see Davies and Harre 1990, 146; in Pinkus 1996).

33 I use the phrase ‘aggregated social structures’ to conceptualize a loosely connected totality of social identities and relations (such as cultural, economic and political), which are although diverse yet not isolated and insulated from one another. Thus, an individual has diverse ‘selves’ or identities that may or may not supplement each other. In case an individual’s different identities (formed within different social structures) clash with each other, hegemonic discourses help them take a “definite” identity position, in order to avoid having a split personality, or what is commonly known as ‘dissociative personality disorder.’ For instance, a subject belongs to a particular social class as well as has different ethno-political
of, and constituted by, the nondiscursive; in other words, the discursive and nondiscursive are dialectically related to one another (Fairclough 1992; Van Dijk 1993).

Thus, the hegemonic discourses in Pakistan, examined in this study, reveal the socio-political outlook of the state as well as structure identities and relations among nations comprising Pakistan. After summarizing the theoretical framework of this chapter, I examine both the constitutive and constituted character of the official (identity) discourses in Pakistan.

This chapter is organized into three main parts. Part I explains of the theoretical model of the chapter. Part II briefly analyzes the concept of Nation (and Nationalism). Part III analyzes the hegemonic discourses in Pakistan.

**Critical Discourse Analysis: Theoretical Framework**

To analyze the official discourses in Pakistan, I utilize the critical discourse analysis (CDA) approach as expounded by Fairclough (1992), Van Dijk (1993), Blommaert and Bulcaen (2000), and Jorgensen and Phillips (2002). The CDA framework contextualizes the text (linguistic practices), on the one hand; and politicizes it, on the other. It helps us situate discourses and ideologies within the socio-political structures under study as well as reveals the constitutive nature of discourses. In addition, some poststructuralist and post-orthodox-Marxist identity. More often than not, class and ethnicity are in discord. Different discourses (employed to create and maintain hegemony) help an individual with conflicting identities to take a specific position, by preferring one identity over another. In short, a dominant discourse (re)configures different social structures into a (vulnerable) socio-political totality, wherein subjects are positioned.
theoretical insights propounded by scholars, like Gramsci (1971) Laclau and Mouffe (2001), and Wittgenstein (2001)) supplement my analytical model.34

It goes without saying that my reliance on post-structuralism does not necessarily justify normative chaos and extreme moral relativism, which poststructuralist and postmodernists are sometimes accused of (see Balkin 1996; and, Jorgensen and Phillips 2002). More often than not, post-structuralism rather emphasizes the need to recognize others as others – having different standpoints – and be willing to consider their perspectives (see Cornell 1992; cited in Balkin 1996, 7-8).35 Using post-structural analytical tools, I try to reveal the contingent character of Pakistan’s official discourses which establish binary oppositions.36 In other words, I want to demonstrate that Pakistani political discourses construct a particular identity and worldviews to delegitimize alternative worldviews and identities.

To understand the concept of discourse and its political significance, I draw on Laclau and Mouffe (1990 and 2001). Inspired by Gramsci, Laclau and Mouffe are critical of the orthodox Marxists’ economism and teleology – the latter maintaining that relations of production and class struggle determine the superstructure (including meanings and ideas) and that history is predetermined by the “abstract logic of capital” (Dallmayr 2015, 285). Challenging the ontological centrality of social classes as the driving force of history, Laclau and Mouffe emphasize the primacy of the ‘political’. Politics, in their theory, is a struggle for “… temporary

34 Equally insightful is the scholarship on nationalism and nation-building (such as Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983, Anderson 1991, Bačová (1998), and Mugane 2005), which helped me to critically examine the official discourses of Pakistan.

35 Concerning the absolutism/relativism controversy, emanating from structuralist/post-structuralist and modernist/postmodernist thoughts, suffice it to note that I use post-structuralism as a method to demonstrate the contingent nature of the dominant political identity-positions in Pakistan, resulting from hegemonic discursive practices. However, in this study post-structuralism is not used as a normative benchmark to validate (or at least be sympathetic towards) each and every worldview, although it can be utilized to set political norms by emphasizing to keep the discursive field open.

36 By binary opposition I mean the discursive construction of signs or conceptual categories whereby one sign/concept (for instance, Islam in Pakistan’s identity discourses) acquires meanings relative to another sign (say, Hinduism), and whereby one sign is privileged over the other, in order to suppress or delegitimize the other.
fixations of meanings in an undecidable terrain which reproduce or change the existing discourses and thereby the organization of society” (Jorgensen and Phillips, 36). As noted earlier, according to Laclau and Mouffe, a discourse is a socially constructed system of meanings and relations among material objects and events. Social practices and relations, identities, and material objects and events acquire meanings only within socially constructed rules and systems of signification (100-101). For instance, kicking a spherical object in a street has different meanings than kicking a ball in a football match. The football, as a spherical object, does not establish its relations with other objects by virtue of its mere materiality but within a set of socially constructed rules of football game (100). It is worth noting that Laclau and Mouffe do not deny the existence of material objects, yet he believes that they acquire meanings within a system of signification – a discursive totality. Hence, the social (structural relations and identities) does not exist as an objective (neutral) reality, outside a particular discourse. What appears to be real and natural is constructed through contingent articulation (Laclau and Mouffe 1990, 102), whereby a particular worldview is hegemonically established while other social doctrines are relegated as abnormal (Jorgensen and Phillips, 30 & 38).

To further elucidate Laclau and Mouffe’s argument concerning the relationship between the discursive and the non-discursive, it is relevant to elaborate their conception of social practices and hegemony. Laclau and Mouffe write:

[w]e will call articulation any practice establishing a relation between elements such that their identity is modified as a result of the articulatory practice. The structured totality resulting from the practice, we will call discourse. The differential positions, in so far as they appear articulated within a discourse, we will call moments. By contrast, we will call element any difference that is not discursively articulated (italics in original; 105).
According to Laclau and Mouffe theory, a discourse is assigning meaning in a specific communicative event, through the practice of articulation. In Laclau and Mouffe’s theory an element is a sign whose meanings have not been fixed yet (see, Rear and Jones, 2013). Every element acquires meaning in relation to other elements in a discourse. The differential position where an otherwise element acquires meaning within a discourse is called moment. Accordingly, every meaning assigned to an element/sign is relative – the fixation of meanings is neither absolute nor unchangeable. In other words, an element changes its meanings according to the discursive context in which they are employed. This notion of meanings as a system resulting from a specific social convention has its roots in post-structural thought, which emphasizes what Derrida calls iterability – i.e., “… the capacity of signs (and texts) to be repeated in new situations and granted onto new contexts” (Derrida 1977; cited in Balkin, 4). Inserted in new context, an element changes its meanings, partly drawing on the previous usage and partly modified by the context (Balkin, 4).

What follows is that the conversion of elements into moments within a discourse is never absolute, since every element outside the discourse is a ‘floating signifier’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 113). A floating signifier is an element (sign) capable of acquiring different meanings, and which different discourses compete to assign them meanings ‘in their own particular way’ (Jorgensen and Phillips, 28). For instance the word ‘equality’ is a floating signifier, which different discourses (such as democratic discourse or Marxist discourse) ascribe different meanings to. Given the fluid character of the floating signifiers, a discourse is always exposed to be subverted by other antagonistic discourses in the ‘field of discursivity,’ where struggle for transforming a particular element into moment is going on. Thus, a particular discourse establishes a closure, by partially fixing the meanings of an element (a floating signifier) in its own particular way, i.e.,

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37The field of discursivity is a reservoir for the ‘surplus of meaning’ produced by the articulatory practice – that is the meanings that each sign has or had, in other discourses, but which are excluded by the specific discourse in order to create a unity of meaning.” For instance the sign ‘equality’ has other/different meanings outside (and excluded by) the liberal-democratic discourse. Thus the ‘surplus of meanings, which the sign ‘equality,’ has signifies the field of discursivity.
transforming it (the element) into a moment within itself (the discourse). Therefore, Laclau and Mouffe argue that neither complete fixity nor complete non-fixity is possible (111). If a complete fixation of meanings were possible, we would have had discursive (and political) inertia; and consequently, politics (as a struggle for hegemonic articulation) would have been impossible. On the other hand, if complete non-fixity were possible, communication would have been impossible: “a discourse incapable of generating any fixity of meaning is the discourse of psychotics” (Laclau and Mouffe, 112; emphasis added). In other words, every discourse temporarily fixes meanings of what are called elements so as to make communication possible. In short, every element is temporally fixed within a particular discourse, thereby gaining a meaning (becoming a moment) relative to other moments (otherwise elements).

Yet another important analytical category in Laclau and Mouffe’s theory that I will apply while analyzing Pakistan’s official discourses is the ‘nodal point.’ Drawing on Lacan’s concept of points de capiton, nodal points, according to Laclau and Mouffe, are the “… privileged signifiers that fix the meaning of a signifying chain” (112). In Jorgensen and Phillips words: “Nodal points are the privileged signs around which other signs [moments in discourse] are ordered; the other signs acquire their meaning from their relationship to the nodal point.” (26). For instance, ‘human reason’ is a nodal point in the liberal (Lockean) discourse, around which other signs, like individual rights, consent and limited government, are organized.

In the light of what has been said so far, a discourse is a social practice through which meanings are partially fixed. However, because of the flexible nature of the floating signifiers, including the nodal points, the struggle for hegemony between/among antagonistic discursive communities is going on. During this struggle, one of the competing discourses emerges.

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38 Contrary to metaphysical fundamentalists, like Hobbes or Plato, who assign eternal and universal meanings to things, Laclau and Mouffe emphasize the contingent nature of meanings, which makes politics possible. According to Laclau and Mouffe, politics signifies the struggle for meanings between/among competing discursive communities.

39 Signifying chain is a network of interrelated signs in a meaningful totality.
triumphant, while others are marginalized; thus ‘objectivity’ is established. Objectivity, according
to Laclau and Mouffe, is *naturalized* discourse (hegemony). Accordingly, social subjects and
identities are discursive and social formulations: as such, they are not meaningful outside a
particular discourse or set of social practices and institutions. Society is partly and temporarily
structured through articulatory practices and hegemonic practices and institutions. In Dallmayr’s
(2015) words: “Social identities are neither given nor totally dissolved, but rather emerge through
constant renegotiations (or a process of challenge and response)” (288). It is worth mentioning
that the assertion that the ‘objective’ is a discursive construct has nothing to do with the
conventional realist/idealist or discursive/non-discursive dichotomy (Laclau and Mouffe, 107-8).
What Laclau and Mouffe oppose is the essentialist and positivist characterization of sociopolitical
phenomena, following their own logic, independent of the thought processes and articulatory
practices (ibid). When it comes to its relationship (or causal association) with other objects, an
external material object or event is constituted as a meaningful discursive moment only within a
particular discourse. Laclau and Mouffe illustrate this as under:

An earthquake or the falling of a brick is an event, an event that certainly exists, in the
sense that it happens here and now, independently of my will. But whether their
specificity as objects is constructed in terms of ‘natural phenomena’ or ‘expressions of
wrath of God’ depends upon the structuring of a discursive field. What is denied is not
that such objects [and events] exist externally to thought, but the rather different assertion
that they could constitute themselves as objects outside any discursive condition of
emergence (108).

Laclau and Mouffe’s emphasis on the role of the discursive in shaping the non-discursive
help me critically evaluate hegemonic discourses in Pakistan, as well as to appraise the political
(discursive) strategies of the challengers – Pashtun and Baloch nationalists (Chapter 5).\textsuperscript{40}

However, my argument goes beyond that: the social asymmetries and power hierarchies (in narrow, juridical, sense) significantly determine the discursive positions and strategies of those contending for hegemony. In other words, articulatory practices and struggle for hegemony happen within the social – institutional constellations, (juridical) power and resource configuration, and antecedent discourses. On the one hand, discourses constitute the social in the sense that meanings and subject positions and the ensuing power relations are partly and temporally fixed within a specific discourse structure. On the other hand, the preexisting identity markers and structural relations such as juridical power relations, class and ethnicity play significant role in shaping one’s worldview and discursive stances. Therefore, I complement Laclau and Mouffe’s theory with critical discourse analysis (CDA) model, which further elaborates the role of the non-discursive in constituting the discursive. Accordingly, the discursive and the non-discursive are in a dialectical relationship, thereby influencing each other. For instance, a people’s ‘national’ identity is discursively constructed; yet, their preexisting identity markers are discursively exploited to construct a common national identity.

According to Fairclough, “the discursive constitution of society does not emanate from a free play of ideas in people’s heads but from the social practice which is firmly rooted in and oriented to the real, material social structures [like class or caste or juridical power relation]” (in Jorgensen and Phillips, 62). Hence, Fairclough situates discourses within its sociopolitical context as well as assert the significance of discourses to produce and reproduce the social. On one hand, he recognizes the socially determined nature of discourse; on the other, he equally emphasizes its productive capacity. Besides serving as an indicator of social relations and historical processes, discourse is a significant instrument utilized to shape (and reshape) such processes (Fairclough,

\textsuperscript{40} It is noteworthy that, in this study, I use the concept of discourse in linguistic/symbolic sense.
Yet another significant analytical category of Fairclough’s CDA theory is ‘intertextual analysis’ of discourses, which I use in this study. Intertextual analysis takes into account pre-existing discourses in order to see how a particular text or discourse draws on them. Though dependent on, and limited by, the existing ‘order of discourses,’ a discourse may significantly modify an order of discourse, and therefore the social (Fairclough, 194-5). For example, the Pashtun ethno-nationalist discourse draws on (and is limited by) both the official hegemonic discourse, based on religion, and the traditional discourse of Pakhtunwali – the traditional code of conduct of Pashtuns.

The second half of this chapter critically analyzes the state’s (civic) identity discourses, which reveal the institutionalized and naturalized relations of dominance and inequalities (see Van Dijk 1993, 250). It focuses more on the “… ‘top-down’ relations of dominance than [on] ‘bottom-up’ relations of resistance, compliance, and acceptance” (ibid) – though without denying the politics of resistance as demonstrated through articulatory practices and discursive struggles of ethno-nationalist challengers (which is discussed in Chapter 5). Nevertheless, the official discursive project in Pakistan is more subtle and mundane: i.e., the hegemonic discourses of the state are propagated through such routine activities as sports and the portraits of Pakistani national icons displayed at public places and roadsides. The purpose of this study is to divulge what is projected in the routinized and subtle discursive practices (see Van Dijk, 254). In other words, my research examines the ‘opaque as well as transparent structural relationships of dominance, discrimination, power, and control’ that are maintained through the customary

41 “The order of discourse is the sum of all other genres and discourses which are in use within a specific social domain” (Jorgensen and Phillips, 72).
discursive practices are analyzed in this chapter (see Wodak 1995, in Blommaert and Bulcaen, 448).

Pakistan’s civic identity discourses fix meanings around civic religion (a nodal point). Islam and Muslimness are ‘normal’ categories, used as benchmark to evaluate one’s identity-positions and socio-political outlook. The officially sponsored discourses draw intertextually on previous discourses (the Pakistan Movement rhetoric) to naturalize the existence of Pakistan and the existing (juridical) power structures. However, the meanings so fixed are never permanent: they are persistently challenged by antagonistic discourses (especially the ethno-nationalists); therefore the state has to renovate them frequently to maintain its hegemony.

Finally, the analytical model used in this chapter emphasizes not only what is said, but also what is not said. For instance, it reveals how the state’s discourse structures undermine ethno-linguistic identities of the ethno-national communities comprising Pakistan, while emphasizing religion as the primary identity marker of its citizens.

The Nation and Nationalism

As a principle of political legitimacy, nationalism requires that political boundaries should coincide with the national boundaries (Gellner 1983, 1; Calhoun, 1993, 213); or that a people having and claiming a separate national personality should not be barred from the corridors of power, at least. This definition of nationalism is, nevertheless, parasitic on the idea of the ‘Nation,’ which is not self-explanatory. Constructionists (such as Smith 2000, Anderson 1983, Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983, and Hobsbawm, 1990) argue that Nation is created by political elites through ‘invented traditions’ and hegemonic discourses in order to construct a feeling of
oneness among a people. Given the analytical and empirical relevance of the constructionist conception of nation, it is pertinent to ask: if a separate collective persona of a people can be constructed through hegemonic articulatory practices, should we assume that nations are created through some free play of ideas in the elites’ heads, even in the absence of some pre-existing common identity marker to unite them? The existence of common identity marker(s) (such as common history, ethnicity, religion, language, political institutions, or common enemy) is a necessary condition to construct a nation.

Though a nation is an ‘imagined community’, it has limited boundaries, beyond which lie other nations (Anderson, 6-7). And such boundaries are determined either by language and ethnicity (of a considerable majority or powerful minority) or by consensual political arrangements persisting for a considerably long period. Therefore, scholars of ethnicity and nationalism have elaborated two types of nations (and nationalism), consequent upon the content of what constitutes their imagined boundaries: a nation (and nationalism) based on ethnicity is called ethnic nation; on the other hand, a nation defined by common citizenship is referred to as civic one. In case a considerable majority of a people having common language and collective myths and memories establish their own state, we call it a ‘nation-state’. Conversely, if political elites construct, in due course of time, a feeling of oneness among otherwise different ethnolinguistic communities through liberal and inclusive constitutional arrangements and/or through hegemonic nationalist discourse, we call it a state-nation.42

As noted above, the traditions invented and/or utilized by political elites aspiring to create a state-nation are not as void of common constitutive experiences as to engineer a feeling of

42 A state-nation refers to a state promoting (more or less successfully) a sense of common identity among erstwhile diverse population (Riggs 1991, 453; cited in Bačová 1898, 29). It is worth noting that there is a likelihood that an ethnolinguistic community may revoke their consent to a common state, given their ever-growing sense of deprivation (created more or less through the politics of grievance-generation) and greater prospects of founding a state of their own along ethnolinguistic lines (e.g., Bengalis secession from Pakistan – the state they had created in association with north-Indian Muslims).
oneness a priori. In Stewart’s (2000) words: “some shared circumstances are needed for group construction, e.g., speaking the same language, sharing cultural traditions, living in the same place, or facing similar sources of hardship and exploitation” (247). On the other hand, neither is ethnicity as fixed a social category as to make politics almost impossible. In both cases, the social and the discursive aspects of nation and nationalism are dialectically related. In other words, nation-formation is contingent on the interplay between the distinctive identity markers (such as race, ethnicity, religion, language and political memories) of a particular community and their discursive consciousness, created by nationalist leadership through hegemonic nationalist discourse. Nevertheless, all of the identity markers of a community identified as a nation need not be in attendance, simultaneously, to construct a nation. For instance, Brahavis and Balochs belong to different racial stocks and speak different languages, yet ethnicity and common political memories and aspirations unite them against the Punjab-dominated Pakistan. Similarly, in British India, East Bengalis had only religion and politico-economic threats (emanating from Bengali Hindu majority of West Bengal) in common with the north-Indian Muslims which united them for a common cause – the creation of Pakistan. Hence, the discursive strategies of Muslim nationalist elites of Bengal and north India, who manipulating religious identities of Muslims of India, were instrumental to construct a feeling of oneness among erstwhile diverse peoples – having diverse racial, historical, cultural and linguistic backgrounds.

What is more, why would a people barter their ethnic identity and collective memories for a state whose boundaries are incongruent with their ethnolinguistic boundaries? In other words, why would different peoples, with different ethnolinguistic backgrounds, be willing to create a common state which may undermine their respective ethnolinguistic identities? First, the constituent ethnolinguistic communities of a prospective state-nation may be either so small or

41 As mentioned earlier in this study, politics here means the struggle for establishing (counter-) hegemony through articulatory practices, besides the struggle for having access to, and establishing control over, institutions.
territorially so dispersed to make the creation of their respective nation-states either unfeasible or counterproductive. Such ethnolinguistic communities are prone to opt for an inclusive multi-ethnic territorial state guaranteeing their group’s rights (e.g. Hazara and Uzbek communities in Afghanistan). Second, through its ideological and coercive apparatuses, a state may assimilate a considerable ethnic population having territorial concentration, which may otherwise have the potential to become a separate nation state. Pashtuns in Pakistan illustrate the second scenario. However, in such situations it is reasonably difficult, if not impossible, to eradicate collective cultural myths and memories of a people. Separatist tendencies may keep resurrecting, depending on the discursive tactics of ethno-nationalists aspiring to create a nation-state (elaborated in Chapter 5) and the Political Opportunity Structures and constraints (Chapter 7).

Following the constructionist pattern, the state of Pakistan has been promoting certain hegemonic discourses in order to construct a feeling of oneness among diverse ethno-linguistic communities. Using the CDA model, these discourses are analyzed in the following lines.

**Hegemonic Discourses in Pakistan**

As noted above, in its quest for nation-building, Pakistan has frequently been invoking Islam; has been projecting Urdu as the language suggesting Muslimness;\(^4^4\) and has repeatedly been instilling the fear of Hindu India. Islam, Urdu, and a constructed Indian opposition help the state to create new meanings and subject-positions, and thereby to exorcize the ethno-

\(^4^4\) Urdu Language was spoken by Muslims of north India. After the creation of Pakistan, the state elevated it to the status of national language, although majority of Pakistanis do not speak it as their first language. Only about 4-5% of Pakistanis at the beginning of Pakistan, who migrated from north India after partition, spoke Urdu as their first language. The rest of the population of the newly created state spoke other languages that are mutually unintelligible, such as Bangla, Pashto, Punjabi, Saraiki, Balochi or Sindhi. The official discourse of the state, however, suggests that Urdu has more of what is considered as Islamic culture and literature (this point is further elaborated later in this chapter).
historically\textsuperscript{45} rooted sense of identity among its citizens, which has recurrently been threatening its existence as a state. While attempting to have its citizens ‘imagine themselves as a nation,’\textsuperscript{46} Pakistan has been ‘inventing traditions’\textsuperscript{47} that transcend historical ethno-linguistic identities of its citizens. The state portrays itself as a telos, which the forces of history – or Providence – had purportedly envisaged to achieve (Khan, 2015).

In the following section, I analyze speeches and interviews of the formally recognized Founding Fathers – Jinnah (1876-1948), the first Governor General of Pakistan, and Dr. Muhammad Iqbal (1877-1938), a leading figure in All-India Muslim League\textsuperscript{48} and officially acknowledged national poet of Pakistan. Formally recognized and ritualized, the symbolic capital invested by the Founding Fathers before and after the creation of Pakistan serves as the strategic intertextual referent (i.e., discursive frames of reference) for the later Pakistani-nationalist leadership which aspires to accomplish the hitherto unfinished project of building a Pakistani civic nation. Ayaz (2013) puts it aptly: “… the contemporary discourse … is within the ‘two-nation theory,’ Islamic ideology\textsuperscript{49} and at best within the parameters set by its founding leader – Muhammad Ali Jinnah – and his colleagues” (134). For that reason, I examine the speeches and

\textsuperscript{45} The sense of separate identity among ethno-nationalists is informed not only by their ethnicity and language but also by their respective political histories. As elaborated in Chapter 5, ethno-nationalists frequently invoke their respective political histories so as counter the state’s narratives. To emphasize the significance of the histories in ethno-nationalists’ counter-hegemony discourses, I use the term ethno-historical.

\textsuperscript{46} A nation as a political community is imagined in the sense that “… members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion” (Anderson 1983, 6). Besides, “the nation is imagined as limited because even the largest of them, encompassing perhaps a billion living human beings, has finite, if elastic, boundaries, beyond which lie other nations” (ibid, 7).

\textsuperscript{47} “Invented tradition’ is taken to mean a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behavior by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with … a suitable historic past” (Hobsbawm, 1983, 1).

\textsuperscript{48} All-India Muslim League harbored and propagated the idea of Pakistan to divide British India along religious lines.

\textsuperscript{49} As stated in Chapter 1, the Two-Nation Theory forms the basis of Pakistan. It envisages that Muslims and Hindus were two separate nations living in the British India; and that the cultures and interests of the two nations were mutually conflicting and irreconcilable. Therefore, the division of India along religious lines was inevitable, so that the interests of Indian Muslims could be safeguarded from the Hindu majority.
interviews of later Pakistani leaders (both civilian and military) in connection with rhetoric of the formative phase of Pakistan to evaluate the historically and politically contingent nature of the later articulatory practices in Pakistan.

Islam as the Basis of Pakistani Civic Nationalism

With the advent of representative institutions in the early 20th Century following the consolidation of British colonial Raj in India, Muslim elite of north India (where they were a minority) became conscious of the threats to their economic and political interests posed by Hindu majority. Unsurprisingly, Muslims of the so-called minority provinces – provinces where Muslims were a minority – opposed democratic institutions, like elections and local representative councils (Cohen 2004, 24; and Ali 2009, 1). Thus the minority-complex among Muslim elite in the minority provinces made them come out of what Ayaz calls ‘convenient amnesia’ thereby realizing that they were a separate nation (23). To put it so: Muslims’ elite of north and east India realized that they were a minority only when their rule in India came to an end with the establishment of English colonial rule. However, the minority complex and fear of Hindu majority among Muslims in minority provinces was not altogether unwarranted. The establishment of colonial Raj and majoritarian democratic institutions and modern bureaucratization eclipsed their earlier cultural and political prominence in British India. The sense of a distinct nationhood among Muslim-minority surfaced purportedly after the famous ‘Hindi-Urdu controversy’ in the mid-19th century. The partition of Bengal in 1905 (and its

50 As a minority, Muslims of north and east India suffered from persecution-complex – fearing that they will be object of hostility on the part of Hindu majority if majoritarian democratic institutions were instituted in India.

51 Following the consolidation of English colonial rule in India, the British Raj decided to categorize and standardize Indian languages, based on their scripts. Muslims of north India identified themselves with Urdu, written in Arabic script, whereas Hindus considered Hindi, written in Devanagri (Sanskrit) script, as the language truly Indian. Barring their scripts, the two languages were not mutually unintelligible, yet the two religious communities rivaled each other to tug official patronage for “their” respective languages.
subsequent annulment in 1911) further congealed the sense of separate identity among Muslims.\textsuperscript{52} As a consequence of the minority-complex among Muslim elite in minority provinces, they launched a communalist political party, All-India Muslim League (AIML),\textsuperscript{53} in 1906 to protect Muslims’ interests in British India.\textsuperscript{54} It is noteworthy, that their coreligionists in Muslim majority provinces of British India (like the united Punjab and North West Frontier Province) did not share north-Indian Muslims’ anxieties, as the former were the beneficiaries of the newly introduced majoritarian representative institutions (see for instance, Ali 2009; and Ayres 2009).

As the 1937 provincial elections results in British India indicate, Muslim League had yet to garner mass sympathies in Muslim majority provinces that would later constitute Pakistan (see for instance Sandhu 2009, for the 1937 elections’ results in the Punjab). Following the elections, Iqbal, the Muslim ideologue and poet highlighted the need for a separate Islamic state in a letter to Jinnah:

\begin{quote}
The League will have to finally decide whether it will remain a body representing the upper class of Indian Muslims or Muslim masses who have so far, with good reasons, taken no interest in it. [Iqbal further suggested that] the solution to Muslim poverty was the enforcement of the law of Islam and its future development in the light of modern ideas. … But the enforcement and development of the Shariat [var. Sharia] of Islam is impossible in this country without a free Muslim state or states (in Ayaz, 26).
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{52} In 1905, Lord Curzon, the Viceroy of India, partitioned Bengal ostensibly for administrative reasons. Muslims of the eastern half were the beneficiaries of the partition; however, Hindus were enraged as they believed that they will be converted into a minority in the eastern part. Consequently, the Raj was forced by Bengali Hindus to annul the partition.

\textsuperscript{53} The league is considered a communalist party in the sense that it claimed to be an organization devised to protect the interests of Muslim community vis-à-vis the Hindu majority in India.

\textsuperscript{54} The British Raj also played on the Hindu-Muslim divide to strengthen and perpetuate its colonial rule (see Khan, 2004; Ayres, 17; Ayaz, 58, and Khan, 2004).
Unlike Iqbal, majority of the League’s leadership wanted to create a separate state for the Muslims of India rather than establish an Islamic state (this point is elaborated later in this chapter). However, Muslim communalist elites had realized the instrumental value of religion; and therefore, utilized the religious lexicon and aligned themselves with the *pirs* (Muslim Sufis) and *sajada nashins* (guardians of Sufi shrines), especially in Punjab – a Muslim majority province where the pro-British Unionists (representing Muslim, Sikh, and Hindu landed interests) were the only political force to reckon with (Sayeed 2015). Ironically, the secular-minded Jinnah, with a taste for ham sandwiches and whisky, asked his Hindu neighbors to let him “… live according to his history in the light of Islam, his traditions, culture, and language” (in Qureshi 2012, 83; emphasis added).

Jinnah’s political rhetoric (during and after Pakistan Movement)\(^{55}\) is centered mostly on Islam whereby ‘divisive binary oppositions’ are articulated. While addressing a gathering in Lahore on March 23, 1940 (the day which would later be celebrated as Pakistan’s Day – on which the demand for a separate Muslim state was set forth), Jinnah said:

> The Hindus and the Muslims belong to two different philosophies, social customs, and literatures. They neither intermarry, nor inter-dine together [*sic*], and indeed, they belong to two different civilizations which are based on conflicting ideas and conceptions. Their aspects on life and of life are different. It is quite clear that Hindus and Muslmans [Muslims] derive their inspirations from different sources of history. They have different epics, their heroes are different, and they have different episodes. Very often the hero of one is the foe of the other, and likewise, their victories and defeats overlap (quoted in Cohen, 28).

\(^{55}\) The movement for a separate state for the Muslims of India is popularly known as Pakistan Movement.
One cannot but partly agree with Mr. Jinnah that Muslims and Hindus are different from one another in several respects. Yet, he exaggerated the differences among the two religious communities so as to fix meanings in supposedly sutured socio-political spaces: according to Jinnah’s characterization, their (Muslims and Hindus’) respective religions are two distinct and mutually conflicting philosophies and civilizations (nodal points) that determine their respective social customs and habits in a manner to make sociopolitical negotiation and conciliation between the two communities almost impossible. Jinnah (and the rhetoric of Pakistan Movement) appeals to the religious identities of Indian Muslims, which he wanted to transcend complex spatial and temporal exigencies. Hence, Pakistan’s nationalist discourse essentializes “the religiously informed identities of a highly differentiated subject population … called upon to conceive of itself as members of communities bound by doctrinal creeds” (Jalal 2000, 41; quoted in Shaikh, 17). The elements/signs (such as ‘foe’, ‘heroes’, etc.) in Jinnah’s speech quoted above are converted into moments, thereby acquiring meanings contingent on religious affiliations.

Nevertheless, as we have seen in the first part of the chapter, all meanings thus assigned are fluid; they are challenged in the field of discursivity by other antagonistic discourses (this point is elaborated later in this chapter).

While addressing the All-India Muslim League meeting in Karachi, 1943, Jinnah praised the cementing role of Islam:

What is [it] that keeps the Muslims united as one man, and what is the bedrock and sheet anchor of the community? It is Islam. It is the Great Book, [the] Qur’ān, that is the sheet anchor of Muslim India. I am sure as we go on and on, there will be more and more of oneness – one God, one Book, one Prophet and one Nation (quoted in Qureshi 1998, 83).
So, according to Jinnah, Islam is “the bedrock and sheet anchor” that bind Muslims of India together as a nation, irrespective of their ethnolinguistic and historical differences (one God, one Book, and one Prophet = one nation, in essence). Those who believe in different gods, who do not believe in the Qur’ān as the book authored by Allah, and who do not acknowledge Muhammad as the last Messenger of Allah, are regarded as ‘the constitutive others’, whom the “believers” would avoid to ‘marry or dine with’. Henceforth, Pakistani nationalist discourse structures establish a closure by partially fixing the meanings of a floating signifier – ‘nation’ – around religion, as the nodal point.

The word ‘nation,’ as a floating signifier, acquired different meanings in other discourses, prevalent during the concluding phase of British Raj in India. For instance, Jami’at-e-Ullama-e-Hind (Party of (Islamic) Scholars of India), with a pro-All India National Congress stance, assigned different meanings to the word ‘nation’: that Hindus and Muslims of India constituted one and the same Indian nation, and that partition of India on religious/communal lines was unjustified. However, the League was eventually relatively successful in establishing its hegemony in the Muslim majority districts of north India, Bengal, Sindh, and the Punjab, as testified by the 1946 provincial elections. 56

Apprehending the ethno-linguistic and politico-historical differences among Muslims of British India (and Pakistan), Pakistani hegemonic articulations appealed (and continues to appeal) to their religious sensitivities and symbols which are supposed to surpass their temporal identities.

56 This is noteworthy that the League’s successful strategy of hegemonic articulation is not the only factor which contributed to its victory in its ‘war of position’ against Indian nationalists, which resulted in its victory in the ‘war of maneuver’. Although in some cases, its opponents (like Khudai Khidmatgar in the Pashtun belt) failed to invoke the ethno-linguistic and local primordial sensitivities of Muslims, the political opportunities for the Muslim League’s opponents, Indian nationalists, were very scarce: suffice it to say that while the British Raj suppressed the Indian nationalist movement, including the Khudai Khidmatgars, the Muslim communalist elite was endowed with honorifics and socio-economic and political favors to acknowledge their services to the Raj. While Congress leadership (including Gandhi and Bacha Khan) was frequently subjected to rigorous imprisonment, most of the Muslim Leaguers and their predecessors were given honorary titles, like Sir Sayid Ahmad Khan, Sir Muhammad Iqbal, Sir Muhammad Shafi, Sir Zafrullah etc.
For example, in his speech to the National Assembly of Pakistan on April 14, 1972, the then-President of Pakistan Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (1971-1973) reiterated the rationale of creating Pakistan:

…”In essence we separated from India because we rejected its iniquitous system, its exploitation, and domination. This struggle against tyranny culminating in our people braving the enormous hazards of partition to carve out Pakistan, the pure land of promise and fulfillment. Millions of India Muslims made the great pilgrimage to integrate with the Balouch [var. Baloch], the Bengali, the Pathan [var. Pashtuns], the Punjabi, and the Sindhi to build the largest Muslim state on the foundations of Islamic justice and brotherhood. Our ambition was to create a country where we could share everything according to our belief, our traditions and our aspirations (emphasis added). 57

Like his predecessors, the secular Bhutto appeals to the religious myths and symbols of Pakistanis. Accordingly, millions of Muslims struggled against the inequity, exploitation and tyranny of Hindu majority to carve out the pure land promising Islamic justice and brotherhood. And that Muslims of the “impure” post-partition India – the logical counterpositive of the land of the pure – made ‘the great pilgrimage to the ‘pure land’ to assimilate with their brothers-in-faith – Baluch, Bengalis, Pashtuns, Punjabis, and Sindhis. Employing religious lexicon (such as ‘the great pilgrimage,’ ‘the pure land,’ and ‘Islamic justice and brotherhood’), Bhutto tried to construct religion-based subject positions of Pakistanis implicitly in opposition to their constitutive others – primarily, Hindus.

After securing a separate state for themselves in 1947, Pakistani nationalist leadership was (and is) self-assured that the discrete nations constituting Pakistan could be integrated. In a

broadcast talk to the people of Australia on February 19, 1948, Jinnah said that the great majority of Pakistanis had faith in the Almighty God and followed the teachings of Prophet Muhammad, and therefore were “members of the brotherhood in Islam,” giving them “a special and a very deep sense of unity”.58 He was “… confident that a united nation of 70 million people with a grim determination and with a great civilization and history need fear nothing.” Jinnah asked masses never to forget their motto: “Unity, Discipline, and Faith” (emphasis added).59

To articulate a nation on the basis of religion, hegemonic articulatory practices in Pakistan deemphasized ethno-linguistic and politico-historical identities of the peoples of British India (and Pakistan). Locally evolved identities and cultural heritage of the regions now constituting Pakistan were ignored (Cohen, 37). In his address to the Quetta Municipality, on June 1, 1948, Jinnah accentuated the need for Pakistanis to get rid of the evil of provincialism.60 He asserted:

Local attachments have their value but what is the value and strength of a “part” except within the “whole” [Pakistani national identity] … We are now all Pakistanis – not Baluchis [Baloch], Pathans [Pashtuns], Sindhis, Bengalis, Punjabis, and so on – and as Pakistanis we must feel [sic], behave and act, and we should be proud to be known as Pakistanis and nothing else.61

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60 In Pakistan, ethnonationalist struggles for greater autonomy are also referred to as ‘provincialism,’ as ethnonationalists demand greater autonomy to provinces (federating units) vis-à-vis the Punjab-dominated center.
Mr. Jinnah warned Pakistanis in March 1948, in his farewell message to the East Pakistan, that if they began thinking of themselves as Bengalis, Punjabis, Pashtuns etc., Pakistan, as an ‘embodiment of the unity of the Muslim nation,’ was bound to disintegrate (in Jaffrelot, 99).

Therefore, those who are reluctant to give up their ‘relatively insignificant local attachments’ are posited in Pakistan’s discourse structures as the ‘enemies of Pakistan financed by foreign agencies’ to ‘disrupt and sabotage Pakistan (Jinnah’s speech in Dhaka, March 21, 1948, discussed below at length). For instance, Jinnah warned Bengalis in his March 1948 farewell address to remain alive to the exploitation and sinister attitude of Indian political agencies and press, which had adamantly opposed the creation of Pakistan, and which was allegedly supporting the ‘just’ claims of the Muslims of East Pakistan demanding autonomy. Surprisingly, Jinnah, who once advocated constitutional guarantees to the Muslims of British India against Hindu majority, censured ethnonationalist claims to equal treatment in his Pakistan as ominous phenomenon. And the trend continues hitherto (for further details, see Nizamani 2000).

In the light of what has been said so far, it is pertinent to consider the following questions: Does ‘brotherhood in Islam’ signify pan-Islamism, depending on Pakistan’s hegemonic structures of significations? Or, is it confined to the boundaries of the then British India (and the present-day Pakistan)? Also, whether the founding-fathers imagined their anticipated Pakistan as a theocratic state, where the Will of the Almighty would reign supreme? Or, did they want a separate state for the Muslims of India to protect their temporal interests?

As noted in Chapter 1, “Pakistan meant (and continues to mean) different things to different people” (Shaikh, 17). And the vagaries of Pakistan Movement continue to haunt contemporary Pakistani nationalist project (see for instance, Shaikh, 14-45; Ayaz, 133-144; and Jan, 55-170).
Concerning our first query, Pakistan’s identity discourse is equivocal: on the one hand, anyone believing in one God, one Book, and one Prophet becomes a member of the Islamic fraternity by default. Rhetorically, Pakistan was (and is still) conceived as “… Islamic outpost with a long term historic mission that transcended South Asia” (Cohen, 171). On the other hand, “… the introduction of permits, passports, and visas for Muslims [including Indian-Muslims] seeking entry [in Pakistan] in the 1950s left few in any doubt that, whatever the claims of the new state, ‘being Muslim’ did not automatically translate into ‘being Pakistani’ (Shaikh, 50).

Although Article 40 of the constitution of Pakistan lays it out as a general principle of policy that “the state shall endeavor to preserve and strengthen fraternal relations among Muslim countries based on Islamic unity” (emphasis added), in practice, Pakistan’s officially romanticized universal Islamic brotherhood does not result automatically into the ‘withering away of Pakistani state’, as predicted by its national poet (discussed below). Afghanistan (and sometimes Iran, too), for instance, does not inevitably become the member of the “universal” Islamic brotherhood envisaged in the official (and popular) imagination of Pakistan. The ‘Muslim Pakistan’ has been asking the ‘Muslim’ Afghanistan to recognize the Durand Line as international border between them, which Afghanistan has persistently been denouncing as artificial colonial legacy dividing Pashtun/Afghan nation arbitrarily.62 Contradicting its self-assigned role to promote Islamic brotherhood, Pakistan has been insisting on fencing the Durand Line to obstruct “cross-border” movement, despite the fact that majority of the peoples straddling the Line are Muslims.

62 The Durand Line was drawn in 1893, as a consequence of an agreement between Britain and Afghanistan, bifurcating Pashtun/Afghan land into colonial-British and Afghan spheres of influence. Afghanistan and Pashtun nationalists in Pakistan question the legality of the border, as they believe that the Durand Line Agreement was forced on the Amir of Afghanistan by the then-colonial power against the will of Pashtun/Afghan people. Therefore, both Afghanistan and Pashtun nationalists prefer to call the present border between Pakistan and Afghanistan as the Durand Line instead of calling it Pak-Afghan border. However, this study does not establish or contest the legitimacy of the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Therefore, I use the phrases ‘Pak-Afghan border’ and ‘Durand Line’ interchangeably to refer to the border between the two neighbors.
In short, “the universalist logic of Islam was [and is] at odds with Pakistan as national project” (Shaikh, 44); and therefore, some scholars (Ali, 2011, and Shaikh 2009, for instance) argue that Pakistani conception of nationhood has become more and more territorialized, and that the emphasis has been shifted from ‘Islamic ideology’ to ‘Pakistan ideology’. Even if so, Islam as a civic religion is still the nodal point of Pakistan’s hegemonic symbolic chain; and it will remain a relatively convenient instrument of cross-ethnic assimilation until the state is assured that it has accomplished the hitherto unfinished project of nation-building – until counterhegemonic voices have significantly been muted and ethnolinguistic centrifugal forces have substantially lost their vigor. Until then, Iqbal, a pan-Islamist thinker, will remain revered as the national poet of Pakistan and his poems will continue to be part of curriculum; his poetry, such as the following, will linger to be frequently aired both on the state-owned and state-controlled media:

*Aik hoon Muslim haram ki passbani kay liye,*

*Neel kay sahil say thaa ba’khay kay Kashghar.*

(Muslims, from Nile to Kashghar,

Be united for the sake of guarding Haram.63)

Iqbal further pleads Muslims to:

Smash the icons of race; submerge yourself in millat,64

So you remain neither a Thurani, nor an Iranian, nor an Afghan.

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63 Haram is the Muslim holy place in Mecca, Saudi Arabia.

64 Millat is Persian word meaning ‘nation’. Millat in Pakistani identity discourse generally (and in Iqbal’s poetry specifically) refers to Muslim community as a “monolithic” entity. It is also of note that Iqbal conflates racial and ethnolinguistic identities, as evident in the second line of the couplet.
Iqbal’s anthologies (both Urdu and Persian) are replete with ideas that glorify pan-Islamism and religion-based transcendental identities. Therefore, we should not be surprised if pan-Islamist political parties in Pakistan garner mass-support quite opportunely, or if we see Pakistan virtually converted into an effective incubator to produce global jihadists; because Pakistani mass-mentality has officially been nourished for decades with Iqbal-like pan-Islamic idealism. To further elaborate his romanticization of pan-Islamism and Ummah (Muslim nation), it is imperative to briefly discuss his views about one’s loyalty to their homeland. Iqbal says:

*In tha’za Khudāoon may barra sub say watan hay,*

*Jo pairhan iss ka hay, wo mazhab ka kafan hay.*

(Homeland is the greatest of all the deities,

Its garb is the shroud of religion)

In one of his Persian poems, Iqbal asserts:

Our heart is bound neither to Syria nor Turkey nor India,

Its birth-place is naught but Islam.

Thou art a Muslim; do not bind thy heart to any country.

Do not lose thyself in this world of dialects (in Chaudhry 1996, 497).
The Prophet [Muhammad] migrated [to Medina] from his birth-place [Mecca],\textsuperscript{65}

And thus revealed the secret of the Muslim’s nationalism.

His [Prophet’s] wisdom established a world-encircling community,

On the foundations of the ‘Kalima’\textsuperscript{66}

By the grace of his overflowing bounty,

The whole earth became a mosque for us.

Live in the ocean like the fish,

Freed from the fetters of locality.

He who frees himself from the prison-house of direction,

Becomes all-pervasive like the sky (in Chaudhry, 497-8).

As we can see, Iqbal, the national poet of Pakistan, deprecates the notion of loyalty to one’s birth-place as antithetical to the spirit of Islam. Accordingly, once someone professes their faith in the Oneness of the Allah and in the Prophethood of Muhammad, the ‘whole earth becomes a Mosque (a holy place) for them’. In short, Iqbal argues that Islam obliges every Muslim to give up other identities, such as linguistic, ethnic, political, and geographical. It is worth mentioning that his discursive stance is partly in tension with Pakistani nationalism.

Contrary to what the pan-Islamist Iqbal asserts, the early Iqbal once eulogized India, his own birthplace, as the best place in the whole world,\textsuperscript{67} and later on demanded a separate state in

\textsuperscript{65} Mecca and Medina are Muslim’s holy places in today’s Saudi Arabia. On 16\textsuperscript{th} July, 622, Prophet Muhammad and his companions migrated from Mecca (his birth-place) to Medina (his burial-place) in order to avoid persecution. The event marks the beginning of Muslim Lunar Calendar – Hegira (meaning, migration).

\textsuperscript{66} Kalima is the solemn declaration which one makes while professing his faith in Islam: “There is no God, but Allah; and Muhammad is the messenger of Allah.”
northwestern India in his historic Allahabad address to the All-India Muslim League’s annual session on December 29, 1930. Iqbal leaves us with little doubt (if any) that a separate country for Muslims of India was not an end in itself, but a means to an end, in his imagination. Although he regarded geopolitically demarcated borders antithetical to his dream of Muslim solidarity, Iqbal later realized that a separate homeland was temporarily instrumental to safeguard the cause of Islam, and which he believed was “… destined over time to wither away by ever enlarging the frontiers of Islamic community ‘by example and persuasion’” (in Shaikh, 33). In his letter to Ghulām Bheek Nāring, December, 5, 1928, Iqbal writes:

To me the propagation of Islam should be accorded precedence over all other issues. If the objective of the Muslims of India is only freedom and economic betterment, and not the protection of Islam, as is evidenced by the behavior of today’s [Muslim Indian] nationalists, then Muslims will never succeed (quoted in Qureshi, 89).

Some of his very popular Urdu couplets say:

Zamām-e-kaar gar mazdoor kay hathoň may hooň phir kya?

Tareeq-e-kohkan may bhee wahi heeley haiň pervazee.

Jalal-e-pādshahi ho keh jamhoori thamasha ho,

Juda ho deeń siyasath say tho reh jāthee hay changaizi.

(What if the proletariat seizes reins?

The cunning workers ape the millionaire.

Be it the majesty of monarchy, or the pomp of democracy,

67 Iqbal’s anthem – saray jahaň say acha, Hindustaň hamara (the best in the whole world is our India) – is still passionately sung in India.
If religion is divorced from politics, what remains is tyranny.\(^{68}\)

To emphasize the significance of an Islamic state, Iqbal argued that secular democracy in a free India was far worse than slavery under British Raj. He wrote in one of his letters, dated February 7, 1929, that as an Indian Muslim he would prefer religion to freedom, and that he would distance himself from freedom divorced from religion (in Qureshi, 89).

What can be inferred safely from what has been said so far is that Iqbal had a ‘primordial attachment’\(^{69}\) to Islam. But, most of the Pakistan movement’s leadership employed religious language and symbols instrumentally. While Iqbal believed that democracy and secularism were antithetical to Islam, Jinnah occasionally praised democracy and expressed his aversion for theocracy. In his oft-quoted speech to the constituent assembly of Pakistan, August, 11, 1947, which Ahsan terms as the Magna Carta of Pakistan (Ahsan 2012, 61), Jinnah emphasized the need to divorce religion from the state to make the ‘great state of Pakistan happy and prosperous.’ Jinnah assures the citizens of Pakistan:

You are free: you are free to go to your temples. You are free to go to your mosques or any other place of worship in this state of Pakistan. *You may belong to any religion or caste or creed that has nothing to do with the business of the state* (quoted in Ahsan, 63; emphasis added).

\(^{68}\) Also see Chaudhry, 1996, 492, for the translation of the couplets.

\(^{69}\) “Primordial attachment is meant the one that stems from the ‘givens’ or more precisely, the assumed ‘givens’ of the social existence of humans. ‘Givenness’ is immediate contiguity and kin connection but also being born into a particular community, religion, culture, then it is the mother tongue, and sharing the same social practices” (Bačová, 1998, 31). Primordial attachment to one’s culture, language and religion motivates them to preserve their common cultural heritage as an end in itself, as opposed to the instrumental use of cultural legacies to achieve some political or economic ends (for details of Primordialism and instrumentalism, see for instance Bačová 1998, and Ayres 2009, 1-15).
Similarly Jinnah had promised that Pakistan will be a democratic country. In his broadcast speech to the peoples of the United States of America, February, 1948, Jinnah said that he did not know what the ultimate shape of the constitution of Pakistan was going to be, but he was sure that that would be of a democratic type, “embodying the essential principles of Islam” (emphasis added). At another occasion, 14th February, 1948, while addressing the Sibi Durbar in Baluchistan, Jinnah declared that he had ‘one underlying principle in his mind, the principle of Muslim democracy.’ He added:

It is my belief that our salvation lies in following the golden rules of conduct set by our great lawgiver, the Prophet of Islam. Let us lay the foundation of our democracy on the basis of truly Islamic ideals and principles.

What would “Muslim democracy” look like? And what ‘Islamic principles’ did Jinnah had in his mind which could have been incorporated in the anticipated constitutional structure of Pakistan? How is it possible to lay the foundation of democracy on the fundamental ideals and principles of Islam, while at the same time religion will have nothing to do with the business of the state? Jinnah is ambiguous; rather, he is contradicting himself on different occasions. Such ambiguities and discrepancies in Pakistan’s official discourses arise from the instrumental application of religious language and symbols to temporal issues to legitimize and naturalize the

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70 Though Jinnah ruled the country in an authoritarian manner, and arbitrarily dismissed the democratically elected provincial assemblies of Sindh and the then-NWFP soon after the creation of Pakistan.


state (for details of instrumental use of religion in Pakistan, see for instance, Sayeed 2015; Jaffrelot 2015; Cohen 2004; Ali 2011; Shaikh 2009; Ayaz 2013; and Ayres 2009).

As stated in the first part of this chapter, the discursive and the non-discursive are dialectically related: On the one hand, Pakistani nationalists considered (and continue to consider) the use of religious symbolism expedient to rally support for the cause of Pakistan, a state which was meant to protect temporal interests of north-Indian Muslims. As noted earlier in this chapter, they were (and are) aware of the fact that Muslims of British India (and of Pakistan) had very little in common barring religion. Contrary to what Pakistani nationalists want us to believe, Muslims of British India had distinct (and sometimes mutually conflicting) histories, different cultural symbols and icons, and mutually unintelligible languages. We know it on the authority of Mubarak Ali, a renowned historian in Pakistan, that in the pre-colonial India “… ethnic identity was more powerful in dividing Muslim society than the religious factor was in unifying it” (14). “Local converts to Islam were despised by Muslim ruling elite and [the latter] preferred high-caste Hindus to be appointed to government offices. Muslim Afghans formed alliance with Hindu Rajputs and fought jointly against Muslim Mughals in the battle of Khanua, 1527” (ibid, 14-15). Similarly, Bahlul Ludhi (1451-1489), the founder of Ludhi dynasty in India, invited Afghans from mountains to strengthen his rule in India, instead of trusting his non-Afghan coreligionists (ibid, 14). Khushal Khan Khattak (1613-1689), an Afghan leader fighting against the Muslim Mughal emperor, Aurangzeb Alamgir (1618-1707), invoked Pashtun/Afghan ethnolinguistic symbols through his poetry, to incite Pashtuns to fight against the Muslim Mughal dynasty.74

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73 Most of the Hindu converts to Islam were low-caste Hindus who saw Islam as a religion that discourages caste-system and racial discrimination. However, according to Ali, Muslim ruling elites did not accept the local low-caste converts to Islam as their equals: the former considered the latter as racially and ethnically inferior to them.
74 Khushal Khan Khattak is revered by Pashtun/Afghan nationalists as their national poet, an icon of resistance and a symbol of their contemporary struggle against the state’s hegemony in Pakistan.
During the early years of British rule, Muslims in the Muslim-majority provinces were indifferent to the concerns of Muslims of north India. Sindhi and the Punjabi Muslim elite did not support the League’s stance until the mid-1940s – only when they realized that their landed interests were threatened by the Indian National Congress’s land reforms policies. Similarly, Pashtun nationalist movement, the Khudai Khidmatgar (Servants of God), led by Abdul Ghafar Khan (popularly known among Pashtuns as Bacha Khan), and which was later on merged in All-India National Congress, opposed the division of British India along religious lines. It is noteworthy that Khudai Khidmatgar was so popular in the Pashtun belt that Congress formed government in the then NWFP, following the elections of 1937 and 1946. Equally noteworthy is the fact that the Baloch nationalists were against the idea of becoming part of the proposed Muslim state of Pakistan, as they believed that Balochs were a separate nation, having a different ethno-linguistic identity from the rest of the Muslims of British India. Therefore, they argued that Balochs were entitled to have a nation-state of their own. Consequently, the Baloch state of Kalat, having internal autonomy in British India, had unsuccessfully opted for independence, instead of becoming part of Jinnah’s newly created Muslim Pakistan (this point is discussed in detail in Chapter 3). And the story does not end here: as alluded above in this chapter (and discussed in Chapter 1), Pakistan’s dream of nation-building has not been materialized yet. The myth of Islamic solidarity was seriously undermined by the secession of Bengal in 1971; and it continues to be challenged by ethnonationalist movements in Pakistan, especially by Baloch separatists (see Jaffrelot, 97-196; Shaikh, 46-80; Cohen, 201-230; Ayaz, 49-104; and, Rahman, 2011), although official discourses have proved instrumental to expedite the state’s project of nation-building.

Solicitation of the religiously-informed sensitivities of Muslims could not be delimited as mere rhetoric in Pakistan: the discursive constructs and reconstructs the nondiscursive. In addition to helping the state to assimilate the ethnolinguistically diverse nations in Pakistan, the hegemonic discourses in Pakistan have been informing the formal institutional structures in
Pakistan since its very inception. Besides declaring Islam as the official religion of the state (article 1 of the constitution of Pakistan), the preamble of the constitution states that “sovereignty over the entire universe belongs to the Almighty Allah alone, and the authority to be exercised by the people of Pakistan within the limits prescribed by Him as a sacred trust”. If, on the one hand, official narratives help the state to expedite the process of assimilation and national integration; on the other hand, political elites as secular as General Ayub Khan and Z. A. Bhutto had to utilize religious symbolism to appease the religious right and to gain legitimacy to their rule and policies. Following the footprints of his predecessor, Bhutto, for instance, championed folk Islam as part of his populist ideology. He had to christen his economic reforms agenda as “Islamic socialism” in order to secure mass acquiescence, at least. Islam could not be relegated as a mere symbolic instrument to counter the religious opposition; Bhutto had to Islamize the state and society as well, to placate mass sentiments. He declared Friday as the weekly holiday and banned alcohol, for instance (Shaikh, 6; Jaffrelot, 11; and, Nasr, 84-85). In short, be it the form of government or the war on terror or economic reforms or women’s rights or even such trivial issues as public schools uniform and family planning, Islam had become (and still is) the taken-for-granted frame of reference in Pakistan. Even secularists and ethno-nationalists have to appeal to religion to garner popular support.

The Pakistani Civic Identity and Invented Traditions

What is more, to ensure that masses transcend their ethno-linguistic identities and their local histories, to have them imagine themselves as a united nation, Pakistan has been inventing traditions amounting to ‘the murder of history,’ as Aziz (2014) would argue. To further illustrate what has been said so far in connection with the ethnolinguistic and historical differences among Muslims of the then-British India (and today’s Pakistan) and the attendant discursive imperatives, I will examine some of the fabricated myths and constructed symbols in the following lines.
Resulting from a recurring “… process of formalization and ritualization,” these invented traditions construct “… an ancient past beyond effective historical continuity, either by semi-fiction … or by forgery” (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983, 5-7). For instance, the origin of Pakistan is traced back to the advent of Islam in South Asia, ostensibly with the conquest of Sindh by an enigmatic Arab teenager, Muhammad Bin Qasim, around AD 712. “Although allusions to Qasim being the ‘first Pakistani’ can be found in various publications after 1953, he was first officially adopted as the ‘first citizen of Pakistan’ in the Fifty Years of Pakistan published by the Federal Bureau of Pakistan in 1998” (Paracha, in Dawn, April 12, 2015). Official historiography in Pakistan maintains that the creation of Pakistan was bound to happen as Muslims of India realized that they were a separate people who would ultimately create a state of their own. In Yousaf’s (1991) words, “The nation along with its ideology was already there for centuries but the country came into existence afterwards. Hence Pakistan’s geography is a result of its ideology” (2; in T. Khan, 9).

Another Pakistani historiographer, Dr. Safdar Mahmood, in his article in daily Jung (August 11, 2015), argues that Shahabuddin Muhammad Ghori (1149-1207), from Ghor, present-day Afghanistan, laid the foundation of a Muslim homeland in India when he invaded India and asked his rival Hindu Raja to concede to Gori’s suzerainty over Multan, Punjab, and Sarhad (the Frontier, Pashtun territories in today’s Pakistan) as a condition to establish truce.

Such invented traditions are meant to forge an historical continuity at the expense of local histories – to prove that Pakistan was destined to be materialized by the so-called Great Leader, Jinnah. Consequently, early Muslim invaders to predominantly Hindu India are celebrated as “liberators”, whereas the ‘children of the soil’, who were defending their motherland against the Arab and Central Asian invaders, are portrayed as tyrants. Pakistan’s invented traditions leave

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75 Formalization and ritualization here means that certain traditions and discourse are formally adopted and official reinforced to construct popular worldview and to standardize behavior.
Pakistanis completely disoriented, glorifying what is foreign, and loathing what is indigenous. Because Islam is painted as the modernizing and liberating force, Pakistanis distance themselves from their non-Muslim/non-Arab civilizational past. Hence, given the binary-oppositions created by the hegemonic articulations in Pakistan, it is not surprising that Pakistanis valorize Arab, Turk, Afghan, and central Asian Muslim invaders who plundered their lands, slew their non-Muslim forefathers, and took their foremothers as concubines. Ahsan puts it aptly:

Our earth, we are told, was not our own until people from distant lands came and conquered it (and us) for us. Our ancient heroes cannot be our heroes because they preceded our own civilization to our faith (Ahsan 1996, 18; quoted in T. Khan, 2015, 7).

To invent new national symbols, Pakistan has named its modern weaponry after Afghan and Central Asian Muslim invaders of India such as Abdali Missile (named after Afghan conqueror of north India, Ahmad Shah Abdali (1722-1772)) and Ghorı missiles (named after Sultan Shabı-Dın of Ghor, who invaded India in the 12th Century AD).

Contrary to what Pakistanis are told today, earlier accounts of Muslim invaders do not mention them favorably. We know it on the authority of Abid (in the daily News, October, 12, 2015) that Bin Qasim did not receive a hero welcome in Iraq, and that he was imprisoned by Caliph Walid where he succumbed to torture. Accordingly, Bin Qasim was punished for sleeping with the virgin daughters of Raja Dahar, the vanquished ruler of Sindh, before they were offered to Caliph Walid as concubines.

Another instance of fabrication in Pakistani historiography cited above is the Mahmood’s reference to Ghori’s invasion of India and his demand from the Hindu Raja to hand over Multan, Punjab and Srahad to Ghorı, if the latter desired to have peace. To bolster his claim, Mahmood
cites the Urdu translation (by Khwaja 2008) of *Tharikh-e-Ferishta*, written by a Persian historian, Farishta (1560-1620). Yet, the Urdu translation of Fareshta (trans. Khwaja, 147) to the English translation of the book (trans. Briggs 1908, 176), Ghori’s letter to the Raja does not contain any demand of any territory to be conceded to him as a condition to establish peace between the two belligerent armies. A student of history is shocked to see how unashamedly Pakistani historiographers forge history while inventing traditions, so much as to insert texts in the ancient historical accounts of the region; and in so doing, they blatantly disregard common-sense historical continuity.76

Pakistan’s National Language Discourse

Another invented tradition and a significant element of Pakistan’s national discourse is what Ayres calls ‘language ideology’. Following the Hindi-Urdu controversy, Muslims of north India associated themselves with Urdu language, which gradually signified Muslimness in the pre-partition Muslim elite’s political discourse. Supplementing Islam, Urdu has been an important nodal point in Pakistan’s identity discourses aimed at constructing a ‘united nation’ (Rahman, 2; Jaffrelot, 112; Ayaz, 58-9; Ayres, 27 & 43; and Khan, 2). After partition, when students of Dhaka University protested against Pakistan’s resolve to institutionalize Urdu as the national language of Pakistan, Jinnah and Liaqat Ali Khan (the first Prime Minister, and following the death of Jinnah, the second Governor General of Pakistan (1947-51)) delivered speeches in favor of Urdu, which are worth quoting at length. Jinnah said, on March 21, 1948:

76 Neither Khwaja nor Mahmood even bother to mull over the names of the regions allegedly mentioned in Ghori’s letter to his Hindu adversary, which were unknown during the Ghori’s invasion of India in the 12th Century AD.76 The region now known as Punjab assumes different historical names, such as ‘Sapta Sindhu’, (the land of seven rivers) in Rig-Veda; Hafta Hindva (seven rivers); in Zoroastrian holy text, Zend Avesta; and, Aratta, in the epic Mahabharata. The word Punjab (meaning five rivers in Persian) as the name of the region appears first in the travelogue of a Moroccan Muslim traveler Ibne-Battuta, who came to India in 14th Century AD (Soofi, in *Dawn*, January 2, 2015). Similarly, the name Sarhad (meaning, the frontier) of the Pashtun land in today’s Pakistan is a 20th century British coinage.
But I want to tell you that in our midst there are people financed by foreign agencies who are intent on creating disruption. There object is to disrupt and sabotage Pakistan. I want you to be on guard; I want you to be vigilant and not be taken in by attractive slogans and catchwords. They say that the Pakistan Government and the East Bengal Government are out to destroy your language. A bigger falsehood was never uttered by a man.

[...]

Let me tell you in the clear language that there is no truth that your normal life is going to be touched or disturbed so far as your Bengali language is concerned. But ultimately it is for you, the people of this province, to decide what should be the language of your province. But let me make it very clear that to you that the state language of Pakistan is going to be Urdu and no other language. Anyone who tries to mislead you is really the enemy of Pakistan. Without one state language, no Nation can remain tied up solidly together and function. Look at the history of other countries. Therefore, so far as the state language is concerned, Pakistan’s language shall be Urdu (quoted in Ayres, 42; emphasis added).

While addressing Dhaka University’s convocation, 24th March, 1948, Jinnah maintained that:

The state language … must obviously be Urdu, a language understood throughout the length and breadth of Pakistan and above all, a language which, more than any other provincial language, embodies the best that is in Islamic culture and Muslim tradition and is nearest to the language used in other Islamic countries (quoted in Ayres, 43).

Liaqat Ali Khan also tried to Islamize Urdu to construct religiously-informed association of Pakistanis to Urdu language:
Pakistan has been created because of the demand of a hundred million Muslims in this sub-continent and *the language of a hundred million Muslims in [sic] Urdu.* … Pakistan is a Muslim state, and it must have a lingua franca, *a language of the Muslim nation.* … It is necessary for a nation to have one language and that language can only be Urdu and no other language (quoted in Ayres, 3; emphasis mine).

The above quoted speeches Pakistan’s Founding Fathers should do to understand Pakistan’s national language ideology whereby new myths have been concocted, which in turn disorient peoples and nations enfolded in the newly created Pakistan. Essentializing Urdu as a language ‘embodying Islamic culture and signifying Muslimness,’ Mr. Jinnah tried to create a language-hierarchy whereby Urdu is elevated to higher position, given the religiously informed subject-positions of Muslims. As Ayres opines:

This linkage of religion to nation to language revealed an overt language ideology as a neatly logical proposition: *[If Muslim, then language = Urdu]*. The logical contrapositive *[if language ≠ Urdu, then not Muslim]* would structure the politics of language and culture in Pakistan over the subsequent decades (27).

As we have already observed in connection with Pakistan’s officially sanctioned historical narratives, its language discourse distorts facts, too. Contrary to what Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan assert, neither all Muslims of British India wanted to create Pakistan, nor was Urdu spoken by all Muslims as their national language ‘in the length and breadth of Pakistan’. Like the creation of Pakistan, conservation of Urdu language was a concern only of the Muslims in provinces where they were a minority (Ayres, 23).
But Pakistan kept insisting on imposing the language of 3.3% minority of West Pakistan, who migrated from India after partition, on a 55% majority of Bengali-speaking population of the then-East Pakistan (Ayres, 23). On February, 21, 1952 (the day now celebrated as the International Mother Languages Day), when Bengali students of Dhaka University protested against Pakistan's language policy, who Jinnah would characterize as ‘foreign-agents financed by foreign agencies to create disruption and sabotage Pakistan’, were violently suppressed, claiming five lives. Pakistan still insists on elevating Urdu as the national language of Pakistan (Article 251 of the Constitution of Pakistan), while relegating other languages (spoken by nations constituting Pakistan) as regional languages. The Supreme Court of Pakistan recently asked the federal and provincial governments to fulfill their constitutional obligation (with reference to Article 251) by adopting Urdu as their official language. “During an earlier hearing on July 11, 2015, the federal government [of Pakistan] informed the Supreme Court that an executive order had been issued to make it mandatory for the president, prime minister, federal ministers, and other official representative to deliver their speeches in Urdu while within the country or abroad” (Dawn, September 6, 2015).

Dressler (1972) calls the domination of a language the death of dominated languages (in Rahman, 10). And the death of a language is tantamount to the death of a nation (B. Khan, 334). As Sacks argues, “… it is through language that we enter fully into our human estate and culture” … without which “… we may be so little able to realize our intellectual capacities as to appear mentally defective” (Sacks 1990, 8-9; quoted in Mugane 2005, 175). Collective memory and native traditions and knowledge live and die with language. For instance, Pashto refers not only to a language, but also signifies a people (Pashtuns), a culture (Pashtunwali) and a land

77 Urdu was favored by the state’s elites as they wanted to have a neutral language-policy – to have a common national language that all the ethnolinguistic communities constituting the territorial state of Pakistan would associate themselves with. The leading figures of Pakistan Movement (like Jinnah and Liaqat Ali Khan), who spoke Urdu as their first language, believed that Urdu was a language historically associated with Muslims of India and contained what they believed as Islamic history and culture.
Therefore, discouraging Pashto as a language will ultimately lead to the political and cultural disorientation of Pashtuns.

Moreover, the superimposition of a foreign language on a people, and thus forcing them to live in linguistic limbo, results in what Mugane (2005) calls ‘semilingualism’ – a situation of linguistic in-betweenness, when one claims to know and speak more than one language, but masters none. Pakistan’s official policy of privileging Urdu (as national language) and English (as official language) to local languages results in semilingualism. School and college students in Pakistan have been converted into “linguistic zombies” – whose learning abilities have been reduced to verbatim memorization: because of ‘different linguistic recourse for learning and deliberating’ – different from indigenous linguistic resource for thinking – students cannot relate the structures of signification (which they have parroted in schools), to their local experiences and sociopolitical structures. A foreign language, if superimposed on a people, alienates them. They find it difficult to associate themselves with (and make sense of) indigenous knowledge and socio-cultural institutions.

To conclude, Pakistan’s language policy disorients (culturally, historically and politically) the ethno-linguistic collectivities of Pakistan, which in turn contributes to the state’s policy of assimilation. What I have observed is that given the official patronage of Urdu (supplemented by marginalization and suppression of other language discourses in Pakistan), an average speaker of indigenous languages avoid using their own languages as a medium of written communication, at least, and take pride in speaking Urdu and English fluently at the expense of their own languages.

78 English language is used for governmental written communication in Pakistan.
79 For better appreciation of the role of language in a peoples’ collective life, see Mugane (2005).
Pakistan’s Constitutive Others

Identity construction necessitates a ‘constitutive other’. Pakistan’s national identity is constructed primarily (but not exclusively) in opposition to Hindu India (see Nizamani, 72). Over time, the North-Indian Muslim elite vindicated their demand for a separate homeland for fear of being dominated by Hindu majority (discussed above). The creation of Pakistan, nonetheless, did not help abate that fear – rather Pakistani elite thought it politic to portray India as a diabolic ‘other’ so that ethnolinguistically-informed internal differences could be alleviated and threat perceptions be externalized. Although Indian nationalists were against the partition of India and they hoped (and occasionally expressed their resolve) to reunify the divided Indian territories, yet “… Pakistani leaders were even more prepared to believe (or at least to argue in public) that India did not want their country to survive” (Jaffrelot, 99). Since then, Pakistan has been characterizing India as “a great monster, a greater aggressor always given to aggression” to “annihilate Pakistan” (Bhutto’s speech to the UN General Assembly, September, 1965; in Nizamani 2000, 75).

In a handwritten note ‘dating probably late 1947 or early 1948’, Mr. Jinnah revealed:

1. The Congress have [sic] the present settlements [of dividing India] with mental reservations.
2. They [India leadership] now proclaim their determination to restore the unity of India as soon as possible.
3. With that determination they will naturally be regarded as avowed enemies of Pakistan state working for its overthrow (quoted in Jaffrelot, 100; emphasis mine).

80 All-India National Congress, which opposed the creation of Pakistan.
With reference to the All-India National Congress’s resolution on the partition of India, President Bhutto argued in his speech (April 14, 1972) to the National Assembly of Pakistan:

From the very beginning, acceptance of partition by Indian National Congress was merely a tactical move to cover its real aim of ruling over the entire subcontinent. Mr. Gandhi never tired of alluding to the partition of the subcontinent as a ‘moral evil’, accepted under the compulsion of circumstances.

Nevertheless, Pakistan’s attitude towards India does not ‘emanate altogether from the free play of ideas’ in Pakistani leadership’s heads. The pre-partition legacies of mistrust between north-Indian Muslims and Hindus continued to influence the early as well as later post-partition relations between India and Pakistan and their consequent symbolic representations. The trauma of cross-communal carnage following Indian partition, India’s reluctance to give a fair share to Pakistan in the assets of the defunct British Raj and the disputed nature of the Jammu and Kashmir princely state (resulting in the 1948 war between India and Pakistan) were some of the obstacles in the establishment of normal neighborly relations between the two neighbors.

Henceforth, Pakistan started articulating political differences with India in terms of religious and civilizational identities, positing India as not only a strategic monster, but a “civilizational” threat as well. As General Ayub Khan, the first military dictator of Pakistan (1958-1969) states: “Indian nationalism is based on Hinduism and Pakistan’s nationalism is based on Islam. The two philosophies are fundamentally different from each other, and cannot combine” (quoted by Nizamani, 73-74). Essentializing the supposedly unbridgeable religious identities of Indians and Pakistanis, Pakistan’s political discourses establish the “… logocentric logic whose objective is to create two easily distinguishable monolithic identities at the expense

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81 The resolution says: “The All-India Congress committee earnestly trusts that when the present passions have subsided, India’s problems will be viewed in their proper perspective and the false doctrine of two nations in India will be discredited and discarded by all” (Quoted by Bhutto in his speech).
of their complexities in order to consolidate a fragile Pakistani identity” (Nizamani, 77). Suffice it to say that Pakistan’s project of national identity construction is incomplete without ‘the greater Indian monster’. By constructing diametrically opposed religious identities of Indians and Pakistanis, the hegemonic discourse in Pakistan create subject-positions wherefrom an average ‘Pakistanized’ Pashtun or Punjabi finds it hard to think beyond their religious identity. On the other hand, they find it expedient to overlook ‘internal’ differences and injustices across the ethnolinguistic boundaries in Pakistan, and hence to imagine themselves as one nation.

Contrary to Pakistan’s popular description of India as its avowed archenemy, which is allegedly intent on overwhelming Pakistan, India has never aggressed against Pakistan, as Asghar Khan, the former Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Air Force (1957-1965), has argued on several occasions. Irrespective of who is resolute to annihilate whom, the discursive and nondiscursive continue to reinforce each other. The pre-partition and early post-partition socio-political legacies and the concomitant symbolism are still capitalized by Pakistan, which in turn determines its regional-policy behavior. Consequently, Pakistan’s behavior has inevitably invited unfavorable reaction from its neighbor as well. And, the vicious circle of interrelation between the discursive and nondiscursive continues to exist.

It is of note that India is not the sole ‘enemy’ purportedly determined to overpower Pakistan. Afghanistan is yet another element positioned as a rival state – India’s ally – in Pakistan’s foreign policy discourses. To be sure, Pakistan did not inherit a welcoming neighbor on its west. Afghanistan refused to recognize the North West Frontier (Pashtun territory) as part of the newly created Pakistan until Pashtuns of Pakistan were given the ‘opportunity to determine for themselves whether they want to be independent or remain part of Pakistan’.

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representative to the UN, quoted in Jaffrelot, 8). In response to Afghanistan’s support to Pashtun and Baloch nationalist movements in Pakistan, the latter harbored the religious fundamentalists of Afghanistan who wanted to topple President Daud’s regime in the early 1970s (see Titus and Swidler 2000). Since then, Pakistan has been supporting and commending the Islamist militants fighting against successive Afghan regimes, as a strong and stable Afghanistan may potentially undermine Pakistan’s territorial integrity.

General Zia-ul-Haq, the then Chief Martial-Law-Administrator of Pakistan (1977-1988) praised the Islamist militants fighting against the Afghan “socialist” regime and its ally – the former USSR – as the holy warriors fighting Pakistan’s war. General Zia urged Pakistanis to at least pray for their Afghan brothers fighting their war in Afghanistan. Referring to the Soviet ‘invasion’ of Afghanistan in the 1980s, Zia asked rhetorically: was humanity in the 20th century regarded so demeaned that one country would be able to dominate another country? He added:

And would I and you close our eyes to recognize it [domination of Afghanistan by Soviet Union]? This is not a question of bigger or smaller power. This is a question of principles [not to acknowledge aggression]. And an Islamic country cannot abandon its principles (italics mine).

Consequently, the Islamic State of Pakistan continued to stick to its principles even after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. The Islamist terrorists continue to be Pakistan’s strategic assets used to undermine peace efforts in Afghanistan, despite an apparent change in

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85 President Daud of Afghanistan supported the Pashtunistan movement of Pashtun nationalists who wanted secession from Pakistan, ultimately. Pakistan saw Daud’s regime as a threat to its integrity. Therefore, it supported the anti-Daud Islamic fundamentalists so that Daud’s regime could be destabilized.

86 As noted earlier, Afghanistan has irredentist claims over Pashtun lands in Pakistan, and Pashtun nationalist movement may gain momentum if Afghanistan is strong enough to support it.


Pakistan’s rhetoric and public commitments after 9/11 to fight terror. Pakistan has formally denounced the Taliban and other terrorist groups operating in Afghanistan, who are popularly identified as the “good” Taliban as distinguished from the “bad” Taliban – Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (Pakistan Taliban Movement) – who are ostensibly at war with Pakistan. However, it is now public knowledge that Pakistan kept supporting the Afghan Taliban avowedly to emasculate Indian influence in Afghanistan even after the US invasion of the country, as acknowledged by General Musharraf, the last military ruler of Pakistan (1999-2008), in an interview with The Guardian in 2015.89

Pakistan has been accusing the post-Taliban Afghanistan of being pro-India at the cost of Pakistan’s sway in Afghanistan. General Musharraf in an interview with Jaag TV, in September 2015, claimed that India and Afghanistan have been plotting against the integrity of Pakistan; and that India should stay away from Afghan affairs, otherwise it would be detrimental to the whole region. Musharraf’s opinion about Afghanistan (as expressed in the interview) is worth quoting at some length, as it exemplifies Pakistan’s official discursive construction of Afghanistan.

India has great influence in Afghanistan. This has been for the last 60 years. It is not a new thing. Since the beginning … when we got independence, since 1947, all the three intelligence agencies, Soviet Union’s KGB, and KHAD [of Afghanistan] and RAW [of India] were always united against Pakistan. Since Fifties, this Pashtunistan90 and greater Baluchistan was their game. This has been going on since 1950s. … The RAW and KHAD nexus continued to exist [after the defeat of Soviet Union in Afghanistan], even during my era. I used to argue with Mr. Karzai [former president of Afghanistan] that his intelligence head and defense minister were pro-India. And activities against us [Pakistan] are going on there [in Afghanistan]. RAW agents are coming from there. …

90 Pashtunistan literally means the land of Pashtuns. It refers to a geo-political goal of the nationalist movement of Pashtuns in Pakistan aspiring to have a separate nation state. This point will be discussed in details in the next chapter.
Actually India has nothing to do with Afghanistan. … Where have you [India] come from? Neither you have border [with Afghanistan]; nor does their [Afghans’] culture similar to yours [Indian]; nor is their religion; nor [do you have] geographic, historical linkage [with Afghanistan]. So, you stay away! … This [alleged Indo-Afghan nexus] is an unfortunate game [against Pakistan]. But, I would say, it is detrimental not only to Pakistan, but to all; it can be detrimental to this whole region. It should not be so. India should completely stay away; they should layoff. Otherwise it will be harmful to India too.\(^{91}\)

The danger for Pakistan is Indian presence in Afghanistan, said Musharraf, in an interview with *Dawn* in 2015. Accordingly, India wanted to create an anti-Pakistan Afghanistan by supporting certain ethnic groups (primarily Tajiks) in Afghanistan. And in response, “Pakistan will use its own support for ethnic elements, and our ethnic elements are certainly Pashtuns, Musharraf warned.\(^{92}\)

What Musharraf said epitomizes the official discursive positioning of Afghanistan as pro-India, which in turn gives public justification to Pakistan’s support for the Taliban and other militant organizations maneuvering to destabilize the post-9/11 Afghan regime. Words like ‘ethnic element’ and ‘Pashtuns’ are euphemisms used to signify the Afghan Taliban,\(^{93}\) which Pakistan continued supporting even after its frequent public commitments to fight global terror.

**Conclusion**

To legitimize its existence and to discourage centrifugal propensities among the various ethno-linguistic communities (like Bengalis, Pashtuns, Sindhis and Balochs), Pakistan devised

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\(^{93}\) Pakistan has launched propaganda against Kabul, accusing it of marginalizing Pashtuns of Afghanistan. The propaganda helps the Taliban to amass public support against Afghan government among Pashtuns across the Durand Line.
and kept propagating certain discourses, which ultimately resulted in its hegemony. Given the state’s hegemony, constructed through official mythologies, iconography, symbols and texts, one can easily discern the state speaking loudly through the common man. Hegemonic discourses often serve as the frames of reference for the masses to evaluate and make sense of the non-discursive – material conditions and socio-political events. Using the discursive psychology model, I have observed that majority of the people utilize and reproduce the state’s hegemonic outlook in their routine behavior. For instance, if you ask a Pashtun that what is their national language, the answer of an overwhelming majority will be ‘Urdu’. Similarly, many average Pashtuns celebrate Pakistan’s win over India in a cricket match in a way that often amounts to popular frenzy.

Yet, hegemony does not necessarily result from the empirical exigencies and logical coherence of a specific discourse structure. A discourse may not be empirically tenable, yet majority of a people may believe in it as a reliable frame of reference to evaluate a phenomenon. For instance, earthquake may not be an expression of the wrath of God, yet majority of the religious people believe that earthquake occurs when God is angry with us. Similarly, a discourse structure may be logically incoherent, yet people believing in it may not ponder seriously about its logical inconsistencies. As noted above, the state power (in juridical sense) controls and monopolizes the discursive arena – determining the relative ‘discourse access profile’ of antagonistic doctrinal entities struggling against each other in the field of discursivity. The rule is especially applicable to Pakistan where the state’s hegemony is reinforced through its ideological and repressive apparatuses employed to marginalize and/or suppress alternative worldviews (see these points are elaborated in Chapter 6 and 7, respectively)

Discursive Psychology is an approach to social psychology through which an analyst investigates how people utilize available discourses in their commonplace interactions whereby they transmit, (re)produce and negotiate representations of the non-discursive. Discursive psychology views individuals as both products and producers of discourses. It treats individuals not only subjects constituted by (dominant) discourses, but also acknowledge their capacity to create and propagate discourses (Jorgensen and Phillips, 7; and, 96-137).
CHAPTER 3

HISTORIES OF BALOCH AND PASHTUN NATIONALISM

Pakistan’s nation-building project (discussed in Chapter 2) substantiates the constructionist notion of nation and nationalism: that ‘Nation’ is a modern social construct and product of nationalist endeavors consciously engineered by elites and proliferated through mass education and public rituals (Smith 2000, 52; also see Anderson 1991, Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983; and Hobsbawm 1990). Notwithstanding the relative success of the state’s hegemonic venture to contrive an ‘imagined’ Pakistani nation through ‘invented traditions,’ the ethnolinguistic identities and competing collective interests among smaller ethno-national communities vis-à-vis the Punjab-dominated state still persist. Pashtun and Baloch ethno-nationalists have been insisting on their respective political histories and ethnolinguistic identities while remonstrating against the exploitative and marginalizing structures and policies of the state, indicating that Pakistan has not yet succeeded in constructing a stable civic nation. In this chapter I briefly discuss the histories of Pashtun and Baloch nationalist movements, first against the British Raj in India and then in Pakistan, so as to understand their current struggle in larger historical perspective.

This chapter elucidates Brueilly’s (1993) argument that “the key to an understanding of nationalism lies in the character of the modern state, which nationalism opposes or claims to be its own” (19; in Khan 2003a, 68). Accordingly, Pashtun and Baloch nationalism emerged as a response to English colonialism, and owe their existence to the Punjab-dominated state of Pakistan – what ethno-nationalists call as the Punjabi colonial apparatus. Therefore, they aspire to
create their own nation-states – or to have greater autonomy within Pakistan, at least. In consideration of the foregoing, Gellner’s (1983) and Anderson’s (1991) theses that industrialization and print capitalism, respectively, paved the way for modern nationalism are not intelligible in regard to Pashtun and Baloch nationalism. Pashtun and Baloch societies were neither industrialized nor literate, yet they (especially Baloch nationalists) were conscious of, and politicized, their separate ethno-national identity during British Raj in India. They introduced their respective societies to print media and struggled to educate their people while their respective economies remained either agrarian or semi-pastoral (see Khan 2003a 68, and Khan 2003b, 285).

Moreover, this chapter briefly discusses Pashtun and Baloch histories, for two reasons: First, history has a discursive value. Pashtun and Baloch nationalists, struggling for counterhegemony, draw on their histories to generate consensus and mobilize action for their movements’ cause. They highlight and romanticize their past in order to create a collective political nostalgia. As elaborated in Chapter 5, they emphasize – amounting to exaggeration – their respective political histories so as to undermine the state’s historical narratives and ‘invented traditions.’ Therefore, it is important to briefly discuss political histories of Pashtun and Baloch people and their respective nationalist struggles. Second, historical accounts of Pashtun and Baloch nationalism help identify the critical historical junctures underlying their current trajectories. The concept of ‘critical junctures’ emphasizes “the causal relevance of earlier stages in temporal sequence.” Accordingly, the path once taken at some earlier point in history increases

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95 By politicization of ethnicity (and history) I mean the construction of constitutive others – or creation of an ‘Us’ vs. ‘Them’ binary – on the basis of ethnicity (and history). This chapter argues that, as compared to their Baloch counterparts, the earlier Pashtun nationalist elite failed to politicize Pashtun/Afghan ethno-linguistic and historical identity. Pashtun nationalist elite associated themselves with Gandhi’s Indian nationalism. However, this does not indicate that they were unconscious of their Pashtun-ness or Afghan-ness altogether: the predecessor of Pashtun mass-movement organization, Khudai Khidmatgar (KK), was named as Anjuman-e-Islah-ul Afaghena (the Society for the Reformation of Afghans) and Bacha Khan was entitled as Fakhr-e-Afghan (the Pride of Afghans). When faced with partition, Bacha Khan (and his successors), the leader of the KK, politicized Pashtun identity while demanding Pashtunistan (see, for instance, Titus and Swidler, 47).
“the probability of further steps along the same path … with each move down the path” (Pierson 2000, 252). Once a decision is taken and institutionalized, it reproduces itself recursively through creating structures of incentives, normative networks, and cognitive/discursive chains. Therefore, it becomes relatively costly for the new comers to change the path previously taken by the predecessors (for ‘critical junctures’ and ‘path dependence,’ see Collier and Collier 1991; Pierson 2000; and 2004). Hence, in this chapter I identify some critical junctures of Pashtun and Baloch nationalist movements which have influenced their subsequent political strategies and behavior.

The chapter is divided into two parts. Part I elaborates the various phases of Baloch national struggle. Part II elaborates Pashtun nationalism before and after the creation of Pakistan.

**Baloch National Struggle: Between Federalism and Separatism**

Baloch (five percent of the Pakistani population, mostly Muslims) is an ethnonym signifying different linguistic and racial groups, primarily the Balochi- (or Baloch-) speaking Balochs and Brahui-speaking Balochs. Balochi-speaking Balochs are about 3.5%, and Brahui-speaking Balochs constitute 1.5% of Pakistan’s total population, according to the 1998 census. “Balochi [language] belongs to the western group of the Iranian branch of Indo-European languages, and is closely related to the Kurdish and Persian, while Brahui is [believed to be] Dravidian in origin” (Foreign Policy Center 2006, 7). However, Baloch origin in general (and Brahui genealogy in particular) is marred in controversy. Harisson (1981) argues that “in terms of vocabulary … Brahui is merely a variant of Balochi” (185). The Brahui royal family of the then autonomous Kalat state and the Bezinjo-Sardar96 family and Bazinjos of Makkoran (Brahuis by origin) and the Brahuis of Iran speak Balochi as their first language (Breseeeg 2004, 128).

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96 Sardar and Nawab are titles used for tribal chiefs in Balochistan.
Breseeg, a Baloch nationalist historian, argues that the notion that Brahuis are Dravidians by decent is British fabrication. In order to justify and legitimize their occupation of Baloch Land, the colonialists “… attempted to prove [that] the Brahuis are racially and culturally Indians” (129). Following the English footprints of its colonial predecessor, Pakistan treats Brahuis as a separate ethnic group. Notwithstanding the variation of language (real or perceived) between Balochs and Brahuis, shared history and culture and common enemy help in shaping their common Baloch identity.

Although ethnicity unites Balochs and Brahuis, tribalism blurs their common ethno-national consciousness. Hierarchically organized, the sardars and nawabs (tribal chiefs) are central figures in Baloch social structure and politics. Edward Oliver (1890) argues that a Baloch “… is as loyal to his chief as a Highland clansman is to McIvor” (24). Conscious of Balochs’ loyalty to their tribal chiefs, English colonialists co-opted the sardars, serving as instruments of British colonial rule in Balochistan (Oliver, 13 & 24; and Breseeg, 90). At the end of British colonial era, the newly created state of Pakistan inherited and maintained the British colonial instruments, including the sardari system. Majority of the sardars entered into a symbiosis with the post-colonial state of Pakistan. Although tribalism and sardari system have remained as significant aspects of Baloch socio-political organization, modern education, market economy, and representative institutional structures have gradually weakened the sardari system. Moreover, educated and urbanized Balochs, along with recalcitrant sardars of Marri, and Mengal tribes, having strong ethno-nationalist tendencies, are instrumental in actuating a Baloch nationalist consciousness, which in turn undermines the sardari system.

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97 The sardari system refers to the role of tribal chiefs (nawabs and sardars) in the Baloch socio-political hierarchy.

98 The total number of sardars in Balochistan is estimated to be around 80. However, the tribal chiefs of Mengal, Marri, and Bezinjo tribes (later on joined by the Nawab of Bugti tribe) have played a leading role in mobilizing Baloch resistance against Pakistan. Though the question that why only these three Baloch tribal chiefs have been defying the state is beyond the scope of this study, suffice it to say that Ghaus Bux Bezinjo (1917-1989) had started entertaining nationalist ideas as a student at Aligarh Muslim University (AMU), India, in mid-1930s. The AMU was a hotbed of “Muslim Nationalism” in India, spearheaded by All-
As noted earlier in this chapter, modern Baloch nationalism originated as a reaction against British colonialism and continues to challenge the state of Pakistan which Baloch nationalists consider as a new colonial apparatus of Punjab. Colonization of Baloch lands had little (if any) economic incentives for British. English colonialism in Balochistan was rather driven by geo-strategic considerations (Swidler 2014, 1). As explained later in this chapter, British considered Baloch and Pashtun lands as gates to India, which they ensured to be guarded against any Russian adventurism in India. After consolidating their control over Baloch historical land, British divided it among three countries through Goldsmid Line (drawn in 1970 to demarcate British and Iranian territorial jurisdiction) and Durand Line (demarcated in 1893 to specify Afghan and British spheres of influence). Thus, historical Baloch land includes the Baloch areas of Pakistani Balochistan, the Nimroz province in Afghanistan and the Iranian province of Sistan-wa-Balochistan.

The present-day Balochistan province of Pakistan constitutes 347,190 square Kilometers (43.6%) of Pakistan’s total 796,096 landmass area. The province has more economic than geostrategic importance for Pakistan. It is a site for major warm-water, deep-sea port facility – the Gawadar port. The port is considered to become a hub of transit trade for China and the Central Asian Republics (CARs) through the proposed China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), linking China’s Xinjiang province to the Arabian Sea. As a substitute to the Karachi port, Gawadar is considered to augment Pakistan’s defense as well (Grare 2006, 4), as it can be used

India Muslim League (see Chapter 2). Yet, Bezinjo was not sympathetic towards the League’s idea of separate Muslim Nationalism, because he, as a Baloch, did not see Hindu majority posing any threat in Muslim-majority Balochistan. Bezinjo was inspired by All-India National Congress’ anti-British politics. As elaborated later in this chapter, he supported the idea of a separate Baloch nation-state during the concluding phase of British colonial rule in India. The Marri and Mengal tribal chiefs (Nawab Khair Bux Marri (1928-2014) and Sardar Atta Ullah Mengal (1929-), respectively) are said to be later entrants (than Bezinjo) into Baloch nationalist movement. They started participating actively in Baloch nationalist struggle during the early phase of General Ayub’s Martial Regime (1958-1969) which had started a clampdown on Baloch nationalism (for details see Harison 1981, 41-70).

99 Of the total area of the existing Balochistan province, about 65,736 km² consists of Pashtun majority districts.
for naval defense. Moreover, strategically located Balochistan is a transit route to some proposed natural gas pipelines, such as Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) pipeline and Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline (for details, see Wirsing, 2008). According to Imdad Baloch (5015), natural resources worth of US$ 1 trillion have been discovered in Balochistan, including gold, copper, black pearl, gemstones, coal, chromites, and natural gas. Natural Gas from Balochistan constitutes 36.41 percent of Pakistan’s total gas production (19.3 trillion cubic feet out of the total 53 trillion cubic feet) (see Khwaja, Suleri and Shahbaz 2009, 4; and Wirsing, 7). Baloch nationalists argue that Pakistan has deprived Baloch people of their right to be the appropriators and distributors of their national resources. As elaborated in the next chapter, despite being rich in natural resources, Balochistan is the least developed province of Pakistan.

Before discussing the modern Baloch nationalist struggle against Pakistan, it is pertinent to briefly highlight modern political history of Baloch (and Balochistan), which constitutes contemporary Baloch memory and is politicized by nationalists to counter the hegemonic discourses of the state. One of the most important discursive elements of Baloch counterhegemonic articulatory practices is the Khanate of Kalat (Kalat state), established in the mid-17th century. The Khanate was the first Baloch feudal confederacy encompassing all of the historical Baloch land (see map below). Before the establishment of the Khanate, a rather short-lived Baloch Union under Mir Jalal Han in the 12th century and the Rind-Lashari confederacy of Mir Chakar Rind, in the late 15th century, are the only noticeable episodes of Baloch traditional history. Mir Ahmad I was the first Khan of Kalat, elected in 1666 by Jirga, representing Baloch tribes. The Khanate was a loose confederacy and had to vie for autonomy against the Mughals of India and Safvides of Iran. Following the death of Nadir Shah Afshar of Iran in 1747, Nasir Khan I (1749-1795), the nominee of the Shah of Iran, consolidated the Khanate and extended his rule over all Baloch areas and Karachi (map 1).
However, the Khan had yet to wrestle internal autonomy from Ahmad Shah Abdali of Afghanistan (1723-1772). As a consequence of the Khan’s refusal to pay tribute to the Afghan King, the latter marched on the Khanate, and laid siege to the Kalat Fort for forty days. Eventually, they reached a peaceful solution by signing the ‘Treaty of Kalat’ (1758). Accordingly, the Afghan King would not interfere in the internal affairs of Balochistan. As a quid pro quo, the Khan had to provide men-in-arms to the Afghan King in case of Afghanistan’s military expeditions beyond its borders. As a consequence of the treaty, Nasir Khan took part in Afghan military expeditions against Iran in 1759 and against Marhatas and Sikhs of India in 1761 and 1765, respectively.

Edward Oliver contends that Nasir Khan was “… a fief of Ahmad Shah of Kabul, a position from which even his declaration of independence of 1758 did not entirely relieve him” (21). One of the treaty provisions, cited by Ganda Singh (1958), mentions that “Naseer [Nasir] Khan shall recognize Ahmad Shah Durani [also known as Abdali] as his suzerain” (214). Nonetheless, Naseer Dashti (2012) does not mention any such provision in the treaty (185).
Nasir Khan I is said to be “… practically the first man of any rank who stands out of the historic fog enveloping the more modern Brahui and Baloch genealogical story” (Oliver, 21). His death in 1795 occasioned anarchy and ultimate disintegration of the Khanate (Breseeg, 156-159).

By the end of 1830s the Britons extended their influence as far as to Baloch territories. In order to avert any Russian adventurism in India, British thought it more reasonable to safeguard the gates to India in Pashtun and Baloch lands – the Bolan Pass and Khyber Pass. Alluding to what is known as ‘the forward policy,’ Oliver argues that it was “… better to deal with an enemy outside the gate of the fort, than to let him in, and fight him afterwards inside” (10). While marching to Afghanistan through the Bolan Pass in 1839, the British forces were resisted by Mehrab Khan, the then Khan of Kalat. Consequently, Mehrab Khan lost his life along with some of his men, and the British established its rule in Kalat. Baloch nationalists revere Mehrab Khan, along with Nasir Khan I, as an iconic nationalist figure of their modern history.

The British instituted Shahnawaz Khan, a distant relative of the deceased Mehrab Khan as the new Khan of Kalat, who was later on deposed by Baloch elders to enthrone Nasir Khan II, Mehrab Khan’s son, as their Khan (see Breseeg, 160; and Oliver, 22). In 1841, the British concluded the Outram Treaty with Nasir Khan II, thereby assigning British Political Agent to the Khan, and promising a subsidy to him. In return, the Khan promised his loyalty to the British (Breseeg, 160). The Outram Treaty was revived with the subsequent treaties of 1854 and 1876. The 1876 treaty stipulated that British troops might be stationed in any part of the Khanate; and that, should there be any dispute between the Khan and his sardars of the Kalat, the British agent at the court of the Khan should resolve the dispute through his good offices, failing which the Khan should refer the matter, with the consent of the British government, for British arbitration. The award of the arbitration would be binding on the disputing parties. Moreover, the Khan was required by the treaty to protect trade routes and telegraph and railway lines. In exchange, the
British government had to pay a hundred thousands of Rupees (Rs) to the Khan, in addition to Rs 20500, annually for building posts and developing trade routes in the territory of the Khanate. As elaborated later in this chapter, the 1876 Treaty was invoked by Baloch nationalists as a legal (and discursive) instrument to claim that Kalat state was not an integral part of India, and therefore must be treated as such if the British were to grant self-rule to its colony(ies) in South Asia.

In 1877, the British appointed Sir Robert Sandeman as Agent to the Governor General (AGG). Sandeman created a patronage network by establishing direct relations with the sardars and tribal chiefs to the detriment of Khan’s authority. Besides, the British had established the jirga-levies system. The tribal chiefs used to sit on the jirga (Kalat’s judicial council) to settle disputes. The levies included both a paramilitary force headed by British officers and the district levies under sardars. The levies were entrusted with the task of safeguarding government installations (like post-offices, check-posts, and roads and bridges) and maintaining law and order (Titus and Swidler, 49). Practically, the Khan was relegated to a nominal position.

During the British colonial era, pan-Baloch national consciousness gained popularity in 1930s. The idea of Greater Balochistan was entertained and popularized by a nationalist Baloch organization, *Anjuma-e-Ittehad-e-Balochistan* (the Society for Unity of Balochistan). The *Anjuman*, which ultimately transformed into the Kalat State National Party (KSNP), published the map of Greater Balochistan in its weekly *Al-Baloch*, dating December 25, 1932 (Bansal 2010, 34). The proposed independent Balochistan included the Kalat state and its principalities of Lasbela, Kharan, and Makran (also Makoran), the leased areas of British Balochistan,101 and Baloch areas in Iran and Afghanistan. The KSNP, established in 1935, was banned in the Khanate

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101 British Balochistan was a misnomer used for areas majority of which were not Baloch. It consisted of: 1) Pishin, Thal Chotiali, Zhob and Loralai – Pashtun areas of Afghanistan occupied by British under the 1979 Treaty of Gandamak; 2) the Marri and Bugti Baloch tribes; and 3) the areas leased from Kalat. British Balochistan was governed through the office of Chief Commissioner, which was assisted by *Shahi Jirga* (Royal Council of elders) nominated by British authorities in India.
in July 1939, due to its anti-British and anti-sardars activities. As a result, it shifted its office to Quetta and continued Baloch independence movement.

At the end of World War II, when decolonization became inevitable, the British sent Cabinet Mission to determine the future of British India and its princely states. The Khan of Kalat submitted a memorandum to the Mission demanding independence of Balochistan. In the memorandum, the Khan contended that the status of Kalat state is different from other princely states of India: the Kalat state and Nepal had direct treaty relations with Whitehall as opposed to the treaty relations which other princely states had with the colonial government in New Delhi. Therefore, the memorandum says, the government (or governments) of the post-colonial Indian state (or states) “… would inherit only the treaty relationships of the colonial government in New Delhi and not those of Whitehall” (in Foreign Policy Centre, 19; and Harrison, 23). It is noteworthy that the 1935 Government of India Act treats Kalat as an Indian state, like other Indian princely states. However, the Kalat State’s memorandum and Baloch nationalists contend that the Khanate was not consulted by the Raj while drafting the Act. Accordingly, the Kalat States was not a party to it. In addition, the Khan of Kalat demanded the return of the Baloch territories which had been the tributaries of Kalat and which were leased by the British from the Kalat state. However, the British Mission did not take the memorandum seriously.

On August 15, 1947 the Khan declared the independence of Kalat from British, with an intention to establish special relations with Pakistan in spheres of defense, foreign affairs and communication. The declaration was endorsed by both the lower house (popularly elected, a few weeks before the declaration, in which the KSNP had an absolute majority) and the upper house (representing the sardars) of Balochistan National Assembly: both the houses decided not to join Pakistan, indicating both mass and elite support of independence (Harrison, 24).

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102 Ethno-nationalists despised majority of the sardars and nawabs whom they considered as agents of colonial rule in Kalat.
Ironically, Jinnah (the founder of Pakistan who once pleaded Kalat’s independence) refused to recognize Kalat as an independent state. After a diplomatic tug of war, Kalat state was forcibly annexed by Pakistan on April 1, 1948. As a result, Agha Abdul Karim Khan, brother of the Khan of Kalat, launched an armed struggle against Pakistan. However, Baloch nationalists were divided on the nature of the struggle for independence. Leading figures of the KNSP, like Ghaus Bux Bizinjo, Abdul Aziz Kurd and Gul Khan Nasir thought that armed struggle would be counterproductive. On the other hand, Karim Khan believed that Balochs could wrestle their independence from Pakistan by launching an armed offensive. Therefore, he and his freedom-fighters (about 1000 in number) crossed the border into Afghanistan, where they set up a training camp (Breseeg, 240). Breseeg opines that Afghanistan was reluctant to support Karim Khan’s insurgency, and asked him to either seek political asylum in Afghanistan or leave the country (242-3). According to another nationalist writer, Inayatullah Baloch (1980) Afghanistan was reluctant to support the movement for an independent Balochistan as it wanted to include Balochistan in the future Afghan-controlled Pashtunistan (22; cited in Harrison, 26). On the contrary, the Foreign Policy Centre’s monograph says that the Khan of Kalat, threatened with reprisal from Pakistan, convinced his brother to surrender on the condition of amnesty from Pakistani authorities (25-6). Notwithstanding the reason of his return to Balochistan, Karim Khan was arrested, along with his 102 guerillas, on his way to Balochistan. He and one of his comrades were sentenced to 10 years of rigorous imprisonment by an official jirga tribunal. Karim Khan’s revolt is another significant critical juncture in Baloch national history. As elaborated later in this chapter, Karim Khan’s violent resistance set a precedent for the Baloch nationalists to utilize violence as a reliable political resource to generate consensus and mobilize action for Baloch national cause. Moreover, it is a significant element in Baloch counterhegemonic narrative as well. Baloch nationalists argue Karim Khan’s revolt indicate that neither Kalat ruling family nor popular leadership agreed with the idea of merging Kalat with Pakistan.103

103 Prince Daud, son of the Khan of Kalat, also expressed similar views in a documentary film of Al Jazeera
In 1952, Pakistan created Balochistan State Union by merging the one-time vassals of Kalat (Lasbela, Kharan, and Makran) with Kalat. The Khan, Mir Ahmad Yar Khan, was nominated as a nominal head of the Union. The Union was, nonetheless, dissolved in 1955 and merged with the rest of the provinces, Pashtun tribal areas and princely states in the West Pakistan to form One Unit, which was intended to counter the Bengali majority of the former East Pakistan, in order to retain the Punjabi-Mahajir political supremacy.\(^{104}\)

One Unit was denounced by Baloch, Pashtun and Sindhi nationalists as a conspiracy to usurp the identity and autonomy of smaller ethnicities and provinces in West Pakistan. In a bid to compel the state to annul the One Unit, Baloch, Pashtun, Sindhi and Bengali nationalists formed a broad alliance – National Awami Party (NAP) – in 1956. The NAP demanded, besides the dissolution of One Unit, a loose federation, granting maximum possible autonomy to ethnically demarcated federating units, free and fair elections, land reforms and abstention from becoming part of the anti-Soviet Western military pacts – CENTO and SEATO.\(^{105}\)

\(^{104}\) As mentioned earlier in this study, until 1971, Pakistan consisted of two wings – East Pakistan and West Pakistan. East Pakistan consisted of Bengal, having 56% of the total population of the country. West Pakistan, having 44% of the total population, included Punjab, Sindh, North West Frontier Province (NWFP, now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), Balochistan State Union, and other, mostly Pashtun-dominated, administrative units – former British Balochistan, Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), and princely states of Swat, Chitral and Amb. The ruling elite of Pakistan (Punjabi-dominated military and Muslim league’s leadership, representing Punjabis and Mahajirs’ interests) feared that if representative democracy was instituted in Pakistan, government and politics of the country will be dominated by Bengali majority. Therefore, they devised an institutional design to merge West Pakistan into a single political unit where Punjab would be a majority) and grant both of the wings a parity in Parliament and equal share in resources. Consequently, the One Unit design helped Punjab to balance Bengali majority in claiming share in national resources; and, on the other hand, it virtually disenfranchised the smaller provinces and administrative units of the West Pakistan vis-à-vis Punjab in the West Pakistan’s legislature. Therefore, ethno-nationalist leadership, representing Sindhi, Baloch, Pashtun, and Bengali interests protested against One Unit and formed a grand political organization, National Awami Party (NAP) to force the ruling elite to annul the scheme (this point is elaborated in succeeding lines).

\(^{105}\) Ethno-nationalists in Pakistan regarded “… the Soviet Union as more sympathetic to Third Word aspirations than the capitalist and ‘imperialist’ West and continue[d] to look hopefully to Moscow as a potential supporter of their cause” (Harrison, 127). Harrison further argues that although the Soviet Union had constitutionally recognized its constituent nationalities and had granted them the right to secession
NAP’s popularity and its opposition to One Unit is said to be the main reason provoking the military to impose Martial Law in Pakistan in 1958 (see Titus and Swidler, 51). General Ayub Khan, the Chief Martial Law Administrator banned political parties in Pakistan and arrested a number of NAP leaders, including the Khan of Kalat. As a reaction, the sardar of the Zarakzai Baloch tribe, Nauroz Khan (followed by about 500 men), launched a second revolt against Pakistan. Nauroz Khan demanded the release of the Khan and the annulment of One Unit. Nauroz Khan’s insurgency was put down soon, in 1960. He was arrested and sentenced for life behind bars, and his sons were hanged. Nauroz Khan died soon afterwards in jail, in 1962.

Following the 1958 insurgency, the military set up new garrisons in Balochistan, which further intensified Baloch resentment against the state. This time, it was Sher Muhammad of Marri tribe who led yet another insurgency against the state. He set up Parrari (guerrilla) camps throughout Balochistan. The guerrillas targeted military installations and communication lines. In retaliation the military inflicted collective punishment on Baloch people, like bulldozing 13,000 acres of almond trees of Marri tribe (Foreign Policy Centre, 27). Marris’ insurgency continued till General Yahya Khan (1917-1980), the new military dictator replacing Ayub Khan, dissolved the One Unit in 1970.

Yahya Khan held elections in 1971. In West Pakistan, Z. A. Bhutto’s Peoples Party won a majority in Sindh and Punjab. The ethno-nationalist NAP managed to form provincial governments in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP, renamed as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) and Balochistan, in coalition with the Islamist political Party, Jamiat-e-Ullama-e-Islam (JUI, the Organization of Scholars of Islam). To redress Baloch grievances, the NAP government replaced Punjabis in the provincial administration with locals. Besides, the provincial government also

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from the USSR, and was sympathetic towards nationalist struggles elsewhere, it did not support the idea of disintegrating Pakistan along ethno-national lines. It rather wanted the communists in Pakistan to actuate communist revolution and convert the whole country into a loosely multinational federation (127-148).
established a new security force called *Balochistan Dehi Muhaafiz* (Balochistan Rural Guards). The central government grew suspicious of the NAP’s aforementioned administrative reforms in Balochistan. Armed attacks on Punjabi settlers in Balochistan and the seizure of weapons from Iraqi embassy in Pakistan\textsuperscript{106} further deteriorated relations between the provincial government and the centre. Bhutto, who had no less an authoritarian outlook than his predecessors, accused the Mengal-led NAP government in Balochistan of inciting Baloch separatism in collusion with Soviet Union and Iraq. Ultimately, in 1973, the provincial government in Balochistan was dismissed by the central government and three leading Baloch nationalist sardars – Sardar Atta Ullah Mengal, Khair Bux Marri and Ghaus Bux Bezinho were arrested.

In reaction, the Baloch youth started yet another guerrilla war against the state. This time the uprising was even more widespread and intense. The central government deployed around 80,000 troops to counter about 55,000 Baloch guerrilla fighters (see Bansal, 43; and Foreign Policy Centre, 28). Fearing the spillover of Pakistani Baloch uprising into Iranian Balochistan, Iran sent military aid to Pakistan – 30 US Cobra helicopters manned by Iranian pilots – to suppress the insurgency in Pakistan. The 6-day battle at Chamalang, in September 1974, is considered as a turning point, which considerably abated the Baloch fighter’s prowess. Sporadic clashes between the Baloch guerrillas and the Pakistani military continued until the demise of Bhutto’s regime by General Zia in 1977.

In a bet to garner mass support, General Zia released the NAP leadership and announced general amnesty. Most of the top Baloch nationalist leadership went into exile in Afghanistan and England. However, some headstrong Baloch nationalist elements of Marri tribe continued challenging Pakistani authorities. During 1980s, Atta Ullah Mengal continued his activities from London, forming a Sindhi-Baloch-Pashtun Front with Mumtaz Bhutto, son of Z. A. Bhutto.

\textsuperscript{106} The weapons were actually meant to support Iranian Balochs in reprisal to Iran’s support to Kurd insurgency in Iraq.
“Mengal continued to advocate armed struggle to achieve a confederate regime” (Jaffrelot, 140). Khair Bux Marri, another veteran Marxist-Leninist, remained in Afghanistan, wherefrom he led the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) for the creation of Greater Balochistan through armed struggle (ibid). In 1990s, after the fall of Zia regime, the exiled Baloch leadership returned to Pakistan.

In the late 1980s and 1990s some leading Baloch nationalist sardars, like Mengal and Bugti participated in the electoral arena. Headed by Nawab Akbar Bugti, the Balochistan National Alliance (BNA) formed provincial government in 1988. In 1997, Mengal’s Balochistan National Party (BNP) managed to form the provincial government.

Baloch separatism gained more impetus during General Musharraf’s reign (1999-2008). Baloch nationalists rejected Musharraf’s megaprojects (such as the construction of Gawadar Port, the Makran Coastal Highway, Saindak Copper Mining Project etc) as tools of neo-colonization. The Baloch nationalists complain that the manpower from other provinces (particularly, the Punjab) has been employed in these mega projects. Moreover, they contend that these projects will ultimately result in an influx of outsiders, which will create a demographic imbalance at the cost of local Baloch population. Besides, Baloch nationalists claim that the mega projects, like building rails and roads, are intended to gain access to the Baloch insurgents’ strongholds (see Bansal, 224-227). Given their apprehensions and distrust of the state, Baloch nationalists started armed attacks on the development projects and military installations in Balochistan. The central government retaliated even more heavy-handedly.

The current Baloch armed insurgency, which started in 2004, is rather more widespread. Educated middle-class youth constitutes the major driving force of the insurgency. The older generation of the so far intractable sardars of Mengal, Bugti, and Marri tribes has been replaced by their equally stubborn successors, who denounce electoral politics while advocating armed
struggle to achieve Baloch national independence. Sardar Akhtar Mengal’s Balochistan National Party (BNP) took part in 2013 elections, however. Besides Mengal’s BNP, National Party of Hasil Khan Bezinjo, with federalist orientations, participated in the last elections and formed a provincial coalition government with Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) and Pashtunkhwa Mili Awami Party (PMAP) – a Pashtun nationalist party having a stronghold in Pashtun areas of Balochistan. Though the turnout rate in Balochistan is encouraging from the state’s point of view (40.85%), it is comparatively low in Baloch areas. Despite Pakistan’s efforts to convince Baloch nationalist leadership to end their exile and participate in electoral arena, the latter insists on demilitarization of Balochistan from Pakistani troops, recovery of the missing Baloch nationalist activists, and holding referendum in Balochistan, under the auspices of the UN, to determine the future of Balochistan.

Pashtun Nationalism: From Separatism to Federalism

Pashtuns, an ethnolinguistic community, mostly Muslims, are about 15 percent of Pakistan’s total population. Pashtuns are a semi-tribal people. However, their tribal structure is more egalitarian than that of their Baloch neighbors. As Oliver puts it in 1880:

The political organization of both [Pashtuns and Balochs] is tribal: but the Pathan [Pashtun] is essentially a Radical – every man is as good as his neighbour, and better –

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107 The exact number of Baloch missing-persons, allegedly abducted by the Pakistani security forces, is unknown. According to Pakistani authorities, only 46 Balochs are missing, whereas Baloch nationalists claim that thousands of Balochs are missing. This point is elaborated in Chapter 7.

108 By semi-tribal I mean a society in which traditional social capital (social norms and networks) exists alongside modern institutions (such as elections, statutory laws, courts and bureaucracy). The former not only have relevance but occasionally surpass the latter.
and will obey no one but the Jirgah [Jirga] or democratic council, and not always that, while the Biloch [Baloch] is as loyal to his chief as a Highland clansman to a McIvor (24).

But it is not the 1880s – the times when Oliver wrote these words: neither Baloch sardars are as influential as they used to be, nor is Pashtun social organization (including the institution of Jirga) the same across the width and breadth of Pashtunkhwa as it was back then. Land reforms by the British Raj, in 1930s, in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP – now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) and modern political and administrative institutions (such as representative assemblies, judiciary and police system) and forces of modernization and globalization have undermined the traditional social capital in Pashtunkhwa considerably, with some exception in the FATA region.

Pashtuns’ historical land in Pakistan, Pashtunkhwa, is administratively divided into three parts: the province of Khyber Pashtunkhwa (formerly known as the North West Frontier Province), Pashtun areas in Balochistan, which were taken away by the British from Afghanistan under the Treaty of Gandamak, 1879, and which constituted most of the then British Balochistan; the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Besides, Karachi (the capital city of Sindh

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109 Jirga (arbitration council) is an informal dispute settlement institution of Pashtuns, which settles disputes (both civil and criminal) according to Pashtuwali (or Pashtunwala) – customary code of conduct. Jirga usually represents the disputing parties. Every party has the right to nominate an equal number of jirga members. A Jirga involving private disputes is normally composed of 4-6 members. However, in some matters of public importance, its strength may be in tens, representing different tribes or sub-tribes. One of the examples of such grand jirgas is Afghanistan’s Loya Jirga, which may be summoned by government to seek popular opinion and/or support regarding an issue.

110 As noted above, educated and middle-class Baloch youth (and political organizations representing them) have become a significant element in Baloch society and politics, notwithstanding the relative relevance of Sardari system in Balochistan.
province) is home to the largest urban population of Pashtuns. Pashtuns in Karachi are estimated to be 4-5 million – the second largest ethnic group in the city.\textsuperscript{111}

Pashtunkhwa covers an area of about 167,477 km\(^2\) (roughly 21\% of the total landmass of Pakistan). It is a mountainous terrain that has both geostrategic and economic significance for Pakistan. It is rich in mineral resources such as precious and semiprecious stones, metallic and non-metallic minerals, and water and energy resources. For instance, for the year 2013-13, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa produced 1097603 tons of marble, 125327 tons of phosphate, 355505 tons of gypsum, 11495 tons of iron ore, 36469 tons of coal, 14 tons of copper, 695 tons of emerald, 129 tons of lead, 7888 tons of graphite, besides other metallic and non-metallic minerals (Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 2014, 57-59). Moreover, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa produces much of Pakistan’s hydro-electricity. For instance, the hydro-power generation capacity of Tarbela Dam, the largest earth-filled dam in the world, was estimated to reach around 4888 megawatts (MW) by 2016 (The Express Tribune, October 8, 2013). In addition, southern districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa are rich in oil and natural gas. According to the Business Recorder, February 25, 2016, the province has 9 trillion cubic feet of recoverable natural gas. Currently, it is producing 400 million cubic feet of natural gas and 510 LPG per day.

As noted earlier, Pashtun nationalist consciousness – a sense of separate group identity in opposition to some ‘constituent other’ – among Pashtuns is not a product of modernity – industrialization, urbanization, and print capitalism. For instance, Khushal Khan Khattak (1613-

\textsuperscript{111} Peshawar valley has been the centre of Pashtuns’ cultural, economic, and political life. Modern Pashtun nationalist movement emerged in the valley and spread elsewhere. Although the British Raj faced sporadic armed resistance from the adjoining tribal areas (FATA), more institutionalized and organized Pashtun nationalist movement was launched from the valley, which later on spread to the Pashtun areas in Balochistan as well. Therefore, my focus is more on the Pashtun history and their nationalist movement in Khyber Pashtunkhwa and Balochistan.
1689), the national poet of Pashtuns, politicized Pashtun/Afghan national identity so as to muster support among Pashtuns against the (Muslim) Mughal dynasty in India (1555-1857):\footnote{112}

\begin{quote}
\textit{Da Afghan pa nang may wa tharrala thoora,}
\textit{Nangyalay da zamaney Khushal Khattak yam.}
\end{quote}

(I have raised the sword for the honor of Afghan,
I, Khushal Khattak, am the noble of the day).

At another instance, Khushal says:

\begin{quote}
\textit{Drusth Pakhtun ihr Kandahara Ihr attoka,}
\textit{Sara yow da nang pa kaar, patt aw ashkaar.}
\end{quote}

(Pashtuns, everywhere, in Kandahar, in Attock,\footnote{113} Are united for their honor, overtly and covertly).

However, contemporary Pashtun nationalism emerged in response to the colonial rule in British India. In the following lines I briefly elaborate the recent history of Pashtuns, which Pashtun nationalists in Pakistan have been romanticizing in order to construct a collective national consciousness in opposition to Pakistan’s civic identity discourses.

The contemporary Pashtun nationalist consciousness and discourse are informed by some noteworthy historical developments in the region in the 18\textsuperscript{th} and 19\textsuperscript{th} century. The most significant among them is the institution of the modern state of Afghanistan in 1747 by Ahmad Shah Abdali (1721-1772), which enfolded all of the historical Pashtun Land, and beyond. Abdali

\footnote{112 It is worth noting that Khushal Khan is romanticized by contemporary Pashtun nationalist as a symbol of resistance. Moreover, contemporary Pashtun poetry utilizes the word 'Mughal' figuratively to signify Punjab-dominated Pakistani state.}
\footnote{113 Kandahar is a southern province of present-day Afghanistan; and Attock is a province of Pakistani Punjab, bordering the present day Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.}
defeated the Marhatta\textsuperscript{114} in the Third Battle of Panipat in January 1761 and occupied Punjab in order to expand his empire. On the other hand, by 1757, the English East India Company had consolidated its rule in Bengal and the Mughal emperor of Delhi was relegated as a titular King of India. Abdali’s wars with Marathas and his subsequent return to Afghanistan helped the Sikhs of Punjab to rise to power. In 1764 Abdali attacked India for the sixth time to punish Sikhs who had revolted and assassinated the Afghan governor of Punjab. In 1767, Abdali marched on India for the seventh time, to punish the defiant Sikhs this time too. However, eminent threat of civil unrest at home forced Abdali to return to Afghanistan without any significant success (see for instance, Rome 2013, 118-9).

In 1793-1798, Shah Zaman, the grandson of Abdali invaded India and occupied Punjab. Shah Zaman appointed Ranjit Singh as the governor of Punjab, in recognition of his services to the Afghan King. Ranjit Singh consolidated his power, and revolted against his Afghan patron, in 1801. Ranjit Singh signed a treaty of ‘perpetual amity’ with the Britons in 1908. The treaty required him not to expand his rule to the east of India. However, he was free to march towards north and northwest. By 1824, Ranjit Singh occupied territories as far as the Peshawar valley.

The Sikh kingdom lasted only till 1846. The Anglo-Sikh War of 1845-1846 and the concomitant Treaty of Lahore resulted in the East India Company taking control of the Punjab and the Sikh-occupied Afghan territories. In 1848, during the second Sikh revolt against Britons, Dost Muhammad Khan, the Amir of Afghanistan, came to Peshawar to assist Sikhs in their second war against the English and to regain Afghan territories previously lost to Ranjit Singh. But the Afghan Amir and his Sikh allies failed to gain any ground against the Britons. Eventually, the Amir had to flee back to Kabul (see Rome, 120-121). Most of the areas of the present day Khyber Pakhtunkhwa came under direct control of Britons in 1849, when the Britons formally annexed Punjab.

\textsuperscript{114} Marhatta is Marathi-speaking Hindus living in the Maharashtra province of today’s India. Marhatta challenged the Mughal emperor Aurangzeb (1658-1707), and established a confederacy over much of the north India, extending to Peshawar in the west until they were defeated by Abdali of Afghanistan in 1861.
As an end result of the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878-1880), the British occupied the Khyber Pass and Kurram valley and the present Pashtun areas of Balochistan province. By 1893, consequent upon the controversial Durand Line Agreement between Afghanistan and the British, Pashtun (Afghan) territories, now constituting Pakistan, came under direct English influence. The Second Anglo-Afghan War and the consequent occupation of Pashtun/Afghan lands by British through the Treaty of Gandamak (1879) and the Durand Line Agreement (1893) are significant junctures in modern Pashtun/Afghan history. Contemporary Pashtun nationalists question the legality of the aforementioned treaties, as they believe that the aforementioned agreements were thrust upon Afghanistan by British imperialists. Moreover, they contend the legitimacy of the treaties on the ground that they divide Pashtun land and people.

The British Raj further divided the occupied Pashtun areas into different administrative regions. Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan and Hazara division remained part of Punjab province till 1901. The southern districts (occupied under the Treaty of Gandamak) were named as the British Balochistan, governed through the Office of Chief Commissioner. And most of the existing FATA region was divided into different agencies, indirectly ruled through the offices political agents. Bajawar, Utman Khel, Swat, Dir, and Chital were integrated into the Agency of Swat, Dir, and Chital. The agency was, however, not under the direct control of the British governor of Punjab. After the creation of the NWFP as a separate, 1901, its control was transferred from the Foreign Department of the Government of India to the Chief Commissioner of the NWFP.

However, the creation of a separate province did not improve its status in any significant manner, in terms of self-rule and human rights. Various constitutional reforms (like reforms in 1909 and 1919) were not introduced in the NWFP until 1932, which had introduced limited local governments in the rest of the provinces of India. It was still ruled through the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) law, promulgated by the provincial government of Punjab in 1872. The FCR law was a tyrannical instrument intended to control the vanquished, yet recalcitrant, inhabitants of
the region. Under the principle of collective responsibility, the FCR stipulated that the government could punish a whole tribe or village if government property and installations were intentionally damaged in their village or area. It gave immense powers to a commissioner (an administrative official), including judicial powers. The commissioner was empowered to appoint a three-member jirga (judicial tribunal) in order to try a person accused of a crime against government, without giving them the right to have recourse to fair trial in an appellate court of law. The NWFP was given the status of a full province in 1932. As a consequence, modern state institutions (like elections, provincial assembly, and modern judiciary) were introduced in the province.

Although the separation of the NWFP from Punjab had little, if any, significance in terms of local self-government and human rights, it was tantamount to recognizing the separate ethnic identity of Pashtuns (see Caroe 1977, 420; quoted in Rome, 202). Moreover, the introduction of modern state institutions (like bureaucracy, elections, and representative provincial assembly), in 1932, had unintended consequences for Pashtun society and politics. As elaborated later in this chapter, the modus operandi of Pashtun resistance against the colonial rule changed from being violent and disorganized to more organized and non-violent.

However, violent episodes of earlier Pashtun resistance against their colonial masters have deep imprints on contemporary Pashtun nationalist discourse. Armed uprisings against the Britons are part of their collective national consciousness which the nationalist elite have been

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115 The FCR is still in force in the present-day FATA and is a significant element of the current Pashtun nationalist politics. Pashtun nationalists, besides other political parties and local political elements, demand the abolition of the law. However, Pashtun nationalist parties are divided on what will be the status of FATA after the FCR law is abolished. The Awami National Party (ANP), with a strong support base in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, wants that the FCR be put an end to, and the region be merged with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. On the other hand, Pashtunkhwa Mili Awami Party (PMAP), supported mostly in Pashtun districts of Balochistan, demands that the FCR be abolished, and FATA be renamed as Central Pakhtunkhwa (signifying its geographic location and ethnolinguistic identity). It further demands that the proposed Central Pakhtunkhwa should have an elected governor and representative assembly, with complete regional autonomy – whereby the central government in Islamabad will have only defense, foreign affairs, communication and currency-related jurisdiction in the region.
romanticizing to generate support for their national cause. Therefore, it is pertinent to briefly mention some of the violent Pashtun insurgencies against the British raj in their land.

British advances into the Pashtun territories were violently resisted, albeit in a disorganized and erratic manner. Besides the two Anglo-Afghan wars, Pashtun tribesmen, from Waziristan to Chitral, continued defying the British authorities. In summer of 1897, the Waziristan rebellion (claiming 100 lives on Pashtun tribesmen side and 26 on British side) was followed by the Swat uprising, led by Sar Thor Fakir. The Fakir was joined by thousands of fighters from Buner and Malakand. However, they were subdued soon. In August 1897, Momands (Mohmands), led by Najmuddin (aka Hadday Mulla), and Afridis and Orakzai tribes, under the leadership of Aka Khel Mulla revolted against the British occupation. Likewise, tribes from Waziristan rose against the Raj, in June 1897, who remained active for almost three years under Mulla Powinda. But, as noted above, the late-1890s Pashtun armed resistance to the English colonial occupation was localized, unorganized and impromptu (for details of the late 19th Century Pashtun uprising, see Rome, 152-191).

It was under the leadership of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan (popularly known as Bacha Khan or Badshah Khan) (1890-1988) that Pashtuns of the NWFP launched a well organized and more widespread non-violent struggle against the British Raj. Born in a small Khan (feudal)’s family in Charsadda, Bacha khan received early education in his village, Utmanzai. While he was a student of 10th grade in Edward Memorial Mission High School in Peshawar, he was commissioned in the British Army. Nonetheless, given the humiliating attitude of the British officers towards the local military personnel, Bacha Khan decided to quit the military, and to pursue higher education. But, due to his mother’s reluctance to allow her second son to go to England for education, he decided to stay home and to launch sociopolitical activities to educate his people.

Bacha Khan established close relations with popular anti-British Pashtun figures, like Haji Saib of Turangzai (1858-1937). In 1910, when Bacha Khan was only 20, he founded the first
Azad School in his village, imparting both religious and contemporary education. By 1914, Bacha Khan had developed a close liaison with anti-British Deoband Islamic scholars of India. The later asked him to find out an appropriate place in Pashtun tribal belt along the Durand Line, wherefrom resistance against the British Raj in India could be instigated. Bacha Khan toured the area and selected some suitable places that could be used as a base for the movement of independence. But, the plan could not be materialized because of the outbreak of WWI (Rome, 246). To repress Indian nationalist tendencies and revolutionary activities, the British Raj promulgated the ‘Anarchical and Revolutionary Crimes Act’ (popularly known as the Rowlatt Act). Indian nationalists started protesting against the Act. Agitations spread to the NWFP as well. Bacha Khan participated in the agitations as one of the leading anti-British figures of the province. On April 6, 1919 he organized a public gathering to protest against the Act. On the pretext of the seditious activities he had been organizing, the provincial authorities arrested Bacha Khan. “He, however, was released after six months on a bond of Rs. 30,000” (Rome, 246).

To obstruct the British plan of Balkanizing the Ottoman Caliphate at the end of the WWI, Indian Muslims launched the *Khilafat Movement* (1919-1924).\(^{116}\) Bacha Khan joined the movement, and the ensuing *Hijrrat Movement* – mass exodus – (in August 1920) to Afghanistan, as some leading Muslim Indian clerics (like Maulana Abdul Kalam Azad and Maulana Asharaf Ali Thanvi) had issued fatwa declaring British India as *Dar-ul-Harb* (the Land of War, i.e., the land occupied by infidels).

But the Hijrat Movement was a failure. Coming back to Peshawar, Bacha Khan resumed his social reforms program. On April 1, 1921, he founded the *Anjuman-i-Islah-ul-Afaghana* (the Society for the Reformation of Afghans). “The stated objectives of the Anjuman included: the

\(^{116}\) The Turkish Ottoman Empire was considered by India Muslims as a Holy Islamic State (Khilafat), which symbolized Muslims unity. The Ottoman Empire had sided with the Central Powers in the WWI. After the defeat of the Central Powers, the United Kingdom decided to disintegrate the Ottoman Khilafat, which Muslims of India believed was an assault on Muslims’ symbol of political unity. Therefore, they started the Khilafat Movement to force the British authorities to abandon the plan of Balkanizing the Ottoman Empire.
promotion of unity among Pashtoons [Pashtuns], eradication of social evils, prevention of lavish spending on social events, encouragement of Pashto language and literature, and creation of ‘real love’ for Islam\(^\text{117}\) among the Pashtoons” (Shah, 91). In 1924, the Anjuman organized a large public gather in honor of Bacha Khan and conferred on him the title of *Fakhr-e-Afghan* (the Pride of Afghan) (Rome, 401). The Anjuman leadership started touring different Pashtun areas, preaching the need to get contemporary education and “… the eradication of social evils from Pashtoon society like blood-feuds and factionalism, prevention of crimes and the use of intoxicants” (ibid; also see Banerjee 2000, 51). The colonial authorities arrested Bacha Khan for his ‘objectionable’ activities, and sentenced him to three years in jail. It is worth noting that the Anjuman supported King AmmanUllah Khan (1892-1960) of Afghanistan during the Afghan civil war in 1920s (Banerjee, 55).\(^\text{118}\) Moreover, to promote political awareness and anti-British sentiments, the Anjuman launched a monthly magazine *The Pashtun* in May 1928.

Banerjee argues that Bacha Khan and his colleagues feared further retaliation from the British authorities, and therefore, felt the need to have a political organization of educated Pashtun Youth, which struggle for Indian independence through peaceful means (55-56). Hence, the *Zalmo Jirga* (the Youth Council) was founded in 1929. To complement the Youth Council, Bacha Khan launched another organization, the *Khudai Khidmatgar* (the Servants of God), to mobilize the general, uneducated, Pashtun population. The Khudai Khidmatgar (KK), virtually

\(^{117}\) What does Shah mean by Bacha Khan’s urge for promoting ‘real love for Islam’ is not clear. However, we know this on the authority of several historical accounts (like Benerjee 2000 and Rome 2013) and from Bacha Khan’s memoir and speeches that he had secular and liberal views. He believed that Islam preached love for humanity, compassion, and tolerance.

\(^{118}\) Upon succeeding to the throne of Kabul in 1919, Amir AmmanUllah Khan reclaimed Kabul’s control over Afghanistan’s foreign policy, which it had lost to the British. Infuriated by AmmanUllah’s decision, the British declared war (the Third Anglo-Afghan War, 1919) on Afghanistan. Ultimately, the British conceded to Kabul the control of Afghanistan’s foreign policy. Following the consolidation of his rule in Afghanistan, AmmanUllah launched out on modernizing Afghan state and society along secular lines. But, his modernization program was not welcomed by the conservative Islamist forces of Afghanistan, who were allegedly supported by the British. Following a prolonged civil war, AmmanUllah’s regime was eventually toppled in 1929.
absorbing the Youth Council as well, had almost the same goals as did its predecessor, the Anjuman, had.

Impressed by All-India National Congress (henceforth the Congress)’s program\textsuperscript{119} and organizational structure, after attending the Congress’s Conference in Lahore in December, 1929, Bacha Khan decided to affiliate his KK with the Congress. Many of his Pashtun nationalist critics accuse Bacha Khan of political imprudence for affiliating – or rather merging – the KK with the Congress: the Congress obscured the KK as well as Pashtun/Afghan identity politics was inundated by Indian nationalism endorsed by the Congress. Why Bacha Khan did merge the KK with the Congress? Some historians contend that the British authorities were determined to further repress the KK, as they could hardly afford tolerating a popular anti-colonial organization knocking at the so-called Gate to India – the North West Frontier. Therefore, the KK leadership decided to line up their organization with an All-India-based political organization. They contacted All-India Muslim League (henceforth the League),\textsuperscript{120} but to no avail. The KK leadership turned to the Congress. The Congress needed support in the NWFP, a Muslim-majority province, in order to mitigate the League’s propaganda that the Congress was a Hindu communalist party which did not represent Muslim’s aspirations. Therefore, it agreed to the support the KK, provided that the latter honors the struggle for the independence and unity of India through non-violent political struggle (see Banerjee, 69; Shah, 101; and Rome, 257).

Whether the KK was completely merged with the Congress or they formed a political alliance is not settled yet. According to Banerjee, the structures and nomenclature of both the KK and the Congress were modified so as “to suit the coalition better … The district and provincial

\textsuperscript{119} To remind the readers, the Congress was an India nationalist organization, led by Gandhi. It was struggling for the Independence and unity of India during the British Raj in India.

\textsuperscript{120} The League, having a support base in Muslim-minority provinces of north and east India, believed that Hindus and Muslims were two separate nations, and that Hindu majority posed serious politico-economic and cultural threats to the Muslim minority of India. It accused the Congress of Hindu-communalism. Consequently, the League demanded a separate state – Pakistan – by dividing India along religious lines so as to protect the interests of Muslims. As demonstrated later in this study, the League’s apprehension of Hindu-domination was not shared by Muslims in the Muslim-majority provinces, like the NWFP and Punjab.
committees of the Congress and the district and provincial jirgas (councils) of the Khudai Khidmatgars were merged” (69). Though the KK was allowed to retain its name and uniform, it had to abide by the Congress’s constitution and political agenda (ibid, 70). Consequently, the KK leaders elected to the NWFP provincial legislature (and the resultant ministries), following the 1937 and 1946 provincial elections, were cataloged as the Congress’s representatives (and the Congress ministries).

Thereafter (from early 1930s to mid-1940s), Bacha Khan’s KK can hardly be categorized as a Pashtun nationalist organization. Even if it retained its separate identity as a social reformist organization in Pashtunkhwa, its political agenda was that of the Congress – non-violent struggle for the freedom of a united India. Notwithstanding Bacha Khan’s claim that he was working for the establishment of Pashtunistan (or Pakhtunistan) all his life (quoted in Rome, 408), the KK failed to assert and politicize historical Pashtun/Afghan identity which could have been utilized as a political capital to insist on a separate Pashtun state or to rejoin Afghanistan. It was only during the concluding phase of British colonial rule that the KK politicized Pashtun ethnolinguistic identity. According to the Indian Partition Act (June 3, 1947 – also known as the 3rd June Plan), the NWFP had to opt either for India or Pakistan through a referendum. The Plan was discriminatory against the NWFP, as the rest of the provincial assemblies of British India were given the right to determine their future, but the NWFP assembly (where the KK/Congress

121 The KK activists used to wear red uniform, which earned them (and their movement) the name Soor-posh (Red Shirt).
122 Bacha Khan met the editor of the Civil and Military Gazette and a reporter of the Statesman at Simla, after the Gandhi-Irwin Pact of 1931. One of them asked him to dismantle his KK, as peace had been established between the government and the Congress, referring to the Pact. Bacha Khan replied that the KK would automatically come to an end if the British left India (B. Khan 2008, 494-495; also see, Rome, 280). This indicates that the prime political objective of the KK was the independence of a united India.
123 For a broader context, it is worth noting that in this study I argue that the early Pashtun nationalist discourse and political agenda failed to politicize Pashtun/Afghan identity, which could have been utilized by later generations of Pashtun nationalists to mobilize popular support against Pakistani state too. This point is further discussed in Chapter 5.
had a clear majority) was denied the right to decide on the future of Pashtuns. The Congress accepted the Plan for the NWFP. Bacha Khan and his colleagues from the NWFP felt deceived by the Congress, as the latter did not concede to the former’s demand to included a third option in the referendum – the creation of Pashtunistan – in accordance with the Bannu Resolution of June 21, 1947, adopted by a joint Jirga of the Khudai Khidmatgar and the Zalmay Pukhtun (the Young Pakhtun). Commenting on the partition plan, Bacha Khan asserted that a great majority of Pashtuns was reluctant to join either India or Pakistan and that the creation of a free Pashtun state was what Pashtuns aspired to. He expressed his willingness to hold a referendum to ascertain the will of Pashtun concerning the establishment of Pashtunistan. Furthermore, he asked his followers to abstain from taking part in the referendum as per the 3rd June Plan. Alluding to the future of Pashtun national movement, after the creation of Pakistan, Bacha Khan maintained that a new struggle had been forced upon Pashtuns (quoted in Rome, 407-408).

The KK boycotted the referendum after the British authorities casted off its demand of independent Pashtunistan. Only 14% of the Pashtuns of the 5 settled districts of Pashtunkhwa were entitled to vote (Banerjee, 189). According to Shah, the votes casted were 50.49% of the total electorate (108). 99.01% of the poled votes were for Pakistan, and only 0.5% for joining India (Rome, 340). Hence, about 50% of the registered voters did not cast their vote.

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124 The English authorities and Muslim League wanted the NWFP to be merged in the newly created Pakistan. However, they knew that the NWFP elected assembly, dominated by the Congress’s affiliate – the KK – would not vote for Pakistan. Therefore, they decided to conduct referendum on the future of the NWFP instead of empowering the provincial assembly to determine its fate.

125 Zalmay Pukhtun organization, led by Bacha Khan’s eldest son, Ghani Khan, was most probably founded in December 1946 to thwart violence against the KK leadership by the Ghazi Pukhtun of the Frontier Muslim League. As a believer of non-violence, Bacha Khan denied any association of the KK with the Zalmay Pukhtun. However, Bacha Khan’s non-violence was not limitless, as Sultan-i-Rome argues, and tacitly approved the Zalamay Pukhtun (Rome, 269 & 205-206). The later was more a Pashtun nationalist movement than the KK and mocked Ahimsa (idea of non-violence) as something inherently Indian and against Pashtun way of life. The Zalmay Pukhtun was ultimately disbanded after the partition due to its differences with Bacha Khan’s KK, and Ghani Khan decided to quit politics forever (see ibid, 270).

Retrospectively, some Pashtun nationalists (like Malik Kasay) argue that, if supported by Bacha Khan, Ghani Khan’s plan of violent political action for independence could have helped materialize the creation of Pashtunistan.

126 The right to vote was not universal in British India: only the upper stratum of the society was enfranchised.
The referendum cannot be considered as representative of the general Pashtun population. First, it was held only in five districts of Pashtun land where majority was disenfranchised (only 14% were entitled to vote), while the princely states of Swat, Amb and Chitral, and FATA and Pashtun areas of Balochistan were excluded from the referendum. Pashtun districts in the former British Balochistan (now part of Balochistan province) were merged in Pakistan through the British-appointed Shahi Jirga (Royal Council of Elders), which did not represent the populace. Second, as noted above, the Frontier Congress (dominated by the KK), which represented the majority in the provincial assembly, boycotted the referendum: because, unlike the rest of the British-Indian provinces, the NWFP provincial assembly was not given the right to decide the future of the province. Finally, the referendum was held in the absence of a neutral authority, and is said to have been rigged: “there was much dubious electoral practice, such as bogus votes cast for absentee and deceased voters (Jansson 1988, 243; Rettenberg 1977, 395; cited in Banerjee, 189; also see Rome, 320-346, for further details of the referendum).

After the creation of Pakistan, Bacha Khan took oath of allegiance to Pakistan, and tried to convince Jinnah, the Governor General of Pakistan, to grant greater autonomy to provinces. But Pakistani state authorities had other plans for Pakistan and ethno-nationalists. Jinnah, under the 1935 Act, centralized the state machinery. On August 27, 1947, the NWFP provincial government led by Dr. Khan Saib, the elder brother of Bacha Khan, was dissolved by the Governor on the order of Jinnah (Banerjee, 189). The Khudai Khidmatgar was banned in September, 1948. Bacha Khan was arrested, and was sentenced for 3 years in jail, which was later on extended to an indefinite period. He was released in 1953, after spending six years in jail (Rome, 274 & 276).
Bacha Khan opposed the creation of One Unit, and demanded referendum on the issue.\textsuperscript{127} Bacha Khan is said to have affiliated his KK with the anti-One Unit NAP in 1957. We hear of the KK when Bacha Khan revived its pledge and objectives, while in self-exile in Kabul (1964-1972). The revised pledge of the KK put emphases on the personal character of a KK activist: to abstain from violence and family feuds, to live a simple life and side with the oppressed. The pledge also required the KK activists to serve their nation and homeland and not to abstain from any kind of sacrifice for the nation and homeland. The KK, nonetheless, became politically irrelevant, though it still remained to be a social reform movement among Pashtuns. A major Pashtun nationalist segment of the former NAP was (and the contemporary Awami National Party is) a continuation of the KK legacy.

As noted above, under the leadership of Wali Khan (1917-2006) – the second son of Bacha Khan – NAP succeeded to form provincial governments in Balochistan and the NWFP in coalition with the Islamist JUI, following 1971 elections. Charged with anti-Pakistan policies, Balochistan government was dismissed. The JUI-led coalition government of NAP in the NWFP resigned in solidarity with Balochistan government. Wali Khan and his NAP colleagues were arrested in February 1975 and the party was disbanded. He was accused of conspiring against the integrity of Pakistan. Bhutto, the then Prime Minister of Pakistan (1973-1977), set up special tribunal in Hyderabad Jail to try Wali Khan and his colleagues. However, General Zia, soon after deposing Bhutto in July 1977 military coup d’état, exonerated him of all the charges, with an intention to win over Bhutto’s rivals and to gain popular support. Wali Khan remained active in politics from the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD)’s platform, which was launched against the Zia regime. In 1986, his National Democratic Party was merged with the progressive forces from Pashtunkhwa, especially the Mazdoor Kissan Party (Afzal Bangash wing) to form Awami National Party (ANP).

\textsuperscript{127} As stated earlier in this chapter, One Unit was formed by merging all the provinces and administrative units (like FATA, the princely state, and Balochistan State Union) of West Pakistan in order to counterbalance the numerical strength of Bengali population in the East Pakistan.
The ANP stated political objectives are secularization of Pakistan, social democracy and Pashtun national autonomy. It has remained part of alliances and coalition governments. It formed coalition with Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), led by Benazir Bhutto (1953-2007), and Pakistan Muslim League (PML) in the late 1980s and early 1990s, respectively. However, it failed to make any significant electoral progress until 2008 elections. The ANP could make its way to form coalition governments with the Zardari-led PPP, both in the province and in the centre. It claims the 18th Constitutional Amendment to its credit. At present, the ANP is sitting on the opposition benches in the provincial assembly.

Yet another – and more radical – strain of Pashtun nationalism is represented by the Pakhtunkhwa Mili Awam Party (Mili means national and Awami means People’s) (PMAP, sometimes abbreviated as PkMAP). The PMAP is a continuation of Abdul Samad Khan Achakzai (also known as Khan Shaheed)’s political vision. Born in the Pashtun-belt of the then British-Balochistan, Samad Khan (1907-1973) became active in conscious anti-British political activities as a teenager. He was arrested in 1929, when he was 22, for his activities prejudicial to the British Raj in India and was sentenced for two years in prison. In 1931, he met the Congress leadership, including Gandhi, to apprise them of the adverse human rights situation, created by the Raj authorities in British-Balochistan. In 1938, Samad Khan and his colleagues from the British-Balochistan founded an anti-British organization Anjuman-i-Watan (Society for Homeland) in 1938, and issued the first ever weekly newspaper, Istiqalal, from Quetta. In 1939, Samad Khan and Bacha Khan toured together the British-Balochistan to mobilize support against the British Raj.

After the creation of Pakistan, Samad Khan continued his struggle for provincial autonomy and human rights (such as right to vote, right to speech, and right to association). He was one of the advocates of Pashtunistan – apparently an autonomous Pashtun state within the

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128 The 18th Amendment, promulgated in April 2010 during the Zardari’s rule (2008-2013), gave more autonomy to the provinces and renamed the NWFP as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa – a long-cherished demand of the ANP. The amendment is further elaborated in the next chapter.
Pakistani federation. He was jailed in February 1948 for spreading what the authorities “called disruptive propaganda in his weekly newspaper” (Titus and Swidler, 53). In 1958, he was sentenced for ten years in jail for resisting General Ayub’s military regime (1957-1969). “All told Samad Khan spent eighteen of Pakistan’s first 21 years in prison” (ibid).

In 1954, Samad Khan had founded the Wror Pashtun (Pashtun Brother), advocating democracy and federalism. The Wror Pashtun was merged with anti-One Unit NAP. Samad Khan developed differences with NAP leadership when General Yahya Khan, the successor of General Ayub Khan as the Chief Martial Law Administrator (1969-1971), decided to abolish One Unit. As per the NAP agenda, provincial boundaries were to be redrawn along ethnolinguistic lines. Three options were debated, concerning the future of the then British Balochistan, having Pashtun majority: 1) Pashtun areas of the British Balochistan should be merged with the Pashtun-majority NWFP; 2) make a separate province of the British Balochistan; and 3) merge it with the then Kalat state to constitute Balochistan province. Samad Khan defended the first option during Yahya Khan’s round-table conference (ibid, 58). But the NAP leadership, including Wali Khan, was content with the third option, which was ultimately materialized. As a protest, Samad Khan founded Pashtunkhwa National Awami Party (P-NAP). He was elected as a member of provincial assembly in 1970 elections from the NAP platform, and presided the first meeting of the Assembly. He continued pursuing his democratic and federalist agenda, when he was assassinated in 1973.

The P-NAP, led by Samad Khan’s son Mahmood Khan Achakzai (born in 1948), and the leftist Mazdoor Kissan Party (Sher Ali Bacha’s faction) were coalesced into Pashtunkhwa Mili Awami Party (PMAP) in 1989. The PMAP advocates the unification of Pashtun areas in Pakistan,
federalism, civilian supremacy, secularism, and non-interference in Afghanistan on the part of Pakistan.129

Conclusion

The Contemporary Pashtun and Baloch nationalist movements emerged against the colonial Raj in the region and continue to resist the post-partition Pakistan which they consider as an instrument of the ‘Punjabi colonialism.’ Pashtun nationalist movement remained politically disoriented until the partition of India, and is weak today. Had the Pashtun nationalist leadership politicized Pashtun/Afghan ethno-linguistic and historical identity during the British colonial rule, Pashtun nationalist voice would have been more appealing to the masses today (even if it had failed to convince the British Raj to concede to their Pashtunistan demand). It is worth mentioning that the newly-created Pakistan was even more intolerant of the ethno-nationalist movements than its predecessor, the Raj, thereby denying the ethno-nationalists enough breathing space (discussed in Chapter 7). Besides, Pashtuns were gradually integrated in the state by raising their relative stakes in the system (Chapter 4). On the contrary, the founders of modern Baloch nationalism were more judicious and more tenacious than their Pashtun counterparts in asserting and politicizing Baloch ethnolinguistic identity. Furthermore, Balochistan lagged behind the rest of the provinces, which makes the Baloch nationalist agenda more alluring to the Baloch masses.

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129 As mentioned in Chapter 2 (and in the following chapters) Pakistan has been supporting Jihadist elements in Afghanistan since 1973, in order to destabilize successive Afghan regimes which it considered (or considers) as anti-Pakistan. On the contrary, Pashtun nationalists have been opposing Pakistan’s policy towards Afghanistan. They believe that a stable, democratic and progressive Afghanistan can be an anchorage for Pashtun nationalism in Pakistan.
CHAPTER 4

RELATIVE DEPRIVATION OF PASHTUNS AND BALOCHS

In this chapter I analyze the relative deprivation (political, cultural and socio-economic) of Balochs and Pashtuns in Pakistan, which can significantly influence the momentum and trajectories of their respective nationalist movements, inter alia. My argument is that the more a people are deprived (in relative terms), the easier it will be for the challengers (ethno-nationalists) to counter the state’s hegemony.\(^{130}\)

The feelings of deprivation among a people are always relative: “people feel deprived of something they had, but subsequently lost, or when others have gained relative to them” (Nafziger et al 2000, quoted in Freeman 2005, 4). In addition, I have used the notion of deprivation broadly, to assess the political and cultural deprivation of Pashtuns and Balochs in Pakistan as well. Political deprivation refers to the exclusion of a people or group from (and/or subordination through) the institutionalized power mechanisms. Thus, in this chapter power is understood in narrow sense: i.e., “… regularized relations of autonomy and dependence between actors or collectivities in context of social interaction” (Giddens 1984, 16).

By cultural deprivation I mean (institutionalized or non-institutionalized) inability of a people to preserve and propagate their collective memories and symbolic capital (both linguistic and non-linguistic). More often than not, the invented traditions of a state aspiring to construct civic nationalist sentiments imperil the cultural legacies of the constituent ethno-national

communities, which can in turn intensify their primordial attachments (see Smith, 22). It is noteworthy that in this chapter I do not treat culture as a mere instrument of mobilization utilized by nationalist leaders competing for power and resources. “It is rarely possible to disentangle political, cultural and economic elements, as each is embedded in the other” (Stewart 2000, 246). Ethnic groups have a propensity to preserve their collective myths and memories as an end in itself (as elaborated in chapter 1). Besides, “ethnicity … becomes [more] relevant when it overlaps with patterns of relative deprivation” (Freeman 2005, 4).

Nevertheless, deprivation does not necessarily translate into a feeling of resentment without elite intervention. As noted in the previous chapter, the objective (one’s ‘real’ situation) and the subjective (one’s assessment of their real situation) are dialectically related; and that the elites are instrumental in shaping the subjective experiences of the masses. Notwithstanding the role of the elites in constructing a people’s assessment of their situation, their objective status is a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for their political mobilization (this point is elaborated in Chapter 5).

Baloch and Pashtun ethno-nationalists have been challenging what they see as the unjust distribution of power and resources within the multi-ethnic state of Pakistan. Their struggles exemplify ethno-nationalism that aspires to constitute either a state of their own (Baloch nationalism) or to secure greater autonomy within Pakistan, at least (Pashtun nationalism).

This chapter is organized four parts: Part I discusses its methodology. Part II analyzes socio-economic deprivation in Pakistan along ethno-linguistic lines. Part III of the chapter examines political structures of Pakistan in order to explore relative political deprivation of Pashtuns and Balochs. In the last part of this chapter I have examined cultural deprivation of Pashtuns and Balochs.
Methodology

I quantitatively analyze the socio-economic dispossession of Balochs and Pashtuns in Pakistan. In addition, this chapter examines the ever-evolving institutionalized political structures in Pakistan (including its constitution) in order to understand their political deprivation. Finally, cultural deprivation of Balochs and Pashtuns is studied qualitatively by analyzing the formally institutionalized cultural policies and practices of the state vis-à-vis the indigenous cultures and languages.

Concerning the socio-economic deprivation, I have used two-tailed t-statistics to see if the difference between the two populations is statistically significant or not. Moreover, I have also compared Balochs and Pashtuns with Sindhis and Punjabis in order to see which ethno-national community is absolutely deprived.

There are several datasets, published by various governmental and non-governmental organizations, assessing and mapping spatial socio-economic heterogeneity across Pakistan. In this study I utilize the data published by Pakistan Social and Living Standards Measurement Survey (PSML, 2010-11),

131 which I believe is more comprehensive than other available datasets. The data covers district-wide Indices of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) in Pakistan. The variables are arranged into five groups of composite variables, indicating deprivation in different socio-economic sectors: education, health, housing quality, housing services, and economic deprivation with regard to household assets. The selected variables are operationalized as under:

Deprivation in education: deprivation in education (abbreviated as Edu) is operationalized as illiteracy rate among both males and females of 10 years and above age, and by out-of-school children (5-9 years age). Illiteracy is defined as the “ability of a person to read a newspaper [sic] or to write a simple letter in any language” (PSML, 2010-11, in Jamal, 4).

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131 I have accessed the data through Jamal (2012).
**Deprivation in Health:** Relevant information on life expectancy and infant mortality rate (IMR) are not available, which is generally used to measure health conditions in a given population. Therefore, deprivation in health sector (health) is measured by using proxies such as lack of parental and post-natal health care, lack of immunization, and no tetanus Toxoid injection during last pregnancy (Jamal, 5).

**Deprivation in Housing Quality:** Deprivation in housing quality (HQ) is measured in terms of inadequate house structures – made of unbaked bricks, and poor roof and wall structures. Deprivation in this sector is also indicated by households without latrine facility and by households with only one room (signifying congestion) (ibid).

**Deprivation in Household Services:** Deprivation in household services (HS) is measured in terms of the lack of electricity, inadequate sources of fuel for cooking (wood and coal), lack of telephone facility, and households having no safe (covered) drinking water.

**Economic Deprivation:** Economic deprivation (Eco) is measured by the lack of household assets and utilities (indicating poverty): ‘house-ownership, pacca (solid) house structure, iron, fan, sewing machine, radio, chairs, watches, TV, refrigerator, air cooler, air conditioner, computer, bicycle, motor-cycle, car, mobile phone, cooking range, burners, and washing machine (25).

To calculate composite deprivation indices for all of the provinces of Pakistan in terms of the selected variables, Jamal has first combined the variables for each sector by using the formula of geometric mean (geomean). Then he has combined all the sectors, using the geomean again, so as to calculate the overall IMD for all of the provinces of Pakistan. Although Jamal’s method informs his readers about the relative province-wise deprivation in Pakistan, it does not tell them whether or not the difference between (and among) his units of analysis is statistically significant.
Moreover, Jamal does not disaggregate the province along ethno-linguistic lines. Deprivation in Pakistan exists not only across provinces, but also along ethnic lines. Therefore, I have compared the levels of deprivation in Pakistan across ethnicities. I have disaggregated Pashtun and Baloch districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan from the non-Pashtun and non-Baloch districts, respectively, so that my findings are not skewed by the latter. Likewise, I have excluded the non-Punjabi-speaking districts of Punjab and non-Sindhi districts of Sindh from my study.

Socio-Economic Deprivations

As a starting point, I have calculated the means of the selected variables for each of my units of analysis to summarize their respective levels of deprivation. As shown in Table 1 (and Figure 1) below, Baloch districts are the most disadvantaged, whereas the Punjabi majority districts are the least deprived. Balochs are followed by Sindhis with regard to deprivation in education, housing quality and household economy. It was, nonetheless, unexpected that Sindhis were less underprivileged than Pashtuns in terms of health and housing services.

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132 As this study argues that ethno-nationalist movements of Balochs and Pashufts (and their respective counter-hegemony discourses) are appealing primarily (if not exclusively) to their respective ethno-linguistic communities, notwithstanding the fact that Pashtun-nationalist parties have reasonably significant support among some of the territorially dispersed non-Pashtun linguistic communities of Pashtunkhwa (such as Hindko-speakers of Peshawar), albeit not necessarily because of the former’s nationalist outlook. This study is not concerned with the ethno-nationalists popularity among linguistic communities other than their respective ethno-linguistic communities. Nonetheless, suffice it to say that, electoral support of the ethno-nationalist parties among other linguistic groups can be attributed most probably because of their regionalist development agenda or its stance on contemporary issues, like terrorism, or because of their candidate’s personal vote bank.
Table 4.1: Variables Means across Ethnicities in Terms of Socio-Economic Deprivation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>B Means</th>
<th>S Means</th>
<th>P Means</th>
<th>PB Means</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Edu</td>
<td>53.07</td>
<td>48.57</td>
<td>37.72</td>
<td>21.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>36.76</td>
<td>23.00</td>
<td>26.81</td>
<td>21.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>37.07</td>
<td>31.81</td>
<td>29.76</td>
<td>19.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS</td>
<td>55.24</td>
<td>17.95</td>
<td>20.97</td>
<td>9.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eco</td>
<td>83.06</td>
<td>64.39</td>
<td>55.19</td>
<td>32.61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 4.1: Variables Means across Ethnicities in Terms of Socio-Economic Deprivation

However, simple comparison of means does not tell the readers about the level of significance of the differences between the populations’ means across my units of analysis.

Therefore, I have run t-test comparing the variables’ means of my units of analysis with each

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Note that in this table (and the rest that follow) B Means stand for the variables’ means of Baloch population; SMeans, for the variables’ means of Sindhis; P Means, for the variables’ means of Pashtuns of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa; and PB Means for the variables’ means of Punjabis
other. First, I have compared Baloch population with Pashtuns, and then I have compared both of them with Sindhis and Punjabis so as to assess their socio-economic situation in terms of the selected variables. As I had expected Pashtuns are significantly less deprived than Balochs across all the selected variables (see Table 2, below).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>B Means</th>
<th>P Means</th>
<th>t-stat</th>
<th>t-crit</th>
<th>( \alpha ) at 0.05</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Edu</td>
<td>53.07</td>
<td>37.72</td>
<td>3.66</td>
<td>2.04</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>36.76</td>
<td>26.81</td>
<td>2.48</td>
<td>2.04</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>37.07</td>
<td>29.76</td>
<td>2.28</td>
<td>2.04</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS</td>
<td>55.24</td>
<td>20.97</td>
<td>7.97</td>
<td>2.04</td>
<td>8.60E-09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eco</td>
<td>83.06</td>
<td>55.19</td>
<td>6.23</td>
<td>2.05</td>
<td>1.14E-06</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As Table 2 indicates, Baloch districts of Baluchistan are significantly more illiterate and have more children out of schools. The former have significantly low level of parental and postnatal care and less immunization and receive less tetanus Toxoid injection during last pregnancy than the latter. Moreover, Pashtuns have more sturdy and solid house structures than Balochs. Pashtuns’ houses are relatively less congested and have more household services such as electricity, gas-fuel for cooking, and latrine facility. Likewise, the difference between Baloch and Pashtun populations is highly significant in terms of household economy and assets.

Interestingly, Baloch districts of Baluchistan are more deprived than its Pashtun districts too. The variables’ means of Baloch population is higher than the variables’ means of Pashtuns of Baluchistan (PB Means) for all the selected variables. However, the difference between the two populations’ means is statistically significant only for household services (HS) and economy (ECO) (see Table 3 below).
Table 4.3: Level of Significance between the Population Means of Baloch and Pashtun Districts of Baluchistan (Pb) in Terms of Socio-Economic Deprivation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>B Means</th>
<th>Pb Means</th>
<th>t-stat</th>
<th>t-crit</th>
<th>α at 0.05</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Edu</td>
<td>53.07</td>
<td>50.46</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>2.05</td>
<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>36.76</td>
<td>31.47</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>2.05</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>37.07</td>
<td>33.59</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>2.05</td>
<td>0.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS</td>
<td>55.31</td>
<td>31.67</td>
<td>3.31</td>
<td>2.05</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eco</td>
<td>83.06</td>
<td>55.29</td>
<td>3.13</td>
<td>2.05</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Similarly, Baloch population is more deprived than Sindhis. As shown in Table 4, Baloch districts are more deprived than Sindhi districts of Sindh along all the selected variables. Nevertheless, the difference between the two populations’ means is statistically significant for three of the five variables – health, housing services, and economy.

Table 4.4: Level of Significance between the Population Means of Balochs and Sindhis in Terms of Socio-Economic Deprivation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>B Means</th>
<th>SMeans</th>
<th>t-stat</th>
<th>t-crit</th>
<th>α at 0.05</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Edu</td>
<td>53.07</td>
<td>48.57</td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>2.05</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>36.76</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>3.64</td>
<td>2.06</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>37.07</td>
<td>31.81</td>
<td>1.48</td>
<td>2.02</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS</td>
<td>55.24</td>
<td>17.95</td>
<td>8.25</td>
<td>2.03</td>
<td>1.55E-09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eco</td>
<td>83.06</td>
<td>64.39</td>
<td>5.69</td>
<td>2.02</td>
<td>1.61E-06</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On the contrary, Pashtun districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa are more developed than the Sindhi districts of Sindh in terms of education, housing quality and economy (Table 5). What I did not expect was that Pashtun districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa were more deprived than Sindhi districts with regard to household services and health, although the difference is statistically not significant.
Table 4.5: Level of Significance between the Population Means of Sindhis and Pashtuns in terms of Socio-Economic Deprivation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>S Means</th>
<th>P Means</th>
<th>t-stat</th>
<th>t-crit</th>
<th>α at 0.05</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Edu</td>
<td>48.57</td>
<td>37.72</td>
<td>3.76</td>
<td>2.03</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>26.81</td>
<td>-1.56</td>
<td>2.03</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>31.81</td>
<td>29.76</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>2.03</td>
<td>0.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS</td>
<td>17.95</td>
<td>20.97</td>
<td>-0.87</td>
<td>2.03</td>
<td>0.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eco</td>
<td>64.39</td>
<td>55.19</td>
<td>2.09</td>
<td>2.05</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Finally, as I had expected, Punjabi districts of Punjab are far more developed than Pashtun districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The difference between the two populations’ means is highly significant (Table 6). Consequently, it can be safely incurred that Punjabi majority districts are far more developed than Baloch districts of Baluchistan too.

Table 4.6: Level of Significance between the Population Means of Punjabis and Pashtuns of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in Terms of Socio-Economic Deprivation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>PB Means</th>
<th>P Means</th>
<th>t-stat</th>
<th>t-crit</th>
<th>α at 0.05</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Edu</td>
<td>21.74</td>
<td>37.72</td>
<td>-5.82</td>
<td>2.03</td>
<td>2.00E-06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>21.05</td>
<td>26.81</td>
<td>-2.43</td>
<td>2.04</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>19.92</td>
<td>29.76</td>
<td>-3.8</td>
<td>2.03</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS</td>
<td>9.45</td>
<td>20.97</td>
<td>-4.81</td>
<td>2.07</td>
<td>9.20E-05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eco</td>
<td>32.61</td>
<td>55.19</td>
<td>-4.57</td>
<td>2.03</td>
<td>6.43E-05</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To conclude, Punjabi districts of Pakistan are the least deprived, and Balochs are the most dispossessed. Pashtuns of both Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan are better off than Balochs in respect of the selected socio-economic indicators. Pashtuns are even less deprived than Sindhis with regard to education, housing quality and household economic indicators. Moreover, my findings are mostly consistent with some other studies on socio-economic spatial heterogeneity across Pakistan (see for instance, Jamal and A. Khan 2007; Jamal 2012; and Ghaus, Pasha and Ghaus 1996).
Political Deprivation

In Pakistan, all of the ethno-national communities, except Punjabis, have been contesting the political and administrative structures in Pakistan, because of their relatively marginalized position in them (Bansal 2013, 20). As noted in the previous chapter, Pashtuns and Balochs had opposed the merger of their traditional lands in Pakistan. Since then, they have been cherishing the idea to secede from Pakistan (Khan 2005, 15; cited in Bansal 2013, 21), or at least want to institute a strong federation in Pakistan so that they could have an equal share of power vis-à-vis Punjabis.

Nevertheless, Balochs were left politically worse off than Pashtuns, after the creation of Pakistan. During the Raj, the mainland Pashtunkhwa (i.e., the NWFP) was under direct colonial rule, whereas the Kalat state had internal autonomy, even if symbolic. The Kalat state had direct treaty relations with the Whitehall and the Khan (and his tributaries) had been given relative freedom to manage the internal affairs of the Khanate; while the mainland Pashtunkhwa was made one of the provinces of British India, and the British-Baluchistan (with Pashtun majority) was controlled through the Chief Commissioner and the Shahi Jirga. For Pashtuns, transition from being a part of the British-India to become part of Pakistan was tantamount to a change of masters, though they were more apprehensive of the new one.134 Notwithstanding Bacha Khan’s popular apprehension (concerning Pashtunkhwa becoming part of Pakistan), the KK did not demand (nor expected) anything resembling independence – or even autonomy – on ethnic basis in the proposed united India. On the other hand, the Kalat state declared independence and remained (at least) an autonomous entity after the withdrawal of British until it was occupied by Pakistan against the wishes of the Kalat State parliament. As a reaction, the Baloch nationalists denounced Baluchistan’s merger in Pakistan and Prince Karim Khan started armed struggle

134 Bacha Khan expressed his apprehension to the Congress leadership, when the latter accepted the 3rd June Plan to hold referendum in the NWFP and the merger of Pashtuns in Pakistan seemed unavoidable. While complaining against the Congress leadership’s reluctance to support his Pashtunistan demand, he is said to have told them that Pashtuns had been thrown to the wolves (see for instance, Rome 330).
against Pakistan, which would ultimately become a significant component of the Baloch national memory.

Democracy is generally believed to accommodate diversity “… without recourse to repression and assimilation (Wolff 2011, 1). However, the dictum does not hold true across time and space unless (ethnolinguistic or religious) minorities are given institutional guarantees against the ‘tyranny of the majority.’ One of the institutional strategies which can reasonably ensure such guarantees (and which can possibly avert or minimize ethnic conflicts in divided societies) is ‘consociational democracy’ – an alternative to the majoritarian democracy. As Lijphart (1999) argues, majoritarian rule in heterogeneous societies is less democratic (32). Majority’s rule is tenable only to avoid the ‘tyranny of minority’ – that is, in dilemma situations where a consensus between the majority and minority is impossible.

The existing Pakistani institutional structure partially satisfies some of Lijphart’s consociational criteria – like federalism, power-sharing (through multiparty parliamentarism and coalition-rule representing different ethnic segments), cultural autonomy, judicial review, and proportionality (in some public sector employment). It, nonetheless, does not espouses the principles of proportional representation (which is irrelevant in Pakistan’s case, because of the geographic concentration of ethnolinguistic communities) and minority veto (for details of consociational democracy, see Lijphart 1999, 2002, 37-54; also see, Wolff 2011a, 2011b). In the following lines, I elaborate in details institutional structures in Pakistan (both past and current) in the light of the cosociationalist model, to evaluate the relative share of Pashtuns and Balochs in them.
The institutional history of Pakistan oscillates between centrist majoritarianism and moderate federalism. Soon after its creation, the Mahajir-dominated Muslim League contrived in league with the Punjabi-dominated military to keep other ethnic communities (including the 56% Bengali majority) out of power. It took Pakistan almost 9 years to have a constitution. The 1956 constitution merged all the provinces of West Pakistan to coagulate them into One Unit. The two wings (East and West) of Pakistan were equally represented in a unicameral parliament. The 1956 constitution virtually disenfranchised the smaller provinces of the West Pakistan, as Punjab had a majority in the West Pakistan provincial legislature (see Chapter 3). The 1956 Constitution was abrogated by General Ayub in 1958. The military dictator imposed the 1962 Constitution which further disregarded diversity by adopting presidential system, besides retaining the One Unit. As a reaction to the One Unite, the ethno-nationalists from the NWFP, Baluchistan, Sindh, and East Pakistan (Bengal) launched NAP. General Yahya ultimately dissolved the One Unit and abrogated General Ayub’s constitution as well. Following the 1971 elections and the secession of Bengal, a new constitution of 1973 was enacted by the National Assembly, with Z. A. Bhutto as the leader of the House and Wali Khan, the NAP leader, representing the opposition in the assembly (see, for instance Goraya, 2010).

In theory, the original 1973 Constitution (before the 18th Constitutional Amendment, April 2010, discussed below) was comparatively more federal and consociational than the previous ones. It incorporated the principles of parliamentarism, judicial review, bicameralism, and federalism. But in practice, it hardly espoused provincial autonomy. It established two legislative lists: 1) the Federal Legislative List (FLL); and 2) the Concurrent List (CL). Policy

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135 By centrist majoritarianism I mean an institutional design in which the central government has more power and the centre is dominated by a specific ethnolinguistic group, whereas the term moderate federalism here refers to an institutional setup in which relatively more autonomy is granted to the federating units.

136 The FLL included such policy areas as the defence of Pakistan, foreign affairs, currency, communication, electricity, citizenship, mineral oil, posts and telegraphs, public debt, international and inter-provincial trade and commerce, railways and census. The CL dealt with such policy areas as criminal law and criminal
areas which were mentioned in the FLL were exclusively the domain of the federal government to legislate on. On the other hand, both the provinces and the federal government could legislate on the policy matters in the CL. As per Article 143 of the Constitution (before the 18th Amendment), if any law enacted by a provincial assembly on an issue enumerated in the CL is repugnant to an Act of the Parliament (federal legislature), enacted on the same issue before or after the provincial assembly’s Act, the Act of the Parliament should prevail, and the provincial assembly’s Act would be void. Keeping in mind the provincial legislative powers, although the provinces could legislate on the subject matters enunciated in the CL, yet the Parliament (where Punjab had the majority) could easily override the provincial legislation; and therefore, the smaller provinces (roughly representing smaller ethno-national communities) were practically disempowered. In the popularly elected lower house of the Parliament (National Assembly) the number of seats from each federal unit is commensurate with their respective population (although census is a controversial political issue in Pakistan). Thus, Punjab always constitutes a majority of the National Assembly. The current seats allocation to the Provinces is as follows: Baluchistan, 17; Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, 43; Punjab, 183; Sindh, 75; FATA (Pashtun area), 12; Federal Capital (Islamabad, having Punjabi majority), 2. Thus, out of the total 332 seats, the share of Punjab in comparison with the rest of the federal units is 183 to 149. In the Senate, the provinces are equally represented – 23 seats each; whereas 8 seats are allocated to the FATA, and 4 to the Federal Capital.

Besides the division of legislative powers between the center and the federating governments, bicameralism is yet another significant principle of federalism, where the upper house, constituted on parity basis, represents the interests of the federal units. The 1973 Constitution of Pakistan adopted the principle. Yet again, the smaller province can hardly (if

procedure, civil law, marriage, divorce, and adoption, contracts, arms and explosives, trade unions and unemployment insurance.
possibly, through the party system\textsuperscript{137}) counter the Punjabi majority in the Parliament, given the legislation procedure prescribed in the Constitution: as per Article 70, any bill, except money-bills, may be tabled in any house. Passed by the house of its origin, the bill is sent to the other chamber of the parliament, which may suggest amendments to the bill and send back to the house where it is initiated, whereupon the latter may not accommodate the amendments to the bill. In case of disagreement between the two houses, a joint session is convened to decide on the fate of the bill through a simple majority (in case of constitutional amendment, two-third majority is required). Thus, Punjabi majority can be countered in the joint session only if the representatives of the rest of the provinces and FATA are all on the same page. Besides the ordinary bills, the money bills must originate in the National Assembly (NA) and may be sent to the Senate even before it is passed from the house of its origin. The latter has 14 days (7 days before the 18th Amendment) to review the bill. The NA is not bound to accommodate the suggestions of the Senate, if any. Yet again, Punjab can easily monopolize the budgetary policies through its numerical strength in the Parliament.

Thus, keeping in view the constitutional history of Pakistan and its majoritarian institutional structures with reference to the federalist principles of bicameralism and of legislative power-distribution between the center and the federal units, both Balochistan and Pashtuns are equally disempowered. However, Pashtuns have greater representation in the

\textsuperscript{137} In Pakistan, political support of parties comes, more often than not, from their traditional ethno-linguistic bastions, with some exceptions in cases of Pakistan Muslim League (PML) and Pakistan People’s Party (PPP). The PML is Punjab-based party, which sometimes gets seats from other parts of the country as well; and the PPP, associated with the Sindhi-speaking population of Sindh, has a support base in the non-Punjabi southern Punjab too. Besides, the two parties have, occasionally, led coalition governments in Baluchistan, co-opting the sardars and independent (non-partisan) members of the provincial and central legislatures. Similarly, the two parties formed coalition governments in the present-day Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, with the support of the Pashtun-nationalist ANP. Notwithstanding, the PML and the PPP are the Punjabi- and Sindhi-based parties, respectively. Keeping in view the Party-mechanism in Pakistan, it is either the PML or the PPP that form the elected-government, and they sometimes accommodate their coalition partners’ (representing smaller provinces) demands. Nevertheless, a political party seeking to form government in the center has to be sensitive to the interests of Punjab at the expense of smaller provinces, more often than not.
Parliament than Balochs do have: the total seats representing Pashtun population (of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Baluchistan, Karachi and FATA) in the National Assembly are almost 55; whereas those representing Balochs are about 11. And in the Senate, Pashtun representation is more than any ethno-national community of Pakistan – more than even Punjabis. Consequently, while forming a government in a hung parliament, a political party can hardly ignore Pashtun representation (nationalist or otherwise) in the NA to devise a power-sharing formula. Even if the party forming government at center does not need the Pashtun representative’s support to form a stable government, it has to take on board the notion of Pashtun-representation as a stabilizing (or otherwise) factor. What's more, if Pashtun-representatives are not part of the coalition, they can form an effective opposition. In short, Pashtuns are more conspicuous in the Parliament than Balochs, and therefore, is a force to be reckoned with. In other words, Pashtuns have relatively greater share than Balochs in the parliamentary power-sharing arrangements – a concomitant feature of the multi-party and majoritarian parliamentarism in Pakistan.

In addition to their relatively greater parliamentary influence, Pashtuns have a greater share in the military. Categorized as the so-called martial race, the British recruited Pashtuns in the British Indian Army (BIA). After the partition, 77 percent of Pakistan’s army was from Punjab, whereas 19.5 percent of the army that fell in Pakistan’s share was from the NWFP, now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (Cohen 1984, 42, 42; cited in Khan 2003a, 80; and in Jaffrelot, 2002, 117). In 1959, Pashtuns constituted the majority of the top-ranking military officers – 19, followed by Punjabis and Mahajirs, who were 17 and 13, respectively. At the end of 1960s, Pashtuns constituted 40 percent of the total 48 highest military ranks of Pakistan – even more than Punjabis, who were 34 percent. Moreover, three of the Commanders-in-chief were Pashtuns,

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138 Pashtuns outweigh any other ethno-national community in the Senate by virtue of the number of seats allocated to the administrative units inhabited by Pashtuns: besides the 23 seats form the Khyber Pashtunkhwa, the 8 seats allocated for FATA and about 4-6 seats representing Pashtun population of Baluchistan and Karachi. Although the Senate is not much a significant legislative institution, its symbolic worth cannot be undermined, thereby giving Pashtun masses a feeling of being partners in power.
including General Ayub Khan and General Yahya Khan – the former Martial Law Administrators of Pakistan (see Jaffrelot, 154). General Ayub Khan further encouraged Pashtuns to join army. Currently, they are said to be 15-20 percent of the total manpower of the military, second to Punjabis who are estimated to be about 75%. Balochs, on the other hand, are inconspicuous in Pakistan’s army.

As noted in Chapter 1, Pakistan is ruled by the military, directly or indirectly. It has been ruled directly by the military for at least 40 years since its inception. During the so-called civilian era, which is almost 28 years, the military has been wielding the veto vis-à-vis the representative institutions of the state. Therefore, a popular saying goes that the military is the only ‘party’ in Pakistan which always remains in power (for details of the role of military in Pakistani politics, see for instance, Haqqani 2005, 199-260; I. Ahmad 1913; Siddiq 2007; and Cohen 2004, 97-130).

Figure 4.2: Military Vs Civilian Rule in Pakistan 1947-2016

*Source:* (Z. Khan 2015, 151; as updated by the author)
Given the political role of the military, both direct and indirect, and the relatively greater share of Pashtuns in the Armed forces of Pakistan, they have been a minor ‘partner in crime.’ This gives them a greater sense of empowerment as compared to Balochs.

The 18th Constitutional Amendment is considered a major step forward in the constitutional history of Pakistan, giving more autonomy to the federal units. Adopted in April 2010, the Amendment guarantees more legislative and financial autonomy to the provinces. It abolishes the Concurrent List, which means that the Constitution has the FLL, on which the federal government can legislate, whereas the residual powers are given to the provinces. The FLL has two parts: Part I delineates matters (like, foreign policy, currency, nuclear energy, defense and armed forces etc) on which the Parliament can legislate exclusively; in Part II, 10 more policy matters have been added (such as electricity, census, major ports, public debt, regulating standard of higher education and scientific research etc) on which the Parliament has the power to legislate, yet in the light of the policy-guidelines of the Council of Common Interests (CCI) by virtue of which the provinces can raise their concerns and politicize them on the federal level.

The CCI was established under the original constitution to develop understanding between the centre and province concerning the matters in the FLL, Part II and the Concurrent List. But it remained dysfunctional until 2010. It was put in abeyance during the various regimes, both military and civilian. It held only 11 meetings between 1973 and 2010, three of them being held during Bhutto’s era. Six of the rest of the meetings of the Council were convened during Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s first two terms (1991-1993 and 1997-1999). Moreover, the CCI could not frame its rules until in 1991 (Z. Khan 2015, 147). The 18th Amendment makes it obligatory on the Council to meet quarterly. It can also be convened on the request of a Chief Minister (CM) of a province to the Prime Minister (PM) in case of emergency. The Council is chaired by the PM. The CMs of the four provinces of Pakistan are its permanent members, in
addition to three other federal ministers nominated by the PM. The quorum for the Council is four, provided at least two of the CMs are present.

All the policy areas listed in Part II of the FLL fall within the purview of the CCI. The Parliament may issue directions (general or specific) to the Council through a resolution in its joint session. Such directions are binding on it. Moreover, if the federal government or a province is not satisfied with a decision taken by the Council, the matter may be referred to the joint sitting of the parliament, in which case the decision of the parliament is final (for a detailed discussion of the CCI, see Z. Khan, 146-162).

The abolition of the CL through the 18th Amendment confers on the provinces the power to make laws on what falls outside the FLL, without the fear of being overruled by the centre. But transfer of 10 of the policy areas (including the electricity) from the defunct CL to the FLL, Part II, has limited the legislative domain of the provinces. And the residual policy matters on which the provinces can legislate are not enough to generate adequate revenue and exercise significant authority within the province.

Yet another significant measure taken by the central government in the wake of the 18th Amendment is the signing of the 7th National Finance Commission (NFC) award on December 30, 2010. Article 160 stipulates the formation of the NFC at intervals not exceeding five years. Accordingly, the President of Pakistan shall institute the NFC, consisting of the Federal Finance Minister and finance ministers of the provinces and “such other persons as may be appointed by the President after consultation with the Governors of the Provinces” (Article 160). The NFC makes recommendations pertaining to the distribution of the net proceeds of taxes (such as taxes

\[^{139}\text{Such as civil procedure code, marriage and divorce, minor and infants, adoption, will, donations, contracts, trust and trustees, inheritance, arms, shipping and navigations on inland waterways, newspapers and books, printing press, films and censorship, population planning and social welfare, women and labor affairs, curriculum and syllabus planning and education (except standards of higher education and research, and scientific and technical institutions), Usher and Zakat (taxes sanctioned by Islam on Muslims), environment and drugs and medicines etc (see for instance, Hamid 2015, 94).}\]{
on income, sales and purchases of goods, export duty on cotton, and other taxes as specified by
the President) among the provinces and the federal government. It is worth noting that sales tax
on services is devolved to the provinces. Besides, the NFC also issues the Federal Government’s
grants-in-aid to provinces. It also deals with any other financial matter referred to it by the
President. What is more, as per clause 3a of Article 160 (inserted through the 18th Amendment)
the share of provinces in an NFC award cannot be decreased in a subsequent NFC award. And,
according to clause 3b of the said article, the Federal Finance Minister and the finance ministers
of the provinces shall monitor the implementation of the award every 2 years and report on it to
the central and provincial legislatures.

Before I assess the share of provinces in the 7th NFC award, it is pertinent to look at the
average share of each province in the preceding NFC awards in the divisible pool (Table 7), as
this study argues that the effects of deprivation are cumulative: that is, the longer an ethno-
national community is kept neglected, the stronger are the feelings of deprivation among them.

Table 4.7: Average Share of Provinces in the Previous NFC Awards Before 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Punjab</th>
<th>Sindh</th>
<th>NWFP/KP*</th>
<th>Baluchistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>58.21%</td>
<td>23.24%</td>
<td>13.51%</td>
<td>5.02%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ahmad, Mustafa, and Khalid (2007)
*KP stands for Khyber Pakhtunkhwa

As shown in the table above, Baluchistan received the least of the Federal Divisible Pool
in the previous NFC awards, followed by Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Previously, population had been
the sole criterion to distribute the resources among the provinces (Jalal 1999, 220, cited in
Adeney 2012, 549). Smaller provinces resented the population-based horizontal distribution of
the federal divisible pool. Sindh, benefiting from Karachi as the major port-city of Pakistan,
demanded that distribution be made on the basis of a province’s contribution to the federal
exchequer. Whereas Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan asserted that socio-economic backwardness and inverse population density (in Baluchistan) should be taken into account while chalking out the distribution formula (Adeney, 549). Before the promulgation of the 18th Amendment and the 7th NFC award, Baluchistan remained the most underprivileged. Covering an area of 347,190 km², with a population of 6.56 million (1998 census), Baluchistan is the least densely populated province, thereby leaving it as the most disadvantaged one when it comes to the distribution of resources on the basis of population, exclusively.

The 18th Amendment and the 7th NFC award address the concerns of the smaller provinces, albeit not as substantially as to satisfy all. Vertically, the provinces share was increased from 45 percent to 57.5 percent vis-à-vis the 42.5 of the central government’s share (which was 55 percent in the previous award) (see Adeney, 548). Concerning horizontal distribution of resources among provinces, the 2010 award recognizes poverty and inverse population density as part of the resource allocation criteria. Accordingly, “82 percent of resources allocated to the provinces was distributed according to population, 10.3 percent for poverty/backwardness, 5 percent for revenue generation and collection, and 2.7 for inverse population density” (ibid, 549). Thus, the share of Punjab was reduced by 5.6 percent. Horizontal distribution of divisible pool among the provinces (57.5 percent of the total divisible pool) in the 7th NFC award is as given in Table 2:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provinces</th>
<th>Share (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Punjab</td>
<td>51.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sindh</td>
<td>24.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KP</td>
<td>14.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baluchistan</td>
<td>9.10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Pasha and Pasha (2015, 125)*
In addition, the amended Article 172 says that “mineral oil and natural gas within the Province or the territorial waters adjacent thereto shall vest jointly and equally in that Province and the Federal Government.” Thus, the revision of Article 172 gives power to the provinces to have greater share in their mineral resources – most of the resources rich areas are outside Punjab. Besides, the 18th Amendment has modified Article 157, whereby it is made binding on the federal government to seek the consent of the province before constructing a hydro-electric power station in that province. “This goes someway to appeasing the demands of provinces such as KP [Khyber Pakhtunkhwa], but fails to satisfy those downstream of such constructions” (Adeney, 549). Before the 7th NFC award and the 18th Amendment, smaller provinces were denied their due right in the net profit of their resources. It was only in 1991 that the centre recognized the provinces’ right to royalty payment for oil and gas and hydel-power profit. Thus, in 1991-92 the then-NWP government was paid only 5.99 billion as net profit on the hydel-power royalty, and “… the federal government imposed an annual cap of Rs. 6 billion on this payment” (Khwaja, Suleri, and Shahbaz, 11). Likewise Baluchistan produced more gas than Punjab – 303,433 MBTU (Million British Thermal Unit – the unit of energy) and 57.46 MBTU, respectively – yet the latter received more than the former as royalty for their respective gas production – Rs. 35.12/MBTU as compared to 22.67 (ibid, 9).

How far does the 18th Amendment satisfy the smaller provinces? Experts of Pakistani ethno-national politics and institutions are ambivalent. Though the abolition of the CL and autonomy over provincial resources were longstanding demands of ethno-nationalists, the abolition of the CL, devolving 17 ministries to provinces, becomes a liability on the provinces without having adequate resources to finance the devolved responsibilities. The General Sales Tax (GST) on services delegated to the provinces hardly relieves the provinces\textsuperscript{140} of the burden to

\footnote{140 Especialy smaller provinces like Baluchistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa which have lagged behind in generating service-based economic activities, as compared to the Punjab that has a much deeper economic base and has greater capacity to generate more revenue (see, for instance Adeney, 554).}
support the ministries devolved to them. “The logistics of collecting this tax are enormous. It would not be surprising if the amount of revenue collected from this source declined (Ahmad 2010b, 18; cited in Adeney, 553).

As compared to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Baluchistan’s share in the NFC award has been raised significantly: the former’s share has been increased by 1.11% of the total share of the provinces, whereas the latter’s share has been raised from 5.02 of its average in the previous NFC awards to 9.01. In addition, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa has been denied the right to own the electricity it generates already (which has been moved from the defunct CL to the FLL, Part II), notwithstanding its post-18th Amendment right to construct new hydro-electric power stations. On the other hand, the federal government has acknowledged 50% share of provinces in the natural gas and oil resources, which benefits Baluchistan more than Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

However, the centre has failed to appease the Baloch nationalists, especially the separatists: they have declined the 18th Amendment and the 7th NFC award altogether, as they maintain that nothing short of independence is acceptable to them (this point is elaborated in the next chapter). The grievances of Baloch people are historically and otherwise so deep-rooted and their ethno-national movement has got so much momentum as to make it difficult for the state to placate Baloch separatist sentiments. On the contrary, Pashtun nationalists (particularly those from the ANP) have been celebrating the 18th Amendment and the 7th NFC award. The ANP leadership asserts that they have accomplished the dreams of their forefathers – Bacha Khan and Wali Khan. Unlike Balochs, Pashtuns have never been so marginalized (politically and socio-economically) and their ethno-national consciousness has never been as strong and widespread as to give Pashtun nationalists (especially the nationalist party having a support-base in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa – the ANP) moral courage and political support enough to insist on more.

141 Although this right is universal, yet Khyber Pakhtunkhwa has more capacity to avail it because of the water resources it has, as compared to other provinces.
Therefore, Pashtun nationalists have to content themselves with what they have got in the form of the 18th Amendment as well as to exaggerate what they have got, for gaining (or sustaining) electoral support.  

Cultural Deprivation

As far as autonomy in cultural sphere is concerned, the formal state institutions treat almost all the communities equally. Article 251 declares Urdu as the national language of Pakistan. Clause 3 of the said article says that a provincial government may prescribe by law measures to be taken for the promotion, teaching and use of provincial languages, “without prejudice to the status of the National Language.” However, before the 18th Amendment, the federal government could easily override a provincial government’s effort to teach and promote provincial languages, as the constitution empowered the federal government to override anything it thought “prejudicial” to the federal government’s culture and language policy. Furthermore, Article 31 of the Constitution requires the government to enable Muslims of Pakistan to spend their lives, in individual and collective capacities, in accordance with the teachings of Islam. It also makes the teaching of the Quran and Islamiat (Islamic Studies) compulsory, and asks the government to encourage and facilitate learning of Arabic. Given these constitutional provisions, the state adopted the policy of promoting Arab culture and Arabic language, through school and college curricula, in the name of Islam, at the cost of “local” cultures and languages.

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142 This point has been discussed above and in chapter 1, and will be further elaborated later.
143 Article 31 is part of Chapter 2 of the Constitution – Principles of Policy (Articles 29-40). The Principles of Policy encourages the federal government or an organ thereof or a person serving in official capacity to act according to the principles enumerated therein, such as the promotion of Islamic way of life, establishing good relations with Muslim countries and promoting global peace, promotion of local government, social justice, encouraging and enabling Pakistanis to join armed forces. The Principles of Policy are general policy guidelines, and are not binding on the government or an organ thereof.
144 When I was a middle school student (grades 6th to 8th), we were taught Arabic, but not Pashto (the language spoken by almost all of the inhabitants of the area where I studied – FATA). Similarly, in our
Keeping in view its culture and language policies, the state’s objective is to assimilate the erstwhile diverse cultures and histories of the ethno-national communities constituting Pakistan, as discussed in chapter 2. Besides being shunned from the school and college curricula, the so-called local languages have been neglected in the state-owned and/or state-controlled media.145 Almost 95 percent of the private electronic media houses, accessed through cables in urban areas, air their programs in Urdu. The state-owned televisions give limited time to the indigenous languages, as summarized in Table 4.9:

Table 4.9: Time Allocated to the Indigenous Language in the State-Owned TV-Stations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language</th>
<th>TV Station</th>
<th>No. of Programs</th>
<th>No. of Hours/Week</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Balochi</td>
<td>Quetta</td>
<td>4 (25 min. each)</td>
<td>1 hr. 40 min.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brahvi [Brahui]</td>
<td>Quetta</td>
<td>4 (25 min. each)</td>
<td>1 hr. 40 min.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindko</td>
<td>Peshawar</td>
<td>1 (50 min.)</td>
<td>1 hr. 15 min.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 (25 min)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pashto</td>
<td>Peshawar</td>
<td>2 (50 min. each)</td>
<td>3 hr. 33 min.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Quetta</td>
<td>4 (25 min. each)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punjabi</td>
<td>Lahore</td>
<td>3 (50 min each)</td>
<td>4 hr. 16 min.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Islamabad</td>
<td>4 (25 min. each)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sindhi</td>
<td>Karachi</td>
<td>3 (50 min. each)</td>
<td>4 hr. 58 min.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5 (25 min. each)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urdu</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>Many</td>
<td>49 hr 18 min.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urdu/Arabic</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>Many</td>
<td>7 hr. 45 min.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source:* Rahman (2011, 262)

Thus, Urdu gets a lion share of the state-owned TV stations’ programs at the expense of indigenous languages. Moreover, as Jan (2016) argues:

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145 Note that the provinces do not own media.
Indigenous languages suffer from double jeopardy: 1) few programs of short duration, 2) they are not broadcasted in prime time. This means indigenous languages programs go on air at a time when few people have spare time to sit in front of TV or listen to radio.

In addition, Urdu receives the bulk of the Grants-in-Aid for the Promotion of Languages from the Pakistan Academy of Letters (PAL)\textsuperscript{146} to the detriment of indigenous languages: for instance Urdu received Rs. 1,577,500 for the year 1994-95; whereas Balochi and Pashto received Rs. 100,000 and 105,000, respectively, for the same year (Rahman, 264). Likewise, there are about 9 institutions for the promotion of Urdu, the collective budgets of which was roughly Rs. 30.35 million, for the year 1994. On the other hand, Balochi has only one institution for its promotion and Brahui has two such institutions; and their collective budget for the year 1994 is only Rs. 0.257 million. Likewise, Pashto has three institutions, with a collective budget of Rs. 3.61 million for the same year (ibid, 265-266).

As stated above, the constitution does not prohibit the establishment of indigenous print and electronic media. For instance, Pashto has 2 dailies, and 5 monthlies; and Balochi and Brahui have 1 weekly each (ibid, 261).\textsuperscript{147} In addition, Pashto has several private FM radio channels and a TV station, and 2 of its tributaries. Nevertheless, because the ethno-national communities in Pakistan have been deprived of getting education in their languages, majority of them cannot (and/or does not) write or read in their own languages. And predictably, the local TV stations and FM radios scarcely promote indigenous cultures and histories. Rather they have been advancing

\textsuperscript{146} The PAL was established in 1976 as an autonomous organization under the Ministry of Education to promote Pakistani languages, literature and welfare of writers in literature in Pakistani languages.\textsuperscript{147} According to Pakistan Bureau of Statistics (PBS) the total number of Pashto newspapers and periodicals in the country is 17 for the year 2012, which has decreased since 2005 – total 35 newspapers and periodicals. On the other hand the newspapers and periodicals in Brahui and Balochi is 4 and 12, respectively, for 2012. Interestingly, only Pashto newspapers or periodicals are published in all provinces of Pakistan, which signifies that a significant number of Pashtuns have migrated and settled in all of the provinces of Pakistan, taking with them the language and culture (Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, “Newspapers and Periodicals by Language and Province,” Accessed September 8, 2016. \url{http://www.pbs.gov.pk/sites/default/files//tables/Press%20by%20language%28website%29%2011.pdf}.}
the state’s discourses to the local population. Those who want to establish media houses to prop up indigenous cultures and histories (which inevitably contradict the official narratives) are discouraged either through formal legal mechanisms or are intimidated by the secret coercive apparatuses of the state.\textsuperscript{148}

Moreover, Pashto cinema is also a source of giving Pashtun masses a sense of cultural empowerment. It has outweighed other cinemas in terms of the total numbers of movies released during 2001-2012 – 158 of Pashto movies as compared to 127 and 156 in Urdu and Punjabi, respectively. On the contrary no film has been released in Balochi (or Brahui) during 2001-2012.\textsuperscript{149} It is worth noting that Pashto cinema is more of a liability than a resource for Pashtun nationalist movement: it lessens the sense of cultural deprivation among Pashtuns, on the one hand; and, on the other, it rarely represents and/or promotes Pashtun culture and history. Pashto cinema rather reinforces some negative stereotypical traits and essentializes a distorted collective persona of Pashtuns, thereby disorienting them both culturally and politically. For instance, Pashtuns are presented as simpleton, war-loving and barbaric people (for details, see T. Khan 2015).

As compared to Balochi and Brahui (the languages spoken by Baloch people), Pashto has been given slightly more share in the state-run TV stations airtime, and has more institutions for the promotion of languages. As noted above, institutions promoting Pashto language has significantly higher budget than those promoting Balochi and Brahui languages: Rs. 3.61 million for Pashto as compared to the Rs 0.257 million for Balochi and Brahui, collectively.

Besides the formal sources of (and resources allocated to) the support of local languages, in which Pashto has more share in comparison with Baloch languages, the former has relative

\textsuperscript{148} This information is based on the author’s personal communication with a popular Pashtun music artist and nationalist activist, April 30, 2015. This point is discussed in detail in Chapter 6.

advantage over the latter when it comes to the informal sources of language and culture conservation and promotion. In the post-partition period, Pashtuns migrated to various major cities of Pakistan such as Karachi, Sindh, the federal capital, Islamabad, and Rawalpindi and Lahore, Islamabad. After the creation of Pakistan, Karachi became the hub of industrial and commercial activities, followed by Punjab, partly due to the state’s policies. “By 1967, although the NWFP had 17.7 percent of the West Pakistan’s population, its share of fixed assets was only 7 per cent, and of production in manufacturing industries around 6 per cent” (Ahmad 1998, 195; cited in Khan 2011a, 80). Instead of accentuating resentment among Pashtuns, they became integrated in Pakistan through capital flight and migration from the Pashtun regions to Karachi and Punjab. Pashtuns took with them their culture and language as well. The cultural capital they have taken with them, nonetheless, does not translate automatically into political or economic capital. They need to adopt non-Pashtun cosmopolitan cultural capital, especially in Karachi, which can enable them to have access to the power-corridors. However, most of the Pashtuns living in other cities of Pakistan are dual-housed – having houses and properties and family connections back in Pashtunkhwa as well. Consequently, they tend to conserve their culture and language so that they are not estranged back in their motherland. In addition, Pashtuns are considerably large population of Karachi, which has to compete with other ethno-national communities (mainly, the Mahajir). Therefore, the Pashtun nationalist elite instrumentalize Pashtun culture and language to garner political support, which in turn helps in conserving Pashtun social capital, social norms and networks.

All said, Pashtuns are arguably more visible than Balochs as a distinct ethno-linguistic entity in the non-Pashtun and non-Baloch cities of Pakistan, giving them a sense of culturally empowered community as compared to Balochs, who are either assimilated by the host population or constitute a reasonably negligible part of the huge cosmopolitan non-Baloch cities, like Karachi or Islamabad. Therefore, Balochs perceive greater threat to their identity, while
Pashtun have been exchanging their language and cultural traits such as their clothes and cuisines with the host population of the non-Pashtun cities. For instance, non-Pashtun urban elite, throughout Pakistan, is fond of wearing Chatrali-Pakol (a special men’s headwear, becoming popular among the young, non-Pashtun elite girls too) Shalwar-Qamees and Waistcoats,150 Peshawari Chappal (Pashtun footwear) and Swati winter Shawls (wrapped by both men and women during winters) for instance.151

Conclusion

Because of their relatively worse socio-economic conditions and more marginalized position in the power structures of the state (both formal and informal), Balochs feel more resentful than Pashtuns. Therefore, in comparison with their Pashtun counterpart, Baloch nationalist elite find it easier to mobilize their people for their national cause. However, as noted earlier, relative deprivation is not the only necessary condition determining the trajectory of an ethno-nationalist movement. Other factors such as a movement’s frames and discourse (discussed in the next chapter), resource mobilization and the political opportunity structures may play a decisive role in shaping its trajectory.

150 Shalwar Qamees (a loose and soft dress worn by both men and women) and waistcoat are not exclusively Pashtun dress: it is popular among Indian and Punjabi elite as well. It is, nonetheless, predominantly associated with Pashtuns, both rural and urban. Besides, Balochs wear a different type of Shalwar-Qamees, which is not sought-after among non-Baloch Pakistanis.
151 This information is based on my observation of the Pakistani media and society and my interactions with different ethno-national communities of Pakistan.
CHAPTER 5

The POLITICS OF COUNTERHEGEMONY

As noted earlier, a situation of subordination and deprivation does not necessarily translate into popular resistance, following its own logic. A social movement organization (SMO) shapes the form and impetus of resistance depending on how it politicizes deprivation. A movement’s elite problematizes the existing structures of relations by (re)articulating deprivation and attributing it to ‘unjust’ and ‘exploitative’ structural mechanisms, while emphasizing the need to recast them through collective action. The deliberate interpretive practices on the part of a movement’s elite, in order to reshape popular cognition of a situation of domination and to generate consensus and mobilize action, is commonly referred to as the framing processes. According to contemporary literature on social movements, framing processes are a necessary condition for movement participation (Snow et al, 1986, 464; also see Zald, 1996; Benford and Snow, 2000; Oliver and Johnston, 2000; Hunt and Benford, 2016; and Skillington, 1997). 152

With reference to Baloch and Pashtun nationalists’ framing processes, this chapter argues that the clearer, the more consistent, and the more frequent a movement’s frames are, the easier it will be to counter hegemony and mobilize popular resistance against the state. Moreover, I argue that, other things being equal, the initial framing processes of a movement are instrumental in shaping its subsequent frames.

152 It is worth noting that every interpretive and articulatory practice is not necessarily change-oriented. Some sociopolitical organizations – counter-movement organizations – may interpret and describe a situation to justify and maintain status-quo. Such interpretive and cognitive processes are called the counter-framing processes. Counter-frames undermine a movement’s “…myths, versions of reality, or interpretive framework” (Benford and Snow, 626). Counter-frames are studied in Chapter 7.
This chapter is organized into five parts: Part I discusses the concept of ‘frames’ and ‘framing processes,’ which serve as the theoretical frame of the chapter. Part II operationalizes the selected variables. Part III of the chapter discusses its methodology. The third part is followed by a description of my ‘units of analysis.’ Finally, I analyze and compare the Baloch and Pashtun nationalist framing processes.

**Frames and Framing Processes**

Frames are the differential interpretation and symbolic representation of a situation of subordination to generate and sustain grievances, specify responsibility, and mobilize collective action. In Zald’s (1996) words, frames are “… the specific metaphors, symbolic interpretations, and cognitive cues used to render or cast behavior and events in an evaluative mode and to suggest alternative modes of action” (262). Thus, frames *diagnose* a particular situation of deprivation by identifying its source(s) and culpable agents (Benford and Snow, 616). Collective action requires what McAdam (1982) calls ‘cognitive liberation,’ by persuading the audience that their subjugation and deprivation is not a matter of misfortune, but a consequence of injustice (Snow et al., 466). In addition, frames do what is commonly known as prognosis – i.e., suggesting an alternative course of action to end the (perceived) relations of domination. In short, framing processes entail both diagnosis and prognosis to generate consensus as well as to mobilize action. Consensus generation involves securing support for a movement’s cause; whereas, action mobilization implies the activation of the movement’s supporters (Snow et al., 466). The process of linking an SMO’s ideological orientation with ‘unmobilized and unorganized popular sentiments pool’ is also referred to as the frame bridging (Snow et al., 467; Benford and Snow, 624). Frame bridging that occurs across movements is called frame diffusion:
that is, the spreading of interpretive cues and collective action frames from one movement to another (Snow et al., 467; Benford and Snow, 627). For instance, when the lawyers and democratic forces launched a popular uprising against General Musharraf’s unconstitutional move of suspending the Chief Justice of Pakistan in March 2007 they used to chant the slogan ye jo dehshatgard i hay, iss kay peechay wardi hay (the men in uniform are behind this terrorism) to highlight the military establishment’s role in patronizing terrorist organizations. This frame was later on adopted by Pashtun nationalists, which has recently become very popular.

What follows is that a movement’s frames are dialectically related to people’s cognitive orientations and cultural inspirations: a movement’s diagnostic and/or prognostic frames may be either constrained or facilitated by the existing normative structures and popular cognitive cues. Likewise, an SMO’s framings may put into effect a change in the existing cultural norms. Thus, on the one hand, the existent cultural myths and practices constitute the symbolic capital which a movement’s elite invest to construct new meanings; on the other, the extant cultural values serve as the frame of reference for the prospective supporters of a movement to appraise its frames. Consequently, movements are “both consumers of existing cultural meanings and producers of new meanings” (Tarrow 1992, 189; in Benford and Snow, 629). The mobilizing potential of an SMO’s frames is, therefore, directly proportional both to their degree of cultural resonance (Benford and Snow, 619; and Zald, 1996) and to the SMO’s strategies to reorient popular sentiments and to change (or reproduce) the existing cultural and psychological structures.

The idea of resonance also signifies frames consistency and empirical credibility – including the credibility of the frame articulators. Consistency refers to the uniformity in an SMO’s frames and between an SMO frames and its strategic actions (Benford and Snow, 620). It also denotes homogeneity between a movement’s frames on a specific issue and its long term objectives. Likewise, contradictions between the frames and ‘reality’ make the frames less credible. Although ‘reality’ is always open to multiple cognitive and interpretive claims and is
constructed through hegemonic discourses and framing processes, the “empirical referents [must] lend themselves to being read as ‘real’ indicators of the diagnostic claims.” In Benford and Snow’s words, there should be an “apparent fit between the framings and events in the world” (620) in order that frames become more appealing and plausible to a movement’s prospective supporters. In this chapter, I have examined how consistent the challengers’ frames are on certain issues of ethno-national significance such as provincial autonomy, civilian control of the coercive forces of the state and democratic freedoms.

A related framing concept utilized in this chapter is ‘frame amplification.’ Frame amplification entails articulating some experiences, beliefs and values as more significant than others. Frame amplification consists of value amplification and belief amplification. The former involves the recognition and glorification of socially recognized general standards of right conduct, such as justice, integrity, truthfulness, perseverance. In order to garner support, a movement’s elite make appeal to social values pertaining to personal, familial, ethnic or national integrity and honor of prospective constituents. Thus, a movement reinvigorates and highlights certain values relevant to its cause, which otherwise may not be so salient (see Snow et al, 469; Benford and Snow, 623). Another aspect of frame amplification is belief amplification. “Beliefs refer to presumed relationships ‘between two things or between something and a characteristic of it’” (Snow et al., 469), such as, gods are immortal, or Chimpanzees are our ancestors. Snow et al. enumerates five types of beliefs distinguishable in the movement’s literature, which are constructed and exploited for consensus generation and action mobilization: beliefs about 1) the

153 The concepts of ‘frame’ and ‘discourse’ (in narrow, linguistic, sense) are not diametrically different from each other, although they are not the same. Following Laclau and Mouffe (2001), a discourse is a structured totality, a system of signification, resulting from articulatory practices. A particular sign/element acquires certain meanings within a particular discourse. Thus, a discourse is an overarching, and relatively stable, chain of signification (see Chapter 2). On the other hand, a frame refers to the interpretive and articulatory strategies of a movement’s elite to appeal to the masses by (re)structuring their cognition of a particular issue. Hence, a movement’s frames seek to propagate a competing (counterhegemonic) discourse while politicizing an issue. In other words certain frames are related to specific counterhegemonic discourses. A discourse shapes and constrains framing processes.
gravity of an issue or problem; 2) the locus of causality or responsibility; 3) the antagonists and protagonists; 4) the efficacy of collective action (or the possibility of change); and 5) the need and propriety of action (ibid, 470).

While studying the framing strategies of Baloch and Pashtun nationalists, I have focused more on how they have prioritized various issues of ethnolinguistic significance (such as their ethnolinguistic and historical identities, autonomy, and democratic freedoms) in order to make them appear more salient than others. First, I have identified how frequently the challengers have diagnosed a specific issue of ethno-national importance. Second, I have studied how often the challengers have made a prognosis about specific issues. Third, the concept of frame amplification is utilized in this chapter to signify how the ethno-nationalists have emphasized the propriety (or impropriety) and the possibility (or impossibility) of a particular action and/or policy. In addition, frame amplification signifies how the challengers undermine popular political beliefs constructed through the state-sponsored hegemonic discourses.\textsuperscript{154} Correspondingly, frame amplification indicates the ethno-nationalists’ framing strategies to appeal to some abstract values like ‘honor’ or ‘justice’ (value amplification) as well as to emphasize the propriety and possibility of collective action. Finally, I have studied how often the challengers have framed an issue in a way inconsistent to their popular position as ethno-nationalists. The concept of frame inconsistency also signifies contradictions within the structure of their argument and between their frames and the ‘reality.’ Frame inconsistency is abbreviated as \textbf{Incon}.

It is worth noting that the aforementioned attributes and/or types of the framing processes overlap with each other. While specifying responsibility and identifying the culpable agents (a diagnostic frame) a frame may be amplifying (and/or undermining) a belief or cultural values,\[\textsuperscript{154}\text{For instance one of such beliefs is that military is the only viable force to salvage Pakistan from the corruption of politicians as well as from Indian conspiracies; or that ethno-nationalism is against the spirit of Islam and a conspiracy against Pakistan.} \]
more often than not. For instance, Wali Khan, a veteran Pashtun nationalist, once opined that unless all of the four provinces (which roughly represent various ethno-national communities of Pakistan) had a feeling of equality and consociation, the future of Pakistan was uncertain (in Sidiqui n. d., 146). Thus, while suggesting an alternative constitutional arrangement, Wali Khan made the future of Pakistan contingent on the provincial autonomy (prognostic frame) and, at the same time, undermined a very popular belief that Pakistan was destined to survive till the Last Day (frame amplification). Likewise a diagnostic frame usually implies a prognosis as well, and vice versa. Consequently, I have categorized the ethno-nationalists’ frames intuitively, where they could be classified in multiple ways without affecting my conclusions.

**Operationalization of Variables**

The most significant frames of ethno-national importance evaluated in this chapter involve politicization of Pashtun and Baloch ethnolinguistic and historical identities in opposition to Pakistani civic identity constructed through hegemonic discourses. By politicization of ethnicity I mean constructing ‘us vs. them’ binaries along ethnolinguistic lines (primarily directed against Punjabis or the Punjabi-dominated state of Pakistan). Assertion of ethnolinguistic and historical identities leads to demanding provincial autonomy and/or separation from Pakistan along ethnolinguistic lines (prognosis). My argument is that the more consistently an ethno-nationalist organization asserts its ethnolinguistic and historical identities, the easier it is to undermine Pakistani civic identity to mobilize support for its cause. Frames pertaining to the politicization of ethnolinguistic and historical identities in opposition to the Pakistani civic identity are tabulated as Eth.

155 “Pakistan Qayamat thak qa’im rahey ga,” as they say it in Urdu.
The second significant issue concerning ethno-national politics is the politics of grievance articulation. Grievance articulation involves indicating the causes of socio-economic deprivation of a people and the alternative course to end deprivation. In addition, I have operationalized frames related to deprivation to include the state’s policy of directly or indirectly repressing the ethno-nationalists and their supporters. In this chapter, ethno-nationalists’ politics of deprivation and grievance generation is signified by Dep.

Third, I have examined how the challengers have framed the scarcity (or otherwise) of democratic freedoms and civilian supremacy – abbreviated as Dem. Vindicating the democratic rights of people and the need to rein in the military from interfering in politics helps create and maintain a discourse that can significantly tarnish the public persona of the military, created through the state-sponsored hegemonic discourses, which can in turn help create political opportunities for the challengers to mobilize resources, keeping in view the political and repressive role of the military in Pakistan.

Finally, the ethno-nationalists’ frames analyzed in this chapter pertain to peace and stability in Afghanistan and the need to establish cordial relations with India, Afghanistan and Soviet Russia (and later on, the US) – countries which the challengers consider either sympathetic towards their cause or whose regional policies help create political opportunities for their struggle. Moreover, India, Afghanistan, the former USSR (and currently the US) are the constitutive-others in Pakistan’s hegemonic discourse structures to externalize conflict and threat perception among smaller ethno-national communities. Consequently, undermining the popular images of the constitutive-others of Pakistan destabilizes the official civic identity constructed at the cost of the ethno-national and historical identities of the constituent ethno-national communities. Pashtun and Baloch ethno-nationalists’ framing processes concerning the foreign policy of Pakistan and its relations with its neighbors and major actors in the region are categorized as FP.
It is equally challenging to clearly categorize a frame along the issues mentioned above. For instance, articulating grievances and politicizing deprivation may also entail politicization of ethnic identity. While claiming the political rights of Pashtuns in Pakistan, Wali Khan said that there were two ways of making a government: the first was the legal and political (i.e., electoral) one; if the first one did not work then the second option was the one which Pakistan had adopted in Afghanistan – i.e., the non-constitutional and violent one. Thus Wali Khan threatened the state with (and alluded to the possibility of) violent struggle against the state. In addition, he referred to Pakistan’s support to the militant Islamists, who according to Wali Khan had denounced the peaceful and democratic means to govern a polity. But at the same time, Wali Khan’s frame is inconsistent, as drawing an analogy between the violence of the Islamists in Afghanistan and the possible violence of Pashtuns, which Wali Khan pointed to, was inherently wrong: according to Wali Khan’s ANP’s stated position, the former was illegitimate in the sense that it was undemocratic, whereas the later could be legitimized in the sense that a people have the right to violent resistance if peaceful means of freedom and equality are denied to them.156

In short, I have categorized the ethno-nationalists’ framings pertaining to a variety of contemporary issues of ethno-national importance thematically. However, I have classified the issues discussed in this chapter either contextually or instinctively when a single frame could be categorized in multiple ways along the issues of ethno-national significance. It is to be noted that sometimes a single sentence or a paragraph frames multiple issues; and therefore I have categorized them as such. On the contrary, more than one sentence or a whole paragraph is categorized as a single frame, irrespective of the fact that how many times a word or phrase is repeated if its theme did not change or if the same frame on the same issue did not have multiple framing attributes.


The real issue is that Pakistan is considered one nation, whilst the fact is that there are several nations in it, for whom there should be autonomous provinces on the basis of their languages. In such situations (i.e., in a multi-ethnic state), whatever is the system, it should be federal (in Ghano 2013).

The first sentence of this speech has two framing attributes: 1) it amplifies the ethno-nationalist claim that Pakistan is a multi-ethnic state, while undermining the popular Pakistani nationalist belief that Pakistan is one nation; and 2) the sentence suggests the prognosis that maximum autonomy should be granted to the ethnolinguistically organized provinces. Therefore, I divide the first sentence into two counterhegemonic frames. The second sentence of the speech reiterates the prognosis suggested in the first sentence. Therefore, I classify the second part of the first sentence and the second sentence as a single frame.

**Units of Analysis**

My units of analysis in this chapter are speeches and interviews of Pashtun and Baloch nationalist leadership. Pashtun nationalist leadership includes the leading figures of Awami National Party (ANP) and its predecessor, the Khudai Khidmatgar (KK), and Pakhtunkhwa Mili Awami Party (PMAP). As mentioned in Chapter 3, both of the parties have assumed different

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157 The interview is reproduced in Ghano (2013), which does not carry the exact date of publication in the paper.
names (and programs) before and after the creation of Pakistan. And, both of them have occasionally remained parts of either a single party (like NAP, discussed in Chapter 3), or of some political alliance. However, they claim different legacies within the Pashtun nationalist movement: the ANP takes pride in the Bacha Khan-led Khudai Khidmatgar (KK); while the latter (PMAP) associates itself with Samad Khan Achakzai’s struggle (see Chapter 3). It is equally worth noting that both of the parties revere both Bacha Khan and Samad Khan as their national heroes.

Notwithstanding their difference with each other on some marginal issues of national importance, both the ANP and PMAP have ostensibly the same objectives – ethno-national autonomy, civilian control of the military, secularism, and peace in Afghanistan, besides avowing Afghan ethno-national and historical identities of Pashtuns in Pakistan. Still and beyond, the ANP and PMAP are organized along different lines: the former is relatively loosely organized, granting greater freedom of opinion to its members, and elects its leadership through secret ballot; whereas, the PMAP believes in the principles of ‘democratic centralism, centralized elections and collective leadership.’

Among the Baloch ethno-nationalist parties, I have studied both the federalists and the separatists, though they do not lend themselves to be classified categorically. Most of the Baloch ethno-nationalist parties have been oscillating between federalism and separatism, and between electoral politics and militancy. For instance, at present, Sardar Akhtar Jan Mengal (b. 1962), the former Chief Minister of Balochistan (1997-1998) leads the federalist Balochistan National Party (BNP), while his brother Javed Mengal leads a separatist faction – Laskar-e-

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158 The ethno-nationalists promote secularist discourse because it undermines Pakistan’s Islamist civic-identity discourse.

159 To remind my readers, by ‘federalists’ I mean the political parties which seek autonomy for provinces demarcated along ethno-national lines within Pakistan. The federalists are active in electoral politics. On the contrary, Baloch separatist do not recognize Pakistan’s sovereignty over Baloch territories. They have launched (or support) armed struggle against the state.
Balochistan. Their father, Sardar Atta Ullah Mengal (b. 1929), one of the Baloch triumvirates, endorses both. It is worth mentioning that the senior Mengal participated in electoral processes and supported militant separatism, intermittently.

Besides Mengal’s of Balochistan National Party (BNP), I have analyzed the framing tactics of Khair Bakhsh Marri (1928-2014). Marri has been critical of both federalism and electoral politics. He repented participating in the elections of 1970. He (and his tribe) has remained a significant force of both the 1970s and current Baloch insurgencies. At present, his son Harbyar Marri is believed to be one of the leading figures of the militant Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) following the death of his brother, Balaach Marri (1966-2007), in an armed conflict with Pakistan’s security forces.

Finally, this chapter analyzes the frames of National Party led by Mir Hasil Khan Bezinjo. It is worth noting that the NP represents Ghaus Bakhsh Bezinjo’s legacy.\textsuperscript{160} The stated objective of the NP is to secure constitutional autonomy along ethnolinguistic lines within Pakistani federation through electoral political struggle.

Thus, my focus is on the framing strategies of Baloch triumvirates and the BNP and NP. I have excluded the militant separatist leadership\textsuperscript{161} from my analysis. The reason for not analyzing the frames of the leadership of separatist militant organizations is that they are either in exile (Harbyar and Brahmargedgh, for instance) or are operating underground. Comparing their frames with ethno-nationalists engaged exclusively in non-violent counterhegemonic struggle can significantly skew my analysis, as it has different political dynamics than militant separatist

\textsuperscript{160} Ghaus Bakhsh Bezinjo (1917-1989) was one of the leading figures of Kalat State National Party (KNSP) that led the movement for the creation of an independent Baloch state following the end of the British Raj in India. After the annexation of Balochistan by Pakistan, the senior Bezinjo remained part of the NAP-led political struggle to secure constitutional autonomy to the proposed ethnolinguistically constituted federating units of Pakistan (see Chapter 3).

\textsuperscript{161} The most prominent separatist figures include Harbyar Marri, allegedly leading Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), Brahmargedgh Bugti popularly associated with Baloch Republican Army (BRA), and Allah Nazar Baloch, founder of the outlawed Baloch Students Organization-Azad (BSO-Azad) who is currently leading the militant Baloch Liberation Front (BLF).
struggle. The former are exposed to the state’s repressive apparatuses more than the latter. Consequently, advocating separatism within electoral arena can significantly raise the costs for challengers. Therefore, generation of grievance and highlighting the need for ethno-national autonomy is a better discursive strategy for those engaged in electoral politics. It is worth noting that the Baloch federalists’ framing processes significantly help the separatists to recruit support. Likewise, the militants partake in discursive struggle, more often than not, which helps generate grievances among Balochs, and thus generates popular support for those engaged in electoral arena. Although Pakistan has denounced the militant separatists as terrorists and have banished them from the mainstream media, they have been making the most of the social media outlets (such as YouTube, Twitter, and Facebook) to reach out to their followers and the world at large, and thus to mobilize support for their cause.

In addition, Baloch and Pashtun ethno-nationalist leadership has been further categorized into the first and second generation leadership. The former includes those who were active in pre-partition British-Indian politics and the post-partition period till late-1980s. Among the first generation Pashtun leadership, I have analyzed public speeches and interviews of Bacha Khan, Wali Khan, and Samad Khan Achakzai. And the first generation Baloch leadership includes Ghaus Bakhsh Bezinjo, Khair Bakhsh Marri, and Atta Ulla Mengal. It is worth noting that some of the first generation Baloch and Pashtun leadership’s speeches and interviews analyzed in this chapter are as late as of 1990s and even 2000s. The reason for selecting their later interviews is that I could not find enough of their earlier speeches and interviews. Therefore, I have used their recent frames as proxies for the earlier ones. The former do not differ significantly from the latter.

The second generation of the Baloch and Pashtun leadership includes the leadership leading their respective nationalist struggle in the post-1980s. Among the second generation of Pashtun nationalist leadership, I have studied the framing strategies of Asfandyar Wali Khan (b. 1949), the President the ANP, and Mehmood Khan Achakzai (b. 1948), the Chairman of the
Among the second generation of Baloch nationalists, I have analyzed the speeches and interviews of Hasil Khan Bazeno of the NP and Sardar Akhtar Jan Mengal of the BNP.

**Methodology**

The interviews and speeches analyzed in this chapter are randomly selected by using Stratified Sampling Technique (SST). First, I classified the available interviews and speeches into spoken and now written ones. Then, I selected my samples from the stratified categories of interviews and speeches through Simple Random Sampling (SRS) – using lottery method. Consequently, I ended up having 58 speeches and interviews of Baloch and Pashtun political elite, 29 each.

It is worth noting that the selected interviews and speeches were of varying length. Therefore, I faced the problem of quantifying the written interviews and speeches of the first generation of ethno-nationalists in order to calculate the average of the frames pertaining to various issues of ethno-national importance, such as politicization of ethnicity, democratic freedoms, deprivation, and foreign policy of Pakistan. To overcome this problem, I converted the written interviews and speeches in terms of time. By using stopwatch, I read several pages of every book containing the interviews and speeches of the first generation of ethno-nationalist leadership so as to calculate the average time a single page required to be verbalized.

I have used both quantitative and qualitative methods to evaluate the ethno-nationalist frames. Concerning quantitative analysis, I have conducted t-statistics to see if the difference between the samples’ means is statistically significant. For the purpose of qualitative study of the
ethno-nationalists framing processes, I have used the critical discourse analysis (CDA) model so as to contextualize the framing strategies of the challengers.

**Pashtun and Baloch Nationalists’ Frames**

First Generation Frames: Quantitative Analysis

Based their themes, I have quantified Pashtun and Baloch nationalists’ framing strategies aimed at creating the counterhegemony. As Table 1 indicates, Baloch nationalists have politicized their ethnolinguistic and historical identities (signified as Eth) more than Pashtun nationalists, i.e., 1.16 times per minute as compared to 0.61 times per minute, respectively. Likewise, Balochs have politicized their deprivation (Dep) to generate grievances, and have criticized Pakistan’s foreign policy ventures (FP), especially in Afghanistan, more than their Pashtun counterparts. However, Pashtun nationalists have emphasized the need for establishing and strengthening democratic institutions (Dem) more than Baloch nationalists. Finally, Pashtun nationalist frames are more inconsistent (Incon) than those of Baloch nationalists.

Table 5.1: Means of the First Generation Pashtun and Baloch Nationalists’ Frames

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Challengers</th>
<th>Eth</th>
<th>Dep</th>
<th>Dem</th>
<th>FP</th>
<th>Incon</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pashtuns</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balochs</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The mean difference between Pashtun and Baloch nationalist framings in terms of the selected variables is illustrated in Figure 5.1.

![Bar chart showing the mean differences between Pashtun and Baloch nationalists' frames for various variables.]

**Figure 5.1: Means of the First Generation Pashtun and Baloch Nationalists’ Frames**

However, calculating and comparing populations’ means do not tell us whether the difference between them is statistically significant or not. Therefore, I have run t-test to ascertain the statistical significance of the difference of samples’ means along the selected variables. The t-test results are as summarized in Table 5.2.

**Table 5.2: T-Test Results Comparing First Generation Pashtun and Baloch Nationalists’ Frames**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>P Means</th>
<th>B Means</th>
<th>t-stat</th>
<th>t-crit</th>
<th>α 0.05</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eth</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>2.05</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dep</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>-0.28</td>
<td>2.04</td>
<td>0.77</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5.2 indicates that Baloch nationalists have prioritized, more than Pashtun nationalists, the politicization of their ethnolinguistic and historical identities in opposition to Pakistan’s civic identity. As we will see later in this chapter, while advocating Baloch separatism, Atta Ullah Mengal and Khair Bakhsh Marri rarely emphasized Baloch grievances to be addressed within Pakistani federation. They refused to accept anything short of independence. Nor did they insist on democratic freedoms as much as they popularized the idea of an independent Baloch state. Nevertheless, Ghaus Bakhsh Bezinjo, a non-violent federalist, has equally emphasized scarcity of democratic freedoms and the need to establish parliamentary democracy in addition to politicizing Baloch ethnicity and generating grievances.

Though the first generation Pashtun nationalists opposed the civic identity discourse of Pakistan, they failed to assert their ethnolinguistic and historical identities as frequently and as emphatically as their Baloch counterparts did. Moreover, Pashtun nationalist frames focusing on their ethnic identity did not translate into separatist demands – rather they insisted on autonomy and control over their resources within Pakistani federation.

First Generation Frames: Qualitative Analysis

As noted in Chapter 3, the Pashtun nationalist movement was sidetracked when Anjuman-i-Islah-ul-Afghana (Society for the Reformation of Afghans, founded by Bacha Khan in April 1921) was replaced with the Khudai Khidmatgar (KK) (the Servants of God) in 1929.
Although the *Anjuman* was a social reform organization, its name indicates that Bacha Khan was mindful of the Afghan ethno-historical\(^{162}\) identity of Pashtuns in British India; whereas the KK’s name and its program signified social reformism more than an ethno-historically oriented political agenda, although its pledge, which every member of the KK had to make, obliged them not to abstain from any sacrifice to serve their nation and homeland. In addition, the merger of the KK with the All-India National Congress (henceforth, the Congress) eclipsed Pashtun nationalism further.\(^{163}\) Thenceforth, Pashtun nationalism in British India remained equivocal – rather nonexistent.

Bacha Khan, a charismatic leader of the KK, infrequently used the words *mulk* (meaning ‘country’ in modern political lexicon) and *Watan* (homeland) interchangeably, by which he meant Pashtun homeland in British India. Yet, he hardly ever politicized the terms *mulk* and *qaam* (nation) in the sense to construct a separate Pashtun/Afghan political identity in opposition to the Indianization of Pashtun/Afghan people and land in British India. As late as July 1946, the KK’s agenda was the independence of a united India. It remained obscure concerning the future of Pashtuns in the anticipated post-partition India. For instance, with reference to the Cabinet Mission Plan,\(^{164}\) Bacha Khan complained in his July 1, 1946, speech that the KK, which won majority seats in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) from the Congress’ electoral platform, was not given a ministry in the central cabinet. He also argued that the All-India

\(^{162}\) The term ethno-historical is used in this study to highlight the significance of political histories of ethno-national communities comprising Pakistan. Pashtun and Baloch nationalists emphasize their respective histories, too, to promote their nationalist cause.

\(^{163}\) The Congress, led by Gandhi, was an Indian nationalist party struggling for the unity and independence of India.

\(^{164}\) The plan was made by a delegation of the British cabinet ministers of Clement Atlee’s administration on June 16, 1946, to transfer power to Indians. The plan envisaged that there would be three groups of provinces formed on communal basis: Muslim-majority provinces of Sindh, Punjab, NWFP, and (British-) Balochistan would constitute one group, Bengal and Assam would form another, whereas Hindu-majority provinces would constitute a third group. The provinces were given the right to leave one group and join another. The center (government of the Union of India) was given control over defense, currency, and foreign affairs. In addition, a 14 members’ coalition government was proposed at the centre, which included 5 ministers from the Congress and League each.
Muslim League\textsuperscript{165} should not have censured the Congress for nominating a Muslim for the transitional government at the center. Bacha Khan actually wanted to dispel the League’s propaganda that the Congress was a Hindu communalist party. He said:

… Instead of including a Khudai Khidmatgar representative from the Frontier Province in the transitional [central] government (given the fact that in this province it [the KK] is the only party that has made sacrifices for the independence of \textit{mulk}, and particularly, it has been proved in the last elections that the majority of the people of this province support the Khudai Khidmatgar), the Cabinet Mission has taken such a person [from the Frontier] who has lost his seat [in 1946 elections] provincial elections. The [Congress] working committee was upset by this decision … But in this decision there was something else which had really annoyed the working committee: that in the transitional government no national Muslim\textsuperscript{166} has been included. Because the whole world knows that majority of Muslims in India have the same views as do the Congress, and oppose the Muslim League, concerning the independence of \textit{mulk}. And, particularly, the Khudai Khidmatgar party has gone very far in this direction. And majority of the Frontier Province support it [the KK]. This party [the KK] supports the Congress. Is this justice that all of the five Muslim seats are given to Muslim League, and so many Muslims [who do not support the League] are not given representation (in Khan, trans. n. d. 69-69)?

As most of his speeches (delivered between 1939 and 1946) indicate, Bacha Khan failed to help Pashtun ethno-historical identity transform into popular aspiration (and demand) for a separate nation-state or for the reunification of historical Pashtun land in British India with Afghanistan. The term \textit{mulk} is equivocally used by Bacha Khan on different occasions. It is clear from his speech quoted above that \textit{mulk} signified British India for Bacha Khan, notwithstanding

\textsuperscript{165} As noted in Chapter 1 and 2, the All-India Muslim League (briefly, the League) was a Muslim communalist party which wanted constitutional guarantees for Muslims of British India, and which later on demanded the partition of India on the basis of religion.

\textsuperscript{166} By ‘national Muslims,’ Bacha Khan means those Muslim leaders who were against the colonial Raj and opposed the partition of India along communal lines.
the fact that he used the term, on occasions, to connote Pashtun homeland too. He told his followers, categorically, that the KK supported the Congress’ agenda of a united India, despite the fact that his followers were not Indians – neither historically nor ethnolinguistically.

As noted earlier, a people’s identity is constructed through hegemonic discourses. However, other antagonistic discursive entities endeavor to subvert the meanings created in the discursive arena. In an ‘ideal speech situation’ a discursive position which renders itself to be read as ‘real’ will have greater chances to generate consensus among the audience. In other words, in free and fair conditions of communication, a discourse that is more reasonable and has greater empirical validity will be more appealing to its prospective constituency. Accordingly, Bacha Khan’s discursive position was not only relatively vague and inconsistent but also did not resonate with the ethnolinguistic and historical identity markers of Pashtuns of British India. Had Bacha Khan organized opposition to the British Raj in terms of Pashtuns’ ethnolinguistic identity, it could have helped Pashtuns to imagine themselves as a separate ethno-national community entitled to have a nation-state of their own. This would have also helped the KK to mitigate the League’s popular allegation that the former was taking sides with the Hindu Congress that was perceived to be against Muslims’ interests.

The idea of Pashtunistan was floated by the KK leadership only too late – when the partition of India along communal lines became obvious. By then, it was not viable to generate consensus and/or mobilize action to wrestle Pashtunistan away from the Raj (or subsequently from Pakistan). The British administration was reluctant to consider the KK’s demand of

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167 Ideal speech situation is characterized by communication that is not manipulated in favor of a specific doctrinal/discursive community through instruments of coercion (for details on ‘ideal speech situation,’ see Habermas, 1992; and James and William, 2014).
168 It is noteworthy that Pashtunistan had never been an historical political entity. Instead of demanding Pashtunistan, Bacha Khan (and his colleagues) should have asked for the reunification of Pashtun/Afghan land in British India with Afghanistan. The call for a greater Afghanistan would have underscored and politicized both the history and ethnicity of Pashtuns. This would have also helped Afghanistan to solicit global support for its irredentist claims.
Pashtunistan,\textsuperscript{169} while non-violence had been modus operandi of the KK, which Bacha Khan and his colleagues would never compromise on. Thus, to organize the KK resources for violent struggle was almost impossible by the time when partition of India along communal lines had in principle been agreed upon by major players, the Raj, Congress and League.

What is more, the colonial administration took every measure to suppress the KK: ranging from confiscation of property to imprisonment to repression of peaceful political protests. On the contrary, the League leadership – the KK’s rival – was rewarded for the services it rendered to the Raj, because the former supported the Raj. Bacha Khan accused the colonial administration of sponsoring the Leagues candidates against the KK during the 1946 provincial elections. While addressing a gathering, he said:

I have recently been on a trip of the province [NWFP – the present-day Khyber Pakhtunkhwa] … Every public servant in the province – from a low scale revenue collector to a commissioner [district administrator] and even the Governor – wants the Congress candidates to fail[ in the 1946 provincial elections]. Every servant asks people who they are going to vote for. When they reply, “for the Congress,” the public servant says: “what! You are going to vote for a Hindu, and not for Muslim League – a Muslim!” (in Khan, n. d. 49-49).

Although the colonial-state apparatuses, both repressive and ideological, were employed against the KK, Bacha Khan could have politicized Pashtun ethnicity and history. He did not do so until the partition of India became manifest. If one analyzes his speeches before 1947, he used

\textsuperscript{169} As noted earlier, the demand for Pashtunistan was made in a grand council of Pashtun representatives on June 21, 1947, in Bannu district of the NWFP. The Bannu resolution passed by the council said that Pashtuns wanted neither to be part of India nor Pakistan. Instead they wanted to establish self-rule. The resolution, however, is an important symbolic marker which enlightens the current Pashtun nationalism. It is worth mentioning that the council was attended by non-Khudai Khidmatgar Pashtun nationalists, too, such as such as Samad Khan Achakzai from British Balochistan and Faqir of Ipi from Waziristan, the present day’s FATA. Faqir Ipi had launched a violent resistance against British, which continued against Pakistan till the end of 1954.
the terms nation and mulk in an apolitical manner. He emphasized the need to reform Pashtun society very frequently, while reproaching Pashtuns’ socio-psychological depravities. He recurrently criticized Pashtun society for the social vices which he felt were rife among Pashtuns, such as extravagance, ostentation, violence, tribal and family feuds and rivalries, avarice, and egotism. He was convinced that Pashtuns could not become a prosperous nation unless they desisted from such evil practices. Therefore, he preached fraternity, austerity and frugality, tolerance, non-violence, forbearance, and altruism to Pashtuns. On the whole, Bacha Khan’s speeches during the specified period reveal that he was more of a messianic figure who would instruct his followers in moral uprightness than a visionary ethno-nationalist leader – who would politicize the situation of his people along ethno-national lines.

On the other hand, Samad Khan Achakzia, a Pashtun nationalist leading Anjuman-e-Watan (Society of Homeland) based in British Balochistan, refrained from aligning his political agenda with that of Congress. As evidenced by his 1939 speech to the annual conference of the Anjuman, Samad Khan advised his followers to desist from indulging in the Congress-League controversy. He categorically denounced any political connection with the Congress. However, he praised the Congress for its anti-colonial stance, and believed that the destiny of British Balochistan was associated with the greater question of India. Like Bacha Khan, Samad Khan attempted to dispel the propaganda that the Congress was a Hindu communalist party (in Ghano, 42). By so doing, he wanted the populace to avoid becoming part of the Hindu-Muslim controversy. He believed that Balochistan had certain peculiarities which necessitated a Balochistan-centric political organization. Samad Khan argued:

I am not against the establishment of Congress because I do not consider Balochistan as part of India; or because I am not aware of the fact that our concerns and problems are more or less the same as those of India … Currently, indulging ourselves in some all-
Indian issue is tantamount to taking sides with one of the two parties [the League and Congress] ... Our party must be above all this [controversy]. It is possible that the Hindu-Muslim controversy may partially be a majority-minority issue, yet it is usually a concern of some selfish elements from both the communities. Religion has nothing to do with it. This is why the Muslim League could not hold sway in any of the provinces where Muslims are in majority. For instance, in the first three of the provinces, Bengal, Punjab, Sindh, and the Frontier Province, the Congress does not have any considerable power. However, Muslim League does not have government or power in these provinces [either]. Rather Muslims and Hindus have made joint government there (in Ghano, 43).

As compared to Bacha Khan, Samad Khan could see the perils of aligning or merging his party with the Congress. He knew that political alliance with the Congress would mean partaking in the Hindu-Muslim controversy prevalent in the Muslim minority provinces of India. Thus, he made a conscious effort not to drag Muslims of British Balochistan into the Hindu-Muslim conflict of India, which could have ultimately helped the Muslim-communalist League to gain foothold in British Balochistan.

Therefore, we can infer that Samad Khan was against the League’s communalist stance that ultimately led to the partition of India along religious lines; and that he was sympathetic to the Congress’ stance of anti-British colonialism. By not affiliating his party with the Congress, it is evident that he did not consider British Balochistan as part of India, which he hinted at in the same speech. However, it is not very clear whether he wanted to have a separate state for Pashtuns of British Balochistan or reunification with Afghanistan during the colonial era. Besides, Samad Khan frequently used the word Balochistan, which obscures Pashtun ethnicity and history. It is only in his post-partition speeches and interviews that he specified Pashtun geography and took a clearer stance to merge Pashtun territories in Pakistan into a single administrative unit (in Ghano, 124; also discussed in Chapter 2). It is only once in those speeches
and interviews analyzed in this study, that he asserted the historical identity of what he so often calls Balochistan. He said, “The British, for their colonial designs, named the areas snatched from Afghanistan … as British Balochistan, instead of [naming it as] British Afghanistan” (in Ghano, 113).

It is noteworthy that Samad Khan admitted in one of his interviews that he affiliated his party with the Congress in 1945 (in Ghano, 92). Again, it is not apparent what benefits, in terms of Pashtun national autonomy or freedom, could have accrued from the affiliation of his Anjuman with the Congress. Yet it can be safely deduced that the said affiliation had nothing to offer to Pashtuns with regard to their freedom, as evident from the merger of the KK with the Congress. The post-partition speeches of Samad Khan indicate that he emphasized the integration of Pashtun areas in a single administrative unit, Pashtunistan, with maximum possible autonomy within a Pakistani federation.

Nevertheless, Samad Khan’s Anjuman originated (and was popular only) in the British Balochistan. The majority of Pashtuns from the NWFP supported Bacha Khan’s Khudai Khidmatgar. In addition, the available speeches and interviews of Samad Khan are too few to be generalized. Therefore, I have focused more on Bacha Khan and Wali Khan’s speeches concerning the politics of Pashtun ethnicity in the post partition Pakistan.

After partition, Bacha Khan made an indeterminate demand of Pashtunistan in the First Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, on December 16, 1948. Contrary to the Pakistani leadership’s apprehensions, Bacha Khan believed that the creation of Pashtunistan was not against Islam or Pakistan. He maintained, “If Pashtuns become united and stable again, how is it against Islam? If you [Pakistani leadership] help us create a strong and stable state of Pashtuns, whose strength it

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170 It is worth noting that very limited speeches and interviews and press statements of Samad Khan are publically available as compared to the rest of Pashtun and Baloch leadership studied in this chapter.
would be?" (in Bacha Khan Research Centre, n. d., 15). He said that Pashtunistan signified nothing more than renaming the land of Pashtuns in Pakistan. He argued:

Let me tell you what we mean by Pathanistan [Pashtunistan]. You know that the inhabitants of Sindh are called Sindhis. Similarly, the inhabitants of Punjab and Bengal are called Punjabis and Bengalis, respectively. Likewise, we have the North West Frontier Province. Here, we, the inhabitants, are one nation. And this is our land. We also want that people know this from the name of our Watan [homeland] that its inhabitants are Pashtuns (in Bacha Khan Research Centre, n. d., 16).

Bacha Khan further said:

We want Pashtunistan. And we want that Pashtuns on the other side of the Durand Line [Afghanistan] are also included in Pashtunistan. You help us in this regard. If you call it un-Islamic, I say it is totally Islamic. If you say that Pakistan will be destabilized by this, I say it to you that Pakistan will never be weakened by the creation of a separate political unit. Rather it will be strengthened and stabilized further (in Bacha Khan Research Centre, n. d., 17; emphasis added).

One wonders what Bacha Khan really meant by Pashtunistan, taking into account his speech to the Constituent Assembly. Did it signify a separate state for Pashtuns? Did he want to rename his Watan in Pakistan? Did he want to unite Pashtun majority areas in Afghanistan (by dividing Afghanistan) with Pashtun majority areas in Pakistan? If so, was it going to be a separate state? How could (greater) Pashtunistan strengthen and stabilize Pakistan if the former was
intended to be a separate state? Or, was the greater Pashtunistan anticipated to be part of Pakistan, in which case Pakistan could have been strengthened and stabilized, as claimed by Bacha Khan?

Another thing of note in Bacha Khan’s speech is his appeal to Islam. He invokes Pashtuns’ history and ethnicity on certain occasions during his speech, yet he took a discursive position in consonance with what I have called the nodal point of the state’s hegemonic discourse – Islam – so as to warrant his claim to Pashtunistan.

In his March 25, 1954, speech to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, Bacha Khan reiterated his stance on Pashtunistan. This time he was clear and consistent in what he said. He argued that they (Pakistanis) were five brothers living in Pakistan: Sindhi, Punjabi, Pashtun, Baloch, and Bengali. Four of them had names of their respective lands indicating their ethnolinguistic identities. However, Pashtuns did not have a name of their land indicative of their ethnicity. Therefore, Bach Khan demanded that the name of his province be changed from the NWFP to Pashtunistan. Accordingly, Pashtunistan signified rather a demand for having ethno-national identity of Pashtuns within Pakistan than a separate nation-state of Pashtuns (also see Wali Khan, in Sidiqui n. d., 179).

It is worth noting that different arenas (such as legislative, judicial, electoral or public rallies) necessitate different framing strategies. Similarly, a movement’s framing tactics are determined by the political opportunities and constraints structures. Bacha Khan and his colleagues were mindful of the fact that the state was intolerant of provincialism and politics of ethnicity. However, the newly-created state of Pakistan was not strong enough to effectively suppress the Pashtun nationalist movement, given the Bengali, Baloch, and Sindhi nationalist opposition to the Punjabi-Mahjir domination which provided greater political opportunities to

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171 To remind my readers, the present day’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa used to be officially called as North West Frontier Province (NWFP) until the 18th Amendment was passed which changed the name of the province.
Pashtun nationalists to articulate their Pashtunistan discourse in a consistent manner, even if it meant an autonomous unit within Pakistan. To the detriment of Pashtun nationalist movement, the very concept of Pashtunistan failed to evoke Pashtun history – to orient Pashtuns to their political history of being part of the greater Afghan state. As noted above, there had never been any historical entity (independent or otherwise) by the name of Pashtunistan. What Bacha Khan referred to as Pashtunistan used to be Afghanistan before it was occupied by Sikhs of Punjab in 1824, and later on by the British in 1839.\(^{172}\)

It was under Wali Khan’s leadership that such slogans as *lar aw bar, yow Afghan* (which means that Afghans straddling the Durand Line are one) and *khpala khawara, khpal ikhtyar* (signifying self-rule on Pashtun homeland) were popularized during late-1980s and 1990s. The ANP under Wali Khan attempted to construct and politicize ethno-historical identity of Pashtuns. Wali Khan also problematized Pakistani hegemonic discourse infrequently. In his speech on September 11, 1988, Wali Khan said that Pashtuns rights have been usurped in Pakistan, although it was created in the name of Islam, under the slogan of *La Illaha el-Allah* (there is no God but Allah). Hence, he brought into play the popular conception that Islam taught justice, in order to accentuate the contradiction between what Pakistani ruling elite professed and what they practiced. Moreover, he would occasionally undermine the state’s narrative that the Muslim leadership of British India had rendered great sacrifices to create Pakistan. He said:

> It is written in the school and college textbooks … who did create this country, and how? Huh! The students are told: “A poet came from Punjab [alluding to Iqbal] who had a dream [to create a separate state for Muslims of India] and Muhammad Ali Jinnah came from Bombay [currently, Mumbai – a north Indian city] to make his dream a reality, and [thus] the British were made to flee. Look at this! Man, you show us a police inspector make off with a dream, I will admire you – let alone the British … They teach you all this, my sons,

\(^{172}\) I am indebted to my friend Ayaz Khan for bring this point during our discussions on the issue.
in order to have you forget your history, your [ethno-nationalist] leaders, who have sacrificed their lives for your right; who have spent years in jail; whose properties have been confiscated. They [Pakistani state elite] want those people [Pashtun nationalists] to vanish from your sight, and have you disoriented.173

However, Wali Khan was neither as consistent nor did he accentuate as frequently Pashtuns’ ethnolinguistic and historical identity markers as his Baloch counterparts did. For instance, Wali Khan asserted (as his successors would argue) that Pashtuns were a free people and that Bacha Khan and his KK-associates liberated them from the British colonialism, after giving great sacrifices. He asserted:

We have given sacrifices for our freedom; we died as martyrs; cemeteries have been filled [with our martyrs]; we have suffered imprisonment [during the British Raj] … Consequently, we have got ourselves liberated; we have got ourselves liberated; we want to remain free. We want to tell them that we are not asking for charity from anyone. We are asking for what is ours.174

As noted earlier, a social movement organization attempts to politicize grievances by instilling a sense of deprivation among its constituents. Instead of accentuating the subordinate position of Pashtuns in Pakistan, Wali Khan described them as a free people, thereby legitimizing, consciously or unconsciously, the extant political structures in which Pashtuns have a subordinate position. If Pashtuns were a free people, then what did the ANP, under the leadership of Wali Khan, want to accomplish? The stated objectives of the ANP of Wali Khan

were to rename the NWFP as Pakhtunkhwa (also Pashtunkhwa); to obstruct the construction of Kalabagh Dam on the Indus River in the Mianwali district of the present day Punjab; and to secure provincial autonomy by abolishing the Concurrent List in the 1973 Constitution.\(^{175}\)

The grievance politicization strategy of Wali Khan’s ANP, with regard to these objectives, helped politicize ethnicity of Pashtuns, too, insofar as to popularize the demand for provincial autonomy along ethnolinguistic lines. It, however, did not transmute into a separatist prognosis.

On the other hand, Baloch nationalist leadership framed Baloch deprivation to instill a feeling of separatism among Balochs. As shown in Table 1 above, Baloch nationalists underscored Baloch deprivation slightly more than their Pashtun counterparts emphasized Pashtun deprivation – 0.24 times per minute as compared to 0.21 times, though statistically not significant. However, Baloch nationalists frequently denounced development projects in Balochistan, as they considered them tools of Punjabi colonialism. For instance, Sardar Atta Ullah Mengal argued in a rally in Khuzdar that the Gawadar megaproject (discussed in Chapter 3) was nothing more than a justification for Punjabis to settle there and convert Balochs into a minority in their own land. Mengal asserted that the outsiders in Balochistan should not be given the right to cast votes in Balochistan. If they wanted to cast votes, they should do so where they have come from. Mengal further maintained:

\(^{175}\) Two of the objectives of the ANP have been achieved through the 18\(^{th}\) Constitutional Amendment: renaming the province and abolition of the Concurrent List. The third one, i.e., the construction of the Kalabagh dam, is currently out of consideration, which the contemporary leadership of the ANP take a credit for. Actually, the Punjabi elite had to put the construction of the dam on the back burner because of the opposition from Sindh, Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Sindh and Balochistan, claiming riparian water rights, believe that the construction of the dam would end up in a decrease of their share in water from the Indus, whereas Pashtun ethno-nationalists argue that the proposed dam will convert the agricultural lands of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa into marshes.
You see, the mega projects are accompanied by the construction of military cantonments … cantonments are built everywhere [in Balochistan] … These cantonments are for no one but you and me – to kill you and me. Because, they have to keep these colonies at any cost … They know that people [of Balochistan] would not let them stay here. [So they have decided] that if people are not willing to let us stay [in Balochistan], we will rule here through force.\textsuperscript{176}

Hence, Mengal drew Balochs’ attention to their politically subordinate position by categorizing Balochistan as a colony of Pakistan.\textsuperscript{177} The first generation Baloch leadership, especially Mengal and Marri, believed that the only way to end Baloch deprivation was the fight for the independence of Balochistan. In a 2011 interview with a Pakistani TV channel, Dawn News, Mengal argued that the differences between the state and Balochs were irreconcilable, and that he would have joined the ongoing guerrilla war against the state, had his age and health allowed him. Furthermore, he asked Baloch militants to fight against Pakistan with valor.\textsuperscript{178} Although Mengal used to legitimize armed separatist struggle, he occasionally participated in peaceful /parliamentary electoral politics for autonomy. On the contrary, Ghaus Bakhsh Marri was critical of electoral politics. He was equally against the development projects in Balochistan, which he (like Mengal) termed instruments of colonization. Marri articulated Baloch economic deprivation very rarely. He emphasized the political subordination of Baloch people that could be

\textsuperscript{176} “The veteran Baloch sardar Attaullah Mengal Addressing in Khuzdar Press Club,” YouTube video, posted by TheBaloch68, June 8, 2010, \url{https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TZc9Vga-v-4&list=PLiVKO-XZNspqMZ40YdyG9zZkf4mCbrdy}.

\textsuperscript{177} It is interesting to note that while Baloch leadership resented the establishment of military cantonments in Balochistan as instruments of suppression and colonization, a contemporary leading figure of the ANP, Afzal Khan Lala, welcomed the establishment of a cantonment in Swat (see \textit{The News International}, December 12, 2014; and, \textit{Dawn}, December 12, 2014), while the rest of the party leadership remained silent on the issue. However, Pashtunkhwa Milli Awami Party (PMAP), another Pashtun nationalist party, vociferously rejected the construction of the said cantonment (see, “We will not let the Army Cantonment in Swat at any cost said Senator Usman Kakar,” YouTube video, posted by PMAP Official, July 19, 2016, \url{https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ofBjP6ztLQ}).

\textsuperscript{178} “Sardar Attaullah Mengal’s Exclusive Interview with Dawn News,” YouTube video, posted by Baloch Liberation, December 25, 2011, \url{https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5wsytFXlk88&index=3&list=PLiVKO-XZNspqMZ40YdyG9zZkf4mCbrdy}. 
ended only through armed struggle against the state. As a strategy of belief amplification he
framed the differences between Balochs and the state of Balochistan as irreconcilable. He also
believed that the contemporary Baloch resistance was stronger than it was in 1970s. 179

The contemporary Baloch nationalist frames are articulated within the broader discursive
framework set by the Baloch nationalist discourse constructed during the British Raj. The pre-
partition Baloch nationalists were fully aware of their separate ethno-national identity which they
articulated and politicized very plainly, as evident from the memorandum of the government of
the Kalat state submitted to the British Cabinet Mission in 1946. The memorandum is a
significant historical document, which adds up to the collective memory of Baloch people.
Defining the Kalat state, the memorandum maintained that Kalat constituted a significant buffer
state: a) between India and Afghanistan, and b) between India and Iran (in Bansal 2013, 51). It
further stated that Kalat had never remained part of India – neither linguistically, nor
geographically, nor politically. It asked the British that Marri and Bugti areas of British
Balochistan should be reverted to Kalat, as these areas were exclusively Baloch. In short, the
memorandum asserted the independence of Kalat state, which should not be affected by any
decision taken by the British Raj in relation to India (in Bansal, 51-82).

Another significant signpost of the recent Baloch history that keeps informing the current
Baloch nationalist framing processes is the Kalat state legislature’s vote against Kalat’s merger
with Pakistan. Speaking to the popularly elected House of Commons of Kalat state in December
1947, Ghaus Bakhsh Bezinjo argued:

179 See for instance, "Nawab Marri Interview with Samaa TV Part I," YouTube video, posted by Kohdil,
August 30, 2009, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SzChutNSNHO&t=73s; and, “An interview with
Baloch leader Sardar Khair Bakhsh Marri by Abdul Hai Kakar,” YouTube video, posted by Balochistan
Channel, June 17, 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wol0nJFdxlO&t=36s.
We have a distinct culture like Afghanistan and Iran, and if the mere fact that we are Muslims requires us to amalgamate with Pakistan, then Afghanistan and Iran should also be amalgamated with Pakistan. They say we Baloch cannot defend ourselves in the atomic age. Well, are Afghanistan, Iran, and even Pakistan capable of defending themselves against superpowers? If we cannot defend ourselves, a lot of others cannot do so either (quoted in Breseeg 2004, 238).

Concerning the proposed merger of Kalat with Pakistan, Bezinjo added: “this means signing the death-warrant for 15 million Balochs in Asia. We cannot be guilty of this major crime to humiliate the Baloch nation to a merger with a non-Baloch nation” (ibid). Nevertheless, a few months later (April, 1948), the Khan of Kalat was forced to sign what Bezinjo called the death-warrant of the Baloch people. Consequently, Baloch nationalists launched the first armed insurgency against Pakistan, in May 1948, which would be followed by several other Baloch insurgencies, intermittently. Successive Baloch uprisings (discussed in Chapter 3) have symbolic value, even if they have not yet accrued any material or institutional gains. They keep nourishing Baloch nationalist thought. For instance, Baloch nationalists frequently refer to these insurgencies to appeal to their national memory and prove that they have been forced to become (and remain) part of Pakistan. Conversely, Pashtun nationalism has so far remained non-violent. Consequently, Pashtun nationalist narrative lacks a significant discursive capital which violence could have generated.

However, following the annexation of Kalat state, Bezinjo turned into a non-violent federalist demanding autonomy for provinces. He believed that elections can guarantee stability and prosperity in Pakistan provided that:
It [Pakistan] is organized according to the principles of federalism – a loose federation. Smaller provinces should be given complete autonomy. The centre must not interfere in the affairs of the provinces. It should be content with the powers over the four [proposed] policy matters. We have to erect the [political] structure of this country according to the 1940 Resolution\textsuperscript{180} (in Nagori ed. 2010, 130).

Bezinjo invokes the 1940 Resolution, which is a significant element in Pakistan’s hegemonic civic discourse, in order to emphasize the right to autonomy of the units constituting Pakistan. In addition, he consistently emphasized the distinctive ethnolinguistic and historical identities of these units. He used to argue:

Instead of provinces, we talk about units. A province is an administrative entity; whereas units are historical entities, and their basis are [ethno-] national. If any changes happen in [provincial] units, they should be on historical and [ethno-] national basis (in Nagori, 138).

Bezinjo argued in his speech to an intellectual forum in Lahore that Pakistan was not a nation; rather it was multi-national state. The nations constituting the newly created Pakistan had nothing in common with each other, barring religion. To subvert the state-sponsored identity discourse in Pakistan, Bezinjo maintained that ummath and millath\textsuperscript{181} do not conceptualize Nation:

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{180} The Resolution (also known as the Lahore Resolution), was passed by All-India Muslim League on March 23, 1940. It envisaged the idea of grouping together the Muslim majority areas to north-west and east India to constitute ‘independent states’ in which the constituent units should be allotted autonomy and sovereignty. It also espoused the principle of cultural autonomy for and constitutional guarantees to minorities in the proposed Muslim and Hindu majority states. It is noteworthy that the resolution was ambiguous in the sense that it simultaneously demanded the creation of ‘independent states’ in the north-west and east of India as well as recommended autonomy and sovereignty to the units which would constitute the proposed independent states.
\item \textsuperscript{181} Ummath and millath signify Muslims, as a monolithic entity in Pakistani hegemonic discourse structure.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
Someone tell me if Muslims are referred to by the name ‘Nation’ anywhere in the Quran. The Quran has always mentioned them either as ummath or millath. Both ummath and millath are multinational social facts – not national ones. So … which nation’s country is Pakistan? If we say Muslim nation, then it will create many complications. You [Pakistanis] do not grant an Indian Muslim the right to cast vote here [in Pakistan]; you do not appoint an Iranian Muslim as a General in your army; nor can you make a Turk your President. But [you still believe that] Muslim is your nation. [Consequently,] you have fallen victim to contradictions and confusion (in Nagori, 24).

Likewise, Bezinjo problematized the concept of *watan*,\(^{182}\) which is utilized by Pakistani state to inspire a feeling of patriotism among its citizens. He believed that there was a difference between *watan* and *mulk* (country) – a political arrangement. The former is a permanent entity, the latter is transient. He further argued:

> Ones loyalties are in the first place with their *watan*, and then with their country. Because our (Baloch’s) *watan* has not been given its due status in our country, Pakistan, therefore, we (Baloch) have been deprived of our due rights. Hence, rivalries and a tug of war ensued among nationalities and units (which you call provinces). In this tug of war neither democracy could be established, nor could the state gain stability. This rivalry resulted in the division of the state [in 1971] (in Nagori, 25).

In short, Bezinjo accentuated, very frequently and consistently, the multi-national character of Pakistan, and emphasized the need for the state to recognize the historical, linguistic, and cultural diversity by instituting a federal setup (in Nagori, 111-112). Unlike Marri, Bezinjo was convinced that the creation of a civic nation – Pakistani nation – was a possibility if the nations constituting Pakistan were given constitutional guarantees through a loose federation (in Nagori, 24). Given Bezinjo’s federalist stance, Marri would not categorize him as an ethno-nationalist. However, Bezinjo continued politicizing Baloch ethnolinguistic identity and

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\(^{182}\) *Watan* signifies the historical land of an ethno-national community in Baloch and Pashtun ethn-nationalist lexicon.
generated grievance among Balochs, more frequently and more unequivocally than his Pashtun counterparts.

As shown in Table 1, the difference between the Baloch and Pashtun nationalist frames with respect to democratic deficit in Pakistan is statistically not significant. It is worth noting that, for the separatists the demand for democratic rights within Pakistan was synonymous to legitimize its existence. However, they infrequently mentioned the political preponderance of the military, which I categorized as frames pertaining to democratic deficit and the need for instituting human rights (Dem in Table 1). Also, Bezinjo – a federalist – emphasized the lack of democratic freedoms in Pakistan recurrently – 0.14 times per minute.

Similarly, the difference between the means of Baloch and Pashtun nationalists’ frames concerning the foreign policy ventures of Pakistan is statistically not significant. Among the older generation Pashtun and Baloch nationalists, Bacha Khan, Samad Khan, Marri and Mengal rarely focused on the issue. Nonetheless, Wali Khan and Bezinjo persistently criticized Pakistan’s involvement in Afghan affairs during 1980s, following the socialist revolution in Afghanistan. Wali Khan blamed Pakistan of becoming an instrument of fighting America’s war in Afghanistan, which had infuriated Soviet Union. Accordingly, Pakistan would eventually be held responsible for what Soviet Union called an undeclared war on the part of Pakistan. He also reiterated Afghanistan’s allegations against Pakistan of stockpiling weapons on Afghan border. He advised Pakistan to normalize relations with Afghanistan (in Sidiqui, 194). Pinpointing contradictions in Pakistan hegemonic discourse during Cold War, Wali Khan questioned why communism in China was not considered a threat to Islam and Pakistan – the so-called fortress of Islam – while communism in Soviet Union was perceived to be a threat to both Islam and Pakistan (in Sidiqui, 192).183

183 According to Wali Khan, Pakistanis believed that Pakistan was the fortress of Islam and that communism was against the spirit of Islam (in Sidiqui, 192). He, as pro-USSR, maintained that Pakistan was contradicting itself by having cordial relations with communist China, which claimed to be more communist than Soviet Union.
With reference to Pakistan’s relations with India, Wali Khan advocated good neighborly relations. Given their mutual antagonism, the two countries were wasting their resources on amassing weapons, instead of alleviating poverty, he believed. He emphasized the need for India and Pakistan to have a mutual agreement of not waging war against each other. He criticized Pakistan for buying arms from the US, which made India become suspicious of its designs, notwithstanding Pakistan’s offer to India to sign such a treaty. It is worth stating that because of Bacha Khan’s pro-Congress political stance during the British Raj in India and later on Wali Khan’s position concerning India-Pakistan rivalry, Pakistan accused them of being pro-India – and hence, anti-Pakistan.

Similarly, Bezinjo accused Pakistan of interfering in Afghanistan. In order to legitimizing the socialist revolution in Afghanistan, Bezinjo maintained in his speech to All-Parties Conference that the revolution was an internal phenomenon supported by Afghan people (in Nagori, 7-17). He argued that the communist regime in Afghanistan was not against Pakistan and that the latter should have friendly relations with the former. Bezinjo said in an interview:

Today they [the Pakistani nationalist elite] say that socialism has taken place in Afghanistan. Socialism has taken place in China too. When you [Pakistan] can have good relations with China, where there is communism, why are you so annoyed with Afghanistan where there is only national democracy? It is obvious that communism is not an issue. It is clear from Gorbachev’s speech that they will struggle for peace [in the region]. They want peace with Pakistan. But we did not accept their [Soviet Union’s] offer just because of American interests (in Nagori, 131-132).

Bezinjo believed that civil war in Afghanistan might be a matter of neighborhood (foreign affairs) for Pakistan, but it was a domestic concern for Balochs and Pashtuns, as both of them constituted part of Afghanistan too. He argued that the blood spilt on the other side of the Pak-Afghan border was the blood of Balochs and Pashtuns. Therefore, Pakistan should refrain
from the supporting the mujahidin – holy warriors. Bezinjo frequently amplified the belief that the revolution in Afghanistan was a people’s revolution and was irreversible He repeatedly asserted that by supporting the mujahidin in Afghanistan, Pakistan had become America’s pawn. The latter, according to Bezinjo, looked down upon the former as a beggar (in Nagori, 114-115).

Like Wali Khan, Bezinjo criticized Pakistan for harboring Afghan refugees. Accordingly, the refugees would create law and order situation in Pakistan. It is to be noted that both Wali Khan and Bezinjo were mindful of the fact that the refugees would be used by Pakistan against the socialist regime in Afghanistan by recruiting them into jihad.

Bezinjo had been very consistent in criticizing Pakistan’s ventures in Afghanistan. But, unlike Marri and Mengal, he occasionally used the terms ‘we’, ‘our country’ while censuring Pakistan’s interference in Afghanistan. As noted earlier, Marri and Mengal recurrently created binaries between Balochs from Pakistan by dissociating the former from the latter, whereas Bezinjo would occasionally associate himself with Pakistan by using the terms ‘we’, and ‘our country.’ However, I believe that using such terminology was necessitated by Bezinjo’s (and also Wali Khan’s) federalist politics within electoral arena in order not to give the state an excuse to delegitimize and suppress their struggle. His strategy of persistently and consistently undermining the state-sponsored civic identity discourses, of accentuating the deprivation of Balochs, and of the need for instituting a loose federation helped in amassing support for the Baloch nationalist cause.

Thus, the first generation Baloch nationalist leadership politicized Baloch ethnicity more frequently and more consistently than their Pashtun counterparts. Among the former, Marri and Mengal consistently amplified the inconceivability of staying with Pakistan. On the other hand, Bezinjo constantly framed the multi-national character of Pakistan and the need for giving autonomy to ethno-nationally organized units within Pakistani federation. He focused more on articulating grievances. He said in an interview with Akhbar-e-Jahan, in December 1988, that if
he realized that the rulers are determined to keep Balochs as slaves, he would join his people in the final battle against Pakistan. On the contrary, Pashtun nationalists did not politicize their history and ethnicity as frequently and unequivocally. They demanded more autonomy within Pakistan. Moreover, they emphasized the need for democratic freedoms slightly more than Baloch nationalists did.\(^{184}\)

Second Generation Frames: Quantitative Analysis

In this section I analyze the second generation ethno-nationalists’ speeches and interviews. I give more weight to speeches than interviews, given the former’s analytical significance. During a speech, the speaker has more freedom to choose the issues they want to highlight, whereas the agenda of an interview is set by the interviewer. But, my freedom of selection was constrained by my limited knowledge of Balochi and Brahui languages. Most of the Baloch nationalists’ public speeches were either in Balochi or Brahui. Therefore, I had to rely more on their interviews on the mainstream Pakistani electronic media. What I observed is although the interviewer had the discretion to control the outline of their talk-shows, the popular political/discursive outlook of the guest (nationalist leaders) was also decisive in shaping the major theme of the show. Moreover, some nationalist leaders (especially, Mahmood Khan Achakzai) have oft-times managed to manipulate the agenda of a talk show in order to highlight issues of ethno-national import.

In the following lines, I analyze the t-test results for Pashtun and Baloch nationalists’ framing processes. Then I qualitatively study their respective discursive positions on the issues of ethno-national consequence – identity (Eth), deprivation (Dep), democratic deficit in Pakistan and the need to institute democratic institutions (Dem), and foreign policy ventures of the state.

\(^{184}\) It is equally noteworthy that despite being popular for his pro-democracy stance, Wali Khan initially supported Zia’s martial law in order to settle scores with his political archrival – the former Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto who was deposed by General Zia on July 5, 1977 (see for instance his interview in Sidiqui, 53-56).
In addition, I evaluate their frames pertaining to yet other contemporary issues of ethno-national significance for Pashtuns and Balochs: terrorism in Pashtunkhwa and Afghanistan (tabulated as Tr) and counter-insurgency military operations in Balochistan (abbreviated as Op), respectively. My aim is to evaluate how Pashtun leadership has framed the issue of terrorism (which has haunted Pashtunkhwa more than the rest of Pakistan) in opposition to the officially-sponsored discourse on terrorism. Terrorists (especially Taliban) have established sanctuaries in the FATA region along the Durand Line with the support of the state. Besides planning and launching attacks in Afghanistan, the terrorists have been targeting Pashtun nationalists (especially the ANP) and Pashtun social activists in Pashtunkhwa who oppose them. Apparently, Pakistan has posed itself as a frontline state in the fight against global terror. The ongoing terrorism in Pakistan has popularly been projected by conservative political parties and civil society organizations as a backlash against the US’s presence in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s decision to become an ally in the US-led anti-terror campaign. Pashtun nationalists, however, argue that Pakistan has employed terrorists as its strategic assets in the pursuit of its unpopular strategic-depth policy in Afghanistan as well as to suppress Pashtun dissention at home.

In case of the second generation Baloch nationalist leadership (which is active in electoral and legislative arenas), I have examined their frames about the current military operation against militant separatism in Balochistan. The Pakistani state has termed Baloch militant separatists as terrorists. On the contrary, contemporary Baloch leadership categorizes Baloch militancy as a reaction against the marginalizing and repressive policy of the state.

The t-test results of the means’ difference between the Pashtun and Baloch nationalist frames with regard to the selected variables are summarized in Table 5.3:

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185 The strategic-depth policy was devised and popularized by General Zia during the USSR’s presence in Afghanistan. The policy envisaged the idea of having a Pakistan-friendly regime in Afghanistan so that in case of war with India, Afghanistan would serve as a strategic backyard of Pakistan. As noted in Chapter 2, in the pursuit of what it calls the strategic-depth policy, Pakistan has been supporting religious extremists in Afghanistan, whom it sees as friendly elements, with the hope to reinstate them.
Table 5.3: T-test Results for the Means’ Difference between the Second Generation Pashtun and Baloch Framing Processes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>variable</th>
<th>P. Means</th>
<th>B. Means</th>
<th>t-stat</th>
<th>t-crit</th>
<th>α 0.05</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eth</td>
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<td>0.68</td>
<td>-2.08</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dep</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>-2.23</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dem</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>1.39</td>
<td>2.11</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FP</td>
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<td>0.15</td>
<td>1.65</td>
<td>2.08</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tr/Op</td>
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<td>0.37</td>
<td>-0.42</td>
<td>2.07</td>
<td>0.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incon</td>
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<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.98</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 5.2: Means of the Second Generation Pashtun and Baloch Nationalists’ Frames
Second Generation Frames: Qualitative analysis

As indicated in Table 5.3, the difference between the populations’ means is statistically significant only with the respect to Eth and Dep. I expected the statistical significance between the two population means’ difference with the respect to the politicization of ethnicity. Pashtun nationalists have politicized their ethnicity 0.3 times per minute, whereas Baloch have emphasized their ethno-national identity 0.68 times per minute in opposition to Pakistan’s civic identity. Among Pashtun leadership, it is Mahmood Khan Achakzai, leading the Pashtunkhwa Mili Awami Party (PMAP), who has laid emphasis on the ethno-historical existence of Pashtuns in Pakistan. Mahmood Khan is mindful of the political significance of the word Afghan. Therefore, he recurrently suffixes the word Pashtun with Afghan, in order to highlight the Afghan identity of Pashtuns in Pakistan. Achakzai asserted that a Pashtun denying their Afghan identity was guilty of kufar (infidelity). Though, the term Afghan is an ethnonym for Pashtuns straddling the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, it has gained civic connotation in Afghanistan. Thus, the word Afghan also refers to a non-Pashtun citizen of Afghanistan as well. In his speech to the Pashto International Conference, Achakzai argued that all Pashtuns were Afghans, yet every Afghan is not a Pashtun. By asserting the Afghan identity of Pashtuns in Pakistan, Achakzai reminds his audience their historical civic identity. He argued on several occasions that from Oxus to Indus is the land of Pashtun/Afghan. In most of his speeches and interviews Achakzai has highlighted the difference between ‘country’ and ‘motherland’. Accordingly, Pashtunkhwa was the motherland of Pashtuns now constituting Pakistan – the country. To amplify the transient nature of ‘country’ as a political entity, Achakzai argued that his grandfathers were citizens of Afghanistan; that his father was born on this side of the Durand

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187 Ibid.
188 Oxus is the Latin name of Amo Darya (river) between Afghanistan on its south and Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan on its north.
Line, i.e., as a British national; and that he himself was born in Pakistan. He asked rhetorically: “Now, tell me who am I?” He believed that the Durand Line that divides Pashtun land was the tyranny of history. Using the frame amplification strategy, Achakzai maintained that Pashtuns would never accept slavery.\(^{189}\) In most of his speeches and interviews that I have come across, Achakzai recognized Pakistan as his country and expressed his willingness to remain part of it provided it is restructured on basis of federalism and democracy.

It is worth noting that Achakzai is conscious of the discursive worth of Islam in Pakistan and the political role of the clergy and Islamist political parties. Therefore, he frequently employs religious lexicon. To downplay the state’s identity discourse, he maintained that one’s religious beliefs do not amount to their nationhood. Accordingly, in the Quran, Moses and Jesus addressed their people as their ‘nation’, irrespective of their religious affiliations.\(^{190}\)

In contrast, Asfandyar Wali Khan of Awami National Party (ANP) has rarely politicized Pashtun identity to counter the hegemonic identity discourse of the state. Although he has occasionally asserted the Afghan ethno-historical identity of Pashtuns, Asfandyar prides himself on the 18\(^{th}\) Amendment.\(^{191}\) He believed that Bacha Khan’s dreams of renaming the NWFP as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (signifying Pashtun identity) and securing provincial autonomy had been fulfilled through the 18\(^{th}\) Amendment. On the whole, Asfandyar’s framing strategy failed to subvert the officially sponsored identity discourses in Pakistan. In addition, to argue that the ANP has achieved what Bacha Khan had dreamt of is to minimize Pashtun grievances vis-à-vis the Punjab-dominated centre.\(^{192}\)

\(^{189}\) “Da Mili Rehbar Muhtaram Mashar Mahmood Khan Assakzai Pakhto Narriwal Siminar tha Mukamala Weina” (in Pashto Script) (Complete Speech of the National Leader Mahmood Khan Ackhazai to the Pashto International Seminar), YouTube video, posted by Inayat Ullah, September 14, 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GCQNCCk2ygA.


\(^{191}\) The 18\(^{th}\) Amendment was passed when the ANP was part of the Zardari coalition government.

Among my units of analysis, the ANP leadership’s frames are the most inconsistent. For instance, cricket as a sport has become a symbolic capital for the state to appropriate loyalties. When Pakistan wins a match against India – its so-called conventional rival in cricket – both Pakistani elite and society reach a state of euphoria. The ANP leadership would, on such occasions, pose itself as partaking in the general excitement over Pakistan’s victory. Such a discursive position on the part of ANP leadership helps the state to appropriate loyalties of Pashtuns and followers of the ANP. In a popular talk-show, ‘Jirga with Saleem Safi,’ the interviewer asked Asfandyar who he would blame for the poor performance of Pakistani cricket team – players or the management – in a match against India. Asfandyar’s answer was: “I will not blame the players. Look, in such a crucial match, which was yesterday, because [pause] if someone likes it or not, when there is a match between India and Pakistan, it is [like] a war between Islam and Infidelity; it is [like] a Jihad … in such crucial matches experimentations should not have been done. Yesterday we were doing experiments.”

On the other hand, the second generation Baloch nationalists have framed their Baloch ethno-historical identities more frequently than Pashtun nationalists (particularly the ANP), but not as recurrently as their predecessors did (see Table 2). Among them, Balochistan National Party (BNP)’s leadership is more insistent than the National Party (NP)’s leadership with regard to their ethnic identity. Although the BNP has currently positioned itself as a federalist political party active in the electoral and legislative arenas to secure provincial autonomy, its leadership has occasionally amplified the desirability and possibility of an independent Baloch nation-state.

In his speech to a mass-gathering, Akhtar Mengal asked his followers that if they had ever to pray for him, they should pray that the BNP leadership got sacrificed for the honor and dignity of Baloch and Balochistan. Praising his followers, Mengal added: “Today you have proved it to the world, with your enthusiasm, your fervor, and your determination, that you [Baloch] are a nation;
you own a mulk [homeland]; and that you want to be the owner of an independent state”. Criticizing the state’s claims and resolve to develop Balochistan, Mengal asked Pakistani state elite, rhetorically: “who you are! Who did give you this right [to develop Balochistan]? This is the right of Balochistan and Baloch to settle on what type of development they want.” For Mengal, development in Pakistani-held Balochistan implied further extension of the repressive state apparatuses in the form of military cantonments in Balochistan. He induced his followers to recognize and respect the sacrifices of militant separatist who were fighting for their freedom.

Yet this was the Akhtar Mengal of 2006. Mengal was arrested in September 2006, during General Musharraf regime, on the pretext of what the authorities called seditious activities against the state. He was, however, acquitted on May 9, 2008. Mengal’s BNP boycotted the 2008 elections, and he himself went into exile, wherefrom he advocated separatism. He ended his exile in March 2013, and decided to take part in the 2013 elections. Separatist politics could have significantly raised the costs for Mengal (and also for NP), if they had to remain in electoral and legislative arenas. In order to have an unprovocative posture, both the BNP and NP leadership did not frame Baloch ethno-historical identities as radically as to amount to separatism and militancy. They have, alternatively, accentuated the multi-national character of Pakistan and the need for instituting a loose federation to grant more autonomy to provinces, and thus to end Baloch deprivation.

With regard to what I call the politics of deprivation and grievance articulation (Dep), I had accurately anticipated that the difference between the two populations’ means would be

196 Mengal’s decision to return to Pakistan and participate in elections was viewed with suspicion in the militant separatist circles. Consequently, the militants threatened to target both the BNP and NP leaders and activists if they participated in elections.
statistically significant. It is worth noting that the means’ difference between the first generation Pashtun and Baloch nationalists’ frames concerning Dep is statistically insignificant. Among the later, Mari and Mengal were outright separatists, who abhorred the politics of development within Pakistan. Therefore they did not advocate socio-economic development of Balochistan within the Pakistani federation. On the contrary, the second generation Baloch nationalists participating in electoral and legislative politics have frequently emphasized Baloch deprivation and the need for their socio-economic uplift. Thus, the politics of development in electoral and legislative arenas necessitates not only diagnosing structural deprivation but also the advocacy of development through financial federalism, which I have categorized as the politics of deprivation (Dep). Also, the federalist Baloch nationalists of the second generation have frequently accentuated Baloch deprivation in order to mitigate the state’s propaganda against the militant separatists. Moreover, Pashtun nationalist leadership (especial the ANP leadership) contents itself with the autonomy conferred through the 18th Constitutional Amendment, thereby diminishing their emphasis on deprivation and need for federalism. Consequently, the second generation Baloch nationalists’ scores on Dep are significantly higher in comparison with Pashtun nationalists.

Contemporary Baloch nationalists, who are active in electoral politics, have kept emphasizing the exploitation of their resources by the centre, underdevelopment and deprivation in Balochistan. They have been demanding control over their resources, through financial federalism. Mega projects, like Gawadar port, are viewed as colonial instruments to convert Baloch into a minority on their ancestral land.

As mentioned above, the ANP leadership of Pashtuns, on the contrary, is satisfied with the autonomy given to provinces through 18th Amendment. I believe that glorification of the autonomy accruing from the 18th Amendment minimizes grievances among Pashtuns, thereby weakening Pashtun nationalist sentiments. However, the ANP has insistently demanded a fair

197 Although Marri and Mengal generated grievances among Balochs through what I call the politics of deprivation, they demanded rather independent Balochistan (categorized as politicization of ethnicity, Eth, in this study) than autonomy within Pakistan.
share for Pashtuns in the proposed China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).\textsuperscript{198} The ANP leadership accuses the central government of diverting the rout from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa to Punjab, and of installing most of the CPEC-accompanied projects in Punjab. Yet, Achakzai of the PMAP has seldom asked for fair share in the CPEC. Alternatively, he has been making the success of the CPEC contingent upon the security situation in Afghanistan. Thus, he has consistently admonished Pakistani elite to play an active and sincere role to ensure peace in Afghanistan, in order to materialize the CPEC and related regional development projects. In addition, Achakzai (and his PMAP) is not satisfied with the 18\textsuperscript{th} Amendment. Instead, he is consistent in criticizing the extant federal design. He has very frequently expressed his conviction that the very existence of Pakistan is at stake if true democracy and federalism are not instated.

As Table 3 indicates, Pashtun nationalists have scored higher than Baloch nationalists on the variable \textbf{Dem}, which signifies the democratic deficit in Pakistan (diagnostic frames) and the prognosis about ensuring democracy in Pakistan, although the difference is statistically insignificant. Yet again, it is the PMAP leadership which has very frequently censured the military’s control over foreign and security policies of Pakistan. Achakzai of PMAP has recurrently insisted on the need for making the army subservient to the parliament.

On the other hand, Baloch nationalists, too, have been framing the military’s preponderance very emphatically, yet not so frequently. They have maintained, repeatedly, that the military has been repressing Balochs with impunity. To remind my readers, I have categorized the frames regarding the current repression of Baloch people during the counterinsurgency operations in Balochistan as \textbf{Op}. Nevertheless, the federalist Baloch nationalists have kept demanding the establishment of judicial writ in Balochistan. They have been accusing the

\textsuperscript{198} The CPEC is the proposed transit route that will connect northwestern “autonomous” region of China, Xinjiang, with Gawadar port. The proposed rout envisages some other development projects, such as power generation plants, fiber optic, and agricultural development.
military of behaving as if it is above law.\textsuperscript{199} Therefore, I have categorized such frames as Dem, as they imply democratic deficit indicated by the subservient nature of judiciary to the military in Pakistan.

Given their cultural, political, strategic, and economic stakes in Afghanistan, Pashtun nationalist leaders are more concerned about peace and stability in Afghanistan than their Baloch counterparts. Consequently, they have criticized Pakistan for interfering in Afghanistan through its jihadist proxies. Among Pashtun nationalists, Achakzai has very consistently downplayed Pakistan’s undertakings in Afghanistan. He has kept amplifying the belief that democracy and stability in Afghanistan are irreversible, and that Pakistan has globally become isolated because of its adventurist foreign policy. In order to dispel the conservatives’ propaganda that Afghanistan is occupied by America, Achakzai has oft-times described Afghanistan as an independent and democratic country. Consequently, Achakzai’s strategy of undermining the hegemonic discourse about Afghanistan has relatively augmented the means of Pashtun nationalists’ frames concerning my variable FP.

Another popular belief created by the state and its ideological allies (such as the religious political parties) is that the ongoing terror in Pashtun areas across the border is a backlash against the US “occupation” of Afghanistan. On the contrary, Achakzai has consistently held the state responsible for harboring and sponsoring global terrorists. He has recurrently maintained that Pashtuns are peace-loving people, and that their areas (especially FATA) have been proffered by Pakistan to the terrorist networks from across the globe, which it (Pakistan) has been using as its proxies in Afghanistan. Consequently, the US has launched regular drone strikes, targeting terrorist hideouts in FATA region, according to Achakzai. Thus, he has also tried to dispel the

state-sponsored discourse against drone strike.\textsuperscript{200} Besides Achakzai, I have listened and talked to the PMAP leadership and activists. Their views regarding terrorism reveal that the PMAP has developed and propagated quite a coherent discourse on the issue.

Nevertheless, Asfandyar Khan of the ANP has been quite inconsistent with reference to terrorism in Pashtunkhwa and Afghanistan. Instead of categorically identifying Pakistan’s role in supporting terrorists (especially the Taliban), in his speeches and interviews he speaks as if the terrorists in Pashtunkhwa are an independent entity. Although the terrorists have targeted the ANP more than any other political party, its frames pertaining to terror are ambiguous and misleading. While Achakzai has time and again held the state responsible for terror, Asfandyar has discursively kept dealing with the Taliban as an autonomous entity in its own right. As a result, the ANP’s framing processes blurs Pashtuns’ understanding of terrorism, thereby absolving the state of the allegation of supporting terrorists. It is worth stating that the intellectual cadre of the ANP (represented by such figures as Afrasyab Khattak and Lateef Apriday) has definitely and consistently accused the state of sponsoring terrorism. But, such figures in the ANP do not have as much popular standing as Asfanyar and Mian Iftikhar (the Secretary General of the ANP) do have so as to effectively shape popular cognition pertaining to terrorism in Pashtunkhwa and Afghanistan.

Religious terrorism is not confined to Pashtunkhwa only. The state is accused of colluding with such terrorist organization as the anti-Shia Ahl-e-Sunath-wal-Jumath (previously known as Sipah-e-Sahab Pakistan) in Balochistan. These terrorists, according to Baloch nationalists, are employed by the state to suppress Baloch separatism.\textsuperscript{201} However, terrorism is not as widespread in Baloch areas as it is in Pashtunkhwa; the state has employed its formal instruments of repression in Baloch areas of Balochistan. Therefore, Baloch nationalist politics is focused more on the existing anti-separatist military operations in Balochistan. Accordingly,

\textsuperscript{200} The hegemonic discourse pertaining to the drone strikes in the region posits they are unwarranted, generating popular resentment against the US.

\textsuperscript{201} This information is based on my communications with the Baloch nationalist leadership and activists.
separatist militancy in Balochistan is an expected outcome of the stark Baloch deprivation. As noted earlier, the second generation Baloch nationalists, participating in electoral politics, can hardly afford taking a discursive position of openly supporting militant separatism. Therefore, they have emphasized Baloch deprivation, which has allegedly triggered Baloch insurgency. Baloch nationalists have maintained that instead of assuaging Baloch grievances, the state has taken to repression. They have recurrently and emphatically accused the state of human rights excesses, ranging from forced disappearance of nationalist activists to torture and mutilation to burning houses and property. Such frames regarding the Pakistani state behavior vis-à-vis Baloch people politicize grievances among them and legitimize Baloch armed struggle against the state.

I had expected that the Baloch frames concerning $Tr/Op$ would be more statistically significant than Pashtun nationalists’ frames, given the ANP’s sporadic and inconsistent framing strategies regarding terrorism. However, PMAP’s frames have amplified the overall Pashtun nationalists’ frames about the variable $Tr$.

To conclude, the politics of federalism in electoral and legislative arenas have moderating effects on the challengers’ framing processes. Notwithstanding, the second generation Baloch nationalists have politicized their ethnicity significantly more than Pashtun nationalists, although not transmuting straight into a separatist discursive position. Besides, the politics of federalism necessitates the politics of grievance articulation too, in order to emphasize the need for granting more autonomy to the ethnolinguistically demarcated provinces. With respect to these two variables (i.e., $Eth$ and $Dep$), Baloch nationalists’ discursive stance is statistically more significant than that of Pashtun nationalists. The former’s strategy of avoiding frequent criticism of Pakistan’s foreign policy ventures is a better framing tactic, which could have otherwise tendered their politics of ethnicity and grievance generation. Pashtun nationalists’ frames with regard to Pakistan’s foreign policy (particularly its policy towards Afghanistan) could have augmented their politics of ethnicity, had they frequently and categorically asserted their ethno-historical identity. As noted above, both the first and second generation of Pashtun nationalist
leadership failed to take a clear and firm discursive position on their ethno-historical identities, which could have otherwise encouraged Pashtuns to view themselves as more Afghans than Pakistanis. As a result, Pashtun nationalists’ frames concerning Pakistan’s policy vis-à-vis Afghanistan are less appealing to Pashtun masses, as their self-identity is determined more by Pakistani hegemonic discourses than by the infrequent and inconsistent counterhegemonic Pashtun nationalist frames.

However, treating Pashtun nationalists as a monolithic entity is misleading. Among Pashtun nationalist factions, the PMAP leadership and activists have framed issues of ethno-national significance (such as history and ethnicity, deprivation, relations with Afghanistan and terrorism) in a more coherent and consistent manner than the ANP leadership (see Table 5.4).

Table 5.4: Average of the ANP and PMAP Frames

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pashtun Parties</th>
<th>Eth</th>
<th>Dep</th>
<th>Dem</th>
<th>FP</th>
<th>Tr</th>
<th>Incon</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANP</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMAP</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Relatively speaking, the contemporary ANP leadership, as stated earlier, contents itself with the 18th Amendment. It has rarely politicized Pashtun ethnicity and history; has barely specified the culpable agents of terrorism, which could have politicized grievances among Pashtuns; has infrequently criticized the military’s involvement in politics; and has occasionally downplayed the hegemonic discourse about Afghanistan.

On the other hand, the PMAP frames are quite radical and consistent. However, the PMAP has popular support only in the Pashtun areas of Balochistan, with an estimated population of only five to six million. The party has failed to take roots in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA.
region – where an overwhelming majority of Pashtuns lives. Though this is not within the scope of this study, suffice it to say that one of the most plausible reasons for the PMAP’s failure to gain popularity in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa is the legacy of Bacha Khan, represented by the ANP, which has co-opted Pashtun nationalist sentiments and social capital in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Secondly, Samad Khan Achakzai’s legacy, represented by the PMAP, could hardly reach Khyber Pakhtunkhwa because of the state’s monopoly over information and its strategy of marginalizing Pashtun nationalist discourse (this point is further elaborated in the next chapter). Thus, the ANP was historically better positioned in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, as compared to the PMAP, to exploit the informal structures of community mobilization in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and thereby to disseminate its outlook among the majority of Pashtuns by utilizing the social capital in the province. Likewise, the PMAP had better chances to establish monopoly over Pashtun nationalism in Pashtun areas of Balochistan. It is worth noting that the two parties have viewed each other more as rivals than potential allies. Consequently, a rather more consistent and coherent Pashtu nationalist discourse represented by the PMAP could barely take roots in the majority Pashtun areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the adjoining FATA region.

The current ANP leadership is engaged more in what I call conventional politics – i.e., to have access to, and/or establish control over, the formal state institutions. More often than not, conventional politics necessitates undertakings to improve the popular image of the party within the ambit of hegemonic outlook at the expense of the politics of counterhegemony. This has ultimately weakened the counterhegemonic position of the ANP as an ethno-nationalist challenger. Nevertheless, while it was in power (from 2008-2013), the ANP named some development projects (such as universities, airports, roads, and parks) after Pashtun nationalist figures (such as Bacha Khan, Abdul Wali Khan, and Faqir Ipi). It also made Pashto as a compulsory course at schools, and introduced Pashtun national heroes to the curriculum. The discursive worth of such measures should not go unrecognized, however. On the other hand, the PMAP has thus far failed to take such measures after assuming power in 2013 in Balochistan, in
coalition with Baloch nationalists, although its framing strategies and discursive position have mostly remained intact.
CHAPTER 6

HEGEMONY AND THE IDEOLOGICAL STATE APPARATUSES

As stated in earlier, the state is both a repressive and educative institution. In order to legitimize and normalize its existence as an instrument of coercion, the state employs its formally sanctioned educative institutions (like school and state-owned media) as well as co-opts what Gramsci calls ‘private initiatives and activities,’ i.e., civil society (see Gramsci 1971, 258). Writing after Gramsci, Althusser (1970) calls the instruments of education andindoctrination ideological state apparatuses (ISAs). The ISAs include (but are not limited to) family, school, church, media, cultural ISAs (such as sports, music, and art), and political ISAs (like parliament and political parties). The state penetrates (and acts within the society) through the ISAs without being noticed. Althusser maintains that the ISAs “… may be not only the stake, but also the site of class struggle, and often of bitter class struggle (99; italics in original). A social movement struggling for counter-hegemony should confront the state first in the form of its ideological apparatuses before it launches a frontal attack on the state. My argument in this chapter is that the more a society is exposed to the state’s ideological apparatuses, the more difficult it is for a movement to recruit popular support for its cause.

This chapter is organized into two parts. Part I briefly outlines the theoretical frame of the chapter. Part II analyses the relative exposure of Pashtun and Baloch societies to the ideological apparatuses of the state of Pakistan and the ideological content which the selected ISAs (education and media) have been circulating in Pashtunkhwa and Balochistan.
Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses

The notion of ‘ideology’ is narrowly defined in common parlance: it signifies a consciously formulated and formally propagated system of ideas put into service by socio-political elite to secure legitimacy. However, Althusser has expounded the term ideology in a much broader sense that makes his theory of ideology correspond to Gramsci’s concept of hegemony. As mentioned earlier in this study, hegemony refers to certain ontological claims, notions of identity and existence, and concrete actions inscribed in socio-politically recognized norms that are almost uncritically accepted and propagated by the masses through their individual and collective normative preferences and behavioral patterns. Likewise, Althusser believes that ideology not only “… represents the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence” (109; italics in original) but also interpellates individuals as subjects (113). By interpellation, Althusser means the function of ideology to recruit subjects among individuals or its capacity to transform an individual into a subject (118). In other words, ideology constitutes an individual by establishing an imaginary relationship of the individual with their conditions of production, specifically the relations of production. On the other hand, the individual interpellated as a subject in turn constitutes the ideology itself through their normative preferences and social practices. In Althusser’s words: “… the category of the subject is only constitutive of all ideology insofar as all ideology has the function (which defines it) of constituting concrete individuals as subjects” (116; italics in original). Hence, every social practice is by, and in, an ideology; and every ideology is by, and for, the subjects (115). A subject is a concrete ideology; they act within an ideology. Accordingly, we “live, move, and have our being” within an ideology (116).

As a Marxist, Althusser believes that in the last instance it is the conditions of production that determines the ideology, which in turn serves as an instrument of naturalizing the relations of production.
In this chapter I utilize Althusser’s concepts of ideology and ideological state apparatuses to analyze what is popularly known the ideology of Pakistan, a system of related ideas enshrined in the hegemonic discourses and propagated through its ideological apparatuses. The ideology of Pakistan is reflected in sports and music, in arts and literature, in school curriculum, in parliamentary practices, in judicial proceedings, in official ceremonies, and in religious rituals. It establishes an imaginary relationship of smaller ethno-national communities to their relations of subordination. Individuals are so interpellated by the ideology of Pakistan as to make the structural relations of subordination appear ‘normal,’ thereby reproducing the relations of subordination.

The Pakistani state has brought into play its ideological apparatuses to ‘educate’ the masses and appropriate loyalties by representing the existing relations of ethno-national subordination as normal. If the repressive state apparatuses (RSAs), such as the police, judiciary, military, and legislature, are united by the unified and centralized leadership representing the ruling class or ethnicity, the ISAs are unified by the ruling ideology, the ideology of the ruling class or ethnicity (Althusser, 100). It is worth noting that although an RSA functions primarily by repression (physical or non-physical, like financial penalties), it also serves as an ideological apparatus of the state, secondarily, by propagating the ruling ideology among its members and general public. By repressing a specific outlook or behavioral patterns, a repressive apparatus tries to establish the binaries of ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ behavior. In addition, a repressive apparatus acts as an ISA, more often than not, by propagating hegemonic discourses. For instance, the military in Pakistan organizes public ceremonies and events to educate masses in the ruling ideology. The Independence Day military parades are one of such events. Similarly, an

I have modified Althusser’s phrases ‘relations of production’ and ‘class’ with ‘relations of subordination’ and ‘ethno-national community,’ respectively, to extrapolate his theory of ideology while studying the structural relations among ethno-national communities comprising Pakistan.
ISA functions secondarily by repression too. For instance, an educational ISA may rusticate a student or fire a teacher who refuses to subscribe to the ruling ideology (see Althusser, 96-98).

**Ideological State Apparatuses of Pakistan in Pashtunkhwa and Balochistan**

There are multiple ISAs propagating the ruling ideology in Pakistan. The most prominent among them are education, mass media and religious organizations (including mosque and Islamic revivalist movements, like the Tableeghi Jamat). In this Chapter I have focused on education and mass media. Although the religious organizations (both militant and electoral) are significant ISAs, they (especially, the religious political parties) participate in electoral arena, and have frequently remained in power. Therefore, I have analyzed the religious political parties in the next chapter, while examining the Political Opportunity Structures in Pakistan.

Education as an ISA

In 1981, the University Grants Commission (UGC) of Pakistan instructed the authors of Pakistan Studies:\footnote{Pakistan Studies is a compulsory course taught in high schools and colleges (grades 9-14). The course, along with Islamic Studies, is also compulsory for student seeking professional degrees in medicines and engineering, and for the undergraduate university students as well.}

... to demonstrate that the basis of Pakistan is not to be founded in racial, linguistic, or geographical factors, but, rather, in the shared experiences of a common religion … [in order] to get students to know and appreciate the Ideology of Pakistan, and to popularize it with the
slogans … [and] to guide students to the ultimate goal of Pakistan – the creation of completely Islamized State (in Afzal 2015, 2; and 2015a, 5).

Consequently, distortion of history, religious intolerance, and prejudiced civic nationalism, at the expense of logic and common sense are the distinguishing marks of the curriculum and textbooks taught in Pakistan. Logocentric binaries on the basis of religious identities – Muslims vs. non-Muslims – are created, whereby ethnolinguistic and historical identities of ethno-national communities in Pakistan are glossed over. Concomitantly, most of the textbook material alienates the non-Muslim population of the country as well. The Ideology of Pakistan is founded on Islam, emphasizing the inevitability of the creation and existence of Pakistan to uphold the tenets of Islam and safeguard the rights of Muslims in British India from the Hindu majority. Muslims of British India are portrayed as a homogenous community in opposition to Hindus in an attempt to make irrelevant the ethnic, linguistic, historical, economic and political differences among Muslims of British India. Political movements and forces in the Muslim-majority provinces (like the Khudai Khidmatgar in the then NWFP\textsuperscript{205}), which were unsympathetic to the Muslim League’s agenda of dividing India along communal lines, are omitted from the historical accounts taught in Pakistani schools and colleges. In addition, the Urdu language is presented as a repository of ‘Islamic culture and identity’ of the Muslims of British India.

The officially sanctioned curriculum in Pakistan violates the Constitution of Pakistan, which proscribes instructing students in a religion other than their own. Article 22 (1) of the Constitution says, “No person attending any educational institution shall be required to receive religious instructions, or take part in any religious ceremony, or attend religious worship, if such instruction, ceremony or worship relates to a religion other than his own.” Although non-Muslim

\textsuperscript{205} North West Frontier Province, renamed as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
students at the school and college levels are not required to take Islamic Studies, which is compulsory for Muslim students, they are still instructed in Islam because of the inclusion of Islamic content in other compulsory courses, such as Urdu and English language—and even natural sciences. Poems praising Allah and Prophet Muhammad and lessons glorifying Islamic history and morality are incorporated in Urdu and English courses, which are compulsory for every student until grades 12 and 14, respectively. For instance, the Urdu textbook taught in grade 5 is comprised of eight lessons (units) containing Islamic teachings. Likewise, the current Urdu textbook of grade 7 contains a chapter on Ghazi Ilm Din (1908-1929), who was convicted for murdering a Hindu writer Mahashe Rajpal, in 1929, who wrote a blasphemous book on Prophet Muhammad. Eulogizing characters like Ilm Din may promote intolerance and vigilantism. Therefore, it is not surprising that society has appropriated the magisterial powers to punish someone accused of blasphemy.

It was decided in 2006 to review the curriculum, as the older curriculum was considered too slanted. However, the current curriculum still contains several serious defects. First it violates the basic right of religious minorities to not be instructed in religious precepts other than their own. Second, religion continues informing the religion-centric civic identity of Pakistanis at the expense of their ethnolinguistic identities, which simultaneously alienate non-Muslims as well. Third, history is still distorted in the new curriculum (see Nayyar 2013).

206 It is worth stating that non-Muslim students at undergraduate level in my university, University of Peshawar, are compelled to take a compulsory course in Islamic Studies, as they do not have other alternative to the course.

207 However, in recent years the state has discouraged vigilantism in cases of blasphemy, as evidenced by the execution of Mumtaz Qadri, the murderer of the former Governor of the Punjab, Salman Taseer: Qadri believed that Taseer had committed blasphemy against the Prophet of Islam. Similarly, people identified in the recent lynching of Mashal Khan, April 17, 2017, were arrested and tried in the court of law. Mashal was lynched by his fellow students in Abdul Wali Khan University of Mardan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, for his supposedly blasphemous views.

208 I have also examined the content of one of the old textbooks of Pakistan Studies as well, to see if significant changes are made in the course or not.
Before the 18th Constitutional Amendment in 2009, the curriculum was controlled by the central government. The Amendment devolved to the provinces the power to develop their own curriculum. According to Nayyar (2013), Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s curriculum is less biased than that of Punjab. However, the desired changes – to incorporate alternative worldviews and histories – have not been introduced even in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s curriculum. The present government in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, led by a right-wing Pakistan Tahrik-e-Insaf (PTI) in coalition with the Islamist Jama’at-e-Islam, has incorporated extremist hegemonic content in textbooks taught in the province.

In addition, it is not only the curriculum that is so designed as to inculcate religious conservatism and civic nationalism in opposition to Hindu-India into students but also the majority of the teachers and administration in education department have fervently been propagating conformist attitudes. The education institutions have drawn lines beyond which free thinking and scientific inquiry are discouraged. The Higher Education Commission (HEC) of Pakistan issued a memo to heads of all the universities and degree awarding institutions (DAIs) of Pakistan, on October 28, 2014, reminding them the “responsibility of promoting the ideology and principles of Pakistan through teachings, dialogues, meetings, conferences, formal and informal gatherings and social discourse.” The letter reminds them that “demonstrations of such rightful perceptions promote nationalism, dispel confusion and infuse beliefs and principles that bring harmony in society, and bolsters unity and performance.” It regrets that activities, such as discussions and classroom presentations, contrary to the ideology and principles of Pakistan are hosted or sponsored in universities and DAIs; and warns them to remain vigilant and forestall such activities. What I have observed both as a student and a teacher is that the majority of the teachers in Pakistani schools and colleges believe in, and zealously inculcate into their students, religious bigotry and extremism, distorted history, and officially sponsored myths. To illustrate, some of my colleagues justified the lynching of Mashal Khan. A couple of weeks before Mashal
was murdered, Peshawar University Teachers Association (PUTA), led by a so-called liberal group of teachers called “Friends” organized a protest against some Facebook pages allegedly spreading blasphemy. The teachers participating in the protest were calling for death for the administrators of the pages and were demanding that the authorities block them and punish their administrators. Moreover, those teachers who dare challenge the conventional wisdom and bigotry are beleaguered and threatened by the spy agencies.

Literacy Rate in Pashtunkhwa and Balochistan

Keeping in view the current role of education in Pakistan as an ISA, I argue that the higher the literacy rate among a people, the more widespread and deep-rooted the hegemonic discourses would be among them. Consequently, the challengers would find it difficult to counter the state’s hegemony. However, it worth stating that education is not the only, though very significant, ISA, therefore an illiterate people may be indoctrinated into hegemony through other ISAs such as the media, political parties and family.

As examined in Chapter 4, the literacy rate in Pashtun districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa is significantly higher than it is in Baloch districts of Balochistan (see Table 6.1, as reproduced).

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209 It is to be noted that some of the leading figures of the Friends were infuriated by the protest.
210 It is worth noting that there is a difference between education and literacy: education is the process of teaching and learning, literacy means the ability of someone to read and write. Given the hegemonic educational system in Pakistan, I use the literacy rate as a proxy for hegemonic education. Moreover, literacy is also a tool to propagate hegemony through other means, like newspapers.
211 To remind my readers, deprivation in education (abbreviated as Edu) is operationalized as illiteracy rate among both males and females of 10 years and above age, and by out-of-school children (5-9 years age). Illiteracy is defined as the “ability of a person to read a newspaper [sic] or to write a simple letter in any language” (PSML, 2010-11, in Jamal, 4).
Table 6.1: Level of Significance between Means of Illiteracy Rate in Baloch Districts of Balochistan and Pashtun Districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>B Mean*</th>
<th>P Mean*</th>
<th>t-stat</th>
<th>t-crit</th>
<th>α at 0.05</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Edu</td>
<td>53.07</td>
<td>37.72</td>
<td>3.66</td>
<td>2.04</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hence, Pashtuns are more exposed to the educational ISA than Balochs; and therefore, Pashtun nationalists are more disadvantaged than their Baloch counterparts to generate consensus and mobilized action in support of their respective movements.

Content Analysis of Textbooks Taught in Pakistan

To further elaborate the role of education as an ISA in Pakistan, I have qualitatively analyzed Pakistan Studies’ textbooks taught in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan for compulsory courses in grades 9 to 12. In general, Pakistan Studies covers such topics as the ideological and historical basis of Pakistan, its geography and ethnography, its resources, its relations in the neighborhood and with Muslim countries and major powers. The course also contains chapters about different regimes and political events in Pakistan. In succeeding lines, I will briefly discuss some of the recurring themes in Pakistan Studies which aim at constructing a Pakistani civic identity and depoliticization of ethno-linguistic differences within Pakistan. In addition, I also examine some of the contradictions in the content of the textbooks.

The most recurring theme of Pakistan Studies is the Ideology of Pakistan, which is derived from Islam. Accordingly, the movement for the creation of Pakistan was enthused by the religious sentiments of the Muslims of India. With the advent of majoritarian institutions introduced by the British Raj, the Muslims of India grew conscious of the threat posed to their

*BMean signifies the average illiteracy rate in Baloch districts of Balochistan, whereas PMean stands for the average illiteracy in Pashtun districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
religion and civilization by the Hindu majority. Consequently, they resolved to carve out a Muslim-majority state out of the British India where they would be free to practice and preserve their religion. The Pakistan Studies textbook published by Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Textbook Board defines Pakistan’s ideology in the following words:

The term ‘Ideology of Pakistan’ refers to the very basic thought and belief which constitute the foundation of Pakistan. The purpose of this ideology was the creation of a separate and independent state for the Muslims of [the Indian] subcontinent, where they would be free to live their lives in accordance with their culture and religious values (2; trans. mine).

All of the textbooks of Pakistan studies, examined in this study, coalesce the official ideology of Pakistan and Islam into a connected whole. For instance, the textbook for grades 11 & 12 of the Federal Textbook Board, Islamabad. enumerates the components of Pakistan’s Ideology as Islam, democracy, social justice, equality, sense of responsibility and fundamental human rights (A. Khan 2005, 2-3). Likewise, according to the old textbook of Pakistan Studies taught in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in grade 10, Tawheed and Rasalat (belief in the oneness of Allah and in the Prophethood of Muhammad), justice and equity, (Islamic) fraternity and brotherhood, and freedom and equality are the elements constituting Pakistan’s ideology (Ahmad, Javed, and Saeed n. d., 1-3). However, some changes have been introduced in the textbook of Pakistan Studies for Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2010 during the Awami National Party’s (ANP) coalition government in the province. Accordingly, the ‘foundations and components of the Ideology of Pakistan’ are: Islam and belief in Tawheed; Islamic code of life; Islamic concept of sovereignty;

213 The same textbook is taught in colleges and higher secondary schools of Balochistan as well.
social justice and equality; Islamic democracy; and, equal rights of minorities (Marwat et al. 2010, 2-6).\footnote{214}

Thus, the new Pakistan Studies’ textbook of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa acknowledges religious minorities and their rights. There is an obvious tension between Pakistan’s exclusivist raison d’être, Islam, and the ostensibly unfolding zeitgeist, characterized by democratic freedoms and equality. Consequently, the ideology of Pakistan Islamizes its existence, on the one hand, and democratizes Islam on the other. The first component of Pakistan’s ideology warrants the creation of the country to preserve Islamic values and way of life that were threatened by Hinduism in British India. Pakistan’s ideology (and Constitution) also envisages the sovereignty of the Almighty Allah, which implies that legislation and public policies shall be drafted within the framework of the Quran and Sunnah – traditions of Prophet Muhammad. Simultaneously, the state’s ideology (and Constitution) endorses certain democratic freedoms, such as freedoms of thought and action. It also upholds the rights of religious minorities to profess, preach, and practice their religious dogmas (see, for instance, Marwat et al., 2-6; and, A. Khan, 2-3). The principles of the sovereignty of Allah and democratic principles of secularism, basic freedoms and equality are contradictory to each other, for instance. Also, neither orthodox Islam (which informs the dominant political thought in Pakistan) nor the constitution of Pakistan treats non-Muslims as equal citizens of the state. The constitution bars them from holding certain public offices such as the premiership and the presidency.

Moreover, Pakistan Studies posits the ideology of Pakistan in opposition to Hindus. Accordingly:

\footnote{214 The Pakistan Studies textbook, sanctioned by Balochistan Textbook Board, Quetta, elaborates the ideology of Pakistan to include Islamic rituals and festivities and safeguarding the economic and political interests of Muslims of British India as some of its (Pakistan ideology's) objectives (see, Khattak and M. Khan 2012, 6-9).}
The ideology of Pakistan was based on the “Two Nations Theory,” which was conceived by Sir Sayed Ahmad Khan\footnote{Sir Sayed (1817-1898) was one of the renowned Muslim reformers of India who legitimized the English rule in India and persuaded Muslims to adopt a conciliatory attitude towards their new masters so as to avoid political and socio-economic marginalization. Moreover, he induced Muslims to get contemporary education. He founded Madrasat-ul-Uloom Muslmanan-e-Hind (Indian-Muslim’s School of Sciences) in Aligarh, in 1875. The School was renamed, two years after its establishment, as the Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental (MAO) College. Sir Sayed succeeded in getting the official recognition and patronage for his college. It is worth stating that the MAO College played a vital role in educating and awakening the Muslims of Muslim-minority province of India (see, for instance A. Khan, 8-10). Besides, he interpreted and preached a very liberal version of Islam. Having in mind his political outlook and the services he rendered to the Muslims of India, it can be said that Sir Sayed was the progenitor of the identity politics among Muslims of the north-and east-India, where they were a minority.} … who realized that Hindus and Muslims were two separate nations, whose history, culture, social values, and religious dogmas are totally different from each other. The same ‘Two-Nations Theory’ later on assumed the form of Pakistan’s Ideology and [thus it] became the basis of the creation of Pakistan (Al-Hassan et al., 2).

The students in Pakistani schools and colleges are taught that “Muslims treated Hindus with tolerance and justice during their rule [for centuries] in India” (Al-Hassan et al., 3). However, after snatching power from Muslims, the British subjected them to slavery and discrimination. Accordingly, “extremist Hindus, too, took full advantage of the situation by joining hands with English to take revenge on Muslims for ruling India for several centuries” (Al-Hassan et al., 9). Moreover, “Muslims also feared that after the withdrawal of the British, they would come under the cruel rule of Hindu majority,” as they had realized that “Hindus were biased against the [sic] Muslims” (Khattak and M. Khan, 9-10; emphasis added; also see Al-Hassan et al., 13-14). According to Pakistan Studies textbooks, Hindus had monopolized not only politics and market but also posed civilizational threats to Islam. Accordingly, the Hindu extremist elements of the Arya Samaj (Noble Society), founded in 1975, started the Shudhi and Sangathan (Purification and Consolidation) movement in 1920 to reconvert Muslims to Hinduism (see for instance, A. Khan, 9).
Besides constructing a negative image of Hindus, the Pakistan Studies textbooks claim that the English rulers of India connived with Hindus against Muslims of India (Al-Hassan et al., 9). The old textbook of Pakistan Studies taught in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa maintains that after imposing their rule in India, the English defaced Islamic values, with the support of Hindus, while promoting Western values (Ahmad, Javed and Saeed, 4). Likewise, while praising the leadership and political acumen of Jinnah, the current textbook of Pakistan Studies of Balochistan Textbook Board says that: “He [Jinnah] foiled the conspiracies of the British and the Hindus and succeeded in achieving a separate homeland for the Muslims [of India]” (Khattak and M. Khan, 11).

On the contrary, history tells us that the officially recognized founding fathers of Pakistan had not only a western life-style but were also loyal to the British colonial rule in India. Most of the All-India Muslim Leaguers had accepted the Western honorifics and other socio-economic rewards bestowed upon them by their English masters in return for their services to the Raj. For instance, Sayed Ahmad Khan, who is regarded as the progenitor of the ‘Two Nations Theory,’ supported the British rule in India and denounced the War of Independence, 1858, as mutiny – “an upheaval spurred by trouble mongers” (A. Khan, 9). Recognizing the services he rendered to the Raj in India, Sayed Ahmad Khan was given the title of Sir. On the other hand, the Congress leadership, which the textbooks in Pakistan have portrayed as the defenders of Hindu interests only, was subjected to all sorts of repression by the Raj.

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216 In May 1857 Indian soldiers in the British East India Company’s army revolted against the Company’s rule to liberate India. The revolt started in the northern and central India and was joined by both Muslims and Hindus, though the former are believed to have played the leading role in it. The revolt was suppressed soon in June 1958. Indian nationalists call it the War of Independence, while the British authorities called it a mutiny. After the revolt was suppressed, the East India Company’s rule was replaced with the direct rule of English government.

217 Different textbooks of Pakistan studies contradict each other. For instance, the 1858 insurgency on the part of British-India soldiers (both Muslims and non-Muslims) to overthrow the East India Company’s rule in India and re-institute the Mughal King is described as the War of Independence in Al-Hassan et al. (8). Interestingly, the main reason of the uprising, according to book, was religious. Muslims were infuriated by the activities of the Christian missionaries who were openly preaching Christianity. On the contrary, the Pakistan Studies book taught in Balochistan affirmatively cites Sir Sayed denouncing the insurgency of 1858 as an illegitimate uprising by some miscreants (Khattak and M. Khan, 11).
Concerning Pakistan’s relations with other countries, the textbooks construct binaries of friends and foes using religious lexicon. Hindu-India is portrayed as a major existential threat to Pakistan. The old textbook of the NWFP Textbook Board says, “Hindus were against the establishment of Pakistan. Despite their opposition, Pakistan was created. Yet, they employed every tactic to damage and weaken Pakistan” (Ahmad, Javed, and Saeed, 31). Commenting on the current situation, the book says that Western powers (ostensibly the US and UK), in collusion with Jews, are determined to wipe out Islam and Muslims. Therefore, Pakistanis must work hard for the progress and prosperity of their homeland (Pakistan). They must love their country more than their caste, *elaqa*, and province. Furthermore, after essentializing the religious identity of Pakistanis, the textbook induces the students to pan-Islamism. The chapters on the foreign policy of Pakistan emphasize the need for having special relations with Muslim countries, besides establishing good relations with rest of the world. One of the books quotes a verse by the officially recognized national poet of Pakistan, Muhammad Iqbal, highlighting the need for unity among Muslims, from Nile to Kashghar for the sake of *Haram* – the holy place of Muslims in Saudi Arabia.

Hence, the Pakistan Studies textbooks homogenize the identity of Muslims by underlining their religious identity only. The textbook for grade 9 in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, for instance, quotes Jinnah saying: “Mussalmans [Muslims] are a nation according to any definition of nation and they must have their own homeland [Pakistan]” (in Marwat et al., 10). And, as noted earlier, this identity is constructed in opposition to Hindus (and non-Muslims in general). The movement of Pakistan is presented as if all of the Muslims of British India, irrespective of their ethno-historical and religious identities, had struggled for its creation. However, the fact is that the minority complex could be found only among Muslims of north- and east- India, which culminated into the demand for the creation of Pakistan (see chapters 1 and 3). It is worth noting

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218 The word *elaqa* means region, which signifies the ancestral land of a people in this context.
that the movement for Pakistan was unpopular among the orthodox Muslims. The leadership of Iсламиist political parties, Jami’at-e-Ulama-e-Hind (JUH) and Jamat-e-Islami (JI), were critical of the idea of dividing India along religious lines, as they (especially the JUH) believed that the division of India along religious lines was synonymous to the division of the Muslims of India (this point is further elaborated in the next chapter). Nor was the movement for Pakistan popular in the Muslims majority province, like the then NWFP, Punjab, and Kalat state (see Chapter 3). However, Pakistan Studies claims that it was equally popular in all the provinces currently constituting Pakistan. A chapter on “National Integration and Prosperity” in the textbook for grades 11 & 12 in Balochistan defines nationalism as a feeling of commonness among a people. Accordingly, the centripetal forces strengthen a nation, whereas the centrifugal ones are detrimental for national integration. The book further maintains that all ethno-national communities now constituting Pakistan resolved to transcend all their differences (in terms of language, culture, and history) in order “… to form one coherent group” (A. Khan, 146). The reason behind their resolve was Islam. It further says:

They were all Muslims; they all faced to one Qibla [means, Mecca] while offering prayers, and the Quran was the common code of life they cherished to follow. Belief in the oneness of Allah (Tauheed) had united them like one man. Their heart throbbed together in the love o [sic] Prophet Muhammad … and it ran in their blood. Islam was the paramount bond that united them, and this single bond was so strong that it overcame all the factors that separated them from each other (i.e. language, race, culture, geography etc.) (146).

In short, Pakistan Studies downplays and ‘depoliticizes’ the ethnolinguistic differences among Muslims of British India (and Pakistan) that played a significant role in shaping the politics of the time. It ignores, for instance, the Khudai Khidmatgar movement in Pashtun areas
that was against the division of India. The textbooks are also incorrect about the popularity of Pakistan Movement in Balochistan stating that the Shahi Jirga (Royal Council) of Balochistan voted in favor of Pakistan. In fact it was the Shahi Jirga of British Balochistan that comprised mostly of the Pashtun areas. The majority of the Baloch areas constituted the then Kalat state, which had opted for independence (see Chapter 3).

One of the textbooks (A. Khan 2005) quotes Jinnah to depoliticize ethnolinguistic differences and to censure ethno-nationalist politics in Pakistan. Accordingly, Pakistanis are no more Balochs or Pashtuns or Sindhis or Punjabis. They are only Pakistanis. They must think, feel, and behave as Pakistanis only (38). After highlighting the need for national integration, one of the textbooks delineates some of the hurdles as follows:

1. Provincialism and parochialism;
2. Linguistic differences and laxity in the implementation of the national language, Urdu; and
3. Racial and group difference (A. Khan, 147).

To sum up, realizing the ideological worth of education, the state has designed the textbooks so as to construct a hegemonic identity discourse. Besides the Pakistan Studies textbooks, the courses in English and Urdu languages, too, indoctrinate students into the ruling ideology. For instance, the first three chapters in the Urdu textbook for grade 10, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, are on the following topics: ‘Migration of the Prophet Muhammad’ from Mecca to Medina to avoid persecution; ‘Ideology of Pakistan;’ and ‘Urdu Language.’ The chapter on Urdu language, written by Moulvi Abdul Haq, contends that Urdu is the only language that can be rightly called Islamic, as it is the only language originating among (and spoken only by) Muslims.
The writer further argues, “Gentlemen, the stability of Pakistan is of prime importance, and stability requires unity, and unity necessitates a national language” (15) – which is Urdu.

The Media as an ISA

The media agenda and discourse significantly affect a movement’s capacity to generate consensus and mobilize action. Therefore, a movement’s elite goes all out to have access to the mainstream media, as the media coverage helps them disseminate their frames and gain legitimacy. Steidley (2017) identifies three ways in which media coverage gives legitimacy to a movement. First, they do so by broadcasting the movement’s frames that resonate with the public, media convinces the populace of the movement’s legitimacy. Second, media coverage of a movement’s cause increases awareness of the incentives for participation. The media propagates the counterhegemonic discourse of the movement and amplifies the possibility and benefits of collective action. Finally, media coverage of a movement’s frames and activities can destabilize and delegitimize a countermovement’s claims (609). In addition, I believe that even if a movement’s frames do not resonate with public, frequent and consistent media coverage of a movement may ultimately ‘normalize’ its frames by persistently inducing the public to think otherwise.

However, a movement may have limited access to the media, for two reasons. First, compared to public arena, the media has lesser number of gatekeepers and more centralized setup that restrict a movement’s access to the media agenda. Second, the media is not unbiased. It does not “transmit information without transforming it” (Klandermans and Goslinga, 320). Generally speaking, several factors account for influences on the media agenda. McCarthy, Smith and Zald

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219 Media agenda refers to ‘the set of issues receiving attention in the mass media’ (McCarthy, Smith and Zald 1996, 293), whereas media discourse refers to “the system of meanings created and transmitted through mass media (Klandermans and Goslinga 1996, 319).
(1996) have elaborated three of such factors. The first is news routines, “the standard procedures that routinize and regularize” the tasks of news gathering. In other words, media normally assigns reporters the task to collect news from particular institutions and important officials who are considered as reliable and marketable sources of information. If a specific movement is not on the media’s news routines, it will have little chances to get media coverage. The second is news pegs, the events that are interesting. What make an event “interesting” are such characteristics as being about popular personalities or cultural resonance or unusualness or having wide impact. Again, if the movement (and its discourse and objectives) does not constitute what is “interesting,” the media will ignore it. Finally, there is corporate hegemony, which refers to the advertisers’ influence on the media’s agenda and discourse. McCarthy, Smith and Zald argue that, as a profit-making institution, the media depends as much on advertisers as it does on consumers.

Consequently, a media outlet has to be mindful of the political and normative preferences of its advertisers (296-297). In addition, a media outlet’s biases emanate from the underlying system of ideas and beliefs sanctioned in its internal guidelines, the instructions for reporters and editors from the owners. These guidelines play a vital role in “structuring and patterning” the agenda and discourse of a media organization (Barkho 2011, 297). Finally, the state’s media regulatory institutions may control the agenda and discourse of mainstream media substantively. In fact, this is more so in (semi-) authoritarian states. An (semi-) authoritarian state tends to co-opt mainstream media organizations so as turn them into its ideological apparatuses, whereas intractable media outlets are suppressed in order to obscure counterhegemonic worldviews.

In order to propagate and maintain its hegemony, Pakistani state has effectively managed to either co-opt or gag the mainstream media. According to the Center for Civic Education Pakistan (CCEP) (2010), Pakistan has used media “… to construct national identity and nationalistic ethos” (3). As we will see below, the state has used both formal institutional means and informal repressive mechanisms to muffle mainstream media. Historically, Pakistan “…
inherited the laws that were prepared by the British colonial rulers with a mindset to control and subjugate the natives” (CCEP, 15). In the face of strong ethno-nationalist centrifugal tendencies, the ruling elite were uncertain about the stability and survival of the country. Therefore, they resorted to authoritarian practices, including restrictions on media (see, for instance, Khan and Eleazar 2016). Different laws, such as the Press and Publications Ordinance of 1960, were enacted to curb the freedom of press.\textsuperscript{220} However, laws regulating the printing press were relaxed in 1988 to create a relatively conducive environment for the expansion and growth of printing press, although the print media kept demanding more freedom throughout 1990s.

Until the start of the 21\textsuperscript{st} Century, the state had almost complete monopoly over electronic media as a source of production and distribution of information. General Musharraf’s era (1999-2008) witnessed an unprecedented growth in, and freedom of, both print and electronic media. In 2000, the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA) issued licenses to cable and satellite channels to operate in Pakistan. This brought to an end the state-owned Pakistan Television Corporation Limited’s (PTCL) monopoly over news and views, as dozens of private TV channels were launched. Moreover, Musharraf’s era was marked by a mushrooming growth of private FM radio stations and news agencies (for details, see CCEP). Previously, the PTCL and Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation (PBC), which provided radio services, had almost absolute control over electronically transmitted information, whereas the print media was bridled through restrictive legal frameworks. For instance, the Press and Publication Ordinance of 1960, which remained a tool of controlling the media till 1988 (see CCEP, 15) the printing press was not allowed to publish anything that undermined the integrity and sovereignty of Pakistan.

However, the private broadcast media still does not have unlimited access to general public. Private broadcasters are allowed to air only through satellite, which means that private channels could be accessed only through cable networks that are available only in urban and

\textsuperscript{220} Then, the private broadcast media was non-existent in Pakistan.
semi-urban areas. This means that majority of Pakistanis living in rural areas do not have access to private TV channels (see Khan and Eleazar, and CCEP, 6).

Musharraf tolerated media criticism of his regime and some of his policies, such as the presidential referendum of 2002 and his decision to join the US-led campaign against terrorist network in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, freedom of media remained scanty by democratic ideals. The media was (and is) restrained through both formal institutional instruments and informal repressive tactics. Currently, there are several laws and codes of conduct in place that regulate journalistic practices in Pakistan. The Ethical Code of Practice (ECP), the Registration Ordinance 2002, the Defamation Ordinance, and Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA), 2002, are noteworthy among the formal institutional devices that limit the freedom of media. For instance, the ECP says that “the press shall avoid printing, publishing or disseminating any material which may bring into contempt Pakistan or its people or [which] tends to undermine its sovereignty or integrity as an independent country (in CCEP, 18).

Likewise, the PEMRA Ordinance of 2002 (as amended in 2007) circumscribes media’s freedom by suppressing media discourse that can possibly undermine the integrity and sovereignty of Pakistan. The ordinance establishes a federal authority (PEMRA) entrusted with the responsibility to issue (and revoke, if the need so arises) licenses to electronic media outlet. One of the terms and conditions of the license issued by PEMRA stipulates that ‘the sovereignty, security, and integrity of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan’ are to be ensured by a media outlet operating in Pakistan (sub-clause 20a). Moreover, the subsequent sub-clause requires a media outlet to guarantee the preservation of national, cultural, religious and social values of Pakistan, as spelled out in the constitution of the state. The sub-clause 20k further requires a TV channel or a radio to make sure that “no anchor person, moderator, or host propagates any opinion or acts in any manner prejudicial to the

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221 Musharraf was legalized as the President-in-Uniform through the referendum.
222 However, some of the restrictions imposed through these legal apparatuses are not inconsistent with democratic norms, such as discouraging sensationalism of violence, publishing names and photos of the victims of sexual offences and violation of privacy (see for instance the ECP, in CCEP, 17-18).
ideology of Pakistan or sovereignty, integrity or security of Pakistan” (emphasis added). In addition, sub-clause 20l says that a media organization should not broadcast anything defaming or ridiculing any organ of the government of Pakistan and members of the armed forces.

Although the terms and conditions of license enshrined in the PEMRA Ordinance have not been applied frequently, the ordinance has been invoked from time to time to punish non-compliant journalists and TV channels. For instance, on June 6, 2014, PEMRA suspended GEO TV’s license for 15 days and imposed a fine of PKR 10 million for reporting that the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), a spy agency, was responsible for shooting one of its senior journalists, Hamid Mir. Practically, it is not very likely to implement PEMRA Ordinance in letter and spirit because too much censorship can possibly radicalize the media and democratic civil society organizations, yet it remains a significant legal instrument that can be (and is occasionally) used to control media agenda and discourse.

Besides the legal apparatuses employed by the state to “curb its [media’s] freedom through filtering contents deemed blasphemous, secessionist, anti-state, or anti-military” (Sadegh 2013, 2), it has resorted to extra-legal repressive tactics to ensure that media observes self-censorship. The military establishment has carved for itself a niche in Pakistani politics, which it has jealously guarded against the democratic forces. It is intolerant of any criticism of the state’s policy of establishing and using a terror-complex in the pursuit of its foreign policy ventures in Afghanistan and India. Nor does it allow any debate over the security and human rights situation in Balochistan and FATA. Journalists who dare question military’s role in politics and its policies are intimidated, tortured, or even killed (CCEP, 2). The 2007 annual report of Reporters Sans Frontiers has ranked Pakistan 152 out of 169 in its annual Worldwide Press Freedom Index (Siraj 2009, 43). The International Federation of Journalists has placed Pakistan as the fourth most dangerous country for journalists, where 115 journalists have been killed since 1990 (The Express Tribune, 2017). Besides, journalists are targeted by the so-called non-state actors – terrorist

In addition to the legal and extra-legal mechanisms devised to muzzle the media, the security establishment, big businesses and successive civilian governments have persistently been co-opting journalists to control the media’s agenda and discourse. Above and beyond the advertisement incentives, both government and corporate industries have obliged journalists by offering them selective incentives in the form of official patronage and economic benefits. For instance, *The Express Tribune* (November 1, 2010) reported that 172 journalists were allotted plots in G-13 and G-14 sectors of Islamabad, under the two percent quota for journalists in public housing-schemes. According to Khan and Eleazar:

… [A] top official has speculated that as much as 90 percent of journalists in the country had ties to the security establishment. The very thought that the media was out of the Army’s control was never an issue, he said: ‘They [journalists] were all on the Army’s payroll.’ … Many journalists who had risen to national prominence had been cultivated through Army and political patronage in the form of secret funds, property handouts, increased career prospects and access to power (para.17).

Notwithstanding the repressive and co-opting tactics of the state to control media agenda and discourse, it has gradually been losing control over information following the advent of social media outlet, such as YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter. Counterhegemonic forces have been utilizing social media to ventilate their grievances and propagate their causes. The state has, on the other hand, made attempts to regulate social media too. For instance, YouTube was blocked in

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223 The media revenue in the form of advertisements is estimated to be PKR 9.9 billion for the year 2004 (CCEP, 19) which increased to PKR 2 billion (USD 325 million) for the year 2010-11.

224 It is worth noting that most of journalists, too, are the product of the ideological apparatuses of the state (including education and the mainstream media). Consequently, many among them pronounce the hegemonic discourses and policies (especially foreign policy) of the state as legitimate, without being coerced and cajoled (this information is based on my informal discussions with some journalist friends).
Pakistan from September 2012 to January 2015 on the pretext of blasphemous content. Similarly, Pakistan has blocked several Facebook pages, such as Roshni, Bhensa, Mochi, which the state believed to be anti-Pakistan and anti-Islam. In addition, the Parliament passed the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act in August 2016 to regulate cyber space. Though the Act is progressive in several respects, such as discouraging such acts as glorification of offences, hate-speech, recruitment, funding, and planning of terrorism, and electronic forgery and fraud, it also circumscribes freedom of thought and expression. Article 34 of the Act says that the authority, created under the act, “… shall have the power to remove or block or issue directions for removal or blocking of access to an information through any information system if it considers it necessary in the interest of the glory of Islam or the integrity, security, or defence of Pakistan or any part thereof, public order, decency or morality, or in relation to contempt of court or commission of, or incitement to an offence under this Act.” Moreover, the authority is empowered to confiscate and investigate a person’s electronic devices while investigating a cyber crime. Several social media activists have been arrested on the pretext of circulating content considered against Islam or integrity of Pakistan. In addition, extra-legal arrests and torture of (and threats to) social media activists are commonplace (Wasim and Tahir 2017; Ali 2017).

Equally noteworthy is the fact that hegemonic forces, including serving military personnel, have created social media accounts and pages (both real and fake) to propagated hegemonic discourses. However, it is almost impossible for the state to completely silence dissenting and liberal democratic voices. Although the impacts of social media in terms of popularizing counterhegemonic discourse are yet to unfold, the state has so far successfully controlled and utilized mainstream media to establish and maintain hegemony.

Media Access in Pashtunkhwa and Balochistan

Before analyzing the mainstream media agenda and discourse I have statistically analyzed, using t-statistics, the relative access of people in the Baloch districts of Balochistan and
Pashtun districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa to see the relative presence of one of the significant ISAs in these areas. I have used 2002 data compiled by Population Council (Pakistan Office) on the district-wide percentage of households with access to TV, radio, and newspapers. Although the data is not up-to-date, it is more comprehensive and reliable in the sense that it contains statistics about all districts of Pakistan regarding peoples’ access to mainstream media.

Moreover, the data reflects what I have noticed during my field work and interviews with political leaders and activists. In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa people have more access to TV and newspaper than the inhabitants of Balochistan. The difference between the two provinces in terms of their exposure to TV and newspaper is because of variation in degree of urbanization, access to electricity, and literacy rates (as noted in Chapter 4). In Balochistan (including Pashtun districts of Balochistan), people use radio as an alternative source of information and entertainment.\(^{225}\) It is noteworthy that radio in Pakistan has remained a medium having more diverse agenda and discourse as compared to TV and newspaper, given the relatively lesser control of the state over radio broadcasts. People could (and can) access different radio channels from different countries with diverse agendas on international and regional issues. And, they usually prefer listening to international radio broadcasts, as they are free from the Pakistani state control and have relative discursive diversity.\(^{226}\)

As shown in Table 6.2 below, the t-statistics results regarding media access in Pashtun districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baloch districts of Balochistan indicate that the former are exposed to the media ISA of the state in Pakistan significantly more than the latter.

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\(^{225}\) The percentage of radio listeners in Balochistan (including Pashtun districts of Balochistan) is higher than it is in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa: 39.7 as compared to 27.4. Nevertheless, the percentage of radio listeners is significantly higher in Pashtun districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa than it is in the Baloch districts of Balochistan.

\(^{226}\) For instance, during 1980s and 1990s, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) radio was the most popular source of information, which aired news in both Urdu and Pashto. The BBC is now replaced by the Voice of America (VOA) in the peripheries of Pashtunkhwa, which airs news and entertainment programs in Pashto. However, the VOA has not yet started its services in Balochi language. It is noteworthy that the government of Pakistan recently banned the US-funded Mashal Radio on the pretext that it had anti-Pakistan agenda.
Table 6.2: T-Statistics of Media Access in Pashtun Districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baloch Districts of Balochistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>P Mean</th>
<th>B Mean</th>
<th>t-stat.</th>
<th>t. crit.</th>
<th>α at 0.05</th>
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<td>Radio</td>
<td>53.79</td>
<td>36.83</td>
<td>2.29</td>
<td>2.08</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TV</td>
<td>37.86</td>
<td>10.52</td>
<td>4.28</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspaper</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>11.31</td>
<td>3.54</td>
<td>2.04</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Media Agenda and Discourse in Pakistan: Units of Analysis

In order to qualitatively evaluate the agenda and discourse of mainstream media in Pakistan, I briefly analyze the editorials of one of the popular private Urdu newspaper, *Daily Mashriq*, issued from Peshawar – the capital city of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. *Daily Mashriq* is circulated in all major cities of Pakistan, too, including Quetta, the capital of Balochistan. The reasons for selecting *Daily Mashriq* are, first, that it is one of the most popular Urdu newspapers. The Urdu press has more readership than English newspapers. English dailies – the most popular among them are *The News* and *The Dawn* – are read by very limited, highly educated, people (see, for instance CCEP, 5). And, second, I could easily access most of the issues of *Daily Mashriq* among Urdu newspapers for the selected time span.

I randomly selected 40 issues of the paper from 1998 to 2015, which contain a total of 89 editorials. First, I categorized the available issues of the newspaper on the basis of the years of publication by using stratified sampling technique (SST). Then, I selected my sample among the stratified categories by using lottery method. It is noteworthy that the 1990s marks the end of civilian interlude between the two military regimes of General Zia (1977-1988) and General Musharraf (1999-2008). The years 2008 onward characterizes another transition to civilian...
rule. In addition, I have also analyzed some of the available issues (eight in total) of the second half of the 1980s in order to understand the mainstream media agenda and discourse during one of the most stringent authoritarian regimes in Pakistan, General Zia’s martial law. Thus, the selected time span helps me situate media discourse(s) within the varying political contexts.

In addition, I briefly discuss the private electronic media’s agenda and discourses at the end of the chapter. Although the private media broadcasts are gradually making inroads into media market, it was introduced very recently as compared to private print media and very limited people have access to cable networks (only in urban and semi-urban areas), through which private TV channels are broadcasted (see CCEP, 9-10). Therefore, relative to the print media’s agenda and discourses, I do not discuss the private broadcast media’s agenda and discourses in details.

Print Media in Pakistan: Agenda and Discourses

First, I have divided the selected editorials of the daily Mashriq into three categories, depending on the discursive/ideological messages they contain: 1) conservative/hegemonic identity discourses (discussed earlier); 2) liberal (counterhegemonic) discourses, which means raising and propagating certain issues that somehow undermine the conventional/hegemonic outlook of the state, such as highlighting the need for constitutional recognition of ethnolinguistic identities, or emphasizing the need for normalizing relations in the neighborhood, or endorsing the principle of civilian control of the military; and 3) what I call neutral/nonideological editorial, in the sense that neither hegemonic nor counterhegemonic outlook is explicitly reflected in it.

The frequencies of the different ideological/discursive positions taken by the selected editorials of Daily Mashriq are summarized in Table 6.3:

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227 As noted earlier, even during civilian rule, the military has never relinquished control over certain policy areas – especially, over foreign policy and security issues.
Table 6.3: Frequency of Ideological Positions taken by the Daily *Mashriq*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hegemonic</th>
<th>Counterhegemonic</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>35.95</td>
<td>6.74</td>
<td>57.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As shown in Table 3, the newspaper has the supposedly neutral/nonideological posture more than hegemonic and counterhegemonic stances it has taken. The apparently nonideological (neutral) position is taken on the issues pertaining to governance, administration, development, social policy, and crimes. The frequency of the nonideological frames of the daily also indicates that media agenda is more focused on the issues of governance, administration, and social policy. More often than not, the mass media censures the incumbent governments (federal, provincial, and local) for poor performance concerning the unavailability of social services (such as electricity, health and education), the rising crime rate, inflation, maladministration and corruption.

Nevertheless, the ostensibly nonideological messages are usually as framed as to depoliticize the dominant ideological structures and to obscure institutionalized ethno-national subordination. For instance, one of the selected editorials of the daily (December 1, 2006) vilifies organized political activities in colleges and universities, following a clash between two students’ wings of political parties in Timargarah College, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The editorial opines that students’ involvement in politics is detrimental not only to those involved in it but also to their fellow students (who are not active in politics). Therefore, according to the editorial, the studies and precious time of the majority of students (who are not part of organized politics) must not be sacrificed on the altar of politics of a few students. The newspaper also advises the parents to keep a watchful eye on their children’s activities in colleges. Thus, the newspaper wants to promote an anti-politics attitude by portraying politics among students as a necessarily harmful activity. Given the general attitude of the mass media towards politics (and politicians), the word
‘politics’ has assumed pejorative meanings in Pakistan. Interestingly, it has rarely questioned the military’s involvement (both direct and indirect) in politics. The denigration of popular politics and politicians, all and sundry, implies a justification of authoritarianism and of the military’s interference in public affairs. Besides, media frames disparaging organized popular politics ultimately results in political inertia among masses so that they are rendered incapable of asserting their basic freedoms and rights. In other words, the denigration of politics and politicians across-the-board by Pakistan mainstream media causes a general political apathy among the masses and strengthens the authoritarian forces.

Moreover, grievances among smaller ethno-nations against the Punjab-dominated state are understated by emphasizing issues that are relatively irrelevant to them, such as the conventional power-struggle among the centrist Pakistani nationalist forces, or corruption at federal level. Most of the mass media frames related to the scarcity of utility and social services gloss over the structural/institutionalized deprivation. By the way of illustration, one of the editorials of *Daily Mashriq* (July 14, 2011) criticizes Peshawar Electric Supply Company (PESCO) for frequent and prolonged load-shedding in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, instead of highlighting the unjust distribution of resources and institutionalized deprivation of provinces to have autonomy over their resources (see Chapter 4 for details). Likewise, the media usually disparages civilian governments for insufficient health and education facilities, while disregarding the defense expenditure every year. It has kept understating the fact that Pakistan has virtually been converted into a security state at the expense of public welfare. For example, in the total budget of Pakistan Rupees (PKR) 4.394 trillion for the fiscal year (FY) 2016-17, Rs 959.5 billion were reserved for defense, whereas PKR 22.4 billion and PKR 79.5 billion were allocated for health and education, respectively (*Daily Pakistan*, April 29, 2018).

The mainstream media in Pakistan tends to take a very explicit hegemonic stance on the issues related to the state’s foreign policy and internal security situation. As shown in Table 3 above, the frequency of supposedly nonideological frames of *Daily Mashriq* editorials is followed
by the frequency of the hegemonic ones – 35.95%. The hegemonic ideological frames related to
foreign affairs focus more on India’s and United States’ regional policies and on the situation in
the Indian-held Jammu and Kashmir (J&K)\footnote{Of note is that the Pakistani-held Kashmir is called as the Azad (independent) Kashmir.} and Afghanistan. The mass media frequently
highlights the alleged predacious Indian attitude towards its neighbors and human rights’
violations by its security forces in J&K. The militants fighting for the independence of Indian-held J&K are labeled as {	extit{Mujahideen}}, ‘the holy warriors’ to justify insurgency (see \textit{Daily Mashriq},
June 9, 2005).

However, following the US invasion of Afghanistan in the aftermath of 9/11, Pakistan’s
foreign policy became more obsessed with the situation in Afghanistan, and so did the agenda of
the mainstream media. The earlier media discourse signified the Taliban and its affiliates in
Afghanistan as {	extit{Mujahideen}} (see, for example, the \textit{Daily Mashriq}, January 27, 2003). However,
the later media frames describe the terrorist groups operating in (and from) Afghanistan by their
official organizational names. Most of the media frames have censured the US’s strategic and
political endeavors in Afghanistan and exaggerated and justified the Taliban’s resistance to the
Afghan and NATO forces. One of the selected editorials said that the invasion of Afghanistan by
the US (and its allies) was unwarranted and illegitimate, and that Bush (the former President of
the US) and Blair’s (the ex-Prime Minister of the UK) expansionist and aggressive attitudes were
a threat to global peace. The newspaper claimed that even American and English intelligentsia
and people believed that Afghans had the right to fight for their freedom (against the NATO
forces in Afghanistan), and that they would fight till their last breath. Afghans were, accordingly,
fighting for their survival and security. The editorial further claimed that the Taliban movement
had a popular support and that Afghan people were fighting alongside the Taliban (November 22,
2006).
Thus, reflecting the state’s viewpoint on the situation in Afghanistan, the Pakistani mass media has recurrently portrayed the Taliban not only as freedom-fighters but also as an invincible force. One of the editorials of the newspaper amplified the popular belief in Pakistan that the ‘resistance against the foreign forces’ in Afghanistan could not be subdued with force, and that it was impossible for the US to stay in the country anymore. Eventually, the US and Afghan governments had only one option to restore peace in the region: negotiations with the Taliban and its affiliates. The editorial maintained that the role of Pakistan could be instrumental in facilitating peace-talks between the belligerent forces. It is noteworthy that Pakistan and its mainstream media are critical of the alleged presence (and role) of India in Afghanistan, and have been struggling to secure a role for Pakistan in Afghan affairs through the Taliban and Haqqani networks (January 20, 2010).

Terrorism in Pakistan is associated with the US invasion of Afghanistan by the Pakistani state and media in order to obscure Pakistan’s support to the terror complex operating across its border with Afghanistan, which it has used as an instrument to accomplish certain foreign policy objectives in Afghanistan and to repress challengers at home. In fact, after being expelled from Afghanistan, the Taliban and other terror organizations needed a safe haven where they could reorganize their resources and activities so as to fight back the NATO and Afghan forces. Pakistan harbored them in the Pashtun belt bordering Afghanistan. Consequently, the writ of the state was relinquished to a variety of affiliated terrorist networks so that the world could be made believe that it has lost control over its areas bordering Afghanistan. In other words, Pakistan was playing the victim to conceal its ventures in Afghanistan (this point is further elaborated in the next chapter).

The state has effectively used the mass media to pass the buck for the security situation in the region. Terrorism in Pakistan is described as a local reaction to the US presence in Afghanistan and to Pakistan’s ostensible anti-terror campaign (see, for example, Daily Mashriq, January 20, 2010). In addition, Afghan refugees in Pakistan are held responsible for the adverse
security situation in Pakistan. An editorial of the newspaper emphasized the need to manage and monitor the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan so that the movement of miscreants across the border could be restricted (February 14, 2013). On the one hand, the newspaper actually speaks the language of the state to shift the blame on the non-state actors who are moving without restraints to undermine law and order situation in both countries. In addition, it wants to legalize and naturalize the Durand Line as an international border between the two countries by highlighting the need to regulate movement across the border without visa and passport, which has been a practice until recently.  

To propagate the ruling ideology, the media discourses in Pakistan homogenizes Pakistanis by using such term as “Pakistani nation,” “our culture” and “our values” (see, for instance, *Daily Mashriq*, June 17, 2012). Another editorial of the newspaper asks the authorities not to allow Afghan refugees to gain residence in Pakistan. It is argued that:

The enduring residence of Afghan refugees [in Pakistan] has debilitated Pakistani society; and, has caused tremendous damage to its [Pakistan’s] social, cultural, and economic values. Afghan refugees staying here [in Pakistan] any longer will harm whatever is left of our national values (May 7, 2007; author’s translation).

Thus, in a bid to construct and consolidate Pakistani civic identity, the newspaper disregards the diverse ethnolinguistic identities in Pakistan. However, the fact is that there is nothing common, but Islam and citizenship, among the majority of Pakistanis that can be unmistakably categorized as Pakistani culture and values. A commonly observed phenomenon is that various ethnolinguistic communities of Pakistan avoid social intermingling (intermarriages, for instance) with each other. Rather, their mutual socio-cultural aversion (especially, the Punjabis vs. the rest of the ethnic nations) amounts to ethnocentrism. Calling a Pashtun a Punjabi

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229 Pakistan has recently imposed visa restrictions on both Pakistanis and Afghans travelling across the border. Nevertheless, Afghanistan does not require Pakistanis travelling to Afghanistan to carry visa documents.
is considered a cultural and moral epithet among Pashtuns. Similarly, Pashtuns are frequently ridiculed by Punjabis, even on the mainstream media – both private and state-owned (see T. Khan, 2012; and Siraj, 2009, 044). Contrary to what the Pakistani state and its media want us to believe, Pashtuns of Pakistan share almost every identity marker (language, ethnicity, history, religion, and folklore), barring citizenship, with Pashtuns in Afghanistan. In addition, the language of the editorial is biased, which derides Afghan refugees and their culture.

In short, the media frames, on the whole, reinforce the official agenda of otherization to construct the constituent others of ‘Pakistaniness’ – what is called Pakistaniyat in Urdu. The process of otherization trivializes institutionalized subordination and structural deprivation of smaller ethno-national communities in Pakistan. The media frames sometimes very explicitly dismiss their grievances. While responding to Pakistan’s Oppressed Nations Movement (PONM)’s alleged threat to secede from Pakistan if Punjab does not concede to their demands, one of the editorials of Daily Mashriq argued:

… Instead of issuing threats, or inciting the fear, of breaking away from Pakistan, PONM leadership needs to concentrate on [the question] that how the nation can get rid of the problems, created by the exploitative classes and system. The reality is that until the biased class-based [i.e., capitalist] system is replaced with national democracy, these evils [exploitative practices] cannot be surmounted … PONM leadership should come up with, and present to the nation, a program that can end the exploitative system and class-based injustices, which is the demand of democratic politics. The talk about separate national anthems or masters-and-slaves [by PONM leadership] is not appropriate. The

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230 Nonetheless, majority of smaller ethno-national communities (particularly, Pashtuns) have accepted Pakistani civic identity, because of the popularity of the hegemonic ideology among them.

231 The PONM is a defunct organization of the Pashtun, Baloch, Sindhi, and Saraiki ethno-nationalist factions that was create in 1998 to struggle collectively for the rights of their respective peoples.
reality should be accepted: in the beloved homeland [Pakistan] only two classes do exist, the exploitative and the exploited (emphasis added).²³²

In addition, the editorial tried to amplify the belief that it was possible to overthrow what it called the class-based exploitative system (i.e., capitalism) that had resulted in the generation of grievances among smaller ethno-national communities, whilst remaining within the existing “national persona and unit” (Pakistan). Thus, it framed the situation of deprivation of (and concomitant grievances among) smaller ethno-national communities in Pakistan as a class-based exploitative phenomenon. Hence, the newspaper pursues a general discursive stance taken by Pakistani civic nationalist whenever the question of exploitation of smaller ethno-national communities is raised.

As compared to the hegemonic frames and messages disseminated by the newspaper, it has very rarely taken a counterhegemonic stance on the issues pertaining to the Pakistani state and society. As stated above, I call them counterhegemonic because they downplay the existing (hegemonic) socio-political attitudes by promoting democratic outlook. It is worth noting that democratic stance on various issues is taken usually (but not exclusively) by ethno-nationalists in Pakistan, because liberal and democratic framing processes destabilize the hegemonic discourses of the state, which in turn helps to create political opportunities for ethno-nationalist politics (see Chapter 5).

As shown in Table 3, only six out of the total 89 editorials analyzed in this chapter (6.74%) conveyed liberal messages. One of the editorials highlighted Iftekhar Muhammad Chaudhri’s (the former Chief Justice of Pakistan) response to President Musharraf that asserted the right of the lawyers’ community to safeguard the freedom of judiciary (May 7, 2007). Another editorial of the newspaper (September 30, 1998) castigated the former military

²³² The copy of the editorial does not contain the date, due to printing mistake. A photo copy of the editorial page is affixed in Appendix 2.
dictatorships for violating the constitution, and praised the then-incumbent Chief of the Army Staff (COAS) for categorically dismissing the possibility and desirability of imposing martial law in Pakistan. However, the editorial has also obscured the indirect role of the military’s involvement in politics. Yet another liberal message contained in an editorial of the daily is the understatement of the proposed 15th constitutional amendment of 1998 of Nawaz Sharif government which aimed at introducing Sharia (Islamic laws) in Pakistan. According to the editorial, the amendment was against Jinnah’s (the founder of Pakistan) democratic vision (August 31, 1998). One of the selected editorials called Pashtuns a nation, while appreciating their cultural traits and their role in combating terrorism (November 22, 2005). Another one acknowledged as legitimate the position of the then NWFP provincial government concerning the proposed construction of Kalabagh dam (December 1, 2006).

To conclude, as reflected in Daily Mashriq, the media discourse reflects and buttresses the dominant ideology of the state. Issues pertaining to governance, administration, corruption, development, the existing security situation and crimes appear more frequently on the print media agenda, followed by foreign policy undertakings of Pakistan and its regional concerns. The dominant state ideology is reflected more frequently and emphatically by the mainstream media when it writes about international and regional affairs. The ostensibly nonideological frames on the issues of governance and development, too, normalize the existence of Pakistan and trivialize the real issues faced by smaller ethno-nations and provinces, although in a subtle and indirect way.

Private Sector Broadcast Media: Agenda and Discourses

In order to analyze the agenda of the private sector broadcast media agenda, I rely on three recent surveys by Gallup and Gilani, Pakistan, for the months of October and November

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233 To remind my readers, the construction of the proposed dam at Kalabagh, in district Mianwali of Punjab, is disputed by all of the provinces of Pakistan, except Punjab.
2016, December 2016, and February 2017. Each of the surveys analyzes the agenda of eight popular current affairs talk shows. The first survey studies 218 episodes of the selected talk shows, the second one, 110, and the third one analyzes 100 episodes. In addition, in this section of the chapter I analyze the discourse(s) of 20 randomly selected talk shows, based on the popularity of a TV channel or the talk show. I have examined Capital Talk, hosted by Hamid Mir, Jirga with Salim Safi, hosted by Salim Safi, and Khara Such hosted by Mubashir Luqman. Moreover, I have selected the TV channels on the basis of their supposed discursive positions. Dawn TV and Geo News are popularly perceived as relatively liberal, in the sense of having a somewhat pro-democracy and anti-military establishment stance, whereas the ARY News and Sama TV are popularly known for their anti-democracy and pro-establishment tendencies. It is worth noting that Khara Such was aired on the 24 News, before its host joined the ARY News. Therefore, I have analyzed those episodes of Khara Such that were aired on the 24 News.

According to the first of the selected surveys of Gallup and Gillani, Pakistan, in the month of October and December, 2016, politics was the most discussed of the topics in the talk shows at 39 %, followed by security and governance at 24% and 22%, respectively. Among the most debated political issues in the October 2016 talk shows was the threat by one of the opposition political parties, Pakistan Thihreek-e-Insaf (Pakistan Justice Movement) (PTI) to March against the ruling Pakistan Muslims League (Nawaz) (PML-N). The issue occupied 43% of the airtime of the selected talk shows. The second most discussed political topic was the All Parties Conference (APC) convened to deliberate and “…to formulate a unanimous response on [Indian] occupied Kashmir and the situation along the Line of Control (LoC)” between India and Pakistan (The Express Tribune, October 12, 2016). According to the survey, the APC was given 24% of the time of the political issues discussed in the talk shows of October 2016. The rest of the topics among the political issues were related to the party-specific politics of
Muthahida Qoumi Movement (MQM) (9%), Pak Sarzamin Party (PSP) (6%),\textsuperscript{234} and PML-N (5%) (Gallup and Gilani, 2017, 2-3). Furthermore:

In October 2016, within Security, the dynamics of the relationship between Pakistan and India and the Kashmir issue occupied 43% of airtime. Another major chunk of talk time constituted debates on domestic security, crime and terrorism (41%). Civil-military relations, military-state interactions, and General Raheel Sharif\textsuperscript{235} were discussed 16% of the time. There was considerable speculation on the allegations/true agenda of the Pakistan cricket team’s push-up celebrations (Gallup and Gilani, 2017, 5).

The respective airtime taken by various agenda items of the mainstream electronic media is summarized in the figure below:

![Pie chart showing distribution of airtime by agenda items](image)

Figure 6.1: Media Agenda: October 2016  (Source: Gallup and Gilani, Pakistan, 2017).

\textsuperscript{234} Both the MQM and PSP are Karachi-based political parties. The later splintered from the former on the pretext that the former had allegedly turned into an anti-Pakistan organization. The PSP is believed to be a pro-establishment political party that was formed to debilitate the MQM, which had recently opposed the military operations in Karachi.

\textsuperscript{235} The mass media in Pakistan had constructed a public persona of General Raheel, as the Chief of the Army Staff (November 2013-November 2016), by glorifying him as a visionary and courageous person.
According to another report of Gallup and Gilani, Pakistan (2017a), politics remained as the most debated topic on the media agenda (28), followed by law (24%), governance (18%) and security (15%) during December 2016. Accordingly, the most discussed political issues were the Panamagate\textsuperscript{236} (32%), politics specific to Pakistan People’s Party (PPP – the opposition in the federal government) (23%), and the PTI’s boycott of the Panamagate Commission (21%). The law related topics revolved around the legal controversies and consequences of the Panamagate issue (73%), the Quetta Inquiry Commission Report concerning August 8, 2016, attack on lawyers in Quetta (21%), and General Musharraf’s case (6%).\textsuperscript{237}

In a February 2017 survey of the media agenda by Gallup and Gilani, Pakistan (2017b) follows almost a similar pattern of the issues discussed during different talk shows. Security is the most talked-about issue (29%), followed by legal and political issues, 21% and 16%, respectively. Topics pertaining to governance were given 14% of the airtime.

These surveys also summarize the professional and political background of the guests in the selected talk shows. On average, three guests were invited to these talk shows. Among them, politicians were invited most frequently (almost 61%), followed by independent political and security analysts. The surveys further indicate that, on average, the PTI was the most represented

\textsuperscript{236} The Panama leaks papers contained the names of some of the family-members of the former Prime Minister of Pakistan, Nawaz Sharif, too. Ultimately, a probe into the papers was ordered by the Supreme Court of Pakistan (SCP) against the Prime Minister and his family. In the light of the Joint Investigation Team (JIT)’s report, the SCP ordered the National Accountability Bureau (NAB) to further investigate the cases of corruption against Nawaz and his family members, while disqualifying Nawaz from holding any public office, under article 62 & 63 of the Constitution, on the pretext that he had not declared as part of his assets the salaries (amounting to AED 10000) from his son’s company in the UAE. Nawaz did not actually receive the salaries. However, the court believed that the salaries constituted Nawaz’s accounts receivable. Therefore, he had to declare them in their assets, the court maintained. Hence, according to the court’s verdict, July 28, 2017, Nawaz had lied, and, therefore, was not qualified to hold a public office as per the Constitution of Pakistan.

\textsuperscript{237} General Musharraf, the former President of Pakistan, was charged for high treason, under the Article 6 of the constitution of Pakistan, for imposing a state of emergency on November 3, 2007. He, however, managed to escape, by seeking help from the then Chief of the Army, Raheel Sharif, who exerted pressure on the court to facilitate Musharraf leave the country on the pretext of getting treatment abroad. It is of note that Musharraf acknowledged the role of General Raheel in facilitating him avoid being tried for the charges against him (see, for instance, The Dawn, December 20, 2010). Musharraf is still in self-imposed exile.
political party (30.25%) in the talk shows, followed by the PML-N and PPP, getting 27% and 24.5% representation, respectively.

The agenda and political representation of different political parties, as analyzed in the survey above, and the talk shows which I have studied, suggest that, on the whole, conventional/nonideological socio-political issues (such as governance, tug-of-war among the so-called mainstream political parties, law and order, and security) occupy most of the airtime of the talk shows on the private sector media broadcasts. Nevertheless, as stated above while analyzing print media frames, electronic media coverage of even the purportedly neutral/nonideological themes help the state in mainstreaming and homogenizing popular thinking. The Punjab- or Center-specific issues are portrayed as indistinguishably common to all Pakistanis. On the other hand, issues specific to smaller provinces and ethnicities (for instance, socio-economic deprivation, military operations or human rights situations in Pashtun and Baloch areas) were trivialized by totally ignoring them. On the whole, the media messages related to such topics as politics, governance, security, which are the most debated ones, are intended to mainstream popular thinking and deemphasize ethno-linguistic identities.

In addition, the private broadcast media framing processes related to politics, security and governance, which appear to be nonideological, have strong ideological undertones. For instance, politics specific to the MQM and PSP were given 9% and 6% airtime, respectively, during the month of October 2016. The PSP was portrayed as a patriotic party, whereas the MQM, under its leader Althaf Hussain who has been in exile for the past 20 years, is disparaged as an anti-Pakistan political party, funded by the Indian spy agency, RAW.238 Similarly, political forces that want to ensure civilian control of the military (for instance the ruling Muslim League-N) are vilified as corrupt, India-friendly, anti-military and anti-judiciary.

238 RAW stands for Research and Analysis Wing.
In order to avoid unnecessary repetition, suffice it to say that media debates on security and terrorism in Pakistan obscures the role of Pakistan and its army in harboring and supporting terror networks intended to achieve certain foreign policy goals. A binary of military vs. terrorists is constructed, whereby terrorism in Pakistan is signified as a cultural phenomenon emerging as a reaction to Pakistan’s policy of joining US-led campaign against global terror. Moreover, India and Afghanistan are accused of supporting terrorist organization in Pakistan.

The private broadcast media discourse about India and Afghanistan echoes the state. India is frequently accused of violating human rights in India-held Kashmir, and its regional policy postures are described as necessary threats to Pakistan’s interests. Afghanistan, too, is categorized as India’s ally against Pakistan. For instance, in one of the talk shows, Shahzad Chaudhary, a defence analyst, who is frequently invited to appear on talk shows, accused Afghanistan of aggression with reference to border skirmishes between Pakistan and Afghanistan on May 8, 2017. Chaudhary characterized Afghanistan as the state without a government, politics, and economy. In addition, he accused Afghanistan of aggression against Pakistan to please its foreign masters – India, according to popular media discourse. Moreover, the host of the show, Shehzad Iqbal, exaggerated the casualties on Afghan side during the skirmishes. Afghan soldiers who were killed were described as halak’ whereas the two Pakistan soldiers killed were tagged as shaheed. Thus, using the religious lexicon, Iqbal wanted to demonize Afghanistan and glorify Pakistani forces.

Moreover, ethno-nationalist politics and voices are put into political obscurity by the mainstream media. None of the 20 talk shows that I have randomly selected have ethno-nationalist politicians. In fact, Baloch separatists are banished from the media, whereas Pashtun

239 The term halak is a pejorative term for ‘killed,’ while shaheed refers to someone killed for a noble cause – usually religious one.
ethno-nationalist politicians are invited in talk shows very rarely. Among the Pashtun ethno-nationalist parties, the Awami National Party (ANP) is represented more than the Pakhtunkhwa Mili Awami Party (PMAP). However, as demonstrated in the previous chapters, Pashtun nationalists (especially, the ANP leadership) have failed to politicize Pashtun’s ethno-historical identities and their deprivation in order to counter the hegemony of the state. They have focused more on the conventional politics of gaining institutional (electoral) power than on making conscious discursive efforts to resist the ruling ideology.

On the contrary, the so-called mainstream political parties, which solicit votes from the Punjab, are overly represented on electronic media. And, “as long as Punjab’s voters are happy, a [mainstream] political party can easily afford to ignore other provinces, especially Balochistan and FATA” (Kakar 2017, para. 9). The reason behind the general political indifference on the part of the mainstream (Punjab-based) political parties towards smaller provinces and ethnic nations is the majoritarian constitutional design of Pakistan, which promises immense political incentives to a political party catering to its constituency in Punjab at the expense of smaller provinces. Because representatives from Punjab constitute the absolute majority of the National Assembly seats (see Chapter 4), a political party cannot form a government without having sufficient electoral support in Punjab. Citing an example of the conventional political apathy of the mainstream political parties, Kakar points out that none of the mainstream political parties’ leaders or government officials visited Parachinar, FATA, and Quetta, Balochistan, to console the victims (and their families) of terrorist attacks on June 24, 2017. On the other hand, most of the political leaders (including Prime Minister) rushed to Bahawalpur in southern Punjab to show their sympathies with the families of the victims of oil-tanker inferno on June 25, 2017 (Daily Times, July 4, 2017).

Senator Usman Kakar of the PMAP summarized the mainstream media agenda and attitude towards smaller provinces and ethnic-nations, while talking on a recently launched TV channel, PBS. Usman Kakar opined that the mainstream media was partial and aired news and
views only about one of the federating units, Punjab, and that it had been glorifying the undemocratic forces for their corporate interests. He expressed his hope that the PBS would highlight the plight of all of smaller provinces, and that it would stand for democracy and supremacy of the parliament.

Conclusion

As we can see, the ideological state apparatuses in Pakistan, especially education and the mainstream media, have been instrumental in propagating the hegemonic discourses of the state to assimilate diverse ethno-national identities into a Pakistani civic identity. They have been used to ‘mainstream’ popular outlook by overemphasizing Punjab- and center-specific political processes and issues, while understating the issues and concerns of smaller provinces. The state has employed its ISAs to externalize threat-perception of the masses by reinforcing the distorted images of the constitutive-others of Pakistan – primarily India, Afghanistan, and USA.

This chapter also concludes that Pashtunkhwa is more exposed than Balochistan to the ideological apparatuses of the state. Consequently, Pashtun nationalists are more disadvantaged than their Baloch counterparts to generate consensus and mobilize action for their cause.

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241 One of my journalist friends who is working as a reporter for the Geo News, a private TV channel with relatively democratic agenda, told me during a casual discussion that one of the tactic of the military establishment to control the media is to pressurize the private sector companies and businesses not to give advertisements to those media outlets which are critical of the military and its policies. Usman Kakar is probably referring to this strategy of the military.
A social movement’s origin, its development trajectory, its organizational structure, its framing strategies, its mobilizing tactics and action repertoire are profoundly influenced by the political context in which it is situated. The political context of a movement refers to political opportunities (and constraints) structures, characterized by such elements as the institutional constellation (both formal and informal), the state’s capacity and willingness to repress challengers, the presence or absence of elite allies (McAdam 1996, 27) and countermovement – what Rucht (1996) calls the structures of conflict. In addition, political context also refers to ‘international trends and events’ shaping the ‘domestic institutions and alignments’ (Rucht, 34; and Oberschall, 1996, 94-97). In this Chapter I argue that the capacity of Pashtun and Baloch nationalist movements to counter the states hegemony is proportionate to the degree of openness (or closure) of their respective structures of political opportunities.

After briefly discussing the concept of political opportunities and its probable impacts on a social movement, I elaborate some of the significant aspects of political opportunities with the reference to Pashtun and Baloch nationalism.

**Social Movements and Political Opportunity structures**

The structures of political opportunities refer to power relations between/among political actors (including the state) which can possibly enhance (or diminish) the resource mobilizing
capacity of a movement. Thus, broadly speaking, political opportunities include the formally or informally institutionalized power mechanisms (and their policy outcomes) and other political actors (both allies and opposition) interacting with a movement elite. Drawing on McAdam (1996) and Rucht (1996), the structures of political opportunities as operationalized in this chapter include:

1. The institutional design facilitating (or constraining) the access of a movement’s actors to policy making processes;
2. The state’s capacity and propensity for repression (McAdam, 27);
3. The structures of alliances, which refers to “the configuration of allies which may provide substantive and/or symbolic support for the movement” (Rucht, 190); and,
4. “Conflict structure is the configuration of opponents which has the capacity to limit, undermine, or repress social movement mobilization” (Rucht, 191). In this chapter, the term conflict structure is also referred to as the countermovement.

It is important to note that the concept of ‘political opportunity structures’ (POSs or briefly, opportunities) is sometimes stretched as far as to encompass mobilizing structures and socio-cultural surroundings of a movement (see, for instance, Gamson and Meyer 1996). Mobilizing structures and socio-cultural environment may be conducive (or otherwise) in determining the consensus generating and action mobilization tactics of a movement, yet it does not constitute what I treat in this chapter as political opportunities. Moreover, the analysis of mobilizing structures as an independent variable is beyond the scope of this study.

242 According to McCarthy (1996), mobilizing structures of a movement include ‘social movement organizational’ form and “modular social movement repertoires.” It also means “... to include the range of everyday life micromobilization structural social locations that are not aimed primarily at movement mobilization, but where mobilization may be generated: these include family units, friendship networks, voluntary associations, work units, and elements of the state structure itself” (141).
Although I examine the effects of opportunities on movements, it is pertinent to mention that movements also create new opportunities (see Gamson and Meyer, 276; and McAdam, 35-37). A movement may create opportunities in a variety of ways. First, the movement elite may capitalize on the extant political opportunities to generate new opportunities. For instance, following the 2008 general elections, the Awami National Party (ANP), a Pashtun nationalist party, joined the coalition government at the center, led by Pakistan People’s Party (PPP). The coalition proved instrumental in passing the 18th Constitutional Amendment, which grants relatively more autonomy to provinces. One of the significant policy areas devolved to provinces through the 18th Amendment is education and curriculum (see Chapter 4). Hence, the ANP-led provincial government (2008-2013) gained the opportunity to utilize education as an apparatus to promote Pashtun nationalism by including Pashtun ethno-nationalist icons and symbols into the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa curriculum. Second, the movement may make its way into the system so that it may “operate largely within the institutional channels” (Kitschelt 1986, cited in Tarrow 1996, 44). This happens when the movement produces allies and supporters within the system (this point is elaborated later in this chapter). Third, other movements may help expand or constrict opportunities for a movement. Tarrow (1996) argues that the “… protesting groups create political opportunities for groups and elites within the system in a negative sense, when their actions provide the ground for repression; and in a positive sense, when opportunistic political elites seize the opportunity created by challengers to proclaim themselves as tribunes of the people” (60). Hence, the movement creates new opportunities in negative sense when the regime is relatively unified and has the capacity and willingness to restrict the movement activities undermining the state’s policies and/or existence. It creates opportunities in positive sense when the governing elite is split into softliners and hardliners and the movement’s activities have significantly weakened the regime. This ultimately opens doors for the opportunistic elements (or softliners) to cease power. In order to consolidate their control, the new governing elite try to appease the opposition, thereby giving more space to the movement’s activists to
mobilize their resources (see for instance McAdam, McCarthy and Zald, 1996, and McAdam 1996).

**Pashtun and Baloch Nationalism: Political Opportunity structures**

The Formal Institutional Design of the State

The first element of political opportunities, enumerated above, signifies the formal juridico-political constraints on (and opportunities for) a movement to generate consensus and mobilize resources. Institutions affect the resource mobilization strategies and action repertoires of a movement. Pakistan has devised its legal mechanisms in such a way as to curb the resource generation and action mobilization capacity of dissenters (especially, ethno-nationalists). For instance, its constitution makes certain basic freedoms contingent upon the territorial integrity of Pakistan and the glory of Islam. Articles 17 and 19 grant the right to association and freedom of speech, respectively, subject to “reasonable restrictions” imposed by law to ensure the integrity and sovereignty of Pakistan and the glory of Islam. Similarly, sub-clause 1(g) of Article 63 stipulates that a person shall be disqualified if convicted by a competent court of law for their opinion or activities prejudicial to the integrity, sovereignty, security, and ideology of Pakistan. In addition, the mass media is legally required to not air or publish news and views against the integrity, sovereignty and ideology of Pakistan (see Chapter 6). In short, the legal mechanisms of the state limit the space for (both Pashtun and Baloch) ethno-nationalists to generate consensus and mobilize action for their cause. Consequently, Baloch nationalists who publically subscribe to secession from Pakistan have been de facto banished from mass media.

243 The word political is used here in the narrow sense, i.e., institutionalized power relations.
The aforementioned legal apparatuses have occasionally been invoked against the ethno-nationalist factions advocating for autonomy within a loose federation of Pakistan. The NAP, which represented ethno-nationalist aspirations in Pakistan, was banned twice (first in February 1971, and then in February 1975) because of its allegedly anti-Pakistan activities. Similarly, the ethno-nationalist leaders have been jailed from time to time for what the authorities believed to be anti-Pakistan activities (*The News*, May 3, 2015; also see Chapter 3). Nevertheless, since the 1990s, the authorities have avoided invoking the formal legal mechanisms with regard to ethno-nationalist politics as far as it does not involve secession from Pakistan.

The state’s capacity and willingness for repression is another significant variable underlying the mobilizing capacity of a movement. The capacity and propensity of the authorities for repression may temper the effects of formal institutions on the resource and action mobilization strategies of the movement (see McAdam, 28). As noted in the previous chapter, Pakistan has very stringent legal mechanisms concerning the mass media behavior, yet they are invoked infrequently to punish a media organization transgressing the prescribed limits. In this chapter I argue that the state has occasionally invoked formal institutions to suppress ethno-nationalism in Pakistan, whereas it has demonstrated both its propensity and capacity for repressing dissention without resorting to, or often disregarding, legal mechanisms (this point is further elaborated below).

Suffice it to say that the formal legal apparatuses are consistent for the Pashtun and Baloch nationalist factions that are peacefully struggling for provincial autonomy along ethno-national lines. However, as compared to Balochs, Pashtun nationalists have more political opportunities when it comes to Pashtuns’ representation in the repressive state apparatuses (such as the military, parliament, and bureaucracy). The institutional structure of Pakistan is so designed as to increase the probability of Pashtun nationalists to have some share in power. As elaborated in Chapter 4, Pakistani institutional design is majoritarian in nature with some
consociational elements such as parliamentarianism, judicial review, and a multi-party system. Therefore, based on their respective population strength, Pashtun areas are allocated more seats than the seats allocated to Baloch areas in the central legislature (parliament). In the popularly elected lower house of the parliament (National Assembly), the number of seats allocated to Balochistan is 17 (including five-six seats from Pashtun areas of Balochistan); Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, 43 (including six-seven seats from Pashtun-minority districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa); and, in the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA), 12. Thus, As compared to the total 11 or 12 seats allocated to Baloch areas, Pashtuns’ representation is around 53 in a 332-membered National Assembly. In the upper house of the parliament (Senate), all provinces have equal number of seats – 23 seats each whereas eight seats are allocated to FATA. Hence, Pashtuns are a majority in the Senate, owing to the seats allocated for FATA and Pashtun districts in Balochistan, besides the 23 seats apportioned to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. So, if Pashtun nationalists win popular elections from their respective constituencies, the institutional design in Pakistan provides them more opportunities than their Baloch counterparts to either form a coalition government, in case of a hung parliament, or to become a significant segment of opposition in the central legislature (for details, see Chapter 4).

The Structures of Allies

The second element of the structures of political opportunities, the concept of the structures of allies is operationalized in this chapter to signify the presence of the movement’s allies both outside and within the system. Allies within the system refers to the sympathizers and supporters of the movement in the state’s institutions – such as the parliament, universities, judiciary, police, and armed forces. Pashtun and Baloch nationalist movements have frequently

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244 To remind my readers, according to 1998 census, Pashtuns constitute about 15% of Pakistan’s population, whereas Balochs (both Brahui- and Balochi-speaking Balochs) are about 5%.
formed electoral alliances and coalition governments with other political parties that have effectively helped them to gain more political space. For instance, the coalition between the Awami National Party (ANP) of Pashtuns and Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) paved the way for the 18th Amendment. As noted above, their coalition in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa also helped the ANP government in the province to promote Pashtun nationalist discourse by introducing Pashtun nationalist icons in the curriculum and by naming several public universities, airports and other public places after Pashtun nationalist leaders. Similarly, the National Awami Party (NAP) (1957-1975) was a significant ally to ethno-nationalists in Pakistan, which had helped open opportunities for them. The NAP made it possible for Pashtun and Baloch nationalists to form governments in the then North West Frontier Province (NWFP, renamed as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) and Balochistan in coalition with the Islamist Jamiat-e-Ulama-e-Islam (JUI). The NAP government in Balochistan made attempts to create new opportunities for ethno-nationalists through certain administrative reforms such as replacing the Punjabi civil servants with locals and creating a new police force, Balochistan Dehi Muhafiz (Balochistan Rural Guards), which was purportedly composed mainly of the NAP supporters. The NAP government also attempted to trim down Pakistani military and para-military interference in provincial affairs. However, the central government grew suspicious of the NAP government and dismissed it (see Chapter 3).

At present, Pashtun and Baloch federalist parties have found new electoral and parliamentary ally in the form of the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) (PML-N), which has a strong support-base in Punjab. The ruling PML-N, led by Nawaz Sharif, former Prime Minister of Pakistan (2013-2017), currently espouses the principles of civilian control of the military and good relations in the region – some of the short-term objectives of ethno-nationalists in Pakistan (see Chapter 5). The Pashtunkhwa Mili Awami Party (PMAP) and National Party (NP) – Pashtun and Baloch nationalist parties, respectively – formed a coalition government with the PML-N in Balochistan following the 2013 elections. The consequences of the new opportunities for Pashtun
and Baloch nationalists (offered by their coalition government in Balochistan) are yet to unfold. However, they have gained some political support in Punjab for their long cherished objectives of civilian control of the coercive apparatuses of the state and for non-interference in Afghan affairs on the part of Pakistan. As elaborated in Chapter 5, Pashtun and Baloch nationalists (especially the federalist parties) have been demanding civilian control and human rights, which they believe can provide them opportunities to generate consensus and mobilize action for their nationalist cause. Similarly, they are critical of Pakistan’s regional policy – particularly its policy of supporting jihadist\textsuperscript{245} forces in Afghanistan, because Pashtun and Baloch nationalists believe that a stable and prosperous Afghanistan can help strengthen their respective movements in Pakistan.

On the whole, the political opportunity structures in the form of electoral and parliamentary allies have remained almost the same for both Pashtun and Baloch nationalist parties seeking autonomy through a loosely structured federation of a democratic Pakistan.

The presence of allies of Pashtun and Baloch nationalist movements within the bureaucratic machinery of the state is not very apparent. Although Pashtuns are represented more than Balochs in the repressive apparatuses of the state (see Chapter 4), they are not generally nationalists. However, there is a possibility that popular counterhegemonic nationalist discourse ultimately make inroads into the institutional structures of the state. Protagonists of ethno-nationalism in bureaucracy are evident. Nevertheless, it was not feasible for the author to collect data about the presence of such ethno-nationalists.

The ethno-nationalist elements are relatively more discernable in colleges and universities. I have noticed during my casual conversations with some faculty members at various universities (particularly at the University of Peshawar, where I teach, and the University of

\textsuperscript{245} The literal meaning of the Arabic word ‘jihad’ is struggle against evil within oneself and in society. However, in popular parlance and in this study, jihad signifies (armed) struggle against the enemies of Islam and oppressors.
Balochistan) that ethno-nationalists have a noticeable presence in educational institutions. As explained below, university faculty are closely monitored by security agencies. A faculty member with ethno-political views is intimidated if they keep openly expressing their views in classes, conferences, and seminars (also see, Chapter 6). Regardless of the state’s policy of discouraging counterhegemonic discourses in colleges and universities, the political (discursive) effects of colleges and university teachers affiliated with ethno-nationalist movements may be marginal, yet not negligible. 246

Taking all this into account, the structures of allies have remained mostly consistent for both Pashtun and Baloch ethno-nationalists struggling peacefully for ethno-national autonomy within the federation of Pakistan.

Repression of Pashtun and Baloch Nationalism

What I believe has played a more important role in determining the respective trajectories of Pashtun and Baloch nationalism in Pakistan is the state’s capacity and propensity for repression. Since its creation, the Pakistani state has demonstrated both its willingness and capacity for violently repressing ethno-nationalism, which it regards as antithetical to its raison d’être 247 – and therefore a threat to its very existence. As noted in Chapter 3, on August 22, 1947, the then Governor General and founder of Pakistan, Jinnah, unconstitutionally dismissed the

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246 I did not consider it safe to collect data about faculty members in colleges and university espousing ethno-nationalist ideology and about their contribution in propagating counterhegemonic discourses among their students. Nor would every ethno-nationalist faculty member openly express their political affiliations, given the threats they face from the security agencies of the state. Therefore, I had to rely on my casual interactions with students and my colleagues (and friends teaching in different colleges and universities).

247 To remind my readers, the raison d’être of Pakistan is to protect the interests of Muslims of South Asia (and beyond) and to enable them to live their private and collective lives according to the tenants of Islam (for details, see Chapter 2).
popularly elected NWFP ministry of Doctor Khan Sahib.\footnote{248} On August 12, 1948, the provincial police opened fire on the Khudai Khidmatgar (KK) workers protesting against the arrest of the KK leadership in Babara, Charsada district of the present-day Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Pashtun nationalists claim that more than 600 peaceful protesters lost their lives in the incident. Moreover, the subsequent provincial government of Abdul Qayyum Khan (1947-1953) ordered the victim’s families to pay for the bullets fired on the protestors.\footnote{249} Ever since, Pakistan has subjected ethno-nationalists to various kinds of repression such as imprisonment and torture in jails, confiscation of property, policing of peaceful protests and military operations. For instance, Bacha Khan spent more than 30 years in British and Pakistani jails. In 1962, Amnesty International declared him ‘the prisoner of the year.’\footnote{250} Zarif opines that “Bacha Khan spent more time in prison (37 years) than Nelson Mendala, both during the British rule and the latter day Pakistani governments for demanding equal rights for his people” (in \textit{Dawn}, January 31, 2016, para. 7). In addition, he spent most of the 1960s and 1970s in exile. Likewise, as stated earlier in this study, Samad Khan Achakzai (1907-1973), another Pashtun nationalist from the present-day Balochistan, spent about

\footnote{248} Khan Abdul Jabar Khan (1883-1958), popularly known as Doctor Khan Sahib, was the elder brother of Bacha Khan (1890-1988), a leading figure of Pashtun nationalist movement. Khan Sahib was elected as the Chief Minister of the NWFP, after winning majority of the seats in 1946 provincial elections from the All-India National Congress (briefly, Congress) platform. As stated in Chapter 3, Bacha Khan had merged his Khudai Khidmatgar (KK) with Ghandi’s Congress. Although the KK retained its separate identity as a Pashtun social reform movement, it had adopted the Congress’s political agenda of a free and united India. When the Colonial authorities decided, in consultation with the Congress and League’s leadership, to divide British India into India and Pakistan, the KK leadership opposed the idea of merging Pashtun areas in Pakistan. Instead, they demanded an independent Pashtun state – Pashtunistan. Eight days after the creation of Pakistan, the KK’s government in the NWFP was dismissed by the central government, believing that the former had lost the confidence of the majority in the provincial assembly.

\footnote{249} This information is based on my personal interactions with the ANP workers. However, the exact number of casualties and other details pertaining to the incident could not be ascertained through independent sources. Also see, Orbala, “The Babarra Massacre of August 12, 1948: Translation and Background of Pashto Song “Margiya Ma Raza Darzama,” Freedom from the Forbidden (Blog), August 28, 2015, \url{https://orbala.net/2015/08/28/translation-and-background-of-pashto-song-margiya-ma-raza-darzama-the-babarra-massacre-of-august-12-1948/}.


24 years in the British and Pakistani jails.\(^{251}\) He was ultimately assassinated in 1973. His murderers remain unidentified. As stated above, the descendants of Bacha Khan were jailed by Bhutto regime on the pretext of high treason against the territorial integrity of Pakistan. Pashtun nationalists were afterwards forced into exile by the Zia’s martial law regime.

In like manner, the state has employed different repressive tactics to suppress Baloch nationalism. Besides incarcerating Baloch nationalist leadership, the state is accused of kidnapping, torturing, and killing Baloch nationalist activists. Along with the Pashtun leadership, Baloch leaders of the NAP Ghaus Bakhsh Bezinjo, Khair Bux Mari, and Attaullah Mengal were imprisoned during the Bhutto administration. After they were released by Zia in 1977, they went into exile and came back to Pakistan in the second half of 1980s (see Chapter 3).

Unlike Pashtun nationalists, Baloch nationalists have intermittently resorted to armed insurgency as one of their modi operandi to accomplish self-rule, resulting in vicious cycles of insurgency-counterinsurgency activities. So far, they have instigated four armed insurgencies, after which the state has retaliated inordinately (for details, see Chapter 3). The exact number of casualties during the successive armed insurgency and counterinsurgency military operations is unknown. Harrison (1981) believes that the total number of causalities on Baloch side in the 1970s uprising was about 5000. The military bulldozed 13,000 acres of almond orchards owned by Mari tribe. In addition, 6000 Baloch activists were imprisoned, who were ultimately released during the Zia martial law regime (29-40). Nevertheless, the information provided by Harrison could not be substantiated through other sources.

Similarly, the current armed conflict in Balochistan is said to have taken a heavy toll on both on the combatants and civilians. Yet, the exact number of fatalities resulting from the ongoing insurgency and counter-insurgency operations remains undocumented. Both the Baloch

\(^{251}\) Samad Khan’s supporters believe that he spent about 30 years in British and Pakistani jails. Titus and Swidler (2000) opine that Samad Khan spent 18 years in Pakistani jails.
militants and Pakistani security forces conceal the losses on their respective sides (and exaggerate the damages on their enemy’s side) for propaganda purposes (see Gazdar 2006, 1953).

The main targets of Baloch militants are Pakistani security forces, government property and infrastructure, supposedly pro-Pakistan political activists, and workers and settlers from other provinces (especially, Punjab). According to Baloch insurgents, settlers and foreign workers are the tentacles of what they see as the Punjabi colonial apparatus – the Pakistani state. They believe that people from other provinces come to Balochistan to loot its resources and to relegate the indigenous Baloch population into a minority. “Human rights groups criticized the Baloch armed groups for killing numerous non-Baloch citizens under the allegations of spying for the Pakistani government while ordinary Baloch citizens also became victim of their attacks on similar unsubstantiated allegations” (Akbar, n. d., para. 12).

On the other hand, the state has responded to the Baloch insurgency heavy handedly. Heavy artillery shelling, aerial bombing, search operations, and abduction and lethal torture of Baloch activists by the state have become a routine in Balochistan since 2006. Baloch activists accuse the state of killing civilians, including women and children in indiscriminate bombardments. The state is accused of extra-judicial abduction, torture and killings of Baloch nationalists. The exact number of Baloch missing persons, allegedly abducted by the state, is yet unknown. “The number of victims … differs widely, from the tens to the ten thousands [sic] – it should be safe to say that at least hundreds of Baloch[s] have disappeared in this way” (Wilkens 2015, para. 14). Pakistani authorities deny the allegations. The Chairman of the Commission of Inquiry on Enforced Disappearances (CIED) apprised the standing committee of the Senate that as of December 2016 only 96 persons were missing, and that the issue was much politicized

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(Dawn, December 20, 2016). The Attorney General of Pakistan recently informed the Supreme Court that over 500 persons reported to be ‘missing’ were in custody of security agencies” (Omar 2013, para. 1). However, the number of Baloch missing persons is much higher, according to Baloch nationalist activists. For instance, in May 2013 Khalil Baloch, a nationalist activist, wrote an open letter to Ban Ki-moon, the then Secretary General of the UN, in which he accused Pakistani security forces of abducting 5000 Balochs, among whom 700 were killed.253 Similarly:

In 2012 the Voice of Baloch Missing Persons estimated that more than 14,800 persons had disappeared in Balochistan since 2001. The number of missing persons that the organization was able to document in detail was considerably lower during the year, with their official lists as of September 2010 registering 2,627 missing persons since 2001 and 493 killed since 2009.254

Also, two of the Baloch senators, Mir IsrarUllah Khan Zehri and and Dr. Jehanzeb Jamaldini, rejected the CIED’s report to the Senate’s standing committee. They believed that the state had been concealing the real number of missing persons in Balochistan, which was much higher than what they were told. According to Senator Jamaldini:

Every day, newspapers are filled with news about disappeared persons, and two to six bodies are recovered in Balochistan every day. Seven people from my family and 87 from my party have been killed. I have a list of over 1,800 missing persons … People

have stopped registering FIRs [First Information Report in a Police station] because the next day, the complaints also disappear (in Dawn, December 20, 2016, para. 8).

Pakistani security forces are accused of killing and dumping the mutilated bodies of Baloch activists. In January 2014, three mass graves were found in Khuzdar district of Balochistan. The Deputy Commissioner of Khuzdar has reportedly confirmed that 25 bodies were found in these graves, while Baloch nationalists claim that there were more than a hundred bodies (Akbar, n. d., para. 3; and, The Express Tribune, March 26, 2014).

The stories of enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings in Pashtun belt of Pakistan are no less appalling. In year 2012, the cases of approximately 425 missing persons remained pending in Pakistani courts. According to the media reports, 1,050 missing persons were released by the security agencies in 2013 on the strict directives of the Peshawar High Court. “During a December 10 hearing, the government informed the Peshawar High Court that since the formation of the federal task force for missing persons in July, it has identified 643 missing persons in KP [Khyber Pakhtunkhwa] and 64 in the tribal areas [FATA] as internment centre detainees.” Contrary to the official claims, the number of missing persons from Pashtun areas is in thousands, according to popular narratives. One of the leaders of the families campaigning for the recovery of the missing members claimed that more than 6,500 people are missing only in Swat, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. She further claimed that the Pakistani military had threatened to kill the missing persons if they keep protesting for the recovery of the missing members of their families. In addition, stories of extrajudicial killings in Pashtunkhwa are commonplace. For instance, in August 2012, the Peshawar High Court “… pointed out that 16

256 Azad Pakhtoon Qabayel’s Facebook page, accessed December 24, 2018,
bodies were recovered in Peshawar in a single month, while reports of bodies found in other parts of KP continued throughout 2012."

Who the missing persons from Pashtunkhwa are? Exact information about their political backgrounds is unknown. The missing persons whom I personally know have diverse political affiliations. Most of them were either the supposedly splinter elements of the apparently anti-Pakistan terrorist organizations, like the Tahrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), or were considered as the accomplices of these organizations. Some of them, however, were Pashtun nationalists and civil society activists, including journalists who were critical of the state’s policy of sponsoring terrorist groups in order to suit certain domestic and foreign policy ends.

As noted in Chapters 1 and 6, Pakistan has encouraged the creation of dozens of terrorist organizations operating both within and outside of Pakistan (for a brief description of some prominent terror organizations in Pakistan, see *Dawn*, November 4, 2014; also see Sharma and Behera 2014). It opened its gates to the fleeing Taliban and al-Qaida terrorists from Afghanistan following the US invasion in 2001. These terrorist groups were provided sanctuaries in Pashtun areas of Pakistan so that they could reorganize themselves to launch attacks on the US-led NATO and Afghan forces. Consequently, terrorist networks were given ample space to plan and carry out attacks in Afghanistan, as well as to repress the counterhegemonic voices raised against Pakistan’s domestic and foreign policy behavior.

Though the state has avoided directly repressing Pashtun nationalism since the early 1990s, it has allowed its proxies in the form of the Taliban to target Pashtun nationalists. The Taliban have carried out attacks mostly in Pashtunkhwa and Balochistan (see, for instance,

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258 To remind my readers, Pakistan perceives a stable and strong Afghanistan a threat to its own existence, as the latter is a supporter of Pashtun and Baloch nationalist movements. Therefore, Pakistan has supported militant Islamists since the early 1970s to destabilize successive Afghan regimes supporting Pashtun and Baloch nationalism in Pakistan.
Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS)’s reports for the year 2013; cited in, *The Express Tribune*, May 25, 2013). One of their prime targets is Pashtun nationalists, mostly the ANP activists. As mentioned in Chapter 5, Pashtun nationalists support democratic peace and stability in Afghanistan and are critical of Pakistan’s policy of supporting armed jihad in Afghanistan. They also demand democracy and secularism in Pakistan. Therefore, the extremist/terrorist elements in Pakistan see them as a threat to their existence. The exact number of the ANP activists killed by the Taliban is not documented. Ullah (2014) says that about 800 of the ANP activists have been killed by the Taliban (152). Popular accounts of the ANP suggest that more than 1100 of its workers (including its leaders) have been killed by terrorists, in addition to an equal number of Pashtun elders and civil society activists killed in FATA and in the surrounding areas. The ANP could not openly run its 2013 elections campaign because of the threat from the Taliban. The PIPS’s report (2013) concludes that the ANP had to bear the brunt of terrorism during 2013 elections. It “... was targeted 37 times in almost all provinces from where it was contesting polls,” followed by attacks on Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and Mutahida Qoumi Movement (MQM), 12 times each (PIPS, 2013, cited in *The Express Tribune*, May 25, 2013).

The Islamist terrorist organizations are active in Balochistan too. Prominent among them are the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Afghan Taliban. As noted earlier, the TTP professes allegiance to the Afghan Taliban. The former operates mainly in Pakistan, whereas

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259 The main targets of the TTP are the Pakistani security forces and liberal and nationalist elements. It is worth noting that the TTP was formed, in early 2000s, and remained active under the watchful eye of the state’s intelligence and security agencies. Apparently, the TTP started targeting Pakistani security forces too, because of Pakistan’s ostensible support to the US anti-terror campaign in Afghanistan. In retaliation, Pakistan has so far launched several military operations against the TTP in FATA and Swat valley of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. It claims that thousands of the TTP members have been eliminated during these operations. However, these claims cannot be authenticated through independent sources, as the security forces do not allow the media and independent observers to verify their claims. Indigenous people reject these claims. Although the security forces have dismantled most of the TTP sanctuaries, the inhabitants of the region question their sincerity. They claim that the state cannot name a dozen of the local TTP commanders, worth their names, killed during these operations. They believe that the current tango of insurgency and counterinsurgency between the TTP and the Pakistani security forces is a smokescreen deliberately created to delude international community. Accordingly, Pakistan has been playing the victim
the latter has focused on Afghanistan. In Balochistan, both of them are concentrated in Quetta and the surrounding Pashtun areas. Besides, the anti-Shia sectarian organizations Sipah-e-Sahaba and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi are also active in Quetta. The main target of these organizations is the Hazara community, a Shia minority in Quetta city. Another terrorist organization that has claimed responsibility for some deadly attacks in Quetta is Jamat-ul-Ahrar (JUA), a splinter group of the TTP and an affiliate of Islamic State (IS, aka Da’ish). The JUA claimed responsibility for the attacks on lawyers on August 8, 2016, killing 72 people and leaving 92 injured. On October 26, 2016, it carried out another attack on the Quetta Police Training College, killing about 60 police trainees (see Ahmad, in The Diplomat, July 12, 2017; and Roggio, 2016).

Although terrorists have not targeted Baloch nationalists as frequently as the TTP has targeted Pashtun nationalists, the former believe that the growing religious extremism in Balochistan poses a threat to their existence and activities. Baloch nationalists lay blame on the state that it has been promoting Islamic extremist organizations in Baloch areas to counter Baloch nationalism. One of such organizations is Shafiq Mengal’s Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Aman, Balochistan (TNAB – the Movement for the Restoration of Peace, Balochistan) which is allegedly associated with anti-Shia Ahl-e-Sunnat wal Jumat (ASWJ). The TNAB operates in district Khuzdar. Its stated objective is to eliminate Baloch nationalists. Nationalist Balochs maintain that the TNAB is also involved in kidnapping for ransom and killing innocent Balochs in the name of Baloch nationalism, so as to malign Baloch militant separatists.

260 Though the organization was

in order to have the outside world believe that it is the victim of terrorism itself (this information is based on my personal observation in Khyber Agency, FATA, and my communication with the people from other parts of FATA and Swat valley of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa). It is also worth mentioning that almost all of the top leaders of various terror organizations (Al-Qaeda, Afghan Taliban, and the TTP) who have been killed on Pakistani soil were targeted by the US drone and surgical strikes.

260 This information is based on my interview with a local leader of Baloch nationalist party, National Party (NP). Also see, Khalil Baloch, “The UN should Play its Role in Stopping Human Rights Abuses being Committed by Pakistan against the Baloch,” Baloch Sarmachar (blog), May 6, 2013, https://baluchsarmachar.wordpress.com/2013/05/06/the-uno-should-play-its-role-in-stopping-human-rights-abuses-being-committed-by-pakistan-against-the-baloch-khalil-baloch/; and, “Death Squad Leader Shafiq Mengal is Organizing ISIS in Balochistan,” Baloch Sarmachar (blog), September 17, 2016,
proscribed by the state in 2012, its leadership is free to propagate its ideology in Balochistan. One of my respondents, a Baloch nationalist writer and activist, told me that because of the long-cherished secular Baloch traditions and the popularity of Baloch nationalism (both militant and nonviolent), the Islamist extremists have little space to organize its resources in Baloch areas.

As compared to Pashtun nationalists, their Baloch counterparts have rarely been targeted by the extremist proxies of the state. As noted above, they are directly repressed by the state on the pretext of anti-state militant insurgence. Nevertheless, direct state repression is counterproductive for the state too. It reproduces anti-Pakistan sentiments among Balochs, which the nationalists exploit for promoting their cause. On the other hand, Pashtun nationalists have been killed by the state’s proxies since 2006, yet their repression did not earn them mass sympathy for two reasons. First, the conservative civil society (rightist political parties, the mainstream media and other ideological state apparatuses) had constructed popular support for the Taliban by justifying their struggle as jihad against the US “occupation” of Afghanistan, while Pashtun nationalists (who supported the US toppling the Afghan regime and the concomitant process of democratization in Afghanistan) were labeled as agents of Yahud-of-Nassarah (Jews and Christians). Second, Pashtun nationalists (the ANP, in particular) failed to categorically identify the state and its security establishment as the real face behind terrorism in Pashtun areas. Had the ANP categorically and unequivocally specified the military establishment of Pakistan as the sponsor of terrorism, it could have created relatively more intense and wide-

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261 The direct repression of Baloch nationalism has also invited some global support for their movement. For instance, the US Congressman Dana Rohrabacher, a California Republican, tabled a bill in February 2012 in the US Congress that called for the independence of Balochistan, although the bill was defeated. Similarly, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) took notice of the human rights situation in Balochistan in August 2011, and urged the Pakistani government to investigate the numerous occurrences of abductions, disappearances and extrajudicial killings, particularly in Balochistan (see, UN News Center, “Pakistan: UN Calls for Probe into Abductions and Killings of Journalists,” August 19, 2018, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=39333#.WluJRKs6WB1).

262 This point is elaborated later in this chapter.
spread anti-state sentiments that may have translated into popular support for Pashtun national cause.

To conclude, the state has consistently demonstrated its propensity and capacity to repress both Pashtun and Baloch nationalist movements, either directly or indirectly. As one respondent whose identity is confidential stated during an interview, the anti-nationalist counterinsurgency operations in Balochistan, costing civilians’ lives and properties, are fuelling ever-increasing anti-Pakistan sentiments among the Baloch masses. In the long-run, repression and fear have curvilinear relationship, although the state’s policy of brutal repression constrains the mobilizing capacity of Balochs in the short-term. In other words, when repression increases, so does fear among challengers and masses; but at certain point, fear starts receding with increase in repression, or rather fear assumes the form of resistance. For instance, the indiscriminate anti-terror operations in Pashtun areas since 2004 have created fear of the Pakistani military among Pashtuns. People avoided speaking up against the brutalities of the security forces, as anyone daring criticize them for human rights violations was silenced. However, as time passed, their fear has subsided. Consequently, people have started criticizing (and protesting against) the military’s repressive policies in Pashtun areas, albeit very recently.263 Yet, Pashtun nationalists

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263 Although it is beyond the scope of this study, suffice it to say that the educated youth from the Mehsud tribe of Waziristan, FATA, were organized in the Mehsud Tahafuz Movement (MTM, Mehsud Protection Movement) to raise their voice against the atrocities of the Pakistani security forces in Waziristan. In March 2018, the MTM, led by a 24 years old Manzoor Pashteen (Pashtun), started a long-march to Islamabad, the capital city of Pakistan, to record their protest against the state’s policy of sponsoring terrorists, the enforced disappearances, extrajudicial killings of Pashtuns and the humiliating behavior of the security forces on the check-points in the FATA. The march ended in an eleven days long sit-in in front of the Islamabad Press Club. The sit-in was instantly joined by Pashtuns from all parts of Pakistan. Consequently, the MTM was renamed as the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (PTM, Pashtun Protection Movement) during the sit-in. The PTM is supported by Pashtun educated youth in general, yet the workers of the Pashtun nationalist parties are playing a leading role in organizing the PTM protest activities. However, the ANP central leadership has distanced itself from the PTM, though the workers of the party still play a leading role in it (the query into why the ANP leadership withdrew its support to the PTM needs extensive research). On the other hand, the Pashtunkhwa Mili Awami Party (PMAP) and the Pakhtunkhwa Ulasi Tehrik (PUT, Pakhtunkhwa People’s Movement), a small non-electoral Pashtun nationalist organization that was founded in 2014 by the splinter elements of mostly the PMAP, have openly expressed their support to the PTM.
parties (especially the ANP, which has relatively greater popular support) have failed to politicize and channel mass grievances against the state. As mentioned above, they have even failed to publically specify the state’s role of sponsoring terrorist organizations. Had Pashtun nationalists successfully exposed the role of the state in supporting terrorism in Afghanistan and Pashtunkhwa, they might have generated more anti-Pakistan sentiments.

The Countermovement

Meyer and Staggenborg (1996) argue that “a ‘countermovement’ is movement that makes contrary claims to those of the original movement” (1631). It is more likely that a countermovement may emerge when the movement is conceived as a formidable threat to the established interests and the extant socio-political and normative structures (see Zald and Useem, 6). However, contrary to what Zald and Useem (1983) say, I argue that a countermovement does not emerge only in response to the movement.264 A countermovement may emerge simultaneously with, or even before the emergence of, the movement: that is, when the conservative elements of a society realize that the authorities are not sincere to the raison d’être of the state or when they apprehend that the system has become susceptible to penetration by liberal elements. Consequently, a countermovement is expected to emerge and challenge the authorities to revamp the raison d’être of the state and to reshape the institutional structure and public policies accordingly.

The Islamist movement in Pakistan illustrates such a countermovement against Pashtun and Baloch nationalism. Like Pashtun and Baloch nationalists, the orthodox Islamist parties, Jamat Islami (JI) and Jami’at-e-Ullama-e-Hind (JUH), opposed the creation of Pakistan, but for a different reason. They believed that the division of British India along communal (religious) lines

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264 Zald and Useem are interested in “how movements generate countermovement, and how they then engage in a loosely coupled tango of mobilization and demobilization” (1).
was against the interests of Muslims of India. They argued that the creation of Pakistan, by separating the Muslim-majority provinces in the north-west and east of India, would render the Muslims in the post-partition India further vulnerable. At that specific historical juncture, the Islamist anti-Pakistan struggle can be rightly called as the countermovement of what is popularly known as the Pakistan Movement. The Islamists made claims contrary to the communalist leadership of the League\(^{265}\) and tried to demobilize the ever-growing support for Pakistan among the Muslims of north India.

After the creation of Pakistan, the Islamist political parties appropriated for themselves the role of defending the *raison d’être* of the state. Therefore, they resisted what they saw as secularizing attempts on the part of the authorities. For instance, they mobilized resistance against General Ayub’s regime (1958-1969) which attempted to secularize Pakistan by renaming it in the 1962 Constitution as the Republic of Pakistan, instead of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Hence, they have occasionally challenged the authorities they deem too liberal, but not the state – rather they have consistently propagated and reinforced the state’s hegemony.

Since the creation of Pakistan, the Islamist political organizations have been playing the role of the countermovement against the ethno-nationalist movements in Pakistan. They make claims and frame issues contrary to those of the ethno-nationalists and ‘vie for attention from the mass media and the broader public’ (Meyer and Staggenborg, 1632). The Islamists limit the opportunities for the ethno-nationalists to generate consensus and mobilize action. The ethno-nationalists confront the Islamists in discursive, institutional and electoral arenas. Moreover, the Islamists have taken it upon themselves to violently repress those propagating liberal and/or counterhegemonic ethno-nationalist discourses. Keeping in view the role that Islamist political organizations have played in limiting the mobilizing capacity of ethno-nationalists, I include them

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\(^{265}\) The All-India Muslim League (briefly, the League) leadership is referred to as communalists, as they believed that Muslims of India as a religious community were a separate nation entitled to have a separate state of their own.
as a significant element of the political opportunity structures for Pashtun and Baloch nationalist movements in Pakistan.

It is important to note that unlike Zald and Useem, I take more a synchronic and non-processual approach to study the movement-countermovement interaction in Pakistan. By synchronic and non-processual approach I mean the analysis of discrete events of movement-countermovement interaction, instead of tracing the process of the origin and development of countermovement over time. However, it is pertinent to briefly describe the origin, political agenda, and mobilizing strategies of the leading Islamist political parties, Jamiat-e-Ullama-e-Islam (JUI) and Jamat Islami (JI), which comprise the countermovement against Pashtun and Baloch nationalism in Pashtunkhwa and Balochistan.

The JUI is an outcome of the Sunni-Hanafi school of Islamic studies, *Dar-ul-Ulum Deoband* – founded in 1866, in Deoband (now in Uttar Pradesh, India). The Dar-ul-Ulum was part of the movement of Muslim religious scholars to revive Islamic beliefs and practices purportedly undermined by the English cultural intrusions. The Deobandi scholars were “inward looking and primarily concerned with the Islamic qualities of individual lives” (Metcalf 1982; in Ullah 2014, 77). Until 1919, it was more a religious reform movement than an organized political force. At present, Deoband has metamorphosed into a regional Islamic revivalist and jihadist movement. “Its [political] outlook is not dissimilar to that of Wahhabism, the austere, antimodernist Saudi variant of Islamic fundamentalism embraced by Osama bin Laden” (Goldberg, in New York Times, June 25, 2000, para. 11).

In 1919, the Deoband scholars founded the Jamiat-e-Ullama-e-Hind (JUH – Organization of the Clerics of India)\(^{266}\) to put pressure on the British authorities to respect the territorial and political integrity of the Ottoman Caliphate and to grant independence to India.

\(^{266}\) The JUH in the united India is the predecessor of the JUI in Pakistan.)
The JUH aligned its political agenda with that of Gandhi’s Congress. It was against the League’s demand of partitioning India to create a separate state for Muslims, as it believed that Muslims of the British India shared a common Indian national identity with Hindus. Moreover, the JUH argued that the division of India was tantamount to the division of the Muslims of India.

In 1945, the JUH experienced differences among its ranks on the issue of partition. A splinter group – *Jamiat-e-Ulama-e-Islam* (JUI), led by Shabir Ahmad Usmani (1887-1949) – supported the League’s demand of creating a separate state for Muslims of India. The JUI argued that Pakistan could be used as a platform to serve Muslims and Islam in South Asia and beyond. Since the creation of Pakistan, it is struggling for the establishment of Shariah Law (Islamic Law) in Pakistan and for protecting Muslims’ interests across the globe. The JUI espouses religious orthodoxy, pan-Islamism, and Islamization of the Pakistani state and society. Moreover, the JUI is an ardent supporter of the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan.

The JUI recruits support among the rural Hanafi (a school of thought of the Sunni sect) population, having little (or no) formal education. It uses mosque and madrasa to generate consensus and mobilize action for its cause. Most of the mullahs (clergy) and religious scholars in Deobandi areas\(^\text{267}\) are affiliated with the JUI. The Friday sermons, delivered by Mullahs before offering weekly congregational prayers, contain messages that propagate the JUI agenda. The JUI candidates usually use mosques to garner popular electoral support.

The other actor in the Islamist countermovement, *Jamat-e-Islami* (JI), was founded in August 1941 by Abul A’la Maududi (1903-1979). After receiving his primary schooling at home from his father and private tutors, Maududi was enrolled in Dar-ul-Ulam-e-Deoband. However, the sudden death of his father forced him to discontinue his formal studies. Yet, he had a passion

\(^{267}\) By Deobandi areas I mean areas where Deoband version of Sunni-Hanafi Islam is followed. Majority of Pashtuns and Balochs are Deobandis.
for education and writing. He became a journalist and ultimately became the editor of the two leading Deobandi journals, *Muslim* and *al-Jamiyate*. Maududi was critical of the Hindu revivalist movements, *Shuddhi* and *Sangathan*, and of Gandhi’s political agenda. He believed that the creation of an Islamic state was inevitable for the revival of Islam. However, he did not support Jinnah’s Muslim League’s demand for Pakistan, as he was convinced that the League was not sincere in creating an Islamic state and society. Therefore, Ullah argues, “Maududi’s grand vision likely involved converting India’s Hindus and creating an ideal Islamic state in a unified India” (80). Moreover, Maududi and his colleagues believed that the Deobandi JUH was not sophisticated enough to appeal to public. They believed that Muslims of India needed a vanguard organization that would recruit and train educated and ideologically committed ‘believers.’ They were mindful of the possible dangers of electoral politics; therefore, they remained committed to its vanguardist political agenda.

After the partition of India, Maududi migrated to Pakistan. His party, the JI, was critical of the secular political elite of the country. It “… focused on building political structure, not mass support, and tried to wield influence in targeted areas, such as the design of Pakistan’s first constitution” (Ullah, 78). In addition, the JI runs various networks of schools, colleges, and universities, where students are educated in religious dogmas, pan-Islamism, and anti-West and anti-Indian Pakistani nationalism.

Although both the JI and JUI espouse almost similar political objectives, they have somewhat different strategies to achieve them. As a vanguardist organization, the JI believes more in the struggle for hegemony than in populist electoral politics. It concerns itself more with political Islam, while the JUI-affiliated activists focus more on private morality and folk Islam.268

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268 Political Islam refers not only to the ideology and activities aimed at transforming the state and society according to the tenants of Islam but also to the politics of constructing religion-based civic identity at the cost of ethno-national and historical identities of the citizens/subjects of a country. Pan-Islamism is a significant aspect of political Islam, which helps it transcend indigenous ethno-national concerns.
The former criticizes the latter for its alleged orthodoxy and sectarian bent. On the other hand, the JUI disparages the JI for its exegetical laxity – for its supposedly liberal interpretation of Islamic history and traditions.\textsuperscript{269} Moreover, the JI adulates the communalist leadership of the Pakistan Movement, while the JUI reveres the early Deoband scholars who were against the creation of Pakistan. However, the differences between the two parties are more of degree than of kind. The gulf between them is not so wide as to make bridging impossible. They have occasionally made electoral alliances, such as the Mutahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA – United Council of Action), which succeeded in making governments in the NWFP and Balochistan in 2002 after winning majority of seats there.\textsuperscript{270}

Both the JI and JUI have considerable electoral support, particularly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the FATA and Balochistan. They have intermittently formed provincial

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item This information is based on my communications with the JI and JUI activists. One of the JI activists described the Deoband school of thought (followed by the JUI) as Deenband – i.e., a group that restricts religion because of its narrow interpretation. On the other hand, a JUI activist told me that the JI is a stray organization that does not follow the established Islamic traditions.
\item The MMA was founded in 2001. The rallying slogans of the alliance were anti-Americanism and Islamization of the Pakistani state and society. The alliance was practically dissolved in 2008. The MMA was recently revived for the 2018 elections. It is worth noting that it included, besides the JI and JUI, the Wahabist Jamiat-e-Ahl-e-Hadiss (JAH – Organization of the People of Traditions), the Shia Islamist party, Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Fiqah-e-Jaafriay (Movement for the Restoration of Jaffariya Law), and a Barelvi Islamist party, Jamiat-e-Ullama-e-Pakistan (JUP). It is worth noting that Barelvi version of Sunny-Hanafi Islam is popular among Punjabis. The Barelvi school of thought was founded by Ahmad Raza Khan (1856-1921) of Bareli, a town in north India. The Barelvis differ from Deobandis in their devotion to Sufism. Their love for Sufism and rituals at Sufi shrines are viewed by Deobandis as tantamount to idolatry, although the latter believe in and practice Sufism too. Their differences have occasionally led to violent conflicts.
\end{itemize}
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governments in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. In 1971, the JUI formed governments in
Balochistan and the NWFP in coalition with the NAP. After winning a majority seats in the 2002
elections, the MMA, in which the JI and JUI were the leading partners, succeeded in forging
coalition governments in both provinces. Once again, in 2008, the JUI became part of the
coalition government in Balochistan. At present, the JI is the coalition partner of the ruling
Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI, Pakistan Movement for Justice) in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

As noted above, notwithstanding their mutual differences, both the JUI and JI have
almost the same stated objectives: the Islamization of Pakistani state and society; unity among
Muslims across the globe; protection of Muslim’s interests in the world, like the right to self-
determination of the people of Indian-held Jammu & Kashmir and Palestine; and support for jihad
in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Thus, most of their claims and objectives are contrary to those of
Pashtun and Baloch nationalists. In this chapter, I argue that the more the Islamist parties (JUI
and JI) are popular among Pashtuns and/or Balochs, the more difficult it will be for their
respective ethno-nationalist activists to mobilize support.  

To see the relative strength of the countermovement in Baloch and Pashtun areas, I have
compared t-test results of the votes secured by the JI and JUI in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and
Balochistan in the 2002 and 2013 elections. I have used the data regarding the electoral support
of the JI and JUI in Pashtun and Baloch districts, published online by the Election Commission of
Pakistan (ECP). It is important to note that voting behavior in Pakistan is not essentially
determined by the ideology and manifesto of a political party. Several other relevant factors (such
as tribal and clannish loyalties of voters, the popularity of the candidate, and support from the

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271 For a detailed study of the origins and politics of Islamist parties in Pakistan, see Ullah (2014), Aziz
272 I also wanted to analyze the Islamists’ electoral support in 2008 elections (held between the 2002 and
2013 elections), yet the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) has not published detailed (constituency-
wise) results for the said elections.
military establishment) play their role in shaping the choices of voters. To overcome this problem, a better option is to use the party membership of the Islamist parties in Pashtun and Baloch districts. Unfortunately, I required data is not available. Therefore, I use popular vote for the JI and JUI as proxy for their popular support. Hence, I treat other relevant factors, which may possibly influence the electoral behavior of masses, as constant across all of the Pashtun and Baloch electoral constituencies studied in this section.

The mean of the popular vote for the MMA in Pashtun areas (of both Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan) in 2002 elections is 37.14, while that in Baloch areas of Balochistan is 15.42. Because of the difference in population of the two provinces, the number of total general constituencies in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa is more than that of Balochistan.\(^\text{273}\) Therefore, I have compared an equal number of randomly selected Pashtun and Baloch constituencies, 26 each. As shown in Table 1 below, the difference between the means of the MMA’s (alliance of religious parties) vote totals in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (then, the NWFP) in the 2002 elections is highly significant. The mean of the total votes bagged by the MMA in Pashtun districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan (P Mean) is 38.35, while the same for Baloch districts of Balochistan (B Mean) is 15.42. The difference is between the two populations is statistically significant.

\(^{273}\) Currently, the total number of general seats (constituencies) of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Assembly is 99, whereas that of Balochistan Assembly is 51, including about 22 constituencies allocated to Pashtun areas of Balochistan.
Table 7.1: T-test of the MMA’s vote in Pashtunkhwa and Balochistan in 2002 elections

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<tr>
<td>P Mean</td>
<td>B Mean</td>
<td>t-stat.</td>
<td>t-crit.</td>
<td>α at 0.05</td>
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<tr>
<td>38.35</td>
<td>15.46</td>
<td>5.61</td>
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The JUI and JI contested the 2008 and 2013 elections separately, i.e., not as part of any coalition. In 2008 the JUI succeeded in organizing a coalition government in Balochistan. In the 2013 elections, the JI secured six among 99 general seats of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa assembly. Consequently, it entered a coalition government with the Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaf (PTI). On the other hand, it failed to win any seat in Balochistan. Its electoral support in Baloch areas is too small to make statistical comparison meaningful, although it has considerable support in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. In the 2013 elections, it won 7.5 percent of the total valid votes cast in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. In Balochistan (both Pashtun and Baloch areas) its share of the popular votes is below one percent. On the other hand, the JUI has significant popular support in both Pashtunkhwa and Balochistan. In Balochistan, its support comes primarily from Pashtun districts of the province. In Pashtun districts of both Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the JUI secured 20.34 percent of the popular vote in 2013 elections. In Baloch areas, it won 10.05 percent of the votes casted. I compared randomly selected Pashtun and Baloch constituencies, 24 each. The difference between the JUI electoral support in the 2013 elections in Pashtun and Baloch areas is statistically significant (see Table 2).

Table 7.2: Percentage of popular vote casted for the JUI in Pashtunkhwa and Balochistan

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<td>P Mean</td>
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<td>t-stat.</td>
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<td>17.32</td>
<td>10.04</td>
<td>1.94</td>
<td>2.01</td>
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As we can see the Islamist political parties support, which constitute the countermovement against ethno-nationalism, is stronger in Pashtun areas than Baloch region. The Islamist parties counteract Pashtun and Baloch nationalism not only in electoral and institutional spheres but also in discursive arena. They uphold and propagate every element of the state’s hegemony discussed in Chapter 2 and 6. Although they had opposed the creation of Pakistan, now they believe that it was inevitable. Both the JUI and JI denounce ethno-nationalism, as they believe that it is antithetical to the concept of *Ummah*, which regards Muslims as a single nation. Moreover, they endorse the state’s foreign policy postures, considering the West, Israel, and India as the enemies of Islam and Pakistan, notwithstanding the fact that they were allies of the US-led West in the Cold War to contain the USSR and the then socialist regime in Afghanistan, as they claimed that communism was antithetical to Islam. Ironically, the Islamists applaud Pakistan’s friendship with China, which claims to be a socialist and secular state. Echoing the hegemony, they have politicized the plight of Muslims in Palestine and Kashmir but overlook China’s anti-
Islam and anti-Muslim policies in Xingjian. At present, they support the Taliban fighting in Afghanistan in every possible way in order to oust the US and its allies from Afghanistan and to replace the current Afghan regime with the Taliban.

Besides being supportive of the state, Islamist political parties complement it with repression of counterhegemonic voices as well. Both the JUI and JI have extremist militant organizations that are formally or informally affiliated with them. These militant organizations fight jihad in Kashmir and Afghanistan and suppress ethno-nationalism and liberal elements in Pakistan. *Hizb-ul-Mujahideen* is the JI’s militant organization that is active primarily in Indian-held Jammu & Kashmir. Furthermore, the students’ wing of the JI, *Islami Jamiyat-e-Talabah* (IJT – Islamic Organization of Students) is notorious for its violent activities against its challengers in the educational institutions of Pakistan. The IJT gets frequently involved in violence to suppress whatever it considers un-Islamic and profane. More often than not, it has resorted to violence to disrupt Pashtun and Baloch cultural activities in colleges and university campuses, primarily in the Punjab University, Lahore, and University of Peshawar. For instance, violence erupted between the IJT and Pashtun nationalist students at the Punjab University when the IJT attempted to disrupt Pashtun Culture Day celebrations. Seven students (five Pashtuns and two IJT members) were injured in the clash (Shehzad, in *Dawn*, March 17, 2017). In January 2018, violent clashes took place between the IJT activists and Pashtun and Baloch Students Council (PBC), yet again at

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274 This information is based on my interactions with the JI and JUI activists and leaders. Moreover, I watched 15 online interviews and speeches of their leadership, which revealed that the Islamist political parties play the role of the ideological state apparatuses (see, for instance, “Maulana Fazlur-Rehman (Full Speech) Islam Zinda Baad Conference Peshawar 25/03/2012 (by SamiSwati),” YouTube video, 52:58, posted by “Sami Swati,” May 6, 2012, [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1vRpfXlzFCE](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1vRpfXlzFCE); “23 March 2014 Darul Uloom Karachi - Maulana Fazlur Rehman,” YouTube video, 39:22, posted by “sahoodahmad02,” April 23, 2014, [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PayOhsklfls](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PayOhsklfls); “Allama Iqbal Day - 21 April 2011 - Speech of Qazi Hussain Ahmad Part 1,” YouTube Video, 13:24, posted by “nazariapakistantrust,” May 6, 2011, [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3B1ds80JY_k&t=662s](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3B1ds80JY_k&t=662s); and, “Siraj ul Haq Shab ka Tarikhi Khitaab,” YouTube video, 1:03:01, posted by “darsooquran,” November 24, 2014, [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KHzOKUWkS7Q](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KHzOKUWkS7Q).)

275 The Islamists, especially the JI and its student wing, IJT, consider indigenous cultural activities (like music and dance) antithetical to what they view as Islamic values and Pakistani culture. However, they do not hesitate to play Pakistani patriotic songs in their rallies.
the Punjab University, which necessitated police action to quell the violence. The Punjab police had reportedly arrested 196 students, among whom 180 were the members of the PBC (L. Khan, in *Daily Times*, January 29, 2018). Anti-terror laws were invoked against the arrested students. The Punjab police was accused of racial discrimination against Pashtuns and Baloch students. Social media campaign and public protests by Pashtun and Baloch nationalist activists against the arrest of the students generated a debate in the Parliament that ultimately resulted in the release of all the arrested students.

As mentioned above, the IJT continues sabotaging indigenous cultural activities in university campuses of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa too. I have witnessed the IJT frequently suppressing Pashtun cultural events, although Pashtun nationalist students continue to resist them. It is worth noting that like its parent organization, the IJT is almost non-existent in the colleges and universities of Balochistan.276

Besides, there are several Deoband-affiliated militant organizations such as *Harkat-ul-Mujahideen* (HUM) *Jaish-e-Muhammad* (JM), and the Taliban (both Afghan and Pakistani),277 which pose a direct threat to peace and stability in Afghanistan and to Pashtun nationalism in Pakistan. HUM and the JM were intended to fight against Indian forces in Jammu & Kashmir, while the Taliban are active in Afghanistan and Pakistan. However, these terror organizations are closely associated with each other. As noted above, the Taliban have accepted responsibility for killing hundreds of Pashtun nationalist activists. Although, the JUI denies formal association with these organizations, it has been openly endorsing their struggle against India, the existing Afghan regime and the West. For instance, Maulana Fazlur Rehman, the head of the most popular faction of the JUI (JUI-F) endorses the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan as a legitimate war, while

276 I visited one undergraduate college in Quetta and the University of Balochistan where I observed that the IJT was almost invisible.

277 For details on terrorist networks operating in South Asia, see Sharma and Behera (2014).
denouncing religious militancy in Pakistan as un-Islamic. Similarly, Maulana Sami-ul-Haq, the leader of a splinter group of the JUI (JUI-S), refers to the Taliban as his children, whom he feels proud of. It is important to note that Sami-ul-Haq runs a Madrasa, Haqqania, in Nowshera district of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, which is considered as a factory of jihadists – especially the Taliban (see Goldberg 2000, for instance).

Conclusion

In this Chapter I analyzed four of the most significant elements of the structures of political opportunities with reference to Pashtun and Baloch nationalism: the formal institutional constellation, structures of allies, the state’s capacity and propensity to repress and structures of conflict – the countermovement. The first two elements of political opportunities have remained nearly consistent across Pashtun and Baloch nationalism. Concerning the third element, the state has demonstrated its capacity and willingness to repress ethno-nationalism. However, the dynamics of repression of Baloch and Pashtun nationalism vary across time and space. In the beginning, the state repressed Pashtun and Baloch nationalism directly by invoking coercive apparatuses of the state. Imprisonment, torture, and protest-policing were the tools utilized by the state to repress both Pashtun and Baloch nationalism. However, to repress the intermittent Baloch secessionist militancy, the state has resorted to counterinsurgency military operations that have claimed noncombatant civilian lives, more often than not. These indiscriminate counterinsurgency operations have further intensified anti-Pakistan sentiments among Baloch masses. On the other hand, the state has allowed its (terrorist) proxies to suppress Pashtun

nationalism. In Pashtun areas, the repressive tactics of the state have proved more lethal, yet Pashtun nationalists (particularly the ANP) have failed to unambiguously politicize their repression (see Chapter 5). Had they been able to hold the state accountable for the violence and terror in Pashtunkhwa, they might have generated popular resentment against the state. Last, unlike Baloch nationalism, Pashtun nationalism faces a very strong countermovement in the form of Islamist political parties in almost every political arena – electoral, institutional and discursive. As an ideological apparatus of the state, the countermovement takes the edge off the counterhegemonic discursive endeavors of Pashtun nationalists in addition to constraining them in the electoral and institutional arenas.
CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSION

To protect the political, economic and cultural interests of Muslims vis-à-vis the Hindu majority in the north and east of the British India, the communalist Muslim elite of the All-India Muslim League instrumentalized religion so as to generate consensus and mobilize action among Muslims. In due course, Muslim communalist politics culminated into a demand for the creation of a separate state. Nevertheless, the Pakistan movement was unpopular in the Muslim majority areas of the British India, particularly in latter-day Pashtunkhwa and Balochistan. Pashtun and Baloch nationalist elites opposed the merger of their ancestral lands in the newly created Pakistan. They are still a potential threat undermining the legitimacy of Pakistan.

The Punjabi and Mahjir political elite of Pakistan, who were the beneficiaries of the newly created Pakistan, underscored religion as the most – rather the only – significant identity marker to legitimize its existence and marginalize the ethnolinguistic sense of identity and separatist tendencies among the marginalized ethno-national communities including Bengalis, Pashtuns, Balochs and Sindhis. In addition, the assimilationist nation-building project of the state accentuated Urdu (then spoken by 4-5% of the total population of the newly created country) as the language signifying Muslimness. As demonstrated in this dissertation, the construction of national identity necessitates the creation of a ‘constitutive other.’ Therefore, the state of Pakistan constructed its constitutive others, primarily India, by utilizing religious lexicon.

The state made use of both its ‘armor of coercion’ and its ‘ideological apparatuses’ to legitimize and maintain the existing structures of subordination. Consequently, the military and
mullah (the clergy) appropriated for themselves the role of safeguarding the so-called ideological frontiers of the newly established fortress of Islam – Pakistan. Praetorianism and religious extremism took roots in the country, which in turn resulted in political and economic instability, organized religious extremism, social conservatism and a tarnished global image of the Pakistani state and society. Thus it can be safely deduced that the current predicament of Pakistan is a corollary of its unpopular origin and its raison d’être.

At the end of the British Raj in India, Pashtun nationalists organized into the Khudai Khidmatgar (KK) demanded Pashtunistan, a separate nation-state for Pashtuns in the north-west of the British India. But, the Raj and the League did not concede to their demand. Instead, they decided to hold a referendum on whether Pashtuns wanted to merge with India or Pakistan. The KK leadership believed that the Raj and the League had discriminated against Pashtuns by not including the option of a free Pashtunistan in the referendum. The majority of the inhabitants of the North West Frontier Province (NWFP), now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, decided to join Pakistan in the referendum of 1947, though Pashtun nationalists still question the legitimacy of the referendum. Nevertheless, the KK elite conceded to join Pakistan and fight for provincial autonomy through peaceful electoral politics.

Contrary to the Pashtun position, Baloch nationalists launched an armed uprising in 1948 in order to end what they called the occupation of Balochistan by the Punjab-dominated Pakistani state. Since then, Baloch nationalism has oscillated between peaceful electoral struggle for provincial autonomy and armed insurgency for freedom from Pakistan. Baloch separatists launched a fourth armed uprising against Pakistan in 2006, which remains unabated. In addition, they have mobilized the Baloch masses for contentious political activities such as mass protests and rallies to highlight their exploitation and repression in Pakistan. This indicates that Baloch nationalists’ struggle for counterhegemony has partly paid off. According to a Gallup survey, 2012, 37 percent of Balochs want separation from Pakistan. On the other hand, only 12 percent of
Pashtuns of Balochistan entertain the idea of separation from Pakistan (see The News, August 13, 2012). What I have observed during my fieldwork is that separatist propensities among Pashtuns of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the FATA are even less apparent. None of the Pashtun nationalist parties has openly questioned the territorial integrity of Pakistan.

As I have argued in this study, a frontal attack on the state requires a successful struggle for counterhegemony. As compared to Pashtun nationalism, the Baloch nationalist movement is relatively successful in countering the hegemony of the Pakistani state. Several explanations have been offered in this study to understand the difference between the two movements such as the relative stakes and/or deprivation of Pashtuns and Balochs in the Pakistani state, the framing strategies of Pashtun and Baloch nationalist elites, the relative exposure of Pashtuns and Balochs to the ideological state apparatuses (ISAs), and the structures of political opportunities.

Following the traditional theories of social movements, I have demonstrated that Balochs are more deprived than Pashtuns; therefore, it is easier for Baloch nationalists to generate resentment against the state among Baloch masses. I compared the socio-economic deprivation in Pashtunkhwa (Pashtun areas in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) and Balochistan. The selected indicators include deprivation in housing quality indicated by inadequate house structures; deprivation in utilities – electricity, natural gas, telephone and safe drinking water; economic deprivation, indicated by household assets (such as house-ownership, mobile phone, car, refrigerator, and TV set); deprivation in education, measured in terms of illiteracy rate among both males and females and out-of-school children (5-9 year age); and deprivation in health, operationalized as the lack of parental and post-natal health care, lack of immunization, and no Tetanus Toxoid during pregnancy. I found that Baloch were the most deprived ethno-national community of Pakistan. The difference between Pashtun and Baloch people in terms of their relative socio-economic deprivation was statistically significant. In addition, Balochs are politically more marginalized than Pashtuns. The latter have a considerable presence in the
Parliament of Pakistan. Their representation in the lower house of the Parliament is almost 55 out of the total directly elected 272 seats, whereas the number of seats from Baloch areas in the lower house is about 11. Moreover, Pashtuns representation in the indirectly elected upper house of the Parliament, Senate, is more than any other ethno-national community of Pakistan. In addition, Pashtuns have relatively adequate presence in the military – about 15-20 percent. On the contrary, Baloch are almost invisible in the Pakistani armed forces.

Furthermore, the nation-building project of the state, founded on Islam and Urdu language, helped Arab and north-Indian cultures and histories to further immerse into Pakistani state and society at the expense of indigenous languages, cultures and histories. This ultimately resulted in the sense of cultural and linguistic marginalization among indigenous ethnolinguistic communities of Pakistan, which in turn helped Pashtun and Baloch ethno-nationalists to instrumentalize their respective languages and cultures in order to mobilize popular support for their causes. In Chapter 4, I have demonstrated that Pashtuns are culturally and linguistically better off than Balochs. By virtue of their relatively greater number (about 15% as compared to 5% Balochs), Pashtuns have a considerable presence in the politics, bureaucracy, civil society and market. Additionally, Pashtuns have migrated to some of the non-Pashtun major cities of Pakistan (Karachi, Islamabad, and Lahore), taking with them their culture and language. All things considered, Pashtuns are a more visible ethnolinguistic community than Balochs, thereby giving them a sense of cultural empowerment.

Nevertheless, the socio-economic conditions of Pashtuns and Balochs and the counterhegemonic politics of their respective nationalist elites (i.e., to their framing strategies with respect to the politicization of their ethnicities and deprivation) supplement each other. The Pashtun and Baloch counterhegemonic struggles have evolved overtime in a path-dependent fashion. In the British India, the Pashtun nationalist movement, represented primarily by Bacha Khan’s Khudai Khidmatgar, remained equivocal till the end of the colonial Raj. The most
significant critical juncture of the modern Pashtun national history is Bacha Khan’s decision of merging his KK with Gandhi’s Indian nationalist party, the All-India National Congress. Thenceforth, instead of politicizing Pashtun ethnolinguistic identity and political history, the KK became embroiled in Indian nationalist politics, advocating the idea of a united and independent India. Though the KK elite politicized Pashtun ethno-national identity at the end of the British Raj by demanding Pashtunistan, it was too late for the KK to effectively reorient itself to that end. As indicated by its framing processes, both the earlier and contemporary Pashtun nationalist movement has failed to politicize Pashtun ethnolinguistic identity. Among the Pashtun nationalist factions, the Pashtunkhwa Mili Awami Party (PMAP), having a strong support-base in the Pashtun districts of Balochistan, has highlighted and politicized Pashtun ethnicity and history more frequently and unequivocally than the Awami National Party (ANP) that spearhead Pashtun nationalism in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

On the whole, the earlier generation of Pashtun nationalist leadership had underscored Pashtuns’ deprivation more frequently than their Baloch counterparts. Relatively speaking, they frequently emphasized the need for ensuring democracy and human rights in Pakistan too. In addition, they were critical of Pakistan’s support for mujahidin fighting against the then socialist regime in Afghanistan. However, the difference between the earlier generations of Pashtun and Baloch nationalists’ frames with reference to the socio-economic deprivation of their people, the democratic and human rights deficit, and Pakistan’s foreign policy ventures is statistically not significant.

Unlike their Pashtun counterparts, the earlier Baloch nationalist leadership focused more on politicizing their ethnolinguistic and historical identities. The difference between the two nationalist movements in terms of politicization of ethnicity is statistically significant. The founders of Baloch nationalism had articulated their political program more judiciously (i.e., demanding an independent state of Balochistan) than their Pashtun counterparts during the British
rule in India. After the creation of Pakistan, Baloch nationalists violently resisted the merger of Baloch lands in Pakistan. In contrast, the earlier generation of Pashtun nationalists decided to join Pakistan with a resolve to struggle for autonomy through peaceful electoral politics. What I have identified as the critical junctures of Pashtun and Baloch nationalist histories constitute their respective collective memories, which are utilized by their successors while struggling for counterhegemony.

As compared to their Baloch counterparts, the contemporary Pashtun nationalist elite (particularly the ANP leadership) have also failed to politicize their ethnic identity. As I have argued in this study, politicization of ethnicity helps ethno-nationalists to counter the state’s religion-based hegemony. In addition, the contemporary Baloch nationalists have highlighted and politicized Baloch socio-economic deprivation more than Pashtun nationalists have underscored Pashtun deprivation. The difference between them is statistically significant.

The Pakistani state has deployed its ideological apparatuses to create and maintain hegemony. The most efficient of its ideological apparatuses are the mass media, education and religious establishment. I have argued in this study that the more a people are exposed to the ISAs, the more difficult it is for the ethno-nationalist challengers to generate support and mobilize action. In Chapter 6, I analyzed education and the mass media as the ISAs in Pashtun and Baloch areas. In order to measure education as an ISA in these areas, I compared the literacy rate among Pashtuns and Balochs. The t-test results revealed that Pashtuns were more educated than Balochs and that the difference between them was statistically significant. Subsequently, I analyzed the content of the Pakistan Studies textbooks taught in high schools and colleges as a compulsory course. The textbooks established Islam as the only source of Pakistani civic identity, while understating the ethnolinguistic identities of the communities comprising Pakistan. Ethno-nationalist tendencies and politics were censured as racism and regionalism that could prejudice the integrity of Pakistan. The analysis of the historical accounts contained in the textbooks
posited that the socio-economic, cultural and political interests of Muslims were threatened by the Hindu majority of India; that both Hindus and the English rulers of India conspired against Muslims; and that the Muslim elite of the communalist League were convinced that the only way to safeguard Muslims’ interests was the creation of a separate state. Keeping in view the hegemonic nation-building project of the state, it is not surprising to see that the official historiography in Pakistan ignores the popular ethno-nationalist opposition to the Pakistan movement in the Muslim majority areas of present-day Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. In addition, the textbooks analyzed in this study constructed the constitutive others of Pakistan on the basis of religion. These constitutive others include the Hindu India, primarily, and the West.

In addition to education, I studied the mass media as an ISA in Pashtun and Baloch districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. The data published by the Population Council (Pakistan Office) in 2002 indicated that more people have access to the mainstream media, radio, TV, and newspaper, in Pashtun districts than in Baloch districts and that the difference is statistically significant.

The analysis of the agenda and discourse of a popular Urdu newspaper *Daily Mashriq* and of some popular talk shows aired on private TV channels revealed that the media in Pakistan promoted the hegemonic discourses of the state pertaining to its domestic politics and its regional and global policies. For instance, the newspaper legitimized the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan. Ethno-nationalists were very rarely invited to these talk shows. Most of the shows focused on the conventional power-politics between/among the centrist (Punjab-based) political parties. The anchorpersons and guests of the shows promoted the hegemonic worldview, while admiring the military and censuring politicians. They also undermined the peace efforts in Afghanistan, legitimized the Taliban insurgency there, and criticized India for violating human rights in the India-held Kashmir.
Nevertheless, there are certain newspapers such as *The Nation* and *Dawn* and some private TV channels such as the Geo News and Dawn TV that have a somewhat counterhegemonic, democratic, agenda. Yet, they have observed self-censorship because of the stringent media laws and the repressive behavior of the military establishment and extremist religious organizations towards the mass media outlets and journalists having democratic leanings.

Finally, I have argued in this study that the momentum and trajectory of a social movement are influenced by the political opportunity structures (POSs). I operationalized the POSs to include the formal institutional structures of the state, the structures of allies, the state’s capacity and propensity for repression and the structures of conflict – i.e., the countermovement against Pashtun and Baloch nationalists. The first two elements of the POSs, i.e., the formal institutional structures and the structures of allies, have remained nearly consistent for both Pashtun and Baloch nationalist movements. Concerning the state’s capacity and willingness for repressing ethno-nationalism, the state had been changing its modus operandi. It kept utilizing its legal mechanisms to suppress Pashtun and Baloch nationalist groups struggling for greater autonomy within the federation of Pakistan. They were infrequently imprisoned or forced into exile. However, the state launched several counterinsurgency operations to quell the separatist Baloch uprisings in the late 1940s and 1950s and mid-1970s, which claimed thousands of lives on both sides, including civilians. Currently, Pakistan has launched another offensive against Baloch separatist militants. Baloch nationalists accuse the state of gross human rights violations, including harassment, forced disappearances, torture and killing of Baloch nationalist activists, damaging the properties of Balochs who are suspected of supporting separatism, and forcing Baloch separatist elites into self-exile. Despite the ongoing repression of Baloch separatism by the security forces, it does not exhibit any sign of decline.
On the other hand, the state has allowed its strategic proxies, the Taliban, to target Pashtun nationalists, primarily Awami National Party (ANP) workers and leaders since 2008. They have killed more than a thousand Pashtun nationalist, in addition to the Pashtun tribal elders who opposed the Taliban activities in FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Moreover, the state has abducted and killed thousands of Pashtuns during the counterinsurgency operations against the anti-Pakistan terrorist elements. The missing persons from Pashtun areas are believed to be mostly the splinter elements of the Taliban-affiliated militant organizations such as the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Lashkar-e-Islam, which is active in Khyber Agency, FATA. Nevertheless, the security forces have also frequently harassed and abducted Pashtun nationalists, tribal elders and journalists in Pashtun areas, who were critical of the state’s policy of sponsoring terrorist networks.

As I have demonstrated in Chapter 7 of this study, the state has repressed Pashtun nationalists more than Balochs, indirectly through its terrorist proxies and directly during the counterinsurgency operations. However, Pashtun nationalist elite (especially the ANP) failed to politicize their repression. On the other hand, Baloch’s repression has resulted in popular resentment and uprising against the state, because 1) the state has directly repressed Balochs; and 2) Baloch nationalists diagnosed their situation frequently and unequivocally by identifying the Pakistanis state as an instrument of colonization and oppression.

It is worth noting that in March 2018, some young Pashtuns from Waziristan, FATA, started a long march from the adjoining Dera Ismail Khan (D. I. Khan), a southern district of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, to Islamabad in order to highlight their plight and put pressure on the military establishment to end their repression. The long march, which ended in an 11 days long sit-in in Islamabad, was started by an indigenous students’ organization, the Mehsud Tahafuz Movement (MTM, Mehsud Protection Movement). The march and sit-in were joined by Pashtuns from across the Pashtun areas in Pakistan, who have suffered losses in terms of life, property and
human dignity during the ongoing tango of terrorism-counterterrorism between the TTP and the Pakistani armed forces. The MTM was renamed during the march as the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (PTM). The PTM has so far organized several rallies attended by thousands of protestors in different parts of Pakistan. It is worth stating that the activists of Pashtun nationalist parties play a leading role in the PTM.

Although the queries into the origin and nature of the PTM are yet to be addressed, it is important to note that it claims to be a non-partisan, non-electoral and non-violent struggle for materializing the constitutional rights of Pashtuns to life and dignity. It has a minimalist civil rights agenda to put pressure on the security establishment of Pakistan to stop sponsoring terrorist organizations and end the repression of Pashtuns during the counterinsurgency operations. At this specific juncture, it can be predicted that the PTM will most likely congeal into a radical Pashtun nationalist organization, given its leadership’s ideological propensities and the state’s reluctance to consider their demands as legitimate. The security establishment is attempting to marginalize the PTM by categorizing it as an anti-Pakistan organization supported by the spy agencies of India and Afghanistan. The PTM workers are intimidated in phone calls and some of them have been arrested and interrogated. In addition, the PTM has been banished from the mainstream media (see, for instance The New York Times, April 17, 2018). On the whole, the state’s attitude to the PTM may further radicalize Pashtuns.

The fourth element of the Political Opportunity Structures of Pashtun and Baloch nationalism that I have analyzed in this study is the countermovement. A countermovement refers to the structures of conflict, i.e., the configuration of opponents that makes claims and frames

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279 By non-partisan I mean that the PTM has categorically repudiated affiliation with any political party, notwithstanding the leading role played by Pashtun nationalist activists. It claims that its agenda is supported by the rank and file of all political parties, though none of the political parties’ leadership but the Pakhtunkhwa Mili Awami Party (PMAP), has categorically expressed their support to the PTM.

280 This information is based on my interactions with the PTM workers and my observation of the ongoing political events.
issues contrary to the movement’s claims and discourse and hence weakening its support. I hypothesized that the stronger the countermovement was, the more difficult would it be for the movement to mobilize action. The countermovement against the Pashtun and Baloch nationalists in Pakistan is represented primarily (but not exclusively) by the Islamist political parties, the Jamat-e-Islami (JI) and Jamiat-e-Ullama-e-Islam (JUI). I used the percentage of the vote totals of these parties in the 2002 and 2013 elections as proxies for their popular support in Pashtun and Baloch areas. The t-test comparing the vote totals of the two parties in Pashtun and Baloch areas revealed that the Islamists’ support in the former is significantly higher than the latter. The Islamist parties that constitute the countermovement against the Pashtun and Baloch nationalist movements work as the ideological apparatuses of the state to promote hegemony and demobilize the nationalists’ support. In addition, the JI and JUI support militant Islamist organizations fighting jihad in Afghanistan and Indian-held Jammu & Kashmir. The Islamist militants have also targeted ethno-nationalists, especially Pashtun nationalists, in order to deny them space to mobilize support for their cause.

As we can see, Balochs in Pakistan are socio-economically and politically more deprived than Pashtuns and their counterhegemonic frames – especially those with respect to their ethnic and historical identities – are more unequivocal and frequent than Pashtun nationalist frames. In addition, Pashtuns are more exposed to the ideological state apparatuses, their nationalist elite are repressed through the terrorist proxies of the state more than Balochs and the countermovement is stronger in Pashtun areas. Taken together, all these factors have contributed to the Baloch nationalist movement’s advantageous position compared to that of Pashtun nationalists in countering the hegemony of the state.

Keeping in view the current trajectory of the Pashtun nationalist movement, is it possible for the Pashtun nationalists to create a sufficiently vigorous counterhegemony so as to launch a separatist movement? It is not unlikely. The state is gradually losing its monopoly over the mass
media. The private broadcast media has supplemented the state-owned TV channels. Notwithstanding the restrictive legal mechanisms imposed on the mainstream media, counterhegemonic voices are gradually making their way into the media agenda. More importantly, the introduction and popularity of the social media outlets such as Facebook, YouTube and Twitter have provided new opportunities to the dissenting voices to propagate counterhegemonic discourses. As a social media activist, I have observed that the hegemonic outlook of the state is frequently questioned by the ethno-nationalists and democratic political forces, leading to the gradual popularization of counterhegemonic nationalist discourse. Given that, the state also finds it difficult to legitimize direct repression of the ethno-nationalist forces unless they launch a premature separatist movement.281

Nevertheless, the electoral politics in which Pashtun (and some Baloch) nationalist parties are active has neutralizing effects on their counterhegemonic discursive politics. Pakistani electoral politics has become more clientelist than ideological in the sense that public development funds are distributed through the members of the central Parliament and provincial legislative assemblies. The voters tend to support those candidates (and parties) who can promise securing maximum development funds for their respective constituencies. Consequently, the political parties’ electoral agenda is driven by developmentalist discourse at the expense of counterhegemonic nationalist discourses. In order to minimize the effects of the clientelist electoral politics on the counterhegemonic politics, the ethno-nationalists have to either abandon electoral politics or devise a more radical counterhegemonic electoral discourse even if it costs them defeat in general elections. The former is not a good option, as they need the electoral, legislative and executive arenas to create political opportunities for their counterhegemonic politics. Therefore, a better strategy for them is to frame contemporary issues in a more radical

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281 This is what I have observed in case of the PTM, which has taken a very clear and radical stance against the military establishment by publically and frequently declaring it as the sponsor of terrorist organizations and violator human rights. Yet, the security forces have so far refrained from taking considerable repressive measures against the PTM workers.
counterhegemonic manner if they want to popularize their cause. Moreover, Pashtun ethno-nationalist parties (especially the ANP) need to train their workers in counterhegemonic politics and discourse through such organizational activities as regular seminars, workshops and study-circles on various contemporary issues, history, religion, philosophy, geography and resources of Pakistan and Pashtunkhwa.

Moreover, the ethno-nationalists need to forge alliances with each other (and with other democratic forces, if possible) across Pakistan to create more political opportunities. Further research is needed to see why the ethno-nationalists have failed to form strong and enduring alliances after the National Awami Party (NAP) ceased to function in the late 1970s. In addition, democratic peace and stability in Afghanistan can significantly strengthen both Pashtun and Baloch nationalist movements in Pakistan. Afghanistan has been (and can be) a significant international ally of these movements. Therefore, Pashtun and Baloch nationalists need to more vigorously resist Pakistan’s policy of destabilizing Afghanistan through jihadist armed insurgency.

Hence the future of Pashtun and Baloch nationalist movements in Pakistan depends on several things: their elites’ discursive and framing strategies; their readiness to train their workers in counterhegemonic politics through such organizational activities as seminars, workshops and study-circles; their willingness to make broader counterhegemonic alliances; the state’s propensity and willingness for repression; and the policies and support of regional and global actors with regard to ethno-nationalism in Pakistan.
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