The Catholic Church and Its Impact on Public Policy in Contemporary Democracies

Dawid Tatarczyk
Western Michigan University, dawidt1986@gmail.com

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THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AND ITS IMPACT ON PUBLIC POLICY
IN CONTEMPORARY DEMOCRACIES

by

Dawid Tatarczyk

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate College
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
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Doctoral Committee:

James Butterfield, Ph.D., Chair
Priscilla Lambert, Ph.D.
Gunther Hega, Ph.D.
Claudius Wagemann, Ph.D.
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THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AND ITS IMPACT ON PUBLIC POLICY
IN CONTEMPORARY DEMOCRACIES

Dawid Tatarczyk, Ph.D.
Western Michigan University, 2018

The overarching aim of this dissertation was to examine the extent to which the Catholic Church is still a significant public policy actor in 35 economically developed democracies. The research design used in this project draws on three distinct approaches, each addressing a different puzzle but when integrated together they provide an answer to the main question. Taken together these three approaches show that the Catholic Church continues to be an important political institution with considerable influence even in economically developed democracies.

The rational choice institutionalism paradigm is used to explain the political behavior of the Catholic Church. The paradigm focuses on Catholic abortion teaching to demonstrate that doctrine is as a form of endogenous institutional constraint. In addition to its institutional self-interest, the Church is also motivated by its doctrinal commitments. When institutional and doctrinal interests collide, the Church acts in favor of its doctrine and violates its self-interest.

Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) examines the macro-conditions under which the Church is able to exercise influence on public policy outcomes. QCA findings demonstrate that the political influence of the Church on public policy outcomes is still substantial and its influence is especially pronounced in countries belonging to the third
wave of democratization. The Church uses a number of necessary and sufficient conditions to secure its policy victories. When such victories have obtained a combination of strong Christian Democratic parties and institutional availability of referendums is sufficient to keep these gains in place. The QCA analysis identified Poland as the ideal case study candidate for process tracing analysis.

The process tracing and case study analysis focuses on Poland to demonstrate the specific mechanisms used by the Church to exert its power. In the early democratic period, the Polish Episcopate took advantage of the fragmented political scene to overturn abortion-on-demand laws and to introduce catechesis to public schools. In 2010, the Church started to depend on pro-life groups and the conservative Law and Justice party (PiS) to secure new policy concessions. The ban of trade on Sundays institutionalized in 2018 helps illustrate that the Church’s influence is considerable even many years after the democratic transition.
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Dawid Tatarczyk
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Two millennia after its creation, the Catholic Church continues to shape critical political events around the globe. Its significance has been especially pronounced in Europe "where for more than 2000 years the Roman Catholic Church has been one of the central pillars of Western Civilization" (Allen 2014, 5; see also Hitchcock 2012). In the last century alone the Church informed the creation of the European Union (Grzymała-Busse 2012), opposed some authoritarian regimes in Latin America while cooperated with others (Gill 1998), was essential for the promotion of social justice and greater educational opportunities for the poor in Brazil and Mexico (Mainwaring 1986; Trejo 2009), embraced democracy during the Second Vatican Council (1962-65) thus helping solidify the third wave of democratization (Huntington 2010 [1991]; Philpott 2004; Troy 2009) and then took an active part in the process of transitions to democracy in Eastern Europe (Eberts 1998; Grzymała-Busse 2015).

With its long history and extensive bureaucratic structures, the Catholic Church is a specimen of institutional endurance and bureaucratic longevity (Kollman 2013). The political-legal unit known as the state was born after the Treaty of Westphalia (1648); by then Catholicism had been in existence for more than sixteen centuries. With 1.2 billion members, the Church’s administrative structures reach the most remote places around the globe and Catholicism is the only religion with a state (the Vatican) at its disposal. The Holy See has official diplomatic relationships with most countries in the world, and in 1964 it has been granted a special observer status at the United Nations.

Important philosophers from Hobbes through Rousseau and Mill to Gramsci devoted
a significant part of their work to analyze and critique the Church. Later, thinkers such as Marx, Weber, and Freud were interested in religion more generally and predicted that it would disappear from the public discourse (Mainwaring 1986, xi). These assessments continue to resonate with contemporary social scientists belonging to the secularization camp, and the assumption that as societies become more industrialized, religion will be fading away from the public arena still has its many proponents (e.g., Bruce 2011; Norris and Inglehart 2004). One of the many impacts of the secularization theory was that until recently the comparative study of religion in general, and of the Catholic Church in particular, was considered anachronistic (Gill 1998, 3). Since religion was to disappear from our societies, there was little reason to study it.

However, another group of scholars posits that empirical evidence points in the opposite direction, with religion doing better than ever before (e.g., Duffy Toft, Philpott and Shah 2011; Finke and Stark 2005). It might be true that institutional expressions of faith like mass attendance have come down over the last 50-60 years even in economically developed America, but Americans did not turn into atheists. Instead, Christian Orthodoxy has given way to do-it-yourself forms of faith exemplified by prosperity preachers like Joel Osteen and media stars like Oprah Winfrey (Douthat 2013). Thus the political relevance of the Catholic Church in the contemporary world remains an open question and it requires further empirical investigation.

**Literature Review**

**Institutionalism**

Given its institutional longevity, the Catholic Church is an example of institution *par excellence* (Kollman 2013). Scholars nonetheless disagree about what the Church wants and why. Because the Church is a religious institution, it speaks in a religious language usually
referred to as Catholic doctrine. Some scholars see doctrine as superfluous. Vallier (1970) argues, for example, that Church’s actions are not primarily shaped by its doctrinal teachings but by the need to obtain and perpetuate religious influence. In Vallier’s account, the Church acts as a corporate organization that seeks to preserve its religious and political monopoly. For others, Catholic doctrine is inevitably linked with the political mission of the Church. Such scholars argue that to understand Church’s political positions one has to pay attention to its doctrines and theology (Mainwaring 1986, 7).

Similar disputes persist in other areas. When writing about the political mission of the Church, some scholars take an expansive view: “Divine agendas aside, churches want to ensure their own survival” (Grzymała-Busse 2015, 12). Others are more specific in pointing out that rational allocation of resources is a necessary pre-condition for survival: “No matter how divinely inspired the clergy may be, a church exists in a word of scarcity and can thrive only to the extent that its leaders use resources efficiently” (Gill 1998, 11). Another disagreement centers on the question of Church membership. In some accounts a large amount of religious adherents is used as means for other ends: “without those full pews Churches have a hard time convincing politicians or society that they represent broad national interest” (Grzymała-Busse 2015, 34). Others see maximization of parishioners as an axiomatic end of the Church (Gill 1998, 55). Analyses of the institution thus oscillate between broader and narrower conceptions of Church’s political mission and often reduce its interest to a mere defense of its influence (Mainwaring 1986, 4). Such assessments begin to falter, however, when there are Churches, or groups within the Church, who consciously seek to live on less money, who are not concerned with mass attendance, or who sever ties with elites (Mainwaring 1986, 4).

Elster (2000) issues an even more elementary challenge to scholars studying
institutions asking them to explain why aggregation of institutional preferences is possible, and how reasonable is it to expect them to remain fixed. The Church is often assumed to have fixed and aggregated preferences so it can be treated as a unitary actor (e.g., Gill 1998; Grzymała-Busse 2015; Htun 2003; Kalyvas 1996; Trejo 2009). These assumptions, however, are not self-evidently true. Bishops might be in charge of individual dioceses, but their power is not absolute. The pope too does not rule alone (Bueno De Mesquita and Smith 2011). In the case of the Church, the challenge issued by Elster (2000) is still awaiting a systematic response. Also, the literature on the institutional Church has left some fundamental questions unanswered, including what is the political mission of the Church, what are its institutional preferences, and how vital is Catholic doctrine for the institutional behavior of the Church?

**Macro-mechanisms of Influence**

In her important book, Grzymała-Busse observes “The missing links between religion and religious influence on politics are the churches themselves – churches that serve not just as communities of faith, but as political advocates and actors” (2015, 6). When accounting for the political power of the Catholic Church scholars have identified three democratic mechanisms of influence – the share of the Catholic electorate, the presence of referendums, and the strength of Christian Democratic parties. In countries with a significant share of Catholic voters, the Church can effectively mobilize its faithful for political purposes. Since the Catholic Church is organized hierarchically and its doctrinal teachings are cohesive, a higher degree of discipline in the matters of popular mobilization can be exercised, and thus *ceteris paribus* “the Catholic Church is a much stronger societal veto player than the Protestant churches” (Fink 2009, 83). The Catholic voters can also create a demand for Catholic friendly public policy outcomes (Kulczycki 1995) and
participate in a variety of pressure activities from letter writing to public demonstrations.

The power of Catholic electorate is strengthened by the presence of a "special veto point" - referendums. The importance of referendums for the Catholic Church rests "with the threat of using their mobilization potential in a referendum, churches can start negotiations with political actors; or they can use the referendum to overturn already existing laws" (Fink 2009, 84, see also Hug and Tsebelis 2002; Grzymała-Busse 2015). Fink examines stem-cell legislation in Italy, Austria, and the United Kingdom and finds that the most Catholic friendly policy was adopted in highly Catholic Italy through a referendum. Austria lacks regular referendum procedures but given a large number of Catholics in the country similarly restrictive policy has been passed. In the UK the Catholic Church lacked the mobilization potential to influence the policy process due to the low numbers of adherents. However, the problem with Fink’s explanation is that it does not account for countries with similar levels of Catholic religiosity, but different levels of the Church’s influence on policy outcomes. Ireland and Italy, for example, are both highly Catholic countries (with close to 90% of the population identifying as Catholic), “but the Catholic Church in Ireland influenced the policy on abortion, divorce, and education far more and for far longer, than it did in Italy” (Grzymała-Busse 2015, 3).

The third way for the Catholic Church to obtain its policy preferences is to seek alliances with political parties. In such instances, Catholic electorate is used as a “currency” that allows the Church to bargain with political parties. Both sides engage in a political transaction that exchanges specific policy outcomes for electoral support (Grzymała-Busse 2015, 7). Focusing on Italy, Warner (2000) describes the alliance between the Catholic Church and the Democrazia Cristiana party (DC) and contrasts Italy with other two cases (France and Germany) to conclude that the decision whether to ally with a political party or
not was contingent upon the role that the Church played in the past. The Church distanced itself from the fascist regime in Italy and thus gained political legitimacy and was able to ally with the DC party. In France, on the other hand, the Church was closely linked to the fascist-backed Vichy regime making it a less desirable strategically for political parties (Warner 2000).

Scholars continue to see Christian Democratic parties as the vehicle that allows the Catholic Church to drive policy changes (Van Kersbergen and Manow 2009, 1-34) even though historically the relationship between the two has been rather uneasy (Kalyvas 1996). Christian Democratic parties prefer broad cross-class coalitions and for the sake of political gain are willing to compromise on issues and principles than the Catholic Church cannot (Grzymała-Busse 2015, 47). The emphasis on political parties is also present in works focusing on Latin America. Gill (1998) finds that in Latin American countries where Protestantism came into competition with Catholicism, the Catholic Bishops realigned with the poorest segments in the society advocating for policies such as the preferential option for the poor as well as the principle of subsidiarity (see also Trejo 2009). Similarly, Htun (2003) writes that in new Latin American democracies where the Catholic Church was actively engaged in the struggle for democracy, political parties rewarded the institution with policy concessions. In her account, a Catholic-friendly public policy is a form of repayment to the Church for its active political opposition toward the authoritarian regime.

The emphasis on political parties suffers from an important causal limitation because once in power Christian Democratic parties might decide that they no longer need the Church to mobilize the faithful. Grzymała-Busse (2015, 48) reminds us “political gratitude is notoriously short-lived and fragile, and the coalitions with the Church are not more robust.” Even more fundamentally, when exercising its political influence, the Church is not limited in
pursuing any of these three democratic mechanisms exclusively. Instead, the Church can utilize a three-pronged strategy that includes all three mechanisms. The question, then, becomes under what conditions is the Catholic Church able to secure its preferred public policy outcomes?

**Case Study Research**

Case study research is another way of examining the political power of the Catholic Church. The focus of such studies is less on generalizable patterns of influence and more on the analysis of specific mechanisms and how the Church uses them to achieve its political ends (e.g., Bruneau 1974; Bruneau 1982; Coleman 1978). Furthermore, while comparative studies emphasize the church-state interaction (e.g., Gill 1998; Grzymała-Busse 2015; Htun 2003), case study accounts stress the church-society interaction (e.g., Mainwaring, 1986; Mainwaring and Wilde, 1989). The latter emphasis is essential since the Church very often uses civil society to affect the state (e.g., Byrnes 2006; Gowin 2002).

Despite its authoritarian structures, the Church is a heterogeneous institution consisting of 1.2 billion members living in diverse cultural settings. The Church membership consists mainly of the laity that vastly outnumbers the clergy making it an essential element of the institution. Lay Catholic groups, for example, played a significantly important role in transforming the Catholic Church in Brazil, making it one of the most progressives Churches in the world (Mainwaring 1986) and a similar process followed in Mexico (Trejo 2009) and the Nethelarnds (Coleman 1978). The intermixing of Catholicism and Marxism in Latin America known as liberation theology was also initiated by Catholic lay movements (Mainwaring 1986; Mainwaring and Wilde 1989). In this instance groups within the Church were attempting to push it to the left of the political spectrum. While the attempt procured important concessions such as the preferential option for the poor, the more radical groups
found themselves outside the institutional structures of the Church and with the Vatican using disciplinary actions against them. Ultimately, the Vatican and local bishops retained ultimate control over the direction of Catholicism in Latin America. The episode demonstrates, however, that when Catholic lay groups are trying to initiate a change in Church’s behavior, their demands cannot be easily dismissed.

While case study research is limited in its ability to offer generalizable conclusions, it does offer two important advantages. First, it allows us to test how the specific mechanisms of influence used by the Church work in practice. Thus the analysis moves away from the when is the Church able to exercise political influence to how it is able to do it. Secondly, we have already seen that the emphasis on the institutional structures of the Church tends to downplay the role that grassroots organizations and the laity play in shaping Church’s actions. Mainwaring reminds us that there is a "dialectic interaction" between the institutional Church and the society at large where the two are continually interacting and shaping each other (Mainwaring 1986, 11-4). The experience of the Church with liberation theology is particularly instructive because it raises further questions about the generalizability of this interaction.

**Research Questions**

The main goal of this project is to examine the political relevance of the Catholic Church by answering the following question: How influential is the Catholic Church in contemporary democracies? This project makes use of a multimethod research framework utilizing both cross-case causal inference and within-case causal inference (Goertz 2017, 5). In doing so, the overarching question is answered by a set of three interlocking puzzles. Each puzzle approaches the central question from a different methodological perspective, but when taken together they provide a fuller account of the phenomenon under
consideration (discussed below).

**Hypotheses**

Hypothesis (1) - The Church’s institutional behavior is motivated more by its doctrinal teachings than by the need to realize its institutional self-interest (Chapters 2 & 6)

Hypothesis (2) - The Catholic electorate is necessary for the attainment of Catholic policy preferences (Chapters 3 & 4)

Hypothesis (3) - The presence of referendums is necessary for the attainment of Catholic policy preferences (Chapters 3 & 4)

Hypothesis (4) - The presence of strong Christian Democratic parties is necessary for the attainment of Catholic policy preferences (Chapters 3 & 4)

Hypothesis (5) - The laity and lay groups within the Church will act as a progressive force in shaping Church’s political mission, while Catholic bishops will tend to be conservative and reactionary (Chapters 5 & 6)

**Research Design**

This project builds on the multimethod research framework developed by Goertz (2017). The key aspect of his approach is that it combines cross-case inference with within cases inference (see Figure 1).
Chapter 2 focuses on the internal workings of the Catholic Church and in doing, so it engages the Rational Choice Institutionalism literature. The chapter aims to explain the link between Catholic doctrine and institutional preferences of the Church and to clarify what the political mission of the Church is.

Chapters 3 and 4 use Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) to find the conditions under which the Catholic Church is able to secure its preferred public policy in economically developed democracies. The sample of cases includes 35 economically developed democracies belonging to the OECD group as well as a subset of 14 third wave democracies.

Chapters 5 and 6 concentrate on the examination of mechanisms the Church uses to exercise its political influence in Poland since QCA analysis identified it as the best case for within-cases research. In addition, both chapters provide an in-depth description of the relevant political actors that shape public policy in the country, these include: (1) the Polish Catholic Church, (2) political parties and the Catholic Law and Justice party (PiS) in particular, (3) the pro-life movement, and (4) the pro-choice movement.
Methods

Hall (2003) reminds us of the importance of aligning ontology and methodology in comparative research. For the inferences to be valid one needs to be sure that the used methodologies are congruent with the ontology of our research questions. The methodology one uses should, therefore, depend on the question being asked, and not the other way around. Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) is a comparative set-theoretic method focused on the relationship between subset and superset, where necessary and sufficient conditions are at the heart of the analysis (Schneider and Wagemann 2012). Building on the structure provided by formal logic and set theory, the method is well designed to detect if a particular condition is necessary or sufficient for the outcome. QCA treats cases as having either full or partial (i.e., fuzzy) membership in a particular set.

Scholars employing QCA justify the use of this method on different grounds. First of all, QCA builds on the strengths of both qualitative and quantitative research in that it requires an in-depth knowledge of cases under consideration while at the same time allowing for a systematic analysis of the data at hand. Secondly, the method is particularly well suited for the analysis of medium \(N (10-50)\) cases and thus fits well with the overall number of cases examined in this project (35 and 14 cases, respectively). Thirdly, because of the Boolean algebra structure that QCA builds on, the method aims to understand how different conditions interact with each other, as opposed to measuring their net effects in isolation. Such emphasis fits well with the aim of discovering the combination of conditions under which the Catholic Church can exercise political influence on public policy.

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1 Since France is in Europe and the US is not we can assign France a membership score of 1 (fully in) in the set of European countries, and the US a score of 0 (fully out). Turkey, however, is neither fully in nor fully out and it might be appropriate to assign it a partial (fuzzy) score of (0.7), for example. It quickly becomes obvious that the (0.5) score (also known as the crossover point) is of crucial importance because it determines which cases are in the set and which are outside of the set.
In many ways process tracing is the primary within-case analysis method and the approach refers to “the examination of intermediate steps in a process to make inferences about hypotheses on how that process took place and whether and how it generated the outcome of interest” (Bennett and Checkel 2015, 6; see also George and Bennett 2005, 183; Mahoney 2012). Process tracing is also well suited as a complementary method to QCA (Schneider and Wagemann 2012). When applied to analyze Church’s influence in Poland, the has three main objectives: (1) to establish that the mechanism identified in QCA analysis took place, (2) to establish that a subsequent outcome also occurred, and (3) to establish that the former was the cause of the latter (Mahoney 2012). The method is also very usefully for developing new theories about the phenomenon under investigation (George and Bennett, 2005). The Church in Poland, for example, might be using mechanisms of influence that were not recognized in the current literature. Process tracing analysis will be aided by the use of counterfactuals understood as claims about events that did not actually occur. Using counterfactual allows us to imagine another (not actual) case in which the presumed causal agent is absent but everything else that is relevant is identical (Fearon 1991). Counterfactuals complement process tracing because they serve as an element of control that allows us to eliminate the possibility that the same casual process would occur in both the treated and control cases (Bennett and Checkel 2015, 192).

**Conceptualization, Operationalization, Case Selection, and Data**

The current scholarly literature points to three necessary conditions for the Church to exercise political influence: (1) the share of Catholic electorate, (2) the strength of Christian Democratic parties, and (3) the presence of referendums. While these conditions are fully calibrated in Chapter 2, below is a brief outline of how these conditions are operationalized. The share of Catholic voters is operationalized as an aggregate measure of
self-identified Catholics at five points in time: (1) 1970, (2) mid-1990, (3) mid-1995, (4) mid-2000, and (2017). These five measures are then averaged to capture a single measure of the variable.

The strength of Christian Democratic parties is based on five measures developed by Emmenegger (2011): (1) whether a religious party has participated in at least one election in the time period of interest, (2) whether the party program of at least one of these religious parties supports traditional values, (3) whether these religious parties have participated in governments for at least one-third of the period under consideration, (4) whether the denominational cleavage is electorally salient, and (5) whether these religious parties were electorally successful in the period of interest.

The presence of referendums makes use of the veto player framework developed by Hug and Tsebelis (2002. Who may trigger the process of referendum, and who can frame the question are the two most important aspects of the institution (Hug and Tsebelis 2002, 477). Using these questions as building blocks, a typology of four different types of referendums is created: (1) required referendum, (2) popular veto, (3) veto player referendum, and (4) popular initiative. The first two types of referendums provide the most policy stability because they leave the powers of the veto players in the representative arena untouched (Hug and Tsebelis 2002, 490), while the last two types provide some limited opportunities for policy change.

The outcome variable, also calibrated fully in Chapter 2, is operationalized as an aggregate of seven policy areas: (1) abortion, (2) euthanasia, (3) stem-cell research, (4) capital punishment, (5) same-sex marriage, (6) divorce, and (7) religious instruction in public schools. The outcome variable data comes from a variety of sources including but not limited to the Pew Research Center, Amnesty Intentional, and the Kennedy Institute of
Ethics at Georgetown University. The resulting dataset includes 35 OECD countries from 1961 or year of OECD accession to 2017.

Data analyzed in Chapters 5 and 6 was obtained from a number of sources: (1) fieldwork in Poland (May 2017-August 2017), (2) interviews with bishops, priests, politicians, and pro-life life activists, (3) qualitative analysis of official documents, public speeches, and press releases, (4) quantitative analysis of public opinion, electoral outcomes, and measures of religiosity, (5) archival analysis of primary documents, and (6) participant observation.

**Expected Contributions**

Grzymała-Busse (2012) issued a call that comparativists should take the study of religion more seriously. By analyzing the extent to which the Catholic Church is still a significant public policy actor in economically developed countries this project indeed does that. Moreover, this study engages in the broader debate about the secularization theory by moving the analytical focus away from individual-level indicators (e.g., weekly mass attendance) to the examination of public policy outcomes in countries that should exhibit very little Catholic friendly public policy in the first place.

Despite its institutional longevity, the institutional Catholic Church has been understudied by political scientists (but see Kollman 2013). This project seeks to remedy this imbalance by responding to a challenge issued by Elster (2000). Chapter 2 demonstrates why it is justifiable to treat the Church as a unitary actor, and why its institutional preferences are fixed. Chapter 2 also pushes back against the practice of assuming that the Church is primarily concerned with some conception of its self-interest. While such considerations are indeed important, Catholic doctrine provides an even better explanation for why the Church behaves the way it does.
From a methodological point of view, this is the first project to analyze the Church’s influence using QCA. Doing so will test how different macro-level conditions interact with each other, and which combination of them allows the Church to obtain the greatest amount of public policy victories. Furthermore, when paired with process tracing analysis, the analytical framework will link macro-level structures (Chapters 3 & 4) with micro-level motivations of individual actors (Chapters 5 & 6).

Finally, much of the comparative literature on the Catholic Church has been focused on elites (i.e., bishops) and the role they play in shaping Church’s actions (Gill 1998; Grzymala-Busse 2015; Warner 2000). While certainly important Catholic bishops do not rule alone. Chapters 5 and 6, therefore, focus on the interaction between the Polish Episcopate and the Catholic supported pro-choice movement and the degree to which Polish lay Catholics serve as a progressive force within the institution.
CHAPTER II

RATIONAL CHOICE INSTITUTIONALISM

The Catholic Church continues to insist that abortion, euthanasia, and same-sex marriage are immoral and should be made illegal despite widespread opposition to its teachings. What is the source of such intransigence and why does the Church care about these issues so deeply? While scholars analyzing Catholicism underscore the importance of doctrine, its impact on the behavior of the institutional Church is nonetheless underappreciated. This chapter conceptualizes doctrine as a collection of endogenous institutional constraints that in the self-understanding of the Church are practically unfalsifiable. Such understanding runs against the assumption that the Church is primarily or exclusively concerned with protection of some form of its self-interest. It is shown instead that Catholic doctrine rests upon four different internal sources of moral authority - the Bible, magisterium, tradition, and natural law – and that these factors shape what the Church does. In addition to endogenizing institutional preferences of the Church, this chapter also responds to a challenge issued by Elster (2000) and demonstrates why the stability of preferences should be expected and why aggregating of preferences is justifiable.

The Institutional Catholic Church

In 2013, Pope Francis was asked about the so-called gay lobby inside the Vatican. Part of his answer included the now well know “who am I to judge” phrase, prompting media pundits to interpret his words as a sign that Catholic doctrine on same-sex marriage
will become more moderate (Donadio 2013). The Catholic Church has long opposed same-sex marriage, but the expectation that the teaching will become more moderate was further corroborated by a drastic shift in public opinion on this issue. Figure 2 is based on PEW data (2017a) and illustrates how Americans have changed their views on homosexuality during the last fifteen years. We see that American Catholics continue to be ahead of the general population in their support for same sex-marriage. Clearly, then, what the American public and American Catholics want is way out of line with what the Church teaches.

Figure 2. Public Support for Same-sex Marriage in America (2001-2016)

The same gap exists on other issues as well. Seven out of ten people in the US support euthanasia, while 57% of Americans believe that abortion should be legal in all or most cases and this view is supported by 54% of Catholics (McCarthy 2014; PEW 2017b). The situation is arguably worse in other developed democracies, and even in highly Catholic Poland, only 7% of the respondents want to make current abortion law more restrictive

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2 The full transcript of the interview can be found at http://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/speeches/2013/july/documents/papa-francesco_20130728_gmg-conferenza-stampa.html
(CBOS 2018). However, the Church for its part has not moderated its stance on any of these issues. To understand why Catholic doctrine remains unchanged we need to examine institutional structures of the Church more closely.

An institution is a reoccurring pattern of behavior, or more precisely a system of rules through which a set of social behaviors are mediated (Knight 1992). Given its long history and extensive bureaucratic apparatus, the Catholic Church is an institution par excellence, and its influence can be found at every level of analysis (Reese 1992; 1996). Internationally, the Vatican is a sovereign state with official diplomatic ties to other countries. At the state level, bishops are engaged in country-specific problems affecting the people they represent, while Catholic parishes serve as the immediate source of a grassroots activity providing a wide range of social services from healthcare to education.

Christianity has always had an institutional element to it, even though the initial structures were more egalitarian than the current ones (Küng 2003, 28). Institutional structures were simply necessary for Christianity to spread around the globe. One can debate the consequences of extensive institutionalization, centralization, and bureaucratization of the Church (Kollman 2013; Küng 2003; Wolin 2004, Ch. 4) but these features were always present in the Church.

Out of the many paradigms available to contemporary social scientists, rational choice institutionalism (RCI) offers particularly valuable insights about the importance of institutions. The core of the RCI paradigm is that institutions affect the behavior of rational actors (Shepsle 2006). Institutions constrain and incentivize individual behavior, but individual agents are seldom in a position to directly change the rules of the game for their benefit. Even though every institution is initially human-made the relationship between the
two is best described as circular: institutions are designed by individuals, however once formed they have the capacity to shape future human behavior (Offe 1996).

When analyzing the Catholic Church political scientists frequently evoke the RCI paradigm along with its three core assumptions (Hall and Taylor 1996; see also Elster 2000). First, it is assumed that aggregation of preferences is possible and thus the Church is treated as a unitary actor usually reduced to Catholic bishops. Secondly, preferences of the Church are accepted as fixed and stable over time. Thirdly, the Church is assumed to be a rational agent concerned with utility maximization, conceptualized broadly as institutional survival or more specifically as maximization of parishioners (e.g., Gill 1998; Warner 2000).

While the paradigm can be very powerful, its most prominent practitioners warn that one needs to proceed with caution, especially when important assumptions are made. Tsebelis (1990, 30) reminds us that rational choice theory (RCT), with which the RCI intersects, is normative because it claims what the behavior should be. If we insist that the word rational be used in an objective sense—that actors make decisions that make their life go better—as judged by objective criteria such as health, then the idea loses all of its explanatory power (Elster 2015, 251). A prominent scholar of religion who is a rational choice practitioner echoes similar concerns: “our difficulty is not that rational-choice theory is wrong (though it usually is); the greater problem is that, beneath the brittle veneer of hypotheses and equations, there is a sea of vagueness that allows almost any outcome to be claimed as support for rational choice” (Bruce 2011, 147). He then continues: “the economistic model requires that we be able to assess costs and returns from some neutral or consensually agreed standpoint, before we make a commitment to one religion rather than another. But the nature of religion does not allow such comparison and measurement”
(Bruce 2011, 147; for a critical overview of rational choice when applied to religion see, Levine 2012, 46-9).

One way to mitigate these dangers is to look at politics through the eyes of the agent—the Church itself (Elster 2015, 253; Levine 2012, 4). This amounts to analyzing what the Church has to say about its political mission and thus paying attention to its internal theological debates. In the next section, all three assumptions of the RCI are subjected to critical evaluation. It will become apparent that the assumption that the Church cares primarily about some form of its institutional self-interest is most problematic.

**Current Understanding of Institutional Preferences**

Despite a recognition that endogenous processes affect how institutions function (Bueno De Mesquita and Smith 2009; DellaPosta, Nee and Opper 2017; Greif and Laitin 2004), scholars of the Church have systematically underappreciated the importance of such mechanism. Examples of research that treat institutional interests as primary abound in the literature “Divine agendas aside, churches want to ensure their own survival” (Grzymała-Busse 2015, 12). “No matter how divinely inspired the clergy may be, a church exists in a world of scarcity and can thrive only to the extent that its leaders use resources efficiently” (Gill 1998, 11). “[W]ithout those full pews Churches have a hard time convincing politicians or society that they represent broad national interest” (Grzymała-Busse 2015, 34). “What are the most important potential benefits [of Church aligning with a specific party]? First and most generally, any policy that promotes the institutional survival and expansion of the Church” (Warner 2000, 209-10).

These claims are at odds with other empirical works on the subject. Scholars focusing on Latin America, for example, point out that the Church has very often acted in violation of its institutional self-interest (e.g., Mainwaring 1986; Mainwaring and Wilde
1989). Historically too the Church has often acted in ways that undermined its influence. The Early Church in Rome declined in membership when martyrs were killed because of their unwillingness to abandon their religious beliefs (Hitchcock 2012; Stark 1997). Even recruitment of new members is not a costless activity because it decreases the degree of influence that can be exercised over people. There is a trade-off between a large but weak church and a solid but smaller church and stricter Churches tend to be stronger (Kalyvas 1996, 34; Iannaccone 1994).

Furthermore, given its close association with RCT, the RCI uses rationality as its building block, and the exogenous preference for protection of some form of institutional self-interest is a logical extension of this structure. The preference for institutional self-interest imputed to the Church is a modified version of a well-known rational choice axiom that people prefer more goods to less. In that sense, there exists a one to one correspondence between the individual rationality of RCT and institutional rationality of RCI; the Church acts as self-interested individuals do. However, the soundness of accepting complete rationality as a dependable building block for formal modeling in social sciences has been undermined by experimental research in cognitive psychology and behavioral economics. Contrary to the predictions of many mathematical models, it turns out that people are not conservative Bayesians, and if they do update their prior beliefs once new evidence becomes available they do it more slowly than the theorem predicts. Human mental capacities are limited making certain activities extremely effortful. To combat these difficulties we employ all kinds of shortcuts, which in turn lead to biases and even irrationality (Elster 2015, Ch. 13-15; Kahneman 2013).

That individual rationality is not unbounded has a profound effect on the RCI because if people are not always fully rational, then it is even more problematic to impute
that belief onto aggregate institutions. On the other hand, the view that people and institutions are constantly irrational is also mistaken because both need elements of rationality to survive. Commenting on this issue, one prominent observer notes: “This work [behavioral economics] is only just finding its way into the rational institutionalist research program, but again is an illustration of how the bright line between canonical rationality and psychological reality is fading” (Shepsle 2006, 34). The challenge, then, is to re-specify what the Church wants and why.

**Political Mission of the Catholic Church**

The mission of the Catholic Church is very broad. This is how Mark the Evangelist summarizes Jesus’ last instruction to his apostles is, “[g]o, therefore, and make disciples of all nations [...]” (Mark 29:19). Before becoming Pope Benedict the XVI, Cardinal Ratzinger interpreted this passage in the following way, “the final word of the Risen Lord to his disciples is a word of mission to the ends of the earth” (2004, 55). Moving away from these general pronouncements, the mission of the Church can be understood in two primary ways. The first one seeks to convert individuals, the other works at the level of society (Bruneau 1974, 3). This micro-macro dichotomy can be made even more explicit: “1. To convert men to make them disciples; therefore, evangelization; 2. to guide the world towards God; therefore, action in the temporal sphere, or civilization” (Congar 1967, 307).

This micro-macro distinction is important because while these two strategies can complement each other, in the contemporary democratic setting, they are very often antagonistic. Evangelization is a matter of a personal choice, and the process cannot be externally imposed, but instead, requires a genuine acceptance of Catholic faith. The latter approach can be imposed on others, and this is exactly what the Church does when it is able
to translate its policy preferences into law. It is then possible for an active opponent of the Church to have to live under laws shaped by the Catholic Church.

The dichotomy also forces us to think very carefully about the different types of influence the Church can exercise. Converting individual people to Catholicism is much different from the ability to pass Catholic friendly legislation affecting all citizens. When thinking about macro-level outcomes the influence of the Church is thus understood as:

The capacity of a unit (whether an individual, a group, an association, or a state) to generate commitments—loyalties, resources, behavioral support, etc.—in amounts sufficient to allow the agency of influence to impose a direction of its own choosing on the structure, and thereby to change a situation. An influential is thus a person or corporate unit that is able to place a distinct stamp on a valued sphere of interest of activity (Vallier 1970, 12).

When the Church promotes its moral policies, it attempts to give a specific and direct orientation—based on the message of Christ—to the state and individuals within its boundaries, when such influence would ordinarily be rejected (Bruneau 1974, 3).

Given this definition, the ability of the Church to acquire new members does not have to be at the heart of the analysis. Although such micro-level influence is certainly important for the institution, focusing on it exclusively produces a distorted view of the Church. For one, it implies that maximization of parishioners is its primary goal. Secondly, it mistakenly assumes that a weakening of institutional indicators, such as membership and mass attendance, automatically leads to a decline in influence. This point is well illustrated in Brazil where “the gap between the institutional Church and popular practices has always been significant, [...] but religious beliefs still shape the world view of a majority of the people” (Mainwaring 1986, 16). Macro-level structures, belief systems, and social norms are proving to be very durable, even when cut away from their micro-level roots. That is why in many economically developed countries “the influence of religion has proved far more
durable than religion itself; it has sustained customs and institutions in the face of universal or nearly universal secularization (Milosz 1984, 227).

**New Understanding of Institutional Preferences**

Knowing what the general mission of the Church is, the next step is to explain how policy preferences within the Church are formed. Endogenization of preferences has to account for the process by which they come about. To demonstrate how this mechanism works the focus is on abortion, but the process described here is generalizable to other moral issues such as euthanasia, the death penalty, and same-sex marriages among others. It will become apparent that Catholic doctrine and institutional preferences are inevitably linked. Doctrine, in other words, is what drives political Church into action. It also has to be noted that Catholic doctrine rests on, and is formed by, four different sources of moral knowledge - the Bible, tradition, the authority of the magisterium, and natural law - and “in the traditional Catholic understanding, these sources cannot fundamentally disagree because all ultimately reflect the same truth; accordingly, each source is properly understood in light of the others” (Mackler 2003, 27; Catechism of the Catholic Church 1992, §74-141). The interaction between these four sources of moral authority is summarized in figure 3 below.
Figure 3. Endogenous Determinants of Catholic Doctrine

The Bible
Critics of the Catholic teaching on abortion claim that the Bible should not be used in the abortion debate because it remains silent on the issue. In the New Testament, we do not find any explicit references to abortion. The Old Testament contains the fifth commandment "Thou shall not kill," but Ward (1993, 393-4) argues that this commandment is not a universal one since Israelites were expected to kill in certain circumstances (e.g., kill enemies during war). We also learn that fetus is not a person according to the Bible because in Hebrew nephesh means a living creature that breaths, thus fetus was not a nephesh until the moment of birth. Similarly, in the Greek New Testament living persons are described as psuche (a translation of the Hebrew nephesh), so again defining life in terms of breath (Ward 1993).

Not everyone agrees that the Bible does not have anything to say about abortion. The New Testament contains five passages making references to pharmakeia (and its cognates). In the context of New Testament, the word pharmakeia can be read as having negative connotations and mean “a specific evil drug such as a poison or an abortifacient” (Gorman 1982, 48). Such reading of the Bible suggests that it does indeed condemn
abortion, but Ward (1993, 407) unsurprisingly rejects efforts to interpret pharmakia as drug abortifacient.

**Tradition**

Scholars’ ability to discern what the Bible says or does not say about abortion depends on translation, contextualization, and interpretation. However, when Ward (1993) claims that since abortion is not mentioned in the Bible, Catholics and other Christians have no basis to fight against, he disregards how Catholic doctrine is formed. His objection is much more applicable for the Protestant churches with their emphasis on Sola Scriptura (by Scripture alone). The Catholic Church does not base its teachings exclusively on the Bible, and the dogmatic constitution Dei Verbum (On divine revelation) explains this in detail. The document states: “Sacred tradition and Sacred Scripture form one sacred deposit of the word of God [...] but the task of authentically interpreting the word of God, whether written or handed on, has been entrusted exclusively to the living teaching office of the Church” (article 10). There are documents in the sacred tradition of the Church that condemn abortion. This is particularly the case for the Didaché and Apologeticum. Therefore, even if it is true that the Bible remains silent on abortion, this does not preclude the Church from taking a strong position against it.

**Magisterium of the Catholic Church**

While the sacred tradition is composed of many different documents, it is up to the magisterium of the Church to decide which documents should be considered as sacred. The teaching authority of the Church is ultimately resting in the hands of the Pope, who has the final say on all issues and according to the Catholic doctrine is infallible in the matters of faith. The Pope is one bishop among many, but as a Bishop of Rome, he is first among all bishops.

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3 Didaché is an Early Christian treatise dating back to the first century, while an early Christian writer, Tertullian, authored Apologeticum.
equals. Every bishop is considered to have the fullness of priesthood, while the same cannot be said about priests in general. The magisterium of the Church, generally speaking, consists of all bishops who are in communion with the Pope. The magisterium decides which documents are to be included in the sacred tradition, and how the tradition and the Bible are to the. On the problem of abortion, the magisterium has spoken on numerous occasions, and it univocally condemns it as a mortal sin (e.g., Gaudium et Spes 1965; John Paul II 1995; National Conference of Catholic Bishops 2009).

**Natural Law**

The fundamental idea behind the natural law is that particular human rights and values are inalienable by virtue of human nature. Moreover, an essential feature of the natural law is that all people through the use of reason can understand it. The Church judges the legitimacy of human laws based on “the extent to which they uphold precepts of natural law (Htun 2003, 36). Needless to say, that natural law serves as the building block of Catholic doctrine, including its teaching on abortion. Since natural law is supposedly accessible to anyone consulting her reason, the teaching on abortion should also be stated in a purely logical form. Gensler (1986) developed a formal argument against abortion, stressing consistency as its principal requirement:

Premise (1): If you are consistent and think that it would be all right for someone to do A to X, then you will think that it would be all right for someone to do A to you in similar circumstance.

Premise (2): If you are consistent and think that it would be all right for someone to do A to you in similar circumstances, then you will consent to the idea of someone doing A to you in similar circumstances.

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4 On December 8, 2015, Pope Francis initiated an Extraordinary Jubilee of Mercy and allowed regular priests to absolve people from the sin of abortion during the sacrament of confession. Given the seriousness of this sin such power is usually vested only in the hands of Bishops. The Year of Mercy ended on November 20, 2016, and this privilege has been made permanent.
Conclusion: If you are consistent and think that it would be *all right to do A to X*, then you will *consent* to the idea of someone doing *A to you* in similar circumstances. (Gensler 1986, 89)

Using this structure, the author shows that stealing is not morally permissible (Gensler 1986, 90). Furthermore, applying his structure to abortion, he offers the following reasoning:

Premise (1): If you are consistent and think that abortion is morally permissible, then you will consent to the idea of your having been aborted in normal circumstances.

Premise (2): You do not consent to the idea of your having been aborted in normal circumstances.

Conclusion: If you are consistent then you will not think that abortion is morally permissible (Gensler 1986, 93-4).

**External Factors Affecting Abortion Doctrine**

While the process of policy formation is, for the most part, endogenous, external factors can in some instances play a significant role. In the case of abortion, medical advancements occurring outside the Church further cemented its teaching on this issue, demonstrating that religion and science need not always be in opposition to each other. Recognizing that Catholic teaching on abortion has remained steady, we also have to underscore the influence of Aristotle on Catholic doctrine.

Many of his works were only re-discovered in the Middle Ages (Connery 1977, 51), and thus revitalized the theological debate surrounding abortion. Writing about the difference between the animated and unanimated fetus Aristotle estimated that the soul was infused into the fetus at 40 days for males and 80 days for females (Connery 1977, 168). Until fetus became "ensouled" by God, it was not considered human. Thus, many theologians believed that “if the fetus is animated, even doubtfully so, it would be wrong to procure an abortion, since taking the life of an innocent person is an intrinsically evil thing (Connery 1977, 135).
While the debates may be perceived as naïve from a contemporary point of view, we need to keep in mind how recent medical advancements are: "Medicine has come of age only in relatively recent times, and it is only since the discovery of the ovum by Von Baer in 1827 that our knowledge of the process of conception and generation has been at all accurate" (Connery 1977, 4). Given the advances in modern science and discoveries in medicine, the Church now teaches that the zygote resulting from fertilization is a new human being. Although this new individual is wholly depended on the mother, it is nonetheless a new organism with its own genetic program. Using science and technology to bolster its anti-abortion stance the Church believes it “is not proposing its own philosophical theology, nor is it making a theological argument, it is rather an empirical fact that there is a new individual” (Ratzinger 2006, 131-2).

**Stability of Preferences**

Elster (2000, 693) writes “any account that imputes goal-oriented behavior to aggregate entities has to explain why we should expect consistency in their behavior.” This is especially applicable to RCT and RCI since in most formal models agent’s preferences are assumed to be given and stable over time (Hindmoor and Taylor 2015, 18). Commenting on the importance of fixed preferences, Becker (1986, 110) notes, “the assumption of stable preferences provides a stable foundation for generating predictions about responses to various changes, and prevents the analyst from succumbing to the temptation of simply postulating the required shift in preferences to ‘explain’ all apparent contradictions to his predictions.”

At the same time, much of the RCT and RCI literature has had very little to say about preferences in general and one critic observed: "while economists are able to carefully specify axioms governing preferences, they have had surprisingly little to say about what
preferences are, and what they have said is frequently indefensible and inconsistent with their practice" (Hausman 2011, 4). Some practitioners of the paradigm believe that actor’s beliefs and desires need not be accounted for (Satz and Ferejohn 1994) because their preferences are revealed through actions (Samuelson 1948). The notion that actions reveal preferences is very prevalent. Morrow (1994, 17) writes, "we can deduce actors’ goals from observing their prior behavior or by experimentation." The same recommendation is made for scholars interested in studying institutions: "It is my view that one cannot understand or explain institutions, however, without first explicating their effects. So it is quite proper to examine effects first" (Shepsle 1989, 138).

The recommendation that observing consequences of behavior can help us understand actor’s preferences seems implausible: “All explanation is causal explanation. We explain an event by citing its cause. Causes precede their effects in time. It follows that we cannot explain an event, such as an action, by its consequences (Elster 2007, 271). Hausman (2011, 36) offers a similar assessment: “If all that consumer choice theorists could say about why an agent purchased one thing rather than another was that the consumer preferred to make that purchase, there would be no Nobel Prize in economics and game-theory texts would be very brief.”

Consequently, to argue that the Church is against abortion because it seeks to outlaw it is not very informative. However, since the process of preference formation has been already endogenized, it is now easier to see why the Church is against abortion. Catholic doctrine acting as the “software” of the institutional Church informs its political behavior. The mechanism of preference formation also accounts for its stability over time. Since the different sources of moral authority cooperate with each other, as the time goes on it becomes increasingly implausible that their collective effect will be overturned.
Once Catholic doctrine is determined it evolves in the sense that it becomes more consolidated and less likely to be overturned. The idea of evolution understood in the sense of rupture with the past runs against the belief in sacred tradition and undermines pronouncements made by the magisterium. In that sense, the whole process is strictly deductive because conclusions were already contained in the premises. The so-called regressive method used by theologians is essentially an apparatus to confirm what the Church already teaches. When studying original sources theologians apply the regressive method by “utilizing the latest teaching of the magisterium as an indicator of what must have been present from the beginning, since the Church at this period disclaimed any power of innovation in its teaching of revelation” (Dulles 2002, 32; see also, Congar 1967).

Given the internal interworking of the institution, we can be rather confident that preferences of the Church will remain fixed. The use of the regressive method and the fact that Catholic doctrine rests on four interdependent sources of moral authority that reaffirm each other raises serious doubts about the possibility of doctrinal innovation within the institution. It also becomes ever more apparent that the whole process cannot be fully comprehended without paying attention to Catholic theology. Conversely, an inaccurate understanding of doctrinal debates can lead to false inferences about the possibility of evolution of preferences. Fleishman (2000) contends, for example, that a strong anti-abortion position is a recent development in the Catholic doctrine. She links the development of the abortion teaching with the papacy of Pius IX in 1854 and his affirmation of the Immaculate Conception of Mary.\(^5\) Besides the fact that numerous studies have demonstrated that a strong anti-abortion stance has been a consistent hallmark of the

\(^5\) According to the teaching of the Catholic Church, the Immaculate Conception of Mary presents a view that Mary, as a mother of God, was born without the original sin.
Catholic doctrine from the first century (e.g., Connery 1977; Gorman 1982), the more fundamental issue is that the Immaculate Conception of Mary is not at all linked to the Catholic doctrine on abortion (Venzor 2011).

**Aggregation of Preferences**

Arrow's impossibility theorem and social choice theory in general, warn that aggregation of preferences is very problematic. Certainly, there are instances when aggregation of preferences is possible (e.g., firms subjected to market constraints are treated as unitary actors), but clear justification is needed. Most scholarship on the Catholic Church in political science, however, sidesteps this critical issue. This is especially problematic given the many reasons against aggregation, as one prominent scholar observed: "national churches can diverge from Vatican directives, bishops often disagree with each other, lower level clergy and lay Catholics can voice dissenting opinions and act in ways that are not authorized by the episcopate" (Kalyvas 1996, 32-3). Thus, in reality, the Church is neither monolithic nor univocal (Levine 2012, 48). Kalyvas (1996, Ch. 2), nonetheless, goes on to treat the Church as a unitary actor. He justifies this move because of the authoritarian top-down structures present in the nineteenth-century Catholic Church (i.e., his period of interest).

The internal structure of the Church is indeed authoritarian. The relationship between the Pope and other bishops illustrates this point. Early attempts by Bishops of Rome to impose their primacy failed. Leo I (440-61) was the first Bishop of Rome to whom historians have given the title “pope” in the real sense (Küng 2003, 57). Over time popes were able to centralize power in their office (Kollman 2013), but the importance of the horizontal relationship between Pope and bishops, officially referred to as *collegiality*, continues to define their relationship (DeClue 2008).
In the matters of doctrine, the role of the Pope is important, but his influence is not unlimited. In theory, Pope Francis could decide to overturn any doctrine by issuing a statement *ex-cathedra.*\(^6\) In practice, any attempt to overturn what the Catholic Church teaches on abortion would result in schism. As Cardinal Burke pointed out: "[...] it is always my sacred duty to defend the truth of the Church’s teaching and [...] no authority can absolve me from that responsibility, and, therefore, if any authority, even the highest authority, were to deny that truth or act contrary to it, I would be obliged to resist, in fidelity to my responsibility before God" (CNA 2014).

Generally speaking, popes do not issue teachings *ex-cathedra* without the support of the magisterium. The importance of collegiality was on full display in the context of the already mentioned “who am I to judge” answer made by Pope Francis. Other bishops immediately sought to clarify and correct pope’s statements. Appearing on the CBS today show Cardinal Timothy Dolan said: “[...] no way this [Pope’s comments] could be interpreted as a change in church doctrine or the church’s faith and morals. It is a change in tone [...]” (Kyung Kim 2013). In a similar vein, Cardinal George stated: “[the phrase] It’s very misused, because he [Pope Francis] was talking about someone who has already asked for mercy and been given absolution whom he knows well. That’s entirely different than talking to somebody who demands acceptance rather than asking for forgiveness. It’s constantly misused” (Allen 2014).

It is also interesting that in a popular understanding Pope Francis has been seen as a reformer and a progressive force within the Church. As a result, many of his pronouncements are interpreted as a sign that the Church will democratize in a more liberal

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\(^6\) Latin term defined as "from the chair." It refers to a situation when the Bishop of Rome issues teaching that is binding for the whole Church.
direction. Five years into his pontificate, however, there is no single doctrinal teaching that has been changed. The endogenous institutional constraints embedded so deeply in the Church provide an explanation for why that is the case. One could go a step further and ask whether Pope Francis is indeed a reformist. With his decision to centralize power over Vatican banks and implementation of harsher penalties for priests exhibiting subordination problems, a case could be made that democratization and reform were never his goals and he might turn out to be one of the most authoritarian popes in recent history.

We should also not exaggerate the extent of the disagreement between bishops, especially in the case of abortion and moral issues in general. From a historical point of view, the debate about abortion was not between two camps that were either in favor or against the practice. Instead the focus was on when does the human life begin and even then “the distinction between the formed and unformed fetus (animated and unanimated) played no more than a secondary role, at least in reference to abortion because the final result was the same: a child was not born” (Connery 1977, 304-5). It is equally imprecise to describe bishops as liberals or conservatives because if we map abortion onto a one-dimensional political spectrum, even the most liberal bishop will be far to the right of the median voter. Liberal and conservative labels can be applied to identify general postures espoused by individual Church leaders to describe their style of management, for example. However, the labels lose their meaning as soon as they are applied to the matters of doctrine.

We might say, however, that the nature of the institutional Church is conservative since there exists an unchanging core that it builds on. That core is doctrine. The rigidity of the institution is easily missed because the Church continues to operate in a variety of geographical, cultural, and historical settings. To fit into these diverse environments, the
Church has adjusted its practices and forms of expression, but without changing the doctrine. Moreover, the debates about moral issues happen within carefully specified boundaries as outlined by doctrine. The spectrum of the abortion debate is particularly narrow, and this is also true for other morally salient issues. However, when moving away from doctrinal discussions and matters of faith to general political postures, we begin to see a greater plurality of opinions. This explains why liberal-Marxist groups promoting liberation theology and conservative Opus Dei can operate underneath the same institutional umbrella.

Although there exists an extensive heterogeneity of groups within the Church, once they begin to fall outside the boundaries of doctrine the disciplinary measures against them begin to activate. This is also true for individual actors who can even be excommunicated. Hans Küng is a Swiss Catholic theologian well known for his opposition to the doctrine of papal infallibility and acceptance of euthanasia. Consequently, his teaching credentials have been revoked and he is no longer allowed to teach Catholic theology. The Society of Saint Pius X, on the other hand, rejected many of the changes initiated by the Second Vatican Council. As a result, the group was initially suspended, and later some of its members were excommunicated. In both cases, the process of disciplining took place over an extended period of time. As an authoritarian structure, the Church allows for a prolonged deliberation process, which is meant to offer the accused party an opportunity to explain and correct its actions. In the matters of doctrine, there can be no doubt about what the Church teaches, and individuals who wish to stay within its structures have to follow suit. Pope and the magisterium are responsible for the enforcement of doctrine, and they can use a variety of disciplining mechanisms, including excommunication, to ensure obedience. It is certainly

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7 Pope Benedict the XVI removed the excommunication in 2009.
true that the 1.2 billion Catholics have different and at times even mutually exclusive preferences. However, since the Church tends to be associated with high-ranking bishops who are able to enforce doctrine the aggregation of preferences becomes possible.

**Conclusion**

This chapter aimed to underscore the political importance of Catholic doctrine and present it as a set of endogenous institutional constraints. To survive the Church, of course, has to manage its resources accordingly and it certainly cares about obtaining new members. This is, in fact, an important element of its mission but that does not mean, however, that obtaining more adherents is its only or primary goal of the institution. The Church also cares about what it stands for, and as a result, its teachings are not easily compromised. Even when institutional and doctrinal considerations collide, the Church will favor doctrinal commitments. The Church is experiencing this conflict in many contemporary democracies, where people find its teachings unappealing and yet doctrine has not been moderated. It is true that institutional indicators such as mass attendance, baptism rates, and the number of marriages have been declining, but one should not expect the Church to adjust its teachings to improve its institutional condition. When Catholic doctrine and its institutional concerns conflict, the former wins out because the Church remains true, above all else, to its mission and teachings. Another author puts this point even more forcefully: "[a] church will renounce financial benefits, prestige, institutional expansion, and other interest it if feels that its religious mission compels it to do so" (Mainwaring 1986, 10).

After 2000 years of Catholic history, these endogenous institutional constraints are so embedded that a rupture with past teachings would undermine the institution from within. Catholic bishops are given considerable power to enforce doctrines, and they are the
primary political movers in the Church. With roughly 5,000 bishops around the world, it is important for the Church to preserve high levels of elite-cohesion. The plurality of opinions begins to disappear once the issues of doctrine are raised, and as we have seen even the Pope is subjected to scrutiny by other bishops.

It might be tempting to see doctrinal commitments as expressions of rational action. The problem with such interpretation is that it becomes tautological - anything that the Church does is strategic. Such rationality is boundless and it loses its explanatory power. The Church instead is committed to doctrinal teachings, not because of rational or strategic calculations but because it believes them to be true. This means that when bishops are forced to choose between institutional self-interest (e.g., negative media exposure) and doctrinal commitments (e.g., affirming that abortion is morally objectionable), they will favor the latter commitment.

Doctrinal commitments are not born in a vacuum. Throughout its long history, sophisticated institutional mechanisms were developed to both produce doctrine and connect it to Church’s institutional mission. Catholic doctrine on abortion is produced by four institutionally endogenous and interdependent sources of moral authority: the Bible, tradition, natural law, and the magisterium of the Church. The mechanism that produces doctrine is akin to path-dependence, so over time doctrine becomes more solidified and practically unfalsifiable. The development of doctrine is, therefore, best understood as a process of deepening and consolidation while opportunities for radical rupture with past pronouncements are unlikely to materialize.

When thinking about the general mission of the Church, a distinction has to be made between the focus on the individual and the emphasis on the aggregate. The former emphasis stresses individual believers and non-believers alike. Social scientists emphasize
this level of analysis when they implement measures of believing, behaving, and belonging (e.g., Davie 1994). The emphasis on the aggregate takes a form of shaping macro-structures such as constitutions, laws, and legislation. Hence, when the Church attempts to outlaw abortion, it is interested in shaping political outcomes that affect both Catholics and non-Catholics alike. These two measures capture different types of political influence. It is possible for the Church to have many adherents and little impact on public policy, or conversely to have a small membership and yet significant impact on policy outcomes.
CHAPTER III

CALIBRATION

Chapter 3 provides both theoretical and empirical groundwork necessary for QCA analysis carried out in the next chapter. The primary goal of Chapter 3 is to create a new comparative dataset that aims to capture the influence of the Catholic Church on public policy in consolidated democracies. The coverage of the resulting dataset includes 35 countries, from 1961 or year of OECD accession to 2017 and includes three macro-level conditions identified in prior chapters as necessary for the exercise of Church’s political influence. The three conditions include: (1) the share of Catholic electorate, (2) the strength of Christian Democratic parties, and (3) the presence of referendum. The outcome variable is operationalized as an aggregate of seven policy areas: (1) abortion, (2) euthanasia, (3) stem-cell research, (4) capital punishment, (5) same-sex marriage, (6) divorce, and (7) religious instruction in public schools.

The created dataset will be used to engage the secularization theory, while shifting the focus away from individual-level indicators to the analysis of aggregate outcomes (i.e., Church’s influence on public policy). In addition to testing the robustness of secularization theory in 35 economically developed countries, another within-sample comparison will be carried out to examine if the 14 countries belonging to the third wave of democratization are substantively different from the other countries in the sample. The Second Vatican Council (1962-65) embraced democracy as the most preferred political system, leading some scholars to argue that the third wave of democratization consisted mainly of Catholic countries. There are thus theoretical reasons to believe that the influence of the Church in
those countries should be substantively higher than in other economically developed democracies.

Analytical Scope and Case Selection Strategy

One of the major methodological concerns of comparative research has to do with achieving valid causal generalizations (Bunce 2000). In most research designs there exists an inverse relationship between the number of cases under investigation and the types of theories, concepts, and findings involved. Generally speaking, as the number of cases increases, generalizations become less thick (Coppedge 1999). To maximize the power of generalizations, one has to carefully demarcate the scope of empirical analysis (Goertz 2017). In practice, this amounts to setting analytical boundaries on the types of theories, area studies, and cases the project seeks to engage in order to produce the most reliable findings.

The current comparative literature on the political influence of the Catholic Church suffers from two limitations as far as scope conditions are concerned. First, by focusing excessively on the experience of Latin American countries, the analytical scope is too narrow. Although no longer unchallenged, Latin America continues to be a Catholic stronghold making it a natural analytical area for numerous studies (e.g., Bruneau 1974; Bruneau 1982; Htun 2003). The fierce religious competition between Catholicism and Protestantism also produced answers to important questions, such as why did some Catholic Churches cooperate with authoritarian regimes while others did not (Gill 1998), or why did the Church in Mexico re-align itself to support indigenous movements (Trejo 2009). Moreover, after the Second Vatican Council (1962-65), the Latin American churches gave rise to liberation theology and as a result drew attention of another group of scholars (e.g., Levine 2012; Mainwaring 1986; Mainwaring and Wilde 1989). By fusing Catholicism with
Marxism, liberation theology sought to address structural causes of poverty and focused on helping the poor. The emphasis on political action meant that at times violent political struggle ensued (Lodge 1970). Some Catholic priests gave up their vocations to participate in guerilla warfare, and this, in turn, drew a sharp reaction from the Vatican that ultimately disintegrated the movement. The rise of liberation theology appears to be an area-specific phenomenon, but the more general finding of this literature is that Catholic laity, once activated, tends to act as a progressive force within the Church. The analytical robustness of this expectation will be tested when actions and structure of the Polish Catholic Church are analyzed, but there exists a more general theoretical and conceptual need to push comparative analysis of the Church beyond Latin America.

Secondly, the analytical scope in other studies of the Church appears to be too broad. If the influence of the Catholic Church is analyzed through the democratization paradigm, then by definition non-democratic and democratic environments are collapsed into a single analytical background (e.g., Gill 1998; Grzymała-Busse 2015; Warner 2000). The problem is that non-democratic and democratic regimes are profoundly different from each other in numerous important ways. They offer different rewards and punishment, and even more fundamentally democracy rests on procedural solution to conflicts while non-democracy does not. If indeed social actors adjust their behavior to the political environment they operate in, then an all-encompassing account of the Church as a rational institution has to necessarily be a very thin one. The net result is that we still need to better understand how the authoritarian Catholic Church behaves in a democratic setting (Fink 2009, 80).

By focusing on the OECD member countries both of the above-mentioned analytical shortcomings are resolved simultaneously as the analytical focus is moved beyond Latin
America, and democracy is the only political environment under consideration. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) was founded in 1961, and its mission is to promote policies that will improve the economic and social well being of people around the world (OECD 2017). The organization seeks to promote greater inter-governmental cooperation on a wide range of social and economic issues. As of 2017, the OECD consisted of 35 member states, and the organization is in accession negotiations with numerous countries. The two fundamental memberships requirements are a commitment to democracy and economic development (OECD 2017). This consequently means that the current OECD members are economically developed and consolidated democracies.

The fact that the OECD countries are economically democracies is crucial because the influence of the Church in consolidated democracies has been systematically understudied. This is perhaps unsurprising given the expectations of secularization and modernization theories. Both theories predict that as the world becomes more modern and economically developed, religion will become increasingly marginalized and eventually removed from the public sphere (e.g., Bruce 2011; Norris and Inglehart 2012). This analysis, therefore, also contributes to the secularization debate by empirically testing the influence of the Church in an environment presumably least favorable to it. It does so by focusing on collective outcomes, rather than on traditional measure of religiously that focus on dimensions of believing, behaving, and belonging (Davie 1994). According to secularization and modernization theories, modern countries experience a trend towards less religious influence. Given that most countries in the sample have been modern and economically developed (based by OECD standards) for many years now, the influence of the Church should be systematically eroded. Thus if the secularization theory is correct, then the Church should have minimal, impact on public policy outcomes in cases under
consideration.

From a methodological perspective focusing exclusively on consolidated democracies offers an important mechanism of control across cases. Democratic regimes tend to converge on a set of common preferences through three causal mechanisms: (1) citizens use the words as opposed to the sword to resolve conflicts, (2) they produce political elites that are sympathetic towards one another, and (3) they pressure their representatives not to engage in war, as war disrupts trade and increases taxes (Møller and Skaaning 2013, 171). This is why democratic peace theory predicts that democracies do not go to war with each other. Once archenemies, Germany and France are now able to peacefully coexist and serve as the backbone of the European Union. Equally important is the fact that the development of democracy results in the institutionalization of conflicts.

Certainly, no two states are alike, and paths to democracy vary, but a big part of successful democratization depends on states’ ability to overcome its non-democratic past. Once democracy is institutionalized, authoritarian legacies become increasingly less important and in some cases even irrelevant. Whether a country was a former Spanish colony or a Soviet satellite state matters less once a certain level of development has been achieved. Since economic development and democracy are highly correlated (Cheibub, et al. 1996), the OECD countries examined are also unlikely to become non-democracies.

Max Weber (2002 [1920]) argued famously that Protestant countries are more entrepreneurial and as a result more democratic than Catholic states. Part of the explanation for this divergence is to be located in the structure of both religions. The decentralized nature of Protestantism fosters curiosity and a good work ethic, while Catholicism with its top-down structure of authority hampers personal growth and produces a set of attitudes that are incompatible with the development of democracy. Weber’s
assessment held during the first two waves of democratization, as both waves consisted overwhelmingly of Protestant countries. This has not been true of the third wave, however, as most countries transitioning after 1974 were Catholic states (Troy 2009). Judged from this perspective the importance of the Second Vatican Council can hardly be overstated. Huntington (2010 [1991]) identifies the Council as one of the five major international causes that helped give rise to the third wave of democratization. In addition, the Council has been credited with re-orienting the Church towards democracy as the most preferred political system (Kollman 2013; Weigel 1989). As a result, there are important theoretical reasons to treat the third wave countries as substantively different from other OECD member states. Such additional re-specification of the population of interest is very common in QCA analysis, particularly when new and interesting patterns of interaction exist (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 121). In general, we would expect the influence of the Church on public policies in those countries to be greater than in other democracies. Thus, in Chapter 4 two types of samples will be subjected to empirical analysis: 1) that includes all 35 OECD member states, and 2) a sample of countries that democratized in or after 1974. The additional analysis will allow for comparison within an overall sample of consolidated democracies, and will also test another unanswered puzzle in democratization literature—whether the political influence of the Church is, in fact, substantive in countries that democratized after the Second Vatican Council.

QCA and Calibration
Political science research should be carried out transparently, to allow for replication of findings (King 1995) and the DA-RT proponents (data access and research transparency) argue along the very same lines. Judged from this perspective, QCA practitioners have been pioneers of transparency in social sciences. The goal of calibration is to assign numbers
(fuzzy values) to empirically existing cases. Ragin (2008, 72) notes that “researchers calibrate their measuring devices and the readings these instruments produce by adjusting them so that they match or conform to dependably know standards” and this, in turn, makes measurements interpretable. Although the practice of calibration is widely used in hard sciences, its usage in the social sciences is still unfamiliar; this is unfortunate since fuzzy-sets are very well suited to social science research (Emmenegger 2011).^8

Calibration is also used in statistical research, but it tends to be done implicitly, through the use of inductive calculations such as mean and standard deviation. While the two offer great precision, the problem is that they vary from one sample to another. As a result, both mean and standard deviation produce measurements that are *internal* to data. This is problematic because measures such as mean, “are properties of the data at hand and, as such, void of any substantive meaning vis-à-vis the concept that one aims to capture with a set (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 33).

Calibration in QCA aims to translate knowledge-based of phenomena in the real existing world into numbers. Thus, it builds on knowledge and information that are *external* to the data. In that sense, QCA calibration takes the best aspects of qualitative and quantitative research traditions. It builds on external theoretical knowledge of case studies and calibrates them in a transparent and precise way (Ragin 2008). Moreover, calibration allows for an eclectic use of knowledge from a wide variety of sources including obvious facts, generally accepted notions in the social sciences, and the knowledge of the researcher accumulated in a specific field of study (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 32).

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^8 Fuzzy sets and values used in QCA allow for a fine-grained operationalization of social science concepts (see also Chapter 1).
Different calibration techniques exist (e.g., qualitative calibration, direct method, indirect method), but as long as principles of calibration are observed the choice of the technique does not matter much. Schneider and Wagemann (2012, 32) list the most important requirements for successful calibration:

1. a careful definition of the relevant population of cases
2. a precise definition of the meaning of all concepts (both the conditions and the outcome)
3. a decision about the point on where the point of maximum indifference about membership versus non-membership is located (the 0.5 anchor)
4. a decision on the definition of full membership (1) and full non-membership (0)
5. a decision about the graded memberships in between the qualitative anchors

**Conditions**

In QCA’s terminology conditions make the presence of an outcome possible. The scholarly literature recognizes three main macro-mechanisms used by the Church to obtain its policy preferences (see Chapter 1). The share of Catholic electorate can create a demand for Catholic friendly policy outcomes, Christian Democratic parties are the political vehicles used by the Church to drive the policy change, and referendums help the Church to consolidate its gains or to win new policy concessions. The following acronyms will be used to denote them the three conditions and the outcome variable:

- \( C \) = Catholic electorate (condition one)
- \( P \) = Christian Democratic parties (condition two)
- \( R \) = Referendums (condition three)
- \( I \) = Influence of the Catholic Church on public policy (outcome)

Since three conditions are considered, there exist eight possible combinations among them. Formally this can be expressed as \( 2^k \) where \( k \) is the number of conditions. Therefore, \( 2^3 \) produces eight possible combinations. These eight combinations are represented in the Venn diagram below (Figure 4).
The share of Catholic voters in a given country is of crucial importance for the political mission of the Church. For one, Christian Democratic parties arise in response to popular demands from Catholic voters (Kalyvas 1996). Moreover, referendums serve as effective veto players, but when combined with highly mobilized Catholics they become especially effective and can even lead to policy change that is more in line with Catholic doctrine (Fink 2009). Bishops and clergy can also encourage Catholic faithful to get directly involved in politics by staging a public protest or by lobbying their representatives. In short, Catholic voters can participate in politics in a variety of different ways.
Political scientists sometimes attribute the emergence of political parties to particular types of electoral systems. Duverger’s law predicts that plurality-voting systems tend to lead to two-party competition, while Duverger’s hypothesis states that proportional voting systems tend to be associated with multi-party competition (Hindmoor and Taylor 2015, 57). This suggests that whether Christian Democratic parties are formed or not depends on the type of electoral rules in a given country, rather than on the cleavages within it. But societal cleavages are important, and they sometimes override institutional arrangements. Hindmoor and Taylor (2015, 81) note that Lichtenstein and Sri Lanka both use proportional representation systems but have fewer than two and a half effective parties. This implies, in turn, that the key issue in determining the number of parties is not the electoral system but the number and type of cleavages in that society. Cusack, Iversen and Soskice (2007) went even further when demonstrating that electoral rules themselves are products of societal cleavages. While electoral rules are certainly important, the share of Catholic voters has important consequences for the Church and its ability to influence politics.

The share of Catholic voters is based on survey measures of self-identification and is based on two sources: (1) Barrett, Kurian and Johnson (2001) and, (2) CIA’s world factbook (CIA 2018). The first source provides data for four time periods that coincide with the creation and existence of the OECD: (1) 1970, (2) mid-1990, (3) mid-1995, (4) mid-2000. The second source provides the last data point (5), which is a snapshot of number of Catholics around the world taken in 2017. The five points are then averaged to capture a more historically accurate representation of the variable over time.

The condition is calibrated via the direct method, which “uses a logistic function to fit the raw data in between the three qualitative anchors (Schneider and Wagemann 2012,
The three anchors are 90% (full membership), 50% (point of indifference), and 10% (full non-membership). The 90% anchor is meant to capture the so-called Catholic monopolies. In those countries, Catholic voters are the dominant religious voting block, and such operationalization builds on prior academic research (e.g., Emmenegger 2011; Esping-Andersen 1990). On the other hand, being a religious minority tends to make the Church more creative. In the United States where the share of Catholic voters is around 20 percent, for example, the Church has developed extensive structures that are often referred to as the Church outside the Church. These include more than 7000 Catholic schools with a student population of 2.1 million, 244 Catholic colleges and universities, and a healthcare system of 629 Catholic hospitals that care for one in six patients in the United States (Allen 2014, 234). But some minority churches are simply too small to exercise any meaningful political influence. The 10% anchor is thus meant to delineate the difference between creative minority and insignificant minority. The Indian Church serves an illustration. With less than 10% of population being Catholic, the Church in India tries to make itself indispensable to the larger society by offering contributions in health care and education, but these activities have not yet transformed the Church into a meaningful political actor (Allen 2014, 253-8; Schmalz 2006). The indifference point is located right at the 50% mark, so for a country to be classified as belonging to the set of Catholic countries more than 50% of its population has to be Catholic. Table 1 summarizes the transformation of raw data into a calibrated score for each case.
### Table 1. Calibration of the Catholic Electorate (C) Condition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Country Code</th>
<th>OECD accession</th>
<th>Raw % of Catholics</th>
<th>Calibrated Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>AU</td>
<td>June 1971</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>AT</td>
<td>September 1961</td>
<td>78.5</td>
<td>0.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>BE</td>
<td>September 1961</td>
<td>76.9</td>
<td>0.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>CA</td>
<td>April 1961</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>CL</td>
<td>May 2010</td>
<td>76.4</td>
<td>0.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>CZ</td>
<td>December 1995</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>DK</td>
<td>May 1961</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>EE</td>
<td>December 2010</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>FI</td>
<td>January 1969</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>FR</td>
<td>August 1961</td>
<td>80.1</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>DE</td>
<td>September 1961</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
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<td>GR</td>
<td>September 1961</td>
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<td>0.00</td>
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<td>HU</td>
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<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
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<td>August 1961</td>
<td>86.2</td>
<td>1.00</td>
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<td>IL</td>
<td>September 2010</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>0.00</td>
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<td>March 1962</td>
<td>93.2</td>
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<td>April 1964</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.00</td>
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<td>0.00</td>
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<td>1.00</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>SI</td>
<td>July 2010</td>
<td>79.2</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>KR</td>
<td>December 1996</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>ES</td>
<td>August 1961</td>
<td>91.2</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>September 1961</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>CH</td>
<td>September 1961</td>
<td>43.6</td>
<td>0.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>TR</td>
<td>August 1961</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>GB</td>
<td>May 1961</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States of America</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>April 1961</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
To identify countries that belonged to the third wave of democratization, Huntington’s (2010 [1991]) 1974 starting point is used and combined with dichotomous operationalization of democracy and dictatorship created by (Przeworski, Alvarez, et al. 2000). Countries that democratized before 1974 are not included in the smaller sample. Third wave democracies include Chile, Czech Republic, Estonia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Mexico, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, and Spain.

Christian Democratic Parties (P)
In numerous studies, political parties are seen as primary vehicles of Catholic influence (e.g., Gill 1998; Htun 2003; Warner 2000), but the presence of religious parties alone is of course not enough to realize the Church’s institutional preferences. The parties also have to be strong by being electorally successful. To conceptualize the presence and strength of Christian Democratic parties, Emmenegger’s (2011) data and operationalization are used. Emmenegger looks at 19 Western democracies to examine the determinants of job security regulations, and religious parties are hypothesized as one of the necessary conditions. His analysis does not cover the following cases that are examined in this project: Chile, Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Japan, Latvia, Luxemburg, Mexico, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, and Turkey. Consequently these countries operationalization and calibration was based on the following five criteria developed by Emmenegger (2011):

1. Whether a religious party has participated in at least one election in the time period of interest (one point). This indicator has been coded using data from (Álvarez-Rivera 2017; Carr 1999; Lehmann, et al. 2016).

---

9 The time period of interest for the missing cases is the year they enter the OECD until 2017. OECD membership is conceptualized as a signal that a country is economically developed and consolidated, and thus unlikely to slide back into non-democracy. The analysis starts with the first election after accession and continues until the most recent one finishing in 2017.
Countries receiving 1 point: Chile, Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Luxembourg, Mexico, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea.

Countries receiving 0 points: Iceland, Israel, Latvia, Japan, Turkey.

2. Whether the party program of at least one of these religious parties supports traditional values (one point). This has been measured on the basis of the Manifesto Project (MP) dataset (Lehmann, et al. 2016). Two indicators have been used: PER603 (traditional morality: positive) and PER604 (traditional morality: negative). Religious parties have been coded as supporting traditional values if indicator PER603 minus indicator PER604 is bigger than two. When MP’s indicators are not available the score has been assigned based on secondary literature’s findings.

Countries receiving 1 point using the Manifesto Project dataset: Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Luxembourg, Poland, Slovakia.

Countries receiving 1 point not included in the Manifesto Project dataset: Chile—Huneeus (2003, 128) notes that young and committed Catholics whose program was based on the Catholic social teachings promoted by the Church created the ideological platform of the party. Mexico—Magaloni and Moreno (2003, 260) argue that PAN "continues to uphold religious freedom as one of the basic elements of its doctrine." The party also sought to improve its relationship with the Vatican and rejects abortion and cloning, while promoting freedom of religious education as the main pillars of its platform (Magaloni and Moreno 2003, 260). South Korea—the Christian Liberal Party’s program appears to be deeply rooted in religious values, as it strongly opposes homosexuality and seeks to promote Christianity as the most preferred religion (The Korea Herald 2016).

Countries receiving 0 points: Estonia, Iceland, Israel, Japan, Latvia, Slovenia, Turkey.

3. Whether these religious parties have participated in governments for at least one-third of the period under consideration (one point). Data gathered from (Álvarez-Rivera 2017; Carr 1999; Lane, McKay and Newton 1997; Lehmann, et al. 2016; Nordsieck 2017).

Countries receiving 1 point: Chile, Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Luxembourg, Mexico, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia.

Countries receiving 0 points: Iceland, Israel, Japan, Latvia, South Korea, Turkey.

4. Whether the denominational cleavage is electorally salient (one point). Emmenegger (2011) conceptualizes denominational cleavage as salient if the average level of denominational-based voting, measured by Cramer’s V correlations, is higher than 0.25 based on the work of Minkenberg (2002) and Dalton (2006). His analysis is

---

10 PER 603 and PER 604 are individual indicators developed by the Manifesto Project to capture the extent to which political parties support “traditional morality.”
aided here by data retrieved from Knutsen (2010).

Countries receiving 1 point: none

Countries receiving 0 points: Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Japan, Latvia, Luxembourg, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, Turkey. Chile—Bornschier (2009, 8) notes “the gradual expansion of suffrage in Chile coupled with re-democratization has produced an institutionalized system of parties with a more clear-cut social basis, making the Catholic secular cleavage not salient” [see also, Torcal and Mainwaring (2003)]. Mexico—Although one of PAN’s primary goals was to defend religious freedom this issue did not play a major role “in the party system that prevailed before the defeat of the PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party) in the 2000 presidential elections. At the mass level, the PAN is not an ideologically coherent party: its supporters are clearly pro-democratic and religious, but they are ideologically dispersed in economic and cultural terms. This presents a major dilemma for the party: although party elites seem to be relatively coherent and compact in ideological terms, at the mass level, PAN supporters define a catchall party” (Magaloni and Moreno 2003, 247).

5. Whether these religious parties were electorally successful in the period of interest (two points). The electoral strength of all religious parties combined in one country has been used. Countries have been coded 1 if the average electoral strength is above 10 percent (relevant but not dominant party) and 2 if the average electoral strength is above 30 percent (very strong party). This has been coded using data from (Álvarez-Rivera 2017; Carr 1999; Dalton 2006; Lehmann, et al. 2016; Nordsieck 2017).

Countries receiving 2 points: Greece, Hungary, Luxembourg, Poland.

Countries receiving 1 point: Chile, Czech Republic, Estonia, Mexico, Slovakia, Slovenia.

Countries receiving 0 points: Iceland, Israel, Japan, Latvia, South Korea, Turkey.

Countries can receive a total of 6 points for the criteria outlined above. To calibrate these additive indicators Emmenegger (2011) uses the following qualitative calibration scheme:

- 6 points → 1.0 (fuzzy set score)
- 5 points → 0.8 (fuzzy set score)
- 4 points → 0.6 (fuzzy set score)
- 3 points → 0.4 (fuzzy set score)
- 2 points → 0.2 (fuzzy set score)
- 1 point → 0.0 (fuzzy set score)
- 0 points → 0.0 (fuzzy set score)

The raw data, the additive indicator and the fuzzy-set score for all cases under investigation
are summarized in Table 2 below.

### Table 2. Calibration of the Strength of Christian Democratic Parties (P) Condition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Religious parties</th>
<th>Traditional values</th>
<th>Government participation (years)</th>
<th>Salient cleavage</th>
<th>Electoral strength (percentage)</th>
<th>Additive indicator</th>
<th>Fuzzy-set score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
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<td>1.29</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>41.67</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>2.11–5.06</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>34.34</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
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<td>–</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1.48</td>
<td>14.85</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>22.16</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>13.08</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>19.69</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>1.28</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>1.72</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>France</td>
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<td>3.15–4.24</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>6.61</td>
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<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>2.53–9.35</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>44.68</td>
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<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
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<td>41.11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
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<td>21.49</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>45.08</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
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<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
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<tr>
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<td>25</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>29.91</td>
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<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
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<td>0.0</td>
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<td>1.0</td>
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<td>–</td>
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<tr>
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<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
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<tr>
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<td>36.25</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>0.16</td>
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<td>–</td>
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<td>0.21</td>
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<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
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<td>20</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>9.26</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>14.72</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>32.71</td>
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<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Spain</td>
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<td>0.36–3.18</td>
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<td>0.27</td>
<td>16.07</td>
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<td>4.74–11.70</td>
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<td>0.31</td>
<td>22.63</td>
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<td>0.00</td>
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<td>0.0</td>
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<tr>
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<td>–</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.00</td>
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<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
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<td>–</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Referendums (R)**

Although referendums are sometimes associated with direct forms of democracy and advancement of progressive causes, their institutional origins and function are in fact conservative. British Conservatives championed the referendums and their veto player function makes them a powerful conservative weapon (Qvortrup 2014, 4-5). Tsebelis defines *veto players* as “individual or collective decisionmakers whose agreement is
required for the change of the status quo” (2000, 442). Thus presence of referendums makes public policy change more difficult because as the number of veto players in a political system increases, policy stability increases as well (Tsebelis 2000, 446). The veto player function of referendums is of great significance for the Catholic Church.

The Church has used referendums on numerous occasions to protect public policy outcomes that were in line with its teachings. In countries where Catholic and political identities had fused, the Church has often received policy concessions in exchange for political support of incumbent governments (Grzymała-Busse 2015). After successful democratization, many of these countries inherited public policies that were designed during the authoritarian era and in line with Catholic doctrine. This meant that in democracy, the Church was effectively defending the status quo. To be sure, mere presence of referendums does not guarantee policy stability, but the Church has won some referendum battles.\footnote{For example, the Church has secured its preferred outcomes during abortion referendums in Ireland (1983), Switzerland (1977), and Portugal (1998). This has also been true for other policy areas, such as divorce referendum in Ireland (1986) and same-sex referendum in Slovakia (2015).}

Because referendums vary greatly on a number of important dimensions, it is challenging to study them systematically. This is exactly why Hug and Tsebelis (2002), building on the veto players framework, developed a multi-dimensional model that operationalizes how various provisions for referendums affect policy stability and the relationship between voter preferences and policy outcomes. Who may trigger the process of referendum, and who can frame the question are the two most important aspects of the institution (Hug and Tsebelis 2002, 477). Using these questions as their building blocks, the authors create a typology of four different types of referendums: 1) required referendum, 2)
popular veto, 3) veto player referendum, 4) popular initiative. The first two types of referendums provide the most policy stability because they leave the powers of the veto players in the representative arena untouched (Hug and Tsebelis 2002, 490), while the last two types provide some limited opportunities for policy change.

In a veto player referendum, one actor controls both the triggering and asking of the question, and is thus able to cancel out the remaining veto players in the legislative arena. This form of referendum is available in Belarus, for example, and in 1996 has allowed President Lukashenka to increase his presidential powers by going over the heads of the parliament and appealing straight to the Belarusian voters (Hug and Tsebelis 2002, 489). The popular initiative also need not decrease the potential for policy change. Such is the case in Switzerland for instance, where citizens can submit their own policy proposals and trigger a referendum, thus canceling out powers of existing veto players (Hug and Tsebelis 2002, 489).

Since mere presence of referendums decreases the potential for policy change and because the mechanisms continue to be used by the Church to defend its policy gains, countries with institutional provisions for referendums are conceptualized as being above the 0.5 threshold. To calibrate this condition, the theoretical framework developed by (Hug and Tsebelis 2002) has been combined with empirical evidence provided by (Qvotrup 2014), resulting in the following calibration scheme, which is then summarized in Table 3 below.
• 0—countries with no institutional provisions for referendums, where referendums are non-binding, or when only required referendums are available.\(^\text{12}\)

• 0.2—this score is assigned to Portugal alone. Even though its referendums are non-binding, the government respected their outcome on several occasions, including when the proposal to liberalize abortion laws was defeated.

• 0.6—countries with provisions for the veto player referendum, or the popular imitative.

• 0.7—countries with provisions for the veto player referendum, or the popular imitative, where the Church has struck at least one policy victory in the time period of interest.

• 0.8—countries with provisions for the popular veto.

• 0.9—countries with provisions for the popular veto, where the Church has struck at least one policy victory in the time period of interest.

• 1.0—countries with provisions for the popular veto, where the Church has struck at least two policy victories in the time period of interest.

\(^{12}\) Countries with provisions for required referendums deal with very narrow types of questions, such as constitutional amendments, changes in borders, ratification of international treaties (Hug and Tsebelis 2002, 490), and are thus of limited use for the Church. This form of referendum overlaps with the popular veto provision as far as their capacity to limit policy change is concerned, so in the rare circumstance where constitutional amendment referendum was about one of the moral policy considered in this study (e.g., abortion referendum in Ireland in 1983), this information would nonetheless be adequately captured by merging identical conceptual categories with empirical information at hand.
Table 3. Calibration of the Referendums (R) Condition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Calibrated Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
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<td>South Korea</td>
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<td>Spain</td>
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<td>Sweden</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
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<td>Turkey</td>
<td>0.8</td>
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<td>United Kingdom</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States of America</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Outcome

In QCA’s terminology, outcome is the phenomenon to be studied in an analysis. In this project, the outcome is operationalized as a collection of seven interconnected policy
areas. Chapter 2 explained that the political preferences of the Catholic Church are direct outgrowths of its doctrinal teachings. Thus the outcome variable is calibrated via the examination of official documents authorized by the Church, with the aim of deducing particular policy preferences from them. These sources include primarily the Catechism of the Catholic Church (hereafter, CCC), which summarizes Catholic beliefs and doctrine, as well as encyclicals, apostolic exhortations, and secondary literature.

Policy Areas
Chapter 2 also defined what is meant by influence, described there as:

“the capacity of a unit [the Church] to generate commitments—loyalties, resources, behavioral support, etc.—in amounts sufficient to allow the agency of influence to impose a direction of its own choosing on the structure, and thereby to change a situation. An influential is thus a person or corporate unit that is able to place a distinct stamp on a valued sphere of interest of activity” (Vallier 1970, 12).

Peter Hall (1986) expressed a similar understanding of influence in his analysis of institutions that shape economic policies in Britain and France. He writes: “[i]n a complex society, power is mediated by organization and distributional conflict is conducted through institutional structures that leave their imprint on the result” (Hall 1986, 14). The more the Church is able to leave its imprint on public policy by making it correspond to its doctrine, the greater its political influence.

The seven public policy areas include: (1) abortion, (2) euthanasia, (3) capital punishment, (4) in-vitro fertilization, (5) divorce, (6) same-sex marriage, and (7) religious education in public schools. These seven issues are interconnected because they revolve around questions of morality. They are also often referred to as “hot button” issues because of their tendency to alienate people with opposing views. Given their moral and political significance, it is then perhaps unsurprising that they continue to dominate political debates in many contemporary democracies worldwide.
In the US, for instance, it does not matter that the *Roe v. Wade* case is more than four decades old, conservatives still see abortion as evil and efforts to fight against it continue (e.g., by defunding Planned Parenthood). Similarly, in Poland, numerous pro-life grassroots organizations keep pushing for a complete ban on abortion, even though Poland has one of the most restrictive abortion laws in Europe. The moral significance of these issues is also underscored by their ability to mobilize people and helping them overcome the collective action dilemma. The recent legalization of same-sex marriage in the US was made possible, to a large extent, because of the grassroots civil rights activism. Similarly, the annual “March For Life” held in Washington D.C. attracts hundreds of thousands of people united in a fight against abortion.

Contemporary democracies have specific legislative guidelines that regulate the moral issues considered in this project. One can say that they have been settled *politically* because democracies around the world stipulate what is legal and what is illegal. But they have not been resolved in an *absolute* sense. The very nature of democracy allows for an ongoing battle over these issues. In a democratic polity, any issue can be contested, provided that it goes through proper institutional channels. Today, abortion in the US is widely available and legal. This does not mean that the same will be true in the future.

Interestingly, even when the Church is able to achieve one of its policy goals, the debate and political struggle about it does not go away. After the preferred outcome is reached the Church still has to actively defend the *status quo*, either in public debates or the legislative arena. Conversely, when the opposite of the preferred policy is true, like in *Roe v. Wade*, the Church does not idly sit by but engages politically to push for its goals. Democracy, then, is a like a double-edge sword because it allows for a contestation of any
issue. The Church, much like its opponents, has everything to win and everything to lose at any time.

When deciding which issues to include in this project three criteria have been used: (1) moral significance for the Church, (2) overall theoretical cohesiveness, and (3) universal applicability. The “hot button” issues examined here are of crucial importance to the Catholic Church as signified by the fact they are a part of its doctrinal teaching. The family moreover, lies at the center of theological debates, and perhaps with the exception of capital punishment the remaining six issues directly affect the family structure (Grzymała-Busse 2015, 56). Another observer commented that: “[t]he Catholic Church has given the defense of human life, and thus opposition to abortion, euthanasia, and embryonic stem-cell research, a clear pride of place among its political concerns, along with defense of the traditional family based on a lifelong union between a man and a woman, and thus opposition to same-sex marriage (Allen 2014, 159).

Secondly, Goertz (2005) underscored the importance of proper concept formation in social sciences. For an analysis to be valid, the indicators used have to be conceptually connected and representative of theoretical concepts they seek to capture. A clear link between the two has to exist. Thus, particular attention has been paid to the theoretical cohesiveness of the outcome that connects the seven policy areas into three interconnected sub-groups and consequently into one whole.

On the most general level, all seven areas are interrelated because they are moral issues. Abortion, euthanasia, the death penalty, and in-vitro fertilization, however, are connected on the more fundamental level because they deal with questions of life and death. When does the human life begin? When does it end? To whom does human life belong? These questions are central to the first subset of moral issues, so it makes sense to
include them in the same analysis. The second sub-group of issues includes same-sex marriage and divorce. The Church sees them as related issues that undermine the institution and sanctity of marriage. Once again it makes more sense to analyze them in tandem, rather than individually.

The last subset consists of the sole issue of religious instruction in public education. Education is different from other policies in the sense that it promotes a particular way of thinking, and so it is less particular. Put simply, education shapes the way we understand the world around us. But education is also the means through which the Church spreads its morality and teachings, which can be consequential for public policy outcomes. Explaining how the Church in Ireland was able to win abortion (1983) and divorce (1986) referendums, one author writes: “[b]y this point, then, the church could rely on the values it had inculcated through the educational system and exercise its own demographic dominance in referenda, which further meant the church could amend the Constitution. The moral authority that earlier had allowed it to control one public sector—education—now allowed it to exercise power in others (Grzymała-Busse 2015, 81).

Both the Catholic Church and its opponents understand that education shapes how one sees the world. Once our moral views are developed, it is improbable that they will change in the future. Basic intuition tells us that it is much easier to teach a child that abortion is wrong than to convert a pro-abortion activist. This mechanism also works the other way around, if a child is taught that abortion is a fundamental human right, then the likelihood that such person will be convinced otherwise diminishes drastically. G.K. Chesterton, one of the most influential Catholic writers of the 20th century captures this very dynamic when noting that children, because of their unassuming nature and ability to wonder at the world, have little difficulties in accepting Catholic dogmas (Chesterton 1955,
21-38). The problem with adults, he notes, is that their understanding is handicapped by popular science and journalistic jargon (Chesterton 1955, 25).

It becomes apparent, therefore, that children’s formative years are of crucial importance. The type of education they receive determines, to a large extent, their future outlook on the world. Their minds are like a tabula rasa upon which Catholic, atheistic, or any other type of morality can be inscribed making Catholic education one of the key moral issues of the day. It is then not surprising that Catholic elites have long ago recognized the importance of education, “its purpose is to produce ideologically committed Catholics who might become agents of the church’s purpose in the world” (Coleman 1978, 14), and furthermore the very emergence of confessional parties in Europe resulted from the conflict over who will control public education (Kalyvas 1996; Lipset and Rokkan 1967).

Thirdly, the issues examined here are of universal importance for the Church in contemporary democracies. To be sure, each country faces problems that are specific to its environment. In the US, the controversy over contraception gained a lot of media attention because of the Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores (2014) case in which the Supreme Court allowed certain corporate entities to be exempt from providing contraceptives to their employees. The origins of the case, however, go back to the essentially privatized American health care system making the US an outlier as most developed democracies use single-payer healthcare systems. Poland too deals with a number of idiosyncratic problems like alcohol consumption and prostitution and the Church is very much engaged in the struggle against them. While these country specific issues can be more representative of challenges that particular states are facing, focusing on them alone would undermine the cross-sectional analysis at the heart of this project. The seven issues examined here maximize the
chances of systematic and comparative analysis of the influence of the Church in consolidated democracies.

**Abortion and Euthanasia**

The CCC bases its teachings on abortion in the fifth commandment (Thou shall not kill) and states, “Human life must be respected and protected absolutely from the moment of conception. From the first moment of his existence, a human being must be recognized as having the rights of a person - among which is the inviolable right of every innocent being to life” (CCC 1992, §2268-§2270). Moreover, “since the first century the Church has affirmed the moral evil of every procured abortion and this teaching has not changed and remains unchangeable” (CCC 1992, §2271). Any person formally cooperating in an abortion is guilty of a grave offense and “the Church attaches the canonical penalty of excommunication to this crime against human life” (CCC 1992, §2272).

Euthanasia, whatever its forms or motives, is considered a murder (CCC1992, §2324). Euthanasia, like abortion, is considered as a mortal sin that is “contrary to the dignity of the human person and to the respect due to the living God, his Creator” and as such this “murderous act, must always be forbidden and excluded” (CCC 1992, §2277). In certain circumstance it is not wrong to discontinue medical treatments “that are burdensome, dangerous, extraordinary, or disproportionate to the expected outcome can be legitimate; it is the refusal of over-zealous treatment” (CCC 1992, §2278). The crucial distinction is that in such circumstances “one does not will to cause death” but recognizes that “one's inability to impede it [death] is merely accepted” (CCC 1992, §2278). Overall, “even if death is thought imminent, the ordinary care owed to a sick person cannot be legitimately interrupted”, especially “palliative care is a special form of disinterested charity and as such it should be encouraged” (CCC1992, §2279).
The Second Vatican Council also condemned abortion stating that, “Life must be protected with the utmost care from the moment of conception: abortion and infanticide are abominable crimes” (Gaudium et Spes 1965, §51). American bishops too denounce abortion because “the directly intended destruction of a viable fetus, is never permitted” (National Conference of Catholic Bishops 2009, §45) and the same opinion holds among prominent Catholic theologians: “[t]he direct killing of innocent human beings can never be ethically justifiable” (Ashley and O'Rourke 1997, 261).

Euthanasia is also firmly and explicitly condemned by the Church: “The varieties of crime are numerous: all offenses against life itself, such as murder, genocide, abortion, euthanasia, and willful suicide...are criminal: they poison civilization, and they debase the perpetrators more than the victims and militate against the honor of the Creator” (Gaudium et Spes 1965, §27). Pope John Paul II presents a similar view: “In harmony with the Magisterium of my predecessors and in communion with the bishops of the Catholic Church, I confirm that euthanasia is a grave violation of the law of God, since it is the deliberate and morally unacceptable killing of a human person” (John Paul II 1995, §65).

For the Catholic Church the prohibition against abortion and euthanasia is absolute (Mackler 2003, 132; Ratzinger 2004). Complicating the matter, however, is the principle of double effect: “this principle recognizes as morally valid some actions that directly cause a good effect while indirectly causing an evil effect, as a result, hysterectomy may be performed for a pregnant woman with cancer of the uterus, intentionally and directly removing cancerous tissue and saving the woman’s life, though it indirectly and unintentionally causes the death of the unborn child” (Mackler 2003, 30). This principle is applied to many issues in bioethics, “including mutilations whose intent is not to destroy bodily functions but to save the patient’s life; termination of pregnancy where there is no
intent to kill or harm the fetus (or even precisely to end the pregnancy); decisions to withhold treatment whose intent was not to shorten life but to avoid other evils; and actions in which support is given to wrongdoing, but not for the sake of fostering wrongdoing” (Tollefsen and Boyle 2004, 5).

Emphasis on agents’ intentionality is what makes Church’s approach to bioethics different from that taken by the US Supreme Court. The Court zooms in on the question of fetus viability, the point when a fetus is able to live outside mother’s womb. Once that threshold is reached (typically after 23 or 24 weeks) abortion becomes illegal. For the Church, life begins at the moment of conception, so it does not matter at what point the fetus is aborted, the final result is always the same. However, the reasons for procuring abortion matter greatly. The Church will always see abortion as an objective evil, but it also recognizes that there are qualitative differences in every case. Pope John Paul II wrote that a woman might choose abortion “out of a desire to protect certain important values such as her own health or a decent standard of living for the other members of the family” (John Paul II 1995, §58). “Decisions that go against life sometimes arise from difficult or even tragic situations...Such circumstances can mitigate even to a notable degree subjective responsibility and the consequent culpability of those who make these choices which in themselves are evil” (John Paul II 1995, §18).

Glendon (1987) differentiates between what she calls soft and hard reasons for procuring an abortion. Abortion on demand and abortion for socio-economic reasons are considered to be soft reasons for obtaining an abortion. Hard grounds to procure abortion occur in a case of rape, for example, making it qualitatively different from the other two cases (Glendon 1987, 14). It is also true that legislation recognizing only hard grounds for procuring an abortion is more restrictive to the one based on soft grounds. Consequently,
the Church prefers laws based on the former grounds, with the ultimate goal still being the complete ban on abortion.

Glendon’s distinction serves as a useful basis for calibration. The soft grounds are conceptualized to be below the 0.5 anchor because in both instances the access to the procedure is widely available. When abortion is on demand, the Church does not get any part of its preferences realized, and therefore such cases will be assigned a score of (0). When abortion is available on socio-economic grounds, public policy becomes more restrictive but far from what the Church wants to achieve, so a score of (0.3) will be assigned.

When, on the other hand, abortion is limited to what Glendon (1987) calls hard grounds, the Church is very close to realizing its ideal preference positions. Thus, countries in which abortion is legal to protect maternal life and health and mental health, or when it is available because pregnancy is a result of a criminal act, or in case of fetal defects, such cases will be coded as (0.7). Although not an ideal policy outcome for the Church, cases exhibiting such policies are described as having very restrictive abortion policies. When the Polish Catholic Church successfully eliminated abortion on demand in favor of the three above-mentioned exceptions “the number of legal abortions performed annually in Poland fell a thousandfold, from over 100,000 in 1998, to only 312 a decade later. The official abortion rate plunged from 18% to 0.07% of all pregnancies. […] The Roman Catholic Church had effectively banned abortion in democratic Poland (Grzymała-Busse 2015, 1-2). Finally, when abortion is not legal under any circumstances, as in Chile until August 2017, the score for such cases is (1.0).

Overall, then, countries with scores (0.7) and (1) are conceptualized as policy victories for the Church on abortion, while scores (0.3) and (0) signal policy defeats. It also
has to be noted that the focus is on what the Church is able to pass into law, and not how and to what extent the law is implemented. Therefore, when Grzymała-Busse (2015, 56 ft. 103) writes “abortion ends roughly 20% of all pregnancies in the United States (but only half the population can undergo the procedure),” she highlights problems with applicability and execution of the on-demand abortion laws in America. Such concerns, however, are not the focus of this project and more importantly do not have a bearing on the calibration strategy. Information about abortion laws is taken from Center For Reproductive Rights (2017) and PEW (2015).

Euthanasia is also of great concern for the Church and data about euthanasia laws is informed by the Kennedy Institute of Ethics (2017). Given the nature of this policy area and the type of data at hand, euthanasia laws are conceptualized in a binary way (0 or 1), what in QCA methodology is known as a crisp set. The Kennedy Institute of Ethics distinguishes between two types of euthanasia: 1) Physician-Assisted Suicide, 2) Voluntary Active Euthanasia. Not to overestimate the influence of the Church, if one of the two types of euthanasia is allowed at the national level, then the score is (0). The same is true of course if both types of procedures are legal. If on the other hand, both types of euthanasia are forbidden at the national level, then the score assigned is (1).

**Capital Punishment**

The Catholic Church recognizes the state’s efforts to contain and prevent "the spread of behaviors injurious to human rights, and the fundamental rules of civil coexistence corresponds to the requirement of watching over the common good" (CCC 1992, §2266). The primary scope of penalties imposed by the state is to redress the disorder caused by the offense and to preserve public order and the safety of persons, and as far as possible it should contribute to the correction of the offender (CCC 1992, §2266). The Church does not
exclude "recourse to the death penalty, when this is the only practicable way to defend the
lives of human beings effectively against the aggressor" (CCC 1992, §2267), as can be the
case in some failed states. In contemporary times and in well-functioning democracies,
however, “given the means at the state’s disposal to effectively repress crime, cases of
absolute necessity for suppression of the offender today [...] are very rare, if not practically
non-existent” [Evangelium vitae, 56] (CCC 1992, §2267). Moreover, in line with the overall
argument presented in Chapter 2—that Catholic doctrine develops by deepening as
opposed to liberalization, and thus becomes more consolidated over time—Pope Francis
announced in October of 2017 that the death penalty is always contrary to the gospel and
that this teaching should be more accurately reflected in the Catechism of the Catholic
Church (Harris 2017).

The death penalty is conceptualized as a crisp set and informed by Amnesty
International (2017) data. If the death penalty is legal at the national level, then a country
receives a score of (0). If the death penalty is outlawed or if it is abolitionist in practice, then a score of (1) is assigned.

**In-vitro Fertilization (IVF)**

The Catholic Church does encourage research that reduces human sterility as long as
inalienable human rights are protected and the design and will of God is not violated (CCC
1992, §2375). Medical procedures involving only the married couple (homologous artificial
insemination and fertilization) are perhaps less reprehensible than techniques that entail
the dissociation of husband and wife (donation of sperm or ovum, surrogate uterus) but
they nonetheless remain morally unacceptable (CCC 1992, §2376-2377). The problem with

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13 Amnesty International assigns such category to countries that retain the death penalty in
law, but had not used in for at least 10 years. Since the law is simply dead, it allows the
Church to focus its energies on other policies.
the artificial insemination, such as in vitro procedure, is that it “entrusts the life and identity of the embryo into the power of doctors and biologists and establishes the domination of technology over the origin and destiny of the human person. Such a relationship of domination is in itself contrary to the dignity and equality that must be common to parents and children” (CCC 1992, §2377). In the eyes of the Church, such procedures violate genuine rights of the child: “the right to be the fruit of the specific act of the conjugal love of his parents, and the right to be respected as a person from the moment of his conception” (CCC 1992, §2378).

Even though IVF in homologous cases is qualitatively less reprehensible than in other cases, the Church still fundamentally opposes it. Additional concerns about the IVF procedure include: (1) IVF involves the death of embryos that are in excess of the number the couple wishes to implant; (2) sperm is usually obtained by masturbation, which is prohibited by the Church; (3) there is a risk of gametes or in vitro embryos being mixed up, leading inadvertently to a heterologous case (using gametes from outside the marriage) (Mackler 2003, 157). Even if these technical concerns were resolved, the Church would still object to IVF on the moral grounds outlined above (Mackler 2003, 158).

Only countries that prohibit IVF will be located above the 0.5 threshold, countries that allow it will be below it. IVF is an example of public policy that on the one hand necessitates sophisticated technical knowledge to understand its full implications, while on the other it continues to develop and improve. It thus requires a more sophisticated calibration than mere crisp set analysis. The data for laws regulating the procedure come from IVF Worldwide (2017) and provide fine-grained information on five important questions:

1. Whether eggs can be used for reproduction
The Church cares deeply about each of these questions, so when a four-part referendum on fertility laws was being held in Italy (2005), Pope Benedict XVI issued a call to boycott it (Wilkinson 2005). The referendum sought to deregulate IVF laws by scraping the legal definition of embryos as people and included three other provisions. Although a majority of voters expressed preferences that ran against Catholic teaching on these individual questions, Benedict’s call to de-mobilize Catholic voters invalidated the referendum as the voter turnout was too small.

When operationalizing this policy, the five above-mentioned questions are also taken into consideration along with the legal status of IVF around the world resulting in the following scheme:

- 0—when IVF is legal and fully de-regulated
- 0.1—when IVF is legal but at least one restriction exists
- 0.2—when IVF is legal but at least two restrictions exist
- 0.3—when IVF is legal but at least three restrictions exist
- 0.4—when IVF is legal but at least four restrictions exist
- 0.45—when IVF is legal but five restrictions exist
- 1—when IVF is prohibited

Divorce and Same-sex Marriage

In the Catholic doctrine, divorce and same-sex marriage are closely linked. The Church does not allow or recognize divorces: "If the divorced are remarried civilly, they find themselves in a situation that objectively contravenes God’s law. Consequently, they cannot receive Eucharistic communion as long as this situation persists" (CCC 1992, §1650). The Church believes that marriage is indissoluble (CCC 1992, §2382). Moreover, for the Church same-sex marriage is an oxymoron. The Church defines homosexuality "as a relation
between men or between women who experience an exclusive or predominant sexual attraction toward persons of the same sex" and sees "homosexual acts are intrinsically disordered and contrary to the natural law" (CCC 1992, §2357). The Church teaches that men and women with homosexual tendencies "must be accepted with respect, compassion, and sensitivity and every sign of unjust discrimination in their regard should be avoided", homosexuals are nonetheless "called to chastity" (CCC 1992, §2358-2359). The Church attaches great value to the institution and indissolubility of marriage, and thus political institutionalization of any practice that undermines marriage like same-sex marriage, divorce, or artificial insemination is to be actively opposed (Ratzinger 2006, 133).

Although the Church does not recognize divorce as an appropriate institutional channel to invalidate marriages, it does allow for annulments. For annulment to be issued, serious legal reasons have to be met. This would obtain, for example, if one of the spouses hid a serious illness, or if person was coerced into marriage. In such cases, annulment could be awarded, which amounts to stating that a marriage never occurred in the first place.

Divorce laws are calibrated using data from PEW (2016). If divorce is legal and completely unregulated, then a score of (0) is assigned to a particular case. The PEW data offers two additional indicators which will have an assigned worth of (0.2) each: (1) if a minimum age requirements exist, taking 18 years of age as a baseline, (2) if the age requirement is equally applied to both males and females. These two restrictions are crucial in preventing child marriage, which continues to be a big problem in advanced countries with a large number of migrants. In France, for example, 70,000 children between the ages of 10 and 18 were at risk of forced marriage. The penalties for violation of marriage laws are up to three years’ imprisonment and a 45,000 Euro fine (PEW 2016). Therefore, if only one of these conditions holds, then a score of (0.2) is assigned. If both restrictions hold, a score
of (0.4) obtains. The Church supports these regulations because they help ensure that two consenting adults enter into marriage and this should help limit both the number of divorces and annulments. Yet having these two restrictions is still not enough to be above the 0.5 anchor, and thus to be understood as policy victory for the Church.

Same-sex marriage data is taken from PEW (2017) and is operationalized as a crisp set. If gay marriage is legal on national level, then a score of (0) results. If on the other hand, gay marriage is prohibited, then a country receives a score of (1).

**Religious Education in Public Schools**

The Church recognizes the importance of education for the spread of Catholic morality: “the necessary precondition for the development of true freedom is to let oneself be educated in the moral law. Those in charge of education can reasonably be expected to give young people instruction respectful of the truth, the qualities of the heart, and the moral and spiritual dignity of man” (CCC 1992, §2526). But the burden of proper Christian education is especially placed on parents (CCC 1992, §902). They are the first and principal educators (CCC 1992, §1653) and should also make sure that proper education is received outside the household. The main goal of education is to acquire proper human virtues (CCC 1992, §1810). Catholic education, however, cannot be treated as a private issue only. The Church believes that making Catholic education public and when possible mandatory is indispensable in a fight against secularization and for the spread of proper moral values (Grace and O'Keefe 2007).

The data for this policy area is informed by PEW (2017) and is calibrated as a crisp set. The data first delineates whether governments have official or preferred religions. Countries where no religion is favored will receive a score of (0), and only countries in which Christianity is preferred (or official) are considered for being above the 0.5 threshold. Then,
two indicators are considered: (1) if religious education is subsidized\(^{14}\) (1 point maximum) and, (2) if other religious activities are state funded (1 point maximum). If a country receives a combined score of 1 or above, then the case is calibrated as (1). If the combined score is less than 1, then a score of (0) is assigned.

**Points Total Across Seven Policy Areas and Calibration of the Outcome (I)**

Before the newly collected information is summarized in table 3.4, several important points need to be underscored. First, the empirical information assembled here is more fine-grained than in other datasets that seek to capture the influence of the Catholic Church. It is a common practice to conceptualize influence over particular policy areas in a binary way. As we have seen, however, such operationalization is problematic because it oversimplifies political and social realities. Very often the devil is in the details, as in the 2005 Italian IVF referendum.

Secondly, the seven policy areas examined here had been chosen based on important theoretical considerations, as outlined in the “policy area” section. In standard with the literature, careful attention has been paid not to pick policy areas that would predetermine the outcome and overestimate Church’s influence (Grzymała-Busse 2015). In fact, inclusion of divorce and IVF all but assures that this will not be the case. Among European countries, only the Vatican does not recognize divorce, and IVF is legal in every one of the 35 countries examined here.

Finally, much like the design used by Grzymała-Busse (2015, 360), the outcome variable created here captures the cumulative effort of the Church until November 2017.

\(^{14}\) PEW report does not provide exact monetary amounts, instead it uses the following scale: 1=Funding or resources disproportionately benefit official/preferred religion, 0.5= Funding or resources available to official/preferred religion and other religions, and 0=No significant funding or resources.
This also guards against overdetermination of Church’s influence, as any public policy gain can be rolled back in democracy, it takes considerable influence to keep legislative guidelines in line with Catholic doctrine and only a politically powerful Church could do that. In addition to relying on outlined sources to calibrate particular policy areas, the actual outcomes have been verified using secondary sources to ensure the greatest level of empirical accuracy. Moreover, the resulting dataset has been compared to and corroborated by the Churches In Democracies dataset created by Grzymała-Busse (2015) to check for possible mistakes and large divergence of influence across individual cases.¹⁵

¹⁵ I thank Professor Anna Grzymała-Busse for making her CID dataset available to me along with a great number of secondary sources that made the data collection process considerably easier.
Table 4. Points Across Seven Policy Areas of the Outcome (I)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Abortion</th>
<th>Euthanasia</th>
<th>Death penalty</th>
<th>IVF</th>
<th>Gay marriage</th>
<th>Divorce</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Total points</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
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<td>0.4</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
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<td>0.2</td>
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<td>0.4</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Data from table 4 has to be calibrated before it can be analyzed in Chapter 4. The outcome (I) like the condition (C) is calibrated via the direct method. Any country can score a maximum of seven points, making it a natural anchor for full membership. Full non-membership is signified by a score of zero points. The point of indifference is located right in the middle of the data and signified by a score of (3.5). While selection of the anchors and distances between them has been carefully chosen, it is also important to note, “[that] results derived from QCA are robust to slight changes in the calibration methods” (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 40), so a change in value from 0.6 to 0.66, for example, will not alter the results. The results of direct calibration are summarized under column (I) in table 3.5 below.

**Data Matrix**
Table 5 summarizes calibrated scores for three conditions and the outcome and will be used in QCA analysis in Chapter 4. Before proceeding to formal data analysis, however, several additional features of the calibrated scores need to be pointed out. Although QCA is ultimately a tool for cross-sectional analysis, the data in this project has been conceptualized and calibrated to account for developments over time. Rather than capturing a simple snapshot of reality at a given time, an effort has been made to account for the way variables change over time. That is what Grzymala-Busse (2010) calls “temporality and sequencing” in comparative analysis, or “moving pictures” in Pierson’s (2004) terminology. As a result, the number of Catholics in a given country is not a snapshot reflection of the current situation. Instead, the variable has been operationalized in a way that captures the relevant historical trajectory of this variable for the time period under investigation. The same effort has been repeated for the other two conditions.
Table 5. Fuzzy Values Data Matrix (35 OECD Countries)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>P</th>
<th>R</th>
<th>I</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>United States of America</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

C = Catholic electorate  
P = Christian Democratic parties  
R = Referendums  
I = Influence of the Catholic Church on public policy
Conclusion

While the data matrix will be subjected to rigorous empirical analysis in Chapter 4, table 3.5 already reveals some interesting patterns. A number of countries with high a share of Catholic voters nonetheless exhibit low levels of the Church’s influence. These include France (1, 0.35), Ireland (1, 0.46) Luxembourg (1, 0.11), Mexico (1, 0.3), Portugal (1, 0.35), Slovenia (1, 0.35), and Spain (1, 0.44). On the other hand, Austria, Chile, Poland and to lesser extent Hungary and Slovakia reverse this pattern by scoring high on both measures.

In Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands Christian Democratic parties receive perfect score of (1) but only Italy displays level of influence that is above the indifference point (0.5). Furthermore, only Ireland and Italy attain perfect referendum score (1), with the former not obtaining high levels of the Church’s influence (0.46). On the other hand, the influence of the Church in the sample as a whole is rather high. Twenty cases display levels of influence that are above the (0.5) threshold and the average sample score is just below it (0.45). Some unlikely countries to exhibit high levels of the Church influence include the Czech Republic (0.54), a group of Nordic countries including, Denmark (0.56), Finland (0.61), Iceland (0.58), Norway (0.54), and the United Kingdom (0.52) among others.
CHAPTER IV

QCA

This chapter applies QCA to the dataset created and calibrated in the previous chapter. \(^\text{16}\) In doing so, it attempts to answer the following research question: under what conditions is the Catholic Church able to secure its preferred public policy outcomes? This chapter begins by providing essential information about epistemological underpinnings of QCA and then turns to analysis of necessity and sufficiency. It is found that two conditions are necessary for the Catholic Church to exercise influence over public policy outcomes in consolidated democracies. Such influence can be found in countries where (1) the share of the Catholic electorate is small or Christian Democratic parties are strong, and (2) in countries where the share of the Catholic electorate is high or Christian Democratic parties are weak. The first of the two necessary conditions, in particular, has been identified as relevant in both samples under consideration, making it particularly robust and generalizable. Furthermore, a combination of strong Christian Democratic parties and the institutional presence of referendums is a sufficient path to allow the Church to influence public policy in both economically developed and third wave democracies.

Findings presented in this chapter have broader implications for the study of religion in general and secularization theory in particular. It is shown that the influence of the Church in countries presumably least hospitable to religion is much more robust and durable than the secularization theory predicts. This influence is especially high in countries that democratized after the Second Vatican Council (1962-65) took place. Finally, in

\(^{16}\) Fuzzy set QCA (fsQCA) is the actual QCA variant used.
different types of analyses, Poland has been identified as the ideal case study country for process tracing analysis.

**QCA Fundamentals**

As a comparative research method, QCA rests on three overlapping branches of mathematics: (1) formal logic, (2) set theory, (3) Boolean algebra. The mathematical foundation of QCA is therefore different from most statistical methods that make use of probability calculus. Since both approaches build on different types of mathematics, it follows that they are suited to answering different types of questions. Moreover, the mathematical paths they take to reach answers are also divergent. Given its mathematical structure, QCA uses four distinct logical operators to structure the relationship between variables:

1. $+$ is defined as “OR”
2. $*$ is defined as “AND”
3. $\sim$ is defined as “NOT”
4. $\rightarrow$ is defined as “IF-THEN RELATION”

To appreciate the uniqueness of both methods consider that in regression analysis $1 + 1 = 2$, while in QCA $1 + 1 = 1$ making it clear that they make use of different mathematical structures. The mathematical basis of research methods matter greatly, and that is why QCA methodologists point out that the method has to be evaluated on its own epistemological grounds (Ragin 2000, 2008; Schneider and Wagemann 2012).

QCA works with membership scores of cases in a well-specified set. As was pointed out in Chapter 3, membership scores range from 0 to 1, and the 0.5 score is the indifference

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17 Although epistemological overlap exists between them as well because in both methods the following holds: $0 + 0 = 0; 1 + 0 = 1; 0 + 1 = 1$. 
point. The cases receiving a score above the 0.5 threshold are considered in the set, while those below it are out of the set. The important point here is that membership scores are not probabilities but express a truth-value. Therefore if offered a choice between drinking liquid A which has a 0.05 membership score in a set of poisonous liquids and liquid B that has 5% probability of being poisonous, a rational person should choose A (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 31). Option A (beer) is only mildly poisonous as indicated by its small membership score (0.05) in the set of poisonous liquids and is consumed by thousands of people every day. Liquid B, on the other hands, is a poison, and given the assigned probabilities there is a 1 in 20 or 5% chance that it will turn out deadly (Ragin 2008, 88).

It follows that in QCA the relationship between data is not conceptualized in probabilistic terms, but focuses on the notions of necessity and sufficiency. These notions can be expressed both formally and graphically using Venn diagrams. Formal definition of both concepts can be expressed in the following way:

Necessity: $X \leftarrow Y$ (read: “only if $X$, then $Y$”)$^{18}$

Sufficiency: $X \rightarrow Y$ (read: “if $X$, then $Y$”)

The methodology of necessary and sufficient conditions is widely used by social scientists, even if their application is not explicitly recognized. Writing about the use of necessary conditions two authors note: “[they] provide an interesting example of a concept that everyone knows, that many people use, and yet for which no explicit methodology exists” (Braumoeller and Goertz 2000, 844). The authors then review well-known political science works that implicitly use necessary conditions and describe procedures that help determine

$^{18}$ The fact that the arrow points from the outcome to the condition does not mean that Y causes X, the arrow refers to the logical statement expressed in the parenthesis.
whether in fact, X is a necessary condition for Y, and if so, whether X is trivially necessary. Elsewhere Goertz notes that “[n]ecessary conditions are a core part of social theory if influential social scientists have used them at the core of their theories” (2003, 65), and to illustrate that this indeed is the case he goes on to list 150 necessary condition hypotheses used in political science, sociology, and economic history.

The notions of necessity and sufficiency are constructs of formal logic, making them a natural language of social sciences. It is very easy to translate social science arguments into language of formal logic because the logical structure of social science arguments is already implicitly formal. One of the most famous assessments in comparative politics illustrates this point: “[a] vigorous and independent class of town dwellers has been an indispensable [i.e., necessary] element in the growth of parliamentary democracy” (Moore 1993 [1966], 41). The same logical structure can be found in works on American Congress: “[w]e wish to show that a necessary condition for the strong centralized leadership exhibited in the Senate by the Aldrich oligarchy was the existence of a party membership that was homogenous in its policy preferences” (Brady, Brody and Epstein 1989, 205); and in rational choice literature: “communication leads to [i.e., is necessary for] enlightenment if and only if [...]” (Lupia and McCubbins 1998, 69). The original hypotheses for this part of the project are re-stated below:

Hypothesis (1) The Catholic electorate is necessary for the realization of Catholic policy preferences

Hypothesis (2) The presence of referendums is necessary for the attainment of Catholic policy preferences

19 It would be trivial to point out, for example, that oxygen is a necessary condition for exercising political rights. In QCA the relevance of necessary and sufficient conditions is assessed via measures of consistency and coverage.
Hypothesis (3) The presence of strong Christian Democratic parties is necessary for the attainment of Catholic policy preferences

In fact, these three hypotheses can be expressed even more succinctly in the following way, while also adding an element of sufficiency:

Catholic electorate, Christian Democratic parties, and referendums are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for the Catholic Church to influence moral public policy outcomes in consolidated democracies.

Let us now turn to Venn diagrams to graphically express these hypotheses (Figure 5).

Figure 5. Venn Diagram Summary of QCA Hypotheses

The three top Venn diagrams illustrate the notion of necessity where Catholic electorate, Christian Democratic parties, and referendums are necessary conditions for the Catholic Church to exercise political influence (read: (1) “only if the presence of Catholic electorate (C), then the Church’s political influence (I)”; (2) “only if the presence of strong Christian
Democratic parties (P), then the Church’s political influence (I’’); (3) “only if the presence of referendums (R), then the Church’s political influence (I’’). The green subset of countries where Church’s influence is present belongs to a blue superset of countries with the three hypothesized variables.

The other Venn diagram illustrates the notion of sufficiency. In this case, Catholic electorate, and Christian Democratic parties, and referendums are jointly sufficient for the Church to exercise political influence (read: (1) “if C and P and R are present, then I is present”; or formally expressed as: (2) C*P*R → I). But as the diagram illustrates, the subset (C*P*R) does not completely fill the superset of (I). If it did, the subset would be both necessary and sufficient for (I). As it stands, however, the subset does not account for all cases that are members of the superset, and therefore there must be other subsets of (I) which all represent other sufficient conditions of (I) (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 60). This incidentally captures the meaning of equifinality, which itself is another constitutive element of set-theoretic causal complexity. Equifinality simply means that the outcome can be achieved in more than one way. Studying before final exams helps students be academically successful, but some might be naturally gifted and do not have to study at all, others still might test their luck and cheat. It is possible that all three groups of students will do well on their finals, but they will do so for different reasons. Given that the superset/subset relationship is at the core of QCA analysis, the concern for equifinality is built into its epistemological structure. This stands in contrast to regression analysis, which reduces causal complexity and favors unifinality instead: “[i]n the most common form of regression analysis the line that is chosen is the one that minimizes which is called the sum of the squared errors, frequently denoted SSE (Schroeder, Sjoquist and Stephan 1986, 19-20).
Two additional features make QCA’s causal complexity distinct from statistical approaches. *Conjunctural causation* points out, “that conditions do not necessarily exert their impact on the outcome in isolation from one another, but sometimes have to be combined to reveal causal patterns” (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 89). To illustrate this point consider the following example: "changes in the amount of sunlight a plant is exposed to make little difference if the plant does not receive any water, but makes substantial difference if it does: water (or its absence) moderates the impact of sunlight on plant growth. The converse is true as well, of course: the amount of sunlight that a plant receives moderates the impact of water on plant growth" (Braumoeller 2014, 42).

Hence, here too dissimilarity with statistical approaches can be observed. Regression analysis captures the explanatory power of individual variables in isolation from one another (hence the name “control variables”). When examining U.S. presidential approval rating for the period 1948-2008, for example, one author finds that peace and prosperity are two key determinants of the electorate’s judgment of its leaders(s), while controlling for other theoretically important variables such as divided government and political scandals among others (Geys 2010). The so-called interaction terms can be used to capture elements of conjunctural causation that is at the heart of QCA analysis. But the problem with many multiplicative interactions in statistical analyses is that they tend to be misapplied or misinterpreted; “a survey of the top three political science journals from 1998 to 2002 suggests that the execution of these models is often flawed and inferential errors are common” (Brambor, Clark and Matt 2005). Moreover, interaction terms that contain more than two variables become essentially unintelligible (Axel, Rihoux and Ragin 2014, 118).

*Asymmetrical causation* points out “that both the occurrence and the non-occurrence of social phenomenon require separate analysis and that the presence and
absence of conditions might play crucially different role in bringing about the outcome” (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 89). Although economic development and democracy are closely linked and wealthier countries are more likely to remain democratic (Cheibub, et al. 1996; Lipset 1959), numerous young democracies have survived in spite of disastrous economic performance because robust political institutions help prevent a return to authoritarianism (Kapstein and Converse 2008). Thus the explanatory power of economic development is much stronger when explaining transitions to democracy. But once democracy is formed the variable becomes less important and scholars interested in transitions away from democracy will be interested in other variables, and thus the asymmetrical nature of economic development is revealed. The logic of asymmetrical causation is also the driving force behind solution to many important puzzles in comparative welfare state literature. Reviewing Paul Pierson’s *Dismantling the Welfare State? Reagan, Thatcher, and the Politics of Retrenchment*, for example, Hega notes that: “[t]he central thesis of Paul Pierson’s important new study of the Reagan and Thatcher administrations’ strategies to cut the welfare state is that the politics of welfare state retrenchment is fundamentally different from that of welfare state expansion. Not only is retrenchment ‘in no sense a simple mirror image of welfare state expansion,’ (1) it is also a far more difficult political enterprise than the expansion of welfare states” (1996, 917). So while the epistemological foundations of QCA are for the most part different from traditional statistical analyses, the focus on equifinality, conjunctural causation, and asymmetrical causation makes it particularly distinct among comparative cross-sectional methods. QCA, in other words, is particularly well suited to study the notions of necessity and sufficiency which are at the center of this project.
Analysis of Necessity

An analysis of necessity has to be done from the bottom up. The focus is first on individual conditions and their negations, but combinations of conditions can also be examined if strong theoretical reasons exist. Most generally a condition is necessary if it is present anytime the outcome is present. In a fuzzy set analysis, a condition might be interpreted as necessary if, across all cases, set membership in (X) is larger than or equal to each case’s membership in the outcome (X ≥ Y). Or stated differently, X is a superset of Y as in the top three Venn diagrams in Figure 5.

Three conditions are hypothesized to be individually necessary for the outcome. When analyzing necessity, we depend on two measures to evaluate its empirical validity and importance. Consistency tells us the degree to which the empirical information at hand is in line with the statement of necessity. When XY plots are used to visualize QCA results, we would want most cases to be below the diagonal line. Consistency takes into account how many cases are above the diagonal and their distance away from it. Coverage, on the other hand, tells us how relevant a particular condition is. Some conditions can be necessary and trivial at the same time, so the coverage measure helps us distinguish between important and unimportant necessary conditions.

Results and Interpretation

Table 6 below presents both consistency and coverage measures for the three hypothesized conditions, their negations, and several combinations of conditions. Christian Democratic parties and referendums are directly linked to Catholic voters because in both instances the Catholic electorate serves as the triggering condition that puts the other two mechanisms in motion. At other times, a group’s ability to mobilize and overwhelm the
political system is more important than its size alone. That is why \( \sim C \) is also tested in conjunctions with \( P \) and \( R \) and overall six additional combinations are included as well.

### Table 6. Analysis of Necessary Conditions for the Outcome (I)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>Consistency</th>
<th>Coverage</th>
<th>Consistency</th>
<th>Coverage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( C )</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \sim C )</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( P )</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \sim P )</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( R )</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \sim R )</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( C+P )</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>0.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( C+R )</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>0.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \sim C+P )</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>0.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \sim C+R )</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>0.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( C+\sim P )</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( C+\sim R )</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>0.57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Before a condition is interpreted as necessary for the outcome, it is advisable that consistency values should be very high. Consistency is a measure of fit, while coverage is a measure of relevance. Consistency indicates the extent to which an outcome is subset of a condition (see figure 5) or a combination of conditions. The consistency and coverage measures are inversely related, therefore it is required that the measure of consistency (fit) be carried out first. In this analysis numerous conditions pass the standard (0.90) threshold. However, only conditions with consistency values of (0.95) and above—that is with almost perfect consistency score—are interpreted as necessary for the Church to exercise influence over public policy outcomes. The use of an even higher threshold level makes the findings even more reliable and robust. In the analysis of 35 OECD democracies two conditions meet such threshold (\( \sim C+P \)) and (\( C+\sim P \)). When 14 third wave democracies are analyzed the (\( \sim C+P \)) condition is once again identified as necessary for the outcome. Let us now turn to XY plots
to visualize these results and to better understand the importance of consistency measure (Figure 6).

**Figure 6. Visual Representation of the (~C+P) Condition**
We see from the plot above that only five cases violate the notion of necessity by being above the diagonal line (see Table 1 in Chapter 3 for country codes or Table 7 in this Chapter). If few cases are above the diagonal line and if those above it are nonetheless close to it, then the consistency measure will be high. This is in fact what we see in Figure 6 above. Only five countries are above the diagonal line (PT, FR, IE, CL, PL); they are nonetheless very close to the line making the consistency values very high overall. We can therefore be rather confident that the (~C+P) condition is necessary for the outcome. Such interpretation is strengthened by the absence of deviant cases, as the top left cell in the figure above is empty (deviant cases are those countries that exhibit the relevant condition but not the outcome).

In addition to high consistency values, we are also interested in knowing how relevant the condition is, because some necessary conditions might be trivial.\textsuperscript{20} With a score of (0.54) coverage measure (relevance measure) is at acceptable levels. Since consistency and coverage measures are inversely related, the latter score is brought down by cases below the main diagonal that have very high values in the (~C+P) condition. A number of countries, in other words, are clustered close to the right margin of the plot (e.g., JP, BE, NL, SE) and this lowers the overall consistency value of the whole condition.

\textsuperscript{20} In regression analysis too not every statistically significant variable is of substantive importance.
Figure 7. Visual Representation of the $(C+\neg P)$ Condition

Both consistency and coverage measures are a bit lower for the $(C+\neg P)$ condition.

Even though only three cases are now above the diagonal line, the consistency score has
decreased. The lower measure is a result of Greece, Norway, and the Czech Republic being present in the top left corner, making them deviant cases. Deviant cases are defined, as having a too large value in the outcome (above 0.5), and a too low value in the condition (below 0.5). Such cases exhibit the outcome (I) without exhibiting the (C+¬P) condition. That this is indeed the case for the three mentioned cases can be clearly inferred from the plot. The outcome in these three cases was not brought about by the(C+¬P) condition, thus reducing its overall explanatory power. We also see once again that numerous cases are being clustered along the right vertical line, bringing down consistency of this condition. Overall, the (C+¬P) condition can still be interpreted as necessary for the outcome, but as measures of consistency and coverage, and visual inspection of Figure 7 demonstrate its empirical robustness is a little bit less than that of the (¬C+P) condition (Figure 6).
The (~C+P) condition was revealed as necessary for (I) when 35 cases were analyzed, but this finding also holds when the 14 third wave democracies are examined. This time,
however, the condition is even more robust than before. While consistency (0.97) is once again almost perfect, coverage is very high too (0.69). We can, therefore, be very confident that countries exhibiting a small share of Catholic electorate, or strong Christian Democratic parties (or both) will exhibit high levels of the Church’s influence. We see from the XY plot that only three cases violate the notion of necessity, but they are once again very close to the diagonal line. The top left cell is empty and thus free of deviant cases. Finally, only four cases are now clustered along the right diagonal line, resulting in much higher coverage measures.

Discussion

Analysis of necessity demonstrates that numerous conditions are at or above the (0.90) threshold. Only conditions with nearly perfect consistency score of (0.95) and above are considered for further analysis. Overall two conditions have been identified as necessary for the Church to exercise influence over public policy outcomes. Such influence can be found in countries where (1) Catholic voters are not numerous or religious parties are strong (~C+P) (or both), and (2) in countries with numerous Catholic voters or less powerful religious parties (C+~P) (or both).

Furthermore, the (~C+P) condition has been identified as necessary in both types of samples under investigation making it particularly robust and generalizable. As the analysis of this condition has been moved from 35 countries to 14 cases, its explanatory power has actually increased. The finding that a small group of Catholic voters is part of a necessary condition that makes the influence of the Catholic Church possible might appear counterintuitive and just like any macro condition identified as relevant, it requires further empirical investigation (Chapters 5 & 6). However, this finding is very much in line with a pluralist conception of democracy, and its understanding that even when the vote share of a
specific group of people is small the group can nonetheless successfully overwhelm the political system to win important public policy concession (e.g., Driscoll and Krook 2012). This finding also fits with the logic of collective action and Olson’s (1965) argument that it is easier for smaller groups to organize and that is especially true when these groups stand to lose (or have been losing) important political or economic benefits.

**Analysis of Sufficiency (35 OECD Countries)**

The analysis of sufficiency makes use of the so-called truth table algorithm and is considerably more complex than the analysis of necessity. The analysis proceeds in following three steps:

1. The data matrix is converted into a truth table.
2. Each truth table row is classified either as a logical remainder, as consistent for the outcome of interest, or as not consistent.
3. The truth table is logically minimized (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 193).

Steps (1) and (3) are mathematical operations carried out by appropriate computer software. To complete step (2) a number of qualitative decisions have to be made, and therefore an effort has been made to outline the justification behind them as clearly and transparently as possible.

Step (1) consists of translating the raw data matrix presented in Table 5 into a new truth table presented below. The procedure has several important consequences. First, the data is summarized in eight rows, each of them representing a specific combination of conditions. The number of rows is identical to the number of combinations visualized by Figure 4 (Chapter 3) because three conditions can create eight possible combinations

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21 Two types of software are used to calibrate and analyze the data analyzed in this project: (1) fs/QCA 3.0 developed by Ragin and Davey (2014), and (2) R with a software package developed by Dusa (2007).
among them \((2^3 = 8)\). Row 2, for example, represents countries that exhibit all three conditions \((C^*P^*R\) or \(C=1\ P=1\ R=1)\). Secondly, each case is assigned to that row in which its membership exceeds 0.5, which also happens to be its ideal type. Each case has only one ideal type row and membership score in particular conjunction for each country is reported in parenthesis. To illustrate this point, Greece’s membership score in its ideal type row \(\sim C^*P^*R\) is \(0.60\). Thirdly, when raw data matrix is being translated into a truth table, no loss of information occurs, as the fine-grained information contained in fuzzy sets remains available at all times (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 103). In other words, Truth Table 7 contains the empirical evidence gathered in Chapter 3 and summarized in data matrix Table 5.

**Table 7. Truth Table (35 OECD Countries)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Row</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>P</th>
<th>R</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>Cases with membership &gt; 0.5 in this ideal type</th>
<th>Raw consistency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td><strong>GR (0.60)</strong> CH (0.62)†</td>
<td>0.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>AT (0.80)* <strong>CL (0.60)</strong> HU (0.60)* IT (1.00)* <strong>PL (0.60)</strong> SK (0.60)*</td>
<td>0.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>PT (0.80)†</td>
<td>0.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>FR (0.60)† SI (0.60)†</td>
<td>0.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>DK (0.60)* EE (0.60)* IS (0.60)* LV (0.60)* SE (0.80)† TR (0.80)*</td>
<td>0.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CZ (0.60)* DE (0.77)** NL (0.75)† NO (0.60)*</td>
<td>0.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>BE (0.88)† LU (0.80)† MX (0.60)† ES (0.60)†</td>
<td>0.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>AU (0.85)* CA (0.65)† <strong>FI (0.60)</strong> IL (1.00)* JP (1.00)† NZ (1.00)* KR (0.80)* GB (1.00)* US (0.89)†</td>
<td>0.67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Bold = Cases supporting sufficiency in their ideal rows \((X \leq Y)\)

* = Inconsistent cases in their ideal rows \((X > Y)\)

† = True logically contradictory cases in their ideal rows \((X > 0.5; Y < 0.5)\)

Note: Australia (AU), Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Canada (CA), Chile (CL), Czech Republic (CZ), Denmark (DK), Estonia (EE), Finland (FI), France (FR), Germany (DE), Greece (GR), Hungary (HU), Iceland (IS), Ireland (IE), Israel (IL), Italy (IT), Japan (JP), Latvia (LV), Luxembourg (LU), Mexico (MX), Netherlands (NL), New Zealand (NZ), Norway (NO), Poland (PL), Portugal (PT), Slovakia (SK), Slovenia (SI), South Korea (KR), Spain (ES), Sweden (SE), Switzerland (CH), Turkey (TR), United Kingdom (GB), United States of America (US)
To complete step (2), a decision has to be made about each row in the truth table. Any row can be classified either as a (1) logical remainder, as (2) consistent for the outcome of interest, or as (3) not consistent.Rows deemed consistent for the outcome will exhibit (1) in the (I) column, inconsistent rows will exhibit (0). When a particular row (i.e., conjunction) receives (1) it is deemed sufficient for the outcome (I).

Rows in Table 7 are sorted based on their raw consistency values starting with the highest scores. Consistency scores indicate the degree to which the statement of sufficiency is in line with the empirical evidence at hand (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 128). Truth table rows with higher scores are more consistent, and as a result more in line with the notion of sufficiency. While it is standard practice to include rows with raw consistency scores above (0.75) in the formal analysis of sufficiency, this alone should not be the only criterion used (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 182; Ragin 2008, 136). One also needs to look at the number of cases in each row that violate the statement of consistency and the number of true logically contradictory cases.

Each row can be populated by three types of cases. Some cases are consistent with the notion of sufficiency. For a case to be sufficient for the outcome, each case’s membership in the condition must be equal to or smaller than its membership in outcome. Greece (GR) illustrates this type of case since its membership in row (¬C*P*R) is (0.60) while its membership in the outcome (I) is (0.75), and therefore the following holds, (X ≤ Y).²³

When the opposite is true, (X > Y) we are dealing with an inconsistent case because its membership in condition (X) is greater than its membership in outcome (Y). Latvia (LV)

²² Logical reminder is a truth table row for which not enough empirical evidence is at hand. In Table 7 each row is represented by at least one case and therefore no logical reminders exist.
²³ Membership scores in the outcome (I) can be verified by looking at the data matrix (Table 5).
serves as an example here because its memberships in row (∼C∗∼P*R) is (0.60) and its membership in the outcome (I) is (0.56). Even though Latvia is an inconsistent case, the notion of sufficiency is barely violated as the difference between two values is only (0.04).

Whenever a neat logic of formal analysis is used to analyze noisy social science data we can expect some degree of inconsistency and in this example it is minuscule. The true logically contradictory (TLC) case is a special type of inconsistent case, while also being much more problematic. Such a case is more in than out in X (row score > 0.5) but more out than in in Y (outcome score < 0.5). Belgium (BE) illustrates this point. Belgium’s (0.88) membership score in row (C*P*∼R) is above the indifference point (0.5), and thus deviates greatly from its (0.16) membership in the outcome (I), which happens to be below the (0.5) anchor. Belgium is thus an example of cases that exhibits the (C*P*∼R) condition without exhibiting the outcome. Thus, identifying the (C*P*∼R) path as sufficient for (I) would be very problematic because such interpretation stands in contrast to empirical information at hand. Table 7 conveniently summarizes whether individual cases are consistent, inconsistent, or contradictory with the outcome for their ideal type conjunction.

Rows (∼C*P*R) and (C*P*R) are deemed sufficient for the outcome and as a result exhibit (1) in the (I) column. Their consistency values are well above (0.75) and they both exhibit cases that support the notion of sufficiency. In (∼C*P*R) conjunction only Switzerland (CH) deviates from the proper subset relation. Although Switzerland (CH) is a true logical contradictor (just like Belgium above), its effects are moderated by the presence of Greece (GR) since they belong to the same empirical row. Row (C*P*R) is free of TLC cases while both Chile (CL) and Poland (PL) are fully consistent cases. Moreover, in the

---

24 The appendix contains Table 19 that lists fuzzy-set membership scores of cases in rows with consistency values above (0.75). Both Table 7 and Table 19 are consulted when making decisions about individual rows.
whole sample, only six cases deviate from the perfect subset relation in this row which is
good for the analysis of sufficiency because it makes it consistent with the general
expectations that the row is sufficient for the outcome.

Rows \((C^*P^*R)\) and \((C^*P^*R)\) are deemed as inconsistent for the outcome \((I)\) despite their high consistency values because both rows consist of only TLCs. Although out of 35 cases, only three are not in line with the notion of sufficiency in the \((C^*P^*R)\) conjunction, it just happens that these three cases (FR, IE, SI) are both truly logically contradictory cases and ideal examples of the before mentioned row. In other words, the three ideal cases that are supposed to best represent that the \((C^*P^*R)\) condition is sufficient for the Church’s influence actually are doing just the opposite by exhibiting a membership in the conjunction (above 0.5) but not in the outcome (below 0.5). Therefore, inclusion of this row in the formal analysis of sufficiency would be empirically unjustifiable, despite this row’s high consistency value \((0.82)\).^25

Row \((\neg C^*P^*R)\) contains only one TLC, while 29 other cases support the statement of sufficiency for this conjunction. Row \((\neg C^*P^*R)\) exhibits two TLCs, but 31 other countries support sufficiency. As a result, both rows receive \((1)\) in the \((I)\) column. Paths \((C^*P^*R)\) and \((\neg C^*P^*R)\) have consistency values that are well below \((0.75)\) which also makes them both inconsistent with the outcome \((I)\).

Step (3) amounts to logical minimization of the truth table. Four Boolean expressions are classified as sufficient path to the outcome:

\[
\neg C^*P^*R + C^*P^*R + \neg C^*P^*R + \neg C^*P^*R \rightarrow I
\]

This expression is minimized to:

---

^25 This example illustrates that high consistency values cannot be the only criterion used in the formal analysis of sufficiency.
1. \( P \cdot R \Rightarrow I \)
2. \( \neg C \cdot R \Rightarrow I \)
3. \( \neg C \cdot P \Rightarrow I \)

There exists, therefore, three sufficient paths for the Catholic Church to exercise political influence on moral public policies in economically developed and consolidated democracies: (1) a combination of small number of Catholic voters with strong Christian Democratic parties, (2) a combination of small number of Catholic Voters with institutional provision for referendums, and (3) a combination of strong Christian Democratic parties with institutional presence for referendums. These findings are subjected to further empirical verification in the section below.

**Results and Interpretation**

The application of the truth table algorithm resulted in three sufficient paths leading to the outcome (I). This finding, however, needs a fuller interpretation. Producing XY plots is perhaps the best way to present QCA findings. Moreover, a table with parameters of fit follows each XY plot. Both pieces of information are used in tandem to provide an in-depth analysis of each path, while making references to specific cases under consideration.
Figure 9. Visual Representation of the (P*R) Condition
Table 8. The Parameters of Fit for the (P*R) Solution (35 Countries)†

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>P*R</th>
<th>→ I</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Raw coverage</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unique coverage</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uniquely covered cases*</td>
<td>AT, CH, CL, GR, HU, IT, PL, SK</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consistency</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solution coverage</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncovered cases**</td>
<td>AU, CZ, DK, EE, FI, GB, IL, IS, KR, LV, NO, NZ, TR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solution Consistency</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* = Cases uniquely covered by path, that is membership > 0.5 in only this path and not the other
** = Cases with membership in outcome > 0.5 and of < 0.5 in any path
† Complex, parsimonious, and intermediate solution formulas produced identical parameters
Note: Australia (AU), Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Canada (CA), Chile (CL), Czech Republic (CZ), Denmark (DK), Estonia (EE), Finland (FI), France (FR), Germany (DE), Greece (GR), Hungary (HU), Iceland (IS), Ireland (IE), Israel (IL), Italy (IT), Japan (JP), Latvia (LV), Luxembourg (LU), Mexico (MX), Netherlands (NL), New Zealand (NZ), Norway (NO), Poland (PL), Portugal (PT), Slovakia (SK), Slovenia (SI), South Korea (KR), Spain (ES), Sweden (SE), Switzerland (CH), Turkey (TR), United Kingdom (GB), United States of America (US)

The XY plot above maps the (P*R) conjunction on axis x against the outcome (I) on axis y. The diagonal line separates case into two groups into two triangles. Cases above the line confirm the notion of sufficiency because (X≤Y), while cases below the diagonal line violate the notion of sufficiency since (X>Y). Generally speaking, in the analysis of sufficiency, it is desirable to have as many cases above the diagonal line as possible. In this particular graph, we see that only six cases are below the line. The distance away from the line matters too, so Switzerland (CH) and Italy (IT) are the biggest offenders in this respect.

The XY plot is also divided into four rectangle cells. The cell in the top right corner contains cases where both the (P*R) conjunction and the (I) outcome are present. It will then be referred to as the (x=1, y=1) cell. This cell is of the most theoretical and empirical importance because it should exhibit cases that are best examples of the Church’s influence. Indeed we see that seven cases are present in the (1,1) cell. Slovakia (SK), Hungary (HU), Austria (AT), and Italy (IT) are all below the diagonal line, which means that they are not
fully consistent cases; although (SK) and (HU) are very close to the diagonal line poising only a minimal challenge to the overall solution term.

Poland (PL), Greece (GR), and Chile (CL), on the other hand, are located above the diagonal line. These three countries are the best empirical examples of Church’s influence through this particular conjunction. They are also ideal candidates for intense within-case analysis because “[a] focus on causal mechanism leads to choosing cases from the (1,1) cell” (Goertz 2017, 66). All three cases exhibit identical scores in the (P*R) condition, but Poland (PL) has the highest membership in the outcome, thus making it an ideal candidate for intense case study analysis. The presence of these three countries in the (1,1) cell and above the diagonal line is important not just one but as many as three cases exhibit the relevant causal path.

The (x=0, y=1) cell located in the top left corner contains thirteen cases. These cases are not covered by the (P*R) conditions, but nonetheless are members of the outcome (1). This cell, then, exemplifies equifinality because the outcome is produced by a different combination of conditions. The bottom left cell contains cases were neither the configuration nor the outcome are present (x=0, y=0) cell. This in many ways is exactly what we would expect to find. When the condition is absent, there is no theoretical basis to expect the outcome. This cell is the least consequential for the overall analysis. The bottom right cell is most problematic for the analysis of sufficiency because the condition is present, while the outcome is not (x=1, y=0). It is preferable that this cell contains as few cases as possible. In fact, only Switzerland (CH) falls into (1,0) cell, and this country would also be the worst possible case to do a within-case analysis because the outcome was not observed.

In the parameters of fit table 8, five unique measures are reported. Solution consistency accounts for all three paths (P*R, ~C*R, ~C*P) and the extent to which they
collectively explain the outcome, while *solution coverage* equals the percentage of all cases’ set membership in the outcome covered by the solution term. With scores of 0.76 and 0.69, respectively we learn that a great majority of cases are in line with the notion of sufficiency and the three distinct paths outlined above explain almost 70% of countries. The (P*R) path overlaps with another path (s) since raw coverage and unique coverage measures are not identical, but with a score of (0.86), its consistency is again rather high.
Figure 10. Visual Representation of the (~C*R) Condition
### Table 9. The Parameters of Fit for the (~C*R) Solution (35 Countries)†

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>~C*R</th>
<th>→ I</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Raw coverage</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unique coverage</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uniquely covered cases*</td>
<td>CH, DK, EE, GR, IS, LV, SE, TR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consistency</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solution coverage</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncovered cases**</td>
<td>AT, AU, CL, CZ, FI, GB, HU, IL, IS, KR, NO, NZ, PL, SK</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solution Consistency</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* = Cases uniquely covered by path, that is membership > 0.5 in only this path and not the other
** = Cases with membership in outcome > 0.5 and of < 0.5 in any path
† Complex, parsimonious, and intermediate solution formulas produced identical parameters

Note: Australia (AU), Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Canada (CA), Chile (CL), Czech Republic (CZ), Denmark (DK), Estonia (EE), Finland (FI), France (FR), Germany (DE), Greece (GR), Hungary (HU), Iceland (IS), Ireland (IE), Israel (IL), Italy (IT), Japan (JP), Latvia (LV), Luxembourg (LU), Mexico (MX), Netherlands (NL), New Zealand (NZ), Norway (NO), Poland (PL), Portugal (PT), Slovakia (SK), Slovenia (SI), South Korea (KR), Spain (ES), Sweden (SE), Switzerland (CH), Turkey (TR), United Kingdom (GB), United States of America (US)

The (~C*R) solution term is less empirically substantive than the (P*R) path. First of all, seven cases are now located below the diagonal line. Therefore its consistency measure drops to (0.77). Moreover, the (1,0) cell contains not one but two cases. Both Switzerland (CH) and Sweden (SE) exhibit the solution term but not the outcome, making the overall assessment of this path less substantive. The presence of these two cases in the (1,0) thus undermines the empirical importance of the whole solution term. Although the (1,1) cell is represented by six cases, five of them violate the notion of sufficiency, and only Greece (GR) is located in the upper triangle of the cell. This too helps us understand why the (~C*R) solution term is of less substantive importance than the (P*R) path. Out of 35 cases under examination only one country exhibits the type of mechanism identified here as relevant.

The (0,1) cell contains a number of cases. Many of them are being clustered along the left vertical line of the graph, signaling that the overall coverage of the path will be diminished as most cases achieved membership in the outcome via a different path. The so-called
irrelevant (0,0) cell also contains a lot of cases distributed along the same diagonal line. Although this cell is not as important from a theoretical point of view as other cells, the distribution of cases is such that the coverage measure will be less substantive. Finally, this path too overlaps with another solution term(s) as raw coverage and unique coverage are not identical making it overall less substantive. Because of this overlap, the overall explanatory power of this solution term is decreased.
Figure 11. Visual Representation of the (~C*P) Condition
Table 10. The Parameters of Fit for the (~C*P) Solution (35 Countries)†

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>~C*P</th>
<th>→ I</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Raw coverage</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unique coverage</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uniquely covered cases*</td>
<td>CH, CZ, DE, GR, NL, NO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consistency</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solution coverage</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncovered cases**</td>
<td>AT, AU, CL, DK, EE, FI, GB, HU, IL, IS, IT, KR, LV, NZ, PL, SK, TR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solution Consistency</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* = Cases uniquely covered by path, that is membership > 0.5 in only this path and not the other
** = Cases with membership in outcome > 0.5 and of < 0.5 in any path
† Complex, parsimonious, and intermediate solution formulas produced identical parameters
Note: Australia (AU), Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Canada (CA), Chile (CL), Czech Republic (CZ), Denmark (DK), Estonia (EE), Finland (FI), France (FR), Germany (DE), Greece (GR), Hungary (HU), Iceland (IS), Ireland (IE), Israel (IL), Italy (IT), Japan (JP), Latvia (LV), Luxembourg (LU), Mexico (MX), Netherlands (NL), New Zealand (NZ), Norway (NO), Poland (PL), Portugal (PT), Slovakia (SK), Slovenia (SI), South Korea (KR), Spain (ES), Sweden (SE), Switzerland (CH), Turkey (TR), United Kingdom (GB), United States of America (US)

The (~C*P) conjunction is the least empirically substantive of the three solution terms. Even though this path’s consistency (0.76) is comparable with the other two paths, six countries are below the diagonal line. Moreover, the three cases are present in the most problematic (1,0) cell and thus pose a direct theoretical challenge to the identified solution term. The three cases include Switzerland (CH), Germany (DE), and the Netherlands (NL). Both (CH) and (NL) are multilingual states with heterogeneous populations. This helps explain why (~C*P) might not be as empirically salient in those cases as opposed to other countries. Germany (DE) too consists of a mix of both Protestants and Catholics and a similar mechanism might be at play. While the (1,1) cell contains three cases, all of them violate the notion of sufficiency and no country presents itself as an ideal candidate for within-case analysis. This too is very problematic because out of 35 countries analyzed not a single case illustrates the mechanism identified as relevant in cross-cases analysis. The (0,1) cell contains the majority of cases in the sample and thus undermining the overall coverage.
of the path. It means that most cases arrived at the outcome through a different causal path. This too takes away from the overall empirical importance of the (¬C*P) conjunction.

**Analysis of Sufficiency (14 Third Wave Democracies)**

Chapter 3 provided theoretical justification for analysis of countries that democratized after the Second Vatican Council (1962-65). The third wave of democratization (1974) is sometimes described as the Catholic wave because the Church played an important role in the process (Philpott 2004). It remains an open question, however, if the influence of the Catholic Church on public policy is, in fact, greater in countries that become democracies after 1974. Out of 35 OECD cases, 14 states have been identified as belonging to the third wave. The secondary analysis of sufficiency proceeds along the same lines as when 35 OECD countries were analyzed.

**Table 11. Truth Table (14 Third Wave Countries)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Row</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>P</th>
<th>R</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>Cases with membership &gt; 0.5 in this ideal type</th>
<th>Raw consistency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td><strong>GR (0.60)</strong></td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td><strong>KR (0.80)</strong>*</td>
<td>0.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td><strong>EE (0.60)</strong>* LV (0.60)***</td>
<td>0.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td><strong>CL (0.60)</strong>* HU (0.60)*** PL (0.60)*** SK (0.60)***</td>
<td>0.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td><strong>SI (0.60)†</strong></td>
<td>0.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td><strong>MX (0.60)†</strong> ES (0.60)†</td>
<td>0.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td><strong>PT (0.80)†</strong></td>
<td>0.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td><strong>CZ (0.60)</strong>* DE (0.77)†**</td>
<td>0.79</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Bold = Cases supporting sufficiency in their ideal rows (X ≤ Y)

* = Inconsistent cases in their ideal rows (X > Y)

† = True logically contradictory cases in their ideal rows (X > 0.5; Y < 0.5)

Note: Chile (CL), Czech Republic (CZ), Estonia (EE), Germany (DE), Greece (GR), Hungary (HU), Latvia (LV), Mexico (MX), Poland (PL), Portugal (PT), Slovakia (SK), Slovenia (SI), South Korea (KR), Spain (ES)

Truth table 11 assigned each case to its ideal row type. Since the number of relevant conditions remains the same, we are still dealing with eight possible combinations of conditions. We see that each row is represented by at least one case; therefore, logical
remainders (i.e., rows without at least one case representing them) do not exist. The overall raw consistency values are very high as each row is above the (0.75) threshold. However, before a row is classified as sufficient for the outcome (I) and included in the truth table algorithm for further analysis once again a more detailed examination of each conjunction is required.

Row 1 (~C*P*R) has perfect raw consistency score (1.00) because every case in the sample is in line with the notion of sufficiency. This conjunction, therefore, receives (1) in the (I) column. Rows 2 and 3 (~C*~P*~R, ~C*~P*R) are free of TLCs (i.e., cases that exhibit membership in the path but not in the outcome), and only two cases in both conjunctions deviate from a perfect subset relation. Thus, both of them are also deemed as sufficient for the outcome (I). Three cases are inconsistent with sufficiency in row 4 (C*P*R), but the row does not contain TLCs resulting in it being classified as consistent with the outcome.

Rows 5, 6, and 7 (C*~P*R, C*P*~R, C*~P*~R) have high consistency scores, but the paths are best represented by cases that happen to be TLCs, and thus all three combinations receive (0) in the (I) column. Row 8 (~C*P*~R) is the only path with raw consistency score below (0.80), and it contains one TLC as one of its ideal type cases. The net result is that the row is qualified as not sufficient for the outcome.

Four Boolean expressions are classified as sufficient path to the outcome:

\[ \sim C*P*R + \sim C*\sim P*\sim R + \sim C*P*R + C*P*R \rightarrow I \]

This expression is minimized to:

\[ \sim C*P*R \]

---

26 Once again information contained in truth Table 11 and Table 20 (appendix) are used when making decisions about particular truth table rows.

27 Identification of the (~C*~P*~R) row as sufficient for (I) means that its consistency values are high and individual cases are in line with the notion of sufficiency, but the row itself will be subjected to further empirical testing once the truth table algorithm is applied.
1. $P \times R \rightarrow I$

2. $\neg C \times \neg P \rightarrow I$

As a result, there are two sufficient paths for the Catholic Church to exercise political influence on moral public policies in third wave democracies: (1) a combination of strong Christian Democratic parties with institutional presence for referendums, and (2) a combination of small number of Catholic voters with not strong Christian Democratic parties; although as we will see in the section below only the first path is of substantive importance.

**Results and Interpretation**

Once again we turn to XY plots and parameters of fit measures to provide a more fine-grained interpretation of QCA results. When compared with the analysis of 35 OECD democracies, both solution consistency and solution coverage measures are significantly higher. Scoring at (0.87) solution consistency for $(P \times R)$ and $(\neg C \times \neg P)$ conjunctions is rather high. Solution coverage for both paths is also very robust. The score of (0.80) means that 80% of all cases’ set membership in the outcome is covered by the solution term.
Figure 12. Visual Representation of the (P*R) Condition in 14 Third Wave Democracies
### Table 12. The Parameters of Fit for the (P*R) Solution (14 Third Wave Countries)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>P*R</th>
<th>→ 1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Raw coverage</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unique coverage</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uniquely covered cases*</td>
<td>CL, GR, HU, PL, SK</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consistency</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solution coverage</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncovered cases**</td>
<td>CZ, EE, LV, KR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solution Consistency</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* = Cases uniquely covered by path, that is membership > 0.5 in only this path and not the other
** = Cases with membership in outcome > 0.5 and of < 0.5 in any path
† Complex, parsimonious, and intermediate solution formulas produced identical parameters

Note: Chile (CL), Czech Republic (CZ), Estonia (EE), Germany (DE), Greece (GR), Hungary (HU), Latvia (LV), Mexico (MX), Poland (PL), Portugal (PT), Slovakia (SK), Slovenia (SI), South Korea (KR), Spain (ES)

The (P*R) solution term produces very strong empirical findings. Only three cases are below the diagonal line, but they are not very far from it. This fact translates into a very high consistency measure (0.95). The three cases that violate the notion of sufficiency (SI, SK, HU) are just below the line resulting in almost perfect consistency score. Moreover, the most problematic (1,0) cell is empty. Looking at raw and unique coverage measure, we can make an inference that some cases are covered by another path. The unique coverage also tells us that the (P*R) path alone covers 37% of cases. The (1,1) cell contains five cases (SK, HU, CL, GR, PL), three of which happen to be above the diagonal line. Just like in the analysis of 35 OECD democracies, Poland is once again the best candidate for process tracing analysis. Greece and Chile are also potential candidates for process tracing analysis, although their membership in the outcome is smaller than Poland’s.

The (0,1) cell contains five countries (EE, CZ, LV, KR). Except Estonia, the remaining three countries are not members in the (P*R) solution term path. All four cases are
nonetheless members in the outcome set, signaling a partial equifinality. A more intense analysis of these cases would be beneficial for the purposes of theory building as these four countries exhibit the outcome without exhibiting the relevant path causal. The Czech Republic in particular is a country that other scholars have identified as an interesting and complex case. Although not very religious, the Czech Republic gave rise to strong Christian Democratic parties (e.g., Kalyvas 1996; see also Table 5) and in this analysis the country exhibits high levels of the Church’s influence. Cases in the (1,0) cell exhibit an unobserved heterogeneity, and QCA just like other cross-case methods is limited in its ability to unpack the specific mechanisms at work. Given the high levels of robustness of the (P*R) path, a more intense examination of cases in the (1,0) cell would help explicate some of the unidentified causal paths. However, it is unlikely that the Church was the primary mover in those countries, the presence of the outcome was most likely driven by political agent(s) with similar conservative commitments (e.g., conservative political parties, the Orthodox Church).

The (0,0) cell, also known as the irrelevant cell holds five cases. Countries falling into this cell are not members in the solution path, and therefore it is unsurprising that they are not members in the outcome set. Perhaps the most surprising part about the (0,0) cell is the countries that belong to it. Spain, Mexico, Portugal, and to smaller extent Germany are cases that are often associated with Catholicism and consequently with high levels of Church’s influence. However, in both analyses, these countries have underperformed showing that if we move the analysis of influence of the Church away from individual-level indicators such as mass attendance to public policy outcomes the results might confound our prior expectations.
Figure 13. Visual Representation of the (~C*~P) Condition
Table 13. The Parameters of Fit for the (~C*~P) Solution (14 Third Wave Countries)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>~C*~P</th>
<th>( \rightarrow I )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Raw coverage</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unique coverage</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uniquely covered cases*</td>
<td>EE, LV, KR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consistency</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solution coverage</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncovered cases**</td>
<td>CL, CZ, GR, HU, PL, SK</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solution Consistency</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* = Cases uniquely covered by path, that is membership > 0.5 in only this path and not the other
** = Cases with membership in outcome > 0.5 and of < 0.5 in any path
† Complex, parsimonious, and intermediate solution formulas produced identical parameters

Note: Chile (CL), Czech Republic (CZ), Estonia (EE), Germany (DE), Greece (GR), Hungary (HU), Latvia (LV), Mexico (MX), Poland (PL), Portugal (PT), Slovakia (SK), Slovenia (SI), South Korea (KR), Spain (ES)

Overall, the (~C*~P) path is less empirically substantive than the (P*R) conjunction.

We see from the plot that four cases are now located below the diagonal line. Although the (1,0) cell is empty, Latvia brings the consistency value down by being very close to the right horizontal line. There are three cases in the (1,1) cell, but none of them supports the notion of sufficiency. In other words, there is no ideal candidate for case study research of this path. The six cases in the (0,1) cell signal that equifinality is at work. This is to be expected since as we have seen with the (P*R) path several cases are covered by more than one path.

The (0,0) cell contains numerous countries that are normally associated with high levels of Church's influence. Once again these include Mexico, Spain, Portugal, and Germany. The path as a whole is substantively less important than the prior (P*R) conjunction.

Discussion

When analyzing 35 OECD democracies, three paths have been identified as sufficient for the outcome. Examining XY plots and parameters of fit measures demonstrates, however, that the (P*R) path is the most substantive and sound empirically. The presence of
strong Christian Democratic parties combined with institutional provisions for referendums is sufficient for the Catholic Church to exercise political influence over public policy. The (1,1) cell in this path contains several cases suitable for within-case analysis. Since Poland has the highest membership in the outcome, it is, therefore, is most suitable process tracing analysis.

Application of the truth table algorithm in the analysis of third wave democracies resulted in two conjunctions being identified as sufficient for Church’s influence, but upon further examination, only one path was interpreted as substantive. The (P*R) conjunction, therefore, turns out to be the sufficient condition in both samples. The overall parameters of fit measures are higher when only third wave democracies are analyzed, thus signaling that the influence of the Catholic Church in those countries is more robust. This claim is further corroborated by the absence of any case in the problematic (1,0) cell. Poland once again emerges as the ideal candidate for process tracing analysis, as its presence in the (1,1) cell confirms along with the highest membership score in the outcome.

**General Discussion and Conclusions**

The primary goal of this chapter was to establish which conditions by themselves or in combination with other factors are necessary and sufficient for the Catholic Church to influence public policy outcomes. In the analysis of necessity, two conditions have been identified as relevant (¬C+P) and (C+¬P). The (¬C+P) condition given its high parameters of value and applicability to both subsets of cases is particularly robust and generalizable to countries that fall within the scope of this study.

The analysis of sufficiency revealed that a combination of strong Christian Democratic parties combined with institutional provisions for referendums (P*R) is a sufficient condition for the Catholic Church to exercise influence over public policy. This
path has been identified as sufficient in the analysis of 35 OECD democracies and when only 14 third wave democracies were examined, thus once again its generalizability has been confirmed. While cross-sectional analysis has been at the heart of this chapter, a much more in-depth analysis of specific causal mechanisms is required going forward. In both samples, Poland turns out to be the ideal case for process tracing analysis.

This chapter has broader implications for comparative studies of the Catholic Church. By systematic assessment of public policy outcomes in economically developed countries, the findings presented here move the current literature beyond Latin America and allow for a better understanding of how the Church behaves in consolidated democracies. Considering claims advanced by the secularization theory, this study finds that the Church is more powerful than the theory predicts. One limitation of the current secularization literature is that it tends to focus exclusively on the impact religious institutions have on their faithful. The famous “three Bs” originally developed by Davie (1994) were an attempt to measure precisely this type of influence. While useful, these measurements tell us very little, if anything, about the political power of religious institutions as far as the church-state relationship is concerned. Churches that attract many faithful do not automatically become influential political actors, and there is nothing inevitable about strong individual-level indicators translating into high levels of political influence. The opposite is true as well. Even though micro-level indicators such as weekly mass attendance (see also Chapter 5) have been declining in developed democracies, it is still not a given that public policy outcomes will automatically become more secular. Therefore, a total share of Catholic electorate by itself is not a good predictor of Church

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28 These include measures of (1) believing (do people believe in higher power?), (2) behaving (do people pray and perform rituals?), and (3) belonging (do people feel part of a congregation, or religious group?).
influence. The assessment is further corroborated by the analysis of necessity because the (C) condition was identified as meaningful in countries that also exhibit weak Christian Democratic parties (C+~P). In the analysis of sufficiency, the share of Catholic electorate was not part of the most meaningful solution term (P*R).

Thus, by moving the focus away from micro-level indicators to public policy outcomes, this study demonstrates that the Church’s influence is stronger than the secularization theory predicted. The (P*R) solution term in particular demonstrates that the Church is quite capable of defending its policy gains when Christian Democratic parties and strong and referendums are available. A descriptive analysis of the outcome variable further confirms the assessment that the Church is still an important public policy actor. A majority of countries in the sample (20) exhibit levels of influence that are above the (0.5) threshold and the average score is just below it (0.45). The Church has the least influence in the US and Luxembourg (0.11) and is most influential in Poland (0.85). The mean level of influence in third wave democracies rises to (0.51). Poland still exhibits the strongest level of influence, while the German Church is the least influential (0.19). Nine out of fourteen third wave democracies have membership scores in the outcome that are above the indifference point which means that these cases belong to a set of countries that where the Church is a powerful political actor.

The overall assessment is that the Church has been rather successful in defending Catholic-friendly public policy despite a decrease in popular measures of religiosity. The assessment warns against an implicit teleology that a decline in micro-level indicators will inexorably lead to secularization of macro-level outcomes. While not making predictions about future developments, it appears that at least for now Miłosz (1984) was correct in arguing that the influence of religion (public policy outcomes) is more durable than religion
itself (individual level outcomes). Moreover, a small share of Catholic electorate is an important part of necessary condition only in those countries that also exhibits strong Christian Democratic parties. So while a decline in Church membership does not lead to a loss of public policy influence, a small share of Catholic electorate by itself does not help the Church to win new policy concessions. Finally, as a set-theoretic cross-section method QCA is well equipped to identify the relevant combination of conditions that allow the Church to influence public policy, however, a specific examination of these mechanisms is best done at case study level and preferably when combined with process tracing analysis (Chapter 5 & 6).
CHAPTER V

CASE STUDY

This chapter provides an in-depth description of relevant political actors that shape moral public policy outcomes in Poland (the Polish Catholic Church, political parties, and pro-life groups). Particular attention is paid to both organizational strength and institutional capacity of these actors. When appropriate an attempt is made to link these macro-level variables to micro-level motivations of specific political agents operating within their structures (see also chapter 6). By outlining the strength of these three structural variables, Chapter 5 is also setting the stage for process-tracing analysis carried out in chapter 6.

The chapter begins by outlining historical trajectories that have fused Catholicism and Polish nation-state. The net result of these long-term processes is that the Church was able to extend and reinforce its institutional infrastructures while also gaining a high degree of moral authority in the process. The power of Polish Catholicism is thus understood both in terms of its organizational capacity situated in a comparative perspective, as well as in its ability to mobilize faithful members. The last asset is a direct consequence of the process of decentralization that can be traced back to the teachings of Vatican II (1962-65). The Polish Church might not be as wealthy as other European Churches, but its members are still very religious and they act can and do act as agents of change on behalf of the Church.

Public policy does not happen in a vacuum, and the Church adjusts its political strategies based on which party is in power. From the early 2000s, Poland has experienced a political re-alignment as left-wing parties became less successful politically. The country as a whole had experienced a profound and lasting conservative turn that consolidated in 2015 when the Catholic Law and Justice (PiS) party won both presidential and parliamentary
elections. In addition to tracing these developments over time, this chapter also explains how the Polish political system allows for abortion-restricting bills to be introduced by the Church and pro-life groups while paying particular attention to the link between the PiS and Catholicism.

Finally, the relationship between the pro-life movement and the Church is extensively analyzed. Although numerous pro-life groups operate in Poland, the movement is also marked by a high degree of fragmentation. This presents a significant challenge for the Church because it has to play a facilitating role and bring the different groups together. Moreover, fragmentation decreases the overall probability that a specific anti-abortion measure will be successfully adopted. When bishops officially endorse an anti-abortion bill, they expect it to pass. A failed or only partially successful bill jeopardizes the institutional self-interest of the Church since official endorsement amounts to overt political action, and this is not Church’s most preferred strategy (Grzymała-Busse 2015). Nonetheless, when forced to decide between institutional self-interest and doctrinal commitments. Church leaders opt out for the latter consideration (see also Chapters 2 and 6).

Data

Chapters 5 and 6 analyze data collected from a number of eclectic sources. The bulk of the information was collected during ten weeks of fieldwork in Poland (May 2017-August 2017), when Catholic bishops, priests, politicians, lay members associated with the Polish Bishops’ Conference, and leaders of pro-life groups were interviewed.29 These semi-structured interviews ranged from thirty minutes to two hours in length. To corroborate the insights gained from these interviews, both chapters rely on official documents and public

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29 Table 21 (appendix) contains the names and institutional affiliation of people interviewed for this project.
speeches of relevant political actors. Official records include statements released by the Polish Bishops’ Conference, programs authorized by political parties, and press releases.

Most of the interviewed people are also well known public figures, which means that their views are widely known and a matter of public record. Their official statements can be easily juxtaposed with the contents of collected interview data. Public statements are taken from newspaper articles, social media activity, radio and TV appearances, and parliamentary debates. Quantitative data are also utilized including public opinion surveys, electoral outcomes, measures of religiosity, and descriptive statistics. To better understand how the Church pursued public policy concessions under communism, I engaged in archival research analysis of primary documents made available to me by “Fundacja Karta” (The Karta Foundation).

During my fieldwork, I also participated in two academic conferences to better understand the extent to which the Church has left its imprints on Polish higher education in general and political science in particular, and to grasp the mindset of well known Catholic educators and leaders who are influential public figures. Both conferences were held in Warsaw: (1) Conference of Lecturers of Catholic Social Teaching (June 19-21, 2017); and (2) Warsaw East European Conference (July 10-13, 2017). The former conference offered an especially unique opportunity to engage in the form of participant observation understood as an attempt “to describe what goes on, who or what is involved, when and where things happen, how they occur, and why […]” (Jorgensen 1989, 12). The conference is held annually, and it brings together leading Polish social scientists many of whom are priests, but the meeting is not open to the public. The prestige of the conference is underscored by

30 Every parliamentary debate in Poland is recorded and freely available at http://www.sejm.gov.pl
31 File number: AO IV/252.3 EPISTKOPAT POLSKI
the fact that the Metropolitan of Wrocław holds an official tutelage over it and the symposium was attended by another high-ranking Catholic bishop, Cardinal Nycz.

**The Polish Catholic Church**
The histories of the Catholic Church and the Polish nation-state have been fused together for many centuries. Although Poland is now much different from what it used to be even thirty years ago, it is necessary to provide a brief historical sketch that outlines the importance of Catholicism in Poland because historical antecedents continue to shape the contours of contemporary political debates (Slater and Simmons 2010). This is especially true in Central and Eastern European counties that have had very limited experience with institutional continuity (Ekiert and Ziblatt, Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe One Hundred Years On 2013), with the Catholic Church being the notable exception to this rule. Over the last thousand years, the Church has shaped Polish culture, economy, and politics, and the country is still deeply religious. Almost nine out of ten people identify as Catholic, and 45% of them attend mass on a weekly basis (PEW 2017, 9-11). The historical equation that “Pole = Catholic” (Polak Katolik) is not an outdated relic of the past as 64% of respondents said that being Catholic is very or somewhat important to truly be a national of their country (PEW 2017, 12). In Poland the Church is not just one institution among many; rather it continues to enjoy a privileged place in public debates, and as a result, its political power is considerable.

**Historical Overview**
Catholicism has been an integral part of the Polish nation since its inception in 966 when duke Mieszko I accepted baptism for himself and the territory he controlled. The immediate consequence of his decision provided much-needed security, as German rulers were no longer able to attack Poland from the west under the pretext of conversion to
Christianity. Mieszko’s decision to accept baptism has had profound long-term consequences; it made Poland an integral part of Western Civilization through the adoption of its religion, language, and cultural heritage (Koneczny 1905). Pope Sylvester II approved the first institutional structures of Roman Catholicism on Polish soil in 999 when he allowed for the creation of the Archdiocese of Gniezno. As the institutional structures grew, bishops heading the first archdiocese were recognized as the de facto leaders of the Polish Church. This informal norm became institutionalized in the early XV century when the office of Primate was introduced. Until this day the title of Primate belongs to the bishop of Gniezno and he continues to enjoy a privileged place among Polish bishops (PBC 2009, §3) and they play an important political role. Primate Wyszyński (1948-81), for example, helped defend Church prerogatives against the communist state, while Primate Glemp (1981-2006) assisted in ushering Poland into the democratic era.

In 1795 the Third Partition of Poland ended its sovereign existence for the next 123 years. Although the state was gone, the nation was not, and under the rule of foreign powers (Austria, Prussia, Russia) a critical emphasis was placed on destroying these aspects of social life that bonded people together; including literature, language, education, and Catholicism. In the early 20th century the possibility of genuinely international conflict was becoming increasingly more likely (Kershaw 2015, Ch. 1) leading many Poles to believe that independence can be regained. At the end of World War I in 1918, the Second Polish Republic was born. The interwar period (1918-1939) was marked by a variety of state-building efforts in which the Church participated actively. However, the period also gave rise to...
to a new church-state model, one that was marked by competition rather than cooperation. This new model of politics was very much in line with similar developments in Western Europe, and the competition gave rise to confessional parties (Kalyvas 1996). The so-called “Wawel Conflict” best illustrates how this newfound tension played out in Poland.

The Wawel Royal Castel is the historical burial site of the most prominent Polish individuals, and the task of administering it belongs to the archbishop of Kraków. When Marshall Józef Piłsudski (a legendary Polish leader) died in 1935, Adam Sapieha – then the local archbishop – agreed to bury his body at Wawel but two years later moved his remains sparking a widespread political conflict (Nowak 2011). To alleviate the conflict Sapieha issued an official letter in which he outlined his reasoning and apologized, but the archbishop did not revoke his decision. The competition with the state meant that Catholic bishops had to be ready to protect their institutional autonomy and religious freedom more generally. This experience would prove especially useful during World War II and then under communism. The high level of moral authority that the Church acquired through its resistance to foreign powers is a direct consequence of many individual decisions made by bishops and priests alike (Grzymała-Busse 2015). To underscore this point, Ramet notes that “the Catholic Church in Poland has been guided, at least over the past 90 years, by prelates of distinction—men of honour, characterized by integrity, courage, and, as already stated, political acumen” (2017, 5).

The interwar period lasted only two decades and ended in 1939 when World War II broke out. The Nazi rule in occupied Poland was particularly brutal. When Pope Pius XII publicly condemned Nazi crimes, the Polish clergy petitioned him to refrain from future public denunciations as his remarks made the situation on the ground even worse (Riebling 2015, 88). Weigel notes that the Nazi regime understood that if the nation’s spirit is to be
broken, the Church and the cultural environment it has helped to create had to be “decapitated” (Weigel 2004, 62). During World War II about one-third of clergy in Poland was murdered (Nowak 2011). The Church nonetheless preserved a degree of institutional autonomy and when Poland fell under the influence of Soviet Union “even Stalin understood that a publicly active Catholic Church is the price he had to pay for making Poland a buffer against German or Western aggression” (Judt 2006, 172). That is also why postwar Poland should be classified as an authoritarian regime, not a totalitarian one (Linz and Stepan 1996, Ch. 15).

The Soviet-backed communist leaders also attempted to destroy the Church (Nowak 2011). The height of the oppression came in 1953 when Primate Wyszyński was imprisoned and spent three years under house arrest. The Church and the communist regime continued to clash over property rights, the appointment of bishops, and religious freedoms more generally. The regime lacked domestic legitimacy and thus used coercive measures to stay in power. The prolonged period of oppression resulted in a paradoxical situation; the Church operated within a regime that was hostile to religion, but the institution was surrounded by a supportive and highly religious civil society. In 1958 Karol Wojtyła was nominated as an auxiliary bishop of Kraków and became the de facto archbishop of Kraków in 1962. In 1967 Pope Paul VI appointed him to the Sacred College of Cardinals. Since then Wojtyła and Primate Wyszyński collaborated closely, and it became clear that the future of the Polish Church rested on the shoulders of these two personalities.

In 1978 Cardinal Wojtyła became John Paul II. Not even a year into his pontificate John Paul II visited his native country in June 1979. Particularly significant was his mass at the Victory Square in Warsaw attended by 1 million of his countrymen. Several times the excited crowd started a rhythmic chant “We want God! We want God […]” (Weigel 2004, 1-
2). Throughout John Paul’s visit Poles displayed a strong commitment to their faith and their newly appointed Pontiff, a commitment that even three decades of secular communism were unable to root out. The estimates are that some eleven million Poles, about a quarter of the population, saw John Paul II during his nine days in Poland (Weigel 2010, 112) and from 1979 the country was on a path towards democracy. The pope’s pilgrimage empowered the nascent civil society. In 1980 Lech Wałęsa and other social activists achieved an extraordinary victory when the Solidarity trade union was officially recognized in August of that year. John Paul II would visit his motherland seven more times, and Poland would stay under his political and spiritual tutelage until his death in 2005. 33

The Catholic Church shaped and continues to shape Poland in many vital ways. Archbishop Stanisław Gądecki, the current President of the Polish Bishops’ Conference, captured exactly this dynamic in an interview when stating, “The history of the Catholic Church in Poland is a process of continuity. Not everyone realizes that the Church is the only institution, which is constantly operating in Poland. All other institutions, including the state (due to partitioning), have a pause in its course” (Gądecki, Jako pasterze nie możemy milczeć 2015). Thus institutional longevity combined with high levels of moral authority make the Church a very powerful political institution, one that is not to be taken lightly even by secular politicians and their political parties.

**Institutional Structures**

The Catholic Church dominates the religious market in contemporary Poland, and the roots of its monopoly can be traced back to World War II: “As the result of the devastation of World War II and the population transfer that followed, postwar Poland became a homogenous Catholic nation—one where communism was seen as an alien

imposition that violated tenets of sovereignty and faith” (Grzymała-Busse 2015, 150). By actively protecting the Polish nation from hostile foreign regimes, the Church has made it possible for political and religious identities to fuse over a relatively short period of time (Grzymała-Busse and Slater 2018). The fusion, in turn, created a demand for creation of robust and extensive institutional structures to serve the needs of Polish Catholics.

These structures are also of great value to pro-life activists. When collecting signatures to initiate anti-abortion legislation, pro-life activists take advantage of the already existing networks of parishes that are distributed all over the country from the most urban city centers in Warszawa and Kraków to remote villages. The task of collecting signatures is made more manageable still when local priests encourage their flock to support anti-abortion projects. With a blessing of a local bishop, or better yet with official approval of Polish Bishops’ Conference, pro-life groups have all the help they can ask for in getting their projects off the ground. In fact, their main task is to provide enough volunteers to collect the necessary number of signatures (100,000). Everything else is already in place, including the ready-made constituency which is very likely to sign such petitions after Sunday mass.

The Church is organized hierarchically with the parish being its most basic administrative unit. Although the parish is usually associated with a church building, the specific meaning of the term refers to people within a clearly defined geographical territory and a priest specifically assigned to provide pastoral services to his people. The parish is where most Catholics live out their faith and often the only structure of the institutional Church they interact with. The diocese is headed by a bishop and is the central administrative unit of the Catholic Church, and in theory, diocesan bishops respond only to the Pope. In practice, some dioceses—and therefore some bishops—are more important
than others. The diocesan bishops are very powerful and can shape the life of their diocese in many ways. Here is how Allen describes what a diocesan bishop does:

[he] determines which priest is assigned to which parish; which parishes may be closed or clustered, and which new parishes may be opened; which practices of prayer and worship are permitted (within the basic guidelines set by the Vatican); who may be invited to speak at church events, which textbooks can be used in schools, and how the funds of the diocese will be spent (2014, 17-8).

Some bishops exhibit a more authoritative style of governing, while others prefer collegiality. For the most part, however, the buck stops with a diocesan bishop. A group of dioceses is assembled into a metropolis, with an archdiocese serving as its “capital.” An archdiocese then “refers to an especially large diocese, and its leader—the archbishop—exercises a degree of authority over the bishops of smaller diocese in its vicinity” (Allen 2014, 18).³⁴ It is possible for an archbishop to exercise a degree of control and power over other diocesan bishops of the smaller dioceses under his administrative jurisdiction, but much depends on the idiosyncratic leadership style of individual archbishops. This too is of great significance for pro-life activists. With an official blessing from just one diocesan bishop, pro-life groups obtain permission to work on the whole territory of a diocese. If a particular archbishop practices a more top-down style of governance, his approval might extend over the whole area of the metropolis. Thus major coordination problems can be easily solved, as individual priests no longer have to be approached in search of support, endorsement, and permission to act.

However, institutional infrastructures alone are meaningless. Their existence makes sense only if there are enough people to operate them, and more importantly if there is enough demand for their existence. When thinking about individuals who make up the

³⁴ The Archdiocese of Detroit, for example, consists of seven dioceses (Detroit, Gaylord, Grand Rapids, Kalamazoo, Lansing, Marquette, Saginaw).
Church, a distinction has to be made between those who serve in the official capacity and those who do not; that is between clergy and laity. The clergy is composed of three distinct spheres of individuals. First, there are deacons. When (usually) young men enter seminaries they will at some point in their training become deacons. This progression grants them limited pastoral privileges (e.g., giving homily), but they are not fully priests yet and hence cannot administer certain sacraments (e.g., confession). It used to be the case that being a deacon was a stepping-stone on the road to priesthood. Increasingly, however, being a deacon is a calling in itself and in contrast to priests, deacons can marry. Priests are the workhorses of the Catholic Church. They are responsible for providing pastoral services to their flock and are very often trusted with managing a parish. In the Roman Catholic (Latin) rite priests take vows of celibacy, that is they renounce the possibility of being married. Finally, there is the episcopate, officially understood as the collective body of bishops. Only bishops can administer the sacrament of the Holy Orders to appoint new priests and other bishops. Becoming a bishop is difficult because one has to be appointed and unlikely; in 2011 there were just over 5000 bishops worldwide (Allen 2014, 31).

Even though Vatican II re-shaped the relationship among bishops by emphasizing co-governance and collegiality, some bishops are nonetheless more important than others. The pope, of course, is at the top of the hierarchy. Then there are the cardinals. The collective body of cardinals (the College of Cardinals) elects the new pope in an event called a

35 There are twenty-three separate churches that collectively make up the one Catholic Church. The “Latin” church is by far the largest and is associated with the mainstream form of Catholicism. There are, however, twenty-two other, “Eastern,” churches that nonetheless accept the pope’s authority. The three largest Easter Catholic churches include the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (4.5 million members); the Syro-Malabar Catholic Church (3.9 million members with its center in India); and the Maronite Catholic Church in Lebanon (3.3 million members) (Allen 2014, 24-5). Some of the Eastern Churches allow their priests to marry, so in technical sense celibacy is not absolute in the Catholic Church.
conclave. There are about 200 cardinals around the world at any given time, but only those below eighty years of age are eligible to vote (approx. 120 cardinals). Given their status, cardinals also advise the pope on important theological and political matters. An archbishop is usually in charge of an archdiocese, but there are exceptions to this rule. Pope's official ambassadors, known as nuncios, also hold the rank of archbishop even though they do not govern any particular territory. Lastly, there are many different types of "regular" bishops (diocesan, auxiliary, coadjutor, emeritus). Considering that the Church has 1.2 billion members, bishops constitute a minuscule part (about 0.05%) of the overall Catholic population (Allen 2014, 33).

The laity is by far the most numerous group within the Church (about 99.95%) and refers to those Catholics who were baptized and believe the articles of faith outlined in the Nicene Creed. Barring extreme circumstances, lay members cannot administer sacraments. This means that nuns—even though they take the three vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience—are also considered as part of the laity. Conversely, this is also true of religious brothers who do not feel the call to the priesthood but take the same three vows (Allen 2014, 32).
Table 14. Description of Catholic Structures and Assets

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number of Parishes</th>
<th>Number of Dioceses</th>
<th>Number of Archdioceses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Globally</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3,157</td>
<td>630</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>17,651</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>10,339</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number of Bishops</th>
<th>Number of Archbishops</th>
<th>Number of Cardinals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Globally</td>
<td>5,473</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>446</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number of Priests</th>
<th>Number of Seminarians</th>
<th>Number of Deacons</th>
<th>Number of Nuns</th>
<th>Number of Religious Brothers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Globally</td>
<td>412,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>275,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>40,262</td>
<td>5000</td>
<td>17,400</td>
<td>57,100</td>
<td>4,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>25,016</td>
<td>2,300</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>18,197</td>
<td>1,313</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number of Catholics</th>
<th>Percent of Catholics</th>
<th>Ratio of Priests to Catholics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Globally</td>
<td>1.2 billion</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>67 million</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>approx. 1:1300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>33 million</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>approx. 1:1000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Allen (2014); Catholic-Hierarchy.org (2018); ISKK (2017); PBC (2018); Pew Research Center (2017); USCCB (2018)
Information presented here reports observations from different points in time, from 2012-2018.

Table 14 provides a descriptive picture of how the Polish Catholic Church compares to American Church, and to global Catholic structures in general. The geography of both countries is of course not without meaning. Poland is comparable in size to the state of New Mexico, and with 304,459 sq km, the US is about thirty times larger (9.16 million sq km). Despite the overwhelming disproportion in size, however, Poland has only 7,000 fewer parishes than the US. Thus the services provided by the Polish Church are likely to be more tailored to the needs of individual communities and the variation between them is also
smaller given the homogenous makeup of Polish society. In Poland, the average parish covers about 29.5 sq km and contains just a little over 3000 parishioners.

Figure 14. The Ratio of Catholics per Parish and Catholics per Priest in Poland (1990-2014)

The ratio of individual priests to Catholics is also smaller in Poland by about 300 members (Figure 14). Examining longitudinal trends summarized in figure above, we see that both the ratio of Catholics per parish and ratio of Catholics per priest has been declining since 1990. As both ratios become smaller, we can reasonably conclude that the quality of pastoral service provided increases because it is easier to tailor services to smaller communities.

The discrepancy in ratios masks another important difference between the two Churches that further testifies to the power of Polish Catholicism. In the US one out of every six priests is foreign-born (Allen 2014, 35), while in Poland the supply of priests is met exclusively through domestic recruitment. The shortage of priests in America has forced US bishops to look for creative solutions to deal with this problem. Some parishes are closed as a result of priest shortages; others are combined with previously independent units to form ever bigger institutional entities. But above all else, the number of deacons in the US is
telling. Although, not fully priests, deacons are used as proxies in the American Catholic Church providing crucial services in a church that struggles to meet the needs of its flock. In Poland, the statistics about deacons are not available in large part because deacons are a residual category. Being a deacon continues to be a mere stepping-stone on the road to priesthood, while in America deacons are now understood as an enduring category of men who want to serve the Church while also being allowed to marry.

The very small number of seminarians in America is also striking. In a country of 326.6 million people and 69 million Catholics, the small number of seminarians (5,000 in 2012) captures the personnel problems that the American Church has to contend with. In a much smaller Poland (38.5 million people, 33 million Catholics), the number of seminarians in 2016 was just 1,700 less. Thus, while American Church meets its personnel needs through the import of priests from abroad and an increasing reliance on deacons, the Polish Church is one of the world’s biggest exporters of priests. In 2016 alone 3253 or 27% of Polish religious friaries worked abroad (ISKK 2018, 18).36

36 Religious friars are priests who belong to a religious order (e.g., Jesuits, Dominicans, etc.). This means that they answer to the superiors within their orders and the Pope, and not to a local bishop (Allen 2014, 75).
The fact that the Polish Church produces a surplus of priests to meet domestic needs is further testimony to its power and influence. However, examination of long-term trends strikes a more cautionary note, as the number of seminarians has been declining systematically since 2001 (Figure 15). Thus even though Poland is still in much better shape than most Catholic countries as far as training of new priests is concerned, the shortage of seminarians is a global problem for the Church to contend with. It is therefore unsurprising that during the 2018 Synod of Bishops (March 19-24) in Rome “vocational discernment” was one of the key topics on the agenda.

The American Church and the majority of European Churches as well are built on a model that is likely not sustainable long-term. Two-thirds of priests in the world live in the global North, where mass attendance and religious observance have been declining for quite a long time. In comparison, the Church is gaining many new adherents in Africa and
Southeast Asia, yet in Africa, there is about one priest per 4,786 baptized Catholics; in Southeast Asia that ratio is even higher, 1 to 5,322. Thus Allen (2014,35) is correct when he points out that “it wouldn’t take a systems manager long to figure out that there’s a serious mismatch in the Church between personnel and markets.” The shortage of priests in America stands in stark contrast to the overall size of its episcopate. With 446 bishops, the American Church is one of the best represented in the world in this regard. In fact, it comes in second after the Italian Episcopate. Cardinal Sean O’Malley, the current archbishop of Boston, is one of Pope Francis’ closest advisors.

The bishop body in Poland is considerably smaller, but with 154 bishops the group is not small by international standards. To be sure, after the death of John Paul II in 2005, the Polish episcopate had little choice but to became more collegial. None of the contemporary Polish bishops can claim to speak authoritatively on behalf of the whole institution and few, if any, of Polish prelates, are recognized internationally. Furthermore, the Polish Church cannot compete with European and American Churches by material wealth. The University of Notre Dame alone has an annual budget of $1.2 billion and an endowment of about $7.5 billion; the Archdiocese of Chicago is valued at $2.5 billion, and American Catholics give over $8 billion every year into the Sunday collection plate. In Germany every baptized Catholic has a portion of her income tax collected on behalf of the Church, amounting to $8.8 billion in 2010, and thus allowing the Church to be the second largest private employer, behind Volkswagen (Allen 2014, 187-8). In comparison, revenues collected by the Polish state in 2017 amounted to just $90.8 billion (CIA 2018).

The real power of the Polish Catholic Church comes not from bishops or monetary resources, but from the Catholic laity. Their number, strength of religious commitments, and engagement in civic activities are crucial for the Church allowing it to shape politics and
public policy outcomes in a myriad of ways. When measured by the absolute number of Catholics, Poland is the 9th largest country in the world, with Brazil (149 million) leading the way.

Figure 16. Measures of Dominicantes and Communicantes in Poland (1980-2016)

An examination of weekly mass attendance levels in Poland over time (Dominicantes) shows that the overall longitudinal trajectory is negative (Figure 16). However, since the early 1990s until 2016 weekly mass attendance has also proved remarkably stable falling somewhere between approx. 42% to approx. 38% range. It is also interesting to note that even though fewer people attend weekly religious services, the number of people receiving the Eucharist (Communicantes) is increasing steadily. So while the weekly mass attendance is shrinking slowly, the Church is also gaining more cohesion because those who attend Catholic masses also participate in its sacramental life. Catholic theology provides guidelines that need to be followed before one can receive the Eucharist,
and therefore the *Communicantes* measure can effectively be interpreted as a measure of commitment to faith with all of its political implications. More cohesion and commitment translates into political power because as Iannaccone (1994) has pointed out that strict churches are strong. The fact that a significant subset of Polish Catholics (approx. 2.1 million) is regularly participating in the Church’s religious and sacramental life is of great significance for pro-life groups. With 2.1 million committed members, these groups have more than enough political capital to collect the required number of signatures to initiate legislation and then to pressure political decision-makers when promoting Catholic friendly legislation effectively. This is also true of other public policy issues.

Comparatively speaking, Polish Catholics are considerably more religious than their European counterparts. In the Netherlands, only 5% of Catholics attend mass weekly. In Belgium and France, the numbers are 8% and 13%, respectively (PEW 2017, 8). The percentages are a little bit higher in traditional Catholic strongholds such as Portugal (28%), Spain (21%), Ireland (21%), and Italy (25%), but nowhere near the 41% level exhibited in Poland (PEW 2017).

The religious observance exhibited by Poles is not constrained to weekly attendance at mass. This is also what makes the Polish Church so powerful. When a grassroots event called “Rosary to the Border” was being first organized, few people expected it to gain much traction. The event aimed at prayer “for peace, for families and youth, and for the conversion of the world” (Giangravè 2017). The lay organizers were eventually able to secure the official endorsement of the Polish Bishops’ Conference (PBC). The event took place on October 7, 2017, with more than one million Poles participating in it, making it the largest religious gathering in Europe after Catholic World Youth Day in 2016 which also took place in Poland (Kraków). All in all, the Polish Catholic Church draws its political influence
from the well-organized and religiously active laity. With that being said, coordination is still one of the major obstacles to any organization, and this is why the PBC is so essential. The laity might be very religious and politically active, but their energy still needs to be channeled appropriately, and its activities harmonized if institutional preferences of the Church are to be realized.

**Polish Bishops’ Conference**

Given its vast reach, coordination is one of the main challenges that the Catholic Church has to contend with and National Bishops’ Conferences are part of the solution. National Conferences are sanctioned by the Vatican and serve as the official communication points between the particular Churches (e.g., Polish Catholic Church) and Rome, and among particular Churches as well. Their origin resulted from two simultaneous processes, the rise of nation-states and the separation of church and state (Reese 1996, 31). As a result of these two processes, bishops and their churches found themselves locked into new geographical units and separated from official political powers, and thus the need for Conferences was further solidified. The Second Vatican Council made them even more vital, as the Church moved away from Latin as its official language vernacular translations were needed and National Conferences (e.g., Polish Bishops’ Conference) were particularly well equipped to provide this service. National Conferences are also combined into continental units, such as the Council of the Bishops’ Conferences of Europe. However, Conferences are also kept in check by the Vatican to avoid the danger of excessive nationalism, and doctrinal pronouncements have to be approved by the Vatican before they become official (Reese 1996, 33).

The Polish Bishops’ Conference is organized vertically, and so it inevitably makes some bishops more important than others. The conference was first established in 1919,
and its current charter was last been updated in 2009. The three bishops forming the presidium have considerable national influence given their frequent media appearances, and their impact is also significant within the PBC.

Figure 17. Structure of the Polish Bishops’ Conference

The chairman must represent the PBC "outside" making him especially visible in national media. The primary responsibilities of vice-chairman and secretary general are to support the chairman in his activities. The chairman’s power within the PBC is also substantial; he convenes the permanent council, a plenary meeting, or the council of diocesan bishops and chairs the meetings. In “exceptional and special cases” he invites other persons to the PBC meetings (PBC 2009). The power of inviting outsiders to an otherwise closed meeting proved to be consequential for two pro-life activists who in 2017
addressed the whole body of Polish bishops and secured official and institutional support for their abortion-restricting project (Chapter 6).

The real significance of the presidium rests in its ability to take a position on public matters without the need of consultation with other bishops. Whenever anti-abortion projects need a quick and official endorsement, it usually comes from the presidium. Moreover, the presidium also presents candidates for the commission, councils, committees, rectors of Polish Catholic institutions, and other important functions. The thirteen highest ranking bishops currently form the permanent council. The permanent council possesses strong agenda-setting powers, as it prepares programs for plenary meetings and the council of diocesan bishops. It also supervises the implementation of decisions of the Conference and the council of diocesan bishops. When in 2016 Polish bishops issued an official statement that condemned criminalization of abortion (chapter 6), the permanent council was responsible for executing this decision. The council of diocesan bishops includes only bishops who are in charge of individual dioceses (44 in total).\footnote{The council also includes the bishop in charge of Military Ordinariate of the Polish Army and diocesan bishops of the Eastern Greco-Catholic rite.} These bishops are the workhorses of the Polish Catholic Church, and they are the singular leaders of their respective dioceses. These bishops decide, for example, if a particular abortion-restricting project should receive PBC's official endorsement.

The plenary assembly contains the whole body of Polish bishops and usually meets twice a year. There are also 11 commissions, 12 councils, and 17 committees, and they deal with a wide range of issues, including relationships with other Conferences, interreligious dialog, ecumenism, media, and family life. Commissions, councils, and committees have identical structures (chairman, members, consulters). The roles of chairman and members
are reserved to bishops alone. The function of consulters, on the other hand, is open to priests and Catholic laity and includes pro-life activists and university professors (for examples see table 21).

The Joint Committee is of particular political significance as it offers high-ranking Catholic bishops direct and institutional access to policymaking. Grzymała-Busse (2015) has identified the Joint Committee as the primary mechanism of direct institutional access that the Church uses to fight for its public policy preferences. Cardinal Nycz, a current committee member, explained that the Joint Committee allows bishops to “raise issues they do not want to talk about in public” (Nycz 2017).

The PBC engages in a variety of political efforts. From the point of view of public policy, the PBC fulfills three primary functions. First, it allows Polish bishops to coordinate their activities and speak in a unified voice, and therefore to make their influence more robust. An official endorsement coming from PBC goes a long way in profoundly Catholic Poland. Secondly, the PBC serves as a facilitating institution allowing pro-life and other groups to synchronize their activities and to channel their efforts more effectively. Pro-life groups might have the same goal, but they disagree about strategies to achieve it (see below). Father Drąg, the member and the secretary of the family council at PBC, is in charge of bringing pro-life groups together when specific anti-abortion projects are pursued. He explained that this can be a difficult task and when one such facilitating meeting took place in the November of 2015 “past grievances, resentment, and personal grudges” were initially dominant, and the specific abortion-restricting was discussed only in later meetings (Drąg 2017). Finally, the Joint Committee offers direct and institutionalized access to government and deputies, allowing bishops to raise issues they care about and press for public policy outcomes that are in line with Catholic teachings. However, it matters much who is sitting at
the other end of the table. The Joint Committee is much more effective when its requests are heard by a Christian Democratic party, not by former communists. Hence, the political framework that bishops operate within and which party happens to be in power matter significantly for the Church and its ability to exercise public policy influence.

**Political Framework**

Poland’s democratization began in 1989 after a series of “Round Table” negotiations (February 6 to April 5). The two main bargaining camps—communists and Solidarity, moderated by Catholic bishops—agreed to hold partially contested parliamentary elections that Solidarity candidates won overwhelmingly. The constitution that currently governs Poland was ratified in 1997 also with the support of the Catholic Church (Grzymała-Busse 2015). The Constitution allows for initiation of specific bills via citizens’ legislative initiative (CLI). Pro-life groups and other movements associated with the Catholic Church frequently use CLIs as a way to pressure the political system. The mechanism has several features that make it particularly appealing and easy to use. First, the minimal threshold of signatures required to get a bill onto the Sejm’s floor (the lower house) is rather low. In three months, only 100,000 signatures need to be collected. Secondly, assuming that proper procedural guidelines are followed and respected, the Sejm has to at least consider the proposed bill within three months of its official submission. Even if a snap election were to be called, pending CLIs bills are still required to be addressed by the new assembly after elections.

**Political Landscape**

In addition to analyzing specific public policy outcomes (chapter 6), the political influence of the Catholic Church also has to be understood in terms of the political environment it has helped to bring about. After the successful democratic transition, the Church enjoyed a great deal of moral prestige. However, the lack of knowledge about the
nuts and bolts of electoral democracy resulted in overt political participation. Many bishops openly endorsed political parties with close ties to Catholicism, while reducing the moral authority of their institution in the process (Gowin 2002; Grzymała-Busse 2015). It would not take long for bishops and non-communist parties to pay for their lack of political experience. Already in 1993, the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) won parliamentary elections and just four years after transition away from non-democracy the ex-communists were back in power, but this time their victory was legitimate.

Bishops can be quick learners, and thus after 1993 most of them refrained from overt participation in political affairs. Political candidates and Catholic parties were no longer officially endorsed. Yet the Church continued to speak openly about its preferred public policy outcomes and, therefore, it continued to provide its followers with political cues. The party or candidates whose views were closely aligned with Catholic doctrine were preferred to those who actively opposed it.

The moral authority of the Church never climbed back to its peak levels from the early 1990s, but such a goal was highly unlikely. Democratization is not a panacea for all ills (Møller and Skaaning 2013; Sorensen 2007) and Poland was no exception. The euphoria of doing away with communism evaporated quickly after Poles learned first hand that the task of successful transition and subsequent consolidation are daunting. Nascent democracies inherit institutions that tend to corrupt, inefficient, or both, if they exist at all. The multitude of required reforms, including of the political, economic, and social institutions is analogous to rebuilding the ship at sea (Elster, Offe and Preuss 1998). Thus it is unsurprising that initial enthusiasm wears off quickly and voters become disillusioned with the possibilities that democracy can offer. In Poland as in other post-communist countries, the marketization of the ineffective Soviet-style centrally planned economy has led to high levels of
unemployment, inflation, and reduction in income levels and economic hardship resulted in a general decline of support for most institutions. The Church was able to withstand this early erosion of public support by learning to skillfully navigate the new political terrains. Bishops shifted away from imposing to proposing their public policy recommendations while also exercising covert pressure, especially through the Joint Committee that directly links a small group of bishops with parliamentary deputies (Grzymała-Busse 2015).

It also helped that the Polish Church was never undermined by large-scale scandals, similar to those experienced by churches in Ireland and the US where a number of priests sexually abused minors, and some bishops helped cover up these crimes. The significance of John Paul II once again could hardly be overstated as he helped stabilize the uncertain political environment of the newly democratic polity. After the SLD won the power back in 1993, the Church had to be patient if it once again wanted to be an important public policy actor. That patience paid off in the early 2000s when the political landscape of Poland was once again reshaped. The birth of Catholic PiS, in particular, offered new prospects for further public policy concessions. From 2000 on, the power of left parties began to wane, while the political scene in Poland began to take a turn to the right. The conservative shift first benefited the Civic Platform (PO) that occupied the middle of the political scene, but the realignment did not stop there, and from 2005 it was the right-wing PiS that started to look like a dominant party, only to fully solidify its rule in 2015 after successful presidential and parliamentary elections.

**Political Realignment (2000-2015)**

In the early 2000s, social scientists were puzzled by the regeneration of Communist Parties in Eastern Europe (Andras and Ishiyama 2002; Grzymała-Busse 2002). This puzzle, at least in Poland, appears to no longer be salient as SLD and other anti-clerical left-wing
parties continue to be punished by voters at the ballot boxes. The new political environment in which anti-Catholic parties are unable to attract much support appears to have its roots in the early 2000s when both PiS and PO were born and filled in the electoral gap created by the previously influential Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS). AWS won parliamentary elections in 1997 and ruled until 2001. By 2001, however, the party was in disarray opening the door for SLD to win another election, and more importantly allowing new parties, especially PiS and PO to take its place. A quick glance data illustrates the conservative turn in Polish politics (Figure 18).

![Figure 18. Vote Share in Elections to the Polish Sejm (2001-2015)](image)

In 2001, SLD regained power, but with 216 seats it was unable to rule without a coalition party (Figure 19). By 2005 SLD was no longer in charge and both PiS and PO improved their vote share from the previous election. PiS won the 2005 election and secured 155 seats. It also aligned with two smaller parties to obtain a parliamentary majority. That coalition proved to be short-lived and snap elections were held in 2007. PiS’ 2005 victory was surprising to many. Equally astonishing was the fact despite promises made during the campaign season, PiS and PO failed to form a coalition. This was a sign of
things to come; the two largest parties originating from the same political camp (AWS) were no longer seeing eye to eye. From 2005 on PiS would occupy the right wing of electoral politics in Poland, while PO would become increasingly liberal pushing the SLD into the political fringes and eventually into irrelevance. From 2007 to 2015 PO was the winning party in Poland. By winning two elections in a row, PO provided stability to Polish electoral scene never seen before. However, despite its strong showing in 2007 and 2011, PO failed to secure parliamentary majority and both times had to form a coalition government. SLD, on the other hand, was becoming increasingly irrelevant; its vote share and number of seats were declining steadily. The downward spiral was cemented in 2015 when SLD failed to meet the required electoral threshold and did not secure any seats. By 2015 PO too was also on its way down and for the first time in Polish parliamentary history, one party secured a parliamentary majority. In 2015 PiS won 235 out of 460 seats, and for the first time in the democratic history of Poland, one party ruled alone.

![Figure 19. Distribution of Seats in the Polish Sejm (2001-2015)](image)

The trend just described is not limited to SLD alone. The Palikot’s Movement (RP) offers another illustration of a left-wing party unable to keep steady political support given
its anti-clericalism. The RP formed in 2010 after splintering away from PO’s liberal wing. In the 2011 election, the party obtained 10% of votes translating into 40 seats. During the campaign season, party leaders hid their anti-Catholic sentiments, focusing instead on the need to modernize. Once in the Sejm, however, the party made its anti-clerical sentiments overt. It called for the removal of a Christian cross from Sejm’s chamber and argued for the cancelation of an official agreement between Poland and the Vatican, known as concordat. Such recommendations fell on deaf ears while diminishing the party’s popularity. To prevent electoral backsliding, RP changed its name to Your Move (TR) and joined the United Left coalition. In 2015 election, the United Left coalition consisted of five parties—(1) the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), (2) Your Movement (TR), (3) Polish Socialist Party (PPS), (4) Labour United (UP), and (5) the Greens (PZ)—but with 7.6% of votes the coalition failed to break the 8% threshold and failed to secure any seats.

SLD’s performance in presidential election also corroborates the narrative of its political marginalization. In the 1995 presidential election Aleksander Kwaśniewski, a former communist and the “Round Table” participant, defeated the well-known Solidarity leader and presidential incumbent Lech Wałęsa. Kwaśniewski went on to win his second presidential bid in 2000. However, by 2005 the political situation in Poland has changed. Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, a former communist Prime Minister (1996-97), received SLD’s official endorsement. Gaining minimal support, Cimoszewicz decided to drop out of the race early. The SLD went on to endorse the more moderate Marek Borowski, but with 10.3% of support, he was never a serious contender.

In 2005 it was PiS’ time to rule as the country took a conservative turn in both parliamentary and presidential elections. In an unexpected victory, Lech Kaczyński won the presidency, beating PO’s leader and heavy favorite Donald Tusk who won the first round of
voting. In 2010 PO’s candidate, Bronisław Komorowski managed to claim the presidency. His victory was aided by a tragic plane crash near Smolensk, Russia (2010) that killed the current President Lech Kaczyński along with numerous high-ranking officials (96 in total).

Komorowski, himself an incumbent in the 2015 presidential election, was defeated by PiS’ candidate and Andrzej Duda.

As of January 2018, PiS and President Duda are enjoying a high degree of domestic legitimacy (CBOS 2018, 4). Seventy-three percent of Poles trust the president, making him the most trusted politician in Poland. Furthermore, 44.1% of respondents declared their support for PiS, while only 14.9% of Poles favored the second largest party, PO (CBOS 2018, 3). The remaining political parties are operating on the fringes of electoral thresholds.

Overall, then, the 2001 election marked the beginning of the realignment of the Polish political scene. From 2001 on SLD and other left-leaning parties steadily weakened and the process culminated in 2015 when SLD and other left-wing parties failed to secure seats in national elections. The conservative turn in Polish politics opened the door for PiS in 2005. However, its hold on power proved to be tenuous. Forming a government with not one but two smaller political parties coupled with the tragic death of President Kaczyński opened the door for PO. The centrists PO stayed in power from 2007 to 2015 while also controlling the presidency from 2010 to 2015.

PiS leaders, and especially its founder Jarsoław Kaczyński, learned valuable lessons during those eight years. They have recognized, above all else, that the overwhelmingly Catholic electorate was ready to give a Catholic party a chance at ruling. Kaczyński and his collaborators embraced Catholic teachings and as we will see continue to manifest their faith openly. PiS succeeded in monopolizing the Catholic faith. Many of its deputies are no doubt sincere believers, but there is also an element of instrumental rationality involved. PiS
is using Catholicism as means to stay in power, and this, in turn, is putting the party at odds with some bishops (see chapter 6). The incremental shift away from cooperation to competition between the Church and PiS has profound implications for both the quality and future of democracy and Poland. For now, however, it is in the interest of PiS deputies to appear more Catholic than the pope himself, and that is what they do.

The Law and Justice Party and Catholicism
The twin brothers Lech and Jarosław Kaczyński created PiS in 2001. From its inception, the party’s political program has been deeply rooted in Catholicism, and this commitment can be found in numerous official documents. In one such brochure from 2005 titled *Catholic Poland in Christian Europe*, the party devoted itself to protection of human life from the moment of conception to natural death (quoted in Kratiuk 2017, 22-3). Similar pledges to Catholic doctrine can be found in the party’s program from 2009 and in the most recent statement from 2014 which states: “[w]e defend and will continue to defend the right to life and resist euthanasia” (PiS 2014, 7).

PiS’ affiliation with the Catholic Church does exist merely on paper. After every election Deputies are sworn into office by taking an official oath which reads: “I officially swear to be honest and conscientious in my duties to the Nation, to protect the sovereignty and interests of the State, to do everything for the good of the homeland and the good of the citizens, to abide by the Constitution and other laws of the Republic of Poland.” After the 2015 election, every PiS Deputy added the optional phrase “so help me God.” Some of them modified it even further to reflect Catholic theology by stating: “so help me, Lord God Almighty in the One Trinity and All Saints.” Out of 458 deputies present, only 26 did not refer to God in their oaths; most of them were from PO and Modern (Nowoczesna) parties (Gazeta Wyborcza 2015).
PiS’ deputies also manifest their commitment to Catholicism through participation in highly profiled religious events. Given that the Catholic Church monopolizes the makeup of Polish religious market, such events occur very frequently. Both President Duda and Prime Minister Beata Szydło participated in the Catholic mass in Gniezno to honor the 1050 anniversary of Polish baptism. They were also seen together in Zakopane during the ceremony to honor the 100th anniversary of Fatima apparitions, and in Kraków when Metropolitan Archbishop Marek Jędraszewski was formally vested with a pallium. When Szydło’s son celebrated his first mass as a Catholic priest at the National Shrine in Jasna Góra, many of the party’s top-level ministers and deputies arrived to showcase their faith and support (Steinhagen 2017). Therefore, rarely a month goes by without top PiS’ politicians participating in highly profiled Catholic events.

It also matters significantly that these religious events receive extensive and friendly media coverage. On December 28, 2015, PiS effectively co-opted the public media through the so-called “small media law,” despite the international outcry over such action:

It [the law] was intended as a temporary measure, to remain in force for six months so that a more comprehensive media law could be developed. The key provisions would terminate the mandates of the current members of the national television and radio broadcasters’ management and supervisory boards, and fill their positions through direct appointment by the treasury minister—rather than through competitions organized by the KRRiT (National Broadcasting Council)—until a ‘new national media organization’ could be created under subsequent legislation (Chapman 2017).

The report issued by the Freedom House concludes further “that the most visible consequence of PiS’s changes to the public media is their effect on public television’s evening news program, Wiadomości, aired every night at 7:30 p.m.... What Wiadomości says matters: It is one of Poland’s two most-watched evening news programs, with an average

38 A Catholic symbol of the plentitude of pontifical office reserved to the Pope and archbishops who are metropolitans.
PiS can also count on favorable radio coverage, mainly from “Radio Maryja” station run by Father Tadeusz Rydzyk. Rydzyk’s media empire also includes the television channel TV Trwam (TV Endure) and the newspaper *Nasz Dziennik (Our Daily).* A few weeks after the PiS’s electoral victory, Jarosław Kaczyński stated that without Rydzyk “there would not have been this victory” (quoted in Chapman 2017, 5). The party can finally count on favorable newspaper coverage, as the Catholic *Gość Niedzielny* is the best selling Polish weekly with a monthly circulation of 125,000 and three of the top five most popular weeklies are either Catholic or conservative (Chapman 2017, 6).39

PiS’ performance at the ballot box and its participation in Catholic events tell an important story about party’s fusion with Catholicism, but they do not capture everything. The full extent to which the political life in Poland is suffused with Catholicism can only be achieved by research on the ground (see also Wood 2009). Even though the politicians interviewed for this research came from different backgrounds and represented competing political parties, they nonetheless operated within a common political framework that recognizes the political power of the Church.

That PiS politicians manifested their Catholicism openly during the interview process is hardly surprising. Their offices were decorated in Catholic symbols such as crosses, pictures of Jesus, and statues of Mary the Mother of God along with other saints. Moreover, when discussing politics, they frequently invoked the importance of their faith and how it shapes every part of their life, including their political activity. Some politicians were not

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39 *Gość Niedzielny* is located in Katowice, and thus it falls under the direct supervision of the Archbishop of Katowice Wiktor Skworic.
available for immediate interviews because of their participation in religious retreats and pilgrimages. Others acknowledged openly that they consult with Catholic bishops on important political matters. Catholicism, in short, is a core party identity for deputies and their voters alike.

More surprising is the approach taken by politicians who despite a clear voting record that runs against Catholic teachings on moral issues are careful not to brand themselves as being anti-Catholic. As one such deputy explained: “I am a practicing Roman Catholic” (Kołodziej 2017). Their objection is not that the Church teaching on abortion, for example, is mistaken. Instead, they object to Church’s interference in political affairs. However, the line separating church and state is somewhat porous (Levine 2012), and this is especially true in a country such as Poland where the Church has played a significant political role for centuries. The net result of such unsuccessful opposition is that PiS has been able to monopolize religion for its political purposes. As it stands, opposition parties have an easier time articulating what they are against (i.e., PiS) as opposed to what they are for. However, it is also clear that nobody wants to be against the Church (because those who did are no longer in power), so such opposition is not very effective. These developments, in turn, makes pro-life and other Catholic groups particularly compelling when the political system needs to be pressured and ultimately overwhelmed to secure Catholic friendly public policy outcomes.

**Pro-life Groups**

One of the many consequences of the Second Vatican Council (1962-65) was its empowerment of lay Catholics. The Council explicitly recognized that laity should be the primary mechanisms through which the church-state interaction is to be carried out (Himes 2006). This new emphasis changed laity’s role from “pay, pray and obey” to “pray and seize
the day." However, from the Vatican's point of view, the decentralization of power has had mixed consequences for Catholic Churches around the globe. Certain currents of liberation theology engaged in actions that Catholic hierarchy interpreted as too radical and in direct violation of Church’s mission, ultimately resulting in disciplinary actions. In America, a number of Catholic groups started to openly challenge local bishops on critical doctrinal issues, and these groups too have experienced the coercive power of the Vatican (Allen 2014, 240). In practice, then, the decentralization of power and political activation of the laity has proved to be much more challenging than initially assumed. It appears, however, that the equilibrium envisioned by the Council fathers has found its proper expression in Poland. The antecedents of this newly found equilibrium can be traced back to the pre-democratic period in Polish politics, but its full manifestation became fully apparent only after John Paul's II death in 2005. Thus, since 2010 pro-life groups have engaged in continuous attempts to restrict abortion laws, even though Poland has one of the most restrictive abortion regulations among consolidated democracies. This rather new approach to banning abortion is both an expression of political strategy and a logical extension of decentralization of power within the Church envisioned by the Vatican II.

**The Process of Decentralization in Poland**

The ultimate goal of reforms proposed by the Council fathers was to strike a balance between active laity and doctrinal discipline. In the ideal case scenario for the Catholic Church, the laity should promote teachings handed down to them by bishops and priests. In actuality, however, the newly found autonomy has often resulted in internal divisions, competition, and attempts to tone down or outright change—albeit without success—certain Catholic teachings (Mainwaring 1986; Mainwaring and Wilde 1989). The equilibrium envisioned by the Council is difficult to achieve. The Church in Poland demonstrates,
however, how a balance between doctrinal clarity and constructive empowerment of laity can be obtained.

Three factors help explain how this newfound stability came into being. First, Poland’s long experience with communism all but guaranteed that a fusion of Marxism and Catholicism was never a serious possibility. Time and again Polish bishops and priests actively opposed communism, and they did so effectively (Gowin 2002; Grzymała-Busse 2015; Nowak 2011; Ramet 2017). Hence, the demand for other forms of societal representation has not developed under authoritarianism and crystalized only after successful democratization after 1989. More importantly, the Church in Poland was never outflanked, either from the left or right, by groups that could legitimately claim to represent sectors of the population that were systematically ignored. In practice, then, the formation of radical groups was stopped in its tracks, so when laity groups began to flourish after 1989, they did so within parameters outlined by the Church. Poland, in short, is not fertile soil for the radical Catholic groups so prevalent in the Americas.

Secondly, because of its homogenous population, the country was divided into two opposing political groups: communists and non-communists. Other cleavages of course existed, but overall they were secondary and thus less salient. Since only the Church was able to secure a degree of institutional breathing space, it also became a natural coordinating organization for all of the regime’s opponents. Those who were not in power were necessarily siding with the Church, even if such allegiances were uneasy and fell apart almost immediately after 1989. It is informative, for example, to compare Adam Michnik’s (1993) earlier work on the alliance of the Church and the dissident Left, to the contemporary and profoundly anti-clerical content promoted by Gazeta Wyborcza, the newspaper under his editorial leadership. However, before 1989 only the Church could
legitimately claim to represent the interest of Polish nation. This fact combined with the effective leadership provided by Catholic leaders translated into a great deal of moral authority that the Church could utilize after 1989.

Thirdly, for more than fifty years Cardinal Wyszyński and later Pope John Paul II provided strong and essentially unilateral religious and political leadership that continues to shape how the Catholic Church in Poland functions. One observer notes that after World War II the Polish Church in practice meant Wyszyński (Weigel 2010, 44). John Paul II’s legacy, however, is proving to be even more consequential than Wyszyński’s. This, of course, is understandable given that from 1978 to 2005 he was in charge of the whole Catholic Church. All in all, the governance provided by these two bishops was not only authoritarian but also politically effective (Weigel 2004, 2010). Their many pastoral and political accomplishments have left a deep imprint on Catholic ecclesial system of governance and more importantly on public imagination in Poland. After John Paul II’s death in 2005, Polish Catholics became leaderless for all practical purposes. To be sure, each diocese has continued to be governed by its bishop, but none of them could speak authoritatively on behalf of the whole Church. The increased decentralization and amplified collegiality were only logical consequences of the circumstances that came into being after 2005. The voids left by Wyszyński and especially Wojtyła were, and continue to be, too large for any one bishop to fill.

It is true that some individual bishops continue to separate themselves from others through their words and deeds. Archbishop Marek Jędraszewski, the current bishop of

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40 This sentiment has only strengthened by the fact that in 2014 John Paul II was canonized (declared a saint), while in December of 2017 Pope Francis has officially recognized the heroic virtue of Cardinal Wyszyński making him one step closer to beatification and possible sainthood.
Kraków and Vice-President of the Polish Bishops’ Conference, is one such figure. He is at the same time one of the most respected bishops among conservative Catholics and a frequent target of attacks originating from the anti-clerical left. Pope Francis, who unexpectedly moved Jędraszewski from his previous post as the Archbishop of Łódź to Kraków, has aided the latter’s rise to prominence. As a successor to now Saint John Paul II, Jędraszewski is in charge of Poland’s perhaps most important episcopal see.\footnote{Since 1890 every bishop of Cracow was also a cardinal. Thus there is an expectation that Jędraszewski will also be promoted soon.} However, it is hard if not impossible to imagine how his ministry could overshadow that of Cardinal Wyszyński or Pope John Paul II. In 1966 Wyszyński ushered the Polish Church into the second millennium of its existence, in 2000 Wojtyła did the same for the whole Catholic Church when the third millennium of its existence officially began. Thus it is probably best to think of both bishops’ ministry as ideal type models that contemporary leaders of the Polish Church can aspire to imitate, rather than seeing their accomplishments as benchmarks that can be surpassed.

When civil society started to breathe more freely after 1989, the Church was enjoying high levels of moral authority and public trust (Grzymała-Busse 2015). These two conditions combined with legacies shaped by Wyszyński and Wojtyła allowed the Church to activate laity in a way that was consistent with the vision of the Second Vatican Council. The net result of these interconnected sets of conditions is that the contemporary Church in Poland is governed by a newly found equilibrium, one that became fully solidified shortly after John Paul’s death. It is thus not accidental that from 2010 on, Polish pro-life groups continue to push for restrictions on abortion through the use of Citizens’ Legislative Initiatives, even though by European standards the current legal framework is already quite restrictive. This newly found activity should be interpreted primarily as an expression of a
new model of Church-State interaction. In this model, public policy proposals that are in line with Catholic teaching are proposed by bishops and advocated by the laity, with bishops exercising their influence informally and behind closed doors.

**Consequences of Decentralization for Pro-life Groups and the Church**

The collapse of communism changed everything, including how the Church operates. By now the days of iron-hand rule practiced by Cardinal Wyszyński are long gone, and much emphasis is placed on cooperation. For obvious reasons, the decentralization of power and empowerment of laity has also re-shaped how bishops and pro-life groups interact.

The initial case study hypothesis was that: “lay Catholics and Catholic movements will act as a progressive force in shaping Church’s political mission, while the Church's leaders will tend to be conservative and reactionary.” This expectation was based on the experiences of Latin American churches and their experience with liberation theology. This hypothesis turns out not to hold in Poland, and to some extent, the opposite is true (chapter 6). At its best (from the point of view of the Church) Polish bishops and lay Catholics will work in tandem to outlaw abortion, and this happens most of the time. However, because of the general trajectories and historical circumstances described above, some lay Catholics—especially those associated with the pro-life movement— have at times found themselves outflanking the Church from the right. Individual leaders of pro-life campaigns can be more rigid and more orthodox than bishops themselves, and this puts them at odds with the latter.

However, in the ultimate struggle for control over the future direction of the Church, it is the bishops who hold the upper hand (chapter 6).

On a day-to-day basis, the Church and pro-life groups are autonomous from each other. Every pro-life group is free to create and change its internal structures, choose its leadership, and decide on its own organizational strategy. However, it would be a mistake to
see these groups as self-sufficient and completely independent. Their dependence on the institutional Church becomes especially apparent once specific anti-abortion initiatives are pursued. When this happens these groups "become the Church" as numerous bishops have underscored during my interviews with them. In such a way, the ideal equilibrium envisioned by the Vatican II becomes materialized.

Polish bishops go beyond mere approval or rejection of specific anti-abortion initiatives. In fact, a rejection of specific anti-abortion proposals is not an option because doing so would amount to turning away from Catholic doctrine (chapter 2). As one bishop explained to me “bishops will never have a problem condemning abortion” (Pieronek 2017). Other bishops see the issue along the same lines, Catholic doctrine is clear and set and “there is no room for maneuvering” (Jędraszewski 2017). However, as we have already seen, pro-life initiatives need more than official blessing to have a chance of being successful, and that is why they turn to the Church for additional support. They make use of Church's infrastructure, facilities, and its ability to attract media coverage.

Generally speaking, pro-life groups focus their activities on two distinct spheres of activity. First of all, they engage civil society in an attempt to re-shape the public perception of abortion. There is a wide variety of methods these groups employ to make their case. Some use more conventional means such as informational campaigns, letter writing, conferences, and public debates. Others aim at shock value by using billboards and flyers with pictures of aborted fetuses and by organizing pro-life rallies in city squares of important metropolises. Pro Foundation (Fundacja Pro) is perhaps the most prolific and controversial anti-abortion group in Poland. In 2017 alone the group organized 1007 pickets, hung 33 billboards, and has organizational cells in 39 major cities (Fundacja Pro 2018).
Secondly, pro-life movements attempt to re-reshape the legislative framework regulating abortion with the ultimate goal of making the procedure illegal. It is often assumed that influencing public opinion is a critical pre-condition of any legislative change. In actuality, the activities taken by pro-life groups need not depend on strong public support. The very nature of pluralist democracy allows these groups to apply pressure for their preferred public policy outcomes, despite what the public wants. Public support is, of course, preferred to outright opposition, hence the attempts to sway the people in favor of anti-abortion bills (chapter 6). However, given the current legislative guidelines, the endorsement of 100,000 citizens is sufficient to initiate the procedural mechanism of legislative change.

From the Catholic Church’s perspective, pro-life groups in Poland suffer from two significant limitations. First, the movement is marked by a high degree of fragmentation and competition. It is difficult to identify the exact causes that contribute to such state of affairs, but part of the explanation can be found in the different tactics used by these groups. Putting up billboards with aborted fetuses is highly controversial and not every pro-life group thinks this is the best strategy to make abortion illegal. Catholic bishops too have expressed their reservations about such strategy, but because since pro-life groups are autonomous, they get to decide how they want to spend their resources.

The fragmentation also occurs at the level of individuals. A group or a project that receives PBC’s official endorsement is essentially assured to receive extensive media coverage. This consequently means that leaders of these groups are thrust into the public spotlight. Such individuals take part in important TV programs; give radio and newspaper interviews, and participate in national and international conferences. Banning abortion is what pro-life groups might have in common, but not every group participates in this process
equally. It is easy to see how taking a back seat might be difficult for ambitious leaders who want to be in the public spotlight as well. Acting on principle is undoubtedly what motivates most pro-lifers, but self-interest considerations do play an important, if hidden or suppressed, role.

The two most important pro-life leaders in Poland are Kaja Godek and Mariusz Dzierżawski. Godek used to work in Dzierżawski’s Pro Foundation until their cooperation ended in October 2015. Godek ended up starting her own pro-life group (Foundation Life and Family). The two foundations are the most important pro-life groups in Poland; they are responsible for organizing and supervising the last two and largest anti-abortion initiatives in Polish democratic history (chapter 6). It remains unclear what lead to the breakup, but self-interest and competition likely played at least a minimal role. Here is what Godek posted on her Facebook page on October 24, 2015:

I regret to inform you that a few weeks ago, by the decision of Mariusz Dzierżawski, I was removed from the board of the Pro-Foundation and removed from the influence on the organization. Two days ago, I received an e-mail from Mr. Dzierżawski, from which it appears that I was expelled from the foundation altogether. These are unfair and incomprehensible decisions for me (the more so because I am in advanced pregnancy), however, they have been made (Godek 2015).

Godek, however, did not waste much time and by June 2017 had secured the PBC’s official endorsement for her anti-abortion bill.

The fragmentation is also manifested at the group level. Founded in 1992, the Polish Federation of Life Defense movement consists of 130 unique pro-life groups (PFROŻ 2018). To coordinate activities of 130 different and sometimes competing groups is no easy task, and as we have seen already seen, this chore is often left to the Church. The overall result of these different types of fragmentations (i.e., in strategy, individual, organizational) is that
the PBC has to facilitate and coordinate anti-abortion efforts. This, however, leads to another and perhaps a more severe problem for the Church.

Not only is fragmentation inefficient, but it also decreases the overall likelihood of anti-abortion measures being successfully adopted. This is especially important if we consider that every time the Church officially approves a particular anti-abortion project, it exposes itself to public criticism from groups and political parties that favor a pro-choice stance. Poland might be Catholic, but it is also pluralistic, and this presupposes a variety of different groups and opinions. Not everyone agrees that abortion should be outlawed and pro-choice groups are relevant political actors, even though their efforts are not reflected in public policy outcomes (Chapter 6).

From a doctrinal point of view, the Church has no option but to say that abortion is immoral and should not be allowed (Chapter 2). From an institutional point of view, however, Catholic bishops think hard about whether a particular anti-abortion measure has a chance of being politically successful. Endorsing an anti-abortion project is associated with putting the institutional interest of the Church at risk because bishops are seen as intervening in politics, for example. This is why direct institutional access is preferred to overt political participation (Grzymała-Busse 2015). If an overt political action has to be taken, bishops prefer a quick policy victory over a prolonged effort that either ultimately fails or is only partially successful. So although fragmentation creates numerous institutional challenges (e.g., coordination), its main drawback is that it makes public policy victory less likely (chapter 6).

**Conclusion**

This chapter focuses on the relevant macro-level variables and institutions because individual political agents, regardless of their political power, operate within clearly defined
and constrained environments. Thus, much of the analysis presented in this chapter provides both a historical and comparative view of how the Church became a political powerhouse in Poland. Secondly, the chapter also outlines how the political scene in Poland has been reshaped since the early 2000s, while also underscoring the implications of this realignment for the Church and its quest to secure Catholic friendly public policy outcomes. Finally, the chapter looks at the pro-life movements in Poland. While the movement is well represented from an organizational point of view, the environment these groups operate in is marked by a high degree of competition which overall decreases the possibility of making abortion law more restrictive.
CHAPTER VI

PROCESS TRACING ANALYSIS

This chapter process traces three public policy outcomes—abortion policy, Sunday trade ban, and religious instruction in public schools—to demonstrate how the Catholic Church achieved its policy preferences in Poland. In doing so this chapter situates individual actors within broader institutional framework that shapes their political environment. The Polish Catholic Church emerges as a strategic institution that adjusts its political strategies to the political environment it operates in. The strategies used by the Church correspond in turn to the findings yielded by cross-sectional QCA analysis. Thus in the early 1990s, the Church took advantage of the fragmented party system to roll back abortion on demand and institutionalize Catholic education in public schools. When the party system consolidated, the Church turned to conservative Law and Justice party and pro-life groups to continually press for restriction of already limited abortion laws and keep abortion-liberalizing bills off the political agenda. Furthermore, in 2018 the Church secured another policy concession by successfully banning trade on Sundays, and it thus demonstrated that its political influence is not limited to the early democratic period when both the electorate and the media were distracted (Grzymała-Busse 2015, 147). The Catholic Church in Poland remains a formidable institution even three decades after democratization. Finally, the blend of the strong position of the Law and Justice party (PiS) combined with the institutional provision for referendums is sufficient for the Church to keep its current public policy gains in place. The analysis offered here also corroborates the expectation that the Church will pursue legal restrictions on abortion laws, even if such actions violate its institutional self-interest. The Episcopate, however, has not allowed pro-life groups to
outflank it from the right and has retained the ultimate control over the direction of Catholicism in Poland.

**Abortion**

Abortion legislation in Poland underwent significant changes from the time the procedure was made available upon request in 1956 by the communist regime. The momentous change came in 1993 when the Church struck a major policy victory, effectively abolishing the procedure. A series of failed political and legal attempts to challenge the law actually made it more robust. By 2010, the Church decided to depend on pro-life groups to pressure for its policy concessions while continuing to shape abortion policy debate in Poland. Over the last eight years, the overall trajectory of policymaking is to make the procedure even more restrictive. Moreover, the current Church-supported proposal to ban the so-called eugenic abortion has a very high chance of further restricting Polish abortion laws once again.

**Communism (1945-1989)**

The communist era in Poland (1945-1989) had many drawbacks ranging from the lack of political competition to suppression of individual and religious freedoms. From the point of view of policymaking, communism did not allow for proper contestation of public outcomes. The communist party, unconstrained by the democratic rules of the game had total control over policymaking. This created a distinct challenge for the Polish Church. Since government decisions could not be contested procedurally, the Episcopate had to revert to symbolic actions and appeal directly to the consciousness of individual Poles. These, however, were poor substitutes for the Church seeking to shape public policy outcomes in accordance with Catholic doctrine.
Even when policy concessions were granted, they were usually short-lived and easily revoked (Grzymała-Busse 2015, 155). Since the communist rule was not legitimate, the party in power faced reoccurring periods of domestic unrest. Confronted with an internal disturbance, the regime would reach out to the Church with a plea to stabilize the turbulence, offering policy concessions in return. Such was the case in 1956, for example, during the workers’ revolt in Poznań. Eberts explains:

> In exchange for the Church’s cooperation, the authorities signed a new agreement with the Episcopate in December 1956. Among other things, the agreement reinstated the Church’s control over its internal affairs and appointments. Shortly afterwards, however, the regime curbed the privileges recently granted to the Church, including banning religious education from public schools. This pattern continued throughout the communist period (1998, 819).

One consequence of the increased interaction between the regime and the Episcopate was that their meetings became institutionalized through the use of the Joint Commission officially established on April 14, 1950.42

> When in 1956 the communist regime institutionalized what amounted to abortion on demand there was little that the Church or anybody else could do about it. From 1945 to 1956 the Church experienced the highest degree of coercive oppression (Nowak 2011; see also chapter 5). While banning abortion is high on Catholic bishops’ list of priorities, in the 1950s the Church was merely trying to survive. In democracies, conflict is institutionalized; in non-democracies it is not and that matters greatly for the political actors involved (Przeworski 1999). In 1953 alone Primate Wyszyński was placed under house arrest; eight other bishops along with 900 priests were also imprisoned (Eberts 1998, 819). Also, the communist regime made a conscious and systematic effort to infiltrate the Church with the

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42 The Commission outlived its initial context and continues to provide an official link between the Polish Bishops’ Conference and the government.
so-called “patriotic priests” whose job was to destroy the institution from within (Szajkowski 1983, 16).

Spending three years under house arrest (1953-56) gave Primate Wyszyński a lot of time to think about how to best challenge communism. It was then when Wyszyński came up with an original plan to start the “Great Novena,” launching the event in 1957, a year after his release from house arrest:

Conceived as a nine-year cycle of prayer and building bonds between the church and society, the Novena was ostensibly a celebration of a thousand years since the baptism of Poland—and thus the obvious alternative to the secular communist celebrations of a thousand years of Polish statehood set for 1966. The Novena was a call to renewed religious commitment, made manifest by repeated pilgrimages to the holy shrine of Our Lady of Czestochowa (the Black Madonna) and subsequently the pilgrimage of the venerated portrait of the Black Madonna across Poland, and into every parish (Grzymała-Busse 2015, 151).

The Novena was a hugely important event in Polish politics, both at the time when it occurred and for the years to come: “[the Novena] was the early innovator in the postwar cycle, one that established a symbolic and tactical paradigm for contention—a master frame” (Osa 1997, 351).

Abortion was not forgotten during the Novena. Each year of the nine-year cycle was dedicated to a specific religious promise and pastoral activities for that year were organized around that theme. In the 1959-1960 period, abortion was the focus as signified by the promise “We swear to stand on the guard of an awakening life” (Fundacja Karta 1960).

Official statements released by the Polish Bishops’ Conference accompanied the religious activities planned for that year. In one such pastoral letter read out in every parish during the first Sunday of lent in 1960, the bishops instructed millions of Poles that:

We will fight in defense of every child and every cradle as brave as our Fathers fought for the existence and freedom of the Nation, paying with their own blood. We are ready to die rather than to inflict death on the unarmed. We will consider
the gift of life as the greatest grace of the Father of all life and as the most precious treasure of the Nation (Fundacja Karta 1960, 1).

A common theme of official Catholic pronouncements during the communist period was that they equated “restricting abortion with national interest” (Grzymała-Busse 2015, 171).

As the level of oppression against the Church subsided, Catholic bishops became even more vocal in their opposition to abortion. This was especially true in the 1970s because only then did the Catholic Church “move beyond self-defense and began to speak out more forcefully in defense of human rights” (Anderson 2003, 144; see also Grzymała-Busse 2015, 152). In 1974, Cardinal Wojtyła43 “blasted the ‘tremendous threat to family life’ represented by the regime’s pro-abortion policies: ‘We are afraid that it may so happen in our country that more lives are terminated than propagated. That would lead to incalculable and disastrous consequences’” (Weigel 2010, 85).

Between 1945 and 1989 the two primary goals of Polish bishops were first to ensure institutional survival (especially in the immediate post-war years 1945-1956), and secondly to challenge the communist regime after the Church secured at least a modicum of institutional autonomy (after 1956). In the early post-war period, abortion was not the focal point of Church’s political agenda because the communist regime was using coercive powers of the state to undermine the very existence of the Catholic Church. In the early communist period, the Church was merely trying to survive. Lay Catholics and clergy were able to withstand this initial onslaught, and over time became more institutionally secure, and began challenging the communist party more openly.

Still, the lack of democratic rules of the game meant that public policy outcomes were not open for proper contestation. The Church was seeking greater religious freedom

43 Wojtyła was elevated to a cardinal in 1967.
broadly conceived (Weigel 2004; 2010) although abortion remained of particular concern for the Polish bishops. Even when policy concessions were made, they were quickly revoked, as the communist party was not accountable to either voters or other institutions. Thus when Poland began its transition to democracy, abortion was still available on demand. The Church, however, acquired both a great degree of moral authority and direct institutional access through the Joint Commission, and when Christian Democratic parties started to form and lay Catholics became more politically active the Church was sensing its opportunity to restrict abortion on demand.

**Early Democracy (1989-2010)**
Chapter 5 demonstrated how religious and political identities in Poland became fused. Because the Polish Episcopate offered an effective form of resistance to communism, religious and political identities in Poland became fused over a short period of time (Grzymała-Busse and Slater 2018; see also Chapter 5). These developments allowed the Church to grow its institutional structures and use them for political purposes. Moreover, through its resistance to communism the Church was able to acquire a high level of moral authority. The very high levels of moral authority that the Church was able to acquire were reflected in public opinion data from the early transition period:

National opinion polls conducted shortly after the collapse of the old regime showed over 90 percent of the respondents, virtually regardless of socioeconomic status, age, and urban or rural place of residence, declaring support for the Catholic Church and appreciation for its contributions to Poland’s ‘national liberation’ (Morawska 1995, 61).

The communists understood both the religious salience and political importance of abortion. When it was becoming increasingly clear that non-democracy in Poland was on its last legs, the communist regime attempted to use abortion as means to fragment the political opposition. Thus in 1988, the communists invited the Church to re-negotiate the
1956 liberal abortion law (Gowin 1995, 105). The proposal put forth by the Church was extremely restrictive. It sought both to completely outlaw abortion and criminalize it.

The proposal was completed in May 1989, a month before the semi-free elections agreed to during the Round Table negotiations. Since politicians were focused on the next election, the bill would not be signed until 1993 and in a slightly modified form. Going forward, however, the bill would serve as a baseline for any subsequent negotiations on the topic (Grzymała-Busse 2015, 173). It would take another four years before abortion on demand would be eliminated, but already in September 1990, the upper chamber (the Senat) approved an anti-abortion measure that would allow the procedure only if it were necessary to save a woman’s life. In 1991 a new and this time fully free parliamentary election was held. The election resulted in a very fragmented Sejm (the lower chamber), which consisted of 29 parties with 11 of them having just one deputy. Christian Democratic parties with close ties to the Church were well represented and their power was particularly significant given the overall level of political fragmentation: “In the freely elected but deeply fractured new Parliament, the Christian National Union (ZChN) and the Center Alliance parties, both supporting the Church, together won about 20 percent of seats” (Kulczycki 1995, 484).

The restructuring of power in the Polish Sejm allowed the Church to pressure for policy change on abortion. Some deputies wanted to settle the question of abortion via referendum, but the Episcopate rejected such a solution (Gowin 1995, 108). Such actions are consistent with the view that referendums are veto players and help promote policy stability rather than policy change (Hug and Tsebelis 2002). Since Polish bishops were interested in policy change as opposed to policy stability, they correctly understood that an institutionalized presence of Christian Democratic parties in the Polish Sejm combined with
pressures from Catholic groups offers them a better chance to make abortion law more restrictive than a referendum. Kulczycki (1995, 483) observes: "The hierarchy's offensive was supported by the concerted action of many politicians who assumed the Church's mantle; the mobilization of anti-abortion groups; and the co-opting of the medical sector" (Kulczycki 1995, 483).

When the abortion bill was finally passed in January 1993, the legislation allowed for abortion in three specific circumstances: (1) when mother’s life or health is in danger, (2) when the fetus is damaged, (3) when pregnancy is a result of a criminal act (e.g., rape, incest). After almost four decades of abortion on demand, the Church struck a major policy victory, and the new legislation has had profound consequences: “As a result of this law, the number of legal abortions performed annually in Poland fell a thousandfold, from over 100,000 in 1988 to only 312 a decade later. The official abortion rate plunged from 18% to 0.07% of all pregnancies" (Grzymała-Busse 2015, 1-2).

Even though the Episcopate struck a major policy victory, bishops were not entirely satisfied. Allowing for the three exceptions made the Episcopate uneasy. Furthermore, leaders of the Church recognized that in a democracy public policy gains need to be actively defended and when possible made more robust. That is why “the Polish Primate, Cardinal Józef Glemp, referred to the law as only ‘a step in the right direction' since it did not fulfill the Church's wishes completely” (Eberts 1998, 824).

Indeed, the law would come under attack after the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) composed mainly of former communists won the 1994 parliamentary elections. Their first attempt to liberalize abortion by allowing the procedure in “difficult life situations” was vetoed by profoundly Catholic President Lech Wałęsa who “cited the thousand years of Christian tradition in Poland as one of his reasons” behind the veto (Grzymała-Busse 2015,
Another attempt was made in 1996 when the SLD controlled the Sejm and a different President, Aleksander Kwaśniewski—also a former communist—signed a law that would allow abortion for hardship reasons. The attempt was met with enormous criticism from the Polish Episcopate, while high-ranking bishops threatened excommunication to anybody who sympathized with the new law (Grzymała-Busse 2015, 176). The Constitutional Tribunal deemed the new law unconstitutional, thus further cementing the restrictive abortion law in Poland. The two failed attempts to liberalize abortion not only made the current law more robust, they also communicated loudly and clearly that “anything to do with the sphere of procreation and sex (contraceptives, education, IVF, abortion) is the domain of the Church” (Grzymała-Busse 2015, 176).

The Constitutional Tribunal found grounds to deem abortion for hardship reasons as unconstitutional because the Church was able to shape the wording of the Polish Constitution when it was being created. The Episcopate pressed for several specific demands, including: (1) reference to God in the preamble, (2) protection of human life from conception until death, (3) exclusive recognition that marriage can only be granted to members of the opposite sex, and (4) recognition of wide-ranging Christian values as defined by the Church (Eberts 1998, 834). The Polish Constitution ratified in 1997 was drafted when the anti-religious SLD controlled both the parliament and presidency. Still, the Church was able to obtain many concessions because of the widespread fear “that bishops and oppositional groups would appeal to society to reject the Constitution in the referendum” (Waniek 2011, 339). The final document guaranteed religious education in schools and defined marriage as between a man and a woman, and the Constitution also states that “the Republic of Poland guarantees each person legal protection of life” (Eberts
Thus even when the party in power was not Catholic-friendly, the Church was able to shape the overall framework of the democratic rules of the game. Given the wording of the Constitution and the subsequent ruling of the Constitutional Tribunal, from a legal point of view abortion on demand is precluded from a set of potential public policy outcomes. The Church was able to effectively foreclose this policy choice and take it off the political agenda.

The SLD lost power in 1997 giving way to a more Catholic-friendly government headed by the Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS), but in 2001 the SLD found itself in power once again. This time the Church would prove to be even more effective in preventing any liberalization of abortion. In fact, the Episcopate effectively took abortion off the SLD’s agenda when it recognized that its support was indispensable for Poland’s accession to the European Union. The widely held fear was that in the accession referendum, the Church would call on its faithful to reject the accession, understanding this the Church offered to back accession only if the abortion law remained unchanged and after being assured that abortion would stay exclusively under domestic (not international) control (Grzymała-Busse 2015, 176). In March 2003, two months before the accession referendum, President Kwaśniewski (himself an atheist) went to the Vatican along with 20,000 other Poles to seek John Paul’s II official endorsement. In his official remarks, the President stated “There would be no Polish freedom without the Pope-Pole, without his vision, attitude and action,” while Pope John Paul reciprocated with a decisive endorsement of the accession process that the SLD and the President were actively seeking: “entering the structures of the European Union on an equal footing with other countries is an expression of some historical justice for our nation and the Slavic nations’ brothers, and on the other, it may constitute an enrichment
for Europe” (Barankiewicz 2003). Poland entered structures of the European Union on May 1, 2004 with abortion laws remaining intact.

**Mature Democracy (2010-present)**

**Abortion Policy Making from 2010 to 2015**

By the time Pope John Paul II died in 2005, Poland had one of the most restrictive abortion laws among economically developed democracies, comparable only to those present in Ireland and Chile. After a series of failed liberalization attempts sponsored by the left-leaning SLD party, the abortion law in Poland was actually made more robust, especially after the Constitutional Tribunal held in 1997 that allowing abortion for hardship reasons is unconstitutional. John Paul’s death was not unexpected as the Pope was becoming increasingly ill towards the last years of his pontificate. Nonetheless, his departure has had profound consequences for the Catholic Church in general and for the Polish Church particularly. Given his many pastoral and political accomplishments, no other Polish bishop or a group of bishops could ever fill the void left by the departed Pope. In 2015—ten years after his death—a staggering 95% of Poles declared that John Paul II continued to be an important moral authority figure in their life. The percentage drops to 84% when respondents were asked about the moral authority of Pope Francis. Furthermore, 43% of respondents stated that they often or very often thought and talked about John Paul II, while 64% of Poles admitted that they pray to him asking for specific favors (CBOS 2015).

After the Pope's death in 2005, the Polish Church was on a path to decentralization as no single bishops would be able to overshadow the Polish Church in a way that John Paul II did. The new equilibrium took some time to crystallize, manifesting itself in 2010 when the first anti-abortion bill was being drafted and promoted by a pro-life group. Since 2010 the strategy of the Church and pro-life groups has been to continuously propose legislation that
is in line with the Catholic teaching on abortion and to make the already restrictive legal framework even more orthodox. The primary mechanism through which this was to be achieved - Citizens’ Legislative Initiative (CLI) - was available since the Polish Constitution was ratified in 1997 but the Church and pro-life groups did not use the instrument until 2010.\footnote{Article 118 (paragraph 2 sentence 1) of the Polish Constitution stipulates that legislation can be introduced by a group of at least 100,000 citizens having the right to vote in election to the Sejm (Szczypiński 2016, 156; see also Chapter 5).} Two factors help explain why CLIs were only later identified as a potential route to policy concessions. First, political actors need time to learn the democratic rules of the game, and thus: “As of the end of the seventh term of the Sejm (2015) there have been [only] 144 citizens’ legislative initiatives, since the implementation of this instrument” (Szczypiński 2016, 159). Moreover, collecting the required 100,000 signatures in three months requires both significant member mobilization and organization support. Out of 84 initiatives launched between 2007-2015, “only 36 cases gathered 100,000 signatures, and they were presented in draft bill form to the Speaker of the Sejm” (Szczypiński 2016, 159).

The increasing use of CLIs by pro-life groups thus follows a broader pattern of Polish civil society becoming more active in the legislative arena by learning the democratic rules of the game and adjusting its organization resources accordingly. The institutional support offered by the Church was also indispensable in collecting the required number of signatures.

Secondly, the Polish pro-life environment continues to be heavily influenced by the experience of their American counterparts. Although since Roe v Wade (1973) abortion in the US has been available on demand, pro-life groups in America developed a variety of grassroots methods that Polish groups found useful and readily adopted. Bernard Nathanson, Gregg Cunningham, and John C. Willke are the well-known American pro-life activists whose influence was specifically cited during the interview process (Dzierżawski... }
2017); all three of them visited Poland on numerous occasions to share their experience of fighting abortion on demand in America. Nathanson was “one of the pioneers of the movement to legalize abortion in the United States, and by his own admission, Nathanson personally performed more than 60,000 abortion […]” (Pearce 2013, 196). He later converted to Catholicism and directed The Silent Scream, an anti-abortion educational film that is also often shown in Polish public schools during religious instructions classes. When addressing a group of Polish pro-life activists in 2004, Cunningham made references to civil rights and anti-Vietnam movements, and their use of graphic images to shock American public about the true dangers of racisms and napalm bombing. Thus when posters sponsored by the Pro Foundation depicted Hitler next to graphic images of fetuses, Dzierżawski said, "We did not create these tactics," and continued, “I was able to learn what was going on in the States. And I kept him [Cunningham] up to date as to what we were up to in Poland.” The two continue to regularly stay in touch (Gross 2016).

Table 15 outlines every bill related to restrictions or liberalization of abortion introduced between 2010 and 2015. Since 2010 pro-life groups and consequently the Polish Episcopate went on the offensive, pursuing public policy concessions through overt politicking and making use of Citizens’ Legislative Initiative (CLI) combined with public campaigns that aimed at shock value.
### Table 15. Pro-life and Pro-choice Bills Introduced Between 2011 and 2015

#### 2011 bill to completely outlaw abortion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Introduced by</th>
<th>Signsatures (N)</th>
<th>Votes (N)</th>
<th>Reject</th>
<th>Approve</th>
<th>Abstention</th>
<th>Did not vote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pro Foundation via CLI</td>
<td>600,000</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>382</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
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<td>PIS</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>136</td>
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</table>

#### 2012 bill to liberalize abortion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Introduced by</th>
<th>Signsatures (N)</th>
<th>Votes (N)</th>
<th>Reject</th>
<th>Approve</th>
<th>Abstention</th>
<th>Did not vote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Palikot’s Movement party</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>432</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIS</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

#### 2012 bill to outlaw eugenic abortion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Introduced by</th>
<th>Signsatures (N)</th>
<th>Votes (N)</th>
<th>Reject</th>
<th>Approve</th>
<th>Abstention</th>
<th>Did not vote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Poland party</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>439</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>PIS</td>
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<td>129</td>
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#### 2013 bill to outlaw eugenic abortion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Introduced by</th>
<th>Signsatures (N)</th>
<th>Votes (N)</th>
<th>Reject</th>
<th>Approve</th>
<th>Abstention</th>
<th>Did not vote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pro Foundation via CLI</td>
<td>450,000</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>421</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIS</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

#### 2015 bill to completely outlaw abortion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Introduced by</th>
<th>Signsatures (N)</th>
<th>Votes (N)</th>
<th>Reject</th>
<th>Approve</th>
<th>Abstention</th>
<th>Did not vote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pro Foundation via CLI</td>
<td>400,000</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>394</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>PIS</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
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CLI = citizens’ legislative initiative (min. 100,000 signatures required)
Sources: Kratiuk (2017) and sejm.gov.pl

The Pro-Foundation was at the front of the legislative struggle against abortion in Poland. Between 2010 and 2015 the foundation introduced three major bills seeking to make the procedure more difficult to obtain. Since the current law allows for abortion in only three cases—(1) when pregnancy is a result of a criminal act, (2) when life/health of the mother is threatened, and (3) when fetus is damaged—the proposed bills sought either to restrict abortion altogether or to strike down the third exception which allows for the
procedure in Down syndrome cases. Efforts to eliminate only the third exception are usually referred to as attempts to eradicate eugenic abortion. The major difficulty for pro-life movements was that from 2007 to 2015, the centrist Civic Platform (PO) and its smaller coalition partner Polish People’s Party (PSL) controlled the government. As a centrist party, PO is not interested in making abortion more restrictive; its party program from 2016, for example, states: “Politicians in power have no right to condemn citizens to suffering in the name of their own ideology. Therefore, we strongly oppose the tightening of abortion laws” (Platforma Obywateksa 2016, 5).

The first anti-abortion bill proposed in 2011 aimed to make abortion completely illegal. The Pro-Foundation collected 600,000 signatures—six times the required limit—and the vote in Sejm was scheduled for 31 of August 2011. The results of voting proved to be much closer than anyone could have predicted. The bill was rejected by only five votes, with 191 votes against the bill and 186 for it (Table 15). The Church came within six votes of making abortion wholly illegal. Several factors help explain why the voting was so close in the PO dominated Sejm. First, 78 out of 460 Deputies did not show up for voting that day, and this included 31 PO deputies. Moreover, the conservative wing of the party (15 deputies) and 22 out of 31 PSL deputies also voted for the bill. PiS for its part voted overwhelmingly in favor of the proposal (136 out of 146 votes), with 10 deputies not being present. Had six of ten PiS deputies showed up in Sejm that day and voted along the party line, the bill would have passed.

The impact of the 2011 bill is not to be underestimated. The close voting margins gave pro-life groups a boost of confidence that making abortion illegal in democratic Poland is within their reach. Pro-life groups in Poland and especially the Pro Foundation were re-energized, and the value of CLIs as a useful pressure mechanism was immediately
confirmed. The close vote also signaled important ramifications for political parties. Despite official party programs that might declare a lack of support for restricting abortion, it became evident that individual deputies might not want to vote against their Catholic beliefs. In October 2011 new parliamentary elections were held. PO's and PSL's seat share remained mostly intact, and the two parties once again formed a coalition government.

In 2012 two smaller political parties wanted to make a name for themselves by sponsoring two competing abortion legislations. The Palikot’s Movement sought to make abortion on demand available until the 12th week of pregnancy. This proposal was soundly defeated by a vote of 365 to 60. In addition to PiS deputies staunchly opposing the measure, the PO – the largest party in Sejm – rejected it almost unanimously. The PO’s party program declared its unwillingness to restrict abortion, but the party was also not in favor of liberalizing it. The Palikot’s Movement found itself marginalized and by the time of next parliamentary election in 2015 it disappeared from the political scene in Poland.

The similarly small United Poland party (16 deputies) went in the other direction. It wanted to make a name for itself by outflanking PiS from the right and committed itself to voting in accordance with Catholic doctrine on moral issues, and in 2012 it sponsored its own an anti-abortion bill. The legislation was less comprehensive than the one proposed by the Pro Foundation a year earlier as it sought to limit abortion only in cases when a fetus was damaged. The party hoped that a less comprehensive bill would have a higher chance of passing. This time, however, the vote was not as close, and the measure was defeated by a vote of 245 to 184. Despite the loss, a general pattern of voting was starting to crystallize. PiS once again supported the bill overwhelmingly with 129 members voting in its favor (7 deputies were not present). Once again no PiS deputy voted against restricting abortion, and this pattern would also hold later. Furthermore, the conservative wing of PO once again
voted according to their Catholic conscience (14 deputies) and so did 20 out of 28 PSL deputies.

The wider margin of defeat in the 2012 voting has to be understood within a broader context of parliamentary politics. First, the composition of Sejm changed after the 2011 election, most notably with the anti-clerical Palikot’s Movement (RP) winning 43 seats which consequently translated to 42 votes against the measure (1 member was not present). Secondly, in 2012 only 21 deputies did not show up to vote, and while 31 PO deputies were not present in 2011, that number fell to 9 in 2012. The size of the conservative wing of the party has remained roughly the same, but given the higher voting ratio within the party, its impact became less significant in 2012. Finally, from a political point of view defeating a bill sponsored by another political party was less costly than going against a proposal sponsored by thousands of citizens. Measures initiated by citizens were interpreted as expressions of the general will and CLIs as mechanisms of participatory democracy. One of the reasons why PO lost the 2015 presidential and parliament election is precisely because the party has been viewed as consistently ignoring important citizen initiatives (Szczypiński 2016). It is then no accident that in the 2015 campaign PiS committed itself to carefully consider ever citizen-sponsored bill that will collect the required number of signatures.

In 2013 the Pro Foundation made an attempt to eliminate eugenic abortion once again. The widely held belief was that it would be more difficult for Sejm to defeat a legislation sponsored by citizens. The margin of defeat in 2013 was only slightly better compared to that of 2012 and by then a general pattern of abortion voting appeared to be fully consolidated. PiS being the major opposition party once again underscored its Catholic credentials by overwhelmingly supporting the bill and the Pro Foundation could once again count on 14 PO votes and most PSL deputies. It was also clear, however, that for anti-
abortion measures to have a realistic chance of being passed the composition of Sejm would have to change.

By 2015 it was increasingly clear that PO is on its way out and the PiS is about to take power, although few would have been able to predict that PiS would gain a majority of parliamentary seats. Recognizing that the PiS is likely to be the ruling party after the 2015 parliamentary election, the Pro-Foundation took an unprecedented step and organized another campaign to completely ban abortion. The campaign to collect signatures was timed so that the bill would be voted on in September, a month before the next parliamently election. Thus the scope of the bill and its timing were deliberate. The initiative had little chance of being successfully passed, but it offered a form of a litmus test. On the eve of its unprecedented political victory, the bill forced PiS to once again demonstrate its allegiance to Catholic doctrine on abortion. PiS deputies did not disappoint; 130 out of 134 members supported the bill and no deputy voted against it.

**Summary of the Period**

From 2010 to 2015 four anti-abortion bills were proposed, three of them by pro-life groups closely cooperating with the Church. The overall trajectory of abortion policy in Poland was thus unmistakable; despite its already restrictive law, pro-life groups were continuously pushing to make it more restrictive. The one abortion-liberalizing bill did not gain much traction in Sejm, while also leading to the eventual disintegration of the sponsoring party given its firm anti-religious commitments. After 2010 CLIs were permanently incorporated into the political toolbox of pro-life groups in Poland. With the Church's support, the required 100,000 signatures were easy to collect, and the mechanisms allowed the anti-abortion bills to be presented as expressions of the general will and therefore making them politically costly to ignore. When PiS obtained parliamentary control
in late October 2015, the Church and pro-life groups had good reasons to hope for future policy victories. As we will see, however, pro-choice groups learned from the pro-life movement and also began to use CLIs as mechanisms to prevent further restriction of abortion laws. PiS for its part would learn that it is much easier to demonstrate its Catholic orientation when the vote is not binding.

**The Stop Abortion I Campaign (2015 - 2016)**

The 2015 presidential and parliamentary elections have re-structured the balance of power of Polish politics. From 2015 both the executive and legislative branches of government were controlled by PiS. The party merged with two smaller groups, the United Poland Party responsible for initiating the anti-abortion bill in 2012 and the Poland Together party to win 235 seats with only 37.5% of votes. This re-alignment offered new hopes for the Church and pro-life groups as the party in power was publicly committed to supporting Catholic morality and religious values.

The Pro Foundation began to prepare a new bill in late 2015. The initiative was named “Stop Abortion (Stop Aborcji)” and the next campaign would be even more comprehensive in scope, not only aiming to completely ban abortion but also criminalizing it with up to five-year prison term. The bill also included a variety of additional measures including economic benefits to pregnant mothers, liberalization of adoption laws, and a number of educational programs among others. To gain a wide-ranging support a series of meetings began to take place, starting in November 2015. The meetings were organized and

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45 In November 2017 Poland Together transformed itself into the Alliance party increasing the number of its deputies from 9 to 12. Electoral rules in Poland allow candidates to switch party membership once in office. Deputy Mieczysław Baszko, for example, was elected from Polish People’s Party (PSL) list only to join the Alliance party in 2017. Although such occurrences are rare, PiS has increased the overall number of its deputies from 235 in 2015 to 237 in 2018 without new elections being held. The total number of deputies is nonetheless fixed at 460 members.
facilitated by the National Center for the Pastoral Care of Families which falls under the
direct supervision of Polish Bishops' Conference. Father Przemysław Drąg directs the center
and was charged with bringing the fragmented pro-life movement together. By his account,
the first meeting in particular focused not on the initiative but on resolving past tensions
between different groups and individuals (Drąg 2017).

In addition to many pro-life organizations, a conservative Institute for Legal Culture
named Ordo Iuris was also invited. Ordo Iuris’ lawyers were charged with creating the legal
framework of the bill, while the Pro-Foundation would focus on collecting the required
number of signatures. Finally, Antoni Szymański, a senator representing the PiS, was also
invited. In addition to being a current senator, Szymański was also the Vice President of the
Polish Federation of life defense movements (PFROŻ), the umbrella organization responsible
for coordination activities of pro-life groups. He was invited to serve as a link between PiS
and pro-life activists. It would not take long, however, for the irreconcilable differences that
plague the pro-life movement to resurface.

On December 16, 2015, Szymański objected to the proposal being created and
stopped participating in the meetings. Other participants had their doubts about the
criminalization of abortion. When the measure was finally voted on, it passed but a number
of pro-life groups refused to be associated with the campaign going forward (Kratiuk 2017,
47). The insistence on penalizing abortion fractured the already fragmented pro-life
movement. PFROŻ too would no longer be associated with the bill. Criminalization of
abortion was so controversial that PFROŻ decided to start its own anti-abortion campaign,
focused on more traditional pressure group activities (letter writing, calling, petitions) and
not on the use of CLI. This inevitably weakened the bill sponsored by the Pro Foundation
and Ordo Iuris. PFROŻ launched its own media campaign and its representatives met with
Catholic bishops to promote their approach while speaking against the bill created by the Pro Foundation in the process. When leaders of the “Stop Abortion” initiative met with the caucus head of the Law and Justice Party, PFROŻ representatives were there as well. Hence by March 2016 two competing anti-abortion campaigns were being advocated.\textsuperscript{46} The insistence that abortion needs to be criminalized made the “Stop Abortion” initiative very controversial from the outset. Despite internal opposition to its ideas, the Pro-Foundation and Ordo Iuris decided not to compromise, and criminalization of the procedure remained in the bill. Thus the Pro-Foundation, Ordo Iuris, began outflanking the Polish political scene and the Church from the right. The bill proposed by them was very radical, but both groups believed that this was a gamble they were willing to make, but their chance backfired.

The Church soon started to issue calls to restrict abortion laws. On March 30, 2016, the Presidium of the PBC released a statement on the full protection of human life:

\begin{quote}
Everybody’s life is protected by the fifth commandment of the Decalogue: ‘Do not kill!’ Therefore, the position of Catholics in this regard is clear and unchanging: the life of every human being must be protected from conception to natural death. In the matter of protecting the life of the unborn, one cannot stop at the current compromise expressed in the Act of January 7, 1993, which in three cases allows for abortion. Hence, in the 1050th anniversary of the Baptism of Poland, we turn to all people of good will, to believers and non-believers, to take action aimed at the full legal protection of the life of the unborn. We ask parliamentarians and governors to take legislative initiatives and launch programs that would provide specific help for the parents of children who are ill, disabled and have been raped. All Poles are asking for prayer for the full protection of human life from conception to natural death both in our homeland and beyond its borders (PBC 2016).
\end{quote}

This statement was read in every Polish parish on the first Sunday after Easter. Almost immediately top PiS politicians endorsed restricting abortion. The Law and Justice party

\textsuperscript{46} Since the PFROŻ project was submitted as a petition, the 100,000 signatures were not required. The drawback of petitions is that they do not have to be formally voted on by the Sejm. The plan was officially submitted to one of the Sejm committees in September 2016. By July 2017 PiS effectively stopped working on it with barely any public mention. From its inception, the PFROŻ legislation was taking a back seat (in terms of media coverage) to the approach taken by the Pro Foundation and Ordo Iuris.
leader, Jarosław Kaczyński stated publicly “I am a Catholic and therefore I must take into account in my decisions on moral matters the teachings of bishops.” During an interview Prime Minister Beata Szydło added “As for my opinion, yes I support this [anti-abortion] initiative” (quoted in Kratiuk 2017, 55). President Duda was equally committal: “As Andrzej Duda, I have always said that I am for pro-life […]” (quoted in Kratiuk 2017, 73).

Privately, however, PiS leaders were very concerned about any proposal that would further destabilize the already shaky political situation. Almost immediately after winning elections, PiS began a series of highly controversial reforms of the Constitutional Court. Its attempts to pack the Court with party loyalists were met with strong domestic opposition and harsh international condemnation. Party leaders believed that the very controversial anti-abortion bill would only add fuel to the fire. On March 21, 2016, just before Easter media outlets reported that Kaczyński and Szydło met privately with the Chairman of the Polish Bishops' Conference Archbishop Gądecki to thwart the anti-abortion bill (Krzyżak 2016). On that same day, the Episcopal spokesman released an official statement that “There is no pressure on the part of those currently governing that would change the position of the Chairperson Archbishop Gądecki on the protection of every human life” (KEP 2016). The statement did not dispute, however, that such a meeting took place and that PiS was lobbying against the controversial anti-abortion bill.

Polish bishops for their part were divided not over the morality of abortion or whether it should be legally allowed, but over the criminalization of the procedure. The more orthodox wing of the Church reasoned that since human life starts at the moment of conception, it follows that abortion should be penalized just like other similar crimes.\(^47\) To deny that would amount to a logical contradiction. Another group of bishops believed that

\(^{47}\) For example, when a mother kills her toddler.
abortion is always harmful, especially to women whom the Church contended very often have to deal with post-abortion difficulties such as feelings of guilt, shame, anxiety, and depression. Abortion in their view is an expression of dire circumstances, so criminalization of the procedure would lead to a double penalization: first moral and then legal. The insistence on outlawing abortion without penalizing it was always favored by a majority of bishops within the PBC. That is why on April 4, 2016, Father Drąg issued an official letter signed by the PBC chairman, PBC secretary, and two other prominent bishops. The letter stated that “[bishops] clearly advocated total protection of the child’s life, but at the same time, they opposed legal proposals that postulate the criminal responsibility of a woman who would kill her unborn child” (Nałęcz 2016). By then it was becoming clear that that the Pro Foundation and Ordo Iuris were going to insist on keeping the legal penalties in their bill. This was set in stone two days later, when on April 6 the Marshal of the Sejm officially acknowledged the introduction of the "Stop Abortion" initiative. The Pro Foundation now had three months to collect at least 100,000 signatures, but formal changes to the bill were no longer allowed. Ten days later, on April 16 the PBC issued a statement after holding its 372 plenary meeting:

[…] Thanking the lay people who engage in pro-life movements, associations, and federations, the Church's shepherds in Poland ask for solidarity cooperation in this important matter. At the same time, they declare that they do not support the punishment of women who have committed abortion. These issues are solved by the Church in the sacrament of reconciliation, in accordance with the provisions of canon law and ethical and moral standards. The determinants of a woman deciding to have an abortion are complex and diverse [see John Paul II, Evangelium Vitae, 59] (KEP 2016).

The Episcopate had spoken and although the debate at the plenary meeting over the criminalization of abortion was heated, once the matter was settled Polish bishops preserved a consistent position: yes to banning abortion, no to criminalization. The Pro-
Foundation would still be able to collect signatures in Catholic dioceses all over Poland, but the group’s intransigence had alienated many bishops. Bishop Jan Wątroba (one of the co-signers of the April 4 statement) stated, for instance, that he is “opposed to putting bishops under the wall through the production of such bill” (quoted in Kratiuk 2017, 70); nonetheless he still allowed the Pro-Foundation to operate within the confines of his diocese. Many other bishops would share this sentiment.

*The Pro-choice Counter-offensive*

The controversy surrounding criminalization of abortion had the unintended effect of mobilizing the previously lethargic pro-choice movement in Poland. Adopting the strategy used by the Pro-Foundation, the pro-choice movement initiated its own CLI bill in April 2016 just days after the “Stop Abortion” campaign. The “Let’s Save Women” campaign was aimed to make abortion on demand legal until the 12th week of pregnancy in addition to preserving the three expectations allowed under the current law. The feminist’s movement attempted a similar initiative during the previous term of the parliament (under PO’s leadership), but they fell well short of the 100,000 signatures requirement collection only 30,000 instead so the bill was never formally considered (Kratiuk 2017, 56). Given the media storm around the “Stop Abortion” initiative, the pro-choice movement had an easier time collecting the required number of signatures. Over the summer, both initiatives successfully collected enough support for their bills and thus for the first time two competing citizen-sponsored bills would have to be considered.

The Marshall of the Sejm scheduled both bills for voting on September 23, 2016. Despite public pronouncements, the PiS leadership was uncomfortable with the extremely restrictive anti-abortion measures. Having its eyes on reforms of the judicial branch, moral considerations were not high on their political agenda. For rank and file members of the
party, on the other hand, abortion was important. This created a tension within the party that held a very slim majority in the parliament. The bishops for their part expected the anti-abortion bill to pass. Given that PiS had control of every Sejm committee the problematic issue of criminalization was easy to amend. To lessen the intra-party tension, the caucus head of the Law and Justice party announced in the matters of conscience party discipline would not be executed.

PiS further complicated its position by overcommitting to bills sponsored thorough citizens initiative. Its party program from 2014 reads, “In particular, we will completely eliminate the possibility of rejecting citizen bills at the first reading, which the majority of the Sejm created by the PO-PSL eagerly does, and thus its lack of respect for democracy is expressed” (PiS 2014, 72). The PO-PSL coalition was notorious for ignoring CLIs.48 This would consequently mean that the PiS should at least send the “Let’s Save Women” proposal to further work in one of the Sejm committees, but this proposition would not sit very well with its conservative electorate and of course with the Church.

When the anti-abortion bill was being voted on, it passed by a rather wide margin and every PiS deputy voted in favor of sending it to a committee for further deliberation (Table 16). The situation became more complicated with the bill sponsored by the pro-choice movement. A significant number of PiS deputies (43), including Kaczyński, voted in favor of submitting it for further deliberation. It was believed that formally admitting both

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48 Its bill mandating the lowering of the required school age from seven to six years of age was met with widespread discontent. Two CLI initiatives signed by 350,000 and 300,000 people, respectively, and citizen-sponsored referendum gathering almost 1 million signatures have been promptly ignored or rejected outright (Szczypiński 2016). When ascending into power, PiS promptly rolled back the PO-PSL mandate in December 2015, allowing parents to decide whether they want to send their children to school early or not.
bills would help diffuse the already tense political situation, but the rank and file members did not buy into this political calculation, and the measure was rejected outright.

### Table 16. Pro-life and Pro-choice Bills Introduced in 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Introduced by</th>
<th>Signatures (N)</th>
<th>2016 bill to completely outlaw and criminalize abortion (initial vote)</th>
<th>2016 bill to liberalize abortion (initial and final vote)</th>
<th>2016 bill to completely outlaw and criminalize abortion (final vote)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Votes (N)</td>
<td>Reject</td>
<td>Approve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro Foundation via CLI</td>
<td>450,000</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>432</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PIS</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Let's Save Women via CLI</td>
<td>215,000</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>418</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PIS</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro Foundation via CLI</td>
<td>450,000</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>428</td>
<td>352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PIS</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CLI = citizens’ legislative initiative (min. 100,000 signatures required)
Sources: Kratiuk (2017) and sejm.gov.pl

The Law and Justice party was then left with a highly controversial bill on its hands, and this helped the pro-choice movement to organize a series of protests planned for Monday, October 3, 2016. Although accurate numbers are difficult to obtain, it was reported that up to 98,000 people protested around the country, with around 17,000 protestors in Warsaw (PAP 2016). The event became known as the “black protest.” Particular striking was the absence of any counter pro-life protests. The Pro-Foundation was able to collect twice as many signatures as the "Let's Save Women" initiative, but it was entirely unprepared to organize any public counter resistance. Furthermore, the insistence on the criminalization of abortion severed any communication between the Foundation and PiS and precluded any possibility of exercising political pressure.

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Because the protesters were dressed in black the event was labeled as “black protests” or “black marches.”
The next day, the PBC held its 374th plenary meeting (October 3-4) also in Warsaw, but after "black protests" the political situation became very costly for PiS. With its tenuous grip on power, a large social movement was organized against a legislation that PiS leaders did not even want to consider in the first place. Moreover, parties in the opposition used the protests as a way to attack PiS on a whole host of issues. Political calculations changed, and it was now in PiS' interest to reject the bill as soon as possible. The opposite was true for the opposition parties, who saw the waves of protests as an opportunity to improve their meager political standings. At noon on Wednesday, October 4 and in a gross violation of Sejm’s procedures, organizers of the initiative and members of the Justice Committee to which the bill was sent received a text message that the committee would start its deliberation at 5:00 p.m. on the same day. (Kratiuk 2017, 113).50 The Church for its part issued another statement on October 4 after its plenary meeting ended:

[...] The Polish Bishops’ Conference emphasizes that the life of every human being is a fundamental and inviolable value. Polish bishops remind them that they do not support draft legal provisions that envisage punishing women who have committed abortion. These issues are solved by the Church in the sacrament of reconciliation, in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Canon Law and ethical and moral standards. The conference of the Polish Episcopate at the same time encourages people to pray for the intentions of women who, through their lives, fulfill their vocation to motherhood and for women who are experiencing difficulties in their lives (KEP 2016).

During the whole campaign, the Polish Episcopate was trying to affirm its position of being both against abortion and against criminalization of abortion. The call, however, landed on deaf ears, and when the Justice Committee began its deliberations in the Sejm, one of the PiS deputies moved imminently to reject the initiative without any further debate. The “Stop Abortion” bill was defeated for all practical purposes. Recognizing that rejecting the bill might not sit well with the majority of rank and file members in his party, Kaczyński

50 The procedures require at least a three-day notice before any committee is held.
called for an urgent party meeting for Thursday morning. Explaining that the bill might lead to the fall of the government, he added that sometimes it is necessary to take a step back so that two steps can be taken forward later (Kratiuk 2017, 188). Polish bishops issued yet another official statement on Thursday morning, but to no avail. Despite public declarations and parliamentary speeches preceding the official voting that invoked teachings of Johan Paul II and Mother Teresa, 186 PiS deputies voted to reject the “Stop Abortion” bill on Thursday, October 5, 2016.

**Summary of the Period**

Each party involved learned important lessons from the 2016 abortion campaign. The Church learned that PiS is not a reliable political partner and that more pressure would have to be applied to gain future public policy concessions. Most bishops took it for granted that abortion would become more restrictive with the PiS in power. Cardinal Nycz added that he was “embittered” that the 2016 bill did not pass (Nycz 2017). The Church also became wearier of citizen-sponsored initiatives as they dragged bishops into public controversies while not offering policy concessions in return. Although there was little the Church could do to stop a group of citizens from initiating CLIs, the bishops would become much more judicious in offering their institutional support.

The Pro-Foundation and Ordo Iuris gambled when they insisted on the criminalization of abortion, and they lost. The 2016 campaign lacked any strategy that would exercise at least a modicum of pressure on PiS deputies. Because of its intransigence, the Pro-Foundation also lost much of the support within the Church. Its actions during the 2016 campaign were interpreted as an attempt to manipulate the Church by outflanking it from the right. Although the Church will most certainly endorse future anti-abortion bills even if they are sponsored by the Pro-Foundation, it is unlikely that the two will enter into
an official collaboration. The 2016 campaign demonstrated that pro-life groups in Poland still have a lot to learn about how democracy works.

The pro-choice movement benefited the most from the failures of the Pro-Life Foundation. For the first time in Polish democratic history, the movement was able to initiate a citizen-sponsored abortion-liberalizing bill successfully. The movement’s most significant victory was to apply enough pressure to keep the status quo. However, any rollback of existing abortion laws is rather unlikely, especially given the current make-up of Polish political landscape. The movement also learned that CLI might not win them policy concessions, but they need to be employed as a counterbalance to anti-abortion bills. With its “black marches” protests, the movement was able to claim a legitimate political victory that manifested itself not in getting what the movement wanted but in preventing others from obtaining what they were after. However, with the continued re-alignment of the political scene to the right, it remains an open question if the pro-choice movement will continue to find enough support to remain politically relevant.

In voting to reject the 2016 bill, the Law and Justice party took an unprecedented step of going against its core electorate and the Church. The explanations for why they voted against the anti-abortion bill did not sit well with Polish bishops. Deputy Krystyna Pawłowicz, for example, wrote on her Facebook page, “the Polish Bishops’ Conference authorized PiS” to vote against the bill (Kratiuk 2017, 117). Other deputies explained that if the Church pressured them more the bill would have been passed. One deputy went as far as to suggest that the bill was an attempt by leftist groups to bring PiS government down. Archbishop Skworc interpreted such justifications by PiS deputies as “in fact accusations against the Church” and added, “we [the Church] are pressuring them [PiS] very hard to ban trade on Sunday, and they are yet to respond” (Skworc 2017) (discussed below).
In their explanations, PiS deputies also consistently ignored the fact that they had enough votes to amend the anti-abortion bill in any way they wanted. The controversial criminalization clause could have been abolished in one vote while keeping the rest of the bill intact, for example. Kaczyński understood, however, that the Law and Justice disappointed its Catholic electorate and the Church. He also understood that the issue of abortion would not go away as long as PiS is in power. The 2016 abortion debate has re-shaped the Church-PiS interaction moving it from implicit cooperation to tension. This prompted Kaczyński and his party to appease the Church with a different policy concession (the Sunday trade ban) that the Church had been actively pressing for. For the Church, however, abortion is the primary concern, and thus another campaign to restrict the procedure is already underway.

**The Stop Abortion II Campaign (2016 - present)**

The Law and Justice might have disappointed the Church in 2016, but it was imperative that another anti-abortion campaign was initiated as soon as possible. As long as PiS held a parliamentary majority, there was a real opportunity to push for further restrictions on abortion. Kaja Godek, who previously worked in the Pro Foundation, founded the Foundation Life and Family and joined forces with Citizens Go group to organize another anti-abortion campaign. Founded in Spain, Citizen Go is a conservative citizen group dedicated to the promotion of Catholic causes. The group operates in 50 countries around the globe and specializes in informational campaigns. The group was thus meant to provide the type of political pressure mechanisms that were missing in 2016. Once the new anti-abortion campaign was launched, pro-life supporters would be able to sign a petition or send a letter or email to their deputies to pressure them for their votes. Moreover, a large
social media campaign would also be launched. In short, the pro-life movement was learning from its past mistakes.

In the early 2017 Kaja Godek and Magdalena Korzekwa-Kaliszuk (a leader of Citizen Go in Poland), asked for and were granted the opportunity to address the collective body of Polish bishops at their next plenary meeting. When in early June 2017 the PBC held its 376th plenary meeting in Zakopane, both women spoke to every bishop in Poland informing them about their plan to initiate the “Stop Abortion II” bill (Zatrzymaj Aborcję).51 Never before have pro-life activists been granted this level of admittance. Even more surprising, such access was granted despite them not having an official bill in hand. PBC’s vice-chairman Jędraszewski admitted that considering the circumstances both women were “given a carte blanche” (Jędraszewski 2017). Even more surprising still, the PBC officially committed to the “Stop Abortion II” initiative immediately after the meeting. The official meeting statement reads:

The bishops support the call for full legal protection of children conceived as a constitutional right to life. During the plenary meeting, the Polish Bishops’ Conference became acquainted with the civic initiative “Zatrzymaj Aborcję” (Stop Abortion II), aimed at greater protection of the life of a child conceived in the perspective of the growing scope of prenatal eugenics. Bishops recommend this initiative and support the collection of signatures (KEP 2016).

With one speech to the collective body of Polish bishops, Godek and Korzekwa-Kaliszuk solved a major coordination problem. Receiving the PBC’s official endorsement meant that no other priest in Poland would have to be approached about the permission to collect support signatures in his parish. The official endorsement also resulted in considerable media coverage, with both women being invited to numerous TV and radio shows. Bishops

51 Both “Stop Aborcji” and “Zatrzymaj Aborcje” mean essentially the same thing, so “Stop Abortion II” is meant to distinguish the 2017 bill sponsored by the Life and Family Foundation from the 2016 bill originated by the Pro Foundation and Ordo Iuris.
for their part liked the idea that two women, as opposed to two men as was the case in 2016, would lead the new initiative. Godek especially was by then a veteran of the pro-life movement. A mother of three, Godek is also a parent of a Down syndrome child. This made her an obvious leader of the campaign that sought to eliminate eugenic abortion. Korzekwa-Kaliszuk was also known in Catholic circles given her affiliation with the Polish Bishops’ Conference.

Godek and Korzekwa-Kaliszuk kept their word, and when their legislation was finally created, it aimed to strike down only the provision that allows for the abortion of fetuses suspected of being damaged. In fact, the bill is so specific that it contains only five sentences and it gives PiS deputies little room to maneuver. Here too we can see signs of strategic adjustments. The 2016 initiative was too comprehensive, and this allowed PiS to reject the bill; now the deputies would be either for or against eugenic abortion as nothing else was included in the bill. The narrow scope of the bill should not, however, be confused with irrelevance. Drawing on official government estimates, Godek’s foundation website states that “in 2015 1044 conceived children were legally killed, 1000 of which were suspected of being handicapped” (Fundacja Życie i Rodzina 2018). In other words, adopting the bill would eliminate 95% of legal abortions, effectively abolishing the procedure.

The media attention given to "Stop Abortion II" campaign alerted the pro-choice movement that it too needed to engage in another campaign to block anti-abortion measures. Thus in the early months of 2017, a new pattern of abortion policymaking in Poland became solidified. For every anti-abortion legislation, another bill pointing in the opposite direction would also emerge. The pro-choice movement initiated its own bill named once again “Let’s Save Women.” Interestingly enough, the pro-choice movement decided to make its bill more comprehensive. In addition to making abortion available on
demand up to 12 weeks and under the three current exceptions, the bill also sought to provide:

- the right for women to legal abortion by the end of the 12th week;
- reliable, based on scientific and pedagogical knowledge, sexual education for older children and preparation for life in the family and society for the youngest;
- easy and free access to contraception, including access to emergency contraception without a prescription; regulating the use of the conscience clause by gynecologists (Ratujmy Kobiety 2017)

Both groups relied on CLIs to make their proposals official. With both groups collecting signatures simultaneously, they engaged in a competition of who will be able to collect more signatures. Both groups recognized that more signatures means more political legitimacy and greater political leverage. The “Let’s Save Women II” bill sponsors had been accused of manipulating the number of collected signatures. They claimed to have collected 400,000 signatures, but Ordo Iuris lawyers sued the initiative organizers claiming that only a little over 200,000 signatures were collected. The pro-life movement for its part collected a record-breaking 830,000 signatures. The specifically tailored bill that did not include criminalization of abortion and its emphasis on eliminating only eugenic abortion resonated deeply with many citizens who might have been more wary of the 2016 initiative.

Polish Bishops for their part offered unequivocal support for the initiative from the outset. After its plenary meeting in June 2017 the PBC press release stated, “Bishops recommend this initiative and support the collection of signatures” and when signatures were still being collected in November another call was issued to increase the overall support, “In a few days the time set for collecting signatures ends, so once again we encourage you to support this initiative” adding that “St. John Paul II did not find any justification for abortion, […] nothing and nobody can give the right to kill an innocent human being, be it an embryo or fetus, child or adult, an old man, terminally ill or dying.”
On December 12, once the initiative was formally admitted, the PBC chairman Archbishop Gądecki called on PiS to act on it “without undue delay,” emphasizing that “removing the eugenic condition that allows the child to be killed in the prenatal period will be an important step towards guaranteeing full protection of life.” Two weeks later, on December 27 the PBC’s presidium called on “both believers and non-believers to protect life from conception to natural death” and underscored that “Polish Bishops support this civic initiative [Stop Abortion II] as a step towards full protection of life and appeal to all people of good will to express their support. We also appeal to the consciences of all Deputies and Senators, being aware that it is up to them to decide whether this law will be adopted” (EKAi 2018). In addition to these official endorsements, individual bishops would use their pulpit to push the anti-abortion bill forward. The frequency and timing of these statements stand out. The Episcopate learned that PiS needs to be pushed, so instead of reacting to unfolding events the PBC and individual bishops became much more assertive and pro-active and issued statements before PiS deputies acted, not afterwards. The Citizen Go group helped in this regard by circulating an online petition signed by almost 23,000 people and addressed to the Chairwoman of the Sejm Social Policy and Family Committee. The petition stated:

Madam President, I am asking you to immediately start the work on the civic project "Stop abortion II." [...] Over 830 thousand citizens directly expressed their support for the "Stop abortion II" initiative. This initiative also gained full support of the Polish Bishops’ Conference and the Orthodox Church. It is difficult to have doubts as to the need to change the law to one that will protect the lives of children, and thus women and families. [...] (Skwoc, Gosc.pl 2017).

The pro-active stance of the Church gave PiS leaders little to hide behind. Once again the Law and Justice leadership publicly announced its loyalty to Catholic teaching on abortion and offered its support for the initiative. In a series of interviews for the most
popular weekly newspaper in Poland *Gość Niedzielny*—which happens to be a Catholic newspaper under the direct supervision of Archbishop Skworc—Kaczyński, President Duda, and Prime Minister Szydło offered their unconditional support. In April Kaczyński proclaimed, “I believe that the ban on eugenic abortion has a chance to be introduced in a relatively short time,” (GN 2017) on October 12 Duda added “I will sign a law prohibiting eugenic abortion, first of all, to exclude the right to kill children with Down’s syndrome” (GN 2017) only to be followed by a week later by Szydło and her declaration ”I am convinced that this project will find a lot of support in our parliamentary club. I will, of course, vote for his acceptance, I am against eugenic abortion” (GN 2017).

Upon collecting enough signatures, the “Let’s Save Women” bill was formally admitted by the Marshall of the Sejm on October 23, 2017, followed by the “Stop Abortion II” bill on November 30. To protect his party, Kaczyński and over 100 deputies (most of them from PiS) issued a query to the Constitutional Court asking it to decide whether eugenic abortion is allowed under the Polish Constitution. The pro-life movements initially welcomed the move, but the query gave PiS an extra layer of protection—the party could justify not working on the anti-abortion bill under the pretense of waiting for a formal ruling.
Table 17. Pro-life and Pro-choice Bills Introduced in 2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Introduced by</th>
<th>Signatures (N)</th>
<th>Votes (N)</th>
<th>Reject</th>
<th>Approve</th>
<th>Abstention</th>
<th>Did not vote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Let’s Save Women via CLI</td>
<td>200,000-400,000</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>403</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PiS</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2017 bill to liberalize abortion (initial and final vote)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2017 bill to outlaw eugenic abortion (initial vote)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life and Family Foundation via CLI</td>
<td>830,000</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>418</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PiS</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CLI = citizens’ legislative initiative (min. 100,000 signatures required)
Source: sejm.gov.pl

Both bills were scheduled for voting on January 10, 2018. Lest PiS forget about its promises, the PBC presidium issued another statement right before the voting calling on deputies “to respect the right to life of every human being and to adopt the ‘Stop Abortion II’ project’”, and anticipating PiS’ strategy the three bishops forming the presidium also pointed out that “those who respect human rights - and among them the first is the right to life - should not support legal projects directed against life” (EKAI 2018). This time the “Let’s Save Women” bill was to be voted on first. Throughout the campaign, Godek and other pro-life leaders were trying to organize a meeting with Kaczyński. No party discipline on the issues of conscience might have been the official party line, but people close to PiS understood that as he goes so does his party. Despite numerous attempts, the meeting never took place as Kaczyński stood little to gain from it. The Law and Justice leadership was convinced that the best way to avoid future public unrest is to vote in favor of both bills and send them for further work in committees.

Keeping this strategy in mind, we can see that the “Let’s Save Women” bill was barely rejected with eight votes being the difference (Table 17). Fifty-eight out of 237 PiS
deputies including Kaczyński voted in favor of the bill. The measure was rejected because the right-leaning Kukiz’ 15 party and centrist PSL accounted for most of the missing votes (11 and 12, respectively), and 64 deputies either did not vote or abstained. The second largest party in the Sejm, PO instituted party discipline resulting in 38 of its deputies deciding not to vote. Three PO deputies voted against the bill, leading to their exclusion from the party. Kaczyński’s plan, however, did not hold as seven out of ten of his deputies opted to vote in accordance with their religious convictions.

The vote on “Stop Abortion II” bill was much less dramatic. Every PiS deputy voted in its favor and the initiative passed by a wide margin of 277 to 134. The bill was sent to two committees; this move too would allow PiS to buy some time if it needed it. Any delay in work on the bill could be blamed on the lack of coordination between the committees. On January 11, one day after the voting, the PBC presidium once again asserted its presence, thanking deputies who voted to support Catholic principles while also expressing “trust that soon the legal guarantees to protect the lives of the weakest will be increased by stopping eugenic abortion” (EKAI 2018).

Summary of the Period
As of this writing, the Law and Justice party is working on the “Stop Abortion II” legislation. Given that the “Let’s Save Women” bill was rejected in January, the pro-choice movement in Poland was once again able to organize widespread resistance to both PiS and anti-abortion measures. This time, however, the pro-life movement was prepared; when "black marches" were organized in major cities around the country, they were met with "white marches" dedicated to supporting the ban on eugenic abortion. By combining its forces with the Citizen Go group, the Life and Family Foundation is also able to exercise a much stronger influence on PiS deputies. On-line petitions, pickets, emails and phone calls
organized by the Citizen Go reminded PiS deputies about the importance of the bill to their core constituents. The debate surrounding the bill has also become more violent, with death threats being issued against Godek and her family. PiS is purposefully delaying any work on the bill, most likely trying to time the passage of the bill closer to the next elections, which will be held in 2019. Banning the eugenic abortion right before the next parliamentary elections will all but guarantee to re-energize the core PiS electorate. The bishops do not want to wait that long; on March 14, 2018 the Episcopate issued another statement after its 379th plenary meeting in Warsaw: “Recalling the necessity of unconditional respect due to every human being in all its moments of existence, bishops call for immediate legislative work on the civic project [Stop Abortion II]” (EKAI 2018).

Discussion

Any attempt to understand abortion policy-making in Poland has to take longitudinal trends into consideration. Among 35 OECD countries, only Ireland and Chile restricts access to abortion in a similar way as Poland (chapter 3). However, in both Chile and Ireland the Church is on the defensive and trying to protect its policy gains. In August 2017, Chile overturned its complete ban on abortion, allowing for the procedure in three specific circumstances, while Ireland will hold a national referendum in 2018. In it, the voters will be asked if they want to repeal the so-called eighth amendment which under the current law dating back to 1983 gives unborn fetuses and pregnant women an equal right to life.

In Poland, the Church and pro-life groups cooperating with it continue to set the contours of abortion public policy agenda. By continuously pushing for a restriction on the procedure, potential efforts in the opposite direction have been effectively foreclosed. From 1997 to 2015 not a single citizen-sponsored proposal to liberalize abortion law was entertained and the one party sponsored bill was rejected without much support. The
Church’s influence, therefore, has to be understood both in terms of policy gains it has been able to acquire, and in terms of proposals its has successfully prevented from being introduced. Robert Dahl (1957) reminds us that the power of A over B is not limited to B doing what A wants, but also manifests itself in A preventing B from doing what it wants to do.

The most recent anti-abortion bill has the highest chance of being successfully approved, given that PiS is gearing up for another parliamentary election. Given its endogenous doctrinal commitments (chapter 2) it is hardly surprising that the Polish Church continues to support anti-abortion bills. The so-called abortion compromise passed in 1993 that made the procedure legal only in three specific cases was at the same time as a critical policy victory for the Church and a stepping-stone in a quest to entirely outlaw the procedure. The Episcopate interprets the 1993 framework as a necessary political compromise that had to be made at the time of high political tension, and not as a sign of doctrinal liberalization. Catholic doctrine is fixed and unfalsifiable, and the Church, therefore, will continue to push for a full ban on abortion.

Even in an overwhelmingly Catholic Poland, the fight against abortion is not cost-free. By endorsing anti-abortion measures, the Church overtly engages in highly contentious political campaigns. After the Episcopate urged PiS deputies to speed up its work on the “Stop Abortion II” bill, for instance, the pro-choice movement organized a series of protests in front of metropolitan curie around Poland. Moreover, every citizen-sponsored initiative requires the Church to get involved in highly controversial political campaigns. This often means that the Church can be dragged into an uncomfortable political controversy, as the 2016 problem of criminalization of abortion demonstrated. At the same time, the Episcopate continues to press for ban on abortion, regardless of the costs. It is clear that
Poles just like their European counterparts want a strong church-state separation. In 2005, 70% of Poles said that religious leaders should influence government and 83% of respondents believed that religious leaders should not influence votes (Grzymała-Busse 2015, 5). At the same time, the Church played an important (partisan) role during the last two parliamentary elections (2011, 2015). Markowski notes that:

According to a poll conducted after the 2011 election of those respondents who reported that parish priests had openly indicated the party for which a Catholic should vote, 9 out of 10 said that the party in question was PiS. In the 2015 election, the political interference of the Church was more overt, including open mobilization of the electorate of their favored party as well as assisting voters in getting to the polls (2016, 1313-4).

Similarly, the Church is at odds with public opinion on the issue of abortion. In 2016 only 7% believed that abortion law should be made more restrictive, 62% of respondents wanted to keep the current law as is, and 23% of Poles wanted to liberalize it (CBOS 2016, 7). Moreover, 77% wanted the Church to change its doctrine and allow abortion in “certain situations” (CBOS 2015). Thus, both the overt political participation of the Polish Episcopate in politics and its continuous and intransigent emphasis on outlawing abortion help explain why in 2017 the level of trust for the Polish Church has declined. In 2011, 62% of Poles looked favorably at the institutional Church while that number has dropped to 52% in 2017. Conversely, only 26% of respondents had a negative opinion of the Church in 2011 and that number has increased to 35% (CBOS 2017, 6). Therefore, from the time when the Church and pro-life groups began to use CLIs we see a decrease in support for the institutional Church, this however has not stopped the Church from actively engaging in politics and the Episcopate continues its attempts to outlaw abortion.

52 A survey administered in 2012 yielded the following results on the same question: 9% for restriction, 49% for status quo, and 32% for liberalization. So the preference for the current legal framework regulating abortion has actually solidified in 2016 (CBOS 2016, 7).
Since 2010 pro-life groups in Poland have adopted a strategy of a continuous push for new legislation that would make abortion laws more restrictive. By now the approach is starting to take its toll, with some bishops beginning to question its usefulness. The 2016 campaign organized by the Pro-Foundation, in particular, left many bishops dissatisfied because it appeared to have produced negative consequences for the Church (including mobilization of the pro-choice movement) while offering very little in return. That is also why the “Stop Abortion II” is so important. With the official goal of banning eugenic abortion, the campaign is also the ultimate test of cooperation between the Polish Catholic Church and lay Catholics working in the pro-life movement. Both actors made significant adjustments that allow for better collaboration between them. The Episcopate, however, does not want to be outflanked from the right, as it was the case in 2016 and so far the campaign is proceeding along the lines envisioned by the Church and in accordance with the Vatican II vision.

When looking at the pro-life groups in Poland it becomes clear that they are different from one other. Some groups are more radical and combative; other groups stress a less radical approach to politics and policymaking. So even though each group agrees that abortion is fundamentally wrong and should not be allowed, there is little consensus on the best means to achieve that goal. Such internal divisions about the best means of political activism severely weaken the position of these groups. This is also a concern for the Church that always condemns abortion, but would prefer not to have to endorse competing anti-abortion bills. The source of division is also rooted in personal ambition. For the longest time, the leadership of citizen-sponsored bills came with many personal benefits, including significant media attention and widespread recognition in Catholic circles. On the other
hand, when Godek's life and family came under attack following the 2017 campaign, it became apparent that significant personal costs are also incurred.

Starting in 2010, the pro-life movement was able to re-shape abortion policymaking in Poland. The movement has been very successful in getting its initiatives onto the political agenda and in shutting down any attempts to liberalize abortion. But the movement also had to come to terms with its 2016 campaign, which re-energized the previously lethargic pro-choice movement. The 2017 campaign is as much about strategic adjustment to mistakes made by the Pro-Foundation and Ordo Iuris a year before, as it is about banning eugenic abortion.

For much of Polish democratic history, there was a little pro-choice movement to speak of and when it formed it was almost wholly reactionary. This was a product of both the political power of the Church and the party system that the Church helped to create. Anti-Catholic parties have been consistently punished at the ballot box, and without their support, it was difficult for the pro-choice movement to organize. Both the “Let’s Save Women” and “Let’s Save Women II” initiatives were headed by Barbara Nowacka, a well-known left-leaning politician who despite her very strong personal following failed to win a seat in the Sejm since her party (the SLD coalition) did not obtain the required electoral threshold. For now, the pro-choice movement's activity is focused on preventing the Church from getting what it wants, but as long as right-leaning and centrist parties dominate in Polish politics, the movement is very unlikely to win any policy concessions.

In 2001 PiS was able to establish itself as an important player in Polish politics. Its core electorate consists of committed Catholics, although in the 2015 parliamentary election the party attracted voters from across social groups. The Law and Justice party makes it association with Catholicism overt, and it was able to monopolize the Church for its
political purposes of winning elections and staying in power. While being the largest opposition party (2007-2015) not a single PiS deputy voted against any of the four anti-abortion bills. Once in power, however, PiS found it much more difficult to restrict the already conservative abortion law. When rejecting the 2016 bill, the party decided nonetheless to approve an economic package that aids single mothers and families with disabled children. PiS’ unwillingness to restrict abortion follows a more general pattern of the Church losing control of Christian Democratic parties once they become electorally successful (e.g., Kalyvas 1996; Van Kersbergen and Manow 2009). Polish Bishops are frustrated with PiS and decided to shift their political strategy from implicit cooperation to semi-conflict. In 2015 Polish bishops believed that the PiS party would make abortion more restrictive, therefore, the statements released by the PBC were mild and for the most part reactionary. The current strategy of the PBC is to be more pro-active with its official statements and their content is also more direct and more adversarial. This puts the party in a challenging situation since its electoral support depends on close association with Catholicism. The PiS responded by given the Church a different policy concession.

**Sunday Trading Ban**

In addition to pro-life and pro-choice groups, other associations also began to use CLI as a mechanism of exerting political pressures. The Solidarity trade union organized an initiative that aimed to eliminate almost all trade on Sundays. The initiative was primarily pointed at large supermarkets, while individual small business, such as gas stations, would still be allowed to remain open. Upon its transition to democracy in the early 1990s Poland and other Eastern European countries implemented a series of free-market reforms that opened the country to an influx of foreign capital (Epstein 2017), which had a profound impact on the fabric of Polish society. According to OECD data, Poles are very hardworking,
with an average worker spending 1928 hours per years in his or her workplace (Table 18). Among OECD member states, only citizens of Chile, Greece, and Mexico work more extended hours. Compared to Germany, the difference in average annual hours worked per worker amounts to 14 working weeks per year.

Table 18. Average Annual Hours Worked per Worker (2016)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Hours</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1363</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1472</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>1783</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>1928</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>2255</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OECD

Even after the fall of communism, Poland has enjoyed a very vibrant civil society. At the peak of its power, one in four Poles (a total of about 10 million) belonged to the Solidarity trade union amounting to about half of the electorate (Ekiert, Kubik and Wenzel, Civil Society and Three Dimensions of Inequality in Post-1989 Poland 2017). In 2016, Solidarity activists collected over 500,000 signatures to ban trade on Sunday and the Marshall of the Polish Sejm formally accepted the initiative on September 22, 2016.

The Catholic Church in Poland is closely linked with the union given their prior cooperation to overthrow communism. Polish bishops supported the initiative for a variety of reasons. First, they argued that Sunday should be a day of rest and every worker is entitled to a day off. The current system was understood as exploitation of the Polish workforce. Secondly, freeing workers from their work obligations would also likely result in higher mass attendance. Although weekly mass attendance in Poland is markedly higher than in other OECD countries (see Chapter 5), the Episcopate nonetheless seeks new ways to re-energize Polish Catholics. Finally, the ban would help strengthen the social fabric of Polish society. The Solidary union estimated that as many as 4.5 million workers would be
affected by the law, most of them women who work as checkout cashiers at large supermarkets. Thus bishops saw the initiative as potentially strengthening Polish families because both parents would be able to spend time with their children.

In many EU countries, such as Austria, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and the UK, the ban on Sunday trading is already in place. The comparison to Germany, however, is particularly relevant. Polish politicians and bishops see the German Catholic Church as somewhat liberal, yet in Germany, workers enjoy the benefits of not having to work on Sunday. Thus Germany served as the immediate point of reference for most Polish bishops who noted that the liberal Church in Germany was enjoying a benefit that the supposedly conservative Church in Poland was not able to secure for its faithful.

The “Free Sunday” initiative was scheduled for its first reading on October 6, 2016, and thus became a part of a larger political calculation. To ease the negative impact of rejecting the anti-abortion bill (“Stop Abortion I”), PiS deputies voted to send the “Free Sunday” bill to further work in Sejm committees, with both votes being held on the same day (October 6). Pro-business associations opposed the “Free Sunday” initiative, but since PiS has an extensive record of bolstering welfare programs this opposition did not matter much. Instead, the party leadership recognized that the initiative could be used as a protection against accusations that PiS was betraying its core electorate and Catholic teachings. It was in PiS’ interest, therefore, to extend the work on the “Free Sunday” bill because the party anticipated another anti-abortion bill being formally introduced. It is not by accident that the second reading of the bill was scheduled for November 22, 2017, eight days before the “Stop Abortion II” initiative was officially introduced, and two days later on

53 The “500+” program, for example, is the most ambitious and popular initiative implemented by PiS. It awards 500 zloty (Polish currency) for second and each subsequent child to every Polish family regardless of their household income.
November 24, 2017 PiS approved the bill sending it to the upper house chamber (Senat).

The PiS-controlled Senat scheduled its work on the bill for January 9-11, 2018, which coincided with the first vote on the “Stop Abortion II” bill occurring in Sejm on January 10.

Polish bishops recognized that the “Free Sunday” bill was being used as a political bargaining chip. Already frustrated with PiS’ rejection of the 2016 “Stop Abortion” bill, the Episcopate once again used its public platform to challenge PiS deputies, this time more openly. At the same time bishops carefully avoided conflating these two issues; eliminating trade on Sunday would be welcomed, but that in no way would prevent them from calling for the increased restrictive abortion laws. The overt pressure exercised by the Church followed the by now familiar pattern. After a meeting of diocesan bishops in August 2017, for example, the Episcopate released the following statement:

Diocesan bishops once again express their support for the bill, which was presented by the Solidarity trade union on the restriction of trade on Sunday. They trust that the initiative of this trade union and significant public support will not be ignored, and the Parliament of the Republic of Poland will restore Sunday to the Polish nation as a religious, family, cultural and social value (KEP 2017).

Archbishop Gądecki, the PBC chairman, added: “in defense of free Sunday there is a need to mobilize all social forces, both trade unions, and Catholic associations” (Gądecki, Konferencja Episkopatu Polski 2017) and the PBC presidium followed suit in October 2017:

In connection with the ongoing legislative work on the draft law on limiting trade on Sundays […], we express our concern about the fate of the civic initiative of the Solidarity trade union, which has been supported by over 500,000 citizens […]. We appeal, therefore, to those who have a real influence on the shape of the law in our country, that they should pay attention primarily to the well being of the citizen and the well being of society. Do not forget your own slogans and postulates on the way to achieving power in such a socially important matter. It is not allowed - even in the face of lobbying environments for which profit is more valuable than a human being or a nation (KEP 2017).
Archbishop Wiktor Skworc played a significant role in pushing PiS on the issue Sunday trade ban. Every year two major pilgrimages are organized in his archdiocese. More than 100,000 Catholics participate in each pilgrimage giving thanks to “Our Lady of Social Justice and Love.” This also means that PiS deputies have attended both pilgrimages in large numbers to manifest their religiosity. In 2016 even Prime Minister Szydło participated in the ceremony, while President Duda was there in 2017. With the President in attendance, the archbishop did not mince his words:

Soon, a year will pass from the submission of a civic bill in the Sejm by Solidarity trade union to limit trade on Sundays. The signature of over half a million citizens has supported this solution! The bill seeks to act in the defense of man; over one million people, especially women, working - doing unnecessary work - on Sundays and public holidays. [...] Deputies! The “500+” program creates a positive support for Polish families. However, this is the beginning of the road, because the family also needs time for themselves! Today Poland - the country of the baptized - looks like a big market on the map of Europe! We have committed this for ourselves through the sin of omission. I recall the commandment of God: "remember that the holy day may be holy." We cannot ignore this commandment if we want to stand as families, society and the state (Skworc, Gosc.pl 2017).

Skworc repeated his plea in August when addressing thousands of women: “Ms. Minister, we ask for more empathy for women, whose symbol are those of them who are forced on Sundays to work as cashier clerks in supermarkets” (Skworc 2017). The overt and more hostile nature of these calls was becoming more difficult for PiS deputies to ignore. The more aggressive posture of the Church worked; both Sejm and Senat approved the bill, and President Duda signed it into law on January 30, 2018.

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54 First, the Pilgrimage of Men and Boy to Piekary Holy Mary in Piekary Śląskie (usually in May) and secondly the Pilgrimage of Women and Girls to Piekary Holy Mary in Piekary Śląskie (usually in August). This tradition dates back to 1960s when former archbishops of Katowice would use the occasion to challenge the communist regime and raise critical social issues.
Religious Education in Public Schools

The issue of religious instruction in public schools and abortion followed a similar historical trajectory. In the immediate post World War II years, religious instruction was allowed as this policy outcome was carried over from the democratic Second Republic (1918-1939). The communist regime was eager to establish international legitimacy, so for a very short time after the war it avoided unnecessary confrontation with the Church. The situation began to change quickly and “once the fallout from the 1956 Poznań revolt had subsided, the communists simply removed religious education from schools with a decree announcing that all schools and educational institutions were secular” (Grzymała-Busse 2015, 167; see also Eberts 1998). Once again the absence of democratic procedures prevented the Church from contesting such a decision. Under communism the Church was powerless as far as public policy outcomes were concerned.

The political situation began to change in 1989. Sensing that communism would not survive for much longer, the Church began to mount pressures to strike an early and decisive policy victory. In May 1990 the Church released a statement that summarized its aims in no uncertain terms: “the full return of religious education to public schools, and for the need to guarantee it in the Constitution and in the law on national education” (quoted in Grzymała-Busse 2015, 168). The nascent and fragile democracy depended on the Church for its domestic legitimacy. This in turn meant that the Church was in a very strong negotiating position. It was nonetheless important to properly frame the issue of religious instructions in public schools. Eberts observes:

The primary reason given by the bishops in support of their position was the historical significance of religion and religious education in the country, and particularly its role in the preservation of Polish national identity. The bishops also argued that re-establishment of religious education in public schools would serve as a form of compensation to Polish society for the wrongdoings of the former
totalitarian regime, including its attempts to eradicate the presence of God in the lives of Poles (1998, 821; see also Gowin 1995, 140-1).

For the Church, then, religious instruction in public schools was a matter of both historical justice and a return to proper way things were before. On the first point, in June 1990 the Episcopate underscored its importance in case Poles had short memories:

We do not have to remind the role that religion played in defending the rights of the nation, as in the times of partitions or in the years of both World Wars, or in the years of struggle with the totalitarian system, whose principles negated God and limited basic human rights ... it would not be an exaggeration to say that education played a fundamental role in these processes ... it is therefore hard to believe in the enormity of the damage inflicted on the nation through the despoliation of schools of religious values, which always had a place in them (quoted in Grzymała-Busse 2015, 168).

Secondly, the Church argued that it was not proposing anything new. The lack of religious instruction under communism was presented as aberration imposed by a hostile government backed by an imperial superpower. Thus the Church was not introducing but re-introducing religious instruction arguing that this would normalize “relations between the state and the Church and return it a normal situation in Polish education dating back to the period of the Second Republic (1918-1939)” (Zwierządżyński 2017, 138-9).

The Church would not have to wait long for policy concessions. As early as August 1990, the Minister of Education signed the Instruction on Religious Education that re-introduced religion lessons in public schools and kindergartens (Eberts 1998, 821). The policy concession also came with significant monetary benefits as “teachers of religion would have the same status as other teachers, including salary, benefits, and tenure, and the Church retained full control over the content of religious education, with bishops further evaluating classes” leaving the state with little influence over the policy area (Grzymała-Busse 2015, 169; see also Gowin 1995, 149). Furthermore, in September of 1991, the Parliament fully cemented religious instruction in public schools when it mandated that
Christian values are to be respected in all schools and subjects (Eberts 1998, 822). From 1992 on religious instruction in public school was institutionalized for all practical purposes. This did not mean however that details surrounding the policy area would not have to be actively defended. Just like in the case of abortion, the policy was sent to the Constitutional Tribunal on two occasions, and both times the Tribunal ruled that the concession was constitutional thus making the policy more durable.

The Church for its part would continue to push for small changes that would nonetheless prove significant. A change to an opt-out system - where students are enrolled in religious classes by default and have to petition to opt-out - proved to be a great success for the Church (Grzymała-Busse 2015, 169); in 2009, 98% of elementary schools students, 96% of middle school students, and 91% of high school students were attending catechesis (ISKK & GUS 2014, 233). In addition to religious education being taught in public schools, by 2012 the Church established 540 specifically Catholic schools (ISKK & GUS 2016, 254).

Because the newly formed party system was so dependent on the Church as its source of domestic legitimacy, political parties, and individual politicians were overwhelmed by the Episcopate and the pressure it was able to exercise: "the representatives of the first democratic government that introduced the law felt they had little choice but to bring back religious education to schools;" this belief was shared particularly strongly by the former Catholic activist and Prime Minister, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, who believed that “he could not enter into conflict with the Church” (Grzymała-Busse 2015, 170; see also Gowin 1995, 141). Public opinion too was in favor of bringing religion education back and thus further limiting Mazowiecki’s options. In 1993, 55% of Poles believed that religion should be taught in public schools while 41% opposed the idea. The solution became more popular over time and in 2008 only 32% opposed religious education (Zwierządżyński 2017, 149). In contemporary
Poland, religion continues “to be taught by church-certified teachers and priests across Poland, for two hours weekly, and the grade was included in students’ report cards” (Grzymała-Busse 2015, 171). In the 2011/2012 academic year, religious education in Poland was taught by 31,000 teachers (many of them priests and nuns) with their salaries paid from public funds (ISKK & GUS 2016, 256). Religious education is at this point very institutionalized and not seriously threatened, especially with the PiS in power.

General Discussion and Conclusions

The QCA analysis identified Poland as the country with the highest level of Church influence making it an ideal candidate for case study analysis. This chapter was explicitly concerned with demonstrating how the Catholic Church in Poland was able to obtain its policy preferences. In doing so, the chapter focused on both motivations of individual actors and the structural environment that shapes the choices available to them and it process-traced three public policy outcomes.

The QCA analysis has identified two necessary paths for the Catholic Church to exercise political influence. First, a case would have to exhibit either frail Christian Democratic parties or strong Catholic electorate. This is what we see when looking at Poland in the early 1990s when the party system was still fluid leading to fragmentation of the political parties, while the Catholic electorate was robust and saw the Church as a key player in overthrowing communism. This combination allowed the Church to obtain major policy victories especially when it rolled back the abortion-on-demand law dating back to 1956. At that time the Church also institutionalized Catholic education in public schools.

A combination of strong Christian Democratic parties or a frail Catholic electorate was the other necessary condition. We see this condition in action in consolidated Poland, especially after 2010. It is then that the Church shifted to relying on strong Christian
Democratic parties to secure its policy preferences while also using small but energetic Catholic groups to overwhelm the political system. We see this most clearly in the case of abortion with anti-abortion bills being a steady fixture of the contemporary political agenda, and in the case of Sunday trade ban when PiS gave the Church what it wanted.

The sufficient condition, which consists of strong Christian Democratic parties and institutional availability of referendums, is also best understood in the contemporary context of Polish politics. In a country that already exhibits high levels of Church influence, the condition is sufficient in the sense that it consolidates the Church’s political gains. Given the dependence of the PiS on the Church for its political survival, it is very unlikely that the party would initiate any measure that attempts to roll back existing Church prerogatives.

We have also seen that the Church avoided using referendums in the early 1990s to roll back abortion on demand, making its actions consistent with the veto player framework that conceptualizes referendums as policy stability as opposed to policy change mechanisms (Hug and Tsebelis 2002). Furthermore when the SLD-led government was negotiating the ratification of the Polish Constitution and accession to the European Union with the Church, the Episcopate used the threat of boycotting referendums to secure new concessions and to prevent roll back any existing benefits. Thus the Constitution accommodates the Church’s preferences on both abortion and religious instruction in public schools.

The Polish Catholic Church emerges as a powerful and strategic political institution. Over the years, the Church has adjusted to different political environments and was able to preserve its politically privileged status. Its influence has to be understood both in terms of policy concessions the Church was able to achieve and in how it prevented others from getting what they wanted. This is not to say that the quest to secure its institutional preferences has been cost-free. The 2010 shift to pro-life groups to secure an even more
restrictive abortion law came with a significant institutional cost. The Church had to overtly engage in politics and this created a political backlash that has led to the mobilization of previously weak pro-choice groups. However, in line with the logic of chapter 2, institutional self-interest takes a back seat to doctrinal commitments especially where abortion is concerned. The Church, therefore, continues its attempts to restrict the abortion laws even more and its chances of eliminating eugenic abortion are high given that the PiS is so dependent on the Church for its political survival.

Finally, the expectation that lay Catholic groups will moderate the Church’s demands did not materialize. The experiences of Latin American Church with liberation theology are not compatible with the way the Pro-Foundation interacted with the Polish Episcopate. In fact, the opposite was true; the Pro-Foundation issued a proposal that was too radical for the Church to accept. In both Latin American and in Poland bishops were able to secure the final authority over the direction of Catholicism but they both operate in much different political environments. In Latin America, the Church had to contend with grassroots groups that were challenging the Church from the left, while in Poland, it was being outflanked from the right.
CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSIONS

The overarching aim of this dissertation was to examine the extent to which the Catholic Church is still a significant public policy actor in economically developed countries. The research design used in this project draws on three distinct approaches, each addressing a different puzzle but when integrated together they provide an answer to the main question. The rational choice institutionalism paradigm is used to explain the political behavior of the Catholic Church. Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) examines the macro-conditions under which the Church is able to exercise influence on public policy outcomes. The process tracing and case study analysis focuses on Poland to demonstrate the specific mechanisms used by the Church to exert its power. Taken together these three approaches show that the Catholic Church continues to be an important political institution with considerable influence even in economically developed democracies.

Key Findings

The rational choice institutionalism analysis focuses on Catholic abortion teaching to demonstrate that doctrine is as a form of endogenous institutional constraint. In addition to its institutional self-interest, the Church is also motivated by its doctrinal commitments. When institutional and doctrinal interests collide, the Church acts in favor of its doctrine and violates its self-interest.

QCA findings demonstrate that the political influence of the Church on public policy outcomes is still substantial and its influence is especially pronounced in countries belonging to the third wave of democratization. The Church uses a number of necessary and sufficient conditions to secure its policy victories. When such victories have been obtained, a
combination of strong Christian Democratic parties and institutional availability of referendums is sufficient to keep these gains in place. The QCA analysis identified Poland as the ideal case study candidate for process tracing analysis.

The process tracing investigation focuses on how the Church shapes public policy outcomes in Poland. In the early democratic period, the Episcopate took advantage of the fragmented political scene to overturn abortion-on-demand laws and introduce catechesis to public schools. In 2010 the Church started to depend on pro-life groups and the conservative Law and Justice party to secure new policy concessions. The ban of trade on Sundays institutionalized in 2018 helps illustrate that the Church’s influence is considerable even many years after the democratic transition.

**Rational Choice Institutionalism (Chapter 2)**

What does the Church want to achieve in the realm of public policy and what principles guide its institutional behavior? To answer these questions, Chapter 2 offers an in-depth look at the institutional internal workings of the Catholic Church. A large body of the scholarly literature presents the Church as a rational institution that seeks to realize some form of its institutional self-interest (e.g., Gill 1998; Grzymała-Busse 2015; Htun 2003; Vallier 1970; Warner 2000). This view is usually based on exogenous assumptions about maximization of parishioners or institutional survival. By analyzing the Church’s primary documents, Chapter 2 demonstrates that the process of institutional preference formation is mostly endogenous, and although exogenous factors can play an important role in shaping Church’s political behavior they are secondary in importance.

The Church is a rational institution. If it were not, it would not have been able to survive for 2000 years. But the Church also has strong doctrinal commitments and they are a vital component of its political mission. Doctrine tends to be associated with theological
debates and thus it can be dismissed too readily. Chapter 2, on the other hand, presents doctrine as a set of endogenous institutional constrains that guide the Church’s political behavior. It might be tempting to see doctrinal commitments as expressions of rational action. The problem with such interpretation is that it becomes tautological, in that anything that the Church does is strategic. Such rationality is boundless and it loses its explanatory power. The Church instead is committed to doctrinal teachings, not because of rational or strategic calculations but because it believes them to be true. This means that when bishops are forced to choose between institutional self-interest (e.g., negative media exposure) and doctrinal commitments (e.g., affirming that abortion is morally objectionable), they will favor the latter commitment.

Doctrinal commitments are not born in a vacuum. Throughout its long history, sophisticated institutional mechanisms were developed to both produce doctrine and connect it to Church’s institutional mission. Chapter 2 demonstrates that Catholic doctrine on abortion is produced by four institutionally endogenous and interdependent sources of moral authority: the Bible, tradition, natural law, and the magisterium of the Church. The mechanism that produces doctrine is akin to path-dependence, so over time doctrine becomes more solidified and practically unfalsifiable. The development of doctrine is, therefore, best understood as a process of deepening and consolidation while opportunities for radical rupture with past pronouncements are unlikely to materialize.

When thinking about the general mission of the Church, a distinction has to be made between the focus on the individual and the emphasis on the aggregate. The former emphasis stresses individual believers and non-believers alike. Social scientists emphasize this level of analysis when they implement measures of believing, behaving, and belonging (e.g., Davie 1994). The emphasis on the aggregate takes a form of shaping macro-structures
such as constitutions, laws, and legislation. Hence, when the Church attempts to outlaw abortion, it is interested in shaping political outcomes that affect both Catholics and non-Catholics alike. These two measures capture different types of political influence. It is possible for the Church to have many adherents and little impact on public policy, or conversely to have a small membership and yet significant impact on policy outcomes.

**Comparative QCA Analysis (Chapters 3 & 4)**

Chapters 3 and 4 provide a comparative analysis of the conditions under which the Catholic Church is able to influence public policy outcomes. The scholarly literature identifies three necessary conditions for the Church to exercise political influence: (1) the share of Catholic electorate, (2) the strength of Christian Democratic parties, and (3) the presence of referendums. The outcome variable is operationalized as an aggregate of seven policy areas: (1) abortion, (2) euthanasia, (3) stem-cell research, (4) capital punishment, (5) same-sex marriage, (6) divorce, and (7) religious instruction in public schools. The resulting dataset includes 35 OECD countries from 1961 or year of OECD accession to 2017.

A descriptive analysis of the outcome variable reveals that several traditionally Catholic countries exhibit low levels of the Church’s influence on public policy. Measured on a zero to one scale, these include France (0.35), Ireland (0.46), Mexico (0.30), Portugal (0.35), and Spain (0.44). The influence, however, is strong in other Catholic strongholds such as Chile (0.65), Italy (0.74), and Poland (0.85).

Chapter 4 uses QCA to test which conditions by themselves or in combination with other conditions are necessary or sufficient for the Catholic Church to exercise political influence. The comparative examination identified two conditions as necessary for the outcome and they can be found in countries (1) where the share of the Catholic electorate is small or Christian Democratic parties are strong (~C+P), and (2) where the share of the
Catholic electorate is high or Christian Democratic parties are weak (C+~P). The analysis of sufficiency revealed that there is one sufficient path to the outcome and it includes a combination of strong Christian Democratic parties and the institutional presence of referendums (P*R).

In addition to examining the 35 OECD countries, Chapter 4 also analyzed a subset of 14 countries belonging to the third wave of democratization. The third wave is sometimes referred to as the Catholic wave and indeed we see that the influence of the Church in those countries is more robust but the mechanisms of influence remained the same. In both samples, Chile, Greece, and Poland are countries that exhibited the highest levels of Church’s influence, with Poland receiving the highest score overall and thus being identified as the best country for case study investigation.

This study also finds that the Catholic Church exercises more influence over public policy outcomes in economically developed countries than both secularization and modernization theories would lead us to believe. Once again on a zero to one scale, a majority of countries in the sample (20) exhibited levels of influence that are above the (0.5) threshold and the average sample score is just below it (0.45). The Church has the least influence in the US and Luxembourg (0.11) and is most potent in Poland (0.85). The mean level of influence in third wave democracies rises to (0.51) with the German Church apparently being the least influential (0.19). Nine out of fourteen third wave democracies have scores above the (0.5) indifference point.

The overall assessment is that the Catholic Church has been successful in defending its public policy gains. This has been true despite a decrease in standard measures of individual religiosity (e.g., weekly mass attendance). Thus the analyses presented in Chapters 3 and 4 warn against the implicit teleology that a decline in micro-level indicators
will inexorably lead to the secularization of macro-level outcomes. The influence of religion on public policy outcomes appears to be more durable than individual measures of religiosity.

**Case Study and Process Tracing Analysis (Chapters 5 & 6)**

Chapters 5 and 6 move the empirical analysis away from the search for general patterns to the analysis of specific mechanisms of Church’s influence. The focus is on Poland, the country identified as the ideal case study candidate. The relevant political actors that shape public policy in the country include (1) the Polish Catholic Church, (2) political parties and the Catholic Law and Justice party (PiS) in particular, (3) the pro-life movement, and (4) the pro-choice movement. An attempt is made to capture both the organizational strength of these actors and their institutional capacity to exercise political power.

Chapters 5 and 6 analyze data obtained from a number of sources: (1) fieldwork in Poland (May 2017-August 2017), (2) interviews with bishops, priests, politicians, and pro-life activists, (3) qualitative analysis of official documents, public speeches, and press releases, (4) quantitative analysis of public opinion, electoral outcomes, and measures of religiosity, (5) archival analysis of primary documents, and (6) participant observation.

Chapter 4 begins by outlining the historical trajectories that have made the Catholic Church in Poland powerful. Over the last 1000 years, the Church was able to build, reinforce, and extend its institutional infrastructures, while also gaining a high degree of moral authority in the process. In contemporary Poland the Church can effectively mobilize faithful members, overtly and indirectly pressure political parties, and provide institutional support to pro-life groups. Although not as wealthy as other European Churches, the Church in Poland has found a functional balance between the hierarchal control and the active laity. The model of political action envisioned by the Second Vatican Council (1962-65) in which
bishops provide doctrinal instructions while the laity works to translate it into law has found its expression in Poland.

As a strategic actor, the Church adjusts its political strategies based on who governs. From the early 2000s, Poland has experienced a political re-alignment as left-wing parties began to wane while the country took a conservative turn. The shift to the right consolidated in 2015 when the Catholic Law and Justice Party (PiS) won both the presidential and parliamentary elections. The dependence of the Law and Justice on the Church for its political support opened the door for new policy concessions. Political pressure has been increased even further when pro-life groups with Church's backing used intuitions of participatory democracy to introduce bills to entirely outlaw abortion.

The relationship between the pro-life movement and the Church is complicated. The movement is marked by a high degree of fragmentation and competition, making cooperation with the Episcopate difficult, often forcing the Church to play a role of a peacemaker in bringing the numerous groups together. The fragmentation of the pro-life movement also decreases the likelihood that abortion-restricting bills will be successfully adopted. A failed anti-abortion campaign harms the Church’s institutional self-interest since official endorsements depend on overt political action and this is not the preferred strategy of the Episcopate (Grzymała-Busse 2015). Nonetheless, it is shown that when forced to decide between institutional self-interest and doctrinal commitments, Catholic bishops in Poland continue to support anti-abortion campaigns.

Chapter 6 describes how the Catholic Church achieved its policy preferences in Poland. Using process tracing analysis three public policy outcomes - abortion policy, Sunday trade ban, and religious instruction in public schools - are analyzed. The Church once again displays the capacity for rational action, with bishops adjusting their strategies to the
political environment they find themselves in. These strategies correspond in turn to conditions identified as relevant in QCA analysis.

First, it is shown that in the early 1990s, the Episcopate capitalized on the yet not well-institutionalized party system to obtain two major policy victories on abortion and religious education in public schools. Secondly, when the party system stabilized, the Episcopate turned to the conservative Law and Justice party to secure new policy gains. Using a combination of well-organized pro-life campaigns and overt political pressure the Church has kept pro-choice bills off the political agenda and in 2018 it obtained another policy victory by banning trade on Sunday. In profoundly Catholic Poland, the Church is influential when both the electorate and the media were distracted (Grzymała-Busse 2015, 147) but also when all eyes are on the Episcopate. Finally, the analysis of mechanisms sufficient for the Church to exercise political influence is understood in terms of consolidating existing gains. The Polish Church won numerous public policy battles and the combination of a strong Christian Democratic party (PiS) and the institutional availability of referendums is sufficient for the Episcopate to keep its policy gains intact.

The political influence of the Catholic Church is presented both in terms of policy victories it was able to achieve and in its ability to prevent others from obtaining their policy preferences. Most notably, the limited power of the pro-choice movement is directly connected to the political-religious environment the Church has helped to bring about. We also see that bishops continue to support anti-abortion projects even though they harm the institutional self-interest of the Church. By openly endorsing pro-life bills, the Episcopate exposes itself to attacks stemming from the pro-choice movement and against the charge that it is directly interfering in politics. One consequence of this strategy is that
unintendedly the Church has helped to reinvigorate the previously lethargic pro-choice movement.

The relationship between the Episcopate and the pro-life movement is equally complicated and it does not correspond to the expectation that Catholic lay groups will moderate Church’s institutional demands. The experience of the Church in Latin America with liberation theology does not travel well to Poland. In Latin America lay Catholic groups sought to make the Church more liberal. The opposite of that was true of Poland where some pro-life groups pressed for anti-abortion proposals that were too radical for the Episcopate to accept. In both Latin America and in Poland bishops were able to secure the ultimate control over the direction of Catholicism but in many ways, they were addressing different challenges. In Latin America, the Church had to contend with grassroots groups that were challenging the Church from the left, whereas in Poland, the Church was being outflanked from the right.

**Main Contributions**

By utilizing a multi-method approach, this project pushes disciplinary boundaries in three important ways. First of all, it adds to the rational choice institutionalism paradigm by endogenizing the process of institutional preference formation. The current paradigm depends on exogenous assumptions that favor the expectation that the Church will primarily protect its self-interest. By endogenizing Church’s preferences, it is shown that institutional and doctrinal interests are different and they can at times collide. When they do, the Church will treat doctrinal considerations as primary. The argument offered here has broader implications for the study of institutions. Institutions are in danger of collapsing both when their self-interest is threatened as well as when their political missions come under attack. Thus, in addition to believing that Catholic teaching on abortion is correct, the
Church stands by its doctrine because doing otherwise would undermine its prospects for institutional unity and survival.

Secondly, this is the first project to use QCA to comparatively examine the impact of Christian Democratic parties, referendums, and share of Catholic voters on the levels of Church’s political influence. Rather than focusing on the effects of these conditions in isolation from one another, QCA examines how these three conditions interact and which combination of them is most conducive to Church’s influence. This study also moves the focus away from the individual-level indicators such as weekly mass attendance, and focuses instead on the analysis of collective outcomes (i.e., public policy). In doing so this project demonstrates that the Church is a powerful political institution even though individual-level indicators of its strength are in decline.

Thirdly, the process tracing analysis focuses on the public policy making in Poland. The analysis reveals that since 2010 the Church shifted its strategy from using primarily covert pressure mechanisms to overt political action through the activation of pro-life groups. Exercising covert pressures might be the preferred strategy (Grzymała-Busse 2015) but the Church is certainly capable of manifesting its power openly, especially in its pursuit to outlaw abortion. While this more adversarial strategy resulted in new policy gains, such as the ban of trade on Sundays passed in 2018, it also produced an unintended effect of reenergizing the previously weak pro-choice movement. This example thus corroborates the claim that even the most rational actors have a very hard time anticipating how others will react to their actions and as a result social interactions continue to produce many unintended consequences (Elster 2015, Ch 17; Schelling 2006). By securing policy concessions in 2018 we see also that the influence of the Church is not limited to situations when the electorate and the media are distracted (Grzymała-Busse 2015, 147). Instead, the
Polish Episcopate secured the ban of trade on Sundays because it was able to count on favorable media coverage and mobilize its religious electorate. Finally, the experience of Catholic churches in Latin America does not travel well to Poland. In Latin America the Catholic lay movements acted as a progressive force within the Church, in Poland they played a more conservative role when attempted to move the Church to the right of political spectrum.

**Limitations and Future Research**

Each empirical chapter is marked by certain limitations that in turn lead to new research puzzles. By underscoring the political importance of Catholic doctrine, Chapter 2 raises new questions about its enforcement. The pope might be the last absolute monarch but nobody rules alone (Bueno De Mesquita and Smith 2011). The task of enforcing doctrine falls to the 5,000+ bishops spread around the globe. However, what happens if individual bishops begin to question doctrine or start to challenge it outright? This question becomes even more interesting if we consider that mechanisms to keep bishops horizontally accountable are particularly weak and rarely enforced: “Even in extreme cases of doctrinal and disciplinary disarray, it can take years to effect a change of governance in the diocese” (Weigel 2014, 132).

Catholic bishops are defrocked only in the most extreme cases, usually when they are involved in a doctrinal controversy, financial scam, or participation in a sex-abuse scandal. A future project would look at longitudinal disciplining trends within the Church to see which Pope exercised his disciplining power over fellow bishops more frequently. Pope John Paul II tends to be associated with an authoritarian style of management while Pope Frances is labeled as a liberal but as it stands such assertions rest on limited empirical evidence.
The issue of horizontal accountability within the Church raises a further question about who gets to become a bishop in the first place. The membership of the Catholic Church is growing rapidly in the Global South while the opposite trend holds for much of the Western World. Yet prelates from the Global North dominate both the College of Bishops and the Sacred College of Cardinals (Allen 2014). What explains this divergence in outcomes? Do popes “pack” the Church with bishops who they believe will be loyal to them and extend their political and theological legacies? If so, what kind of characteristics a priest has to possess to became a bishop? Several factors appear to matter in the nomination process including age, the country of origin, professional background (pastoral experience vs. academic post), and prior association with a diocese (local vs. newcomer). At this point, however, a systematic study of these questions has not been carried out.

The comparative examination in Chapters 3 and 4 purposefully limits its scope to economically developed democracies. However, in addition to carrying out within-sample analysis of 14 third wave democracies, it would also be interesting to make an even more structured comparison. Poland and Chile emerge as the two most likely candidates. Both countries exhibit high levels of Church influence and the analysis of sufficiency identified them as good case study materials. Still, the dynamic in both countries appears to be pointing in the opposition direction. In Poland, the Church continues to push for a full ban on abortion and the overall trajectory of abortion policy is heading in a more conservative direction. In Chile, on the other hand, abortion laws have been recently liberalized (2017) allowing for the procedure in three specific cases. The abortion law in Chile is still very restrictive but the successful attempt to de-criminalize the procedure demonstrates a momentum in the liberal direction. Thus a structured comparison of these two countries would be an attempt to unpack some of the unobserved heterogeneity; the countries might
be exhibiting similar levels of influence but what factors explain their divergent policy trajectories?

The case study Chapters (5 and 6) take democracy for granted, and in many ways so does the Church. We have seen that under communism the Episcopate was not successful in contesting public policy outcomes because of the lack of vertical (voters) and horizontal (institutions) accountability. While Poland has been long recognized as a successful case of democratization and it is widely documented that the Catholic Church played an active and positive role in the transition process (Grzymała-Busse 2015; Grzymała-Busse and Slater 2018), recent observers warn that the country is backsliding into non-democracy and believe that contemporary Poland is currently best described as an illiberal democracy (Ekiert, Kubik and Wenzel 2017; Freedom House 2017; Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018). Thus a new empirical puzzle emerges: will the Catholic Church be defending procedural democracy in Poland as it did before (1989-1993) or is the informal alliance with the conservative Law and Justice party (PiS) making Polish bishop quiescent as the country backslides into non-democracy?

Finally, it is also necessary to examine how PiS ascended into power and the extent to which open list proportional representation (OLPR) electoral rules played a role in the process. Although proportional representation electoral rules tend to produce coalition governments, in 2015 the PiS party secured the majority of seats with only 37.5% of votes. In 2017, close to 50% of Polish voters expressed their support for the ruling party, theoretically allowing PiS to obtain the 3/5 majority required for constitutional amendments. The question then is whether political parties under OLPR rules retain a significant role in shaping electoral competition and if parties have bargaining power because they control access to their label and can deploy financial, logistical and operational resources that translate into votes and are highly
desirable by individual candidates. To examine these claims, every parliamentary election since
the PiS’ birth (2001) would have to be analyzed. The examination of the effects of OLPR on
Polish politics would also add to the literature on electoral engineering and the impact of formal
rules on the quality of democracy.


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## APPENDICES

Table 19. Fuzzy-set Scores of Cases in Rows with Consistency > 0.75 (35 OECD Countries)

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Consistent with subset relation

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Consistent with subset relation

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<td>1 Grzegorz Długi</td>
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<td>June 14, 2017</td>
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<td>2 Aniela Dylus</td>
<td>Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University in Warsaw and PBC</td>
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<td>June 20, 2017</td>
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<td>3 Jerzy Polaczek</td>
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<td>16 Marek Jędraszewski</td>
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<td>19 Przemysław Drag</td>
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<td>Priest, member and secretary of the Family Council, director of the National Family Pastoral Center</td>
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<td>20 Magdalena Korzekwa-Kaliszuk</td>
<td>Citizen GO and PBC</td>
<td>Campaign Manager in Poland and PBC member</td>
<td>October 24, 2017</td>
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Note: PBC = Polish Bishops’ Conference
Date: May 9, 2017

To: Jim Butterfield, Principal Investigator
    Dawid Tatarezyk, Student Investigator

From: Amy Naugle, Ph.D., Chair

Re: Approval not needed for HSIRB Project Number 17-05-08

This letter will serve as confirmation that your project titled “The House Built on the Rock: the Catholic Church and Its Policy Preferences” has been reviewed by the Human Subjects Institutional Review Board (HSIRB). Based on that review, the HSIRB has determined that approval is not required for you to conduct this project because you are not collecting personal identifiable (private) information about individual and your scope of work does not meet the Federal definition of human subject.

45 CFR 46.102 (f) Human Subject

(f) Human subject means a living individual about whom an investigator (whether professional or student) conducting research obtains

(1) Data through intervention or interaction with the individual, or
(2) Identifiable private information.

Intervention includes both physical procedures by which data are gathered (for example, venipuncture) and manipulations of the subject or the subject's environment that are performed for research purposes. Interaction includes communication or interpersonal contact between investigator and subject. Private information includes information about behavior that occurs in a context in which an individual can reasonably expect that no observation or recording is taking place, and information which has been provided for specific purposes by an individual and which the individual can reasonably expect will not be made public (for example, a medical record). Private information must be individually identifiable (i.e., the identity of the subject is or may readily be ascertained by the investigator or associated with the information) in order for obtaining the information to constitute research involving human subjects.

“About whom” – a human subject research project requires the data received from the living individual to be about the person.

Thank you for your concerns about protecting the rights and welfare of human subjects.

A copy of your protocol and a copy of this letter will be maintained in the HSIRB files.

1903 W. Michigan Ave., Kalamazoo, MI 49008-5456
Phone: (269) 387-8293 Fax: (269) 387-8276
 Campus Site: 253 W. Walwood Hall

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