The Commentary on Book Five of Boethius' "Consolation of Philosophy" By Pseudo-Thomas Aquinas and Josse Bade

Janet Suzanne Evenson
Western Michigan University

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THE COMMENTARY ON BOOK FIVE OF BOETHIUS' "CONSOLATION OF PHILOSOPHY"
BY PSEUDO-THOMAS AQUINAS
AND JOSSE BADE

Janet Suzanne Evenson, M.A.

Western Michigan University, 1995

A transcription, translation and discussion of Book Five of the Dual Latin
Commentary of Boethius' Consolation of Philosophy by the scholastic Pseudo-Thomas
Aquinas and the humanist Josse Bade is the focus of this study.

The commentary of Pseudo-Thomas Aquinas possesses the scholastic
preoccupation with using ancient philosophy to aid understanding of Christian
doctrine. The commentary of Josse Bade embodies the humanist focus on the
importance of eloquence in written expression.

The findings of this study were that Josse Bade and Pseudo-Thomas Aquinas
were products of two different educational philosophies, yet they shared the same goal
of wanting to educate university students in a manner which they believed would best
facilitate pursuit of truth.
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Finally, I dedicate this thesis to Dr. Anthony Moses, who introduced me to the works of Boethius.

Janet Suzanne Evenson
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Statement of Problem

The German tradition of commentaries on Boethius' *Consolation of Philosophy* has received very little attention from scholars.¹ The source noted in the German tradition is the commentary on *De Consolation Philosophie* which is attributed to Saint Thomas Aquinas, hence the title Pseudo-Thomas Aquinas. However, very little is known about Pseudo-Thomas Aquinas.² Alastair Minnis explains that Pseudo-Thomas Aquinas was probably German and lived in the fifteenth century.³


³Minnis cites H.F. Sebastion as the source for this information. Minnis 354.
scant information written about the actual contents of Pseudo-Thomas Aquinas' commentary, and much of what has been written is misleading. ⁴

There is adequate information on Josse Bade (Jodocus Badius Ascensius) as a printer in Lyons, but there is almost no mention of him as a commentator on texts. ⁵ He is best known for his printing of famous author's works. ⁶ He lived from 1462 to 1535. ⁷ He was educated by the Brethren of the Common life at Ghent, which William

⁴Palmer suggests that Pseudo-Thomas Aquinas' technique of beginning each section of the commentary with a "literal paraphrase" betrays the school or university context in which the work was written. Literal paraphrasing may indicate the context of the work, but Pseudo-Thomas Aquinas does not always begin each section in this way. He begins meter sections with a discussion of the meter style and its possible originator. While Alastair Minnis notes that Pseudo-Thomas Aquinas was one of many commentators known for "narrative elaboration", the definition he gives of this technique is not completely true of the commentator's work. He does not give "case histories of exemplary individuals" or "brief biographies of famous or infamous men, including the pagan rulers and philosophers" in any part of the text other than the Proemium, where he discusses the history of Boethius.


⁷Delaney and Tobin 91.
Estep suggests was most certainly the origins of his humanist thinking. He taught Greek at Lyons and was a university professor at Paris, where he set up his printing press around the year 1500.

The text itself is properly titled *Commentum Duplex in Boetium De Consolatione Philosophie cum Utriusq tabula*. The dual commentaries are *De Consolatione Philosophie* which is "falsely attributed to Saint Thomas Aquinas" and *De Disciplina Scholarium" generally attributed to Boethius." The larger part of text of the *Dual Commentary on the Consolation of Boethius* is by Pseudo-Thomas Aquinas. Bade's contribution is a running gloss on Pseudo-Thomas Aquinas'

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8Ferguson notes Bade's educational background. Ferguson 97. William Estep explains that the Brethren of the Common Life were the "transmission lines of Northern Humanist learning. The Brethren also educated Agricola, Mutian, Erasmus and Luther. William R. Estep, *Renaissance and Reformation*, (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1986) 45. However, R.R. Post's does not hold this view. He states: "...despite their merits in training and supplementing the education of small groups of students with a particular aim within their hostels, the Brothers were essentially pastors and not teachers in the late medieval and first Humanist schools. Their main task was the pastoral care of the schoolboys and nuns. Only in exceptional cases and in a few cities did they introduce their charges to the humanistic culture, and here too they only developed after the new concepts had already gained hold in the schools. R.R. Post, *The Modern Devotion: Confrontation with Reformation and Humanism*, (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1968) 630.

9Delaney and Tobin 91.


11Nigel Palmer states this information about Boethius being assumed as *De Disciplina Scholarium*, which is a thirteenth century text.
commentary. Anthony Grafton suggests that Bade's gloss "drew upon the proper ancient and humanist sources to refute Ps.-Aquinas point by point." However, this is not the case. There are no instances of point by point refutation by Bade; his few refutations are in the Proemium, concerning Pseudo-Thomas Aquinas' information on the life of Boethius. Furthermore, current scholarship assumes a Thomist tradition behind the commentary of Pseudo-Thomas Aquinas, but offers no justification for this other than that it has been attributed to Aquinas.

Purpose of Study

The purpose of this study is primarily an investigation of the scholastic and humanist views as they are applied here to Boethius' *Consolation of Philosophy*. After preparing a literature review on scholasticism, humanism and the tradition of the *Consolation of Philosophy*, I was better able to understand the educational philosophies of scholasticism to which Pseudo-Thomas Aquinas adheres and of humanism to which Josse Bade adheres. Understanding these philosophies allowed for a more conscientious analysis of their comments.

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12 Grafton 413.

13 Nigel Palmer explains that the first printing of this text was in Northern Europe by Anton Koberger at Nurnberg in 1473. It was a bilingual edition which contained a "fairly elementary Latin commentary attributed to Ps.Aquinas. Palmer 363. Anthony Grafton states that Ascensius was teaching in Lyons in 1498 when he wrote the running gloss to the commentary attributed to Aquinas.
Organization of Study

The text utilized for this study is taken from the commentary on Book Five for its discussion of eternity as well as the discussion of the compatibility of divine providence with free will. The sections are set of by centered titles, and the commentaries of Pseudo-Thomas Aquinas are distinguished by name and underlined.

The transcription was prepared with the aid of Adriano Cappelli’s *Lexicon abbreviaturarum*. The translation was prepared with the aid of Charlton T. Lewis’ *A Latin Dictionary*. The actual text of Boethius’ *Consolation of Philosophy* is represented in the transcription and translation inside quotation marks. At first the method may seem confusing, but it was necessary in order to separate the actual words of Boethius from the paraphrases and comments of Pseudo-Thomas Aquinas and Bade.
CHAPTER II

TRANSCRIPTION OF BOOK FIVE

Incipit Prosa Prima Libri Quinti

Sanctus Thomas

"Dixerat orationis quem cursum..." hic incipit quintus liber Boethius De Consolatione Philosophie cuius hec est prima prosa in qua philosophia studet solvere quedam dubia suam determinationem consequentia de fato et providentia. Videtur enim ex dictis que casus non sit: quia si omnia provisa ita que nihil eveniat preter ordinem divine providentie videtur que nihil casualiter evenit: quare casus importat eventum in opinatum. Item videtur ex dictis que liberum arbitrium non sit, quare omnia disponuntur secundum ordinem fatalis necessitatis. Liberum aut arbitrium necessitatem excludit. Videtur ergo si ponitur providentia et fatum que omnino excludatur liberum arbitrium. Philosophia ergo in presenti libro inquirit utrum casus sit et quid sit. et inquirit utrum liberum arbitrium sit ponendo argumenta quibus liberum arbitrium cum providentia divina non videtur posse stare. Post hoc ponit falsam solutionem quorundam quam improbat et ponit propriam quam rationibus confirmat, et de eternitate determinat. Et alia plura sicut patebit. Et dividitur iste liber in undecim partes quare sex sunt prose et quinque metra, eiusque partes et que
in ipsis determinantur patebunt in processu libri. In prima prosa determinat de casu. 

Et primo Boetius tangit acta Philosophie commendans eius exhortationem factam et movet questionem de casu. Secundo Philosophia excusat se ab eius determinatione. 


Nota per hoc que dicit Boetius dixerat innuit philosophia iam expedivisse que ad sui speculationem spectabant, et ita determinasse principalem huius libri intentionem, et Philosophia vertebat cursum orationis id est orationem currentem, quia oratio philosophie non impediebatur ignorantia docentis, nec tarditate discentis. Hanc orationem vertebat ad quedam alia tractanda. Quae autem fuerunt illa Boetius non exprimit quare forsitam sua opinione nimis erant consideranda, vel forsitam quantum tum ad propositum extranea. Notandum que dicit exhortationem Philosophie fuisse rectam, quare Philosophia hortatur ad virtutes et ad contemptum fortuitorum. Talis autem exhortatio quem sit ad bonum prosequendum et ad malum fugiendum recta est.  

Et dicit exhortationem Philosophie esse dignissimam auctoritate: quare quod a
sapientibus dicitur auctoritate sapientis dignum reputatur.

"Tum illa festino" inquit, hic philosophia excusat se de huius opinionis vel questionis determinacione, et Boetius illam excusationem removet dicit Philosophia inquit. "Ego festino absolverere" id est perficere "debitum promissionis et aperire tibi viam qua revebaris ad patriam. Hec autem que tu queris de casu etsi pro quem vis sunt per utilia cognitu" id est cognitione "tamen paulisper aversa sunt tramite" id est a via nostri propositi et dicit "paulisper, quare non sunt totaliter aversa sed aliquantulum incident permissa. Et est verendum" id est timendum "ne tu fatigatus devii id est questionibus extraneis non possis sussicere ad emetiendum" id est transeundum "rectum iter" dicit Boetius, "O philosophia ne illud vereare" id est ne timeas, "quare hoc fuerit mihi loco quietis agnoscere ea quibus maxime delector et cum omne latus" id est ommis constantia tue disputationis "mihi constiterit fide indubitata: nihil est quod ambigatur de sequentibus."

Notandum que di. qua via reverbaris patriam. Hic patriam vocat beatitudinem quam prius invenire docuit. Illa autem per que homo pervenit ad ipsam sunt virtutes de quibus Boetius intendebat agere -- non in hoc libro sed in ultimis libris musice sue agendo de musica humana. Intentionem autem suam non complevit, quare a Rege Theodorice morte preventus fuit. Tum illa "mortem" inquit, hic philosophia determinat de casu soluendo permissas causas et questiones. Primo soluit primam. An casus sit. Secundo secundam, "Quid sit casus" ibi licet igitur. Primo ostendit quid significetur per nomen casus, ponendo opinionem quorundam. secundo improbat illam opinionem, ibi, "Quis enim." Primo distinctione "O Boetius ego geram tibi morem id
estconfirmabo me voluntati tue. Et simul sic est exorsa id est sic incepit, "si aliquis
diffiniat quo ad nomen dicens casum e contra eventum productum motu temerario" id
est improviso: et nulla contextione causarum. Ego Philosophia confirmo casum sic
omnino nihil esse. "Et decerno" id est iudico "vocem casus prorsus esse in anem
propter significationem rei subiecte, sicut hec vox chimera inanis est."

Nota que quem vis questio si est precedit quid est secundum que questio quid
est querit de quid ditate rei. Quare quid est rei nulli debetur nisi enti tamen questio
quid est querens de quod quid est nominis est prima cognitio. Et ideo ex quo quid est
nominis oportet scire de aliquo si est. Propter hoc philosophia ad querendum de casu
utrum sit vel non accipit quod quid est, quod significat per nomen et dicit: "Si aliqui
dicunt casum esse eventum temerarium sine omni causa productum, ego video vocum
casus esse inanem tanquam sibi nihil correspondeat in re.

"Quis enim coercente..." hic Philosophia improbat opinionem istam ostendens
casum nihil esse secundum eam. Secundo solvit secundum rei veritatem ibi,
"Arsoteles meus." Primo ponit unam rationem. Secundo ilam, ibi, "Nam nihil."
Antiqui dicebant que casus est eventus temerarius id est improvisus. Contra hoc arguit
philosophia sic. Ubicumque omnia sunt provisa ibi nihil est temerarium, sed omnia que
sunt: provisa sunt a deo. Ergo inter ea quem sunt nihil est temerarius. Hanc rationem
breviter innuit in littera di, "Quis enim locus ullus potest esse reliquus" id est relictus
teritati id est improvisioni deo coercente cuncta in ordinem secundum provisum, quasi
diceret nullus.

Notandum que omnia a deo sunt provisa: cuius ratio est. Quocumque deus est
causa. Omnia talia provisa sunt a deo, sed deus est causa omnis entis, ergo omnia entia a deo sunt provisa. Que autem deus sit causa omnis entis patet quare ab ipso dependet celum et tota natura, ut patem ex duodecimo metaphisice.

"Nam nihil ex nihilo existere..." hic ponit aliam rationem phantem que casus non potest esse sine omni causa productus sicut dicebant antiqui. Et arguit sit, "Quod est ex nihilo nihil est. Secundum quod est ex nulla causa ex nihilo est. Ergo quod ex nulla causa est nihil est. Sed secundum antiquios casus est ex nulla causa, quia est productus sine omnmi connexione causarum. Ergo casus nihil est. unde dicit in littera: "Vera sententia est cui nemo unque veterum refragatus est," id est contradixit "scilicet ex nihilo nihil existere: queque illi antiqui illam propositionem ex nihilo nihil existere iecerint," id est posuerint, quasi quoddam fundamentum non de operante principio scilicet de deo creatore, quare ille ex nihilo aliquid fecit. Sed intelleherunt hoc de materiali subiecto id est de tota natura fundata in materia. Et exponit seipsum distinctione "hoc est de natura omnium rationum nunc" id est de materia "que est subiectum formarum naturalium. Sed si aliquid oriatur ex nullis causis, id videtur esse ortum ex nihilo. Sed hoc fieri nequit, ut aliquid oriatur ex nihilo. Ergo non est possibile casum esse huiusmodi," id est talem qualem pauloante diffinivimus. Secundum antiquos: que sit eventus temerarius sine connexione causarum.

"Quid," ergo "dicendum est de casu" querit Boetius. "Est ne nihil in rerum natura quod iure possit appellari casus vel fortuitum, vvel est aliquid tametsi pro quamvis lateat vulgus cui ista vocabula conveniant." Notandum que hec propositio ex nihilo nihil existere est vera in comparisone ad causam particularum que in sua actione
presupponit materiam. Tamen in comparatione ad causam universalem que est causa totius entis non est vera, unde diximus deum omnia creasse ex nihilo et fide tenemus. Sed antiqui de isto modo productionis per creationem non loquebantur sed primo modo. Unde Aristoteles primo Phisicorum, "Impossibile est aliquid fieri ex his que non sunt." In hac enim opinione conveniunt ommnes qui de natura sentiunt. "Aristoteles meus inquit in phisicis..." hic Philosophia solvit questionem de casu, et primo ostendit eam esse solutam ab Aristotele, et ostendit modum eius. Secundo declarat que casus licet non habeat causas per se, habet tamen causas per accidens, ibi, "Hec sunt igitur..." Primo dicit "Aristoteles meus," id est doctrina mea nutritus et deditus "diffinivit casum in phisicis," id est in secundo phisicorum breve ratione et propinqua veris, id est veritati. Et querit Boetius, "Quoniam inquam modo." Dicit Philosophia, "Quotiens aliquid geritur," id est fit "gratia cuiuspiam rei," id est alicuius rei et aliud "obtingit quibusdam de causis que quod intendebatur illud vocatur casus, ut si aliquis causa colendi agrifodien humum inventat pondus auri defossum, hec inventio auri creditur fortuito," id est a casu accidisse. "Verum pro sed talis eventus casualis non est de nihilo," id est de nulla causa "sicut dicebat diffinitio antiquorum. Nam eventus casualis habet proprias causas quarum concursus et in opinatus et improvisus supple ab eo qui aliquid fecit causa alterius rei videbitur operatus esse casum, nisi enim cultor agri foderet humum que supple fossio est una causa inventionis auri, et nisi eo loci id est loco depositor obriisset," id est abscondisset "pecuniam suam, que est alia causa inventionis auri, aurum non esset inventum."

Nota que causa secundum Aristoteles est quoniam aliquid sit propter aliquem
finem ut fossio agri propter seminationem. Si aliquid aliud evenit ex quibusdam causis
preter hoc quod intendebatur hoc est casus, ut inventio thesauri casualis est que, non
intendebatur a fossore agri. Ex quo patet que inventio thesauri est casualis, non ideo
que non est previsa a deo, sed quare non est provisa ab homine. Et ita casus nihil est
quo ad deum sed est aliquid quo ad hominem preter cuius intentionem et previsionem
evenit. "Ne sunt igitur fortuiti cause compendii..." hic ostendit philosophia que casus
non habet causas per se, sed per accidens dicit, "Ne igitur sunt cause fortuiti
compndii," id est fortitui eventus "quod fortitum compendium evenit ex causis obviis
et confluentibus non ex intentione gerentis. Non enim ille qui aurum obruit: vel qui
agrum exercuit," id est fodid intendit "ut ea pecunia reperiretur sed ut dixi preter
gerentis intentionem evenit hunc fodere quo ille obruit pecuniam, et occurrit supple
inventio pecunie."

Nota que causa efficiens non agitur nisi moveatur a fine. Finis autem non
movet nisi secundum que est in intentione. Et ideo respectu illius effectus que est in
intentione agens est causa per se. Si aliquid contingat in actione preter intentionem
agentis illius agens est causa per accidens et sic casus. Quare contingit preter
intentionem agentis non habet causam agentem per se sed per accidens. "Licet igitur
diffinire..." hic philosophia solvit secundam questionem ostendendo quid sit casus.
Concludit igitur diffinitionem eius ex iam dictis dicens, "Licet igitur diffinire casum
esse eventum in opinaturn ex causis confluentibus in his que geruntur ob aliquid aliud."
Tunc ostendit quoniam effectus casualis cadit ab ordine providentie. Ductum est enim
que casus provenit ex causis confluentibus. Que autem cause confluant hoc provenit
ex ordine providentie. unum distinctione Causas "vero concurrere et confluere facit
iste ordo super fatalis procedens inevitabili connexione scilicet causarum, qui
descendens super ordo de fonte providentie cuncta disponit suis temporibus et locis.

Nota que diffinitio casus est bona: quia per eam casus distinguitur ab aliis. Per
hoc quod dicitur casus est eventus in opinata excluditur effectus necessario eveniens,
vel ut frequenter sicut solem oriri vel hominem nasci cum quinque digitis in una manu
talia non eveniunt casualiter et inopinate, per hoc. Quod dicitur ex confluentibus
causis excluditur casus primo modo dictus: qui secundum antiquos ponebatur produci
ex nulla connexione causarum. Per hoc autem quod dicitur in his que geruntur ob
aliquid aliud, per hoc excluditur a casu casualitas per se. Casus enim et fortuna sunt
cause per accidentes: et fiunt preter intentionem agentis.

Ascensius

Dixerat, orationisque cursum ad alia quedam tractanda et expedienda vertebat.
Dixerat "recte" dicit quare qui perorant id est finem orationis faciunt. Dicunt in fine
"dixi" quare ergo Philosophia materiam acceptam quodammodo fini erat sese ad alia
vertens, bene dicit auctor ex persona sua. Dixerat supple Philosophia, et cursum
orationis, hoc quoque recte dicit. Quare debet oratio non lente ingredi neque violate,
sed currere id est medio modo sese inter prosam id est locutionem prorsus solutam et
metrum poematis haberere. Implicatam esse, sepius implicitam, leges que implicitam:
sex neutrum caret auctoritate. Morem geram id est votis tuis annuam. Est enim is
moriger et morem gerit alteri, qui morem. Et institutum vite sic gerit ut alteri placeat.
Simulque sic exorsa est id est incepit loqui. Venit enim ab exordior. non itaque legendum est exorta vel exhorta ut scriptum in quibus inveni. Cetera dilucida sunt.

Metrum Primum Quinti Libri

Sanctus Thomas

"Rupis achemenie scopulis..." istud est primum metrum istius quinti quod dicitur metrum elegiacum, et primum metrum est dactylicum hexametrum. Secundum est anapesti cum pentha metrum vel dactylicum pentametrum, in quo Philosophia ostendit quomodo eventus casualis se habet ad providentiam divinam. Est autem materia exempli que Tigris et Eufrates sunt duo fluvii ab eodem fonte procedentes qui postea ab invicem dividuntur. Etsi iterum concurrant necesse est naves et alia que per ista fluvia deferuntur concurrere, qui, quidem concursus provenit in quantum reguntur decursu istorum fluviorum. Et tamen est preter intentionem istorum qui regunt naves. Eodem modo concursus causarum casualis quemvis sit preter intentionem ipsorum agentium. Tamen concurrunt secundum defluxum ordinis fatalis ex regimine providentie. Et quevis nobis ignorantibus ordinem providentie videatur aliquid casuale et fortuitum, tamen in comparatione ad deum omnia sunt ordinata et provisa. Unum dicit id est litera Tigris et eufrayes resolvunt sese uno fonte scopulis id est concavitatibus rupis achemenie id est montis perthie, ubi scilicet in perthia fugax pugna versa spicula. Iid est sagittas figit pectoribus sequentum. Est enim consuetudo perthorum que fugiendo pugnant sagittando a tergo contra insequentes. Et mox id est
post pervum spactum Tigris et Eufrates dissociantur adiunctis aquis super aliis, et si
dicti fluvii iterum coeant id est conveniant et revocentur in unum cursum confluat id
est oportet confluem aliud. Quod unda alterni vadi id est utriusque fluminis trahit id
est secum ducit. Et conveniant puppes et trunci vulsi id est eradicati flumine flumine
idest per flumen. Et unda mixta id est confluentes implicet id est implicabit fortuitos
modos quia unda faciet concurrere fortitu naves et truncos.

Quos tamen vagos casus id est casualis eventus regit ipsa declinia terre id est
deressio terre dans viam fluvio. Et defluus ordo lapsi gurgitis id est currentis aque
regit illos vagos cursus. Et ita est de eventu casuali respectu providentie. Unum
distinctione fors id est casus vel fortuna que videtur fluitare permissis habenis id est
sine regimine, illa patit frenos id est regimina. Et meat id est transit ipsa lege id est
per ipsam legem divine providentie.

Notandum que scribitur in Genesi: Tigris et Eufrates sunt flumina quorum ortus est in Paradiso. Sed Hieronymus auctoritate Salustii, que ortus Tigris et Eufratis
demonstrantur in Armenia id est in Perthia, cui videtur Boethius consentire. Beatus
autem Augustinus super Genesis ad litteram istam contrarietatem concordat elicit,
"Illud contingit in istis fluminibus quod in aliis experimur scilicet que aliquando
absorbentur a terra et iterum oriuntur, et quare hec sepe possunt contingere, ideo de
ortu ipsorum fluviorum diversa possunt dici. Quando enim Moyses dicit in Genesi que
oriantur in Paradiso potest intelligi de prima origine eorum. Sed que dicitur ab aliis
que alihi oriantur, potest intelligi de ortu eorum secundario quotiendunt.

Notandum que parthia est regio quendam que alio nomine dicitur Armenia.
Unum dicitur homines Parthi qui vincunt hostes suos fugiendo sagittas a tergo mittendo, et sic amor vincendus est fugiendo. Unde poeta dicit, "Qua specie mmartis cedit victoria Parthis." Cipris ea parte similis quoque vincitur arte. Cypris id est Venus que colebatur in Cypro. Et pauper Henricus, "Proscribas igitur gladiis et fustibus ipsum super amorem. Et fugiendo fuga que fuga sola fugat."

Ascensius


Dicuntur autem parthi ipsorum lingua ut docet Iustinus. exules. Quia exules veniebant ex Scythia Orientali. Habent que sermonem mixtum ex Scythico et Medo.
Omnes equitare et sagittare magna industria docent liberos suos. Auri autem et argenti
nullus ipsis olim usus erat nisi in armis. Habent plures uxores, et nulla delicta aut
peccata gravius puniunt qua adulteria. Habent et alia instituta que nihil ad presens
faciunt. Tigris a velocitate seu a sagitta dictus fluvius est armenie: sed sepe in lacus
recipitur et nonnunque occultatur. Unde Seneca in Troade. "Et qui renatum prorsus
excipiens diem. Templum rubente Tigrim immiscet freto." Quod autem apud Parthos
sit ostendit illud bucolicum. Aut ararim Tarthus bibet aut Germania Tigrim. Terre
declivia scilicet declivitas. Sors patitur frenos, legitur et quidem melius fors id est
fortuna vel casus.

Prosa Secunda Quinti Libri

Sanctus Thomas

"'Animadverto' inquam'" hic incipit secunda prosa huinus quinti in qua incipit
determinare de convenientia liberi arbitrii ad providentiam divinam. Et primo querit
an liberum arbitrium possit stare cum providentia divina, et Philosophia probat liberum
arbitrium esse. Secundo ostendit quomodo diversificatur in diversis. Et tertio ostendit
actus liberari arbitrii cadere sub providentia divina. Secunda ibi, "Sed hanc." Tertia
ibi, "Que tamen." Primo dicit "Animadverto inquam" id est cognosco "quoniam casus
stat cum providentia, ita consentio sicut dixisti," et querit Boetius, "Est ne ulla libertas
arbitrii in hac ferie causarum sibi herentium, an fatalis cathena," id est fatalis
necessitas "constringit motus," id est affectus "humanorum animorum." Tunc
Philosophia probat liberum arbitrium esse dicens, libertas arbitrii est non obstante predicta connexione causarum, "neque enim fuerit," id est esse poterit, "ulla rationalis natura quin libertas arbitrii" eidem assit et accipitur natura large pro omni illo quod habet cognitonom intellectivam. Probat autem que omni nature rationali insit liberum arbitrium dicens, "Illud quod potest naturaliter uti ratione hoc habet iudicium quo discernat unum quodque, igitur per se dignoscit," id est discernit "fugienda et optanda." Quod autem quis iudicat optandum id petit" id est prosequitur "et refugit illud quod estimat esse fugiendum. quare quibus inest ratio illis in est libertas volendi et nolendi."


Notandum que dicit, "Illud quod utitur ratione habet iudicium quo discernat unum quodque." Hoc dicit ad differentiam iudicii naturalis quod est brutis quo non iudicatur unum quodque agendum, sed aliquod particulare. Sicut ovis non iudicat de quolibet fugiendo, sed tantum de lupo. Et apes non habent industriam ad faciendum aliquod opus nisi ad favos mellis. Sed iudicium rationis est de quolibet que aguntur. Notandum que dicit "habens rationis iudicium per se iudicat prosequendum vel fugiendum.". Licet enim bruta quodammodo cognoscant fugienda vel prosequenda non tamen per se, quia non sunt causa iudicii. Homo autem non solum cognoscit finem et ordinata in finem sed cognoscit ea universaliter vel per modum collationis vel per mod si sillogisticum,etiam homo suum iudicium iudicat et discernit, quare
intellectus est virtus conversa supra se.

"Sed hanc..." hic ostendit Philosophia quoniam liberum arbitrium diversificatur in diversis scilicet in angelis et hominibus distinctione hanc scilicet libertatem arbitrii. Non constituo esse equam id est equalem in omnibus, quare maius est in substantiis divinis quem in hominibus. "Nam subernis et divinis substantiis inest perspicax iudicium, id est infallibile iudicium: et in est eis incorrupta voluntas," id est inflexibilis ad malum. Et in eis est presto id est parata efficax potestas optatorum. Quare non est in eis impedimentum executionis. "Humanas vero animas necesse est esse liberiores quoniam conservant se in speculatione divine mentis. Minus vero libere sunt cum dilabuntur ad corpora" id est aliquid curam rerum corporalium, et ad hunc minus libere sunt cum colligantur terrenis artibus id est affectibus quibus minus resistere possunt passionibus insurgentibus. "Extrema vero" id est maxima est "servitus" animarum quasi dedit eviciis ceciderint a possessione proprie rationis que regi id est dirigire doceant in agendo. "Nam ubi," id est post que anime "deiecerint oculos" rationis intellectus "a luce summe veritatis ad inferiorea et tenebrosa," id est ad terrena et carnalia "mox caligantur," id est obscurantur "nube inscitie," id est ignorantie "et turbantur perniciosos affectibus," id est passionibus "quibus accedendo et consentiendo adiuvant," id est augmentant "servitutem quam sibi invexere," id est induxerunt. et anime viciosorum "sunt quodam modo captive propria libertate."

Notandum que liberum arbitrum est libertas iudicandi et etequendi res. Vel secundum Boetius super primo periarmenias, liberum arbitrium est de voluntate iudicium animi nullo extrinseco aut violenter cogente aut violenter impediente, nullo

Notandum que quidam dixerunt fuisse de intentione Platonis; animas humanas simul esse creatas in celo et postea descendere in corpora et in eis detineri tanquam in vinculis. Secundum illos gradus libertatis animarum humanarum quas ponit in littera sic distinguitur. Scilicetque anime cum sint in celo create in contemplatione divine mentis, sunt maxime libere. Cum antem iam sint colligate corporibus adhunc sunt minus libere. Sed minima libertas est in eis quoniam subduntur viciis. Ista tamen expositio non tenet secundum veritatem. Ideo aliter exponitur que illas animas necesse est esse liberosque que contemplationi divine inserviunt ,ut anime virtuosorum contemplativorum quorum conversatio in celis est. Ille autem sunt minus libere que dilabuntur ad corpora id est que descendunt ad curam rerum temporalium,sicut sunt practici qui negociantur circa bona temporalia ad communem utilitatem dispensando. Ad huc minus libere sunt anime que terrenis artibus colligantur id est que descendunt
ad curandum proprium corpus et propriam utilitatem. Minime autem libere sunt que
subdite viciis rationem amittunt. Viciosus enim non unius tamen domini est servus,
sed tot dominorum quot viciorum secundum Augustinus.

"Que tamen ille..." hic ostendit philosophia quoniam actus liberi arbitrii cadunt
sub providentia divina, quare propter hoc que divina cognitio se extendit ad omnia
dicens, "que omnia dicta quo ad diversos gradus libertatis et quo ad omnes actus inde
provenientes cernit ille intuitus providente divine cuncta prospectiens," et queque
predestinata disponit suis meritis reddendo bonis bona et malis mala. Et hoc confirmat
auctoritate Greca que sonat in Latino. "Omnia videt deus, et omnia audit." Vel
secundum alios sonat. "Deus illustrat omnia Clarius que sol."

Notandum que licet divina providentia ab eterno omnia prospectit, non tamen
propter hoc necessitatur liberum arbitrium ad faciendum bonum vel malum. Quia
secundum Aristoteles iii Ethicorum, "Homo est dominus suarum operationem a
principio usque ad finem." Et ergo secundum merita operationum liberi arbitrii recipit
penam vel premium.

Ascensius

"'Animaadverto' inquam' et cetera. Animaadverto id est considero quasi animum
ad id verto et applico. Sed in hac herentium de libertate arbitrii -- non solum apud
theologos nostros, sed etiam apud veteres philosophos magna semper fuit disputatio.
Unde Aulus Gelius libro vi.c.ii. fatum inquit Chrysippus Stoice princeps philosophie sic
diffinit, "Fatum est sempterna quedam et indeclinabilis fories rerum, et catena
voluens semet ipsa sese et implicans per eternos consequentie ordines ex quibus opta
connexaque est." Aliarum autem opinionum disciplinarumque auctores huic
diffinitiioni ita obstrepunt. Si Chryssippus inquit fato putat omnia moveri ac regi nec
declinari transcendique posse agmina fati et volumina, peccata quoque hominem et
delicta non subsistenda neque condicenda sunt ipsis voluntatibusque eorum, sed
necessitati cuidam et instantie que oriter ex fato. Omnium umque rerum domina et
arbitrata per quam necesse sit fieri quicquid futurum est. Et propterea nocentium penas
legibus inique constitutas, si homines ad maleficia non sponte veniunt sed fato
trabuntur. Contra ea Chrysippus tenuitur multa et argute disserit que super ea scripsit.
Sententia huiusmodi est, "Quamque ita sit," inquit "ut ratione principali quadam
necessario coacta atque connexa sint fato omnia." Ingenia tamen ipsa mentium
urnarum perinde sunt sato obnioxia ut proprietas eorum est ipsa et qualitas. Nam si
sunt per naturam primitus salubriter utiliter que ficta, omnem illam vim que de fato
extrinsecus ingruit in offensius tractabiliusque transmittant. Sin vero sunt aspera et
inscita et rudia nullisque artium bonarum adminiculis fulta, etsi parvo sive nullo
fatalis incommodi conflictu urgeantur, sua tamen levitate et voluntario impetu in
assidua delicta et in errores ruunt. Itque ipsum ut ea ratione fiat, naturalis illa et
necessaria rerum consequentia efficit, que fatum vocatur. Est enim genere ipso quasi
fatale et consequens ut mala ingenia peccatis et erroribus non vacent. Huius deinde rei
exemplo non Hercule nimis aliene neque illepine utitur. Sicut inquit lapidem cylindrum
si per spacia terre prona atque diruta iacias causam quidem ei et initium preceipitantia
feceris, mox tamen ille preceps voluntur, non quare tu id iam facis: sed quomodo ita
sese modus eius et forme volubilitas habet. Sic ordo et ratio et necessitas fati genera
ipsa et principia causarum monet, impetus vero consiliorum mentiumque nostrorum
actionesque ipsas. Voluntas cuiusque propria et animorum ingenia moderantur. Infert
deinde verba hec iis que dixi congruentia. Quam obrem a Pythagoreis sic dicitur,
"Nosces homines spontaneas haurire calamitates, quasi detrimenta singulis a seipsis
fiant et suo impetu delinquant et in incommoda ruant sua voluntate atque proposito."
Propterea negat oportere ferri audirique homines aut nequam aut ignanos et nocentes
et audaces, qui quum in culpa et maleficio revicti sunt; perfugiunt ad fati necessitatem
tanquam in aliquod sani asylum, et que pessime fecerunt, ea non sue temeritati, sed
fato esse attribuenda dicunt. Primus autem homo et sapientissimus et antiquissimus
poetarum dixit in hisceversibus. Hei mihi quid damnant mortales numina celi. Esse
aiunt et enim per nos mala, cum tamen ipsis Vecordi preter fatum sint mente dolores.
Itaque Marcis Cicero in libro quem de fato scripsit quem questionem istam diceret
obscurissimam esse et implicatissimam: Chrysippum quoque philosophum non
expedisse se in ea refert his verbis. Chrysippus estuans laboransque quonam pacto
explicit et fato omnia fieri, et esse alicuid in nobis intricatur hoc modo et cetera hoc.
Aulus Gelius ubi super, sed ad auctorem revertor. Est ne inquit. Meltus responsive
legas sic. Est inquit, neque et cetera, quo quicque discernat, quicque legendum est non
quodque. Non enim additur substantivum. sed quodque adiectivum est sicut quod
aliquod et similia: et ita substantivum desiderant: quique autem quid, alicuid, et similia
sine substantivo ponuntur aut substantivum in genetivo regunt. Supplent enim vicem
substantivorum. Artubus a nominativo artus per u scribitur. quare artibus a nominativo
artes declinatur, cetera patent.

Metrum Secundum Quinti Libri

Sanctus Thomas

"Puro claru lumine Phebum..." istud est metrum secundum huius quinti quod dicitur Archiloicum ab inventore. Dactylicum a pede predominante. In quo Philosophia commmendat excellentiam divine cognitionis in comparatione ad solem materialem dicens, "Homerus oris melliflui," id est dulcis eloquentie "canit," id est descriptit "Phebum" id est solem "clarum puro lumine." Forsan enim Homerus fecit librum de claritate solis, qui scilicet sol "non valet prorumpere" id est penetrare "intima viscera" id est profunda "terre et pelagi" id est maris "infirma" id est debili luce "radiorum." Haud sic id est non sic habet se conditor magni orbis scilicet Deus, sed ipse sua cognatione penetrat omnia, cum nihil possit ipsum latere huic scilicet conditori tuenti id est respicienti cuncta ex alto id est celo terre sibi resistunt nulla mole id est magnitudine sicut obsistunt radiis solis. Nec etiam nox obscura "obstat sibi atris nubibus." Immo in uno "ictu mentis" id est in uno mentali intuitu cernit quem scilicet quantum ad presentia que su erunt quantum ad preterita, que veniunt quantum ad futura. Quem scilicet conditorem respicit omnia solus tu possis dicem verum solem.

Notandum licet deus omnia cognoscendo prevideat etiam illa que fiunt ex libero arbitrio, volunt tum quasdam creaturas esse liberi arbitrii, quare hoc magis decet
divinam bonitatem. Sicut enim melius et nobilius est regnum in quo non tamen servit regi a servis sed etiam a liberis que ubi tamen servitur a servis, sic melius erit regnum dei et decentius ex hoc que sunt alique creature libere servientes sicut homor angelus, que si essent sole creature serviliter operantes cuiusmodi sunt omnes creature preter hominem et angelum: que ex determinatione nature necessitantur ad sua opera.

Ascensius


Prosa Tertia Quinti Libri

Sanctus Thomas

"Tum ego 'en' inquam..." hic incipit tertia prosa huius in qua Boetius obiicit contra praedictam ostendens non posse similis stare providentiam et liberum arbitrium. Et primo premittit que dicta possunt habere dubitatonem. Secundo ponit rationem dubitatonis ibi, "Nimium inquam." Primo dicit, tum pro tunc finitur, dicit
incerta opinio, quod iudico nephas credere de deo."

Notandum que ex littera sic formatur ratio. Illa providentur infallibiliter de necessitate eveniunt, sed omnia providentur a deo infallibiliter. Igitur omnia de necessitate eveniunt: et sic perit libertas arbitrii. Notandum que scientia Dei non est opinio, quare opinio est eorum que sic et aliter se possunt habere, ex primo posteriorum. Scientia autem est eorum quem non possunt se aliter habere. Igitur scientia dei non est dicenda opinio. "Neque enim illam probo rationem..." hic Philosophia excludit quandam responsionem que posset dari ad predictam rationem. Et primo ponit eam. Secundo eam excludit, ibi, quasi vero. Primo dicit, "Neque enim probo" id est approbo illam rationem. Iid est responsionem que quidam credunt posse dissolvere nodum id est difficultatem questionis. "Aiunt enim non ideo quid venturum quomodo providentia prospexerit" illud esse futuru id est venturum. "Sed potius econtrario" id est econverso "quomodo quid futurum est" illud non "posse latere providentiam divinam." Quasi diceret eventus rei est causa prescientie et non econverso. Et ideo ex eventu dicet concludi necessitas prescientie, non econtra verso secundum eos, et isto modo necessarium est. Hoc quod concludit de eventu "relabi in contrariam partem" scilicet quod concluditur de eventu, hoc concludatur de prescientia. Neque enim necesse est "contingere quae providentur" secundum eos, "sed ea que futura sunt necesse est provideri."

Notandum que prior ratio pretendebat que omnia futura de necessitate eveniunt, quare Deus futura infallibiliter providet. Responsio autem quorundam dicit contrarium. Dicit enim non ideo quia deus previdet. futura necessario eveniunt, sed
quare futura sunt ideo Deus ea previdet. "Quasi vero que cuiusque rei causa sit prescientia..." hic excludit istam responsionem. Dicit ista responsio procedit quasi laboraretur querendo cuius rei causa sit prescientia, utrum sit causa necessitatis futurorum, vel utrum "necessitatis futurorum sit causa providentie." Sed nos nitamur id est laboramus hoc demonstrare scilicet "necessarium esse eventum rerum prescitarum quoquo modo" id est quocunque modo "se habeat ordo causarum." Et si pro quanveis "prescientia non videatur inferre necessitatem eveniendi rebus futuris," quod declarat exemplo dicit, si aliquis "sedeat necesse est opinionem esse veram que coniunctat eum sedere et econtraverso si de" aliquo "vera sit opinio quare sedet necesse est eum sedere. Igitur in utroque" scilicet in opinione et "sedente" est "necessitas". In hoc scilicet in sedente est necessitas sedendi, in altero scilicet in opinione est necessitas veritatis. Sed non idcirco quique sedeat super casualiter: quonam vera est opinio, quia "veritas opiniosis" non est causa sessionis, "sed hec scilicet" opinio "potius est vera quomodo precessit quem piam" id est aliquem sedere. Et "ita cum causa veritatis ex altera parte procedit, tamen in utroque est communis necessitas."

Et eodem modo contingit arguere de providentia et de his que providentur. Unde dicit "patet" id est manifestum est "ratiocinari" de providentia et de "rebus futuris. Nam etsi" pro quem vis "id circo providentur quomodo futura sunt, non tamen ideo eveniunt quomodo providentur nihil minus tamen necesse est a deo velventura provideri vel provisa evenire." Ita queutraque parti inest necessitas quevis alteri casualitas, "quod solum satis est" id est sufficit "ad perimendam liberatem arbitrii." Notandum que responsio ista quam innuit in litterarum vestra fuisse ipsius Origenis,
qui supra epistolam ad Roma sic dicit, "Non propterea aliquid erit, quare illud deus scit futurum, sed quare futurum est ideo scitur a deo anteque fiat. Quod tamen potest intelligi dupliciter. Uno modo que eventus rei sit causa prescientie secundum rationem consequentie.

Et sic responsio est vera Alio modo potest intelligi que eventus rei sit causa prescientie secundum existentiam. Et sic est falsa, et hoc modo improbatur hic a Boetius. Primo igitur ostendit Boetius. que ista responsio non est ad propositum. Secundo ostendit que non includit veritatem ibi. "Iam vero que propter mum est..." hic philosophia ostendit que ista responsio includit falsitatem, quia ponit que aliquod temporale sit causa eterni. Dicunt enim que res future sint causa provisionis eterne. Unum dicit, "Iam vero preposterum" id est perversum est, et "eventus rerum temporalium dicatur esse causa" eterne prescientie quod dicitur in ista responsione. Unum subdit, "Quid est aliud arbitrari deum ideo providere futura, quoniam sunt eventura, quam putare que olim acciderunt" id est ipsa futura esse "causam summe providentie," quasi diceret nihil est aliud dicere. Notandum que nullum temporale est causa eterni, sed potius econtraverso. Indignius enim non est causa digioris eo que causa dignior est effectu. Temporale autem est indignius eterno, sicut corruptibile incorruptibili, igitur et cetera. "Ad hec sicuti cum quid esse scio..." hic ponit secundam respondionem ad probandum secundam conclusionem. Dicit "ad hec" super predicta addenda est hec ratio, sicuti cum scio esse quid id est aliquid necesse est ipsum esse, ita cum novi quid futurum necesse est id ipsum esse futurum. Sic igitur fit id est contingit, ut eventus rei prescite nequeat evitari. Notandum que ratio sic
posset formari. Sicut se habet scientia respectu scibilis praesentis, sic prescientia respectu effectus futuri. Sed cum scio in presenti aliquid esse necesse est ipsum esse.

Ergo cum prescitur aliquid futurum esse. Necesse est ipsum esse, sed deus prescit omnia futura. Ergo necessario eveniunt, et sic iterum tollitur libertas arbitrii. "Postremo si quid aliquis..." hic ponit tertiam rationem ad idem dicit, "Si quis existimet aliquid esse aliorum" id est aliter "quae res se habeat, illud non modo" id est non tamen non est "scientia sed est fallax opinio longe diversa avertitate scientie, quaere si aliquid ita futurum est ut eius eventus non sit certus est necessarius" quoniam illud "poterit presciri eventurum" quasi diceret/qua distinctio nullo modo. Cuius rationem assignat dicit, sicut ipsa scientia est impermixta falsitati, sic illud quod concipitur ab ea non posset aliter esse que concipitur. Quare si posset aliter se habere, tunc scientia posset esse falsa, unde subdit, ista est causa quare scientia "carent mendacio" quare necesse est unamquamque "rem ita se habere" sicut "scientia comprehendit eam se habere."

Notandum que ratio quam intendit est ista: quicunque estimat rem aliter esse qua est: eius estimatio est falsa et non est scientia, "sed fallax opinio." Ergo si deus prescit aliquid futurum esse, et si ipsum non necessario evenit sicut prescivit, prescientia Dei non erit scientia sed fallax opinio. Ergo futura a Deo previsa necessario eveniunt, et sic perit liberum arbitrium. "Quid igitur..." hic Philosophia improbat modos quibus aliqui nituntur salvare providentiam. Et primo querit quoniam possit salvari providentia divina improbando duos modos quibus aliqui conabantur ipsam salvare. Secundo ponit tertium modo similiter ipsum improbando. Secunda ibi,
"Quod si apud."

Primo dicit, "Quid igitur" super dicemus. "Quonammodo" dici potest que "Deus prenoscat hoc futura incerta." Primus modus est dicatur deum ea que providet iudicare infallibiliter quevis possint non evenire, sed inconveniens est, quia tunc falleretur sua providentia. Unde dicit, "Nam si" Deus censet id est iudicat evenire infallibiliter, "que etiam possibile est non evenire fallitur" super Deus "quod non modo" id est non tantum "nephas est sentire" de deo "sed etiam nephas est voce proferre." Secundus modus est ut dicatur deum providere futura indeterminate sicut futura sunt. Sed isto modo providentia dei non est certa. Unum dicit, at id est sed si Deus "decernit" ista "futura esse" previdentur indeterminate sicut sunt, ut scilicet "cognoscat ea eque" id est equaliter "posse fieri vel non fieri, que est ista prescientia que nihil certum nihil stabile comprehenditur." Quasi diceret talis providentia nulla est, et quid hec prescientia differt ab "illo vaticinio ridiculoso Tiresie, qui dicebat, "quicquid dicam" hoc "erit vel non" erit. Quo etiam id est in quo "divina providentia prestiterit" id est prevalebit humana opinione si iudicat "incerta," sicut homines ea quorum eventus est incertus quasi diceret nullo differt.

Notandum que cum Tiresias vidisset duos serpentes simul coire proiecto baculo ipsos seperavit ab invicem, permutatus fuit in mulierem. Post septennium iterum sepentes coeuntes baculo separavit, et mutatus fuit in virum. Cum autem orta fuisset dissentio inter Iovem et Iunonem an maior esset delectatio in coitu viri qua mulieris electus fuit Tiresias in iudicem, qui expertus erat fortem utriusque sexus. Tum autem diceret maiorem esse delectationem mulieris Iuno commota excceavit ipsum. Iupiter autem sui misertus in recompensam amissi visus dedit sibi spiritum vaticinandi. Fuit
autem hec suavati timatio: "Quicquid dicam erit vel non erit." Si ergo deus non aliter presciret futura indeterminata nisi quare erunt vel non erunt, non disserret sua prescientia a prescientia Tiresie, quod est ridiculosum. "Quod si apud illum..." hic ponit tertium modum conantium salvare providentiam. Et est ut ponamus omnia evenire de necessitate, et auferamus liberum arbitrium. Primo ergo ponit istum modum. Secundo ostendit que inconvenientia sequantur ad ipsum, ibi, "Quo semel."

Primo ergo concludit istum modum dicens, "quod si apud illum certissimum fontem omnium rerum nihil potest esse incertum, certus est eventus eorum que ipse firmitur presciverit futura. Quare nulla libertas humanis confiliis et actionibus, quas divina mens sine errore falsitatis cuncta prospiciens alligat et constringit ad unum eventum."

Notandum que nulla mutatore cadit circa fontem omnium rerum quare cognitio eius potest esse incerta. Etiam si esset icerta esset imperfecta nec divina. Si ergo est certa respectu futurorum: necesse est ut omnia futura prescita a Deo necessario eveniant. "Quo semel recepto..." hic ponit inconvenientia que sequuntur si auferatur liberum arbitrium. Et primo ostendit que inconvenientia sequuntur ex parte hominem. Secundo que ex parte Dei. tertio que ex parte conjunctionis hominem ad Deum. Secunda ibi, "Quo nihil." Tertia ibi, igitur ne sperandi. Inconvenientia ex parte hominem sunt. Si non sit liberum arbitrium "frustra proponuntur" hominibus "pene vel permia," et iniuste puniuntur "mali" et preminatur "boni," nec erunt "vicia nec virtutes" hominibus. Sicut nec in aliisque agunt necessitate nature et non libertate animi. Unde dicit "Quo semel recepto" id est posito scilicet ut negetur liberum arbitrium. Liquet id est manifestum est quantus occasus id est quanta destructio
humanarum rerum consequantur. "Frustra enim proponentur bonis premia et malis pene." Ita statua et leges humane erunt inutiles que "penas et premia" statuunt que "nullus motus animorum liber ac voluntarius meruit." Et illud "videbitur iniquissimum" omnium "quod nunc iudicatur equissimum" scilicet "puniri improbos" et "remunerari" bonos, "quos ad alterum" id est ad probitatem vel improbitatem "non mittit propria voluntas sed cogit certa necessitas futuri, igitur virtutes et vicia non fuerunt quicque sed potius erit mixta et indiscreta confusio omnium meritorum" scilicet bonorum et malorum.

Nota que omnes virtutes et vitia oriuntur ex libera electione boni et mali. Similiter punitio et remuneratio fiunt propter liberam actionem boni vel mali. Si ergo tollitur libertas arbitrii non erit libera electio, nec nisi libera actio bona vel mala est. Et per consequens nulla erit virtus, nullum vitium, et inistuste malus punietur, cum ex necessitate malum operetur, et iniuste bonus premiatur, cum ex necessitate operetur bonum, quod est absurdum dicere. "Quo nihil sceleratius..." hic ostendit inconveniens quod sequitur ex parte Dei scilicet, que Deus erit auctor Malorum. unde dicit. Cum omnis ordo rerum ducatur ex providentia divina, et si "nihil liceat" habere fieri ex "humanis consiliis," fit id est sequitur "ut vitia nostra referantur in auctorem omnium scilicet Deum. "Quo nihil sceleratius ex cogitari potest qua scilicet deum dicere auctorem malorum. Quod tamen necessarium est ablata libertate. Notandum que defectus in operatione, qui defectus non est in potestate rei ut enitetur necessario est ab agente et a producente. Si ergo actio voluntatis nostre non est libera, defectus actionis secundum voluntatem reducetur in Deum. Et sic Deus erit causans defectum
nostrum. Quod est absurdum. "Igitur nec sperandi aliquid..." hic ponit inconvenientia que sequuntur ex coniunctone hominis ad deum, quia tolleretur actus deprecandi et actus sperandi, quibus maxime coniunguntur Deo. Unde dicit Igitur si tollitur liberum arbitrium, nec uilla ratio est sperandi aliquid, nec deprecandi inter deum et homines. "Quid enim quisque deprecetur vel speret, si series indeflexa connectit omnia optanda." Quasi diceret frustra fieret. Utroque "igitur aufertur illud unicum commercium scilicet sperandi et deprecandi inter deum et homines." Vocat autem spem et deprecationem commerium quare istis mercamur omnia beneficia. Unde subdit, si quidem precio iuste humiltatis nos homines promeremur inestimabilem vicem id est retributionem divene gratie, qui modus deprecandi solus est quo homines videantur posse colloqui cum deo et contungi inaccessibili luci, scilicet deo. Prius que homines impetrent quod petunt. prius enim preces porrigimus que effectum nostre petitionis consequamur. Que spes et deprecatio si nihil credantur habere virium recepta id est concessa necessitate futurorum. Quid erit quo connecti id est coniungi atque ad hereri possemus illi summo principi rerum. Quasi dicat nihil. Quare necesse erit genus humanum disseptum id est dissipatum atque disiunctum suo fonte id est a suo principio super a deo fatiscre id est deficere uti pauloante cantabas in sexto metro quarti libri.

Notandum que actus deprecandi spectat ad intellectum. Et est oratio secundum Johannem Damasce. Ascensus intellectus ad Deum vel in Deum, quoquidem actu insinuamus Deo indigentiam nostram. Non que Deo per insinuationem nostram aliquid innotescat quod prius ignoraverit, sed ut nos ipsa insinuatione utendo consideremus in
his esse recurrendum ad divinum auxilium. Actus autem sperandi pertinet ad
volunatem, quia eius obiectum est bonum futurum. Per istum actum adheremus deo
tanquam perfecto principio bonitatis nitentes eius auxilio ad consequendum bonum quo
indigemus. Sed si huiusmodi bonum necessario eveniret vel impossible esset evenire
uterque actus tam deprecandi qua sperandi esset inutilis.

Ascensius

"Tum ego 'en' inquam" et cetera. En et ecce tunc dicuntur quoniam inopinatet praeter
solitum aliquid obvenisse narratur, sicut ibi "Ecce virgo concipiet et paret
filium." Divinam providentiam latere non posse. "Lateo" active sumitur significatque
fere quod fugio ne sciatur. Unde primo Eneid, "Nec latuere doli fratrem Iunonis."
Reperitur etiam cum dativo, ut tu mihi causa lates id est occultus es, et absconderis
mihi. "Quasi vero..." et cetera illud quod sequitur, ac non illud demonstrare nitamur
pro quo in glosa ponitur, sed nos nitamur, debet sic ordinari. Quasi vero laboretur id
est in aquirendo labor fiat que sit causa cuiusque id est cuiuslibet rei id est "ne" pro
"an". An scilicet prescientia super dei sit necessitas futurorum id est sit causa
necessaria ut futur fiant. An necessitas futurorum sit causa providentie id est quare
Deus de eis habeat certam providentiam ac pro et quasi super. Non nitamur id est non
conemur et studeamus demonstrare eventum rerum prescitarum a Deo super esse
necessarium super quoquo id est quocunque modo ordo causarum se habeat id est sive
res sit causa prescientie, sive prescientia causa rei. Hic animadverte duo. Primum que
hec particula quasi vero, tunc poni solet quoniam per ironiam loquimur, et gnificamus
non esse ut a quibusdam creditur, nec dicitur quasi "autem nec neque autem," saltem
tam frequenter et decenter secum vallam sicut, "quasi vero," "neque vero." Secundum
ex presciano quotiens dictiones "relative" aut "infinite" et eis equivalentens
geminantur. Possumus posteriorem partem mutare "incunque" ut "qualisqualis"
"qualiscunque utut," "utcumque ubiubi," "ubicumque," "quotquot," "quocunque". Quare
tamen "ly" cunque non iungit cum "quis" et "quid", sed cum qui et quod. Non
resolves "quisquis" in "quiscumque", sed in 'quicunque", et "quicquid" non in
"quidcumque" sed in "quocunque". Iam vero que preposterum et cetera qua id est
que tum preposterum id est in ordine perversum, quem "illud" preponitur quod
postponi debeat aut econtraverso preposterum dicimus.

Sane meminisse debes lector omnia verba huius prose sequentia, et etiam
sequentis carminis attribui Boetius. Non ergo dices cum commentario supiore, "hic
Philosophia ostendit," sed "hic Boetius ostendit." Ad hec dixi potius legendum esse
"ad hoc" id est "preterea", quod frequenter reperitur require per tabulam ubi dictum
sit. Quid igitur et cetera. Ad huc sunt verba Boetius non Philosophie. Aut quid hoc
refert id est distat interest a super vaticinio Tiresie. "Preterea" quam iam de Tiresia
vidisti ad de eum vatem Thebanum fuisse, et multa etiam post mortem secundum
Homerum ulixi predixisse apud inferos. Unum etiam Horatius libro ii. Sermonum. Hoc
quo tiresia preter narrata petenti Responde. Et quare cecus effectus erat dicit iuvenalis
nec surdum nec tiresiam quem que esse deorum. Quod autem in feminam mutatus sit
licet fabulosus putatur. Plinius tamen in septimo Naturalis Historie fiere potuisse
ostendit, docens re vera sexum non nullos mutasse. De vaticinio autem in textu hoc
posito dicere que iussus oraculum certum enunciare dixerit. Hoc pro oraculo certo
habete: "Que quicquid dixero aut dicturus sum aut erit aut non erit." Quasi veritas
eius dicti ex futuro dependeat, cum iam necessaria sit. Unde merito ridiculum dicere
si aliud non pretendert.

"Humana opinione prestiterit..." vide si non potius legendum est humane
opinioni. Nam Terentius in Eunucho ita locutus est, homo quid homini prestat, et non
dubito si hoc loco dixisset quid etiam divina providentia quoniam addidisset. Humane
opinioni non humana opinione prestiterit. Construitur autem multis modis hoc verbum.
Aliquando enim significat cum prestantia et eminentia exhibere. Et sic ac tamen regit,
ut apud Virgi: "Ibo animis contra vel magnum prestet Achillem." Aliquando significat
fere idem additio dativo cui sit prelatio, ut in dicto exemplo, homo quid homini
prestat. Aliquando absolute et quasi impersonaliter ponitur ut prestat Trinatrie metas
lustreare Pachomini id est melius religibilius est. Series indeflexa id est que nunquem
fuit flexa, vel potius inflexibilis. Nam sepe participia preteriti temporis ponuntur loco
verbalium inhilis que aptitudinem sonant: ut apud Virgi: "aut illaudati nescit husiridis
aras." Illaudati id est illaudabilis secundum Servium. Et ibi hoc est septimo Eneid:
"Dives inaccessos ubi solis filia lucos." Inaccessos lucos dicit non quos nemo accessit,
sed inaccessibiles, id est quos nemo debeat accedere. Fatiscore est affatim: id est
abunde hiscere. Sicut primo Eneid: "Omnes accipiunt inimicum imbrem, rimisque
fatiscent." Disseptum venit a dis et sepio, et est quod sepem a missit id est compagem.
Uti pauloante cantabas. Ex hoc patet verba hec ex persona Boethii dici.
Sanctus Thomas

""Quenam discors federa rerum?" hic incipit tertium metrum huius quinti quod dicitur adoni cum vel secundum alios Archiloi cum ab inventore. Dactylicum a pede predominante. unum facit exclamationem super incompossibilitate qui apparat inter providentiam et liberum arbitrium. Et primo quare sint incompossibia cum per se considerata sint possibilia. Secundo ponit responsionem ad hoc. Tertio contra responsionem obiicit. Quarto obiectionem soluit. secunda ibi, "An nulla." Tertia ibi, "Sed cur tanto." Quarta ibi, "An cum mentem." Primo dicit, "Quenam discors causa resolvit" id est separat federa id est concordias rerum scilicet providentie divine et liberi arbitrii ne compatiantur se simul. Aut quis deus tanta bella statuit duobus veris et singula vera, quem carpim id est singulatim vel divisim accepta constant id est permanent. Eadem tamen mixta id est conjuncta "noluit iugari" id est copulari se invicem conpatiendo. Tunc ponit responsionem dicens que istis duobus veris scilicet providentie et libero arbitrio nulla est discordia, sed apparentia discordie provenit ex debilitate nostri intellectus. Unde dicit: "An est nota solutionis nulla est discordia veris" si semper certa coherent sibi, "sed mens nostra obruta id est opressa membris cecis id est cecantibus animam, illa nequit igne splendore id est oppressi luminis." Scilicet intellectus noscere tenues id est subtiles nexus id est coniunctiones "rerum que videntur discordare."

Nota si consideremus providentiam divinam per se, possibile est eam esse. Si
consideremus liberum arbitrium per se, etiam possibile est eum esse ut patet ex dictis. Sed si consideremus utrunque simul tunc videntur incompossibilia, sicut patet ex rationibus superioribus. Secundum veritatem autem se bene compatiuntur et sunt compossibilia, sed nobis non apparet. Quare intellectus noster oppressus mole corpis non potest se elevare in huiusmodi cognitionem, nam secundum sapientem corpus quod corrupitur aggravat animam, et terrena habitatio opprimit sensum multa cogitantem.

"Sed cur tanto flagrat amore..." hic Philosophia obiicit contra solutionem. Si enim anima ignoret istas subtiles coniunctiones, unum est que desiderat eas scire cum nihil ignotum possit desiderari? Unum dicit, "Sed cur anima flagrat" id et ardet "tanto amore" id est desiderio reperire notaste etas id est notificationes latentes veri id est veritatis. "Scitne mens illud quod ipsa anxia" id est sollicita "appetit nosse?" Quasi diceret non, quare nemo appetit scire, illud quod scit et hoc est quod dicit, "Quis laborat scire nota?" Quasi diceret nullus. Oportet igitur dicere que nesciat, et tunc sequitur aliud inconveniens scilicet que anima desideret illud quod nescit. Unde dicit, "Si nescit" illud quod petit "quid petit" id est desiderat mens ceca, id est ignorans. Quis enim nescius optet id est desideret quicque, an quis potest sequi nescita, aut quis nescius potest noscere quo inveniat super illud quod querit, et quis ignotus, id est nescius quis at id est potest noscere formam repertam. Quasi diceret nullus.

Notandum que dictum est in responsione que anima ignorat compossibilitatem providentie et liberi arbitrii, sed desiderat eam scire. Contra hoc arguit sic, "Nullus appetit scire quod scit." Si anima desiderat scire aliquid, vel ignorat illud vel scit. Si scit, ergo non desiderat ipsum scire quod scit, quia nullus appetit scire quod scit, cum
omnis appetitus sit ratione carentie. Si autem ignorat quod desiderat, quomodo ignotum desideratur cum voluntas non querit incognitum. Ideo si ignorat nuncque cognoscet. "Quis enim ignotum inveniet?" Si enim pater familias quereret servum fugitivum quem ignoraret, posset sibi multotiens occurrere que ipsum non inveniret, sicut dicit Linconiensis super primo posteriorum. "An cum mente cerneret altam..." hic solvit obiectionem, ubi notandum est que Plato posuit animas esse in celo creatas et habere cognitionem omnem perfectam sed per lapsum ad corpora eam oblivisci cognitionem rerum in particulari et retinere eam in universali. Et postea per exercitium recuperare cognitionem rerum in particulari. Unde dicit sic, "An" est nota solutionis cum anima "cerneret" id est specularetur altam "mentem" id est profundam mentem Dei, ipsa pariter et simul norat id est noverat summam id est universalem cognitionem et singula id est singularem cognitionem rerum. Sed nunc ipsa condita id est tecta nube membrorum non est oblita sui in totum id est totaliter. Sed ipsa tenet summam id est cognitionem universalem rerum perdens singula id est singularem cognitionem. Igitur quisquis requirit id est investigat cognoscere vera, talis est neutro habitu super ut perfecte cognoscat vel que omnino ignorat. Unde dicit, "Nam neque novit" scilicet in speciali et perfecte illud quod requirit, "nec penitus nescit omnia, sed ipse meminit" id est in memoria habet summam id est universalem cognitionem "quam retinens consulit" super. Actuali consideratione "retractans" id est revocans per studium. Arte id est subtiliter. "Visa" id est prius in speciali cognita, ut ipse "queat addere oblitas partes" partibus servatis supple in memoria. Nota que secundum istam, "viam Platonis absolveretur ratio prius tacta." Vel anima scit quod desiderat vel nescit.
Dico que nescit in speciali et in propria forma sed scit in universali. Et cum dicitur nullus desiderat ignotum, verum est sicut est ignotum in universali. Tamen desiderat ipsum ut est ignotum in speciali. Et cum dicitur si ignoret nunque inveniet, verum est si ignorat tam in generali quam in speciali. Et si ignorat in potentia et in actu. Si tamen scit in potentia et in universali et ignorat actu in propria forma, potest ipsum invenire et addiscere.

Ascensius


Prosa Quarta Quinti Libri

Sanctus Thomas

"Tum illa. Vetus inquit..." hec est prosa quarta huius quinti, in qua Philosophia
incipit dissolvere questionem de compassibilitate providentie et liber arbitrii. Et primo tangit difficultatem huius questionis et causam difficultatis, et tangit modum procedendi circa eius solutionem. Secundo dissolvit eam, ibi, "Quero enim." Primo dicit "hec querela," id est questio hec de providentia est "Vetus." Et est vehementer agitata id est protractata Marco Tullio, cum distribuit id est dividit divinationem, in libri *Divinationum*, ubi dividit divinationem in suas species, non solum hoc, sed sibi ipsi est res multum diu quesita. "Sed haud quaquam" id est non alicubi "ab ullo vestrum satis diligenter et firmiter expedita. Cuius caliginis" id est difficultatis "causa est que motus id est actus humane ratiocinatis non potest ad moveri" id est applicari "ad simplicitatem divine prescientie" id est providentie. "Que si ullo modo queat excogitari. Nihil relinquetur prorsus ambiguus." Quod scilicet rationem et causam difficultatis, ita demum patefacere et expidere tentabo, si prius expando" id est declarabo vero "ea quibus tu moveris." Notandum que questio de providentia divina et libero arbitrio est omnium questionum difficillima, de que multi antiquorum dubitabant, et non nulli modernorum propter difficultatem lapsi sunt, quam Tullius in libri *De Divinationum* pertractans et non valens dissolvere eius difficultatem, negat penitus providentia et presciam futurorum a deo in predicto libro *De Divinationum*. "Quero enim..." hic Philosophia accedit ad solutionem questionis, et primo discutit motiva Boetius secundo solvit dubitationem sive questionem, ibi, "Quomodo igitur." Circa primum sciendum que duo fuerunt motiva Boetius principalia circa hanc questionem. Primum quare videtur necessarium si deus previdet futura que necessario eveniunt. Secundum motivum que futura quorum eventus est incertus sicut sunt futura
contingentia non possunt a deo certa provideri. Primo ergo pertractat primum motivum. Secundo secundum, ibi, "sed hoc inquis." Primo ostendit que si deus previdet futura non propter hoc necessario eveniunt. Secundo movet dubitationem, ibi, "Sed qui fieri potest." Primo ostendit que ex prescientia Dei non infertur necessitas libero arbitrio. Secundo ostendit que prescientia dei non sit signum necessitatis futurorum ibi, "Sed prescientia." Circa primum sciendum est que prius improbavit quandam responsionem qua quidam nitebantur impedire rationem, ostendentem non esse liberum arbitrium propter prescientiam divinam. Quam responsionem hic resumit ostendens eam aliquo modo esse bonam, quare sufficienter impedit intentionem adversarii. Nam adversarius ex nullo alio probat necessitatem futurorum, nisi quare sunt prescit a deo. Cum igitur ex responsione habeatur que prescientia nullam causalitatem habet super futura videtur sufficienter ostensum esse que ea que procedunt ex libero arbitrio non sunt necessaria.

Primo ergo ponit istam responsionem resumendo eius solutionem dicens. "Quero enim cur illam rationem solventium putes minus esse efficacem que putat libertatem arbitrii" non impedire a prescientia, quare estimat prescientiam non esse causam necessitatis futurorum. Quod autem per istam responsionem impediatur illatio necessitatis futurorum patet ex hoc, quare tu non "trahis aliunde argumentum neccessitatis futurorum, nisi quod ea quae presciuntur non possunt non evenire. Si igitur prenotio id est prescientia futurorum nullam adiicit" id est imponit necessitatem rebus futuris ut dicit responsio, ut tu etiam fatebare pauloante, quid est id quod esse poterit quod "voluntarii exitus cogantur ad certum eventum rerum?" Et ita per istam
responsionem excluditur necessitas futurorum et manifestat se in exemplo dicens, "Ut advertas quid consequatur gratia positionis id est exempli, statuamus id est ponamus per impossibile nullam esse prescientiam futurorum, igitur hoc posito "quantum ad hoc" id est quantum ad istam illationem qua ex prescientia concluditur necessitas futurorum, "ex ea quae eveniunt ex arbitrio coguntur ne ad necessitatem. Dicit Boetius, "Minime" et Philosophia "Statuamus iterum esse" providentiam, "sed nihil necessitatis iniungere rebus futuris. Manebit ut opinor eadem libertas voluntatis integra et absoluta. ab omni necessitate.

Notandum que prior solutio improbata fuit bona et mala, in hoc fuit bona quare posuit prescientiam non esse causam necessitatis futurorum. dicere enim Ideo futura eveniun, non quare deus ea previdet. Sed in hoc fuit mala. Quare posuit futura esse causam prescientie Dei. Dixit enim quare futura sunt ideo Deus ea previdet. Patet ergo ex responsione antiquorum que prescientia non cum causa necessitatis rebus futuris. "Sed prescientia inquies..." hic ostendit Philosophia que prescientia divina non sit "signum necessitatis" rebus futuris. Secundo ostendit que modus probandi ex signo non "esse efficat" ibi. iam vero primo dicere, Tu "inquies" id est dicere "poteris, tametsi" pro quamvis prescientia non sit necessaria eveniendi rebus "futuris, tamen est signum ea necessario esse ventura." Et ita prescientia posset inferri necessitas futurorum" tamquam ex signo. "Hoc igitur modo" ponendo prescientia esse signum "necessitatis futurorum constaret exitus" id est eventus "futurorum esse necessarios etiam si" non fuisset "precognito," quod probat ex natura signi distinctioni. "Omne namque signum tamen ostendit quid sit" id est manifestat illud
cuius est signum, sed non efficit quod signat. Quare "ut prenotionem" id est providentiam "apparet esse signum necessitatis" futurorum demonstrandum erat. Prius nihil contingere non ex necessitate" id est omnia evenire necessario. Alioquin si haec necessitas" futurorum "nulla est," nec illa prescientia "poterit esse signum eius rei quae non est." Et ita non valet argumentem necessitatem futurorum ex prescientia tanquam ex signo.

Notandum que signum non est causa eius cuius est signum, sed tamen manifestat signatum esse, ut circulus non est causa venditionis vini, sed tamen est signum venditionis. Si igitur prescientia essent signum necessitatis futurorum presupponeret futura esse necessaria. Et sic ad ostendendum prescientiam esse signum necessitatis futurorum oportet prius ostendere futura necessario esse futura tanque prescientia esset singum necessitatis futurorum, aliis prescientia est signum alicuius rei que non esset quod est absurdum. "Iam vero..." hic ostendit modum probandi ex signo non esse efficacem et dicit. "Constat" id est manifestum est "rationem subnixam" id est firmam probatione id est demonstratione eam non esse ducendam "ex signis neque ex argumentis extrinsecus petitis" id est acceptis, sed firmam rationem esse "ducendam ex convenientibus" id est ex propriis ex "necessariis causis." Cum ergo predicta ratio processerit ex signo non est efficax et demonstratina cum sit a posteriori. Demonstratio aut que est potissima probationum ipsa est a priori, cum sit ex causis per se immediatis prioribus et notioribus, et pro tanto est demonstratio est sillogismus faciens scire efficax ad probandum ex primo posteriorum.

"Sed qui fieri potest..." hic Philosophia monet quamdam dubitationem et solvit
eam. Videtur seque quod alique possunt preferri que tamen non necessario eveniunt. Si autem non necessario eveniunt possunt non evenire. Et sic sequitur quod aliquid prescitum a deo non eveniat. Primo ergo Philosophia dubitando de hoc querit dicens, ex quo ita est, que ea que sunt prescita non sunt necessaria sed possunt non evenire qui, id est quomodo fieri potest ut ea que providentur futura esse non proveniant. Tunc solvit dubitationem dicens, que non negatur que prescita non eveniant, immo oportet dicere que prescita eveniant, sed tamen non eveniunt de necessitate. Unde dicit, "Quasi vero." Quasi dicat ista dubitatio procedit quasi non credamus ea que providentia prenoscit non esse eventura. Sed hoc non est verum, ac quasi non potius arbitremur illud scilicet que licet futura eveniant, nihil tamen necessitatis habuisse in sui natura ut evenirent. Id manifestat in exemplo quomodo aliquid certe comprehenditur, quod tamen non est necessarium. Dicens que aliquid cognitum eveniat, et tamen non necessario licebit que tu hoc perpendas huic, id est ex tali exemplo. Intuemur enim plura subiecta oculis dum fiunt, id est dum sunt in fieri, sicut ea que videntur aurige facere in moderandis et flectendis quadrigis et cetera. Videmus ad hunc modum ut que fiunt in aliis actibus volutariis num quid ulla necessitas compellit aliquod illorum ita fieri sicut oculis videtur? Et dicit Boetius, "Minime," et assignat rationem, "frustra enim esset effectus artis si omnia moverentur coacta," et frustra esset ars flectendi quadrigas si necessario flecterentur. Igitur illa que cum fiunt carent necessitate existendi eadem sunt futura sine necessitate priusquam fiunt. Ex quo concludit, "Quare quaedam sunt eventura quorum" exitus id est eventus est absolutus ab omni necessitate, et forsan aliquis diceret, nam ea que nunc fiunt non erant futura
priusquam essent.

Hoc concludit dicens, "nullum arbitror esse dicturum quod quae nunc fiunt eventura non fuerunt," hoc enim esset nimis irrationabile. Ideo necessario concluditur que hoc etiam precognita habent eventus liberos. Quare sicut scientia presentium nihil importat necessitatis his rebus quae fiunt in presenti, sicut patet in exemplo predicto de regimine quadrigarum ita prescientia futurorum nihil importat necessitatis his que ventura sunt. Notandum quod licet futura in comparatione ad divinam providentiam sint necessaria necessitate conditionata, non tamen omnia sunt necessaria necessitate absoluta. Multa enim libere eveniunt sicut ea que fiunt ab arte et voluntate ad regimen quadrigarum. Si enim regimen quadrigarum necessario eveniret: frustra esset ars regendi quadrigas.

prescientia et contingentia. Tu enim "putas si prevideantur" contingentia "necessario ipsa consequi" et "si necessitas desit minime ipsa presciri," et putas "nil posse comprehendi" prescientia divina "nisi certum." Et "si ea que sunt incerti exitus" id est eventus sicut contingentia, si "providentur" illa "quasi certa: tu putas "illud esse caliginem" opinionis "non veritatem scientie." Et in hoc tu deciperis, cuius deceptionis causa est error tuus circa iudicium cognitionis. "Credis" enim "diversum esse ab integritate scientie aliter arbitrari rem" que se habeat et in hoc erras.

Nota que quare nos non possimus futura contingentia certe prenoscere. Putamus similiter Deum hoc non posse. Res enim eodem modo se habens diversi mode a diversis posset cognosci. Unum cognoscere rem aliter quae se habeat ex parte cognoscentis bene est scientia, et sic futura contingentia licet in se sint incerta. Possunt tamen presciri a deo sine errore falsitatis. Cuius erroris causa est. Hic assignat causam erroris, ubi notandum que causa erroris. Quare putamus futura incerta non posse certe presciri est quare putatur que facultas cognitionis sit secundum facultatem rei cognite et non ipsius cognoscentis quod est falsum. Primo igitur premittit huiusmodi causam erroris. Secundo probat ipsum, ibi, "Nam ut hoc brevi." Dicit primo, "Cuius erroris causa est." Quare existimatur quod omnia quae quisque novit illa cogniscit "tantum ex vi et natura ipsorum que sciuntur" et non ex vi cognoscentis, "quod totum est contra" id est per contrarium. Quare res magis cognoscuntur secundum naturam cognoscentis. "Omne enim quod cognoscitur non comprehenditur secundum sui vim" id est secundum modum sue nature sed potius secundum facultatem cognoscentis.
Nota que si cognitio esset secundum facultatem rei cognite, tunc res ab omnibus eodem modo cognosceretur. Et sic comprehenderetur aliquid eodem modo ab intellectu humano et divino quod falsum est, quia que sunt incerta comprehensione humana sunt certa comprehensione divina. Cognitio ergo potius attenditur secundum facultatem potentie cognoscentis ita quod quanto potentia est efficacior et certior tanto certius et limpidius rem comprehendit. "Nam ut hoc brevi exemplo liqueat..." hic probat quod facultas cognitionis est secundum facultatem potentie cognoscentis et non rei cognite. Primo declarat hoc exemplis. Secundo probat hoc idem per rationem, ibi, "Ipsum quoque." Primo dicit que cognitio sit secundum facultatem cognoscentis liquet brevi exemplo. Nam visus aliter agnoscit eandem corporis rotunditatem et aliter tactus. Ille eminus scilicet visus "manens enimus" id est a longinquo "intuitur totum" corpus "simul iactis radiis" visualibus. Hic vero scilicet tactus coherens et coniunctus "orbi" id est "rotunditati et motus circa" ipsum "ambitum," id est circa corpus rotundum "comprehendit" scilicet eius "rotunditatem partibus," id est per partes.

Nota que innuit duplicem differentiam inter modum cognoscendi visus et tactus. Prima est que visus a remotis existens cognoscit aliquod corpus rotundum. Tactus autem non cognoscit ipsum nisi coniunctus. Secunda differentia est que visus totum corpus simul comprehendit, tactus autem per partes. Talis autem diversitas in cognoscendo non esset si res cognosceretur ex sui natura cum eadem res maneat in utraque cognitione. Notandum que quidam dixerunt visionem fieri per emissionem radiorum visualium ab oculis usque ad rem visam, sed hec opinio est contra Aristoteles. visio enim non sit extramittendo sed intus suscipiendo. Patiente enim
aliquo sensitivo sit ipsum videre. ii. de anima. Hic autem loquitur secundum opinionem antiquorum cum dicit quod visus totum corpus intuitur iactis radiis. "Ipsum que hominem..." hic ponit secundum exemplum in virtutibus cognoscitivis subordinatis. Secundum ostendit quoniam iste virtutes se habeant ad invicem, ibi, "In quo illud." Primo igitur declarat quomodo idem a diversis potentiiis diversi modo comprehenditur. "Dicit sensus exterior aliter contuitur ipsum hominem, aliter imaginatio, aliter ratio: aliter intelligentia" divina. "Sensus enim" exterior sicut visus "iudicat figuram" hominis in "subiecta materia" id est in sensibili materia, sed imaginatio solum figuram discernit sine materia id est in absentia rei materialis. "Ratio vero hane" imaginationem "transcendit" et "ipsam speciem" id est naturam specificam hominis quae singularibus inest perpendit" id est discernit "universalis consideratione, oculus vero" id est consideratio "intelligentie est celsior." Quare intelligentia divina super gressa "ambitus universitatis" que existit in singularibus "illam simplicem formam" scilicet ideam hominis que est in mente divina "contuitur pura" facie id est speculatione "pure mentis."

Notandum que primum exemplum fuit de virtutibus cognoscitivis non subordinatis sicut de visu et tactu. Istud autem exemplum est de virtutibus subordinatis que sunt quattuor scilicet sensus exterior quo in est omnibus animalibus imaginatio que tamen in est animalibus perfectis, ratio que tamen est in hominibus, et intelligentia per quam intelligit divinam cognitionem. Iste virtutes habent diversum modum cognoscendi eandem rem scilicet hominem ut declaratur in littera quod non esset nisi cognitio fieret secundum facultatem virtutum cognoscentium et non rei cognite. "In
quo illud maxime considerandum est..." hic ostendit Philosophia quoniam predicte
virtutes cognoscitive se habent ad invicem ostendens quod quicquid potest virtus
inferior, potest etiam et superior et amplius. Et primo hoc ostendit de intelligentia
respectu aliarum virtutum. Secundo ostendit idem de ratione, secunda ibi, Ratio
quoque. Primo dicit "in quo" id est in ordine istarum virtutum "illud est maxime
considerandum quevis comprehendlendi superior amplecitur in se inferiorem." Quare
virtus superior cogniscit omnem illud quod inferior. "Inferior" autem non "surgit ad
superiorem" ita ut apprehendat illud quod superior, quod manifestat in exemplo dicit,
"Neque enim sensus aliquid valet apprehendere extra materiam," et "imaginatio
contuitur species universales" id est minus particularis. Sed ratio capit "simplicem"
id est universalem formam. "Intelligentia" aut divina "quasi desuper spectans," cum
sit in supremo gradu cognitionis ipsa "concepta forma" ideali "diuidat etiam cuncta
que subsunt" illi forme, ut cognoscendo ideam hominis cognoscit omnia que sunt in
hominie, sed eodem modo comprehendit ipsam formam que nulli inferiori virtuti nota
esse poterit. Nam ipsa cognoscit universum id est universalem formam "rationis et
figuram imaginationis et materiale sensibile" quod spectat ad sensu extriorem non
"utens ratione nec imaginatione nec sensibus, sed prospiciens cuncta uno ictu mentis"
id est absque decursu cognoscit quod non facit ratio.

Nota quod virtus superior virtutem inducit inferiorem, sicut tetragonum includit
trigonum, ut patet. ii. De Anima. Ideo quicquid potest virtus inferior potest et
superior et magis. Quare non magis universali comprehendit quod inferior, modo
magis particulari licet non econtraverso. Ideo que potest intelligentia humana
comprehendere potest et divina intelligentia, licet non e contrario. "Ratio quoque cum quid respicit..." hic ostendit idem ratione, que sicut intelligentia comprehendit alias tres virtutes inferiores, sic ratio etiam comprehendit sub se alias duas virtutes scilicet imaginationem et sensum dicit, "Quoque cum ratio respicit quod universale non utens imaginatione nec sensibus: et comprehendit in imaginabilia et sensibilia" universalis comprehensione. "Haec enim est ratio que ita diffinit universale sue conceptionis. homo est animal bipes rationale, quae" diffinitio "cum sit universalis notio" id est notificatio. Cum "nullus etiam ignoret rem esse imaginabilem sensibilem que" hac diffinitione explicatur. Illa ratio considerat universale non utens "imaginatione vel sensu sed rationali conceptione." Tunc ostendit que sicut ratio comprehendit imaginationem et sensum, sic imaginatio sensum comprehendit dicit "imaginatio quoque tametsi" pro quisivis "sumpsit" exordium "ex sensibus visendi et formandi figuras, tamen absente" sensu exteriori imaginatio collustrat id et cognoscit "quaeque sensibilia, non sensibili sed imaginaria ratione iudicandi." Et tunc concludit dicit, "Videsne igitur quod cuncta potius utantur sua" id est propria "facultate in cognoscendo, quam facultate eorum quae cognoscuntur?" 

Notandum quod licet ratio in comprehendende suum universale non utatur imaginatione et sensu, tamen in actu suo presupponit imaginationem et sensum, quare nihil est in intellectu nisi fuerit in sensu. Similiter licet imaginatio in sua operatione non utatur sensu, tamen presupponit sensum fuisse in actu, quare fantasia quam hoc vocat imaginationem est motus factus a sensu secundum actum ex secundo De Anima. "Neque id injuria..." hic confirmat dictum suum per rationem dicens, illud scilicet que
res cognoscitur non secundum sui naturam sed secundum sui naturam cognoscentis
illud non cognovit iniuria id est irrationabiliter. "Nam cum omne iudicium" cognitionis
sit actus et operatio iudicantis id est potentie cognoscitivae, "necesse est ut quisque"
cognoscens "perficiat suam operam" id est suam operationem cognoscendi, "non ex
aliena potestate secundae" rei cognitae "sed ex propria potestate" id est ex virtute
cognoscentis. Notandum quod ex littera formatur talis ratio. Omnis actus et operatio
sequitur conditionem illius potentie cuius est actus et operatio, sed iudicare sive
cognoscere est actus et operatio potentie cognoscentis et non rei cognitae. Ergo iudicare
et cognoscere sequitur modum et conditionem potentie cognoscentis et non rei cognitae.

Ascensius

"Tum illa vetus" et cetera, hic incipit Philosophia respondere ad proposita
obiecta. Est autem facillimus verborum textus, et sententiae satis explanate in superiori
commento sunt. Scies tamen iniungi in significatione in qua nunc vulgo ponitur. Et
Plurimus, Quintilianus, Statius et alii illorum tempore posuerunt, Ciceronem non
posuisse. Memineris etiam ut super notam bigas, triges, et quadrigas singulariter non
profertur apud doctos. Ibi autem, "Atque ad hunc modum" et cetera, defectus est qui
sic credo supplebitur. "Atque ad hunc et ad hunc modum" et cetera. super facere
videntur. "Illic" autem, minime, frustra enim esset," et cetera, verba sunt Boetii usque
ad illum locum, "Qui igitur..." et cetera. Et ita distinximus cum aliter invenissetemus,
sed ad alia pergamus.
Metrum Quartum Qunti Libri

Sanctus Thomas

"Quondam porticus attulit..." istud est quartum metrum huius quinti quod dicitur glionicum ab inventore, coriambicum a pede predominante. In quo metro improbat opinionem Stoicorum, ex qua videtur sequi contrarium dictis suis. Fuit enim opinio Stoicorum quod cognitio intellectiva solum preficeretur ex hoc que corpora exteriora suas similtudines impremunt in mentem, ita ut mens solum se habeat in ratione patientis, et res extra in ratione agentis. Ex quo sequitur cum patiens trahatur ad naturam agentis et non econverso, que cognitio sequetur naturam rei cognite et non naturam cognoscentis, quod est contra dicta. Primo ergo ponit opinionem Stoicorum. Secundo improbat eam, ibi, sed mens. Primo dicit. "Quodam porticus attulit senes" scilicet Stoicos, qui dicebantur senses propter maturitatem morum. Senes in qua "nimium obscuros" super in sententiis, quo Stoici credunt "sensus et imagines" id est rerum sensibilium formas imprimi mentibus ex "corporibus extimis" id est exterioribus. Et posuerunt corpora illa eo modo imprimere "imagines mentibus, ut quondam mos" fuit alicui scribenti "celeri stilo figere pressas litteras equore" id est planicie "pagine quae pagina nullas prius notas habebat."

Nota quod Stoici dicuntur a stoa Grece quod est porticus Latine, quare Athenis in manifestissima porticu et aliis locis publice Stoici disputare soebant. Illi posuerunt animam tamen habere se in ratione patientis respectu rerum exteriorum. Et quia cognitio magis videtur sequi virtutem activam qua passivam, ideo secundum eos
cognitio potius debet attendi secundum facultatem rei cognitae que est activa, quod
anime cognoscens quae est passiva. "Sed mens si propriis vigens..." hic improbat
hanc opinionem. Secundo ponit suam veritatem, ibi, "Hec est efficiens." Primo ergo
deducit ad plura inconvenientia istam opinionem dicens, "Sed si mens vigens nihil
explicat" propriis motibus id est si nullam actionem propriam habet, "sed tantum iacet
patientis subdita notis," id est similitudiniubis corporum. Et si ipsa "redit" id est
representat "cassas" imagines rerum id est similes "invicem speculi" id est ad modum
speculi, tunc queritur "unde viget hec notio" id est hec cognitio "animis" quod anima
est "cernens omnia," non tamen corporalia sed etiam incorporalia.

Nota quod primum inconvenientis est si cognitio intellectiva fierit per solam
impressionem corporum in anima, tunc non esset virtus per quam anima cognosceret
incorporalia. Nunc autem manifestum est que etiam incorporalia cognoscit. Aliud
inconveniens ponit dicens, si anima tamen est passiva, "quae vis anime cognita singula
perspicit" id est iudicat? Aut quevis anime cognita dividit, divisa recolligit, aut quevis
anime legens id est apprehendens alterum iter componendi et dividendi. "Nunc insertit
caput summis" id est generalissimis ascendendo a specialissimis ad generalissima
colligendo multitudinem, et nunc desidet vel decidit secundum aliam litteram id est
cadit in infima id est in specialissima procendo a generalissimis ad specialissima
dividendo. Tum id est tandem anima "referens" id est comparans "sse sibi redarguit
falsaveris" id est per vera.

Notandum quod ex littera talis formatur ratio. Illa anima non est tamen passiva
sed activa que iudicat componit et dividit et vera falsis redarguit, sed anima intellectiva
est huius modi, ergo et cetera Maior est nota. Quare iudicare, componere, dividere, redarguere, videntur esse operationes active. Minor apparat. Anima iudicat inter verum et falsum. Componit predicatum cum subiecto, aliquando dividit predicatum a subiecto, et falsas opiniones redargint. "Hec est efficiens magis..." hic Philosophia ponit veritatem dicens, "Hec mens est magis causa efficens" quod est "causa longe potentior qua illa que modo materie" id est similitudine materie "patitur notas impressas." Et quare aliquis crederet que in anima nulla esset passio ideo subdit. Quandam passio precedit operationes anime in uno corpore excitans et movens vires animi ad operandum, ut quando "lux ferit oculos" tunc patitur visus "vel cum vox instrepit" id est insonuit auribus tunc patitur auditus. Et "tandem vigor mentis excitus" id est "excitatus vocans species quas intus tenet ad similes motus applicat eas notis exeris" id est simmilitudinibus exterioribus, et "miscet" id et "applicat imagines exteriores" corporum "formis" id est speciebus 'introsum" id est in anima "reconditis."

Notandum quod Boetius hic utitur sententia Platonica quod ponit species rerum a principio naturaliter inditas anime, sed anima sopita est in corpe, ita quod non intelligit per eas nisi exciteetur per imutationem sensuum exteriorum. Excitata autem evocat speciem similem illi quam sensus exterior impressit, et applicando eam rei exterior, et sic intelligit per eam. Ad hanc intentionem etiam loquitur Linconienere id est posteriorum dicens, "Ratio in nobis Sopita non agit nisi prius per operationes sensuum quibus admiscetur fuerit experta." Notandum quod ex littera videtur quod intellectus passibilis intelligendo etiam sit activus cum sit causa efficens, ut dicitur in littera. Aristoteles autem, iii. De Anima vult quod intelligere sit pati, et quod
intellectus nullam habet naturam nisi que est passibilis vocatus. Ad hoc dicunt aliqui que quare anima comprehendit tam intellectum passibilem quam agentem. Anima est activa, immo causa effectiva intlectionis ratione intellectus agentis, sed est passiva ratione intellectus passibilis. Vel dicendum que intellectus passibilis est potentia passiva saltem quo ad primum eius actum, cum intelligere sit pati. Sed omnis potentia passiva de necessitate reliquit potentiam activam que reducat ipsam ad actum. Tale aut activum non posset esse res corporalis extra, cum agens sit prestantius passo. Ideo tale activum ex parte anime erit intellectus agens cuius operatione est facere potentia intellecta actu intellecta, ita que a rebus extra virtutem intellectus agentis imprimitur aliquid intellectui passibili, per quod in actum intelligendi reductur. Non est ergo intentio Boethius negare quin mens sit passiva ratione intellectus passibilis, sed vult que mens sive anima magis habeat efficientiam in intlectione que sit passiva ab ipsis corporibus extra. Et per consequens efficentia intellectus non debet attribui rebus extra: quod erat de intentione Stoicorum.

Ascensius

"Quondam porticus attulit" et cetera, versus est monocolosi. unius membri, est autem glyconicus ab inventore. Dactylicus a pede predominante, trimeter a numero pedum, acatalecticus, quare plenus et non redundans. Constat autem spondeo et duobus dactylis sed ultima syllaba sicut semper est communis. Damnat opinioni Stoicorum qui a menone prius menonii dicti postea a porticu stoici ceperunt appelari. Omnia satis dilucida sunt.
Stylus aliquando est columna: aliquando instrumentum scribendi in tabula cerata aut simuli, aliquando qualitas scriptorum. Hic est instrumentum equor dicitur ab equalitate sive in mari sive in terra, quicquid asperum non est equor dicitur. Voluerunt autem animam esse velut tabulam rasam in qua nihil scriptum est. Pagines autem inquit festus dicte sunt que in libris suam queque obtinent regionem, ut pagi id est vici iuxta fontes siti, vel a pangendo que in illis versus panguntur id est figuntur. Est igitur pagina utraque pars phyllure seu folii dicta que in ea carmina pangantur hoc est sigantur. Unde hic bene dicit pressas figere litteras. Nam pangere est sigere et solidare, et per translationem cantare dicitur, notis subdita id est impressionibus subjicta.

Tum mentis vigor excitus, ita scribendum est non exitus. Habet autem excitus secundam syllabam communem, quia apud Virgi. in iii. Eneid, producitur cum dicit "excitum ruit" et cetera, et hic corripitur. Volunt "acio" quarte coniungationis produci, et "acieo" secunde corripi, nam ab utroque deduci arbitrantur.

Prosa Quinta Quinti Libri

Sanctus Thomas

"Quod si in corporibus sentiendis..." hec est quinta prosa huius quinti libri, in qua probat specialiter divinam cognitionem esse secundum motum cognoscentis, et non rei cognite. Secundo ostendit insufficientiam eorum qui ex nostro modo cognoscendi improbant providentiam divinam, ibi, "Quid igitur" et cetera. Primo facit quod dictum
est. Secundo infert duas conclusiones, ibi, "Hac itaque." Primo dicit, "Si in sentiendis" id est in cognoscendis "corporibus animus noster non tamen insignitur" id est afficitur "passione corporis sed ex sua vi iudicat passionem subiectam corpori, itaque" in cognoscendo sequitur proprium motum, quamvis qualitatis "obiecte forinsecus afficiant" id est mutent instrumenta id est organa sensuum. Et "passio corporis antecedat vigorem agentis animi, quod passio provocet actum mentis in se, et excitat formas intrinsecus quiescentes." Si hoc est in animo nostro multo vagis "ea quae absoluta sunt cunctis affectionibus" id est qualitatibus corporum, sicut intelligentia separate et precipue deus, illa "in discernendo non consequuntur obiecta extrinsecus, sed expediunt" id est perficiunt "actum suae mentis" id est operationem intellectivam secundum naturam propriam.

Notandum quod ex littera potest sic argui, si id de quo minus videtur inesse inest et de quo magis, sed minus videtur que animus noster in cognoscendo sequatur motum suum et non rei cognite, et tamen sequitur facultatem sue cognitionis, ergo mucho magis intelligentia divina sequitur in cognoscendo proprium motum sue cognitionis que ipsius rei cognite. "Hac itaque ratione..." hic infert duas conclusiones ex premissis dicit, ex quo cognitio sequitur naturam cognoscentis et non rei cognite. Et cum cognoscentia sint diversa secundum naturam, omnem diversis cognoscentibus convenire diversas cognitiones unum dicit, "Hac itaque ratione," quare cognitio sequitur naturam cognoscentis "multiplices cognitiones cessere" id est cesserunt diversis "ac differentibus substantiis sensus enim solus destitutus aliis cognitionibus cessit animantibus immobileibus quales sunt conche maris et quaeque nutriuntur herentia
saxis. Imaginatio vero cessit mobilibus beluis" que moventur motu progressivo "quibus videtur inesse affectus" id est appetitus "fugiendi" malum vel "appetendive" bonum. "Ratio vero" per quam comprehendimus universale tantum est humani generis, sicut intelligentia est divini generis." Tunc ponit secundam conclusionem quod illa conclusio est notior et nobilior que non solum apprehendit proprium obiectum, sed etiam obiecta aliarum notitiarum id est cognitionum. Unum dicit, "Quo fit ut ea notitia," id est cognitio "prestet" id est nobilior sit ceteris "quod suapte natura" id est "propria natura non modo" id est non tammodo proprium super obiectum cognoscit, "sed etiam cognoscit subiecta certarum noticiarum."

Notandum circa primam conclusionem que cum actus et operationes diversitatem secundum diversittem agentium et operantium. Sequitur si agentia et operantia sint diversa que habeant diversas operationes et cognitiones. propter quod sensus sine aliis cognitionibus cessit animalibus ignobilibus, et accipitur hic sensus stricte pro apprehensione sensitiva que solum imutatur ad praesentiam sensibilis. Sic enim distinguetur contra imaginationem que non tamen apprehendit rem presentem, sed etiam absentem.

Notandum circa istam conclusionem que quecumque potentia plura agnoscit videtur esse prestantiorea que cognoscit pauciora. Si igitur alique potentia "cognoscit proprium" obiectum et cum haec obiecta aliarum potentiarum inferiorum sicut est intelligentia divina et non econverso, sequitur que potentia superior plura cognoscens sit nobilior inferiori. "Quid igitur..." hic Philosophia ostendit insufficientiam eorum qui ex modo cognoscendi numero improbant divinam providentiam. Secundo hortatur
nos ad considerandum modum divine cognitionis, ibi, "Quare in illius." Primo manifestat insufficientiam eorum per simile. Secundo applicat simile illud ad propositum, ibi, simile est similitudo autem quam intendit talis est Sensus et imaginatio sunt cognitiones inferiores qua ratio. Si ergo sensus et imaginatio vellent iudicare modum cognoscendi rationis ex modo cognoscendi proprio et dicere que ultime nihil esset quod ratio apprehendit, vel si verum esset iudicium rationis, vel si esset particulare et sensibile ratio vero dicere contrarium manifestum est que nos qui vigemus utraque cognitione potius assentiremus rationi iudicando motivum sensus et imaginationis esse insufficiens. Dicit ergo, "Quid igitur si sensus et imaginatio refrangentur" id est contradicant "ratiocinationi dicentis nihil esse universale id quod ratio putat se intueri." Sic arguendo, "Quod enim est sensibile vel imaginabile id non posse esse universum" id est universale habet iudicium sensus et imaginationis. "Aut igitur iudicium rationis necesse esse verum," et per consequens "ne quicque esse sensibile," quod est absurdum. "Aut quoniam motum sit" tibi secundum "sensui et imaginationi plura esse subiecta sensibus et imaginationi" que necesse est "esse sensibilia," crederes ne "conceptionem rationis esse in anime que considerat illud quod est sensibile" et "singulare quasi quoddam ultime. Ad hec si ratio respondeat conspicere in ratione" universali illud "quod est sensibile et imaginabile, illa vero," sed sensum et imaginationem "non posse aspirare" id est pervenire ad "cognitionem universitatis" id est universalis "quoniam notio" id est "cognitionio eorum non excedis figuras corporales." Et diceret ratio "potius esse credendum firmiori et perfectiori iudicio rerum. In huiusmodi igitur lite" scilicet inter sensum et imaginationem ex una
parte et rationem ex altera parte, nos quibus inest tam vis ratiocinandi et imaginandi et sentiendi nonne potius probaremus causam rationis. Et reputaremus motiva sensus et imaginationis esse insufficientia quo diceret immo.

Notandum quod iudicio nobilioris potentie potius est astandum que iudicio potentie ignobilioris. Cum igitur ratio sit potentia nobilior sensus et imaginatio eo que ratio comprehendit proprium obiectum et obiectum sensus et imaginationis et non econverso. Ergo potius astandum est iudicio rationis que potenterum inferiorum. "Simile est..." hic applicat illud simile ad propositum et dicit, illud quod est dictum de sensu et imaginatione respectu rationis "simile est ei quid humana ratio" non putat "divinam intelligentiam intueri, nisi que ipsa ratio cognoscat" quod apparat ex ipso modo arguendi. "Nam ita disseris" id est arguis, "si qua videatur non habere certos ac pro et necessarios eventus, talia nequunt presciri ea certo eventura. Igitur harum rerum nulla est prescientia, quam scilicet prescientiam si credamus esse in his nihil erit quod non proveniat ex necessitate. Si igitur uti pro sicut" sumus participes rationis "ita possemus habere iudicium divine mentis, sicut nunc iudicavimus imaginationem et sensum oportere cede id est locum dare rationi, sic censeremus" id est iudicaremus "iustissimum humanam rationem sese submittere divine menti."

Notandum quod simile est de iudicio sensus et imaginationis respectu rationis, et rationis respectu intelligentie divine. Nam sensui et imaginationi videtur quod ratio aliter non possit comprehendere rem, nisi sicut ipsa comprehendit, quod falsum est. Sic similiter videtur rationi humane que intelligentia divina non possit res incertas cognosces aliter qua ipsa cognoscit quod falsum est, nam que ratio humana incerte
cognoscit intelligentia divina summa comprehendit. "Quare in illius..." hic Philosophia hortatur ut erigamus nos ad cognitionem divine intelligentie dicit, "Quare si possimus erigamur" per diligentem considerationem in "cacumen" illius summe "intelligentie" super divine. "Illic enim ratio videbit quod in se non potest intueri. Scilicet quoniam certa et diffinita prevotio Dei" cognoscat illa "quae non habent certos" existus. Et illud non erit opinio, "sed potius erit simplicitas summe scientie nullis termins inclusa." Quare simplicitas summe sapientie est infinita. Notandum quod si cognitio sequiretur facultatem rei cognite et non virtutis cognoscentis, tunc sicut ratio humana cognoscit futura contingentia incerte, sic similiter intelligentia divina ea incerte cognosceret. Sed quia facultas cognitionum est secundum facultatem virtutum cognoscentium, et intelligentia divina id est cognoscentia divina in cognoscendo excedit rationem humanam, poterit ipsa certe cognoscere que ratio humano incerte cognoscit.

Ascensius

Sanctus Thomas

"Quam variis terras..." hic incipit quintum metrum huius quinti quod dicitur Archiloicum ab inventore. Dactylicum a pede predominante. In quo ostendit hominem esse dispositum ad contemplationem ex figura corporis sui. Et primo describit figuram corporalem aliarum bestiarum. Secundo figuram hominis, ibi, "Unica gens." Primo dicit "Animalia permeant terras quam variis" id est valde "variis figuris. Namque alia animalia extento corpore" sicut sunt serpentes sicut sunt reptilia. Illa "verrunt" id est vertunt "pulverare" et "incipit" id est mota vi "pectoris trahunt continuum sulcum" super in pulvere. Sunt alia animalia quibus in est "vaga levitas alarumque verberant ventos et enatant" et transeunt "liquido volatu spacia longi etheris" id est aeris. Sunt alia que "gaudent vestigia pressisse solo" id est terre gressibus super suis et transmittere id est pertransire "virides campos et gaudent subire silvas. Quae omnia animalia licet videas eas discrepare variis formis" tamen "facies eorum prona" id est ad terram inclinata "valet ingravare" id est ingravatos ostendere sensus bebetes.

Nota quod Philosophia tangit tria genera animalium scilicet reptilia, volatilia, et gressibilia, quae licet differant in formis, quia quedam formantur ad reptandum ut serpentes, quedam ad volandum ut aves, quedam ad gradiendum ut bestie terrestres. Tamen in hoc omnia conveniunt que habent facies inclinatam ad terram. "Unica gens hominem..." hic describit figuram hominis dicit "Unica gens hominem," id est solum genus humanum "levat celsum cacumen" id est caput suum altius et "levis stat recto"
id est erecto "corpore et despicit terras," vultque elevato ad celum. Tu homo "terrenus qui recto vultu petis celum et exeris" id est exigis frontem. Haec recta "figura admonet te quod tu male decipis, nisi" etiam feras id est extolles "animum tuum sublime" id est in celestia, ne mens "gravata" id est grave divine depessa "pessum" id est sub pedibus vel subtus, et est pessum adverbium loci, ne illa mens fidat id est resideat inferior levato corpore celsus.


Ascensius

"Quam variis" et cetera. Versus est monocolos. est enim totus phaletius seu Archilochius constat que ex quatuor pedibus heroicis id est consuetis in hexametro heroicico, et tribus trocheis. Ita tamen que ultima syllaba intelligatur communis, nam ultimus pes spondeus frequenter est. Quartus autem dactylus est semper finiens partem orationis more bucolici versus, et si quartam syllabam a fine dempseris erit totus heroicus, ut deposita ultima syllaba huius verbi pertineant erit hexameter sic.

"Quam variis terris animalia perme figuris." Et ita in singulis legitur autem principium diversi mode. Nam alii dicunt quod variis: alii tam variis, alii tum variis.

Notum etiam esse debet "que ibi hec nisi terrenus male desipis." Non est legendum "decipis", venit enim a "de" et "sapio" non a "capio". "Pessum" est sub pede vel sub pedem. Est autem mala ut docet Augustinus politia: dum corpus quod debet esse ancilla dominatur anime que merito fuerit domina, aut dum sensus rationi imperat. Sidere est capere sedem ad sedendum.
"Quoniam igitur uti pauloante..." hic incipit sexta prosa et ultima huius libri quinti in qua determinat veritatem de compassibilitate prescientie divine et liberi arbitrii. Et primo ponit suam determinationem. Secundo subiungit utilem exhortationem circa finem libri, ibi, "Adversamini igitur." Primo ostendit modum divine cognitionis. Secundo solvit obiectiones factas contra divinam providentiam. Tertio concludit compassibilitatem liberi arbitrii cum providentia divina. secunda ibi, "Quid igitur postulas." Tertia ibi, "Que cum ita sint." Primo determinat de statu Dei qui est eternitas. Secundo ex hoc declarat modum divine providentie, ibi, "Quoniam igitur omne iudicium." Primo premittit que determinandum sit de eternitate. Secundo determinat de ea, ibi, "Eternitas igitur est interminis" et cetera. Primo dicit, quomodo monstratum est pauloante que omne quod scitur cognoscitur non ex sui natura id est ex natura rei scite, sed ex natura comprehendentium id est cognoscentium. Intueamur nunc quantum probatas est quis sit status divine essentie vel substantie, ut possimus agnoscere que sit eius scientia. Et subdit que commune iudicium cunctorum degentium id est utentium ratione est Deum esse eternum. Idea consideremus quid sit eternitas, "hec enim nobis patefecit pariter naturam et divinam scientiam."

Notandum quod viri degentes ratione sunt viri prediti luce sapientie et omnes isti concedunt Deum esse eternum. Nam philosophus viii. Phisicis, "Ex eternitate motus ostendit eternitatem motoris." Et omnes tam greci qua barbari putantes deos

Notandum secundum Albertus supre libro de causis. "Aliquid est eternum et est in eternitate, et est ipsa eternitas sicut Deus." Aliqua sunt eterna et sunt in eternitate, sed non sunt ipsa eternitas sicut subsantie separate. Alia sunt eterna non in eternitate, nec sunt ipsa eternitas ut motus tempus et mundus. Notandum cum dicit eternitas est possessio, ibi utitur nomine possessionis ad designandum immutabilitem et indeficientiam eternitatis, quia ipsa firmiter possidetur et quiete habetur. Et dicit vite ad innuendum que nonviventia non mensurantur eternitate. Et dicit interminabilis ad differentiam illius vite que habet terminum a parte ante et a parte post sicut vita hominis, vel a parte ante tamen sicut vita angelorum. et distinctio tota simul ad differentiam vite angelice quevis enim esse angeli secundum substantiam sit totum simul, non tamen secundum operationem cum habeat operationes successivas et intellectiones. Et dicit perfecta ad designandum que eternitati nihil de est. Perfectum enim est cui nihil de est id est celi et mundi. "Quod ex..." hic declarat definitionem. Secundo redarguit quosdam qui vocabulo eternitatis abutebantur, ibi, non recte. Primo igitur declarat diffinitionem eternitatis in comparantione ad tempus dicit, Unum dictum est que "eternitas est possessio tota simul interminabilis vite, quod liquit clarius ex collatione" id est ex comparatione temporalium. "Nam quicquid vivit in tempore illud..."
praesens procedit" per successivam mutabilitatem "a preteritis in futura et nihil est in
tempore constitutum quod pariter possit amplecti" id est comprehendere ultimum
spacium vite sue, "sed crastinum nondum apprehendit. Hesternum vero tempus iam
perdidit, et in hodie nativa non amplius vivitis" id est nihil plus est praesens de hodie
nativa nisi quod "in illo mobili et transitorio momento" continetur de vita. Et dicere
momentum illud indivisibile instans quo futurum copulatur cum preterito. "Quod
igitur temporis conditionem" id est successionem "licet nunque ceperit esse nec
desinat esse sicut Aristoteles censuit de mundo, licet vita" id est duratio eius "tendatur"
id est extendatur "cum infinitate temporis, nondum tamen tale est ut iure credatur esse
eternum." Quare "non comprehendit" neque "complecitur simul totum spacium vite"
id est sue durationis, "licet infinite" id est "infinito tempore" duret, "sed futuram
nondum habet transacta" id est pertransita et preterita non habet. "Quod igitur" non
"comprehendit" et "possidet pariter totam plenitudinem interminabilis vite cui nihil
absit futuri" nec aliquid "fluxerit preteriti," illud "iure prohibetur esse eternum," quare
illud "eternum" sui compos eo, quod nihil sibi desit necesse est "semper sibi assistere
praesens" est "necesse presentem habere infinitatem" id est "infinitam" durationem
"temporis mobilis" id est successivi. Notandum que quare per cognitionem temporis
devenimus in cognitionem eternitatis, eo que opposita iuxta se posita magis elucescunt.
Ideo per naturam et successionem temporis declarat nobis naturam eternitatis. Sicut
enim ratio temporis consistit in successione et apprehensione prioris et posterioris in
motu cuius una pars preterit et alia futura est. Sic ratio eternitatis per oppositum
consistit in apprehensione uniformatis illius quod omnino est extra motum
comprehendens simul preteritum et futurum tamquam praesens. Notandum que ipsius eterni nil transit in preteritum. Ideo semper sibi praesens assistit, quare vero numquam deficiet sicut nec unque incepit cum habeat vitam interminabilem. Necesse est que assint quelibet differentiae temporis, etiam si ponatur tempus infinitum. Et quare eodem modo assistit differentiis temporum per quem modum in se subsistit. Motus autem quo in se subsistit est presentarius. Ideo etiam assistit differentiis temporis per modum praesente. Ideo dicit que necesse est et eternum praesentem habere infinitatem temporis mobilis.

"Unde quidam non recte..." hic Philosophia reprobat quosdam quo abutebantur vocabulo eternitatis. Secundo docet proprium modum loquendi ibi. Ita si digna, primo facit quod dictum est. Secundo manifestat quoniam temporalia deficiunt a simplicitate divine natura quam nituntur imitari, ibi, "Hunc enim." Primo dicit Dictum est que eternitas non solum dicit interminabilitatem sed etiam simplicitatem. "Unde non recte quidam" putant "qui cum audiunt visum esse Platonis mundum hunc non habuisse initium temporis nec habiturum defectum" id est finem "hoc modo putant mundum conditum fieri coeternum conditorei." Causa autem quare non recte putant est; "quia aliud est" duci per "interminabilem" vitam cum quadam successione, "quod Plato tribuit mundo" et aliud est simul "esse complexam totam praesentiam vite interminabilis quod est proprium divine mentis." Et quare aliquis diceret, si mundus nunque incepit vester esse coeternus Deo. Ad hoc respondit que Deus est prior mundo non "antiquitate temporis sed simplicitate nature." Unde dicit, "Neque" enim "deus debet videri antiquior rebus conditis quantitate temporis" sed "potius proprietate
simplicis nature."

Notandum sicut patet ex libro thimei Plato voluit mundum incepisse sed finem non habere. Et hoc idem Aristoteles sibi imponit in libro *Celi et Mundi*, dicit que solus Plato generat mundum. quid est ergo quod dicit Boetius que Plato non posuit mundum incepisse. Ad hoc dicitur que dum Plato dixit mundum habuisse initium intelligitur que habuit initium institutionis non autem temporis. Sicut ponit exemplum de vestigio pedis, ut si pes ab eterno stetisset in pulvere, pes esset causa vestigii naturaliter precedens vestigium licet non tempore.

"Hunc enim vite..." hic manifestate quoniam temporalia deficiunt a simplicitate divine nature quam nituntur imitari dicit, "Ille infinitus motus rerum temporalium imitatur" quatum potest "hunc præsentarium statum vite immobiles" id est eternalitatis. "Et cum non potest effingere" id est exprimere "et equare, deficit" ab eius "immobilitate" successive acquirendo quod habere "non potuit et ex simplicitate prescientie decrescit in infinitam quatitatem preteriti et futuri, et cum nequeat possidere pariter totam plenitudinem vite sue, hoc ipso que aliquo modo nunquam esse definit. Videtur aliquatenus emulari illud quod implere non potest alligans" se scilicet status temporalis "ad qualemcumque presentiam huius momenti" id est instantis "exigui" id est indivisibilis "et volucris" id est transitorii qua scilicet præsentia instantis temporis gestat. Habet "quandam imaginationem manentis prescentie" id est eternitatis et "prestat quibuscumque contigerit ut illa esse videantur." Nam illam dicimus esse quod sunt in praesenti momento. "Quoniam vero non potuit manere" scilicet presentia instantis propter naturam rei mobilis, ideo "rapuit infinitum iter
temporis" per successionem et "eoque modo factum est ut continuaret vitam eundo"
de uno esse in aliud, "cuius plenitudinem non valuit" id est potuit complecti
"permanendo."

Notandum quod infinitus motus rerum temporalium quantum potest imitatur
statum eternitatis quare non potest eum totaliter exprimere, quare status temporalis est
successivus status eternitatis. Non et status temporalis respicit preteritum et futurum.
Status eternitatis tamen praesens. Et tamen hoc imitatur status eternitatis que sicut
eternitatisnumqua deficit. Sic infinitus motus rerum temporalium numquam esse
definit. Et sicut in tempore est dare instans quod habet quandam imaginem cum
eternitate, itaque sicut in eternitate aliquid dicitur esse. Et sicut illa dicimus esse que
sunt in praesenti instanti. Ideo status rerum temporalium licet non possit imitari
status eternitatis presentialiter permanendo, tamen ipsam imitatur suam durationem
successive continuando.

"Itaque si digna..." in ista parte Philosophia docet quoniam proprie loquendum
sic de Deo et de mundo dicit, "Si nos sequentes Platonem velimus imponere nomina
digna" id est convenientia "rebus, dicamus deum esse eternum. mundum vero dicamus
perpetuum." Et hoc consonant dicto auctoris Grecismi. Eternum vero sine principio
sine fine. Perpetuum cui principium sed fine carebit. "Quoniam igitur omne
iudicium..." hic Philosophia ex dictis ostendit modum scientie divine. Primo ergo
ostendit qualis sit scientia divina et qualiter sit nominanda dicit, "Quoniam omne
iudicium comprehendit ea quae sunt sibi subiecta" id est sua obiecta secundum "sui
naturam." Secundum id est naturam virtutis cognoscentis. Natura autem dei talis est
que "semper ipsi deo est status eternus et praesentarius." Ex quo sequitur que scientia Dei supergressa omnem motionem temporis manet in simplicitate praesentie," et "complectens infinita spacia preteriti et futuri temporis omnia considerat quasi iam" id est praesenti aliter "gerantur in sua simplici" conditione. Tunc ostendit quoniam scientia Dei est nominanda dicit, "Itaque si velis pensare prescientiam quo cuncta dignoscit," non dices divinam scientiam "esse prescientiam quasi futuri, sed rectius estimabis divinam scientiam esse instantie" id est praesentie "numquam deficientis." Quod confirmat per ethymologiam huius nominis providentiam dicit unum cognitione divina "non dicitur praevidentia" quare illa importat ordinem ad futurum "sed dicitur providentia quod porro" id est procula "rebus infimis constituta, quasi ab excelso cacumine rerum cuncta prespiciat."

Notandum que cognition sequitur modum rei cognoscendis, ideo cognition et scientia Dei sequitur statum et dispositionem Dei. Status autem dei est eternus et praesentarius, cum esse divinum mensurat et eternitate. Ergo scientia dei erit eterna et praesentaria, itaque omnia que sunt preterita et futura cognoscit quasi sint praesentia. Notandum que aliquis diceret, non ens non potest alicui esse praesens, sed preteritum et futurum est non ens. Ergo non potest esse praesens cognitioni divine. Dicendum que duplex est non ens, quoddam quod nullo modo est ens nec potest esse ens,et tale non est realiter praesens alicui cum nihil sit. Aliud est non ens non simpliciter, sed quia actu non est ens, et licet huiusmodi non ens non possit realiter coexistere temporis presenti, potest tamen coexistere eternitati, quare eterinitas cum sit infinita excedit tempus praesens extendendo se ad preteritum et futurum. Et sic preteritum et futurum
sunt eternitati coexistentia praesenti aliter, quare in eternitate non est successio. Unum non sequitur si aliquid coexistit eternitati que pro tanto simpliciter existat, quare eternitas etiam extendit se ad non existens sicut ad preteritum et futurum.

Notandum que deo omnia sunt praesentia. Sibi nihil est futurum. Ideo scientia sua non est dicenda prescientia que sonat aliquid futurum, nec debet dici previdentia propter eandem causam, sed debet dici providentia quasi procul constituta a rebus inferioribus omnia prescipient. "Quid igitur..." hic solvit obiectiones superius factas contra providentiam. Primo ergo ostendit qualiter huiusmodi obiectiones solventur. Secundo resumit primam obiectionem ipsam fortificando ut formalius solvatur. Secunda ibi, hic si dicas circa primum notandum que erant rationes quarum prima et secunda fundantur super hoc scilicet que nihil potest esse prescitant a deo nisi id sit necessarium. Tertia fundatur super hoc que eventus incertus non potest certitudinaliter cognosci. facit ergo duo. Primo ostendit que prescientia non imponit necessitatem rei prescrite, per quod solvitur prima et secunda ratio. Secundo ostendit que scientia dei non mutat naturam rei, sed simul stant certitudo a parte scientiae et in certitudo a parte eventus, per quod etiam solvitur tertia ratio. Secunda ibi, "Quare hec divina." Primo dicit. Ex quo deus cogniscit omnia tanque presentia, "quid igitur postulas ut illa fiant necessaria quae lustrantur" id est que comprehenduntur "divino lumine" id est divina cognitione, "cum nec homines faciant ea necessaria que presentialiter vident" verbi gratia. Quod homo videt in presenti non "facit esse necessarium. Numero pro nunquid enim intuitus tuus addit" id est dabit aliquando "necessitatem eis quae tu cernis presentia." Dicit Boetius, "Minime." Et Philosophia "Si est digna collatio divini et
humani" intuitus respectu praesentis uti pro sicut "vos videtis quedam hoc praesenti temperario" id est in praesenti tempore "ita" deus suo "eterno" intitu "omnia cernit" tamquam praesentia.

Notandum que intitius noster rei presentis nullam ponit necessitatem rei presenti, quia visio fortis currentis non imponit necessitatem currenti, quare potest fortes currere vel non currere. Sic etiam intitius divinus qui omnia presentialiter cognoscit nullam imponit rebus necessitatem, sed videt ea praesentialiter sicut futura sunt. Futura enim necessario videt necessario futura, et futura contingentia videt contingentur futura. "Quare hec divina prenotio..." hic ostendit que circa contingentia simul stant certa cognitio dei et incertus eventus rei dicit, "Quare hec divina prenotio" qua deus novit futura illa non mutat proprietatem rerum quo ad necessitatem et contingentiam. Quare non imponit necessitatem rei que contingens est, sed "talia apud se spectat presentia qualia olim prevenient futura, nec confundit rerum iudicia" ut contingens faciat non esse contingens, sed "uno intitui mentis dignoscit tam necessarie quam non necessarie ventura" id est futura. Quod declarat in exemplo dicens, "sicut vos homines quando pariter" id est in eodem instanti "videtis hominem ambulare in terra et solem oriri in celo," licet "utrumque simul" sit "conspectum tamen discernitis hoc esse voluntarium" scilicet "hominem ambulare in terra, et illud esse necessarium" scilicet "solem oriri." Ita similiter "divinus intitius cuncta despiciens" deorsum inspiciens minus "perturbat rerum qualitatem," scilicet contingentiam et necessitatem rerum. Dico apud se presentium ratione eternitatis, sed futurarum ad conditionem temporis, "Quo fit ut cognitio" futurorum Dei tanque presentium non sit opinio, "sed
cognitio veritate nixa" id est confirmata, "cum cognoscit" aliquid "esse exiturum" id est futurum, "quod idem non nesciat" id est bene sciat "carere" potest "necessitate" existendi.

Notandum de hoc quod dicitur Deum omnia presentialiter cognoscere scilicet preterita et futura ponunt quidam exemplum: de baculo fixo in aqua qui successive toti fluvio praesens est cum partibus eius. Sic eternitas simul est cum toto tempore, et cum omnibus que fiunt in tempore. Itaque totum tempus et quicquid est successivum in tempore est praesens eternitati. Aliud exemplum ponitur de centro ut si ponatur eternitas sicut centrum et totum tempus sicut circumferentia tunc licet circumferentia continue moveatur et pars toti succedat, tamen in comparatione ad centrum uniformitur se habet. Aliud exemplum ponitur de aliquo qui vadit per viam et non videt homines post se venientes sed ille qui de alta turri respiceret videret totam viam et homines per eam transeuntes tam precedentes qua sequentes. Sic deus de speculo sue eternitatis respiciens omnia presentialitur videt tam presentia quam futura.

"Hic si dicas..." hic philosophia redit ad primam rationem superius positam ipsam fortificando ut formalius solatur et fortificat eam. Secundo soluit. Tertio solutionem declarat, secunda ibi, "Respondebo." Tertia ibi, "Due enim." Dicere igitur sic. Si dicas hoc obiiciendo illud non posse non evenire quod Deus videt eventurum, quare deus falleretur. "Quod autem non potest non evenire id ex necessitate" super dicas "contingere, et sic astringas me ad nomen necessitatis," vel concedam contingens aliquo modo esse necessarium. Ego "fatebor rem solidissie veritatis cui vix aliquis accesserit" eam concedendo "nisi speculator divini" id est divine nature. Tunc soluit
obiectionem dicit, si coartaveris me ut concedam aliquam necessitatem futurorum, "respondebo idem quod futurum est quo ad nos cum refertur ad divinam notionem" cui ipsum est praesens. Dico necessarium esse necessitate conditionata secundum ratione presentie. Cum autem "idem futurum perpenditur in sui natura" ratione cuius habet futuritionem et futuritinem et determinationem in sui causa, necesse est "videri liberum."

Notandum que sicut illud quod se est contingens quoniam est nobvobis praesens ratione praesentie sortitur quandam necessitatem qua necessitate est ipsum esse dum praesens sit, ita quare omnia sunt deo praesentia, ratione istius praesentie in ordine ad ipsam divinam cognitionem sortiuntur quandam necessitatem, licet in sui natura prorsus videantur libera. "Due enim sunt necessitates, simplex una..." hic Philosophia declarat solutionem per quandam dicit necessitatis et eam applicat ad propositum. Secundo concludit ex premissis simul siare quod aliqua sunt secundum se contingentia et incerta, quod tamen eveniunt certitudinaliter, inquam tum a Deo previsa. Secunda ibi, "Fient igitur procul dubio cuncta." Primo dicit "due sunt necessitates, una simplex, que est necessitas" nature, sicut "omnes homines" necessario "esse mortales." Alia est necessitas conditionis, "ut si scias" hominem "ambulare" illum necesse ambulare est. Quare "quod quisque novit" illud non potest aliter esse qua notum est, "sed haec conditio" id est necessitas conditionata "minime" trahit "secum simplicem" necessitatem. Quare necessitatem "conditionis non facere propria natura, sed adiectio conditionis. Nulla enim necessitas cogit incedere" id est ambulare, gradientem id est ambulantem "voluntate" sua "quamvis necessarium sit eum" ambulare "tum cum"
graditur id est ambulatur. Hanc dicit applicat ad propositum dicit "Eodem modo, si quid providentia" divina "praesens videt illud esse necesse est" secundum ea conditione qua provisum est et ea qua pronitur tibi praesens quavis nullam habeat necessittem nature. Sed "ea futura contuetur" tanque "praesentia" quae "ex libertate arbitrii proveniunt. Haec relata ad intuitum divinum fiunt per conditionem notionis, per se vero" id est in sui natura non habito respectu ad divinam cognitionem. Ipsa "non desinunt" id est deficiunt "ab absoluta" id est perfecta libertate "sue nature."

"Notandum secundum intentionem Boetius ista ratio, quicquid est provisum a deo necessario evenit, soluitur dicendo quod verum est necessario evenit necessitate conditionata, sed non necessitate absoluta. Alii aliter soluunt que illa proposita est vera in sensu composito, sed falsa insensu divino. Unum cum dicitur, quicquid provisum est necessario evenit, verum est in sensum composito, quare impossibile est provisum a deo non evenire. Tamen in sensum diviso falsa est, quare eventus rei saltem contingetis in se non est necessitas. "Fient igitur procul dubio..." hic Philosophia concludit ex predictis que ista simul stant, que aliquo secundum se sunt contingentia et incerta que tamen certitudim aliter eveniunt in que tum provisa a Deo. Secundo obiicit contra hoc, ibi, "Quid igitur refert non esse necessaria" et cetera. primo dicit, "procul dubio cuncta futura sunt quae deus prenoscit esse." Alioquin falleretur divina providentia, "sed quandam eorum proficiscuntur" id est procedunt "de libero arbitrio," ita que quantum est de seipsis possunt non evenire. Unum subdit, "quae quamvis eveniant, non tamen amittunt propriam naturam" libertatis, "quare priusquam fienter" potuiscent "non evenire."
Notandum que tota intentio. Boetius fundatur super hoc que aliquid libere futurum ex sui natura in comparatione ad prescientiam divinam necessario evenit et talis est necessitas conditionata. Quare inquantum pervisum est sic necessario evenit, sed non absolute circum scripta pervisione. "Quid igitur refert non esse necessaria..." hic obiicit contra solutionem et solvit obiectionem. Secundo contra illam solutionem iterum obiicit, ibi, "Sed si inquies in mea." Obiectio in hoc constitit, ex quo futurum contingens prescitum certitudinaliter evenit in necessario non videtur esse differentia inter contingens et necessarium. Unde dicit, "Quid igitur refert" contingentia et libere futura "non esse necessaria cum ista eveniant instar" id est ad similitudinem "necessitatis." Tunc solvit dicens que inter eventum necessarium et contingentem hoc refert quod manifestum apparret per exempla "quae pauloante proposui scilicet quod sol oriens et homo gradiens. Quae dum fiunt non possunt non fieri" id est necesse est fieri, et ita utrumque est necessarium sub conditione presentie. Presentia enim necesse est esse dum sunt praesentia. Tamen unum eorum "scilicet sol ories priusquam fieret necesse erat existere. Alterum vero" scilicet "homo gradiens minime" habet necessitatem fieri antequa fiat. Ita etiam" illa "que deus habet in praesentia procul dubio existunt" propter necessitatem conditionis qua sunt provisa evenire tanque praesentia, sed eorum quod sic sunt provisa hoc de rerum necessitate descendit sicut solem oriri, aliud de potestante facientium scilicet hominem ambulare. Ex quo concludit. Ideo non "iniuria diximus prius quam hoc scilicet" illa que contingenter eveniunt si referantur ad divinam noticiam sunt necessaria scilicet ex conditione divine scientie. Si vero "per se considerentur" ipsa sunt absoluta "nexibus" id est a vinculis
"necessitatis" quod manifestat per simile "sicuti si id quod patet sensibus si referas ad rationem" tunc est "universale. Si autem referas ad" sensum tunc est "singulare."

Notandum quod si idem relatum ad diversa potest esse universale et singulare, videtur similiter quod idem comparatum ad diversum possit esse contingens et necessarium. Nam particulare habet rationem contingentis et ultime rationem necessarior. Sed videmus que humana natura comparata ad intellectum agentem abstrahentem a conditionibus individiantibus et comparata ad intellectum possibilem habet rationem ultimis. Sed comparata natura humana ad sensum qui particulariter comprehendit rationem habet rationem singularis. Nam universale est dum intelligitur: particulare vero dum sentitut. Similiter erit de futuro contingenti que ipsum comparatum ad divinam prescientiam est necessarium conditionalter: In se autem consideratum habet se contingenter. "Sed si inquies in mea." Hic obiicit contra solutionem iam dictam: et solvit illam obiectorem. Secundo movet dubitationem, ibi. Quid igitur .Primo dicit, tu obiicies contra solutionem, sic, "Si in mea potestante est mutare propositum" meum scilicet currendo vel non currendo ego "evacuabo" id est frustrabo "providentiam" divinam "cum" ego in ut a vero illa que prenoscit esse futura. Ipse solvit, ego "respondebo te posse deflectere" id est mutare "propositum tuum, sed veritas providentie" illa intuetur illud "te posse," scilicet mutare propositum "et an facias" quod propositum mutes, et "intuetur quove convertis propositum tuum."

" Ideo scias "te non posse vitare divinam prescientiam, sicuti quamvis libera voluntate convertas in varias actiones." Tu non potes "effugere intuitum presentis oculi."

Nota que licet homo possit mutare propositum suum per hoc tamen non effugit
prescientiam divinam, quia Deus illam mutationem prenoscit. Posito enim que deus previderet te cras iturum ad forum quavis possis non ire et proponas non ire non tamen non ibis. Quare Deus providet simul et propositum et potestatem non eundi et mutationem propositi actionem eundi, et ideo non potes aliquo modo effugere eius prescientiam. "Quid igitur inquies..." hic movet dubitationem dicens, tu forte inquies, quid igitur contingat ex ista solutione "mutabitur" ne scientia divina "ex mea dispositione?" id est ex mea variatione scilicet cum ego "nunc velim hoc nunc aliud videatur ne prescientia divina ex hoc alternare" id est mutare vices suas noscendi et cognoscendi. Ipse respondet, "Minime" contingit hoc "quod divina scientia mutetur" quod approbat Philosophia dicit, quia divinus "intuitus precurrit omne futurum et retorquet" illud ad "prescientiam proprie cognitionis" cognoscendo omnia simul tanquam presentia, nec alternat, id est mutat vices suas noscendi nunc hoc nunc illud successive sicut tu estimas, sed manens liber a mutatione uno ictu prevenit et compлектitur tuas mutationes, quam presentiam comprehendendi visendi omnia tanque presentia deus non est fortitus ex rebus futuris, sed ex propria simplicitate, ex quo resolvitur id est declaratur "illud quod paulo ante posuisti, secundum indignum esse si futura nostra dicantur prestare causam scientiae die. Virtus enim scientiae" divine "cuncta complectens" potestialiter ipsa imponit modum omnibus rebus quia scientia Dei est causa rerum. Ipsa vero nihil debet ipsis rebus, quare nihil ab eis accipit sicut nos accipimus scientiam a rebus.

Nota si deus simul non cognosceret ea que successive eveniant in tempore, tunc scientia dei esset variabilis propter hoc que ad cognitionem unius succederet cognitio
alterius. Sed quare omnia simul cognoscit tamque presentia, ideo in scientia non cadit variatio, ut prius nesciat esse alicuius, et posteat sciet. Vel que prius sciat hoc non esse et postea esse immo simul omnia cognoscit. Et ideo simul scit aliquid non esse in una differentia temporis menisurantis rem et esse in alia differentia temporis. "Que cum ita sint..." hic concludit ex premissis compossibilitatem liberi arbitrii cum prescientia divina dicit, "Que cum ita sint" ut predictum est "manet" libertas arbitrii "mortalibus intemerata" id est incorrupta. "Nec leges proponunt" hominibus "penas et premia inique" id est iniuiste "voluntatibus nostris solutis," id est liberatis ab omni necessitate. "Manet etiam" immobiliter "Deus" prescius "cunctorum," et "praesens eternitas sue visionis" concurrit cum "futura qualitate" secundum bonitate malicia nostrorum actuum "dispensans," id est distribuens "bonis premia et malis supplicia. Nec frustra sunt" posite preces et spes "in Deo que non possunt esse inefficaces cum sint recte."

Nota ex quo propter liberum arbitrium possunt res sic aliter evenire. Non iniuste bonis premia et malis supplicia proponuntur, nec spes et preces frustrantur. Frustrarentur autem omnia hec si omnia vinculo necessitatis uterentur sicut patet ex dictis. "Adversamini igitur vicia..." hic Philosophia subiungit exhortationem utilem dicit, ex quo sic est que non estis coacti necessitate ad faciendum aliquid sed manet in vobis libera voluntas. Ideo adversamini id est spernite vicia per ea iuste incurratis penas, colite id est exercite virtutes propter quas merita consequamini, sublevate animam vestrum ad rectas spes que veram beatitudinem tenduut. porrigite in excelsa ssecundum ad deum humiles preces, et hoc merito faciatis. Quare "si non vultis
dissimulare" avertendo animum vestrum ab his, tunc magna vobis est indita necessitas probitatis, quare illud quod agitis non potest latere eum qui est index actuum vestrorum. Unum subdit, "cum agatis ante oculos" id est cum actiones vestrre sint in prospectu "iudicis cuncta cernentis" scilicet Dei. Nota vitia sunt spennenda que reddunt hominem servilem. Nam qui facit peccatum servias est peccati. Et Seneca dicit, "Si scirem deos peccata ignoscituros et homines ignoraturos," ad huc propter vilitatem peccati peccare erubescerem. Virtutes autem sunt colende, quare virtus est que habentem preficit et opus eius bonum reddit. Recta spes et recte praecentes sunt deo porrigende. Quare his deo coniungimur et ipsum alloquimur. Et si nos dissimulamus negligendo predicta magna virtutes probitatem nobis inditam et promissam inde consequimur, quomodo omnia que agimus sunt in prospectu dei cuncta cernentis, sic enim scribitur ad Hebreos iii "Omnia nuda et apta sunt oculis eius quis est Deus." Bene dictus in secula seculorum Amen.

Ascensius

"Quoniam igitur" et cetera, hec est ultima pars operis scripti. Quod nonnulli imperfectum rentur eo que preventus morte non potuerit alia que conceperat persequi. Bonam tamen ut videbimus conclusionem facit et fere que ad consolationem necessaria videbantur iam dicta sunt. Intueamur nunc quantum fas est. Bene dicit quantum fas est: quare de deo sapiendum est sobrietatem. dictum que est. "Alti ora te" ne "quasi eris". verum quare "Deus amari non potest nisi utcunque notus," etiam "noscitandus est." De hoc autem vocabulo tueri scies que duo significat servare scilicet custodire aut
protegere et inspicere. Et licet alexander varias voces indicandi det, ut pro priore "tueor". Pro secundo "tuor", iuxta versiculum. Dic "tuor insipcio" "tueor" defendere dico, tamen in utroque significatu apud ydoneos tueor secunde declinationis invenies, ut hoc loco "intueamur". Nam si "intuor" diceretur: esset hic dicendum "intuamur". Item quod Alexander "tuor facere tiutum" in supino et "tueor tum", invenies a "tueor utrumque" dici. Nam "inspectio dicitur a multis intuitus," et a Virgilio etiam "obtutus" non "obtuitus". Veruntamen non est dubtum etiam "tuor dici", unde Statius in Achileide. Utero modo contuoreses. Cui "nec" futuri quicque absis. Sic "legendum" est non quicquid sicut plerique legunt. "Eternum" si ut quidam volunt ab ethere deflectit deberet in prima syllaba habere "ae" diphthongon, et in secunda "h" et scribi "aethernum". Ideo autem "ab ethere" deductum volunt, quia sicut "ether". Id est celeum cum sit sphericus figure non habet principium neque finem, ita nec "ethernum" in tempore. "Perpetuum" autem sine dubio dicitur a "per" et "peto". Illud autem perpetit quod semper petit id est aggregatur quod sequitur, unde perpetuum tempus est cuius una pars procedendo semper petit et urget aliam. Sicut "continuum" a "continendo" quoniam una pars "continet" aliam, et "continguum" a "contingendo" que una contingit aliam. Et "assiduum" ab "assidendo" quando una assidet alteri.

"Respondebo namque" et cetera, ordo est. "Namque respondebo," idem futurum id est aliquid unum et idem quod est futurum. Videri necessarium cum id est quod refertur ad divinam notionem, "vero" pro "sed", sed "videri liberum" 'et prorsus" id est versus hoc est omnino esse solutum a necessitate scilicet, cum id est quando perpenditur id est consideratur in sua id est propria natura. "Adversamini
Finitur Boetius *de Consolatu Philosophie* cum duplici commento Sancti Thome videlicet et Ascensii.
"She spoke and [changed] the course of speech..." here begins fifth book of Boethius's *De Consolatione Philosophie* of which this is the first prose section, in which Philosophy strives to resolve certain questions following her conclusion concerning fate and providence. Indeed, it appears from her statements that chance does not exist, because if all things are foreseen, so that nothing comes to pass apart from the order of divine providence, it appears that nothing happens by chance, because chance brings about an unexpected event. Moreover, it appears from statements that free will does not exist because all things are arranged according to an order of destined necessity. Here, free will excludes necessity. Therefore, it appears that if providence and fate exist, free will is entirely excluded. Therefore, in the present book Philosophy examines whether chance exists and what it is, and examines whether free will exists by proposing arguments, by which free will does not appear to be able to stand with divine providence. After this she proposes a false solution of matters which solution she rejects and proposes her own solution, which she confirms..."
by rational arguments, and establishes based on arguments concerning eternity, and many other things will be just as plain.

Also, this book is divided into eleven parts, whereby six are prose and five verse. Its parts and of what things are determined by them will be clear in the course of the book. In the first prose section she first draws a conclusion concerning chance, and first Boethius mentions the acts of Philosophy, commending her exhortation which was made and he puts forward the inquiry concerning chance. Second, Philosophy excuses herself from drawing a conclusion about it and Boethius withdraws that excuse. Third, Philosophy draws a conclusion concerning chance. The second point is there: "Then she [said] 'I hasten....'" The third point is there: "Then she [said] the manner...." First he says Philosophy had mentioned this before and was changing the course of discourse, that is, of the discussion, to treat and explain certain other matters. "Then I", Boethius said, "O, Philosophy your exhortation is right and truly it is most worthy of authority, but what you said a little while ago," in the sixth prose section of the fourth book, "the question concerning providence is to be related to many other things," that is, inquiries. "Therefore I know from the experience," that is, from reality for, "I ask whether you believe," that is, whether you believe "chance to be anything at all," understand "in the nature of things", "and whether you consider it to be a certain thing," understand "in the nature of the things". Note in this what Boethius said. Philosophy intimates at length to have explained what things they examined with regard to his speculation, and so to have determined the principal purpose of this book, and Philosophy turns the course of speech, that is, the running
discourse, because the speech of Philosophy is not hindered by ignorance of teachings nor slowness of learning. She turned speech to certain different things fit to be investigated. However, what things they were, those Boethius does not express, for which reason, perhaps, in her opinion they were excessively considered, or perhaps so much so as to be an extraneous purpose. Note that he say: the exhortation of Philosophy was right, wherefore philosophy urges toward virtues and toward a contempt of fortuitous things. Moreover, an exhortation of such a nature which is toward the good, is fit to be pursued, and one to the bad, is fit to be avoided. He says the exhortation of Philosophy is most worthy of authority, wherefore what is said by wise men, with importance of knowing a suitable thing, is pondered. "So that is said in haste..." here Philosophy excuses him of this opinion or question with a conclusion, and Boethius removes that excuse. He says that Philosophy says: "I hasten to finish," that is, to accomplish "the debt of the promise and open the way to you by which you are returned home. These things, moreover, which you seek to learn concerning chance just as they are of strength, although beneficial by knowing," that is, by knowing, "nevertheless a little turned from the course," that is, from our proposed way "with a little of a separation, whereby they are not indeed different from adverse things, but one should stop things somewhat exercised without reserve. And it is feared," that is, fit to be feared, "lest you not be able to continue toward things fit to be traversed," that is, passed over, "the straight path, fatigued from on out of the way thing, that is, extraneous questions."

Boethius says: Oh Philosophy, lest you fear that, that is, you should not fear,
whereby this will be in a place of rest for me, to know things in which I most delight
and with all latus, that is, all your constancy of reasoning I will agree with, with an
undoubted faith. Nothing is which is uncertain on the following matters

Note that she says in what way you return home. Here she says the native land
is happiness which she previously taught to discover. Those things, moreover, by
which man arrives to it are virtues concerning which things Boethius intends to pursue
-- not in this book, but in the last books of his music from things fit to be done
concerning human music. However, he did not complete his intention, because he was
prevented by King Theodoric with death. Then she said "Morem..." here Philosophy
determines the permitted causes and questions of chance removed. From the
beginning she removes the former, whether chance is. Second she shows the
following, what is error, where it is therefore said. At the beginning she shows what
is indicated by a thing of chance, by considering the opinion of certain ones.
Following this, she rejects that opinion, where it is written, "Quis enim". From the
first she says, "Oh, Boethius, I will show the way to you, that is, I will confirm by
myself your own will." And at once she began this, that is, she began: "If someone
should define the meaning of chance saying by that which is an event produced by
thoughtless movement," that is, unexpectedly, "and not by a joining of cause, I,
Philosophy, confirm chance thus to be nothing at all. And I determine," that is, I
judge "the voice of chance to be absolutely empty because of the emphasis of the
matter suggested, just as the voice from Chimaera is empty."

Note that whatever question whatever it is, he broke off, whatever it is
followed what question, whatever it is, he asks from what something is enriched. Whereby, what is of no matter is owing, except for the thing. Nevertheless, the question which he is seeking on what is anything of a thing is primary knowledge. Therefore from that which is anything from a thing, it is necessary to know from what a certain thing is. Propter hoc philosophia ad querendum de casu utrum sit vel non accipit quod quid est: which expresses in itself and she says: "If some say chance to be an accidental event produced without all reason, I see the voice of chance to be empty, just as nothing corresponds to it in truth."

"Quis enim coercente" here Philosophy rejects that opinion showing chance to be nothing according to her. Secondly, she removes the following, the reality of a thing in that place where she says, "Aristoteles meus." First she considers one reason, in the second place "Nam nihil." The ancient writers said that chance is an accidental event, that is, unexpected. Contrary to this Philosophy proves thus, "wherever all things are seen there is nothing accidental, but all things which exist have been foreseen by God. Therefore, there are among these things nothing which is accidental." She intimates this reason briefly in literature saying, "Indeed what is able to be left behind," that is, abandoned, that is, a thing unexpected "from God, controlling all, who follows in a foreseen order as if nothing is said." Note that all things are foreseen by God, from whom reason exists. In every possible thing God is the cause. All such things are foreseen by God, but God is the cause of all things; therefore, all things are foreseen by God. Moreover, in whatever God is the reason of all things, it is clear since heaven and the entire universe depends upon him, as it
is clear from the twelfth book of metaphysics.

"For nothing comes from nothing..." here she makes another reason, an image of chance which is not able to exist without all cause produced, just as the ancient writers said. She proves thus, "what is from nothing is nothing." Accordingly, because it is from no cause is from nothing. Therefore, because it is from no cause it is nothing. But, indeed, according to the ancient writers, chance is from no cause, since it is produced without any logical sequence of causes. Therefore chance is nothing. Whereupon she says it says in literature: "True knowledge is for no man who ever contested," that is, opposed "the ancients. It is clear enough that nothing exists from nothing, all those ancients established," that is, asserted "that proposition: nothing exists from nothing. As if some foundation from the efficient beginning is not manifest from God the creator, as if man makes something from nothing." But indeed they understood this on a material subject, thus it is from a whole nature grounded in matter. She herself proposes, she says, "this is from the nature of all reason; thus now" it is from matter, "which is subjected to natural patterns. But if something originates from no cause, it is seen to be born from nothing. But this is unable to be done, that something originates from nothing. Therefore, it is not possible that chance exist in any way," that is, of such a kind as we defined a little before. Following the ancient writers: an accidental event is that which is without a union of causes.

Therefore Boethius asks, "What is fit to be said of chance? Is it something in the nature of things since, by right, is it able to be called chance or fortune, or is it anything at all, although it is unknown to the common people for whom those names
are suitable. Note that this proposition that nothing exists from nothing, is true in comparison to the particular cause which in its action submits before the material cause. Nevertheless, in a comparison to the universal cause which is the entire cause of a thing it is not true, wherefore, we mentioned that God created all things from nothing, and we have faith. But the ancients did not talk about this way of production by creation, but by the prime mover. Therefore, Aristotle in the first book of *Physics* says: "it is impossible that something be made from things which do not exist." Indeed, all are united on this opinion, those who think about nature. "My Aristotle says in this *Physics*..." here Philosophy solves the question on chance and from the first she shows it is solved by Aristotle, and she shows his method. Following this, she proves what is allowed of chance, that it does not have causes in itself, it has nevertheless causes by accident, where she says, "These are therefore." First she says "my Aristotle," that is, with my sustained and diligent teaching, "defined chance in *Physics*. It is in the second book of *Physics* with a brief reason and things related to truths, that is, in nature.

Boethius asks: "Seeing in that method." Philosophy says, "whenever something is performed," that is, is done "for the sake of an uncertain thing," that is, of a certain thing or something, "it occurs at any time from causes, because that which was intended is called chance, as if a certain man with a cause of plowing afield to be cultivated were to discover a covered mass of gold, this invention of gold is thought accidental," that is, to have occurred by chance. "The truth, however, of the accidental event is not from nothing," that is, from no cause, "as the definition of the
ancients said. For an accidental event has its own causes from which a combination both in imagined and unexpected things appears to have produced a chance event for him who made something from the cause of another matter. For if the cultivator of the field were not digging up the region which is filled up from the first cause of the appearance of gold, and if the depositor had not buried his money, "that is, concealed it, "in that particular spot," that is in that place, "the thing which exists from a certain cause of the appearance of gold, that gold would not have been found."

Note that according to Aristotle a cause is when something exists on account of another end, as the digging of soil for the sake of propagation. If some other thing happens from certain causes before this thing, which was intended, this is chance. So that the appearance of the treasure is accidental, not what was intended by the digger of the soil. From this what is plain is that the appearance of treasure is accidental, not for this reason what is not foreseen by God, but on what account it is not provided by man. So chance is nothing quo ad deum sed est aliquid quo ad hominem, before the appearance and foresight of which it happens. "They are not, therefore causes of accidental gain..." here Philosophy shows since chance does not have causes in itself, yet they occur by accident, saying: "Therefore causes are not of accidental gain," that is, of an accidental event, "because accidental gain happens from obvious causes and from confluences, not from the appearance of something showing. Truly, not that man who buries the gold, nor who disturbed the field," that is, he who dug it up, he intended, "so that the wealth has been discovered but as I said before, the appearance of something showing, this being dug up by which that man buries the wealth filled
Note that an efficient cause is not held unless it is transformed in the end. The end, moreover, is not chanced unless following what is in the appearance. For that reason, with regard to this effect, what is an appearance is an efficient cause in itself. If it relates to something in the action beyond the appearance of that efficient thing, the cause is efficient by accident, and thus chance. Therefore, chance reaches beyond the appearance of efficient, it does not have an efficient cause in itself, but by accident. "One is permitted therefore, to define..." here Philosophy solves the second question by showing what chance is. Therefore, she concludes her definition now mentioning from the saying. "We may, therefore, define chance to be an unexpected event from merging causes among things which are brought forth for some purpose." Then she shows because an accidental effect occurs by order of divine providence, truly, what is deduced is that chance originates from merging causes. Moreover, what causes merge, this originates from an order of providence. One says that "truly the causes are made to run together and merge, that order decreed from above, preceding by an inevitable connection of causes is clear, which descending from above the order from the origin of providence sets in order all in its time and place."

Note that the definition of chance is good, since by it chance is distinguished from others. By this since it is said that chance is an event from something unexpected a necessary effect occurring is removed, or as frequently as if originated alone, or a man born with five digits on one hand, such as this does not happen accidentally and unexpectedly on account of this. Since it is said from merging causes, it is excluded
from chance intended by the prime mover, which following the ancients it was
supposed to have been made from no connection of causes. By this, moreover, since
it is said among things which are brought forth for some purpose, by this it is excluded
from accidental chance in itself. Indeed, chance and fortune are causes by accident
and they make this more than an appearance of an efficient cause.

Bade

She had spoken and was changing the course of speech toward treating and
setting right certain questions. He had said "Right" by what means do they persuade?
that is, How do they make an end of speech? They say in the end "I said".
"Therefore, how is Philosophy materiam acceptam quodammodo fini erat sese ad alia
vertens," the author speaks well from this character. Philosophy has spoken fully, and
the course of speech, he says this all rightly. For this reason speech should neither
begin slowly nor violently, but it has a running, that is, a middle way, between prose,
that is, prose as a mode of expression alone, and the meter of poems. "Involving
others", often implied laws rather than "involving", but neither is without authority.
I will show the practice, that is, I will grant your wish. Est enim is moriger et morem
gerit alteri, qui morem. And the purpose of life she explains thus, so it is pleasing to
the other. Thus, she began, that is, she began to express clearly. venit enim ab
exordior. non itaque legendum est exorta vel exhorta ut scriptum in quibus inveni. The
rest are clear.
Saint Thomas

"Among the crags in the rocks of Persia..." here is the first verse of this, the fifth book which is called elegiac meter, and the first verse is dactylic hexameter. The following is anapestic with pentameter, or dactylic pentameter, in which Philosophy shows in what way an accidental event is constituted in regards to divine providence. It is, moreover, a matter of example, which the Tigris and Euphrates are two rivers from the same source proceeding, after which they are mutually divide. Though they repeatedly rush together, it is inevitable that ships and others are brought to come together in this river, which, indeed produces a running together in so far as they are controlled by the running down of these rivers. Nevertheless, it is beyond the intention of this which directs ships.

In the same way the running together of accidental chance in any such way is beyond the intention of the doings themselves. Nevertheless, they come together following a flowing of order decreed from the command of providence. And in whatever ignorance of ours something accidental and fortuitous is understood as an order of providence, nevertheless in comparison to God, all things are ordained and foreseen. A certain source says that it is in a written work that the Tigris and Euphrates release of themselves from one source in the crags, that is, from the hollow rocks of Persia, that is, from the mountain of Persia, where no one disputes that in Persia those fleeing fighting turned from arrows. That is, arrows were fastened into
the chests of those following. Soon afterwards, that is, after, pervum spactum the Tigris and Euphrates separate from these joined waters and if the rivers of the verse should come together a second time, that is, should convene and should be called back and should flow into one course, that is, one stream, that is, something should come together. Because water from an interchangeable stream contracts from one stream and another, that is, moves with this. And if they join the sterns of ships and plucked tree trunks, that is, plucked up by the roots, with the stream, into the stream, that is, it is by means of the stream, and water mixed, that is, running together should envelop, that is, encircle the fortuitous ways, since water makes the ships and tree trunks rush together accidentally.

Nevertheless, such unfixed ways of chance, that is, of an accidental event, a cause itself guides the ebbing of the land, that is, the sinking of the land, giving a path to the river. And an order falling down of falling waters, that is, of running water, guides those unfixed courses. This is from an accidental event, with respect to providence. A certain one says perhaps it is chance or fortune which is understood to flow in extended directions, that is, without direction which endures bridled, that is, it endures rules. It goes, that is, moves, itself by law, that is, by the law itself of divine providence.

Note that it is written in Genesis: The Tigris and Euphrates are rivers whose origins are in Paradise. But Jerome, with the authority of Salus, says the origins of Tigris and Euphrates are shown in Armenia, that is, in Persio, to which Boethius is seen to agree. Moreover, the blessed Augustine in addition to Genesis, word for word
brings into union that opposition saying: it touches on these rivers because the others we prove although what they devoured at any time from the land grew again, and wherefore these are able to reach, for that reason, concerning the origin of the rivers themselves, they can be called different. When indeed Moses says in Genes what things grow in Paradise, it can be understood on the first origin of these. But it is said by some what other things grow, and it can be understood of the origin from the second of these. Note that Persia is a certain region which is called by another name, Armenia. A certain source says the men of Persia who conquer their enemies in flight, sent arrows in to the back, and thus, a conquering desire is fleeing, where the poet says, in such a form, "Mars allows victory for the Parthians." The Cyprian (Venus) for her part likewise in such a way is conquered by skill. Cypris, that is, Venus, who rejoiced in Cyprus, and Henricus, the poor man says: "therefore, you should confiscate by swords and clubs in addition to love itself, and route in fleeing because flight alone routes."

Bade

"Of the rocks of Persia..." the poem is elegiac, just as the first of Book One. The opinions of which are clearly well enough in the previous commentary. Achemenes was, with the historian Herodotus as witness, in the fourth History book, the first king of the Persians from whom all kings of Persia, without interruption are descended afterwards up to those of Darius. Therefore it is said here the rocks from Persia, that is, Persia which is in Persia or in Persis. For Persis and Persia and Parthia
is the designated region of the Persians. Moreover because many teach following that way of fleeing and in the flight they had attacked the tormented enemy by arrows, such as Virgil in the third book of Georgicus: "Fidentem que fuga parthum versis que sagattis et cetera ad cuius imitationem hic dicit versa spicula." Nam ly versa non recte adiiceretur ly pugna. Vitio sum enim esset dicere. Pugna fugax verse. Indeed two more adjectives are not to be sought in the Latin language, with out connecting at the middle. The order therefore is: The Tigris and Euphrates separate from one source itself the crags of the rocks of Persia, that is Persia, ubi pugna fugax scilicet parthorum figit spicula versa id est obversa in pectoribus sequentium id est sequentium hostium.

Moreover, Justinus teaches that the Persians themselves spoke the Latin language as they were exiles. Because the exiles come from Eastern Scythia, they have a way of speaking mixed from Scythian and Persian. All teach their children to ride and shoot with great diligence. Of gold and silver however, they formerly had used nothing except the armor itself. They have many wives and they punish no offense or transgression as seriously as adultery. They have other habits which present nothing for the present. The Tigris by its speed or by arrow led rivers to Armenia, but often it withdrew into basins and sometimes it lay hidden. Whereupon Seneca in Troadis says: "Et qui renatum prorsus excipiens diem. Templum rubente Tigrim immiscet freto." Moreover, because it is at Parthos, as Virgil's pastoral poetry shows. "Sooner will Parthus come to Germany or the Germans to the country of the Parthians." Declivitis it is clear is a declivity. Fortune endures the bridle which is
appointed, and indeed, perhaps this is better than fortune or chance.

The Second Prose Section of Book Five

Saint Thomas

"'I understand' I said..." here begins the second prose section of this fifth book in which he begins to determine on the harmony of free will in regard to divine providence. From the first he asks whether free will can continue along with Divine Providence, and Philosophy shows free will to exist. Second, she shows in what way it is diversified on opposite things. Third, she shows the act of free will falling under divine providence. Then according to this she says, "But in this...". The third point thereupon, "Yet that...". First he says "I understand", that is, I know, "seeing that chance continues along with providence, so I agree just as you have said" and Boethius asks "Is there not any freedom of the will in those temporary things of those causes holding fast to one another, or does the chain of something fated," that is, a fated necessity "bind the motions," that is, volition "of human minds?" Then Philosophy shows that free will exists saying that freedom of the will is not things ordered by an opposing logical sequence of causes. "Unless, indeed, it had been" that it could have been "any nature of a rational kind but that same freedom of the will" were present and fully accepted from nature for all, since it has knowledge dependent on discernment. Moreover, she shows because free will belongs to all rational things of nature saying, "that which is naturally able to use reason has this judgment, by which
it alone discerns everything. Therefore, it distinguishes by itself," that is, it discerns things "to be avoided, and things to be chosen. Moreover, what one judges to be chosen, that he seeks," that is, pursues, "and he shuns that which he estimates to be avoided. Therefore, in whatever beings reason is contained, in those, freedom over something desirable and undesirable is contained." Therefore, reason can thus be directed. "Everything which uses reason has judgment over something to be known, avoided, or chosen. But what every man judges fit to be chosen, he pursues and what he judges to be avoided, this he shuns. Therefore, everything which is able to use reason has freedom over something desirable and something undesirable."

Note that she says, "That which uses reason has judgment by which it alone discerns everything." This she says in respect to the difference of natural judgment which is irrational in which everything to be done is not decided, but something in particular. The sheep does not decide concerning anything to be avoided, except only concerning the wolf. Bees do not have the diligence toward accomplishing a certain work unless for honey at the honeycomb. However, what things are aimed for about anything is a judgment of reason.

Note that she says, "having judgment of reason in itself, it decides what is to be pursued and avoided." Although, certainly irrational in a certain matter, they know things fit to be avoided or desired, still, not in themselves, since they are not with a cause of judgment. Moreover, man does not know only the limited and things ordained in the end, but he knows this universally, or by way of comparison or by syllogistic ways, and man decides his judgment and discerns whereby comprehension is virtue
itself directed from above.

"Yet this..." here Philosophy shows free will is diversified in different things, certainly, by the difference in angels and in men, this freedom of the will is clear enough. I determine that it is not equal, that is, comparable, in all things, where more is in divine substances than in men. "For in celestial and divine substances a penetrating judgment," that is, an infallible judgment is contained, and in these an uncorrupted will, that is, a will inflexible toward evil, is contained. And present in these, that is, furnished, is an efficient control of things desired. Wherefore, it is not a hindrance of execution in them. "Truly, it is necessary that human souls be more free since they preserve themselves in speculation of the divine mind. Truly, they are less free when more they move away to bodies," that is, care of corporal things, and toward this they are less free when compressed in mortal limbs, that is, in a state of mind in which they are less able to resist rising passions. "Extreme," that is, greatest, "servitude" of their souls is, as if given to vice, they strike against the possession of reason, which is proper to ruling, that is, ought to be directed in action. "For when," that is, after, such souls "have cast down their eyes" of discerning reason "from the light of the highest truth to inferior and dark things," that is, to earthly and carnal things, "soon afterwards they are surrounded by darkness," that is, obscured "by the cloud of unknowing," that is, ignorance, "and they are troubled by destructive affections," that is, passions, "acceding to and consenting to which they assist," that is, they increase "the servitude which they have brought about," that is, introduced for themselves. The souls of misfortune "are in a certain way, captives by their own
freedom."

Note that free will is freedom of judging and a matter of etequendi. Or, following Boethius, beyond the first periarmenias, free will is the judgment of the soul on desire, not an outer or vehement urging, or vehement clinging. Nullo cogente ad faciendum quod displicet: nullo impediente ne fiat quod placet. Note that free will consists in two parts, both in freedom of judging and in freedom judged from comparing. First, because freedom of judging hinders ignorance, yet inability of accomplishing and corruption of the will hinder freedom of comparing. Although, indeed, we are able to accomplish good, nevertheless, with the will corrupted by vice, we do not accomplish. Moreover, neither ignorance of judging, inability of achieving, nor corruption of the will exists among separate substances. Therefore, in these is the greatest freedom of the will. Intelligent beings are deceived in nothing. Therefore, they have sharp sighted judgment and never wish but good. Therefore, an incorrupt will is contained in these and they are able to achieve whatever they desire. Therefore, in these there is an efficient conducting of desires.

Note that certain ones are said to have been from Plato concerning the intention; human souls likewise, are things made in heaven, and afterwards descend into bodies and are held in these, as it were, in chains. Following those degrees of liberty of human souls which he proves in the literature. Though, what souls when they are things made in heaven, they are most free in contemplation of the divine mind. However, as now they are jointly in bodies, in this they are less free. But less freedom is in these since they are subjected to vices. Yet, this explanation does not
hold the following truth. Therefore, another is explained which is that these souls are necessarily freer, those who serve in contemplation of the divine, so that conversation is of the virtuous contemplative souls who are in heaven. These, moreover, are less free, those who fall into confusion with regard to bodies, that is, those who descend to the care of temporal things, as those who are active, who carry on business by distributing in earthly goods for common service. In this their souls are less free who are brought together in earthly limbs, that is, who descend to caring for one's own body and one's own profit. Moreover, those are less free who, as subject to vices, and dismiss reason. They are vicious indeed, not still a servant of the one lord, but so many of the lord of the vicious, according to Augustine.

"Yet that [regard of providence] which..." here Philosophy shows since the acts of free will fall under divine providence. Accordingly, she explains this, that divine knowledge extends to all things, saying, "which looks forth to different things of freedom and to all deeds truly understands them as predestined. It is understood by providence now looking forth," and he disposes all that is predestined by returning good for good, bad for bad, by their merits. Thus, he confirms through the Greek author which he speaks in Latin. "God sees all, he hears all," or following others he says, "God shows all to Apollo who is the sun." Note that although divine providence sees all by eternal vision, still not because of this free will it is necessary to doing good or evil. Because, following Aristotle in Book Three of *Ethics*: "Man is lord of his works from the beginning continuously to the end." And therefore, following the merits of the works of free will, he receives penalty or punishment.
"I see that, I said..." I see that, that is, I consider, as if the soul says I turn to this and I affix to it. But in this adhering, on the freedom of the will, this was always a great debate - not only between theologians, but also between ancient authors. Aulus Gellius speaks of it in Book VI, c.ii. He says that Chrysippus, the first Stoic of philosophy defined it thus: "Fate is a certain perpetual thing and a series of unchangeable things and a voluntary chain that goes through to itself and encircles through eternal orders of natural succession, and we must choose what is necessary from this." Moreover, the authors of other opinions and teachings accordingly oppose this definition. If they say Chryssipus proposed all to be moved by fate and are notable to be avoided and passed over by a king agmina fati et voumina in anything, mistakes and faults are not encountered or proclaimed for their own desires of these things by free will choices themselves, but by a certain necessity and force which originates from fate. At any time the mistress of all matters and through whom it is necessarily done, in whatever way it is future. Therefore the penalties from laws for wicked things are unequally constituted since men come to evil deeds unwillingly but by fate.

Against this Chrysippus diminished much and subtly examines what is written upon this. His opinion is as such: "Everything is such that all things are assembled and connected by a certain first necessary reason. Yet, natural capabilities themselves of minds, or vessels, are such that they are punishment by means of fate, so the
quality itself and the condition itself of these. For, if by nature they are originally, wholesomely, and rightly fashioned, all this power concerning fate which attacks from the outside may transfer to the offensive and the inoffensive. However, if they are hopeless, ignorant, and unskilled, not strengthened with aids of good rhetoric, or they are urged by no impression of destined trouble, yet they rush forward into continual crimes and errors from fickleness and voluntary impulse. This is such that is done with reason, the natural and necessary consequences of these matters, then it is called fate. Indeed, it is in the origin itself, as if it were a matter destined by fate and consequence with the result that they contain evil natures from sinning and errors. About this matter then, one controls, for example, not as Hercules by excessively unfriendly and not impolite ways. As he says lapidem cylindrum si per spacia terre prona atque diruta iacias causam quidem ei et initium precipitantie feceris, mox tamen ille preceps voluntur, non quare tu id iam facis, sed quomodo ita sesse modus eius et forme volubilitas habet. So, order, reason and necessity of fate are the origins and the first of the causes brings to mind a hinderence, but of our intentions, our intellects and our actions themselves. Free will of each is proper and the natures of our souls are controlled. Then she applies these words to this which I have said are in agreement. Therefore, from Pythagorus this is said: "You know man to choose the worst in spontaneous misfortunes, as if the damages were caused from separate events by themselves and by his passion they transgress and they hasten to misfortunes by this choice and intention." On that account he denies that it is necessary that men are led or understood, wretched or cowardly, wicked or bold, when they are convicted or
take refuge in crime or wickedness; they say that it is to be attributed to the necessity of fate, as if this were a sanctuary of something rational, and they say that because they are made worse not by chance, but by fate.

However, a great, most wise, very ancient man of the poets said about speaking in verse, "Hei mihi quid damnant mortales numina celi. Esse aiunt et enim per nos mala, cum tamen ipsis vecordi preter faum sint mente dolores." Itaque Marcis Cicero in libro quem De Fato, scripsit quum questionem istam diceret obscurissimam esse et implicatissimam, Chrisippum quoque philosophum non expedisse se in ea refert his verbis. Chrisippus estuans laboransque quonam pact explicet et fato omnia fieri, et esse alquid in nobis intricatur hoc modo et cetera hoc. Aulus Gelius ubi super, sed ad auctorem revertor. Est ne inquit. Meltus responsive legas sic. Est inquit, neque et cetera, quo quicque discernat, quicque legendum est non quodque. Non enim additur substantivum, sed quodque adiectivam est sicut quod aliquod et similia, et ita substantivum desiderant, quidque autem quid, aliquid, et similia sine substantivo ponuntur aut substantivum in genitivo regunt. Supplent enim vicem substantivorum. Artubus a nominativo artus per u scribitur. Quare artibus a nominativo artes declinatur, cetera patent.

The Second Meter Section of Book Five

Saint Thomas

"Phoebus with pure shining light..." this is the second verse section of this fifth
book which is named after the inventor Archilochus. It is dactylic by a surpassing measure. In this Philosophy commends the excellence of divine understanding in comparison to asserting the material alone. "Homer of the honeyed speech," that is, of sweet eloquence "sings," that is describes "Phoebus," that is, the lone "shining pure light." Perhaps Homer made the book on the beauty of the sun, he who "did not have the strength to burst forth," that is, penetrate "the innermost parts," that is depths, "of the land and sea," that is the "weakness" of the sea, that is, by the feeble light "of his rays." So, not at all, that is, thus he does not possess in himself the maker of the great Earth, God, who himself by his own intellect penetrates all things, since nothing is able to be unknown to him the maker by watching, that is, caring for everything on the earth from on high, that is from heaven in his view they continue, nothing in the foundation, that is in the magnitude is such that it hinders the light of his rays, not even "dark night hinders by its gloomy clouds." On the contrary, in one "thrust of the mind," that is, in one mental view he knows what things are concerning present as much as what they are concerning the past, what things will come concerning the future. "He alone looks upon all things you could say, truly him alone."

Note although God by knowing all foresees all and even these which are from free will, voliunt tum quasdam creaturas esse liberi arbitri, quare hoc magis decet divinam bonitatem. Sicut enim melius et nobilius est regnum in quo non tamen servit regi a servis sed etiam a liberis que ubi tamen servitur a servis, sic melius erit regnum dei et decentius ex hoc que sunt alique creature libere servientes sicut homo et angelus,
"Shining with pure light..." The poem now often described wishes, however, to show God to be mentioned specially as the sun. Since indeed the sun is interpreted alone as all illuminating, and there are a great many things which the sun does not naturally penetrate, although it is said in the fourth book of the Aeneid: "Sun, you alone who observe the works of the earth by flames..." following is God alone for whom nothing is hidden and who alone illuminates all. Indeed, he alone is to be called the true sun. But Plinius and Macrobius thought the sun alone to be God, and all duties to be are united by him, but he does nothing concerning the present affair for which it is enough to be shown that God alone sees everything not as the natural sun sees things.

The Third Prose Section of Book Five

Saint Thomas

"Then I said [See...]" here begins the third prose section of this fifth book in which Boethius objects against the before mentioned things, saying that providence and free will can continue together. First she instructs what sayings are held uncertain. Second, she puts reason to the doubt, where she says, "I said '...too much...'". First
he speaks. Then, before it is determined, Philosophy speaks. "O Philosophy," he said, "I, Boethius, am quite confused with a more difficult doubt." Philosophy asks "What is this ambiguity? For indeed, I guess," that is, I judge that you are confounded by these things, that is, you are "disturbed." Note that to conjecture is to think something from certain signs. Thus, Philosophy guesses the doubt of Boethius in this passage by accidents together, because they were speaking on everything that concerns providence and free will, reflecting upon the joint possibility of these. "I said '...too great..." here Boethius expresses his doubt, showing providence and free will to be incompatible. First he does this. Second, he separates certain ways by which some things they were attempting to defend, where he says "Why then". To this examination, the impossibility of predictions, he proposes three reasons. The second point is there. For these the third is there last. First he considers the first cause. Second he puts a certain solution there. For neither [do I agree with that]" or a certain act. First he said "It seems too opposing and incompatible" that God "foreknows all things and that any sort of free will exists," moreover he shows what is incompatible. "For, if God foresees" all "things and is not able to be mistaken in any way, it necessarily follows that what he discerns beforehand to is the future." But, if that does not follow, providence is mistaken or is in no way eternal. That is, "if he knows not only the acts of men, but even their plans and desires, there will be no freedom of the will," but if all things follow from necessity. Moreover, what can be said if God knows all things through his providence. For neither will any deed or any desire be able to exist unless "divine providence will have perceived beforehand," that is, will
have foreknown, that is, not being able "to be mistaken," just as they are not able to follow what things are foreseen. "For if they wish to be turned in another manner," so that they follow another, "the firm foreknowledge of God will no longer exist. But rather an uncertain opinion will exist which I judge as something contrary to divine law to believe that about God."

Note that from the writing reason is shaped. Those things foreseen follow infallibly from necessity, but all things are infallibly foreseen by God. Therefore, all things follow from necessity, and so, free will vanishes. Note that the knowledge of God is not opinion, whereas the opinion of men is just this, and they are able to have an opinion such, from the first of the latter things mentioned. Of these things, they are not able to possess knowledge in itself. Therefore, knowledge itself is not stated opinion. "For neither do I approve that argument..." here Philosophy excludes the certain response since the previous argument was able to be given. From the first she proposes a certain answer. Second she removes it, where she first says, "For neither do I approve...", that is, regard as good, that argument. It is this which they believe to be able to solve a certain knotty point, that is, difficulty of the question. "Indeed, they say a thing will not happen since providence has foreseen" that to be the future, that is, it will happen, "but rather on the contrary," that is, the opposite, "since what will be", that is, is not able to be hidden from divine providence. As if one may say an occurrence of an event is from the cause of foreknowledge and not the opposite. Therefore, the necessity of foreknowledge is bound to be concluded, not the opposite as when following those, and in this way it is necessary. He concludes from this "to
return to the opposite side," although is known, is concluded, from the occurrence, and this is concluded from foreknowledge. Indeed, it is not necessary that the events following these "which are foreseen come to pass," but it is necessary that these things which are foreseen will be.

Note that prior reason asserts that all future things which will occur are from necessity, since God surely foresees future matters. However, the response of certain ones says the contrary. Indeed, it is said that it is not so that God foresees future events occurring by necessity, but "since they will exist" in the future, God foresees them. "As if indeed such foreknowledge is the cause of a certain matter..." here he removes the reply. He says this response proceeds as if it were "labored" by an acquiring, "the cause of which is foreknowledge," whether the cause is from "the necessity of future things" or whether "the cause of providence" is from "the necessity of future things." But we strive, that is, we labor to show this our (work), although "the occurrence of things foreknown is necessary, in whatever way," that is, by whatever way "the order of causes possesses in itself." And if as though any "foreknown thing does not seem to introduce the necessity of an occurrence in future things," he shows such a thing with an example, he says, "If someone sit, it is necessary that the opinion be true, that one concludes from the signs that he sits, and conversely, if the opinion about someone be true, that he sits, it is necessary that he sits. Therefore, in either point of view" certainly in the opinion and the "sitting" it is "necessary". In this there is necessity of sitting , in this man sitting, in the other there is necessity of truth of the opinion. But whoever he be above, he does not sit "for that
reason," accidentally, "but because the opinion is true," since "the truth of the opinion" is not the cause of the sitting, "but rather the opinion certainly is true," seeing that something preceding," that is, someone sits. "So, although the cause of the truth proceeds from another part, still in both is a common necessity."

In the same way he happens to argue on providence and on these things which it foresees. From which he says it "holds," that is, it is plain "to reason" concerning providence and "concerning future things. For, even if for that reason it is foreseen before anything, that will be. Still, they do not occur because they are foreseen. Nevertheless, they are still necessary for God, either willing to be foreseen or foreseen to occur." So, for each part necessity is combined in any of these accidentally, "because that alone is enough," that is, it is sufficient "for destroying freedom of the will." Note that this reply which he signified in the literature seems to have been from Origen himself, who over a letter to Rome says thus: "Therefore, something will not be because God knows that future matter, but because it is a future matter it is therefore known by God to have been made before." Yet it is able to be understood on two accounts. In one way that occurrence of a matter is from a cause of foreknowledge, a reason of consequence.

Thus, Boethius' refutation is true in another way as it can be understood that an occurrence of a matter is a cast of foreknowledge following a thing existing. So, it is false and in this way it is rejected by Boethius. First, therefore, Boethius shows why this refutation is not toward the argument. Second, he shows why it does not include the truth, where he says, "But now how preposterous it is..." here Philosophy
shows that this argument includes falsehood, since she proposes that something
temporal is from eternity. Indeed, they discuss what future matters are from cause of
eternal foreknowledge. First he says, "But now how preposterous," that is, it is
pervasive, and "the occurrence of temporal matters may be said to be from a cause" of
eternal foreknowledge, which is mentioned in this argument. First he adds, "What is
else is to be declared that God therefore foresees the future things because they are
going to occur, than to think that these things, once they have occurred," that is,
themselves will be "the cause of highest providence." As if he were saying nothing
is something. Note that nothing temporal is the cause of an eternal matter, but rather
the contrary. Indeed, a cause is not more worthy in itself because that more worthy
cause has been performed in time. Moreover, it is undeserving with respect to eternity,
just as the corruptible compared to the incorruptible, and the like. "Therefore, just
as when I know that about this..." here she explains the second argument for proving
the following conclusion. She says about this that the reason is beyond our
understanding of foreknowledge, just as "when I know that something is future,
therefore, it is brought to pass," that is, it happens, "so the occurrence of a foreknown
matter is unable to be avoided."

Note that reason is able to be shaped thus. Just as he has knowledge with
regard to knowable matters of the present, so he has foreknowledge with respect to an
occurrence of a future matter. But when I know something to be at present, it is
necessary that this itself exist. Therefore, when something is foreknown, it will be.
It is necessary that this itself exist, but God foreknows the entire future. Therefore
they necessarily occur, and thus, once more, freedom of the will is removed. "Lastly, if anyone [think] a thing...". Here he proposes the third reason for the same, saying, "If anyone considers something to be otherwise," that is, other "than what this matter contains by itself, that by no means" that is, yet not even this "is knowledge, but it is a false opinion, very much different from the truth of knowledge. Wherefore if something is future, in such a way that the occurrence of this is not certain and necessary," then that "will be able to be foreknown of events", it is as if he says it in now way exists as such. Of what things he ascribes to reason, saying, "Just as knowledge itself is unmixed with falsehood," so that "which is received by it is not able to be otherwise than what is received". Therefore, if it is possible that another contain this, then knowledge can be false, whereupon he adds, this is the cause whereby knowledge is "without falsehood," because it is necessary that every single "thing as it contains this, be contained" just as "knowledge understands it to be."

Note that the reason which he intends is this: whoever estimates a thing to be other than what it is, his estimation is false and is not knowledge "but a false opinion." Therefore, if God foreknows something to be future, and if that event does not necessarily occur as he foreknew, foreknowledge of God will not be knowledge but a false opinion. Therefore, future events foreseen by God do occur necessarily, and thus, free will comes to nothing. "Then how [is this?]..." here Philosophy rejects the ways in which some labor to save providence. First she asks in what way divine providence is able to be saved by rejecting two methods by which some presumed to save it. Second, she proposes a third similar to this. Following this is where she says,
"But if in [him]...". First he says "Then how is this?", as we mentioned above. "In what way" it can be mentioned by which"God foreknows in this uncertain future." The prime mover is God, called this because he perceives beforehand to judge infallibly whether it may not occur, but this is unsuitable, because then divine providence is mistaken. Whereupon he says "For if...". God assesses, that is, judges, that this occur infallibly, "and also because it is possible that they not occur, it is falsely said "that God in no way," that is, it is not only "impossible to perceive" of God in this way, "but also it is impossible to bring forth from speech." The second method is that God is said to provide a future of unlimited matters as they will be. But in this way the providence of God is not fixed. First he says, "but yet, that is, but if God "discerns that those future things will be" just as they are foreseen, they are indeterminantly known, so although he "knows these to be equal," that is, they can equally "happen or not happen, what is this foreknowledge which understands nothing as stably fixed." It is as if he were suggesting that providence is nothing. And how does this foreknowledge differ from "that ridiculous prophesy of Tiresias" who said "whatever I will say, this will or will not be", and by what means, that is, in what way "will divine providence be superior to," that is, have greater worth than human opinion, if it judges "this unstable" in this way as men do an event, "the outcome of which is uncertain," as if he were saying it does not differ at all.

Note that when Tiresias had seen two serpents come together at the same time like projecting sticks these separated themselves from each other, and changed into a woman. After a period of seven years the serpents again joined together like a stick
and changed into a man. However, when a disagreement had arisen between Jove and Juno as to whether it had been more pleasure in the combination as a man or a woman, Tiresias was elected as the judge, who was considered an expert on the strengths of both sexes. However, when he said the better pleasure was as a woman, Juno became enraged and blinded him. However, Jupiter in recompense of his pitied state of his blindness gave him the gift of prophecy. Moreover, this was mentioned in the Timatius. "Whatever I say will or will not be." Therefore, if God did not know the future to be otherwise unlimited, unless whereby they were or were not examined by his foreknowledge, it would be as if Tiresias had foreknowledge, which is ridiculous.

"But if in him..." here he proposes the third way, presuming to save providence. It is so that we propose all things to occur from necessity and we remove free will. First, therefore he proposes this method. Second, he shows what inconsistencies follow toward this, where he begins, "This once...". First, therefore, he concludes this method, saying "But if in him, that most certain source of all matters can be uncertain of nothing, certain is the occurrence of these things which he himself knew before it will have been. Therefore, no freedom from human resolution or action which the divine mind, discerning the whole without error of falsehood, binds and draws together all such in relation to the first event."

Note that nothing happens by a changer around the source of all things since his knowledge can be uncertain. If he is uncertain, he is imperfect, not divine. Therefore, if this is certain with respect of the future, it is necessary that the entire future foreknown by God necessarily occur. "This once accepted..." here he proposes
inconsistencies which follow if free will were removed. First he shows what inconsistencies follow, in part from man. Second, he shows which ones are in part from God. Third, he shows which are in part the union of man and God. Following this he states where he says that in such a thing there is nothing inconsistent. The third he states where he says that the inconsistencies are therefore on the part of man. If free will does not exist, "punishment and rewards are placed before men," and the wicked are punished and the good rewarded "for nothing," unless they are crimes or virtues for men. But they are done from necessity of nature and not of free will. Whereupon he says "This once accepted..." that is, assumed, certainly so that free will is denied. He says "this is clear...", that is it is made clear how great the ruin, that is, how great the destruction of human matters that follow. "For it is to no purpose that the rewards are proposed for good men and punishments for wicked men." Thus, statutes and laws for man are futile, because "penalties and rewards" are unjust because "nothing merited the motive as free or voluntary will." And that "will seem most unjust" if all "which now is judged most just," certainly that "the wicked be punished and the good be rewarded, those who turned," that is toward uprightness or wickedness "did not sense by their will, but knew certain the necessity of the future. Therefore, virtues and vices would be anything. But rather, it will be mixed and indistinguishable confusion of all merits," certainly good and bad.

Note that all virtues and vices arise from free choice of good and evil. Similarly, punishment and reward exist because of the free action of good and evil. If then freedom of the will is exalted, a free act will not exist, not unless free action
from good or evil exists. In consequence, there will be no virtue, no vice, and the wicked punished with injustice, when the bad thing was done from necessity, and the good rewarded with injustice when a good thing was done from necessity, but it is absurd to say this. "In which nothing more impious..." here he shows the inconsistency which follows on the part of God, certainly, that God will be the author of evil matters, whereby he says "since the whole order of things is led from divine providence" and if "it holds that nothing is done by human intention," it happens, that is, it follows "that our vices are returned to the author of all things," God. "In such a thing as this nothing more impious from this can be conceived," to say that God is the author of evil matters. Nevertheless, it is necessary with freedom removed. Note that failure is the work which defect is not in power of a thing so that it is said to be necessary for an act or for a production. Therefore, if an act of our will is not free, the failure of that act following the will is produced in God. Thus, God will be causing our failure. But this is absurd.

"Therefore [there is no reason] of hoping anything..." here he proposes the inconsistencies which follow from the connection of man to God, since the act of praying and the act of hoping was taken away, by which the best are joined with God, whereupon he says that free will is therefore removed, unless there is any reason for hoping something or praying something between God and man. "Indeed, what should any man pray or hope" if "an unchanged series connects all desired things." It is as if he is saying it is done in vain. "Therefore," in both directions "that sole fellowship known between God and man of hoping and praying is taken away." Moreover, he
calls that hope and prayer fellowship whereby we purchase the entire benefits with these. Whereupon he adds, if a certain price of just humility, we humans are deserving of the inestimable return, that is retribution of divine grace, which is the only way of praying in which men seem to be able to converse with God and be joined in the inaccessible light known as God. Before men get what they seek, even before we offer prayers, we obtain the purpose of our request. What are hopes and prayer if we do not believe to have received strength, that is, pardon from the necessity of future matters. How will it be that we can be joined by this, that is, connected by this and kept close to that highest principle of things. It is as if he says nothing. Since the human race will be divided, that is scattered and separated from its source, that is, will fall apart from its origin above from God, that is, it would cease to perform, as was said a little while ago in the sixth verse section of the fourth book.

Note that the act of praying pertains to the intellect. The speech of the following is from John Damascus: Knowledge of the approach to God or in God by which the act of truth we make our way to God, which is our need. It is not because in our entrance something is made clear from God which before was unknown, but that we contemplate ourselves by exercising the entrance itself, that in these things, hope and prayer, we are hastening back to divine assistance. The act, moreover, of hoping pertains to the will since its object is future good. In this act we cling to God as if shining by assistance from the perfect principle of his goodness to the following good of which we have need. But if it comes to a necessary good in any such way or is impossible that it occur, either act of praying or hoping is in vain.
"Then I said 'See'...". See and lo, then are said because something unexpected and outside the usual is said to have occurred, just as where it is said "Lo, a virgin shall conceive and shall bring forth a son." Divine providence cannot lie hidden. "Lateo," or I am hidden, means at the same time to cause oneself to go actively, that is, I flee. Whereupon in the first book of the Aeneid "And the tricks of Juno not escape the notice of her brother." Even with the dative it is understood that you are unknown to me, that is, you are concealed, and you will be hidden from me. "As if truly..." she says this because it follows, and not that we might strive to indicate by what is placed in the gloss, but indeed, let us endeavor that it ought thus to be arranged. Indeed, it is as if it were formed, that is, as if it were a work made in comparing which is the cause of whatever it is, that is, of anything whatever, that is, "ne" before "an". Or perhaps that is to say foreknowledge is above God a necessity exists of future things, that is, a necessary cause so that future things happen. Or perhaps the necessity of future things is a cause of providence, that is, because God holds among these a certain providence both before and as if beyond. We should not labor, that is, we should not try and apply ourselves to show the occurrence of things foreknown by God to be beyond necessary things, beyond everything, that is, in whatever way the arrangement of chance events controls itself, that is, if this is the cause of foreknowledge or if foreknowledge is the cause of this. Here consider two things. First, what this clause is truly about, then it is accustomed to be placed since
we speak through irony and we express it to be so that it is believed by certain ones, and it is not said as such. Moreover it is said as "autem nec" or "neque autem", at least as frequently and properly I will defend, as in "quasi vero" or "neque vero". Accordingly, consider how often "relative" or "endless" follow directly foreknowledge, and these are repeated with equal number. We are able to change the latter part in any way as "incunque" or "qualisqualis" or "qualiscunque utut" or "utcumque ubiubi" or "ubicunque" or "quotquot" as "quotcunque". Yet since "lycunque does not connect as quis and quid, but qui and quod do connect. One does not separate quisquis as in quiscumque, or in quicunque and quicquid, not in quidcumque, or in quodcunque. Truly now how reverse and the rest in what way, that is, what things so reversed, that is, perverse in arrangement, when illud has been placed before, because it should be postponed or, on the contrary, we say perverse.

You the reader ought to well remember all the words, the sequence of this prose, and, likewise, the sequence of the poetry attributed to Boethius. Therefore, you should not speak as in the former commentary, as "here Philosophy shows and here Boethius shows, "Ad hec dixi" it is better to be read "ad hoc", that is "preterea", because frequently it is discerned, seek it in the table where it is said. "Why then..." are the words of Boethius, not Philosophy. Or this thing is of importance, that is, differs, it makes a difference, from above, from the prophecy of Tiresias. "Preterea" which you now understand concerning Tiresias that he may have been a Theban prophet, and many likewise have predicted to Ulysses in the underworld after death in the second work of Homer. Once also, Horace in Book II of the Sermons. Hoc quo
Tiresia preter narrata petenti responde. Et quare cecus effectus erat dicit Juvenalis nec surdum nec Tiresiam quem que esse deorum. Quod autem in feminam mutatus sit licet fabulosus putatur. Pliny, however in the seventh chapter of *Natural History* shows this able to have been done, teaching truth from this six, none was unchanged. De vaticino autem in Textu hoc posito dicere que iussus oraculum certum enunciare dixerit. You have this for a certain oracle: "What I will have said or I am about to say, either will or will not be". It is as if the truth of his saying is dependent upon the future, when now it is necessary. Whereupon, I would earn ridicule by speaking if something should not happen. "Will [divine providence] be better than the opinion of man.." see if it is not more fit reading for human imagination. For Terence, in "The Eunuch" said thus, "Man is distinguished as a thing separate from human kind, and I do not doubt if he said this place something, likewise, since it had been put to divine providence. Opinions of men was not distinguished from human belief. Moreover, this word is construed in many ways at any time. It is significant since it shows excellence and eminence. Even so, it still directs, as in the work of Vergil, "I will go against the spirits or, he should prove himself a great Achillles". This indicates something by an additional dative as it is a preference to something, so that in the example mentioned man is distinguished as something apart from mankind. Aliquando is used fully and as if impersonally, as Pachomius is distinguished as a Sicilian lingering around columns, that is, he was most religious. "Series indeflexa", that is, that which was "nunquem flexa", or rather "inflexibilis". For often a past participle is considered present in place of an awkward verbal construction, because they sound intelligent,
as in Vergil's work it is stated: "Aut illaudati nescit husiridis aras. Illaudati id est illaudabilis, secundum Servium. This is in the seventh book of the Aeneid: "Dives inaccessos ubi solis filia lucos." He says inaccessible woods, not those no one has access to, but inaccessible, that is, those which no one ought to enter upon. A thing gapes open sufficiently, that is, gapes abundantly, just as from the first book of the Aeneid: "Omnes accipiunt inimicum imbrem, rimisque fatiscent." Divided comes from "apart" and "encircle", and also, "fence" takes its root from "sepio", that is, there is a connection. Make use of the little sayings. From this look for these words to be spoken and the persona of Boethius.

The Third Meter Section of Book Five

Saint Thomas

"What unlike [cause breaks] the agreement of things?" here begins the third meter section of the fifth book, which is said in Adonic verse, or accordingly, it follows a certain style from the inventor Archilocus. It is predominantly dactylic in measure. First, Boethius makes an exclamation over the incomparability which appears between providence and free will. At first, why they seem incompatible when by themselves they are considered possible. Following this she produces an answer to this. Third, she objects against the answer. Forth, she solves the objection. The second is found where it begins, "On the contrary." The third is found where it begins "But why in such a way." The fourth is found where it begins "Or whereas the
mind." First she says "What unlike cause breaks," that is, separates the agreement, that is, harmony of things of divine providence, and free will, that they are not compatible together. Or what God establishes conflicts between two truths and a single truth, which separately, that is singly, or divided, they make an acceptable agreement, that is, they last. They are the same; yet mixed, that is, joined, "they refuse to be yoked," that is, to be mutually united in compatibility. Then she explains the answer, saying what in these two truths are evident of providence and free will, "that no such discord exists," but the illusion of discord is produced from our weakened intellect, whereupon she says the answer noted here "Or is there no such discord among truths..." if they always know themselves fixed "but is it the mind, obstructed," that is, oppressed by blindness of its unseeing parts, that is, a soul in darkness, that cannot know, the splendid light because of oppressed light. It cannot recognize the fine, that is, the subtle, interlacing, that is, the connections of things which appear to clash.

Note, if we consider divine providence by itself, it is possible to exist as such, if we consider free will by itself, it too is able to exist as such, as it is plain from the sayings. But if we consider from both sides at the same time, then they appear incompatible, just as it is plain to superior reasoning. Moreover, according to this the truth is that by themselves, they are compatible, they are possible, but to us this is not apparent. Therefore, our intellect, oppressed by the mass of the body, is not able by itself to elevate in such a way to cognizance, for the following wisdom, which is corrupted by the body oppresses the soul, and earthly habitation greatly oppresses the
"But why does it flame with so great a love?" Here Philosophy objects toward the solution. If indeed, the soul ignores these subtle connections, for what reason does it desire to know these things when nothing unknown is able to be lost? First she says, "But why does the soul flame with such a great love," that is, with desire that it should find something from a different time, that is, hidden true sighs, that is, of truth. "Does the mind know that which it anxiously," that is, passionately "strives to know?" It is as if she were saying no, but no one strives to know that which is known, and this is what she says, "Who works to know known things?" It is as if she were saying no one does this. Therefore, it is reasonable to say because something is unknown, then something dissimilar follows, because the soul desires that which is unknown. Whereupon she says, "If it does not know that which it seeks...", that is, in blindness the mind desires, that is, it is ignorant. Indeed, he who wishes is unaware, that is, desires everything, or who can seek the unknown, or he who is unaware can understand by what he ascertains, beyond that which he seeks, and he who overlooks, that is, who is unaware, that is, who can come to know, will discover the before known form. It is as if she were saying no one.

Note that it is said in response that the soul is unable to understand the compatibility of providence and free will, but it desires to know this. Against this, she argues thus: "No one strives to know what is known. If the soul desires to know something, it either knows or does not know something. Therefore if it knows, the soul itself does not desire to know what it knows, since no one seeks to know what he
knows when everything has been sought without reason. If, however, he is unaware of what he desires, in what way is the unknown desired, when free will does not seek the unknown? Therefore, if he is always unaware, he learns. "Who indeed ascertains the unknown?" Indeed, if the ordinary citizen were to ask servum fugitivum quem ignoraret, posset sibi multotiens occurrere que ipsum non inveniret, sicut dicit Linconiensis super primo poestrium. "Or when it perceived the greatest mind," here she solves the objection, where it is noted that Plato proposed the soul to be the things made in heaven and to possess whole perfect cognizance, but by slipping into bodies, it forgot knowledge of things, in particular things, and retained this in universals. Thereafter by exercise it recovers the knowledge of things in particular. Wherupon she says thus: "Or", as is noted of the solution, "when it perceives the soul", that is reflects on the great "mind," that is, the profound mind of God, and at the same time learns of, that is, has become acquainted with the greatest, that is, universal knowledge and separate, that is, particular knowledge of things. But now those things are preserved, that is, they are concealed in the division of parts not offered to the soul on the whole, that is, wholly. But the soul itself has the greatest, that is universal knowledge of things, forgetting the singular, that is, particular knowledge. Therefore, everyone who seeks, that is, looks toward learning the truth, such is beyond neither quality, so that he knows perfectly, or is wholly unaware of such things. Whence she says, "For indeed, it does not come to know", but seeks to join in the particular and complete, and "the inner part does not know all, but remembers itself," that is, it holds in memory the greatest, that is, universal knowledge, which he goes over, holding,
"examining" again in practical reflection, that is, recalling through study, with skill, that is, accurately, "those things perceived," that is, previously into particular knowledge, "so that he might add the forgotten parts to those parts which were furnished for serving in the memory."

Note that according to this, "the way of Plato is that reason sets free what was known before." Or, the soul knows what it desires or does not know. I say that it does not know the particular or special forms but it knows the universal forms. Although it is said that no one desires the unknown, it is doubtless here that what is thought to be unknown is a universal. Still, it desired this so it is unknown in particular things. When it is said if one is unaware, he learns, it is doubtless here that he is unaware whether in the general sense or the particular. If he is unaware of a power and deed, if however he knows power and in universals, and does not know from the act the special forms, the soul itself is able to ascertain and learn further.

Bade

"What discordant..." in this poem we had the first law. Boethius says toward these, looking at the apparent contradiction between the two truths, when he might have wanted to declare in what way the truth might agree with another truth. Moreover, the truth is that God infallibly foreknows all things. Also, the truth is our free will, and it exists because divine providence, as was touched on previously, seems to contradict, it is on the contrary. Moreover, nothing of obscurity is here, unless in the poem. For in the end, he reflects from skill, or is able to do this by a higher law,
however, he does not consider it. Moreover, I found the poem sequence to have two feet beyond a just measure. Thus, it was written so that he might be able to add the unclear parts to those kept unharmed, but I believe that spondee in itself fit to be placed at the beginning, and I placed it in the manner mentioned.

The Fourth Prose Section of Book Five

Saint Thomas

Then she said: "That is the old complaint..." here is the fourth prose section of this fifth book, in which Philosophy begins to destroy the question of compassionate providence and free will. From the first she touches on the difficulty of this question and the reason of the difficulty, and she touches on the way of proceeding around the solution of this. Following this she destroys the question, where she says "For I ask". At first she says "this complaint", that is, this question of providence is "the old complaint", and it is powerfully pursued, that is, exposed by Marcus Tullius, when he classified that it divided divination, in his book "On Divination", when he classifies kinds of divination in the species not only here, but a matter sought out for a very long time by you yourself. "But so far by no means," that is, not in any way, "has it been developed sufficiently, diligently, or powerfully by any of you. The obscurity of which," that is, "the reason of the difficulty is that the emotion," that is, impulse "of human reasoning is not able to be led," that is, to be connected "to the simplicity of divine foreknowledge," that is, providence. "If that could in any way be conceived,
nothing whatsoever would remain ambiguous. But here the reason and the cause of the difficulty are plain, and I will attempt to make clear and explain "just only when I will have considered," that is, declared truly "those things by which you are moved."

Note that the question of divine providence and free will is wholly a most difficult question, about which many of the ancients were uncertain, and none of the moderns at hand escaped the difficulty, which Cicero in the book *On Divination* investigating and not attempting to influence to refute this difficulty, denied the inner providence and foreknowledge of future events by God in the before mentioned book *On Divination*. "For I ask..." here Philosophy comes to a solution for the question and from the first she dissipates the motive of Boethius. Following this, she takes apart the uncertainty, or the question where it begins "Quomodo igitur." Circa primum scendum que duo fuerunt motiva Boetius principalia circa hanc questionem. First, therefore, it seems necessary, since God foresees the future, that these things happen by necessity. Following this motive, the occurrence of things in the future is uncertain as future connections are not able to be foreknown for certain by God. First, therefore, she explores the Prime Mover. In the second point she explores the following, where she says "but this you ask". First she shows that if God foresees future events, not this at hand, they occur by necessity. In the second point she removes uncertainty when she says "But how could it be". From the first she shows that from foreknowledge of God, necessity is not occasioned with free will. In the second she shows that foreknowledge of God is not a sign of the necessity of future things, where she says, "again, foreknowledge..." Near the first it is known that she
first rejected a certain answer in which certain things that looked bright hinder reason, showing them not to be free will on account of divine foreknowledge. Here she takes up this answer again, showing it in such a way to be good, wherefore she sufficiently entangles the attention of the rival. For the enemy proves the necessity of future things from nothing else, unless, therefore, they are things foreknown by God. Therefore, since from the answer it is held that what is foreknown holds no causality over future events, it seems sufficiently to be shown that such things which proceed from free will are not necessary.

Therefore, at first she considers this answer by taking up his answer, saying, "Indeed, I ask why you ask that reason of those solving is less effectual which proves free will" not ensnared by foreknowledge, wherefore it estimates that foreknowledge is not the cause of the necessity of future things. However, because one might be hindered by this answer, a conclusion of the necessity of future things is accessible from this, wherefore "you do not consider from one argument of the necessity of future things other than from the fact that those things which are foreknown cannot come to pass. If then foreknowledge," that is, foreknowledge of future things adds nothing, that is, hinders necessity of future things, since then the answer by this, as you truly did admit a little while ago what this is, that is, how might it be "the solution of a voluntary act toward a certain event of things?" So, by this answer the necessity of future events is excluded, and she makes this clear in an example, saying, "that you might perceive what follows, for the sake of argument" that is, for example, let us set for an example, that is, "let us consider as impossible that nothing is foreknown" of
future things. Therefore, from this position, with respect to this, that is, with respect to this conclusion, in which the necessity of future events is concluded from foreknowledge, "from this those things which occur from this, are they compelled by free will not by necessity?" Boethius says, "Not at all" and Philosophy says "Again, let us suppose" that providence exists, "but that it joins nothing of the necessity for future things. It will remain, I believe, that same freedom of the will, entire and absolute" by every necessary thing.

Note that before the solution had been made void by good or evil in this, it was good, wherefore, it could have been that foreknowledge is not the cause of the necessity of future things. Dicere enim ideo futura eveniunt, non quare deus ea previdet. But in this sense it was bad. Therefore, it could have been that future events are the cause of foreknowledge of God. Then she said that future events, therefore, such that God foresees these things. Therefore, from the answer of the ancients he perceives what foreknowledge is not the cause of the necessity of future things. "But you inquire, concerning foreknowledge..." here Philosophy shows that divine foreknowledge is not "a sign of the necessity" of future events. Following this she shows that the way of examination from a sign does not "effect the existence." For indeed, she says from the first, "You will say", that is, "you will be able to say although" any such foreknowledge is not necessary for future events, "still it is a sign that these things will necessarily come to pass." So, foreknowledge can be applied to "the necessity of future things," as if from the sign. "In this way," by considering foreknowledge to be a sign "of the necessity of future things, it would correspond that
the outcome," that is, the occurrences of future events are necessary, even if "foreknowledge" of it had not existed, because it is shown by the nature of that sign. She then says, "For truly every sign still shows what is", that is, it makes clear that thing whose sign it is, but it does not effect that sign. Wherefore, it must be demonstrated "that foreknowledge," that is, providence "may be seen as a sign of the necessity" of future things. "First, nothing comes to pass that is not from necessity," that is, everything occurs necessarily. "Otherwise, if this necessity" of future things "is nothing," then this foreknowledge "might not be a sign of that thing which does not exist." So, it is not a strong argument that the necessity of future things is from foreknowledge, as if from a sign.

Note that a sign is not the cause of that of which it is a sign, yet it is shown to be a sign so that a circle is not the cause of the selling of wine, but still it is a sign of selling. If, therefore, foreknowledge might be a sign of the necessity of future events, this presupposes the future to be necessary. So, toward the showing that foreknowledge is a sign of the necessity of future things, it is first necessary to show the future to be necessarily future, just as foreknowledge is a sign of the necessity of future things with other things, that foreknowledge is a sign of another thing which it is not is absurd. "But truly" here she shows the way of showing from a sign not to be effectual and she says, "It is evident", that is, it has been made clear that "firm reasoning", that is, strength by expression, that is, something with description, must not be drawn "from signs or from arguments sought from the outside," that is, from the acceptable ways, but strong reasoning "is drawn from conventional means," that
is, from particular, from necessary causes. Therefore, since foreknown reasoning will have proceeded from the sign, it is not effectual and demonstrative since it is from later things. A demonstration, or what is most powerful of an examination, is from the former, since it is from causes in themselves from the better known moderns, ancients, and for such it is a demonstration, it is an argument making known effective and showing from the first of the ancients.

"But how could it be..." here Philosophy warns against a certain doubt and solves it. It seems in the following that anything can be shown which still does not occur by necessity. If, however, they do not occur by necessity, they cannot occur. So, it follows that anything foreknown by God does not occur. Therefore, from the first Philosophy, from doubting concerning this, says that from this, as it is, these things which are foreknown are not necessary, but those things cannot occur, that is, how can it happen that these things which are foreseen to be future do not take place? Then she solves the uncertainty, saying that in this she does not deny that foreknown things do not occur; on the contrary, it is necessary to say that foreknown things occur, but, nevertheless, they do not occur from necessity. Whence, she says "Just as if" it is as if she were saying this uncertainty proceeds as if we were not to believe these things which providence foreknows must not follow. But this is not true, and if we would rather not think that it is necessary, because it is necessary that future events occur, yet they have nothing in their nature that must occur of necessity. It is clear in the example in what way something is really understood, but still it is not necessary. Then she says that because a known thing occurs, still it is not by necessity, although
you might consider it as such from this, that is, from such an example. For we observe many things with our eyes while they are happening that is, while they are in action, as these things seem, as charioteers do in managing and directing horses, and other things. We see in this way that what things are happening in any of these voluntary acts, but does any necessity compel another of these so that it happens as it appears to the eyes? Boethius says "Not at all" and ascribes reasoning, "for the exercise of skill would be to no purpose if all things moved by force", and skill would be useless in directing horses if they were necessarily directed. Therefore, those things which, when they are happening are deprived by necessity of existing, the same things are in the future without necessity before they happen. Whence, she concludes, "therefore, there are certain things about to happen" and the final result, that is, the occurrence of which is free from all necessity, and perhaps, some might say, for these things are happening now and were not going to happen before they happened.

Here she concludes, saying, "I do not think that any man would say that those things which are now happening were not going to happen." This truly would be irrational beyond measure. Therefore, it is necessarily concluded that this and even foreknown events have free ends. Wherefore, as knowledge of present things conveys nothing of necessity for those things which were happening before, just as they seek in an example foretold of the direction of horses, so foreknowledge of future events conveys nothing of the necessity for those which are about to come. Note that although the future events in comparison to divine providence are a necessary necessity by condition, still all things are not necessary for free necessity. Indeed, many things
occur freely as these things which occur by skill and voluntarily, as in the direction of horses. Certainly if the direction of horses necessarily occurs, it would be useless, the skill of directing horses. Note that as these things are happening by an act, so they were future events, but some things are happening by a free act. Therefore, they were free future events, and in the following not all are necessarily future events, although by necessity conditions in as much as they are compared to divine providence, still the nature considered in itself occurs necessarily by absolute necessity, just as they will seem afterward, where she distinguishes dual necessity, the conditional and absolute.

"But this, you say..." here Philosophy breaks down the motive of Boethius, the one which in uncertain future events as they are contingent might be certain to be foreknown. From the first she shows the uncertainty concerning this, and she comes to a reason of this uncertainty. Following this she assigns the cause of error, where she says from the first, "The cause of the error is..." and then "But you say, 'O Boethius'..." this itself is doubted, if anything can be foreknown, that is, foreknowledge of these things which do not have necessary ends, that is, occurrences. Certainly in no way is this possible, since truly, foreknowledge and dependence on chance "are seen to be discordant." Certainly "you believe if they are foreseen," contingency itself is "necessarily a consequence" and "if necessity itself is wanting in the least to be foreknown," and you believe "nothing can be understood" by divine foreknowledge, 'unless it is certain." And "if those things are of an uncertain end," that is, occurrence, as if they were contingent, if "they are foreknown as certain," you believe it "to be obscurity' of opinion, "not truth of knowledge" and you will elude to
this. The cause of this deception is your error about judgement of thinking. Truly, "you believe thinking things to be other than they are, considering a thing" which possesses itself and in this you err.

Note that therefore we are not able to foreknow future events to be for certain dependent upon chance. We consider likewise that God is not able to do this. Truly things in the same way a thing is able to be known in a different way by different beings. A thinking thing is different from a part of knowing well which itself is knowledge, and so it is necessary that future events dependent on chance are uncertain in themselves. Still, they can be foreknown by God without error of falsity. "The cause of this error is..." here she assigns the cause of the error where it is noted what the cause of the error is. Therefore, we consider that an uncertain future cannot be certain to be foreknown because it is believed that the faculty of knowing is not following the power of the thing understood and not of its own power of thinking, that is, false. Therefore from the first she sets forth the cause of the error. Following this she proves it, when she says from the first "For - that this by a brief example...and the cause of this error is...." Wherefore it is considered "that everyone thinks everything" that he knows "such from the strength and nature of those things which are known" and not from the strength of knowing "which is wholly otherwise," that is, by the opposite herefore great things are not known according to the nature of knowing. "For everything which is learned is not understood according to its own strength," that is, according to the way of its nature, but rather according to the power of knowing.
Note that if knowledge were according to the power of a thing known, then the thing would be known by everyone in the same way. Thus something would be understood in the same way by human intellect and divine intellect which is false, since what things are doubtful of comprehension in humans are certain of comprehension by the divine. And cognition is directed rather according to the power of capacity of knowing so that in such capacity is more effective and more certain in such a way that one understands this very fixed and very clear. "For that this may become clear by a brief example..." here she shows that power of knowledge is according to power of capability of thinking and not of the think known. From the first she shows this by example. Following this she shows this same thing through reasoning where she says, "Also man himself...." From the first she shows that knowledge is according to the power of thinking which may become clear by a brief example. For sight recognizes in one way the same roundness of body and touch recognizes it in another way. That sight "remaining at a distance" is evident, that is, from far off "it looks at the whole body at once by the visually emitted rays. Truly here" it is clear that touch corresponding to and conjoined "to the sphere," that is, "to the round shape and motion around, a moving around itself," that is, "around" the round body, "understands,' although "the roundness is with the parts," that is, in the parts.

Note that she means a double difference between way of knowing and sight and touch. First it is that sight manifesting form distances understood as a certain round body. Touch, however, does not understand unless conjoined to this. In the second difference is that sight sees the whole body at once, touch however in parts.
Moreover, such diversities in understanding would not exist if this were understood by its nature, since the same form remains in each conception. Note that certain ones said vision to be made by emission of light rays from the eyes all the way to the thing seen, but this opinion is different from Aristotle's. In fact, vision is not a sending beyond but a sustaining within. Indeed, by experiencing a certain sensation, this itself is seen in *De Anima*. Moreover, here she shows following the opinion of the ancients since she says that sight looks at the whole body with emitting rays. "Also, man himself..." here she shows according to an example by the capacity of a below ordinary understanding. Following this she shows since these capacities hold toward each other, "In such as this...." Therefore, from the first she declares likewise in what way this is understood in a different way by different powers. She says "man himself," the exterior "senses, imagination, reason and divine intellect consider it in a different way," than divine intelligence.. For the exterior "sense" as sight "judges the shape" of man "in underlying matter," that is, in matter that can be perceived by the senses, but "imagination alone" discerns "without matter," that is, in the absence of material things. "Indeed, reason transcends" this imagination and "considers the specific" itself, that is, the specific nature of man "which is in individual people," that is, discerns "with universal consideration. Truly the eye," that is, consideration of "intelligence is higher." Wherefore divine intelligence approached beyond the periphery of the universal, which exists in individual things, "that simple form," the archetype of man is clear, which is in the divine mind, "looks with pure" sight, that is, with speculation "of a pure mind."
Note that the first example was from powers of cognition, not below ordinary as from sight and touch. Moreover, that example is from subordinate powers which exist, although exterior senses with which all animals are endowed, imagination which nevertheless, is within perfect animals, reason which nevertheless is in man, and intelligence by which the divine mind knows. These virtues have different modes of knowing each thing although man as it is said in the literature, which would not exist unless thinking were made according to the faculty of excellence of thinking and not of the thing known. "In such as this the greatest consideration must be toward this..." here Philosophy shows from where the before mentioned capacities of thinking possess in themselves mutually showing that everyone is capable of the inferior capacity, and even higher and beyond. From the first she shows this concerning intelligence with respect to other capacities. Following this she shows the same concerning reason when according to this she says, that reason also "in this", that is, in order of these capacities. "this must be the greatest consideration, the higher power of comprehension is understood in the inferior itself," while the higher capacity learns all that is inferior. "The lower" however "does not raise to the higher," so that it understands that which is superior, which she shows in an example, "For neither does the sense desire the power" to grasp "matter outside itself," nor "does imagination understand universal specific forms," that is, lesser particulars, but reason seizes "the simple form," that is, the universal form. "Intelligence," or the divine, "as if looking from above," although it is in the position of knowing, "determines" the conceived form itself and all things which are underneath that form, so in what ought to be known, it sees the
archetype of man, understanding all things which are among men, "but in the same way it comprehends the form itself which could not be known by a lower power. For it knows the universal form itself," that is, the universal form "of reason and the shape of imagination materially sensible," which looks to the exterior by means of sense, not "using reason or imagination or the senses, but all in one stroke of the mind," that is, without descent it understands what reason does not.

Note that higher capacity brings in the lower capacity, just as the quadrangle includes the triangle, as it is clear in the second book of De Anima. Therefore, it is capable of the inferior, superior and higher capacities, wherefore it does not comprehend higher universals as inferior, in this way higher particulars although not otherwise. Therefore, what human intelligence is able to comprehend, divine intelligence is also able to comprehend, although not otherwise. "Since too, it is reason which regards..." here she shows the same by means of reason, that just as intelligence comprehends the other three inferior capacities, she says, so reason also understands under the other two capacities, which are imagination and sense, saying, "Also, reason, when it regards a certain universal not using imagination or senses and it comprehends among imaginable and sensible things" from complete comprehension. For it is reason that so defined the universal of thought itself: man is a rational bipedal animal, since by definition, "this is a universal notion...", that is, a known thing. Since "no one is ignorant that this is imaginable and sensible," this is explained by a definition. The reason considers the universal not using "imagination or sense, but by rational conception." Then she shows that just as reason comprehends imagination and
sense, so imagination comprehends sense, and she says "imagination also, although it is a assumed for such a thing that its beginning of seeing and forming shapes from the senses, still it considers with sense beyond imagination," that is, understands all sensible things not by a sensible, but by an imaginatively reason of judging. Then she concludes, saying, "Therefore, do you see that all use their own", that is, special "power in understanding, rather than the power of those things which are known?"

Note that although reason in understanding is itself a universal, it does not use imagination and sense, still in its doing a thing it presupposes imagination and sense, wherefore nothing is in the intellect unless it was in the sense. Likewise, although imagination in this act is not used with sense, still it presupposes sense to have been in the act, wherefore fantasy, which this imagination calls upon is achieved by emotion from senses, following the act from the second book of De Anima. "Nor is this wrong..." here she confirms the saying itself through reason, saying although a thing is understood, not according to its nature but according to its nature of knowing, it does not understand unjustly, that is, irrationally. "For since all judgement" is the act of knowing and the labor of judging, that is, powers of thinking, "it is necessary that each" thinking being "perform his work", that is, his labor of learning, "not from some other's power" of an inferior thinking thing, "but from his own power", that is, from the capacity of understanding. Note that from literature such reason is formed. Every act and labor follows a condition of this power whose act and labor exist, but to judge or learn is an act or work of power of thinking and not of the thing understood. Therefore, to judge and learn follows a means and condition of power of
thinking and not of the thing understood.

Bade

"Then she said: 'That is the old...'" here Philosophy begins to respond to the proposed charges. Moreover, it is a text of very easy language and sentences are explained enough in the above commentary. Still you understand it to be directed in signifying in what now is considered a vulgar style. Plinius, Quintillianus, Statius and others of these times would have considered it vulgar. Cicero would not have considered it vulgar. As you will remember the above note: two, three and four separately is not used among learned writers. Moreover, there is "Atque and hunc modum..." which had disappeared, so I believe it was supplied. Atque ad hunc and ad hunc modum..." and the rest appear to be produced above. Moreover, "illic, minime, frustra enim esset." These words are of Boethius without interruption to this place, "Qui igitur...." Also we distinguished when other we brought in another, but we will go on to another section.

The Fourth Meter Section of Book Five

Saint Thomas

"Sometimes the porch has brought..." This is the fourth meter section of this fifth book which is called Glyconic from the inventor, the feeling predominantly iambic by measure. In this measure she shows the opinion of the Stoics which appears
to follow opposite her words. In fact, it was the opinion of the Stoics that theoretical knowledge was set over apart because exterior bodies impress their likenesses on the mind, so that the mind alone holds this in reason of suffering and this outer matter among the reason of a powerful being. From this it follows since suffering is brought together to the nature of the efficient and not the opposite, because cognition follows the nature of the thing pondered and not the nature of the one thinking, but it is against the sayings. Therefore, from the first she shows the opinion of the Stoics. Following this she rejects it, where she discusses the mind. From the first she says "Sometimes the porch has brought old ones" according to the Stoics, who were called the old ones, because of their mature understanding of morals. Old ones in which "excessive darkness" over among maxims, in which Stoics believe "senses and imagination," that is, forms of sensible things are impressed upon the mind from "the outermost bodies," that is, from exterior things. They considered those bodies in this way to imprint "images on the mind, as when a character" was made with certain writings "with a swift stylus on a smooth surface," that is, flat page, "a page which had no previous marks."

Note that the Stoics are called Stoa in Greek, which is porticus, or porch in Latin. Wherefore in Athens on a very open porch and in certain places, the Stoics publicly were accustomed to dispute. They considered the soul still to hold within itself in reason of suffering with respect to exterior things. And because great thinking is understood to follow active virtue rather than passive, therefore according to these, cognition should rather be extended toward the following faculty of the thing known
which is active, than to the knowing soul which is passive. "But if the mind thriving on proper things..." here she rejects this opinion. Following this she considers its truth where she says "This is efficient...". Therefore from the first she brings down the many dissimilarities as to this opinion, saying, "But if the thriving mind develops nothing from proper movements," that is, if it has no proper action, "but nevertheless lies permitting, subjected to marks," that is, in likeness of bodies. And if it "repeats" itself, that is, portrays "empty" images of things, that is, likenesses "one after the other as a mirror," that is, in the manner of a mirror, then it is asked "whence grows this idea," that is, this knowing in souls that "the soul is all knowing," not yet corporeal but even incorporeal.

Note that the first dissimilarity is if theoretical learning were made by a singular impression of bodies upon the soul, then it is not the mental excellence of man through which the soul learned incorporeal things. However, now it is clear that he understands even incorporeal things. A certain dissimilar thing she asserts, saying that, if the soul is still passive, "what power of the soul does the individual see", that is, from the knowing? Or, whatever of the soul divides the known things, things divided gather again or whatever gathers to the soul, that is, understanding the way by turns of what is joined and separated. "Now the head lifts to the highest things," that is, by ascension with the most general things from the most specific toward the most general things, a multitude by consideration, and now it falls or descends according to a certain source, that is, loses worth to the lowest, that is, by proceeding to the most specific from the most general by separation to the most specific. Then, that is, in the
end the soul "reconsiders," that is, compares, "for itself and refutes false things by true things," that is, by truth.

Note that from such a source reason is formed. The soul is not yet passive but active which judges, restores, separates and refutes true things from false things, but the theoretical soul is of this way, and therefore the rest and the greater is noted. Wherefore to judge, to restore, to separate, to refute, are understood to be active operations. The lesser is evident. The soul judges between a true and false thing. The predicate is combined with the subject at any time the predicate divides from the subject and false opinions are refuted. "This is a more efficient (cause)…" here Philosophy considers truth, saying, "This mind is a more efficient cause", that is, "a cause far more powerful than that which in a material manner," that is, in a material likeness "submits to the impressed marks," therefore, if anyone would believe that in the soul there is nothing enduring, therefore, they substituted falsely. Yet, enduring precedes operations of the soul in our body exciting and moving forces of the soul to work, as when "light leads the eyes," they then allow sight, "or when the voice makes a noise," that is, sounds in the ears, then hearing. And in the end, "the power of the mind is excited," that is, "roused, calling forms which it holds inside to similar movement, it applies these to the outer marks", that is, to the outward likenesses and 'unites," that is, "applies the outer images" of the body "with forms," that is, to forms "within," that is, to those "hidden" in the soul.

Note that here Boethius uses Platonic thinking because he considers forms of things from the beginning naturally placed in the soul, but the sophist soul is
incorporeal, so that it does not learn from these unless it is aroused by an immutable exterior sense. However, the thing aroused evokes a form similar to that which the exterior sense impressed, and applying this to the exterior thing, and thus it learns by this. To this intention Linconienus says also that is, of later philosophers saying that "Reason in us the Sophist does not lead unless first by operations of the senses by which it was mingled something known." Note that from written works it is understood that the intellect is capable of suffering, and is also understood as active since it is an efficient cause, so it is said in written works. Yet, Aristotle in the third part of *De Anima* proposes that to be intelligent is to experience and that no comprehension possesses the nature of the thing unless it is called that which is capable of suffering. Concerning this, certain ones say that wherefore the soul comprehends as an intellect capable of suffering rather than an act. The soul is active, by all means, it is an efficient cause, a synecdoche for reason of active comprehension, but by common reason comprehension is capable of feeling. Or it ought to be said that because the intellect is capable of suffering it is a passive power at the least, to which the first deed of this, since to be intelligent is experience. But all passive power because of necessity, relinquished active power which reduces itself to an action. Or such an active thing is not able to exist externally as a corporeal thing, since doing so is most remarkable with something experienced. Therefore, such active thinking partly of the soul, will have been comprehended, whose action by working is to make the perceived power by motion a perceived thing, so that by external things any such power of guiding perception is impressed upon the mind for comprehension capable
of suffering, through which it is drawn back in the act of comprehending. Therefore, it is not the intention of Boethius to deny that the mind does not exist as comprehension capable of suffering with common reason, but he wishes that the mind or soul more completely holds efficiency in synecdoche which is a common external occurrence from the substances themselves. By consequence efficiency of comprehension ought not be attributed to exterior things as it was concerning the intention of the Stoics.

Bade

"Sometimes the porch has brought..." the verse is in single feet, of one division, however it is glyconic from its inventor. It is predominantly dactylic by measure, containing three measures by the number of feet, no syllable wanting in the last foot, wherefore more and not overflowing. However it is well known as spondaic and double dactylic measure, but the last syllable thus always is of a common type. He condemns the opinion of the Stoics who from a balcony, rather, the sayings from the balcony, afterward they took to be called the painted porch. All other things are clear enough.

The style is somewhat supported, now an implement of writing on a wax covered table or in comparison, somewhat a quality of writing. This is an apparatus as a level surface is called evenness or as by sea and by land, whatever is not uneven is called a level surface. However, they wished the soul to be just as a tabula raza, on which nothing was written. However, it is said they were called pages which proved
their region in the books. So, districts, that is, villages situated close to springs or by writing which in these verses they were written, that is, impressed. Therefore, it is a page, each part of papyrus or on which they were composed in these poems, that is, impressed. Whence, here one says eloquently pressed letters for impressed. For to write is to compose and fasten together, but through translation one is said to sing by marks placed, that is by impressions set.

Then strength of the mind excited, so it ought not to be written as exitus which is expired. Yet he has excited the following common syllable, as with Virgil in the third book of *The Aeneid*. it is used when he says "he fell down excited" and this is considered faulty. They intended accio (to summon) of the fourth conjugation to be used, and accieo from the second to be considered faulty for by either view they are considered to be deduced.

The Fifth Prose Section of Book Five

Saint Thomas

"Now if in understanding corporeal things..." here is the fifth prose section of this fifth book, in which she specifically shows divine knowledge to be according to something caused by perceiving, and not by the thing known. Following this she shows the insufficiency of these things which things are made void from our way of understanding as divine providence, where she says, "Therefore what...." From the first she raises what has been said. Following this she brings forward two conclusions
where she says "And so on this [principal]...". From the first she says, "if in perceiving," that is, in understanding "corporeal things our rational soul is not yet distinguished," that is, affected by the event of the body but from its power, judges the event subject to the body, and so" in understanding it follows a particular motion, although qualities "brought before from the outside affect," that is, change the apparatus, that is, instrument of the sensations. "Movement of the body goes is prior to power of a moving mind, a movement which calls out to itself the action of the mind and excites forms inwardly, remaining neutral." So this is in our great soul with rambling ideas, "those things which have been completed with whole feelings," that is, with qualities of bodies, just as particular intelligence and chiefly God, that "undiscerning do not follow objects from the outside but they put in order," that is, they perfect "the action of the mind itself," that is, the theoretical operation according to one’s own nature.

Note that from the writing it can thus be argued that if less is seen to be contained in this from which it is in, or more from which, but less is seen from which our soul in perceiving follows of the motions themselves and not of the thing considered, and yet it follows that the capacity of perceiving itself, therefore by far greater divine intelligence follows in perceiving its own specific motion of its understanding than of the thing itself considered. "And for this reason..." here she brings forward two conclusions from the things said before, saying that from this understanding it comes out of the nature of understanding and not out of the thing understood. And since the examinings are diverse according to nature, she says that
all things combine diverse thoughts as one from different examinations. "And for this reason..." because perception comes out of the nature of understanding "much knowledge belongs to," that is, will belong to diverse "and different substances. Indeed, sense alone deserted by other understanding belongs to immobile beings, such as shells of the sea and any other thing holding fast to rocks are fed. But, imagination belongs to mobile animals" which are moving by progressive movement "to those which volition is understood to be contained in," that is the power "of fleeing" evil or "approaching" good. "But reason," through which we understand "the whole, such is of human kind," just as intelligence is of a divine kind. Then she considers the second conclusion because that conclusion is more notable and nobler, it not only knows its own object, but even the objects of other sorts of ideas, that is, of perceptions. First she says, "So it happens that notion," that is, perception "exceeds", that is, is more noble than others "which is properly its nature," that is, "from its own nature," it not only understands, that is, not just its own nature over the object, "but it even knows the subjects of other kinds of knowledge."

Note near the first conclusion that since motions and operations are done differently, according to difference of those performing and of those working. It follows that the agent and operation are diverse things which possess different operations and knowledge, throughout which sense without the other knowledge belongs to base animals and this close understanding is accepted for sensitive understanding, which alone is transformed to foreknowledge of something perceptible. So, in fact, it is distinguished from imagination which still does not understand the
present thing, or even absent thing.

Note near this conclusion that whatever more ability it allows, it is understood to be more extraordinary because it understands the more distinguished. Therefore, if anything "knows by capability" its own object and since these objects of certain inferior faculties, as exists in divine intelligence and not otherwise, it follows that a more superior faculty is more understanding, nobler as compared to a lower faculty. "Therefore, what..." here Philosophy shows the insufficiency of those who from just understanding in part reject divine providence. Following this she urges us to consider the manner of divine perception where she says, "wherefore". From the first she makes clear the insufficiency of these things by simile. Following this she adds to the simile, in a proposition where she says that a simile is a likeness, yet what it intends is as follows, that sense and imagination are lower modes of thinking than reason. If therefore, sense and imagination will pick out to judge a way of knowing reason from its own manner of understanding and say that a universal thing is nothing that reason understands, or if truth is judgement of reason, or if a particular or sensible reason in fact says otherwise, it is clear that what we esteem in either way by better or understanding, we approved by reason, judging the motion of sense and imagination to be insufficient. Therefore, she says "What, therefore if sense and imagination oppose," that is, contradict "reasoning, saying the universal is not that which reason thinks herself to look at." Thus saying "Indeed, what is sensible or imaginable in not able to be a universal," that is, universal judgement of sense and imagination. "Therefore, either the judgement of reason is necessary truth ," and by consequence
"it is not anything sensible," which is absurd, "or since the following is known to you, from sense and imagination many things are subject to senses and imagination" which necessarily "exist as sensible things," you believe conception of reason not "to be empty because it considered that which is sensible and singular as if some sort of universal. Further, if reason should respond to observe the universal reason, that which is sensible and imaginable," truly this sense and imagination are "not able to aspire to," that is, to come to "the knowledge of universality," that is, the universal, "since their notion," that is, "their understanding does not exceed corporeal figures." And she says that "we ought to believe reason the firmer and more perfect judgement of things. Therefore, in such strife," though that sense and imagination are from one part and reason is from another, with such that it is contained in us such strength of reasoning. Of imagination and sense should we not rather prove the cause of reason and consider the motion of sense and imagination to be insufficient, wherefore she affirms this.

Note that this ought to exist from judgement of nobler force rather than from judgement of a lower force. Therefore, since reason is the nobler force, sense and imagination with it, reason comprehends its own object and the object of sense and imagination, and not the opposite. Therefore, it ought to exist rather for judgement of reason than of lower capabilities. "It is similar..." here she applies that simile to a resolution and says that because that is said about sense and imagination with respect to reason, "it is similar to this because human reason does" not think "divine intelligence to observe, unless that reason itself perceives" what it provides from the
method itself of proving. "For as you discuss," that is argue, "if things are not understood to have certain and necessary events, such things are not able to be known for certain as things about to occur. Therefore there is no foreknowledge in of these things. Although, if we believe there is foreknowledge in these things there will be nothing which does not come form necessity." Therefore, we are to use pieces of reasoning "so we can have judgement of the divine mind, then just as we have judged that imagination and sense must yield to this in distinction," that is, give place to reason, that is, we must judge "it is most just that human reason itself should submit to the divine mind."

Note what is similar concerning judgement of sense and imagination with respect to reason, and of reason with respect to divine intelligence. For to sense and imagination it seems that reason otherwise is not able to comprehend this, unless, just as it comprehends itself, which is a false understanding. So it seems similar to human reason because like the divine reason it is not able to understand these things as you understand, otherwise than what it understands from itself, which is a false understanding. For what human reason understands dubiously, the highest divine intelligence understands. "Wherefore, among those things..." here Philosophy urges that we raise ourselves toward comprehension of the divine intellect saying that "wherefore we are able, let us be raised up" by diligent consideration "in the utmost" of these to the highest "intelligence" concerning divine things. "For there, reason will see that which she is not able to observe in herself. Although, "since a clear, definite innate idea" she sees, "those which have no certain" existence. And that is not
opinion, "but rather it is simplicity of the highest knowledge enclosed by no
boundaries." Therefore, simplicity of the highest wisdom is infinite. Note that if
reason were to follow faculty of the thing understood, and not of fortitude of
understanding, then just as human reason understands the contingent future to be
uncertain, so divine intelligence itself would understand it to be uncertain. But since
capacity of understanding is following capacity of fortitude of understanding, and
divine intelligence, that is, divine comprehension in perceiving exceeds human reason,
it is able to understand clearly what human reason understands as not firmly
established.

Bade

"Now if perceiving corporeal things..." that is, a knowing apart from sense.
Understanding lies in different substances. Because it is usual for "cedere", to yield,
to be interpreted for that which says "locum dare", to give place to. Therefore, it is
not at any time to be accepted for that which is the passive form, "dari", to be given,
because one yields to something, one gives to that. Whence, Virgil writes in the
eleventh book " This whole region and heavens from the wooded region of the
mountain, he yields to the alliance of the Trojans." "Yields," that is, he is diminished
in force, and it is yielded. So, therefore, here she says, "understanding yields to," that
is, they were give, and these things occurred by force. The rest are noted.
The Fifth Meter Section of Book Five

Saint Thomas

"How living things [travel about] the lands in varieties of shapes..." here begins the fifth prose section of this fifth book which is called Archilochus from its inventor. It is predominantly dactylic by measure. In this she shows man to be disposed toward contemplation concerning the shape of his own body. And from the first she describes the bodily shape of other lesser animals. Following this she describes the figure of man when she says "The unique species...". At the beginning she says "living things travel about the lands in such various ways, that is, mightily" in various shapes. For some living things are with long bodies," as serpents or as reptiles. These "brush," that is turn to "scatter dust and they drag along swiftly running," that is, moved by strength, "by strength of the stomach as a continuous plowing" constantly scattering dust about. There are certain living beings in which their "wanderings belong to their lightness of wings, which they beat against the wind" and then float and "go beyond the space of the upper pure air," that is, of the lower atmosphere. There are certain ones who "delight to press footprints in the ground," that is, in the soil of the earth. In addition to those there are those who "delight" in passing throughout "green fields" and walking under trees. All of these living beings, although you see that they are different in various forms, still "the faces of these are bending down," that is toward the earth, that is, weighed down, showing the senses to be dull.
Note that Philosophy touches upon three kinds of living beings following reptiles, flying beings, and walking beings which, although they are different in form, since certain ones are fashioned toward creeping, such as serpents, certain ones, toward flying as birds, certain ones as walking as terrestrial beasts. Yet in this all those are united who have their faces turned toward the earth. "The unique class of men..." here she describes the shape of man saying, "One class of men", that is, one genus of human beings, "lifts the uppermost part toward the sky," that is, its head, "very high and easily stands with straight," that is, upright "in body and looks down on the earth" and turns by this height toward the heavens. You, man, "you, by your straight appearance seek the heavens and put forth," that is, thrust out your forehead. This upright figure suggests to you though you ming erroneously deceive yourself, and also unless you assert, that is, exalt "your spirit in lofty matter," that is, as heavenly, lest the mind "burdened," that is, burdensome to the divine mind be "lowered down," that is, under the feet or beneath, where down is an adverb of place, lest that mind, proud rely upon, that is, reside in an inferior weakened body. Note although man has the shape of a body, upright toward the heavens, if the soul raised up in contemplation of the heavens, the body appears to be more noble than the soul. Note following Aristotle, in the sixteenth book of De Animalibus: "Man among all living beings has the linear shape of uprightness. Indeed, Ovid speaks concerning that shape in the sixth book of Metamorphosis. He says, "Although certain animals look to the earth, he judges that the face of humanity uplifted allowed that it see the heavens." He commanded this, and their upright expression exalts the heavens.
"How...in a variety...." the verse is one measure and it is entirely phaletius or in the style of Archilochus. It is established from the fourth measure in heroic (Homeric) style, that is, customary in heroic hexameter, and it has a metrical foot of three short syllables. Yet the syllable which is last is judged common to all, for the last foot is frequently spondaic. The fourth, however is dactylic, always the ending puts part of the language in a mode of pastoral verse, and if the fourth syllable from the end, is more suppressed, it is wholly heroic. So, whatever of the words will have been placed in the last syllable, they are suitable to the hexameter.

"How living things travel about the lands in a variety of shapes." And so in each it is brought together at first with diverse methods. For they say: certain ones that in various forms, certain ones as in a variety, certain ones then in a variety. In that verse, however, "Those delight to press footprints," these two faults are offensive: "gressibusque" is used instead of "et", and "they delight" should take the ablative. But "pressisse" was written "precessisse", which neither verse nor sentence permits. In fact, it comes from the principal parts "premo, pressi". But the sense is that "they delight to press", that is, to imprint or fix footprints in the ground. Another fault was because the syllable that was removed there by "gressibusque", from which the verse was made, diminished rather than the sense. Only the class of men as Ovid in the first book of Metamorphoses "Inclined" that with "they looked". "Gens," however, is said "genus" and besides, it is attributed to horses, whence Virgil in the
seventh book also said it is a if they are a herd as horses. "And they look down toward the earth," here "despicere" is "to examine downwards" and because it is done through a despising, which we do not wish to examine in any way, and since it is said they behold him, so we look upon it as if downwards and it is said they inspect, "inspiiientes" a vile thing. Therefore, "despicere", to look down upon, is accepted for "contemnere, to despise, as it is said in bucolic verse: "I have been disregarded by you and you do not question who I am of the law." Conversely "suspicere", to respect, to look upwards, or to examine high up, as, "my eyes were weakened looking up high in ascent." And "you thrust out the forehead" is erroneously read for "exerisque," meaning and you elevate, because the verse does not permit it. Moreover, "exero" is composed by "ex" meaning from, or "extra" meaning beyond, and "sero", to produce, but since "x" desires gemination "ss" or "c", but according to Priscianus, after "ex" it is not customary to put "s." For "ab" and the principal parts of "salvio" make "exulto" not "exsulto", meaning to rejoice. Moreover, "exerere", to thrust out, in this is greater meaning to serve the language we speak, beyond others, or "expuere" to expel.

Note also what should be there "and, unless terrestrial, you are erroneously void of understanding." It ought not be read "you are void of understanding" for it comes from "de", meaning on, and "sapio", meaning to be wise, not from "capio", meaning to seize. "Pessum," sank, means beneath the foot, or under the foot. Moreover, it is erroneous as Augustine teaches the position, can the body which should be a slave, have dominion over the soul? In what merit will the one who commands
have done so? Or what while the sense commands against reason? To sink down means the body is seized by inactivity.

The Sixth Prose Section and the Last

Saint Thomas

"Since, then, as a little before..." here begins the sixth prose section and the last of this fifth book in which she determines the truth about the compassion of divine foreknowledge and free will. And from the first she asserts the conclusion itself. Following this she joins the beneficial exhortation near the end of the book where she says, "Turn away thus...." From the first she shows the method of divine comprehension. Following this she solves the objections made against divine providence. Third, she concludes the compatibility of free will with divine providence, according to the passage where she says, "Why then do you demand...." The third point is made there with "These things being so....." From the first she determines about the state of God which is eternal. Following from this she declares the manner of divine providence, where she says, "Therefore, since every judgement...." From the first she sets forth what ought to be concluded about eternity. Following this, she determines concerning it, where she says, "Eternity, then, is endless...." From the first she says that since it was pointed out a little before that everything which is known is understood not from its own nature, that is, from the nature of the thing known, but from the nature of comprehending, that is,
understanding. Let us consider now as far as these are allowable who is of a state of
divine essences or substance, so we may know what is his knowledge. And she adds
that the common judgement of all living, that is, of all using reason, is that God is
eternal. Therefore, let us consider what is eternity, "for this shows to us together
divine nature and divine knowledge."

Note that men living by reason are men endowed with the light of wisdom, and
all these concede that God is eternal. For the philosopher in the seventh book of
*Physics* says, "the mover outside eternity appears as eternity in motion. And all the
Greeks were such that the barbarians considered them to be gods, as they believed
them to be immortal. Note then that the eternity of God and the nature and knowledge
of God are not different according to substance. Therefore, eternal understanding is
not understood as the nature and knowledge of God. Therefore, "eternity is..." here
she continues on eternity and from the first she considers its definition. Following this
she declares it, where she says "which if by comparison...." From the first she says
"eternity is the complete simultaneous and perfect possession of eternal life." Note
that according to Albertus the greater, in his book on causes: "Something is eternal
and exists in eternity and eternity itself exists just as God." Some things are eternal
and some exist in eternity, but eternity itself they are not, as a separate substance.
Some are eternal not in eternity and they are not eternity itself, such as time and world
motion.

Note when she says eternity is possession, there she employs the name of
possession to designate immutability, and unfailing supply of eternity, because it is
firmly possessed and calmly held. She says of life to the specification that nonliving things not be measured by eternity. She says this is endless, concerning difference among these life forms which has an end in part before and in part after, such as a life of man or in part before, such as the life of angels. She says all at the same time are different according to the substance as it is wholly the same. Yet, not according to works, since they possess successful and intellectual operations. She says it is perfect, to designate that nothing exists from eternity. Indeed, perfection is for what nothing is wanting, that is, from heaven and earth. "Which [becomes clearer] by comparison..." she declares therefore. She addresses the ideas of eternity in the words here, where she makes clear which things are not correct. From the first, therefore, she declares the definition of eternity in comparison to time, saying that it has been said that "eternity is the simultaneous whole possession of boundless life, which becomes clearer by comparison," that is, comparison with temporal things. "For, whatever lives in time proceeds in the present" through successive change "from present into future and there is nothing established that can by itself encircle," that is, comprehend the ultimate space of its life, "but tomorrow surely it does not apprehend. Truly yesterday time has already lost, and "in this day to day life," that is, nothing more is present of day to day life, rather "in that moving and transitory movement" continuing of life. And we say that movement is indivisible present, because the future corrects with the past. "Therefore, that condition of time," that is, succession, "although it neither began nor ceases to be, as Aristotle thought about the world, although life," that is, its duration, "is drawn," that is, extends, "with the infinity of
time, yet it is not yet such that it may rightly be believed to be eternal." For, "it does not comprehend or possess simultaneously the whole space of life", that is, its duration, "though infinite," that is, it perseveres "through infinite time, but it does not yet hold the future," that is, it does not hold past experiences or past time. "Whatever, therefore does not comprehend and possess at the same time whole fullness of boundless life, from which nothing future or anything past or present or has flowed away, that is rightly defended as eternity, wherefore that eternity of itself and in itself, because "nothing of itself is wanting, it is always present, possessing itself. "It is necessarily held as present infinity," that is, "infinite" duration "of moving time," that is, successive.

Note that since through cognition of time we arrive at cognition of eternity, from this because it is situated nearly opposite these greatly shine forth. Thus through the nature and succession of time, he declares to us the nature of eternity. So indeed, reason of time consists in succession and apprehension of prior and past things, in motion whose one part is lost and some future thing exists. Thus, reason of eternity through opposition consists in apprehension of the uniform thing which wholly exists outside motion, comprehending the same past and future as still present. Note that of eternity itself nothing passes into the past. Truly, it is all at once present to him. Wherefore, truly it never ceases thus or ever begins, since he holds boundless life. Necessarily, it is because whatever things are present in the mind of a different time, indeed as if it is represented as infinite time. Because in the same way it is present in the mind of different time, in such a way it subsists in itself. The way, however, by
which it subsists in itself is momentary. Indeed, for this reason he stands at a different
time in the present means. For this reason one says that it necessary that the eternal
present holds an infiniteness of moving time. "Therefore, those are not right who..."
here Philosophy corrects those ways by which men misuse the meaning of eternity.
According to this she teaches a special way of speaking on it. So, if it is to be proper,
from the first she does what has been said. According to this she makes clear that
temporal things are deficient by the simplicity of the divine in nature by which they
strive to imitate when she says, "For this [makes plain]...." From the first it has been
said that eternity is not only endless but also simplicity. "Whence those people" are not
right who consider "when they hear the vision of Plato to be a world that did not have
a beginning in time or would have worn out," that is, an end, "in this way they think
the world is made co-eternal to the established author." Moreover, because it is those
who are not right who think this, but it is a different thing to be led to boundless life
with a certain succession, "which is what Plato attributes to the world," and what is
at the same time "to be the complex whole presence of boundless life that is the
property of the divine mind." Because a certain one should say that if the world never
began we are co-eternal with God. To this she answers that God exists before the
world, not "as a condition of the world, but in simplicity of his nature." Whereupon
she says, "Nor should God seem more ancient than things created by an amount of
time, but rather, by the peculiarity, by the simplicity of his nature."

Note thus, she says that Plato, from his book *Timeus*, wished the world to have
begun but not to have an end. This same thing Aristotle himself set forth in his book
De Caelo et Mundo. But Plato says that the earth alone began which is therefore why Boethius said that Plato did not propose the world to have been created. To this it is said that he said Plato rightly held the world to have a beginning what he held to be the beginning of its regulation was not, however, the beginning of time. Thus, he proposes the example of the print of a foot, that if the foot from eternity had remained in the dust, it follows that the foot is the cause of the footprint naturally preceding the footprint, not time.

"For this [present nature of unmoving life]..." here she makes clear since temporary things fail against the simplicity of divine nature which they endeavor to imitate, she says "that infinite movement of temporal things imitates" what it is able "this present state of immobile life," that is, eternity. "And since it cannot represent," that is, portray "and equal, it falls short" from its "immobility" to extra procurement because "it is not able to hold and it decreases from simplicity of foreknowledge into the infinite quantity of past and future, and since it cannot possess at the same time the whole plenitude of its life, in this itself, this in some way never ceases to be. It seems in some respects to emulate that which it is not able to satisfy," obliging itself to a temporary state "to the sort of present of this moment," that is, of a brief instant, that is, of an indivisible "and rapid movement", that is, a transitory time which creates a present of an instant of time. It holds "a certain likeness of adhering to present," that is, eternity and "grants to whatever thing it touches that they should seem to be." For this we say exists because they are in the present moment. "Since it cannot continue," the present of the instant of time, because of the nature of a mobile thing, thus, "it
seized the infinite journey of time" by succession "in that way with the result that it should continue by going" from one thing to another, "whose fullness it did not wish," that is, it could not "comprehend" as being permanent.

Note that infinite motion of temporal things how much is possible, that the state of eternity is imitated since it is not able to be wholly expressed, because the state of temporal time is a state outside of eternity. And the state of temporal time looks to the past and future. The state of eternity, however, is present and, moreover, this imitates the state of eternity, such that it never falls short of eternity. Thus, infinite motion of temporal things never ceases to be. And so an instance is to confer in time because it has some sort of likeness with eternity. And so, in the same way a certain thing is said to exist in eternity, and so these things we say exist because they are in a present instance. Therefore, it is necessary that the state of temporal things is not able to imitate the state of eternity presently being permanent, yet it imitates the duration of time itself by continuing outside of it.

"And so [if we should wish]..." in this part Philosophy teaches that a particular expression is accordingly concerning God, or the world, saying, "If following Plato we should suggest the names befitting," that is, assembled "of these things, we should say God to be eternal, but the world we should say is perpetual." This agrees with the sayings of the Greek Authors. Indeed, eternity is without a beginning, without end. It is critical perpetualness for which there is no beginning or an end. "Since then each judgement..." here Philosophy shows the way of divine knowledge from their teachings. First she shows of what sort divine knowledge is and how it is named,
saying, "since then each judgement comprehends those things which are made subject to it," that is, are made its objects according "to its nature." Accordingly, it is the nature of virtuous understanding. Moreover, the nature of God is such that God himself is "always an eternal and present state." From this it follows that "knowledge of God surpasses all movement of time, shows in the simplicity of his present" and "possesses infinite space of the past and future time, he considers them all as if now," that is, present, just as if "they were being carried out in his simple act" of knowing. Then she shows in what way the knowledge of God is mentioned saying, "So, if you should wish to think about foreknowledge by which he discerns all things" do not say divine knowledge "to be foreknowledge as if it were of the future, but you will more rightly value divine knowledge to be of instant," that is, of the present, "never passing." This she confirms by etymological means of this name, she says providence, from which comes divine cognition "is not called foresight" since that imports an ordinary nature to the future, "but pre-vision is said, because it is to a distance," that is, "arranged far from the lowest of things, as if it were seen beforehand from the highest peak of things."

Note that knowledge follows the way of the thing understanding, understanding and knowledge of God follow the nature and disposition of God. Moreover, the state of God is eternal and present, since to be divine is measured by eternity. Therefore, knowledge of God will be eternal and present in such a way that all things which are past and future, he knows as if they are present. Note that some would say that nothing is able to be present by itself, but past and future are not a thing. Therefore,
the past is not able to exist apart from divine knowledge. The saying is that two is not
one thing, something that in no way is one can be one, and as follows, it is not really
present to something since it is nothing. Something is not simply a thing, but because
the performance of a thing is not the thing, and although such a nonexistent thing
cannot coexist in present time, still, it can coexist in eternity, since eternity, because
it is infinite, exceeds present time by extending itself to the past and future. And so
the past and future are presently coexisting just as if in eternity, since nothing is
outside eternity. A thing does not follow if something coexists in eternity, but it
simply exists by virtue of such a great thing, since eternity also extends itself to the
nonexisting thing, so to the past and to the future.

Note that all things are present to God. To him nothing is future. Therefore,
his knowledge is not a prediction foreknown, that resounds as a future thing, nor
should it be called pre-vision because of the same cause, but it should be called
providence as things created far away from inferior things endowed with all foresight.
"Why then..." here she solves the highest objections against providence. First she
shows how such objections are to be solved. Following this she resumes the first
objection itself by fortifying as it would normally be solved. Following this she says
that if you speak about the first mentioning such reasons are where the first and
second are established above this, although that nothing can be foreknown by God
unless it is necessary. Third is established beyond this that an uncertain event is
impossible to truly be known. Therefore, she makes the second point. First she
shows that foreknowledge does not impose necessity of a foreknown thing, through
which the first and second reasons are solved. Following this she shows that
knowledge of God does not change the nature of a thing, but, likewise, they truly
subsist apart from knowledge and in truth, apart from an event. Through which also
the third reason is solved. Following where she says "And therefore this divine...."
From which God understood all things "as if they were present, why then do you
postulate that these things are made necessary which are illuminated," that is, which
are understood by "divine illumination," that is, divine understanding, "when not even
men make these same things necessary which they presently see" on account of the
word. What man sees in the present is not "made to be necessary. Whether it is
indeed your consideration, does it add," that is, will it give "necessity to a certain
thing in these which you understand as present?" Boethius says, "Not in the least."
Philosophy says, "If this union of divine and human" view is proper with respect to
the present, just as "you see certain things in the temporary present," that is, in present
time, "so God understands all things in his internal view" as present.

Note that our view of a present thing places no necessity of the present thing,
since a vision of hastening of chance does not impose necessity on the hastening, since
chance can hasten or not hasten. So also, divine view, which presently understands
all things imposes no necessity upon things, but he sees such things presently just as
if they were future. The future he also sees unavoidably, as unavoidably future, and
contingent future events he sees as future events that are happening. "Therefore this
divine foreknowledge..." here she shows that around contingent things, just as if they
stand alone as fixed knowledge of God and uncertain outcome of a thing, saying,
"Therefore this divine knowledge " in which God is unwilling to change "future events," the proper nature of things in which they are necessary and contingent. Therefore, he does not impose the necessity of an event just because it is happening, but "unto hereafter he sees them present just as one day in the future they are foreseen, nor does he confuse the judging of things" with the result that contingent things are made not to be contingent, but "with one view of the mind he distinguishes both the things necessarily about to be and the things not necessarily about to be," that is, the future. She declares this in an example, saying, "just as you see a man, when at the same time," that is, in the same instant, "you see the man walking on land the sun rising in the sky," although "these things are at the same time, understood, still you discern this to be voluntary," although "the man walking on land and the sun rising is necessary. So likewise "divine vision looking down at everything," looking downwards, "does not disturb" in the least "the quality of things," though it is the contingency and necessity of things. I say before concerning this, present circumstances, on the reason of eternity, but of future things toward the condition of time. "So it is that knowledge" of future things of God as it is not opinion of present circumstances, "but a knowledge founded in truth," that is, confirmed, "when he knows" something "to be about to exist," that is, future, "that something he is not unaware of," that is, he well knows it "to be free from," it can be existing "by necessity."

Note from this that it is said God presently knows all things past and future. They are proven in a certain example: de baculo fixo in aqua qui successiva toti fluvio
praesens est cum partibus eius. So eternity likewise is present as whole time, and with all who would be in time. Therefore, all time and whatever is extra in time is present to eternity. A certain example is proven concerning a center, so if eternity is put as if the middle point of a circle, and all time as if the circumference, then although the circumference continually moves and part of the whole remains stationary, still in comparison to this the center holds itself uniform. A certain example is put forth concerning a certain person who rushes through life and does not see men coming after him, but this person who looks about from the high tower sees all life and men passing through, either proceeding or following through it. Thus, God, concerning his view of eternity, sees looking at everything presently both present and future.

"If at this point you were to say..." here Philosophy returns to the first reason by strengthening the position itself with the result that soothes and strengthens this. Following this she makes clear. The third solution she demonstrates, following where she says, "I shall answer." The third, where she says that "there are two," if you say this by objecting that the thing cannot not happen because God sees the thing about to occur. "Therefore God is deceived, moreover, because it cannot happen, I will say it is an occurrence from necessity, and so you bind me to the word necessity," or I will concede the occurrence in a certain way to be necessary. "I will acknowledge this is of the firmest truth to which barely anyone could approach " it conceding, "unless a witness of the divine," that is, divine nature. Then she makes clear the objection saying that if he should coerce her so that she concede a certain necessity of the future, "I will respond that the same future, by which to us whom it is related to divine
knowledge, "by which thing it is its own present. I say it is necessarily from a necessary condition by the present reason. Moreover, since "the same future event is considered in its own nature," by what reason it holds the future and the act of determining future, and determination by its own reason, it necessarily "seems free."

Note that she says just as that thing which is occurring, since it is a present occurrence, by you it is judged with present reasoning, as a certain necessity with such a necessity, this itself exists as if it were present, so therefore all things are present to God, for this present reason is in order according to his own divine knowledge, which they judge as a certain necessity, although in its nature it seems utterly free. "For there are indeed two necessities, one simple..." here Philosophy shows the solution through a certain example, speaking of necessity and applies this to the argument. Following this she concludes from the things mentioned before, concerning the stars, since some are following them they are coming to pass and are uncertain because even though things certainly result, it is said foreseen by God. Following this she says, "Therefore they will without a doubt come to be...." From the first she says "there are two necessities, one simple, which is a necessity" of nature, "as all men are mortals" by necessity. The other is a condition of necessity, "as if you know a man walks," it is necessary that he walks. "Therefore what anyone knows," that cannot be otherwise than is known, "but this condition," that is, conditional necessity, "at the least" carries "with it the simple necessity." For a conditional necessity "is not made by a proper nature, but by the addition of the condition. For necessity compels nothing to move forward," that is, walk, taking
steps, that is, walking "by his own free will as much as possible, it is necessary that he walks at that time when" he is taking steps, that is, walking. Here she says this applies to the previously suggested things, saying, "In the same way if what divine providence sees as present, that necessarily is to be," following this conditional necessity which is foreseen, and which seems to you as present, albeit it has no necessity of its nature. "But he beholds those future things if present which come forth from free will. These things, related to divine perception were so through the condition of investigation by him, truly," that is, in its nature not by that it held with regard to divine knowledge. Some of these "did not stop," that is, they ceased "from being absolute," that is, perfect freedom, "as is their own nature.

Note the following instruction where Boethius states a reason, saying that whatever is foreseen by God occurs by necessity, this is solved by the explanation that truth is necessary, and occurs by conditional necessity, but it is not absolute necessity. And other things are solved because that is stated true in the regular perception, but false to divine perception. One thing which is said is that whatever is foreseen by God occurs by necessity, truth is regular in perception whereas it is impossible that something foreseen by God does not occur. Yet, in perception it is from false division since the occurrence of a thing at the least contingent in itself, is not a necessity. "Therefore they will without a doubt come to be..." here Philosophy concludes from the things said before that this, likewise, stands firm, that certain things, according to these contingencies and uncertainties exist, although still certain other things occur, in such a way as they are foreseen by God. Following this she objects against this
where she says that "What then, that they are not necessary...." From the first she says "without a doubt all future things are such that God foreknows them to be." Divine providence is not deceived in any other way, "but certain of these are come from," that is, they proceed "from free will," therefore whatever is from this itself cannot not occur. It brings on this one, "because, albeit, they occur, still they are not let go from the proper nature" of freedom, "which, before they happened, they were capable of not occurring."

Note that is the entire instruction. Boethius speculates upon this that a certain future event without hinderance from its own nature in comparison to divine foreknowledge occurs by necessity and as such is a conditional necessity. Therefore in as much is foreseen, thus it occurs by necessity, but it is not absolutely bound by foresight. "Therefore what does it matter if these are not necessary things..." here she objects to the solution and explains the objection. Following this she objects to the solution a second time where she discusses this, saying as "if he should say it is within her power." She makes the objection in this, from which foreknown future happening certainly occurs in necessity, it does not seem to be different between the connected occurrence and the necessary occurrence. Whereupon she says, "Therefore what does it matter" that connected and free future events "are not necessary when these should occur after the fashion of," that is, in a likeness of "necessity." Then she explains that between necessary events and a connected event this matters because the manifestation is clear by example "which a little before I proposed, saying that the sun rising and man walking, while these things are occurring they cannot not occur," that is, they are
to occur necessarily, and so, whether this is necessary by a present condition. The present event indeed is necessary to be while they are present. Still, one of these, "the sun rising, although this happening was necessary to occur. Truly the other," that is, "the man walking, by no means" had a necessity to occur. "So also," those things "which God holds as present without a doubt do come forth," since by conditional necessity these things are foreseen to occur as present, but of these things, because they are foreseen, concerning this necessity of events, it descends, just as the sun is rising, the other "upon the power of doing them," though a man walks. From this she concludes that, therefore "we were not wrong before in this just as" in this because they occurred contingently, if they referred to a divine notion, these things are necessary, just as from the condition of divine knowledge. But "if they are considered by themselves," these things are absolute, "by joining," that is, by linking of necessity, because they make clear by the likeness "just as if that which is free to the senses, if you relate it to the reason," then it is "universal." However, "if you relate it" to the sense, then it is "singular."

Note that if the same thing is related to opposite things, it can be universal or singular. It seems likely that the same thing compared to an opposite thing can be related and necessary. For it has a particularly connected reason, and lastly, a reason of necessity. But we see that human nature holds the last reason, compared to the acting intellect, diverting from conditions not separate and compared to the possible intelligence. But human nature, compared to the sense, which it particularly understands as reason, has a singular reason. For it is universal, when it is
understood, but particularly, while it is thought. Likewise, it will exist concerning future connections that this itself compared to divine foreknowledge is conditionally necessary. Considered in itself, it holds this contingently. "But if you will say it is my...." here she objects to the explanation now expressed and explains the objection. Following this she removes the uncertainty, where she says "What then...." From the first she says that he objects to this explanation as "if it lies in my power to change" as by running or not running I will "cancel," that is, destroy divine "providence, although" that is foreknown to be future. She explains "I shall answer that you can turn," that is, change "your intention, but truth of providence, it understands that you can do this" just as you can change your intention "and as you do this" you change your intention, and "it is understood by this that you change your intention." Therefore you know that "you cannot avoid divine foreknowledge, even though with free will you change to different actions." You cannot "flee the knowledge of the present eye."

Note that although man can change his intention by this, still he cannot flee divine foreknowledge, since God foreknows these changes. By this proposition, truly, because God foresees the hereafter for you, again, outside space, though you cannot go and you resolve to not go, it is not, however, that you will not go. Wherefore God foresees also both the intention and possibility of a thing not happening and the change of intention, also the occurrence of the thing happening, you therefore cannot in any way flee his foreknowledge. "What then, will you say..." here she removes the doubt, saying that he asks by chance what then comes about from this solution, will
divine knowledge "be changed by my disposition?" that is, by his change as if since he now "wishes this now something else, it seems that divine foreknowledge alternates from this," that is, changes "the changes" themselves of things "known" and things understood. He answers this himself, that "this is not at all" connected, that "divine knowledge could be changed." Philosophy then proves this, saying that since divine "perception runs before every future thing and turns" it back to "foreknowledge of proper thinking" by all understanding, just as if present, lest it turn, that is, change its change from foreknowledge, now this now that successively, just as you suggest, but remaining freedom prevents change in one flash, complicates your changes, which at present he holds everything in his comprehending vision, so that God's present does not exist accidentally in future things, but proper in simplicity, in which it is resolved, that is, made clear, "that which you suggested a little while before that, "accordingly, it is not right if our future acts should be said to be responsible for the cause of God's knowledge. For the excellence of divine knowledge itself" imposes the way for everything since the knowledge of God is the cause of all things. It owes truly nothing to these things just as it learns nothing of these, just as we learn knowledge from these things.

Note if God, likewise, does not see these things as successive, they occur in time, then knowledge of God would be variable on account of this, because the knowledge of one would succeed the knowledge of another. But since all things he understands as like, as if present, therefore, in his knowledge the variation ceases, so that before he should know it to be of another cause, and afterward. Or because he
should know this not to be, and after to be, indeed he understands all things to exist at the same time. And indeed, he also knows something not to be in a different event of time, a measurable thing, and to be in a certain difference of time. "These things being so..." here she concludes from the before mentioned things, the possibility of free will with divine foreknowlege, saying, "These things being so...." as was said before, shows freedom of the will "inviolable by humans," that is, incorrupt. "Nor are laws set forth" for humans "toward punishment and rewards unfair," that is, unjust, "for our voluntary freedom," that is, freewill for all necessity. "It shows also" the immobility in "God's foreknowledge of everything." and "the immediate eternity of his vision" concurs with "future qualities" as "the dispensation" from our deeds in good and evil, that is, distributing "of good reward or evil torments. Nor are prayers made in deception, or "hope in God, because they cannot be ineffectual when they are right."

Note from this on account of free will these things are possible so in another manner they come to pass. It is not unjust that for good deeds rewards are set forth and for bad deeds torments are set forth, nor hope or prayers made in vain. But all these things are made in vain if all things are used for a bond of necessity. This she makes evident by saying, "Turn away from vices..." here Philosophy subjoins the prophetic exhortation saying that from this, since you are not by necessity doing something, but show it remains in your free will. Therefore, you will be observed, that is, you should scorn vices through just actions, lest you commit crimes, cultivate, that is, make use of virtues, because in such you will be followed by rewards, and
raise up your soul to righteous faith, because true happiness stretches out. And offer humble prayers up to heaven, to God, and by this reward you shall be made. Therefore, "if you do not wish to deceive" your soul by turning away from these things, then a great necessity is given to you, because he alone supplies all, you act and it cannot be concealed from him who is the one who sees your deeds. She adds, "When you act before the eyes," that is, when your actions are in view "of a judge knowing all," as God. Note vices are rejected because they resign man to slavery. For he who commits a sin is a slave to that sin. Seneca says "Si scirem deos peccata ignoscituros et homines ignoraturos," because if you sin, the baseness of sin will cause you to feel shame. Virtues, however, are to be cultivated, because virtue is what sets over the thing it possesses and resigns the work to his good. Righteousness, faith and correct prayers are offerings to God. Therefore in these things we are joined to God and in this we are comforted. And if we feign to neglect the great things said before, the virtues, the goodness granted to us, and the promise we are to follow after, that in such a way all things that we do are in view of an all knowing God. So truly it is written in Hebrews iii:14, "all things are naked and opened to the eyes of him who is God" is well said in a lifetime of lifetimes, Amen.

Bade

"Since then..." here is the last part of the work written. Because several things are declared here are incomplete, a certain one has taken to pursue what was prevented by the death [of Boethius]. It is good, nevertheless, although we will see that the
conclusion made here concerning the *Consolation* did not appear as it was stated in the present form [by Thomas]. We should consider now what is right. It is good to state what is correct, because it is prudent to have knowledge concerning God. A statement which is put forth is stated "alti ora te", not "quasi te". Also, it is written "deus amari non potest nis utcunque notus," but should be written "noscitandus est". From this, moreover, you know this to be associated with a word, and so it signifies "to serve" two things, as to serve or protect or examine. And although Alexander offers different voices of indication, so for the first "tueor" is written. For the second tuor is written, next, a little line. You say "tuor inspicio," I say tueor defendere, still in either point of view for significance among appropriate words appearing in the second declension, so in this place we should be "intueamur." For if "intuor" should be said, it is here the saying "intuamur." So, because Alexander, wrote "tuor facere tiutum" in the supine and "tueor tutum," you come to the saying "tueor utrumque" As "inspectio dicitur a multis intuitus." and from Virgil also we have "obtutus," not "obtuitus." However, it is not doubted for "tuor dici" where Statius says in his poem "The Achilleid." In either way I consider a sword attentively. To which "nee" is absent in everything in the future. So "legendum" is not everything as these "nec" and "Legendum" are often brought together. "Eternum" as when they wish such beat downwards from the air, should in the first syllable have an "ae" dipthong, and in the second syllable "h", and it is written "aethernum". Truly, therefore they want to deduce "ab ethere" as if "eter". That is, heaven when it is the shape of the spheres and does not possess the beginning or the end, and so it is not "ethernum" or "eternal in
time". Moreover, it is called "perpetual" without a doubt, from "per" and "peto". However, it is said that one endures, because that one always seeks, that is, he undertakes, since he follows, when perpetual time is one part of what by proceeding always, one always seeks and urges another. Just as "continuum", or continuous, and "continendo", continuing, when one part "continet," or connects to another, and "continguum," or meeting, "contingendo", by touching, because one touches (contingit). The other area continual (assiduum) by engaging (assidendo) when one engages (assidet) with another.

"For I shall answer..." here the order is "Namque respondebo," the same future, that is, a certain on and the same which is future. It seems necessary (videri necessarium), that is, because (quod) it is related to divine knowledge, he uses "vero" for "sed", but "videri liberum" and "prorsus", that is, this word is wholly to be explained by necessity, since (cum), that is, because (quod) it is examined (perpenditur), that is, considered (consideratur) in itself (sua), that is by its own nature (propria natura). "Then turn away from vices..." where he says it is certain that sin is voluntary and produced from free will. Therefore "turn away" (aversamini), loathe vices (detestamini). Here it has been written badly as "adversamini". For "adversor" in the dative means "joined, and at the same time means "I am adverse". "Aversor," however, in the accusative signifies "detestari," to be bathed, or "dignari," to be deemed worthy. This is enough. Officioque leven mon aversatus bonorem. And our author in the first poem of the first book at the first, so he seems to have been able when he says, "heuheu qua surda miserum avertit aure." Just as when in works of
good deeds freely made they are given first. Therefore, cultivate virtues and when he
who foresees everything also foresees the middle. And he wants that our safe being
should be granted by prayers. Therefore raise up your soul to righteous hopes and
offer up humble prayers to heaven. Humble (humile) is said to come from "humo",
to bury. Therefore it is the antithesis in these words: humble (humiles) and heaven
(excelsa). A great thing is granted to us. To judge (iudere) is very different ["u" as
opposed to "n"], and yet from this comes the word granted (inditus). Just as "predare"
is not read as an active verb meaning to rob, still it is frequently written as the past
participle "preditus", meaning robbed. Moreover, it is "inditum the past participle by
its nature ingrafted or inserted, as "when an act before the eyes of an all knowing
judge." To this statement as said by a holy man. If virtuous man fears the lord, the
all knowing sees this. More pressing however is what is said here "of an all knowing
judge." If indeed he is a judge, then he ought to be feared. These things have been
best explained for Stephanus about The Consolation of Boethius. Into which I bore the
function of grammarian, rather than what has come from an old philosophical
commentary. Since truly as one thing I declared as often for employment, I led the
work of these words which I have explained in particular. I indicated and catalogued
and alphabetized the addendum, joined to the appendix from Marcus Fabius.
Quintilian's De Scholarium Disciplina (such as I call it), but we prepared the former
of the former the table of the commentary.

The Consolation of Philosophy of Boethius with the duplex commentary by
Saint Thomas as stated, and Ascensius, is finished.
CHAPTER IV

DISCUSSION

Boethius in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance

Boethius spent a great part of his life translating works of important Greek authors into Latin. Perhaps he sensed that the unity of the Roman Empire was not as stable as many of his fellow senators believed, and with the Empire's stability in question, Roman Education would no longer offer the quality it had given to him. Whatever his reasons, Boethius' efforts were not in vain. His translations and commentaries make him "the principal mediator between Antiquity and the Middle Ages."¹

Boethius' works were essential in passing along a great deal of Platonic, Stoic, Pythagorean and Augustinian ideas.² Boethius had intended to provide translations of all the works of Plato and Aristotle, for he thought their philosophies were not as dissimilar as many believed. He was unable to accomplish this goal because of his untimely death. Yet, he was able to translate and offer commentary on many of the works of Aristotle. In fact, in the Middle Ages there were two "standard collections"


²Maurice De Wulf, trans. P. Coffey 145.
of Aristotle's writings on logic and natural science, with the versions of Boethius and James of Venice being preferred for the logical works, while the versions by William of Moerbeke were used for the scientific works.³ Maurice De Wulf places an even greater importance on Boethius' influence when he suggests that the translations, commentaries and original treatises of Boethius "formed the basis of all logical studies [in the early Middle Ages].⁴

Boethius was clearly an authority on the logic of Aristotle, yet he was equally well known for his Consolation of Philosophy.⁵ His Consolation of Philosophy transmitted a great deal of information to the Middle Ages. It was not only steeped in various ancient philosopher's ideas, it also passed along information on Roman history during Theodoric's reign as emperor, classical forms of poetry, and classical mythology. We shall see later that Boethius' texts on Aristotle influenced not only the history of logic in the Middle Ages, but in turn effected the commentaries written by medieval philosophers on his Consolation of Philosophy.

Boethius' intentions were to translate and comment on all of the works of Aristotle, but he managed to translate only six of Aristotle's works, and wrote


⁴Maurice De Wulf, trans. P. Coffey 145.

⁵For the two authors who confirm this information, see G. R. Evans 32; Michael Haren, Medieval Thought: The Western Intellectual Tradition from Antiquity to the Thirteenth Century, 2nd ed.(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992) 67.
commentaries on each of these. These sources were so influential that they made Boethius "the chief source of Aristotelianism" from the time of their transmittal until the end of the twelfth century. These translations of Aristotle were literal, which encouraged scholars and commentators of the Middle Ages to carry on the literal expression of this terminology in a very precise way, which eventually led to the creation of a perfected, special vocabulary.

Boethius' *Consolation of Philosophy*, however, did not reach to Northern Europe until the end of the eighth century, when Alcuin brought the work back with him after a visit to Italy. The text's wealth of information in its variations in poetic style, philosophical ideas, and logical reasoning, meant that its popularity grew quickly. The work's popularity is surprising when its lack of Christian references is weighed against the wealth of information it contains on ancient philosophers and pagan culture. The immortality of the soul is mentioned only briefly in Book II of his *Consolation of Philosophy*, and the god of whom Boethius speaks is the deity of

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6Boethius translated and commented upon Aristotle's *Categories*, *Prior and Posterior Analytics*, *The Hermeneutics* (*De Interpretatione*), *Sophistical Arguments*, and *Topics*, see Frederick Copleston, *A History of Medieval Philosophy* 54.

7Maurice De Wulf, trans. P. Coffey 145.


Neoplatonism. Noel Kaylor explains that despite the fact that there was no direct reference to the Christian God, medieval translators and commentators on the text tried very hard to reconcile the deity in the *Consolation of Philosophy* with the Christian God. They very often "medievalized" a great deal of the work to make it more congruous with Christian thinking. 

What medieval scholars did not feel they needed to alter in the *Consolation of Philosophy* was the commentary format itself. It was Boethius who gave the Middle Ages the "technical models of the way in which a commentary should be made." Commentators certainly made use of the format set forth by Boethius, following it from its introduction in the late eighth century well into the Renaissance.

The *Consolation of Philosophy* was written in a genre of classical literature which had already been firmly established by Boethius' time. This genre is called the *consolatio*, 'consolatory discourse', and its form was handed down from Greek models by Cicero. Thus Boethius was not original in his use of the genre itself, but he was the first Christian writer to use it. Boethius' themes in the work are greatly

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12Maurice De Wulf, trans. Ernest Messenger 111.

influenced by the Greek tradition. Boethius' originality lies in his treatment of the classical idea that "man is either the plaything of chance or the pawn of an inexorable Fate."  

A medieval audience might have found a work so immersed in pagan themes unsettling, had they not been accustomed to the method of using pagan ideas to aid in Christian edification from the works of Augustine and other early Church Fathers. Augustine encouraged the use of pagan philosophers' works, arguing that if their comments aid our understanding of Christian revelation, there is certainly no harm in using their knowledge. Boethius does as Augustine recommended by employing pagan philosophers' ideas to better explain faith. The difference in Boethius' use of classical reasoning to support faith is that his "apologetic aim" is to mention nowhere in the text anything particularly Christian or Biblical. If Boethius' philosophy was not original, then we can appreciate the originality in these techniques. Medieval

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14 For more information on the lack of originality in the themes of "variation of fortune, the nature of evil, and the compatibility of providence with free choice, see Michael Haren 63.

15 Haren suggests "there is a psychological process from a point where the possibility of providence requires detailed explanation to a position where it is considered reconciled or at least reconcilable with the inequity of the world's order as man experiences it." Haren 64.


17 Jaroslav Pelikan 44.
thinkers searched his works for understanding of the philosophy of the ancients, and it was his ability to express their ideas which made him a "channel" by which these medieval thinkers acquired that understanding, as well as their Latin vocabulary of logical terms.\textsuperscript{18}

Henry Chadwick suggests that there are quite a few similarities between the \textit{Consolation of Philosophy} and Augustine's earlier works, and such similarities reveal that "in his Platonism Boethius is not necessarily turning away from Augustine."\textsuperscript{19} The Platonism of Boethius is similar in that he believed, as did Augustine, that truths were above the human mind, and these truths could be recognized but not changed by man.\textsuperscript{20}

Boethius' translations, commentaries and \textit{Consolation of Philosophy} served medieval thinkers well. His popularity was so great that his \textit{Consolation of Philosophy} was one of the top three "best sellers" of the Middle Ages.\textsuperscript{21} However, Anthony Grafton suggests that it was because of such popularity in the Middle Ages that

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{18}Frederick Copleston, \textit{A History of Medieval Philosophy} 54.
\item \textsuperscript{19}He believes that Boethius may well have written the \textit{Consolation of Philosophy} with many of Augustine's works in mind, saying, "Even the mature works of Augustine, the \textit{City of God}, the \textit{Trinity}, and that neglected masterpiece the Literal Commentary on Genesis, offer many anticipations of Boethius's Platonism, especially expounded in the last book of the \textit{Consolation}." He suggests that the similarities with the works of Augustine are: "the personification of philosophy (Solil. i, 1), ...the ejection of the Muses from a serious discussion (C. Acad. iii, 7; De ordine i, 24)." Henry Chadwick 249-250.
\item \textsuperscript{20}Frederick Copleston, \textit{A History of Medieval Philosophy} 34-35.
\end{itemize}
Humanists had mixed feelings about Boethius. In fact, "no classic of Latin literature made the humanists more uneasy."\textsuperscript{22}

A few Italian humanists in the first half of the fifteenth century believed Boethius to be a "brilliant inventor" and gave him the status of a classic author. This belief was readily accepted by Northern scholars who went to Italy for learning near the end of the fifteenth century.\textsuperscript{23}

Northern scholars are of great interest to this discussion, because the two commentators on the text of \textit{Consolation of Philosophy} studied here were heavily influenced by different traditions of Northern scholarship.\textsuperscript{24} Moreover, it would be a disservice to the commentators to ignore the fact that this commentary was used


\textsuperscript{23}Grafton believes that Northern scholars readily accepted this belief because they were "less sensitive to style than the Italians and even more encyclopaedic in their interests." Anthony Grafton 412.

during the fifteenth century in university settings, and that the *Consolation of Philosophy* was then lectured on in German universities. However, the *Consolation of Philosophy* was not used for introductory courses, but rather for students with advanced skills in Latin. It is important for the study of this commentary that one remains fully aware of the commentators' purposes and their original audience.

Scholasticism, The German Tradition and Pseudo-Thomas Aquinas

Falsely attributing a commentary on the *Consolation of Philosophy* to Saint Thomas Aquinas immediately suggests the scholastic nature of the work. Humanists questioned the *via antiqua*, the name they gave to the teachings of Augustine, Anselm and Aquinas, but they were especially critical of Aquinas' system of combining Aristotelian philosophy and Christian revelation, in as much as Scholasticism found

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25 Palmer points out that there are course listings and lists of texts in 1412 at Erfurt, and in the fifteenth century at Prague the *Consolation of Philosophy* appears in a list of texts used in lectures. Each of the lectures were to cover a time period of four months. At St. Dionysius College of Heidelberg (founded 1452) a master who had "a short lecture course in a year should lecture on a less usual subject in the following year, citing the *Consolatio* and Euclid among examples." Nigel Palmer, "The Latin and Vernacular in the Northern European tradition of the *De Consolatione Philosophie*," ed. Margaret Gibson (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1981) 380-381.

26 Heinrich Bebel, who was a professor of oratory and rhetoric at the university of Tübingen (he began there in 1496), suggests that because Boethius and Seneca had a "crude and dry" style, they should be reserved for advanced students. James H. Overfield, Humanism and Scholasticism in Late Medieval Philosophy, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984) 145, 149. Also, Nigel Palmer suggests that there is no evidence that the *Consolation of Philosophy* was part of the main curriculum of courses, but was a "less usual subject." Nigel Palmer 380-381.
its greatest expression in the works of Thomas Aquinas.\footnote{27}

The name, Pseudo Thomas Aquinas implies the anonymity of the true author, but there is some rather limited information about the actual person who wrote the commentary on the *Consolation of Philosophy* attributed to him. The first printing of his commentary was in Northern Europe by Anton Koberger at Nürnberg in 1473.\footnote{28} Pseudo Thomas Aquinas' method was to open each section of the commentary with a literal paraphrase. It is this method which reveals the school or university context of the commentary.\footnote{29} The *Duplex Commentario* edition of Jean de Vingle contains a preface on the life history of Boethius which offers what is often questionable information. Noel Kaylor suggests that prefaces such as this formed "a tradition of their own."\footnote{30}

\footnote{27}For information on Thomas Aquinas as the "peak of this development" see, William Estep 13. For information on *via antiqua*, see William Estep 104.

\footnote{28}It was the second part of the book, the first part being a bilingual edition of the *Consolation of Philosophy*, see Nigel Palmer 363.

\footnote{29}Palmer also states that this university text was expanded, in that printed editions of Pseudo Thomas Aquinas' commentary later contained elementary school texts as an appendix to the *Consolation of Philosophy*. The first edition of these, which included the elementary texts, was the 1482 Toulouse edition printed by Johann Parix. It also contains the thirteenth century *De Disciplina Scholarium*, which is attributed to Boethius. Palmer also mentions the 1498 Lyons edition printed by Jean de Vingle, pointing out that it contained a new commentary by Josse Bade, the *De Officio Discipulorum* of Quintilian and another section on table manners. Nigel Palmer 363.

\footnote{30}Kaylor says in his introduction: "Earlier translators borrowed information from earlier prefaces, they used information from the commentaries, and they extracted material from the *Consolatio* itself. The resulting mixture of information and misinformation entered the vitae. In that tradition Boethius was generally viewed
Alastair Minnis says that Pseudo Thomas Aquinas was known for "narrative elaboration." Also, the incipit of Pseudo Thomas Aquinas and William Whetley (fl 1309-16) were the same, so that sometimes there was confusion concerning the authorship of each. Minnis cites Dr. H. F. Sebastian as saying that Pseudo Thomas Aquinas was "a fifteenth century writer, probably German, and that he and Whetley were independent borrowers from [Nicholas] Trevet." Apart from the information given by Minnis, Palmer, and Grafton, we have just one more mention of the Pseudo Thomas Aquinas tradition, which is by Pierre Courcelle. Courcelle's information, however, is scant, offering little information on the commentary other than placing it in the German tradition, and none on the author himself.

Even though German humanism began in the early fifteenth century, it was not formally acknowledged as a movement in German universities until the 1450's. Assuming that Pseudo Thomas Aquinas was German, and living in the fifteenth century, it is clear from his commentary that he had not embraced German humanism as a Christian martyr; he was even acknowledged as a saint in some parts of Italy."

Noel Howard Kaylor, Jr. 14.

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31Alastair Minnis 354.

32Alastair Minnis 354.

33His treatment of Pseudo Thomas Aquinas is mentioned by Palmer, who also suggests that apart from this reference the German tradition in the Consolation of Philosophy "has received no critical attention." See Nigel Palmer 380. See also Pierre Courcelle, La Consolation de Philosophie dans la tradition litteraire antecedents et posterite de Boece, (Paris: Etudes Augustiniennes, 1967).

34James Overfield 61.
The content of the commentary, as well as the comments of Jose Bade concerning Pseudo Thomas Aquinas' work are evidence of this.

Pseudo Thomas Aquinas' procedure for explicating the text of the *Consolation of Philosophy* follows the basic method used by scholastics for the most part, but differs from the scholastic method in certain ways. He begins the commentary on the meter sections by discussing the type of meter used for that poem. He gives the name of the person who is believed to have originated that meter style, and offers a few words on the technical aspects of the meter. This is the only way in which the commentary on meter sections differs from the commentary on prose sections.

The commentary on the prose sections of Book Five opens with a general summation (two to four sentences) of the major points made, citing the places where those points are to be found in the main text. Pseudo Thomas Aquinas then follows with an in-depth discussion of each of the major points separately, by which he intersperses the main text of Boethius with his literal paraphrases and then reiterates that major point's meaning through summaries in his own words. Throughout the sections of his commentary Pseudo Thomas Aquinas attempts to validate points made by Boethius by citing corresponding passages from ancient authors.

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35Jacque Le Goff explains that this "basic scholarly method began with a commentary on a text, the *lectio*, an in-depth study beginning with a grammatical analysis which gave the letter (littera), advancing to a logical explanation which provided meaning (sensus), and ending in an exegesis which revealed the text's content of knowledge and thought (sententia). See Jacques Le Goff, *Intellectuals in the Middle Ages*, trans. Teresa Lavender Fagan (Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1993) 89.
Pseudo Thomas Aquinas is forever working to enhance the authority of statements in the *Consolation of Philosophy* by citing ancient authors whose statements support Boethius' ideas. In the sixth prose section of Book Five, where Boethius discusses the effect of vices on man's ability to reason, Pseudo Thomas Aquinas reiterates the author's thought, saying "vices are rejected because they resign man to slavery, and he who commits a sin is a slave to that sin." Pseudo Thomas Aquinas then cites Seneca as saying, "if you sin, the baseness of sin will cause you to feel shame."\(^{36}\)

As mentioned earlier, Pseudo Thomas Aquinas and other commentators were known for narrative elaboration. With this type of elaboration the commentator enhances the work of the author by including educational stories, histories of outstanding people or events, and by brief biographies of individuals, often pagan leaders and writers.\(^{37}\) In the fourth meter section of Book Five Pseudo Thomas Aquinas explains the origin of the word 'stoic', saying, "Stoics are called *stoa* in Greek, which is *porticus*, 'porch' in Latin. Wherefore in Athens on a very open porch and in certain places, the Stoics were publicly accustomed to dispute."\(^{38}\) In the second meter section of Book Five Pseudo Thomas Aquinas mentions Homer's description of Phoebus as "shining pure light," but also negates the power of this pagan god by

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\(^{36}\)Translation 180.

\(^{37}\)Alastair Minnis 315.

\(^{38}\)Translation 145.
comparing him with the Christian God. He says:

Perhaps Homer made the book on the beauty of the sun, he who "did not have the strength to burst forth," that is penetrate, "the innermost parts," that is the depths, "of the land and sea...." So, not at all, that is there he does not, possess in himself the maker of the great earth, God, who himself by his own intellect penetrates all things.\textsuperscript{39}

In the sixth prose section of Book Five Pseudo Thomas Aquinas uses an appropriate metaphor, a compass, to illustrate the idea of divine perception not alternating, but remaining constant, anticipating and embracing man's choices at one stroke. He says:

if eternity is put as if the middle point of a circle, and all time as if the circumference, then although the circumference continually moves and part of the whole remains stationary...the center holds itself uniform.\textsuperscript{40}

Nigel Palmer explains that the technique of Pseudo Thomas Aquinas was to begin each section with a "literal paraphrase."\textsuperscript{41} Pseudo Thomas Aquinas summarizes the major points addressed in that section, and specifies where those major points are to be found in Boethius' text. His literal paraphrase is often done in such a way that it is only a word or phrase following a Latin term of Boethius', which a reader might not readily understand. Pseudo Thomas Aquinas' treatment of the Stoics' concept of

\textsuperscript{39}Translation 109.

\textsuperscript{40}Translation 172.

\textsuperscript{41}Palmer also believes that the technique of beginning with a literal paraphrase "betrays the school or university context in which the work was read." Nigel Palmer 363. He also believes that "the reading of the Consolation in a school or university context in fifteenth century Germany is attested by a number of Latin commentaries, including Ps.-Aquinas, which contain a straightforward elementary exposition of the text, and which seem to belong mostly to the tradition of Nicholas Trevet." Palmer 380.
theoretical knowledge illustrates this point. The words inside quotation marks are from the text of the *Consolation of Philosophy*, those outside quotation marks are the literal paraphrases of Pseudo Thomas Aquinas:

> forms of sensible things are impressed upon the mind from "the outermost bodies," that is from exterior things. They considered those bodies in this way to imprint "images on the mind, as when a character" was made with certain writings "with a swift stylus on a smooth surface," that is on a flat page, "a page which had no previous marks."  

When the information which he has paraphrased is a particularly important philosophical concept, Pseudo Thomas Aquinas often follows up the literal paraphrase with an additional explanation of the idea. A fine example is in the fourth meter section of Book Five, concerning the Stoic belief that knowledge comes from experience with exterior things which impress themselves upon the mind. He clarifies the Stoic concept by comparing it to the Platonic view that knowledge is within the soul as universal things understood by it and are sought again by the human mind. Following the comparison, Pseudo Thomas Aquinas refutes the Stoic concept by asserting that the soul is not passive, because it "judges, restores, separates, refutes and understands true things from false things," which are all active operations.

Pseudo Thomas Aquinas' literal paraphrase of the definition of eternity in the sixth prose section of Book Five is exemplary of the laborious exactness which was expected from the vocabulary in a scholastic commentator's explication of a text. He

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42 Translation 145.

43 Translation 147.
chooses his words very carefully, and is clearly preoccupied with expressing what he views as the *sensus*, the precise meaning, of the definition. Yet he also alters its meaning by giving it Christian overtones. By Pseudo Thomas Aquinas' changes to the concept of eternity presented by Boethius, we see an example of the medieval principle *philosophia ancilla theologiae*, that philosophy is the handmaiden of theology, and that medieval scholars consciously labored to "bring the works and ideas of philosophy into partnership with those of the Church."\(^{44}\) He says:

> Note when she [Philosophy] says eternity is possession, there she employs the name of possession to designate immutability, and unfailing supply of eternity, because it is firmly possessed and calmly held. She says of life to the specification that non-living things not be measured by eternity. She says this is endless, concerning difference among these life forms, which has an end in part before and in part after, such as a life of man or in part before, such as the life of angels. She says simultaneous, according to its substance which is wholly the same. Yet, not according to works, since they possess successful and intellectual operations. She says it is perfect in order to designate that nothing exists outside of eternity. Indeed, perfection is that in which nothing is lacking, that is, from heaven and earth.\(^{45}\)

This synthesis of Christian and ancient philosophical thought was especially prevalent in the works of Saint Thomas Aquinas.\(^{46}\) Saint Thomas was very aware that there was a definite difference between philosophical reasoning and Christian

\(^{44}\)Price suggests that "*philosophia ancilla theologiae*...became the motto of the medievals...." Betsey Price 70.

\(^{45}\)Translation 162-163.

\(^{46}\)Betsey Price 70.
revelation, but he also believed that "truth itself is one and common to them both."\textsuperscript{47}

Awareness that Aquinas was very conscious of the difference between these two sources of knowledge prevents our assuming that Aquinas might have been tempted to "Christianize" the works of Aristotle or other Ancients. He simply used what he viewed as a very efficient philosophy to better explain aspects of Christian doctrine.

Pseudo Thomas Aquinas is quite similar to Saint Thomas Aquinas in this respect. When commenting on Boethius' use of Aristotle's interpretation of free will, Pseudo Thomas Aquinas says:

\begin{quote}
Philosophy shows free will is diversified, certainly, by the difference in angels and in men, this freedom of the will is clear enough. I determine that it is not equal, that is comparable, in all things, where more is in divine substances than in men.\textsuperscript{48}
\end{quote}

The key word here is "angels." Clearly, Pseudo Thomas Aquinas is adding to the text. Throughout the commentary he consistently alters the context of the philosophical ideas of the ancients which are expressed by Boethius to edify his readers on the finer points of Christian doctrine.

His word choice when expounding on the Stoics' view of theoretical knowledge in the fourth meter section of Book Five is another area in which he shows his desire to render Christian revelation more accessible through philosophical reasoning. Here Pseudo Thomas Aquinas refers to that which the Stoics understand to be passive as anima, soul. Yet in the Loeb edition of the \textit{Consolation of Philosophy} Boethius' word

\textsuperscript{47}Michael Haren 181.

\textsuperscript{48}Translation 103.
choice for that which the Stoics understand to be passive is *mens*, mind.49 If Pseudo Thomas Aquinas were commenting on the Platonic idea that the rational part of man, for which the Greek is often translated interchangeably as mind or soul, then the significance of his word choice would be minimal. However, the significant factor is that he is not translating from Greek, but is replacing Boethius' Latin word with one he prefers. Moreover, their can be no confusion after his commentary on the Stoic position on theoretical knowledge that it is polar to the Platonic one. His word choice is most likely a conscious decision to intentionally remind the reader of the Christian concept of the soul.

Boethius’ last major point in the sixth prose section of Book Five about the effect of faith and correct prayers is the point at which Pseudo Thomas Aquinas has most obviously synthesized philosophy of the Ancients with Christian doctrine. Pseudo Thomas Aquinas paraphrases Philosophy’s thought on this subject as, "Righteousness, faith and correct prayers are offerings to God. Therefore in these things we are joined to God and in this we are comforted."50 His choice of "offerings" suggests sacrifices, as were performed by the Jews in the Old Testament. It was in this act that Jews understood themselves to be communing with God. Here Pseudo Thomas Aquinas is expressing the Christian intellectual notion that "both the law and the prophets on the one hand and philosophy on the other looked forward to the


50Translation 180.
Gospel. ”51

If any of his readers missed the connection between ancient philosophy and the Old Testament, he ends the exegesis of this point saying, "So truly it is written in Hebrews 4:13, "all things are naked and opened to the eyes of him who is God." 52 This verse of Scripture may not initially appear to be directly relevant to the notion of the Law of the Hebrews, Old Testament prophets and ancient philosophers anticipating Christianity, but it cannot be coincidence that Pseudo Thomas Aquinas cites a verse from "The Letter to the Hebrews." Hebrews is the book of the New Testament which Christians believe offers "proof of the pre-eminence of Christianity over Judaism." 53 Furthermore, it is the same verse of scripture which Saint Thomas Aquinas quotes in reply to the idea that God understands all things because it is "in His own essence in which all the species of things are comprehended." 54

The method of using The Law of the Hebrews and sayings of Old Testament prophets to add validation to Christian revelation began early on in the Christian

51 Copleston 19.

52 Translation 180.


tradition. At the same time, this method nullifies the idea of the supremacy of Judaism in Christians' opinion. Likewise, working from the idea that the ancients possessed partial truths allowed Christian intellectuals to exercise restraint over the power of philosophy while utilizing those ideas for Christian exegesis. Ancient philosophy and the Books of the Old Testament served medieval intellectuals well in this manner. Certainly Christian doctrine was their foremost subject matter, but with the scholastics in the later Middle Ages, it was philosophy which came to the forefront as the mode of expression.\textsuperscript{55}

It is in the works of Saint Thomas Aquinas that we see most vividly this utilization of ancient philosophy to explicate Christian doctrine. Particularly it is his use of Aristotle's works to interpret doctrine for which we best remember him. This was his most readily identifiable trait in the Middle Ages and Renaissance as well. So it is understandable that a commentary which incorporated this trait by which we recognize Saint Thomas Aquinas should mistakenly come to be considered the saint's work.

Pseudo Thomas Aquinas was a medieval intellectual steeped in the writings of Aristotle, and as we shall see in other ancient writers. He was familiar with the works of Saint Thomas Aquinas as well, certainly with the \textit{Summa Theologica}. Yet he never mentions the saint's works in his commentary. This was a clever way to lend authority to his commentary. Because the author chose to remain anonymous and alluded

\textsuperscript{55}Price 70.
authorship to Saint Thomas Aquinas, his action cannot be viewed as a personal desire for fame. Rather, he seems to have been motivated by a desire to ensure the acceptance of the commentary. The term *auctor*, means 'author' in its most literal sense, but it had a more particular meaning for medieval intellectuals. The word embodied the idea of the works of a 'founder', an 'author of scientific or literary productions'; it implied the works of an ancient writer or respected Christian writer.

This is what the anonymity of Pseudo Thomas Aquinas' worked to obtain. By the simple fact that he quoted *auctores* such as Aristotle, and to a lesser degree Plato and others, and because he implicated philosophical ideas from Boethius' *Consolation of Philosophy* in a certain way, his commentary was readily associated with Saint Thomas Aquinas. The commentary was given immediate credibility and authority because of the *auctores* it discussed, and the manner in which it explicated philosophical ideas.

**Pseudo-Thomas Aquinas and Aristotelian Philosophy**

As mentioned earlier, Christian ideas were the foremost subject matter of medieval intellectuals, but the way in which they most often chose to express those ideas was through philosophical ideas and technical language in the later Middle Ages.\(^5^6\) Christian intellectuals realized very early on that some philosophers had come close to the "religious truths recognized by the Jews and Christians," yet not all were

\(^{56}\text{Price 70.}\)
comfortable with conceding such authority to philosophy.

One way to solve this problem was to suggest that certain philosophical ideas had perhaps emerged under the influence of Judaism. For instance, some suggested that Plato "borrowed from the Old Testament." Others believed that the divine word or Logos gave these philosophers "partial recognition of religious and moral truth." This idea suggested that there was some truth to be found in Greek Philosophy, but at the same time it nullified the pursuit of religious truths through philosophy alone.

Later in his life Augustine changed his opinion regarding the great importance of philosophy as an aid to Christian revelation. However, many of his works as a Christian writer incorporated the use of philosophy to aid his understanding of the Christian religion. Boethius was also viewed as a Christian intellectual who used pagan writings in his quest to better understand truths. These authors had a tremendous impact on medieval intellectuals. In their wake, Scholastics "exploited the literary heritage of antiquity and made a place for the profane sciences in Christian knowledge.

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57 Frederick Copleston explains that "Plato's hypothesis, in the Timaeus, of the divine craftsman was thought to incorporate ideas borrowed from Genesis." Copleston, History of Medieval Philosophy 19.

58 Copleston also states that Christian writers believed the Logos was synonymous with the second person of the Trinity. Copleston, History of Medieval Philosophy 19.

59 Copleston, History of Medieval Philosophy 19.

in its broadest sense. 

The ultimate goal of medieval intellectuals was to understand the Bible's meaning, and following the example of Augustine and others, they used classical texts as a guide to understanding scripture, believing strongly that "classical knowledge and ancient languages provided the tools to mine scripture for meaning." In fact, throughout the Middle Ages utilization of philosophy for understanding grew to be emphasized more and more, with the result that authors of philosophical commentaries were to a great extent understood to be under the guidance of philosophy.

The method of both Augustine and Aquinas was termed *via antiqua*. However, the term became more closely associated with the scholastic method developed in the universities during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries and was exemplified by Thomas Aquinas (1224-1274) whose theological system is considered the greatest achievement of the scholastic method. His synthesis of Aristotelian philosophy and Christian teaching was designed to enlist reason and logical argument in support of Church dogma, although the latter proved to be irreconcilable with Christian doctrine on a number of issues.

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62 Price 54.

63 Price 76.

64 Estep 104.

65 Estep 13.
For example, Etiennne Gilson explains that Aristotle's god, described in his *Physics* as the 'unmoved mover', 'separate', 'pure act', 'thought of thought', is 'the highest degree of being'. However, Aristotle's "natural theology has as its proper object a plurality of divine beings," which is incompatible with Christian natural theology. Nevertheless, as an unmoved mover, Aristotle's God and the God of Saint Thomas Aquinas are very similar. Aristotle's philosophy and Christian theology are in agreement that all things are put into action by God as First Cause. Pseudo Thomas Aquinas echoes this point of view in the first prose section of Book Five when he states:

Moreover, in everything God is the reason of all things, it is clear since heaven and the entire universe depends upon him, as it is clear in the twelfth book of *Metaphysics*.

Medieval scholastic theologians were convinced that there was a certain "mode of being" which existed in movement, that there was a "way of existing metaphysically inherent in the essence of the thing which thus exists." We see this view expressed by Pseudo Thomas Aquinas in the sixth prose section of Book Five:

[with] infinite motion of temporal things...the state of eternity is imitated since it is not able to be wholly expressed, because the state of temporal time is a state outside eternity...

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67 Translation 91-92.

68 Gilson 66.

69 Translation 167.
The sense here is that eternity exists as something apart from what is perceived as the temporal universe. It is described here almost as if it were an entity, a being existing by self sufficiency. Here temporal time is described as existing outside eternity, imitating eternity in the act of looking to past and future.

Aristotle expresses his views on chance in *Physics*, but also in *Metaphysics*, where Boethius takes the example of a man digging in a field for the purpose of planting but finds buried treasure. Boethius tells us that Aristotle defines chance in the second book of *Physics*, and we see that it is Aristotle's definition which is used here. Aristotle sees chance as coincidence that occurs for unintended reasons, it is a "coincidence of a different process of causation." Philosophy explains chance saying:

> For an accidental event has its own causes from which a combination of both imagined and unexpected things appears to have produced a chance event for him who made something from the cause of another matter.

Pseudo Thomas Aquinas paraphrases Boethius' definition of chance, further expounding Aristotle's definition, saying, "chance originates from merging causes...and what causes merge...originates from an order of providence." However, chance is different from luck, in that there is no room here for the

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70 Henry Chadwick states this, giving the citations as *Physics* (B 4-5) and *Metaphysics* (1205a, 14ff.) Chadwick 244.

71 Translation 93.

72 Chadwick 244.

73 Translation 94.

74 Translation 142.
possibility of deliberate choice.  

On the subject of choice, Aristotle suggests that *prohairesis*, 'practical reasoning' should end in a "rational choice and appropriate action." When man fails to do what he should, this is *akrasia*, 'weakness of the will', or 'weakness of character'. Electio, 'the act of choice' is a major point of discussion in Aristotle's *Ethics*, and it was a view that Christians found essential for their understanding of choice. Only humans, unlike other animals, possess the ability of rational choice, which men "both think and desire," the actions of which "are open to moral praise and blame." Moreover, an important element to rational choice is that it is a voluntary act. If rational deliberation did not occur before the decision made by the will, the act could not be understood as a choice. Pseudo Thomas Aquinas expounds this idea in the third prose section of Book Five where he says:

Note that all virtues and vices arise from free choice of good and evil.

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75 Ackrill 39.

76 Ackrill 145.


78 Gilson explains Aristotle's meaning as "it is by the choice we make between good and evil that we are morally qualified. The choice belongs to the sphere of voluntary, but it is only part of it, for all choice is voluntary, but all that is voluntary is not a choice." Gilson 305.

79 Ackrill 142-143.

80 Gilson 305.

81 Gilson 310.
Similarly, punishment and reward exist because of the free action of good and evil....a free act will not exist, unless free action concerning good or evil exists. Therefore, if an act of our will is not free, the nature of that act following the will is produced by God. Thus, God will be causing our failure. But this is absurd.\(^{82}\)

Here Pseudo Thomas Aquinas simplifies the question of choice, explaining that it is a free act. He suggests that denying its existence as a free act makes God responsible for our actions.

So, for Boethius and others who adhere to Aristotelian philosophy on the topic of choice, *arbitrium* does not mean 'the spontaneous option of the will', but 'free movement of reason'. Also, the will itself is free "only inasmuch as it is judged by reason."\(^{83}\) Therefore, Pseudo Thomas Aquinas is following Aristotelian philosophy along with Boethius when he says, "Note that free will is freedom of judging.... Or, following Boethius...free will is the judgement of the soul on desire...."\(^{84}\) Pseudo Thomas Aquinas goes further and explains that man is responsible for his actions, citing Aristotle in the third book of *Ethics*, "Man is lord of his works from the beginning continuously to the end." Pseudo Thomas Aquinas then adds to this, "following the merits of the works, of free will, he receives penalty or punishment."\(^{85}\)

Pseudo Thomas Aquinas shows his understanding of Aristotelian doctrine by

\(^{82}\)Translation 119-120.

\(^{83}\)Gilson 311.

\(^{84}\)Translation 104.

\(^{85}\)Translation 106.
commenting on Boethius' expression of Aristotle's distinction between sensitive and intellectual levels of knowledge. His comments reflect knowledge of Aristotle independent of Boethius's teachings on this subject, as Pseudo Thomas Aquinas notes the passage in De Anima where discussions of sense and cognition are to be found. He writes:

Note that the higher capacity brings in the lower capacity, just as the quadrangle includes the triangle, as is clear in the second book of De Anima. Therefore what human intelligence is able to comprehend divine intelligence is also able to comprehend, although not otherwise.86

Such methods of incorporating ancient philosophy in a system of Christian theology seems, at times, to have a sterilizing effect on the religion itself. Often the rationalizations which scholastics used to expound on Christian doctrine seem trite, even frivolous. For instance, Pseudo Thomas Aquinas, in his attempt to further distinguish the difference between man and other animals says:

Note, following Aristotle in the sixteenth book of De Animalibus, "Man among all living things has the linear shape of uprightness." Indeed, Ovid speaks concerning that shape in the sixth book of Metamorphosis. He says, "Although certain animals look to the earth, he judges the face of humanity uplifted, allowing that it see the heavens." He commanded this, and their uprightness exalts the heavens.87

It is examples such as this that later gave humanists ample opportunity to mock the Scholastic methods of exegesis. Yet, there is much knowledge to gain from such a system of theology. By examining the ways in which Pseudo Thomas Aquinas

86Translation 142.

87Translation 158.
employs the works classical authors and philosophers, we are better able to comprehend what he expected his audience to understand and consider what type of information he valued and believed needed to be passed on to others through his commentary.

Pseudo-Thomas Aquinas and Platonism

As discussed earlier, some Christian thinkers were not comfortable with the idea that some philosophers had come close to "religious truths recognized by Jews and Christians." In fact a few went so far as to suggest that Plato's doctrine of the divine architect in the Timaeus "incorporated ideas from Genesis." However, this problem was more profitably solved by putting forth the idea that pagan writers had come close to religious truths through the help of the Logos, who was identified with the second person of the Trinity. Most medieval theologians have little difficulty with this platonic idea. The Platonic Deity who "being without jealousy desired that all things should come as near as possible to being like himself" and the Christian God "who so loved the world that He sent His only begotten son" are similar enough that Platonism was used by Christian philosophers to aid revelation with reason. In fact, Pseudo

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88 Copleston, A History of Medieval Philosophy 19.

89 Copleston, A History of Medieval Philosophy 19.

90 Copleston, A History of Medieval Philosophy 19.

Thomas Aquinas echoes a very similar notion in the second meter section of Book Five, saying, "Note although God by knowing all foresees all...he wishes them to be creatures of free will, whereas this great thing he gives in his divine goodness."\(^92\) Saint Thomas Aquinas was one of the many medieval theologians who also made use of the works of Plato in his system of theology. In fact, there is quite a bit of Platonism in Saint Thomas Aquinas' works since so many of the Christian writers before him had incorporated Plato's philosophy to expound on the doctrine of Christianity.\(^93\)

Pseudo Thomas Aquinas is steeped in the philosophy of Plato as well, as is evident in his paraphrase of Boethius' incorporation of Plato's theory of the soul's reminiscence. Pseudo Thomas Aquinas says:

> here she [Philosophy] solves the objection, where it is noted that Plato proposed the soul to be the things made in heaven and to possess whole perfect cognizance, but by slipping into bodies, it forgot knowledge of those things, and retained this in universals.\(^94\)

Plato's idea of the soul's reminiscence was not one which all medieval theologians were comfortable with. Augustine rejected it, as it implied a previous existence of the soul, and instead substituted his own theory of divine illumination.\(^95\) This idea

\(^92\)Translation 109.

\(^93\)Copleston suggests that though Saint Thomas Aquinas was a great admirer of Aristotle, there was still quite a bit of Platonism in his work due to this fact. See, Copleston, A History of Medieval Philosophy 23.

\(^94\)Translation 128.

\(^95\)Copleston 35.
suggests that human beings are able, through illumination, to understand eternal truths. Because Boethius used the theory in the fourth meter section of his *Consolation of Philosophy*, Pseudo Thomas Aquinas was presented with an opportunity to comment on it. His comment synthesizes Plato's theory of reminiscence with Augustine's theory of divine illumination. He says:

Note that here Boethius uses Platonic thinking which considers forms of things from the beginning naturally placed in the soul, but the sophist soul is incorporeal, so that it does not learn from these unless it is aroused by an immutable exterior sense.\(^96\)

He suggests that reminiscence, or remembering truths which the soul understood as truths in its former incorporeal form, is revealed to it by an outside force, one that does not change. Pseudo Thomas Aquinas paraphrases Plato's theory of reminiscence in such a way as a similarity between it and Logos, revelation through the second person of the trinity.

In the *Timaeus* God is seen in the representation of the demiurge, the architect or maker of the cosmos.\(^97\) Betsey Price explains that Platonism contained the idea that "everything which comes into being owes its being to a cause." Plato's ideas on causality suggested that the creator of the universe wanted all things to be good as he

\(^{96}\)Translation 147-148.

\(^{97}\)Curtius explains that the *Timaeus* was the only work of Plato's known to the Middle Ages. He also suggests that it had its strongest influence through Cicero, African Platonism, Chalcidius and Boethius (from the Consolation in the ninth meter section of Book Three).

was. She says that with Plato's creator came the notion of a hierarchy of being. Pseudo Thomas Aquinas expresses aspects of this idea of a hierarchy of being in the second prose section of Book Five where he says:

from Plato...human souls likewise, are things made in heaven, and afterwards descend into bodies and are held in these, as it were, in chains. Though souls, when they are made in heaven, are most free in contemplation of the divine mind. However, as now they are jointly in bodies, in this they are less free, because less freedom is in these since they are subjected to vices.

It is because of this descent into bodies that the souls perceive less than they did in their incorporeal forms. This is the theory behind the hierarchy of levels of knowledge. Pseudo Thomas Aquinas explains this hierarchy where he says, "since reason is the nobler force, sense and imagination with it, reason comprehends its own object, and the object of sense and imagination, and not the opposite." It is this theory which enables Boethius to explain man's inability to fully understand the coexistence of divine providence and free will. Pseudo Thomas Aquinas clarifies this theory in the fifth prose section of Book Five where he says, "divine comprehension in perceiving exceeds human reason. It is able to understand clearly what human reason understands as not firmly established."

Although medieval intellectuals placed great importance on the philosophies of

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98Price 78.
99Translation 104.
100Translation 154.
101Translation 156.
Plato and Aristotle, in particular, philosophy in general was seen as an aid in coming
to a clearer understanding of Christian doctrine.\textsuperscript{102} An example of this view occurs in
the first prose section of Book Five, where Philosophy says, "true knowledge is for
no man who ever contested." Pseudo Thomas Aquinas clarifies the statement by
adding, "that is, opposed the ancients."\textsuperscript{103} Here his words embody what Betsey Price
suggests came to be the guiding principle of the Middle Ages \textit{philosophia ancilla
theologie}, 'philosophy is the handmaiden of theology'.\textsuperscript{104}

The Renaissance and Josse Bade

In 1277 the Bishop of Paris condemned as heretical the Aristotelianism of the
Averroists at the University of Paris and along with it many of the teachings of Saint
Thomas Aquinas.\textsuperscript{105} This condemnation seems to have done little more than increase
his notoriety and little to discourage the use of Aristotelian philosophy to support
Christian doctrine. By the end of the fourteenth century Scholasticism and
Aristotelianism were almost synonymous.\textsuperscript{106} The fourteenth century witnessed the
birth of the Renaissance and its call for a return to the sources of classical antiquity,

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{102}Price 70.
\textsuperscript{103}Translation 92.
\textsuperscript{104}Price 70.
\textsuperscript{105}Van Steenberghen also notes that the Latin Aristotelianism of Siger Braband
was condemned in the same year. Van Steenberghen 238.
\textsuperscript{106}Estep 26.
\end{flushleft}
its language, literature, and learning. Late medieval scholasticism along with Aristotelian metaphysics became the target of mounting criticism on the part of the Renaissance humanists who now favored Plato over Aristotle. Aristotle's works which had been available and read in Latin during the high Middle Ages, now were being studied in the original Greek, with primary attention to the *Ethics* and *Poetics*, rather than his *Physics* and *Metaphysics* which had been too closely linked with scholasticism.

It is important to remember that the term 'humanism' was not a term by which Renaissance intellectuals referred to themselves. The term 'humanist' was probably created among university students to specify a teacher of the *Studia humanitatis*, who normally taught what we now think of as the liberal arts, as in grammar, poetry, and rhetoric. These teachers were expected to equip students with the skills to speak and

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108 Price suggests that even the "most eager to understand his ideas" read them in Latin. Price 81.

109 Estep mentions that Aristotle's works had been used to excess by the Nominalists as well. Estep 26. Dr. Otto Gründler clarified the information concerning texts of Aristotle to which Renaissance humanists gave primary importance.


111 Kristeller's speculation on where the term originated is used here. He also includes history and moral philosophy in the *Studia humanitatis*. See Kristeller 24. McGrath sees *Studia humanitatis* as synonymous with the Liberal Arts. McGrath 42.
write well in verse and prose mostly in Latin, but often in Greek as well.\textsuperscript{112} The term 'humanists', therefore normally refers to the type of teachers described above, but also to secretaries, writers, scholars.\textsuperscript{113} Humanists used the classics as a means to an end. The primary goal was to gain eloquence, and the study of classical languages and study of their philology were pursued merely as resourceful means to achieve personal written and spoken eloquence.\textsuperscript{114}

Although they studied the same models of ancient literature to achieve that eloquence, Paul Kristeller states that:

"for every opinion that we find expressed by a humanists in one of his writings, we can find different or even opposite opinions on the same matter expressed by other humanists or even by the same humanist in another part of his work."\textsuperscript{115}

Hence Kristeller suggests that with a work from the Renaissance, we should pay particular attention to its citations of ancient works, and consider the humanist desire to avoid technical language.\textsuperscript{116}

\textsuperscript{112}Kristeller 25. This and the note which directly follows it comprise the definition of humanism which was developed by Kristeller, and which according to McGrath, "has gained wide acceptance within North American and European scholarship, and has yet to be discredited." McGrath 44-45.

\textsuperscript{113}Kristeller 23.

\textsuperscript{114}McGrath observes that "the writings the humanists devoted to the promotion of eloquence, written or spoken, far exceed those devoted to classical scholarship or philology." McGrath 43.

\textsuperscript{115}Kristeller 15.

\textsuperscript{116}He also suggests that avoiding technical language was "reflected in the author's imitation of Cicero." Kristeller 15.
The return to classical languages encouraged a return not only to ancient Greek authors, but to ancient Latin authors as well. A new found interest in Virgil, Cicero and others aided the recovery of "the true Aristotle and Plato." Although for some the return to these authors resulted only in their imitating the style of these ancients, in general it renewed the force of Platonic and Neoplatonic philosophy.

The Renaissance saw the creation of a new kind of Christian philosopher, of which Erasmus was one of the most famous. He was critical of the scholastic method, as were many in his circle, and he voices this criticism in his *Praise of Folly*.

Josse Bade was an associate of Erasmus, though this association came after his work on the Boethian commentary of Pseudo Thomas Aquinas, and his life shows some interesting parallels with that of Erasmus. Bade, like Erasmus was educated in

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117 Estep 27.

118 Estep 27.

119 Estep states, "The term 'philosophy of Christ' first occurs in the writings of Rudolf Agricola, but it was Erasmus who gave it new meaning. This term was symbolic of Christian humanism's approach to reform. Estep 84.

120 Erasmus implies through the persona Folly that "the scholastics, enmeshed in their own abstract categories, were more interested in speculative subtleties than in questions relevant to religious and moral experience." Erasmus of Rotterdam, *Praise of Folly: And Letter to Maarten Van Dorp: 1515*, trans. Betty Radice (New York: Penguin Books, 1993) 87.

121 Ferguson explains that "a letter was inserted after Epistle 182 [written in 1505] in Erasmus' edition of Valla's *Annotationiones* which Bade printed," which states that Bade "remained for years in close relations with Erasmus." Ferguson 97.
the school of the Brethren of the Common Life. In fact, "some of the most important leaders of the Northern Renaissance came under the influence of the Brethren." For instance, Cusanus, Hegius, Agricola, Wessel, Reuchlin, Celtis, Mutian, Erasmus and Luther were all educated by the Brethren. The Brethren of the Common Life was a "semimonastic order", established in 1374, and they considered Gerhard Groote their founder. They are believed by Estep to have "became the transmission lines of both

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122Estep 45. However, R. R. Post strongly disputes this view, specifying that the Brethren "were essentially pastors and not teachers in the late medieval and first Humanist schools. Their main taskk was the pastoral care of the schoolboys and nuns. Only in exceptional cases and in a few cities did they introduce their charges to the humanistic culture, and here too they only developed after the new concepts had already gained a hold in the schools. Post 660.

123In this "roll call" Mutian is also known by the name Mutianus Rufus, who will be mentioned later in the discussion. Estep 45. Again, the extent to which the Brethren were responsible for the education of these men is questioned by Post. He points out that Erasmus did at one time hold Hegius "in particular esteem", but that the humanist later changed his opinion, as evidenced in his Spongia, where he wrote that he "owed little of his education to Alexander [Hegius] and Rudolf Agricola." (see Erasmus, L.B. X 1666, A). Post 659. Erasmus, when reflecting on the Latin education given to him by the Brethren who were masters in charge of the hostel in 's-Hertogenbosch, suggested that "one of his superiors he considered the ultimate in stupidity, while the other in is opinion was merely a recruiting agent for the monastery." Post 660. In addition, the New Catholic Encyclopedia suggests that "recent research has shown that the Brethren of the Common Life concentrated on pastoral work and taught only rarely; usually the students from large city schools lived in residences managed by the Brethren or with lay families formed by the Devotio Moderna. New Catholic Encyclopedia, vol II, ed. The Catholic University of America, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967) 788.

124Estep refers to them as a "semimonastic order". Estep 45, yet this is contradicted in the New Catholic Encyclopedia, which defines the Brethren of the Common Life as "a religious society...[which]differed from religious orders in that its members did not take vows. New Catholic Encyclopedia 788.
humanist learning and deep religious devotion." 125

An important factor of humanist learning is the particular interest with "how ideas were obtained and expressed, rather than with the actual substance of those ideas." 126 This explains why humanists were opposed to the methods of the Scholastics. Humanists felt that the scholastic method did more to show the schoolmen's ignorance than display any proof of knowledge, and that their thoughts on texts were "tortured obscurities." 127 As Erasmus writes:

Nature has a fine laugh at them and their conjectures, for their total lack of certainty is obvious enough from the endless contention amongst themselves on every single subject. They know nothing at all, yet they claim to know everything....most of them are half-blind or because their minds are far away, they still boast that they can see ideas, universals, separate forms, prime matters.... 128

Of the Humanists who accepted Boethius' *Consolation of Philosophy* as a classic, the majority were Northern Humanists. 129 They thought that Boethius' works had been abused by medieval commentators. 130 In fact, Mutianus Rufus mocked the commentary of Pseudo Thomas Aquinas, saying his comments were "not only false

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123Estep 45.

126McGrath is paraphrasing Kristeller here. McGrath 45.

127Erasmus writes "These subtle refinements of subtleties are made still more subtle by all the different lines of scholastic argument, so that you'd extricate yourself faster from a labrynth than from the torturous obscurities of the realists, nominalists Thomists, Albertists...." Erasmus 88.

128Erasmus 85.

129Grafton 410.

130Grafton 412.
and foolish, but not worth reading."\textsuperscript{131}

Josse Bade found similar fault with the commentary of Pseudo Thomas Aquinas. In line with humanist practice, Bade’s comments on the work put a great emphasis on proper usage of grammar, and correct (classical) spelling and meaning of words. There are eleven sections of commentary on Book Five, and in three of these Bade does not comment on any part of the philosophy. He instead concentrates his efforts on criticizing Pseudo Thomas Aquinas' grammar, improper use of terms and incorrect spelling of words.\textsuperscript{132} Further, he states at the end of the sixth prose section of Book Five:

These things have been best explained for Stephanus about the \textit{Consolation} of Boethius, into which I bore the function of grammarian rather than \textit{[discuss]} what has come from an old philosophical commentary.\textsuperscript{133}

Bade’s singular noteworthy comment on the philosophy of the \textit{Consolation of Philosophy} is in the fourth meter section of Book Five, where he discusses \textit{tabula raza}, saying, "However, they [Stoics] wished the soul to be just as a tabula raza, on which nothing was written."\textsuperscript{134} His purpose is not to clarify Aristotle’s meaning\textsuperscript{135} of

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{131}Grafton cites Mutianus Rufus’ comments on Pseudo Thomas Aquinas in footnote 23. Grafton 412. See Mutianus Rufus, \textit{Briefwechsel}, ed. C. Krause (Kassell, 1885)58.
  \item \textsuperscript{132}See Ascensius' comments on the third prose section (39-42); third meter section (46); fourth prose section (69).
  \item \textsuperscript{133}Translation 183.
  \item \textsuperscript{134}Translation 149.
  \item \textsuperscript{135}Simon Blackburn explains that although Aristotle’s \textit{tabula rasa} is a term
the term, from which Boethius is drawing, rather it is to point out the fact that
Boethius's original phrasing was *aequore pagine, Quae nullas habeat notas*, meaning
"a smooth page on which nothing has been written."\(^{136}\) He then writes:

> However, it is said they were called pages, which proved their place in books. So writing, which is [what it is called] in those verses, was in districts, that is, villages situated close to springs, since they were written, that is impressed. Therefore, it is a page, or each a part of papyrus, on which these poems were composed.\(^{137}\)

It is somewhat tempting to see Bade's commentary as an example of superficial humanism due to the excessive concentration on grammar, syntax, and proper word use. However, Kristeller's view that humanists were "concerned with how ideas were obtained and expressed, rather than with the actual substance of those ideas"\(^{138}\) is very pertinent here. Before Bade wrote his running gloss on the commentary of Pseudo Thomas Aquinas he had studied at Ghent with the Brethren of the Common Life, and then in Italy. When Bade wrote his running gloss, he was living in Lyons, teaching Greek, and working for the printer Johann Trechsel. Following this he moved to Paris where he set up his own printing press and became "professor of letters" in the

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\(^{136}\)Tester 412.

\(^{137}\)Translation 149-150.

\(^{138}\)Kristeller's view is paraphrased by McGrath. McGrath 45.
university. He was immersed in humanist culture as well as print culture. This must have shaped his thinking to a great degree.

Yet, despite the fact that his views differed from those of Pseudo Thomas Aquinas, for the most part, both men shared one important concern, namely, the teaching of the *Consolation of Philosophy* in university settings. Pseudo Thomas Aquinas and Josse Bade clearly represent different philosophies of education, but both believed that their respective educations contained some noble aspects worthy of being passed on to other generations.

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139 See Ferguson's note on Bade. Ferguson 97. Also, see John Delaney's dictionary entry on Bade. Delaney 90-91.
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