Considerations for Acquiring Excess Military Equipment by Police Leaders

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CONSIDERATIONS FOR ACQUIRING EXCESS MILITARY EQUIPMENT BY POLICE LEADERS

by

Michael P. Mendenhall

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CONSIDERATIONS FOR ACQUIRING EXCESS MILITARY EQUIPMENT BY POLICE LEADERS

Michael P. Mendenhall, Ph.D.
Western Michigan University, 2021

Police departments across the United States have been able to acquire excess military equipment from the 1033 program since 1997. Although several studies have examined police militarization, including the 1033 program, this is the first study that has surveyed police leaders at the local level to understand the determinants of 1033 acquisitions in Michigan. Using an open systems framework, this dissertation will examine both the internal and external factors that contribute to police leaders’ decisions to acquire or not acquire equipment for their departments. These determinants include internal factors such as budgetary considerations, perceptions of the profession, and knowledge of the effects that the 1033 program may have on a community. External factors include community engagement, whether or not to inform the public, as well as police perceptions of the community they serve. With this framework, a regression model was developed to measure the relationship between internal and external factors and the extent of militarization. The model was tested with survey data from Michigan police leaders. Model estimates provide exploratory evidence that police leaders who stated their budget allows them to independently purchase equipment were less likely to use the 1033 program. In contrast, external factors were not found to be associated with the use of the 1033 program. These exploratory
findings will provide a framework to research police leaders outside of Michigan. The dissertation also provides police leaders with administrative recommendations when acquiring 1033 equipment as well as insight into the steps they should take before acquisition.

*Keywords: 1033 program, police militarization, police studies*
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Michael P. Mendenhall
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The idea of a standing army has been viewed a threat to individual freedom in the United States since six of the original states made it a point to voice concerns in their constitutions (Schmidt & Klinger, 2006). The constitutions in Pennsylvania, North Carolina, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Delaware, and Maryland each recognized that standing armies are dangerous to liberty and “…ought not to be kept up in time of peace without the consent of the legislature” (Hamilton, 2014, p. 122). Similarly, the Third Amendment prohibits the quartering of soldiers without the consent of the owner of the house. In fact, the Declaration of Independence states that the King “…has kept among us, in times of peace, Standing Armies without the Consent of our legislatures” and “has affected to render the Military independent of and superior to the Civil power” (para. 13–14).

Our nation’s historical distrust of the military’s power over its own people arises because the people fear the military’s power may trample upon their liberty. According to Schmidt (2004), there was “…significant citizen sentiment against the mere presence of standing armies, particularly in peacetime” (p. 651). Although our founding fathers may not have foreseen a program at the federal level that distributed military equipment to local authorities, which reflects the concept of police militarization, their concerns can still be applied to our current situation, particularly the effect that military equipment could have on police officers. Samuel Adams believed that soldiers were likely to consider themselves separate from the populace and
thus not act on behalf of the people, but instead, the government (Scarinci, 2014). This mindset is in direct contrast with that of police officers in this country who swear an oath to protect and serve the community they serve. A concern for citizens and police leaders should be:

> if you give a peace officer the dress of a soldier, the weapons of a soldier, the armored vehicle of a soldier, and the training of a soldier, then that peace officer may come to define his role not as the peace officer he was hired to be, but as a soldier at war in his own community” (Rizer, 2016, p. 470).

Thus, if local police officers begin to acquire excess military equipment, the concern that Samuel Adams raises is that the mindset of those sworn to protect not only us, but our liberties, may begin to be a threat to us.

It was the response by police in Ferguson, Missouri in 2014 that brought the issue of the militarization of police in America back into the public discussion. In the wake of the shooting of Michael Brown by Darren Wilson, a City of Ferguson police officer, more than 50 police departments descended upon the city of Ferguson (Williams, 2015) to help with what largely amounted to protests, with some acts of vandalism and looting (Corely, 2015). Officers dressed in camouflage uniforms, wearing bulletproof vests on the outside of their uniforms, and the deployment of armored tactical vehicles drew sharp criticisms from citizens of Ferguson, other police leaders, and ultimately the Department of Justice (DOJ).

Former Chief Mike Koval of the Madison Police Department in Madison, Wisconsin discussed the police response in Ferguson: “You go in working the crowd, not antagonizing the crowd. It (is part of) personalizing yourself and your approach. You don’t show up in hard gear, with riot gear and a facial visor” (Linscheid, 2014, para. 3). Although the response (primarily the weapons and equipment) by police in Ferguson was viewed by both the police and the public as too much force too soon, it is important to understand why a police department would acquire such equipment.
According to Grovum (2015) lawmakers in more than a half dozen states point to the “…highly weaponized response…” in Ferguson by police and have worked on sponsoring bills that call for restrictions or an end to the “…law enforcement-industrial complex,” which is a play on words from Dwight D. Eisenhower’s warning about the military-industrial complex (para. 3–4). The current paper will examine equipment that is acquired by departments through the 1033 program, specifically the more controversial pieces, such as the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle, that can be considered too militaristic through the eyes of police leaders in the state of Michigan.

Rizer (2016) asks the question “would the nightly protests and riots that gripped the nation’s attention in Ferguson have escalated to such a crescendo had the initial police reaction not been so…militaristic?” (p. 470). It is a relevant question, but what complicates the matter is a scathing DOJ report about the Ferguson police department that came to light almost seven months after the Michael Brown shooting. In it, reports contained evidence of unconstitutional stops and arrests, patterns of first amendment violations, and use of excessive force, particularly within the African American community (United States Department of Justice [USDOJ] Civil Rights Division, 2015). The report goes on to say that:

“…these practices severely damaged the relationship between African Americans and the Ferguson Police Department long before Michael Brown’s shooting death in August 2014. This divide has made policing in Ferguson less effective, more difficult, and more likely to discriminate.” (USDOJ Civil Rights Division, 2015, p. 79)

Although the militaristic equipment and show of force used by police during what were mostly protests in Ferguson angered many of the residents in Ferguson, it could be argued that the resentment and mistrust of the Ferguson police had been building for a long time and came to a head due to the lack of information about the shooting as well as the police response (Chokshi, 2014). This dissertation examines the determinants of acquired military equipment through the
1033 program including the attitudes and surveyed opinions of police chiefs and sheriffs who choose whether to acquire such equipment.

**History of the 1033 Program**

The Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 codified the separation between the military and civilian law enforcement in the United States. A 1981 provision to this Act gave power to the Secretary of Defense to make available any equipment “...of the Department of Defense (DOD) to any Federal, State, or local civilian law enforcement official for law enforcement purposes” (10 U.S.C. 372). This provision also mandates that the Secretary of Defense, along with the Attorney General, provide a briefing to law enforcement officers of each State regarding information, training, technical support, and equipment available to them from the DOD (Doyle, 2000). Furthermore, the Attorney General and Administrator of General Services designate an office(s) to maintain a working list of military equipment which is suitable for law enforcement and available to them as surplus property (10 U.S.C. 372). According to Doyle (2000), the authority granted in these provisions are subject to three conditions; the equipment may not be used to undermine the military capability of the United States; the civilian departments must pay for the assistance; and the Secretary of Defense must issue regulations to ensure the authority of the provisions do not result in the armed forces making arrests, conducting searches or performing seizures solely for the benefit of civilian law enforcement.

When Congress passed Section 1208 of the 1990 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991, it allowed the transfer of excess Department of Defense (DOD) property to both Federal and State agencies to combat drug activities. Under Title XII of this Act, the Secretary was authorized to “…transfer to Federal and State agencies personal property of DOD deemed suitable for use by such agencies in counter-drug activities and considered excess
to the needs of DOD” (National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991, p. 5). This program is overseen by the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) and is run by the Law Enforcement Support Office (LESO), which is located at the DLA Disposition Services Headquarters in Battle Creek, Michigan.

In 1996, Congress replaced Section 1208 with Section 1033, which coined the name 1033 program (Govern, 2016). In 1997, Congress expanded the scope of this program which would now allow all civilian law enforcement agencies the ability to acquire excess DOD equipment, with preference given to departments looking to target issues concerning counter-drug and counterterrorism in their communities (10 U.S.C. 2576a). Title X, Section 1033, authorized the Secretary to “…transfer to Federal and State agencies excess personal property of DOD which is suitable for use in law enforcement activities, including counter-drug and counter-terrorism activities” (National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997, pp. 7–8). Also included under the scope of law enforcement activities was riot gear, which included non-expandable batons, riot helmets (designed to protect the head and face from projectiles), and riot shields (designed to protect the officer from projectiles as well as push back a crowd) (Executive Order 13688, 2015, p. 15).

On January 16, 2015, Executive Order 13688 (2015) was issued by President Barack Obama titled, “Federal Support for Local Law Enforcement Equipment Acquisition” (p. 1). Executive Order 13688 (2015) was intended to “…identify actions that can improve Federal support for the appropriate use, acquisition, and transfer or controlled equipment by State, local, and Tribal law enforcement agencies” (p. 4). This order established a list of prohibited equipment which law enforcement agencies (LEAs) would not be able to acquire through the 1033 program. Equipment not eligible for acquisition included items such as tracked armored
vehicles, grenade launchers, and bayonets because “…the substantial risk of misusing or overusing these items, which are seen as militaristic in nature, could significantly undermine community trust and may encourage tactics and behaviors that are inconsistent with the premise of civilian law enforcement” (Executive Order 13688, 2015, p. 13).

A second list that was proposed by the working group was titled the ‘controlled equipment’ list, which included items such as armored wheeled vehicles (Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) which include ballistic protection), riot batons (non-expandable baton of greater length than service-issued types), riot helmets (include a visor to protect the face), and riot shields (Executive Order 13688, 2015). Property on the controlled equipment list was viewed as equipment that has “significant utility” for law enforcement operations, however due to the property’s “lethal nature,” the property may have a “negative impact on the community,” and thus need to take additional steps to acquire the property (Executive Order 13688, 2015, p. 14). These additional steps include submitting a detailed justification regarding the need for the property as well as “…a description of how the equipment would be deployed, the agency’s policies and protocols on deployment, and verification of training provided to LEAs on the appropriate use of such controlled equipment” (Executive Order 13688, 2015, p. 15).

After Executive Order 13688 was put into effect, departments wishing to acquire property through the 1033 program had to complete a 15-point justification form. The justification point of particular interest to this dissertation is the need for departments to obtain their “…civilian governing body’s review and approval…” (“Law Enforcement Support Office” [LESO], 2020). It is important to note that the 15-point justification form, which was put into effect on September 28, 2015, under President Obama, was replaced with another form on October 31, 2017, when President Trump revoked Executive Order 13688. The new form still
requests approval from an agencies’ governing body and requires the agency to check a box that reads in part: “I certify with the authorization of the relevant local governing body or authority…” (‘Law Enforcement Support Office,” 2020).

Law enforcement agencies intending to participate in the 1033 program currently must fill out an application form and designate a full-time employee of the agency to serve as the “Reutilization Transfer and Donation (RTD) Screener” (LESO, 2020). An RTD screener, once approved by the LSO, can view available excess property on website and make requests to acquire it on behalf of the agency. The agency is also required to sign off on an agreement with the LESO to:

- comply with U.S. Code 2576a for all controlled property, which states: With the authorization of the relevant local governing body or authority, that my agency has adopted publicly available protocols for the appropriate use of controlled property, the supervision of such use, and the evaluation of the effectiveness of such use, including auditing and accountability policies; and that it provides annual training to relevant personnel on the maintenance, sustainment, and appropriate use of controlled property. I certify under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Making a false statement may result in judicial actions or prosecution under 18 USC § 1001. (LESO, 2020, p. 2).

A key part of this agreement is that the relevant local governing body authorizes the acquisition of such equipment. No study on the 1033 program has yet to explore the process by which departments obtain approval from city or county boards, assuming they do at all, as well as whether the policies for its use are made publicly available.

1033 Program in Practice

Since the beginning of the 1033 program more than $7.2 billion worth of excess DOD property has been transferred, $980 million in 2014 alone, to the more than 8,000 law enforcement agencies enrolled in the program (LESO, 2020). These numbers are based on the initial acquisition cost of the property, which is the original amount the DOD had to pay for the
property. It is important to note that according to the Law Enforcement Support Office (LESO, 2020), 5% of the excess property that law enforcement agencies receive are small arms (handguns), and less than 1% are tactical vehicles. Some of the weapons and tactical vehicles that can be acquired include: MRAPs (Mine Resistant Vehicles), other armored vehicles, night vision (sights, binoculars, goggles and lights), aircraft (planes and helicopters), machine guns (5.56mm and 7.62mm rifles) and or magazines with no ammunition. The vast majority of property acquired through the program includes clothing, office supplies, tools, and rescue equipment and is thus not militarized (LESO, 2020).

A police department intending to participate in the 1033 program must first complete a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) (see Appendix A). Once a police department has been approved to participate in the 1033 program by the state coordinator and LESO, it is up to the department to appoint member(s) of the department to visit and request equipment off of the DLA Disposition Services Site (DLA, 2020). The governor in each state is tasked with appointing a State coordinator to oversee the program, which includes investigating and reporting any abuse of the program to the DLA (DLA, 2020).

Departments wishing to participate in the 1033 program must complete an application for participation through LESO (see Appendix A) as well as have authorization to do so from the department’s local governing body. LESO expects departments to understand the effect that the use of this equipment, such as armored vehicles, may have in their communities and thus requires departments who are applying to list the intended use of the equipment (See Appendix B). Some of the reasons listed for why departments would deploy this equipment include: SWAT, active shooter, barricaded suspect, emergency response, first responder, critical incident, hostage rescue, natural disaster response, border security, homeland security, counter-drug, and
counterterrorism (LESO, 2020). Once the approval is given to law enforcement agencies to acquire property, it is the responsibility of the agencies to cover the cost of shipping the property to their respective department.

According to The President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing (2015), law enforcement agencies should “…establish a culture of transparency and accountability to build public trust and legitimacy…” which is “…critical to ensuring decision making is understood and in accord with stated policy” (p. 1). There is, however, a lack of knowledge of the approval process for acquiring military equipment in the literature on the 1033 program. There is also limited evaluation of the recommendations from the President’s (2015) Task Force.

In an attempt to build trust and legitimacy between police agencies and the public, former President Barack Obama issued Executive Order 13688 on January 15, 2015, in direct response to the Ferguson, Missouri protests/riots, which occurred following the officer-involved shooting of Michael Brown. The order placed limits on the types of excess DOD equipment law enforcement agencies could procure. Items that were no longer available to civilian law enforcement agencies included tracked armored vehicles, grenade launchers, bayonets, large caliber weapons and ammunition, as well as certain camouflage uniforms (Executive Order 13688, 2015). Implementation of this order was due to:

“…the substantial risk of misusing or overusing these items, which are seen as militaristic in nature, could significantly undermine community trust and may encourage tactics and behaviors that are inconsistent with the premise of civilian law enforcement” (Executive Order 13688, 2015, p. 13).

The acquisition of excess DOD equipment by law enforcement agencies and its effects have been examined (Hutto & Green, 2016), as well as its history, legal rationale, and geographic extent at the county level (Radil, et al., 2017). The relationship between acquiring military equipment through the 1033 program and police violence (Delehanty et al., 2017) as
well as the relationship between community policing and acquisition of equipment (Koslicki & Willits, 2018) have also been examined\(^1\).

Although the 1033 program allows for local law, state, and federal law enforcement agencies the ability to acquire equipment for free, except for the cost of shipping, maintenance costs on acquired equipment have still made the program prohibitive for some departments (Craver, 2015). The cost of shipping equipment is in most cases significantly cheaper than purchasing a similar piece of commercial equipment. For example, Johnson County Sheriff department in Indiana paid approximately $5,000 for an MRAP through the 1033 program, which had an original acquisition value of $733,000 (Alesia, 2014). Looking strictly at cost, an alternative for police departments is to pay the full purchase price for a vehicle such as the Lenco Bearcat, like the one purchased by Macomb County, MI for approximately $350,000.00 (Wisely, 2017). Vehicles like these provide ballistic protection for officers like the MRAP, but unlike the MRAP, they are not as criticized for their use by law enforcement. “Morgan County Sheriff Robert Downey and Maj. Jerry Pickett, head of Johnson County SWAT, said if they had $300,000 to spend, they would prefer a commercial “BearCat” armored vehicle…instead of a military MRAP” (Alesia, 2014). This is due to the “BearCat” being smaller, lighter, and fast, but since they don’t have that money, the 1033 program is their only option for possessing an armored vehicle for their officers (Alesia, 2014).

There is a legitimate concern over whether police departments both need this type of equipment and the type of effect this may have on the communities they serve. The militarization of police in the U.S. is a phenomenon that many have raised concerns over. The President’s Task

\(^1\) First, I searched for “1033 program” in all police/military journals. I then used a database to search across all journals using the search term “1033 program.”
Force on Twenty-first Century Policing created a report, which in part, provided recommendations for use of military equipment by local law enforcement agencies over concerns of the police response in Ferguson, Missouri (Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, U.S. Department of Justice, 2015). In response to police use of military equipment in Ferguson after the Michael Brown shooting, Missouri Senator Claire McCaskill stated that police dressed in military fatigues will not be viewed as partners in any community (Grossman, 2014).

Concerns of fiscal responsibility at the federal level have also been included in the discussion of the 1033 program. O’Rourke-Friel (2018) states that the federal government should be concerned with minimizing new procurement costs of controlled property, which would thus limit the amount of property flowing to nonfederal law enforcement agencies. According to O’Rourke-Friel (2018), a GAO inquiry into property disposal at the federal level between 2013 and 2014 found that 150 law enforcement agencies acquired 285 pieces of earth moving and excavating equipment through the 1033 program, while nine federal agencies purchased the same equipment during that time period. The federal government could save money by prioritizing equipment to federal agencies first (O’Rourke-Friel, 2018). City, county, township, and village boards; those who are in a position to represent the communities they serve, are tasked with approving or disapproving requests by local sheriff and police departments to acquire such equipment.

Since the DLA does not define “use of equipment,” it is up to the individual police departments to determine the situation and manner the equipment be used for (DLA, 2020). These stipulations for equipment use are typically outlined in a department policy, which may or may not be made available to the public. There is, however, limited insight into whether police leaders take input from the public or adopt policies around militarized equipment.
Problem Statement

Kraska (2007) argues that policing is self-evidently militarized. Therefore, “…research should be focused on the extent of its militarization rather than its existence” (Radil et al., 2017, p. 206). Much of the existing literature on police militarization acknowledges that it exists; particularly in the forms of weapons, equipment, training, and paramilitary units (e.g. SWAT teams). No study, however, asks police leaders in the field about the how and why they participate in the 1033 program, which is the first problem that will be addressed. This dissertation will also look at what factors police leaders consider when determining the types of equipment they acquire from the 1033 program.

Police militarization is a polarizing issue with one side arguing that it can create mistrust with citizens, lead to abuses of authority and contribute to blurring the line between the military and civilian police officers. This dissertation focuses on this problem by surveying police leaders on whether excess military equipment should be used or in what situations by civilian police. This is the second gap in the literature that is explored.

Finally, another area that has not been explored in the literature concerning police militarization is the transparency between police and the community in terms of both acquisition of equipment as well as policy creation. In the application for participation (see appendix A) in the 1033 program, an agency must sign off and certify that their department will comply with U.S. Code 2576a for all acquired equipment which states in part that they will adopt “…publicly available protocols for the appropriate use of controlled equipment…including…accountability policies” (LESO, 2020, p. 2). Building upon the preceding discussion, I offer the following research questions.
Research Questions

Turner and Fox (2019) surveyed members of the 114th Congress U.S. House of Representatives along with police executives and local law enforcement officers about their support for police militarization and related policies. Their study focused on all of four of Kraska and Kappeler’s (1997) dimensions of the police-military model including material, cultural, organizational and operational. One of the limitations of their study according to Turner and Fox (2019) was that it was a short survey (22 questions) focusing on all of four of Kraska and Kappeler’s (1997) dimensions. Each of these four dimensions are quite broad and thus it is important to carefully look at each of them in depth.

The present study, however, focuses primarily on one dimension (material) in order to delve deeper and gain an understanding on why police leaders choose or choose not to participate in the 1033 program. Although Turner and Fox’s (2019) study represents the first-time police executives and officers have been surveyed about their opinions on police militarization, the present study provides a more focused examination about why police leaders may or may not participate in the 1033 program (material dimension). The first research question will be:

1.) What factors do police leaders consider when participating in the 1033 program?

Participation data from the 1033 program is part of the data being used for this study. Not all police and sheriff departments in Michigan participate in the 1033 program. Since every police leader from every police and sheriff department in the state of Michigan will be included in the sample, responses will include reasons why leaders do and don’t participate in the program. Participants will also be asked about their level of concern about appearing too
militaristic and whether the militarization of police phenomena is real or necessary. The second research question that will be used in this study is:

2.) **What factors do police leaders consider when acquiring types of 1033 equipment (militarized versus non-militarized)?**

Ultimately, police leaders are the ones who decide whether to participate in the 1033 program and thus acquire excess military equipment. On the LESO application for participation (See Appendix A), departments are required to have authorization for participation from local governing bodies or authorities. It reads in part “…I certify that my Agency will comply with U.S. Code 2575a for all controlled property, which states; With the authorization of the relevant local governing body or authority…” (LESO, 2020). It is not clear who or what constitutes as a local governing body or authority. More importantly, it is not clear whether department’s seek approval from county or city boards for acquiring such equipment.

It is also important to investigate whether departments seek input from community members through town hall meetings, Q & A sessions, or during city and county meetings. Seeking input from community members is one way to demonstrate transparency, since it requires police departments to explain the need for such equipment as well as how it will be used. According to the LESO application for enrollment into the 1033 program, enrollees must sign off that their agency “…has adopted publicly available protocols for the appropriate use of controlled property…” (LESO, 2020). The Madison Police Department in Madison, WI had provided a publicly available policy (See Appendix C) for its use of the MRAP on their website (“Madison Police Policies,” 2014), however the department no longer has one. It outlined approved situations in which the MRAP could be deployed in and who could operate it.
According to Chanin et al. (2016), what is certain is that “…little about police transparency, particularly from the perspective of law enforcement” is known (p. 499). This dissertation will look at in part, what steps, if any, police leaders take to be transparent in regard to 1033 program equipment acquisitions in both deciding to participate in the program and whether the creation of policies for its use are made public or with the public input. Question 2 seeks to understand whether anyone has a voice in the community other than a police department in participating and acquiring equipment from the 1033 program.

Budgetary constraints (Alesia, 2014), geographic location (Radil et al., 2017), and officer as well as civilian safety (Dudley, 2014) have all been cited as reasons for why civilian police departments acquire excess military equipment. Studies that have explored police militarization, specifically as it relates to the 1033 program, have examined acquisitions at the county level (Bove & Gavrilova, 2017; Radil, et al., 2017; Harris et al., 2017) or have excluded county, state, and campus departments and looked only at local department (Ramey & Steidley, 2018). Davenport et al. (2018) examined 1033 program acquisitions by state as well as interviewed individuals from law enforcement agencies, which ranged from police officers, support services, and a sheriff.

However, no study has surveyed police leaders to identify the reasons they cite for acquiring such equipment and equally important; the reasons why they do not acquire equipment from the 1033 program. The current study will examine the logic behind the key decision makers in a police and sheriff organizations in order to get a better sense of how this program benefits communities or hinders it (creating distrust). The dissertation will also examine the amount of equipment acquired from each department at the department level to examine trends, if any, between departments. This study included campus and county departments in Michigan.
Theoretical Framework

This dissertation analyzed the decision police leaders face when deciding whether to acquire military equipment through the 1033 program. The decision-making process of the organization’s leader (e.g. police chief, sheriff) was examined since this person has the final say within their department about this decision. Using a systems framework which was developed by March and Simon (1958) and Cyert and March (1963), this dissertation explored both the external factors and internal factors that go into this decision-making process (Figure 1).

Matusiak et al. (2017) stated that “one of the most fruitful areas of research to emerge from the open-systems perspective has been the study of how police organizations are influenced by their institutional environments” (p. 6). Police and sheriff departments operate and base decisions on both internal and external factors. Internal factors can include things such as budgetary considerations, perceptions of the safety of the profession, policies, and knowledge of both police militarization and the 1033 program.

External factors can include factors such as informing the public, specifically looking at whether policies are available to the public that dictate the use of 1033 equipment. Community engagement is another external factor that includes police departments holding meetings on the potential of acquiring 1033 equipment and its use. A third external factor is community factors, which include police perceptions of the community (dangerousness) and actual dangerousness.

To understand organizations and the decisions they make, an organization must be viewed as systems composed of both informal and formal organization as well as the environment in which it is operating in (March & Simon 1958; Cyert & March, 1963). Peel’s principle number two states that “the ability of the police to perform their duties is dependent upon public approval of police actions” (Nagle, 2014, para. 3). In order for a police organization
to be successful, it has to rely on building and maintaining networks in the community (informal organizations).

Oshry (1996) discussed patterns of relationships including top/bottom, ends/middle, and provider/customer to illustrate how parties act within and around an organization. The provider/customer relationship, the provider provides a service to the customer. In a police organization, the police provide various services to the customer, who in this case are the citizens. According to Oshry (1996) “…there is the potential for partnership in which both parties are committed to the success of their shared project or process” (p. 59). In a relationship between the community and the police, the community itself is the shared project. Both parties have a vested interest in maintaining the community.

For the police, they are often judged on how well they can keep crime down and streets safe. Police leaders such as sheriffs, who are elected in most places, will want to ensure that they maintain a positive relationship with their citizens (other party) to keep crime down, build trust, and keep their job. As noted in Peel’s principle above, the police are only as effective as the strength of their relationship with the community (Nagle, 2014). Oshry (1996) states that…

Customer needs to become more directly involved in the delivery process—knowing how the delivery system works; setting clear demands and standards; getting into the delivery process early as a partner, not late as a judge; staying close to the Provider. And the Provider needs to allow the Customer into the delivery process (p. 92).

Police departments (provider) should involve citizen (customer) input into the decision-making process in order to help build support, to help the customer understand expectations, capabilities, and needs of the provider. Conversely, a provider should incorporate the customer in policy decisions in order to gain or maintain legitimacy.
Another concept that is important to understand when discussing organizations is the learning organization. Watkins and Marsick (1993) defined a learning organization as an organization that fosters continuous learning at the individual, team, organizational and societal levels. By doing so, organizations are able to make the necessary changes in a timely manner (Watkins & Marsick, 1993). According to Senge (1990) and Watkins and Marsick (1993), a learning organization has the ability to continue to learn, but also to transform itself based on its new knowledge. In order to do this, an organization must think systemically so that it can understand itself as a whole as well as the relationships between each part of the organization (Senge, 1990).

Marsick and Watkins (2003) state that a learning organization promotes dialogue and inquiry, encouraging collaboration, empowers people toward a collective vision, and connects the organization to its environment. As each party learns from one another, they develop trust and more of an understanding. A police organization relies on the trust of citizens to help do its job. Police organizations that involve citizens in the decision-making process create an opportunity for citizens to learn more about their ideas, thoughts, and direction for the department. Citizens who may have concerns over participation and acquisition of equipment through the 1033 program by their department would have questions answered and more of an understanding if that department operated as a learning organization. Conversely, a police department that operates as a learning organization would also have to consider the point of view from citizens in order to make a more informed and collaborative decision on a program such as the 1033 program.

Both local and state governments should consider the effect of both internal and external factors (Nelson & Balu, 2014; Reitano, 2018). By making a policy decision like participating in
the 1033 program, a department may not fully understand the effects until years later (Nelson, 2012). Some of those effects can include the cost to repair or replace parts on items acquired through the 1033 program. The cost for small parts on a handgun would be minimal compared to the cost of replacing parts on an MRAP. These changes and effects could be visible on both the organization and the community. The demands and constraints present in the municipal environment vary across states, counties, and individual municipalities (Nelson, 2012). Given the variation of departments and communities, an examination of all departments in Michigan is important in order to gain a better understanding police leader’s perceptions on the 1033 program.

According to Wolf et al. (2008), in an open system, organizations are tied to the “…economy, political tides, perceived/real crises, demands from local citizens, and other related factors” (p. 178). Due to the demands of police work, specifically the unique authorities, responsibilities and public expectations (Cotton & Coleman, 2010), police leaders are expected to understand both internal and external factors, how they will affect their agency, what resources are available to them, and then finally make the best decision with both the organization and the community in mind. Collier (2001) for example, examined the implications of introducing local financial management, specifically devolved budgeting systems, to the West Mercia Constabulary police force. He found that the shift of financial power from police headquarters to divisions ultimately led to divisions “…implementing new operational initiatives that involved a shift from a reactive, demand driven style of policing to a more proactive, intelligence-led and problem-solving style” (Collier, 2001, p. 23).

The combination of both internal and external factors which police leaders have to navigate creates a complex situation. Wilson (1968) stated decisions of local police organizations
are influenced by both the structure and culture of local politics. According to Dietz and Mink (2005) a police or sheriff’s department would be considered a “complex system;” because complex systems almost always overlap or are nested in other complex systems, they are sometimes referred to as “complex adaptive systems” (Gell-Mann, 1994; Mink et al., 1991; Mink, 2000). Complex adaptive systems can be seen in the police response in Ferguson, MO in 2014 with the deployment of militarized gear, which was largely seen as too aggressive as mentioned earlier. According to Dietz and Mink (2005),

In a complex system, a simple event can produce complex events; this is referred to as the “butterfly effect.” In law enforcement every event involving an officer and a citizen can result in drastic changes or a complex set of reactions or responses that tend to highlight aspects of the system such as bottlenecks, and ambiguous procedures (p. 8).

Police organizations have to be adaptive to both external and internal factors and this dissertation will focus on what factors police leaders examine in whether or not to acquire 1033 equipment.

As both internal and external factors are considered and weighed by the police leader, their decision as is concerned with police militarization will either increase stay the same or in some cases decrease. In some cases, equipment acquired through the 1033 program was returned to the LESO or transferred to another agency, pending the approval of the LESO. When looking at extent of militarization, it is important to remember that participation in the 1033 program contributes to the extent rather than it being the deciding factor of whether a department is considered militarized or not. This is based on Kraska’s (2007) notion that policing is self-evidently militarized, and the focus should be on the extent to which departments are militarized. A department may not participate in the 1033 program, but still have militarized equipment as a result of little to no budget constraints within their department.

Police organizations are often considered both the frontline and one of the most visible forms of government, which means, according to Wolf et al. (2008) that police organizational
systems cannot be closed off from their environment and thus must be open to a diverse set of people and influences from both inside and outside the organization. Therefore, an open systems model is the best one to describe the decision-making process of police leaders when it comes to participation in the 1033 program as well as the extent of their militarization.

**Research Methods**

For the purpose of this study, I will be using survey research along with the 1033 program database from the LESO. The study is non-experimental with a focus on a theory-praxis linkage. The goal of the survey research method is to more fully understand the decision-making process of police chiefs and sheriffs relative to what can be observed from analyzing the raw 1033 program data. This method was chosen to identify the internal and external factors that police leaders weigh when deciding whether to participate in the 1033 program as well as understand their thoughts on militarization in policing in the United States. The survey data will be connected with the 1033 data which is an innovation in the literature. Geography will also be looked at in terms of department size as well as whether it is located inside or outside of a county labeled a High Incident Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA), which will also be a first in the literature. HIDTA designators are important since the conception of the 1033 program was aimed at combatting drug trafficking and departments located with HIDTA counties are given first consideration when acquiring 1033 equipment. Descriptive and regression analysis using the survey data will be used to analyze the data.

**Assumptions**

Since the militarization of police is seen as a phenomenon that is already apart of policing in the United States, participants in this study will most likely be well aware of the concept.
What will be examined in this dissertation however are police leader’s beliefs on the extent of police militarization, which may vary by respondent.

Sir Robert Peel, considered to be the father of modern policing, has nine principles that every officer and every police leader would have heard. Former New York Police Department (NYPD) commissioner, William J. Bratton, stated that he carries the principles everywhere he goes (Nagle, 2014). Principle four states that “the degree of cooperation of the public that can be secured diminishes proportionately to the necessity of the use of physical force” (Nagle, 2014, para. 5). Force is not only physical but can also be visual. Police leaders especially will be aware that the trust and cooperation of the public is paramount in being a successful officer and having an effective department. Therefore, police leaders would have considered the effect acquired military equipment would have on the perception of their department. To what extent they weighed these options and what effect this weighing of the options had will be examined in this study.

Trust and cooperation between the community and the police is paramount to community policing. According to Kang (2015) community policing encourages departments to increase citizen participation by engaging with community members to not only define specific problems in a neighborhood, but to come jointly create solutions to those problems. Community policing in this way is believed to enhance trust levels between officers and citizens, so that they see each other as a team (Cordner, 2015). Police militarization would thus be seen as a threat to this partnership and therefore the police leaders being surveyed in this study will be well aware of the impact of either their acquisitions of military equipment or their reasoning behind not participating in the 1033 program.
Scope and Delimitation

The geographic focus of this paper will be the state of Michigan. Although part of the data being used in this study includes equipment acquisitions by departments in Michigan through the 1033 program and equally important are those departments that do not participate in the program. A survey was distributed to the leader of each department in the state of Michigan to examine their thoughts on both the 1033 program and more broadly, police militarization. Although the scope of the study focuses on one state, it is important to note the potential survey application for a national population of all police officers will be a possibility in the future. Since no prior study has looked at the acquisition of equipment at the local level nor surveyed police leaders on their thoughts on acquiring such equipment, this study will serve as a potential springboard for future studies at a regional or national level.

Limitations

LESO provides an open database on their website which includes equipment transfers from the 1033 program, including type of equipment and date, to every department in the United States. Specifically looking at state of Michigan, departments have acquired equipment from the program since 1995. Thus, the date range for this study will include the years 1995 through 2018. Since Michigan is the sole focus of this paper, the geographical scope of this study is the prominent limitation of this paper, and may limit the generalizability of findings. A second limitation of this paper is that the police leader (e.g. chief, sheriff) will be the sole representative of their department in terms of their thoughts on police militarization and equipment acquisitions. This view, however, may not be representative of the entire department, which would show a potential disconnect between police leaders and their organization.
Significance and Implications for Theory and Praxis

Since examining those departments participating in acquiring excess military equipment seems to be one logical way to assess the extent of militarization, I plan to contribute to the literature by measuring ‘extent’ as the total value of equipment acquired by each department at the local level. Similar studies have used a similar approach including a study by Ramey and Steidley (2018) which focused on cities and towns, but excluded county and state departments, while others have examined 1033 equipment procurement at the county level (Radil et al. 2017; Harris et al., 2017; Bove & Gavrilova, 2017). The total amount of equipment acquired at each department in Michigan would be compared as well as those communities who elect not to participate in the 1033 program to begin to get an idea on the extent of militarization.

Another contribution to the literature will be to survey police leaders in the state of Michigan in order to determine the reasons why they participate in the program. Examining equipment acquisitions as an indicator of police militarization is an important first step but determining the reasons why departments participate may provide a more complete picture. For instance, Morgan County Sheriff Robert Downey and Maj. Jerry Pickett, head of Johnson County SWAT, who said that if the agency had $300,000 to spend, he would prefer a commercial “BearCat” armored vehicle instead of a military MRAP from the 1033 program (Alesia, 2014). A low operating budget in this case pushed this department to acquire a piece of equipment from the 1033 program, thus increasing the extent of its militarization. According to Radil, et al.’s (2017) findings in a study of geographic locations of 1033 allocations; “the importance of local and regional contexts for 1033 usage is also reinforced with our findings of statistically significant clusters of high and low acquisitions at the county scale” (p.210). They add that a great deal of work remains in examining this issue and will involve quantitative
research using county or smaller scale data to identify possible correlates to police militarization (Radil et al., 2017). The present study will look at 1033 acquisitions at the local level along with survey data from local police leaders in the state of Michigan.

One of these possible correlates discussed by Radil et al. (2017) is the policing of drug transportation corridors within the United States. This possible correlate will also be explored in the current study through the examination of departments that fall within a High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) counties. According to the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) there are currently 12 counties with the HIDTA designator in Michigan (ONDCP, 2019). HIDTA as it relates to the 1033 program, is important because departments within a HIDTA county are given preferential consideration when it comes to acquiring 1033 equipment. In fact, on the justification form (see Appendix E) for both armored vehicles and aircrafts through the LESO, it asks “is the requesting agency located within an office of National Drug Control Policy designated High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA)?” (DLA, 2020 p. 1).

As mentioned earlier, the creation of the 1033 program had to do with counter-drug activities. By exploring the justification of acquiring 1033 equipment through survey data of local police leaders, a shift from the original intention of the program (counter-drug activities) to issues of terrorism, officer safety, and or citizen safety could be discovered.

Radil et al. (2017) also call for research that is “place-specific” and that seeks to understand rationale behind issues connected to 1033 acquisitions. They contend that research that examines decision making behind 1033 acquisitions is needed. The present study will seek to find the rationale behind why police leaders at the local level may or may not participate in the 1033 program and what factors affect that decision. Although this study will only take place in
the state of Michigan, it will help us begin to understand some of the rationales at the local level, which can later be replicated in other states.

The historical origins of SWAT teams have been typically described as a reactive response to situations where police have found themselves underequipped or “outgunned” (Balko, 2013). When looking at the reason(s) why police departments would acquire excess military equipment to be used in their communities, this notion of being underequipped may be one of the reasons given. Events such as the North Hollywood shootout in Los Angeles, CA in 1997 and the 1966 Texas clock tower sniper are just a couple of examples where police did not have the necessary equipment to stop an active threat to the public.

Structure

The dissertation is structured in the following format. Chapter II presents a literature review of both the militarization of policing as well as the 1033 program. Chapter III details the research methods, including survey design and the econometric models. Findings from this study will be presented in Chapter IV. The final chapter includes a detailed discussion and implications for those serving as sheriffs or chiefs for police departments.
CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

Defining Police Militarization

It is important to note that there are varying definitions of police militarization, also known as paramilitary policing, including differences of opinions as to the appropriateness of its use, as well as the impact that it has on both the community and the officers. The term militarization has been defined as the social phenomenon where police become socially, organizationally, institutionally, or ideologically dependent upon the military or military principles, usually without the direct military participation or initiative (Enloe, 1980; Herzog, 2001). For example, Rantatalo (2012, p. 51) states that “One can conclude that the term ‘paramilitary policing’ has been used ambiguously with a variety of associations and meanings in the scholarly world.” Additionally, police militarization has been defined as “…the process whereby civilian police increasingly draw from, and pattern themselves around, the tenets of militarism and the military model” (Kraska, 2007, p. 503). The visible signs of this include the adoption of uniforms, military-style ranks, and organizational hierarchy.

Lieblich and Shinar (2018) define police militarization as a “…cultural phenomenon in which certain attributes are generally perceived by the public as reflecting militarization” or a “…symbolic process” (p. 110). Rantatalo (2012) defines paramilitary policing as “organizations within law enforcement bodies that in differing degrees are modelled after the military, but with the statutory powers and legitimate status of the police” (p. 51). Herzog (2001) states that
militarization is based on the internalization of the ideology militarism, which is the value and belief system (conceptual and ideological) providing rationale supporting militarization.

Militarism has been defined as “…a set of beliefs, values, and assumptions that stress the use of force and threat of violence as the most appropriate and efficacious means to solve problems. It emphasizes the exercise of military power, hardware, organization, operations, and technology as its primary problem-solving tools” (Kraska, 2007, p. 503; Enloe, 2004). Radil et al. (2017) stated that militarism is the “…underlying philosophy or ideology…in which the threat or use of force to resolve social or political issues is seen as normal, unproblematic, and efficient…” (p. 206). Bernazzoli and Flint (2009) argued that militarism may become largely accepted within society, especially when the military has an elevated status in society and even when those in that society don’t fully understand the effects it can have on their society.

Although Kraska (2007) views militarization as the implementation of a militaristic ideology, Lawson (2019) contends that it is more than an ideology and is more so a change in organizational and psychological change in the department (organization) and the officers. Lawson (2019) breaks this idea down into two mechanism including hierarchical and cooperation. Hierarchical includes the cues and language used by police leaders. Operational is the cooperation between the military and police and the creation and or expansion of SWAT teams.

Dansky (2016) breaks down the concept of police militarization into four parts including: the 1033 program, the use of Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) teams by federal law enforcement agencies, the use of SWAT teams by local law enforcement agencies, and a culture of policing that is more focused on fear and control as opposed to fairness and safety for the community. Rantatalo (2012) found in his review of the literature between 2001 and 2011 that
there is “no apparent consensus, universal definition, cumulative research programme, or canon of shared knowledge…” regarding militaristic policing (p. 59). He goes on to say that the task of consolidating the varying definitions of police militarization may run the risk of obscuring different dimensions and perspectives of this topic (Rantatalo, 2012). For this reason, this dissertation does not look to create an all-encompassing definition of police militarization. Still, it is important to understand the various ways that militarization is described in the literature.

According to Lawson (2019) “…1033 transfers may cause militarization, militarization may cause an increase in 1033 transfers…I simply argue that there is an association between the use of the 1033 program and militarization” (p. 178). For this dissertation, I define militarization as the acquisition and use of ‘controlled equipment’ by civilian police departments. Controlled equipment, which is defined by LESO (2020), consists of items such as weapons, vehicles, and ammunition magazines. Uncontrolled equipment includes tools, first aid supplies, and office equipment (LESO, 2020). For this dissertation, the focus will be on controlled equipment, since this is the equipment that can be visible to the public, and more importantly seen as more militaristic. Lockwood et al.’s (2018) concern is that militarization of American police departments is occurring through the use of both vehicles and equipment supplied by the federal government. According to Lieblich and Shinar (2018), the 1033 program created a symbolic change for police departments from a force concerned with enforcing laws to a force ready for the possibility of combat. Finally, Ramey and Steidley (2018) state that participation in the 1033 program “…makes an excellent test case for theories of police militarization” (p. 815).

Defining militarization for the purposes of this dissertation will be any equipment listed under the controlled property definition which could be viewed as militaristic in nature. This definition is strictly material in nature and focuses on the material dimension of militarization as
proposed by Kraska (2007). This definition will be used and looked at in greater detail in the methods section.

**History of Police Militarization**

The police and the military represent the legal use of a state’s coercive power and force (Enloe, 1980). According to Turk (1982), the police are expected to produce social order within a jurisdiction without resorting to the use of direct military control. This distinction between the roles and powers of the military and police within our country has been discussed since our founding fathers.

**The Evolution of the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878**

Posse Comitatus is the power of a local sheriff to summon individuals to assist him or her in the execution of laws (Felicetti & Luce, 2003). The early debate about allowing the military to intervene in domestic matters was not about police militarization as we know it today, but rather the concern that if our newly formed government was allowed to create and maintain an army, it could threaten the liberty of citizens (Rizer, 2016). The Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 (18 U.S. Code 1385) was passed by Congress and signed by President Hayes to end the use of federal troops to police state elections in southern states after the Civil War (Doyle, 2000). That same year, President Hayes sent federal troops to New Mexico in order to end civil disobedience in the region (Rizer, 2016). In 1894, President Cleveland sent federal troops to Illinois, against the governor’s objection, to assist in ending rioting by railroad workers.

According to Rizer (2016), in each of these deployments of troops by the president, Congress remained silent. It wasn’t until President McKinley sent federal troops to Coeur d’Alene, Idaho in May of 1899 through April 1901 to help local law enforcement handle disgruntled union miners that members of Congress took issue with federal troop deployments
by a president (Rizer, 2016). In this case over a thousand miners arrived in Wardner, Idaho at the site of a mine that did not recognize the Coeur d’Alene Miners Union. Some of the men seized the train and took dynamite and weapons to destroy the mine in Wardner (Gunning, 1972).

In 1973, a group from the American Indian Movement entered and seized the town of Wounded Knee in the Pine Ridge Reservation in South Dakota to protest a tribal chairman the group accused of corruption (Ray, 2012). During this incident, no federal troops were sent, however the Department of Defense (DOD) sent a representative to give tactical advice and assess the situation. The seventy-one-day standoff, which included aid from the federal government, created more distrust of the government (Ray, 2012).

In 1986, the Military Support for Civilian Authorities directive was published and later updated in 1989 (Rizer, 2016). This policy authorizes the DOD to share information, equipment and training with civilian police departments during emergencies including terrorist attacks and civil emergencies (DOD Directive 5525.5, 1986). Even though a lot of resources would be given and or offered to civilian police departments, Congress restricted the direct participation of those who were members of the military to be granted powers of civilian police, which include search, seizure, and arrest (Rizer, 2016).

When the Homeland Security Act of 2002 was enacted, it clarified the Posse Comitatus Act. Specifically, it stated that Congress can authorize the use of armed forces. Additionally, it stated that the President could use armed forces to respond promptly to issues including war, insurrection, and or other serious emergencies (section 466 (a) (4)).

According to Coyne and Hall (2013), the Homeland Security Act of 2002, restricted the involvement of the military as well as its equipment in civilian law enforcement activities; except where it was specifically allowed by the U.S. Constitution and or ordered by Congress. State
governors could, however, request military assistance when their domestic forces could no longer maintain control. According to Rizer (2016), civilian law enforcement could seek help from citizens or other civilian law enforcement to help keep the peace, however the federal military could not.

**Police Militarization Case Studies**

On August 1, 1966, a former Marine sniper went to the top of a clock tower on the campus of the University of Texas and proceeded to open fire on those below him. The active shooter incident lasted over an hour and a half, killing 14 and injuring 32 others before police were able to stop him with lethal force (Silva & Capellan, 2019). Before police officers were able to stop the gunman, they had to deal with the problem of being ill-equipped to handle an encounter with a sniper in a clock tower. At that time, the campus police officers did not carry weapons, while the Austin Police Department which also responded, did not have the training nor the weapons to deal with an active shooter, especially at that distance (Krueger, n.d.). Vigilante citizens with rifles from home came onto campus to try and stop the shooter (Montgomery, 2016). Ultimately, police were able to get to the top of the clock tower and fatally shoot the gunman.

According to Kraska and Kappeler (1997) the militarization of police is considered a phenomenon that started in the 1970s when Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) teams were used to assist local police departments and national guard units in maintaining order in areas dealing with violent crime and disorder (Clark et al., 2000; Hillman, 1988; Lesce, 1996). According to Balko (2014) the first SWAT team was established in 1965 as a result of the Watts Riots and was later expanded by the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD).
On February 28, 1997, North Hollywood police officers had to borrow high-powered rifles from local gun shops during a shootout with two heavily armored bank robbers in order to stand a chance against them (Smith & Mather, 2017). At that time, officers were equipped with low caliber handguns as well as shotguns, which were not powerful enough to stop the gunman. In fact, the body armor the robbers wore protected them against the handguns and shotguns the police were equipped with at the time (Stamper, 2016). After this incident, law enforcement in America realized that there was the potential for incidents like this which started the trend of equipping police officers with high powered rifles in their squad cars. This would allow police officers a fighting chance while they waited for the SWAT team to arrive on scene.

On April 20, 1999, two active shooters entered Columbine High School and killed twelve students, one teacher, while injuring twenty-four others. At the time, police officers (first responders) were not trained nor equipped to go into a building after an active shooter and were instead trained to secure a perimeter around the scene and wait for SWAT to arrive (Stamper, 2016). This was due to SWAT having both the necessary equipment (body armor that can withstand higher caliber rounds), weapons (rifles), and training to deal with an active shooter threat. According to Stamper (2016), by the early 2000s, departments were beginning to move to train and equip patrol officers to be able to deal with an active shooter threat as opposed to wait for SWAT. This move equipped officers with rifles (AR-15s) and over the uniform body armor which could be thrown on during an active shooter incident to give officers additional protection. Although this could be seen as making officers more militarized, it could also be seen as simply a necessary response to current threats officers face.

Kitchen and Rygiel (2014) argue that blurring the lines between technology and equipment used by both the police and the military can create a situation where state agencies
view cities as testing grounds for military weapons and tactics. They provided examples of large-scale events that blurred the lines such as the Olympics and G20 Summit in Canada. Before the G20 Summit in Toronto, Canada, the Toronto Police Service obtained mass amounts of gas masks and four Long Range Acoustic Devices which were designed for the U.S. Military and kept them for future use. Another example of this that Dunton and Kitchen (2014) provide is prior to the 2010 Vancouver Olympics, the Vancouver Police Department created a Military Liaison Unit to develop communications and training partnerships between the two groups. According to Dunton and Kitchen (2014), the military unit was not disbanded after the Olympics and regularly trains with the U.S. National Guard to learn how technology from the military may assist domestic policing.

The shooting of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri in 2014 marked a critical moment that put the topic of police militarization at the forefront of discussion. Many protestors, along with some looters and rioters, began protesting the shooting. Journalists covering the rioting and protesting that unfolded after the shooting described the situation as ‘us versus them.’ This idea was evident as lines of police officers in riot/military gear on one side with protestors and/or rioters on the other. One journalist remarked “…it seems that some police officers have shed the blue uniform and have put on the uniform and gear of the military, bringing the attitude along with it” (Szoldra, 2014, para. 11). According to Radil et al. (2017), the police tactics used during what amounted to mostly protests in Ferguson emphasized the use of SWAT teams in military uniforms (camouflage patterned) and included snipers on top of armored vehicles.

**Using “War” to Describe Domestic Problems**

It was President Johnson in 1965 who coined the phrase “war on crime.” (Lieblich & Shinar, 2018). The signing of the Law Enforcement Assistance Act that Johnson presented to
Congress in March of 1965, established a direct role for the federal government in local police operations and other facets of the criminal justice system (Hinton, 2015). Hinton (2015) further explains that Johnson’s administration focused on building and providing weapons for civilian police officers by creating a grant making agency (which later became the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) within the DOJ to provide military grade hardware, which had been used by the military in Vietnam and Latin America, just like the MRAPs in Afghanistan.

It was President Nixon who coined the phrase “war on drugs” in 1971, and in 1973, created the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) to specifically target both drug use and smuggling into and across the United States (“War on Drugs,” 2019). President Reagan also declared drugs a national security threat, both of which were echoed by Presidents Bush and Clinton (Lieblich & Shinar, 2018). In 1981, due to the increased dangers of drug trafficking entering the United States, Congress moved to increase the amount of cooperation between the military and civilian police departments (Nevitt, 2014). According to Lieblich and Shinar (2018) police militarization “…was empowered in recent decades through the ‘war’ discourse. From the ‘war on drugs’ to the ‘war on terror,’ militarization saw a process of normalization…” (p. 107). Since local law enforcement lacked the resources to be able to effectively respond to and thwart drugs from entering the country, Congress sought to help civilian police departments by allowing access to military intelligence, training, and equipment (Nevitt, 2014).

After the terrorist attacks on 9/11 in 2001, George W. Bush declared a global “war on terror.” When he addressed the nation, President Bush stated, “either you are with us or you are with the terrorists” (“A Timeline of the U.S.-Led War on Terror,” 2019, para. 4). The problem with using the slogan “war” to identify problems, especially those within our borders, is that it
creates and us versus them mentality. The president of the United States is the national spokesperson on a variety of issues, and his/her declarations on an issue can influence the way citizens view these issues (Elwood, 1995). According to Kuhn (1970), “you don’t see something until you have the right metaphor to perceive it” (p. 128).

Cases where “war” is declared on a social issue implies a commitment to ending the problem by any means necessary. Neocleous (2011), however, states that the slogans “war on drugs” and “war on terror” are not metaphors at all, but are actual wars that incorporate both domestic and foreign resources to combat them, because they are found on both domestic and foreign soil. McMichael (2017) states that the “war on drugs” first involved military engagements in Latin America, but later was expanded to include domestic police officers because the problem of drugs was not central to Latin America but was present in our streets.

The war on drugs, war on crime, and war on terror are all factors in the implementation of changes within the 1033 program. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 expanded eligibility for the program to include transfers of equipment to police departments for both counter-drug and counter-terrorism missions. According to Else (2014), the House version of this act wanted to retain the priority for counter-drug activities. This priority is extended to the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) program, which is a federal program which provides assistance to local law enforcement departments to combat drug trafficking (Finklea, 2018).

**HIDTA**

The HIDTA program was created out of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 and then permanently authorized through the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) Reauthorization Act of 2006 (Finklea, 2018). HIDTA provides assistance to local law
enforcement agencies at the federal, state, local, and tribal level in areas that have been identified as intense drug trafficking areas (Finklea, 2018). Harrison and Kennedy (1996) state that drug smuggling is considered a serious threat, especially along the Southwest border, and the increased amounts of drugs passing through the area presumably translates into increased availability and thus increased use.

According to HIDTA (2020), the purpose of the program is to reduce both drug trafficking and production by facilitating cooperation across federal, state, local, and tribal police departments through information sharing and coordinating efforts; the design and implementation of effective strategies and operations; and to make the most of available resources to reduce the drug trafficking in designated areas. The HIDTA program designates which areas are most vulnerable to drug trafficking. In order to qualify as a HIDTA region, the region must contain a significant amount of illegal drug production, manufacturing, importation, or distribution; local police departments have dedicated resources to combat the issue, thus indicating a need for more resources; drug related activities in the region are having a negative impact in both that region as well as in other areas of the country; and a significant amount of help via resources from the federal government is needed to assist in dealing with the drug problem (HIDTA, 2020).

More specifically, a HIDTA designated area is contained within a county. There is not a focus on a specific drug threat, such as heroin or meth, within the HIDTA program, rather, a focus on combatting whatever drug threat is specific to that region (Finklea, 2018). Ultimately it is the director of the ONDCP that makes the decision about whether to include a county as a HIDTA region. However, the director must also consult with the Attorney General, Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary of Homeland Security, heads of the relevant National Drug Control
Program agencies, and the governor of the state that the county resides in (Finklea, 2018). In most cases, law enforcement leaders within a county will petition the director of the ONDCP for their respective county to be included with the HIDTA designator.

According to LESO, departments that fall within a HIDTA designated county would be given some preferential treatment regarding equipment acquisition, at least for armored vehicles. Departments wishing to acquire armored vehicles must answer a seven-question justification form (see Appendix B). Question Two asks whether the requesting agency falls within a HIDTA area (LESO, 2020). The LESO (2020) looks at five factors when issuing armored vehicle including “the amount of Armored Vehicles available to the LESO program, the date the request was received by LESO, High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA), Geographic responsibility, Fair and equitable distribution” (para. 6). So, a department residing within a HIDTA designated county would already have one of these factors completed. This is also the case when requesting small arms, aircraft, and other equipment according to their website (LESO, 2020).

Currently in Michigan there are 12 counties that have the HIDTA designator. They include Allegan, Genesee, Kalamazoo, Kent, Macomb, Muskegon, Oakland, Saginaw, St. Clair, Van Buren, Washtenaw, and Wayne (Michigan HIDTA, 2019). There are 83 counties in Michigan (Michigan.gov). This dissertation will look at not only the sheriff departments of each of these counties, but also the departments that reside within these counties to see if having a department that falls within a HIDTA county has any effect on choosing to participate and or acquiring equipment from the 1033 program.
Overview of the 1033 Program

According to Bruce et al. (2019), the 1033 program is one of the largest grant-in-kind initiatives in the history of the United States. Since the program’s creation, $7.2 billion worth of property has been transferred to local, tribal, state, and federal agencies (LESO, 2020). In fact, more than 8,000 police agencies have enrolled in the program throughout the United States. Items that are available for acquisition by local police departments include a wide array of equipment used by the U.S. military including clothing, office supplies, tools, rescue equipment, vehicles, rifles, and other small arms. It is important to note however that of all of the excess equipment transferred through the 1033 program, of all the excess equipment provided through the program, only 5% are small arms and less than 1% are tactical vehicles (LESO, 2020).

Equipment that is available to law enforcement to acquire include officer furniture, kitchen and exercise equipment, generators, tents, first aid supplies, bedding, and tools. Other equipment includes handcuffs, riot shields, holsters, combat boots, binoculars, cameras, rifles, and handguns. Large scale items include cranes, MRAPS, other armored vehicles, aircraft, watercraft and various other utility vehicles (Else, 2014). According to Harris et al. (2017), the 1033 Program was created six years before the start of US war in Iraq and Afghanistan and in 2006, transfers of tactical items increased sharply as the Army replaced the M-16 with the M-4 carbine as standard issue.

Law enforcement agencies wishing to participate in the program must apply through the LESO website and once approved by the state coordinator, representatives from the requesting agency can look online at available property or visit a local DLA Disposition Services Site to view items before placing a request (Else, 2014). Once a piece of equipment is requested by a law enforcement agency, the state coordinator must review the request and determine whether or
not the property will be transferred. As noted above, the property is free to departments less the cost of shipping (LESO, 2020).

Else (2014) notes that some equipment such as weapons and armored tactical vehicles that are deemed militaristic are not given to police departments, but rather loaned out to them so the LESO program can re-acquire them if the agency no longer has a use for it. This equipment, called controlled property, is also tracked more closely by the LESO office to ensure it is not misused. Equipment such as tools, kitchen equipment, and first aid kits are considered controlled property for the first year, however after one year, it becomes sole property of the police agency and removed from the LESO audited inventory (Else, 2014).

Although a chief or sheriff may not be in charge of searching for and acquiring new equipment from the LESO website, these leaders are ultimately responsible for all equipment acquired through the program. State coordinators are responsible for keeping updated property records, investigating any alleged misuse of property, and ultimately notifying the DLA of any found wrongdoing by a department. The LESO has the ability to suspend any department that abuses the program or misuses any of the acquired property (Else, 2014).

On January 16, 2015, Executive Order 13688 (2015) was issued by President Barack Obama titled, “Federal Support for Local Law Enforcement Equipment Acquisition” (p. 1). Executive Order 13688 (2015) was intended to “…identify actions that can improve Federal support for the appropriate use, acquisition, and transfer or controlled equipment by State, local, and Tribal law enforcement agencies” (p. 4). In an effort build trust between law enforcement and the communities they serve, Executive Order 13688 was implemented on May 18, 2015 to “…harmonize federal programs so that they have consistent and transparent policies with respect to the acquisition of controlled equipment by Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs)” (“Law
Enforcement Equipment Working Group,” 2015, p. 8). These working groups and recommendations were put into place after the police response in Ferguson, MO after the Michael Brown shooting.

This order established a list of prohibited equipment which law enforcement agencies (LEAs) would not be able to acquire through the 1033 program. Equipment not eligible for acquisition included tracked armored vehicles (vehicles that provide ballistic protection and have a tracked system for movement), grenade launchers (any firearm or firearm accessory used to launch small explosive projectiles), bayonets, large caliber (.50-Caliber or higher) weapons and ammunition, as well as camouflage uniforms (not including woodland, desert or solid color style uniforms) (Executive Order 13688, 2015, p. 12). It is important to note that no police department has ever possessed or used an actual grenade, therefore the grenade launchers which departments could and did acquire were used to launch tear gas canisters for situations such as riots.

Items such as these were prohibited by the Working Group “…because the substantial risk of misusing or overusing these items, which are seen as militaristic in nature, could significantly undermine community trust and may encourage tactics and behaviors that are inconsistent with the premise of civilian law enforcement” (Executive Order 13688, 2015, p. 13).

It is important to note that the 1033 program is not the only program which allows local police departments to acquire equipment. The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) identified two other federal programs that allow police department to acquire military equipment including the Department of Homeland Security’s Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP) and the Department of Justice’s Justice Assistance program (JAG) (ACLU, 2014). The 1033 program will be the focus of this dissertation.

According to Harris et al. (2017),
It is worth noting that the request process for aircraft, armored personnel carriers, firearms, etc., is quite simple and does not appear to require political oversight or public input. The one-to-two page forms amount to a signature from a police chief and a state coordinator, and a very short explanation for why the requested hardware would be useful (p. 296).

Dansky (2016) points out that some of the equipment transferred through the 1033 program is not weaponry, such as desks and computers, however non-weapons such as camouflage uniforms and night vision goggles could be considered militarized equipment as well. He also goes on to say, “and of course much of what is transferred is heavy weaponry designed for active combat,” providing the MRAPs as an example (Dansky, 2016, p. 61). However, according to LESO (2020), 5% of the excess property that law enforcement agencies receive are small arms (handguns), and less than 1% are tactical vehicles.

Opponents of the 1033 program argue “…police have become increasingly aggressive and militaristic” (Greenhut, 2008, p. 15). Opponents also argue that there are cases in which, even when law enforcement (specifically SWAT [special weapons and tactics] Teams), have the militaristic equipment and should use it, they fail to do so. Balko (2014) uses the example of the Columbine school shootings in 1999 and states that “though there were eventually 800 police officers and eight SWAT teams on the Columbine campus, the SWAT teams held off from going inside to stop shooters Dylan Klebold and Eric Harris because they deemed the situation too dangerous” (p. 231). The literature on police militarization ranges from officers being too hyper-masculine and warrior-minded, to being too afraid to act because of the inherent risk involved in a particular situation.

**Role of the Police**

Before discussing the main focus of this dissertation, which is the extent of police militarization, it is important to first understand the role of the police and how it relates to the
topic of this paper. As agents of the state, police are required to help protect the liberties of citizens in a democratic society; however, doing so restricts the liberties of others to ensure this goal. The police are a necessary component of a democratic government because their ability to use force at the individual level help ensure liberty to a society (Dunham & Alpert, 2001; Goldstein, 1977).

Police officers are the agents of both a democratic government and the citizenry of a society to deal with individuals who infringe upon the rights of others. Thus, police are tasked with being responsive to both the government and the public in how they carry out their function of this goal. Individual local governments provide procedural guidelines for the police on the type of force that can be used as well as the extent of force that is allowed in a given situation. For example, police departments in the cities of New York City, Los Angeles, Boston, Orlando, Miami, Detroit, Houston, Cincinnati, and Cleveland all have departmental policies that prohibit officers from firing at moving vehicles (Swaine et al., 2015).

This is a controversial topic because a suspect may be trying to run over a police officer, which could constitute the use of deadly force against the operator of the vehicle. However, the public may not like a policy allowing officers to shoot at a moving vehicle since there may be others in the vehicle or around it who may mistakenly get shot. Policies like these dictate best practices and serve as a litmus test for officers who are accused of being too excessive or negligent in their duties.

Since then, more researchers have been analyzing police militarization to identify the culture within this phenomenon. Salter (2014) states that police militarization “…has become the nexus point for cultural fantasies or righteous male violence and camaraderie within a pluralizing racial, sexual and gender order” (p. 167). McCulloch (2001) argues that these paramilitary police
units have uniforms that resemble that of the military, which is typified by hyper-masculine camaraderie. Working in a profession, such as policing, which can be dangerous at times will create a strong camaraderie.

**Review of the Research on the 1033 Program and Police Militarization**

To date, SWAT teams have been the main focus concerning research into police militarization (den Heyer, 2014; Radil et al. 2017). Prior research in police militarization has looked at analyzing the impact of officer safety outcomes as a result of the transfer of military equipment from the US Department of Defense to local, country, and state police departments (Wickes, 2015). Rojek (2005) used a case study to examine a police tactical unit, however the focus of the research was how operational personnel within organizations manage risk in uncertain situations and did not look at militarization.

Other studies (Clark et al., 2000) examined training needs of SWAT units, while Kraska (1996) looked at the militarization component of policing through an ethnographic study of U.S. military soldiers participating in the creation of rural police paramilitary units. In another study, data was collected over a two-year period from departments in the United States that obtained an MRAP (Redden, 2015). A total of 465 documents were collected and analyzed to determine the justification departments used to obtain the MRAP. According to Rezvani et al. (2014), many questions remain about the 1033 program including why certain surplus items are being requested by police departments, why and how they are being used, and what benefits, if any, are there for law enforcement.

Opponents of the 1033 program argue that “…police have become increasingly aggressive and militaristic” (Greenhut, 2008, p. 15). Opponents also argue that there are cases in which, even when law enforcement (specifically SWAT [special weapons and tactics] Teams),
have the militaristic equipment and should use it, they fail to do so. Balko (2014) uses the example of the Columbine school shootings in 1999 and states that “though there were eventually 800 police officers and eight SWAT teams on the Columbine campus, the SWAT teams held off from going inside to stop shooters Dylan Klebold and Eric Harris because they deemed the situation too dangerous” (p. 231). The literature on police militarization ranges from officers being too hyper-masculine and warrior-minded, to being too afraid to act because of the inherent risk involved in a particular situation.

Kraska and Kappeler (1997) sampled all law enforcement agencies, excluding federal, in the United States with jurisdictions of at least 50,000 people and employing at least 100 sworn officers. A total of 690 law enforcement agencies fit these parameters. Of the 548 departments that responded, 89.4% had a police paramilitary unit (PPU). Although most departments had formed their PPU in the 1970s, the rate at which departments added a PPU grew from around 59% in 1982, 78% by 1990, and 89% by 1995 (Kraska & Kappeler, 1997). They point out that although the formation of PPU is an important indicator of the militarization of police, it is also important to look at the increase in the use of PPU's. They found that between 1980 and 1983, the average number of uses per year was 13. This number had doubled by 1986, almost tripled by 1989 and quadrupled by 1995. The majority of cases (75.9%) where PPU's were being utilized involved high-risk warrant work or drug raids in 1995 (Kraska & Kappeler, 1997). The war on drugs during the end of the 1980s and early 1990s saw a need for increased vigilance in dealing with this problem.

However according to Radil et al. (2017) the presence or absence of paramilitary units (SWAT teams) should not constitute the extent of police militarization by itself, since some departments have armored vehicles, but no SWAT team. A department that acquires more
equipment than another department through the 1033 program may be seen as more militarized on the material dimension of police militarization as discussed by Kraska (2007), however there are 4 dimensions in total that help paint a complete picture.

Kraska and Kappeler (1997) also examined the sources of training with departments, specifically when their PPU was first formed. Approximately 46% stated that they drew upon experience from current police officers with special operations training in the military. Forty-three percent trained with active duty military experts in special operations (Kraska & Kappeler, 1997). The concern is not only is there a growth in the number of PPUs, but their increased use is becoming normalized (Kraska & Kappeler, 1997), and that was 25 years ago.

Lawson’s (2019) concern for police militarization is that as departments become more militarized, the rate of deaths for suspects will increase. Lawson (2019) examined 11,848 nonfederal and non-state law enforcement agencies in the United States between the fourth quarters of 2014 through the fourth quarter of 2016 to examine the number killed during each quarter. Lawson (2019) used the FatalEncounters.org database, which contains records of individual suspects killed by police. He also used the 1033 program database from the DLA to look at the total amount in dollars of acquired equipment to measure the extent of militarization.

Lawson (2019) found that between 2014 and 2016, increasing militarization corresponded to more suspect deaths. He also found that other variables with a significant effect on the frequency of lethal force being use by police included total population, violent crime rate, and the jurisdictional level of the police department. Departments with countywide jurisdiction (sheriff departments) appeared to decrease the number of suspect deaths. A final finding was that racial minority populations appeared to have no effect (Lawson, 2019). Lawson (2019) adds that
future directions of research should include causes of militarization along with how agency-
specific training and supervision play a role.

Kraska and Paulsen (1996) conducted a study of a police department with 391 sworn
officers, serving a population of approximately 250,000 citizens, which involved participant
observation, in depth semi-structured interviews, and quantitative data. They found that
militarism is glorified among the officers and the department actively encourages this subculture
through promotional practices and informal status codes (Kraska & Paulsen, 1996). Further,
Kraska and Paulsen (1996) found that although the chief supports community policing publicly,
the administration seems to favor a more paramilitary style of policing.

The acquisition of excess DOD equipment by law enforcement agencies and its effects
have been examined in the literature (Hutto & Green, 2016), as well as its history, legal rationale,
and geographic concentration at the county level (Radil et al., 2017). The relationship between
acquiring military equipment through the 1033 program and police violence (Delehanty et al.,
2017) as well as the relationship between community policing and acquisition of equipment
(Koslicki & Willits, 2018) have also been examined. Bove and Gavrilova (2017) examined the
effect of acquiring excess DOD equipment had on crimes rates, while Harris et al. (2017)
measured the effects this equipment had on citizen complaints, assaults on police officers, and
offender deaths.

Lockwood et al. (2018) used data from a survey administered by the Monmouth
University Polling Institute, which asked respondents about their perceptions of police and
terrorism to study whether individuals supported the militarization of police in the United States.
Specifically, whether respondents felt that police should be permitted to use both military
weapons and equipment in four situations including counterterrorism, drug enforcement, gang
enforcement, and riot control. They found that both demographic factors (gender, political affiliation, education) and individual perceptions, influence whether or not adults support the militarization of police.

According to Molina (2014), police departments that most frequently take advantage of the 1033 program are those that are smaller and more rural with fewer available resources.

More specifically, males were more likely to support the use of military weapons by police, which is consistent with Brown and Benedict’s (2002) findings. Those who expressed positive views of the police were more likely to support the police using military equipment and weapons, while those who identified as liberal were at lower odds for supporting police in the use of military weapons and equipment. Those with a college degree were half as likely to support police militarization, compared to those who were less educated. Hispanics were not found to be significantly more or less likely to support the militarization of police for any purpose while black respondents were only significantly lower than white respondents for support of military weapons and equipment during riot control situations (Lockwood et al., 2018).

Fox et al. (2018) surveyed 705 adult participants using a stratified random sampling in Qualtrics in order to mirror the composition of Americans from the 2010 U.S. Census. They found that those who had a strong belief in police legitimacy, had trust in the federal government and trusted the local police were more likely to support police militarization. The opposite was true for those who did not support police militarization. Income and political orientation were the only demographic factors that distinguished between those who supported police militarization and those who didn’t, with supporters tending to have higher incomes. They also point that race/ethnicity was not significantly different across both supporters and opponents of police
militarization in their study. Fox et al. (2018) state that police executives and agencies may need to explain policies and practices as it relates to police militarization in order to foster public buy-in, and exploring individual sensitivity to this topic would be a useful next step for this body or research.

Opinion polls on the topic of police militarization have revealed little beyond a polarized public, while academic studies on this topic are few and far between (Fox et al., 2018; Moule et al., 2018). Hanley (2015) examined line of duty deaths (LODD) for officers due to felonious acts between 1987 and 2014. The database utilized was the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted (LEOKA). The average number of LODDs during the 1987 and 1996 period was 69.6 per year, 57.5 between 1996 and 2005, and 51 between 2004–2013 (Hanley, 2015) This downward trend stopped in 2014, when there were 126 LODD reported. One factor stood out in the 2014 LODD and that was an increase in ambush style attacks on officers, which jumped from five reported in 2013 to 15 in 2014.

Since then, more researchers have been analyzing police militarization to identify the culture within this phenomenon. Salter (2014) states that police militarization “...has become the nexus point for cultural fantasies or righteous male violence and camaraderie within a pluralizing racial, sexual and gender order” (p. 167). McCulloch (2001) argues that these paramilitary police units have uniforms that resemble that of the military, which is typified by hyper-masculine camaraderie. Working in a profession, such as policing, which can be dangerous at times will create a strong camaraderie. Police militarization is thus seen as a retreat from community-oriented policing, which erodes public trust (Salter, 2014). This study explores the issue of militarization within policing units, with a specific focus on the practice of police departments purchasing and utilizing military hardware.
Rojek (2005) used a case study to examine a police tactical unit, however the focus of the research was how operational personnel within organizations manage risk in uncertain situations and did not look at the aspect of militarization. Other studies (Clark et al., 2000) examined training needs of SWAT units, while Kraska (1996) looked at the militarization component of policing through an ethnographic study of U.S. military soldiers participating in the creation of rural police paramilitary units.

Mummolo (2018) found that militarized police units (SWAT) are deployed more often in areas with higher concentrations of African Americans, even after adjusting for local crime rates. He also found that citizens react negatively to the appearance of militarized police units in the news and as a result become likely to support police patrols in their own neighborhoods (Mummolo, 2018).

In another study, data was collected over a two-year period from departments in the United States that obtained an MRAP (Redden, 2015). A total of 465 documents were collected and analyzed to determine the justification departments used to obtain the MRAP. According to Rezvani et al. (2014), many questions remain about the 1033 program including why police departments are requesting certain surplus items, why and how they are being used, and what benefits, if any, are there for law enforcement.

Open Systems Framework

According to Rezvani et al. (2014), many questions remain about the 1033 program including why certain surplus items are being requested by police departments, why and how they are being used, and what benefits, if any, are there for law enforcement. Analyzing the decision-making process of police leaders regarding the 1033 program will be done through the open systems framework developed by March and Simon (1958) and Cyert and March (1963).
Officers, like organization, adapt their roles and behavior according to the rules of that organization, whether formal or informal (March, 1994; Lawson, 2019). Police leaders ultimately have the final say within their organization in choosing whether to pursue acquiring equipment, but examining both the internal and external factors that affect this decision is important and has not yet been done in the literature to date. A systems argument depicts the existence of compelling relationships between policing and the social context. The more involved policing is in the other systems in which it is nested, the better the policing process will be at addressing the concerns of the community (Dietz & Mink, 2005, p. 9).

Below is a model (See Figure 1) that depicts both the internal and external factors that can affect a police leader’s decision to acquire excess military equipment. Each of these factors will be discussed in more detail.

![Open Systems Model of Police Militarization](Figure 1)
Internal Factors

Internal Factor 1: Budgetary Considerations

When looking at patterns of local government expenditures on police services, the criminal justice literature points to allocations being determined by socioeconomic factors within a given community (Zhao et al., 2010). Evidence from the literature shows that police strength (resources) is heavily influenced by both crime rates as well as the size of the minority population within a community (Levitt, 1997; Marvel & Moody, 1996; Nalla, 1992). According to Zhao et al. (2010),

It is argued that in cities little substantive debate occurs over the allocation of available resources based on a rational assessment of the needs of each municipal agency; instead, budgetary allocation most often follows an incremental track wherein municipal agencies share similar cuts in economic hard times and share similar increases in economic boom times (p. 267).

Police leaders therefore have to consider that depending on the condition of the economy, their budgets may increase or decrease and thus the need to seek help in the form of grants or program like the 1033 program. Wildavsky (1964) stated that governmental budgets operate over time through small incremental changes, which maintains a stable allocation base. For example, a police leader who believes that they need an armored vehicle may not be able to acquire one due to the cost. The budget may change and therefore make the expenditure associated with acquiring and maintain the armored vehicle challenging. This could potentially lead to fiscal stress.

Fiscal stress in local government occurs when budget deficits arise and thus a need arises to find alternative or additional revenue sources, including increases in state and federal aid, local taxes, and user fees (Pagano, 1993). An increase in federal aid could come in the form of a
program like the 1033 program. Police leaders who are contending with fiscal stress may rely on a program like this in order to acquire equipment they see as necessary.

According to Kim and Warner (2018), fiscal stress varies based on geography. Lobao and Kraybill (2005) found that rural counties are more likely to report fiscal stress. Rural counties were also found to provide less services and have lower levels of expenditures and state aid (Reeder & Jansen, 1995; Johnson et al., 1995; Warner, 2006). These prior findings may show county and rural police departments being more likely to participate in the 1033 program.

Responses to fiscal stress according to MacManus and Pammer (1990) and Morgan and Pammer (1988) can include delays or elimination of planned capital expenditures. For example, a police department in local government may have been planning for a larger capital expenditure such as a Lenco Bearcat, but due to fiscal stress may have to do without or find an alternative means of obtaining it. Programs such as the 1033 program would be one such alternative that would satisfy both a police department looking for an armored vehicle and be a more cost effective alternative for the local government.

Bove and Gavrilova (2017) found in their cost benefit analysis that a 10% spending increase on military equipment per year (around $5,800 per county), that the crime deterred amount to a social benefit of approximately $112,000. The cost of shipping equipment is in most cases significantly cheaper than purchasing a similar piece of commercial equipment. For example, Johnson County Sheriff department in Indiana paid approximately $5,000 for an MRAP through the 1033 program, which had an original acquisition value of $733,000 (Alesia, 2014).

Looking strictly at cost, an alternative for police departments is to pay the full purchase price for a vehicle such as the Lenco Ballistic Engineered Armored Response Counter Attack
Truck (BearCat), like the one purchased by Macomb County, Michigan for approximately $350,000 (Wisely, 2017). Vehicles like these provide ballistic protection for officers like the MRAP, but unlike the MRAP, they are not as criticized for their use by law enforcement.

Morgan County Sheriff Robert Downey and Maj. Jerry Pickett, head of Johnson County SWAT, said if they had $300,000 to spend, they would prefer a commercial “BearCat” armored vehicle…instead of a military MRAP (Alesia, 2014).

This is due to the “BearCat” being smaller, lighter, and faster. Since they don’t have that money, the 1033 program is their chosen option for possessing an armored vehicle for their officers (Alesia, 2014).

Some police departments like Superior and Madison in Wisconsin have elected to send their MRAPs back to the program due to the high maintenance costs, and the lack of maneuverability in city and residential settings. The Superior police chief also cited concerns from citizens about the militarized equipment not being appropriate for civilian police departments, while the Madison police stated that concerns of militarization were not an issue in their city (Kaeding, 2018). Individual cases like these support the need for examining data at the local level concerning finance data and other concerns for acquiring military equipment. Departments and towns make decisions based on their individual circumstances and needs, therefore an examination at the local level is needed and will fill a void in the literature.

Hanley (2015) states that some police departments cite the “war on drugs” as well as the “war on terror” as reasons they need military equipment, even though depending on the department, that threat may or may not exist. Another concern that has been cited by police leaders in America is the threat of active shooters, both in schools and in public. Budgetary considerations become a part of this conversation when considering the cost of training and equipping officers for these potential threats. A police leader has to consider how to best prepare
for these threats, which can affect a department’s preparedness and safety by not being able to acquire needed equipment to do their job. This can affect the safety of both officers and the community.

Even though the likelihood of these threats may be slim in some communities based on past crime data, deeming acquisition of military equipment not appropriate, it is also important to understand that police are in a position where they want to be ready (training) and equipped for a myriad of potential threats to themselves and the community. One method that Dietz and Mink (2005) explain in terms of system adaptation is survival of the fittest. This method is most often seen within police agencies during times of budgetary constraints and thus agencies have to compete for resources or find alternative solutions to meet their needs. An example of this would be the 1033 program, where agencies who cannot afford to purchase equipment, can obtain it for free through the program.

Considerations like these are important to understand and this dissertation will be surveying police leaders in order to see if this is common throughout organizations. In order to advance the literature and examine what role, if any, budgetary constraints play in the decision to acquire equipment from the 1033 program, I will test the following hypothesis:

**Hypothesis 1:** As the severity of budgetary constraints increase, police leaders will be more likely to acquire equipment through the 1033 program.

**Hypothesis 2:** As the economic benefits exceed the costs of participating in the 1033 program, police leaders will be more likely to acquire equipment through the 1033 program.
Internal Factor 2: Perceptions of Safety of the Police Profession

The second internal factor that a police leader would have to consider is the perceived dangerousness of the police profession. This could include both real and perceived dangers of the job. For example, a large city may have many more incidents of attacks on officers and or officers killed in the line of duty compared to a small rural department. The perceived dangerousness of the job might include dangerousness as a whole to the profession, as opposed to what threats have or currently exist. Therefore, a police leader in a small town theoretically would be less concerned with attacks on officers and officers killed in the line of duty compared to a police leader in a large city. Bove and Gavrilova (2017) found the 1033 equipment acquisitions doesn’t affect police calls for service nor does it have a “…significant impact on the number of police officers assaulted or injured in the line of duty” (p.13).

For example, the Spokane (Washington) County Sheriff recently defended his agency’s acquisition of fifty-seven M16 rifles through 1033 as necessary because law enforcement officials are “on the ISIS hit list” (Henterly 2015, p. 17), and the Latah (Idaho) County Sheriff emphasized the need for an armored vehicle to respond to mass shooting events, one of which occurred in the county in 2007 (Harber, 2014).

Bove and Gavrilova (2017) found that acquiring equipment through the 1033 program does not influence the number of offenders killed by police (Bove & Gavrilova, 2017). They also found that police departments which employ military equipment, improves the capabilities of the police to deter crime. Finally, they found that military equipment “…bring a reduction of the assaults on police officers, the number of complaints against them, and an increase of arrest rates for drug and weapon charges” (Bove & Gavrilova, 2017, p. 3).
As mentioned above, active shooter preparedness is something that police organizations have been concerned with since the school shooting in Columbine. Rapid response policies were developed that put the everyday patrol officer on the frontline of an active shooter event as opposed to waiting for SWAT. The idea behind this was that patrol officers would be able to respond the quickest, compared to mobilizing a SWAT team, and therefore they could enter a building or public space to attempt to stop the threat as soon as possible to save lives.

Blair and Schweit (2014) examined 160 active shooter incidents between 2000 and 2013. In 45 of those incidents (28.1%), where law enforcement arrived to stop the threat, gunfire was exchanged between police and the active shooter. Of those 45 incidents where police arrived to engage the suspect, police suffered casualties in 21 of them (46.7%) (Blair & Schweit, 2014). Police leaders in this case must balance the need for officer safety and thus allowing officers to have militaristic body armor and rifles at their disposal with the fear of appearing to militaristic to the community. Wickes’ (2015) analysis showed that law enforcement executives were less responsive to officer safety concerns when ordering equipment from the federal government.

In order to advance the literature and examine what role, if any, the perceived dangerousness of the police profession plays in the decision to acquire equipment from the 1033 program, I will test the following hypothesis:

**Hypothesis 3:** As the perceived dangerousness of the police profession increases, police leaders will be more likely to acquire equipment through the 1033 program.
Internal Factor 3: Policies

Departments have various policies concerning the appropriate response for patrol officers given an active shooter situation. This can range from having one officer go into a building or public space to engage an active shooter (See Appendix D) or waiting for upwards of four officers to engage. Since officers are being expected to confront an active shooter threat as opposed to waiting for SWAT, a police leader may consider allowing patrol officer to be equipped with equipment that was traditionally reserved for SWAT teams, such as outside the uniform body armor to protect against higher power rounds, as well as semi-automatic rifles. Although decisions like these may be difficult, and potentially contribute to the militarization of policing, another part of this discussion must be the transparency of departmental policy with the community. An example where this could be detrimental for officers is during an active shooter incident. If an active shooter knows a police department’s policy on how to engage an active shooter, it could make an already dangerous situation more dangerous.

According to Salter (2014) police militarization can be viewed as a retreat from community-oriented policing, and thus negatively impact public trust in the police (Salter, 2014). One way in which police departments can be community oriented and thus contribute to an effective community policing philosophy is by working with the community to create and or revise police policy. As Fox et al. (2018) point out, police executives and agencies may need to explain policies and practices as they relate to police militarization in order to foster public buy-in. According to Dietz and Mink (2005)...

shared meaning helps us develop clarity around police role expectations, thus enabling the department to take appropriate action and develop the requisite skills and knowledge in their officer…As relationships and shared meaning deepen, boundaries become more permeable, information sharing is more efficient and problem solving is more likely to occur (p. 5).
Mastrofski and Willis (2010) state that one of their distinct elements in determining whether or not a department was practicing community policing was whether the department participated in community engagement in making policies. If citizens are able to be a part of the policy making process, then it would be reasonable to assume then that the policies that are created would be made visible to the public.

Transparency is another factor to consider when looking at whether police organizations allow for their departmental policies to be accessed by the public. Organizations seeking to reach out to outside organizations in an attempt to build trust, cooperation and problem solving, needs to be transparent. This is especially true when considering the role of the police who have a tremendous amount of power over citizens in the community. It is even more true for African American communities where a historic distrust of police is present. Hood and Heald (2006) argue that organizations use transparency to demonstrate democracy and good governance such as improving public scrutiny, promoting accountability, reducing corruption, eliminating unethical behavior in order to enhance organizational legitimacy. By involving the public in the decision to acquire 1033 equipment, a police leader would be seen as embodying these ideals, which would help increase public trust. It would also serve as a way for police leaders to hear concerns from citizens, which a police leader would have a chance to consider and answer.

Heald (2006) discusses a specific type of transparency called transparency inward, which allow those outside the organization to view the workings of the organization in order to improve accountability. He goes on to discuss transparency as a process as sometimes being “…damaging to efficiency and effectiveness, because it directly consumes resources and because it induces defensive behavior in the face of what is perceived as oppressive surveillance” (Heald, 2006, p. 31). Police leaders who do not include community members in on the decision to participate in
the 1033 program or what equipment to acquire may be doing so for some of these reasons. This
dissertation will look at whether police leaders cite some of these reasons.

What is important to note is that on the LE SO application for participation in the 1033
program (See Appendix A) police organizations must sign off that they have adopted
“…publicly available protocols for the appropriate use of controlled property…” (p. 4).
Lockwood et al. (2018) recommended that all police organizations should have written protocols
for the use of military weapons and equipment. Harris et al.’s (2017) recommendation from their
study on the effects of 1033 transfers to police departments is from a policy perspective, and that
is to provide basic transparency between the police and the community. Police departments are
publicly funded for the purpose of providing a very hazardous public service, and while great
police work can have positive effects on a community, careless policing can have detrimental
effects.

In order to advance the literature this dissertation will examine whether police
organizations make policies available to the public and test the following hypothesis:

**Hypothesis 4:** As police leaders make departmental policies more visible, police leaders
will be less likely to acquire equipment through the 1033 program.

**Internal Factor 4: Knowledge**

Police leaders (e.g. chiefs and sheriffs) knowledge on both the concept of police
militarization and the 1033 program will be examined. Edenbak (2014) found that “…military
equipment and training provided to police departments have encouraged law enforcement
officers to adopt a warrior mentality” (p. 1492). The mentality can create an “us versus them”
mindset which is counterproductive to a community police philosophy. Police leaders may see the acquisition of military equipment as needed, in terms of its usefulness in emergency situations; however, if the use of this equipment detracts from a community policing mindfulness on part of the officer, this should be an area for concern for police leaders.

According to a study of police leaders and members of Congress on their perceptions of police militarization (police using military weapons and vehicles), police leaders were found to have more support than members of Congress (Turner & Fox, 2019). In this study, 161 police executives, 279 police officers, and 25 sitting members of Congress responded to the survey. The police executives in particular were drawn from a sample of police organizations and associations, primarily from the southeast region of the United States (Turner and Fox, 2019).

Other knowledge that would be of interest to police leaders would be the thoughts and opinions from those in the community. Lockwood et al. (2018) found that males and those who expressed positive views of the police were more likely to support the militarization of police, while those with a college degree were approximately half as likely to support police militarization than those who were less educated. They also found that 32% of those surveyed believed that police should be able to use military surplus equipment, such as an MRAP (Lockwood et al., 2018).

The President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing (2015) suggested in their report that acquiring military equipment could negatively impact police-community relations. People who have a strong belief in the legitimacy of the police, the federal government, and their local police organization were found to be supporters of police militarization, while those who had the opposite viewpoint on those topics were not supports of police militarization (Fox et al., 2018;
Lockwood et al., 2018; Moule et al., 2018). Finally, according to Fox et al. (2018), demographic features did not appear to significantly influence support of opposition to police militarization.

Wickes’ (2015) findings were more political in nature. He found that race and gender demographics were tremendous predictors of transfer receipt, which he presumed was the result of underlying political forces.

The significance of these variables indicates that either these demographics are informing politicians and police executives that they distrust the practice of equipping law enforcement agencies with military gear, or that these officials simply assume such distrust exists and set policy accordingly (Wickes, 2015, pp. 20–21).

After the Ferguson protests and unrest that took place after the Michael Brown shooting, Police Colonel Jon Belmar, of the St. Louis County Sheriff’s department, in response to deploying armored vehicles in Ferguson stated, “I don’t know how we can responsibly as police administrators not provide our young officers some protection” (Madhani, 2014, para. 7).

Philadelphia Police Commissioner Charles Ramsey raised concerns that the national conversation over police militarization is turning into an “all-or-nothing” narrative (Madhani, 2014). He went on to say…

You can’t make the argument that you need zero equipment other than a patrol car and a baton…at the same time, the issue is around policies and training and it’s about justifying. And in the end, there is probably some military equipment we don’t need (Madhani, 2014, para. 16).

What is important to note that is police leaders have a good idea of what the police profession entails in terms of dangerousness, especially as it relates to the community they serve. Some equipment may be seen as more reasonable in some communities more so than others. Therefore, understanding the reasons or knowledge behind why some police leaders participate in the 1033 program and some don’t will be beneficial for furthering the literature, which this dissertation will do.
**Hypothesis 5**: As police leader knowledge of police militarization and the 1033 program increases, police leaders will be less likely to acquire equipment through the 1033 program.

**External Factors**

**External Factor 1: Police Legitimacy**

Police legitimacy provides the groundwork for citizens to support or at least reduce concerns about police actions (Bayley, 2006; Gerber & Jackson, 2017; Pryce, 2016). According to Gau (2015) the procedural justice theory of police legitimacy suggests that a police organization gains the trust of the public when those that make up the system display respect and fairness when dealing with the public. Moule et al. (2019) states that procedural justice, public’s belief that they are being treated fairly in face to face contact with police, can foster legitimacy, but also reduce cynicism. According to Skogan and Frydl (2004) citizens appear to place a high value on not only the actions of police officers, but the manner in which they do it.

Sunshine and Tyler (2003) found that the public is willing to empower police if they perceive them as legitimate. “Citizens who saw the police as legitimate were more supportive of police tactics (e.g., stop and question) and less willing to reduce police discretion” (Moule et al., 2019, p. 156). Fox et al. (2018) found that those who had a strong belief in police legitimacy, had trust in the federal government and trusted the local police were more likely to support police militarization. Police ought not overlook the importance of legitimacy, especially if they want to cultivate legitimacy among the public in order to garner buy-in regarding militarization or other practices (Huq et al., 2017; Tyler, 2004). Tyler (2006) found that legitimacy is a strong, positive correlate of support for police militarization by citizens, so if police leaders view themselves as
being legitimate in the eyes of their community, there may a stronger possibility that they participate in the 1033 program.

If the citizens in each community believe their police are doing a good job and can be trusted, they may be more willing to accept military equipment. According to Moule et al. (2019) prominent stakeholders believe that the concept of militarization and public perceptions of police are related, although this suggestion is largely speculative. This dissertation will expand on the literature by asking police leaders.

**Hypothesis 6:** As police leaders’ perceptions of their legitimacy in their community increases, police leaders will be less likely to acquire equipment through the 1033 program.

**External Factor 2: Community Engagement**

After the Ferguson protests and unrest that took place after the Michael Brown shooting, Police Colonel Jon Belmar stated…

Does it look right if we have armored trucks in the West Florissant corridor in the Midwest United States…Does it look right if we have TAC guys who are wearing military style fatigues. Is that appropriate? I think the answer is that we can provide explanation on why in certain circumstances that equipment is used (Madhani, 2014, para. 9).

What is interesting about this statement made by a police leader is that he states, “we can provide explanation” concerning the need for certain militaristic equipment in certain situations. To date, no study examines the extent to which police organizations seek input or to inform the public in deciding both the decision to participate in the 1033 program as well as which items are or should be acquired by the department. The second part of this examination is to look at what
steps, if any, are taken to include citizens on the policy creation or revision for militaristic equipment.

According to Nabatchi and Leighninger (2015), public participation is an umbrella term used to describe the various avenues for obtaining citizen’s concerns, needs, interests, and values and incorporating them into decisions on public matters. They add that this can be broken down into direct and indirect participation; indirect is where a group selects a spokesperson who acts on their behalf, while direct participation is where individual stakeholders take part in the input and decision-making process.

According to Nabatchi, et al. (2015), the first form of participation is conventional participation. Conventional participation is held by government officials and is in the form of a public meeting where there is advance notification of the meeting, participants can share their thoughts for a prescribed amount of time and an agenda is followed. The other example used by Nabatchi et al. (2015) are thirty-day public comment periods where citizens can send in their thoughts about a law or idea under consideration by a local government.

Another type of participation as described by Nabatchi et al. (2015) is thin participation which is described as allowing citizens, sometimes in great numbers, to provide feedback or submit ideas in convenient ways such as face to face, over the phone, or online. Thick participation is described as a large group of people being able to discuss, learn, participate, and make decisions either face to face or online in small groups.

Nabatchi et al. (2015) find that conventional participation is the most common form of direct participation. Police leaders may consider or obtain input from community members about whether the department should participate and acquire equipment through the 1033 program. According to Nabatchi et al. (2015), a difficulty for those in local government can be how much
power is given to community participants in this process when determining policy or making recommendations about a program. This may be a concern for police leaders who may feel as if no one knows what’s best for the police more than the police. Police leaders may also assume that taxpayers would prefer their police department acquire equipment for only the cost of shipping as opposed to paying full cost for a civilian model of the equipment. This being strictly a financial thought consideration as opposed to a discussion on whether the community wants their department to possess military equipment.

Lockwood et al. (2018) recommended that police organizations should include outreach to local communities, the media, and schools to show how military equipment can be beneficial for the community when used appropriately. This type of community engagement would be similar to community policing, which includes community partnership, problem solving, and transforming the organization (Doane & Cumberland, 2018). Johnston and Lane (2018) state that community engagement is a “…dynamic relational process that facilitates communication, interaction, involvement, and exchange between an organization and a community for a range of social and organizational outcomes” (p. 634).

In terms of the organization, community engagement offers a means to seek out, identify, understand, and respond to community expectations, which in turn can help build organizational legitimacy and support (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Devin & Lane, 2014; Idemudia, 2007; Johnston, 2010, 2018; Johnston & Lane, 2018; Johnston et al., 2018; Meyer & Scott, 1992). According to Dietz and Mink (2005) “The culture of the department influences and is influenced by the other cultures that make up its context. The more permeable the boundaries among these cultures the greater the influence and the greater the demand for adaptability of the systems” (p. 3). Terpstra (2009) states that citizens should be involved at the beginning stages of programs being
considered by police to obtain understanding and involvement. “If police see neighborhoods as more problematic than do the residents, the two groups will identify different programs as the most effective crime prevention strategies” (Stein & Griffith, 2017, p. 150).

Many police departments have relationships with businesses, community members, educational organizations, churches, and other community organizations. According to Dietz and Mink (2005)

Attractors have varying degrees of impact on an organization, and many times the effect a new event has on an organization is not immediately realized or recognized. This impact of an attractor is not immediately understood nor is it predictable, and requires observation, drawing connection, seeing relationships, and understanding implications (pp. 7–8).

A police department that decides to acquire 1033 equipment may have varying levels of impact on these various organizations within the community.

The police response in Ferguson, MO placed the militarization of police debate back in the public sphere, but it wasn’t until after the DOJ investigation into the Ferguson Police Department that a light was shed on the bad policing practices that were occurring in that community long before the shooting of Michael Brown. The DOJ found patterns of 4th amendment violations and “…a community that was deeply polarized, and where deep distrust and hostility often characterized interactions between police and area residents” (DOJ, 2015, para. 2). The report went on to say, “now that our investigation has reached its conclusion, it is time for Ferguson’s leaders to take immediate, wholesale and structural corrective action” (DOJ, 2015, para. 2).

According to Hanley (2015), “one of the challenges facing police leaders and at the heart of the police militarization debate is balancing the ability to mitigate these types of events, while maintaining traditional-community based policing methods” (p. 55). By including stakeholders
from the community in the policy making process citizens would have a chance to learn what 1033 equipment is needed by police departments, how and when it would be used, and then whether or not it should be acquired. “The exchange of valid information between agents is a first step in establishing a shared meaning. Shared meaning leads to an understanding of patterns, events, and new attractors in question at any one moment in time. Shared information is used by agents to design appropriate responses for community events, or to prevent or combat crime” (Dietz & Mink, 2005, p. 4).

Stakeholders can also include community members serving on city or county boards and others in local government. An Associate County Administrator for Finance Ralph Sarbaugh, recommended that the “…county’s proposed budget policy, updated every year, now…require County Board approval (for surplus equipment) if it will result in additional costs for maintenance, fuel, insurance, storage, tracking and training” (Craver, 2015, para. 35). Once equipment is acquired through the 1033 program, maintenance costs are the responsibility of the police department, or more specifically, the local government. Since the County Board is responsible for all facilities and equipment, newly acquired equipment such as an MRAP from the 1033 program should be approved by the county according to Sarbaugh (Craver, 2015).

Negative effects can include a mistrust between the community and law enforcement, as well as physical harm to those in the community. Falcone et al. (2002) state that police militarization and a “…closed institutional organizational structure support police behaviors that are in conflict with community expectations; they also breed community suspicion and skepticism, as they are closed to any kind of meaningful citizen input, review, or oversight” (p. 378).
**Hypothesis 7:** As police leaders engage in higher rates of conventional participation with the community, police leaders will be more likely to acquire equipment through the 1033 program.

**Hypothesis 8:** As police leaders engage in higher rates of thin participation with the community, police leaders will be less likely to acquire equipment through the 1033 program.

**Hypothesis 9:** As police leaders engage in higher rates of thick participation with the community, police leaders will be less likely to acquire equipment through the 1033 program.

Police leaders who practice both thick and thin participation may be less likely to acquire 1033 equipment while police leaders who practice conventional participation may be more likely to acquire 1033 equipment. Although there is no evidence from the literature to guide each of these hypotheses on participation, both thin and thick participation take advantage of participant interaction. Participant interaction encourages deliberation and can foster cooperation, and productive conflict management between groups (Nabatchi et al., 2015). Conventional participation on the other hand involves one-way communication and encourage position-based statements, which can lead to limited in-depth considerations of group perspectives (Nabatchi et al., 2015). Police leaders who may not take advantage of two-way communication in order to better understand community stakeholder’s concern as well as be able to express their own concerns may be more willing to consider their own interests and acquire 1033 equipment.
External Factor 3: Police Perceptions of the Community

Complex adaptive systems, according to Gell-Mann (1994), adapt to other systems in 3 ways. The first way is through what’s called direct adjustment. Dietz and Mink (2005) state that this is where a police department adopts certain technology to meet the demands of the environment. An example of this would be a police department acquiring an MRAP for the purposes of protecting its officers from dangerous individuals in the community or to protect/extract citizens from dangerous situations including active shooters or natural disasters such as floods. Another example as it relates to the 1033 program would be a police department acquiring additional body armor for officers that protect against higher caliber rounds since officers are often times expected to deal with active shooter events as opposed to waiting for SWAT as stated earlier. Armor such as this is worn on the outside of the uniform but is only worn by a police officer when there is information that a person an officer is about to contact may possess a higher caliber firearm and is threatening to use it.

Police leaders that feel as if their officer and or community need these types of equipment believe in one of two things; either the community is dangerous and this equipment will be used or this equipment should be used in preparation for a dangerous situation, even though it would not be seen as common in the particular community. An example of this would be a small-town department acquiring an MRAP to be prepared in the event of a school shooting. Organizations preparing for events such as these should not be surprising. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) found that between 2000–2018 there were 42 “active shooter” incidents (Pre-K through grade 12) in the United States (FBI, n.d.). However, according to a Government Accountability Office (GAO) report in 2016, two-thirds of school districts in the United States prepare for active
shooters through exercises such as lockdowns. Police departments may be just another organization preparing for a worst-case scenario, regardless of the odds of it occurring.

A police leader who acquires a piece of equipment such as an MRAP must complete a justification form through the LESO office (See Appendix E). The form includes example justifications including among other things “active shooters.” Reasons for acquiring 1033 equipment as well as participation in the program will be explored more in the survey of police leaders. Police leaders who mention factors that could be viewed as protecting officers and or citizens from threats could help explain their perceptions of the community. Skogan (2004) states that police officers who work in high crime neighborhoods typically have biased perceptions of crime within that neighborhood. Other studies show that police perceptions of crime in communities are typically higher than both citizens’ perceptions and actual crime (Bohm, Reynolds, & Holmes, 2000; O’Shea, 2000; Sun & Triplett, 2008).

According to Perkins et al. (1993) and Taylor (2001), police perceptions of communities are typically more negative than residents’ perceptions since the police are usually outsiders and thus not as comfortable in the environment. Departments that practice and are successful at community policing may not feel as uncomfortable and thus not feel as if they need protection in the form of military equipment. According to Terpstra (2009) factors such as level of cohesion and trust, shared expectations among residents, feelings of safety by residents, and perceptions of crime as a problem affect how police view the community and interact with its members. Understanding police leader’s perceptions of their community will be beneficial for furthering the literature, which this dissertation will do.

**Hypothesis 10:** As the perceived dangerousness of a community increases, police leaders will be more likely to acquire equipment through the 1033 program.
CHAPTER III

METHODS

The purpose of this dissertation is to conduct survey research that will seek to understand the attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors of police leaders (e.g. sheriffs, police chiefs, etc.) regarding police militarization and more specifically the 1033 program. Since this dissertation primarily focuses on the material dimension of police militarization (Kraska, 2007), 1033 program acquisition data through the LESO will be examined to determine both participation and extent of militarization. According to Moule et al. (2019), if police executives are able to articulate the need and justification for militarized equipment, then they will be in a better position to address negative press or those in the public who may be skeptical of why certain equipment such as an MRAP might be needed.

Wickes (2015) stated that future research into police militarization should examine outcomes at the agency level, rather than state level. According to Radil et al. (2017) “a survey of the discourses surrounding 1033 in particular settings might be a particularly helpful first step…” to better understand how the issues connected to the 1033 program are understood at the local level (p. 211). As mentioned earlier, Turner and Fox (2019) surveyed members of the 114th congress U.S. House of Representatives along with police executives and local law enforcement officers about their support for police militarization and related policies. Their sample of police officers and police executives came from “…five of the largest and most nationally representative police organizations” in the United States including: Florida Police Chiefs
Association, Virginia Association of Chiefs of Police, North Carolina Police Executives Association, Southwest Florida Police Chiefs Association and American members of the International Association of Police Chiefs (p. 126). A total of 161 police executives were surveyed at the end of the data collection period (Turner & Fox, 2019).

Radil et al. (2017) examined equipment acquisitions from the 1033 program at the county level throughout the United States using the LESO database. Data collected for their study ranged from 2006 through 2014. Acquired equipment by each department within a county was then aggregated to the county level to obtain a total value of acquired equipment for each county. An exploratory spatial analysis was conducted using the data to better understand both the spacing and timing of 1033 acquisitions at the county level (Radil et al., 2017).

Ramey and Steidley (2018) examined 1033 equipment acquisitions between 1995 and 2016 at the agency level, throughout the United States, using the LESO database. Acquired equipment was then classified as either militarized or non-militarized. Both the value for number of pieces of equipment acquired and the acquisition value was aggregated for each agency annually, and then merged with crim and arrest data from the Uniform Crime Report (UCR) and the Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted (LEOKA) database. Agency level data was then combined with data from “…the U.S. Census, American Community Survey, Congressional Quarterly Voting and Elections Collection, and the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START)” (Ramey & Steidley, 2018).

Delehanty et al. (2017) examined the relationship between 1033 acquisitions and police violence in Connecticut, Maine, New Hampshire, and Nevada between 2006 and 2014, using the Fatal Encounters database and the LESO database. Bove and Gavrilova (2017) used UCR data at the county level and LEOKA data at the agency level throughout the United States, while also
examining the LESO database and variables such as poverty rate, median income, 
unemployment rate, population size, race, and age. Harris et al. (2017) examined the 
relationships between the LESO database, annual offenses, arrests, and clearance rates from the 
Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) along with demographic and economic data from the United 
States Census Bureau American Community Survey and Intercensal Estimates. Data on citizen 
complaints from “most of the 100 largest cities in the United States [and] sheriff’s departments 
from populous counties” (Harris et al., 2017, p. 301).

Davenport et al. (2018) sampled 20 states and 2 territories, and ultimately conducted both 
in-person and phone call interviews with 11 LESO State Coordinators and LESO Points of 
Contact (POC). Turner and Fox (2019) sampled members of the 114th Congress U.S. House of 
Representatives, state and local police executives, and state and local police officers across the 
United States. “Members of the Florida Police Chiefs Association, Virginia Association of 
Chiefs of Police, North Carolina Police Executives Association, Southwest Florida Police Chiefs 
Association, and American members of the International Association of Chiefs of Police…” 
were sampled (Turner & Fox, 2018, pp. 39–40). The online survey platform Survey Monkey was 
used. Of the 465 online surveys distributed, 279 police officers, 161 police executives, and 25 
members of Congress responded (Turner & Fox, 2018). 25 out of 434 members of Congress 
responded, while 440 out of 511 police officers and executives responded (Turner & Fox, 2018).

This dissertation serves as an exploratory analysis into the decisions police leaders make 
in regard to participation in the 1033 program as well as the extent of their militarization. A 
mixed methods approach is used in this dissertation utilizing an online survey and semi-
structured interviews from survey respondents wishing to talk more about the 1033 program and 
their participation. The methods for this dissertation were approved by the Western Michigan
University Institutional Review Board (See Appendix I). The online survey link along with the online informed consent document (see Appendix G) were sent to the executive directors of the Michigan Sheriffs’ Association (MSA) and Michigan Association of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators (MACLEA), who agreed to email them out to the members of their associations. Data collection for the online survey ran from November 23, 2020 through December 21, 2021 (four weeks) according to the HSIRB protocol (see Appendix J).

There are approximately 588 separate law enforcement agencies in the state of Michigan including state (state police and conservation officers), county, cities, townships, villages, airports, railways and parks, tribal, and Universities (Riley, 2019). The target number for the online survey was 233 responses, in order to have a confidence level of .95 and a margin of error at .05. If 233 responses were not collected, those respondents who left their email or phone number wishing to be contacted for an interview, would be contacted and an appointment would be made to conduct semi-structured interviews. Since the largest association, MACP, did not agree to participate, the sample shifted to county and campus police departments. According the respective directors of each association, there are 83 members in the MSA and 54 members in MACLEA.

The first research question this dissertation explored is “What factors do police leaders consider when participating in the 1033 program?” The second research questions this dissertation will examine is “What factors do police leaders consider when acquiring types of 1033 equipment (militarized versus non-militarized)?” An open systems framework (See Figure 2) is used in this dissertation to explore the decision-making process of police leaders in Michigan regarding participation in the 1033 program as well as the extent of militarization. Both internal and external factors within and surrounding a police organization will be examined
through a survey of police leaders to examine these factors more closely. By identifying both internal and external factors of a police organization, specifically as they relate to participation in the 1033 program, the goal is that both research questions will be answered. To address these questions, 10 hypotheses were tested:

**Hypothesis 1:** As the severity of budgetary constraints increase, police leaders will be more likely to acquire equipment through the 1033 program.

**Hypothesis 2:** As the economic benefits exceed the costs of participating in the 1033 program, police leaders will be more likely to acquire equipment through the 1033 program.

**Hypothesis 3:** As the perceived dangerousness of the police profession increases, police leaders will be more likely to acquire equipment through the 1033 program.

**Hypothesis 4:** As police leaders make departmental policies more visible, police leaders will be less likely to acquire equipment through the 1033 program.

**Hypothesis 5:** As police leader knowledge of police militarization and the 1033 program increases, police leaders will be less likely to acquire equipment through the 1033 program.

**Hypothesis 6:** As police leaders’ perceptions of their legitimacy in their community increases, police leaders will be less likely to acquire equipment through the 1033 program.

**Hypothesis 7:** As police leaders engage in higher rates of conventional participation with the community, police leaders will be more likely to acquire equipment through the 1033 program.

**Hypothesis 8:** As police leaders engage in higher rates of thin participation with the community, police leaders will be less likely to acquire equipment through the 1033 program.

**Hypothesis 9:** As police leaders engage in higher rates of thick participation with the community, police leaders will be less likely to acquire equipment through the 1033 program.

**Hypothesis 10:** As the perceived dangerousness of a community increases, police leaders will be more likely to acquire equipment through the 1033 program.
Testing each hypothesis will provide a necessary step towards understanding the
decision-making that goes into participation in the 1033 program as well as how thoughts and
beliefs shape these decisions by police leaders. In the following sections, a more detailed
description of the data and methods that will be used to answer these research questions.

**Target Population**

For the purposes of this dissertation all police leaders (e.g. chiefs, sheriffs, public safety
directors, etc.) in the state of Michigan were targeted for the survey in order to understand their
thoughts on both police militarization as well as the 1033 program. According to Riley (2019)
there are 588 separate law enforcement agencies in the state of Michigan including state (state
police and conservation officers), county, cities, townships, villages, airports, railways and parks,
tribal, and universities. Since police leaders are the both the face and the voice of a police
organization, they have to carefully weigh decisions and actions that will impact both the
community they serve and the officers they lead. Obtaining their beliefs on police militarization
and the 1033 program will be a good addition to the police militarization literature. Radil et al.
(2017) state that quantitative research using county-scale or smaller scale data will be important
in future research. They go on to say…

place-specific research is also clearly need to better illuminate the ties between LEA (law
enforcement agencies) decision making about 1033 and the type of justifications used to
advance or counter the program within particular places (Radil et al., 2017, p. 211).

According to Turner and Fox (2019), future research should collect more data on police
executives’ opinions on police militarization.

The executive directors of the Michigan Sheriffs’ Association (MSA), Michigan
Association of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators (MACLEA), and Michigan
Association of Chiefs of Police (MACP) were originally contacted about the survey. The MSA
has been around for over 140 years and provides education, training, and programming opportunities to sheriffs, their offices, and to the public across Michigan (Michigan Sheriffs’ Association, 2020). There are 83 sheriffs representing the 83 counties in Michigan who are a part of the MSA (Michigan Sheriffs’ Association, 2020).

MACLEA is an organization that has been around since 1971, and provides “…support, education and networking opportunities for campus safety, security and law enforcement agencies at both public and private higher education campuses in the state of Michigan” (MACLEA, 2020, para. 1). There are currently 26 colleges and universities who have MCOLES licensed officers in the state of Michigan (MCOLES, 2020). According to the executive director, there are approximately 54 campus police departments who are apart of MACLEA.

The MACP has been around since 1924 and their aim is to “…advance the science and art of police administration, crime prevention, and public service, to develop and disseminate approved administrative and technical practices and promote their use in police work…” (Michigan Association of Chiefs of Police, 2020). Members of the MACP include police departments within cities, townships, villages, and towns and make up the largest membership base out of the three associations, with over 300 members.

Two associations agreed to participate in the study (MSA and MACLEA), which led to the survey pool. There are 83 members in the MSA and a total of 54 members in MACLEA. The target number from the pool of the two participating associations is 137. Turner and Fox (2019), who sampled police executives and police chiefs from five different police associations yielded a .86 response rate. Another survey of police chiefs from one association yielded a .47 response rate (Smyser & Lubin, 2018). For the current study, with a confidence level of .95 and a margin of error of .05, the sample size would need to be 102 respondents. A total of 65 responses were
collected from the online survey. Out of the 65 responses, 55 were fully completed, three had partial responses and seven had either one or no responses. For the analysis, 58 surveys responses were used, which yielded at .42 response rate.

A total of 13 respondents indicated their willingness on the survey to take part in an interview. Follow up phone calls or emails were made to each respondent who was interested in participating, however out of the 13 respondents, only two participated in the semi-structured interviews.

**Survey Design**

The online survey for this dissertation was 27 questions long (See Appendix F) and was administered after IRB approval. After providing participants with informed consent, they were asked if they would be willing to complete an online survey. If they wished to, participants were given a link to click on and start the survey. Participants who were not willing to complete the survey did not have to click on the link. After participants were asked about their participation in the 1033 program, a series of questions were asked about regarding internal factors (budgetary considerations, perceptions of profession, policies, and knowledge of 1033 program) and external factors (police legitimacy, community engagement, perceptions of their community).

Finally, participants were asked a series of demographic questions including gender, race/ethnicity, veteran status, and level of education. This information will be used to get a better understanding or correlates for level of support for militarization and the 1033 program. Turner and Fox (2019) gathered political affiliation as part of the demographic data collection. The final question asked about their willingness to participate in a semi-structured interview. There were a total of 27 questions on the online survey.
The first two questions in the survey look at whether respondents have participated in the 1033 program in the past two years, as well as the type(s) of equipment acquired. The types of acquired equipment in question two are broken down into militarized (e.g. MRAP, armored trucks, rifles) and non-militarized (e.g. tools, computers, clothing, medical supplies). This classification of equipment type is consistent with Ramey and Steidley’s (2018) study of the 1033 program. Each of these questions serve as the dependent variable and help better understand the level of participation in the 1033 program, and also the types of equipment that are acquired by police departments. The rest of the survey questions address one of the ten hypotheses for this dissertation (See Appendix F). Also included are questions to determine beliefs and opinions on the concept of police militarization. This survey was administered through Qualtrics and ran for four weeks.

There is a total of 27 questions in the survey. 18 questions in the survey will consist of Likert scale responses (strongly agree to strongly disagree). Four questions are demographic questions asking respondents about their ethnicity, age, gender, and level of education. One question asks for a range on the number of officers who are MCOLES certified on their department. There are two questions that ask about participation in the 1033 program, and the type of equipment that have acquired. One question asks if they would be willing to be contacted at a later time to participate in a follow up interview.

Originally, the LESO database which contains all of the equipment acquisitions by police agencies including the type and original acquisition value was going to be used as part of this study. However, if the datasets were merged together (LESO data and survey data), there would be a risk that the confidentiality of survey respondents would be compromised and therefore the 1033 dataset will not be used in the data for this survey. Instead, the focus will be on whether
survey respondents participated in the 1033 program, the types of equipment (if any) they acquired, and the reasons for such acquisitions. These questions, which follow the research questions for this study will be answered through the online survey as well as the semi-structured interviews.

**Interviews**

Survey respondents who wished to talk more about their participation in the 1033 program were asked to leave an email or phone number to be contacted at in order to set up a date and time to conduct a semi-structured interview. A total of 65 responses were collected from the interview. Out of the 65 responses, 13 respondents left their contact information (11 left their email and 2 left their phone number). An email was then sent to the 11 respondents who left their email addresses thanking them for taking the survey and asking their availability for an interview. Respondents were also asked if they would prefer the interview to take place over the phone or through the teleconferencing platform WebEx. The recipients of the email were not able to see the email addresses of the other respondents. Survey respondents who left their phone number to be contacted about the interview were called and a message was left discussing their availability for an interview as well as a number to reach the student investigator.

There were a total of six interview questions (See Appendix K) with probes for each question. Each of the interview questions are related to one of two hypotheses for this study which the affect budgetary constraints have, if any, on the decision to acquire equipment from the 1033 program along with the economic benefits and or costs of participation in the program.

The first interview question asked about the police leader’s thoughts on the concept of police militarization. This question ties in with the second hypotheses in that police leaders who feel that police militarization is a phenomenon to be taken seriously, may have to weigh the pros
and cons of acquiring 1033 equipment with the budgetary benefits of free equipment. Asking about the concept of police militarization will help obtain a better understanding of what if any consideration is given to appearing too militaristic by police leaders and how much weight it carries in the decision-making process to acquire 1033 equipment.

The second question asked in the interview is whether their departmental budget allowed the police leader to purchase equipment needed to do their job. This question relates to the first hypotheses, which states as the severity of budgetary constraints increase, police leaders will be more likely to acquire equipment through the 1033 program. With this question, we can hope to better understand the effect of ones’ budget has on the decision to acquire 1033 equipment. The second probe for this question also seeks to understand what a department may look like in the eyes of a police leader if a program like LESO program were to go away.

The third question reflected the second and third hypotheses which concern economic benefits compared to the potential negative consequences of participation in the 1033 program and the perceived dangerousness of the profession. For this question, police leaders are asked why departments may or may not participate in the 1033 program. Police leaders may talk about fiscal responsibility in obtaining free equipment for their community, the safety factors such equipment may provide, and or the concern that department may appear too militaristic. The fourth interview question seeks input on the emphasis police leaders place on making policies publicly available and whether they feel it helps foster trust within their community. This question reflects the fourth hypothesis which states as police leaders make departmental policies more visible, police leaders will be less likely to acquire equipment through the 1033 program. A police leader may or may not participate in the 1033 program after discussion with members of the community as well as a discussion how the equipment will be used.
The fifth question related to the fifth hypothesis which states as police leader knowledge of police militarization and the 1033 program increases, police leaders will be less likely to acquire equipment through the 1033 program. For this question, police leaders are asked whether they should be concerned with their officers appearing too militaristic. Whether or not this is a concern to police leaders may help play a role in their decision to participate in the 1033 program. The final question related to the hypotheses seven, eight, and nine, which examines conventional participation, along with both thin and thick participation as it relates to community engagement. Police leaders are asked whether they should seek input from community members before participating in the 1033 program. A police leader who is facing budgetary concerns may go to the community to seek approval for 1033 program participation or potentially feel as if there is no need to consult the community first since the equipment may be viewed as necessary and there is no other way to obtain the equipment.

It is important to note that since only two interviews were conducted that the results found within in them do not generalize to the pool of respondents.

Data Collection

A survey via Qualtrics was emailed to police leaders (e.g. chiefs, sheriffs, public safety directors, etc.) in the state of Michigan who are members of either the Michigan Sheriff’s Association (MSA) or the Michigan Association of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators (MACLEA) to understand their thoughts on both police militarization as well as the 1033 program. The Executive Directors for the MSA and MACLEA agreed to send out the informed consent email along with a link to the online survey to their respective members. This survey will also examine varying, if any, levels of support for acquiring military hardware and the reasons behind participating or not participating in the 1033 program. The last question on the
survey will ask respondents about their willingness to participate further in semi-structured interviews. Respondents wishing to participate will leave either their email or phone number to be contacted later for an interview date and time that is convenient for them.

Administering survey research via the internet has become a means for researchers to access large, affordable data samples for professionals and academics using quantitative research (Goodman et al., 2012; Kees et al., 2017; Schmidt, & Jettinghoff, 2016; Kimball, 2019). Conducting survey research through the internet has become increasingly popular due to the low cost of administration, ease of use, and the widespread availability of the internet (Couper, 2000; Couper et al., 2001; Dillman & Bowker, 2001; Shin et al., 2012; Loomis & Paterson, 2018). When deciding to conduct either an online survey or a mail survey, it is important to understand the strengths and weaknesses of each approach.

According to Loomis and Paterson (2018), response rates for mail surveys will vary depending on the research design, questions in the survey, and those being surveyed. Online response rates to be similar to (Fleming & Bowden, 2009; Jun, 2005; Sexton et al., 2011) or lower than mail survey response rates (Manfreda et al., 2008; Shih & Fan, 2008; Yetter & Capaccio, 2010). Olsen (2009) found no differences. Shih and Fan (2008) conducted a meta-analysis of 39 studies comparing mail and online surveys and found that email response rates were on average 10% lower than mail response rates. Turner and Fox (2019) sent out surveys to 511 police executives and police officers and 440 completed surveys were collected (86% response rate).
Data Cleaning Procedure

The online survey consisted of 27 questions. A total of 65 responses were collected from the online survey. Out of the 65 responses, 55 were fully completed, three had partial responses and seven had no responses. Thus, 58 surveys were used in the analysis.

Stata software will be employed for managing and statistically analyzing the data. A frequency test will be run to help in identifying missing responses. Surveys that had one or less answered questions were excluded from the dataset.

Dependent Variables

This dissertation will be examining two dependent variables, each of which will be asked in the first two questions in the online survey. The first dependent variable is from the first question, which asks the respondent whether they participated in the 1033 program in the last two years. The second dependent variable seeks to understand the extent of militarization by police departments by examining the types of items they have acquired. For the second question, respondents are given a range of equipment that they may have acquired from the 1033 program including vehicles, weapons, clothing, medical supplies, and tools. This equipment is then dichotomized into two groups (militarized and non-militarized), which is consistent with Ramey and Steidley’s (2018) classification of 1033 equipment.

Bove and Gavrilova’s (2017) used the DLA’s federal supply category and class name to identify the various types of equipment that can be acquired under the 1033 program. Several categories from the DLA list were aggregated into four groups: weapons (e.g., explosives, guns), vehicles (e.g., aircrafts, combat, assault, and tactical vehicles, including their components), gear (e.g., communication devices, special clothing, night vision equipment), and a residual category (e.g., office supplies, furniture, plumbing items) (Bove & Gavrilova, 2017).
Consistent with Ramey and Steidley’s (2018) breakdown of equipment available for acquisition from the 1033 program, this dissertation too will dichotomize equipment as either militarized or non-militarized. Some examples of equipment that will be included as militarized property include munitions (e.g. firearms, explosives); militarized transportation (e.g. armored trucks, MRAPs, airplanes, and helicopters); military communication or surveillance equipment (e.g. night-vision goggles and wide-range radio antennae); uniforms (e.g. body armor and specialized combat clothing); and miscellaneous items, including weapons-training guides, aftermarket armor for vehicles (a.k.a. up-armor kits) (Ramey & Steidley, 2018). This equipment is consistent with Kraska’s (2007) definition of militarism which stresses “the use of force and threat of violence” (p. 503).

Nonmilitarized equipment then includes items such as office supplies (e.g. computers, other computer hardware, software, furniture, and supplies): standard telecommunications equipment (e.g. fiber optics, radar, and video recording); clothing (socks and underwear); agricultural and industrial tools (e.g. pest control, hand tools, generators); safety and rescue equipment (e.g. firefighting and hazardous spill and containment); and health and medical supplies (e.g. medical kits, water purification systems) (Ramey & Steidley, 2018). Items such as ordinance disposal kits were deemed nonmilitarized since they are used in emergency and disaster response (Ramey & Steidley, 2018).

It is important to note that equipment that will be listed under militarized can also be used for non-militarized purposes. For example, MRAPs have been used to for search and rescue missions such as in Hurricane Harvey (Blakinger, 2017). MRAPs can also be used to evacuate citizens and transport police officers during an active shooter event. According to Delehanty et al. (2017), acquisition of surplus military equipment is seen as overbearing police practice. For
this dissertation, militarized equipment will be coded as “1” while non-militarized equipment will be coded as “0.”

**Independent Variables**

The following internal factors will be examined in the survey of police leaders:

1) *Budgetary considerations*

Police leaders must consider what is available to them in their budget when determining what types of equipment they are able to afford and or maintain. The 1033 program would allow police leaders equipment they may need for only the cost of shipping. Thus, departments that may not be able to afford equipment on the budget they have, may use the 1033 program to supplement their budget. Two hypotheses have been developed for this study regarding budgetary considerations.

**H1:** As the severity of budgetary constraints increase, police leaders will be more likely to acquire equipment through the 1033 program.

In order to help answer this, police leaders will have the following questions on their survey:

1) My department is facing budgetary constraints.
2) My department’s budget allows us to purchase the equipment needed to do our jobs.

Responses for each item include a Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly agree) to 5 (strongly disagree).

**H2:** As the economic benefits exceed the costs of participating in the 1033 program, police leaders will be more likely to acquire equipment through the 1033 program.

In order to help answer this, police leaders will have the following questions on their survey:

1) The benefits (e.g. free equipment) of participating in the 1033 program exceed the costs (e.g. potential of being labeled “militarized”) of participating in the 1033 program.
Responses for each item include a Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly agree) to 5 (strongly disagree).

2) Perceptions on safety of the profession

Perceptions on the safety of the police profession is the next internal factor that will be examined. Police leaders who view their community as dangerous may have a desire to equip their officers with equipment to meet these dangers. The 1033 program would allow police leaders the ability to acquire equipment such as armored vehicles to keep officers safe from danger. Thus, the third hypothesis is:

H3: As the perceived dangerousness of the police profession increases, police leaders will be more likely to acquire equipment through the 1033 program.

In order to help answer this, police leaders will have the following questions on their survey:

1) The police officer profession is becoming increasingly dangerous.
2) Police need to become more militarized to deal with current police problems.

Responses for each item include a Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly agree) to 5 (strongly disagree).

3) Policies

The decision as to whether departmental policies should be made visible to the public is a decision left to the police leader. Some departments choose not to display their policies to the public for fear that it might endanger police officers if the “bad guy” knows what to expect from a police officer. Some departments like the Madison Police department in Madison, WI post their policies for the public to see, but “black out” any area of the policy that could endanger an officer if a “bad guy” knew what to expect from the officer (See Appendix D). The third hypothesis is:
**H4**: As police leaders make departmental policies more visible, police leaders will be less likely to acquire equipment through the 1033 program.

In order to help answer this, police leaders will have the following questions on their survey:

1) Making police policies available to the public helps create trust with the community.
2) Police militarization is acceptable as long as there are policies and procedures in place to ensure the safety of the officers and the public.

Responses for each item include a Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly agree) to 5 (strongly disagree).

4) **Knowledge (police militarization & 1033 program)**

Knowledge of both the concept of police militarization and the 1033 program will be examined in the survey of police leaders. Police leaders who have knowledge of police militarization may tend to not participate in the 1033 program. Leaders who are not aware of the 1033 program, will not be participants in the program. The fifth hypothesis is:

**H5**: As police leader knowledge of police militarization and the 1033 program increases, police leaders will be less likely to acquire equipment through the 1033 program.

In order to help answer this, police leaders will have the following questions on their survey:

1) As the head of my organization, I am concerned with my officers appearing too militarized.
2) Law enforcement in the United States is becoming militaristic.

Responses for each item include a Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly agree) to 5 (strongly disagree).

The following external factors will be examined in the survey of police leaders:

5) **Police legitimacy**

According to Sunshine and Tyler (2003) citizens in a community are willing to empower their police department if they perceive them as legitimate. Police leaders who feel as if the
community perceives them as legitimate may be more willing to participate in the 1033 program, without fear of being labeled to militaristic or being question on the need for acquired equipment. The sixth hypothesis is:

**H6:** As police leaders’ perceptions of their legitimacy in their community increases, police leaders will be less likely to acquire equipment through the 1033 program.

In order to help answer this, police leaders will have the following questions on their survey:

1) How do you feel about the following statement? “The citizens in my community have respect for our department.”

2) How do you feel about the following statement? “The citizens in my community are cooperative with our department.”

3) How do you feel about the following statement? “The citizens in my community are satisfied with how our department.”

Responses for each item include a Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly agree) to 5 (strongly disagree).

6) **Community Engagement**

Public participation describes the various ways in which organizational leaders may obtain citizen’s concerns, needs, interests, and values and incorporate them into decisions on public matters (Nabatchi & Leighninger, 2015). This study will examine the level to which police leaders involve the community in the decision-making process. The following hypotheses will examine community engagement:

**H7:** As police leaders engage in higher rates of conventional participation with the community, police leaders will be more likely to acquire equipment through the 1033 program.

In order to help answer this, police leaders will have the following questions on their survey:
1) How do you feel about the following statement? “When my department seeks input from citizens, we typically host a townhall meeting where citizens can sit and listen as well as voice their concerns.”

**H8:** As police leaders engage in higher rates of thin participation with the community, police leaders will be less likely to acquire equipment through the 1033 program.

In order to help answer this, police leaders will have the following questions on their survey:

1) How do you feel about the following statement? “My department uses social media to seek input from the community.”
2) How do you feel about the following statement? “My department uses social media to allow citizens to report problems in order to better understand problems within the community.”
3) How do you feel about the following statement? “Police departments should obtain citizen input before obtaining equipment from the 1033 program.”

**H9:** As police leaders engage in higher rates of thick participation with the community, police leaders will be less likely to acquire equipment through the 1033 program.

In order to help answer this, police leaders will have the following questions on their survey:

1) My department engages with the community when creating police policies
2) Allowing citizens in the community to help craft departmental policies is important in order to build trust.
3) Police departments should include local governing boards (i.e. city commission, county board) in the decision to participate in the 1033 program.
4) Police departments should include community members in the decision to participate in the 1033 program.

Responses for each item include a Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly agree) to 5 (strongly disagree).

7) *Police perceptions of the community (real & perceived)*

Perkins et al. (1993) and Taylor (2001), found that police perceptions of communities are typically more negative than residents’ perceptions. The survey being administered to police leaders will ask about the level of dangerousness in the community faced by police. These
responses will be examined along with felonious assaults on officers from the LEOKA data to determine real versus perceived dangerousness in each community. The tenth hypothesis is:

**H10:** As the perceived dangerousness of a community increases, police leaders will be more likely to acquire equipment through the 1033 program.

In order to help answer this, police leaders will have the following questions on their survey:

1) How well do you agree with the following statement? “Due to some of the threats that my department faces, programs like the 1033 program allow my department to be properly equipped to deal with them.”

Responses for each item include a Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly agree) to 5 (strongly disagree).

Another independent variable that will be included is *level of education*. This independent variable will contribute to the internal factor of knowledge on the concept of police militarization as well as the 1033 program.

**Control Variables**

Ramey and Steidley (2018) used several control variables in their study of police militarization including poverty rate, unemployment rate, police officers per 10,000 population, percent Republican, population size, average distance to DLA disposition center, land area, lagged total property value. Bove and Gavrilova (2017) used control variables such as poverty rate, median income, unemployment rate, size of the population. For the sake of the anonymity of respondents, for this study, the only control variables that will be used include department size (number of MCOLES certified officers), gender, race, age, and level of education.

**Analysis**

According to Garson (2016), logistic regression uses maximum likelihood estimation (ML) to derive parameters, and therefore relies on “…large-sample asymptotic normality which
means that reliability of estimates declines when there are few cases for each observed combination of independent variables” (pp. 280–281). Small sample sizes may lead to high standard errors, and the inability to come to a conclusion (Garson, 2016). Harrell (2001) states that a rule of thumb is “…the number of cases in the smaller of the two binary outcomes in binary logistic regression divided by the number of predictor variables should be at least 20.”

The logistic regression used in this dissertation used no more than five predictor variables when running a regression with one of the binary dependent variables. According to Hosmer & Lemeshow (1989), a minimum of 10 cases per independent variable is required. This requirement was met for this dissertation since the final analysis included 56 observations and no more than five predictor variables were ran for a logistic regression.

**RQ1:** What factors do police leaders consider when participating in the 1033 program?

For the first research question a logit will be used to examine participation in the 1033 program. This will be a binary response with those who participate in the 1033 program being coded as “1,” while those who do not participate being coded as a “0.”

**RQ2:** What factors do police leaders consider when acquiring types of 1033 equipment (militarized versus non-militarized)?

For the second research question a logit will be used to examine dichotomous dependent variable (1 for militarized and 0 for non-militarized).
CHAPTER IV

FINDINGS

Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Variables

The online survey yielded 58 surveys that were used in the final analysis of police leaders from sheriffs’ departments (MSA) and campus law enforcement departments (MACLEA) in Michigan. A total of 34 departments (.586) reported participating in the 1033 program in the last two years (24 departments did not). Of the 34 departments that participated in the 1033 program in the last two years, seven (.205) reported acquiring vehicles (e.g. Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle (MRAP), armored trucks, etc.), 15 (.44) departments reported acquiring weapons (e.g. rifles, shotguns, pistols), and nine (.26) departments reported acquiring weapon accessories (e.g. scopes, sights, magazines, etc.). Ten (.29%) of the departments that participated in the 1033 program in the last two years acquired clothing (e.g. boots, jackets, gloves), five (.15%) acquired tools (e.g. hand tools, generators, computer equipment, etc.), and six (.18%) acquired medical supplies (e.g. tourniquet, first aid kit, etc.).

Table 1
1033 Program Participation in the Last Two Years from Survey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1033 Program Participation in past 2 years?</th>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>58.62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>41.38%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Property was dichotomized into militarized and non-militarized equipment, consistent with Ramey and Steidley’s (2018) categorization. Out of those who responded “yes” to participating in the 1033 program in the past two years, 22 (.66%) departments acquired some form of militarized equipment (vehicles, weapons, weapon accessories), while 11 (.33%) only acquired non-militarized equipment (clothing, tools, medical supplies. In total, out of the 58 respondents, 22 (37.93%) acquired militarized equipment in the last two years from the 1033 program (See Table 2). It is also important to note that since respondents were asked to check each type (militarized and non-militarized) equipment that they acquired in the last two years, several respondents (N=10) checked both types of equipment. For these cases, they were coded as “militarized.” Therefore, out of the 22 cases identified as “militarized (see table 2), 14 (64%) departments acquired solely militarized equipment, while 8 (36%) departments acquired both militarized and non-militarized equipment.

Table 2
* Militarized vs. Non-militarized Acquired Equipment from Survey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equipment Type</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Militarized</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>37.93%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-militarized</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>20.69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did Not Participate</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>41.38%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3 lays out the amount of equipment acquired by all police departments in the state of Michigan between 1995 and 2018 who participated in the 1033 program (LESO). Equipment was dichotomized here according to Ramey and Steidley’s (2018) categorization of 1033 equipment type. According to Riley (2019), there are 588 law enforcement agencies in the state of Michigan. A total of 266 (45%) departments participated in the 1033 program between 1995 and 2018 according to the LESO database. From the police leaders surveyed in this dissertation,
58.62% participated in the 1033 program in the past two years. Out of the equipment acquired in the past two years by survey respondents, 37.93% was coded as militarized, while 20.69% was coded non-militarized.

Table 3
*Militarized vs. Non-Militarized Units from State of MI 1033 Program LESO Data*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Sum of Militarized</th>
<th>Sum of Quantity</th>
<th>% of Militarized Equip.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>482</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>474</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>981</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>756</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>1186</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>927</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>338</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>738</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>541</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>1433</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>1174</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>1335</td>
<td>10983</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>326</td>
<td>529</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>551</td>
<td>1572</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>611</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>631</td>
<td>2337</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>697</td>
<td>5431</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5606</td>
<td>31893</td>
<td>25.54% (avg.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is important to note that those sampled in Table 3 represent the entire state of Michigan including county, city, village, township, state, and campus departments. Those departments represented in this dissertation (Table 2), include only campus and county police departments. In Table 3, the average amount of acquired militarized equipment was 25.54%. When looking at police leader’s response to is the police profession becoming increasingly dangerous (Table 4), it is observed that it has the highest mean (4.75) and the second lowest standard deviation (.54). Mass shooting incidents were discussed by both police leaders during semi-structured interviews as a reason to acquire 1033 equipment, specifically to be prepared for such an incident. When
one then looks at the differences in militarized equipment acquisition by year (Table 3), there is a spike in militarized equipment acquired after major mass shooting incidents. In 1999 the Columbine mass shooting occurred, and the following two years saw a large spike in militarized equipment acquired. In 2012, the Aurora, Colorado movie theater mass shooting occurred, which was followed by a few years of increased acquisition of militarized equipment. In 2018, the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Shooting in Parkland, Florida mass shooting occurred, which like the other incidents, may explain the spike in militarized equipment acquisition from the survey from 2019–2020.

**Descriptive Statistics for Independent Variables**

Descriptive statistics for each variable are presented in Table 4. There are seven independent variables that this survey looked at including perceptions of budgetary considerations, perceptions on safety of the profession, policies, knowledge (police militarization and 1033 program), police legitimacy, community engagement, and police perception of the community. Each factor in Table 4 comes from the survey. There were ten hypotheses in this dissertation, consisting of both internal and external factors to examine the reasons police leaders participate in the 1033 program as well as the types of equipment acquired. Descriptive statistics for each of the independent variables can be found in Table 4.
Table 4
Descriptive Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Facing Budgetary Constraints</td>
<td>3.87</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget Allows for Needed Equip.</td>
<td>3.06</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benefits of Participating Exceed Costs</td>
<td>4.01</td>
<td>.95</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profession Increasingly Dangerous</td>
<td>4.75</td>
<td>.54</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Need Militarization</td>
<td>3.36</td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Policies Create Trust</td>
<td>3.51</td>
<td>.85</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Militarization OK with Policies and Procedures</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>.88</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concerned with Officers Appearing Militaristic</td>
<td>3.25</td>
<td>.99</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policing Becoming Militaristic</td>
<td>2.62</td>
<td>.82</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizens Respect our Dept.</td>
<td>4.36</td>
<td>.67</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizens Cooperative with Dept.</td>
<td>4.37</td>
<td>.52</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizens Satisfied with Dept.</td>
<td>4.28</td>
<td>.59</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen Input from Town Hall Meetings</td>
<td>2.82</td>
<td>.89</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Media Used for Community Input</td>
<td>3.67</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Media Used to Report Problems</td>
<td>3.67</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen Input Before 1033 Participation</td>
<td>1.78</td>
<td>.67</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dept. Engages with Community for Policy Creation/Revisions</td>
<td>2.33</td>
<td>.85</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen Input on Dept. Policy is Important for Trust</td>
<td>2.41</td>
<td>.80</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governing Boards Included on 1033 Participation</td>
<td>2.74</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Included on 1033 Participation</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>.86</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1033 Program Equips Dept. to Deal with Threats</td>
<td>4.05</td>
<td>.77</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first independent variable (internal factor) that was examined was budgetary considerations. Respondents were asked to rate their response on a Likert Scale (strongly agree to strongly disagree) for the question *My department is facing budgetary constraints.* Out of the 58
respondents, most respondents indicated “agree.” Thirty-eight respondents answered either “agree” or “strongly agree.” For the second independent variable, *my department’s budget allows us to purchase the equipment needed to do our jobs*, most respondents indicated neither agree nor disagree. Twenty-one respondents indicated either “agree” or “strongly agree,” while 19 respondents indicated “disagree” or “strongly disagree.” Interestingly, the highest standard deviation is “police need militarization” (Table 4). This was almost identical to the response of those departments facing budgetary constraints. This question too was asked on a Likert scale. Those who may be more likely to agree or strongly agree, may feel as if militarization (equipment from the 1033 program) is needed to do their job. However, those who may be more likely to disagree or strongly disagree may associate militarization as a negative, such as being labeled a militarized police force.

**Table 5**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Sum of Quantity</th>
<th>Sum of Acquisition Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>482</td>
<td>$146,001.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>$93,118.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>$38,002.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>474</td>
<td>$68,363.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>981</td>
<td>$33,895.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>756</td>
<td>$377,133.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>$9,088.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>1186</td>
<td>$124,856.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>927</td>
<td>$26,862.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>$246,585.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>$42,905.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>338</td>
<td>$99,474.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>738</td>
<td>$136,432.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>541</td>
<td>$140,074.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>1433</td>
<td>$76,905.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>$537,088.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>1174</td>
<td>$1,544,267.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>10983</td>
<td>$4,207,606.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>529</td>
<td>$8,956,348.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>1572</td>
<td>$7,054,802.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>$566,664.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>611</td>
<td>$11,654,508.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>2337</td>
<td>$7,054,241.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>5431</td>
<td>$3,820,898.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>31893</td>
<td>$47,056,122</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The third independent variable (internal factor) that was examined was economic benefits. Respondents were asked whether the benefits of participating in the 1033 program (e.g. free equipment) exceeded the costs (e.g. being labeled militarized). Forty-three (74%) answered either strongly agree (20) or agree (23). Ten respondents answered neither agree nor disagree, while four respondents answered either disagree (3) or strongly disagree (1).

The fourth and fifth independent variable (internal factor) examined perceived dangerousness of the profession. Forty-five respondents (77.5%) strongly agreed that the police profession was becoming increasingly dangerous, while 11 “agreed,” and one “disagreed.” When asked whether police need to become more militarized to deal with current police problems, 20.6% strongly agreed, 22.4% agreed, 22.4% neither agreed nor disagreed, 24.1% disagreed, while only one strongly disagreed.

The sixth and seventh independent variables (internal factor) examined the role of policies regarding trust with the community and 1033 equipment. 8.7% of police leaders strongly agreed and 45.6% agreed that making police policies available to the public creates trust. 33.3% neither agreed nor disagreed, 8.7% disagreed, and one respondent strongly disagreed. When asked if police militarization is acceptable as long as policies are in place to ensure the safety of officers and the public, 22.8% strongly agreed while 40.3% agreed. Twenty-eight percent of police leaders neither agreed nor disagreed with this statement, while 7% disagreed.

The eighth and ninth independent variables (internal factor) examined the knowledge police leaders had regarding police militarization and the 1033 program. When police leaders were asked whether they were concerned with their officers appearing too militarized, 5.2% strongly agreed, while 43.8% agreed. 22.8% neither agreed nor disagreed, 22.8% disagreed, and 3.5% strongly disagreed.
The tenth, eleventh, and twelfth independent variables (external factor) examined police legitimacy. Police leaders were asked three questions about how they believe they are perceived by the community they serve (See Table 6). These questions examined thick participation between police departments and the community.

Table 6
**Police Legitimacy**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neither agree nor disagree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Citizens respect the dept.</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td>52.7%</td>
<td>43.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizens are cooperative with the dept.</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizens are satisfied with the dept.</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>63.6%</td>
<td>34.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The thirteenth independent variable (external factor) that was examined was community engagement. This question looked at thin participation, in terms of dialogue between police departments and the communities they serve. Police leaders were asked if they use a town hall meeting approach when seeking input from citizens. 1.7% of police leaders strongly agreed, while 19.6% agreed. 44.6% neither agreed nor disagreed, 26.7% disagreed, and 7.1% strongly disagreed.

Variables fourteen through sixteen (external factor) also had to do with community engagement. Police leaders were asked about the ways in which they do seek input and when they should seek input (See Table 7). These questions looked at citizen engagement as well as whether police leaders should consult community members about participation in the 1033 program.
Table 7

*Seeking Citizen Input*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neither agree nor disagree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dept. uses social media to seek citizen input</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>10.7%</td>
<td>19.6%</td>
<td>46.4%</td>
<td>19.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dept. uses social media to report problems</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
<td>10.7%</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>53.5%</td>
<td>17.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Depts. should obtain input from citizens for 1033 program participation</td>
<td>33.9%</td>
<td>55.3%</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Variables 17 through 20 examined the role community members, including local governing boards play in making and revising policies and 1033 program participation with their police departments. Question 17 asked police leaders *My department engages with the community when creating or revising police policies*. 10.7% of police leaders agreed with this statement, while 26.7% neither agreed nor disagreed. 48.2% of police leaders disagreed, while 14.2% of them strongly disagreed with the statement. Police leaders were then given the statement: *Allowing citizens in the community to help craft departmental policies is important in order to build trust*. 7.2% agreed, while 40% neither agreed nor disagreed with the statement. 40% disagreed with the statement and 12.7% strongly disagreed.

Police leaders were then given the statement: *Police departments should include local governing boards (e.g., city commission, county board) in the decision to participate in the 1033 program*. 1.8% strongly agreed, while 30.9% agreed. Twenty percent neither agreed nor disagreed, 34.5% disagreed, and 12.7% strongly disagreed. Finally, police leaders were asked whether they agreed that community members should be included in the decision to participate in the 1033 program. 1.8% strongly agreed, 7.2% agreed, and 16.3% neither agreed nor disagreed. 58.1% disagreed, while 16.3% strongly disagreed.
The last independent variable that was examined was perceived dangerousness of the community. Police leaders were asked if the 1033 program allows their department to be properly equipped to deal with threats (e.g. gun violence) to their community. Twenty-nine percent of police leaders strongly agreed with this, while 50.9% agreed. 16.3% of police leaders neither agreed nor disagreed and 3.6% disagreed.

Another interesting finding for some of the questions was how skewed the responses were. For example, when police leaders were asked their opinion on whether the police profession is becoming increasingly dangerous (Q6), police leaders overwhelmingly stated that they agreed or strongly agreed (Table 8).

Table 8
Police Leaders Response to Whether Profession is Increasingly Dangerous

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Freq.</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>19.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>78.95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The same was true for three questions that asked police leaders how they felt the community respected, cooperated and were satisfied with their department (See Tables 9–11).

Table 9
Citizens in My Community Respect our Department

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Freq.</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>52.73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>43.64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 10
Citizens in My Community are Cooperative

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Freq.</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Neither Agree nor Disagree</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>58.93%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>39.29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>56</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 11
Citizens in My Community are Satisfied with our Department

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Freq.</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither Agree nor Disagree</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>62.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>33.93%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>56</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Regression Estimates**

**Internal Factors**

A logistic regression was run for the independent variables that fell within the internal factors of an organization. First, these variables were run with the first dependent variable, which is participation in the 1033 program. These internal factors included budgetary considerations, perceptions on the safety of the police profession, policies, and knowledge of the 1033 program and police militarization. For the first internal factor, police leaders were asked if their budgets allowed them to acquire the equipment needed to do their jobs. For the second internal factor, police leaders were asked whether the benefits of free equipment (from the 1033 program) exceeded the costs (being labeled militarized) of participating in the 1033 program. The third internal factor asked police leaders whether the police needed to become more militarized to deal...
with current police problems. Finally, the last internal factor asked whether making police policies available to the public helps create trust with the community. Each of these questions were measured on a Likert scale.

Given the distribution of survey responses, the variables had to be modified. For several questions, there were so few responses in the range of agree to highly agree or disagree to highly disagree. Responses were measured on a Likert scale (1–5), with a response of 1 meaning strongly disagree and a response of 5 meaning strongly agree. The variables were changed from 1–5 to 1–3 scale. On the new scale, 1 represents strongly disagree and disagree, 2 represents neither agree nor disagree, and 3 represents agree and strongly agree. Coding was changed to this way in STATA. For this part, I am comparing to the reference level to each variable under internal factors. Results are presented as marginal effects (Table 12).

In Table 12, the first dependent variable, which is participation in the 1033 program in the last two years, is measured with five independent variables. The first independent variable examined through the survey asked police leaders whether their budgets allow them to purchase the equipment needed to do their jobs.

The first internal factor, budgetary considerations (Q4) was the only internal factor that was significant at an exploratory level. The coefficients for this internal factor had a p value less than 0.05. Therefore, as police leaders are more likely to have a budget that allows them to purchase acquired equipment, they are less likely to use the 1033 program. This finding supports the first hypothesis, which states as the severity of budgetary constraints increase, police leaders will be more likely to acquire equipment through the 1033 program.
Table 12
Regression Analysis of Internal Factors on 1033 Program Participation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coef.</th>
<th>Std. Err.</th>
<th>z</th>
<th>95% Conf. Interval</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Budgetary Considerations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>-0.059</td>
<td>0.145</td>
<td>-0.41</td>
<td>-0.342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>-0.295*</td>
<td>0.152</td>
<td>-1.94</td>
<td>-0.592</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benefits of Participation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>-0.116</td>
<td>0.298</td>
<td>-0.39</td>
<td>-0.700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.264</td>
<td>0.274</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>-0.274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More Militarized</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.164</td>
<td>0.152</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>-0.134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>-0.023</td>
<td>0.147</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
<td>-0.311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policies Available</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.175</td>
<td>0.196</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>-0.210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>-0.018</td>
<td>0.201</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td>-0.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appearing Militarized Concern</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>-0.135</td>
<td>0.180</td>
<td>-0.75</td>
<td>-0.489</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.240</td>
<td>0.146</td>
<td>1.64</td>
<td>-0.046</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No. of obs.=56
LR chi2(10)=19.01 Pseudo R2=.250 Log Likelihood=-28.413

Compared to police departments that strongly disagree or disagree with Question 4, respondents that agreed or strongly agreed with Question 4 were almost 30% less likely to participate in the 1033 program (Table 13). One limitation is that the categories had to be combined (strongly disagree and disagree), etc. could biased the estimate. It is also important to note in Table 13, that the chi squared value is not below .05, and therefore the model does not have a good fit and shows the need for a larger sample in future research.
Table 13
Regression of Internal Factors on 1033 Program Participation Marginal Effects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coef.</th>
<th>Std. Err.</th>
<th>z</th>
<th>95% Conf. Interval</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Budgetary Considerations</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>-0.352</td>
<td>0.865</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>-2.048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>-1.615</td>
<td>0.887</td>
<td>1.82</td>
<td>-3.355</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Benefits of Participation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>-0.664</td>
<td>1.664</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
<td>-3.926</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.461</td>
<td>1.535</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>-1.547</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>More Militarized</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.038</td>
<td>1.010</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>-0.941</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>0.844</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>-1.788</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Policies Available</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.105</td>
<td>1.219</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>-1.284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>-0.106</td>
<td>1.191</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>-2.441</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Appearing Militarized Concern</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>-0.705</td>
<td>0.958</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>-2.583</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.363</td>
<td>0.832</td>
<td>1.64</td>
<td>-0.267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>_cons</td>
<td>-0.912</td>
<td>1.830</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
<td>-4.500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No. of obs. = 56
LR chi2(10)= 19.01
Pseudo R2=.251
Log Likelihood= -28.413

Turner and Fox (2019) found that 64% of police executives in their survey supported military procurement programs while 97% of them stated that law enforcement officers should have military weapons. In Table 14, the chi squared value is not below .05, and therefore the model does not have a good fit and shows the need for a larger sample in future research.

The second internal factor, perceptions of safety of profession, was not statistically significant, indicating no support for the second hypothesis, as the economic benefits exceed the
costs of participating in the 1033 program, police leaders will be more likely to acquire
equipment through the 1033 program. This was also true of Q7, which asked police leaders if
police need to become more militarized to deal with current police problems. Q7 was also part of
the second internal factor, perceptions on safety of profession. Q7 was not significant below
the .05 level, providing no support for the third hypothesis, as the perceived dangerousness of the
police profession increases, police leaders will be more likely to acquire equipment through the
1033 program. Turner and Fox (2019) found that 62% of police executives support the
militarization of policing in the United States.

The same was true for the Q8, which asked police leaders whether making police policies
publicly available helps create trust within a community. Q8 dealt with the third internal factor
which is policies and was found to be not significant below the .05 level. Therefore, there was no
support for the fourth hypothesis, which states as police leaders make departmental policies more
visible, police leaders will be less likely to acquire equipment through the 1033 program.
Knowledge of police militarization and the 1033 program, the last internal factor, was also found
to be not statistically significant. Police leaders were asked whether they are concerned with their
officers appearing too militaristic on a Likert scale (Q10). Therefore, no support was found for
the fifth hypothesis.

The internal factors were then run with the second dependent variable which was the
extent of militarization by police departments by examining the types of items they have
acquired (Table 14). In Table 14, the chi squared value is not below .05, and therefore the model
does not have a good fit and shows the need for a larger sample in future research. When a
regression was run on the second dependent variable with the internal factors, no variables were
statistically significant (Table 14).
Table 14
**Regression Analysis of Internal Factors on Extent of Militarization**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coef.</th>
<th>Std. Err.</th>
<th>z</th>
<th>95% Conf. Interval</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Budgetary Considerations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.414</td>
<td>0.758</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>-1.072</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>-1.063</td>
<td>0.806</td>
<td>-1.32</td>
<td>-2.643</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benefits of Participation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>-1.890</td>
<td>1.543</td>
<td>-1.22</td>
<td>-4.917</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>-0.660</td>
<td>1.318</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
<td>-3.245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More Militarized</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.838</td>
<td>0.893</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>-0.912</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.720</td>
<td>0.807</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>-0.862</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policies Available</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.523</td>
<td>1.139</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>-1.710</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.347</td>
<td>1.105</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>-1.819</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appearing Militarized Concerns</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>-1.208</td>
<td>0.992</td>
<td>-1.22</td>
<td>-3.153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>-0.056</td>
<td>0.754</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>-1.533</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>_cons</td>
<td>-0.174</td>
<td>1.686</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
<td>-3.479</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of obs.</td>
<td>9.64</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LR chi2(10)=</td>
<td>9.64</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R2=</td>
<td>.130</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Likelihood=</td>
<td>-32.225</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Table 15, the chi squared value is not below .05, and therefore the model does not have a good fit and shows the need for a larger sample in future research.
Table 15

*Regression of Internal Factors on Extent of Militarization Marginal Effects*

|                      | Coef. | Std. Err. | z     | P>|z|   | [95% Conf. Interval] |
|----------------------|-------|-----------|-------|-------|----------------------|
| Budgetary Considerations |       |           |       |       |                      |
| 2                    | 0.092 | 0.17      | 0.55  | 0.58  | 0.23                 | 0.42                 |
| 3                    | -0.2  | 0.15      | -1.35 | 0.18  | -0.5                 | 0.1                  |
| Benefits of Participation |     |           |       |       |                      |
| 2                    | -0.36 | 0.3       | -1.25 | 0.21  | 0.93                 | 0.21                 |
| 3                    | -0.14 | 0.3       | -0.51 | 0.61  | -0.7                 | 0.40                 |
| More Militarized     |       |           |       |       |                      |
| 2                    | 0.16  | 0.2       | 0.96  | 0.34  | -                    | 0.5                  |
| 3                    | 0.14  | 0.15      | 0.92  | 0.35  | -0.2                 | 0.43                 |
| Policies Available   |       |           |       |       |                      |
| 2                    | 0.1   | 0.21      | 0.48  | 0.63  | -                    | 0.51                 |
| 3                    | 0.07  | 0.20      | 0.32  | 0.75  | 0.33                 | 0.5                  |
| Appearing Militarized Concerns | |           |       |       |                      |
| 2                    | -0.22 | 0.8       | -1.29 | 0.2   | -0.6                 | 0.12                 |
| 3                    | -0.01 | 0.16      | -0.07 | 0.94  | -                    | 0.3                  |

No. of obs. = 56       LR chi2(10)= 9.64       Psuedo R²=.130      Log Likelihood= -32.225

**External Factors**

A logistic regression was then run for the independent variables that fell within the external factors of an organization. First, these variables were run with the first dependent variable, which is participation in the 1033 program. These external factors included police legitimacy, community engagement, and public perceptions of community. For the external
factor, police leaders were asked to rate on a Likert scale how much they agreed or disagreed with statements regarding how well their citizens respected, cooperated, and were satisfied with their department. For the second external factor, police leaders were asked about what methods were used to seek input and obtain feedback from citizens to better understand concerns. Methods included town hall meetings, the use of social media, and engagement with the community to create or revise policies as well as to provide input on participation in the 1033 program. Each of these questions were measured on a Likert scale.

Given the distribution of survey responses, the variables had to be modified, just as they were with the internal factors. For several questions, there were so few responses in the range of agree to highly agree or disagree to highly disagree. Responses were measured on a Likert scale (1–5), with a response of 1 meaning strongly disagree and a response of 5 meaning strongly agree. The variables were changed from 1–5 to 1–3 scale. On the new scale, 1 represents strongly disagree and disagree, 2 represents neither agree nor disagree, and 3 represents agree and strongly agree. Coding was changed to this way in Stata. For this part, comparisons are made to the reference level to each variable under external factors.

Due to the minimal variance in responses, both Hypotheses Six and Ten were left out of the regression. Hypothesis Six, which states that as police leaders’ perceptions of their legitimacy in their community increases, police leaders will be less likely to acquire equipment through the 1033 program, was unfounded. Therefore, the first external factor, police legitimacy, found no support. Hypothesis Ten states, as the perceived dangerousness of a community increases, police leaders will be more likely to acquire equipment through the 1033 program. No evidence was found for Hypothesis Ten, therefore the third external factor of police perceptions of community was unfounded.
As shown in Table 16, the remaining independent variables (Q13, Q14, Q19) from the external factors were run with the first dependent variable (Q1), which was participation in the 1033 program. A control variable was also run in the regression which was department size (Q22).

Table 16  
*Regression Analysis of External Factors on Participation in the 1033 Program*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coef.</th>
<th>Std. Err.</th>
<th>z</th>
<th>[95% Conf. Interval]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Town Hall Meetings</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>-0.263</td>
<td>0.699</td>
<td>-0.38</td>
<td>-1.635</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.310</td>
<td>0.875</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>-1.405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Media Input</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.509</td>
<td>1.143</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>-1.732</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.169</td>
<td>0.905</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>-1.605</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Include Local Boards</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.466</td>
<td>0.936</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>-1.369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>-0.603</td>
<td>0.689</td>
<td>-0.87</td>
<td>-1.954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dept. Size</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-20 officers</td>
<td>-1.166</td>
<td>1.346</td>
<td>-0.87</td>
<td>-3.805</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-30 officers</td>
<td>0.357</td>
<td>1.421</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>-2.429</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31-40 officers</td>
<td>-0.212</td>
<td>1.837</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
<td>-3.814</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41-50 officers</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>(empty)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;50 officers</td>
<td>0.269</td>
<td>1.563</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>-2.795</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>_cons</td>
<td>0.733</td>
<td>1.632</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>-2.466</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of obs.</td>
<td>=54</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LR chi2(10)</td>
<td>=9.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R2</td>
<td>=.127</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Likelihood</td>
<td>= -31.86</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Community engagement, the second external factor that was measured (Q13, Q14), community was not significant below the .05 level, indicating no support for these external factors. Hypotheses seven, which states as police leaders engage in higher rates of conventional participation with the community, police leaders will be more likely to acquire equipment
through the 1033 program, was unfounded. Hypotheses Eight, which stated as police leaders engage in higher rates of thin participation with the community, police leaders will be less likely to acquire equipment through the 1033 program, did not conform to the expectations. Finally, Hypothesis Nine, which stated as police leaders engage in higher rates of thick participation with the community, police leaders will be less likely to acquire equipment through the 1033 program, also went against expectations and was unfounded.

Similarly, when each of the external variables above along with the control variable was run with the second dependent variable, which was extent of militarization, there was nothing significant below the .05 level, indicating no support for these external factors (Table 17).

Table 17
Regression Analysis of External Factors on Extent of Militarization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coef.</th>
<th>Std. Err.</th>
<th>z</th>
<th>95% Conf. Interval</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Town Hall Meetings</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>-0.285</td>
<td>0.746</td>
<td>-0.38</td>
<td>-1.748 - 1.177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.384</td>
<td>0.863</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>-1.308 - 2.078</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Media Input</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>-0.785</td>
<td>1.254</td>
<td>-0.63</td>
<td>-3.244 - 1.672</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.667</td>
<td>0.988</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>-1.269 - 2.605</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Include Local Boards</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.654</td>
<td>0.972</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>-0.252 - 3.560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.771</td>
<td>0.736</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>-0.672 - 2.215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dept. Size</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-20 officers</td>
<td>-2.018</td>
<td>1.397</td>
<td>-1.44</td>
<td>-4.757 - 0.720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-30 officers</td>
<td>-0.577</td>
<td>1.424</td>
<td>-0.41</td>
<td>-3.368 - 2.213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31-40 officers</td>
<td>-0.600</td>
<td>1.823</td>
<td>-0.33</td>
<td>-4.175 - 2.974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41-50 officers</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>(empty)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; 50 officers</td>
<td>-1.136</td>
<td>1.549</td>
<td>-0.73</td>
<td>-4.172 - 1.899</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Qualitative

Internal Factors

Among the 58 police leaders who responded to the survey, two agreed to a semi-structured interview over the phone to talk more about their thoughts on the 1033 program, police militarization, and police policy. One of the police leaders who was interviewed stated that his budget does not allow his department to acquire the needed equipment to do their jobs. This police leader stated that without the 1033 program, his department would only have shotguns, as opposed to rifles (which he stated he acquired through the 1033 program) which allow officers to confront potential threats from a much safer distance. He added that if the 1033 program was not made available to civilian law enforcement, it would be “devastating.” The second police leader stated that although the budget does allow the department to purchase needed equipment, if the 1033 program went away, it “would negatively affect some departments and could be devastating.” The second police leader added that he takes advantage of the 1033 program to help his budget.

Another benefit of the 1033 program according to the second police leader is that it allows his department to acquire necessary equipment to be prepared for many scenarios including barricaded gunman and natural disasters. He cited one example of how he offered to loan a vehicle acquired through the 1033 program to another department whose jurisdiction experienced several dam collapses. This same vehicle was used to help pull out a fire department vehicle that became stuck fighting a brush fire. He also believes that the 1033 program makes the police profession safer by properly outfitting officers and providing them with needed equipment.
equipment. He stated, “when you make the police safe, you make the community safer…the officers are more confident and more equipped.” The second police leader stated that he considered participation in the 1033 program as being “fiscally responsible.”

**External Factors**

The first police leader stated that he does not believe that making policies available to the public creates trust within a community. He stated that “most people don’t pay attention anyways.” He believed that those wanting access to police policies would want them to attack police. Finally, he stated that “most people are not interested in policies and just want to feel safe.” The second police leader believed that making policies available to the public does create more trust, but he stated that there are some policies that cannot be disclosed. By releasing policies on “…SWAT tactics and other investigation techniques” it would negatively affect investigations and the safety of both officers and the public. He added that “the more open a department is, the more trust is created.”

Both police leaders believed that police leaders should be worried about their officers appearing too militaristic. The first police leader stated that if the acquired equipment is used on a regular basis, it would be “too intimidating” and make officers “not approachable.” He added that “there is a time and a place to use such equipment” specifically during “active shooters and riots.”

The second police leader stated that police leaders already do a good job in terms of community engagement. He added that if relationships are made and they are transparent with the community, “…you don’t have to justify equipment.” The second police leader did state that police leaders need to be “…very transparent and in touch with funding units, stakeholders, and city councils” in terms of equipment acquisitions and needs.
The first police leader stated that police leaders don’t need to seek input from the community on 1033 program participation because they have “…no concept of police work.” He added that decisions like these should be “…left to the experts” and said that “that’s why we get voted in.” The first police leader also stated that acquired equipment such as military vehicles can improve community engagement because they can serve as a “conversation piece” between police and citizens at community events. He also stated that the 1033 program has allowed his department to acquire sewing machines to mend inmates clothing, tractors for use in the inmate garden, and a van to transport grown vegetables to food banks across the jurisdiction. He said that the 1033 program has helped a lot of people in the community and that he is also in the process of writing a grant to show other departments how to set up programs like this with acquired equipment.
CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

Summary

This dissertation has attempted to fill a gap in the literature by examining the decision-making process and opinions of police leaders as it relates to participation in the 1033 program and acquisition of equipment. Turner and Fox (2019) stated that “future research should aim to collect more information on stakeholder opinions on police militarization, and specifically focus on why the stakeholders developed their opinions” (p. 135). Moule et al. (2019) stated that “understanding decision-making processes among these stakeholders would be useful for understanding the militarization of police” (p. 97). This dissertation answered that call by adopting the open systems framework developed by March and Simon (1958) and Cyert and March (1963) and applying a model consistent with a police organization to examine the decision-making process of police leaders when choosing to take part in the 1033 program. This is the first time the open systems framework has been applied to police organizations to examine the decision-making process for militarized equipment acquisition.

By applying this model to the police militarization discussion, we can begin to understand which factors affect the decision-making process, and which factors have more bearing than others. Both internal and external factors were explored within a police organization to determine what factors lead police leaders to participate in the 1033 program as well as what
to acquire from the program. This model was then tested through an online survey which was created to include questions reflecting both internal and external factors.

Respondents were also asked on the survey if they wished to participate in a semi-structured interview to examine their decision-making process more in depth, which led to some interviews and additional knowledge on the process to participate and acquire equipment. This study was able to produce some findings at the exploratory level, to better understand the decision-making process of police leaders in regard to 1033 participation. By examining 1033 program acquisitions, this dissertation contributed to the literature on both the material and organizational dimensions of police militarization (Kraska & Kappeler, 1997).

**Findings**

This dissertation found that perception of budgetary adequacy was the only significant internal factor that played a role in participation in the 1033 program by police leaders. Police leaders who reported having a budget that allowed them to purchase necessary equipment, were found to be 30% less likely to use the 1033 program. This exploratory finding helps us better understand the role the budget may play in an organization’s decision to participate. Of the external factors that were examined, none were found to be significant. What’s of interest is that on several questions, police leaders as a whole responded agree/strongly agree or disagree/strongly disagree with little to no variance in responses. This could be due to concerns about answering honestly or potentially reflects isomorphic pressure to conform to norms in police leadership (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).

**Limitations**

This dissertation is not without its limitations. First, the sample size was small. Internal and external factors had to be tested in separate regressions due to the sample size. Separating
the factors in this fashion is inconsistent with open systems theory, so findings should be interpreted with caution. Future research should focus on obtaining a larger sample in order to support the findings.

Ultimately, two large police associations in Michigan (MSA and MACLEA) were used in this study. The MSA represents the sheriff’s departments in the state of Michigan while MACLEA is representative of the campus and university police departments within the state of Michigan. Unfortunately, the third and largest form of local police departments was not represented in this dissertation. This includes city, town, village, and tribal police departments and make up over three quarters of the departments in the state of Michigan. Since some police leaders are elected while others are hired, it would be important to determine what if any differences exist among them.

Future research in this area should aim at collecting perceptions of the 1033 program and police militarization from these types of departments. If the sample size was larger and more inclusive of the types of police departments at the local level, there is the possibility that the results could change.

Future research may be able to bypass this limitation and incorporate responses from departments within cities, towns, villages, and tribes by reaching out to departments individually, as opposed to collecting responses through associations. By contacting departments individually, researchers would be able to have direct communication with police leaders. This would help build trust and may yield more responses in data collection. Another strategy that could be employed by future researchers would be to contact the state certifying agency for police officers. In Michigan, MCOLES is the state certifying agency for all commissioned police
officers in the state. MCOLES would not distribute emails or phone numbers of police leaders, however other state agencies may.

Another limitation of this dissertation is that only police leaders within the state of Michigan were sampled. The focus of this dissertation was exploratory in nature and its aim was to obtain a baseline understanding of police leaders’ perceptions on participation and acquisition of equipment from the 1033 program. Future research should seek to understand perceptions of police leaders in other states in order to better obtain generalizability.

There may also be hesitancy to take surveys from researchers, especially those that come from associations. Police leaders may receive numerous invitations to participate in research and therefore may not be interested in participating.

**Future Research**

From the dissertation’s exploratory findings, more data should be collected on ways in which police organizations are able to supplement their budgets, if they believe their budgets are not adequate to supply their department with what they deem as needed equipment. The 1033 program is one way to supplement their budget. A case can be made that participation in the program is fiscally responsible for both the department and the city or county since the equipment is free, less the cost of shipping. In cases where police leader’s budgets do not allow them to acquire needed equipment, a case can be made that the 1033 program is needed. One of the police leaders interviewed stated that if the 1033 program was not made available that their department may not have rifles. Police leaders can explain to governing boards and community why equipment like this can make the officer and community safer.

According Kavanaugh et al. (2020) police budgetary decisions are largely driven by professional staff, with little consideration given to input from the community or thoughtful re-
examination of what is working well and what isn’t. One suggestion for future research is to examine what steps, if any, are being taken by departments to include community members in budgetary decisions. As one police leader stated in the interview, without the 1033 program, we wouldn’t be able to purchase rifles for our officers and would have to rely on shotguns. By bringing together police leaders, local governing boards, and community members, a better understanding of what is needed and the most acceptable way of acquiring those items might be determined.

Pillar two in the Financial Foundation for Thriving Communities Framework require people in this process for creating police budgets to work together on a vision (Kavanaugh et al. (2020). Part of that vision would include how do we want to envision our police, which could dictate the types of equipment acquired (militarized versus non-militarized), and second, how does the community go about achieving that vision. For example, if an MRAP is seen as too militaristic for a community, but police say there is a need for an armored vehicle, perhaps they would look at the costs associated with a civilian model of an armored vehicle such as the Lenco Bearcat. Visions of the police combined with cost (free MRAP versus paying for a civilian model) would be discussed and decided upon. In this model, all those involved share a responsibility for the decisions and visions of the community, which would go along with pillar three in the Financial Foundations model (Kavanaugh et al., 2020).

As stated earlier, organizations within an open systems framework are tied to economic factors among other things (Wolf et al., 2008). Budgets play a large role in a police leader’s ability to acquire the equipment they see as needed for their officers to be able to do what is needed in the police role. The only significant finding at the exploratory level within the internal factors examined in this dissertation had to do with budgetary considerations. Police leaders in
the survey who reported having a budget that allowed them to purchase necessary equipment, were found to be 30% less likely to use the 1033 program. This exploratory finding allows for future research to examine how what other effects a budget may have on the decision to participate in the 1033 program and acquire needed equipment. Future research could examine whether local governing bodies approve of participation in the 1033 program, if they are made aware of participation by departments, as well as other opinions they may share on this program.

Police militarization is a controversial topic that needs to continue to be examined to better understand the thoughts of both community members and police leaders. As this dissertation found exploratory evidence for, police budgets play a role in participation in 1033 program. If departments are not able to acquire needed equipment, they may be more willing to look towards programs like the 1033 program. President Obama saw that need for a transformation in the way we police, which was the impetus for the creation of the 21st Century Policing task force. Kavanaugh et al. (2020) found that “regardless of race, gender, political persuasion, or urban versus rural, most people believe the current system needs to be changed but don’t have clear ideas about how that should be done” (p. 1). As stated above, police leaders appear to have confidence that they have the trust, cooperation, and satisfaction of their community members. If department participation in programs like the 1033 program take away from police legitimacy in a community, police leaders and local governing boards need to be concerned.

The model and survey developed for this dissertation can be used again for other studies or to examine police leader’s perceptions in other states. One of the limitations of this dissertation as noted earlier is that respondents represented only Michigan. By examining more states, we can begin to develop a better idea of whether police leaders around the country tend to
have similar reasons for participation and acquisition in the 1033 program. Understanding opinions and concerns from both sides (community and police leaders), will lead to a better understanding of what equipment may or may not be needed, how equipment should be used, and how do we equip departments with necessary equipment.

Future studies should also focus on obtaining a larger sample size in order to accurately incorporate both external and internal factors into a regression to look for significant findings. This dissertation’s exploratory finding that budget considerations play a role in driving police leader’s decisions to participate in the 1033 program may still be a factor in studies with larger samples. There may also be findings in future studies that there are external factors that also play a role.

The semi-structured interviews that were used to supplement the survey in this dissertation were not generalizable, however they may provide some insight for ideas on future research. Although only two ultimately participated in the interviews, there were several statements made which yielded more in-depth anecdotes on this topic than could be captured in a survey. For example, one police leader said that most people are not interested in policies and policy decisions so there is no need to include the public on such things. They also added that they are elected in, and therefore are trusted to make those decisions by the public. The second police leader stated that departments should be transparent as much as they can be without negatively affecting investigations and public safety. Future research could use a more qualitative approach to examine these beliefs more in depth.

**Final Thoughts**

Another area for future research, which little research has addressed is the police leader’s evaluation of self. Malcher and Rymaszewska (2009) surveyed police officers and found that
officers averaged high levels when they scored themselves on self-evaluations and found that older officers were less likely to rate themselves high on self-evaluations. According to Aremu and Tejumola (2008) self-concept is an important area of study, considering how public perception can impact officer’s feelings of self, which can affect how officers act in public. In this dissertation, police leaders overwhelmingly rated themselves and their departments as having the respect and satisfaction of the community as well as seeing their citizens as cooperative with their department. Future research could examine if this mindset is common among police leaders and what effect this has on the decision-making process to participate in the 1033 program. For example, if police leaders feel their community respects them, is satisfied with them, and is cooperative with them, does this lead to the mindset that there is no need then to obtain citizen support in programs such as the 1033 program? Future research may be able to shed light on this.

According to Tyler (2017), higher levels of police legitimacy correspond to higher rates of compliance and cooperation from the community. Sunshine and Tyler (2003) state that as police legitimacy increases, so too does empowerment of the police. According to one of the police leaders interviewed, his community voted for him to be sheriff, and therefore he believed that he had the ability to do his job that way he saw fit. Future studies should look at whether police leaders have similar thoughts on being empowered by the public and using programs like the 1033 program to assist them in doing their job. According to Nix (2017), police leaders feel that their communities care more about effective policing than rather than procedurally just policing. Differences, if any, between elected (sheriffs) and non-elected (chiefs) positions would also be worth examining.
Equipment from the 1033 program was dichotomized by Ramey and Steidley (2018) into militarized and non-militarized equipment as it was for this dissertation. Equipment such as rifles, handguns, ammunition, rifle optics, and MRAPs are classified as militarized, while equipment such as generators, office equipment, and medical supplies are considered non-militarized. A basic question that has not been examined is what makes something militaristic? Items such as rifles, handguns, and ammunition that are coded as militaristic are all items that can be acquired by both civilian police departments and civilians as well. Items that were solely made for the military, such as the MRAP and various camouflage fatigues, may be a good place to start. Do police leaders who participate in the 1033 program acquire items based on how militaristic an item is? This would be another question for future research.

In 2015, President Barack Obama issued Executive Order 13688 (2015) in an attempt to improve among other things, the appropriate use of equipment transferred to civilian police departments through the 1033 program. The order banned certain equipment such as tracked armored vehicles, grenade launchers, and bayonets since they were viewed as militaristic in nature and could pose a threat to community trust (Executive Order 13688, 2015). These statements highlight a need to learn more about what acquired items are used for.

The police leaders I spoke with stated that any grenade launcher ever acquired by a civilian police department would be used to fire tear gas. They added that no civilian police department has ever possessed a real grenade. Another police leader stated that bayonets that were acquired were not used at the end of a rifle, but rather as a tool inside the patrol car in case they needed to cut a seatbelt during an emergency situation. Future research could focus on the reasons some equipment is acquired (and why some is not) and how it is used would clear up a
lot of misconceptions about the realities of what the equipment is needed and used for by civilian police departments.

Police leaders would benefit from sharing stories with their community about how equipment from the 1033 program has benefitted their community. One of the police leaders interviewed stated “we need to do a better job explaining the role 1033 equipment plays.” Compiling stories about how 1033 equipment has benefitted communities may lessen reservations community members and scholars may have about participation in the program. One practitioner point would be beginning to collect such “good news” stories and make them publicly available on the department website. An officer, deputy or non-sworn civilian on the department who is tasked with updating the department’s web page or social media site could also monitor these stories being posted and be able to answer questions community members may have who post on these stories.

According to Kraska & Kappeler (1997), police militarization has four dimensions including material, cultural, organizational, and operational. This dissertation strictly looked at the material dimension. Future research should also look at what benefits programs like the 1033 program have had on the police and the community. Information gathered from police leaders during the semi-structured interviews revealed that the 1033 program has allowed departments to acquire equipment to sew inmates’ garments along with creating and maintaining a garden ran by inmates which supports several foodbanks around the state of Michigan. If citizens are aware of made aware of programs like this as a result of participation in the 1033 program, how would they feel about their department participating in the 1033 program?

Future research should also look at opinions from other stakeholders in the community. These could include citizens and governing boards. Police leaders in this study during semi-
structured interviews stated that citizens don’t care about departmental policies and or shouldn’t be included in the decision-making process to participate in the 1033 program. Police leaders are in some cases are elected (sheriffs), they may feel as if they have already been given consent to make decisions for their department and therefore wouldn’t need citizen approval. By researching citizen’s attitudes on the 1033 program and citizens participation in the participation and acquisition process, we will have a better understanding of exactly how they feel.
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APPENDIX A

Law Enforcement Support Office (LESO) Application for Participation/Authorized Screeners Letter
Law Enforcement Support Office (LESO)
Application for Participation / Authorized Screeners Letter
(This form is for State/Local Law Enforcement Agencies only)

**Indicates Required Fields**

**SECTION 1:**

*Originating Agency Identifier (OBI) Number (if applicable):* 

*Agency Name:*

*Agency Physical Address:* 

*CITY:*

*NOC P.O. Box or address (if different than above i.e. Terminal Location):*

*Phone #:* 

*Fax #:* 

*State:* 

*Zip Code:* 

*Email:* 

Note: Email is needed for automated system notifications.

Agency **MUST** have at least 1 full-time officer to participate in the program. Indicate the number of compensated officers with arrest and apprehension authority. Part-time field **MUST** be filled in: N/A, 0 or - is acceptable.

*Full-time:* 

*Part-time:* 

**RTD Screeners** - **RTD Screeners must be employed by the aforementioned LEA. Individuals identified below may request access to act as an authorized "RTD Screener" on behalf of this Law Enforcement Agency. Agency **MUST** have at least 1 RTD Screener.**

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SECTION 2:

RESERVED FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY USE ONLY

Law Enforcement Agency/Activity - The LESO Program defines this as a governmental agency/activity whose primary function is the enforcement of applicable Federal, State, and Local laws and whose compensated Law Enforcement officers have the powers of arrest and apprehension.

I certify that my agency meets the definition of a "Law Enforcement Agency/Activity" as described above. I certify that all information contained in this application is valid and accurate. I understand that I must provide my State Coordinator an application to update my agency participant information if the following information changes: 1. Chief Law Enforcement Official (CLEO) changes. 2. Agency physical address changes or 3. RTD Screener additions/deletions.

*(Check one only): I am signing this document as the CLEO of this law enforcement agency.

In my official position or as Acting/Interim, I am authorized to sign documents on behalf of the CLEO for this agency. If checked, please provide current department policy or Memorandum that provides such signature authority to the individual holding that official position.

By signing this application, I certify that my Agency will comply with U.S. Code 2576a for all controlled property, which states: With the authorization of the relevant local governing body or authority, that my agency has adopted publicly available protocols for the appropriate use of controlled property, the supervision of such use, and the evaluation of the effectiveness of such use, including auditing and accountability policies; and that it provides annual training to relevant personnel on the maintenance, sustenance, and appropriate use of controlled property. I certify under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Making a false statement may result in judicial actions or prosecution under 18 USC § 1001.

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SECTION 3:

RESERVED FOR STATE COORDINATORS OFFICE USE ONLY

As the State Coordinator/State Point of Contact it has been determined that the agency meets the definition of a "Law Enforcement Agency/Activity" as described in section 2. I certify that all information contained in this application is valid and accurate.

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SECTION 4:

RESERVED FOR LESO USE ONLY

NOTICE FOR DLA DISPOSITION SERVICES PERSONNEL: Regulatory guidance outlining Screener identification and Authorization must be accomplished in accordance with DOD 4160.21-M, Volume 3, Enclosure 5, Section 8 (k). In accordance with the aforementioned reference, the LESO Program authorizes the individuals identified in Section 1 of this form to screen excess property at your facilities as authorized participants in the LESO Program. This authorized screener letter supersedes all previously issued screener letters for this Law Enforcement Agency/Activity and is valid only on or after the date signed by authorized LESO signatory. Only two individuals authorized to screen per visit; however, additional personnel may assist receiving material previously screened and approved for transfer.

*This agency is authorized to screen items via the LESO Program under authorized Agency DODAAC: ____________________________

*LESO Authorized Signatory: ____________________________

*SIGNATURE

*Screener letter is valid one year from this date:

Note: Once this screener letter has expired, agency can request a new screener letter (LESO AUTHORIZATION SCREENER LETTER, v.MARCH 2018) only through their SQ/IPDC.

LESO Notes: ____________________________
APPENDIX B

Justification Memorandum for Armored Vehicles
(TEMPLATE Justification Memorandum for Armored Vehicles)

(Must be placed on Law Enforcement Agency Letterhead)

To: LESO Program Manager
DLA Disposition Services Law Enforcement Support Office (LESO)
74 Washington Avenue North  Battle Creek, MI 49037

Subject: Armored Vehicle Justification (Please address all justification points in sequential order)

1. Please thoroughly explain the intended use and impact the resource will have upon your jurisdiction and/or neighboring jurisdiction support to other agencies (examples may include SWAT, active shooter, barricaded suspect, emergency response, first responder, critical incident, hostage rescue, natural disaster response, border security, homeland security, counter-drug, counter-terrorism).

2. Is the requesting agency located within an office of National Drug Control Policy designated High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA)?

3. Is the requesting agency involved by mutual agreement with multi-agency associations/task forces of a counter-drug/counter-terrorism/border security nature?

4. State the population within the requesting agencies jurisdiction and describe the geographical size of the area of responsibility.

5. Describe the type of facility that will be used to store and secure the resource.

6. Provide estimated usage/mission requirements for the requested armored vehicles.

7. If requesting a Tracked Armored Vehicle, provide additional justification for intended use. (justify the need for a tracked vehicle)

Chief Law Enforcement Official/Head of Local Federal Agency
(Supervisor/RAC/SAC):

________________________________________
(Print Name and Official)

________________________________________
(Signature and Date)

Version 1-16-2020
APPENDIX C

Madison Police Department Standard Operating Procedures

Armored Vehicle Use
Madison Police Department
Standard Operating Procedures
Armored Vehicle Use
(Effective October xx, 2014)

Armored Vehicle Operation

The MPD Armored Rescue Vehicle (ARV) will only be used in accordance with these procedures. Operation of the Vehicle must be in accordance with MPD policy at all times.

Deployment

The ARV is intended for use during critical incidents, planned and unplanned events within the community, and trainings. SWAT Commanders will approve the use of the ARV unless a critical incident or event is rapidly developing and waiting for such approval is impractical.

The ARV will only be driven by approved personnel who have received training in the vehicle’s operation. A second person (spotter) should also staff the vehicle when driven (unless an emergency situation makes it impractical to do so).

Approved Deployment situations

- An active critical incident within the City of Madison involving the use or potential use of firearms, where the use of the ARV will aid in stabilizing the situation. These requests should be directed to the OIC. On-duty approved drivers of the ARV that are closest to the current location of the vehicle shall respond and prepare the vehicle for deployment.

- An active or pre-planned incident involving MPD SWAT. These deployments shall be coordinated by MPD SWAT Command.

- A mutual aid request from another jurisdiction for an active critical incident. The decision to use the ARV shall be made by the OIC and communicated to SWAT Command as soon as practical. On-duty approved MPD drivers should be used to deploy the vehicle to the incident.

- A mutual aid request from another jurisdiction for a pre-planned event. These requests should be directed to MPD SWAT Command.

- Planned community events. Requests for use of the ARV at pre-planned, community events should be directed to MPD SWAT Command.

- Routine preventative maintenance and operation. A maintenance and operation schedule will be maintained on an annual basis by MPD SWAT Commanders to ensure this weekly maintenance and operation occurs.

Any use of the ARV (other than for maintenance/repair) should be approved by a SWAT commander (unless obtaining approval is impractical). The Chief and Assistant Chief of Operations will be notified promptly of any ARV use (other than for maintenance/repair).
APPENDIX D

City of Madison Police Department Standard Operating Procedure

Active Shooter/Killer Incidents
CITY OF MADISON POLICE DEPARTMENT
STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE

Active Shooter/Killer Incidents

Eff. Date 12/23/2019

Purpose

Establish standard procedure for MFD response to incidents involving active shooters/killers.

Policy

The objectives of this department in dealing with barricaded person, hostage, and active shooter/killer incidents are:
1. Preservation of life
2. Apprehension of perpetrator(s) using a reasonable amount of force
3. Securing available evidence to assist in the appropriate disposition of the perpetrator(s)

SAFETY PRIORITIES

The basis for operational and tactical decisions will be based on the following safety priorities:
1. Hostages and citizens
2. Law enforcement personnel
3. Suspects and subjects

In situations where ongoing deadly force is reasonably likely to be employed by a suspect—and delay in taking police action could result in injury or death—rapid intervention of officers at the scene is authorized and expected when such actions are deemed reasonable to prevent further injuries or loss of life.

Definitions

Active Shooting/Killing: An incident, normally in a confined and populated area, in which one or more armed persons have used, or are reasonably likely to use, deadly force in an ongoing manner, and where persons have been injured, killed, or are under imminent threat of death or serious bodily harm by such persons. This includes all situations where there is an active, ongoing deadly threat, to include those from firearms, explosives, knives, and other weapons.

Rapid Intervention: Immediate response by one or more officers to an active shooting based on a reasonable belief that failure to take action pending the arrival of additional officers would result in death or serious bodily injury.

Hot Zone: Physical location(s) under direct threat by a person(s) or other mechanism (improved explosive devices, etc.).

Warm Zone: Physical location not believed to be under direct threat but where there is potential for hazard. Cleared and occupied by law enforcement but not secured.

Cold Zone: Area outside the immediate warm zone.

Contact Team: The first officer(s) at the scene of an active shooting tasked with locating the suspect(s) and neutralizing the threat.

Rescue Team: An organized team of officers who make entry after the contact team to provide first aid and evacuate persons from a hostile environment. May include a mixture of law enforcement and fire/EMS elements operating in a warm zone environment to triage patients, provide medical care and coordinate casualty evacuation.
APPENDIX E

Justification Memorandum for Armored Vehicles
(TEMPLATE Justification Memorandum for Armored Vehicles)
(Must be placed on Law Enforcement Agency Letterhead)

To: LESO Program Manager
DLA Disposition Services Law Enforcement Support Office (LESO)
74 Washington Avenue North, Battle Creek, MI 49037

Subject: Armored Vehicle Justification (Please address all justification points in sequential order)

1. Please thoroughly explain the intended use and impact the resource will have upon your jurisdiction and/or neighboring jurisdiction support to other agencies (examples may include SWAT, active shooter, barricaded suspect, emergency response, first responder, critical incident, hostage rescue, natural disaster response, border security, homeland security, counter-drug, counter-terrorism).

2. Is the requesting agency located within an office of National Drug Control Policy designated High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA)?

3. Is the requesting agency involved by mutual agreement with multi-agency associations/task forces of a counter-drug/counter-terrorism/border security nature?

4. State the population within the requesting agencies jurisdiction and describe the geographical size of the area of responsibility.

5 Describe the type of facility that will be used to store and secure the resource.

6 Provide estimated usage/mission requirements for the requested armored vehicles.

7. If requesting a Tracked Armored Vehicle, provide additional justification for intended use. (justify the need for a tracked vehicle)

Chief Law Enforcement Official/Head of Local Federal Agency
(Supervisor/RAC/SAC):

(Print Name and Official)

Signature and Date)

Version 1-16-2020
APPENDIX F

1033 Program Questionnaire
Q1 Has your police agency participated in the 1033 program in the past two years?

- Yes (1)
- No (2)

Skip To: Q3 If Has your police agency participated in the 1033 program in the past two years? = No

Q2 What types of equipment has your department acquired in the past two years under the 1033 program? Select all that apply.

- Vehicle(s) (e.g. Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle (MRAP), armored trucks, etc.) (1)
- Weapon(s) (e.g. rifles, shotguns, pistols) (2)
- Weapon accessories (e.g. scopes, sights, magazines, etc.) (3)
- Tools (e.g. hand tools, generators, computer equipment, etc.) (4)
- Clothing (e.g. boots, jackets, gloves) (5)
- Medical Supplies (e.g. tourniquet, first aid kit, etc.) (6)
- Other (7)
- N/A (My department did not participate in the 1033 program in the past 2 years) (8)
Q3 My department is facing budgetary constraints (e.g., if revenues are less than expenditures)

- Strongly agree (1)
- Agree (2)
- Neither agree nor disagree (3)
- Disagree (4)
- Strongly disagree (5)

Q4 My department's budget allows us to purchase the equipment needed to do our jobs.

- Strongly agree (1)
- Agree (2)
- Neither agree nor disagree (3)
- Disagree (4)
- Strongly disagree (5)

Q5 The benefits (e.g., free equipment) of participating in the 1033 program exceed the costs (e.g. potential of being labeled "militarized") of participating in the 1033 program.

- Strongly agree (1)
- Agree (2)
- Neither agree nor disagree (3)
- Disagree (4)
- Strongly disagree (5)
Q6 The police officer profession is becoming increasingly dangerous.

- Strongly agree (1)
- Agree (2)
- Neither agree nor disagree (3)
- Disagree (4)
- Strongly disagree (5)

Q7 Police need to become more militarized to deal with current police problems.

- Strongly agree (1)
- Agree (2)
- Neither agree nor disagree (3)
- Disagree (4)
- Strongly disagree (5)

Q8 Making police policies available to the public helps create trust with the community.

- Strongly agree (1)
- Agree (2)
- Neither agree nor disagree (3)
- Disagree (4)
- Strongly disagree (5)

Q9 Police militarization is acceptable as long as there are policies and procedures in place to ensure the safety of the officers and the public.

- Strongly agree (1)
- Agree (2)
- Neither agree nor disagree (3)
- Disagree (4)
- Strongly disagree (5)
Q10 As the head of my organization, I am concerned with my officers appearing too militarized.

- Strongly agree (1)
- Agree (2)
- Neither agree nor disagree (3)
- Disagree (4)
- Strongly disagree (5)
- N/A (6)

Q11 Law enforcement in the United States is becoming militaristic.

- Strongly agree (1)
- Agree (2)
- Neither agree nor disagree (3)
- Disagree (4)
- Strongly disagree (5)

Q12 How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Strongly agree (1)</th>
<th>Agree (2)</th>
<th>Neither agree nor disagree (3)</th>
<th>Disagree (4)</th>
<th>Strongly disagree (5)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Citizens in my community have respect for our department.</td>
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<td>Citizens in my community are cooperative with our department</td>
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<td>(7)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Citizens in my community are satisfied with our department</td>
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<td>(8)</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q13 When my department seeks input from citizens, we typically host a town hall meeting where citizens can sit and listen as well as voice their concerns.

- Strongly agree (1)
- Agree (2)
- Neither agree nor disagree (3)
- Disagree (4)
- Strongly disagree (5)
Q14 My department uses social media to seek input from the community.

- Strongly agree (1)
- Agree (2)
- Neither agree nor disagree (3)
- Disagree (4)
- Strongly disagree (5)

Q15 My department uses social media to allow citizens to report problems in order to better understand problems within the community.

- Strongly agree (1)
- Agree (2)
- Neither agree nor disagree (3)
- Disagree (4)
- Strongly disagree (5)

Q16 Police departments should obtain citizen input before obtaining equipment from the 1033 program.

- Strongly agree (1)
- Agree (2)
- Neither agree nor disagree (3)
- Disagree (4)
- Strongly disagree (5)

Q17 My department engages with the community when creating or revising police policies.

- Strongly agree (1)
- Agree (2)
- Neither agree nor disagree (3)
- Disagree (4)
- Strongly disagree (5)

Q18 Allowing citizens in the community to help craft departmental policies is important in order to build trust.

- Strongly agree (1)
- Agree (2)
- Neither agree nor disagree (3)
- Disagree (4)
- Strongly disagree (5)
Q19 Police departments should include local governing boards (e.g., city commission, county board) in the decision to participate in the 1033 program.

- Strongly agree (1)
- Agree (2)
- Neither agree nor disagree (3)
- Disagree (4)
- Strongly disagree (5)

Q20 Police departments should include community members in the decision to participate in the 1033 program.

- Strongly agree (1)
- Agree (2)
- Neither agree nor disagree (3)
- Disagree (4)
- Strongly disagree (5)

Q21 Due to some of the threats (e.g., gun violence) that my department may face, programs like the 1033 program allow my department to be properly equipped to deal with them.

- Strongly agree (1)
- Agree (2)
- Neither agree nor disagree (3)
- Disagree (4)
- Strongly disagree (5)

Q22 How many Michigan Commission on Law Enforcement Standards (MCOLES) certified police officers are in your department?

- 0-10 officers (1)
- 11-20 officers (2)
- 21-30 officers (3)
- 31-40 officers (4)
- 41-50 officers (5)
- More than 50 officers (6)

Q23 What gender do you identify as?

- Male (1)
- Female (2)
- Other (3)
- Prefer not to answer (4)
Q24 Please specify your ethnicity.

- Caucasian (1)
- African American (2)
- Latino or Hispanic (3)
- Asian (4)
- Native American (5)
- Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander (6)
- Other/Unknown (7)
- Prefer not to say (8)

Q25 What is your age?

- Under 21 years old (1)
- 21-25 years old (2)
- 26-30 years old (3)
- 31-35 years old (4)
- 36-40 years old (5)
- 41-45 years old (6)
- 46-50 years old (7)
- 51-55 years old (8)
- 56-60 years old (9)
- 61-65 years old (10)
- Over 65 years old (11)
- Prefer not to say (12)

Q26 What is the highest degree or level of school you have completed? (If you are currently enrolled in school, what is the highest degree you have received to date?)

- High school graduate (1)
- Some college credit, no degree (2)
- Associate degree (3)
- Bachelor’s degree (4)
- Master’s degree (5)
- Professional degree (e.g. Juris Doctorate) (6)
- Doctorate degree (7)
Q27 Would you be willing to participate in a follow up interview via phone or video conference? If so, please include your email address. If not, please leave blank. Please click the last arrow at the bottom right corner to submit the survey.
APPENDIX G

Invitation for Participation in Research Project
You are invited to participate in this research project titled “Considerations for Acquiring Excess Military Equipment by Police Leaders”

STUDY SUMMARY: This consent form is part of an informed consent process for a research study and it will provide information that will help you decide whether you want to take part in this study. Participation in this study is completely voluntary. The purpose of the survey is to understand the reasons for participation in the 1033 program as well as opinions about police militarization by police leaders. This study will serve as Mike Mendenhall’s dissertation for the requirements of the Doctor of Philosophy in Public Administration. If you take part in the research, you will be asked to complete a 27-question online survey through Qualtrics. Your replies will be completely anonymous, so do not type your name anywhere in the survey. Your time in the study will take approximately 15 to 20 minutes to complete.

What are we trying to find out in this study?
There are two questions that we are looking to answer in this study. They are as follows.
   1.) What factors do police leaders consider when participating in the 1033 program?
   2.) What factors do police leaders consider when acquiring types of 1033 equipment (militarized versus non-militarized)?

Who can participate in this study?
The inclusionary criteria for participation in this study includes police leaders from the MSA, MACP or MACLEA.

Where will this study take place?
This study will take place online through a survey platform called Qualtrics. You may take this survey on a computer or smart phone.

What is the time commitment for participating in this study?
The overall time it will take to complete the survey from beginning to end will be approximately 20-25 minutes.

What will you be asked to do if you choose to participate in this study?
If you choose to participate in this study, you will be asked to complete a 27-question survey regarding participation in the 1033 program as well as thoughts on police militarization.

What information is being measured during the study?
The information being measured in this study are the reasons for deciding to participate in the 1033 program as well as the opinions about police militarization.
What are the risks of participating in this study and how will these risks be minimized?
There are no risks in participating in this study.

What are the benefits of participating in this study?
There is no benefit for participating in this study.

Are there any costs associated with participating in this study?
There are no costs associated with participating in this study.

Is there any compensation for participating in this study?
There is no compensation for participating in this study.

Who will have access to the information collected during this study?
The principal and student investigator will have access to the information collected during the study. The results will be used for the purposes of the student investigator’s dissertation. Your identity and the identity of your departments will be kept confidential.

What will happen to my information collected for this research project after the study is over?
The information collected about you for this research will not be used by or distributed to investigators for other research.

What if you want to stop participating in this study?
You can choose to stop participating in the study at any time and for any reason. You will not suffer any prejudice or penalty by your decision to stop your participation. You will experience NO consequences either professionally or personally if you choose to withdraw from this study.

The investigator can also decide to stop your participation in the study without your consent.

Should you have any questions prior to or during the study, you can contact the principal investigator Vincent Reitano at (732) 801-1777 or vincent.reitano@wmich.edu or the student investigator Mike Mendenhall at (231) 250-1143 or mendenm@ferris.edu. You may also contact the Chair, Institutional Review Board at 269-387-8293 or the Vice President for Research at 269-387-8298.

This study was approved by the Western Michigan University Institutional Review Board (WMU IRB) on 10/27/20. You may also contact the Chair, Institutional Review Board at 269-387-8293 or the Vice President for Research at 269-387-8298 if questions arise during the course of the study.

This consent document has been approved for use for one year by the Western Michigan University Institutional Review Board (WMU IRB) as indicated by the stamped date and signature of the board chair in the upper right corner. Do not participate in this study if the stamped date is older than one year.
I have read this informed consent document. The risks and benefits have been explained to me. I agree to take part in this study.

If you wish to participate in the study, please click on the following link, which will take you directly to the survey.

https://wmich.co1.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_3fyzdgmZgfuxSDP
APPENDIX H

Consent Form for Study Participants
Western Michigan University  
Public Affairs and Administration

Principal Investigator:  Dr. Vincent Reitano  
Student Investigator:  Michael Mendenhall  
Title of Study:  Considerations for Acquiring Excess Military Equipment by Police Leaders

You are invited to participate in this research project titled “Considerations for Acquiring Excess Military Equipment by Police Leaders.”

STUDY SUMMARY: This consent form is part of an informed consent process for a research study and it will provide information that will help you decide whether you want to take part in this study. Participation in this study is completely voluntary. The purpose of the study is to understand the reasons for participation in the 1033 program as well as opinions about police militarization by police leaders. This study will serve as Mike Mendenhall’s dissertation for the requirements of the Doctor of Philosophy in Public Administration. If you take part in the research, you will be asked a series of 6 questions. Your responses will be completely anonymous. Your time in the study will take approximately 30 minutes to complete.

Data collected from the interview will be stored confidentially and kept in Dr. Reitano’s office for three years. After three years, the notes collected during the interview will be destroyed.

Possible risk and costs to you for taking part in the study may be the time to complete the interview and potential benefits of taking part may be a better understanding as to why departments participate in the 1033 program and the process each department takes to acquire such equipment. Your alternative to taking part in the research study is not to take part in it.

The de-identified (anonymous) information collected for this research may be used by or distributed to investigators for other research without obtaining informed consent from you.

The following information in this consent form will provide more detail about the research study. Please ask any questions if you need more clarification and to assist you in deciding if you wish to participate in the research study. You are not giving up any of your legal rights by agreeing to take part in this research or by signing this consent form. After all of your questions have been answered and the consent document reviewed, if you decide to participate in this study, you will be asked to sign this consent form.

What are we trying to find out in this study?
There are two questions that we are looking to answer in this study. They are as follows.

1.) What factors do police leaders consider when participating in the 1033 program?
2.) What factors do police leaders consider when acquiring types of 1033 equipment (militarized versus non-militarized)?
Who can participate in this study?
The inclusionary criteria for participation in this study includes police leaders from the MSA, MACP or MACLEA who indicated on their survey that they wished to participate in a semi-structured interview.

Where will this study take place?
This study will take place via a phone interview or through WebEx, whichever is more convenient for you.

What is the time commitment for participating in this study?
The overall time it will take to complete the semi-structured interview from beginning to end will be approximately 30 minutes.

What will you be asked to do if you choose to participate in this study?
If you choose to participate in this study, the investigator will ask you a series of six questions about participation in the 1033 program as well as thoughts on police militarization.

What information is being measured during the study?
The information being measured in this study are the reasons for deciding to participate in the 1033 program as well as the opinions about police militarization.

What are the risks of participating in this study and how will these risks be minimized?
There are no risks in participating in this study.

What are the benefits of participating in this study?
There is no benefit for participating in this study.

Are there any costs associated with participating in this study?
There are no costs associated with participating in this study.

Is there any compensation for participating in this study?
There is no compensation for participating in this study.

Who will have access to the information collected during this study?
The principal and student investigator will have access to the information collected during the study. The results will be used for the purposes of the student investigator’s dissertation. Your identity will be kept confidential.

What will happen to my information or biospecimens collected for this research project after the study is over?
The information collected about you for this research will not be used by or distributed to investigators for other research.
What if you want to stop participating in this study?

You can choose to stop participating in the study at anytime for any reason. You will not suffer any prejudice or penalty by your decision to stop your participation. You will experience NO consequences either professionally or personally if you choose to withdraw from this study.

The investigator can also decide to stop your participation in the study without your consent.

Should you have any questions prior to or during the study, you can contact the principal investigator Vincent Rentano at (732) 801-1777 or vincent.rentano@wmich.edu or the student investigator Mike Mendenhall at (231) 250-1143 or mendenam@ferris.edu. You may also contact the Chair, Institutional Review Board at 269-387-8293 or the Vice President for Research at 269-387-8298.

This study was approved by the Western Michigan University Institutional Review Board (WMU IRB) on (approval date).
You may also contact the Chair, Institutional Review Board at 269-387-8293 or the Vice President for Research at 269-387-8298 if questions arise during the course of the study.

This consent document has been approved for use for one year by the Western Michigan University Institutional Review Board (WMU IRB) as indicated by the stamped date and signature of the board chair in the upper right corner. Do not participate in this study if the stamped date is older than one year.

I have read this informed consent document. The risks and benefits have been explained to me. I agree to take part in this study.

Please Print Your Name

__________________________________________
Participant’s signature

__________________________________________
Date
equipment which states in part that they will adopt “…publicly available protocols for the appropriate use of controlled equipment…including…accountability policies” (LESO, 2020, p. 2). Building upon the preceding discussion, the following research questions will be examined.

1.) What factors do police leaders consider when participating in the 1033 program?
2.) What factors do police leaders consider when acquiring types of 1033 equipment (militarized versus non-militarized)?

**Federal Funding**

This project is not federally funded.

**Subject Recruitment**

**Subject Recruitment for Survey**

1) There is a total of 588 separate police agencies in the state of Michigan and therefore, 588 police leaders will be recruited for this study.
2) The inclusionary criteria for subjects
   - 1) They are a police leader for a police department sheriff’s department or public safety department in the state of Michigan. The reasoning behind this is that the police leader for each organization has the final decision about whether they will or will not participate in the 1033 program.
3) The exclusionary criteria for subjects
   - 1) They are not a police leader for a police department, sheriff’s department or public safety department in the state of Michigan.
4) The MSA, MACP, and MACLEA executive directors will send their members an email with instructions that explain the survey, informed consent, and a link to complete the survey via Qualtrics
5) Potential subjects will be able to contact the investigator(s) to express interest in learning more about participating through cell phone and email, which will be included along with an explanation of the study.
6) The investigators will respond to any email or phone call from individuals expressing interest in the study by answering any questions they may have about the purpose or any other questions they may have.
7) There are no risks to survey participants.

**Subject Recruitment of Interview**

1) Respondents in the survey will be asked at the end if they wish to participate in a semi-structured interview. If they wish to, respondents will include their email at the end of the survey. If less than 233 responses are collected from the survey, the semi-structured interviews will take place.
2) A blanket email will be sent out to those wishing to participate in the semi-structured interview, thanking them for wishing to participate.
3) A PDF Consent form will be emailed to them so that they may sign and date it before a WebEx or phone interview takes place.
4) Participants will choose if they would prefer to be interviewed via phone or WebEx.
date the document before either a phone interview or WebEx interview (participant’s choosing).

There are no risks to interview participants.

**Methodology**

**Survey design**

The survey for this study is 27 questions long and will be administered through Qualtrics. After providing participants with informed consent, participants will be asked a series of demographic questions including gender, race/ethnicity, veteran status, and level of education. This information will be used to get a better understanding or correlates for level of support for militarization and the 1033 program. Each of the questions address one of the ten hypotheses for this dissertation. Also included are questions to determine beliefs and opinions on the concept of police militarization.

There is a total of 27 questions in the survey. 21 questions in the survey will consist of Likert scale responses (strongly agree to strongly disagree). Four questions are demographic questions asking respondents about their ethnicity, age, gender, and level of education. One question asks approximately how many certified officers are on their department. One question asks them if they would be willing to participate in a follow-up interview over the phone or video conference. One question asks about their participation in the 1033 program while another asks for the types of equipment they have obtained from the 1033 program if they participated.

**Interview Design**

The semi-structured interview is six questions long and will be administered through either WebEx or phone. Participants who choose to participate in the interview, which can be indicated in the last question of the survey, will be sent an email thanking them for their participation along with an informed consent document (PDF). Respondents will be able to indicate whether they want to participate or not on the form as well as be able to sign and date it.

Each of the six questions reflects one of the internal or external factors being used in this study (See appendix). The survey seeks to better understand the decision-making process behind whether police leaders choose to participate in the 1033 program as well as their opinions on police militarization. Responses from participants will be coded as part of either an external or internal factor. Statements from respondents will be coded to reflect an external factor (e.g., police legitimacy, civic engagement, etc.) or internal factor (budgetary considerations, policies, knowledge).
**Risks and Cost to and Protections for Subjects**

There are no known risks in this study to survey or interview participants.

**Adverse Events or Unexpected Problems**

In the event that there are less than 233 responses from the online survey, we will move into a case study approach. At the end of each survey, respondents will be asked if they would be willing to be interviewed in the future regarding their responses if asked. If less than 233 responses are obtained, then we will look at the respondents who answered “yes” to this question and seek them out for an interview. The script is attached below. Respondents who answered “yes” would be asked to conduct an interview either over the phone or via Zoom (whichever is most convenient to them). Respondents would be asked six questions reference the survey and not last longer than 30 minutes. Notes would be taken during the interview and would then be written up at a later time in the analysis. The responses given by respondents would be compared to the internal and external factors listed in the attached appendix for coding. The notes taken during the interview would be locked up in Vincent Reitano’s (the principal investigator) office for no longer than three years and then be destroyed.

**Benefits of Research**

Benefits of this research include a better understanding about why police leaders decide to participate in the 1033 program, which can help develop awareness for both police and citizens on the reasons for military equipment acquisition.

**Confidentiality of Data**

The survey will be anonymous.

Data from the survey will be extracted onto a password protected flash drive from Qualtrics and placed into Dr. Vincent Reitano’s office for three years and then destroyed. If not enough responses are collected from the survey, the notes from the interview will be stored and locked in Vincent Reitano’s office for no longer than three years and then be destroyed.

**Future Use of Information:**

Data from this study may be used in the future for journal articles. Any future research will not reveal the name or agency of any survey or interview respondents.

**Use only one of the 3 statements in quotations below:**

- “The information collected about participants for this research will not be used by or distributed to investigators for other research.”
APPENDIX I

IRB Approval Letter
Date: October 27, 2020

To: Vincent Reitano, Principal Investigator
Michael Mendenhall, Student Investigator for dissertation

From: Amy Naugle, Ph.D., Chair

Re: IRB Project Number 20-10-13

This letter will serve as confirmation that your research project titled “Considerations for Acquiring Excess Military Equipment by Police Leaders has been **approved** under the **expedited** category of review by the Western Michigan University Institutional Review Board (IRB). The conditions and duration of this approval are specified in the policies of Western Michigan University. You may now begin to implement the research as described in the application.

Please note: This research may **only** be conducted exactly in the form it was approved. You must seek specific board approval for any changes to this project (e.g., **add an investigator**, **increase number of subjects beyond the number stated in your application**, etc.). Failure to obtain approval for changes will result in a protocol deviation.

In addition, if there are any unanticipated adverse reactions or unanticipated events associated with the conduct of this research, you should immediately suspend the project and contact the Chair of the IRB for consultation.

The Board wishes you success in the pursuit of your research goals.

**A status report is required on or prior to (no more than 30 days) October 26, 2021 and each year thereafter until closing of the study.**

**When this study closes, submit the required Final Report found at https://wmich.edu/research/forms.**

**Note:** All research data must be kept in a secure location on the WMU campus for at least three (3) years after the study closes.
APPENDIX J

Semi-Structured Interview Protocol
Semi-structured Interview Protocol

Hi, my name is Mike Mendenhall, and I am a doctoral student at Western Michigan University in the Public Administration program. I am working towards completing my dissertation, which is a requirement to obtain a PhD. in the program. You recently completed an online survey through Qualtrics and indicated your willingness to speak with me regarding a follow up interview. First, I want to ask you if you are still willing to answer a few questions regarding 1033 program and the concept of police militarization.

- If “no,” ask if there would be a better date or time to conduct the interview or if they would prefer not to participate at all.
  - If they request a new date/time, thank them and tell them they will be contacted at that time.
  - If they do not want to answer any questions, thank them for their time.
- If they answer “yes,” continue

I have six questions I would like to ask you regarding the 1033 program and the concept of police militarization. You may stop answering at any time with no consequences to you. The benefit of this research is a better understanding about why police leaders decide to participate in the 1033 program, which can help awareness for both police and citizens on the reasons for military equipment acquisition.

I will be taking notes during this interview in order to re-read them later and analyze the responses later and compare them to notes I collect during other interviews. Your responses will be kept confidential and anonymous to anyone else. The notes will be kept and locked in my office for three years. After three years, the notes will be destroyed.
The first question I would like to ask you is what does the term “police militarization” mean to you?

**Probe:** Can equipment be considered militarized or non-militarized?

**Probe:** Are police in the United States becoming more militarized?

**Probe:** What is your overall assessment of police militarization?

The second question I would like to ask you is whether your department’s budget allows you to purchase the equipment needed to do your job?

**Probe:** Does your department have any budgetary constraints?

**Probe:** If the 1033 program wasn’t made available to civilian police departments, what would it mean for your department?

What are some of the reasons you believe that police departments acquire equipment through the 1033 program?

**Probe:** Does 1033 equipment make the police profession safer?

**Probe:** Does 1033 equipment make the community safer?

The fourth question I would like to ask you is do you believe making policies available to the public helps create trust within the community?

**Probe:** Does your department make policies available to the public?

**Probe:** Does your department include citizens in making and revising policies?
The fifth question I would like to ask you is if you believe police leaders should be concerned with their officers appearing too militaristic?

**Probe:** Do you think officers who use militarized equipment relative to those who don’t have an effect on the community?

**Probe:** Do you believe that any of the equipment provided through the 1033 program makes officers look militaristic?

The final question I would like to ask you is whether you believe police departments should seek the input of the community when they consider participating or continued participation in the 1033 program?

**Probe:** Do police departments need to do a better job explaining the role 1033 equipment plays in their department to the public?

**Probe:** Do you believe that allowing for more citizen participation in the decision acquire 1033 equipment as well as create and or re-shape policies would help build more trust?

That is all of the questions I have for you. I want to thank you again for all of you help and support in this research. If you have any questions or comments, please feel free to reach me on my cell phone at (231) 250-1143 or by email (mhs5689@wmich.edu). Thank you for your time.