The Importance of the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: A Study on Mali, The Democratic Republic of Congo, and South Sudan

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The Importance of the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations:
A Study on Mali, The Democratic Republic of Congo, and South Sudan

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

**ABSTRACT** ........................................................................................................................................... 3

**CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION** ................................................................................................................ 4

- Significance of Research ....................................................................................................................... 6
- Contributions to the Success of UN Missions ....................................................................................... 7
- Why Does Peacekeeping Fail? ............................................................................................................... 8
- Explanation of Case Selection .............................................................................................................. 9
- Research Process ................................................................................................................................ 11
- Organization of the Study .................................................................................................................... 11

**CHAPTER 2: A BACKGROUND ON PEACEKEEPING** .......................................................................... 13

- What is UN Peacekeeping? .................................................................................................................... 13
- Evolution of Peacekeeping .................................................................................................................... 15

**CHAPTER 3: UNITED NATIONS MULTIDIMENSIONAL INTEGRATED STABILIZATION MISSION IN MALI** ................................................................................................................................. 18

- Country Profile: Mali ............................................................................................................................. 18
- MINUSMA Background ......................................................................................................................... 19
- Why Was MINUSMA Deployed? .......................................................................................................... 23
- Current Accomplishments and Strengths of MINUSMA .................................................................. 23
- Failures and Challenges ....................................................................................................................... 24

**CHAPTER 4: THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION STABILIZATION MISSION IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO** ......................................................................................... 27

- Country Profile: The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) ....................................................... 27
- MONUSCO Background ......................................................................................................................... 28
- Why Was MONUSCO Deployed? ......................................................................................................... 30
- Current Accomplishments and Strengths of MONUSCO ................................................................. 31
- Failures and Challenges ....................................................................................................................... 32

**CHAPTER 5: UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN** ......................... 34

- Country Profile: South Sudan ............................................................................................................... 34
- UNMISS Background ............................................................................................................................. 36
- Why Was UNMISS Deployed? ............................................................................................................. 39
- Current Accomplishments and Strengths of UNMISS ................................................................... 40
- Failures and Challenges ....................................................................................................................... 41

**CHAPTER 6: FINDINGS/ANALYSIS** ..................................................................................................... 44

- Findings ................................................................................................................................................ 44
- Dimensions for Determining Effectiveness in MINUSMA ................................................................. 46
- Dimensions for Determining Effectiveness in MONUSCO ............................................................... 48
- Dimensions for Determining Effectiveness in UNMISS ................................................................. 50

**CHAPTER 7: FINAL REMARKS** ........................................................................................................... 53

**BIBLIOGRAPHY** ................................................................................................................................... 56
Abstract

This paper presents the history of UN peacekeeping and how it has evolved over time to create more effective solutions to peacebuilding while providing a comparison of the backgrounds of three different peacekeeping missions, the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), and the United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO), to demonstrate the importance of peacekeeping. Through critical research of peer reviewed sources and contextual information from reports provided by the United Nations and the Effectiveness of Peace Operations Network (EPON), this paper argues that despite rough criticism and rigid concerns of the United Nations peacekeeping operations, many peacekeeping missions are successful and influential on the future of the host country, though evaluations on a case-to-case basis are needed to determine how this success is defined. This paper further shows that the missions that are classified as a “failed mission” still show importance to the host country in one category or more. These UN missions that are labeled as a failure, failing to succeed in one or more aspects, still provide a net benefit to peace processes, aids in the protection of civilians, and assists to save lives while alleviating human suffering. Each case provided in this study displays reasons to consider the operation a success or a failure.
Chapter 1: Introduction

In the seventy years since the creation of the first UN peacekeeping mission in 1948, there have been several distinct phases that have modified the way each operation is conducted. This has led to the completion of over seventy different missions, all bearing different results. It is important to note that UN peacekeeping was created to help countries navigate the difficult path from conflict to peace and operates under three major principles that set the UN missions apart as a tool for maintaining international peace and security and not peace enforcement. These three principles are: the consent of the parties, impartiality, and the non-use of force (except in self-defense and defense of the mandate). In order for a mission to be successful, as defined by the United Nations Peacekeeping website, a commitment by the parties in conflict is needed, as their acceptance of the operation provides the UN with the necessary freedom of action, physical and political, to carry out its mandated tasks (“Principles of Peacekeeping”). Although the main parties have given their consent to the deployment of an operation, it does not imply that there will also be consent at the local level amongst civilians, causing barriers to its success. As the peacekeepers are in the process of completing a mission, impartiality is very crucial to maintaining the consent and cooperation of the main parties. As stated by the United Nations, “UN peacekeepers should be impartial in their dealings with the parties to the conflict, but not neutral in the execution of their mandate” (“Principles of Peacekeeping”). The final principal outlines that it is important to realize that UN peacekeeping operations are not an enforcement tool but, at the authorization of the Security Council, they may use force at the tactical level in self-defense and defense of the mandate. It is not to be confused with peace enforcement.

As the first phase of the peacekeeping operations (which lasted during the Cold War era of 1948-1988) came to an end, leaving room for the future phases to follow this as an outline, these
principles became somewhat of a malleable guideline for engagement, but the goals of the peacekeeping operations (PKOs) have remained the same: to protect and promote human rights, to assist in restoring the rule of law, and to assist in the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of former combatants. After the Cold War ended in 1989 the second phase began, lasting until 1998. During this phase, UN peacekeeping expanded in the amount and scope of operations, launching 34 new operations overtime and across the world with the increasing support and cooperation on behalf of the Security Council to build peace, security, and stability. However, in an attempt to push the development of the operations, a “liberal peace theory” became more common, which argued that “these societies [that are market-oriented in war torn states] would be more peaceful in their inter-state relations and less prone to internal violence” (Gledhill, Caplan., & Meiske, 2021, pg. 209). This was an issue because the PKOs were often mandated to ignore the potentially destabilizing effects of each country’s political and economic liberalization, causing more violence.

This began to change as the third phase, lasting from 1999-2009, came to fruition. The national security interests of powerful UN member states was highlighted, as well as the economic, political, and social development state interests of the fragile or ‘failed’ states. Human rights protection became written into most mandates during this phase as well, due to concerns of past PKOs infringing on these human rights. The fourth and final phase leads to the current time (2010 to present), where stabilization became an outline for each mandate, especially in the missions that began in Mali and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Although each phase maintained a focus on development activities, in the fourth phase the focus shifted towards stabilizing fragile and conflict-ridden countries as multi-dimensional peacekeeping was outlined.
Many people argue that most peacekeeping missions are successful because they accomplish each of the goals of their mandates along with the overall UN goals, at the same time that many people oppose by arguing that peacekeeping is ineffective and unimportant because the missions do not achieve their designed goals. Overall, it is very difficult to objectively evaluate the performance of PKOs, since a mission’s performance is not only affected by the ability to succeed at these goals, but also by the absence of an inclusive and comprehensive peace agreement, the lack of understanding of the peacekeeping mandate, lack of continued support from the UN Security Council, inadequate budgetary support, and more. I will be researching three cases of peacekeeping missions in Africa, the mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), the mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), and the mission in Mali (MINUSMA), to determine whether or not peacekeeping operations are important to the conflicting parties participating. Unless there is coherence between the goals of the mandates, strategies, structures, and program initiatives, a peacekeeping operation cannot be successful enough to make a lasting difference.

**Significance of Research**

In order to express the importance of PKOs, it is necessary to compare the overall success rate and background of different peacekeeping missions in conflicting developing countries. This research is necessary because peacekeeping rarely makes the news unless there is something going wrong. I find it important to research about the importance of UN Peacekeeping, especially in retrospect to each country because it is not always failing. Since peacekeeping has developed from four different phases with different focuses in each phase, it is important to understand the current phase in relevance with the current PKOs. This will provide insight as to why each mandate might
succeed or fail based on whether it is developed to adapt to the needs of the country, or it sticks to the principles of the UN and the mission’s mandate.

**Contributions to the Success of UN Missions**

Each peacekeeping mission is deployed in different contexts and operates under variable conditions that affect the operation’s capacity to influence conflict. Some are similar, but some are deployed for vastly different reasons, so there can be many different contributions to the general success of each mission. “… each military organization with its own ‘operational style’ or ‘culture’ interprets in distinct ways its own mandate, the surrounding context it is deployed into as well as its own ways to interact with other troops” (Ruffa, 2022, pg. 5). The UN defines factors required for a successful mission as: being guided by the three peacekeeping principles of consent, impartiality, and the non-use of force except in self-defense and defense of the mandate; being able to be accepted and perceived as credible and legitimate in the eyes of the local population; and being able to promote local and national ownership of the peace process in the host country (“Our Successes”).

Overall, effective missions are those responsible for decreasing the intensity of battle violence, protecting civilians, and containing conflict diffusion and recurrence in the postwar phase. When analyzing each different feature of the several missions, peacekeeping success is more common when large contingents are deployed under robust mandates (Salvatore & Ruggeri, 2017). Although some might label these missions as failures, the Effective Peace Operations Network’s (EPON) comprehensive reports on the three most criticized U.N. missions, MONUSCO in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, MINUSMA in Mali, and UNMISS in South Sudan, present evidence that U.N. peacekeeping had a positive effect on reducing levels of violence and providing some measure of protection to civilians (Long & Thomas-Jensen, 2021). For the purpose
of this research, the three countries Mali, South Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo were examined in respect to their country and how effective each peacekeeping operation was from dimensions gathered from studies by the EPON and directly stated from the Security Council on UN Peacekeeping. Each mission is considered successful under the following dimensions: protection and stabilization, international support, national and local ownership, peace and security, and an overall implementation of each designated mandate.

**Why Does Peacekeeping Fail?**

When considered factors that lead to the potential failure of a peacekeeping mission, there are two specific explanations that normally arises: there is no peace to be kept in the host country or it is on behalf of institutional shortcomings. Peacekeeping is seen as a non-violent conflict management and mitigation tool but should not be viewed as an immediate solution to a complex conflict with long-term underlying drivers (Long & Thomas-Jensen, 2021). For example, the peacekeeping mission in Rwanda is one of the operations that seemingly did not achieve the goals of its mandate nor the guidelines of the UN for each of their peacekeeping missions. The UN became actively involved in Rwanda when the Rwanda Genocide began at the hand of a race and culture war between the Hutu people and the Tutsi people. Both factors of potential failure were evident in this mission as they struggled to stop the genocide and their initial arrangement of ceasefire between the two was denied and UN personnel were attacked, showing there was no peace to maintain and, on the institutional side, there was a major absence of international aid leading to a scarcity of resources and reported misconduct of peacekeepers. Former Swedish Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson, who was a part of leading the peacekeepers, said in regard to the failure of The United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR): “Our conclusion is there is one overriding failure which explains why the UN could not stop or prevent the genocide, and that
is a lack of resources and a lack of will - a lack of will to take on the commitment necessary to prevent the genocide…” (Winfield, 1999).

**Explanation of Case Selection**

The purpose of this study is to express how beneficial peacekeeping operations are to developing countries, especially in times of conflict. By combining overall research of the origins of the United Nations peacekeeping operations with three specific missions, the mission in Mali (MINUSMA), the mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), and the mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), this study refines the criteria behind what makes a PKO successful and what could contribute to its failure, while explaining why it was needed in order to aid the country with peacekeeping. Since peacekeeping has evolved on a large-scale since its first mission in 1945, there have been many different opinions on the necessity of peacekeeping with most studies explaining how peacekeeping is more effective currently than it was in previous years. However, when analyzers consider the effectiveness of peacekeeping, it is important to remember how each mission is different and is deployed to solve different problems, so the effectiveness of peacekeeping should vary by case and should not be labelled as “unnecessary” based on just a few past missions.

The study of peacekeeping and its effectiveness was an engaging topic that I found an interest in while planning my post-undergraduate plans. Following graduating with my Bachelor’s, I had planned to join the Peace Corps, a smaller, grassroots-driven version of the UN Peacekeeping Operations, as a community development coordinator for any country they had openings for, with my original interest being in an African country. After my plans changed, I still found myself interested in the detailed service of humanitarian intervention and wanted to familiarize myself with the different global versions that are offered to conflicting countries in need. I have also found
through conversations with colleagues and acquaintances that, it is not common for people to be familiar with these types of humanitarian intervention and how beneficial it is to our global security, thus leading to my desire to broaden their understanding through my own studies.

Although there are currently 12 active peacekeeping operations led by the Department of Peace Operations, these three caught my interest for a few reasons. MINUSMA, the operation in Mali has been active since 2013 to support political processes in the country and to aid in the stabilization of the government system. Some of the top ten military contributors as of April of 2022 include Bangladesh, France, and Germany, which sparked my interest as I am a French minor. Mali was also a country of interest of mine with the Peace Corps and, until 2016, the operation was labeled relatively successful. However, I found it important to analyze what it meant to be “relatively successful” in the UN’s perspective and to explain how important it has been to the stabilization of the country.

MONUSCO, the operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo sparked my interest because this region is French speaking, and I have had previous class discussions about the long peacekeeping mission and the positive effects on the citizens. This mission was established in 2010, but it was a revised continuation of the original mission, MONUC, which was deployed in 1999 to help enforce a potential ceasefire between the Hutu and Tutsi after a rebellion broke out leading to the Rwandan Genocide. Due to the length and detailed revisions of this mission, I found it very intriguing to research how effective it was and how it was successful.

UNMISS, the operation in South Sudan, has been in and out of the news for the past 10 years as tensions waiver. At the time of the case selection, South Sudan was in a state of disarray with UNMISS in the light for not being a strong enough force to stop conflict from arising. This
sparked my interest and I found it important to dive into why it is not accomplishing its mandate goals and whether it still has had an impact on the citizens of the country.

**Research Process**

The impact of peacekeeping in developing countries has been thoroughly researched. Although some research findings outline the negative aspects of PKOs, a number of studies demonstrate a correlation between effectiveness and each country’s profile to explain why each PKO is succeeds at implementing the mandate for the operation, but not overall. The research provided in this case study brings together the work to authenticate all claims being made surrounding the UN peacekeeping operations and how they expressed importance. The Effective Peace Operations Network (EPON) and the United Nations informational sites assisted in gathering quantitative information to help form an analysis on the effectiveness of the peacekeeping missions MINUSMA, UNMISS, and MONUSCO. Additionally, peer reviewed studies and journals provided differing opinions on the importance of peacekeeping missions, making it easy to form a finalized result from the basis of these three missions.

**Organization of the Study**

This study organizes each topic of peacekeeping into six different sections to analyze the importance of the UN PKOs. The introduction chapter contains subsections which explain the reasoning behind this case study, a summary of the research completed, and a detailed explanation of what defines success in peacekeeping operations and what outlines a failure. In the second chapter, an overview of the origin of the UN Peacekeeping Operations is provided along with a summary on the three case selections: MINUSMA in Mali, MONUSCO in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and UNMISS, in South Sudan. The following chapters gives each
respective operation a section to discuss the background of the host country and the mission, the details of the mandate, and how it accomplished these goals under specific dimensions. The final chapter combines all research into an analysis section that explains the findings and discusses the answer for how important peacekeeping missions to these conflicting countries are and how does that effect the global necessity for peacekeeping, or humanitarian intervention as a whole.
Chapter 2: A Background on Peacekeeping

In order to assess the level of importance that the UN peacekeeping operations provide to conflicting nations, it is important to understand the framework and principles of UN peacekeeping. It is very common to confuse peacekeeping with peace enforcement, but these two terms are not the same. Peacekeeping involves different levels of maintaining security by peacebuilding with the consent of both parties, whereas peace enforcement involves the use of military resources to enforce peace against the will of the parties involved. Over the past 74 years that the peacekeeping operations have been active, not only has peacekeeping significantly evolved as an international crisis response tool, but it has also changed over time to shift the focus of each mandate in order to better aid the consenting parties.

What is UN Peacekeeping?

Peacekeeping is used as an instrument to provide aid to countries torn by conflict that will facilitate conditions for a lasting peace agreement. It was created at a time when Cold War rivalries posed frequent issues to the Security Council. The UN Peacekeeping website explains their mission by stating: “We have unique strengths, including legitimacy, burden sharing, and an ability to deploy troops and police from around the world, integrating them with civilian peacekeepers to address a range of mandates set by the UN Security Council and General Assembly” (Peacekeeping.un.org). The major goals of each operation vary based on the mandate for each case, however, the overall goal of each mission is not only to maintain peace and security, but to also help stabilize each political and economic system within the country. UN peacekeeping helps host countries to become more resilient to conflict, laying the groundwork to sustain long-term peace, including by addressing root causes of conflict. As stated by authors Barış Arı & Theodora-Ismene Gizelis in an extensive study that explores the fragmentation of civil societies and the
effectiveness of peacekeeping in these societies: “In the context of comprehensive peace agreements, UN involvement also increases overall accord implementation, which is likely to make an additional indirect contribution to the durability of peace. Regarding ongoing conflicts, the effectiveness of UN PKOs is contested, but numerous studies argue that they reduce conflict duration both at the national and local levels” (2020, pg. 622).

When a new peace operation is considered, there are multiple steps that must be followed before it can be deployed. First, the Security Council considers what the best response towards the increasing conflict would be. During these consultations, all relevant UN actors including the potential host government, member states (including the states that might contribute troops to police the operation), regional and other intergovernmental organizations, and other external partners are included to offer an assessment on the issue (“Forming a New Operation”, n.d.). Following this consultation is a technical field assessment to analyze, assess, and create a report based on the overall military, political, security, humanitarian, and human rights situation on the ground. From this report, options will be presented for the establishment of a peace operation and the size and resources needed. Next is the adoption of a resolution from the Security Council to outline out the operation’s mandate, size, and specific tasks that it will perform. During this step, a budget and list of resources is sent to the General Assembly for approval. The final steps involve appointing a Head of Mission, a peace operation’s Force Commander, Police Commissioner, and the senior civilian staff; creating a plan for the military aspect, operational and support aspect, and political aspect of the operation; and the final deployment, which typically happens as quickly as possible in order to take into account the security and political conditions current on the ground (“Forming a New Operation”, n.d.).
Although the UN Security Council makes all major decisions regarding the establishment of a PKO, the maintenance, expansion, and financing of the peacekeeping operation is the collective responsibility of the member states of the UN as they are legally obligated to pay their respective share towards the peacekeeping sector stated by Article 17 of the Charter of the United Nations. The nation with the highest contributions are the United States, China, and Japan as of 2021. The approved budget for the fiscal year beginning in July 2021 to June 2022 was around $6.38 billion to fund 10 out of the 12 current peacekeeping missions with the other two being funded through the UN’s regular budget (“How We are Funded”, n.d.). This budget represented an average decrease of 2% from the approved budget for 2020-2021. At the end of the financial cycle, the General Assembly approves and considers performance reports submitted by each operation to show the actual use of resources and that not used. From these reports, the next budget is considered.

**Evolution of Peacekeeping**

Since the establishment of the U.N. peacekeeping operations in 1945, there have been over 70 authorized peace missions that have been conducted. Peacekeeping began when the Security Council authorized the deployment of UN military members to observe conflict in the Middle East. This began the first unarmed peacekeeping missions, the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) and the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), which are still active to this day. These missions “exemplified the observation and monitoring type of operation and had authorized strengths in the low hundreds” (“Our History”, n.d.). In 1956, the first armed peacekeeping operation, the UN Emergency Force (UNEF I), was deployed to address the Suez Crisis. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, a cluster of short-term missions were established in the Dominican Republic, West New Guinea, and Yemen and a handful of longer-term
deployments were established in Cyprus and the Middle East. The Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to the UN peacekeepers in 1988 citing, “the Peacekeeping Forces through their efforts have made important contributions towards the realization of one of the fundamental tenets of the United Nations. Thus, the world organization has come to play a more central part in world affairs and has been invested with increasing trust” (“Our History”, n.d.).

After the end of the Cold War period in the 1990s, the number of countries contributing to the peace operations had increased from about 45 participating nations to around 120 and the number of peacekeepers itself had increased from 10,000 to almost 100,000 globally (Salvatore & Ruggeri, 2017). With some exceptions, early missions were mandated to pursue narrow security roles and had no development goals associated with them (Gledhill, Caplan, & Meiske, 2021, pg. 8). As the nature of conflicts began to change, the strategic context for peacekeeping dramatically changed as well. Throughout the Cold War, security was understood in state-centric terms as “the physical security of the state from external aggressors” (Gledhill, Caplan, & Meiske, 2021, pg. 203). However, with the reduction of Cold War tensions, this focus shifted from the stability of the states towards the safety of individuals within those states and outlining human security. This led to peacekeepers needing to undertake a wide variety of complex tasks from helping to build sustainable institutions of governance, to security sector reform and the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of former combatants to maintaining human security (“Our History”). A period of reassessment came for the Security Council as civilian casualties rose, and hostilities continued in areas where peacekeepers were deployed because of three high profile peacekeeping missions that were not successes due to ongoing armed turmoil. At the end of the 1990s, reform was needed to strengthen the capacity to effectively manage current and future missions. A variety of challenges arose, including challenges with delivering the expected outcome
on the largest, most expensive, and complex missions and challenges to design and execute viable transition strategies where a level of stability has already been attained ("Our History", n.d.), causing this phase of consolidation to bring a reconsideration of certain mandates. This idea was fortified when the reduction of troops in mission held in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the mission in the Central African Republic and Chad led to positive results.

In the present day and age, there is a little more than 110,000 military, police and civilian staff currently serving in 14 peacekeeping missions globally, which represents a decrease in personnel and peacekeeping missions that are active as a result of peaceful transitions and success in rebuilding the function of states ("Our History", n.d.). Out of the selected peacekeeping missions for this study, the operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, The United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), has been active for the longest and has evolved the most, as it originally was launched in 1960 as the UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC). This mission was the first large scale mission with around 20,000 military personnel being deployed. Although 250 UN personnel died while on this mission, ONUC demonstrated the clear risks of trying to bring stability to war ridden regions while establishing a newly developed mission in the region to meet the needs of the civilians and the Congolese government ("Our History", n.d.).
Chapter 3: United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali

Country Profile: Mali

Originally, the area that is now called Mali was previously part of the three precolonial Sudanic empires: Ghana, Mali, and Songhai. A flat and monotonous country landlocked in west Africa, Mali is one of the largest countries in Africa but, as explained in an EPON report on the UN peacekeeping operation in Mali, “Mali is one of the poorest countries in the world, and relative to the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa, it faces huge development challenges, ranking 182 out of 189 on the 2018 Human Development Index” (Van der Lijn, 2019, pg. 25). With a relatively small population of 21 million people, mainly centered along the Niger River (Imperato, P., Baker, K., and Clark, A., 2021), the population is made up of many ethnic groups. However, more than 50% of the population identifies with the Mande group (a makeup of Bambara, Malinke, and Soninke) and the other 50% is a combination of percentages from the Peul, Voltaic, Songhai, and Tuareg and Moor groups (“Mali Facts & Culture,” n.d.). French is the official language spoke in this nation while Bambara is 80% spoken along with numerous other African languages. Although a majority of the population already identify as Muslim, Mali’s constitution prohibits religious discrimination and grants individuals the freedom of religion in conformity with the law. Therefore, it is important to note that Sunni Islam is accompanied by Christianity in the country, with only about 3% of the population practicing as Christians (Imperato, P., Baker, K., and Clark, A., 2021).

The most notable towns in Mali are spread along the Niger river, which travels through the interior of the country, and functions as the main trading and transport avenues. Towns along the Niger include Bamako and Tombouctou. Bamako, the nation’s capital along the southwest part of
the river, is known to be a busy city with a large market serving a majority of Mali’s industrial enterprises. Tombouctou, also known as Timbuktu, is very relevant in African history as a major trading post on the trans-Saharan caravan route and a center for Islamic culture through the 15th to middle of the 17th century (Imperato, P., Baker, K., and Clark, A., 2021). In 1958 the territory became an autonomous state within the French community and was known as the Sudanese Republic. The next year a congress of the Union Soudanaise–Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (US–RDA) proclaimed the area as the independent country of the Republic of Mali (Imperato, P., Baker, K., and Clark, A., 2021). This began a time of internal crises as a result of ethnic conflicts, civil and political violence, and religious conflicts.

**MINUSMA Background**

In 2012, dissatisfaction with the government’s handling of past conflicts in the north arose from Tuareg rebels. “The separatists accuse the central government in Bamako of neglecting the populations living in the northern territories and ignoring their need for economic development and political representation” (Gauthier Vela, 2021, pg. 846). This dissatisfaction quickly turned into a fourth military coup led by Tuareg rebels and Islamic insurgents, also known as jihadists. Soon the group seized power in Mali and suspended the constitution and, consequently, the international community began to criticize the coup leading to the suspension of Mali. This resulted in sanctions being imposed, forcing food and energy shortages onto the citizens of Mali (Imperato, P., Baker, K., and Clark, A., 2021). As the international community discussed ways to keep this growing conflict at bay, the rebels and insurgents continued to take advantage of the political instability, taking over the northern half of the country.

In December of 2012, representatives from the Malian government met with officials of the MNLA, the Mouvement National pour la Libération de l’Azawad, which was the declared
name for the Tuareg rebel groups, and ECOWAS (the Economic Community of West African States), in order to discuss an end to this crisis. As the insurgents started towards the nation’s capital Bamako, the Malian government called upon French forces to intervene militarily, so the French Operation Serval accompanied by a Chadian contingent from the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) intervened to neutralize and disperse the Islamist insurgents from the major cities (Van der Lijn, 2019, pg. 24). Not too long after the French support began in January of 2013, state authority had all but collapsed in the North and Central parts of Mali and political negotiations commenced. Both groups agreed to respect national unity and human rights and to observe a ceasefire, leading to the passing of Resolution 2100 authorizing the UN Security Council to deploy peacekeepers to Mali (Imperato, P., Baker, K., and Clark, A., 2021). The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (Mission multi dimensionnelle intégrée des Nations unies pour la stabilisation au Mali), MINUSMA, was deployed in April 2013 and now, with about 17,600 total personnel involved in the country, is known as one of the deadliest missions due to the large number of fatalities suffered; as of April of 2022, 275 total personnel have suffered fatalities (Gauthier, 846).

In the initial creation of the mandate under resolution 2100, the United Nations explains how in the first few points of the mandate, “… the Council authorized MINUSMA to use all necessary means, in support of the transitional authorities of Mali, to stabilize key population centers, especially in the north, deter threats and take active steps to prevent the return of armed elements to those areas” (S/RES/2100, 2013, pg. 27). The mandate then lists a few additional focuses for the mission such as the protection of civilians and United Nations personnel, the promotion and protection of human rights, the support for humanitarian assistance, the support for cultural preservation and, finally, the support for national and international justice (S/RES/2100,
MINUSMA began to act side by side with the previous French intervention, Operation Serval, and made clear distinctions between what the two would accomplish. “Operation Serval will undertake peace-enforcement activities, while MINUSMA will ‘deter threats and take active steps to prevent the return of armed elements to those areas’ – in practice such lines quickly fade and problems arise” (Bergamaschi, 2013, pg. 2). Fast forward to the present day and MINUSMA was approved for an extension of an additional year beginning on June 29th, 2021 to remain until June 30, 2022 before it would require extension again. By adopting Resolution 2584 under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the main strategic priority of supporting the implementation of the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, is continued with heavy support. The basics of the new mandate, authorizing MINUSMA to use all necessary means (within the limits of its capacities and areas of deployment) to carry out its priority tasks are as follows:

“Support for the implementation by the government, the Platform, and the CMA, as well as other Malian stakeholders, of the Peace Agreement, in particular its main political and security provisions.

Support for the implementation of the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali…

Support the stabilization and restoration of State authority in the Centre; including supporting the Malian authorities to reduce violence and inter-community tensions using its good offices…

Protection, without prejudice to the primary responsibility of the Malian authorities, of civilians under imminent threat of physical violence and specific protection of women and children affected by armed conflict…
Good offices, confidence-building, and encouragement measures at national and local levels, in order to support dialogue with and between all stakeholders towards reconciliation and social cohesion and to support efforts aimed at reducing inter-community tensions…

Assistance to the Malian authorities in their efforts to promote and protect human rights, in particular in the areas of justice and reconciliation…

In support of the Malian authorities, by contributing to the creation of a safe environment for the delivery of civilian-led humanitarian aid, in accordance with humanitarian principles…

And Protecting UN personnel, including uniformed personnel (UN military and police), facilities and equipment and ensuring the safety, security, and freedom of movement of UN and associated personnel” (S/RES/2584, 2021, pg. 8-11).

After a meeting between the United Nations and the African Union (AU) to discuss certain aspects of the current standing peace and reconciliation agreement in Mali, a joint statement was issued which made it clear that MINUSMA was expected to be extended for another year. “The Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission commend the parties for their renewed commitment to peace and reconciliation…In that regard, they look forward to a forthcoming meeting of the Monitoring Committee on the implementation of the peace agreement” (“Security Council Renews…”, 2022). On June 29th, 2022, the Security Council adopted Resolution 2640 to continue MINUSMA, taking it through the end of 2022 to June 2023 (“Security Council Renews”, 2022).
**Why Was MINUSMA Deployed?**

As stated by the mandate, the main goal of the mission was to support the implementation of a peace agreement between the Malian parties and other relevant Malian actors and show support for the 2015 peace agreement. Although the written mandate makes a focus on national insecurity, “the mission is situated in a context of transnational threat – organized crime and jihadism” (Gauthier Vela, 2021, pg. 830). A large question hovered over the international actors who were discussing the means of humanitarian aid, on whether there is even a peace to maintain in Mali and if a peacekeeping mission would therefore be beneficial. However, in 2013 when the Security Council was called upon to look into the Mali case and send UN peacekeepers, they made the decision to deploy the mission because the parties in Mali and the international community agreed that the situation between the Tuareg rebels and Malian authorities had become beyond their ability to resolve alone. Instead of focusing solely on maintaining peace, MINUSMA became one of the UN’s handful of missions that focused more on stabilization than other areas of concern.

**Current Accomplishments and Strengths of MINUSMA**

“MINUSMA’s extension is crucial, as it provides the Malian authorities a chance to work with the Mission and other partners towards a political transition” (“Security Council Renews…”, 2022). MINUSMA is a multidimensional mission with a stabilization and civilian protection mandate, and, in the current age of peacekeeping, this has become almost a standard mission framework; it is also one of the most diverse peacekeeping missions ever deployed. Right off the bat, it is easy to determine whether MINUSMA has been helpful in Mali since it has been renewed for multiple years following its deployment in 2013. However, the question stands with how it has been constructive. Unlike some contemporary peacekeeping missions, MINUSMA has a significant and diverse intelligence unit, AFISU or the All-Sources Information Fusion Unit, that
is tasked to “contribute especially to traditionally non-military intelligence analysis, such as illegal trafficking and narcotics-trade; ethnic dynamics and tribal tensions; corruption and bad governance within Mali and MINUSMA area of interest” (Ruffa & Rietjens, 2022, pg. 10). This aspect of the mission provides a major sector for praise since the intelligence unit has helped aid the mission with peace building. Additionally, the protection of civilians and stabilization aspects of the mandate for this mission proved exceptional in the division of handling asymmetric threats and preventing the return of armed conflict in those areas (Van der Lijn, 2019, pg. 67). The presence of peacekeepers provided by MINUSMA has prevented a relapse into conflict in the northern half of the country. The mandate also outlined a desire for the mission to support the country’s elections and peace process during the 2013 and the 2018 elections and after succeeding, was praised for these efforts of overseeing the elections. MINUSMA then successfully deescalated tensions by preventing the Malian security forces from engaging in violent behavior towards citizens, especially when breaking up protests and demonstrations (Van der Lijn, 2019, pg. 71).

**Failures and Challenges**

At the initial drafting of the mandate, the African regional organizations and the UN disagreed over the wording of the resolution and how robust it came across, as well as with its role in counter-terrorism. As stated by researchers from the Peace Research Institute Oslo, missions with more robust mandates are more complex and require larger budgets (Hegre, Hultman, & Nygård, 2018, pg. 8). Counter-terror operations seek to eliminate the terrorist threat through military tactics against terrorist cells. When an operation leans too much into counter-terrorism, it can produce counterproductive results with regards to civic participation (O’Halloran, 2018, pg. 39). This was a major concern for the future of MINUSMA. Countries like Argentina, Guatemala, Pakistan, and Russia pushed for a reaffirmation of the basic principles of peacekeeping in the
mandate and sought to limit the robustness of MINUSMA although observers argued that by limiting the robustness, these countries were exploring an avenue to diminish the use of force by UN operations (Van der Lijn, 2019, pg. 52). At deployment, MINUSMA began to exhibit signs of weakness on many fronts, including the resource front. Foreign actors like China, Bangladesh, Honduras, Sweden, Norway, Burundi, and Mauritania had agreed to send troops, but the lack of troops persisted as they did not follow through. This put the mission out of 6,000 troops that could have aided with facilitating a peace process. In addition to a lack of troops, the mission had only four aircraft carriers, leaving a need for helicopters, engineers, transport aircraft, etc. Without appropriate means to transport troops and equipment, engineering personnel and equipment, and appropriate air assets, MINUSMA began its mission lacking sufficient resources (Bergamaschi, 2013, pg. 2). “Major General Jean Bosco Kazura, MINUSMA’s Force Commander, stated that ‘MINUSMA is in a terrorist-fighting situation without an anti-terrorist mandate or adequate training, equipment, logistics or intelligence to deal with such a situation’” (Van der Lijn, 2019, pg. 56).

Although the mandate for this mission was drafted with the intention of stabilizing the situation in Mali, in order to help the government transition to peace instead of conflict, MINUSMA has been criticized by members of the international community and within the Malian government because the peacekeepers were focusing too much on the implementation of the peace agreement in the North and protecting its own personnel instead of concerning over the protection of civilians, as it also mentions (Van der Lijn, 2019, pg. 72). Peacekeepers deployed in Mali have spoken in regard to the danger in the nation and how being connected to MINUSMA puts a dagger to their back, especially civilian peacekeepers, as they are trying to build peace in an area where there was little peace to be kept. “‘They [the civilians in the mission] are targeted more often than
soldiers are because those who target them know that they don’t have the same training or experience or equipment. So, they become an easier thing to go after’” (Gauthier Vela, 2021, pg. 856). Following the renewal of MINUSMA on June 29th, 2022, breaking news involving the mobilization of MINUSMA was aired on July 14th, 2022. The Malian government requested a suspension of all new rotations of the UN mission due to issues with national security, as 49 soldiers from the Ivory Coast are arrested with intent to topple the military led government. “Mali will from Thursday suspend all new rotations of the United Nations’ MINUSMA peacekeeping mission, including those already scheduled, for “national security” reasons, the foreign ministry said” (News Wires, 2022).
Chapter 4: The United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Country Profile: The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)

The Democratic Republic of the Congo is the second largest country in Africa, with a population of about 95 million civilians (Worldometer, 2022). In 1960 the DRC gained independence from Belgium and adopted the name “the Republic of Zaire.” The original name of what is now the Congo river, was initially the Zaire river. Following the overthrow of the then ruler, General Mobutu Sese Seko in 1971, the name “the Democratic Republic of the Congo” was reinstated, since it was felt that this name more closely represented the African roots of the Kongo people who lived in a kingdom near the Congo river during the colonial period (Cordell, 2022). Soon after the change in power, the Congo was thrown into a devastating civil war that lasted until 2003, with tensions still remaining in the eastern part of the country. Although violence due to political instability was at the root for the ongoing conflict, “the war’s central cause was a desire for possession over the DRC’s mineral wealth, water and food which gravely dented its infrastructure” (Sasidharan & Dhillon, 2021).

The constitution for the country prohibits religious discrimination, providing freedom of religion and the right to worship to all; however, about 95% of the population sticks with one religion and identifies as Christian, while the remainder are made up of small communities of Hindus, Jews, Buddhists, Muslims, and Baha’is (U.S. Department of State: Office of International Religious Freedom, 2020). The country’s official language is French, with some people still speaking languages like Lingala, Swahili, Kongo, and Tshiluba. The ethnic composition of the population is very vast, as more than 200 African ethnic groups live in the Congo with the majority being Bantu (Cordell, 2022). Poverty is very common among the population. It was estimated in
2018 that about 73% of the Congolese population (about 60 million people) lived on less than $1.90 per day, which is the international poverty rate (Sasidharan & Dhillon, 2021). This large country is located in central Africa, with a 25-mile coastline on the Atlantic Ocean and is considered to be the second largest country on the continent. The capital city, Kinshasa, serves as the country’s official administrative, economic, and cultural center and it is the largest city in central Africa (Cordell, 2022). Not only does the Congo River flow through the country, draining a large basin that sits mostly in the republic, but the DRC is also very rich in natural resources, such as industrial diamonds, cobalt, and copper, and possesses half of the hydroelectric potential of the continent.

**MONUSCO Background**

The Democratic Republic of the Congo is not unfamiliar to peacekeepers being present in their nation. Originally, following the establishment of a new government system and the Rwandan genocide in 1994, a rebellion began in the neighboring Kivu regions of eastern DRC. With aid from Rwanda and Uganda, the capital city, Kinshasa, was overtaken in 1997. Larger areas of the country began to flood with conflict as more rebellions began to pop up, leading to the first Congo War, or Africa’s First World War. This civil war and international military conflict caused the UN Security Council to soon initiate a call for a ceasefire and the withdrawal of foreign forces from the DRC. Following the signing of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement in July of 1999 between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and five regional states including Rwanda and Uganda, the Security Council established the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) with resolution 1279 of November 30, 1999 (“MONUC Background”, n.d.). Resolution 1279 stated that the mandate for MONUC planned for the observation of a ceasefire, maintenance of a liaison with all parties to the ceasefire agreement, and the
disengagement of forces. Later was added the supervision of the implementation of the ceasefire and tasks in different sectors including in areas often associated with development such as agriculture, communications, education, finance, foreign trade, health, labor, ‘magistrature’, natural resources, and public administration (S/RES/1279, 1999). On July 30, 2006 the country held its first free and fair elections and, with the oversight of the UN mission, successfully elected President Joseph Kabila in what was one of the most complex votes the UN had ever helped organize (“MONUC Background”, n.d.). “Originated with a request from the Congolese government for military assistance to facilitate the withdrawal of Belgian troops and other foreign military personnel, evolved into a wider operation after the internal situation deteriorated” (Gledhill, Caplan., & Meiske, 2021, pg. 4). This was MONUSCO, the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (in French is Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en République démocratique du Congo).

In accordance with the Security Council resolution 1925 of May 28th, 2010, MONUSCO was deployed on July 1st, 2010. Similar to its predecessor, MONUC, this mission was authorized to “use all necessary means to ‘ensure the effective protection of civilians, including humanitarian personnel and human rights defenders’” (Spijkers, 2015, pg. 98), but it was a scaled down version of MONUC with fewer troops and resources. The current mission also had a so-called “force invention brigade (FIB)” given by the Security Council in response to the massacre that occurred in November of 2012 when rebel groups took the capital of the eastern Congo and Goma. The FIB was seen as a major step in the evolution towards more robust peacekeeping, as the Council made sure to carefully draft the principles of the FIB to make sure they aligned with those of peacekeeping. Not only is the Council authorized to carry out targeted offensive operations and prevent the expansion of all armed groups, but the mandate of MONUSCO with the FIB states:
[MONUSCO shall] on an exceptional basis and without creating a precedent or any prejudice to the agreed principles of peacekeeping, include an ‘Intervention Brigade’ […] with the responsibility of neutralizing armed groups […] and the objective of contributing to reducing the threat posed by armed groups to State authority and civilian security in eastern DRC and to make space for stabilization activities (Spijkers, 2015, pg. 100).

This force intervention brigade separated MONUSCO from other contemporary multidimensional missions that use robust postures because this mission strayed into the territory of peace enforcement to neutralize armed groups. In regard to the difference between MONUSCO and other missions, researcher Jenna Russo states, “In this sense, it goes beyond robustness, which utilizes force exclusively at the tactical level to manage spoilers” (2021, pg. 3073). According to the United Nations official website, MONUSCO is still currently active under resolution 2612, with about 13,500 military personnel, 660 military observers, 591 police and 1,050 police units until December 2022 when they will need to adopt a new resolution calling for its renewal (SC/14743, 2021).

**Why Was MONUSCO Deployed?**

After decades of conflict and political unrest in 1999, 30 years after the nation gained independence from Belgium, the Security Council was called on to approve the deployment of peacekeepers to the Democratic Republic of the Congo. This also followed the second African World War, or the second Congo War, which had resulted in the death of over five million people from nine different countries (Das, n.d. pg. 2). In 2010 the UN decided to make the mission more robust by investing the newer mandate with a peace enforcement mandate, which MONUSCO carried. The newer mission, MONUSCO, was amended to carry on in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo instead of MONUC, which was more of a peace building effort instead of enforcement, as a result of a recurrence of violent conflict in North and South Kivu (“Background Info”, n.d.). MONUC was deployed to observe the current ceasefire between the DRC and five regional states and observe the disengagement of forces while maintaining liaison with all parties. In comparison, MONUSCO was created to strengthen the effects of MONUC by creating a force intervention brigade to use all necessary means to carry out its mandate relating tasks like the protection of civilians, defending humanitarian personnel and human rights under imminent threat of physical violence, and supporting the Congolese Government in its peace consolidation and stabilization efforts (“Background Info”, n.d.).

**Current Accomplishments and Strengths of MONUSCO**

The first success of MONUSCO is detailed around the elections in 2006 and the UN’s ability to prevent violence between Bemba and Kabila supporters in Kinshasa after the election results were announced. “Numerous interlocutors considered that the 2006 elections would not have been held without the UN’s logistical support and expert guidance to the Congolese’s Independent Electoral Commission (CENI)” (Novosseloff, 2019, pg. 73). MONUSCO strongly supported the advancement of the Congolese political process so that the nation was able to hold their first free and fair elections without turmoil. The mission has also succeeded in playing a preventative role in halting local violence through a number of different initiatives led by the Civil Affairs sections of the mission.

Within the civilian population, MONUSCO has had a major impact on Congolese media and played a major role in broadening access to independent information, which was seen as a positive influence provided by the mission. Not only did MONUSCO train journalists, but the mission also aided in increasing the investigatory capacity of many Congolese, and helped
democratize the media environment (Novosseloff, 2019, pg. 105). Overall, many Congolese civilians and members of the international community have still expressed frustration and discontent with the results of MONUSCO, viewing the mission as imperfect, but still necessary for the protection of civilians in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

**Failures and Challenges**

Overall, MONUSCO has seen more challenges than it has achievements. MONUSCO has shown that if a large-scale electoral violence spreads to any of the major cities, the peacekeeping force would not be able to address the violence, proving that there are major limits with the mandate. The mission did not have the correct mandate, political support, resources, size, mandate, etc., to prevent all conflicts or to protect the entire population. “MONUSCO troops are spread thin across the entire country, with less than 1,000 UN Peacekeepers deployed to the capital of Kinshasa, which has a population of 9.5 million people. The mission does not have the capacity to address large-scale violence, especially if it extends to urban areas” (Das, n.d.).

Additionally, there are a number of drawbacks that occur when a peacekeeping mission pursues militarized approaches. Crossing the line from peacekeeping and peace building to peace enforcement and having peacekeepers become parties to conflict, undermines the principle of impartiality, which states that “UN peacekeepers should be impartial in their dealings with the parties to the conflict, but not neutral in the execution of their mandate” (Russo, 2021, pg. 3074). Not only does this have negative political consequences for the peacekeepers, as it disrupts relationships between members of armed groups, troops and police contributing countries, because it appears that the UN has taken sides, but it also has negative implications for humanitarian workers whose work depends on the perception of impartiality. On top of this point, a focus on military operations draws attention and resources away from other important activities, like the
protection of civilians. MONUSCO already had a lack of resources, since the international actors involved in the creation of the mandate were not willing to put their national or strategic weight into solving the instability in the country. “One European diplomat even qualified MONUSCO as an “orphan mission” as it has no real supporter within the Council” (Novosseloff, 2019, pg. 100).
Chapter 5: United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan

Country Profile: South Sudan

South Sudan, a country landlocked in the northeastern part of Africa, is one of the richest agricultural states in Africa with highly fertile soils and an abundance of natural resources (Sabr et al., 2019). There are two contrasting upland areas: the Ironstone Plateau, lying between the Nile-Congo watershed and the clay plain Al-Sudd, and the Imatong Mountains, containing Mount Kinyeti, the highest point in South Sudan along the Ugandan border. Being home to over 60 different major ethnic groups, with a majority of its people following traditional religions and Christianity, this state is one of the most diverse countries in Africa (“South Sudan Country Profile”, n.d.). South Sudan is bordered by Sudan in the north; Ethiopia on the east side; Kenya, Uganda, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the south; and the Central African Republic to the west. Each of the ethnic groups have settled in different parts of the country as time progressed. The largest ethnic group in South Sudan is the Dinka, who constitute about two-fifths of the population, followed by the Nuer that constitute about one-fifth of the population. The remainder of the population is made up of other groups like the Zande, the Bari, the Shilluk, the Anywa, and a very small Arab population (Sabr et al., 2019). The Dinka, mostly cattle herders, can be found throughout most of the country, while the Shilluk and Anywa are mainly concentrated in the east with small groups being found in other parts of South Sudan. In the center-northeast of the country, the Nuer are settled. The Zande live in the southwest, along the border of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, along with the Bari who are also found in the south, but closer to the Ugandan border (Sabr et al., 2019).

With a population of about 13 million people, South Sudan remains in a constant severe humanitarian crisis. About two-thirds of the population are estimated to be in need of humanitarian
assistance, an increase since 2021 (“The World Bank in South Sudan”, 2022). In July of 2011 the nation gained independence from its origin country to the north, Sudan. Since independence, South Sudan has struggled to establish a viable governing system and has been ridden with widespread corruption, political conflict, and violence that has persisted for centuries. The road to sovereignty began in 1956 when Sudan declared independence from the British rule, causing distraught feelings from the south that made it difficult for numerous governments to win general acceptance for the country’s diverse political constituencies (Sabr et al., 2019).

An early conflict following Sudan’s independence arose between northern leaders who aimed to impose a vigorous extension of Islamic law and culture to all parts of the country. Those who opposed this policy, a majority of the southern population, were already “up in arms over fears that the south would be further marginalized by the northern-based government,” leading to a drawn-out civil war lasting from 1956 to 1972 (Sabr et al., 2019). The Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972 brought an end to the civil war, but served only as a temporary solution as a second civil war broke out in 1983 to 2005 when the Sudanese government canceled the autonomy arrangements (“South Sudan Country Profile”, n.d.). Through multiple discussions, cease-fires, and agreements between southern leaders and their northern counterparts, it wasn’t until the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that the second civil war ended. This agreement also produced an outline of new measures to “share power, distribute wealth, and provide security in Sudan” (Sabr et al., 2019) while granting southern Sudan semiautonomous status and calling for a referendum on independence for the region. After a few setbacks, South Sudan became independent from Sudan in 2011 with head of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), Salva Kiir Mayardit, becoming the president of the new state as a result of a re-election in multiparty polls (“South Sudan Country Profile”, n.d.). One major result of South Sudan’s
independence was the end of the 22-year-long civil war. This drawn-out conflict had resulted in the displacement of over four million people, including the 20,000 “Lost Boys of Sudan” who fled from Sudan to Ethiopia in the midst of the civil war to escape death or induction into the northern army (“The Lost Boys of Sudan”, 2014). Unfortunately, independence did not provide a lasting peace, as war broke back out again in 2013, forcing an additional 2.2 million refugees to flee their homes (“History of South Sudan”, n.d.).

**UNMISS Background**

In January of 2005 the Government of the Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), which marked a turning point in the history of Sudan. The CPA “included agreements on outstanding issues remaining after the Machakos Protocol and had provisions on security arrangements, power-sharing in the capital of Khartoum, some autonomy for the south, and more equitable distribution of economic resources, including oil” (“UNMIS Background”, n.d.). Later that month, the UN Secretary-General recommended the deployment of a multidimensional peace support operation, which would consist of around 10,000 military personnel and 700 police officers included as an appropriate civilian component. The UN mission in Sudan was prepared to include components focusing on four broad areas of engagement: “good offices and political support for the peace process; security; governance; and humanitarian and development assistance” (“UNMIS Background”, n.d.). This mission was officially established on March 24th, 2005 by the Security Council’s Resolution 1590 (2005) as UNMIS, the United Nations Mission in the Sudan. A main component of the mandate expressed through the resolution was the need for this mission to be in support of the CPA.

In August of 2006 a new resolution was written to expand the mandate for UNMIS to include deployment to Darfur and to strengthen the numbers of military personnel and the civilian
component. Resolution 1706 (2006) brought an additional 17,300 military personnel and 3,300 civilian police personnel and up to 16 Formed Police Units to the mission (S/RES/1706, 2006, pg. 3). On July 9th, 2011 many things occurred. The mandate of the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) ended after six and a half years of humanitarian efforts (despite efforts from the Secretary-General to consider a three month extension of UNMIS due to ongoing security concerns between the north and the south); South Sudan became its own state, separate and independent from Sudan; and UNMISS, the United Nations Mission in South Sudan, was established (which was initially created for a period of one year, with the intent to renew for further periods as needed) (“UNMISS Background”, n.d.). By adopting Resolution 1996 (2011), the Security Council demonstrated a concern for the conflict between the situation in the South, as it “continued to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region [calling for the establishment of UNMISS] to consolidate peace and security and to help establish conditions for development” (S/RES/1996, 2011).

The United Nation’s mission in South Sudan deployed almost 14,000 peacekeepers and established a working mandate that fell under four pillars: the protection of civilians, creating conditions conducive to the delivery of humanitarian assistance, supporting the implementation of the revitalized agreement and the peace process, and the monitoring and investigating of human rights (“UNMISS Mandate”, n.d.). Under the “protection of civilians” aspect of the mandate, peacekeepers were called upon to actively patrol in communities across the country in order to provide a protective presence in spaces where displaced people are returning, and to make the transition smoother. This aspect also called for peacekeepers to be responsible for “maintaining safety and security for people living within UNMISS Protection of Civilians sites, deterring and preventing sexual and gender-based violence where possible, and supporting efforts to prevent,
mitigate and resolve intercommunal conflict” (“UNMISS Mandate”, n.d.). The mandate then went on to explain how in order to create conducive conditions, UNMISS peacekeepers would work to ensure that humanitarian aid reached millions of people who are in need across South Sudan. This was also intended to assist in the reintegration of displaced people to aid them in the return to their homes and communities in a safe and confident manner. Next, the mandate expressed how important it was that the mission supported the implementation of the revitalized agreement and the peace process in South Sudan. UNMISS was committed to helping build a lasting peace in South Sudan by “…working as an impartial partner at the national and subnational level with political, religious, traditional and community leaders as well as with communities and individuals” (“UNMISS Mandate”, n.d.). Finally, by monitoring and investigating human rights, the mission mandate calls for a focus on reporting violations and abuses of human rights and international humanitarian law, with a particular focus on abuses against children and women. Despite this focus, the mission in South Sudan has seen a large amount of sexual abuse allegations by aid workers since 2015 (“UNMISS Acts on Allegations…”, 2018). Additionally, the initial mandate of UNMISS, resolution 1996 (2011), called for a ceasefire from the rebel groups and members of the LRA, the Lord’s Resistance Army, towards citizens of South Sudan by stating: “…all parties, in particular rebel militias and the LRA, immediately cease all forms of violence and human rights abuses against the civilian population in South Sudan, in particular gender-based violence” (S/RES/1996, 2011, pg. 5).

The current mandate, resolution 2625 (2022), still determines that the situation in South Sudan continues to constitute a threat to the peace, security, and international peace in the region (S/RES/2567, 2022, pg. 4). The Security Council enacted this mandate to extend the mission for another year until March of 2023, making this the 11th year that UNMISS has been operating. The
extension of UNMISS is part of a three-year strategic plan, defined in resolution 2567 (2021), to prevent the return of a civil war and support free, fair, and peaceful elections in accordance with the Revitalized Peace Agreement (2018) (S/RES/2567, 2021, pg. 6).

**Why Was UNMISS Deployed?**

The United Nations peacekeeping mission, UNMISS, was deployed in South Sudan for a few reasons. The first reason involves the original peacekeeping mission, UNMIS, that took place in Sudan before the south became its own nation. Originally, UNMIS was deployed in Sudan to aid in the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and to assist in facilitating a path to peace for the Sudanese government and the southern Sudan region. “According to the UN resolution passed by the Security Council in 2005, the mandate for UNMIS was to support the implementation of the CPA, assist returnee refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), participate in de-mining initiatives, promote human rights, as well as protect the property and personnel of the UN and its key partners” (Zambakari, Kang, & Sanders, 2018, pg. 95). When South Sudan became independent in 2011 the mandate for UNMIS was then considered complete, so there was a need for a new mission to be mandated and deployed. The UN Security Council established UNMISS with a mandate to:

…to consolidate peace and security, and to help establish the conditions for development in the Republic of South Sudan, with a view to strengthening the capacity of the Government of the Republic of South Sudan to govern effectively and democratically and establish good relations with its neighbors (S/RES/1996, 2011, pg. 3).

The Secretary-General reinforced the wording of the mandate by explaining how the main focus of the mission, within its means, should be on the protection of civilians, the contribution to the
creation of security conditions that would be useful to the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and human rights (Garcia, 2020).

**Current Accomplishments and Strengths of UNMISS**

Although the security situation in South Sudan has improved significantly since the signing of the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan in 2015, most critics agree that the general list of accomplishments from this mission is limited. The main accomplishment that UN officials boast about is the impact that UNMISS has provided for the protection of civilians (PoC) in South Sudan through PoC sites. After many years of brutal, harsh widespread violence as a result of the civil wars and horrible living conditions, civilians of South Sudan began to flee to neighboring countries (a few being Uganda, Ethiopia, and Kenya) in a desperate bid to reach safety. In an effort to aid those who are fleeing, through the mandate of UNMISS, more than 200,000 civilians were provided with immediate physical protection through PoC sites (Day, 2019). Over time, these sites decreased the number of mass killings throughout the country and reduced them to sporadic episodes only. This was seen as a brief success during that time and now has been viewed in a negative light as UNMISS announced in 2020 its intention to redesignate its PoC sites as locations for internally displaced persons, which then transferred the legal and de facto control to the South Sudan government. As of September 2021, four out of the five PoC sites have been redesignated. These four include Bentiu, Bor, Juba, and Wau. Still hosting around 34,000 civilians, the site in Malakal yet remains under UNMISS control due to continuing tensions among resident ethnic populations (Day, et al., 2022, pg.16).

A second and less recognized accomplishment of the mission is its ability to successfully help the South Sudanese in developing local ownership. Local ownership is developed by a commitment to build the amount of local actors through inclusive participatory processes which
are accompanied by international partners in order to help make sure that local concerns are at the center of peacebuilding (Interpeace, 2018, pg. 3). This is a critical part to peacebuilding processes because it helps to restore trust between conflicting parties and parties in power while also preventing conflict and consolidating peace because if people are participating in defining the problem, they have a sense of responsibility and ownership of the solutions. A report from the International Organization for Peacebuilding explains that, “the hard-learnt experience of many years of peacebuilding research and practice is that peace needs to emerge from within a society and cannot be ‘imposed’ by external actors, nor can it be ‘imported’ from other experiences” (2018, pg. 2). UNMISS successfully created this bond by distributing the management of the mandate across 10 offices in the country, providing closeness to the population and their problems (Alvarez-Espada, Fuentes-Bargues, & Gonzalez-Gaya, 2022, pg. 9).

**Failures and Challenges**

Two years following the deployment of the mission in July 2011, South Sudan proceeded to descend back into violent conflict, erupting in a brutal civil war which led to tens of thousands of people being killed, displaced, and pushing roughly half of the population into urgent need of humanitarian assistance. Since then, UNMISS has been exposed for its flawed mandate and overall failure to prevent most conflict. Although there are multiple reasons for this failure, the root cause is within the institution of UNMISS.

The protection of civilian sites in South Sudan clearly came with positives and negatives. On the negative side, despite the protection of civilian sites from local level intercommunal violence, UNMISS was unable to protect civilians from violence and abuse by security services and non-state armed actors, including actions committed by UNMISS personnel. The PoC site in Malakal first reported accounts of sexual abuse committed by aid workers in 2015 that only
increased from then on. In a UN Population Fund report sent to humanitarian agencies in October of 2020, residents of the PoC site said, “… sexual exploitation was experienced “on a daily basis”, mostly perpetrated by humanitarian workers; UN and NGO workers were renting houses in the camp to have sex with women, and UN peacekeepers were paying bribes to gain access to women” (Al Jazeera, 2022). Despite reforms to the mandate to address this abuse, the violence continued to grow and, because the POC sites also absorbed a significant uniformed capacity calling for the military component to be focused on providing security to these areas, UNMISS’s capacity to protect civilians in other conflict hotspots was limited (CSRF, 2021). “With more than two million people displaced within the country, and large at-risk populations spread across the enormous terrain of South Sudan, many within the UN and elsewhere argued that UNMISS could better use its resources by focusing their deployment further afield” (Day, 2019).

Another reason contributing to the overall failure of this mission was the lack of manpower and resources. UNMISS was undermanned and underfunded, given the number of peacekeepers and the size of the region. South Sudan is a sweeping region filled with tropical forests, swamps, and unnavigable rivers, leaving only about 300 kilometers of paved road spanning the entirety of the country (Morin, 2019). This made it close to impossible for UN peacekeepers to do a multitude of supportive actions for the Sudanese people, including transporting needed resources to higher risk areas, implementing routine foot-patrol for areas filtered with enemy strongholds, and using guard towers or other tactical measures in areas that needed monitored for potential conflicts. “The availability of land to expand UN facilities, visas for key personnel, refusal to allow the use surveillance drones, and other administrative obstacles can have an enormous impact on an operation” (Kilroy, 2018, pg.140). As a result of this, the UN authorized the deployment of more
peacekeepers to Sudan bringing the number from an initial 14,000 to around 20,000 (“UNMISS Background”, n.d.).
Chapter 6: Findings/Analysis

Findings

As described by I. J. Wani throughout his chapter of the book “The State of Peacebuilding in Africa,” the presence of the United Nations physically on the ground and in the host country has endorsed an expectation that the UN will undoubtedly protect the civilian populations of the host country. Failure to do so is perceived as a “blemish on the credibility and legitimacy of the UN and the international system that could undermine its central purpose to facilitate and support a peace process” (2020, pg. 84). Thus, each mandate and resolution of a peacekeeping mission is seen as a strong obligation to accomplish its stated tasks and demonstrate why that mission will provide importance and a change. However, one thing that most critics do not consider is the perception that United Nations Peacekeeping Forces come in many different forms due to the differing natures of their mandates and compositions. They can differ in their scale of involvement from monitoring ceasefires and withdrawing troops as an observation mission to a multidimensional mission that is there to “‘help implement comprehensive peace agreements’ with substantial military and civilian involvement” (Chae, 2019). Each peacekeeping mission has about three different roles that the personnel can hold and those include UN troops who intercede between combatants and disarm, UN police forces for patrolling and protecting, and unarmed UN observers who document and report actions. Since each of these roles differs according to the different motivations of government forces and rebels, it is important to differentiate in analyzing the mission’s effect on reducing violence against civilians (Chae, 2019). The accounts explained above summarized the detailed backgrounds of the mission in Mali, MINUSMA; the mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, MONUSCO; and the mission in South Sudan, UNMISS, and how they should be viewed to determine its overall importance to the country that it is serving.
Overall, the formalization and operationalization of human rights and the protection of civilians has been the biggest priority for the United Nations, as outlined in each mission by an elaborate body of norms, policies, and institutions across the UN system, including the UN Charter and the global human rights and humanitarian laws framework, Security Council resolutions and pronouncements, and internal UN policies and guidelines (Wani, 2020, pg. 84). Although the three missions have each played a similar role in consolidating stability and security in Africa, while maintaining an effort to support the UN’s priority for the protection of human rights and protection of civilians, the three missions, MINUSMA, UNMISS, and MONUSCO differ in the wording of their mandates and the initial cause for the mandate, each particular to different issues. The mission in Mali deployed a mission in 2013 following years of political unrest with the Malian government and conflicts stirred by Tuareg rebels and Islamic insurgents. The mandate called for the support of the Malian government through stabilization efforts as they reestablished State authority throughout the country and to prevent by all means the return of armed conflict in the eastern regions (Boutellis, 2015, pg. 4). The mandate also made an effort to relate state-building to the protection of civilians by strengthening the coordination between UN personnel and civilians with local and regional communities, groups, and civilian authorities (Day, Tchie, & Kumalo, 2022, pg. 21).

The mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), deployed in 2010, was already active in the Congo as early as 1999 as MONUC. In comparison with MINUSMA, MONUSCO was created to support the stabilization and strengthening of public institutions, major governance, and security reforms. The mandate was focused on relating the state building to reforms (Day, Tchie & Kumalo, 2022, pg. 21). This mandate also called for a force intervention brigade which would allow the use of military components to enforce the tasks of the mandate that
were organized around two objectives: the protection of civilians and stabilization and peace consolidation (Russo, 2021, pg. 3072).

The mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) implemented a strong center protection of civilians’ mandate that was hampered by numerous attacks from non-state actors. In comparison to MINUSMA and MONUSCO, UNMISS did not have a large focus on state-building until a few years into the mission, as it was largely focused on the PoC and stopping continued violent attacks throughout the country. In order to correctly respond to these threats and attacks, the UN Security Council created a specific unit within the mandate for UNMISS called the Regional Protection Force, which was similar to the force intervention brigade brought about by MONUSCO.

All three mandates called for the stabilization of the nations that they were deployed to in some part of the texts, but it was easier for MINUSMA to provide stabilization for Mali since there was a peace agreement in place two years following the deployment. However, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and South Sudan, conflict persisted causing the need for a newly revised mission, MONUSCO instead of MONUC and UNMISS instead of UNMIS. This was due to the death of many peacekeepers and civilians, the ongoing turmoil in large parts of each country, and in South Sudan’s case, the result of succeeding from Sudan and becoming independent.

**Dimensions for Determining Effectiveness in MINUSMA**

Previously in this study, a list of dimensions were provided in which each case would be considered to determine whether it was important for the country and beneficial to the current state it is in now: protection and stabilization, international support, national and local ownership, peace and security, and an overall implementation of each designated mandate. The mission in Mali, MINUSMA, was labelled exceptional in its implementation for the protection of civilians and stabilization because of its capability to deal with asymmetric threats including, “to anticipate,
deter and counter threats, including asymmetric threats”, “to take robust and active steps to protect civilians”, and “to prevent the return of armed elements to those areas, engaging in direct operations pursuant only to serious and credible threats” (Van der Lijn, 2019, pg. 67). The stabilization aspect also pleased international actors and the Malian government as it managed substantial funds for QIPs, or quick impact projects, and supporting security and political structures. An EPON report states that after the deployment of the mission, violence (measured in conflict-related deaths) decreased significantly throughout the country (2019, pg. 68). When analyzing the dimension of international support for the peacekeeping mission in Mali, it is apparent that there is international support for MINUSMA, as it is given a budget of about $1.2 billion and has the support from large international actors. However, with lots of distrust and competition between individual neighboring states and outside actors, much work remains to be done before a joint international strategy that caters to a long-term stabilization solution can be developed in Mali (“MINUSMA Peacekeeping Fact Sheet”, n.d.).

In light of the national and local ownership dimension, Mali and international actors are spread across the board with their acceptance of the mission. Since the United Nations Security Council only deploys missions with the consent of the conflicting parties, there is clear acceptance of the mission, but acceptance is different than understanding. It seems that those who are not keen about United Nation’s support do not understand the mandate of MINUSMA fully, causing them to be very critical of the support given. Communities of Malians criticized the UN for either “doing too little” and the rebelling groups had suspicions of the mission to being partial to the government and not understanding the impartiality of peacekeeping (Boutellis, 2015, pg. 6). On the other hand, those who are supportive of a mission, often say they are happy with the Mission as it is
“contributing to such things as development, project financing, providing air transportation, and stabilization” (Van der Lijn, 2019, pg. 89).

Peace and security in Mali is still an active aspect of the mandate as distrust still persists between the Malian government, rebelling groups, and all international forces. However, peacekeepers are taking the correct steps towards overall peace and security as expressed in a recent tweet from the official MINUSMA page, stating in French, “Hommes et femmes de UNPOL et de la Police malienne sillonnent régulièrement les rues de #Gao pour impliquer les habitants dans la sécurité de toute la ville. Une belle réussite de la police de proximité” (MINUSMA [@UN_MINUSMA], 2022) which easily translates to “Men and women of UNPOL and the Malian Police regularly crisscross the streets of #Gao to involve the inhabitants in the security of the whole city. A great success of community policing”. Finally, in the overall implementation of the mandate, it can be determined that MINUSMA succeeded in the tasks of the mandate, leaving the Malian government in a decent spot to begin with supporting its country without humanitarian intervention.

**Dimensions for Determining Effectiveness in MONUSCO**

In the case of the Democratic Republic of the Congo the mission, MONUSCO, the protection and stabilization dimensions differed greatly. The operation has been considered a test case for new concepts or postures, such as robust military actions and specific protection actions to set new grounds for peacekeeping in general (Novosseloff, 2019, pg. 77). MONUSCO was not originally successful in illustrating good protection and stabilization measures in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. As a result of the security environment deteriorating in the Congo, the Security Council decided to make the current mission more robust with a peace enforcement mandate. “MONUSCO’s main objective was to be the provision of security with priority assigned
to the protection of civilians. To carry out its new mandate, the operation was subsequently equipped with the UN’s first ever military Force Intervention Brigade” (Krahmann, 2021, pg. 92). Following the deployment of MONUSCO, a number of initiatives in the most recent mandate led to the prevention or delay of local violence, causing civilians to agree that the situation in the conflicting areas of the DRC would have been more severe without the mission’s presence.

MONUSCO demonstrates a major downfall in terms of international support. Although there is a current approved budget of $1.1 billion, the mission is seeing a lack of resources and lack of international support as international actors are not seeing a benefit to investing in the mission. “As one interlocutor put it: ‘Nobody wants to pay for it anymore’” (Novosseloff, 2019, pg. 100). This is resulting in the Congolese government left largely to its own devices to maintain the mandate of this mission, which is an issue because the Democratic Republic of the Congo is one of the poorest countries in the world with a GDP per capita of $753 and half of the population under the poverty line (Sasidharan, 2021, pg. 1). When examining the national and local ownership dimension of the MONUSCO mandate, the relationship between MONUSCO and the Congolese government is largely defined by the alignment of interests between the mission, the ruling party, and the political realities of the particular moment. This alignment has forced a stiff relationship between local ownership of the mission as a result of the Congolese government seemingly starting to ignore the UN’s efforts to stabilize the country. With the gain in confidence that the country’s government was developing in being able to maintain stability on their own, one civil society representative said to Novosseloff in the EPON report that: “For some time now, the Government does not want MONUSCO anymore, and that is the main weakness of the UN Mission” (2019, pg. 95).
Overall, peace and security is maintained internally in the Democratic Republic of the Congo by the presence of United Nations peacekeepers. In the 8936th meeting where the Security Council met to extend the mandate for MONUSCO, it was said that:

The Council also expressed serious concern over increased attacks on humanitarian and medical personnel — as well as over impediments to humanitarian access in the eastern part of the country — and demanded that all parties allow and facilitate the full, safe, immediate, and unhindered access of humanitarian personnel, equipment, and supplies (SC/14743, 2021).

As the violence continues in the DRC, the force intervention brigade that was implemented within the mandate to assist with the peace and security of the region is continuing its support and still states its purpose and intent to defend the mandate under all circumstances. To also spread peace and security in a diverse manner, MONUSCO has promoted a gender-sensitive approach within the mission to gain the trust and understanding of the civilians. Overall, without the full cooperation of the host country, MONUSCO can only succeed as far as providing a presence to oversee any conflict. The overall implementation of the mandate would be stronger with more international and local support.

**Dimensions for Determining Effectiveness in UNMISS**

By analyzing the mandate of the mission, it is clear that UNMISS details a protection task with seven different points that are in line with the three-tiered UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support (UN DPKO/DFS) PoC policy. These points are as follows:

(i) protect civilians under threat of physical violence; (ii) deter violence through proactive deployment; (iii) implement a mission-wide early warning strategy; (iv)
maintain public safety within the PoC sites; (v) deter and prevent sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) within capacities and areas of deployment; (vi) exercise good offices in support of protection (this includes local conflict resolution); and (vii) foster a secure environment for the safe, voluntary return of IDPs and refugees (Day, et al., 2019, pg. 58).

Of these seven points, UNMISS was effectively able to accomplish only two in the span of about 10 years: “maintain public safety within the PoC sites” and “exercise good offices in support of protection (this includes local conflict resolution)”. The other points were problem areas for UN personnel, especially when it came to deterring and prevent sexual and gender-based violence, as it was common that many UN personnel were contributing to these acts. Despite these negative aspects, UNMISS received positive recognition among many residents for the protection of civilian sites that were set up throughout South Sudan, stating: “…the presence of UNMISS police within the sites – in line with their mandated task to provide public safety – was having a positive effect, limiting criminality, and mitigating protection risks” (Day, et al., 2019, pg. 60).

When examining the dimension of international support, the issue of UNMISS having a lack of manpower and resources is highlighted. This was as a result of a lack of international support, specifically from international peacekeepers within UNMISS’s mission. It was common that many peacekeepers from countries like China, India, Ethiopia, and Nepal (the countries that contributed the most troops) would not operate under a unified command leading to many peacekeepers to interpret for themselves how to proceed with the mission and abandoning posts or engaging in activities that were in violation of UN code. Since South Sudan is extremely reliant on international and regional support, it gives international and regional actors a chance to play a consistent positive role in the success of the peace process; but they have so far failed to do so.
This, however, is not the case when it comes to the next dimension, national and local ownership. As said by the UN’s top envoy in South Sudan, Nicholas Haysom, “Peace doesn’t just happen. It cannot be wished or willed into existence. It has to be made, it has to be fought for, it needs its own warriors” (Chowdhury, 2021). Many South Sudanese people agree with this and have combined their efforts with the governing personnel of UNMISS to launch a Peace Fellows Program as an initiative with South Sudan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, to harness the power of young Peace Ambassadors to galvanize civic engagement (Chowdhury, 2021). It is important to the civilians in South Sudan that the UN helps to support sustainable political solutions to conflict at the same as protecting civilians. By working together, it is clear that there can be peace to keep and build in South Sudan. Haysom continues by saying, “Such solutions can only happen when all South Sudanese invest in peacebuilding processes themselves to secure the peace that this country needs and richly deserves. If there is no national ownership of peace processes, there will always be a reluctance to defend them” (Chowdhury, 2021).

Peace and security in South Sudan has been non-existent since the nation declared independence from Sudan in 2011, due to continued violence throughout the country. UNMISS was not able to prevent this but was able to decrease the amount of violent crimes and attacks on civilians. After UNMISS was deployed following the independence of the country in 2011 another civil war broke out, putting civilians and UN personnel in danger as a result of a collision of cultures, religions, and ethnicities in South Sudan. This made it hard for the mission to implement their desired mandate as a means to halt violence, but UN actors made a good effort in maintaining it following the end of the civil war in 2020.
Chapter 7: Final Remarks

Through my findings of each mission, it was easy to come to the conclusion that peacekeeping is important but only to a limited extent. Before completing my research, I believed that peacekeeping was one of the most important aspects to international humanitarian intervention. I held a great deal of respect for peacekeeping because I considered it necessary to the development of a country plagued by violence. Following my research, my respect still stands, however, I understand that there are levels to what peacekeeping missions can accomplish, resulting in potential failures to complete their mission tasks. It was important to remember that if peace could not be achieved or kept in the country receiving the aid, then it would be nearly impossible for the mission to carry out as planned and according to their mandate. For example, the situation in South Sudan has increasingly became more difficult for UNMISS to contain alone as a result of increased violence, not only by conflicting parties, but by UN personnel as well. In order to accomplish different tasks, there was need for other peace initiatives and task forces as well as the support of international actors, which was received but not on the scale that South Sudan requires. Over many years of changing and molding the mandate for UNMISS to fit the current situations in the country, the mission does not seem like it will accomplish its main goal in the near future. Still, I do believe that UNMISS has greatly impacted the lives of many South Sudanese civilians despite its shortcomings.

Similarly, MONUSCO has been deployed in the Democratic Republic of the Congo for close to 20 years now and has accomplished just the opposite of its mandate that calls for the restoration of peace through the protection of civilians and combatting rebel groups, and the facilitation of a safe electoral process. The country has seen a number of armed groups increase, civilians living in unsafe and unsanitary conditions, and innocent lives being taken. As of August
of 2022, it was reported that many civilians are migrating from the DRC in search of safety due to the extremely high levels of violence that MONUSCO has not been able to prevent ("DRC: ‘The United Nations’…", 2022). Many Congolese people protest against MONUSCO because it has failed at its core mandates, which will only continue to lead the mission to failure, since it is impossible to maintain peace in a place that does not accept your presence. Now, this mission was not marked “unimportant” to the development of the Democratic Republic of the Congo since it has successfully alleviated a decent amount of human suffering among the civilians, but it has been considered a failed mission that is still active today.

Finally, in Mali up until 2016, MINUSMA was a successful peace operation as it was persistent in strengthening the stability in northern Mali and decreasing the number of civilians killed in violent conflict. Many civilians praised the mission as the efforts for strengthening the government and protecting civilians was clear, although this was considered to be one of the most dangerous peace operations for peacekeepers. Unfortunately, there have been multiple reports of UN personnel killed in attacks from rebel groups, including a recent explosive attack in February of 2023 that left three UN Senegalese peacekeepers dead and five others, seriously injured ("Mali: Three UN Peacekeepers…", 2023).

Each of these missions was of great importance to the host country. However, in terms of effectiveness, most failed to prove how effective they were. If we compare and analyze on a systemic level based on the written mandates across the record of peacekeeping missions, it would be evident that peacekeeping does work most of the time. However, it is not realistic to assume that peacekeeping is effective without comparing the state of each country with what is currently being accomplished and what is lacking. When this is examined, it is easy to conclude that although peacekeeping is important, it is not nearly as effective as it wants to be.
It is important for peacekeeping to remain a main source of humanitarian intervention for conflicting countries. When looking at the broader spectrum of what peacekeeping still accomplishes, regardless of being written off as a failure, one can see that the impact it has is still important to the development of each country that holds a peacekeeping operation. Considering many factors that hold peacekeeping back from its full potential of being able to solve each nation’s problems, it still accomplishes many things. Going forward, I believe it would be beneficial for the success rate of peacekeeping operations to analyze the needs of the country on a more in-depth basis before deploying a mission in order to examine what the peacekeeping mission needs and what it should accomplish. Many operations end up needing their mandates revised as time goes by because more issues are brought into light that were not noticed beforehand. The three missions that I selected would be more on the path to success if they had not run into an issue of a lack of resources, whether that be basic human needs of water and food or whether that is manpower, transportation, or equipment.
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