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Banesism and Molinism in Theory and Practice

Rev. Burns K. Seeley

Western Michigan University

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BANEZISM AND MOLINISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE

by

The Rev. Burns K. Seeley

A Thesis submitted to the
Faculty of the School of Graduate
Studies in partial fulfillment
of the
Degree of Master of Arts

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The Rev. Burns K. Seeley
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INTRODUCTION

Gentle reader: I beg your indulgence if the following pages display a lack of complete comprehension of the philosophical and theological subtleties involved in one of the most important controversies in the history of the Roman Catholic Church. I being a citizen of that strange land of Canterbury situated between Rome and Geneva am not always aware of what has taken place outside my own realm. One of the chief reasons being that many things at home have kept me occupied. But when I have had a chance to travel abroad I am amazed to find other peoples also can have honest differences of opinion and at times become quite argumentative and yet remain in godly communion with one another.

In fact the controversy which I am about to explore is not new to me in essence, but rather some of the language employed and parts of the approaches used to solve a very thorny problem are unfamiliar to me (or at least were). If for no other reason than to acquaint myself with this language and the proposed solutions, I as an Anglican have found this paper valuable.
I also feel bound to state at the outset that I am most sympathetic with the Molinist solution, not because one of my professors is of that school, but rather because this has been my own position for many years. However, while the Molinists and Bañezists (Thomists) employ chiefly scholastic terminology, I have used chiefly biblical. This is not meant to imply that one set of terms is superior to the other. Both have their merits. The use of biblical language or thought patterns has the advantage of being more explicitly Christo-centric in its analysis and partial solution to the problem. On the other hand scholastic terminology has the advantage of being more methodical, orderly and scientific, and hence perhaps more perceptive.

Because I am already a Molinist but did not realize it till recently, I have taken special pains to understand the Thomistic position, and I allow that the position of the Thomists might be far more valid than I understand it at this writing.

The purpose of this paper is to acquire a better understanding of the relationship between grace and free will, that is, the paradox between the omnipotence of God and human free will. More specifically speaking, this paper will deal with two historical approaches to the problem, namely, Bañezism and Molinism. At the
onset we shall learn something about Domingo Báñez, O.P.
and Luis de Molina, S.J. who were largely responsible
for the systems which bear their names. We shall then
learn something of the historical circumstances which
produced Báñezism and Molinism and also some of the
reasons for the controversy between the two systems.
Then we shall look at some of the history itself. But
more importantly we shall examine both systems and seek
to understand and criticize them as well as we can
according to their respective merits and demerits.
Finally, we shall attempt to see how two saints of six-
teenth century Spain, Saint Ignatius of Loyola and Saint
Theresa of Avila, understood the problem of grace and
free will by comparing and analyzing their own writings
as well as biographical works.
CHAPTER 1: THE HISTORICAL SETTING OF BANEZISM AND MOLINISM

Among the Dominicans it was Domingo Báñez (1528-1604) who was to become the principal opponent of the Jesuit Luis de Molina (1535-1600) in the theological dispute which was centered mainly on the nature of efficacious grace. As a youth Báñez studied philosophy at the University of Salamanca in Spain. He entered the Dominican order in 1547. For several years he studied under the noted Dominican Domonio Soto who had been the Imperial Theologian at the Council of Trent. Báñez later held professorships in the Spanish universities of Avila, Valladolid and finally Salamanca, where in 1580 he was elected to the chief chair of theology. He was held by his contemporaries to be an outstanding theologian and especially a close disciple of Saint Thomas Aquinas.

Some hold that Báñez was the founder of the present day theological system known as Thomism, especially regarding the theories of physical premotion, the intrinsic efficacy of grace and predestination irrespective of forseen merit. However, Father John R. Voltz
believes that based upon Bañez's own writings he would have strongly denied it as he was above all a strict adherent to the Angelic Doctor.

By not so much as a finger nail's breadth, even in lesser things have I departed from the teachings of Saint Thomas. In and throughout all things, I determined to follow Saint Thomas, as he followed the fathers.¹

If for no other reason Domingo Bañez would be famous in that he was the spiritual director and confessor of Saint Teresa of Avila for twenty years (1562-1582).

Because of the positions which Bañez held, as well as his outstanding ability to teach and debate, he attracted a large following, especially among the Dominicans. But the historian Ludwig von Pastor wrote:

When confronted with the Jesuits his determinism degenerated into bitterness and rancour; when they were not of his way of thinking he described them as ignorant men, who against their consciences, refused to recognise better doctrines.²

Luis de Molina was a learned Jesuit whose specialty was expounding the Summa Theologica of Saint Thomas. He entered the Society of Jesus in 1553 and


²L. Pastor, History of the Popes (St. Louis: R. Herder Book Co., 1933), XXIV, 299.
later taught at the universities in Coimbra (1563-1567) and Evora (1568-1583). He then spent several years writing; the culmination of which was his famous Concordia of which we will learn more about later. In 1590 he retired to his birth place, Cuenca, but in 1600 he was appointed professor of moral theology at Madrid, and that year he died.

"The originality of his mind is shown quite as much by his novel treatment of the old scholastic subjects as by his labors along new lines of inquiry and theology." Molina, while an interpreter of Saint Thomas, did not hesitate to depart from him when he thought he should, as is evidenced in the Concordia. The Concordia is an exhaustive commentary on only a few articles of the first part of the Summa Theologiae of Saint Thomas. While he felt free to disagree with Saint Thomas, he says in the preface to the Concordia that the purpose of the work is to follow Saint Thomas as the Sun Prince of scholastic theology. Molina spent thirty years in preparing the Concordia.

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4L. Molina, Concordia Liberi Arbitri... (Paris, 1876) p. 111.
The origins of the controversy over efficacious grace between Domingo Báñez (and his fellow dominicans) and Luis de Molina (and his fellow Jesuits) go back to the beginnings of the Protestant Reformation; the Reformers laid stress upon the total depravity of man after the Fall and hence the loss of free will. The sixteenth century Council of Trent reaffirmed that man indeed had freedom of will, but that divine grace also was necessary for man's justification and sanctification. That man is capable of cooperating with and is expected to cooperate with grace for salvation was asserted. Even before the Council of Trent, Saint Ignatius Loyola (1491-1556) emphasized the need for balance when speaking of grace and free will, i.e., one should not be stressed at the expense of the other or even give the appearance of so doing.\textsuperscript{5} Mother M.C. Wheeler writes that the Protestant preoccupation with the problems of justification and free will forced the Catholic theologians to defend and seek to harmonize the paradoxical truths that God wills all men to be saved and yet permits some to be lost; and that God's grace is efficacious

yet man has free will. 6

Molina felt that the older heresies regarding grace would never have some into existence (or soon would have passed away had the Catholic doctrine of grace been dealt with previously as it was for the first time in his Concordia with such minuteness and accuracy of detail. 7 Had the Concordia itself not been the occasion for a bitter controversy within the ranks of Roman Catholicism, Molina may well have been right.

According to the Dominican P. Mandonnet, the controversy between the Dominicans and the Jesuits had its roots in the reaction of certain Catholic theologians to Lutheran-Calvinistic theology. These theologians, writes Mandonnet, produced a doctrinal modification which they hoped would more easily combat the Protestant tenets.

However, in so doing they departed from the beaten paths (les voies frayées) of Saint Augustine and Saint Thomas when it came to the question of predestination and grace.

The initiators of this movement were Jacques Sadolet (1477-1547), Albert Pighius (1470-1542) and Ambrose Catharin (1484-1553). As this movement gained adherents,

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7 Pohle, p. 436.
there were violent clashes throughout the second half of the sixteenth century between the traditional school of theology and the new.  

Father Hardon writes that during the same period the Jesuit Leonhard Lessius (1554-1623) while teaching at the University of Louvain (1595-1600) opposed the ideas of Michael Baius (1513-1589) concerning the efficacy of grace. Baius at the time was Louvain's chancellor and was seeking to reconcile Catholic teachings with those of the Reformers. During his controversy with Baius, Lessius developed a system of his own quite similar to that of Molina, who had yet to publish the Concordia. Baius, who previously had been condemned by the Council of Trent for his doctrines about grace and also by the theological faculty of Louvain, himself censured thirty-four of Lessius' theses on grace and predestination.

The dispute between the Dominicans and Jesuits broke out at the University of Salamanca in January 1582. On the 20th of January while the Trinitarian Francisco Zumel presided over a public debate, the Jesuit Prudencio de Montemayor had to defend a series of propositions, one of which had to deal with the liberty of Christ.

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8P. Mandonnet, "Banez, Domingo, "Dictionnaire de théologie catholique, (Paris, 1905), II, 141-5."
Montemayor held that Christ did not die freely and consequently did not receive merit if He received the order to die from God the Father. At this point the Dominican Domingo Báñez asked Montemayor what would be the case if Christ had received from the Father the order not only regarding the substance of the act of dying but also regarding the circumstances. To this Montemayor replied that in such a case neither liberty nor merit would remain to Christ. At this point another Dominican, Father Guzman, and Báñez said that the replies of the Jesuit were heretical. Now the noted Augustinian theologian Luis de Leon took over the defence of Prudencio de Montemayor.9

As an immediate result of this debate, in which the Jesuits no longer had a part, the cries of "Pelagian" for Luis de Leon and "Lutheran" for the Dominicans became commonplace. Several days later Báñez and Luis de Leon continued the debate. As a result, according to Mandonnet, all the teachers and students accused Leon and Montemayor of heresy.10

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9According to Ludwig von Pastor, Luis de Leon suspected the Dominicans were deliberately plotting to accuse the Jesuits of heresy out of hatred for them, and that the propositions which the Jesuits were asked to defend as part of the public debate could not in and of themselves have provoked the Dominicans. (Pastor, p. 271).

10Mandonnet, D.T.C., II, 143.
Because of the uproar at Salamanca the Hieronymite Juan Santa Cruz presented sixteen propositions before the Spanish Inquisition as having been defended by Leon and Montemayor. Also Báñez, Leon and Montemayor were summoned before the Inquisition. As a result Báñez was cleared of suspicion of heresy, Leon had to retract some assertions and Montemayor was forbidden to teach. Also the sixteen propositions of Juan Santa Cruz were censured.

The sixteen statements contained the following expressions concerning the liberty of Christ and also others dealing with human freedom and predestination:

IV. *Non quod Deus voluit me loqui ego loquor, sed contra: quod ego loquor Deus voluit me loqui.*

V. *Non quod Deus providet me loqui ego loquor, sed contra: quod ego loquor Deus providet me locuturum.*

IX. *Dei providentia non determinat voluntatem humanam aut quamlibet aliam particularem causam ad bene operandum, sed potius particularis causa determinat actus divinae providentiae.*

The judgement of the Spanish Inquisition was rendered on the 3rd of February, 1584. After this, Luis de Leon maintained that he had defended the propositions disputatively and not assertively and furthermore acknowledged that the propositions were not those of Saint

\(\text{11ibid.}\)
Augustine or Saint Thomas and that he did not personally believe or teach them as being true. Prudencio de Montemayor said that he had defended only what had been taught by his professors. After a lapse of several years he once more was teaching.

During the interval between 1582 and 1584 all of the theological schools in Spain were shaken by the controversy. Some schools sided with Bñez and the Dominicans, and others with the Jesuits, who were busy developing their position on grace and free will. Especially the Jesuits were interested in the question of the efficacy of grace and for the most part the Society of Jesus agreed among themselves on the matter. But there was still a need for a minute scientific examination of the question.

With all the above in mind we have the immediate background for the great controversy which was to ensue between the Dominicans (Thomists) and Jesuits (Molinists). The controversy was centered about the difficult question of efficacious grace which was the focal point for the solution of grace and free will for both sides. The proposed solutions are to be found in the writings of

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12bid.

13Pastor, XXIV, 293.
Bañez and Molina. In 1584, Bañez produced his Scholastic 
commentaria in primam partem angelicae d. Thomae. 
In 1588 Molina produced his Concordia.

In the popular sense efficacious grace means all 
grace is efficacious since it has the power (virtus) to 
produce any given effect; the effect being some salutary 
action freely consented to by the will.14 In this con­ 
text sufficient grace is also efficacious (sufficient 
spirit being grace which may be impeded by the human will). 
More technically speaking, however, efficacious grace has 
two operative stages. In the second stage or act, the 
grace achieves the desired effect (or salutary act) with 
man's cooperation. In the first stage or act, the grace 
is considered to be infallibly efficacious, producing 
salutary acts prior to the consent of the will. In other 
words, God gives a person out of all the possible types 
of grace that He might give, one which He knows before­hand will in fact truly be efficacious as He knows this 
person will give consent to it and hence human liberty 
is preserved. It is this type of efficacious grace (actu 
primo) that was the center of the conflict.

14Hardon, p. 147.
Indeed it was exactly on this crucial problem of how to safeguard human freedom while admitting antecedent certitude of consent that conflicting theories of efficacious grace arose in Catholic theology.  

Catholic theology has always upheld the doctrines of God's free grace and man's free will, although at various times and places one aspect has been emphasized to the relative overlooking of the other, depending upon the circumstances. The controversy about efficacious grace engendered by Báñez and Molina in short was over the question whether the grace is intrinsically or extrinsically efficacious; the former held by the Dominicans and the latter generally by the Jesuits.

In 1588 before the Concordia was first published in Lisbon it was made available by Molina in manuscript form. Almost immediately the University of Salamanca sought to prevent its being published. Because of the controversy surrounding the book the Spanish Inquisitor General asked Báñez to examine it. He replied that six of the sixteen forbidden propositions previously mentioned were to be found in it. But the censor of the Portuguese Inquisition, Bartolomeo Ferreira, gave the imprimitur to it stating that there was nothing in it contrary

15ibid.
16ibid., p. 149.
to the Catholic faith. However, before its publication in 1589, due to so much hostile criticism, Molina wrote a clarifying appendix which in no way modified his previous views.

Father Pohle writes that the *Concordia*:

May also be regarded as a scientific vindication of the Tridentine doctrine of the permanence of man’s free will under the influence of efficacious grace. It also is the first attempt to offer a strictly logical explanation of the great problem of grace and free will, foreknowledge and providence, and predestination to glory or reprobation, upon an entirely new basis, while meeting fairly all possible objections.17

Pohle adds that the *Concordia* is difficult reading due to its complex style.

Even though much of the obscurity of the book may be attributed to the subject matter itself, it may be safely said that the dispute concerning Molina’s doctrine would never have attained such violence and bitterness, had the style been more simple and the expressions less ambiguous.18

Conceding that the above may be true, a contemporary theologian at the University of Vallodolid, Garcia Coronel, said that:

Although it was true that the fundamental idea of the book contained nothing new, and was to be found in his opinion, clearly stated in Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, Molina nevertheless

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17 Pohle, Catholic Encyclopedia, XXIV, 436.
18 Ibid.
was the first who treated the matter in detail, by solving the difficulties and building up the proofs; theologians who had to fight against the heretics were grateful for the weapon he had placed in their hands.\textsuperscript{19}

Leonard Lessius, of course, approved of the work, especially where he shared the same opinion of efficacious grace as Molina. Father Hardon writes:

The judgement of Lessius is particularly valuable because St. Francis de Sales, who was later declared a doctor of the Church, declared that he shared Lessius' views on the doctrines of predestination, which completely excludes the physical predeterminism of Baez.\textsuperscript{20}

Yet because the Concordia was unique, even fellow Jesuits criticized it, e.g., Saint Robert Bellarmine. Nevertheless Bellarmine agreed with the main thesis of the book and later defended Molina against his accusers in Rome.

The chief objection of these Jesuits was not about Molina's doctrine of efficacious grace and how he reconciled it with human freedom, but that in much of the book the omnipotence of God is neglected and one reading certain sections might discern some sort of Pelagianism. Also others felt that certain expressions used by Molina were inadequate. But they also did not find fault with the substance of his thesis.\textsuperscript{21}

\textsuperscript{19}Pastor, p. 297.

\textsuperscript{20}Hordon, p. 151.

\textsuperscript{21}Pastor, p. 298.
Between 1590 and 1594 Báñez and Zumel were among those asked by the Spanish Inquisition to prepare a supplement to its Index of prohibited books. Both of whom sought to place the Concordia on it. However, the attempt failed.

Molina, having heard of the plan, was no longer interested in merely defending his book but now turned to attack Báñez's doctrines. He asserted that Báñez's teachings were not in accord with the Council of Trent. It was Molina's contention that starting from the same principles upon which Báñez based his proofs, the Lutherans carried them to their logical conclusion which was a complete denial of free will. He demonstrated this by comparing texts from Luther, Calvin and Chemnitz with those of Báñez. 22

For seven years after the publication of the Concordia a theological war was waged in Spain and

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23 This to me does not seem to be a very valid argument. Simply because Báñez and the Protestants start out with the same premises, this does not automatically make Báñez a heretic. For example, two persons begin a meal each with a bottle of wine, the one drinks all his wine and becomes ill, the other drinks a third and does not become ill. The point being, of course, that simply because Báñez begins with the omnipotence of God he need not deny real freedom of the will. Though it is my opinion that he does deny true free will, not because he begins with the assertion of the omnipotence of God, but because he fails to face the reality of the nature of human freedom.
Portugal which made itself felt in the rest of Europe.

In 1594 the Jesuits appealed to the Grand Inquisitor of Spain. He in turn was informed by Pope Clement VIII that since such an important matter of faith was involved only the Holy See could decide the matter. Pope Clement forbade both orders to discuss efficacious grace either publicly or privately under the pain of excommunication.

The controversy which was begun by the first edition of the *Concordia*, even with its explanatory appendix, caused Molina to write another edition with many additions and alterations of many of the controversial passages, seeking to make them more intelligible so that his adversaries might find them more compatible. This edition first appeared in Antwerp in 1595, then again in 1609 and 1705. This same edition was published again in Paris in 1876. About 1700 at Louvain, the Dominican H. Serry asserted that Molina omitted much that was pertinent to the controversy from the second edition. But the Jesuit Livinus de Meyer, after a critical comparison of the two texts declared that the omissions were only of secondary import.²³


In 1597 Baez asked Clement for a judgement in favor of the Dominicans. The Pope asked Robert Bellarmine
to study the matter and to report to him on it. Bellar­
mine's opinion was that Báněz still had to prove that his
position concerning efficacious grace was the traditional
one held by the Church, following in the footsteps of
Augustine and Aquinas. Bellarmine raised the question
as to whether Báněz's doctrine of physical predetermi­
nation could be reconciled with Scripture, the Councils and
the ancient Fathers of the Church. Bellarmine also
thought that both parties in the dispute should be given
a hearing and that the final decision should be up to the
Pope and that the prohibition about efficacious grace be
lifted with the provision that any debating to be done
must be done on a scholarly level.

The following passages pertain to the memorial
which Báněz sent to the Pope dated October 28, 1597 re­
questing that the ban of silence be lifted. It is in­
cluded in this paper because it reflects some of the per­
sonal elements involved in the conflict and also because
I was unable to obtain Báněz's original work dealing with
efficacious grace, namely, his commentary on the first
part of Saint Thomas' Summa Theologica.

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24 Hardon, p. 152.

25 The reason Bellarmine, a Jesuit, was chosen by
the Pope for this task was that at the time he occupied
the post of Papal Theologian.
Bellarmine:

This Memorial gives six reasons by which its authors endeavor to show that the law of silence should have been imposed upon the Fathers of the Society of Jesus alone. As the reasons do not prove what they were meant to prove, as they appear to contain statements that reflect discredit to the Pope, as some of them are plainly false and others beside the point, and finally, as they run now and then into what looks like calumny, I have undertaken to discuss them briefly at the command of him to whom I owe obedience under many titles. My only purpose in the discussion is to bring the truth to light.

Bañez:

The Dominicans have a claim to be exempted because the law is directed against innovations in theology, and they hold the ancient doctrine that was taught in the Church since the time of St. Augustine. While the law remains in force, they are in a manner losing their immemorial possession of this doctrine. The Jesuits, on the other hand, knowing that the law puts them on an equality with the defenders of the venerable teachings of St. Augustine and St. Thomas, try by every means in their power to delay the sentence of the Holy See. Owing to this face, and also to the vastness of the inquiries which are being pursued, there is reason to fear that a conclusion will not be reached for a very long period. Meantime the new theories tend to be regarded with as much respect as the ancient doctrine of the Church.

Bellarmine:

This first reason appears to be plainly derogatory to the Pope, for it equivalently says that his command was both unjust and dangerous .... The authors of the Memorial coolly assume that they alone possess the ancient doctrine. But this is the very point in dispute .... The question is not whether St. Augustine, St. Leo, and the Council of Orange, are to be followed. All the Fathers of the Society, including Molina himself, profess to follow them, and if printed
books are made the test, it will be found that the Jesuits, to say the least, are not behind the Dominicans in their anxiety to have the ancient authorities at the back of all their agreements. The real question is whether God's physical predetermination of the human will is, or is not, in accordance with the Scriptures, the Councils, and the Fathers. The Jesuits contend that it is not, and consequently a new theory. As the matter is still sub judice, and the authors of the Memorial show a good deal of impudence by talking as if the Fathers of the Society, whom they invariably style innovators, had already been condemned... As for their charge that the Jesuits are trying to delay a decision, I can only say that I know for certain that the contrary is the truth.... The Pope knows better than anybody, and it is very strange that they should endeavor by their flat affirmations to call his judgement in question.

Báñez:

During the long period that must elapse before the Holy See gives its decision, it is greatly to be feared that the Church and her theologians will suffer harm from the law of silence... We have ever been impatient of novelty in doctrine to which the Jesuits are prone. It was this liking of theirs for curious theories which gave rise to the present tempest. In our age, however, these men, our juniors in the Lord's vineyard, laugh at St. Thomas, and not one of them considers himself a perfect theologian until he has invented and taught theories beyond or rather totally opposed to what St. Thomas taught.... If the Dominicans are obliged to remain silent, their preachers will be unable to instruct the people in the ancient doctrine of grace and free will. Lacking such instruction, it is greatly to be feared that they may easily become tainted with Pelagianism. 26

During the same period a lengthy report was sent to Rome from the Spanish Inquisition relating the opinions of five bishops and four scholars, none being Dominican or Jesuit, about the relative merits of Banezism and Molinism. Some were for one or the other, and some blamed both for innovations.

The papal commission, *Congregatio de auxiliis*, was established to resolve the matter and they held a series of three sessions between 1597 and 1607. The term "*de auxiliis*" was chosen because the question under scrutiny was the auxiliary function of grace. To make matters more difficult for the Congregation to settle was that there were two different attitudes held by the disputing parties. The Jesuits were interested principally in finding out whether or not physical determinism was true. Therefore, only those portions of the *Concordia* that dealt with the matter were the concern of defence by the society. The Dominicans generally wanted to avoid this approach and make the *Concordia* as a whole the subject under dispute. (In other words, not only the question of grace and human freedom, but everything which Molina taught, though the *Concordia* does deal principally with reconciling grace and free will.)

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As a result of the first session the Congregation urged the condemnation of the teaching of Molina and of the Jesuits. In the second meeting of the series, Clement VIII personally assisted, which gives an indication of the gravity of the matter. In the final session Pope Paul V personally assisted. In dismissing the Congregation, Paul V forbade either side to condemn the other's position and to treat one another with charity. Despite several attempts to alter this decision it has remained to this day. While neither party was favored by the decision, the important Catholic truths of both the omnipotence of God and the freedom of man were preserved and safeguarded. And on this matter both sides in the dispute were in agreement.

At first glance this decision seems to an outsider at best to be a type of poor compromise (often experienced in his own Communion) but when viewed in the wider context of the Protestant Reformation, and also bearing in mind that the issue was more than merely academic (but also a bitter struggle between two religious orders within the Church), the decision for the time being at least would seem to have been on the side of the angels.

In 1598 while the Congregatio de auxiliis was just getting under way, Clement VIII, following the
advice of Bellarmine, allowed both sides to resume teaching their doctrines on grace in conformance with the Church's doctrines. It was at this point that Domingo Báñez's personal participation in the debate ceased.28

In the subsequent history of the Roman Catholic Church, the basic tenets of Báñez and Molina have been focal points and battle cries for two heresies: the former have led or at least given support to Jansenism;29 the latter, the ideas of Molina, have tended towards semi Pelagianism.30

Therefore after the condemnation of Jansenism by papal bulls in both 1653 and 1713, the Dominicans became suspect of Jansenism. And in 1727 Benedict XIII supported the Dominicans by stating that the Thomistic doctrines on the efficacy of grace were not to be questioned or denied by the condemnation of Jansenism. On the other hand, Benedict upheld other schools within Catholicism

28 I have been unable to find out when Molina ceased his role in the dispute. However, he died two years after Báñez ceased to be active.

29 Jansenism was very similar to Calvinistic doctrines of grace and predestination, i.e. grace is irresistible.

30 Semi Pelagianism placed stress upon the independence of man to achieve salvation apart from the grace of God. However the grace of God was necessary but only after an individual human, by the exercise of his own freedom, initiated the process of salvation.
which have a different understanding of the efficacy of grace than that of the Thomists.  

In 1748, Pope Benedict XIV defended the Molinist position. According to Father Hardon it is "the latest authoritative declaration on the subject, which briefly summarizes the various schools of thought permissible in Catholic theology on the efficacy of grace." Benedict wrote as follows:

You know that there are manifold opinions in the schools on the famous questions about predestination and grace, and on the manner of reconciling human liberty with the omnipotence of God. The Thomists are said to be destroyers of human liberty and followers not only of Jansenism but of Calvinism. However since they meet the charges with eminent satisfaction, and since their opinion has never been condemned by the Holy See, the Thomists carry on without hindrance in this matter, as it is not right for any ecclesiastical superior in the present state of affairs to force them to change their opinion...

The followers of Molina and Suarez are condemned by their adversaries as semi Pelagians. But the Roman Pontiffs have not passed judgement on the Molinist system, which they presently defend and may continue to do so.

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31 Hardon, p. 154.

32 ibid.

33 Francisco de Suarez (1548-1617) was a Jesuit theologian who somewhat modified Molina's position.

34 Hardon, p. 155.
Báñezism

Báñez began with the principle of God as First Cause and Prime Mover of all creation. Every creaturely act is dependent upon God. Therefore creatures are not dependent upon God only for their existence and faculties. In his *Commentarium in summam theologicaum*, Báñez states that, "No second cause can operate unless it has been efficaciously determined by the First Cause." 35 Every creaturely act is directly dependent upon God, and God being personally concerned with each creature adapts Himself to the unique nature of each and then moves it. God works directly upon His creatures through the means of secondary causes through which God brings about His desired effect "...like a workman may use his tool, moves and applies the secondary cause to produce the effect by God." 36 This phenomenon of God asserting His divine power on all secondary causes is known as "premotion" or

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35 *ibid.*
36 *ibid.*
"physical predetermination".

The predetermination and predefinition of Báñez and his contemporaries, which included others besides Dominicans, emphasized, on the part of God's knowledge and providence, a priority to, and independence of, future free acts, which in the Catharino-Molinistic theories, seemed to them less clearly to fall under God's caused action. The words 'physical premotion' were meant to exclude, firstly moral impulse and, secondly, a concurrence of the Divine causality and free-will, without the latter's subordination to the First Cause.  

For a salutary act Báñezism teaches that two different graces are needed: sufficient (excitans) and efficacious (adjuvans). Sufficient grace gives the necessary (sufficient) power to bring about an effect; efficacious grace moves and brings about the effect. Efficacious grace implies the free consent of the will.  

So far so good, but Báñezism goes further and says in effect that efficacious grace physically predetermines or premoves our wills so that we become predisposed to accept the grace "freely". It is at this point that the Molinist becomes quite upset. Báñezism is explained by stating that efficacious grace is predeterministic as it comes before a person's consent.

37Ambrosius Catharinus (1484-1553) was a Dominican theologian who held prior to Molina views of grace somewhat similar to those of Molina.

This efficacious grace is a determination because it is absolutely impossible for the will, under its influence, not to perform the act which God has determined; it is in every sense a pre-determinism since it comes before our consent, and for the sake of that consent and in order to effect a consent; and it is physical because it produces its effect by virtue of its own reality, intrinsically woven into its nature, and independent of any circumstance or consent of the free agent. ¹⁹

I can appreciate Báñez's position and that of the Dominicans (Thomists) in general, viz., to preserve the omnipotence of God, but to a non-Roman Catholic, this position as I understand it does not allow for freedom of the will in any sense other than it is "free" to do only that which God wants. To me there is here a sense of coerciveness that one cannot equate with perfect freedom. My position is that when one becomes fully sanctified by the merits of Christ and free only to do God's will, it is only the result of a constant struggle against evil. The saints themselves freely admit that along the way they have given in to temptations to evil. This implies that a person does indeed have the moral freedom to reject the love and grace of God, as well as to accept it, no matter how much God may seek us. Physical predetermination seems to me to be strangely akin to Calvinism. However it must always be said that the Dominicans believe in some type of moral freedom, whereas the strict

³⁹Hardon, p. 156.
Calvinists do not.

Not only would I say that efficacious grace as understood by Báñez, in effect, rejects moral freedom, but he also leaves himself open for attack on the matter of the Scriptural and Catholic doctrine that Christ became man, died, and was raised from the dead for all men (I Tim 3). Perhaps I am missing some subtle distinctions made by Báñez, but if what I believe he says is so, why then does God, who is able to save all men by physically predeterministic grace, not do so? I submit that efficacious grace is not physically predeterministic, though God could certainly make it so. However, if He were to do so then logically man's moral freedom is destroyed. In other words there would be no responsive love on the part of man.

Perhaps an analogy will help here. We can take the faithful and unselfish love of a man for a woman. He is attracted to her by various qualities that she possesses (a sort of sufficient grace), but in no way is he compelled to fall in love with her (although there are some who claim they could not help themselves; this in essence would deny moral freedom and responsibility). But the man willingly persists in being attracted to the woman and falls in love with her (a sort of efficacious grace). It is my opinion that no human being is forced to love
another, because as such it is a contradiction in terms. I would of course apply the same statement about ourselves towards God.

Now let us continue with Báñezism. The system does recognize the difficulties of man's freedom and therefore states that man may indeed resist sufficient grace and therefore sins (hence "freedom"). But the permitted sin is only the result of physical predeterminism by an eternal decree from God. By this physical predeterminism man is "conditioned" to the material element in the sin, but nevertheless because of this, man resists the sufficient grace and sins formally, since it is only sufficient grace. In other words to the Thomists efficacious grace is intrinsically so. Somehow by this process man is deemed fully responsible for sin.

If this is a correct understanding of Báñezism, then it would seem again that man is not really morally free because of premotion, i.e., physical predeterminism, and it would seem that God for some mysterious reason desires one to sin (not merely permit) and is therefore directly responsible for every sin. Father Hardon writes:

The relation of efficacious grace to predestination in the Báñezian system follows naturally

\[ \text{ibid.} \]
on the foregoing. God wants all men to be saved, unless a universal salvation would impede the achievement of higher divine end or purposes. Antecedant to His prevision of their good or bad use of freedom, by a free and absolute decree on God's part, He chooses certain persons for a definite measure of eternal glory. The rest of the human race He omits from this decree, which is technically called a negative antecedant reprobation - reprobation because not predestination to glory, negative and not positive because (otherwise than Calvin) the object of the divine resolve is not eternal punishment but exclusion from the beatific vision, and antecedant because God's will on their fate is determined (in human language) before He sees their merits or demerits.41

I should like to question the phrase which according to Father Hardon is a part of the Benezian system, "God wants all men to be saved, unless a universal salvation would impede the achievement of higher divine ends or purposes." Just what would these divine ends or purposes consist of?

It seems to me that the ultimate basis for the theological problem of efficacious grace in the Thomistic system is to be found in such biblical references as contained in Exodus 33:19 and Romans 8:28-30. In the former we read:

And he said, I will make all my goodness to pass before thee and I will proclaim the name of the Lord before thee; and will be gracious to whom I will be gracious, and will show mercy upon whom I will show mercy.

41bid., p. 157.
In the latter:

For whom he did foreknow, he also did predestinate to be conformed to the image of His Son, that he might be the firstborn among many brethren. Moreover, whom he did predestinate, them he also called; and whom he called, them he also justified; and them whom he justified, them he also glorified.

It would seem that among Christians it is Saint Paul who first clearly saw the difficulties between grace and free will but he did not attempt to solve the mystery, nor did Saint Augustine or even Saint Thomas from what I have read of them. However Saint Thomas did write in great length and detail about predestination, foreknowledge, grace and free will in the first part of the *Summa Theologica*, but he did not attempt to solve the mystery as to how God is omnipotent and we have free wills. But I can easily see how Baez interprets Saint Thomas as he does, since Aquinas logically begins with God and His attributes (one of which is His omnipotence), and from there he proceeds to talk about man and man's secondary and inferior place in contrast to his Creator. We must remember that Saint Thomas was not confronted by Calvin and Luther.

While Saint Paul in speaking about the omnipotence of God (which at times seems to be a purely arbitrary omnipotence) is indeed emphatic about it, he also is equally emphatic about human freedom, e.g. Romans 6:19. As far as predestination is concerned, Saint Paul
writes in I Tim 2:3, "This is good and praiseworthy before God our Savior who wants all men to be saved to come to the knowledge of truth."

Returning to Bænezism, it states that God has eternally predestined some for salvation independent of their "free" will. God insures this by conferring efficacious graces upon the elect which assures that they elect "freely" to do God's will. The efficacy of this grace then is inherent in the grace and independent of the free will of man. Sufficient grace only supplies the potential efficacy which only efficacious grace can guarantee.

Since God has eternally willed the free consent of His chosen ones to the efficacious grace He confers, He thus ineluctably brings about the salvation of those who are included in His loving decree. All the rest who do not come within the ambit of this election are permitted, through the abuse of their freedom, not to attain heaven; and the divine motive for this negative reprobation is that God willed to manifest His goodness not only by means of His mercy, but also by means of His justice.42

It seems to me that while Bænezism seeks to preserve human freedom and Calvinism denies it, it becomes a mere adjunct to Bænezism by the nature of its structure. Human freedom is placed in the structure as a necessary counterbalance, but it does not seem to me to be a logical part of the framework. This is not to say that

42bid., p. 158.
everyone who starts out with the omnipotence of God must arrive at this difficulty, i.e. illogical difficulty, as we shall see later on.

**Molinism**

Molina also holds to the same Catholic truths as Bañez. But in his system he took a different approach in seeking to reconcile God's omnipotence with man's free will. Actually there are two forms of Molinism; the one which Molina himself developed, and the other (Congruism) a modified form of Molina's teaching, which resulted from the controversy between the Molinists and their opponents. The original form is, of course, contained in the **Concordia**. As we have already said the book is quite difficult reading, even for those proficient in Latin, and, as several of Molina's colleagues admitted, many of his terms are ambiguous. Nevertheless, after the thorough-going scrutiny which Molina's work received by the Holy Office, not once was one of its some 300,000 words condemned by the Apostolic See.\(^{43}\)

Molina wrote that Pelagius occasioned the beginning of a theology of predestination, and that following in the footsteps of Augustine, Molina contends that,

\(^{43}\text{ibid., p. 159.}\)
"The gifts and the means of grace are conferred not according to the effort of our free will but according to the pleasure of God." Molina also said that the following were above controversy, being accepted Catholic tradition: (1) human freedom of the will; (2) none can attain salvation except through the merits of Christ; (3) "no adult, by reason of his own powers and without the aid of supernatural grace, can be justified and attain everlasting life"; (4) God has a foreknowledge of all future events and that there is by God a "predestination of the good to eternal life through grace, gifts and supernatural helps" and; (5) the freedom of the will is related to all of these and is not in the least diminished or impeded by them.

But Molina also believed that human freedom which is not premoved was above controversy because according to the ancient Fathers of the Church, it was not due to God's foreknowledge that things take place which depend upon our created wills. Molina says:

On the contrary it was because such things would happen through the freedom of the will that He foreknew it. He also would foreknow the opposite, if the opposite was to happen, as was possible by the freedom of the will.

44Molina, p. 547.
45bid., p. 554f.
46bid., p. 547.
These have been fighting words ever since to the Thomists. Molina says in essence that God has endowed us with a free will which means just that - a created will which within certain limitations is free to act independently of its Maker, viz. a moral freedom. Let us keep in mind that Molina is well aware of the dangers of semi Pelagianism and in no sense interprets the above as semi Pelagian.

The following is translated by Father Hardon from the Concordia and is considered to be the essence of what he wrote:

The first and basic principle is the nature of the divine influence, both through its concurrence in the natural acts of the will, as well as through particular aids to supernatural acts. [Thus] the prevenient and auxiliary graces which are conferred upon us in our pilgrim state on earth, are efficacious or inefficacious for conversion or justification, and depend upon free will and the cooperation of our will with them. In fact, they are within our free will, either to render them efficacious by consenting to or cooperating with them towards those acts by which we are disposed to sanctification; or to render them inefficacious by refusing our consent and cooperation, or even to raise a contrary disagreement.47

The second principle is the legitimate, or better the orthodox, explanation concerning the measure of the gift of perseverance....Two things are necessary for the gift of perseverance. One on the part of God: That He will have decided to give those aids with which He foresaw that the adult would persevere by his own free will. Another (on the part of man): that the free will

47 Ibid., p. 231.
of man is a necessary condition; for without it the [divine] will to confer such aids could not imply the will to confer the gift of perseverance, namely, that the adult of his own free choice would so cooperate with such helps that he might persevere, with it is clearly within his ability to do. Therefore it should not be understood that the gift of perseverance from God is of such a nature that it takes away the power of not persevering. 48

Father Pohle writes that above all Molina stressed the necessity of the freedom of the will in spite of the Fall and concupiscence. If man did have it he would be no more than animal.

Molinism escaped every suspicion of Pelagianism 49 by laying down at the outset that the soul with its faculties (the intellect and the will) must first be constituted by prevenient grace, a supernatural principle of cooperation in the actu primo, before it can in conjunction with help of the supernatural concursus of God, elicit a salutary act in the actu secundo. 50 Therefore the salutary act is due to God and not the human will. However the will does cooperate by allowing the salutary act to take place.

In other words, as I see it, man's will can in no way save man by itself. It is God who stirs up the will by prevenient grace and it is God who also provides the

48 ibid., p. 548f.

49 Pelagianism denies the need of all graces; semi Pelagianism denies only prevenient graces.

necessary (sufficient) grace to obtain a salutary act. Therefore the grace is also efficacious. However the will can freely impede the efficacy of the grace, but in no manner does the human will condition or strengthen the power of grace. However in order for the grace to be efficacious the human will must cooperate. Father Pohle states:

According to this explanation not only does Divine grace make a supernatural act possible, but the act itself, though free is wholly dependent upon grace, because it is grace which makes the salutary act possible and which stimulates and assists in producing it.\(^{51}\)

It certainly is clear to me from this explanation of Molinism that it nowhere borders on Pelagianism or semi Pelagianism.

There are two principle features in the Molinistic theory of grace which distinguish it from the Thomistic theory, namely: (1) The salutary act is dependent upon the pure cooperation of the human will. Secondly, whereas the Thomistic theory with its physical predeterminism or premotion of the will really renders the will non-self-deterministic, Molinism and Thomism have different views of the nature of merely sufficient grace and of efficacious grace. Thomism views efficacious grace as intrinsically efficacious (independent of

\(^{51}\)ibid.
the human will). Because Molinism allows for the genuine freedom of the will, then a grace is intrinsically sufficient but only extrinsically efficacious.

Father Pohle points out the embarrassing dilemma for the Thomists. He says that of two men having exactly the same grace, one turns to God and the other does not. The Molinists would say that man's free will interfered and did not allow the grace to become efficacious. The Thomists since they say the will is physically predetermined and that efficacious grace is intrinsically so, must conclude that it is not the fault of the human will and hence must logically conclude that God directly wills evil.\(^{52}\) I suppose that a Thomist would reply that God foreseeing that the sinner would not repent would not send intrinsically efficacious grace in the first place, but merely sufficient grace. In other words, to the Thomists the two men did not have equal grace in the first place and, what is more important, could not have had equal grace.

According to Pohle, the Thomists allege that the Molinists make everything depend ultimately upon the human will and hence the omnipotence of God is a fiction and in essence man's salvation from the point of view of

\(^{52}\)ibid.
the Molinists is really the work of man and not of God.\textsuperscript{53}

I think that if the above be true then they are unwarranted in their accusation, because it has already been made abundantly clear, the Molinists attribute salutary acts to God's initiation.

To answer the Thomists' objections Molina developed his famous divine scientia media which idea he borrowed from his teacher, Pedro de Fonseca, S.J.\textsuperscript{54} Molina insisted that it is the free cooperation of the human will which makes a grace efficacious; he went a step further and stated that the very idea of efficacious grace implies that God somehow has an infallible metaphysical certainty (foreknowledge) of its efficacy, i.e. whether or not one will cooperate with any given grace or resist it and therefore the foreknowledge was prior to His decree.

Molina asked in what way does God infallibly foresee future free acts. As we know he rejected Báněz's idea of premotion or physical predeterminism since in his opinion it denies any real freedom. Molina wrote that before God from all eternity decrees by His will a certain act on the part of man to take place, He, prior to the decree, must by a special foreknowledge (scientia media) of every

\textsuperscript{53}ibid., p. 439.

\textsuperscript{54}ibid.
(potential and actual) human act, and all the various circumstances surrounding it, know infallibly how an individual would react and therefore sends efficacious grace only to those whom He foreknew would cooperate with the grace, e.g. in conversion, and therefore the grace is also prevenient in the sense that it comes prior to one's acceptance. Therefore by God's scientia media genuine free will is preserved.

The chief objection of the Thomists was that the human idea of the scientia media was an innovation, i.e. not in accordance with Saint Thomas' understanding of divine foreknowledge. Again it may be said that Saint Thomas was not confronted with the Protestant Reformation. To me it seems to be beside the point that the idea of scientia media was an innovation. The important question is whether or not it is true. One could easily say for example that the doctrine of the Holy Trinity was an innovation, however this innovation is held de fide by most Christians.

Molina used the term scientia media in contrast to God's foreknowledge of the merely possible and also that which in reality would take place and exist. God's middle knowledge is that of things which would occur in

\[\text{This efficacy I assume is in the actu primo.}\]
the future if certain conditions were to be fulfilled (or "futuribles"), but need not actually take place. It seems to me that the scientia media is really a further (and legitimate) development of the idea of God's knowledge of the merely possible.

Therefore the key now to Molinism is the divine scientia media which is responsible for the infallible positive outcome of efficacious grace. In other words it is not anything intrinsic in the grace nor is it the human will which initiates infallible grace. The will only cooperates with it.

Now we shall take a look at a further development of Molinism conceived by the Jesuits Robert Bellarmine and Francisco de Suarez. This development seemed necessary to many Jesuits because of the furor aroused by the Concordia and therefore was an attempt at clarifying the concept of the divine scientia media and a further attempt to reconcile the dependence of human moral action upon divine grace and yet maintain human freedom. Their development is known as congruism. The term "congruism" is derived from "gratia congrua" or a grace which is accommodated or adapted to the circumstances. Congruous grace, because it is adapted to the internal and external circumstances of any individual produces efficacious grace and therefore is the result of the scientia media.
Bellarmine and Suarez seeking to walk as closely as possible with the Thomists in order to avoid the semi Pelagian charges stated that predestination is prior to foreseen merits. They said:

God freely resolved from all eternity, without considering the merits of men, to confer grace for the performance of good works (gratia de con-gruo) in accordance with such circumstances He foresees will be favorable to their use.  

Therefore as I understand it, the strict Molinists maintain that God confers efficacious grace because He foresees that it will be efficacious in as much as He knows that a person will cooperate with the grace. The Congruists on the other hand, seeking to avoid the definite role that human free will plays in making a grace efficacious (and hence the semi Pelagian charge), state that the grace is intrinsically efficacious because the merits of men are not initially considered by God. They either mean this and in essence are Thomists or they are employing language which is ambiguous (deliberate or not I cannot say). The emphasis in the above quotation could be upon "in accordance with such circumstances He foresees will be favorable to their use". And in reality differs not from the scientia media. To me the statement is a contradiction of terms. Either God takes into account

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56 Hardon, p. 162.
human freedom before conferring efficacious grace or He does not. If the former be true then Molina is correct, if the latter then Báñez is correct. If my interpretation is correct then I am a strict Molinist and not a Congruist. It seems to me that the Congruists are saying that efficacious grace is intrinsically so.⁵⁷

⁵⁷ibid.
CHAPTER III: SOME MODERN CRITICISMS

Father William O’Connor writing in the *New Scholasticism* points out that neither Molina nor Báñez were faithful interpreters of Saint Thomas. This was especially true says O’Connor when Molina speaks about Saint Thomas’ understanding of divine knowledge. According to O’Connor, Molina did not really understand what Saint Thomas taught and therefore misrepresented him.

The knowledge of simple intelligence for Molina does not mean a knowledge of possibilities which will never be realized, as it does for St. Thomas in article nine of question fourteen. It is simply a knowledge of things before God’s decree to make them actual. This may be good Molinist doctrine, but it is not the doctrine of the article of St. Thomas that Molina undertakes to explain.58

O’Connor writes that Molina had every right to deviate from Saint Thomas and develop his own ideas such as the *scientia media*, but that he ought not to have misrepresented Saint Thomas. Assuming that the above is true we can more readily understand why Báñez was upset with Molina. However O’Connor equally points out that Báñez

himself was not always a faithful interpreter of Saint Thomas. To me this is more serious because Banez claimed that he never departed from the teaching of Saint Thomas; whereas Molina did not make this claim. Banez makes the statement that Saint Thomas says (Summa Theologica Ia, q.19, a.8.) that God as First Cause determines the human will. Twice Banez writes in column 533 in his Scholastic Commentary on the First Part of the Angelic Doctor D. Thomas (Salamanca, 1585) that "Prima causa determinat meam voluntatem". But in fact, says O'Connor, Saint Thomas never uses the term determinare (which term of course Molina attacked). O'Connor also notes that Aquinas does not even hint at the necessitating action of God on the will of man. What Aquinas does say is that the divine will imposes necessity on some things that are willed (quibusdam volitis) but not upon all. The things that are willed refers to things willed by God not man.

Again according to Saint Thomas (Summa Theologica Ia, q.19, a.8.), God wills some things to happen of necessity and others from contingency.

It is one thing to say with St. Thomas, that God has adopted or prepared contingent causes for contingent effects, as He has adopted or prepared

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59bid., p. 253.
necessary causes for necessary effects. But it is quite another thing to say, with Bañez, that God determines my will to read. 

Therefore one cannot agree with Bañez from his cited references to Aquinas that Aquinas says God determines our wills, nor can we conclude that Saint Thomas teaches that God as First Cause necessitates our wills (wills, being secondary causes), when Saint Thomas expressly says in the references cited by Bañez that some things are caused by contingency.

As the following deals directly with the Thomist-Molinist controversy I should like to quote the following from Father O'Connor:

Bañez, regularly interprets the infallible certitude associate with the divine knowledge and will in terms of determination and necessity. For St. Thomas the fact that God wills an event to take place means that it will infallibly take place, although some things will happen contingently and others necessarily. For Bañez this simply means that because God wills an event to be, He determines and necessitates it, even though it may be contingent from the standpoint of a secondary cause. This is why he does not hasten to read into Saint Thomas the statement: God determines my will freely to read.

The difference between St. Thomas and Bañez on this point I think can be stated as follows. For St. Thomas, because God wishes some effects to be necessary and others contingent, therefore He has prepared necessary secondary causes to account for necessary effects and contingent secondary causes to account for contingent effects. For Bañez, God determines and necessitates all

\[\text{ibid.}\]
second causes, some to produce necessary effects and others to produce contingent effects. 61

In conclusion O'Connor shows from various selections of Saint Thomas' writings how he used the word determinare in relation to the human will. From the selections it is hard not to conclude that Aquinas was more of a pre-Molinist than a pre-Plantiscist. 62

In defending the Bænezian position, Mother M.C. Wheeler writes that intrinsically efficacious grace in no way deters human freedom, because when God grants someone intrinsically efficacious grace it so clarifies the mind to the proper choice, that the will freely chose to do it even though moved by efficacious grace.

It may still refuse to act at all, but under the influence of this grace he does not wish to refuse. And as Garrigou-LaGrange writes: Selon St. Thomas sous la grâce efficace, la liberté ne vout jamais de fait resister et poser l'acte contraire (la grâce ne serait plus efficace), mais elle conserve le pouvoir de poser cet acte contraire. 63

To this reader at least, genuine human freedom is here denied.

Now we shall proceed to an extensive criticism of Molinism by Father Garrigou-LaGrange who appears to be

61 ibid., p. 255.
62 ibid., pp. 255ff.
one of the most outstanding defendants of Bañezism of recent times. He writes that according to the Thomists, "Every other explanation of God's foreknowledge of the future inevitably ends in contradiction." He says contradiction and not mystery because:

These theories, of descending from universal and necessary principles to explain a particular and obscure case, propose from the outset a gratuitous solution that involves the very denial of the absolute universality and necessity of the principles.64

Defending the Thomist position he quotes from the Summa Theologica (Ia, q.83, a.1.):

Free will is the cause of its own movement, because by his free will man moves himself to act. But it does not of necessity belong to liberty that what is free should be the first cause who moves causes both natural and voluntary. And just as by moving natural causes He does not prevent their acts from being natural, so by moving voluntary causes He does not deprive their actions of being voluntary: but rather He is the cause of this very thing in them; for He operates in each thing according to its own nature.65

From this passage Garrigou-Lagrange interprets Saint Thomas as saying that intrinsically efficacious grace far from destroying free actions, causes them.66

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65ibid.
66ibid., p. 81.
I am afraid that I cannot agree with this interpretation. God, indeed, is the First Cause of both natural and voluntary acts (necessary and contingent) in the sense that it is He who establishes the laws governing the operation of these actions. But in no way can I understand from this passage of the Summa Theologica that Saint Thomas is saying that God is coercing voluntary acts (a contradiction in terms). Nor can I deduce from this passage that God (while very much involved and concerned with voluntary acts) is somehow premoving or physically determining them.

In all fairness it must be stated that Saint Thomas also wrote in the Summa Theologica (Ia, IIae, q.9, a.6 ad 3um):

God moves man's will as the universal Mover, to the universal object of the will, which is good. And without this universal motion, man cannot will anything. But man determines himself by his reason, to will this or that which is a true or apparent good. Nevertheless, sometimes God moves some specially to the willing of something determinate; which is good; such is the case with those whom He moves by grace.67

However in this passage it seems to me that the key word is move, not cause. Indeed, cause is not even used. I could interpret "...sometimes God moves some specially to the willing of something determinate, which is good..."

67 Ibid., p. 83.
whom He moves by grace", to mean prevenient grace, which one would be entirely free to reject. The phrase, "... sometimes moves" could mean then by the use of prevenient (or sufficient) grace - not necessarily equating the two - God sometimes moves the will depending upon whether or not one accepts it.

Garrigou-LaGrange, with all the Thomists, states that in effect Molina's theory of scientia media denies freedom instead of safeguarding it.68 The Thomist position is this:

The middle knowledge conceived to safeguard the freedom of the will, virtually implies the denial of it. How can God seeing a cause, which by its nature is undetermined as to whether or not it will act, that it will, de facto act? The supercomprehensive knowledge of a cause cannot enable anyone to see in it a determination which is not there. And if, in reply, we are told that this determination is known through the circumstances in which the free will is placed, the theory ends fatally in Determinism, which is the denial of the free will. The foreseeing of the circumstances may enable, indeed to form conjectures, but not to have an infallible knowledge of the conditionally free acts of the future.69

Perhaps I fail to see the subleties here, but it seems to me there is absolutely no denial of free will by Molina and the Molinists. In the first place, assuming the human will is undetermined by nature as to whether

68 ibid., p. 82.
69 ibid., p. 82f.
or not it must act, this does not preclude God's foreknowledge of whether or not it will act by man's initiative. In the second place, the statement, "The supercomprehensive knowledge of a cause [i.e. the human will] cannot enable anyone to see in it a determination which is not there." To this I agree. However, the will which is undetermined means to the Molinists, that it is undetermined by God and not by man. Hence there is a determinism on man's part, permitted by God, and God can foresee what man will determine.

To reply to the statement, "And if, in reply, we are told this determination is known through the circumstances in which the free will is placed, the theory ends fatally in Determinism, which is the denial of the free will," I should point out that the Molinists never say that the circumstances which one may find oneself in are determined by God in the sense that God somehow foreordains them, which is what Garrigou-LaGrange believed they are saying.\(^7^0\) The *scientia media* simply states that God foreknows all possible circumstances and how anyone would act were he to be placed in them. This we have already discussed.

\(^7^0\) *bid.*, pp. 478ff.
When the Thomists say that the foreseeing of circumstances only enables God to form conjectures and not have infallible knowledge, I am hard pressed to understand why. To me the answer is simply one of secondary causes and effects which is closely connected with the all-embracing personal knowledge by God of every human being. Even we as humans - if we live long enough and are observant enough - can accurately predict (usually) how another human whom we have known for years will react to a given set of circumstances.

Garrigou-LaGrange concludes that Determinism is not the only flaw in the Molinistic theory:

It attacks God's universal causality and supreme dominion over all things, and consequently renders His knowledge passive with regard to our free determination of which alone are the cause. God ceases to be the universal cause of being, since the free determination on our part, which is some being, is not produced by Him in us and with us. He is no longer master of the will; His grace remains powerless.

Man alone is the cause of his freely determining himself to act and of the good use he makes of his grace.71

To me this statement is more an adverse criticism of Thomism rather than Molinism. It points out acutely the Thomists' over-stressing the omnipotence of God. Also it seems to assert that if one claims that he has

71 ibid., p. 86.
genuine free will (though God makes it possible) he is a PLAGIAN and that there is no omnipotence with God. Of course, to the Molinist this is a problem and a mystery, but not one incapable of some understanding. It would seem that to the Thomist that genuine freedom on man's part and God's omnipotence do not mix.

Continuing, Garrigou-LaGrange writes:

Instead of viewing our will and the divine motion as two total causes, one of which is subordinate to the other in such a way that our act; so far as there is any good in it, comes entirely from God as the primary cause, and entirely from man as the secondary cause, the Molinists view them as two partial causes like two men hauling a boat. Hence God's external causality as it effects us proves to be rather mediocre and is like created causality. Our free will participates with God in the work of salvation and claims the better part of it. Since God's knowledge is no longer the cause of our free acts, the result is that it must be passive in with regard to them. Instead of determining them, it is determined by them. And what is there more inadmissible than to admit a state of passivity in the Being who is pure act?

Molina does indeed write, "...as when two men are pulling a boat." But in the context as I understand it, Molina in effect says that in any given human act of the will, both primary and secondary causes come into play. Yet while man's will is subordinate to God's, God still permits the human will to cooperate with His to achieve

72ibid.
73Molina, p. 158.
any desired salvific effect. I must admit that the phrase, "...as when two men are pulling a boat," is certainly not the best as it gives one the impression that man is equal to God.

Also Molina in the same paragraph states that, "We say neither God by His universal concurrence nor secondary causes are total but partial causes of the effects. Again, I believe that Molina is being misinterpreted but understandably so. However I could easily interpret the above passage to mean, contrary to the Thomists, that God as the First Cause is the total cause of all effects in the sense that He is the author of all secondary causes, viz. human wills (moral freedom) both primary and secondary causes in actually bringing about an effect are both partners and hence both are partial causes. But again I agree that the term partial is inadequate. But so would the phrase total cause of all effects referring to God.

Below is the controversial passage under discussion as contained in the Concordia. In it we get a glimpse at Molina's difficult style.

Ex dictis intellegetur facile, si sermo sit de causa integra, ut comprehendit omnem ad actionem necessarium sive ec universalis sit, sive particularis, Deum per concursum universalem cum causis secundis efficiere unam integram causam coalescentem ex pluribus non integris comparatione cujusque effectus, ita ut neque Deus per solum concursum universalem sine causis secundis, neque causae secundae sine concursu universali Dei sufficiant ad effectum producendum. At
cum dicimus neque Deum per concurum universalem, neque causas secundas esse integras, sed partial-escausas effectuum, intelligendum id est de partialitate causae, ut vacant, non vero de partialitate effectus: totus quippe effectus et a Deo est, et a causis secundis; sed neque a Deo, neque a causis secundis, ut a tota causa, sed ut a parte causae, quae simul exigit concusum et influxum alterius: non secus ac cum duo tra-hunt navim totus motus proficiscitur ab unoquoque trahentium, sed non tanquam a tota causa motus, siquidem quivis eorum simul efficit cum altero omnes ac singulas partes ejusdem eorum simul efficit cum altero omnes ac singules partes ejusdem motus. Si vero sermo sit de integra, sive tota causa, non omnio, sed in aliquo gradu causae, tunc Deus per concursam universalem est causa integra in gradu causae maxime universalis, eo quod null a alia cum eo concurrat in eo gradu causae; eodemque modo variae causae secundae pos-sunt esse integrae ejusdem effectus, quaevis in suo gradu, ut sol et equus comparatione alterius equi generandi, sol quidem ut causa universalis equus ut causa particularis. 74

Domingo Báñez was certainly well schooled in the techniques of mystical contemplation and had first-hand experience with mysticism in as much as he was the spiritual director of Saint Teresa of Avila, one of the most famous of Catholic mystics. It would seem probable that he believed with other orthodox Catholics of the period in the stage of infused contemplation where the human will and the divine will are one (yet each remains autonomous). During this stage the human will is moved passively. One wonders whether or not because of this knowledge Báñez generally concluded that in all the stages of the

74 Ibid., p. 157f.
spiritual life prior to this state God physically predetermined or premoved the human will so that it passively accepts efficacious grace. Should the above be the case, it makes it much easier to understand why Báñez interpreted Saint Thomas as he did and one of the reasons why he so vehemently opposed Molina's primary emphasis on the freedom of man to act regarding the acceptance or rejection of divine grace (be it sufficient or efficacious).

Regarding Luis de Molina one can conclude that while he indeed rendered theology a great service by his doctrine of the divine scientia media, it would seem that it was highly imprudent of him to attack Báñez's teaching on a personal basis and getting himself involved in a controversy which created much harm to the Church. And as has been stated previously, his writing style is quite difficult to follow and was subject to much misinterpretation by the Thomists. Therefore as is the case of many who are called "heretics" much harm is done because an idea which indeed is novel has not been explicated as fully as possible and a sufficient apology given to show that it is a legitimate development of the "faith which was once delivered to the saints (Jude 3)." Indeed, the writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas himself were to suffer a similar fate as those of Molina.
Now that we have seen specifically what Bânezism and Molinism teach and have discussed their respective merits pro and con, I should like to present my own understanding and partial solution to the problem. The problem briefly stated is in what sense can the paradoxical Catholic truths of the omnipotence of God and genuine human freedom be reconciled? Or in another way, in what manner does divine grace affect and effect salutary human acts?

The purpose of God giving us moral free will is to enable us to freely respond to God's initial acts of love toward us. Ultimately by the continuous free response to God's love (grace), as manifested through Christ and His Church, we become increasingly more like Him. And eventually we are enabled to be free only to do His will and therefore are completely sanctified. As is implicit in the previous sentence, sanctification can only be accomplished in and through, by and with, Christ. It is only in Christ that the fullness of the Kingdom of Heaven is achieved. Negatively speaking, we can abuse our freedom and separate ourselves from God's friendship,
and eventually "achieve" hell. But it is most important to recognize the fact that in spite of our freedom it is always God who has the last word as well as the first.

God not only creates our free will but constantly seeks to lead us to Him by enticing our wills to do good acts. Because of His eternal love for us and His eternal desire to have us share His life of perfection with Him, He initiates within us every good desire. But of course we are free to reject these initial impulses and in no sense are we blindly lured to do His will. If however we consent to these impulses of love they become efficacious, though the act of consent may involve a real struggle on our part against the evil impulses which we also have.

While we have genuine freedom then, we cannot escape the fact that it is God who is our Creator, Redeemer, Sanctifier, and Judge. It is God who establishes the laws by which our freedom may be exercised. If we exercise our free wills properly then we gain the friendship of God. (This friendship is granted to us on the condition that we freely respond to His love for us. In the last analysis it is nothing that we really earn or deserve.) On the other hand if we reject God's love and friendship then we can truthfully say that we deserve separation from God because His friendship can be ours if we really want it enough to cooperate with God and
receive it. God makes available to us every possible means to be with Him. That God is personally concerned about us and wishes to help us exercise our freedom correctly is more than abundantly clear by the Incarnation, teaching, Passion, Death, Resurrection, and the Ascension of our Lord, as well as the descent of and the constant outpouring of the Holy Spirit on the ecclesia of God.

Those who have experienced God's friendship know that it is only through the grace of God that they are enabled to maintain it. And yet their wills in spite of the constant outpouring of grace are still free to reject it, and indeed do from time to time as they sin sufficiently to warrant it. We cannot escape the eschatological truths of divine judgement, and eternal rewards (in as much as they are derived from the merits of Christ) and eternal punishment.

While we are constantly under the merciful, loving and just surveillance of God, we are neither overly protected in the sense that we have no freedom nor are we abandoned as orphans. If the above be true then it follows that God indeed is omnipotent (but not in the sense that He can do anything. He is only omnipotent in the positive sense that He can only do that which is in accord with His perfect nature.). Man has been given moral freedom so that he might truly love God and become His
adopted sons, not puppets. This allows for evil and ultimate damnation. But it is God who chose it to be so and it is God who is personally running the universe and it is God who consummates it.

To me the omnipotence of God is manifested in His granting of free will both to angelic and human beings, since it means (humanly speaking) that God is supremely confident that His will will ultimately triumph. Indeed, His triumphant will has already been expressed in the Christ-event and continues to do so in His Church. It must be acknowledged that at first glance it would seem that God by granting man free will seems to be limiting His omnipotence. But from God's point of view this is not the case, since He did not have to grant free will (and allow evil). This act of God was done freely and solely out of love for His creatures.

Finally the question is raised, "How could God being omniscient, and therefore knowing many creatures will be lost to Him, allow free will?" In a not so direct answer, one must state that it is no injustice on God's part. He has given us far more than we deserve to fulfil our destinies with Him. God is more than fair with us. If we are lost it really is our fault and not His.
CHAPTER V: TWO SIXTEENTH CENTURY SPANISH SAINTS

Now that we have been exposed to a scholastic treatment of the problem of grace and human freedom in a sixteenth century Spanish setting, I next propose to study the problem by analyzing the writings of and about two of the Church's greatest Spanish saints of the same period. The two are Saint Ignatius of Loyola and Saint Teresa of Avila. These two are especially appropriate in as much as Saint Ignatius influenced the life of Luis de Molina and Saint Teresa influenced the life of Domingo Báñez.

Saint Ignatius, founder of the Society of Jesus, was born of a noble family in the castle of Loyola near the southern edge of the Pyrenees about 1491. As a young man he became a soldier serving under the Duke of Nagera. In 1521 he received a wound in his right leg which disabled him for many months. During this period he read about the life of Christ and the lives of many


76Voltz, p. 247.
saints. These narratives were the sacramentals that aroused in Saint Ignatius' mind the desire to become a soldier for the Lord. When the Saint had sufficiently recovered his health, he went to Montserrat to the Benedictine monastery which enshrines the image of Our Lady of Montserrat. There he made a general confession of his sins and hung up his sword at the altar of Our Lady. After exchanging clothes with a beggar, he went to Manresa. Here he spent a year in retirement (1522-1523) where he devoted his time to prayer and mortification. During this period he had mystical experiences which led him to write his famous **Spiritual Exercises**. Leaving Manresa, Saint Ignatius went to Rome and then to Jerusalem living solely on alms. After these journeys he returned to Spain and studied at Barcelona, Alcalá, and Salamanca (1524-1528). Here he made a deep impression upon his fellow students.

Leaving Salamanca, he spent the next seven years chiefly at the University of Paris. At Paris he formed the nucleus of the Society of Jesus in 1534 which included Saint Francis Xavier and Blessed Peter Faber. There they made vows of chastity and poverty and vowed to travel to Jerusalem if possible. The life of the Society as envisioned by Saint Ignatius was to be spent in apostolic work. In 1537 Saint Ignatius and several others
went to Rome where they were ordained priests; they offered themselves and their immediate services to the Pope since adverse circumstances made it impossible for them to go to Jerusalem. In 1540 the Society was solemnly approved by Pope Paul III and Saint Ignatius became its first general. The rest of his life he spent principally in organizing his Order which was rapidly growing. His chief goals for the Society were to reform the Church from within, mainly by education, to bring the Church to the newly discovered pagan world, and to war against heresy. 77

Saint Teresa of Avila was born in 1515 of a well-to-do Spanish family. She was educated by Augustinian monks and in 1533 she entered the Carmelite convent at Avila. Due to illness she was obliged to return to her family for a while but later returned to the convent and commenced to lead the rather lax spiritual life which the convent encouraged. However, in 1555, while praying before a statue of Christ being scourged at the pillar, she became converted to a life of perfection. Her mystical life began shortly thereafter with divine locutions and the vision of the Lord. During this period she received her first experiences of estatic union with God.

So that she might lead a more mortified life, she wished to found a new convent based on the primitive rules of the Carmelite Order. However, she received much opposition to her ideas from her superiors. Nevertheless in 1562 the convent of Saint Joseph was established at Avila. Here she was to enjoy the most quiet period of her life. It was here that she wrote her first book, *The Way of Perfection*. From 1667 to her death she was principally active in establishing houses of the primitive rule for both nuns and friars. The members of these convents were called Discalced or Barefoot Carmelites. Saint John of the Cross was of no small assistance in carrying out Saint Teresa's plans. In spite of continuing opposition from the unreformed Carmelites and Church authorities, her work continued and her spiritual life flourished. In 1572 she wrote that she had attained a state of "spiritual marriage". Also during this period by command of her confessors she wrote her *Life, Foundations, The Spiritual Castle*, and several smaller works. In 1582 after her last foundation at Burgos, she became acutely ill and died. In 1662 she was canonized, the same year as Saint Ignatius.78

Because of their emphasis on the mystical life, one might suspect that Saint Ignatius and Saint Teresa

78*ibid*, p. 1332.
deprecated formal learning, at least to an extent. This is hardly the case. Saint Ignatius deeply felt the need for a sound classical and theological background in order that he might better understand the Catholic Faith and be in a position to communicate the Faith to others. As a soldier of Christ no better weapons could he have than a sound faith based upon a profound spiritual life.

In the course of his formal studies Saint Ignatius received the Doctor of Philosophy degree with distinction in 1534 after three and a half years study at the University of Paris. His diploma reads as follows:

To all to whom the present letter shall come, the Rector and the University of Paris, health in the Savior of all men.

Whereas all who hold the Catholic faith are bound, both by the natural law of justice and by the divine law, to give faithful witness to the truth, it is, moreover, fitting that ecclesiastic, especially professors of the various sciences, whose duty it is to search into the truth in all things and teach it to others, should in nothing deviate from the path of truth and reason, either through love or favor, or from any other motive whatsoever. Desiring, therefore, to give thereby witness to the truth, we make it known by tenor of the present letters, to all and each whom it may concern, that our well-beloved and beloved Doctor, Ignatius of Loyola, of the diocese of Panpeluna, Master of Arts, has with honor and glory obtained the degree of Doctor, in the illustrious Faculty of Arts at Paris, after having passed difficult examinations, in the year of Our Lord 1534, after Easter, according to the statutes of the said Faculty of Arts and with the usual solemnities. In attestation to which we have set our grand seals to the present letters.

Given at Paris, in our Assembly General, solemnly held at St. Mathurin in the year of Our
Lord 1534, the 14th. of the month of March.
Leroux.79

After receiving his doctorate, Saint Ignatius continued with his formal education in theology.

During the course of his studies Saint Ignatius suffered a great deal due to lack of adequate finances which also contributed to further ill health. After such exasperating experiences he was determined that those who had served with him as soldiers of Christ in the Society of Jesus would not be without adequate funds. Pedro de Rivadeneira, a contemporary of the Saint, wrote the following:

Porque afirmaba que donde hay suma pobreza no es fácil atender al estudio de las ciencias, y que con el cuidado de mantener el cuerpo se pierde mucho tiempo que se había de poner en cultivar el entendimiento. Y, así, dejó en las constituciones ordenado que los colegios donde los nuestros estudian puedan tener renta en común. La cual no deroga nada a la santa pobreza, y ayuda mucho a alcanzar la doctrina que para mayor gloria de nuestro Señor se pretende; y porque también él había sido impedido en sus estudios de las devociones y gustos de cosas celestiales, que sin tiempo se le venían al pensamiento y le ocupaban el entendimiento, proveyó que en el tiempo de los estudios los hermanos de la Compañía no se dejen llevar del fervor del espíritu de manera que les desvie de sus ejercicios de letras. Sino que así sus meditaciones y oración como las ocupaciones con los prójimos sean tasadas y medidas con la discreción que aquel tiempo de estudios requiere. Las enfermedades muchas que tuvo le debilitaron y menoscabaron su salud. Por esto tuvo

especial cuidado, todo el tiempo de su vida, de la salud de todos sus hijos, y dejó a los superiores muy encomendado en las Constituciones que mirasen por ella y que procurasen que los trabajos de nuestros estudiantes, con la intermisión, pudiesen durar. Vio asimismo que él al principio había abrazado en un mismo tiempo el estudio de muchas facultades juntas, y que esto le había sido muy costoso; y, porque no errasemos también nosotros, dejó bien ordenados los tiempos y ocupaciones de los estudios. De manera que ni queden faltos, ni se estude primero lo que ha de ser postrero, ni se sigan compendios ni atajos, que suelen ser causa de llegar más tarde que cuando se va por el camino real. De suerte que él de lo que pedeció y en lo que fue tentado, aprendió por experiencia como había de enderezar y ayudar a otros cuando lo son.

Y a este propósito solía él mismo decir la mucha pobreza que tuvo en sus estudios, y el gran cuidado con que estudió, y decíalo con mucha razón. Porque primeramente él pasó siempre con gran pobreza, como habemos dicho; y ésta voluntaria y no tomada por obediencia (como lo hacen algunos religiosos), sino de su propia y espontanea voluntad. Lo segundo, acosado y afligido de tantas enfermedades y tan recias y continuas como se ha visto. Demás de esto, no teniendo por blanco ni por fin de sus estudios, ni la riqueza, ni la honra, ni otra ninguna de las cosas temporales, que suelen ser estímulo a los hombres para sus estudios y alentarlos y animarlos en sus trabajos. Tampoco le era alivio lo que a otros le suele dar, que es el gusto que reciben de lo que van aprendiendo; el cual suele ser tan sabroso que muchas veces, por no perderle, se pierde la salud y la vida, sin poder los hombres apartarse de sus libros. Mas Ignacio, así por su natural condición, como por su crecida edad en que comenzó los estudios, y también porque había ya gustado de la suavidad de los licores divinos y de la conversación celestial, no tenía gusto en los estudios ni otro entretenimiento humano que a ellos le convidase. También en todo el tiempo de sus estudios tuvo muchas ocupaciones, persecuciones gravísimas, infinitos cuidados y perplejidades que le cortavan el hilo de ellos, o a lo menos se le embarazaban y impedían. Y con todas estas dificultades estudió casi doce años continuos con mucho cuidado y solicitud, abnegando a sí mismo y
sujetándose a la voluntad del Señor, al cual en todo y por todo deseaba agradar. Y para hacerlo mejor y alcanzar lo que deseaba, procuraba con todas sus fuerzas de cercenar y apartar de sí todo lo que de su parte para ello le podía estorbar. Y, así, cuando estudiaba el curso de artes, se concertó con el maestro Fabro que a la hora de estudiar no hablasen cosas de Dios, porque si acaso entraba en alguna plática o coloquio espiritual, luego se arretaba y se engolfaba tan adentro de la mar que, con el soplo del cielo que le daba, iba navegando de manera que se le pasavan muchas horas, sin poder volver atrás, y con esto se perdía el provecho que había de sacar de sus estudios. Y por la misma causa, en este tiempo del curso de la filosofía no quiso ocuparse en dar los ejercicios espirituales, ni en otros negocios que le pudiesen embarazar. Y como en este tiempo tuviese mucha paz, y ninguno le persiguiése, dijo un amigo suyo: ¿No veis, Ignacio, lo que pasa? ¿Qué mudanza es ésta? ¿Desde de tan gran tormenta tanta bonanza? Los que poco ha os querían tragar vivo y os escupían en la cara, ahora os alaban y os tienen por bueno; ¿qué novedad es ésta?». Al cual respondió Ignacio: «No os maravilléis de eso, dejadme acabar el curso, y lo veréis todo al revés; ahora callan porque yo callo, y porque yo estoy quieto están quedos; en queriendo hablar o hacer algo, luego se levantará la mar hasta el cielo y bajará hasta los abismos, y parecerá que nos ha de hundir y tragar». Y así fué como él lo dijo, porque, acabado el curso de la filosofía, comenzó a tratar con más calor del aprovechamiento de las almas, y luego se levantó una tormenta grandísimas, como en el capítulo siguiente se contará.80

Certainly Saint Teresa was not the scholar that Saint Ignatius was to become. Nevertheless, with Saint Ignatius she believed that those who have mastered sound reasoning ability and have acquired a good foundation in the Faith were especially capable of leading people to

80 Pedro de Rivadeneira, Vida De Ignacio De Loyola (Buenos Aires, Mexico: Espasa-Calpe Argentina, S.A., 1946), 74-75.
God as revealed in Christ and to help those like herself who had become proficient in prayer to better understand their life with God. In her autobiography Saint Teresa writes:

Although learning may not seem necessary in a director, my opinion has always been and always will be that every Christian should endeavour to consult some learned person, if he can; and the greater his learning the better. Those who take the path of prayer have great need of learning; and the more spiritual they are, the greater the need.

Let us not deceive ourselves by saying that learned men who do not practise prayer cannot be suitable directors for those who do. I have consulted many such, and for some years now have sought them out most eagerly because of my increased need of them. I have always got on well with them; for even though some of them have no experience, they are not enemies of the spirit or ignorant of its nature, for they are familiar with the Holy Scripture, where the truth about it can always be found. I firmly believe that a person who practises prayer and consults learned men will never be carried away by any delusions of the devil, unless he be willingly deceived. I believe that the powers of evil are very much afraid of learned men who are humble and virtuous. They know that such people will find them out and defeat them.

I say this because some people hold that learned men cannot help us on the path of prayer unless they are also spiritual. I have just said that a spiritual director is necessary. But if he is not a learned man that is a serious drawback. Great help can be obtained by consulting a learned man who is virtuous, even if he is not spiritual. Such a person will be of great use to us. For God will instruct him what he shall teach, and may even make him spiritual in order that he may be of assistance to us. I do not say this without experience; it has happened to me in at least two cases. I repeat that anyone in religion who puts his soul in the hands of a single director, without making sure that he is a man of this kind, will be making a great mistake, since he also owes obedience to his own Superior. His director
may be lacking in all the three qualities I spoke of, and that will be no light cross for the peni­tent to bear, without his also voluntarily sub­jecting his understanding to a man whose under­standing is poor. I at least, have never been able to bring myself to do this, nor do I think it right.

If the beginner is a person living in the world, let him praise God that he is free to choose whom he will obey, and let him be sure not to give up his justifiable freedom. Let him rather remain without a director until he finds the right one, whom the Lord will provide if his life is founded in humility, and if he has the de­sire to succeed. I praise God - and we women and unlearned folk must render Him infinite thanks - that there are persons who have laboured so hard to reach the truth, of which we ignorant people know nothing.

I am often astonished that learned men, and monks in particular, will give me the benefit of what they have worked so hard to acquire, and at no more cost to me than the mere asking. To think that there may be people who will not take advan­tage of this! God forbid that this should be! I see these learned men bearing the very great trials of the religious life with its penances, its poor food, and its yoke of obedience - really, it sometimes makes me quite ashamed to think of it! They get scant sleep, and nothing but trials and crosses. Yet I think it would be very wrong for anyone to forego the benefits of such a life through his own fault. Then, possibly, some of us who are exempt from these trials, who have the food dropped into our mouths - as they say - and live at our ease, sometimes think that, because we practise prayer a little more than they, we have a right to consider ourselves superior to them.81

But it certainly would be a gross injustice to Saint Ignatius to infer from the above quotation of Saint Teresa that Saint Ignatius was not well schooled in

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prayer nor that he did not practice it continually after his conversion at Montserrat. One need only to refer to his famous Spiritual Exercises to demonstrate that he at least knew the fundamentals of the prayer life which, faithfully complied with, would prepare one for a greater love of God and man. At the very beginning of his work Saint Ignatius writes:

Annotations [.] To give some understanding of the spiritual exercises which follow, and to enable him who is to give and him who is to receive them to help themselves [.] First Annotation. The first Annotation is that by this name of Spiritual exercises is meant every way of examining one's conscience, of meditating, of contemplating, of praying vocally and mentally, and of performing other spiritual actions, as will be said later. For as strolling, walking and running are bodily exercises, so every way of preparing and disposing the soul to rid itself of all the disordered tendencies, and, after it is rid, to seek and find the Divine Will as to the management of one's life for the salvation of the soul, is called a Spiritual Exercise.82

I think one of the chief differences between Saint Ignatius and Saint Teresa regarding the nature of prayer is that Saint Ignatius, while desiring sanctity for himself, saw prayer as only a steppingstone toward helping others (both religious and secular in all walks of life) to attain sanctity. Saint Teresa, on the other hand, was principally interested in sanctifying herself.

and then later on others who wished to follow the Discalced Carmelite Rule. I would not say that her outlook on the nature of prayer was in any way defective, but only that she considered the end of her spiritual exercises in a much more limited sense than Saint Ignatius. Both Saints wanted reformed human lives and would begin with themselves. It might be appropriate to state that the difference between Saint Ignatius and Saint Teresa in this matter was a matter of vocation. Also it would seem that Saint Teresa had less confidence in her own capabilities than did Saint Ignatius, principally because she was a woman and relatively uneducated. Perhaps the following passage adequately describes Saint Teresa's viewpoint:

There is another very common temptation; and that is, when one begins to enjoy the calm and fruit of prayer, to wish everyone else to be very spiritual too. The wish is not wrong; but attempts to bring it about may not be good unless carried out with great discretion and in such a disguised way that one does not appear to be trying to teach. If a person is to do any good in such matters he must be very strong in the virtues, so as not to put temptations in the way of others. This I discovered for myself, and so I understand the danger. For when - as I said before - I persuaded others to practise prayer, on the one hand they heard me say so much about the great blessings that come of it and, on the other, they saw how poor I was in virtues although I prayed. Thus I led them into temptations and foolish conduct; and they had some excuse for this, since, as they afterwards told me, they failed to see how these two things could be compatible. For this reason they imagined that there was nothing wrong in certain habits that were definitely evil, for they saw me practise them myself at a time when they had a good opinion of me.
This is the devil's work; he seems to make use of the virtues in us to sanction, in so far as he can, his own evil purposes. However small our wickedness may be, he must gain a great deal by it, especially when it is practised in a religious House. How much more must he have profited then from my wickedness, seeing that it was very great! Thus in several years only three persons benefited by what I said to them; while in the three or four years since the Lord has strengthened me in virtue many have derived profit by me, as I shall relate hereafter. Such lapses bring us another great disadvantage also: the loss suffered by our own soul. For the utmost that we can attempt at the beginning is to look after the soul, and to reflect that there is nothing in the world but it and God; and this is a very useful thing to remember.83

Also Saint Teresa as a woman did not consider herself a director of souls. As we have already seen, she placed much emphasis upon a theological education for a good spiritual director. She would apparently include as a part of that education a knowledge of the rudiments of the spiritual life and also how to direct souls who are at various stages of spiritual development even if they themselves as directors are not spiritually proficient, for she writes the following:

The beginner requires advice, so that he may see where his greatest benefit lies. To this end a director is most necessary. But he must be an experienced man, or he will make many mistakes, and may guide a soul without understanding its ways or allowing it to understand itself. For since the soul knows that it is most meritorious to obey a director, it dare not transgress the commands it receives. I have met souls so constrained and tormented by the inexperience of

83Saint Teresa, p. 91.
their masters that I have been really sorry for them. There was one who did not know how to act for herself; for directors who do not understand spirituality afflict their penitents in body and soul, and block their progress. Another person who talked to me had been kept in bondage by her director for eight years; he would not allow her to leave the stage of self-examination, and yet the Lord had raised her to the prayer of quiet. Consequently she was suffering great trials. This self-examination must never be neglected, however; for there is no soul on this path who is such a giant that he does not often need to turn back and be a child at the breast again. This must never be forgotten. Indeed I shall repeat it many times, since it is most important. For there is no state of prayer so high that it is not necessary often to return to the beginning, and the questions of sin and self-knowledge are the bread which we must eat with even the most delicate dish on this road of prayer. Without this bread no one could be nourished, but it must be eaten in moderation. Once a soul finds itself exhausted and clearly understands that there is no good in it; once it feels itself ashamed before so great a King, and sees how little it pays towards the great debt it owes Him, what need is there to waste time on this? It will be better for us to go on to other dishes that the Lord puts before us, and that we should be wrong to neglect. His Majesty knows better than we what kind of food suits us.

Therefore it is very important that the director shall be prudent - I mean a man of sound understanding - and that he shall also be experienced. If he has learning as well, that is a great advantage. But if these three qualities cannot be found together, the first two are the more important, because we can always find learned men to consult when we have need of them. I mean that learned men are of little use to beginners, unless they also practise prayer. I do not mean that beginners should not have conversations with men of learning, for I would rather see spirituality based on truth than accompanied by prayer. Learning is a great thing, for it teaches us who know little, and gives us light. Then, when we come to the truths in Holy Scripture, we act as
we should. God deliver us from foolish devo-
tions!  
Saint Teresa definitely believed that it is of the utmost
importance that a good spiritual director be experienced,
meaning that he must have a thorough knowledge of the
stages of the spiritual life and the various stages of
spiritual growth that his particular penitent has
achieved, so as to carefully guide him or her to a closer
union with God. However, Saint Teresa had previously
said that in her opinion a competent spiritual director
need not be one who is spiritual but only one who is vir-
tuous and learned.  
This appears to be a contradiction
in her thinking, but perhaps she means by a spiritual man
one who makes the life of contemplative prayer his chief
occupation.

84 Ibid., pp. 93-94.
85 Ibid., p. 95.
CHAPTER VI: THE SAINTS' UNDERSTANDING OF GRACE AND FREE WILL

How did Saint Teresa and Saint Ignatius understand grace and free will? Let us remember once again that their writings were not of an academic nature, but rather couched in simple language designed to help learned and unlearned people to lead better spiritual lives.

Saint Teresa has much to say about the grace of God working upon the soul and the role of the human will in cooperating with that grace. The following famous quotation from Saint Teresa's autobiography leaves no doubt in my mind at least that she believed in the complete free self-determination of the human will. To Teresa the will is inspired by prevenient grace to achieve sanctity by constantly cooperating with God's abundant love and friendship made available only by Our Lord's Incarnation, Passion, Resurrection, Ascension, and the constant outpouring of the Blessed Holy Spirit through our Blessed Lord's Mystical Body, the One, Holy, Catholic, and Apostolic Church.

To speak then of the early experiences of those who are determined to pursue this blessing
and succeed in this enterprise - I will continue later with what I had begun to say about mystical theology, as I believe it is called - it is in those early stages that the labour is hardest, for it is they who labour and the Lord who gives the increase; whereas in the further stages of prayer the chief thing is joy. Nevertheless, at the beginning, the middle, and the end, all bear their crosses, though not all crosses are alike. For all who follow Christ must tread the road that He trod, unless they want to be lost. But how blessed are their labours that even in this life are so superabundantly rewarded!

Here I shall have to make use of a comparison through, being a woman and writing only what I have been commanded to write, I should like to avoid it. But this spiritual language is so difficult to use for those like myself who have no learning, that I must find some other means of expression. It may be that my comparisons will not very often be effective, in which case your Reverence will be amused at my stupidity. It strikes me that I have read or heard this one before. But as I have a bad memory I do not know where it occurred or what it illustrated. But for the present it will serve my purpose.

A beginner must look on himself as one setting out to make a garden for his Lord's pleasure, on most unfruitful soil which abounds in weeds. His Majesty roots up the weeds and will put in good plants instead. Let us reckon that this is already done when a soul decides to practise prayer and has begun to do so. We have then, as good gardeners, with God's help to make these plants grow, and to water them carefully so that they do not die, but produce flowers, which give out a good smell, to delight this Lord of ours. Then He will often come to take His pleasure in this garden and enjoy these virtues.

Now let us see how this garden is to be watered, so that we may understand what we have to do, and what labour it will cost us, also whether the gain will outweigh the effort, or how long it will take. It seems to me that the garden may be watered in four different ways. Either the water must be drawn from a well, which is very laborious; or by a water-wheel and buckets, worked by a windlass - I have sometimes drawn it in this way, which is less laborious than the other, and brings up more water - or from a stream or spring,
which waters the ground much better, for the soil then retains more moisture and needs watering less often, which entails far less work for the gardener; or by heavy rain, when the Lord waters it Himself without any labour of ours; and this is an incomparably better method than all the rest.

Now to apply these four methods of watering, by which this garden is to be maintained and without which it will fail. This is my purpose, and will, I think, enable me to explain something about the four stages of prayer, to which the Lord has, in His kindness, sometimes raised my soul. May He graciously grant that I may speak in such a way as to be of use to one of the persons who commanded me to write this, whom the Lord has advanced in four months far beyond the point that I have reached in seventeen years. He prepared himself better than I, and therefore, without any labour on his part, his garden is watered by all these four means; although it only receives the last water drop by drop. But, as things are going, with the Lord's help, his garden will soon be submerged. If my way of explaining all this seems crazy to him, he is welcome to laugh at me.

We may say that beginners in prayer are those who draw the water up out of the well; which is a great labour, as I have said. For they find it very tiring to keep the senses recollected, when they are used to a life of distraction. Beginners have to accustom themselves to pay no attention to what they see or hear, and to put this exercise into practice during their hours of prayer, when they must remain in solitude, thinking whilst they are alone of their past life. Although all must do this many times, the advanced as well as the beginners, all need not do so equally, as I shall explain later. At first they are distressed because they are not sure that they regret their sins. Yet clearly they do, since they have now sincerely resolved to serve God. They should endeavour to meditate on the life of Christ, and thus the intellect will grow tired. Up to this point we can advance ourselves, though with God's help of course, for without it, as everyone knows, we cannot think one good thought.

This is what I mean by beginning to draw water from the well - and God grant there may be water in it! But at least this does not depend on us, who have only to draw it up and do what
we can to water the flowers. But God is so good that when for reasons known to His Majesty – and perhaps for our greater profit – He wishes the well to be dry, we, like good gardeners, must do what we can ourselves. Meanwhile He preserves the flowers without water, and in this way He makes our virtues grow. Here by water I mean tears, or if there be none, a tenderness and inward feeling of devotion. But what shall a man do here who finds that for many days on end he feels nothing but dryness, dislike, distaste and so little desire to go and draw water that he would give it up altogether if he did not remember that he is pleasing and serving the Lord of the garden; if he did not want all his service to be in vain, and if he did not also hope to gain something for all the labour of lowering the bucket so often into the well and bringing it up empty? It will often happen that he cannot so much as raise his arms to the task, or think a single good thought. For by this drawing of water I mean, of course, working with the understanding.

Well, what, I repeat, shall the gardener do now? He shall be glad and take comfort, and consider it the greatest favour that he is working in the garden of so mighty an Emperor. He knows that He is pleasing his Master in this, and his purpose must be to please Him and not himself. Let him praise Him greatly, for having placed such trust in him, and for seeing that though he receives no payment he is carefully carrying out the task assigned to him. Let him help the Master also to bear His Cross, and think how He carried it all through His life. Let him not seek his kingdom here, nor ever abandon prayer, and let him resolve never to let Christ fall beneath His Cross, even though this dryness may last all his life. The time will come when he will receive his whole reward at once. Let him not be afraid that his labour is in vain. He is serving a good Master, who is watching him. Let him pay no attention to evil thoughts, but remember that the devil put them into the mind of Saint Jerome also, in the desert.

These labours bring their reward. I endured them for many years, and when I drew one drop of water from this blessed well I thought of it as a mercy from God. I know that they are very great labours, and that more courage is needed for them than for most worldly trials. But I
have clearly seen that God does not fail to reward them highly, even in this life. A single one of those hours in which He has allowed me to taste of His sweetness has seemed to me afterwards a certain recompense for all the afflictions I bore during my long perseverance in prayer.

I believe that it is our Lord's pleasure to send these torments and many other temptations, which often occur at the beginning and sometimes later also, in order to test His lovers, and to discover whether they can drink of the cup and help Him to bear His Cross, before He entrusts them with great treasures. I believe that it is for our good that His Majesty chooses to lead us in this way, so that we may thoroughly realize our own worthlessness. For the favours that follow are so exalted that before granting them to us He would have us first know by experience our own wretched state in order that ours may not be the fate of Lucifer.

Is there anything that You do, O Lord, that is not for the greater good of that soul which You know to be already Yours, and which places itself in Your power to follow You wherever You go, even to death on the Cross, and which is determined to help You carry that Cross and not to leave You alone with it? No one who discerns this resolution in himself has anything to fear. You spiritual persons have no reason to be distressed. Once you have reached so high a state as this, in which you wish to converse alone with God, and abandon all worldly amusements, the greater part of the work is done. Praise the Lord for it, and trust in His kindness, for He has never failed His friends. Blindfold the eyes of the mind, which asks why He gives devotion to this person after a few days, and none to you after so many years. Let us believe that it is all for our greater good. Let His Majesty guide us where He will. We are not our own now, but His. He shows us a great favour when He grants us a desire to dig in His garden, and to be so near its Lord. For He is certainly near us. If it be His will that these plants and flowers shall grow, some of them with water drawn from this well and some without it, what is that to me? Do as You will, O Lord, and let me not offend You. If You have, of Your kindness alone, given me any virtues, do not let them perish. I wish to suffer, Lord,
because You suffered. Fulfil Your will in me in every way, and may it please Your Majesty that a thing of such high price as Your love shall never be given to people who serve You only for what You give them.

It is of especial note - and I say this because I know it from experience - that the soul which begins resolutely to tread this path of mental prayer, and can manage not greatly to care about consolations and tenderness in devotion, neither rejoicing when the Lord gives them nor being discouraged when He withholds them, has already gone a large part of the way. Though it may often stumble, it need have no fear of falling back, for its building has been begun on firm foundations. The love of the Lord does not consist in tears or in these consolations and tendernesses which we so much desire and in which we find comfort, but in our serving Him in justice, fortitude, and humility. Anything else seems to me rather an act of receiving than of giving on our part.

As for a poor woman like myself, a weak and irresolute creature, it seems right that the Lord should lead me on with favours, as He now does, in order that I may bear certain afflictions with which He has been pleased to burden me. But when I hear servants of God, men of weight, learning, and understanding, worrying so much because He is not giving them devotion, it makes me sick to listen to them. I do not say that they should not accept it if God grants it to them, and value it too, for then His Majesty will see that it was good for them, but they should not be distressed when they do not receive it. They should realize that since the Lord does not give it to them they do not need it. They should exercise control over themselves and go right ahead. Let them take it from me that all this fuss is a mistake, as I have myself seen and proved. It is an imperfection in them; they are not advancing in freedom of spirit but hanging back through weakness.

I do not say this so much for beginners - though I do stress it, since it is most important for them to start with this freedom and resolution - but for others. For there must be many who have made a beginning and never succeeded in reaching the end. It is, I believe, mainly due to their not having embraced the Cross from the first, that they are now distressed and
think they are making no progress. When their understanding ceases to work it is more than they can bear, though perhaps even then their will is putting on weight and gaining new strength without their knowing it. We must realize that the Lord pays no heed to these things, and that though they seem faults to us they are not so. His Majesty knows our wretchedness and the lowliness of our nature better than we do ourselves. He knows that all the time these souls are longing to think of Him and love Him for ever. This is the resolution that He wants; the other affictions that we bring upon ourselves only serve to disturb the soul which, if it is incapable of profiting from one hour's prayer, will be disabled by them for four. Very often - I have very great experience of this and know that it is true, for I have made careful observations and afterwards discussed them with spiritual persons - this arises from physical indisposition, for our condition is so wretched that this poor imprisoned soul shares in the miseries of the body. Seasonal changes and the alterations of the humours very often prevent it, for no fault of its own, from doing what it will and make it suffer in all kinds of ways. The more one tries to compel it at these times, the worse it gets and the longer the trouble lasts. Let us use discretion to see when this is the cause; the poor soul must not be smothered. People in this state must understand that they are ill and change their hours of prayer, and very often these changes will have to be continued for some days. They must endure this banishment as best they can. It is very unfortunate for a soul that loves God to find itself in this state of misery and unable to do what it will because of its evil guest, the body.

I spoke of discretion because sometimes the devil is the cause. It is never right, therefore, invariably either to abandon prayer when the mind is much distracted and perturbed, or to torture the soul into doing what is beyond its power. There are other, exterior acts, such as works of charity or reading, although at times the soul will be unable to perform even these. Let it then serve the body, for the love of God, so that on many other occasions the body may serve the soul. Let it take some pious recreation, preferably a really religious conversation or a walk in the country, as the confessor may
advise. In all these things it is important to have experience, for this shows us what is suitable for us, but let God be served in every way. His yoke is sweet, and it is of the utmost consequence that the soul shall not be dragged, as they say, but gently led, so that it may make the greater progress.

I repeat my advice, then, and I do not mind how many times I do so. It is most important, I say, that no one should be distressed or afflicted because of aridities or disturbances or distractions in his thoughts. If he wishes to gain freedom of spirit and not always to be troubled, let him begin by not being afraid of the Cross. Then he will see how Our Lord will help him to carry it, and will advance joyfully and gain profit from everything. It is clear now that if the well yields no water we can put none in. It is true too that we must not be careless, and fail to see when there is some there, for at such times it is God's wish by means of it to multiply our virtues.86

Now let us see what Saint Ignatius has to say about the matter. The following quotation from Saint Ignatius' Spiritual Exercises should suffice.

Likewise, we ought not to speak so much with insistence on grace that the poison of discarding liberty be engendered.

So that of faith and grace one can speak as much as is possible with the Divine help for the greater praise of His Divine Majesty, but not in such way, nor in such manners, especially in our so dangerous times, that works and free will receive any harm, or be held for nothing.87

After comparing the two quotations from the writings of Saint Teresa and Saint Ignatius it is very difficult not to conclude that both Saints believed in the

86Ibid., pp. 77-83.

complete freedom of the human will and that in no way did they believe that one's will is physically premoved or determined to cooperate with God's grace as Domingo Báñez believed.

One might conclude, however, from the above quotation of Saint Ignatius that he gave a priority to the human freedom of the will to obtain salvation over that of God's grace. However, one must remember that the Saint was concerned with the doctrines of John Calvin and Martin Luther who taught that God's grace was the all important factor and that man's freedom was in essence nonexistent due to the Fall.

As far as the doctrine of Predestination itself is concerned, Saint Teresa does not directly mention it. But from what we have already read one can safely assume that she did not hold to any Calvinistic or Lutheran view since she with Saint Ignatius claims that man's free and undetermined will is necessary for salvation as well as God's grace. The following quotation I believe adequately supports this contention.

For if a beginner tries hard, with God's help, to gain the summit of perfection, I think he will never reach heaven alone, but will take many others with him. God will prize him as a good captain and give him his company; and the devil will put such perils and difficulties in his way that he will need not merely a little courage but a great
deal, also much help from God, if he is not to turn back.88

Though Saint Teresa herself was ignorant of many of the philosophical and theological terms of her learned contemporaries, one can see from the foregoing that if she had been asked if man had a part to play in his destiny, she would have answered in the affirmative.

Saint Ignatius directly speaks about the doctrine of Predestination in his Spiritual Exercises, but he feels it would be wise not to speak about it unless one has to and then with the utmost care since the doctrine in Reformation times was easily misunderstood. In his Spiritual Exercises we find the following:

Although there is much truth in the assertion that no one can save himself without being predestined and without having faith and grace; we must be very cautious in the manner of speaking and communicating with others about all these things.

Fifteenth Rule. We ought not, by way of custom, to speak much of predestination; but if in some way and at some times one speaks, let him so speak that the common people may not come into any error, as sometimes happens, saying: Whether I have to be saved or condemned is already determined, and no other thing can now be, through my doing well or ill; and with this, growing lazy, they become negligent in the works which lead to the salvation and the spiritual profit of their souls.89

88Saint Teresa, p. 77.
89Saint Ignatius, The Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius of Loyola, pp. 192-93.
To sum up Saint Teresa's and Saint Ignatius' viewpoints on grace and free will one can write that both upheld the doctrine that the efficacy of the grace of God is dependent upon man's acceptance or rejection of that grace. Also it has been demonstrated that both Saints believed in the doctrine of Predestination, not in a Calvinistic or Lutheran sense, but rather in the traditional Catholic sense according to which one is predestined to heaven or hell according to God's foreknowledge of one's free acceptance or rejection of His saving grace.

Neither Saint Ignatius nor Saint Teresa seemed to be troubled with the paradox that God predestines man and yet man has a definite part to play in his own predestination by God. It would seem that Saint Ignatius did not want to think or talk about it too much because of the dangers of the doctrine being misunderstood. Saint Teresa did not seem to be aware of any apparent inconsistency and therefore does not explicitly raise the question in her writing.

Both Saints were writing didactically. Both have experienced the overwhelming goodness, mercy, and love of God. Yet Saint Ignatius was principally concerned with teaching others the ground rules, so to speak, of obtaining union with God in this life and did not go into his personal experiences of mystical union with God. Saint Teresa, while also teaching others the necessary basic
steps of obtaining union with God in this life, did so with less detail than Saint Ignatius. She was chiefly concerned with telling others what it was like to be one with God and the various stages of that union that she had experienced. Saint Ignatius wrote his Spiritual Exercises eagerly for the benefit of others. Saint Teresa wrote her autobiography reluctantly at the command of her spiritual directors, among them Domingo Báñez. But she also had close contact with and a great admiration for the Jesuits. 90

One is tempted at first to see Saint Teresa as a Báñezist but to the best of my ability I have been unable to detect any Báñezism in her writing. It does not seem an unwarranted conclusion to me that while Father Báñez's influence over Saint Teresa's life was considerable, he was principally her spiritual director and as such did not become involved in technical theological discourses with his famous penitent.

Saint Ignatius' influence over Father Molina was indeed somewhat different. Molina was a spiritual and theological son of the Saint and Saint Ignatius' strong emphasis upon the role of genuine human freedom in man's destiny had a pronounced effect upon Molina's thinking,

90Saint Teresa, p. 40.
especially as found in his treatise on grace and free will contained in his *Concordia*. 
CHAPTER VII: GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

This dissertation has described attempts to better understand the nature of the paradox of God's omnipotence and man's genuine free will. The controversy between Luis de Molina and Domingo Báñez in sixteenth century Spain gives one an excellent opportunity to see the difficulties involved in understanding the paradox. To the Catholic Christian the real difficulty is the limitation of the finite human mind to fathom fully this paradox.

In spite of the bitter controversy engendered by Báñez and Molina over the mystery of God's omnipotence and man's free will, they have both rendered Catholic theology a great service by helping not only sixteenth century Spain to better understand the mystery but also succeeding generations to this present time. It can generally be stated that in the history of the Church Catholic that mysteries of the faith have come to be better understood and appreciated only as a result of controversies. For example, the Christological controversies of the early church have given Catholic Christendom a profound insight into the nature and person of Jesus.
New controversies being raised today regarding birth control and the "population explosion" are being used by trained theologians and laymen alike to gain new insights into the dignity and worth of man as a creature of God made in His image and his right as an express image of God to be procreated and become an inheritor of God's eternal kingdom through the merits and mediation of Our Blessed Lord and Redeemer Jesus the Christ.

After carefully analyzing Bănežism and Molinism I have attempted to show that two of the Church's greatest Saints, Saint Ignatius of Loyola and Saint Teresa of Avila, also of sixteenth century Spain, also dealt with the problem of grace and free will, but in a less complicated and simple manner as is often the manner of the sanctified. We have seen that with Bănež and Molina, Teresa and Ignatius are in perfect agreement in upholding as true that God is indeed omnipotent and yet somehow His omnipotence included the bestowal of genuine free will upon human beings.

To myself, an Anglican, this thesis has been particularly valuable, as I have been exposed to the paradox of grace and free will in an entirely new context, that is, within the history of the Roman communion. In these days of the remarkable if not miraculous ecumenical confrontations between the various divisions of the Christian church, it is my sincere hope that the knowledge I
have acquired from doing this work may in some small way help heal the breach between Anglicans and Roman Catholics. As a result of this paper I for one now have a greater understanding and appreciation of that great Church to which so many of us Anglicans ardently desire reunion.
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