The Russian Revolution of 1905 as Depicted by Contemporary American Reports, with Special Emphasis on the "Bloody Sunday" Incident of January 22, 1905

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THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION OF 1905 AS DEPICTED BY CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN REPORTS, WITH SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON THE "BLOODY SUNDAY" INCIDENT OF JANUARY 22, 1905

by

Patrick Kay Bidelman

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the School of Graduate Studies in partial fulfillment of the Degree of Master of Arts

Western Michigan University
Kalamazoo, Michigan
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On Sunday morning, January 22, 1905, a crowd of workers marched through the streets of St. Petersburg, Russia. They were led by a Russian Orthodox priest, Father George Gapon, who had a petition to grievances to present to Czar Nicholas II. As they converged on the square in front of the Winter Palace, they were fired upon by the Imperial troops. The result was a complete military victory for the autocracy and a casualty rate among the petitioners that has caused the incident to go down in history as "Bloody Sunday."

On Monday, January 23, newspapers throughout the United States reported the slaughter to the American people. Within the next few weeks, magazines, some of whom sent reporters to St. Petersburg, augmented the initial coverage with reports of their own. Throughout the year, as a matter of fact, interest in Russian affairs continued to mount. Periodicals expanded beyond a strict accounting of current events, and began to analyze such topics as the Russian personality, Russian minority groups, and so on.

The purpose of this study is to survey and record the information available to the thorough, intelligent reader in 1905. In other words, this paper attempts to determine what an American contemporary of "Bloody Sunday" could know about the massacre and its aftermath.
The turn of the century was an influential period in the development of the United States. Only seven years before "Bloody Sunday," the Spanish-American War had projected the United States into world affairs as a major power. During the following decade, the Chinese "Open Door" was initiated, an isthmian canal was commenced, the Caribbean was transformed into an American lake, President Roosevelt mediated the Russo-Japanese War, and the United States sent delegates to the conferences in Algeciras and the Hague. At home an era of reform was dawning. Trusts were attacked; muckrakers vilified the world of big business; income taxes, direct primaries, initiatives and referendums proliferated on the local level; a Department of Commerce and Labor was created; and the Pure Food and Drug and Meat Inspection acts were passed. Obviously, the early Twentieth Century was an excited, impressionable period in the history of America, and it was the response of this period to the "Bloody Sunday" incident that provided the topic for this paper.

One further point should be made. The American citizen of 1905 lived in an era without radio and television. Magazines and newspapers were his sole contact with the outside world. Therefore, the opinions he formed were necessarily based on the reports he received. The nature of those reports is the subject of this paper. In it is depicted a nation's sympathies, biases, and prejudices. As time progressed, new information was discovered, new interpretations appeared, and opinions changed, but the American of 1905 could not make use of later accounts. As the following is perused, one might
speculate on what actions could have been taken on the basis of the information available, and further reflect on what today's news media do to provide each American citizen with a fair chance to evaluate foreign situations.

The author acknowledges the assistance of Professors Willis Dunbar and Emanuel Nodel of the Western Michigan University History staff for their helpful criticisms and suggestions. Additional credit must also be given to the resources and friendliness of the libraries at Western Michigan University, Kalamazoo College, the City of Kalamazoo, and the City of Detroit. Of course, the opinions expressed are solely those of the author, whatever be their merits or shortcomings.
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INTRODUCTION

There can hardly be imagined a more tragic contrast than that of the extremely complicated situation inherited by Nicholas II and the complete nullity of the man who had to solve the problem. — Paul Milyukov

Nicholas II succeeded his father to the Russian throne in 1894. It was expected that he would be liberal and raise the "leaden coffin lid" of Alexander III's reactionary regime, but this expectation was not fulfilled. The new Czar preferred not to reign, but finding that impossible, he vowed to preserve the autocracy intact, and keep the "senseless dream" of representative government from despoiling the Russia he had inherited.

In 1896, the first of a series of strikes that plagued Nicholas' reign broke out in St. Petersburg. Two years later, the Russian Social Democratic Party was founded, and began to organize the disgruntled elements in Russia into a hard core body governed by the political and economic principles of Karl Marx. Also in 1898, the People's Will, a terrorist organization that had assassinated Alexander II in 1881, reorganized under the Social Revolutionary label. Its main precepts were agrarian revolution and renewed terrorism.

The following year student disorders began. These culminated in 1901 with the assassination of the Minister of Public Instruction, N. P. Bogolepov, who had been drafting disorderly students into the army. A year later, the Interior Minister, D. S. Sipyagin, was assassinated and replaced by V. K. Plehve.
Plehve, who was recommended by the reactionary head of the Holy
Synod, Constantine Pobedonostev, introduced a new era of oppression
in Russia. His policies alienated many of the moderate, as well as
the radical, elements in the empire. Among government officials,
only Sergei Witte, Finance Minister, opposed Plehve's policies. A
short time later, though, Witte was dismissed, and by 1903, the
number of persons convicted for political crimes was five times the
1894 total.

Concurrent with the domestic disturbances came a crisis in the
Far East. For centuries, Russia had been expanding in that direction,
and with the commencement of the trans-Siberian Railroad in 1891 and
the occupation of Port Arthur in 1898, her aspirations came into
direct conflict with Japan. Fortified with the bonds of the Eastern
Asiatic Industrial Society, the Czar and his court vigorously pursued
Russian expansion into the area.

Naturally alarmed, the Japanese concluded an alliance with
England in 1902, and for the next two years attempted, through
diplomatic means, to halt Russian encroachment into Manchuria. At
the same time, Plehve's circle, under the assumption that a success­
ful war would channel internal discontent away from the autocracy,
continued its exploitive policy.

The logical result of this intransigence took place on the
night of February 8, 1904, when Japan initiated a sneak attack on
Port Arthur. Unable to stem the "yellow tide," Russian arms suffered
defeat after defeat. Internal unrest, instead of decreasing as
expected, mounted steadily. In July, Plehve was assassinated by
Sazonov, and was replaced by the more liberal Svyatopolk-Mirsky.
Mirsky, catering to liberal pressure, called a meeting of zemstvo presidents. After an initial delay, they met in December, 1904, and petitioned the Czar for a guarantee of civil rights and a representative assembly with legislative and fiscal powers. Nicholas, standing on his divine right, refused to acquiesce in the representative assembly and only equivocated on the civil rights issue.

Thus, thwarted on the official level, the masses took matters into their own hands. On January 22, 1905, Father George Gapon led the march that is the subject of this investigation. In attempting to petition the Czar for reforms, he and his followers were met by a barrage of bullets. Recovering from the initial onslaught, the workers finally grasped the situation and dashed from the square. As they fled, they left behind them the bodies of dozens of men, women, and children: the victims of "Bloody Sunday."

Throughout the remainder of 1905 disturbances multiplied. Mirsky, repulsed by the St. Petersburg carnage, resigned; Grand Duke Sergei, the Czar's uncle, was assassinated; and by October a general strike threatened to depose the Czar. At this point, Nicholas II, advised by Witte, issued the "October Manifesto," which granted a representative assembly, called a duma.

With the duma came a strong reaction against further liberalization. Cooperating with the police, court reactionaries initiated a series of demonstrations and pogroms. By 1907, the Czar had reestablished most of his prerogatives, and had rendered the reformist factions in the duma powerless through new election laws.
During the next ten years, the third and fourth dumas offered a facade of representative government while the forces active in 1905 regrouped and waited for a second chance. It came in 1917 when military disasters were again coupled with internal unrest. However, this second outburst reaches far beyond the scope of this paper.
CHAPTER I

THE EVENT

"Bloody Sunday" was one of the prime news items of 1905. It was featured in magazines and newspapers throughout the United States. So important was it regarded that many popular journals sent reporters to Russia to get eye witness accounts, while others hired the services of newsmen already on the scene. Needless to say, though, the first topic of interest to the nation was what really happened in St. Petersburg.

On January 23rd, the day after "Bloody Sunday," the headline of the New York Times proclaimed a "Day of Terror in Czar's Capital" and observed that "St. Petersburg's streets were the theater today of scenes unparalleled in the history of the world."¹ The Detroit Evening News announced January 22, 1905, as "a day of unspeakable horror," and added a detailed description of the slaughter:

A bugle sounded and the men in the front ranks sank to their knees and both companies fired three volleys, the first two with blank cartridges and the last with ball. A hundred corpses strewed the sidewalk. Many women were pierced through the back as they were trying to escape. One boy of thirteen had his skull pierced and rent by bullets. Great splashes and streams of blood stained the snow.²

A short time later, Emile J. Dillon penned an even more sanguine description for the Review of Reviews:

²The Evening News (Detroit), January 23, 1905, 1.
Boys perched on the boughs of leafless trees, women clinging to the iron railings of public gardens, babies in their mothers' arms, passers-by who ran into adjacent houses for shelter, were slain deliberately, mercilessly, gleefully. I saw Cossacks grinning as they began their bloody work; I saw others joke when the dead were carried past them; and I heard of others who boasted of inhuman deeds... God was still in heaven, but the Czar was far away.3

So horrible was the massacre that Ernest Poole reported, in the *Outlook*, that a woman went mad after she saw the carnage and death of "Bloody Sunday."4

After the massacre, government officials immediately and quietly removed the victims from the square in front of the Winter Palace. So quickly was it done that in some cases the survivors had trouble locating the deceased. One journal noted a case where the wife of a young writer sought to recover the body of her husband. After numerous delays, she finally received a coffin with his name on it. But upon closer inspection, she found that another man's remains were inside. Her husband's body was never recovered. The article concluded by explaining that the lumber shortage often necessitated the placing of two bodies in each casket.5

Another journal reported that, as a further punishment, "it was forbidden, strictly forbidden, to collect or suscribe money for the

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4Ernest Poole, "Thou Shalt Not Think—in Russia," *Outlook*, LXXIX (April 8, 1905), 883.

5Emile J. Dillon, "The Situation in Russia," *Contemporary Review*, LXXXVII (March, 1905), 327.
wounded, the crippled, the widows or the orphans" of the
demonstrators. Those who did help Bloody Sunday's victims were
arrested.⁶

Not all reports, however, catered to the sensational. Many
attempted to expunge the grisly details so that the actual sequence
of events could be more fully examined.

The Independent found that the disturbance began on January 16
when the laborers at the Putilov Iron Works went out on strike. By
their action, they hoped to have four discharged workers reinstated
and an oppressive foreman removed. In addition, they demanded an
eight hour day, a minimum wage of six cents for men and four cents
for women, a permanent arbitration committee, and improved sanitary
conditions. At this point, the Independent reported, the socialists
stepped in and gave the strike its political character.⁷

Harper's Weekly agreed with the Independent and added that the
workers' demands included a guarantee of civil rights, especially the
freedom of speech and religion. They also desired, it related, a
referendum on the Japanese War.⁸

Again affirming the centrality of the workers position in the
disturbance, the Saturday Review explained that, even though "we have
all supped full of horrors this week, and are hardly yet sufficiently

⁶Emile J. Dillon, "The Paralysis of the Russian Government,"
Contemporary Review, LXXXVI (March, 1905), 319.

⁷"Rioting in St. Petersburg," Independent, LVIII (January 26,
1905), 174-6.

recovered to think," the main issue was the workers' desire to have their union recognized.  

Some writers found, however, that the origins of "Bloody Sunday" went deeper than an "ordinary" labor dispute. The *Nation* related that "the greatest single cause of discontent is the treatment of political offenders on a footing with ordinary criminals."  

"To the fall of Port Arthur," another analyst opined, "are attributed the ugly occurrences of Sunday, January 22 . . ." The most extensive grouping of causes, though, was given in the *Detroit Evening News*. In a front page article entitled "Russian Troubles that Threaten to Cause a Revolution," the following were enumerated:

- General strike in St. Petersburg.
- Disaffection in the army.
- Great activity of nihilists both at home and abroad.
- Ruinous industrial depressions.
- Crushing effect of heavy taxes.
- Growing insolence of the bureaucrats.
- Revolutionary unrest in Finland.
- Riots in various towns festering to sedition.
- Feverish condition in Poland.
- Perils of international complications.
- Students in all the big cities ripe for revolt.
- The war with Japan.
- Growing dissatisfaction with church rule.
- Shocking inefficiency of officials in all departments of government.
- Gross corruption in army and navy circles, whose shamless "graft" and looting have eaten into the public funds.
- Worthlessness of the army and navy that has cost billions.
- General demand for representative government.
- Oppression of the police system.

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9 *Saturday Review*, XCIX (January 23, 1905), 97.

10 "The Lines of Russian Reform" *Nation*, LXXX (June 8, 1905), 450.

11 Douglas Story, "Russia's Search for Peace," *World To-Day*, VIII (June, 1905), 625.
Shameful conditions affecting the judiciary, who owe their office more to favor than ability.\textsuperscript{12}

The demonstration itself had been announced beforehand with an appeal by Father George Gapon to the Czar:

\begin{quote}
Sovereign, I fear your ministers have not told you the truth about the situation. The whole people, trusting in you, have resolved to appear at the Winter Palace at 2 p.m. in order to inform you of their needs. If, vacillating, you do not appear before the people, then the moral bonds between you and the people, who trust in you, will disappear, because innocent blood will flow between you and the people.

Appear tomorrow before your people and receive our address of devotion in the courageous spirit. I and the representatives of labor and all brave workingmen and comrades guarantee the inviolability of your person.\textsuperscript{13}
\end{quote}

On Saturday, January 21st, a Russian workman was reported to have said that "the soldiers are on our side. They may fire on the palace, but not on us."\textsuperscript{14} But Sunday, as Vladimir G. Simkhovitch observed in the \textit{Political Science Quarterly}, not only repudiated the Russian workman and verified the fears of Gapon, it portended a war between the Czar's government and the Russian people.\textsuperscript{15}

After the initial debacle in the square in front of the Winter Palace, which the Czar refused to attend, the workers barricaded the streets of St. Petersburg, and proceeded to murder any Czarist officers that they could catch alone. Within a short time, though, government troops were dispersed throughout the city, and the "demonstrators

\textsuperscript{12}The \textit{Evening News} (Detroit), January 23, 1905, 1.


\textsuperscript{15}Vladimir G. Simkhovitch, "Russia's Struggle with Autocracy," \textit{Political Science Quarterly}, XX (March, 1905), 111-39.
began to give way and the bitterest insults and oaths, in which the
Russian vocabulary is rich, became frequent." On Monday, January 23rd,
Gapon announced, quite prematurely: "The Czar does not exist. No
longer pray for liberty."17

As the fighting subsided, Witte advised Nicholas II to issue a
ukase promising a full investigation, with compensation for the victims
and survivors, punishment for those responsible, and new legislation
for the working class. Instead, the Czar, after forbidding anyone
else to do so, donated 50,000 rubles to a relief fund for the victims,
and ignored the suggested reforms.18

Next, it was reported that the Czar would allow the workers to
elect representatives to confer with him. However, this plan
materialized in a quite different form. The Russian police, in the
middle of the night, hustled thirty unsuspecting workers out of bed.
Hauled before the Czar, they were ridiculed for bringing the disaster
upon themselves. They had only themselves to blame, Nicholas said,
but added that he would forgive them.19 About the same time, a rumor
was spread, with official sanction, that the marchers had been bribed
by the English and Japanese. The amount they received for stirring
up trouble was set at $8,160,000 dollars.20


18 Emile J. Dillon, "The Situation in Russia," Contemporary Review,
LXXXVII (March, 1905), 330-2.

19 Ibid.

20 Emile J. Dillon, "The Doom of the Russian Aristocracy," Review
of Reviews, XXXI (March, 1905), 307.
After the impromptu workers' conference, Nicholas appointed Dmitri Trepov to the post of Governor-general of St. Petersburg. The new Governor-general quickly squelched the rioting, and restored order in the Russian capital.\textsuperscript{21}

Just six days after "Bloody Sunday," the New York Times noted the "remarkable circumstance" that the workers had returned to their jobs without demanding better conditions from their employers. However, it concluded, had the workers not returned, they would have forfeited their back pay.\textsuperscript{22}

As the laborers returned to work, other segments of Russian society continued the protest. The Independent reported that the physicians of Moscow went on record in favor of reform.\textsuperscript{23} Thirty-five thousand Russian students refused to attend classes out of respect for their dead comrades, and pledged to continue the boycott until reforms were promulgated.\textsuperscript{24}

Foreign opinion also condemned the slaughter. France, Russia's ally since 1894, admitted that Russia "not only excited the scorn and execration of the whole civilized world, but alienated what little sympathy it retained in the only country in Europe where up to

\textsuperscript{21}New York Times, January 27, 1905, 3.

\textsuperscript{22}New York Times, January 28, 1905, 2.

\textsuperscript{23}"The Russian Labor Movement," Independent, LVIII (February 16, 1905), 347.

\textsuperscript{24}"Student Strike in Russia," World To-Day, VIII (May, 1905), 487-91.
yesterday it still counted friends."\(^{25}\) Even Germany, which saw the slaughter as a necessary action "to avoid anarchy," looked upon the uprising as "one which proceeded from the hearts of the people."\(^{26}\)

The full magnitude of the January 22nd event cannot be understood without some mention of the casualties. And as is often the case, not all sources agree. Official Russian figures acknowledged 76 killed and 233 wounded.\(^{27}\) Quite different totals were reported by many American journals.

The \textit{Independent} calculated that out of 12,000 marchers, there were 300 killed and 500 wounded.\(^{28}\) The \textit{New York Times} reported 96 dead and 333 wounded, but added that its figures were considered to be very conservative.\(^{29}\) The largest totals were related by the \textit{World To-Day}:

\begin{quote}
Newspaper correspondents estimate the killed at two thousand and the wounded at five thousand, while the official version was about one-twentieth of these figures: the truth presumably lies between these extremes.\(^{30}\)
\end{quote}

The \textit{Outlook} quoted the Russian statistics, but added that "these figures are generally believed to be a deliberate understatement."\(^{31}\)


\(^{26}\) \textit{Ibid}.


\(^{28}\) \textit{Ibid}.


\(^{30}\) "Revolt in Russia," \textit{World To-Day}, VIII (March, 1905), 240.

Another article, in the same magazine, reported that many were killed outside of St. Petersburg, but that "the number of people killed in these affairs is small compared with the hundreds of deaths at the capital (no one believes the official figures as to the latter). . ."\(^{32}\)

From another point of view, the *Detroit Evening News* theorized that the official figures were a deliberate overstatement. A large number of casualties, it explained, would help the Russian government "impress the mob with the folly of its undertaking."\(^{33}\)

Within a week of "Bloody Sunday," St. Petersburg was quiet. The workers had returned to their factories, and Trepov's close surveillance had kept any new revolutionary spirit from erupting.

The Czar had done precious little to control the flow of events, but he was still securely on his throne. What exactly prompted the demonstration was not readily discernible, but one could easily presume a mixture of causative factors. Likewise, a precise casualty list was not available, but one could live without it. The problem of the Anglo-Japanese bribe was still unsolved, but due to its clandestine nature, it was likely to remain that way. Even the exact sequence of events was hazy. And though some analysts tried, no one in the first few weeks after "Bloody Sunday" was able to untangle them. Nevertheless, the American citizen of 1905 could discover additional information about the incident by studying the prominent personalities in Russia and the characteristics of the people.

\(^{32}\)"The Russian Revolt," *Outlook*, LXXIX (February 4, 1905), 254.

\(^{33}\)The *Evening News* (Detroit), January 23, 1905, 2.
"Bloody Sunday" projected new personalities into the world's spotlight. The foremost, yet the least known, was the man who led the march on the Winter Palace, Father George Gapon. After his surprising appearance on January 22nd, dozens of articles appeared to explain who he was, what he did, and why he did it.

The Independent told about Gapon's early life. As a youngsters, he had been a swineherd. Forsaking the pork business, he entered a seminary at Poltava, but was expelled for meddling in politics. From there, he went to the capital, and was finally graduated from the St. Petersburg Ecclesiastical Academy. After the January 22nd affair, it added, he had been excommunicated from the Russian Orthodox Church. The Review of Reviews reported that, previous to the demonstration, Gapon had been employed by the government to control St. Petersburg workers through a company union. But when the four men who were discharged from the Putilov Iron Works were not rehired, he decided that political reforms were needed, and that an appeal for them could best be voiced through an united march on the Winter Palace.

Father Gapon's whereabouts after "Bloody Sunday" were not outlined as neatly. On January 27th, the New York Times reported

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that Gapon had been wounded and was imprisoned in a hospital. He was soon to go on trial, it opined, and would probably be executed. A week later, however, the Independent announced that Gapon had escaped to Sweden via Finland. By this time, the same article related, the Russian Church had not only denounced Gapon, but had also accused him of stealing the relics that were used in the demonstration.

Gapon's character and purpose were familiar topics of discussion. Catherine Breshkovsky, a Russian liberal who was lecturing in America at the time, saw Gapon as an earnest humanitarian who recognized the plight of the workers and felt compelled to do something about it. She compared his direct action methods with Count Tolstoy's peaceful evolutionary tactics. All the Russian people wanted, she surmised, was the justice and happiness that could be obtained through the implementation of God's "golden rule."

Wladimir Bienstock, in the Independent, claimed the correct spelling of the priest's name was "Gapone," and called him a man of action. He was dedicated to the working class, Bienstock said, and used Teddy Roosevelt's "strenuous life," and Count Tolstoy's "simple life" as his models.

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4 "At St. Petersburg," Independent, LVIII (February 2, 1905), 231.

5 Catherine Breshkovsky, "Who is Father Gapon?" Outlook, LXXIX (February 4, 1905), 268-72.

6 Wladimir Bienstock, "Father George Gapon," Independent, LVIII (February 16, 1905), 351-3.
On the subject of the march, the Detroit Evening News lauded Gapon for managing the affair "like a genius." He broke the people's faith in the Czar, it said, which was the first step towards reform. Likewise, the New York Times admitted that if Gapon's aim was to isolate the Czar from his people, he certainly achieved it. Ernest Poole observed, after the march, that Gapon was like a god in the eyes of the people. But of course, he added, two thirds of the working class were illiterate. Another journalist related that his surname was not Gapon, but Agathon, which meant "the good" in Russian. However, no accolade matched that of the January 23rd issue of the New York Times. After philosophizing that the ways of the Lord were mysterious, it surmised that Gapon "must be God's own man since he took no weapons and met the Cossacks with nothing but a cross raised aloft." It must be more than a coincidence, it continued, that the Russian New Year was marked by the surrender of Port Arthur to the Japanese, and the annual Russian convention in the United States was held on January 22nd.

Not all reports, however, were so favorable to Father Gapon. The Quarterly Review gave him credit for conscientiously planning the march.

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[9]Ernest Poole, "St. Petersburg is Quiet," Outlook, LXXIX (March 18, 1905), 688.

[10]"Is It a Revolution?" Independent, LVIII (January 26, 1905), 213.

march, and for enlightening the Russian laborer to the idea "that it was his government that stood in the way of his deliverance," but considered "George Gapon to be an indifferent priest, a mediocre citizen, and a fanatical leader." His only attribute, it said, was that he "could fire men's souls." A Detroit Evening News article blamed him for exceeding the demands of the workers. It was Gapon's fault, it observed, that the petition presented to the Czar contained "insolent demands of a political character." Another critic lampooned the whole demonstration by complaining "that the nearest approach to a popular hero among the malcontents—Father Gapon—is by origin an Italian or Jew." Dr. Schlitlovsky, quoted in the Independent, thought that in all probability Gapon was an ignorant priest caught in the force of circumstances. And even in St. Petersburg, Gapon was damned as a "traitor" and a "Judas," when some of his followers believed the rumor that he had fled from the city.

Part of Gapon's American popularity was due to a visit he had allegedly paid the United States a few years before. Many journals printed pictures that portrayed "the priest who organized the popular uprising in St. Petersburg... He came to America... to represent

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12 "The Condition of Russia," Quarterly Review, CCII (April, 1905), 600.

13 The Evening News (Detroit), January 23, 1905, 1.

14 "Maxim Gorky and the Russian Revolt," Fortnightly Review, LXXXIII (April, 1905), 600.


Russia at the International Convention of the Y.M.C.A. at Boston, ... where he delivered ... the greetings of the Czar. ... "17 One fellow, John Baker, reported that he interviewed Gapon during his visit. He found the young priest to be "intensely interested" in the American system of government. As a matter of fact, Mr. Baker related, "he seemed scarcely able to comprehend such wonderful liberty after his intimate knowledge of how matters are regulated in the land of the Czar."18

However, Franklin A. Gaylord, who attended the convention in question, stated that it was a Father Vasilieff, not Gapon, who represented the Czar in America. He added, in a letter to the Outlook, that he found "the blunder, if indeed it was only a blunder and not a brilliant example of journalistic humbug, most entertaining."19

The complete story of Father Gapon was lacking in 1905. His youth and education were consistently, but inadequately covered. His activities before and during the massacre were hard to trace and little understood. As was noted, some thought him a genius, while others reviled him as a soldier of fortune or worse. Even his alleged operations within the confines of the United States were not verified. American journalists did place Gapon's name before the public, but the man behind the name remained a mystery.


CHAPTER III

NICHOLAS II

The role of Czar Nicholas II in the St. Petersburg massacre was the most widely discussed aspect of the event. The "little father," as he was nicknamed by the Russian people, was thoroughly investigated by the American press. In making their evaluations, some reporters adhered scrupulously to the rules of evidence, while others used the slightest rumor or incident to vent their prejudices.

Some analysts excused the Czar from any culpability in the massacre. The former ambassador to Russia, Andrew J. White, was one of the first to do so. He admitted that Nicholas had "no strength of character, no proper education, and is hopelessly unfit to grapple with the situation," but went on to say that "he is surrounded by Grand Dukes, women, etc., who tell him what they want him to believe and keep the truth away from him." Nicholas' limitations made it impossible for him to do "the thinking for 140,000,000 of people," he added, but there was no doubt that "the worst of the features of the situation have been kept from him." Even more definite was a reviewer for the Fortnightly Review who opined that Nicholas II was "no more responsible for the shooting of his subjects on January 22 than he is for an eclipse of the moon." 


Those who excused the Czar from complicity in the massacre usually pinned the responsibility for it on either Nicholas' advisors or the Russian bureaucracy. As the New York Times observed:

Nicholas II stands for very little in these dreadful happenings. It is not against him personally. It is against the Russian Institution, that ponderous, immovable, enduring tradition of adherence to a barbarous, stupefying, repressive form of government. . . .

A French correspondent agreed by declaring that "disgust for the administration and hatred of everything touching the bureaucracy are the motives at the bottom of the dispute, and it is useless to seek them elsewhere.

Alexander Ular, in the Contemporary Review, disregarded the Czar altogether, and singled out the noble class as the reformist element in the empire. Its first objective, he said, was the elimination of the bureaucracy, which could best be described by the French word arrivisme, which means "an awful mixture of egotism, ambition, cynicism, stupidity and insolence." "It is universally known now," he continued, "that the Czar is separated from his nation, as well as from the whole outer world, by an insurmountable wall of relatives and officials." Even Nicholas' newspapers, Ular related, were edited before he saw them.

A month later, Mr. Ular, this time in the Review of Reviews, again appraised the situation:

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The bureaucracy will soon be crushed by the Czar, who is its slave, in order to procure for himself the real moral power of a constitutional sovereign over a self-governing nation, and the satisfaction of seeing his great empire develop from starvation and moral servitude into welfare, prosperity, and conscious power. 6

The bureaucracy, however, was not the only Russian institution to be criticized. The World To-Day observed that the Czar was at the mercy of the police and the military. Any reforms that were contemplated were not likely to succeed, because the spirit of change had not infected these two groups. 7 Justice Willis J. Gaynor, of the Supreme Court, after appealing for the "civilizators" of the world to intervene and assist the revolutionists, declared that the Czar was not a free man. Instead, he "was the tool and victim of a corrupt and avaricious church and aristocracy." 8 In Russia itself, the assassin of Grand Duke Sergei explained that he desired "only to free the Czar from his evil advisors, the object of all members of the opposition . . ." 9

Not all opinion saw the Czar in such a favorable light. The Living Age considered Nicholas to be a "mild, nerve-shattered youth, incapable of clear, hard thinking, or of pitting his will against

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that of the masses." He alone was responsible, it said, for causing the "whole nation to bleed to death for himself and a parasitic brood of human bloodsuckers."\textsuperscript{10} Another article related that Nicholas' primary objective was to stifle all unfavorable opinion, and "the means by which this end is to be reached is wholesale slaughter, as often as a crowd large enough to be slaughtered can be found gathered together."\textsuperscript{11} A similar opinion was expressed by Wanda Ian-Ruban in the \textit{Outlook}:

> It is now matter of common knowledge that the same amiable potentate who sends postage-stamps upon request of an unknown American child allows Russian children by the scores and hundreds, together with their parents, to be butchered when they dare to appeal to him to save them from starvation.\textsuperscript{12}

David Bell MacGowen, in the \textit{Century}, stated point-blank that the belief that Nicholas "was favorably disposed toward constitutionalism, but that his ministers and others hindered him in the adoption of his beneficent plans" was quite untrue. The Czar, he concluded, was very much against reform, and only a few ministers favored it.\textsuperscript{13}

In the \textit{Contemporary Review}, E. J. Dillon refuted the notion of the idealistic paternalism of the Czar, as portrayed in the conservative

\textsuperscript{10}"An Autocracy at Work," \textit{Living Age}, CCXIV (March 18, 1905), 662-3.

\textsuperscript{11}"Little Father and His Children," \textit{Living Age}, CCXIV (February 18, 1905), 445.

\textsuperscript{12}Wanda Ian-Ruban, "Some Possibilities in the Russian Situation," \textit{Outlook}, LXXIX (February 25, 1905), 477.

\textsuperscript{13}David Bell MacGowen, "The Outlook for Reform in Russia," \textit{Century}, LXIX (March, 1905), 787.
Russian press, by quoting the liberal journal, Nasha Shism:

Yes it is a picture of papa and his dear little children. How delicate and touching! But would that prudent and respectful journal point to a father—any father—capable of replying to the prayers and entreaties of his little children by volleys of bullets or deadly strokes of sharp sabres gashing the dear little children's heads? 14

Prince Kropotkin, a Russian nobleman, provided the tersest interpretation of the Czar's attitude towards the whole affair. Looking at Nicholas' reign, he is quoted as having said:

All these last ten years... forces... endeavored to induce the ruler of Russia to adopt a better policy; and all through these ten years he himself—so weak for good—had enough energy to turn the scales in favor of reaction. ... Everytime, his interference was for the bad. 15

Whether the massacre was justified or not was also an important consideration in 1905. And beyond this came the question of what really motivated the Czar. The Saturday Review suggested that "sympathy for the sufferers ought not to be incompatible with at least an attempt to be fair to the authorities." Nicholas' position, it thought, should be contributed more to an "error of judgement than want of courage." 16

Alexander Kinloch, in the Fortnightly Review, reflected that Nicholas, although blessed with "benignant and benevolent aspirations," was "imbued on the one hand with too much sentimentality and vacillation, on the other with a nervous anxiety

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15 "Prince Kropotkin's View of the Czar," Review of Reviews, XXXI (January, 1905), 47.

to be powerful and strong as the Czar of all the Russias in the full
sense of the word." Kinloch further suggested that Nicholas pattern
himself after William II of Germany, and remove those ministers who
would separate him from the people. The Sunday demonstration, he
concluded, "amounted practically to sedition," and the Czar was fully
justified in suppressing it.

Some reports went beyond a mere justification of the Czar's action.
Austin Ogg, in the Chautauquan, noted that Nicholas was favorable to
liberal pedagogy; and quoted the Czar as saying:

> Experience has shown such important defects in our
> educational system that I believe it is time to correct
> them.

William Jennings Bryan, who had recently traveled to Russia,
reported a personal interview with the Czar. He found Nicholas eager
to learn and interested in all forms of government. As an aside, he
countered the rumor that the Czar was mentally deranged by declaring
that Nicholas II "is not a man of great force, but he's not stupid
either."

The most positive espousal of Nicholas' cause, though, came from
the New York Times. The only logical course for the autocracy to
follow, it said, was to shoot the insurgents. Allowing the zemstvo

17 Alexander Kinloch, "Russian Social and Political Conditions,"
Fortnightly Review, LXXXIII (March, 1905), 422.

18 Ibid., 426.

19 Austin Ogg, "Social and Industrial Russia," Chautauquan, XLI
(May, 1905), 214.

presidents to petition for reforms was a mistake, it added, and had encouraged the Russian workers to overstep themselves. They were justifiably murdered on January 22nd.\textsuperscript{21}

Many, however, saw very little to praise in the Czar's policy. The \textit{Outlook} blamed Nicholas II for missing the opportunity of his life. The massacre destroyed centuries of love and the tragedy of the Romanov dynasty had begun, it reflected.\textsuperscript{22} The \textit{North American Review} seconded the \textit{Outlook}, and asserted that the Russian people no longer trusted their Czar.\textsuperscript{23} Maxim Gorky, a Russian intellectual, echoed the same view. He said that "by the shedding of innocent blood \textit{he} Nicholas II has alienated himself forever from his people."\textsuperscript{24} Harper's Weekly, too, observed that a "torrent of innocent blood" had separated Nicholas from the masses: "He that was idolized is execrated."\textsuperscript{25}

The \textit{World To-Day} felt that Nicholas II, who was honestly desirous of a better Russia, was afraid that reforms would lead to a cataclysm. The article went on to say that this fear of reform was a characteristic common to weak men. To emphasize the point, Nicholas was cartooned

\footnotesize{\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{21} \textit{New York Times}, January 28, 1905, 2.
\item \textsuperscript{22} "The Russian Revolution," \textit{Outlook}, LXXIX (February 4, 1905), 261-63.
\item \textsuperscript{23} "Russia and Revolution," \textit{North American Review}, CLXXX (February, 1905), 300.
\item \textsuperscript{24} \textit{New York Times}, January 23, 1905, 1.
\item \textsuperscript{25} "St. Petersburg Massacre," \textit{Harper's Weekly}, XLIX (February 4, 1905), 152.
\end{itemize}}
huddling behind a drapery which separated him from the guillotine of the French revolution.\textsuperscript{26}

The destruction of the dynasty, or at least a major change in government, was predicted by many analysts. The mildest advocate of this idea, in the \textit{New York Times}, observed that "the Little Father has become the murderer of his people. It remains for him to save the country, . . . but only by recognizing that autocracy has gone forever."\textsuperscript{27} The \textit{Outlook} also predicted the autocracy's doom, because, unlike the masses, it could not find forceful, new leaders.\textsuperscript{28} Sydney Brooks, in \textit{Harper's Weekly}, blasted the autocracy as "unstable in intention, indecisive in action, drifting and rudderless." Such vacillation as Nicholas displayed, he observed, had not been seen since the days of Louis XVI.\textsuperscript{29} The \textit{Chautauquan}, likewise, dismissed any notion that the dynasty could be restored. Terrorism and the demise of the Czardom would occur, it predicted, because "the autocracy is too dishonored and demoralized to compel obedience to commands so irrational and arbitrary, so defiant and offensive."\textsuperscript{30}

The \textit{Quarterly Review} continued the castigation of the Czar by comparing his power to both make and enforce the laws with sheep herding:

\textsuperscript{26}``The Czar and Reform,'' \textit{World To-Day}, VIII (March, 1905), 240-1.


\textsuperscript{28}Wanda Ian-Ruban, "Some Possibilities in the Russian Situation," \textit{Outlook}, LXXIX (February 25, 1905), 477-84.


\textsuperscript{30}``News Section,'' \textit{Chautauquan}, XL (February, 1905), 499.
The wolf may be willing to offer his services as a sheep-dog, but he will never be a good substitute for the collie.31

In the Czar's feeble attempt to help the workers, it saw another comparison:

Thus the wounds may be healed which the madman has inflicted, but the knife will not be snatched from his hand, nor will a keeper watch over his movements.32

Nicholas, it observed, was at the crossroads of legal reform and anarchy, "but it is to be feared that, left to himself, he will never discern the dilemma nor realize the necessity of choosing between the alternatives." In so many words, it concluded, the Czar was "hurrying his country to the brink of the abyss."33

E. J. Dillon, in the Review of Reviews, feared for the survival of the empire. Nicholas must choose, he explained, between "the abolition of the one-man regime of the Romanoffs or the ruin of Russia." An advisory assembly would be convened, he predicted, but a constitution would not be forthcoming.34 However, Victor E. Marsden, in the Fortnightly Review, did not expect Nicholas to convoke such an assembly. The Czar's unofficial utterances were quite liberal, he explained, but his public announcements were always conservative. The


32Ibid.

33Ibid.

34Emile J. Dillon, "The Doom of Russian Aristocracy," Review of Reviews, XXXI (March, 1905), 308.
representative government, so necessary for the Czar's survival, Mr. Marsden thought, would definitely not be established.35

Nicholas might be a liberal, reflected Harper's Weekly, but his backbone was much too rubbery:

He has the reformer's temperament, but not the reformer's decision, and too much should not, therefore, be expected of him. It is not so much insight as strength of will that is required of a Czar who means his liberalism to be effective.36

In addition to those concerned with "Bloody Sunday," many other articles appeared about the Czar. These were often quite unconcerned with his relationship to the massacre.

The day after the slaughter, the Detroit Evening News offered its readers a personal glimpse of Nicholas II. His income was $4,800,000 per year, which made him the highest paid man in the world. Among his possessions were included 100 estates, 140 castles, 30,000 servants, 5,000 horses, and 50,000 cattle. In temperament, he was "mild and retiring." The "possessor of several hundreds of titles," he was always closely guarded, and his home was like a penitentiary. "Said to be affected with epilepsy, and to be a victim of hallucinations, one of his peculiarities is to wink at everybody he meets." "Bloody Sunday," related the Evening News, was caused by the dowager-empress, who had persuaded Nicholas to preserve the autocracy intact for his son: The "combination of a weeping grandmother and cooing babe was too much for Nicholas. He snubbed the nation."37


37The Evening News (Detroit), January 23, 1905, 4.
Women's Home Companion published an article entitled "The Thread of Blood in Russia's History: How the Emperors Have Taken Vengeance on Their People by Fire and Sword." Bloodmarks, it related, were on all the pages of Russian history, and "Bloody Sunday" had placed Nicholas II in the same sanguine category as Ivan the Terrible. Would "this already bloody year," it asked, be "marred by the murder of another emperor?" 38

Perceval Gibbon, in McClure's Magazine, blamed the Czar's "sensual putrescence and moral irresponsibility" for Russia's disruption. Nicholas' advisors were all debauchees:

They are the blanket that smothers the struggling flame of civilization, these grand dukes, the tombstone that holds down the coffined soil of Russia. 39

Personally and genetically corrupt, his emotional instability often caused him to fly into violent rages, or to succumb to weeping sessions. Even his prayers, Gibbon wrote, were ridiculous, because of the high pitch of his voice: "Little, scared, fooled, this is the Czar." Every segment of Nicholas' person was repulsive:

[He] has the blood of the polygamist in his veins; he is himself the outcome of ancient harems, congenitally unable to find in womanhood that grace of purity which has made the Christian religion possible. 40

In short, Gibbon summed up, "Russia sweats and toils for her courtesans; the scarlet of their lips is the blood of martyrs." 41

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38 Arthur Hoyt, "The Thread of Blood in Russia's History: How the Emperors Have Taken Vengeance on Their People by Fire and Sword," Women's Home Companion, XXXII (March, 1905), 11.


40 Ibid.

41 Ibid.
Wolf von Schierbrand, in the World To-Day, considered Nicholas II, of all persons, to be the least capable of ruling:

The tablets of his memory are like wax, easily inscribed upon and as easily erased. With him it is always the last advisor heard who carries the day. . . . He combines that dangerous quality of a feeble monarch with an exalted sense of his own dignity and merits. 42

"The Womanly Qualities of the Czar" were described in an article for Current Literature: "Incapable of perseverance in conduct of policy, he is characterized by extreme obstinacy in small things."

Nicholas spent more time with the Czarina and his family, it observed, than he did on matters of state: "The Czar clings to women, leans upon them, never seems to want to be alone or with other men . . . ." 43

Mark Twain even got into the Czar-baiting act by penning a soliloquy for the North American Review:

(Viewing himself in a pier-glass) Naked, What am I? A lank, skinny, spider-legged libel on the image of God! Look at the wax work head—the face, with the expression of a melon—the projecting ears—the knotted elbows—the dished breast—the knife-edged shins—and then the feet, all beads and joints and bone-sprays, an imitation X-ray photograph! There is nothing imperial about this, nothing imposing, impressive, nothing to invoke awe and reverence. Is it this that a hundred and forty million Russians kiss the dust before and worship? Manifestly not! No one could worship this spectacle, which is me. Then who is it, what is it, that they worship? Privately, none knows better than I: it is my clothes. Without my clothes I should be as destitute of authority as any other naked person. Nobody could tell me from a parson, a barber, a dude. Then who is the real emperor of Russia? My clothes. There is no other. 44


Twain concluded by calling for a true Russian patriotism, "not to a Family and a Fiction, but loyalty to the Nation itself." The paradox in Russia, he added, was that the moralist who preaches pacifism is the Czar's best friend. Actually, more violence was needed so that Nicholas "would think twice before he butchered a thousand helpless poor petitioners" again. 45

Also degrading to the Czar's stature was a report by a Paris phrenologist who discovered, from a diagnosis of Nicholas' skull, that the Czar was a maniac. 46

To some Americans, the Czar was more than an object of scorn or curiosity. The Independent reported that numerous life insurance policies, with exorbitant rates, had been taken out on Nicholas II, but condemned this practice as being "very objectionable." 47 In New York, Bartley Campbell's melodrama, Siberia, received a spirited reception. One man in the audience went so far as to shout: "that day came today," when a harangue about revolution was delivered. 48 An automobilist, after reading a New York Times' poster, exclaimed that he could visualize the Czar with his crown under one hand and a knapsack under the other, crying: "A bubble, a bubble, my kingdom for

45Ibid.

46Perceval Gibbon, "What Ails Russia," McClures, XXIV (April, 1905), 610.

47"Insuring the Czar's Life," Independent, LVIII (January 19, 1905), 107.

a bubble." And riots broke out in New York between Russian anarchists and other revolutionary sympathizers. And in Chicago, a number of women were injured as they jammed into a hall where a revolutionist was speaking.

Even the United States Congress was disturbed by the Russian situation. In the House, Representative Robert Baker of New York moved for an adjournment "in order that we may express our indescribable horror at the wanton massacre that has taken place in Russia." After his motion was soundly defeated, Mr. Baker shook his finger at the Republicans, and exclaimed: "That is the interest you people have in humanity."

The feelings, though, of most Americans were summed up by Ben Neal who criticized a suppliant's appeal to the Czar. Any self-respecting man, he declared, "wouldn't offer such a prayer to God himself, much less to flesh and blood." Americans should be thankful, he admonished, that they live in the land of the free and the home of the brave.

Obviously, it was difficult to determine the Czar's exact role in the "Bloody Sunday" incident. It seems quite probable that Nicholas had some knowledge of the massacre, but one could not be

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51 The Evening News (Detroit), January 23, 1905, 4.
52 Ibid., 1.
sure that he was aware of its full implications. Neither could one be sure that the court circle had prevented him from learning of the workers' plight. Nevertheless, Nicholas' American image was badly damaged by the slaughter. Few reporters came to his defense, and those that did usually qualified their support. In addition, most analysts agreed that the Czar's ties with the Russian people had been severely strained. Practically alone was Robert Bowman, writing for the Temple Bar, who maintained that the peasant's "love for his Czar is that of a child." Instead, most reporters saw a greatly weakened dynasty at the top of an unstable governmental structure.

Edwin A. Grosvenor's observation that the Russian people did not want reforms, because if they did "The autocracy would not have been tolerated for an hour," found few adherents.

Probably, though, the most accurate estimate of the Czar's attitude was that related by Nicholas himself in an interview for the Review of Reviews:

His majesty stated that he felt called by God to discharge certain arduous duties towards the great Russian people, and he was responsible to God only. . . . The Emperor would gladly put down part of his prerogatives and part of his responsibilities for the good of the people . . . and divest himself of all his Imperial privileges and ranks if that sacrifice were truly conducive to the improvement of his people's lot. . . . Neither his character nor his training had fostered within him a passion for power or a love of responsibility. Left to himself he would select from life's


various pleasures the pure joy of serene family life, unbroken by the trying cares of State. But he is not left to himself. Providence has placed him in a most difficult and unenviable position. . . . He cannot grant a constitution nor concede other less sweeping demands for representative government, not because he is solicitous about the maintenance of his own privileges, but because those desires do not emanate from the Russian people.56

However, a more appropriate attitude towards Nicholas II might be that of the Outlook which observed that "nothing is more tragic than a weak good man put in a place that needs a strong wise man."57

56"Reply by Czar to Count Tolstoi," Review of Reviews, XXXI (March, 1905), 223.

57Outlook, LXXXI (November 4, 1905), 544.
CHAPTER IV

FIGURES AND FACTIONS

In addition to Father Gapon and Czar Nicholas II, many other Russian leaders were introduced to the American public in the early months of 1905. Most often, they were mentioned only in passing, but occasionally an article would analyze them in depth. The same sort of coverage was also given to the different groups and factions in Russia.

Among government officials, Count Sergei Witte was the most popular. One of the few moderates at court, he was often in the Czar's disfavor. Maybe it was because of this, that he was leniently treated in many American reports. Wolf von Schierbrand evaluated "The Advisors of the Czar," and, after criticizing Grand Duke Sergei and Pobedonostsev as too reactionary, praised Witte as one of the most moderate, truthful men in the empire.1 A reviewer for the Fortnightly Review admitted that no one really knew where Witte stood, but added, quite optimistically, that he would save Russia by acting decisively.2

Sir Donald Mackenzie Wallace's praise was more tempered. He recognized Witte's capabilities, but refused to believe that he could


2"Has the Russian Crisis been Exaggerated," Review of Reviews, XXXI, (April, 1905), 50.
pilot the Russian "ship of state to calm waters." The Independent went one step further, and denounced Witte, along with Interior Minister Mirsky, for failing to prevent the January 22nd massacre. Witte knew, it maintained, that the consultive assembly he recommended would not satisfy the Russian people.

Prince Svyatopolk-Mirsky, the Interior Minister who resigned after "Bloody Sunday," was also a subject of discussion. E. J. Dillon credited him with relaxing the reactionary policies of Plehve. Mirsky, he related, even attempted to introduce a measure of self-government through the zemstvo presidents' congress of December, 1904. Of the same opinion were both Alfred M. Low of Forum and David MadGowen of Century, who considered him to be Nicholas' only liberal advisor. A final laud came from the New York Times. Mirsky alone realized that Russia must reform, it declared, but he "has been betrayed by his imperial master."

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3Donald Mackenzie Wallace, Russia, in a review by A. W. Greely, "Russia in Recent Literature," National Geographic, XVI (December, 1905), 565.


8David MacGowen, "The Outlook for Reform in Russia," Century, LXIX (March, 1905), 787-98.

Many other names were mentioned briefly. Karl Blind, in the North American Review, singled out Prince Sergei Trubetskoi for commendation when he unsuccessfully attempted to sway Nicholas towards liberalism. Maxim Gorky was credited, by the Fortnightly Review, for rallying Russian intellectuals to the revolutionary banner. And Trepov, the new Governor-general of St. Petersburg, was reported to have quieted the demonstrators by arresting 158 women on his first day in office.

Groups and classes, as well as individuals, were ripe topics for analysis. And one of the most belabored, the Russian bureaucracy, was again exposed by its critics.

Vladimir Simkhovitch, troubled by semantics, observed that by substituting the word "bureaucracy" for "autocracy," the Russian system of government had been attacked with startling frankness. "Patriots throughout Russia," he added, "feel the absolute necessity of saving the nation from its government." Ernest Poole cautioned that Russia, for its own sake, must repel the "Cabal" that is leading it to destruction. In an article for the Contemporary Review, Alexander Ular accused the bureaucracy of treason. It was disloyal


14 Ernest Poole, "St. Petarsburg is Quiet," Outlook, LXXIX (March 18, 1905), 685.
to the government, haughty with the nobility, two-faced with the middle class, and completely isolated from the masses, he explained, and added that its four aims were nationalism, legal anarchy, impoverishment, and illiteracy. Through its efforts, Ular calculated, twenty per cent of Russia's annual budget was dissipated by corruption.\(^{15}\)

The zemstvos, commented the Saturday Review, were part of the Russian heritage, while the bureaucracy was not. Therefore, it reckoned, the former should be improved, and the latter should be eliminated.\(^{16}\)

E. J. Dillon, again borrowing from the liberal Nasha Shism, announced that the conflict in the East had opened many eyes: "At present the utter rottenness of our bureaucratic machine has become manifest to all. Therein lies the grand conquest of the war."\(^{17}\) And in a rather esoteric fashion, the New York Times completed the castigation of the bureaucracy by declaring its policy to be that of the "Blagovestchensh massacre."\(^{18}\)

The term "liberal" was flung about with wild abandon. It was applied to a wide variety of peoples whose principles were often conflictive. Paul Milyoukov, in the Atlantic Monthly, recognized this, and sought to correct it by criticizing an Associated Press account of Russian liberalism: "The correspondent seems to be at sea and we are at sea with him." The real liberals of Russia, he clarified,


\(^{16}\)"The Russian Crisis," Saturday Review, XCIX (January 22, 1905), 100-1.

\(^{17}\)Emile J. Dillon, "The Situation in Russia," Contemporary Review, LXXXVII (March, 1905), 306.

were united on the Alliance for Emancipation. He recalled two
previous periods of liberalism, but considered the 1905 episode to be
the beginning of a "radical third stage." The autocracy made a mistake
by negotiating with conservatives after "Bloody Sunday," he alleged,
because the liberals should, and must be given a voice in the govern-
ment. He concluded that, although not all reform groups were
cooperating, one thing was sure: "The government is isolated."19

Another ideology drew the fire of Alfred Rambaud. During the
disturbance, the workers, he said, had been duped by the Socialists
who collaborated with left wing students and unpatriotic Jews.20

A New York Times editorial, however, differed with Mr. Rambaud, and
considered the demands of the Russian Social Democratic Party to
contain "nothing that a sensible and right-thinking American could
not approve, sanction, and sign." It considered the program to be
more "common sense and political wisdom" than "Socialism," and added
that a broad reform program was needed:

An agitation limited to improved conditions for labor,
or to the not always very clearly expressed purposes for
which international workingmen's associations so frequently
make appeals to what they call the "proletariat," would
naturally not bring about the reforms demanded by the
leading men of the Zemstvos.21

19Paul Milyoukov, "The Present Tendencies of Russian Liberalism,"
Atlantic Monthly, XCV (March, 1905), 404-14.

20Alfred Rambaud, "What is Passing in Russia," Independent,
LVIII (March 23, 1905), 660-4.

The Socialists themselves, though, considered many of their followers to be fair weather politicians who needed the support of the masses. Only the industrial centers in Russia were actually Marxist. But the confusion still existed, and it reflected a general lack of precision among analysts of the Russian scene:

The Russian Social Democratic organ Iskra calls the present moment the honeymoon of the exposition, a moment of revolutionary exaltation when democrats regard themselves as socialists, liberals figure as democrats, weak bureaucrats as liberals, and moderate reformers as revolutionists.22

22Vladimir G. Simkhovitch, "Russia's Struggle with Autocracy," Political Science Quarterly, XX (March, 1905), 122.
CHAPTER V

PEASANTS AND PEOPLES

Most reporters found it impossible to assess the Russian situation without some mention of the peasantry. Forming the largest single class in the empire, their active support was indispensable to a successful reform movement, many analysts observed. "Bloody Sunday" also encouraged a more thorough look at the rising industrial centers, which had already shown on January 22nd their propensity to agitate for change. And to round out the picture, a smattering of reports were concerned with Russian minority groups, primarily the Cossacks, Tartars, and Jews.

Quick to notice the peasantry was the London Times. Great things, it said, could be expected from the Russian masses:

When the Slav genius, hitherto trampled and trodden down, finds scope at last for its superabundant energies and remarkable gifts we may all be compelled to rearrange our ideas.1

The Independent observed that possibly all peace loving nations could learn from the peasant:

It begins to look as if belated Russia, ignorant, superstitious, poverty-stricken, land of knouts, vodka and ikons, might have a lesson in Christianity to teach the world.2

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2 "Is It a Revolution?" Independent, LIII (January 26, 1905), 213.
The Review of Reviews quoted a Russian editor who freely projected a new, more liberal empire:

Abuses and lawlessness and all possible forms of oppression, violence and robbery for many decades, have driven society to such extremes that, in spite of natural timidity, it has begun to proclaim in loud tones its rights, its ideas of freedom and equality, and even its intention to demand a share in framing the laws of the state.3

Vladimir G. Simkhovitch praised the peasantry for its dedication to reformist ideals, and predicted that "the place of every man shot to death, flogged to death, exiled or entombed . . . would be taken by a hundred men, ready to meet the same fate."4

The total Russian character, some reporters thought, was admirably pleasant. Catherine Breshkovsky praised the desire of the masses to acquire justice and live by the "golden rule."5

H. M. Conacher, in the Living Age, compared the Slavs with the Celts and Teutons, and found that the Slav temperament was hostile to authority. For this reason, he surmised, feudalism had not flourished in Russia, and the Slav had "remained more free and more democratic."6

Captain T. Bentley Mott, in Scribner's Magazine, went the furthest, though, in attempting to dispel any doubts about the masses:

There must be a great deal of misunderstanding in our country over the Russian character. . . . The average

3"Educational Needs of Russia," Review of Reviews, XXXI (March, 1905), 373.


5Catherine Breshkovsky, "Who is Father Gapon?" Outlook, LXXIX (February 4, 1905), 272.

Russian is the most kindly, good-natured, lazy, careless, and improvident of men, with a simplicity and directness in the humbler classes that have nothing in common with the enslaved and oppressed.\(^7\)

However, those who spoke in favor of the Russian peasant were far outnumbered by those who saw little, if anything at all, to praise. And accompanying the criticism were almost unbelievable descriptions of the mental and physical degeneracy that prevailed in 1905.

Vladimir G. Simkhovitch, who praised the peasant for his courage, had to admit that living conditions were appalling. Russia's mortality rate was forty deaths per thousand as compared with thirteen to sixteen per thousand in Western Europe. Twenty percent of its men aged twenty-one were unfit for military service, and just a decade before it was estimated that 32.2% of Russian farms had no horses.\(^8\)

So inadequate was the food supply, E. J. Dillon calculated, that Russia, even if it quit exporting grain, would still have to import ten percent more foodstuffs to equal consumption rates in Germany.\(^9\)

Alexander Ular estimated that the Russian peasant actually ate three times less than his counterpart in Germany. And although his consumption was thirty percent below minimum health requirements, Ular added, he was still required to pay forty percent of his income as taxes.\(^10\)


\(^8\)Vladimir G. Simkhovitch, "The People's Uprising in Russia," World's Work, IX (March, 1905), 5977-81.


Harper's Weekly related that the peasant ate meat only three times a year.\textsuperscript{11} The Temple Bar nauseated its readers by reporting that hunger often caused the peasants to eat undigested corn husks that had been floated out of horse manure. Tartar women, it continued, kept their young from starving by dousing them with freezing water, a much quicker, less painful way to die.\textsuperscript{12} Front line Russian soldiers were reported to have resorted to cannibalism during prolonged food shortages.\textsuperscript{13} At times the food situation, as attested by Mr. Simkhovitch, was so bad that it seemed impossible that any human being could be responsible:

A day or two ago I was shown a black, hard piece of mud; it was a piece of bread from the Krestetski district. This bread was made of bark mixed with bran, the like of which is perhaps given to pigs in Western Europe. I looked at the bread and thought: this bread is from the Devil. Would the father give this black stone to his children, who pray for bread? This bread is from the Devil, from the source of darkness and of fear, from disbelief in the everlasting law of life, from disbelief in freedom.\textsuperscript{14}

Russian homes were equally deplorable. In Novo-Jivotinnoye, E. J. Dillon reported, the peasants' homes were so filthy that the black beetles and cockroaches died.\textsuperscript{15} And outside the cities, he

\textsuperscript{11}"St. Petersburg Massacre," Harper's Weekly, XLIX (February 4, 1905), 182.

\textsuperscript{12}Robert Bowman, "Some Russian Types and Scenes," Temple Bar, CXXXI (February, 1905), 176.

\textsuperscript{13}"The Conditions of Russia," Quarterly Review, CCII (April, 1905), 589.

\textsuperscript{14}Vladimir G. Simkhovitch, "The People's Uprising in Russia," World's Work, IX (March, 1905), 5979.

\textsuperscript{15}Emile J. Dillon, "The Breakdown of Russian Finances," Nineteenth Century, LVII. (March, 1905), 387.
related, living conditions were worse:

The dwellings of the people in the rural districts are not fit for brutes. The huts, when the fire is lighted, are filled with smoke, which escapes through chinks in the walls or the open door, while the inmates lie flat on the floor like travelers in the desert during the simoom in order to avoid breathing the air. In winter-time the water actually freezes inside the hovel. Sometimes two or three families live like this together in one room. Here they eat; here they sleep on straw; here the women bring children into the world; here they spin and weave; here the boys do their school tasks; here, too, are the calf, lambs, sometimes suckling pigs, poultry; here a mephitic odour prevails.16

Industrial complexes, factories and slums, were even more wretched. The Independent told of two Russian workmen who immigrated to the United States. One worked at the French Mechanical Works in Nikolayev where laborers were paid three to seven cents per hour for an eleven hour day. For 39,000 workers, there were 5,000 prostitutes and 10,000 tramps, he recalled, and the chief amusements were getting drunk and attacking the Jews. As he was leaving Russia, he was thrown into jail where he was fed "cabbage or beet soup well spiced with an admixture of worms." The other worker, himself a Jew, told of the match factory in Kovno where three thousand young girls were employed. Many of them slept in the factory, because their homes were too far away to commute. The work was so disagreeable, he said, that within a short time "some lose their teeth, and even their gums begin to rot."17

16 Ibid., 337-8.
17 "Two Russian Workmen's Stories," Independent, LVIII (February 2, 1905), 244-51.
An investigation by Mr. L. Kulomzin revealed that St. Petersburg's tenement district provided 300% to 650% less air to breathe than the minimum recommended by hygienists.\(^{18}\)

Brutal employers, bestial police, and bigoted censors seemed to be everywhere. Censorship was so strict, reported E. J. Dillon, that a new library named for the poet Nekrassoff was prohibited from displaying any of his works. Mothers-in-law jokes were forbidden because they led "to the destruction of the foundations of family life." And to top it off, Dillon concluded, the peasant lives in "a hovel, more filthy than a sty, more noxious than a phosphoric match factory."\(^{19}\)

Education levels, as one might expect, were terribly low. Alexander Ular estimated that 28% of the priesthood, 30% of the nobility, 60% of the middle and industrial classes, and 89% of the peasantry were illiterate.\(^{20}\)

Some analysts, though, considered the peasant to be almost incapable of improving his mind. Perceval Gibbon, in *World's Work*, observed the peasant to be "of an ignorance unparalleled and bestial:"

> It is not easy to convey to Western minds an idea of the mental blackness in which them men and women live and die. Ninety millions and odd of them neither read nor write, and this is but a small thing in comparison with what remains. The peasant that works on the land knows nothing

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\(^{18}\)Emile J. Dillon, "The Situation in Russia," *Contemporary Review*, LXXXVII (March, 1905), 316.

\(^{19}\)Ibid.

of the land. He tills a stretch of ground and sows wheat, but he never thinks of reaping till it is dead ripe, and half the good stuff rots in the rains. He is afraid of the dark-growing, stupid, and inarticulate. He dies without curiosity, and there are scores of millions of him balanced eternally between mere hunger and real famine.  

In the same vein, the Jewish Daily News lamented their complete lack of political sophistication:

The Russian peasants are not ready for democracy. They are besotted and densely ignorant. They have no conception of government beyond the tax-gatherer.

A. S. Rappaport, in the Fortnightly Review, discovered a strain in the Russian character that closely resembled masochism:

Unlike the Englishman, the Russian is unhappy if he is left to himself, but as long as he can account for some external superior power that tortures him, he is satisfied.

Like the Negro, Rappaport continued, the peasant "never respects a man who treats him like a human being." Enthusiastic wife-beaters, living where severities were "quite a natural state of affairs," the peasants were "not only ignorant and stupid, but alas, were full of prejudices and of Slavish admiration for force and authority." In short, he concluded, the peasantry represented "not a living spring, but a stagnant pool of resignation." Victor Marsden disagreed, however,

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21 Perceval Gibbon, "The Church's Blight on Russia," World's Work, X (June, 1905), 6244.


24 Ibid., 391.
with this barbaric picture of the Russian peasant. Instead, he recalled, "the Russian, in fact, is not a fighting man: you may live in Russia for a lifetime and never see a blow struck in anger."25

Indicative of the peasant's degeneracy, reported Harper's Weekly, was the treatment of Russian women. They were rigidly controlled, it related, first by their parents and then by their husbands. In order to travel from one town to another, they had to obtain a pass from the local lord. In court, their statements carried less weight than a man's.26 Maybe it was this double standard that caused the Outlook to opine that a successful revolution depended on the Russian female. The social life of any country depends on its women, it explained, and in Russia, the female sex was the one force available that could bind the revolutionary groups and peasants together.27

In addition to the above, many reporters attempted to probe deeper into the subject of the Russian people. Analysts wanted to know not only what the conditions and the people were like, but also what the underlying causes were for such apparent backwardness. "The brutalization of human beings," remarked E. J. Dillon in the Nineteenth Century, is one of the results of the financial policy of the Czardom." Nicholas was the "Midas of Petersburg," he said, and the "dazed, haggard peasants are part of the price paid for the stock of gold


27Wanda Ian-Ruban, "Some Possibilities in the Russian Situation," Outlook, LXXIX (February 25, 1905), 84.
before which Russia's English friends bow down." Reinforcing Mr. Dillon, Ray Long, in the Fortnightly Review, blamed economic centralization for reducing "Russia to the nation of weak-willed, dumb serfs" that it was.

Sigmund Krausz, in the New England Magazine, attributed the "prevailing degeneracy" to social and economic factors. So rampant was drunkenness and immorality among the lower classes that excessive drinking was "not regarded as a vice," he related, and the normally brutal police were especially kind to bums. Corruption was manifest in all aspects of Russian life, Krausz concluded, and morals were so lax that orphanages were overflowing with bastards.

The World To-Day held modern technology responsible for the backwardness of the masses:

In Russia industrialism has been superimposed, ready made, upon an incomplete social order, and the capitalist has been able to exploit the immobility and stupidity which have made the Russian peasantry so incapable of development and self-protection.

Edith Sellers, in the Nineteenth Century, attributed the peasants' deplorable condition to a "topsy-turvy system" of poor relief. Many villages, she explained, provided for their poor by sending them to beg in other villages. Each class in Russia was required to care for

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its own unfortunates, Sellers continued, which meant that a great many poor people had to rely on the poverty-stricken peasant class for sustenance. The only assistance provided by the government was the issuance of begging permits. Families were so poor that convicted criminals often had to take their children to jail with them. Fortunately for the poor, she concluded, the Slav was by nature very generous, but maybe if this generosity had been withdrawn, the revolution would have commenced sooner.32

Edwin Grosvenor, in the National Geographic, believed that Russian backwardness stemmed from the 13th Century Mongol invasions. Emerging from the middle ages "240 years after the rest of Europe," the peasants had been unable to throw off their subservient attitude:

Thence were developed those traits of sluggish patience, of long endurance, of morbid self-sacrifice which distinctly mark the Russian people of today.33

A simple second came from Arthur Hoyt who stated that "the Russian is part Oriental. . . . He dislikes change."34

Luigi Vallari, in a book reviewed by the National Geographic, interpreted the peasant as the victim of impossible schemes of world domination. Vallari could not, however, make up his mind about the peasants themselves:

They are underpaid, ill-fed, worse housed, and are not cheap. The peasant has great industrial possibilities, is

32 Edith Sellers, "Official Poor Relief in Russia," Nineteenth Century, LVII (June, 1905), 1020-30.
34 Arthur Hoyt, "The Thread of Blood in Russia's History," Woman's Home Companion, XXXII (March, 1905), 11.
docile, quick to learn, but is without initiative, careless, and needs constant supervision.35

Austin Ogg, in the Chautauquan, discounted the government's contention that the "pig-headedness" of the peasant caused the frequent crop failures, but did admit that the peasant lacked ambition. What the peasant needed most, Ogg concluded, was an education that would release him from the "blighting weight of ignorance, superstition, and poverty."36

Few reporters, however, matched the diagnosis of Angelo S. Rappoport, who analyzed Russia's national character:

The Russian seems to be in a state of becoming and crystallization. Being a young people, there is yet no fixity, no permanent, fundamental trait in a Russian. The inequality and inconsistency, the vagueness and chaos, are fundamental traits of the national soul and character which neither time nor historical events ever obliterate. The Russian nation has a fixed character and is perfectly constant in its inconsistency. If it were permitted to ascribe sex to races as well as to individuals, I would say that psychologically the Russians are a feminine race.37

Three minority groups, the Cossacks, Tartars, and Jews, were also investigated.

Ernest Poole, in Everybody's, typified American opinion about the Cossacks. He quoted their motto, "Fear God and be Loyal to the Czar," and described their social attitude as anti-educational and pro-vodka.

35Luigi Vallari, Russia Under the Great Shadow, in a review by A. W. Greely, "Russia in Recent Literature," National Geographic, XVI (December, 1905), 568.


37Angelo S. Rappoport, "Russians are Feminine--Cause of Trouble?" Review of Reviews, XXXI (April, 1905), 379.
Tho peasants, he related, bow to the Cossacks as oxen do to the whip. Wanda Ian-Ruban, in the Outlook, described the Cossacks as degenerate barbarians. A free system of government, she added, was their only hope for salvation. Harper's Weekly, which expected the regular army to defect to the side of the revolutionists, observed that the "Cossacks, Circassians, Turcomans, and Mongols" would probably attempt to defend the beleaguered autocracy. The anti-Cossack opinion, though, was best expressed by the World To-Day:

The Cossacks, who have lost much of their reputation as real fighters in actual warfare in Manchuria, still remain terrible antagonists for a herd of unmounted peasants and laborers.

Arminius Vambery, in the Nineteenth Century, dedicated his research to the Tartars, and found them to be a "peaceful, sober, industrious, obedient, and strictly religious population, whose adherents are either craftsmen, small-traders, and hotel-keepers, or coachmen, guardians, stewards, etc., always fully reliable, and consequently preferred to the Christian servants of the country." Being Moslems, they had "successfully frustrated the Russianizing efforts of the Church and of the State," he continued, and were becoming one

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32 Ernest Poole, "Peasant Cattle," Everybody's, XIII (October, 1905), 494-504.


41 "Revolt in Russia," World To-Day, VIII (March, 1905), 239.

of the primary forces for reform in Russia. 43

The Jews were also mentioned briefly. Alexander Ular proffered that the Jews had joined the revolutionary movement because their financial activities had been restricted by the government. 44 The Independent agreed that the Jews wanted political reforms, because of their desire for economic freedom. 45 Luigi Vallari discovered that, although law restricted Jews to one-tenth of the school population, they were the backbone of the economy in many places. 46 And Abraham Cahan, in World's Work, recognized the Jews as the leading reformists among the industrial workers. Due to their superior education and dedication, he explained, they had become the "vanguard of the revolutionary army of Russia." 47

The composite picture of the Russian people in 1905 was not too inspiring. The few analysts who saw the peasant as a force for progress were greatly outnumbered by those who saw in him nothing but filth and stupidity. And even if only a fraction of the descriptions of wretched living conditions were true, a great majority of the Russian

43Ibid.

44"Is a Russian Revolution Possible?" Review of Reviews, XXXI (March, 1905), 371-2.

45"Two Russian Workmen's Stories," Independent, LVIII (February 2, 1905), 249.

46Luigi Vallari, Russia Under the Great Shadow, in a review by A. W. Greely, "Russia in Recent Literature," National Geographic, XVI (December, 1905), 567.

47Abraham Cahan, "Turmoil in Russia," World's Work, IX (April, 1905), 6034.
people were certainly in desperate straits. Their chance of gaining reforms if left to themselves, most observers agreed, was very slim. Nevertheless, just twelve years later, the dynasty was overthrown and reforms were implemented. True, the whole population did not take an active part, but enough participated to justify an earlier comment by the German statesman, Otto von Bismarck:

Russians take a long time to harness their horses, but then they drive like the very storm wind.18

CHAPTER VI

THE CHURCH

"Bloody Sunday" inspired a lengthy discussion of the Russian Orthodox Church. Since the time of Peter the Great, it had been controlled by the Czar through a layman, known as the Over-Procurator. And it was assumed in 1905, that as a branch of the state, it had cooperated in promoting the reactionary policies of the autocracy.

The supposed influence of the Over-Procurator in the affairs of state stimulated discussion about the man who occupied the office in 1905, Constantine Pobedonostev. Charles Johnson, in Harper's Weekly, considered him to be a "wholly honest fanatic," who thought freedom was a delusion.¹ The conservatism of Nicholas II, thought Wolf von Schierbrand, could be attributed directly to the persuasiveness of Pobedonostev:

Such an innovation [as liberalism] would mean the end of holy Russia, would permit the influx of all those ungodly western ideas to which he had refused ingress so far, and would, in point of fact, put an end to autocracy itself, a form of government eminently suited to the Russian people and become a part of their very selves.²

An even closer look came from Karl Blind, in the North American Review, who examined Pobedonostev's book, Reflections of a Russian

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Statesman. In it, the Over-Procurator condemned secular states, parliamentary government, freedom of the press, and trial by jury. The Czar, Pobedonostev concluded, must never relinquish his privileges:

Thou hast the right, as Autocrat and as the anointed of God, to do everything Thou likest in accordance with Thy wisdom and Thy heart's desire, . . . but do not forget, O Czar, that Thou hast not the right to break Thy coronation oath . . . [that] didst [give you] the symbols of irresponsible power.3

Many reporters, though, forsaking Pobedonostev, broadened their remarks to include either the Church as a whole, or its priesthood. Sir Donald Mackenzie Wallace censured the Church for transforming the service of God into a profitable business.4 Sydney Brooks observed a dualism in the empire between "education, industrialism, and liberty, on the one hand, and the medievalism of a church-supported autocracy on the other."5 H. J. Hagerman, of Century, interpreted the Church as a throwback to the Dark Ages:

In her religion, as in some other aspects, Russia is still almost medieval, and, in spite of foreign wars and internal dissensions, she is likely to remain so for several generations.6

Stories were frequently spread that illustrated the nature of the Church and the men who served it. The Contemporary Review mocked the


4Donald Mackenzie Wallace, Russia, in a review by A. W. Greely, "Russia in Recent Literature," National Geographic, XVI (December, 1905), 565.


6H. J. Hagerman, "The Russian Court," Century, LXX (June, 1905), 245.
desire of churchmen to be "pioneers of civilization in the East" by quoting a priest who sanctioned the destruction of a Chinese dwelling:

They are Catholics, and Chinese Catholics are worse than Pagans. Go ahead, lads! . . . And he gleefully rubbed his hands.\(^7\)

In St. Petersburg, there were 425 churches and only four theaters.\(^8\) But Sigmund Krausz countered the impression that Russia "must be a deeply religious people and a true Christian nation." The Russian religion was form and ritual, he explained, not actual faith. In the cities, dozens of religious pictures, called ikons, were scattered about, and each required a minute or two of worship from the passers-by. This almost constant devotion, Krausz reckoned, reduced the productivity of labor and the profits of enterprise. The Church, he concluded, exercised "complete sway over the more than simple minds of its parishioners," through the priests who were drawn from the ranks of "discharged, drunken soldiers, former students and similar characters."\(^9\)

Ernest Poole, in *Everybody's*, told a story entitled "The Night that Made Me a Revolutionist." It tells of an over-taxed mother of a college student who worked herself to death. Because she had paid no tithes for the past two years, the local priest refused to bury her.

\(^7\)Emile J. Dillon, "The Situation in Russia," *Contemporary Review*, LXXXVII (April, 1905), 322.

\(^8\)The *Evening News* (Detroit), January 23, 1905, 7.

Instead, he told the bereaved husband: "I will speak with God and He will prepare a terrible place in hell for your wife—unless you pay."

Eventually, the chief of police offered to bury the woman, but only if he could seduce the eldest daughter. That night, the motherless family fled into the forest:

You know how terrible this life is. You have lost your mother. She was killed by taxes. Why are these taxes? To feed that policeman, to feed the Czar, that is all. The Czar and all his police and judges have choked her to death.\textsuperscript{10}

In the \textit{Outlook}, Poole again criticized the Church by comparing the altars of gold and gems with the starving congregations.\textsuperscript{11}

The \textit{Contemporary Review} related a tale quite similar to Poole's. This time, the police prevented a young boy from being buried: "No bribe, no grave." As the parents collected the requisite ten rubles and twenty pounds of butter, the little body "began to decompose, and the family had to breath the mephitic atmosphere of the hut." Finally, the bribe was paid, and the boy was buried:

But from the day of the child's death down to the day on which the heartbroken parents were allowed to inter his mouldering corpse a fortnight had elapsed.\textsuperscript{12}

E. J. Dillon reported on the "Monastery Prisons in Russia," where nonbelievers were confined without the benefit of a trial. In 1905, he observed, there were still four men in Suzdal Monastery whose

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\textsuperscript{10}Ernest Poole, "The Night that Made Me a Revolutionist," \textit{Everybody's}, XIII (November, 1905), 635-40.

\textsuperscript{11}Ernest Poole, "St. Petersburg is Quiet," \textit{Outlook}, LXXIX (March 18, 1905), 637.

\textsuperscript{12}Emile J. Dillon, "The Situation in Russia," \textit{Contemporary Review}, LXXXVII (March, 1905), 314.
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only crime was to harken to the voice of their conscience. He described the monks praying a few feet from men who were dying, and concluded that "truly [sic] it is a medieval picture." In another article, Mr. Dillon described the peasants' faith:

Their worship is fetishism, their dogmas are gross superstitious beliefs, their notions of life and the world childish, their dwellings are "black holes." Without a doubt, though, the Church's most vindictive critic was Paul Gibbon. In an article for World's Work entitled "The Church's Blight on Russia," he considered the common priest to be "no more than the lackey who serves the altar, a gross implement in a ticklish trade:"

No consideration attaches to him save about the business of his office. He is often a drunkard, almost always ignorant, generally a cadger and a beggar. The common run of parish priests are quite unlettered; the authentic voice of intonation and a vocation for an unlaborous [sic] and unproductive life are their sole qualifications. They are rapacious, immoral, and intemperate.

The long and numerous fasts, Gibbon pointed out, were a major cause of the high mortality rate and listlessness among the peasants. In Russia, the first test of loyalty was submission to the Orthodox Church, with the result that the peasant "is under a stern obligation to conform to custom in all these respects, but the Church observes its limits and lays no moral duty whatsoever upon him:"


14Emile J. Dillon, "The Doom of Russian Aristocracy," Review of Reviews, XXXI (March, 1905), 303.

He may come to church drunk, as a priest does, if he likes; he may live in whatever irregularity he pleases; but the crossing must be done, the ikons must be honored, and the fasts kept, or he is a marked man, a seditious example.  

After mocking the "wonderworking" holy pictures, he closed with an appeal for atheism:

It is a dreadful thing to say, but a true one—that only by the growth of irreligion, like that flamboyant atheism that puffed the French Revolution to a blaze, can the great slave land come by its own. It is over the body of the priest that the peasant will strike at the prince—the priest that fashioned a God to awe him with a menace of perdition.  

Not all opinion was so vehement in its denunciation of the Church. More moderate was Victor Marsden, who thought it "reasonable to suppose that the Orthodox Church, which is passing through her own period of internal adjustment, has not yet declared into which scale to throw the weight of her overpowering influence." However, Marsden did maintain that unless the Church changed its ways, the dissenters offered the best chance for reform. Twenty million strong, he explained, they "are more thrifty, harder working, more sober, and are now beginning to make their weight felt in the scale solidly against the existing form of government."  

S. C. de Soissons, in the Contemporary Review, described a new religious movement in Russia. Called the Novyj Put, or New Road, it de-emphasized the prevailing rationalism and materialism in favor of a

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16 Ibid., 6244.  
17 Ibid., 6254.  
mystical approach to Christian principles. Unlike the historical Christianity of the Russian Orthodox Church, Soissons declared, the Novyj Put followed the precept that "faith must reanimate free thought, which had become stagnant owing to rationalization."19

The situation in Russia elicited comments from churchmen throughout the world. And in the United States, it appeared that readers were especially interested in the opinions of their clergy. To meet this demand, the Detroit Evening News reported the statements of a number of leading churchmen on the "Bloody Sunday" incident. Bishop John Samuel Foley opined that the Russian situation was a natural reaction of "people goaded to desperation by the government."

The Reverend D. H. Glass considered the "Greek Catholic Church" to be responsible for "Bloody Sunday." The Reverend E. P. Bennett expected the revolution to succeed:

Might as well try to stop sunrise by beheading a rooster as to stop the march of progress by shooting a few peasants.20

"Better for the peasants to die by bullets than by starvation," observed Reverend Walter Calley, "It has become necessary for someone to die in order that the cause might live."21 And the Pope in Rome even chimed in with "the hope that the internal situation in Russia was not so black as depicted."22


20The Evening News (Detroit), January 23, 1905, 4.

21Ibid.

22Ibid., 7.
However, Captain T. Bentley Mott could not quite understand all the criticism of the Russian Orthodox Church. On his last trip up the Volga, he recalled, the evening song of the loggers appeared to verify Russian piety:

The hymn of those rough men rising over the still river at nightfall was as one voice in the great chorus which we knew at that moment was borne to God from every camp and hamlet, every field and fireside throughout the strange land which, with no pharisaical arrogance, but reverently and with deep conviction, calls itself "Holy Russia."  

In conclusion, if the observations of Marsden and Mott are discounted, the Russian Orthodox Church certainly took a beating in the American press in 1905. Not only was the Over-Procurator maligned, but the entire clergy was vilified. Even the Russian faithful were admonished for obeying Orthodox precepts. Undoubtedly, as demonstrated by Poole and Dillon, the Church and police cooperated with each other, but to what extent was difficult to determine. One can hardly help speculating, however, that at least a part of the animosity towards the Russian Orthodox Church was the result of the prevailing spirit of the times. State churches and police tactics had never been popular with the American public, and to find these as prominent causes of "Bloody Sunday" was only natural.

CHAPTER VII

TERRORISM

The Russian scene in 1905 was characterized by violence. "Bloody Sunday" was just one of many riots and demonstrations. For years, as a matter of fact, underprivileged and dissatisfied elements had reacted against the government through mass uprisings and brutal retaliations against individuals. To protect itself, the autocracy had countered with a program of arrests that increased the number of political crimes from one in 1872 to 2,510, involving 11,995 people, in 1903. However, the opposition, as the statistics indicate, continued to grow. And the assassination of the reactionary Interior Minister, Plehve, in late 1904 and of Grand Duke Sergei soon after "Bloody Sunday," again brought the issue of terrorism home to the public.

Many critics of the Russian situation thought that terrorism conducted by the revolutionists was completely justifiable. Domestic reforms must be seized, Emile J. Dillon declared, because they will not be conceded by the administration. More men like Sazonov, the assassin of Plehve, were needed, he concluded, to remove all the supporters of the autocracy. The murder of Grand Duke Sergei incited the Review of Reviews to call for more violence:


Assassination is the substitution which autocracy prefers to risk rather than face the unknown dangers of a parliament.³

In the Independent, an anonymous contributor penned "A Plea for Terrorism," which described the Russian government as "an incorrigible Asiatic despotism." Terrorism, it maintained, was justified on both humanitarian and utilitarian grounds. It was humane because it averted the slaughter of hundreds by killing only a few, and practical in the sense that the removal of a few key figures could change the entire policy of the autocracy. In the end, it predicted, terrorism would voluntarily subside with the advent of representative government.⁴

Mark Twain also advocated the use of force. Reforms would be inevitable, he observed, if the masses adopted the barbarous practices of the Romanovs.⁵ Paul Milyoukov applauded the wave of terrorism that resulted in the assassination of Plehve as an indication of liberal growth.⁶ Terror was absolutely necessary, opined A. S. Rappoport, if the masses were ever to be stirred into action against the government.⁷

The Independent praised violence for its educational value. Properly enlightened, the masses could easily gain reforms. Beware

though, it warned, for the education process was not complete and the government could strike back at any moment:

The recent massacres of unarmed, underfed, underclothed men, women and children, who, in the bitter cold of an Arctic winter, came out on the street to tell the Czar of their sufferings and present their extravagant demands for a minimum wage of 50 cents per day for men engaged in skilled labor, is ample proof that the spirit of the late von Plehve is still alive in the councils of the government, tho the Minister be dead.8

The most prolific proponent of force was Vladimir G. Simkhovitch, who authored three articles on the subject. In the International Quarterly Review, he quoted a French analyst's description of the autocracy as a "despotism tempered by assassination." "Bloody Sunday," he maintained, would accelerate the pace of terrorism.9 In World's Work, Mr. Simkhovitch observed that all true Russians would support the terrorist's program:

Strange as it may seem, a Russian captain of industry, a provincial marshall of nobility, or a zemstvo president has more in common with the terrorist than with a representative of the autocratic regime.10

And the Czardom, through persecution, was inadvertently solidifying the masses:

The Russian government itself was unconsciously spreading and fostering revolutionary ideas, ignorant that it was preparing its own downfall.11

8"The Social Democratic Party of Russia," Independent, LVIII (March 2, 1905), 495.

9Vladimir G. Simkhovitch, "Terrorism in Russia," International Quarterly Review, XI (July, 1905), 266.


11Ibid., 5978.
Terrorism alone though, Simkhovitch recognized in the Political Science Quarterly, was not enough. A populace united through moral suasion was also needed. No longer, he concluded, would a purely military venture succeed against the modern weapons of the autocracy.\(^{12}\)

In two of his articles, Simkhovitch reprinted a letter of condolence from the Russian terrorist groups known as the People's Will. Written for Garfield's assassination, it pretty well summed up the philosophy of the Russian terrorist:

> In expressing our deep sympathy with the American people bereaved by the death of the president, James Abram Garfield, the "Executive Committee" regards it as its duty to protest in the name of all Russian Revolutionists against deeds of violence, such as the murderous attempt of Guiteau. In a land where the freedom of the individual makes a struggle for ideals possible, where the free will of the people determines not only the law of the land, but the personality of the ruler—in such a land political murder as a means of political struggle is the very essence of despotism; it is despotism of the very same type the extermination of which we regard as our task in Russia. The despotism of an individual or the despotism of a political organization are equally deplorable, and violence only then can find justification, when directed against violence.\(^{13}\)

Contemporary analysts of "Bloody Sunday" were surprised at the acquiescent attitude of Americans towards terrorism. R. Long, in the Fortnightly Review, acknowledged that the general public approved of "the casual bomb as society's deliverer."\(^{14}\)

\(^{12}\)Vladimir G. Simkhovitch, "Russia's Struggle with Autocracy," Political Science Quarterly, XX (March, 1905), 113.

\(^{13}\)Vladimir G. Simkhovitch, "The People's Uprising in Russia," World's Work, IX (March, 1905), 5980.

succinctly seconded Mr. Long in a two sentence article:

   The Russian terrorists seem to have the grand-dukes on the run. A remarkable degree of philosophical composure characterizes the attitude of most of the civilized world as it looks on at this situation.¹⁵

   The Outlook excused the terrorists as public executioners, not assassins. Assassination was despised by the modern world, it admitted, but the autocracy was getting what it deserved. The executioners were not criminals or maniacs, instead, they were professional people who found all logical avenues of protest closed to them. However, as a rejoinder to any anarchist accusations, the Outlook concluded that it "does not justify these acts of violence; it abhors them; but it is endeavoring to explain them."¹⁶

   As a matter of fact, no writer has been found who condemned terrorism per se. One critic of the "Plea for Terrorism" even advocated a full-fledged civil war. If successful, he said, reforms would be secured much quicker than through single assassinations, which were based on the fallacious great man theory of history. Assassins often represent a minority viewpoint, he argued, and there was no guarantee that a victim's successor would be an improvement. In Russia, it was not the monarch, but the monarchy that must be destroyed. And, this should be done by a change in sentiment and loyalty, not with bombs. A sense of fair play and the need for political freedom indicates, he concluded, that reforms must be obtained through united effort, not personal vendettas.¹⁷

¹⁵Contemporary Review, LXXXVII (February, 1905), 173.

¹⁶"The New Russia," Outlook, LXXIX (February 25, 1905), 472.

¹⁷"Revolution by Assassination," Independent, LVIII (February 23, 1905), 441-3.
Sigmund Krausz accepted the public service aspect of terrorism, but feared that Russian morality would suffer. Crime and corruption were already so prevalent, he explained, that even criminals and assassins pray for success.18

The reporting of Russian terrorism was a difficult task for American newsmen because of the moral implications of violence. For the most part, analysts approved the use of force to gain reforms. But a few, Krausz for example, feared its long range effects. Could Russian society, given the divergent aims of the different revolutionists, really forsake terrorism once the autocracy was overthrown? No one could be sure. However, newsmen did agree that assassinations, though acceptable, maybe even necessary in Russia, were strictly taboo in the United States. Journalistic support of terrorist violence hardly concealed the feeling of relief that the same activities were not being conducted in America. In a sense, the reaction of Grand Duke Sergei's wife to the news of her husband's death aptly reveals the aggregate American opinion towards terrorism in 1905:

The pity of it! the crime of it! the suffering of it! and how grievously wrong begets, or even seems to excuse, wrong!19


19 Independent, LVIII (March 2, 1905), 514.
CHAPTER VIII

AND OTHER REVOLUTIONS

It was only natural that analysts would attempt to clarify "Bloody Sunday" by putting it into an historical context. And the most obvious comparable event was the spectacular uprising in France that had occurred more than a century before. Of course, the American revolution and the European activities of 1848 were also looked at, but neither could rival the great revolution of 1789.

Very few articles, though, were devoted entirely to the comparative study of the French and Russian revolutions. Instead, the parallel was used to emphasize the importance of "Bloody Sunday" by relating it to a well-known event.

Sydney Brooks, mentioned earlier, was one of the first to relate the Russia of 1905 to the France of 1789. Mr. Brooks saw in Nicholas' vacillation the reincarnation of Louis Capet, and expected the Czar to terminate his reign in the same fatal fashion. The New York Times viewed the march on the Winter Palace as a reinactment of the earlier march on the Palace of Versailles, but added that Russian incompetency in high circles, in 1905, was worse than in prerevolutionary France.

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Harper's Weekly paralleled the Russian workmen's demonstration with the bread march that had sparked the earlier upheaval. Both innocent appeals were rebuked with disastrous overtones, and the Russian autocracy, it concluded, was acting like a reactionary Napoleon. The North American Review observed only minor similarities between the two revolutions, and surmised that the latter event was moving slowly but would eventually be more fierce. The Fortnightly Review quoted Maxim Gorky's apprehension that the Russian revolution might exceed the French: "France produced one Napoleon; we might have the misfortune to produce twenty." Even August Bebel, the German Socialist, observed a significant parallel between the two, but confined the majority of his remarks to the Twentieth Century Russian proletariat.

Comparison with the French revolution gave rise to a good deal of prophecy concerning the outcome of the Russian event. The Independent, noting the political character of the strike, remarked that the beginning of the latter revolt so closely resembled the earlier revolution "that it is freely predicted the outcome will also be similar." Likewise, an article entitled "St. Petersburg Massacre"

3Harper's Weekly, XLIX (February 4, 1905), 148.


predicted the doom of the Romanov dynasty. Its executioner would be either the Russian Lafayette, Svyatopolk-Mirsky, or the Russian Turgot, Witte.8

Needless to say, all analysts did not agree. Some saw very few points of similarity between 1789 and "Bloody Sunday." The prerequisite for a French type revolution, thought the Nation, was missing in Russia:

The economical situation of the majority of the Russian people is not to be compared for extreme misery with the condition of the French peasants which precipitated their catastrophe.9

The World To-Day, in a lengthy explanation, saw little to warrant the expectation that the Russian masses would fit the French mold. It admitted that the two events were similar. In both, local bodies urged reform, revolutionary ideas circulated about the countryside, legislative representation was demanded, industry was strike-ridden, reactionaries controlled the administration, and the monarch lacked intestinal fortitude. But these were not enough to overcome the dissimilar characteristics. For Russia lacked freedom of the press, separation of church and state, personal liberties, a great capital city, and a mutinous army. In addition, the Russian nobility was for conservative reform, and the masses were still loyal to the Czar. Needless to say, it concluded, "the parallelism is therefore unconvincing."10

8"St. Petersburg Massacre," Harper's Weekly, XLIX (February 4, 1905), 152.

9"The Lines of Russian Reform," Nation, LXXX (June 8, 1905), 458.

The Saturday Review reflected that Russia lacked the homogeneous population and compact territory of France. Any attempt to concoct similarities between the Russian and French disturbances, it admonished, was "to confess absolute ignorance of the vital difference in the two situations." 11

Brief mention was also made of a more familiar occurrence. In the Detroit Evening News, "Bloody Sunday" was investigated in the light of the American Revolution. The Americans, it explained, had the advantages of a broad ocean and an armed populace. Lacking both of these, the Russian situation was more of an incitement to revolution than a revolution itself. The possibility, it declared, of an American type upheaval in the land of the Czar was very unlikely. 12

Probably though, the most encompassing appraisal was that offered by an editor in the Independent, which asked if 1848 had come again, or, was "it the bloodier French revolution that is visiting Russia after a weary, waiting century of tyranny?" 13

Clearly, "Bloody Sunday" invited historical inquiries into similar past events. Also apparent was the general lack of erudition on the part of most reporters. The historical approach was a fine idea, but its execution was less than commendable.

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12 The Evening News (Detroit), January 23, 1905, 2.

13 "Is It a Revolution?" Independent, LVIII (January 26, 1905), 213.
CHAPTER IX

FINANCE

The uprising in Russia meant different things to different people. To some, it was a righteous crusade against a villainous evil. To others, it was the first great struggle of the Twentieth Century between the forces of liberalism and the forces of reaction. It was viewed as the traditional pattern of interaction between an autocrat and his subjects. Marxists saw it as a manifestation of the class struggle, and racists denounced it as another example of Slav degeneracy. To many Americans, however, the Russian situation meant nothing at all, except that it might possibly affect their daily lives and well-being. And the most vulnerable area that could have been affected was their pocketbooks.

The financial effect on the average American, of course, was quite indirect, because few citizens had direct dealings with Russia. Some, though, had connections with the world's economic situation through international trade and foreign securities. The day before "Bloody Sunday," the New York Times predicted that violent revolution might diminish the value of Russian stocks and bonds.¹ If that came to pass, France would suffer the most because of its $1,800,000,000 dollars

worth of loans to the Czar.\textsuperscript{2} The United States might also be affected, because its gold reserves would have to be tapped to keep the economies of England and France from collapsing.\textsuperscript{3}

When news of the actual uprising reached Wall Street, the market faltered, but did not collapse. "Russian affairs," reported the Detroit Evening News on January 23rd, "was the cause of an opening break in prices of stocks today of considerable violence."\textsuperscript{4} But even though losses ranged between large fractions and a point or more, and the "general tone of the market was weak," Wall Street, by the end of the day, was nearly back to normal. On the next day, Tuesday, the Russian situation again bred apprehension:

Although there was no pronounced weakness, the market fluctuated up and down, and generally behaved so erratically that it was evident that it would take but little to break prices a few points more.\textsuperscript{5}

However, Russian bonds, a good indication of Czarist solvency, remained steady. Wheat even rose because of an anticipated slackening of Russian competition, while cotton fell due to an expected cutback in Russian consumption.\textsuperscript{6} Japanese securities, reflecting "Bloody Sunday's" assistance to its war effort, took advantage of the situation to pick up a few points.\textsuperscript{7}

\textsuperscript{2}"France and the Millions She has Loaned to Russia," Review of Reviews, XXI (May, 1905), 602.

\textsuperscript{3}New York Times, January 22, 1905, 1.

\textsuperscript{4}The Evening News (Detroit), January 23, 1905, 7.

\textsuperscript{5}New York Times, January 24, 1905, 13.

\textsuperscript{6}Ibid

\textsuperscript{7}New York Times, January 24, 1905, 1.
By January 25th, the New York Times noted, with an exclamation of relief, that Russian bonds, held by American insurance companies, had not been dumped on the market. Actually, it continued, very little news had reached Wall Street since the day before, and the available British reports were unreliable because of their Russophobia. The next two days, Thursday and Friday, were uneventful, but the twenty-eighth recorded the startling news that France had refused to grant another loan to her ally. This, opined the New York Times, could be worse than either the war or the revolution.

A week after the massacre, word reached the market that the revolutionists would not recognize any Czarist debt that was contracted after "Bloody Sunday." Responding to the challenge, financiers pledged to covet money rather than morality:

It is nothing to Wall Street whether or not the autocracy is on the point of conversion into a republic or anarchy.

However, in the same New York Times article, the author did wonder how Russia was going to maintain fiscal stability when the demands of the war and revolution necessitated an increase in the 50% tax rate. Russia must, it concluded, make peace with Japan in order to stop the revolution, and industrialize in order to become a modern nation. This of, by, and for the dollar attitude had been expressed even more succinctly in the New York Times a few days before:

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11. Ibid.
For the politics of it Wall Street cares not a jot: for peace and constitutionalism there is no repugnance, but the contrary. Yet, the Street has had experience of another peace which was disappointing, and the dead weight of undigested Russians, both Governments and unrealizable time bargains, will oppress foreign markets for long, let events take never so favorable a course regarding the position of the Czar.12

A few periodicals also attempted to assess the financial situation in Russia. E. J. Dillon, in the Contemporary Review, predicted a serious crisis. The war debt, need for increased exports, and soldiers returning from the eastern front, demanded a booming economy. But the internal disruption caused by "Bloody Sunday," he explained, and the following wave of strikes and riots were too severe to allow it.13 In another article, for the Nineteenth Century, Mr. Dillon considered the high interest rate of the last French loan as an indication of Russian insolvency. Sure, he continued, Nicholas' income had recently increased, but this had been accomplished through the nationalization of the railroads and spirits' concessions, plus a tax raise, not because of overall economic growth. Russia's enormous gold reserve was used to impress foreign investors, not to assist the Russian people, even though the reserve was collected by the exportation of foodstuffs at a time when Russians were starving. Gross illiteracy among the masses kept Russia from producing manufactured goods capable of competing on the world market. So the question was,
he asked, how long could Russia continue to borrow money to pay off old loans?\textsuperscript{14}

A French analyst was even more critical of the Russian situation. In the Review of Reviews, he protested against the subsidizing of an autocracy with republican monies. French loans to Russia were being squandered, wasted on "useless armaments and unreproductive industries."

Capital gains, he concluded, should not blind France to its moral duty:

For Russia! For Russia! Always for Russia. There is a war of madness,—France furnishes the money. Russia looses her fleet, and then is defeated in a number of great battles; the stupidity of her generals and the shameful corruption of her administration is known to the whole world,—France furnishes the money. The world begins to lose all hope in the final result of this terrible disaster,—still France furnishes the money. An internal revolution breaks out; the Russian Government finds itself at war with its own laboring classes, with its intellectuals, with its noblesse; political assassinations portend the overturn of the empire and the triumph of revolution; bombs bursting on all sides make known in dark, sinister tones the breakup of the Russian Empire,—and France still furnishes the money.\textsuperscript{15}

It appears that in 1905 Wall Street took a rather narrow attitude towards Bloody Sunday. What good would revolution be, it seemed to ask, if it did not line the pockets? However, there was a scarcity of comment about Russia's financial relationship to the United States, and maybe some financiers felt differently. Nonetheless, the impression stands that, even though the United States was involved very little with the Russian economy, to the extent that it was involved, some

\textsuperscript{14}Emile J. Dillon, "The Breakdown of Russian Finances," \textit{L\textsuperscript{WII}} (March, 1905), 373-89.

\textsuperscript{15}"France and the Millions She has Loaned Russia," \textit{Review of Reviews}, XXXI (May, 1905), 602.
Americans sought profits, not reforms. Of course, their interpretation reeks of moralism and may not be fair, but the evidence seems to support it. Some Frenchmen on the other hand, in their usual passionate way, felt the necessity to criticize the overt materialism of their nation's credit policy. But with only one article to represent the Third Republic, who can say what the majority opinion was?
CHAPTER X

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

The reporting of "Bloody Sunday's" effect on Russian foreign policy dealt almost exclusively with the Russo-Japanese conflict. Could Russia cope with its internal troubles and still prosecute the war?

One school of thought opined that Russia could not possibly suppress the insurrection at home and win the war too. As the New York Times said:

If the strike becomes general all over Russia, and especially if the railroads are drawn in, it might immediately force the nation to make peace with Japan.1

The Outlook agreed, and added that Russia had already decided to terminate the war so it could cure its internal ills.2

Another school of thought expected Russian defeat in the East to lead to reforms. As Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu said:

The war in the Crimea gave us the emancipation of the serfs, the war in Manchuria should bring us political freedom.3

Austin Ogg, in the Chautauquan, expected a sound Russian defeat to spur social advances, which in turn would increase Russia's influence.

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2"The Russian Revolt," Outlook, LXXIX (February 4, 1905), 261-3.

3Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu, "The Situation in Russia," Independent, LVIII (February 23, 1905), 405.
with the Western world. Harper's Weekly observed that once peace was Made with Japan, the Eastern army would join the strikers and together they would call for reforms.

Some reporters, in a slightly different vein, saw the war as a monument to Czarist incompetency. It was a war, as Vladimir Simkhovitch thought, that estranged the masses even more from the autocracy. Abe Cahan found satisfaction in Russian defeats because they demonstrated that Russia could never hope to compete with a civilized nation as long as it was under a medieval regime. And A. S. Rappoport, assessing Nicholas' blunders, proposed that if the Japanese failed to coerce reforms from the autocracy, the nations of Europe should combine to do so. In protecting their constitutionalism, western countries would be acting, he concluded, like the fireman who ruthlessly extinguishes a solitary fire to preserve the entire neighborhood.

However, the most thorough analysis of Russian influence on foreign affairs came from the London Spectator:

but much of the future of Europe A paralysis of that

4 Austin Ogg, "Social and Industrial Russia," Chautauquan, XLI (May, 1905), 207.
5 "St. Petersburg Massacre," Harper's Weekly, XLIX (February 4, 1905), 152.
6 Vladimir G. Simkhovitch, "Russia's Struggle with Autocracy," Political Science Quarterly, XX (March, 1905), 119.
7 Abraham Cahan, "The Turmoil in Russia," World's Work, IX (April, 1905), 6030.
8 Angelo S. Rappoport, Is Russia on the Eve of a Revolution? Fortnightly Review
great empire which for more than a century has hung like a heavy cloud on the Eastern frontiers of the really civilized world, would, for example, leave Germany mistress of the continent. It might shatter the Austrian empire to pieces for her Slav majority would no longer have to fear being buried in the Russian morass. It would intensify to a high degree the quarrel always smoldering between the Ottomans and the remnant of their Christian subjects—a result of which Europe already perceives signs in the new arrogance which the Devan is displaying in the Balkans.

French society would be shaken to its heart by a new liability to invasion and with it fresh proclivity to panic. Even Great Britain, though still encompassed by her inviolate sea, would feel the influence of the great change, for India would be as safe from invasion as herself, and being safe, would be apt to indulge in dreams of large ambition.9

American reporting of Russian foreign affairs was much more concerned with the effect of the Russo-Japanese War on internal reforms than the possible disturbance of the European balance of power. Maybe this was because the United States felt secure behind its inviolate seas. Nevertheless, the consensus was that the Russo-Japanese War was going to have traumatic effects on the Russian domestic scene. First defeat, then reforms, American analysts predicted. That the eventual reforms would be short-lived, and would soon be followed by a new era of reactionary ascendancy was not foreseen. The 1905 analyst saw in the Eastern War the harbingers of reform.

CHAPTER XI

WAS IT A REVOLUTION?

The most obvious and probably the most important question facing contemporaries of "Bloody Sunday" was what it actually portended. Was it the beginning of a full-scale revolution? Was the Czardom really in danger, or would it emerge stronger than ever? Did the dead die in vain, or would a new, more liberal system emerge from their sacrifices. Was it just another of the periodic riots that had plagued Russia for centuries, or was it the beginning of a bountiful era of peace and stability? These and other similar questions were discussed by nearly every author who addressed himself to the Russian situation.

One school of thought predicted that "Bloody Sunday" would be the beginning of the end for the autocracy. In an Independent editorial, R. C. Thompson optimistically voiced this view. The slaughter of January 22nd, he asserted, was a good omen for the masses, and portended bad luck for the Czar. "It is now hardly possible," he concluded, "that some sort of revolution will not occur, peaceful or violent, which will give the people a voice and right in the government."1 Another article in the Independent admitted that it was impossible to accurately predict the course of the revolution, but it

1Quoted in "The Omens for Russia," Independent, LXII (February 2, 1905), 230.
was clear that from "Bloody Sunday" would "at least come a form of constitutional government:"
"The people have found their voice. They will have self-government; and they will have peace." "Why should men fight," it asked, "for anything but liberty?" The most important people in Russia were demanding reforms, "landowners; the manufacturers, the men of substance; the journalists; authors, and university men, men of quality." "The knell tolls not too soon in 1905 over the grave of Russian despotism."²

The Outlook perceived that popular unrest, Japanese victories, a corrupt bureaucracy, and the supernatural would bring a successful conclusion to the uprising in Russia. "Bloody Sunday" was the beginning of a revolution that would result in a new democratic, not Cossack, Russia. A "Divine Power," it added, could only bring about this divine end.³ A second article expressed the opinion that "Bloody Sunday" had at last freed the Russian soul:

For many years the progress of the Russian people has been arbitrarily arrested, the natural flow of its energies artificially damned, the normal expression of its spirit tyrannically suppressed.⁴

Wanda Ian-Ruban agreed that "the revolution has begun." It cannot fail, she concluded, because "the very foundations of the autocracy are irreparably undermined."⁵

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²"Is It a Revolution?" Independent, LVIII (January 26, 1905), 213-4.
³"Is It a Revolution?" Outlook, LXXIX (January 28, 1905), 217-8.
⁴"The Russian Revolution," Outlook, LXXIX (February 4, 1905), 261.
⁵Wanda Ian-Ruban, "Some Possibilities in the Russian Situation," Outlook, LXXIX (February 25, 1905), 477.
Ernest Poole also predicted a successful revolution:

To say that all will not soon be better in Russia is as blind and unreasonable as though one were to say, "A Century hence there will still be a king in England or an Emperor in Germany."6

E. J. Dillon agreed with Poole, and called January 22nd "a victory for autocracy—a Pyrrhic victory." The eventual outcome of the battle, he declared, would be the disappearance of one man rule.7

The Contemporary Review portrayed Russia as a secular oak, "sturdy in seeming and rotten within." January 22nd had united the revolutionists with the liberals, and police pressure had solidified the masses. This meant, it concluded, that "government in Russia has ceased to exist and the Tsardom itself is crumbling away."8

Dr. Schilitlovsky, at a New York meeting of Revolutionary and Democratic Socialists, echoed the same: "January 22 will go down in history as the death day of the autocracy."9 Abe Cahan, editor of Forward, not only expected the revolution to succeed, but added that the Russian people were capable of governing themselves.10

6Ernest Poole, "Thou Shalt Not Think—in Russia," Outlook, LXXIX (April 8, 1905), 387.

7Emile J. Dillon, "The Doom of Russian Aristocracy," Review of Reviews, XXXI (March, 1905), 303.


10Ibid.
The Nation described the "Irrepressible Reform in Russia," which guaranteed a successful conclusion to the revolution. Reformism was everywhere, and "all classes in Russia have caught the new spirit." The New York Times optimistically reported that the "revolt has been quelled, but the revolution has begun." And Harper's Weekly reveled in the thought that the "grand-ducal corterie" had had its day. The Russian people, beginning with January 22nd, will have their day next.

However, not all observers of the Russian situation were so blandly optimistic about the chances of the uprising in Russia. Many qualified their estimates with various reservations. Frank Robinson hoped that many thousands had been killed, because, even though a full scale revolution was in progress, it would take more and more bloodshed to awaken the masses. Karl Blind, in the North American Review, admitted that both commoners and nobles wanted a democratic form of government. The best chance yet was at hand for overthrowing the Czar, but whether this would occur or not was quite unpredictable.

Sydney Brooks, after posing the question of whether Russia was the most backward part of Europe or the most progressive part of Asia,
thought it inevitable that Russia would pass through the same stages as the states of the West. But what stage "Bloody Sunday" was in, he did not say.16 The Quarterly Review reported that, even though the Russian situation hardly resembled a revolution, the Japanese victories had educated the Russian empire "to a conception of its urgent political need."17 The Century agreed, and predicted that Russia would advance towards a modern form of government. Japan, it added, would be a good example to follow.18

Alexander Ular expected a three stage revolution. First civil rights would be granted, next the bureaucracy would be overthrown, and finally the Czar, at last confronted with the real needs of his people, would grant liberal reforms, including a constitution.19 The victory of liberalism, predicted Harry Pratt Judson, was assured, because of the activities of constitutional agitators and industrial reformers. However, the high illiteracy rate necessitated a special form of liberalism which he did not define.20

Even though "Russia is not ripe for a revolutionary change," thought the Chautauquan, some reforms would be implemented:


17"The Condition of Russia," Quarterly Review, CCII (April, 1905), 587.


Concessions are inevitable—concessions not only to the working people, but to the intelligence and liberalism of the empire. The Russian autocracy has not been "overthrown," but it will be compelled to institute reforms which will gradually bring about its extinction. The beginning of the end is distinctly visible.21

Again, the New York Times opined that without the army on its side, the revolutionists were lost. Nevertheless, even if the January movement should collapse, economic deprivations would eventually lead to reforms:

Intelligence grows with the spread of the industrial spirit. Each reinforces the other. In the end they will free Russia from the absolutism of stupid Czars and the insolence of predatory nobles.22

Austin Ogg doubted the ability of the Russian masses to govern themselves, but observed that Russia was on the eve of great social advances. The exact role of the "Bloody Sunday" incident, however, was not outlined.23 The North American Review found the Czar on the horns of a dilemma. He could not provide both military success and economic stability, but to fail in either department would bring disaster. "In a word, Russia had entered upon the first stage of revolution."24

However, Jacob Marinoff, at a New York meeting of Russian sympathizers, could not restrain himself. Casting all reservations aside, he said: "This is the greatest news of all. The dynasty is lost."

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21Chautauquan, XLI (March, 1905), 1.


The day of freedom has dawned upon Russia. "25

Even official Washington expected the January events in Russia to produce momentous results:

Persons familiar with Russian conditions who are receiving private advices from the capital say the situation is vastly more serious that appears in the present dispatches. They expect a revolution.26

In the Russian situation, thought Hannis Taylor, "an explosion is possible at any time which may lift it into a higher sphere." And the mir would be an ideal base for a liberal form of government:

There is no reason why a parliamentary system should not be rapidly developed in Russia, because the entire substructure of the state is composed of nuseries in which the democratic principle of election and representation by small democracies is in full bloom.27

Wolf von Schierbrand also expected at least partial success for the revolution:

It is quite certain that if, as it looks now, the road of political enfranchisement be valiantly and persistantly trodden by the thinking classes of Russia, autocracy will fall before the trumpet blasts of an unshackled public opinion.28

Some reporters, though, were much less optimistic about the Russian situation. A few reflected that "Bloody 'Sunday" portended no revolution at all. The Living Age expressed just such an opinion.


Large numbers of troops in the key cities were still loyal to the Czar, it explained, and the workers' petition to the Czar omitted universal suffrage, vote by ballot, and a national assembly. Clearly, their petition was "more an utterance of discontent with their own material condition than a demand for constitutional changes."\(^{29}\)

The *World To-Day* observed that Russia's vastness and numerous ethnic groups worked to the disadvantage of the revolutionists. An army could always be obtained from one area of the country to quell disturbances in another area.\(^{30}\) Of the same opinion was the *Chautauquan*, which believed that the 3,000,000 Russian workmen were too scattered and disorganized to act in concert.\(^{31}\) The *Quarterly Review* reflected that the easy suppression of the St. Petersburg marchers" seemed to prove that Russia was not yet ripe for a labor movement on the Western pattern."\(^{32}\) Even the United Hebrew Trades Association, which applauded the Russian events, considered "Bloody Sunday" to be only a strike, not a revolution.\(^{33}\)

A. S. Rappoport stated point-blank that Russia was not on the eve of a revolution: "The nation will never revolt against the Czar." The Russian found no attraction in power, he continued, and Russia was the

\(^{29}\)"The Little Father and His Children," *Living Age*, CCXLIV (February 12, 1905), 443.


\(^{31}\)Chautauquan, XLI (March, 1905), 1.

\(^{32}\)"The Condition of Russia," *Quarterly Review*, CCII (April, 1905), 600.

\(^{33}\)New York Times, January 24, 1905, 2.
only country that never had, and never will have, a revolution.34 Russia, he concluded, would not reform unless it was forced to by the nations of the West: "The day of liberty will never dawn for the oppressed masses in Russia without an order from Europe."35

Alexander Kinloch observed that both England and Russia were suffering from the "consequences of national myopy." And in Russia's case, its society was too heterogeneous to "apply any Western ideas of reform." Hence, "constitutional government in Russia in the distant future seems scarcely feasible."36

Russia's philosopher statesman, Count Tolstoy, also expressed little hope for sweeping social and political changes in the Czar's country. The peasant, he said, was just not interested in such a movement:

His solo desire is to own land, which should no longer be an object of sale or purchase, but should be the common property of those who till it. At present the Russian people do not dream of revolution.37

Addressing itself to the subject of disorder, the Detroit Evening News expected numerous riots, but a successful revolution to force constitutional concessions from the government was "very doubtful."38

Edwin A. Grosvenor, addressing the National Geographic Society, saw

34"Revolution Impossible in Russia," Review of Reviews, XXXI (March, 1905), 372.


37Review of Reviews, XXXI (March, 1905), 229.

38The Evening News (Detroit), January 23, 1905, 2.
little chance for a successful revolution in Russia because of the long
tradition of unchecked autocratic rule.^{39} Likewise, a Russian
immigrant, in the Independent, thought the loyalty of the army and the
peasants to the Czar was too strong to condone a revolution.^{40}

R. Long, in the Fortnightly Review, definitely expected no major
changes in Russia:

> As it is, revolution has receded out of sight, and
> instead, we are faced with the aimless, sporadic, lawlessness of
desperation—proof not of the people's power to rebel, but of their
weakness and total lack of concord and plan.\textsuperscript{41}

Russians were so apathetic, continued Mr. Long, that children playfully
 imitated bomb throwers, and pretended to be state officials conducting
massacres. All the prerequisites for a revolution were missing. The
people were not armed, the army was not mutinous, the treasury was not
empty, and there was no philosophical or religious awakening. In total,
St. Petersburg reflected the attitude of the whole nation, and "there
was no revolution, no revolutionary movement, hardly any revolutionary
feeling in the Russian capital."\textsuperscript{42}

Without a doubt, though, the most vehement denial of a Russian
revolution came from the Russian ambassador to the United States,
Count Cassini. He said:

\begin{footnotes}
\item[^{40}] "Two Russian Workmen's Stories," Independent, L/VIII (February 2, 1905), 249.
\item[^{41}] Ray Long, "The Erosion of Autocracy," Fortnightly Review, LXXXIII (May, 1905), 373-4.
\item[^{42}] Ray Long, "Revolution by Telegraph," Fortnightly Review, LXXXIII (March, 1905), 404.
\end{footnotes}
There is a great deal of difference between a riot and a revolution, and Americans will make a great mistake if they infer from the unfortunate stories of the disturbance in the Russian capital that the demonstration is a revolution or even hostile to the war. The love of a great people for their sovereign is not wiped out by the cries of a few street brawlers. It will be found, when public order has been restored, that the traditional and ancient affection of the Russian people for their emperor still abides. 43

Clearly, it can be seen that opinion was widely divided over the question of what the Russian events really meant. But even if no revolution occurred and no lasting changes were implemented, even if the riots were "merely a temporary sputter of indignation," at least one benefit could be attributed to "Bloody Sunday." And this, as the Quarterly Review said, was the "cry of liberty" that had been heard. It was "clear that the Russian people is made of the same clay as European nations." 44 And as the New York Times observed, that "Bloody Sunday" occurred at all was significant in itself. 45

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44 "The Condition of Russia," Quarterly Review, CCII (April, 1905), 583.

APPENDIX

THE POETRY OF REVOLUTION

Traumatic experiences often elicit a flow of words, and the "Bloody Sunday" incident was no exception. The following are a few of the numerous literary efforts that attempted to eulogize the event.

Louise Morgan Sill found her effort published in the letter to the editor section of Harper's Weekly:

TO THE CZAR

Imperial minion, swollen with a pride
That reeks to Heaven; not pride that still may rear
A loft an honest brow to face the world,
But pride that builds itself on craven fear,
Gnawing thy vitals like a stinging worm,
That gropes a deadly way to death more near;

Who art thou that hast dared to crown thyself,
Now is the day of brotherly desire,
With power of a God? What gave thee warrant
To cast strong equal men into the mire
Beneath thy foot, or pour the deadening slime
Of tyrant power upon their sacred fire?

By what divine decree hast thou yet spurned
The long, sad yearning question of thy race?
Or cast thy fellows, oft more than thy peers,
Enchained in some dark, vermin—wringing place,
Where Shame sat quaint by Women's shrinking breasts,
Whilst thou swept on nor slacked thy wanton pace.

What gives thee holy right to murder hope,
And water ignorance with human blood?
Wert thou not born of women like thy kind? Hast thou not eyes and limbs? Do evil, good, Not blind thee like the rest to like result,—Hast thou not need of water and of food?

From what high, Universe-dividing power Draw'st thou thy wondrous, ripe brutality?
Is it from Jesus, standing at thy gate and murmuring, "Little Children, come to me"—
While babies lie bathed in gore about thy feet, With more than seven wounds that gape at thee?

O horrible . . . Thou God who see'st these things
Help us to blot this terror from the earth.
Count, in thy memory divine, the lives
That cast into this chasm their noble worth,
And grant to Russia in her dying need
From thine own hand a radiant new birth!

Robert Underwood Johnson, also in Harper's Weekly echoed the same view of the Czar:

OPPORTUNITY

He heard his loyal people cry
Like children to a saint:
"Help, Little Father, or we die!
We starve and freeze and faint.
The noble hears not for his crimes,
The soldier, for his drum,
The Procurator, for his chimes—
At last to thee we come.

"To-morrow, with a faithful priest—
God's best gift to the poor—
A throng shall stand, as at a feast,
Before thy palace door.
And that with favor it be crowned,
The prayer we bring to thee
Shall to the Holy Cross be bound
As Christ on Calvary.

"And wives and children too shall come
To move thy piteous heart,
And when thou see'st them, pale and numb,
Thy ready tear shall start.
We blame thee not: how could'st thou know,
With courtiers trained to hide?
But thou wilt hear: our daily woe
Shall woo thee to our side."

Then the good angel of the Czar
Spake with a sibyl's voice:
"Let no mischance this moment mar,
'Tis sent thee to rejoice.
Go meet thy people as they trudge
Toward thee their weary way,
To find in thee a righteous judge;
And go unarmed as they.

"Enough, through centuries of wrong,
Thy line's inverted fame,
The Romanoff has been too long
The synonym of shame.
Then haste to meet the cross afar
Do thou what courage can,
And thou shalt be the greater Czar
If thou but show thee man."

He rose, resolved; but--fortune dire!--
One glance his purpose crossed:
An impulse from some recreant sire
Triumphed, and he was lost.
The flower is trampled in the sod;
False dawn delays the day:
And once again the Will of God
Marches the bloody way.

Thomas Bailey Aldrich's offering was printed in the Outlook:

BATUSCHKA

From yonder gilded minaret
Beside the steel-blue Neva set
I faintly catch, from time to time
The sweet, aerial midnight chime,
"God save the Czar!"

3Thomas Bailey Aldrich, "Batuschka," Outlook, LXXIX (February 4, 1905), 272.
Above the ravelins and the moats
Of the white citadel it floats;
And men in the dungeons far beneath
Listen, and pray, and gnash their teeth—
"God save the Czar!"

The soft reiteration's sweep
Across the horror of their sleep,
As if some demon in his glee
Were mocking at their misery—
"God save the Czar!"

In his red palace over there,
Wakeful, he needs must hear the prayer.
How can it drown the broken cries
Wring from his children's agonies?—
"God save the Czar!"

Father they called him of old—
Batuschka!—How his heart is cold!
Wait till a million scourged men
Rise in their awful might, and then
God save the Czar!

A much acclaimed sonnet by Charles Swinburne appeared in the

New York Times:

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**Czar: Louis XVI! Absit Omen**

Peace on his lying lips, and on his hands
Blood, smiled and cowered the tyrant, seeing afar
His bondslaves parish and acclaim their Czar
Now, sheltered scarce by Murder's loyal bands,
Clothed on with slaughter, naked else he stands—
He flies and stands. Not now the blood red star
That marks the face of midnight. As a scar
Tyranny trembles on the snow it brands,
And shudders toward the pit where deathless death
Leaves no life more for liars and slayers to live
Fly, coward and cower while there is time to fly.
Cherish awhile thy terror—shortened breath,
Not as thy grandsire died, if justice give
Judgement, but slain by judgement thou shalt die.

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*New York Times, January 26, 1905, 6.*
The most unique contribution to the poetry of revolution came from the pen of Richard Watson Gilder who, after learning of "Bloody Sunday," added a third section to a poem he had already composed. The entire work appeared in the January 26th issue of the New York Times.

THE WHITE TSAR'S PEOPLE

I

The White Tsar's people cry:
"Thou God of the heat and the cold
Of storm and lightning,
Of darkness, and dawns red brightening;
Hold, Lord God, Hold,
Hold Thy hand lest we curse Thee and die."

The White Tsar's people pray:
"Thou God of the South and the North
We are crushed, we are bleeding:
"Tis Christ, 'tis Thy Son interceding
Forth, Lord, come forth!
Bid the slayer no longer slay."

The White Tsar's people call:
Aloud to the skies of lead:
"We are slaves, not freemen:
Ourselves, our children, our women--
Dead, we are dead.
Though we breathe, we are dead men all."

"Blame not if we misprize Thee--
Who can, but will not draw near.
"Tis Thou who has made us--
Not Thou, dread God, to upbraid us.
Hear, Lord God, hear
Lest we whom Thou makest despise Thee."

II

Then answered the most high God,
Lord of the heat and the cold,
Of storm and of lightning,
Of darkness and dawns red brightening:
"Bold. yea, too bold
Whom I wrought from the air and the clod!

"Hast thou forgotten from me
Are those ears to quick to hear
The passion and anguish
Of your sisters, your children who languish
Near? Ah, not near--
Far off by the uttermost seas!

"Who gave ye your brains to plan--
Your hearts to suffer and bleed?
Why call ye on Heaven--
'Tis the earth that to you is given!
Plead, ye may plead
But for man I work through man.

"Who gave ye a voice to utter
Your tale to the wind and the sea?
One word well spoken
And the iron gates are broken!
From me, yea, from me
The word that ye will not mutter.

"I love not murder but truth.
Begone from my sight ye who take
The knife of the coward--
Even ye who by Heaven were dowered!
Wake ye, o Wake,
And strike with the sword of the truth!

"Fear ye lest I misprize ye--
I who fashioned not brutes, but men
After the lightning
And darkness--the dawn's red brightening!
Men! be ye men!
Lest I who made ye despise ye!"

III

At last is the great word said:
White Tsar! it is spoken to thee.
Thy children, heart-broken.
To thee their sorrows have spoken;
To thee, yea, to thee!
O listen, and bow thy head.

For the word is their fearful cry.
And the word is their innocent blood.
0 red is the chalice
Lifted up to thy empty palace!
Blood, crimson blood.
On the snows where the murdered lie!
Their shed blood is the word! It is winning
   Its way swift from zone to zone;
Through the world it has thrilled
And the heart of the nation stilled.
     Alone, thou alone!
Art thou deaf to the voices and the meaning?

Lo, it swells like the sound of the sea.
     Dull Monarch! yet, yet, shalt thou hear it!
For, once 'neath the sun
By the brave it is spoken—all's done.
     Hear it—and fear it;
For freedom it cries, "We are free!"
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