The Rhodesian Crisis: The Struggle for Majority Rule 1965-1978

Richard W. Stekette
THE RHODESIAN CRISIS:
THE STRUGGLE FOR MAJORITY RULE 1965-1978

by

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Richard W. Steketee Jr.
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PREFACE

On November 11, 1965, Ian Smith, Prime Minister of Rhodesia, proclaimed his country's unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) from Great Britain. His proclamation set off a storm of protest around the world from the United States to the Soviet Union. The criticisms were generally the same: the white minority government of Rhodesia was accused of illegally seizing power. Although most countries felt that the Rhodesian UDI was a British colonial problem, leaders from Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, and Zambia convened in Nairobi, Kenya, to discuss the potential need of taking matters out of British hands. The issue to them was more than Rhodesia's illegal declaration of independence from Britain. It had racial overtones as well for the Smith government was one of the last remnants of white western colonialism in Africa.

The UDI was a turning point in Rhodesian and world affairs. It legitimized white minority rule, and it de-emphasized the issue of black majority rights. Today in 1978, the situation is much the same. Britain has not recognized Rhodesia as an independent state, and the white minority government of Ian Smith still maintains tight control over the vast African majority.

I have selected the Rhodesian crisis for my Master's Thesis in Political Science because it focuses on a number of important issues in international affairs: human rights and majority rule; colonialism and Third World African independence; the effectiveness of the
United Nations as an international peacekeeper; and major power politics. It is these issues with which I will be concerned in the following pages.

The major purpose in this paper is twofold: (1) to analyze the role of the United Nations in trying to resolve the Rhodesian crisis 1965-1978, concluding with an assessment of its successes, failures, and effectiveness or ineffectiveness as an international mediator; and (2) to assess the impact of other external and internal pressures on the Smith regime, including the protracted guerrilla war in Rhodesia and the possibility of major power confrontation in southern Africa.

In analyzing the Rhodesian crisis from 1965 to the present, I will divide the thesis into two parts. Part I will deal with the role of the United Nations in the Rhodesian issue. Within this section, Chapter I will give a brief background to the crisis and will explain the constitutional problem of illegal independence faced by Britain. Chapter II will explain how the Rhodesian crisis attained international dimensions. The human rights issue of majority rule, the United Nations concern with international peace and security, and the organization's eventual decision to implement economic sanctions against Rhodesia will be examined. Chapter III will deal with the actual implementation of United Nations sanctions. Chapter IV will focus on the effectiveness and ineffectiveness of economic sanctions. Chapter V will conclude with an evaluation of the role of the United Nations as an effective and/or ineffective mediator in Rhodesia.
Whereas Part I will focus on the role of the United Nations and the use of economic sanctions in trying to resolve the Rhodesian crisis, Part II will concentrate on related dimensions of the problem: the impact of an escalating guerrilla war on the viability of the Smith regime; the role of primary and secondary actors in the outcome of the crisis; and the place of southern Africa (Rhodesia) in contemporary world affairs. Chapter VI will emphasize the failure of negotiations to bring majority rule to Rhodesia. Chapters VII and VIII will focus on the major groups involved in resolving the crisis -- the Smith regime, the African moderates, and the nationalist guerrillas as well as South Africa and the front-line states -- and their influence on the outcome. Chapter IX will show how the Rhodesian problem has been internationalized to include participation by the United States and the Soviet Union as well as Red China. Chapter X will contain some concluding reflections on the Rhodesian question and the future of the African state of Zimbabwe.
PART I

ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS
I. NATURE OF THE CRISIS

Pre-UDI History of British Involvement

The Rhodesian crisis 1965-1978 can only be understood if one looks at past internal developments in the country. Rhodesia is a multiracial society in which blacks outnumber whites approximately 25 to 1, but in which economic and political power is vested in the hands of the white minority. It has been this way since the turn of the twentieth century when white Europeans began to settle in Rhodesia and call the country their home. The small white minority is economically and politically dominant and is primarily responsible for the growth of Rhodesia because it provides most of the professional, administrative, and managerial skills as well as technological know-how.

Rhodesia was first settled in 1890 by a group of 200 white settlers and several hundred mercenaries selected by Cecil Rhodes, one year after he had received a British royal charter to form the British South Africa Company. The charter granted Rhodes authority to settle in Salisbury and administer the land to the north of the South African Republic and west of Portuguese territories for twenty-five years.

By 1923, after many years of fighting between the white settlers and local African tribes, company rule was abolished, and Rhodesia was granted constitutional status as a self-governing colony of the British Crown. Under the 1923 Constitution, political and economic
power was concentrated in the hands of the white minority. There were also powers reserved for the British which allowed them to protect the African population against discriminatory legislation. However, these reserve powers were never used because the British Parliament refused to legislate for internal Rhodesian affairs.

The character of the white society, therefore, developed as a result of many factors: the settlers' desire to claim Rhodesia as their homeland; the struggle against the local Ndebele and Shona peoples who had taken up arms against the settlers; the settlers' aspiration for political autonomy; and the superiority of white values and interests in the development of the area. The early conflict situation with the natives was replaced by a kind of paternalism in which the African was subservient to his white master.4

In the years following the British granting of self-governing colonial status to Rhodesia, there were three major objectives that dominated Rhodesian development:5 the preservation of the privileged status of whites and the exploitation of blacks; the creation of a "greater Rhodesia" by extension of European control into territories to the north of Salisbury; and achievement of independence from Britain.

The white minority passed a great deal of legislation designed to enhance its economic and political control over the country. The Land Apportionment Act of 1930, later replaced by the Land Tenure Act of 1969, became the basis of Rhodesia's social, economic, and racial structure. This act allocated over 30% of the land, including most of Rhodesia's arable land, for European use, while the
balance was reserved for the Africans. This act has been modified a number of times so that today although whites comprise only 5% of the population, they have been allotted 50% of the best land, while Africans and others who comprise 95% of the population, receive the same amount of land. The Land Apportionment Act did not allow Africans to own property or occupy premises in towns. Because the act has been regarded by whites as evidence of their privileged position and as a source of racial discrimination by blacks, it is a major source of bitterness between the two races.

Voting restrictions since 1923 have denied Africans effective participation in the political process. Various legislation has denied all but a few blacks the right to vote. Under Rhodesian law, Africans must meet financial, property ownership, or educational standards to qualify to vote. In addition, the Unlawful Organization Act, the Preventive Detention Act of 1959, and the Law and Order Maintenance Act of 1960 have prevented African groups and individuals from organizing effective resistance to discriminatory white policies.

As early as 1924, the possible political amalgamation of Northern (Zambia) and Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland (Malawi) was discussed. The primary reason for this potential union was economic. It was felt that Southern Rhodesia, using manpower from Nyasaland, could provide the expertise and power (coal) to develop the mineral wealth of Northern Rhodesia. In addition, it was also felt that an amalgamation would consolidate the white minorities in each country. Although a conference between Northern and Southern Rhodesia was held
in 1935 and serious consideration was given to possible unification, no action was taken because the conference felt that the discriminatory policies of Southern Rhodesia would conflict with British commitments to Africans in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland.

With urging by whites in Northern and Southern Rhodesia and agreement by the British government, however, the union of the three areas into the Central African Federation became a reality in 1952. Although one reason for the federation was economic in nature, another was that Britain was also interested in developing a multiracial society. It failed, however, because African desires for independence conflicted with European desires to maintain their privileged positions. When Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland achieved independence during 1962-63, Southern Rhodesia was left on its own, and the European desire for independence intensified.

Race became an even bigger issue in the drive for independence. The new Constitution of 1961 gave Africans only token participation in the political system. This was an important document for the white minority because Britain surrendered its right to veto discriminatory legislation. Even though Britain's reserve powers were replaced by a Declaration of Rights designed to provide equal enjoyment of fundamental rights and freedom for all individuals, regardless of race, discrimination remained because the Land Apportionment Act and the stringent security laws stayed intact. In addition, Africans were only allowed 15 out of 65 members in the Legislative Assembly. Because of the continuing political, economic, and social inequities, African nationalist groups boycotted the 1962 elections,
at which time European support passed from the moderate United Federal Party of Sir Edgar Whitehead to the white supremacist, right-wing Rhodesian Front Party of Ian Smith. The Rhodesian Front highlighted its election campaign by promising "separate development" of the races. African political support was split between the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), founded in 1961, and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), founded in 1963. Both parties were banned and their leaders arrested and placed in detention for ten years (1964-1974) in light of increased terrorist activities and militant African demands for majority rule. Europeans were fearful that African majority rule, with the blessing of the British Crown, would destroy their privileged role in Rhodesia. As a result, European demands for a unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) began to surface. On the eve of the Rhodesian UDI the situation, therefore, looked something like this: both the British Labor and Conservative parties were committed to a policy of withholding independence from Rhodesia until its government agreed to broaden the base of its franchise. They had established the claim that independence on the basis of the 1961 Constitution was acceptable only if it applied to the people of Rhodesia as a whole. Britain was not willing to grant Rhodesia independence based on its established racial policies. The Rhodesian Front Party, on the other hand, supported overwhelmingly in the 1965 general election, was advocating independence as the only alternative to British-imposed majority rule.

As early as February 1964, Britain warned Rhodesia of the dire consequences of a unilateral declaration of independence. Later,
Prime Minister Harold Wilson on two separate occasions indicated the seriousness with which Britain viewed a UDI. In October 1964, he said,

The British government cannot believe that once the consequences (of an UDI) have been made clear, the government and people of Southern Rhodesia will take an irrevocable step of this kind.\textsuperscript{12}

Then in April 1965, he warned the Smith regime of possible economic sanctions and United Nations or Commonwealth interference in Rhodesia's affairs if Rhodesia initiated an illegal independence move:

Rhodesia cannot hope to defy Britain, the whole of the Commonwealth, nearly the whole of Africa, and the United Nations.\textsuperscript{13}

Unilateral Declaration of Independence

Despite negotiations between Rhodesia and Britain and the numerous British warnings concerning the consequences of UDI, the self-governing colony and its mother country were not able to resolve their differences over the issue of black majority participation in government, and Rhodesia declared its independence on November 11, 1965,\textsuperscript{14} knowing full well that its act would be criticized by the Commonwealth and the United Nations.

The British responded to UDI by implementing the following policies: recalling the British High Commissioner and expelling his Rhodesian counterpart; excluding Rhodesia from the sterling area; refusing to recognize Rhodesian passports; requesting Rhodesian civil servants not to help the rebels' cause and asking Rhodesian armed forces not to take up arms in favor of the rebel government; barring Rhodesia from the Commonwealth Preference area; preventing the
exportation of capital and arms to Rhodesia; imposing economic sanc-
tions on sugar and tobacco.

Harold Wilson viewed UDI as "an act of rebellion against the
Crown and against the Constitution," and he was confident that
Britain would have on its side "not only the support of the House (of
Commons), not only the support of the nations of the world, but... the
clear and decisive verdict of history." The initial sanctions and
other British policies were described as non-punitive and were de-
signed to restore Rhodesia to a state of constitutional legality in
which there would be loyalty to the British Crown and a government
acting in the interests of all Rhodesians. It is also worth not-
ing that the British leaders, from Arthur Bottomley, Secretary of
State for Commonwealth Relations, to Prime Minister Wilson, affirmed
Britain's position not to use force to resolve the Rhodesian prob-
lem.

The roots of the Rhodesian crisis and the ultimate confronta-
tion between Britain and Rhodesia can be summarized in terms of the
economic and political distribution of power in Rhodesia as well as
in the general feeling among white Rhodesians that their culture is
superior to that of the blacks. To the Europeans, land has meant
the acquisition of wealth and ultimately the consolidation of white
political power resulting in their privileged social status. The
whites believe that they are deserving of a special political power
role and also land ownership rights by virtue of the fact that they
have developed Rhodesia into a modern civilization. To the Africans,
on the other hand, the Europeans represent the dispossessing of their
land and the violation of their dignity. This condition has not only caused bitterness between the races, but it also helped initiate the constitutional crisis with Britain in 1965.
NOTES FOR CHAPTER I

1. I will refer to the problem at hand as the Rhodesian crisis, despite the fact that Rhodesia has not been officially recognized as a sovereign nation by any country or international organization. In the eyes of the international community, the territory's official name, developed during British colonial times, is still Southern Rhodesia. The term Rhodesia, however, is shorter and is a more commonly-used description.

2. Depending on which census figures one uses, the ratio of blacks to whites varies from 20 to 1 to 25 to 1. In Africa South of the Sahara 1977-78, London: Europa Publications Limited, 1977, p. 692, the 1976 population is estimated to be 6,530,000 including 6,220,000 Africans, 277,000 Europeans of Rhodesian, South African, or British origin, and 21,400 Asians and Coloureds.


4. loc. cit., p. 19.


6. Houser, George M., Rhodesia to Zimbabwe--A Chronology 1830 to 1976. New York: The Africa Fund, 1977, p. 2. At present 45 million acres, 71% of Rhodesia's total grade 1 (most arable) land is owned by whites, and 45 million acres, almost 50% of which is poor farming land, is owned by blacks. Blacks, therefore, average 7.3 acres per individual, while whites average 162 acres per individual.

7. Under the 1923 Constitution high franchise qualification excluded virtually the entire African population from voting. Under the 1969 Constitution, for example, only 6645 Africans out of 5 million qualified to vote.

8. See Windrich, op. cit., p. 48 for an explanation of the principles of the Rhodesian Front's platform.

9. The name Zimbabwe comes from the Shona word "Dzimbabwe" meaning "house of stones." Although the term was not brought into contemporary political usage until the 1960's by the two black nationalist political parties, it has nevertheless represented opposition to white colonial rule since the time of white settlement in the area. ZAPU and ZANU are named after the great Zimbabwe ruins, located near Fort Victoria about 220 miles southeast of Salisbury. These ruins have been identified as the center of a pre-colonial African state system. See Houser, op. cit., p. 2.
10. See Windrich, op. cit., p. 205 referring to the message dated September 21, 1965, from Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, Arthur Bottomley, to the Prime Minister of Rhodesia, Ian Smith, in which the following Five Principles for Rhodesian Independence were explained: (1) the principle and intention of unimpeded progress toward majority rule would have to be maintained and guaranteed; (2) there would have to be guarantees against retrogressive amendment of the Constitution; (3) there would have to be immediate improvement in the political status of the African population; (4) there would have to be progress towards ending racial discrimination; (5) the British government would need to be satisfied that any basis for independence was acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole.


14. It is interesting to note that this was the first UDI in British history since 1776. Between 1776 and 1965 Britain and her colonies had always been able to reach agreement on independence and the constitutional system.


16. loc. cit., Col. 356.

17. loc. cit., Col. 359.

II. UNITED NATIONS INVOLVEMENT

Rhodesia's UDI created two major conflicts. The first presented Britain with a constitutional crisis since UDI was perceived as an act of rebellion. The second presented the United Nations and the international community with a problem because the Rhodesian situation attained international proportions.

In examining UDI and the conflicts it created, it is important to look at the crucial issues: human rights and majority rule; colonialism; the initial United Nations involvement in the crisis; the combined role of the United Nations and Britain in trying to handle the problem. Since all of these issues are intertwined, they will be examined as a group.

Pre-UDI Considerations 1961-1965

In 1960 a new source of anti-colonial influence developed in the United Nations with the passage of Resolution 1514 (XV) on the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, more popularly known as the "Anti-colonial Manifesto." This resolution provided that:

Immediate steps shall be taken, in Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories or all other Territories which have not yet attained independence, to transfer all powers to the peoples of those territories, without any conditions or reservations, in accordance with their freely expressed will and desire, without any distinctions as to race, creed, or colour, in order to enable them to enjoy complete independence and freedom.¹
In 1961 a Special Committee on the Situation With Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples was established to review areas covered by Resolution 1514 (XV). With the establishment of this Special Committee, anti-colonial forces showed that they had enough votes to make the abolition of colonialism a major issue in the General Assembly, and, according to David Kay, that they were sophisticated enough to develop a political vehicle by which they could attain their objectives. From the time of its inception, the Special Committee included a substantial anti-colonial majority with representation from eight Afro-Asian nations, two Soviet bloc nations, two Latin American states, two Western European states, Yugoslavia, United States, and Australia. When the Special Committee's membership was increased in 1962 from seventeen to twenty-four, four of the new members were Afro-Asian states.

Much of the impetus behind the anti-colonial forces' push for power came when African and Asian nations expressed concern at Britain's support for the new constitution in Rhodesia in 1961. Despite the fact that Africans were given their first representation in the Rhodesian Parliament, the new constitution restricted their franchise through a two-role voting system, and political power was still heavily concentrated in the hands of whites. This situation greatly alarmed the African nations, but perhaps more importantly, they did not agree with Britain's abscision of its veto in Rhodesian legislation in exchange for references in the constitution to majority rule and a promise not to implement future discriminatory
legislation. As a result, a Subcommittee on Southern Rhodesia was established by the Special Committee of Twenty-four to study the future of the territory.4

The crucial issue was whether Rhodesia was self-governing or non-self-governing. Its interpretation by Britain was the determining factor in how the Rhodesian situation was subsequently handled. After receiving a recommendation from the Subcommittee on Southern Rhodesia that "the situation in Southern Rhodesia should be considered by the General Assembly...as a matter of urgency," the Special Committee endorsed the recommendation and, in addition, decided that Southern Rhodesia was non-self-governing within the meaning of Chapter XI of the United Nations Charter and requested Britain to do the following: 6 overturn the 1961 Rhodesian Constitution to restore civil liberties in Rhodesia; apply the 1960 Anti-colonial Manifesto; and repeal those Rhodesian laws which supported discrimination. The committee requested that the matter be considered by the General Assembly at its resumed sixteenth session. Its decision that Rhodesia was non-self-governing was affirmed by the General Assembly in June 1962, with the passage of Resolution 1747 (XVI), initiated by a 38 member Afro-Asian group as a moderate alternative to the more sweeping draft proposed by the Special Committee.7 While it declared that Rhodesia was a non-self-governing territory, it avoided requiring Britain to annul the 1961 Constitution as the Special Committee had wanted. It did request Britain:

to undertake urgently the convening of a constitutional conference...which would insure the rights of the majority of the people in conformity
with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples.

The General Assembly, acting under the pressures of anti-colonial Afro-Asian political forces, tried to promote majority rule in Rhodesia. According to Leo Cefkin, it was their purpose to establish that Rhodesia was non-self-governing under Chapter XI of the Charter so that Britain could be held responsible for bringing about independence under majority rule as stated in Resolution 1514 (XV), thereby eliminating the situation where the vast majority of the African population had no voting rights or political impact on the establishment of a new constitution.

Resolution 1747, however, conflicted with the British position that Rhodesia was self-governing. After failing initially to resist the Special Committee's demand that the Rhodesian situation was a matter of urgency, thereby thwarting the Committee's goal of forcing a General Assembly vote on the issue, Britain countered the supporters of the draft resolution by arguing that Rhodesia had been autonomous since 1923 and that London's authority had been limited to external relations, and that, therefore, Britain was powerless to overturn the 1961 Constitution. The British delegation argued that the draft resolution did not address the constitutional limitations on London's power to change the Rhodesian constitution: "It asks us to do things, such as the convening of another constitutional conference, that we cannot do alone."

At the same time that Britain called Rhodesia self-governing, it also stated that Rhodesia was not fully independent either and
was, therefore, beyond the jurisdiction of the United Nations and still within London's authority. As pointed out by the British delegation, United Nations intervention in the administration of dependent territories in circumstances precluded by the Charter was "objectionable" and "dangerous." In addition, Britain continued to maintain that it could not provide information required under Article 73e of the United Nations Charter because being self-governing, Rhodesia did not supply it.

During the 1962-1965 period, the issue of non-self-governing versus self-governing continued to be argued between the British and their supporters and the anti-colonial forces of the Third World. What is important is that, at that point in time, there was a consensus in the United Nations on one major point: the Rhodesian crisis was primarily a British problem. The United Nations only had an indirect role to play in resolving that crisis. It was a lobby of Afro-Asian nations which tried to pressure Britain into using effective measures to deal with the Rhodesian white minority regime. The ultimate objective of the anti-colonial bloc of nations was to have Rhodesia adopt majority rule rather than to allow it to maintain white autonomy. The Third World wanted a new constitution for Rhodesia based on one man-one-vote, thereby assuring black majority rule. That is why those nations argued that the Rhodesian problem was an urgent matter. They felt it deserved that kind of attention, especially because the 1961 Constitution had been opposed by the vast majority of Africans. And that is why they forced the issue of Rhodesia's non-self-governing status to a vote in the General Assembly.
The Afro-Asian bloc felt that while white Rhodesians maintained an autonomous position, that circumstance did not override the absence of self-government for the African majority, as restrictions on African participation were characteristic of colonial rather than self-governing situations.\textsuperscript{14}

Despite the Special Committee's studies and demands and the subsequent supportive United Nations resolutions, no progress was made toward forcing Britain or the Rhodesian white regime to change their positions. While the Special Committee of Twenty-four and the entire General Assembly were able to achieve their initial objective of focusing world attention on the discriminatory government of Rhodesia, they were unable by 1965 to pressure Britain into providing results to meet their demands for black majority rule in Rhodesia. As a result, the Afro-Asian nations became more forceful in their use of United Nations operational procedures and more outspoken in their demands, attempting to have what they called the "urgent" and "explosive situation" in Southern Rhodesia considered by the UN Security Council.\textsuperscript{15} They also openly criticized Britain for its "persistent refusal" to cooperate in the implementation of United Nations policies on Rhodesia.\textsuperscript{16}

Security Council Involvement

The African states had great success in bringing resolutions to the General Assembly and getting them passed. They were unsuccessful, however, in gaining the support of the Security Council, at least prior to UDI. The first major confrontation in the Security
Council occurred after the dissolution of the Central African Federation in 1963. The Africans of Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) and Nyasaland (Malawi) had achieved political control over their internal affairs and desired independence and the severing of ties with Southern Rhodesia. They achieved this objective by 1963, after gaining their independence from Britain. However, division of the property of the Federation, namely the transfer of the armed forces and aircraft, created a conflict between Britain and the African nations. The Afro-Asian bloc of the Security Council asked Britain not to "transfer 'powers and attributes of sovereignty' until the Southern Rhodesian regime became representative of all of its people." The British refused to side with the Afro-Asian bloc and vetoed the resolution, arguing that since the forces and equipment belonged to Southern Rhodesia prior to the Federation, they should revert back to that territory's control.

The Security Council again considered the Rhodesian case in April 1965, in light of the United Nations concern that Ian Smith, Prime Minister of Rhodesia, would declare a unilateral declaration of independence. A moderate resolution, calling on Britain and all other states to refrain from recognizing an independent Rhodesia and asking Britain to promote independence according to the desires of the majority of the Rhodesian people, passed over the initial criticisms of the Soviet Union.

Ironically, it was not the pressure from the African states, but rather Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of independence on November 11, 1965, which accomplished the objective sought by the African
nations in the preceding years—the direct involvement of the United Nations Security Council. And even more ironically, it was Britain which initiated action in the Security Council.

Although the General Assembly was first to react to UDI when it passed a resolution condemning the act and asking Britain to end the rebellion and the Security Council to consider the situation as a matter of urgency, there is no evidence, according to Cefkin, to indicate that the Assembly's position influenced to a significant extent the position of Britain or Rhodesia. In fact, British warnings during the negotiations just prior to UDI, that it would not be able to control the actions of the United Nations, did not prevent Smith from declaring UDI.

Because of the description in the United Nations Charter, the role of the General Assembly is limited to discussion and adoption of recommendations to members of the organization or specifically the Security Council. Its decisions are not binding on all members. The Security Council, on the other hand, has broader powers than those designated for the General Assembly. It is given power to not only investigate disputes or situations which are likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, but also to decide what measures should be taken to maintain or restore international peace and security. In addition, according to the Charter, its decisions are binding on all United Nations members.

At the request of Britain the Security Council met on November 12, 1965, to discuss the Rhodesian crisis. The focus of United Nations involvement shifted from the General Assembly to the Security
Council. Michael Stewart, British Foreign Minister, asked for support of British measures, which included, as already noted, the recall of the British High Commissioner, the cessation of arms exports, the exclusion of Rhodesia from the sterling area, and the ban on imports of tobacco and sugar. He admitted that the establishment of an illegal minority regime was a matter of world concern:

The question of Rhodesia and the extent to which this can create a difficult situation in Africa and the Commonwealth makes it a matter of world concern and those who deny this are burying their heads in the sand.

He also reaffirmed Britain's position not to use force to solve the Rhodesian problem. That same day the UN Security Council passed Resolution 216 condemning UDI and calling upon member states "not to recognize the illegal racist minority regime in Southern Rhodesia and to refrain from rendering any assistance to the illegal regime."

It is necessary to stress the significance of the status of the Rhodesian crisis on November 12, 1965. Even though Britain asked the United Nations for support for its policies, the Wilson administration still wanted it to be "clearly and unmistakenly" understood that it was a "British responsibility to reestablish the rule of law in Southern Rhodesia and not the United Nations." Britain, in fact, was abandoning its position that it did not have the right to interfere in Rhodesia's internal affairs, but it did want the United Nations to stay out.

The major argument in favor of the British position was that somebody else would have raised the issue at the United Nations if
the British had not. Since Britain feared potential communist involvement in Rhodesia under United Nations legitimacy, it wanted to make sure that it controlled the initiative on all further action on Rhodesia. As a result, British involvement with the Security Council precluded the possibility of independent United Nations action.

Transfer of British Colonial Problem to United Nations

After UDI the British continued to regard the Rhodesian problem as their constitutional crisis. In speaking to the United Nations General Assembly in December 1965, Prime Minister Wilson again rejected the use of force, denied the practicality of immediate majority rule, and appealed for international support for economic sanctions:

In theory and under constitutional law, this is a bilateral matter between the British Parliament, who alone has the responsibility of decision in Rhodesia, and the people of Rhodesia... We accept the responsibility for dealing with this matter because it is our responsibility... But having embarked on a series of measures of unprecedented severity... we have the right to ask every Member of the Assembly to give us their fullest support.

There was evidence, however, that the sanctions which began as a unilateral action by Britain against Rhodesia were proceeding to a more universal action by the United Nations. The British continued to feel the pressure of greater Security Council demands. The passage of Resolution 217 (November 22, 1965) called on Britain to put an end to the "grave situation" in Rhodesia and said that its "continuance in time constitutes a threat to international peace and security." It called on Britain to take all appropriate measures to eliminate the power of the Smith regime and called on states to
desist from providing Rhodesia with arms, equipment, military materials, and to do their utmost to break economic relations, including an embargo on oil and petroleum products.\textsuperscript{35} The United Nations role began as an extension of the British policy of instituting sanctions, which were intended to restore Rhodesia to a state of legality. The significance of Resolution 217 is the reference to the "threat to international peace and security" because the interpretation of this phrase provided the United Nations with grounds for future involvement in the Rhodesian crisis.

In defiance of the Security Council's request for sanctions on oil, tankers continued to transport oil and petroleum products to Rhodesia through the port of Beira in Portuguese Mozambique. As a result, at the request of Britain the Security Council met, declared the "situation a threat to peace," and authorized the British to "prevent by force if necessary" oil arriving at Beira for Rhodesia.\textsuperscript{36} The resolution also called on Portugal not to allow oil to be pumped through Mozambique to Rhodesia.\textsuperscript{37} This marked the first time that an individual state was authorized to carry out a decision of the Security Council.\textsuperscript{38}

After the failure of the "Tiger" talks,\textsuperscript{39} sanctions were tightened in December 1966, with the passage of Resolution 232. This time the Security Council called for selective mandatory sanctions on asbestos, iron ore, chrome, pig iron, sugar, copper, meat and meat products, hides and skins, and leather in addition to arms and oil.\textsuperscript{40} The sanctions, again initiated by the British, were termed mandatory because failure to comply with them would constitute
a violation of Article 25 of the Charter. This was the first time that the Security Council had ever called for mandatory sanctions.

By the end of 1966, the white Rhodesians, through their initiation of UDI, had provoked British as well as international reaction to their discriminatory policies. What had begun as a British constitutional problem had been transformed into an international problem. This transition was accomplished with the concurrence of the United Kingdom.

Legality of United Nations Involvement

According to the United Nations Charter, the maintenance of international peace and security through adjustment or settlement of disputes or situations must be attained in conformity with the principles of justice and international law. Although it is not possible here to provide a comprehensive study of all of the legal problems in the Rhodesian case, it is necessary to at least highlight the major issues involved in the United Nations handling of the dispute.

According to Myres McDougal and W. Michael Reisman, arguments raised for and against United Nations involvement in the Rhodesian situation focus on two important issues:

1. the merits of the Security Council's finding of a "threat to peace."

2. the conformity of the Security Council's action to certain designated policies of the United Nations.

In order for the United Nations to get involved in the first place and especially to apply mandatory economic sanctions, the
Security Council had to decide that the case was an international problem, not just a British one, and that it created "a threat to international peace and security" under Article 39 of the Charter. In addition, once that decision was made, the Council, in accordance with Articles 41 and 42 had to decide how to restore the peace and make that decision binding. The question that must be considered then is whether or not the violation of African rights by a white minority constitutes a threat to or a violation of peace and justifies United Nations intervention? Like any legal issue the answer depends on the interpretation of the facts and arguments, in this case as they relate to appropriate provisions of the United Nations Charter.

The basic argument against the legality of United Nations action in Rhodesia is that the activities of the white minority regime did not represent a "threat to peace" within the meaning of the Charter. Therefore, no matter how reprehensible the actions of the white minority may be, they are beyond the jurisdiction of United Nations action. Charles Fenwick characterizes the Rhodesian situation as "primarily a domestic issue between a mother country and its colony and concludes that it would be better to have 'slower progress' toward the objective of majority rule rather than magnify the denial of it into a threat to peace under the Charter." John Howell feels that the assumption of jurisdiction came before a threat to peace was ever declared. There are numerous other articles criticizing United Nations action on the following bases: that the activities of the Rhodesian authorities contain no elements of aggression against
her neighbors and are therefore within the rules of accepted international law; that all activities of the Rhodesian regime have occurred within the bounds of that territory. Charles Burton Marshall perhaps sums up the argument against United Nations action most effectively when he says,

the globe abounds with situations which do not accord with the preferences of one government or another and which, under hypothetical conditions, might be productive of violence. To construe the pertinent phrase in Chapter VII as a warrant for the Security Council to invoke compulsory action on behalf of those who, because of frustrated preferences, might conceivably resort to force is to infer for the U.N. a mission to engender unending hostilities.

Many international scholars, on the other hand, have supported the legal action of the United Nations in Rhodesia. The feeling is that framers of the United Nations Charter deliberately conferred upon the Security Council in Chapter VII the responsibility to "determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of peace, or act of aggression," and also to decide what action should be taken to "maintain or restore international peace and security." The framers rejected specific definitions of "threat to peace," "breach of peace," "act of aggression," because of potential peculiarities in each case of threat or coercion, and they gave the Security Council broad responsibility to define those situations of "threat to peace." In addition, it can be argued that the action of the Security Council was also intended to be anticipatory and was not required to await the commencement of disaster. In this sense the Security Council's responsibility in Article 39 would also be considered preventative in nature.
The broad responsibility of the Security Council to make determinations of "threats to peace" is not absolute. Each situation must be examined on its own merits to see if the threat exists. In addition, procedural safeguards are established in the Charter with regard to voting procedures by the Security Council members. They require a unanimous vote among permanent members and a majority of all members. It would, therefore, be difficult for the Council to pass arbitrary legislation not in conformity with the accepted concepts of international law.

Ralph Zacklin indicates that the denial of fundamental rights anywhere is a threat to international peace and security and violates the community principles of international public policy of the United Nations Charter. Myres McDougal and Michael Reisman agree in the sense that in terms of substantive merits... in the contemporary world, international peace and security and the protection of human rights are inescapably interdependent and that the impact of the flagrant deprivation of the most basic human rights of the great man of the people of a community cannot possibly stop short within the territorial boundaries in which the physical manifestations of such deprivation occur first.

The major argument supporting United Nations involvement was that the "threat" to peace overrode domestic jurisdiction. While the Rhodesian rebellion was at first recognized as a domestic problem, the British government obviously felt that the international ramifications of the act made review by the United Nations politically wise and legally correct. It subsequently internationalized the problem by initiating resolutions in the Security Council. The
fact that France, for one, abstained from those resolutions seems to Rosalynn Higgins to be a political argument rather than a legal one: if the constitutional authority wishes to involve the United Nations in matters which are otherwise within its own jurisdiction, it certainly has that prerogative.57 The British, in other words, were willing to accept the proposition that the Rhodesian crisis was a "threat to peace."

What is important about the legal aspects of the Rhodesian crisis is that the Security Council, in conjunction with the British, determined that the Rhodesian problem was a crisis that endangered international peace and security, and it did so in an overwhelming manner. Although the decision by the Security Council may be considered a political one,58 as a matter of law within the articles of the United Nations Charter, the Council is allowed to make that choice.59 Once that decision is made -- once the international body agrees there is a threat to peace -- the activities that constitute that threat cease to be "matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of a state."60

The Security Council felt that the UDI, violation of African majority rights, and the perpetuation of white supremacy were, at the very least, a potential threat to peace. It was this situation more than Rhodesia's threat of aggression that clouded the future in southern Africa.

The argument that the activities of white Rhodesians were within their domestic jurisdiction was not found to be correct by the Security Council. Even in the absence of finding of threat to
peace, the United Nations could have considered the issue on the grounds that human rights in Rhodesia had been violated. They could have accomplished this by using Chapter I, Article 2(7), to allow them to incorporate a domestic jurisdiction issue under international supervision. 62

In retrospect, the evidence tends to support the position that United Nations majority's point of view on Rhodesia was correct. The subsequent fighting between Rhodesian forces and nationalist guerillas, South African troop support for Rhodesia, the involvement of neighboring Zambia, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Angola, and the potential conflict between East and West made and continue to make, the Rhodesian situation a crisis with international dimensions, rather than just a constitutional problem for Britain.

In summary, prior to and just after the time of UDI, the Rhodesian situation was considered by the United Nations to be a British problem. Many other United Nations members had achieved independence through rebellion, and Rhodesia was no different. The UDI was an illegal act in constitutional law, but it had no validity in international law. The UN General Assembly and Security Council recognized the Rhodesian crisis within these constitutional constraints by calling on Britain to end the rebellion. When it became clear, however, that Britain could not or would not quell the rebellion (this issue will be examined later in this thesis), the United Nations found itself in a position to try and solve the crisis. The basis for the international community's encroachment into what seemed to be a domestic matter was British divestiture of the
problem as well as the realization that the denial of human rights in a volatile area of the world was a "threat to international peace and security."
NOTES FOR CHAPTER II

1. General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV), December 14, 1960, adopted 89-0 with 9 abstentions.

2. General Assembly Resolution 1654 (XVI), November 27, 1961, adopted 97-0 with 4 abstentions. The membership of the committee originally included 17 nations, but was increased to 24 in 1962.


4. The subcommittee was established because 15 of the first 26 meetings of the Special Committee dealt with Rhodesia. It consisted of India, Mali, Syria, Tanganyika, Tunisia, and Venezuela.


6. ibid.

7. General Assembly Resolution 1747, June 28, 1962. The vote was 73-1 (South Africa) with 27 abstentions. Britain and Portugal did not participate in the vote. Britain would normally have voted against the resolution, but because it disapproved not only of the proposal itself, but also of the entire proceedings, it refused to vote. See "Assembly Requests Action Regarding Southern Rhodesia." United Nations Review, IX (August 1962), 8.


9. Cefkin, Leo, "The Rhodesian Question at the United Nations." International Organization, XXII (Summer 1968), 653. At the time of his writing, Cefkin was Professor of Political Science at Colorado State University.


11. Quoted from ibid.

12. See Cefkin, op. cit., p. 653 where he explains in footnote #15 that Rhodesia's status as a self-governing colony was anomalous
because it had not taken steps toward full independence, but had remained in the "twilight zone" between dependence and independence.


18. The vote was 8-1 with France and the United States abstaining.


22. ibid.

23. See Chapter IV, Articles 10, 11 of United Nations Charter (Appendix I of this paper).


28. ibid.

29. ibid.


31. S/PV 1257, p. 5.

32. See Wilson's speeches in British Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 718,
#671, Col. 359, November 11, 1965, and Vol. 720, #672, Col. 636, November 12, 1965.


35. ibid.


37. ibid.


39. Prime Minister Wilson held talks on a new constitution with Ian Smith on the British battleship Tiger. Britain again enunciated its Five Principles and insisted that there had to be progress toward majority rule and an end to discrimination before it would withdraw from the Rhodesian problem. Nothing concrete resulted from the negotiations.


42. See McDougal, Myres and Reisman, W. Michael, "Rhodesia and the United Nations: The Lawfulness of International Concern." The American Journal of International Law, LXII (January 1968), 5. Reisman is Professor of Law at the Yale Law School. McDougal, now deceased, was formerly Professor of Law at the Yale Law School.

43. See summary of viewpoints in loc. cit., p. 5.


45. ibid.


47. ibid.

49. See United Nations Charter Chapter V, Article 24 and Chapter VII, Articles 39, 41, 42.

50. McDougal, op. cit., p. 7.

51. ibid.

52. ibid.


54. See Zacklin, Ralph, Challenge of Rhodesia. New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1969. At the time of his writing Mr. Zacklin was Associate Director of the International Law Program of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and was an instructor at Rutgers University Law School.


57. ibid.


59. loc. cit., p. 102.

60. Quoted from Chapter I, Article 2(7) of the United Nations Charter.

61. Cefkin, op. cit., p. 663.

III. IMPLEMENTATION OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

Definition and Purpose of Sanctions

Prior to showing how sanctions have been applied to Rhodesia, it is essential first to define them in terms of their aims and objectives. Although the use of many different kinds of sanctions in policy decision-making will be mentioned, the primary concern of the paper will be with economic sanctions and their impact on Rhodesia.

Johan Galtung\(^1\) of the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, Norway, defines sanctions as

> actions initiated by one or more international actors (senders) against one or more others (receivers) with either or both of two purposes: to punish the receivers by depriving them of some value and/or to make the receivers comply with certain norms the senders deem important.

According to Michael Reisman,\(^2\)

Sanctions are techniques and strategies for supporting public order...Sanctions are not legitimized patterns of vengeance, but of maintenance and improvement of public order... coercive sanctions should be used only when no lesser sanction will avail or a genuine overriding crisis requires exigent and intensely coercive action in the defense of public order.

If one begins with these definitions, he must examine both British and United Nations objectives in using sanctions. The British objective in using sanctions as part of their foreign policy was political in nature. It was designed to force the Rhodesians to stop their rebellion and return to a state of constitutional legality worked out by the Smith regime and the British government. It was also
originally designed, as noted earlier, to be non-punitive. In fact, the British tried negotiations before opting for sanctions. In addition, force was ruled out from the beginning as a viable British foreign policy toward Rhodesia. United Nations objectives, on the other hand, influenced heavily by the Afro-Asian bloc, were in the beginning and continue to be political -- the defeat of the Smith regime and its replacement by African majority rule. The difference between the two lies in the degree and type of sanctions. The British opted for economic sanctions as a last resort while the Afro-Asian nations called on the British to use military sanctions (force) before they accepted economic sanctions as a compromise. The Afro-Asian nations were not concerned with the methods used in bringing majority rule to Rhodesia. They were only interested in the results.

According to J. Kombo Moyana, economist with the United Nations Council on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), a more specific kind of sanctions, namely economic ones,

...refer to a group of measures applied by one or more parties to a dispute with a view to partially or totally cripple the economy of the adversary party or parties. These measures are designed to affect the economy of the adversary via the adversary's exports, imports, and/or external financial dealings. Partial or total economic ruin implies personal incomes declines in the sanctionee's economy. These income declines would then be expected to cause enough hardship to the population to induce desired changes in the policy of the target government. Economic sanctions are generally used as a substitute for force.

While it may be true that economic sanctions were used as a substitute for force, it was not Britain's intent, at least originally, to totally or even partially cripple Rhodesia's economy. The British hoped that
the threat of economic sanctions would serve first as a deterrent to Rhodesia's contemplation of UDI, and subsequently, as a way of negotiating a new constitution. The Third World nations of the United Nations were not as concerned with protecting the economy of Rhodesia as Britain was. Again, they desired results -- the removal of the Smith regime from office and its replacement by a government responsible to the African majority. If that meant using force or crippling the economy, they were in favor of it.

The crucial question for any nation or group of nations in applying economic sanctions is whether or not they will be effective. The degree of effectiveness will be measured primarily in terms of the economic, the psychological, and the political impact they have in the country against which the sanctions have been levied. In sum, economic sanctions would be considered efficient if they make the receiving nation change its policies to comply with those considered important by the sending nation. One must remember that economic sanctions are still regarded as a viable alternative to military sanctions. In fact, they are specifically mentioned in the United Nations Charter as a means of giving effect to the organization's decisions.

The key concept in the implementation of sanctions is vulnerability and the most important element is concentration. The more a country's economy depends on one product, the more its exports consist of one product, and the more its imports and exports are concentrated on one trading partner, the more vulnerable the country is to economic sanctions.
British Decision to Invoke Sanctions

The British leadership believed so strongly in the use of sanctions that Prime Minister Harold Wilson said in a communique at a Commonwealth Prime Ministers' meeting in Lagos, Nigeria, in January 1966, that on the basis of "expert advice available to him the cumulative effects of the economic and financial sanctions might well bring the rebellion to an end within a matter of weeks rather than months." Rhodesia's vulnerability made the success of sanctions seem probable, especially since the country was so dependent on Britain for trade.

At the time of the implementation of economic sanctions, one study ranked Rhodesia fourth most vulnerable out of a group of forty countries. This report was primarily concerned with external vulnerability and incorporated such factors as the importance of imports and exports and the accessibility of substitute markets. According to 1964 statistics, Britain was the largest buyer of Rhodesian tobacco, importing 50% of Rhodesia's $117 million earnings. Tobacco accounted for one-third of the total export earnings of Rhodesia. Britain was also the chief source of capital for Rhodesia with British investments amounting to $600 million in 1965. Commonwealth trade preferences helped the Rhodesian sugar and tobacco industries. Sugar, for example, sold at $126/ton as compared to a world price of $56/ton, thus earning Rhodesia an extra $11.2 million. Most importantly, 21.9% of Rhodesia's exports were sent to Britain and 30.3% of her imports were received from Britain. In addition, the British
contribution to Rhodesia's national income through the export sector was approximately 7%. Therefore, if Britain cut off her imports, the national income of Rhodesia would fall by 7%, assuming Rhodesia could not find substitute business. The national income in 1965 was $1.025 billion of which 39% came from the export sector. Also, the fact that Rhodesia is a landlocked country made her even more vulnerable to economic sanctions.

The Wilson government felt that economic and financial sanctions would create enough pressure on the Smith regime from the business community to cause the government to agree to terms with Britain. There was at that time evidence of business unrest: the Rhodesian Tobacco Association was worried that if Commonwealth preferences were withdrawn, farmers would have to compete with the United States' tobacco industry on less favorable terms; financial groups feared the loss of capital from Britain to the point where only 19 out of 294 people who answered the Rhodesian Branch of Institute of Direction were in favor of UDI; the Association of Rhodesian industries believed economic sanctions would severely cripple the Rhodesian economy; the Associated Chamber of Commerce said "if Mr. Wilson was as good as his word, Rhodesia would run short of currency." It is even true that many Rhodesian businessmen were so fearful of sanctions that they exaggerated their economic impact on Rhodesian industry.

Taking the above characteristics of Rhodesian society into consideration, the Labor government of Harold Wilson opted for economic and financial sanctions against Rhodesia instead of the Afro-Asian
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alternative of military intervention.

Three Stage Approach to Sanctions

Britain's attitude and policies toward the Rhodesian crisis created by UDI were significant in influencing the way economic sanctions were formulated, implemented and enforced. The British position from the beginning is best summed up by their United Nations representative George Brown: 13

Our objective throughout has been to compel the rebel regime to return to legality on terms which would be manifestly fair and acceptable to the population of Rhodesia as a whole. Only when legal government can be established on such terms can Rhodesia move ahead to genuine independence and to a stable and prosperous future...

As a result, the British instituted two programs to achieve the return of Rhodesia to a state of legality: the outlawing of the Rhodesian Front regime; economic pressures designed to show the Rhodesians that there was no future in defying the civilized world. The best way to achieve that, according to the British, "was...to strike directly at Rhodesia's earning power by action against the exports which are most important to it in international trade..." 14

At the same time that Rhodesia was a British responsibility, the crisis also had the reality of being a world concern. 15 While the British wanted international help for their sanctions policies, their ultimate goal was to achieve an end to the rebellion by peaceful means. They subsequently resisted demands in the General Assembly to use force to bring about a settlement with the Smith government. Britain made it clear that she would veto any mandatory resolution in the
Security Council calling for the use of force in Rhodesia. Prime Minister Wilson argued that force could plunge Africa into armed conflict beyond the borders of Rhodesia and insisted, therefore, that Britain would try to resolve the crisis through discussions and negotiations.

Because Rhodesia was also an international concern, Britain asked the United Nations for assistance. As the United Nations acquired more responsibility in the handling of the Rhodesian problem, its strategies became more defined. It was the Security Council, where resolutions can be adopted that are "binding" on all members according to the Charter, which finalized United Nations strategy.

The United Nations policies toward Rhodesia after UDI can be divided into three stages: voluntary sanctions; selective mandatory sanctions; comprehensive mandatory sanctions. The initial response of the United Nations in the form of Resolutions 216 and 217 was to condemn UDI and call for voluntary economic and political sanctions against Rhodesia. At that time the United Nations role was an extension of British policy aimed at bringing the Smith regime to the realization that UDI would not be successful. Voluntary sanctions failed, however, because foreign ships were still able to deliver goods, especially oil, to Rhodesia. As a result, Britain was asked in Resolution 221 to prevent oil from reaching Rhodesia through the Mozambique port of Beira.

Phase two of United Nations sanctions policy -- selective mandatory sanctions -- occurred with the passage of Resolution 232. Resolution 232 acknowledged that the Rhodesian crisis constituted a "threat
to international peace and security" and called on member nations to prevent trade with Rhodesia on those selected items mentioned earlier in the paper.

Phase three added a new dimension to United Nations sanctions policy when the Security Council voted unanimously on May 29, 1968 (Resolution 253), to impose under Chapter VII of the Charter comprehensive mandatory sanctions. These involved a total embargo on trade with Rhodesia, because the members were "gravely concerned that measures taken by the Security Council have not been complied with by all States..." In addition, the resolution proposed an embargo on utility undertakings, tourist enterprises, and investments.

The passage from voluntary to mandatory sanctions made a system of control absolutely necessary. Nations were first asked to report to the Secretary General those measures undertaken to implement Resolution 232. Subsequently, a seven member sanctions committee was organized after Resolution 253 to accumulate trade facts from United Nations member states and to provide information on sanctions evasions.

Actions taken by the UN Security Council since the passage of Resolution 253 have focused, as a part of phase three, on making comprehensive mandatory economic sanctions successful as a policy tool. Each of the resolutions has done one or more of the following:

1. continued to call on states to end assistance to Rhodesia.
2. condemned the refusal of nations to cooperate with the United Nations in observance and implementation of sanctions.
3. dealt with tactics used by nations to avoid implementation of sanctions. 22

4. widened sanctions to include other areas. 23

Most recently, the Third World nations of the United Nations have tried to gain Security Council acceptance of resolutions which propose penalties against those nations which still support the Rhodesian regime. 24

Resolution 333 passed after Britain and the United States vetoed an alternative resolution which had called for the following: limiting imports from South African and Portuguese territories to pre-UDI levels; denying landing rights to those airlines of nations granting such rights to Rhodesia; and extending the British blockade of Beria to the Mozambique port of Lourenco Marques. This was the ninth British veto of a Security Council Resolution, the others having been cast in opposition to the use of force and the expansion of sanctions to South Africa and Portugal.

National Viewpoints of the Crisis

Up to this point, the thesis has described and analyzed the conflicting policies of the British and Afro-Asian nations toward the Rhodesian problem. The British government, for a variety of reasons to be discussed in the next chapter, opted for a policy of economic sanctions combined with United Nations international backing. The Afro-Asian nations, on the other hand, pressed for a policy of force to end the Rhodesian rebellion. It is, however, the purpose of this section to examine briefly how other nations viewed the crisis.
Although this study has also been made elsewhere, it is worth discussing here so that the groundwork can be prepared for analysis and conclusions in the next chapter. Examination will be limited to those nations -- France, United States, West Germany, Switzerland, the Soviet Union, South Africa, Portugal, and the black African neighbors of Rhodesia -- which not only represent the greatest divergence of opinion on Rhodesia but also have had the greatest amount of impact on the outcome of the Rhodesian crisis and United Nations sanctions' policies.

From the beginning, France viewed Rhodesia as a British responsibility, similar to its problem in Algeria, and not one within the jurisdiction of the United Nations. As a result, France abstained on Security Council votes until May 1968. France was able until that time to maintain good relations with African nations because they agreed on the point that Rhodesia was a British problem. But in 1968 when the Smith regime executed five African political prisoners and the African nations pressed for stronger United Nations actions against Rhodesia, France was faced with a dilemma. If France did not show concern for the humanitarian tragedy in Rhodesia, DeGaulle was faced with the possibility of losing his popularity among African nations. As a result, France supported United Nations jurisdiction for the first time and voted for comprehensive mandatory economic sanctions against Rhodesia, indicating that she was "compelled 'by the vast depth of feelings created throughout the world, and particularly in Africa' by the Rhodesian situation."
The United States viewpoint was, and is, largely a carbon copy of the British perspective. The United States was initially supportive of British policies to maintain the status of the Rhodesian crisis as a British colonial concern. It wasn't until the British ceded a great portion of the responsibility for ending the problem to the United Nations that the United States backed international involvement.

The perspectives of both the Federal Republic of Germany and Switzerland are interesting since neither nation was a member of the United Nations at the time of the implementation of sanctions. The position of West Germany has been to recognize neither the status of Rhodesia as a state nor its minority government. In addition, it has argued that in spite of the fact that it is not a member of the United Nations, it has taken actions to restrict trade to Rhodesia. However, trade contracts signed by West Germany and Rhodesia prior to mandatory sanctions in 1968 were allowed to stand.

The Federal Council of Switzerland, on the other hand, has taken the position that:

for reasons of principle, Switzerland, as a neutral State, cannot submit to the mandatory sanctions of the United Nations. The Federal Council will, however, see to it that Rhodesian trade is given no opportunity to avoid the United Nations sanctions policy through Swiss territory. It is for that reason that it decided as early as 17 Dec. 1965, independently and without recognizing any legal obligation to do so, to make imports from Rhodesia subject to mandatory authorization and to take the necessary measures to prevent any increase in Swiss imports from that territory.

Permanent neutrality status indicates that Switzerland should not assist either side in a dispute. Yet her official policy has
been to maintain a ban on exports of war materials and to limit the imports from Rhodesia to a level not exceeding the average of three years prior to UDI. 31 So indirectly she claims to have provided some degree of effectiveness to United Nations sanctions by not allowing Rhodesia the opportunity of exporting goods through Switzerland to other countries.

The Soviet Union and other socialist countries supported the Afro-Asian point of view in the Rhodesian crisis because it gave them a chance to criticize British and American policies and to champion their cause as friend of the exploited peoples of Africa. Interestingly enough, however, the Soviets and Bulgaria abstained when Resolution 232 was adopted, saying they disagreed with the British rejection of stronger Afro-Asian amendments to the resolution. 32 In 1968 the Soviets did vote for Resolution 253, thereby supporting the view that Rhodesia was a "threat to international peace and security" and the plan for economic sanctions. Throughout the period 1965-1968, they also supported the African pressure on Britain to use force in Rhodesia to put down the rebellion.

The South African and Portuguese positions can be examined simultaneously since each nation supported the viewpoint that Rhodesia was a self-governing territory responsible for its own internal affairs. 33 They never accepted the Security Council judgment that the Rhodesian crisis presented a "threat to international peace and security." 34 In addition, South Africa and Portugal have claimed that the Security Council Resolution 232, providing for mandatory sanctions, was illegally passed because of the abstentions of France
and the Soviet Union. They interpreted Article 27(3) of the Charter to mean that the abstention of any permanent member prevents the Security Council from taking a positive position.\textsuperscript{35} Since France and the Soviet Union had abstained, Portugal and South Africa felt that Resolution 232 should not have been adopted. While this argument has not won wide support in legal circles, it was nevertheless one of the major positions argued by Portugal and South Africa at the time of the implementation of sanctions. On the contrary, the legal counsel of the United Nations holds that the practice of abstention does not invalidate resolutions and is not contrary to the objectives emanating from the United Nations Conference on International Organization.\textsuperscript{36} While Portugal and South Africa often voiced their legal objections to sanctions, their primary refusal to comply with sanctions had to do with economic and political interests. Portugal was concerned with maintaining control over its colonial interests in Angola and Mozambique. South Africa, on the other hand, was concerned because its racial policies were similar to those of Rhodesia and it feared the repercussions if United Nations objectives were attained.

The last position to be analyzed is the one held by Rhodesia's neighbors to the north and west. While this viewpoint was advocated by Botswana, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Malawi, and Zambia, at this point the study is only concerned with Malawi and Zambia since they are adjacent neighbors. Both nations pointed out the adverse effects of sanctions on their economics.\textsuperscript{37} While both nations supported United Nations sanction policies in theory, in
reality they could not afford economically to implement comprehensive sanctions because they were too dependent on Rhodesia for trade. A Malawi spokesman said "...the country cannot be expected to participate in such sanctions to an extent where its own economy will be destroyed." The Zambian government acknowledged that it would give "maximum support" despite the fact that Zambia and Rhodesia's economies "have been intertwined for 70 years like Siamese Twins."
NOTES FOR CHAPTER III


5. See Chapter VII, Article 41 of the United Nations Charter for examples of sanctions (Appendix I).


7. Quoted from Kapungu, op. cit., p. 9.

8. See Galtung, op. cit., reference to Michael Michaley's study of vulnerability in which Rhodesia is ranked high in concentration with exports accounting for 43% of GNP.


10. loc. cit., p. 5. This figure is actually a bit less than Michaley's figure of 43%.

11. ibid.


14. ibid.


17. loc. cit., p. 116.


19. Established in paragraph 22 of Resolution 253, the Sanctions Committee consisted of France, Algeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, United States, Soviet Union, and Britain.


21. See Security Council Resolution 320, September 29, 1972, asking for types of actions that could be used by the United Nations in light of the refusal of South Africa and Portugal to implement sanctions. See also UN Monthly Chronicle articles in May, June, and October 1973 issues and June 1974.

22. See Security Council Resolution 333, May 22, 1973, requesting states "in the event of trading with South Africa and Portugal to provide that purchase contracts with those countries should clearly stipulate, in a manner legally enforceable, prohibitions of dealing in goods of Southern Rhodesian origin; likewise, sales contracts with these countries should include a prohibition of re-sale or re-export of goods to Southern Rhodesia." South Africa, Angola, Mozambique, Guinea (Bissau), and Namibia were re-exporting goods to Rhodesia.


25. Dr. Kapungu is Assistant Professor of Government and Politics at the University of Maryland and a former Research Associate of the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR). He has written extensively on the issue of Rhodesia.


28. ibid.

31. ibid.
33. Kapungu, op. cit., p. 34.
35. loc. cit., p. 2.
39. ibid.
IV. INEFFECTIVENESS OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

As one of the most important chapters in Part I, Chapter IV will assess the impact of British and United Nations economic sanctions on Rhodesia. Using Rhodesia as a case study, conclusions will be drawn as to the effectiveness and/or ineffectiveness of United Nations sanctions in resolving any crisis, in turn looking at implications for future sanctions policy.

Objectives and Limitations of Sanctions

The basic objective of sanctions against Rhodesia, as already noted, has been to try and restore the country to a state of constitutional legality so that majority rule can be achieved. The question that must be asked is: Have the sanctions caused the receiving nation (Rhodesia) to alter its policies in line with those of the sending nations (Britain and United Nations sanctions supporters)? Clearly, the answer is "no." Thirteen years after the initiation of sanctions, the Smith regime remains in political and economic command of Rhodesia, at least until 1979. Economic sanctions have not resulted in political disintegration, their primary objective in the first place. The British hope was that sanctions would cause economic deprivation and unemployment in Rhodesia, thereby leading the populace to pressure the Rhodesian leaders into negotiating a settlement that was an acceptable form of independence.

Galtung in his studies of sanctions policy has developed a number
of interesting questions which are applicable to the Rhodesian situation:

1. Are sanctions negative (punishment for deviance) or positive (reward for compliance)?

2. Are sanctions aimed at responsible individuals in the receiving nation or are they collective (hitting nations as a whole including those not responsible)?

3. Are sanctions internal (due to changes arising inside the receiving nation) or external (interaction pattern with other nations)?

4. Are sanctions unilateral (one sending nation) or multilateral or universal?

5. Are sanctions general or selective (all or some measures)?

6. Are sanctions total or partial?

He then lists three broad kinds of sanctions: diplomatic sanctions, which include non-recognition, rupture of diplomatic relations, no cooperation by international organizations, no direct contact with political leaders; communications sanctions, which include the rupture of telecommunications, mail contact, transportation, news communications, and personal contact; and economic sanctions, including internal destruction and rupture of trade relations in terms of economic boycott.

The policy of sanctions directed at Rhodesia were immediately negative, collective, and external. In addition, there was a progressive increase from unilateral sanctions to almost universal, from selective to general, and from partial to almost total. By examining these categories in combination with British foreign policy moves and
Rhodesian counterstrategies, the effectiveness/ineffectiveness of United Nations sanctions policies can be determined.

British Foreign Policy

Despite Rhodesia's vulnerability, Prime Minister Harold Wilson's decision to implement economic sanctions did not prove to be a good one. The reality of the situation was that Britain did not have a sound economic base from which to prosecute sanctions effectively against Rhodesia. In addition, Wilson was faced with serious political obstacles in his attempts to handle the situation.

During the 1964-1970 period, Britain suffered a balance of payments deficit. It was estimated that by enforcing economic sanctions against Rhodesia, the nation would lose an estimated $90 million, although according to Robert Sutcliffe, the damage caused by the loss of British-Rhodesian trade was not so spectacular as to undermine the British government's desire to enforce sanctions. Britain was not prepared, however, to cause further damage to its balance of trade deficit by altering its economic relationships with South Africa. And after all, it was South Africa which was providing the major loophole in United Nations sanctions policy by trading heavily with Rhodesia. Although Britain was willing to block the port of Beira (Resolution 221), the nation was not willing to do the same with Lourenco Marques, another Mozambican port, because South Africa used that port, and Britain did not want to risk an economic confrontation. As a result, Rhodesia continued to receive oil by rail through Mozambique, and the port of entry continued to be Lourenco Marques.
the Rhodesian affair is another lesson, if Mr. Wilson needed it, that a weak economy is no basis for a strong foreign policy. Two years ago he not only fatally underestimated the durability of the Rhodesian economy but had not realised the debility of his own...Having cast aside the deterrent of force, he started an economic war which in advance he could see South Africa in its own interests had to defeat.

In addition to economic complications, Wilson was faced with some troublesome political problems. The Labor Party at the time of UDI had a majority of only one in the House of Commons, and because of the "kith and kin" factor -- blood relationships between Rhodesians and Britons -- the government could not afford to alienate itself from the British electorate, especially in an election year. After the election in March 1966, when Labor was returned with a comfortable ninety-seven vote majority, Wilson was again forced to reassess his foreign policy, especially in light of the fact that Rhodesia had not been brought to its knees. Wilson found himself in an uncomfortable situation. He still was opposed to the use of force, having been influenced by logistical problems, the kith and kin factor, and negative advice by the military. Yet his economic sanctions had not brought the quick desired results, and he had incorrectly estimated that South Africa would not frustrate British sanctions policy.

Wilson best summed up his predicament in a speech to the House of Commons in April 1966:

This is one of the most difficult problems which any government have had to face in this country in this century...because the complications are due to the fact that Rhodesia is at the point of interception of a number of distinct circles which cover vital Commonwealth interests and vital economic interests
for Britain -- and the economic interests cut more than two ways -- covering Britain's standing in the new world. This issue is at the very centre of that area of the new world which is dominated by race conflict, racial intolerance, and the ever present danger of race explosion...Wrong decisions here or the failure to take the necessary action...still could touch off a new division in world affairs based not on ideology but on colour.

Wilson first tried to negotiate a settlement with the Smith regime, but his efforts were in vain. Instead of reacting meaningfully to the Rhodesian crisis, he actually ended up reacting more to the reactions to Rhodesia in order to minimize British interests in collateral areas -- those regarding Tory opposition in Britain, Commonwealth nations, United Nations, and South Africa. Britain had an important stake in all four, but Wilson's policy in trying to deal with all four constantly worked at cross-purposes because all were incompatible with one another.

Wilson did not want the Conservatives undermining his position in Britain so he approached the question of sanctions with caution. He was confronted with opposition in that the Conservative Party as a whole found sanctions anathema. R. H. Turton expressed this position when he said "Nobody will benefit from economic sanctions and the use of force except the Russian and the Chinese communists in Africa." In addition, sanctions also contravened commercial interests in southern Africa and created an aversion among Conservative Party members toward outside (United Nations) interference in British affairs. In fact, Edward Heath called the problem on Rhodesia "the great divice." Wilson never did receive strong support from the opposition. The Conservatives were much more interested in settling
the dispute, or if that were not achievable, perhaps disengaging from sanctions actions altogether. In his memoirs, Wilson says the Conservative Opposition was more interested in getting rid of him and his Labor government than they were in getting rid of the illegal Smith regime. By imposing sanctions in stages, Wilson maintained as much Conservative Party support as possible. At the same time, however, he allowed the Smith regime to prepare its defenses, and he alienated the Commonwealth members who wanted majority rule for Rhodesia.

Wilson admits in his memoirs that if Britain had failed to react strongly against UDI, the Commonwealth would have broken up entirely or would have been reduced dramatically in size. As it was, Tanzania and Ghana broke off diplomatic relations when Britain refused to intervene in Rhodesia with force.

The Commonwealth was divided on how to bring the Rhodesian rebellion to an end. The division was generally along racial lines with Britain supported mainly by Australia, New Zealand, Malta, and Malawi, while opponents, who supported the use of force in Rhodesia, were comprised of the Afro-Asian-Caribbean group. What kept the Commonwealth from completely breaking up was the British concession to restrict negotiations with Smith to three months (October-December 1966), after which time the British would seek United Nations mandatory sanctions if a settlement had not resulted. As mentioned earlier, talks with Smith broke down, and Britain made good on its promise to ask the United Nations to initiate mandatory sanctions (Resolution 232). At the same time, Britain made another major concession to the Commonwealth when Wilson accepted NIBMAR (acronym for no independence
before majority rule). The acceptance of NIBMAR, however, resulted in the termination of negotiations with Smith.

Within the pressure group of the Commonwealth was Zambia, which posed a major problem for Britain in terms of economic and strategic factors. Zambia was the most sensitive to sanctions against Rhodesia as the nation was almost totally dependent on Rhodesia for coal, electricity, oil, consumer goods, and transportation. While Zambia felt from the beginning that economic sanctions would not undermine the Smith regime and instead advocated force, the nation was still willing to support the British sanctions to the best of her ability. More than any country associated with the Rhodesian problem, Zambia was the one which suffered the most.

At the same time that he tried to deal with the Conservative opposition and attempted to appease the Commonwealth majority, Wilson also attempted to balance competing objectives at the United Nations by insisting on the maintenance of British responsibility for the outcome of the Rhodesian affair while also trying to strengthen Security Council pressures on Rhodesia.

Pursuing United Nations objectives to maintain credibility among Afro-Asians had the effect of making it difficult to work with South Africa, which from the start opposed any type of sanctions against Rhodesia. After all, South Africa, which provided the greatest portion of economic assistance to Rhodesia, was in the best position to help Britain bring pressure on Smith to reach a negotiated settlement. Unfortunately, discussion with South Africa did not produce results. Wilson's efforts in this area were compromised from the
start because Britain was not in a position to start an economic war with South Africa over Rhodesia.

By trying to simultaneously deal with all of the above interest groups, Wilson produced a foreign policy that constantly worked at cross-purposes. Negotiations with Smith excited the Afro-Asian-Caribbean bloc in the Commonwealth -- at least until Wilson accepted NIEMAR -- and also compromised the seriousness with which Britain approached the use of sanctions in the United Nations. At the same time, support for United Nations sanctions measures alienated the Conservative opposition as well as South Africa, the country with the most influence on Rhodesia. The result of this policy of not using force to quell the rebellion, of not confronting South Africa as the major "sanctions buster," and of not "selling out" to the Afro-Asian-Caribbean bloc was that the initial British goal of restoring Rhodesia to a state of legality was not achieved. In fact, the minority regime of Ian Smith remained stronger than ever.

John Foster Dulles\textsuperscript{16} once said:

\begin{quote}
The great advantage of economic sanctions is that on the one hand they can be very potent, while on the other hand they do not involve that resort to force which is repugnant to our objective of peace.
\end{quote}

Dulles's comments are pertinent to the Rhodesian problem, especially in conjunction with the conclusions of International Peace Research Institute scholar, Fredrik Hoffman, who analyzes the political aspects of sanctions decision-making. Although studies like Galtung's indicate that it is extremely difficult to make sanctions effective, Hoffman\textsuperscript{17} says "sanctions are very well fit to
alleviate the tension in a cross-pressure situation." While sanctions would not be used if a country is politically motivated for destroying its opponent because they would be considered too slow and complicated, they would be used if the political leadership "feels a need for doing something but not 'too much.'" In effect, he develops a paradox: when sanctions are used, the goal will probably not be attained because that decision probably indicates that the motivation of the sanctioning country is too low and that it is not strong enough to cope with the difficulties involved.

If Hoffman's conclusions are true -- and they appear to be quite logical and based on fact -- then the Labor Party and Wilson were trying to buy time, hoping that negotiations with Smith would be successful. Faced with a "cross pressure situation," and openly disavowing the use of force as a viable alternative, they chose the option of sanctions ("they wanted to do something but not too much") as the only way to handle the situation. What happened is that Britain, either by its own decision or because it was forced to by the Commonwealth, ceded responsibility to the United Nations. Either Wilson was naive and totally underestimated the effectiveness of sanctions, or he found the time right for "passing the buck." While many might sympathize with Wilson's unenviable political position of having to cater to four constituencies, the fact remains that Britain's foreign policy was unsuccessful in achieving its stated goals.

Hindsight is always better than foresight and a British policy of force in Rhodesia was not only unlikely and distasteful, but it was also inappropriate. It is still worth speculating, however, as
to what would have happened if the Wilson administration had opted for a policy of force. Robert Good, United States Ambassador to Zambia during 1965-1968, assesses British policy this way:

The estimate is this, that just as Rhodesia under white rule is geopolitically the keystone in South Africa's developing co-security system, so its removal, together with Britain's reinvolvement in the area, would have opened up new opportunities for pressure, persuasion, and maneuver probably leading to eventual changes in South Africa less productive of racial violence and possible communist exploitation than otherwise would seem to be the case...British failure to use force was a missed opportunity of historical significance.

A settlement acceptable to whites and blacks in Rhodesia was beyond the power of the British to achieve. The Rhodesian Front refused to entertain the solution of majority rule and the Africans, inside and outside Rhodesia, wanted nothing less than that. The alternative for the British was to stand aside and let the Rhodesians settle their own differences or let someone with more power intervene to insure that they did.

Loopholes in Sanctions Policies

The success of United Nations sanctions was dependent on the interpretation of their wording, the willingness of nations to participate, and the ability of the organization to enforce its actions. In the case of Rhodesia there was no consensus as to the precise objectives of economic sanctions. There were automatic loopholes because South Africa and Portugal as well as many others were not willing to abide by United Nations policy. In addition, there was no effective international control system to coordinate the sanctions
or, more importantly, to enforce them.

In the first place, the United Nations was unable to create agreement among nations as a basis for action. South Africa, Portugal, and France refused to participate because they felt the problem was a British one. Malawi and Zambia could not afford economically to fully implement sanctions because of their great dependence on Rhodesia. Switzerland, for reasons of neutrality, also refused to invoke sanctions. Even the United States tested the credibility of the sanctions policy during 1971-1977 by importing chrome from Rhodesia.

The willingness of states to participate in sanctions depends on the priorities that the states have, how much they will be affected by sanctions, and how much their national interests will be enhanced. While all states believe in the maintenance of international peace and security, they must ultimately view sanctions in terms of the effects on their national interests. Obviously, nations like Zambia and Malawi felt that their economic survival was more important than the implementation of complete sanctions, even though they strongly believed in the objectives of the sanctions. Any nation which participates in sanctions must be ready to bear the sacrifices and losses resulting from its participation.

The effectiveness of sanctions by doses -- voluntary, selective mandatory, comprehensive mandatory -- must also be questioned. It was British policy which determined the gradual escalation of sanctions. While gradual economic sanctions do allow the sending nations to adjust their patterns of trade, find alternative markets, and, in
the case of democratic countries, to pass legislation regarding the sanctions, they also do the same for the receiving nation. Because the time lapse between voluntary sanctions and comprehensive mandatory sanctions was two and one-half years, Rhodesia had time to prepare its counterstrategies, find alternative markets, and solve its internal problems. In addition, the use of voluntary sanctions caused problems for the United Nations. Because they were not binding, and United Nations members were, therefore, not required to enact them, sanctions provided an automatic loophole for nations like South Africa and Portugal to continue trading with Rhodesia.

Most experts feel that Britain and the United Nations should have invoked effective first measures to preclude Rhodesia from preparing its defenses. The United Nations should have selected measures in such a way that the population of Rhodesia would have pressured the government to sue for peace to avoid dislocation of its economy. What happened in Rhodesia was that most people, instead of opposing Smith, actually rallied around him.

While voluntary sanctions were unenforceable, mandatory sanctions were enforceable, at least according to the United Nations Charter. Yet the effective enforcement of sanctions depends on international opinion. United Nations sanctions, in other words, still depend for their success on their implementation by individual nations. While the Special Committee Established in Pursuance of Resolution 253 had the capability to monitor the effectiveness of sanctions, it did not have the capability to enforce compliance with those sanctions. In reality, it is extremely difficult for the United Nations
to force compliance to its decisions. For example, out of 127 states in the United Nations in 1970, only 49 cared to inform the organization as to how they were implementing sanctions, 37 responded vaguely, 40 states did not reply at all to the Secretary-General, and one state challenged the legality of some of the sanctions policies.27

In trying to determine the impact of the loopholes and of those countries which happened to be sanctions evaders on the success of United Nations policies, it is worth examining the Seventh Report of the Special Committee in Pursuance of Resolution 253 (Sanctions Committee) issued on May 7, 1975, which shows trading statistics between Rhodesia and "sanctions busters" during the 1968-1973 period.28 While the first six reports of the committee are important, they will not be used in this study because the Seventh Report provides cumulative information. It is important to note, however, that beginning in 1973, Rhodesia suppressed publication of trade figures because of "intensified U.N. hostility,"29 and, as a result, there is little specific up-to-date information indicating which countries are evading sanctions.

In its report the Special Committee30 noted the laxity of too many governments in pursuing sanctions. It reported evidence that sanctions evasions continued heavily throughout 1974, and that the failure of the government of the Republic of South Africa to implement sanctions continued to be a major loophole. It also noted that Southern Rhodesian trade continued to flow through Portuguese territories -- Mozambique, in particular. However, the committee concluded:
that, although sanctions might not be effective in securing a rapid return to legality in Southern Rhodesia without the cooperation of the authorities in South Africa and the Portuguese territories of southern Africa, strict enforcement by all of those governments which professed to enforce them could nonetheless make an important -- and possibly decisive -- contribution to the objectives of the Security Council in imposing sanctions.31

The following statistics, prepared by the Secretariat on Southern Rhodesian trade, estimate Rhodesian exports and imports during the first nine years of voluntary and mandatory sanctions:32

Exports

Rhodesian exports during the 1965-1973 period increased from $399 million to $640 million (estimated because of restrictions on figures). The $640 million in 1973, if it was attained, was a substantial increase over the $474 million figure in 1972. Seventy-three countries, whose imports were reported to the Special Committee, show that Rhodesian exports to them were itemized in the following way (millions):

| To reporting countries | $343 to $68 |
| South Africa Customs Union | $41 to $103 |
| Non-reporting countries | $15 to 0 |
| World markets via indirect trade | 0 to $470 |

Of the $68 million, $26 million was exported to the United States in 1973, $21 million to Malawi, $11 million to Zambia, $8 million to Switzerland, and $1 million to other countries. It is estimated that South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland -- as a group, they are called the South Africa Customs Union -- received Rhodesian exports valued at $103 million. It would, therefore, appear
that $470 million worth of Rhodesian exports reached world markets via Rhodesia's neighbors and were reflected as imports.

During the 1965-1973 period, over 40% of Rhodesia's tobacco reached world markets. One must remember that this was the reported amount, and, undoubtedly, more reached world markets in clandestine ways. It is estimated that this type of trade was very "active."

There also seems to be evidence that South Africa was importing asbestos and that West Germany was importing copper.

Evidence of the existence of indirect imports from Rhodesia is indicated by a comparison of imports of 23 reporting countries (see Table I). The Sanctions Committee offered the following explanations: the discrepancy of $73 million in 1965 ($52 million excess of imports over exports under South Africa and $21 million under Mozambique) represents imports received from the South African Customs Union and Mozambique by the 23 reporting countries over and above the exports that South Africa and Mozambique declared to have sent. These imports were generally known as shipments from Rhodesia that were sent overseas by the Customs Union and Mozambique. They were treated as goods in transit by them, but as imports from the South Africa Customs Union and Mozambique by the 23 reporting countries. This explanation is substantiated in Table I by the excess of declared exports in 1965 of Zambia and Malawi to the 23 reporting countries over the reported corresponding imports. This explanation implies that in 1965, for example, an amount of merchandise valued at $24 million originated in Rhodesia. If this reasoning is accepted, it would mean that during 1970-1973, exporters in the South
### Table I

Comparison of imports of 23 reporting countries (U.S. $ in millions)

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<td>Exports</td>
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<td>23 reporting countries imports $^a$</td>
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<td>1640</td>
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<td>52</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>222</td>
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<td><strong>Mozambique</strong></td>
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<td>Exports</td>
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<td>23 reporting countries imports $^a$</td>
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<td>Exports</td>
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<td>939</td>
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<td>-188</td>
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<td><strong>Malawi</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 reporting countries imports $^a$</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excess of imports over exports</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-6</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exporting countries figures</td>
<td>1551</td>
<td>1844</td>
<td>1963</td>
<td>2262</td>
<td>2497</td>
<td>2417</td>
<td>2101</td>
<td>2650</td>
<td>3639</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 reporting countries imports</td>
<td>1575</td>
<td>1841</td>
<td>2065</td>
<td>2384</td>
<td>2692</td>
<td>2738</td>
<td>2344</td>
<td>2948</td>
<td>4050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excess of imports over exports</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>411</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$^a$Reduced by 10% to cover freight, etc.
Table II

Southern Rhodesian Exports: 1965-1973 (U.S. $ in millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Domestic exports excluding gold (1973) is an estimate)</td>
<td>399</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>297</td>
<td>346</td>
<td>379</td>
<td>474</td>
<td>640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To reporting countries (less 10% to cover freight)</td>
<td>343</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To South Africa Customs Uniona</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To non-reporting countries</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To world markets via indirect trade</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>314</td>
<td>474</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Re-exports</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

aDerived from published data for imports of the South Africa Customs Union from "Africa," less exports to the South Africa Customs Union reported by the African countries.
Africa Customs Union and Mozambique were handling merchandise from Rhodesia valued at $317 million in 1970, $243 million in 1971, $310 million in 1972, and $411 million in 1973. It should be noted that the 1970 and 1972 figures are approximate calculations.

In comparing Rhodesian exports to world markets via indirect trade shown in Table II with figures shown in Table I as "excess of imports over exports," the amounts of re-exports should be added to the former because the importing countries identify the sources of supply without any distinction between national exports and re-exports.36

The Sanctions Committee made the following observations about Table III:37 the substantial agreement of the figures for the years 1967-1969 and 1971-1972 indicates implicitly that since the implementation of United Nations sanctions, Rhodesia has been able to send its exports to world markets indirectly via the South Africa Customs Union and Mozambique. The discrepancy in 1970 does not detract from this observation because the A figure is larger than B. For 1973, $411 million seems small to cover the indirect exports of Rhodesia of $486 million. However, it should be noted that 1973 Rhodesian exports were estimated at $166 million higher than 1972 exports. Considering the "time lag" due to transportation, it is conceivable that $40-$50 million of the total annual growth were reflected only in the early part of 1974's trade return of the 23 reporting countries. It is also possible that a small portion of 1973 exports from Rhodesia were of a clandestine nature and that they were not reflected at all in any recorded imports of any country.
Table III\textsuperscript{38}

Indirect Exports of Southern Rhodesia
(millions U.S. $)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Excess of reported imports of 23 countries over exports of 4 neighbors of Rhodesia</th>
<th>Indirect exports of Rhodesia including re-exports (add last two lines in Table II)</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>A - B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>411</td>
<td>486</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Imports

Rhodesian imports during the 1965-1973 period increased from $334 million to $480 million (see Table IV), up from $404 million in 1972. They were itemized this way for the year 1973: $6 million to Malawi, $4 million to Switzerland, $2 million to Britain, $2 million to West Germany, $1 million to the United States, and $1 million to other countries. These figures total $16 million compared to $19 million in 1972. In addition, it is estimated that the South Africa
Table IV

Rhodesian Imports: 1965-1973 (U.S. $ in millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Imports (1973 figure is estimate)</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>395</td>
<td>404</td>
<td>480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From reporting countries (less 10% to cover freight)</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From South Africa Customs Union(^a)</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unspecified origin</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unaccounted for</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>284</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\) Derived from published data for imports of the South Africa Customs Union from "Africa," less exports to the South Africa Customs Union reported by African countries.
Customs Union sent $180 million to Rhodesia. It appears, therefore, that $284 million worth of Rhodesian imports were not reflected in the corresponding 1973 export figures of world trade.

It is not possible to investigate the true situation concerning unaccounted Rhodesian imports for the years after sanctions. In view of the fact, however, that there has been considerable expansion of the import trade of the South Africa Customs Union, Mozambique, and Angola (Table V), it needs to be determined whether a part of the expansion has been in the form of goods that ultimately reached Rhodesia.

Table V

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>South Africa Customs Union</th>
<th>Mozambique</th>
<th>Angola</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>2461</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>2307</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>2690</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>2638</td>
<td>234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>2983</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>3565</td>
<td>326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>4039</td>
<td>335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>3657</td>
<td>327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>4964</td>
<td>466</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While it is not possible to reach a definite correlation between the unaccounted Rhodesian imports and the exports of its neighbors, it is still interesting to note the great increase in imports during
the years following sanctions. The implication is that many of these goods reached Rhodesian markets.

As noted earlier, the United Nations Special Committee concluded that 40% of Rhodesia's tobacco reached world markets during 1968-1973, and it assumed that much more reached Rhodesian markets in clandestine ways. Reports from Britain, the Economic Research Service, and the United States Department of Agriculture indicate that Rhodesia was able to dispose of almost its entire stockpile of tobacco on world markets.\(^4\) In addition, Rhodesia apparently exported its entire production of nickel via South Africa until 1972 and 1973, at which times the United States directly imported $4.5 million and $11 million respectively.\(^42\)

According to the United Nations study,\(^43\) there is little information regarding petroleum and petroleum products. There was no statistical evidence during 1965-1973 that any country sent petroleum to Rhodesia. Yet there is no report that indicates that a petroleum shortage existed in Rhodesia. It is, therefore, reasonable to assume that there was a constant flow of oil into the country. Based on the increase in South Africa's oil exports, the oil most probably came from that country.

The purpose of the next two tables is to show first of all which countries did not fully implement United Nations sanctions, and secondly, to show to what extent they broke the sanctions policies. The analysis will be limited to the 16 (out of 73) nations which did an adequate amount of trading with Rhodesia. The remaining 57 nations either imported or exported an insignificant amount or nothing at
all, especially after the imposition of mandatory sanctions. Sweden, for example, reported no imports after 1966. Norway, Spain, Argentina, and Brazil reported no imports after 1967. And Ireland and Austria reported no imports after 1969.

The most important observation to note in Table VI is that all of the countries reported some degree of imports from Rhodesia. This occurred despite the fact that most of these nations openly supported mandatory sanctions in 1968. In addition, while Portugal did not report imports after 1968, it is a known fact that the country was importing goods from Rhodesia. It is interesting that with the exception of Switzerland, Austria, Malawi, and Zambia, the remaining twelve nations are considered supportive of the Western point of view.

In examining the relationship of total imports of the reporting nations to the years in which progressive stages of sanctions were applied, one can make two key observations. First, due to the imposition of voluntary United Nations economic sanctions in November 1965 (Resolution 217), the total volume of Rhodesian exports to the reporting nations dropped 44% from approximately $330 million in 1965 to $184 million in 1966. While on the surface this seems like a dramatic decrease, it should be pointed out that Britain and Zambia together accounted for $106 million of that drop. Most of the other nations did not reduce their imports that much. On the whole, therefore, voluntary economic sanctions proved unsuccessful in terms of participation by the members of the United Nations. Second, with the exception of Portugal in 1967 and Switzerland, Zambia, and Malawi in 1969, all of the nations made dramatic reductions in imports from
Table VI

Nations' Imports from Rhodesia: 1965-1973 (thousands $)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>14056</td>
<td>9359</td>
<td>6463</td>
<td>1599</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>807</td>
<td>12400</td>
<td>25670</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>3152</td>
<td>1087</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium-Luxemburg</td>
<td>2806</td>
<td>3540</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>829</td>
<td>477</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>2873</td>
<td>1856</td>
<td>1059</td>
<td>1171</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>907</td>
<td>215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Germany</td>
<td>35112</td>
<td>30525</td>
<td>15966</td>
<td>13298</td>
<td>1120</td>
<td>572</td>
<td>485</td>
<td>367</td>
<td>521</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>16666</td>
<td>8554</td>
<td>259</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>5987</td>
<td>5722</td>
<td>2406</td>
<td>542</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>83711</td>
<td>12809</td>
<td>405</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>2927</td>
<td>2148</td>
<td>5635</td>
<td>3582</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>5678</td>
<td>4155</td>
<td>3925</td>
<td>3483</td>
<td>3625</td>
<td>4296</td>
<td>4511</td>
<td>4582</td>
<td>7749</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>2991</td>
<td>5862</td>
<td>4458</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>3266</td>
<td>787</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>26497</td>
<td>13781</td>
<td>1266</td>
<td>822</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>4436</td>
<td>1673</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>99507</td>
<td>64904</td>
<td>45129</td>
<td>31602</td>
<td>30481</td>
<td>32473</td>
<td>29540</td>
<td>16240</td>
<td>11000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>20805</td>
<td>17267</td>
<td>14732</td>
<td>12588</td>
<td>12534</td>
<td>15505</td>
<td>15896</td>
<td>21077</td>
<td>21278</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Rhodesia in 1967 after selective mandatory sanctions were imposed and again in 1969 after comprehensive mandatory sanctions were instituted. Canada, Australia, Britain, Austria, Japan, Italy, and the Netherlands reduced their imports to virtually nothing after 1968. The same holds true for the United States in 1969-1970 and for France in 1969-1971. And West Germany substantially reduced its imports after the 1968 Resolution calling for comprehensive sanctions. It is interesting to note that during 1969-1971 Zambia imported more than all of the other reporting countries combined in spite of the fact that she had reduced her dependency on Rhodesia by 65%.

With the exception of France in 1972, a situation for which there is no specific explanation, Canada, Belgium-Luxemburg, Italy, the Netherlands, Britain, Australia, Austria, Japan and France were the countries that best followed the sanctions policies. On the other hand, the United States, with the passage of the Byrd Amendment in 1971 dramatically increased its importation of chromium and other goods in the subsequent years to a high of $25.7 million in 1973. Switzerland, because of its policy of neutrality, maintained a steady trade with Rhodesia in the area of $3.5 to $4.5 million, that is until she increased her imports to $7.7 million in 1973, another situation for which there is no obvious explanation. In addition, while Zambia presumably made every effort to reduce her dependency on Rhodesia, and in fact had reduced imports in 1973 by 90% of 1965 levels, Malawi actually increased its imports from Rhodesia during the same period of time.

There are a few other observations that are worth noting.
Portugal refused to report information to the United Nations Special Committee after comprehensive mandatory sanctions were passed in 1968, presumably because its trade increased substantially with Rhodesia after that time. Mozambique and Angola, as Portuguese colonies, did not report imports from Rhodesia either. In addition, there were no import reports sent in by the communist nations after 1966, with the exception of Yugoslavia, or from the African nations of Nigeria, Botswana, and Uganda after 1967.

The same pattern of trade that was true of imports is also true of exports in that all nations, with the exception of Canada in 1971 and 1973, Austria 1970-1973, and Japan in 1973, reported some degree of exports to Rhodesia. In total, however, the nations in Tables VI and VII were more willing to restrict exports to Rhodesia than they were imports from Rhodesia. By 1970 all nations together had reduced their exports by 92%, but they had only reduced their imports by 83%. With some modifications, the same observations made earlier about the stages of import sanctions can also be made about export sanctions. Voluntary sanctions as a universal policy were not widely upheld. The great reductions in exports to Rhodesia occurred in Britain, the United States, Zambia, and Japan. In addition, dramatic reductions didn't occur on a general basis until 1969 after the institution of comprehensive mandatory sanctions. In fact, in 1967 after selected mandatory sanctions had been implemented, nations like France, Switzerland, and Malawi did approximately the same amount of business with Rhodesia while West Germany and Australia actually increased their exports to Rhodesia.
Table VII  

Exports to Rhodesia: 1965-1973 (thousands $)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>22982</td>
<td>7491</td>
<td>3557</td>
<td>2024</td>
<td>455</td>
<td>514</td>
<td>652</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>581</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>3625</td>
<td>575</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium-Luxemburg</td>
<td>6832</td>
<td>3444</td>
<td>1922</td>
<td>1312</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>3850</td>
<td>4246</td>
<td>3976</td>
<td>2380</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>488</td>
<td>451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>10903</td>
<td>11186</td>
<td>12305</td>
<td>12914</td>
<td>1234</td>
<td>1176</td>
<td>1552</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>2229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>6318</td>
<td>5010</td>
<td>1339</td>
<td>1295</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>7291</td>
<td>5748</td>
<td>4699</td>
<td>3000</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>88808</td>
<td>7648</td>
<td>2877</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>1958</td>
<td>1206</td>
<td>1698</td>
<td>1796</td>
<td>1947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>559</td>
<td>1055</td>
<td>1824</td>
<td>878</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>1641</td>
<td>1890</td>
<td>1939</td>
<td>2513</td>
<td>1540</td>
<td>1969</td>
<td>2851</td>
<td>3230</td>
<td>3834</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
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In general, the same countries which greatly supported import sanctions -- Canada, Belgium-Luxemburg, Austria, Japan, Italy, and France and the Netherlands, although the last two nations' export volumes were a few hundred thousand dollars higher -- also greatly supported export sanctions. It should also be mentioned that after Resolution 253, Japan virtually cut off exports to Rhodesia. On the other hand, Australia, despite United Nations sanctions policies, maintained a consistent level of exports to Rhodesia until 1973 when the nation decided to discontinue its policy of shipping wheat to Rhodesia for humanitarian reasons. While both the United States and West Germany reduced exports after 1968, each maintained an export average of approximately $0.5 million and $1.5 million respectively during the 1970-1973 period. Britain also consistently exported $1.5 to $2.0 million worth of goods to Rhodesia during the 1968-1973 period, as did Switzerland whose trade increased during the 1970-1973 period. Lastly, the same comment that was made about Zambian and Malawian imports can be made about their exports. While Zambia greatly reduced its exports to Rhodesia to only $400,000 in 1973, Malawi actually filled the gap after 1968 by expanding its export trade to Rhodesia.

A few additional concluding remarks are in order. First, the biggest import "sanctions busters," according to the statistics were Zambia, Malawi, United States, and Switzerland, followed by West Germany. While there were other nations which broke the United Nations sanctions policies, these five countries were the biggest offenders of the reporting countries. South Africa and Portugal and its territories should also be included even though they are non-reporting
nations. South Africa was the biggest offender of all.

The biggest export "sanctions busters" according to the statistics during 1968-1973 were Malawi, Australia, Switzerland, West Germany, Britain, and Zambia, followed way behind by the United States and France. Again, both South Africa and Portugal, as non-reporters, were primary sanctions breakers.

The Special Committee established to monitor sanctions did not prove to be very effective. Since it is the responsibility of the individual nations to submit reports, it is very possible that the figures mentioned in the preceding tables are inaccurate. However, despite the possibility that there may be discrepancies in the figures, it is still safe to conclude according to experts that the biggest offenders of United Nations sanctions policies were those nations mentioned above. The greatest problem faced by the committee is that it did not have the power to force the members who are "sanctions busters" to obey United Nations policies.

Another control factor was the inability of the United Nations to get non-members like Switzerland and West Germany to comply with sanctions. The two countries together bought approximately 10% of Rhodesia's exports and provided approximately 4.5% of Rhodesia's imports in 1965. In fact, as of 1965 West Germany was the second largest European trading partner of Rhodesia, next to Britain. She actually ranked first after Britain imposed sanctions. When West Germany finally did comply with sanctions in 1968, it was very likely the result of pressure applied by the Western powers. Nevertheless, long-term contracts prior to 1968 were allowed to stand in
West Germany. Switzerland, on the other hand, caused a problem because of her status as a neutral nation. The major concern with Switzerland, however, was not over the amount of trade with Rhodesia -- the average of the 1962-1965 period was not substantial -- but rather with the fact that the nation was a distribution center for Rhodesian goods for all of Europe.

Second, based on the preceding statistics and despite the cases of "sanctions busting," one could make a strong case for the success of sanctions during the 1965-1973 period, at least with those nations reporting to the United Nations. The 16 nations mentioned in Table VI represented 83% of Rhodesia's exports in 1965 ($330 million out of $399), but by 1973 they represented only 10% of Rhodesia's exports ($66.8 million out of $640 million). In Table VII the same nations represented 59% of Rhodesia's imports in 1965 ($197 million out of $334 million) and only 3% in 1973 ($15.7 million out of $480 million). Both sets of figures indicate dramatic declines in the trade of the reporting nations with Rhodesia. However, by finding alternative markets, instituting clandestine trade practices, and diversifying its own economy, Rhodesia was able to weather the "sanctions storm" and prosper in the 1970's. The major reason for this success was that South Africa and Portugal, including its territories (Mozambique and Angola), were willing to support the Smith regime.

Third, it is interesting to see how most nations interpreted the policy of comprehensive mandatory sanctions as stated in Resolution 253. While the intent of the resolution was that all trade with Rhodesia was to be severed by the members of the United Nations,
almost none of the nations voting for the resolution were able to achieve that goal.

Rhodesian Counterstrategies

The Rhodesian response to sanctions was grossly underestimated by the British. The Smith regime was well prepared politically and economically to meet the challenge. Internally, it gained the support of the Rhodesian populace by eliminating opposition from the African nationalists and Europeans opposed to UDI. In addition, it consolidated its control over the army and the news media. In September 1962 and August 1964, the Rhodesian Front banned two African nationalist parties, the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and detained their leadership, saying that the infighting among nationalists was a threat to law and order. Joshua Nkomo, head of ZAPU and Ndabaningi Sithole, head of ZANU, actually spent their next ten years in prison. With the leadership of the opposition effectively immobilized, Smith declared UDI at an opportune time because African morale was at an all time low, and they were too unorganized to resist. The African nationalists were not able to build a revolutionary infrastructure to oppose UDI.

To eradicate European opposition, the Smith regime undermined the support of the Rhodesian National Party and its successor, the Rhodesian Party, which warned of the negative effects of UDI and advocated a constitutionally-achieved independence. The Rhodesian Front's strategy was to adopt the independence issue without explaining
how it would happen. It was difficult for the European opposition to challenge the Rhodesian Front without attacking the struggle for Rhodesian sovereignty.  

To ensure that opposition within the army was eliminated, Major General J. Anderson, General Officer commanding the Rhodesian army, was retired on the grounds of age, but in reality because of his opposition to UDI. After UDI any army move to suppress the independence movement was eliminated by appeals from the British government to Rhodesia to avoid violence.

The Rhodesian regime also moved to control the media and use it as a preparation for UDI. It portrayed Rhodesia as a target of world conspiracy and placed loyal men in key broadcasting positions. It eliminated African opposition by banning the African Daily News in 1964. In addition, at the time of UDI there was a blackout of news except for pro-regime ideas.

Smith made sure that the white minority in the country favored independence by having a referendum prior to UDI in which there were 58,091 "yes" votes and 6906 "no" votes.

The Smith regime and the Rhodesian people also countered the economic impact of sanctions. To develop counterstrategies in the short run, the government sent out instructions to all major economic interest groups prior to UDI to get some idea of the impact of sanctions. Smith asked for advice from the business community, especially those who opposed UDI. In addition, since the Smith regime was able to decide the date of UDI, in the short run he was able to control the impact of sanctions. Rhodesia's trade was lowest in
November and highest in early spring when the tobacco and sugar crops are exported. By selecting November for UDI, the Rhodesians were able to avoid the immediate effects of sanctions. Rhodesia also attempted to gain assurances from South Africa, Mozambique, Zambia, and Malawi that economic relationships would not be disrupted. In November 1964, the nation signed a five year trade pact with South Africa, and it sought alternative markets in case Zambia and Malawi decided to apply sanctions. In addition, Rhodesia withdrew a large amount of its reserves from London to South Africa before Britain moved to freeze them. In response to a freeze on £5.1 million in investment income owed Rhodesia by Britain and Zambia, Rhodesia countered by blocking £8.8 million owed to them, therefore, netting £3.7 million.

In the longer term, Rhodesia was forced to counter the major two-part objective of United Nations sanctions, which were designed to deprive Rhodesia of needed imports, thereby creating a high level of consumer dissatisfaction within the country and also to deprive Rhodesia of markets for its exports, thereby preventing the nation from obtaining foreign exchange earnings necessary to help it pay its import bills and to grow as a nation. Rhodesia combatted the United Nations sanctions objectives by instituting measures (import quotas and diversification) to hold down import bills to keep the economy going while the country searched for alternative markets for its exports through loopholes in United Nations policies.

Immediately after UDI and the institution of sanctions by Britain, the Smith regime put through emergency legislation designed to
avert a balance of payments crisis in light of the situation that
exports would be restricted. Executives of international companies
were persuaded to act in the national interest by diversifying their
product lines according to government import substitution guidelines
and to invest locally rather than outside the country. Since most of
the management of foreign industry was centered in the hands of Rho-
desians, these enterprises acted like nationalized or de facto
expropriated enterprises.56

The government also imposed regulations controlling manpower in
order to prevent unemployment among Rhodesians. Furthermore, unem-
ployment among whites was eased as they were "reassigned" to public
service jobs throughout the country. African unemployment was eased
somewhat by the forced departure of workers from Malawi and Moza-
bique.57

Tobacco that could not be exported was stockpiled at government
expense until new markets could be found or until new structural
adjustments in the economy occurred. These new structural adjust-
ments took one major form -- import substitution. The purpose of
this policy was to make Rhodesia less dependent on foreign imports
and more self-sufficient.

The import substitution policy had a great effect on the indu-
trial sector as manufacturers switched from producing goods for export
to producing substitutes for commodities that were previously imported.
By allocating foreign exchange away from unnecessary items to those
that could be manufactured locally, the government assisted Rhodes-
ian businesses to become more self-sufficient and make use of all
available plant capacity. While the economy was mainly geared to agricultural export-oriented policies prior to UDI, afterwards the manufacturing industry blossomed with this new government approach. In fact, the number of enterprises almost doubled, and the number of domestically manufactured products increased from 1059 to 3837 between 1966 and 1970. To finance the expansion in the manufacturing sector, the government relied heavily on South African investments, government financing, and reinvestment of blocked profits by foreign and domestic firms.

In agriculture the government forced farmers to switch from the key export crop (tobacco and sugar) syndrome to food and industrial crops. Quotas placed on the amount of tobacco that could be grown forced farmers to diversify into the production of wheat, maize, vegetables, and dairy products and brought Rhodesia to a point of near self-sufficiency in food crops. By diversifying into cotton production, farmers also aided a quickly expanding textile and clothing industry. As far as agriculture is concerned, Rhodesia no longer produces for export, but if there happens to be a surplus, the nation tries to export the commodities through the loopholes in sanctions policies.

To counter the second objective of United Nations sanctions, Rhodesia searched for alternative markets through loopholes. As was already discussed earlier, Rhodesian businesses had a great deal of success finding markets for their exports, especially those from the nation's mining industry. Rhodesia increased the production and processing of chrome ore and ferrochrome, especially for the American
market, as well as nickel, copper, steel, iron and asbestos. In fact, mineral production increased annually at an average rate of 7% during 1966-1974.  

The Special Committee Established in Pursuance of Resolution 253 considered a number of possible violations during its annual sessions. Without examining those in detail, let it suffice to say that Rhodesia was not only able to find obvious loopholes like the trade statistics indicate in the previous section, but was also able through clandestine measures to establish trading outposts throughout Europe and also in South Africa. The loophole can follow a number of patterns: importers can falsify documents relating to the origin of the imports; goods can change their points of embarkation in mid-ocean; goods are usually sold to one country and then re-exported to another. The best example of this type of action is the UNIVEX affair where a business in Switzerland, in conjunction with a South African firm, acted as a coordinating body for the sale of Rhodesian chrome in Europe. By routing shipments of chrome through Mozambique, falsifying certificates of origin, and using a corporation in Switzerland as an intermediary, UNIVEX was believed to have handled exports of 10,000 tons of chrome in 1968-69. Italian, West German, and Dutch businesses have similarly assisted Rhodesia in evading sanctions. South Africa is reported to have gone so far as to repack Rhodesian goods in South African packages for re-export.

The mineral that was most crucial to Rhodesia's survival, especially in the early stages of sanctions, was oil, and Rhodesia
has had little trouble procuring it despite the British blockade of Beira. The British blockade forced the shutdown of a pipeline carrying crude oil from Beira on the Mozambique coast to Umtali in Rhodesia and subsequently shut down the Rhodesian refinery built at Umtali by an oil group of which the major partners were Mobil, Cal- tex, Total, Shell, and B.P. Because of the Umtali shutdown, Rhodesia for the last thirteen years has not only had to import crude oil but fuels and non-fuels (lubricants) as well. This has been public knowledge since the imposition of sanctions in 1965, but because of a web of secrecy, it has not been clear until recently which companies were involved or how they were doing it.

There is evidence that the five oil companies mentioned above, especially Mobil, have been responsible for providing Rhodesia with her oil needs. As subsidiaries in Rhodesia of either United States or European parent companies, these five companies under "direct watch" by the Smith government, have allegedly operated with their subsidiaries in Mozambique (until closure of the border) and South Africa to break United Nations sanctions. Evidence suggests that Mobil was the principal provider of Rhodesian oil in the beginning and that the other companies became involved in the early 1970's.

While evidence shows that the oil may have come from the South African subsidiaries, it also indicates that the oil did not come directly from them, but came via intermediary companies in South Africa. Mobil called this technique a "paper-chase." Its purpose was to minimize the chance that the scheme would be detected. The Rhodesian recipient has usually been GENTA, an agency set up
by the Smith regime to coordinate the importation of oil. It has served first as a front for the government and secondly as a tight control over the importation of oil products.

The most economical way to transport oil to Rhodesia was by rail or ship from South Africa to the Mozambican port of Lourenco Marques and then by rail to Rhodesia. However, when the FRELIMO government imposed sanctions against Rhodesia in March 1976, and, subsequently closed its border, Rhodesia was forced to use more costly routes for its oil importation. The first and most important route now is a direct rail link between Rhodesia and South Africa opened up in 1974. The second is a road between South Africa and Rhodesia, and the third is a rail link between South Africa to Rhodesia via Botswana. The first route is by far the most advantageous, and most importantly, it shows how completely dependent Rhodesia is on South Africa for its petroleum products.

While it appears that sanction legislation written in Britain, France, Netherlands, and the United States does not apply to South African subsidiaries, thereby exempting the oil companies from prosecution -- unless perhaps intent to supply Rhodesia could be proved -- the entire situation produces a serious loophole in United Nations sanctions policies. In the final analysis, Rhodesia is the beneficiary.

The Oil Conspiracy does make a convincing case and presents a fascinating analysis of alleged "sanctions busting." Whether one wants to believe the evidence or not, the fact of the matter is that Rhodesia has received oil from somewhere, and it has come in sufficient
quantities to keep the country running for the past thirteen years. However, pressure is building from African sources to stop the flow. Zambia has initiated legal proceedings against the five oil companies mentioned earlier.\textsuperscript{72}

The Smith regime has tried throughout the economic boycott to keep the white population as removed as possible from the effects of economic sanctions, thereby thwarting the United Nations objective of trying to create citizen dissatisfaction with the regime. The government has, for the most part, been able to maintain white incomes and consumption, often at the expense of the African population. The ability of the Smith regime to generate public support among whites for its programs and maintain a relatively high morale under the circumstances (at least until the mid-1970's) has allowed Rhodesia to successfully resist the sanctions of the United Nations.

When Britain and the United Nations imposed sanctions, they acted under the assumption that a cut in exports or in imports would send incomes down, creating pressures within Rhodesia for a return to legality and subsequent majority rule.\textsuperscript{73} While the success of this kind of action was disputed by University of York economists, Timothy Curtin and David Murray, back in 1967\textsuperscript{74} because they felt that Rhodesian incomes would not drop far enough (25\%) to cause citizen pressure on the regime, subsequent policies were instituted anyway. Rhodesia shattered United Nations objectives and confirmed the conclusions of Curtin and Murray. Expanded trade with South Africa and other sanctions breakers, accompanied in Rhodesia by government
measures such as import substitution designed to make Rhodesia more self-sufficient, provided the nation with a successful means of resisting United Nations sanctions.
NOTES FOR CHAPTER IV

1. Galtung, op. cit., p. 381.


4. ibid.

5. loc. cit., p. 16.


8. He held fruitless meetings with Smith in 1966 aboard the British battleship "Tiger" and again in October 1968 aboard the ship "Fearless."


15. These concessions were the result of the Commonwealth meetings in January 1966 in Lagos, Nigeria, and again in September 1966 in London.


17. loc. cit., p. 154.

18. ibid.

20. Wilson actually mentions this dilemma in his Personal Record, p. 180-183.

21. Good, op. cit., p. 314. He supports the view that force was not a likely British foreign policy alternative.


24. loc. cit., p. 41.

25. ibid.

26. It is interesting to note that in the case of Sweden, there was no legislation between November 1965 and May 1969 to implement sanctions. Because Sweden had to appoint a commission to decide what actions to take, it took one year from the enactment of Resolution 253 for the nation to pass legislation.

27. Kapungu, op. cit., p. 84.


29. loc. cit., p. 2, citing the April 1974 issue of Economic Survey of Rhodesia in which the Ministry of Finance reported: "It is regretted that because of the United Nations intensification of hostility toward Rhodesia and the consequent use to which certain statistical data can be put, it has been necessary to limit the amount of detail given in both the narrative and the tables to Survey."


31. ibid.

32. United Nations Document S/11594/Add 3, May 7, 1975, p. 1-34 (includes figures above and the explanation up to explanation of Table I).

33. loc. cit., p. 3.

34. ibid.

35. loc. cit., p. 4.

36. ibid.

37. ibid.
38. loc. cit., p. 5.
40. loc. cit., p. 7.
41. ibid.
42. ibid.
43. ibid.
44. loc. cit., p. 32-34.
45. loc. cit., p. 36-37.

46. The "humanitarian" factor was included in Resolution 253, even though the argument was eventually rejected by the United Nations since Rhodesia produced a surplus of wheat and maize.


49. Cavallero, op. cit., p. 33.
51. loc. cit., p. 105.
54. Moyana, op. cit., p. 504.
55. ibid.
56. ibid.
57. ibid. One hundred thousand Malawians and 50,000 Mozambicans actually worked in cheap labor occupations (tobacco) spurned by local
black Rhodesians. This situation found black Rhodesians back to subsistence farming, especially after the resulting decline in tobacco output.

58. loc. cit., p. 506.

59. loc. cit., p. 509.

60. The Sixth Report of the Special Committee, for example, lists 71 violations and the Seventh Report, 54 violations.

61. Zacklin, op. cit., p. 48. UNIVEX has also been implicated by the Special Committee in Pursuance of Resolution 253 as well as by other experts such as Kapungu.


63. Sutcliffe, R.B., "Rhodesian Trade Since UDI." The World Today, XXIII (October 1967), 419.

64. Mobil and Caltex (jointly owned by Standard Oil of California and Texaco) are American-owned. Total is mainly held by the French government. Shell is 40% British and 60% Dutch-owned. And the British have a 51% controlling interest in B.P. (British Petroleum).

65. See ____ Sanction Breakers: Selling Oil to Rhodesia. New York: The Africa Fund, 1977. This article is adapted from testimony presented by Bernard Rivers to the Sanctions Committee of the Security Council. Rivers, a British economist and researcher on Third World issues, has been investigating since 1974 how Rhodesia has procured its oil.

66. See ____ The Oil Conspiracy. New York: Center for Social Action of the United Church of Christ, 1976. This material was gathered by OKHELA, a clandestine organization of white South African patriots, who support the cause of the African National Congress of South Africa.


68. loc. cit., p. 8.


70. loc. cit., p. 7. Ostensibly a private company, GENTA is actually 100% owned by the Rhodesian government according to the authors of The Oil Conspiracy.

71. loc. cit., p. 8.

73. This assumption was based on the Keynesian and neo-classical beliefs that a cut in exports (Keynesian) or in imports (neo-classical) would send incomes down, setting off pressures in Rhodesia for change.

V. CONCLUDING REMARKS

The purpose of this chapter is to substantiate the conclusions made in chapters three and four that ineffective British foreign policy, loopholes in United Nations sanctions policies, and innovative and devious Rhodesian counterstrategies resulted during the 1965-1978 period in the unsuccessful attempt to return Rhodesia to a state of legality and to effect a change to majority rule. This objective will be accomplished through a brief summary of the impact of economic sanctions on Rhodesia in terms of the available statistics. Unfortunately, attempts to do this are hampered, in some cases, by inaccurate statistical data, and, in others, by outright contradictory data. The greatest contradiction seems to appear in British figures, which attempt to paint a favorable picture of the success of sanctions, at least in the late 1960's, and the Rhodesian figures, when they are available, which attempt to show how Rhodesia has thrived since the implementation of sanctions. The correct statistics probably appear somewhere in between, but at least these can indicate some important trends. The intent of the analysis is to split the economic impact of sanctions on Rhodesia into two time periods: 1965-1974 and 1975-1978.

Economic Impact 1965-1974

During the initial period, sanctions failed to damage the economy severely, despite the significant declines in Rhodesian imports and exports during the 1966-1969 period. Imports were kept at a tolerable
level by import substitution strategies. By 1969 Rhodesian exports began again to increase dramatically. One must remember that available statistics do not acknowledge fully the success the Rhodesians had in clandestine trade. However, figures show a marked deterioration in Rhodesia's visible trade balance from a surplus of £40 million in 1965 to a deficit of £8 million in 1968. Rhodesia was able to gain on balance, though, by repudiating commitments on past borrowing and controlling the transfer of dividends and interest, so that the net requirement for foreign exchange on current account actually fell. As a result, the balance of payments on current account moved from a surplus of £15 million in 1965 to an approximate balance in 1966, to a £10 million deficit in 1967 to a large deficit in 1968 of £27 million. The inflow in 1968 of over £25 million in private investment, however, brought the net amount to a meager deficit of £1.6 million. Up to 1972 when the visible trade balance recovered to show a surplus, the Rhodesian government was able to keep the nation's balance of payments in line by raising the capital amount reserves either through private or public sector investments. Because of the favorable visible trade balance, by 1973 the nation achieved its largest surplus.

After a 4% decline in the gross domestic product in 1966, due to initial British and Zambian export-import restrictions and the transitional period involving the institution of the import substitution program in agriculture and industry, the Rhodesian economy experienced remarkable economic growth through 1974. The nation was able to average an annual growth rate of 7% for the entire post-UDI
period and actually experienced an impressive growth rate of 8.5% during 1970-1974. This is a remarkable figure even if the rate were exaggerated.

While all key sectors of the Rhodesian economy -- agriculture, manufacturing, mining -- were hurt by sanctions, agriculture was hit the hardest. Sugar and tobacco commodities suffered the most. For example, less than 40% of the tobacco crop was sold in 1966, and today the number of tobacco farmers has been cut in half from 3000 to 1500. Yet by 1971 and 1972 the agricultural sector had recovered. However, in 1973, due to a severe drought, the output again declined by 16%. Rising world commodity prices, however, especially in meat, sugar, and tobacco, offset the decline in agricultural volume. The shortage of tobacco also enabled Rhodesia to sell its entire stockpile accumulated after UDI, although it probably had to do so at lower than current world prices. In fact, by 1975 the total volume of agricultural output had increased by 72% of the 1964 level.

Mineral exports were less affected by sanctions and with increased world demand for Rhodesian products, the volume of mineral production increased at an annual average rate of 7% between 1966 and 1974. It was claimed that mineral exports set new records in 1972-73, and that production alone during 1976 increased 35% over the previous year.

The steady growth in the importance of manufacturing indicates Rhodesia's transition from underdeveloped to semi-developed status. In 1965 manufacturing had a 19.7% share of the gross domestic production compared to a combined share of 24.1% for agriculture and
mining. By 1974 it had increased to 25.2% against 24% for agriculture and mining.\(^{20}\) It was the manufacturing sector of the Rhodesian economy which actually benefitted from sanctions and the subsequent governmental emphasis on import substitution to a point where it registered an average annual growth rate of 12% per year during 1966-1974.\(^{21}\) This is obviously a very impressive figure.

It is also important to note that gross national income was maintained at more than adequate levels. Despite an initial drop of 4% in 1966, the impact of which was felt particularly by the minority of whites in the agricultural sector, gross national income grew at the rate of 9% in 1967-68.\(^{22}\) Figures indicate that employment and average earnings rose faster during 1966-1971, after sanctions were imposed, than they did prior to UDI.\(^{23}\) Moreover, white Rhodesians were able to maintain their standard of living between 1965-1971 because average earnings rose 35% while the consumer price index went up 18%.\(^{24}\) In addition, between 1971 and 1974, national disposable income increased 46%.\(^{25}\) This present annual rate of approximately 2% seems to fit the explanation provided by Curtin and Murray that "over a longer time horizon, 2% to 3% growth of national income although inadequate in terms of the rate of the African population increase would provide for reasonable increases in per capita income of the static white population."\(^{26}\) In other words, there would not be enough citizen economic dissatisfaction to create an environment for political change.

As one can see, the political and economic repercussions that were supposed to occur in Rhodesia after sanctions did not result in
the fall of the Smith regime from power. Both UDI and United Nations sanctions forced major structural changes in the Rhodesian economy, which actually benefitted an economy that had probably become too dependent for its own good on cash crop production. Agriculture was forced to shift from production of tobacco and sugar as export crops to consumer-oriented food crops and to industrial crops which, in turn, supported the food processing and textile industries. Manufacturing shifted to the production of consumer and capital goods. And mining, which continued to be mostly export-oriented, also benefitted the economy by earning most of the foreign exchange needed to help finance capital goods imports for manufacturing and large scale agricultural projects. The end result during 1965-1974 was impressive economic growth, especially in light of United Nations sanctions.

Economic Impact 1975-1978

Despite Rhodesia's economic success during 1965-1974, events have occurred in the last three and one-half years, which seem to indicate that the political and economic success of the Smith regime might be short-lived. Economically, events have taken a turn for the worse, partially because of expanded United Nations sanctions and partially because of an expanded guerrilla war. While this paper will deal briefly with the guerrilla war later in this section, the major intent here is to focus on expanded economic problems caused by United Nations sanctions policies. The impact of the guerrilla war on both the economic and political status of the Rhodesian Front and Ian Smith will be studied in greater detail in Part II of the thesis.
United Nations sanctions are now more effective because they have been made more universal. First, in January 1973, Zambia implemented more comprehensive sanctions. By late 1973 the nation had closed its borders completely to Rhodesian trade. Although the United Nations recognized Zambia's predicament and on March 10, 1973 appealed to all states for "immediate technical, financial, and material assistance" for the country, the bulk of the aid did not arrive, and Zambia continued to suffer. However, the border closure was also particularly damaging for Rhodesian Railways which lost the lucrative traffic of Zambian copper.

Secondly, the independence of Mozambique from Portugal in June 1975, also changed Rhodesia's economic position. After instituting a radical Marxist government, Mozambique changed from being a close ally of Rhodesia to being a political antagonist. On March 3, 1976, Mozambique closed its borders to Rhodesian trade, worth approximately $49 million per year. On March 17, the Security Council made the same appeal to member states for assistance to Mozambique that it had made for Zambia. In April Henry Kissinger supported the resolution by pledging $12.5 million in aid from the United States.

Thirdly, on March 20, 1977, the United States repealed the Byrd Amendment which had authorized importation of chrome from Rhodesia for security reasons, thereby depriving Rhodesia of millions of dollars worth of export trade ($26 million in 1973).

The significance of the effects of the expansion of United Nations sanctions by Zambia, Mozambique and the United States is difficult to measure. Rhodesia has undoubtedly found alternative
markets for exports and imports, presumably from South Africa. With
the closure of the Mozambique border, however, Rhodesia has lost a
useful export market and is now forced to incur the added costs of
lengthening her lines of communication and trade with foreign markets.
In addition, the closure of both the Zambian and Mozambique borders
have created substantial transport problems for Rhodesian goods,
thereby making the nation more dependent on South Africa for her
merchandise. This presents a real threat to Smith if South Africa
uses this monopoly of Rhodesian transport lines to the sea as a press-
ure lever for political change. Moreover, the imposition of sanc-
tions on chrome has indicated that the United States is more fully
committed to a policy of majority rule in Rhodesia than it used to be.

The closures of Zambian and Mozambican borders to Rhodesian
trade may or may not have an adverse effect on Rhodesia's economy.
Much depends on how much of the slack South Africa is willing to
pick up. They do, however, provide significant political and military
consequences for Rhodesia. Both governments are openly committed to
the demise of the Smith regime and are doing their part to enhance
that situation by providing sanctuaries for Rhodesian nationalists
to make attacks on the country.

The statistics that are available indicate that Rhodesia is
experiencing economic problems. The economy is under a much greater
strain than in preceding years. After the phenomenal growth rate of
manufacturing from 1965 to 1974, there was a fall in output of 7% in
1976.\textsuperscript{33} The country ran net balance of payments deficit of \$ $\text{R}\ 33.1
in 1974 and \$ $\text{R}\ 26.6 in 1975.\textsuperscript{34} Tourism, a source of foreign exchange
fell by 40% in 1976 to 140,000 people, down from 244,000 in 1975 and from 339,000 in 1972. Real gross domestic product fell in 1975 by 1.1% and in 1976 by 3.4%. Although the 1976/77 budget earmarked $R 84.4 million for defense, an increase of 40% over 1975/76, it may be closer to $R 125 million by adding defense-related expenditures from the ministries of the Treasury, Police, Interior, and Roads. The sales tax has been upped from 5% to 15% in two stages to help pay for the war effort. Perhaps indicative of the situation in Rhodesia is the fact that economic problems and the guerrilla war have increased white emigration, which resulted in net losses of 7000 whites in 1976 and 3600 in the first quarter of 1977. What is significant about the outflow of whites is that most are professionals, who provide technological and administrative services to the country.

Evaluation of the United Nations Role

In retrospect, it doesn't appear that United Nations economic sanctions have been effective. The political and economic repercussions that were supposed to occur in Rhodesia after the institution of sanctions did not result in the fall of the Smith regime from power. The British were unable to resolve the Rhodesian problem even though they had the responsibility because they did not have the power. They were faced with the alternative of either accepting the situation existing in Rhodesia, which meant permitting a racially segregated society as a basis for independence, or intervening forcefully to alter it. Unable or unwilling to do either, they chose a
compromise which in fact made matters worse. Part of that compromise was a reliance on economic sanctions and the support of the United Nations. Just as Britain would not use force to bring about a constitutional settlement, so the Wilson regime would also not challenge the sources of support for the Smith regime.42 As a result, Britain helped implement a United Nations policy that could not possibly have resulted in a settlement. In the first place, Portugal, South Africa and others continued to violate the sanctions. Secondly, the Smith regime, entrenched in power and buoyed by innovative emergency measures and by assurances of continued economic support, was able to hold out against a constitutional settlement that would have resulted in African majority rule.

Perhaps the above conclusion is a bit too harsh. The outcome might have been different if some of the conditions under which sanctions were imposed were changed. Suppose, for example, that the following changes were made: that the timing of sanctions had been handled more effectively, thereby eliminating the piecemeal approach and providing for the institution of comprehensive mandatory measures much sooner than 1968; that Rhodesia had not had the capacity to implement effective internal measures to combat sanctions; that South Africa, the biggest obstacle to the success of sanctions had agreed to support the economic boycott; that sanctions had been extended to nations not cooperating with the United Nations against Rhodesia; that the African population in Rhodesia had instituted internal sanctions (general strikes) in conjunction with the United Nations external measures; or as a last resort, that force had been
used in the matter. All of these conditions presume that the United Nations would have had greater controls and enforcement powers, characteristics more consistent for a national government. In reality, the organization does not have those powers, and while it is safe to say that if South Africa were to support United Nations sanctions, the "rebellion" in Rhodesia would come to an abrupt halt, it is less likely that the other conditions would have produced the same results, with the possible exception of the situation of internal sanctions or expanded sanctions to those uncooperative nations.

While sanctions in theory provide a feasible policy tool for meeting stated objectives, in reality they do not. At least by themselves they do not. The crucial point is that the divergence of opinion by nations concerning their own economic and political priorities makes it almost impossible to provide a universal front to reach those stated objectives. This fact is clearly borne out by the reality that South Africa and others saw sanctions as being less important than something else, thereby creating loopholes. The politics involved with deciding on sanctions as evidenced by the split between Britain and the Commonwealth and between the United Nations and South Africa precluded the possibility that United Nations sanctions in Rhodesia would work. This is why Michael Reisman's comment that "the process of sanctions and enforcement has fared poorly"\(^4\) is so relevant to the Rhodesian crisis. In addition, sanctions can, and have in the case of Rhodesia, caused suffering among the participating nations (Zambia) as well as among the masses (Africans), despite the fact that they are also aimed at the elite
ruling body of the nation.

The argument that sanctions were really the only viable policy alternative that the United Nations had in trying to resolve the Rhodesian crisis raises some other points worth discussing. In addition to the effects on the Rhodesian economy, sanctions have achieved a number of more limited aims: they have denied outright victory to the Smith regime; they have kept the regime in diplomatic isolation; they have forced the regime to go on struggling for economic survival; they have internationalized the human rights issue; and they have sustained the unacceptability of the Rhodesian regime. In sum, sanctions have helped to rally most of the international community to the "cause" and have lent a measure of illegitimacy to the Smith regime and its policies.

The more limited objectives, however, have become less important in light of the general ineffectiveness of sanctions on the economy. One must, therefore, question the credibility of the United Nations as a peacemaker in world affairs in view of what has happened in Rhodesia. The need for conflict resolution is still very great. Werner Levi has commented that "the institutionalization of measures for the non-violent settlement of international conflicts has been called the central problem of international politics and interna-
tional law." There is still a large gap, however, between the need for conflict resolution and actual achievement. Cyrus Vance said in 1971, "The United Nations, despite twenty-five years of modest achievement, still has little capacity to shape a more orderly world...The political achievements have been sporadic and on the
whole unsatisfactory."

In the words of David Forsythe, the United Nations has used the techniques of mediation-conciliation, arbitration-adjudication, and enforcement-sanction in attempting to attain peaceful settlements to world conflict. Yet enforcement-sanction, the major concern in Part I, has failed in Rhodesia for lack of a consensus in support of sanctions measures.

Two other points are worth discussing. The first is the position of some that sub-organizations within the United Nations do not favor conciliation, but rather follow a practice of brow-beating target states into complying with their points of view. This strategy can be applied to the case of Rhodesia where the Third World countries used the Special Committee of Twenty-four and the General Assembly in their attempts to pressure Britain into using force to "decolonize Rhodesia." In fact, George Mudge has argued that possibly United Nations activities have contributed to the politicization of the racial question in Rhodesia, that the highly publicized condemnation of the Smith regime may have had a dysfunctional effect on domestic politics and actually contributed to more racial extremism. While it is likely that Smith would not have acted any differently in terms of implementing political change in Rhodesia, he still was able to use the actions of the United Nations as a means of rallying support for the Rhodesian Front. While the actions of the Third World nations on the issue of Rhodesia do depict an inevitable kind of brow-beating, at the same time, they have helped those nations to develop a political consciousness at a much faster rate.
The second point is that certain nations' perspectives of power sometimes cause them to bypass the United Nations in favor of national mediators. While it is premature to discuss this point in detail at this time as it will become an integral component of Part II, it is nevertheless worth mentioning. What it means is that nations -- usually world powers -- either for reasons of politics or self-interest, feel more comfortable about solving international problems on their own. They, therefore, go over the head of the United Nations in trying to end the dispute. This argument is especially appropriate in the Rhodesian case, where both Britain and the United States in the mid-1970's have, with the assistance of South Africa, attempted to resolve the Rhodesian crisis. The national priorities of individual states become more important than the efforts of the United Nations. Or, at the very least, these states feel that the United Nations is incapable of being the peacemaker.

In conclusion, United Nations sanctions against Rhodesia have had only limited success. The resolution of the Rhodesian conflict must be analyzed in terms of other dimensions, namely the impact of the guerrilla war and outside forces on the Smith regime. It must be emphasized that only in examining sanctions by themselves can it be argued that they are ineffective. In conjunction with an expanded guerrilla war and pressure from outside forces, economic sanctions are proving to be successful in helping to effect political change in Rhodesia. Coincidentally, Rhodesia began to feel the economic strain of sanctions in 1976 at the same time that the guerrilla war was escalated and that pressure began to be exerted by
South Africa on the Smith regime to find a political solution to the problem.

Finally, in light of the preceding evidence, United Nations economic sanctions alone will not be an effective policy tool in future conflicts as long as there are loopholes. After a comprehensive study of Rhodesian sanctions, one can only tend to agree with Forsythe when he states that

...economic sanctions entail such difficulties that they have not proven a clearly effective way to rectify impermissible behavior...military sanctions have not been tried through true collective security because of even greater problems -- that is greater costs and greater suffering. Inis Claude has noted a whole series of psychological and material problems impeding collective security through the U.N. Little on the horizon indicates that these problems will be overcome, and indeed Claude suggests that if they could be overcome a global consensus would support not just collective security but true world government. This insight demonstrates how far the U.N. is from effective enforcement...One is forced to reaffirm that UN peacemaking, narrowly defined, is insufficient for what ails the world.
NOTES FOR CHAPTER V

1. See Kapungu, op. cit., p. 123-126 for further explanation.

2. Note percentage drops indicated in Tables II and IV discussed earlier in the paper.


4. ibid.

5. ibid.

6. loc. cit., p. 568. See Table II.


8. ibid., citing United Nations Yearbook of National Account Statistics. See also "Rhodesia: The Last Frontier." The Economist CCXLIII (March 6, 1976), 75.

9. ibid.

10. Sutcliffe, op. cit., p. 420.

11. Leistner, op. cit., p. 76.


13. ibid.

14. ibid.


18. Leistner, op. cit., p. 76.


21. ibid.
22. loc. cit., p. 505.


24. ibid.


29. The case of Zambia clearly illustrated that the United Nations could have done a more effective job of devising assistance plans to help those states adversely affected by sanctions.


31. ibid.


34. loc. cit., p. 705. The Rand dollar, which is the currency of Rhodesia, was equal to U.S. $1.62 in 1976.

35. loc. cit., p. 711.

36. _____ "Rhodesia: Three Years of Squeeze." The Economist, CCLXIII (May 7, 1977), 86.

37. Moyana, op. cit., p. 514.

38. _____ "Rhodesia: Three Years of Squeeze," op. cit., p. 86.

39. ibid.

41. Windrich, "Road from Luanda," op. cit., p. 102.

42. ibid.


45. Quoted in Forsythe, David, "United Nations Peacemaking." *Academy of Political Science, Proceedings*, XXXII (1977), 206. Forsythe is Professor of Political Science at the University of Nebraska.

46. ibid.

47. loc. cit., p. 207.

48. loc. cit., p. 212.


50. ibid.

51. Forsythe, op. cit., p. 212.

52. loc. cit., p. 216-217.
PART II

TOWARD MAJORITY RULE
VI. FAILURE AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE

Africa in this decade is a testing ground of the world's conscience and vision. That blacks and whites live together in harmony and equality is a moral imperative of our time. Let us prove that these goals can be realized by human choice, that justice can command by the force of its rightness instead of by force of arms. These are the ideals that bind all the races of mankind. They are the mandate of decency and progress and peace. This drama will be played out in our lifetime, Our children will inherit either our success or our failure. The world watches with hope and we approach it with confidence. So let it be said that Black people and White people working together achieved on this continent -- which has suffered so much and seen so much injustice -- a new era of peace, well-being and human dignity.¹

These words, spoken by Dr. Henry Kissinger in Lusaka, Zambia, in April 1976, place the problem at hand in perspective. In the case of Rhodesia, the issue is not whether the human rights goal of black majority rule will be achieved, but when. The issue is more than a moral imperative, it is an inevitability. The question is whether or not black majority rule can be achieved peacefully, and, in addition, whether or not it will provide conditions under which blacks and whites can live together in equality and harmony.

The assumption, therefore, is that political change in the form of black majority rule will be achieved in Rhodesia. The thesis of Part I is that United Nations economic sanctions have not, and will not by themselves, cause political change in Rhodesia. What will cause political change, as examined in Part II, is one of two events: a peacefully-negotiated settlement or a dictated peace following the
conclusion of a violent civil war. While economic sanctions are a factor in the outcome of the Rhodesian crisis, the current guerrilla war in Rhodesia will provide the major impact leading to either solution to the problem. Assuming that majority rule is inevitable, the questions are: How long will it take for majority rule to be achieved, and who will wield political power in the name of the majority?

 Rhodesia has become increasingly dominated politically and economically by the guerrilla war. To understand why the nation has reached this stage of confrontation politics, it is necessary to provide a brief background of the events leading up to the present situation. This background information will indicate that there have been many unsuccessful attempts at achieving a negotiated peace in Rhodesia.

Formation of ZAPU and ZANU

To understand the effect of the war, one must examine the attitudes of black nationalists and the development of their opposition parties. It has already been mentioned that the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) were banned as opposition parties prior to UDI. Since that time, their military wings have operated either undercover in Rhodesia or from sanctuaries in neighboring Zambia, Botswana, and Mozambique. Their major goal is the military defeat of the Smith regime.

Up until 1976 the African nationalists were not formidable foes for the white minority regime in Rhodesia. Racked by internal
conflict, the African leadership was not able to offer an effec-
tively organized means of opposition to the Smith regime in its
quest for majority rule. The first attempts to initiate independence
for Rhodesia under majority rule began in 1960 with the formation of
the National Democratic Party (NDP) under the leadership of Joshua
Nkomo, Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole, and others. This party pressured
Britain into having a constitutional conference in 1961. When the
NDP did not achieve their demand for one man-one vote in the 1961
Constitution, it tried to force Britain into rescinding the constitu-
tion and was promptly banned as a political party. Nkomo and
Sithole regrouped and formed ZAPU to lobby the United Nations into
helping to bring about change in Rhodesia. Recognized in Rhodesia
as a threat to the white regime of Sir Edgar Whitehead, ZAPU was
banned in 1962, and its leadership detained. When the Smith regime
came to power in 1962, the African leadership was released from de-
tention. It was at that time that Sithole organized ZANU as a
splinter party because he felt that Nkomo had not fulfilled his prom-
ise to have a successful revolution in Rhodesia.

Because of the split in leadership and the lack of organization,
the African nationalists were not able to provide a united front to
the Smith regime, either at the time of UDI or in the years following.
Rather than competing with the Smith regime during the 1964-1970
period, they fought among themselves for political legitimacy. The
Zimbabwe revolution was devoid of ideology and revolutionary leadership. The cause of the guerrillas was hurt further by the fact that
both Nkomo and Sithole had to spend the years 1964 to 1974 in prison.
A turning point for the nationalists' cause came in 1971 with the establishment of the African National Council (ANC) by Bishop Abel Muzorewa to mobilize African opposition to the Home-Smith Agreement, a settlement for independence negotiated between British Foreign Minister, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, and Ian Smith. This agreement modified the 1969 Constitution to the point of conceding the principle of majority rule at an unspecified date in the future through the progressive addition of more African members of parliament to the Legislative Assembly. However, because of franchise qualifications -- based on education and income -- it was estimated that majority rule would not have been reached until 2035. In fact, Smith said, "... no European need harbour any anxiety about the security of his future in Rhodesia."

Although the terms for Rhodesian independence were thought by many to be no more than a token gesture to the first four British principles, the agreement did contain, in conformity with the fifth principle, provisions for a test of the agreement's acceptability "to the people of Rhodesia as a whole." A British Commission under the leadership of former High Court Judge, Lord Pearce, was sent to Rhodesia to determine whether or not the Home-Smith Agreement met the test of acceptability. Mass African opposition, developed by the African National Council, showed the Pearce Commission that the new constitution was unacceptable to the African population, and it was subsequently withdrawn by the British government. Although the
African National Council was recognized as a "legal" organization in continued negotiations with Smith, it met with harassment, and its leaders were often detained. Negotiations between ANC and Smith finally broke down in June 1974, precipitating the African National Council to reverse itself and support a policy of armed struggle as the only means to achieve African majority rule.

Lusaka Agreement

The African leadership and the Rhodesian government again tried to reach a settlement in December 1974 in Lusaka, Zambia. These meetings were prompted by the collapse of the Portuguese empire in Africa and the possibility that the guerrilla war in Rhodesia would spread beyond its borders and engulf all of southern Africa. The talks were held between Rhodesia, South Africa (which had troops in Rhodesia), and Zambia, Tanzania, and Botswana, which supported the nationalist movement. While the political viewpoints of Rhodesia's three black neighbors varied widely with those beliefs held by Rhodesia and South Africa, all of the nations had a direct interest in keeping the war from spreading.

The diplomatic effort was kept secret until December when Nkomo and Sithole were released from prison and agreed to unite ZAPU and ZANU under the leadership of Muzorewa and the ANC. Further prisoner releases, normal political activity, and a cease-fire were intended as part of the basis for a negotiated settlement. In addition, South Africa began to withdraw its military forces from Rhodesia as part of the agreement. The leaders of the ANC and the
Smith regime were finally brought together under the sponsorship of President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia and Prime Minister John Vorster of South Africa in the historic Victoria Falls talks in August 1975. The talks failed, however, and the terms of the Lusaka Agreement were never met. There was not a ceasefire, as militant members of ZAPU and ZANU continued to fight. Political detainees were not released. Instead, more African nationalists were arrested. Thus, despite the pressure of Zambia on the guerrillas and South Africa on Rhodesia, the settlement was never realized. More than anything, the failure of the Victoria Falls talks pointed out two important problems in the resolution of the Rhodesian crisis: (1) the deep split within the African leadership and (2) the intransigence of the Rhodesian leadership and its unwillingness to accept the role that South Africa wanted it to play. Although the Lusaka Agreement and the subsequent talks at Victoria Falls failed to produce a settlement to the Rhodesian problem, they were a significant prelude to renewed involvement by Britain and the initial involvement by the United States in the crisis.

British Proposals

Influenced by the presence of Cuban forces in Angola and the fact that the African front-line states (Zambia, Botswana, Tanzania, Angola, and newly independent Mozambique) were gearing up to support the guerrillas by providing sanctuaries from which they could mount raids against Rhodesia, British Foreign Minister James Callaghan attempted to play a greater role in negotiations. The British role
to that point had been to remain an interested, but detached, party. Although committed to a negotiated settlement through the use of a constitutional convention, the British had not done so because the major condition for majority rule had not been met -- renunciation of UDI and the acceptance of majority rule prior to independence. However, the solution which Callaghan proposed -- transition to African majority rule over an 18 month to two year period, no independence before majority rule, and the negotiation of a new constitution implementing majority rule -- was essentially the same proposal that the African National Council had advocated earlier and that had been rejected by the Smith government. What is important is that Callaghan, in announcing his solution to Parliament on March 22, 1976, admitted that the British government was in no position to impose such a solution. Instead, Britain was trying to put forth proposals for others to consider. If an agreement could be worked out, Britain in turn would provide financial and economic assistance to ensure a background in which both blacks and whites could live in harmony in Rhodesia. The problem was that Callaghan's proposals were rejected by Ian Smith as "no less extreme than those of the ANC."

Diplomatic Efforts of Henry Kissinger

During his first official state visit to black Africa, United States Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, appeared to have been influenced by the successful Russo-Cuban intervention in Angola, leading the United States to emphasize a commitment to black majority rule in southern Africa. In April 1976, Kissinger announced in
Lusaka, Zambia, that the United States desired a rapid, just, and African solution to the issue of Rhodesia. Kissinger's involvement turned into a "shuttle diplomacy" as he visited the African front-line states and South Africa prior to holding talks with Ian Smith. Those talks culminated in a Smith-Kissinger Agreement on five principles: (1) majority rule within two years; (2) a multi-racial interim government including a Council of State to be composed of an equal number of whites and blacks with a white chairman; (3) a Council of Ministers with a black majority, but with the Ministries of Law and Order (security) and Defense to be kept in white hands until independence; (4) an international trust fund to assist Rhodesia in its transitional efforts; and (5) the protection of the political and property rights of the white minority. In essence, the Kissinger plan called for majority rule, but also included the protection of minority rights so that whites as well as blacks would have a secure future in Zimbabwe.

While the Kissinger-Smith Agreement seemed at first to be a major breakthrough in the Rhodesian crisis, it ultimately failed to achieve its objectives. While the proposals were accepted by Smith in a national broadcast on September 25, 1976, they were denounced by the front-line African presidents the next day as "tantamount to legalizing the colonialist and racist structures of power." In their view and the view of the African nationalist guerrillas of Rhodesia who also criticized the plan, any details relating to transitional government should be decided by a conference of the "legitimate representatives of the people of Zimbabwe." According
to Colin Legum, a distinguished expert on southern African affairs, Associate Editor of The Observer (London) and Editor of the Africa Contemporary Record, Kissinger's subtle diplomacy led (or perhaps misled) Smith to believe much more than was actually conveyed in the essential, yet ambiguously-worded, talks of September 21. While Kissinger felt that the five principles were negotiable, Smith maintained that they were not. In addition, officials of the United States acknowledged that details of the settlement proposals were not accepted by the front-line presidents in advance of their submission to Smith. Apparently, the actual plan was Kissinger's "own refinements of terms for a peaceful settlement."

The Kissinger proposals did, however, result in a Geneva Conference in October-November 1976, chaired by Britain. But Smith's acceptance of the Kissinger plan as a non-negotiable package, and the African nationalists' and front-line states' desires for modification, led to irreconcilable differences. The conference broke down without any accord on the formation of a transitional government.

The Owen-Young Proposal

Prior to 1978 one last attempt was made to resolve the Rhodesian crisis at the negotiating table. Since both the Carter administration in the United States and the Callaghan administration in Britain are committed to majority rule in Rhodesia, they attempted to influence in the spring of 1977 Rhodesian politics by sending United Nations Ambassador Andrew Young and British Foreign Minister
David Owen to southern Africa. The outcome of the visits was a British proposal which asked the United States to aid Britain in resolving the Rhodesian crisis. The plan went further than the Kissinger proposal and was more specific about how future events would be handled in Rhodesia. The plan incorporated the following elements: 19 (1) the holding of a constitutional conference to define the democratic process for a transfer of power to majority rule and to provide for an independent Zimbabwe nation; (2) the surrender of power by the Smith regime to a British transitional government; (3) the presence of a United Nations peacekeeping force during the transitional phase to help guarantee a ceasefire; (4) the cessation of United Nations sanctions; (5) the establishment of a development fund through the World Bank to help with the economics of the transitional stage; (6) the institution of black majority rule, but also protection of white minority rights; (7) the replacement of the existing armed forces by a new Zimbabwean army after the transition phase; and (8) the invocation of an amnesty clause preventing punitive actions arising out of the political situation since UDI.

For a variety of reasons, there was no agreement on the major issues. While Muzorewa and Sithole both endorsed the proposal, they needed to be satisfied that the Smith regime was actually willing to relinquish power. Nkomo and Mugabe, on the other hand, wanted the conference to transfer complete and effective power to the majority. Since they felt that the Patriotic Front represented the legitimate interests of the Rhodesian blacks, their feeling was that the conference should be between their organization and the British. 21
While Muzorewa and Sithole favored the idea of a United Nations peacekeeping force, both Smith and the Patriotic Front rejected it, the latter because of memories of what happened in the Congo.22

A major controversy arose during discussions on the security arrangements during the transitional phase. The guerrillas would not accept the idea of phasing the Smith army into a Zimbabwean army. Muzorewa did not want guerrillas in his army, and Smith rejected a plan to replace his army with one made up mostly of guerrillas.23 He supported the Kissinger proposal which insured white control over the army.

There was obviously no agreement on the crucial issues. The three groups contesting for control of the government -- the Patriotic Front, the Smith regime, and the Muzorewa-Sithole supporters -- could not resolve their differences. Because of this pattern of disagreement, a negotiated settlement, based on majority rule and acceptable to all of the factions involved, was not produced during the 1962-1977 time period. The result was an escalating civil war between the guerrilla forces of the Patriotic Front and the Smith regime, with the moderate nationalist leaders caught in between.
NOTES FOR CHAPTER VI


5. The problem was that the organization included supporters of the banned ZAPU and ZANU nationalist parties.


8. loc. cit., Cols. 29-45.


14. ibid.

16. ibid.


18. ibid.


20. For a further discussion see Matatu, Godwin, "Zimbabwe -- the War Intensifies." Africa, LXVI (February 1977), 39-42.


23. ibid.
VII. THE GUERRILLA WAR: THE PRIMARY ACTORS

Escalation of the War

Despite the fact that the Zimbabwe nationalist government was ineffective and unorganized during the 1964-1970 period, it is evident that it has grown in strength in the 1970's. While the guerrilla war, initiated by African nationalists, has not had complete success in forcing Ian Smith to accept majority rule, including ZAPU and ZANU participation in the formation of a new government, it has had relative success in forcing Rhodesia to act in a state of siege. The guerrilla war has escalated for a number of reasons: the failure of political negotiations to achieve black majority rule left a military solution as the only alternative to ending the Rhodesian conflict; African front-line state backing, especially from Zambia and Mozambique, has provided Rhodesian guerrillas with sanctuaries from which to operate their attacks on the Smith government and the white population of Rhodesia; and the guerrillas have developed a kind of military infrastructure as well as a political ideology and are much better trained in the techniques of fighting.

Although the escalation of the guerrilla war began to occur in 1973, especially along the Zambian border, it wasn't until 1976 that the African nationalist movement established itself as a formidable foe of the Smith regime. Despite political divisions within the movement, by 1977 all factions were united on two major issues: (1) their demand for immediate independence under majority rule, with
no transitional agreement that would leave the sources of power (police, military, defense) in the hands of the white minority; and (2) their commitment to armed struggle as the only way to achieve majority rule as long as negotiations continued to fail.

In addition to developing their own commitment to armed struggle, the nationalist guerrillas are supported by the African frontline states of Botswana, Zambia, Angola, Tanzania, and Mozambique. President Kaunda of Zambia, once an advocate of non-violence, represented the common feelings of the group when he indicated that there would be no "peaceful settlement" of the Rhodesian conflict because of the intransigence of the Smith regime. With Zambian sanctuaries open to Joshua Nkomo's ZAPU forces and with the Marxist government of Mozambique supporting the ZANU forces of Robert Mugabe, Rhodesia is faced with a major security problem. It has become extremely difficult for the nation's security forces to patrol the borders of Botswana, Zambia, and Mozambique to prevent the infiltration of the countryside by guerrilla forces.

Aims of the Movement

The African nationalist guerrillas have also developed a disciplined theoretical framework for revolution. According to Herbert Chitepo, assassinated ZANU leader,

The strategical aim...is to attenuate the enemy forces by causing their deployment over the entire country. The subsequent mobilization of a large number of civilians from industry, business, and agriculture would cause serious economic problems. This would have a psychologically
devastating effect on the morale of the whites, most of whom had come to Zimbabwe, lured by the prospect of the easy, privileged life promised by the regime.

There is a great deal of evidence which indicates that to some degree the guerrilla movement has achieved these objectives. Aside from the fact that the war zone has increased dramatically as a result of the support for the guerrillas by the FRELIMO government in Mozambique, the war has also become a drain on Rhodesian society. Defense expenditures for 1976-1977 are estimated at 25% to 40% of the national budget. This amounts to $R 80.4-$R 84.4 million (U.S. $125-$130 million), a 40% increase over the 1975-1976 period and almost a 300% increase since the fighting began in 1972. At the end of January 1977, the government instituted a military call-up rule affecting men between the ages of 38 and 50. While this decision reflected the growing escalation of the war, it also caused concern in the business community for its effect on the Rhodesian economy. Because the war has taken skilled and professional people from the business sector, it is feared that productivity will drop off substantially. This now means that national service for high school and college graduates is twelve to eighteen months, and that men between 25 and 38 years of age are liable for compulsory military training for at least 84 days. In addition, those men between 38 and 50 are eligible for lighter training and shorter tours. The impact of these military tours on the Rhodesian economy is substantial for another reason as well. When employees of the private sector are on tour or in training, they still receive their normal wages in addition to those paid
by the Ministry of Defense. 8

The guerrilla war has also increased white emigration. Reports indicate that Rhodesia registered a net loss of 2280 people for the first six months of 1976 (compared to a gain of 1600 in 1975 for the same period) 9 and 7000 for the year. 10 The nation suffered a net outflow for the first three months of 1977 of 3600 people. 11 This emigration presents Rhodesia with a serious problem because most of the people leaving are skilled workers.

One other factor, which could become a potential problem for the white minority, is the role of the black members of the army and military police. They provide two-thirds of the active manpower and 25% of the reserves. 12 While at the moment they seem to be loyal to the Smith regime, the question remains as to whether the blacks in the armed forces will continue to maintain their allegiance. If they don't, the consequences would be disastrous for the white minority government.

Nationalist Leadership

There is no doubt that the guerrilla war is taking its toll on Rhodesian society. While negotiations originally involved the British and Rhodesian governments, today the black nationalists and the Smith regime are the primary actors in the resolution of the conflict. Yet factors such as the lack of a consensus among black leaders, feelings of distrust among political and military parties, and intertribal rivalry, which have hampered meaningful negotiations between the Smith government and the African nationalists in the past,
continue to plague attempts at a solution today.

An understanding of the internal politics of the guerrilla movement is essential if one is to assess the outcome of the war effort and the subsequent struggle for power among the nationalist guerrilla leadership. What is crucial is that the four major African nationalist leaders -- Bishop Muzorewa (ANC), Rev. Sithole (formerly ZANU), Joshua Nkomo (ZAPU), and Robert Mugabe (ZANU and ZIPA) -- have not been able to consistently resolve their political differences. The Zimbabwe nationalist movement has been complicated further by the fact that the leaders have two constituencies -- their electorate at home and their military cadres in the front-line states. It has been extremely difficult for them to mold the political, military, and ideological beliefs of each constituency into a national movement.

Dissatisfaction within the ranks of the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union and with the leadership of Joshua Nkomo caused a split in 1963 and resulted in the formation of the Zimbabwe African National Union. Division at that time followed tribal lines with the Ndebele supporting ZAPU and the Shona, ZANU.

The ethnic factor resulted in another split in 1971 when the Zezeru, who had lost faith in both ZAPU and ZANU, defected to form the Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe (FROLIZI). The division was temporarily solidified in 1974 when the African National Council (ANC) combined ZAPU, ZANU, and FROLIZI under the leadership of a "neutral" political figure, Bishop Muzorewa. Yet this unity was short-lived when Muzorewa expelled Nkomo and his ZAPU supporters from the ANC in the fall of 1975. Sithole later broke with
Muzorewa, leaving himself without a supporting organization, because Robert Mugabe had deposed him as head of ZANU. Sithole's military wing of ZANU elected to join the Zimbabwe Independence People's Army (ZIPA), and his internal supporters chose to stay with Muzorewa's United ANC. Despite the endorsement of the African front-line states, the ANC leadership was never able to control the military camps in Zambia and Mozambique. When talks between Smith and Nkomo failed in March 1976, and when Nkomo and Muzorewa failed to form a political alliance in early October 1976, Nkomo and Mugabe formed the Patriotic Front shortly thereafter.

The purpose of the Patriotic Front was to consolidate the allegiances of ZAPU, of ZANU, and indirectly through Mugabe, of ZIPA, thereby eliminating the danger of conflict between the three rival armies and providing a united front to the Smith regime at the Geneva talks in December. While Legum terms this alliance a "marriage of convenience," it dealt a major blow to the ANC when it received the support of the front-line presidents in November 1976. In January 1977, the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African States (OAU) also decided to recognize the Patriotic Front, thereby robbing Muzorewa of the outside support he so desperately needed.

It is obvious that by 1977, the African nationalist movement in Rhodesia still had a fractured leadership. The dilemma was that while Muzorewa and the United ANC had the widest political backing in Rhodesia, they did not have the military backing of ZAPU, ZANU, and ZIPA. In addition, it was rejected by the African front-line
states and ignored by the British and the United States, which
demanded a constitutional conference with all groups participating. 18

Various theories have tried to account for the occurrence of
factional fighting between the nationalist groups. These explana-
tions view the clashes in terms of tribal, ideological, or personal-
ity differences, by which groups may be distinguished. 19 ZAPU and
ZANU, for example, have been criticized for expending most of their
energies fighting among themselves rather than against the Smith
regime. This in-fighting has been blamed on the fact that ZAPU is
comprised mostly of Ndebelian tribesmen and ZANU of Shona tribesmen.
Most commentators believe, however, that tribal differences take a
secondary place in the explanation of events when political, ideolog-
ical, or personality differences can be found. 20

Ideology might be a cause of conflict between the various
nationalist groups. The Soviet Union, for example, has supported and
helped train ZAPU recruits, while Red China has supported and helped
train ZANU recruits. While there have been differences in policy
and strategy between ZAPU and ZANU, they have, more noticeably, how-
ever, shared similar nationalist goals. 21

The most widely-held theory on conflict within the nationalist
movement has drawn on personality differences, style of leadership,
and other psychological factors to explain inter-group rivalries.
The thought here is that people like Muzorewa, Sithole, Nkomo, and
Mugabe are involved in the political struggle for power in a future
Zimbabwean nation. Although this aspect will be discussed later in
this chapter, the major confrontation today is between the Patriot
Front, which espouses armed struggle as the only strategy to bring down the Smith regime, and an alliance between Muzorewa and Sithole, who together have formed a "moderate front" and have signed an "internal agreement" with Smith for the transfer of power to black majority rule on December 31, 1978. This situation has added a new dimension to nationalist politics in that the nationalist leaders are no longer opposing Smith as a group because two of them have now sided with the "hated" Rhodesian leader.

Rivalry, however, still exists within the Patriotic Front. Mugabe has always opposed Nkomo's leadership. He assisted Sithole, for example, to set up ZANU as a rival to ZAPU. His alliance with Nkomo in the Patriotic Front is merely tactical. Mugabe\textsuperscript{22} explained that:

\begin{quote}
It is possible to enter into an agreement with your political opponents to fight your enemy; but it is never possible to ally yourself with the enemy to fight your political opponents.
\end{quote}

The implication is clear. Mugabe's alliance with Nkomo is necessary to bring about the downfall of Smith. At the same time, however, once that objective is achieved, he will feel free to engage in a struggle for political power with Nkomo.\textsuperscript{23}

As the youngest (51) of the nationalist leaders, Mugabe is also considered the most militant. His support in the ranks of ZIPA indicates his ability to articulate the younger guerrillas' belief in armed struggle as the only means to bringing an end to the Smith regime. His Marxist beliefs, however, have not allowed him to build a constituency within Rhodesia. Yet Mugabe, and the fact that he is the "political spokesman" for ZIPA, present a serious threat to
Nkomo's dream of heading a new Zimbabwe state.

Joshua Nkomo, on the other hand, represents a more moderate voice in the Patriotic Front. More conciliatory than Mugabe, he is also more of a politician, having tried in the past to negotiate rather than fight to bring majority rule to Rhodesia. He too, however, committed himself to the armed struggle in 1976 after talks with Smith broke down. What is important is that Nkomo commands more political respect in Rhodesia than Mugabe. Despite his Russian patronage, Nkomo is the Rhodesian leader whom British, American, and Rhodesian businessmen would like to see win -- unless it is Muzorewa.24

Ndabaningi Sithole will not be discussed in detail because after he was deposed as leader of ZANU, he never regained his status as a formidable nationalist leader. Bishop Muzorewa, as the political figure with the most popular appeal in Rhodesia, is a formidable foe for both Nkomo and Mugabe, especially since he became part of Smith's "internal agreement." His major problem has been his inability to gain the allegiance of the guerrilla groups ZAPU, ZANU, and ZIPA. In addition, he has not been able to gain the support of the African front-line states or the British and American governments in his attempts to bring majority rule to Rhodesia through Smith's internal agreement.

The four nationalist personalities represent an interesting amalgamation of leadership qualities. Each has been involved in the nationalist movement since the early 1960's. Each is desirous of leading a new Zimbabwe nation based on majority rule. Yet each, for whatever reason -- the desire for political power, differing ideology,
or tribal influence -- has not been able to subordinate his personal position for the good of the nationalist movement. Or perhaps, it has not been possible for the leaders to balance political and military interests to gain a united nationalist movement. At any rate, as political leaders, Nkomo, Sithole and Muzorewa are still distrusted by ZIPA, which has emerged as a major factor in the guerrilla war.

Zimbabwe Independence People's Army

The Zimbabwe Independence People's Army (ZIPA) was formerly organized in November 1975 to merge the military wings of ZAPU and ZANU and especially to heal the quarrels within ZANU itself. Up until that time, more guerrillas had been engaged in fighting rival guerrilla factions than had been engaged in fighting the common enemy. Pressure to unify the Zimbabweans came from the front-line presidents, mainly from Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and Samora Machel of Mozambique, especially since the military training in the camps is directed by the Chinese, Tanzanians, and Mozambicans. According to Dzinashe Machingura, Political Commissar in ZIPA, the organization was formed

for the purpose of rescuing the Zimbabwe liberation struggle from the chaotic situation that had been created by the ANC leadership. It is an armed body of men, which was formed for the purpose of resuming the armed struggle, intensifying the armed struggle, and carrying it to its logical conclusion...

In a further explanation of who is considered the enemy by ZIPA, Machingura says
Our society is essentially a colonial society and as such we have to wage a national democratic revolution to overthrow national oppression... those who are opposed to the liberation and independence of the Zimbabwean people are our enemies. These comprise the Smith racist regime, and the imperialist powers that back it, puppet Africans serving the Smith regime, and all those who are opposed to the independence of the Zimbabwean people...

While ZIPA has not had much success combining ZAPU and ZANU cadres in the same training camps, the unified structure of the military command has remained intact. What is important is that the organization opposes Sithole and Muzorewa and is a major factor in the continuation of the guerrilla war. At this point in time, ZIPA has the most respect for Robert Mugabe.

In sum, despite the organizational problems experienced by the nationalist movement, since 1976 it has presented a formidable opposition to the Smith regime, until, that is, Muzorewa and Sithole decided to join forces with the Smith government. The Patriotic Front and ZIPA are now the only organizations which advocate, and continue to pursue, the armed struggle.

Strength of Liberation Forces

While it is difficult to find a consensus of opinion as to the real strength of the guerrilla forces, it is still worth looking at estimates. They indicate that between 12,000 (Rhodesian estimate) and 20,000 (African estimate) men are involved in the guerrilla movement. It is interesting to note that probably for political and strategic reasons, the Rhodesian estimate is at the low end of the
spectrum and the African estimate is at the high end. South African intelligence sources estimate the guerrillas' strength at 15,000 men, a figure in between the Rhodesian and African amounts. In January 1977 Ted Sutton-Pryce, Deputy Minister in the Rhodesian Executive Office, broke down the Rhodesian estimate this way: 1500 "terrorists" operating in Rhodesia under the ZIPA banner; 2000 reinforcements in Mozambique with another 2000 in training or awaiting it; 4000 in Tanzania; and 100 operating in Rhodesia under the ZIPRA banner (ZIPA's counterpart in ZAPU) with approximately 2000 more backing them up in Zambia. The total Rhodesian figures seem underestimated, primarily those concerning ZAPU forces operating in Botswana and Zambia. South African estimates indicate there are more guerrillas being trained in Zambia and more operating within the country. Other sources indicate that Nkomo's ZAPU forces have as many as 8000 men. At any rate, this is a sizable military force with which the Rhodesians have to contend.

Liberation forces have mounted attacks in almost every part of the country. While Rhodesian forces still control the cities and most of the countryside, guerrillas have "semi-liberated" large sections of the nation, especially along the Zambian, Botswanan, and Mozambican borders. Attacks on white civilians appear to be part of a strategy aimed at lowering the morale of the minority population. These attacks, as well as those against economic and transportation targets, have put a great deal of pressure on Rhodesian security forces.
Rhodesian Resistance

Despite escalating guerrilla activities, the Rhodesian army and police have done an effective job of instituting counter-insurgency measures. Guerrilla strategies of disrupting rural government, of interfering with the transportation of goods, and of trying to gain the allegiance of the local population have been countered by a Rhodesian "protected village" program. This plan, started in 1973 and designed to cut the guerrillas off from the Rhodesian population, has forced 300,000 Africans to live in communities that are protected by Rhodesian security forces. In addition, the Rhodesian army has taken its case to the classroom. By instituting psychological actions based on counter-insurgency techniques developed in Malaysia and Vietnam, the government is trying to demoralize the guerrillas by diminishing support for them among the country's black population. This technique has been used especially along Botswana's border, where guerrillas have been recruiting Rhodesian students.

Although the active army of Rhodesia is relatively small -- 7900 men including 2400 conscripts -- it is a highly efficient fighting force. There is a high degree of professionalism and motivation since the soldiers feel they are defending their homes. Rhodesian armed forces are not hindered by outmoded conventional warfare methods. They are experts in the use of guerrilla and counter-guerrilla tactics including the use of bush fighting, flexible warfare, and the elements of stealth and surprise. The Rhodesians depend on smaller tracker units rather than massive conventional warfare
techniques to resist the nationalist guerrillas. In addition, the army is backed by an effective air force and a military police made up of 8000 active men and 35,000 reservists. 40

Despite the fact that the Rhodesian armed and security forces provide the nation with an effective defensive system, it is obvious that the military situation will get worse. There are a number of probable reasons, including: the expansion of the war zones; aid from the front-line states; increasing numbers of guerrilla recruits; and training assistance from the Russians and the Chinese. While the Smith regime could put a total of 50,000 security forces in the field against the guerrillas, by using every able-bodied white Rhodesian and black volunteer, this situation would place a heavier burden on an already beleaguered Rhodesian economy.

Ian Smith's Internal Solution

Besides the Rhodesian guerrilla groups and the black moderate nationalists, the other primary actor in the Rhodesian drama is Prime Minister Ian Smith. Smith shocked the world in November 1977, when he announced a drastic change in his domestic policy and accepted the concept of one man-one vote for the black population in preparation for majority rule, as long as black moderate leaders accepted the principle that white rights would be protected. 41 This was a far cry from the Smith who had said after the failure of the Victoria Falls talks in August 1975, "We have never had a policy in Rhodesia to hand our country over to any black majority government and as far as I am concerned we never will." 42
Smith's aim in his 1977 initiative was to invite black moderates into a multiracial government and rewrite a new constitution which would protect white rights and allow them a major say in the operation of a new government. Referred to as his "internal solution," the plan would actually involve a unilateral implementation of the Kissinger proposals. This strategy was aimed at collaborating with moderate black leaders -- Muzorewa, Sithole, and Chief Jeremiah Chirau, the leader of the Zimbabwe United People's Organization (ZUPO) -- in an effort to win international legitimacy as well as external support to fight the guerrillas. The "internal solution" became a reality on March 3, 1978, when the agreement was signed by the four leaders.

The accord contains three major agreements worked out in negotiations:

1. It grants majority rule to the African population by enfranchising all citizens over 18 years of age who will elect officials on the basis of one man-one vote. These officials will constitute the first Zimbabwe government, with 72 of the 100 seats in the legislative assembly reserved for blacks and the remaining 28 for whites. Twenty of the seats reserved for whites will be elected on the basis of a preferential voting system (only whites will vote), while the remaining eight will be elected on the general franchise (multiracial electorate) from 16 candidates nominated by the present Rhodesian Parliament. The 28 seats reserved for whites will be retained for ten years or the life of two parliaments, whichever is longer. Since major constitutional
changes can only be made by a vote of 78 members of Parliament, this situation will give the whites a veto power for at least ten years.

2. It involves a transitional government, which will lead the country to independence. This government's major tasks include establishing a ceasefire in the guerrilla war, integrating guerrilla forces into the existing Rhodesian forces, and providing aid to those affected by the war. The transitional government will comprise two bodies: an Executive Council and a Council of Ministers. The former organization will include the four leaders who signed the accord, with the chairmanship of the committee rotating among its membership. All decisions must be unanimous. The Council of Ministers will be made up of equal members of white and black officials and will be responsible for the day-to-day affairs of the country. The chairmanship of this body will alternate between a black and white minister. In addition, the present Rhodesian government will continue to function, but will only assemble at the request of the Executive Council. Its major function will be to enact legislation formulated by the Council, concerning the process of transition.

3. The interim government will provide for the release of political detainees and will review cases of political prisoners. It will also supervise electoral procedures and try to ensure the existence of an atmosphere that is conducive to free political activity and the holding of fair elections. Another clause will provide for an independent judiciary and an independent public service
board that will control appointments, promotions, and discharges from the 45,000-member civil service, which currently is also all white above the clerical level. The following safeguards will also be provided for whites: the prevention of the deprivation of property without adequate compensation and the guarantee of government pensions which can be sent out of the country if people wish to emigrate.

According to the signatories, the constitutional accord should lead Rhodesia to black majority rule by December 31, 1978, the date for the changeover to the transitional government. If the accord is carried out, it could mark the end of 88 years of white minority rule in Rhodesia.

While Smith has indicated that the vast majority of the black as well as the white population of Rhodesia supported the "internal solution," it is by no means certain that it will succeed. The accord has not won the support of the Patriotic Front, the African front-line states, Britain, the United States, or the United Nations. Joshua Nkomo responded in Lusaka by saying:

That these black men in Salisbury should have been parties to such an agreement must rank as the greatest sellout in history...What Smith has conceded is not majority rule, but one-man, one-vote for the election of 72 powerless seats in parliament and 72 dummies with no power...We are not giving our lives for a constitution that is going to entrench the position of the black man and the position of the white man...

Robert Mugabe's reaction was equally critical:

The agreement guarantees that white settlers will remain in possession of our people's stolen land. The judiciary presently comprised of racist and
genocidal judges will be preserved (and) the public service will remain all white for the foreseeable future.

The Patriotic Front vowed to escalate the guerrilla fighting because its leaders feel that the agreement does not truly establish majority rule in Rhodesia. Most importantly, since they claim to be the legitimate representatives of the people of Zimbabwe, Nkomo and Mugabe want a major role in any settlement which will result in the nation's transition to majority rule. Besides indicating that they would escalate the war against the Smith regime, the two leaders devised a diplomatic strategy to deny external support for the accord.

First, they traveled to the United Nations to speak to a special session of the Security Council on Zimbabwe. With the support of the Afro-Asian bloc in the United Nations, they secured the passage of Security Council Resolution 423 on March 14, 1978, declaring "illegal and unacceptable any internal settlement under the auspices of the illegal (Rhodesian) regime and calling upon all states not to accord recognition to such a settlement."48 This was a major victory for the Patriotic Front since it denied United Nations recognition for the new agreement and the subsequent lifting of economic sanctions, a primary objective of the Smith regime.

Second, the leaders wanted to prevent endorsement of the accord by the British. The initial reaction of the British was a "qualified support" by Foreign Minister David Owen and a warning to the Patriotic Front not to wreck a settlement that had the support of the Rhodesian people.49 In fact, it was reported in the New York Times that the British were ready to abandon the Anglo-American plan
and support the internal agreement.50

The United States, on the other hand, through United Nations Ambassador Andrew Young, warned that the Smith agreement could lead to a "black-on-black civil war."51 Young went so far as to draw a parallel with the situation in Palestine: "What are they (the British) going to do -- run out and leave us with 30 years of trouble the way they did in 1948."52 After patching up their differences, the United States and Britain refused to support a Rhodesian settlement that did not include participation by the Patriotic Front. Instead, Owen and United States Secretary of State Cyrus Vance met with Nkomo and Mugabe and also with the signatories of the Rhodesian accord, in hopes of preparing a peace conference that would include all of the interest groups. Such a conference, however, did not materialize. Both groups -- the Patriotic Front and the signatories of the Smith agreement -- actually opposed the meeting. The Patriotic Front rejected the meeting on the grounds that an enlarged conference would add a degree of legitimacy to the internal settlement. The signatories of the accord rejected talks outside the framework of their agreement. The Owen-Vance talks were important, however, in establishing two arguments: (1) that an accommodation between the Smith regime, the black moderates, and the Patriotic Front is necessary to end the fighting and, as will be discussed later, from averting an expanded war with Soviet and Cuban involvement; and (2) that international presence would be desirable to legitimize elections in the eyes of the world.
In addition to rejection by the Patriotic Front, the United Nations, Britain, and the United States, the internal agreement was condemned by the African front-line states in a communique issued at the end of their summit conference in Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, in late March. They vowed "total support" for the black guerrillas and called for an "intensification of the armed struggle."

Analysis of Smith Agreement

Perhaps the most interesting element concerning the internal solution to the issue of majority rule is that it brings together three people -- Smith, Muzorewa, and Sithole -- who have been political enemies for years. Sithole, for example, spent six years in prison (1968-1974) for plotting to assassinate Smith, and was, at one time, regarded as the foremost leader of the Zimbabwe militants. Muzorewa has always been an ardent foe of Smith. And Smith has declared that he did not want to see majority rule "in my lifetime or in that of my children." Why then would these three leaders -- Chirau is omitted because he is recognized as a collaborator of the Smith regime -- form an alliance?

It is difficult for an objective observer to conclude that Smith had a change of heart, especially in light of his past actions and statements about majority rule. The internal solution, however, is the only viable alternative that Smith has if he wants to continue a situation in which he and the Rhodesian Front have had great political power. It is obvious that UDI is failing and would fail more rapidly if he did not gain the backing of the black moderates. By omitting
the Patriotic Front from political participation, Smith will, in effect, bring about a change to a new government that is "moderate" by black standards and, therefore, more desirable to the Rhodesian white population. This is reinforced by the items agreed to in the settlement relating to protection of white rights. Because of the whites' ability to block legislation for ten years, the internal solution grants majority rule without effectively granting majority power. From a political standpoint, therefore, Smith and the Rhodesian Front, as well as the entire white population, would benefit greatly, at least in the short run.

Muzorewa and Sithole will also benefit from an internal settlement. Since Muzorewa is considered the most popular black leader in Rhodesia, he stands to gain the most politically. Because of his fear of the Patriotic Front, he is obviously more interested in collaborating with Smith than he is with either Nkomo or Mugabe. His distrust of Nkomo and Mugabe was enhanced by the isolation he felt at the Geneva talks in 1976. Sithole, on the other hand, has a great deal to gain, especially since he has lost favor with the ZANU forces who used to support him.

Nkomo and Mugabe have nothing to gain politically by accepting the internal agreement. Because of their distrust for Smith, neither one would accept the internal agreement. Nkomo, on the other hand, has more to gain if a settlement is reached, which includes active participation by the Patriotic Front, primarily because he has more political clout in Rhodesia than Mugabe. If the ultimate solution to the war is a military one, however, Robert Mugabe, as the most
popular leader among the militant factions, will have a political edge. Because Mugabe does not have the political base of either Muzorewa or Nkomo, violent overthrow and an authoritarian type of government would serve his political aims. Peaceful, free elections would benefit either Nkomo or Muzorewa.

Although the internal solution would accomplish Smith's goal of excluding the Patriotic Front from a political settlement, it will, if implemented, probably have the reverse effect and deepen the split between the moderates and the guerrillas, thus resulting in an expanded civil war. According to Legum, while the Salisbury agreement marks the end of white rule, what remains may be more bloody than anything that has happened before. His view is that if the United States and Britain had given in to pressures to support the accord, they might have been responsible for creating a turmoil similar to what happened in the Horn of Africa. What he is saying is that the internal agreement does not provide conditions that are necessary for a durable peace. The following is a synthesis of his reasons why.

There are three prerequisites for having a durable peace: the ending of the violent struggle; the holding of free elections before independence to enable all Rhodesians, white and black, to select their leaders; and the cessation of international sanctions.

First, the armed struggle can only be ended if the Patriotic Front agrees to the settlement. Since the Salisbury agreement did not include the Patriotic Front, the fighting will -- in fact, has -- continued. Second, as long as the fighting continues, it will be
impossible to hold free elections. Even if they were held, they would lack validity. As long as guerrilla leaders claiming to represent a considerable part of the black electorate are excluded from elections, the principle of majority rule is vitiated. Third, there is no way of rescuing the Rhodesian economy unless sanctions are called off. Only the Security Council can lift sanctions, and that body is unlikely to do so as long as the Patriotic Front is excluded. Therefore, none of the three prerequisites can be achieved unless the Patriotic Front is included.

Whether one agrees with the ideas of Legum or not, they have great appeal. The Rhodesian problem is one of power, and its outcome hinges on whether or not the Smith government and the black moderates can make the internal solution work. If they are only willing to accept majority rule under their conditions and are not willing to include the Patriotic Front, one thing is certain: the civil war will continue. Unless Muzorewa and Sithole are somehow able to rally the guerrillas to their side -- and this is very unlikely -- the result will be a more intensive black-against-black civil war.
NOTES FOR CHAPTER VII


4. See the following: Hodges, op. cit., p. 16; Legum, Africa Contemporary Record 1976-1977, op. cit., p. B911; Moyana, op. cit., p. 514; Carter and O'Meara, op. cit., p. 35. See O'Meara's chapter "From White Rule to Independent Zimbabwe."


6. ibid. and Hodges, op. cit., p. 16.


9. Carter and O'Meara, op. cit., p. 36. See chapter by O'Meara entitled "From White Rule to Independent Zimbabwe."


11. Hodges, op. cit., p. 16.


15. Nkomo stated: "We don't want fighting between ZAPU and ZANU. We don't want our people to wage a war after finally getting their freedom they have strived to achieve for years." See loc. cit., p. A19.

16. ibid.
17. It is estimated, for example, that a Salisbury crowd of 100,000 welcomed his return from 15 months of self-exile in October 1976. It is widely held among experts on Rhodesia that he is the most popular nationalist figure among Rhodesian blacks.


20. loc. cit., p. 507.


23. ibid.


25. The military wing of ZANU is the Zimbabwe African Liberation Army (ZANLA) and its counterpart in ZAPU is the Zimbabwe Peoples Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA).

26. Legum, Africa Contemporary Record 1976-1977, op. cit., p. A20. At one point in 1974 as many as 2000 guerrillas were in detention in Zambia and Tanzania. Virtually the entire ZANU High Command was in prison, facing charges of killing Herbert Chitepo.


28. loc. cit., p. 17.


30. See Gann, op. cit., p. 10 and Legum, op. cit., p. B909. Other sources place these figures as high as 30,000-40,000 men. See Matatu, Godwin, "A Consensus of Suspicion." African Affairs, LXXX (April 1978), 22 where ZANU's forces are estimated between 20,000-30,000 and ZAPU's at 8000 with another 3000 operating within Rhodesia.


32. Gann, op. cit., p. 10.

34. South African sources break down the guerrilla movement this way: 5000 men in training in Tanzania; 4000 in Mozambique; 3000 in Botswana; 3000 in Rhodesia.


36. Hodges, Tony, "Counterinsurgency and the Fate of Rural Blacks." Africa Report, XXIV (Sept./Oct. 1977), 18. It is interesting to also note that during the Vietnam war, American strategists utilized a similar "protected village" approach. The technique, however, failed to prevent the Vietcong from reaching and winning over the support of a large portion of the rural population.


40. ibid.


42. Quoted in Houser, op. cit., p. 11.

43. Chirau is a conservative black who briefly served as Smith's Minister of Development before he resigned last year to form a new political party.


45. See interview between Johannesburg Bureau Chief William McWhirter and Ian Smith, "Putting Down the Burden." Time, CXI (March 6, 1977), 46-47.


47. ibid.


52. Quoted in Matatu, op. cit., p. 22.


54. ibid.


56. Some reports indicate that Muzorewa's popularity is exaggerated. See loc. cit., p. 12.

VIII. THE GUERRILLA WAR: THE SECONDARY ACTORS

The secondary actors in the Rhodesian drama are the African front-line states and South Africa. Both have an impact on the outcome of the Rhodesian crisis: the front-line states, for example, by providing sanctuaries for the Patriotic Front, and South Africa by providing economic, and possibly military help, for the Smith regime.

African Front-line States

The five front-line presidents -- Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, Samora Machel of Mozambique, Sir Seretse Khama of Botswana, and Agostinho Neto of Angola -- have come to play a crucial role in the affairs of all of southern Africa, but especially in Rhodesia. They have acted as a caucus within the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and emerged as a group of like-minded leaders in response to South Africa's overtures in 1974 (talks prior to negotiations at Victoria Falls). Kaunda and Nyerere have long been close friends and both are close to Khama, who sees them as allies in his attempt to lessen Botswana's dependence on South Africa. Nyerere is especially close to Machel in that he allowed Tanzania to be used as a base for the FRELIMO movement in its struggle in Mozambique.

Nyerere's role as chairman has been crucial. His credentials as the champion of liberation movements in southern Africa have enabled him to balance competing interests within the group, especially between Kaunda and Machel. Kaunda has been regarded as a moderate
and a pacifist and has often been willing to negotiate, as already noted. Machel, on the other hand, under pressure from his revolutionary Marxist colleagues, has had to balance the desire to abandon diplomacy with the pragmatic realism of trying to negotiate with the United States and South Africa.

While there may be fundamental differences among the front-line presidents, they are agreed on two major objectives: first, the achievement of majority rule in all of southern Africa, beginning first in Rhodesia and ending in Namibia and South Africa; and second, commitment to change through peaceful negotiation, but if that should fail, then commitment to armed struggle. The second objective is an outgrowth of the Lusaka Manifesto, written by Kaunda and Nyerere in 1969. It states:

We have always preferred, and we will still prefer, to achieve liberation without physical violence. We would prefer to negotiate rather than destroy, to talk rather than kill. We do not advocate violence. We advocate an end to the violence against human dignity which is now being perpetrated by the oppressors of Africa...But while peaceful progress is blocked by actions of those at present in power in the states of southern Africa, we have no choice but to give the peoples of those territories all the support of which we are capable in their struggle against their oppressors.

The front-line states originally committed themselves to armed struggle in 1976, after the failure of the Victoria Falls talks and the subsequent Smith-Nkomo talks. Today, that position has not changed. In fact, armed struggle was re-emphasized in March 1978 in their communique denouncing the internal agreement. The stand of the front-line presidents is that negotiations will not result in a
lasting peace unless all contending forces are involved in the final decision-making.

The front-line states have tried to unify the divided and unorganized ranks of the Zimbabwean movement into a credible opposition to the Smith regime. As already noted, they first attempted in 1974 to organize ZAPU, ZANU, and FROLIZI under the umbrella of the African National Council. When that failed, they withdrew support from the political leaders and supported what Nyerere called the "Third Force" (ZIPA) in its escalation of the struggle. In Geneva in 1976 they attempted to bring together the military and political wings of ZAPU and ZANU in addition to Muzorewa and Sithole to negotiate with the Smith regime. During the Geneva talks, Muzorewa and Sithole found themselves isolated by the Patriotic Front. Despite his popularity at home, Muzorewa did not have the backing of the military camps. When Muzorewa's deputy, Dr. G.L. Chavunduka, attacked Kaunda in public for "plotting with Smith and the Western imperialists" to undermine Muzorewa, and Muzorewa refused to apologize, he was subsequently disowned by Kaunda. In November 1976, the front-line states as a group abandoned their position of neutrality and supported the Patriotic Front as the political voice of ZIPA and the guerrilla movement. Afterwards, Muzorewa lashed out at Kaunda, saying he had an "unbeatable record of backing losing horses" and accused the front-line presidents of trying to impose their own leadership on the Zimbabwean movement.

The front-line states are an important link to external support for the guerrilla movement. These African nations have been adamant
in their desire, however, to keep the liberation struggles out of the hands of the major powers. They would prefer to resolve the problems themselves. Nyerere has said the "Peoples of southern Africa are not asking others to fight their liberation battles for them...They cannot import freedom. The peoples of these countries are asking only for appropriate support..."7 The front-line states fear a situation of being caught in the middle of the rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States.

While the African nations would prefer to settle their own differences, the intransigence of the Smith regime and the failure of the West to pressure Smith into meaningful negotiations could cause the front-line presidents to reshape their policies. Nyerere has said that in looking for help, they look toward Africa first. But outside Africa, he says, "experience has shown that communist nations are almost the only ones which are both able and willing to give assistance (arms) to nationalist movements. The Western bloc urges patience and non-violence."8

Kaunda has also warned the Western nations of the danger of the Rhodesian situation. He wants the West to understand why the front-line states support a policy of armed struggle. In addition, he wants the United States and Britain to know how close the region of southern Africa is to war. He has admonished that "The Western countries should not blame anybody when the Angolan situation repeats itself in Zimbabwe, as the freedom fighters will turn to the Eastern bloc countries, the only ones willing and prepared to help them achieve their freedom..."9
The United States and other Western nations have made a point of not identifying themselves with the Smith regime. If the solution to the Rhodesian crisis, however, has to be decided on the battlefield, the situation that the West fears most -- radicalization of the war effort and the growth of communist influence -- might well occur. This is a situation that even the front-line states would not like to see happen. While the front-line states do not want an American solution to the problem of Rhodesia, they do want the United States to use its influence to persuade Rhodesia to accept a negotiated peace resulting in majority rule.

Divisions within the Patriotic Front and the "power struggle" between Nkomo and Mugabe present another problem for the front-line states to consider. At least one observer -- Lawrence Vambe -- has raised the question: Have the presidents made peace more difficult by supporting the Patriotic Front? His point is that the front-line states have become less concerned with wresting power from Smith's hands and more concerned with which black hands should hold power. Since this appears to be the case, it raises the question of which Patriotic Front leader will the front-line states be likely to support? While the front-line states at this point are probably more interested in a Patriotic Front victory over Smith than in the issue of who should lead Zimbabwe, it is interesting to note that Kaunda and Khama might back one leader and Machel the other. Zambia and Botswana support Nkomo's ZAPU while Mozambique is more closely associated with Mugabe's ZANU. While Angola gives political support to ZAPU, it is more centrally involved in the problem in Namibia. That
again leaves Nyerere in the unenviable position of trying to unite the groups.

Role of South Africa

Throughout the crisis, South Africa has played a vital role in preventing the destruction of the Rhodesian economy as well as the Smith regime. South Africa has been so important to the survival of Rhodesia that some people have called Rhodesia its "sixth province." For this reason, South Africa could hold the key to the future of Rhodesia.

The collapse of Portugal's fascist state on April 25, 1974, and the subsequent impact on its African territories of Angola and Mozambique, greatly affected the balance of power in southern Africa and forced South Africa to reshape its African foreign policies. What had once seemed a stable tripod of white power in the region -- Portuguese territories, Rhodesia, and South Africa -- was beginning to crumble. Independence for Angola and Mozambique provided an immediate threat to the stability of the Smith regime in Rhodesia and increased the possibility that South Africa would face greater military and strategic pressures. The black challengers of white power would hold a strategic area all the way down to the borders of Namibia and South Africa, thereby depriving South Africa of the cordon sanitaire on which it had relied to keep its borders insulated from pressures to the north. In addition, Rhodesia no longer would be able to rely on Portuguese military assistance to secure its eastern border, nor on the availability of transportation to give its
imports and exports access to the sea. 14

Because Rhodesia was the most vulnerable area for the next stage of the African liberation movement, South Africa began to play a major role in the negotiations affecting the Smith regime. Prime Minister John Vorster responded with a new South African policy of detente. He held out a hand of friendship to the new FRELIMO government in Mozambique, commenting that a "black government in Mozambique holds no fear for us whatsoever."15 More importantly, on Rhodesia he said "it is in the interests of all the parties to find a solution."16

Vorster followed up his statement on the necessity of a peaceful solution to the Rhodesian problem in 1974 with overtures to the front-line states, primarily Zambia, asking them to cooperate in bringing the Smith regime and the African nationalists to the negotiating table. He made no secret of his view that the only viable policy that Rhodesia could adopt was one of majority rule since the alternative of guerrilla war would present a much worse outcome to the situation. Vorster's decision to participate in the Lusaka Agreement and the subsequent talks at Victoria Falls indicated that South Africa viewed the deterioration of Rhodesian-Zambian relations as an impediment to its foreign policy of detente with black Africa. In preparation for the talks, South Africa pulled its 3000 combat troops out of Rhodesia.

The desire for a settlement of the Rhodesian problem was actually not a new foreign policy adventure for South Africa. Vorster was well aware that since UDI, the Rhodesian crisis had
placed severe constraints on South Africa's ability to play an influential role in the affairs of southern Africa commensurate with its economic and military power. If a solution were not found, South Africa feared the prospect of having to support the Smith regime economically and militarily in the face of a protracted guerrilla war.

What was new in Vorster's policy of detente was the recognition that cooperation was required between the nations in southern Africa if peaceful transition to majority rule was to be accomplished in Rhodesia. Moreover, South Africa's ultimate goal -- to have neighbors that are moderate or conservative in political outlook so that its security is not threatened -- is a major objective of his detente policy.

The major obstacle to Vorster's strategy in southern Africa has been Ian Smith. As long as the white tripod existed in southern Africa, the Vorster and Smith regimes saw their national interests as being mutual. With the collapse of Portugal's colonial system and the advent of detente, however, their national interests began to diverge. While South Africa's foreign policy dictated that it help implement majority rule in Rhodesia, this was not an acceptable solution to the Smith regime. There is a good reason: it is ironic that while South Africa advocates black majority rule in Rhodesia, it still practices the same kind of repressive policies within its own borders.

Vorster could argue, probably convincingly, that the interests of the white communities in both Rhodesia and South Africa demand
that majority rule be achieved in Rhodesia. In addition, South Africa has had the power to initiate this kind of a change by withholding economic support from Rhodesia. There are two important constraints, however, on this kind of foreign policy. First, Vorster's electorate, as well as elements within his party, need to be convinced about the wisdom of "selling out" the white minority population in Rhodesia. They could convincingly use the argument that once majority rule came to Rhodesia, South Africa would be next. Second, Vorster's policy cannot afford to cooperate in actions associated with economic sanctions, since these are weapons which have been advocated over the years by the international community against South Africa to force it to change its policies of apartheid.

The result of South Africa's policy of detente -- at least toward Rhodesia -- has not yet been successful. Despite Vorster's involvement in the Lusaka Agreement and his subsequent influence on the Kissinger-Smith talks in September 1976, he was not able to get Smith to come to terms with the nationalist movement.

South Africa is, therefore, faced with a major dilemma, which governs how it will respond to the Rhodesian crisis. On the one hand, Pretoria, must help bring change to Rhodesia -- and Namibia, for that matter -- in the form of moderate governments which would cooperate with South Africa. On the other hand, South Africa must try to influence the make-up of these regimes so that they don't appear to the international community to be puppet regimes, thereby subjecting them to destabilization via their Marxist neighbors (Angola and Mozambique) to the north. South Africa has not been able to
accomplish this feat, primarily because of the intransigence of the Smith regime and the constraints placed on Vorster's foreign policy.

What is important is that if the internal solution succeeds in Rhodesia, South Africa's goal of having a moderate regime to the north will be achieved. However, since the success of the internal solution is highly problematical, and, assuming that Smith remains intransigent, South Africa is faced with some unpleasant prospects. First, if Vorster and the front-line presidents are unable to achieve a compromise, the guerrilla war in Rhodesia will probably continue to expand. The regime that ultimately comes to power will likely be more leftist in nature and less willing -- at least in the long run -- to cooperate with the South African regime. If South Africa is willing to accept this prospect, then it would have to be ready ultimately to defend its borders from guerrilla attacks as Rhodesia has. If South Africa is unwilling to accept the prospect of a leftist regime in Rhodesia, it might intervene militarily to prevent that situation from occurring. The result would likely be an "Angolan solution" in which the Rhodesian guerrillas and front-line states would ask for outside aid from the Soviets and Cubans, thereby embroiling all of southern Africa in a war.

Second, even if South Africa achieves its goals of decolonization in Rhodesia and Namibia, it may still ultimately be faced with guerrilla attacks from sanctuaries in these countries. One must remember that the ultimate goal of the front-line states and the African movement is to bring majority rule to all of southern Africa. Because South Africa is so economically and militarily dominant in
southern Africa, the front-line states have encouraged wars of liberation to take place first in Rhodesia and Namibia. Clearly, the black nations of Africa are in no position in the near future to take on the might of South Africa.

While neither prospect appears encouraging to the Vorster regime, a peaceful solution to the Rhodesian problem would go a long way toward improving the situation. Because the nations of southern Africa are still so economically dependent on South Africa and are in many ways so underdeveloped, they would probably in the foreseeable future leave South Africa alone, despite what happens in Rhodesia and Namibia. Ultimately, however, South Africa's northern neighbors will press more strongly for majority rule in that country. The more radicalized these regimes are, the sooner that is likely to occur. Prime Minister Vorster was undoubtedly right when he said a failure in Rhodesia might result in "consequences too ghastly to contemplate."
NOTES FOR CHAPTER VIII

1. Neto did not become part of the group until September 1976.


3. ibid.


8. ibid.


14. ibid.


18. ibid.


IX. CRISIS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: THE ROLE OF THE SUPER POWERS

The most desirable solution to the Rhodesian crisis would be a peace that could be negotiated between the primary actors -- the Smith regime, African moderates, and the guerrillas. If they are not able to do this on their own, hopefully the secondary actors, with their immediate interests in the area, can persuade or pressure them to do so. If a solution is not achieved peacefully through the efforts of the primary or secondary actors, however, and a military solution becomes the only alternative (which seems likely), then the role of the world's major powers -- the United States and the Soviet Union -- becomes more important.

Internationalization of the Conflict

The extent to which the Rhodesian crisis has become internationalized since UDI is manifested in the words of James Chikerema,¹ former lieutenant in ZAPU and FROLIZI leader:

The Rhodesian crisis has become more serious and more complicated with every passing year. Today there are many people and countries involved (in the crisis) in one way or another.

It is probably true, as a minister of the Rhodesian government told an elections meeting in Salisbury in 1977, that "Rhodesia has become the football of international politics."² What is perhaps even more obvious is that, as the Rhodesian crisis becomes more internationalized, there is a greater chance that the United States and the Soviet Union will become more directly involved. A major
position taken in this study, therefore, is that the impetus for a solution to the problem has switched from United Nations sanctions to the escalation of the guerrilla war. Since a military solution to the Rhodesian crisis presents the most likely outcome at this time, the roles of the United States and the Soviet Union take on more importance. The basic question is: Can the major powers agree on the means to effect peaceful change in Rhodesia? A corollary then is: What is the place of southern Africa (Rhodesia in particular) in the international arena?

Two major changes -- both of which occurred against the thrust of Western policies -- showed the dramatic suddenness by which events have changed the situation in southern Africa. The first, as already noted, was the unpredicted demise of Portuguese colonialism in April 1974. This event contradicted the predictions of the National Security Council of the United States, the British Foreign Office, and the NATO Defense Council. The second change was the successful intervention by the Soviet Union and Cuba in Angolan affairs to ensure the victory of the Popular Liberation Movement (MPLA).

Besides damaging the stable tripod of white power in the region, the collapse of Portuguese colonialism strengthened the African belief in the viability of armed struggle in liberating a nation. It also brought to power Marxist governments in Angola and Mozambique, which had only the communist nations to thank for their success.

The Angola affair was important in demonstrating that the Soviet Union was both willing and able to provide military support for the
liberation movements in Africa. The Russians' influence in Africa was greatly strengthened. In addition, it showed that the West had not only underestimated the volatility of the region, but had also underestimated the desire of the Soviets to get involved. Perhaps most importantly, the Angola affair demonstrated that nothing did more to legitimate the Soviet-Cuban interference in Angola than the intervention in the fighting by South Africa.  

The Soviet intervention in Angola dramatizes the fact that a super power can become a primary actor and change the entire course of events in a liberation war. President Kaunda of Zambia emphasized the importance of such interventions:

Our failure to find a solution here (in Angola) confirms that the Organization of African Unity (OAU) has no power to shape the destiny of Africa. Power is in the hands of the Super-Powers, to whom we are handing Africa by our failure.

The experience of Angola does not necessarily mean that the same chain of events will occur in Rhodesia. According to Legum, the Soviets were able to play a successful role in Rhodesia for three major reasons: (1) because of the unique nature of the power struggle among rival factions where there was no legally recognized government; (2) because of the Chinese decision to stay neutral in the power struggle; and (3) because of South Africa's decision to intervene militarily.

None of these conditions is present in Rhodesia, at least not at this time. First, the front-line presidents are committed to a strategy of insisting that the fighting in Rhodesia be done by Zimbabweans. Second, because the Chinese are directly involved with
the training of ZIPA and ZANU forces, it is doubtful that they would allow active Soviet or Cuban participation similar to what occurred in Angola. In addition, the adamant stand of the front-line presidents that major power involvement should only be supportive (providing training, for example, or arms) will help prevent an Angolan situation. Nyerere,8 aware of the danger that Africans could lose the power to determine their own political future, commented that "...We are not fighting in order to enable Russia or China or the United States to intervene in Africa." The fact that all foreign military and economic aid for the guerrillas must be funnelled through the OAU Liberation Committee in Tanzania9 is indicative of the big-power role sought by the front-line presidents. Third, while it is difficult to say what South Africa will do, especially in view of the fact that Vorster is unwilling to apply pressure to the Smith regime to force him to negotiate a settlement, it does appear that he is unwilling to support Smith with troops. This was evidenced by Vorster's policy of detente and subsequent decision to withdraw troops from Rhodesian soil. Unless South Africa is willing to commit troops to Rhodesia, it appears that the primary actors will settle their differences. According to Nyerere,10 if South Africa comes to the aid of Smith, the nationalist guerrillas would be forced to seek external help and the communists would likely give that assistance. The reverse could occur too, however, if Cuban soldiers were introduced on the side of the guerrillas, thereby forcing South Africa to come to the aid of Rhodesia.
United States Policy Towards Rhodesia

The Angolan civil war forced the United States to re-evaluate its foreign policy towards southern Africa. Prior to that time, American foreign policy, according to Dr. Donald Baker, was based inter alia on the following assumptions: whites in the Portuguese colonies, Rhodesia, Namibia, and South Africa would retain power for a long time; although guerrilla warfare might eventually lead to Portugal's withdrawal in Angola and Mozambique, factional divisions within the nationalist movement in Rhodesia would not allow it to effectively contest the Smith regime; South Africa, because of its military and economic power, could resist any African opposition; the condition of black workers might improve through greater industrialization, thereby creating a more stable atmosphere; and South Africa would ultimately grant independence to African homelands, which would still remain dependent on that nation.

American foreign policy concerning southern Africa was based extensively on the now infamous National Security Council Memorandum No. 39, enunciated by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. Option 2 of that policy was adopted in part by President Richard Nixon in 1970 and was based on the following premises: whites are there to stay and effective change can only come through them; there is no hope for blacks to gain political advantage through violence, which will only lead to chaos and communist involvement.

Most of the American foreign policy objectives during the early 1970's were, therefore, directed at supporting the white regimes at
the expense of the liberation movements, which were considered radical and responsible for most of the instability in the area. In particular, American foreign policy followed the lead of the British. Although economic and political sanctions were applied against Rhodesia, it has already pointed out that the United States continued to import chrome and other minerals under the Byrd Amendment. In general, up until 1974, southern Africa was relegated to the status of a "neglected" area.

With the advent of change in Angola, the last ten months of the Ford administration and the "reign" of Henry Kissinger witnessed a major change in American foreign policy toward southern Africa. The results in Angola provided an implicit threat to American economic, trade, investment, political and strategic interests. At that time, the United States abandoned its traditional policy that Europe (Britain) should take the lead in initiating Western foreign policy in southern Africa.

Kissinger's first problem was to overcome his statements in National Security Council Memorandum No. 39 by emphasizing America's commitment to majority rule in southern Africa. Another problem he faced was in conducting "open" foreign policy: he found it difficult to negotiate with the front-line states since they could not impose their decisions on the liberation movements; he also found it difficult to negotiate with the guerrilla leaders since they often had a tough time controlling their bands. As a result, he found it easier to negotiate with Prime Minister Vorster. Because the interested parties (Britain, the United States, and South Africa) could
not simultaneously work out all of the problems of southern Africa, he proposed a concentration on Rhodesia. Kissinger advocated United States support for majority rule with a timetable. In addition, he pledged support for African nations implementing sanctions against Rhodesia and advocated repeal of the Byrd Amendment. The result was the agreement with Smith (and Vorster), which proposed a transfer of power to a multiracial government within a two-year period.

According to Baker, Kissinger's basic assumption was that development in southern Africa is impossible without stability. Kissinger recognized that the Third World countries would undergo periods of political and economic instability. If the major powers, however, could keep from becoming enmeshed in that instability, then peace could be maintained among the major powers. While racial, economic, and political conflict would persist, the major powers should only serve as mediators rather than participants.

Currently, the Carter administration appears to be following a more "open" kind of diplomacy toward southern Africa. Its foreign policy has stressed the importance of fundamental civil and political rights. In fact, people like Andrew Young, United States Ambassador to the United Nations, have been critical of past American policies for tending to neglect the issue of human rights. Yet, according to Richard Bissell, Young's record has not differed substantially from Kissinger's. He proposes this question: Is the United States committed to justice and development -- the perspective of the front-line states -- or is it mainly interested in preventing Soviet influence in the area? He tends to agree with the latter statement,
indicating that elements of American foreign policy in 1977 still sound traditional: 17 (1) the need for human rights and majority rule without violence; (2) the need to reduce white resistance to change by guaranteeing compensation to whites for property rights; (3) confidence that the economies of the nations of southern Africa would continue to be closely tied to the United States and Western Europe, no matter who rules the nation; and (4) recognition of the African quest for stability, law, and order. The problem, as Bissell sees it, is that the combination of one and four is not acceptable to both whites and blacks, and that, therefore, the United States needs an unorthodox policy to help resolve the crises in southern Africa.

Legum is another scholar who feels that United States foreign policy is outmoded. 18 Despite the triumph of Soviet and Cuban intervention in Angola and the onset of other racial conflict in Rhodesia, he feels that the United States, as well as Britain and other NATO countries, still cling to the "carefully formulated ambiguities" designed over the past 20 years to maintain a kind of neutrality between the forces in conflict in southern Africa. His argument follows:

In the absence of a credible policy the Western nations, with their different degrees of involvement and commitment, fall back on a generally defensive posture and react on an ad hoc basis to each new development as it occurs. Thus Washington and London have both warned the Russians and Cubans to keep out of Rhodesia, but without at the same time indicating what role they themselves intend to play in the struggle and, without spelling out what precisely they intend to do to stop the Russians and Cubans if they should decide, as in Angola, not to stay out. To the Africans who, having waited patiently for a solution to the Rhodesian rebellion for 11 years, their advice is that they should be careful not to get themselves involved in a race
war; and to the besieged white minority they urge 'caution and wisdom' in not getting themselves involved in a war they cannot hope to win. But these exhortations in a highly-charged emotional situation, with both sides already engaged on the battlefield, are no more than pieties. Unwilling to adopt any positive positions of their own, Western diplomacy is limited to telling others to behave sensibly.

Legum's argument bears examining. He feels it is no longer credible to remain carefully neutral, that the West should pick a side. Up to this point it is obvious that neither the United States nor Britain has been willing to do this. Neither country, for example, has been willing to pressure South Africa into forcing Smith to achieve a settlement with the Patriotic Front. While the policy of neutrality, on the one hand, is very desirable, Legum feels, on the other, that it can create one very serious problem in the future: 19

The active role of the Communist nations in support of liberation movements will have increased; and anti-Communist African leaders will find it much less easy to resist the influence of the Communist supporters. If the Western nations should have failed to make their choice by then, their options during the last stage of the struggle will be even more sharply reduced...their influence in southern Africa will by then have been seriously eroded, and their standing in the rest of the continent considerably weakened.

The key problem for the United States is still how to promote a peaceful change of power to African leadership that is favorable to western economic development, economic investment, trade, and political interests while also trying to avoid the appearance of intervention in that process. 20 If change comes through a military transfer of power, that objective would be more difficult to achieve.

What are the options of the United States? First of all, it
should be clearly stated that there are limitations on what policies
the United States can follow. President Carter recently said that his
options are hamstrung by congressional control over foreign policy.

The Congress of the United States, in the post-Vietnam period,
has demonstrated that it disapproves of covert military or guerrilla
operations by the Central Intelligence Agency. Yet, given the degree
of legitimacy assigned to the Patriotic Front, the United States and
the West cannot easily support Smith's internal solution. Agreeing
to Muzorewa's initial suggestion that a Rhodesian referendum should
select a nationalist leader with whom Smith could negotiate would
ignore the security arrangements associated with such an election.

What the United States and Britain are left with, therefore, is the
necessity of inserting a "neutral" force capable of claiming legiti-
macy between the militant guerrillas on the one hand and the intransi-
gent white regime on the other. That "neutral" force was desig-
nated in the Anglo-American peace proposal to be a United Nations
interim peacekeeping force. The problem is that this solution was
not agreeable to either the guerrilla forces or Smith.

Despite the fact that Legum's argument is highly credible, it
is possible for the United States to achieve its goal of stabilizing
southern Africa and allowing the primary actors in the Rhodesian
crisis to solve their own problems if it is able to keep the Russo-
Cuban and South African forces out of the struggle. Right or wrong,
this is the tact the United States seems to want to follow. Andrew
Young's response to a question about the role of the United States
in Rhodesia is indicative of that policy.
We were in the position of having been told by the Africans...that they did not want this initiative to in any way suggest some superpower rivalry in Africa, and they wanted to see it as essentially a proposal of the United Kingdom, and they welcome the U.S. support but they insisted that our role be a supportive role.

The Western position in southern Africa (Rhodesia) has been ambiguous, given the dilemma between its economic, political, and strategic interests in the area and its desire to avoid a race war. The United States and Britain achieved one objective, however, although it must be considered a short-term aim. By rejecting Smith's internal agreement, the chances are that they, at least temporarily, have prevented a major escalation of the war and more direct involvement by Russia and Cuba. If support for the agreement had been given, the front-line states, who have been cooperative with Britain and the United States, would have felt betrayed and might have thrown more support behind the guerrilla forces by asking for more direct Russo-Cuban involvement. In the long run, however, the British and the Americans may have to choose between their interests in South Africa and the rest of the African continent.

The Soviet Union and China in Southern Africa

It must be mentioned initially that it is difficult to discuss communist strategies in southern Africa because the availability of information is limited. In the case of the Soviet Union and China, a discussion of foreign policy strategies also depends a great deal on whether their aims are perceived as ideological goals -- the struggle between the imperialists and the anti-imperialists -- or
whether they reflect policies dictated by national interest. While it is impossible to completely separate the two, the strategies of Russia and China will be viewed here primarily in terms of their national interests.

This thesis has argued that neither the Russians nor the Chinese have had any problem supporting the African wars of liberation. They have not faced the dilemma that the United States has faced. Their policies are one-sided and are not as ambiguous as those of the West. What has occurred, however, is that a competition has developed between the two powers for influence in southern Africa. In fact, Legum\textsuperscript{26} notes that most commentators' analyses of the Soviet intervention in Angola as a cold war move against the West omit an important element -- the rivalry between Russia and China.

It is obvious from this study that the Soviets (and the Cubans) were the chief beneficiaries of the MPLA victory in Angola. The Soviets succeeded in outmaneuvering the Chinese, who supported the Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA). When the Organization of African Unity called for a neutrality between the MPLA, the FNLA, and the UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola), the Chinese, in response to this call, withdrew their instructors from FNLA camps in Zaire. When the Soviets refused to honor the OAU's call for neutrality and backed the MPLA, the Chinese were left out in the cold. According to Legum\textsuperscript{27} what happened in Angola indicates that the Sino-Soviet rivalry in southern Africa may have become more important than either nation's rivalry with the United States.

In Rhodesia, where both communist nations have kept a much lower
profile than in Angola, the Sino-Soviet rivalry also exists. ZANU's relations with China in the early 1960's caused the Soviets to back the ZAPU forces. While the Chinese have always provided training instructors to ZANU camps in Mozambique and Tanzania, until recently the Soviets trained ZAPU forces in Eastern Europe. Now, however, this task has been assumed by Cuban instructors in Zambia. What remains unclear, however, is how the alliance of ZAPU/ZANU leaders in the Patriotic Front will affect future relations with Russia or China.

Although China's major pre-occupation in foreign policy is with trying to increase its status as a world power and to counter Soviet and United States' attempts to isolate it, its role in southern Africa, at least according to Nyerere, is limited. By supporting the more radical forces of Robert Mugabe, however, China has a great deal to gain by the continuation of the armed struggle in Rhodesia.

Since Chinese aid is given in a way that is widely accepted, most African leaders find the Chinese the easiest of the major powers to get along with. However, it is clear that the Chinese do not have the capability to deliver the massive amounts of military aid that may be required by the liberation movements. In this respect, the Soviet role in southern Africa is more important.

It does not appear that the Soviets have been able to follow up their success in Angola with future successes in Rhodesia. Because of Kissinger's commitment of the United States to majority rule in Rhodesia, the Soviets could no longer argue that the United States is a supporter of the white-ruled Smith regime. While they have achieved Friendship Treaties with Angola and Mozambique, their
headway in Rhodesia is still somewhat limited. Besides diminishing American and Chinese influence in the area and seeking to spread its economic and political interest as a world power, Russia is also interested in promoting its security interests, especially those related to the Soviet navy. 32

While the changing environment in southern Africa has opened the way for the Soviets, their track record in helping to establish communist regimes in Africa has been dismal. Yet, the added factor of Cuban assistance makes them more influential in the outcome of the Rhodesian liberation struggle. The crucial point, however, is that there appears to be just as much suspicion of the intentions of the Russians among southern African leaders as there is of the aims of the West. Because of this feeling, it will be difficult for the Soviets or the Americans to play a lasting influential role vis-a-vis the government of Rhodesia or any other southern African nation. While the supportive role of a major power is welcomed in the solution to the Rhodesian problem, the competition between the Soviet Union, China, and the United States is perceived by the front-line states as a dangerous rivalry. It is for this reason that they strongly desire that the major powers avoid a direct confrontation in Rhodesia, although they recognize that competition among them to gain influence in southern Africa may contribute ultimately to the kind of solution they want.
NOTES FOR CHAPTER IX


2. ibid.


4. ibid.

5. loc. cit., p. 5.


7. loc. cit., p. 5.


11. See Baker, Donald, "Two Views of Southern Africa." *Africa Institute Bulletin*, XV (#8, 1977), 197-198. Dr. Baker is Professor at Long Island University and has served as a consultant to the United States government on the development of black African states, notably the problems which will be experienced by Zimbabwe and Namibia.


14. ibid.


17. loc. cit., p. 44.


21. ibid.

22. ibid.

23. ibid.


27. loc. cit., p. 751-752.


32. loc. cit., p. 759-760.
X. FUTURE OF ZIMBABWE

If majority rule is inevitable, Zimbabweans will have crucial political, economic, and social decisions to make. The future of Zimbabwe hinges on the outcome of the guerrilla war and/or the success or lack of success of Smith's internal accord. The shape of Zimbabwe's political structure will determine its economic and social order. The extent of change in Zimbabwe will depend, in other words, on whether the new government is moderate or radical. Patrick O'Meara, for example, states that

The difference between moderate and radical perspectives is a difference between simple reform and revolutionary reordering: a mere replacement of the white establishment by an African establishment or a fundamental change in the structure of the society and in international relations.

The difference, therefore, between a new nation which espouses the ideas of a Smith-Muzorewa-Sithole coalition, on the one hand, and one which is based on the ideas of the Patriotic Front, on the other, is immense. Moreover, the difference between a Mugabe-led nation and a Nkomo-led nation would also be substantial. In addition, the role of the white Rhodesians in any of these new situations is an issue of great importance. Their place in a society which initiates incremental change would obviously be much different than one that initiates comprehensive, revolutionary change.

Before Rhodesia can make the transition to Zimbabwe, it must solve its political problems. Because of the rivalry between groups -- the Patriotic Front, the black moderates, and the Rhodesian Front --
and also between individuals, the many-faceted struggle for power must run its course. It is difficult to say at this time what kind of political structure Zimbabwe will have. It could become a multi-party state including the Rhodesian Front, black political parties, and/or multiracial parties. On the other hand, a one-party state, led by Robert Mugabe, is a distinct possibility. The future hinges on the outcome of the guerrilla war. What is certain, however, is that ideological and regional ethnic positions, hardened by the nationalists' struggle, will create problems in the building of a new nation. The reentry of guerrillas into the civilian sphere might create immediate problems, while in the long run, military appointments for former guerrillas might create a situation for a military coup. Despite Smith's internal agreement, there is no doubt that the guerrilla war will continue. If the Patriotic Front is successful in overturning the internal agreement, there is also the possibility -- especially because of past experience -- that factional fighting will continue within that group. Much will depend on how successful the nationalist leaders are in controlling the military groups, especially ZIPA.

Prior to determining the political role of the white minority, the black leadership must, therefore, resolve its own internal conflicts. What is obvious is that whites will play a subordinate role in Zimbabwe. The extent of that role depends on which black leaders gain control of the government. Under the Smith-Muzorewa-Sithole-Chirau Agreement, the white minority will still have substantial political and economic power for a decade. Under a Mugabe-led
government, it might not have any. Multiracial coexistence has a much greater chance of succeeding under a moderate government than it does under a radical one.

The economic issues will largely be determined by the structure of the economy. The structure of the economy, in turn, is dependent on the government of Zimbabwe. African leaders on all levels accept the basic premise that Zimbabwe is the home of both black and white. Because of his managerial abilities and professional skills, the white man could have a major role to play in Zimbabwe. It still remains to be seen, however, what role that will be. A moderate government -- based on a coalition of Smith, Mugorewa, Sithole, and Chirau -- would probably propose what O'Meara calls "Africanization-localization," while a radical approach -- instituted by Mugabe -- might go beyond the Africanization of the bureaucracy and initiate nationalization of industry, land, and business.

Under the terms of the Smith agreement, all property rights are to be protected. If the government confiscates property, there must be just compensation paid to the owners. This part of the agreement is reminiscent of Anglo-American proposals for a Zimbabwe Development Fund, which would have compensated whites who were unwilling to live under black majority rule. This Fund was based on the key assumption of the "Kenya model," which is the willingness of a future Zimbabwean government to develop an African elite. What the West wants, in fact, is an expansion of the black middle class and more opportunities for black participation in the business sector. The result would be an economic system based on black capitalism, which
would be more acceptable to the West and to Rhodesian whites because their rights would also be protected.

Both Mugabe and Nkomo have indicated that they do not want Zimbabwe to depend on a capitalist development model. Mugabe, however, backs a more radical agrarian program, urging redistribution of land to those who have been dispossessed in the past (black farm laborers) and the establishment of rural cooperatives. In addition, more nationalization of industry would occur under his regime than any of the other leaders.

Muzorewa and Sithole's commitment to Smith's economic proposals are not too different from what they have advocated in the past. Dr. Gordon Chavunduka, hired by Muzorewa to draw up an economic program for the United ANC, stressed that Muzorewa and the party did not favor widespread nationalization. A similar view was provided by Phineas Sithole, the National Secretary of the African National Council Sithole, the legal internal wing of ZANU, led by Ndabaningi Sithole. In interviews, both Chavunduka and Sithole explained that their parties did not support communism and desired a mixed economy with an important place for private enterprise.

Nkomo's economic policies fall somewhere in between Muzorewa's and Sithole's, on the one hand, and Mugabe's, on the other. While Josiah Chinamano, Nkomo's chief lieutenant in Rhodesia, has indicated their party does not favor "nationalizing for the sake of nationalization," Nkomo and ZAPU are more committed than the Muzorewa-Sithole alliance, at least on the surface, to a socialist economic structure. It could be called "African socialism" where "all citizens of
Zimbabwe must benefit from the nation's wealth" and "where free enterprise that is not inconsistent with the policy...will be permitted indefinitely." The degree of socialism and resulting nationalization will depend on the philosophy and on the policies of those political leaders who ultimately win power in the state.

A settlement in Rhodesia would result in the lifting of United Nations sanctions, greater access to foreign capital and transportation routes, and the opening of major markets in Africa, thereby providing the economic base for boom conditions in the country. The government, however, will still face difficult economic problems. Any future policies will probably be directed at raising the income levels of black workers, especially in the rural areas. Because the total potential work force is so large as to preclude its absorption into a present employment situation, government economic plans would have to be directed at increasing investment in the tribal areas and resettling the tribal population onto unused commercial and plantation lands. Recent studies indicate that 75% of European land would be needed to accommodate the present excess tribal population and enable them to achieve modest wage gains. Such a resettlement would not only require huge government investments, but it would also confront the issue of white economic rights.

Conditions associated with urbanization could also present potential problems. The introduction of foreign aid and new capital after a resettlement will lead to an urban influx, which, if not controlled, could create serious dysfunction because of inadequate housing and other facilities. Employment opportunities will
undoubtedly exist on a large scale, but unemployment problems could arise in a post-boom period. If the problems associated with urbanization occur, the result could be a large alienated section of the population. These conditions might produce major political instability.  

A post-settlement government will also have to contend with a debt problem and the outflow of funds. The experience of Third World nations shows that international debt repayment is a major economic problem which severely handicaps domestic economies. Both Kenya and Zambia can attest to this problem. This condition assumes that a Zimbabwe government will pay off these debts. While a more radical restructuring of the economy might ignore the situation, a future government would then be subject to the loss of its international credit.

The issue of development aid depends a great deal on the outcome of the guerrilla war. A moderate government will undoubtedly attract assistance from the West. A victory by the Patriotic Front, and especially the political success of Robert Mugabe, will attract aid from the communist nations. What is perhaps more important is the future relationship between Zimbabwe and South Africa. While most of the nationalist leaders have indicated that trading links with South Africa would not be terminated, it is difficult to predict what a radical government would do. Because Zimbabwe is so dependent on South Africa for economic assistance, it would be almost impossible for any government to sever relations with the Vorster regime, at least in the short run.
According to Moyana, the major weakness of the Rhodesian growth model is that it has not evolved into a development model which would allow for internal structural changes in the society in order to make the inward-looking structural changes in the economy more meaningful. His point is, and it appears to be valid, that any model which shuts off 95% of the population from having a meaningful role is ignoring creative energies which could increase its potential. Such a situation is bound to be unstable.

Any Zimbabwe government will face a difficult challenge in trying to solve the nation's problems. While a multiracial society would be ideal for Rhodesia, a great deal depends on how many whites decide to stay in the country. A Marxist government would probably inspire more whites to emigrate. A moderate regime would probably encourage people to stay. The problem is that the present violence in the guerrilla war creates a future atmosphere of political and economic instability. As Dr. Chavunduka has observed: "Any government that takes over, I'll feel very sorry for them."

Concluding Remarks

The concluding remarks in this paper will be based on the descriptions and analyses provided in this study. Most of the conclusions will be recapitulations of points stressed in earlier chapters. This study has attempted to analyze the Rhodesian crisis from UDI (1965) to the present. It has focused on two major themes: first, that United Nations economic sanctions, while impacting upon
the crisis, have not been successful as a primary tool for resolving the problem; and second, that the outcome of the conflict will most likely be decided on the battlefield, although there is still a chance that peace can be negotiated.

The Rhodesian crisis is an extremely complicated phenomenon in international affairs. Despite the fact that the crisis started as a constitutional conflict between Britain and Rhodesia, it escalated quite rapidly into an international problem. The United Nations served not only as the forum where the Rhodesian issue was internationalized, but also where coterminously the nations of the Third World, especially the African countries, began to develop as a potent, independent political force.

Besides raising the human rights issue of majority rule in Africa, a continent that had felt the impact of colonialism for decades, the Rhodesian crisis has also (along with the situation in Angola) led to the reawakening of United States interests in southern Africa, to greater involvement by the Soviet Union, China, and Cuba in the area, and to the reshaping of South African foreign policy. It has forced the entire world to evaluate the role of southern Africa in world affairs and the future of black Africa.

The Rhodesian crisis also mirrors many of the problems characteristic of southern African affairs: political and economic instability in the area caused by the circumstances preceding majority rule, although Rhodesia is unique in that, to this point, it has not negotiated its independence with its mother country; factional in-fighting characteristic of political power struggles; severe problems
faced by African majorities that have been deprived of a key role in society and the impact of that situation on the future of the nation; and economic interdependency of the involved nations with South Africa.

There are a tremendous number of variables present in the outcome of the Rhodesian conflict. United Nations economic sanctions, by themselves, have been partially successful in initiating white attempts to bring majority rule to Rhodesia. More importantly, however, the guerrilla war, influenced immediately by the African frontline states and South Africa, and potentially by the effects of great power involvement, will determine the outcome of the drama. In the case of Rhodesia, United Nations economic sanctions did not precipitate the desired political objective of majority rule. While sanctions should not be interpreted as a mechanism for bringing peace and orderly change to Rhodesia through the reform of the Smith regime, they should, however, be viewed as an adjunct to the growing assertion of African rights and power. This growing assertion of rights is not only characteristic of the moderate nationalist and guerrilla movements aimed at majority rule, but also of the black African nations who are members of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity who have supported the nationalists' cause in the Rhodesian conflict. If this assertion of rights is not accommodated through a negotiated settlement with Ian Smith, or through the assistance of an outside power, the only way left for political change to occur in Rhodesia is through violence. That condition now appears to be more of a probability than a possibility.

While the resolution of the Rhodesian crisis was initially the
responsibility of Britain, it was gradually ceded to the United Nations, although the organization's strategy of economic sanctions failed to achieve the objective of majority rule in Rhodesia. The roles of Britain and the United Nations have now been superceded by the primary actors in the conflict -- the signatories of the Smith accord and the Patriotic Front.

While majority rule is inevitable in Rhodesia, it does not look like that condition will be achieved through Smith's political solution to the crisis. Despite the fact that United Nations economic sanctions, in conjunction with an expanded guerrilla war, caused Smith to seek a political solution, it still appears at this point in time, however, that a military solution to the problem is the only realistic alternative. The reason that the continuation of the guerrilla war seems certain is that the Patriotic Front has not accepted Smith's political solution -- the internal settlement. The participants in the Smith accord seem confident that they can establish majority rule in Rhodesia and that they can hold out against the continuing onslaughts of the Patriotic Front. Their hope is that if their transitional government can get the support of the black population through elections, that their regime would be accepted by the world, and that subsequently, sanctions would be lifted by the United Nations and that aid would come from the West. Because the guerrillas, on the other hand, have been excluded from the internal settlement, they will try to disrupt the elections and wreck the signatories' attempts to legitimate their majority rule. It appears that the guerrillas are strong enough to continue the war, and that
those who will suffer the most will be Rhodesian civilians, both black and white.

Even if the competing parties were to sit down again at the negotiating table, it is difficult to imagine that they could put aside their past differences and compromise. One of the obstacles in the way of a negotiated settlement, according to Kenneth Mufuka, is the "divergence between African aspirations and European assumptions, shared by white Rhodesians, the Americans and the British, as to what is reasonable and desirable." His point is that the white Rhodesian-American-British side assumes that a reasonable period of transition is necessary to avoid political and economic chaos. The first assumption is that Africans must be "taught" the arts of government. The second assumption is that the interests of both blacks and whites would be served if the economy were kept at least at the present level of production, in order to ease political antagonisms between blacks and whites. In order to achieve economic growth, the presence of whites would be necessary.

Mufuka continues that these assumptions cannot be supported by facts or logic in the case of Rhodesia. If whites are willing to teach Africans the arts of government, one must assume that the nationalists would want to learn. He feels that having failed to do this for 88 years, the Europeans would not now be prepared to transmit this knowledge, especially to those Africans in the civil service bureaucracies.

There is also the question of trust. Because of the presence of fear, distrust, entrenched privilege, and racial dominance and
subordinance in the Rhodesian crisis, any solution will be difficult to attain. When one looks at potential negotiations between the Patriotic Front and the Smith regime, it is difficult to imagine the forces of moderation winning out in the end.

The future of a Zimbabwean nation is obviously clouded. Writing in Rhodesia in 1959, Colin Leys commented, perhaps with some considerable foresight, that

> a solution to the country’s major problems is fundamentally impossible within the system.
> To solve them is to change it.

The issue is whether or not the changes initiated by Smith, Muzorewa, Sithole, and Chirau are fundamental enough to solve the nation's problems. Obviously, from the viewpoint of the Patriotic Front, they are not. The Rhodesian situation in 1978 is at an impasse. The resistance of the Smith regime, the devisiveness among African nationalists, and the inability of Britain, regardless of the party in power, to resolve the confrontation means that Rhodesia sits on a powderkeg.

If Britain and Portugal had effectively decolonized their territories in the 1960's, there might not be left-wing regimes in Mozambique and Angola today and a potential one in Rhodesia. As a result of these failures in Africa, and in Rhodesia in particular, there is a unity of purpose among the Soviets, the Chinese, and the Third World nations to end white minority rule in that region. The Western nations, on the other hand, find themselves in a difficult position. Past policies identified them with the white-ruled nations. Today, however, in response to the increasing communist influence in
southern Africa, Western policies have changed and have moved closer to the African side. Great power rivalry in the region has both produced a change toward Africanization and majority rule while at the same time creating obstacles to their realization by support of competing groups.

The ultimate solution to the Rhodesian crisis would be a negotiated peace among all competing factions -- the Patriotic Front, the Smith regime, and the black moderates. Since this does not appear likely or even possible in 1978, or in the foreseeable future, it is increasingly evident that the parties involved will continue to try to settle their differences militarily. The greatest danger stems from the possibility that the front-line states and South Africa will undertake actions which will cause a major power confrontation in the area.

In regard to the Rhodesian crisis, therefore, four very important questions remain: (1) Will the Rhodesians (Zimbabweans) settle the problem themselves? (2) At what point, if any, will the guerrillas ask for more direct help from the Soviets and/or the Cubans? (3) At what point, if any, will the African front-line states permit a situation like that to occur? (4) If it does occur, how will the West and South Africa react? These are extremely difficult questions to answer. It does appear, however, that the conditions present in the Rhodesian crisis -- the opposition of the front-line states to direct major power involvement, the Chinese influence in ZANU and ZIPA and their desire not to be outdone by Russia like they were in Angola, and the probability that South Africa will stay out of the
conflict as long as the Cubans do--will prevent, at least in the short term, an "Angolan solution" from occurring and allow the primary actors to settle the dispute themselves. If, however, the participants in the internal agreement are able to hold elections and gain a degree of legitimacy, the Patriotic Front might be forced to take more drastic action by asking for more involvement from the Russians and the Cubans to help achieve their aims, resulting in further de-stabilization of Rhodesia and southern Africa. If the Patriotic Front is successful in mounting future military charges, thereby forcing Smith and the moderate African nationalists to come to the negotiating table on their own, further Russo-Cuban involvement is unlikely.

Given the magnitude of danger involved in a major power confrontation or a Cuban-South African conflict, one can only conclude that a grave responsibility rests with the world community -- inside and outside the United Nations -- and especially upon the great powers involved to expedite their efforts to secure a viable settlement to the conflict. While those attempts proceed, the world community and the great powers must recognize that the crisis must be "controlled" to the extent that it does not worsen and provide circumstances for potentially catastrophic results. The record of African anti-colonial changes since World War II lends credence to the hope that ultimately some form of compromise solution to the impasse will emerge.
NOTES FOR CHAPTER X

1. Carter and O'Meara, op. cit., p. 44. See chapter by O'Meara entitled "From White Rule to Independent Zimbabwe," 15-47.

2. loc. cit., p. 45.


4. Carter and O'Meara, op. cit., p. 44. See O'Meara's chapter.


9. ibid.

10. ibid.

11. Quoted in ibid.

12. Quoted in ibid.


14. ibid.

15. Carter and O'Meara, op. cit., p. 46-47. See O'Meara's chapter.

16. ibid.

17. Riddell, op. cit., p. 53.


23. loc. cit., p. 55.

24. Quoted in Good, op. cit., p. 311.
APPENDIX I

Pertinent Excerpts From Charter of the United Nations

CHAPTER I--PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES

Article 1

The Purposes of the United Nations are:
1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace;
2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace;
3. To achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; and
4. To be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends.

Article 2

The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1, shall act in accordance with the following Principles.
1. The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.
2. All Members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter.
3. All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.
4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.
5. All Members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter, and shall
refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action.

6. The Organization shall ensure that states which are not Members of the United Nations act in accordance with these Principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security.

7. Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.

CHAPTER IV--THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

FUNCTIONS AND POWERS

Article 10

The General Assembly may discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of the present Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any organs provided for in the present Charter, and except as provided in Article 12, may make recommendations to the Members of the United Nations or to the Security Council or to both on any such questions or matters.

Article 11

1. The General Assembly may consider the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments, and may make recommendations with regard to such principles to the Members or to the Security Council or to both.

2. The General Assembly may discuss any questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security brought before it by any Member of the United Nations, or by the Security Council, or by a state which is not a Member of the United Nations in accordance with Article 35, paragraph 2, and, except as provided in Article 12, may make recommendations with regard to any such questions to the state or states concerned or to the Security Council or to both. Any such question on which action is necessary shall be referred to the Security Council by the General Assembly either before or after discussion.

3. The General Assembly may call the attention of the Security Council to situations which are likely to endanger international peace and security.

4. The powers of the General Assembly set forth in this Article shall not limit the general scope of Article 10.
CHAPTER V--THE SECURITY COUNCIL

FUNCTIONS AND POWERS

Article 24

1. In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.

2. In discharging these duties the Security Council shall act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. The specific powers granted to the Security Council for the discharge of these duties are laid down in Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and XII.

3. The Security Council shall submit annual and, when necessary, special reports to the General Assembly for its consideration.

Article 25

The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.

VOTING

Article 27

1. Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote.

2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of seven members.

3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting.

CHAPTER VI--PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

Article 33

1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.

2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means.
Article 34

The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 35

1. Any Member of the United Nations may bring any dispute, or any situation of the nature referred to in Article 34, to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly.

2. A state which is not a Member of the United Nations may bring to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly any dispute to which it is a party if it accepts in advance, for the purposes of the dispute, the obligations of pacific settlement provided in the present Charter.

3. The proceedings of the General Assembly in respect of matters brought to its attention under this Article will be subject to the provisions of Articles 11 and 12.

Article 36

1. The Security Council may, at any stage of a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 or of a situation of like nature, recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment.

2. The Security Council should take into consideration any procedures for the settlement of the dispute which have already been adopted by the parties.

3. In making recommendations under this Article the Security Council should also take into consideration that legal disputes should as a general rule be referred by the parties to the International Court of Justice in accordance with the provisions of the Statute of the Court.

Article 37

1. Should the parties to a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 fail to settle it by the means indicated in that Article, they shall refer it to the Security Council.

2. If the Security Council deems that the continuance of the dispute is in fact likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, it shall decide whether to take action under Article 36 or to recommend such terms of settlement as it may consider appropriate.

Article 38

Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 33 to 37, the Security Council may, if all the parties to any dispute so request,
make recommendations to the parties with a view to a pacific settle-
ment of the dispute.

CHAPTER VII--ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THREATS TO
THE PEACE, BREACHES OF THE PEACE,
AND ACTS OF AGGRESSION

Article 39

The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat
to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall
make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in
accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore inter-
national peace and security.

Article 40

In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security
Council may, before making the recommendations or deciding upon the
measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned
to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or
desirable. Such provisional measures shall be without prejudice to
the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned. The Secur-
ity Council shall duly take account of failure to comply with such
provisional measures.

Article 41

The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the
use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions,
and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such
measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of
economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio,
and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic
relations.

Article 42

Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for
in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate,
it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be neces-
sary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such
action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by
air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.

CHAPTER XI--DECLARATION REGARDING NON-SELF-GOVERNING
TERRITORIES

Article 73

Members of the United Nations which have or assume responsibilities
for the administration of territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government recognize the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of these territories are paramount, and accept as a sacred trust the obligation to promote to the utmost, within the system of international peace and security established by the present Charter, the well-being of the inhabitants of these territories, and, to this end:

a. to ensure, with due respect for the culture of the peoples concerned, their political, economic, social, and educational advancement, their just treatment, and their protection against abuses;

b. to develop self-government, to take due account of the political aspirations of the peoples, and to assist them in the progressive development of their free political institutions, according to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and their varying stages of advancement;

c. to further international peace and security;

d. to promote constructive measures of development, to encourage research, and to cooperate with one another and, when and where appropriate, with specialized international bodies with a view to the practical achievement of the social, economic, and scientific purposes set forth in this Article; and

e. to transmit regularly to the Secretary-General for information purposes, subject to such limitation as security and constitutional considerations may require, statistical and other information of a technical nature relating to economic, social, and educational conditions in the territories for which they are respectively responsible other than those territories to which Chapters XII and XIII apply.
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277 Dec. 18, 1970 (Condemning South Africa and Portugal)

314 Feb. 28, 1972 (Concerning cooperation and obligations of states in sanctions policies)

318 July 28, 1972 (Same as #314)

320 Sept. 29, 1972 (Concerning United States importation of chrome)

333 May 22, 1973 (Concerning provisions for tightening sanctions)

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S/PV 1257 Nov. 12, 1965 (British position on Rhodesia)

S/PV 1331 Dec. 9, 1966 (Aims of British economic sanctions)
S/PV 1333 Dec. 12, 1966 (Speeches by fourteen nations concerning Rhodesian crisis)

S/PV 1340 Dec. 16, 1966 (Positions of Soviet Union and Bulgaria on Resolution 232)

S/7271 April 28, 1966 (Positions of South Africa and Portugal on Rhodesia)

S/7776 Feb. 20, 1967 (Note from acting permanent observer of West Germany to Secretary-General and also note from Minister of Foreign Affairs of West Germany)

S/7781/Add 3 July 27, 1967 (Report by Secretary-General in Pursuance of Resolution 232)

S/7781/Annex II (Replies of Switzerland, Zambia, Malawi, and Botswana to Secretary-General's report)

S/7783 Feb. 23, 1967 (Letter from Zambia to Secretary-General)


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General Assembly Resolutions:

1514 (XV) Dec. 14, 1960 (Anti-colonial Manifesto)

1654 (XVI) Nov. 27, 1961 (Establishing Special Committee of Seventeen)

1747 (XVII) June 28, 1962 (Establishing status of Rhodesia as non-self-governing)

2012 (XX) Oct. 12, 1965 (Requesting Britain not to accept UDI)

2022 (XX) Nov. 8, 1965 (Condemning racial policies of Rhodesia)

2024 (XX) Nov. 12, 1965 (Condemning UDI)
2262 (XXII) Nov. 8, 1967 (Calling on Britain to use force in ending UDI)

2379 (XXIII) Oct. 28, 1968 (Establishing non-recognition of independence in Rhodesia without majority rule)

2382 (XXIII) Nov. 8, 1968 (Calling on Britain to use force in Rhodesia and also condemning South Africa and Portugal)

Other General Assembly Documents:

A/6041 Nov. 11, 1965 (Report of Special Committee on Situation With Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples)