A Comparative Analysis of John Foster Dulles and Henry A. Kissinger and the Impact Their Personalities Had on the Formulation of American Foreign Policy

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A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF JOHN FOSTER DULLES AND
HENRY A. KISSINGER AND THE IMPACT THEIR PERSONALITIES HAD ON THE
FORMULATION OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

by

Denis Joseph Sullivan

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I am deeply indebted to Professor Lawrence Ziring for his advice and guidance during not only the writing of this thesis, but also throughout my career as a political science student. I thank my entire family for their prayers and interest in this project. Thank you, Mother, for your support. Thank you, Stephanie, for your love and encouragement. And, thank you, Lord, for bringing me through these many years healthy, happy, and always learning something new.

Denis Joseph Sullivan
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF JOHN FOSTER DULLES AND HENRY A KISSINGER AND THE IMPACT THEIR PERSONALITIES HAD ON THE FORMULATION OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

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Western Michigan University, 1981

This thesis examines the impact of personality on the making of American foreign policy. John Foster Dulles and Henry A. Kissinger dominated the American foreign policy process. Their performance allows the political analyst to study the relationship between personality and policy-making.

What follows is a study of John Foster Dulles and Henry Kissinger, their personal background and development, and especially the problems they faced as presidential advisors. Both men were challenged by wars in the Middle East. These Middle East conflicts are here presented as case studies and they reveal how each of these figures met the test. Efforts are made to show how early-life experience influences the handling of world events.
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CHAPTER I

Discussion of Content

This thesis focuses on the influence of personality in the making of American foreign policy. The persons under examination are John Foster Dulles and Henry A. Kissinger. The two men were chosen for this study because they revealed powerful intellectual ability, dominated those around them, and held strong convictions. They managed U.S. foreign policy virtually alone and neither depended on nor trusted the State Department apparatus or other agencies of government. Each man proved to be a one-man show. Foreign policy therefore was an extension of their ideas, attitudes, assumptions, experiences, backgrounds, and personalities.

Analyzing background and experience helps to explain the development of personality. This thesis suggests that to analyze foreign policy decisions, personality must be studied, and to study personality, background and experience must first be analyzed. There are many theories about personality development. James David Barber and Erik Erikson, two personality theorists from opposite ends of the theoretical spectrum, have been adopted for use in this thesis. Together, they offer insight into theories concerned with the development of personality and its impact on the decision-making process.

Barber is a behaviorist who describes how early childhood experiences shape a person's character, way of seeing the world, and way
of acting in response to his perceptions. He says that these early developments remain with a person throughout his life and continue to influence, if not actually dictate, the decisions he will make when confronted with various situations. Barber's (1977) analysis appears in *The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House*. Although a study of presidents, the analysis is also helpful in predicting behavior of other politicians, if not all human beings.

Erikson is a developmentalist. He believes personality continues to develop throughout the entire life span. Behavior of an individual depends on what stage of development the person is in and how well he has progressed through the previous stages. Erikson (1950) offers eight stages and explains the benefits of successfully completing each and the consequences of failure to complete any or all of them. His analysis may be found in *Childhood and Society*. *The Growth of Personality* by Gordon R. Lowe (1972) gives the layman a clear picture not only of Erikson's neo-Freudian theory, but also of Freudian psycho-analysis.

Survey material used in studying general foreign policy trends in the U.S. include *An Introduction to American Foreign Policy* (Knappen, 1956). This work outlines the domestic influences on foreign policy formulation. It describes the alliances, pacts, and treaties the U.S. is involved in. And it analyzes the Containment Theory as enunciated by George Kennan. *World Politics: Trend and Transformation* (Kegley & Wittkopf, 1981) studies the development of international relations, the origins and evolution of the cold war, oil politics, disarmament
and arms control, and various other topics.

Since 1945: Politics and Diplomacy in Recent American History (Divine, 1979) gives an overview of the major foreign and domestic issues as they were dealt with by successive presidents, Truman through Carter. The U.S. Since 1945: The Ordeal of Power (Grantham, 1976) surveys U.S. foreign policy decisions while attempting to point out the continuity between pre-World War II America and the years since then.

The Arab-Israeli Conflict: Readings and Documents (Moore, 1977) provides readings on the underlying causes of the conflict, articles relating to each of the four major wars, the role of the U.N. in dealing with the conflict, and personal thoughts on settling the disputes.

Biographies of and others works dealing specifically with Dulles include John Foster Dulles (Beal, 1957). This biography views Dulles in a favorable light and reads as if Dulles never made a mistake and as if all his actions were justifiable when handling American foreign policy. Dulles: A Biography of Eleanor, Allen and John Foster Dulles and Their Family Network (Mosley, 1978) deals with John Foster Dulles in a more critical way. While recognizing that Dulles had some successes, Mosley sees him more as a ruthless and arrogant manipulator of world events while at the helm of the U.S. foreign policy ship. He also describes the close familial and political relationship which John Foster enjoyed with Eleanor and Allen.

Michael A. Guhin's John Foster Dulles: A Statesman and His Times (1972) studies the political philosophy of Dulles, its origins,
and its influence on the direction of U.S. foreign policy. It is biographical and somewhat psycho-historical in that it hopes to explain his policies based on his philosophy, which is rooted in his personality and background. **John Foster Dulles: A Reappraisal** (Goold-Adams, 1962) is a critique of Dulles' record as Secretary of State. The author wrote that he tried to look dispassionately at that record. Although he did allow that Dulles dealt with some crises with success, he seemed overly critical of Dulles' handling of the Suez Crisis of 1956. **Duel at the Brink: John Foster Dulles' Command of American Power** (Drummond & Coblentz, 1960) is that even-handed discussion of Dulles as Secretary of State which previously-mentioned authors claimed to be writing but failed to achieve. This work sets up a balance sheet of Dulles' major foreign policies and assigns to each a PLUS or MINUS, designating a policy that succeeded by benefitting the U.S. leadership role or one that failed by backfiring to the benefit of the Communist bloc.

**Dulles on Diplomacy** (Berding, 1965), as the title suggests, concentrates on Dulles' views on negotiating with the Soviets, disarmament, Communist China's threat to American interests, and the U.N.'s role in achieving a peaceful world.

Dulles wrote two books: **War, Peace and Change** (1939) and **War or Peace** (1950). These are outlined in detail in Chapter II.

Kissinger's biographical material includes a favorable work by Marvin and Bernard Kalb entitled **Kissinger** (1974). The work outlines Kissinger's pre-National Security Council days from Germany to New York, Harvard, and Washington. It also gives a detailed account of
the war and negotiations with the Vietnamese. And it discusses detente, SALT and linkage, the opening to China, and the Middle East diplomacy up through early 1974. Kissinger: Portrait of a Mind (Graubard, 1973) describes Kissinger the intellectual, the scholar of foreign affairs, the critic of American foreign policy as practiced by various presidents, and the American with the European mind. The author, a friend of Kissinger, tells his readers not to be surprised or startled by any policy Kissinger may announce. The policy undoubtedly will be found, however generally, in Kissinger's writings.

Another friend and colleague of Kissinger who wrote a book about him is John C. Stoessinger. His book is Henry Kissinger: The Anguish of Power (1976). Stoessinger also relies on Kissinger's writings to explain the latter's philosophy on various subjects—e.g., power and force, history and destiny, stability and peace. But this is only a small part of the book and therefore not as extensive as Graubard's work. The majority of this work deals with Kissinger the Statesman and his foreign policy achievements in Vietnam, China, the Soviet Union, and the Middle East. Kissinger: The European Mind in American Policy (Mazlish, 1976) is a biography and a discussion of his philosophy, policies, and actions. It is a fine psychological survey, but it approaches incredulity when it attempts to explain Kissinger's supposed neuroses as the result of a love-hate relationship with his father. For example, Mazlish says this relationship caused Kissinger to retain his accent, give up his faith, and have a penchant for things German.
Kissinger: The Adventures of Superkraut (Ashman, 1972) is part biography, part expose of Kissinger's secret sex life. Kissinger: The Uses of Power (Landau, 1972) was written before Kissinger concluded a peace agreement with Le Duc Tho, but it asserts that Kissinger's Vietnam policy was a failure. But more than just Vietnam, Landau asserts that Kissinger's entire approach to international relations was a failure. The Kissinger Experience: American Policy in the Middle East (AlRoy, 1975) suggests that Kissinger manipulated the October 1973 War to achieve a stalemate so his diplomatic efforts would find anxious participants.

Uncertain Greatness: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy (Morris, 1977) claims to be the inside story to Kissinger's handling of foreign policy. Morris worked for Kissinger on the National Security Council until May 1970, when he resigned as a protest to the bombing of Cambodia. He criticizes Kissinger for his Machiavellian handling of foreign policy in Vietnam, Chile, Cyprus, Angola, and Biafra, among other areas.

Four major works by Kissinger used in the present report are: A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace 1812-22 (1957); Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (1957); The Necessity for Choice (1961); and White House Years (1979). These works are discussed in detail in Chapters III and V.

A New History of the Cold War (Lukacs, 1966) attempts a description of how and why the Cold War evolved. It is not a definitive history, as the author admits, but it does cover the main events of this era of tension between East and West. I. F. Stone's The Haunted
Fifties (1969) is a collection of his articles written between 1953 and 1961. The work outlines the foreign and domestic policy issues relevant to the 1950's--McCarthyism, Civil Rights, the Cold War, the Warren Court, to name but a few.

The Compact History of the Korean War (Middleton, 1965) describes how the war started and gives details of various military campaigns. The diplomatic efforts are not analyzed to the same extent but do describe the results of those efforts. The Korean Knot (Berger, 1957) fills in what Middleton's work leaves out. It describes the diplomatic efforts before and during the war.

A Short History of the Vietnam War (Millett, 1978) is a collection of articles on the military, political and diplomatic aspects of the conflict. It also provides a useful chronology of events at the end of the book. George C. Herring wrote America's Longest War (1979). This is a history which analyzes U.S. policies toward Indochina from World War II to 1975. It describes how each president from Roosevelt to Ford viewed the region and any U.S. involvement there.

Suez: The Seven Day War (Barker, 1964) is a description of the military operation carried out by Israel, France, and Britain against Egypt in 1956. Suez Thrombosis (Bindra, 1969) gives a brief account of the origins of Arab-Israeli tensions. The work is mainly concerned with the 1956 and 1967 closures of the Suez Canal, why these occurred, and what hopes there are for peace in the region.

Crisis: The Inside Story of the Suez Conspiracy (Robertson, 1965) reveals an account of the Israeli-British-French collusion to invade Egypt. Robertson, a Canadian, also stresses the diplomatic efforts of
Lester Pearson, then-Canadian Ambassador to the U.N., to find a peaceful solution to the long-standing Middle East conflict. Dulles Over Suez (Finer, 1964) is severely critical of Dulles, Nasser, and to some extent, Eisenhower. It is also highly supportive of the British-French-Israeli hostilities taken against Egypt. Due to Finer's obvious biases, the work cannot be viewed as an objective piece of analysis and therefore has no substantial contribution to serious literature.

Suez and After (Adams, 1958) is a compilation of a journalist's news dispatches regarding the 1956 Suez Crisis. As such, the work contains some analysis by an author who was, admittedly, untrained in the field of Arab or Middle East politics. But the work is useful in cases where the straight facts are presented.

Insight on the Middle East War (Insight Team of the Sunday Times, 1974) describes events leading to the Arab attack on Israel in 1973 and the course of the ensuing war. Israel and the Arabs: The October 1973 War (Sobel, 1974) presents the straight facts, without analysis, on a wide range of interrelated issues. This work gives information about mounting tensions in 1972 and 1973, the outbreak of hostilities, and the subsequent peace efforts. Peace-Making in the Middle East (Sobel, 1980) takes up where the previous work left off in 1974. This work ends with the presentation of the facts surrounding the signing of the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel in 1979.

The Road to Ramadan (Heikal, 1975), in addition to reporting the Arab view of the 1973 War, reports the events which led to the Arab attack on Israel. Heikal says the Arabs could have defeated Israel
if they had continued on the offensive while relying on their moral strength.

*Suez 1956* (Bowie, 1974) is concerned primarily with the legal position each side of the crisis relied on in their quest for justice. It explores the role international law played in the decisions and actions of the major participants to the dispute. *Decisions in Crisis* (Brecher, 1980) is a comparison of the decisions made and how they were made in the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli Wars. It describes the decision makers and what psychological factors were working on them.

*Decade of Decisions* (Quandt, 1977) gives accounts of the 1967 and 1973 Middle East Wars. It also describes the inter-war period and the U.S. initiatives to avoid another war. Further, this work details Kissinger's step-by-step diplomacy, which resulted in disengagement agreements between adversaries. This is an objective, fair, and well-informed account of American foreign policy making in the Middle East between the years of 1967 and 1976.
CHAPTER II

John Foster Dulles

John Foster Dulles was born on February 25, 1888 in the home of his maternal grandparents in Washington, D.C. John Foster's mother, Edith, was the daughter of John Watson Foster, who became Secretary of State in the Benjamin Harrison Administration (1889-1893) four years after John Foster was born. John Watson Foster was a man of great influence in the Republican Party, as well as in the business and banking world. John Watson Foster's father, Matthew, was an Indiana farmer whose parents--George and Jane Watson Forster* of England--emigrated in 1815 to America following the end of the Napoleonic Wars.

John Watson Foster loved the frontier life and tried to pass along to John Foster Dulles a living sense of the pioneer American spirit. In 1955, Secretary Dulles spoke of his family history after receiving an honorary degree from the University of Indiana:

My grandfather, whose name I bear, exerted a great influence over my life, and he had ideals and purposes which I have tried to make my own. He was a deeply patriotic American. He belonged to the period which saw this country rapidly developing from a small Atlantic coast group into a nation that spread across the continent. He fought to preserve the union; and then on diplomatic missions and as Secretary of State he helped to spread the influence of this nation throughout the world both in Europe and Asia. (Beal, 1957, pp. 25-26)

*The Forster name changed to Foster when the family emigrated to America.
As a youth, John Foster would spend most of his summers with his maternal grandfather in Henderson, New York, and the two would go on fishing trips which sometimes included renowned financiers, senators, and statesmen. John Foster's uncle, Robert Lansing, who later became Secretary of State under Woodrow Wilson (1913-1921), often joined the fishing party. William Howard Taft, Andrew Carnegie, and Bernard Baruch were but a few of the many guests in Henderson. John Foster greatly admired his grandfather and enjoyed listening to his stories about his travels in China, Mexico, Russia, and Japan. These moments with his grandfather served as John Foster's introduction to international affairs.

Allen Macy Dulles, John Foster's father, was pastor of the First Presbyterian Church in Watertown, New York. Allen's grandfather, Joseph, was the first of the Dulles clan to arrive in the United States. In 1776, Joseph arrived in Charleston, South Carolina, but moved to Philadelphia in 1792 where he became a wealthy merchant. He died in 1818. John Foster's paternal grandfather, the son of Joseph, died one year after John Foster was born.

Allen Macy Dulles was the major influence in John Foster's religious development. The Reverend Dulles was a theological moderate with some liberal tendencies. He disassociated himself from the die-hard clergy and the fundamentalists by supporting and encouraging intellectual inquiry and science. He encouraged John Foster to adopt moderate religious views. But the five Dulles children still had a strict religious upbringing. Each week they attended Sunday school,
three Sunday worship services, Monday night young people's service, Wednesday prayer meeting, and Friday preparatory service whenever Communion was to be served the following Sunday. Sundays also entailed learning a poem, a chapter of the Bible—either from Psalms or the New Testament—and one or two verses of a hymn.

John Foster soon learned all of John's Gospel and eventually became proficient at citing the Bible. He was a fervent Christian, so much so that he often made others feel sinful and guilty when they did something with which John Foster did not approve. Early in life he developed a rigid code that controlled his behavior. Learning seemed to come naturally to him. Aside from the Bible, John Foster read the classics at an early age. He devoured Shakespeare, Dickens, Spencer and Scott and read Voltaire, Molière, and La Fountaine in the original French. He also traveled widely with his family to France, Germany, and Switzerland, usually touring by bicycle.

John Foster's childhood was not all work and no play. He was not above playing hooky from school to go fishing. He admitted to getting his hands caned and his ears cuffed for throwing spitballs in class. (He eventually praised his public school education because it preached a good old Americanism and pride in country.) John Foster joined boys' gangs and threw snowballs after school. He also enjoyed playing with his brother and sisters. But, "though there were five children, it was always as a triad that Eleanor, Allen and Foster Dulles spent the formative years in Watertown and Henderson, and this grouping was something that would continue throughout their lives, each of them symbiotically feeding on the other emotionally,
professionally, and politically." (Mosley, 1978, p. 20) And there was never any doubt that Foster was the strong personality and leader of the trio. The three trained themselves to be tough. They would jump out of John Foster's dinghy, Boat No. 5 as it was called, and take a swim (as long as the water was above 50 degrees Farenheit). John Foster always outlasted his two siblings, who neither could equal his record of swimming the five-mile round-trip of Henderson Harbor. No. 5 was a gift to John Foster by his grandfather, John Watson Foster. The gift was a recompense when John Foster had to miss a 1901 Pan-American exposition due to an illness.

John Foster developed into an adept sailor. Sailing taught him self-reliance, for many times his life literally depended on how well he handled his ship. It taught him patience, since there was no sense worrying during periods of calm. It taught him courage, restraint, and steadiness when management of the craft required calm, taut-nerved operation. No. 5 instilled a love of sailing that stayed with John Foster all through life.

As children of a minister, the Dulleses never felt a conflict between what they believed and how they lived. There was no sense of inferiority on Foster's part as a son of a preacher. In fact, he may even have felt a sense of superiority because of his religious fervor and his quest for perfection in the human condition. His family had the "usual" family problems, but they adjusted to them. Reverend Dulles earned $3,000 annually, which in itself represented considerable buying power in the late 1800's and early 1900's. But he had a private income (source unknown) which paid the costs of family
travel abroad.

John Foster Dulles experienced a generally normal and probably exceptionally happy childhood. He was born into an aristocratic family which emphasized Christian values, intellectual inquiry, and sportsmanship; a family which traveled extensively, and which benefitted from the wealth of experiences and connections of a family patriarch, world traveler and statesman: John Watson Foster.

**Dulles: The maturing years**

In 1904, when Foster was 16, his parents and his grandfather decided that only a university could continue to challenge Foster's mental capacity and he was enrolled in Princeton University. John Foster found his studies easy. He had a quick mind and excellent power of concentration. But he continued to play hard, too. Though he joined no clubs, he passed his leisure time playing whist, bridge, and poker. He took part in debate but never tried out for varsity. He also enjoyed chess.

John Foster's first English paper was turned in September 24, 1904 and was entitled, "My Preparation for English". The work was full of misspellings, but what showed through the piece was "a curious combination of shyness, intellectual self-confidence, conventional modesty, and unconventional tendency toward iconolasm." (Beal, 1957, p. 31) He admitted that he never had an English course yet asserted that he knew basic grammatical rules from what he picked up from studying Latin and Greek. He told how his knowledge of literature came from reading the "masterpieces"—reading not as a task, which entails
dissecting them piecemeal, but rather as a whole, to get a clearer picture of their entirety. He admitted he wrote few essays and told of his surprise that he was ever allowed to enter college—"as far as English preparation is concerned".

Near the end of his junior year, John Foster was invited by his grandfather to attend the International Peace Conference at The Hague. This was the second such conference at The Hague. The first, held in 1899, was attended by 26 nations. The second drew representation from 44—virtually every nation on earth. This conference met from June 15 to October 18 and encountered big-power opposition to disarmament recommendations. Nor could it prevent World War I. The conference however, achieved many successes. It encouraged the peaceful solution of international disputes; it adopted rules for warning would-be victims if hostilities were inevitable; and it urged nations to set up an international court of justice (which was established after World War I).

John Foster Dulles was a secretary to the Chinese delegation to the conference. The delegation members spoke English but not French—the language of diplomacy. John Foster was fluent in French and became the delegation's translator. But his first contribution to the conference related to protocol. The participants of the conference could not decide on the order of precedence for courtesy calls on one another. John Foster was helpful in getting the conference started by seeing to it that all calling cards were delivered simultaneously. It was exciting for John Foster to see the most noted statesmen of his day and the clash of national interests they represented.
His experiences at the conference convinced him that increased cooperation between the nations was possible. These experiences also deepened a conflict in John Foster—whether to be a Christian minister, like his father, or a lawyer and a diplomat, like his grandfather. All through his life, John Foster's father and grandfather represented positions that did not conflict and in fact that complemented each other. Each man, father and grandfather, had hopes of John Foster choosing a career following his own. John Foster was at a crossroads. He had to decide which career to pursue, for he only had one year left at college and it was necessary to make plans for whatever was to follow. He left The Hague Conference still undecided and returned to his senior year at Princeton.

John Foster's major at Princeton was philosophy, which also entailed several courses in psychology. He was elected to Phi Beta Kappa and did his senior thesis on "The Theory of Judgment," a 19-page paper on pragmatism. This paper won him the Chancellor Green Mental Science Fellowship, a $600 scholarship to the Sorbonne in Paris to study for a year under Henri Bergson, French philosopher and Nobel Prize winner. John Foster stood second in the Princeton class of 1908 and gave the valedictory speech at the graduation ceremonies. He was 20 years old.

The Dulles family left for Paris in the summer of 1908. While at the Sorbonne, John Foster developed a life-long appreciation for the French heritage and a patience with France in her days of political impotence. This patience was to yield to an "agonizing" feeling when he felt compelled to "reappraise" U.S.-France relations when he became
Secretary of State. In addition to philosophy, John Foster also studied international law at the Sorbonne, and he leaned toward law and diplomacy as a career. This development greatly pleased his grandfather.

On his return to the United States, John Foster enrolled in George Washington Law School in Washington, D.C. He chose George Washington so he could live with his grandparents. John Foster not only completed the three-year law program in two years, he also kept an active social life. He was invited to parties which his grandparents also attended and he became well acquainted with Washington social circles. John Foster made the highest marks ever achieved at George Washington Law School, but despite this performance he was refused a degree because he did not meet the required three years of study. The University did not award him his degree until some 25 years later, when he was already a leader of the bar.

After he finished his law program, John Foster returned to Auburn (where his family had moved a few years previously) to study for the New York State bar exams. On the one side he prepared for the exams by cramming, while on the other he took long study breaks so he could go canoeing with a friend. During the exams he answered enough questions to satisfy himself that he had passed and he left the test early because he had a date with his canoeing friend, Janet Avery. "It was while they were canoeing on Owasco Lake that he asked Janet to marry him and she accepted at once." (Mosley, 1978, p. 28) That night, Foster told his parents of his engagement and they did not object. Janet's parents, however, were not so calm about the idea. They knew little about John Foster and they wondered if he was worthy enough to be
admitted to their family circle. The Averys need not have worried. John Foster passed the bar exams, as he knew he would, and he was on his way to New York City to find a job.

For six weeks John Foster applied for jobs with the more notable New York attorneys without success. These attorneys had their choice from Harvard, Yale and Columbia Law School graduates, many of whom also had post-graduate degrees from Oxford and Cambridge. Princeton was, in those days, a provincial college for would-be clergymen. Harvard-bred lawyers told Foster they considered his alma mater a "country club". Washington Law School did not have much standing in New York. And any tourist could enroll for a summer course at the Sorbonne. Thus, what John Foster considered to be excellent qualifications for international law, including his mastery of French and Spanish and his adequate German, the law firm of Sullivan & Cromwell found to be "commonplace" and did not hire him.

Discouraged but far from crushed, John Foster enlisted the help of his grandfather. Prior to the Civil War, John Watson Foster had been associated with the Cincinnati law firm of Algernon S. Sullivan. Sullivan later moved to New York and founded Sullivan & Cromwell. Grandfather Foster gave his grandson a letter to the surviving partner, William Cromwell, recalling their old association and outlining young John Foster's qualifications. It was not Cromwell's practice to interview applicants for his firm, but he made an exception for John Foster. He decided to give him a chance.

John Foster Dulles received $50 a month as a starting law clerk, but the experience proved far more rewarding. Sullivan & Cromwell
had extensive legal business with Latin America and John Foster, with his command of the Spanish language, became the firm's representative in the region. On one of his trips to British Guyana, John Foster contracted malaria and nearly died. He was treated with heavy doses of quinine, a drug which affected his optic nerve and left his sight impaired. Afterwards, he wore glasses and had a tic in his left eye for the rest of his life. But by the end of John Foster's first year with Sullivan & Cromwell, his salary had risen to $100 a month, and he became an established member of the firm.

John Foster and Janet were married in Auburn on June 26, 1912. His grandfather intended to leave $20,000 to each of his grandchildren when he died, but he told John Foster he could start drawing on his inheritance to further his career. With this financial support, Janet was able to accompany John Foster on his trips abroad. One trip Janet did not go on, however, was one made by John Foster in 1917 at the prodding of his uncle, Robert Lansing, then Secretary of State under Woodrow Wilson.

John Foster Dulles accepted a secret assignment in Central America where he gained the assurances from the Nicaraguan, Costa Rican, and Panamanian governments that they would align their policies with the United States in the impending war against Germany. The Latin Americans also promised they would hunt down German spies and saboteurs who might interfere with the passage of military supplies through the Panama Canal.
Returning to the U.S., John Foster Dulles applied for active military service but was turned down because of his poor eyesight. Instead he was commissioned as an Army captain (and was promoted to major by the end of the war). He was assigned to the War Trade Board superintending shipments to neutral countries as the assistant to Vance McCormick, the Board's chairman. Dulles' position also brought him into contact with Bernard Baruch, one of the more influential men of the day. Baruch ran the War Industries Board, which mobilized domestic production. Dulles' position would better serve him in his future career than would active duty. He learned firsthand how to deal with foreign governments and with domestic bureaucracies, such as the War and Navy Departments. Dulles regretted the fact that a physical infirmity kept him out of the active service.

World War I ended on November 11, 1918. Dulles heard that President Wilson would personally lead the U.S. delegation to the treaty negotiations at Versailles and he asked his Uncle Bert (Lansing) if he (Dulles) might go along to Versailles. But Lansing had had a falling out of sorts with the President and felt himself lucky to be going and therefore did not want to press his luck by asking that his nephew go along with the delegation. There were other ways for Dulles to get to Versailles. Bernard Baruch was impressed by Dulles' clear-mindedness and his legal and organizing abilities. When Baruch was named head of the American Delegation on Reparations, he asked Dulles to serve as the delegation's counsel.
The Allies were in bad financial shape after the war. Their citizens had suffered considerable property damage and they also faced the burden of wartime taxes. Some leaders falsely asserted that Germany was able and should be requested to pay large amounts of reparations to the victorious allies. Baruch later reported on this spirit of vengeance or selfish advantage that was present in the minds of the framers of the treaty. The U.S., however, was the only delegation with a definite reparations scheme, and it had been drafted by Dulles. The scheme would exact from Germany the cost of damages resulting directly from acts clearly in violation of international law as well as damages to civilian populations and their property. Other delegations merely filed general statements demanding compensation for all damages—direct and indirect.

It was up to Dulles to argue the U.S. position. He said America joined with the others in condemning Germany's instigation of war as an international crime and that the U.S. had a substantial war debt, too. But he said the delegates must be bound by the pre-Armistice agreement, which the Allies offered and which the Germans accepted and which did not call for the heavy reparations that some of the delegates were seeking.

Gentlemen, if we hold to the domain of reason, we cannot adopt such methods. To demand the gigantic total of war costs would be to jeopardize securing that specific reparation as to which Germany must clearly recognize her liability, and the satisfactions of which will tax her resources to the limit. (Beal, 1957, p. 68)

Dulles found himself in agreement with John Maynard Keynes, who also attended the negotiations. They held to the position that exacting
a heavy toll from the Germans, who were unable to pay, would threaten starvation and sow the seeds of unrest. Dulles wanted Germany as a productive, stabilizing, consuming nation.

President Wilson asked Dulles to stay on in Europe as American representative on the Reparations Commission. Dulles was 31 years old and he found it exciting working with prominent and powerful ministers from the other countries. Dulles' service ended in the fall of 1919 when the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, under pressure from postwar isolationists, passed a resolution that the U.S. should not be represented on the reparations group. Dulles, a Republican, was disappointed with the isolationists because they were mostly members of his party. He saw American isolationism as the inability to face up to international responsibilities to insure the peace.

When Dulles returned from Paris, he had earned international respect and recognition as a diplomat and expert on reparations and international finance. His experiences at Versailles conditioned his actions for the rest of his life. Thereafter, Dulles was interested in equitable solutions to international problems. He was also more sensitive to the need for Senate involvement in and support for America's role in world affairs.

Dulles became a junior partner of Sullivan & Cromwell in 1919 and the senior partner in 1926. He continued to take an active interest in German reparations and allied indebtedness to the U.S. Between 1920 and 1923, most of his speeches and writings were on these problems. He continued to blame Germany for its crimes in World War I. But in December of 1922, he blamed Wilson for demanding huge reparations from
Germany, which heavily taxed Germany's ability to pay any reparations. Dulles suggested a moratorium on reparation payments so Germany could "get its house in order". (New York Times, December 20, 1922)

In 1924, the Dawes Plan was formulated to provide loans for Germany and to moderate Germany's payments for a few years. Dulles supported this plan but felt it was not enough because it did not set a fixed amount for Germany's obligations. Nor did it set a date when payments would cease. In 1926 and again in 1928, in speeches to the Foreign Policy Association, Dulles urged the continuance of loans to foreign countries, which could in turn buy U.S. exports. "Otherwise, our neighbors would starve while we had surplus goods rotting in our warehouses." (New York Times, March 25, 1928)

At a Conference on the Causes of War, Dulles said the greatest danger to the peace lies in the "impulse to retain such wealth as we have. Under changing economic conditions men opt for the status quo. Government is a strong ally in this struggle to retain wealth and position. Under such conditions, a powerful and ruling class is apt to use its wealth and position to put into power...a strong government." (New York Times, January 21, 1925)

After World War II started in 1939, Dulles formulated a Plan for Peace which called for limiting national sovereignty. His proposal involved a willingness on the part of nations to adhere to rules made by an international organization. (New York Times, October 29, 1939) Dulles argued that the U.S. must take the lead in developing an international organization but that it must avoid war in order to devote full attention to the project.
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Dulles presented his plans in his first book: *War, Peace and Change*. He started with the premise that change is inevitable and desirable. If change is not allowed to occur peacefully, then violent change will occur. His work was against status quo thinking and the ideology of nationalism. He hoped to find the causes of war and to eradicate them. Dulles did not justify the expansionist policies of Germany, Japan and Italy, as he had been criticized for doing. He merely explained why they happened. He criticized the self-righteous attempts to personify nations as either heroes or villains. He rejected isolationism and he rejected one-world government. The establishment of international agencies not limited or restricted by national sovereignty would begin "that dilution of sovereignty which all enlightened thinkers agree to be indispensable." (New York Times, October 29, 1939)

Dulles: National leadership

Dulles was named Chairman of the Commission on a Just and Durable Peace, created by the Federal Council of Churches in early 1941. The Federal Council of Churches was formed in 1908 for the purpose of greater Christian unity. Goals of the Council focused initially on the solution of industrial problems; the Council sought to effectuate the abolition of child labor, to shorten the work week, to establish a minimum wage and to insure the right to organize workers. The Council was also involved in political issues. It urged President Franklin D. Roosevelt (1933-45) to stay out of World War II; it further advocated a world organization in a letter to Roosevelt where the "sovereignty
of the individual state would be limited to the interests of a world community". (Singer, 1975, p. 104)

As Chairman of the Commission on a Just and Durable Peace, Dulles was in contact with hundreds of religious leaders (who were predominantly Protestant). He sought to move public opinion by encouraging these leaders to preach to their congregations on the necessity for non-involvement in the "European" war. Dulles defended, even demanded, Christian involvement in the political process to insure good government.

In his quest for a lasting peace, Dulles criticized the Atlantic Charter declaration of President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston Churchill, Prime Minister of Great Britain, because it did not specifically provide for a world organization. Though the Charter provided for "a wider and permanent system of general security," Roosevelt rejected Churchill's explicit plan to work for an international agency. (Knappen, 1956, pp. 235 & 249) Roosevelt was aware of past American opposition to international organizations. But friendly American reception to the Atlantic Charter persuaded him that such a project might again be politically feasible. Dulles felt the Charter did not go far enough in promoting a new international system of security. He said the end of the war would find a concentration of power in one or two hands and that this power must be used, not to perpetuate itself, "but to create, support and eventually give way to international institutions drawing their vitality from the whole family of nations". (Beal, 1957, p. 91)

Once the United States entered World War II, Dulles warned Americans
not to think of victory as a "push over". It was an illusion to think that just because the U.S. was in the war, victory was at hand. Victory would come in the long run. The war itself should be viewed as a mission to achieve a lasting peace.

As Chairman of the Commission on a Just and Durable Peace, Dulles formulated his plan for a lasting peace. His plan was known as "Six Pillars of Peace" and called for, among other things, collaboration between all nations, assurance of autonomy for subject peoples, control of armaments, and world organization. John D. Rockefeller spoke in favor of Dulles' plan. Dulles sought to promote his plan to the American public. Though not enthusiastic about Dulles' plan, Roosevelt was certain that the American public would support U.S. participation in a world organization. Roosevelt set Secretary of State Cordell Hull to work on plans for the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, which developed the scheme for the United Nations.

On April 6, 1945, Dulles became a general advisor to the U.S. delegation at the San Francisco Conference which formalized the establishment of the United Nations (U.N.). The U.S. delegation agreed not to leak anything to the press about the behind-the-scenes creation of the U.N. But everyday Dulles was reportedly out in the hotel corridors leaking to newsmen details of the day's discussions. As a general advisor, Dulles was at the conference to offer suggestions and to represent the Republicans. He was not an official spokesman. Democrats saw Dulles' leaking of news to the media as an attempt by him to advertise his contributions to the conference, regardless of their actual importance, and to promote the Republican party. Dulles,
although not on record in response to this point, always desired strong public support for governmental programs. He apparently justified his actions, correctly or incorrectly, as an attempt to get public opinion behind the conference's goals and to assure its success.

Republican ideologue on foreign affairs

The above example of bipartisan participation was not the first program in which Dulles participated. In 1944, Thomas Dewey ran for President on the Republican ticket against Roosevelt. Dulles became Dewey's foreign policy advisor. The Republicans criticized the Dumbarton Oaks conference. Dewey and Dulles feared the proposed international organization "smacked too much of big-power control of the world, without adequate representation for little nations". (Beal, 1957, p. 97) The White House denied this accusation and at a press conference, Secretary Hull announced he would confer with Dewey to explain the administration's policy. Dewey accepted the invitation but he sent Dulles to confer with Hull. Dulles and Hull spent hours quibbling over the terms to describe U.S. policy toward the U.N. Hull wanted to use the term 'non-partisan', which indicated that issues were not split by party lines or partisan sentiments. Dulles preferred 'bi-partisan', indicating that both parties worked together on a solution. Dulles preferred bi-partisanship because it granted the Republicans equal status in a politically profitable project. This was the same reason why Hull and Roosevelt rejected the term. Dulles finally conceded to Hull's demands. The two agreed that Roosevelt and Dewey should not campaign on a promise for world organization. Both favored the
organization, but they had different opinions on how it should be established. They and their advisors did not want these differences to be debated in the campaign, thus risking a division of the American public which could threaten public support for the United Nations.

In 1945, Dulles was involved in another bipartisan conference. He was the Republican representative and the counselor to Secretary of State James Byrnes at the Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in London. Byrnes was ready to yield to uncompromising Soviet demands which would have knocked France and China out of discussions at the meeting. The Soviets claimed the French and Chinese had no right to participate in discussions on the Balkan and Finnish peace treaties because they (the French and Chinese) were not parties to the surrender terms. Dulles told Byrnes that he opposed the Soviet demands and that he would go public with his views unless Byrnes stood firm against the Soviets. Byrnes did not yield to Soviet demands and gained the necessary Republican support.

In 1948, it was generally believed Dewey would defeat Truman for the Presidency. Dulles was overseas during much of the campaign working with Secretary of State Marshall at a U.N. meeting in Paris. President Harry S Truman (1945-53) set up a transatlantic communication system so Dulles could be in touch with Dewey. Many foreign ministers talked with Dulles at the meeting, expecting him to be the next Secretary of State. Truman's surprising victory over Dewey, however, left Dulles still on the margins of power.

When Robert Wagner, Sr. resigned as U.S. Senator from New York in 1949, Governor Dewey appointed Dulles to replace Wagner until a new
election could be held. Dulles resigned from Sullivan & Cromwell and was sworn in as a member of the United States Senate. Breaking the Senate tradition of silence for newcomers, Dulles challenged Senator Robert Taft by advocating the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Dulles said that security was not achieved just because the United Nations existed to keep peace and that it was necessary to secure peace through a series of organizations that provided for collective self-defense. The NATO treaty was approved by the Senate, but Dulles lost his bid for election in November 1949.

Senator Arthur Vandenberg, a Republican leader in the Senate, gained Dulles a position in the State Department in March 1950. In this job, he masterminded the treaty of peace with Japan, a task that lay untouched for five years. In drafting the treaty, Dulles used his experience at Versailles in 1919. He did not want to be vindictive or to force Japan into a position similar to the one Germany found itself in in the 1920's and 1930's. He wanted Japan to prosper and to be an ally of the U.S. Japan was required to pay reparations and it had to provide free services, technical assistance and manufacturing facilities for those it injured in the war. But security was also provided Japan by a U.S. pledge to protect Japan. Japan, however, was allowed to decide which China it would recognize, thus avoiding a dispute between Great Britain, which recognized the People's Republic of China, and the United States, which recognized Nationalist China. Whenever Dulles made a breakthrough in the treaty process, he delivered a major speech thus informing the world of his progress and waiting to hear its reaction.
Dulles also wrote his second book, War or Peace, in 1950. It was a tract telling of the probability but not the inevitability of war. He offered hope for peace, provided Americans followed enlightened policies. Dulles believed the U.S. also needed to better understand the Soviet Union which he was convinced was aimed at the destruction of non-Communist governments. He reiterated his distaste for status quo thinking and called for greater unity within Europe in order to fend off the Communist menace. By working closely with the Soviets in negotiations over the U.N. and at the Council of Foreign Ministers, Dulles perceived them as being dishonest and concerned only with spreading their influence throughout the world. Dulles, the champion of world peace, saw the Soviet Communists as a threat to peace. The "small, fanatical Soviet Communist Party" with Stalin as its leader, uses fraud, terrorism and violence to extend their control throughout the world. (Dulles, 1950, p. 5) Dulles had no quarrel with the Russian people, only their "despotic" leaders who forcibly spread Communism to other nations. (Dulles, 1950, p. 6)

On May 5, 1952, Dulles spoke on the subject of Indochina to the French National Political Science Institute in Paris. The actual purpose of his trip was to talk with General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Commander of NATO forces. Dewey had previously thrown his support behind Eisenhower and now it was Dulles' turn. Dulles found Eisenhower's views coincided with his own. The two agreed on the need for opposition to Communism, on the principle of collective defense, and on the need for promoting unity through the European Defense Community. Dulles returned home committed to Eisenhower as his choice for the
Presidency in the 1952 campaign.

Dulles wrote the foreign policy plank at the 1952 Republican Convention. It was a hard indictment against Communism and an accusation that Truman "lost" Nationalist China to the Communists and that the Korean Conflict could have been averted with foresight. Dulles later said he could not accept all of these statements as true, but that he was merely stating the Republican case against the Democrats.

When Eisenhower was elected President in November, he offered Dulles the position of Secretary of State in his administration. Both men opposed the isolationist sentiments in the traditional wing of the GOP. They agreed on a strategy of deterrence, free trade, and access to raw materials (Guhin, 1972, p. 165) as well as other issues. Both men respected the other's views on virtually all foreign policy matters.

Dulles had hoped for the position of Secretary of State in 1944, and had expected it in 1948. In 1952, however, he questioned whether it was what he wanted. He was indifferent toward administration and wanted to devote himself solely to foreign policy planning. He accepted the position because it would allow him to pursue the goal of world peace at a critical time.

Psychological considerations

Applying psychological theory to this extensive background should be able to explain Dulles' behavior as Secretary of State. James David Barber's personality analysis of presidential performance can be helpful in this explanation and has been adopted below.

Character is developed mainly in childhood and is the way a person
orients himself toward life. It is the person's stance as he confronts experience. Dulles had a self-confidence that allowed him to succeed in new endeavors, such as sailing, scholastics, and diplomacy. Dulles was raised in a wealthy home where he received a great deal of parental and grandparental affection and guidance. Thus, young Dulles did not suffer from either economic or psychological deprivation. This, says Barber, is one of the most important determinants of character development. Lack of either deprivation means a freedom from various financial and emotional problems, which may otherwise occur when deprivation is experienced. Lack of deprivation, as is common among middle and upper class families, is associated with an Active-Positive character, as in the cases of Franklin D. Roosevelt and John F. Kennedy. An Active-Positive person is achievement-oriented and has high self esteem. He uses his styles flexibly, adaptively. "He sees himself as developing over time toward relatively well-defined personal goals--growing toward his image of himself as he might yet be. There is an emphasis on rational mastery, on using the brain to move the feet. This may get him into trouble; he may fail to take account of the irrational in politics. Not everybody he deals with sees things his way and he may find it hard to understand why." (Barber, 1977, p. 12)

Early in his life, Dulles adopted a rigid code of conduct in keeping with his Christian upbringing. He achieved positions of influence, power and wealth relatively early in his life. He called for rational solutions to world problems, rejecting the emotional as not a basis for sound, equitable answers. Versailles was his model of irrationality leading to disaster. Dulles could be flexible when he wanted to
be; he could also be rigid. His support of "no appeasement" is an example of the latter; his successes at negotiating prove the former—e.g., the Japanese peace treaty. His desire for peaceful change also implies his flexibility.

Dulles worked hard in all his endeavors, especially politics: he was Active. He enjoyed politics, ever since he was a young boy listening to his grandfather's stories of world travel and diplomacy, and he got much satisfaction once he developed his own political career: he was Positive.

Dulles' world view focused on the inevitability of change in the world. He saw that if the status quo was maintained by forceful methods then change would also come about violently. He stressed the need for peaceful, deliberate change to avoid violent change—i.e., war. World View, in Barber's terms, is developed in adolescence, or between 13 and 19 years of age. Dulles went to The Hague Peace Conference when he was 19 and witnessed the clashes of national interests embodied in the delegates. Dulles, later in life, developed a concept calling for a dilution of the sovereignty system to avoid violent clashes of interest and to promote peaceful, open change.

Style refers to the person's habitual way of performing his political roles: rhetoric, homework, or personal relations. Virtually everyone exhibits elements of all three, but one is usually dominant in a person and that is his main Style. Character and World View come together in early adulthood when a person adopts a Style. This period stands out as "the time of emergence, the time the young man found himself." (Barber, 1977, p. 10) This is his first independent
political success, when the man moves away from detailed guidance of his family. For Dulles, this would be Versailles in 1919. Although Dulles was not successful in changing the dangerous outcome of the negotiations, he was successful in proving himself as an intelligent, conscientious diplomat which earned him fame as an expert on international finance and reparations. Dulles had "arrived".

This Active-Positive with a realistic yet hopeful view of the world, who used personal relations and diplomacy to gain support for his views had, in 1953, attained a position where all his characteristics would determine the decisions he would come to make as Secretary of State, or so says Barber. With his type of character, Dulles' performance as Secretary should be one of flexible, goal-oriented, positive programs. Dulles would not let failure destroy his career or himself, as happened with the Active-Negative Woodrow Wilson who was so totally absorbed in the League of Nations project that when it was defeated, Wilson too was destroyed politically. Dulles, as Active-Positive, would not do this. He would accept defeat as the reality of politics. Whether Barber's theory, as here applied, holds up to reality will be analyzed in a later chapter dealing with the actual performance of Dulles as Secretary of State as compared with Barber's psychology theory.

Another personality theorist is Erik Erikson. Erikson, as opposed to Barber, is a developmental psychologist. That is, he does not say that only early-life experiences shape and determine behavior for the rest of a person's life, but that new experiences continue to affect behavior all through life. Erikson has developed eight stages which he says everyone goes through. Successful adjustment to one
stage helps in, but does not guarantee, the normal adjustment to subsequent stages. Abnormality or illness occurs when (a) there is failure to resolve a psychological crisis appropriate to a given stage; and (b) regression occurs—i.e., the use of behavior which is appropriate to earlier stages. (Lowe, 1972, p. xxii) It can only be assumed that Dulles had a normal upbringing because the signs which Erikson says are signs of normality cannot be checked—e.g., the first stage (Trust) is seen by ease in feeding the baby, the length of his naps and whether he lets his mother out of sight without crying long. Assuming normality where it is unable to be checked is not taking unwarranted liberty. Disproving this assumption would be possible by viewing regression tendencies in later life.

The first two stages of Dulles' life are here assumed to have been completed normally. These are the Trust stage from 0-2 years old and the Autonomy stage from 2-4 years old. From 5-7, Dulles did show Initiative in his relationships. He was an energetic and adventurous youth who enjoyed new experiences and learning new things. The initial school age years run roughly from 6-12 in Erikson's category where Industry proves normality. "The child's ability to adapt to the school environment depends on how well family life prepared him for school." (Lowe, 1972, p. 130) Dulles was a quick learner before he even started school, a trait which continued with him through life. The Adolescent years of 13-19 are the Identity years. Physical and social changes cause a disruption in the adolescent and his ability to cope with these changes and to "find himself" demonstrates a normal adjustment so his Identity is firmly rooted. Again, this was the
period where Dulles attended The Hague Conference. He saw the necessity for international conferences and agreements to avoid war. He developed an Identity that was to thereafter seek world peace as the number one priority in his life.

In young adulthood, between 20 and 30 years of age, Intimacy is the goal. This requires finding someone you love, of the opposite sex, and surrendering part of your identity in order to live with that loved partner. Dulles found Janet Avery when he was 23, married her, and brought her into his life and his career as she traveled with him on career-related trips. In adulthood, 30–65 years old, a person seeks interest in guiding the next generation. Dulles raised a family and enjoyed spending time playing games with his children. Apparently, he did not have a great deal of time to spend with them as he traveled often and spent much of his free time with Janet. But his children, when they grew up, said the time he spent with them was sufficient. Perhaps Dulles did not succeed in this Generativity stage with a perfect 100%. If not, he would likely regress to this stage later in life.

Old Age, 65 and older, is the last stage and it is the stage in which Dulles acted as Secretary of State. This will be discussed in a later chapter. But, the relative successes of earlier stages should give an indication of how Dulles would behave as Secretary. Assuming the last stage is successful, as were previous ones, it would be expected that Dulles would have a feeling that his life had not been wasted and that it "makes sense". He should have Ego Integrity where he does not regret the things he has done in his life. A normal Old-Aged person will also have a good-humored serenity and an eager
involvement in ordinary things. This would mean, in effect, that Dulles would not work so hard in his career and would relax with his family and enjoy playing with his grandchildren. If this were so, Dulles would have to neglect many of his career-related duties. This will be analyzed in Chapter Four dealing with his actual performance as Secretary of State.
Heinz Alfred Kissinger was born in Furth, Germany, on May 27, 1923. This year is best remembered in Germany as the year in which Hitler made his premature attempt to seize control of the German government with his "beer-hall putsch" in Munich. Germany also suffered from severe unemployment and high inflation in the early 1920's.

Heinz' father, Louis, was a teacher-advisor at a high school for privileged girls. His position brought him sufficient income and the family did not suffer, even in those inflationary years. Louis' father, David, was also a school teacher. Like Louis, David was an Orthodox Jew and attended the synagogue frequently. Heinz loved his grandfather and eventually named his own first born son, David, after him. Heinz' grandfather did not live near the Louis Kissinger family in Germany and thus he did not have much influence over his grandson.

Louis was a strict father, keeping close watch on Heinz and always checking his school homework. Louis has also been described as "serious, cultured, refined, a person of courtly manners...shy...a man of utmost sincerity, genuine piety and kindness, friendly...witty...authoritarian." (Mazlish, 1976, pp. 23-24) Heinz respected his father as a youth. Although Louis did not play soccer or other sports with his children, he was a loving and concerned parent.

Heinz' mother was Paula Stern Kissinger. Paula's mother died when she was quite young. Paula was raised by a step-mother and her
father, who was a cattle dealer and prominent member of the Jewish community in Leutershausen. As a teenager, Paula moved to Furth to attend school and lived with an aunt. She married Louis when she was 20 and he was 35. She was the driving force in the family. A natural leader, it was Paula who arranged for the family's departure from Germany.

Heinz' hometown, Furth, emerged as a village as a result of Fourteenth Century anti-Semitism in Nuremberg which banned Jews from living within the city limits. By the Twentieth Century, Furth was known for its religious harmony. Oppression and anti-Semitism returned to Germany and came to Furth in the 1920's. Heinz and his younger brother Walter began to mature when the Nazis were gaining influence. But Heinz' childhood was relatively normal. Heinz was an average student. He was also a normal child, preferring soccer and socializing with the girls over academic assignments.

Religious practice took up much of Heinz' time. He attended synagogue each morning before school and studied the Torah on Saturdays. His family observed the dietary laws and all the Jewish holidays. In preparing for his Bar Mitzvah at 13, Heinz learned to chant the Torah. He also helped his brother prepare for his Bar Mitzvah the following year. He conducted the synagogue choir and assumed a variety of leadership roles in the community. This otherwise idyllic life came to an abrupt halt when Adolph Hitler was chosen to lead the German nation.

When the Nazis came to power, Heinz, Walter and their Jewish friends were constantly harassed and beaten up by the Nazi youth.
This did leave marks. Even after coming to America, Heinz would cross the street if he saw a group of boys approaching on his side.

The Kissingers fled Furth in 1938. Paula had an aunt in London and after visiting with her, the family went to America. Heinz was then 15, old enough to remember the tragedy which his town and his country suffered. He would later write that "it is difficult for Americans to visualize national disaster". (Kalb, 1974, p. 34) But he also dismissed his childhood experiences as "not a key to anything... the political persecutions of my childhood are not what control my life". (Kalb, 1974, p. 35)

The family settled in the German-refugee section of Washington Heights in New York. Louis Kissinger found it difficult to adjust to his new country. He was 50 and did not have command of the English language. He took a job as a bookkeeper as his teaching career was ended. Paula, however, adapted quickly. She worked as a cook at private parties and then established her own professional catering business. She also learned English quickly.

Heinz, soon to be Henry, was enrolled in George Washington High School in 1938. His school record shows that he had a foreign language handicap. Henry did not lose his German accent and he became self-conscious about it. In the strange new world of America, Henry was shy and a loner. He devoted his time to his studies and he earned good grades. He did not date much, if at all. He had to work in a brush factory during the day to supplement the family income. He finished high school at night.

After graduating from high school, Henry enrolled in the College
of the City of New York. He wanted to be an accountant. His college career was cut short, however, when he was drafted into the U.S. Army in 1943. With this, Henry became an American citizen and he was sent to South Carolina for basic training. But he was soon returned to college. His IQ (Intelligence Quotient) and aptitude tests qualified him for specialized training at army expense. His record as a student in engineering at Lafayette College, in Pennsylvania, was outstanding. But he did not finish his training as this special army program was terminated. The American public voiced opposition to the fact that some soldiers spent their time in a classroom while others were on the battlefield.

Back on the rifle range, Henry met Private Fritz Kraemer. Kraemer was a Protestant German who voluntarily left Germany because he could not tolerate Nazism. Kraemer held a doctorate of law from the Goethe University in Frankfurt and a doctorate in political science from the University of Rome. He turned down an officer's commission but he commanded substantial personal authority for a man of his low military rank. His superiors respected his insights and intelligence and they welcomed his advice. He spoke to Henry's unit about the necessity of fighting the Germans to get rid of the Nazi menace. Henry was impressed by Kraemer. Kraemer saw that Henry had potential and a desire to learn. With Kraemer's help, Henry became the German-speaking interpreter for the 84th Infantry Division. In January 1945, his division occupied Krefeld, Germany, and Henry was made military administrator—again on Kraemer's recommendation. In Krefeld, the municipal government was not functioning when Henry arrived. He reversed this
situation within three days. His success in Krefeld led to an assignment to run the district of Bergstrasse. Henry was now a sergeant, but his powers were extensive—including the power to arrest. "When it came to Nazis," Kraemer recalls, "Kissinger showed human understanding, self-discipline. Unbelieving impartiality, really. He was guided in everyday life by an unshakable conviction that moral values are absolute." (Kalb, 1974, pp. 40-41)

Henry was also on his way to becoming a marginal Jew, respectful of his parents' views but no longer a practicing adherent to his faith. He was, it seemed, giving up his Jewish heritage. Even after the war, friends in college thought of Henry only as German and learned of his being Jewish months or years later. Why he gave up his faith is a difficult question to answer. One reason may be that as a youth he saw his God as unable to prevent the oppression of his people. He may have seen his faith as inadequate and therefore not worth the effort to practice it.

With the help of Kraemer, Henry was transferred to the European Command Intelligence School at Oberammergau in 1945. Henry was still shy and a loner at this school, but because of his performance, he was asked to teach at the school and he remained there after the war had ended and he was discharged. He was 23 years old teaching German history. He was in a position of authority, as he had been in Krefeld and Bergstrasse, over men his superiors in age and rank.

In the spring of 1947, Henry decided to return to America and to college. He applied to several prestigious universities and Harvard accepted him with the offer of a scholarship to start in the fall of 1947.
As an undergraduate at Harvard, Henry kept to himself and was constantly studying. He would discuss his experiences in the military with his roommate. In these discussions, his roommate listened to Henry's concern that the Russians were out to dominate the world. He would also hear his anti-Communist and anti-fascist views. In addition to voicing his views on various issues to his roommate, Henry took the time to date and fall in love with Anne Fleischer, also a German-Jewish refugee. He married her in February 1949.

Henry's undergraduate senior honors thesis was "The Meaning of History: Reflections on Spengler, Toynbee and Kant". In it he spoke of the importance of reason, rational analysis and objectivity. He wrote mockingly of those who felt everything was reducible to formulas, that all problems were solvable, and that good will would cause injustice to be abolished and peace to reign. He believed in the indeterminacy of the future. The work was 377 pages long, which led the Government Department at Harvard to set a maximum limit on the length of future theses. Because of the work, Henry graduated summa cum laude (with highest honors) in 1950 and was elected to Phi Beta Kappa.

By now Henry had decided to become a professor. To do so it was necessary for him to secure a Ph.D. degree. He would, of course, stay at Harvard. He chose for his dissertation, not a contemporary problem as his colleagues had chosen, but to analyze the European world order in the first decades of the Nineteenth Century. Henry wanted to learn
more about international relations and he argued for the continuing importance of history as a guide for the present and future. Quoting Thucydides, he said the present, while never replicating the past, must inevitably resemble it; so must the future. The task of the historian was to find where the similarities lay and where the differences were. Professor William Yandell Elliott was Henry's tutor for graduate studies.

In 1951, Elliott named Henry to be Director of the Harvard International Seminar. The Seminar brought foreign persons to Harvard to discuss relations between states. These individuals were oftentimes about to reach positions of leadership in their own countries. This gave Henry the opportunity to meet with future world leaders and to establish contact with them—contacts that would be helpful in his later governmental career. The Seminar initially attracted West Europeans, but later was attended by Indians, Pakistanis, Arabs, Israelis, Africans, Latin Americans, Chinese, Japanese, Greeks and Turks. East Europeans and Russians were invited but never attended. The Seminar folded in 1969 when Henry left Harvard.

In 1952, Henry became editor of Confluence, An International Forum. It was a quarterly journal financed by the Rockefeller Brothers Fund. This magazine brought together European and American thinkers to express a variety of ideas and positions. It was another vehicle for Henry to become acquainted with world political figures as well as intellectuals. Though the journal was criticized as having an anti-Communist slant, it allowed various ideological positions—leftist, centrist, and rightist—to be aired without bias. The journal folded in 1958, but it served Henry well in exposing him further to American
and European circles of power.

Henry completed his dissertation in 1954, which was later published under the title *A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh, and the Problems of Peace, 1812-22*. With this completed, he received his Ph.D. and was confident of being appointed to the Harvard faculty. But his hopes were dashed. The judgment against him had nothing to do with his academic credentials. The Harvard administration felt Kissinger wanted a post on the faculty only as a stepping stone to another career. (Ashman, 1972, p. 61) Kissinger was not unemployed very long.

**Council on Foreign Relations**

The Council on Foreign Relations set up a discussion group on nuclear weapons and foreign policy in 1954. The Council wanted to produce a book from these discussions and sought someone outside the Council to write it. Kissinger was recommended for the position by Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., McGeorge Bundy, and William Elliott. Kissinger also exhibited such self-confidence when interviewed that the Council hired him. This self-confidence was later seen by some Council members as arrogance. Kissinger seemed to dominate the discussions, never fearing to contradict men his superiors in background, power and practical knowledge.

*Foreign Affairs* is the widely known quarterly publication of the Council on Foreign Relations. However, it is only the Council's public face. The Council is comprised of bankers, lawyers, former government officials, professors, journalists, and business executives.
This basically male club continues to meet two or three times a week to confer with American or foreign dignitaries.

_**Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy,**_ however, was Kissinger's book. He made sure that he could write it the way he wanted. But it would not have been possible to mobilize the various sources for that book without the Council's help. The Council had sponsored other books before, but none had met with the success of Kissinger's book. It was a bestseller, an instant success that catapulted Kissinger to the center of discussion on foreign policy issues.

Nelson Rockefeller was a member of the Council on Foreign Relations but attended few of the meetings during Kissinger's two-year tenure as Director of the Committee on Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy. In 1956, Rockefeller set up a Special Studies Project under the Rockefeller Brothers Fund to make projections on United States domestic and international problems. Rockefeller asked Kissinger to be Director of the Project. Kissinger accepted but because he was still working on _**Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy,**_ the work load on him was tremendous. As Director of the Special Studies Project, he was again overseeing the work of men his superior in experience in foreign affairs.

The final report of the Project was written under Kissinger's direction. It was entitled _**Prospect for America: The Rockefeller Panel Reports**_, and was released in January 1958, just as Nelson Rockefeller entered the first of his successful campaigns for Governor of New York. The report reflected Kissinger's view of the need for a strategy focused on tactical use of nuclear weapons. It called for an expanded
national civil defense system (an idea especially favored by Rockefeller) and for a sharp increase in defense spending. When the project ended, Kissinger remained a consultant to and close associate of Nelson Rockefeller.

Teaching at Harvard

Although Harvard rejected Kissinger's request for a permanent position in 1954, it did offer him a position in 1957. He was appointed lecturer in the Government Department and was confident of a permanent appointment on the faculty shortly thereafter. He was made Director of Harvard's Defense Studies Program. And he was appointed Associate Director of the Center for International Affairs with Robert Bowie as its Director. Again, Kissinger was overextended in his responsibilities. Aside from Harvard, he was still tied to Rockefeller and to the Special Studies Project.

Bowie and Kissinger did not get along. Their personalities clashed and ideas for the Center diverged greatly. Kissinger was unable to influence the shape the Center would take. He did not try to wrest control of the Center from Bowie. It was not worth the effort. This attitude fits in with how Kissinger viewed his professorial colleagues: they struggle too hard for prizes too small; they are insecure and narrow-minded. (Graubard, 1973, p. 118) Yet, Kissinger liked being a professor, mainly because of the independence the position afforded. He did not like Harvard much, but it provided more independence and opportunity to associate with practical politicians than most any other university. He was proud of his position. But he distrusted
the values of his colleagues. He did not belong at Harvard as others did. He was not wholeheartedly dedicated to the academic world. He enjoyed associating with political figures, hoping to influence foreign policy.

Kissinger "did not figure among the most distinguished teachers of the university or even among the best in his own department". (Graubard, 1973, p. 114) He had, as mentioned, several different sets of responsibilities but never found enough time to prepare for his course lectures to his own satisfaction. Some years later, however, he gained the reputation as an outstanding teacher. By then, the Harvard undergraduate newspaper referred to his lectures as meaty, invariably interesting and at times witty. But, it continued, some students found his delivery monotonic and his 16-page reading list savagely long.

Kissinger's colleagues differed in their opinions of him. Some thought very highly of him. Others found him arrogant. He was an intellectual heavyweight with a wide range of outside contacts. He used his contacts and invited men in power to speak to his classes. Secretaries, assistant secretaries, deputy assistant secretaries of the Departments of Defense and State spoke in his Defense Policy Seminar. His students gained valuable insight into foreign policy from these practitioners of power. And he was expanding his ties with the power brokers of Washington.

Foreign policy advisor

When John F. Kennedy was elected President in 1960, he appointed
members of the professorial ranks of Harvard and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology to administrative positions. Kissinger also worked for the Kennedy Administration (1961-1963). Kennedy did not invite Kissinger to the White House. It was Kissinger's friendship with McGeorge Bundy and Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. that brought him to the stage of American policy making. Bundy was Kennedy's National Security Advisor and Schlesinger was Special Assistant to the President.

In the summer of 1961, before and after the Berlin Wall was built, Kissinger commuted to Washington several days each week as a junior advisor to Kennedy. His immediate boss was Bundy, but he tried to circumvent him to propose his suggestions directly to Kennedy. Kennedy did not appreciate this attempt by Kissinger, nor did he agree with his advice on foreign policy. In February 1962, Kissinger was told his services were no longer required by the President.

He returned to Harvard and to writing. His last book had been Necessity for Choice, published in January 1961. In it he repudiated limited nuclear war as a doctrine and proposed the strengthening of conventional forces. After leaving his advising post in the Kennedy Administration, Kissinger published articles in Foreign Affairs and The Reporter. He criticized the Kennedy Administration's handling of foreign policy, but not as severely as he did the Eisenhower Administration.

In 1964, Nelson Rockefeller sought the Republican nomination for President against Barry Goldwater. Kissinger was Rockefeller's foreign policy advisor. He was still teaching at Harvard and was working on
another book, The Troubled Partnership. A Rockefeller victory in
November would have put Kissinger at the pinnacle of power in the form-
ulation of foreign policy. Kissinger did not even come close. Rocke-
feller did not even gain his party's nomination and Goldwater was
pitted against Lyndon Johnson (1963-69).

When Johnson was elected President in 1964, Kissinger had another
chance to advise a president. Henry Cabot Lodge, Ambassador to South
Vietnam, asked Kissinger to visit Vietnam and make a report suggesting
the role the U.S. should play there. Kissinger knew virtually nothing
about the culture or history of Vietnam, so he prepared for his trip
with the aid of briefings by academic experts. His first visit to
Vietnam was in October 1965. He conferred with Embassy and military
personnel, but he knew their official version of conditions in
Vietnam was self-serving. Determined to get a more realistic view of
the situation, he traveled the countryside, sometimes at considerable
risk to his safety. He made contact with political dissidents, espe-
cially Buddhists. He talked to army privates, village dwellers, news-
men, and village leaders. He asked questions about history, society,
and culture. He wanted to know if the South Vietnamese army could be
improved and, if so, how fast.

Kissinger was dismayed over what he discovered in Vietnam. He
found American and South Vietnamese officials "untalented and corrupt".
(Landau, 1972, p. 156) He decided the U.S. was pursuing a hopeless
and worthless cause. He was sure the Saigon government would collapse,
but he could not predict the date. Yet, despite his feelings, he did
not recommend withdrawal from Vietnam. In an article for Look
magazine in 1966, he said withdrawal would be disastrous because "a demonstration of American impotence in Asia cannot fail to lessen the credibility of American pledges in other fields". (Look, August 1966, p. 28) The United States was fighting for international stability in Vietnam, but to achieve its goals, negotiations were indispensable.

Kissinger visited Vietnam twice. In 1966, he was involved in secret exchanges of messages between Hanoi and Washington. These experiences were valuable to him and he would later use them in his dealings with North Vietnam.

In 1968, Kissinger returned as foreign policy advisor to Rockefeller in the latter's campaign for the Presidency. Kissinger poured all his energies into the campaign. He even became interested in the domestic side of the campaign. It was clear, however, that Nixon would win the party's nomination. Kissinger's only hope of serving the next President was if Hubert Humphrey beat Nixon. Kissinger was staunchly anti-Nixon. He referred to Nixon as a "disaster" and "not fit to be President". (Kalb, 1974, p. 16) Because he was so opposed to Nixon, he did not even consider the possibility that Nixon might ask Kissinger to serve him.

But Nixon did invite Kissinger to his room at the Hotel Pierre on November 25, 1968, after Nixon defeated Humphrey for the Presidency earlier that month. Nixon and Kissinger spoke for four hours on foreign policy issues. On November 27, Kissinger was offered the position of Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Kissinger was not sure he could accept, but one week later, after talking with Rockefeller and other friends, he did. Kissinger needed
that week to reassess Nixon and to decide if he could work with this man of whom he was so critical. He could. Their discussions erased some prejudices both men had of each other and indicated that they held similar views on how foreign policy should be conducted. Both men distrusted the bureaucracy. They agreed that the Soviets should be brought in to negotiate an end to the Vietnam War. Triangular diplomacy with the Soviet Union and China was also likely. Kissinger would work with Nixon, not because he liked him personally, but because he would be at the center of power in foreign policy formation.

It was not surprising that Kissinger took the job. What is surprising is why Nixon offered it. In addition to their discussions, Nixon knew of and agreed with Kissinger's hard-line views as expressed in his several books and articles. Also, Nixon wanted to run foreign policy by himself, not through the State Department. Kissinger would be totally accessible to and dependent on Nixon and would serve him well as National Security Advisor, especially since both men shared a distrust of the bureaucracy. Whatever the other reasons may be, Nixon did ask Kissinger to serve him and Kissinger accepted. Kissinger, at the age of 45, thus began his first truly political career--a career which lasted 8 years in the service of two presidents in a period which was one of the most tumultuous in America's history.

Kissinger's writings

Kissinger's philosophy on foreign policy can easily be examined by studying his writings. The two works for which he is best known and which best typify his outlook on the world order are _A World_
Restored and Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy. In the former, he says the objective of an international system is not peace but rather stability, which is dependent on a generally accepted legitimacy. Peace is the bonus that follows from the attainment of stability. Should peace be the objective, every state within the system would be at the mercy of the most ruthless—the revolutionary—state, since there was an incentive to mollify the aggressor and to accept its demands in order to maintain peace. Negotiating is impossible when a revolutionary state exists in a state system. Negotiating is possible within a legitimate state system. Napoleon's France was a revolutionary state. Metternich, Foreign Minister of Austria, saw France as such in the Nineteenth Century and sought to destroy Napoleon.

Henry admired Metternich for his ability to form a coalition against Napoleon; but Henry criticized him for his unwillingness to achieve social and political reform in the Austrian Empire. Henry also admired Castlereagh, Foreign Minister of Great Britain, for insisting on a peace settlement that did not seek retribution when his countrymen were clamoring for vengeance against France; Henry criticized Castlereagh for not gaining parliamentary support for his Quadruple Alliance, which he had proposed would guard Europe against revolutionary power. Largely by Metternich and Castlereagh's efforts, a balance of power was set up and Europe was spared a major war for a century.

Through his studies, Henry learned that the statesman, who "knows" the future prospects of his nation, has to act before his intuition is made actual. But this would make the statesman suspect in his
countrymen's eyes. Therefore, the statesman has to educate his fellow citizens about his insights to "bridge the gap between a people's experience and his vision, between a nation's tradition and its future."

This has to be done in order to gain public support for the statesman's policies. But:

A statesman who too far outruns the experience of his people, will fail in achieving a domestic consensus, however wise his policies; witness Castlereagh. A statesman who limits his policy to the experience of his people will doom himself to sterility; witness Metternich. (Kissinger, 1957, p. 329)

In Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, Kissinger says that with the discovery of atomic weaponry, man held an excess of power. The survival of the earth and its inhabitants depended on man's ability to use that power subtly and with discrimination. Total war was no longer thinkable because of this power and the risk of nuclear holocaust.

He said the U.S. required a strategic doctrine suited to its defense needs. It had wasted the years in which it had an atomic monopoly because it failed to establish a stable world order. He credited the Soviets with gaining control of East Europe and with stockpiling nuclear weapons during the American atomic monopoly without causing American retaliation. The Soviets thus learned how to gain increments of power and to present challenges to the U.S. without being confronted by an all-out war. Americans, he wrote, were only used to all-out war and unconditional surrender. But what they needed to realize was that "massive retaliation", as enunciated by John Foster Dulles, was the wrong policy. A limited war could produce specific political objectives. The Soviets were not deterred from a
U.S. threat of massive retaliation because they knew the U.S. would not follow through. And a deterrent which one is afraid to use when it is challenged ceases to be a deterrent. Nuclear weapons could also be used in a limited fashion without risking nuclear holocaust—unless, of course, the enemy escalated the war. Thermonuclear war must be avoided, wrote Kissinger, except as a last resort.

Diplomacy was also too concerned with absolutes—its only objective was absolute peace. Kissinger proposed that negotiations should focus on limiting the use of atomic weapons rather than on only searching for "peace". The Soviet Union, a revolutionary state, existed within the state system and therefore peace was unattainable as the primary objective. Kissinger further proposed an approach to arms control that would have the advantage of focusing thinking on things to accomplish rather than on things to prohibit.

Kissinger also took the U.S. alliance system to task. The success of alliances depends on a recognition of the fact that the interests of the U.S. and those of its allies could not in all cases coincide. The disparity of power was too great for the interests of all allies to be the same. Cooperation was possible on regional matters; but not always on world balance of power issues. However, "no progress can be made in our policy of alliances until there has been an agreement on strategic doctrine". (Kissinger, 1957, p. 246)

**Psychological considerations**

To consider the psychological aspects of Kissinger's life, Erikson's developmental theory is applied in this section. As in the
case of Dulles, assumptions must be made concerning the earliest stages of Kissinger's life. But for Kissinger, the first three stages (rather than the first two in Dulles' case) are assumed to have been completed normally for "there are no data whatever on how he was raised in infancy. Our first glimpse of him is in school, that is, after his sixth year." (Mazlish, 1976, p. 29) Mazlish adds, Kissinger's childhood seems to have been normal, at least until the Nazis came to power when Kissinger was about 10.

It is assumed then that Kissinger became a Trusting Infant (Stage 1: 0-2 years). This Trust, once established, would help him meet future crises with a good chance of normal development. Between 2 and 4 years old, Kissinger probably asserted his independence (Autonomy, Stage 2) by self-regulating his own behavior. Stage 3, 5-7 years, is the play age where Kissinger developed a sense of Initiative by being energetic and adventuresome.

Beginning with Erikson's Stage 4, 6-12 years (School Age), data on Kissinger are available. Normal development in this stage would be evident by the industry Kissinger showed in school (and in play). Being a school teacher, Louis Kissinger probably helped his son prepare for his formal education. It is known that young Heinz showed none of his later brilliance while in school in Germany.

With the Hitler youth groups attacking him, his brother and friends, Heinz was shaken emotionally. Like other children in this stage, Heinz wanted to accept his environment for what it was but further wanted to master its problems. He could not. He was a victim of one of the most bizarre moments in history. Because he failed in
this stage, he developed an inferiority complex. He would later overcompensate or rebel because of his failure in this stage, says Erikson. He could, of course, later regress to this stage from a higher one, solve its problems, and continue to develop normally.

The Adolescent Stage lasts roughly from 13 to 19 years of age. Identity is the goal sought and can be achieved by normal adjustment to the physical and social changes occurring within and to the youth. The biggest social change for Kissinger in this stage was his escape from Nazi Germany. Perhaps he finally overcame his environment, a feat he could not achieve previously. His adjustment to American life was slow but steady. He was shy and a loner. He worked hard in high school and earned excellent grades—even with his "foreign language handicap". He attended baseball games and enjoyed his American surroundings.

As a young adult, ages 20-30, a person's outlook turns toward intimacy. He seeks a lasting, loving relationship with a member of the opposite sex. Kissinger married Anne Fleischer when he was 25. The marriage did not fit Erikson's ideal where each individual would surrender part of his/her hard-won identity in order to succeed in the relationship. Kissinger required silence from his wife during his long writing episodes. He usually was overextended in his responsibilities (aside from his husbandly duties) and he demanded submissiveness from Anne. The marriage was unstable, perhaps due to the inability to surrender identity and independence for the sake of the marriage. In 1964, after having two children, Henry and Anne were divorced. Where intimacy fails, isolation occurs. Kissinger was isolated in his own
home and marriage.

Generativity, or the desire to establish and guide the next generation, is the result of successful completion of adulthood, ages 30–65. A teacher is a good example of someone successful in this stage. This stage is not only the one in which Kissinger performed as an instructor at Harvard; it is also the one in which he was National Security Advisor and Secretary of State under Nixon and Gerald Ford (1974–77). Thus, not only did Kissinger help guide a younger generation through college; he tried to guide all generations of Americans (and as a consequence, everyone else in the world) toward a more stable world order. This was his goal, as is evident from virtually all his writings. He was successful as a professor at Harvard, guiding a future generation to a better understanding of world politics. Whether he was equally successful in guiding all generations toward a more stable world order will be discussed in Chapter V.

Because he failed to attain intimacy in the previous stage, Kissinger regressed to that stage from adulthood. He married Nancy Maginnes in 1974. By doing so, he hoped to achieve that intimacy which he was unable to achieve before.

James David Barber's personality theory also may provide some insight as to why Kissinger behaved the way he did as chief foreign policy advisor. An individual's character is developed mainly in childhood and is the way a person confronts new experiences. Kissinger's character was one of overcoming handicaps. He overcame the pressures of Nazi Germany when his family left that country. He overcame his "foreign language handicap" in America by working hard
at his studies. He overcame his "handicap" of being a potentially biased participant in Germany as an American soldier of German-Jewish origin by being objective and judicious in dealing with Nazis in Krefeld. He overcame a similar handicap by saying how his childhood experiences as a persecuted Jew in Germany are "not a key" to how he thinks or acts. He even overcame his handicap of not being able to date many girls during his first few years in America by becoming a middle-aged "swinger". Kissinger still has a sense of vulnerability which he acquired in his youth. He is forever on the lookout for enemies. He is still a loner. He does not let many people get too close to him personally; nor does he let anyone know who or what Henry A. Kissinger really is: "No, I won't tell you what I am. I'll never tell anyone." (New Republic, December 16, 1972)

Like Dulles, Kissinger did not suffer from economic or psychological deprivation. Though the Dulles family was much better off financially, Kissinger's father earned a good salary as a teacher-advisor during the character-formative years of young Heinz' life. In America, Louis worked as a bookkeeper, Paula earned money as a cook, and eventually Henry worked in a factory to supplement the family income. Again, there was enough money to keep the family of four happy. "We had a very close family relationship and things did not seem that hard to me. I was not brought up to have a lot of leisure; there was no shame in that." (Kalb & Kalb, 1974, p. 37) The Kissingers were close—brother and brother, parents and children. Louis spent much time with his sons, teaching them in the ways of his faith, watching them play, disciplining them, helping them with homework. Paula was a
good and loving mother—at home (in Germany) when her sons needed her; in America she was working and not always home but was no less attentive to her sons. There was no deprivation, which is surprising given the circumstances in which Kissinger grew up.

To describe Kissinger as active is perhaps an understatement. "Workaholic" may be a more suitable term. He was constantly busy throughout his life (as he admits, he had little time for leisure). And he usually overextended himself in his responsibilities. Yet, he received much satisfaction from his work, whether it was working on books and articles or with the Council on Foreign Relations or for presidents. Thus, he enjoyed his activity which indicates a positive approach to his work.

An Active-Positive uses "his styles flexibly, adaptively, suiting the dance to the music." (Barber, 1977, p. 12) When Harvard refused to hire him full-time in 1954, Kissinger directed his talents to the Council on Foreign Relations. Though a known "Rockefeller Republican", Kissinger saw Kennedy's election as a chance to influence foreign policy in a Democratic Administration. And he advised Johnson on the role the U.S. should play in Vietnam. Here Kissinger proved his ability to work for anyone—regardless of party—so long as he was influencing the direction of U.S. foreign policy. Kissinger truly proved his flexibility and his ability to succeed when all else pointed to failure when he went to work for Nixon. Ardently anti-Nixon and deeply rooted in the Rockefeller camp, Kissinger proved to Nixon that he could serve and be loyal to him (as Nixon had hoped).

An Active-Positive works toward "well defined personal goals".
Kissinger's goal:

I'd like to leave behind a world that seemed more peaceful than the one we entered. More creative in the sense of fulfilling human aspirations. And of course it's been my dream, which for many reasons has not been fully realizable, to have contributed in some sense to unity in the American people. (Kalb, 1974, p. 12)

He has written about such goals in most, if not all, of his books: Metternich and Castlereagh established a stable world order; Nuclear Weapons could be used in a limited way for political goals--namely stability.

Kissinger's World View was developed in his adolescence, roughly between 13 and 19 years of age. His early adolescence was spent in tumultuous Germany; he moved to America at 15. In his doctoral dissertation, Kissinger said if revolutionary states were allowed to exist in the world, stability and therefore peace would never be achieved. Napoleon, Hitler and Stalin were revolutionary leaders. The world system was unstable as long as these leaders (and any others like them) were in power.

Style is developed in early adulthood. It is the way a person behaves. When the person moves from thinking about what he wants to do to actually doing it, he adopts a style. The period this happens in is when the person emerges as an independent actor. Kissinger's time of emergence was when he directed the Council on Foreign Relations Committee on Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy and when he wrote his book on its deliberations. The style he used to achieve his success would be used throughout the rest of his political career. Barber offers three styles: rhetoric, homework and personal relations.
Kissinger dominated the discussions on Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy. He was confident that his ideas were correct. He told the Council that he would write the book only if he could do it his own way. He wrote the book and did express his ideas, relying on the data supplied by the discussions. In expressing his controversial ideas, Kissinger relied on the power of persuasion via his writing. But Barber does not provide for a style of "persuasion". It is difficult to determine which style of persuasion is most related to—rhetoric, homework or personal relations.

Analyzing a subsequent political success, his style will be more evident. When Kissinger visited Vietnam for Johnson, he relied on personal contacts to find a realistic picture of life and society in South Vietnam. He reported his findings directly to Ambassador Lodge and to President Johnson because he was always "a believer in face to face exchanges". (Kalb, 1974, p. 63) It was in such situations that Kissinger was at his best. He could make two adversaries believe that he agreed with both of them. He manipulated a co-negotiator, making him feel that he and Kissinger were smarter than a third party. Kissinger would do the same with the roles reversed, with the third party, making him feel righteous and better than the rest. Kissinger also had (and has) a timely sense of humor that helped in breaking the ice in many tense situations during negotiations. These elements of his style would remain during his tenure in the Nixon and Ford Administrations.
CHAPTER IV

Dulles: Presidential Advisor and Secretary of State (1953-59)

John Foster Dulles was sworn in as Secretary of State under President Eisenhower on January 21, 1953. Dulles and Eisenhower had a special working relationship. But it took a while to cultivate this relationship. At first Eisenhower was impatient with Dulles' slow, meticulously detailed oratory. But he respected Dulles' grasp of historic and current facts of foreign policy, especially in relation to the Soviet Union. Dulles studied Marxist-Leninist ideology intensely and would quote from Josef Stalin's *Problems of Leninism*, which he kept at his bedside and on his desk along with the Bible and the Federalist Papers. He would present several alternative courses of action for the President to decide from, offering various consequences and advantages of each alternative. He presented the facts as he knew them, offered his suggestions and then asked for the President's decision.

Dulles respected Eisenhower's military experience and his position as President. "While Dulles was always the prime mover, he meticulously respected Eisenhower's authority in making the final decision." (Goold-Adams, 1962, p. 61) Dulles had easy, free access to the President at any time of the day. The two would converse two or three times a day on the phone. The only other Cabinet member who was closer to Eisenhower than Dulles was Secretary of the Treasury, George Humphrey, long-time friend of Eisenhower.

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As Secretary of State, Dulles sought to form public opinion in favor of his policies, not to be guided by that opinion. He made himself far more accessible than his predecessor, Dean Acheson, to the American press. He was at all times more communicative to the public. He opened to the public "an unusually wide window on the purposes and motives of the Department of State". (Drummond & Coblentz, 1960, pp. 67-69) But he also had a tendency to oversimplify complicated foreign policy issues and his grand boasts misled the public he was hoping to enlighten and alienated those with a more sophisticated knowledge of foreign affairs.

Although he was respectful of Eisenhower and was open to the press, Dulles did not get off to a good start with the State Department personnel. When he took office, morale was virtually nonexistent due to Senator Joseph McCarthy's attacks on the Department. In February 1950, McCarthy said Communists inside the State Department were responsible for American setbacks in the world. When Dulles arrived, he outraged and frightened the Department staff by telling them he would demand their "positive loyalty", a phrase "that suggested a new test of allegiance was to be imposed as a condition of continued employment". (Divine, 1979, p. 58) He reinforced their fears when he appointed Scott McLeod, a close friend of McCarthy, as head of the State Department security program with access to personnel files. State Department personnel believed Dulles was appeasing McCarthy.

Dulles soon stood up to McCarthy and reassured his staff that he was not a McCarthy supporter. Eisenhower appointed Charles Bohlen as Ambassador to Moscow, replacing George Kennan. Bohlen had been a
member of the first diplomatic mission to the Soviet Union following recognition in 1933, headed up the Russian desk at the State Department in World War II, served as Roosevelt's interpreter at Yalta, and was counselor to Secretaries Marshall and Acheson. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee unanimously confirmed his appointment. McCarthy objected to the appointment after McLeod refused to clear Bohlen because the FBI file on him contained damning evidence concerning his loyalty. (Divine, 1979, p. 59; Guhin, 1972, p. 201)

Senators Robert Taft (Republican-Ohio) and John Sparkman (Democrat-Alabama) reviewed Bohlen's file at the FBI and found nothing suggesting he was disloyal to his country. Dulles continued to support Bohlen. He had a stake in assuring that the State Department would run its own affairs. Bohlen's rejection by the Senate would mean that McCarthy would have a veto over Dulles' decisions. With Dulles' and Eisenhower's support, Taft was able to secure Senate confirmation for Bohlen by a margin of 74 to 13.

Liberation

One of the simplistic phrases used by Dulles to describe complex foreign policy issues was uttered by him in the 1952 Presidential campaign. Dulles criticized the Truman-Acheson containment policy, which focused on stopping Communism from spreading any further. Dulles felt that containment was too static because the policy wrote off the Eastern Europeans who were imprisoned in the Soviet sphere. Dulles sought a more positive, dynamic policy of liberation. The Europeans were worried about this policy because they feared their region would
become a battleground of U.S.-Soviet rivalries.

Liberation was typically Dullesian. It was anti-status quo; it was anti-Communist. When he was given opportunity to implement his policy, that policy proved to be merely a desire for peaceful change and not a plan for action. In 1956, when Poland and Hungary rebelled against Soviet domination, Dulles could only offer his moral support and not armed assistance. He had never promised military action to achieve liberation. He laid out an advance strategy of this policy in *War or Peace*: East Europeans "have no arms, and violent revolt would be futile." Worse than that, "it would precipitate a massacre...We have no desire to weaken the Soviet Union at the cost of the lives of those who are our primary concern." (Dulles, 1950, p. 247) Dulles proposed instead of armed revolt to exert intense political, economic, and moral pressure on the Soviet empire from without, and to activate the same type pressures from within. He saw Yugoslavian President Josep Broz Tito's break with Stalin in 1948 as the beginning of liberation.

**Agonizing reappraisal**

Dulles and Eisenhower were primarily concerned with European unity in their handling of foreign policy. Dulles feared Communism spreading through West Europe. He envisioned the creation of a United States of Europe that would insulate the continent from Communist subversion. Moreover, a European Defense Community (EDC) was to be the nucleus for the unification of the European states. EDC emphasized an integrated European army comprised of French, German, Italian, Dutch, Belgian, and
Luxembourg troops. Such a force was perceived deterring any Soviet aggression against West Europe. EDC had been proposed by France in 1951, but Paris later proved to be the main obstacle to the creation of the European army. The French National Assembly was divided on the issue. Many Frenchmen "began to have second thoughts about the proposed rearmament of Germany", a country which had thrice invaded and twice conquered France in 70 years. (Grantham, 1976, p. 92) Dulles sought to push the French Assembly into a decision--either for or against. Their delay left the security of West Germany and all of Europe uncertain.

Dulles consistently stated there was no alternative to EDC. It must be approved by the various parliaments in order to commence the unifying of West European interests and purposes. He denied the possibility of alternatives in hopes of gaining a decision on EDC. He knew there were alternatives to EDC--such as West German membership in NATO--but he felt EDC was the best of the practicable solutions. It would merge German and French troops along with others. "The German military units to be integrated were to be of less than divisional size. Thus there would be no separate German army and no German General Staff, a body with a militaristic tradition much feared by the French and British." (Knappen, 1956, p. 356) The European army was to be a joint contribution to the defense of Western Europe and was to be under the direction of the NATO Commander at SHAPE.

West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer was Dulles' closest friend among international statesmen. Adenauer wished to align his country with the West--the United States, France, and Great Britain. While
he worked hard for the reunification of his country, he did not want to be unified under Communism. Fearing for the security of the western part of Germany, he sought the support of the West to guard against any Communist threat.

Britain encouraged ratification of EDC but would not join it. It was skeptical, even fearful, of being party to German rearmament. In addition, it did not wish to weaken the London-Washington axis by becoming part of a London/Paris/Bonn-Washington axis. Britain's refusal to join EDC added to the delay in the French Assembly. Without the British as a counterweight, France may soon find its position in EDC weakened if Germany came to dominate the European army.

Dulles attempted to hasten the French decision on EDC. If EDC was approved, a major hurdle would be overcome and the European army could start organizing, pending the approval by other national assemblies. If rejected, Dulles could work on an alternative way of unifying Europe and strengthening West Germany—an alternative which officially did not exist in Dulles' mind. In December 1953, while in Paris for a NATO meeting, Dulles stated that if France rejected EDC, the U.S. would be forced into an "agonizing reappraisal" of its European policies. (Drummond & Coblentz, 1960, p. 85) Such a reappraisal might include the withdrawal of U.S. military and economic aid to the European continent. Dulles intentionally left his threats vague. He would let the French assemblymen wonder about possible U.S. reaction to EDC's rejection. Ambiguity was also a safe way not to have to punish an ally and risk losing his friendship.

Dulles did push France into making a decision, but it was not the
one he wanted. On August 30, 1954, the French National Assembly re-
jected EDC. Dulles' threats were never carried out. United States
troops remained in Europe. Dulles and Sir Anthony Eden, then British
Foreign Secretary, worked on an alternative to EDC. The Western European
Union (WEU) was formed by allowing West Germany and Italy to join the
Brussels Pact, which consisted of Britain, France, Belgium, the Nether-
lands, and Luxembourg. Through WEU, West Germany was admitted to NATO
in 1955.

Massive retaliation

When Dulles took office, the U.S. was still involved militarily
in Korea. Truce talks were deadlocked. Dulles went to Korea with
Eisenhower in December 1952 in fulfillment of the latter's campaign
promise. On the return trip, Dulles told Eisenhower that he was sure
the Chinese and North Koreans were content with the de facto truce
which they could reconvert into open hostilities whenever it suited
them. He said the U.S. must act to force the Communists' hand. To
force them into an official truce, the U.S. had to threaten dangerous
consequences if the North Koreans refused a truce. Dulles noted such
a policy risked renewed fighting in Korea, but Eisenhower acted accord-
ing to his Secretary's advice. "Eisenhower's decision was, as he put
it, 'let the Communist authorities understand that, in the absence of
satisfactory progress, we intended to move decisively without inhibi-
tion in our use of weapons, and would no longer be responsible for con-
fining hostilities to the Korean Peninsula.'...And immediately after
he took office he acted on his decision." (Middleton, 1965, p. 223)
The next step was to convey this policy to the Asian Communists. In his first State of the Union address, on February 2, 1953, Eisenhower announced he was rescinding a Truman order which placed the U.S. Seventh Fleet between Formosa and the People's Republic of China (PRC). The presence of the Seventh Fleet prevented any Nationalist Chinese invasion against mainland China and was a deterrent to any Communist Chinese aggression. Critics of Eisenhower said he was "unleashing" Chiang Kai-shek, the Nationalist leader. Eisenhower and Dulles never expected Chiang to invade the mainland. Eisenhower was simply warning the Chinese Communists that if a truce was not arrived at in the Korean War, the U.S. might use Formosa as an additional base of operations and thus threaten to open another front against the PRC.

On May 21, Dulles also issued a warning. In New Delhi, India, he told Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru that the U.S. wished to end the Korean War honorably, but if need be it would fight an all-out war and would restrict neither its effort nor its weapons. Dulles knew Nehru would convey this message to the Chinese.

Truce talks had been hampered by the prisoner of war problem. Some Communist POWs held by South Korea did not wish to return to their country. South Korea said they did not have to. China and North Korea said they did. But on June 4, two weeks after Dulles conferred with Nehru, the Communists proposed a plan whereby the fate of the POWs could be determined by the United Nations. On June 8, a POW agreement was signed.

South Korean President Syngman Rhee opposed the truce talks. He wanted to fight until all of Korea was united under his leadership.
To disrupt the talks, on June 18 he ordered the release of 27,000 North Korean prisoners who said they wanted to stay in South Korea. The talks were off again. Dulles predicted that the Communists would overlook Rhee's action if they truly wanted a truce and if they were given assurances that South Korea would abide by an armistice agreement. He was correct. Talks resumed on July 10. Dulles let Rhee know that the U.S. would not support a South Korean solitary war with North Korea and offered him a security pact and economic aid, which he accepted. The armistice was signed on July 27, 1953.

Dulles felt it a moral obligation to deter war. Threatening severe punishment to aggressors who wish to dominate others by force was a means to deter war. He believed that wars are created by miscalculation where aggressors believe they can achieve military ends without great risks to their own security. He felt the Korean War was one of miscalculation. When Secretary of State Dean Acheson and President Truman stated that Korea was outside the vital interests of the U.S., this in effect gave North Korea (and the PRC) a license to start a war without fear of U.S. military response. Dulles did not want another such miscalculation on the part of other potential aggressors. He thus stated his position on how to avoid war.

In an address to the Council on Foreign Relations on January 12, 1954, he said, "a potential aggressor must know that he cannot always prescribe battle conditions that suit him." The way to deter aggression is for the free community "to depend primarily on a greater capacity to retaliate, instantly, by means and at places of our own choosing...Local defense must be reinforced by the further deterrent of
massive retaliatory power." (Divine, 1979, p. 66; Grantham, 1976, p. 90) The doctrine of "massive retaliation" was thus introduced into the Eisenhower Administration. Dulles enunciated this concept twice before, at a Paris speech and in Life magazine in 1952. In 1954, it had the status of foreign policy doctrine as it was an official U.S. policy statement.

A particular reason for this threat of massive retaliation at that time was that Dulles wanted China to know that it ought not get involved in fighting in Indochina. In Foreign Affairs in April 1954, Dulles revised his policy and described it as "selective retaliation" because

massive atomic and thermonuclear retaliation is not the kind of power which could most usefully be evoked under all circumstances...The heart of the problem is to deter attack. This, we believe, requires that a potential aggressor be left in no doubt that he would be certain to suffer damage outweighing any possible gains from aggression...To deter aggression, it is important to have the flexibility and the facilities which make various responses available...The free world must have the means for responding effectively (to open assault by Communist forces) on a selective basis when it chooses...That does not mean turning every local war into a world war...It does mean that the free world must maintain the collective means and be willing to use them in the way which most effectively makes aggression too risky and expensive to be tempting. (Foreign Affairs, XXXII, 1954, p. 359)

Thus, in addition to stating his desire to "have the capacity" to retaliate against aggression (and Dulles did not state he would use it under specific situations), he also emphasized the importance of local and collective defense. Collective defense systems, or pacts, such as NATO could be an important part of deterring aggression--especially potential Soviet aggression. These pacts would warn
aggressors that those members of the pacts were ready to fend off aggression and would be aided by others—especially the United States.

Dulles and Eisenhower faced another crisis in Southeast Asia in 1954 and they dealt with it by considering the viability of the massive retaliation and collective defense doctrines. On March 20, General Paul Ely, the French Chief of Staff, asked Eisenhower for U.S. intervention in Indochina to help French forces under siege at Dien Bien Phu. The Joint Chiefs of Staff told Eisenhower that the fall of Indochina would precipitate the collapse of other states in the area and create a "Soviet position of dominance over Asia". (Divine, 1979, p. 67) Eisenhower concurred with this judgment but decided that the use of limited American forces would not alter the situation and that the American public would not stand for a massive intervention. Dulles and Eisenhower wanted to avoid unilateral American action. They did endorse a united action—a plan where the U.S., Great Britain, France, Thailand, Australia, New Zealand and the Associated States of Indochina would form a coalition to resist Communist expansion in Southeast Asia. This was Dulles' proposal for the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, later known as SEATO. He wanted Britain and France to join SEATO before attending the Geneva Conference on Indochina in late April so that France would be negotiating with the Communists from a position of strength and with allied support. But Britain, the key co-participant along with the United States, refused to use force to help France in Indochina. No action—unilateral or united—was used by the United States. Dien Bien Phu fell to the Communists on May 7.

The Geneva Conference, ending the French role in Indochina,
convened on April 26, 1954. Dulles stayed for the opening sessions, until May 3, and boycotted the rest of the proceedings. While at the Conference, he turned his back on Chinese Premier Chou En-lai's outstretched hand. Dulles had mixed feelings about the Conference. He did not wish to be seen as a party to French colonialism. Nor did he want to be a "cosignatory with the Communists" to an agreement which he knew would call for the partition of Vietnam. (Herring, 1979, p. 39)

The outcome of the Conference, the Geneva Accords of 1954, called for the partition of Vietnam at the 17th parallel. Ho Chi Minh and his Vietminh forces would control the north and Emperor Bao Dai would be the titular head in the south. This would be a temporary division until elections could be held in the summer of 1956 to reunify the nation under one ruler. Neither portion of Vietnam could join a military alliance. Laos and Cambodia were granted independent status.

Although the U.S. was not a signatory to the agreement, it unilaterally declared that it would not interfere with the Accords. Dulles and Eisenhower were not totally displeased with the results. If elections had been demanded immediately by the Communists, they were certain Ho would win a resounding victory. But, with elections two years away, they could build up the credibility of Bao Dai or his Premier, Ngo Dinh Diem, in hopes of getting a non-Communist elected to rule the whole country.

These hopes, however dim, were lost when Diem ousted Bao Dai, set himself up as President, and refused to consider elections for 1956. The U.S. formally recognized Ngo Dinh Diem as President of
Vietnam on October 26, 1955. (Branyan & Larsen, 1971, pp. 774-75)

Eisenhower told Diem that he would continue to supply aid to Vietnam to maintain a strong state capable of resisting subversion or aggression by military means.

To guard South Vietnam and other regional states from Communist aggression, SEATO was formally accepted in September of 1954 by Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Thailand, the Philippines, and the United States. Dulles hoped the mere existence of SEATO would deter the Communists from overrunning Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam. Because of the Geneva Accords, these states could not participate in alliances. (Herring, 1979, p. 45) If any of these Indochinese countries were invaded, SEATO provided the United States with the legal basis for intervention.

**Brinkmanship**

Along with "liberation", "agonizing reappraisal" and "massive retaliation", "brinkmanship" was another word which raised some controversy during Dulles' Secretaryship. Of the four phrases, brinkmanship best typifies his performance as Secretary of State. The term derives from several statements Dulles made in an interview with Life magazine correspondent, James Shepley:

You have to take chances for peace just as you must take chances in war. Some say that we were brought to the verge of war. Of course we were brought to the verge of war. The ability to get to the verge without getting into war is the necessary art. If you cannot master it, you inevitably get into war. If you try to run away from it, if you are scared to go to the brink, you are lost. We've had to look it square in the face—on the question of enlarging the Korean War, on the question of getting into the Indo-China War, on the question of Formosa. We walked to the
brink and we looked it in the face. We took strong action. (Shepley, 1956, p. 78)

Brinkmanship was deeply rooted in Dulles' philosophy. It was not a startling revelation. It was merely a phrase used to describe several ideas. Dulles wanted to deter war. By facing a potential aggressor at the brink of war, the U.S. was telling its adversary that it was willing to fight to protect an ally or a vital interest. By expressing that willingness to fight—-even to the extent of a massive retaliatory attack—the adversary then must decide if the potential benefits of its aggression were worth risking. This open opposition to aggression would avoid wars started by miscalculation, as both sides to a conflict would know beforehand where the other side stood on the issue of a war.

The national and international responses to the article were severely critical of Dulles. Adlai Stevenson, Democratic candidate for President in 1952 and 1956, said Dulles was playing Russian Roulette. The Russians said the story "proved" Dulles' cold-warrior-like intentions against the Soviet Union and other peace-loving nations. "Some attacks were politically inspired. But without question, millions of people were alarmed by the article" and they criticized Dulles for risking the safety of the U.S. "One of the most distressed was John Foster Dulles." (Heller, 1960, p. 230) It disturbed him to think that millions of people regarded him as "gambling" with world peace, as acting recklessly, with human lives at stake.

John Foster Dulles had committed his life to search for a just and durable peace. Dulles never started a war; he avoided it
throughout his tenure as Secretary of State. He did, of course, take a tough line and spoke often of the consequences of aggression. This, however, was part of the game of international politics. His duty, as he saw it, was to warn potential aggressors that any hostilities they start would be met with far greater hostilities. His was a deterrence game. He sought to keep the peace—"wage peace"—by threatening terrible consequences to aggressors where the risks outweigh any possible benefit. Dulles was used to criticism from the press, but the fallout from the "Brink of war" article was more devastating to his career and to him personally than any other barrage of criticism he had encountered as Secretary of State.

Dulles weathered the storm over "brinkmanship". Eisenhower had complete confidence in him and rejected any idea of Dulles' resignation. Eisenhower used his press conference of January 19, 1956—the first since his September 1955 heart attack—to endorse Dulles' position by calling him "the best Secretary of State I have ever known" and by saying Dulles was devoted to peace. Public confidence in Dulles was at one of its lowest points over the 1956 brinkmanship article. A few months later, however, a Gallup Poll indicated public confidence in Dulles had reached a new high. This dramatic reversal resulted from Dulles' handling of the Suez Crisis.

**Suez 1956: A case study**

Dulles' involvement in Egypt and with Gamal Abdel Nasser began in his earliest months as Secretary of State. In May 1953, Dulles set off on a Middle East tour. He hoped to extend to this region the NATO
system of military alliances. After SEATO was established in 1954, the Middle East was a gap in the defense system which needed to be filled. Despite his rhetoric against the Truman-Acheson policy of containment, Dulles still felt the need to stop the spread of Soviet influence (Soviet expansion has to stop before liberation can even begin). Cairo was sounded out by Washington on the possibility of starting a Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO), which would be allied to the West. Cairo refused. Dulles then considered a defense system limited to the so-called Northern Tier, which bordered on Russia. Dulles lobbied for this system and the Baghdad Pact was signed by Turkey and Iraq in February 1955. The United Kingdom joined the Pact in April. Pakistan joined in September and Iran in November. The United States did not join.

There is some conjecture over why Dulles refused to join the Pact which he formulated. One analyst says that after giving the impression (especially to Britain) that the U.S. would join, Dulles backed down in an attempt to "play along with Arab nationalism". (Goold-Adams, 1962, pp. 192-3) Another says that Dulles could not be associated with anti-Israel Iraq. (Drummon & Coblentz, 1960, p. 150) A third maintains that Dulles did not want to be associated with Britain (a colonial power) in the Middle East, where anti-British sentiment was building in the emerging Arab nations. (Guhin, 1972, p. 150)

Nasser saw the Baghdad Pact as an attempt by the NATO powers to drive a wedge between the Arab states. He also feared that Iraq might be trying to take the lead in a pan-Arab movement, a movement in which
Nasser had placed himself as its leader. Britain was entangled in the inter-Arab conflict between Nasser and the pro-Western Prime Minister of Iraq, Nuri Es-Said. Now Britain was aligned with Iraq and others in the Baghdad Pact. And although British forces remained in Egypt, these were to be removed by July 19, 1956. Nasser viewed the Pact as perpetuating Western dominance in the region. He preferred Arabs defending themselves with arms supplied by the West. Nasser saw a need to defend Arabism from Zionism and not from Soviet expansionism, as Dulles tried to suggest. The Israeli threat to Egypt's security was made more visible in February 1955, when David Ben-Gurion returned to the Israeli Cabinet as Defense Minister and Israel launched a destructive reprisal on Egyptian forces in the Gaza Strip. Nasser reacted by forming the Fedayeen, a guerilla unit to mount reprisals across Israel's borders. (Bowie, 1974, p. 10)

Nasser tried to buy arms from the West in the summer of 1955. But these arms were not forthcoming. France, Britain, and the U.S. had signed the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 guaranteeing Middle East borders and regulating the arms flow to the region. The British used this declaration to refuse to sell large amounts of arms to Nasser. Although the British delivered previously purchased arms to Egypt, they did not wish to sell any more weapons fearing they would be used against British forces. Moreover, the French said they would supply arms to Nasser only if he would stop inciting and training the Algerians to revolt against them. Dulles told Nasser he could have the arms if he joined in a Middle East defense alliance. (Bindra, 1969, p. 34)
Given the conditions placed on the West's sale of arms, Nasser turned to the Soviet bloc. By September 1955, he announced an agreement to buy from Czechoslovakia a supply of arms in exchange for Egyptian cotton and rice. Nasser called this deal a simple commercial transaction.

Dulles did not, of course, view it as such. He saw it as the first of many Soviet politico-military moves to infiltrate and eventually control the Arab world. With Nasser's announcement of a Czech arms deal, Dulles became a victim of self-fulfilling prophecy. He had proposed the Baghdad Pact as a defense system to keep the Soviet Union from gaining a foothold in the Middle East. By his constant pressure on Nasser to join the alliance, Dulles achieved that which he sought to avoid. Nasser did not like to be pressured and he did the opposite of what Dulles tried to force him to do. He brought Soviet influence to the heart of the Middle East. But Dulles was not willing to forfeit the region to the Soviets without a fight. He also sought to aid Egypt—not on a military but on an economic basis. In December 1955, the U.S. and Britain, together with the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development (the World Bank), offered to finance Egypt's High Aswan Dam project. The reservoir created by the dam would retrieve land for cultivation and add up to 25 percent to Egypt's arable land. The project appealed to Dulles because it would improve the economic conditions of the Egyptian people whereas the Communist aid would be military in nature. The Communists would be in Egypt as merchants of death; America was offering the means for growth and life. (Mosley, 1978, p. 396)
Also, the project would cost $1.3 billion and would take 12 to 15 years to complete. Since U.S. assistance would basically be in loans to Egypt, the U.S. would have a long-term claim to Egypt's resources. Dulles saw this as an opportunity to control Egyptian finances thus preventing Egypt from buying more arms from the Soviet bloc. The initial assistance offered was $56 million from the U.S., $14 million from Britain and $200 million from IBRD. "Negotiations dragged on for months, with Nasser objecting strenuously to the fiscal safeguards requested by the IBRD." (Bowie, 1974, p. 11)

During the months it took for Nasser to decide if he wanted Western aid with, as he saw it, so many strings attached, the U.S. and Britain were also wondering if they should pursue the financing or if they should let the project dwindle without either rescinding their offer or pushing Nasser to accept. Dulles was certain Congress would not approve the aid package to Nasser, who was perceived as an upstart dictator, friendly with the Soviets and Communist China and belligerent toward Israel. Furthermore, Dulles had doubts that Egypt could pay back the loans, even if they were granted. Nasser insisted he could meet his debts with the increased revenues from the cotton and rice produced from the reclaimed land. But both Dulles and Congress shared the view that Egypt's revenues would go to pay for Czech arms, leaving no resources to either pay back U.S. loans or to finance its portion of the Aswan Dam project. (Bowie, 1974, p. 12)

Congress was so against the package that Dulles decided not to continue his fight for it. Dulles believed Dean Acheson had failed in his foreign policy because he did not listen to the voice of
Congress and he would not make the same mistake. The dam was not worth risking his effectiveness as foreign policy formulator, especially since his "brinkmanship" interview of January 1956 had dealt a harsh blow to his image.

Britain was also uncertain about its offer. In early February 1956, Sir Anthony Eden, the British Prime Minister, and Selwyn Lloyd, Foreign Secretary, arrived in Washington for three-day talks with Eisenhower and Dulles. Dulles, Eden and Lloyd agreed that Nasser would not be able to finance his portion of the Aswan Dam project and that, due to his pledging of Egyptian cotton for Czech arms, he would not be able to keep the Egyptian economy viable during the construction period. More important, however, Nasser was not playing ball with the West. He not only refused to join the Baghdad Pact, he continued to verbally attack it. He mounted pressure on Jordan, which subsequently refused to join the Pact in December 1955. And he did not lessen his support for Algeria in its struggle for independence from France. The Americans and British both decided not to go through with their offer of aid. The intention was to let the offer die without public announcement about the change in plans.

When, on March 1, King Hussein of Jordan dismissed General Glubb ("Pasha"), a British subject in charge of Jordan's Arab Legion, Eden was sure his decision was correct. He would not aid the "fascist" Nasser, who was accredited with Glubb's dismissal. (Dooley, 1976, p. 10) Hussein dismissed Glubb as pro-Nasser Jordanians accused Glubb of portraying himself as the real ruler of Jordan. Some Jordanians started "whispering campaigns ridiculing the King as a weak, ineffective
parody of a monarch who would not remain on his throne for one day if Glubb's Legion were not there to support him." (Robertson, 1964, p. 26)

Dr. Ahmed Hussein, Egyptian Ambassador to Washington, returned to Cairo in the summer of 1956 to tell Nasser that opposition to the Aswan Dam project was mounting in Congress and "that if he wanted to go through with it, it was now or never. To his astonishment, Nasser, who had procrastinated so adroitly, now instructed him to go back to the U.S. and gave him carte blanche to accept all Foster Dulles' conditions." (Mosley, 1978, p. 400) Nasser had been hinting that the Soviet Union had also made him an offer to finance the Dam. But the bid had not been made public.

The news of the Egyptian Ambassador's impending visit with Dulles preceded him to the U.S. and it made headlines in many newspapers. Dulles called a meeting with his staff to discuss how to handle Ahmed Hussein. It was decided to withdraw the U.S. offer instead of "negotiating the thing to death," as Robert Bowie wanted to do. Dulles feared that Bowie's plan would give Congress a false impression that the Secretary of State still hoped to pursue the offer. He did not wish to do this. Dulles privately informed Eden and Lloyd that he was going to withdraw his offer. The advance notice was conveyed to London by Henry Cabot Lodge, then U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. He told Anthony Nutting, Britain's U.N. delegate, that Dulles was ready to act. Eden and Lloyd made no attempt to dissuade Dulles. In the meantime, Britain had completed its Suez base evacuation five days early on June 13, 1956.

Ahmed Hussein landed in New York on July 17 and spoke to the press--
who already knew of his planned acceptance. On July 19, 1956 Hussein met with Secretary of State Dulles for about one hour. Hussein announced Egypt's acceptance and added that he hoped the Americans were not planning to renege on their offer because, if they did, he had a promise from the Soviet Union to finance and build the dam instead. This gave Dulles the opportunity to fake a loss of temper over this "insult" and withdraw his offer. He told Hussein that conditions had changed since the offer was made and he implied that he did not think Egypt was credit-worthy. He also tried to color his rejection by saying that who ever builds the dam would earn the hatred of the Egyptian people because the burden would be crushing. He said Americans did not wish to be hated in Egypt and he was leaving that "pleasure" to the Soviet Union--if they really wanted to do it. (Mosley, 1978, p. 402)

Even if there was a Soviet offer, Dulles believed the Soviet economy was too weak to finance the whole project. At about the same time that Dulles spoke to Hussein, the press was issued a State Department communique outlining the U.S. decision to reject the Aswan project. By this act, Dulles gave Nasser an additional rebuff and also demonstrated U.S. impatience with neutrals seeking to exploit East-West rivalries.

Within 24 hours of the U.S. move, Britain also withdrew its offer to help finance the Aswan Dam.

On July 26, 1956 at a rally celebrating the fourth anniversary of the Young Officers' coup which overthrew King Farouk, Nasser announced the nationalization (or Egyptianization) of the Suez Canal Company.
Simultaneously, Egyptian troops moved into the Canal area to insure the movement of traffic through the Canal. The announcement was not unexpected but the swiftness of the action caught Western officials off guard. These officials had discussed the possibility of such a move, given Nasser's nationalistic tendencies. Indeed, Nasser had asked an advisor to study the Canal issue as early as 1954. And Nasser told U.S. Ambassador to Egypt, Henry Byroade (after the nationalization) that he had decided to nationalize the Canal if the West dropped its offer to finance the Dam project.

Dulles was in Peru for an inauguration of a new President when news came of Nasser's move. He sent Robert Murphy, Assistant Under-secretary of State, to London to gauge the likely British-French response. Britain and France not only owned virtually all shares in the Suez Canal Company, those countries also depended on the Canal for their existence as maritime and industrial powers. If their oil imports were not allowed to flow through the Canal, their industrial production could be seriously impaired. Eden told the U.S. charge d'affaires it was intolerable for Nasser "to have his thumb on our windpipe". (Finer, 1964, p. 62)

As Dulles admitted later, his purpose during the early days of the Suez Crisis was to gain time in the hope of defusing the situation and relieving the pressure on the British and French. Dulles and Eisenhower were dead set against the use of force. They feared the use of force in the region would be a "dangerous spark which was likely to set off the Third World War". (Goold-Adams, 1962, p. 207) They also had to consider the fact that Eisenhower was involved in
an upcoming election, and "peace" was part of Eisenhower's campaign slogan—peace, prosperity and progress. Dulles also firmly believed in the U.N. and its ability to work for peace. He wanted to use the U.N., not force to resolve the dilemma. If diplomacy failed, "world opinion" reflected in the U.N. would produce a solution. Dulles, however, did not immediately move the issue before the U.N. The Secretary feared for world peace if the U.N. were used first and failed to solve the Suez Crisis. He knew he could not prevent Britain and France from using force if the U.N. failed and he attempted to buy time.

British and French leaders decided to go along with Dulles' diplomatic efforts. They also needed time to develop a military plan. These secret plans went forward as the Tripartite powers met at the Foreign Office in London: Murphy for the U.S., Christian Pineau for France, Lloyd for the United Kingdom. But Murphy soon learned of the Anglo-French military program and he reported to Dulles that Paris and London were determined to use force. Dulles flew immediately to London.

Dulles also recognized the British-French resolve to not only force the Canal out of Nasser's control, but also to force Nasser out of power. Dulles showed sympathy for the European position and he argued that Nasser should be made to "disgorge" the Canal. (Finer, 1964, p. 97) Nevertheless, Dulles was steadfastly against the use of force. Within Britain there was division of opinion over the use of force. Opposition Leader Hugh Gaitskell denounced any use of force as a means to achieve "justice". In France, however, public opinion supported Prime Minister Guy Mollet and Foreign Minister Pineau. Many
Frenchmen believed Nasser's destruction would also solve the problem in Algeria by reducing support for the insurgents. American public opinion, however, was against the use of force and it reinforced Dulles' diplomatic efforts.

During the discussions in London, Dulles formulated a plan for the international operation of the Suez Canal. The three powers then called a Conference of 24 maritime nations with special interest in the Canal. The Conference opened in London on August 16. Twenty-four countries were invited; two did not attend—Egypt and Greece.

The British and French rested their legal right to justice on the Constantinople Convention of 1888 which governed the status of the Canal. The Convention guaranteed free passage to all vessels at all times and left the operation of the Canal to the Universal Suez Canal Company, an international organization. Nasser had already violated this agreement even before he nationalized the Canal by refusing free passage to Israeli ships. Under the terms of the Convention, the Canal was to revert to Egyptian control in 1968.

"Eden relied on the international character of the Canal Company, which 'although...registered in Egypt, is of course an international organization.' Accordingly, the normal right of a state to nationalize could not properly be exercised to take over such an international public utility." (Bowie, 1974, p. 23) At the London Conference, Dulles spoke of the need for "a permanent operation of the Canal under an international system which will in fact give confidence to those who would normally wish to use the Canal...Confidence is what we seek; and for this it is indispensable that there should be an administration..."
of the Canal which is non-political in its operation...The Canal should not be allowed to become an instrument of the policy of any nation or any group of nations." (Finer, 1964, p. 153)

The Conference formulated a plan, the 18-Nations Proposal, which was largely of Dulles' making. The Soviet Union, India, Indonesia, and Ceylon did not support the plan. Nevertheless, it was presented to Nasser as a basis for negotiating a more formal agreement. It was not looked upon as an ultimatum. The proposal called for: international operation of the Canal; respect for Egypt's sovereignty; a fair return to Egypt by the users of the Canal; compensation to the Universal Suez Canal Company; negotiable Canal tolls; and greater development of the Canal.

Dulles refused to lead the mission that offered the 18-Nations Proposal to Nasser. Some analysts assert Dulles felt the mission was doomed to fail anyway and that he did not want to have his reputation wrapped up in the proposal. Dulles, however, felt the proposal satisfied all parties. He wanted it to succeed because it promised to keep the peace. Dulles also knew Nasser was bitter toward him after the United States withdrew its Aswan Dam offer. By going to Nasser Dulles could risk the defeat of the proposal. He therefore urged the Conference to send a strong leader, one who did not represent the Tripartite powers. Robert Menzies, Prime Minister of Australia, was selected for this task and he led the mission to persuade Nasser to negotiate a peaceful solution to the Suez dispute. Nasser said he would meet the mission on Tuesday, September 4.

While Menzies was in Cairo, Eisenhower held a news conference at
which he said, "We are committed to a peaceful settlement of the dispute, nothing else." (Finer, 1964, p. 189) When his words reached Cairo, the Menzies mission was doomed. Nasser felt no great need to negotiate a settlement of the dispute. By Eisenhower's words, he knew the U.S. would not support the use of force against Egypt and therefore Egypt was under no threat to resolve the crisis to Britain's or France's satisfaction. Even before Nasser heard of Eisenhower's statement, he had not been willing to give Britain and France what they wanted. Eisenhower's news conference merely reassured him that he would not have to face U.S. military retaliation. Menzies reported to Dulles after leaving Cairo:

I had been making some impression on Nasser by keeping him guessing as to whether the United Kingdom and France would actually resort to force. Then came newspaper reports of Eisenhower's statements. That did it...Nasser became cool, confident and impossible to deal with. (Robertson, 1964, p. 87)

Nasser rejected the 18-Nations Proposal outright and the mission returned to London having achieved absolutely nothing.

Dulles tried again to find a peaceful and final solution to the problem—and if that failed, at least he would gain time to defuse the tense situation. His new idea was the Suez Canal User's Association (SCUA). Dulles' reasoning was that "since the 1888 Convention entitled the users to transit the Canal, they could band together to form a co-operative to exercise their rights under the Convention." (Bowie, 1974, p. 43) The users could hire their own pilots to navigate the ships through the Canal, organize convoys, collect dues, and pay Egypt its due compensation for tolls. Dulles saw SCUA as
provisional, but it might lead to alternatives for solutions.

Mollet was not happy with the proposal as it was premised on Egypt's cooperation. But Eden accepted SCUA and presented the plan to the House of Commons on September 12. Amid cries of "deliberate provocation" and "You are talking about war!", Eden told the House that if Nasser rejected SCUA, "Her Majesty's Government and others concerned will be free to take such further steps as seem to be required either through the U.N., or by other means, for the assertion of their rights."

(Finer, 1964, p. 226) Eden saw SCUA as a certain failure. But he could say, when it did fail, that he exhausted diplomatic efforts. Moreover, given the U.N.'s inability to resolve the crisis, Eden felt justified in using force.

Dulles' view of SCUA was different than Eden's or Mollet's. He viewed it as provisional until a more permanent peaceful solution was found. It was not an effort to merely go through the motions or a prelude to force. He said if Egypt rejected SCUA, the U.S. would divert its ships around the Cape of Good Hope. And the U.S. did not intend to shoot its way through the Canal. Nasser denounced SCUA on September 15, four days before the Second London Conference met to decide on whether to use SCUA as a basis for further negotiations with Nasser. Nevertheless, the conference met from September 19 to the 22nd and the 18 nations (the same nations which agreed on the 18-Nations Proposal) agreed to set up SCUA on October 1. In reality, however, SCUA was stillborn since Egypt refused to recognize or deal with it.

Britain and France had decided to appeal to the U.N. if SCUA
failed to secure a satisfactory settlement. But Dulles "advised that at all costs Britain and France should avoid reference to the United Nations until a plan had crystallized with clear objectives, one which the United States could readily support." (Robertson, 1964, p. 122)

Dulles knew the Soviet Union would likely veto any resolution brought before the Security Council which punished Egypt and recognized British and French rights to the Canal.

As Dulles left London on September 23, Britain and France requested U.N. action on the Suez crisis without telling Dulles of their secret moves. They asserted their rights under the 1888 Convention and urged Egypt to negotiate a settlement of the dispute based on the 18-Nations Proposal. Dulles supported the British-French assertion of their rights but said the 18-Nations Proposal was not sacrosanct. There were other solutions to the problem. If Dulles had been consulted on bringing the issue before the U.N., he would have rejected the proposal. SCUA had not been given a chance. More important, Dulles knew a move by Britain and France to involve the U.N. was a prelude to use of force. Dulles would have argued for further diplomatic efforts outside the U.N., while secretly hoping to gain more time. But Dulles was not given the opportunity. France and Britain moved swiftly in appealing to the U.N.

The Security Council members met with the Egyptian representative privately from October 9 to 12. Some progress was reported and Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold outlined six principles governing a solution to the Suez dispute. These six principles paralleled Dulles' original plan. They had been formulated at the First London Conference
and Menzies had presented them to Nasser in September. Under U.N. auspices, the parties—Egypt, France and Britain—were to meet in Geneva on October 29 for further negotiations.

But nothing further was done on the proposed Geneva Conference. On October 16, three days after the six principles were made public, Eden and Lloyd were persuaded by Mollet and Pineau to join in a military plan, devised by France and Israel, to attack Egypt in late October or early November. Such collusion entailed a revision of the British-French plan of action, but the potential payoff was worth the effort. The new plan was for Israel to invade the Sinai and cross to the Suez Canal. Britain and France were to issue an ultimatum to both countries—Israel and Egypt—to stop fighting or face British-French intervention. This was to make it easier for Britain and France to use military action in subduing Egypt. (Bowie, 1974, pp. 66-67)

French-Israeli collusion had developed several months before the British became involved. France furnished Israel with weapons in violation of the 1950 Tripartite Declaration. By October, Britain and France had already mobilized their forces and moved them to Malta in preparation for an invasion of Egypt.

On October 25 reports reached the State Department that Israel was beginning a military mobilization. By October 28 this was confirmed as a total mobilization. Eisenhower sent Prime Minister Ben-Gurion two personal messages in as many days saying he hoped Israel would take no steps endangering the peace. But Israeli troops crossed the Sinai on Monday, October 29, 1956 and dropped paratroopers within 40 miles of the Suez Canal.
On October 30, Britain and France issued an ultimatum that both sides withdraw to within 10 miles of the Canal or they (Britain and France) would occupy the Canal to insure free passage and safety for its users. Britain and France also vetoed a U.S. resolution in the U.N. calling on Israel and Egypt to stop fighting and on member nations to refrain from the use of or threat of force.

Eisenhower went on television on October 31 and explained his policy: "We do not accept the use of force as a wise and proper instrument for settlement of international disputes." (Bowie, 1974, p. 61) October 31 was also the first day of the British-French air attacks on Egypt. Eisenhower hoped the U.N. General Assembly would be able to bring a "just end to this tormenting problem...The U.N.'s inability to halt Soviet intervention in Hungary was already undermining its standing. An added failure to cope with the Suez attack in violation of the Charter could discredit it utterly." (Bowie, 1974, p. 62) Eisenhower and Dulles could not allow the U.N. to be so discredited. Neither could they condone aggression by allies while denouncing aggression by adversaries (the Soviets). They had to be consistent, especially since Soviet aggression in Hungary was so recently denounced by the U.S. in the U.N. The U.S. also saw long-range damage to Western influence in Africa, Asia and Latin America due to the British-French action. The U.S. thus sought to separate itself sharply and clearly from the French-British-Israeli action.

The General Assembly met in emergency session on November 1. Late that evening, Dulles spoke to the session.

I doubt that any delegate ever spoke from this forum with
as heavy a heart as I have brought here tonight... The U.S. finds itself unable to agree with three nations with whom it has ties, deep friendship, admiration, and respect, and two of whom constitute our oldest, most trusted and reliable allies...

Even after re-evaluation (of our position) we still find ourselves in disagreement... It seems to us that that disagreement involves principles which far transcend the immediate issue... If we were to agree that the existence of injustices in the world... means that the principle of renunciation of force is no longer respected, and that there still exists the right wherever a nation feels itself subject to injustice to resort to force to try to correct that injustice, then we would have, I fear, torn the Charter to shreds and the world would again be a world of anarchy...

It is still possible for the united will of this organization to have an impact on the situation and perhaps to make it apparent to the world that there is here the beginning of a world of order... We do have a power of recommendation, a power which, if it reflects the moral judgment of the world community, of world opinion, will, I think, be influential on the present situation. (Finer, 1964, pp. 394-396)

In the early morning hours of November 2 (about 3 a.m.), a U.S. resolution passed the General Assembly by 64 to 5 with 6 abstentions. The resolution called for an immediate cease-fire, withdrawal of all forces behind the 1949 armistice line, and after the cease-fire, the clearing of the Canal, which Nasser had blocked with sunken ships. Dulles returned to his Waldorf-Astoria hotel room at 5 a.m., was up by 9:30 a.m. talking to the President and was in Washington at 2:30 p.m.

Dulles retired about 10:00 p.m. that evening but was awakened by severe abdominal pains at 2:00 a.m., Saturday, November 3. By 5:30 a.m. physicians were in attendance, and by 7:30 a.m. he was rushed to Walter Reed Hospital. He was operated on almost immediately. Dulles had cancer of the small intestine. Though the Secretary of
State was out of action for the remainder of the crisis, he could still "pull strings" in the background.

An important part of the U.N. solution to the Suez Crisis which Dulles supported was Lester Pearson's (Canada's Minister for External Affairs) proposal to set up a U.N. Emergency Force. The force (UNEF) would "keep these borders at peace while a political settlement is worked out." (U.N. GAOR, First Emergency Special Session, 1956, pp. 35-36)

UNEF was accepted by the General Assembly 57 to 0 at 1:00 a.m. (New York time) on November 5, as the first British and French paratroopers were landing at the north end of the Suez Canal. The U.N. and American actions as well as the economic and political pressures were more than Britain and France could manage. The British Pound rapidly lost value, oil reserves were depleted, and the U.S. refused aid if the Europeans ignored the U.N. demands. Thus, Britain and France accepted a cease-fire on the night of November 6 (election day in the U.S.) and the Anglo-French Suez Expeditionary Force halted their advance about 20 miles south of Port Said. A U.S. loan of $1 billion was immediately promised to Britain. Egypt and Israel also accepted the U.N. cease-fire resolution on November 5 after the Israelis successfully crushed the Fedayeen guerillas and Egyptian troops.

The impact of personality on policy

Dulles' role in handling the Suez Crisis was applauded by many Americans: he had kept a volatile situation from becoming a general
war. He also demonstrated consistency in his aversion to aggression from any quarter. Dulles was also criticized (mainly by Anglophilic authors) for acting with duplicity, i.e., telling British and French officials privately that he supported their objectives while publicly disavowing any resort to force or to pressure on Nasser. Dulles was also criticized for not telling his allies his true position, whether he accepted their view (and the use of force) or whether he rejected it outright. Dulles was further accused of single-handedly ruining Western unity by abandoning his friends to world criticism and by even leading that criticism.

Western unity was damaged, but Dulles was not to be blamed. Eden and Mollet deserve their share of criticism for deciding on aggression before diplomatic efforts were allowed to take their course. Their near-maddened quest to "destroy Nasser" made any peaceful solution to the crisis impossible. Dulles, on the other hand, pursued what he believed to be a rational solution. His objective was peace with justice, not destruction or violence. In the final analysis, he defused a potentially calamitous crisis.

Dulles pursued his objective the way he knew how—he sought to mobilize "world opinion" through negotiations. His personal approach to the problem led to the 18-Nations Proposal that conveyed a portion of the opinion that was intended to influence Egyptian behavior. Dulles traveled extensively between Washington, London and New York in the hope of buying time. He worked feverishly to persuade Eden and Mollet to rely on diplomacy and peaceful solutions rather than force.

Although force was ultimately used in the Suez affair, Dulles did
not fail in his task. He succeeded in avoiding a general war. He forced the belligerents to give up their aggressive action. Dulles' performance in the Suez Crisis of 1956 was consistent with the behavior he exhibited throughout his lifetime. He emphasized the personal relations style which he learned at Versailles in 1919. His later world view was also consistent with previous beliefs. Dulles believed, early in his life, that change was inevitable and that if the status quo was maintained forcefully, then violence would be used by those who resisted the status quo. In November, 1956, Dulles supported Canada's proposal for UNEF not only to respect the 1949 Armistice line, but to find a political solution to the long-standing disputes in that region--i.e., Dulles sought peaceful change, not status quo.

Dulles' character was also consistent during the Suez Crisis with that which he developed early in life: Active-Positive. Dulles worked hard from the first sign that a crisis was building over the seizure of the Canal by Egypt. He typified Barber's description of the Active-Positive Character all through the crisis. Dulles put "an emphasis on rational mastery...This may get him into trouble; he may fail to take account of the irrational in politics. Not everyone he deals with sees things his way and he may find it hard to understand why." (Barber, 1977, p. 12) Eden and Mollet were acting irrationally--they wanted to destroy Nasser regardless of the consequences to them; Dulles assumed high government officials would act sensibly and analyze every solution rationally. He could not understand why Eden and Mollet were dead-set on using force when Dulles offered "better," peaceful solutions.

Dulles did not personalize this crisis, which is indicative of
an Active-Positive character. Had he failed to deal with the Suez Crisis (which he did not), he would not have allowed such failure to destroy his whole career or his personal life (as Active-Negative characters do when they personalize crises and fail). Dulles did not fail in dealing with the Suez Crisis. The positive attitude which he took in dealing with the crisis indicates that it would not ruin his career or his life even if he did fail.

Nobody knows whether I'm doing a good job or a bad job as Secretary of State. This is a great comfort for me when people are certain I'm doing a bad job, and criticize me so severely. I realize that they don't really know and the returns aren't in yet...But it works both ways. And when you're excessively praised, you've got to discount that too. Because they don't know either. Your friends don't know either. (Mosley, 1978, p. 411)

Barber's analysis appears to be appropriate when applied to Dulles' political career. Dulles maintained the Active-Positive character until his death on Sunday, May 24, 1959.

Although Barber's theory is directly applicable to politicians, Erikson's is not. In that sense, Erikson's theory does not account for the unique circumstances in which a politician finds himself. Yet, his theory describes the human being rather than taking into account the human being's career. In this way, Erikson complements Barber. Together, both theorists provide insight into Dulles the man and Dulles the politician.

In describing Erikson's theory in Chapter II, it was indicated that normal completion of the stage in which Dulles acted as Secretary of State, the old age stage, would be highlighted by ego integrity. Dulles achieved this integrity. He did not feel his life was wasted.
He did not regret his actions. He could boast he kept the world at peace by facing the brink of war and by not backing away from it. The U.S. did not go to war during Dulles' tenure as Secretary of State.

Dulles could brag that no country was overtaken by Communism while he was in office. North Vietnam was under Communist domination before Dulles came to power and the Geneva Convention on Indochina in 1954 formalized this domination. Iraq did not fall to the Communists despite leftist support for the military coup there in 1958. Dulles was generally satisfied with his success at "winning" several battles in the Cold War. He achieved ego integrity.

Erikson also notes that people in this stage take life easy, relax with their families and enjoy watching their grandchildren play and grow. But Dulles did little of this. He was totally involved in foreign policy formulation and implementation. According to Erikson's theory, Dulles could be judged a "normal" human being. Dulles is also "normal" in regard to Barber's theory. He was consistent throughout his career, i.e., in his actions, beliefs and attitudes. With such a consistent personality, it should have been possible to determine Dulles' moves in situations such as the Suez Crisis. This is not to say Eden and Mollet should have known beforehand what Dulles intended to do to solve the crisis. It is only to say that Dulles was consistent in this as in other situations and that if they made the effort, they would have known how he would act.
Henry Kissinger assumed his duties as Advisor to the President on National Security Affairs on January 20, 1969. He was untested in foreign policy formulation and implementation. Over the next eight years, however, he would be confronted with several problems and potential diplomatic breakthroughs. These situations rigorously tested his ability to perform as chief diplomatic and foreign policy spokesman for two administrations. The Vietnam negotiations, detente with the Soviet Union, the opening to China, and the October War in the Middle East would be the most prominent of these tests. As National Security Advisor, Kissinger only answered to the President. This is what President Nixon wanted. The President was determined to manage foreign policy from the White House, not through the State Department. Nixon entertained some ambitious projects--e.g., the opening to China--and did not want to be impeded (nor did Kissinger) by a slow-moving, bureaucratic machine.

The National Security Council (NSC) had been used differently by different presidents. Kissinger assumed a primary role on the NSC. Under Nixon, Kissinger advised the President on all national security and foreign policy issues. He soon became the dominant influence in the direction of foreign policy, at Nixon's insistence, bypassing the Secretary of State. In addition to the NSC, Kissinger developed other committees offering foreign policy advice to the President. They
included the Washington Special Action Group (WSAG), the 40 Committee, and the Senior Review Group. The membership of the groups was similar, but they each grappled with different questions. WSAG was the NSC subcommittee for contingency planning and crisis management. The 40 Committee was the interagency committee supervising covert intelligence activities. The Senior Review Group also discussed intelligence activities but had more input from staff members than did the 40 Committee.

This chapter deals with the more prominent tests which Kissinger dealt with as National Security Advisor and Secretary of State. It will give background to the issues, explain the decisions Kissinger made and the suggestions he offered to Nixon, and reiterate his own opinions about the actions he took.

The Vietnam negotiations and settlement

Nixon and Kissinger inherited a war in Southeast Asia. The Vietnam War was to claim some 56,000 American lives, 31,000 of whom were lost by the time Nixon came to power. Nixon promised to end the war within his first term. He missed that mark by only three days. Kissinger was more optimistic than Nixon. He told a group of Quaker anti-war activists, "Give us six months, and if we haven't ended the war by then, you can come back and tear down the White House fence." (Kalb, 1974, p. 120; Stoessinger, 1976, p. 51) His plan was entitled "The Vietnam Negotiations" and an outline of it appeared in the January 1969 issue of Foreign Affairs. His approach to negotiations promised to be two-track. On one track, the U.S. and North Vietnam
would work out a military settlement of the war. On the other track, South Vietnam and the Communist National Liberation Front would find a political solution for South Vietnam. If Hanoi rejected this plan, Kissinger said the South Vietnamese army would be strengthened as American combat troops were gradually withdrawn. But America's credibility as an ally and as a counterweight to Communism was at stake in Vietnam. Peace had to come, but only if the U.S. retained its honor. It was more than just saving face. Ending the war honorably was essential for the peace of the world. "Any other solution may unloose forces that would complicate the prospects of international order." (Foreign Affairs, 1969, p. 234)

Hanoi, however, had its own plan. It called for total and immediate U.S. withdrawal, the removal of South Vietnam's President, Nguyen Van Thieu, and the installation of a coalition regime dominated by Communist Viet Cong. On February 22, 1969, Hanoi launched a countrywide offensive that cost 453 American lives during the first week. In retaliation, Nixon ordered the bombing of North Vietnam sanctuaries in Cambodia. The B-52 attacks took place on March 18. In his memoirs, Kissinger justified this action. The North Vietnamese had controlled these areas in Cambodia for four years. From these sanctuaries they launched numerous offensives against South Vietnam. "Over the next 15 months, more than 100,000 tons of bombs were dropped on Cambodia, and the operation (MENU) was kept secret from the American public and indeed from much of the government." (Herring, 1979, p. 221) The U.S. did not publicize the bombings because, according to Kissinger, "we saw no sense in announcing what Cambodia encouraged and North
Vietnam accepted...Our bombing saved American and South Vietnamese lives." (Kissinger, 1979, pp. 251-252)

But Americans did learn of the bombings. Information of such magnitude could not be kept from the press. Nixon and Kissinger, however, saw leaks of military operations to the press as endangering American lives in Vietnam. J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), recommended wiretaps on the telephones of Kissinger's NSC staff as well as certain newsmen. Attorney General John Mitchell defended the legality of the action and President Nixon ordered them carried out. Kissinger "went along with what (he) had no reason to doubt was legal and established practice in (those) circumstances." (Kissinger, 1979, p. 253)

Kissinger had met secretly with Le Duc Tho, a member of Hanoi's politburo, to discuss peace proposals for Vietnam. Their first meetings were held between February 21 and April 4, 1970. These sessions ended with Tho telling Kissinger that unless the U.S. accepted Hanoi's demands, there was nothing more to discuss. In March, Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia was ousted by Lon Nol, an anti-Communist. Hanoi's forces began overrunning Cambodia in late March, 1970. Weeks later, the U.S. began arming Cambodia to fend off North Vietnamese troops. Nixon also gave the order to invade the "Parrot's Beak" (33 miles west of Saigon) and "Fishhook" sanctuaries in Cambodia. Kissinger supported the decision to invade, but he warned Nixon of the possible adverse reaction to the U.S. move and the deeper cleavages it would cause in the country. Kissinger cited these shortcomings but he also saw benefits in the U.S. action if Hanoi's next major offensive was delayed by six to eight
months. The delay was closer to two years.

The remainder of 1970 and 1971 found no conclusive military or diplomatic achievements. On March 30, 1972, the North Vietnamese began their major offensive. Kissinger was convinced this would be Hanoi's last serious effort. If the allies held fast, North Vietnam would be forced to negotiate more seriously. But on April 27, North Vietnamese forces attacked in even greater strength. On May 2, Kissinger met with an inflexible and confident Le Duc Tho. Negotiations crumbled. Kissinger advised Nixon to bomb Hanoi and Haiphong. The North Vietnamese, however, continued their advance.

In retaliation, Nixon ordered the mining of the Port of Haiphong against Kissinger's advice. Kissinger felt this action threatened the impending Moscow Summit and the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) talks. Nonetheless, he told reporters, the President felt the mining was necessary. Kissinger, however, led the press to believe he had disassociated himself from Nixon's decision. "On all previous occasions, he had announced decisions in a way that made Nixon's policies indistinguishable from his own." (Stoessinger, 1976, p. 63) Nixon's actions brought the North Vietnamese back to the conference table and Hanoi began to negotiate more seriously. In fact, the Vietnamese pressed for a quick settlement. Tho dispensed with the idea of a coalition government in the South, and with his insistence that Thieu be removed. It was agreed the U.S. would continue aiding Saigon, but the remaining 60,000 American troops would be withdrawn 60 days following a settlement. Prisoners of War (POWs) would be released at that time. A timetable for ending hostilities was drawn
up with a cease-fire arranged for October 27, 1972. Kissinger, however, required President Thieu's concurrence.

To Kissinger's surprise, the South Vietnamese leader rejected the proposal. Instead, Thieu presented Kissinger with 69 changes in the draft peace treaty. He accused the U.S. of subverting his rule. Kissinger was reluctant to sign a separate peace with Hanoi and Thieu's rejection meant the war would continue. The North Vietnamese tried to force Nixon's hand by broadcasting the secret terms of the peace treaty. They also accused the U.S. of stalling.

Kissinger returned to Paris in November, 1972 to resume negotiations with Tho. Tho seemed less eager for a settlement. Kissinger warned Nixon that North Vietnam was playing for a clear-cut victory, anticipating a split with Saigon or a domestic collapse. (Herring, 1979, p. 247) Kissinger was even more convinced that a solution to the war would come about through diplomacy combined with force. He preferred to negotiate from a position of strength. Thus, he told Nixon to step up the military pressure on Hanoi. Nixon ordered B-52 bombings on North Vietnam, especially Hanoi. The bombings started on December 18 and lasted for 12 days. (Millet, 1978, p. 154) Public reaction to the "Christmas bombings" was fierce and critical, but many journalists reported Kissinger had opposed the bombings. These reports infuriated Nixon.

Kissinger sensed his tenure as National Security Advisor was in jeopardy. If the negotiations with North Vietnam collapsed, he intended to resign immediately. If they succeeded, he expected to see the settlement through and resign toward the end of 1973. In his
memoirs, Kissinger notes, "Except for Watergate, I would have carried out this plan." (Kissinger, 1979, p. 1456)

Although he was opposed to the Christmas bombings, Kissinger did go along with them. And, although he preferred other actions, he did see benefits accruing from the attacks. Later, Kissinger wrote, Nixon's "decision speeded the end of the war; even in retrospect, I can think of no other measure that would have." (Kissinger, 1979, p. 1461)

Hanoi finally agreed to resume negotiations on January 8, 1973 and a breakthrough came on January 9. A demilitarized zone was decided on, thus recognizing the sovereignty of South Vietnam. Kissinger returned to the U.S. for consultation with the President. Nixon was urged to send a letter to Thieu indicating the United States would sign the treaty on January 27--alone, if necessary. If along, he said he would declare President Thieu an obstruction to the peace and all aid to South Vietnam would be terminated. Thieu accepted the treaty. On January 23, 1973, Kissinger and Tho initialed the peace agreement. The Vietnam War was over.

**The Soviet Union: Detente, SALT, and linkage**

Nixon and Kissinger hoped to improve relations with the Soviet Union. The two men did not want to be overly friendly with the Soviets because they did not trust them. But they did wish to see a lessening of tensions between the two superpowers in order to work for a more peaceful world.

In Kissinger's view, peace was impossible without stability. And
without Soviet cooperation, there would be no stability and maybe even no survival. To achieve Soviet participation, a relaxation of tensions--a detente--between the superpowers was first necessary.

Detente is rooted in a recognition of differences and based on the prevention of disaster... (It) is a process of managing relations with a potentially hostile country in order to preserve peace while maintaining our vital interests. (Stoessinger, 1976, pp. 79 and 81)

In his first inaugural address, Nixon announced that "after a period of confrontation, we are entering an era of negotiations." (Kalb, 1974, p. 100) The Soviet Union took this as an offer and announced that it was ready to start a serious exchange of views on limiting the nuclear arsenals of the two superpowers. Neither Kissinger nor Nixon wanted to rush into SALT talks. Though it was important, the limitation of nuclear weapons was not an isolated issue, but rather it was a key element in a broader dialogue with the Soviet Union. Every problem between the United States and the Soviet Union was linked with every other problem. The linkage of various issues of concern would be the new approach to dealing with the Soviets.

Nixon and Kissinger felt the Soviet Union was a key to peace in Vietnam. So if the Soviets wanted American credits, trade, and technology, and if they wanted a SALT agreement, they would have to engage in diplomatic barter. That is, if they helped the U.S. get out of Vietnam honorably, the U.S. would be more helpful in getting the Soviets what they wanted. This was the basis of the Nixon-Kissinger policy of linkage.

Nixon rejected the initial bid for SALT discussions. Kissinger
wanted to be better prepared for the negotiations. He prepared studies on the nation's strategic posture, what the Soviets had in their nuclear arsenal, and the basis for arms limitations. When SALT negotiations opened in Helsinki on November 17, 1969, he felt the U.S. delegation was ready. Earlier in the year, he had convinced Nixon to alter the U.S. position in order to make negotiations more acceptable to the Soviets. Instead of superiority over the Soviet Union as the goal of U.S. military policy, Nixon said sufficiency was a better term to use. This reflected Kissinger's more modest approach to stabilizing the balance of power.

In July, 1971, the announcement was made that Nixon would travel to China in early 1972. Less than four weeks later, the Soviet Union formally invited the U.S. President to Moscow. As with the visits to China, Kissinger served as a diplomatic advance.

Kissinger secretly visited Moscow on April 20, 1972. He met with Soviet Communist Party Chief Leonid Brezhnev and told him that Hanoi's March 30 offensive threatened the summit. He also told the Soviet leader that he (Brezhnev) had an interest in preventing a North Vietnamese victory because Nixon would probably not come to Moscow if the U.S. suffered a defeat at the hands of the North Vietnamese Communists. Kissinger concluded from his meetings with Soviet leaders that the U.S. role in Vietnam did not jeopardize the summit.

Nixon arrived in Moscow on May 22, 1972. His meetings with Brezhnev were generally cordial. At least one Soviet-American agreement was signed everyday. Scientific research and environmental protection, the Apollo-Soyuz space mission, prevention of naval incidents,
and credit and commercial agreements were all signed during the summit. Friday, May 26 was the day arranged for the signing of SALT I—if difficulties could be worked out at the last minute.

Kissinger was responsible for the American negotiating team while Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko assumed a similar role for his government. Kissinger did not appear to be under as much pressure as Gromyko. By 3:00 a.m., Friday, no agreement had been reached. Later that morning, Kissinger was summoned back to the conference table by the Soviets. Once there, Gromyko told him the Soviet Union would accept the U.S. position. The details of that position included replacement of missiles on G-class submarines and the dimensions of missile silos. Kissinger could only guess why the Soviets suddenly accepted the SALT agreement. They were probably satisfied with the agreement, believing they could not expect more concessions from the Americans. Moreover, Gromyko accepted the American formula because Brezhnev "had staked his prestige on a Friday ceremony." (Kissinger, 1979, p. 1241) SALT, however, gave the Soviets an advantage in the number of missiles and submarines. Thus, the agreement came under immediate attack in the U.S. But, "even its ardent critics like Senator Henry Jackson (later) agreed that the agreement had saved a generation of weapons unbuilt and billions unspent." (Morris, 1977, p. 279) Perhaps linkage was working, too, if only slightly. Nixon won Brezhnev's promise to persuade Hanoi to negotiate more seriously with the U.S.

Detente between the two superpowers passed through several stages
in the next several years. Part of the tenuous effectiveness of detente was due to the differing interpretations given it by both countries. The U.S. felt it meant a lessening of tensions based on not only arms control but also on restrained international involvement in other nations' affairs. The Soviets were more inclined to see it as acceptance of their view of peaceful coexistence in tandem with each country's agreement not to tamper with the internal affairs of the other.

Kissinger was under no illusions when he left the Soviet Union.

For reasons deeply rooted in the ideology of the regime and the structure of internal Soviet politics, Soviet foreign policy will remain antagonistic to the West and especially to the U.S. The world-power ambitions of the Soviet leaders, and any likely successors, plus their confidence in their capability to support their ambitions with material resources, suggest that the USSR will press their challenge to Western interests with increasing vigor and in certain situations assume risks which heretofore would have seemed excessively dangerous. (Kissinger, 1979, p. 1203)

Kissinger says America's task should be "a willingness to confront Soviet expansionism and a simultaneous readiness to mark out a cooperative future. A more peaceful world is prevented if we lean too far in either direction." (Kissinger, 1979, p. 1254)

Playing the China hand

From the start of his political career, Richard Nixon was avowedly anti-Communist, and especially anti-Chinese Communist. Yet, he was shrewd enough to try to exploit the reality of Communist China. In October, 1967, he wrote in Foreign Affairs:

Any American policy toward Asia must come urgently to grips with the reality of China...Taking the long-view, we simply
cannot afford to leave China forever outside the family of nations, there to nurture its fantasies, cherish its hates and threaten its neighbors. There is no place on this small planet for a billion of its potentially most able people to live in angry isolation. (Nixon, 1967, p. 121)

Nixon may have been the only presidential candidate who could suggest a new China policy without fear of a right-wing backlash due to his spotless anti-Communist credentials.

Nixon was determined to open the door to China. In April, 1969, he asked French President Charles de Gaulle to convey this to China's leaders. In June, Kissinger asked the State Department what the U.S. could do toward normalizing relations with Peking without disturbing America's Pacific allies. The U.S. began unilateral acts of reconciliation toward China. These actions overlapped military clashes between China and the Soviet Union on their common--disputed--border.

Between December, 1970 and January, 1971, secret messages were passed between American and Chinese leaders. Yahya Khan, President of Pakistan, was Kissinger's confidential courier to Peking. In February, 1971, the Indochina War interrupted the U.S.-China exchange, but in March, another note was passed to Kissinger. China extended an invitation for an American envoy to come to Peking. Kissinger and Rogers were the names suggested by the Chinese. Nixon decided Kissinger would go.

Kissinger departed Washington on July 1, ostensibly on an around the world tour. On July 8, he flew into Islamabad, Pakistan. At 3:00 a.m., July 9, he secretly boarded a Pakistani plane and flew to Peking. En route, he recalled how John Foster Dulles refused to shake Chou En-lai's hand at the 1954 Geneva Conference on Indochina. The
Chinese would also recall it during Kissinger's visits. He was determined to make amends for the diplomatic snub to the Chinese Premier.

Four Chinese officials met Kissinger at a military airfield and drove him and his aides to a guesthouse outside Peking. At 4:00 p.m., Chou-En-lai arrived at the guesthouse. Kissinger read an opening statement and made a reference to China as a mysterious land. This prompted Chou to enquire into the nature of the term "mysterious" and the two statesmen engaged in philosophical and historical discussions for the next eight hours. Both men had powerful intellects, shared an elitist disdain for bureaucracy, and recognized the necessity to adjust to reality. They developed a personal rapport and a lasting friendship.

While in China, Kissinger was completely cut off from Washington and the rest of the world. He made decisions on his own. He found the best way to deal with Chou was to present a reasonable position, explain it in detail and stick to it. Chou acted the same way. Kissinger found that the Chinese would stick to the spirit and the letter of any agreement, a position which he found lacking in the Soviets and the North Vietnamese.

He left China with an invitation for Nixon to visit there in 1972. On July 15, Nixon told a stunned television audience of Kissinger's secret visit and his own plan to visit China. In October, 1971, Kissinger returned to China with an advance team to prepare for Nixon's visit. The Presidential visit was set for February 21-28, 1972. A communique, to be issued at the end of Nixon's visit, was also outlined in October. The document provided for separate statements by China and the U.S. Kissinger felt this novel approach would
allow the U.S. to reassure its allies of its support. And if some common positions were found with the Chinese, these would stand out as authentic convictions of the countries' leaders.

In December, events in Southeast Asia occurred which had implications for the growing U.S.-China relationship. The Indian army crossed into East Pakistan on December 3. Kissinger had been trying to arrange secret talks between Yahya Khan and Bengali leaders as well as the release of Mujibur Rahman, the Bengali nationalist leader imprisoned in West Pakistan. Kissinger believed the Indian invasion destroyed his efforts to effectuate a political evolution toward autonomy in East Pakistan. He also feared India wanted more than just to set up an independent Bangladesh. He was certain India hoped also to dismember all of West Pakistan. He would not abandon an ally—Pakistan—especially one who was instrumental in opening the door to China for the U.S. and who was also friendly with China. He feared that China might think the U.S. was not an effective counterweight to adversaries—whether it is India vs. Pakistan or the Soviet Union vs. China. For these reasons, Kissinger announced his and Nixon's tilt in favor of Pakistan. This announcement came in a policy meeting but someone leaked the news to the press and the press and congressional leaders began criticizing Nixon and Kissinger for their policy. But they stuck to their position.

Nixon's visit went off as planned. Within three hours of their arrival at Peking Airport, Nixon and Kissinger—but not Rogers—were invited to visit with Chairman Mao Tse tung. The two Americans were impressed by this legend, Mao, who was alert, philosophical and humorous
despite his declining health. The rest of the week was filled with high-level discussion, friendly dinner toasts, sight-seeing and working out last-minute details of the joint communique that would be issued in Shanghai. Kissinger had a taste of late-night, early-morning negotiating in China that would be so commonplace at the Moscow Summit later that year.

In Shanghai, the communique was issued. The most delicate issue in it dealt with each country's stand on Taiwan. The People's Republic of China called the issue an internal problem. The United States did not dispute the fact that there is only one China. It hoped for a peaceful settlement to the issue and called for the removal of U.S. troops on the island as the tension in the area diminishes--i.e., when the Vietnam War ended. With this, the linkage policy was used in China. At the final banquet on Sunday, February 28, Nixon said, "This was the week that changed the world." (Kalb, 1974, pp. 281-282) Nixon returned to Washington to a hero's welcome.

As with the Soviets, Kissinger was under no illusions about U.S.-China relations.

Peking and Washington were entering a marriage of convenience transformed into an emotional tie primarily by Chinese psychological skill and American sentimental recollection of a China that no longer existed, if ever it had. Once China becomes strong enough to stand alone, it might discard us. A little later it might even turn against us, if its perception of its interests requires it. Before then, the Soviet Union might be driven into a genuine relaxation of tensions with us--if it has not first sought to break out of its isolation by a military assault on China. But whatever China's long-term policy, our medium-term interest was to cooperate, and to support its security against foreign pressures. (Kissinger, 1979, pp. 1090-1091)
Like Dulles before him, but for different reasons, Kissinger has been criticized for threatening the relationship between America and its allies in Western Europe and Japan. Some European leaders felt he placed the interests of U.S.-Soviet detente above the interests of Europe.

With the Vietnam War behind him, the China policy well under way, and the Soviets reacting positively to detente with the U.S., Kissinger did turn his attention to Europe. On April 23, 1973, he announced a Year of Europe and called for a "new Atlantic Charter". (Stoessinger, 1976, p. 139) He persuaded Nixon to meet with West European leaders in the summer and fall of 1973. But the Middle East War in October consumed virtually all of Kissinger's diplomatic energies and Watergate consumed Nixon's attention in 1973-74. These events rendered both men unable to meet with friends.

Kissinger planned to resign in the fall of 1973. His image in the press and public was one of admiration and acclaim. Nixon seemed to be bearing the brunt of his administration's failures--the Christmas bombings, the secret bombings--while Kissinger enjoyed approval for the successes--the opening to China, end to the Vietnam War. Nixon felt his assistant should not receive such public acceptance while he was being constantly criticized. Their relationship deteriorated. But Nixon was pragmatic enough to exploit a potential asset. When Watergate
was tarnishing, and later destroying, his image, his foreign policy successes—personified in Henry—provided a crutch.

This was a new turn of events for Kissinger. All his life he depended on others to further his career—Fritz Kraemer in the army, William Y. Elliott in Harvard, Nelson Rockefeller, and finally, Richard Nixon. Now someone—Nixon—depended on Kissinger's reputation to maintain his career. Kissinger had been called Secretary of State in everything but name. Nixon gave him a chance to change that one minor detail when William Rogers left his post in 1973.

While swimming with Kissinger in his San Clemente pool in August, 1973, Nixon asked him to succeed Rogers as Secretary of State. Nixon told reporters of his decision on August 21, but if he felt it would divert attention from Watergate, he was wrong. Kissinger held a news conference the next day and said his conduct of foreign policy would be more open than it had been. He also said his Jewish heritage would not bias U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. Asked if he preferred to be called Mr. Secretary or Dr. Secretary, he replied, "I don't stand on protocol. If you just call me Excellency, it will be okay." (Kalb, 1974, p. 447)

Kissinger's confirmation hearings lasted between September 7 and 17. He was applauded by senators for his contributions to U.S. foreign policy and for his brilliance. He was questioned about his secretive style of diplomacy, his role in the secret bombings of Cambodia, and the wiretapping of NSC staffers and newsmen. He was also questioned about any involvement in Watergate. But Kissinger satisfied the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and on September 18 he was recommended for
confirmation. On September 21, by a vote of 78 to 7, the U.S. Senate confirmed Kissinger's nomination. He was sworn in the next day as America's 56th—and the first Jewish-American—Secretary of State.

The October War

Two weeks after becoming Secretary of State, Kissinger was faced with a crisis in the Middle East. On October 6, 1973, Egypt and Syria launched Operation Badr, the invasion against Israel. Israeli and American officials were aware of the impending attack several hours before the Arabs launched it at 14:00 hours on Yom Kippur. But Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir and her Cabinet decided against a pre-emptive strike "in order to have the political advantage of being the side that is attacked." (Sobel, 1974. p. 90) Kissinger also warned Meir not to pre-empt, for if Israel did, it would have to fight alone—i.e., without American resupply of military weapons. Nonetheless, Kissinger was surprised that the Arabs initiated the attack. He thought it was folly, given Israel's qualitative military advantage. Indeed, Kissinger initially thought Israel had started the October War as Egypt had claimed. But he soon realized that he was wrong.

Regardless of who started it, Kissinger saw the war as an opportunity to formulate a lasting solution to the tensions in the Middle East. To find this solution, he felt that the outcome of this fourth Arab-Israeli war must not have a clear winner or loser. Both sides must be in a position to find it advantageous to agree to a diplomatic effort for peace. The Egyptians had made substantial military gains in crossing Israeli-occupied Sinai and the Syrians had pushed Israel
back across the Golan Heights all within the first few days of the War. Despite these achievements, U.S. officials were certain that Israel would deliver a devastating counter-attack against the Arabs within 48 hours of the opening of hostilities. (Heikal, 1975, p. 228)

But Israel did not turn the tide of war to its favor until the second week of the War. Its supplies were insufficient to keep up with the heavy losses. Two days into the War, Israel's Ambassador to the U.S., Simcha Dinitz, had been asking for ammunition, spare parts, and accelerated delivery of aircraft promised to his country before the War. But massive American resupply did not occur until October 13, when President Nixon ordered Secretary of Defense Arthur Schlesinger to commence the airlift of supplies. From October 14-25, the U.S. delivered 11,000 tons of equipment, 40 F-4 Phantoms, 36 A-4 Skyhawks, 12 C-130 transports and 20 tanks.

There is some contention over why it took the U.S. eight days to respond to Israel's near-hysterical demands for resupply. One story holds that Kissinger was very willing to get supplies sent to Israel, but that Schlesinger and the Pentagon were holding back. In this story, Kissinger is seen as a friend of Israel, fighting the Defense bureaucracy, yet constantly reassuring Dinitz that supplies would be sent soon. Finally, Nixon convened between his feuding Cabinet ministers by personally demanding the airlift. (Kalb, 1974, pp. 464-478)

The other story said, "Kissinger did not fight for resupply but actually led the fight against it." (AlRoy, 1975, p. 76) He supposedly ordered Schlesinger to hold off on resupply. Even though Israel was losing the War due to lack of supplies on its part, plus a massive
Soviet airlift to Egypt and Syria, Kissinger still held his position as late as October 12. Nixon stepped in, against Kissinger's wishes. Despite the conflicting stories, the evidence does suggest "that Kissinger tried to use the War to promote a settlement. If neither side should win decisively, it would be easier for him to launch a diplomatic offensive." (Stoessinger, 1976, p. 186) As long as the Soviets showed restraint, Kissinger would withhold major resupply, but would provide enough to keep the balance. But the Soviets were not restrained and Israel was losing, so Kissinger decided to release a massive flow of arms to Israel.

With the resupply, Israel did turn the tide of the War. It had, as early as October 10, turned back the Syrian invasion and had re-taken the Golan Heights and even moved past the 1967 cease-fire lines heading for Damascus. On October 15, Israeli forces crossed the Suez Canal in small numbers and were moving into the Egyptian missile fields. October 16, Soviet Premier Alexsei Kosygin flew to Cairo to try to persuade Egyptian President Anwar Sadat to stop fighting. Also on that day, Kissinger said at a WSAG meeting that the U.S. airlift would run the Soviets into the ground. Kissinger was looking at the War not in terms of Arab-Israeli tensions but as a superpower confrontation.

By October 20, Israel had pushed 20 miles west of the Suez Canal and had cut off the road leading south from Ismailia to Suez City, entrapping the Egyptian Third Army. That day, King Faisal of Saudi Arabia announced an embargo of oil to the U.S., as well as substantial production cuts, as a response to Nixon's request to Congress for $2.2 billion
billion in aid for Israel.

On October 19, Brezhnev sent a message to Nixon "requesting urgent consultations on the Middle East Crisis. Either Kissinger would come to Moscow or Gromyko would fly to the U.S....Kissinger now felt that a cease-fire could be achieved quickly." (Quandt, 1977, p. 190)

He told Dinitz that by going to Moscow, he would be able to gain a few more days for Israel to complete her military operations. He felt that if he rejected Brezhnev's invitation, the Soviets may have intervened militarily on the Arab side to save their allies from defeat and humiliation. He flew to Moscow in the early morning hours of October 20. He wanted to obtain Soviet and Arab agreement to a cease-fire resolution that was a basis for a subsequent diplomatic effort. If the agreement was not forthcoming, he would wait until Israeli military achievements created a new reality. If the agreement was forthcoming, he expected Israel to stop all fighting. He had no interest in humiliating Sadat, especially in view of the encouraging U.S.-Egyptian exchanges which were coming through the "back channel"—a secret message channel set up between the two countries aimed at improving relations.

While he was airborne, Kissinger received two important messages. One was that of the oil embargo. The other, from Nixon, gave Kissinger full authority to negotiate the terms of a cease-fire agreement without further Presidential approval. Nixon was too bogged down with Watergate to deal with the cease-fire. He fired Archibald Cox, the first Watergate Special Prosecutor, and this action in turn forced the resignations of Attorney General Elliott Richardson and his
deputy William Ruckelshaus. These events came to be known as the "Saturday Night Massacre". (Kalb, 1974, p. 484)

Kissinger met with Brezhnev on Saturday, October 20 until well past midnight Sunday morning. No agreement was reached, but Kissinger felt Brezhnev was eager for a quick cease-fire. On Sunday afternoon, the two men met for four hours. Brezhnev accepted Kissinger's demand for a cease-fire linked with direct peace talks between the Arabs and Israelis. Kissinger knew the Israelis would not be happy with the timing of the agreement. A few days more and they could defeat the Egyptian and Syrian armies. But Kissinger also knew they would be glad for the opportunity for direct talks with Egypt.

The United Nations Security Council met in New York at 10:00, Sunday night and by 12:58 a.m., October 22, Resolution 338 was adopted. The Resolution called on all parties to stop fighting within 12 hours, to implement Resolution 242, and to start negotiations aimed at a durable peace in the Middle East. Resolution 242 recognized the rights of all states in the Middle East to exist and called on Israel to withdraw from occupied Arab lands. Kissinger flew to Tel Aviv at noon (Middle East Time) on Monday, before the cease-fire went into effect, to urge the Israelis not to violate the cease-fire or it would risk losing American support.

On October 23, the cease-fire was violated. The Israelis blamed the Egyptians, the Egyptians and the Soviets blamed the Israelis. Regardless of whom was to blame, it was the Israeli forces that were advancing beyond the October 22 cease-fire lines and threatening to cut off the Third Army from supplies. The U.N. passed Resolution 339
calling for an immediate cease-fire, return to the October 22 lines, and dispatch of U.N. observers to supervise the cease-fire. Syria finally accepted the cease-fire later on October 23.

On October 24, Sadat asked for Nixon's help in getting the Israelis to allow food and medical supplies through to the Third Army. Kissinger called Dinitz and asked that Israel stop fighting and let supplies through to the trapped Egyptians. Later that day, Sadat asked the U.S. and the Soviet Union to send troops to the area to oversee the cease-fire. The White House immediately rejected the idea. Dobrynin called Kissinger with a message that Brezhnev accepted the idea. Brezhnev "invited" the U.S. to join Moscow "to compel observance without delay. I will say it straight, that if you find it impossible to deal with us in this matter, we should be faced with the necessity urgently to consider the question of taking appropriate steps unilaterally."

Kissinger quickly relayed the message to Nixon, who reportedly empowered him to order a military alert if necessary. (Quandt, 1977, p. 196)

At 1:30 a.m., October 25, Nixon approved Kissinger's order for placing U.S. forces on military alert. The U.S. was not put on a war footing but the alert provided for cancellation of leaves, the return of men to their units and preparation to move out if necessary. (Sobel, 1974, p. 115) On October 26, Brezhnev assailed the rumors of Soviet plans for unilateral military intervention. With this, the brink of war with the Soviet Union was walked away from. But the U.S. was prepared to send troops into the Middle East in case the Soviets intervened. On October 25, the U.N. passed Resolution 240—the third call for a cease-fire—calling for implementation of Resolution 338 and the establishment of a U.N. Emergency Force (UNEF). This call
for a cease-fire did take hold and the fourth Arab-Israeli War finally ended. But the diplomatic effort was just beginning.

In shaping the American diplomatic policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict, Kissinger and Nixon defined the parameters of that policy. The U.S. was committed to a step-by-step process toward peace but could not promise peace. Israel depended on the U.S. for economic and military aid to insure its security. The Arabs needed the U.S. because the Soviets could provide them with arms, but only the U.S. could give them their land back by producing Israeli territorial concessions through negotiations. Thus, both sides of the conflict needed the U.S. as an intermediary to negotiations aimed at a more permanent solution to the crisis than just a cease-fire. And the U.S. needed a more permanent solution to establish a dominant role in the region while pushing the Soviets out, and to stabilize the area to end the then-present oil embargo and to avoid such future actions.

The agreed-to negotiating format was a multilateral conference with U.S. and Soviet participation, to be held in Geneva under U.N. auspices. But, instead of relying on Geneva, Kissinger planned to deal with concrete issues by personal diplomacy. Egyptian Foreign Minister Ismail Fahmy met with Kissinger on October 29 and 31 to outline his country's position on implementing the cease-fire provisions. Israeli Prime Minister Meir also met with Kissinger and Nixon on October 31 to outline her position. It was far away from Egypt's. With these talks behind him, Kissinger left for the Middle East on November 5. November 7 he met Sadat for the first time and in their private talks, they began to develop a genuine admiration
for each other. Sadat agreed not to demand Israel's return to the October 22 lines and to work for a larger disengagement of forces. Meir called this a "fantastic achievement". (Quandt, 1977, p. 217) Two days later, agreement on a cease-fire plan and the exchange of POWs was announced. This was signed two days later by Egyptian and Israeli military representatives at a point along the Cairo to Suez Road known as Kilometer 101.

Kissinger began his second Middle East trip on December 12. He met with Algerian President Boumedienne, Sadat, King Faisal, Syrian President Hafez Asad, and Meir. Israel appeared reluctant to attend the Geneva Conference. It opposed a strong role for the U.N. Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim and any mention of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and it refused to sit in the same room with Syrian representatives until Syria complied with Israeli demands for a list of POWs and Red Cross visits to them. Kissinger urged them to attend and offered favorable U.S. consideration of Israel's request for arms. Sadat said Egypt would attend. Jordan would also go. But Syria refused to attend until a disengagement of forces was agreed to. The PLO was neither mentioned nor invited, as a concession to Israel. The Conference convened on December 21 with the U.S. and the Soviet Union as co-chairmen.

Israeli elections were held on December 31. Gold Meir's Labor Coalition was weakened somewhat but not enough to require a new Prime Minister and Cabinet. Defense Minister Moshe Dayan was in Washington with Kissinger on January 4 and 5, 1974 to present his country's proposals for disengagement. Kissinger returned to the
Middle East at Dayan's and Sadat's request on January 10. Kissinger hoped merely to establish a framework for an agreement with the details to be worked out in Geneva. But Sadat asked Kissinger to stay on in the region until the disengagement agreement was finalized. This was the start of Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy, flying between Aswan and Jerusalem with each side's proposals.

On January 13, the Israelis gave Kissinger a map with the proposed disengagement of forces in the Sinai. Kissinger took this to Sadat who approved the idea, but not the extent of force limits. Kissinger told him the limit need not be stated in the formal document but could be defined in letters exchanged by Sadat and Nixon. Sadat also agreed to committing to private letters his assurances on Israeli cargos transiting the Canal. In Israel on January 15, Meir dropped her demand for an end of belligerency as part of the disengagement agreements. With a few other changes in the parties' positions, an agreement was reached and was signed on January 18, 1974.

The Egyptian-Israeli agreement called for Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank of the Suez Canal and from the East Bank 20 miles into the Sinai. This 20-mile strip had three zones. Egypt would control the zone closest to the Canal with a maximum of 7000 troops. The U.N. would control the middle zone. And, the last zone would be controlled by Israel, also with 7000 troops. Israel would retain control of the Mitla and Giddi Passes. The U.S. would perform reconnaissance flights to monitor the agreement and give the results to both sides.

On January 20, Kissinger talked with Asad and obtained a new
Syrian disengagement proposal, which he delivered to the Israelis. He returned to Washington and tried to end the oil embargo while also laying the groundwork for Syrian-Israeli talks, by meeting and phoning the appropriate Middle East officials. But Asad, Sadat, Boumedienne and Faisal decided not to lift the embargo until further progress toward a Syrian-Israeli disengagement agreement had been made. Kissinger returned to the Middle East and met with Asad on February 26. He was authorized to deliver to the Israelis the list of POWs in return for a concrete Israeli proposal on disengagement. He returned to Damascus with an Israeli proposal which he was certain Asad would reject outright, so he did not show him the proposal. He merely tried to explain the benefits of U.N. buffers and limited zones. He left Damascus and the Middle East with nothing substantial accomplished.

Kissinger began his fifth Middle East mission on April 28, after fighting had intensified on the Syrian-Israeli border. He realized that achieving a disengagement of forces between Syria and Israel would be more difficult than it was between Egypt and Israel. The U.S. was in need of an agreement. Its new moderate Arab friend, Sadat, could not be isolated as the only Arab leader promoting peace with Israel. Asad must also reach agreement with Israel. Without such an agreement, the oil weapon—the embargo being partially lifted on March 18—may continue to be used against the U.S. If war broke out again between Syria and Israel, Egypt might be pulled in and the Soviets may also use it as a pretext to intervene militarily, threatening the stability of the region, the world and the vital interests
of the U.S. And Watergate was continuing to cripple Nixon domest­
ically and he needed to achieve a further foreign policy success
accredited to his administration.

On April 28-29, Kissinger met in Geneva, before flying to the Middle East, with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko to enlist his help in achieving a Syrian-Israeli accord. The Soviets had earlier criti
cized Kissinger for his one-man style of diplomacy in the Middle East, saying that Geneva was to be the place for negotiations. Kissinger replied that the parties concerned had asked him to personally mediate the negotiations. In April, he assured the Soviets that a final settlement would be handled in Geneva.

Kissinger flew to Algeria and Egypt to ask the support of Boumedienne and Sadat for the Syrian-Israeli negotiations. These ne­gotiations proved to be long and arduous. Several times, Kissinger was so exasperated at the intransigence of Asad and the Israelis that he decided to end his shuttle diplomacy. But something always happen­ed to make him continue. Once Nixon interceded and urged Kissinger to continue. If Israel was not negotiating seriously, Nixon was prepared to pressure it by perhaps holding back aid. He was also pre­pared to offer aid to Syria as an incentive to be more flexible in its negotiating stance. Two other times when Kissinger was ready to quit, Asad changed his position and agreed to Kissinger's terms (or Israel's terms). One of these times, when Kissinger was prepared to leave, Asad said, "What a pity. We have come so far and we have not succeeded. Can't anything be done?" (Stoessinger, 1976, p. 193) Asad asked him to stay and two days later the deal was concluded.
Thirty-three days after starting his journey, on May 29, the announcement was made that Syria and Israel had reached a disengagement agreement. Two days later, Syrian and Israeli representatives signed the document in Geneva. Some of the concessions made during the negotiations included an Israeli agreement to a Syrian presence in all of Quneitra on the Golan Heights. Asad dropped his demand to control the hills west of Quneitra if Kissinger could guarantee that no heavy weapons would be placed there. The U.S. also had to insure, at Israel's request, that the U.N. force would not be withdrawn without the consent of both parties. Asad also gave Kissinger his oral commitment that he would not allow the Syrian side of the disengagement line to be used for terrorists' attacks against Israel.

The disengagement agreement stated that a U.N. buffer zone would parallel the 1967 cease-fire line, including the city of Quneitra. Ten kilometers east and west of the zone, each side could station 6000 men, 75 tanks and 36 122mm artillery weapons. The United Nations Disengagement Observer Forces (UNDOF) would inspect the various zones and U.S. aircraft would carry out reconnaissance flights. Nixon assured Asad that Israel would observe the cease-fire and its other agreements. He also assured Israel that the U.S. recognized Israel's right of self-defense in case of violations of the agreement--i.e., terrorists' attacks across the disengagement lines.

In June, Nixon set off for a tour of the Middle East. Watergate was smothering him at home and he hoped to escape this critical atmosphere and perhaps even hear applause coming from cheering Middle East crowds for his support of the peace process. Kissinger was also
being criticized at home, not for his shuttle diplomacy but for his alleged role in ordering wiretaps of NSC members and journalists in 1969. In Salzburg, the first stop of Nixon's trip to the Middle East, Kissinger threatened to resign unless the Senate cleared him of any wrongdoing. And the Senate did clear him. Two months later, on August 8, 1974, Richard Nixon resigned as President as of noon the next day. Gerald R. Ford (1974-1977) became the 38th President of the United States.

After the Syrian-Israeli disengagement agreement, Kissinger's step-by-step diplomacy was halted for a while as other events vied for his attention. In the summer of 1974, two NATO allies--Greece and Turkey--found themselves at war over Cyprus. Also that summer, and for the next year, Kissinger had to confront the possibility of a Communist domination of Portugal, another NATO ally.

But in February 1975, Kissinger again set out for the Middle East to rebuild the momentum toward peace by attempting another step in the process. Expecting no breakthrough in a second round of Egyptian-Israeli talks, he was not disappointed when none emerged. The only positive outcome of this trip came when the Shah of Iran indicated he would provide Israel with oil if it gave up the Abu Rudeis and Ras Sudr oil fields in the Sinai. Kissinger again traveled to the Middle East in mid-March with higher hopes for a breakthrough. He and Ford needed a new foreign policy achievement. Their popularity was declining. Congress sought to be more assertive in guiding foreign policy. Kissinger was dismayed over what he saw as Israeli inflexibility, which caused his third shuttle to end in stalemate.
Returning to Washington on March 24, Kissinger and Ford embarked on an agonizing reappraisal of U.S.-Israeli relations. Ford, in an attempt to pressure Israel for concessions, suspended military and economic agreements with Israel.

During the next several months, international crises occurred but the U.S. seemed powerless to act constructively. On April 17, 1975, the Cambodian capital of Phnom Penh fell to Communist forces. On April 29, Saigon also came under Communist control. These events acted as a slap in the face to Kissinger's and Nixon's peace with honor policy in Indochina. Also that spring, King Faisal was assassinated leaving the future of Saudi Arabia and its relations with the U.S. and Egypt in doubt. Another Middle East crisis, the civil war in Lebanon, began to erupt in April. Domestically, congressional leaders voiced their opposition to Ford's reappraisal of U.S.-Israeli relations.

Perhaps more than before, Kissinger had to achieve an Egyptian-Israeli agreement, a further step toward peace. He had to guarantee U.S. influence in the region, at the exclusion of the Soviets. He also had to stabilize the region where the potential for radical regimes was great. And he had to save his hard-won reputation of peacemaker and foreign policy genius. His initial mediation was held in Washington, where for six weeks in the summer of 1975, Israeli and Egyptian positions were sent through him to the other side. By the time he left for Israel on August 6, an agreement was within reach for a further pull-back of forces in the Sinai. Sinai II, the second Egyptian-Israeli agreement, was signed in Geneva on September 4, 1975.
The main points of the agreement include the commitment of both sides to resolve the conflict between them by peaceful means and not to use or threaten force. UNEF's mandate would be extended annually. Egypt agreed to allow non-military cargo to transit to and from Israel through the Suez Canal, which had been reopened the previous June. The parties agreed that their next agreement would be a final peace agreement. Israel agreed to withdraw from the Mitla and Giddi passes as well as the Abu Rudais and Ras Sudr oil fields. The new buffer zone was enlarged as Israel withdrew further east. Arrangements for an early warning system operated by U.S. civilian personnel were also spelled out. Three watch stations in the Mitla and Giddi passes would monitor the Egyptian and Israeli surveillance stations and report any movements to both parties. This system was subject to Congressional approval, which was received on October 9. (Moore, 1977, pp. 1208-1212; 1225)

Four secret agreements were also signed by the U.S. Three were with Israel, one with Egypt. The U.S.-Israeli agreements dealt with military assistance to Israel, assurances on Israel's supply of oil, and the need for consultations between the two countries in the event of Soviet military intervention. The freeze on new weapons agreements, started in April, was ended. The U.S. also reiterated its position not to recognize or negotiate with the Palestine Liberation Organization until that Organization recognized Israel's right to exist and accepted U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338. The U.S.-Egyptian agreement committed the U.S. to try to continue negotiations between Syria and Israel and to aid Egypt in the early warning system in the buffer zones.
Kissinger was unable to complete his step-by-step diplomatic process for peace in the Middle East as James E. Carter (1977-1981) defeated Ford in the 1976 Presidential election. Now, it was up to the Democrats to build upon Kissinger's achievements.

**Psychological conclusions**

Kissinger's diplomatic initiative during and after the October War substantiates the behavioral psychologists' claim that past behavior determines future action. His personal style of diplomacy in the Middle East was the same type of style he used in his past diplomatic efforts. In addition to his style, his world view and character were also consistent with how they developed earlier in his life.

His Active-Positive Character was especially evident in the aftermath of the October War when Kissinger became the indefatigable shuttling diplomat. He enjoyed the fast-paced mediation between adversaries. Although the possibility for success was tenuous, if it was achieved, he saw benefits not only to his reputation but moreso to world stability.

This desire for world stability is consistent with his world view, which he developed in adolescence. As an adolescent in Nazi Germany, he developed the preference for a stable society, rather than a revolutionary one. Although peace was not necessarily achieved in a stable world order, it did have a chance. There was no chance for peace if a revolutionary state existed in the world system. Kissinger's decision to use step-by-step diplomacy instead of trying for an all-out peace agreement is also consistent with his world view. In his
doctoral dissertation, he wrote that world stability is the goal to strive for and peace would be a bonus—if it were achieved. Step-by-step diplomacy was used to stabilize the Middle East and thus the world. Peace was never promised by Kissinger.

As a young adult, Kissinger adopted a style in order to implement his desire for world stability. The style he used was personal relations, as indicated by his information-gathering trip to Vietnam for President Johnson. His adopted style remained consistent when he was Nixon's foreign policy advisor. His negotiations with Le Duc Tho, his warm relations with Chou En-lai, detente with the Russians, and especially his handling of the disengagement agreements between Israeli leaders and Sadat and Asad—all these suggest that Kissinger consistently relied on personal relations in a sincere attempt to stabilize a volatile world.

Inasmuch as Kissinger achieved what he sought in Vietnam, China, the Soviet Union, and the Middle East, Kissinger was a success. Active-Positives are motivated by success. They do not seek power for power's sake, as Active-Negatives do. They are not in politics out of a sense of duty or merely to be liked, as Passive-Negatives or Passive-Positives do. Success is an Active-Positive's reward and Kissinger felt rewarded again and again.

In an interview with Orianna Fallaci, as quoted in Chapter III, Kissinger said he would "like to leave behind a world that seemed more peaceful than the one we entered." (Kalb, 1974, p. 12) Kissinger was correctly assuming that stability and peace depended a lot on his behavior as the foreign policy spokesman of the Nixon and Ford
Administrations. He was thus placing himself in the role as a leader of his nation. He perceived his role as one used to guide Americans into a more stable world. This attitude corroborates Erikson's theory of generativity, which is the successful completion of the adulthood stage, ages 30-65. Kissinger thus successfully completed another of Erikson's stages by hoping to guide those with less power than he.

Kissinger has one final stage, old age, to complete. For the most part, being successful in the previous stages, he should expect to succeed in the last. If he does, he will be happy with how his life has progressed. He will feel his life was worthwhile and that it "made sense". He will not regret his past actions. As a preview, perhaps, into his attitude toward past actions, his memoirs indicate that he fully supports the decisions he made as Nixon's National Security Advisor. He realizes that mistakes were made, but says that they are inevitable and that the outcome compensates for them.
Dulles and Kissinger in American Foreign Policy

To better understand the formulation of American foreign policy, an analyst must consider the psychological constraints on a formulator as well as the circumstances of the problem or policy in question. The goals, opinions, ideas and assumptions that a policy-maker brings to the decision-making process are psychologically constraining. These psychological constraints are rooted in a person's background and early-life experiences.

John Foster Dulles and Henry Alfred Kissinger display different backgrounds and environmental influences. Yet both men achieved the same position—one of the most powerful non-elected political offices in the United States.

Dulles was born into an aristocratic, upper-class Christian family. The world around him was peaceful and serene. He grew up admiring wonderful stories of the adventures of a world statesman. His family traveled widely and Dulles became familiar with many different countries and cultures. With Dulles' family connections and family reputation, it was easy for him to become involved in foreign affairs. It would have been a surprise if he had not been.

Kissinger, on the other hand, was born into a middle-class German-Jewish family and into a turbulent world in a revolutionary country. He grew up watching his people persecuted because of their heritage. He "travelled", but only to escape persecution. There
was no great political family reputation as the Dulles family enjoyed. To become Secretary of State would be an "impossible dream" for Kissinger. When he achieved that post, he declared that, for a man of his background, his attainment of that post could only happen in America.

As an emerging statesman, Dulles was a champion for peace. He was a promoter of bipartisanship in foreign affairs. Kissinger was a teacher who criticized American foreign policy as practiced by various presidents and offered his own strategies for international stability. Like Dulles, Kissinger was non-partisan in his willingness to work for any president, regardless of party. Whether called bipartisan or non-partisan, the effect of their services was the same: both men, though Republican, worked for Democratic and Republican presidents.

Dulles was a trained lawyer. Kissinger was critical of lawyers and businessmen in politics because he viewed them as too limited in their outlook on foreign affairs. Kissinger was a scholar who sought to influence foreign policy first through his writings and later through his personal involvement in the field. Dulles wrote two books and several articles, but he was more involved personally in the field of foreign affairs.

Dulles' writings stressed the inevitability of change and cautioned against the maintenance of the status quo. His philosophy was that peaceful change was essential in maintaining order. Without such change, violent change would occur. Kissinger thought that stability was the primary objective of foreign policy. The achievement
of peace was merely the bonus once stability was reached. Change was necessary, but it could not outdistance a nation's experience.

The element of force is also found in both men's philosophies. Kissinger believes force is acceptable in attaining certain goals. Force, or power, is neutral—it can be used toward good or evil ends. It should be used when no other means are available and only to attain good ends. For Dulles, the threat of using force is a deterrent to aggression. If the aggressor is not deterred, Dulles is not so clear. His policy may call for retaliation, but his practice was ambivalent. Dulles favored massive retaliation while Kissinger believed that limited nuclear war was preferable—at one point in their careers. They were later to rethink and adapt these theories.

Early-life experiences are a major cause for the development of ideas and philosophies a person holds. These experiences may also cause an individual—consciously or unconsciously—to develop a goal in response to those experiences. When solving a crisis or formulating a policy, the individual will relate the new situation to past experiences and strive for a familiar goal.

At the Versailles Peace talks, John Foster Dulles witnessed the attempts by victors of war to stifle peaceful development and change. From this experience, he developed as a goal the desirability for peaceful change. He assumed that change was inevitable and that forceful maintenance of the status quo would lead to violent change. These assumptions and this goal were the key inputs Dulles relied on when making policy decisions as Secretary of State. In the Suez Crisis of 1956, he opposed the British-French reliance on force to retain
control of the Suez Canal. He preferred peaceful diplomacy to force. He also approved of the United Nations plan to work toward a peaceful solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

As an adolescent, Henry Kissinger witnessed the impact a revolutionary state had on a people. As a young adult, he witnessed this same state's impact on world peace. He committed his ideas on the subject to writing in a doctoral dissertation. His goal was a stable world order. He assumed that such an order was impossible to achieve if a revolutionary state existed in the state system. He further assumed that power was a neutral element, to be used for either good or evil. Diplomacy combined with force was the way to achieve his goal. He sought to stabilize the Middle East, and thus the world, by making sure the Arabs and the Israelis gave up the use of force to achieve political ends. His shuttle diplomacy was supplemented by the power of the Presidency. Nixon and Ford saw the necessity of giving incentives or making threats to the Middle East adversaries to give up their reliance on force and rely instead on peaceful negotiations.

Analyzing personality also gives insight to the general workings of an individual's mind. It suggests how he confronts a situation—with confidence or with uncertainty, with assertiveness or with lack-adaisical disinterest. It can also suggest how he deals with various situations—i.e., it indicates his style of work.

When Dulles was confronted with the Suez Crisis, he utilized personal diplomacy in order to defuse the potentially calamitous situation. Through his actions, enough time lapsed between Nasser's seizure of the
Canal and the British-French response with force that world opinion was brought to bear on the belligerents, chiefly through the United Nations, to give up their military intervention.

Where Dulles' main contribution to peace came before a Middle East war began, Kissinger's came after a war ended. Both men, of course, contributed to the cessation of hostilities. Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy after the October War achieved two disengagement of forces agreements and the beginning of Israeli withdrawal from occupied Arab territories. These initial steps proved to be prerequisites for the peace agreement which was reached between Egypt and Israel in 1979.

Dulles and Kissinger achieved what each saw as successes in relation to his world view: Dulles was avoiding war by effectuating peaceful change; Kissinger was stabilizing the world order. Despite the confidence each man had in himself, the public saw Dulles and Kissinger as two of the most controversial figures in the history of American foreign policy formulation. Neither man was offended by this fact. They realized that people either approved of their actions or did not. They did not let public opinion dictate their decisions, although they were not totally unaffected or unmoved by that opinion. Both men attempted to mold that opinion. They realized that not all of their decisions would be understood completely by the populace and that these decisions were subject to criticism and debate. They also took into account that mistakes were possible. They made decisions on foreign policy as they saw best able to achieve their individual goals.
Although both considered the impact of public opinion in their decision making process, that impact was a greater consideration for Kissinger than for Dulles. When Kissinger was in office, especially after Watergate, the media had taken on an air of greater self-confidence in its role to inform the populace. It is not that the media was less informative when Dulles was Secretary of State. But in Kissinger's time, the public placed greater trust in the media as its chief source of information and had less trust in the statements and actions of politicians than in Dulles' time. Kissinger learned to manipulate this situation. He had a secretive style of diplomacy, not open to public scrutiny. What he wanted the public to know about his diplomatic initiatives, he would inform them through his close ties with newsmen. Most often, the newsmen had no other source for their news tips. What they printed or broadcast about Kissinger's secret diplomatic initiatives was most often what he wanted to be broadcast or published.

Dulles did not have to be as secretive as Kissinger would later be. Through his numerous news conferences, he too kept the public informed of his point of view. The media and public had no reason to doubt his remarks as he appeared sincere and open in expressing administrative policies.

Both men, therefore, sought to inform the public of their policies from their point of reference. For its part, the public came to approve of some of each man's actions and to disapprove of other actions. It would admire and respect these men and also criticize them. But Kissinger and Dulles rode every storm out. Neither man was
forced into resignation from his post by an overwhelming public chas-
tisement. Kissinger did contemplate resignation, but he did not go
through with it. And Dulles did resign his post before the end of
his appointment, but this was due to failing health.

It could easily be argued that Dulles and Kissinger were two of
the most powerful Secretaries of State this nation has known. Even
with their utilization of their power, did both men use their full
potential as Secretaries of State? Was one more "successful" than
the other—successful either in terms of personal goals achieved or
national interests maximized?

In viewing their personalities, there is a distinct difference
between Dulles and Kissinger. Dulles had the air of a restrained man.
He was not the type of person to break from tradition. He consistently
behaved as others expected him to behave. He was anti-Communist and
righteously so. He may have made some shocking statements, but once
analyzed, these could be seen as consistent with his well-known
beliefs. In addition to his being anti-Communist, he also had a
distaste for colonialism (of which Communism may be seen as a new
form). He preached a desire for independence for all countries while
maintaining that neutrality was not possible—indeed, independent countries
still must take sides and align themselves with either the East or
the West. But Dulles was not one to make major diplomatic break-
throughs.

It is difficult to place one specific description on Dulles. He
was neither a visionary nor a realist, although he exhibited elements
of both. His visions included a non-Communist, peaceful, progressive
world. He held out great hopes for the future. What he saw as an impediment to the achievement of these hopes was the Communist world, and in this was his view of his realistic assessment of the world. He did, in fact, take a tough stance against Communists, and especially the Soviets. Many people, who shared his distrust of the Soviets, applauded his behavior.

This behavior, however, is the reason Dulles can be placed neither in the realist nor visionary camps. By failing to take account of the existence of the Soviets (or other Communists), he was unable to realistically deal with them. Because of this inability, the Soviets could not be expected to cooperate, in any respect, with the United States. And, with lack of cooperation between the superpowers, a better future was impossible.

These statements are not intended to diminish the importance of Dulles or of his successes as Secretary of State. Although people disagree with how he dealt with the Soviets, it cannot be disputed that Dulles kept the United States at peace during his tenure in office—regardless of the ways he used to do so.

Kissinger was not the same type of man which Dulles was in at least one respect. He was able to break from tradition when he saw benefits accruing to such a move. For example, for whatever reasons Kissinger was able to break with his faith—a great part of his family tradition—whereas Dulles would probably never have been able to make such a drastic step, if he ever wanted to do so. This is merely an example of a distinct difference between the two men. In the realm of foreign policy, Kissinger was known for his revolutionary
diplomacy and diplomatic breakthroughs. He was thus able to pursue
non-traditional, even drastic, policies.

In this sense, Kissinger was more successful than Dulles. Al­
though Kissinger too was anti-Communist, he was able to put his feel­
ings to the side in order to mark out a cooperative future between
the two superpowers. Yet, he always was on guard. He knew he could
not trust the Soviets too much. He could thus be described as a
visionary, with hopes of a stable world order, and as a realist, who
knew how to exploit an established set of circumstances in order to
achieve his goals.

Kissinger thus developed his potential more fully than did Dulles.
Both men were given much autonomy to achieve what they wished in the
way of foreign policy. Kissinger established and utilized a larger
"constituency" than did Dulles. That is, he had easy access to many
world leaders of various ideologies and he allowed himself to confront
those leaders face to face. Dulles was limited (self-limited) to
those on "his side". He refused to acknowledge Communist leaders
(e.g., by refusing to shake Chou En lai's hand). Kissinger was more
willing to meet with adversaries in hopes of enlisting their help to
create a stable world order. Dulles could never do this.

Kissinger's goals, although personal, were transformed, via his
positions as National Security Advisor and Secretary of State, to
within the national interest. The same can be said for Dulles'
goals. Dulles was quite satisfied with his ability to meet his goal
of a peaceful, progressive world. He saw himself as in a struggle
for peace and freedom against Communism and he was pleased with his
achievements in that struggle. Kissinger was also engaged in a struggle. He sought to achieve a stable world order. His various successes as chief foreign policy formulator for two presidents--SALT, the China opening, his Middle East peace initiatives--were important steps toward his goal, but he did not fully achieve a stable order while in office. And Kissinger knows this. Perhaps that is the main reason he wants to get back in power. He needs a position similar to the one he held under Nixon and Ford to keep striving for his goal. He may not feel his life has been worthwhile unless he does make another major effort--as a U.S. official--toward his goal. Dulles did feel complete. He led a full life and achieved his goal--peace--as best he could. In this sense, and at this point in time, Dulles could be said to have been more successful than Kissinger in that he was happy with his achievement of his stated goals. If Kissinger becomes satisfied with his efforts to achieve his personal goals, then he too will be a success, in his own eyes at least. Then no one can say that one was more successful than the other for both will have viewed their efforts as successful.

The methodology used in this research focused on two personality theorists. However, their theories are to be used as a general guide to further research. They are not to be used as straitjackets restricting analysis or closing the doors to further insight from other sources. These methods are not sacrosanct. They are offered to give insight as to the workings of the minds of two of America's more noted Secretaries of State. They indicate one way of explaining the policies of these Secretaries. Other points of view are needed for
a fuller perspective.

The application of this methodology to the real-life experiences of Dulles and Kissinger allows the conclusion that both men were successful and achieved much of what they sought. Success may be gauged both in terms of personal satisfaction and public acclaim for a person's actions. If both gauges are working together, a person is undoubtedly a success.


