Political Stability and the Division of Czechoslovakia

Timothy M. Kuehnlein

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POLITICAL STABILITY AND THE DIVISION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA

by

Timothy M. Kuehnlein, Jr.

A Thesis
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Western Michigan University
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The completion of this project was both a tedious and rewarding experience. With the highest expectations for the style and content of the presentation, I have attempted to be as concise yet thorough as possible in the presentation and defense of the argument.

The composition of this thesis entails nearly two years of diligent work outside of general course studies. It includes preliminary readings in Central and East European affairs, an extensive excursion throughout the Czech and Slovak republics with readings in the theory of political stability, the history and politics of Czechoslovakia, in addition to composing the text. My pursuit was driven by a passion for the topic, a quest for knowledge and understanding, and the argument's potential for continued development.

To my family, friends and thesis committee, all of whom have remained committed and encouraging throughout this prolonged educational experience, I extend my gratitude for the time and support offered to me during the successful completion of the thesis.

Timothy M. Kuehnlein, Jr.
POLITICAL STABILITY AND THE DIVISION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Timothy M. Kuehnlein, Jr., M.A.
Western Michigan University, 1996

Utilizing the historical development of relations between Czechs and Slovaks for a century and more, the following thesis contends that Czechoslovakia has exhibited a propensity for dissolution and the lack of a sound basis for stable order.

Socio-political, economic and ethno-cultural variables have traditionally characterized Czechoslovak society as highly bifurcated, and with negative implications for a stable political union, especially within the post-revolutionary period.

This thesis argues that the division of Czechoslovakia need not be lamented. Rather, division may be viewed less negatively than other examples of modern state devolution in post-revolutionary Europe. Indeed, the division of Czechoslovakia has positive implications for stability, especially when viewed in light of the historical relations between Czechs and Slovaks, the peaceful process by which dissolution occurred, and countervailing trends in inter-state cooperation and supranational development throughout the continent.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

A Perspective

Revolution gripped France and the entire European continent over two hundred years ago. With the ideals of liberty, equality and fraternity as a moral basis upon which revolution emerged and evolved in the wake of the Enlightenment era, the French Revolution completely overthrew all vestiges of established order. The absence of durable legitimate authority of any sort led France through at least four successive forms of government within a ten year revolutionary period. Order became something short of a civic virtue in France to say the least, and with telling consequences for France's European neighbors for over a century and more as well. Likewise, the scope of events which have characterized revolution in Central and Eastern Europe during the late twentieth century will undoubtedly reveal their effects over the coming century. Invariably, potential threats to state and continental stability, rivaling the effects of the French Revolution, present themselves with no less optimistic certainty.
Truth and freedom from oppression were the trumpet sounds of the revolution in Central and Eastern Europe, ideals which may very well parallel liberty, equality and fraternity. The object of the French Revolution, while a consequence of the frustration and discontent of the masses, was a calculated event of the out-elite and Third Estate. Similarly, revolution in Central and Eastern Europe emanated from glasnost and perestroika, and it too is characterized as a revolution from the top and bottom of society simultaneously. In this instance, the establishment tried to preserve its power by reforming internally while the out-elite and the masses challenged and overturned the existing order when opportunity arose. Indeed, revolution in the Balkans, Central and Eastern Europe is similar to the French experiences of 1789 and their aftermath in many respects, but it is also distinct in many ways. Revolution in Eastern Europe is characterized more deliberate than its French predecessor. Events therein were considerably more peaceful due mostly to the various stages and locations at which they occurred. Specific examples pertaining to Romania and Lithuania, of course, deserve recognition for their displays of extreme revolutionary fervor and subsequent hardship as the revolution developed; but the overthrow of communist government in six countries and eventually the Soviet Union came from within established institutions and primarily
at the summons of dysfunctional economic structures throughout the Soviet sphere of influence. The demonstrations in Gdansk, Bucharest, Leipzig, Dresden, Prague and the various other locations were expressions of intense social discontent from the masses, and each succeeded independently, yet with respect to the other, in discrediting the authority and legitimacy of specific regimes.

Keeping in mind that the revolution in eastern Europe is characteristically unique to the various states in which it occurred, one must consider the consequences of revolution as they pertain to each experience. From another perspective, however, a vast ideological empire collapsed entirely, and much as monarchy collapsed, communism's demise and its far reaching institutional disintegration has singularly sweeping ramifications for stable order within individual states and the continent as a whole. Indeed, the revolution in Central and Eastern Europe raised the very foundations on which societies have been governed for decades and, in one regard at least, almost a century. Governments were overthrown with often dramatic events. Entire regimes, institutions and classes of people have become disenfranchised as a result of revolution, and this inevitably has immeasurable consequences.
The French Revolution succeeded in overthrowing an established government, and instability for France and Europe were the outcome of this objective. By April of 1793, Austria, Great Britain, Holland and Spain were immersed in war with France. Monarchy was also restored by 1815 and a considerable degree of internal stability returned to France as a result, but history indicates nevertheless that the remainder of Europe suffered at the dawn of the Napoleonic era. Is it possible that a scenario similar to that of post-revolutionary France will reveal itself in Central and Eastern Europe? Although conditions as of yet seem to preclude the onset of a Reign of Terror and its Thermidore in most cases, one still wonders where the effects of revolution in Central and Eastern Europe might lead. France's internal politics was shaped by decades of revolution and counter-revolution well into the late nineteenth century, and the entire continent acted and reacted to those developments several times over. Likewise, degrees of instability have resulted along with the systematic overthrow of government in Central and Eastern Europe and with implication for individual states, the continent and the world as a whole. Yet, the course of post-revolutionary developments and their affects on state and continental stability have yet to be revealed in their entirety. Sta-
bility continues to hinge on the nature and success of Central and East European post-revolutionary developments, developments which are a direct result of, and in direct response to, revolution.

While one may indeed envision a resurgence of conservative forces in Central and Eastern Europe, the actual restoration of communist rule, similar to the restoration of traditional monarchy in the French experience, is highly unlikely. Authoritarianism of another sort is possible, and this serves as only one example of the many potential outcomes and consequences for the independent states and the region at large. The outcome of revolution in Central and Eastern Europe and its affect on both state and continental stability overall, however, will be revealed only over the course of time. Most importantly, the outcome of revolution in Central and Eastern Europe depends on the delicate interrelationship and balance of independent states and their ability to maintain stable order within themselves and within the scope of regional, continental developments, especially in light of and in response to the effects of revolution as a whole.¹

¹ Refer to Bauman for elaboration on the extent outcome of revolution in Central and Eastern Europe, especially as it pertains to orthodox views on the nature of revolution and its consequences from both a theoretical and an historical perspective.
While on the surface this may seem to be a topic of consideration for students of international relations or revolutions, the role of revolution and its affect on stability merely set the framework for a comparative study on state stability in and among the successor states of the former Czechoslovakia. More specifically, the framework is set for analysis of state stability in terms of maintaining stable order in itself and within a larger geopolitical context based on impending circumstances - circumstances caused by revolution. The effects of revolution in France dramatically reshaped the order of states in Europe and set new criteria for maintaining stability. Likewise, revolution in the twentieth century has reshaped the terms of stability for modern Europe and its interdependent states.

The revolution of Central and Eastern Europe begins with the evolutionary internal and external reorganization of the Soviet Union and its sphere of influence. Moreover, the progression of events are such that fifteen new states have emerged in the area of the former Soviet Union alone, possibly four in the area of the former

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2 Refer to Valdez and Daniels for a succinct and thorough account of the various stages of revolution in Eastern Europe.
state of Yugoslavia and two from the former Czechoslovakia. A burgeoning process of political devolution presents itself with alarming suddenness, and this devolution stands in stark contrast to German unification and the proliferating reorganization and growth of supranational structures such as the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Each represents the effects of a revolutionary, post-Cold War era and the essence of establishing identity and maintaining survival in light of changing circumstances.

At the apex of this dichotomous relationship, however, a relationship defined in terms of the simultaneous devolution and centralization of power in terms of European geopolitics, is the delicate concept of stability with its multiple variables and nuances, whether it be from an internal perspective of individual states, or from interdependent regions on a continental, geopolitical level. Each aspect is integrally related to the other. At the center of post-communist Europe and the nucleus of the centripetal and centrifugal forces operating in tandem in this respect is the former state of Czechoslovakia.

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3 Refer to Ziring for elaboration on the centripetal and centrifugal forces operating in tandem throughout Europe.
Czechoslovakia experienced its own dissolution as a surprisingly orderly process, especially with comparison to similar processes in other areas, for example, in the Balkan and Caucuses regions. Currently, and in accordance with the dichotomous relationship just briefly described, the successor states of Czechoslovakia seek an increased union with the established West European superstructures such as the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and with evidence for less mutual animosity than is found elsewhere.

Czechoslovakia's role in post-revolutionary Europe, therefore, is such that it stands as a primary example of the process of state dissolution that at least in the short-run was peacefully negotiated. The former Czechoslovakia and its successor states have indeed been confronted with a great array of those problems that challenge efforts at political reconstruction throughout Central and Eastern Europe. They have been confronted with the expected political and economic complications of throwing off an authoritarian yoke in favor of liberal democracy, and displacing a command economy with a free market-economic structure. Additionally and as a consequence of revolution, the region of the former Czechoslovakia

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4 Refer to Illner 1-13 for a succinct perspective on the transformation, its success and the process of dissolution in Czechoslovakia.
vakia has experienced the prevalent circumstances of restless nationalism, shifting regional associations and state structures, each of which threaten the general fabric of European order in this post-revolutionary period in their own respect. Indeed, the process of dissolution and transformation performed its purpose in the former Czechoslovakia. The overthrow of the establishment and disenfranchisement of the ancien regime is nearly complete, at least in tangible terms, but along with the success of non-violent revolution comes a plethora of problems which have affected all sense of order and stability in one manner or another.5

The most significant post-revolutionary development regarding Czechoslovakia is the very demise of the federal state and its society, leaving the process of transposing communism with democracy and a command economy with free markets surrounded by entirely new and complex circumstances. Subsequently, the instabilities caused by the 1989 revolution have persisted, making the nature of political stability surrounding the successor states, not to mention the region, an even more arduous topic for consideration. We are presented with the need to address primary questions. How and why did the dissolution of

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5 Refer to Illner 8 for an elaboration of the difficulties associated with the cognitive transformation.
Czechoslovakia arise? Further, what do the reasons for Czechoslovakia's dissolution imply for the stability of the new dispensation? In explaining such issues, we approach the condition that permitted, at least in this instance, a process of peaceful state dissolution, one of the few such examples at our disposal.

The objective of this thesis is to establish that the division of Czechoslovakia, unlike the process of deconstruction elsewhere, does not necessarily mean greater instability for each successor state or the region at large. Indeed, it is plausible to suggest that stability in Czechia, Slovakia and the region may have been enhanced by the division of the Czechoslovak state.

The most important point from which this argument is posited concerns the inherent weakness of the "Czechoslovak" associational identity and its implications for the social and political organization of the Czechoslovak state. In essence, there has never been a significant degree of social or political cohesion between Czechs and Slovaks, and this condition has implications for stability in both historical and contemporary terms.

Throughout their history, Czechs and Slovaks, coming from two separate spheres of influence, have struggled with their individual and mutual identities. Czechs were strongly connected to the Habsburg throne since the sev-
enteenth century, whereas Slovaks were closely associated with the Magyars and the Crown of St. Stephen from as earlier as the tenth and eleventh centuries. As well, Czechs have traditionally been very progressive both socially and economically, while the Slovaks have had, and continue to have, a delayed pace of modernization and a more provincial and conservative outlook on national questions. Czechs and Slovaks did not begin to look to one another for the realization of their shared identity as Slavs until the national revival of the mid-nineteenth century. Ironically, this occurred in the wake of the French Revolution. Even then, however, this shared identity and the desire for national realization was confronted with an array of impediments toward achieving a more inclusive, common identity which has itself been highly inhospitable to shared social and political relations - an essential point for this analysis and one to which considerable attention is given.

It is essential that we examine the various socio-political, economic and ethno-cultural influences in historical terms as they have affected political relations between Czechs and Slovaks, the nature of the state, and most assuredly, the basis of the state's stability. It is the foundation of the argument in Chapters II, III and IV, that the federal arrangement of Czecho­slovakia was unstable in light of both these historical
circumstances and the exacerbating circumstances of the post-revolutionary, reform period.

The first three chapters, in effect, describe the socio-political, ethno-cultural and economic discrepancies between Czechs and Slovaks which have inhibited the solidification of a true Czechoslovak identity and a sound basis of political unity and stability, especially within the context of a centralized Czechoslovak state from 1918-1939 and the federal, communist state, particularly after 1968. Chapter IV, in particular, looks at the contemporary circumstances which surrounded the revolution and its after-affects leading to Czechoslovakia's dissolution. The concluding chapter, Chapter V, then explains why, in light of both these historical predispositions and the troublesome circumstances created by the post-revolutionary period, Czechs and Slovaks are unlikely to have successfully maintained a stable, democratic political union.

The primary point of the analysis is that the division of the federation, while probably inevitable due to its inherent instability based on socio-political, economic and ethno-cultural reasons, may be viewed positively overall; albeit, no less, to the varying benefit of each successor state. In other words, as stated earlier, stability in the region overall is enhanced by two independent states with mutually exclusive identities
rather than with a Czechoslovak state where two exclusive identities increasingly vied for self-interest as post-revolutionary circumstances distanced their individual needs and drew greater distinctions between them; for the consequences of two such exclusive entities within the context of a federal arrangement as it existed until 1993 had drastic ramifications for the success of consolidating the post-revolutionary reforms, reforms which are an essential element of any sort of stable order in both republics and the region at large.

The hypothesis relies heavily on a basic understanding of the nature of stability in the context of a plural society: especially useful is Arend Lijphart's theory of consociational democracy. While such theories are discussed in the succeeding portion of this Introduction for their general structural significance, an elaboration of their relationship to practical conditions in Czechoslovakia is more than less reserved for Chapter V, the heart of this thesis. When they are integrated with specifics of Czechoslovakia's demise, these theoretical constructs help substantiate the hypothesis.

A larger theoretical aspect of this thesis' consideration entails the exceptional experience of the Czech and Slovak division in the context of trends toward modern state decentralization and exclusive nationalism. Surely, this context presents itself with portentous
prospects for the European continent. While analyzing the psychological and practical elements which have ultimately prevented any considerable cohesion between Czechs and Slovaks, at least to form an overwhelming sense of Czechoslovak nationhood, this larger theoretical consideration proposes and argues that the division of Czechoslovakia, while having been probable, is a primary example for qualifying the traditionally negative conception of modern state devolution, that deconstruction is not always to be lamented. Division should be viewed as a vital contribution towards reestablishing stability within the republics of the former Czechoslovakia and indeed the region.

Decentralization of states, as most clearly exemplified by the breakup of the Soviet Union and the threat of continued decentralization in the Russian federation, not to mention the effects of such a trend in the former Yugoslavia, does present an array of potential dangers. Indeed, extreme nationalism and the question of exclusivity and territorial claims present a whole series of perplexing concerns and problems. Yet national identi-

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6 Refer to Dahbour, Brown and Ritchie for a consideration of rising nationalist and separatist sentiments and their impact on the world order.

7 Refer to Rothschild, Ritchie, Waltzer, Habsbawm and Brecher for a framework of the general lamentation of modern state decentralization.
ties and their claims for self-realization and determina-
tion deserve a conscientious understanding, especially in
light of the need for stable and effective democratic
government as it pertains to Czechoslovakia and the con-
tinent.

The basis of the argument in this larger and more
audacious theoretical consideration is that stability in
the region of the former Czechoslovakia has probably been
enhanced by the occurrence of division along traditional
socio-political, economic and ethno-cultural boundaries;
In other words, a truer national identity expressed
through independent statehood. In more idealistic terms,
however, this thesis is fundamentally arguing that by
allowing the long established identity of Slovaks, for
example, an opportunity for self-determination - the role
that Slovakia plays as a sovereign entity, especially in
light of the countervailing trends in inter-state coop-
eration in Europe and the nature of Czech and Slovak
relations, may very well enhance the prospects for both
inner-state, inter-state and regional stability.8

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8 Refer to Waltzer for a general discussion of the
need for small nations to develop within themselves; also
refer to Implementation of the Helsinki Accords.
Edmund Burke wrote skeptically of the French Revolution in 1790 and criticized revolution because of its effects. He argued that revolution created chaos and threatened stability by discrediting the institutions of government and society and the traditions upon which they have developed and matured over time. He criticized the French for debasing all forms of established order and warned the English by example of the French of the impending consequences from blatant disregard for order, authority and tradition.

Burke's commentary outlines the principles of a stable political and social order and the manner in which each may be challenged during an age of revolution. His commentary also, therefore, provides unparalleled perspective on the events which helped shape the Romantic era - the aftermath of revolution. This in turn provides useful perspective for revolution and its aftermath in Central and Eastern Europe.

The following excerpt from Reflections on the Revolution in France provides a general outline of Burke's convictions on the issue of social order and stability, primarily the dialectical functioning of political society. He writes:

By a constitutional policy, working after the pattern of nature, we receive, we hold, we
transmit our government and our privileges, in the same manner in which we transmit our property and lives. The institutions of policy, the goods of fortune, the gifts of providence, are handed down to us, and from us, in the same course and order. Our political system is placed in a just correspondence and symmetry with the order of the world, and with the mode of existence decreed to a permanent body composed of transitory parts; wherein, by the disposition of a stupendous wisdom, molding together the great mysterious incorporation of the human race, the whole, at one time, is never old, or middle-aged, or young, but, in a condition of unchangeable constancy, moves on through the varied tenor of perpetual decay, fall, renovation, and progression. Thus by preserving the method of nature in the conduct of the state, in what we improve, we are never wholly new; in what we retain, we are never wholly obsolete. By adhering in this manner and on those principles to our forefathers, we are guided not by the superstition of antiquarians, but by the spirit of philosophic analogy. In this choice of inheritance we have given to our frame of polity the image of a relation in blood; binding up the constitution of our country with the dearest domestic ties; adopting our fundamental laws into the bosom of our family affections; keeping inseparable, and cherishing with the warmth of all their combined and mutually reflected charities, our state, our hearths, our sepulchers, and our altars (Burke 29-31).

Constitutionalism, in its broadest sense one might conclude, is the basis of all order for Burke, and an understanding of this constitutional order is an essential stepping stone for understanding some necessary prerequisites for a stable social and political order, especially within the very context of revolution and its consequences in Czechoslovakia.
Roy C. Macridis writes in reference to political society and the conservatism of early British thought; "Society thus consists of interdependent parts - and all the parts are equally conscious of the interdependence. Each one does its own work, but what it does makes sense only when the whole is understood and valued" (Macridis 87). Regarding an organic constitution he continues:

The 'whole' - this society that consists of the harmonious interdependence of many parts - is formalized in the Constitution. This is not a written document, and in fact there is no way, according to conservative thinkers, a constitution can be set down. The Constitution is a set of customs, understandings, rules, and especially traditions, that define political power and set the limits upon its exercise. Power thus enshrined by habit, custom, and tradition becomes authority; that is, it is accepted and respected. In this way, it is the Constitution that binds the whole of the citizenry to its rulers and the rulers to the citizenry within the nation (88).

Burke, however, concerns himself first and foremost with a reasoned perspective on the essentials of civil society and established order by way of institutions, including reasons why tradition and established institutions should not be wantlessly discarded in the face of change and reform - revolution to be exact.

Nonetheless, Burke is not always opposed to change and he is not opposed to reform, according to John H. Hallowell, a leading American conservative scholar of the last generation: "He is opposed to the radical presumption that it is possible to start de novo without concern
for history and tradition," no less. "There is a middle
ground," he insists, "between 'absolute destruction' and
'unreformed existence' and it is the task of the states­
man to find the middle ground" (Hallowell 194). Hallow­
ell continues:

Political problems are not like problems in ge­
ometry nor can we proceed to construct a social
order from a set of a priori assumptions. The
materials with which the statesman must work
are not counters which can be pushed this way
and that in accordance with some preconceived
plan but are passionate human beings, capable
of cooperation with the good but capable also
of rebelling against it. Sentiment, or love,
therefore, must always be reckoned with and it
is only by inculcating habits of veneration
through institutions that the passions of men
can be channelized into socially beneficent ac­
tion (196).

Revolution in France on this set of presumptions
neglected these principles, the crux of Burke's revul­
sion. Civil society, based on a traditional constitution
and rule of law, was abandoned for and challenged by
liberty with no prudent regard for order, according to
Burke; the consequences of which were predictable.
"Unlike Rousseau, Burke argued that 'without ... civil
society man could not by any possibility arrive at the
perfection of which his nature is capable, nor even make
a remote and faint approach to it'" (189). French soci­
ety was shortsighted and their government unable to en­
dure the extraordinary strains which self-inflicted revo­

cution placed upon its constitutional countenance as
might any government or society under such circumstances (Ayling 206).

Unlike the "social revolution" in France however, revolution in much of Eastern Europe, and particularly revolution in Czechoslovakia, did not disdain existing civil society and the rule of law, and in this sense, one may argue that the middle ground was found in the events of 1989. Civil society in Czechoslovakia helped shape the nature of revolution therein by forging it in a beneficent direction. In earnest, stability and order remained more than less intact as a consequence.

Giuseppe Di Palma argues in his analysis of legitimacy in communist Europe that "civil society of sorts survived in Eastern Europe, not just as a conventional clandestine adversary but as a visible cultural and existential counterimage of communism's unique hegemonic project" (Di Palma 49). "As communism lost faith," writes Di Palma, "social resistance to its dogmatic and historical baseless claims turned the transitions in Eastern Europe into true revolutions of citizenship, underscored by an extraordinary mobilization of civic identities and expectations" (50).

Among a number of other accounts, Samuel Huntington supports these claims in The Third Wave where he highlights the uniqueness of revolution and its aftermath in Czechoslovakia particularly by demonstrating Czechoslovakia-
kia's regard for finding the middle ground between "absolute destruction" and "unreformed existence," a location central to Burke's sense of traditional, constitutional order and stability. Huntington terms Czechoslovakia's revolution and its immediate aftermath a process of "transplacement," a concept he defines as an incremental but surely complete overturn of the existing order (Huntington 1990, 156). Negotiation and compromise among political elites were at the heart of the democratic process in November of 1989 when Vaclav Havel met with leaders of the communist party, and the transition agreements between the communist regime and its societal opposition, Civic Forum and Public Against Violence, are proof that revolution in Czechoslovakia remained civil.

Social forces did indeed overthrow the communist establishment in Eastern Europe, but not in the same manner as the French experience where an entire social and political order was discarded with no prudent regard for order, tradition or what would take its place outside of liberty. This scenario is a direct contradiction to the facts which surround "revolution" in Czechoslovakia, to which any basic account of the events will attest. Rather, there was a sound rationale for overthrowing the institutions of government throughout the region, but especially in Czechoslovakia where the communists seized
power by illegitimate means in 1948. One could also argue that the divergence of the institutions of government from the basic tenants of society, especially in light of the severe infractions committed by the communist regime towards the populace at large, warranted the overthrow of such an order; for that order was, in its own right, highly unstable and increasingly distanced from the more natural order of society, an order to which virtually everyone outside of the *ancien regime*, and many of those within it, ascribed - democratic legitimacy. The legitimacy and, therefore, the stability of the regime was, in fact, already diminished by the point of the velvet revolution, if in fact it ever truly existed, and the revolutionaries merely sought to resurrect a government based on the principles of constitutional democracy. Furthermore, the truest Burkian constitution, that which is not written but woven throughout the basic tenants of society, was not altered by the immediate revolution. If anything, its bonds were strengthened in order to achieve the immediate goals of the revolution - the overthrow of the communist regime. This was not a social revolution in the traditional sense of the term. It was more precisely a revolution of the communist political order and its social elements carried through by a subjected social order, or civil society if you will, as a whole. Only
the formal constitution between the people and its government was discarded, and for just reasons one might argue.

Revolution in Czechoslovakia, nevertheless, becomes troublesome and must answer to Burke's primary concerns precisely at the second and final phase of its completion - the point at which constitutional democracy is institutionalized in lieu of the old order and the realization of the necessary consensus among varying interests within society - that harmonious interdependence to which Macridis refers so eloquently - for establishing the framework of a new order. It is at this point that the events become particularly important to the interests and focus of this thesis.

Along with the complete revolution in Czechoslovakia, a divergence of social interests developed responding to deep historical precedents, and this in turn diminished those vestiges of stability which withstood the immediacy of revolutionary events. Civil society became affected by revolution to the point that, in the end, society and the state both dissolved. Indeed, Burke's warnings about revolution radiate an haunting echo from the eighteenth century. Bearing its weight, revolution really does have consequences for stability regardless of merit. A social order was discarded in its entirety for change and reform, revolution to be exact, and this con-
ceives consequences which extend far beyond the immediacy of the revolution itself. It is from this perspective that the most fundamental concerns of this thesis are elicited - those being the basis of stability and the likely prospects for achieving it in post-revolutionary Czechoslovakia in light of both historical and contemporary circumstances relative to the revolution and its affects.

Sir Ralph Dahrendorf has extended Edmund Burke's reflections with a contemplation of his own in the form of a letter to a gentleman in Warsaw entitled, *Reflections on the Revolution in Europe.* With considerable optimistic concern for the direction of revolutionary developments in post-1989 Europe, Dahrendorf contemplates the same sort of issues which Burke addressed, regarding constitutionalism, civil society and socio-political stability in light of a revolutionary experience.

The particulars of Dahrendorf's discussion of establishing a stable constitution of freedom are quite pertinent as they comprise the basis of present reform efforts in most countries of Central and Eastern Europe, including the reform and consolidation programs of the former Czechoslovakia and its successor states. They also provide a starting point at which reform becomes institutionalized for the sake of stability.
Dahrendorf looks to Burke, among others such as Freidrich von Hayek and Karl Popper, as a defender of civil society, and he concerns himself with expounding on the essentials of an open society as it applies particularly to Poland, but also universally to all of eastern Europe in the post-revolutionary context (Dahrendorf 31). He posits the ideas of basic rights, the rule of law, and as much democracy as possible as the basis of a just order in which stability may endure. In other words, Dahrendorf is concerned with keeping power from the hands of the few and establishing a constitution of liberty (86-87 and 78). In this sense, he too extends merit to the revolution of 1989, but the complete transformation of political, economic and social organization to meet these ends, Dahrendorf warns, is not an easy task and not one without considerable risk.

In light of the revolution's immediate success, Dahrendorf elaborates on the merits of constitutional liberalism in contrast to socialism and a third way, warning of its radical tendencies and questionable consequences for conservative post-revolutionary communist Europe. He states that "the old politics is spent". "Constitutional liberalism and social reform need to build a new alliance," (77) what Burke has called a reconciliation of liberty and authority (Hallowell 190). "We are all embarked upon a journey into an uncertain
future and have to work by trial and error within institutions which make it possible to bring about change without bloodshed” (Dahrendorf 41).

Quoting Edmund Burke, Dahrendorf elaborates on the complexity of political development and institutionalization. "Society is indeed a contract and cannot be obtained in many generations. It becomes a partnership not only of those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born, it is also a clause in the great primaevil contract of eternal society" (101). The issue before us, states Dahrendorf, is how to establish the constitution of liberty and order and anchor it firmly within the current circumstances. The heart of the problem, he concludes, lies in the incongruent time-scales of the political, economic and social reforms needed to this end (78). Continuing with the words of Timothy Garton Ash, Dahrendorf reminds his readers that somehow communism "did not manage to poison the words 'citizen' and 'civic' and that citizenship and civil society are, therefore, guiding lights in the new march to freedom" (27).

More precisely, therefore, it is within this context that stability itself has been and continues to be equivocal and of most relevance to Czechoslovakia's division. Not only are the political, economic and social reforms for establishing a constitution of liberty and
order incongruent with one another with respect to Dahrendorf's concerns, but the very relationship between Czechs and Slovaks and their endogenous constitution provide even deeper elements of incongruency which pertain to stability within Czechoslovakia.

Stability and the Essence of a Constitution

There is little doubt that one of stability's greatest threats is revolution. Revolution and structural reform, while two separate issues, are similar in effect on stability because they both seek to fundamentally change an existing order, and this in itself can have a significant impact on stability. Modernization or reform, "in practice always involves change and usually the disintegration of a traditional political system, but it does not necessarily involve significant movement toward a modern political system" (Huntington 1969, 35). Furthermore, political modernization, an alluvious form of structural reform, involves the extension of political consciousness to new social groupings and the mobilization of these groups into politics. A complete revolution, however, that which is at issue here, is by definition, violent and compressed in its time of operation. What Theda Skocpol terms social revolution also involves a second phase: The creation and institutionalization of new political order, the success of which entails a com-
bined rapid political mobilization and rapid political institutionalization. Thus the full scale revolution involves the rapid and often violent destruction of existing institutions, the mobilization of new groups into politics, and the creation of new political institutions (see also Huntington 1969, 266).

It is, in fact, within the full scale revolution as defined by the destruction of existing institutions and the creation of new ones that the context for achieving stability within Czechoslovakia is established. Looking beyond the direct effects of revolution, however, one is forced to correlate basic theory of stability with Czechoslovakia's particular circumstances in order to discern a foundation for stable order both in terms of theory and circumstances. Hence, my discussion of stability arises from and is limited to the Czechoslovakian experience and a few brief theoretical propositions which involve the institutions of government and politics, civil society and elites, all within the framework of informal constitutionalism and the revolutionary context portrayed heretofore. Following Harry Eckstein's concerns, I am most particularly interested in the requisite conditions of stability (refer to Eckstein 179-86). Considerable emphasis, therefore, is placed on theory relating to plural society and particularly Arend Lijphart's theory of democracy in plural society due to the
fact that elements of it most directly address the circumstances and framework under which stability is most probable. Historically, it is precisely with the very nature of Czechoslovakia's endogenous social and political constitution that stability has been most dubious, and while Czechoslovakia has, in the past, experienced a considerable degree of stability based on democratic principles, it has had its share of problems related to its rivined political culture, despite these principles. The post-revolutionary period is no exception. The following paragraphs, therefore, first present the theoretical points which aid in defining stability, and then draw a sufficient degree of practical relevance to Czechoslovakia before going into the historical development of social and political relations between Czechs and Slovaks in Chapters II-IV.

Stability is a difficult and ambiguous concept to define in part due to the many necessary variables upon which it depends and the many factors which invariably affect the conditions by which it is achieved (Lijphart 1-5; Eckstein 223-24). Of this array of conditions, as various scholars contend, stability hinges on the extent of democracy contained in a political and social system - primarily for the part which democracy plays in both providing and maintaining prolonged legitimacy. Others suggest the integral importance of effective government
as well, not to mention external variables (Eckstein 184). This thesis is solely concerned with the internal variables of stability due to the fact that within the revolutionary context, the internal variables of stability have been the most challenging for the Czechoslovak context.

Stability naturally involves the formal organization of governmental structures and how these structures relate to one another in terms of a political process. For the early philosophers, the success of institutions, indeed the success of the polity as a whole, depended heavily on the character of the citizenry. "Civic virtue," the "spirit of the laws" as Montesquieu put it, and its relationship to institutions has indeed been the subject of inquiry since antiquity, notably discussed in Plato's Republic. Stability also depends heavily on the nature of elites and elite interaction within a prescribed constitutional order; for the direction of elite interests and political activity has a profound effect on the populace at large and visa versa. Elites also play a significant part in defining the parameters by which stability itself may endure. Hans-Ulrich Derlien and George J. Szabowski, for example, highlight the crucial role of inter-elite consensus in achieving a stable democratic order. "Elite actors make strategic decisions to promote their individual or institutional interests, to
build or destroy inter-party coalitions, to increase their chances for re-election, and to discredit their rivals and opponents." "Such pursuit of 'subjective rationality,'" they claim, "may produce unintended consequences in the context of specific socio-economic and international constraints, and may contribute to the regime's stability or instability" (Derlien 317).

Seymore Martin Lipset argues that stability is determined by "certain supporting institutions and values, as well as because of its own internal self-maintaining process". This, he argues, relates to conditions within a particular context which, by necessity, must entail democratic principles (Lipset 69). Outside of the specific rules of the political game however, Lipset argues that the variables which explain stability are interrelated and involve, first and foremost, securing legitimacy (acceptance of a regime as right for society); garnering support from conservative groups (loyal versus disloyal opposition), particularly as it concerns societal cleavages; the historical development of legitimacy and the effectiveness of government and democracy; and finally, the means to temper cleavages for the purpose of continuity in social and political order as it relates to democracy (Eckstein 217; Lipset 70-72 and 86-103; Li-jphart 10).
Gabriel Almond, however, hits at the heart of stability as it concerns plural society and the interests of this project by emphasizing political homogeneity as an element of stability. The homogeneity of a political culture, he argues, has a direct bearing on stability as defined by a typology of four socio-political systems, two of which pertain to democracy. The first, known as the Anglo-American type, is characterized by a homogenous, secular political culture and a highly differentiated role structure. The other, known as the Continental European type, is characterized by a fragmented political culture which is, in the words of Almond, "embedded in the subcultures and tends to constitute separate subsystems of roles" (Lijphart 6). The former - in terms of relating to homogenous culture, with its autonomous parties, interest groups and communications media - epitomizes stability. The later type epitomizes instability because of its fragmented political culture and mutual dependence of parties and groups, not to mention the inherent immobilism of its nature (7-12). Almond highlights the significance of role structure and political culture, arguing that each is linked as a condition of political stability (7). He argues that the degree to which governmental and societal institutions are autonomous or separate and maintain their proper boundaries -
paralleling separation of powers doctrine - has a direct impact on the stability of democratic political systems (8-10). This applies to the organization of government and political institutions into separate spheres of influence (i.e. executive, legislative and judicial; parties, interest groups and media communications).

It should be mentioned that Almond's theoretical propositions place considerable emphasis on input structures of society and government due to their affect on stability in terms of "checks and balances" (9), and he is also concerned with political development and party systems (12-13). Notwithstanding their importance, these aspects of Almond's views are not addressed. Almond's typology is extremely useful, however, for deducing the extent to which stability in Czechoslovakia is likely, based on the nature of its fragmented political culture.

A plural society, according to Harry Eckstein, is one which is divided into segmental cleavages based on religion, ideology, language, region, culture, race, and ethnic identity (3-4). Eckstein argues that political parties, interest groups, media of communication, schools and voluntary associations tend to be organized along these lines of segmental cleavages as well. Indeed, for Eckstein, the nature of authority patterns found in these associations relative to the authority pattern of government is an important factor for continuity in legitimat-
ing authority. The manner in which these segments are organized, however, is the primary concern here; for the manner in which cleavages are organized in relationship to one another and their government weighs heavily on the nature of constitutional order and, therefore, stability. In a sense, this correlates with Macridis' contention with respect to the consciousness of society's harmonious interdependent parts (Macridis 89).

Cleavages do indeed create problems for the continuity of a general constitution, and stable democratic government is difficult to achieve in a plural society for reasons that pertain mostly to political consensus and cultural homogeneity in socio-political terms (Eckstein 180; refer also to Lijphart 1 and 48). Almond, for example, places great emphasis on the need for a secular political culture, one in which differences within society's socio-political composition are not so extensive so as to threaten mutual respect and adherence to authority. In contrast, Almond's Continental type highlights the inherent nature of instability. Great degrees of fragmentation and their correspondence with subcultures diminish continuity in plural society and, therefore, make stability less achievable. This stands to reason, if there are divergent views on what is just or who may have authority in a certain situation, conflict will arise unless there are proper formal and/or
informal constitutional measures in place or within the political culture itself particularly which may resolve or temper the differences for the sake of stability, but Almond suggests that in the fragmented political culture, role structures are usually mixed and the segments polarized. Consequently, the political process is troubled with immobilism. Indeed, in reference to Almond, Arend Lijphart concludes that deep social divisions and political differences within plural societies are responsible for instability and the breakdown of democracy (Lijphart 1).

Lipset's concerns with legitimacy and perceptions of government effectiveness are also directly related to the nature of social cleavage. There are problems with segmentation of society in terms of legitimacy, defining loyal opposition and maintaining legitimacy by effectiveness in government (Lipset 89). One main source of legitimacy lies in the continuity of primary conservative and integrative institutions, particularly during transition periods, but where historical antagonisms have developed weltanschaung politics, the institutions of integration are useless and the political atmosphere polarizes, leaving society immersed in partisan battles (88 and 95). Conflict among cleavages threatens social disintegration (91).
In terms of societal organization, Lipset states that "the extent to which contemporary democratic political systems are legitimate depends in large measure upon the ways in which the key issues which have historically divided society have been resolved (86). He too argues that stability is enhanced by what Gabriel Almond calls secular political culture (89). In this sense, Lipset is particularly concerned with defining loyal opposition and creating cross pressures, concepts which are addressed in the coming paragraphs. Societal cleavages and the way they relate to one another dramatically influence stability. Lipset argues that the stability of a democratic system depends on the system's efficiency in modernization, but also the effectiveness and legitimacy of the political system in terms of the nature and effects of social cleavages; for much like legitimacy, effectiveness is determined by the performance of a political system to the extent that it satisfies the basic functions of government as defined by the expectations of most members of society, and the expectations of powerful groups within it which might threaten the system (86). The crux of Lipset's concerns entail maximizing political cosmopolitanism with such variables as urbanization, education, communications media and increased wealth (97).

Indeed, Lipset's main theoretical argument in conjunction with legitimacy, is that stable democracy de-
pends on levels of economic development and the proportional distribution of wealth (74 and 83). High levels of development mean greater stability, but rapid economic development is inimical to stability while gradual economic development supports it (Eckstein 180, refer also to 216-20; Lipset 75-78). Of course, this is a contentious issue with which scholars diverge for reasons that are too numerous and detailed to expound upon here or, for that matter, within the context of this thesis (Eckstein 219). Nonetheless, Lipset argues that the level of industrialization, urbanization and educational development in a society bears significantly on the support of a democratic order and its stability (Lipset 78-91). He argues that together factors of economic development and modernization are linked closely to the historic institutionalization of the values of legitimacy and tolerance (78-91).

Furthermore, in addition to the effectiveness of government and its policies over a period of time, conditions which serve to moderate the intensity of partisan battle are among the key requirements for a plural, democratic political system (91-92). Lipset argues that the chances for stable democracy are enhanced to the extent to which groups and individuals have a number of cross-cutting, politically relevant affiliations (96-97; Lipjphart 11). Almond and Lipset both believe, for example,
that when individuals belong to a number of
different organized or unorganized groups with
diverse interests and outlooks, their attitudes
will tend to moderate as a result of these psy-
chological cross-pressures. Moreover, leaders
of organizations with heterogeneous memberships
will be subject to the cross-pressures of this
situation and will also tend to assume moder­
ate, middle of the road positions. Such mod­
eration is essential to political stability.
Conversely, when a society is riven with sharp
cleavages and when memberships and loyalties do
not overlap but are concentrated exclusively
within each separate segment of society, the
cross-pressures that are vital to political
moderation and stability will be absent
(Lijphart 10).

"In practical political terminology," Arend Lijphart
states, "overlapping memberships are characteristic of a
homogenous political culture, whereas a fragmented cul­
ture has little or no overlapping between its distinct
subcultures" (11).

Each of these propositions about the nature of sta­
bility is extensive and quite elaborate, not to mention
cumbersome. For now, however, these ideas provide a
basic foundation from which to proceed. Stability in­
volves institutions, elites, civil society and economic
success, all within the a formal and informal constitu­
tion based upon a cohesive political culture. External
variables, of course, also influence stability, but as
already stated, this thesis concerns primarily the inter­
nal variables which contribute to social cohesion.
Constitutional Stability: The Argument Applied

With the initial success of the revolution in 1989, a provisional government was established in Czechoslovakia followed by the election of a legitimate government in the summer of 1990. Each contributed to organizing a new constitution based on democratic pluralism and the rule of law, in essence reforming the state's legal framework to conform with the likes of a free-market democracy (Ulc 21-22; Wolchik 1991, 50 and 60-61). The very continuity of Czechoslovakia unraveled with such action however. Divergences of opinion from vested interests in society - Czech, Moravian and Slovak - surfaced over the political equation in terms of unification. Along with the reforms came questions of how power was to be distributed between the republics and between the republics and the central government. Czechs and the predominance of their representative political parties advocated a centralized government. Slovaks, on the other hand, advocated a decentralized government with greater powers to the republics.9

With particular resonance to Lipset, rapid economic reforms and their distinct effects on Czechs and Slovaks

9 See Wolchik 1994; refer also to Illner for elaboration about the divergence of attitudes between Czechs and Slovaks towards reforms.
helped fuel the divergence in political interests. In a sense, they were the primary cause of political divergences. From the earliest stages of the revolutionary period, government policy advocated and initiated a rapid economic transformation from a planned economy to one of markets. So-called shock therapy made the currency convertible, broke monopolies, lifted price controls and instituted the privatization of the state-owned economy. Also, a great deal of emphasis was placed on fiscal and monetary policy, including heavy doses of fiscal restraint, in order to bring supply and demand into harmony. The effects influenced Czechs and Slovaks differently from one another. Slovaks experienced the brunt of the hardship as a result of their sharply underdeveloped economic structure. In contrast, Czechs witnessed a revival of economic dynamism and optimism for the future condition seen only in the days before communism. As a result, the Czechs took a progressive position and Slovaks took a more conservative position with regard to revolutionary and post-revolutionary reforms. Ethnic nationalist sentiments increased and elite interests directed the post-revolutionary period along divergent and contentious lines. Czech politicians generally advocated a highly centralized state apparatus and a quick move to the market economy via market principles while
Slovak politicians advocated the decentralization of state structures and a slower pace of economic reform with limited privatization and strong state intervention (Islam 75). In the end, the complete revolution had consequences for both the stable order of society, and subsequently the very existence of Czechoslovakia as a modern "nation-state".

Why the sudden deterioration of mutual relations, and the threat of complete dissolution? The process of deterioration took a remarkably short period of time - some three years. The revolution occurred in November 1989, and the state was completely dissolved by January 1, 1993.

Saul Newman is particularly concerned with finding out what causes and directs ethnic conflict by determining why and how certain ethnic identities become politicized and why some succeed where others fail. Newman concludes that shortcomings in conflictual modernization theory are evident, and he stresses the need for understanding the ethnic component in order to understand the extent and viability of such conflict; how and why, for instance, relations between Czechs and Slovaks could deteriorate at such a catastrophic rate.

Newman stresses the manner in which modernization politicizes ethnic identification, emphasizing the ideational aspects of ethnic movements rather than just the
economic and political changes that precede such movement's formation. He states; "By emphasizing the ideological component of ethnicity, [the argument] addresses the reasons for mass participation in ethnic movements, brings an ethnic component to the study of ethnic politics, and expands on the purview of the conflictual modernization approach" (478). Commenting further on typical conflictual modernization theory, Newman states that it avoids "a detailed study of the ideological, strategic and organizational apparatus of ethnic movements. Also, in emphasizing the economic and political interests of elites, theorists have avoided discussing the role of ethnic boundaries and ethnic cultural and ideological markers for determining the depth and breadth of movement support" (467).

Newman's extension of conflictual modernization theory, therefore, provides a strong theoretical framework from which to analyze the ethno-cultural and socio-political premise for Czechoslovakia's demise. It stresses the importance of understanding the social composition of Czechoslovakia in the context of state dissolution. Hence, his theoretical clarification serves as a guideline for structuring Chapters II-IV.

Corresponding with Almond's Continental type, Czechoslovakia has, in fact, been traditionally divided along distinct ethnic, geographic, linguistic, economic,
and political lines since its establishment, and these lines of distinction correspond with very little significant, if any, crosscutting or overlapping segmentation, in Lipset's sense. Carol Skalnik Leff argues that, in fact, two separate and self-sufficient societies have developed, mocking the Czechoslovak ideal and this in spite of its virtuous chase of composite unity over the years (1992). Additionally, role structures have traditionally been truncated into two separate subsystems with separate role structures relative to each segment of society suggestive of Almond's propositions. Indeed, Czechoslovakia consisted of a deeply fragmented political culture, and the nature of such fragmentation has and continues to have implications for the common government of Czechs and Slovaks. Every major period of Czechoslovak history has been troubled by deep ethnic conflict involving perceptions of equitable distribution of power and resources among the most prevalent segments of society, most predominantly Czechs, Slovaks and Germans. The antagonisms are evident and well documented throughout the course of the state's seventy-five year history.

Expounding upon Gabriel Almond's Continental European type, however, and the limited prospects for stability which it places on fragmented political cultures, the likes of which Czechoslovakia resembles, Arend Lijphart argues in *Democracy in Plural Societies* that democratic
stability is achievable in highly fragmented political cultures. He argues that small states with diverse subcultures such as Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands and Switzerland, for example, have proven through the practice of consociationalism that stability is, in fact, feasible within plural societies (Lijphart 14-16). The question is, however, how such a solution could be found in Czechoslovakia under the current circumstances.

Acknowledging that it may be difficult, but not at all impossible, to achieve and maintain stable democratic government in a plural society, Lijphart puts forth three interlocked solutions to the political problems of plural society while maintaining a democratic order. One is to eliminate or substantially reduce the plural character through assimilatory means based on centralized government. A second alternative, and this the crux of Lijphart's theory, is to accept the plural divisions as basic building blocs of a stable democratic regime - the essence of consociationalism. Finally, Lijphart states, "if the second solution should be unlikely to succeed or if it was tried and failed, the remaining logical alternative is to reduce the pluralism by dividing the state into two or more separate and more homogenous states" (44-45). These strategies will be expounded upon in the detail necessary in Chapter V because one may indeed be tempted to argue that consociationalism is a possible
framework for political union between Czechs and Slovaks. In fact, elements of consociationalism have historically been a factor in achieving stability throughout Czechoslovakia's history, only under the centralist and assimilatory practices of various governments - democratic and authoritarian alike.

After disbarring centralism because of its historical significance in creating much of the adverse sentiments between Czechs and Slovaks within both the First Republic and communist authoritarianism, I argue in Chapter V, that the political and economic divides of Czechoslovakia are not conducive to consociationalism, and this is primarily reflected in the nature of elite interaction and the problems associated with societal segmentation and the lack of a secular, or at least cohesive, social order and political culture. Indeed, the circumstances of the post-revolutionary period and the conditions of Czech and Slovak relations, especially in terms of elite interests and overall social dispositions, do not lend themselves to consociational democracy as a means of fashioning an endurable stability.

Helga A. Welsh analyzes the political transition processes in Central and Eastern Europe by emphasizing the changing modes of conflict resolution responding to revolutionary and post-revolutionary developments (379). Her analysis contains important implications for the
stability of a newly emerging political order by describing the manner in which order and stability are achieved at various stages during a transition process, be it revolutionary or post-revolutionary reform. Welsh's specific sense of transition is directed at that interval between the decay of an authoritarian political regime and the arrival of a democratic one. She highlights the fact that such transitions attempt to address crucial issues under urgent time constraints, they present great uncertainty with regard to the process and the results of the transition, and they involve a rapidly expanding range of political actors and forms of communication among them. They are also elite centered and involve bargaining.

Welsh identifies three stages in which successful transitions move toward democratic political rule. First, a liberalization of the authoritarian regime is accompanied by a decline in the use of command and imposition methods for conflict resolution. Secondly, bargaining and compromise emerge as the key features in decision-making as the transition proceeds to extricate the old regime and institutionalize a new political system. And finally, she states that increasing competition and cooperation as methods of conflict resolution distinguish the consolidation process of a transition and ulti-
mately become institutionalized in the newly established social and political framework (380).

Much as Huntington describes Czechoslovakia's revolutionary experience as a transplacement (1990, 156), Welsh categorizes it as a process of liberalization through negotiation and power-sharing. The liberalization process was started by the communists as popular mobilization gave them few choices. However, with round table negotiations, opposition gained the necessary status and visibility needed to become a shareholder of power in a coalition government with the communists, ultimately transferring power before the democratic election in June 1990 (387). The process was peaceful, consisting of negotiation and compromise which in turn established a sound level of stability for the extension and consolidation of further political and economic reforms.

Welsh comments, however, that "while bargaining and compromise contributed to the peaceful and orderly transfer of power and the institutionalization of pluralist political structures in Central and Eastern Europe, further progress toward the consolidation of these emerging democracies was hampered by unresolved issues of power distribution and by conflictual elite attitudes (391).

Supporting arguments made earlier in this regard, those very same prospects which provided great success
and optimism for the Czechoslovak transition began to present themselves in a different light as the consequences of post-revolutionary reforms and their consolidation grew deeper and wider. The prospects for stability in a united Czechoslovakia became increasingly more guarded, and the smooth consolidation of reforms less likely. The basic reform, consisting of elaborate political and economic initiatives, played itself out in the Czech lands and Slovakia in very different ways for which negotiation and compromise were afforded little opportunity by the newly placed political elites. Referring to Samuel B. Bachrach and Edward J. Lawler, Welsh states, "independent of the mode of transition, the concept of bargaining is crucial in understanding transition processes. The argument is based on the assumption that the 'bargainers need to reach some settlement but, at the same time, wish to settle on terms favorable to themselves'" (379). Of course this had considerable significance for negotiations between the communist government of Czechoslovakia and its successful opposition, but its relevance to a later period in the transition process, especially the basis for state dissolution, is ironic. Negotiations between the Czech and Slovak prime ministers served as the means by which reform and its consolidation could proceed in light of heightening tensions between
the federated republics. Each side, however, chose to insist on terms primarily favorable to itself. Little compromise was extended by either side, and the federation collapsed as a result. The conditions for conflict resolution became dim at the very least, and this, of course, has implications for stable democratic government, not to mention the very basis of consociational democracy and the fate of the federal republic.

I will argue in conclusion that circumstances were so adverse to the continuation of a federated union that Lijphart's third option, disassociation, was the most reasonable outcome. The division of Czechoslovakia has, in fact, created two more or less homogenous political entities within which stability currently exists, albeit to varying levels for each state. Stability within a unified state would have been a formidable status to achieve in light of the diverging level of stability within each republic. Not only would the Czech Republic's increased pace of reform have affected Slovaks adversely as a whole, the political volatility currently experienced in Slovakia would have most emphatically had adverse affects for the stability of each republic, the union itself and the region overall. It is from this perspective that this thesis is argued. The division of Czechoslovakia is not to be lamented; rather, the divi-
sion of Czechoslovakia is an inevitable and even positive example of modern state devolution.
CHAPTER II

THE HISTORY OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK IDEAL AND ITS PROPENSITY FOR DISSOLUTION

There are ethno-cultural, socio-political and economic variables of prolonged historical significance which have defined the Czech, Slovak and Czechoslovak conceptions of a national identity separately from one another. These distinctions provide significant insight into the complexity of the "Czechoslovak" concept of associational identity and subsequently the delicate nature of mutual political relations between Czechs and Slovaks defined in terms of the modern state of Czechoslovakia. They are also an essential point from which to understand the circumstances and causes relative to Czechoslovakia's dissolution.

Czechs and Slovaks have long shared a strong common history. Indeed, they were tied closely to one another within the Great Moravian Empire (c. 833-907), but ever since its collapse at the close of the tenth century, Czechs and Slovaks diverged from one another. Czechs (Bohemians and Moravians) coalesced within the Bohemian Empire and later the Holy Roman Empire since its earliest
stages of development in the twelfth century. Then in 1620, the Czech Crownlands were slowly absorbed by the Habsburg dynasty with their defeat by Bavarian Emperor Maximillian at the Battle of White Mountain during the Thirty Years' War. Slovaks, on the other hand, became associated with the Crown of St. Stephan from as early as the tenth century. With millions of other ethnic Slavs, both Czechs and Slovaks emerged from the Middle Ages under the vassalage of Austrian Germans and Magyars respectively, striving incessantly throughout their accent to the modern age to resurrect a distinct, yet shared sense of identity.

The mid-nineteenth century is a natural starting point for understanding the complexities of a conceived "Czechoslovak" identity and state. By this time, the Czech lands and Slovakia were integral parts of the Austrian Empire and the Habsburg crown. The national identities of Czechs and Slovaks reemerged from centuries of quietude with increasing intensity during this period of intense national revival which began throughout Europe and within the Empire at the turn of the eighteenth century in the wake of the French Revolution. In response to the rooted traditions of German and Hungarian aristocracy and the slowing reforms toward a parity of nationalities within the Austrian Empire, nationalist spirits of Czechs, Slovaks, Poles, Romanians, Ruthenians, Slo-
venes, Croatians, and Serbs were revived and developed as Pan-Slavism swept the Empire's peripheral regions. From the turn of the century and for the first half of the nineteenth century, following the Enlightenment Reforms and abolition of serfdom initiated by Maria Theresa and her son, Joseph II, national sentiments were augmented (Leff 1988, 28). After squelching the revolutionary events of 1848 however, the Habsburg crown attempted to curtail rising nationalist sentiments by centralizing its administration of the Empire. Despite such efforts, the nationalist resurgence persisted with moderate progress and the internal quest for national rights; this and the external threats from various Prussian and French military encounters earlier in the century worked at challenging the Austrian conundrum's delicate nature.

The realization of Czech and Slovak national identities had been stifled considerably by the administrative organization and cultural superiority of the imperial powers. Language and culture were dominated by German and Magyar, and the administration of political and economic affairs were based strictly according to imperial spheres of Austrian and Hungarian influence, especially after the formation of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Czechs and Slovaks, in effect, lay subject to Austrian and Hungarian administration respectively until the Empire's dissolution. And while each sphere had distinct
socio-political and economic characteristics, endogenous nationalities were subject to and dramatically influenced by their centralized bureaucratic apparatus.

The reorganization of administration in the Austrian Empire began as early as 1774 in response to external threats and the attraction of Enlightenment principles from the French philosophes. Enlightened absolutism was the means by which the Habsburgs addressed nationalist sentiments, but even after the 1867 Ausgleich, the political and administrative organization of the Empire remained heavily centralized, becoming a sort of "masked absolutism" (Skilling 1994, 156). Austria-Hungary was based on a federalist principle of the Dual Monarchy which left the Habsburg throne residing independently, although simultaneously, over both Austria and Hungary. This arrangement, of course, lent credence to Magyar demands for internal autonomy and national parity with the Germans, and it is evidence of the monarchy's need to disperse authority to its nationalist constituencies, especially the more influential Magyars, as a result of mounting political pressure from nationalist resurgences.

While various organs of democratic and provincial government existed at regional levels within each kingdom, legislative power remained primarily in the hands of the Austrian central government and the monarchy based in Vienna. In a sense, a dual system existed in more ways
than one. There was not only a dual monarchy, but also a mockery of federalist principles; a type of federalism that was limited horizontally to Austria and Hungary and vertically to the seventeen Crownlands and their virtually powerless representative bodies. This truncated form of federation provided limited integrative potential for the Empire's various governmental segments based primarily on nationality. The local organs of government - communes and districts based on provinces and lands - were completely subordinate to the centralized monarchy. The Empire's executive power was based almost entirely in the hands of the Monarch, the ministries, bureaucracies and administrative offices of which were vested with governors and provincial committees with no responsibility to the various imperial and provincial diets to which all nationalities within the Austrian sphere at least, including Bohemia and Moravia, were represented with limited residual powers. There was no territorial administrative autonomy within the Empire outside of that granted to Hungary (147). Slovaks, therefore, also had no political autonomy within the Hungarian sphere of the Empire, and they received only very limited national representation in the Hungarian parliament (65). With minority nationalities, Czechs and Slovaks alike having little access to the centralized administrative struc-
tures, their attempts for greater parity with Germans and Magyars were often either overlooked or stifled.\textsuperscript{10}

The Empire also adapted economically with the loss of Silecia to Prussian expansionism in the mid-eighteenth century. Replacing Silecia as the industrial sector of the Empire, the Czech lands quickly developed specialization in sugar refining, smelting, coal mining, machine-tool production, and glass and textile manufacturing. Slovakia developed industrially as well, but as it fell subject to Hungarian administration, its economy remained predominantly based in agricultural production (Leff 1988, 12-23; Cornej 34 and 36). Economically, the imperial spheres developed distinctively for the duration of the Empire's existence, subsequently presenting a basis for perplexing consequences with regard to political relations between Czechs and Slovaks as time passed and new circumstances evolved (Leff 1988, 11-26).

Czechs had slowly accumulated wealth as a result of their unique experience with industrial modernization whose new elites displaced, in some respects, the traditional role of the landed gentry and aristocracy of mostly German origin. Austria had been thought of as being increasingly embourgeoisified compared to Hungary,

\textsuperscript{10} Refer to Skilling 65-66 and 156-57 for elaboration on the political organization of Austria-Hungary.
and Czechs experienced considerably more liberties under the Austrians than did the Slovaks under the Magyars (18). Czechs became integrally involved as opportunities for greater parliamentary participation in local and imperial diets developed throughout the nineteenth century. The Czech language was accepted for public use in 1880, and that, in turn, created greater opportunity and impetus for the accelerated institutional development of universities, theaters, newspapers and various other social and cultural organizations of a distinctly Czech nature (17). A high standard of education developed and provided fertile ground on which claims for further national recognition advanced (Polisensky 100), demands for greater political representation and administrative autonomy. Sokol became a distinct mark of national health. Dvorak, Smetena and Manes developed their expressions around the ideals of national identity, and literary Czech experienced a revival after two centuries of neglect (100).

The Slovak experience of increasing magyarization over the course of some eight hundred years, however, left its identity much more obscure. Oppression of the Slovaks became especially harsh after 1867 when Magyars became equals to Germans and the Emperor's influence in Hungarian domestic affairs became limited, especially his ability to protect non-Magyar peoples. The Slovak class
system was sharply truncated over the years in a staunchly conservative aristocratic system. Its educational opportunities drastically limited, the territory of Slovakia had a literacy rate ten times less than that of the Czech lands (Leff 1988, 17). Magyar remained the only official language, and the few remaining Slovak schools were closed by 1874 (28). Suffrage was severely curtailed as well. Even with six percent of the populace permitted to vote, very few qualified Slovaks made it to the ballot boxes (25). Between 1899 and 1913, some 300,000 of the roughly two million Slovaks migrated from the Hungarian kingdom as a result of the social and economic misery (Skilling 1994, 65). Slovak culture was being suppressed while that of the Czechs was expanding (Leff 1988, 23).

The greatest cultural distinction between Czechs and Slovaks involves the literary language as it developed over the course of the nineteenth century. While germanization and magyarization of the Czech and Slovak regions hindered the mastery and development of endogenous languages, each survived its long period of repression and managed to resurge and develop with considerable vibrancy in the period of national revival. One also finds within this context, the earliest conception of a "Czechoslovak" identity and the roots of contention be-
between Czechs and Slovaks defined in terms of national association and cultural distinction.

A language renaissance was a central element of the national revival from the very beginning. Prior to 1829 Josef Dobrovsky began using literature to support the national cause, and his successors, Josef Jungmann being among them, developed the conception of a common Slavonic literary language based on Czech. Jan Kollar and P.J. Safarik, Protestant Slovak authors writing in Czech, are the most acclaimed for their development of this concept beyond the aspirations of Jungmann and others.

In their idea of what constituted a nation, the mutual influences of Slovak and Czech on the literary language were very important for national cohesion. They wanted "a Slovak Czech and a Czech Slovak" language (Agnew 22). Their views evolved from a very complex interrelationship of literary Czech and an early, written form of colloquial Slovak known as bernolacina, an interrelationship which pitted Slovak Catholic and Protestant clergy and intellectuals against one another based on perceptions of what should be distinctly defined as Czech and Slovak or possibly even Czechoslovak, a complex and polemical situation to say the least.

Catholic priests, Father Anton Bernolak chief among those Slovaks who used bernolacina and from whom the form derived its name, began codifying this written form of
Slovak in the late eighteenth century (22). As a result of this codification and Magyar suppression of literary Czech and colloquial Slovak, Slovak intellectuals began to question the fate of Slovak itself (28). Consequently, a debate over literary language ensued among and between Czech and Slovak intellectuals.

Czechs, in contrast, aggressively pursued lingual purity. In particular, German infringed on professional literary and colloquial Czech as a result of the professional and cultural dominance of German throughout the empire. Slovak also managed to get a word in edgewise as Czech was the literary language of Slovak intellectuals, some of whom interspersed it with bernolacina.

There were indeed different forces of Slavism at work within Austro-Slavism in many respects (30). Some argued that the literary language of Slavs could be unified while allowing dialects in the spoken word. After all, the Germans had succeeded in such an endeavor, and the consequences of their efforts proved lucrative. The strength of the German empire was considerably enhanced by the concept. Yet, despite the logic of such a principle for pan-Slavism and the eventual liberation of Slavs from their oppressors, "tribal" proclivities of the Slavic nation hindered any probability of realizing this sort of ideal.
Kollar and Safarik both used the term 'nation' to refer to the Slavs as a group (narod slovansky), while using the term "tribe' (kmen) to refer to the different Slav peoples making up the Slav nation. Within this framework, according to Kollar and Safarik, the Czechs and Slovaks belonged together to a common "Czechoslovak" tribe of the Slavic nation.11

The Slovaks L'udovit Stur and Josef Hurban, however, purported a different conception of national association and the development of linguistics. They believed that Slovaks constituted a separate tribe from the Czechs (31); indeed that they were a separate nation, and that to the contrary of Kollar and Safarik, "Czechoslovak" would not be considered a tribe of Slavism.

Stur codified what is called a "cultured Central Slovak" in the mid-nineteenth century as it related to the more western, cultured dialects of colloquial Slovak. He codified the language as it was spoken rather than as it was written from historical axiom, primarily from the era of Bernolak (29). By doing so, Stur and his supporters stretched the idea of an independent literary Slovak to its apex when in 1843 they declared in public that from thenceforth they would write only in the Slovak

11 Refer to Agnew 23 for a discussion of the tribal concept.
language, in affect declaring an independent nation of Slovaks in Central Europe (21).

The logic of Stur best sums up exactly why the separate tribal proclivity became so appealing. It also fits appropriately in the context of describing why the Czechs and Slovaks diverged on the basis of one of the most important elements which define a nation, language. Stur comments:

Each nation is most easily united by what is its own, what is nearest to it, for in what it senses itself, its spirit, its thought, and thus too the Slovak nation will be most quickly and most certainly united through its own unique, national, ancestral language (32).

This, of course, neither favored Czech interests nor the ideals which Kollar and Safarik had put forward in an effort to consolidate a Czechoslovak national identity. In fact, Kollar and Safarik subsequently embarked upon a collection of essays underwritten by the National Museum in Prague in which they criticized the Slovak literary language (25).

The course of events in the development of linguistics highlights the fact that the development of Slovak was not because of any hostility towards Czechs. It was due to the purpose of uniting Slovaks (33), and the dilemma lingered on the proposition put forward by Stur: "If we [Slovaks] write in pure Czech, then we limit our
common people's access to reading, and if we prefer our own language, we cut ourselves off from the Czechs" (24).

Aside from the development of linguistics, there are, of course, many elements which have helped define national association among Czechs and Slovaks independently from one another over the course of centuries. Foremost among them is the religious orientation of Czechs and Slovaks. Czechs have ascribed to Catholicism since the Christianization of their lands, yet ever since the fourteenth century and the Hussite movement which challenged the Catholic church, Czech culture as such has commonly been interpreted as incorporating a strong Protestant ethic; this despite the fact that only some 14 percent or less of the population has traditionally ascribed to Protestant theology. In contrast, Slovaks have remained devoutly Catholic with only a very small proportion of the population ascribing to Protestantism. The distinction has not only contributed to two distinct senses of national identity, as we shall see in Chapter III, it has also affected how Czechs and Slovaks relate to one another, especially with respect to goals, ambitions, interests and even conceptions of a mutual destiny. From an historical perspective, then, Czechs and Slovaks have come from two very clear and separate circumstances. The elements that comprise national identity - a common history, culture, language, and common views
about one's destiny, etc., have been distinctively qualified. Simply put, Czechs and Slovaks have separate foundations for national association, and this has implications for the political stability of union between them.12

Cooperation and Statehood

Cooperation between Czechs and Slovaks, indeed the concept of a Czechoslovak associational identity, can be traced to the early nineteenth century linguistics debate and as nationalist sentiments were taking shape. It evolved as Czechs, in particular, grasped for greater self-realization and liberation from the restrictive, imperial controls of local and national affairs, while Slovaks, by nature of their considerably more sharpened repression, found commiseration with them (Leff 1988, 27). This is not to suggest, however, that Slovaks did not actively pursue their own interests. Rather, because of their circumstances within the oppressive Hungarian administration, Slovaks could not effectively express and lobby for their own interests independently from the

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12 Refer to Illner 85 for an elaboration of religious distinctions; refer to Wolchik 1991 and Leff 1988 generally for more basic cultural and historical distinctions.
However, despite this mutual cooperation, Czechs and Slovaks did not approach each other with any significant effort for shared independent statehood until the early twentieth century. And such cooperation came in the face of the Empire's immanent demise. Czechoslovak statehood came about under precarious circumstances and with limited support (Leff 1988, 27; Skilling 1994, 77).

Thomas G. Masaryk, Czechoslovakia's first president, is often noted as the keystone figure in the realization of Czechoslovakia. Masaryk was primarily a proponent for Czech national rights in the Austrian sphere of the Dual Monarchy, advocating a peaceful pursuit of national rights for equality and self-government, essentially calling for a reformed federal union of nationalities within the monarchical arrangement, he sought greater Czech rights beginning from the early 1880s and until his exile at the onset of World War I (Skilling 1994, 158, see also 147-71).

Masaryk's ideas for greater Czech autonomy were influenced by the thoughts of Frantisek Palacky, Karel Havlicek and Alois Hajn. Each of these early intellectuals of the national revival, with the exception of Hajn

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13 See Felak 30; refer to Skilling 1994 in general for further elaboration on the evolution of mutual relations and the influence of Czechs with Slovaks.
with whom Masaryk worked, argued for varying degrees of national autonomy within the monarchical arrangement, and each presented an intricate program of defining the Czech and Slovak relationship in political terms. From the basis of their arguments, the conception of Czech and Slovak political unity emerged, reinforced by those of Kollar and Safarik on lingual separation and national association. Masaryk was influenced by elements of each and, in turn, influenced the revival period with his own moderate approach to the Czech, Slovak and Czechoslovak questions of national identity and political union by serving as a delegate to the imperial diet in Vienna and as a professor of philosophy at Prague's Charles University.

Palacky argued that the Czech nation could not be politically independent of the imperial power because of its size, an aspect on which Masaryk reflected considerably (see Skilling 1994, 158-59). Palacky emphasized the development of the nation's culture and education, particularly in the sciences, and advocated a power share of the Czechoslavs (Czechs and Slovaks) with six other national groups or provinces within the monarchical arrangement (Skilling 1994, 158). He wavered between the conception of a federation of nationalities and the federation of historical lands, finally preferring the latter (158).
Havlicek, on the other hand, called for complete administrative independence of the Czech Crown, advocating a federation of nations, "sometimes [referring] to a union of the 'Czechoslav nation' and sometimes to one of Bohemian lands," but he never directly addressed the particulars of any such conceptions (158).

Hajn's plan of federation appeared in a 1905 draft program of the Progressive party. He advocated Austria's division into large autonomous territories based on nationality. These would include the lands of the Czech Crown (Bohemia, Moravia, and Silecia without the Polish population), the German lands (not including the German parts of the Bohemian lands), and the Italian-Slovenian-Serbian-Croatian territory (159). The plan had provisions which foresaw the eventual victory of the nationality principle in Hungary, and the justified incorporation of the Hungarian Slovaks into the Czech kingdom (159).

Masaryk was a critic of the Dual Monarchy for its reluctance towards change and especially its foreign policy. Being of partial Slovak decent and realizing the need to awaken the national consciousness of Slavs and Slovaks in particular, Masaryk extended his quest for national rights to all minorities within the Empire. He began to identify Slovaks as part of the Czech nation, or as co-nationals, as the claim for Czech independence developed into the twentieth century especially. His
consideration of the Slovak question however, particularly its fate, and the organization of the Empire in terms of federalism should be described as ambiguous as were most considerations of the kind. He admired Jan Kollar's thoughts regarding Slavic reciprocity, and he favored national autonomy based on natural rights as put forward by Havlické rather than the historical rights claims of Palacky (70-71). It must be made clear from the outset that Masaryk did not advocate any sort of political union with the Slovaks either within the Empire or as an independent state until prospects for the Empire looked dim at the close of war in 1918 (79).

When speaking before parliament in Vienna on various occasions, Masaryk would often make reference to Czech-Slovak reciprocity, suggesting the need for greater cooperation. At other times, however, he would speak of the need for independent Slovak initiatives, making his commitment to any specific schemes rather vague (71). One fact stands clear, however, Masaryk respected the Slovak national identity, and he did not see its distinct identity as an obstacle for broader cooperation between Czechs and Slovaks (71). He believed that Czechs and Slovaks formed a single nation, separated by language, history and culture, but limited by primitive rational identity.
Masaryk took great pleasure in acquainting himself with the Slovak people and their political culture throughout his extended travels in the region. His professorship in Prague proved a unique position from which to associate with many Czechs and Slovaks alike, expressing his views and influencing young students in particular, especially young Slovak students who ultimately played a considerable role in the events which helped shape the future of the region (71; Leff 1988, 34).

Czechs were particularly interested in Slovak cultural and economic development from as early as the 1880s. The Ceskoslovenska jednota served as a base from which intellectuals and the middle class could sustain contact with Slovak intellectuals (Leff 1988, 33). The organization encouraged understanding and support of Slovak culture and its liberation from Magyar oppression (33). Political cooperation between Czechs and Slovaks, however, was virtually non-existent (Skilling 1994, 68; Leff 1988, 38). In fact, the majority of leading political figures in Bohemia, being disenchanted with the ideal of linguistic separation, turned away from any significant concern for Slovakia, thus concentrating on Czech rights within Austria. Czechoslovakism was hardly an element of everyday affairs, and few Czechs were even aware of the true plight of the Slovaks and their mutual interests regarding autonomy and self-determination. The
idea that Czechs needed Slovaks and Slovaks needed Czechs was not a concept deeply rooted in the social consciousness of either society (Leff 1988, 36). As the suppression of Slovaks became more severe, however, Czech political parties, in particular the Social Democrats, National Socialists and the Progressives, expressed considerably more concern for the plight of Slovaks (Skilling 1994, 69).

Slovak intellectuals and politicians were heavily divided over the issue of political and cultural cooperation with the Czechs. For many Slovaks, Czech interests in Slovakia were more instrumental than they were inherent to the needs of Czechs (Leff 1988, 32). As the idea of a Czechoslovak state became more obvious towards the end of the First World War, some skeptics suggested that Czechs needed Slovaks to offset the German populations if Bohemia and Moravia were to become liberated even within an existing empire. Others feared the hybrid nature of the Czechoslovak ideal or saw it as a mere tactical maneuver by the Czechs (30 and 35).

The most conservative elements of Slovak society were of the older generation who had been shaped by the ideas of Stur and the linguistic separation. From the small town of Turciansky Svaty Martin where Stur declared the distinct Slovak language, Svetozar Hurban-Vajansky led this conservative, predominantly intellectual faction
of Slovak society with widespread support. They touted the distinct qualities of the Slovak nationality and looked to the Russian Czar for support. They were anti-Western and anti-modern, but not extreme like other nationalist forces in Slovakia. Also, like most nationalist factions therein, the movement lacked a clear agenda on the question of national goals, and they subsequently failed to gain the type of strength which Czech nationalist parties had mounted towards Vienna.

The Catholics also had strong leadership in the nationalist question. They called for enhanced Slovak national rights and held close relations and influence among average Slovaks. They often supported the Martin Centre but not without considerable criticism of its policies and tactics. It is, in fact, with the Catholic leadership and its following that some of the most conservative nationalist sentiments of the First Republic were to be exhibited over time, as illustrated later in this chapter.

The Hlasists, named after their monthly publication Hlast - which focused on the literature, politics and social questions of the time, espoused the ideas of a strong Czechoslovak tendency corresponding with the con-

\[14\] Refer to Skilling 1994, 67 for further elaboration.
cepts of Kollar, Safarik, Havlicek and Palacky (74). Hlasists believed in the virtue of polemics and encouraged debate on the Slovak question. They called for the replacement of pan-Russianism and Slavic cosmopolitanism with the ideas of Slavic reciprocity, putting aside most differences about language (74). Along with the social democratic tendency which called for Czech and Slovak cooperation within the framework of Marxist internationalism, the Hlasists experienced limited support even among young intellectuals (69 and 78-79). But at the turn of the century, their range of support expanded. Receiving encouragement and intellectual nourishment from Masaryk himself, the Hlasists advocated the activism of ordinary people on the basis of civil rights. They believed that an alliance with the Czechs was the only way to achieve the national rights of the Slovak people (67-68).

With this explanation of the Czech, Slovak and Czechoslovak conceptions of association, there are primary elements which preclude the national identification of the Czechoslovak state (refer to Leff 1988, 37). The advocacy of unity lacked intensity and depth. Both Czechs and Slovaks had matured from two separate visions of national identity, and while efforts to establish mutual understanding among the two societies served well, the fact remains that both societies developed from two
distinct circumstances. One society was advanced politically, economically, culturally and socially, the other much less so, and political integration, by necessity, requires a considerable degree of mutual growth. Most of the interrelationship between Czechs and Slovaks was based on the initiative of Czech efforts at mounting socio-cultural assimilation, a force which many Slovaks indicted as an infringement and potential threat to their own unique identity (39).

The conception of Czechoslovak unity was also amorphous. As exemplified by the ideas behind Masaryk's position, there was never a clear plan of Czech and Slovak reciprocity, let alone a plan for mutual and independent statehood. Czechs never considered the possibility of statehood for themselves until the last years of the war (Leff 1988, 39). Simply put, there was no overarching pressure for the consolidation of a drive toward deeper unity between Czechs and Slovaks, except as this was seen as an instrument in the quest for independence. The ambiguity surrounding the liberation struggle and establishment of political union at the close of war merely set the stage for future conflict (38).

The Decline of Empire and the Rise of Statehood

Austria-Hungary's nationalist problems had been mounting since at least the mid-nineteenth century. The
Empire had expanded and with little or no reform of representation, only promises. In particular, Bosnia and Herzegovina were annexed in 1908, and Vienna continued its stalling tactics regarding Czech autonomy. Emperor Franz Josef I had promised three times to crown himself as King of Bohemia and raise the status of Czechs to parity with Germans and Magyars, but he never acted upon his promises, especially because of Magyar dissension. Masaryk, for one, continued to criticize the expansionism and particularly the antiquated form of governing Austro-Slav minorities. In fact, his efforts toward constitutional reform were augmented at the turn of the century, while maintaining allegiance to Austria even after the outbreak of war (Skilling 1994, 168).

The unfolding events of 1914 set the stage for the realization of nationalist calls of self-determination, yet not without considerable caution and confusion (Leff 1988, 39). Radicals were conspiring for complete independence (39). The strains of war suggested the possible demise of the Empire, and Masaryk turned his peaceful pursuit of national rights for Czechs into an aggressive pursuit of Czech and Slovak interests abroad shortly thereafter (Mamatey 80).

Charles I succeeded Franz Joseph in 1916. The Russian Revolution occurred in 1917, and American forces also began their mission on the European continent in
that same year. The Bolshevik withdrawal from the war and their avowed distaste for imperialism gave their Slavic cousins in Austria-Hungary a sense of confidence for their independence movements. Finally, the American presence in Europe spelled the death knell of the Central Powers, especially Austria-Hungary and her allies. America's position in the subsequent peace settlements, as formulated by President Wilson, pressed for national (ethnic) "self-determination". Nationalists had reason to be optimistic, and the mood of Austria-Hungary, which characterized Charles I as "Charles the Last," foretold the Empire's fate.

By this time, Masaryk had bet everything on the demise of the Central Powers (Polisensky 107). He and several other Czech leaders, including Eduard Benes and Milan Ratislav Stefanik, spent a considerable amount of time in exile, particularly in Paris, for the purpose of rallying support for the national liberation of Czechs and Slovaks (Mamatey 82-3). On November 14, 1915 in the name of the "Czech Foreign Committee," a formal declaration was issued demanding the establishment of an independent Czechoslovak state (84). In 1916, the Czech Foreign Committee was transformed into the Czechoslovak National Council of Paris (85).

With support from Czechs and Slovaks living abroad, the conception of Czechoslovak unity became even more
crystalline (81-83; Petr). Masaryk signed the Pittsburgh Agreement with American Slovak émigrés in May 1918 for the sake of garnering support for independence from abroad. In this agreement, both Masaryk and the Slovak émigrés agreed to support a common Czechoslovak state with the condition that broad autonomy would be provided to Slovaks. Slovak émigrés wanted to assure that Slovakia would have her own administrative system, diet and courts, and that Slovak would be the official language of public schools, offices and public affairs generally in Slovakia (Felak 143).

On May 24, 1918 in Turciansky Svaty Martin, the Slovaks declared themselves for union with Czechs. On October 29, the Hlasist and Masaryk disciple, Dr. V. Strobar became a member of the National Council and declared in Martin that "the Slovak nation is both by language and history a part of the united Czechoslovak nation". He then pronounced Slovakia's claim for a common state, a pronouncement with which much ambiguity was evident. Neither the Martin Declaration or the Pittsburgh Agreement, however, precisely defined the political relationship between Slovaks and Czechs (Petr).

Much soul searching and anxiety was a part of this process, to say the least (Leff 1988, 40). The one hundred self-selected conferees at Turciansky Svaty Martin were operating out of complete ignorance of their sur-
roundings (41). The isolation of Czech and Slovak political leaders prevented any mutual understanding and cooperative efforts in the establishment of a Czechoslovak state (38). The complications of unifying two very disparate social and administrative entities, with no clearly defines role for Slovakia, presented complications for the future (39). Upon the release of the Martin Declaration, the delegates were unaware that a Czechoslovak state had been proclaimed by the Prague National Committee a day earlier (41).

Masaryk and Benes persuaded the French to include Czechoslovak liberation among the allied war aims, and Vienna's reluctance to accept Article 10 of the peace treaty because of Magyar dissension spelled the demise of the Empire (Mamatey 86-7). Indeed, in December of 1917, the demise of the Austro-Hungarian Empire was spelled out in U.S. President Woodrow Wilson's famous Fourteen Points. A Congress of "suppressed nationalities" was convened in Rome and the "Twelfth Night Agreement" concluded demands for unification of Bohemia, Moravia, Silecia and Slovakia (Polisensky 109).

In the haste and uncertainty of the events of 1918, the Czechoslovak National Council was recognized by France, Britain, the United States and Italy as the representative of a new nation. At last, the Czechs were free after years of striving for autonomy. Slovaks were
free of the Magyar oppression as well, and a new and independent state was born from the whirlwind events of World War I. Indeed, as Carol Skalnik Leff has stated, the nationalist revival served as the gestation period for not only the demise of the Empire but also the birth of new and independent states, including the modern states of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia (1988, 38).

The First Republic

The two years following the euphoria of 1918 brought a degree of stability to the region based on a constitution of parliamentary democracy, a strong party structure, and a strong presidential personality. Czechoslovakia had been ruled by a provisional, revolutionary National Assembly and constitution from its establishment until a more detailed constitution was approved in February 1920. Modeled after the great Western democracies, the constitution guaranteed basic rights and freedoms to every citizen. Additionally, the constitution provided guidelines for work and social insurance and the protection of basic family values. It granted national minorities equal status with Czechs and Slovaks and guaranteed freedoms for their cultural development through public support. The Constitution of the First Republic also promised an autonomous administration of Ruthenia which came to realization only in 1938 (Anderle 98).
Czechoslovakia was designed as a parliamentary democracy which incorporated a bicameral National Assembly, an executive branch and a presidency. The National Assembly had superior power in legislative issues, exercising formal control of the executive branch and judiciary. It elected the President who served as a head of state and shared executive powers with considerable limitations. The National Assembly approved the President's appointment of the government and had measures available for impeachment and a vote of no confidence built into its constitutional authority.\footnote{Anderle 98-99; Incidentally, neither measure had ever been used in the history of the First Republic.}

The local administration of Czechoslovakia was highly centralized. The territories from which the new state was formed had been administered by various codes of law under the Habsburg monarchy. The provincial constituent bodies of the Czech lands were reorganized and, along with Slovakia and Ruthenia, divided into self-administering counties. By 1927, however, the provincial parliaments and governments of the Czech lands were reestablished and expanded to Slovakia and Ruthenia due to the preferences of local interests, especially Slovak interests and the lack of compliance in implementing the county based structure. The provisional governments were
limited to adjusting laws and regulations of the central government and local conditions (99-100).

A number of circumstances accompanied the establishment of Czechoslovakia. The territories of Czechia and Slovakia were in a perilous economic situation as a result of the war and post-war periods. Various cleavages in the social composition of the state presented themselves as a result. Bolshevik antagonists threatened revolution. Work days lasted up to thirteen hours, and over half a million Czech peasants owned less land than three noble families. Two thirds of industry was owned by German and Hungarian entrepreneurs and bankers. Wages were some 60 percent below the pre-war level while foodstuffs were twenty times higher. Industry was going through a period of post-war transition, and inflation rose with unemployment. Each aspect had near devastating consequences for both peasants and workers, but the government addressed the problems with radical social and economic reforms from the onset in order to divert attention away from desperate alternatives (95-97).

Land reform was enacted in April 1919 with roughly 32 percent of all land being distributed among the peasants over a ten year period. Large estates were limited to 250 hectares on a just basis of reimbursing the estates by the sale of land and providing government credits to the peasantry. Commerce and industry were also
reorganized. Workers gained great strides in protective welfare and education. Many public utilities were nationalized and dominant foreign ownership of companies and institutions was relinquished. Strict laws on monopoly were enacted, and inflation was brought under control. Each aspect of the government's efficacy enhanced the citizenry's allegiance to the new state (95-98).

The ethnic problems of the newly established state paled in comparison to the social and economic difficulties of the time. Nevertheless, they remained a primary factor and underlying element of threat to Czechoslovakia's overall stability. Czechoslovakia consisted of more than six different ethnic identities. Its borders had been carved to encompass territories populated by Germans (3.1 million), Hungarians (750,000) and white Russians (500,000). The territories of Czechia and Slovakia consisted of endogenous populations of Roma (under 250,000), Jews (180,000 claimed identity), some Poles in Silecia, just over six million Czechs and just under three million Slovaks. Czechia had been restored to the historical perimeters of the Czech Crownlands, the crest of the surrounding Bohemian Massif and Bohemian-Moravian Uplands (Paul 100). Slovakia, having never been an independent administrative unit, was carved from Hungarian regions to the north and south of the Danube and Ipel rivers. Slovaks inhabited the northern mountainous re-
gions while Magyars inhabited the great plain stretching immediately south from the river beds. Ruthenia was also ceded to Czechoslovakia from Hungary along with its sizable Magyar population (Anderle 91-93).

The First Republic is recognized as having a considerable amount of stability based on its constitutional framework and balanced social and political system (Anderle 101), despite the social and economic difficulties with which it was afflicted from the outset. A strong state structure brought two independent nations together and provided a strong institutional and political system for the purpose of their common government. But the divergent political cultures and national aims of Czechs and Slovaks clearly tempered the nature of their mutual political relations and the attempted consolidation of a deeper sense of shared national identity, especially when real political influences emerged at the international level and political union was challenged by nationalist sentiments. In particular however, Slovaks had all along desired greater administrative autonomy within the political union, an interest that was afforded little attention. It is within this context that the most basic concerns are posited regarding the propensity for Czechoslovak dissolution and stability generally.

Czech and Slovak aims were dependent on their ability to work together (102). Czechs needed Slovaks in
order to offset the population imbalance between Czechs and Germans. Slovaks needed the strengths of Czechs to offset threats of possible Hungarian revisionism of the peace settlement. Yet Czech and Slovak aims were often at odds with one another, primarily over the definition of their political relationship in terms of the Czech, Slovak and Czechoslovak conceptions of national association and political organization within the new state. Czechs and Slovaks were forced to address the Czechoslovak conception more seriously as a result of being placed within common political borders, and this required a significant amount of negotiation, cooperation and compromise at various levels of social and political life. Within this web of conflict resolution, however, Slovaks, in particular, often carried the real burden of compromise because of their conservative political culture and desire for increased administrative autonomy in relationship to trends toward cohesive Czechoslovakism.

Slovaks generally rebuked Czechoslovakism conceptually simply because of its centralizing elements and threats to their narrower sense of national allegiance. This, of course, contrasted with the more cosmopolitan Czechs and their progressive interests regarding a strong, unified state. Czech cosmopolitanism set the agenda precisely because of its progressive nature and preponderance of influence in political structures, while
Slovaks found themselves on the defensive in an effort to protect their identity and interests from enculturation and intrusion. Additionally, while the political system possessed some of the resources necessary for conflict resolution, it relied heavily on an inter-elite cooperation and particularly the satisfaction of individual national aims, two aspects of Czechoslovak political culture that were often at odds with one another (102). Just about every conceivable ethnic, religious, and socio-economic interest was represented by party affiliation in Czechoslovakia. More often than not, each segment was represented along distinct national lines (Leff 1988, 54-59), and segments often overlapped each other as well (48-58). More than thirty parties (Anderle 101) and some accounts of fifty were represented in the First Republic with an average of fifteen parties being represented in the republic's first four elections (Leff 1988, 48). Unlike its neighbors who experienced major impasses due to the overabundance of party participation, Czechoslovakia managed this seemingly chaotic situation with a very strong party and elite core based on the precepts of Czechoslovakism which permeated every aspect of politics, government and society and maintained leadership through consensus government for the duration of the republic's existence (48). Parties were generally too small to gain an overwhelming majority by themselves, and only a little
more than twelve were able to gain enough electoral support for parliamentary representation (Anderle 103). The centrist Czech People's Party, the rightist Agrarians and National Democrats, the leftist Czech National Socialists and Social Democrats, all known together as the Petka, or party of five, provided the basis of coalition government for the duration of the republic by example of their cooperative efforts (100-03; Leff 1988, 59).

Coalition governments and the interrelations of elites, bridging the economic, religious, ethnic and regional cleavages, served as the basis of stability. Rational moderation is also often cited as one of the foremost characteristics of the Czechoslovak elite and populace which enhanced the maintenance of cooperation among such diverse interests. Various individuals of Czech, Slovak and German origin such as the conservative Czech Agrarian Antonin Svehla; Father Jan Sramek of the Czech People's Party; Socialist leaders Vlastimil Tusar, Rudolpf Bechyne and Vaclav Klofac; Slovak Agrarians Milan Hodza and Vavro Strobar; Social Democrat Ivan Derer; and German Agrarian Franz Spina, Social Democrat Ludwig Czech and Christian Socialist Erwin Zauicek are acknowledged for encouraging and maintaining the basis of non-emotional cooperation and the promotion of the Czechoslovak ideal (Anderle 104).
Masaryk, however, is the person with whom most people associate the nature of elite interrelations and the maintenance of stability within Czechoslovakia's otherwise volatile political environment. He defined the presidency as a powerful factor of Czechoslovak government beyond its constitutional provisions and used his authority to temper the various divisions of Czechoslovak society. Masaryk had a rapport with the people that defined him as the essence of the state. Being of high moral principle and moderately inclined toward democratic socialism, there is little doubt that Masaryk's idealism and his commitment to preserving the state was a basis for its very legitimacy and authority (105; Anderle 100-06; Leff 1988, 61).

The significance of the political system and its elite, however, must, again, take into account the basis of various national interests and the extent of their commitment to the Czechoslovak ideal, an ideal that was ambiguous and often at odds with the individual national goals, as previously stated. While the constitution provided for the welfare of indigenous nationalities and was obliged to tolerate national goals, for the sake of its legitimacy and authority, especially the legitimacy of democracy (Leff 1988, 65), the fact remains that assimilating practices toward a Czechoslovak national identity were a part of the core elite's agenda (68 and 148).
The dominant personalities deemed it necessary for the sake of maintaining the stability of the state to place limits on nationalist questions of self-determination and self-administration. The centralist structure of Czechoslovakia's government and the influence of the core political framework are basic reflections of this integrative goal. The other more telling aspect is the nature of the core parties and the elite, each of which took moderate to favorable approaches to the Czechoslovak question. As a consequence, questions of independent nationalist goals and their role within the state order were neglected in certain respects for fear of proliferating and polarizing the nationalist distinctions.

Ironically, the very efforts for preventing this occurrence would lead to resistance movements of both moderate and extremist proportions (68).

Regardless of the considerable strides forward in the socio-economic and cultural welfare of the various national identities as a result of core party and elite efforts for parity among nationalities, the national goals of Germans, Hungarians, Ruthenians and Slovaks were never entirely satisfied, and their political cultures were never properly conditioned for the motives of accelerated assimilation along the lines of Czechoslovakism. Mutual frustrations between national identities increased over the years as a consequence, and the Czechoslovak
ideal was insufficiently strong to withstand these pressures. In particular, Germans and Slovaks evidenced increasing resistance toward the assimilatory affects so intrinsic to the centralist governmental structure and its Czechoslovak core elite in Prague.

The Slovak Peoples Party was the first to oppose the Czechoslovak idea, primarily the centralist structure of the First Republic (Felak 139). Lead by Father Andrej Hlinka, a prominent advocate of nationalism in pre-war Hungary (140) and followed by a large proportion of the Slovak Catholics and Protestants known as ludaks (meaning nationalists in Slovak), the party demanded Slovak self-determination and autonomy within the Czechoslovak state. A party resolution presented in parliament in 1922 emphatically stated that,

The Slovak people have never formed a nation with the Czech people, they do not form one now and do not want to form one. Instead they want to live as their own people with their own language, in their own land, with the right of self-administration and autonomy, to be sure, within the framework of the Czecho-Slovak Republic (142).

The ludaks based their claims for autonomy on the rights of self-determination entitled to them as a separate nation. They argued that autonomy would remove the major impediment to good relations between Czechs and Slovaks and thus help to consolidate the republic. They
also looked to their interpretation of the Pittsburgh Agreement for justification.

Ludaks strove for legislative autonomy. They demanded a separate diet elected by Slovaks for the purpose of passing laws that pertained to Slovaks, including laws on administration, education, trade, agriculture, justice, public works and the finance of these spheres (142); all of this while the party leadership extolled the virtues of the new state and maintained its allegiance. Propositions for Slovak autonomy even had provisions for the Czechoslovak President's appointment of a Slovak government and veto power over its legislature, requiring a two-thirds majority vote in the Slovak legislature to override that veto. Ludak proposals also made provisions for matters of statewide concern such as the military, foreign policy and international trade. The Slovak legislature would have a two-thirds majority veto power over such matters. While subsequent ludak proposals for autonomy differed in detail, they all contained the principle of legislative autonomy for Slovakia. No autonomy proposals were considered by the National Assembly until 1938 (142), and this was also too little too late in the scheme of consolidating interests.

Much of ludak disenchantment was based on Prague's alleged cultural and economic discrimination, the imposition of the Czech language in Slovak schools and the
stationing of Czech soldiers on Slovak soil (140). As a result of its inability to compete with Czech industrial technology, Slovakia was de-industrialized in the 1920s (139), and its treasured religious institutions were often treated with irreverence by scores of Czech professionals and tradesmen filling the Slovak vacuum of skilled personnel (139). Nonetheless, ludaks never wavered from their formal support of the Czechoslovak state until the critical days of 1939. Ludaks, like most Slovaks, generally realized the significance of maintaining strong relations with Czechs for their own national interests (143-44).

In a similar, yet contrasting vein, the Slovak Agrarians, another moderately conservative faction of society, had joined ranks with the Czechoslovak Agrarian Party in 1922 and officially supported the idea of a Czechoslovak nation and a unitary state. With the leadership of Milan Hodza, the Slovak Agrarians approached the Czechoslovak ideal with considerable support by citing the merits of reaching a higher unit of Czechoslovak nationality (145). Yet their conviction in this regard, like most cases, was vague, confusing, contradictory and considerably distanced from the more radical Czechoslovakism of the Slovak branch of the Social Democratic Party (145). Slovak Agrarian views on the issue of national self-administration sought a middle ground between
the ludak autonomism and strict centralism (145). They advocated the administrative decentralization of the state, but not legislative autonomy. They were regionalists and strong advocates of the county-based system of local government. They also supported the institution of various social, political and economic organizations that would address Slovakia's specific interests in an extra-constitutional form and redress them with Prague (147).

In fact, the Slovak Agrarians, especially under Hodza's encouragement, advocated a principle of "Slovak cooperation" among all parties in Slovakia for the purpose of assuring Slovak interests overall, especially with regard to labor, land reform, educational development and tax reform. This concept was also intended to temper the more extremist factions of Slovak politics, including the Slovak People's Party and the socialists (147).

As a result of the growing discontent throughout Slovak society, in 1925 the Slovak People's Party commanded the largest following in Slovakia with 34.3 percent of the vote, twice as much as its nearest rival (142). The ludaks joined the government in 1927 and moved to replace the county-based administrative organization of the state with provincial status for Slovakia, Bohemia, Moravia-Silecia and Ruthenia (148). The ludaks had attempted to find common ground with the Slovak Agrarians and other Czechoslov parties from that point
and again in the 1930s, but in light of rising radicalism within its own ranks, they failed to agree on issues basic to national identification and self-determination; in other words, a political formula for mutual relations (147-50). The ludaks became increasingly hostile toward Prague beginning in the autumn of 1936, and by 1938 they intensified their autonomist demands, demands that Prague could ill-afford to address in light of the German question.

Succession, the Third Republic and Communism: Moving Towards Independence and Federalism

Amid a souring economy in the 1930s, nationalist radicalism intensified in Czechoslovakia, despite the government's success in maintaining the state's social welfare under such circumstances (Anderle 108). In particular, Sudeten German nationalist sentiments were stirred and intensified under the leadership of Konrad Henlein and the coercive measures of Nazi propaganda from Germany. Sudeten separatism most severely threatened Czechoslovakia's political stability and her territorial integrity, a threat which Czechs had feared from the Germans since the beginning of their efforts toward autonomy in the nineteenth century. With the Allied powers reluctant to defend the territorial integrity of Czechoslovakia and forces pulling at the nationalist
threads of contention, the First Republic was transformed from the only respectable democracy in Central Europe to a dissolved and occupied set of fascist protectorates, to a restored democracy and, finally, to a Soviet satellite state within a short ten year period. Moreover, nationalist struggles were the substantive cause of this transmutation through which Czech and Slovak contentions themselves became even more elevated to a level not previously experienced. As a result of the World War II experience, Jews had been virtually exterminated from Czechoslovakia along with large populations of Roma. Almost all Germans were expelled from Czechoslovakia after the war, and the Slovaks, in a state of contrasting scourge and self-satisfaction, had elevated themselves to independence, a status that affected future relations with Czechs in a restored, yet dramatically changed Czechoslovak state known as the Third Republic. Slovak nationalism and its claims for greater autonomy continually persisted from that point forward, even pervading the communist dictatorship of the state, an effort which the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, by all intents and purposes, most emphatically attempted to prevent, yet to no avail.

The Munich Agreement of September 30, 1938 ceded all territories of Czechoslovakia in which the German population exceeded fifty percent to the German Third Reich
Slovak separation was induced by Hitler's contingency plans following the Munich dictat in order to smash the Czech state and bring it completely under German control. With the Slovak People's Party leading the pact and Slovak Agrarians coming into the fold, Slovaks declared independence on March 14, 1939, and the invasion of the remaining Czech lands followed the next day (118). Czechoslovakia was completely dissolved as Czechia was incorporated with the Third Reich under "The Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia," and Slovakia became a "protected state" of German tutelage. Ruthenia was once again ceded to Hungary (119).

While Czechs were full of sorrow about the events, Slovaks were generally optimistic about their prospects (126-27). In certain respects, they were relieved to have escaped from direct control of the Third Reich. For the first time, Slovaks had an opportunity at state building and a sense of achievement with regard to their nationalist goals (Leff 1988, 89), but the fact remains that Slovakia was shaped for Germany's interests and not Slovakia's interests (Taborsky 127). Authoritarian structures were established in Slovakia and directed from Berlin. Naturally, relations between Czechs and Slovaks changed drastically as each was cut off from the other, the only exception being the limited communication links between often diametrically opposed exiles in London,
Paris and Moscow (Leff 1988, 87). The euphoria died quickly, however, as Slovaks realized that they would not escape the oppressive measures of Hitler, and resistance movements ensued which in itself adds an ironic twist to Slovakia's sense of pride from the World War II experience of independence; Slovaks had proven to themselves what they could do as a nation. Of course this has a dualistic and contradictory meaning between the separatists elements of Slovak society and those who resisted the Tiso regime (Taborsky 127; Leff 1988, 90-91). Nevertheless, what remained from the experience is a more acute sense of Slovak identity apart from the Czechs from whichever perspective one chooses - secessionist or liberationist. The need for mutual growth between Czechs and Slovaks had been tragically interrupted at a very crucial time in Czechoslovak history, a time when Czechs and Slovaks needed to grow together as one nation, not as separate nation's and at one another's expense.

On March 11, 1945, Benes returned to a restored Czechoslovakia, but the circumstances of the state proved to be nothing of the sort that they had been prior to 1938. The degree of continuity between Czechs and Slovaks had been severely curtailed by limited communication and dislocations throughout the war, not to mention that the memory that Slovaks had abandoned the Czechs during a vital time of national distress. The nurtured coopera-
tion and assimilating effects between Czechs and Slovaks before the war had been broken by external events as authoritarianism established itself and destroyed the fragile association (Leff 1988, 96 and 215-17). Czechoslovakia would again have to be restructured politically, economically, socially and in terms of international relations in order to address the new circumstances of the post-war era (86).

One aspect of this restructuring was a commitment for administrative decentralization for the Slovaks, and the need to balance an ever growing communist encroachment in the restored political and institutional structures of Czechoslovak democracy (89). There was opportunity to rectify the perceived injustices of the past and begin to build an equitable relationship for the future. The Slovak liberationists had established their own National Council already in 1943, a body which served as the legislative agent of Slovak affairs and the basis for claims toward symmetric federalism. (91-96). The Agrarians, Small Tradesmen, National Democrats and the Slovak People's Party were all prohibited in the post-war Third Republic, and Czechoslovakia's balanced political system, core party and elite slanted towards Czechoslovakism, had suffered severe blows as a result of the occupation forces and these subsequent developments of the post-war period (94-95). The exclusion of nationalist German and
Slovak collaborationist parties in a provisional government effort to control the political climate of the country in effect limited Czechoslovakia's parties to the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, the National Socialist Party, the Czechoslovak People's Party, the Social Democrats of Czechia, the Communist Party of Slovakia and the Slovak Democratic Party (Wolchik 1991, 18). The Slovak Democratic party had consolidated power for itself in Slovakia and became tightly pitted against the communists (95). There was little sound basis for coalition building with this combination of political interests, especially as Thermidorian communism became effectuated (Leff 1988, 95).

Czechoslovakia's liberation from the Germans by the Allied American forces in the west and the Soviet forces from the east definitively determined Czechoslovakia's future and the future of regional and international politics for the remaining twentieth century. The demarcation lines established by U.S.-Soviet agreement defined spheres of influence which ultimately included the Third Republic in the Soviet sphere (Taborsky 126-29). As a result of the Czechoslovak-Soviet Agreement of 1944, Czechoslovakia's borders were restored. Ruthenia had been annexed to the Soviet Union by a sort of forceful military diplomacy, and the communization of Czechoslovakia began as communist sympathizers infiltrated local
governments, the police and the leadership of labor unions, not to mention the military under the leadership of General Svoboda (129-30). By February 1948, after an unsuccessful attempt to win control of government democratically, the communists ascended to control of the government in Czechoslovakia by way of coup d'etat whence democracy and prospects for the development of a truly democratic relationship between Czechs and Slovaks, as it was known in the Third Republic, came to a halt.

Being founded in 1922 as a runoff of the social democratic movement, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia pursued successively a variety of approaches to the issue of national identities and Slovak autonomy within the First Republic (Felak 152). Until 1924, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia adhered to the idea that Czechs and Slovaks constituted a single nation, and they were opposed to Slovak autonomy. The party espoused the idea that autonomy was purely an effort to prevent national unification with the Czechs as well as to prevent the elevation of Slovaks from the oppression of historical conditions, particularly the Catholic church (153; Leff 1988, 218). According to the communists, national union with the Czechs was the surest way to improving Slovakia (Felak 153; refer also to Leff 1988, 218).

The Comintern sharply condemned the nationality policy of the Czechoslovak Communist Party at its Fifth
International Congress of July 1924. Party policy began to fluctuate on the nationality issue beginning after 1924 as Leninist principles were introduced to party platforms. Klement Gottwald, a Slovak communist of Czech origin who led the bolshevization of the party, proposed the full independence of Slovakia as part of the communist program, a program which only intended to exploit the Slovak nationalists for its own purposes - the consolidation of communist allegiances (Felak 154). In actuality, Gottwald cleansed the party of ethnic Slav "nationalists" and "liquidators" throughout the remaining 1940s and 1950s (Leff 1988, 219 and 229).

Unlike most other parties, the communists were highly centralized from Prague and not divided along nationalist lines. In fact, very few Slovaks had infiltrated the party apparatus in the beginning. Mostly Germans, Czechs and Magyars had occupied the leadership positions and party membership (218). Slovaks did not generally associate with the communist concerns of socio-economics and class contention especially in earlier times. One reason has to do with the fact that Slovaks were primarily agrarian peasants who had little understanding of references to proletarianism and the problems of the urban lifestyle so typical of Central Europe during the early twentieth century. They were also gener-
ally threatened by the anti-religious expressions of communist ideology (Felak 153).

Claims for the territorial autonomy and federalization of the state ensued within party ranks, and Gottwald ascended to the helm of the Czechoslovak party in 1929. At the Fifth Party Congress in December 1929, the right to self-determination to the point of separation was included in party policy (156). At the Sixth Congress in March 1931, the party condemned the "opportunistic passivity" of its pre-1929 leadership and supported the liberation movements of all nationalities until fascist elements literally threatened the state's dissolution (156). In 1937 the Slovak leadership in the party issued the so-called "Plan for the Economic, Social and Cultural Empowerment of Slovakia," for the purpose of greater parity between Czechia and Slovakia and for the purpose of consolidating the state (157).

Communists in general, however, offered vague, unrealistic and unpopular approaches to the Slovak question. Instead, they used the nationalist questions as brokerage power for garnering support for their efforts toward a proletarian dictatorship. As a consequence and against Comintern wishes, the Slovak communists organized amongst themselves for the first time in 1939 (Leff 1988, 95).

In 1947 the Slovak communists were brought back into the fold of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, (95-
100) and a triangular relationship was established between Czechs, Slovaks, and purest communists during the Socialist Republic (230-33). The organization of the party was such that a party existed within a party on an asymmetrical level, the Slovak Communist Party functioning as a distinct part of the Czechoslovak Communist Party (99). And there was no Czech party to balance the nationalist interests. Asymmetry was a structural compromise between Slovak nationhood and Czechoslovak statehood (103). It symbolized, as one scholar of the subject has suggested, enduring but politically unfulfilled national aims (103), and it resonates on earlier discussions of societal segmentation and role structures as outlined in the Introduction.

The party had actually become the "pathway" to peaceful conflict resolution within the Socialist Republic (103). It softened relations between Czechs and Slovaks on a number of contentious issues relating mostly to culture and economy, in a similar, although less democratic, fashion one might say as the petka and core elite of the First Republic (103 and 223). Great strides in assimilation were also achieved as the focus of government and party organs was to solidify the state and temper nationalism. While decentralization of the local governments occurred, in effect making Slovakia three regions, centralization of the state structures under
those of the party structure provided the basis of a highly centralized state and party structure (107). The Slovak National Council was slowly transformed into a state organ in this process (103 and 106). This centralization of institutions, argued Slovaks in light of the asymmetrical organization of the party and state, defended Czech interests and advanced a feeling of Czech guardianship over the state (123). Of the 181 ministerial appointments from 1948-1967, only forty, or twenty-two percent, went to Slovaks, and the party appointments were proportionally deficient as well (221-22).

The party apparatus continued to provide a narrow and quite means of settling problems throughout the 1950s, (106) a period known for its harsh purges, especially those of the Slovak party ranks and the general population (109 and 229). This, in turn, left the Slovak Communist Party leadership subordinate to the Czechoslovak communist leadership (230).

In the 1960s, however, nationalist forces were on the rise within the party apparatus itself as Czechoslovakia began its belated process of de-Stalinization or decentralization and newer minds began to enter the party rank and file (109 and 234). Rehabilitated "bourgeois nationalists" such as Gustav Husak were brought back into the limelight in 1962 (109), and Alexander Dubcek became the first secretary of the Slovak communists after his
(rehabilitation (110 and 234). While no wholesale transformation of the party occurred, the media and Slovak intellectual community were provided opportunity to rekindle nationalist feelings. By 1963, throughout several years of quieted debate, the conception of federalism reemerged as an effort to solve the reoccurring tumult of Slovak autonomy that even communist mechanics could not suppress (111-12 and 120).

From 1964 on, the Slovak National Council regained some of its position. Debate intensified on the issue in 1967 when the treatment of Slovakia emerged as only one among many grievances made against the regime. The Novotny leadership, the Slovak party elite and the Slovak intelligentsia then collapsed into a consensus position (234-35). Only at the height of the Prague Spring in 1968, was the federalization of Czechoslovakia put forward and approved by the party and government organs. Parity was granted to federal committees, the constitutional courts and structural and procedural elements of the National Assembly. The ministerial and governmental appointments remained under simple majority rule (127).

Federalism was put into effect on January 1, 1969, leaving Czechoslovakia as the only communist state in the Soviet fold, outside of the formal structure of the Soviet Union itself and Yugoslavia, to be a federation of nationalities. Slovaks had finally achieved a degree of
the structural parity they had sought since the establishment of the state in 1918. The extent to which federation truly addressed the problems facing Czechoslovakia nevertheless, particularly political relations between Czechs and Slovaks and Slovak satisfaction with the newly achieved status, bears heavily on the context of federalism's implementation. This is a matter for consideration in the following chapter.
CHAPTER III

FEDERALISM: THE POLITICAL SOLUTION FOR A BIFURCATED SOCIETY?

The Progression of Political Relations

The "Czechoslovak" concept is indeed complex both in terms of nationhood and statehood. In terms of national identity, the description provided in Chapter II has established that the national identities of Czechs and Slovaks have been affected and shaped by various stimuli and with often dramatic effects for their mutual relations. Czechs and Slovaks had grown together as they pursued a sense of self-realization beginning with the national revival of the mid-nineteenth century, but more importantly, as we have seen, their growth has diverged in numerous ways over the course of time. Not only have Czechs and Slovaks begun their mutual political relationship on an uneven plateau, their interests within the initial stages of that relationship diverged when the political equation failed to meet the demands for a parity of national interests. Despite mutual growth between Czechs and Slovaks over the course of some seventy years of shared history, the development of events did not translate into sufficient cohesion between Czechs and
Slovaks and their interests. Rather, divergent growth has persisted and Czechs and Slovaks have grown apart.

The Context and Basis of Federalism

As a point of context for the consolidation of federalism, the period of de-Stalinization in Czechoslovakia culminated in 1968 with a fundamental change of the strongly centralized system, including the democratization of authority, introducing the protection of civil liberties, reexamining judicial malpractice from the past, guaranteeing justice for the future and finding an equitable relationship between Czechs and Slovaks. The Prague Spring reforms also sought to institute a decentralized economic planning apparatus with aspects of market socialism (Paul 63 and 79-84; see also Wolchik 1991, 27-35).

Nevertheless, Warsaw Pact forces invaded Czechoslovakia in August of 1968 in order to abate the threats which such reforms presented to Soviet hegemony (Wolchik 1991, 34). By April 1969, Alexander Dubcek was replaced as head of the Czechoslovak communist party and government by the rehabilitated Slovak nationalist Gustav Husak, and the following period of Czechoslovak history, until the later-1980s, is known as the period of "normalization".
The Husak regime reasserted the strongly centralized government and ultra-conservative role of the communist party during this period, and it purged the party of reformist "counter-revolutionaries" (Paul 84-90; Wolchik 1991, 36). In fact, the party experienced its second largest purge from January 1969 to December 1970 as more than twenty-five percent of its members were expelled for their involvement in the events leading up to 1968 (Paul 70). Of the Czech members in particular, some twenty-five percent were expelled because of their alleged liberal tendencies during the Prague Spring. Normalization re-imposed censorship and restrictions on freedom of expression, and it changed the political formula, reversing all reforms except federalism (Paul 64; Wolchik 1991, 36-37). Nevertheless, while federalism remained the only reform of the Prague Spring to survive the Soviet led intervention of 1968, it did not escape unchanged.

The party began to emphasize class relations over national concerns once again in 1970 (Leff 1988, 247). In 1971, the socialist constitution of 1960 was amended in order to curtail the 1968 federalization amendment and clarify ambiguity over the central government's role in the affairs of governing, especially concerning the economy (Paul 65; Wolchik 1991, 62; Leff 1988, 243-44). Certain Slovak ministries such as planning, transportation and telecommunications were abolished or reorgan-
ized, and their jurisdictions were transferred to the federal arena. Dual citizenship was abolished and regional committees were reestablished, signifying the decentralization of republic power, once again, as in the pre-August 1968 period of the socialist republic (Leff 1988, 247-48).

The Equitable Solution

The nature of events in late 1968, and the two years of political recentralization which follow, prevented any clear realization of federalism until the early 1970s (Wolchik 1991, 63; Leff 1988, 247). It is clear, however, that after the reforms settled, federalism in Czechoslovakia provided less autonomy and power to its republics than did Yugoslavian federalism, yet it certainly provided more autonomy in determining social, educational and cultural issues than the Soviet form of federalism (Wolchik 1991, 63). This formula, in its final version, fell short of Slovak wishes for an equitable solution.

In the most formal sense, the central government of Czechoslovak federalism was comprised of a bicameral Federal Assembly, a president and a government cabinet composed of a premier, vice-premiers and ministers of the various governmental departments. The central government controlled foreign affairs, defense, currency, the pro-
tection of the constitution, federal legislation and the administration (Paul 64; Wolchik 1991, 64 and 69). The National Assembly, holding formal sovereignty, consisted of a 200 member Chamber of the People and a 150 member Chamber of Nationalities (Paul 65; Wolchik 1991, 64 and 69). The former was elected from districts composed of proportional populations and the latter consisted of equal representation from Czechs and Slovaks. The Federal Assembly was required to meet at least twice a year. In the interim, the powers of the assembly were vested with a forty member presidium for each chamber (Wolchik 1991, 69). Parliamentary committees were also attached to each chamber of the Federal Assembly (69). The assembly elected the republic's president who served as the ceremonial executive and head of state. The president appointed the government cabinet for the oversight of administrative policies of the federal state and the republics (Paul 65; Wolchik 1991, 65 and 69).

The republic governments of the Czech lands and Slovakia paralleled the federal level structure, with the exception of the presidency. A unicameral 200 member Czech National Council and the long established 150 member Slovak National Council were the highest government organs in the respective republics (Wolchik 1991, 73). The executive functions were fulfilled by elected national councils instead of a president, and each council
consisted of a prime minister and deputy prime minister who supervised the republic-level ministries (Paul 66; Wolchik 1991, 73). The republics had jurisdiction over education, culture, justice, health, trade, construction, and forest and water resources. They shared some control with the central government over such areas as industry and agriculture, but republic powers were extensively curtailed by the 1971 amendment (Paul 65; Wolchik 1991, 73). Most important, nonetheless, is the fact that the federal government had the authority to override all republic-level laws, and it had superior responsibility for economic affairs (Wolchik 1991, 74).

The local level of government was organized by regional, district and local national councils consisting of directly elected representatives. Councils served as a sort of town council with jurisdiction over local affairs such as utilities, public health, local enterprise and construction codes. They also had the responsibility for implementing laws and policy of higher governmental and party directives, and most importantly, once again, they had little autonomy unto themselves (Paul 66; Wolchik 1991, 75-76).

Even more importantly and resembling more accurately the reality of government in Czechoslovakia, however, the executive branch of the government, along with the top branches of the communist party, played the most impor-
tant role in state government, despite the legislature's formal superiority (Wolchik 1991, 70 and 83). As with all Soviet style socialist republics, the communist party apparatus was the real broker of power in Czechoslovak government and society. It's members permeated every level and aspect of each (Paul 70). The state structure served merely as a rubber stamp for decisions made first through the party apparatus (70).

The supreme power of the party rested formally with the Congress of People and the Central Committee, a body elected by the congress for the purpose of assuming the authority of the congress during its recess. The party congress met every five years while the Central Committee met every month for the purpose of reviewing executive decisions of the party in a purely formal manner (Wolchik 1991, 84). Real power resided in the executive organs of the Presidium and the Secretariat of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. Being comprised of roughly thirteen to eighteen members at any given time, the Presidium was the supreme policy-making body of the party and the state, serving in a similar capacity as the Politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The Secretariat served as the administrative organ of the party. Elected by the Central Committee in theory, the organ consisted of six secretaries and seven members, including the First Secretary, who were responsible for carrying out Presid-
ium policies, directing the operation of the Central Committee departments and supervising the day-to-day operations of local levels of the party organization (85). Incidentally, and paralleling the Soviet Union's pattern, the number of party members in 1988 totaled 1,717,000 or approximately eleven percent of the population, the second largest enrollment after November 1948, and quite a limited number of the population considering the extensive influence it had in society (89).

The Faults of Federalism

There is considerable evidence to indicate that conceptually the federal solution fell short of its intended purpose could not provide a full resolution to outstanding Czech and Slovak grievances (Leff 1988, 243). Primarily, there is reason to doubt that federalism provided the Slovaks with the influence that they had clearly desired from it, especially after 1970, because the degree of Slovak access to the decision making process remained questionable (245). Moreover, the federal arrangement was flawed by two major loopholes or weaknesses, and the party's role in government raises an even greater impediment for federalism's intended purpose, providing structural parity between Czechs and Slovaks in terms of an equitably institutionalized government.
Firstly, the parity principle existed only in the composition of the constitutional courts and national legislature, the two weakest bodies of the communist system of government. Secondly, the federal ministries were guided by the majority principle, a point which bears a crucial relationship to the essence of consociationalism (245). The fact of the matter is that Slovaks were a permanent minority in the Czechoslovak state, constituting one-third of the state's total population. Between 1969 and 1983, one-third of all ministerial positions were, in fact, occupied by Slovaks. Slovaks constituted roughly 40 percent of any given cabinet, well in tune with their proportion of the population (253, 248 and 251; Paul 128). Slovaks, however, wanted structural parity with their Czech counterparts, not proportional representation in the traditional sense of the term. In this case, Slovaks would maintain fifty percent of the power of the state and raise themselves from their inherent status as a minority.

Additionally, the real power broker of government and the administration of state affairs, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, remained asymmetrical and unitary, as explained in the previous chapter, even after federalization. Despite the existence of informal parity between Czechs and Slovaks within the party's elite ranks, and considering the role of the party within the
governing arrangement, party asymmetry prevented any sense of real and secure parity - defined in terms of equality (or even proportionality) within the party apparatus as well - between Czechs and Slovaks. Disproportional federalism and party asymmetry simply failed to provide a durable framework for beneficial relations between Czechs and Slovaks.

There was an attempt to federalize the party structure in 1968 with the proposition that a Czech communist party parallel the Communist Party of Slovakia; the idea being that Czech and Slovak republic parties could veto the federal Central Committee in certain instances where national interests were at stake. This concept failed, however, due to Soviet fears of Czech tendencies, in particular, toward the liberal reforms of the Prague Spring era. Simply put, Soviet authorities feared the divergence of relations which such an arrangement posed. Instead, the central party organs doubled as Czech organs, preventing further bifurcation, and the Communist Party of Slovakia remained preempted by the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia for the duration of the socialist republic (Leff 1988, 245-46).

Providing some substantive altercation to the situation, in short, some people argued that this asymmetry in the unitary party was an impediment to federalism's proper functioning, reducing Slovak autonomy to
"declaratory significance". Others viewed the Slovak party's semi-independence as advantageous to the Slovaks for the reason that they had a privileged sort of organized lobbying power. And others argued that the asymmetry guaranteed bilateral negotiation (246-47). Most of all, however, as we shall see in Chapter V, federalism was not the only and probably not the best alternative for Czechoslovakia considering the bifurcated nature of its society and the historical antagonisms associated with it; it was, nonetheless, a natural development in the progression of political relations between Czechs and Slovaks as a result of historical conditioning. Later (Chapter V), it will be argued that while federalism may serve as a measure conducive to stability in plural society by dividing society into component parts, in a bifurcated society, the equation may lend itself to increased levels of polarization with a basis of confrontation rather than consensus building.

The Diminishing Role for Slovak Nationalist Sentiment and the Rise of Political Dissent

Despite increased Slovak participation in the party elite ranks after the post-1968 purges (261), there was always the threat that Slovak representation could erode during the period of normalization and diminish Slovakia's influence within the establishment, especially as
party ideology constrained nationalist expressionism and more and more Slovaks found themselves alienated from the party (Wolchik 1991, 36; Leff 1988, 245 and 260). There is little doubt that class concerns overshadowed national concerns when it came to party policy (Leff 1988, 247). The centripetal objectives of the party demanded a coherency in policy planning and the suppression of factional tendencies which offset any threats of nationalism within the formal structures of society and government (248). Party policy held that the "struggle against bourgeois and petit bourgeois nationalism would persist until the definitive defeat of nationalism" (272). Slovaks in general, therefore, found little security for their national interests within the political arrangement of the state's federal structure as it existed under the communists, and they found little opportunity to vent their sentiments as well (249 and 253).

There were two camps within the communist party organs. They were based on ideological differences - conservative and ultra-conservative - and on national differences as well as might be expected with the asymmetrical arrangement; but the national forces were, nevertheless, tempered by their commitment to party ideology. The tripartite nature of the party structure, as in the pre-reform period of the mid-1960s, was virtually non-existent during the period of normalization (259-60;
Educational development for the party ranks occurred in separate channels according to national, regional affiliation, producing elites at the statewide level that were inevitably accustomed to interpreting events from national perspectives (Leff 1988, 260). Nevertheless, while the party Presidium was also ideologically polarized by the late 1970s and especially in the mid-1980s (255; Wolchik 1991, 129-30), party ranks managed to transcend these lines of national divisiveness (Leff 1988, 260-61). In fact, the divisions of party ranks were cross-sectional (257). With party policy determined to defeat nationalism (272), communist party members of both nationalities were immersed in a very complex interrelationship of interests, the most important being the preservation of power and the enforcement of communist policies, not nationalist concerns (260-61; refer also to Wolchik 1991, 126-37).

The staff of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia also experienced little movement during the period of normalization, especially in the top echelons of the party order. Gustav Husak was challenging the lengthy tenure of Thomas Masaryk, and the limited amount of turnover in the highest ranking positions of the party created a turgidity, the likes of which was not seen in most other communist states during this era (Leff 1988, 255). The Communist Party of Slovakia also experienced little
turnover in its upper party ranks. There was little polarization even in the later days of the socialist republic as Slovak communists kept their ranks more orderly and thoroughly "cleansed" of nationalist tendencies than even the Czechoslovak party (253 and 258-61).

Slovak nationalists who had been increasingly ostracized from the governing framework, in particular, held considerable quiet contempt for it. Many of them were advocates of confederalism and economic autonomy from the very onset of the federalist initiatives of the later 1960s. They were, of course, excluded from the governing apparatus, and if they dared reveal their true feelings, they most likely found themselves removed from professional positions of any sort, if not removed entirely from public participation all together (Wolchik 1991, 155). The nationalist celebration was indeed drawn to a close in the 1970s normalization period, and it was provided little opportunity for liberal, democratic expression until the political climate loosened considerably in the later 1980s (Leff 1988, 261-63).

While Slovak nationalism was very seldom expressed publicly, the grievances which polarized society during normalization can be documented in abundance (269). Czechs perceived Slovaks as advancing their national interests at the expense of the aborted "socialism with a human face". Slovak opportunism and the sudden infusion
of Slovak influence in the federal political system during normalization created resentment from Czechs. Czechs accused Slovaks of profiteering, and Slovaks blamed the Czechs for their social and economic woes as usual (269-71). Personal enmity surfaced toward Husak from both Czechs and some Slovaks for abandoning the 1968 reforms. Czechs, especially, blamed Husak and his conservatism for their personal problems. Further, Husak was a Slovak, and this only fueled negative Czech perceptions of Slovaks overall, however well-founded or ill-founded they may have been. Apathy and a self-conscious diffidence developed toward the fraternal conception of the republic (269-70). An "us versus them" relationship emerged between Czechs and Slovaks and between party and non-party affiliates which polarized the federal structure of the state despite the party's attempts to stem such developments.

In the meantime, both Czechs and Slovaks alike became increasingly alienated by the limited political arrangement generally. With only eleven percent of the population represented during a peak time of party membership in the socialist republic, governing became an exclusionary practice which neglected the sentiments of the populace at large and with rather destabilizing consequences one might add despite the perceived stability of the regime. Despite the party elite's stability, and
as a direct result of the party's firm if narrow grip on power, two distinct counter-elite movements emerged along national lines which challenged the communist regime (261 and 268). Dissident activists called for Czech and Slovak leaders to uphold human rights as stipulated by Czechoslovakia's obligation to the 1975 Helsinki Accords (Wolchik 1991, 152-53).

Already by 1977, Czechs and Slovaks turned to such organized dissident activism as Club 231, The Club of Engaged Non-Party Persons, and the human rights organization Charter 77 (Leff 1988, 263; Wolchik 1991, 152). Charter 77 was primarily a Czech initiative which gained most of its strength in the Czech lands during its initial stages. Only eight of the early signatories of Charter 77 were Slovak, and most of them lived in Prague (Leff 1988, 263-66; Ulc 28). Slovak dissent was organized predominantly through religious channels and the environmental concerns of the officially sanctioned Club of the Guardians of Nature.

The bi-polarized, counter-elite of Czechoslovak society remained relatively distinct for the duration of the communist state, aiding in their own unique ways the challenging of the legitimacy of the communist (Leff 1988, 268). With the limited ideological divisions among party elites, these opposition forces, be they weak, unofficial and barely organized, were able to fill a sort
of void with respect to the party's internal divisions, system inadequacies, and neglect of social concerns (Wolchik 1991, 151).

A Divergent Economy

Efforts to integrate the two distinct economies of the Czech lands and Slovakia during various periods throughout Czechoslovakia's history have been successful in several respects, but they have been hindered by nonsynchronic modernization; they have failed to diminish the real and perceived differences between Czechs and Slovaks based on distinct national interests defined in purely socio-economic terms.

Slovakia's economy emerged from that of the Hungarian sphere of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and it remained predominantly agricultural until the end of the Second World War (Klein 1979, 147). And while Slovakia emerged from the Austro-Hungarian Empire as the most industrialized of the Hungarian regions, its capabilities and productivity were dwarfed by the Czech lands which served as the industrial sector of the entire empire. As illustrated in the previous chapter, this discrepancy created a difficult situation for Czech and Slovak economic and political relations within the First Republic, its shadow remaining half a century later in the post-revolutionary period.
The more conservative, eastern portion of Czechoslovakia, with its traditional culture, presented difficulties for the overall socio-economic modernization of the state (Wolchik 1991, 186). One must remember that the First Republic's integrationist policies concentrated on educational and cultural development in terms of Czechoslovakism (Leff 1988, 138 and 141-43). Economically, the free market of the First Republic favored continued development of the more advanced and productive Czech lands (Paul 103). Nonetheless, Czechia's economic prosperity and influence with the new political and economic organization tangibly benefited the eastern portion of the republic from its very early stages. Transportation, communications, education, social and medical services were advanced considerably in Slovakia by Czech economic influences and the integrationist policies of the First Republic. Despite this, the eastern portion of the state remained economically stagnant, and at times regressionary, for a considerable period of time thereafter (103; Leff 1988, 277). With 28 percent of the state's population, Slovakia and Ruthenia produced only 15-18 percent of the national product (Paul 103). The nature of this economic disparity superimposed on the nationalities problem created the highly politicized situation which helped fuel the nationalist tensions in the First Republic (Leff 1988, 277; Wolchik 1991, 186).
Marxists argued that the origins of inequality and national tensions were in the economic and technological spheres; industrialization and economic reorganization, therefore, became the means of rectifying the inequalities of Czechoslovak society during the socialist republic. This, Marxists argued, would bring Czechs and Slovaks closer together into a common culture and in line with the principles of socialist internationalism (Leff 1988, 141-42).

The greatest thrust for economic modernization and development came with a series of five year plans which transformed the Czechoslovak economy from a leader in light industry and services, predominately in the Czech lands, to an integrated statewide economy based on heavy industry. The first three five year plans in particular - 1949, 1956-60 and 1961-65 - advanced heavy industry substantially. For nearly a decade, Czechoslovakia's capital production increased considerably as well, at the expense of consumer goods, agriculture and technological innovation no less (Paul 108; Klein 1979, 152).

The greatest degree of modernized development and integration in and between the Czech and Slovak economic regions, did indeed, occur during the socialist industrialization programs. Even prior to the Prague Spring and within less than twenty years under socialist policies, Slovakia, in particular, made great advances in its in-
dustrial capacity and standard of living (Paul 108-09; refer also to Wolchik 1991, 187). Its industrial production rose by 347 percent compared to 233 percent for the whole country from 1948-1959 alone. Even after this ten year period, however, Slovakia's total industrial product remained less than that of the Ostrava region of Moravia (Paul 106; Klein 1979, 156). Slovakia's advances also came at the expense of balanced development in consumer goods, agriculture and technical innovation, not to mention the Czech economy (Paul 105; Leff 1988, 281).

By the 1960s, the Czechoslovak economy was suffering from chronic and inherent problems typical of command economies throughout the Soviet sphere of influence. Such problems entailed the obsolescence of plants, low productivity, commodity shortages and plummeting growth rates (Paul 105 and 110). As a consequence, this chronic, low-level economic crisis set the stage for the reform efforts of the Prague Spring (105 and 110). Debate arose about the fundamental issues of socialist economics, and radical reforms of the economic structure were proposed (110). The New Economic Model (NEM), posited by Ota Sik and Zdenek Mlynar among others, called for a decrease in the influence of planning and an increase in the authority of individual enterprises and market forces. Market principles such as profit, competition and wage differentials for incentives were pro-
posed to compliment long-range planning. Workers' councils were also envisioned for expanded participation in the work place, serving as yet another form of democratization and decentralization (111-14; Wolchik 1991, 240-41; Klein 1979, 153-56).

Any challenge to the integrated socialist economy, however, especially in the form of a looser model, ran the risk of creating separate "autotarchical" economies (Leff 1988, 128). The 1960s reforms stressed thrift and profitability, but Slovakia's economy could hardly afford such concerns. Slovaks had, by necessity, an affinity towards the Stalinist, command economy (238-39; Paul 105; Klein 1979, 156), and nationalist Slovaks were qualified in their commitment to both revising the economic structure and developing it as it existed with the centralized features. Czechs, on the other hand, were eager for reforms (refer to Paul 113; Musil 18; Wolchik 1991, 191).

Modernization, then, proceeded more quickly, although at a later time, in Slovakia than it did in the Czech lands. The Czech lands modernized prior to, and during, the earliest stages of the First Republic, beginning in 1900 and continuing into the present day (Musil 8). Modernization in the Czech lands was implemented under the framework of West European capitalism with a widespread and diversified network and structure (7).
For example, the proportion of consumer goods produced was a relatively high proportion of overall production in the Czech lands (10; refer to Klein 1979, 147-49). Despite their neglect of consumer goods, the communists inherited a highly sophisticated industrial economy in the Czech lands with little need for building anew (Klein 1979, 152).

Slovakia, on the other hand, modernized in the 1950s according to the Soviet, command model (Musil 7 and 17; Klein 1979, 152). Its industry was designed according to the economic as well as strategic targets of the federation and the Soviet bloc (Musil 10). Its industrial framework was virtually non-existent prior to modernization, essentially needing a massive buildup of infrastructure. As a result of being constructed under the Stalinist model, Slovakia's development was not widespread, very well diversified or organized. There were some advancements in textiles, lumber, paper and food products as well as an emerging development in electro-chemicals and machine production prior to the socialist republic. Slovakia's industrial modernization, nonetheless, proceeded towards heavy industry from that point forward (Paul 102). Industrialization also developed according to the location of resource deposits, irrespective of population centers and logistical strategy (Musil 10). Consequently, not only was Slovakia's economy based
initially on the inherent weaknesses of the Soviet, com-
mand economic model, but as will be elaborated upon
later, the traditional social transition which usually
accompanies economic modernization was severely affected
by this method of development. This has, as well, varied
consequences in both cause and effect from the Czech
experience with modernization (10).

Slovakia is perceived as having benefited most from
the Stalinist strategy of economic modernization and
development. Its limited industrial infrastructure prior
to the modernization process of the 1950s was more easily
organized according to the command structure and integra-
tionist objectives of the region than that of Czechia's
developed and sophisticated market structures. Any
consideration for economic reorganization along the lines
of efficiency, especially by moving away from the Stalin-
ist, command economy towards market principles, was a
major threat to the foundations of Slovakia's economy and
all its advances made thus far under the aegis of the
command economy (Leff 1988, 237-39; Klein 1979, 152 and
156).

Slovaks were concerned about continued, guided mod-
erization and an increase in their standard of living.
Czechs, on the other hand, had mutual concerns, but their
standards were focused towards Western capitalist econo-
mies (Klein 1979, 153). The achievement of those stan-
dards necessitated reforms. Thus, Czechs and Slovaks found themselves at odds once again, only in terms of the economy this time. Communists and nationalists alike complained about the persisting failure of the Slovak economy and its failure to catch up with that of the Czech lands, despite the fact that statewide production approached the proportion of the population overall (Paul 110 and 113). Slovaks had for a long time advanced the idea of a separate economy, and the 1960s reforms, particularly the threats which they posed, only invigorated Slovak support for the idea (Leff 1988, 238-39; Paul 113).

A considerable degree of economic autonomy was, in fact, envisioned for the two regions in the 1969 federalization amendment, but the recentralization of political affairs during normalization ceased economic liberalization and reorganization altogether (114). As with the political formula, the 1971 constitutional amendment reduced the economic powers granted to the republics under the original federal structure (Wolchik 1991, 219). The rationale for these adjustments centered on, "strengthening cooperation and unity of direction, especially on certain economic questions" (Leff 1988, 247). Where the 1968 law alluded to the "'integration of two socialist economies,' the revision starkly proclaimed the economy unified" (247). The economy remained highly
centralized in the State Planning Commission and the various ministries responsible for its operation (Wolchik 1991, 219; Paul 114). Czechoslovakia actually remained one of the most centralized command economies in the Soviet bloc (Wolchik 1991, 218).

Beginning in 1975, the government implemented a series of appeasement policies which served as a contract of sorts between the authoritarian Husak regime and the people at large. In light of the Prague Spring, if people behaved and allowed the government to govern, the authorities promised to provide the populace with the necessities of life, including a rise in the standard of living. The 1976-80 Five Year Plan allowed for more available consumer goods, increased imports and a considerable increase in the standard of living. Growth occurred at satisfactory rates in accordance with the plan, and Slovakia continued to reach greater parity with the Czech lands in industrial development (Paul 116). This, of course, was possible only with Soviet subsidies (115; Klein 1979, 155).

The degree of egalitarianism in Czechoslovak society overall is difficult to judge from the socialist era because of limited and untrustworthy socio-economic studies. In many cases, the party elites were not included in the configurations (Wolchik 1991, 171-72; Klein 1981). A noteworthy study by Pavel Machonin from the 1970s sug-
gests that social differentiation and stratification did, in fact, take place around such factors as occupation, education, geographic locale and ethnicity, thus defying old ideological formulas and qualifying the degree of egalitarianism between Czechs and Slovaks (Paul 141-42; Wolchik 1991, 172 and 179). There is substantial evidence, nonetheless, to point towards some success in creating a more economically egalitarian society (Wolchik 1991, 171-72; Paul 139).

Government statistics indicate that the incomes of Czechs and Slovaks reached parity in 1971 (Klein 1979, 147). The number of people employed in industry and construction was nearly equal between Czechia and Slovakia, and the number of people employed in agriculture overall diminished to less than 13 percent by 1974 (Wolchik 1991, 167 and 187-88; Klein 1979, 147). Average wages tended to be higher in transport, construction and industry. The lowest wages were in trade, education, culture and health across the board (Wolchik 1991, 171-74). Wage differentials were stable from the 1950s until 1979, averaging in difference from highest to lowest by only two and one-half times (171-74; Paul 139-40). The gap between educational access, infant mortality and living standards also narrowed considerably (Wolchik 1991, 189-90). By the mid-1960s there were more students
per one thousand in population in Slovakia than in the Czech lands (189).

A Divergent Social Transition

The demographic transition which accompanied industrialization in the Czech lands began already in 1870. The period from 1870 until 1900 experienced an overall decline in the population; the Slovaks began their decline later, about 1900 (Musil 11). From 1921 until 1991, however, Slovaks have moved from 23 percent of the Czechoslovak population to 34 percent. Growth has occurred the fastest in Slovakia, reflecting traditional values; large families, religious beliefs which both discourage birth control and promote a conservative view of women in society (11; Wolchik 1991, 186; Paul 126). Reproduction levels have ranged from roughly thirteen in every one thousand people in the Czech lands compared to roughly seventeen per one thousand in Slovakia, and presently the average Slovak is younger than the average Czech (Wolchik 1991, 162; Musil 11). Over time, demographic development has fluctuated in part according to population policies and social circumstances. This demographic shift is expected to continue well into the twenty-first century (refer to Wolchik 1991, 162 and 186).
Czechia experienced a low rate of urbanization during its industrialization process (Musil 7), but its urbanization was concentrated in the cities, not in the peripheral regions of cities as in Slovakia (13). Czechia has also experienced a higher standard of living than Slovakia throughout the duration of the state's existence (13). Slovakia's industrialization process, on the other hand, was accompanied by an insufficient level of urbanization. (10). Work was available in the newly developing industrial areas, but housing was virtually non-existent as a result of the location of industrial development. A typical industrialized urban environment was absent with very few exceptions - Bratislava for example. Subsequently, population centers had to transfer to areas around emerging industrial sites. By necessity, Slovaks had to construct private dwellings in the periphery of industrial centers as state funds for housing complexes were severely limited.

In contrast, Czechs typically dwelled in long established housing complexes, be they limited in availability, within already established industrialized urban settings. This possibly helps explain the persistent provincial mentality in Slovakia despite such high rates of industrialization and literacy compared to the Czechs. Urbanization has, indeed, been constantly higher in Slovakia than in Czechia as well (12), but the quality of
living has also been generally poorer because of the swiftness of expansion (13). According to the 1980 census, roughly 17 percent of Czechia's population is urbanized compared to 50 percent of Slovakia's population (Wolchik 1991, 189). While differences in and between Czech and Slovak rural and urban areas have not disappeared, changing demographic patterns have brought them closer together (Paul 44-45). The total number of villages declined by one-third between 1945 and 1975. Sociological differences associated with rural and urban lifestyles have considerably diminished, but they still remain (145).

As noted earlier (see 57-58), Czechia's level of educational development was quite high even during the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Its literacy rate was in the ninetieth percentile by 1918. Slovakia's most obvious advancement in educational levels and literacy occurred during the First Republic and the socialist era. Slovaks represented only 1.4 percent of the students in Hungarian universities (Musil 13). The literacy rate of Slovakia reached 82 percent by 1921 (Leff 1988, 277), and presently, some indexes of educational structure are slightly superior to those of the Czech Republic (Musil 13; Wolchik 1991, 189). By 1970, the proportion of those without any education had decreased considerably to only 0.4 percent of the total population (Wolchik 1991, 164).
Politically as well, Czechia and Slovakia have modernized at different rates and with distinct characteristics (109). Czechia displayed a healthy degree of pluralism in its political structure from the very beginning of the national revival and throughout the state's existence. Slovakia, on the other hand, experienced its national rebirth with a more conservative political expressionism. From the 1890s until the First World War, Slovakia was organized preponderantly around the Slovak National Party (Musil 14). Slovakia has been more nationalistic, autistic, conservative and panslavistic (14). While Slovakia's political climate did become more complex, equal and pluralistic, during the First Republic, Czech and Slovak political cultures have remained traditionally distinct. This divergent set of political values, attitudes and opinions continued during the communist period (Wolchik 1991, 108). Even under communism, the Czechs tended to support political pluralism and a strong sense of social democracy and commitment to social justice. The Slovaks were more attracted to authoritarian measures, even within the ranks of the party apparatus (111). This evidence then, once again, supports the conception posited in the Introduction that Slovaks remain rather provincial in their social outlook, whereas Czechs are more cosmopolitan (Musil 15). Studies from the 1960s have even shown that Slovaks viewed Masaryk and
the First Republic in a less favorable light than did Czechs. Instead, Slovaks reserve their truest affections for their own national revival and its leaders (Wolchik 1991, 111-12; Leff 1991, 296). All of this, of course, has implications for national cohesion and stability.

A Conclusion

As a result of this non-synchronistic modernization - the initial discrepancies and the asynchronous process - the Czech and Slovak societies have remained bifurcated both during the process and in its outcome. They do, indeed, resemble one another in many respects and some economic integration has occurred (shared currency, infrastructure and open trade, etc.). However, Czechs and Slovaks have not integrated socially throughout the process of modernization and economic integration. On the contrary, they have grown further apart (Leff 1988; also refer to Wolchik 1991 and Musil). All of the sociological research regarding family relations, the importance of neighborhoods, their locations, social structure, household structure, etc. also indicate the continuing divergence of both societies (Musil 12).

Sociological differences predictably extended to communal values and beliefs. Czechs have traditionally attached a considerable degree of importance to the efficiency and effectiveness of individuals and their success
in such areas as education, personal endeavors, talent, diligence and willingness to take risks, for example (Musil 15). Slovaks have traditionally attached greater importance to ascriptive circumstances such as ancestral extraction, family and tradition. Their concern for the efficiency of the individual is quite limited (15).

While Czech society has become one of the most secularized in Europe, Slovaks remain strongly Catholicized and religiously active. Secularization has appeared in Slovakia, but at a much slower rate than in the Czech lands. Languages have remained distinct between nationalities, and the number of inter-marriages between Czechs and Slovaks is limited to a very few (Wolchik 1991, 191). In the Czech lands in 1988, roughly forty marriages out of every one hundred ended in divorce compared to roughly twenty-two in every one hundred in Slovakia (Leff 1988, 295; Wolchik 1991, 163 and 180-95).

The rate of integration, no doubt, depends on the exchange of people, information, capital commodities and other mobile elements between societies (Musil 16). The limited interaction in terms of cross migration and integrated educational and professional development between disaffected Czechs and Slovaks is one more primary example of just how distanced Czechs and Slovaks have remained (Leff 1988, 282 and 285-86; refer to Wolchik 1991, 180-95).
Cross migration between the Czech lands and Slovakia has diminished considerably over the last four decades (Musil 16). Some 40,000 people migrated annually from Slovakia to the Czech lands during the 1950s in search of employment opportunities in the Ostrava region in particular. By the second half of the 1950s the number of migrations decreased to around 20,000 on average, and by the 1980s, migrations to the Czech lands had decreased to a level of some 10,000 people. The migration from the Czech lands to Slovakia, being considerably smaller in proportion, also decreased (16). Presently, Slovaks constitute four percent of the total population of the Czech lands, and Czechs represent roughly one percent of the population living in Slovakia (Leff 1988, 284; Wolchik 1991, 191). Migration in Czechoslovakia has consisted primarily of two relatively closed migratory subsystems according to demographers (285). Ninety-five percent of those Czechs who migrated from one village to another stayed within the Czech republic. Roughly half of the mobile Slovaks moved to the Czech lands. The others simply stayed within Slovakia.

The number of Slovaks that have acquired their education in Czechia has also been decreasing as modernization has advanced and developed. Czechs have remained consistent in their pursuit of education within their native land, and in terms of professional development and
employment, Czechs have also remained in the Czech lands, the only major exception being shortly after the establishment of Czechoslovak statehood when Czechs were filling the professional vacuum of Slovakia. Slovaks have increasingly turned away from both educational and employment opportunities in the Czech lands for opportunities at home with the increased modernization and development (287-92; Musil 17).

Modernization in Czechoslovakia is indeed complex in its nature and consequences. Industrialization occurred largely at the expense of the Czech lands. Czech capital infusions in Slovakia created resentment between the Czechs and Slovaks (Klein 1979, 156; Paul 105). As in the political arena, Czechs claimed that Slovaks did not appreciate their generosity, and Slovaks perceived the Czech infusions as a means of intrusion into Slovak affairs, not to mention the threat which such developments possibly posed to Slovak culture (Klein 1979, 156).

Despite progress in terms of Slovak socio-economic advancement and economic integration overall within the socialist republic, the very distinct socio-political, economic and cultural tensions remained an ever present component of the political landscape which, in turn, prevented the success of economic parity and union. In an area where the success of uniting two separate societies became possible as Carol Skalnik Leff has suggested,
the opportunity was diminished (Leff 1988, 281). Slovak nationalists claimed that Czechs and communists, in general, had the same conception for solving the nationality problem; greater integration in economic terms as well as socio-political and cultural terms, and Slovaks naturally viewed this as a threat to their identity (238-39).

Federalism, with all of its potential prospects, failed miserably to serve as a constructive means of coordinating Czech and Slovak interests equitably within a formal and practical constitution of political unity. Instead, federalism's very existence helped institutionalize the natural bifurcation of society. In one sense, federalism divided the segments of society institutionally for effectiveness in government. In another sense, the division made the dissolution of Czechoslovakia all the more accommodating and free of trouble. We must, however, return to this in Chapter V.
CHAPTER IV

THE VELVET REVOLUTION AND THE DIVISION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA

A Pretext

The revolution which swept eastern Europe in 1989 was instigated by a series of events and circumstances which developed over an extended period of time and from internal and external factors inherent to the socio-political and economic structure of the region and its independent states. Each worked simultaneously to advance the social revolution throughout its development in the 1980s. With particular relevance to Czechoslovakia, the manner in which these events affected the actual revolution and its aftermath becomes pertinent to relations between Czechs and Slovaks for it indicates that while relations between Czechs and Slovaks in no significant way either encouraged the revolution or shaped its immediate course, relations between Czechs and Slovaks were most certainly affected by the revolution. From the point at which revolution overthrew the ancien regime, however, Czech and Slovak relations emerged as a major determinant of the revolution's continued affects, ultimately shaping them according to the enveloping
socio-cultural fault lines as described earlier.

Czechoslovakia's revolution began on November 17, 1989 with a demonstration commemorating the death of Jan Opletal, a student who was killed in Prague by occupying Nazi troops in 1939. The commemorative demonstration, however, turned into a mass rally for freedom which became quickly and brutally suppressed by communist authorities. As a consequence, both students, many of whom had been participants in the demonstrations, and intellectuals became invigorated by such acts of state aggression. The infuriated demonstrators and socially conscious groups alike called for a nationwide, general strike on November 27, 1989 in protest of the government's blatant mis-use of power in this affair (Judt 98; Bankowicz 156), and from this seemingly innocuous incident revolution evolved in Czechoslovakia and overthrew the communist government of some forty-one years, an outcome permitted by the remarkable transition within the Soviet Union.

There are, of course, a number of factors which predate the crucial event of November 17 and its aftermath and prepared the undercurrents of revolutionary fervor, propelling the oppression of that day as a catalyst of social revolution. Illegal demonstrations advancing the ideas of free elections, a new democratic government and the resignation of Milos Jakes, leader of
the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia at the time, had occurred prior to November 17 (Scheer "Post-Revolution Haze"; Judt 97-98; Bankowicz 155-56; Wolchik 1991, 39-49).

By August, there had been mass demonstrations to mark the anniversary of the Prague Spring's termination, including demonstrations in memory of Jan Palach who immolated himself in 1969 while protesting the end of the Prague Spring reforms and the positioning of Soviet troops on Czechoslovak soil in August of 1968 (Bankowicz 155-56; Judt 98). Vaclav Havel, the well known and respected playwright and dissident organizer of Charter 77, had also been imprisoned once again in February 1989 for his involvement in organizing dissident activities (Judt 96; Bankowicz 157).

Moreover, revolutionary currents in Eastern Europe and Czechoslovakia occurred as a result of the number of structural weaknesses inherent to the economic and political order of the entire East Bloc as indicated in the previous chapter (Judt 97). As in the 1960s, Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) countries experienced the effects of economic inefficiencies. Czechoslovakia, for one, experienced obvious economic difficulties in the early to mid 1980s, while the whole process of economic stagnation began as early as the mid 1960s.
This, of course, had profound affects itself on the politics and social condition of Czechoslovakia.

As a result of the economic deterioration and the new awareness of the oppressive nature of political regimes throughout the East Bloc, opposition movements gained a great deal of support; and the devolving state of affairs in the Soviet Union, with all of its implications, provided impetus for reform throughout the region. The wave of revolution finally brought the Berlin Wall down on November 9, 1989, leaving Czechoslovakia and its staunchly conservative Jakes regime virtually isolated with its frail economic condition, devolving political authority and the dissolving Soviet hegemony (96-97; Bankowicz 156).

Organized opposition in Czechoslovakia arose due, in part, to the liberalizing affects of political revolution in Moscow and the entire Soviet sphere of influence with the onset of perestroika and glasnost in the mid to late 1980s, but political opposition in Czechoslovakia also came about because of the conservative nature of the Jakes regime and its reluctance to correct its political and economic shortcomings (Wolchik 1991, 40-42, 151-56 and 224). The opposition forces which existed in Czechoslovakia during the period of normalization were influentially weak and not very well organized mainly because of the authoritarian nature of the regime and the threats
which such a system posed to opposition activists as exemplified by the experiences of Vaclav Havel. Opposition forces in Czechoslovakia served, however, as a most profound element of the social revolution, and it is within this context of opposition forces and revolution that one finds the essence of Czech and Slovak relations in terms of mutual coexistence and separation.

Dissident forces were effective at challenging the communist establishment by way of underground organization and criticism of the regime's shortcomings throughout the normalization and appeasement periods of the socialist republic, and they gained mass appeal by as early as 1987, despite government efforts to squelch the dissemination of their ideas and the proliferation of interest in them (42 and 151-56). By the late 1980s, as many as a dozen new groups were formed, and mass demonstrations became a common occurrence along with their emergence (42, 44 and 151-56). Among the groups which joined the ranks of Club 231, The Club of Engaged Non-Party Persons and Charter 77 in 1987 and 1988, were the Helsinki Committee, Social Defense, Committee for the Defense of the Unjustly Persecuted, Movement of Civil Liberties and Democratic Initiative, Friends of the USA, the T. G. Masaryk Association and the Masaryk Society (42). Such organizations as the Czech Children, the Independent Peace Association and the John Lenin Club
were formed among the young people of Czechoslovakia beginning also in 1988 and well into 1989 (43).

The number of independent demonstrations and pilgrimages gained in popularity as well from as early as 1988, particularly in Slovakia and Moravia where demands for religious freedom were strong. Estimates indicate that participation in the demonstrations and pilgrimages grew to some 700,000 strong by 1989 (43-44). By the early stages of the revolution, in mid to late 1989, these opposition forces found common ground among themselves with regard to human rights and social justice. Collectively, they provided the mass support for challenging the communist authority and ultimately providing the means for a smooth social revolution (156, also 40-52).

Civic Forum was one organization which originated from the primary leadership of Charter 77 in November 1989 at the height of revolution, and it served as the major organizing force of the revolution along with Public Against Violence in Slovakia. Civic Forum and Public Against Violence guided the revolution into the initial stages of the transformation process and the post-revolutionary period (79).

Civic Forum served as an umbrella organization for opposition in the Czech lands with the purpose of coordinating the many diverse interest groups and their griev-
ances against the communist government (52). By 1990, the organization attracted many prominent intellectuals, political and cultural figures from all shades of the political spectrum and broad social strata (80 and 83). Their common attributes were a commitment to democracy, economic reform and Czechoslovakia's reorientation towards Europe, together with a commitment to human rights and social justice (80; Bankowicz 157; Ulc 20-21).

Likewise, Public Against Violence, the Slovak equivalent of Civic Forum, united the Slovak opposition forces (Wolchik 1991, 82). Opposition in Slovakia was slightly different than its Czech counterpart, however, because a considerable amount of the movements' grievances came from a religious perspective. While political dissidents comprised most of the Czech opposition, supporters of opposition in Slovakia were often "non-conformists," or those who remained in positions of official power and influence, but lobbied for increased restructuring and openness (82 and 154). Most of Public Against Violence supporters were involved in the official Guardians of Nature (82), and while many supporters were mere non-conformists, there were also open Slovak dissidents (80). What this suggests is that the consideration to support reform in Slovakia came from a very diverse group of interests much like the Czech experience, but it also came with a distinctly Slovak nature - meaning that
opposition had a more conservative and subdued nature than its Czech counterpart. There is also evidence to corroborate that support for opposition in Slovakia came at a much slower pace and in a more delayed time-frame than in the Czech lands (see Wolchik 1991, 46-47).

Despite their differences, Civic Forum and Public Against Violence found common ground for the duration of the revolution's transformation of power from communist totalitarianism to a provisional government of reconciliation. In fact, their mutual efforts were a primary basis of the revolution's success. Nonetheless, as a later portion of this chapter details, once the communist regime was removed from power and the power structure became increasingly restored on the leaders of democratic pluralism, this cooperative relationship diminished and Czech and Slovak relations degenerated far beyond anything previously experienced with the possible exception of the events leading up to 1939, Czechoslovakia's first division. Even Civic Forum and Public Against Violence found it necessary to distinguish themselves. Essentially, a great deal of confusion and decentralization of authority was created, while simultaneously, a healthy dynamic for a plural society was also established. Once the mutual interests of overthrowing the communist government were satisfied, Czechs and Slovaks found themselves at odds about the course of post-revolutionary
developments, primarily in terms of the political structure and economic reform. Subsequently, the post-revolutionary period became shaped by their differences (79-83; also refer to De Luce "Political Unity").

The Revolution

The factors just described provide the general context for the revolutionary events in Czechoslovakia. From November 18, 1989 and until November 27, a series of events led to the actual transfer of power and the beginning of the long road of "recovery" in the post-revolutionary period (Judt 98).

Along with the establishment of Civic Forum on November 19, demonstrations were held for the following three days at which time some 200,000 people gathered at Wenceslas Square in Prague to protest the violence of November 17 (98; Bankowicz 157). Many others gathered in Brno and Bratislava as well, demanding political and economic reforms and the resignation of leading party and state functionaries. It was on this day that Public Against Violence was formed in Bratislava (Bankowicz 157).

Vaclav Havel emerged as the leader of Civic Forum on November 21 and began to address the crowds for the first time (Judt 99). On November 23, some 300,000 people gathered at various sites throughout the country
Havel spoke to 50,000 Public Against Violence supporters in Bratislava, and the president and secretariat of the Prague communist party were dismissed from their positions that day because of their involvement in the suppression of the November 17 demonstrations (Judt 99). Some 800,000 people then gathered at Letna Field on November 25, 1989, marking the height of the revolution. Karel Urbanek, who had replaced Milos Jakes as the first secretary of the party on November 24, was strongly criticized (Scheer "Post-Revolution Haze," 8; Bankowicz 157-58). The following day, November 26, another demonstration was held at Letna Field, and by this time, the real liberalizing force in these events, Civic Forum, had a mandate from the populace at large. The government could no longer avoid negotiations with the leaders of Civic Forum as it had until this point (Judt 99; Bankowicz 157-58).

On behalf of Civic Forum, Vaclav Havel met with Prime Minister Ladislav Adamec, and as a result of unsuccessful negotiations, general strikes were called throughout the country on November 27, as had been threatened. Millions of blue collar workers from throughout the country supported the strikes, calling for greater political liberty (Judt 99 and 101; Bankowicz 158). As a result, Civic Forum began negotiations with the government again on November 28, and this time Adamec
promised to promote a coalition government. The Federal Assembly voluntarily removed the constitutional clause guaranteeing the communist party a "leading role" in government (Judt 99; Bankowicz 158), and within seventy-two hours, the communists accepted a new non-communist majority government with Marian Calfa, a communist himself, as Prime-Minister. The following day, former Secretary-General Milos Jakes and Prague party chief Miroslav Stepan were expelled from the party because of their alleged involvement with the events of November 17 (Judt 99). They were the first among many to be dismissed or resigned from the party (Bankowicz 159).

On December 3, 1989, the People's Malitia was disarmed and the Calfa government was inaugurated (Judt 99). On December 8, a Government of National Agreement was established at the Czechoslovak Round Table negotiations (Bankowicz 158), and on December 10, Husak swore in the Calfa government and then resigned his position as president of Czechoslovakia (Judt 100). Of the government's twenty-one members, only a minority of ten were communists (Judt 100; Bankowicz 158-59). With the possible threat that communists might feasibly attempt a comeback, public demonstrations proliferated, demanding the election of Vaclav Havel as president. Havel agreed to run for president on December 16, and on December 29, he was finally elected by a show of hands in the Federal Assem-
bly, a day after the assembly nominated Alexander Dubcek as its chairman (Judt 100). Interestingly, Havel made his election based upon the condition of Dubcek's election, attempting to strike a balance between Czech and Slovak interests. At this point, the six week old student strikes were called to a halt, their demands being finally satisfied.

The Government of National Reconciliation

Once the provisional government of national reconciliation was put into place, steps were taken to institutionalize a pluralist democracy and restructure the state's economy. Elections were scheduled for June of 1990 at which time a legitimate government could be instituted on the basis of democratic principles (Ulc 19; Judt 101; Wolchik 1991, 50). In the meantime, opposition activists had to take responsibility for running the government and instituting the necessary and immediate political and economic changes that guided the revolution for the sake of stability (Wolchik 1991, 50). Policy had to satisfy Czechoslovakia's diverse interests; this is the obligation of a plural society based on democratic principles. The real challenges in such post-revolutionary developments, therefore, lay with the diverse nature of Czechoslovakia's composition (50 and 59-61; Ramet 102; Wolchik 1994, 153-54; Judt 101).
By 1990, political organizations had proliferated. Some 334 associations and 58 parties were formed (Ulc 19; Bankowicz 159; Wolchik 1991, 51 and 77; Wolchik 1994, 154). The Federal Assembly's representative composition changed markedly. Over 100 new members, mostly from Civic Forum, replaced forcibly retired communist party members on January 30 (Judt 102; Ulc 19-20; Wolchik 1991, 51 and 70-71; Bankowicz 159). Even Prime Minister Calfa left the party (Bankowicz 159), and from this panorama of political organization and interests, the new political order had to be contrived.

In terms of reorganizing the political structure in Czechoslovakia, however, little could be done until after the June elections when a legitimate government would be seated. The role of the communist party was dramatically diminished and pluralism was taking root, but little was seriously settled. The task at hand for the interim government was to establish the ground rules for the June elections and begin consideration of a constitutional framework of government, a task, that would prove to be the most vexatious of the state's post-revolutionary developments (Judt 106).

On February 28, 1990, the Federal Assembly passed an electoral law which called for a list based, proportional representative system of election (106; Wolchik 1991, 51). The ground rules specified that any party seeking
election had to prove that it had 10,000 members or signatories of support. The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and its former allies, i.e. the Czechoslovak People's Party, the Czechoslovak Socialist Party and the Slovak Freedom Party, were regarded as existing parties and were, therefore, not required to register. The same was true for Civic Forum and Public Against Violence (Bankowicz 160; Wolchik 1991, 78). By April, twenty-three parties met this test. They included a number of parties from the inter-war period such as the Christian Democratic Movement, the Christian Democratic Party and the Conservative Party, not to mention Slovak nationalist parties, the Movement for a Self-Governing Democracy-Association for Moravia and Silecia and the parties of Hungarian nationalism, forces which would ultimately play a significant role in the composition of a new constitution (Wolchik 1991, 51 and 77).

In order to be represented in the Assembly, a party had to secure at least five percent of the popular vote in the elections, a method commonly practiced among several West European multi-party systems. Of the 150 seats in the House of People, Czechs would occupy 101 seats while the Slovaks would occupy 49 seats as under the communist structure. A further 150 seats in the House of Nations were to be divided evenly among the Czechs and Slovaks (Judt 106). Elections to the Czech and Slovak
national councils were being held simultaneously. As with the election of representatives to the Federal Assembly, the Czechs would utilize a five percent hurdle for the election of their national council, while a three percent hurdle would pertain to the Slovak National Council because of Slovakia's smaller electorate and the number of minor parties within the republic (106; Wolchik 1991, 78).

In terms of the economy, debate about the nature and extent of the economic reforms necessary to curtail Czechoslovakia's downturn had been growing since prior to the revolution, but little continuity among various expert circles and political interests was evident even in the early stages of the post-revolutionary period (Myant 155-67). Again, as with the political reforms, little serious action was taken on economic issues during the interim government. Instead, the first half of 1990 served as a period of great debate about the political and economic direction of the country for the coming years.

Since the 1987 Law on State Enterprises, communists had been discussing among themselves just how Czechoslovakia's economy might revive itself. The approach taken, among other aspects, involved a degree of decentralization by removing one tier of management. It was hoped that management and workers' councils would play a
greater role in shaping individual enterprises, boosting productivity so as to jump start the economy (155-60; Wolchik 1991, 219-22 and 245-47). Foreign investment was even permitted at one point, but real and radical consideration of economic reforms, nevertheless, began to take shape only after the revolution.

Debate about the economic reforms centered primarily on propositions put forth by the newly placed Deputy Prime Minister Valtr Komarek, Federal Minister of Finance Vaclav Klaus and his deputy, Vladimir Dlouhy. Komarek, stressed the need for a slower pace of reform leading towards a traditional free-market system by way of structural reform of the economy. Klaus and Dlouhy differed from Komarek with regard to both the rate and nature of the transformation. They advocated a rapid economic transformation with primary emphasis placed on restoring or achieving macroeconomic equilibrium, and their plan entailed only a few minor corrections to the institutional economic framework.¹⁶

By April of 1990, Klaus and Dlouhy were successful at advancing their conception of shock therapy, a rapid and painful move away from a planned economy to one of free enterprise, markets and foreign investment. Under

¹⁶ For more details about the debate, refer to Myant 161-63 and 168-70; Wolchik 1991, 247-48; Judt 103.
their plan, the currency was to be made convertible, monopolies were to be broken up, price controls progressively removed and privatization initiated immediately (Judt 103; Ulc 24). They continued to stress the need for achieving equilibrium in terms of macroeconomics - bringing supply and demand into harmony - and the need for restrictive fiscal and monetary policy. Inflation, they argued, had to be prevented for the sake of social stability (Myant 162 and 172).

Most experts were conceding that Czechoslovakia's economy needed dramatic reform based on market principles and greater integration into the world economy (Wolchik 1991, 248). This, of course, entailed steps which went far beyond what the communists authorities had considered. Subsequently, property was slowly restituted in the initial stages of the post-revolutionary period. Corporations, joint stock companies and partnerships with foreign ventures were also increasingly permitted beyond the steps taken by the communist policies. The role of the planning commissions and ministries was eliminated entirely. The State Planning Commission became the Ministry of the Economy, performing more and more along the lines of a regulatory body rather than one issuing commands (222).

The interim government proposed a "minimal" economic reform plan in April of 1990. It detailed Czechoslova-
kia's transformation into a market economy over a two year period of time. Initial plans entailed the creation of the legal and institutional framework for a market system (Myant 169 and 174). Along with such action, and with all constituencies supporting at least some measure of economic reform as a result of Czechoslovakia's devastated industrial and ecological situation, debate became increasingly intensified primarily over the pace and costs by which Czechoslovakia could and should transform itself (Judt 103; Ulc 23; Myant 155-71; Wolchik 1991, 249).

The Federal Assembly passed some sixty laws between February and June of 1990, many of which reshaped the methods of economic activity in the country and sought to move Czechoslovakia closer to the free market orientation of Western Europe (Judt 103). A law ending monopolies and establishing free enterprise was instituted on April 19, 1990 (103). Also in April, the Central European Free Trade Agreement was enacted, and Czechoslovakia set its course for joining such organizations as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Community (104; refer to Wolchik 1991, 257-72 for a discussion of external economic relations). In May of 1990, communist party property was expropriated (Judt 109), and prices were set to be freed in two stages, once on July 1, 1990 and again on January 1, 1991 (103; Wolchik 1991, 229). With the
reforms of July 1 alone, some thirty thousand items, mainly foodstuffs, increased in price by 25 percent, adding 10 percent to the overall inflation rate. The cost of industrial goods increased by 11 percent and services by 10 percent (Judt 110; Ulc 23; Myant 174; Wolchik 1991, 229).

As one can imagine, the economic reforms had near devastating effects on social conditions, especially considering society's vulnerability in light of the revolutionary experience. As one might also imagine, the devastation was felt more severely in Slovakia than in the Czech lands, and this most naturally influenced the nature of political discourse within Czechoslovakia.

Democratic elections were held on June 8 and 9, 1990 as scheduled by the provisional government (Ulc 20-21; Judt 106-07; and Bankowicz 160). Ninety-six percent of the eligible electorate, consisting of 11,247,000 registered voters, participated in the election (Ulc 21). Of the hundreds of parties and movements which competed, Civic Forum, Public Against Violence, the Christian Democratic Party, Social Democratic Party, Communist Party, Liberal Party, Conservative Party, the Agrarians, and the Slovak National Party, among many others, were represented (Bankowicz 160). Only seven of the registered parties passed the five percent threshold (Bankowicz 162; Ulc 21; Wolchik 1991, 51 and 78).
The results left Civic Forum and Public Against Violence with a narrow overall majority in both houses of the National Assembly, with the exception of the Slovak section of the House of Nations (Judt 107). The Civic Forum/Public Against Violence alliance received 168 of the 300 seats in the Federal Assembly (Bankowicz 161; Wolchik 1991, 71-72). Civic Forum received 50.0 percent of the vote for the House of Nations while receiving 53.2 percent of the vote for the House of People (Wolchik 1991, 51). The Christian Democrats, however, were a foreboding challenge to Public Against Violence. They received 19 percent of the vote for the House of People and 17 percent for the House of Nations compared to Public Against Violence's 33 percent and 37 percent, respectively. The Christian Democratic Union and Christian Democratic Movement received forty seats overall in parliament (52; Judt 107).

The communists received forty-seven seats with 13 percent of the vote, making them the second largest party in the Federal Assembly and the Czech National Council (Wolchik 1991, 71-72). Incidentally, most of the support for the communists came from the older generations (Judt 108; Ulc 21; Wolchik 1991, 52). The Movement for Self-Governing Democracy-Association for Moravia and Silesia received sixteen seats, while the Slovak National Party received fifteen seats and the Coexistence-Hungarian
Christian Democratic Movement received twelve seats in the National Assembly.\textsuperscript{17}

In the republic legislatures, Civic Forum did well as it won 127 of the 200 seats in the Czech National Council with 49.5 percent of the vote (Judt 107; Wolchik 1991, 51). Civic Forum's largest rival, the union of Christian Democratic parties received only 8.7 percent of the vote due to last minute allegations of secret police collaboration made against its main political figure, Josef Bartoncik (Wolchik 1991, 51; Judt 107). The communists followed Civic Forum with thirty-two seats. The Movement for a Self-Governing Democracy-Association for Moravia and Silecia obtained twenty-two seats with 10.3 percent of the popular vote (Judt 107).

The Christian Democratic Party received 19.2 percent of the vote and thirty-one seats in the Slovak National Council as opposed to Public Against Violence's 29.3 percent and forty-eight seats (Wolchik 1991, 52). The Hungarian nationality scored 8.64 percent of the vote and fourteen seats (Judt 107), and the Slovak National

\textsuperscript{17} Wolchik 1991, 71-72; refer to Table 2.2 of Wolchik 1991, 72 for a complete distribution of mandates in the Federal Assembly; also see Judt 107.
Party received twenty-two seats with fourteen percent of the vote, equal to the proportion of the communists.¹⁸

The local elections held in November 1990 indicate that Civic Forum maintained its dominant position with 35.4 percent of the vote. Public Against Violence received 20.4 percent, running second to the Christian Democratic Movement at 27.4 percent of the vote. The Slovak National Party received a mere 3.2 percent of the vote (Wolchik 1991, 53; Wolchik 1994, 167).

As a result of the election, the emergent government contained no communist party members for the first time in the history of post-war Czechoslovakia, whereas only nine had served in the previous interim government. The new government also decreased in size from 23 to 16 members (Ulc 22). Dubcek was returned to the chairmanship of the National Assembly, and Havel was elected as President again in July 1990 for a two year term by a vote of 234 votes in his favor, 50 opposed (Ulc 21-22; Bankowicz 160; Judt 108).

The Government of Attempted Consolidation

Now that a legitimate government was in place, political and economic reforms could proceed in full force

¹⁸ Judt 107; refer to Table 2.3 of Wolchik 1991, 75 for a complete distribution of seats in the republic legislatures.
with little hesitation, except, of course, for finding consensus among the vested interests of society. This, naturally, entailed finding an equitable political solution between Czechs and Slovaks above all other considerations.

The purpose of the new government was to establish permanence and continuity, providing a constitution, and the reconstruction of government from that of a police state to one of democratic pluralism based on the rule of law (Ulc 21-22; Wolchik 1991, 50 and 60-61). The parliament and its newly elected members were vested with the task of devising a new constitution and revising the country's legal framework to conform with the likes of a free-market democracy (Wolchik 1991, 73). Immediately after the election of 1990, Czechoslovakia moved one step closer to western Europe by joining the Council of Europe (Ulc 22).

Politically, the state was indeed transformed into a pluralist democracy, yet it was chaotic in its composition. Ethnic and political cleavages were becoming increasingly evident as debate over the nature of reforms and their consequences, particularly economic reforms, found Czechs and Slovaks coming from two different perspectives. Resentment was also mounting towards Civic Forum's newly found hold on power (Judt 102).
How to structure the state politically and economically had been a primary issue of contention in the June election. Up to this point, for example, each level of government had been performing duplicate responsibilities: decisions were being made at three administrative levels (federal, Czech and Slovak) with ministries, commissions and administrations often triplicating one another (Judt 105). Now the newly elected government was responsible for actually finding a workable integrated formula (Bankowicz 164; Wolchik 1994, 153).

During the election campaign, Civic Forum promised to adopt three new constitutions by June of 1992, one for the federal level of government and one for each of the two republics. Yet, the most fundamental political issue of the time lingered over the relationship between the federal and republic levels of government, and the task of finding a workable solution would prove formidable.19

The basis of disagreement between Czechs and Slovaks focused on which level of government should have primacy. Public opinion polls in June 1990 indicate that some 42 percent of those surveyed in the Czech lands favored a common state with a strong central or unitary government. Thirty percent supported a common state with strong re-

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19 Refer to Ulc 31 for more details; Wolchik 1991, 62; Wolchik 1994, 155.
public governments. However, 41 percent of Slovaks were far more supportive of a common state with considerable powers for republic level governments; some 30 percent favored a confederation. Support for two independent states, nonetheless, was not an issue of any great significance as only eight percent of the Slovaks and five percent of Czechs surveyed favored such an arrangement (Wolchik 1994, 178). Another study from May 1989, only one year earlier, shows that Czechs and Slovaks viewed one another positively, with some 69 percent of the Czechoslovak population affirming that relations between Czechs and Slovaks were friendly (Wolchik 1991, 114). In May of 1992, 64 percent of Czechs thought they had good relations with Slovaks while 72 percent of Slovaks thought they had good relations with Czechs (Wolchik 1994, 175-76). However, by November of 1991, the issue of political unity was deemed unsustainable by many people as overall public sentiments became increasingly nationalist, and moves were made by the more extreme factions of Slovak society, particularly more nationalist elites, to declare Slovakia's independence, despite the overall population's reluctance to do so (Ulc 31).20

20 Refer to Ramet 102 for a discussion of radical separatist movements.
The distribution of votes within the National Assembly gave the Slovak nationalists a considerable amount of power in influencing the design of a new constitution since the Christian Democrats in Slovakia supported some autonomist claims in order to improve their standing with the populace. Along with the Moravian/Silecian association and the communist dissenters, consensus would prove difficult to achieve (Judt 107-08; Ulc 29; Ramet 102). A constitution would have to be approved by three-fifths of the deputies of each house of the Federal Assembly, including the House of Nations, and the Slovak National Council (Judt 107-08).

The divergence of Czechs and Slovaks at this point in the development of events is best exemplified by the "hyphen debate" which took place in March 1990, roughly one year prior to the first democratic election. The socialist adjective was, of course, removed from the state's name when the communist regime abdicated, which in turn created controversy over what to rename the state. With the issue being opened for debate, Slovaks wanted to accentuate their identity with the designation "Czecho-Slovak Republic". Czechs, on the other hand, preferred the designation of "Czechoslovak Federative Republic". After heated debate, on March 29, a compromise allowed each republic to use its own variation of the state's name. Czechs could refer to the state as the
"Czechoslovak Federative Republic" and Slovaks could refer to it as the "Czecho-slovak Federative Republic". The lower case "s" in the hyphenation was deemed mandatory by Prague however, and three weeks later, after significant protest from Slovaks at large, parliament changed the state's name to the "Czech and Slovak Federative Republic".

This dispute merely represents the intensity of distinction held by both Czechs and Slovaks at this point. It resonates with the earlier discussions of what defines the national identity between the two peoples and how they define themselves in political terms, even after the course of some seventy years of mutual existence. It also represents the lengths, albeit petty, to which each would go to defend its sense of identity in the larger, more serious scheme of things. Moreover, it represents the degree to which nationalist sentiment was becoming increasingly evident, and it provides a prelude to the more serious diffusion of mutual interests in the post-revolutionary period.21

A more serious incident demonstrates not only the sentiment of some Slovaks, but also the rising intensity of nationalism and the degree to which the political

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21 Refer to Ramet 101-02 for a discussion of the hyphen debate; refer also to Judt 104-05 and Wolchik 1994, 154-55.
situation in Czechoslovakia was degenerating. In October 1990, Slovakia celebrated its March 14, 1939 declaration of independence. The commemoration included the unveiling of a plaque commemorating Jozef Tiso, Catholic priest and protector of Slovakia from 1939-1945 who was executed at the end of the World War II for deporting thousands of Jews and other victims of Nazi oppression into the hands of Hitler (Ulc 29; Bankowicz 163). The memorial itself was enough to disturb many, but to top all, it was unveiled on the same day that the Israeli president was making a state visit to Prague.\textsuperscript{22}

On the economic front, the question still facing reformers was how to implement the economic transformation without disrupting the social order and the prospects for more extensive reforms in the future. The economic debate had intensified considerably by this time and served as the primary element of contention which contributed to the political polarization (175). Vaclav Klaus continued to push for the institution of a market economy within the earliest possible time-frame and with all of its positive and negative ramifications. He re-

\textsuperscript{22} Refer to Ulc 29-30 and Ramet 105 for discussions on the rise of neo-fascism in Slovakia; refer to Ramet 106 for discussion surrounding the language controversy in Slovakia; refer to Judt 112-13, Ramet 100-01 and Wolchik 1994, 154 and 176-77 for a discussion of rising nationalism in Czechoslovakia generally.
jected a transitional phase with substantial central intervention or regulation, a scheme that many Slovaks, in particular, had preferred (Myant 175).

The federal, Czech and Slovak governments adopted the previous, provisional government's minimal plan of action in October 1990 (171; 175 and 177; Wolchik 1991, 249; Judt 103). By September of 1990, after private government discussions and lobbying on the part of Czechoslovakia's several economic institutions, the federal government contemplated an even more rapid transformation of the economic structure (Judt 103; Myant 175-77). The platform entailed an absolute priority for containing inflation by further tightening fiscal and monetary restraint, and proposed institutional changes for simplifying the economic organization of enterprises and government regulation (Myant 177; Wolchik 55 and 249). Subsidies were to be reduced along with the final deregulation of prices and making the currency internally convertible in January 1991 (Myant 178-79 and 187; Wolchik 1991, 249). There were also provisions for a stern wage policy with only some regulation of particularly sensitive prices (Myant 179). The new policy made way for private enterprise, foreign investment, and the end of central planning as expected. Public control and ownership of the means of production were to be minimized
(Judt 103; Wolchik 1991, 249), and this included the denationalization and privatization of all property through the use of domestic and foreign capital, a policy which is anathema to independent Slovakia's current course of action under Prime-Minister Meciar (Myant 178; Wolchik 1991, 55 and 249).

Structurally, the economic program provisioned for a reduction in armaments production and the mining of various ores such as uranium (Myant 182). From as early as January 25, 1990, Foreign Minister Jiri Deinstbeir had petitioned that Czechoslovakia stop exporting arms (Judt 110; Myant 223). In fact, production would have been reduced to 15 percent of its peak level by 1992, according to the plan (Myant 223).

Armaments manufacturing, however, was located predominantly in Slovakia and served as a major means of employment there. While the industry accounted for about three percent of Czechoslovakia's overall output in 1987, a peak year, making it the seventh largest arms exporter in the world (182-223; Ramet 111), the reduced production level would have left Slovakia with only a 40 percent share in the remaining industry and an estimated 58,000 unemployed (Myant 223). Considering the general downturn in heavy industry overall as a result of the reforms in general, Slovakia, being especially dependent on heavy industry and the hard hit electronics industry, was al-
ready feeling the pinch of economic reform (Wolchik 1994, 164-65; Myant 223; Ramet 111).

In early November 1990, Czechoslovak Prime Minister Marian Calfa, Czech Prime Minister Petr Pithart and Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar held a series of meetings to negotiate a power sharing scheme between the federal and republic levels of government in light of the ever increasing divergence of interests in political and economic terms. On November 13, after intense negotiations, an agreement was reached to amend the Constitution of the Czechoslovak federation in such a way that it would allow considerable autonomy to the republics in many areas (Wolchik 1991, 104). The agreement constituted a compromise between centralists and advocates of decentralization, and it established a relationship between the federal and republic level governments on such issues as the central banking system, the postal service, gas and oil pipelines and jurisdiction over the policies of nationalities (64). Much to the aversion of Slovaks, it also made provisions to move forward with economic reforms (63).

The compromise agreement resulted in a devolution of power to the republic level of government. The federal government retained jurisdiction over such all-state functions as defense, the currency, the central bank, taxation, price policy, foreign policy and trade,
churches and nationality policy. All areas not specifically assigned to the federal government were reserved by the republics. Thus, republic governments had extensive powers over such policies concerning the economy, communications, society, culture and education, and to some degree international affairs. Both republics contributed to the budget of the federal government, but it was also established that funds would remain in the republic of origin instead of being redistributed by the federal government (74; Ramet 104). The provisional agreement was adopted by the Federal Assembly on December 12, 1990 by a vote of 237 to 34 with 17 abstentions (Wolchik 1991, 64).

With no real political authority mandated to resolve conflict in this power-sharing agreement, President Havel called for an increase in the powers of the presidency and the institution of a constitutional court for the resolution of potential problems. He requested the right to dissolve the Federal Assembly should it fail to pass laws. He asked for the power to call elections in the event of a no-confidence vote or when the legislature could not form a government, and to rule by decree in the interim. He also requested emergency powers in the event of threats to the state, and for the formation of a Federal Council to serve as an executive cabinet to the president himself (66; Wolchik 1994, 155).
Slovaks were generally opposed to an increase in the power of the presidency for fear of its centralizing nature (Wolchik 1991, 66-67). Slovak trust in the president ranked at 60 percent of those polled in a January 1991 survey, and this is substantially lower than the 90 percent of those polled in the Czech republic who had confidence in the president. Slovak trust was vested with the Slovak government which ranked at 85 percent of those polled. The Slovak National Council received 69 percent and several Slovak politicians, including Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar, also received high ratings among the Slovaks (120 and 125-26).

Despite the fact that the power sharing agreement passed, it was provisional, and negotiations continued into 1991 and beyond (63; Wolchik 1994, 156-57). By December of 1991, agreement was still lingering over procedural issues and differences of conceptualizing sovereignty, not to mention the nature of continued economic reforms (Wolchik 1994, 157). The constitutions that should have gone into effect in October 1991 were postponed (156; Ulc 31), and support for an independent Slovakia continued to grow as satisfaction with the composition of the Federal Assembly was waning for many Slovaks (refer to Ulc 31; Ramet 102 and 104).

Vladimir Meciar, moderates and the extreme nationalist parties alike remained disillusioned with the compro-
mise, and the situation deteriorated considerably within the first few months of 1991 as shortcomings in the politico-institutional equation became increasingly more obvious. The Slovak National Council prepared a draft declaration of sovereignty in September 1991. All of the major political actors in Slovakia wanted to see an increase in the autonomy and powers of the republic level governments, especially when they concerned the economy - it was largely the nature of economic reforms which spurred Slovak demands for greater autonomy. Many Slovaks simply viewed the power of the republics as insufficient (Wolchik 1991, 63), and various main-stream parties such as the newly established Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS), Vladimir Meciar's offshoot of Public Against Violence, and the Christian Democrats were increasingly swayed further to the right as a consequence (Ramet 108; Wolchik 1994, 155 and 186).

Political continuity in Czechoslovakia had begun to unravel and polarize. This is best represented by the diminishing cohesion in and between Civic Forum and Public Against Violence (Judt 103; Wolchik 1994, 155; De Luce "Political Unity"). Approval ratings for Civic Forum and Public Against Violence declined significantly

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23 Ramet 104 provides a reprint of the Declaration's Preamble and Article I; Ulc 31.
from a rate of 60 percent in February 1990 to 38 percent by October 1990 (Ramet 103).

Civic Forum had survived through the congress of September 1990, only a few short months after the first democratic election, but it quickly disintegrated into competing parliamentary factions shortly thereafter in February 1991 (Bankowicz 162; Ulc 27). Vaclav Klaus was elected chairman in September, and the organization evolved towards a highly centralized organ with a strong neo-conservative slant (Bankowicz 162; Wolchik 1991, 52 and 78-79; Myant 206). As a result of the centralization and strong ideological slant espoused by Klaus, the forum divided into three parties beginning a month later, in October. Civic Movement (OH) emerged as a left-of-center party composed of communist party members who were expelled in 1968 (Ulc 27). Others leaned away from Klaus's economic platform towards a more moderate pace of reform (Myant 207). Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA) emerged as a centrist party and the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) as a right-of-center party headed by Klaus. The Civic Democratic Party became the largest party in Czechoslovakia in 1991 (Ulc 27).

Public Against Violence had lost most of its support in almost less than two years after its establishment as well. Support was redirected to a variety of forces within Slovakia's political spectrum, namely Slovakia's
first post-communist premier, Vladimir Meciar, and his newly established party, the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (29; Bankowicz 163).

Meciar, a former communist who had been successful at winning over supporters because of his populist and nationalist overtones, had been striking a careful balance on the issues of federalism. On one hand, he had an avowed commitment to the federation and eschewed any consideration of separatism whatsoever. On the other hand, he stressed nationalist concerns, vowing to destroy centralism and bureaucracy, winning enthusiastic approval from Slovakia's nationalist groups (Ramet 103 and 107-08; refer also to Ulc 29; Wolchik 1991, 53). He and his followers argued for months that Public Against Violence should adopt a more nationalist stance. After an unsuccessful attempt to procure the chairmanship of Public Against Violence from Fedor Gal, Meciar and his followers then broke away and established the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia on March 5, 1991, with a strongly anti-federalist stance (Ramet 107; Ulc 29; Wolchik 1991, 53; Wolchik 1994, 155-56; Bankowicz 163).

Despite questionable support for autonomist claims in Slovakia, whether a form of confederalism or outright separation, Meciar's political might allowed him to procure a significant portion of the population's support, advancing his party's position and ability to shape many
aspects of the post-revolutionary development. As the opinion polls indicate, the issue of autonomy was a contentious one, not only between Czechs and Slovaks, but also among Slovaks themselves. Defying public opinion, in part due to his controversial stands on the issue of unification, parliament voted Meciar out of office in April of 1991 after a series of events involving his management style and personality, the secret police and dealings with the Soviet military (Ramet 107-08; Ulc 29; Wolchik 1991, 53). Jan Carnogursky, leader of the Christian Democratic Movement, replaced him as Premier. Meciar's power grew even more, however, after his ouster. Some 100,000 people demonstrated in Bratislava demanding his return to office. The Slovak government's approval rating plummeted from 69 percent to 22 percent, and within a matter of months, Meciar's organization became the strongest party in Slovakia. By July 1991, HZDS commanded 39 percent of the electorate, far ahead of the second place Christian Democratic Movement at 17 percent. In August of 1991, less than one year before the second democratic election, Meciar proposed that his party be co-opted into government as part of a "grand coalition" (Ramet 108).

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24 Refer to Wolchik 1994, 172-77 for a discussion of elites and their ability to appropriate support.
Economically, recession had taken shape with the collapse of CMEA and Czechoslovakia's transformation to a market economy. There was a decline in output, and problems of infrastructure surfaced with the market's implementation (Myant 200; Ulc 26). Czechoslovakia experienced a 23.1 percent decline in industrial production in 1991 overall. The Federal Office of Statistics reported a fall in productivity in the area of 18.2 percent in the Czech lands alone. The fall in Slovakia amounted to 23.6 percent (Ulc 24). By mid-1991, unemployment reached 6.31 percent and affected 500,000 individuals with the effects being felt more severely in Slovakia than in the Czech lands. Slovakia's unemployment rate was 11.1 percent while Czechia's was 4.1 percent (23). On top of all of this, the second wave of price liberalization on January 1, 1991 increased the price of some 85 percent of goods (Myant 192; Wolchik 1991, 252). By the close of the first half of the year, consumer prices had risen by 45 percent, to stabilize at a near-zero rate of inflation during the second half of the year (Ulc 23). A 64 percent increase in overall prices and a 30 percent decrease in real purchasing power during the first half of 1991 created increasingly greater hardship in Slovakia where substantially more households were in the lowest income
group and unemployment afflicted many a household
(Wolchik 1994, 165).

By November 1991, 42 percent of all retail stores
and service companies in the Czech and Slovak republics
had been transferred to private management through public
auction. In the spring of 1992, the Ministry for the
Administration of National Property and its Privatization
began to privatize large industrial complexes as well
through several methods, including the voucher method,
direct and partial sales of firms to foreign and domestic
interests, along with limited options for labor and man-
agement. As one might imagine, privatization further
complicated an already troubled economic and social con-
dition.

Under the guise of the Tripartite Council of Mutual
Agreement, the government attempted to counter economic
instability with a General Agreement passed in parliament
on January 28, 1991. The agreement fixed wages so as to
counterbalance the market's rapid fluctuations in con-
sumer goods prices, especially food (194; refer also to
Wolchik 1994, 166). In addition to controlling the re-
main ing 15 percent of prices on staples (Wolchik 1991,

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25 Refer to Ulc 24–25; Wolchik 1991, 250; Sedlak;
Simoneti 92 further details on small privatization.
26 Refer to Ulc 25; Wolchik 251; Sedlak; Simoneti 90–
94 for a discussion of large privatization.
252), the government took various measures to create and protect jobs (Myant 196).

Also, the economy began to experience success with foreign trade and payments after the initial stages of the transformation, due primarily to the shift in trade relations from the east to the west. The drop in trade with the former CMEA countries was compensated by a 23.1 percent increase in trade with the European Community (Myant 203; Ulc 26). The trade balance did, however, show signs of worsening in 1992 (Myant 203). In 1991, Czechoslovakia's foreign currency reserves increased from USD 1.5 billion to USD 3.3 billion (Ulc 26). Czechoslovakia joined the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in September 1990 (Wolchik 1991, 271), and in November 1990, it gained most-favored-nation trade status with the United States (270). In December 1991, Czechoslovakia entered an Agreement of Association with the European Community which allowed ten years for a transitional period to complete the trade liberalization and possible community membership (Myant 203-05; Wolchik 1991, 270). By January 1992 output had stabilized and unemployment had dropped to a level of 7.1 percent of the total labor force. Inflation lowered from 58 percent in 1991 to 10 percent in April 1992 (Ramet 110). Real wages
and savings were on an upswing, and exports were making a strong recovery (111).

Economic recovery, however, was taking place mostly in the Czech lands (Ramet 110-11; Wolchik 1994, 164-67). Foreign investment, for example, was concentrated in the Czech lands and amounted to $900 million in the first three quarters of 1992. In contrast, it amounted to $76 million in Slovakia (Wolchik 1994, 166; Ramet 111; Simoneti 93-94; Ulc 26). In economic terms, differences between the Czech lands and Slovakia appeared from as early as mid-1990, but unemployment peaked in the Czech republic and Slovakia at 4.3 percent and 12.7 percent respectively in January 1992 (Myant 202-02; Ramet 110). In June of 1992, unemployment reached 3 and 15 percent in the Czech lands and Slovakia respectively. In fact, the rate of increase in comparison is astonishing. From May 1991 until June of 1992, unemployment in Czechia edged upwards only one percentage point, from two percent to three percent. Unemployment in Slovakia surged upwards from 5.4 percent to 15 percent in the same time frame (Ramet 111). Unemployment was hitting small rural towns especially hard, and once again considering the socio-economic structure of Slovakia as explained in the previous chapter, one can easily understand how reforms threatened Slovaks in particular. Prague, however, was pulling labor from the surrounding communities (Myant
In addition to this state of affairs, Klaus' fiscal responsibility placed sharp restraints on the 1992 budget by cutting entitlements substantially in order to reduce the deficits of federal and republic governments (204).

The consequences of economic shock therapy were the polarization of political life along the traditional left-right continuum as indicated by the demise of Civic Forum and Public Against Violence (206; Ulc 22-26 and 28-32), and the rise of strong nationalist sentiments.27

The reforms proceeded blind to the unique nature of each republic, and the consequences undoubtedly affected ethnic relations between Czechs and Slovaks (Wolchik 1994, 164; Ulc 24). The perplexing state of affairs became increasingly more evident as time advanced and reforms developed. The post-revolutionary developments were forcing each republic to embark upon separate paths of reform in order to address their unique problems and potential social concerns, especially in economic terms. In fact, as one sees with regard to Civic Forum, division over the nature of reforms occurred even within Czechia itself. Because of the nature of their condition, how-

27 Refer once again to Judt 112-13, Ramet 100-01 and Wolchik 1991, 154 and 176-77 for a general consideration of rising nationalism in Czechoslovakia.
ever, Czechs generally embraced the classical liberal ideas for reform.

Public acceptance of the economic transition has been mixed throughout the post-revolutionary development. In December 1991, 45 percent of the Czechoslovak population claimed that their standard of living had gone down. Only six percent claimed that their living standards had increased. Twenty-five percent of the population expressed satisfaction with the domestic political situation, and only 20 percent with the economy. Most supportive of the radical economic reforms were younger respondents and those with higher education. Negative responses in all subject categories were higher in Slovakia than in the Czech lands (Ulc 27). Public opinion polls conducted in 1990 indicate that support for economic reforms was ambivalent, and later polls indicate that large segments of society either actively opposed or were uncommitted to the economic changes (Wolchik 1991, 254-57). Some 80 percent of Slovaks were opposed to the economic transition (Wolchik 1994, 170-71; Judt 104). Popular dissatisfaction continued to increase from 1991 to 1992, especially in Slovakia. In January 1992, roughly 67-79 percent of the overall population surveyed were dissatisfied with social welfare provisions, domestic politics, the economy and the standard of living.
(Wolchik 1994, 171). Opinion polls taken in the spring of 1992 suggest that 65 percent of Slovaks believed that the economy was going in the wrong direction and 31 percent favored a return to what had existed before November 1989. Czechs viewed the economic reform with optimism however. Only 38 percent believed the economy was going in the wrong direction while 16 percent favored a return to the old ways (Myant 225).

A January 1992 survey by the Institute for Public Opinion Research found that 52 percent of respondents in Slovakia felt that the federal government worked to the advantage of the Czech nation, while 42 percent of Czechs felt that it benefited Slovaks disproportionately. In April, the Slovak figure rose to 73 percent (Wolchik 1994, 171 and 174). Sixty-eight percent of respondents in Slovakia surveyed by the Association for Independent Social Analysis in April 1992 felt that Czechs often treated Slovaks as an underdeveloped nation. Eighty-four percent of Czechs, on the other hand, disagreed (refer to Wolchik 1994, 175).

In February 1991, in response to the impasse and heightened politicization of the political union, President Havel put forth a set of propositions. He suggested making Moravia and Silecia a third republic along side Bohemia and Slovakia. This idea was turned down by the Slovaks, however, for fear of diluting their unique posi-
tion in the struggle for power (Ramet 102; Wolchik 1994, 155). Searching for another solution, Havel proposed, only a month later, that the Czech and Slovak republics be recognized as the exclusive subjects of political sovereignty. Needless to say, this time Moravians and Silecians rejected the plan (Ramet 102 and 105). Havel had also committed himself to the idea of holding a referendum on the issue of political union from as early as November 1991 (Bankowicz 164). His proposal called for a public referendum to decide the fate of the union once and for all. The idea fell short because it allowed for only a choice of either a common state or separation and nothing in between. There was no clearer definition of what might constitute a common state, and this was the very basis of the disagreement between Czechs and Slovaks. Subsequently, Meciar, the HZDS and Carnogursky's Christian Democratic Movement rejected the referendum. The referendum issue failed to pass the three-fifths majority vote in the Federal Assembly.

The Velvet Divorce

In light of this blatant discrepancy between Czech and Slovak attitudes about the political union and economic reforms, President Vaclav Havel initiated a series of talks at Lany in mid to late 1991 in which federalists and confederalists might iron out their differences.
Facing another impasse, however, Havel once again called for a referendum on the fate of the union in January 1992, this time without parliamentary approval (Ramet 110; Bankowicz 163). The Civic Democratic Party opposed the referendum for fear that Czechs might advocate separation themselves at this point, subsequently causing Prague to lose its successor rights to international agreements. Slovaks, however, blocked the referendum in parliament. Havel had made it clear that if the referendum did not decide the issue, then a decision on the fate of the union had to be made by September 30, 1992.28

On February 8, a joint commission of the republic councils submitted a draft constitution for parliamentary consideration. On February 12, the proposed draft was rejected by the Slovak National Council. Shortly thereafter, Slovak federal parliamentarians defeated three amendments designed to redefine the relations between the president and the parliament and to reform parliament's structure (Ramet 109-10; Wolchik 1994, 156; Bankowicz 164).

Vladimir Meciar continued to push for a union along the lines of a confederation with slower economic reforms

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28 Refer to Ramet 108-09 and Hangley "Federal Future" for a discussion of the impasses at Lany; refer also to De Luce "Nations Leaders" and Wolchik 1994, 177-78 for details on the referendum, ODS opposition to it and the deadline.
(Ramet 110). He made it clear in the spring of 1992, just prior to the June elections, that he was not contemplating anything that would be incompatible with a united Czechoslovak economy (Myant 222; Hangley "Federal Future"; Ramet 108-09). Meciar stressed the impact that rapid marketization policy was having on Slovakia. He wanted to move closer to the type of social market economy found in Austria, reducing the speed and nature of the economic reforms initiated by Klaus. He also demanded that Slovakia be allowed to establish its own central bank and to regulate its own privatization programs, promising to slow down the pace of privatization (Ramet 110-11; Wolchik 1994, 157 and 167; Hangley "Federal Future").

Meciar built his strength among disgruntled industrial workers despite a modest decrease in unemployment. Slovak unemployment declined from 11.3 to 10.4 percent from June to December 1992, but Czech unemployment also abated, if only one tenth of a percent, making the divergence an issue of contention (Wolchik 1994, 165). Meciar had a 47 percent approval rating in Slovakia, far ahead of the second place Alexander Dubcek at 24 percent, Vaclav Havel at 16 percent and former Slovak Prime-Minister Carnogursky at 13 percent (Ramet 110).

Klaus argued that a confederation would not work, and along with his supporters, he argued that there could
not exist, simultaneously, two states and one unified state. He continued to call for radical and rapid steps to reform the economy, claiming that Slovaks wanted merely to reap the benefits as a distanced participant in a reforming Czech economy (Wolchik 1994, 157). Klaus, therefore, continued to pursue the traditional arguments for tightening the federation. This was, after all, in his interests as a progressive reformer. 

Discussions about the fate of the union provided a prelude to the June elections. In a sense, the decisions made in the election determined the fate of Czechoslovakia. A vote for a particular party was a vote for its leaders' beliefs about the union and other vital issues such as the economy and certain social issues such as lustration. The various views were, no doubt, very well known by this point.

Surveys conducted after the June 1992 elections, however, reveal a degree of dissent from the positions articulated by the dominant political leaders in both parts of the country. Although a quarter of those surveyed in the Czech republic agreed strongly with the

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29 Samuel Huntington makes reference to the importance of centralized power in transition periods in Political Order in Changing Societies.

30 Ramet 110; Bankowicz 164; refer also to Wolchik 1994; Hangley "Federal; Future" briefly discusses Klaus's and Mecliar's divergence on the lustration issue.
viewpoint of Vaclav Klaus regarding the form of the state, and another 40 percent, more or less, supported his position, approximately 27 percent did not agree or strongly disagreed. Thirty-one percent of those surveyed in Slovakia agreed with the positions articulated by Vladimir Meciar. Some 37 percent strongly agreed, but 16 percent disagreed with his position, while 11 percent strongly disagreed (Wolchik 1994, 176). Regardless, only eight percent of the Slovak respondents were satisfied with the existing federation prior to the June elections according to a study conducted by the Institute for Public Opinion Research in Bratislava in October 1991.31

Elections were held on June 5-6, 1992, with approximately 83 percent of the population voting.32 Klaus's Civic Democratic Party obtained just over 33 percent of the Czech vote for the federal parliament and roughly 30 percent of the vote for the Czech National Council. Meciar's HZDS received a third of the Slovak vote for the federal parliament and about 37 percent of the vote for the Slovak National Council.33 The results left Klaus

31 Ramet 110; Wolchik 1994, 179; also refer to Wolchik 1994, 178-81 for a discussion of preferred state arrangements.
32 Wolchik 1994, 168 provides details about voter interests.
33 Ramet 111; refer to Wolchik 1994, 184-86 for a breakdown of the election results.
and Meciar, two diametrically opposed political figures by this time, as the two most powerful forces in Czecho-slovakia who would ultimately determine the fate of the country. Two weeks after the election, Meciar was returned to the Slovak premiership and Klaus became prime minister of the Czech republic (Ramet 111).

Additionally, the dominant political parties reinforced Klaus's and Meciar's polarized grip on power in their respective republics. This, of course, was facilitated by the divergences of Czech and Slovak political cultures generally. The Left Bloc and Czechoslovak Social Democrats, strong advocates of maintaining the federation, ranked second and third respectively in the Czech republic, just behind ODS. Although the Left Bloc and Social Democrats were not necessarily akin with ODS, the coalition partners of ODS gave Czechia a strong right-of-center slant, attempting to preserve the federation, yet leaning towards separation if necessary to preserve the liberal economic policy. In contrast, HZDS was joined by the strongly left-of-center and autonomist/separatist parties, the Party for a Democratic Left, the Slovak National Party and the Christian Democratic Movement, each of which are listed in order of their
electoral representation at both the federal and republic levels of government.34

Indeed, the election results determined the fate of the federation (Bankowicz 164; Hangley "Federal Future"). With Klaus wanting to preserve the union, yet not at the expense of slower economic reforms, and Meciar favoring a confederation based only on a common defense and currency, the two sides met in Brno and Prague to discuss the fate of Czechoslovak federalism (De Luce "Deadlock"). They concluded that the federal level of government had to be substantially reduced. Neither side could agree, however, on the election of Havel as President, or to the formation of a new government (De Luce "Deadlock"; Hangely "Federal Future"). Meciar stood firm in his convictions - even going so far as to suggest that a confederation might consist of two internationally recognized states - while Klaus rejected such ideas, arguing that there was no mandate for what amounted to the breakup of the state. He also claimed that efforts at redefining the relationship were a ploy to build Slovak institutional might with federal moneys (Ramet 111;

34 Refer to Table 4 in Wolchik 1994, 185 for an account of the distribution of seats and voting percentages; also refer to Hangley "Federal Future" for a discussion of the absence of centrist and moderating forces in the June 1992 elections.
De Luce "Deadlock"). Klaus gave an ultimatum - accept the existing federation or opt out of it (Bankowicz 164).

On June 19, 1992, after 10 days of discussions, the two prime ministers agreed to split the state (Ramet 111-12; De Luce "Deadlock"; Bankowicz 164). An interim government of "maintenance" was established for the purpose of dismantling the state, or for agreeing on another arrangement. The future of the country was to be determined by legal, constitutional means - meaning ratification by the Federal Assembly. However, after impasses over electing the president, determining the exact structure of the constitutional framework, the interests of ODS in severing ties quickly if, in fact, that was to be the case, the possibility of agreeing upon an arrangement other than separation was moot by August of 1992, and so were the formal means of ending the state. The state was to be politically divided by September 30, 1992, with

35 De Luce "Nations Leaders" and "Slovaks"; Kobylka; Larsen "Czechs Don't Want"; Hangely "Czechs Lead Drive"; refer to Chang "Parliament Stalls" for a discussion of attempts by Democratic Left to save the union; refer to De Luce "Havel Criticizes" for a discussion of Havel's criticism delaying the division; also refer to Boris Gomez "Klaus, Meciar Thwart" for a discussion of Klaus's and Meciar's thwarting of opposition's demands.
economic ties being severed from federal control by January 1993.\textsuperscript{36}

Subsequently, the Czech National Council began to assume powers without the Federal Assembly's official sanction. In fact, it had been doing so from as early as June 19.\textsuperscript{37} The Czech government also began to prepare a constitution for an independent Czech republic, despite last minute efforts by oppositionist forces within each republic's parliament to save the union.\textsuperscript{38} At the same time, the Slovak government pursued its own direction. It immediately initiated a new economic strategy and restricted the free press, among other liberties such as public use of the Hungarian language (Ramet 112).

With negotiations on the budget for 1992, the Czech government voted to deny subsidies to Slovakia (Myant 225). On November 25, 1992, the Federal Assembly voted for the dissolution of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic. Czechoslovakia was formally replaced by two independent states on January 1, 1993 (Bankowicz 165).

\textsuperscript{36} Ramet 99; refer to Boris Gomez "Federal Role" and "The Currency Debate" for an elaboration on the severing of economic and currency ties.

\textsuperscript{37} Boris Gomez "Klaus, Meciar Thwart" and "Federal Role"; refer to Chang "Parliament Stalls" for a discussion of delays in the Federal Assembly regarding the division.

\textsuperscript{38} Refer to Larsen "Czechs Don't Want"; Hangley "Czechs Lead Drive"; refer once again to Chang "Parliament Stalls".
CHAPTER V

TWO NATIONS

Czechs and Slovaks were brought together by the circumstances of World War I and the demise of imperialism. They were also brought together by a mutual pursuit of national self-determination. In one respect, self-determination brought Czechs and Slovaks to a point of mutual interest and collaboration with one another, yet in another respect it brought them together with contrasting views about the nature of their shared political relations based precisely on distinct national characteristics and interests. Naturally, this disconnection has served as a basis for adversity and instability throughout the history of shared political relations between Czechs and Slovaks.

Both Czechs and Slovaks pursued autonomy from their imperial rulers separately from each other over the course of nearly a century, and while they found consolation in one another in pursuit of their independent goals, and ultimately resorted to shared statehood out of mutual interest in finding a means to their ends - self-determination, the terms of a political union between Czechs and Slovaks were never clearly established. In-
deed, what one may surmise from a detailed historical account of mutual relations is that while Czechs and Slovaks may have found solace in one another for the pursuit of their mutual interests, each had a vague and often contradictory vision about their common political and social relationship. The equation has provided a ground for conflict and instability in Czechoslovakia over the course of the state's seventy-five year history, and with implications that defy virtuous efforts to consolidate a common national identity.

The First Republic provided the institutional and political organization for the common government of two independent nations, but the political culture and national aims of Czechs and Slovaks clearly qualified the nature of their mutual political relations and the consolidation of a shared national identity, despite even the degree of stability and assimilation encompassed within its political framework defined in terms of a highly centralized institutional structure, elite and party organization. The significance of the qualifications is that they precluded various shared national interests and their commitment to the Czechoslovak ideal, nation and state. In fact, this thesis has argued that the ideal itself was ambiguous and quite often at odds with individual national goals from its very conception. Furthermore, there is a discouraging absence of an inter-
locking civil society, or more directly, a cohesive informal constitution among societal segments throughout the Republic's history. Instead, two primary social, political and economic units have existed separately from one another and developed accordingly with aims at advantaging independent objectives and ambitions rather than, or in spite of, the collective condition.

Relations between Czechs and Slovaks were indeed favorable throughout the first twenty years of coexistence. A highly centralized government and political elite based on the Czechoslovak ideal helped meld relations between the plethora of ethnic and political interests which comprised the state. Prospects for a state which unified Czechs, Slovaks and Germans, among other nationalities, were genuinely optimistic. Nevertheless, loyalties to the Czechoslovak ideal never consolidated to any significant degree. In fact, they were more often than not challenged by both internal and external forces, forces which focused primarily on fear of domination and a lack of respect for self-government.

The political organization of the First Republic put considerable limits on self-determination and self-administration of peoples, the two most basic elements of German and Slovak discontent which have emerged repeatedly to the detriment of the ideal. Even after twenty years of steady development in international relations,
the semblance of a social and political order that existed within Czechoslovakia was challenged and ultimately destroyed by divergent interests within society itself - German and Slovak. While Nazi Germany bears the responsibility of being the efficient cause for the dissolution of Czechoslovakia, the fact remains that the nature of Czech, German and Slovak relations compromised the very cohesion of Czechoslovakia - society and state, making its continence more vulnerable to fortune. Twenty years of mutual coexistence, especially among Czechs and Slovaks, amounted to very little in terms of a cohesive Czechoslovak national identity and its ability to counteract such aggression, especially with respect Slovak secession; the pretense was ended.

With the restoration of Czechoslovakia in 1945, Czechs and Slovaks had an opportunity to build an equitable relationship. Sudeten Germans were expelled from the country in retaliation for their role in the occupation of Czechoslovakia, simplifying the ethnic fabric. By 1948, however, communism had instituted its own assimilatory centralism of far greater proportions than had ever before been experienced, and relations between Czechs and Slovaks were subsequently thrust into a brusque campaign designed to bridge the social, political and economic gaps between each segment for the sake of national, or rather doctrinaire, cohesion based this time on the com-
munist ideal. But even after twenty years of forced assimilation under communism, the strength of Slovak resistance to assimilation persisted and inevitably led to increased demands for a precisely defined equitable political relationship in the liberation campaign of the 1960s. With ethnic tensions between Czechs and Slovaks being the primary political cleavage of the initial socialist experience (Wolchik 1992, 192-93), federalism surfaced as a solution to such a problematic relation.

Defined in terms of a compromise between an extreme concentration of power and a loose confederation of independent states for governing a variety of people where power is divided, with balanced spheres of authority on a proportional basis, vertically and horizontally, in order to allow each state its own fundamental political integrity (Plano 32), federalism may have, in effect, provided a structural solution to the Czech/Slovak conflict had it been given an opportunity to develop along these normative lines. After all was said and done in terms of instituting federalism, however, Czechoslovakia remained highly centralized and became increasingly bifurcated along the traditional, more natural lines of distinction - socio-political, economic, ethno-cultural, and geographic in nature. Federalism failed both because of inadequacies in its design after 1971 and as a result of the communist encroachment upon its proper function.
Moreover, in the more recent context, Czech and Slovak nationalism impeded upon federalism's utility as well. The issues of proportional equality in terms of territorial neutrality and the lack of a sufficient amount of homogeneity of fundamental interests prevented the constitutional, political structure of federalism from providing a solution to Czechoslovak political and social organization. Indeed, the very existence of federalism aided in the separation and dissolution of Czechoslovakia, not successfully negating the forces of disharmony but legitimating their persistence (refer to Leff 1996).

With the success of revolution in 1989, reforms designed to institutionalize a real democracy within the existing federal structure were proposed with great optimism. Centralized authority no longer existed in Czechoslovakia, and the traditional presence of coerced assimilation disappeared for the first time. Moreover, opportunity arose once again for Czechs and Slovaks to work at achieving a truly democratic and equitable relationship between themselves without outside interference (i.e., Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union). Czechs and Slovaks were free to define their mutual relations based on the merits of mutual desire and democracy.

Prior to 1989, Czechs and Slovaks were denied the opportunity to effectively develop their interrelationship of a more accommodating order within formal demo-
cratic and federalism. Instead, communist centralism had guided their relations in what appeared to be a constructive direction of cooperation via sheer force. Centralized government and policies of assimilation had always created a veneer of harmony— even within the First Republic. With the success of revolution, however, the reality of the social condition under communism became increasingly evident and more troublesome over time, and when the circumstances of the post-revolutionary period developed and affected Czechs and Slovaks respective to their real conditions, the fundamental divergences and a severe lack of "national" cohesion dramatically qualified the post-revolutionary optimism. Years of asynchonic modernization and development in political, economic and social terms, supported by the institutionalized separation of Czechs and Slovaks within federalism, presented itself with distressing implications for a smooth and successful transformation; Czechs and Slovaks responded to post-revolutionary reforms differently, each group in terms of its specific conditions and perceptions. Institutionalized federalism based on distinct social, political, economic, ethno-cultural and territorial lines only contributed to the polarized nature of society, all consequences of which have had perilous implications for a stable, cohesive order in the final analysis (refer to Leff 1996, 132).
From an historical perspective, one should clearly see a fundamental lack of national cohesion and a propensity for dissolution. Relations between Czechs and Slovaks had been jarred and jeered for far too long. Attempts at finding a workable solution were never allowed to develop historically, and the circumstances of time and tribulation, foreign and domestic in origin, left Czechs and Slovaks estranged. When, in fact, opportunity arose for Czechs and Slovaks to work at an equitable and just relationship between one another, which in turn would have provided a greater sense of cohesion for the sake of stability, either an external variable would enter into the picture and destroy the opportunity as exemplified by the influences of Nazi Germany and the onset of communism, or Czechs and Slovaks would go in divergent directions as with the increased support of the ludak movement of the 1930s and the introduction of federalism during the era of Prague Spring. By the time of the events of 1989, divergences between Czechs and Slovaks were greater in many respects than when Czechs and Slovaks had first come together, and with the absence of a central authority of even the most mild nature, Czechs and Slovaks were once again repelled from one another.

With the historical development in mind and given the nature of conditions and circumstances in the post-revolutionary period, the prospects for a stable politi-
cal union between Czechs and Slovaks appeared to be slim at best. Seventy-five years of coexistence between Czechs and Slovaks did very little in terms of advancing the nature of political relations and a significant degree of national cohesion. Under the circumstances of the post-revolutionary period there was too little which bound Czechs and Slovaks together and all too many things which pushed them apart. The equation suggested little sound basis for a stable political union, and it is from this fundamental perspective that the thesis is restated and argued within this chapter.

In compliance with the stated objective of this thesis, this chapter argues from the proposition that the former state of Czechoslovakia is inherently unstable due primarily to the incohesive composition of the state, the historical conditioning of relations between Czechs and Slovaks in social and political terms over the course of a century and more, and most particularly as these variables relate to the circumstances of the post-revolutionary period. To clarify the significance of these propositions and to prepare the ground for my contention that durable regional security is best achieved by the division of Czechoslovakia into two independent and reasonably homogenous states, we must again consider Arend Lijphart's theory of democracy in plural society and his theory of consociational democracy.
We have seen that Lijphart argues convincingly that consociationalism is a means for achieving stable order in plural society. However, a more detailed understanding of consociational theory and its application to Czechoslovakia reveals that the basic elements of consociationalism are not present in Czechoslovakia.

The argument of this thesis is designed to correlate the theoretical propositions for stability in plural society with the nature of Czechoslovakia's circumstances from an historical and contemporary perspective in order to draw conclusions about the prospects for stability within a unified Czechoslovakia versus that which currently exists within and among the successor states. The argument is supported by a comparative analysis of the prospects for stability within the union versus that which exists within the successor states under current circumstances, and it concludes with a reasoned explanation as to why division should not be lamented; for the division of Czechoslovakia has provided not only a higher probability for stability within each successor republic, it also serves as a constructive example, be it isolated, to counter negative perceptions of modern state devolution in light of the trends in modern state devolution.

It has been argued in Chapter I that the favorable alignment of institutions, elites, and civil society is a vital and necessary component of stable order. Constitu-
tionalism is the basis of all order, and the elements which comprise an informal constitution must be in themselves wholly compatible and center (centripetal) oriented. The nature of a regime in terms of the organization of government institutions, the interrelationship of elites, especially with respect to the established institutions of government, and civil society have a tremendous impact on stability. The manner in which each is constructed and relates with the other is a most fundamental basis for a constitutional order; in essence it is the basis for stability. In this vein, therefore, considerable emphasis has been placed on the situation of plural society as it relates to the arguments presented previously with regards to Gabriel Almond and Seymore Martin Lipset, for example. Without a considerable degree of political homogeneity and elite agreement, institutions, elites, and civil society are susceptible to the fragile nature of society's composition (political, economic and socio-cultural). If the cohesiveness which binds society is frail, the greater the burden placed on political elites and institutions.

Czechoslovakia is clearly classified as a non-homogeneous state and, therefore, inherently unstable. Much as Gabriel Almond defines stable and non-stable types according to their plural nature as depicted in the Introduction, Arend Lijphart agrees with the fundamental
premise of such propositions and regards social homogeneity and political consensus as natural prerequisites for, or factors strongly conducive to, stable democratic government, arguing that the deep social divisions and political differences within society are held responsible for instability and the breakdown of democracy. Lijphart goes beyond the perspective of political homogeneity, however, and argues that political stability is achievable in plural society despite the injurious elements inherent to its very nature. He argues that where the obvious conditions for stability appear absent, one is challenged to find solutions, and solutions, he contends, can be found in consociational theory. The large number of states classified as unstable types, and what this suggests for the stable order of the world order overall, demands solutions. It is from this perspective that Lijphart posits a series of alternatives for sustaining or achieving stability in plural society, primarily his theory of consociational democracy.

The Management of Pluralism

Arend Lijphart's primary concern is the centrifugal force inherent in plural society, arguing that while segmental cleavages and the centrifugal tendency associated with them create instability by way of the divergences, cleavages are an inherent part of a plural soci-
ety and must be, therefore, used as basic building blocs upon which stability may be constructed. Lijphart argues the importance of reversing such destabilizing forces by inculcating certain elements such as elite cooperation and consensus government (i.e., each major bloc has a veto over collective decisions) into political and social designs. He states that centripetal forces in plural society are dependent upon the interaction of segmental elites and their ability to channel the various segments of a plural society in a beneficent direction - centripetal or cohesive in nature. The several elites must work closely in order to achieve consensus on what is mutually conducive to society as a whole instead of segments within society vying for their own interest in a manner detrimental to the interests of the collective. Only by this means is stability effectively enhanced in plural society. The means of achieving this consensus of interests, according to Lijphart, can be done in several ways which vary in nature according to the conditions and circumstances within varying contexts. Each of these conditions has relevance with limited prospects for success in the context of Czechoslovakia, and each will therefore, be presented as succinctly as possible in relationship to the Czechoslovakian context.

Centralized government and assimilation are one method for stabilizing plural society according to Li-
jphart's theory. By integrating segments within society and providing an adequate degree of egalitarianism, divisions and the problems associated with them will either disappear or diminish considerably. Lijphart contemplates centralized government where possible as the most effective means of providing continuity. Centralism, however, usually requires considerable state coercion which may undercut the principles of democracy, a direction which Lijphart advocates with great reservation. In fact, Lijphart warns of its often counterproductive outcome and tendency to stimulate segmental cohesion and inter-segmental violence rather than "national" or inter-segmental cohesion (Lijphart 24). With regard to centralism and assimilation, Lijphart states the following:

Although the replacement of segmental loyalties by a common national allegiance appears to be a logical answer to the problems posed by a plural society, it is extremely dangerous to attempt it. Because of the tenacity of primordial loyalties, any effort to eradicate them not only is quite unlikely to succeed, especially in the short run, but may well be counterproductive and may stimulate segmental cohesion and inter-segmental violence rather than national cohesion (24).

The potential role which centralism might play in helping shape the stability of Czechoslovakia in the post-revolutionary era, therefore, is not a viable consideration. First of all, centralism has never been accepted as a just means of government in Czechoslovakia
historically, despite its relative successes during the First Republic. In fact, resonating with Lijphart's concerns, centralism by its very existence has only provided the fuel for segmental cohesion and instability, although the weight assigned to centralism is obscured by other factors (communist objections, etc.). Centralism and assimilation only invigorated Slovak demands for greater autonomy. Moreover, centralization of power was the very phenomenon that the revolution heartily discarded for nothing other than democracy and the right to self-determination. It is highly unreasonable that Czechs, Slovaks and other endogenous peoples of Czechoslovakia would desire a centralized state after forty years of authoritarian rule and twenty years of pseudo-federalism. This is precisely the case; Slovak public opinion, a substantial social force, demanded greater autonomy within the post-revolutionary period, but this was countered by Czech wishes for a strong centralized union. In light of the history of centralism and its affects on relations historically, therefore, centralized government and assimilation are unreasonable means for achieving continuity and stability within Czechoslovakia.

Rather than the risk associated with centralized government, Lijphart proposes a normative and empirical model of consociational democracy as an alternative for stable order in plural society, stating that it offers a
more promising method for achieving both democracy and a considerable degree of political unity than does centralism (45).

Aside from the grand coalition which will be discussed in a moment, Lijphart stresses the need for such concepts as mutual group veto, proportionality, and adequate autonomy for societal segments as necessary prerequisites for effective consociationalism. Each element has a fundamental and theoretical relevance to Czechoslovakia, yet each is limited in its prospects for success due to the lack within Czechoslovakia of the prerequisites.

Consociationalism, by its very definition, entails the cooperation of segmental leaders in spite of the deep divisions separating them. Leaders must be committed to the unity of the country and they should be committed to democratic principles. They must have a basic willingness to engage in cooperative efforts with the leaders of other segments in a spirit of moderation and cooperation, while at the same time, maintaining the support and loyalty of their own followers; a difficult balancing act to say the least (refer to 31 and 53).

Lijphart stresses most of all in his theory of consociationalism the conception of a grand coalition in the form of a "grand" council or committee composed of representative leaders from each of the segments in society,
each of which have important advisory functions (25). While the grand coalition may come in many different forms, its primary purpose is to collect the leaders of all significant segments in society within a grand, coalition government. The concept is coalescent and not adversarial, and it is contrasted with the British system where leaders are divided into a majority government and minority opposition. The prime example of a grand coalition government is that of Switzerland's Executive Grand Council where the leaders of each segment in society - French, German and Italian - come together and serve as the executive head of government and state (25). A grand coalition may take a number of shapes depending on the nature of societal segmentation for example, but as Lijphart states, it is not so much any particular institutional arrangement which satisfies the prerequisite as much as the participation by the leaders of all significant segments governing a plural society (31-36).

Another element of Lijphart's consociational democracy, the mutual veto of concurrent majority rule serves as protection of vital minority interests. It must be mutual among all interests, especially minority interests. Lijphart quotes with respect to John C. Calhoun:

The very fact that a veto is available as a potential weapon gives a feeling of security which makes the actual use of it impossible. By giving to each interest, or proportion, the power of self-protection, all strife and strug-
gle between them for ascendancy is prevented, and thereby...every feeling calculated to weaken the attachment to the whole is suppressed (36-38).

Decisions must be unanimous at the group level, and they must deviate from the majority rule principle in order to be effective.

Furthermore, proportionality serves as the principle standard of political representation in terms of the civil service appointments and the allocation of public funds, according to Lijphart. Parity is an especially useful alternative to proportionality when a plural society is divided in two segments of equal size (41). Proportionality eliminates the majority/minority confrontation in decision making bodies (38-41).

In tune with proportionality, a large amount of segmental autonomy, providing segmental rule over itself is an essential point of consociational theory (41). On all matters of common interest, decisions should be made by all segments with equally proportioned degrees of influence. On all other matters, the decisions and their execution can be left to individual segments (41).

Abstractly, each aspect of this theory has considerable relevance to Czech and Slovak relations. The conceptions of a grand coalition, mutual veto, proportionality and autonomy, in particular, are essential components for stable order in Czechoslovakia. They are the basis
upon which a stable political union might have been constructed equitably and to the benefit of each party involved. Consociationalism seems an interesting alternative for achieving a stable order therein. In fact, Lijphart has drawn attention to Czechoslovakia's modest attempt and success with consociational democracy (the Petka) during the First Republic.

There are, however, significant specific circumstances which prevent consociationalism from being a viable alternative in Czechoslovakia's case. These circumstances pertain primarily to the role and nature of elites and the other prerequisite conditions necessary for consociationalism - the commitment to union, the degree of segmentation within society, the structure of federalism and the level of overarching loyalty.

The conditions which are favorable for consociational democracy include the size of a state, the structure of cleavages - including the cross-cutting of cleavages, multiple balance of power among societal segments, segmental isolation, and overarching loyalties (54). Lijphart argues that small size is favorable to consociational democracy in so far as it is conducive to closer interaction (65-70).

One of the most important conditions conducive to consociational democracy is the structure of cleavages themselves, a point made by Lijphart and others, notably
Lipset (10; Lipset 78-91). Cleavages must be distinguished in terms of numbers and the degree of fragmentation that they cause in society, the extent to which different cleavages crosscut or coincide, the types and intensities (Lijphart 71). Agreeing with such as Lipset and Eckstein, Lijphart stresses that the number, relative size of segments and the manner in which cleavages cut across each other affects the chances for consociational democracy by providing a balance of power. Cross-cutting can have important consequences for the intensity generated with and between cleavages because they moderate attitudes and actions (75). Nevertheless, the theory of consociational democracy does not rely on the advantages of crosscutting cleavages as the primary explanation of the political stability of plural societies. Of greater significance is the relationship of elites, how those elites are chosen, how they interact with respect to the nature of segmentation, and their commitment to the advantages of inter-segmental cooperation (81). When cleavages are roughly equal in social power, they result in separate internally homogenous segments that are not strongly subject to cross-pressures (81); such divisions are, therefore, more dangerous and require greater measures to bridge the gap for the sake of harmony.

In terms of the balance of power, Lijphart argues that a multiple balance of power among the segments of a
plural society is more conducive to consociationalism than a dual balance of power or a hegemony by one of the segments because if one segment has a clear majority, its leaders may attempt to dominate rather than cooperate with the rival minority. In a society with two segments of approximately equal size, the leaders of both may hope to win a majority and to achieve their aims by domination instead of cooperation (55). This is precisely what happened in Czechoslovakia; Czechs dominated in every respect simply because of their plurality, and the domination was exacerbated by Slovak perceptions of Czech dominance. However, Lijphart states that when one is dealing with a large number of segments within society, as with a very limited number, the greater the difficulty in achieving cooperation among all interests. The greater the number, the greater is the task of forging social cohesion and the greater likelihood for deadlock and contention. The optimal number of segments for effective consociationalism, he states, is three or four.

The conflict potential of cleavages also depends on the degree to which inherent intensities are moderated by overarching loyalties - cohesive forces which bond segments together and diminish their isolation from one another. For example, the overarching loyalty of Slovaks, one might argue, is particular to Slovak interests solely, whereas for Czechs, overarching loyalty may be to
the Czechoslovak ideal. Conversely, overarching loyalties may operate simultaneously with the cleavages. The conflict potential depends on the combined effect of both the divisive and cohesive forces—cleavages and overarching loyalties (81).

In terms of the interrelationship between segmented cleavages and party systems, political parties are the principle institutional means, according to Lijphart, for translating segmental cleavages into the political realm (83). Yet, the evidence suggests that the influence of cross-cutting between segments of society and party are not very strong and not always positive. The most significant types of cross-cutting, argues Lijphart, are those moderating class cleavages and their linkage to segmental cleavages, especially if they produce segments with approximate economic equality and stimulate society-wide overarching loyalties (87).

In terms of party systems which are favorable to consociational democracy, Lijphart argues that parties based on segments are most favorable because they can act as the political representative of their segments and provide a good method of selecting the segmental leaders (62). While a more homogenous political culture may respond favorably to a limited number of parties, multi-party systems are appropriate to plural, less homogenous cultures (64). In plural societies with regionally con-
centrated segments and a federal constitution, the func-
tion of representation may, furthermore, be shared by the
state governments or the state representatives in the
national legislature and executive (62). The merit of
proportional representation is that it allows the forma-
tion of segmental parties, and that it does not artifi-
cially force the establishment of larger but less repre-
sentative parties (64-5).

Finally, Lijphart also introduces the role which
federalism may play in enhancing stability within plural
society (42). Federalism is an attractive way of imple-
menting the ideas of segmental autonomy, according to
Lijphart, because it organizes the segments for representa-
tional purposes (43), if the segments have specific
geographical foci. One would expect instability to in-
crease as territorial fragmentation increases because
clear boundaries between the segments of a plural society
have the advantage of limiting mutual contacts and conse-
quently the escalation of potential antagonisms into
actual hostility (88). Federalism, however, can serve as
a means of enhancing consociational democracy by separat-
ing societies institutionally. It aids in giving seg-
ments a sense of autonomy and independence and provides a
constructive system by which interests may be equitably
balanced both in terms of the formal institutional struc-
ture and the operation of democracy. However, federalism
is not a panacea; there are dangers Lijphart warns, and the greatest danger is particular to segmental isolation along geographic lines. Here federalism may increase the degree of separation by applying segmental autonomy, and in a bifurcated society without a varied balance of interests, this can be detrimental to the objectives of consociational theory (89).

The prospects for consociationalism in Czechoslovakia are, therefore, severely limited by the prerequisite conditions required for its success. In terms of the population at large, Czechoslovak society is bifurcated. Two distinct segments do not provide for a sound balance of power, especially when viewed from the perspective of federalism based on ethno-geographic lines. The degree to which cross-cutting cleavages are present — that is in terms of socio-economic status, religion, language etc., has not superseded ethnic/national cleavages. There is no adequate basis of overarching loyalty. Segments remain isolated and loyalties were confined to the several segments, and while levels of civil society were evident, there were certainly no developed institutions bridging the two primary segments. Indeed, there is little evidence to suggest that the population at large had any extraordinary commitment to union, certainly not enough to compensate for the absence of elite accommodation.
There is a fundamental lack of basis for elite cooperation in Czechoslovakia within the post-revolutionary period. The events surrounding the constitutional crisis from 1990-1992 as described earlier are testament to the perils which afflict elite relations. There is simply no strong social commitment to the union. Instead, as Welsch depicts so succinctly, elite relations developed according to self-interest. The ability of elites, Vaclav Klaus and Vladimir Meciar in particular, to engage in cooperative efforts with one another while maintaining the support and loyalty of their followers was a difficult balancing act to achieve in light of both the diversity of interests within each republic, and the divergence of conditions between the republics. In theoretical terms, the concept of a grand coalition is pertinent, but in practical terms, considering the real variables, it is simply not feasible that a grand council of segmental interests be assembled and operate under the conditions found among Czechoslovak elite as they stand, both during and following the process of dissolution. The Czech and Slovak republics, their people and elites had little upon which they could find consensus, including how to reform economically, let alone the extent to which they should remain united.

Lijphart argues that where the basis for consociationalism is not evident in a plural society, another
solution is to divide society into more or less politically homogeneous entities in order that stability may then be achieved within this assemblage of interests either through centralized or consociational means. It has been argued here that neither of these alternatives are feasible and that, therefore, political stability is enhanced by the division of Czechoslovakia. Indeed, two more than less homogeneous states have been created, each upon the merits of its more localized sense of national association - a shared heritage, language, present condition and vision of the future - with characteristics which are more conducive to an enduring stable order.

Contrasts: The Successor Republics

In light of the division of Czechoslovakia, a certain stability is evident both within and among the successor republics. The level of stability, however, varies for each republic, and a comparison of levels of stability within each, in contrast to the federation as described earlier, suggests that stability is considerably enhanced by the division.

As it stands, the Czech Republic may be characterized as more than less homogeneous in its social and political composition. Of the 10.4 million inhabitants in the Czech Republic, Czechs (Bohemians and Moravians) comprise 94 percent of the population. Ethnic Slovaks
comprise about 3 percent of the population, close to 300,000 people. There are some 69,000 Poles comprising about 0.6 percent of the population and 52,000 Germans comprising 0.5 percent of the population. Additionally there are roughly 31,000 Gypsies, 20,000 Hungarians, and 15,000-18,000 Jews living in the Czech Republic.

The Czech Republic also has a sound basis for stable order in terms of its formal constitution. Organized as a parliamentary republic, the Czech Constitution provides for a bicameral national legislature consisting of a two hundred member Chamber of Deputies and an eighty-one member Senate. The executive branch is composed of a President who serves as head of state and a national government composed of a Prime-Minister and cabinet. The Constitution provides for a healthy basis of individual rights within a Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, and there is a sound basis for a separation of powers and checks and balances (Illner 74 and 79). The President, for example, is elected by the legislature (National Council) every five years and is responsible for appointing the Prime Minister at the recommendation of the Chairman of the House of Deputies. The President makes appointments for an independent Constitutional Court, top officials at the National Bank and the Supreme Control Office - an independent office for supervision of state property and the budget. The President has veto
powers and the power to dissolve the House of Deputies within certain conditions. As head of state, the President also has a number of rights and responsibilities concerning the ratification of treaties, appointment of military leadership and the right to grant amnesty. The legislature is the only directly elected body of government. The House of Deputies is elected on the basis of universal suffrage with party proportional representation, while the Senate, rather limited in its authority, is elected by majority representation. As an example of its limitations, the Senate can only initiate legislation at the suggestion of the government; legislation is primarily initiated from the House of Deputies.

There are ten main political parties in the Czech Republic representing a broad range of political interests. Government is comprised of the Christian Democratic Union-Czech People's Party; Civic Democratic Alliance; The Civic Democratic Party; Christian Democratic Party. Each is reform-oriented, center-right with pro-European stands and only minor differences on such issues as agricultural policy, protectionism and centralism (Illner 81-82). The coalition as a whole is currently solidly right of center. The Christian Democratic Union-Czech People's Party is characterized as social-liberal; the Civic Democratic Party, conservative liberal with emphasis on a strong state; the Christian Democratic
As described earlier, the Civic Democratic Party was the first Western style political party to emerge from the dissident movement, Civic Forum. It is the only political party with a well developed grass-roots organization and a democratic base from which to elect its leadership and formulate party policy (Pick 207). Chief among the coalition members, the Civic Democratic Party has a broad appeal due to successes in formulating and implementing economic reforms and its ability to absorb smaller parties and form alliances with centrist parties. With the leadership of Vaclav Klaus, the Civic Democratic Party has maintained a directed economic reform program complimented by a deliberate social policy which has substantially delayed unpopular measures for the sake of social peace since the revolution (Illner 31 and 76).

Opposition, on the other hand, is comprised of the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia; Social Democrats; Czech and Moravian Party of the Center; Liberal Social Union (the Farmers' Party and the Green Party); Liberal National Social Party; and Czech Republican Party. Each is characterized as either radically populist, left, centered, moderately liberal or state centered-nationalist and extremist-authoritarian. The Left Bloc
and Republican parties are the two most extreme parties with little more than 15 percent of the public's support (Illner 77 and 81). Opposition is primarily vested with the left of center Social Democratic Party, an offshoot of the former communists. The Social Democrats tend to concentrate on the quality of the social condition, but they have failed to produce a concise and coherent economic program (81; Pick 207). They advocate moderate state interventionism, participation of employees in corporate life and ownership, and the legality of privatization. Ranking second to Civic Democratic Party, the Social Democrats suffer from the lack of a broad appeal and they are commonly associated with the policies of the former communists (Economist Intelligence Unit 1995, 9 and 11).

Despite the number of parties and the diversity of interest, however, Czechia's party system seems to be evolving towards a two party system. Main parties are coalescing and consolidating with one another (Illner 82). It is, therefore, fair to characterize the political party orientation of the Czech Republic as center-right, centripetally oriented and stable (77 and 83). Currently, the orientation of Parliament is such that of the two hundred seats, Civic Democratic Party holds 65 seats; Christian Democrats 10; Civic Democratic Alliance 16; Christian Democratic Union-Czech People's Party 15;
Czech Social Democrats 18; Left Bloc 25; Communist Party 10; Liberal Social Union 9; Liberal National Social Party 5; Bohemian-Moravian Center Party 9; Assembly for the Republic 6; and 12 seats for the independents.

Complimenting this structural basis of stability is a positive elite composition. The Czech Republic's elite representation and interaction is diverse yet congenial and also centripetally oriented. Czechia has instituted a policy of lustration ("screening") since the revolution which prevents top communist functionaries, members of the People's Malitia and agents and suspected collaborators of the secret police from holding key positions in both government and industry for a period of five years (Derlien 412). Just recently parliament has extended this policy until 2000 (Knox "Screening Extended").

The policy of lustration has aided in the transition of the state apparatus from the old elite to the new democratically oriented elite of the revolutionary era. In general, there has been a generational and political shift as a result (Illner 79). The new elite tend to be younger; they are typically better educated and professional. Most importantly, however, there is a healthy elite dialogue. Elites struggle with one another over various policy issues as one might expect in any healthy political context, most of all in a transitional process; the nature of elite interaction in the Czech Republic is
vibrant and healthy. Much like the nature of political party representation, elites are center oriented and generally conciliatory. Such individuals as Vaclav Havel, President of the Czech Republic; Milos Zeman, Chairman of the Social Democratic Party; Vladimir Dloughy, member of Civic Democratic Alliance and Minister of Foreign Trade; Jiri Dienstbier, former Minister of Foreign Affairs; Josef Zilience, current Foreign Minister; Vaclav Klaus, Prime-Minister; and trade union leader Richard Falber help create an atmosphere conducive for stable government and political interaction.\(^{39}\)

The Czech Republic's successful economic transformation, based on macroeconomic stabilization and microeconomic restructuring, has also contributed to a sound basis for stability. The economy grew in the first half of 1995. The Gross Domestic Product increased by 3.9 percent in real terms in the first quarter of 1995 and 4.1 percent in the second quarter against the same periods in 1994. Inflation halted in July 1995 with an annual rate of 9.5 percent for 1995 compared to 11.1 percent and 9.5 percent in 1994 for pensioners and employees respectively. Unemployment was a mere 2.92 percent in July 1995 compared to 3.18 percent in July 1994 — Prague has an unemployment rate of 0.2 percent (Economist Intel-

\(^{39}\) Refer to Derlein 317 for a thorough discussion of elite interaction within Eastern Europe generally.
Labor productivity was up, and average wages have increased evenly across all sectors. There is also indication of a trend towards investment rather than consumption. Additionally, as of October 1, 1995, the Czech Korun is fully convertible, making investments in and out of the Czech Republic easier and completing the Czech Republic's last condition for membership of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (8 and 15).

Clearly, the Czech Republic is well on its way to integration with Western Europe, the primary goal of the post-revolutionary government. In September 1994, Prague repaid $471 million in International Monetary Fund (IMF) loans five years ahead of schedule, making the Czech Republic the first in Eastern Europe to pay off all IMF debts (World Fact Book 114). Hard currency reserves in the banking system totaled more than $8.5 billion in October 1994, and Standard and Poor's gave the Czech Republic a credit rating of BB+, two steps higher than Hungary and one step higher than Greece (114).

In structural terms, the Czech Republic has privatized 75-80 percent of its economy. There are roughly only 2,000 enterprises remaining in state control while 1,426 are still owned by the National Property Fund. A further 579 enterprises are scheduled for partial or whole sale by June 1996; these primarily include the
country's steelworks, coal mines and electricity generating enterprises. Some forty-five enterprises deemed to be of strategic importance to the state, and therefore exempt from privatization initially, are now docketed for privatization as well. Only four enterprises will remain under state control within the next five years (*Economist Intelligence Unit* 1995, 15-18; Illner 51).

Despite the successes in political and economic reform, however, there is still work to be done. The outcome of reforms are not imminent, and there is always the danger that reforms will adversely affect social conditions. Democracy and capitalism - the free market - are not clearly understood or firmly anchored, and civil society is not well developed institutionally.\(^{40}\)

Constitutional provisions for instituting the second chamber of parliament, the Senate, have not yet been implemented despite the fact that election of the Senate has finally been scheduled for the general election in June of 1996. Additionally, Higher Level Administrative Units of Government (HLAUs) have not been instituted, leaving a gap between the central government and its 6,237 rural and urban principalities and seventy-five districts. Prior to January 1, 1991, the Czech Republic was divided into seven regions, being themselves composed

\(^{40}\) Pehe provides a well developed description of this claim through a contrast of Klaus and Havel.
of eight to ten districts, but since 1991, regions and districts have been completely eliminated.

While such conditions present no serious threat to social or political stability, they do present serious concerns for constitutional order, especially the manner in which civil society is to be constructed (refer to Pehe). Prolonged delays in implementing various constitutional bodies of government are cause for concern because they are part of the process by which the political order is defined. Additionally, the sentiments with which the issues have been addressed are cause for concern. Vaclav Klaus, for example, has all along criticized the bicameral legislature, arguing its redundancy and potential threat to maintaining a small and efficient government. This, of course, coincides with his classical liberal philosophical position and his concerns for consolidating the transformation quickly before the state gets mired down in parliamentary procedures (Pehe 15). Opponents of Klaus, however, argue that the basis of constitutional democracy and order depends upon the complete implementation of the constitutional order.41 Again with respect to the HLAUs, Klaus maintains that the state does not need multiple layers of government, and that it

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41 Refer to Lansky 12; Victor Gomez "Delay Could Spell Death"; Knox "Deputies Approve System of Election" and "Creation of Senate" for detailed information about the Senate.
only inhibits efficient government. Vaclav Havel, on the other hand, argues that HLAUs are an essential element of civil society. They tie government to society integrally, he argues, building government from the bottom up and making a basis for stable social and political order. Advocates of decentralization favor limited, yet precisely directed government, and the debate surrounding the issues remains healthy and conciliatory, but the duration of the debate runs the risk of compromising stability by affecting public confidence in establishing a sense of order.

While there is no serious demagoguery in Czech politics, there is use of populism and non-democratic measures, neither of which contribute to an atmosphere of rationality or trust among the population at large (Illner 88). Indeed, varying levels of corruption are prevalent in both government and the economy. While most cases are only a result of inadequate legal restrictions such as parliamentarians taking advantage of their positions (refer to Zivnustkova "Accountability Makes a Debut"), there are more extreme cases of fraud and corruption. The most infamous and highly publicized case of

42 Refer to Victor Gomez "New Level of Government"; refer also to Lyman and Hanspach 2-3 for a details about HLAUs and the debate surrounding their implementation; refer to Pehe 14-15 for a discussion of the debate between Havel and Klaus over the issue of centralized government and civil society.
corruption involves the chairman of coupon privatization, Jaroslav Lizner, who was convicted in October 1994 for accepting a substantial bribe ($307,000) for the sale of a western Bohemian milk company. The case raised public concern about the legitimacy of privatization despite the fact that there are no other instances of corruption of such magnitude. Needless to say, this type of development places serious doubts in the public's trust of authority (Lawson "Lizner Handed a Seven-Year Sentence").

Campaign finance is also a hot button issue among the general public. Political parties have been known to accept significant amounts of money from questionable sources. The coalition Christian Democratic Union – Czech Peoples' Party, for example, allegedly borrowed Kč 3 million ($100,000) from Italian businessman and alleged cocaine trafficker, Lionell Moscu, in order to pay for 1992 campaign debts, and Klaus's Civic Democratic Party is known to have held very expensive fundraisers during privatization (some $4,000 per plate) at which leaders of Czech industry were present.43

A more direct and serious threat to stable order, however, is microeconomic restructuring and the implications it poses for social order. While macroeconomic

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43 See Prognosis (April 29-May 12, 1994: 2) for an explanation concerning the corruption found among opposition forces.
stabilization is being addressed rather eloquently, microeconomic restructuring has yet to face its greatest challenges - competition and profit. Laws and regulations provisioning bankruptcy and capital markets, for example, are either not yet created or are not clearly drawn. Additionally, private sector development is still deficient with regard to technological advancements (Illner 44-46 and 55). There is an ever increasing realization of greater corporate modernization and reform. Corporations and industry are continually down-sizing and reorganizing for competition and profit (43-50), while firms remain inefficient and struggle for profit in an increasingly competitive marketplace. With the need to catch up to the West, companies are forced to modernize or face bankruptcy. In 1994 alone, bankruptcies quadrupled, and this trend in itself has left the general public with a greater sense of skepticism about the reforms. In many cases, little of the promised benefits of privatization are being realized. As a result of companies either going bankrupt or modernizing, few people are seeing clear returns on their investments.

With the end of communism, securing of market reforms and the continuing reintegration into Europe, increasingly greater attention is being paid to social conditions. There is an increasing sense of alienation and anomie as the economy moves further away from command
structures towards free markets and capitalism. There are problems with wages, employment, the cost of living, and economic security. Workers are having to increasingly reorient their careers to meet the needs of industry and the market. With the pace of change, there is always a sense of uncertainty about the future. Jobs are going from industry and agriculture to tourism, services, banking and the insurance sectors (27). Still, more than 30 percent of the labor force is employed in manufacturing with well over 45 percent in the services, and the percentages are decreasing and increasing, respectively (30). The Czech Statistical Office reported in March 1993 that Czech family incomes rose by half ($93) between 1988 and 1992 to 2,809 Kc. – average monthly wages are now $250-$300 per worker. When 88 percent inflation is taken into account over the same period, the real value of incomes fell by one-fifth (Knox "Six Years After"). While inflation has been kept under control and wages are increasing, the nature of reforms places greater strain on incomes. Housing and medicine are still in the process of being privatized (Illner 68; Knox "Bills Outstrip Incomes"; Schneider "Patients Face Big Bill"). Educators, doctors, and rail workers, all of whom are still predominantly employed by the state, are struggling to survive on incomes that are increasingly falling behind the market averages. The public sector simply can not
compete with market wages, and strikes have been initiated by educators, medical unions and rail workers. Thus far, however, government has been able to negotiate with unions and management within a tripartite arrangement to diffuse the tensions (Zivnustkova and Kayal "Unions Threaten Chaos"; Schneider "One-day Strikes").

It is also evident that as reforms take shape Czech society is becoming increasingly stratified along socio-economic and political lines typical of free-market democracy. Change in real income is indeed dramatic. There has been a remarkable increase in inequality between 1988 and 1990 (Illner 68). The socio-professional structure is witnessing a leveling off in terms of the percentage of population in each subdivision. For example, while skilled labor has traditionally been the highest percentage of labor, higher staff and intellectuals are becoming equal in percentage to other higher professionals. The percentage of self-employed is also increasing. By the year 2005, roughly ten percent of the population is projected to belong to the higher staff-intellectual class, 14 percent to other higher professionals, 17 routine non-manual, 16 self-employed, 21 skilled workers and 16 unskilled workers with only 5 percent as farmers and agricultural workers (67).

Despite the fact that Czech society appears to be abandoning its egalitarianism in terms of a relationship
shaped by market determined wages and occupations, a significant proportion of the population continues a commitment to equality of result (71). In fact, the share of poor in the total population is low. The share of those in poverty - the percentage of those individuals living under 50 percent of the income median - was 1.3 percent of the population in 1993 compared to 3.1 percent in 1991 (69; Knox "Bills Outstrip Incomes").

In November and December of 1989, more than 40 percent of the population preferred the reformed socialist option for the Czech Republic, 3 percent were for capitalism and some 50 percent for the "third way," comprising elements of both capitalism and socialism. As of 1993, 63 percent of the population supports unlimited enterprise, 50 percent gives a positive evaluation of privatization and more than 50 percent views capitalism as the only road of development (Illner 70). More than half recognize the capitalist character of the privatization. A majority, ranging to two-thirds of the population, tolerates the changes. The remaining part of society regards privatization with some suspicion. Seventy-five to 80 percent of the population favors state intervention in the economy in order to control private enterprise (71).

Over 70 percent of the population favored the contemporary regime over the communist regime in 1991, this
compared to 31.5 percent in Hungary, 50.7 percent in Poland and 43.5 percent in Slovakia (87). Democratic-liberal orientations have strong support in Czechia. In 1992, 92 percent of the population agreed that all people must have equal rights, 74 percent agreed that the state should not force an individual to do something he does not want to do. Above all, Czechs had strong feelings about order in society, having in mind the need to suppress the growing crime rate. Ninety-four percent of Czechs stated that "above all, there must be order in society". As it stands, the political orientation of the Czech Republic is such that roughly 29 percent of the population advocates policies espoused by the left. They typically include pensioners, people with secondary education and "losers" in the transformation process. Some 26 percent is oriented towards the center, and 45 percent to the right. Those professing the right are private entrepreneurs, non-manual laborers, the young and winners in the transformation process (88). Roughly 90 percent of the population favors either reformed socialism or the third way - a healthy mixture of capitalism and socialism, probably defined best as social democracy as experienced in many Scandinavian countries. This assemblage of variables represents an extremely sound basis for socio-political continuity, and with the institutional organization, the nature of political party orientation and
elites, not to mention Czechia's economic success, the promise of social cohesion of Czech society outweighs the immediate dangers presented here.

Despite all such possible threats to stability, government reforms are moderate and incremental and this is likely to become more the case by necessity as society reacts to them over time. Government has proven itself keen on the social problems which threaten its very own position to say the least. The government coalition holds only a slim majority - 106 of the 200 seats with a third of the vote, and there is evidence that the Civic Democratic Alliance is loosing popular support while the Social Democrats are gaining. Indeed, the Social Democrats have maintained just below a third of the public support in public opinion polls as of late, and the percentage of support for the Civic Democratic Party and the Social Democrats has fluctuated since September 1994 (Knox "Social Democrats Surpass Klaus"). Nevertheless, opposition is unlikely to muster enough support to oust government in the June 1996 election (Economist Intelligence Unit 1995, 17; Stojaspal "Social Democrats Are Closing In"). They may, however, influence the direction of policy by gaining a significant proportion of the vote, in turn impacting the nature of government reforms. Much depends on the nature of reforms, their success, especially in terms of the economy, and the public's
reaction to the effects of such reforms. But with economic forecasts, the future appears optimistic. A growth rate of 14 percent is expected over the next few years. Gross Domestic Product is forecasted to grow by 4.2 percent in 1996 and slightly higher in 1997 (Economist Intelligence Unit 1995, 8). Inflation is projected to remain slightly below 10 percent for the immediate future, and government is beginning to address the regulation of the economy (17). The future holds promising prospects for the Czech Republic. This and the nature of Czechia's social composition suggests a high probability for a durable stable order.

The prospects for Slovakia are not as promising. The stability of Slovakia is highly questionable due predominantly to the nature of Slovakia's ethnic and cultural structure. Slovakia is highly fragmented in terms of both social organization and political culture; and the nature of elite accommodation is incondusive to coalescing these differences. In fact, it is the primarily catalyst for societal divisiveness.

Eighty-six percent of Slovakia's 5.4 million inhabitants are Slovak, and one million people are of minority status. Of greatest concern are the 560,000 Hungarian inhabitants who comprise 11 percent of Slovakia's population. While Slovak and Hungarian relations have traditionally been congenial since World War II, relations
have become especially troublesome since the revolution. In fact, relations between Slovaks and Hungarians are beginning to bear a striking resemblance to the nature of Czech and Slovak relations prior to the division. Other accounts of the situation have equated Slovak-Hungarian relations with those surrounding the Sudeten German population of Czechoslovakia prior to World War II.

Hungarians are organized politically into three parties which, as a coalition, form the third largest political movement and the second largest opposition group in Slovakia. With Hungarian support for the plight of nationals living outside of Hungary proper, tensions with Slovakia are becoming increasingly troublesome with tenuous implications for stability both within Slovakia and the region.\(^4\)

The issue of contention centers on the Hungarian claim for distinct nationhood and the rights of minority status in general. In particular, Slovak-Hungarian relations began to deteriorate considerably in 1990 with the Gabockova Dam dispute between Hungary and Slovakia (Implementation of the Helsinki Accords 16). It escalated with Slovak independence and the ratification of the Slovak Constitution in 1992 which makes reference to

\(^{4}\) Refer to Implementation of the Helsinki Accords 12-14 and Economist Intelligence Unit 1995, 38 for a consideration of ethnic tensions in Slovakia.
only the Slovak nation, with no attention paid to Hungarian nationals or any other of the sizable non-Slovak population. As of late, however, contentions have centered on legislation which prohibits the use of Hungarian in official state business, declaring Slovak the official language of Slovakia. Legislation passed in early 1995 has, in essence, prohibited the use of Hungarian on street signs and in public schools, even in areas which are occupied predominantly by Hungarians. The legislation goes so far as to insist that Hungarian women use the traditional Slovak suffix "ova" with their names. Furthermore, radical Slovak nationalists have advocated the enculturation of Hungarians into the Slovak nation by introducing Slovak in the curriculum of Hungarian nurseries, closing Hungarian schools and instituting Slovak schools in towns inhabited predominantly by Hungarians (12; Economist Intelligence Unit 1995, 41).

Other concerns with Slovakia's ethnic composition involve the significant Gypsy population which is by most accounts dramatically under estimated in the last census. It is suggested that the Roma comprise 1.5 percent of Slovakia's population. The Banska Bystrica incident of July 21 in which a teenage Romany died of burns inflicted by skinheads is the most famous example of just how the Gypsy population is treated within Slovakia, and the broader region (refer to Implementation of the Helsinki
While the Romany conflagrations pale in comparison with respect to the more serious political implication of Slovak/Hungarian relations, they contribute to the ever increasing concern about the national stability of Slovakia. And while it is also true that Czechia has its share of problems with racial hatred etc., the issue in Slovakia takes on a more serious tone, one which seriously threatens the stability of the society itself both internally and externally. In each case, the ethno-racial problems of the post-revolutionary era are usually indicative of other endemic problems in society. In addition to the sizable Hungarian and Roma population, there are roughly 54,000 Czechs, 32,000 Ukrainian/Ruthenians, 5,400 Germans, 54,000 Poles, 3,000 Jews and a number of others people of various ethnic groups/nationalities living in Slovakia (Illner 22; Wolchik 1991, 181; Implementation of the Helsinki Accords 11).

In terms of a formal constitution, Slovakia has the basis of a sound democratic order. Much like Czechia, Slovakia is organized as a parliamentary republic with a president as head of state, a 150 member unicameral national council and a government headed by a prime-minister serving as chief executive officer. As with the Czech constitution, there are adequate separation of
powers and checks and balances provisioned in the Slovak Constitution. The President is elected by the National Council, and the Government is appointed by the President on the recommendation of the Prime Minister who, in turn, is appointed by the President at the suggestion of the National Council. While there is skepticism about Slovakia's use of party slates in electing the National Council, the most vexing aspect of Slovakia's constitution is its vagueness with respect to free speech, personal liberties and the protection of minorities (Implementation of the Helsinki Accords 7 and 9), a problem of greater concern considering that Slovakia does not have a free and independent judiciary (19).

An additional negative attribute of Slovakia is the nature of political party organization which is neither stable or centripetally oriented. The organization of political parties in Slovakia is developing along increasingly divergent lines, reflecting Slovakia's political fragmentation. On the one hand there are eight major contending parties of which the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, Slovak National Party and the Association of Slovak Workers comprise a loose-knit governing coalition. Opposition, on the other hand, consists of the Party of the Democratic Left, the Christian Democratic Movement, the Democratic Union, the Hungarian Christian Democratic
Party, the Hungarian Civic Party, and Coexistence (Economist Intelligence Unit 1995, 37).

The coalition government is staunchly conservative and fragile as it is comprised of three radically different political interests, each of which have come together under the pretenses of vague and often self-serving interests. Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, for example, is the leading party within the government. Headed by Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar, it holds 12 of the 17 key ministries of government and 61 of the 150 seats in parliament with 35 percent of the popular vote from the September 30-October 1, 1994 election. Advocating a strong centralized government, the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia is highly nationalistic and authoritarian. It supports the continued role the state police, and it has gone so far as to call for the elimination of the Presidency and the cancellation of privatization (Ledford "Night of Long Knives"; Mihailovich "Meciar Takes No Prisoners"). The first major move of government was to postpone the second wave of privatization scheduled December 15, 1994 (Reynolds "Meciar's Hand of Friendship").

The Slovak National Party, on the other hand, is the oldest of Slovakia's political parties. Being founded in 1881 at the height of the emerging Slovak nationalism, the goal of the party has been to create an independent
Slovak state. The Slovak National Party is best characterized for its nationalist and xenophobic stands on a number of issues, and it is most responsible for inciting the ethnic and racial problems in Slovakia, especially the antagonistic governmental policies towards Slovak Hungarians (*Economist Intelligence Unit* 1995, 41). Jan Slota, leader of the coalition partner, has suggested that Romanies be housed in separate villages because of failed attempts to integrate them into society (41).

The Association of Slovak Workers is a left-wing party which espouses limited economic reform and a moderate level of privatization. While they have an interest in continuing with privatization, members of the Association of Slovak Workers contend that Meciar's current privatization scheme is unjust. This, in turn has created the potential for a split within the Association itself (38 and 42). Both the Slovak National Party and the Association of Slovak Workers are opposed to Slovak entry into NATO and the European Union (refer to Gomez "Slovakia's Odd Bedfellows"; Reynolds "Meciar's Hand of Friendship"). The Association holds 13 parliamentary seats with 7.3 percent of the vote.

Much like government, opposition is diverse and more limited in its common interests. Indeed, it is weak due to the level of fragmentation among such diverse interests. The Party of the Democratic Left is the major
opposition party. Coming in second to the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, with 10.4 percent of the vote in the last election, the Democratic Left is an offshoot of the former Communist Party. The third largest representation in parliament, as stated earlier, is the Hungarian Coalition. Holding 10.2 percent of the vote in the last election, the Hungarian parties are moderate and ethnically oriented, advocating territorial autonomy within Slovakia (Economist Intelligence Unit 1994, 31). The remainder of opposition in parliament is the Christian Democratic Movement with 10.1 percent of the popular vote, and the Democratic Union, an offshoot of Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, which received 8.6 percent of the popular vote. As it stands, the government holds 83 of the 150 seats in parliament (MDS 61, SWP 13, SNP 9) while the opposition holds 67 seats (DLB 18, Hungarian Coalition 17, CDM 17 and DU 15) (World Fact Book 381).

Complimenting this fractured semblance of political representation is a autotarchical elite structure with fault-lines that permeate deeper into society's political orientation and set a course for the country's future within the post-revolutionary period (Economist Intelligence Unit 1995, 37). Keep in mind that Slovakia has no policy of lustration, and that which existed under the federation was eliminated with Slovak secession and Vladimir Meciar's lack of interest in keeping the policy
Implementation of the Helsinki Accords 19; Reynolds "Meciar's Hand of Friendship"). Seventeen of the 18 members of government, including Meciar, have been members of the Communist Party at one time or another. Elites are predominantly organized into two polarized camps led by Vladimir Meciar and President Michal Kovac, the two most visible figures in Slovak politics. Peter Weiss of the Party of the Democratic Left along with Jan Carnogursky of the Christian Democratic Movement and Jozef Moravcik of the Democratic Union are also recognized as fundamental figures who help shape the nature of elite interaction in Slovakia.

Most attention in Slovak politics, however, is currently paid to Michal Kovac, Slovakia's President. Standing for a liberal interpretation of constitution, he is recognized as the "guardian" of democracy and capitalism, and he advocates a society built on the rule of law (Economist Intelligence Unit 1995, 37 and 40). He insists that the formal constitution of Slovakia is adequately structured, but much more responsibility must be displayed by political elites in order to insure stability within the existing structures (40). He has accused Meciar of pursuing a course of "permanent political confrontation" (41).

Meciar, on the other hand, stands for a conservative interpretation of the constitution. He has tried to
strengthen his executive position and has pursued controversial policies on such issues as privatization, ethnic minorities and trade unions (37). Often using fear and intimidation, there is growing evidence which suggests that Meciar is using the Slovak Intelligence Service (SIS) to consolidate his personal position and privatization to reward his political allies. Despite this, however, opinion polls show steady support for Meciar (Economist Intelligence Unit 1995, 37).

Being first elected in June 1990 and taking control of government, Meciar was ousted from government by a vote of no-confidence in 1991. He was then reelected in the June 1992 by a significant plurality of the vote, some 30 percent. Meciar pursued an ill-defined agenda which satisfied only his personal aspirations. He and President Kovac disagreed on appointments to key government positions such as minister of privatization, and the Slovak economy was suffering because of inaction. Foreign investment sharply declined for fear of political instability. In the midst of such gridlock, Foreign Minister Jozef Moravcik and Deputy Prime Minister, Roman Kovac, formed a splinter party of HZDS in the name of the Alternative of Political Realism, presently known as the Democratic Union. In turn, Meciar supporters passed a no-confidence vote on Moravcik and Kovac, effectively expelling them from the administration and party. With
the splintering of HZDS, Meciar lost his majority, and with pressure mounting from the Democratic Left, the HZDS was forced into an alliance with the Slovak National Party. The stalemate worsened to the point that the international community expressed concern about the events. President Kovac called for a vote of no-confidence against Meciar's government in March 1994 (Reynolds "Rebels Surround Meciar"; Drew "Meciar is Ousted"). The Parliament gained enough votes, acting with uncharacteristic unity, to heed the President's call. Members of Parliament voted by a margin of 78-2 with the remainder of the 150 deputies abstaining to remove Meciar from the Prime-Ministership on March 11, 1994 (Drew "Meciar is Ousted").

Despite the economic and political successes of the interim government headed by none other than Moravcik, public opinion extended little confidence to the government. Indeed, with the October-November 1994 general election, the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia made a rebound by receiving the largest percentage of the vote, some 38 percent. With the difficulty in forming coalitions that presently exist, Meciar resumed control of government.45 Since his reelection, Meciar has pursued an even stronger authoritarian stance, vowing to "steamroll"

45 Refer to Drew "Meciar Ousted" for an elaboration on the success of the interim government.
anyone involved with his ouster, and often showing disrespect for constitutional order. He has put considerable limitations on the press, removing several key officials in the communications departments of government and industry. He has also established several parliamentary committees to investigate the past activities of his political opponents (Spitkova "Slovak Dragnet"). Moreover, he has instituted a policy which dramatically halts or reorients the privatization process, advocating the direct sale, public auction and/or a complicated and questionable bond program for offering of a very limited number of state assets to the public (Economist Intelligence Unit 1995, 42-43). Vital industries such as gas, electricity, telecommunications and the manufacture of arms will remain in state hands (42-43). Meciar's policy also advocates maintaining state influences with 50 companies in the areas of oil, energy and steel (43). Several laws already in existence advocate reversal of the status of many companies that have already been privatized under Slovakia's first phase of privatization. The legislation also bars the involvement of investment funds which have proven to be particularly prevalent in the Czech Republic's privatization process. Meciar and his supporters argue that chosen economic policy will prevent major shut downs and the problems endemic to other reforming economies in Eastern Europe. The purpose, he
contends, is also to create a strong domestic business class, but critics argue that it will amount to political cronyism.

In retaliation for calling for a vote of no confidence in 1994, Vladimir Meciar is currently pursuing a public referendum to remove President Kovac from office (Spitkova "Slovak Cabinet Demands" and "Secret Attempt"). Meciar has repeatedly asked Kovac to resign under the allegation that he used intelligence units to gather damaging information to remove Meciar from office.

The most intriguing development of Slovak politics, however, and a primary example of just how far Slovak politics has devolved, involves the kidnapping of Michal Kovac, Jr., son of President Kovac, who has been implicated and indicted by the German government on fraud charges. Meciar and the state security apparatus (SIS) have been implicated in the kidnapping, and there is substantial evidence to suggest that Meciar was indeed involved. Several special prospectors, for example, have been relieved of their duties just as each had come to the conclusion that Meciar and SIS were most likely involved in the affair. Ironically, Meciar appoints the special prosecutor and is overseer of the SIS (Economist Intelligence Unit 1995, 39).

Also suggestive of the political climate is the Miklosko affair; Civic Movement representative, Frantisek
Miklosko, was beaten on a Bratislava street corner. He and his party have been the most boisterous in their accusation of misdeeds by Meciar and SIS (39; Spitkova "Kovac, Jr. Gives President's Foe"; "Kidnappers Abduct Son"; "Plot Thickens"). Opinion on these developments have been divided along party lines, with the opposition claiming that such things do not happen in a democracy, implicitly placing blame on Meciar (Economist Intelligence Unit 1995, 40).

Needless to say, this state of affairs is reaching dangerous proportions. Violence has erupted, and there is particular concern about the significant portion of the population which is increasingly turned off by the political discourse and remains silent. There is evidence to suggest that society is becoming increasingly divided (37). The opposition Christian Democrats and the Hungarian Civic Party have gone so far as to claim that Slovakia's transition to democracy has been diverted to a completely opposite direction than was intended (39). The political wrangling, ethnic problems and violations of civil rights have brought great skepticism from the world community, including the United States, European Union, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and others such as U.S.-Hungarian financier George Soros who has warned of fascist undercurrents in
Central Europe, particularly in Slovakia (41; Larsen "Europe Demands"; Spitkova "Meciar Snubs").

Nevertheless, Slovakia is doing reasonably well economically (Economist Intelligence Unit 1995, 38). According to the Slovak Statistical Office, GDP in the first half of 1995 was 6.1 percent higher in real terms than a year earlier (46). There was a 7.9 percent rise in industrial output. Inflation rose by only 0.5 percent in August 1995, making the year on year rate 9.8 percent (46). In July 1995 unemployment was 13.5 percent of 343,147 of the workforce, up from 13.3 percent in July, but considerably lower than the 14.6 percent at the end of 1994 (47). Official forecasts for 1996 assume a 5 percent real GDP growth with inflation dropping below 10 percent, declining unemployment and a budget deficit that is expected to reach only 1.5 percent of GDP. The government has constructive relations with the IMF, and plans are to follow the Czech Republic in current-account convertibility of the Slovak Koruna (38). Slovakia is also the only country in the region to have a positive trade balance with the European Union (Spitkova "Slovak Government"). Slovakia formally applied for membership into the European Union on June 27, 1995 (Economist Intelligence Unit 1995, 44).

Despite such positive attributes, foreign investment in Slovakia has waned significantly because of the po-
itical turmoil (38), and the prolonged effects of postponing economic reform are not going to be offset by Slovakia's macroeconomic capital for very long (38). Bankruptcies are being postponed in an effort to soften the effects of economic transition. While such a policy is understandable and necessary for maintaining social and political stability, the situation is being capitalized upon for political gains. Economic stability is fragile. The balance of variables suggests great uncertainty about the future of Slovakia. Will Slovakia remain divided and in a state of attrition? Will it implode through its own internal pressure, or will events begin to take a more positive course? While Slovakia has a great deal to address in terms of its own development, and while it is impossible to reach firm conclusions in such matters, much of the evidence presented in this contrast suggests that Slovakia's ability to handle its internal divisions is greater than if these variables were antagonized even more by the issues which affected stability within the union.

Optimism for the Future: A Conclusion

The division of Czechoslovakia is not to be lamented. As it stands, each republic is free to address the problems peculiar to its own conditions, irrespective of the other (refer to Illner 11). Had the union been
preserved, history suggests that relations between the republics would have become increasingly more antagonistic. Considering the current struggle within Slovakia itself, not to mention the divergences among the two republics currently, one can surmise that contentions between Czechs and Slovaks would probably be escalated had the union been preserved due to the nature of circumstances in the post-revolutionary and post-dissolution periods. Even after separation, each society has only become more rooted in its own convictions. Both Klaus and Meciar remain in office as a result of democratic elections, and despite concerted efforts in Slovakia to reshape the leadership. Moreover, the direction of Czechia's reforms suggest only negative consequences for Slovakia's political climate. Even a modified pace of reform would have been enough to antagonize Slovak attitudes, especially rouge elite interests. Likewise, the need for Slovakia to have delayed reforms would have antagonized Czech attitudes towards Slovaks. As it stands, an independent Slovakia has only itself to blame for its present and future direction; much the same with Czechia. Both Czechia and Slovakia are maturing as democratic nations, and division has eliminated one major impediment to their successful development - the antagonisms historically associated with union - allowing each
other to develop according to distinct needs and aspirations.

Additionally, it is important to highlight that despite little public support for the division, the dissolution of Czechoslovakia was easily achieved. Czechoslovakia was divided with only a few minor disputes concerning state assets and boarders, but nothing that has not been settled peacefully (Fischer "Czech and Slovak Relations," 11-13). The point is that while there was a sigh of disappointment from Czechs, Slovaks, and the world alike about the division, there was no public outcry within Czechoslovakia itself contesting the decision. The federal legislature approved the division. Moreover, there is currently no public sentiment calling for reunification (9-10; refer also to Leff, 1996)

Relations between Czechs and Slovaks are cordial. They work cooperatively both bilaterally and within the framework of the Visegrad Four. In bilateral terms, Czechs and Slovaks maintain a customs union with which trade between the republics is made easier and less costly. As of late, the union has experienced problems of a political nature; the Czechs have pulled out of a clearing house agreement for the finance of trade after Slovakia increasingly raised tariffs and import quotas on Czech agricultural imports (Fischer "Czech and Slovak Relations," 14-15). Nevertheless, relations remain fa-
vorare despite such developments. The Czech and Slovak republics maintain a number of cultural and educational exchanges, and their policies on citizenship are mutually cooperative (refer to Fischer "Czech and Slovak Relations").

The evidence to this point suggests that the division of Czechoslovakia provides a more solid foundation for stability within each republic by virtue of the very devolution of political relations and, therefore, the problems historically associated with them, especially in light of the absence of a sound basis for consociationalism. With the probability of a more durable stability based on a more homogenous political culture within each republic, stability in and between the successor republics is enhanced. Moreover, greater opportunity for the realization of national self-determination based on mutual respect and democracy is evident, provided the new republics are responsible to their own inhabitants, each other, and the larger community of nations of which they are an integral part.

This thesis has been concerned with revolution's affect on stable order, most particularly as it pertains the disruption of established order in Czechoslovakia. Indeed, just one of the outcomes of revolution in Eastern Europe is the disruption of the geopolitical order of the continent as it has been known for the last half-century
and more. The revolution of communist Europe has disrupted the established order of states with ramifications the world over. Yet the dangers commonly associated with the dissolution of so-called modern nation-states should not inhibit one from realizing the virtue of modern state devolution within this context, especially as it pertains to Czechoslovakia, but also with respect to the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and even Russia. Such activity is indeed a direct outcome of revolution as well as historical circumstance.

Both the Czech Republic and Slovakia are aspiring to become members of the international community of European states. Each is a member of the United Nations, NATO's Partnership for Peace Initiative and the Central European Initiative as well as the Council of Europe. Both maintain associate membership with the Western European Union and the European Union with aspirations for full membership by the twenty-first century (Fischer "Czech and Slovak Relations," 10-11; Hunter 467 and 1164). Countervailing trends in inter-state cooperation and supranational development throughout Europe help temper the negativity of separation. And while the integration of Central and Eastern Europe into West European political and economic structures is conducive to both independent state stability and geopolitical order, there is still no guarantee for peace and stability. Yet when placed into
this context and the historical context portrayed heretofore, the division of Czechoslovakia is not as threatening as one might be led to believe. Rather, division provides a basis for political stability in and among the republics of Czechoslovakia in this, the post-revolutionary era, especially when viewed in light of the political relations between Czechs and Slovaks historically, the peaceful process by which dissolution occurred, and the potential for continental cooperation.
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