Intellectuals and Nationalism in Cyprus: A Study of the Role of Intellectuals in the 1931 Uprising

Georgios P. Loizides

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INTELLECTUALS AND NATIONALISM IN CYPRUS: A STUDY OF THE ROLE OF INTELLECTUALS IN THE 1931 UPRISING

by

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Georgios P. Loizides
INTELLECTUALS AND NATIONALISM IN CYPRUS: A STUDY OF THE ROLE OF INTELLECTUALS IN THE 1931 UPRISING

Georgios P. Loizides, M.A.
Western Michigan University, 1999

My thesis addresses the role of Cypriot intellectuals in the nationalist movement aiming at the political union of Cyprus with Greece. In particular, it will examine the contribution of three intellectual categories to the 1931 uprising, namely clerics, teachers, and journalists. The 1931 nationalist uprising was the first Greek nationalist mass movement in Cyprus, and can be seen as laying the ground for the 1955-1960 armed struggle against the British, who were the colonial rulers of the island at the time. Furthermore, I argue that over and above the petty interests of modernized urban elites, it was the accommodation of prevalent cultural values and symbols that afforded the movement's resonance among the Greek population of the island. Finally, I propose that structuralist theories viewing the development of nationalism in Cyprus as a purely hegemonic process tend to neglect the dialogical aspects of nationalist discourse.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

General Background

To ignore the role of values in shaping a group's behavior is vulgar materialism; to omit analysis of the conditions under which persons conform with or deviate from their values is vulgar idealism. Alvin Gouldner (1979, p. 59)

My thesis will address the role of Cypriot intellectuals in the nationalist movement aiming at the political union of Cyprus with Greece. In particular, it will examine their contribution to the 1931 uprising, which was the first Greek nationalist mass movement in Cyprus, and which can be seen as laying the ground for the 1955-1960 armed struggle for union with Greece. Although my study aspires neither to be conclusive nor exhaustive, in the sense that it neither examines all nationalist movements in Cyprus, nor it examines all intellectual categories, it does provide a basis for a more conclusive study on the contribution of intellectuals to nationalist movements in Cyprus. In my effort, I will focus on the role of three intellectual categories: (1) clerics; (2) teachers (elementary and secondary education teachers, as there were basically no post-secondary institutions on the island at the time in question); and (3) journalists. The 1931 uprising aimed at uniting Cyprus with Greece, or rather to protest the powers (the British Empire) that prevented Cyprus from exercising the Greek Cypriots'
perceived right to politically uniting with Greece, with which they had historical and cultural ties. Thus, the movement was imbued with the early European (romantic) national ideology of making the national unit congruent with state structure. In the case of wider Hellenism, this ideology was expressed by a popular irredentist nationalist movement. If we can talk of a resentment (or transformation) that breaks traditional from modern ideologies, in Cyprus this would rest in the perception that modernity allowed for self-determination, and so a demand for the assertion of political freedom from Colonial rule, although traditionally perceived as right and just, now was also deemed feasible.

Historical Background

The unionist movement was not a short-term affair. Discourse expressing the demand for the union of Cyprus with Greece can be traced to the very beginning of the 1821 Greek revolution against the Ottomans, who then ruled both Cyprus, and what is now Greece, and which lead to the creation of the then Kingdom of Greece. The Ottomans ruled Cyprus between 1570-1878, and were succeeded by the British, in exchange for British support to the sultan in case of attack from Russia. During the 1821 Greek revolution, many Cypriots fought as volunteers in various parts of Greece, some under their own makeshift flag that comprised a blue cross over a white background, reading: Hellenic Flag of the Fatherland Cyprus (Koumoulides, 1974). ¹ Revolutionary literature was circulated on the is-
land by, among others, Archimandrite Theofylact, and the then Archbishop Kyprianos, who was in contact with the revolutionaries, sent a letter to the Filiki Etaireia (the Friendly Society comprised the core of the Greek revolutionaries) promising financial aid (Koumoulides, 1974; Kyrris, 1985; Pavlou, Piggouras & Ftohopoulos, 1983).

These developments alarmed the Ottoman authorities in Cyprus, mainly after some of this literature fell in their hands. The Ottoman authorities in Cyprus promptly reacted by ordering the hanging of the "heads of Church, and a great number of notables and common people" (Papadopoulllos, 1965, pp. 57-58). This persecution lasted for many months, and aimed at cutting off any possible links with the Greek revolution that had just begun in other parts of the Ottoman Empire, and at warning the general population that any expression of dissent would be crushed. At the end of the massacre, 470 notables and hundreds of other people were hanged (Koumoulides, 1974). These extreme measures did not prevent the newly elected Archbishop of Cyprus in 1828 from sending a letter to Kapodistrias--then Governor of the revolutionary Greece--who was negotiating the borders of the new state with the great powers (England, France and Russia), requesting that Cyprus be included in his demands (Englezakis, 1995; Pavlou et al., 1983). This was the first official request by the Greek Cypriot leadership for union with Greece. Although all the above point to an already developed identification of the Greeks of Cyprus with the fate of Hellenism in general, the idea of uniting Cyprus with the newly established state of Greece did not develop into a mass
movement during Ottoman rule, partly due to the harsh and swift reaction of the Ottomans to any such prospect. The few localized revolts that did take place during the Ottoman rule were quickly contained and never developed into mass movements. Interestingly enough, clerics comprised the leadership of at least two of these revolts, during the years immediately following the 1821 Greek War of Independence. One instigated by Ioannikios, a monk (thus, the rebellion is called the Rebellion of the Monk), and the other by Nikolaos Theseus, brother of Archimandrite Theofilos (who was himself involved in circulating revolutionary literature on the island) and nephew to the Archbishop (Panteli, 1984, pp. 34-35). Thus, the Enosis movement can be said to have begun during the 19th century. This is what Panteli (1984, p. 61) is arguing. Yet, as a social movement, which could achieve mass mobilization, the Enosis movement did not develop until the arrival of the British. Note that Enosis is Greek for union, which was the slogan of the struggle for the incorporation of Cyprus in the Greek state.

Greek nationalist discourse on the island intensified immediately after the British occupation of the island (1878-1959). Hill (1972) is clear on this: "Hardly a year has passed since the Occupation without the 'Hellenic idea' finding expression in some form or another. It is to be observed, of course, long before the occupation. We have noticed its first symptoms as early as 1830" (p. 152). Note that Hill is here referring to an envoy of the Cypriots who was sent in an effort to persuade the Great powers to
allow the annexation of the island to the then newly-found Kingdom of Greece. The British, at least initially, recognized the Hellenic character of Cypriot culture, and did little to alter it as they did not perceive it to be a threat to the empire. In his memoirs written in 1937 and reprinted in the U.S. in 1973, Sir Ronald Storrs, one of the first British Governors of Cyprus (from 30 November 1926 to 29 October 1932), described his (Storrs, 1973) arrival on the island on November 30th, 1926 as follows:

The anchor had hardly dropped before politics began with the Commissioner of the District informing me, not without agitation, that the Mayor of Famagusta's Address of Welcome would be tied up in the white and blue ribbons of Greece. This he said had been the practice for many years: after all the Mayor was not bound to offer any address: it would be a pity to begin with an incident bound to offend four-fifths of the population. (p. 480)

Elsewhere in his memoirs, Storrs (1973) comments on Greek Cypriot national identity:

The Greekness of the Cypriots is in my opinion indisputable. Nationalism is more, is other, is greater than pigmnetations or cephalic indices. A man is of the race of which he passionately feels himself to be. No sensible person will deny that the Cypriot is Greek-speaking, Greek-thinking, Greek-feeling, Greek... Indeed, the race-consciousness of the Greeks is only less persistent than that of the Jews themselves. (p. 495)

His racist stereotypes notwithstanding, Storr's statement is nevertheless interesting for it provides us with the impression of a man who, although he had every reason to downplay any disloyalty by his Royal subjects, nevertheless acknowledges that at a time when the vast majority of the population still lived in rural areas, the wider culture on the island was clearly Greek. Graph 1 shows the
The vast majority of the population, around 80% at the time in question, to be rural.

It is characteristic that upon the arrival of the British the first appointed High Commissioner of Cyprus, Sir Garnet Wolseley, was greeted by the Bishop of Kition-Larnaca with the slogan of Enosis, while similar feelings were expressed in the address of notables from Lemesos (Kyrris, 1985). In the capital Lefkosia, the Archbishop in his greeting expressed a more collaborationist attitude by merely noting the expectation of the Cypriots for freedom, justice, and equality under the law (Kyrris, 1985). Although confusing the Bishop of Kiti (Larnaca) with the Archbishop, Storrs (1973) gives us a taste of the moment:

[W]hen Sir Garnet Wolseley landed at Larnaca in 1878 he was waited upon by a deputation headed by the Archbishop who, in his address, used the following words: 'We accept the change of Government, inasmuch as we trust that Great Britain will help Cyprus, as it did the Ionian Islands, to be united with Mother Greece, with which it is nationally connected.' This attitude a large proportion of Greek-speaking Cypriots have never abandoned. (p. 490)

Note that the term Greek-speaking Cypriots was seen by many to be part of an effort to undermine the Greekness of the Greek Cypriots, and in the 1930s and 1950s it was the cause of many protests.

Three years later, in 1880, at a time when the Greek state was preparing for yet another clash with the Ottoman empire, Greek officers arrived on the island to purchase mules (Cyprus was known since antiquity for its mules). Hill's (1972) description of the event shows the fervor with which the Greeks of Cyprus reacted to national crises.
At the time of the Greek mobilization and preparations for war against Turkey a wave of enthusiasm swept Cyprus. Greek officers came to purchase mules; to the 143 which they bought, Cypriotes added 107 more as a free contribution; the Archbishop accompanied the gift with a letter to King George (my note: the then King of Greece) expressing Cypriote solidarity with Mother Greece. When the Greek officers sailed on 7 November, 150 volunteers went with them. What is extraordinary about the whole affair is that the Government, in the face of these demonstrations maintained at first an attitude of complete indifference. No measures were taken to restrain the effusions of the people in public demonstrations or articles in the Press. (p. 411)

In 1887, following an article in the newspaper "I Foni Tis Kiprou" (The Voice of Cyprus), which called for a mass demonstration to express the needs and aspirations of the people, a National Committee was formed to organize the first such demonstration after Britain took on the island. About ten thousand townspeople and villagers joined in the rally, which was attended by the Archbishop and Greek members of the newly found Legislative Council. The rally was addressed by a teacher and a member of the Legislative Council, and approved a resolution (by voice), which the Archbishop, and the members of the Legislative Council, accompanied by the crowd delivered to the High Commission (Sofokleous, 1984). At the same time, similar demonstrations took place in two other cities of the island (Larnaca and Ammohostos). These early requests for union are evident of the optimism with which the Greeks of Cyprus viewed the change of command on the island, from Ottoman to the British. Soon enough, requests turned into demands, and gradually peaked into full-blown nationalist movements in two instances; in the short-lived October 1931 rebellion, and in the 1955-59 armed struggle.
For centuries Cyprus was ruled by foreign conquerors, and more specifically, by the dominant power in the east Mediterranean region. When the British arrived on the island, the general expectation, be it naïve or not, was that the self-proclaimed modernizing empire would grant the Cypriots their freedom, if only they made their demands clear and demonstrate their popular support. Fifty years of disillusionment with British intentions culminated in the rise of a more aggressive nationalist movement.
CHAPTER II

INTELLECTUALS, CULTURE, AND NATIONALISM

Intellectuals

After my introductory remarks, and before embarking on the examination of the role of intellectuals in the 1931 nationalist movement in Cyprus, a few theoretical points must be made concerning definitions. Pinard and Hamilton (1989) consider as intellectuals (or intellectuals proper), all those who are engaged in occupational roles concerned with the creation and transmission of culture (this definition is used by Lipset, Shumpeter, and others). Although this definition excludes practitioners and appliers of culture (highly educated persons or persons engaged in professional and technical occupational roles) from the category of intellectuals, these are included in the wider category of intelligentsia. The emphasis on occupational roles is also shared by Barber (1998) who strives "to get a better analytic understanding of the nature and functions of the intellectuals" (p. 17), which he views as educated elites whose function is "providing information and justifying and criticizing norms and values" (p. 20). Although I do not believe in any given "nature" of intellectuals, Barber's focus on articulation and dissemination of public discourse is helpful in the study of the political leadership roles of intellectuals. Sadri (1992), who adopts a Weberian standpoint, suggests a set of ideal-type concepts for use
as tools by the social sciences. Through examining the various types of intellectuals as they are defined (indirectly rather than directly) by Weber and other intellectuals, Sadri unfolds a continuum of roles and functions and types of commitment (pure-knowledge-seekers to committed intellectuals), as well as various layers (intellectuals as carriers of ideas to intelligentsia as organizers of ideas).

Definitions of intellectuals as creators of culture can be seen as elitist, since they tend to disregard other potential sources of culture creation. With that as context, I still believe that the emphasis on intellectuals' occupational roles is preferable to the alternative of seeing intellectuals as possessing some innate constitutive quality. Thus, I consider intellectuals to be those educated strata of the population, which occupy themselves with the articulation, justification, and/or critique of culture. This definition in no way implies that other categories of people not included in the above definition do not engage in intellectual work.

Culture

Although culture is not the focus of my thesis, it is my contention that culture is an active factor in social change. In this sense, some clarifications on culture as an analytic tool are in order. In my study I will adopt Ann Swidler's (1986, 1995) view of culture as a set--or toolkit--of "symbols, stories, rituals, and world-views, which people may use in varying configurations to solve
different kinds of problems" (Swidler, 1986, p. 273). According to this view, the causal significance of culture lies "not in defining ends of action, but in providing cultural components that are used to construct strategies of action" (p. 273). In other words, culture "shapes the capacities" (p. 277) from which strategies of action are constructed.

Structural and modernist theories neglect both culture and action altogether, or they brush them aside by merging culture into structure, and defining action as mere reaction to structural strains. Efforts to provide processual explanations within the structural outlook (i.e., Eisenstadt's concept of elites) are to say the least underdeveloped, and the elites themselves are seen as acting out of mostly instrumental self-interest. On the other hand, action-oriented theorists (social movement theorists) tend to view national identity as a collective identity, as opposed to a social identity (note that Smith calls national identity a collective identity, but without the distinction in question), meaning that it emerges with the nationalist movement that gives it birth. The only culture that this model acknowledges as actively constructed and processual is the culture of the movement itself. Societal culture is either neglected, or treated as a structural background against which activists construct their frames and strategies of action.

Until recently, most theories dealt with nationalism on a macro level, often viewing it as a unified, monolithic social fact. Thus, it was equated with national identity—which itself was seen
as monolithic and as merely reflecting existing structures rather than as an active part of structure. This approach views nationalism as an "ideology" that either stems from an effort on the part of the modern state to acquire legitimation (Anderson, 1983; Gellner, 1983; Hobsbawm, 1990), or from a popular (ethnic) reaction to external forces such as global capitalism, colonialism, or imperialism (neocolonialism) (Smith, 1995). These macro level analyses are useful in delineating ideal types like modernity, but they fail to examine the process of social construction and change closely, and inevitably either fail to recognize, or take for granted, the role of the agent in the process of social change.

Social movement theory, on the other hand, takes a more processual view of identity. Melucci (1988), for example, views collective identity as a process rather than a monolithically harmonious set of orientations. In this case, we run the risk of conflating nationalism with national identity (discourse creates identity that in turn challenges the state), almost in the reverse manner of Gellner (the state makes the discourse that shapes identity). Social movement theories identify social movements as creators of collective identities; in this sense, modern nationalist movements (and nationalist discourse) are seen as the founders of national identities. In other words, nationalist movements are seen as the agents in charge of constructing national identities. Jenson (1995) for example, notes that the politics of nationalist movements include the construction of a collective identity. She goes on further to
note that national identities are "no more 'embodied' than are the collective identities of other social movements" (p. 107). Such an approach, which is common among social movement theorists, runs the risk of neglecting the broader culture as a factor in inspiring nationalist discourse, shaping it, or impeding it, thus neglecting the role of the wider culture in the construction of national identity. The concept of resonance, which was developed by social movement theorists, to their credit, must be taken into account if we are to understand how discourse can sometimes but not always lead to mass mobilization. The role the broader culture plays in the resonance or not of various (competing) discourses, although not central to social movement theorists, is examined by Ann Swidler (1986, 1995). In essence, Swidler warns us against viewing the wider culture as a social background, but rather to see it as a set of skills and orientations that informs social action.

It is my view that agents, including agents advocating social and political change, are acting in a "cultured" manner, and within structural constraints. Furthermore, what is usually seen as instrumental action can be said to be informed by culture (the generally prevailing culture, but also the subculture of the group, community, movement, or organization). Even groups or movements that have a stake in overturning existing cultural norms and values are usually very careful in their wording, so as not to alienate their potential audience, and thus achieve maximum potential for mobilization. In other words, even when the acting agents themselves do not adhere to
prevailing cultural norms and values, they must take into account the values, beliefs, and actions of what they hope to be their audience, and the structural constraints and possibilities of society.

Furthermore, the use of cultural symbols usually has some instrumental function. Because nationalist movements are acting in a cultured way (meaning that agents have already existing personal and social identities) they not only act out to either challenge or support existing structures (states), but also engage in the process of identity construction (for example in immigrant states), reconstruction (as in the Soviet Union following the October Revolution), modification (as in ethnic nationalism--Egypt, Greece), or just affirmation (as in state led nationalist discourse in states where there is already a national identity).

My purpose is not to negate the social movement theories' emphasis on action, as it truly illuminates the process of social change, and comprises a valid (in my evaluation) argument and standpoint, against theories that over-emphasize the role of structure. Rather the opposite, I believe that Swidler's (1986, 1995) insight on culture as a catalyst for action opens the way for a social movement approach to the study of nationalism that takes both the culture of the movement as well as the wider culture into consideration. I hope that my effort will contribute to such an approach to the study of nationalism.
Nationalism and National Identity

Nationalism is what William Conolly calls a contested concept, in the sense that it carries different meanings, and so defining nationalism "is in the first place a definitional task and not an empirical challenge" (Motyl, 1992, p. 307). In light of this warning, Alexander Motyl, in an article arguing for the modernity of nationalism, notes that whatever functional definition one may use for nationalism, the definition must be used uniformly; "internal consistency is the goal" (p. 308). Motyl defines nationalism as a "political ideal that views statehood as the optimal form of political organization for each nation" (p. 310), but recognizes other possible definitions or meanings. These include the notion of nationalism as a political ideology or ideal promoting self-determination (statehood or self-rule), a belief in the natural and proper division of the world into nations, a feeling of love for one's nation, and finally, a belief in the superiority of one's nation. In short, "these views of nationalism boil down, respectively, to the following beliefs: in the nation-state, in self-government, in national identity, in national well-being, and in national superiority" (p. 311). Motyl then concludes that

a dispassionate application of the concept of nationalism leads up to the conclusion that nationalism, in all of the above five designations, is not only alive and well in the West, which claims to be everything but nationalist, but it is also quite modern. (p. 312)

Giddens (1996) defines nationalism as "the affiliation of individuals to a set of symbols and beliefs emphasizing communality
among members of a political order" (p. 169). Greenfeld (1996) is more or less in agreement with Giddens. She defines nationalism, in its general, neutral sense, as an umbrella term which subsumes related phenomena of national identity (or nationality) and consciousness and collectivities based on them--nations. Most specifically, it refers to the set of ideas and sentiments, which form the conceptual framework of national identity. Calhoun's definition doesn't even require the pre-existence of a solidified consciousness (affiliating itself with a particular political order) but rather a mere lingua franca suffices; "Nationalism is, among other things, what Michel Foucault called a 'discursive formation,' a way of speaking that shapes our consciousness" (Calhoun, 1997, p. 3).

Each of the theorists mentioned above cautions that the term is problematic, not only because of the multitude of definitions adopted in the literature, but also because of the vagueness of those definitions. This vagueness is not surprising considering that nationalism is largely a psychosocial phenomenon, and as such, difficult to measure, or even define for that matter. For my purposes, I will adopt the widest possible meaning for the concept of nationalism, subsuming both national identity (affiliation with symbols and beliefs--feeling of togetherness), and nationalist discourse. Therefore, nationalism can be seen on the one hand, as the political ideology that gives primacy to the nation as a political entity, and to national identity over other collective identities, and on the other hand, as the discourse which both shapes and is shaped by
national identity.

National identity is sometimes viewed as a direct, or indirect consequence of modernization (a construct of state processes so to speak). My view is that national identity is indeed a social construct (as opposed to a primordial innate quality), relational, contextual—ever changing even, according to the social, economic, and political reality of each era. I believe that both internal and external factors influence nationalism, although I feel that primacy should be given to internal factors, aided, or inhibited by external ones. The reason I give primacy to internal factors is that nationalism is so closely connected to national identity, and as I believe the concept of false consciousness is problematic, I am inclined to view external factors as having an enabling-constraining influence rather than a determining one. I see nationalism as both the political ideology and the discourse reflecting national identity. Such a standpoint allows for the examination of both internal and external factors of social change, on both the macro and micro levels, and most importantly, without neglecting the agent from the process of change.

As national identity (and nationalism for that matter) is a contested concept, it is neither surprising nor unwelcome that we often find competing nationalist discourses, even within people that profess to be members of the same nation. This competition can be seen as a process of negotiating change, and does not always take the form of pro- and against modernization, nor is it always based
on opposing reactions to external factors. This nationalist competition, or negotiation, sometimes reflects what Greenfield would call a resentment and Wallace (1956) would call a transformation of mazeway.4

The nationalist movement in Cyprus embraced both traditional and “modern” symbols to secure and maintain the loyalty and achieve the mobilization of the Cypriot Greeks. An array of Byzantine political and social symbols, together with ancient Greek ideas and symbols, made up a medley of insignia that promoted the Greekness of Cyprus, and the right for self-determination.5 Nationalist rhetoric though, never attacked modernization in favor of tradition. Modernization was sought after, while tradition was held in high esteem. Actually, one of the most often used accusations against Britain by nationalists (and internationalists/communists alike) was the neglect of the economic progress of the island--keeping Cyprus backward.

Nationalism then, in my evaluation, is neither inherently pro-tradition, nor inherently pro-modernization. Its form and content is ever being shaped by economic processes, social and political developments (both internal-class structure, and external-World capitalism), and last but not least, by the visions, expectations, aspirations, and loyalties of the people. In its turn, nationalism often affects political and socio-economic events. In sum, one must not make the mistake of either downplaying or overestimating the role of the agent in processes of social change.
The leadership role of intellectuals in nationalist movements is well established. Pinard and Hamilton (1989) point to a significant involvement of intellectuals in the leadership of New Left and communal movements, such as nationalist ones. Giesen (1998) also makes the connection between intellectuals and nationalist movements, although in my evaluation he may be going too far by arguing that, "it is usually not the impoverished and oppressed masses on the periphery who emerge as carriers of national identity, but rather the elites within peripheral sectors and classes" (p. 6). In any case, he is not alone; Schumpeter (1950) seems to agree with the Giesen's observation, and notes that the people (as in the masses), "never develops definite opinions on its own initiative. Still less it is able to articulate them" (p. 145). Although this argument seems elitist, it is a recurring theme in the literature, and in line with current structural theory, which tends to view nationalism as the preoccupation primarily of modern, urban elites, if not as merely the preoccupation of the state. The connections between education, urbanization, and class are not to be overlooked. Nevertheless, whether the message of an elite becomes accepted by larger portions of the population than by its immediate client audience is an empirical question, and depends on many factors (historical circumstance, culture, political/economic developments, etc.). Furthermore, public discourse is not a one way communication, but a dialogical negotiation process. Melucci (1988, who views social
movements as "multipolar action systems," warns that when using a dualistic assumption one must resort to a deus ex machina (e.g., the intellectuals) "in order to connect the objective preconditions and the subjective attitudes and to transform the latter into action" (p. 332). In the case of early 20th century Cyprus, as we will see, the nationalist message of the intellectuals seems to have had resonance among both urban and rural populations, partly due to its accommodation of local cultural values, and partly due to the power of the church to communicate its message to the majority of the population, both urban and rural.
CHAPTER III
INTELLECTUALS AND NATIONALISM IN CYPRUS

Introductory Remarks

There were four main categories of intellectuals in pre-World War II Cyprus: (1) clerics, (2) teachers, (3) journalists, and (4) lawyers. Journalists and lawyers comprised new and rising in size and status, intellectual strata, while clerics comprised the traditional Cypriot intelligentsia for centuries. If Gramsci's definition of organic intellectuals can be expanded to include cultural characteristics as well as class, clerics can be said to comprise an organic (to religious ideology if not culture in the wider sense) intellectual category. Whereas clerics have been virtually the only allowed local authority for at least the previous three centuries, teachers, journalists, and lawyers as social "classes" did not make their appearance until the arrival of the British in 1878.

I should note that my focus on only three intellectual categories does not imply that other members of the intelligentsia did not play a role in the Greek nationalist movements of Cyprus. Indeed, doctors were prominent in the struggle for union, and one of the leading articulators of the unionist camp in the 1960s was a psychoanalyst. Furthermore, poets, writers, play-writers, and other categories (lawyers for example) have all contributed to the development of the nationalist movements of the 1930s and 1950s. Yet,
clerics and teachers comprised the largest intellectual categories in early 20th century Cyprus, with an often stated contribution to nationalism on the island, and hence their importance to my thesis. Journalists in the 1930s on the other hand, comprise an emerging intellectual category, which produced nationalistic public discourse that reached the urban population at first, and the rural subsequently.

Loizos (1974) notes that during the first fifty years of British rule there were three main categories of Greek Cypriots who had "an interest" in Enosis; the Church, the "literate urban elite," and school-teachers (pp. 116-117). By urban elite I understand Loizos to mean the rising commercial class, which was indeed urban. Loizos argues that the Church supported the movement partly because it perceived the British as being threatening to its religious and political authority (note that this view seems to originate in Hill, 1972); the literate urban elite supported Enosis in order to claim membership in a larger political unit; and, school-teachers supported Enosis as they were socialized in the ideas of the Greek nation through their education and training, and because it allowed them to be the cultural gate-keepers on the island.7 Loizos (1974) ends by arguing that

the illiterate and debt-ridden rural population, for whom British rule brought both efficient administration and improved economic opportunities, were not aware to any large extent of the agitation for Enosis which Church, elite and teachers were supporting. Only as their children became literate and as new roads brought the politicians to the villages, did their awareness quicken into interest. This interest was probably still slender by 1931. (p. 118)
As we will see later, the participation of many villages in the 1931 uprising casts doubt on parts of Loizos' argument, mainly if we consider that his argument is almost identical to that of the colonial English historian Hill (1972), whose account is at least dubious. Furthermore, Loizos fails to mention the links between the various intellectual categories, or to establish the links between nationalist discourse and Cypriot culture. Had, for example, the Church decided to adopt a different frame to its message (even if such an instrumental standpoint is valid), would it have the resonance it did among the people? For instance, would the parents of the students tolerate any message taught to their children in schools had it not been in accord with their own values and beliefs? Another point I must make concerning Loizos' argument is that the involvement of the Church in nationalist movements prior to the arrival of the British casts doubt on his reasoning concerning the alleged anti-British interests of the Church causing its unionist stand. In any case, Loizos' (1974) observation that teachers and clerics comprised the core of nationalist agitation is supported by historical accounts. Although my thesis does not intend to debunk the claims of the structurists that nationalist movements are more often than not affairs of educated, urban elites, the case of the early 20th century Greek Cypriot nationalist movement at least casts doubt on the teleological implications of such an outlook, and if nothing else, it shows the chameleonic nature of nationalism.

In another account of the rise of nationalism in Cyprus, also
with a structuralist approach, Cypriot sociologist Caesar Mavratsas (1998, p. 73) notes that the role of education in the "national incorporation" (linguistic, cultural, political) and to the politicization of Greek ethnicity, was of "capital importance." Mavratsas considers the identification of Cypriots with the Greek state as a process that had to be "installed and cultivated" rather than one being developed in popular consciousness through the centuries. Nevertheless, he does acknowledge the total success of this irredentist project, at least on the ideological and cultural levels, in the process of imagining Cyprus as part of a wider Greek national state. He furthermore notes: "the dream of the Great Idea included not only the promise of national strengthening, but also the promise of their deliverance from an arbitrary and autarchic regime" (p. 72). The process described by Mavratsas is not without merit, although it does not consider the bases for the resonance enjoyed by the Greek nationalist vision among the Cypriots, and which must be sought in Cyprus' Greek Byzantine past, rather than the petty interests of various elites. Furthermore, his position, together with Loizos' tend to force the phenomenon to fit the model (the structural model which views state processes as being central to national identity formation). In other words, I argue that the modern Greek Cypriot nationalist vision was in tune with the cultural models and values of the Greek population of Cyprus, and that is where the roots of its resonance among the population will be found. Only when we consider the cultural bases of the Greek Cypriot national-
ist discourse can we begin to understand its success.

Overall, clerics, teachers, and journalists played a major role in the formation and development of the Greek nationalist movement in Cyprus. Indeed, during the 1931 uprising, the commissioner of Pafos sent an urgent and confidential letter to the Governor of Cyprus, noting that those who stirred trouble were basically schoolmasters, clerics, and lawyers (Stylianou, 1984). Even though journalists are not mentioned in the letter, subsequent censorship laws nevertheless reflect their contribution to the movement. In his memoirs, Storr (1973) expresses the predicament of the British authorities prior to the 1931 revolt:

The Government was thus placed in a position of absolute dependence upon an obstructive, unreasonable, and determinedly hostile majority, counting upon and assisted by the dead weight of opposition and detraction continuously (and as a rule not illegally) applied by the schools, Press, pulpit and platform of Enosis propaganda. (p. 531)

Education and Church in Cyprus

I shall begin my discussion with an analysis of the role of clerics as intellectuals, and their impact on the nationalist movement of the 1930s and 1950s. Although education is not a sufficient determinant in being an intellectual, it is no less a necessary characteristic of intellectuals. Therefore, I must make some introductory notes as to the development of education in Cyprus.

Up to the latter part of the 19th century, we cannot really speak of public education in Cyprus. Anyone who could read and write was considered an educated person, and enjoyed a higher status in
the village community. Anything more than basic literacy was a rare luxury within reach only of the elite who could afford it. The Ottomans, who ruled Cyprus for three hundred years from the 16th to 19th centuries, paid no attention to educating the local population.

The first institution to show any interest in education was the church of Cyprus, which was upgraded during Ottoman rule from a cultural and religious institution to one that also enjoyed considerable political power through the role of Ethnarchy, meaning religious and cultural, as well as national leadership. It is important to note here that the Greek language does not differentiate between ethnic and national. The word used to denote both is ethnos, and therefore, Ethnarchy in Greek literally means National Leadership. The recognition by the Ottomans of the Cyprus Church as both a religious and a national (and thus politicised) institution had a profound effect on the power and authority the church enjoyed. Furthermore, this new role required an administrative infrastructure. As the only organisation in Cyprus with funds available to devote to culture, and as the only institution which actually had some use for intellectuals and educated bureaucrats, the church took on the role of patron of education up until the beginning of the twentieth century. This relationship between church and education had its limitations though. It is characteristic that the Bishop of Kyrenia in a conversation with British journalist Agnes Smith expressed the fear that the spread of education would pave the way for materialistic ideas to permeate Cypriot society (Prodromou, 1984).
During the 16th-19th century, makeshift schools staffed by poorly educated monks or priests ran in some monasteries and elsewhere, under the aegis of the monasteries themselves, or that of the bishoprics. Education in these schools was limited to some reading and writing from scriptures and classic Greek philosophy. There was also a school in Lefkosia, on the grounds of, and run by, the Archbishopric of the Church of Cyprus. The first school was established by Archbishop Filotheos in 1741 and was housed in the Archbishopric in Lefkosia. From then on and up until the 20th century the few schools that operated in Cyprus, mainly with funds from the church or rich benefactors aspired only to teach their few students to read and perhaps to write. This first, three-year school was founded in 1741, and ran up to around 1780, when it was closed, allegedly due to a particularly harsh administration of the then Ottoman governor of the island (Prodromou, 1984). Archbishop Kyprianos, following the footsteps of his predecessor, founded another school in Lefkosia, housed on land that belonged to Kykko monastery, right opposite the Archbishopric itself in 1812. This, as the previous school, apart from church backing, was maintained by donations from rich benefactors. In 1893, the school was upgraded to Gymnasium (intermediate education school--high-school), and was recognized by the Greek ministry of education as equal standing with the high-schools then operating in the Kingdom of Greece. This recognition also reflected the control that the Greek ministry exercised over the educational material taught in Cyprus. The Pancyprian Gymnasium, as it was
called after its upgrade, was the first modern public education institution, and ever since, it played an important role in the development of ideas in Cyprus.

The close relationship between church and education throughout the 18th and 19th centuries is reflected in the origins of the intellectual category of teachers on the island, which can be said to have originated in the stratum of teachers. Throughout these two centuries, clerics and teachers are basically the only two educated strata among the Greek Cypriot population, with a sense of mission to create and disseminate culture. The teachers and head-masters of the developing Cypriot schools were educated in the few Greek institutions of higher education. Many of these teachers were clerics. Furthermore, many of the posts in the church hierarchy were manned by individuals that served successful careers as teachers. Prodromou (1984) offers many examples of teachers that became Bishops, or Archbishops. The relationship between church and education in Cyprus is also reflected in the culture of the Cypriots, according to which, teacher and father are the two socially acceptable terms used to address a Greek orthodox priest, and are used interchangeably (Das-kale and Patera).

The turning point for Cyprus education, as with other public institutions, was the transfer of power from the Ottoman to the British Empire in the late 19th century. During the three centuries of Ottoman rule, Cyprus was depleted of both resources and people due to ill treatment, high taxation, and an arbitrary rule that kept the
vast majority of the Greek Cypriots in virtual serfdom. Still, the Ottomans, in need of an indigenous social structure, which would mediate their authority to the people, have upgraded the church, from the religious and cultural institution it was prior to the Ottoman conquest, to a politico-economic institution as well. Although the Church of Cyprus had a long tradition of political and economic involvement throughout the Byzantine era (4th-13th centuries), three centuries of Frankish persecution reduced it to a religious and cultural role. After the Ottoman conquest of Cyprus in 1570-71, the newly arrived conquerors immediately re-established the Orthodox Church as an independent organization, and recognized it not only as a religious institution, but as a representative of the Christians of the island, and a mediator between the authorities and the people (Kyrris, 1985). This included the collection of taxes by the church on behalf of the Ottomans, which gave the church considerable power as it not only enjoyed special privileges in its new role, but also gained administrative authority, representing the orthodox Christian population of Cyprus in administrative matters. Papadopoulos (1965) for example, in a study of demographic changes in Cyprus during Ottoman rule, shows how the Church tended to underestimate the size of the Christian tax-paying population, in its reports to the Ottomans. In short, Ottoman rule upgraded the church to an Ethnarchy, meaning both religious and cultural, as well as national leadership. This new role required an administrative infrastructure, which had to be staffed by educated personnel. After three centuries of educational
neglect, the Church once again required an educational infrastructure to carry out its upgraded mission. It is, I believe, important to note that the status of Ethnarchy, which combines elements of both religious and secular leadership, gives the church the power to define what is shameful behavior, both in the religious and secular worlds. This power did not rest on any overt imposition of the church's commands but rather it rested on the cultural premise of obedience to one's own leadership (or one's own patron).

Efforts by the new rulers of Cyprus to Anglicize education on the island were successfully resisted by both religious and civil institutions, and so the educational system remained, throughout British rule, under the control of the Greek and Turkish religious authorities. The Greek Orthodox Church (through the Communal Councils) controlled Greek education, and the Muslim Church controlled Turkish education.

Nationalism and Dissent

Although competing strategies for the achievement of union with Greece were being negotiated among the intellectuals, Enosis itself was not seriously contested. Even though subsequent dissent from the cause of Enosis was evident among teachers, this did not occur until the Cypriot state took over the educational system from the church (or more accurately, from the Communal Councils in which the church and local politicians dominated), after 1960.

As far as journalists are concerned, the right-left continuum
can be seen as the primary axis around which their loyalties and opinions revolved. As so many other aspects of modern Cypriot society (from football clubs, to coffee shops, and even car brands and import trade shops), the popular press too was split into right press and left press. Yet, in the 1930s, the few initial Communist intellectuals were still a very small and marginal group. In any case, journalist accounts of national issues were in unison, and national issues dominated both newspapers and magazines. In the 1950s struggle, we see the first dissent among leftist publications but only on strategy (AKEL was against the armed struggle as it developed). Dissent on issues of vision did not really become evident until after the 1960s. This phenomenon points to the culture of obedience of the day, which labeled any expression of dissent from approved lines as shameful behavior and, by extension, branded whoever dared to voice dissent, at least on essential issues such as the vision and goals of the movement, as a traitor. It was only after this ethic was eroded through urbanization, tourism, and bureaucratization, and through the lessons of civil conflict in the 1960s and 1970s that critical discourse could really be developed and facilitate political dialogue. In any case, due to the long pre-existing cultural identification of the Greek Cypriots (urban and rural) with the Hellenic nation, the ideal of Enosis was treated as sacred by the Greek Cypriot intellectuals, in the sense that it was considered to be over and above any acceptable disagreement. Hill (1972) mentions that "alternative models to the Enosis by Greek Cy-
priots did not make their appearance until after the 1931 revolt" (p. 554). Note that he is referring to a model calling for the autonomy of the island within the framework of the British Empire, which was the one supported by the British, and some of the collaborationists, and the one that dominated in the end, albeit within the framework of the British Commonwealth.

That being said, it was not the case that dissent in political and social issues was necessarily silenced. Although up to the 1931 revolt the Church basically dominated Greek Cypriot political leadership, that was not without contest. The local press, as Englezakis (1995) informs us unanimously opposed the candidature of clerics, maintaining that the laity did not want the prelates as members of the Legislative Council. However, the election of the Bishop of Kition (Larnaca) in two divisions proved otherwise. Thus we see that on lesser issues, those of administration, etc., dissent was evident, and sometimes even bitter. Yet, this accentuates even more the difference between lesser socio-economic, issues, and the national issue, which was put over and above acceptable disagreement.

Clerics

Although the Church as a whole and on an official level did not fit neatly into either the radical unionist camp, or the collaborationist camp, it did uphold and maintain the ideal of Enosis. Various clerics, with Bishop Mylonas first, comprised the leadership of at least the radical (nationalist) camp of Greek Cypriot political
leadership. Apart from proclamations, such as that which sparked the 1931 uprising, clerics have been disseminating their message (both religious and secular) through weekly sermons which accompanied mass (which at this point were attended by the majority of both the rural and urban population), and through religious youth organizations, largely in charge of Sunday school. Papastavros (translating literally as Father-Stavros), one of the clergy exiled by the British in the 1950s for his nationalist stand, offered an interesting anecdote in a classic BBC documentary called Cyprus: The Grim Legacy. In it he described how during a sermon he proclaimed the revolution, while after noticing that British officers were moving to arrest him, he added, the revolution against evil. Papastavros described this incident to describe the thin line clerics were walking by using nationalist discourse in and out of church. The anecdote is characteristic of the potentially instigating role of the sermon and how clerics were aware of its political power. Hill (1972) also comments on the nationalist discourse taking place in the island churches when he describes a boycott of the celebration of the English queen's Jubilee in 1887. According to him, during the boycott "[I]n six hundred churches the clergy spoke for Union with Greece, and sports meetings were organized so that the English celebrations failed for lack of attendance" (p. 498). Hill (1972) mentions another instance, which sheds light on the potential role of the sermon as political discourse, in which the Bishop of Pafos (a Cyprus town) was fined a large sum for sermons
and speeches that agitated for union with Greece. It is worth noting that while journalists were mainly an urban genre, not one of the nineteen Cypriot Bishops belonged to the "urban-middle class" during the seventy-seven years of British rule (Englezakis, 1995, p. 434).

Teachers

Teachers have overtly been influenced by two main factors: (1) The church (which also had direct control over them—and thus over their voice), and (2) the educational institutions of Greece in which they trained (and in which Greek irredentist nationalism was dominant). Teachers were disseminating their message in the classroom, but also in informal ways, and through writing in newspapers and magazines. These early teachers were imbued with the orthodox Christian ethic and cosmology. They were also influenced by the contemporary trends that influenced the rest of the Greek intelligentsia, which was concentrated in the few centers that trained teachers from Cyprus. These secular trends involved mainly the Great Idea, which was the ideological framework for Greek irredentist nationalism—the dominant political ideology in the Greek political scene throughout the 19th century. This irredentism basically demanded the incorporation of all Greek-speaking, Christian orthodox populations that remained under Ottoman rule, to the then newly found Kingdom of Greece. Greek nationalist ideology viewed modern Greeks as directly descending from ancient Greeks, through Byzantium, and incorporated symbols from all three periods to legiti-
mate the struggle for unification of all Greek-speaking, orthodox populations of the eastern Mediterranean, and the Balkans, around the national center--Athens (Kyrris, 1985; Mavratsas, 1998).

Greek Cypriot schools prior to the 1931 uprising were clearly exposing their students to Greek nationalist discourse. Storrs' (1973) graphic description of the Greek schools of his days is very revealing of the nationalist discourse taking place in schools:

There was no definite anti-British curriculum in the Schools, but they were all actively Hellenizing. All Greek Elementary Schools used the 'Analytical Programme' as published in Greece, and adopted by the Cyprus Board of education. No reading books were allowed in these schools except those that were approved by the 'Critical Committee' in Athens. The Gymnasium of each town and the Teachers Training College were recognized by the Greek Ministry of Education, and worked under Regulations issued there from. Portraits of King Constantine and Queen Sophie, of Venizelos and other worthies, but of no English Sovereign, adorned the walls of the classrooms, together with elaborate maps of modern Greece; while that of Cyprus, if to be found at all, was as a rule small, out of date, worn out, and frequently thrust behind the blackboard. (p. 493)

Hill (1973) confirms Storrs' account of Greek Cypriot schools of the time, and adds that,

their maps represented Cyprus as part of 'unredeemed Greece'. Portraits of King Constantine, Queen Sophia, Venizelos and of the heroes of the Greek war of independence decorated the walls. It was the glories of Greek history, not the achieve­ments of the British nation, that were made familiar to the pupils they were taught that Greece was their mother-coun­try. . . . Not until after the outbreak of 1931 was the fly­ing of the flag without Government license prohibited. (p. 492)

Note that in a footnote referring to the above passage, Hill men­tions that maps of Greece that included Cyprus were prohibited on 23 December 1936, under the Seditious Publications Laws of 1921 and
1932, and yet that they were still being imported into the island in 1937. Maps of Greece that included Cyprus were an important tool in nationalist discourse, as they clearly illustrated the boundaries of the nation. At least until the 1970s, when I went to public school in Cyprus, every school map of Greece (circulating in Cyprus schools) had a frame on the right bottom corner, with a map of Cyprus in it.

**Journalists**

Up until the end of the last century there was no such thing as mass media in Cyprus. Information was disseminated by word of mouth and official information was posted in public areas. Apart from the prohibitions of Ottoman rule there was a general lack of the necessary infrastructure. There were no journalists, no printing presses, and most of all, no readership of any size, as the vast majority of the population was illiterate. When journalism made its first steps on the island, it was by middle and high-class urbanites. At least up to the time in question (and surely much later), journalism was an almost purely urban genre (Sofokleous, 1984). I have made a survey of early Cyprus publications from the available sources (Kyrris, 1985; Sofokleous, 1984), and have compiled Table 1. Although rudimentary and surely neither conclusive nor exhaustive, the table shows clearly the urban location of journalism in 1930's Cyprus. All of the publications mentioned in the sources were published in the rising urban centers of Lefkosia, the capital (11),
Table 1

Early Cyprus Publications: 1878-1930s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Publication Title</th>
<th>Frequency of Publication</th>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Type of Publication</th>
<th>Period in Print</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Publisher and Notes</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ermis (Hermes)</td>
<td>Monthly</td>
<td>Greek</td>
<td>Commercial journal</td>
<td>1909-1911</td>
<td>Lefkosia</td>
<td>C. Samuel (private school owner)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kosmos (World)</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Greek</td>
<td>Literary journal</td>
<td>1909-1911</td>
<td>Larnaca</td>
<td>Scholar, teacher and author H.M. Barlaam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elikon (Material)</td>
<td>Monthly</td>
<td>Greek</td>
<td>Literary journal</td>
<td>1910-1911</td>
<td>Lemesos</td>
<td>O. Lasonides</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estiades (Esiades were vestal virgins)</td>
<td>Biweekly</td>
<td>Greek</td>
<td>Literary journal</td>
<td>1913-1914</td>
<td>Varosha (Famagusta)</td>
<td>Teacher persephone Papadopoulou (this is the first Cypriot and second Greek women's journal of time)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Avgi (Dawn)</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Greek</td>
<td>Literary journal</td>
<td>4/1924-3/1925</td>
<td>Lemesos</td>
<td>Marxist literary critic, journalist and essay writer, E. Chourmouzios</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Publication Title</td>
<td>Frequency of Publication</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zinon (Zeno)</td>
<td>Biweekly</td>
<td>Greek</td>
<td>Literary, scientific, and commercial review</td>
<td>1906-1908</td>
<td>Lekosia</td>
<td>Schoolmaster N. Katalanos</td>
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<tr>
<td>Stasinos - Stasinos I foni tis Kyprous (Stasinos The Voice of Cyprus)</td>
<td>Weekly</td>
<td>Greek</td>
<td>Newspaper</td>
<td>1/1/1882-1/1887</td>
<td>Larnaca</td>
<td>Teacher Themistodes Theocharides</td>
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<tr>
<td>Efimeris (Newspaper of the People)</td>
<td>Weekly</td>
<td>Greek</td>
<td>Newspaper</td>
<td>1906-1913</td>
<td>Larnaca</td>
<td>NA</td>
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<td>Publication Title</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kition (and subsequently)</td>
<td>Weekly</td>
<td>Greek</td>
<td>Newspaper</td>
<td>6/4/1879-6/9/1884</td>
<td>Larnaca and then Lefkosia</td>
<td>Th. Constantinides</td>
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<tr>
<td>Neon Kition (New Kition)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Simaia tis Kyprou (formerly Evagoras) (Flag of Cyprus)</td>
<td>Weekly</td>
<td>Greek</td>
<td>Newspaper</td>
<td>1905-1906 (?)</td>
<td>Lefkosia</td>
<td>Lawyer, Th. Theodotou followed by poet G. Stavrides (ed.) and schoolmaster N. Katalanos (redactor in chief)</td>
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<th>Publication Title</th>
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<tr>
<td>Kipriakos Filax (formerly Simaia tis Kyprou) (Cyprus Guardian)</td>
<td>Weekly</td>
<td>Greek</td>
<td>Newspaper</td>
<td>1906-1921</td>
<td>Lefkosia</td>
<td>Schoolmaster (and &quot;influential nationalist activist politician&quot;) N. Katalanos</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nea Foni tis Kyprou (New Voice of Cyprus)</td>
<td>Weekly</td>
<td>Greek</td>
<td>Newspaper</td>
<td>1912-NA</td>
<td>Lefkosia</td>
<td>K. Pavlides</td>
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<td>Publication Title</td>
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<tr>
<td>I Fonti (formerly Stasinos)</td>
<td>Weekly</td>
<td>Greek</td>
<td>Newspaper</td>
<td>2/5/1887-1912</td>
<td>Lefkosia</td>
<td>G. Nikolopoulos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiprios (Cypriot)</td>
<td>Weekly</td>
<td>Greek</td>
<td>Newspaper</td>
<td>3/1900-NA</td>
<td>Lefkosia</td>
<td>C. Filactou</td>
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<tr>
<td>Neos Kipriakos Filax</td>
<td>Weekly</td>
<td>Greek</td>
<td>Newspaper</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Lefkosia</td>
<td>C.A. Constantiniades followed by his son-in-law B. Markides</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evagoras</td>
<td>Weekly</td>
<td>Greek</td>
<td>Newspaper</td>
<td>3/1890-1905</td>
<td>Lefkosia</td>
<td>Printer, publisher, and author P. Michaelides</td>
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<tr>
<td>Publication Title</td>
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<tr>
<td>Salamis</td>
<td>Weekly</td>
<td>Greek</td>
<td>Newspaper</td>
<td>1907-1911</td>
<td>Varosha (Famagusta)</td>
<td>&quot;Progressive undergraduate of law&quot; L.Z. Zaloumides and C. Nikolaides</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ammoxostos</td>
<td>Weekly</td>
<td>Greek</td>
<td>Newspaper</td>
<td>1912-1921</td>
<td>Varosha (Famagusta)</td>
<td>L.Z. Zaloumides</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus-kypros</td>
<td>Biweekly</td>
<td>Greek-English</td>
<td>Political journal</td>
<td>8/29/1878-8/7/1882</td>
<td>Larnaca</td>
<td>Th. Constandinides followed by British partner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efterpi</td>
<td>Biweekly</td>
<td>Greek</td>
<td>Satirical journal</td>
<td>1/21/1881-6/15/1882</td>
<td>Larnaca</td>
<td>Teacher and writer Th. Constantinides</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diavolos (Devil)</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Greek</td>
<td>Satirical journal</td>
<td>1/1888-4/1888</td>
<td>Lemesos</td>
<td>The national poet of Cyprus V. Michaelides</td>
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<td>Weekly</td>
<td>Greek</td>
<td>Satirical journal</td>
<td>1/1884-6/21/1937</td>
<td>Lemesos</td>
<td>Chief Chanter of the Church of Cyprus S. Chourmouzios</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(the Bugle)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(political)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O Ragias</td>
<td>Biweekly</td>
<td>Greek</td>
<td>Satirical journal</td>
<td>1/1/1898-1906,</td>
<td>Lefkosia</td>
<td>Poet G. Stavrides</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(The Raya - the Slave - the Servile)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(political)</td>
<td>10/6/1922-4/16/1923</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diaplasis</td>
<td>Weekly</td>
<td>Greek</td>
<td>Scientific journal</td>
<td>9/1/1901-19/6/1902</td>
<td>Lemesos</td>
<td>N.D. Frankoudes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Formation)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus Herald</td>
<td>Weekly</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>Newspaper</td>
<td>10/14/1881-1/22/1887</td>
<td>Lemesos</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus Times</td>
<td>Weekly</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>Newspaper</td>
<td>4/1/1880-12/17/1881</td>
<td>Larnaca</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The table was compiled with information from Kyrris (1985) and Sofokleous (1984).
Larnaca (7), Lemesos (6), and Varosha (3).

It is no coincidence that the first newspaper on the island was published on 29th August 1878, the same year the British took control of Cyprus from the Ottoman Empire (Kyrris, 1985). The British had a more liberal attitude than their predecessors concerning the rights of colonial subjects, and even though they did reserve the right to close down newspapers for political reasons, they rarely exercised that right, at least up to the 1931 uprising (Sofokleous, 1984). Printed on a press imported from nearby Alexandria in Egypt, the first newspaper was called Kypros (Cyprus). It was a weekly with a circulation of one thousand. Quickly more newspapers followed, and by the turn of the century at least seven were in circulation. These were local, weekly newspapers, each published, written and printed by a team of three or four people. It is important to note that the first newspaper publishers in Cyprus were teachers (Sofokleous, 1984). Note that the same individual was usually owner, publisher, director, and editor of the newspaper, and together with one to two other people they would undertake all the tasks of publishing, from writing, to printing (Sofokleous, 1984).

It was not until 1936 that the island saw the publication of the first daily. It was called Eleftheria (Freedom) and it continued circulating until the Turkish invasion of 1974. Politics dominated the content of these early publications, with sports and social issues a close second. The national issue dominated these early newspapers, with most of their articles and editorials focus-
Cypriot historian C. Kyrris (1985) notes that the number of journals and periodicals that appeared in Cyprus during the first sixty years of British rule (1878-1937) was "considerably great," and that this increase "points to an intellectual explosion of a mature people" (p. 323). The publications mentioned in Kyrris' account, are mainly literary, religious, and current event, magazines and newspapers. It must be noted that this "intellectual explosion" should be seen in light of the urbanization that was starting to take place on the island. Kyrris mentions among other characteristics of early Cypriot journalism the "Hellenic national and historic consciousness and a usual agreement on basic national, political and other matters" (p. 322).

Table 1 shows that from the thirty publications cited in the sources (Kyrris, 1985; Sofokleous, 1984), twenty-seven were Greek, two were English (these comprise the main source of Hill's account), and one was bilingual (Greek-English). The two English publications were weekly newspapers, catering mainly to the British on the island, but also to the still few English speaking Cypriots. The bilingual "Cyprus-Kypros" was a biweekly political journal. Of the Greek publications mentioned, fifteen are weekly newspapers, while one progressed from weekly to biweekly to daily. Four literary journals (ranging from biweekly to monthly), one biweekly literary, scientific, and commercial review, four satirical journals (weekly
and biweekly), and one weekly scientific journal complete the list.

In Kyrris' (1985) and Sofokleous' (1984) reports there are twenty-seven individual publishers mentioned, of which the sources offer professional information on fifteen. Of these fifteen publishers, six are educators, two are lawyers, two are poets, and five carry various other professional characterisations ranging from "progressive intellectual" (Kyrris, 1985, p. 321), to literary critic, printer, publisher, and author. Although an in-depth study of these early publishers would be of great value in delineating the cultural and institutional affiliations of early journalism in Cyprus, it is nevertheless not the focus of my study. I offer this information partly in support of Sofokleous' (1984) argument concerning the connections between teachers and early journalism in Cyprus.

Sofokleous (1984) argues that the pioneers of Cyprus journalism played a "national awakening" role by criticizing rayadism (servility) and apathy towards the colonial authorities. According to Sofokleous, these early journalists were the "forerunners of the '31 revolt and the 1955 liberation struggle" (p. 247). Hill (1972), who describes the atmosphere of tolerance the British followed up to the 1931 uprising, seems to agree with Sofokleous' argument:

Freedom of speech and of the Press was in fact, before the outbreak of 1931, very extensive, although the nationalists did not always show moderation in their criticism. About 1930 seventeen Greek newspapers were allowed to discuss local political and administrative questions. (p. 494)
CHAPTER IV

INTELLECTUALS AND THE 1931 UPRISING

The Beginning of the Revolt

As we have seen, the roots of the Enosis movement must be sought in the culture of the Greek Cypriots more than the petty interests of specific elites. Yet, the Enosis movement, as a social movement, can be said to have been born during the 1931 revolt, precisely because it was not until then that a group of people identified with the strategy of aggressively pursuing the goal of union with Greece from the British colonial power. Furthermore, it was the first time that the unionist movement demonstrated its mass mobilization potential, in the sense that it is the first time that mass demonstrations took place all over the island. The National Organization (previously known as National Assembly), which was formed in 1922 and was supported by the church and its own subscriptions, was dissolved one day before the uprising due to internal polarization between extremists and collaborators (Kyrris, 1985). This break in the Greek Cypriot leadership signified the beginning of the revolt.

Two years before the 1931 uprising, a group of teachers, lawyers, journalists and other intellectuals and people of other professions established the conspiratorial National Radical Union of Cyprus (Ethniki Rizospastiki Enosi Kyprou, EREK)" (Hill, 1972; Kyrris, 1985). This group comprised the core of the radical fraction in
the Greek Cypriot political leadership. It is useful to note that this group was probably mainly an urban group. If we analyze the signatories of EREK's October 18, 1931 programmatic proclamation, we will see that nineteen out of the twenty-one signatories are from various towns, with only two from urban areas. Furthermore, it is useful to note the signatories' professions as stated next to their name; six lawyers, five merchants, four educators, three physicians, two journalists, and one secretary. Yet, disagreement among intellectuals revolved around the strategy rather than the end result of union, which was fervently supported by both camps. Bishop Mylonas' proclamation was the manifestation of the strategy adopted by the extremist camp of EREK. This was also the line that prevailed and led to the 1955 uprising. It is exactly this polarization in the Cypriot leadership ranks that signifies the birth of the Enosis movement. The polarization between collaborationists and extremists among the Cypriot intellectuals partly reflects a general change in attitude, which stemmed from disillusionment setting in after the initial optimism that accompanied the British take-over of the island. This disillusionment is expressed well in Bishop Mylonas' proclamation, which begins as follows: "Greek brothers, fifty three years of British occupation have convinced all and proved beyond doubt that enslaved people do not free themselves with pleading, requesting, and appealing to the sentiments of the tyrants" (Stylianou, 1984, p. 53).

Stylianou (1984) sheds some light on the role of the journal-
ists and clerics in the 1931 uprising. As he notes, the events that led to the uprising reached a critical level of agitation after the resignation of the Bishop of Kiti (Larnaca) from his position as member of the Legislative Council on October 17 (it was made public on Sunday, October 18). In his resignation proclamation, Bishop Nicodemos Mylonas urged the Greeks of Cyprus to pursue "national liberation through the union with Mother Greece, at the cost of any sacrifice, and in every means" (Stylianou, 1984, p. 53). Within 48 hours of the proclamation, the rebellion spread all over the island.

To suppress the uprising, the British brought in troops from Egypt, which were dispersed to both the rural areas and the towns (Kyrris, 1985). The mother-daughter symbolism in Greek Cypriot nationalist discourse is indicative of the way Cypriots saw their relationship to Greece, and persists in political discourse to this day. It is not a coincidence that this mother-daughter model is also used to denote the relationship between the Cyprus Church, and the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Constantinople (Istambul).

Panteli (1984) argues that the movement for union in the 1930s, "was based on spiritual ideals and not on material grievances. Hence the illiterate Cypriot peasant" cared much less for the national aspirations of the educated minority--the priest, physician, lawyer and schoolmaster. The unionists drew their support "almost entirely from the organized urban masses and, generally speaking, from both the right and the left" (p. 158). Although Panteli's argument seems to underestimate the power of the Church to disseminate
its message to the rural population, his observation on the leadership of the movement is in agreement with other historians and social scientists (Kyrris, 1985; Stylianou, 1984). In any case, it is understandable that the impact each intellectual category made and to which strata of the population depended on lines of communication between the intellectuals and their audience. Teachers for example, surely had more direct impact in urban areas, where the concentration of schools was higher (and mainly among the upper than the lower classes), while priests may have had more impact in rural areas, where secularism—with its separation of church and polity—was not yet dominant. Furthermore, the unionist movement was backed by intellectuals expressing both traditional (Byzantine Christian through church and teachers) and modernized (journalists and teachers) sections of the population. Be that as it may, as all three categories were pursuing the ideal of Enosis with equal fervor, unionist discourse was reaching all strata of the population.

It is interesting to note that on January 19, 1932 the Commissioner of Lemesos, in a report to his superiors commenting on the results of the uprising, mentions that members of the Cypriot high class were viewing the national goals with materialistic criteria, for they believe that under British rule, their interests were served better than if Cyprus came under Greek control. He went on to note that these individuals were expressing their views only in private, in fear of being branded a traitor by their Greek Cypriot compatriots (Stylianou, 1984). Although one must be careful in as-
sessing the objectivity of colonial reports, mainly when they deal with anti-colonial revolutionary movements, this report on the one hand, points to the fact that obedience to group leadership was part of Cypriot culture, and on the other hand, lends support to the argument that the nationalist movement in Cyprus was not as elitist as the literature may suggest (at least classwise). Thus, among the cultural bases that sustained the movement, we must include this long Christian tradition of obedience to group leadership. This feature kept going strong in Cyprus culture, at least up to the 1990s, and still does in many facets of Cyprus society.

The Revolt in the Urban Centers

At the time of the British takeover in 1878, the urban population of Cyprus was barely 16%. By 1920, it had risen to 20%. During the 1920s, urbanization proceeded with a slow but steady pace, only to increase, still with a steady pace, during the 30s. Table 2 and Figure 1 reveal the demographic structure of Cypriot society at the time in question.

Stylianou (1984) offers a day-to-day account of the 1931 uprising, which basically consisted of mass protests and other actions of disobedience to British authorities, which on one occasion led to the burning of the Governor's House. The various localized protests would more often than not begin with the church bells calling the local population to the protest, and the crowd marching with patriotic songs and slogans to the nearest official building, where
they would attempt to raise the Greek flag in the place of the union jack, while proclaiming union with Greece. At the forefront of each procession, there were usually the religious leaders, together with municipal and political leaders, followed by as many people as the momentum of the day could amass.

Table 2
1931 Cyprus Population by Residence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District/Town</th>
<th>Area in Sq. Miles</th>
<th>Total District Population</th>
<th>Population within Municipal Boundaries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lefkosia</td>
<td>1,040</td>
<td>110,010</td>
<td>23,324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lemesos</td>
<td>542</td>
<td>57,841</td>
<td>15,066</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Larnaca</td>
<td>398</td>
<td>42,108</td>
<td>11,725</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammohostos (Varosha)</td>
<td>784</td>
<td>71,472</td>
<td>8,229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pafos</td>
<td>574</td>
<td>43,769</td>
<td>4,467</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrenia</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>22,659</td>
<td>2,049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Population</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,584</strong></td>
<td><strong>347,859</strong></td>
<td><strong>64,860</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The table was compiled from information contained in the 1931 Census (in Stylianous, 1984).

In the capital Lefkosia, there were two proclamations circulating on October 18th: That of Bishop Mylonas and that of EREK.
Figure 1. Population Growth by Area of Residence.


Note: The above Figure was taken from Rangou (1983, p. 34). I have added the English translation (just below the original Greek text) and the grid lines for the first three decades of the 20th century.
EREK's proclamation circulated as a leaflet, which in support of bishop Mylonas' move, put forth a ten point program aiming at uniting Cyprus with Greece (Panteli, 1984; Stylianou, 1984). By late afternoon of the same day it was made known that the Greek members of the Legislative Council decided to resign in support. The news sparked a chain of events; "the stores and workshops were closing down and people headed to the Lefkosia Commercial Club--while the Faneromeni Church bells were ringing non-stop" (Stylianou, 1984; p. 60).

Dionysios Kykkotis, chief priest of an important Lefkosia church (the Faneromeni), headed the demonstration that ensued. Hill's (1972) graphic, if ironic, account is nevertheless clear and concise: "Holding a Greek flag, he kissed it and 'declared revolution'" (p. 548). The demonstration was three to six thousand strong (British sources mention three, while Greek participants quoted by Stylianou mention up to six thousand), and was powerful enough to cause even moderate Greek Cypriot politicians to adopt a more radical tone. G. Hadjipavlou, for example, a member of the Legislative Council who spoke at the rally, began his speech by criticizing Bishop Mylonas for his preemptive strike. After being shouted down, he adopted a more hard-line tone (Stylianou, 1984). After the various leaders finished with their speeches, the shouts to the Governor's House, which were probably instigated by young EREK sympathizers, began to thicken. Despite desperate calls by various leaders for the crowd to disperse, accompanied by promises for more action the next
day, people began to walk towards the Governor’s House, headed by Dionysios Kykkotis, Greek Cypriot politicians, teachers and other radical leaders (Stylianou, 1984). When the demonstration reached Governor’s House, some of its leaders called on to the people to disperse, but it was too late. The people began to stone the small police force that was guarding the building, the police fired, and the protestors set the building ablaze (Hill, 1972; Kyrris, 1985; Panteli, 1984; Stylianou, 1984). Police fire injured fifteen protestors, from which one later died. This incident, and others like it, in turn fueled more reaction by the population (more demonstrations following the news of the death, even more during the funeral, etc.), and added to the unionist pantheon of heroes, thus strengthening the Enosis movement. It is also understood that these events were putting pressure on the more moderate politicians and other leaders to take sides, on the union issue, and articulate a justification for their choice. In this sense, competing nationalist public discourses stemmed from the events in 1931.

In Lemesos, there was no mass reaction to Lefkosa’s demonstrations, at least until the arrival to the town of the Bishop of Larnaca Mylonas on October 20, after an invitation by Lemesos representative N. Kl. Lanitis. A crowd of about 3,000 gathered in the town’s football stadium to hear Bishop Mylonas speak. Afterwards, the protestors moved en masse to another location, where again Bishop Mylonas gave a speech, as did other notables of the town. After the speeches the protest dispersed quietly. The next
day, Bishop Mylonas visited the neighboring village of St. Tycho­nas, where he again gave a revolutionary speech. One day later, the Bishop returned to Lemesos, where news was heard of a shipment about to depart from Lemesos market with supplies to the Lefkosia gar­rison. A crowd promptly formed in the market area and destroyed the supplies. Later on, they marched to the Bishopric where Bishop My­lonas addressed them and said that if the people of Lefkosia would not allow the local British garrison to be supplied, then it would be a shame for the people of Lemesos to allow the colonialists to be supplied by Lemesos. A demonstration was formed, and headed to the Commissioner’s House. The protestors, armed with Greek flags, wooden sticks, and nationalist songs, reached the Commissioner’s House and set it on fire. On the next day, the British authorities of the town were reinforced and moved to arrest Bishop Mylonas. Upon hearing the news of the arrest, a large mass of people headed towards the Bishopric, where he was held, aiming to free their leader. Police opened fire, resulting in one death and five injur­ies. Bishop Mylonas and other notables were swiftly exiled (Stylia­nou, 1984).

The news of the Lefkosia demonstrations reached the town of Ammohostos (Varosha) and the surrounding villages by October 23. After being notified by Greek Cypriot town leaders that they could not guarantee the result of any effort to pacify the people of the town, the local colonial authorities evacuated the British residents to a British Navy ship that was anchored at Ammohostos’ port, and
called on the population for calm. Despite these calls from the authorities, the next day there was an 800 strong demonstration, which marched towards the Municipal Hall. Another, larger demonstration was planned for the following day. By then the news of the unrest had reached the surrounding villages and the rally on October 24 was 8,000 strong. The town Mayor, and various other politicians, teachers and notables spoke at the rally. The unrest and fragmented demonstrations that followed for about six days resulted in the killing of a protestor from a neighboring village (Stylianou, 1984). Again, this supports Stylianou's point that upon hearing the news of unrest in their district's town, villagers would descend upon the town and take part in the demonstrations.

In Larnaca, seat of Bishop Mylonas, there was a 600 persons strong demonstration and march, which was headed by Bishop Mylonas himself, on the very day of Mylonas' proclamation. Other demonstrations on October 24 and October 25 clashed with police forces with no injuries. It is interesting to note that villagers from many surrounding villages marched on foot in separate processions (Greek flag at the forefront), to join in the demonstrations (Stylianou, 1984).

In the smaller towns of Kyrenia and Pafos, events took on a similar form (for information on the size of the various districts/towns, see Table 2). In Kyrenia, demonstrations did not break out until Sunday October 25, at which time the Bishop of Kyrenia was stopped at a roadblock by security forces en-route to Lefkosia and
was turned back. Shocked and insulted by the refusal of the British to allow him free movement, he returned to Archangelos Church in Kyrenia, right before the sermon was over. There, he called on the participants to raise the Greek flag, and despite the reservations of the mayor, headed a procession to the Commissioner's House. There, the people replaced the union jack with a Greek flag. The British sent police, and under threat of force, the protestors dispersed. The British also set up roadblocks to prevent the influx of villagers to Kyrenia, although they were not very successful in their task, at least on this occasion, and the number of protestors gradually increased to around 1,000 people. The subsequent demonstration ended up in a clash with police forces, and the protestors suffered two injuries and one death (Stylianou, 1984). The Bishop of Kyrenia was arrested and later exiled with the Bishop of Larnaca and other political and religious leaders.

In Pafos, as in Larnaca, and elsewhere, the local Bishop's nationalist speeches prior to the October 1931 events, created an atmosphere of revolutionary expectation (Stylianou, 1984). By October 22, the news of the unrest in the capital and elsewhere had reached the people of Pafos. At around 7 p.m., all the bells of the town's churches began to call the people, which started to gather in front of the Bishopric. This first demonstration was dispersed a few hours later, after electing representatives to contact Bishop Mylonas and ask him to speak to a larger rally being organized for the 24th. In the meantime, reinforcements to the Pafos garrison be-
gan to arrive and were greeted by student demonstrations. On the 24th, separate demonstrations took place by various groups, which converged near the garrison quarters, only to hear their representatives inform them of Bishop Mylonas' arrest. The demonstration dispersed grudgingly after a British military squad armed with Lewis machine-guns and headed by Pafos Commissioner moved to disperse them (Stylianou, 1984).

The Revolt in Rural Areas

The difference between rural and urban subcultures was not very pronounced due to the small distances between villages and towns, and the relatively good communication lines between them, which allowed many to commute, and thus keeping rural communities alive (Loizos, 1974). Furthermore, traditional villages in Cyprus, as in other Mediterranean societies, resemble miniature towns. Traditionally Cypriot villages revolved around the village church, which in this respect replaced the ancient citadel. The central plaza typically contained the Church (or Mosque), the village coffee-shop(s), and residential buildings crowded around it. It is characteristic that traditionally, both villages and towns comprised church parishes. Large villages could comprise two or more such parishes, each identifying with a patron saint who also bore the name of the parish church. Towns typically contained many parishes (who still compete during Easter celebrations for the most beautiful epitaph shrine). Cultivated fields encompassed the village, not
each residence separately. In this setting, a civic ethic (civilita) was cultivated, thus making the transition from rural to urban culture smoother. It must be noted that the urbanization process which took place during the first half of the 20th century was not sustained through industrialization; it was rather commerce and a growing service industry (public servants, teachers, and later the tourist industry) that sustained it.

The participation of rural communities in the movement is noted by Kyrris (1985) who mentions disturbances in 400 villages, but also by Panteli (1984). Panteli notes that "though the towns, especially Lefkosia, were the main centres of discontent, scores of villages were also active" (p. 143). He also mentions "excitement and demonstrations" (p. 143) in 200 out of a total of 598 Greek Orthodox and mixed Orthodox and Moslem villages on the island. The number 200 seems to have originated in Storr’s (1972, p. 542) account, who was Governor of Cyprus at the time of the revolt, and who argues that 389 out of the 598 "Greek Orthodox and Mixed Orthodox" villages took no part in the revolt. Again one must warn against accepting colonial reports as accurate when in search of historical data, mainly when such reports clearly take into consideration their authors’ own agenda to downplay any disloyalty of British colonial subjects. In any case, a number of 200-400 out of 598 Greek and mixed villages taking some part in a semi-spontaneous revolt is certainly no proof of the alleged absence of the villagers in the revolt. On the other hand, if we take into consideration
the information given by Stylianou (1984), we get a clearer picture of the contribution of rural Cypriots to the revolt.

When the events that sparked the revolt in Lefkosia and subsequently in the other towns of the island were made known to the rural areas, there were demonstrations, gatherings, and other actions by the local Greek Cypriots, aiming at protesting British occupation (Stylianou, 1984). This shows, according to Stylianou, that on the one hand the villagers were expecting some kind of revolutionary move against the British colonials, and on the other hand that the movement was island-wide and had popular support.

According to Stylianou (1984), of the nine Greek Cypriots killed by the colonial authorities during the uprising, six were inhabitants of villages, while only three were urban dwellers. The summary of the ages and place of residence of the dead is found in Table 3. The number of rural inhabitants’ deaths during the uprising at least points to a number of villagers at the very forefront of the demonstrations.

Although Stylianou (1984) does not offer an exhaustive account of all the events in the uprising, his chapter concerning the attitude of the Greeks in rural Cyprus surveys official colonial reports in the archives of the Arch-secretariat of Cyprus (that were unpublished until 1984), and reports the major events mentioned. The picture that emerges from his account is one of protest against the colonial symbols, their replacement by Greek symbols, and civil unrest and disobedience to authority, accompanied by the cry for
Table 3
Protestors Killed by Security Forces in the 1931 Revolt

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Residence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Onoufrios Clerides</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Lefkosia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyriakos Papadopoulos</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>Lefkosia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Savvas Masouris</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Kato Zodia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgios Moutsios</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>Akaki</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panagiotis Demetri</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Lemesos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charalambos Fili</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Lefkoniko</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michael Ioannou</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Karavas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loizos Loizides</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Dikomo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(&quot;old) Saloumis</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Mandria</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The table was compiled with information given by Stylianou (1984). As I have no feasible means to triangulate the information provided by Stylianou, and being conscious of the potential misunderstandings when translating/reporting, the reader must consider the possibility that some of the rural residents may have been living in an urban center, yet still consider and declare themselves to be from their village of origin. Still, this table lends support to Stylianou’s argument that upon hearing news of disturbances, many villagers would go to the nearest town for information and participation in demonstrations.

Enosis. The aim was seemingly not to inflict any real damage (which was also impossible given the absence of any central authority to facilitate grandiose plans) to the colonial structure, but to assert the will of the people so to speak. The hope still lingered that the British would yield to the "popular will" and hand over the island
to the administration of the Greek state, although this expectation was now mixed with an implied or else threat. The Lemesos Commissioner, in his report, underlines the fact that "inspite of this extraordinary state of upheavel the actual damage done was not great" (in Stylianou, 1984, p. 148).

Although the incidents of nationalist protest in October 1931 in rural Cyprus are too numerous to reference, a quick mention of the major trends is in order. One major trend during the revolt, in both villages and towns, was the replacement of symbols of British occupation with national Greek symbols by locals. The raising of the Greek flag in place of the union jack is mentioned in most instances of protest in villages mentioned by Stylianou (1984). In Cambos (district of Lefkosia), for example, news of the events in the capital arrived by October 22. On that day, community members gathered at the village coffee shop, and raised the Greek flag. In another act of defiance, they also cut off the village telephone connections and prohibited a British administrator of the Forestry Department from entering the village. Similarly, at Morfou, district of Kyrenia, the villagers gathered outside the local railway station and, after raising the Greek flag, sang nationalist songs.

Another trend in rural protests was the clashing of villagers with British military and police forces. On October 26, in Zodia, a group of 150-300 protestors gathered with Greek flags to face a British military contingent that was en route to Pafos. The protestors began to stone the troops, who promptly fired, killing one man and
injuring an 18 year old woman and a 10 year old boy. On the same day, similar events took place in the villages of Kalopanayiotis, Psimolofou, and Argaki, where police fire injured two residents (Stylianou, 1984).

Yet another trend of village protests comprised efforts to inflict damage to colonial infrastructure, such as destroying telephone lines, setting administrative buildings on fire, and stealing guns from police stations. Stylianou offers many examples of this trend, like the efforts of villagers from Morfou to inflict damages to the Morfou railroad station, while residents of Vyzakia village tried to set the local police station on fire. In Dora, two rifles, a bayonet, and four shotguns were stolen from the Dora Police Station. Similar incidents are mentioned in Lissi, Paralimni, Bogazi, and other villages.

A fourth form of village protest was interference with colonial administrators. In many villages, including Arsos, Vassa, Omodos, Zoopigi, Lofou, Agros, Kivides, Eptakomi, and Marathovounos, there were incidents of villagers disarming local authorities, while in other villages there were incidents of preventing colonial administrators from carrying out their tasks. The uprising in the villages was suppressed by special pacification measures undertaken by the colonial authorities, which instigated patrols in the major villages (Stylianou, 1984).

Unfortunately, Stylianou (and presumably the reports themselves) does not give us any details of the makeup of the groups of
rural protestors, although his account seems, at least to me, convincing of the mass nature of village protests. In other words, the events of village unrest, as they unfold in Stylianou's (1984) account, do not seem to be the work of a small conspiratorial elite, but seem to have had the support of whole communities. It is interesting to note that in the villages local political and administrative authority was expressed in the face of the koinotarhis (Village Council Head). So, when talking about rural Cyprus, and the original cultural leadership duo of the priest and teacher, we must take account of the koinotarhis. Stylianou (1984) mentions that the majority of Greek Cypriot Village Council Heads in the district of Lemesos had resigned following the demonstrations in the capital and the ensuing colonial reaction, and that the rest were also considering resignation.

The picture painted by Stylianou presented above is in stark contrast with Hill's (1972) account, who more or less presents the Village Heads as being in conflict with such annoyances. When describing a petition by the Church of Cyprus to the British demanding the union of the island with Greece, in July of 1930 (three months before the uprising), Hill argues that the Mukhtars (the Turkish and traditional Cypriot dialect word for Village Council Head) supported the colonial status of the island, and that they only publicly supported Enosis under pressure by the Church. The following quote from his account is, I believe, interesting for it not only comments on the quality of his account's data, it also shows how, even if we
take all his reservations into account, there still remains a large number of village commissions that publicly supported the nationalists. According to Hill (1972), of 496 commissions of villages which were presented with the petition for signature,

on inquiry it was found that in 378 the whole commissions signed; in 66 all and in 52 some (usually the mukhtar himself) refused. Many who signed only did so under pressure; 22 such cases were reported from one District alone--102 villages, for some reason, were not asked. The Greek mukhtars of two important villages said: 'We don't approve of the Union, we don't want Greece, and we do want England to govern us. He who wants Greece, let him leave us alone and go there.' In April 1931 a leading mukhtar said that 80 per cent of the villagers desired to remain British and would vote against Union if they were free to do so. (p. 544)

Unfortunately the villagers were not free to do so, and so we can never know. I must note that Hill does not offer the source of this information, and as I felt I could not possibly do justice to his account of the above incident by merely paraphrasing it, I let the reader assess the quality of Hill's account. Be that as it may, even if we take Hill's account for granted, we are still left with the great majority of Cyprus communities (both urban and rural) conforming in one way or another to church backed nationalist discourse, prior to the October 1931 uprising.

The Aftermath

The aftermath of the 1931 uprising comprised, apart from the nine dead protesters and great material destruction, 2,952 persons tried and 2,679 persons convicted for offenses related to the revolt (Panteli, 1984). It is important to note here that the dead added to
the pantheon of the "martyrs of the struggle," and the stories of those arrested added to the pool of stories and symbols that comprise cultural knowledge, thus giving the nationalistic movement more impetus.

Following the uprising, the British authorities instituted a series of repressive measures, including the dissolution of political parties, curfew, the prohibition of the raising of the Greek flag, and censorship of Greek newspapers and magazines. Furthermore, a number of leading clerics, union leaders, and political leaders were exiled. Specifically, the list of exiled leaders included, apart from clerics, both conservative (rightist) and communist leaders, which shows that the ideal of union with Greece enjoyed a wide agreement (Panteli, 1984). The educational system also became more and more centralized. The period following the 1931 insurrection is still remembered by Cypriots as Palmerocracy (after the name of the then Governor) as the harshest period of political repression in modern times. Part of the measures that affected education included (a) the direct control of all elementary schools by the colonial authorities; (b) limitations in the administration and functioning of the Greek secondary schools; and (c) education of elementary school teachers in an English speaking government controlled Teachers Training College (Kyrris, 1985; Panteli, 1984; Spyridakis, 1974).

The new British policies on education were perceived by the Greek population and teachers, clerics, and other intellectuals alike, and without undue reason, as an effort to de-Hellenize the
In a letter to the editor of the New York Times on May 5, 1952 (twenty years after the new educational policy was implemented), Pancyprian Gymnasium Headmaster Dr. C. Spyridakis (1974) protested the colonial educational policy, and ended thus:

I regret to say that the whole educational policy of the Cyprus Government tends to depart from the educational programme applying in Greece in an attempt to undermine the Greek ideal in the minds of the young generation. (p. 485)

Spyridakis, who served as a schoolteacher and a schoolmaster in Cyprus from 1923 to 1960, was headmaster of Pancyprian Gymnasium when the rebellion broke out. In his account, Spyridakis comments on his efforts to "rescue the flame of national education," (p. 36) without clashing dangerously with the authorities and their newly imposed limitations on Greek education. It is evident that educators were careful not to cross the structural boundaries set up by the British colonial authorities, even while communicating nationalist ideals.

Censorship of the press was enforced by the Commissioner of Lefkosia, H. Davis, who issued a report on his work in 1931. In his report, Davis mentioned that even the serious press tended to glorify the protagonists of the events, with the justification that the events, as "deplorable" as they were, publicized the problem of the Cypriot people to the wider public in Greece and other countries. In his report, Davis contrasts the agitating role of the Greek journalists with that of their Turkish Cypriot counterparts who, according to Davis, have proved themselves to be more law-abiding (Stylianou, 1984). Davis' comments reflect the British policy of divide and conquer, which, in my evaluation, was one of the main causes of the
ethnic conflict between Greek and Turkish Cypriots in later years.
CHAPTER V
CONCLUDING REMARKS

A narrative dealing with a chamaeleonic phenomenon such as nationalism, must be very careful not to present the phenomenon as a monolithic, homogeneous process with clearly defined causes and effects. Furthermore, one must not force the phenomenon to fit any preferred theoretical model. Rather, a study should exhibit what Lofland calls intimate familiarity with the data.

My thesis has attempted to show that the Enosis movement was affirming rather than negating of the traditional culture of the Greek Cypriots, while at the same time, transforming it into its modern form. The movement was inspired by developments in the wider Hellenic world (creation of the Greek state, Great idea, etc.) and the traditional culture of the island, and its resonance in the Greek population of Cyprus was due partly to its accommodation of pre-existing cultural models. Greek Cypriot intellectuals articulated the symbolic values of the prevailing wider culture, while at the same time contributing to the construction of the various strategies of action drawn up to realize those values. As we have seen, the demand for union of Cyprus to Greece was not a short-term political goal, but rather a century old demand for the political realization of its people's traditional cultural ties with mainland Greece. This is one of the reasons why we do not have much disagree-
ment on what were perceived as "national issues" among intellectuals, almost up to the creation of the Cyprus republic. The communist party AKEL’s disagreements with the armed struggle can be seen as the first expressions of a rising group of critical intellectuals as opposed to traditional intellectuals in Cyprus. Even then, the differences were of strategy rather than of goal. The communist party AKEL, for example, which embodied the collaborationist camp, opposed the 1955 armed struggle (which was headed by a fervent anti-communist) but agreed with conviction on the principle of Enosis (union), at least up to the point of the Communist defeat in the Greek civil war of the 1950s. Another reason for the evident lack of major internal opposition to the "national issue," was again due to cultural reasons, namely the prevalence of the Christian Orthodox ethic of obedience to one's own leadership, which for Greek Cypriots in the 1930s was embodied by the Church of Cyprus.
ENDNOTES

1 Elliniki Simea Patris Kyprou. Note that Koumoulides translates it as Hellenic flag of the state of Cyprus. The flag is exhibited in the Museum of National Struggle in Athens.

2 Kyrris (1985) mentions 500 "Greek Cypriot notables, prelates and clergymen including the three metropolitans for their alleged involvement in revolutionary activities connected with the Greek War of Independence" (p. 281). Note that in the hierarchy of the Church of Cyprus, the term Metropolitan is used in place of the term Bishop. When translating in English, some writers use both terms interchangeably.

3 Note that not all these anti-Ottoman revolts were led by Greek Cypriots, nor were they all driven by nationalistic fervor.

4 In his study of revitalization movements, Anthony F.C. Wallace (1956) coined the term mazeway to denote the mental image of society and its culture as perceived by individuals. A revitalization movement is one involving a reshaping of the mazeway. This concept is similar to the concept of resentment used by Greenfeld and social movement theorists.

5 I see the refusal of the right to self-determination, or euphemistically, decolonization, as being central to the process of rising nationalism.

6 For a discussion on the positive relationship between class and education, and urbanization and education in early 20th century
Cyprus, see Markides et al. (1978).

7 Note that Loizos (1974) attributes his argument concerning the reasons of the Church involvement in the nationalist movement to a personal communication with K. Markides. Yet, this argument seems to originate in Hill (1972), who argues that the movement for union was the affair of small elites rather than a popular demand (much in agreement with Loizos and Mavratsas). Hill states that "there is no room for doubt that among the elements hostile to the preservation of law and order a prominent place was taken by the Orthodox clergy, who found their influence and the prestige which the archbishops as ethnarchs had enjoyed under the Turks, waning. . . . Whether they express the real sentiments of the population, whose grievances are connected rather with taxation than with national politics, is another question. But political agitation is the breath of life to people who have been imbued with Greek culture" (p. 495).

8 How modern Greek nationalist discourse and Greek national consciousness is, is contested, not only by nationalists themselves, but also by more objective scholars. Armstrong (1982) traces the roots of the modern Greek national identity to the thirteenth century. Late Byzantium is characterized by the shrinking of the empire of the areas that had a Greek speaking, orthodox population. During this period the empire lost its ecumenical character, while at the same time the Greek ethnic origins, which up to this point were dismissed as pagan, began to be acknowledged as legitimate and part of the glorious past of Hellenism. So for more than two cen-
turies, the Greeks (and among them, the Cypriots) were developing, or recreating a national past.

9The Franks followed a policy of forced religious assimilation in Cyprus which, among other things, ultimately demanded the acknowledgement of the Pope as the highest authority. This policy ranged from reducing the number of orthodox bishoprics from 14 to 4 and displacing them to remote villages, to the burning of orthodox monks as heretics (Kyrris, 1985).

10The Organization of Christian Youth Groups (OXEN), operating under the aegis of the Cypriot Church, was and still is a catalyst for the socialization of youth into the Greco-christian nationalist ideals.

11"Now there are 598 Greek Orthodox and Mixed Orthodox villages in Cyprus, of which 389 took no part whatever in the disturbance; nor was any evidence ever discovered that the outbreak was premeditated or prearranged" (Storrs, 1973, p. 542).

12The conscious efforts of the British to counteract the unionist movement by undermining Greek culture become evident through an examination of British documents dating from the 1931 uprising up to 1959. Argyrou (1995), who undertook such an examination, presents strong evidence of this argument.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


