First and Second Generations of Urban Black Mayors: Atlanta, Detroit, and St. Louis

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FIRST AND SECOND GENERATIONS OF URBAN BLACK MAYORS:
ATLANTA, DETROIT, AND ST. LOUIS

by

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A Thesis
Submitted to the
Faculty of The Graduate College
In partial fulfillment of the
Requirements for the
Degree of Master of Arts
Department of Political Science

Western Michigan University
Kalamazoo, Michigan
December 2001
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to first acknowledge the courage and leadership of those very first urban black mayors. Without their bravery, hard work, and accomplishments this research, and possibly even this researcher would not exist. In many ways they served as the flagship for the validity of black political empowerment as they struggled to balance their roles as leaders of large cities and spokespersons for the African American cause.

Secondly I would like to thank the members of my thesis committee, specifically Dr. David Houghton, Dr. James Visser, and Dr. Alan Issac, for listening to my ideas and helping me to shape them into valuable research. I would also like to thank the many professionals I interviewed for their time and ideas.

Finally, I would like to thank my mother for lovingly forcing me to value school when my youth and rebelliousness denied me the foresight to value it myself.

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This research attempts to create an understanding of generationality as it applies to successive black mayors in the urban setting. At a glance, the first black mayors of Atlanta, Detroit, and St. Louis received criticism for being anti-white and using racial conflict to accomplish their goals of diversifying the decision-making elites in each city. The black mayors immediately following in each city were criticized in the black community as being too accommodating to white interests as they attempted to find racial balance in the decision-making elite.

This research uses literature to establish the nature of early black mayors as believing it part of their job as mayor to: (1) Diversify the decision-making elite of the city, and (2) Serve dual purposes of being a black leader as well as the leader of the city. By comparing the first black mayors elected in each city to the succeeding black mayors of the same cities, this research finds the first black mayors in the three cities studied do fit a clearly defined generation that adheres to the two principles listed above. On the other hand, succeeding mayors strived to be ambassadors or technocrats depending on the city’s needs.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The decade of the 1960’s has been described in many ways. It was a time of turmoil for America; a time of civil uprisings, war, and assassinations. The war in Vietnam and its implications only added fuel to a fire that many thought was tearing this nation apart. Needless to say America survived and some would say grew stronger as a result of its trials. One positive result of the 1960’s was that it introduced an age of black political empowerment, bringing America one step closer to equality and justice for all. The combination of the political invigoration of the Civil Rights Movement, the 1965 Voting Act, and the ever-increasing congregation of African Americans to urban areas, created an opportunity for blacks to finally express themselves politically. White flight, or the migration of whites from the inner cities to the surrounding suburbs, only worked to exacerbate the transition. These trends combined to force a black political presence on the face of what were once traditionally white power structures. Cities like Detroit and Atlanta were quickly approaching a black voting majority, and many were beginning to see that the time for urban black political power was now.

Then in 1967, Richard Hatcher was elected mayor of Gary, Indiana, and Carl Stokes was elected in Cleveland, Ohio. As the first black mayors elected in major urban areas, these elections were extremely significant in that they brought the dream
of a big city black mayor to reality. Urbanized African Americans had equated many of the continued problems they faced with the white face of the political establishment. They believed racism and other factors kept the white establishment from providing solutions to the plight of urban ghettos. For most blacks, electing a black mayor was not simply a matter of symbolism. Many blacks believed electing a black mayor could actually resolve some of the issues of crime and unemployment plaguing the cities. They saw in the black mayor both their hope for a better city, and a better life as Americans in general.

Survey of Literature on Urban Black Mayors

With the election of the first urban black mayors came the scholarly literature regarding them. Interestingly enough, the early literature I found regarding urban black mayors was focused around three aspects: (1) The reactions of various groups in the city and metropolitan areas to the election of the black mayors; (2) How blacks won the mayoralty; and (3) What they did in office. A book by Peter Eisinger (1980) examined the reactions of whites in the cities of Detroit and Atlanta after the elections of black mayors and the emergence of black political dominance. He then compared his findings to the rise of the Irish in Boston before World War II. He found that the reactions of the established elite groups ranged from attempts at cooperation with the new elites to complete withdrawal from the city.

A study by Hadden, Masotti, and Thiessen (1968), found that African American mayors in the cities of Cleveland and Gary were elected with the overwhelming support of the black community along with support from the respective liberal white communities. Because of this particular type of coalition, both mayors found themselves in the difficult position of trying to balance the needs
and desires of a hopeful black community with the trust and acceptance of the white community.

Clarence Stone (1989) found that in the period after World War II until the end of the study in 1988, Atlanta was governed by coalitions of business and political elites. Notice that Stone's work covers a period much larger than the length of time African Americans have held the mayoralty in Atlanta. This study is relevant here because it demonstrates that the new African American political elites learned that very little could be accomplished without the support of the existing business elites.

Albert K. Karnig and Susan Welch (1980) attempted to explore some of the conditions that affect the number of black elected officials. They focused mainly on the election of mayors and city council members, and also looked at the effect of those officials on the urban budgets. Of the factors demographic variables and white population characteristics, federal antipoverty efforts, municipal political and election rules, and black resources, they found the strongest correlation with the number of black elected officials was the extent of black resources.

William E. Nelson, Jr and Phillip J. Meranto (1977) did a critical analysis of the elections and administrations of Hatcher and Stokes and attempted to discover among other things, if these elections demonstrated a benefit to African Americans if black mayors are elected over white mayors. Interestingly enough, they came to two conclusions. First, the increase in the number of black elected officials does have a symbolic value and substantive payoffs for ordinary black people. But they further believed that the historical relationships of economic, political, and sociocultural domination between white society and black society continue under the black mayor. They theorized that mayors are traditionally administrators of a fundamentally exploitative and oppressive association between whites and blacks and that the race of
the mayor made little difference. Cited were cases where black mayors broke predominately black sanitation strikes or quelled black rebellions in the interest of the media, suburban, and other white elites.

Chuck Stone's *Black Political Power in America* (1970) analyzed the evolution of black power through the end of slavery up until 1969. He closed his research with a description of the urban black mayor who must among other things consolidate the militant and conservative sections of the black community while appealing to other ethnic groups and the white liberal factions.

An article by Mack Jones (1978) presents an altogether different framework for the analysis of African American political power during this time. Using the city of Atlanta as the basis for his research, he offers that black politics should be viewed as a struggle between whites attempting to maintain their political control and blacks attempting to escape this domination. The basis for this approach is found in studying the various research that indicates whenever blacks make advances toward political control, counter forces are activated in the white community. (U.S. Civil Rights Commission, 1969) Using this theoretical approach Jones offers that even when Black mayors are elected in majority black cities, their powers are extremely limited by the economic weight of the white elites, and the lack of a well organized and politically structured black community to counteract those elites.

Willis D. Hawley (1972) suggests that regional metropolitan governments would improve the situations of Blacks and other minorities as well as urban cities in general. While the central cities face declining tax bases and increased needs for city services, often their suburban counterparts control the area resources needed to effect change. Hawley believed that placing elected decision makers at the regional level would give minorities more influence in the matters of resource allocation needed to
solve many of the problems of the inner city. "White flight" and industrial exodus would no longer reduce the tax base for the areas of the region needing the largest expenditures.

Leonard A. Cole (1976) examined elected officials across New Jersey to see if there was truly a difference between black and white officials other than race. He looked at various factors including the path to office and the behavior once in office. He found overwhelmingly that the election of blacks to office does make a difference. Among the reasons cited were black elected officers influence the formulation and implementation of policy and white elected office holders rarely take opposite sides on issues. In fact, Cole even offered that black elected officials sensitized their white counterparts to the interests of blacks. He also cited that black elected officials influenced the number and level of black appointments in governmental positions.

Kenneth S. Colburn's study (1974) was in response to a request from the Conference of Southern Black Mayors to research and describe the many problems facing Southern Black Mayors and outline some possible solutions. Colburn calls for a national commitment of attention and resources to improve the quality of life in these towns. Colburn completed this study as part of his duties as deputy director of research for the Joint Center for Political Studies. Another publication by the Joint Center was Profiles of Black Mayors in America (1977). This book took on the rather large task of providing the first in-depth look at the American black mayor. They researched more than 150 black mayors in both urban and rural communities and found that the black mayor of that time period was likely to be a 51 year old male Democrat with fifteen years of formal education. They were likely to be elected in southern towns of fewer than 5,000 residents with a majority black population.
Abney and Hutcheson, Jr (1981) attempted to determine whether or not the election of a black mayor affects the levels of political trust among black and white citizens. The study was conducted during a period where citizens across the nation had increased distrust of the government. They found that whites under the black mayor in Atlanta had no more distrust for the government than did whites in other areas of the nation. At the same time, blacks during this period actually gained in trust and political identification with the government.

Scope and Purpose of This Research

These studies and others like them seemed to portray the black mayors of the late 1960s and early 1970s as having to balance the hopes and needs of the black community with the trust and resources of the white elites. Many of these politicians rode to office on the backs of African American supporters expecting them to rectify hundreds of years of injustice and provide solutions for the ill effects the eroding tax base, crime, and failing education systems were perpetrating on urban areas. Once in office however these mayors found that the structure of city government requires that many of the reforms and improvements desired be assisted by the local economic elites. Those mayors in cities without a black majority also had the difficult task of managing both the black and white communities since it usually took some voting support from both to win an election.

In order to get at the focus of this research, we must first analyze the fundamental nature of the new black mayoralty of this early period. That is, what was the fundamental change that occurred specifically because of the election of a black mayor? If we assume that the administrative functions, chain of command
relationships, and other areas of the mayoralty remain constant regardless of the
office holder, then we can assume that this question of “What changes with the
election of a black mayor?” will give us the specific nature of this stage in urban
black mayoralty. I propose that we can use this nature to determine if the current
crop of urban black mayors can truly be considered a different generation, or simply
more urban black mayors. If we find that the nature of urban black mayors has
changed with the current crop, we can say that we now have a different generation.

I propose from my study of the research regarding mayors of the late 1960s
and early 1970s that there were two fundamental changes that occurred with the
election of the first black mayor. First, the new black mayor faced an assumed
responsibility to diversify the political, economic, and social elites governing the
respective cities. Indeed this was part of the reason for the election of a black mayor.
If the city had reached a black majority it was not enough for the mayor himself to be
black, and the rest of the decision-makers remain white. It was assumed that the
black mayor would work to alter the decision making elite so that they reflected the
demographic makeup of the city they controlled. In doing so a black mayor would
have to work to remove a portion of these elites and replace them with new elites
from different ethnic and social backgrounds.

Second, unlike those city executives before him, this first generation also had
to deal with the additional responsibility of being a black leader as well as the leader
of the city. For them being mayor of a major city such as Atlanta or Detroit meant
more than just being the mayor of a major city. At that time, black mayors were on
the forefront of the new politically realized African American. Nelson and Meranto
(1977) noted that increases to the number of black elected officials probably led to the
increase in the acceptance of blacks as elected officials. We may infer from this
research that as black mayors proved their competence, they legitimized the future existence of black elected officials. Conversely, the failure of these first urban black mayors could jeopardize the future of black politics.

Since most of these mayors were elected through strong support from the black communities, being a black mayor in that era also meant being a politically legitimate spokesperson for African American causes. A traditional black issue, such as affirmative action, would directly concern a large portion of the mayor’s electing coalitions. Therefore, these black mayors championed many traditional black causes in an attempt to appease their electorate. In fact, any black mayor in a city with a large black population probably felt compelled to stand as somewhat of a spokesperson for many of these causes.

In summary, we can say two things separated black mayors from their white counterparts for this time period, and therefore define the nature of black mayoralty as opposed to simple mayoralty during this era: (1) It was considered part of their job as mayor to diversify the decision-making elites and city authorities; and (2) They were both black leaders and leaders of the city. Holding all other aspects of the mayoralty constant, we will test the current crop of mayors to see if these two things still set them apart from their white counterparts. If we find that these two aspects are no longer an intrinsic part of being a black mayor, we can say that the nature of the black mayoralty has changed. If we find that the nature of the black mayoralty has changed, we must also find that the current set of urban black mayors comprises a different generation than the earlier mayors. It is the task of this research to discover whether or not a different generation of urban black mayors exists.
Research Methodology

While the present study is concerned with the general question of generationality among black mayors, some simplification and assumptions are needed in order to produce valuable research. I have already outlined what I believe to be the two basic aspects of the fundamental nature of the urban black mayoralty in the early 1970s. It is my intent to use these two basic aspects to test to see whether the black mayoralty of today has the same fundamental nature. In other words, I intend to ask two questions regarding the current black mayors:

1. Do they believe / Is it assumed “part of their job to diversify the decision making elites and city authorities?”

2. Are they / Are they expected to be “both Black leaders and leaders of the city?”

I am attempting to describe what it meant to be an urban black mayor in the 1970’s, versus what it meant to be an urban black mayor in the 1990’s. In doing so, I believe I will attend to the question of generationality in a form that is more easily processed. Since these questions are based from the research of the earlier mayors, it follows that an analysis of the first generation mayors by definition would indicate “yes” to both questions. If an analysis of the more current mayors not included in that earlier research also indicates “yes” to both questions, this would indicate that the nature of the urban black mayoralty has not changed. On the other hand, if an analysis of those mayors not included in the earlier studies indicates a “no” to both questions, we can assume the fundamental nature of the black mayoralty has changed, indicating a new generation of mayors.

I intend to use the Institutional approach and the Ideal Type theory as models for analyzing the question of generationality. As can be imagined, I found plenty of
literature regarding institutions, much of it offering differing solutions to questions of its defining and usefulness. For the purposes of this research I chose five of those sources to use as a basis for my institutional analysis of mayoral generations. March and Olsen (1989) contended that institutions are best viewed as being systems of rules, routines, norms, and procedures around which activities are constructed. March and Olsen further offered that institutions are governed by a logic of what is appropriate according to what is learned through socialization. Regarding institutional changes, a work by Cohen, March, and Olsen (1972) offers a garbage can approach where institutions keep a set of routinized solutions that will be considered for every problem. If these pre-made solutions are not effective, then alternatives that conform to the logic of appropriateness will be considered.

Jack Knight (1992) concludes social institutions are best explained in terms of their distributional consequences. Institutional development and change are functions of the distributional conflict over substantive social outcomes. Furthermore, institutional maintenance and stability are functions of the continuing ability of institutional rules to provide distributional advantages.

Samuel Huntington (1968) offers four criteria of institutionalization: complexity, autonomy, coherence, and adaptability. A work by Robert S. Robins (1976) postulates that the nature of the political system is vitally affected by the form and degree of elite movement among its institutions. Robins adds to Huntington’s research by analyzing the four criteria as they apply to elites and institutions. The present research is most interested in Robins’ analysis of the second and third criteria as these are the two most dynamic in urban political institutions. A political institution maintains its autonomy by forcing new groups to identify with established organizations or consent to current procedures and routines before they are admitted
into the institution. On an individual level, the institutions must also insure that all positions of leadership can only be obtained by those who have served in apprenticeship positions. The institution is able to resist external social forces by socializing and therefore controlling its membership.

The coherence of an institution refers to the consensus that exists within its ranks regarding its operating procedures, functions, and problem solving routines. Large numbers of new membership or new leadership often work to dissolve the cohesion of the institution. According to Robins, cohesion exists when members feel the institution's goals are worthwhile and success is being reached.

While the above research certainly provides us with a working understanding of institutions, the present research requires that we make some assumptions to fit this research to urban political institutions. If we assume that institutions are indeed systems of rules and procedures which guide activities as March and Olsen (1989) offered, we must first discuss those rules, procedures, and activities as they would apply to this research. We are interested in that institution in each city that makes or is heavily involved in top level executive decisions regarding urban governance and politics. This institution would include the mayor and his department heads, the members of the city council, certain high level city commissions/boards, and often the heads of some community groups and business associations. The institutional rules and procedures in this case would vary from the powers expressly given to the mayor by city charter to the common courtesies like alerting business groups to changes in tax rates. The institutional rules would also apply to the working relationship between the mayor and the city council, regardless of how oppositional that relationship may be. By the same token, the mayor often needs and expects a certain
level of cooperation from neighborhoods and the business community to accomplish certain tasks.

In the aforementioned institution, as Cohen, March and Olsen (1972) alluded to, routine solutions to problems posed by the city's changing demographics would be considered for all problems before alternatives are considered. Furthermore, alternatives would be considered in the order that they fit the institution's "law of appropriateness" and according to the alternative's proximity to the core values of the institution. It follows from this logic that immediately before the election of the first black mayor, we should find evidence that some members of the institutional elite did take some measures to alleviate some of the social pressure being placed on the institution to change according to the changing demographics. Because this research deals specifically with the two core changes the introduction of a black mayor created in the institutions, an important point of the subjective research will be an analysis of the effect of those changes on the institution itself.

Jack Knight's (1992) research offers the first real insight into the institutional change that occurs indirectly because of the changing demographics, and directly because of the election of the black mayor. Knight first offers that institutions are best understood by their distributive consequences, and that institutional development and change occur over conflicts regarding those distributional consequences. This insight offers a direct link into the first aspect of the new urban black mayoralty; That the new mayor would perceive a responsibility to work to diversify the decision-making elites. While there would certainly be some symbolic value to diversifying the decision-making elites, this was also no doubt a method of altering the distributive priorities of the elites.
Knight further offers that the maintenance and stability of institutions are functions of the distributional advantages. This is significant here because it explains why the influx of new institutional members resulted in a new institution rather than long-term institutional breakdown. Having a solid, operational institution in place worked to the advantage of all parties involved, and eventually insured the smoother operation of the city. Knight’s second point could also demonstrate that the new political elites including the black mayor wanted little more than inclusion, but certainly not at the expense of the working institution itself. In this case however the simple act of inclusion would change the institution because of the new perspectives of one of if not its chief elite member.

Finally, utilizing Robin’s (1976) research addition to two of Huntington’s (1968) four criteria of institutionalization, namely autonomy and cohesion, we can examine how the institution’s internal and external forces played a part in the entire process. The urban political institution also retains its autonomy by insulating itself from outside pressures through socialization. New groups attempting to enter the political arena must ally themselves with current members of the institution if they hope to be effective. Individuals seeking elective office or leadership in elite organizations must often get the approval or at least support of older, more established members of the elite. Through socialization the institution insures that the core values remain as constant as possible within the ranks of the leadership, and the majority of the mass membership.

The challenge to the institution’s autonomy occurs when that institution is no longer able to socialize incoming members and groups, especially when the new inductees take leadership positions. This is exactly the case when the changing demographics of a city create a radically new electorate, and one with a strong
interest in changing the decision making institutions so that they correspond with the population statistics. In this case, the sheer numbers of the voting population can work to place unsocialized leaders at the top of the institution.

The cohesion of the urban political institution is in many ways related to its autonomy. As the changing electorate chooses new political elites to represent them, they create dissention within the ranks of the political institution by introducing a new group of members that do not share the institution’s values and priorities. The new membership may also lack a complete understanding of the institutional rules and routines. The combination of new leadership and a significant portion of new membership works to dissolve the institution’s cohesion.

Responding to the support and demands of a newly empowered African American electorate, the first urban black mayor would see a responsibility to change the function of the mayor’s office to fit the needs of the new demographic city. For the sake of simplicity, we will assume that the same two factors that separated the first black mayor from the past mayors will be the factors here which disturb the institution. To clarify, we will assume that the first black mayor upset the institutional value base with the addition of the following two values: (1) The need to diversify the decision making elites in order to allow for greater benefit distribution to the African American community. (2) The symbolic need for the merging of the city leaders and the leaders in the African American community.

One could probably assume that any attempts by a mayor to radically alter the current city institutions would be met with serious opposition from those established members of the current decision making institution. While the established elites would probably be increasingly sensitive to the special needs of the new electorate, they would also wish to retain their positions of leadership within the city. By the
same token, many of the institutional elites would have simply been wary of the new mayor's willingness to do things the way things have been done. Utilizing Eisinger's (1980) research, we can already see that the elites could react in many ways to the new institutions, simplistically, they could attempt to cooperate with the new mayor, try to remove him from office, or simply leave the city. On the other hand Stone's research (1989) informs us that the first generation mayor would ultimately realize that his ability to transform the current decision making institution is certainly not as far reaching as he may have thought.

Even though the conflict between the new political elites and the older established elites would damage the institution, as Jack Knight's (1992) research might suggest, despite their differences there would be some willingness to reach an agreement. The potential distributional benefits of a strong institution could motivate each side to be more flexible in their endeavor to rebuild the institution. The established elites would be willing to accept some changes rather than see a complete institutional meltdown. The newly elected political elites would like to see the institution remain intact as well, but they would also like to see the institution working to benefit them and their social groups. Institutional rebuilding assumes that after the initial transition and conflict period, new values and priorities would be established as well as new routines and institutional rules. From this point on the institution would continue to evolve through the interactions and expectations of the elite actors.

Generationality differs from simple institutional rebuilding by categorizing various stages in the rebuilding effort into specific generations. What we are theorizing here is that generation one is characterized by the dismantling of the current institution, a transition period where each organization and individual actor
attempts to discover and secure their role within the new institution, and finally the creation of a solidified base of values and routines for the emerging institution. Generation two might be characterized by attempts to extend, define, and mechanize the interactions and other dynamics of the institutions.

With this perspective the question of generationality also addresses the state of the mayoral institutions themselves. In many ways this more subjective analysis of generationality is much like the more objective test. Again since this research is based on conclusions drawn from studies of the first black mayors, it follows that an analysis of the literature on these mayors will demonstrate the conflict of values and routines that lead to the breakdown of the established institution, and the attempts by the mayor and other elites to establish new values, priorities, and routines. If an analysis of the research on the newer mayors does not find significant conflict regarding institutional values and routines, or significant attempts to redesign the institution itself we can say that we have a different generation of mayors.

We might further theorize that the first generation mayors and the business elites reached some sort of equilibrium point, which allowed them to establish and resolidify that city’s decision making institution. This would leave the second mayor free to pursue mayoral tasks not directly related to institutional rebuilding. On the other hand, if we find that we do not have a different generation of urban black mayors, we may ascertain that no equilibrium point has been reached, and the mayor and other elites are still vying to establish the intrainstitutional relationships.

The Charismatic Ideal Type adds to this research by exploring the effect of charisma on institutional rebuilding during the first generation urban black mayors. The definition of charisma being used here is that outlined by Max Weber in *Theory of Social and Economic Organization* (1947): “a certain quality of an individual
personality by virtue of which he is set apart from ordinary men and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional qualities.” Regarding followers recognition of such a leader Weber further notes, “this recognition is a matter of complete personal devotion arising out of enthusiasms, or of despair and hope.”

When the first urban black mayors were elected, minorities in most large cities were suffering greatly. Many blacks believed the answer to their problems was a black mayor who cared about their dire situations. From this perspective, the black mayors being elected fit Weber’s charismatic type. Many of them were considered champions of the people with a cause that made them bigger than life to some African Americans. I propose that the earlier mayors would fit the charismatic model, carrying the power of a larger than life image based on the enthusiastic hope of an electorate in desperate times. I further propose that as the black community matured politically and socially, they would lean towards the election of mayor based more on his professional qualifications and history than on his charismatic hype. Accordingly, it should follow that the second generation mayors should not fit the charismatic leadership type.

Specifically, I will study the first and third terms of Coleman Young, as well as the first term of Dennis Archer from Detroit. From Atlanta I will study the first terms of Maynard Jackson, Andrew Young, and Bill Campbell. To isolate the effects of the time period versus other factors I will also study Freman Bosley, Jr and Mark Harmon from St. Louis, Missouri. For this research I will draw on the various literature available regarding the mayors, and the newspaper articles found during the objective portion of this research.
My reasons for picking these specific cities are simple. Detroit and Atlanta provide the best examples of long term urban black mayoral institutions. At the same time the cities provide uniqueness because in Detroit Coleman Young was in office for twenty years, clearly identifying him as the only first generation mayor. On the other hand, during that same time in Atlanta there were two different mayors, one of which returned after eight years for an encore performance. Coleman Young and Maynard Jackson were elected at roughly the same time, as were Dennis Archer and Bill Campbell. Because of this, analyzing each of their first terms will provide a models for two sets of mayors operating in the same slice of time. For this reason I have decided to add the third term of Coleman Young in order to balance the first term of Andrew Young. I hope to use this time slice method to rule out other social and economic factors of the time. Finally I chose St. Louis because at face value Bosley, Jr and Harmon appear to exemplify the same generational change found in Detroit and Atlanta with only one term for the transition. St. Louis adds to the analysis because it allows us to ponder whether any generational changes found are the result of a certain chain of events in each city, or differences in 1970s versus 1990s political realities.
CHAPTER II

FINDINGS

Atlanta

Atlanta in the 1960s was going through a change that much of America was enduring. As more and more blacks began to move into the central city, Atlanta began feeling the first vibes of its change. Atlanta had for many years been a city where the business and governing elites formed a strong coalition to run the city. With the changing demographics however, came a voting bloc with radically different objectives.

One of the first signs of change was the 1961 election where Ivan Allen, Jr campaigned heavily in the black community and received 99.4% of the black vote. With the addition of 47.9% of the white vote, Allen garnered 64% of the total vote. As mayor, Allen hired more black firemen, created a fire station in a black neighborhood, and increased the responsibilities of black policemen. He also made more extensive black appointments to policy-making boards and committees. (Bayor, 1996, p.37-39) Although this was certainly progress, a new generation of black leaders was not impressed. Allen had failed to appoint black department heads, and in 1962 at the demands of a white community fearing racial transitions, he had erected a barrier on a street in southwest Atlanta. (Stone, 1989, p.57)
The tenure of the following mayor Sam Massell proved to be a pivotal administration in Atlanta’s history. Massell captured 44.2% of the black vote even with a black candidate, Horace Tate, running against him. Massell also captured 21.6% of the white vote with another white candidate, Rodney Cook, capturing 44.8%. In the run-off election Massell won with 92.2% of the black vote with his opponent Rodney Cook getting only 73% of the white vote. (Bayor, 1996, p.43) It is important to note that Blacks comprised 41% of the voting electorate in this 1969 election so many Blacks didn’t vote for the Black candidate because they didn’t think he could win.

In Massell’s first year as mayor he appeared to be making good on his campaign promises to Blacks. He appointed the first black department heads, nominated black aldermen committee chairmen, and set up an affirmative action officer position in his personnel office. (Bayor, 1996, p.44) As his administration continued however he appeared increasingly to be making appeals to white voters. Fearing a black opponent in the next election, Massell began to work more closely with the business and white interests. (Stone, 1989, p.79)

As the 1970s arrived it was becoming clear that African Americans were the emerging political elite. The 1969 mayoral election for example was the first time in many years that the north side white business elite and the black leaders didn’t support the same candidate. (Bayor, 1996, p.43) Of American cities in 1970 Atlanta ranked 27th in total population and 11th in total black population with a 51% black majority. (Davidson, 1973, p. 233-260) Complicating matters further was a fact
discovered in a 1971 survey of Atlanta’s elected and appointed officials. The survey revealed that there was almost no correlation between what black city leaders and white city leaders viewed as their program allocation priorities. (Atlanta Urban Observatory, 1971) In other words it appeared that although a white mayor could be willing to make concessions, the priorities of the political and economic city leadership were clearly separated along racial lines. In the minds of many African Americans this fact created the necessity for the election of the first Black mayor of Atlanta.

Maynard Jackson

Maynard Jackson came from a cultured, educated, middle class family. He was a Morehouse graduate with a successful business law practice. When he first ran for the office of Vice-Mayor he openly defied many established black leaders who believed he should wait his turn. (Jacoby, 1998, p.366) Jackson apparently made the right call, winning the office with 97% of the black vote and 28% of the white vote. (Bayor, 1996, p.43) His luck with elections continued in 1973 when he challenged the incumbent mayor Sam Massell. Massell took the slogan, “Atlanta’s Too Young to Die.” (Bayor, 1996, p.47-48) The slogan was an allusion to Massell’s equating the election of a black mayor to the death of the city. He alleged Jackson’s strong allegiance to black issues would ruin the city. Massell warned white property owners that their property values would deflate and they would end up moving out of the city. A former real estate agent, Massell got the Atlanta Real Estate Board’s
endorsement and one ad even claimed, “It’s cheaper to vote than move.” (Stone, 1989, p.80)

When the race was over, Massell garnered only 41% of the vote including 75% of the white vote. He received only limited support from the business community and suffered criticism in the press for utilizing the race element. (Stone, 1989, p.80) Jackson earned 95% of the black vote and 18% of the white vote to win the mayoralty. Some elements of the black media had supported Massell believing the time was not right for a black mayor. (Bayor, 1996, p.48) Four years later Jackson would reaffirm his winning streak by recapturing the mayor’s office in a landslide election. (Jones, 1978, p.108)

Before Jackson’s election Atlanta business elites had a cooperative understanding with the political elites. The effectiveness of Atlanta’s government was more a result of the informal partnerships between city hall and the downtown business elites than a result of the formal machinery of government. (Stone, 1989, p.3) Under this governing coalition, the business community had gotten used to being an equal partner in the governing decisions of Atlanta. With the election of Jackson however, the business community was becoming a junior partner of a biracial coalition. (Stone, 1989, p.81) As many in the business community may have feared, the existence of a black city executive makes the concept of a group of elite white businessmen who dominate the city’s power structure no longer feasible. (Eisinger, 1980, p.112)
To make matters worse, Maynard Jackson wasn’t just a black mayor, he was a black mayor with an independent agenda and new mayoral powers. Along with Jackson, in 1973 voters supported a new city charter giving the mayor strong chief executive powers of administrative appointment and reorganization. Under the old charter the Board of Aldermen had formal administrative powers, and the mayor only appointed the aldermanic committees. (Stone, 1989, p.85) The new city charter also increased neighborhood participation in the political process by moving to a district system of elections rather than at large elections, and mandating citizen participation in the city’s planning process. In addition, the council created a system of neighborhood planning units with formal advisory powers. Jackson himself also created a Neighborhood Planning Division, through which neighborhoods were given professional planning assistance. (Stone, 1988, p.96)

Jackson’s agenda was also a source of problems for the old business elites. He planned to make blacks an equal participant in the city’s power structure. He wanted to deliver more services to low income areas, appoint black commissioners, and hire and promote more minorities. (Bayor, 1996, p.48-49) Jackson was very committed to affirmative action and neighborhood participation in the political process, and he openly proclaimed his intentions to change the system in place. (Stone, 1988, p.97) He believed he was elected with a reform mandate from the people, so he clearly intended to reject the old business and government governing coalition. (Stone, 1989, p.87) In a city that had been run by the same governing
coalition for so long, Jackson’s actions left many business leaders wondering where they stood in the new regime.

Jackson’s primary struggle was trying to incorporate affirmative action in all areas he could control or influence. Jackson required minority (black, female, etc) participation in companies contracting with the city. (Abney & Hutcheson, Jr, 1981, p.93) In order to accelerate the hiring of minorities employees Jackson appointed a minority personnel director and several minority department heads. (Eisinger, 1980, p.159-163) During Jackson’s first administration the percentage of blacks employed by the city jumped from 19% to 42%. During the same period the percentage of black managers rose from 13.5% to 32.6. (Biles, 1992, p. 120)

There were two basic vehicles used by the Mayor to stimulate the hiring and promoting of minorities and minority business. First, the Findley Ordinance passed by the Council after Jackson’s election required that companies wanting to do business with the city had to agree to minority hiring goals. (Bayor, 1996, p.123) The second vehicle was Atlanta’s Minority Business Enterprise program created by Jackson that mandated that 35% of city contracts be given to minorities. (Biles, 1992, p.120) Under this program from 1973 to 1979 the percent of city contracts going to minorities went from 13% to 24.5%. (Headly, 1998, p.16)

In areas of interest not under the direct or complete control of the city Jackson used whatever leverage was available to encourage minority participation. Jackson warned banks to remove discriminatory practices in the hiring and promoting of minorities and awarding loans or he would take the municipal funds out of the city
and place them in Birmingham, Alabama banks. (Biles, 1992, p.120) During the construction of Hartsfield International Airport Jackson insisted that minorities be involved, even threatening to “Let grass grow on the runways if minority firms were not involved.” (Stone, 1989, p.87) It took a whole year of racial posturing before the white businessmen finally gave in because they knew the airport was badly needed. Jackson negotiated each contract individually to allay fears of the affirmative action program being struck down by the courts. (Jacoby, 1998, p.386-387) In the end 20-25% of airport related contracts went to minority firms, and 40% of the airport concessions went to minority operators. (Headly, 1998, p.16)

One of Jackson’s second largest struggles was his attempt to reform the Atlanta Police department. As with other police departments across the nation at that time the relationship between the black community and the police department left much to be desired. In 1974 blacks were 23% of the police force in a city with a population of more than 50%. (Headly, 1998, p.18) The black community at the time believed the police chief John Inman was too liberal in allowing the use of excessive force against blacks. This belief was exacerbated by Inman’s refusal to go along with Jackson’s affirmative action agenda. Despite Inman’s eight-year contract signed by the previous mayor, Massell, Jackson fired Inman but Inman took the matter to court. Furthermore, Inman used his SWAT team to keep the new chief from entering his office until the court decided in favor of Inman. (Stone, 1989, p.89) Jackson responded by creating a public safety department to oversee police, fire, and civil defense. He appointed Reginald Eaves, a friend from college, as the Public Safety
Director. The appointment was opposed by business and local media, but found favor in Atlanta’s black community. (Headly, 1998, p.18)

Eaves pushed for affirmative action in the police and fire departments and managed to curb the police tendency to resort to force. (Jones, 1978) Eaves however became so bogged down with scandals relating to incidents of cheating of various police exams that Jackson eventually had to dismiss him. (Stone, 1989, p.88) Interestingly enough, during Eaves tenure rates of street crime actually decreased. (Headly, 1998, p.19) Many in the white business community were convinced that Jackson was more concerned with controlling the police than with crime. (Jacoby, 1998, p.368)

As indicated in his struggle to reform the police department, Jackson spent the first eight years as mayor attempting to balance the needs of the black community with the expectations of the white business elite. This constant struggle is demonstrated in economic development projects and his handling of the mostly black sanitation workers strike. As Vice-Mayor Jackson had marched with the sanitation workers, but when they went on strike during his mayoralty he was forced to react differently. The workers average pay rate left them below the poverty line and they went on strike for fifty cents raise. Jackson agreed they deserved the raise, but also told them the city couldn’t afford to give them the raise. Negotiation attempts were unsuccessful and the mayor was forced to fire the workers. (Headly, 1998, p.24)

Perhaps the most telling demonstration of the relations between the new mayor and the old elite was the “Brockey Incident” which happened early in his
career. During Jackson’s first year in office Harold Brockey of the Central Atlanta Progress sent Jackson a letter explaining that many in the business community perceived Jackson as being hostile to business interests and anti-white. Brockey’s letter threatened serious disinvestments, if something was not done to give the business community better access to government. (Stone, 1988, p.97) After the Brockey letter the Atlanta Constitution ran a series call “A City In Crisis.” The series endorsed the need for better government / business cooperation as cited in the letter. (Stone, 1989, p.90) Although the business community criticized the mayor’s person style of leadership, many suggested it was his reform mandated they disliked. When Jackson hired Jules Sugarman from New York as his CAO, and Reginald Eaves to head Public Safety he found himself under pressure for bad decisions. On the other hand when he hired longtime friend of the business elite George Berry to head the airport project, it was seen as a sound management decision. (Stone, 1989, p.93)

Over time however the business community and the mayor were able to establish a working relationship. Some of the success stories include the building of Hartsfield Airport using joint ventures; the creation of the Poundcake Summit meetings at city hall with business leaders in response to the Brockey letter; creating an independent agency, The Atlanta Economic Development Corporation, to serve as a public/private entity to oversee economic development projects; numerous joint trips with both the Mayor and the Atlanta Chamber of Commerce attempting to create new investment in Atlanta. (Stone, 1989, p.93) Despite Jackson’s attempts to work things out however
it is interesting to note that between 1972-1978 Atlanta still lost 6681 jobs, and was the only jurisdiction in a seven county region to show such losses during the period. (Headly, 1998, 24) In the end analysis Jackson was unable to create a lasting coalition between neighborhood groups and the business elites because the two groups simply could not overcome their differences to work together.

Andrew Young

Andrew Young drew much of his popularity from his time at Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr’s side in the Southern Christian Leadership Conference during the civil rights movement. Young is a product of permanent middle class New Orleans where he and his brother were the only middle class students in their all black elementary school. The Young’s were also the only black family in the Irish-Italian neighborhood where he grew up. As a child his father told him two important things: (1) Succeed in the white world and (2) Never lose your temper. In the civil rights movement Young was the cool, levelheaded negotiator who came in after the demonstrators had made their point. (Jacoby, 1998, p.409)

A preacher by trade, Andy Young served in the U.S. House of Representatives until being appointed Ambassador to the United Nations under President Carter. He was fired from his ambassador post after meeting with a U.N. observer of the Palestinian Liberation Organization in violation of US policy. (Smith, 1987) After serving as Mayor, Young made a run for Governor of Georgia. Spending much of his
time attempting to convince whites to elect a black governor, he was defeated partly because blacks felt he was taking their votes for granted. (Sheridan, 1996, p.152-171)

Andrew Young was one of three contestants in the 1981 Atlanta mayoral election. After eight years of Maynard Jackson the business elite and the Atlanta Journal Constitution unofficially supported the white candidate state legislator Sydney Marcus, over the two leading black contenders. (Headly, 1988, p.452-470) He had spent a decade in state government pursuing a liberal, integrationist agenda. (Jacoby, 1998, p.406) Reginald Eaves, who enjoyed some black and neighborhood support, had been appointed and then removed from the position of Public Safety Commissioner by Mayor Jackson. (Stone, 1989, p.109) Eaves ran a black militant style of campaign with plenty of race baiting. (Jacoby, 1998, p.406) Young worked the middle ground, using his name recognition and civil rights background to curry favor. Young won the first round 41% to 39% over Sydney Marcus. (Stone, 1989, p.109)

The business elite continued to back Marcus, but the Atlanta Constitution backed Young. The League of Neighborhoods rated candidates on the basis of their understandings of neighborhood needs and gave both Marcus and Eaves an edge over Young. Fortunately for Young there were some neighborhood leaders who had worked with him in the past and were willing to support his candidacy. Although Marcus had a strong lock on the business crowd, Young worked to erode that support by making economic development his focus. He professed a need to move towards racial peace and harmony while making Atlanta a hotbed of international business
especially with third world countries. (Stone, 1989, p.109) In front of both black and white groups he explained how some legitimate white concerns were often mistaken for racism, and even spoke in favor of a more regionalized government. (Jacoby, 1998, p.409)

Despite his attempts however Young received only a boycott from the white business crowd. Young had always found it easy to get along with whites, and because of his record as a legislator and ambassador he had believed erroneously that he could garner business support. The white businessmen however were not interested in risking another Maynard Jackson. (Jacoby, 1998, p.405) As the campaign wore on however Young began to seek black votes by complaining of racism and problems with police in black neighborhoods. After the elimination of Eaves as a candidate the race seemed to boil down to each candidate getting their side of town out to vote. Eventually Young even garnered the support of the much more radical Shrine of the Black Madonna. (Jacoby, 1998, p.408)

When the polls made it apparent that Young would be the next mayor, Roberto Goizueta, a Coca Cola executive, held a private breakfast with Young and members of the business elite. Young told the group that although he would be elected without their help, he could not govern without their help. (Stone, 1989, p.110) In the end, voters cast their ballots mostly along racial lines, with Young getting a solid lock on the large black vote but only 10% of the white vote. (Hornsby, 1992, p.159-182)
Once in office Young quickly made it clear that a new day had arrived and a new spirit of cooperation with it. Upon taking office, Young returned to his true integrationist self and followed his campaign promise to the business elite to promote development. This new spirit of working with business in effect ended the anti-white stigma the city government had received under Jackson.(Hornsby, 1992, p.160) Young became an international ambassador for Atlanta with an open door to the business elite. His mayoral philosophy was dubbed “Andynomics” or “public purpose capitalism.”(Biles, 1992, p.109-125) He maintained that if the businesses prospered the effects would trickle down to all city residents. By the end of his administration many questioned whether these philosophies really did any good for Atlanta’s poor.

Young was not interested in the day-to-day running of the city, taking various extended promotional trips and essentially allowing the old business government coalition to run the city.(Jacoby, 1998, p.413) But just as the old business coalitions gained ground, the neighborhood movement suffered greatly under Young. Young eliminated the influence of the Neighborhood Planning Units system while joining the Central Atlanta Progress in a study to consider ways to improve Atlanta’s central business district.(Stone, 1988, p.97) Under Young the neighborhood movement found itself switching with the business interests to once again stand outside the circles of decision influence.

One example of the erosion of neighborhood powers is the Carter Presidential Library and Stone Mountain toll way. After President Carter’s loss in 1980, plans
were made for a Carter Presidential Library and Policy Center. Upon taking office
Young created plans for building the library as well as a four lane special access road.
Neighborhoods opposed the road because it would connect to a proposed Stone
Mountain toll way in an area east of the business district. The state Department of
Transportation owned enough land to complete the project but was unable to surpass
the oppositions mounted by the eastside neighborhoods. Mayor Young sided with the
business elites regarding the building of the road and was eventually able to convince
Atlanta blacks that the construction would provide minority jobs. The Presidential
Library was built, and the city council and all other state and local bodies eventually
approved the road but negotiations stalled the project.(Stone, 1989, p.116)

This example was followed by a string of neighborhood defeats that
confirmed Young’s priorities didn’t include the neighborhood. In another example
the Seaboard Coastline Railroad wanted to build an exchange facility where trucks
could exchange cargo with trains. A biracial coalition was formed against the facility
but the company was able to get the city council to vote in its favor. The mayor
vetoed the first vote. The company then promised money for neighborhood
improvement and the creation of a fund for a community center.(Stone, 1989, p.118)
The company also baited Young’s attention by offering to build a land port center for
international trade, and petitioning the Department of Transportation to build a
railroad to run from the World Congress Center to Underground Atlanta to Stone
Mountain and back. Although the neighborhood movement still vehemently opposed
the facility, Young again sided with the business community.(Stone, 1989, p.118)
The neighborhood groups proved to be politically weak and reactive. Rather than forming strong, lasting coalitions they formed small groups to address specific problems. This allowed the more cohesive business group to dominate policy interests. Before long the old coalition was once again in power, with the only difference being that city hall was now black. (Stone, 1989, p.131-135) The cohesion to this new institution was unrestrained development in exchange for powerful encouragement and opportunity for minority participation. Ideas that fit this formula were successful; all others fell to the side. (Stone, 1989, p.159) Although Young and the business community never really lost their ability to work together, one of the biggest fights in his mayoralty was over affirmative action and contract set asides.

Young saw Jackson’s minority business program as the best way to bring financial benefits to Atlanta’s blacks while encouraging business development in general. He also saw extending Jackson’s program as a way to score points with more radical blacks that questioned his dedication to the black community. An ordinance put forth by the mayor legalized and formalized the minority contracting program, while allowing the city to be more aggressive in its efforts to weed out pass through and front companies. If the city were ever in doubt as to whether a company was actually minority owned and operated the city would require the firm to provide financial statements and sometimes city officials would even do audits and on site visits. (Jacoby, 1998, p.416)

While the white elites became tolerant of the program because of the large amounts of money being funneled through the Atlanta, during these same times small
white firms found themselves being chocked out of certain trades. These firms saw the legalization of the minority set-asides as the final blows to their struggling survival. The law firm of Ben Shapiro was hired by several contractors to coordinate with the city in creating a fair system of negotiation that would help minority contractors without damaging white contractors. After several failed attempts to convince the city of a need to rework the set aside programs Shapiro convinced the Georgia Supreme Court to strike the program down. (Jacoby, 1998, p.432-442)

Andrew Young immediately ceased all contract letting until the city could figure a way around the court’s ruling. In two months the program was restored and in January of 1985 Young increased the set aside percentage by 10% to 35%. Shapiro organized another court case that again went to the Supreme Court. This time the Court ruled affirmative action was only acceptable in extreme cases with continuing problems from discrimination. Shapiro attempted to coordinate with the city to create a race neutral policy but found the city reluctant to consider such an option. Instead the city paid for the Brimmer Marshal study delivered in 1990 that offered extensive research regarding discrimination and racism in Atlanta and its continuing effects. In the end Shapiro had lost a ten-year fight and realized the issue was too racially charged for meaningful discussion. (Jacoby, 1998, p.449-462)

The 1984 presidential election brought another problem for Young. Jesse Jackson was running for president in order to energize and organize black voters, and show the Democratic Party that black votes are not to be taken for granted. Young viewed Jackson’s run as an act of racial separatism that could ultimately end in the re-
election of the republican president. Young was attempting to give a speech in a
collection when members of the Jackson delegation heckled him unmercifully for
not supporting Jesse Jackson. Young never really recovered politically from his
refusal to support Jackson. He may have tried to make up for this by supporting a
black candidate, Hosea Williams, over a white incumbent candidate Wyche Fowler.
Following his problems with Jackson supporters, Young even went as far as to sign
his name to campaign literature supporting the idea of electing the only black

Also in 1984 while speaking to the Association of Black Journalists Young
again confirmed his beliefs on why Blacks should support Mondale instead of
Jackson. During the course of this speech, Young referred to Mondale’s staff as a
“bunch of smart assed white boys.” While this language did upset many on the
national scene, back home in Atlanta it caused a humorous movement where many in
the white business set began proudly referring to themselves as “Smart assed white
boys” or SAWB for short. During this period many t-shirts, coffee mugs, and buttons
were sold and the incident proved that potentially troubling racial issues could be
avoided with a little humor.(Jacoby, 1998, p.430)

Perhaps the biggest development issue Young faced was Underground
Atlanta. Several businessmen wanted to refurbish an old nightclub complex that sat
in an underground cavern in the downtown area. Young had a dream of turning the
place into a nexus where all sides and people of Atlanta could come together to shop,
hear music, and eat at various restaurants. He also of course wanted a place full of
employment and entrepreneurial opportunities for minorities. Young had plans to incorporate affirmative action style policies into every phase of the plan, from the construction to the merchants that moved in once the complex was built. (Jacoby, 1998, p.465-483)

In the beginning Young was about the only person who believed a place could be built that would attract both blacks and whites consistently. But using his mayoral clout Young was able to convince and sometimes bully business leaders into investing in the project, while convincing blacks the project would create jobs and money for minorities. It took Young his whole mayoral career to push the project through, with the first five years spent trying to finance the project. When it was finally finished it was celebrated as a triumph of racial harmony and a sign of Atlanta’s bright future. There were over a million visitors in the first four days of its opening and the prosperity continued through Young’s mayoralty. (Jacoby, 1998, p.465-483)

Bill Campbell

Atlanta’s third black mayor, Campbell was elected in 1993 following Maynard Jackson’s third term. Campbell was born in 1953 in North Carolina. His parents were both civil rights activists, and Bill Campbell was the first Black student to integrate the Raleigh school system. Campbell later graduated from Vanderbilt University with bachelor’s degrees in political science, sociology and history. He also earned a law degree from Duke University. Campbell practiced law in Atlanta
until being elected to the Atlanta City Council in 1981, where he served until being elected mayor. (Atlanta Bureau of Management Information Systems, 2001)

The 1993 election started as a three-way race between Campbell, City Councilwoman Myrtle Davis, and former Fulton County Commission Chairman Michael L. Lomax. Campbell, with over $700,000, was able to raise more than twice as much as the other candidates. This election saw some significant changes in campaign financing. First, television stations WAGA-TV/Channel 5 and WSB-TV/Channel 2 limited the amount of political advertising available. Second, a newly passed state law limited campaign contributions to $1000 per election. In the previous election Maynard Jackson needed $1.5 million to overcome his opponent. (Sherman, 10/25/1993) Davis, who was unable to energize the women voters, did not make it past the general election. Lomax was hurt by his countywide property assessment changes in 1991, which increased taxes for many in Northern Atlanta. (Sherman, 10/29/2001) In the end Campbell won with 73% of the vote. (Blackmon, 11/24/1993)

The 1997 reelection turned out as an even bigger challenge for Campbell. While Campbell ran on the success of the Olympics and the city’s economic situation, his challenger Marvin Arrington highlighted the city’s high crime and sewer problems. Campbell suffered major blows in the last days of the race when a federal judge declared that a system of mini-treatment plants had failed to reach clean water standards, and the state issued a negative report regarding Campbell’s management of Atlanta’s Empowerment Zones. (Fears, 11/26/1997) Campbell struck back when
Arrington accused Maynard Jackson of “passing” for white during the civil rights era. Campbell used that accusation and Arrington’s acceptance of contributions from North Atlanta white Republicans to rally Atlanta blacks. Even though Campbell at $3 million rose twice what Arrington did, he barely scraped his way into a second term with 53% of the vote. (Fears, 11/26/1997)

Like any other mayor, Campbell during his terms has had his success and failures. Campbell’s first four months in office did much to show Atlanta what was to come. First, a major water main broke causing flood damage, a water shortage, and small sinkholes. Then the police department threatened a strike if their pay and conditions were not improved. In both cases Campbell reacted immediately to allay fears and avert further disaster. In other cases, such as Freaknik and a failed bond referendum for infrastructure improvements, the Mayor wasn’t able to avoid the potential crisis. (Blackmon, 04/29/1994) In all cases the Mayor was challenged with problems that predated his administration but was unable to avoid negative media attention despite the outcome of his actions. Although he weathered criticism in both issues, the mayor was eventually able to end Freaknik and get voters to pass a $148 million bond issue to repair the city’s deteriorating infrastructure. (Blackmon, 07/20/1994)

In 1995 Atlanta was surprised to learned that it ranked highest on the FBI’s crime ranking. Although the mayor blamed the ranking on poverty, he pledged greater police attention in high crime areas including several measures to increase the safety in public housing. (McDonald & Fears, 05/07/1996) At two years into his
administration, the eight percent drop in violent crime and the lowest homicide rates since 1986 seemed outdone by the charges of corruption and murder facing various members of the Atlanta police department. In 1996, despite the drop in crime, Campbell confessed there was “a crisis of confidence” regarding the police. (Fears, 02/20/1996) This crisis was caused largely by the investigation and arrest of three officers charged with protecting drug dealers, and the execution style murder of an unarmed man by a police officer. Aggravating matters regarding the execution was the investigation that ignored the testimony of three witnesses who saw the officer shoot a man who was unarmed and lying on the ground. Police Chief Harvard also took some heat for the investigation and her refusal to admit wrongdoing. Campbell dismissed criticism as sexism. (Campbell, 01/11/1996)

Campbell’s handling of Freaknik presented another problem as he began to understand that the interests of the business community and those of the black community were directly opposed. In 1994 Campbell announced the black college student festival wasn’t welcome in the city. This pleased the middle class whites but upset African Americans. Councilwoman Carolyn Long Banks, who helped organize the festival, accused the mayor of using the Bull Connor and George Wallace approach to government. (Blackmon & Helton, 10/06/1994) For Freaknik 1995 in order to allay the fears of white business owners, Campbell produced a large police force designed to keep order. This show of force upset many in the black community as it reminded them of the old south where the large police presence was summoned wherever blacks congregated. (Fears, 02/20/1996) The city largely used Freaknik
1996 as preparation for the upcoming Olympics, testing crowd control, security measures, and traffic direction. (Helton & Martz, 04/23/1996) By 1999 the Mayor had lost interest in the gathering, perhaps realizing it was a no win subject. Whites and even some blacks felt it was a dangerous event that should be stopped, while many still believed those who dislike Freaknik really dislike the race of the students it attracted. Freaknik 1998 barely drew 50,000 students, where once it attracted more than 200,000. (Atlanta Business Chronicle, 04/16/1999)

Another problem plaguing the mayor at the half way mark of his first term was pollution in the city's water. The state of Georgia issued a July 1, 1996, moratorium on Atlanta's development pending a reduction in phosphorous levels in the water. Making matters worse, many developers were planning to sue the city if the state had to intervene. (Fears, 02/20/1996) Even though Campbell promised to improve the phosphorous levels years before the state's announcement, a plan to connect two treatment plants through an eight-mile tunnel was scrapped after being labeled environmentally racist. Another plan featuring new technology was eventually abandoned as well. During this time Atlanta was racking up over $7 million in pollution related fines, in 1997 paying as much as $20,000 a day. (Wooten, 03/07/1997) Using a mixture of bonds and outsourcing, by the end of Campbell's second term the city had cleaned up its pollution problems by reducing waterway pollutants 90%, and completing a $1.3 billion renovation of its sewer system. In addition the city had created recycling programs and a citywide stream clean up. (Hairston, 01/03/2001)
The city had also managed to privatize its water systems despite the mayor’s philosophical objections to privatization. (Atlanta Business Chronicle, 09/04/1998) Privatization became an issue early in the mayor’s first term as business leaders of the city looked for ways to help improve city services. The National League of Cities and Campbell’s own Budget Task Force issued reports urging the consideration of privatization as a means of cutting costs. (Fears, 05/04/1996) Campbell, who was supported by unions for his 1993 mayoral election, initially condemned the idea. In 1993, Campbell actually entered into an agreement with the city’s public employee union stating he would not privatize city services unless there was a financial emergency. (Sherman, 10/27/2000) Campbell argued that privatization harms older and minority workers. He further suggested that the savings from privatization comes from dismissing senior city workers with higher salaries, and replacing them with younger non-minority workers. (Fears, 05/04/1996) By 1997 Campbell had begun to soften his stance against privatization, even announcing his intention to privatize water and sewer services. Although some believed it was just a political move to keep City Council President Marvin Arrington from using it as a campaign platform in his race for mayor, Campbell eventually did privatize water services. (Rubinger, 02/17/1997) There still exists a push to privatize city services wherever they would save the city money.

In 1995, under Campbell’s leadership the city was selected to receive $250 million in Federal Empowerment Zone dollars to help rebuild the impoverished areas. (Fears, 02/20/1996) In addition to the $250 million in tax credits the city would
receive $100 million in cash. The empowerment zone development is led by the Atlanta Empowerment Zone Corporation, which would be composed of a seventeen-member board. The mayor himself served as the chairman of the board, and by the end of 1996 the Atlanta Zone was noted as the zone with the most accomplishments. (Charles, 01/02/1997)

Another success credited to the mayor was the decision by Ted Turner to keep the Atlanta Hawks professional basketball team playing in the downtown Omni Center. In 1994 Hawks management announced it would be leaving the Omni Center for a new, larger arena in the suburbs. Mayor Campbell was able to convince Turner it would be a better business move for the city and the Hawks if a deal could be worked out to renovate the Omni to encompass the organization's needs for more space. (Saporta, 05/21/1994) Two years later after several failed proposals a plan to demolish the Omni and create a new facility was accepted. The new project would cost $215 million, with about $140 million being financed through city and county revenue bonds. Revenue from the facility would go towards repaying the bonds, and the Hawks pledged assistance should revenue fall short. The plan also called for about $75 million in public improvements, including a walkway to the Underground. (Unger & Saporta, 01/27/1996)

The 1996 Olympics was an event that brought the international spotlight to Atlanta's stage. Although the mayor's administration was for the most part able to prepare the city and host the games relatively smoothly, Campbell is most remembered for the vending program he created for the games. As a way to
capitalize on the Olympics and provide revenue opportunities for Atlanta’s small business, Campbell created a vending program where organizations could apply for a license to set up on public property and sell goods. The city contracted to 388 vendors, but an additional 1,100 vendors set up on private property. (Whitt, 08/27/1996) Despite Campbell’s attempt to create a festival atmosphere, many argued the city looked like one big embarrassing garage sale. Munson Steed III, who directed the program, was a political person with no marketing abilities and a history of failed businesses. (Hairston & Hinkelman, 10/21/1996) Later in the year many vendors decided to sue the city for fraud and deception. They claimed the mayor led them to believe they would make lots of money. Some of the suing vendors were operating on private property outside the city’s plan. (Whitt, 08/27/1996) Campbell still holds the program was a success that generated $2.9 million for the city.

Another problem that plagued Atlanta during the games was the terrorist attack where a bomb exploded in Centennial Olympic Park. A woman from Albany was killed and more than 100 Olympic gatherers were injured. Although the city was not blamed for the bomb itself, there were allegations that an operator mishandled the bomb threat for more than 10 of the 22 minutes before the explosion. As a result a task force was created and the city’s 911 emergency call center was revamped. (Cook, 01/01/1997)

One of the largest controversies during Campbell’s administration was more than twenty years in the making. As it often does, the arguments regarding affirmative action caused racial discord. Campbell’s dealings with Atlanta’s minority
contracting set aside program started in his first year. The program had been plagued with scandals since the beginning, but problems at Hartsfield airport and Underground Atlanta had recently been uncovered. Campbell claimed that in the past decade, 75% of city set-aides for minorities went to four firms. He also noted that of $80 million dollars purchased annually only 3% went to minority firms. Campbell led the attempt to end the problems by creating new rules requiring a five-year suspension where firms couldn’t bid on contracts if they were breaking the set aside rules. (Blackmon, 06/06/1994) Midway through Campbell’s second term after a federal judge struck down Fulton County’s affirmative action program the Southeastern Legal Foundation called for the end of Atlanta’s set-aside program. The mayor vowed to fight for the program, much to the dismay of many who felt the taxpayer’s money shouldn’t be wasted on a losing fight. (Atlanta Business Chronicle, 06/28/1999) Campbell attempted to make himself a champion of affirmative action in Atlanta, refusing to let it end on his watch. The debate over affirmative action fed the controversy between Campbell and the Atlanta Journal-Constitution. More specifically Cynthia Tucker, editor of AJC’s editorial pages, has led a seemingly personal battle against Campbell’s defense of affirmative action. (Williams, 12/06/1999)

The interesting thing is, the affirmative action debate is just one of the reasons for the ongoing argument between Campbell and the press. As early as 1994 the Atlanta Journal-Constitution was writing negative articles when the mayor failed to release the names of the top three contenders for the Police Chief position.
According to state law, information on candidates must be released 14 days before the final selection is made. After nominating Beverly Harvard, Campbell's staff claimed they planned to release the other candidate's info but lost the paperwork. According to the Atlanta Journal-Constitution Campbell claimed he was looking for a way to avoid the required release, even claiming it was a bad law.(Blackmon, 11/08/1994)

Towards the end of Campbell's tenure articles began to look at his relationship with the media as self inflicted. While the city has done pretty well under his control, his tendency to make people angry caused problems for him. Unlike previous mayors who also lashed out at the media, Campbell neglected in attempting to patch things up.(Campbell, 10/01/2000) He was also accused of enjoying the celebrity and power of being mayor while avoiding the daily grind of administration. In regards the race issues the Atlanta Journal Constitution blamed him for picking sides rather than attempting to lead the city out of controversy.(Campbell, 10/01/2000)

By contrast an article by the Atlanta Tribune commended him for governing without a single tax increase and helping the city develop and flourish while other cities saw urban deterioration. The Atlanta Housing Authority has renovated the quality of housing for the poor and housing values in general have inclined greatly. The city's budget is balanced and crime is at a low.(Atlanta Tribune, 06/2001) Atlanta had the lowest number of homicides since 1966, and decreases in crime across the board due to the community policing strategy and the leadership of police chief Beverly Harvard.(Hairston, 01/03/2001) Census figures demonstrated the
largest growth in population since 1960, and under Campbell the city had experienced a $750 million renovation in housing. (Hairston, 01/03/2001) But with all this the newspaper articles center on the administrations various controversies and ethics violations. The article advised that criticism from the media is a natural part of being mayor of Atlanta. It also notes that Campbell’s problem may be a simple inability to manage the public relations side of being mayor. (Atlanta Tribune, 06/2001) This may be demonstrated by his inability to manage the media and avoid scandal.

Especially towards the latter part of his mayoral career, scandals have marred Campbell’s administration tremendously. As early as 1994 Harold Echols, wealthy owner of several Hartsfield Airport concessions companies, testified in the bribery trial of another official that he made cash payments to Campbell eight or nine times while Campbell was a council member. Campbell denied all allegations, stating that although the meetings did take place no money ever changed hands. (Blackmon, 08/13/1994) Although he was never convicted of these charges, they seemed to set a disturbing trend that would follow him throughout his mayoralty.

In 1996 Campbell was criticized for awarding city contracts to his friends. A firm represented by his former campaign manager Kevin Ross received a $1.5 million dollar consulting contract. Another of Campbell’s friends, Munson Steed, was placed in charge of the vending programs during the Olympics. (Atlanta Journal-Constitution, 01/18/1996) Also in 1996 the city council led by Marvin Arrington voted to force the mayor’s office to sell its expensive city cars in favor of monthly stipends as reimbursement for using their personal vehicles for city business. While both
Campbell and Arrington made arguments regarding which program would be cheaper for the city, many other council members were confused and believed outside agencies should be brought in to do a cost analysis. (Fears, 04/02/1996)

Towards the end of Campbell’s tenure the Atlanta Board of Ethics weighed in on some of the complaints, including ruling Campbell had broken the law by failing to disclose $150,000 in speaking fees during his mayoralty. The state ethics board scheduled a hearing because state law regarding elected officials limits speaking fees to $101. Campbell did eventually disclose, claiming the laws were unclear. Others believed he simply ignored the law. (Judd, 01/11/2001) An article in the Atlanta Business Chronicle called for Campbell to resign or be recalled, partly based on these scandals and numerous other irregularities such as firing or demoting people who refused to go along with his corrupt schemes. (Sherman, 01/12/2001) To the date of this writing however most Atlantans seem fine with letting the mayor serve out his time and move on.

Detroit

Detroit is a 300-year-old city that sits on the eastern side of Michigan facing Windsor, Canada. Detroit was the fourth largest city in America in 1920 with 993,000 people and by 1950 the population peaked at 1.8 million. Every decade since 1950 has seen a pervasive drop in population. (Whelan & Young, 1998) Detroit entering the 1970’s was like many other large cities with emerging black political elites; the increasing prosperity of blacks was met with the decreasing prosperity of
the inner city. (Teaford, 1992, p.126) In 1970 Detroit was the 5th largest city in America and the third largest in black population with 44% of Detroitters being black. This was a 16% increase since 1960 when Detroit was only 29% black. (Davidson, 1973, p.235) It was quite obvious that blacks would eventually inherit Detroit’s political structure.

Unfortunately there were rough times ahead. Between 1978 and 1983 the Detroit region lost 32% of all manufacturing jobs, including a 40% drop in auto related manufacturing. (Ross & Trachte, 1990, p.135) During the same period, employment in the primary metal sector fell 45%. (Becker, 1982, p.4) Unemployment among Detroit’s black population rose to almost 30% during the 1980s. (Michigan Employment Securities Commission...1984) The Michigan Department of Human Services reported in 1982 that one-third of Detroit’s population was receiving welfare assistance. (Ogintz, 1983) Overall some 60% of the population received some sort of transfer payment. (Fermin, 1981) Between 1978 and 1981 as a result of the decreasing tax revenues human and public services in Detroit also took down turns. Health related services dropped $76 million. Economic development dropped by $33 million and 17% of public workers were laid off. (Fermin, 1981)

Even as blacks were inheriting the political structures they were learning another lesson. With every business decision, corporate elites and business managers determine the employment opportunities and by extension the financial health of the urban city. (Sugrue, 1996, p.11) Increasingly blacks found themselves in fast growing, economically isolated areas of the city. (Sugrue, 1996, p.8)
Although in the early 1970s many argued Detroit’s future looked bleak, they also had to admit that Detroit had survived many racial and class conflicts before. In fact Detroit’s history seems to have been filled with successive stages of institutional and social conflicts resulting in status quo changes. (Widick, 1972)

The Detroit riot of 1943 was the result of the racial hostility created by laborers seeking to take advantage of the nation’s newfound prosperity after more than ten years of economic depression. In the late 1960s war, economic conditions, and inflation again created a riot in Detroit. (Conot, 1974, p.627)

A lack of racial cooperation in union organizations has also been a determining factor in Detroit’s history. White workers often encouraged racial discrimination because they were able to benefit from the exclusion of blacks. The mid 1900s saw the urban league and the NAACP often confronting the unions along with government and business entities. (Sugrue, 1996, p.12)

Following World War II and up to 1973 Detroit blacks became part of a coalition that included labor and liberal whites. During this period blacks were only on the winning side of Jerome Cavanaugh in 1961. Even after that election whites totally ignored black requests for better representation and returned to mayors they thought could better represent their interests. Up until the election of Coleman Young blacks seemed locked into their traditional political roles, and many believed the current elite structure would be the one to work out any racial problems in the future. (Eisinger, 1980, p.63-64)
In Detroit’s 1969 election white Wayne county sheriff Roman Gribbs narrowly defeated black Wayne county auditor Richard Austin. Gribbs, who ran a law and order campaign, created the STRESS units within the police department that killed 22 Detroit citizens and harassed, hundreds if not thousands more. (Farley & Danzinger, 2000, p.46) Gribbs also helped to ease the transition to black mayor by insuring that close to 40% of his staff was African American.(Eisinger, 1980, p.64)

**Coleman Young**

Detroit’s first black mayor, Coleman Young, was a former Tuskegee Airman who drew most of his political education from the labor movements that were very strong in Detroit following World War II. The labor organizations in Detroit at that time were seeking to upset the American status quo, not just better wages and working conditions. Young became a spokesperson for blacks within the CIO and was eventually elected to Executive National Secretary of the National Negro Labor Council. During Young’s tenure the Council forced Sears, Roebuck and Company to hire black clerks, but also became known for radicalism and militancy resulting in an investigation by the House Un-American Activities Committee during the “Red Scare.”(Rich, 1989, p.65-68)

Young used his labor popularity to get elected as Michigan’s second black state senator in 1964. As a senator Young sponsored several bills designed to assist Michigan’s poor, including a bill to increase Aid to Dependent Children payments, and another allowing individuals arrested to pay 10% bond to the court instead of bail
bondsmen. This arrangement would allow citizens to get their money back if they were found innocent. Although he did much to assist the poor during these years, there are many who argue that these years turned Young from a radical leader to a professional politician. (Rich, 1989, p.85-89)

Although Young was not the first choice of the emerging black political elite, in 1973 he ran against police commissioner John Nichols in a mayoral race that centered on crime and police behavior. Neither candidate highlighted the race issue, but each drew strong support from their perspective races and arguments regarding the police STRESS units were often split along racial lines. (Eisinger, 1980, p.67-68) Detroit’s strong union base, including black trade workers from the local United Auto Workers, made its presence felt by leading a coalition in support for Coleman Young. (Harris, 1980, p.75) In the end Young won with 90% of the black vote and only 2% of the white vote. (Eisinger, 1980, p.68)

There were many conflicts for Young during his time as mayor, but one thing he didn’t have to worry about was re-elections. In 1977 a black conservative city councilman named Ernie Brown ran against Young in the first Detroit election pitting black against black. This was probably Young’s most competitive race even though both the black community and the white business elite backed him. (Eisinger, 1980, p.69) Brown made many criticisms on Young’s performance as mayor but Young walked away with 95% of the black vote and 60% of the total vote. (Hamilton, 1979, p.222) From that point on his re-elections were considered non-events and it was obvious the job was his for as long as he wanted it.
When Young was first elected Mayor there was an inaugural party lasting three days, including a prayer breakfast, swearing-in ceremony, senior citizen’s reception, concert featuring a Motown luncheon, and an inaugural ball. (Jacoby, 1998, p.294) The theme of the first morning was “Let there be peace in Detroit, and let it begin with me.” At each table sat a small paper cut out with a black and white hand clasped in prayer. (Jacoby, 1998, p.294) There was also a business labor luncheon where about 3000 mostly white business and labor leaders gathered and the main speakers were Leonard Woodcox of the UAW and Governor Milliken. (Eisinger, 1980, p.101)

Although throughout the celebration there was a strong appearance of diversity and the willingness of both races to work together, a misunderstanding of a comment made by Young was certainly a sign of things to come. During a speech by Young, he warned all pushers, rip-off artists, and muggers to hit Eight Mile road. Detroit suburbanites mistakenly took this as Young instructing criminals to prey on the suburbs instead of the inner city. (Jacoby, 1998, p.298)

Once the celebration was over Young got down to the business of running the office. As with every other administration there was some difficulty integrating his campaign staff with the existing bureaucrats. These difficulties were exacerbated by a media looking for any sign of dissention within the ranks. (Rich, 1989, p.108) Young imported black civil servants from other cities to replace white civil servants from Detroit that were reluctant to serve under a black mayor. (Biles, 1997, p.115) Young also appointed blacks into key positions like department heads so they could
quickly diversify the city government. (Eisinger, 1980, p.159-163) Young also maintained cordial relationships with white elites in and around the city. His executive assistant was a white lawyer who had worked as his aide when Young was a senate leader. (Eisinger, 1980, p.107) Young made careful attempts to keep his administration balanced with both black and white appointments. (Jacoby, 1998, p.308)

One of Young's first challenges was reforming the police department. He immediately eliminated the STRESS units and set up mini-police stations as part of a community policing effort. (Eisinger, 1980, p.185) He was committed to racially balancing the police department, even altering police tests and creating two separate lists so that blacks and whites could be promoted equally. (Jacoby, 1998, p.324) Young spent his first year in office revising the police force, and between 1974 and 1975 there was a 25% increase in black applicants and within a year the police academy was half black. (Jacoby, 1998, p.325)

When budget cuts meant layoffs Young skipped the new black recruits and began layoffs according to seniority among white officers. (Eisinger, 1980, p.185) In 1976 during a high crime period Young announced the need to layoff another 20% of the department. (Jacoby, 1998, p.335-336) These layoffs contributed to the summer of 1976 being the worst on record. Riots, looting and vicious murders became everyday activities, and massive groups of youths roamed about town beating and robbing whoever was in sight. In August 1976 during a concert a gang of young black men attacked attendees robbing and beating everyone in sight. There were
complaints that police were slow to respond, and even though some men were arrested that day no muggers were ever convicted of the crimes. (Farley, Danziger & Holzer, 2000, p.47) Judges refused to hear cases because courtroom police had been reduced beyond the range of safety. (Jacoby, 1998, p.335-336) Only after these extreme pressures did Young begin to rehire police officers and speak against crime.

Young’s increasingly black police force also had its share of problems. Police Chief William L. Hart was troubled with scandals regarding police testing. Allegations were made that black applicants were given every unfair measure from extra time to flat out being given the answers. There were complaints of physically unfit recruits and new officers who could barely read. Chief Hart himself was eventually convicted of embezzlement. (Jacoby, 1998, p.346-347)

The decline of city services to residents has been one of the largest criticisms against the Young administration, although much of it has not actually blamed Young himself. Several factors outside the control of the mayor contributed to the overall decline in the quality of life of Detroit citizens. Unemployment in 1975 was 15.6% and between 1969 and 1973 the number of people employed in Detroit fell 20%. (Eisinger, 1980, p.189) For several years Young strained to maintain fiscal solvency through sometimes devastating budget cuts and layoffs. In the neighborhoods 30 million dollars a year, 60% of Community Development Block Grant money, was spent demolishing abandoned buildings. (Jacoby, 1998, p.341)

As Detroit approached the 1980s, almost half of Detroit’s budget came from outside sources and 30% of city employees were paid with federal money. At the
same time there was 30% less bus service, 50% less trash pickup, and 20% fewer firemen on duty. (Jacoby, 1998, p.345) Young created a Secret Committee to study the financial situation in Detroit and the committee recommended the city increase income taxes for residents and non-residents working in the city to avoid a 132.6 million dollar deficit. (Rich, 1989, p.112)

Perhaps the most noteworthy thing about Coleman Young is his political personality and leadership style. Not known for his administrative skills, Young was seen as an experienced and shrewd streetwise politician who used race politics very well. (Eisinger, 1980, p.80) Even as mayor, Young and many of his supporters kept ties to radical groups such as the League of Revolutionary Black Workers. (Georgakas & Surkin, 1998, p.222) Being a former radical, Young was paranoid and secretive and for most of his tenure outsiders, including the media, were locked out of his administrative operations. (Jacoby, 1998, p.312-313) As well as the militant fringe, black churches also composed a large part of Young’s support network. Many considered black Baptist pastors a part of the administration even though there were some rifts with the mayor over issues like casino gambling and supporting Jesse Jackson’s presidential bid. (Williams & McCain, 1994, p.122)

Young was also known for his charisma and ability to move people. Morris Gleicher, head of a political consulting firm, spoke of a day with Young that demonstrated his charismatic abilities. According to Gleicher one day at the beginning of Young’s campaign for mayor he sat down with members of the chamber of commerce over coffee and sweet rolls. Before the meeting they had assumed they
wouldn’t like him or his agenda because he was a black militant. First Young listened to them, and then he spoke on the issues. Within thirty minutes he had impressed them with his knowledge regarding everything they had mentioned.

Less than an hour later Young sat with a group of thirty to forty black ministers all very upset about various issues regarding the state of the city. Young talked about city services, including police and schools, as well as children and the city itself. It took Young all of three minutes to gain their support. (Gleicher, 1994, p.187)

There were several instances where Young attempted to use his charisma to exert influence over the city residents. In 1975 following the murder of a black youth by a white bar owner several hundred blacks responded with two nights of rioting. Young went to the rioting areas directly to try to calm the crowds down with no success. Later Young would commend his officers for acting with professionalism and constraint. (Eisinger, 1980, p.87) Young would also criticize the judicial system for letting the bar owner go on $500 bond while others with less serious crimes are stuck in jail. (Jacoby, 1998, p.331)

Young often used race as a rally point for blacks, telling off whites whenever possible. Downtrodden Detroit blacks and other minorities loved to hear Young stand up to the white elites. Throughout his mayoralty council members and challengers criticized Young for neglecting the neighborhoods, but he continued to keep strong support for his unrelenting willingness to defend Detroit and blacks against any outsiders. In the eyes of Detroit blacks, Young would always be the man
who saved the city from the racists and a treacherous police department.(Farley, Danziger & Holzer, 2000, p.47)

But as much as Young used racial politics to keep support within Detroit, he appeared more faithful to the Democratic Party in national matters. In 1976 Young provided black support for Jimmy Carter early in his campaign, and even offered a blueprint for urban aid once Carter was elected. Carter returned Young’s support with millions of dollars in federal aid to Detroit, and used his ideas for urban aid to formulate his urban policies.(Jacoby, 1998, p.344) The interesting thing is, Young continued to support Carter even after an “ethnic purity” of segregated neighborhoods remark during the campaign caused some controversy. Young even went so far as to issue a statement alluding to the fact that such racially separated neighborhoods are as American as apple pie.(Jacoby, 1998, p.343) Even though he would never need their assistance to win a re-election, in most cases Young was loyal to the Democratic Party even if it risked some backlash among black people. Examples of this include Young publicly refusing to back Jesse Jackson’s bid for president choosing instead to back the Democratic candidate whole-heartedly.(Rich, 1989, p.35)

Young used his confrontational style of politics powerfully in Detroit. After reforming the police department his main enemies were the suburbs, media, and Washington, D.C. under uncooperative presidential administrations. Following the remark mentioned before regarding criminals “hitting eight mile,” many in the suburbs were all too willing to become paranoid of Detroit’s new black mayor. In the early seventies suburbs outnumbered the city 2 to 1, and had far lower unemployment
rates with far higher average worker pay. (Jacoby, 1998, p.310) Because the suburbs were doing better financially, Young felt he needed to create some sense of regionalism so suburbanites felt they had a stake in Detroit’s well being. (Jacoby, 1998, p.310)

But when the state legislature and wealthy Phillip Power wanted to work with Young to create a regional government, they realized Young saw metropolitan governance as an aggressive plan on the part of whites to reduce his power as mayor of Detroit. (Jacoby, 1998, p.315) Young believed suburbanite whites had evacuated Detroit simply to avoid black people, and therefore wanted little more than suburban money to run his city. (Jacoby, 1998, p.317-320) Young was also upset that corporations chose the suburbs to build businesses, and many suburbanites objected to transportation lines running from city to suburb because they didn’t want Detroit criminals to have access to their homes. (Crockett, 1994, p.171)

In the beginning of his term, both of Detroit’s major newspapers adopted generally supportive attitudes, neither supporting nor criticizing the new mayor. (Eisinger, 1980, p.96) After a while however they began to focus on his personal mannerisms like use of “street language,” playing poker with drinking buddies, and giving high fives to friends to greet old friends. (Jacoby, 1998, p.311) Although they expected the mayor to be different, many in the media felt he was going too far and leaving the realm of professional, mayoral conduct. Others felt Young was simply making a big deal of being the first black mayor by proving to whites he wasn’t what they were used to.
Young would also accuse Washington, D.C. of encouraging white flight to the suburbs by reducing Detroit’s ability to provide city services through federal funding. (Jacoby, 1998, p.313) One criticism of Young was that although he had solid development plans for the city; he just didn’t understand the national politics and how it affected Detroit. (Henderson, 1994, p.97) Whatever the truth may have been, Young certainly used this to his advantage by blaming the federal government publicly and drawing increased support from black Detroiter who felt the federal government was cheating them.

It has been suggested that Young followed a “corporate center strategy,” where the mayor attempted to replace the aging industries of Detroit with major corporations moving into the downtown area. Young’s special interest in revitalizing downtown caused many major quarrels as many council members and other leaders believed he should spend more time and resources on neighborhoods. (Whelan & Young, 1998, p.12) Young’s first development project was the 500 million dollar redeveloping of the Renaissance Center created by Henry Ford II. The center would give downtown Detroit the office buildings, shopping plazas, hotels and convention space that Young felt was needed in order to create a comeback for Detroit. Because Young would need state and federal money to put the center together, he needed to create a regionalist attitude towards Detroit so that non-Detroiters would feel they should support any funding measures. (Jacoby, 1998, p.310) It is interesting to note again that Young wanted that regional support without any attempts to reduce his influence as Detroit’s mayor by regionalizing the government.
In 1977 the Renaissance Center was completed and was the largest privately financed real estate development in the world as Henry Ford II and associates invested 350 million dollars. (Jacoby, 1998, p.336) When the center opened the offices were half full, and both Young and Ford had strong-armed as many businesses as possible to move to the new office space. While Young and Ford both believed the center might allay white flight and encourage downtown investment, others believed the few remaining businesses in downtown Detroit would move into the center and leave downtown a ghost town. (Jacoby, 1998, p.339) In the end the center did little to spark new investment; only relocating existing businesses into concentrated office space.

Another mini-project revolved around the 1980 Republican convention. Max Fisher, a wealthy Detroit area businessman, helped bring the convention to town while the city spent two million dollars giving downtown a superficial makeover. Empty buildings were demolished, abandoned cars were towed, and murals were painted to help hide adult movie houses. Detroit General Hospital was closed so the funds could be diverted to completing Joe Louis Arena in time for the convention. During the convention most of the delegates were airlifted in, and most never walked beyond the convention area. A few journalists did travel into the city to capture the real pictures and stories of Detroit life. (Jacoby, 1998, p.348)

Joe Louis Arena and the People Mover were two projects that certainly helped the downtown area. Young received some criticism from Blacks who believed Joe Louis was being built because suburbanites liked hockey. Young believed the sports
team would cause a new interest in downtown investment. He knew that downtown would have to have attractions and convention centers before large investors like hotel chains gain an interest in new ventures. The People Mover, which connects with Joe Louis, was another project that helped the downtown area by transporting people through a large part of the downtown area. Young wrestled this project away from the Southeastern Michigan Transportation Authority and the Urban Mass Transportation Agency because the two organizations were having problems working together.

Some criticisms of Young by Detroiters are that he spent a disproportionate amount of money developing downtown while neglecting the neighborhoods. Young would argue revitalizing downtown would eventually revitalize the city because the increased business investment would bring tax dollars and jobs. Many people believed however that Young was simply a willing puppet of the elite, allowing the corporate structure to run the city behind the scenes. (DeSantis, 1994, p.45) Friends of Young from his labor movement days might also say they didn’t like Young as a politician. (Rich, 1989, p.89) While he surrounded himself with a powerful political machine, the machine did much to suffocate grassroots movements. (Rivera, 1994, p.145) In any case Young was mayor for twenty years, leaving a legacy of development and criticism.

Dennis W. Archer

Mayor Archer was born in Detroit in 1942. He graduated from Western
Michigan University with a Bachelors of Science in Education in 1965 and taught special education in Detroit until finishing his law degree in 1970. Archer worked as a trial lawyer, taught at area law schools, and was very active with various bar associations including being President of the Michigan State Bar in 1984-85. In 1985 he was appointed to the Michigan Supreme Court and was elected to an eight-year term the following year. (City of Detroit Website, 05/30/2001)

After Coleman Young decided he would not seek a sixth term in 1993 Archer ran against former city attorney Sharon McPhail. Both were eloquent Black professions but Archer ran on the need for broad based coalition building, while McPhail ran on neighborhood empowerment. Young’s support of McPhail and her confrontational style proved to work against her as many voters were ready for something new. (Gallagher, 10/18/1993) Archer offered an open, coalitional, and professional image to Detroiters and his campaign was well funded and organized. In the end Archer won the election 56.6 to 43.3 percent. (Whelan & Young, 1998)

True to the electoral traditions set during Young’s tenure, Archer was re-elected over state representative Ed Vaughan with ease in 1997. Vaughan criticized Archer for being a puppet for big business while neglecting neighborhoods. Archer simply touted his accomplishments and the theme “The hope is real. The pride is back.” Archer won re-election with 83% of the vote, although voter turnout was less than 20%. (Whelan & Young, 1998)

Unlike his predecessor, Archer had the benefit of serving in good economic times. This benefit allowed Archer to work on strategies to encourage investment and
redevelop the city where Young may have worked on strategies to keep the city from bankruptcy. During Archer’s first year Detroit received several economic boosts from organizations anxious to get the city back on its feet. Motown received a 100 million dollar grant as part of the federal empowerment zone program aimed at helping the most economically depressed areas of Detroit. (Whelan & Young, 1998) Various business groups, including Detroit Renaissance, committed to one billion dollars in empowerment zone investments through 2005. (Downtown Detroit, Inc, 05/12/1998) Detroit Renaissance also created an investment fund of up to 60 million dollars for city development projects. The city’s largest bank, NBD Bancorp, led a similar effort to create another investment fund. (Whelan & Young, 1998)

Archer’s major development projects were two sports stadiums, three casinos, and the Campus Maritus development. A future project will create a $550 million headquarters for Compuware Corporation. (Waldmeir, 10/16/2000) All projects occurred in the downtown areas. It was announced in 1996 that the Detroit Lions Football and the Detroit Tigers baseball professional sports teams would be willing to move into new stadiums in the theatre district of Detroit pending land and stadium development. (McConnell, 04/18/2001) The Tigers Stadium would require public funding and overcoming the nostalgic opposition to the new site. Mayor Archer and the owner of the Detroit Tigers, Mike Illitch, worked out a plan where the state and city would share costs, while Illitch put up the bulk of the funding. This plan was challenged by referendum and lawsuit, but in 1999 the stadium was finished. (Whelan & Young, 1998)
The Lions stadium has not been finished as of yet, but with the success of the Tigers stadium many are very optimistic about its added impact on the downtown area. In its first year the Tiger's stadium's attendance was the second highest in the team's history at 2,533,752. It is estimated the team had a 120 million dollar economic impact on downtown Detroit. In the Tigers stadium's last year it had only a 77 million dollar impact. The new location of the stadium has also spurred much nearby development, even attracting dollars from outside the city limits. The Detroit Athletic Club, Gem Theatre, Century Theatre, and Century Club were all renovated or relocated to the new area. New residential lofts, the five story Post Bar, and other projects demonstrate the new stadium's ability to draw new investment.(Green & Nichols, 10/02/2000) Detroit has no reason to believe the stadium being built for the Detroit Lions would do anything but increase the economic draw of the area.

Archer originally opposed the building of casinos in Detroit, changing his mind only after voters approved a 1994 referendum on casinos. Archer announced in February 1998 that three casinos would be built on Detroit's riverfront.(McConnell, 04/18/2001) Three temporary casinos would be built in the downtown area while the city worked to get riverfront land for the renovation. Out of the proposals Archer chose three casino groups, excluding a black casino group owned largely by African American businessman Don Barden. That decision would cause Archer problems in the future.

Between July 1999 and November 2000 all three temporary casinos were built and immediately realized huge profits. However soon after their building land costs
made it apparent that the city may not be able to put three permanent casinos on the riverfront. By April 2001 the casinos were looking into other options. Greektown casino purchased two adjacent blocks to build a new gambling complex including hotel, parking structure, and an area for restaurants and shops. MotorCity Casino owned 17 acres in its neighborhood and MGM Grand Detroit Casino was looking into replacing one of its parking structures with a hotel tower.(Yerak & Puls, 04/24/2001)

After Archer’s announcement that he would not seek a third term these projects were stalled as political and economic players wait on the results of the election.

In 1998 Archer pushed to get the long vacant Hudson Building demolished for a Campus Martius development. The new development would have 9 acres of retail and office space and a landscaped park serving as a signature piece of downtown Detroit. The office space is needed due to the purchase of the Renaissance Center by General Motors for use as a new headquarters. It was believed the displaced offices would need downtown space for relocation. Meanwhile General Motors is planning a $500 million renovation of the Renaissance Center and its surrounding areas including new shops, restaurants and other attractions.(Whelan & Young, 1998)

In the midst of these massive development initiatives, Archer’s harshest criticisms have come from neighborhood neglect. While many things have improved, some believe the Mayor just doesn’t focus enough time in the neighborhoods. A 1998 ten-page report by the Detroit Community Initiative outlined problems like the lack of affordable housing, illegal dumping and licensing, broken streetlights, problems with the police, and lack of vocational training.(McConnell, 01/06/1998)
Some say Seven Mile and Gratiot is a microcosm of what is happening to the city. In 1998 construction began on a $35 million Kroger grocery store, while all around it are the same rundown homes, untended parks, and vacant lots piled with refuse. (McConnell, 04/18/2001)

Archer ran on the vision of making Detroit a "World class city" with low crime, and unparalleled education and job markets. He pledged to improve city services while increasing the quality of life for all citizens focusing on residential and neighborhood areas. (Bray, 04/29/2001) In all fairness Archer did run into major opposition from well-entrenched bureaucracies and powerful unions. Archer's pledge not to privatize city services may have worked against his ability to actually change the status quo of city departments. (Bray, 04/29/2001)

A snowstorm in January 1999 brought a whole new issue to the front page. Residents already unsatisfied with some basic city services had a new reason to complain when a blizzard smothered the city. The city had nowhere near the amount of snow removal equipment needed to clear the city, and workers were slow to react to the falling snow. To further exacerbate the matter, the city had a long held policy of not clearing residential streets. Although Archer heard the public cry and submitted a plan for future snow removal throughout all of Detroit, many still blamed him for the weeks of inconvenience. The city was able to get contractors and volunteers as the city first cleared streets around schools, hospitals, fire lanes, and the streets in front of the mayor's home. It took almost the entire month of January to get the rest of the city back into operation. The city spent $3.2 million of its own
resources, and contracted out for another $2.3 million to get the city moving again. (McWhirter, 01/22/1999)

Other city services, such as the fire and police departments, also caused problems for the Archer administration. From 1995 to 2000 Detroit taxpayers shelled out $7.9 million due to lawsuits from police shootings. (Shepardson, Sinclair, Hansen & Grant, 05/15/2000) This is however only a continuation of problems taking place before Archer’s election, as Detroiter have paid $123 million in settlements since 1987. (Detroit News, 10/08/2000) In many cases despite powerful evidence to the contrary, department investigations would clear the officers of any wrongdoing. When the cases go to court they result in million dollar lawsuits, and doubt about the Detroit police department’s ability to control its rogue officers. In September 2000, after several media groups began to rake Archer over the coals for allowing the shootings to continue, Archer asked U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno to investigate every fatal shooting since 1995. (Detroit News, 10/08/2000)

The problems with the Detroit Fire Department stem from neglect, and a Detroit News investigation revealed twenty-one deaths from 1996 to 2000 stemming from equipment problems. (Claxton & Hurt, 11/05/2000) Specific problems include hydrants that have been out of service for four or more years, fire houses being closed throughout Detroit due to a lack of working vehicles, and fire houses without working alarm systems. Archer responded by freeing up $3.4 million so the fire department could purchase new equipment and bring in outside experts to assist the department in getting up to the proper safety standards. (Claxton & Hurt, 11/30/2001)
department also began looking into methods to pay vendors more quickly and provide more training to keep firemen and managers current in their job duties.

Next to the casino issue, perhaps Archer’s second most controversial issue evolved after Governor Engler pushed a mayor takeover of the ailing Detroit public school system. In 1995 11,000 students took the eighth grade state proficiency tests, of those only 4200 took the eleventh grade tests in 1998. Of the 4200, only 239 actually passed all four sections of the test.(Bell & Walsh-Sarnecki, 02/09/1999) As a result of this test and other statistics Engler wanted to place control of the school district into the hands of Mayor Archer. Although originally Archer did not express interest in the plan, media polls demonstrated many Detroiters favored Archer taking control of the school board. While many expressed concern that the state was acting to disenfranchise Detroit voters, there was more concern for the state of the Detroit public schools. The governor’s plan eventually became a reality, but placed the Mayor at odds with other Detroit elected officials and worsened relations with many community groups. Other school boards and even the ACLU were against the plan believing it set a dangerous precedent for discounting the will of the people.(Audi, 03/11/1999) After the takeover the Mayor appointed deputy mayor Freman Hendrix as the chair and a long search for a new school superintendent began. A temporary superintendent, David Adamany of Wayne State University, was appointed to begin the process of breaking the stranglehold the well-entrenched bureaucracy and powerful unions had on reform efforts. Eventually Kenneth Burnely was brought in from Colorado to head the troubled district. While some changes and improvements
have been made, whether the takeover could be considered a success remains to be seen.

As a result of neighborhood concerns, the spurning of a proposal from a black owned casino group, the city's handling of the 1999 snow emergency, and the schools takeover, the Mayor faced a recall attempt in 1999. The Black Slate committee and the Community Coalition, headed by Earnest Johnson, spearheaded the recall attempt believing many in the community didn't like Archer's agenda and wanted their city back.(McConnell, 05/05/1999) The group collected signatures, distributed literature and held constant rallies, some even outside the Mayor's home. In the end, the recall attempt failed to collect enough signatures to force an election. The Mayor maintained an approval rating of 65%, although among black voters it had sunk to near 50%.(Dixon & Mayk, 05/02/1999) In April 2001, the mayor declined running for reelection despite predictions that he would easily win.

St. Louis

St. Louis, Missouri was incorporated in 1823, while its current boundaries were set when it became the first home-rule city in 1876. Because of its positioning near both the Missouri and Mississippi rivers and access to rail lines, St. Louis grew as a center for industrial, commerce and trading activities. As with many American cities during this time period, St. Louis saw wave after wave of immigrants come into the city, and with the Great Migration thousands of African Americans followed as well.(City of St. Louis, 06/25/2001) There were two main forces at work in the
building of the city. First was the constant influx of immigrants and new workers to the city. These workers, usually poor, moved directly near the factories so they could be close to the jobs. As the economic conditions of these immigrants improved, the second force occurred as they moved farther away from the factories in search of better housing and living conditions. (Schoenberg & Rosenbaum, 1980)

In 1950 the city peaked with 856,000 people. The population then began to drop from a large-scale movement to the suburbs, including African Americans during the 1970s. (City of St. Louis, 06/25/2001) There are several reasons why the population dropped. The prevalence of the automobile allowed people to live farther from the commercial and industrial centers of the city. Also, much of the housing stock was dilapidated from the years of neglect during the Depression and World War II eras. Finally, between 1958 and 1972, the number of manufacturing facilities within the city limits declined sharply from 2135 to 1461. (Schoenberg & Rosenbaum, 1980) For all these reasons and more the city’s population by 1970 had dropped to 622,236 while the metropolitan population went from 1,755,334 to 2,363,017.

Where St. Louis differs vastly from Atlanta, Georgia and Detroit, Michigan is that in 1960 the black population was 29% of the total and by 1970 that figure had grown to 41%. (Schoenberg & Rosenbaum, 1980) But St. Louis did not appear to be on a course for eventual black political dominance. South St. Louis continued to remain solidly white and a middle class central area had whites mixing with blacks. Furthermore, blacks were beginning to move to the suburbs upon reaching middle class status and in some cases simply to follow the jobs. Twenty years later in 1990
blacks still only composed 47% of the population and it wasn’t until the 2000 census that blacks actually captured the majority population. (City of St. Louis, 06/25/2001) This does not necessarily equal a majority of voting age individuals who vote according to race, as interestingly enough in 2001 the city elected its first white mayor in eight years.

Perhaps a large part of the reason why blacks did not hold the city’s top office until the 1990s was because of the city’s love/hate fascination with Mayor Vincent Schoemehl, Jr. Schoemehl was elected in 1981 after a Democratic primary upset where he defeated the sitting mayor. The upset was due in part to the support of labor and black leaders throughout the city. Although Schoemehl’s brash and confrontational style eventual made enemies throughout the city and especially the black leadership, he was elected to two additional terms with relative ease. Schoemehl became the only mayor in St. Louis history to serve three terms, retiring in 1993 after a failed run for Governor. (Mannies, 04/18/1993)

At any rate St. Louis does not follow the pattern of the other two cities in the study because when Detroit and Atlanta were electing their first black mayors, the black population in St. Louis was not large enough to have the same effect. Because of this difference in demographics St. Louis did not elect its first black mayor until 1993, twenty years after black mayors were elected in the other research cities. Demographics may also have played a role in why each mayor served only one term, with both being eventually replaced with a white mayor. Finally, race politics in the central city play a much larger role in St. Louis than in the other researched cities.
believe St. Louis provides a valuable addition to the study by providing an example that controls for time period and complete black control of the central city.

Freeman Bosley, Jr

St. Louis's first black mayor, Freeman Bosley, Jr is the son of a long time city alderman Freeman Bosley, Sr., who lost a bid for mayor in 1985 against three term mayor Vincent Schoemehl, Jr. At 38 Bosley served ten years as St. Louis circuit clerk in addition to being city Democratic party chairman since 1990.(Mannies, 03/04/1993) A lawyer by trade, Bosley was one of four Democrats running for nomination in the 1993 mayoral election. The other three candidates were state Rep. Anthony D. Ribaudo, former Alderman Steven C. Roberts, and Aldermanic President Thomas A. Villa.(St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 01/08/1993) When the three term current mayor, Vincent Schoemehl, decided not to run for re-election it opened the field to all manner of newcomers.

Bosley ran on a pledge of a sensible increase in police officers and new directions in crime, education and development. Bosley also campaigned on forming a partnership with the school board including ending busing for mandatory school integration.(O'Neil, 01/23/1993) Approaching the primary Bosley seemed destined to win, capitalizing from his ability to reach out to all sections of the city. In the final months Bosley was able to draw the support of the Post-Dispatch as the candidate with the best plan for the city. He proposed the creation of an urban bank, funded
both publicly and privately, as a way to encourage reinvestment in the city. (St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 03/01/1993)

Bosley won the Democratic primary handily, winning the majority vote in the city's six racially mixed wards, as well as the black wards. There were other factors lending to Bosley's nomination, including a split vote among south side whites, and the fund raising assistance Bosley received from State Rep. William Clay (Fiquette, 03/07/1993) and Governor Carnahan. (Mannies, 03/04/1993) As St. Louis is a strongly democratic state, Bosley hoped his political connections would lead to a working relationship with the state government after he was elected mayor.

The general election for mayor pitted Bosley against Republican John P. O’Gorman and independents William Haas and James A. Garrison Jr. Having won in a well publicized primary, Bosley had an advantage against his challengers because people already knew him and his platform. (St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 03/11/1993) Since for forty years the victor in the Democratic primary was elected mayor, it was expected that Bosley would win this contest as well. (St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 03/26/1993) Bosley eventually captured 98% of the black wards and 75% in the racially mixed wards. In south St. Louis Bosley was only able to capture about 30% as many in that area broke a forty year tradition and voted Republican rather than vote for a black mayor. (Freeman, 04/09/1993)

Upon election Bosley immediately began calling for change. His two immediate concerns were returning control of the police department to the city, and changing St. Louis from a weak to strong mayor system. Another problem was the
state circuit court system. The state has complete control over budgetary and administrative matters for the St. Louis courts, but the city pays the ever inflating bills. (Bosley, Jr, 04/21/1993) The 1914 city charter sought to eliminate city corruption by spreading the powers and budget controls between St. Louis and the state. (St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 04/22/1993) Bosley believed his election signaled the voters wanted a new direction. He believed it was time for the city to reclaim its powers and strengthen its mayor to do the job of running the city.

As the city’s first black mayor, one of Bosley’s challenges was creating an administration that could accomplish his desired objectives. Recognizing that the current department heads had experience, Bosley initially decided against the massive appointment replacements that often follows the election of a new mayor. (Holleman, 10/24/1993) Although many of the appointments the mayor did make during his tenure were without incident, it was of course the problematic appointments that received the media attention. Early in his tenure, some controversy brewed when he nominated a known lesbian for a position on the St. Louis Civil Rights Commission. (St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 07/03/1993) Halfway through his tenure Bosley came under fire from several city alderman who claimed his administration had chased away two quality Housing Authority directors by simply not being cooperative. (Gross, 07/01/1995)

In 1996 after chief of staff Lloyd Jordan left for private practice so he could prepare for the mayor’s reelection campaign, (Tuft, 03/07/1996) Bosley appointed LeRoy Grant in his place. Critics immediately opposed this appointment because
Grant had a history of financial troubles including a recent bankruptcy. (McLaughlin, 10/25/2000) Many felt a man who could not manage his own finances could not manage the city. Grant was later charged with a DWI. (Sorkin, 08/15/1996)

One of Bosley’s main administrative criticisms was his inability to control some of his staff. Exacerbated by St. Louis’ weak mayor system, this problem was demonstrated in a few controversial staff created issues. A staff aid, Walle Amusa, made a racial divisive remark at a public meeting called by Alderman Sharon Tyus that offended some city residents. When questioned about that remark, Amusa reportedly locked himself in the Mayor’s office and refused to comment. (Tuft, 02/02/1996) Tim Person, another aide, was fired after he represented Bosley on a three member airport contract awarding team that chose a company where Person’s wife was a contractor. (McClellan, 11/17/1996) City Assessor Dennis Hill was fired for secretly taping visitors to his office and refusing to cooperate with a residency requirement investigation. (St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 07/19/1996)

Another issue demonstrating the inability of Bosley to control his staff was the administration’s problems with the City Charter’s employee residency requirements. Half way through his tenure Bosley began to crack down on employees violating the residency requirements by living outside the city. Investigations of city firemen led Fire Chief Neil Svetanics to begin procedures to replace around forty firemen. (Tuft & Bryant, 01/19/1996) The city’s Corrections Commissioner, who had fired two employees for residency violations, didn’t even live in Missouri. (McClellan, 03/03/1996) Personnel Director William Duffe came under aldermanic fire for not
enforcing the residency requirements fairly. Many rank and file city employees had been investigated and about forty were actually fired for violating residency requirements. At the same time, twenty-two city department heads told an aldermanic committee they have never been asked about their residency. (Tuft, 04/05/1996) The city’s airport director, Leonard Griggs, was appointed without the requirement of moving to the city pending a legal dispute stemming from a 1980’s court order. Even after it was held that the court order contained no language that would exempt the airport director, Bosley gave Griggs until after the end of the mayor’s first term to move to the city. Many saw this as Bosley allowing his appointment to ignore the residency requirements that had cost so many others their jobs. (St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 04/17/1996)

Perhaps the mayor’s biggest administrative problem came from Police Chief Clarence Harmon. As early as December 1993, Bosley and Harmon were at odds regarding increased police patrols. In response to 253 deaths as compared to 217 the previous year, Harmon called for 200 more police officers over four years. Bosley responded the plan was too expensive for the city’s budget, and that the city could afford 100 more officers by Christmas 1994. (Sorkin, 12/12/1993)

The biggest fight however occurred over the control of the police department. Since the Civil War the state legislature has controlled a significant portion of the St. Louis Police department, with the governor appointing four of the five police commissioners. (St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 04/22/1993) Bosley, state Senator Jet Banks, and other area politicians wanted local control for the police department and
Banks was able to lead legislation giving budgetary control to the city. (Mannies & Bryan, 11/08/1995) Harmon on the other hand wanted control to remain with the state. Local black politicians also accused Harmon of being harder on black officers than white officers, and focusing his policing efforts in white areas of the city. (Mannies & Bryan, 11/08/1995) Harmon denied the race favoritism allegations and believed local control would lead to more city corruption and less job security for officers. (Sorkin, 03/31/1995)

These disagreements lead to several well publicized arguments between Harmon and Bosley regarding budget issues and management decisions. Even though Carnahan sided with Harmon on the local control issue, Harmon criticized the governor for not being active with his support. The police board generally sided with Bosley since the mayor and the governor were allies when they were appointed. Finally, Harmon quit to take a post with United Van Lines of Fenton, citing fatigue from constant arguments with the police board. (Bryan & Sorkin, 11/11/1995)

The quality of city services is another gauge often used to qualify a mayor’s administrative abilities. Some of the most problematic issues dealt with city services the mayor didn’t control. Approaching the end of Bosley’s term, the health care market transition from public hospitals to managed care was preparing to leave the northside of St. Louis without quick access to health care. Regional hospital was originally supported by the city and county, but that support soon ended. To make matters worse, managed care and specialized clinics were beginning to drain the hospital of its paying clients. Eventually it was faced with a chronic shortage of
patients who could afford to pay for the services they received. As a result the hospital threatened a closing and many northside residents demanded their medical needs be considered an important topic in the upcoming election.(Carlton, 02/02/1997)

Another issue not directly under the mayor’s control was education. Bosley took an early stand opposing mandatory school busing to foster integration. Bosley believed the program, which bused about 14,500 city children to county schools, was damaging to city neighborhoods. First the neighborhood schools were shorted funding while the county schools were paid for the busing students. Another problem was that people would not move into the city neighborhoods while the county schools received better funding and were in better condition. He believed the benefit of integration wasn’t worth the lost in quality education to children attending city schools.(Mannies, 09/27/1993) Even though this strong stance on city busing did gain Bosley some support from the southern St. Louis whites who didn’t vote for him, it also raised the ire of the NAACP and other black leaders who had fought to get busing established in 1981.(Mannies & Lindecke, 09/29/1993)

In 1996 things between the school board and Bosley got heated when the board passed a resolution calling for a better focus on neighborhood safety and the end of tax abatements.(St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 03/29/1996) Many felt that while tax abatements are used to lure business investors with lower or no property taxes, the forfeited city income often robbed the schools of as much as $17 million in much needed income.(St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 06/09/1996) The mayor took this resolution
as a criticism of his support to education. He fired back saying the district’s 50% drop out rate and other problems may indicate the district simply needs better management. (Berger & Riley, 03/25/1996) In addition, Bosley also upset some by comparing the city’s catholic schools to St. Louis public schools. The comparison was seen as unfair because catholic schools don’t pay their teachers as much as public schools, and the ability to select students helped save the special education costs and behavior problems public schools had to deal with. (St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 03/29/1996)

Arguably, the mayor’s most effective time was the very beginning of his tenure. Within his first few months Bosley received some high marks for his leadership during the “Great Flood of 1993” where he ordered evacuations and electricity and gas shut-offs. (Holleman & Little, 07/14/1993) Although many believed these measures may have been hasty, they helped residents to see the mayor as decisive and willing to stand behind his judgment calls. Many believe as a result of this flood, Bosley was able to convince voters to approve two sales tax increases the city needed. Voters had denied five such proposals during the former mayor’s tenure. (Mannies & Holleman, 08/04/1993)

The mayor also gained some credit/criticism for his meetings with gang members and drug dealers in an effort to curb the violence in the city. Although no real progress came from the meetings, the mayor vowed continued police harassment if the gang members continued selling drugs and committing violent acts. In some of the meetings members of the community came out to confront the gang members.
The gang members called for better education, training and job opportunities as a way to keep people out of the lifestyle. (Mannies, 09/23/1993) Bosley eventually launched a neighborhood stabilization program where officers were placed into community offices to serve as government liaisons and help curb crime. This program eventually came into conflict as the offices didn’t coincide with aldermanic districts and residents often became confused and misunderstandings ensued. (Gross, 06/17/1995)

Although Bosley was firmly committed to neighborhood development over downtown development, he did find that some focus on the city’s downtown improvement was needed. Half way into his tenure the media began to circulate rumors that downtown was dying due to lack of attention. Plans for a convention hotel had been stalled in the look for an investor until Bosley began to look into city ownership of such a hotel. (Faust & Prost, 02/01/1996) Another downtown development issue dealt with the building of a new city jail next to the municipal courts building. Reacting in part to federal pressure to ease inmate overcrowding, the city originally planned to add to the Workhouse city jail site. The Bosley administration decided however it would be more cost effective to build the site downtown. (St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 02/19/1996)

Neighborhood developments also caused some controversies for Bosley. As with many other large cities around that time, St. Louis was struggling with the problems of neighborhood disinvestment. A Schnucks supermarket proposal on the northside of St. Louis caused serious arguments between the mayor and alderman Sharon Tyus. Tyus accused Bosley of using the project to pay off political allies,
while Bosley accused Tyus of stalling a project that would bring five million dollars in paychecks every year to city residents. (Tuft, 01/13/1996)

The mayor also ran into some trouble when a neighborhood residential developer and old Bosley employer, was suspended by the Department of Housing and Urban Development for diverting funds for federal development. Although Bosley insisted he gave his old employer no special treatment, he also didn’t seem to distance himself far enough to quell rumors of impropriety. (St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 06/03/1996) More negative attention occurred in 1996 when the mayor turned down a $100,000, no strings attached, offer from a mortgage company to help home buyers make down payments. The Bosley administration refused to accept any gift under one million dollars, citing that such assistance would have to be city wide to keep from making enemies. (Tuft, 11/15/1996)

In addition to problems caused in the normal operation of city government, Bosley also had his share of specific controversies. As early as 1993 the mayor and two of his aides accepted an all expenses paid trip to Las Vegas compliments of two casino groups bidding for riverfront gambling leases. (St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 11/09/1993) Although Bosley affirmed his ability to make an unbiased decision regarding which casino would get the lease, it was clearly a mistake in judgment. Another error in judgment occurred in 1996 when Bosley neglected to sign twelve routine bills and mistakenly signed a burglar alarm bill he wanted to veto. (St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 01/16/1996)
More negative press occurred when the Missouri Ethics Commission appointed a special investigator to look into allegations that Bosley spent $46,000 during his mayoral campaign without revealing the sources of the cash,(Tuft, 09/10/1996) and when a Post-Dispatch investigation revealed city employees racking up thousands of dollars in personal phone calls on city cell phones. (St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 02/08/1997)

Another source of constant city problems, the Midnight Basketball Program, was designed to keep young men off the streets and out of trouble. Instead, it found trouble within its own ranks. Bosley started the program in January 1994, and soon after that it began to have trouble with employee overpayments and huge checks for personal items being written against the program account.(Tuft, 11/14/1996)

But the biggest problems came towards the end of 1996 when the program director, Evelyn Rice-Peebles, came to Bosley to alert him that $120,000 was missing from the programs bank accounts. Rice-Peebles says she was told to keep quiet and let Bosley handle it. Bosley claims he told her to tell the Parks Director whose department oversaw the basketball program. A city investigation was inconclusive, but after the media drew attention to the missing money Bosley asked Circuit Attorney Dee Joyce-Hayes to investigate. In the end, Rice-Peebles and several others were fired.(Freeman, 12/06/1996) Rice-Peebles asked the Circuit Attorney to include Bosley himself in the investigation, as several of the suspected Midnight Basketball employees were individuals the mayor’s office had forced the program to hire.(Tuft, 11/20/1996)
All in all, race seems to have played a serious role in Bosley’s administration. In 1995 Bosley upset many blacks when he supported Francis Slay as Aldermanic President over several black candidates. At the same time many whites saw his support as an attempt to make good on his campaign promise of using both black and white keys to play the “Star Bangled Banner.” (Freeman, 03/10/1995) Later in 1995, Bosley would please blacks but outrage whites when he announced he would replace the indicted black comptroller Virvus Jones with another black. (St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 10/08/1995) Bosley believed it was important to maintain the ratios set by the voters. (Mannies, 10/07/1995) Both situations however show the racial line that Bosley often had to walk.

Another racial sticking point was the mayor’s commitment to minority participation in city business. In 1992, after a Brimmer report which looked at the discrimination of blacks, Mayor Schoemehl issued an executive order that sought to award twenty-five percent of all city contracts to blacks and Hispanics. (Tuft, 01/09/1996) In the first six months after his election Bosley appointed two long time black activists to actively make sure minorities get their fare share of city business. (Holleman, 08/11/1993) In 1996 Bosley extended the program to include Asians and Indians as well. (Tuft, 01/09/1996) Bosley’s commitment to the goals caused problems with aldermen who believed the goals were illegal and would cost city taxpayers in the long run. The U.S. Supreme Court had already ruled that set-aside programs based on minority status discriminated against white firms. (Tuft, 01/24/1996) Bosley responded that as the city’s first black mayor, it is his role to
include women and minorities in the daily business of St. Louis. (Tuft, 01/31/1996)

Other critics took issue with the city’s supply commissioner, Ron Mackey, for implementing the mayor’s wishes in a way that exposes the city to lawsuits. The mayor treats the minority hiring and contracting percentages as goals, and as long as they are only goals they are legal. Many insisted the way Mackey enforces the goals they have become illegal quotas. (St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 02/01/1996) Three days before leaving office Bosley signed an executive order raising the goal to 27%. (St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 04/12/1997)

**Clarence Harmon**

Clarence Harmon is a St. Louis native who served as an army paratrooper before joining the police department at age 29. Harmon advanced through the police ranks earning bachelors and master’s degrees along the way. (Schlinkmann, 02/06/2001) Eventually appointed the city’s first black police chief by mayor Schoemehl, Jr, Harmon soon came under fire from Bosley and the police board with allegations of attempting to block Bosley’s efforts to gain local control of the police department. Tired of dealing with the constant fighting, Harmon eventually left public life for a quiet job in the private sector. (Bryan & Sorkin, 11/11/1995)

As the 1997 election rolled around, Harmon originally supported Alderman Marit Clark in the race for mayor. Then, in a move that could perhaps symbolize the coming years Harmon changed his mind and decided to run for mayor. (Schlinkmann, 10/06/1997) Almost immediately the St. Louis chapter of the NAACP issued a
report accusing Harmon of generally favoring whites officers and harsher disciplinary actions towards black officers. Harmon dismissed the report claiming the chapter president, Charles Mischeaux, was one of the police commissioners who gave Harmon a hard time as police chief. (Bryan & Tuft, 09/06/1996)

Although both democratic candidates were black and using mixed campaign staffs, the contest became racial as black northsiders supported Bosley while white southsiders rallied behind Harmon. Although each side accused the other of race baiting, both sides also cited losing potential supporters who did not want to go against the racial grain. White leaders were afraid to endorse Bosley while citizens in black neighborhoods didn’t want to upset their neighbors by putting Harmon signs in their front lawns. (Mannies, 01/12/1997)

The Democratic primary made Harmon the winner of the city’s racial argument. Some Bosley aids believed that in painting Harmon as not “black” enough, they might have painted Bosley as too “black.” Bosley’s objection to the school-busing program may have upset many of the 15,000 black families who voluntarily participate in the program. (Freeman, 03/06/1997) Bosley got only 83% of the black vote while Harmon got 94% of white voters. Since the population of St. Louis is racially balanced, this gave Harmon the advantage. Harmon got 56.3% of the vote, while Bosley got 42.9%. (Wilson, 02/10/1999) Whites of both the Republican and Democratic parties voted at Presidential levels against the current mayor. (Schneider, 03/07/1997)
In the final election Harmon proved once again that the Democratic candidate has the advantage. In the month of the general mayoral election, Harmon raised $346,424, an overwhelming amount as compared to independent Marit Clark’s $45,000. Republican Jay Dearing raised $11,630. (Mannies, 05/08/1997) Harmon won 73% of the final vote, with his nearest challenger Clark winning only 22%. (Lindecke, 04/02/1997) The voter turnout citywide was 37.5%. Interestingly enough, the predominately white South side’s share of the vote was 57%, up from 49.9% in the Democratic primary. The predominately black north side wards contributed 28.6%, down from 36.4% in the Democratic primary. (O’Neil, 04/08/1997)

Once elected Mayor Harmon outlined an immediate and enthusiastic agenda. In what some believe was a ploy to keep business executives from leaving the city, Harmon promised a careful look at the city’s personal earnings tax. He also strengthened his commitment to improve city services and find a way to keep the financial problems of Regional hospital from allowing city residents access to health care. Although no specific goals or plans regarding racial reconciliation were mentioned, Harmon also stressed the city’s need to overcome its racial divide. (Mannies, 04/02/1997) Later in the year Harmon would add the revitalization of downtown, the reorganization and improvement of the city’s development organizations, and willingness to take over and improve the public schools should he be awarded control. (Scherberg, 12/12/1997)
Much like Bosley and others before him, Harmon and his Chief of Staff Mike Jones began the administration with a desire to put together the best team for the job. Although many would argue Harmon did not have the extent of personnel problems that Bosley did, the split of Harmon and Jones in many ways tells the behind the scenes story. As much as Harmon played the outsider role, his chief of staff was a political insider. He had gone to college with Vincent Schoemehl, Jr and had served on the board of aldermen before taking several political appointments including running the St. Louis Housing Authority. Jones believed part of his role was helping Harmon understand the need to reach out to all sections of the city. (Mannies, 04/20/2001)

Towards the end of Harmon’s administration, Jones began to look at other possible avenues of employment. Mayor Harmon developed a habit of constantly changing his mind, and this habit caused problems. Jones was eventually fired over an emotional and public argument between Jones and Harmon after Harmon began to have second thoughts about a development deal that was already finished. (Schlinkmann, 11/10/2000) Because the media and other political leaders in the city gave much of the credit for Harmon’s development accomplishments to Jones, Jones was immediately hired to lead the Greater St. Louis Region Empowerment Zone. (Jackson, 12/22/2000) One article explained that Harmon fired his best political and administrative asset for telling the mayor what everyone was thinking. (Wilson, 11/22/2000)
One of the most important goals outlined by Harmon in the beginning of his administration was the improvement of city services. One of the more pressing issues was that of health care, especially with the impending close of Regional hospital on the northside of the city. Early in his term, Harmon appointed Dr. Larry Fields as director of the city’s Department of Health and Hospitals in an effort to curb the city’s health problems in the areas of infant mortality, sexually transmitted diseases, and lead poisoning in children. (Kurz, 08/17/1997) In the face of these health problems, the closing of a major hospital created what many would consider dire conditions for much of the northern part of the city. Activists began to demand the city do something before the hospital’s financial problems forced it to lay off the rest of its employees. At one point protestors marched into the mayor’s office demanding to know how he planned to respond to the crisis. (Tuft & Schlinkmann, 06/17/1997)

Harmon’s administration and the city’s Estimate Board eventually responded by working out a deal to keep the hospital open until another group could take over. The city agreed to cover costs for three months as well as other miscellaneous costs while alternatives were worked out. (Schlinkmann, 07/04/1997) In April of 1998, a deal was finally worked out where BJC Health System would manage the ConnectCare health care plan for citizens of St. Louis without health care coverage. Various clinics were established throughout the city with the federal, state, and city funds combining to make sure everyone had access to health care. The agreement marked a fixed problem many credited to Harmon. (Schlinkmann, 04/21/1998)
Another area Harmon is credited with improving is the city's ambulance system. After an incident where a city parks worker died of a heart ailment after waiting more than a half hour for the ambulance, Harmon issued an executive order transferring the emergency medical service from the Health to the Fire department. (Schlinkmann, 04/20/1997) The change was considered widely successful as in only two months response times were trimmed by an average of almost three minutes. (Schlinkmann, 07/22/1997) Considering the type of emergencies EMS responds to, three minutes is easily the difference between life and death.

Lead poisoning was also considered an emergency by some after a 1997 study revealed 25% of St. Louis' children tested for lead poisoning had dangerous levels in their blood. (Schlinkmann, 07/10/1999) As a result, Harmon proposed increasing building permit fees from 2$ to $6.50 per $1,000 of the project’s cost. The extra amount would be used in grants to lower income residents with children with high lead amounts in their blood. (Parish, 06/23/1999) The residents would use the grants to make their homes safer by removing the lead based paint. The plan also called for forgivable loans for lead paint removal, and making lead paint an item on inspector checklists whenever a property changes owners. (Schlinkmann, 07/10/1999) In January 2000, Harmon decided to sue paint manufacturers for money to make houses in St. Louis safe for all children. Harmon was widely criticized for this move, as many saw it as a politically motivated and frivolous lawsuit. (Parish, 02/21/2000)
Harmon also attempted to improve services in areas not under the direct control of the mayor’s office. Responding to the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development’s accusations that the St. Louis Housing Authority was spending money incorrectly, Harmon called for the resignation of the entire board and the executive director of the authority. (St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 10/18/1997) The news came as no shock to the Authority, as Harmon had already called for the resignations of all Bosley appointees to the board. Under the heightened scrutiny of HUD, however, Harmon was able to call for a criminal investigation into the organization and begin public hearings to force its leaders out of office. (Parish & Tuft, 11/27/1997)

In a separate issue Harmon called for an investigation of a police slush fund of more than $7.5 million that is solely at the discretion of the department’s finance director. Even though there was no evidence of wrongdoing, Harmon was troubled by the director’s secrecy. He had refused to release details of the fund to the Police Board or its secretary. Harmon believed that in any public fund that large, some accountability was needed. Critics on the police board claimed Harmon was overreacting to scandals that had rocked Kansas City, Missouri’s similar police fund. (Sorkin, 07/09/1998)

The St. Louis school district was problematic with its accreditation in jeopardy and a history of scandals. Although the idea had been floated that the mayor take over the schools, Harmon originally seemed reluctant to do so. When the legislature began to move towards such as proposal, Harmon began to feel compelled
to step forward and be willing to lead the district into improvement. (Singer, 11/09/1997) State Commissioner of Education Robert Bartman gave the school board two years to gain accreditation before the state took over the district. (St. Louis Business Journal, 11/05/1999) Harmon made several pitches to gain control of the school district but was never given the authority. Harmon made a commitment to renew his desire to lead the schools in 2001 if the school board failed to regain accreditation. (Schlinkmann, 09/25/2000)

Financing the improvements to city services often became as much an issue as the improvements themselves. Harmon announced changes like the building of the new, larger city jail, decreasing federal aid in much-needed programs and requests for raises for city workers meant eventually the city would have to downsize. Harmon cited that current trends would lead to the city having huge budget deficits that are illegal under current Missouri laws requiring balanced budgets. Department heads were encouraged to find more economical methods of providing city services. The city was also warned that it might become necessary to begin to look into privatization. (Schlinkmann, 09/17/1997)

At the same time, the city had to look to increase taxes. As part of a package to make the city safer, Harmon asked city voters to approve bonds for capital improvements to the fire and police departments, city court facilities, and the demolishing of abandoned buildings throughout the city. (Schlinkmann, 12/12/1997) The measure passed and allowed Harmon to make improvements throughout the city.
including replacing some emergency sirens that have not worked for decades.(Schlinkmann, 02/06/2001)

The city also began to turn a more scrutinizing eye towards the thirty-year practice of tax abatement to encourage development. Because of problems with abandoned property, 25% of the land in St. Louis generates no tax revenue. In addition to that, 23% of the land is tax exempt, and another 11% of the land is not taxed due to abatement. In total, only about 41% of the land in St. Louis generates revenue through the property tax.(St. Louis Business Journal, 01/09/1998) The abatement's effects are particularly devastating to the city's schools that receive 30% of their budget from property taxes. Critics also argue the abatement is counterproductive, since the incentive to purchase land in the city is offset by the incentive to seek an area with better education. In addition, 76% of all tax abatements are residential, where a full abatement would save a $100,000 new homeowner only $58.77 per month.(Tucci, 01/09/1998)

Downtown development, another of the mayor's outlined objectives, has seen some accomplishments during Harmon's tenure. A few months after entering office Harmon signed legislation allowing street performers in the downtown area as a step to making downtown an exciting place.(Freeman, 07/22/1997) Also in his first year, Harmon created a task force of downtown businessmen to create a list of specific development focus points that can be realized in three to five years.(Schlinkmann, 10/15/1997) In 1999 Harmon signed legislation to create a Planning and Urban Design Agency and the Community Development Administration. The agency would
be responsible for development evaluation and planning while the administration would focus on federal development and housing funding. The St. Louis Development Corporation, a separate entity, would deal with developing employment opportunities for the city's residents. (St. Louis Business Journal, 07/09/1999)

Specific development projects credited to the Harmon administration have given the mayor somewhat of a legacy to point to. One such development was the downtown jail project that began under Bosley. The project had been held up by a disagreement between the mayor and the city treasurer regarding when the jail and a parking structure would be built. The agreement to build both structures simultaneously allowed the project to move forward. (Parish, 07/10/1998)

Another project that predated Harmon but was finished during his tenure was the convention center hotel constructed to bring more conventions to downtown St. Louis. In 1997 Harmon created a committee representing various development and government groups with the objective of constructing a convention hotel within two years. (Tucci, 09/12/1997) Two years later an agreement was reached for a $242.2 million hotel complex using a mixture of public and private funds. Government aid, mostly tax-exempt bonds, comprises 40% of the financing for the project. The hotel’s opening day was scheduled for August 2002. (Schlinkmann, 06/23/1999)

Another project giving the mayor dubious honors was the demolition of The Arena, former home of the St. Louis Blues professional hockey team, and the building of an office park. The mayor encountered opposition from groups concerned with the historic value of the structure, and to aggravate matters a judge ruled the
mayor could not demolish the structure without aldermanic approval.(Parish, 10/17/1998) Citing the failure of concerned groups to provide a concrete plan for renovating and using the vacant structure, Harmon even refused an offer by the Gateway Foundation of St. Louis to pay $600,000 over the course of one year to buy time to find an alternative to demolishing the structure.(Schlinkmann & Duffy, 01/15/1999) At this writing one building of the new office park was near completion.(Schlinkmann, 02/06/2001)

The mayor has had his share of development mis-steps as well, such as his threat to the developer Sansone Group regarding an abandoned Famous-Barr site. The city leased the site to Sansone in 1994 for $10,000 a year, but Sansone subleases the property to another company at a profit of $20,000 to $45,000 a month. The sub lessee, Hechinger Co. planned to build a Home Quarters Warehouse on the site but failed to do so due to financial difficulties. As a result the building at a busy intersection stands empty much to the ire of residents. Harmon initially issued a threat to the Sansone Group warning if something was not done with the property, they would be barred from other developments in the city.(Parish, 09/09/1997) The mayor’s threats proved hollow however when he allowed the Sansone Group to convince him it was not making any profit on the property due to the interest payments from the loan to purchase and prepare the properties.(Schlinkmann & Mihalopoulos, 09/11/1997)

Casinos were another problematic development area for Harmon. Missouri law only allows casino gambling when the facility floats on water, and in April 1998,
2,330 people had to be evacuated after a barge struck a casino. Although no one was seriously injured, Harmon questioned the reasoning behind taking such a risk by only allowing water-based casinos. Harmon believed if gambling was to be legal, it might as well be legal and safer in a land-based casino. Although the land-based casino was not an option, Harmon also supported moving the facility to a safer location in a moat. (Schlinkmann, 04/09/1998)

Harmon upset county officials after he joined them in applying for a federal status that would improve the city's ability to get the funding to build the convention center hotel. The county officials understood they were helping Harmon apply for the status in return for his helping to bring a casino to Lemay. After Harmon secured the funding for his convention center, he changed his mind regarding the new casino. Harmon claimed the new casino would affect the $7 million in taxes the President casino gives the city of St. Louis every year. In addition, Harmon feared the new casino would cause layoffs from President casino, including hundreds of minorities. President Casino leaders had already informed the city that things were not looking up financially, and that they would close the President if another casino opened. Whether or not Harmon's concerns were valid, it was clear that he shouldn't have agreed before he understood the circumstances. (Tuft, 07/13/2000)

This event wasn't the only time Harmon's apolitical mindset upset leaders outside the boundaries of St. Louis. Only a few months after his election Harmon endorsed Republican County Council candidate Edith Cunnane. Although Harmon believed the voters loved bi-partisanship, his endorsement upset many Democratic
leaders. In addition it went against a long tradition of city and county politicians taking a neutral stance in elections outside their jurisdiction. Harmon stood behind his decision claiming he knew Cunnane twelve years and she had supported his election. Nevertheless, he began his tenure on a sour note with many of the area Democrats, including St. Louis County Executive Buzz Westfall.

(Mannies, 06/02/1997)

Five months into Harmon’s tenure he had another run in with Westfall regarding an executive director appointment to the Bi-State Development Agency. Both officials refused to vote for the other’s candidate, and since they effectively controlled the bulk of the money the agency could not move forward without them. (Jackson, 04/29/1997) Harmon also saw problems when an argument between Congressman Bill Clay and Attorney General Jay Nixon erupted around Bill Clinton coming to speak at Nixon’s fundraiser. Harmon, who had already agreed to support Nixon and co-host the fundraiser, denied any endorsement of Nixon. He later recanted and admitted that he was supporting Nixon and had already agreed to co-host the function in question. He had managed to upset both sides of the argument. (McClellan, 10/31/1997)

Another argument Harmon ended up losing was the race argument that seemed to be brewing in every aspect of St. Louis political life. Harmon found, much like Bosley, it was impossible to please both the north and south sides of the city. One issue that was an indication of where city leaders believed Harmon was positioned on the race issue was a school sales tax vote. As a result of the
desegregation settlement regarding school busing, St. Louis had to raise the sales tax in order to improve the conditions of city schools. During the four week blitz designed to convince voters to go along with the tax increase, there were television commercials, radio spots, and several different pieces of political literature that were produced and mailed to the homes of voters. Among the political mailings were two particular pieces that caused a stir. One pamphlet, targeting white voters, included the endorsements of two prominent white politicians and mayor Harmon. Another pamphlet, targeting black voters, included the endorsement of prominent black voters like former mayor Freeman Bosley, Jr. (Freeman, 02/07/1999)

Even though the tax passed in every ward, Harmon strongly criticized the campaign for being racially divisive. This upset many that thought the campaign had been a struggle and success. It also confused some because the mayor was now strongly criticizing a proposal that would bring funding support for the schools. Perhaps Harmon was mostly upset at being left out of the brochure going to north side African Americans, while his campaign opponent Bosley, Jr was included. The fact is Harmon was not very popular in the north side wards so Bosley was a better spokesperson in those areas. (Wilson, 02/10/1999)

Harmon’s support of measures to increase minority contracting and participation in city business has been interesting. Minority contactors staged a demonstration on a stretch of highway to protest a lack of minority participation in a multi-million dollar highway project. Although Harmon did not agree with the blocking of traffic, Harmon did agree that minorities were being unfairly left out, and
contacted Governor Carnahan in an effort to resolve the matter. Contractors were encouraged that Harmon agreed with the need for more minority participation. (Leiser, 07/09/1999)

Further supports of minority contracting include a change to make certified minority contractors with federal or state programs automatically certified to do business with the city (St. Louis Small Businesss Monthly, 09/2000), and a Covenant 2004 program where business and civic leaders around the region pledged to include more minority contractors in their ventures. (Westhoff, 10/29/2000) The mayor also signed an executive order asking all companies doing business with the city to reach the goal of 25% minority and 5% women participation in all cooperative efforts involving the city government. (Harmon, 09/1998) On the other hand, the mayor also caused controversy when his administration chose a Florida firm to study minority hiring practices in the city. Previously in another city the firm’s report led to the overturning of that city’s affirmative action program. (Berger, 02/25/2000)

Perhaps the most informative aspect of Harmon’s mayoralty is the way he was removed from office. This time the Democratic primary was a three-way race between Harmon, Bosley, and Aldermanic President Francis Slay. Harmon, the incumbent, claimed his legacy of downtown development and relatively scandal-free administration should be enough to allow him to carry the torch for four more years. (Schlinkmann, 09/25/2000) Bosley acknowledged some mistakes in his previous administration, saying some of his appointees had not served the city well. He pledged to consult city leaders and conduct nationwide searches for appointees if
he was re-elected. (St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 12/29/2000) Slay, while trying to keep a positive theme to the campaign, cited the city had not taken advantage of national good times during the past eight years. (Schlinkmann, 01/18/2001)

In the final analysis Harmon won only about 5% of the vote. Francis Slay won the nomination with 46,090 votes to Bosley’s 35,326. (St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 03/07/2001) Bosley carried the northside black vote; Slay earned the south side white votes. Slay went on to become the next mayor. There were two lines of reasoning for why the incumbent mayor lost by such a huge margin. One side said although Harmon was a likeable guy and a good police chief, politics just was not for him. He quit the police force because he did not like the politics but then entered politics. Although he was elected mayor by a pretty clear margin, he never seemed to get into the mayor role. (McClellan, 02/19/2001) Another explanation simplifies matters by picturing the election as an extremely racial campaign for an extremely racial city; Bosley got the black vote as the city’s first black mayor. Slay got the white vote because he was white. There was nothing left for Harmon. (Hartmann, 02/21/2001)
CHAPTER III

CONCLUSIONS

Existence and Definition of the Generations

Before I get into an extended discussion on my findings regarding the first and second generations of urban black mayors, I believe it is worthwhile to first examine what I did not find. The entire project is based on my experiences after moving to the city of Detroit, mainly the comments of the media and everyday citizens regarding the differences between current mayor Dennis Archer and the previous mayor Coleman Young. Specifically, Archer was constantly criticized for “not being black enough,” and out of touch with the black residents of the city. Black residents who lived under Young would say Archer was much too accommodating with white and suburban interests. Meanwhile suburban Detroiters would call Archer the man that was going to turn the city around. They seemed to believe Archer was in office specifically to undo twenty years of misconduct, race baiting, and corruption. On the other hand, black city residents saw Young as a former Tuskegee Airmen and labor leader who had wrestled the city away from the racist power structure.

Other than his training as a pilot during his military career, Young was uneducated. He gained his knowledge of politics from applying street savvy and
more connections with area elites than labor and neighborhood movements. During much of Young’s tenure there seemed to be a moat around the city that separated it from the rest of the metro area, while Archer was sometimes criticized for spending too much time abroad. Young seemed to be mayor of Detroit for life, whereas Archer obviously had big plans after his mayoral career.

Following the model demonstrated by my impression of Detroit, my first thesis sentence read: “Second generation urban black mayors are well educated administrators with ties to the elite, who are equally focused on their careers and the cities they lead, as opposed to first generation urban black mayors who were grassroots, social leaders with limited aspirations, mostly concerned with the improvement and representation of the minority and working class sections of their cities.” I expected to find my first impression view of the Detroit political scheme would fit other cities. I created a series of questions and did interviews with urban science professors and journalists in Atlanta, St. Louis and Detroit. I originally intended to study Atlanta, Detroit and Washington, D.C., but congressional interference in Washington, D.C.’s modern budget and administration would interfere with any mayoral study.

The interview questions were: (1) What is the administrative style? (2) What coalitions did this man build? (3) Who were his friends and advisors? (3b) Who were his enemies and opponents? (4) What was his relationship with the media? (5) What was his campaign platform? (6) What qualities do you think led the people to
What I found through these interviews surprised me, and drastically changed my thesis. All mayors in the study appeared to be politicians who rose through the ranks of city politics and had connections and friends throughout the city. In education I found that Detroit was the only city where the first generation black mayor was not as or more educated then the second-generation black mayors. Four of the seven mayors studied had law degrees. As far as ties to the elite, Mayor Archer was appointed to the Michigan State Supreme Court and Andrew Young was appointed ambassadorship by President Carter. Other than those two, all other mayors across both generations appeared to have friends and supporters pretty evenly. Political parties and wealthy businessmen with city loyalty seemed more important than any personal ties to elites.

My assumption that second generation mayors were more concerned with their careers also appeared to be premature. It dawned on my while studying Coleman Young that being mayor of Detroit was his career choice, and he acted accordingly. Archer on the other hand, acted more concerned with becoming a national leader. Not surprisingly, he voluntarily ended his tenure after two terms and began to pursue becoming the president of the American Bar Association. In Atlanta, where mayors are limited by two consecutive terms, both Maynard Jackson and
Andrew Young failed to adequately set themselves up with good jobs after their terms. Andrew Young may have believed he was creating an environment that would lead to his becoming the first black governor of Georgia, but after losing the election he all but disappeared. This may be why from Jackson's returning third term through both terms of Bill Campbell one of the biggest criticisms has been the self-serving administrative and even controversial decisions made by the mayors. In St. Louis both Bosley and Harmon seemed to blindly act as if they believed they would be re-elected. Both were blindsided with defeats motivated largely by the volatile race relations in St. Louis. Bosley who lost to Harmon in 1997, rejected jobs out of the city and ran for mayor again in 2001. An overview seems to suggest the obvious, most mayors were concerned with their careers and acted accordingly.

My belief that the first generation would have been grassroots social leaders also only fit the Detroit model. Maynard Jackson was an attorney from a well-established middle class black family. He had no particular history in civil rights or grassroots movements. Freeman Bosley was the son of an alderman who also had a law degree and had held two political offices before being elected mayor. Although he did have some support in civil rights and grassroots circles, he also led the Democratic Party in St. Louis and had connections with several black elected officials. Andrew Young was probably the closest to grassroots leadership though his experiences with Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. during the civil rights struggle. But even he drew much popularity from his nationwide image and connections to
President Carter. It could be argued that his strongest appeal did not come from his grassroots struggles.

My belief that the first generation mayors would be most concerned with the minority and working class sections of the city turned out to be dubious at best. While all first generation mayors were concerned with increasing minority representation and participation in the decision making processes, it could be argued that no mayors made significant improvements to minority and working class sections of the city as a whole. In fact a strong criticism of both Coleman Young and Archer of Detroit was that these areas of the city suffered greatly as both mayors focused attention on downtown revitalization. Jackson and Bosley did begin their terms concentrating on neighborhood improvements, but soon realized big business resented the lack of attention. They also realized big business often controls the employment resources and economic vitality of the city. Without the cooperation of business, it is very difficult for a mayor to make any real change in a city. Big projects were also much easier to fund and gained more attention from the media than neighborhood improvements. In addition, Young often argued that without big business investment in the city there would be no jobs, and without jobs any economic improvement in the neighborhoods would be short term.

Interestingly enough the questions I created did even more to disprove my preconceived notions. The first question regarding administrative style revealed the later mayors saw themselves more as administrators. Harmon and Campbell referred
to themselves as technocrats. The common criticism however is that they are no more administratively adept than the first generation. In Harmon’s case, there is the addition of the reality that you cannot be a pure administrator in such a political environment. All mayors have received harsh criticism in the basic delivery of city services, suggesting that their desire to be seen as simple administrators is at risk.

Regarding coalitions, I expected to find first generation mayors used grassroots coalitions where later generations used more elite based coalitions. What I found is while black churches and community groups hold some weight, all generations in Atlanta and Detroit quickly learned that sometimes the coalitions that elected them are not the coalitions that help them run the city effectively. While the downtown business groups that control the money held very little influence over the majority black electorate, it was almost impossible to develop the city and create jobs if business leaders did not cooperate. These mayors discovered that if these economic elites abandon the city, the tax base, jobs, and opportunities go with them. On issues where the business elites and neighborhoods were directly opposed, the mayors found the business leaders were a much more cohesive and influential group. St. Louis mayors also discovered it was almost impossible to maintain any cross-racial coalition. Since St. Louis is evenly split between black and white voters, this also means it is almost impossible for any mayor to garner a strong majority of long-term support. Any decision that pleased one race necessarily upsets another. As Mayor Bosley demonstrated in his decision to refuse a grant from real estate groups offering
assistance for homebuyers, if it was not possible to spread a program through black and white areas of the city, sometimes it was better to avoid the program all together.

The friends and advisors of the mayors also tell little difference. Mayors Coleman Young and Maynard Jackson were forced to realize they must include the business interests in their tight knit group of advisors. Mayor Bosley’s friends and advisors group probably included a few more neighborhood and civil rights types than Harmon’s group. Over all though the mayors pretty much associated with elite individuals of both races. Even if those elites were not actual friends, most mayors learned not much could be accomplished without the cooperation of certain groups.

The enemies and opponents question did have some interesting results. Although many critics may offer opinions that first generation black mayors did not have substantial effects regarding the long-term improvement of the conditions of African Americans, no one can argue the rhetoric was not there. The first generations did definitely talk black issues, including publicly acting on behalf of African Americans to diversify the various decision-making bodies in the city. Because of these often controversial stances the first black mayors made, almost invariably the mayors following these black mayors faced criticism from blacks for not being black enough. Andrew Young, Archer, and Harmon all suffered this criticism harshly. Although the actual progress minority groups made under each mayor is debatable across all generations, the loss of black improvement rhetoric in most cases created enemies within the black community. Campbell drew more of an appeal from the
neighborhood and minority groups, especially after his resistance to the strong challenges against affirmative action.

Explanations regarding the relationship with the media seem to revolve around the same dynamics as discussions regarding enemies. Coleman Young, Freeman Bosley, Jr and Maynard Jackson all suffered very harsh criticism in part because of their personalities but also because of their perceived mandate to diversify the city leadership. Although Archer, Harmon, and Young were criticized by the press, because their mannerisms were not nearly as conflictive as their predecessors', they did not seem to suffer as much negative media attention as the mayors before them. Campbell saw an increase in negative media attention because of scandals and his tendency to talk down to the media or ignore them all together.

The analysis of each mayor's relationship with the community turned out to be more complicated than I had originally planned. Coleman Young, Bosley and Jackson all began with strong support from the black communities. All three were able to scrape together a working relationship with business communities despite the mayor's firm commitment to affirmative action type programs. Because Bosley was not in a city with a majority black population, his strong support from the black community created equally strong criticism in the white community. Andrew Young began with popularity from the black and church communities because he was a preacher who was famous for civil rights. After his election Andrew Young was able to reach out and establish strong ties with the business community. Archer began his
tenure with strong support from middle and upper classes of both races. He never really garnered neighborhood or lower class black support. Harmon began his time in St. Louis with strong support from the white community but lost much of that due to problems stemming from his apolitical attitude. Campbell began with strong support from the black community. This support grew stronger during Campbell’s defense of minority set aside programs and the federal and state ethics violation investigations that the mayor blamed on racism.

The nature of city government is such that cooperation from area business elites is necessary in order to effectively manage the city. Although the mayor has some discretion over city funding for example, he cannot do much to create jobs. Most development projects and new jobs must come from the private sector. The most the mayor can do is encourage a working relationship with business elites to foster such economic development. On the other hand, the business elites have motivation to work with the city government because the government controls tax rates on personal and property taxes, as well as empowerment zone grants and other programs. Other basic city services like trash pickup and police protection must also be up to par or businesses could suffer. That being said, each mayor examined developed some working relationship with business elites simply because both sides realized they badly needed each other. Of the seven mayors I would argue Archer had the most success here, but each mayor has certain cooperative projects they can point to as a legacy.
Campaign platforms were widely similar. City governments have very little leeway in agenda setting or extremely controversial issues like abortion. For the most part every mayor ran on improving city services and fostering economic development and jobs. Both mayors in racially split St. Louis also ran on racial harmony. All mayors ran for reelections based on what they accomplished. Bosley’s re-election bid also included some attacks on Harmon’s ability to relate to the black community. These comments helped to solidify Harmon’s support in the white community. Campbell’s reelection bid caused problems as he ran against bitter enemy Marvin Arrington of the city council. Some believed Campbell’s win was more because people liked his lighter skin color and more refined personality than because of superior campaigning or ability to competently lead the city.

As part of the mandate for black political leadership that came with the election of the first black mayor, a solidified black electorate looking for a black mayor to solve the problems of the city elected Coleman Young and Maynard Jackson. Bosley also carried the additional weight of electoral experience and advancing the best proposals for the city. Harmon and Archer were elected largely because they symbolized the opposite of the outgoing mayor. They were perceived as the type of mayor that could reverse the problems of racial divisiveness and corruption brewing from the chief executive’s office. Andrew Young was elected in Atlanta largely because of his name and connection to the civil rights movement. Campbell was elected because of Maynard Jackson’s endorsement, and the fact that
the two front-runners discredited themselves enough to let Campbell squeeze by them both.

First Generation

Based on my findings I believe I am able to establish a relatively clear first generation. There are several specific characteristics that the first mayors fit. Of those mayors in my study, I will affirm that Freeman Bosley, Jr., Coleman Young, and Maynard Jackson seem to fit a category of mayors based on the similarities I will note. Perhaps the most notable similarity is that all three mayors believed it was part of their duty to diversify the decision-making actors in the city. All three mayors increased the African American representation on city boards and committees. All three mayors were strong advocates of minority set-asides and affirmative action. All three mayors fought to control the police department. It should be noted here that only Coleman Young and Jackson wanted to control the police in order to specifically end their habits of harassing and abusing blacks. Although there were also allegations of police harassment of blacks in St. Louis, Bosley wanted control of the police budget and the ability to appoint police commissioners. The current system places those powers at the state level. Previous mayors of St. Louis also tried to regain full control of the police department.

All three mayors offered rhetoric and some actions regarding an increase of neighborhood influence in the political process. All three mayors eventually learned
that the permanent and cohesive business and downtown coalitions are much stronger than the more reactionary neighborhood coalitions. The earlier mayors Coleman Young and Jackson seemed to place more emphasis on big projects and minority set-asides. Two of the first black mayors came into office along with substantial changes to the city’s charter. Bosley’s administration was not able to get the charter changed despite his interest in doing so. He was however able to get control of the police department’s budget, something his predecessors failed to do. The administrations of all three mayors were marred with administrative and departmental scandals. Much of which may be blamed on the vast transitional period needed while many blacks became acclimated to the administrative side of city government.

My belief that the mayors would consider themselves black leaders as well as leaders of the city did not come to full fruition. What I found was the mayors were largely politicians who took politically motivated stances on various issues. While all mayors did take some strong stands on black issues, all three first generation mayors also took some strong stances that angered the black community. Examples include refusing to support Jesse Jackson’s presidential run in favor of the Democratic Party nomination, breaking labor strikes orchestrated largely by blacks, and supporting white candidates for aldermanic elections. None of the first generation mayors had records so biased in favor of African Americans that they could be called black leaders. Instead a better definition would suggest the mayors’ records reflected the electoral demographics of their respective cities. However because the priorities of
those electoral bases were so radically different from the traditional priorities of the city and metro area, all three mayors were accused of being anti-white or too black.

The electoral history of these first generation mayors is perhaps a good indication that they carried a charismatic, larger than life purpose within the black community. Coleman Young was elected five straight times with no serious challenge to his mayoralty. Maynard Jackson was elected two consecutive times, the maximum allowed by Atlanta’s city charter. Eight years later he returned and fairly easily won another term. Many believed he would have won a fourth term if he ran a fourth time. Freeman Bosley, Jr. was only elected to office once. But he carried a strong majority in the predominately black north side wards three straight times. He won more than 40% of the vote in his initial election, his loss to Harmon, and his return during Harmon’s reelection bid. If the city were predominately black one could reasonably assume Bosley would have had at least one more term.

Second Generation

The second-generation mayors are much more difficult to categorize. I did not find substantial evidence that any second generation mayors worked to diversify the decision-making elite. I also found no evidence that second generation mayors saw themselves as black leaders as well as leaders of the city. In these alone I have enough to clarify that another generation does exist. Interestingly enough, all mayors in this study supported affirmative action and minority set-aside type programs.
Indeed the black electorate would have accepted nothing less. Affirmative action and minority set-asides have become emotionally charged issues that would probably end the career of any black mayor who did not vocally support them. Where second generation mayors differ is that outside of these specific problematic issues, there is no rhetoric or mandate following the first generational model.

Every mayor after the first generation seems to follow one of two styles. Archer and Andrew Young were considered very friendly to the elite and white business crowd. They saw themselves as ambassadors for their cities, and did a lot of national and worldwide traveling. While they were well liked throughout the metropolitan area for their open coalitional style of leadership, they were also criticized by inner city blacks for not paying attention to the problems of the neighborhoods. Both mayors were mentioned as possible gubernatorial candidates, although Andrew Young made a failed bid in Georgia and Archer has yet to declare his interest in such an office. Both mayors were also criticized generally for the lack of administrative control or even interest and failed delivery of city services.

The other category of mayors includes Harmon and Campbell as technocrats. It is interesting to note that the title technocrat is self-imposed. That is, they claimed to be technocrats while many if not most in the city doubted their technocratic abilities. Both mayors were elected into office with a rather large following that believed they held a lot of promise as mayors. Both mayors are considered outsiders. Campbell was an outsider because he was not born in the city. Harmon was
considered an outsider because he had never been a politician. Both mayors were relatively uncharismatic and apolitical, choosing instead to focus on the administrative side of being mayor. Both mayors were criticized for having a lazy, bureaucratic attitude in a job that required a workaholic personality.

Both mayors turned out to be big disappointments according to many of their past supporters. Why they turned out to be disappointments is not really clear. It could be an apolitical attitude simply will not survive in a highly political environment. Both mayors exhibited the belief that they were in that office to run the city, not make political friends. Finally, both Harmon and Campbell seemed unwilling or unable to manage the press.

Perhaps the one common characteristic of this generation is that how they conducted themselves is largely in response to the previous mayor. Jackson and Coleman Young were very verbal and conflictive individuals who did not mind upsetting people to get things done. Since both individuals wanted to increase minority participation in city business, this included upsetting many whites that saw this behavior as racist. Also because of the often extreme demographic differences between the city and the surrounding suburbs, many situations panned out as city versus suburbs. As an answer to this, in the election immediately following the first generation mayor voters chose individuals who were more focused on bridging the gaps between the city and the suburbs and representing the city well to the nation and world. These second generation mayors were diplomats.
On the other hand after Jackson’s third term and Bosley’s first term one of the bigger issues was government scandal and failure to deliver basic city services. While the race issue was a pervasive problem, in this election the people elected politicians who would call themselves technocrats. They claimed to be more concerned with the day to day running of the city than the politics of being mayor. While it is pretty clear that those mayors chosen for their diplomatic ability turned out to be good diplomats, it is interesting that both Harmon and Campbell were criticized for their lack of technocratic abilities.

I realize that many mayors were probably elected due to their city’s reaction to the previous mayor. This idea probably applies to a greater number of mayors of all races than those covered in this research. In addition, there were no elections where a diplomat ran against a technocrat where both personalities were obvious and each candidate began with similar popularity. In truth, it seems the only similarity that goes across all mayors I placed into the second generation is that they all follow first generation mayors, without fitting the first generation model.

Each City Considered Individually

In each case the uniqueness of the city provided a backdrop for this study. Detroit’s overwhelming black majority and lack of term limits allowed Coleman Young to remain in power for twenty years. Although Archer only had two terms, his popularity towards the end of his second term could have easily landed him a third
term. Both Coleman Young and Archer seemed to focus a great deal of time and energy into large development projects, although the law allowed Young to require minority contractor involvement. Coleman Young certainly made advancements in areas black Detroiter held as important, such as ending the S.T.R.E.S.S. police units that constantly killed and harassed blacks. Young was able to extend his influence by convincing some area businesses to hire and promote more blacks.

Young's combative attitude contributed to a large rift between city and suburbs, although some would argue that rift would be there regardless of the mayor. Although Young took many controversial political stands, he took very few that clearly separated his role as a black leader from his role as leader of the city. As an elected official in an overwhelmingly majority black city, it would be very difficult to make such a distinction. The only positions that clearly highlighted this role as a black leader were those dealing with affirmative action and minority set-asides because these positions often created inefficiency from a strict city administrative standpoint. There are those who would argue that much of the rhetoric of the time used "Detroit" and "suburbs" to symbolize the racial arguments of the time.

City services and the quality of life for the average Detroit citizen suffered greatly under both Archer and Coleman Young. Although Archer's tenure saw vast improvements in the downtown areas, there are those that would argue that the average citizen saw little change in his neighborhood. Both mayors, and especially Young, were faced with constant financial problems requiring cutbacks so it may be
unfair to blame all city services problems on the mayors. Coleman Young was criticized for police cutbacks at a time when the city suffered greatly from crime, whether or not this was a prudent administrative move, the fact remains the city had to cut the funding somewhere.

One of Archer’s largest criticisms was that he did not seem to care enough about the plight of everyday Detroiterst, and especially black Detroiterst. Because he seemed to focus so much time on downtown development and encouraging suburbanites to move back into the city, many blacks living in neighborhoods felt ignored. The interesting thing is, much of Archer’s actions mirrored the actions of Young. Both mayors encouraged people in the metro area to take an interest in Detroit, and both focused on downtown development. It is possible that what people miss more than Young’s actions is Young’s rhetoric. Archer rarely blamed racism for the city problems. Archer rarely lashed out at suburb and state leaders when they failed to support Detroit. Archer traveled and held various nationwide posts during his tenure. While this behavior did much to help the image of Detroit, it did little to help everyday citizens. Archer drew tremendous criticism from blacks when he failed to choose the proposal of a casino group with a majority of black investors. Although the recall effort failed, it was the final straw for those who believed the mayor was not “black enough.”

Atlanta’s term limits gave me three different mayors to study and the minority white vote was large enough to become a potential swing vote in any election. In
Atlanta Jackson was clearly a first generation mayor who did not mind using his mayoral status to force businesses and city contractors alike to hire and promote more minorities. Although he was not as conflictive as Coleman Young, or at least did not use as much profanity, Jackson was seen as a bully in his own right as he forced various project committees to accept his minority set-asides. Jackson, like Coleman Young, also used big projects as a way to funnel money to minorities. Although Jackson did eventually establish a working relationship with the business community, it was not nearly as strong as it was before Jackson or during the following administration. Jackson seemed more concerned with the state of neighborhoods, although he like Coleman Young, may have strayed from that commitment upon realizing how hopeless the neighborhoods really were. It would have been extremely difficult to see any real change in the neighborhoods without altering the social and economic ills that had caused the neighborhood problems. Unfortunately most of these social and economic ills were beyond the control of the mayor, and indeed just about anyone in the city.

Andrew Young followed Maynard Jackson but did not seem nearly as distracted by the race issue. Although they supported a white candidate for mayor, the business community rallied behind Andrew Young once he convinced them he was on their side. Young seemed to reverse much of the ill will between the political and business elites that brewed under Jackson. In addition Young, much like Dennis Archer in Detroit, seemed more interested in changing the worldwide image of
Atlanta. Also like Archer, many believed the city’s neighborhoods suffered from neglect under Andrew Young. Young did take up the cause of protecting the city’s minority set-asides once they were attacked, even raising the targeted percentage of black contractors doing business with the city.

After Young Jackson returned for a third term, although this time he seemed to lack the purpose that drove him the first time around. This time the scandals that followed his administration tainted his mayoral record and some believe this is why he did not run for a fourth term. Bill Campbell followed Jackson and seemed to inherit some of Jackson’s media problems. Campbell’s support was stronger within the black community than in the white or business communities so in this respect he was much like Jackson. Unlike Jackson however Campbell did not act as if he were in that position to help the plight of blacks specifically. Campbell also did not take on the ambassador role that Andrew Young utilized.

In St. Louis the most unique factor is the demographics of the city. The racial vote in St. Louis is evenly split between black and white, making for interesting dynamics not nearly as evident in the other cities studied. Freeman Bosley, Jr. got a solid vote in the black community in his winning election, as well as in the following two electoral losses. Because he was only in office for one term and St. Louis has a weak mayor system many of Bosley’s initiatives never came to fruition. Bosley did however act as if he believed his job as the first black mayor included paying special attention to the black community. He did things most mayors would never dream of
doing, like meeting with black gang members and drug dealers, and announcing his replacement for the indicted city comptroller would be black before he decided who his replacement would be. In the end though his most controversial position was against another African American, police chief Harmon. In his bid to gain control of the police department, and upon realizing Harmon would be his chief opponent during his reelection campaign, Bosley and his supporters made an enemy of Harmon.

As Bosley’s reelection bid came around, it seemed everyone who disliked Bosley supported Harmon for mayor. Harmon was in an inter-racial marriage and had been constantly criticized for preferential treatment towards white police officers and white citizens in general. This election is interesting because it presents the only instance in this study where the second generation mayor replaced the first generation mayor. This fact is complicated though by the statistics which infer that this second generation black mayor was elected largely by white voters. It is even more difficult to interpret Harmon’s objectives as mayor because he did not seem to have any. Harmon seemed to float with the wind so it is difficult to analyze how his agenda differed from Bosley’s. The same coalitions that elected Harmon over Bosley supported a white candidate during Harmon’s reelection attempt.

Institutional Rebuilding

As expected, I did find that the introduction of the first black mayor does cause a serious interruption in the city’s elite structure. The established rules, norms
and procedures of the institutions were interrupted by the first black mayor’s desire to increase black participation in the city leadership. Since all three first generation black mayors in this study worked to diversify decision-making actors in and around the city, there was also some realignment regarding the institution’s distributional consequences. In all cases contracts to minorities increased. In all cases there was a specific drive to increase the percentage of minority city workers. In all cases the mayoral administration for the first time in each city was about equally split between black and white appointees. In all cases the mayor’s racial causes were reflected in various struggles to get other elites to accept the inclusion of minority actors.

In each city the second black mayor made overwhelming attempts to reach out to whites. Although Archer and Andrew Young made definite attempts to reach out and establish a working relationship with area elites, Harmon was never able to establish a strong working relationship. It is unclear however if this was by Harmon’s design or simply because he was unable to sustain such relationships as a result of his apolitical personality. Although Andrew Young mounted a serious defense to the challenge to affirmative action, as a rule the second black mayors did work to extend and strengthen the biracial institutions that existed after the first black mayors. Interestingly enough, these institutions were not necessarily the same institutions as the first black mayor. In each city, the second black mayor seemed concerned with increasing white political power in the city in order to make white elites feel better about investing within the city’s jurisdiction.
Also, in all first black mayor cases, the condition of working and lower class neighborhoods and city services seemed to decline, and the administration was filled with scandals. In each city, it could be argued that only a small circle of blacks actually received a large benefit from the election of a black mayor. Once each black mayor was elected, he made sure his friends and supporters received jobs. Because the mayor was black, many of his friends and supporters would also be black. As part of the mayor’s perceived responsibility, he opened the city’s contracts to blacks, or forced white contractors to subcontract with blacks. The problem was that the only blacks that could benefit immediately from these new opportunities were those blacks that were already in a financial position to take advantage. One of the main arguments against minority set-asides is that the minority contractors often didn’t train and recruit from the pool of untrained, poor blacks. These black contractors hired the best available workers just like white contractors.

The majority of blacks never saw substantial change in the condition of their lives. The opening of the city’s financial and administrative structures did make a growing black middle class possible, and over time such a class did develop. Often these newly middle class black citizens left the inner city just like middle class whites. It could be argued regarding Maynard Jackson and Coleman Young that their efforts did cause the inclusion of blacks into some of the city’s decision-making institutions, but it took decades for such inclusion to lead to a substantial class of successful middle and upper class blacks. Because Bosley was elected for only one
term and that in the 1990’s it is more difficult to classify him here. There was already a black middle class in St. Louis before his election, and his one term under a weak mayor system really couldn’t do much to effect it either way. While St. Louis did not have a black mayor until the 1990s, it had many other influential black politicians that had successfully worked to cause some decision-making institutions to include blacks.

According to the ideas I promoted at the beginning of this study, the first generation mayors would endure the struggle to break the institutional barriers while the second generation could build on the first generation’s work. While the first generation did certainly legitimize the prevalence of black faces around the decision-making tables, they also realized substantial change to the black community was probably beyond the reach of one mayor. The most a first black mayor could hope for is forcing the city’s elite structures to include some minority elites. The interesting thing is the second black mayors in each city seemed to evade the structures created by their predecessor. Archer, Andrew Young, and Harmon all came to office with their own priorities and friends. All drew the ire of the black community for siding with white and elite interests in racially troubling issues.

Black mayors use the office to help friends and supporters as all mayors do. The first generation had a difficult time because in part the all white elite feared the change to the city’s power structure. By the end of the first generation black mayor’s term, many in the white elite almost seemed to feel as if they had endured the worst.
The elite institutions survived and for the most part only the faces on the political side changed. By the end of the second black mayor, a biracial elite group had emerged that pretty much included every one of means in the city. Because the second black mayors didn’t put as much emphasis on race as their predecessors, they had helped elites on both sides to realize they could work together because many of their interests were the same. The biracial leadership style of the second black mayors also helped to solidify a middle class that included both races and served their common needs. The existence of this strong biracial middle class enabled the mayor’s to separate the issues from city poverty and lack of access from the issue of racism. After the elimination of the institution’s forced focus on race, the institution’s priorities would become strikingly similar to pre-black mayor periods.

Charismatic Leadership

There is evidence to support that the first generation fits the charismatic ideal type as described by Weber. When blacks in each city elected their first black mayor, there was a feeling that blacks had finally arrived. Each city had celebrations in a black community that believed a black mayor might be the answer to many of their problems. Just as Weber described, this dedication and support for the mayor stemmed from the belief that he could somehow fix the crushing problems caused by years of urban neglect and racism. In each city despite the continuation of unemployment, neighborhood dilapidation, crime, and complaints that some mayors
focused on downtown instead of neighborhoods, the first generation mayors remained unbeatable at the polls. Both Coleman Young and Maynard Jackson served for as long as they seemed interested in serving. Coleman Young held the job until he was too sick to continue and Maynard Jackson served his maximum two consecutive terms, followed by a third term eight years later. Although it was clear the polls favored him to win if he ran, Jackson did not seek a fourth term.

Although Freeman Bosley, Jr only served one term, the predominately black north side of St. Louis has given him full support for three straight elections. In his two losing elections, it was the white community and to a lesser extent the mixed middle class areas that voted against Bosley. Voting behavior is probably the best sign that these mayors are viewed with a symbolically powerful mandate for change, even if that change did not come to pass. At least in regards to voting behavior, the black community in each city seems to have given the first black mayor its full and undying support.

These electoral records become especially important when compared to the second and third black mayors of each city. Only Archer demonstrated a lock on his city’s voting electorate. In Atlanta while Andrew Young was reelected pretty easily, he lost much of the black community’s support in his subsequent bid for governor. Bill Campbell of Atlanta barely won his reelection bid. In St. Louis, Harmon only got around 5% of the vote for his reelection bid, despite a majority approval rating.
There were two factors that may have contributed to the inability of the second black mayors in each city to tap into the same charisma held by the first generation mayor. First, the black communities began to form a strong, voting middle class. The existence of a middle class began to negate the stereotype that the plight of blacks living in poverty was due specifically to racism. Each black who entered the middle class eroded a little validity to the mayor’s quest to use his office to bully the rest of the area into assisting African Americans. In addition, the needs of the black middle class weren’t as drastic as those of blacks in poverty. It was much easier for the mayor to work to appease the middle class of both races than work to assist blacks at the lowest rungs of the economic ladder.

Second, the various legal challenges to minority set-asides and the backlash from a white community tired of the first generation’s racial politics worked to extreme racial polarization. This left second generation mayors with a choice of continuing the racial politics of their predecessor, or working to bridge gaps with the white community and be labeled a sell-out. With the black community split between lower and middle class, and the rest of the metro area sick of racial politics, second generation mayors saw themselves as coming with a political mandate to reverse the problems caused by the previous mayor. A mayor with a middle-class mandate is not as powerful as a mayor who is seen as the only answer to the problems of a community suffering from extreme racism and starving from social and economic poverty.
Further Research Considerations

It is my hope that this research will increase the general interest in mayoral and institutional generations especially in those instances where a new electoral group is being introduced into the institution. Such research could prove valuable in discovering and understanding urban electoral trends and how urban institutions react to attempts at racial integration. Future research might seek a specific understanding of how the effectiveness of the first generation black mayor may affect the circumstances left to the second black mayor. This research could take a specific policy area and test how the ability of the first black mayor to alter the priorities in that policy area effected how the second black mayor dealt with that policy area. City Limits by Paul E. Peterson (1981) discusses three policy areas that could provide a basis for such research. Peterson expounds on developmental, redistributive and allocational policy as specific measures to examine mayoral effectiveness.

Another area of future considerations is one that did not receive enough attention in this research. It is possible that a third, more technocratic black mayor would be elected in each city. Because the first black mayor worked to incorporate blacks into the elite institutions, and the second black mayor worked to improve relations with the somewhat displaced white elites, it could follow that the third black mayor wanted to lead the city without considering racial or political agendas. This is possible for three reasons: (1) In each of the citys it could be argued that basic city
services suffered under all mayors. As a result the population may desire a mayor who is able to effectively administrate the delivery of city services, more than any other type of mayor. (2) Because in many cases mayors find it almost impossible to find a winning side in racial manners, future mayors may attempt to govern the city in a manner that straddles a political middle ground by dealing with issues as an apolitical administrator. (3) Black politicians find increasingly that although rhetoric regarding low-income housing and assistance may sound good, low-income voters tend not to vote. Along these same lines, black politicians also find that business and economic elites of all races tend to be a more cohesive and influential group than the neighborhood and lower class groups. Voters and decision-making actors tend to be middle and upper class, and as a result politicians become more inclined to please these social classes.

Campbell as a third black mayor wanted to be a technocratic and racially impartial administrator. Rather than finding this middle ground politically supported however, Campbell found that if he did not choose a side, he would end up without substantial political support. It would appear that a mayor could not successfully straddle the political fence. Rather than technocratic mayors finding themselves able to lead the entire city regardless of race, they would discover a mayor that did not choose a racial side would not get majority support from either race. It would be interesting to discover whether or not Atlanta’s model would fit other cities that had elected three black mayors in a row.
The next logical step to the present research however would probably be testing this research’s conclusions against a broader field of mayors. While I do believe my selection is adequate for the purpose of providing a potential model for generationality, the testing of such model would have to include more cities that have had more than one black mayor. New research like *African American Mayors* edited by David S. Colburn and Jefferey S. Adler demonstrates that for the most part black mayors balance the same forces during their tenure. All black mayors deal with balancing the interests of white and business elites against the interests of neighborhood and lower class groups.

In addition, it would be interesting to note how the mayors in cities such as New York, Chicago and Los Angeles, each of which had only one black mayor, compared with other mayors in their time periods. Did mayors elected in the 1990s have less to do towards racial diversity than mayors elected in the 1970s? It would also be of interest to examine cities where white mayors are elected with significant black or minority populations to see how much of what is attributed to black mayors would have occurred under any mayor with a significant black or minority electorate. All mayors are after all, politicians seeking to be re-elected.

The field of urban political studies is an ever-increasing field, especially with the emergence of Latino political empowerment in southern and some western cities. This could be particularly interesting because Latino cultures also bring the language factor to the forefront. In any case, America’s urban landscape presents in many
cases a microcosm of the social, political, and economic problems facing this country in the long run. While the states may be considered the testing grounds for public policy, one could argue the metropolitan areas are the testing grounds for policies aimed at the civil and social policies and ideals needed to help an increasingly diverse America face the next century.
CHAPTER IV

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**Conclusion**
