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AN ANALYSIS  
OF THE  
RAPACKI PLAN  
TO  
DENUCLEARIZE CENTRAL EUROPE

by

James R. Ozinga

A thesis presented to the  
Faculty of the School of Graduate  
Studies in partial fulfillment  
of the  
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James R. Ozinga

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## INTRODUCTION

In 1957, Adam Rapacki, Foreign Minister of Poland, proposed that a zone be created in Central Europe in which nuclear weapons of all kinds would be prohibited. The zone was to include the countries of West Germany, East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. This paper seeks to study that proposal in the light of its background and consequences. The purpose of such a study, beyond the hopeful accretion of knowledge, is to form conclusions based on the analysis of the proposal as the beginning of a solution to the political and military impasse in Central Europe.

The proposal will be studied in seven chapters which are topically arranged. Chapter One considers the background to the proposal in terms of the security of Central Europe. Chapter Two considers the background with regard to Central European disarmament. Chapter Three deals with the Rapacki proposal itself. Chapter Four discusses the pivotal role played by West Germany in regard to the Rapacki Plan; Chapter Five considers the Western rejection of the Plan; Chapter Six reflects the continuing influence of the Plan; and Chapter Seven summarizes briefly and formulates conclusions. These conclusions will attempt to show that the Rapacki proposals did not receive a fair hearing in 1957-1958, and that present day circumstances might indicate a reappraisal of the proposal's possibilities by the West.

## THE CONTEXT OF EUROPEAN SECURITY

During the years immediately following the Second World War the United States began large scale demobilization of its armed forces and began withdrawing to within its continental shores. Within a short time, Russia exerted pressure in the Black Sea area, the Mediterranean area, and in Central Europe. George F. Kennan, writing in July, 1947 under the pseudonym of "Mr. X", proposed a positive course of action to counteract the aggressiveness of the Soviet Union. This course of action, he said, should not make the Russians lose prestige; but certainly "...it is clear that the main element of any United States policy must be that of a long term, patient but firm and vigilant con-<sup>1</sup>tainment of Russian expansive tendencies".

Why was containment necessary ? The war-exhausted world seemed ready to explode again. This time the threat was Russia rather than Germany. The demobilization of armed forces following the war had not reduced the Russian threat; for where the Red Army had pushed out the Germans, there the Red Army remained. Stalin was taking no chances that a repetition of the invasion by German forces to within sight of the Kremlin could occur again. With the Baltic States under control, Russia now sought to control the Central European States lying between Russia and Western Europe. The dominated territory included Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Austria, Rumania, Bulgaria,

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<sup>1</sup>  
George F. Kennan, "Sources of Soviet Conduct", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 25, July 1947, p. 575.

Yugoslavia, and Albania. From the Arctic Circle to the semi-tropical Mediterranean, Soviet armed forces helped to install Communist governments on the Russian pattern. Turkey felt part of her territory threatened and was pressured to allow at least partial Russian control of the Bosphorus Straits. Greece was besieged by Communist guerillas. Both France and Italy had large, powerful Communist Parties that usually followed Moscow directives. The buffer extended from North to South, from 200 to 500 miles wide between Russia and what she conceived as the aggressor nations to the West.

Facing this monolith of power was a disorganized Western Europe, exhausted and in rubble. If containment was the desired goal, America would have to revise her thinking about involving herself in European affairs. There was such a shift in American thinking. It began to bear fruit in 1947: the year Kennan's article appeared, the year the Marshall Plan was inaugurated, and the year that the United States took over from Great Britain the underwriting of the anti-Communist efforts in Greece and Turkey. Containment was beginning to develop.

Stalin, meanwhile, had become annoyed with Tito. The Yugoslav leader did not owe his regime to Soviet armed forces. He had developed his own chain of command which Stalin could not seem to penetrate. This breach of authority could not be tolerated by the Soviet leader because if national communism swept into the other satellites his wall of states would be drastically weakened. Gomulka, in Poland, was already speaking of a Polish path to socialism and the achievement of socialism by evolutionary rather than compulsory means. So from Stalin's view, Titoism had to be stopped. In 1947 Stalin ordered the formation of

the Communist Information Bureau seemingly for the sole purpose of ousting Tito from the Communist bloc. This formal break came in June of 1948, and was supplemented by the attempted implementation of economic sanctions against Yugoslavia by many of the bloc countries. Thus there was substantial pressure on Tito to align himself with Stalin; but there was also pressure applied from the other Communist countries. The year 1948 in the Soviet bloc seems to be a year in which the reins were tightened, so to speak. This fact, for example, is visible in the Czechoslovak coup, Gomulka's replacement by Bierut in Poland, and the East German Communist indifference to a parliamentary facade. This tightening is also seen in the Soviet pressure at a weak link of the West, viz., Berlin. Located deep within the Soviet sector, the former capital had also been divided among the victors. The Western sectors were cut off from West Germany, and were, therefore, quite dependent on Soviet desires to honor the agreement concerning access routes through the Russian sector. Stalin ordered these routes blockaded in an attempt to force the West out of Berlin altogether. The United States responded to this challenge by instituting the Berlin Airlift, a gigantic and successful effort to maintain both directions of the flow of goods entirely by aircraft transportation. The weak link was stronger than Soviet planners had imagined.

However, after the Communist coup d' etat in Prague in 1948, the Soviet Union had its wall of stone right through the heart of Europe; a wall consisting of states governed by men absolutely loyal to Moscow. To a great extent, Russian domination had been extended to the Elbe

River, a feat the Czars could not equal. The existence of this power bloc created a desire on the part of the West to present a defensive front that was as strong and as unified as possible. Therefore, on March 17, 1948, Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg signed the Brussels Pact which bound them in a defensive grouping for 50 years. The Brussels Pact, also called the Western European Union, was used as an example of legitimate defense grouping by the Vandenberg Resolution which the United States Senate passed in June of 1948. Negotiations ensued between the United States, Canada, and the Brussels Pact powers culminating in the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty on April 4, 1949. Thus by the time the Berlin Blockade was officially lifted in May of 1949, the Western powers had erected an alliance structure which bound the United States to the defense of Western Europe. As Churchill said, "Europe began to rest under the precarious protection of American nuclear power."<sup>2</sup>

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was electrified by the outbreak of hostilities in Korea and the evidence of Soviet nuclear capabilities. The West plunged into an intense program of rearmament and decided that West Germany should be permitted to join the military effort. Just how the former enemy was to be rearmed was a problem. The initial solution was the European Defense Community, a supranational defense organization that did not include Great Britain or the United States. This solution crumbled with the failure of the French National Assembly to accept the agreement, probably because Britain was not a

member and because of fear and distrust of Germany. This clearly seemed to be a victory for the Communists, who had actively opposed the Community. However, in 1954, the United States and Great Britain participated in conferences with the West Europeans which resulted in the revision of the Brussels Pact to permit West Germany to join NATO as a military contributor.

The Russians, even before the NATO treaty was signed, had blanketed East Europe with bilateral alliances. This network extended from Russia to Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania, and Poland.<sup>3</sup> As the 1950's began, therefore, the demarcation line resembled a trip-wire with massive concentrations of armed strength on either side (See Appendix A). Both sides faced each other with nuclear capabilities; each could destroy the other, but in so doing each faced its own destruction. A necessary detente began.

This detente was seemingly given a somewhat altered basis by the death of Stalin in 1953. With the brief emergence of Malenkov swiftly followed by Khrushchev as the new leader, the hope grew in the West that the death of the Russian dictator might somehow change the aggressiveness of Russian foreign policy. This hope was fed by an occasional liberalization of Soviet policy. East German leaders went the opposite way. In the uncertainty following Stalin's death, they attempted to show their control by depriving certain groups of their ration cards, and by increasing work norms by 10%. Because of resultant bitterness, and in the hope of affecting West German elections, the East German

Government granted concessions to the people, admitted errors, and promised remedial action.<sup>4</sup> But before the concessions could be made the anger of the workers broke into revolt. The strikes became demonstrations which turned into riots that the Soviet Army had to put down. Soviet willingness to use force to retain East Germany made reunification an even more important issue in the West German campaign. Russia then let it be known that the unity of Germany would be impossible if West Germany joined NATO.<sup>5</sup>

Nonetheless, there seemed to be a movement of Soviet policy in the direction of a thawing of aggressive tendencies. Even while the Russian forces were crushing riots in East Germany, Soviet relations with Turkey brightened. Russia dropped her post-war claims against part of Turkey's territory and dropped the demand for a partial control of the Straits. Relations with the Middle East were improved, and Malenkov expressed peaceful intentions toward Afghanistan and Iran. Russia began contributing to the United Nations' program for underdeveloped countries and did not interfere with the Korean truce.<sup>6</sup> These evidences of a thaw led some writers such as Isaac Deutscher to conclude that Stalinism was being replaced by a more liberal spirit.<sup>7</sup> Others found no such

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<sup>4</sup> Arnold J. Heidenheimer, The Government of Germany. (New York: Thomas Crowell Co., 1961), p. 172.

<sup>5</sup> Philip Mosely, "The Kremlin's Foreign Policy Since Stalin," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 32, October, 1953, pp 20-33.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid

<sup>7</sup> Isaac Deutscher, Russia What Next, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1953), p. 125. See also Robert Tucker, "The Politics of Soviet De-Stalinization," World Politics, Vol. 9, July, 1957, p. 550.

comfort. Yet the evidence that some change in policy had taken place was given a strong boost by the Soviet agreement, in 1955, to grant a peace treaty to Austria. This treaty ended ten years of negotiations and was probably caused by Karl Renner's 1945 maneuvering, Austria's acceptance of a neutral status, and a thaw in Soviet policy. This agreement provided an additional basis for hope in the West; as did the easing of relations between Russia and Yugoslavia, and the denunciation of Stalin at the Twentieth Party Congress. Moreover, on February 14, 1956, Krushchev made a public speech in which he proclaimed three important principles of Soviet foreign policy: the principle of peaceful coexistence between the two opposed systems, rejection of the inevitability of war, and the approval of various forms of transition to socialism.

Krushchev felt externally secure or he would not have made the statement. The inclusion of a rearmed Germany into NATO following the Paris Agreements of 1954 had been followed by the 1955 formation of the Warsaw Pact, binding Russia and her satellites in a mutual defensive alliance. Moreover, the ostensible relaxation of pressure in Central Europe had the tendency to weaken the Western cohesiveness; and while hope remained alive, voices were also heard urging caution. Henry Kissinger, for example, called peaceful coexistence "the most

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<sup>8</sup> Bruno Kreisky, "Austria Draws the Balance," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 37, January, 1959, p. 270

<sup>9</sup> Philip Mosely, "Soviet Foreign Policy: New Goal or New Manners?" Foreign Affairs, Vol. 34, July, 1956, p. 545.



efficient offensive tactic, a more effective means to subvert the existing order." <sup>10</sup> Others saw peaceful coexistence as the natural result of <sup>11</sup> the nuclear stalemate.

The effects of Khrushchev's easing of tension were profound in the satellite countries. The rapprochement with Tito threw confusion into Party ranks. The new Moscow line necessitated a shift that in many cases was difficult to make since it voided past decisions against Titoists <sup>12</sup> in their own ranks. Then, when Khrushchev dethroned Stalin, the father image seemed to crash to the ground. Poland and Hungary were particularly affected.

The Polish reaction began with the June 28, 1956 worker's revolt in Poznan. Khrushchev's so-called Secret Speech had been in February; and the Stalinist Polish leader, Beirut, had died in March. The revolt was in the form of a protest march in Posnan; a serious and yet somewhat gay march in which many Communists joined. The marchers were protesting tight labor controls, and the movement reflected general unrest in the country. As a result of the unrest Gomulka was released from house arrest in August and took over the Party again. He gained almost immediate popular support by demanding economic reforms and national sovereignty. He fought it out with Khrushchev and won several concessions.

<sup>10</sup>Henry Kissinger, "Reflections on American Diplomacy," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 35, October, 1956, p. 44.

<sup>11</sup>cf. W.W. Kulski's reply to a Disarmament Subcommittee questionnaire recorded in: Control and Reduction of Armaments, Report 2501, p. 400.

<sup>12</sup>An example of this is Slansky's execution in Czechoslovakia partly because of alleged Titoist ideas. cf. Sir Robert Lockhart, "Report on Czechoslovakia," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 33, April, 1955, p. 484.

The Soviet Leader was not satisfied with Gomulka; and yet Khrushchev's hands were somewhat tied in that the crushing of Gomulka would have reversed the direction of his own policy in regard to Tito and Stalin.

This same reasoning could have also applied to Hungary's subsequent attempt to attain sovereignty. Imre Nagy seemed slated to be Hungary's "Gomulka", but by the time he had been called in,

"...the panicked Communist leadership had already called for military aid against the people. In consequence, the revolution, under the pressure of conflict, quickly moved beyond the 'national Communist' position to one that was increasingly anti-Communist and anti-Soviet. The Soviet decision to crush the revolution by force seems to follow directly from this movement beyond the confines of Communism and the Warsaw Pact."<sup>13</sup>

Hungary was far too important in the buffer wall of states for Russia to relinquish, especially with Austria non-aligned. Khrushchev could not have explained that breach in the wall at home. Besides, a Hungarian success would undoubtedly have begun a wave of such revolts; he might have thought that armed intervention would be necessary sooner or later anyway. Fortunately for Khrushchev, Britain and France were involved in the Suez fiasco at this time, and the Eisenhower Administration in Washington seemed to have no intention of carrying out the campaign declarations of Eisenhower with regard to the freeing of the captive nations of East Europe.<sup>14</sup> The risk of a general conflict in

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Henry Roberts, "The Crisis in the Soviet Empire," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 35, January, 1957, p. 193.

<sup>14</sup>

"Ike Would Free East Europe," New York Times, June 8, 1952, p. 52; See also a clarification in regard to whether violence would be used to free East Europe, August 14, 1952, p. 1; and August 26, 1952, pp. 1, 12.

which everyone would lose seemed too great to the United States.

The Polish and Hungarian revolts did prove that resistance to totalitarianism was possible albeit shortlived, and a possible reason for this was the apparent fluctuation in Soviet policy since Stalin's death. The policy seemed to fluctuate between a reluctance to alter the old order and a desire to grant concessions. But the net effect of any thaw in Soviet policy on Central Europe was slight. The propensities for change seemed enlarged but within definite limits. Those limits were dictated by the security interests of the Soviet Union that were in turn apparently dictated by the confrontation of opposed forces in Central Europe.

The Rapacki Plan attempted to break this deadlock by removing part of the reason that the Soviet bloc was becoming increasingly concerned about Central Europe—nuclear weapons. The proposal was a reaction of concern not just because of the deadlocked security aspects of the area; but also because of the known American desire to share its nuclear devices with the West Germans.<sup>15</sup> The May NATO Conference in 1957 at Bonn had deferred the question of the sharing of these weapons by the NATO allies until the December meeting in Paris. This deferral was for the purpose of aiding Adenauer in his election in Germany, in which he was under considerable pressure from the Social Democrats to refuse nuclear armaments entirely.<sup>16</sup> The SDP maintained that German possessions of such weapons would weaken the

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<sup>15</sup>"Nato," Time, Vol. 70, December 30, 1957, p. 18.

<sup>16</sup>"Our Atomic Defense," Newsweek, Vol. 49, May 13, 1957, p.50.

possibilities for reunification by endangering the Soviet Union. Therefore the timing of the Rapacki Plan in early October of 1957 sought the beginnings of a solution to the security problems of Central Europe, but with specific reference to the rearming of Poland's former enemy with nuclear potential.<sup>17</sup> This was most undesirable both to the Poles and to the Soviet Union.

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"Poland Will Cut Forces," New York Times, February 17, 1960, p. 2., and Arthur Olsen, "Poles Disappointed in U.S. Rejection," New York Times, April 8, 1962, p. 19.

## DISARMAMENT IN A CENTRAL EUROPEAN CONTEXT

Rapacki's proposals are also part of the age-old quest for disarmament. The beating of swords into plowshares was a goal already in ancient Biblical times. But, seemingly, man had never been ready for the utopia called for by such a goal; the ideal of disarmament had often been followed by the reality of war, and quite often the war had been followed by the hope for an end to arms. So it was again when the death of Stalin seemed to change the direction of events. Winston Churchill tied Western hopes for a new era to the reduction of arms in a speech before the House of Commons in May of 1953. He said:

"We all desire that the Russian people should take the highest place in world affairs that is their due, without feeling anxiety about their security. I do not believe that the immense problem of reconciling the security of Russia with the freedom and safety of Western Europe is insolvable. Indeed, if the United Nations organization had the authority and character for which its creators hoped, it would be solved already....

"The Locarno Treaty of 1925 was in my mind. It was the highest point reached between the wars...it was based upon the simple provision that if Germany attacked France we should stand with the French, and if France attacked Germany we should stand with the Germans. The scene today, its scale, its factors, is widely different and yet I have a feeling that the master thought which animated Locarno might well play its part between Germany and Russia in the minds of those whose prime ambition it is to consolidate the peace of Europe as the key to the peace of mankind."<sup>1</sup>

Perhaps Churchill was ahead of his time. But the hope he expressed was widely shared. Even though this beginning of optimism

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Bryon Dexter, "Locarno Again," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 32, October 1953, p. 34.

was expressed, there also existed the strong desire to strengthen both defensive and offensive capabilities. Recent showdowns of force throughout the world, the crushing of the East German revolts, and repeated difficulties in Berlin were convincing reminders of the necessity of continuing to arm. Malenkov spoke of the danger for all men in a nuclear war<sup>2</sup>, but these official pronouncements could not always be taken at face value. The West could not turn from the path of strength--the trust was not there. Vice-President Nixon expressed this when he said that the United States had adopted a new principle of foreign policy.

"...the new principle summed up is this; Rather than let the Communists nibble us to death all over the world in little wars we should rely in the future primarily on our massive mobile retaliatory power which we would use in our discretion against the major source of aggression at times and places we choose."<sup>3</sup>

In this Nixon was echoing Secretary of State Dulles' policy of massive retaliation<sup>4</sup>, and responding to the threat from the Soviet Union. Bloc stood against bloc in an organized fashion by 1955; like "two old time gunslingers each with a loaded six-shooter, each with the drop on the other."<sup>5</sup> There seems to be no doubt that these were days of extreme tension.

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<sup>2</sup>U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Disarmament, Control and Reduction of Armaments, 85th Congress, 2nd Session, 1958, Report 2501, p. 378.

<sup>3</sup>"Nixon Takes Strong Stand", New York Times, March 14, 1954, p. 1.

<sup>4</sup>John Foster Dulles, "Policy for Security and Peace," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 32, April 1954, pp. 353-364.

<sup>5</sup>"Where We Would Disengage If," Newsweek, Vol. 54, August 24, 1959, p. 37.

Disarmament activity was given a great impetus by the major Soviet concession concerning Austria. It seemed like a tremendous break-through, a beginning of a new thaw in the Cold War, and the possibilities of German reunification seemed much brighter. It was in this atmosphere both of strength and of hope that the Summit Conference of the Heads of State met in Geneva in 1955. The important conferees were Eisenhower, Anthony Eden, Bulganin, and Khrushchev.

The conference almost immediately ran into a procedural problem that forestalled any real progress. Bulganin wished to emphasize Russian security in Central Europe: "...our eventual objective should be to have no foreign troops remaining on the territories of the States of Europe."<sup>6</sup> He added that German rearmament and inclusion within NATO were obstacles to German reunification because they represented a threat to the security of the Soviet Union.<sup>7</sup> Eisenhower remarked that while he understood the security interests of the Soviet Union, prior consideration should be given the reunifying of Germany by free elections, and the new nation must be free to choose its own defensive alliances. Besides this, Eisenhower felt that it was time to consider giving the peoples of East Europe the freedom to choose their own form and type of government.<sup>8</sup> Whether Germany or security came first—

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<sup>6</sup>Anthony Eden, Full Circle, (New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1960) p. 330.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., pp. 328-329.

that was the problem.

Anthony Eden sought to remove this deadlock by dealing with both security and reunification simultaneously.

"The original Eden Plan was advanced by Sir Anthony Eden, then Foreign Secretary, at the Berlin Conference in January 1954. Its twin objectives were to unite Germany in freedom and at the same time convince the Soviet Union that it had nothing to fear from such a development. In addition to stipulating the conditions under which free elections should be held to establish a government of a united Germany, the plan also suggested that as evidence of good intentions there should be a zone of inspection and control comprising areas of comparable size and depth on both sides of the demarcation line between reunified Germany and her eastern neighbors."

In 1955, Sir Anthony added the concept of a zone of withdrawal by both sides. The original zone of inspection was expanded to include the withdrawal of forces, leaving a rather narrow demilitarized strip between the two blocs on either side of the Iron Curtain. The plan also included inspection of the buffer area, limitations on armaments in areas of Europe, and a security pact between East and West.<sup>10</sup> Both the United States and Russia were willing to consider the proposal, but each favored different elements in the plan, as might be expected. The Eden plan was relegated to the background of the conference, however, after Eisenhower's plans for total, world-wide disarmament were presented to the conference. "Open-Skies", as it was called, was a grand plan for complete disarmament to be inspected both by

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<sup>9</sup>"Macmillan Refuses to Discuss Eden Plan in Commons," New York Times, May 1, 1957, p. 6.

<sup>10</sup>Sir Anthony Eden, Full Circle, p. 325.



ground control posts and by aerial inspection of each other's territory; including the exchange of strategic blueprints.

The October Conference of Foreign Ministers was unable to reach a decision on any of the proposals; but the fact that meetings were taking place gave rise to the "Spirit of Geneva", a feeling that men could work their problems out at the conference table rather than by mutual destruction. The hope seemed to have been erected on little more than the desire for such hope. East and West, after the Geneva meetings, were still far apart. The same procedural problem remained even for Eden's plan which had been altered prior to the October meetings in that German reunification was made the first step of his proposal.<sup>11</sup> Both East and West remained rather inflexible, and the build-up of arms and the testing of nuclear weapons continued. Very little had been accomplished at Geneva; and yet, as Harvard's Dr. Berman pointed out, the door seemed open for further negotiation.<sup>12</sup>

On November 17, 1956, Bulganin sent a comprehensive disarmament proposal to Great Britain, France, India, and the United States. The disarmament door did seem to be still open. Bulganin proposed a world-wide reduction in armed forces with a corresponding reduction in armaments, a total ban on the use and production of

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<sup>11</sup>"Eden Plan for German Reunification," New York Times, September 27, 1955, p. 12.

<sup>12</sup>Harold Berman's reply to a Subcommittee questionnaire, quoted in U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Disarmament, Control and Reduction of Armaments, Report 2501, p. 375.

nuclear weapons, the destruction of existing stockpiles, a reduction of forces stationed in Central Europe and a removal of all forces stationed on foreign soil within two years, reduction in armament expenditures, a ban on nuclear weapons in foreign states, international inspection and control, and a zone of aerial inspection 800 kilometers on either side of the demarcation line between East and West.<sup>13</sup> The West seemed to be cautiously intrigued at first, but after a short time all of the objections were solidified under a "threat to NATO" concept which overshadowed the parts of the Bulganin proposals that seemed acceptable.<sup>14</sup>

Evidently the Russian leaders were interested in the disengagement parts of the Eden plan. This became a strong element in their proposals in 1957, but the Soviet Union was proposing withdrawal of forces from the demarcation line between East and West Germany; whereas Eden had suggested the withdrawal of forces from the border between reunified Germany and its eastern neighbors. This is why Konrad Adenauer could agree to disengagement in 1955, but disagree emphatically in 1957.<sup>15</sup>

On April 20, 1957, Bulganin tried again with a simpler plan. First, a temporary ban on testing; second, a non-aggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries; third, the conclusion

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<sup>13</sup>C.L. Sulzberger, "The Bulganin Proposals," New York Times, November 18, 1956, p. 33.

<sup>14</sup>"Adenauer Sees Merit in Russian Proposals," New York Times, January 12, 1957, pp. 1, 9. "Adenauer Replies to U.S. Criticism," New York Times, January 13, 1957, pp. 8, 40.

<sup>15</sup>Sir Anthony Eden, Full Circle, p. 325.

of an all European collective security pact; fourth, discussion of the Eden plan for demilitarization and partially armed areas; and fifth, serious consideration of other Soviet disarmament ideas.<sup>16</sup>

The timing of this proposal suggests the probability that the Soviet leaders were concerned about the nuclear rearming of West Germany; a question to be discussed at the May NATO Conference in Bonn. Whatever the motivation, the proposal stirred up a variety of reactions. Harold Stassen, attending the London Disarmament Conference, seemed interested, but when he expressed his interest some Western leaders were dismayed.<sup>17</sup> Eisenhower replied to a news conference question that the Bulganin proposal deserved serious study in regard to the Eden ideas, and that "...I personally believe that...mutual inspection is going to come about through some such evolutionary development that is envisaged in that kind of proposal."<sup>18</sup> Leaders in West Germany saw this answer as hedging over a proposal that would tend to perpetuate the division of Germany. When Washington seemed interested in the zone of aerial inspection and arms reduction in Central Europe, West Germany thought that the official sources quoted were referring to demilitarized areas, and they were very critical. Washington denied favorable consideration of areas of demilitarization and

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<sup>16</sup>"The New Bulganin Proposal," New York Times, April 25, 1957, p. 1.

<sup>17</sup>Jerome Spingarn, "Five Months in London," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Vol. 13, September 1957, p. 258.

<sup>18</sup>"Text of Eisenhower News Conference," New York Times, May 9, 1957, p. 18.

blamed the whole misunderstanding on Harold Stassen, chief U.S. disarmament negotiator.<sup>19</sup> Secretary of State Dulles began, understandably, to feel that Central Europe had too many political complications, and that a more politically barren area should be the first step for a zone of inspection.<sup>20</sup> Accordingly, Dulles later flew to London, the site of the Conference on Disarmament, and proposed a possible Arctic inspection zone including parts of the United States, Norway, and Russia.<sup>21</sup> This got nowhere, mainly because Russia refused. The Soviet Union also rejected a twenty-four nation proposal at the United Nations that would have progressively reduced armaments and armed forces with both air and ground inspection, even though the proposal was passed by the General Assembly.<sup>22</sup>

Disarmament talks continued--but nobody disarmed. The hard line on both sides of the Iron Curtain held fast. As one writer put it: "For more than a year now the contending parties have been more concerned with twisting arms than with reducing them."<sup>23</sup> Each side was afraid to stop testing and developing nuclear weapons for reasons of their own security. If there was to be

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<sup>19</sup>"Eisenhower on Troop Reduction," New York Times, May 12, 1957, p. 1.

<sup>20</sup>"U.S. Concerned about Troop Cuts," New York Times, May 30, 1957, p. 1.

<sup>21</sup>"Arms--Putting the Chips Down," Newsweek, Vol. 50, August 12, 1957, p. 38.

<sup>22</sup>"The Partial Measures Approach to Disarmament," United Nations Review, Vol. 4, December 1957, p. 4.

<sup>23</sup>"Twisting Arms," Economist, Vol. 189, February 22, 1958, p. 481.

any progress at all in this Spirit of Geneva, a first step was needed, particularly in Central Europe. As a writer in Nation put it, there seemed to be no sense in a "foolproof inspection of polar bears, while Europe, which both sides have packed to overflowing with military installations and troops, would be ignored."<sup>24</sup> Harold Stassen sought a rather large first step when he proposed a two year moratorium on tests and the production of nuclear devices, an enforceable system of inspection and an initial reduction in conventional arms and armed forces.<sup>25</sup> Premier Khrushchev suggested on a taped Face the Nation interview that both sides withdraw their troops from foreign bases.<sup>26</sup> United States officials did not like this kind of a first step, however. A few days later Senator Knowland (R - California) suggested that Norway be neutralized in exchange for the neutralization of the Warsaw Pact country, Hungary.<sup>27</sup> This proposal was rapidly rejected by Norway, Hungary, Dulles, and the New York Times editorial staff;<sup>28</sup> even though Knowland was advocating free elections in Hungary only a year after the bloody revolution was crushed by the armed might of the Soviet Union, and feeling about Hungary was

<sup>24</sup>"The First Little Steps," Nation, Vol. 184, June 8, 1957, p. 489.

<sup>25</sup>"Answer--A-Blast," Newsweek, Vol. 50, September 12, 1957, p. 38.

<sup>26</sup>"Text of Khrushchev's Remarks," New York Times, June 3, 1957, p. 6.

<sup>27</sup>"Knowland's Plan," New York Times, June 10, 1957, p. 1.

<sup>28</sup>"Norway Irked by Neutrality Plan," New York Times, June 11, 1957, pp. 5, 34; "Dulles Against Knowland Plan," Ibid., June 12, 1957, p. 12; "Hungary Dismisses Knowland Plan," Ibid., June 15, 1957, p. 4.

still very much in favor of doing something to alter the situation.<sup>29</sup>

Hugh Gaitskill, leader of the British Labor Party, sought the first step in a proposal that was specifically Central European. His plan included the removal of all foreign forces from East and West Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary; international control over the national forces that would remain; the reunification of Germany; a security pact guaranteeing European borders; and the removal of Germany and the three satellites from their respective alliances in either NATO or the Warsaw Pact.<sup>30</sup> Mr. Gaitskill was quoted as saying that he would much rather test the Russians than go on testing bombs.<sup>31</sup> His ideas were not championed by the Conservative Government nor by the West generally; but they did stir up interest and discussion.

Another man that created discussion in early 1957 was George F. Kennan, the Mr. X of the containment policy. He testified before the Disarmament Subcommittee on January 9, 1957, making suggestions similar to those of Gaitskill.

"I have never felt that there was any great possibility of arriving at any multilateral agreement for reduction of armaments, so long as you (sic) had American and Soviet forces face to face in the middle of Germany."<sup>32</sup>

<sup>29</sup>"Knowland's Plan," New York Times, June 10, 1957, p. 1.

<sup>30</sup>Hugh Gaitskill, Adlai Stevenson, Pierre Mendes France, "Three Opposition Leaders Discuss Russia and the West," New Republic, Vol. 139, March 24, 1958, p. 12.

<sup>31</sup>"Gaitskill's Plan," New York Times, June 17, 1957, p. 4.

<sup>32</sup>U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Disarmament, Control and Reduction of Armaments (hearings), Part Two, 85th Congress, 1st Session, January 9, 10, 1957, p. 1003.

The next question concerned NATO, in which Germany was by now a prominent member. Senator Symington (D - Mississippi) asked:

"...would you be willing to scrap NATO in order to have our troops out of Western Germany and Russian troops out of Poland or East Germany?"<sup>33</sup> Kennan replied: "I am inclined to think that the dangers might be less by not having Germany in NATO, if the Soviets would really get out of Eastern Europe."<sup>34</sup>

Kennan's ideas received world wide attention in late 1957 when he delivered the Reith Lectures<sup>35</sup> over the British Broadcasting Company facilities. The lecture on Central Europe was given on November 24, 1957. The main element in his prescriptive remarks was disengagement, or the pulling back of opposed forces leaving a buffer area in between. This was not a reversal of his containment article ten years earlier, but rather an adjunct to that policy. It represented an answer to the question implicit in containment: Now what? Kennan's answer reflected many expert opinions<sup>36</sup> that Soviet withdrawal could not be expected without some sort of negotiated quid pro quo agreement between the two powers. The rigid policies of the United States and the Western nations, Mr. Kennan said, generally ask Moscow to abandon

"the military and political bastion in Central Europe which it won by its military effort from 1941-1945,

<sup>33</sup>Ibid., p. 1013.

<sup>34</sup>Ibid.

<sup>35</sup>These lectures are now a Harper & Bros publication, Russia, the Atom and the West, (New York: Harper & Bros, 1957)

<sup>36</sup>U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Disarmament, Control and Reduction of Armaments, Report 2501, p. 11.

and to do this without any compensatory withdrawal of American armed power from the heart of the Continent."<sup>37</sup>

"I think we are justified in assuming that it is this question of the indefinite retention of the American and other Western garrisons on German soil which lies at the heart of the difficulty...."<sup>38</sup> "It assigns half of Europe, by implication, to the Russians."<sup>39</sup>

In that other half, he continues, it is the retention of Soviet troops that prevents the evolution of the satellites to institutions and social systems most suited to their needs.<sup>40</sup> Therefore, what more logical solution than reciprocal withdrawal? In regard to West Germany's part in NATO, Mr. Kennan said:

"I would only say that it seems to me far more desirable on principle to get the Soviet forces out of Central and Eastern Europe than to cultivate a new German army for the purpose of opposing them while they remain there."<sup>41</sup>

Kennan's ideas were accepted by a great many people, but on the official level they were rejected by the Western powers. The interesting part of the matter was that increasingly both sides were suggesting the same thing: some sort of zonal area in which a beginning might be made to make Europe more secure by the reduction of arms and forces. However, progress was not being made. Would a more modest proposal be accepted? Evidently reduction in conventional armed forces and in conventional arms faced certain opposition--but what about a proposal to ban just nuclear weapons, and in just a small area? This was a question Adam Rapacki probably asked.

<sup>37</sup>George F. Kennan, Russia, the Atom and the West, p. 38.

<sup>38</sup>Ibid., p. 41.

<sup>39</sup>Ibid., p. 40.

<sup>40</sup>Ibid., p. 36.

<sup>41</sup>Ibid., p. 45



## THE PROPOSAL ITSELF

Adam Rapacki has been Foreign Minister of Poland since Gomulka came back to power in 1956, during the Polish October. As Foreign Minister Rapacki is the official head of the Polish delegation to the United Nations. It was here that his proposal was initially made, in a speech before the General Assembly, on October 2, 1957.

"The special responsibility of the great powers as stressed by the United Nations Charter, by no means limits the responsibility or the part to be played by the small states. Poland will make its contribution.

"Poland is a socialist country and is therefore able to overcome the consequences of its age-long backwardness and insure its growth in all fields. It can also be a positive factor in the peaceful development of relations among states.

"Strong and stable ties of solidarity, springing from mutual needs and common basic problems, link it with other socialist countries, but it wishes to maintain at the same time the friendliest relations with other states. There cannot be any contradiction in this regard, for this is the essence of constructive peaceful coexistence.

"Poland has embarked on a great effort to reorganize its forms and methods of government and its economic administration. Favorable prospects, however, are linked with the progress of the international situation.

"At this session of the Assembly, attempts should be made to reach mutual understanding on controversial issues, or at least partial solutions.

"Disarmament is the key problem. The first obstacle which the Disarmament Subcommittee proved unable to overcome and the main reason for its lack of success was the concept of the so-called "global strategy" of the Western powers in which so vital a role is played by nuclear weapons.

"Another was that the Western powers made concrete steps toward disarmament conditional upon the simultaneous solution of other controversial international problems. And the third obstacle arose from the opposition of the German Federal Republic and from considerations concerning the remilitarization of Western Germany.

"Time is running short. Every month of the armaments race imposes on humanity an increasing burden. The armed forces of the great powers are being speedily re-equipped with nuclear weapons, and the danger of the armies of an increasing number of states being equipped with such weapons is growing. The danger of weapons of mass destruction being used even in local conflicts will soon become imminent.

"Therefore, if an agreement on a final and complete ban on nuclear weapons is not possible at present, the Soviet proposal for a pledge by great powers not to use such weapons for at least five years is an appropriate initial step. Poland also supports every initiative which will lead, in the shortest possible time, to the cessation of nuclear tests.

"The remilitarization of the German Federal Republic and the concentration of arms and troops there are dangerous to the cause of peace in Europe and in the whole world. The rightful aspirations of the German people toward national unity are in the good interests of Europe, but the process of reunification can develop favorably only in an atmosphere of relaxation of international tension, disarmament, and a growing sense of security on the part of Germany's neighbors, only by rapprochement and understanding by the two German states.

"The existing tension is being intensified by revisionist claims concerning Poland's western frontier, a frontier which is final, inviolable and not subject to any bargaining.

"Poland is against the division of Europe into opposing blocs and military pacts, but in view of the danger which West German rearmament within NATO poses, Poland and its allies had to conclude the Warsaw Pact, which safeguards security until an effective system of collective security is set up to replace the existing division of Europe. Poland supports even partial measures leading toward that ultimate objective. That is why the setting up of a zone of limited and controlled armaments in Europe would serve a useful purpose.

"In the interest of Poland's security and of European detente, and after consultation on this initiative with other members of the Warsaw Pact, the Government of the Polish People's Republic declares that, should the two German states express their consent to putting into effect the prohibition of production and stockpiling of atomic and thermo-nuclear weapons on their territories, the Polish People's Republic is prepared simultaneously to take the same action on her own territory.

"Should this initiative be adopted, it would be at least an initial step forward on a matter of paramount importance not only to the Polish nation and to the German people, to their good mutual relations, but also useful

to Europe and to all nations."<sup>1</sup>

The remainder of his address dealt with related matters such as the reduction of tension in the Middle East, and the improving of trade relations between East and West.

Immediately after Adam Rapacki's speech, Vaclav David, of Czechoslovakia, made the following speech of affirmation.

"In the interests of reducing international tension, Czechoslovakia is prepared to associate itself with the proposals of Poland and to assume an obligation to renounce the production and stationing of atomic weapons on its territory if both German states come to an agreement for the prohibition of the production and stockpiling of atomic weapons on the territory of Germany, as was proposed by the German Democratic Republic.

"The readiness of Poland and Czechoslovakia to assume these obligations can make it easier to reach such an agreement which would, no doubt, constitute a step forward in solving the problems of peace and of European security. At the same time it would help considerably in improving the international atmosphere and reaching agreement on further disarmament measures."<sup>2</sup>

The two speeches were summarized by the New York Times as United Nations news. It was a brief summary on page four, and the reporter concluded with the observation that Rapacki had not mentioned any provision for control and inspection if the proposal were accepted by West Germany.<sup>3</sup> Rapacki does speak of controlled armaments but not the control of the reduction nor the inspection

<sup>1</sup>"Summary of the Debate, U.N. General Assembly," United Nations Review, Vol. 4, November 1957, pp. 84-85.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 85.

<sup>3</sup>"Rapacki and David Pledge Disarming," New York Times, October 3, 1957, p. 4.

of the control. Rapacki replied to this objection in a speech before the Sejm (Polish Parliament) Foreign Affairs Committee on December 13, 1957. He said that Poland was greatly interested in a most effective control to provide maximum security for all the interested states. But he would rather work out the control and inspection aspects of his proposal after there was agreement on the principle itself.<sup>4</sup> As far as Rapacki was concerned at year's end, matters of control could be worked out.

The timing of the proposal was, as mentioned above in connection with Bulganin's proposals, connected with the December meeting of NATO to be held in Paris. Already during the May meeting in Bonn the United States had expressed its desire to station nuclear weapons on the territory of its allies. The matter had been postponed until December and the issue was pending. The United States made it quite clear in the intervening months that as soon as intermediate range missiles and their warheads could be mass produced, it would like to see them distributed among the NATO allies. The primacy of this issue in terms of the denuclearization proposal is clearly visible in the remarks Rapacki made before the Sejm,<sup>5</sup> and this in turn is based on an apparently real fear of Germany which will be discussed in Chapter Four. However, the Rapacki proposals did not get much attention from October to

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<sup>4</sup>Adam Rapacki, "Poland's Active, Constructive and Peaceful Foreign Policy," Polish Facts and Figures, No. 584, December 21 1957, p. 3.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., pp. 1, 2.

December. Therefore, in the week preceding the Paris meetings,

"M. Rapacki quietly called in the diplomatic representatives of a number of Western countries, including the United States, expressed Poland's grave concern over the possibility of West Germany's receiving missiles, and urged reconsideration of his United Nations proposal."<sup>6</sup>

Similar motivation was apparently felt by Soviet Premier Bulganin. On December 10, 1957, he wrote to Eisenhower urging the acceptance of peaceful coexistence. The letter attempted to be a calm, objective approach to the problem. Bulganin urged Eisenhower not to put nuclear weapons in West Germany; to consider the merits of the Rapacki Plan, and to join him in a declaration against the use of nuclear weapons and in a non-aggression pact.<sup>7</sup> Eisenhower replied that the proposals did not meet the heart of the problem which was the mounting production of new nuclear weapons. Besides, he said, of what value is the Rapacki Plan in view of long-range missiles?<sup>8</sup> The Soviet leader also wrote to the Bonn Government on December 11th. In this letter he urged an immediate freeze on armament levels, troop withdrawal or disengagement in Central Europe, the Rapacki Plan, and the signing of a non-aggression pact.<sup>9</sup>

Only seventeen days after George F. Kennan's lecture on BBC,

<sup>6</sup>Sidney Gruson, "Rapacki Pushes Plan," New York Times, January 6, 1958, p. 12.

<sup>7</sup>"Bulganin's December 10th Letter to Eisenhower," U.S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 38, January 27, 1958, pp. 127-130.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., pp. 124-125.

<sup>9</sup>"Text of Bulganin's Proposal to West Germany," New York Times, December 12, 1957, p. 4.

the Soviet Premier had ideas of disengagement linked to the proposals of Adam Rapacki; as well as great power declarations of peaceful intent. The main motivation for this evolution of Soviet policy seems to have been the approaching Paris meeting. The January 6, 1958 issue of the New Republic stated that there were two unseen guests at the Paris meetings; Kennan and Bulganin.<sup>10</sup> They might well have added Adam Rapacki.

The December meetings did not reach complete accord in regard to nuclear weapons in Europe; but enough agreements had been made that Eisenhower suggested to Congress that the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 be amended so that nuclear weapons could be supplied to allies of the United States. The result was Public Law No. 85-479, 85th Congress, 2nd Session (July 2, 1958).<sup>11</sup> Eisenhower referred to this authority on May 26, 1959 in a message to Congress in which he specifically asked authority to supply West Germany, Turkey, and the Netherlands with nuclear weapons.<sup>12</sup> But this was not yet a fait accompli in early 1958, and Bulganin sought to maintain the pressure on the West by suggesting a chief of state's meeting with an agenda cleared of controversial matters. His agenda included tests suspension, renunciation of nuclear weapons, the Rapacki Plan,

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<sup>10</sup>"Kennan's Advice," New Republic, Vol. 138, January 6, 1958, p. 3.

<sup>11</sup>"Atomic Data Exchange," Congressional Quarterly Almanac, Vol. 14, 1958, pp. 62-63.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., Vol. 15, 1959, pp. 104-105.

non-aggression pacts, conventional force reduction with inspection, and the extension of the nuclear-free zone to Scandanavia and Italy.<sup>13</sup> Dulles replied that the nuclear-free zone would lead to the total neutralization of the area, and he stressed the primacy of German reunification by free elections, and freedom for Eastern Europe.<sup>14</sup>

The Rapacki Plan was also used by Bulganin in other proposals, leading some observers to conclude that the Plan was in essence a Soviet concept. Since, however, Rapacki states in his United Nations speech that he made the initiative only after consultation with the member countries of the Warsaw Pact, the question of its real authorship serves no real purpose. However this may be, the Plan was still only a paragraph in a speech. As C. L. Sulzberger editorialized, the Plan needed more elaboration.<sup>15</sup>

Rapacki provided that elaboration on February 14th, 1958, when he handed United States Ambassador Beam a Note and Memorandum<sup>16</sup> in which the original proposal was expanded to answer questions raised against it. The area involved was the same; viz., West and East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. The states agreeing to the proposal obligated themselves not to produce nor to import

<sup>13</sup>"Text of Bulganin's Proposal," New York Times, January 10, 1958, p. 4; "Bulganin Would Extend Nuclear Free Zone," Ibid., January 12, 1958, p. 1.

<sup>14</sup>"Text of Dulles Speech," New York Times, January 11, 1958, p. 6.

<sup>15</sup>C. L. Sulzberger, "Disengagement, What it Means," New York Times, editorial, February 5, 1958, p. 26.

<sup>16</sup>Complete text of the Note and Memorandum in Appendix A.

nuclear weapons of any kind, nor allow them on their territory. The four states bind themselves not to maintain nuclear weapons in the armaments of their forces in the area, nor service installations, nor missile launching equipment; and not to transfer such to another government or persons in the area. Other states having forces in the area undertake similar obligations. Those states possessing nuclear weapons pledge themselves not to use those weapons against the zone.

Rapacki received Soviet approval for his inspection provisions on the 28th of January.<sup>17</sup> As a matter of fact, Khrushchev stated in Die Welt that the "Soviet Union was ready to give reliable international guarantees for such a zone and believed a broad form of control was possible."<sup>18</sup> Rapacki, therefore, suggested both ground observer posts manned by members of both blocs and aerial inspection of the territory involved.

The means of agreeing to such a proposal could be by international convention or by unilateral declaration of the states concerned. This second method would avoid West Germany's reluctance to do anything implying recognition of East Germany. The Memorandum<sup>19</sup> concluded with a plea for favorable consideration; since it could be a step towards facilitation of agreements in regard to the reduction in conventional arms and foreign armies

<sup>17</sup>"Russia Approves Polish Controls," New York Times, January 29, 1958, p. 1.

<sup>18</sup>"Khrushchev Pushes Zone," New York Times, February 7, 1958, p. 5.

<sup>19</sup>The Memorandum was also sent to Great Britain, France, Belgium, Canada, Norway, Denmark, Czechoslovakia, Russia, East Germany, Austria, Switzerland, and India.



within the zone.

The proposal as summarized here was not the final form of the Rapacki Plan. It was, nonetheless, the best expression of the 1957-1958 Rapacki concept of control and the limitation of arms in a specified area. The reduction in conventional armaments and armed forces was not a part of the proposal, at this point in time. In regard to these ideas, Rapacki said that he welcomed a revival of discussion concerning those concepts, but they had previously aroused too much opposition. "That was why, among other reasons, we put forward a more modest proposal, but a simpler and more practical one."<sup>20</sup> He did not wish the nuclear free zone agreements to be conditioned by necessary agreement to any other problem. He sought a simple step, a basis for negotiation that could accomplish something desirable: a step away from the bloc confrontation in Central Europe, the stalemated disarmament talks and the resultant arms race; and a step away from the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

"In this way we want to take part in the struggle of all countries and forces of socialism and progress for the detente in international relations, for peaceful coexistence, for<sup>21</sup> disarmament and collective security for a lasting peace."

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<sup>20</sup> Adam Rapacki, "Poland's Active, Constructive and Peaceful Foreign Policy," Polish Facts and Figures, No. 584, December 21, 1957, p. 3.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid.

## THE PIVOTAL ROLE OF WEST GERMANY

There is no doubt that the Rapacki Plan is intricately bound up in what had come to be known as the German question. The task of this chapter is to trace the development of the German situation; first to attempt to show that a fear of Germany was the prime motivation for the Rapacki Plan; and second to attempt to trace the importance of West Germany in terms of the acceptance or rejection of the Plan by the Western powers.

The European phase of the war had ended with the unconditional surrender of the German nation. Allied land forces had simultaneously pushed the German armies from the East and the West. When Russian soldiers neared American troops in Germany, the war had ended for all practical purposes. Germany lay in economic and political ruin. As the dust of the war settled the four victors divided Germany into occupation zones both to prevent the resurgence of Nazism and to begin a limited effort to rebuild the desolated country.

The conflict of interests between Russia and the West developed into the Cold War which had a profound effect on Germany. The original wartime policy of stripping Germany of industrial assets so as to reduce its productivity was gradually reversed by the West. By 1946 the Western occupation authorities felt that zonal economic programs were futile, and in October of 1946 the British and American zones were merged economically, and were joined somewhat later by the French. By 1948, the original attitude was so reversed that the United States included West Germany in the Marshall Plan. This resulted in Soviet reorganization of East Germany's economy and aid in

the form of long term credits on the foreign exchange.

As the West's apprehension of Russia increased, the fear of Germany decreased. The economic union of West Germany was allowed to evolve into the political union of the three Western sectors. The desire to rehabilitate West Germany was very strong, and accordingly a constitutional convention met in Bonn under the leadership of Konrad Adenauer. The Social Democrats at first opposed this because they feared political sovereignty would perpetuate the division of Germany. But the convention drafted the Basic Law with Allied help, and it was proclaimed on May 23, 1949 even though Germany remained under Occupational Statute until 1951. The Basic Law merged the three zones into the German Federal Republic. The Soviet Union followed this with the establishment of the German Democratic Republic on October 7, 1949. Both West and East tied their respective areas to themselves both politically and economically. East and West Germany became really separate.

The victor's garrisons, however, were not removed. The ostensible reason for the continuation of the presence of armed forces was protection. Western troops protected West Germany and Russian forces East Germany. The German State became thus not an area of occupation but a potential battleground for the victors. Nowhere else in the world was the confrontation so intense and so filled with tension. No matter what else was problematic in regard to Europe, the problem of Germany overshadowed it. The German problem became the single greatest obstacle to the solution of Central Europe's problems. As George F. Kennan said, any Central European solution that did not correct the German situation was not a solution; a solution in Germany was the key

to the whole Central European dilemma.<sup>1</sup> But therein lay the rub. Any change in the situation seemed to imply either war or retreat; so that the question of where does one go from here remained unanswered.

Germany, as a burning issue in Central European politics had two main facets in terms of the Rapacki Plan. In the first place, Germany was the main motivation for the proposal; and secondly, Germany was a major factor in the Western rejection of the proposal. The ability of Germany, in particular West Germany, to so affect both is an index of her importance not only in Central Europe but throughout the world.

The Polish people have a deep-seated fear and distrust of Germany; and, particularly since the Cold War, a fear of West Germany. Whether this fear, which is apparently a viable thing, is manipulated by the Polish Government is a speculative question. The fact is that there are at least two bases for it.

First, the German occupation of Poland during the war would have created fear in almost any people. "The bestiality of the German occupation assumed unparalleled proportions."<sup>2</sup> "Millions died before firing squads and in concentration camps. Those left alive were deliberately condemned to undernourishment and starvation."<sup>3</sup> Well over three million Polish Jews, and over three million Polish non-Jews were exterminated by the German occupational forces.<sup>4</sup> It would seem that no country suffered so ruinous an occupation as did Poland. Concentration

<sup>1</sup>George F. Kennan, Russia, the Atom and the West, p. 36.

<sup>2</sup>Clifford R. Barnett, Poland, Its People, Its Society, Its Culture, (New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1958), p. 8.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 23.

<sup>4</sup>"Poland," Encyclopedia Americana, (New York: American Corporation, 1956), Vol. 22, p. 287.

camps, such as Auschwitz, forced labor, a massive uprooting of people in an atmosphere of inhumanity lead one to conclude that the Germans were bent on the complete extermination of the Polish nation.

In the second place, the fear of West Germany sprang out of concern over the question of the Western boundaries of Poland. This question is bound up with the war and the eventual defeat of Germany. Winston Churchill, at the Teharan Conference in late 1943, proposed that the 1941 Curzon line on Poland's eastern border be agreed to, and Poland would then be compensated for the loss of this territory to Russia by receiving territory from Germany. Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin agreed to this in principle. At Yalta, however, the Soviets were anxious to preserve their military gains. This was in February of 1945. Russia wanted the city of Konigsberg, and wanted the compensation from Germany to Poland to extend all the way west to the Oder and Neisse Rivers. Roosevelt seemed indifferent to this<sup>5</sup> but Churchill felt that this was too much territory. So the question went unresolved. Between Yalta and Potsdam (July-August 1945) the Soviet Union made unilateral arrangements with Poland wherein Russia simply granted the territory to Poland without consultation with the other Allies. At the Potsdam Conference an attempt was made to push the Polish nation back in an eastward direction but no agreement could be reached. Therefore, the final Agreement states:

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Victor S. Mamatey, Soviet Russian Imperialism, (New York: Van Nostrand Co., 1964), p. 67.

"The three Heads of Government reaffirm their opinion that the final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should await the peace settlement.

"The three Heads of Government agree that, pending the final determination of Poland's western frontier, the former German territories east of a line running from the Baltic Sea immediately west of Swinemunde, and thence along the Oder River to the confluence of the western Neisse River and along the western Neisse to the Czechoslovakian frontier, including that portion of East Prussia not placed under the administration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in accordance with the understanding reached at this conference and including the area of the former free city of Danzig, shall be under the administration of the Polish State and for such purposes should not be considered as part of the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany...."<sup>6</sup>

Thus this valuable territory from Poland's point of view has never been a matter of international agreement up to the present day. The Soviet Union, of course, recognized the Oder-Neisse line. The East German Government in the Zgorzelec Agreement of 1950 did also.<sup>7</sup> But very definitely not West Germany.

The Polish acquisition of this territory forced many millions of Germans to leave. The same evacuation occurred in regard to Sudetenland which was returned to Czechoslovakia. Most of these refugees ended up in West Germany but they were not happy there: "...millions of refugees have their eyes fixed towards the east. Many of them are ready for a new war if that is the only way they can regain their old homes."<sup>8</sup> Every week another thousand of these people crossed the borders. By January 1, 1950, there were well over nine million refugees in West

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<sup>6</sup> Ibid., pp. 144-145. (His appendix contains excerpts of the official document.)

<sup>7</sup> W. Gomulka, "The Polish People's Republic," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 38, April, 1960, p. 143.

<sup>8</sup> Edgar Salin, "Social Forces in Germany Today," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 28, January, 1950, p. 275.

Germany, over a fifth of the total population.<sup>9</sup> This high a percentage suggests that the refugees strongly affected national policy in areas of concern to them, and that the Adenauer refusal to recognize the Oder-Neisse line was strongly conditioned by the presence of the refugees.<sup>10</sup>

The arming of Germans with nuclear weapons was a fearful thing to the Poles. They feared the Germans because of occupation terror and the threatened loss of the valuable industrial territory Poland had received. While these weapons were in West German hands in 1959, with U. S. control of nuclear warheads;<sup>11</sup> the Rapacki Plan in 1957-1958 is an understandable Polish effort to forestall this. Arthur Olsen, New York Times correspondent in Poland, writing from Warsaw in 1962, stated that Polish official sources there made no secret of the fact that the first objective of the Rapacki Plan was to forestall the acquisition of nuclear weapons by West Germany.<sup>12</sup>

It is interesting, parenthetically, that the East German regime was also very active in support of the Rapacki Plan. The motivation was somewhat similar in that their support of the proposal probably reflected a fear for their own government if the West Germans were to be given nuclear arms. At any rate, the effort was a strong one. Premier Grotewohl

<sup>9</sup>Marion Donhoff, "Germany Puts Freedom Before Unity," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 28, April, 1950, p. 403.

<sup>10</sup>Office of High Commissioner for Germany, "Political Aspects of the Refugee Problem," Report on Germany, No.4, July 1-September 30, 1950, pp. 30-34.

<sup>11</sup>Norman Thomas, "Support For Rapacki Plan," Letter, New York Times, June 17, 1959, p. 34.

<sup>12</sup>Arthur Olsen, "Poles Disappointed in U.S.Rejection," New York Times, April 8, 1962, p. 19.

broadcast a radio speech into West Germany urging that all the German people be given the right to vote on the Rapacki issue.<sup>13</sup> The East German Communist Party went so far as to suggest that the West German Socialist Party unite with them in a campaign for the nuclear-free zone.<sup>14</sup>

Thus, the West German potential for aggression was a prime motivator of the Rapacki Plan. But the West German State also played a large role in regard to the Western reaction to the proposal. As a matter of fact, West Germany exercised a powerful influence over all disarmament proposals. At the Bonn NATO Conference in May of 1957, Eisenhower had assured Adenauer:

"...that (1) the nation would make no disarmament agreement which might prejudice later German reunification and (2) that any comprehensive disarmament proposal necessarily presupposed solution of the German question."<sup>15</sup>

Later in the year, this same viewpoint was adopted by Britain and France.<sup>16</sup> However well this sounded, the results of such an attitude, as J. P. Morray, a spokesman for the American left, points out were that the German Chancellor had been accorded a veto on any comprehensive disarmament measure.<sup>17</sup> Morray fails to add, however, that this veto also went the other way. On page four of the Bonn Agreements of 1952 as amended by the Paris Protocol of 1954, one finds the statement that the three

<sup>13</sup>

"Text of Premier. Grotewohl's Speech," New York Times, January 23, 1958, p. 4.

<sup>14</sup>

"East Germany Corresponds With West Germany," New York Times, December 26, 1957, p. 9.

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Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., American Foreign Policy in the Nuclear Age, (Elmsford, New York: Row Peterson, 1960), p. 468.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid.

<sup>17</sup>

J.P. Morray, From Yalta to Disarmament: Cold War Debate, (New York: Harper & Bros., 1961), p. 301.



Western powers retained their full rights and responsibilities in West Germany in regard to matters affecting German reunification and a peace settlement.<sup>18</sup> Even though this veto went both ways, it may be suggested that Konrad Adenauer would not be the first to propose greater flexibility in dealing with the Soviet Union and her satellites. Adenauer firmly believed that the future of Germany depended to a great extent on her orientation to the West. A developing prosperity and great possibilities inherent in the concept of the Common Market would tend to confirm a decided reluctance to alter the course of events.

Another possible cause of Adenauer's inflexibility in regard to the Rapacki Plan was the boundary dispute with Poland. From the Chancellor's point of view there was no reason to agree to the creation of a zone such as Rapacki suggested; certainly a part of the treaty or declaration prohibiting nuclear weapons would describe the exact territory involved. Such a description would tend to legalize the Oder-Neisse line and Poland's sovereignty over the area East of the line; just as it would tend to confirm the sovereignty of East Germany. Either of these would be opposed by the Western powers anyway; but it would probably also have been politically unhealthy for Adenauer to even apparently recognize these borders, because of the preponderance of refugee voters. Arnold Heidenheimer suggested that between elections the Chancellor was largely insensitive to the desires manifested in public opinion,<sup>19</sup> but it must be

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U. S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings on the Protocol on the Termination of the Occupation Regime in the Federal Republic of Germany, 84th Congress, 1st Session, March 29, 1955. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1955), p. 26.

<sup>19</sup>Arnold J. Heidenheimer, The Governments of Germany, (New York: Thomas Crowell Co., 1961) p. 220.

remembered that Adenauer first got the Chancellorship by only one vote; and the independent parties that formed part of his several coalitions were often supported by refugee groups. Even after the refugees formed their own party, the Expellees party (BHE), many still voted for independent groups. This was a powerful factor in the 1950-1960 German political situation. Even though the five per cent clause <sup>20</sup> of the Basic Law kept them from exercising too much power, by 1960 the refugee population exceeded thirteen million, or one-fourth of the total population of West Germany.<sup>21</sup>

Some writers have gone so far as to suggest that Adenauer's inflexibility was occasioned by his lack of desire for reunification. One such is Norman Thomas, American Socialist leader, who maintained that Adenauer went along with the West on reunification only as an issue, not as reality. In other words, Thomas charged that Adenauer thought first of the political benefits from the division and secondly of Germany or German welfare. Mr. Thomas states that Adenauer was opposed to German reunification because:

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<sup>20</sup>This clause of the Basic Law reduced the number of splinter parties by maintaining that parties failing to receive 5% of the total federal second ballot vote, or which fail to elect 3 deputies in direct constituency seats cannot share in the distribution of seats on a proportional basis.

<sup>21</sup>Flora Lewis, "The Unstable States of Germany," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 38, July, 1960, pp. 588-597. For additional information on the refugee's political impact see also James Pollock, "The Electoral System of the Federal Republic of Germany," APSR, Vol. 46, December, 1952, pp. 1056-1068; Otto Kirchheimer and Arnold Price, "Analysis and Effects of the Elections in Western Germany," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 21, October 17, 1949, pp. 563-573; and Peter Markl, The Origin of the West German Republic, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963).

"He did not want an accession of Protestant and Socialist strength in his Republic. His refusal to abandon claim to what was German territory east of the Oder-Neisse lines before 1945 is evidence of his desire for an issue rather than its solution. Poland will not give up that territory without war; its German inhabitants are mostly well resettled in West Germany, and the German threat forces a somewhat reluctant Poland into the arms of the Russian bear."<sup>22</sup>

Whatever the reason for his lack of flexibility, Adenauer possessed a major role in the formation of Western policy with regard to Central Europe. He used his veto power often, and always with success.<sup>23</sup> He seemingly could not agree to any proposal adversely affecting the strength of West Germany or its basic orientation to the West.

As late as 1963, the role of West Germany was seen by West Germans at least as no less powerful than it had been. In regard to the test ban treaty during the Kennedy Administration, the West Germans were very unhappy that they had not been shown the treaty before it was initialed in Moscow. Before West Germany would adhere to the treaty, they asked that the Western Allies promise that any future proposals that came up for negotiation with the Soviet Union be submitted to West Germany for scrutiny prior to acceptance.<sup>24</sup>

In terms of disarmament proposals affecting Central Europe, the West was committed to the first step of the reunification of Germany by free elections as a prerequisite; and this was very definitely not a part of

<sup>22</sup>

Norman Thomas, "The Situation in Central Europe," New York Times, May 8, 1959, p. 15. (Advertisement)

<sup>23</sup>

"U.S. Position Explained to Adenauer," New York Times, June 19, 1957, p. 3.

<sup>24</sup>

"West German Reservations About Test Ban," New York Times, August 9, 1963, p. 11.

the Rapacki Plan, which purported to be but a small beginning of a solution to Central European problems. The West German role both in terms of motivation for the Plan and in terms of the Western rejection of the Plan appears to have been a major, even a pivotal one.

## WESTERN REJECTION OF THE RAPACKI PLAN

The initial Rapacki proposal in the United Nations received very little attention in the Western world. It seemed in the beginning that the only person actively aware of possibilities in the proposal besides Rapacki and David was Nikolai Bulganin. Twice in the months following the October speech Bulganin included the denuclearization concept as a part of his package proposal. But Bulganin was not the only one interested. He merely got more publicity. There was reaction throughout the Western world.

The Western reaction was somewhat confused in the sense that many persons confused the Rapacki Plan with disengagement in Central Europe. This seems understandable. George F. Kennan had given the widely publicized Reith Lectures only a month after Adam Rapacki had made his speech. Both had called for a small beginning in the reduction of tension, both asked for the creation of a zone between the two opposed blocs that was in different ways to be partially demilitarized; and both granted the primacy of Germany as a source of friction and sought in different ways to neutralize this. Neither disengagement nor denuclearization called for a neutral status for Germany; but rather a neutralizing of what each considered the prime irritant in Germany: foreign armies or nuclear weapons. But because both plans attempted to reduce the defense capacity of the German States, the Rapacki Plan and disengagement were often confused with the concept of a neutral

status for Germany. The neutrality of the two Germanies might be an interesting discussion topic, but the neutrality of West Germany was the direct opposite of the United States policy since 1949, and to a lesser degree the opposite of the NATO policy.

Part of the confusion was perhaps due to the initial vagueness of the Rapacki Plan.<sup>1</sup> After all, it was just a paragraph in a speech. The connection with disengagement was unfortunate, however, because Rapacki was trying specifically to keep his proposal free from other entanglements. As time went on this situation began to change; from the original aloofness to the concept of disengagement in the hope that his modest proposal would be accepted, the variants of the Rapacki Plan began more and more to contain elements of disengagement. The concluding paragraph of his February 14, 1958 Memorandum states:

"The Government of the Polish People's Republic has reasons to state that acceptance of the proposal concerning the establishment of a denuclearized zone in Central Europe will facilitate the reaching of an agreement relating to the adequate reduction of conventional armaments and of foreign armed forces stationed on the territory of the states included in the zone."<sup>2</sup>

But in terms of his original proposal he was at pains to state that it must not be confused with other plans.

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<sup>1</sup>For example, Senator Douglas, after interrupting a disarmament speech of Senator Hubert Humphrey, stated that George F. Kennan had proposed the atomic neutralization of Central Europe to be followed by conventional forces withdrawal. See "Speech of the Honorable Hubert Humphrey," Congressional Record, Vol. 104, Part 2, January 31 to February 25, 1958, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1958) February 4, 1958, p. 1615.

<sup>2</sup>See Appendix A this report.

"It would mean losing a simple question in a jungle of more complicated matters. It would in practice mean the rejection of our proposal...."<sup>3</sup> Also the connection between Kennan's disengagement and neutrality was unfortunate because the latter represents a conclusion in regard to the consequences of the former. Kennan said:

"People will ask: how do you envisage the future of Germany if not as a full-fledged member of NATO? Is it neutrality you are recommending, or demilitarization, or a general European security pact?

"These again are problems for the planners. The combinations are many; and they must be studied minutely as alternatives. No outsider can judge which is best."<sup>4</sup>

Moreover, as Rapacki began moving toward disengagement, Kennan seemed to be moving in the direction of denuclearization. While discussing the withdrawal of forces, Kennan cannot avoid pointing to an apparent obstacle to that disengagement, namely, the placing of nuclear weapons in the hands of NATO allies. "If therefore the Western continental countries are to be armed with them, any Russian withdrawal from Central and Eastern Europe may become unthinkable once and for all...."<sup>5</sup>

The relationship between the views of Rapacki and Kennan is a close one, therefore, and the fact that the West very often reacted to them both at the same time is understandable. However,

<sup>3</sup>Adam Rapacki, Polish Facts and Figures, p. 3.

<sup>4</sup>George F. Kennan, Russia, the Atom and the West, p. 45.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., p. 59.

those favoring one did not need to favor the other. Denis Healey, British Labor Member of Parliament, favored disengagement but saw only a small amount of merit in the Rapacki Plan.<sup>6</sup>

The reaction of the West was also conditioned by a view of the Polish proposal as a Soviet proposal. This impression was without doubt greatly strengthened by Bulganin's almost immediate snapping up of the Plan as a part of Soviet disarmament suggestions. The question of the authorship of Rapacki's proposal, as stated in Chapter Three, is a speculative one and is perhaps unnecessary to answer. Denis Healey felt that it was a peculiarly Polish suggestion "without Soviet prompting or support."<sup>7</sup> At about the same time Gomulka had said: "It was the result of our own deliberations and studies. We wanted to take a first...simple and effective step in reducing international tension."<sup>8</sup> Certainly the fact that any proposal would originate in a satellite country was itself significant even if it were part of general Communist disarmament policy. However, the evidence available to the West indicated more of a connection with the policies of the Soviet Union than a separation. Vaclav David, in his speech of affirmation following Rapacki's at the United Nations, stated that Czechoslovakia agreed with the de-nuclearization concept "as was proposed by the German Democratic

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<sup>6</sup>Denis Healey, "How to Start Disengagement," New Republic, Vol. 138, March 31, 1958, pp. 14-16.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., p. 16.

<sup>8</sup>Arthur Olsen, "The Polish Memo," New York Times, February 18, 1958, p. 7.



Republic."<sup>9</sup> This referred to a July 27, 1957 program of the East German Government calling for a prohibition of the stockpiling and manufacturing of atomic weapons in Germany, the withdrawal of the two German states from the North Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw Pact, abolition of conscription, agreement on the strength of the respective armies, and a joint request to the Big Four to withdraw their forces from Germany.<sup>10</sup> Besides this, previous Soviet proposals made prior to Rapacki's speech had advocated the creation of a Central European zone of limited armaments. Those who sought a peculiar Polish authorship had to ignore or explain this evidence if they wished to advocate consideration of the Plan simply because it was not part of general Communist policy. The fact that the Rapacki proposal might not have been Polish need not indict the Plan; the discussion here is merely an attempt to explain why the Western leaders did not in fact distinguish it as a Polish proposal.<sup>11</sup> The Netherlands' Foreign Minister, Dr. Luns, returned from the Paris NATO meetings "very pleased with what he called the failure of the latest Soviet effort to sabotage the North Atlantic Treaty Conference."<sup>12</sup>

The West German reaction was a definite rejection. Adenauer,

<sup>9</sup>"Summary of the Debate," United Nations Review, Vol. 4, November 1957, p. 85.

<sup>10</sup>"Khrushchev Repeats his Denuclearization Proposal," New York Times, August 9, 1957, p. 2.

<sup>11</sup>"Remove Nuclear Weapons from Central Europe?," New York Times, December 13, 1957, p. 1.

<sup>12</sup>"NATO Meeting Adjourns," New York Times, December 21, 1957, p. 3.

at the Paris Conference, had not really insisted on nuclear arms for West Germany, but by January he was seemingly most anxious to correct an impression that he had been influenced by George F. Kennan. The Chancellor made it quite clear that he was not so influenced, and rejected the Rapacki Plan because, like Dulles, Adenauer felt that the proposal would lead to the neutralization of Germany. Such a zone, he said, would give the people in it no protection; it "would mean the end of NATO, the end of freedom in Western Europe, and thereby the end of our own freedom."<sup>13</sup> Dr. Adenauer was stating this rather strongly, and his remarks were misleading. Certainly the decision to rearm West Germany with nuclear weapons was a step away from neutralization, but the decision not to so arm West Germany is not a step toward neutrality. Most of the nations of the world did not possess nuclear weapons; they merely possessed their own national forces, bound together with others in alliances. Formosa, for example, could not be called a neutral nation and yet does not possess nuclear weapons. To say, as Adenauer did, that the proposal would afford the people in the zone no protection, is to ignore the fact that the people in that zone had no protection against nuclear war anyway outside of the guarantees of Russia and the United States. The acquisition of nuclear weapons still under the control of the United States would not alter that; it moreover would probably

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<sup>13</sup>"West German Bundestag Backs Adenauer," New York Times, January 24, 1958, p. 5.

result in West Germany's rise in importance as a primary target in the event of war. In addition, there was a strong feeling among many Germans, especially Social Democrats, that the nuclear rearming would decrease chances for reunification of the entire German State. The country was in a furor over the Rapacki and Kennan concepts with meetings being held, and petitions being circulated;<sup>14</sup> even though Adenauer was firmly against them. He said that he would "never, never agree to the Rapacki Plan."<sup>15</sup> Foreign Minister Heinrich von Brentano denounced the Kennan ideas as "senseless".<sup>16</sup> Wilhelm Grewe, Acting State Secretary in the Foreign Office said that he would not negotiate on the Rapacki Plan even if reunification were also on the agenda.<sup>17</sup> But the Social Democrats and even some members of the Christian Democratic Union were very stirred by the large amount of public support for the Rapacki Plan and for Kennan's ideas, but the Bundestag nonetheless gave Adenauer a vote of confidence on January 23, 1958;<sup>18</sup> and on March 25th it approved the nuclear rearming of West Germany by a vote of 275-161 with 26 abstentions.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>14</sup>"Polish Proposal Popular in West Germany," New York Times, February 9, 1958, p. 3E.

<sup>15</sup>"Hope vs Illusion," Newsweek, Vol. 51, February 10, 1958, p. 59.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid.

<sup>18</sup>"West German Bundestag Backs Adenauer," New York Times, January 24, 1958, p. 5.

<sup>19</sup>"West German Nuclear Rearming," New York Times, March 26, 1958, p. 10.

On the other hand, Field Marshall Harding, retired British Chief of the Imperial General Staff, said during a Bonn conference in March that the dangers of a military pull-back were actually less than the dangers in the existing situation.<sup>20</sup> This concurred with the position of the Social Democrats in West Germany. Fritz Erler, prominent spokesman for the Social Democrats, supported the Rapacki Plan, he said, because missiles that could overfly the zone made the bases in that zone meaningless; so therefore why not denuclearize in the hope of reducing tension.<sup>21</sup> Eric Ollenhauer, the Social Democratic leader, called the Plan a first step toward controlled disarmament; the socialist newspaper Neue Ruhr Zeitung said after Adenauer had rejected the Plan: "The only plan that might have checked the armament race has now been rebuffed most strongly."<sup>22</sup> When the Bundestag approved the issue of nuclear rearming Ollenhauer declared that his party would introduce a resolution asking that the issue of nuclear weapons be taken to the people in a referendum.<sup>23</sup> This was far more than mere opposition to the party in power; the Social Democrat position reflected a consistent view of nuclear arms and of West Germany's place in the power picture. They feared such weapons would

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<sup>20</sup>"Conference on Disengagement," New York Times, March 31, 1958, p. 45.

<sup>21</sup>Fritz Erler, "The Reunification of Germany and Security for Europe," World Politics, Vol. 10, April 1958, p. 371.

<sup>22</sup>"Adenauer Opposed on Nuclear Zone," New York Times, January 16, 1958, p. 6.

<sup>23</sup>"Ollenhauer to Request Referendum," New York Times, March 26, 1958, p. 10.

increase the separation between East and West Germany.<sup>24</sup> For this same reason they had initially opposed the formation of the Federal Republic.

However, the official position prevailed. Felix von Eckardt, West German Press Chief, summed up Adenauer's reaction. (1) The plan made no advance to reunification but asked a sacrifice by the West. (2) Western security would be harmed because the military parity would be destroyed. (3) The United States withdrawal from Central Europe would harm NATO. (4) Controls and inspection in the zone would be impossible to organize. (5) The pledge of the nuclear powers not to attack the zone was not a strong enough guarantee.<sup>25</sup> The rejection was made official by means of a note delivered to Warsaw on the 25th of February, 1958.<sup>26</sup>

In Great Britain the situation was somewhat similar, in that the Conservatives generally opposed Rapacki and Kennan, and the Labor Party was generally in favor of both. However, in Britain the Labor Party was much stronger than were the Social Democrats in Germany; this may account for the more moderate position officially taken in London. Back in December of 1957, Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd had stated in response to questions in the Commons that:

"In military reality the buffer zone concept is as outdated

<sup>24</sup>Fritz Erler, "The Reunification of Germany and Security for Europe," World Politics, Vol. 10, April 1958, p. 372.

<sup>25</sup>"Pros and Cons of Polish Proposal," New York Times, February 20, 1958, p. 4.

<sup>26</sup>"Bonn Rejects Polish Plan," New York Times, March 1, 1958, p. 3.

as the medieval moat. With long-range aircraft, and missiles with ranges of 150 miles or more<sup>27</sup> it is impossible to disengage in the sense that may have been possible in the age of conventional weapons. The choice is between a clearly defined line...and a no-man's land, into which it may be tempting to infiltrate, to try some kind of coup in the belief that undefended territory can be taken without risk of war. In present circumstances and on the present demarcation lines, to disengage might well lead to a greater insecurity and a greater risk of war."<sup>28</sup>

This position did not satisfy the Labor Party in the least. Back in April of 1957, a similar response of Macmillan to Bulganin's invitation to discuss the Eden Plan had not satisfied the Liberal Party either.

"Jo Grimond, leader of the Liberal party, pressed the Prime Minister to take up Mr. Bulganin's proposal for reopening discussion of the Eden Plan through ordinary diplomatic channels. The object, Mr. Grimond suggested, should be to ease tension in Eastern Europe and obtain withdrawal of Soviet troops from the satellite nations."<sup>29</sup>

A public opinion poll taken in early 1958 had registered 75% of the people questioned as being in favor of some sort of disengagement.<sup>30</sup> This did not imply that this high a percentage of people would vote against the Conservative Party; but the electorate was certainly

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<sup>27</sup>Mr. Lloyd is being quite conservative here. Just a few weeks after his Commons' remarks the New York Times (January 26, 1958, p. 3) carried a news article concerning the successful firing of the Snark missile which hit its target 5,000 miles away. These were already in service in the Strategic Air Command.

<sup>28</sup>"Neutral Zone," Time, Vol. 70, December 30, 1957, p. 22.

<sup>29</sup>"Macmillan Refuses to Discuss Eden Plan in Commons," New York Times, May 1, 1957, p. 6.

<sup>30</sup>"Hope vs Illusion," Newsweek, Vol. 51, February 10, 1958, p. 59.

being influenced by the advocates of disengagement. A very influential advocate was the British mathematician and pacifist, Lord Bertrand Russell. He wrote open letters to the New Statesman and the Nation<sup>31</sup> much like the letter he was asked to write for the liberal American journal, the New Republic, in which he attempted to make his view clear.

"A Neutralized Zone to be established in Central Europe comprising, as a minimum -- Germany, East and West -- Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. No alien armed forces, whether Russian or Western, to be allowed in the Zone. Each country in the Zone to be free to choose its own political and economic system and in particular, East and West Germany to be allowed to unite with whatever form of constitution they prefer. No State in the Neutralized Zone to conclude an alliance with any State outside the Zone. Germany to accept the Oder-Neisse frontier."<sup>32</sup>

Hugh Gaitskill, leader of the Labor Party, was very emphatic on this point, as was noted in Chapter Two.<sup>33</sup> The Labor position favored such a step as the Rapacki Plan as it favored the concept of disengagement suggested by George F. Kennan -- as bases for negotiation.<sup>34</sup>

<sup>31</sup>"Soviet Stake in a Divided Germany," New Republic, Vol. 139, March 17, 1958, p. 9.

<sup>32</sup>Bertrand Russell, "Bertrand Russell on Negotiations," New Republic, Vol. 138, January 27, 1958, p. 9.

<sup>33</sup>See page 21 this report.

<sup>34</sup>Even though Harold Wilson continues to support the Rapacki Plan and phased disengagement, a Labor victory at the polls does not mean that the British would adopt the Rapacki Plan as such. Wayland Young, a member of the Labor Party's disarmament committee and of the defense committee of the Assembly of the Western European Union, stated recently that the Polish proposals could form "part of an orderly process to minimum deterrent balance." (Wayland Young, "British Labour's Arms Plan," New Republic, Vol. 150, May 23, 1964, p. 14)

These factors of opposition might help to explain why the Conservative reaction seemed to leave room for negotiations. The reply to Bulganin's 1957 proposal which contained the Rapacki concept differed from the replies of the other allies in that it cautiously asked for more information on the Rapacki proposal, and on non-aggression pacts.<sup>35</sup> They evidently felt that the Rapacki Plan in its 1957 form was unacceptable, but saw it as a basis for discussion, as a means of reducing the tension in Central Europe.<sup>36</sup> But by February, 1958, the official reaction was a tentative rejection.<sup>37</sup>

Italy saw the denuclearizing idea as a threat to European security, even after Khrushchev promised Italian neutrality and other concessions if they would join the nuclear free belt. Foreign Minister Pella said: "The partial or total neutrality of the great part of Europe as proposed by Khrushchev would not facilitate but rather make more difficult and impossible the solution of Europe's security."<sup>38</sup> Premier Hansen of Denmark, however, recommended the Rapacki proposals for the attention and consideration of the West.<sup>39</sup> Albert Schweitzer called the Rapacki Plan a ray of

<sup>35</sup>"British Reply to Bulganin," New York Times, January 16, 1958, p. 12.

<sup>36</sup>"Gaitskill Backs Polish Plan," New York Times, January 13, 1958, p. 10.

<sup>37</sup>"British Reaction to Rapacki," New York Times, February 12, 1958, p. 13.

<sup>38</sup>"Italy Rejects Russ Bid," New York Times, March 31, 1958, p. 4.

<sup>39</sup>"Denmark Favors Polish Plan," New York Times, January 16, 1958, p. 12.



light.<sup>40</sup> However, the few voices approving the Plan could scarcely be heard.

The French reaction was quite definitely against the Plan. They were not hostile to the idea; but they pointed out that the original buffer zone concept of Anthony Eden had put the zone between a reunified Germany and the East, whereas the Rapacki zone ignored the division of Germany and would therefore tend to confirm the unhealthy situation in Central Europe.<sup>41</sup> Some, like Mendes France, former French Premier, favored the denuclearization concept as a useful experiment,<sup>42</sup> but the official reaction prevailed. The status quo in Germany and East Europe was not to be recognized in such a formal fashion,<sup>43</sup> nor was the potential removal of West Germany from NATO to be admitted.<sup>44</sup>

The reaction of the United States<sup>45</sup> was a definite rejection of the Polish Memorandum, February 14, 1958; even though, as in other countries, voices could be heard in opposition to the official position. The United States Department of State felt that the

<sup>40</sup>"Schweitzer Backs Nuclear Zone," New York Times, April 29, 1958, p. 14.

<sup>41</sup>"Premier Gaillard Revives Polish Plan," New York Times, January 15, 1958, p. 3.

<sup>42</sup>Hugh Gaitskill, Adlai Stevenson, Pierre Mendes France, "Three Opposition Leaders Discuss Russia and the West," New Republic, Vol. 139, March 24, 1958, p. 13.

<sup>43</sup>"France, NATO Reply to Rapacki Plan," New York Times, January 11, 1958, p. 7.

<sup>44</sup>"Text of Couve de Murville's Speech to French Assembly," New York Times, October 30, 1963, p. 14.

<sup>45</sup>See Appendix D for U.S. Reply to Polish Memorandum.

neutralization of Germany was a long-range goal of the Soviet Union.<sup>46</sup> This was opposed not simply because Dulles seemed against anything suggested by the Soviet Union, but also because Dulles, along with Eisenhower and Nixon, felt quite strongly that any attempt to isolate or neutralize a people as numerous, vital and vigorous as the Germans could only create another climate for a Hitler.<sup>47</sup> The Rapacki Plan was viewed as leading to that neutralization. At a news conference on January 10, 1958, Dulles was asked about the Rapacki proposal. He replied:

"...such a step would in practice be indistinguishable from an almost total neutralization of the area because, if it is not possible to have in the area modern weapons then it might be imprudent to maintain any forces in the area at all, because they would be in a very exposed condition."<sup>48</sup>

A second element in the U.S. position was that the Plan did not address itself to the political problems in the area; and in not so doing tended to perpetuate the existing division of Germany.<sup>49</sup> The same day that this position was announced by Lincoln White, State Department Press Officer, the New York Times carried an editorial on the subject in which there was complete agreement with the State Department reaction. The editorial maintained that one

<sup>46</sup>"Text of Dulles News Conference," New York Times, December 12, 1957, p. 4.

<sup>47</sup>"Rapacki Plan," editorial, New York Times, January 28, 1959, p. 30.

<sup>48</sup>"Text of Dulles Speech," New York Times, January 11, 1958, p. 6.

<sup>49</sup>"U.S. Reply to Polish Plan," New York Times, February 19, 1958, p. 5.

of the first results of the Plan would be the "formal recognition of the East German State as an equal partner in an international undertaking involving the West."<sup>50</sup> A third element in the U.S. reaction was that the Plan's adoption would seriously alter the existing balance of forces. In terms of conventional forces the Soviet Union had always been granted a preponderance; and the great equalizer was nuclear weapons, both strategic and tactical. It must be recalled at this point that the original Rapacki Plan was being considered here; not the disengagement of forces that was later to be incorporated into the Plan. The conventional armies of both sides were to remain as they were; the only difference being that there would be a prohibition of nuclear weapons in the area. Thus, the Plan was viewed by the State Department as extremely dangerous, because the conventional forces would be imbalanced heavily in favor of the Soviet Union.<sup>51</sup> As General Norstadt, NATO Commander, pointed out, the removal of nuclear weapons would destroy NATO's shield.<sup>52</sup> This was an understandable reaction, and one which Adam Rapacki should have foreseen. This reaction should not be confused with the debate in regard to total dependance on nuclear weapons that seemed a part of the Dulles' policy. Even those advocating the build-up of conventional or non-nuclear forces recognized the necessity

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<sup>50</sup>"The Polish Proposal," editorial, New York Times, February 19, 1958, p. 26.

<sup>51</sup>"U.S. Objects to Rapacki Plan," New York Times, February 7, 1958, p. 1.

<sup>52</sup>Ibid.

of nuclear weapons in Central Europe as the equalizer of strength.<sup>53</sup>

With the removal of nuclear weapons it was felt that a vacuum might be created into which the Soviet forces would be tempted.

Lincoln White summed this up when he said:

"This crucial element would depend merely upon the good faith of the powers having possession of nuclear weapons and would therefore be unenforceable." "This element would not appear to make any advance toward disarmament, but only underscore the need for broader disarmament measures as a guarantee of protection for any area."<sup>54</sup>

Belgium's Foreign Minister Spaak, later to become Secretary General of NATO, agreed. "How can a responsible statesman face his people with the proposition that their soldiers fight with outmoded weapons against an enemy with the most modern arms?"<sup>55</sup>

One of the most consistent objectors to this stand of the United States has been Hubert Humphrey, Senator from Minnesota, and Chairman (1957-1958) of the Disarmament Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations. He did not object in the sense that he actively supported either Rapacki or George F. Kennan; rather, like Rapacki, he sought a way out of the deadlock in disarmament by breaking up the total package of U.S. demands and negotiating on one item at a time. In his introduction to the

<sup>53</sup>For example see the report of the Foreign Policy Research Institute of the University of Pennsylvania prepared for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Quoted in New York Times, October 15, 1959, p. 4.

<sup>54</sup>"U.S. Reply to Polish Plan," New York Times, February 19, 1958, p. 5.

<sup>55</sup>"Our Atomic Defense," Newsweek, Vol. 49, May 13, 1957, p. 50.

Subcommittee's final report he stated:

"In its report of September 6, 1957, the subcommittee expressed the view that progress on disarmament 'can come gradually, a step at a time', and that 'it is a mistake to expect that the problem of disarmament can be solved in one sweeping overall agreement'. The subcommittee also concluded that 'if a first step disarmament agreement is to be realized it should be limited both as to armaments being curtailed and as to the amount of inspection to be included'."<sup>56</sup>

His position at the beginning therefore was one that merely advocated the consideration of these limited proposals as a beginning. This is visible in his speech to the Senate on February 4, 1958.<sup>57</sup> But as time passed, Senator Humphrey began to publicly advocate an attempt both at disengagement, and the removal of nuclear weapons from Central Europe.<sup>58</sup> He was very definitely not alone in this position; but he did not affect the State Department's total rejection of the Rapacki Plan, both in 1958 and in later years.

The reaction of the Western powers was thus against the Plan.

<sup>56</sup>U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Disarmament, Control and Reduction of Armaments, Report 2501, 85th Congress, 2nd Session, 1958, p. iii.

<sup>57</sup>"Speech of the Honorable Hubert H. Humphrey," Congressional Record, Vol. 104, Part 2, January 31-February 25, 1958, (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1958) February 4, 1958, pp. 1617, 1629.

<sup>58</sup>For example: "Humphrey Critical of Ike," New York Times, February 5, 1958, p. 1; "West German Nuclear Arms," Ibid., November 23, 1958, p. 42; "Mikoyan Pushes Rapacki Plan," Ibid., January 17, 1959, p. 3; "Humphrey Says U.S. Studying Rapacki Plan," Ibid., October 17, 1961, p. 33.

Besides the reasons given it was felt that inspection would be almost impossible since many nuclear weapons could be fired from conventional devices, or could be carried in a brief case. The Rapacki Plan tended to discriminate against West Germany, some felt, because she really gained nothing by joining the zone. The Rapacki proposal seemed doomed to a limbo of oblivion. Yet this was not the case.

## THE RAPACKI PLAN REFUSES TO DIE

On June 13, 1964, Soviet Premier Khrushchev left from Moscow on a trip through Scandinavia with a first stop at Copenhagen. While traveling, he was expected by the Associated Press "to plug for a ban on nuclear weapons in the countries he is visiting as well as central Europe." "As he tours Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, Khrushchev probably will try again to crack the North Atlantic Treaty Organization northern defense ring by asking the Scandinavian countries to join in turning the Baltic into a sea of peace."<sup>1</sup>

Obviously the Rapacki Plan did not fade away as a result either of Western rejections or the passing of time. The Plan remained influential in two respects. First, the proposal was a stimulus to other plans similar to Rapacki's and yet varying in one respect or another; second, the initial Plan was submitted repeatedly by the Soviet Union, Gomulka of Poland, and by the author himself. The reason basic to this continued activity lay primarily in the continued impasse in regard to both Central European security and general disarmament; almost the same impasse and situation which had motivated the original proposal. As time went on, the relaxation that occurred in both of the opposed blocs which made the possibility of war seem less inevitable did not reduce the possibility of the redevelopment of tension; the problem remained and would remain until

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Associated Press release, Kalamazoo Gazette, June 13, 1964, p.1. See also "Soviet Proposal For a Nuclear Free Zone in Scandinavia" as published in Izvestia, August 14, 1959, American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959, p. 1404.

the German question was solved and the opposed forces no longer faced each other across the slender line of demarcation. Berlin furnishes an excellent example of this. Even though an uneasy detente had developed, the situation in Berlin provoked many days of anxiety and still does today. The chief source of difficulty seems the very vulnerable and easily exploited access routes through East Germany. And as long as the German question remained unsettled, Poland must remain unsure of her borders, garrisoned with Soviet troops, and unable to play a more independent role in either world politics or trade. Again, as long as the problem remained, Central Europe had a potential for trouble. Since the large package proposals did not result in any progress, the emphasis in solutions increasingly was in the direction of small proposals like Rapacki's. Several suggestions were now heard in terms of modest proposals; influenced by the Rapacki Plan and by a desire for some sort of a beginning.

One of the first to publish such a response was Henry Reuss in June of 1958. (Mr. Reuss was a member of the House of Representatives from Wisconsin, and former deputy counsel for the Marshall Plan). By this time the Memorandum had been rejected by the United States and the direction of United States policy in regard to rearming West Germany with nuclear weapons continued unchanged. Eisenhower had proposed legislation that would permit the United States to share its secrets with its allies, as previously noted. Reuss felt that this was an ominous development because it increased the chances that any European war would be a nuclear war, it increased the number of fingers on the trigger; and it could not help but result in the Soviet Union feeling compelled to strengthen their



forces in Eastern Europe with a subsequent greater degree of control over the satellites. The West, he said, demands that the Russians pull out of East Europe with no guarantees. This is silly. Reuss, therefore, recommends mutual withdrawal of forces west of the Rhine and behind Russian borders, a guarantee of free elections in Germany, self-imposed arms limitations in Central Europe internally policed—with the possible prohibition of nuclear arms; a non-aggression pact against the zone; and a de-emphasis on nationalism in Central Europe in favor of regional political and economic federation.<sup>2</sup>

Reuss is not suggesting a totally demilitarized area; the national forces would remain for their own defense. If either side cheated, the situation would go back to what it was. In short, Reuss definitely felt that proposals like the Rapacki Plan deserved to be tried.<sup>3</sup>

Reuss' proposals seemed like an echo of Anthony Eden with a dash of Rapacki. The proposal of Selwyn Lloyd to the House of Commons merely echoed Eden. Lloyd suggested that Germany be united by free elections but that East Germany be left as a buffer zone; there would be ground and aerial inspection and arms limits for all countries having forces within the zone.<sup>4</sup> This plan was attacked by the Labor Party because in their words the proposals did not remove the cause of the tension; namely, the foreign forces in the area.<sup>5</sup>

A few months later United States Senator Mike Mansfield (D-Montana)

<sup>2</sup>Henry Reuss, "Breaking the Stalemate," Commonweal, Vol. 68, June 20, 1958, pp. 295-298.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid.

<sup>4</sup>"British New Plan," New York Times, December 5, 1958, p. 1.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid.

suggested that the German problem be solved by negotiations between the two German states under the United Nations supervision; or a United Nations force in Berlin to replace East and West military forces. If the negotiations failed the troops could always return. Secondly, he suggested that both Russia and the United States guarantee the existing borders of Central Europe. This would have legalized to a greater extent the Western territories of Poland. Thirdly, he urged that serious consideration be given to an arms limitation and a nuclear free zone in Europe as well as a thinning out of opposed forces and a pull-back from contact. He concluded:

"In short, Mr. President, it seems to me essential that our policy, NATO's policies, do not exclude a careful consideration of the Rapacki Proposal, the Eden Plan for a demilitarized zone in middle Europe or similar propositions in connection with the reunification of Germany."

As might be expected, Mansfield's suggestions received direct opposition from West Germany,<sup>7</sup> but they rated warm commendation from Khrushchev.<sup>8</sup> Senator Fulbright revealed his agreement with Mansfield when he said: "It seems to me, for example, if both were to move back an equal distance—however slight the difference—the possibility of war, especially accidental war, would be reduced."<sup>9</sup> Surprisingly, an editorial in

<sup>6</sup> "Mansfield Supports Zone Study," New York Times, February 13, 1959, p. 2.

<sup>7</sup> "West Germany Rejects Mansfield's Suggestions," New York Times, February 13, 1959, p. 11.

<sup>8</sup> "Soviet Leader Praises Mansfield," New York Times, March 17, 1959, p. 6.

<sup>9</sup> "Fulbright Backs Mansfield," New York Times, March 17, 1959, p. 18.

the New York Times agreed with Fulbright.<sup>10</sup> However, like Humphrey's suggestions these were largely ignored.

At about the same time as Mansfield, Macmillan was discussing the Eden Plan with Khrushchev. Both Adenauer and De Gaulle were very upset with Macmillan because he was speaking of a confederation of the two Germanies.<sup>11</sup> A month later Russia proposed disengagement and a limited force zone with inspection,<sup>12</sup> and British diplomats were suggesting that Macmillan's ideas of armed force limits and a limit on weapons be proposed at a foreign minister's conference with the Soviet Union.<sup>13</sup> Macmillan made it quite clear that he thought both the Rapacki Plan and Gaitskill's ideas were extremely dangerous<sup>14</sup> but the other Western leaders thought that he was negotiating on these plans. They converged on Macmillan with criticism even to the point of General Norstad appearing on television to voice criticism of the Prime Minister's position.<sup>15</sup> The Laborite Daily Mirror responded with the caustic remark: "If

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"Disengagement," editorial, New York Times, March 25, 1959, p. 34.

<sup>11</sup>"Bonn and Paris Oppose Macmillan," New York Times, February 7, 1959, p. 5.

<sup>12</sup>"Soviets Push Disengagement," New York Times, March 30, 1959, p.1.

<sup>13</sup>"British Push Limited Disarmament," New York Times, April 1, 1959, p.1.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid.

General Norstadt wants to go into politics, he should resign and become a private citizen. Making peace is a task for statesmen, not for soldiers."<sup>16</sup> However, by the middle of April, Macmillan was again urging the nuclear rearming of West Germany, and he tied the other ideas to German reunification much as Eden had done years before.<sup>17</sup> The errant sheep was back in the fold, but he was not publically forgiven by Bonn until November of 1959.<sup>18</sup>

During April of 1959, another proposal was put forward, this time by Mendes France. He attempted to avoid Western objections in regard to an imbalance of forces. He suggested the creation of three zones in Central Europe. The first zone would lie on either side of the demarcation line, and it would be thirty miles wide. In this zone there would be total disarmament, policed and enforced by United Nation's forces. In the next zone, flanking the first zone on both sides, there would be only the national forces of the countries in the zone, armed only with conventional weapons. The third zone, again on both sides, would contain fully armed NATO and Warsaw Pact forces.<sup>19</sup> Jules Moch, a short time later, proposed a similar solution which had, however, circular zones beginning at Berlin.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

<sup>17</sup> "British Arms Plans," editorial, New York Times, April 11, 1959, p. 20.

<sup>18</sup> "Adenauer and Macmillan," New York Times, November 19, 1959, p. 1.

<sup>19</sup> "Mendes France Proposes Three Zones," New York Times, April 3, 1959, p. 3.

<sup>20</sup> "Jules Moch Arms Proposal," New York Times, April 10, 1959, p. 4.

The Irish Minister for External Affairs, Frank Aiken, proposed in September that a nuclear free zone in Central Europe be guaranteed by a United Nations police force, and that the opposed forces should withdraw from contact. Russian forces would retire behind the Russian border, and Western forces behind French borders.<sup>21</sup> Italian Foreign Minister Pella initially supported Aiken, but the support was withdrawn in December after a visit by Eisenhower to Rome.<sup>22</sup>

Harold Stassen, chief U. S. disarmament negotiator, suggested a Central European disarmament zone including a reunified Germany and small parts of France and the Soviet Union.<sup>23</sup> President Kekkonen of Finland proposed a Scandinavian nuclear free zone<sup>24</sup>, China's Chen Yi proposed such a zone for Asia<sup>25</sup>, and zones were suggested for Latin America and Africa.

Adam Rapacki was at least partly responsible for about ten other proposals like the ones mentioned above; differing in some respects and alike in others; but all favoring some sort of control on the armaments and/or forces in the Central European area. Perhaps the continuing influence of

<sup>21</sup>"U.N. Force For Zone," New York Times, September 24, 1959, p.1.

<sup>22</sup>"Eisenhower Holds Talks In Rome," New York Times, September 25, 1959, p. 28; December 6, 1959, p.34.

<sup>23</sup>"Harold Stassen Suggests Zone In Central Europe," April 12, 1959, p. 10.

<sup>24</sup>"Kekkonen Asks Scandinavian Nuclear Zone," New York Times, May 29, 1963, p.6.

<sup>25</sup>"Chen Yi Proposes Asian Nuclear Free Belt," New York Times, May 12, 1958, p. 4.

the Rapacki Plan was due to the situation which stimulated it, but it was also due to the repeated submissions and adaptations of the proposal. After the Memorandum was rejected, and the Geneva delegates rejected it again in October of 1958, Rapacki may have felt that without adapting his proposal there would be no change in the reaction.

At any rate he made an important change in Oslo, Norway, where he presented his ideas in a speech on October 31, 1958. He now did what he had said he should not do; that is, to tie the original proposal to something else, in this case—disengagement.

"If, as the situation seems to indicate the situation has undergone a change, we are ready to consider atomic disarmament in Central Europe combined with an approved reduction of conventional forces in this area. Under one condition: that this will not cause the deferring of positive decisions and extending nuclear armaments to other armies in the meantime, which should be prevented as soon as possible.<sup>26</sup>

Basically his idea was to divide the enlarged proposal into two stages. The first phase consisted of a zonal ban on the production of nuclear weapons, on the building of nuclear installations and the giving of nuclear weapons to other parties. The second step was to be a ban on all present nuclear installations in the zone after the conventional forces had been reduced to parity. Thus he sought to counter the Western objection that to denuclearize the area would create a serious military imbalance because of the preponderant Soviet conventional force.<sup>27</sup>

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"Rapacki Seeks Support," New York Times, November 1, 1958, p.1.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid.

But the new Rapacki Plan was never officially presented to the various governments and was never, therefore, ever officially answered. However, this revised proposal was quite likely a stimulus to Macmillan's wavering in 1959.

The next major resubmission of the proposal was by Gomulka, First Secretary of the Polish Communist Party. Speaking before the General Assembly on September 27, 1960, Gomulka repeated the two-staged, 1958, variation of the Rapacki Plan with this comment:

"The very reason for the failure of disarmament negotiations which have been conducted hitherto lays in the dangerous and fallacious theory that peace can be only an outcome of the so-called balance of terror between the East and the West, i.e., between socialism and capitalism. This theory determines the policy of the Western Powers. This concept is detrimental to peace— it results not in controlled disarmament but in the control of existing armaments by both sides." <sup>28</sup>

He went on to say that no matter how good inspection may be, the possibility of surprise attack is still present. Even though the United States says she will never attack, the possibility of error exists. If Rapacki's Plan had been adopted in 1958, Central Europe would now be relaxed rather than tense. If it were adopted now it would "reduce the risk of the outbreak of nuclear-missile war in this sensitive area and consequently, also, the danger of the use of such weapons of mass destruction on a global scale."<sup>29</sup> Back in Warsaw the following month, Gomulka challenged the West to show its sincerity by accepting the Rapacki Plan as a

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<sup>28</sup>W. Gomulka, "Peaceful Coexistence," Official Records: General Assembly, 15th Session 874th Plenary Meeting, November, 1960, p. 161.

<sup>29</sup>  
Ibid., p. 161

basis for negotiation. He asked Adenauer to permit a plebiscite in West Germany to let the people vote on the issue;<sup>30</sup> obviously confident that the vote would favor negotiating the Plan.

This proposal, too, was unconditionally rejected by the United States. This was after Rapacki presented his full plan again to the Disarmament Conference in Geneva in March of 1962. This rejection by the United States was almost automatic by now. Max Frankel, New York Times Washington correspondent paraphrased Dean Rusk's comment:

"But all the thinking here appears to be based on the theory that the admittedly undesirable confrontation of Communist and Western forces in Europe is nonetheless preferable to the creation of a military or political 'vacuum'."<sup>31</sup>

The Poles had a difficult time understanding why the proposal was rejected. It seemed to them that Washington did not even study the proposal but just automatically rejected it.<sup>32</sup>

The advocates of the Rapacki Plan were still not discouraged. During the year 1963 the proposal was repeatedly submitted and rejected; and for a time it was tied to the Test Ban Treaty. But to no avail. The United States remained adamant—no troop or weapons withdrawal from Central Europe.

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"Gomulka Challenges West With Rapacki Plan," New York Times, October 22, 1960, p.2.

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Max Frankel, "Rusk Opposes Disengagement," New York Times, October 29, 1961, p. 3.

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"Polish Press Scores U. S. Stand," New York Times, April 6, 1962, p. 1.



Gomulka tried again on January 19, 1964. He advocated a non-aggression pact, the formation of regional security zones outside Central Europe where in nuclear weapons could be banned, a general disarmament agreement, better trade relations; and significantly a freeze on nuclear weapons in Central Europe. This freeze he regarded as an extension rather than a replacement of the Rapacki Plan.<sup>33</sup> The idea of the nuclear freeze was represented by Rapacki as an attempt to get around Western objections in regard to a military disadvantage by permitting forces in Central Europe to maintain present levels of nuclear weapons.<sup>34</sup> Paul Underwood, Times correspondent in Warsaw, said that Rapacki avoided the question of the possible effect of the freeze on the proposed multi-national polaris fleet, but that informed sources had stated that the fleet would be banned.<sup>35</sup> Nonetheless, the freeze idea was made a formal proposal and was published in the United States on March 6, 1964.<sup>36</sup>

This is the current form of the Rapacki Plan and this, too, has been initially rejected by the West but not as strongly as before. William Foster, Director of U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, saw the freeze plan as a most promising area for agreement, linking it

<sup>33</sup> "New Polish Plan," New York Times, January 19, 1964, p. 20.

<sup>34</sup> "Freeze Plan," New York Times, March 1, 1964, p. 2.

<sup>35</sup> "Text of Polish Freeze Proposal," New York Times, March 6, 1964, p. 2.

<sup>36</sup> See Appendix C for complete text of the proposal.

to President Johnson's message in January of 1964.<sup>37</sup> Secretary of State Rusk foresaw some difficulties and wanted to discuss it with the other Western powers. The final reaction is not as yet complete. The Rapacki Plan is, thus, far from dead. The proposal began as a paragraph in a speech, was later expanded, and then expanded again, before it contracted to the modest proposal of today. The Rapacki Plan has adapted—the West really has not.

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"U.S. to Study Freeze," New York Times, March 7, 1964. President Johnson's message was to the Geneva Conference; "...let us agree: (a) That nuclear weapons not be transferred into the national control of states which do not now control them." (New York Times, January 22, 1964, p. 4.)

## CONCLUSION

The Rapacki proposal made initially in the United Nations General Assembly on October 2, 1957, was a proposal to remove all nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery from the countries of West Germany, East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. It was a proposal that arose out of the post-war division of Europe into two opposed groups facing each other in Central Europe; out of the deadlock between the great powers in terms of both European security and general disarmament; and it flowed out of the context of specific proposals that had been made before. The Eden Plan in 1955 was a very definite forerunner of the Polish proposal. Rapacki was not the only person who authored a simple beginning to a complex problem. The failure of package diplomacy in disarmament negotiations had resulted in the voices of several people being raised in defense of a first small step. The voice of George F. Kennan was one such voice, as was that of Hugh Gaitskill, and Nikolai Bulganin.

But the initial proposal was not accepted by the West. The reasons for the rejection were that the adoption of the proposal would tend to weaken NATO and/or Western defenses generally, while the Soviet strength would not really be affected. The resulting imbalance would be prejudicial to the West. Rapacki sought to counter these objections by including in his proposal the concept advocated by Kennan, Gaitskill, and others; namely, the reduction

in conventional arms and armed forces. Rapacki was still seeking the simple first step, but in view of Western obdurance added the disengagement idea. This, too, was rejected by the West for very similar reasons. Even if the conventional forces were reduced to parity, the Soviet Union was very much closer to the area of Central Europe than was the United States; and opinion in the U.S. was that a withdrawal of forces from West Germany would result in a withdrawal from Europe. This, in turn, seemed like a betrayal of trust to Western Europe. The repeated rejections forced a retreat in the Rapacki concept. Beginning with the removal of all atomic weapons from a specific area, then expanding the idea to include conventional arms and forces; Rapacki contracted the proposal in March of 1964 to refer only to a freeze of existing armaments. This was also rejected.

If there is any single thread running through the brief history of the Rapacki Plan that thread is without doubt Germany. In particular it is West Germany that provided some of the strongest motivation for the Plan, both for the original suggestion and for the repeated submissions and variations. West Germany also provided the single most important cause of the Western rejection of the Plan. As was seen, this primacy of West Germany is not just because West Germany is the locale of the confrontation of forces, but also because West Germany is intrinsically bound up with Polish security, and with the foreign policy of the United States.

The Position of the United States in response to the Soviet threat that developed after the war slowly grew into a policy called

containment. Wherever any Communist aggression was experienced, the policy implied Western resistance. The concentrated effort was intended, very simply, to hold Communism from further territorial gains. The policy was not always successful on a global scale, but in Central Europe it was successful. It may perhaps be argued that Russia contributed to this success of the containment policy because she already controlled as much territory as she could handle; but at any rate the policy of the United States, as exemplified by Secretary of State Dulles from 1952-1959, was a rigid enforcement of the containment concept by means of poised defenses and global alliances with other nations.

This rigid policy was, of course, reflected in the disarmament negotiations. The United States, as well as the Soviet Union, very often proposed mutually unacceptable plans for disarmament in the sense that very little room was ever left for compromise at the conference tables. To compromise was considered a sign of weakness by both sides. Both seemed to be seeking maximum security for themselves without much consideration for the opposite number. A very often repeated proposal of the Soviet Union, for example, was that America must remove her foreign bases from around Russia. This sort of withdrawal was understood in the United States as a direct threat to American defense capability. On the other hand, John Foster Dulles stated in 1957: "We seek collective security so that the smaller and weaker nations cannot be attacked and overrun one by one, and the United States in the end, left isolated and

encircled by overwhelming hostile forces."<sup>1</sup> Both sides here seem to be asking the same thing for themselves. This, moreover, is a reflection of the entire disarmament movement. There seems to have been a complete inability to see any good in the other group's proposal. Even if a member of the Western Alliance conceived the plan, if it in any way resembled something the Russians had suggested it was considered falling into a Soviet trap. This was the substance of the criticism Mr. Macmillan enjoyed from Bonn and Washington in 1959 when he flirted with the idea of zonal troop reduction and arms control.

There is rather an obvious question here — was either side sincere in their efforts to negotiate disarmament? Were the pronouncements of sincerity by the State Department and/or by the Russians merely intended for their influence on public opinion? The answer to this question must, of necessity, be speculation. But an affirmative answer to the question has been suggested by reputable people. Hugh Gaitskill charged the West with continual prevarication in the handling of Soviet proposals — the West called them all propaganda and did nothing about them.<sup>2</sup> James Reston of the New York Times suggested insincerity when he wrote: "Problem number one is how to keep our promise to negotiate, made at the recent NATO meeting in Paris, without

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<sup>1</sup>"Text of Dulles News Conference," New York Times, July 22, 1957, p. 6.

<sup>2</sup>"Gaitskill Scores West on Disarmament," New York Times, January 27, 1958, p. 8.

risking the possibility of stopping the arms race at a point highly favorable to the Soviet Union."<sup>3</sup> Robert Wolff, Professor of Philosophy at Harvard, wrote: "But Marx was no fool, and were he alive today he would no doubt amend his dictum to read: capitalism thrives on the preparation for war, whether that war is fought or not. Can we so confidently deny this charge? I wonder."<sup>4</sup> Dr. Inglis, Senior Physicist at the Argonne National Laboratory, stated that it is difficult to tell in either the Russian or American proposals whether there is sincerity or merely a desire to look purer. He felt the latter intention prevailed more than the former.<sup>5</sup> Further substantiation for this position could be sought in the numerous references in reputable newspapers to the fact that the United States is either behind, is gaining, or is dropping back in the propaganda war; or that the U.S. position of leadership in the world is being challenged by a certain disarmament proposal.

Henry Kissinger tried to explain this by making the point that this is not a legitimate world order but a revolutionary one. A legitimate world order is one in which all the great powers accept the international order; whereas a revolutionary world order is a system containing a power or powers which refuses to accept either

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<sup>3</sup>James Reston, "Conference Preparations," New York Times, January 5, 1958, p. 8.

<sup>4</sup>"Disarmament," letter, New York Times, September 25, 1959, p. 28.

<sup>5</sup>Dr. Inglis, "Arms Control Effort Buried in State," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Vol. 13, May 1957, p. 174.

the arrangements of the settlement or the domestic structure of other states. Diplomacy, he said, has a difficult function in a revolutionary world order. In a legitimate order diplomacy seeks to compromise disagreements on the basis of a tacit agreement to agree. But in a revolutionary order diplomacy has tactical significance -- to prepare one's position for the next test of strength. In a legitimate society negotiations seek to bridge differences, to persuade by reason, and to compromise. But in a revolutionary order negotiations are still possible, but the diplomats cannot persuade -- different languages are spoken. Diplomatic conferences become elaborate stage plays which seek to attach the uncommitted to one of the contender's views.<sup>6</sup>

What merit is there in this speculation? The point is that even if Adam Rapacki was as sincere as Sidney Gruson, New York Times correspondent, said he was<sup>7</sup>, his proposal may not so much have entered an arena of negotiation but a stage on which positions were determined beforehand, by the course of history up to that point. Part of that history was the deadlock in terms of the division of Germany. Both sides seemed unable to do anything other than attempt to incorporate their side of the defeated state into their own respective coalitions. For this reason, Fritz Erler, felt that one should blame the West as well as the East for the

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<sup>6</sup>Henry Kissinger, "Reflections on American Diplomacy," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 35, October 1956, p. 37.

<sup>7</sup>Sidney Gruson, "Rapacki Pushes Plan," New York Times, January 6, 1958, p. 12.



continuing division of Germany.

"The cruel fact is that both East and West, in basing their policies upon the integration of their respective parts of Germany into their power systems, further consolidate the partition of Germany and destroy any hope for a peaceful reunification."<sup>8</sup>

And a result of this, he continued, will be that "NATO will become a symbol of the partition of the country instead of a symbol of common defense."<sup>9</sup> This position was considered Soviet propaganda by John Reshetar;<sup>10</sup> but an objective view of the matter suggests that there is at least the possibility that the Russians were not alone responsible for the wall in Berlin. Each side blames the other: who is correct? Neither? Both? Who is telling the truth? Perhaps an example will somewhat clarify the confusion. Konrad Adenauer seems to be the pivotal figure throughout this whole controversy. Part of a 1962 article written by him follows.

"In the disarmament conference which has been underway in Geneva since March 14th of this year, the United States has submitted extremely far-reaching and well considered disarmament plans which we emphatically support. The Soviet proposals, on the other hand, again and again aim at shifting the military equilibrium in favor of the Eastern bloc. This applies in particular to the plans for regional disarmament and so-called aton-free zones in Central Europe, by which it is intended to weaken European defense; as well as to the Soviet refusal to agree to any kind of control, for fear that inspection would remove the secrecy of the closed Soviet system in contrast to the open system of the free world. It seems that the Soviets again wish to use the present disarmament conference only as a vehicle for propaganda.

"Despite all disappointments, the efforts of the

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<sup>8</sup>Fritz Erler, "The Reunification of Germany and Security for Europe," World Politics, Vol. 10, April 1958, p. 366.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid.

<sup>10</sup>U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Disarmament, Control and Reduction of Armaments, Report 2501, Reply to questionnaire, p. 436.

Western powers to find ways and means leading to disarmament must be energetically continued. Our hope must be that consistency on the part of the West in the disarmament field will convince the Soviets of the necessity to enter into serious negotiations which take into account the interests of both sides."<sup>11</sup>

This speech tends to support Kissinger's thesis that the various sides speak different languages. Adenauer is all for one side, and all against the other. He said that the regional proposals would shift military equilibrium to the Soviet side, but would not the Soviets be pulling out of Eastern Europe? The former Chancellor goes on to state that the Soviets refuse any kind of control. This is simply not true. There are repeated instances of Soviet initiative in terms of control and inspection; proposals to which the West did not agree. How can Dr. Adenauer expect the inflexibility of the West to create a climate for Soviet compromise? A compromise that takes into account the interests of both sides is a desirable commodity but it cannot come from only one side. Walter Lippman says, "Each side knows that its asking price is impossible. The reason why both sides continue to ask an impossible price is that both of them think that a divided Germany may be better than any united Germany that can be brought into existence."<sup>12</sup>

If there is any truth at all to these allegations, then the Rapacki Plan did not have a chance from the beginning. The Polish proposal would have altered the existing situation in Central

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<sup>11</sup>Konrad Adenauer, "The German Problem, A World Problem," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 41, October 1962, p. 64.

<sup>12</sup>Walter Lippmann, "The German Question," Newsweek, Vol. 62, September 2, 1963, p. 15.

Europe, it would have changed the developing situation in terms of West German nuclear arms; and for these reasons could not have been accepted. Consider the specific objections. First, the proposal would tend to perpetuate the division of Germany. But other attempts at negotiations have not resulted in German unity either. One could suggest that the formation of the West German Government in 1949, or the inclusion of Germany in NATO in 1954, or the desire to rearm West Germany with nuclear arms in 1957 also contributed to the division of the two German States. Secondly, the area involved is too small. Basic to this objection is the fact that missiles could overfly such a zone easily. However, the Rapacki Plan never was meant as a general disarmament measure. but as a beginning for negotiations. If ballistic missiles can overfly the zone, on the other hand, one could construct an argument maintaining the position that in that case the adoption of the zone would not involve any real shift in world power alignments. Thirdly, the proposal is slanted in favor of the East. The suggestion is coming from Communist Poland — it is not suprising that it might be so slanted. But is the Plan that advantageous to the Soviet Union? Russia would withdraw more than twice the distance the West would. Russia would withdraw from an area of 457,000 square kilometers, whereas the West would withdraw from an area of only 248,000 square kilometers. What seems behind this objection, however, is the assumption that if American troops moved out of West Germany there would be no room for them on the continent; they would have to be moved all the way across the Atlantic. Even

if this were true it need not lead again to American isolationism. Modern weapons technology has made much of conventional warfare obsolete anyway. Think only of the Polaris fleet, air bases in Turkey, Greece, Britain, Portugal, and in the Arctic area. The point that must be made here, however, is that the assumption of complete American withdrawal if not in West Germany is not based in fact. No one, besides Khrushchev, advocated a complete withdrawal; it was merely assumed by men such as Paul Henri Spaak and General Norstadt.

Certainly the West should not desert Europe, or leave West Germany helpless in the face of threats to her survival. But the Rapack Plan did not ask this of America; and it need not lead to that result. It is one of America's goals to get the Soviet troops out of Eastern Europe. It was to a great extent America's lack of knowledge that assisted the Soviet forces in attaining these forward positions. What other way to alter the situation than by limited arms reduction coupled with reciprocal troop withdrawal? If one adds conventional armed force reduction with inspection the Western objections become vaporous. Of course this is what the Soviets wanted; it is what Poland wanted, too. But this fact does not make the Polish proposal bad for the U.S. There is more than black and white — there is gray in between; and the failure to recognize this is an admission of bankruptcy in foreign policy.

Suppose the United States and the other Western nations, including West Germany, had been interested enough in 1958 to have

negotiated Rapacki's proposals. What might have been the consequences in such a hypothetical situation?

1) All nuclear weapons, systems of delivery, stockpiles, and the potential for production of nuclear weapons would have been removed from West Germany. This, of course, would mean a complete alteration in the forward planning of NATO; for the nuclear shield concept would no longer be applicable to the situation.

2) Russia would have been required to remove nuclear weapons and whatever pertained thereto from her forces in the three satellite states. Thus the change in planning would have been an equal disadvantage to both sides.

3) The Western nations would now be at a serious disadvantage in regard to conventional forces. There would be an imbalance in favor of Russia. Therefore, a major element in the negotiations would have been the withdrawal of conventional forces and equipment from the nuclear free zone; and an insistence on the part of the West that the remaining national forces be reduced to parity as soon as this could be arranged. The removal of nuclear weapons would not take place until such parity had been realized.

4) Verification of this withdrawal and reduction as well as the complete removal of nuclear devices would be placed in the hands of a United Nations special force reporting directly to the Disarmament Commission of the U.N. This special force would be composed of an equal number of members of both sides; as well as a number of representatives from uncommitted nations. Both Russia and the United States would have the right of continuous aerial observation of the zone in addition to the special force control.

5) A settlement of the German problem of reunification by means of a confederation of German delegates chosen on the basis of population representation from both East and West Germany's combined population. Such an arrangement would benefit West Germany and would thus be a strong test of how much the Russians were willing to compromise in order to get the non-nuclear zone. The reunification would be in three stages. First, a constitutional convention attended by the chosen representatives; secondly, ratification by both East and West German electorates in supervised elections; and thirdly, free elections to form a national government of Germany. The resultant State would not be permitted to become a part of any alliance; but rather would be the recipient of guarantees from all of the major powers.

6) Russian forces behind Russian borders, and Western armies west of Germany would be required to reduce in strength so that within one year from the date of the treaty reasonable parity would exist. Since both sides would still possess nuclear weapons, absolute parity would not be essential. There is not parity now in conventional forces, but it is the Western view that a balance is achieved by nuclear weapons equality.

7) Efforts to achieve general disarmament agreements would continue as before. Until such agreements could be worked out both sides would retain their ability to destroy the other.

Is this kind of a hypothetical situation too idealistic for consideration? The author submits that it is not. Much of the above has already been proposed by the Soviet Union; her greatest area of compromise would be in permitting a German confederation

in which East Germany would not be of equal status with West Germany. The greatest area of compromise for the West would be to accept the idea of the buffer zone safeguards as being sufficient. The hypothesis to be proven must be attempted. Such an attempt is clearly preferable to the balance of terror that existed then, and still exists today.

The concept of preserving the peace through a balance of terror, Denis Healey said, rests on two assumptions. First, that no one will take the first step toward war knowing the consequences. However, Hungary and Suez have both demonstrated the futility of this assumption. Neither Russia nor America, Mr. Healey said, has sufficient control over events on its own side of the Iron Curtain to rule out the possibility of such a local conflict. The second assumption is that America will massively respond to any major Russian attack. This assumption has steadily dwindled ever since Russia developed the potential to completely destroy the United States.<sup>13</sup>

One need not agree with Mr. Healey's analysis, but little disagreement can be possible that the world is today quite different from the bi-polar world that existed immediately after the war. No longer is either Russia or America the free agent. There is France, and there is China; with many smaller centers of power that one must consider. The Communist bloc is loosening with the

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<sup>13</sup>Denis Healey, "The Case for Disengagement," New Republic, Vol. 139, March 17, 1958, p. 11.

with the increased trade relations that have been made with the Western nations. In the midst of this polycentrism an absolute refusal on the part of the United States to consider limited proposals, as Kennan pointed out, can only result in forcing a unity upon the Communist bloc that would not be there otherwise.<sup>14</sup>

However, there are signs of the possibilities of change. The test ban treaty, for example, provides a basis for hope in that it reveals compromise by both sides: The United States in agreeing to a limited ban without inspection, and the Soviet Union in dropping the non-aggression pact that was originally attached. The simultaneous reduction in fissionable material, and the destruction of obsolete bombers are steps that would seem to reduce tension between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. In West Germany the five per cent clause, time, and prosperity have reduced the bloc effect of the refugee vote. Erhart has replaced Adenauer. Khrushchev, because of his troubles with China may be more willing to make concessions to the West. Agreement on the Rapacki Plan does seem to be more possible now than at any time before. The possibilities inherent in the proposal include not only a reducing of tension; but the potential of the freer development of the satellite states towards institutions of their own, a practical solution to the German question, and a beginning of a type of solution of world problems that is both peaceful and honorable.

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<sup>14</sup>George F. Kennan, "Polycentrism and Western Policy," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 42, January 1964, p. 182.



Perhaps the Rapacki Plan will not work. Perhaps after it is attempted, the situation will revert to what it is today. Perhaps. Would anything be lost? We will never know until we try.

# APPENDIX A

## TROOP CONCENTRATION<sup>1</sup>

### EUROPE

#### NATO

#### WARSAW PACT

Benelux countries...250,000  
 Denmark..... 40,000  
 France  
   France.....470,000  
   United States.... 50,000  
 Great Britain  
   Great Britain....580,000  
   United States.... 50,000  
 Greece.....175,000  
 Italy  
   Italy.....350,000  
   United States.... 10,000  
 Morocco...  
   United States.... 10,000  
 Norway..... 30,000  
 Pakistan.....160,000  
 Portugal..... 60,000  
 Spain  
   United States.... 3,000  
 Turkey.....400,000  
 West Germany  
   German.....130,000  
   United States....200,000  
   Great Britain.... 48,000  
   France..... 30,000  
   NATO (General)...140,000  
                     3,186,000

Albania..... 35,000  
 Bulgaria.....160,000  
 Czechoslovakia.....200,000  
 East Germany  
   German.....150,000  
   Soviet.....400,000  
 Hungary  
   Hungary..... 90,000  
   Soviet..... 60,000  
 Poland  
   Poland.....310,000  
   Soviet..... 30,000  
 Rumania  
   Rumania.....250,000  
   Soviet..... 30,000  
 Russia.....1,250,000  
                     2,865,000

#### RAPACKI PLAN AREA

NATO.....548,000

Warsaw Pact.....1,080,000

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<sup>1</sup>  
New York Times, March 22, 1959, page 5E.

## APPENDIX B

### TEXT OF POLISH NOTE AND MEMORANDUM<sup>1</sup>

FEBRUARY 14, 1957

"I wish to refer to the conversation which I had on December 9, 1957, with the Charge d' Affaires of the Embassy of the United States in Warsaw. In this conversation I have presented the position of the Polish Government in respect to the tendencies to make the nuclear armaments in Europe universal and particularly towards the acceleration of armaments in Western Germany. The threat of further complications, primarily in Central Europe, where the opposing military groupings come into a direct contact and the apparent danger of an increase in the international tension have prompted the Polish Government to initiate at that time direct discussions through diplomatic channels on the Polish proposal submitted to the United Nations General Assembly on October 2, 1957, concerning the establishment of a denuclearized zone in Central Europe.

"This proposal has evoked a wide interest in government and political circles as well as in the broad strata of public opinion in many countries.

"Taking into account a number of opinions expressed in declarations made in connection with the Polish proposal and with the view to facilitate negotiations, the Polish Government has resolved to present a more detailed elaboration of its proposal. This finds its expression in the attached memorandum which is simultaneously being transmitted by the Polish Government to the governments of France, Great Britain, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as well as to the governments of other interested countries.

"The Polish Government is conscious of the fact that the solution of the problem of disarmament on a world-wide scale requires, first of all, negotiations among the great powers and other countries concerned. Therefore, the Polish Government supports the proposal of the U.S.S.R. Government concerning a meeting on the highest level of leading statesmen with the participation of heads of governments. Such a meeting could also result in reaching an agreement on the question of the establishment of a denuclearized zone in Central Europe, should an agreement among the countries concerned not be reached in the meantime. In any event the initiation at present of discussions on the question of a denuclearized zone in Central Europe would contribute to a successful course of the above mentioned meeting.

"The Polish Government expresses the hope that the Government of the United States will study the attached memorandum and that the proposals contained in it will meet with the understanding of the

Government of the United States. The Polish Government on its part would be prepared to continue the exchange of views on this problem with the Government of the United States.

# MEMORANDUM

"On October 2, 1957, the Government of the Polish People's Republic presented to the General Assembly of the United Nations a proposal concerning the establishment of a denuclearized zone in Central Europe. The governments of Czechoslovakia and of the German Democratic Republic declared their readiness to accede to that zone.

"The Government of the Polish People's Republic proceeded with the conviction that the establishment of the proposed denuclearized zone could lead to an improvement in the international atmosphere and facilitate broader discussions on disarmament as well as the solution of other controversial internal issues, while the continuation of nuclear armaments and making them universal could only lead to a further solidifying of the division of Europe into opposing blocks and to a further complication of this situation, especially in Central Europe.

"In December, 1957 the Government of the Polish People's Republic renewed its proposal through diplomatic channels.

"Considering the wide repercussions which the Polish initiative has evoked and taking into account the propositions emerging from the discussion which has developed on this proposal, the Government of the Polish People's Republic hereby presents a more detailed elaboration of its proposal, which may facilitate the opening of negotiations and reaching of an agreement on this subject.

"I. The proposed zones should include the territory of: Poland, Czechoclovakia, German Democratic Republic and German Federal Republic. In this territory nuclear weapons would neither be manufactured nor stockpiled, the equipment and installations designed for their servicing would not be located there; the use of nuclear weapons against the territory of this zone would be prohibited.

"II. The contents of the obligations arising from the establishment of the denuclearized zone would be based upon the following premises:

"1. The states included in this zone would undertake the obligation not to manufacture, maintain nor import for their own use and not to permit the location on their territories of nuclear weapons of any type, as well as not to install nor to admit to their territories of installations and equipment designed for servicing nuclear weapons, including missiles' launching equipment.

"2. The four powers (France, United States, Great Britain, and U.S.S.R.) would undertake the following obligations:

"(A) Not to maintain nuclear weapons in the armaments of their forces stationed on the territories of states included in this zone; neither to maintain nor to install on the territories of these states

any installations or equipment designed for servicing nuclear weapons, including missiles' launching equipment.

"(B) Not to transfer in any manner and under any reason whatsoever, nuclear weapons nor installations and equipment designed for servicing nuclear weapons—to governments or other organs in this area.

"3. The power which have at their disposal nuclear weapons should undertake the obligation not to use these weapons against the territory of the zone or against any targets situated in this zone.

Thus the powers would undertake the obligation to respect the status of the zone as an area in which there should be no nuclear weapons and against which nuclear weapons should not be used.

"4. Other states, whose forces are stationed on the territory of any state included in the zone, would also undertake the obligation not to maintain nuclear weapons in the armaments of these forces and not to transfer such weapons to governments or to other organs in this area. Neither will they install equipment or installations designed for the servicing of nuclear weapons, including missiles' launching equipment, on the territories of states in the zone nor will they transfer them to governments or other organs in this area.

"The manner and procedure for the implementation of these obligations could be the subject of detailed mutual stipulations.

"III In order to ensure the effectiveness and implementation of the obligations contained in Part II, paragraphs 1-2 and 4, the states concerned would undertake to create a system of broad and effective control in the area of the proposed zone and submit themselves to its functioning.

"1. This system could comprise ground as well as aerial control. Adequate control posts, with rights and possibilities of action which would ensure the effectiveness of inspection, could also be established.

"The details and forms of the implementation of control can be agreed upon on the basis of the experience acquired up to the present time in this field, as well as on the basis of proposals submitted by various states in the course of the disarmament negotiations, in the form and to the extent in which they can be adapted to the area of the zone.

"The system of control established for the denuclearized zone could provide useful experience for the realization of broader disarmament agreement.

"2. For the purpose of supervising the implementation of the proposed obligations an adequate control machinery should be established. There could participate in it, for example, representatives appointed/ not excluding additional personal appointments/ by organs of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and of the Warsaw Treaty. Nationals or representatives of states, which do not belong to any military grouping in Europe, could also participate in it.

"The procedure of the establishment, operation and reporting of the control organs can be the subject of further mutual stipulations.

"IV The most simple form of embodying the obligations of states included in the zone would be the conclusion of an appropriate international convention. To avoid, however, implications, which some states might find in such a solution, it can be arranged that:

"1. These obligations be embodied in the form of four unilateral

declarations, bearing the character of an international obligation deposited with a mutually agreed upon depository state.

"2. The obligations of great powers be embodied in the form of a mutual document or unilateral declaration/ as mentioned above in paragraph 1/;

"3. The obligations of other states, whose armed forces are stationed in the area of the zone, be embodied in the form of unilateral declarations/ as mentioned above in paragraph 1/.

"On the basis of the above proposals the government of the Polish People's Republic suggests to initiate negotiations for the purpose of a further detailed elaboration of the plan for the establishment of the demuclearized zone, of the documents and guarantees related to it as well as of the means of implementation of the undertaken obligations.

"The government of the Polish People's Republic has reasons to state that acceptance of the proposal concerning the establishment of a demuclearized zone in Central Europe will facilitate the reaching of an agreement relating to the adequate reduction of conventional armaments and of foreign armed forces stationed on the territory of the states included in the zone."

## APPENDIX C

### TEXT OF RAPACKI FREEZE PROPOSAL<sup>1</sup>

"The Government of the Polish People's Republic has already on numerous occasions manifested its consistent desire in the search for solutions aimed at bringing about international detente and disarmament and lent its support to all constructive proposals designed to achieve this end. The reduction of international tensions and creation of conditions of security in Central Europe have always been and continue to be matters of particular concern to the Polish Government. This objective can and should be achieved above all by way of arresting the armaments race in this part of the world.

"With this in mind the Government of the Polish People's Republic presented some time ago a plan for the creation of a nuclear free zone in Europe which, as is known, aroused the interest of numerous states and of world public opinion. In the view of the Polish Government that plan continues to be fully topical.

"The Polish Government believes that there are at the present time suitable conditions for undertaking immediate measures the implementation of which could facilitate further steps leading to a detente, to a strengthening of security and to progress in the field of disarmament.

"Basing itself on these premises, the Government of the Polish People's Republic is submitting a proposal to freeze nuclear and thermonuclear armaments in Central Europe. The implementation of such a proposal would be of particular significance to the security both of Poland and all countries of this region as well as of the whole of Europe, since, while in no way affecting the existing relation of forces, it would contribute to the arrest of the nuclear armaments race.

"I The Polish Government proposes that the freezing of nuclear and thermonuclear armaments include in principle the territory of the Polish People's Republic, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, The German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany, with the respective territorial waters and airspace.

"II The freeze would apply to all kinds of nuclear and thermonuclear charges, irrespective of the means of their employment and delivery.

"III Parties maintaining armed forces in the area of the proposed freeze of armaments would undertake obligations not to produce, not to introduce or import, not to transfer to other parties in the area or to accept from other parties in the area the aforementioned nuclear and thermonuclear weapons.

"IV To insure the implementation of these obligations, an appropriate system of supervision and safeguards should be established.

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<sup>1</sup> New York Times, March 6, 1964, page 2.



"The supervision over the implementation of other obligation not to produce nuclear and thermonuclear weapons covered by the freeze would be exercised in plants which are or could be used for such production.

"To insure the implementation of other obligations control would be established to be exercised in accordance with an agreed procedure in proper frontier railway, road, waterway junctions, sea and air ports.

"The supervision and control could be exercised by mixed commissions composed of representatives of the Warsaw Pact and of NATO on a parity basis. Those commissions could be enlarged to include also representatives from other states. The composition, structure and procedure of the control organs will be the subject of detailed arrangement.

"Parties whose armed forces are stationed in the area of the armament freeze, and which have at their disposal nuclear and thermonuclear weapons would exchange at periodic meetings of their representatives all information and reports indispensable for the implementation of the obligations with regard to the freezing of nuclear and thermonuclear armaments.

"V Provisions relating to the implementation of the proposal submitted above should be embodied in appropriate documents.

"The Government of the Polish People's Republic is ready to enter into discussions and negotiations with the interested parties to reach an agreement on the implementation of these objectives.

"The Polish Government will give due attention to all constructive suggestions which would be in accordance with the objectives of the present proposal and would aim at the freezing of armaments in Central Europe.

"The Government of the Polish People's Republic expects a favorable attitude to the proposal submitted hereby."



## APPENDIX D

### TEXT OF U.S. REPLY TO POLISH NOTE ON RAPACKI PLAN<sup>1</sup>

May 3, 1958

"United States Ambassador to Poland, Jacob D. Beam delivered on May 3, the U.S. Government's reply to the Rapacki Plan proposals elaborated in the memorandum attached to the Polish Government's note of February 14. Ambassador Beam handed the U.S. note to Polish Deputy Foreign Minister Josef Winiewicz. The text of the U.S. reply is as follows:

"Excellency: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Mr. Rapacki's note of February 14, 1958, enclosing a memorandum elaborating on the Polish Government's proposals concerning the establishment of a demuclearized zone in Central Europe.

"Recognizing that the initiative of the Polish Government stems from a desire to contribute to the attainment of a stable and durable peace, my Government has given these proposals serious and careful consideration. On the basis of this study it has concluded that they are too limited in scope to reduce the danger of nuclear war or provide a dependable basis for the security of Europe. They neither deal with the essential question of the continued production of nuclear weapons by the present nuclear powers nor take into account the fact that present scientific techniques are not adequate to detect existing nuclear weapons. The proposed plan does not affect the central sources of power capable of launching a nuclear attack, and thus its effectiveness would be dependent on the good intentions of countries outside the area. The proposals overlook the central problems of European security because they provide no method for balance and equitable limitations of military capabilities and would perpetuate the basic cause of tension in Europe by accepting the continuation of the division of Germany.

"An agreement limited to the exclusion of nuclear weapons from the territory indicated by your Government without other types of limitation would, even if it were capable of being inspected, endanger the security of the Western European countries in view of the large and widely deployed military forces of the Soviet Union. Unless equipped with nuclear weapons, Western forces in Germany would find themselves

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<sup>1</sup>

Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 38, May 19, 1958, pp. 821-822.

under present circumstances at a great disadvantage to the numerically greater mass of Soviet troops stationed within easy distance of Western Europe which are, as the Soviet leaders made clear, being equipped with the most modern and destructive weapons, including missiles of all kinds.

"The considerations outlined above have caused the United States in association with other Western Powers to propose that nations stop producing material for nuclear weapons, cease testing with such weapons, and begin to reduce present stockpiles. The United States has further proposed broader areas of inspection against surprise attack, including an area in Europe, roughly from the United Kingdom to the Ural Mountains. We remain willing to do this. You will recall, moreover, that the Western nations offered at the London disarmament negotiations to discuss a more limited zone in Europe. With regard to missiles you will recall that over a year and a half ago the United States proposed that we begin to study the inspection and control needed to assure the exclusive peaceful use of outer space now threatened by the development of such devices as intercontinental and intermediate range ballistic missiles.

"The United States, in association with other Western Powers, has also proposed that a comprehensive and effective European security arrangement be established in conjunction with the reunification of Germany. The proposed arrangements would provide for limitations on both forces and armaments, measures for the prevention of surprise attack in the area, and assurances of reaction in the event of aggression.

"Your note speaks of the existence of opposing military groupings in Central Europe as being responsible for tensions in the area. It should not be necessary for me to recall that the present division of Europe stems primarily from the decision of the Soviet Union not to permit Eastern European nations to participate in the European Recovery Plan. Nor need I repeat the many assurances given as to the defensive character of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization which is reflected in its entire organizational and command structure. The entire history of its creation and development testify to this, though persistent efforts are made in some quarters to portray it otherwise.

"In the absence of effective arrangements either general or regional in character which would promote real security and in view of the present policies and armaments of the Soviet Union, the countries of Western Europe along with Canada and ourselves, joined in alliance with them, have no other recourse than to develop the required pattern of integrated NATO military strength and to utilize for defensive purposes modern developments in weapons and techniques.

"The views which I have presented above on behalf of my Government point out the basic reasons why the United States considers that the Polish Government's proposals for establishing a demuclearized zone in Central Europe would not serve to advance their expressed objectives. Nevertheless, the United States appreciates the initiative of the Polish Government in seeking a solution to these problems. It hopes that this exchange of correspondence will enable the Polish Government in seeking

a solution to these problems. It hopes that this exchange of correspondence will enable the Polish Government better to understand American proposals in the fields of European security and disarmament. I trust that the improved relations between Poland and the United States will serve as a basis for a better understanding between our two countries on these problems, as well as on other matters."

## APPENDIX E

### U.S. COMMENTS ON DEVELOPMENTS AT GENEVA DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE<sup>1</sup>

"Discussions concerning general and complete disarmament are continuing at the plenary meetings of the conference. Preliminary discussions are focusing on the objectives and principles of general and complete disarmament. What is needed soon is an exploration of essential substantive problems requiring agreement before the precise language of a comprehensive program on general and complete disarmament can be developed. The United States believes that such a concentration of effort would quickly take the conference to the heart of the issues which must be resolved and hopes that substantive debate may soon begin.

"A Committee of the Whole has been established by the conference to consider those partial disarmament measures which the various delegations might wish to submit. The United States attaches great importance to the work of the Committee. The United States has given clear evidence of its support for those measures which would increase confidence among the nations, facilitate the disarmament process and reduce the risks of war inherent in the present international situation. Agreement on an agenda has not been reached, with priority being given to proposals on the cessation of war propaganda. Other matters such as a cutoff of fissionable material production for use in weapons and reduction of the possibility of war by surprise attack, miscalculation, or failure of communication have also been put forward for consideration by this Committee.

"In connection with the agenda of this Committee, discussions have developed as to the attitude of the United States toward the proposals of the Polish Government which contemplate the establishment of nuclear free zones in Central Europe. While it is recognized that the proposals of the Polish Government, usually identified as the 'Rapacki plan', have been advanced from a desire to contribute to the maintenance of peace, careful study of these suggestions has led the United States to the conclusion that they would not help to resolve present difficulties.

"The United States, on the other hand, has proposed equitable measures to this end. These include arrangements for advance notification of military movements, such as transfers of large military units or the firing of missiles, the establishment of observation

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<sup>1</sup>"U.S. Comments on Developments at Geneva Disarmament Conference," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 42, April 23, 1962, pp. 664-665.

posts at important points within a country, the use of aerial and mobile inspection teams to improve protection against surprise attack, and the establishment of a commission to examine the technical problems involved in measures which could reduce the risks of war. Moreover, these measures proposed by the United States could be put into effect immediately without resulting in one-sided political and military advantages.

"The principal objections of the United States to the Rapacki plan, which purports to be a confidence-building measure, have been and remain: (1) that the measures envisaged do not address themselves to the nuclear weapons located in the Soviet Union, the use of which against Western Europe has been repeatedly threatened by Soviet spokesmen; (2) that the plan would therefore result in a serious military imbalance; (3) that consequently, while creating an illusion of progress, it would in reality endanger the peace of the world rather than contribute to maintaining it. The dangers to peace resulting from such an imbalance under present conditions have been clearly and repeatedly demonstrated by events within memory of all.

"The United States will continue its efforts to focus the attention of the Committee of the Whole on the proposals it has brought forward -- at the same time, it is prepared to give prompt and serious attention to the proposals and suggestions advanced by other conference members which could offer some hope of early agreement on concrete measures and which would, in turn, facilitate progress toward the overall objectives of the conference.

"One initial measure where agreement would do much to set the work of the conference on the road to success is a nuclear test ban treaty. On this subject, unfortunately, there has been no progress at Geneva because the Soviet Union has refused to accept even the concept of international inspection to monitor a test ban. The Soviet Union takes this position in opposition to general scientific opinion and contrary to views held by the Soviet Government itself since 1957. Nevertheless, the United States has not abandoned the hope that the Soviet Government will recognize that it is acting in defiance of the will of people everywhere and will return to its earlier position that international verification is necessary for a nuclear test ban agreement."

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