Order and Organization as Problems of Developing Political Systems: Ghana and Nigeria

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ORDER AND ORGANIZATION AS PROBLEMS
OF DEVELOPING POLITICAL SYSTEMS: GHANA AND NIGERIA

by

Hugh Michael Stevenson

A Thesis submitted to the
Faculty of the School of Graduate
Studies in partial fulfillment
of the
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Hugh Michael Stevenson
# Table of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terminology</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methodology</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND INTERACTING RELATIONSHIPS</td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Psycho-Cultural Approach</td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Functionalist Approach</td>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II LAWS OF CHANGE AND THE ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT</td>
<td></td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III A MODEL FOR THE STUDY OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT</td>
<td></td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV THE REVOLUTIONARY SYSTEM - GHANA AND NIGERIA</td>
<td></td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authoritative Structures and Functional Precision</td>
<td></td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional Values and Progressive Systems</td>
<td></td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V THE STABILIZING SYSTEM - EMBRYONIC DEVELOPMENT IN GHANA AND NIGERIA</td>
<td></td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group Diversification and Functional Specificity</td>
<td></td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value Orientation of the Military</td>
<td></td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONCLUSIONS</td>
<td></td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td></td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

The study of political development has come to dominate that branch of the discipline of political science concerned with comparative politics. There is, however, a terminological and methodological confusion in the literature that is in need of clarification.

Terminology

James S. Coleman in a recent publication attempts to define the central concept of 'political development' as a capacity to institutionalize "new patterns of integration regulating and containing the tensions and conflicts produced by increased differentiation, and (2) new patterns of participation and resource distribution adequately responsive to the demands generated by the imperatives of equality." This would appear to ask as many questions as it answers, but the notion of increased participation by increasingly divergent and conflicting interest groups is clear. Harold Lasswell argues that the concept of political development entails "a sequence

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of approximations toward a self-sustaining level of power accumulation," which he defines:

A self-sustaining level of power accumulation is reached when the nation is able to furnish its own trained personnel, to achieve structural innovations with minimum resort to coercion, and to mobilize resources for national goals.

Diversified educational skills, and the comparatively peaceful resolution of conflict are regarded as the basis of sound development policy. "Political development" is clearly too imprecise and too bulky a concept to allow for its use in rigorously analytic studies. At best, the term conveys so many intricate and interrelated connotations that it defied concise definition, and at worst, the concept is used to imply that political systems move toward a 'manifest destiny' defined in the ethnocentric generalizations derived from the study of modern Western political society. Inasmuch as this thesis constitutes a study of the political development of Ghana and Nigeria, the term 'political development' will be used to mean the changing structural adaptation in the political system to the demands of order and organization.

Order and Organization

The central concern of this thesis is with order and

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organization as problems of developing political systems. By order, we mean the stability that is generated by the exercise of authority. There is a consensus in the majority of modern approaches to the political system that it is the "authoritative allocation of values" for the whole society that distinguishes the political from the total system, and from other sub-systems. Authority implies both legitimacy and control. Control means the ability to structure the behavior of individuals or collectivities in terms of contingent deprivation or reward. Legitimacy, as defined by Lipset, "involves the capacity of the system to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for the society." The primary sanction of political control is the use of violence by that group which is

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1 See David Easton, The Political System (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1964), pp. 129-134. The key concepts of order and authority are common currency amongst anthropologists, who deal with societies in which it is often very difficult to determine whether in fact any institutional arrangement is made for the authoritative distribution of values. Radcliffe-Brown, for example, defines the political system as "That part of the total organization which is concerned with the maintenance or establishment of social order, within a territorial framework, by the organized exercise of coercive authority through the use, or the possibility of use, of physical force." Quoted in Lucy Mair, Primitive Government, (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1964), pp. 19-20.

organized for the purpose of distributing the values for the whole society. To the extent that the exercise of political control is legitimate, however, the actual implementation of physical violence will be reduced, and order as we have defined it will be increased.

In analyzing the political systems of Ghana and Nigeria we shall analyze the degree to which the structure of the political system maintains legitimacy - i.e. The degree to which coercion is a structural characteristic of the political system. Lipset argues that "crises of legitimacy occur during a transition to a new social structure," but our argument is that changes in social and political structure are adaptations to the demand for order, as reflected in crises of legitimacy.

By organization, we mean the degree to which patterned role-expectations and value orientations are integrated within the political system. The central concern with organization stems from the nature of the political system, and from the nature of the structure of a social system. The theoretical complexity of the nature of social systems requires detailed explanation in a later chapter. In comparing the political systems of Ghana and Nigeria, we shall analyze the organization of the system, in terms of established patterns of relationship between roles and values. Change in the structure of the political system is an adaptation to the disintegration

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Ibid., p. 65.
(lack of organization) in the relationships between roles and values related to the authoritative allocation of values.

Methodology

The conceptualization of political development in terms of adaptation to demands for order and organization points to the theoretical importance of the structure of the political system. This has been overlooked in the recent literature on the subject of political development. In the effort to analyze change, structure has been too often dismissed as a static concept, and therefore inadequate for the analysis of changing political systems. The conventional theoretical model, or typology, implicit in much of the literature in the field, is that of traditional, transitional, and modern societies, located on a continuum, according to a relative degree of modernization. This model has polarized conditions of stability at opposite ends of the continuum, leaving all the intervening stages of the continuum in a state of change.

In concentrating on the transitional area of the continuum, two methodological approaches have been tackled. The first is an attempt to avoid the constraining connotation of stability implied in the concept of structure, by isolating a dynamic factor that can explain the changing conditions of transitional society. Lerner's
analysis of empathy, and Pye's emphasis on psychological conditioning, are examples. The second is an attempt to avoid the same difficulty in the concept of structure, while at the same time isolating a static factor that will serve to order the mass of disordered variables in changing conditions. The functional analysis of Almond and Coleman is a prime example. The problem with both approaches is that in their isolation of a significant independent variable, they take on a quasi-determinist character. The first approach argues that social change is conditioned by technological innovation (media of communication in Lerner's instance), or by the cultural motivation of the ego and super-ego (socialization as described by Pye). The second sees changing social institutions, or structures, as determined by functional prerequisites. The determinist character of these arguments leads easily to the assumption that it is possible to order the variables involved in political change into


statements of probability, and to formulate laws of social change. The mood that permeates this attitude is articulated by Gabriel Almond:

The joyous barks of the few formal logicians that have emerged in political science may still be worse than their bites, but there is no doubt that we are moving slowly forward toward a probabilistic theory of politics.¹

The argument presented in this thesis is that both solutions are inadequate, although not unhelpful. The argument is (1) that the isolation of an independent variable (technological, cultural or functional), in an effort to avoid the theoretical difficulties in the concept of structure, stems from a misunderstanding of the structure of the social system, and (2) that laws of social change derive from a theoretical misconception of the nature of the social system, and are therefore inherently improbable. The first chapter deals with the nature of the social system and with structure as the orienting concept in the study of developing political systems. The second chapter deals with the nature of social change, or rather with the analytic problems raised by the nature of social change.

The third chapter is concerned with the development of a new theoretical model for the analysis of political development in terms of order and organization. This model is designed to place emphasis not on the extremes

¹Ibid., p. 7.
of the change continuum, but on the center, and to give conceptual sophistication to the presently ambiguous concept of transitional society. The model is based on the analysis of relationships between various structural variables. It is designed not to isolate independent variables, but to incorporate interdependent variables in an inclusive structural typology. The basic structural patterns of developing systems are shown in the following diagram:

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  low  ORDER  high
ORGANIZATION
  low  Revolutionary  Traditional
   high  Stabilizing  Modern
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The diagram illustrates the typing of differing structural patterns on the basis of the relationship between interacting variables of contrasting intensity. The Traditional and Modern systems are characterized by a high degree of order, whereas the Revolutionary and Stabilizing systems show low degrees of order. This will reflect in the incidence of coercion in the latter systems. The Traditional and Revolutionary systems compare in terms of a low degree of organization, whereas the Stabilizing and Modern systems show a high degree of organization. For the purposes of closer analysis, organization will subsequently be measured in terms of institutional complexity.
and functional specificity, and the value patterns that underlie these systems will be analyzed in the same typology. Order will be analyzed in terms of the incidence of coercion in the political process.

The fourth and fifth chapters form the empirical analysis of the specific political systems of Ghana and Nigeria. Data gathered from both systems are ordered according to the theoretical framework just described.

1 The type of model developed here has been pioneered in empirical studies of the legislative process in the political system of the United States of America. The comments made by those who have found this method useful, if in a different context, are therefore useful. "Such an ideal-type construct is, of course, an exaggeration of empirical reality, but it can serve two valuable purposes: first, it can demonstrate the logic of the postulated network; and second, it can serve as an independent criteria for comparing the concrete, empirical role systems." See John C. Wahlke, et al., The Legislative System (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1962), pp. 410-413.
SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND INTERACTING RELATIONSHIPS

The concept of structure has received scant attention from the majority of scholars dealing with the developing areas. The manner in which they have glossed over the concept bears analysis. Although no detailed survey of the literature is necessary here, three prominent scholars, Lerner, Pye, and Almond will be taken as examples of what may be delimited as the psycho-cultural and the functionalist approaches.

The Psycho-cultural Approach

The Psycho-cultural approach seeks a solution to the analysis of social change, or political development, in the analysis of psychic and cultural factors. Primarily, this approach seeks a motivational theory of development, and the isolation of significant variables which may be regarded as basic stimuli provoking modernizing responses in the political system.

Lucian Pye is aware of the utility of a theory of social structure, in the introduction to his *Politics, Personality and Nation Building*, he states his approach succinctly:

Any form of political analysis must inevitably rest upon some set of assumptions and theories about human psychology on the one hand and a body of sociological knowledge and a philosophy
of history on the other.

But Pye is far less concerned with history and sociology than he is with human psychology, and with a command of the literature of neo-Freudian psychoanalysis, he has centered his research on the psychological impact of change and development, and seeks to understand the problems of developing nations in terms of the psychic dimensions of personality and identity.

His model of political development in transitional society is based on seventeen loosely connected hypotheses about the nature of political behavior in such society. These hypotheses rest on the primary supposition that "the political sphere is not sharply differentiated from the sphere of social and personal relations." His emphasis on political socialization and the psychological problem of personal identity, but he is aware that "it may be fruitful to think of the problems of development and modernization as rooted in the need to create more effective, more adaptive, more complex, and more rationalized organizations."

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1Lucian W. Pye, Politics, Personality and Nation Building, p. xiv.

2Ibid., p. 16.

3Ibid., p. 38.
This sociological insight is underplayed in comparison to the psychological emphasis of the book, and the rationale behind this emphasis is as follows:

Once it is recognized that political and social development involves more than just the form of relationships defined in terms of their functional relevance for an organization, then the problems become largely those of understanding the human personality and understanding how in a particular setting the typical experience of personal development may either foster or inhibit the human potential and talents basic to all forms of effective group action.¹

Political development, therefore, is related to psychological conditioning. Just as toilet-training practices supposedly influence and determine adult behavior, so the earliest training within basic social groups, notably the family, influences and conditions later behavior in more complex groups, like the political system.

Without denying the very real value of Pye's contribution, it is nonetheless true that apart from the acknowledgement paid Max Weber and the sociologists, insufficient use is made of the sociological theory of organization. As a result, we tend to search greedily in the obstruse world of pre-natal and infantile development for an explanation of the political development process. The dilemma of moving easily from micro-cosmic to macro-

¹Ibid., p. 41.
cosmic analysis is clear, and is at the root of the difficulty in this type of theory. There is a further difficulty that relates to the theoretical orientation of the school of Psychology with which Pye is most familiar. Those who can avoid the admitted fascination of the neo-Freudian analysis have not yet attempted to apply the insights of the modern psychology of behavior modification to the study of political development. If they had, we might well have come back to an understanding of the importance of the structured environment as a control on behavior, and, therefore, to a re-evaluation of the importance of social structure to political behavior. Finally, the isolation of the psychological variable, as being independent in the total political system, raises problems in the methodological approach to analyzing social change. This will be discussed in the chapter on social change.

Daniel Lerner has produced a more cohesive formal model of political development. His typology (Traditional-Transitional-Modern) is built on cumulative indices of literacy, urbanism, media participation, and empathy. Like Pye, Lerner wishes to isolate a dynamic, motivational factor in the process of development, and he chooses to describe it as 'empathy'. This factor, though cultural—

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ally determined, is a function of personality. Empathy is the key to the mobile personality, distinguished by a high capacity for identification with new aspects of the environment. Empathy is the ability to project the self into a new situation, and to introject and adapt the self once in that situation. Empathy marks the mobile personality. This capacity is the central concept of Lerner's book, and it is the base variable in the definition of society, and social change:

It is the major hypothesis of this study that high empathic capacity is the predominant personal style only in modern society, which is distinctively industrial, urban, literate, and participant.¹ By isolating this dynamic factor, Lerner avoids any discussion of structure. The effect of social structure and organization is not accounted for in his discussion of social systems as divergent as Turkey, Lebanon, Egypt, Syria and Iran. The structural dissimilarity of these systems is neglected in favor of their dynamic similarity.

Although structural stability can be reconciled with mobility in the social system, Lerner chooses to concentrate on mobility at the expense of a detailed and theoretical concern with structure. Mobility is measured in terms of movement through space — i.e. through the shift from rural to urban communities — and it is, significantly, measured

¹Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society, p. 50.
through movement in ideas. This mobility is existential rather than physical, and it is contingent on the degree to which the individual is able to revitalize his cognitive awareness of, and his affective attitudes towards, his environment. Lerner, like Pye, emphasizes the psychological rather than the structural variables in the analysis of political development. Acculturation, belief systems, and self-image - the components of empathy - are conditioned by the society's communication process. The technical mass media of communication form what Lerner terms the 'mobility multiplier.'

The closest Lerner comes to an appreciation of the importance of structure is in his use of the term 'culture.' He places great stress on the importance to modernization of a change from religious to secular culture.

In polar contrast to the Traditional "courage culture," where the constricted self is routinized in the performance of duty with loyalty and obedience committed once for all, is the Modern type of "ingenuity culture." Here the appropriate style is the expansive, desirous, seeking, acquiring individual.

But the structure of the ideas and values crucial to these contrasting cultures is not explained.

Finally, Lerner's argument raises questions about the nature of social change that have already been mentioned.

1Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society, p. 52.

2Ibid., p. 134.
in the discussion of Pye's work. The base variable, defined in psycho-cultural terms, is isolated as "the" motivational factor in the development process. The result is the confusion between an important variable and an independent variable. Lerner is careful to avoid any suggestion that there is any unique process of social determinism implied in his analysis.

This book seeks to explain why and show how individuals and their institutions modernize together. It denies a unique role to "human nature" or to "social determinism." Having no taste for beating dead horses, we do not even acknowledge these issues, but go directly to a behavioral perspective. To-wit: social change operates through persons and places.

But because no funeral notice is served on the horse, its corpse continues to let at least a whiff of its presence flavor the rest of the book. It is putting the case too strongly to suggest that Lerner sees the extension of mass media of communication as a necessary and sufficient condition of modernization, but there is the impression that empathy is necessarily technologically conditioned, and that a numerical index of the level of participation is a sufficient criterion for the positioning of a political system on the development continuum. The interdependence of content and media in communication and of the structure of values in the social system relating to the information

Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society, p. 78.
communicated, is nowhere systematically discussed. Technologically conditioned empathy tends to be treated as an independent variable in the total system.

Both Pye and Lerner have rejected social structure in favor of a motivational concept to orient their research. In common with the bulk of the literature in the "behavioral tradition" they too easily dismiss structure as a concept that must be defined in the traditional, legalistic terminology of their predecessors. This is neither an adequate appreciation of the more sophisticated work in less modern literature, or of recent theoretical developments in sociology. The jaundiced view of 'structure' is that the concept is essentially static, and that the behavioral perspective requires analysis in terms of motivational factors is not refuted here. But, we take issue with the psycho-cultural school in its isolation of motivational variables, and in its exclusive emphasis on those variables as keys to the discussion of social change. The argument rests on the distinction made by Talcott Parsons between motivational orientation and value orientation. What the psycho-cultural approach fails to do is to relate motivational variables to the structure of value-orientation within which motivation acquires significance:
The classification of the modes of motivational orientation provides essentially a framework for analyzing the "problems" in which the actor has an "interest". Value-orientation, on the other hand, provides the standards of what constitute satisfactory "solutions" of these problems. The clear recognition of the independent variability of these two basic modes or levels of orientation is at the very basis of a satisfactory theory in the field of "culture and personality." Indeed, it can be said that failure to recognize this independent variability has underlain much of the difficulty in this field, particularly the unstable tendency of much social science to oscillate between "psychological determinism" and "cultural determinism". Indeed, it may be said that this independent significance of the theory of the social system vis-a-vis that of personality on the one hand, and of culture on the other.¹

Talcott Parsons, although his major interest is the structure of the social system, is far from missing the behavioral importance of the individual actor in the system. The core of his analysis is the "action frame of reference". He is, however, insistent that the individual, though he be the basis of the society, cannot be divorced from the system in which he operates. The nature of society is such that the individual actor is an interactor and therefore, the analysis of society must be in terms of interaction. It is the interactional environment, as much as the individuals' cognitive orientation towards it, that shapes social

behavior. It is the interaction, the independent variability of different motivational factors that the psycho-cultural approach has failed to analyze with adequate theoretical precision.

Neither Pye nor Lerner are guilty of totally neglecting the importance of interaction in the social system. There is interaction between the individual and the cultural and technological dimensions of the total society, in both of the arguments we have referred to. What they have failed to do is to provide a theoretical framework within which to locate the relevance of individual responses to particular situational stimuli. This is possible only by an appreciation of the difference between the nature of personality, or culture, and the social system. Parsons explains:

It should be made quite clear that the relevance of interaction is not what distinguishes the social system from that of personality. Most emphatically interaction is just as much constitutive of personality as it is of a social system. It is rather the functional focus of organization and integration which is the basis of the difference between personalities and social systems.\(^1\)

It is here that the need for a theory of organization is clearly outlined. The organization of interdependent

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\(^1\) Talcott Parson, The *Social System*, p. 17.
variables - culture, personality, technology, etc. - is the basis of the social system, and the measurement and analysis of separate variables outside of a theoretical conception of their integration leads to faulty analysis. It is to miss the wood for the trees.

The Functionalist Approach

The second major approach to the analysis of political development is functional analysis. Gabriel Almond, together with James S. Coleman has produced a book that is perhaps the most consistent example of this approach. The sociological terminology of structural-functional analysis has been well assimilated by the authors, although the basic importance of structure in the theoretical approach to the social system is de-emphasized to the point of neglect. Almond, who wrote the theoretical introduction to the book, has restated the structural-functional scheme so drastically that his emphasis and influence has been largely independent of Talcott Parsons.

Almond states that the purpose of his introduction

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is to "separate out analytically the structures which perform political functions in all societies regardless of scale, degree of differentiation, and culture."

The lack of emphasis and theoretical concern with structure per se stems from a faulty identification of structure with the traditional-legal concept of an institution. Structure, as defined in terms of organized patterns of role expectations and value orientation, is far removed from the institutional and legal vocabulary of traditional political science. But, Almond is so captivated by the refutation of the traditional preoccupation with specialized and visible structures - "It is this emphasis on the specialized structures of politics which has led to the stereotyped conception of traditional and primitive systems as static systems" - that he identifies structural with legalistic institutional analysis, and is moved to remark that structural comparison is of limited utility. "It is like a comparative anatomy without a comparative physiology." 2

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with Pye and Lerner, the fear of Gabriel Almond is that
dynamic systems will be analyzed in static terms, if
analyzed in terms of structure. To counteract this
problem, he isolates function as a universal feature of
social systems, and leaves structure to those whose unhappy
lot it is to be interested in specialized institutions.

The lack of conceptual clarity in dealing with struc-
ture, springs from Almond's narrow interpretation of an
institution as a specialized legal structure. Talcott
Parsons, however, makes the necessary theoretical distinc-
tion very clear. An institution is defined in terms of
patterned role expectations and shared value-orientations,
that may apply to an indefinite number of specialized
structures (collectivities). It is this difference be-
tween patterns of value-orientation and legally defined
collectivities that Almond does not appreciate, and which
makes structure a dynamic, not a static concept.

This integration of a set of common value
patterns with the internalized need-disposi-
tion structure of the constituent persona-
lities is the core phenomenon of the dynamics
of social systems. That the stability of
any social system except the most evanescent
interaction process is dependent on a degree
of such integration may be said to be the
fundamental dynamic theorem in sociology.

There is here a paradoxical relationship between stability

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and change in the concept of structure that makes the concept admirably suited to the dilemma of analyzing organized systems in a constant state of change. Structure cannot be explained outside of a dynamic process of organization. Structure, rather than function, is the most adequate concept in which to analyze the interactive relationship of interdependent variables in a social system. It is the structural organization of interacting relationships that is the dynamic, not static, basis of the social system.

In the light of this argument, it is clear that the isolation of function as the independent variable in the structural-functional analysis suffers from the same inadequacies as the isolation of psycho-cultural variables previously discussed. But functionalism, as used by Almond and Coleman, suffers from a further defect that is peculiar to their methodological emphasis, and to the functional methodology in the social sciences generally. The central methodological postulate is that systems can only work if they perform certain functions, and that structural elements of the system exist to perform those functions. Structure, briefly, is determined by function. Almond differentiates input and output functions of the political system, and the area contributions that make up the rest of the book demonstrate how
these functions (chiefly the input functions) are performed by certain structures - interest groups, political parties, etc.

The first significant query to be raised in connection with the methodology relates to the manner in which the functions were delineated.

"...we derive our functional categories from the political systems in which structural specialization and functional differentiation have taken place to the greatest extent. Thus the functions performed by associational interest groups in Western systems led us to the question, "How are interests articulated in different political systems?" or the interest articulation function."

Functions here were the product of structural analysis, and yet in the subsequent analysis of the developing areas, structures are systematically delineated as the products of function. There is a tautological inconsistency in the methodology that is difficult to resolve. Function is difficult to define in any other than structural terms, and structure is defined in terms of function. The complexity of the logical circularity in the functionalist argument has been analyzed in more detail

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elsewhere.

The second difficulty with this approach arises from Almond's assertion of the "universality of function." On the basis of this assertion, he is able to make the inference that those functions performed in Western societies will be performed in non-Western society. In terms of this argument, the Western political process becomes the framework for the study of the political process in non-Western nations. This may be a necessary inference from the assertion of the "universality of function", but that assertion is based on a metaphysic that makes function similar to the Platonic form. This is well explained by Carl Hempel:

Historically speaking, functional analysis is a modification of teleological explanation, i.e. of explanation not be reference to causes which "bring about" the event in question, but by reference to ends which determine its course.... A teleological approach...fails to meet the minimum scientific requirement of empirical testability. 2

In Almond's analysis, certain universal functional 'ends'

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have to be met by specific structural 'means'. This dualism harks back to the mind-matter dualism of classical philosophy. Function is elevated to the status of antecedent being, and structure, being a particular expression of that Being, is regarded as incidental to the study of the political system. The logically certain relationship between function and structure, as it emerges in Almond's analysis, obscures the meaning of the concept of continuum, which implies an interactive process in which ends are also means in the total system. The philosophical difficulty encountered here has been thoroughly explored by John Dewey:

Any philosophy that in its quest for certainty ignores the reality of the uncertain in the ongoing processes of nature denies the conditions out of which it arises. The attempt to include all that is doubtful within the fixed grasp of that which is theoretically certain is committed to insincerity and evasion, and in consequence will have the stigmata of internal contradiction.\(^1\)

The functional approach fails to account adequately for the concept of structure. As defined by Parsons, it is the concept of structure that relates the conditions out of which function arises. At root it is structure that, by definition, gives rise to the base functions of order and organization. What is required in the study

\(^1\) John Dewey, The Quest for Certainty (New York; Capricorn Books, 1929), p. 244.
of developing political systems is close analysis of the structures of those systems as a basis for the deduction of uniform and repetitative patterns of interrelationship. A model that placed emphasis on the structural differentiation of varying political systems would enable the analyst to describe variations in the structural accommodation to functional emphasis. This is the correct procedure for comparative political science; not to seek regularities determined by a priori conditions, but to demonstrate uniformities in empirically analyzed conditions.

The central argument of this chapter has been that the isolation of variables in psycho-cultural and functional analysis fails to explain the interactive relationships between variables that is the essence of the political system. Structural analysis which demonstrates contrasting patterns of relationship between related variables can avoid this deficiency.
LAWS OF CHANGE AND THE ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

The prospect of developing a probabilistic theory of politics and the political system is an exciting one, and it has attracted much attention in the academic study of political science. A theory in this sense would be composed of a system of laws, or statements of probable relationships between variables within the political system. The problem of change within the social system is one that is especially inviting to the theorist, and one that is made increasingly valuable in view of the growing demand for policy planning with respect to the developing nations. The prospect of developing laws of social change, however, is made less immediate by an analysis of the nature of the social system, as opposed to other phenomena that are the object of scientific investigation. Laws of social change are in the present state of knowledge, theoretical and empirical, impossible. Such knowledge as we have requires that quantitative evidence must remain descriptive of various aspects of the structure of the social system, rather than prescriptive of the contingencies and direction of development within the system.

The first principle on which the optimistic attachment
to the feasibility of developing laws of social change
is based is the theoretical acceptance of the possibility
of isolating independent variables within the system.
This principle is the result of a theoretical misconcep-
tion of the nature of the social system, and has led to
a mistaken emphasis on independent cause, and related
and dependent effects. The structure of the social
system is such that the interaction of multiple variables
in an ongoing process defies the isolation of any one
dependent variable.

The view that there is no simple intrinsic
priority in the factors of the initiation of
change is inherent in the conception of the
social system which we have advanced here.
The central methodological principle of our
theory is that of the interdependence of a
plurality of variables.... We, therefore,
put forward what we may call the conception
of the plurality of possible origins of
change with the understanding that change
may originate in any part of the social system
described in structural terms or in terms of
variables....

This does not, however, mean that the complexity of the
subject matter forbids rigorous analysis, nor does it mean
that the development of theoretical simplifications of the
relationship between certain variables can be of no
assistance. Abstraction is a necessary procedure in the
scientific study of social or physical phenomena, but the

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limitations of abstraction must be understood.

Artificial simplification or abstraction is a necessary precondition of securing ability to deal with affairs which are complex, in which there are many more variables and where strict isolation destroys the special characteristics of the subject matter. This statement conveys the important distinction which exists between physical and social and moral objects. The distinction is one of methods of operation, not kinds of reality.¹

Necessary simplifications destroy the special characteristics of the subject matter. But the subject matter of our environment, physical or social, must nonetheless be studied scientifically. This implies, as Dewey says, a method of operation, not a type of reality.

The essence of scientific procedure is the controlled analysis of variables that are related in terms of a theoretical construct - an image of the environment within which they operate. The data of science are recurrent and repeating phenomena, which are ordered according to statements of probability, indicating the expected degree of recurrence, and the interacting relationship of recurrence. The significance of empirical data is conditioned by the theoretical framework which orients research. This is crucial to the problem of developing laws of social change. Such laws would be possible only if adequate theoretical analysis of the social

system was at hand. We have argued that the theoretical basis of the psycho-cultural and the functionalist schools are inadequate, and even those who have made systematic theoretical analysis of the social system are loath to present a general theory of social change.

... a general theory of the processes of change of social systems is not possible in the present state of knowledge. The reason is very simply that such a theory would imply complete knowledge of the laws of process of the system and this knowledge we do not possess. The theory of change in the structure of social systems must, therefore, be a theory of particular sub-processes of change within such systems, not of the overall processes of change of the systems as systems.1

The essence of this argument is the distinction between synthetic and systematic theory that David Easton has put well. Synthetic theory is the type characteristic of the psycho-cultural and functionalist schools. It attempts to relate generalizations, developed in the study of one particular set of phenomena, to phenomena hitherto shrouded in doubt. Systematic Theory is the theoretical image of the total system in which phenomena are to be discussed. The fault of those who await the rapid development of laws of social change is the failure to relate the synthetic generalizations they have developed in the

1 Talcott Parsons, The Social System, pp. 485-486.

study of sub-processes to a conceptually coherent theory of the total system, in which those processes are at work. The heuristic and research value of their work is not in doubt. What is in doubt is the suggestion that their approach can give any clear interpretation of the process of change in macro-cosmic systems.

Aside from the theoretical acceptance of the possibility of isolating independent variables within a social system, there is a second difficulty with the theoretical postulate of laws of social change. It is the difficulty of equating social systems with organic systems in natural science. Although it is not possible to argue that an equation between social and biological organisms is explicitly intended by those who discuss the possibility of developing laws of change, it is acceptable to argue that even the most sophisticated metaphorical equation of the two systems is open to misinterpretation. Whether explicit, or implicit, the metaphor has allowed for uncalled-for optimism in the expectation of laws of social change.

The argument that the motivation and conditioning of the individual, psychic organism is the basis of the motivation and conditioning of the social system; or that the functional demands of a sub-system are the functional demands of all other sub-systems, is the re-
result of an implied acceptance that an isolated sub-
sub-system (individual or social) is organically related
to the total system. The difficulty involved with
this postulated relationship between natural and social
systems has been argued by one of the foremost of
British anthropologists, E. E. Evans-Pritchard. He is
adamant that the social system and its structure is the
theoretical core of his discipline. He accepts the
structural-functional analysis of social systems, and
argues that institutionally patterned role-relationships
and value orientations have functional relationship to
the total social system. But, he insists that this
functional inter-relationship is no basis for equating
social with natural systems, and, therefore, for developing
scientific laws of social change in social anthropology.

I think that we may ask...whether social
systems are in fact natural systems at all,
whether, for instance, a legal system is
really comparable to a physiological system
or the planetary system. I cannot myself
see that there is any good reason for re-
garding a social system as a system of the
same kind as an organic or inorganic system.
it seems to me to be an entirely different
kind of system; and I think that the effort
to discover natural laws of society is vain
and leads only to airy discussions about
methods.1

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E. E. Evans-Pritchard, Social Anthropology and Other
pp. 57-58.
As he argues, the burden of proof is on the proponents of the possibility of the development of social laws, and so far they have been conspicuously unsuccessful in stating laws of change. It is methodologically correct in the present state of our knowledge to set about the analysis of social variables within a theory of the social system that allows for a realistic demonstration of their interrelatedness. Any theory that seeks comfort in the suggestion that social and organic systems are by nature alike fails to fulfill that condition of methodological precision.

There is in the present state of knowledge no necessary reason for the equation of social with organic systems. Such equation as has been made arises from a theoretical misconception of the structural complexity of social systems. Until reliable knowledge is collected about the patterned behavior of interacting variables, it is not possible to establish laws that explain the motivating causes of the regularity and change of such patterned behavior.

The foregoing argument does not, however, negate the necessity of analyzing social change. The model of political development advanced in the next chapter is not intended simply to describe the structures of differing political systems. It is intended to demons-
trate the types of structural organization that develop on the continuum of change, and the significant changes made by political systems in response to the demands of order and organization. Change is analyzed not in terms of motivational laws, but in terms of shifting patterns of development.

No necessary pattern of change is described in the analysis of the Traditional, Revolutionary, Stabilizing and Modern systems, but the model indicates a likely order of development. If change is taken to move along the horizontal plane in the model, the Traditional and Revolutionary systems regularly lie on the same axis, as do the Stabilizing and Modern. The suggestion is that, in the long evolutionary picture of political development, there is a pattern in which the Revolutionary system is a reaction to the Traditional, and the Stabilizing a necessary prelude to the Modern system. The radical change of the Revolutionary system needs to be adapted to the requirements of a society that has not yet internalized the role and value patterns of the Modern system. Conrad Arensberg points out that radical change in the economic system must be structured in such a way as to be acceptable to the naturally conservative orientation of traditional economic behavior, and at the same time meet the demands for reorganization in
rapidly changing conditions. In explaining this require-
ment of cultural change, he points to Romer's rule in
paleontology, and to the example of the lung fish, whose
major pre-occupation was to stay in the water for as
long as possible, while adapting to the recession of the
water level in its environment by the development of the
lung.

These observations are drawn more specifically
from an examination of cultural innovation. As
regards institutional advance, they derive both
from historical studies and from the detailed
analysis by social scientists of current develop-
mental transformations that are modernizing the
peasant and tribal peoples of the non-Western
world. At least two generalizations hold:
1) innovations are most likely to be accepted
when they can be fitted into already existing
ways, when they can be set in terms culturally
acceptable to those who must use them; and
2) innovations must accord with the general
trend of their age: they cannot succeed when
they run against or athwart the grain of the
other changes occurring along with them.1

The Revolutionary system fails to take note of the con-
servative requirements of Romer's rule, and as a result
tends to promote evolutionary entrophy, not advance.
The Stabilizing system, however, promotes conservative
change and evolution. This pattern of change has been

1Conrad M. Arensberg, "Cultural Change and the Gua-
 ranteed Income," in Robert Theobald, ed., The Guaranteed
Income: Next Step in Economic Evolution (New York:
characteristic of the institutional transfer from colonial to independent and military rule in Ghana and Nigeria.

The process of change which we analyze in Ghana and Nigeria is concerned with a limited time perspective. The utility of the method of analysis can be maintained, however, in a study of larger compass. What we are concerned to analyze is a process of change, not the causes or laws of change. The changing patterns of structural adaptation may be the most meaningful image of the process of political development, and if this analysis does not provide the neatness and precision of mathematical probability, it may nonetheless provide a significant understanding of the problems of development.

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A MODEL FOR THE STUDY OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

The argument so far has been that approaches to the study of the developing areas have attempted, but failed, to resolve the difficulty of dealing with political society in development. The difficulty is that developing political systems remain systems and are therefore static, inasmuch as they retain and maintain boundaries that differentiate them from other political systems. But, they also constitute a clearly separate field of study because of their dynamic development. Conscious of this difficulty, the major approach to the study of political development has been to seek a dynamic factor, which explains the motivation for change, or which determines the necessary conditions that a changing political system must meet in order to continue as a system. In order to do this, scholars have isolated independent variables within a model that sets the traditional and modern society as pure types at opposite ends of a continuum, and places the transitional society in the center of that continuum. In these terms political development appears as a linear progression from one polarized system to another, and the rate and direction of change is determined by the isolated and independent variable.
This approach fails to account for the structure of the political system. A model built on the concept of structure, however, has the advantage of showing the interaction of variables, which is the essence of the social system, and could have the advantage of providing a more sophisticated conceptual framework, in which to analyze systems that are presently nebulously and uniformly characterized as "transitional." The refusal to regard structure as a convenient concept for political analysis in this field derives from an unjustified connotation of structure, which clothes social structure in the vocabulary of legal institutionalism. Structure is, however, a legitimate behavioral concept as defined in terms of patterned role-expectations and value orientations. So defined, the objection stated above is invalid. Furthermore, a structural model has the advantage of clearly retaining the contradictory features of developing society - change and stability. If the system is to remain a system it has to maintain its boundaries, as well as adapt to internal stresses and dysfunctional conflicts within its boundaries; it has to set certain goals as binding on the members of the system, and integrate new ideas and goals within the structure of traditional norms.

In its emphasis on interactional theory, a structural model rejects methodological attempts to isolate an
independent variable, or "basic factor", and does not pretend to an explanation of social change, based on organic laws, or natural laws of development. The foregoing statement does not mean that change is not a focus of the structural model:

A particularly important aspect of our system of categories is the "structural" aspect. We simply are not in a position to 'catch' the uniformities of dynamic process in the social system except here and there. But in order to give those we can catch a setting and to be in the most advantageous position to extend our dynamic knowledge we must have a 'picture' of the system within which they fit, of the given relationships of its parts in a given state of the system, and, where changes take place, of what changes into what through what order of intermediate stages.¹

The model developed here attempts to build an image of stages of development, based upon contrasting interacting variables. It demonstrates the changing patterns of interrelationship that develop in society. It is built not on a single line continuum, measuring single or parallel intensities, but on twin-axis graphs contrasting different intensities. Three different, though related, sets of variables are controlled, but in each instance a regular typology is produced. The four-fold typology produced, is made up of the Traditional and Modern systems (for the sake of semantic continuity), and the Revolutionary and Stabilizing systems.

Coercion

The high degree of coercion in both the Revolutionary and Stabilizing systems requires comment. The Revolutionary system is so described because of the radical break made with the traditional value patterns, not because of any coercive and violent assumption of authority. The Stabilizing system is not initially stable in terms of the amount of force required to implement authority. The terms Revolutionary and Stabilizing define a difference in value-orientation, not a difference in the degree of coercion necessary to the maintenance of political control.

It should be noted that coercion is not related to the origin of the Revolutionary or Stabilizing systems. It is not necessarily the case that either system should be introduced by the violent overthrow of its predecessor. This is particularly relevant to our discussion of African nations. We have chosen to discuss the political systems
of Ghana and Nigeria, because in both systems change in the organization of authority has occurred through a clearly marked historical event that has changed both the authoritative institutions and the personnel who make the authoritative decisions. The coup d'etat is not, however, a necessary factor in the change from the Revolutionary to the Stabilizing system. In political systems where a violent overthrow of the authoritative system has not taken place, as for example, in Tanzania, it may be more difficult to trace the changing patterns of role-expectation and value-orientation, but it is nonetheless assumed that the change can be traced. Nor should the violent nature of the change in Ghana and Nigeria be taken as necessarily constituting a change from Revolutionary to Stabilizing systems. That has still to be analyzed. The use of violence in the overthrow of political institutions in Africa may be a much more subtle instrument than Western commentators realize, and it is at most a tentative suggestion that the coups have resulted in large-scale institutional change.

The significance of the coups may be put in better perspective if it is realized that the value-orientation towards coercion in African political systems has traditionally accepted change through violence more easily than that in Western countries, where great emphasis
is placed on the peaceful resolution of conflict. Max Gluckman, in his analysis of African political systems, argues that there is a meaningful distinction between rebellion and revolution in traditional African society. Whereas revolution constitutes a violent and radical restructuring of the original system, rebellion allows for the preservation of the general pattern of the political system in the process of a violent transference of power among major institutions in the society. African political systems exhibited a pattern of "recurrent civil war" without changing the institutional framework of the political system at large. Gluckman argues that this pattern of values relating to change in the political systems of Africa is well structured into the system:

I stress that I do not think that the 'rebellious' structure of African politics is significant only when a rebellion occurs. The possibility of rebellion is something that king, subordinate rulers, and subjects have to take into account all the time. Thus we have to see 'rebellion' as an ever-present, persistent repetitive process influencing day-to-day political relations. It is only one of the many processes at work.¹

Coercion, as analyzed in Fig. 1, is in no way intended to describe the means of change within political systems. It describes only the value placed on coercion in the implementation of authoritative decisions.

The high degree of coercion in both the Revolutionary and Stabilizing systems has important implications for the problem of organization. Physical force as an instrument of organization is necessary only in a system in which role-expectations and value-orientations are not sufficiently internalized amongst the actors in the system, to prevent dysfunctional and non-conformist behavior in respect of the valued and expected patterns of behavior. The lack of organization, in this sense, in both Revolutionary and Stabilizing systems accounts for the relatively high degree of coercion characteristic of the implementation of authoritative decisions. The correct application of violence is a question that defies any quantitative measurement. David Apter poses the problem:

The point of optimal efficiency for modernization in each political system is the point of intersection between coercion and information at which the greatest proportion of goals is achieved at the lowest cost.... If a country is trying to modernize in the most efficient manner possible, it will seek a regime that will achieve modernization goals at the least possible cost.

The "point of intersection" is impossible to determine with any operational exactitude. To analyze efficient and inefficient coercion in the manner of cost account-

ing is hardly possible. For our purposes, coercion will be regarded as evidence of a lack of organization and order when its application is not contingent upon the disregard of a well publicized definition of non-conformist behavior.

Coercion is characteristically less intense in the political systems described as Traditional and Modern, than in the Revolutionary and Stabilizing systems. Coercion in the Traditional system is limited both by the institutionally less complex political institutions, and by the limited technological advancement of the instruments of coercion available to authoritative institutions. There is danger of excessive generalization here, but since the Traditional (and the Modern) system is not our chief concern, the use of coercion in the political process of Traditional systems may be illustrated by an analysis of one of the most primitive political systems in Africa - that of the Nuer. The Nuer apparently did not recognize any institutionalized right to the exercise of force on the part of any particular group for the whole society.

Among the Nuer no individual anywhere has authority to say whether fighting is permissible, or to command that it should cease. The general conclusion of Evans-Pritchard is that it is useless for a leopard-skin chief to offer his mediation unless it is clear that the injured side are willing to accept a settlement....
At such a juncture a leopard-skin chief might invoke his supernatural powers to threaten them with a curse. But if this can be regarded as the exercise of authority, it is the barest minimum of authority.

The leopard-skin chieftaincy is an authoritative institution - the Nuer have patterned expectations of his role in making authoritative decisions - but the degree to which the office-incumbent is expected to resort to force in the implementation of his decisions is negative.

The Modern system does not suffer from the institutional simplicity and the technologically underdeveloped instruments of violence characteristic of the Traditional system. Some see modern political systems as being characterized by an increasing level of coercion. Thus, Harold Lasswell speaks of the 'garrison state,' and many grow pessimistic about the escalation of violence in the enforcement of authoritative decisions made in foreign policy. But for the purposes of our model of structure and organization, coercion is significant when it indicates a lack of stability and organization in the

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role expectations and values related to political institutions. The coercion measured is the arbitrary use of force - that which is not contingent on a well-defined and publicized statement of expected behavior. In this sense, coercion is less intense in the Modern system than in the Revolutionary and Stabilizing systems.

'Public opinion' is significant in the Modern system because the opinions of individual actors are related to a high degree of information regarding decisions for the whole system. Decisions are in fact made public. (It is not at all sure that any Western democracy fulfills this characteristic of the Modern system) Furthermore, the actual decision-making process is conditioned by a structure that places high value on 'due process' in the application of coercion. Low coercion in the Modern system is related to the high degree of role and value integration in the system.

Institutional Complexity

Institutional complexity in the structure of the political system is not confined by the restrictive definitions of "institution", characteristic of the legalistic vocabulary of some political science. It is only indirectly related to the number of constituted 'bodies' that enjoy a legally defined status in the political system. In both Ghana and Nigeria, to cite
the cases we deal with, the constitutional machinery transferred to the newly independent nations was elaborate -- possibly more elaborate than that in the country from which it was transferred. But constitutional complexity has only a limited effect on the degree of institutional complexity, which describes the interaction and interrelationship of roles and values as they relate to the political system.

In the progression from Traditional, through Revolutionary and Stabilizing systems to the Modern system, institutional complexity is closely related to the increased participation of the total membership of the system in the political process. The role-patterns and values that attach to the political system grow more complex as the number of politicians, constituents and interest groups increases. Institutional complexity is related to the degree of pluralism in the 'power structure' of the political system.

The role-patterns of subject and chief in the Traditional system was made more complex in the colonial era by the increased interaction of subject, traditional authority and colonial authority. In the Revolutionary System the pattern is further complicated by the introduction of a new elite, which is radically anti-traditional and equally anti-colonial. The complex nature
of the conflict between revolutionary, colonial and traditional elites, demands a reorganization of the prevailing institutional structure. Lucy Mair describes the structural incongruities facing the Revolutionary elites:

They have been cast for a play in which the *dramatis personae* are enumerated but the *lines* are not written. The new African governments are recruited from new men, men who never played governmental roles in the long vanished traditional systems or even in the modified versions of these systems maintained under colonial rule. The relationship of the leader with his followers, of the ministers with their colleagues, with bureaucrats, with the general public are new relationships.¹

In solving the demand for reorganization, the Revolutionary system reduces the role-complexity of the existing structure by prohibiting the traditional and colonial participants from further action within the new political system. Neo-colonialism and balkanization become the war-cries that herald the victory over the one-time participants in the authoritative process, and role-patterns are simplified within the single party, and the relationship between charismatic leader and mass follower.

The reduction of the institutional complexity of the Revolutionary system provokes a demand for the reintegration of those denied participation in the existing political system. The Stabilizing system increases

the degree of institutional complexity in an effort to enhance the legitimacy of the system. Legitimacy is a function of the extent to which the role-expectations of the society are highly organized, and the Stabilizing system has to compensate for the disintegrative effect of the radical reduction of role participation in the Revolutionary system. The equation of the society with the revolutionary movement has to be re-organized to adapt to the structural necessities of a mixed system, in which traditional and modern role-expectations are both component parts.

The system is no longer "theirs' but 'ours'. It has to be made to work.... In a sense, the basic conflict comes to be transferred from the form, the movement vs. the society, to that between the 'principles' of the movement and the temptation of its members to use their control of the society to gratify their repressed need-dispositions some of which are precisely the needs of conformity with the patterns of the old society which they have tried to abolish.1

Institutional complexity is here related to the 'routinization of charisma,' and the move from a personalized to a bureaucratic structure.

1 Talcott Parsons, The Social System, p. 527.

The degree of institutional complexity in the Revolutionary and Stabilizing systems is most clearly seen in the complex role-interaction of opposition and government. The Revolutionary system in its reduction of institutional complexity, and its equation of society with the revolutionary movement, fails to organize the expectations and values of those who dissent from the absolutely defined goals of the movement.

Rather than providing a lever for small, incremental changes, it (government) was thought to embody the one weapon with which to fight for future salvation. Such absolute claims are little suited for the relativist outlook, which the recognition of legitimate dissent presupposes. The historic tasks ahead, the beckoning promises of the future, put all government measures beyond the pale of criticism. Inevitable failures are attributed not to human error or impossible policies, but treacherous sabotage.... Instead of making for a common ground between government and opposition the absolute nature of common goals therefore introduces a witch-hunting atmosphere.1

The failure to allow for the institutional complexity that the existence of an organized opposition demands, heightens the degree to which coercion is a function of organization in the political system. In the Stabilizing system institutional complexity allows for a degree of

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institutionalized dissent. Even if 'an opposition' does not operate within the political system, the model suggests that the Stabilizing system can integrate opposition roles and expectations within it. Patterns of communication between government and divergent interest groups are a part of the complex organization of role-expectations and value-orientations in this system.

The Modern system represents the terminal point of this process of institutional complexity - cf integrating the maximum number of role-expectations within the authoritative system. Here, maximum organization corresponds with maximum legitimacy, in what Almond and Verba have termed the "civic culture". In the Modern system, organizational complexity is based on the 'participant' character of the patterns of role-interaction, and on the 'allegiant' character of value-orientation towards the political system. Here "Her Majesty's Loyal Opposition", and other variations on that theme, have clearly defined roles in the political process, and the gap between 'elite' and mass is blurred by the interaction of plural interest associations.

We have been dealing thus far with the terms "role-

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expectations' and 'value-orientations' with a minimum degree of precision. Clearly the analysis of institutional complexity and coercion as interacting variables in the political system has to make constant use of them, since the terms are, by definition, interrelated. The following two figures deal with the terms more precisely.

**ORDER AND ORGANIZATION**

*Fig. II*

**GROUP DIFFERENTIATION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FUNCTIONAL SPECIFICITY</th>
<th>low</th>
<th>high</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>low</td>
<td>Traditional</td>
<td>Revolutionary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>high</td>
<td>Stabilizing</td>
<td>Modern</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Whereas the variable in Fig. I was styled "institutional complexity," and included role-expectations and value-orientations, the variable in Fig. II - "group differentiation" - is more restricted in connotation, referring only to the organization of role-patterns in the political system. Groups refer to particular structures of interaction, in which the role-participants enjoy demarcated status and role definition. The dis-
The concept of a locational and a processual aspect is a trifle obstruse. It embodies nonetheless an important distinction that Heinz Eulau makes in his discussion of group as a concept. Eulau's language is less gymnastic than Parsons, and he talks of the vertical and horizontal dimensions. What is clear is that relationships are limited vertically by the distance between actors - children in the Victorian adage, are seen but not heard, in the presence of adults - and they are limited horizontally by the qualitative differences between actors - girls apparently should not fight boys.

1 Talcott Parsons, *The Social System*, p. 25.

The number of different groups, and the complexity of interests that they represent is an important structural variable in the analysis of political development. Modernization is related to the increasing differentiation in interests and resources, and to the interaction of interest-oriented groups in the political process.

Functional specificity, the second variable measured in Fig. II, relates to the action-orientation of the structure and its constituent role-patterns. A structure is functionally specific when it operates for the attainment of particular, clearly limited goals. Conversely, and at the lower end of the scale, a structure is functionally diffuse, when it operates for the attainment of generalized goals. Functional specificity connotes an explicit definition of the limitations imposed on the activity of all actors in the system. Whereas in functionally specific structures the limitations on action are regularized, most often in formal, legal terms, the limitations on action in the diffuse structure are irregular, and such "legal" definition as they have is "writ small and high upon a pole."

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The discussion of Functional specificity is based on the last of the five pattern-variables that Parsons discusses as the core of the social structure. See, Talcott Parsons, The Social System, pp. 58-67.
Group Differentiation

In terms of this typology, the Traditional system is characterized by a relatively low number of different groups that participate in the political process. Hierarchically, there is a great divide between aristocracy and commoner, between chief and tribesman, and differentiation within each status grouping is limited. Traditional society is defined to a great extent in terms of the limited technology available to the society, and the lack of group differentiation in this system is in large part due to the limited degree of specialization and, therefore, the absence of a complex division of labor that results from limited technological advance.

The Revolutionary system is characterized by a complex group differentiation, that can be seen most clearly in constitutional terms - the new roles of minister, bureaucrat, judge - and in technological terms - the new roles of manager, rentier and industrial laborer. Independence in the Revolutionary system demands that the complex machinery of the colonial regime be "Africanized", and dignity demands that the roles played by Africans in the political process be in no way inferior to those played in modern Western nations. The M.P., the Civil Servant, the Businessman, Military officer, Diplomat and Country Club member act out roles established by
colonial authorities. The Stabilizing system, on the other hand, reduces the number of groups participating in the political process. There is a tendency to regard much of the status ranking and group interest as superfluous and luxurious in the face of demands for cohesion and sound organization.

The Modern system is characterized by a high degree of differentiation between groups. The authoritative allocation of values in this system is a process involving the interacting influences of plural institutions, in which no single cohesive and homogeneous group makes the decisions for the whole society.

**Functional Specificity**

It is difficult to generalize about the functional specificity of Traditional structures. Although the complexity of group differentiation is limited in the Traditional system, those groups that do participate in the political process have generally had fairly well defined functions to perform. This is particularly true in their relation to ritual. Apter has tried to avoid the complexity of this issue by arguing that the offices in the Ashanti system had ritual precision and functional diffuseness. This argument, however, makes a false

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separation of ritual from political activity. The argument here is that groups in the Traditional system are characteristically less numerous, and are not as clearly differentiated according to specific functions as in more developed political systems. Even in those societies where there was a high degree of participation by various groups - elders, councillors, chief, military commanders - in the process of making decisions, the type of problem requiring solution did not demand functionally specific agencies.

Functional specificity is characteristically low in the Revolutionary system. Diffuse authority is concentrated in the hands of a homogeneous and cohesive minority group. Interaction on the part of those outside of that minority group is controlled from the top. The terms elite and mass describe this system. What Parsons calls the private vs. collective interest dilemma, is resolved in the Revolutionary system in favor of the collective interest. The particular interests of the individual group-participants in the total political process are subservient to the diffuse collective interest of the society, which is equated with the Revolutionary movement. The tendency towards the accumulation of

1 Talcott Parsons, The Social System, p. 67.
diffuse authority by one group in the system makes for conflict, which is most often reflected in the conflict between administrators and politicians. This is particularly true in those societies that have enjoyed a strong tradition of effective colonial administration, in which indigenous peoples have been trained in the functionally specific organization of colonial offices.

The resolution of the conflict created by increased diffuse authority in the Revolutionary system is initiated by a compensatory re-organization of specific roles in the political process. The model structural composition of this system is the centralized bureaucracy, in which offices and officers (not necessarily military officers) have clearly delineated functions.

The structural differentiation between the Revolutionary and Stabilizing systems is clearly outlined in Max Weber's discussion of the structure of charismatic and rational-legal authority. The Stabilizing system conforms to the pattern of rational-legal authority, which is characterized by 1) a continuous organization of official functions bound by rules. 2) Specified spheres of competence are established in terms of a

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1 See for example the discussion of this problem in Lucian W. Pye, Politics, Personality and Nation Building, Chapters 16 and 17.
systematic division of labor. 3) "The organization of offices follows the principle of hierarchy; that is, each lower office is under the control and supervision of a higher one. There is a right of appeal and of statement of grievances from the lower to the higher."

4) Officials are given specialist training for the performance of their functions. 5) Administrators are separated from the ownership of the means of production.

6) Rights attach to the office, not to the incumbent of the office. 7) "The combination of written documents and a continuous organization of official functions constitutes the 'office' which is the central focus of all types of modern action." Bureaucratic administration is the classic expression of this authority structure, in which administrators are appointed not elected. They are selected on the basis of technical qualification, and promoted according to seniority and achievement. The bureaucracy constitutes for the bureaucrat a career, for which he receives a fixed monetary salary, and to which he is bound by systematic discipline and control.

Charismatic authority (Revolutionary authority in

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2 Ibid., pp. 333-34.
our model) reveals a close affinity to the traditional structure of authority. (In Fig. II the two systems lie along the same horizontal plane.) In the traditional system the emphasis was on the personal with recruitment in the gerontocratic and patriarchal societies based on ascribed status and patriarchal favor. Personal, vis-a-vis bureaucratic, norms are basic to the charismatic structure of authority. Weber's language is characteristically precise:

The prophet has his disciples; the war lord his selected henchmen; the leader his followers. There is no such thing as 'appointment' or dismissal, no career, no promotion. There is only a 'call' at the instance of the leader on the basis of the charismatic qualification of those he summons. There is no hierarchy; the leader merely intervenes in general or in individual cases when he considers the members of his staff inadequate to a task with which they have been entrusted.\(^1\)

Unlike the formal and written regulation of bureaucratic behavior, the character of charismatic decision-making is arbitrary. The laws of the Medes and Persians may have grown dangerous in their rigidity, but the laws of the charismatic authority strike with the speed and irregularity of lightning. Again, Weber is worth quoting:

From a substantive point of view, every charismatic authority would have to subscribe to the proposition, 'It is written...'

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but I say unto you...." The genuine prophet, like the genuine military leader and every true leader in this sense, preaches, creates, or demands new obligations.

The Revolutionary system in the post-Independence years has indeed to create a new pattern of obligations and allegiance, and there has been a marked tendency on the part of the leaders of such systems, like Nkrumah of Ghana, to want to borrow the phrase, "Behold I make all things new...."

The relationship between group differentiation and functional specificity is a useful framework for the analysis of corruption in developing systems. The imprecise definition of the expected performance of actors in the Revolutionary system, and the diffuse spheres in which the elite may make authoritative decisions, make for ill-organized and inefficient political activity, and for a high incidence of corruption.

Colin Leys has argued that there is a deplorable lack of systematic analysis of corruption. The issue central to the problem in his words is "the existence of a standard of behavior according to which the action in question breaks some rule, written or unwritten, about the proper purposes to which a public office or a public

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1 institution may be put." The functional diffusion of political structures in the Revolutionary system means that well integrated standards of behavior are unlikely to control political behavior, but at the same time, the constitutional differentiation in these systems implies that some limits are known to exist in any particular arena of political action. The Minister of Finance, in a Revolutionary system, is given the responsibility of managing the state's economic progress. But the functionally diffuse nature of his office encourages him to act as 'politician' and as a 'civilized man'. Because the functional demands of each of these roles is not clearly defined, he may well dispense state funds for the grooming of his constituency, and for the purchase of 'civilized' symbols, such as a gold bedstead or a Mercedes Benz. It is not that standards of behavior do not exist, but that it is possible to confuse what specified standards apply to any particular behavior.

Leys implies that it is not possible to judge the corruption of political behavior in new states, in terms of ethno-centric morality:

Poised as they are between the inherited public morality of the Western nation-

state and the disappearing morality of the tribe, they are subject to very considerable cross-pressures which make it unlikely that the western state morality, at least in its refined and detailed forms, will emerge as the new public morality of these countries.

It is nonetheless true that this duplication of moral expectations, and the diffuse functional definition of political structures, does not obliterate the problems of corruption. Rather, it magnifies them. The justified performance of one function may corrupt the performance of another. The rectitude of action in terms of one set of moral principles may be corrupt in terms of another. The lack of organized standards of behavior, and organized functional requirements in the structure of the Revolutionary system, makes corruption a likely feature of that system. The higher degree of functional specificity in the organization of the Stabilizing system makes for a reduction of corruption in that system. Corruption, therefore, is a useful index of comparison.

Functional specificity is the key to the structural organization of the Modern system. The specificity of bureaucratically organized roles is common to the multiple collectivities that participate within the political process and give it its structural complexity. The division of labor is highly advanced in the Modern system.

in response to the demands of a highly developed technology. Constitutional limitations define functionally specific political structures, and the separation of powers (in the American sense or not) illustrates the sharing of power according to specified areas of competence.

Value Structure

The importance of the structure of social values to the wider problem of order and organization was well appreciated by Emile Durkheim, and by Parsons, who comments on the former's work: "A society, as Durkheim expressed it, is a 'moral community' and only insofar as it is such does it possess stability.... Durkheim arrives at the position that a common value system is one of the required conditions for a society to be a stable system in equilibrium 1

The structural adaptation to the demands of order and organization centers around the building of a 'moral community' in which there is a consensus relating to the valued means and ends of political activity. Fig. III illustrates the changing patterns of value structure in developing political systems.

Fig. III

**AFFECTIVE VALUES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ceremonial</th>
<th>Conservative</th>
<th>Progressive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Traditional</td>
<td>Revolutionary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stabilizing</td>
<td>Modern</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The structure of social value-orientation may conveniently be analyzed in terms of two value categories. Parsons distinguishes between three aspects of, or modes of, orientation towards action - the cognitive, cathetic (positive or negative orientation to action), and the evaluative. The latter distinction seems to be redundant, since both cognitive and cathetic values may be normatively justified. Fig. III contrasts cognitive with affective values, and the term 'affective' may be transposed for 'cathetic'.

"Ceremonial" value-orientation places value on the authority of the transcendent. It stresses an apocalyptic vision of an 'other-worldly' existence, and evaluates

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Talcott Parsons, *The Social System*, p. 46.
action in terms of its approximation to the standards prescribed in that other world. Action in 'this' world is subject to the judgment and uncontrollable intervention of 'that' world. The fate of man is determined by the Divine. "Instrumental" value-orientation, in contrast, values empirical evidence and verification. The 'good' is determined not by metaphysical absolutes, but by the operational utility of material means for the attainment of materially defined ends. Ceremonial values orient superstitious behavior; instrumental values orient rational and scientific behavior.

Affective values are conservative or progressive in their orientation towards action. The distinction is particularly relevant to an analysis of change. The conservative orientation is negatively oriented towards change, and places value on the preservation of the existing structure, and its consolidation. The progressive orientation is positively oriented towards change, and equates change with improvement in the existing structure.

The classification of cognitive values made here, is similar to Weber's distinction between Zweckrational and Wertrational. The former is action in terms of rational orientation to a system of discrete individual ends, while the latter is action in terms of rational orientation towards an absolute value. Weber also distinguishes
between an affectual orientation, that is emotional, and action which is traditionally oriented, through habituation of long practice. We have preferred to make a more direct differentiation between rational and irrational cognitive values, although the typological distinction in no way obscures the "mixed" nature of the actual systems. Weber relates his analysis of value-orientation to his distinction between rational-legal authority, traditional authority, and charismatic authority. The first rests "on a belief in the legality of patterns of normative rules and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands." The second type is based "on an established belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of the status of those exercising authority under them." Charismatic authority rests "on devotion to the specific and exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person, and of the normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by him." The Charismatic structure of authority fits well with the Revolutionary


2 Ibid., p. 328.
system in Fig. III, the rational-legal with the Stabili-
zing and Modern systems in that model.

The Traditional system is conservative in its orien-
tation towards change, and ceremonial in its regularized
patterns of interaction within the political system. The
chief is a political and religious officer, and authority
is handed down from the ancestors, whose influence is
still felt to be pervasive in the system. The influence
of ritual is the key to the importance of ceremonial
values in the making of political decisions. Fortes and
Evans-Pritchard point to the significance of ceremonial
cognition in African political systems:

Africans...do not analyze their social
system; they live it. They think and feel
about it in terms of values which reflect,
in doctrine and symbol, but do not explain,
the forces which really control their social
behavior. Outstanding among these values
are the mystical values dramatized in the
great public ceremonies and bound up with
their key political institutions.... Their
mystical form is due to the ultimate and
axiomatic character of the body of moral and
legal norms which could not be kept in being,
as a body, by secular sanctions.1

The Revolutionary system combines progressive with
ceremonial value-orientations. Rapid change is highly

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valued as the necessary prelude to the achievement of an ideal state, which is ceremonially defined. David Apter talks of political religion in the mobilization system (his term for a political system in which new, modernizing values are created), and he talks of the religious basis of ceremonial values, which he calls "consummatory values".

If in the church bingo and salvation exist side by side, so in politics do instrumental and consummatory values. The balance between them determines the form of legitimacy, and fear of its declining is perhaps the single overriding concern of political leaders in new and modernizing nations.

In the Revolutionary system, the balance between instrumental and ceremonial values is weighted on the side of the latter, and the form of legitimacy is charismatic - authority deriving from a 'gift of grace'. Even in cases where instrumental values are introduced, such as in the new cash economy and the non-traditional election, or appointment, of political officers, the instrumental values are relevated to the status of ceremonially justified values.

In the Stabilizing system, the orientation towards change is more conservative, and the appeal is not to rapid change towards the attainment of some apocalyptic

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vision of the perfect state, but to the orderly improvement of the presently constructed system. Whereas the Revolutionary system is ceremonially oriented, the Stabilizing system places high value on the instrumental orientation in political action. There is a sharp distinction between the ideological emphasis in Revolutionary and stabilizing societies. In the former system, there is a demand for rapid movement towards a modernized socio-political society, but the means of achieving that state of nirvana are the means of grace handed down by the Revolutionary elite. In the latter system, the emphasis is on a more gradual movement towards modernization, and the movement is justified in terms of efficient and rational choice. David Apter explains the difference:

At its widest limits, the modernization process is the confrontation of the ideologue and the scientist, not because their respective ethics are antagonistic but because of the changes that occur in the modernization process itself.... Ultimately the modernizing elites must accept an ideology of science.... This type of ideology is based on the need for information, verification, experimentation, and empiricism. Modernizing elites must also accept rules of eligibility based on technical expertise.

The instrumental orientation of the Stabilizing system marks its movement towards an ideology of science, and

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David Apter, The Politics of Modernization, pp. 172-175.
towards accepting that eligibility in the political system is based on technological expertise.

The modern system is both progressive in its orientation towards change, and highly instrumental in its definition of political policy and problems. Progress in the Modern system is highly valued, but the concept of progress is limited by an instrumental definition of achievement. Talcott Parsons emphasized this in his discussion of the Universalistic-Achievement pattern:

...the choice of goals and not merely the attainment of goals derived from other value-considerations should be regarded as an expression of the actor's achievement values. This, in the first place, eliminates traditionalism as a criterion of goal selection. But it also seems to exclude a universalistically defined absolute goal system, because this is intrinsically capable of attainment once and for all, and such attainment would from then on deprive the achievement component of the value-system of its meaning.

The instrumental orientation towards policy in the Modern system is reflected in the value placed on the informed opinion of specialists (working in bureaucratic agencies and in universities), and in the highly valued freedom to criticize from an informed standpoint. The political system accepts the instrumental ethic of the scientist as the evaluative standard of its own action, and, as

the Modern system progresses, it may be, as Walter Lippmann recently suggested, that the University becomes an institutional political informer and critic. This does not mean that the professional scientist becomes the professional politician; it does mean that the standards of the professional in science become the necessary standards of the professional in the political system.

This pattern of structural development is illustrated by Charles Madge, in his discussion of the social 'eidos,' by which he means "The predominate character of the whole stock of ideas available in a society or group." 2 The three stages he outlines in the development of the social eidos are archaic thought, the stage dominated by the teachers of morality, and the third stage, dominated by natural science. The first stage is dominated by the elements of magical and irrational symbolism in the thinking of primitive society - the ceremonial value-orientation of our model. The sophisticated usage of metaphor in more developed societies depends on the insights of paradoxical and logically independent juxto-


position of images. Bronowski argues that this ability to see likeness in unlikeness is the essence of the creative imagination in both scientific and poetic thought in Western society. The sophistication of this modern imagery lies in the distinction between comparison and identification. In the eidos of archaic society there is "a purely analogical symbolism, in which an element A is persistently stated to be not analogous with but identical with another element B... It is an integral part of primitive social eidos as expressed, for example, in the institutions of totemism." From this early metaphoric absolutism, Madge argues that there develops a progressive rationality in the thought of the teachers of morality, and the teaching of natural science. This rationality becomes increasingly a justification for political action:

The point to be emphasized in this brief analysis is the pressure which exists in modern society towards a belief in the technical-rational validity of the basic economic and political instruments as social regulators. They are conceived as

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the basic rational means towards progress. Behind this conception are two assumptions that are absolutely fundamental, firstly the assumption that rationality is what is to be aimed at and secondly, the assumption that rationality is virtually the same as rational-technicality; i.e. the expert and efficient use of means.

The progressive rationality of political culture, in the structure of political ideas, is clearly a part of the pattern of development as pictured in Fig. III. In these terms, we may speak of the Stabilizing society as more developed in the transition from the Traditional than the Modern, although the radical nature of the movement on which it is based may lead more superficial analysis to think otherwise. This model therefore, serves as a basis for the ordering of data on a comparative level, and in terms of dynamic development.

The pattern of change illustrated by this model of order and organization is best demonstrated by a single matrix, which contrasts the four types of political system with each of the variables discussed in this chapter.

2. I am grateful to Prof. Claude Phillips, Jr. for pointing this out to me.
### TRADITIONAL REVOLUTIONARY STABILIZING MODERN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Order</th>
<th>*high</th>
<th>low</th>
<th>low</th>
<th>*high</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>*high</td>
<td>*high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coercion</td>
<td>*low</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>*low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional Complexity</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>*high</td>
<td>*high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group Differentiation</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>*high</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>*high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Functional Specificity</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>*high</td>
<td>*high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affective Values</td>
<td>low (conservative)</td>
<td>low (progressive)</td>
<td>*high</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cognitive Values</td>
<td>low (ceremonial)</td>
<td>*high (instrumental)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Most developed structural characteristic.

This matrix shows an intriguing pattern of development from Traditional to Modern systems in terms of an involved dialectical adaptation to the most developed structural characteristics. Following each pair of variables along the horizontal axis it will be noticed that each succeeding system is the structural antithesis of its predecessor in terms of the innovation made to one of the
variables. One characteristic is maintained, while the other is reversed. The process resolves itself in a synthesis of the developed structural characteristics in the Modern system. This synthesis is illustrated on the vertical plane of the matrix. Here it is seen that the Revolutionary system and the Traditional system each show two of the most developed structural characteristics, but in each system they are different characteristics. The Stabilizing system has four of the most developed characteristics, but it has none of the developed characteristics of the Traditional and Revolutionary systems. Finally, the Modern system incorporates all of the most developed characteristics that have evolved in the preceding systems.

The simplicity of the matrix does not detract from its heuristic advantages. Political development can be explained in terms of a process of patterned innovation that conforms to the pattern of natural evolution. A conservative tendency is manifest in the maintenance of one characteristic in the face of a progressive innovation in a related structural characteristic. The model is a 'developmental construct' well suited to the analysis of political development.

In the following chapters, this model is applied to
the study of the political systems of Ghana and Nigeria where development is analyzed within the framework of the Revolutionary and Stabilizing systems. As we have said before, a coup d'état does not necessarily indicate a change from one system to the other, but it is a central hypothesis of this paper that the military regimes now in power have tended to move in the direction of the Stabilizing system in an effort to reconcile the dysfunctional conflicts in the Revolutionary system, that we hypothesize was characteristic of the government of the post-Independence era. In order to support this hypothesis certain questions, that arise from the model of order and organization, must be answered. To what degree has coercion been necessary for the maintenance of authority in the political system prior to the coups as contrasted with the system established after the coups? Have the military regimes, vis-a-vis the civilian, been more or less legitimate in terms of this reliance on coercion, and in terms of the relative degree of organization of role expectations in the political system? Has there been a significant change in the institutional complexity of the political system before and after the coups? This question is particularly concerned with the degree to which opposition and conflict are institutionally organized in the system. Has institutional
organization been made more or less complex by the increase in the participation of divergent groups in the political system? How great was the group differentiation in the political system prior to the coup compared with that after the coup? Are authoritative institutions functionally specific or diffuse? Is the differentiation between groups based on personal and ascriptive criteria, or on bureaucratic and achievement criteria? What significance is there in the incidence of corruption in both periods? Finally, with respect to values, is the political ideology based on absolute goals, to be attained by the ceremonial activity of the 'priest' of the gospel of radical change, or is it based on a more conservative goal of order and organization within the present system, to be achieved by the rational choice of the most effective means to the attainment of select, individual goals?
The present territories of Ghana and Nigeria have enjoyed very similar political experiences. They were both subject to British colonial administration, and therefore, to the vagaries of "indirect rule". They both achieved independence from the colonial power - Ghana in 1957 and Nigeria in 1960. In neither country was there any 'war' of liberation, and the peaceful transference of authority was preceded by constitutional conferences, and effective cooperation between nationalist leaders and colonial administrators. After independence, both countries remained within the British Commonwealth of Nations; both territories were the scene of military coups early in 1966. At this level of generalization, however, it is as easy to point to the differences between the two political systems. Whereas in Ghana, a unitary system was in operation, Nigeria was based on a complicated federal constitution. The two-party Westminster model of parliamentary government was replaced in Ghana by the constitutional establishment of a one-party state, but in Nigeria the government and opposition parties continued to coexist, and in large measure, cooperate. The radical Marxist oriented ideology of Nkrumah's Ghana differed from the conservative opposi-
tion to rapid change of Sir Abubakar, and the more pragmatic 'neutralism' of Nigerian foreign policy. Such generalizations offer little help to the student of comparative politics. There is much to be said on both sides.

In this chapter generalizations are made on the basis of our model of order and organization, and the political systems of Ghana and Nigeria are compared to the typological Revolutionary system of the model. No mathematical exactitude is attempted in the measurement of the variables that form significant relationships in the total structure. Rather conceptual clarity is the aim of the analysis, and the data is ordered and compared by reference to a coherent theoretical framework.

Following the model, the Revolutionary system is characterized by high degree of coercion, and a relatively low degree of institutional complexity. The first questions to be answered, therefore, are 1) to what degree has coercion been an instrument in the maintenance of the political system? 2) To what degree have the structures of role-patterns and value-expectations relating to the political system been complex? This second question can best be answered by an analysis of the role of opposition and divergent interest groups within the political system.
Ghana became an independent nation-state in 1957, Nigeria in 1960. Before these dates, however, native Ghanaians and Nigerians were playing new roles in the colonial political systems, and new patterns of value-expectation were making an impression on the imperial authorities. Under 'indirect rule' the traditional authorities in Ghana and Nigeria became agents of the colonial government, and small numbers of British officials, with limited armed forces, exercised authority through the agency of traditional rulers. Only in the North of Nigeria, where the traditional Hausa and Fulani emirates were complex and hierarchical political structures, was the system successful. The creation of 'sole native authorities' in the territories of the Yoruba and Ibo, and in Ghana, ran counter to the traditional system of communal authority, where the age-set more than the particular individual was the structural key to the authoritative system. New and unnatural roles were forced on the majority of the traditional political systems, and the legitimacy of the Stool, for example, became the legitimacy of the British crown. But, it 'indirect rule' made for changed patterns of role-performance and value-expectation in the traditional African society, it did not make the structural characteristics of the political system any more complex.
Institutional complexity was the result of exogenous, not indigenous, forces. The experience of African military personnel in the second World War, and the impressions of African students in Europe and the United States, introduced a new image of the political system. The defeat of European forces by colored forces in Asia, and the demand for self-determination by colonial peoples in Asia and the Middle East, brought a new image of the role of traditional peoples in the wider World political system.

Ghana

By 1957, new political roles and value-expectations had been institutionalized in the many political parties that have been formed in Ghana. J. B. Danquah, the Gold Coast lawyer, had founded the United Gold Coast Convention, and he invited Kwame Nkrumah to leave his organizational work for the Pan-African movement in London and become the Secretary of the UGCC. Nkrumah found the UGCC uncongenial to his own radical determination to

For the growth of nationalism and new political systems in the non-Western World see Rupert Emerson, From Empire to Nation (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1962), and James S. Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958).
institute rapid change in the Gold Coast, and in 1949 he established the Convention People's Party. Under the organizational ability of K. A. Gbedemah, the CPP rapidly became the most potent political organization in the colony. But the growth of the CPP did not, at first, reduce the institutional complexity of the Gold Coast political system. Various opposition alignments were organized before independence, notably the Ghana Congress Party (established in 1952), and the National Liberation Movement, which replaced the GCP in 1954. The elections in 1954 demonstrated the complex web of political affiliations that had been developed in the Gold Coast by this time, and the elections were fought amidst conflict between the major mass political parties, and between various ethnic political associations like the Togoland Congress, the Moslem Association Party, and the Northern Peoples Party. The strength of the combined opposition forces was not reflected in the CPP's victory, with 72 of the 104 available seats. This 70% hold on the parliamentary seats represented only 55.5% of the popular vote. The opposition polled 44.6% of the vote, and received only 30% of the seats. The consolidation

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of the National Liberation Movement, which had a strong concentration of support in the Ashanti region, did not change this position in the election of 1956. "As in the last election, the effect of the voting was once again to distort the actual picture of party strengths: to him that hath was given. For every four voters who cast their vote for the CPP, there were three who voted for alternative candidates; but, with 57% of the votes, the CPP won 67% of the contested seats."

In March 1957, Ghana became independent, and the CPP under the leadership of Nkrumah became the first ruling party of the country. The healthy optimism with which Ghana was regarded was justified. The country had a well-established economy by colonial standards, a Constitution closely modelled on the British one and an apparently vital political system, in which opposition was a prominent feature. This was particularly true in October, 1957, when the United Party was formed under the leadership of Dr. K. Busia, and the previously disparate groupings appeared to be taking on a new cohesion.

But, the optimism sprang from a misunderstanding of the Ghanaian political system. The constitution provided a legal framework for a unified and organized political

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system, and the parliamentarians subscribed to the norms of procedural political behavior as laid down therein. The Legislative Assembly Debates of the Ghanaian parliament read much the same as Hansard. But, this procedural organization failed to point to the real lack of organization in the political system as Ghana became independent. For in reality the political system had not as yet emerged as an organized structure. Rather there were two systems, deriving their separate legitimacy from different sources. On the one hand were aligned the chiefs and the representatives of local, ethnic and traditional interests, and on the other hand, there was the CPP, standing for the rapid modernization of the state, and for the complete replacement of the traditional system. Far from being an organized system of role-relationships and values relating to the exercise of authority, there was a real disintegration of role and value that stemmed from the conflicting interests of traditional and secular authority. David Apter has shown the degree to which this competition reflected a division between two political systems, not conflict within one, and he comments on the issue:

It is only after the substantive issues of legitimacy have been fought out to the level of consensus that a sustaining and institutionalized system of political roles appears.
Equally it is only when effective public support and effective authority are in organizational identity that legitimacy is possible. The presence of traditional authority in significant measures at local levels indicates that the substantive issues of legitimacy are still being fought out, and that consensus has not been achieved, as yet, throughout the system. Therefore a sustaining and institutionalized system of political roles in the secular pattern has not yet been fully achieved.

It was the task of the newly independent Ghanaian government, led by Dr. Nkrumah, to mould a new political structure in which the conflicting systems of traditional and secular authority would be reorganized into a more complex but better integrated system. In attempting to fulfill this task, the government of Ghana restructured a new political system along the lines of the Revolutionary model. Events after 1957 show a close relationship between increased coercion and decreasing complexity in the institutional structure of the political system.

Violence and coercion ushered in the new regime. Even while the independence celebrations were in progress in Accra, disturbances in the Alavanyo district, led by members of the Togoland Congress, had to be put down by government troops and police. Soon thereafter, the CPP moved against the opposition. In 1957, Basia became

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Ghana's first political exile. In March of that year, the Regional Assemblies, the centers of local and traditional opposition to the central government, were abolished. In August, 1957, the Deportation Act was passed and in July, the Preventive Detention Act was introduced to "empower the Government to imprison, without trial, any persons suspected of activities prejudicial to the State's security." Such imprisonment could be for five years. Leading Nigerian business merchants, who had given funds to the United Party, were deported to their home country. The political activities of the Asantahene, the most prominent traditional authority in the Ashanti territory, a center of concentrated opposition strength, were subjected to governmental investigation. Prominent members of the United Party executive were accused of participating in a plot to assassinate Nkrumah, and were put into prison under preventive detention.¹

In November 1958 some 38 members of the opposition were in detention. One of those accused was the secretary-general of the UF, whose seat (Sekyere West) was con-

tested in the by-election in 1959. Busia, now returned from exile, also fought an election in that year. Both he, and the other UP candidate lost, and the election was marked by considerable violence and governmental coercion, in which two CPP supporters were killed, and 58 persons arrested. By 1960, the effects of the government's activity were clear. Of the 32 opposition members at Independence, 3 were in detention, 1 was in exile, and 12 had crossed to the government's side.

The inability of the government to accept the institutional complexity of the position of an opposition in the political system was made clear, not only by the coercive action against party leaders of the opposition, but also by the increasing intolerance of the participation of other interest groups in the political system. In 1959, for example, Nkrumah referred to the University at Legon as "a breeding ground for unpatriotic and anti-government elements." He found it intolerable that "we should be training people, most of whom will eventually come into Government service who will be permeated with an anti-Government attitude, that is to say, an anti-Covention People's Party attitude.... How can these people serve loyally the Government and the State?"

1 quoted in Dennis Austin, Politics in Ghana, p. 365.
This was a prelude to future interference with the autonomy of the university. Another sector of the society to feel the effects of governmental coercion was the trade union movement. In 1958, the Industrial Relations Act was passed, bringing the entire movement under the control of the Ghana Trades Union Congress (TUC), whose general secretary, John Tettegah, was a staunch CPP member. Under the "new structure" a supreme congress made up of elected representatives of each of the national unions, and an executive board elected by the congress, formed the apex of the power structure in the union movement. A cabinet minister made it clear in a public address that all these posts were to be filled by militant members of the CPP. Opposition within the trade union movement was brought to a head by the Sekondi-Takoradi strike, organized by the Railway and Harbor Workers Union of Sekondi-Takoradi, a persistent opponent of the new structure. The strike was called while Nkrumah was away from Ghana, and the Presidential Commission appointed to take charge of government business in his absence declared a state of emergency. Although

union officials called for the workers to go back to work, the United Party had actively espoused the cause of the workers and was telling the rank and file workers to hold fast. When Nkrumah returned, he began by calling off the state of emergency and ordering the release of all persons arrested in connection with the strike. When this conciliatory action failed to have any effect, he informed the public that maximum force would be used if the strike was not brought to an end, and that persons furthering the aims of the strike thenceforward would be considered guilty of trying to overthrow the government. In response to this threat of coercive reprisal, the workers went back to their jobs. In response to the strike, the government detained the official leaders of the union in Sekondi-Takoradi, and others who had supported the opposition. All told, some 47 persons were detained. The TUC took over the executive management of the Railway Union. The trade union movement was effectively consolidated within the structure of the CPP. The complex role of opposition in political society was being simplified. Instead of being integrated within

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1 The details of the strike, and its effects on subsequent government action, are well detailed in St. Clair Drake and Leslie Alexander Lacy, "Government Versus the Unions."
the total structure of the political system, opposition was being eliminated from participation in Ghana. Integration was being achieved at the cost of the development of a simplified, monolithic structure, which could be maintained only by coercion.

Internal dissention within the CPP itself was provoked by the disquieting influence of the opposition in the 1961 strike. Opposition within the new structure, as with opposition without, could not be countenanced. In September, 1961, the party's top leadership was purged by the removal from office, and from the CPP, of Komla Gbedemah (Minister of Health, and the manager of CPP organization since its inception), and Kojo Botsio (Director of ideological studies for the CPP). Botsio was later restored to official favor, though Gbedemah went into exile. Later in the year, Krobo Edusei (Minister of Communications and Transport) was expelled from the cabinet.

By this time the list of governmental legislation, passed to facilitate coercive obstruction to opposition, included the Investigation of Crimes Act (1958), whereby the Attorney-General could compel any subject to supply information in cases where crimes against the state were involved. The 1959 Offenses Against the State Act gave judges the power to sentence persons convicted of making
false reports about Ghana to terms of imprisonment of up to fifteen years. In 1960 the Sedition Act provided for imprisonment of up to fifteen years for any persons found guilty of intentionally exhorting the overthrow of the government by illegal means. In 1961, the Government passed the Criminal Procedures Act, which provided for the establishment of special courts to enact the death penalty without trial by jury. In the same year, the Emergency Powers Act gave the President the right to enact a state of emergency by legislative instrument when he considered conditions to merit such action. While the importance of coercion to the maintenance of the system is clearly forecast in this list of legislation, it does not point to the simultaneous reduction of diverse interest groups, and their incorporation within the simplified institutional structure of the CPP, now increasingly identified with the state. CPP authority and personnel were introduced in the United Ghana Farmers' Council and the National Council of Ghana Women, while other groups representing similar interests were abolished. Through the agency of the Young Pioneers, the League of Ghana Patriots and the Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute, the CPP encompassed all interests in what was still a pluralistic society. Diverse interests were made subject to the single interest of a monolithic institution - the Convention People's
Party. It is interesting to note the position of the apostrophe in the word "People's" - the accent is on a single, corporate organism, not a plural, complex association of individual units. This indeed is the essence of the revolutionary system, that institutional complexity is reduced to a simplified organic institutionalization, in which those that are not for us must be against us. This process is clearly shown in the development of Ghana's press. The major opposition paper, the Ashanti Pioneer, was subjected to vigorous censorship, and eventually capitulated to the government. All other forms of mass communication were in the control of the Government, and the CPP press lost any identification with a separate institutional position within the society. The Evening News, and notably the later publications The Spark and The Dawn, became simply the mouthpiece of the Party. This pattern of decreasing complexity in the framework of Ghanaian political society is illustrated by one of the prominent party officials writing about the structure of the Ghana political system. He refers to the CPP attempt to obliterate the conflict between rural and urban interests, the opposition of the local, traditionally oriented area to the new centralized government:

The administration of villages falls on the
shoulders of CPP members appointed from the Party. The government wants to make sure that laws passed by the government will be observed by the citizens and also to give them the opportunity to take part in the government. President Nkrumah has declared, 'The real responsibility for the administration of a village...will comprise the Party representatives of the village. The Party and Government will then be able to rest content that State administration goes down right to the town and village levels and makes the ordinary worker, farmer and peasant a participant in the government of the country'.... One cannot draw a line in Ghana between the Party and the State. The Party is the State and the State is the Party.

No better illustration of the lack of institutional complexity in the Revolutionary system could be found.

This process of integration by abolishing diverse interests in the society failed to obliterate the role and value-expectations of the opposition. What it did was to make violence the only means of political activity available to the opposition, and thereby to increase the probability that coercion would be used - perhaps be essential - to the continued survival of the political system. This was made abundantly clear at Kulungugug on August 1, 1962, when an attempt was made to assassinate President Nkrumah. Leading CPP members were brought to trial for complicity in the assassination, and in the

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first trials five people were found guilty of treason and sentenced to death. In the major trial of CPP leaders, Tawia Adamafio, Ako Adjei, Coffie Crabbe and two others, R. B. Otchere and Yaw Manu, the evidence was extremely dubious, and the Chief Justice acquitted the three CPP leaders. Although the assassination attempt had been the motivation for a relaxation in CPP coercion (various detainees had been released, among whom was the intellectual leader of the UP, Joe Appiah), the decision in this trial provoked new coercive measures. Nkrumah had a special act passed empowering the President to quash any decisions of the Supreme Court, and he declared the acquittal null and void. Furthermore, he dismissed the Chief Justice, Sir Arku Korsah. A new trial was called, and in February, 1963, the new Chief Justice, Julius Sarkodu Adoo, condemned Adamafio, Adjei and Crabbe to death. The CPP had incorporated the once independent judiciary, and further accelerated the process of simplifying the institutional structure of the society.

In January, 1964, another attempt to assassinate the President was made within the well defended walls of Flagstaff House by a police constable, Seth Amatewee. Again, here was evidence of the relationship between violence and the failure to integrate the role of opposition within the political system. And again, this act
of violence resulted in increased coercive retaliation by the Government. E. R. Madjitey, the Commissioner of Police, and his Assistant Commissioner, S. D. Amaning, and eight other senior police officers were dismissed. Detention orders were served on Amaning, a police superintendent and J. B. Danquah, the venerable leader of the UP. The University again became a target for coercion. De Graft Johnson, the Director of the Institute for Public Education, was detained; a British physicist, Dr. Osborne, was held for questioning; and six senior members of the university were deported. In connection with the University, it was announced that for the "purposes of our revolution, the hallmark of good conduct in our universities should be close identification with the spirit and objects of the Party."

The degree to which opposition had been dispelled from the institutional structure of the political system, and the degree to which institutional complexity had been reduced, are made perfectly clear by the results of the referendum held in January, 1964. The referendum was

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1 For these details see Dennis Austin, Politics in Ghana, pp. 409-414.

held to legitimate the right of the President to remove judges of the Supreme Court, and most importantly, to constitutionally establish Ghana as a one-party state. If passed, the relevant amendments concerned with the one-party state would provide that "in conformity with the interests, welfare, and aspirations of the people and to 'develop the organizational initiative and political activity of the people, there shall be one national party in Ghana.' This party would be the 'vanguard of our people in their struggle to build a socialist society and the leading core of all organizations of the people.'"

The referendum also illustrated the degree to which coercion had become a function of the maintenance of the established political system. The results of the voting were:

<table>
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<th>Yes</th>
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Registered Electorate 2,877,464  92.8 per cent poll

Dennis Austin implies that the results are only intelligible in terms of governmental coercion:

Results of this kind were nonsensical. Malpractices were reported as being so widespread

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that the referendum was an administrative exercise by the party rather than a test of public opinion. The most common device used by the party officers was that of sealing (or removing) the "No" box. Even so, there must have been a very large number of fictitious votes to produce a 93% poll.

The results, however, meant that Ghana's political system now became formally identical with the structure of the Convention People's Party. In February, 1964, Ghana became a one-party state. Only two years later came the military coup d'etat.

This analysis shows that the political system of post-Independence Ghana (1957-1966) closely approximates the model of the Revolutionary system. In attempting to integrate the conflicting political systems of traditional authority and modern secular authority, the CPP chose to restructure the institutionally complex society of 1957 by expanding the simplified structure of the Party. Only those roles and values that related to the ruling party were legitimate in the revolutionary system of these years. This decrease in the institutional complexity of the system was accompanied by an increasing level of coercion within the authoritative system. Until the time of its demise, one-party Ghana failed to adapt to the demands of stability that this

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Dennis Austin, Politics in Ghana, p. 414.
increased coercion denied. What organization was achieved by Nkrumah's party, was achieved at the expense of order. The integrated party failed to accommodate to the diverse patterns of role and value expectation that were common amongst large segments of the society.

Nigeria

We turn now to Nigeria, but continue to show the relationship between coercion and limited institutional complexity. At first glance, Nigeria is a far more complex structural unit than is Ghana. The largest state in Africa, Nigeria is the home of diverse tribal groups, of which the three most prominent are the Hausa, the Yoruba and the Ibo. The obvious pluralism of the society was preserved in the post-independent political system by the creation of a complicated federal constitution, in which first three, and later four, regions shared political authority with the national government. This constitution was not altered until the coup in January, 1966, and therefore, it is not as easy to demonstrate the reduction in institutional complexity in Nigeria as it was in Ghana, where obvious constitutional changes pointed in that direction. Secondly, it is not possible to show a continuing and increasing level of coercion as being characteristic of the Nigerian political system.
The norms governing the independence of the judiciary, and deference to the constitution were more strongly established in the Nigerian political system than they seem to have been in the Ghanaian, and this assuredly has something to do with limiting governmental authority. Nonetheless, these first appearances should not prevent a close analysis of the relationship between coercion and limited institutional complexity in the Nigerian political system.

"Indirect rule" in Nigeria consolidated the authority of the Muslim Emirates in the northern regions of the country, but as in Ghana, the system was not entirely successful in the southern regions of the country. The establishment of 'sole native authorities' was inconsistent with the traditional systems of both the Yoruba in the West and the Ibo in the East. As a result, the system was a source of grievance in the South, while it was very easily accommodated in the North. Under British imperial rule, the South became more wealthy than the North, and, in the main, better educated. The great universities of Timbuktu had long since disappeared, and the strong Islamic tradition isolated the North from the educational impetus, such as it was, of the missionaries, who prospered in the southern regions. The close contact with the authorities and traders in the South, coupled with this
greater exposure to Western education and the disruptive influences in the system of "indirect rule", not unnaturally made the southern regions the early home of Nigerian nationalism. The National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons was founded as a political party in 1944 by Herbert Macaulay and Nnamdi Azikiwe. When in 1961 the people of the Southern Cameroons Trust Territory decided to join with their neighboring Cameroon Republic, the NCNC became the National Convention of Nigerian Citizens. Motivated by fear of radical southern influence on political development of the North, a "social and cultural organization" was formed in the North in 1948, calling itself the Northern Peoples' Congress. This organization became a political party in 1951. In the West, a similar cultural organization was established to protect the cultural homogeneity of the Yoruba. Called the Gebe Omo Oduduwa (The Society of the Descendents of Oduduwa), this organization was also converted in 1951 into a "Western Regional Political Organization," and in this form became known as the Action Group. The predominant ethnosectionalism of each of the regions, and the constitutional development that gave residual power to the regions in the constitutions of 1951 through 1960 enabled each of these three political parties to exercise political power in their home
regions. The numerical superiority of the northern region's population, gave it the largest representation in the federal parliament, but not sufficient of a majority to enable it to form a government outside of a coalition. The coalition was formed at the federal level, with the NCNC, who gained the next largest number of seats.

Organization was a prime issue facing the independent government of the newly created state of Nigeria in 1960. If a national political system was to be established, the regional emphasis of party political organization and socio-cultural segments of the society would have to be reduced. The problem was to retain the institutional complexity implicit in pluralistic societies, and at the same time, would an integrated system of role and value-expectations related to a national and supra-regional authority. Richard Sklar has pointed out certain basic contradictions in the system that would have to be resolved if stable political organization was to be achieved. The first of these was the fact that the machinery of the government was basically regionalized, although the party machinery (except in the case of the NPC) attempted to be trans and anti-regional. Secondly, the main opposition group, the Action Group, found itself in a position of protesting the regional emphasis
in the distribution of political power, while deriving its own support from a largely homogeneous regional power group. Thirdly, the constitution gave dominant power to the numerically more powerful Northern Region, whereas the distribution of power in terms of technological development, and therefore, national importance, was centered in the South. In point of fact, these contradictions were never resolved. Regional authority remained the predominant influence in Nigerian politics until 1966. The fact that the national Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, was only the Vice-President of his party, while Alhajju Ahmadu, the Sarduana of Sokoto was President of the party and Prime Minister of the northern region, indicates this failure. So does the fact that succession of the Eastern Region was a serious problem in the constitutional crisis of 1964-65. National governments in Nigeria, no matter how conscientious the attempts to form a "broad-based cabinet", remained regional in character. This was inevitable given the constitutional development of the country. Henry Bretton argues that Nigerian governments dominated by the NPC were the product of colonial policy, not of

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national political development. He says that the dominance of the NPC at the federal level

is the direct result of legal, administrative, and political measures taken by the colonial regime to favor the emergence of a group of rules based on traditional rather than modern concepts and institutions.... The very construction of the Northern Region, in the form in which it entered the era of independence, represents one of the greatest acts of gerrymandering in history.

If the Nigerian political system was to survive as an organized and stable system, the problem of regionalism would have had to be solved. The fact that it did not survive, may be largely attributed to the failure to overcome this regional disorganization. Nonetheless, such efforts as were made to integrate role and value patterns in a supra-regional system show a relationship between decreasing institutional complexity and increased coercion in the authoritative system.

After Independence, the NPC-NCNC coalition formed under the leadership of the Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar, dominated the federal parliament, and the Action Group became the clearly recognized parliamentary opposition. Although the strength of the Action Group had been built up in the Western Region, on the party's stand for regional protection, and the creation of new regions to

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protect ethnic minorities, the position changed after Independence. Chief Awolowo, the party leader, soon became convinced that as an opposition, the Action Group had no chance of coming to power, unless the regional basis of the NPC's power was done away with. He, therefore, advocated a policy of radical anti-regionalism, and of democratic socialism, to devise a nationally planned economy consistent with the needs of a national political economy. This new program was no doubt motivated by political expediency, but it nonetheless suggested a solution to the problem of regionalism. As it happened, the program provoked strong antagonism from within and without the Action Group. It was the reason for the split between Awolowo and his Deputy Leader of the Party, Chief Akintola, who was Premier of the Western Region. That split, in turn, led to the serious breakdown in order in the Western Region, and the subsequent intervention of the Federal Government in the affairs of the Region and the opposition party.

The dismissal of Chief Akintola as Deputy Leader of the Party, by the Party executive, and his dismissal from the office of Premier by the Governor of the Western Region, resulted in rioting in the Western House of Assembly. The Federal Prime Minister called a
meeting of Parliament, and declared the Western Region in a state of emergency. An administrator was appointed to run the affairs of the Region, and he was given wide police powers, including censorship, detention and restriction. These powers were used. All public meetings were banned, the principal organizers and office holders in the Action Group (except those of Akintola's faction) were restricted, and severe censorship of journalists criticizing the Federal Government's dealings in the matter was carried out. Richard Sklar has analyzed these events in detail, and he comments that they suggest the increasingly obvious partiality of the Federal Government, or rather, the Emergency Administration of the Government, for Akintola's faction.

This partiality seems to have become increasingly obvious. The crisis in the Western Region took place in 1962. In 1963 it continued with a judicial dispute concerning the validity of the Governor's dismissal of Akintola. The Federal Supreme Court ruled against the Governor, but on subsequent appeal to the Privy Council in London, his action was upheld. To counter this re-

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versal, the Federal Government amended the constitution of the Western Region, making it unconstitutional to remove the Premier without an adverse vote in the House of Assembly. This amendment was made retroactive to 1960. Subsequently, the right of appeal to the Privy Council was abolished by another constitutional amendment of the Federal Government. In commenting on this action, C. W. Newbury has said:

The political tendencies, then, at the federal level, seem to be not towards regional fragmentation, as was once feared, but towards stronger federal government and the demise of effective opposition at a federal as well as a regional level.

This observation is supported by later developments. Federal Government investigations were made into the activities of statutory corporations closely attached to leading members of the Action Group. The Coker Commission which reported the inquiry found evidence of gross maladministration and misappropriation of public funds for party political purposes. Sklar again comments:

The commission's primary impact was plainly political, and it came down hard against Chief Awolowo, who was alleged to have chosen all four owner-directors of the NIPC and to have had full knowledge of the surreptitious means whereby public funds

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had been diverted into the coffers of the Action Group.¹

No suggestion is made that the Commission's report did not fulfill the demands of legal rectitude. What is interesting is the initiating role of the Federal Government in exposing the leader of the opposition, when corruption of this sort was known to be rife. The President of the Republic himself had been similarly exposed in earlier years.

The position of the Action Group as the official opposition was further compromised in November, 1963, when Chief Awolowo and thirty other persons were charged with treasonable felony and attempting to effect a coup d'etat to overthrow the Federal Government. In December, the Prime Minister announced that Awolowo would no longer be officially recognized as Leader of the Opposition. Chief Akintola was reinstated as Premier of the Western Region in January of the next year. After a trial lasting eight months, Awolowo was sentenced to ten years in prison. The details of the case are unimportant here.²


²Richard Sklar, "The Ordeal of Chief Awolowo," has outlined the main evidence brought before the courts. For a more subjective analysis, and one that presents the case of Awolowo, see Anthony Enaharo, Fugitive Offender: An Autobiography (London: Cassell and Co., 1963).
What is significant is the impact of this reduction of the position of the opposition for the political development of Nigeria.

Early in 1964, the split in the Action Group was formally clarified when Akintola and his faction established a new party in the Western Region, The Nigerian National Democratic Party. The NCNC, however, had previously been attracted to Awolowo's pressure for the formation of a progressive alliance, and now they formed the United Progressive Grand Alliance with the Action Group, which still appeared to be the most popular party in the Western Region. Included in the alliance were the major opposition party in the North, the Northern Elements Progressive Union, and the United Middle Belt Congress, a former ally of the Action Group. In response to this realignment of the opposition, the NPC prepared to secure their electoral strength by the formation of the Nigerian National Alliance, which significantly included the new party of Akintola's, the NNDDP. The first federal elections since Independence were due in December, 1964, and the new alliances presented interesting opportunities to the electorate. The UPGA stood for a trans-regional society; for an integrated national political system, in which the
political subsystems of region and tribe were organized within a more institutionally complex whole. The NNA, in contrast was pledged to the continued predominance of regional politics in Nigeria. This was always the position of the NPC, and it was the basis of the split between Akintola and Awolowo. The election, therefore, would be a crucial step in the development towards a more stable political order. Even if the UPGA failed to achieve a majority, it could nonetheless present a cohesive national front, and in its election campaigning and in subsequent sessions of the Federal Parliament, it had the opportunity to build into Nigerian public opinion roles and value-expectations related to an institutionally complex, but politically organized, nation-state. Furthermore, the ability of the Government to adapt to the new opposition alignment, would be a crucial indicator of the ability of the system to integrate and sustain the complex role of opposition in a political system. An analysis of the election, however, shows that the government chose to prevent the possibility of increasing the institutional complexity of the political system by consolidating regional power politics. In doing this, they increased the level of coercion in the maintenance of the existing system, by tampering
with the electoral procedures, and by countering opposition to their activities with increased police and military coercion.

Of fundamental importance to the position of the NPC in the national government was the simple truth that in Nigeria numbers meant power. The federal census, therefore, was crucial to the continued dominance of the North. In 1962, the first of a series of census controversies arose, when the figures of that year seemed to give an increased distribution of population in the southern regions. Prime Minister Balewa, with the support of the regional premiers, rejected the figures as unreliable, and ordered a re-count in the interests of Nigerian unity. The agreement reached by the regional premiers was based presumably on the NCNC hope that the recount would consolidate the advantage of the south, and on the NPC conviction that it would maintain its predominant position in the north. The new census was set for 1963. The figures came out in February of 1964, giving a clear superiority to the North. The Eastern and Mid-Western governments rejected the figures. Akintola's Western government, however, found them acceptable, as did the North. This time, Sir Abubakar apparently did not find the interests of Nigerian unity sufficient incentive to challenge the accuracy of the figures and when Azikiwer
appealed later for a postponement of the election, Balewa rejected the idea. The campaigns were fought amidst violence, and frequent complaints of harassment, mass arrests, and malicious prosecution. This was true of all the opposition groups in each region, but the major complaints arose in the Northern region. Joseph Tarka, general secretary of the Northern Progressive Front, was arrested for incitement by local officials in the Northern region. In the Western region political stability had been in jeopardy since the split in the Action Group had become formalized. Stability was maintained only at the cost of governmental coercion. In April, 1964, seventeen persons had been arrested facing charges of creating a political disturbance during a visit of Akintola's to Ilesha. Only the presence of four hundred riot police and the use of tear gas prevented large scale rioting. In June, rioting and looting had continued in the region, and police were stationed outside of prominent politicians' homes.

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As the year progressed, the incidence of violence and coercive retaliation on the part of the government increased. In September, Balewa met with Azikiwe "on urgent state business." They appealed for a cessation of violence in the campaign and Balewa reported that thuggery was to be wiped out. *West Africa* reported that over two hundred people were arrested and detained in Ibadan and Lagos within a week following the government offensive. A police spokesman in Western Nigeria reported that over four hundred persons had been interrogated, and twenty were sentenced to one month prison terms. Two persons were sentenced to two years for willful damage of property. In September, two NNDP politicians were killed within the same week, and in the Tiv division of Northern Nigeria thirty-two persons, described as "mischief makers", were to share two-hundred and fifty years imprisonment. In October, Federal coercion was facilitated by the passage in the Federal parliament of the Newspapers Act, which compelled editors of Nigerian newspapers to register with the government, and produce signed copies of all issues for which they were responsible to the Minister. The law also made the

printing of any "statement, rumor or report," known to be false, punishable by fine or imprisonment. In parliament, Professor Kalu Ezera suggested that the bill was the first step towards the imposition of totalitarian government in Nigeria. In November, before the elections, Sir Abubakar ordered troops of the Federal Army into Tiv. This action provoked a statement from the UPGA which read, "This move savors of the use of force on the part of the NPC and its allies to win the election". The catalogue of violence and coercion is sufficient to suggest the extent to which the peaceful resolution of conflict as a basic value of developed political systems had failed to become an integrated part of Nigerian politics. It shows also that the federal government, by failing to allow for the integration of the role and value-expectations of the opposition was compelled to rely on increased coercion to maintain the system.

The elections, although marred by the high incidence of violence and coercion, were still due to take place on December 30. Nominations for district candidates closed on the 20th, and then came the news that 68 NPC candidates


2 Ibid., November 28, 1964, p. 1346.
were returned unopposed. This fact shattered the hopes of the opposition coalition. The fact was made doubly unpallatable by the acknowledgement of the chairman of the Federal Election Commission that some candidates had been returned unopposed improperly. On December 22, two members of the commission resigned on the grounds that certain irregularities in the electoral procedures were making the election unfair. Another member resigned shortly thereafter for the same reason. This seems to validate the suggestion of the opposition that the government was manipulating the elections. On December 30, the UGPA called for a boycott of the election, having failed to obtain a postponement. As a result, the NNA won 200 seats, and the UGPA won only 54 (mainly in the Mid-Western Region where the boycott was not adhered to). President Azikiwe now informed the nation that he would rather resign than call the Prime Minister to form a government on the basis of this election. The constitutional crisis lasted six days in which both President and Prime Minister are alleged to have consulted the leaders of the Armed Forces. The crisis was brought to an end by a compromise between Azikiwe and Balewa, in which a broad-based government was to be formed, and the elec-

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tions due in 1965 in the Western Region would not be postponed. The election was, therefore, accepted as valid, although the acceptance was by no means universal throughout the UPGA. Dr. Michael Okpara, the Premier of the Eastern Region, regarded the compromise as a "sell-out".

The basis of the compromise, and the hope of the UPGA lay in the coming elections in the Western Region, which were held on October 11, 1965. Again, the violence and coercion characteristic of the federal election was conspicuous in this election. The regional government (in alliance with the NNA) banned all public meetings and procession for an eight-week period, including the whole of the campaign period. Charges of fraud and manipulation were again lodged against electoral authorities. On election day, police discovered thousands of ballot papers in the illegal possession of electoral officers appointed by the government. The results indicate the success of governmental manipulation of the election, and there seems little doubt that they were rigged in the favor of the NNA, who got 71 seats against the UPGA's 17. On the very day of the election, Akintola had imposed a dusk to dawn curfew, which he subsequently

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extended to October 25. That the Action Group had not declined as much as the Western regional election statistics suggest is shown by the results in the Lagos municipal elections of November 13. In the federal capital violence and manipulation were also characteristic of the election. In March, a two-month ban on public meetings and processions had been imposed. Nonetheless, the results gave 32 of the 45 seats to the AG. Violence continued in the Western Region.

The crisis facing the federal government is reflected in further coercive moves made in 1965. The inability to recognize the role of the opposition in the political system was mirrored in the disturbances at the University of Lagos in March. The Vice-Chancellor, Dr. Njoku, a leading Nigerian scholar, but an Ibo from the Eastern region was replaced by a Westerner, a Muslim, Dr. Biobaku. Although Njoku's three-year term of office was up, his term had been apparently one of distinction, and his dismissal was regarded by many in the University as being based on ethnic grounds. Opposition press was made subject to censorship. In November, 1965, the

The statistics were also rejected as being invalid by the chairman of Western regional electoral commission on November 19, when he confirmed the validity of the opposition complaints of irregularities. See Africa Report, January, 1966, p. 36.
editors of the *West African Pilot* and the *Daily Telegraph* (both NCNC newspapers) were arrested on charges of sedition and false propaganda in connection with their reporting of the Western regional elections. In the Western region itself, the sale and circulation of the independent *Daily Times* and the *Sunday Times* were banned in Ibadan in the "interests and defense of democratic norms." Early in January, 1966, the police in Ibadan declared the premises of the Nigerian Press (printers and publishers of Action Group papers) a prohibited area to all persons, and detained without charges 25 press personnel. The extent to which violence had become characteristic of the maintenance of the political system in Nigeria is illustrated by a report of the Federal Minister of State for the Police, Alhaji Auggulu Ahmad, who told the House of Representatives that 153 persons had been killed in the Western region since the October 11 election.

The Federal government of Nigeria had chosen to isolate the opposition from 1964 until the coup in 1966. In doing so, it necessarily increased the use of coercion, and


decreased the pluralizing in the institutional structure of the system. Press, University, political party and economic interest groups came under the close surveillance of the government. An interesting forecast of the results of this process was made in Nigerian Opinion as early as July, 1965:

People get killed, their houses and property are destroyed, their farms are burnt and in many instances, they are deprived of the right to earn a living.... James Fitzjames Stephen once remarked that it seemed good to count heads to avoid breaking them. Some Nigerian political leaders, it seems, began breaking heads in order to count them. This way they may succeed in establishing themselves as a dominant political class with an almost total monopoly of power and wealth. But the narrow conception of their interests which they hold may unwittingly be creating the conditions which makes further resort to violence inevitable, if only to change the structure of political power in the country.

The structure of political power was changed on January 16, 1966.

In comparing Nigeria and Ghana, as they reflect the structural characteristics of the Revolutionary system in terms of a high degree of coercion, and low institutional complexity, certain points emerge. Ghana's political development closely parallels the development of the Revolutionary system. Nigeria, on the other hand, is not

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so easily fitted into the model. In many ways, certainly
before 1964, Nigerian society was not characterized by
governmental coercion, or by the systematic reduction
of the institutional complexity of the system. It is
indeed difficult to argue that events after 1964 repre-
sent a reduction in institutional complexity. Where
there was press censorship there was no corresponding
incorporation of all information services within the frame-
work of the existing political institutions as there was
in Ghana. Where there was infringement of the normal
operation of the opposition, it nowhere amounted to the
extreme measures taken in Ghana. The democratic centra-
lism practiced in Ghana was very different from the
regionally decentralized polity of Nigeria. Although
there was a definite increase in the incidence of coer-
cion in Nigeria, coercive measures did not reach the same
degree of intensity as in Ghana. It was not for anything
that Nigeria was regarded by Western observers as the
star democratic performer amongst African political
systems. There is a case to be made for the argument
that Nigeria more closely approximates the structural
character of the Traditional system than the Revolution-
ary system. But the case is weakened by the evidence of
the last years of the Federal government.
In latter years, the disintegrative effects of the regional autonomy in Nigeria presented a dilemma to those in power. Sir Abubakar, although a Northerner, had a deep commitment to the national character of the new state in which he was the senior governmental official. If regional disintegration in the Western Region, and the possibility of secession in the East were allowed to progress, Nigeria might have been forced to re-write a constitution not yet a decade old. The constitution was in fact preserved, but the institutionally complex system that the Federation had to describe if it was to continue was not built up. Stability was sought without an attempt to organize the ethnically diverse society into a complex political unit. Rather, the regions remained, to a large extent, one-party subsystems of the total political system and the Federal Government, in its restriction of the activity of the opposition, moved towards the consolidation of its own structure without adapting to the pressing demands of a growing opposition. The political systems of Ghana and Nigeria developed, in the first decade after Independence, towards the model of the Revolutionary system. Comparatively their development was of the same kind, if not of the same degree.
Authoritative Structures and Functional Precision

The Revolutionary system as described in the model of order and organization is characterized by a high degree of structural complexity and a correspondingly low degree of functional specificity. In analyzing the relationship between these characteristics in Ghana and Nigeria, the answers to certain specific questions must be found. (1) To what degree are the systems under discussion characterized by numerous differentiated groups, organized for the purpose of making authoritative decisions in the society? (2) To what degree do ascriptive or achievement criteria operate as a basis for recruitment and promotion within those groups? (3) To what degree is corruption a product of inadequate precision in the definition of the role select structures play in the authoritative system?

The answer to the first question requires little space. The new nationalist movements in Africa were themselves the product of interest groups, and they operated in conjunction with the numerous indigenous structures that sprang up to articulate and aggregate native interests. Cultural societies, debating societies, "old boys" associations, and student unions were the breeding ground of nationalist parties and politicians.
Formally established parties grew with the news media that spread their appeal, and the indigenous economic corporations that, in large manner, financed their growth. Once grown, they matured in Independence, and the organizations of the colonial system were "Africanized". The Civil Service, the Judiciary, the Military, the Legislative Assembly, and the Upper House, the Trade Union and the educational system, resemble, in legal appearance, similar structures in modern developed systems. The necessity of planning and the shortage of available skilled personnel has tended to encourage not competition, but cooperation in the economy. As a result the marketing board and the cooperative have become collectivities that make authoritative decisions for the whole society. There is no doubt that in both Ghana and Nigeria the structural machinery of the political system was far more complex than that of traditional African society. The reason lies in the growth of technology in the society, and in the acceptance of new role-relationships and values relating to the political process.

The second question relating to the specificity of the functional operation of these structures is more difficult to answer. It can be best answered by reference to ascriptive and achievement criteria as they may be used
in determining the recruitment and promotion of personnel within politically interested groups. As we use the term, achievement is defined in terms of the attainment of intellectual skill and set standards of performance in a clearly defined area. Many other forms of achievement may be valued - e.g. personal charm and beauty, which have no particular application in the performance of specific roles - but they are not our concern. Functionally diffuse structures, characteristic of the Revolutionary system, emphasize ascriptive criteria. The Modern and Stabilizing systems emphasize achievement criteria in structures that demand efficiency and skill, if their specific functions are to be fulfilled.

The last section drew attention to the process whereby diverse groups in the Ghanaian political system were incorporated into an institutionally less complex system. The Trades Union Congress, The Cooperative Movement, and the Ghana Farmers' Council all had representation on the executive of the CPP, after the establishment of the Republic. This process of absorbing all the diverse interest groups into the fold of the state-party had obvious repercussions on the ability of those structures to maintain functionally specific roles in the society. The leaders of the Trades Union Congress
were party officials, and their promotion and continuity in office depended on their party fidelity. This was true too of the Civil Service and the Judiciary. The dismissal of the Chief Justice after his acquittal of Adamafio and his colleagues in their trial for treason was typical of the way in which personnel in this structure were made subject not to criteria of achievement, but to criteria of ascription. Judgment was made not in terms of their capability and performance in terms of the functional definition of the structure within which they legally operated, but in terms of their conformity to the functional demands of a completely different political structure - the political party. That this was to be the case was made clear in the referendum of 1964, when it was deemed the avowed purpose of the coming one-party state "to mould the judiciary into an instrument serving the people and not an organ of reaction standing in the way of the people." The people and the party were one organism, and no differentiation would be made between the functional needs of that particular structure and those of any other structure. The government of Ghana made of the Civil Service not a body of agencies given specific administrative and advisory tasks to fulfill, but an arm of the party, to be staffed and used as the
party saw fit and when it saw fit. The impact of this was well described by a correspondent in *West Africa*, writing of the latter days of the Nkrumah regime:

Time and time again, over the last few years, Dr. Nkrumah juggled with the country's administration, transferring the responsibilities of one department to another, creating new secretariats to deal with a bewildering variety of problems, only, later, to abolish them or transform them into something else. Of late, the list of functions carried out by his own office had grown alarmingly, with no indication that administrative efficiency was thereby increased.

Nkrumah evidently thought differently about his behavior in this regard. For in his speech to the opening of parliament on January 12, 1965, he referred to his proposed reorganization of the Ministries and Departments as, "the object of which is to increase the efficiency of the public service." But in effect, the changes pointed to the complete disregard of functionally precise definitions of the roles of separated political structures within the all-embracing framework of the GPP. The military structure was another to lose its functional precision in the years after Independence. The functions of maintaining the stability of the political system in the face of external aggression and internal disorder were re-

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placed by the party's desire to see the military operate as an agency for the implementation of its domestic policy. In June, 1962, Kofi Baako, the Defense Minister addressed a meeting of senior members of the Armed Forces:

I want to see bridges constructed by the armed forces, new settlements built by the Workers Brigade, under the guidance of the Army, and large farms cultivated by the armed forces working together with the Workers Brigade and other state organizations.¹

Nkrumah made this clear in his opening address to Parliament in 1965, when he remarked, "To us the most important role of our Armed Forces is to assist in the execution of projects of national development."² This was not all, for Nkrumah established the President's Own Guard Regiment as an independent unit from the authority of the military. This "private army" was under his own personal command, and promotion and appointment in it were ascribed by his own decree. The achievement criteria of skill, good service, energy and efficiency had no place in such a system - they were damned by the leading CPP newspaper as being bourgeois values:

The appointment of anti-Party, anti-Socialist rascals on the basis of bourgeois qualifications

alone leaves open the possibilities of creating so many agents of neo-colonialism in a state administration.

The CPP became a large and diffuse structure, in which the Osagyefo, the victorious leader, ascribed value to participants in much the same way as the chief in the Traditional system. As in the ancillary structures, the importance of office as described by precise limitations on behavior, was unimportant in the CPP. David Apter described the functional diffuseness of the party in exact terms:

Like most political parties, the CPP is a combination of a hierarchy of offices, institutionalized roles, and personal controls. Overshadowing both the offices and personalities is Nkrumah. The offices of the central committee and the national secretariat are hardly limiting factors in the role definition of occupants of these posts. Rather, definition comes from Nkrumah, and association with him provides legitimacy.

In Nigeria the position was very little different, although the evidence for this stems from an analysis of regional, rather than national, structures. This is due to the fact that each region possessed its own regionally oriented collectivites. Banks, cooperatives, press, local courts and police, educational system, economic organizations such as traders organizations, and local

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government bureaucracies were all part of the regional subsystem. As in Ghana, the functional precision of these groups was neglected by the over-powering influence of party-political interests, and in large measure the appointment and recruitment within them was governed by the ascriptive criteria of party favor and influence. Henry Bretton has made a close study of the relationship between these diverse interest groups and political parties in the southern regions of Nigeria, and his conclusion adequately summarizes the results of his survey:

The questions asked in the survey were sufficiently broad to have produced evidence that, within the authoritative decision-making influence structure, nonpolitical considerations, e.g., purely technical, cultural, spiritual, or ideological, exceed political ones in intensity and frequency if such had been the case. Instead, the data collected warrant the conclusion that political considerations, and among these, party-political ones, overshadow all other types. Beyond that, such critical functions as leadership recruitment appear to be entirely under the sway of party politics, not only in the political parties and in public agencies, but in social, cultural (including lay-clerical), economic, and professional groups as well.1

Cooperative organizations in Nigeria such as the regional

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marketing boards and the regional development corporations were responsible for the administration of certain projects crucial to the development of both polity and economy. Appointment to these boards was the prerogative of the political parties, and the criteria on which appointment was based had little or nothing to do with extra-political capability and achievement. These organizations, therefore, developed no precision in their definition of their functions in the system and without this precision, they were guided by the diffuse functional character of the political party. They became, therefore, no more than agencies for the exercise of the political party's function of patronage. Richard Sklar makes this clear:

These patronage systems buttress the incumbent party authorities in two familiar respects: first, public officials appointed on a partisan basis tend to support those leaders to whom they owe their positions; secondly, the power to appoint entails control of the institutional and organizational resources at the disposal of the government.... In sum commercial patronage, including government loans, marketing board licensing, and government contracting, is channelled through public agencies that are quasi-political in nature and composition. In all regions, those agencies serve the political interests of the government party only.

The inability of diverse interest groups to define for

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themselves functionally precise roles in the political system is well illustrated by the dilemma of the press in Nigeria. In place of achieving a well-defined attitude to the function of the press, the party function became identified with the press function. The extent to which this was true, even for a press attempting to define its function independently of that of the party is illustrated by an editorial of the West African Pilot:

We support 100 per cent all that the NCNC stands for. But we cannot live and eat politics all the time. We are a commercial organization and most members of the party who individually receive our constant support do not reciprocate. This paper must survive either as a commercial concern or political enterprise. But we are the former - at the moment at least - and being so, we intend to maintain our independence whilst upholding the principles of the party.  

The happy compromise promised in the last sentence proved impossible, and the functionally precise role of an independent organization, operating a press for commercial purposes, gave way to the function of party propaganda.

The degree to which functionally specific offices and organizations were lacking in Ghana and Nigeria is illustr-

trated by the incidence of corruption in those systems. That corruption was held to be a major defect of the political system in Ghana is clear from the remarks of no less a personage than Dr. Nkrumah, the most prominent defender of the system. In his famous Dawn Broadcast in April, 1961, he spoke as follows:

One of the most degrading aspects of Party conduct is the tendency on the part of some Comrades to go round using the names of persons in prominent positions to collect money for themselves. Equally degrading is the tendency on the part of some persons in prominent positions to create agents for the collecting of money.¹

Leading party members were convicted of gross corruption in the administration of the tasks assigned them. J.A. Braimah, once Minister of Communications and Works, admitted to the acceptance of a 2,000 pound bribe from an Armenian contractor, and Krobo Edusei, a ministerial secretary, was criticized by the Korsah Commission of Inquiry for conduct which was said to have fallen "below any acceptable standard for man in the public service and...is strongly to be deprecated." ² In 1965, Ghana was in severe economic straights. Investigation into the prevailing economic practices revealed a good deal of

¹Quoted in Dennis Austin, Politics in Ghana, p. 404.
²Ibid., pp. 164-165.
corrupt activity, as demonstrated in the Statement of the Ministry of Finance. Seventeen state enterprises (out of about fifty) had failed to submit balance sheets and plans of their progress. Even in cases where these requirements were complied with, "the figures given to the Ministry have to be taken with caution." Balance sheets of most state enterprises did not reflect the true amount of Government investments - e.g. "Despite the heavy investment expenditure by the Government on purchase of aircraft for the Ghana Airways, for instance, this Corporation's balance sheet does not show either the fleet of aircraft as its assets, or the cost of Government investment...." The chronic shortage of consumer goods at the time were again in some measure due to corrupt practices. According to President Nkrumah, goods were being diverted to the wives and relatives of Ministers, regional and district commissioners, civil servants, party officials, parliamentarians, managing directors and managers of state enterprises, who hoarded them and resold them at exorbitant prices. In 1966, the Abraham Commission of Enquiry was established to look into trade malpractices. As a result of their


findings, thirty-three employees of the Ghana National Trading Corporation were dismissed for "extreme corruption." The Commission tackled the problem of the serious shortage of foreign exchange in Ghana, and suggested reforms arising from the need to control the volume of Ghanaian imports. Referring to the existing methods of issuing import licenses the Commission referred to administrative inefficiency and overload. "Unfortunately, we cannot exclude laziness, irresponsibility and corruption of officials of the former Ministry of Trade as contributory factors."

Corruption in Nigeria was as rife as in Ghana. Ronald Wraith and Edgar Simpkins have written a book devoted to the analysis of corruption in developing societies, and their data is gleaned from the analysis of numerous, well-documented reports of Commissions of Inquiry in southern Nigeria. From this data, they generalize for the whole of Africa, and their early generalizations do not fail to make the point.

In Africa corruption flourishes as luxuriantly as the bush and the weeds which it so much resembles, taking the goodness from the soil and suffocating the growth of plants which have been carefully and expensively bred and tended. The forces ranged against it are

negligible; not negligible in fire or indignation or idealism, but quite simply negligible in weight.¹

Although high salaries are no index of a corrupt administration, the very high salaries paid Nigerian politicians reflect the ambiguity in the functional definition of political roles. It was not clear in the minds of politicians whether their specific function was to serve the public interest, or to make interest from their positions of public responsibility. Henry Bretton has commented on this problem:

The loss of a parliamentary seat means more in Nigeria than in advanced societies: the loss of an opportunity to improve one's material standards of living. Under these conditions many parliamentary representatives can be expected to devote considerable time to providing material insurance against the time when the opportunity has dried up.²

As in Ghana, the political authorities were aware of their defects in this regard. An interesting remark made by the Federal Minister of Finance, when discussing a question related to his department, illustrates this. He was moved to comment on certain date: "These are all facts that could be checked in my Ministry and in the Account-

ant-General's office where expatriates still are. They are not Nigerians that could be bribed by anybody."

The neo-colonialist may have defects, but apparently they could not be ascribed to well-trained and skilled bureaucrats. Corruption in Nigeria was also common in the highest places. A commission of Inquiry was established in 1956 to investigate charges of corrupt activity against both the Minister of Finance in the Eastern Region and the Regional Premier at that time, Nnamdi Azikiwe. The former was convicted of corruption during his term of office as Minister of Public Works, and Azikiwe was charged with corruption in his capacity as founder and chief share-holder in the Africa Continental Bank. The Report of the Foster-Sutton Tribunal conceded that "Dr. Azikiwe's primary motive was to make available an indigenous bank with the object of liberalizing credit for the people of this country," but added that his conduct as a Minister "has fallen short of the expectations of honest, reasonable people." That this corruption continued throughout the career of the Federal Republic can be seen by a discussion in Nigerian

2 Quoted in Richard L. Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties, p. 185.
Opinion as late as March, 1965:

The Ijora Causeway land question has provided yet another proof of what most people have commonly believed - that Ministers have no scruples in using their offices to enrich themselves. It is one of the paradoxes of this country that while civil servants are not supposed to have business interests for fear that they might abuse their positions, this rule is not thought to be applicable to Ministers or State.

In both Ghana and Nigeria it is clear that there were numerous differentiated groups established in the political society before the coups in 1966. It is also clear that these groups lacked functionally specific definitions of their roles in the system. The diffuse functional definition of diverse structures was a result of what Spiro has called the "primacy of politics." For Spiro, "we learn more about political development as the development of politics from an increase in the generation of issues than from a decrease in the organizations (like political parties) that participate in this processing." What he is saying is not entirely clear. If he means that development involves a necessary reduction of participating structures when increased numbers of political issues arise, we cannot agree. But if he only

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wishes to imply that developing systems often show a pattern along these lines, his argument is acceptable. What would make it intelligible is an analysis of the functionally diffuse character of those "participating structures." This has been shown in this section. The 'primacy of politics' means that political functions are made to cover all structures, whether the interests they represent are political or no. This is an essential characteristic of the Revolutionary system, and Ghana and Nigeria have developed such structural characteristics.
Traditional Values in Progressive Systems

The Revolutionary system places greater emphasis on affective values than on cognitive values. Affective values are 'progressive' in character while the cognitive value-orientation is ceremonial. The extent to which this value structure is integrated in a political system may be seen in the growth of charismatic authority and the degree to which utopian goals are set as ends of public policy. What is analyzed here is the degree to which the post-Independent systems of Ghana and Nigeria attempted to solve the demands of order and organization by integrating values that were progressive in their orientation to change and progress, and at the same time reactionary in their emphasis on valuation by authority, not instrumental efficacy.

The affective orientation to public policy in Ghana was decidedly futuristic, and appealed to the establishment of a "Continental African Union: in which the "African Personality" would rest secure in his dignity and in the salvation of his soul. Foreign policy in these terms was committed to rapid and radical change. Progress was unthinkable outside of the removal of the power of the latter day Mephistopheles - the neo-colonialist - and outside of the building of a domestic
socialist haven, in which the regressive values of
Traditional and colonial society were replaced by the
values of a quasi-Marxist humanism. The Ghana of
Nkrumah coined two useful ideological symbols to de-
scribe the predominant values of the society they were
attempting to organize - 'tactical action' and
'Nkrumaism'.

Tactical action emerged as a program in the colonial
era. It defined the CPP's program for working towards
independence, and establishing the new African nationalist
government in Ghana. The ends of this action were clear -
the establishment of a new political system. This was a
program that placed great emotional value on the revolu-
tion. In post-Independence years this revolutionary
orientation continued. The revolution was never complete,
and always there lurked the counter-revolutionaries who
might at any moment bring the progress of the system to
a halt. In his New Years Address in 1965, Nkrumah
referred to this:

The revolutionary zeal with which we are pur-
suing our political and economic objectives
should in itself serve as a protective shield
against the seductive influences which, in
many cases, are deliberately fostered by some
who sojourn in Ghana and Africa with dis-
honorable intentions. But there are some
amongst us who have not been completely
orientated to the new and enlightening
morality of our socialist ideology.

The means to the achievement of the goals of tactical action were, however, nowhere clearly defined. They consisted of a series of Marxist oriented generalizations about the tactics of Imperialism, and the means of resisting it. More details than that are difficult to find. Nor were they deemed necessary to the revolutionary party, which was content to sit comforted by the thought that the Osagyefo, already the victorious leader, was ever vigilant, with his every attention fixed on the Imperialist activity.

Bound up with the programs of Tactical Action was the concept of African socialism. African political systems after the attainment of independence were universally "socialist", but this fact does not make the content of socialist theory in Africa homogeneous, cohesive and easy to understand. As opposed to a pragmatic, instrumental and planned economic theory, typical of the body of European socialist thought, African socialism, and specifically that formulated in Ghana, was presented as being more the product of revelation than of systematic analysis. Its ideological emphasis was more religious than scientific, although in Ghana 'scientific

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1 West Africa, January 9, 1965, p. 43.
socialism' was the avowed goal. David Apter has produced a compelling argument to the effect that socialism in developing systems fulfills the function that Protestant theology, following Weber, fulfilled in the development of Western Europe.

Briefly stated the theory is that socialism is to political entrepreneurship what Protestantism was to economic entrepreneurship. The goals of nationalism have increasingly become a useful ethic for political entrepreneurship. It justifies the use of government for economic development, and it stresses economic development.1

There is no doubt that this religious ethic justifying political entrepreneurship was apocalyptic in essence. A 'new heaven and a new earth' were to be ushered in by the ongoing revolution. Progressive change towards the new era was awaited with earnest expectation, and it was assured.

The ceremonial nature of the cognitive value structure of the CPP is clear from the most superficial analysis of Nkrumaism. Charismatic authority in Ghana was developed in its most pure form. 'The ceremonial significance of the 'grace' that comes from a spiritually endowed ruler lies at the heart of Nkrumaism. The religious basis

of the authority of the chief in traditional Ghanaian society was clearly assumed by Nkrumah in his office as president. In parliament he sat on a stool modelled after the traditional Akan stool; he went on private retreats to fast and meditate, and in the CPP publications he was hailed as the Redeemer. The functional importance of this assumption of the cognitive orientation to the authority of the chief is important to an understanding of the methods by which the CPP hoped to integrate traditional values in the new secular structure of authority. But although initially eufunctional to the development of the political system, the continuing reliance on charisma was dysfunctional. Ceremonial values became not valued as a means to secular integration, but as a necessary part of the system. Numerous illustrations could be given of the charismatic stature of Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, and of the ceremonial significance of his office to the value structure of the system. The pseudo-religious fervor of the Nkrumaist personality cult, and the blatantly religious imagery that colors the language in which it is presented, is evident from the following excerpt from the Evening News:

Nkrumah is our Messiah. Whoever sees his brother's need and supplies it - not by casting off the discarded garment to him - but by giving him a moral and spiritual standard by which he shall live; this is the Messiah,
the Savior, the Christ.

From time to time, individuals have caught glimpses of the Christ of the true idea of God, good. Long before Jesus, were men like Moses, Joshua, Elisha, etc. who demonstrated the true idea of sonship. This demonstration by no means ended with Jesus. Why? Karl Marx demonstrated the Christ, and so did Lenin of the USSR, Ghandi of India, Mao (sic) of China and in our midst is Kwame Nkrumah. When our history is recorded the man Kwame Nkrumah will be written of as the liberator, the Messiah, the Christ of our day, whose great love of mankind wrought changes in Ghana, in Africa, and in the world at large.

The writings of Nkrumah became indisputable authorities for diverse political actions. Admonished to seek first the political kingdom, the members of the political society of Ghana were given their manuals of salvation, and the public speeches of Nkrumah were taken as so many sermons on the mount. Newspaper comment on his addresses became no more than reverent repetitions, and the more revivalist of critics pointed to the writings of the Redeemer with an appeal that they be read, marked and inwardly digested. Thus, Habib Niang writes of Nkrumah's major philosophical treatise, Consciencism:

That little book is in fact, both the bible and the Koran in this our era and in the realm of modern languages. This may be another testimony that Africa is not leading mankind and that Kwame Nkrumah is

*Evening News, October 14, 1961.*
the symbol of the conscience of mankind...."

In Ghana there is no problem in identifying the value structure of the political system, before the coup, with the Revolutionary system of the model.

The identification in Nigeria is not, however, so clear. Except for the orientation of the Action Group after the swing to the left in 1962, there is no evidence that a progressive value orientation was a structural characteristic of the political system in Nigeria. At the central level the attitude of Sir Abubakar was expressive of the prevailing attitude towards change in the society. He was often quoted as saying that he was personally against too rapid change. As a man trained in the educational system of the Native Authorities in Northern Nigeria, he seems to have inherited an affection for gradualism, although this is not to suggest that he did not favor liberal reform in certain respects. The difficulty of describing the ill-structured values of the Federal political system are shown by the following discussion of Sir Abubakar:

In the office of Prime Minister, he could be characterized neither as a liberal nor a conservative. Although he was regarded as a great man in his own way, he could not

be compared philosophically with Presidents Nkrumah of Ghana, Toure of Guinea, Nyerere of Tanzania, nor Senghor of Senegal. Each of these leaders can be identified with some school of political thought, be it Marxism diluted to Nkrumaisn or some other variety of African socialism, but Balewa could be identified with none. Lacking the credentials of membership in any of the familiar schools, Balewa might be described as a utilitarian whose personal ethic served him in place of a political platform. Despite the inherent virtues of that ethic, his self-imposed abnegation made his task of governing Nigeria all the more difficult.

In the absence of any systematic ideological position, Nigeria has been widely hailed by Western sympathizers as the finest example of democracy at work in the developing countries, and, by many in the new states, as an example of a state still suffering from neocolonialist pressures. In commenting on Sir Abubakar's death, Nkrumah for example said that "he died a victim of forces he did not understand and a martyr to a neocolonialist system of which he was a mere figurehead." The commitment to rapid development towards Pan-African political union in Ghana, was not a feature of Nigerian policy. Although never clearly put forward, the Nigerian government stood for a mixed economy, and was seldom a

strident champion of socialist planning. Leading members of all parties expressed a strong commitment to democracy. The lack of cohesive expressions of any national ideology point to the lack of integration in the affective values of the post-Independence political system. When a value position was put forward relating to either domestic or foreign policy it lacked the vigor characteristic of many other parts of Africa:

Much of what might have appeared to be an ideological exercise represented a thoughtless display of borrowed goods, alien in origin, politically and socially indigestible. Thus, Nigeria, at the time of independence, had developed neither the form nor the substance of consensus mechanism to permit the development, in turn, of perspectives of direct relevance to the organization, functioning, and survival of the modern state.  

In the absence of the development of an integrated value structure defining the national political system, the structural development of regional value-systems was of prime importance in Nigerian society. This had definite implications for Nigeria's position in relation to the modal of the Revolutionary system. For in all


Regions, the force of traditional cultural values, and the preservation of traditional attitudes to authority prevailed. The traditional authorities in the Northern Region continued to play the most prominent part in the political system of Northern Nigeria. In 1958, there were four of the most important chiefs acting as Ministers without portfolio in the Executive Council of that region - the Sultan of Sokoto, the Emir of Kano, the Emir of Katsina, and the Aku Uka of Wukari. Although the government of this region acquired a more secular appearance in later years, there is no doubt that traditional institutions continued to play a vital role in the political system. The Sarduna of Sokoto seldom gave the appearance of being devoted to the secular development of his region, or his party. In the West, the position of the chief in traditional society had never been so influential, but the respect and prestige of traditional office was not insignificant. Nor was it in the post-Independence Region. Most of the influential officers in Western Regional government were made "honorary chiefs" and "the veritable army of recognized chiefs was a pressure group of the first order of influence in the region." In the East, the influence

of chiefs had never been prominent, nor was it after Independence. It appears that in all the regions traditional values were little, if at all revised. The senior party officials spoke with the authority of the people. Their programs were legitimized not by reference to pragmatic criteria, but by the evocation of cultural unity. Only in the latter years of the Federal Republic did the NCNC and the Action Group, under the new cover of the UPGA, re-evaluate the disintegrative effects of regionalism, and seek to establish progressive change in the system, judged by the cognitive standards of national efficiency and welfare. The conservative orientation to change, prevalent amongst Nigerian political leaders, makes Nigeria more closely resemble the structural character of the Traditional system than the Revolutionary system.

The demands of order and organization in the newly independent states of Ghana and Nigeria were met by similar structural innovation in both countries. Although Nigeria does not correspond as easily to the model of the Revolutionary system as Ghana does, both countries developed similar patterns of relationship between coercion and institutional complexity; between group differentiation and functional specificity, and between progressive and ceremonial values. New nations,
new political systems were established in Ghana and Nigeria, but the pattern of structural re-organization failed to adapt to the demands of diverse opposition interests that were coercively prevented from participation in the system. The new structure failed to integrate clearly defined expectations amongst the members of political systems who were becoming more responsive to the stimulus of educational and technological advance. This failure of order and organization led, finally, to the violent overthrow of the revolutionary system.
Early in 1966, the governments of Nigeria and Ghana were removed from power by military forces. On January 16, Major-General J. T. U. Aguiyi Ironsi announced that he had been formally invested with authority as head of the Nigerian Armed Forces, and that a Federal Military Government under his leadership had taken over the interim administration of the Federal Republic of Nigeria at the invitation of the Council of Ministers. On February 24, General J. A. Ankrah, formerly Deputy Chief of Staff of the Ghana Armed Forces, was removed from office by President Nkrumah in July, 1963) announced that a National Liberation Council had been established under his leadership, and that the military had suspended the CPP from further activity in Ghana.

The new regimes were greeted in both countries by initial displays of good will. There was dancing in the streets of Accra, and sighs of relief in Nigerian press circles, where a Lagos editor commented, "You can't imagine how it rankled to hear our praises sung abroad while at home we were festering with corruption and vile political trickery. Thank God the rotten republic is dead." Too much significance should not

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be attached to this initial popularity, for as S. E. Finer has remarked, "the military coup means all things to all men. The army is popular not because of what it stands for (which nobody knows, at first), but of what, quite patently, it has fought against."

Outside of Africa, comment has been limited. Nowhere more so than in academic circles, where the military in Africa has received only passing attention. There has been unanimous agreement that the armed forces in Africa were too small in relation to the population and too ill-equipped with technical expertise to be considered serious threats to established political authority. The argument is effectively summarized by one who has paid as much attention as any to the position of the military in Africa:

While the armed forces of Africa remain small in proportion to the total populations and to the areas of the countries, they may well intervene in politics in conjunction with other elements, perhaps from the police and civil service, but they are unlikely to be able to consolidate their positions and establish military regimes. They generally lack the necessary professional cohesion and have not sufficient technical 'know-how' to be regarded as uniquely capable of running a country. This is almost certainly the answer to those

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who pose the question of the possibility of military coups in Nigeria or more particularly in Ghana when ennui or resentment against the current regime become dominant emotions.

The problem has been the failure to see the military in Africa as anything but a replica of Western military institutions. More than a capable institution for the enforcement of order in foreign and domestic relations, the military in Africa has been a symbolic institution. It has symbolized the national identity of the new states. It has been a 'dignified' participant in the political development of the new nations, but its role has been more political than military. Outside of the participation in the Congo, there has been no call for the armed forces of Nigeria and Ghana to contribute to the extension of policy by military action and intervention in external affairs. Rather, they have been made agents of domestic policy, and have been forced to intervene and act in situations that are not normally included in the military sphere of action. Domestic politics has become their professional concern, and military

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interest has perforce been defined politically. The functional specificity of the military institutions of developed systems was not characteristic of the Revolutionary system as it developed in Ghana and Nigeria, and it is not surprising that the military has come to regard itself as qualified to intervene in the political "running of a country".

The military regimes in Ghana and Nigeria have been so recently established that the necessary data for accurate analysis and prediction of the political system under their leadership is not yet available. It is possible nonetheless to see common patterns of political behavior emerging in both countries, and to argue that the military are building new political systems which are moving in the direction of the Stabilizing system of our model.

**Institutional complexity**

As we argued in the last chapter, regionalism in the politics of the Federation of Nigeria, was fundamental to the preservation of an institutional structure of limited complexity. It prevented the integration of a 'national' political system, and preserved the elements of a non-pluralistic and traditional political system in each of the dominant ethnic societies. The military government
of Nigeria has made its most significant moves in the direction of re-organizing the national political system, by undermining the regional autonomy of the now inoperative constitution. In an early statement, the Federal Military Government announced the suspension of the provisions of the constitutions of the regions that provided for the establishment of the offices of Regional Governors, Premiers, executive councils and regional legislatures. This has been followed up by repeated affirmations to the effect that a new constitutional machinery will be established, on the recommendation of a commission set up for that purpose, which will satisfy the need for Nigerian unity, so effectively prevented by the regionalism of the old regime. The National study group on Constitutional Review has been established under the leadership of Dr. T. C. Elias, and a study group on National Unity under Mr. Justice Thomas has also been set up. The brilliant Chief S. O. Adebo, leader of the Nigerian delegation to the UN, and one-time head of the civil service in the Western Region, was appointed as the chairman of a National Planning Advisory Group. Although the military government has acknowledged the duty of these

1 The text of the statement to all heads of diplomatic missions in Nigeria was printed in the *Sunday Times*, January 23, 1966, p. 4.
groups to investigate the advantages of federal institutions, there is a clear implication that a unified structure is most suited to the present situation in Nigeria, and that it is the hope of the military that such a structure will be recommended and most thoroughly investigated by these groups. In an address to the study group on educational services, Gen. Aguiyi Ironsi urged the group "to formulate a national and unified policy on primary and secondary education after due examination and consideration of the existing policies in the establishment of such schools." He referred to the lack of organization in the previous education system as follows:

Apparently too many cooks, Nigerian and foreign, have taken part in preparing our education menu, with the result that the final dish is neither Nigerian nor foreign in either flavor or garnishing. What we have is a jumble of ill-assorted, ill-seasoned and clumsily served meal. The jumble is there for every one to see.

Re-organization "in the context of national unity" implies the establishment of larger and more complex political institutions. The limitations on role-expectation in the regional system are to be done away with. At a press conference, Ironsi expressed his disagreement with the

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West African Pilot, April 16, 1966, "Ironsi's Charge to Education Panel."
former administration's policy of Northernization and said that all Nigerians would be free to compete for jobs in the North. There is a hope that a greater degree of participation be characteristic of government in the new Nigeria than was previously the case. Although no pronouncements have been made concerning electoral participation for the present, the military have made it clear that government is to be handed back to the civilian authorities and that their's is simply a caretaker role. In May, 1966, Ironsi stated that military government would continue for three years, unless the military's objectives were realized in a shorter period of time. But, although the complex pattern of role-participation in the electoral process is not yet envisaged, the military has been making other arrangements to increase the participation of diverse sectors of the population in the political system. For example, the Military Governor of Western Nigeria referred to a more complex system of administration at the local level in his first budget speech:

I am giving active consideration to the re-organization of our Local Government Administrative Structure. The base of involvement in governmental activity must be widened and to this end I propose to create eight provinces out of the existing area of Western
The institutional complexity implied in a unified and more open political structure is clearly appreciated by the new government. Ironsi raised the problem of limited powers in his Budget Address:

I am convinced that the bulk of our people want a united Nigeria and that they want in future one government for Nigeria and not a multitude of governments. They want one government whose units of legislative or administrative devolution would, on the one hand, be nearer to the people than the old Region was and, on the other, be of such a size most likely to satisfy local needs but of such limited powers as not to constitute a danger to the unity of Nigeria.  

The creation of a unified structure is the prime concern of the military government of Nigeria. Such a structure will create new and more complex role relationships in the political system, but it offers the possibility of a greater degree of organization and stability in the political system.

In Ghana, similar developments have taken place. The National Liberation Council banned the CPP, and has set about recreating a political system in which the complex


role-relationships of a plural society can find expression. General Ankrah has established committees to advise on the reorganization of the political system in much the same style as the study groups in Nigeria. A National Planning Committee, under the chairmanship of a prominent Ghanaian civil servant who had prepared the budget reports for Nkrumah with noticeable efficiency, is investigating the serious economic plight of the country. In April, 1966, a committee of nine jurists under Chief Justice Sarkodu-Addo, was appointed by the NLC to revise the laws now in force. In the same month, an educational committee, under Professor Alex Kwapong, the newly appointed Vice-Chancellor of the University of Ghana, was established to investigate the problems of the present educational structure.

Like its counterpart in Nigeria, the military government in Ghana is making plans for the re-organization of civilian government. General Ankrah has said that it may be two years before the military government can return power to the civilians, but he has established a commission to draft a new constitution in which "sovereign powers of the state are fairly and judiciously shared among the three principal organs of the state, namely
the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary." Here again the complicated relationships between institutions in constitutional government is envisaged as a necessary prelude to the re-establishment of civilian rule.

Although all political parties have been banned in both countries, there is evidence that the military governments wish to reconstitute a political system in which opposition is free to express itself. On January 18, General Ironsì lifted the ban on all newspapers imposed by the Federal Government, and in Ghana, General Ankrah announced: "The National Liberation Council is determined to open a new page in journalistic ethics in Ghana. The new Ghana Press will be expected to express any political opinion, to criticize freely provided they do it constructively and responsibly." Martial Law has not been imposed in either country, and the judicial system is intended to carry on the function of adjudicating in cases where opposition to the laws is charged. General Ankrah's comments on the need for widening the arena of political action, and re-establishing the com-

1 Africa Report, April, 1966, p. 36.
plex institutional role of the judiciary is instructive.

One of the urgent tasks to which the National Liberation Council has addressed itself is the suspension, repeal, or amendment of those obnoxious laws, Nkrumah's instruments of tyranny and oppression with which he reduced the people of Ghana to virtual slavery and abject misery. To accomplish this, the Council set up a legal committee to review the laws of the land and eliminate those encroaching upon the fundamental freedoms and welfare of the people. The repeal of the notorious Preventive Detention Act and its freak bedfellow, The Criminal Procedure (amendment) Act, 1964, has been universally acclaimed.... Steps have also been taken to restore the independence of the judiciary and guarantee the security of tenure of the members of the bench by amendment of the Judicial Service Act and the reactivation of the Judicial Service Commission.

The continued independence of the judiciary means that freedom within the law is preserved. The institutional complexity of a political system in which the judiciary is an independent agency making authoritative decisions is not generally appreciated by military regimes, but in Northern Nigeria, for example, the military government has consolidated the power of the judiciary by placing the Native Administration Courts under the control and organization of the general court system, "to make them independent of both Government and Native Administration." The importance of this policy is

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appreciated by a correspondent in West Africa.

Thus a revolutionary government has taken a unique step within three months of coming to power, in removing from its own control... 750 courts and placing them under the influence of a completely independent Chief Justice. This is itself a tremendous step in the circumstances.

Quite clearly, there is no likelihood that the military governments will allow political opposition to become a threat to their progress in achieving what they want to get done. The first step in that direction will be the re-introduction of political parties, and that will be the most delicate of steps. For the time being, political parties must suffer from the stigma of being obstacles to national unity, and organized political opposition must be considered an obstacle to national reorganization.

"We realize," says one of Gen. Ankrah's senior advisers, "that economic health cannot be rebuilt in a day. We need until 1968. By then, perhaps we can allow ourselves the luxury of politics again. Until then, we have work to do."2

The work that is to be done may preclude the growth of opposition as a formal institution in the political system. But a greater degree of freedom will be allowed


participants in the political system. The courts, new local government structures, a more complex administrative organization dealing with education, economic planning and welfare, and the renewed encouragement of private interest and investment in the economy, indicate a trend towards greater institutional complexity in both Ghana and Nigeria.

**Coercion**

Coercion is necessarily the means of a coup d'etat. In Nigeria the coercive power of the Army was demonstrated by a young, twenty-eight year old major, formerly trained at Sandhurst. Major Nzegwu took over the city of Kaduna, the capital of the Northern Region, on Saturday, January 15, 1966. His forces were met with resistance from the palace guard of the Sarduana of Sokoto, but the coup was expertly planned and carried out. In other regions, the coup was in the hands of four other junior officers, also trained at Sandhurst. The military forces killed the Sarduana, and, in the Western Region, they killed the Premier, Chief Akantola, and the Federal Minister of Finance, Chief Okotie-Eboh. Sir Abubakar Tafawer Balewa was captured by the military, and subsequently found killed in a car deserted on a country roadside. The senior officer cadres of the Army were likewise purged. All but two of the brigadier-generals (one of whom was
Ironsi), all the colonels and a high proportion of the lieutenant-colonels were killed. On Sunday January 16, Nzeogwu had reached an arrangement with Ironsi, who announced the formation of the Federal Military Government.

In Ghana, the coup was also led by junior officers, whose youth is a striking characteristic. Colonels Kotoka and Ocran and Major Afrifa were the senior plotters of the coup, joined by the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner of Police. Colonel Kotoka is 39, Colonel Ocran 36, and Major Afrifa is only 29. The National Liberation Council is interesting in that the military officers who sit on it represent a broad spectrum of the tribal groups in Ghana. Major-General Ankrah is a Ga; Colonel Kotoka is an Ewe; Colonel Ocran is a Fanti and Major Afrifa is an Ashanti. Opposition to the coup was confined, as it was in Nigeria, to the personal guard of the major political figure - in this case, the Flagstaff.

There is a noticeably 'national' composition of both military governments. This reflects the self-conscious desire of both regimes to diminish the importance of tribalism. It is especially interesting when one considers the very definite tribal imbalance in the composition of the officer corps. In Nigeria, the educational opportunities of the South have made the officer corps of the Army weighted in favor of the Ibo group. Of the 81 Nigerian officers in 1961, 60 were Ibo from the Eastern Region, and many of them came from the comparatively restricted area around Onitsha. The ethnic quota system introduced
House contingent of the President's Own Guard Regiment. The murder of prominent politicians did not take place in Ghana. It is significant that Nkrumah himself was away on a state visit to Peking at the time of the coup.

In both Ghana and Nigeria, the coups were characterized by the disciplined use of coercive action. The National Liberation Council of Ghana announced that only 27 lives had been lost, all being Ghanaian; and in Nigeria the total number of deaths involved in a coup that was organized over a wide geographic area was not large. *Time* Magazine described the Nigerian coup as the bloodiest in any black African state, but even in the jaunty style of that magazine's prose the violence of the coup does not seem to have reached any great proportions. "At least 40 civilians were killed and 24 army officers were killed and throughout the week, bullet-stitched bodies kept turning up in such unlikely places as the 13th tee of a Lagos golf course." In the spirit of the coup, the


military regimes have in their first few months in power been restrained and disciplined in the use of coercive authority. In Ghana, the military leaders have done all they can to overcome the illegitimacy of their coming to power. As General Ankrah explained it, the coup was in accord with "the oldest and most treasured tradition of the people of Ghana, the tradition that a leader who loses the confidence and the support of his people and resorts to the arbitrary use of power should be deposed." The National Liberation Council has been careful to avoid the suggestion that its own government is characterized by the arbitrary use of power. By March 1, 1966, the regime announced that 773 detainees had been released from the prisons of Ghana, and the photographs in the world press testify to the scenes of rejoicing at their release. There is nonetheless a strong indication that coercion will continue to be deemed necessary to effective government by the military. According to an NLC decree of April 22, 1966, there were 544 persons being held in prison in "protective custody". That number may very well increase.

In Nigeria, coercion has also been a prominent feature of the military regime's first months in power. Again, however, it may be described as restrained and moderate. There has been no reign of terror. Early in February, 11 leading members of the MNDF were detained following the issue of a Criminal Offences Edict issued by the Military Governor in the Western provinces, Lieutenant Colonel Fajuyi. The number included the Deputy-Premier of the ousted regional government, Chief Fani-Kayode, and six regional ministers. In the Eastern provinces the Military Governor, Lieutenant Colonel Ojukwu has also announced the detention of certain persons in connection with matters affecting the security of the state, and he said quite simply that "when people try to defraud the state they should be detained." On February 14, Ironsi issued a State Security (Detention of Persons) Decree, under which persons affected could be detained for a period not exceeding six months. Two days later, a Suppression of Disorder Decree was issued providing for execution or up to 21 years imprisonment for offenders against public order. In contrast to Ghana, there have been serious threats already to the ability

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of the military regime to carry out its program, and to establish its legitimacy throughout Nigeria. In May, there was rioting in Northern Nigeria and a death toll of over 60, with several hundred injured, was reported. In June, the area was again the scene of major disturbances, when two weeks of rioting prompted the Military Governor to impose a new curfew on the towns of Katsina and Gombe. Moslem leaders in the area have threatened to take matters into their own hands unless the military drop their plans for centralized control in Lagos. According to the reports of Western diplomatic sources, 200 persons have been estimated killed, and perhaps more than 1,000 wounded since May, 1966. To date, however, the coercive retaliation of the military has been effectively responsible for the maintenance of continued stability. The peculiar position of the predominantly Moslem Northern provinces remains a constant threat to the ability of the military regime to maintain order without recourse to coercion.

Coercion is a part of the military regime. It is the means to power, and the easiest means to the preservation of power. The techniques of coercion are after all

1 west Africa, April 16, 1966, p. 572.
the peculiar province of the military education and experience. There is little doubt that the incidence of coercion will continue to be high, although both regimes under discussion have shown a degree of restraint and discipline in the resort to coercive methods.

The most important problem facing the military regimes of Ghana and Nigeria is to build a consensus in the political communities they now attempt to govern concerning the programs and re-organization they intend to carry out. The mass-party techniques of the CPP, and the ethnically cohesive parties of Nigeria, have made political issues and political offices a source of interest and a source of power. The needs of order and organization in the political system may not attract those who have made profit and careers out of the defunct political systems. The ideologically sophisticated may well find the programmatic and methodical activity of the military unexciting, and many who enjoyed the mass meetings and color of Nkrumah's regime, or the feeling of association with ethnic leaders in Nigeria, may find the somewhat

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The Military Government in Nigeria, for example, has established a Commission of Inquiry into the rioting in the North. The Commission, headed by a British Supreme Court Justice, Sir Lionel Brett, is to be responsible for the distribution of compensation for damage to life and property. *West Africa*, July 2, 1966, p. 742.
ascetic and austere behavior of the military and the ethnically neutral character of their uniforms and traditions, unsatisfying. Coercion may well be the only means of counteracting the psychic shock to a well-conditioned populace, and the physical boredom aroused by the monotony of military routine. One other factor may influence the degree of coercion characteristic of the new military regimes. That is the possibility of internal mutiny. Young officers grow older, and younger ones may see in their superiors' early success an incentive to further intervention.

If the two and three year time limits set by the present regimes is adhered to, however, this factor is unlikely to be influential.

The evidence available at the present time suggests that the military regimes in Ghana and Nigeria are moving towards the establishment of political systems, whose structural relationship between coercion and institutional complexity will closely approximate the

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"The military conspirators seize power with considerably less in the way of common policy or ideology than these civilians. Furthermore, the way in which they have come to power is by treason and violence; for one faction to oppose its opponents by these means is just as valid as the way in which both in alliance originally seized power. The military junta, quasi-civilianize itself how it will, has the lie in the soul. It suffers from the vice of origin." S. E. Finer, The Man on Horseback, p. 193.
model of the Stabilizing system.

Group Diversification and Functional Specificity

The complex organization of interest groups in the Revolutionary system is not a feature of the Stabilizing system where the number of independently constituted organizations operating within the political system is considerably reduced. At the same time, however, those groups that do operate in the political sphere have functions which are specifically defined. In Ghana and Nigeria the military are moving toward the establishment of a system in which fewer collectivities are participants in the political system but in which those that do participate are limited by precise definitions of the functional role they are to fulfill in the society.

The large and complex group organization of the developed society, and indeed of the Revolutionary system, is not a feature of the Stabilizing system. In large part, this derives from the very nature of the military as an organized group in developing societies, and more particularly in Ghana and Nigeria. In both the latter countries, the numbers of military personnel are conspicuously limited. The total size of the Armed Forces
in Ghana are in the vicinity of 8,000, while the police and other forces number some 9,000. In Nigeria, the Armed Forces are again limited to some 8,000 members, and the police and other security forces number 23,000. In neither country is there any complex division of forces, characteristic of the large military complexes of developed nations. The navy and air force in both Nigeria and Ghana amount to prestige equipment, no more. The Army is a small and cohesive organization, in which the special forces and multi-purpose divisions of modern warfare machinery are not a complicating factor. The officer corps in both armies are noticeably cohesive elites. We have already referred to the tribal imbalance in the background of officers. There is further the experience of common educational backgrounds, in the military academies of Great Britain and in the military colleges of home countries. Ghana and Nigeria supplied the largest cadet contingents at Sandhurst from the Commonwealth nations, and in 1962, 40 Ghanaian officers and 60 from Nigeria had enjoyed a training at Sandhurst.

Military education is designed to inculcate esprit de corps, and to stress the virtues of comradeship and

unity. No better outline of the aims of such education is available than that set out in the Armed Forces Yearbook of India:

What it (the academy) turns out is not 'educated wage earners in uniforms' but patriots with full realization of their duty as guardians of national freedom and the national way of life.... The portals of the academy are open to all young men. There is no distinction or discrimination on the grounds of class, creed or religion. The academy, in fact, is a meeting ground of young men from distant corners of the country, living and learning in utmost harmony despite the differences in class, creed or religion. Living together, cadets start on the same footing and grow up in an atmosphere of a healthy secular outlook.1

The Army in Nigeria and Ghana is a highly organized and highly independent sub-system. It is built in the British tradition on the spirit and polish ethics of discipline and obedience. Its members are soldiers and gentlemen. The barracks and the army camp are independent social units, in which all the functions of civilian life are independently carried out - supply, medical corps, engineers, administration and accounting, transport and the like. The military is a total community built on a centralized chain of command, hierarchical divisions of labor, discipline and esprit de corps. Gutteridge sums this up:

Service in the armed forces implies dis-

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discipline of some kind, in all but the poorest military organizations, and discipline creates cohesion and perhaps a real sense of esprit de corps. Soldiers are brought together in a tight community with a clear cut set of rules which tend to smooth out personal and group differences and make human relationships conventional. Unlike most other professions, the military affects directly not only the serving men themselves but also their families, in that they too are often brought together in the contiguity of the military camp and subject to some discipline.1

As a sub-system, the military in developing communities solves the problems of order and organization long before they are solved in the wider and more complex political society, and it is not, therefore, surprising that the military should see themselves as qualified agents of political reform. And, once they have taken upon themselves the functions of government, it is not surprising that they should attempt to reorganize the political system in accordance with the dictates of their military experience. Political parties of all description have been banned in both Nigeria and Ghana. In Nigeria the complex organization of regional ministries, and overseas representation has been simplified. The Agents-General of the separate regions in London have been done away with.

In talking of this reduction of political organization

Ironsi said, "We cannot afford to continue with sterile political strife and mutual recriminations. I have, therefore, ordered that there shall be no display of party flags or symbols, and no shouting of party slogans. Fellow citizens, we are determined to build a strong, united Nigeria." The number of Federal ministries in Lagos has been cut by three, although the officials formerly employed in them have been reshuffled, not dismissed. In the top-heavy administration of the Mid-West, the number of ministries has been reduced from twenty-one to fourteen. The reduction of the complex judicial organization in the North has already been referred to. In Ghana, similar re-organization has taken place. The number of ministries has been reduced from thirty-two to seventeen, and the number of administrative districts has been reduced from one hundred and forty-seven to forty-seven. The quasi-political organizations of the CPP, such as the Ghana Young Pioneers have been done away with, and the number of overseas diplomatic

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3 The United Ghana Farmers' Cooperative Council, and the Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute have also been abolished.
missions has been reduced. Along with the announcement to abolish political party, and tribal organizations, General Ironsi announced that the civil service would be centralized, and unified.

It is not possible at the moment to analyze the degree to which the re-organized political system will be based on functionally specific lines. The national advisory groups in both countries have not yet submitted their recommendations, and the new machinery of government has not for the most part been established. It is reasonable, however, to suggest that the military are concerned to eliminate the corruption and inefficiency that arise from the development of functionally diffuse organizations. Lieutenant Colonel Hassan Katsina, Military Governor of the Northern provinces of Nigeria announced that the Native Authority system of local government would continue under his authority, but that it "must cut down on unnecessary expenditures, do away with redundant staff and use public funds correctly and efficiently." Lieutenant Colonel Odemegwu-Ojukwu, Military Governor of the Eastern provinces, has attacked the "wasted years of planlessness, incompetence, inefficiency, gross abuse of office, corruption, avarice and

gross disregard of the interests of the common man." And General Ironsi in his Budget Message has made a pointed reference to the purpose of his government. "The declared war against unnecessary public expenditure is an essential and effective instrument in our economic and fiscal policy and this war will go on for the whole life of my government. I should remind the public service, therefore, that while the general public are being called upon to bear an extra tax burden, accounting officers have responsibility to keep very strictly within the limits of funds appropriated under their charge. No over-expenditure or supplementary estimates will be permitted this coming year."

In Ghana, the same concern has led to the establishment of a number of commissions of inquiry into corruption. Mr. Justice Apaloo is investigating the property of former President Nkrumah, whose personal economic advisor has revealed the degree to which the President acquired a vast personal fortune ($7,000,000.00) in the process of building his nation. The Ollennu Commission was established to inquire into alleged malpractices and irre-

2 Budget Message, p. 9.
ularities in the issue of import licenses. Other commissions are investigating the practices of allocating government houses, and the properties of former Ministers and Regional Commissioners in the deposed government.

These approaches to the investigation of corruption, and the determination to eradicate corrupt practices under the new regime point to the military's understanding of the necessity of functional specificity in well-organized systems. The division of labor which the military officers themselves are used to, and the close intercommunication between functionally separated agencies in the military organization will be the model for the re-organization and use of the civil service. The military commitment to promotion on grounds of good service and skilled leadership will no doubt be replicated in the new political system at large. Already Ironsi's determination to assign southerners to any area in Nigeria is proof that the only criteria in the recruitment and promotion of political offices is achievement. In terms of the reduction of the number of organized groups, and the likelihood of increased functional specificity, the military regimes in Ghana and Nigeria are likely to develop along the lines of the Stabilizing system.
One addendum should be attached to the discussion of functional specificity in the military regimes. The very establishment of a military government is a denial of functional specificity. It is, however, a conscious denial on the part of the military. Whereas in Latin America for example, the military has had a long tradition of political authority dating from the time of the conquest, the military in the former British territories in Africa have at all times been subject to civilian authority, whether from Whitehall, or the Governor's office in the colony itself. The present military personnel entrusted with the government of Nigeria and Ghana do not appear to envisage themselves as anything but soldiers and policemen. Lieutenant Colonel Fajuyi, Military Governor of the Western provinces of Nigeria may not speak for all the military personnel in government in Nigeria and Ghana, but his attitude to his position is significant: "Quite honestly, I don't feel like a governor, I still feel like a soldier. I am a soldier, and I think of this as an extra-regimental duty. I would be much happier in the barracks with my men than in this Government House." The military's immediate aim is the restoration of order and organi-
zation in a political system that failed to achieve either characteristic in the past. One may take the time limits set on the authority of the military in political authority as a sincere reflection of the desire to re-establish civilian control and government, although it is impossible to predict how accurate these limits will turn out to be.

Value-Orientation of the Military

Close analysis of the value-orientation of the military governments in Nigeria and Ghana is not possible. Patterns of political behavior have not had time enough to emerge, and it is, therefore, not possible to make more than generalizations about the likely effects of the transfer of military values to political systems.

The military in developing societies is a modern institution, in terms both of education and of technological definition. It is also, however, a conservative institution that is required in the nature of things to preserve the status quo. Rapid change is inherently unstable, and the function of the military is to preserve the stability and order of the society it operates within. The military in Africa is perhaps more conservative than its counterpart in other areas in the world, as a result of the peculiar predilection of
the colonial authorities to recruit the bulk of additional members of the ordinary ranks from less advanced regions of the territory they were responsible for.

There is no fundamental flaw in the generalization that, where there was any choice, British officers generally preferred the volunteer mercenary native soldier, especially if he happened to be both a Moslem and illiterate.

In view also of the high prestige of civilian occupations in developing societies, it is not surprising that the upper strata of the new nations' educational elite have not found it profitable or desirable to take up military occupations. In Ghana and Nigeria, military officers have been well educated in the military institutions either at home or abroad, but generally their early background is likely to have been more traditional than that of political leaders, who in general, had the advantages of urban homes, and educations which stressed the value of 'professional' education.

The typical professional Ghanaian officer is then a young man with a secondary school education, and often trained in a military establishment overseas for a period ranging from about six months to nearly three years. Strict social generalizations are more difficult to make. At first, there was a tendency for officers to come from prominent families

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with connections in other professions, but more recently their range of origins has been wider and to a large extent dependent on the chance of the right level of education. They are absorbed into the elite, but they are not necessarily born into it. An Army officer is more likely to be the son of a peasant cocoa farmer or a post office official than of a professional men, who inclines to regard the Bar or the civil service, especially the foreign service, as having greater prestige.1

The more traditional background of the military in Ghana and Nigeria is not the only factor in the conservative orientation of the military. Military organization places high value on tradition, on seniority, and on routine.

...the military have a feeling of sympathy for tradition, not only for their own military tradition but for the traditional style of society as well. Hierarchic dignity, respect for superiors, solicitude for subordinates, solidarity, and conventionality produce in professional soldiers an attachment to the same phenomena in civilian society. The result is distrust of those who derogate traditional life and rush to overturn it.2

In the light of these arguments it is likely that the military regimes in Ghana and Nigeria will tend to be more conservative in their affective orientation than progressive in the style of their immediate predecessors.


The dedication to 'socialism' is replaced by a pragmatic attempt to resurrect the economic progress of Ghana in 1957. "Pyramid building" is being done away with, and the expenditures on national airlines and shipping services are coming under close surveillance. In both Nigeria and Ghana encouragement has been given to prospective investors in the private sector of the economy. Both regimes have assured the rest of the world that they will continue to uphold the neutrality of their states, and that they will continue to subscribe to the Charter of the Organization of African States. The progressive ideal of continental union will no doubt be subdued in new political systems whose major thrust is to re-establish domestic strength.

Ceremony, in the form of military parades and ceremonial dress affairs is not uncommon to the military. But, the value placed on ceremonial authority in the Revolutionary system is foreign to the military, where action is oriented according to strategic contingency planning, and the advice of experts. Lucian Pye has made the interesting observation that the military institution is by nature bound up with rivalry, and the need to evaluate one's position vis-a-vis the rival's. In assessing the position of Ghana and Nigeria vis-a-vis the developed countries of the world, the military
regimes are likely to find the best road to progress in the assistance and advice of more developed partners. The military has for most of its existence been used to advisors in Ghana and Nigeria, where the British expatriate Chiefs of Staff were only recently replaced by African officers. They are used too, to the necessity of receiving foreign military assistance, if they are to survive as modern and competitive armies. By nature, the military is an advanced institution in terms of its expertise in modern technological ammements. As Pye argues military institutions are "essentially industrial type entities. Thus the armies of the new countries are instinct with the spirit of rapid technological development." It can be expected that the values placed on technological modernity, and on disciplined and orderly development in the military will be transferred to the political system. "Tactical Action" was a very different phenomenon to tactics in military thinking. The tactical and strategic thinking of the military in the political system will place value on sound reconnaissance - i.e. on accurate information, and on the accurate assessment of available resources (forces). Von Clausewitz, rather than Marx, is the tutor of the military. Utopian and ceremonial

Values are replaced by more conservative and instrumental values. Development is for the military a necessary feature of their programs, but development can only be encouraged and pushed forward by an accurate evaluation of the contingencies that surround any chosen action, and of the relation of one's available resources to the demands of any particular strategy.

...The greatest and most decisive act of judgment which a statesman and commander perform is that of recognizing correctly the kind of war in which they are engaged; of not taking it for, or wishing to make of it, something which under the circumstances it cannot be. This is the first and therefore most comprehensive of all strategic questions.¹

It is likely, therefore, that the military regimes in Ghana and Nigeria will tend to build political systems in which conservative estimates are placed on the rate of progress most suitable to their available resources, and in which the authority of personality and ideology will be replaced by the authority of the expert. If this speculation is correct, the military will develop a political system, whose value-structure closely resembles the model of the Stabilizing System.

CONCLUSIONS

This thesis has been an essay in the study of political development. It has attempted to analyze changing patterns of relationship in the structure of political systems, and to see development as a process of structural innovation and adaptation to the demands of modernization. The fundamental demands imposed on new societies are those of order and organization. Once independent territorial political entities are created, there is a demand for the creation of an integrated system of authority in which authoritative decisions can be made for the whole society. This implies the moulding of new patterns of attitude and relationship. All members of the system have to feel that the decisions made for them are acceptable. They have to see meaningful and purposeful relationships between the environment they are used to working in and the environment that is being structured about them. It implies also the capacity to avoid disintegrative conflict in the process of re-organization. The gap between elite and mass must be bridged by a common allegiance to the valued limitations on political behavior.
The analysis in the previous chapters has shown the manner in which organization and order have been developed in Ghana and Nigeria. There has been a marked similarity in the process of development in both countries. The momentous step taken in the acquiring of independence from colonial authority led to the creation of Revolutionary political systems, characterized by high degrees of coercion, group differentiation, and by progressive or apocalyptic ideology. Organization was achieved by limiting the complexity of role and value-expectation, by the diffuse functional definition of political relationships, and by the conscious orientation of political thought toward ceremonial and sacrosanct authority. This system failed, however, to integrate roles and values related to political conflict as seen in the progressive obstruction of opposition in both Ghana and Nigeria. And it failed to integrate specific expectations as to the proper role performance of diverse participants in the political process, as seen in the incidence of corruption, and the intervention of centralized political authorities in plural and independent group activity. The failure to adapt to these demands produced a crisis of legitimacy that culminated in the collapse of order in the Revolutionary system, and the re-organization of the political
system by military regimes.

The demand of stabilizing group conflict and of stabilizing rapidly changing relationships so that role-participants are able to agree on the specific limitations imposed on their behavior, have been met by a movement in both countries toward the structural characteristics of the Stabilizing system. Although the numerical proliferation of divergent groups has been reduced, the complexity and specificity of role and value-expectations has been increased. There has been a movement away from personal organization to bureaucratic and hierarchic organization. In both Nigeria and Ghana the adaptation has been made at the expense of military intervention in the political system, and of the maintenance of high degrees of coercion in the preservation of the political system.

The structural changes still required in the development of a modern political system will depend on the capacity of the Stabilizing systems now established in Ghana and Nigeria to reduce the level of coercion required for structural innovation; to allow for increased pluralism in the social structure, and to recreate broad-based participation in the political process. These changes must be made, but there is no suggestion here that they necessarily will be made, or that if
they are made, that they will be made by the present military regimes. Military government is not necessary to the pattern of development we have outlined here, and military regimes are not necessarily the creators of Stabilizing systems. The evidence so far, however, points to the probability that the military regimes in Ghana and Nigeria will effectively establish Stabilizing systems.

The movement from the Stabilizing to the Modern system will turn on the ability of the present regimes to re-integrate civilian political relationships, and the subservience of military power to civilian authority. Finer has discussed this problem:

On the basis of the limited evidence which is all that is available, it appears as though the 'return to the barracks' - what we have called the military's disengagement from overt rule - occurs through the cumulation of three conditions: the disintegration of the original conspiratorial group, the growing divergence of interest between the junta of rules and those military who remain as active heads of the fighting services, and the political difficulties of the regime.1

It is unlikely that two or three years will see the disintegration of the youthful military regimes now in power, or the growing divergence of interest between the military in power, and those still in the 'barracks'. It is,

1 S. E. Finer, The Man on Horseback, p. 191.
however, more than likely that growing political difficulty will enlarge the demand for extra-military assistance and expertise, in the business of making political decisions. The effective authority of the military leaders will then be replaced by the growing authority of bureaucratic (civilian) officers, and the demands and interests of functionally specific interest associations in the political system. This process of evolution from military to civilian authority has already taken place in Mexico, where a comparison of the type of politician who has held presidential office is enlightening: ‘Of the twelve men who have been president of Mexico since 1920, five have been generals, two leaders of armed forces without a corresponding military rank, and only five civilians, but three of those five civilians held the presidential office most recently.’ Given the British military tradition of obedience to civilian authority, and the limited capacity of the Ghanaian and Nigerian militia in both numerical and technical terms, it is probable that the African nations will simulate the Mexican experience in quicker time.

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