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AN ANALYSIS OF THE KOREAN POLITICAL BUREAUCRACY IN TERMS OF RIGGS' THEORY OF PRISMATIC SOCIETY AND KOREAN WITH U.S. BUREAUCRATIC INTERACTION 1945-1953

by

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My family, including my father, Young-Hee Lee, and my mother, Myoun-gja Kim, have been generous and patient in their support also.

Jae Jo Lee
The administrative, political, and social development and modernization experience of Korea for the period 1945 through 1953 was examined in this study. Bureaucratic transformation was understood as significant to developmental outcomes for all facets of Korean society.

The political and social development theory model of Fred W. Riggs, the Prismatic Society, was selected for application in the Korean situation. Prismatic theory itself was first analyzed in detail. Korean bureaucratic formation was elucidated from multiple perspectives. The key factor of analysis was interpreted as being the U.S. with Korean bureaucratic interaction.

The bureaucratic complexity was subjected to analysis in terms of the Prismatic Model. Comparative views were presented, as were critical evaluations of the applicability of Riggs to the postwar situation in Korea.
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Ro (1993) expressed concern that the study of administrative and political development continued to lag behind analysis of economic change, transformation, and progress. The forces causing bureaucratic transformation, the movement from traditional to modern organization patterns, have not been clarified. Bureaucratic transformational patterns are not well understood. Agreement as to contextual relationship between bureaucratic development and the economic and social spheres has not been derived. Ro’s analysis specifies examination of change from "status-oriented" to "modern" bureaucracies (p. 8) as critical to understanding 20th Century modernization process as a whole (1993).

Henderson (1968) characterized Korean politics as a vortex of centralized power. The centralized locus of power draws all elements of the society together in a quest for legitimacy within a context of power against which they cannot successfully contend. As a mass society, in Henderson’s view, Korea remained entirely incapable of creating horizontal power arrangements or groupings of interest aggregates. Within the mass society of Korea, all
elements were atomized and experienced exclusively vertical pressure drawing them to and from the political center. Henderson saw all Korean political phenomena as emanating endogenously from an internal pattern which was deep-rooted and basically unchanging. This deep-rooted, indigenous character influenced the forms of Korean government and bureaucracy relentlessly. For Henderson, the Korean political vortex encapsulated both psychological predilection and historical predominance. Three elements of the vortex are primary. First is lack of local power bases as determined by extreme centralization. Second is a predominance of form over content. And third is a preference for authority above leadership and bureaucratism over individual responsibility (1968).

Extreme centralization came fully into being with the unification of the Korean Peninsula in 918 during the Koryo Dynasty. Total control of all economic resources was given to the ruling elite. Chinese models of administrative systems were established to solidify and regulate control. Structured, influential institutions, including even the military until recent decades, were not allowed to develop. The flow of power passed through merit, achievement, and influence. Power could not be politically derived from below, only protection from above. Attempts at autonomous power bases were dismantled through centralization influ-
ence. The extreme phenomenon of centralized power remains through the present structurally and psychologically entrenched in the Korean people. In terms of form over content, power access, status, rank, prestige, and the like precede substantive issues such as economic management, innovation, passage of laws, and international relations. Adherence to form soon rendered the Confucian bureaucracy as merely the guiding mechanism for allocation of status, with responsible government becoming virtually impossible. Preference of form over content or function indicated, also, manifest emphasis on moral precept and predominance of generalists over specialists. Bureaucratic generalists were adaptable to many different positions. Constant and rapid ebb and flow of powerholders became characteristic of Korean politics. Public interest was in real terms sacrificed to aristocratic personal interests. Substantive administrative programs were impossible, including innovation and institutionalization. Central power figures established authority as despotic, without resort to charismatic leadership, without rational guidance and orientation, without innovation, but instead configured through belabored collegial discussion, avoidance of direct personal conflict, stubborn conservatism, factionalism, and behind the scenes maneuvering. Leaders were prefigured as only powerbrokers. Concern for specific goals, debate of
pertinent issues and interests, and emergence of qualified leadership for change or improvement were all denied. Factions manipulated in opposition to one another defined leadership orientation. Even meaningful autocratic rule was out of the picture. Henderson's vortex thesis, outlined here as still operational in Korea, is supported as theory within Korean political science circles, though qualified as somewhat exaggerated and overly generalized (Ro, 1993). The vortex thesis, nevertheless, with its emphasis upon the continuing predominance of centralized, hierarchical, and bureaucratized power and control through the present time in Korea, provides a useful stepping off point for comprehending Korean modernization and bureaucratic development. Modernization and development are largely shaped and carried out through bureaucratic implementations. The entire process depends upon efficient bureaucratic structures and procedures. This approach to democratic implementation is essentially more characteristic of 20th Century developmental modernization than it had been of Western democratic development processes during the previous century in the U.S. and in Europe. Political development theory of Riggs (1964), nevertheless, suggests that bureaucratic structuring must almost always come before political development. Riggs further notes that the bureaucratic policy implementation process usually is
predominant over policy-making institutions within transformational (i.e., 20th Century developing) societies. Bureaucrats assume preponderantly exaggerated power positions, and the bureaucracy itself assumes highly complex levels of development even though actual complementary political development is lacking. This over-arching bureaucratic structure may be the legacy to the developing country from the withdrawing colonial administration; that is, the complex bureaucratic structure used for exploitation by the imperial power remains essentially intact once that power withdraws. Just as likely, the complex bureaucracy develops due to pressing demands for economic expansion, while, on the other hand, true political modernization and capability, especially in any democratizing sense, are inhibited and deliberately restrained and undercut by politically cautious and defensively rigid regimes, often of the military type. Rapid, inverse, 20th Century modernization almost ineluctably summons forth bureaucratic authoritarianism, creates uneven political growth, and concentrates on stimulating the rate of economic development (Riggs, 1964; Ro, 1993).

The Western modernization paradigm of unilinear development, established in the previous century and contemplated in the analysis of advanced Western nations, created a dichotomy between traditional social aspects and
values and Western paradigms of advanced democratic modernization. Eisenstadt (1973) suggested that newly developed nations had established innovative dimensions of modernization which occupied positions between the traditional and the modern. Thus, the previously polarized extremes, of the modern and the traditional, have in some ways been reconciled. Ideologically, such manifestations of reconciliation also pursue compromises between capitalism and socialism. Economic, political, and social aspects of each are uniquely blended (1973). Lewis (1969) posited the inverse model of development in contrast to the Western hypothetical model which had characterized Western democracies. Western democratic development originated through private sector activation, commerce, and industrialization. Private sector Western development manifested itself largely unrestrained by central guidance or control, allowing the creation of industrial empire. Such development appeared to pursue organic processes and goals, though the course may have been chaotic and oppressive to many, both as individuals and as socially defined groups. Social characteristics of entrepreneurial spirit and rational pursuit of interests or enterprise had prepared the way for development, as had resource availability and manageable populations (1993).

Twentieth Century modernization within developing
countries occurs in far different situations from those of the Western hypothetical model. The sources of difference are many. To some extent, situations can be said to vary from country to country. Nevertheless, two primary differences seem especially critical, when contrasting Western democratic models with 20th Century development patterns. First, modernization in the 20th Century is carried out with prefigured models emulated for their success. Second, in virtually every instance, in the 20th Century, it is an indigenous elite which wishes the modernization to transpire, in one leap forward. The elite imposes the modern industrial model onto traditional forms, with full expectations of resultant conflicts and discontinuities among associated social, political, and economic elements. On the other hand, Western democratic, industrial development, in the historical process, primarily within the 19th Century, grew up endogenously from diffuse elements and points of implantation, coming together to create a new form. Industrial development of the 20th Century instead tends to come together through a centralized impetus. The formative directions are downward and outward, moving from the implanted bureaucratization and industrial organization. Korea’s own modernization process, following what Ro (1993) designates as the inverse model, was initially powerfully impacted by a complex
impositional form, that established through Japan’s colonization (Lewis, 1969; Ro, 1993). Understanding of the relationship between Japanese colonial imposition and Korea’s long-term modernization process is critical to analysis of later post-World-War-Two modernization and bureaucratic development. At conclusion of the Japanese colonial experience, with the close of the Second World War, Korea, led by an indigenous elite, and of course faced with no alternative but to modernize, found itself with no internal means of capitalization. Korea was thrown onto the international financial community for support. All capital formation processes were engineered by the Korean central government, following disengagement of U.S. military governing forces. Korea had endured the 35-year period of Japanese colonialization without development of its own technicians, managers, and entrepreneurs (Ro, 1993). Korea did, nevertheless, begin post-World War Two development having several advantages. The premodern political and social structure, which had endured up through at least the first decade of the 20th Century, had eroded, first due to inwardly working forces of self-destruction, joined with Korea’s initial probes into modernization begun in the 19th Century, then, through the dismantling and suppression of indigenous Korean structures, both traditional and modern, carried out by the
Japanese and, finally, by the total destruction of the colonial regime as a result of the war. As Ro (1993) states, "socially, World War II gave Korea a clean-slate opportunity to leap into the modern age" (p. 35). In terms of resolution toward modernization, it is reasonable to assert that the uprooting and destruction endured over the first half of the 20th Century opened the way to modernization in the second. Additionally, the strong centralizing tendency viewed as prerequisite, or at least the normal course for inverse development, had always been inherent to Korea. Feudal and other localized power bases had rarely interrupted or disturbed the centralized flow of power. For Korea, legacy of centralized dominance remains still intact at the end of the 20th Century. This legacy now rests, however, on a "top-heavy government/business conglomerate, so typical of the modernizing nations of the 20th Century" (Ro, 1993, p. 35), all of which, unlike 19th Century modernizers (among whom Japan is included), began within patterns of dependence upon their respective model developed nation for virtually all beginning where-withal. For Korea, which is to say, here, South Korea, that model and source of intensive social, political, economic, and importantly, military interaction was the U.S. (1993).

The period of original, direct, and quite elaborate
interaction between Korea and the U.S., understood for this paper to have transpired 1945-1953, has not been sufficiently clarified, I believe. This seems an unfortunate lapse in light of the period's huge significance. The Korean War years themselves, in recent times, have been overly generalized. But the immediate post-World-War-Two period, of what is designated here as "bureaucratic interaction" between the two countries, 1945-1950, has been largely closeted from clarification and understanding.

The bureaucratic interaction initiated in 1945 continued in different forms and with different intensities through the Korean War itself, during the years after the war, and at much reduced levels of intensity through the present. Indications of the watershed importance to Korea of both the years 1945-53 and the integral bureaucratic interaction with the U.S. during the period have been suggested somewhat here by way of introduction. Because of the unusual, not to say dramatic nature of the Korean modernization experience, with the special part played by the U.S. and U.S. military, bureaucratic impact, it is better to allow the full ramification of these mutually influencing components to unfold as the background elements to this paper are taken up. It may help to clarify matters at the outset by identifying one or two critical dimensions necessary for comprehending the importance of both the era
and the relationship examined. Korea's modernization should be understood as a process that was to a considerable degree the endogenous expression of a highly distinctive, and in a communal sense, individualistic group of people. Their move toward modernization and democratization was engendered as an expression of a people defining themselves in a new way, and possibly in a way which after many centuries of elite, centralized domination would realize and release their truer, deeper, and more essential identity and spirit, as a nation and as a people. That expression was cut off by Japanese occupation. The liberating experience and spirit remained suppressed for very nearly all of the first half of the 20th Century. The year of liberation, 1945, for Koreans, possibly in some ways even more so than for peoples of other nations, was tumultuous with exhilaration and release from frustration. What ensued from this point, especially up through the end of the Korean War, and very specifically and essentially in terms of the bureaucratic relationship established with the U.S., as well as the unexpected protraction of the North-South demarcation of the country, I have attempted to elaborate upon below. While drawing some conclusions as to the Korean modernization and bureaucratic experience up through our own present time, this paper essentially ends with the Korean War's cease fire, as a culmination of sorts
of the U.S. bureaucratic experience and of Korea's establishment of new identity, no matter how replete with change, disruption, and problems at that time still to manifest themselves.

What follows is a kind of survey which will cover many aspects of U.S. with Korea interaction during the critical postwar period, and will focus on the concept of bureaucracy as the key point, primarily as this institution relates to the process of modernization.

The opening major section of this study, Chapter Two, will turn to the theory of Fred Riggs, which considers in detail the above course of bureaucratization characteristic of the political, social, and economic development model of which South Korea is a part, that is, transitional, or what Riggs (1964) terms, "Prismatic" society. The study in its second major section, Chapter Three, will then analyze Korean bureaucratic development, as suggested above, primarily in the context of relationship with the U.S. The third major section, Chapter Four, will review the Korean bureaucratic interaction and development within its U.S. relationship context in light of Riggs' theory; that is, it will draw together the considerations of Chapters Two and Three. Other general considerations will be suggested in the concluding part, Chapter Five.

Riggs' Prismatic Society Model is given primary
emphasis for understanding Korean bureaucratic development for several reasons. The first of these is simply that as a Korean interested in the political and social development of my country and of the East Asian world region, and having academically studied this subject, both as undergraduate and graduate student, I had never been exposed to a theory which comprehensively explained the postwar developmental experience of my country, as understood and in part experienced by myself, until broached with Riggs' analysis of bureaucracy. Riggs' findings and insights rang true to the contexts of Korea familiar to my understanding. Riggs provided also a universal model, one applicable in a scientifically founded and generalizable sense to the bureaucratic dimensions and experience, not only of Korea, but of all bureaucratic development. Other approaches seemed either not to fit very well at all, or to offer merely limited, culturally relativist perspectives. Riggs' analysis rang true to my own hypothetical judgment, if only in embryonic state, that the crucible of bureaucratic formation, especially in Korea's case, the formation engendered in the U.S.-with-Korea 1945-1953 experience, was in fact the nucleus of virtually all social modernization and change. Riggs' insight and rigorous, detailed, probing, systematic, and, what one might almost designate, conclusive analysis of modern bureaucratic national
development, seemed, by comparison, to suggest a certain
tentativeness, vagueness, and ephemeral quality to the
other theoretical speculations I had come across. When
initially exploring Korean commentators in the area of
U.S.-with-Korean experience, I encountered not only
critical reference to Riggs and incorporation of his
thought into Korean texts, but, possibly more telling,
interpretations and insights made by these Korean scholars
which were clearly marked by an indebtedness, whether
acknowledged or not (though in nearly all they were), to
Riggs' prismatic theory. And thus, the apologia for the
study which follows: which is an attempt to understand the
importance of the 1945-1953 U.S.-with-Korea bureaucratic
interaction, in terms of its shaping and determining impact
on Korean modernization, and as understood through the
prism of Riggs' theory of world development in the 20th
Century, the Prismatic Model.
CHAPTER II

RIGGS' THEORY OF PRISMATIC SOCIETY

Introduction

What follows is primarily presentation of Riggs' theory, although not, because of paper limitations, in exhaustive detail. As pointed out in the introduction, Chapter IV will apply the theory of Riggs, developed here, to the important factors relating to Korean-with-U.S. bureaucratic involvement presented in Chapter III.

Finkle and Gable (1971) characterize Riggs' theory as focusing on how, primarily in developing countries, the growing power and complexity of national bureaucracies are likely to obstruct actual political development. To establish his thesis, Riggs considers bureaucracy in comparison to party systems, the electorate, interest groups, and the legislature. While recognizing that bureaucratic efficiency is necessary for social and economic development, the dilemma is that the bureaucracy's power acts to block the evolution or flowering of a functioning party system and democratic pluralism (1971). The above concerns are important to Riggs, and in his essay appearing in Finkle and Gable's (1971) book (excerpted from
Riggs, 1963, as originally published in Lapalombara, 1963) the above fairly well describes his direction of thought. However, the later Prismatic Model, as developed more fully by Riggs (1964), is a more exhaustively encompassing theory. The theory purports to address the phenomenon of political development as it manifests itself between traditional social functioning and modern, more or less fully developed society, which in Riggs' perspective of 1964 could have been either pluralist-democratic or totalitarian in form. Contrary to the social and cultural relativist positions contemporary with Riggs, which will be touched upon later in this chapter, primarily as they clarify Riggs' own point of view, Riggs' perception is that universal, generalizable characteristics are apparent among 20th Century developing nations. And though his perspective, based in empirically rigorous data collection and analysis, tended to place him outside the growing mainstream of cultural relativism, inclusive of more subjective assessment and even definition of the concept of development itself, Riggs' analysis, by its very painstaking compendiousness and exhaustive, rigorous analysis, is convincing. Moreover, at least within the criticism and commentary of Riggs addressed in this study, the richness and completeness of theory, which seem to go beyond simply depiction of universal development principle, and instead
suggest social, political, cultural design virtually as a paradigm of world society, cannot be understood, I do not believe, without concentrating on the theory's expression in its major text (Riggs, 1964) which Heady (1991), for one, has simply referred to as the single most important work in the field of public administration.

Presented below, then, is first of all a discussion of the concept of Prismatic Society (1964), and then commentaries and related insights, by both Riggs and others, writing mostly of the same subject matter.

Underlying Concepts and Terminology

A key opening observation for Riggs (1964) concerns the extent to which external models or standards affect transitional countries within their transitional phase. Social behavior is not so much institutionalized as it is adopted by fiat or law of "formal organizational structure with a manifest administrative function" (p. 34). Formal administrative structures in developing countries are in many cases mere facades. Older, more diffuse institutions tend to carry out most of the effective administration work as a latent function. Riggs importantly contrasts this developmental phenomenon with the experience of developed, Western democracies, wherein new, specialized administrative functions emerged as latent consequences of changes in
the operation of older institutions, whose charters still retained traditional formulas of a fused type. Fused in Riggs' conceptual universe refers to traditional society, within which power and control, of virtually any form or manifestation, are merged or fused into one aspect or ruling function. Diffraction, the polar extreme, would be the state of development within which power is divided and dispersed. This process of development, for Riggs, is not without its deterministic propensities, as administrative and society characteristics must follow developmental stages or sequence: "only at a later stage of diffraction would the increasingly specialized character of new institutions be recognized and legitimated by the adoption of new formulas" (p. 34).

The term, "prismatic," itself ascribes a particular kind of structural configuration to the area or society. Prismatic is not an ascription of income per capita level, nor does it specify degree of utilization of resources. The term does not indicate the natural endowment of the national entity. Prismatic carries some connotation of transitional and developmental, but, on the other hand, it does not at all carry the sense of direction or movement contained in these terms. Transitional, underdeveloped, and developing countries may or may not be prismatic. Riggs states, however, that the concept of prismatic
society is intended to identify a specific manifestation of social order which is both wide-spread and important, globally. Of more importance, the term is intended to unlock much of the meaning and significance of a given identified social order, and to analyze its importance for understanding political, social, cultural, administrative, economic, and even psychological change in human society (1964).

The conceptual framework associated with the prismatic society is non-teleological, which is to say, prismatic focuses upon observation, description, and analysis of the prismatic society, in and of itself, not as an indication of change, direction of change, or final result. Changes in degree of diffraction over time for a particular society can only be determined through relevant factors open to examination. Changes or change itself cannot be determined in the sense of degree of diffraction through examination of relevant factors. Change cannot be assumed conceptually. Thus, the utility of the term, "prismatic," is established, in Riggs' conceptualization, as carrying no teleological import or connotation. The prismatic exists as an adjustment to circumstances. As such, in theory, prismatic society is neither conceptualized nor, in fact, institutionalized as a stepping stone to modern format. In theory, such adjustment may be permanent. The prevalent
terminology of transitional and modern, or modernizing, on the other hand, does at least connote teleological assumptions and meanings. Transitional and modern carry also qualitative implications of keeping pace with reality, with current needs, or of striving for these things, and of maintaining or pursuing developmental norms. In the general sense of these terms, it is desirable to be modern and up-to-date. In the teleological determination of these concepts, transition, modernization, and so forth express process, not state of existence, toward some conceptualized goal or end state. All in all, modernization conveys a notion of moving, with "moving" the emphasis, toward a preferred condition (Riggs, 1964).

Riggs (1964) further differentiates his term, "prismatic," in perceiving that modernizing, developing, and transitional, but especially the root concept of all of the above, "modern," suggest inevitability of progress, more or less in a preconceived direction. The goal and the process of modernization, as distinguished from the state of prismatic, are viewed as inexorable, with time. Didactically, Riggs informs us that in terms of chronology we are all modern, in the sense of contemporary. It is, however, in terms of substance that we should importantly understand and investigate modernization. The modern society, then, is socially mobilized, relatively industrialized, produc-
tive, and capable of maintaining both effective government and public administration systems. The form of modernity for Riggs, as earlier suggested, manifests in both totalitarian and pluralist democratic forms, in both representative government and in communist dictatorship. In modernity, given its qualitative connotation, functionally specific structures achieve differentiation or diffraction. In transitional society, leadership attempts to invoke change and progress, to one degree or another according to a fixed vision or agenda. The agenda, as transmitted through leadership and elites, evokes positive connotations and images of the leadership as virtually the fathers or prime movers of a new destiny for the masses. The elite are the elect who promote modernization, and initiate industrialization. Through the modernizing elite, the machinery of government assumes effectiveness and builds toward national power. The elite view and display themselves as the creators of progress, although the overall image projected may be also the inevitability of progress, and that change is in fact internally propelled (1964).

Within traditional societies, elites are not thus drawn toward progress. They instead are transfixed within retrospective. Progress in the modern and modernizing sense is hardly conceived. Preservation and restoration of social norms, ancestral lifeways, and what is customary and
familiar, and all the while diverging consciously from the new and novel, all characterize the traditional format. Seeking to restore what has formerly been may well become the characteristic focus. Yet Riggs (1964) postulates that attaining to modernity is only in fact a quest. Traditional societies may pursue the quest, but neither modernity nor traditional realization or reversion is guaranteed.

The terms fused, prismatic, and diffracted are used by Riggs to assist in clarifying societal and administrative states commonly associated with the terms traditional, developing or transitional, and developed or modern, respectively. The defining characteristics of Riggs’ replacement terminology are quite different, however, from the usual nomenclature. The defining characteristics hypothesize proposed empirical investigative support, in that modern societies, upon examination, will be found to possess not only industrial development and comparatively effective administration, but also relatively diffracted, differentiated, and institutionally specific functional dynamics, both bureaucratically and throughout the society.

Societies of a more traditional character, conversely, will be fused or undifferentiated to a far greater degree than their either developed or transitional counterparts. Those viewed as transitional will be prismatic, or very likely prismatic in structural composition (1964).
To clarify, the terms traditional, developing or transitional, and modern or developed all point to teleological assumptions: that developed and modern are realized, or desired, or evolved social states. Traditional, followed by transitional or developing, constitute indications of movement from the folk, or the primitive, in some cases, toward the ideal vision of the modern or developed state, as manifested primarily in Western pluralist democracy. Riggs' theory, while not contradicting the viability and truthfulness of assumptions made by such identification of development process, suggests also a need to establish the structural realities of traditional, transitional, and modern, and to focus upon these individually, and if not in isolation, at least in the sense of identifying structural components of each developmental state, the interrelationships among such components, without necessarily considering either post or prior events or circumstances, and the functions associated with identified components. For such focusing of overall social structure, Riggs finds it most salubrious and conducive to hypothesis formation to isolate bureaucratic structuring. Thus, in Riggs' analysis, traditional equates with fused, wherein all functions, virtually, and all power are manifest in one central structure, the ruling individual, with likely attached and serving elite. Transitional
equates with prismatic, wherein the fused power-hold begins to separate. The central power structure pulls apart from itself into separating elements, but not completely. Instead, the elements lock into a partially separated or diffused state. Developed or modern indicates widely separated elements of power, specified by the term, diffracted, which in the ultimate sense would signify that each structure relates to but a single function. Thus, traditional is fusing of all functions, all power; modern is an equalization of distribution or atomization of power throughout the society. Prismatic is a state wherein the diffraction or diffusion process begins but locks into place, often in a quite permanent sense. This state assumes its prismatic state, its ossified, inert manifestation, as a direct function of bureaucratic power initiative, realization, and control, as will be returned to later in this study.

Heady (1991) considers that Riggs' Prismatic Model is a statement made in direct response and negative criticism to Almond's Input-Output Model. The term, prismatic, can be thought of as closely approximating what is in fact considered either transitional in character, or the transitional society itself, in Heady's view. In Heady's understanding, the Prismatic Model attempts isomorphism with the transitional society or political system.
Ironically, Almond believed his own Input-Output Model was itself ideally suited for transitional societies and political systems. The key factor of differentiation in Heady's view, however, is that Riggs specified the Prismatic Society has inputs that do not lead to rule making and rules which are not often implemented. The society which realizes its prismatic state, moreover, is based on a two-tiered model, of what is prescribed ideally and what actually happens. Riggs' emphasis on the construction of typologies or models for comparative purposes, with concern to keep them value free or value neutral uses the concept of model to specify "'the conscious attempt to develop and define concepts or clusters of related concepts, useful in classifying data, describing reality and/or hypothesizing about it'" (Waldo, 1964, as cited in Heady, 1991, p. 15). Heady (1991) further notes that Presthus (1959) distinguished between theorists attempting broad, cross cultural, all encompassing formulations and those advancing more modest and restricted middle-range theories. Heady mentions that Diamant (1960) discerned general system models and political culture models. Riggs' model was by design and intention a general system model. Waldo (1964) observed:

The central problem of model construction in the study of comparative public administration is to select a model that is large enough to embrace all the phenomena that should be embraced without being, by virtue of
its large dimensions, too coarse-textured and clumsy to grasp and manipulate administration. (p. 22, cited in Heady, 1991, p. 16)

Riggs' model of public administration, using the "general system approach" (Heady, 1991, p. 15), as differentiated from "political culture" or "middle-range" (p. 15) models, established dominance in its field, using structural-functional analysis adapted from sociologists Talcott Parsons, Marion Levy, and F. X. Sutton. Heady interprets Riggs as formulating ideal types of societies in order to advance social understanding, especially in terms of societies undergoing accelerating social, economic, political, and administrative change, which models led to Riggs' (1964) formulation of the subject of central focus here, Administration in Developing Countries: The Theory of Prismatic Society. Riggs (1962) earlier commented on his own work as representative of trends in public administration analysis which moved from the prescriptive or normative toward the descriptive, empirical, and analytic. Riggs, as interpreted by Heady (1991), called for studies that were truly comparative, by which he meant empirical, nomothetic, and ecological. Riggs and others determined that an ecological approach emphasizing human environment adaptation was needed. Human environment factors would include "formally non-administrative" (Riggs, 1964, p. 426) institutions. The crux of the issue was that, especially
in prismatic societies, the formal, administrative institution would "adapt" to the non-administrative and informal:

Even if some sense could be made of administrative institutions as autonomous structures in a relatively diffracted society like that of the United States, we cannot hope to understand administration in situation-al societies, where the interdependence of structures is prismatic in character, without taking into account the impact of formally non-administrative upon administrative institutions. . . . What must be demonstrated are the connections or interdependencies between particular environmental variables and administrative behavior. To do this a nomothetic approach is essential. Without identifying relevant variables and showing how they are linked, it is impossible to demonstrate the ecological relationships. (p. 427)

Riggs cautions that the ecological approach comprising the intention of his Prismatic Model, suggests the advisability of accepting cultural relativist limitation. Cultural relativists, in contradistinction to Riggs' ecology, may tend to establish culturally-specific data as constituting the ecological approach itself. Instead of such enumeration of environmental and cultural conditions, a truly ecological approach must be able to identify "sensitive variables in the environment--whether they form a part of the culture or not--and the demonstration of at least plausible patterns of correlation between these variables and the administrative items which are the focus of analysis" (p. 428). Riggs hypothesized that many environmental factors which might be enumerated through cultural relativist input are "relatively insensitive to development and to the explanation of administrative behavior" (p.
The analysis of politics, change, and administration are not dependent on knowledge of such factors. Instead, analysis of administrative behavior in developing societies depends on access to and ability to differentiate highly selective environmental data, along with organization capability for establishing correlations. Correlations, which are the crux of empirical analysis, can only be seen through extension of focus to nomothetic analysis. Such empirical analysis can lay the groundwork for ensuing normative, prescriptive analysis. Ecological forces analyzable into correlations among factors do not, however, suggest a deterministic approach. They instead work to establish boundaries and ranges of choice. They open up avenues of awareness, and to the extent that nomothetic correlations create constraints, they also create new dimensions of understanding which are liberating. Accepting the impingement of compiled cultural data as necessarily determining administrative formation and developmental choice creates an unnecessary confinement of perspective and limitation of insight. Ecological administrative theory based on empirically valid data will define the framework of reality and likely consequences of various courses of action: "Thus it will reveal unsuspected dimensions of choice, of autonomy, by illuminating new alternatives that have not hitherto been considered" (p. 429).
The ecological would derive administrative and development theory from this kind of scientific evolutionary approach. Riggs pioneered in applying ecological analysis to comparative bureaucratic and public administration systems. Interaction between bureaucratic system and external environment and also the dynamics of socio-administrative change would be examined in a balanced manner emphasizing mutual influence (1991).

Riggs' 1962 analysis, "An Ecological Approach: The 'Sala' Model" (in Heady & Stokes, 1962) suggests that new ecological models are needed in public administration study to fill the gap left by normative doctrine guiding administrative reform and development. In addition to "clear and relevant information about administrative practices, organization, and history in particular countries," also needed will be "more testable and tested hypotheses about causal relationships among administrative variables" (p. 49). Riggs understands his two-fold demand for investigation as contributing in practical ways to public administration, but also in terms of theory formation in the social sciences (1962). Riggs perceived that study of public administration in developing countries through political science models constructed in reference to understandings from Western countries, primarily the U.S., was of limited relevance. These Western models examine,
overall, uniformity of environmental factors in the Western contexts, as if institutions, practices, and structures could be thus studied, in this somewhat abstract manner, outside the context of environment or setting. Western implicit assumptions of institutional autonomy and applied generalizations fall apart when applied to contexts of underdevelopment (Riggs, 1962).

Heady's (1991) interpretation of Riggs' analysis of development contrasts the original Prismatic Society (1964) with Riggs' later Prismatic Society Revisited (1973). Recognizing (as has also been stated here) that only examination of Riggs' complete and complex text can do justice to his findings, Heady begins with Riggs' suggestion that the Prismatic Model also applies, to some extent, to present day societies, by which Heady doubtless intends diffracted societies, since there can be no doubt, as least in Riggs' 1964 analysis, that what was intended was explication of present-day developing societies, with primary emphasis on bureaucracies. Heady notes Riggs' 1973 revision of his theory, Prismatic Society Revisited, attempted greater application of Riggs' prismatic vision to highly diffracted societies undergoing various structural stress and strain, as for instance was notable in the U.S. in terms of the Vietnamese war and the counter-culture movement. Riggs develops in the 1973 revision a two-part
manifestation of the developed or fully diffracted model, including integration of differentiated functions. In the 1973 version, integration was viewed as equally important to the developed condition as the aspect of diffraction or power dissemination and diffusion (the bases of diffraction) itself. In the 1973 version, prismatic does not mean merely transitional, that is, manifesting change between recognized and understood stages. It is instead a form of social integration and stability in its own right and may be as permanent a state as the developed or diffracted condition. Prismatic may reflect equilibrium and exist as adaptation between democratic and authoritarian extremes. As such, prismatic represents successful response to influence or impact from the West. Additionally, an inertia is established to maintain the prismatic state, in that the elite, through its positioning as the official class, maintains, as Riggs reiterates many times, and as Heady underscores, a level and solidarity of rule through its dominance of both military and bureaucracy. The prismatic, though perhaps initially manifested and perceived as transitional in format, acquires its own elite-dominated vitality and solidifies the various social stratifications and elite power structures (Heady, 1991). Riggs of the 1964 compendium had already focused on malintegration as well as stagnated diffraction as indica-
tive of the undeveloped state. Thus, it seems clear that Riggs' 1973 revision addresses primarily theory application to developed countries. In other words, in reapplication, the theory suggests how development and diffraction might, in some instances of environment influence, revert to more prismatic forms. In seeking to develop this concept of what might be termed prismatic reversion, in embryonic form in 1964, Riggs utilized highly predictive insight to discover indications of such prismatic tendency, in developed societies, such as the U.S., even at the beginning of the 1960s, leading to the telling consequences of the later 1960s and beyond, in U.S. society (Riggs, 1973).

A society which is prismatic and experiencing diffraction through endogenous forces Riggs speaks of as endo-prismatic, having an endo-prismatic system. One which changes or experiences diffraction through response to external pressures, Riggs designates as exo-prismatic. Transitional societies tend to be for the most part exo-prismatic systems. They can be identified with contemporary non-Western societies which respond to the impact of the industrialized West. Endo-prismatic systems in which innovations leading to diffraction have taken place are found only in the pre-modern societies of Europe, according to Riggs, in which the scientific and industrial revolutions took place. In these societies, the dynamic element
was provided by the middle class, not by the elite. The power of the older elite was challenged. Constitutional restraints were placed on them. Changes were imposed on them. Most processes of change probably result from mixtures of innovation and adaptation. Influence of either predominantly endogenous or predominantly exogenous forces can lead to the emanation of the prismatic society. The former would be endo-prismatic-pre-modern; the latter would be exo-prismatic and contemporary or transitional. In Riggs' terms, prismatic is taken to mean or specify exo-prismatic. The exo-prismatic model provides analysis of public administration in transitional societies. Change in the model is viewed as response to stimulus, threat, or challenge from the external world, primarily in the form of diffracted societies. When the exo-prismatic society possesses sufficiently strong endogenous forces, the threat imposed externally is responded to through transformation (diffraction) of internal structure sufficient for enabling its maintenance of political independence. Thus, the internal elite remains in command of the processes of change. On the other hand, should the endogenous forces be weak, the society becomes subject to foreign elite rule, or colonialism. The external elite imposes structural change. The pattern and sequence of change varies widely, but economic development always results. Government costs rise
far out of proportion with national income. Transformations in addition create major political, social, cultural, intellectual, and technical consequences. Development can be defined as increasing interdependence, marketization, and extension of the money and price system. Economic development may not be considered desirable from all points of view. The society may develop even while per capita wealth declines simultaneously. Inequity and insecurity may accompany economic development also. Non-economic societal variables may also be affected: social welfare, morality, and the sense of purpose and meaning in life may be either enhanced or undermined. Occurrence of desired correlative changes results in positive development; undesired, in negative development (Riggs, 1964).

As the traditional society confronts the threat of industrial powers, in military terms, the militarily threatened country may feel compelled to adopt modern weapons and modern modes of military organization. Economic costs are great. New forms of social organization would be required. Normally, the traditional economy has little to export, hence to develop from. Response to external threat, such as in the military scenario, generally would demand immediate and severe internal adjustment. If some aspect of internal production, on the other hand, can be readily increased beyond immediate consumption
needs, then it is likely or at least possible that minimal internal social change will be demanded. This minimal adjustment case, however, seems unlikely, since economically demanded organization for exports requires establishment of credit and transportation facilities, opening of new land, procedures for grading and standardization, and so on. In time, basic family and social change demanded becomes much more far-reaching when transformation to initiate industrialization for weapons production must be started. The export base must increase. To accommodate defense and military posture change, the public bureaucracy must be profoundly altered. In time, the externally initiated change process imposes bureaucratic transformation of the following order: a patrimonial or prebendary basis moves toward salaried personnel and professionalization. The patrimonial basis comprised elements of feudal order, independent-small-scale rule, clans, and so forth, permitting the hegemony of hereditary succession and predominant local power through officials or chiefs. The prebendary basis of traditional bureaucracies permitted much greater central control but required officials to procure a substantial portion of their incomes in the form of tributes, fees, gifts, rents, or similar payments not directly allocated and distributed from central sources (treasury) (Riggs, 1964).
Consolidation of bureaucratic power requires two simultaneous yet interdependent transformations. The first is replacement of the patrimonial or prebendary bureaucratic remuneration with salary, set sufficiently high to discourage bureaucratic need for solicitation from external sources. The central treasury must be large to overcome the prebendary or patrimonial habit. The public habit of directly compensating officials for services is not readily overcome. Opportunities and temptations for bureaucrats abound. New political and judicial control systems are required for sharp curtailment. The second transformation involves differentiation of specialized departments and bureaus staffed with specialists having limited scope of activities. Efficiency of tax collection and expenditures of funds for control consolidation over the bureaucracy is demanded. In traditional systems, a trickle up method of fund collection and distribution prevailed. Every bureaucratic level collected, retained, and redistributed upward, with a small fraction eventually reaching the central treasury. Expenditures in turn depended on "trickle down," as heads of agencies and departments are paid and in turn pay subordinates, after deducting for themselves. Only a minute proportion reaches the bottom bureaucratic level. Specialization overcomes the above practice and helps to assure remuneration according to standard procedures, and
to specified persons (Riggs, 1964).

Developing national entities in the modern era tend to face common sets of problems in relation to their course of development. In some cases these problems emanate from circumstances surrounding the throwing off of colonial rule, such as the need for building or rebuilding adequate systems of defense. Societies which have never been substantially impinged upon by alien conquest, when setting upon the course of modernization, must still address the same needs of financing and structuring adequate defensive components. In order to carry out such complex commitments, in either of the above instances, strong bureaucracies are the initial requisites. Their creation will necessarily be, in the post colonial case, extension of basic bureaucratic structures as they had been created by the retreating imperialist regime. Even though replacement of the retreating regime's administrators may occur in wholesale, across the board fashion, the post colonial tendency is to retain the official formats, or recognizable semblances of the alien administrative rule. The modernizing nation which carries little in the way of any acquired baggage of prior Western or European or other hegemony, must seek to emulate some known or predetermined model, generally derived from those implanted in Europe and the U.S. during the 18th or 19th Centuries (Riggs, 1964). In
noting commonalities between post colonial and non-colonial politically and socially developing entities, Riggs discovers powerful confirmation of the generalizability of his Prismatic Model. Riggs’ analysis of extant bureaucratic data, as well as his own more directly derived observational material, suggest that particularities of traditional societies and the idiosyncratic patterns of colonial rule left behind are all, to varying degrees transcended by uniformities seemingly universal to the transitional process. Much beyond this central contention about social, economic, and political development, Riggs’ further contention is that the prismatic form is fully capable of emerging in recognizable distinctness either directly from traditional contexts or through the after effects of colonial rule, but it also may manifest itself as part of highly developed or diffracted societies as well (Riggs, 1964).

Despite strong adherence to universalizing and generalizing principles regarding the Prismatic Model, Riggs also constructs points of differentiation based on cultural difference leading to adaptation variance in approaching the modern. Even so, when stipulating that particular culture traits lead variously to distinct levels of facilitation or hampering in terms of adaptation to evolutionary social development, either exogenously or
endogenously stimulated and carried out, or both, Riggs with greater emphasis states that the society's ability to adapt itself to the vicissitudes of survival as demanded in the contemporary world's definitions of political and administrative modernization does not result from characteristics inherent in the culture, but rather from the society's given level of overall, multi-dimensional integration. Interestingly, this emphasis on social, political, economic, cultural, and bureaucratic integration of elements and variance is returned to in Riggs' 1973 analysis, *The Prismatic Society Revisited*, but, as mentioned above here, in that analysis, in terms of how prismatic characteristics, due to a deficiency of integration, might reassert themselves, disrupting social cohesion and undermining the beneficial foundations of diffracted development. In the 1964 study, Riggs had already developed his perception of socio-cultural integration as perhaps the key factor in both moving on to successful developmental stages, and then, later, maintaining successfully diffracted balances of power. Conversely, however, just as diffraction is supported within a context of social integration, so too is social integration enhanced, as least in Riggs' 1964 view of the relationship, to the degree that diffraction has been realized (1964). Riggs extended this argument to maintain that the success of
social and political innovation and reform, from post
colonial or neotraditional toward development, may likely
rest on the evolutionary elites' understanding of actual
levels of their society's socio-cultural integration. Only
in this way, or through such an analytical process of
attuned awareness, can successful upward transformations to
development be made possible. Such awareness and knowledge
must guide the successful pioneer, whether indigenous or
foreign, toward realization of development potential.
These agents of change, through awareness and analysis of
how socially differentiated factors adjust to one another
within the context of relatively unchanging culture, can
achieve desired transitional momentum and development
impact. Through expert analysis of data and the generaliz­
able processes of developmental change, the transitional
process leader can recognize predictable development levels
and characteristics throughout the stages of transition
(Riggs, 1964).

As transitional stages are completed and the diffract­
ed or developed state is reached, Riggs maintains, the
power of the bureaucracy is increasingly given over to the
political domain. The bureaucracy increasingly acts
passively in response to political initiatives and in
support of the primary political agenda. As social
development, however, is caught up in the prismatic case or
realm, the bureaucratic power agenda, rather than experiencing descent in relation to political power structures, instead rises to new levels of power and dominance. In the prismatic society, formally initiated and structured laws, constitutions, and both legislative and judicial power bases generally do not take the intended effect. Their power is essentially chimerical. Social control passes, rather, to those encompassing and directing technological and industrial power structures. These power bases engender new elite formations, which in turn readily employ the bureaucracy as power and politics control and policy implementation tool and stratagem of choice (1964).

Legislators and executives chosen to assume leading and shaping roles in the society discover that their political functions are under bureaucratic domination. In the overall context and history of developing societies, aid programs of the U.S., with single-minded determination to push development to its utmost limits in transitional societies, have served to bolster prismatic bureaucracy power. As the bureaucratic machinery, which may ostensibly serve developmental interests with efficiency, expands, growth of any effective political institutions is stultified. Thus effective public administrative context too is eroded at its foundations. Political institutions capable of directing and controlling public bureaucracies, accord-
ing to necessity, never materialize. The close association throughout the developing world between the prismatic society and direct U.S. aid and involvement has served to undermine rather than to strengthen public administration, according to Riggs (1964).

Riggs' Theory of Social Change

Survival needs of societies may in fact, Riggs suggests, be mutually contradictory. Societal structures may simultaneously perform many functions, both beneficial and dysfunctional. Reconciliation of typical functions may not be desirable since such accommodation could result in destruction of functions both beneficial and necessary for survival. Institutional change could result if contradictions among functions are great enough in number and consequent tension produced is sufficient. Societal experimentation with new social, political, and economic structures is an attempt to reduce dysfunction within the society. Functional requirements which contradict one another are especially important in reaching understanding of transitional societies. Riggs maintained that "the extent of contradictory functional requirements in transitional societies is extremely great" (1964, p. 76). Contradictory requirements are further suggested through structures which overlap and establish contrast between
manifest and latent functions of particular institutions in the prismatic model (1964).

Transitional societies' prismatic institutions are notably different from the formal models from which they are derived. "Latent consequences clash with manifest roles" (Riggs, 1964, p. 81). Non-economic factors of the transitional society tend to have more powerful effects on prices, supply, and demand than do their counterparts in modern developed countries. The prismatic market is not a true market but rather a quasi-market, described in Fred Riggs' terms as a "bazaar-canteen" (p. 81), a descriptive concept originated by Riggs in order to characterize and to differentiate the economic institutions of the prismatic society. In introducing the concept, Riggs maintained that:

The substantive economic behavior of a prismatic system can be understood only in politico-economic terms, not just in terms of formal economic models. .. [T]he political and administrative behavior of a prismatic system can also be understood only in politico-economic terms, since the bazaar canteen has crucial political and administrative consequences, as well as economic. (p. 81)

The economic terms, "reciprocity" and "redistribution," are important to understanding the functioning of the prismatic society. Reciprocity concerns the exchange of value without price. This process characterizes traditional society and is its primary mode of economic exchange. However, the administration of the traditional
society depends on economic redistribution of a tributary system. Contributions or tribute payments are made by the society’s membership to a central office, from which, in turn, allocations are provided outward, so to speak. In terms of prismatic society nomenclature, reciprocity relates to what Riggs designates as "bazaar" (p. 82) and redistribution relates to "canteen" (p. 82). Riggs views both manifestations as emanating from the impact of Western market institutions on traditional societies. Riggs specifies that "a prismatic system emerges from the superimposition of differentiated, specific structures upon relatively undifferentiated structures" (p. 82).

In the fused or traditional society, the institution of reciprocity is the parallel of the market in the diffracted society. The market is a rationalized version of reciprocity, with non-economic factors subtracted. Through market rationalization, "religious and sentimental values are put aside as purely economic considerations prevail" (Riggs, 1964, p. 103). Redistribution in the fused according to tribute and reallocation becomes tax and something like public works in the diffracted (1964).

The prismatic model looks like a market, in the sense that the economic is formally designated for the sale of goods and services in terms of money. Other factors influence the effective economic results. These include
the arena, the stage, and the office. The determinants of price in relation to goods and services are designated as market factors. Factors which determine power, prestige, and solidarity are called arena factors. In fused society, concern over price hardly arises, since arena factors are almost totally dominant. In prismatic society, both arena and market factors are combined. Within the bazaar canteen model of prismatic society, price indeterminacy is the pervasive economic characteristic. Relationships between buyers and sellers are the basis of pricing and of market fluctuations. Wages also fluctuate through similar prismatic indeterminacy. In diffracted society, market rationality works to level and standardize remuneration. The key point is, in terms of economics, as with all aspects maintained as necessary social, bureaucratic functions, in fused society all valuation is subjective and there thus exists no pricing system, either as standardized guideline to regulate rationally or, as in the prismatic, to be used primarily for manipulation and maximizing price variation according to political and bureaucratic power leverage. As with any formal aspect, whether legal code or price, because of bureaucratic strength and elite manipulation of both traditional values and formal, codified declaration, the rationality of the aspect is lost and instead serves only to intensify prospects for elite
bureaucratic manipulation (Riggs, 1964).

Riggs carries his analysis of prismatic manipulation for elite economic dominance into considerable detail and to virtually all aspects of existence in the Prismatic Model. Riggs' demonstration is in an important sense Marxist, in that the pervasiveness of economic influence and motivation underlie virtually every social, cultural, and political circumstance and position. Political influence maintained through bureaucratic dominance in turn prescribes access to economic wherewithal, in ways which work to undermine not only egalitarian redistribution, but access to formal learning and full development of technical, educational, scientific, and cultural values and accomplishments. It is bureaucratic power and influence which determine the economic sphere, and much less so the other way round. Riggs is painstaking in demonstration of how economic acquisition is utterly precarious and at the mercy of bureaucratic hegemony. Minorities or others who might possess virtues not only of intelligence and industry, but also some positional power due to a certain distancing from the majority culture and its attendant mores and circumspection, are able to accumulate wealth. But their retention and use of economic power is precariously subject to the design or caprice of powerholders, and can be rather unceremoniously, through various quasi-formal
manipulations, stripped from them. In the nomenclature of Riggs, they are "pariah" (p. 116) entrepreneurs. They thrive virtually at the discretion of elite powerbrokers, who may, without material effort allow enrichment of a pariah class, in effect for elite economic gain. Non-elites with economic power may eventually accede to political, bureaucratic ascendance through a series of economic agreements, bargains, or tradeoffs, over time, wherein the elite power strategy is gradually compromised as economic advantage begins to find bureaucratic and political power access. From Riggs' economic calculation it is through this process that power and control escape elite dominance and pass eventually to other, long suppressed classes (Riggs, 1964).

Riggs' (1964) overall critical insight into the nature of prismatic society perceives it as intrinsically paradoxical. The extent of the society's prismatic nature exposes the society increasingly to intermixing of administrative structures with social, economic, political, and cultural aspects. The subsystem of administration becomes understandable primarily in terms of the society's other subsystems or non-administrative components. The intermixing and intertwining of subsystems are the form of prismatic reality. Isolating these structural components, administrative-bureaucratic or otherwise, from one another
becomes virtually a hopeless task. The reality becomes only the single, larger, more comprehensive composite. It is in fact a syndrome or complex. Nevertheless, the various requisite functions, directed toward tasks for survival, must be performed. All societies, from simplest to most complex, including the prismatic, must perform them, according to one pattern or another. This kind of commonality of course is the order of perception which allows Riggs to form the universalizing principles of his study based on prismatic society. These basic functions then are grouped according to survival needs which are thereby addressed. The survival needs are: economic, social, communication, symbolizing, and political (Riggs, 1964).

Riggs' theory attends to the psychological factors contributing to social reality with special care. Riggs follows Kardiner's studies (1939, 1945) which examine interactions between social institutions and personality. The basic hypothesis to the above is that if the congruence between personality and institutions is strong and the motivational patterns within a society are consistent, behavior tends to be more the function of environmental pressures rather than motivation differences.

In a prismatic society the probable, or at least possible, existence of strongly divergent personality types in key roles means that some may react quite differently from others to the same situational
Prismatic politics might exhibit a degree of randomness that could be best explained by psychological variables. (p. 84)

Within transitional societies, inner-directed motivational patterns may be very strong. Rural and lower-class social groups would likely tend to be tradition-directed, predominantly. The upper-class would tend to be more inner-directed. This would be especially true of urban and larger organizations, government administration, and among professionals and politicians. In modern societies great differences of behavior are permitted, according to variation in roles and associational contexts. In modern social systems, the tendency is for individuals to move freely from particular role or context to some other. Within transitional society, on the other hand, variety is induced through competing, overlapping, and often incompatible social system types. Thus, the prismatic is uprooted from traditional social and value foundations, to some extent, yet cannot be fully adapted to the modern instance of psychic flexibility allowing social members to shift values from one situation to another. Individuals may, therefore, when sensing and caught up within this kaleidoscope of flux, resort to contrivance of their own highly personal set of values. This value system may become sensed as well as expressed as a system of "inner direction" (Riggs, 1964, p. 89). Interestingly, Riggs perceives
that variety in disposition, action, and experience in the society occurs between individuals rather than among primary groups or associations. Within transitional societies, among those who have difficulty in making facile value shifts related to changing roles and associational contexts, anxiety will likely be commonly experienced. Trauma experienced may be greatest amongst individuals who are inner directed. They would tend to experience considerably greater difficulty in trying to adjust to cultural settings reflective of "contradictory and often clashing value patterns" (Riggs, 1964, p. 90). Within the changing social order and cultural context, it is as if the world were disallowing these individuals to fulfill their own sets of self-imposed inner norms. One result is the creation of guilt. This sense of culturally imposed individual guilt is generally more difficult to deal with than are other similar problems of adjusting to transition. In general, within transitional societies various levels and forms of guilt are quite prevalent. The "kaleidoscopically changing social order" (p. 90), of transition, which manifests itself finally in some frozen form as the prismatic society, becomes for a time the only certain outward reality. Reality in flux exists as an impossible state for reconciliation with oneself, inner directions, inner drives, and individualized self-imposed demands.
Elites of transitional societies may thus well maintain personal and social patterns of inner-directed motivation. Within the diffracted system, multiple, functionally specific roles are maintained. In general, for individual survival, identification with many groups or subgroups is necessary. Multiple adaptations in behavior, outlook, and symbols of identification must be made. In diffracted society, adjustment means adaptation in self-conduct, utilizing minimum effort, to continually changing group contexts. Riggs cites Daniel Lerner's (1958, in Riggs, 1964) typology to the effect that the social member must be in adjustment through continuous adaptation to the expectations and attitudes of others within the several groups variously confronted. Successful adjustment is contingent on self-accommodation. Ability to maintain group membership, ideally, in diffracted society, with minimal difficulty in access and egress, depends with a high level of certainty on accommodational success. The norm becomes simply continual change in group expectations as associational settings are interchanged, or what Becker (1957; cited in Riggs, 1964, p. 68) refers to as the "secular" norm.

The traditional society had manipulated far fewer social roles, though these few roles covered the spectrum of life relationships. Change of roles was the expectation only after prolonged periods of readjustment, often only
after ceremonial rites of passage, and without ease of movement or shifting among roles. Within the traditional, all life situations were reinforcing to institutionalized norms according to community folkways and mores. Social roles were required to be sanctioned by the society and carefully worked out. Individuals following these formats encountered few inconsistencies or contradictions. Norms were generally held sacred (Becker, 1957, as cited in Riggs, 1964). The pervasive and readily identifiable aspect of the prismatic is that it contains both sets of socio-cultural expectations. Thus, in substantial proportions, one discovers both tradition-directed and other-directed individuals. Prismatic individuals, those who themselves are in transition within the transitional mode, find themselves constantly, critically, and perhaps even devastatingly challenged by new values and attitudes confronted, while still investing some part of themselves in the sense of an unchanging rightness to traditionally held norms. Facile rotation of roles as elicited in diffracted or modern society is never fully possible in the transitional. Conflict of values creates genuine trauma. Traditional formats and roles, while not altogether acceptable any longer, still bind individuals in the sense of powerfully suggesting to them that an ideal form yet exists and can in some way be made compatible with present
change. Traditionalism as a lifeway, while not acceptable in itself, arouses, nevertheless, a need for binding sets of rules, which are actively though perhaps not in all cases directly sought. Inherent past values suffer from discrediting as diffracted institutions emerge to challenge or corrupt them. Moreover, much of the specific content of uprooted tradition-directed values is given up. Equivalent new norms are sought and are expected to provide similar or equal levels of security. New systems are encountered with the expectation they will remain unchanging. Personalities engaged within the prismatic society perpetuate a psychologically costly struggle. Simultaneous impacts of contradictory values can be shattering. Inner-direction can take on a new and highly negatively charged energy. The inner directed individualism of the prismatic model of society provides a key point of differentiation from the inner-directedness of the merely transitional concept; that is, as the inner directed individual relates to the transforming social and governing systems. In Riggs' concept of the prismatic, the inner-directed individual creates critically important consequences for administrative behavior in the society. Riggs suggests that:

In the prismatic model, administration typically involves frequent clashes between individuals having incompatible or conflicting inner-directed value systems and goals. Leaders in politics and administration, having a highly personal set of values, seek to impose them on others. Alternatively, some persons
prove apathetic; resist coordination, and seek to satisfy only their private interest, resisting all attempts to mold or "socialize" them in response to the interests of others. Hence intra-bureaucratic conflict reflects private struggles between clashing personalities as much as conflicts of economic and social interest groups. (1964, p. 94)

From the above it can be interpreted that transitional, prismatic societies are likely to experience difficulty in terms of absorbing individuals smoothly within operating agencies and efficiently inducing them to adequately internalize organization goals and methods. Highly diffracted societies contrast with prismatic, generally, in this respect, in not experiencing such an order of difficulty. Within the prismatic structure, intra-bureaucratic difficulties and struggles do not necessarily occur with greater frequency than in the highly diffracted context, but they tend to be of a different character. Prismatic bureaucratic conflict tends to reflect, most importantly, interpersonal rivalry, with less overt concern for disagreement over organizational goals and principled interests. In diffracted systems the struggle may well transpire in earnest concerning unit program goals and policies. The confrontation, however, is very likely to remain confined to the organizational setting. Outside of that bureaucratic setting, the conflict likely terminates, and the disputants remain on friendly or at least cordial and sympathetic terms, much as do contesting attorneys when
outside of the courtroom. Antagonists within the diffracted context regard conflict as issue- and policy oriented and not as a matter involving basic personality struggle. The contrast here is that in prismatic society conflict involving persons at a formal level results commonly in defining the other, the rival, as the enemy. Against that enemy, thus defined, active ongoing struggle in every aspect, within and also beyond the organizational conflict ensues. Quite without consideration as to actual organization interest or difference, that individual personified as enemy is struggled against and opposed, virtually without exception and without relenting. The increased importance usually credited to factors of charismatic leadership and to factionalism in governmental processes of developing areas can be in part explained by consideration of interpersonal conflict and relatedness difference from the diffracted situation. In the developing area prismatic situation, inner-directness, as emphasized here, is prevalent. Thus, as Riggs points out, the influence of distinctively personal values and motivations increases in prismatic as opposed to diffracted contexts. In diffracted contexts or societies, the greater prevalence of outer-directedness among persons causes them to respond to organizational pressures and social interests with relatively greater uniformity as part of the group (1964).
Finkle and Gable (1971), as previously alluded to, interpret Riggs as stating that:

Bureaucratic interests can actually obstruct political development. The dilemma established by Riggs is that an efficient bureaucracy is necessary for development of the society and the economy. However, political development may come to be retarded through the initial power, structure, and then evolutionary growth of the merit bureaucracy, which stands to impede the evolution of a functioning party system. (p. 239)

Heady (1991) comments on Riggs’ analysis of realism and formalism, as actually manifested in all society but most noticeably within the prismatic, as revealing of a kind of unmasking of deliberate manipulation of refracted sanction, institutions, laws, positions, and in conjunction with these, the expectations and beliefs of the electorate, which is led to perceive higher congruence between reality and form than actually exists. Heady emphasizes Riggs’ suggestion that legal enactments in prismatic society can create little benefit. In the prismatic case, laws are virtually enacted for the purpose of masking the reality and the intention to manipulate. Riggs’ position seemed to be that prismatic bureaucrats, and the powerbrokers who establish and support them, learn to adapt legislation to their own designs. Heady’s projection of Riggs is more to the effect that law enactment may be initiated by these same figures of manipulation in order to extend their
advantage and venue of manipulation. For example, one might imagine such manipulation for control extending to a situation wherein a program or task force, with accompanying legal codes of regulation, is put into place with the formal purpose of monitoring bureaucratic decision making, especially concerning manipulation instances. Yet the intention of creating such an institution of extension of the central bureau, was merely, from the idea's inception, to first, create distraction from the true center of power; second, channel criticism or critical evaluation away from the actual source of corruption; and third, create an internally controlled mechanism (the supposed oversight bureau, with its complex assortment of regulations, functions, and designations of authority) to intensify and deepen opportunities for control, manipulation, and corrupt gain. It is little wonder that, as Riggs himself suggested would prove fruitful, we are led to apply the prismatic model to our own various contemporary political and bureaucratic situations, especially when corruption might be legitimately expected and enactment of new law and new agencies are established, supposedly for monitoring and control purposes (1991).

Riggs' generalizations concerning the above situation suggest that it is within the prismatic arena, initiated through transformation intentions, but then establishing
contexts quite beyond control of transformational ideals, that the "bureaucratic polity" (Riggs, cited in Heady, 1991, p. 429) begins to raise its own interests beyond the purposes of organized government, in any representative or pluralist sense, and to manipulate all aspects of that supposedly representative or communal form to advance its own design and to cater substantially to its official beneficiaries. No outside interest, force, or institution, except in the sense of the overall public will, which of course may be very intractable, or otherwise constantly pulled and manipulated in many directions, can be mustered to counteract the bureaucratic predominance and tendency to act for itself only or its elite supporters, and to thereby corrupt the intentions and purpose of the communal will. Clearly, Riggs' argument favors those experts, including, in Heady's (1991) view: Lapalombara, Goodnow, Pye, and Eisenstadt, though with important differentiations among them and various attitude shifts over the years, who contend that in modern development strong bureaucratic tendency portends weakening, restraint, and stultification of political institutions, and thereby acts most characteristically as an obstacle to overall political development. As bureaucracies appropriate political functions, "political direction tends to become more and more a bureaucratic monopoly, and as this occurs, the bureaucrats themselves
are increasingly tempted to give preference to their own group interests" (Heady, 1991, p. 429).

This kind of bureaucratic ascendance goes beyond transitional stages. Its propensity is the opposite. The imbalance grows and the dominant bureaucratic position increases. Heady interprets Riggs as suggesting that when "the imbalance continues and increases, the prospect for attainment of a desirable mutual interdependence among competing power centers becomes more remote" (Heady, 1991, p. 429). Recognizing that holistic or ecological approaches had been and were continuing to be used in application to developing societies, primarily through anthropological and sociological analyses, Riggs asserted, nevertheless, that alternative analysis of developing administration should explore governmental concepts and typologies developed through Western political analysis, but adapted to developing countries' problematical combination of traditional forms and values with modernizing industrialization. Such a model would go beyond social anthropology and comparative sociology, with their focus upon traditional or "folk" aspects and societies. Riggs' call for an ecological model stipulated, thus, the generalizing models' requirements of Western administrative study, but adjusted to fit developing societies' transitional characteristics, as in part delineated through "folk" anthropology and
sociology analysis. Not content with more purely culturally relative analysis, as had been assuming social science dominance even in administrative investigations, Riggs' assessment of developing country analysis produced the following conclusion: "Hence I suggest our chief need is for an explicit model of transitional societies and their administrative sub-systems" (Riggs, 1962, p. 20). This model and Riggs' absolute certainty of the great void it could fill in political analysis became encapsulated in his interlocking concepts of "Prismatic Society" and the "Sala Model" (p. 20).

Riggs explains his coinage of "prismatic" as based on a need to create terminology that is specific and not encumbered by associated meanings as with terms like "underdeveloped" and "transitional." Prismatic represents the mid ground between "fused," which is the traditional, the folk society basically before development, and "refracted" (a term in Riggs' analysis that later became "diffracted"), which means developed with wide distribution of power throughout the society.

Riggs notes that the process of differentiation within society, which moves it from the fused state toward the modern condition does not transpire according to principles of uniform development throughout the society. Understanding of the process of differentiation, or diffraction
(which is the modernization process) will be in effect coterminous with comprehension of the concept of prismatic. Riggs thus initiates his conceptualization of modernization and the transpositional state which reconciles and contains the generative movement between fused and diffracted societies in the following question and metaphorical response:

How, indeed, does diffraction take place? What are the intermediate stages between the extremes? Using the original context from which our metaphor comes, let us imagine a prism through which fused white light passes to emerge diffracted upon a screen, as a rainbow spectrum. Can we imagine a situation within the prism where the diffraction process starts but remains incomplete? The separate colors, though differentiated, are captive, "imprismed. . . ."

The "prismatic" concept helps us see why the models devised to study both ends of this continuum are inadequate for intermediate situations. (Riggs, 1964, p. 27)

In further developing his formulation of the prismatic concept, Riggs hypothesizes that developing structures within society toward the modern cannot be comprehended through individual social science disciplines because of the impingement of interrelating structures within the social structural relationship:

The social sciences that study specialized structures are inadequate because, although differentiated structures arise in embryonic or prismatic form, they scarcely function autonomously. . . . Hence any approach which tries to comprehend one of these sectors autonomously is doomed to failure. (p. 28)

Riggs concludes his initial exposition concerning the
prismatic concept by contrasting it with the disciplinary vision of anthropology, which characteristically attempts to incorporate an emphasis on "diffuse structures" (1964, p. 28), and in so doing makes it explicit that prismatic is best thought of as an approach or theory or model for studying how societies develop toward the modern in our present, closing century:

The holistic concept [of anthropology] is not too difficult to apply so long as social structures remain largely undifferentiated. Indeed, any other approach would prove meaningless for a largely fused society. But in the prismatic situation the subsystems, in all their complexity, are already emergent, especially in the most industrialized parts of the society, the urban centers. This explains the tendency of anthropologists to restrict themselves to the village, whose structures remain nearest the fused end of the continuum, while eschewing consideration of the urban end, with its diffracted institutions. But in so doing their results remain as fragmentary and partial as those of their colleagues from the other disciplines, who concentrate on the cities where counterparts to familiar specialized structures can be found. The result, of course, is a curiously dissociated or schizoid image of the transitional society. (Riggs, 1964 p. 28)

Thus Riggs' concept of the prismatic acts to overcome the void or separation the divided focus on primitive on the one hand or industrial on the other provides. Prismatic reconciles and refocuses the image, recognizing the new social situation created, with forms and behaviors characteristic to itself, but not necessarily to be discovered in either fused or diffracted.

Within the prismatic society exists a bureaucracy
which not only adheres to more traditional forms but shows
development toward the diffracted model. This "sub-model"
(Riggs, 1962, p. 20) of prismatic is the Sala, which
throughout Asia designates "office," but also "pavilion,
drawing room, or place of religious meetings" (p. 20). The
uses of Sala are more diffuse and undifferentiated than the
bureau of idealized administrative locus in "refracted"
society, though Sala demonstrates similarities and shared
characteristics (p. 21).

Riggs' employment of the term "Sala" is virtually the
fulcrum upon which his analysis of developing bureaucracy
rests. Technically speaking, within Riggs' special lexicon
and nomothetic hypothesis, there exists acknowledgment of
the "tendency in the Weberian literature" (Riggs, 1964, p.
267), to restrict the concept of "bureaucracy" to modern,
developed organizational applications, which is to say, to
"diffracted governments" (p. 267). Riggs, however,
maintaining that "institutions of hierarchic officials" (p. 267)
were indicated in both Confucian and other non-Western
circumstances, suggests that bureaucracies may be said to
characterize all models of his theory: fused, prismatic,
and diffracted. For the prismatic instance of the govern-
ment bureau, or office (diffracted, in Riggs' terminology),
or chamber (fused, similarly), the designation of "'Sala'
applies to personal rooms in a home, to religious and
public halls, but also and particularly, to government offices" (p. 268). Thus the designation of Sala also points to manifestation of "that interlocking mixture of the diffracted office and the fused chamber which we can identify as the prismatic bureau" (p. 268).

Primarily because of the factor of price indeterminacy characteristic of prismatic society as delineated by Riggs' economic analysis of development according to the Prismatic Model, "corruption becomes institutionalized in the Sala" (Riggs, 1964, p. 270). Price indeterminacy allows for distribution of government outputs according to determinations of recipients' social status: the higher the rank within the elite, the more output provided, at negatively direct correlated costs, or, again depending upon an integration of circumstances and elite power-status, at no cost whatsoever. Calculation of such differentials and astute maintenance of such variable payoff schedules significantly interfere, of course, with government efficiency and cost effectiveness. By way of contrast, in the diffracted state, as diffraction is generated toward the ideal, "it is assumed that governmental outputs which are for sale (public transportation, postal services, foreign exchange, import quotas, the use of communication facilities) are available to the public at uniform rates" (p. 269). Moreover, these uniform rates are adhered to
"without distinction of person. Every citizen regardless of class, caste, or community is entitled to such services at uniform rates" (p. 269).

Within the institutionalized corruption made possible and, more to the point, probable within the structure of the Sala, officials extort bribes and special favors from interest groups. Income which can be readily added to official salaries is acknowledged and served through the hierarchical system of the prismatic society as a whole. Officials in superior positions within the hierarchy receive payoffs, as do power wielders not directly positioned within the Sala itself. Lower officials are expected, rather, are demanded to actively extort added income and to initiate the process of filtering rewards up the hierarchy. Cultivation of extra-legal reward systems are necessary for job retention and pave the way to greater promotion and bureaucratic power and success. Beyond the moral and ethical questions of abridgment of rights and duties, and even beyond the corrosive effect such wide and penetrating government corruption will have at the root fiber of the society so governed, collapsing especially both the ethical and productive vitality of those strata of the society with only very limited power access, the directly pragmatic concern of inefficiency seems particularly disturbing:
Thus Sala sanctions reward inefficiency, for what could be more inefficient as a means of rule application than the practice of accepting money to suspend application of a rule? How can one expect efficient administration if appointments are based on favoritism more than on competence? (p. 270)

By contrast, in terms of the model of diffraction juxtaposed to the prismatic Sala, in the bureau or office of modern, developed bureaucracy rational budgeting of funds prevails. Allocation is made "to provide the necessary resources for rule application at minimal cost to the taxpayer" (Riggs, 1964, p. 270). Activities receive the support necessary for survival and maintenance of function, but that is all. Returning to the polar opposite of the fully diffracted and integrated bureau, within the corruption inherently manifest within the Sala:

Price indeterminacy means that some bureaus receive much more than they need, and others much less, depending on the skill and influence exercised by the chief of each bureau in the budget lottery. Some laws, consequently, cannot be applied for lack of funds, while money is wasted in administration of others. Prismatic "budgeting," in other words, reflects officials' as well as program needs. It institutionalizes inefficiency in the allocation of resources as a means for the implementation of prescribed policy goals. Prismatic finance, in short, protects prodigality and assures wealth for the bureaucratic elite. (pp. 270-271)

In "The Sala Model" essay, Riggs (1962) emphasizes heterogeneity in prismatic society. However, the prismatic's unique structures are developed only within terms of prismatic and Sala. These features or aspects characteristic uniquely of the prismatic, are found in their more
fully realized state within the Sala. But throughout the prismatic society, instances of both the modern bureau and the traditional court are also present. In analysis of a particular society, specification of proportions of these elements is important. Heterogeneity is clearly evident and in high degree in prismatic society. Formalism is also highly characteristic of prismatic, meaning, in Riggs' sense, a discrepancy between norms and realities. The tension within the society is to a great extent a reflection of congruence or incongruence between the prescribed reality of development and the heterogeneous reality of fused, prismatic, and somewhat advanced development, or refraction all being contained in one format. But modern industrial societies and fused traditional societies demonstrate a fairly high level of realism. Complete realism, however does not exist in any developed country, and in fact, Riggs feels, the U.S. administrative system is in many areas and in many respects, quite prismatic in nature. Interestingly, this suggestion is made in his study of 1962, yet it is a conclusion he examines later, in 1973, as a revision of his theory (Riggs, 1962, 1973).

The central difficulty, disparity, or uncertainty indicated by evidence of the prismatic, for Riggs, is the degree of presence of formalism, as this term is defined in his work. Importantly, laws are given lip service, but
primarily that is all. The law is important, however, as it is used for manipulation, demanding official obedience, or demonstrating the same, on the one hand, for some strategic purpose, while excusing oneself or one's subordinates from obedience, on the other, when expediency so demands. The bureaucrat or chief bureaucrat, thus manipulates according to inclination and advantage. Also at his disposal is the legal and bureaucratic apparatus of the more complexly instituted prismatic state. The power of bureaucracy is enhanced, and open to elite manipulation, as Riggs discusses later to more telling effect, far beyond what can be realized in either primitively governed or advanced bureaucratic formats. Opportunities for corruption become a keynote insight into the prismatic (1962).

Basic to the motivation of Riggs in constructing prismatic analysis is to suggest how those wishing to adjust or expedite development processes often go wrong, hence, the critical nature of understanding prismatic formalism. For example, adding a law or new code of legal procedure, while likely to effect change in the desired direction in developed society, is more likely in the prismatic to create only further underwritings and opportunities for corruption and illicit financial manipulation and gain. Instead of such manipulations of norms and prescriptions for adherence and adjustment, which under-
standing of the Sala should inform us only result, or likely do, in deeper, more articulate corruption, one should instead, if reform and progress minded, focus on bringing reality and prescription, in general, in a structural sense, closer together. Beyond simply heterogeneous structuring, overlapping is important as a characteristic of prismatic structuring. In the prismatic, refracted co-exist with undifferentiated structures of the fused type. Old undifferentiated structures carry out functions alongside the differentiated institutions intended and designed specifically for particular functions. Thus, in prismatic society, the family, the church, and communal and hierarchical groupings continue carrying out undifferentiated groupings of functions in addition to, or without resorting at all to, the refracted structure: the refracted being parliament, official elections, public schools, and so forth. Perhaps functions spread across all of the above in the more developed state will simultaneously be performed within a church, or by the family. The hold of the traditional, fused condition is powerful. On the other hand, such overlapping can scarcely be determined to be characteristic of either fused or refracted society. In refracted, manifest functions are performed within designated structures. To the extent that realism prevails, overlapping does not occur. In the fused model, the
occasion for overlapping does not arise, since only a solitary, "major set of structures" (Riggs, 1962, p. 23) exists for all functions (1962).

Before moving on to the specifically Korean instance of 20th Century political and social development, as traced in Chapter Three, it is important for understanding Riggs' overall conceptualization of modernization to close with his understanding, more specifically, of the concept of diffraction, or more essentially, the diffracted or fully diffracted society. In what sense can the process of diffraction and the fully diffracted state of society be taken as normative. Prior to assessing the developmental course of any society, these are critical evaluations, which must be made in terms of Riggs' understanding.

In addressing the issue of whether diffracted society can be thought of as representing the norm for human society or, in a slightly different sense, the norm for human social, political, and administrative development, and thus, realization of individual potential, Riggs first notes the importance of facing the issue that diffracted society today is essentially industrial and urban society. Is that desirable, much less the ideal measure of development success? Or, if we cannot readily affirm that it is the ideal, to what extent is "Industria," as conceptualized in an earlier study by Riggs and as cited by him (1964, p.
24) to clarify the valuation that might be made concerning contemporary instances of diffraction, or reflections of that concept, not in fact fully diffracted, but rather instead something more like a further prismatic phase in the development continuum. Especially in light of Riggs' own *Prismatic Society Revisited* (1973) and likely our individual observations and interpretations over the past 20 years of social development, one might opt for the latterday prismatic option, or reversion to prismatic through malintegration of social components, as Riggs hypothesized (1973). Riggs in 1964 strongly implied something of this undercutting of how we value the social, political, and human structures of our present age (somewhat prophetically) when he suggested that "one can postulate that industria resembles the diffracted model, leaving open the question of whether or not 'post modern' society will be more or less diffracted than Industria" (p. 24).

It seems clear that at least a suggestion exists in the above that development may in some postmodern sense and time, or stage, move beyond or move in some way back from diffraction, which would tend to suggest that while for Riggs the process of diffraction may in a sense be normative, that is, in a sense may be carrying humankind to higher, more complete realizations of potential, it is
possibly not normative in the sense that the fuller the diffraction the more desirable, the better, the state of human development. This may be true, even in Riggs' own theory, even though he appears to suggest that diffraction and development are virtually synonymous concepts. It is perhaps at present more accurate to suggest that diffraction is a facet of development, indicating its present manifestation and degree of completeness. Diffraction appears more nearly to characterize description of a process which carries human society to forms which appear to more fully, completely, and equitably satisfy human needs, while perhaps offering also structural conditions tending more toward maintenance of just and fair social and political outcomes. It might be hypothesized because of empirically observed process and example of diffraction that it in itself is the norm, but Riggs pulls back a bit from doing so. The normative factor in human development, social or individual, might be taken to be fullest realization of integrated group and individual potential. Diffraction for the present indicates the move in this direction, but may not be structurally the synonym of the ideal social state.

Examination will be made in Chapter III of the situation of modernization for Korea, primarily as it has occurred in the 20th Century, but in terms of critical
background and contextual factors, and with primary focus on the importance of the U.S. with Korean bureaucratic interaction, 1945-1953. Attention will be given to factors in the above historical process pointing to the phenomenon of diffraction. To some extent indications of how diffraction and development might normatively diverge will be suggested, and the whole, intricate concept of how Riggs' theory in general applies to the Korean situation will be addressed in Chapter IV.
CHAPTER III

THE KOREAN BUREAUCRACY: 1945-1953

Immediate Postwar Situation

Korea's experience of long term arrested modernization, finally reached resolution with the 1945 Liberation. Koreans sensed this liberation as more than freedom from a cruel and protracted suppression. They were being given a second chance to resume the process of modernization from the wellspring of indigenous forces, to "finish the unfinished business" (Lee, H. B., 1968):

A real modernization of the Korean society is possible only in the Korean interest, through Korean hands, and through self-conscious digestion of Western civilization with a thoroughly modernized mind. It is the Liberation that provided for an opportunity for such possibility. (No, as cited in Lee, H. B., 1968, p. 46)

The Liberation itself and the ensuing time period for Korea were explosive. "Discontinuity from the past was so sudden and the expectation of the future was so unlimited. An air of effervescence swept throughout the society" (Lee, H. B. 1968, p. 46). The long latent desire for modernizing was intensified also through the external circumstances within which the Liberation was created. Split between two superpowers, the Soviets and the U.S., with each espousing
egalitarian principles, Korea manifested two various forms. The Southern part, under U.S. influence, expressed democratic ideas and practices. Individual expression and initiative soared to unlimited heights in the quest for equal opportunity. Ideologically, South Korea was swept up in a transforming pattern of social change. The institutional spheres of sociocultural, economic, and political realities were transported and intensified. For instance, in education, a witness to the South Korean transformation, Ch'ón Sok O suggested that the zeal for progress through learning became almost unbounded:

Thus parents poured their enthusiasm into education of their sons and daughters braving all kinds of economic difficulties, and consequently the young literally streamed into the schools. The old generation tried to open the road to achievement for their children by giving them the benefit of education which they themselves had not enjoyed while the new generation attempted to realize their dreams through the channel of education. This phenomenon was like a flood, a flood of zeal for education which had been suppressed under Japanese rules now bursting out like a torrent over a broken dike. (As cited in Lee, H. B., 1968, pp. 47-48)

Initiated by Korean educators, the Compulsory Public Education System began during the three year U.S. military government in Korea, and was later adopted by the Government of the Republic of Korea in 1948 (Lee, H. B., 1968).

Immediately upon Liberation political activities intensified. The underlying quest driving the mushrooming political assertion was equality of opportunity. Still
under U.S. military government administration, 1947 saw the advent of 344 political parties in South Korea. Politics and society became virtually the same phenomenon.

Korea was liberated from Japanese rule on August 15, 1945. A U.S. military government was established, and at the same time the Soviet Union stationed troops above the 38th Parallel, partitioning the country into North and South, Soviet dominated and U.S. dominated, respectively. Extreme economic confusion and disorganization throughout Korea resulted. Partitioning left South Korea with slightly less than 50% of the Peninsula's land area but with 66% of the total population. The South possessed a more productive agriculture, but primarily only light industry. The partitioning had not been expected. The division between the two contrasting structures of production, which in fact had worked together in a complimentary fashion, resulted in disorientation. The separation added to the entrepreneurial void of management and technicians resulting from the abrupt Japanese departure. Huge food shortages developed and grain production went into relative decline with the population increasing. Refugees from North Korea and repatriating Koreans from Japan poured into the U.S.-occupied South, adding 2.3 million persons to the population between 1946 and 1948. Between May, 1946 and January, 1948, the U.S. military imported 670,000 metric
tons of food for the population of Korea. A large percentage of manufacturing plants in South Korea suspended production immediately after the war. Employment in manufacturing and construction declined by 41 percent between 1943 and 1947. Hyper-inflation, expanding the currency by a multiple of 6.7 over the pre-liberation period, 77 percent during the first three months after liberation, and by a multiple of 15 from 1943 to 1949, added to the South Koreans' economic woes. The U.S. military government attempted to gain control over the spiral through rationing and fixing price ceilings. These measures only intensified black market activities. Price control measures were subsequently dropped (Kim & Roemer, 1979).

Despite the continued disorganization, by 1947 industrial production had started to recover and moved ahead rapidly until outbreak of the Korean War in June, 1950. Through 1949, exports and imports remained relatively small, and substantial amounts of goods flowed into South Korea through two U.S. agencies: GARIOA, the U.S. Government Appropriations for Relief in Occupied Areas, and the ECA, or U.S. Economic Cooperation Administration. South Korea's independent government was established August 15, 1948. Less than two years later, extreme economic disorganization and social chaos returned when, on June 25, 1950, North Korea invaded. Fighting continued over a
period of three years, until July 27, 1953, when the armistice was signed. The war resulted in over one million civilian casualties and a $3.1 billion loss in non-military property. Almost one-half of the manufacturing plants in production in 1949 were destroyed. The invasion from the North created a double disaster for the South, returning the country to economic and social disintegration, just at a time when a real bridge in progress and independence had been crossed. By the war's end, South Korea was in extreme economic and social disarray, and was heavily dependent on massive amounts of foreign relief (Kim & Roemer, 1979).

Historical Background

South Korea is unique in many cultural and historical respects. External influences, especially over the present century, have shaped Korea's development and its political ideology. Cole and Lyman (1971) view South Korea as virtually a laboratory for the study of postwar development. The significance of this developmental period gains from the fact that, despite many economic changes during the Japanese occupation of some 35 years, the "long established, distinctive, and homogeneous culture (of South Korea) had not been significantly transformed" (1971, p. 13). In contrast with Korea's Japanese-invoked colonial development, the period beginning after 1945 was filled
with dramatic change in all areas. It is important to understand the phenomenon of this postwar continuing change in terms of Korea's traditional background and long-standing insecurity, primarily, for the present analysis, in relation to how these traditional factors affected Korean-U.S. interaction, in the sense of bureaucratic exchange. The outcomes for Korea in relation to its U.S. influence have been of a different character than were outcomes for Korea's close cultural neighbors, China and Japan, over comparable periods of modernization. Korea's long-standing cultural difference from its neighbors helps to account for this outcome variation. Korea had closed its borders to outsiders for centuries. Commercial activity and ports had also been closed. The society remained homogeneous into the 20th Century without significant minority or alien groups. The central ruling regime existed without regional competition. No warlord or military class of great strength existed to influence the civil process. Strong religious groups were not apparent. Class system rigidity, moreover, had been declining for 200 years. Japanese occupation, through disenfranchisement of a Korean aristocratic class and seizure of its lands, accentuated class leveling (1971).

The present administrative and political structure of South Korea, as well as whatever promise of future develop-
ment remains in store, despite 20th Century influence and dynamic change processes, are derived very essentially from an ongoing and ancient Korean process and patterning. Since the time of its earliest development, for Korea, the predominant influence has been China, just as China has tended to dominate the continent of Asia, of which Korea forms a relatively small peninsular extension. From this influence emanated political and administrative systemization in the form of Confucianism, accepted and promulgated as the official state ideology of the Yi Dynasty (1392-1910). The political philosophy of Confucianism readily suited the new Yi ruling elite, replacing the Buddhism of the preceding Koryo Dynasty. The impetus of that time, bureaucratically, was political and administrative reform, along with consolidation of newly achieved power. Confucianism helped to create a government structure which was both highly centralized and authoritarian and which, therefore, could be readily mobilized to realign the social mores and underlying social structure to suit the emergent ruling class (Ro, 1993).

The Yi transformation envisioned government administration based on moral teachings rather than rigid law. Moral teachings and standards from Confucianism would provide administrators with guidelines as to right conduct and effective decision making and courses of action.
Confucian classical education became mandated for Korean officialdom. The central ruler and the Confucian elite retained all decision-making powers mandating direct action through the lower echelons. The centralized system of autocratic control and merging of political process with public administration engendered in turn a complex, highly organized, and massive—both in size and power—bureaucracy, with which the ruling elite struggled for control and political dominance. Preservation of law and order was an abiding concern, as was education. Libraries and study centers were created, as was a national system of examination for educational accomplishment and placement within the bureaucracy. Poverty among the agricultural and laboring classes was widespread and intense. Local village democracy, of a limited order and efficacy prevailed, with an informally elected leadership, usually honored and respected village elders, acting as buffers between the people and the official central government. Government impositions on the population were heavy; services and benefits were few. Party factions and feuds among elite groups became customary throughout the Yi Dynasty, serving to weaken and delimit ruling effectiveness. Up to the modern era, the last Yi Dynasty phase, these struggles weakened Korean political coordination and ascendance. The primary issue of concern between conservative and progres-
sive forces as the 20th Century drew near was Westernization. Should the country remain closed or open itself to outside influence? The Confucian order had collapsed. The government was inefficient and corrupt, yet outwardly inflexible. Bureaucracy as a mechanism for administration and accomplishment had diluted to a mere channel for status and rewards. The progressives managed, however, to seize power. They instigated international diplomacy and trade. The Independence Club and the School of Shil-Hak provided progressive scholars and bureaucratic leaders. Unfortunately for Korea, simultaneous to all of this development that appeared so promising, Japan, intent on invasion of the Chinese mainland, focused on Korea as the stepping stone for its expansionary designs (Ro, 1993).

Ostensibly, Japanese influence stimulated modernization in Korea and established legal administrative patterns which would permanently alter ancient Confucian methods and institutions carried over from the time of Chinese influence. However, some question of modernization’s true course for Korea, and also its actual sources of influence, must resonate throughout meaningful consideration of Korea’s 20th Century experience and bureaucratic development. When historic factors are carefully weighed, configuration of Japanese impact on Korean modernization becomes especially problematic. Working from a complex
view of modernization as developed by contemporary political and public administration theorists, the character and results of the Japanese interlude of intervention seem of more complex significance than the usual declaration—in both Japanese and Western views—that Japan more or less brought a backward and disparate country into the 20th Century, albeit, even according to such views, with some ruthlessness, flouting of international law, and with designs that were almost entirely based on Japan’s then modern-day sense of self-aggrandizement. The initial insight important to interpreting the full nature of Japanese with Korean interplay is simply to realize that an emergent progressive and democratizing development in Korean society was abruptly cut off as Japan sought control of Korea. Japan’s paralyzing effect on Korea’s modernization struggle was accomplished, in part, through perpetuation or reassertion of Korea’s traditional autocratic character. Using similar hierarchical structures to those Korea had of late struggled to partially free herself of, the Japanese exploited the politics and administration of Yi Dynasty remnants toward purely Japanese ends. Korea, far from moving toward democratic modernization, found itself taken down a path resembling feudal vassalhood. Korea’s human and material resources were vastly exploited and expropriated. A culture and tradition stretching back
some five millennia, instead of embarking on exploration, through essential modernization, of egalitarian and democratizing aspects essential to its inherent nature, was instead forced to adopt Japanese political, economic, and cultural norms, as reinterpreted in recent times to correspond with the Japanese empire’s expansionary tendencies. Several phases over the 35-year period indicate the progress of this oppression. From 1910 to 1920 the pattern of colonial rule was delineated. The political machinery necessary was set in place. From 1920 to 1930, the Japanese created alliances between themselves and elements of the aristocratic and middle classes of Korea. From 1930-1940, the rates of exploitation and domination were greatly intensified as Japan built up its war making capacity. Officially, from the Japanese perspective, Korea existed as a colonial possession under the supervision of the home ministry, exercised in Korea through the person of a governor-general, in turn appointed by the Japanese emperor. A few Koreans held minor government posts in an otherwise Japanese saturated government. The Korean people by and large took no part in government affairs, even though since 1919, through a system of councils with membership, both elected and semi-elected, they had been granted some participatory rights, as part of the Japanese reaction to the outbreak of the Korean Independence
Movement of that year (Ro, 1993).

On the other hand, up until the 1930s, at least, when Japanese repression greatly intensified, Japanese occupation had the unforeseen effect of turning Koreans toward decidedly Western influence in the form of Christian missionary establishments, which had been allowed to remain functioning under the Japanese. The Japanese system of pervasive and insistent cultural imperialism drove Koreans, depending on their degree of anti-Japanese and strong nationalist feeling, to these Western points of relief. Christian Koreans themselves, primarily due to the connections made with strong nationalism, transcended any remaining prejudice of their own countrymen toward Christianity. Christians rose in popular estimation, creating a channel for connections with the West, Western thinking, and later pervasive Western influence. Even though constituting at the time only 8% of Korean population, Christians played a pivotal role in forming post-liberation Korean government. It could well be asserted that this combination of Korean individuality, Japanese hegemony and culturally imperialistic repression, and these conditioned through the succor offered by missionaries from Western countries provided the impetus for Korea's later special association with the U.S. and its acceptance of U.S. influence (Cole & Lyman, 1971).
The Japanese domination of 35 years, nevertheless, did create many changes in Korea. The Korea of 1945 understood that it had irrevocably moved, albeit through a highly negatively charged imposition, into the modern era and that the Korea of previous generations had been in some sense lost. The emergent Korea of the latter half of the 20th Century would initially have to be structured on what the Japanese had at first imposed and then left behind. Koreans themselves, however, overwhelmingly viewed the Japanese administrative overlay, assisted by efforts of the U.S. military bureaucracy, as something to be stripped away from Korean identity, so that genuinely Korean political responsibility and administrative structure and control could be resumed, after the 35-year interregnum. The Japanese period of long intermission, delay, and disruption seemed especially frustrating, almost as much in retrospect as it had in its experience, since it had come just as Korea's elite had begun to be moved toward the complex introduction of techniques and philosophy of modern democratic government. That time of democratic awakening and modernizing self-realization had been cut off just as it had begun to blossom. It could never be recaptured entirely. The need for practical experience, training, and education necessary particularly for democratic form to merge with an incumbent society so stolid in its tradition-
al ways, had waited, entirely unsatisfied, except for the Western Christian exposure, which had remained intact, for the forced removal of Japanese totalitarian hegemony. Korea’s urgent, primary desire became, thus, in 1945, to catch up as rapidly as possible and become the equal of Western standards in democratic self-government (Cole & Lyman, 1971; Ro, 1993).

Ro (1993) finds special significance in Korea’s protracted modernization process, in terms of Japan’s intervention joined with Korea’s more long lasting relationship with Western influence, shaped through her association with Christian religious institutions. Most study of Korean modernization, on the other hand, has assumed that Japanese intervention internally in Korea after 1910 acted as a kind of "experiment in modernization" (p. 41), attempting through outside manipulation of Korean social, political, and economic structures to create rapid development. From this viewpoint, largely imposed on Western understanding through the efforts of Japanese historians, Korea had had no inclination, no propensity whatsoever, toward self-instigated modernization. From this perspective, Korea was viewed as internally debilitated and, therefore, in need of external structuring and rule in order to assume a productive role in the modern era. Japanese invasion and consequent dominance, as interpreted
still by both many Westerners and Japanese alike, thus
could be viewed as benign in intent and even somewhat
salubrious in result (1993).

The Japanese accomplished a virtually total restruc­
turing of the Korean economy. The Korean government
administrative bureaucracy was totally rebuilt according to
Japanese formulations. Industrialization on a somewhat
limited scale was introduced, in conjunction with modern
methods for resource exploitation. Transportation and
communication were modernized. Urbanization expanded. The
changes, however, the actual processes of modernization,
were only surface alterations, yet "the uninformed observ­
er, looking at the external changes taking place during the
period might even believe that Korea made significant
progress" (Ro, 1993, p. 44).

The superficial nature of Korean with Japanese
interaction, in terms of not deeply altering the context of
Korea, was in part due to the reality that all aspects of
the process were Japanese managed and controlled. Distanc­
ing of significant change in terms of Korea and Koreans had
been effectuated through Japanese manipulation for Japanese
national interest. A continuing historical view, as
alluded to above, may insist that at least part of Japanese
intervention intention lay in imposing sure benefit for the
Korean people themselves. The entire process, however,
with its character of structural alienation and external imposition was not likely to take in Koreans' individual interests. Fulfilling these interests and needs was never understood as a possibility, much less as an intention. The true Korean leadership was of course also not brought into the Japanese impositional process. Ro (1993), in connecting Japanese imposition with Korea's modernization, summarizes that:

In the true sense of the word, the structural transformations that took place were not modernization. (In what sense could the Korean bureaucracy be called "modern" if over 90 percent of the important upper-level administrative and managerial positions were held by Japanese?). (p. 41)

Ro goes on to connect this externality and void in true modernization processing with the oft-cited reality that the departure after 1945 of the Japanese colonial administration resulted in total collapse of the Japanese-engineered economic infrastructure. Institutional change imposed from without, and that through implanted military regime and colonial suppression, can hardly be thought favorable for modernization of a people and their society. Korea's true progress of modernization lay outside this Japanese institutional design, and in fact had its beginnings well before Japan's colonial experimentation. The value change necessary to actual modernization began in Korea in the mid 19th Century. Ro (1993) sees, as has been suggested above in this study, that the most significant
factor to this modernization was Western introduction of Christianity. With Christian missionaries and religious establishments came ideals of education, democracy, and modern thinking. These ideals supported development of Korea's initial and indigenous progressive developments, the Shil-Hak School and Independence Movements. Japanese intervention, counteracting the positive interplay of Korean progressive thought with Christianity, destroyed the indigenous progressive leadership which had been engendered. This death blow and stultification administered by Japanese invasion, permanently prohibited the indigenous model of progressive and democratic development from flowering. Later post-1945 efforts, which would be taken up with direct interaction with the U.S., could only follow the "inverse" model of development, which is to say, catching up in an emergency fashion with modern forms through direct implantation and imitation, with very little indigenous processing or evolution of form, because of the 35-year loss of time and 35-year suppression of progressive, modernizing development (1993).

Events prior to the Korean War, after 1945 and the division of Korea, created the extraordinarily difficult times and ideological split between Communist-socialist and both conservative and more liberal forms of democracy. Reflecting not only the North-South division, but also
creating dissension within South Korea along lines similar to the opposition of the two Super Powers, the political and economic struggle in the South, under the aegis of a U.S. military government, led to a military uprising in 1948. The uprising was Communist instigated. The resultant purge of leftist and liberal elements by the rightist bureaucracy was devastating. Dependency on U.S. supplies, both economically and politically, increased in part because Korea had to be viewed as a prize contended for in the struggle between Communist and Western democratic ideologies, which the 1948 uprising served to underline. The U.S. supportive response toward Korea was intensified. Aid from the U.S. was at $6 million in 1946, 93 million in 1947, and 113 million by 1948 (Cole & Lyman, 1971).

The Japanese period of imperialist rule in Korea had not left Korea with bureaucratic know-how. And American military occupation authorities themselves were ill prepared for civil administration. They were further severely handicapped by possessing no knowledge whatsoever concerning the Korean milieu. The overall American presence during the postwar time was one of uncertainty and clear absence of preparation. This ambiguous phase of transition contributed largely to the Korean generally chaotic state of affairs. Koreans themselves seemed uncertain as to the sources of conflict and difficulty, but
one factor remained clear: the split politically between left and right was intensifying. Koreans had expected rapid moves toward reunification, and had not in fact expected the immediate split, based on the reality of their own preparations in China for reclaiming independence and their resistance actions in Manchuria during war time. The U.S. response of vacillation generally, but especially in terms of reunification, in conjunction with elements of strong anti-Communism, which in turn created negative dispositions toward political leftists and liberals in Korea, worked to solidify conservative forces in South Korea. Ironically, these conservative forces were supported by the remnants of bureaucracy, who had in effect collaborated with the Japanese, and by a police force establishment which had also been part of the same collaborationist structure. Too late, American efforts attempted to establish a moderate political solidarity. 1948, the year of Korean independence, saw a rightist political dominance, replete with ruthlessly repressive elements emerging (Cole & Lyman, 1971).

U.S. influence in South Korea pushed for two positions: first, temporary resignation concerning the possibility of reunification and establishment of a separate independence for the South, and second, strong anti-Communist positions internally and in relation to the
North. In this milieu, Syngman Rhee, highly conservative but unquestioned in nationalist credentials, emerged. Rhee supported U.S. dispositions toward anti-communism and separate independence. With the support of bureaucrats, police, rightist nationalists strong in anti-Communist sentiment, land holders, and businessmen, Rhee would head the Democrats, the first Korean post-liberation party, and become Korea's first president. Rhee and the Americans disagreed on many points, but solidarity of views increased as rightist opposition to the Communist presence grew. With U.S. support, Rhee opted for recruitment of Korean bureaucrats trained by and previously supporting the Japanese. Korean feeling generally was very strong against these collaborationist bureaucrats. Political criticism grew over this matter. The prevailing bureaucratic core institutionalized itself as a closed and conservative force. Within its ranks, however, conflict did exist. Nationalistic bureaucrats strove to block Japanese-trained senior level incumbents from achieving higher advancement to politically important areas of the bureaucracy. The Japanese-inspired incumbents, in turn, exerted much administrative influence, primarily to control personnel policies. Highly legalistic and formal standards were set for admission to the bureaucracy. The new personality of Korea, then shaping itself, could not yet penetrate the
bureaucracy for another decade (Cole & Lyman, 1971).

American presence and influence in Korea, as well as input from Washington, could be thus tentatively summarized as increasing economic support and political concern, as the Communist split with Western democracy intensified, and as Korea's own geopolitical division exacerbated internal postwar dissension and disturbance. American presence served to underwrite an intensified conservative Korean agenda, and discouraged reorganization for incorporating a more inclusive and reconciliatory democratic tendency.

With support of the U.S. contingent and under the aegis of the Korean Democratic Party, a very "conservative, defensive, and closed" bureaucracy was implanted in conjunction with independence (Cole and Lyman, 1971, p. 20). Added to this coalition, the force of the Korean police establishment was brought to bear. Supported by and integral to the coalition, the police, still primarily intact from the period of Japanese occupation, and remembered and hated as the most apparent Korean intermediary of Japanese rule, worked to expand their postwar power. As with the Japanese inspired bureaucrats, the police contingency immersed itself politically as a form of protection against powerful anti-collaborationist sentiment. Rhee's 1948 purge of leftist and liberal political factors fit perfectly with the police agenda. They sensed security in
carrying out ruthless actions against the coalition's political opponents (1971).

Still, a positive side did come into being. The spirit of independence among the Korean people, the at least temporary calming of widely divergent political views through division of the country into North and South, the reconciliation of several partisan perspectives in the administration of Rhee, and the bureaucratic know-how of the carry-over administrative framework, provided stability, efficiency, and considerable progress. The infrastructure of South Korea showed indications of strengthening, and South Korean agriculture produced exceptionally well. Land redistribution measures were carried out. Tenant farming was virtually eliminated in Korea during this period. Land acquisition seemed to resolve most political unrest in the rural regions, and stripped the left wing of any hope for rural political support. Political dissension now became the sole province of urban South Korea (Cole & Lyman, 1971).

With some consolidation of political, social, economic, and even technological gains in the South, whatever direct U.S. influence remained, on a bureaucratic process operating smoothly, appeared to be diminishing. Despite associated drawbacks of a conservative and repressive agenda, not enhancing to the elements of representative
government which evidenced themselves from time to time, if only as solitary legislative voices, the Rhee regime, with the efficiency of its bureaucratic machinery and technical-ly able police and security, seemed well able to secure heavy economic sustenance from the U.S., while lending itself a growing character of independence. Though the primary impetus may have been driving at best to the autocratic style already too compatible with longstanding Korean attitudes, and at worst to dictatorship, neverthe-less, a conservative but perhaps still democratic, political philosophy, replete with U.S. approval and support, was unfolding (Cole & Lyman, 1971).

The invasion by the North would, however, irrevocably change all of this, and drive Korea's relationship with the U.S., and with the rest of the world, into a totally unforeseen direction and dimension. The Land of the Morning Calm became virtually overnight, the front-line bastion of the Western Allied defense in the Far East, and by the time of the war's conclusion, Korea's armed forces of nearly one million would testify to the changed nature of almost every aspect of her identity, changes which continued to transpire through close association with the U.S.
The Immediate Bureaucratic Impact

H. B. Lee (1968) suggests that Korea's Liberation in August of 1945 was her second opening to the modern world, identifying the forced commercial treaty with Japan of 1876 as the first, after which Korea had signed similar treaties with the U.S. and with European powers. But in fact Lee's own historical notations amplify the suggestion of indigenous modernization agenda as early as 1864 with the Taewongun reform of 1864, predating Japan's forced exploitation by a dozen years. The famed Independence Club Reformist Movement of 1896-1898 had thus been preceded by Taewongun by more than 30 years. Other indigenous modernization attempts had been Kaehwadang Emeute of 1884 and the Tonghak Rebellion of 1894. Taewongun's forceful and ambitious attempt to restructure Korea through a multifaceted modernization, as father-regent to the young king, incorporated what were then drastic measures, including elimination of factional discrimination in bureaucratic recruitment, and an end to bribery within the kingdom, and establishment of a more vigorous tax collection system. Additionally, the defense units were to be revamped; the dominating influence of Confucian mores on the ruling class was to be ended, inclusive of the elite's "servile adoration" (Lee, H. B., 1968, p. 44) of Ming China and resultant policy identification with them. As promising as
Taewongun's policy appeared for establishing modernization from the top down, it was undermined by its own ultra-isolationist policy and the internal power struggle between the regent-father and the in-laws of the young king. The in-laws conspired to block the country's entrance to the modern world (1968).

The Kaehwadang Emeute, some 20 years after Taewongun, was a modernization attempt of a different character, and was more generally in response to the Japanese presence and forced opening initiatives concerning Korea. Kim Okkyun and an elite group of upper class officials had observed modernization in practice in Japan. They wanted to eliminate the traditionally-oriented Korean royal in-laws from access to royal power. The Japanese expeditionary garrison unit supported their attempt. Failure, however, was predictable due to the elite's lack of sound national identity and their "lack of an organizational base among the mass" (Lee, H. B., 1968, p. 44).

As a massive peasant rebellion originating in Cholla Province under Chon Pongjun, in 1894, the Tonghak Rebellion began as an endogenously syncretized religion in 1860 under Choe Che-u, combining the four extant religions of the time in Korea. These included Confucianism, Buddhism, Taoism, and Catholicism. The movement generated was both nationalistic and social development in nature. Protests against
ruling corruption, both governmental and elite class, were instigated, as well as against all outsiders, especially the Japanese. After 40 days of upheaval spreading throughout the Southern half of the country, the rebellion was subdued by the government acting with assistance from China. Japan acted in turn to intervene. This initiated the Sino-Japanese War on Korean soil. The 1896-1898 Independence Club Reformist Movement provided the climax to the overall Enlightenment Movement of the decade immediately after the Tonghak Movement. Evidence of this new spirit was in the establishment of private high schools founded by both Christian missions and nationalist leaders. The first Korean newspapers were published. The intellectuals of the Independence Club were Western-educated and Western-oriented. Syngman Rhee was included among these youthful reformers. The ruling elites were able to suppress the movement. Indigenous modernization thus could not entirely succeed. Successive intrusions by Chinese, Japanese, and Russians around the turn of the century resulted in the capitulation of the country and takeover by the Japanese. Indigenous initiatives, especially after the March 1, 1919 uprising demanding restoration of Korean independence, were quickly suppressed. Indigenous modernization process was prevented by the "exceptionally narrow-gauged and brutal" (Lee, H. B., 1968, p. 45) colonial rule of the Japanese.
Lee thus emphasizes the importance of viewing the Korean Liberation of 1945 in the light of this long period of suppressed independence (1968).

The actual impact of U.S. military operations on bureaucratic development in the immediate postwar period has been characterized as uncertain, unfocused, and "fumbling" (Mason, et al., 1980, p. 40). From the immediate postwar perspective of U.S. military rule, and through the initial two years of independent government, the economic explosion of Korea, initiated in 1960, would have seemed unlikely. The U.S. postwar perspective was apparently that Korea's state of economic weakness and dependency would be virtually permanent. This presumption of long-term Korean economic dependence would be important to U.S.-Korean bureaucratic relationship during the postwar period. And in fact it was only with the Korean war itself, 1950-1953, which had both a salubrious and solidifying affect on South Korean national identity and confidence, that Korea would initiate efforts which would eventually lead to the phasing out completely of U.S. economic assistance, but not in fact until well after the war, in 1975. Immediate post-World-War-Two administrative or bureaucratic democratization, in the face of ongoing influence from the U.S., was quite another matter. Modernization and Westernization of political development in Korea in terms of its institu-
tions, structures, and values did not progress according to the rapid agenda of the economy. Probably the early postwar reinstitution of Japanese-inspired bureaucracy for management and U.S. support of a repressive regime and related Japanese-organized institutions of repression, combined to create a bureaucratic whole, which, though partly inspired through U.S. associations, could not move institutionally entirely toward the West, and would not rectify much of this administrative, bureaucratic deficiency until after the recent (1992) presidential election. Prior to this very recent change in direction, most momentum may have been generated toward authoritative administrative structures increasingly at odds with the democratizing inclinations of the society, in its fullest sense, outside the machinery of bureaucracy. Democratic progress had been ineluctably, at the behest of U.S. interaction with Korea, forced into a relative state of submission, seemingly for the purposes of administrative strengthening and delineation of more precise lines of political and bureaucratic authority and regime stability, but without nation building, in the sense of fully relating administrative and authoritative structures of government to political forces within the society (1980).

This stunted bureaucratic process clearly finds part of its root source in the immediate postwar, 1945, period,
as has been suggested above, and more specifically, finds its decisive point in the response to the administrative vacuum left by the rapid exit of Japanese administrators. The U.S. interaction with Korean administration and bureaucracy might well have not taken so decisively limiting of an approach—supporting against popular Korean public will a collaborationist bureaucracy, a similarly-founded police institution, and conservative political leaders—if the Soviet and Communist presence and assertiveness in the North had been absent. The Soviets, however, had scrambled avidly into Northern Korea, just three days before full Japanese formal surrender. They had immediately busied themselves in organizing their own hand-picked government. General Hodge, U.S. military forces in Korea commander, arrived nearly a full month later, on September 7. He lacked substantial briefing concerning Korean affairs and possessed no specific direction from either McArthur in Tokyo or the State Department in Washington. The Tri-Power Conference in Cairo had taken up the issue of Korea in what had seemed to many almost an afterthought. The decision had been to establish Korea as a trusteeship, under the U.S. and the Soviet Union. The duration of this administration was to be for an indeterminate length of time. General Hodge, without chosen South Korean representatives, had to prepare for negotiations with the Soviets and their
already established North Korean counterparts (1980).

At this indeterminate juncture, with the Soviets holding the upperhand, Syngman Rhee, considered a pioneer of Korean independence, returned to Seoul on Oct 19, 1945. The Truman State Department had objected to Rhee because of his adamant anti-Soviet posture. Speaking in Seoul on the day after his arrival, Rhee attacked the Soviets, with strong words against the status of trusteeship, against the division of Korea—considering these shortcomings to be entirely due to Soviet machinations—and all the while raising American fears and the concern of General Hodge that such remarks would disturb the already delicate balance of power. Rhee and the U.S. contingent had to cooperate on negotiations with the North Koreans and their Soviet patrons. Though Rhee was of course not conciliatory, and though a less than ideally compatible working relationship among the four counterparts emerged, what became increasingly clear during this phase, supposedly intended for Korean unification, was the more probable nature of Soviet intentions. Their hasty rush through Manchuria and into Korea, to begin political organizing at the moment when Japanese capitulation seemed inevitable, would have been conclusive evidence enough for anyone of Soviet malfeasance, except for the ingenuous Americans, who had taken the Soviets to heart as "peace-loving" allies.
Protraction of unification negotiations for the Soviets was likely a stratagem intended to persuade the U.S. to grow weary and contemplate withdrawal, leaving all opposition to Soviet hegemony to Rhee alone (Mason, et al., 1980). Abandonment became the predominant mood for the U.S. State Department, which turned as a final resort then to the U.N. General Assembly, still in its infancy, and requested they initiate and supervise the election of a Korean National Assembly, that is, national in the sense of being for the whole country. The idea would be to simply presume unification, since no cooperation appeared forthcoming from the Soviets. Elections in the South only, of the Assembly, which in turn would select Rhee, sealed one chapter for Korea, one of great hope for both rapid unification and democratic freedom, and opened another. The ensuing reactions of the U.S. (pulling back support from Korea between 1948-1950) may be somewhat problematical in terms of interpretation, except for the understandability of war-weariness, but far less understandably given the clarification of Soviet intentions, not to say, grand design, in the Far East. South Korea, dislodged from U.S. support, with a populace resenting imposition of and support for a collaborative bureaucracy and police, and struggling, sometimes violently, with its own internal political divisions, was hardly in a position for a creditable self-
defense. With apparent inevitability, as discussed above, the ensuing horrendous and bloody war which then seemed to some clearly developing would bring the U.S. and Korea irrevocably together, and would totally redefine all aspects of their relationship (Mason, et al., 1980).

During the Korean War, the U.S. relationship developed in unforeseen directions with South Korea, not in military conflict only, but within the context of administrative bureaucratic relationship. Rhee's ascendancy to full autocracy, precipitated as early as 1948, with his harsh, Japanese-collaborationist-supported crackdown on a leftist uprising, had created opposition of considerable energy in its own right, from which his rural popularity could not entirely insulate him. The Assembly, particularly, became galvanized in opposition. And waiting in the wings so to speak or at least developing, a military presence, the most immediate and indulged recipient of U.S. support, was solidifying as the primary organizational potency. In 1952, however, Rhee discovered merely that his popularity had waned enough of his left-of-center, or perhaps actually only center, opposition had strengthened enough in the Assembly to oust him, given their constitutional right of appointment or authority to elect the president. Seizing the initiative, and allied with the Korean Martial Law Commander, Rhee forced through a constitutional amendment,
transferring presidential election to popular vote of the electorate. Among the people, Rhee was the only recognizable candidate. He won the election with two-thirds of the popular vote. Rebukes expressed from Korea’s strongest military allies, including President Truman, had no effect (Mason, et al., 1980).

The full-fledged autocratic projection of Syngmon Rhee placed a kind of signature on the U.S. establishment of and involvement with Korean bureaucracy. His 1952 assumption of the presidency would prepare Korea for a trend of autocratic rule and military dominance over state legislative and bureaucratic processes.

The Underlying Effects of U.S./Korean Bureaucratic Engagement

Initiation of U.S. involvement with Korea had had three specified objectives: to establish a free and independent Korea according to promises made at the Cairo and Potsdam Conferences; to strengthen Korea, politically, economically, and militarily, so as to establish her as a factor of stability in the Far East; and to project the new Republic of Korea as an example of democracy in Asia, for other Asian peoples to see and to emulate. The continued obstacle (entirely, it must be so stated, at the instigation of the Soviets) of forestalling unification, created a blurring of the U.S. vision for Korea. With the Soviet’s
true intention displayed, the question arose as to the focus of U.S. development ploys. What was the Korean reality going to be? Unification of division? The possibility of unification remained until 1947, and late into that year. All U.S. action and directive for the first two years of interaction were toward this goal. When the reality of Soviet purpose crystallized, it can be seen how the result would undermine U.S. resolution and commitment. The new vision, as suggested above, became simply that South Korea would have to stand on its own (Mason, et al., 1980).

Accompanying U.S. occupation forces was the GARIOA, or Government Appropriations for Relief in Occupied Areas. The program had three purposes: to prevent starvation and disease; to increase agricultural output; and to provide imported commodities for the massive shortages in almost all consumer goods. Korea, under the program, was to become a net exporter of foodstuffs, as predicted, at some point during the 1950s. Concerning American intentions and interplay with establishing a Korean administration, however, the division of Korea, other than simply finding reflection in a U.S. vision for Korea which became increasingly disunited and at odds with itself, resulted in a new logic, which determined U.S. involvement between the time of South Korea's 1948 Independence and its 1950 military
engagement with the North. The logic of overall U.S. policy asserted that if unification were still possible, even though the process was delayed, it made little sense to bolster South Korea to the extent envisioned for the whole of Korea at Potsdam and Cairo. Congress became very hesitant to allocate more funds; rehabilitation on the scale actually needed was not considered feasible; the U.N. also vacillated and continued to debate the Korean issue; the American military advisor, assessing Korea in 1947, reported reunification was imminent, which scenario evidently convinced President Truman; and therefore the effort for a democratic South Korea became half-hearted. It faded from a picture of Korea as a democratic showplace to a very limited vision wherein it was considered ill-advised to make South Korea self-sustaining. A self-sustaining and separate South Korea had come to be interpreted as establishing an experiment in industrialization without resources (Mason, et al., 1980).

The U.S. Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK), assuming the failure in unification, dedicated itself to an agenda of short-term objectives. Certain actions taken, nevertheless, developed longer-term consequences. Land redistribution of Japanese-held Korean properties was delayed until the USAMGIK established the new Korea Company, Ltd. This agency gathered necessary information
of redistribution, and in March, 1948 established the National Land Administration. By September, 487,621 acres had been sold to 502,072 tenants. Ninety-six percent of Japanese landholdings were liquidated, and provisions were written into the new Korean Constitution for redistribution of larger Korean land-holdings. Some delay resulted, but by 1948 all redistribution had been put into effect. This represented the major accomplishment and most successful bureaucratic interaction of the U.S. with Korea during the 1945-53 era (Mason, et al., 1980).

Divestment of non-land Japanese properties was not so successful. The new Korean Republic acquired these properties in 1948, and largely maintained ownership through the end of the Korean War. Large landholders who had been dispossessed of lands were not readily persuaded to purchase and take over Japanese enterprises. The U.S. military pursued educational expansion and reform, wishing to change the character of Korean education, which had developed under Japanese colonial rule as a mechanism for regimentation of Korean youth. The U.S. intervention doubled primary school attendance and tripled secondary. American-style, locally-elected school boards were encouraged, as was the placement of women into teaching ranks and establishment of more vigorous teacher training programs. Many U.S. interventions and innovations, however, did not
survive. Coeducation was not extended beyond the primary school. Universal education at the primary level did not become a reality until the late 1950s. A strong central ministry replaced local school board control. Little doubt remains, however, that the strong impetus provided through U.S. military government innovation to Korean education contributed significantly to the Korean development potential (Mason, et al., 1980).

Within the ostensibly short-range assistance program promulgated by U.S. authorities, other programs evidenced the longer-term U.S. concern. The Truman State Department had to withdraw its $500 million economic rehabilitation program from Korea in 1947 because Congressional support was absent. With Korean independence, the State Department planned for an aid program under the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), which was already conducting the Marshal Plan. Emphasis would turn to capital development rather than short-term assistance. The ECA administrator in 1949 got assurance from Congress that a comprehensive recovery package was forthcoming. Before installation of the ECA program, the ROK-US agreement of aid was jointly signed. While similar to U.S.-European agreements, several added requirements of specific U.S. expectations for the Korean government to improve financial responsibility were included also. From one perspective, these requirements
were safeguards in face of apparent Korean recalcitrance, in such areas as disposal of Japanese properties. In a larger sense, however, the U.S. stipulations suggested doubt that the Koreans were able to handle their own internal processes. These resentments and disagreements would produce long-lasting friction over the years. The ECA, in 1949, continued to argue for a three-part aid package, stressing to Congress that continuation of mere relief would result in permanent impoverishment of Korea. U.S. capital investment was privately needed in development of coal, expansion of thermal power generating facilities, and construction of fertilizer plants. The U.S. still expected South Korea would be a net exporter by 1953 and that total U.S. aid could be eliminated. Congress, however, refused to pass the aid package. The world observed, as it followed U.S. Congressional expression, as well as when a few days later, it heard a major policy speech by Secretary of State Dean Acheson, that the U.S. appeared to be in the process of pulling out of South Korea, or at minimum doing an about face in terms of its support commitment. North Korea certainly interpreted all the messages in this way (Mason, et al., 1980).

South Korea was understandably disturbed. The messages were confused and confusing coming from the U.S. The U.S. criticized Korea's efforts at checking inflation.
Acheson threatened cutoff of aid. In fact, South Korean measures were already proving effective, and had been doing so over a period of about six months. The strain in relations, marked by considerable distrust on both sides, would characterize much of the Korean-U.S. relationship through 1953, the end of the war and end of the period examined here. However this all may be, still, the U.S. undertook financing of most of the war effort and associated relief provisions. The ECA switched to a war procurement program. The U.N. developed a relief program in Korea, with $429 of the $457 million coming from the U.S. Distribution eventually came entirely under the U.S. Army Command (Korean Civil Assistance). The U.N. also established the United Nations Korea Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA), which aimed at reunification after the war. Multi-nation funding, with the U.S. restricting itself to 66 percent of UNKRA's budget, however, didn't work out. Aid reverted to a bilateral U.S. to Korea situation. Disagreements concerning repayment of funds Korea had deposited with the U.N. emerged at the war's end. Issues of inflation, foreign exchange, and the extent to which the U.S. was willing to assist Korea in reconstruction all marked the end of the war and the 1945-53 period (Mason, et al., 1980).
The essential, outward dynamics of U.S. Korean governmental, administrative, and bureaucratic interplay, especially over the postwar through Korean War period, can be understood in the above terms of continuing turbulence, misunderstandings as to objectives, procedures, and the true agendas of agreements, and also the degree of genuineness in U.S. goodwill in persisting in the establishment of Korean democracy. As the above scenario suggests, given an equal measure of Soviet goodwill in bringing about an early unified and democratic Korea, many of the horrors of the time would never have been conceivable, much less have actually taken place. Nevertheless, and perhaps even more tragically, if that is possible, one may interpret that after 1945 and up to the time of the Korean war, and even with Soviet-inspired hostility, deception, mischief, and malfeasance, still, given an ideal admixture of cooperation and understanding, and the social, political, and economic dynamics that would have thus been generated, the U.S. and South Korea might have created together the showplace for democracy as originally intended, and have drawn in other Asian peoples into emulating that model. The course of almost 50 years of history, in China, perhaps, and in Viet Nam, possibly, might have been far different, had they been able to do so.

But deep U.S. and Korean misunderstandings, at a
cultural level, were present. Most of the difficulties that became virtually unbridgeable were likely manifested at this deeper level. Misunderstandings, many of which were due largely to simply bureaucratic differences, would in turn produce bureaucratic incompatibilities, and in this, an impossibility for working together and for envisioning how commonly held goals could be achieved. Hence, analysis of U.S. Korean bureaucratic relationship becomes, first of all, a necessary probing of these many initial, basic incompatibilities.

The first issue supportive of the idea that bureaucratic misunderstanding was critical in postwar dynamics is simply the relationship of Korean bureaucracy as an institution to the process of modernization envisioned for Korea, importantly at the behest of the U.S. In Korea's history, no governmental organ other than the bureaucracy existed to carry out critical official functions and formations. The postwar visions of modernization and democratization were no exception. No alternative to bureaucratic initiatives at that time existed, nor was any contemplated. In other words, a true state of bureaucratic dependency was the norm. Caiden (1991) suggests that the modernization process for Korea (and this should be understood in terms of 1945 and beyond, and not essentially according to whatever modernization transpired under
Japanese oppression) had positive results outwardly, but structurally, or institutionally, bureaucratic imbalances were internally solidified. First, the positive results were: (a) Koreans became impressed with pragmatic results as practical, concrete development became a reality; (b) technocratic values and realistic conceptions of power in part displaced spiritual values; (c) distribution became secondary to production; and (d) passivity was replaced by aggressive, positive, and progressive attitudes, as fatalism became submerged. Production and rationality were substantiated through technological propagation. However, second, the negative side emerged as: (a) subordination of all other institutions to the public bureaucracy, with consequent modification of political power and decision-making, as well as stagnation of democratization; (b) development of societal imbalance, complacency, apathy, and inefficiency, as institutions increased in dependency and were prohibited from actions which would be self-strengthening and develop them as autonomous; (c) emergence of Jaebols, or family business-holding conglomerates, through cozy patron-client relations, along with institutionalized corruption and economic speculation, among those closed out of the bureaucratic inner circle; (d) spiraling inflation of social costs, made unnecessarily high due to bureaucratic favoring of the privileged classes or groups, resulting
in gross social inequalities and regional disparities; and
(e) bureaucratic implementation of modernization character-
ized by waste, pollution, low-quality products, and a rush
to meet objectives, regardless of costs and illegalities

From the Korean contemporary perspective, the bureau-
cracy, because of its strength, in part based on tradition
and support of the people and the institutions of the
society, has been able to accomplish what it has set out to
do, even given the difficulties enumerated above. Thinking
positively, we see that the groundwork for growth has been
firmly established, so that Korean society can now encour-
age public initiatives and development. From this positive
perspective, all of the shortcomings which have become
bureaucratically entrenched, can now be corrected, as power
is passed into the hands of private ownership and elected
public representatives. This is the theory, at least, and
its positive perspective of bureaucracy is based on very
old, traditional views of bureaucratic function, going back
to Confucian standards. It becomes important at this
juncture to attempt some identification of these standards.

M. K. Kim, (1983) cites Wright (1962) concerning
Confucian attitudes in relation to bureaucracy. Confucian
expectations associated with bureaucracy included:

1) Submissiveness to authority: parents, elders, and
superiors.
2) Submissiveness to mores and norms.
3) Reverence for the past and respect for history.
4) Love of traditional learning.
5) Esteem for the force of example.
6) Primacy of broad moral cultivation over specialized competence.
7) Preference for nonviolent moral reform in state and society.
8) Prudence, caution, and preference for a middle course.
9) Non-competitiveness.
10) Courage and a sense of responsibility for a great tradition.
11) Self-respect (with some permissible self-pity) in adversity.
12) Exclusiveness and fastidiousness on moral and cultural grounds.
13) Punctiliousness in the treatment of others. 
(>Wright, 1962; cited in Kim, M. K., 1983, p. 28)

The persistence, influence, and daily adherence demanded of these precepts should not be readily dismissed or over-looked when interpreting Korean reality, in general. For Korean bureaucracy, an elite function, replete with many honors, they are taken ideally as an unbridgeable code. Exceptions of course exist, in real world application, such as in forms of bureaucratic corruption. But in terms of addressing modern Korean bureaucratic development, with Japanese influence and with the more important American interactions, it is critical to see Confucianism’s dominance in Korea:

To the Chinese people, Confucianism became something like a skin that can never be rubbed off. It has been generally recognized that though Korea introduced Confucianism from China, Korea became an honor student of Confucianism, in some aspects more faithful to the tenets of Confucianism than the Chinese people were. (Kim, M. K., 1983, p. 27).
It can be reasonably asserted that Korea’s success, with serious drawbacks along its path of bureaucratically-dominated ascendance, was largely due to the unrelenting application of ancient principles. Though Korea’s pattern of achievement, derived from Confucianism, caused some disturbance in its interaction with U.S. interventions, this pattern also helped Korea to receive input with a character that allowed full utilization of U.S. collaborative efforts. In some ways, Korea’s interactions with the U.S. have transpired with a mutual closeness possibly found in no other international context. The Confucian pattern of acceptance and utilization, while defining a distinct and separate character for Korea, which is sometimes difficult to integrate with non-Korean culture, also maintained the perseverance, to which the U.S. supportively responded, which finally won out. The U.S. role was truly indispensable, but Koreans accomplished the matter according to their own individual system (Kim, M. K., 1983).

For Korea, the dominant institutions are bureaucratic. To some extent, a tendency still exists to see a bureaucratic office position as a piece of property. Thus, exploitation, through the position for gain, is common. Generally, Korean institutions are more client-oriented in their functions than ordinarily would be expected for comparable bureaucratic institutions in Western, developed
societies. Korea remains far more ascriptive and clientelistic in distribution of its rewards, than do the advanced, industrialized countries with which it is associated. Through a complexity of bureaucratic organizations, both Korean society and polity are hierarchically organized. The bureaucracy simultaneously becomes a patron-client network. Ideological and cultural themes alone cannot account for the importance of face to face contacts. For most of those politically involved, political power is simply rewarding of friends and punishment of enemies. Interest group activities fall short of what is expected in a pluralistic society.

Western influence, not only in terms of Japanese organization from 1910 to 1945, itself a hybrid product modeled on Prussian bureaucratic form, but also through the presence of postwar American military, has been substantial in shaping Korean bureaucracy, but it is not, as this paper has attempted to suggest in several ways, the whole story. Korean scholars are likely more attuned to matters of difference in this area than are Westerners. The "Theory P or Possibility Model" (Guerreiro-Ramos, 1970, cited in Kim, B. W. & Bell, 1985, p. 19) emphasizes that non-Western cultures are not bound by Western determinism in shaping even those institutions powerfully influenced by the West, as for example bureaucracies. Contemporary bureaucratic
practice in Korea blends Korean culture with foreign practice. Korean political culture remains pervasively authoritarian, in face of pluralist, democratically participatory solutions offered from the West, most convincingly and transformationally during the U.S. military presence and period of influence. Some practitioners within the realm of public administration, however, see this nexus of Western with Korean, even in the U.S. case, as primarily functioning at the formal level, with bureaucratic elitism persisting at the policy-making level. Korean authoritarian political tradition has remained resistant to change even in the face of powerful receptivity to so many other U.S. influences evident in Korean culture. B. W. Kim and Bell (1985) mention the following prerequisites for pluralism (first impressed upon Korea by U.S. example and presence, but with for many years no lasting, functional result):

(1) Viable competition among individuals, elite's, or groups; (2) opportunities for individuals and organizations to gain input access to the decision-making process; (3) organizational mediation between elites and masses; (4) viable instruments of mass participation in political decisions such as elections and other media of influence and access; and (5) democratic consensus based on a "democratic creed." (p. 21)

This interpretation, shared by many Koreans at the time of B. W. Kim and Bell's writing (1985), of a drift toward authoritarianism, after initial formulation of an American democratic model of bureaucratization on reconcil-
iation principle, seemed to represent actual Korean practice. Only time will tell with certainty if more recent events leading to greater Korean pluralist, democratic, and reconciliation modes of administration will last, in terms of continuing practice rather than merely outward form. Western theorists have doubted the viability of pluralist democratic practice joined with bureaucratic processing largely dominated by uni-dimensional interest groups. These perceived difficulties of the pluralist model, in Western practice and transmitted in kind to Korea, exposed a theoretical empirical weakness, which Koreans themselves take to be the basis for the problematical assimilation of pluralism into Korean bureaucratic practice. Pluralist political assumptions, in fact, may be viewed by Koreans as dysfunctional for national development in its entirety. Support for preconditions salient to pluralist conceptions falls outside of Korean psychoculture. U.S. democracy, so preconditioned by its own diversity and quest for reconciliation, transmits values of pluralism as endemic to democratic functioning. An unusually homogeneous, cohesive Korean society cannot properly conceptualize, as would inherently, on the other hand, U.S. society, a power structure and bureaucratic initiative fragmented and based on competitive power-group interaction. The pluralist, equilibrium ideal, and in fact
representative democracy in at least the modern Western sense, thrive on cleavages of interest and on bringing into balance components of diversity. Constitutionality itself, in concept and in function, thrives on just such a variously defined and manifested public will; yet, not so Korea, or so it seems; simply because, or primarily so, fragmentation is not considered a virtue, but is instead held to be totally alien. All of this is not so much to suggest that the present Korean situation of continuing domination of elite over mass is consciously, rationally preferred, but that it is more to the effect of what B. W. Kim and Bell (1985) have referred to as the product of "psychocultural" (p. 22). Constraint, differentiation, regulation, stratification, and even narrowing of individual political freedom become the inevitable process, given the propensity of enormous social and cultural conditioning. Postwar constraints of a more ostensible nature have also viably reduced any influence from U.S. bureaucratic modeling toward pluralist acknowledgment of individual interests as primary. Such constraints include:

(1) A narrow range of individual political freedom; (2) executive dominance of the bureaucracy, legislature, and judiciary; (3) limitation on the role and function of political parties; (4) increased role of the military in politics; (5) the security threat from North Korea; and (6) national planning for rapid economic growth. (Kim, B. W., & Bell, 1985, p. 22)

Additionally, it can be seen that Western influence is
rejected, not in the sense of any specific part, but in whole, as it conflicts with traditional forms: family ties, intergroup loyalty ties, and psychocultural roles. B. W. Kim and Bell (1985) further cite both Lapalombara (1963) and Riggs (1963), as substantiating the incompatibility, quite often, of assumptions and practices relating to bureaucratic functioning. Lapalombara (1963) points out bureaucratic assumptions associated with modernity are apparently culture bound and find, in Western democratic development thinking, important roots traceable to Darwinian senses of social development. Such Western assumptions are thus deterministic and unilinear in evolutionary development. Developmental change, in pragmatic terms, however, toward fully democratic institutionalization, may be better realized, sometimes, through non-democratic national forms. Riggs (1963) defines process analysis of administrative evolution to more democratic formats in societies without Western traditions as a matter requiring almost infinite sophistication and attentiveness to realities of the moment. For Riggs, it is fallacious to assume Western modes are always viable, even when it may be reasonable and universally beneficial to pursue similar democratic ends. Developing democracies need not receive, intact, Western bureaucratic technique nor innovation, anymore than it should be presupposed that all stages of
Westernized development must be passed through (Kim, B. W. & Bell, 1985).

Now, even more than when Caiden and B. W. Kim considered Korean Bureaucracy and its intermeshing with democratic ideals in terms of formulations similar to those of Lapalombara and Riggs, it is reasonable to see that, first, Korean autocracy, and then, reemerging elitism, along with a continuing political centralist dominance, have apparently moved Korea simultaneously toward material achievement and democratizing goals, with some efficiency, and with perhaps more resoluteness than could have been prefigured had instead simply close emulation of Western bureaucratic and political process evolved. Still, without the American postwar presence, interaction, and modeling, in conjunction with the Korean strongly antithetical reaction to Japanese dictatorship and purely exploitive governance, such positive results might not have been realizable.

Korean modification of democratic reconciliation modeling, with elitist bureaucratic form, is seen by B. W. Kim and Bell as also effective due to certain "ecological changes in the social-physical environment" (1985, p. 23). Changes include:

1) Population increases and demographic mobility; 2) the impact of the Korean War on political institutions and political consciousness; 3) the effect of economic inflation on political regimes; 4) the expansion of education, urbanization, and the size and status of the military; 5) institutional changes, that is, the
growth of formal organizations, and the growth of occupational specialization; and 6) ideological changes, bringing with them a positive new view of democratic ideals. (p. 23)

Suzanne Keller's theory of strategic elites is cited by B. W. Kim and Bell (1985) to illustrate how a new elite structure, reflecting some social heterogeneity in development process, replaced ruling elites in Korea. These new elites, self-defined as acting collectively for social good, nevertheless based their elitist position of dominance on assumptions that Koreans, in the mass, were not acculturated sufficiently toward democracy to pursue viable policy decision making. What seems fairly clear, since the 1985 writing of B. W. Kim and Bell, is that bureaucratic elitism has opened a bit toward a democratic elitism, or government, which, while not precisely characterized as by the people, is more fully operational when given the approval of the people. Nevertheless, passivity may still be presumed something of a positive value in the elitist prescription for democratic functioning. Social stabilization as development proceeds is thought to depend on such elitist/mass relationship. On the other hand, bureaucratic elitism, fostered through ancient cultural form, Confucian hierarchy, Japanese intervention and postwar carryover, and finally, American military bureaucratic influence, security concerns, and the ensuing emergency realities of three years of war, has likely understated potential contribu-
tions of those outside the exclusivity of the governing elite. The classically defined pluralist model of democratic participation now seems to possibly be becoming something more of a reality for many Koreans. The pluralist model seems not so much outside the ken of present Korean reality, and not so much in alienation to the democratizing process initiated, within confines of Korean bureaucratic elitist heritage, during the postwar, 1945-53 era, as such a fully realized model of democratic reconciliation might have at one time seemed. S. J. Kim (1987) views the bureaucratic relationship between the U.S. and South Korea in the postwar period analyzed here as primarily "postwar identity crisis in the initial state-building process" (p. 61). Gradually, through changes initiated according to regime changes, Korean relations with the U.S. shifted from dominant security dependence in the 1940s and 1950s to an interdependence, by the 1980s, based on economic security relations (p. 65). Significant to culture change in Korea, especially after 1960, were bureaucratic interactions with the U.S. during the earlier postwar era. Of special significance were the changes in Korean education, which implemented greater freedom of thought and individuality, not to mention a far broader, more Westernized, and more comprehensive, as well as comparative, view of the world. This educational redirec-
tion among Korean youth laid the groundwork for revolutionary consciousness and activism in 1960 and beyond. In terms of U.S. and Korean bureaucratic interaction, what transpired in the postwar years would in the long term become precisely challenging of what had been long dominant before.

State structure, carried out through bureaucratic interaction, influenced by social class and world system structural pressures, but primarily acting under its own volition (the U.S. and Korean interaction), served to rearrange society and the administrative bureaucracy’s relation to it. Student strengthening through educational reform, may have influenced initiation of cultural revolution in the 1960s, but of equal importance, emanating from U.S.-Korean bureaucratic interaction, was land reform and virtual destruction of a powerful landlord class (Kim, S. J., 1987).

It can readily be seen that the U.S.-Korean bureaucratic interaction, especially during the incubational stage of U.S. Military Government presence, was not only critical to Korea’s developmental shaping but was multi-faceted as well. In part this multi-faceted process, influence, and later result were due to the unfamiliarity of the U.S. with the situation of their intervention. But they also were due to the rapidly changing nature of the
world systems climate, including the shifting and contradictory Soviet and North Korean Communist posture above the 38th Parallel. Contradictory influences and pressures would result in the contradictory forces within Korean bureaucracy and throughout the society as a whole (Kim, S. J., 1987). The military as a major state institution played a key role in both political and economic areas. Political development remained at reduced levels, due to U.S. military emphasis. U.S. support for an autocratic regime also inclined toward military emphasis, and maintenance of a hierarchical tradition of strong, central, non-participatory, elitist rule. Yet, through education, through democratic example, as well as through support of Korea in face of military and subversion threat from a truly totalitarian dictatorship to the North, and, structurally, through land reform, the U.S. interaction moved South Korea toward what would ultimately become a thoroughgoing democratic consciousness. This modernization, liberalization, and democratization would be part of a contradictory legacy imparted to Korea from the U.S. (1987).

Traditional power structure, anciently centralized, became, overall, for the short term discussed here (1945-1953) powerfully reinforced, first by the U.S. military regime, and then by the assumption of power, following
close upon U.S.-established prerogatives, of Syngman Rhee. Rhee, with U.S. support, set out to fully monopolize power. An elitist system became reestablished under Rhee, at the behest of U.S. established influence, yet all the while the U.S., from a different tendency, through liberalizing education, prepared the coming generation to think in terms of revolutionary consciousness (Paik, 1982).

Whang (1986) notes that an important characteristic of U.S. with Korean bureaucratic interaction, despite obviously acknowledged need for democratic development as espoused by both parties, was a lack of understanding and attendance to patient development in establishing democratic institutions. Whang comments that for the new Korea, born in the wake of World War Two, "judicious restructuring of its institutions as part of nation-building effort" (p. 85) was needed. Much of the resultant political confusion during this time period Whang credits to the lack of clear recognition of need for democratic development. Instead, attempts to realize democratic institutions were marked by impatience, in turn creating confusion, political and economic disruption, and social disorder. Whang views the political-bureaucratic interaction analyzed here as four years of turmoil (1945-49). He depicts neither much opportunity nor any clear action toward laying democratic groundwork for change. The Korean War, which dramatically
and horrendously concluded the era for Korea, is fundamen-
tally viewed as further impeding political development and
nation building. Whang sees the period of initial bureau-
cratic interaction as disruption, confusion, and delay,
with little clear political, economic, or social planning
insight until after the purging of consciousness which was
the Korean War. Nation building, thus, for Whang, had to
emanate primarily through a self-reliant effort, when the
government of Korea would become committed to political as
well as economic development (1986).

This negative aspect and downplaying of the immediate
postwar period of U.S.-Korean bureaucratic interaction for
shaping Korea’s democratic political destiny should
probably be viewed, however, primarily as a corrective to
some thinking which might otherwise envision Korea as
overwhelmingly the product of U.S. bureaucratic and
military intervention. While in fact it seems likely that
neither of these extreme views holds consistently true,
they do point to a third, somewhat composite view, very
much directing us to a vision of how Korean identity itself
has remained unitary, and has existed as predominate, even
through Japanese repression and the preponderance of U.S.
association and influence. The immediate postwar era,
while compatible with and in most important ways supported
by U.S. intervention and presence, should still be viewed
most essentially as Korean instigated and moving toward Korean deeply held values and aims. Recovery of the Korean identity as a people and national entity was first and foremost in Korean consciousness and had been maintained as such throughout all of Japanese occupation. It had not waited for U.S. presence and direction, though, of course in face of Korea's persistent, much larger, and surrounding enemy neighbors, such U.S. presence and intervention was viewed as appropriate and necessary. Even educational reforms after 1945 represented developing Korean attitudes and were truly interactive with American values and overlays of methodology, curriculum, and so forth. Educational reform for Koreans was never the result of their being the more or less passive receivers of U.S. directives. Throughout the domination of Japan, Korea had been developing its own view of a modernizing world and what the eventual Korean place in it would be, once the occupational burden was lifted. Part of full recovery of Korean National and integral self would be education, exemplified by the Korean phrase meaning "benefits for all mankind" (Whang, 1986, p. 144). This universalizing, humanistic, and even democratic spirit had been anciently part of Korea's identity and value system. Revision of educational goals and policies was derived from historically Korean consciousness. Values of equality, individual
autonomy, and fair opportunity access were inherent to Korean culture and history. To all of these values, all clearly compatible with U.S. democratic and constitutional formulations, was added, by the close of the Korean war, a redirection toward American pragmatism. Industrial and technical education became paramount, and essential for the postwar rebuilding effort. Similarly, pragmatic American values in education have been consistently emphasized since 1945, with Korea maintaining an open door policy of educational opportunity. Compulsory primary education for all and government encouragement of private schools have consistently supported the Korean effort in emulation of U.S. educational forms. As with the U.S., open access to education in Korea has been the way to achievement in all areas and aspects. Indicative of its bureaucratic preferences, however, Korea chose to centralize educational activities and decision processes through a national Ministry of Education, in contradiction to basic precepts of the Korean Constitution, guaranteeing political neutrality in education, which had seemed so urgent after the Japanese experience. American decentralizing influence, however, persisted through the 1950s, with over one half of educational funding coming from school-organized PTA groups. This kind of interaction with the bureaucracy, however, eventually became more nominal, and educational
control more centralized, in the 1960s and beyond (1986).

Jung (1983) views all Korean bureaucratic process as primarily a result of stopgap, emergency conditions, 1945-1960. Interaction with U.S. stipulations and influences, as well as use of employees who had gotten jobs prior to 1945 under the Japanese due to support of the enemy, were each stopgap in nature. Only after 1960 could Korea develop bureaucratic forms in keeping with its own identity. Accordingly, Korea has combined great effort and application in the academic study of political science with traditional structures and values discussed earlier. Jung acknowledges the impact of study in the social science of public administration as pivotal for Korean bureaucratic administrative practice. However, more comprehensively, Jung develops an analysis of three perspectives which he designates as "intellectual orientations" (p. 213), essential for understanding Korean development process. These are the "Western," the "Ethnocentric," and the "Reform" (p. 213). Jung’s analysis is critical for comprehending U.S.-Korean bureaucratic interaction, and for synthesizing information concerning the interaction as presented in this study thus far. The Western orientation of bureaucratic administration in Korea develops ideas of British and U.S. Positivist thinking as dominant. Adoption of Western systems thinking and management styles is
thought to work for Korea. Koreans with academic backgrounds in policy science, management science, quantitative decision making, and functional approaches to management follow the U.S. and British view. The Ethnocentric approach is historical and subjective. Widely diverse Korean bureaucratic experiences are studied, however, including the Japanese occupation and the U.S. Military Government intervention. The assumptions are, nevertheless, that Korean society and culture are unique. A similarly unique bureaucracy is needed, subjectively understood, to manage the affairs of that society. The Ethnocentric orientation is weak because of its dependency on historical contexts. It lacks contemporary viability. The third orientation, the Reform, attempts to integrate the two other forms. Development administration is the norm stressed. Importation of viable strategies is emphasized. Such strategies, however, still must be made to work in the unique Korean situation. Still, even given the Reform viewpoint, with its indications of American pragmatism, the final product must be based on an ethnocentric concept: for the Korean bureaucratic reality, all major bureaucratic forms have anciently been ingrained in tradition and reality. New input, from the West, can be added to help in adaptation to contemporary problems (1983).
Several important issues remain unresolved in terms of the foregoing presentation of what are generally considered to be key factors in the analysis of bureaucratic relationship between Korea and the U.S. Before moving to application of Riggs' prismatic concepts to the Korean situation, it may be well to suggest at this point what these unresolved key issues are. The first concerns the overall mindset or disposition of the Korean people with the advent of the 1945 Liberation. Clearly, the populace, long suppressed, was eager for its freedom from foreign domination and, there can be little doubt, equally disposed to set out on a course of national self-determination. It is problematic, however, to adequately assess what the overall sense was of how that self-determination should transpire. For one matter, it is difficult to assess the importance or relevance of separation of viewpoints between the elite and the masses, not so much the elite who may have lost the independent vision of Korean destiny through collaboration with the Japanese, but rather the elite which carried that vision forward, as it originated in both earlier stages of Korean history and suppressed modernization movements throughout the 19th and very early 20th Centuries. For our present understanding, even given internal elite conflict, it may be necessary to dispense with too detailed an analysis of Korean mass postwar disposition and simply
accept the reality that, as in nearly all situations of social development, the ideology or conflict of ideologies of the elites would be what would determine the fate of the society as a whole. One further, more democratic and somewhat populist supposition, however, can likely be made at this point concerning the overall Korean postwar mindset. That is, there is much to indicate, and common sense would seem to support, that not simply the elite, but the general mass, especially in the sense of its greater urbanization under Japanese industrialization influence, had become more egalitarian, independent, and also democratic in spirit. The people's sense of the possibilities of the more open, individually rewarding experience of a modern, democratic, developed world had been awakened through contact with that world, both directly, through urban industrialization processes, and indirectly through elite anti-collaborationist interjection over a considerably extended period. This changed consciousness of the people was evident in the explosion of Liberation exhilaration and enthusiasm, with political activation, after 1945, extending deeply into mass awareness, and not simply a facet of elite political agenda. Nevertheless, the full ramifications of that overall, initial postwar mindset, given the multitude of inputs from many sources, as well as the complex variations among domestic political rivalries
of the time, demand further research to delineate fully.

The second key issue would concern the motivations, strategies, and agendas of what would soon become the world-recognized two superpowers, the U.S. and the Soviet Union, at the outset of the postwar period, in relation to Korea. Hart-Landsberg's (1993) study, taking the socialist perspective, presents some difficulty in terms of incorporating the rather conclusively anti-American view into the scenario of U.S. with Korea bureaucratic interaction as understood here. Some of these variant, socialist perspectives are taken up in Chapter IV and following. The standard interpretation concerning the U.S., as presented from both U.S. and Korean viewpoints, is that the U.S., with all of the best intentions in the world, either failed in approaching the Korean situation with enough information or sophistication, or failed due to a combination of lack of knowledge and naivete concerning Soviet and world communist intentions and agenda, as well as due to interventions of various geopolitical factors, such as changing political contexts throughout both Asia and Europe, which U.S. policy intentions understandably could not well prepare for let alone predict. The socialist view, which finds some support, especially in terms of relative dispositions toward Korea taken by the two emergent superpowers at the Yalta Conference (Hart-Landsberg, 1993),
suggests the U.S. policy had been from the start deliberate and calculating in terms of incorporating Korea into its Pacific dominance strategy for the postwar era after 1945, and had then also become increasingly reactionary to unfolding Korean propensities toward socialism after World War Two, and had moved to support decidedly right wing leaders, agendas, and repressive policies to suppress Korean democratic popular resolve (1993). This paper attempts not to understand the Korean situation from this anti-American, anti-capitalist-free-market perspective (incorporating its own agenda, as it does, of justifying socialist initiatives, past and present). The alternate socialist view must be recognized, at least in terms of the present study, as viable and as important to the attempt to account for all variables and all influences in the complex situation under analysis. The issue, as suggested, can not be fully resolved in this writing, and in terms of overall scholarly political analysis, it has also remained somewhat open to debate.

The final key problematic issue taken up here as impinging on full understanding of the Korean-with-U.S. bureaucratic interaction concerns the character and intent of Korean leadership during the immediate postwar period and up through the end of the Korean War. This intent and character are understood to have been to considerable
extent influenced and marked by factors associated with the above-mentioned other two problematic key issues, concerning first the will and disposition of the Korean people at initiation of the postwar, and concerning, second, the will and disposition of the U.S. bureaucratic intervention for that period with Korea. These first two issues are critical to the overall debate this paper takes up in terms of Riggs' prismatic analysis, primarily as they touch upon and influence the third key identified problematic issue, the character and intent, and, what might also be added, outcome, of Korean, primarily bureaucratic, leadership during the period investigated. And it is of course this last, bureaucratic leadership, which is the fulcrum of prismatic analysis, and which must most directly be studied now and reformulated in terms of Riggs' model, in the chapters which follow. In taking up this analysis, in terms especially of the above complexity of unresolved, critical issues, some culturally-specific in nature, others more indicative of the postwar time of shifting geopolitical realities, it is well to remember Riggs' intention, particularly as delineated in his work, *Administration in Developing Countries* (1964). The purpose of that study was to show how his data-referenced, comparative, ecological, and nomothetic approach is essential for isolating variables which effectively impinge upon and
construe the course of political, social, and administrative development, in all instances of 20th Century modernization, while allowing clarification of perspective, objectively speaking, above a quagmire of conflicting subjective commentary and cultural-specific inquiry. This is the perspective Riggs attempts to demonstrate and to offer for application. It is one that, while the ensuing chapters will hardly do it justice, is nevertheless taken up as offering very much needed clarification, possibly not to be found in any alternative source, to the highly conflictual and labyrinthine Korean postwar development scenario.

The first Korean principle of bureaucratic government in Korean "traditional society" (Pak, T. S., 1986, p. 489), understood as emanating from the Choson or Yi Dynasty (1392-1905), is referred to as "Minbon Chuui, or people-centered" (p. 490). Maintenance of order, through "stratified relationships among the people," (p. 441) was the second principle. And third was classicism, which essentially refers to emulating "an exemplary society that has maintained order in some special era in the past" (p. 491), but which also places emphasis on "rulers themselves to be ethical in their moral conduct in order to realize such an ideal society" (p. 491). Stratification of social classes and reliance on ruler benevolence for exemplary government,
may clash with democratic and modernization development. The first and most basic element of Minbon Chuui, however, government centered in the people, and only through the bureaucracy, suggests a traditional and abiding philosophy predisposed after Liberation in 1945 to true democratic modernization, essentially, government fully centered in the people in the sense of "by the people" (1986, p. 490). Certain governing bureaucracy characteristics, such as the dominant centralizing tendency after the joining of the Three Kingdoms with the Shilla Dynasty in 918, while suggesting non-democratic tendency, which continues as a primary focus of Korean bureaucracy with inherent propensity for autocratic rule, also tended to establish structure conducive to at least proto democratic form. Korea's early establishment of central national government also provided for shared government power among the king, a State Council, Six Boards, and other policy making officials (1986). The process was participatory and driven to consensus, but apparently still dependent upon the benevolence, and also intelligence of the king. Nevertheless, an important thread of Korean public administration scholarship views the central cabinet government, with State Council acting as a quasi-legislative body (the Ui Jong Bu), even though confirmed in Confucian elite structure, as "the budding of democratic politics in Korea, emphasizing
participation, discussion, and consensus" (Pak, 1986, pp. 495-496). Pak’s conclusion, however, suggests that despite an ideological and, in terms of consensus governance, pragmatic democratic tendency within both Confucianism and Korea’s central bureaucracy, enduring in the Chosun dynasty up through the end of the 19th Century, Korea could not evolve to modern democratic form but would have to set out on independent modernization in rejection of Confucian form:

While Confucianism advocated people-centered ideas and the Confucian system was structured to promote the welfare of the people and made decisions by consensus, Confucian system failed to adjust itself to the changing times and failed to consolidate its national strength, eventually causing the loss of national sovereignty. (Pak, T. T., 1986, p. 500)

In overall terms, the specifically Korean perspective concerning development, and Korea’s own position within world development, are unique. The concept of "nationalism," complex in meaning itself, is critical to Koreans’ understanding of their modernization process. In commenting on Korea’s sense of national identity development, Cha (1987) initiates his discussion by addressing the issue of externally instigated development:

Unlike the Afro-Asian nationalism that emerged before the formation of nationhood by its people, Korean nationalism had its people and nation before the introduction of an idea of nationalism, similar to nationalism in Western European countries. But unlike Western European nationalism, which grew on its own from within, Korean nationalism originated from without through external stimuli. (p. 505)
In his footnote, Cha (1987, p. 505) specifically aligns himself with Riggs' notion of exo-prismatic predominance in 20th Century development by noting that "in Western Europe, a nation was founded first and nationalism grew from it, but in newly developing countries in Africa and Asia, nationalism was introduced before the founding of a nation" (p. 505). The unique character of Korean nationalism emanates from several factors which impinge on the exo-prismatic form of her development. This unique character of Korean national development adds a further dimension, as Cha elucidates, to understanding of how both internal and external factors come together in Korea's modernization.

Cha (1987) emphasizes that development in response to external stimuli indicates deficiency vis-a-vis internal strength and cohesion. Cha's contention is that 20th Century development, as was Korea's case, could derive almost entirely from "its effort to meet external challenges" (p. 506). In supposing that Korean initiation of nationalism toward development and modernization was essentially a reactive or even defensive measure, Cha suggests that the entire impetus became not so much internal self-strengthening with effort toward necessary reorganization of social structures and internal unity, but something more like a resistance mode to external challenges. Cha emphasizes that most scholarly research has in
fact relegated itself to examination of the course of such resistance. Cha's perception is that the more important factors underlying Korean development relate not to Korea's "anti-imperialist struggles" (p. 506), primarily, during the overall period of modernizing effort, that is, against the Japanese, but instead are derived from efforts "to overcome national division" (p. 506). Cha introduces then his own analysis as part of a more recent trend in Korean scholarship "to examine the development of Korean nationalism as an internal developmental phase of Korean national history on one hand, and to emphasize on the other the role of the masses in Korean nationalism" (p. 506).

Korean nationalism has developed primarily in terms of self-reliant consciousness among both Korean leadership and the populace as a whole, initiating in the modern instance with the forced opening of Korean ports through combined Japanese and Western powers during the 19th Century. Korea was forced into a response mode of establishing a sovereign state similar to the states of Western Europe. Method of resistance could not be agreed upon; the challenge could not be met, but the maintenance of self-reliant consciousness continued, both as opposition to outside forces depriving Korea of its independence, and preventing unification of nationalist movements for national survival. National unity could not be consolidated toward a single
purpose or goal, and according to Kim Yong-Jak, as cited by Cha (1987) in his thesis of "'dual aspects of self-reliant consciousness'" (p. 509), Korean self-reliance was simultaneously subservient in weakness toward one imperialist power, namely China, during the late Choson Dynasty, while showing more strident resistance to the West and to Japan. This dual aspect continues through the present as was especially notable during the 1945 post-liberation period when:

Among the Korean people there existed a benevolent consciousness toward the Allied powers at the time of Korean independence, particularly toward the United States after World War II. However, excessive benevolent consciousness interferes with the growth of a self-reliant consciousness and may fall into the danger that the government may make more of an effort to acquire the approval of the foreign powers than to develop the people's support. (Cha, 1987, p. 512)

Cha (1987) discerns three ideologies characteristic of Korean movements to affirm or regain sovereignty and to move toward independence in relation to the challenge of the international powers. These were "the ideology of enlightenment, the ideology of reject-evil and protect-orthodoxy, and the Tong Hak ideology" (p. 507). In each movement, preservation and modernization were joined, but "the core of the national efforts at the time was the struggle for national preservation" (p. 508). Armed Sino-Japanese intervention was able to destroy or at least subvert any success these independent movements might have
carried forth, but in retrospect only because the three were unable to recognize the value within one another and join in unified opposition (1987).

Implementation in earnest of Japanese colonialization with the Protectorate Treaty of 1905, solidified Korean independence and modernization thinking. The peasant masses became joined with the "reject-evil and protect-orthodoxy" thinking, forming the "struggle of the righteous army" (Cha, 1987, p. 510). Enlightenment ideology and the urban mass populace became united under the "patriotic enlightenment movement" (p. 510). Together a mass formation toward independence and a grass-roots basis of unified consciousness was established at the time of the March First independence movement, which had been predated by more limited and sporadic popular participation in the Tonghak, Righteous Army, and Independence Club movements. Korean nationalism truly became entrenched among the mass of the people with the March First movement of 1919. Prior to this change in consciousness, even with modernization efforts made in earnest, realization of the urgency of reacting in a unified way to foreign aggression had not established itself. With March First, for the first time, "were the Japanese imperialists defined as the enemy of a free and modern Korean nation" (p. 511). Overall the movement failed, nevertheless, in not going beyond certain
limited objectives, and failed to clearly delineate the Japanese as totally depriving Korea of its economic wherewithal, of its life blood for survival, through the consequences of its economic aggression (1987).

Independence movement failure in conjunction with failed appeals for independence made in both Washington and Paris, caused Korean thinking to turn toward socialism as a more viable and attractive option. Korean nationalism thus became further divided and suffered greater suppression with the Japanese introduction of its "so-called 'cultural policy,' a pacification measure" (Cha, 1987, p. 512).

Economic unity and the perception of unified economic effort or destiny in the consciousness of the Korean people prevented their full perception of the threat of Western and Japanese expansion and exploitative approach to Korea. Even up through the latter part of the Choson Dynasty, with ongoing national administration of the unified political entity, no economic interaction among regions existed. It was in fact only with the attempts of the Sirhak scholars prior to Western and Japanese intervention that national economic reordering and unification was attempted, with establishment of "a national market by maintaining highways, a standard of weights and measures, and a national currency as well as by reforming the means of transporta-
tion" (Cha, 1987, pp. 515-516). Interestingly, this impetus toward economic unity and reformulation would simultaneously engender the Sirhak scholars' attempt to eliminate the status system and thereby unite the Korean people into one.

Thus, their object was to establish a modern nation from a pseudo nation by abolishing the barriers between regions and social classes. However, Korea became a market for modern European capitalism before the forces that were to transform the ideas of the Sirhak scholars into practice could be realized. (p. 516)

At the time of the opening of the ports and the overwhelming of the Choson Dynasty, and, therefore, in consequence, but more indirectly, the overwhelming of the agenda of the Sirhak Scholars, the ruling elite attempted to imitate the expressions of power they were directly confronted with through European nationalist imperialism, also manifested through Japan and the U.S. Their imitation could be, however, only a surface reflection of ostentatious wealth and military prowess, with Eastern values supposedly maintained within. The Chosun leadership proclaimed the concept of Tongdo Sogi, meaning Eastern ways combined with Western technology. The idea was emblematic, clearly, of Western bourgeois thinking, of enrichment and advancement of the whole society through the landlord and merchant classes, a concept somewhat in keeping with Eastern ethical norms centering on the interests of Yang
Ban, or Aristocratic class, wherein landholdings would be centrally honored and wherein, in contemporary terms, they would be kept at equal levels with merchants and usurers' capital and investments. The idea came into clear conflict with the democratizing, egalitarian, and modernizing thinking which had been growing prior to the abrupt overwhelming of Korean ports by means of modern arms. Of major conflict were the demands of the Tong Hak peasant army, consisting of peasants who made up the lower strata of the nation. The Choson leaders were attempting "to persuade the Tong Hak peasant army by citing Eastern ways" (p. 516). Maintenance of separation of classes, intensified through Yangban cooperation with imperialist exploitation, suppressed the development of a unified economic entity which would incorporate all social strata into a truly national economy and creation of a truly national spirit. The Japanese colonial system, in part by making a Korean national economic formation impossible, also acted to prevent the modernizing and democratizing Korean nationalism from developing. Anti-Japanese struggle of the nationalist movement, of course necessary, nevertheless, had the counterproductive impact of pushing the deeper nationalist struggles and realizations of economic and social unity into the background. Even with the 1945 Liberation, these deeper social struggles based in national
economic unity working toward true modernization remained suppressed.

The basic reason was, of course, the division of the Korean nation, but in the case of South Korea alone there seem to have been two reasons. The first was the fact that the leaders who had political power after liberation consisted mainly of a conservative group of landlords and bureaucrats educated and nurtured under the Japanese imperialists. Therefore, it was difficult to expect the formation of a national economy that could overcome the existing feudal characteristics. (Cha, 1987, p. 518)

Japanese occupation had the effect of denying Koreans "independent development in all walks of life" (Sohn, Kim, C. C. & Hong, 1982). Ideological conflicts within Korean culture and society were brought again to the surface with Japan's announcement of formal surrender. In some ways the experience initiated in 1945 would resemble those of typical colonial countries and peoples of the postwar. A new dimension of externally generated conflict, originating also in ideological difference would be imposed with partitioning of the nation. U.S. and Soviet Union difference would intensify the internal Korean ideological difference. The Moscow meeting of the victorious allied foreign ministers, notably including only the United States, Soviet Russia, and Britain, on December 15, 1945, placed Korea under a trusteeship of the four great powers of Britain, China, the U.S., and the U.S.S.R. The purpose was to take a provisional step toward a united Korea. The thinking of the Korean people was not incorporated into the
decision. Koreans protested at this new external imposition, in place a mere four months after Liberation. A powerful will to defy domination of Korea had built up during the Japanese suppression; this will was intensified among Koreans with the postwar division. This will of opposition they of course commonly shared with colonial or former colonial peoples worldwide (1982).

The communist faction of Koreans, which at first had quickly and avidly organized for a rapid, unified, and socialist assumption of power after the war, with the Moscow agreement, and apparently following direct Moscow orders, reversed its position toward support for the trusteeship and division, though individually Korean communist membership was strongly opposed, as were nearly all Koreans. At least in the immediate postwar period the quest for unified national independence was the supreme national goal. To Koreans, even the small communist contingent, the Allied Trusteeship meant only a repetition, though of course abated in intensity and exploitative design, of the Japanese experience. In the Soviet-occupied North, the people were uniformly directed to once again follow the dictates of external imposition (1982).

Pak (1980) presents the standard view of the political milieu facing Koreans and their U.S. military bureaucratic counterparts south of the 38th Parallel. The U.S. military
had three broadly defined goals as mentioned earlier in this paper: Japanese surrender, maintaining order, and preparing Koreans to "govern themselves as a free and independent nation" (p. 15). The political context after the war, as suggested in this writing, from many perspectives, was very complex. It seems fairly certain that the U.S. mission, other than general outlines of its mission given above, had no precise agenda, no clear strategy from either Washington or the U.S. Military Pacific command on which to act. Understanding the nature of the U.S. position and intent is extremely critical for arriving at a correct interpretation of the meaning and importance of the 1945-53 bureaucratic process, its relation to the previous intervening events of Korean modernization process begun at least as early as the 19th Century, the ongoing situation of Korea (largely an outcome of structures put in place and directives carried out 1945-1953), and the relevance of Riggs' model of Prismatic Society. The relevance and importance of these issues should come into clearer focus later in this section of the writing as a contemporary Marxist interpretation of the situation examined is presented. The most widely accepted Korean view of U.S. intervention is summarized by Pak (1980) as follows:

In the prevailing political confusion, [Commanding General of the United States Army XXIV Corps] Hodge
had neither reliable administrative personnel available nor policy direction coming from Washington. Under these circumstances he had to make many political decisions on his own and to rely upon English-speaking Koreans in implementing them. A lack of coordination between the military government in Seoul and the policy planners in Washington [was manifest]. Thus, the military rule was characterized by its confusion and indecision in policy areas. (p.15)

Though the purposes and intentions of the U.S., as largely impressed upon the thinking of Koreans, represented "noble democratic ideals, the U.S. military rule thus failed in achieving its political goals, especially in laying down the plans for future democratic process" (Pak, 1980, p. 16). At this early point in his analysis, however, Pak goes on to assert that "because of its brevity and inadequate policies, the military rule was unable to make any significant contribution toward the development of democratic politics in Korea" (p. 16). This harsh assessment, it is made clear, is in terms of outcomes, from a developing Korean pragmatic political outlook, and not in terms of U.S. intention and strategy. The finality of the assessment, also, is not entirely supported by Korean interpreters, and in fact may not be entirely compatible with Pak's overall view.

Hart-Landsberg (1993) suggests that "Japanese imperialism directed a brutal capitalist transformation of Korea" (p. 117). From this perspective, possibly the most important outcome was in turn an oppositional Korean
formation of "a working-class-led socialist movement" (p. 117). Viewing this socialist movement as not only the correct direction for Korea, but also the position most widely supported by the Korean people, as well as the organic result of the independence, modernization, and egalitarian positions and efforts initiated in the 19th Century and the democratic tendency inherent within the Korean spirit, the socialist perspective of Hart-Landsberg examines "the role U.S. imperialism played in the defeat of this socialist movement, the division of Korea, and the rise to power of a capitalist-oriented, military dictatorship in the South" (p. 117). Citing a study by Choy, Hart-Landsberg (1993, p. 117-118) draws our attention to the relative positions of Roosevelt and Stalin vis-a-vis Korea as recorded at the Yalta Conference, February, 1945, when Roosevelt apparently had suggested that Korea should remain under joint trusteeship of the United States, the USSR, Great Britain, and China from "twenty to thirty years" (p. 117) before being granted full independence. Choy's study, as cited, has Stalin responding with "'the shorter period the better'" (p. 118). One aspect of this apparent paternalistic frame of reference as indicative of U.S. thinking toward Korea rings true in that the U.S., apparently with no manipulative or strategic intent, had believed it necessary after 1945 to educate and develop the
Korean people so that they could then, later, assume responsibility for themselves (apparently accepting the Japanese interpretation of Korea, or the one the Japanese devised for international consumption, to camouflage their exploitation); that is, the U.S. military had come with this unnecessary parental directive prepared ahead of time, before knowing anything concerning Korea. From the contemporary socialist perspective, in 1945 the U.S. was looking for a way to solidify its recaptured hegemony in the Pacific and in Asia. Roosevelt in actuality was trying to circumscribe Soviet impact in the region while also utilizing Soviet prowess for achieving U.S. objectives. Thus the U.S. was at first enthusiastic about Soviet agreement to declare war on Japan, but later became concerned as Japan's collapse, including Soviet overwhelming of the enemy in Manchuria and then immediately into Northern Korea and down the Peninsula, unfolded so rapidly. The U.S., in this interpretation, had been counting on a thoroughly protracted deliberation over Korea so that it could implement with greater care its own East Asian grand strategy, within which the Soviets had been prefigured more as accomplices, albeit unwitting, rather than as rivals and antagonists (1993).

Rather than not having duly considered Korea and its fate, the U.S. is thus more properly viewed, from this
perspective, as facing a disabling hitch in grand design, and finding itself within a "growing foreign policy disaster" (Hart-Landsberg, 1993, p. 118). Truman had in the meanwhile assumed the presidency and was advised of the urgency of moving U.S. troops into Korean and even Manchurian territory to offset Soviet presence. This situation was the immediate scenario of that urgent and decisive moment, according to Hart-Landsberg:

Unable to mobilize U.S. troops quickly enough for such an operation, yet determined to block the Soviet advance, the U.S. War Department sent two colonels into a room on August 11 and gave them Thirty minutes to decide upon a dividing line in Korea, one which would allow U.S. troops to accept Japan's surrender as far north as was possible given U.S. logistical limitations and the Russian troop advance. The recommendation of the colonels was the 38th parallel, a division that placed approximately two-thirds of the country's population and the capital city, Seoul, in the United States Zone. (1993, p. 118)

The U.S. was surprised when the colonels' plan was accepted by the Soviets, even without prior information concerning U.S. intent, with Soviet troops already below the 38th, and without U.S. troops on Korean soil for nearly one more month. The result was the initiation of Korea's postwar division (1993).

From the perspective of contemporary Korean scholarship, as presented in some small part in this paper, and with at least partial agreement of contemporary socialist view concerning Korean development, a long-term generation of Korean democratizing, egalitarian, and then modernizing
pursuit, traced from early Confucian political structures of distributed and consultative bureaucratic initiative, through important reform movements, as well as through peasant revolts, in conjunction with weakening of Chosun dynasty rule and enlightened elite intervention, appeared to be establishing an endogenous progressive reform in Korea by mid-to-late 19th Century. Japanese hegemony and colonialism, and in some views, later U.S.-Soviet implantation of respective dictatorial postwar regimes served to eviscerate Korea's modern, democratic process, which otherwise would have succeeded in pragmatic terms rather than remaining invested as a dominating, survival spirit only, within the Korean people. As it occurred in pragmatic terms, the Chosun or Yi dynasty pattern of non-democratic rule relented just enough to allow Japanese colonial suppression to reestablish totalitarian dominance, but in even more virulent form. Western writers, however, other than those taking the socialist tack, tend not to perceive the democratizing, egalitarian trend so much in Korean thought and history as do Korean native scholars, even though Western non-socialist views may be just as likely to perceive Japan's perpetuation of suppression rather than maintenance of development tendency. Typical Western viewpoints are, perhaps understandably, much less likely to perceive Allied postwar dominance and stratagems as not
much different from those of the Japanese. Earlier Korean postwar scholarship tended to stress continuance of authoritarian rule and absence of independent initiative in Korean political experience. Y. H. Lee (1975), emphasizing the dominance of authoritarian systems of Korean society and underlying social structure, states that even instances of minor political participation carried out by the Korean populace were "compliant instead of autonomous" (p. 17). The peasant revolts from this perspective are minor occurrences, or simply interruptions. Koreans, from this widely accepted view were submissive and accepting of paternalistic authoritarianism:

The ordinary people generally were politically unaware and uninvolved. Their role was that of passive subjects. They did what authorities told them to do. Governmental policy was something to accept and obey rather than something they could question and attempt to change. There was little opportunity for ordinary citizens to participate in the decision-making process. Political infrastructures such as parties and interest groups were absent and there were few channels of demand making. (p. 17)

If the above represents the general view of the political disposition of the Korean people, at least up through the end of the Chosun or Yi dynasty, it is nevertheless, at best, merely an overview of the mass population, and ignores the reforming and modernizing element among Koreans, much as it, too, underplays the democratizing and consensus building aspect of Koreans, at all social levels, especially their willingness to express mass
political will throughout the course of Korean history. Korean endogenous democratizing and modernizing efforts, especially those of the last century of Yi dynasty rule indicate internal adjustment in response to political suppression of developmental needs and the elite class's remission in its obligation to provide harmonious leadership and coordination of effort throughout the society. Korean mass submission to elite leadership indicates not acceptance of authoritarian will, but rather acceptance throughout the culture of the Confucian edict for harmonizing the interplay of all effort of all social elements. When this trust is abridged, as it had been by the ruling elite in the latter days of Yi dynasty rule, and as it had much more markedly been with the advent of Japanese takeover, the direction of the people is clearly toward ridding themselves of that rule. The critical question arises, again, concerning the aftermath of Japanese frustration of Korean endogenous modernizing initiatives. What was the overall postwar political disposition of the Korean populace and leadership? Even though Korean interpretation may in general establish consensus as to the nature of Japanese suppression leading up to the 1945 Liberation, that its totalitarian centralization and injurious effects in relation to Korean society far surpassed any ruling dispositions of the Yi period, the
central questions of this writing cannot so readily be addressed with uniformity, not in Korean critical interpretation, and much less so within critical understanding as a whole. Beyond mere recognition of the disruptive and torturous character of Japanese imposition, several important pieces to the puzzle of visualizing as a whole the long-term process of Korean modernization, however, can be aligned somewhat at this point, if not exactly placed into their precise settings and relationships. A powerful, widespread democratizing will and consciousness among Koreans, instilled through associated strains and tendencies of long development in their history was galvanized in the spirit of the Korean people through reaction to Japanese suppression, came to intense expression with the postwar Liberation, was undercut in many ways by postwar conditions, most of which were imposed from without, and then was further undermined it seemed by internal Korean structural political development, nearly all aspects of which were defined in the postwar period and resultant Korean War, but continued in various manifestations up through the present. In the postwar period, it seemed as though all the forces and vectors of Korean destiny were crystallized. The generation toward democratic modernization would be inevitable, but to comprehend the circumstance and course of the process, much retracing and
reconsideration of Korean identity would be required. This identity would find itself manifested in new and perhaps curious ways in the postwar and following political situation, aptly designated, vortex (Henderson, 1968).
CHAPTER IV

THE POSTWAR KOREAN EXPERIENCE IN LIGHT OF RIGGS' THEORY OF PRISMATIC SOCIETY

The internal conflagration of politics could not subside during all of the eight-year period analyzed here, even with the results of the first general election, May 10, 1948, and consequent establishment of the new Government of the Republic, through election of the first constituent National Assembly which developed the Constitution in July of the same year and elected Syngman Rhee as the first president on August 15, 1948. Even with outbreak of war, almost immediately after the May 1950 second general election, and throughout the pressure of the war, the intense, hothouse political competition continued. If anything, the ambition, egalitarian ideals, and independent spirit of the Assembly constituents increased, all in opposition to the rather authoritarian president, who had maintained that Korean people must be educated and enculturated before they would be able to accept democracy. His Independence Day speech of August 15, 1951, during the height of war, however, marked Rhee’s new direction of thought on this matter:

So far I have considered it premature to install a party system until the people can fully understand the
meaning of a political party...but the time has come to organize a large party covering the whole country on the bases of farmers and working people, in order to promote national welfare and to protect the common interest of the people. We shall have to make such a political party a permanent base upon which the government can firmly stand. (As cited in Lee, H. B., 1968, p. 72)

The reversal of position on Rhee’s part indicated first of all the extremity of opposition he was experiencing from Assembly members. Rhee was setting the stage to move to direct popular election of the president, depending on his image as the "Father of his Country" to establish a broad political base absorbing various competing forces. Rhee’s position, as it developed from the idealist leader of independence in exile for virtually half of the present century to elected official maintaining power and representing particular constituencies in the face of competitive forces, reflects the transitions or transformations, societal, political, and individual, which Riggs (1964) elaborates in his Prismatic Society Model. H. B. Lee (1968) concludes his initial analysis of Korea’s first post-independence administration as follows: "There is no doubt that President Rhee’s immediate intention was, as a student of Korean politics points out, ‘to maneuver through the use of extraparliamentary forces those parliamentary forces in opposition which he could not control with his own parliamentary forces alone’" (p. 73; Yun, 1963, as cited in Lee, H. B., 1968, p. 73). Lee is directly stating
here that the kinds of manipulations he perceives Syngman Rhee engaging in are prismatic in nature. They are made possible and workable by the conflux of fused and somewhat inauthentic progress toward developed or diffracted society as contained in prismatic form. They are indications of Rhee’s own perception of the prismatic nature of the postwar situation for Korea: Power and authority were effectively separated from one another, as they had not been in the traditional, fused society. And Rhee’s manipulations (of his office, the people, and the elected political representatives) denote his willingness to bypass democratic process to maintain bureaucratic, elite power (the essence of prismatic). In terms of pragmatic politics, the essence of Riggs’ disposition concerning the prismatic is twofold. Neither aspect, it should be added, is positive, though each clearly applies to the Korean situation.

The first major underpinning of Riggs’ argument is that intense bureaucratic development, emphasized as prismatic attempts toward the modern, while arguably necessary for the state to achieve its overall developmental goals, tends to be crippling to full political development. Further, conditions within the transition phase are not merely conducive to prismatic bureaucratic formation, they are also, and even more critically,
supportive of maintaining that bureaucratic power, to political formation's detriment, and are virtually impervious to outside claims or influences. This first major pragmatic issue in effect identifies or interprets also the metaphor of the prism as Riggs has established it. The prism Riggs is contemplating, composed of crystals locked in place, initiates in solid form, from the fused society. The social structure begins to break up, to decrystalize, but only so much destructuring can occur, until the separating crystals lock once again in place, but in new position and with greater separation. This frozen, merely initial manifestation of diffraction, is the prismatic state. It is, moreover, and most essentially, the intensely organized and activated bureaucracy of development, differentiated from other bureaucratic formats as the Sala. The exercise of its great powers and its sense of previously unknown control, establish an inertia to go no further toward diffraction. Prismatically its grip of power is locked in place, frozen, in part intentionally for advantages realized in terms of elite power, control, and economic access. This is the first major pragmatic underpinning of Prismatic Society. The second is more graphic in its telling prismatic effects. It is much more definitive in its application. It is the bureaucratic power application which H. B. Lee (1968) has discussed
above in terms of President Rhee. The prismatic manifests
certain legalisms, formalities, and formal structures, not
generally to be found in the fused state, but intact,
formally, that is, in the prismatic. The formal structure,
however, lacks the kind of knowledge, support, and imposi­
tion of legitimacy found in fully developed, fully diffrac­
ted social forms. Moreover, within the prismatic, the
structures and patterns of the traditional, fused society
remain fairly well intact and remain in use. The formal,
modern political or bureaucratic function carries on
separate functions which are also performed by, simulta­
neously, traditional fused structures. The point is,
primarily, that the continuance of fused structures
performing social functions with legitimacy tends to
undermine the validity and the full legitimacy of the
formal, modern structure. This separate, undermining
legitimacy allows or helps to establish the kind of
multiple focus and flexible application of standards which
characterize the prismatic. This enormous discretionary
power, especially as held by bureaucratic elites, as
arguably Syngman Rhee himself was, means that the structure
of law and its codification in prismatic society become the
ultimate tool for manipulation and control. The fused
society, on the other hand, while vesting near total power
in one person, nevertheless, had no formal system which,
through selective application, could be used for browbeating and disempowering the masses, while sustaining, through elite noncompliance or discretionary compliance joined with authority to impose one’s will onto others, the dominance of the elite, as well as the elite’s handmaid, the bureaucracy. A similar scenario to the above of balancing noncompliance with authority became the position and strategy of President Rhee. Such openness to engage in manipulation and rather obvious powerbrokering prevents political movement beyond simply investing all power in the bureaucracy and toward democratic form, while allowing near total power to reside in the elite hands. This power-brokering and manipulation are more or less precisely descriptive of the position Rhee found himself in at the center of Korean Bureaucracy. Ultimately, in such a system, if you are advantaged and have privileged access to the bureaucracy, you will likely be able to subvert, bypass, or escape the edicts of the law. If you are disadvantaged, however, you are not so well off as you would be if under the king’s discretion in the fused society. This is true, simply because the law in the prismatic society can be applied to you any way the power elite wishes, and you will have no recourse. You know only that the law will be applied to enhance the power of elites in control, and it will be applied to further deplete your own legitimacy,
to squeeze added tribute from you, and to prevent your aspiring to higher legitimacy and power authority. In the fused society, as a non-elite, you are better off because you are not really in competition with anyone. You are in no position to contest or threaten even formally the power positions of either central ruler or the formally subjugated positions of elites. The central ruler disposes power at will. Power is neither a contested nor a continuously redefining sphere of control and influence. In the elite format of the prismatic society, the elite power base, which is essentially the only power base, since the king's power has thus been absorbed, is in a position constantly of testing, adjusting, controlling, expanding, and redefining its power, which derives from both fused context that remains and the structures of law open to infinite variation and manipulation, not to mention boundless interpretation. As an individual not under the elite power base umbrella, you are in a precarious position indeed, since you may be challenged and viewed as threatening to the elite power structure, in a way you would unlikely be considered by the king or central ruler. You are in a double bind, knowing that the will of the whole society can be organized against you through the law and its manipulation by the bureaucratically dominant elite. Yet that same law has no binding hold on the elite itself and is in fact the
strategic tool the elite employs to carry out its designs for solidifying and enhancing power. Solidifying and enhancing power through the above such manipulations is of course what the elite adepts, such as Rhee, came to pride themselves upon. They learned this disposition of their political skills from the prismatic bureaucratic structure itself, which came into being though it could not likely have been predicted, through the imposed interface of traditional with modern. It is the structure of the prismatic which creates the huge power of the bureaucracy and the internal mechanisms for power aggrandizement in behalf of the elites, which teaches them the means and processes for power manipulation, and which provides the enthralling absorption into power strategy, design, and interplay which dominates the will and ideals of the elites, causing them ultimately to be so captivated by the experience of power and its demands for successful gamesmanship, that they possess no desire to go beyond that game, except to further solidify their advantage. Rhee, the idealist who would wait for 50 years for the opportunity which could allow unfolding of Korean modern democratic egalitarian destiny, would nevertheless respond with greater urgency and enthrallment to the limitless power reaches of the Korean prismatic bureaucracy. Political reality would become not achievement of ideals but instead "relentless struggle
between the ruling party led by Syngman Rhee and the opposition groups in the National Assembly" (Lee, H. B., 1968, p. 73).

Paige (1971) depicts the presidential term of Rhee as "emergent authoritarian dominant party rule tempered by the rise of a vocal opposition coalition under quasi-competitive conditions" (p. 147). Paige views the long-term Korean political and bureaucratic development as emerging from a centralized bureaucratic state with a low degree of political participation, through a period of proscribed Korean political activity under direct colonial rule, into a condition of marked divergence between authoritarian single party and competitive party rule, both characterized by high levels of political involvement (p. 151).

Korean political development can be viewed as based on social learning theory, from the above perspective, the assumption being that South Korea's adaptation to democratic processing proceeded rapidly and to good effect due to "deliberate human manipulations rather than mechanistic statements about the emergence, structure, and consequences of various political systems" (p. 161). These manipulations should not be thought of as impositions from the outside upon Korean political and bureaucratic experience. In terms of South Korean experience at least, after effecting the division of the country into two spheres, external shaping influence is seen by Paige as "relatively limited" (p. 163). More to the point in terms of driving forces
creating democratic development are Western influence factors based on shared antagonism to Soviet and communist influence, transpiring, in the South Korean instance through post-World-War-Two leadership groups whose political consciousness was fixed in mature form during the "communist-nationalist controversies of the 1920s" (p. 163). Ultimately, Paige views the Korean political experience from 1945 and beyond as demonstrating that "deliberate political action is potentially capable of significantly transforming man's political, social, economic, and cultural institutions" (p. 167):

The extent to which purposive political action will be able to control or shape human society will not be determined by any combination of impersonal systemic or structural forces but rather by the effective initiatives and counter measures that other men organized for political action can bring to bear against it. The Korean case thus helps to remind man of the importance of his values and to liberate his mind to envision the creative potentials in politics for achieving them. (p. 167)

In developing his thesis of social learning in relation to political transformation, Paige suggests insights relevant to Riggs' Prismatic Theory. Political theory may emphasize too much the importance of preconditions within a given society for establishing a modern system. Paige believes this emphasis is misplaced, no matter the system under investigation. More critical to political establishment and emergence, for example, of democratic systems are "goal-means concepts, leadership
skills, organizational effectiveness, and reinforcement capabilities" (p. 159). These take precedence over "macrosystemic variables commonly suggested (e.g., replication of certain European historical processes, high level of education, urbanization, mass media exposure, industrial technology, per capita income, etc.)" (p. 159). The factor of "dissociated learning" developed by Hartley and Hartley and as cited by Paige (1971, p. 159) suggests support for learning capacity and intention as primary for political development, thus somewhat substantiating Riggs' suggestion that the prismatic state is not only predictable for political transformation, but, concomitantly, also, under specified sets of circumstances, necessary, if not altogether desirable. Dissociated learning suggests that the individual embedded within a social context learns behaviors which otherwise are thought to be alien:

Thus, administrators in developing countries can learn to display relatively modern behavior in the office while continuing relatively traditional behaviors at home. Research in developing countries suggests that modern behaviors do not necessarily extinguish traditional ones, or vice versa, except in mutually exclusive situations where the rewards to be gained from the one outweigh those anticipated from the other. In most cases there appear to be high tolerance for, and perhaps even unawareness of, inconsistency. For politics this implies that it is possible to learn a number of different patterns of political behavior in a given social framework. (Paige, 1971, p. 160)

The suggestion is further that political, social, religious, and economic behaviors need not "exhibit a high
degree of similarity in certain respects for the political pattern to be stable. Both learning theory and the Korean case suggest that relatively high degrees of discrepancy are possible" (p. 160).

Paige's analysis, while supportive of Korea's rapid advance into democratic political processes and administration, and also insightful as commentary on Riggs' prismatic analysis of how both traditional and modern can be simultaneously contained within the developmental context or prism, is not entirely cogent, in two respects, in terms of the foregoing analyses of this paper. First of all, Paige's essential supposition is that Koreans, in terms of cultural and historical experience, were not really predisposed toward democratic development. From Paige's perspective, centralized authoritarianism and Confucianism, essential to thousands of years of Korean social experience, would have rendered democratic thinking as largely incompatible with Korean psychohistory and predisposition. Paige's view of Koreans appears to be primarily through a Japanese perspective which largely interprets Japanese interjection into Korean society as instigating Western modernizing contexts, and as predisposing and introducing Koreans to later democratic acceptance. Thus, the emphasis on learning theory suggests Koreans are a case in point of a given society's ability to rapidly absorb new thinking
and imitate behavior when they are motivated to do so, as the Koreans were thought to be, in the Paige interpretation, just after World War Two. Following this interpretation, in the sense that renders it, at least in some psychological mode, compatible with the Prismatic Model, Paige suggests that even though Koreans after 1945 were not simply following a U.S. imposed model working toward democratic development, they did experience such development, though primarily of their own making and instigation, as an alien context, and one which they would follow only through dissociative learning or consciousness. Paige may be critically unaware of the importance of early modernizing and democratic expression and potential within the Korean people and their cultural-historical experience. His awareness of the relationship between Japan and Korea does not incorporate the strategic factor of Japanese suppression and attempt to eviscerate from Korean consciousness the flowering of egalitarian and democratic expression, long a part of Korean psychohistorical awareness, and coming to a kind of fruition prior to Korea's anguishing experience in the 20th Century with Japan. Korean expression and realization of democratic form and direction, as Paige would otherwise know, are not really impositions at all, nor are they, except in a more limited and surface manner, examples of dissociated learning. With
the emancipation or liberation of 1945, the Korean political spirit, as expressed with great urgency, and the egalitarian spirit of democracy, virtually coalesced as one. Korea's administrative formation would also not be prismatic in the way that Paige suggests, which is that the Korean mindset would be traditional, authoritarian, and Confucian, or centralized, while the outward administrative adjustment would tend to be democratic, since that is what the dissociated cultural imposition was demanding. The prismatic application would in fact be virtually the opposite. The prismatic manifestation would instead be more nearly, for postwar Korea, what Riggs' (1964) depicts, and what H. B. Lee (1968) clarifies in the example of Rhee after 1948. It is the structural juxtapositioning of modernizing-democratic with traditional-fused or centralized-authoritarian, which is prismatic, and which creates the contexts which appear to be dissociative in terms of democratic formulation and expectation disjoined from centralized bureaucratic authority and opportunity for exploitation and manipulation on the parts of administrators. In other words, in the Korean case, as the history of its protracted and oftentimes circumvented modernization would indicate, dissociation between democratizing theory and the mindset of the people and culture cannot explain the manifest circumvention and stultification of democratic
modernization development which has more often than not transpired. That is, to suggest that democratic modernizing formulation and activation somehow went against the grain or the spirit of the Korean populace would be a serious misreading of a people and their culture. This paper has attempted to demonstrate how, instead, the spirit and aspiration of the Korean people toward modernization and toward democratization, after long suppression, was released with the 1945 liberation. After that point, even with other frustrations emanating primarily from the political realities of the postwar situation, the pursuit of democracy was avid and intense and continues as such, instilled within the people as a whole. Disruption in that democratizing tendency and transformation, which itself has manifested as virtually unbridgeable and unrelenting bureaucratic and elite dominance, even among those elites who themselves had avidly pursued the spirit of modern democracy, can never be construed as indicating that Korean thinking in relation to democratic principle is dissociated. Nothing, possibly in all of world culture and political thought could be further from the truth of the matter. Disruption in democratic modernization must find other sources of explanation. Riggs' model of dissociation between bureaucratic formulation and bureaucratic motivation and action seems much more satisfactory. And, in
fact, his structural-functionalist position not only appears to fit the facts of the Korean case, but also seems to be the only approach which can offer rational explanation or reconciliation of the contradictory forces which have emerged in Korean postwar bureaucratic development.

C. Y. Pak (1980) suggests that despite the openness to and eager expectancy for a new democratic society and political agenda after 1945, the leadership trends themselves were more toward authoritarianism and personalism. The political opposition, while serving to inform the public in terms of democratic and egalitarian principle, was not successful in pragmatic terms of helping to foster a democratic action agenda to counteract the prevailing prismatic bureaucratic tendency. Despite holding democratic values, the people could not be brought to the necessary psychological level or orientation needed to compete with and to challenge leadership power and strategic bureaucratic manipulation (1980).

B. W. Kim and Rho (1982) emphasize that even with inherent tendency and yearning for democratic expression, a Western rational legal system is nevertheless necessary for exercising true democratic function. Such a demand entails an impersonal and impartial attitude on the parts of administrative officials toward not only all persons, but also toward all documents and legal concerns. Strong
familism and factionalism militate against the impartiality which must govern democratic implementation, and these conservative and fused social characteristics still were sustaining elements of Korean social make up, as they are now, only possibly to a lesser degree. Transactions among officials are viewed in particularist terms. Personal, reciprocal relationships prevail. Any administrative, bureaucratic relationship is a personal relationship. The parameters of these personal dynamics and basis for exchange and reciprocation must be attended to, often in protracted deliberation and occupying almost all of the negotiation agenda. B. W. Kim and Rho (1982) somewhat agree with Paige (1971) that the essential basis of prismatic dilemma is in the consciousness of the bureaucratic official who, from a modern and also democratic perspective must act impersonally and according to law, regulation, and egalitarian principle. From within the context of tradition, however, such action would constitute clear divorcement from cultural demands (Kim, B. W., & Rho, 1982).

The prismatic carry-over effect which did much to shape Korea's post-1945 political destiny was that administrative leaders tend not to be viewed in terms of how functional they are in the sense of fulfilling democratic goals and visions, but rather according to personal
characteristics which emblematically delineate the culture of tradition and interpersonal value:

The specific attributes of the administrator are regarded as more important than his actual performance or achievements. This lingering influence of familism and communalism has greatly retarded the development of rationality and impartiality in Korean public administration during the last two decades. (Kim, B. W. & Rho, 1982, p. 71)

In the realm of administrative decision-making, the tendency remained for the particularist criterion, such as family membership, to rule over the normative order of the society as a whole, in the sense of what the society in a formal way has determined to be desirable for its fullest expression and sense of self. The deep cultural value placed on primary group interests acts to distort the mandated decision process necessary for pragmatic implementation of socially desired political agendas. The democratic essential principle of subscribing to merit and nurturing it through equal treatment of all citizens (the end results of the fully diffracted society, in Riggs' analysis) is sidetracked and subverted through particularist distortion of administrative process. Public process and private process become confused. Government services are valued according to what Riggs called price indeterminacy, with all of the attenuated ill effects, compounding to corruption and further class separation, stratification, and political factionalism, identified by B. W. Kim and Rho
(1982) as serving to deplete Korean development and nation-building, subverting what otherwise could be strengths of "racial, religious, cultural, and linguistic homogeneity" (p. 72).

As Riggs has further argued concerning the formation of the prismatic bureaucracy characteristic of 20th Century developing countries (1962), the Korean administrative authority and administrative control become separated: "The authority may be legally located with an individual occupying a higher position, but the actual exercise of the authority may be entrusted to the man who has the special confidence of a person in a higher echelon" (Kim, B. W., & Rho, 1982, p. 80). Identification of separation of authority as constituted from actual power as pragmatically applied is a further way of penetrating to the core issues of the prismatic society, model, and bureaucracy. The actual configuration of power within the administration can be maintained, understood, and utilized only through personal agreement. From this perspective, since what is formally presented through bureaucratic arrangement cannot provide power access, the net result is that decisions of consequence are made behind the scene, generally through covert process. Paik (1982b) sees this disparity between formal authority and the actual manifestation of power as especially typifying the Korean bureaucratic situation:
In this situation, for a citizen who has business with the government, finding the right person who enjoys the confidence of the right man is by far a more effective course than following normal channels. Especially in the case of the Korean public administration, ministers or higher officials who lack practical experience in administrative affairs usually rely heavily on their subordinates whom they trust. These particularistic relations clearly create a sense of insecurity among those without a proper link with power figures, thereby severely undercutting their morale. (Paik, 1982b, p. 80)

This undercutting of the public morale, as strange as it may appear to those who support democratic egalitarian principle, and who further might suppose that democratically constituted public bureaucracy would attempt all in its power to further democratic interests, in Riggs' Prismatic Model occurs not without intention. From this perspective, as Riggs (1964) clearly presents, as the elite, through bureaucratic access, gains unprecedented political, social, and economic control, control which it may have wished for under centralized, fused political dominance, but of course could never quite attain to, the experience and advantages and simply custom of power, both for one's own interests and the interests of one's associates, familial members, and extended class, become so attractive and all-encompassing of one's interests, that it becomes impossible to give them up. The elite bureaucratic administrator discovers that his primary and virtually exclusive function is one thing only: to solidify and amplify the elite power domain and to defend at all costs against any encroachment.
Creating demoralization within those who lack power access, or who lack the wherewithal to purchase such access, is the surest method of defense against whatever encroachment they might muster. It is a process which strictly draws the demarcation of political debate and power struggle along class lines. Further, if undercutting of morale and resultant class demoralization can be made to seem so pervasive and endemic as to become virtually integral to the class consciousness of itself, the struggle to preserve elite special privilege and advantage is virtually assured of success. Those contemplating any challenge to the system will revert to their negative and demoralized construction of the power access situation, and will thus defeat themselves. And it is critical to bear in mind that it is the structural formation of the prismatic bureaucratic situation that creates the elite privileged situation and establishes an experience of power and control otherwise not to have been contemplated, much less foreknown or predicted. In other words, the elite, as in the case of Syngman Rhee, does not set out to create a prismatic bureaucracy so that it can manipulate and exploit and gain ultimate control for the elite class at the expense of society and democratic development. On the contrary, the original intent is not without idealism and democratic, egalitarian vision. The elite class possesses all of the
knowledge, skill, experience, and its own share of talent for initiating the enterprise of establishing the efficient, modernized, and, as with the mandate for South Korea, democratic society. The intention within the class generally is that it will assume the mandate, the burden, and carry out the enterprise, which is, after all, quite noble, with pride and in equal measure, with good faith. The rest of society, within the limits of its knowledge and sophistication, has given the elite leadership this role. Struggle ensues amongst elite members for the right of some designated faction to fulfill the role, put on the mantle of power, and carry out the will and destiny of the people, of the culture, and even, as with the advent of South Korea as an independent national state in 1948, the fulfillment of expectations of the democratic world. The subverting of these noble designs is prefigured, however, in the prismatic components which result as the forces and structures erected toward modern development are enveloped and conditioned within the still largely fused and traditionally based and derived administrative functions of the society.

Paik (1982b) further relates prismatic development as constituted in Korea to the intense ritualism which is pervasive and often ostentatious and exaggerated among Koreans, especially concerning obligations of group
loyalty. Following religiously strict, specified social norms is essential for the preservation of personal dignity, which in itself is a powerful motivating factor among Koreans. Together, these factors act to provide close coherence between the reality of Korean post-1945 political and social experience and the model of modern development Riggs has elaborated. Access to traditional and ritual-dominated behavior, and especially the ritualistically superlative dictates of "unfailing and ostentatious loyalty to one's primary group associates" (p. 84) determine that:

Therefore, when the interests of such a group are at stake, the timid bureaucrat is suddenly prepared to violate or ignore any regulation or law without hesitation or restraint. It is a much less serious social transgression to bend a few rules than to disappoint a member of one's family, school, or regional group whose life and strength derive from mutual dependability. (Paik, 1982b, p. 84)

The point that Paik (1982b) is driving toward is that the Korean situation in general, from 1945 and beyond, has been so constituted as to have been elaborately, and even on a grand scale, appropriate for prismatic development. Just as several analyses have pointed to South Korea, or in another sense the whole of post-World-War-Two Korea, as a laboratory situation for political development analysis, so might it be suggested that South Korea has developed in many senses virtually as a model case in demonstration of Riggs' Prismatic Theory. The element of high respect for
ritual and tradition beyond rule of law or formally constituted political order Riggs interprets as follows, as noted by B. W. Kim and Rho (1982):

The transitional lacks any strict sense of principle and the implications of "rule of law." Rather, he takes advantage of opportunities to "break the law" when that serves his interest, but demands rigid "law enforcement" when that happens to fit his convenience. (Riggs, 1962, p. 13)

On the other hand, the pursuit of administrative goals and programs tends to be perfunctory and formalistic. Administrative work tends to be formalistic in style and legalistic in substance. The formalistic aspects and outward style dominate over substance and productivity. The administrative goal pursued becomes a flexible arrangement in terms of meeting external expectation and following externally imposed regulations. The specified goal remains overall, formally speaking limited in character (Kim, B. W., & Rho, 1982).

The above aspect of disingenuousness, if it might be so termed, unless it is rather a kind of expediency, realism, or adaptation, possibly, simply to expectations or imposed delineations of Western democracy, as has been suggested as a possibility elsewhere in this paper, was incorporated, though not necessarily specifying the Korean instance, within Riggs' model of Prismatic Society, as "formalism" (as cited in Yoon, 1982, p. 110). Riggs emphasized through this concept the reality that constitu-
tions as written documents, various regulations, and civil service codes are likely to not be truly reflective of actual power relationships and the overall political and bureaucratic substance of the society. The substance of proposed policies tends not to be so important as determinations and implementations made by the suggestion of those with underlying power. Emphasis is always given to the personage truly possessive of power-relationship with the important or top official. Administrative programs are instigated through suggestions made through and with the support of such personal power arrangements. Without such backing, and without, in fact, the presumption that the program was initiated or was somehow the emanation of such a power arrangement, any plan, no matter how well conceived, will have virtually no hope for success. Moreover, the aspect of formalism, as Riggs describes and analyzes, will produce by and large poor administrative coordination and equally disjointed results from administrative individuals and agencies. Laws and regulations will be frequently revised, as anyone conversant with Korean bureaucracy, the instance examined here, will attest to. Government policy will lack consistency. Discontinuity will characterize administrative programs. Policy at all levels will be determined by the personalization of public administration. In-coming top administration figures will likely carry with
them their own retinue of subordinates. In part, this transposition of one's own personnel to the new position acts to substantiate the personalization of one's power play in public administration. The conditioned orientation is to increase at every opportunity the sum total of personal power, which enlisting under control of the incoming official as many of the bureaucratic subordinates as possible is intended to accomplish. The new executive, because of putting personalization above law, code, and regulation, will attempt to institute new programs and to change other functions and programs when at all possible. Personal interests will intentionally be incorporated into the bureaucratic fabric so as to leave little doubt that these assume precedence over supposed actual government objectives:

Bureaucratic organizations may involve dysfunctional characteristics of personalization because organization consists of human beings who are more or less motivated by self-interest. However, in the Korean bureaucracy, the diverting of an individual bureaucrat's activities from achieving the formal purpose of the bureaucracy by manipulating conditions of his personal power and prestige seems to be excessive in that legitimacy tends to be largely compromised with illegitimacy. (Yoon, 1982, p. 110)

Riggs' emphasis is on elaboration of an ecological model for analysis of public administration, most specifically in terms of comparative administration, and that as applied to understanding contemporary administrative circumstances in developing countries. Riggs' analysis,
according to H. B. Lee (1968) was evoked primarily by John M. Gaus' introduction of the term "ecology" to public administration analysis. Lee's explanation of what Gaus was specifying is similar to or related to Riggs' analysis of formalism, as represented in this writing in terms of Korea. Lee says of Gaus that:

According to him, an ecological approach to administration explores the inter-relationship between the physical-social environment in which people are living, and the administrative aspects of the process of government. He emphasizes that changes in the former "coerce" governmental responses, that is, program. His seven ecological factors--people, place, physical technology, social technology, catastrophe, ideas and wishes, and personality--are the case in point. (Lee, 1968, p. 41)

Riggs' presentation of his findings of the transformational processes of developing countries was conceptualized as a model, elaborated primarily in his major thesis of the Prismatic Model (1964), discussed in this writing, following upon the suggestion derived from Gaus. In terms of formalism in transitional administration, as brought out in the ecological approach to analysis, Riggs' prescribed the following:

In modern, transitional societies, there has been a tendency to establish formal political and administrative institutions, but they remain formalistic. That is to say, effective behavior is still determined, to a considerable extent, by traditional structures and pressures, the family, religion, and persisting socio-economic practices. Hence it is possible to understand politics and administration in these countries only ecologically, i.e., by relating these non-administrative factors to the administrative. (As cited in Lee, H. B., 1968, p. 41)
It seems in retrospect clear that the ecological concept of discovering the traditional bases and deep structures influencing administrative and therefore social and political behavior, while not actually originating with Riggs, was developed by him in a comprehensive and systematic way, in part through his original research of developing countries' bureaucracies. Use of Riggs' model in connection with the modernization process within Korea after World War Two has resonated in the present study with interesting and informative corroboration. Scholars in the field of public administration in relation to Korean studies, as shown in this paper, find Riggs' analysis to be elucidative of the Korean situation. In the analysis of this paper, the ecological, developmental focus of Riggs has provided three further aspects important to understanding Korean modernization. The first of these aspects is the unusual and endogenous origins of Korean modernization, and correspondingly how this modernization was simultaneously arrested, crippled, and in some sense redirected through exogenous Japanese influence and prolonged domination of at least the outward aspects of Korean society. The second of these aspects is the telling importance of the 1945 Liberation experience in terms of providing Korea with a second opportunity to fulfill what had come to seem its destiny, of democratic, egalitarian, and communal form
of self-generated development and modernization. And the third is the importance of how and to what extent the traditional character of Korea and her people, carried forward over many centuries, has interacted with forces of modernization and global cultural interaction to create the new, modernized, though not fully diffracted, in Riggs' terms, contemporary society which is Korea today.

H. B. Lee (1968) has suggested certain drawbacks to Riggs' model, as perceived by some critics, which may be pertinent to applying Riggs to Korean modernization, in terms of this paper and its focus on U.S. with Korean bureaucratic interaction, 1945-1953. Critics of Riggs apparently view his ecological model as suspect in application to modern development analysis because of a static nature of theoretical composition. Riggs' model emphasizes, in this view, a "strict culture frame of reference" (Lee, H. B., 1968, p. 42) which in turn creates an exaggerated sense of "cultural incompatibility, preconditions, and dysfunctional consequences of administrative borrowing" (p. 42). H. B. Lee's critique here derives mainly from Edgar Shor, who has suggested that the ecological perspective works to "'magnify the relevance and recalcitrance of the traditional framework and obscure the dynamic and complex character of modernization process'" (as cited in Lee, 1968, p. 42). What I believe this refers to, most impor-
tantly here, but among possibly other aspects of Riggs, is that the bureaucratic interaction of the exo-prismatic-influencing modern with the traditional or fused structure of the society will, by virtue of the new prismatic structure necessarily created, result in bureaucratic dysfunction, at least in terms of goals and ideals, which in turn leads to dysfunction of all aspects of the society, with the overall outcome of delaying and circumventing the advent of modern political process. The logic of how this happens, according to Riggs' analysis, in terms of the Prismatic Model, and in terms also of Korean national development, has been analyzed in this paper from several perspectives. H. B. Lee (1968), citing Shor, suggests that the actual empirical circumstance of the modern and the factors of contemporary change are both more subtle and dynamic than Riggs' model has been able to reveal. Although I do not agree with this evaluation concerning Riggs and think that it may demonstrate some shallowness in approach and understanding of the critics, in relation to Riggs' theory, the positing of concern for how Riggs' theory corresponds to subtle and dynamic issues of modernization process in developing countries is well taken. Examination of these issues as specifically related to Korean modernization will provide the basis of the next and concluding section of this study, Chapter V, which is taken
up directly.
CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

Bureaucratic interaction between the U.S. and South Korea was importantly based on an assumption of almost immediate unification between North and South Korea during the postwar period. Even when such an ideal was not realized, U.S. bureaucratic influence remained more important than any that Korea had received since Confucianism from the Chinese. For Korean society and government, the role of bureaucracy is anciently and pervasively ingrained. It is essential to a uniquely Korean response to the world and to its sense of human interaction. U.S. pragmatic intervention created dramatic change for Korea. The Korean with U.S. interaction has been as uniquely productive as any in history. Korea adopted and consequently transformed U.S. bureaucratic practice. U.S. bureaucratic influence helped to change Korean education, government, military, production, land distribution, political process, world view, and global presence. The years 1945 through 1953 were profound in all aspects for Korea, and prepared Korea for later change and assumption of a global economic and political role.

The conclusion of Chapter IV suggested an important
criticism made of Fred Riggs' analysis of administrative and bureaucratic development in terms of modernization taking place within 20th Century transitional societies. The criticism fundamentally suggested that Riggs' theory was static in nature, in that it pointed up faults and incongruities that were administratively, socially, and politically inherent and problematic in virtually all 20th Century instances of development, and which could stultify meaningful and worthwhile development of a society when the traditional form of that society was interfaced with interventions for modernization. Riggs' theory, the criticism suggests, because of its own inflexibility cannot incorporate within itself the dynamic, unique, and variously manifested properties and manifestations of each country's modernization process. From this view, Riggs' theory tends to over-emphasize many things in the traditional format as favorable, or workable, and to view modernization, because of its attempt to inappropriately match components from societies with entirely different cultural and historical experience, as saddling the developing society with a bureaucratic structure which rides over that society in a tyrannical fashion, allowing for unprecedented elite exploitation and manipulation, so that the average citizen would have had basic life needs better met within the traditional society, which Riggs
designates as the fused form. The criticism is well taken because Riggs largely says all of the above, but, more importantly, the theory can be born out in historical development data of many if not most countries. Korea has been examined here and has been shown to follow this model in many, actually very many and important respects. In other words, the modernization experience of developing countries in the 20th Century has given us reason to be circumspect in our witness to the ongoing changes and to be realistic and sober in our judgments concerning the value, the redeeming qualities of both process and result. The experience of Korea has provided a case in point. Scholarship in public administration and political science has suggested that Korea has provided an almost perfect laboratory circumstance for examining national development since World War Two. It has also provided similarly an object lesson in terms of Riggs' analysis of Prismatic Society. This study, as well as some scholarly commentary from the field of public administration, suggests the Korean administrative development experience corresponds to Riggs' analysis in important respects. The kind of emphasis on a negative fruition from the prismatic interplay between traditional and modern, or fused and diffracted, as the critics have pointed to, may perhaps be most essentially, and one might say, caustically displayed in the summation
of one Korean commentator concerning his country’s Prismatic experience:

Korean bureaucrats may actually want modernization, but they are imbued with a value system which is incompatible with modernization. Further, they are unwilling to make the necessary effort for modernization. They may attempt to achieve various goals in the name of modernization, but their value system and behavior allow them only minimal rewards. They lack the fighting spirit, not to mention the scientific spirit, to challenge their fates. They do not try persistently to solve problems. They desperately avoid risk and adventure, adhering always to routine practices. They usually base decisions and ensuing policies on intuitive judgment or on rough calculation, rather than on a thorough and systematic effort to perceive and comprehend objective reality. They do not recognize their own faults or misjudgments even when policies turn out to be empty. Their loyalty to such primary groups as family, kin, school, and province results in the ineffective utilization of human as well as material resources. When it is necessary to fill a vacancy, they ask where the applicants came from, what school they graduated from, and their lineage, before examining capacity and intelligence. Their attitudes and values ignore the demand that the modern bureaucratic organization stress impersonality, impartiality, and rationality. In this situation, any notion of social justice or equality of all people before law is nothing but a desk theory. Contemporary Korean bureaucrats think that they can manipulate the common people as they like.

Neither the delegation of authority nor group decision-making exists, and therefore, most decisions are made by someone far removed from the actual problem. Korean bureaucrats like subordinates who show humiliating servility toward them. They usually perceive everything in the simplistic terms, either rejecting an opinion or idea totally, or accepting it wholly without evaluating its advantages and disadvantages. If problems are unavoidable, they try to solve them by drastic resolution. They approach policy-making in this way without recognizing its possible incremental nature, that is, incremental in the sense that decisions build on their forerunners. They believe that any innovation or change can be made once and for all.
Furthermore, their main concern is not how they improve the performance of their job, but how they maintain proper relations with their superiors. Rights and duties defined in terms of job descriptions or job titles are meaningless because the actual power always lies in the hands of some small clique formed around a powerful figure.

The values and work ways of the Korean bureaucrats are geared to the preservation of status quo by upholding the existing rules of game. They are not action-oriented or program-oriented. They champion fulfillment of the legal requirements of governmental operation, but they do not perceive the public policy goals or "managerial character" of government. For them the main task of administrative service is that of maintaining accustomed procedure, not solving problems. Only in the recent years has the political leadership taken action to revamp and remodel the psychological orientations of bureaucrats. In this regard, we hope for the successful consummation of the clean-up drive in the immediate future. (Paik, 1982b, pp. 87-89)

Such conclusion undoubtedly must stand as testimony to the kind of negative disposition the critics of Riggs believed his model would precipitate. It is, however, important to note also Paik's (1982b) optimism for a better future. This better future is what Riggs also points toward and importantly elucidates in his prismatic analysis, from several perspectives, though not without some cautionary remark, especially brought forward in the later revision of his model (Riggs, 1973, The Prismatic Society Revisited) discussed earlier in this paper. The present analysis will turn also for conclusion to such more positive understandings, primarily in the future sense, as Riggs' analysis serves to bring out for our understanding.

The primary weakness and danger of modern development
can be summarized in two dimensions: first, loss of spir-

    itual value and context of living for the sake of purely 
material reality; and second, domination of all life func-
    tions of the society by a powerful and manipulative bureau-
    cratic elite for the sake of its own control and dominance 
and at the ultimate expense of depletion of satisfaction 
from those without communication and access to the elite 
power structure. These things are an old story in terms of 
20th Century political experience. They are in many and 
probably most national instances true, and continue to be 
so, within varying limits even in countries which have 
reached advanced states or conditions of development, such 
as Korea, or even the U.S. To some extent, as Riggs' model 
demonstrates, the structure of interaction between tradi-
tional and modern forms creates disjunctions and disequi-
libriums, virtually as necessary aspects of development. 
However, such disjunction is recognized as clearly favor-
able, in terms acceding to monopolization of raw power and 
material control, by the elite class. The state of 
disjunction, the prismatic state, remains in place, because 
of advantages to those who have power to maintain it as a 
permanent condition. Such disjunction is not the goal of 
development. The goal of development in the contemporary 
sense is the fully diffracted society, which means, 
essentially, the society within which each function will
correspond to, and arise from only one structure. In this condition, from Riggs' structural functionalist point of view, class dominance would be impossible, and bureaucratic administration of all social functions would be according to egalitarian principles and according to degrees of reward precisely commensurate with ability and effort, with adjustment for only actual handicap, intellectual, psychological, physical, social, and so forth. Additionally, for modernization to lead to full diffraction and to maintain itself in such a configuration as would maximize both societal and individual outputs and satisfactions, another criterion must be met: coordination amongst diffracted societal functions must be maximized. Thus, the process of modernization, in Riggs' theory, would lead to maximum functional diffraction with maximum coordination. Such an end state of modernization depends on, ultimately, political development wherein the power selection and discrimination potential is dispersed maximally throughout the society. It is clear that for the many reasons described above, the prismatic bureaucracy acts to block social diffraction and political development. Positive modernization is undermined through elite power manipulation and focus on measures to preserve a kind of power monopoly at all costs. Such manipulation and power preservation have been, with all good initial intentions, the plight of Korea
and all developing nations, and as Riggs (1962, 1964, 1973) has demonstrated, very much the plight of even the most advanced and diffracted societies.

Questions concerning the modernization and development theory of Riggs, as encapsulated within his Prismatic Model of Administrative Development (1964), have not been entirely resolved in this study, in terms of U.S. bureaucratic interaction with Korea and in terms of Korea’s overall modernization process, during its formative period, 1945-1953. All of the components mandatory for doing so, however, albeit in necessarily annotated form, are nevertheless in place. To accomplish such resolution, the matter of U.S. bureaucratic interaction will be returned to first.

Riggs’ prismatic analysis proceeds according to its demonstration from objective data that critical explanatory factors or causal variables relative to 20th Century modernization development process can be determined as generalizable across cultures. They can be isolated from the much broader and possibly richer, deeper, and more variable spectrum of culturally specific identifying characteristics. In terms of explanatory power concerning development modernization as largely an outcome of bureaucratic administrative transformation, culturally specific data which fall outside the empirically identified and
generalizable or nomothetic scope of criteria are likely to mostly add confusion rather than elucidation. Riggs' assumption is that for his purpose the prismatic model will provide necessary explanation and will clearly guide our inquiry into development transformation. Moreover, confidence in the validity and reliability of application of his model suggests that conflicting culturally specific findings do not detract from the relevance of the model when the selected, pertinent development factors are in place and can cogently be demonstrated and viewed as having carried forth the situation of development under examination. This present study, while illustrating how Riggs' model demonstrably applies to the Korean situation, has gone significantly further, in attempting to demonstrate that other often commonly accepted explanations, such as the influence of indelible Confucian identity limitations within the mass of the Korean populace, a quite culturally specific direction of thought, produce difficult explanatory conflicts, as for example is the case with juxtaposition of Confucian identity with Korean inherent, long-term, democratic and egalitarian tendency. When, added to this difficulty in accepting Confucian identity or tendency as explanatory for stultification of Korean democratic development, we consider the factors of the model of U.S. victorious democracy acting as reagent both to Korean
frustration built up during centralized bureaucratic Japanese colonial suppression and to Korean burgeoning mass democratic consciousness manifested also during suppression, with each released in the virtually pluralist hotbed democratic party competition immediately at the 1945 Liberation, the Confucian explanation that democracy is somehow beyond the Korean character, identity, and societal goal seems, really, more than just a bit ludicrous. To say that the democratizing of Korea was inhibited because the mass of Koreans did not comprehend, did not want, and could not adapt to the formats of democracy is rather slighting of Korean identity as a people, though this explanation, as indicated in this study, has been resorted to at times by Koreans themselves.

In terms of U.S. bureaucratic interaction with Korea, this too in itself has been offered as explanation for the frustratingly protracted democratic development process under investigation here. From the socialist and Soviet view, U.S. intervention intentionally and strategically suppressed activation of developing democratic tendency coming to rapid fruition in Korea in 1945. The U.S. acted thus to stultify democracy simply because democracy was by and large turning toward socialism and in fact opting for communism (Hart-Landsberg, 1993); and, therefore, a strategic piece among the Pacific dominance design of the
U.S. was about to be lost. What's more, that loss would have been to emergent superpower rival, the Soviet Union, which, now that victory had been gained, could be viewed more satisfactorily, in terms of U.S. elite agenda, as not merely rival for world power dominance, but more convincingly, in the Churchillian sense of moving and shaping world opinion, as the enemy of freedom and democracy. Therefore, according to this socialist world view, the entire U.S. Cold War agenda was cooked up on the spot in Korea because of Soviet presence and indication of communist success in winning the minds and hearts of the developing world, thus eventually shutting the U.S. out of the action and betraying the grand world capitalist design, formulated, including conceptualization of the U.N., well before the War's end. As with any of the most clever and diabolical lies, a grain of truth is contained in this interpretation of U.S. betrayal of democracy. In a "real-politick" sense, the U.S. acted against Soviet penetration into Korea and its early political organizing of Korea, to cut its losses and to build up what defense it could against its former Soviet ally as rapidly as possible. The role of Machiavellian manipulator, however, for the U.S. as shown earlier in this paper hardly fits the facts. The U.S. interaction was clearly blundering, ill-informed, and less than fully committed at first to bearing the burden of
support democracy seemed to demand in Korea. But it was hardly Machiavellian, as most poignantly evidenced in the early departure of the U.S. after Rhee was installed (and he was at the time the consensus choice of Koreans not withstanding his later ultra conservative and repressive transformation), only to be forced to hastily return in stronger military array a mere two years later to halt the communist attack. The facts suggest urgent measures to put in place representative democratic and egalitarian formats in Korea and then to withdraw to allow Korea to develop in relative independence. The U.S. would not fully develop its Cold War posture nor its entire Pacific agenda until later. It would clearly take the shock of the Korean War itself to transform the U.S.' rather idealistic world view. The U.S., in fact, simply in serving as victorious democratic model, in liberating Korea from totalitarian repression, in initiating democratic reforms, in land and education, primarily, in setting up some emergency bulwark against the new totalitarian structure of communism, and in returning to be sure at least half of Korea could be independent to develop toward democracy, acted to clearly inspire and support Korea in its long-term modernizing, democratic quest. Clearly, U.S. bureaucratic interaction stands as the least satisfactory accounting for Korean democratic processing stultification.
What the U.S. accomplished more accurately corresponds to the prismatic model's concept of exogenous modeling or instigation or formulation of democracy. As suggested in several ways, incorporation of the U.S. model of democratic process on the part of the Korean elite and then through endogenous transmutation from the elite and among the mass of Korean people, and finally through implementation in the structures of Korean society itself, however precarious and protracted in its engendering, presents the most satisfying and successfully explanatory concept of U.S. with Korean bureaucratic interaction. Such explanation corresponds suitably with Riggs' theory in terms of referencing conceptual formation of dissociation among intention, formal structure, and result and ensuing practice. We can readily envision U.S. idealism finding difficulty in realizing full pragmatic expression and result within the difficult, prismatic Korean development complexity. We can moreover conceptualize how U.S. tendency toward optimistic democratic prognostications might exacerbate certain negatively prismatic developments in South Korea, if not in fact actively betray Korean democracy itself.

Reconsideration of U.S. bureaucratic interaction with Korea, 1945-1953, and incorporation of its events within the prismatic cosmos begin in themselves to suggest how formulations of Korean modernization other than Riggs'
prismatic model, may be inadequate. The preponderant tendency is for explanations of Korea's modernization to look to inherent characteristics within the mass of Korean people or within the Korean culture as causal to the key fact demanding explanation: Korean postwar democratization within the modernizing process was stultified and in essence misdirected, if not entirely betrayed. Such cultural relativist explanations produce more conflict than comprehension of variables. Their rejection, though not necessary for acceptance of Riggs' theory and explanation, make such acceptance that much more conclusive and satisfying. Certainly, to Koreans, it is enlightening and rewarding to view their own democratic modernization process, replete with difficulties and drawbacks, as what might have been expected even perhaps under the best of circumstances, with such circumstances not of course having been the case for Korean postwar experience, excepting for the strong presence of the U.S. and Korea's own insistence upon and persistence concerning democratic formation at conclusion of the war. The prismatic model as outlined in this paper offers a viable understanding of Korean modernization in terms especially of offering satisfactory comprehension of all influencing and, often as not, conflicting variables surrounding the modernization process, as brought forth in this study. Clarification of the conflictual U.S.-Korean
bureaucratic interaction, which nevertheless set and secured Korea's modernization course, is provided through acceptance of the prismatic model's conceptualization of how modernization initiates: through exogenous modeling example; and then quite ineluctably, through structural more than ideational factors generating unprecedented bureaucratic and thereby elite power, which in turn acts to corrupt democratic political processing and to stultify or freeze modernization democratic development, at a point where elite bureaucratic manipulative power seems most certain of maintaining and defending its hegemony.

Prismatic theory offers structural and process explanation which directs us to a balanced and rational interpretation concerning all interacting postwar factors, without need for discovering conflicting superpower manipulation strategies or ancient character formations as wholly predetermining the modernization difficulties Korea experienced. Korea's experience was structurally similar to and virtually in conjunction with that of all developing postwar societies. Clearly, however, more detailed examination of the interrelationships among, first, Riggs' prismatic model; second, Korean modernization democratic development; and third, U.S. with Korean postwar bureaucratic interaction seems to be called for than that which the present study has been able to provide. Nevertheless,
the viability of connections made among these three factors or themes, as well as their connected importance to analysis of Korean development, has been suggested in this study. Such viability it is hoped has been somewhat substantiated. The study hopefully will induce further examination, by both this investigator and others, into what is determined here to be a fruitful research context.

The bureaucratic interaction between Korea and the U.S. upon the closing of the Second Great War was propitious and seemingly fated. Just as the U.S. as democratic leader of the free world would act as vanguard for world democratic development in the post-World War Two modern age, Korea would struggle, with the support of the U.S., throughout her modernizing experience to finally after long suppression discover and realize at least in part her essentially democratic, egalitarian, and spiritually integrated identity. The Confucian emphasis on four major values of virtue and righteousness, purity and caution, justice and fairness, and sincerity and diligence are still maintained within the Korean identity as part of the modernized world order. The struggle for egalitarian principle and modernization of society and political, bureaucratic administration, begun in the 19th Century in Korea, but as manifestation of a more ancient spirit, was reasserted with Korea's liberation and democratic develop-
ment with the U.S. in 1945 and in years following, as Wright observed, some 20 years ago:

In the years following the Second World War, Western-derived liberal democratic ideas have had a phenomenal impact on the leaders of Korea, as on those of other developing nations throughout the world. Public proclamations of these leaders have spoken of a new era for their nations within a democratic political framework. (Wright, 1975, p. 3)

Wright himself identifying the strong traditional strain within the Korean character as creating "resultant inner struggle between liberal Western ideas and traditional Korean behavior" (p. 3) assumes this struggle as manifesting "barriers to progress," which from such assumption had restrained and inhibited Korea's leadership (1975). It is clear that especially for Westerners the assumption that Korean consciousness and psychohistory are at odds with democratic acceptance is an easy one to make. The present study has shown there is much to be discovered in Korean experience to contradict such facile conclusions. Korea's postwar political development, the central concern of this study, has not simply resulted from the fact that "Western democratic perspective has made inroads into the Korean political consciousness [while] it is equally clear that traditional factors still contribute significantly to Korean political behavior" (Wright, 1975, p. 4). Riggs has provided us greater explanatory power and comprehension of variables to view Korea as it "remains a transitional
society--between old and new, traditional and modern" (Wright, 1975, p. 4). Wright, possibly without identifying an element of conflict with his earlier assessment, after citing instances of how apparent zeal for efficiency and rule of law among the bureaucracy often leads to withdrawal of programs or abandoning of laws, provides the following commentary:

It seems relevant in this regard to refer to the western concept of "rule of law," a principle which westerners feel is little recognized in Korea....One Korean legal scholar, Hahm Pyong-choon, has pointed out that "the rule of law has never been a desirable goal of politics in Korea." This is because traditionally in Korea "Law" was seen as "an agency of rigid political regimentation.... The rule of law advocated by the legalists, as popularly understood in the Korean political tradition, was little different from a rule of punishment or a rule by autocratic decree."... [T]his idea of law is a corruption of both the western view as well as the proper Korean perspective.... According to the latter, the Confucian-derived concept of Li refers to a "moral expression of the way of the Universe." "When both the ruler and the ruled act according to Li, harmony prevails.... The virtuous live by it.... When a society is ordered by Li, its members not only behave properly but also know shame. Li and law are thus mutually exclusive." (Wright, 1975, pp. 5-6)

The spirit of Li suggests that if one or the other, the rulers or ruled, the elite administration or the majority of the populace, do not abide by principles of social harmony, then corruption, exploitation, and injustice, on the one hand, or disorder and dissention on the other, will prevail. In the situation of Korea, where the population has been well ordered, in general highly
productive and zealous in applying itself to productive and economic transformation, it seems clear that the mass of people had been upholding the principle of Li, though it may be clear also that the ruling elite may not have been. Riggs’ explanation has to do with effects of inherent prismatic structural reality. Cultural relativist theories and explanations tend to place a kind of double burden on those who are not part of the dominant elite. Such theories acknowledge that "the Koreans have flung themselves with vigor and determination into the process of economic development," (Wright, 1973, p. 4), while accepting the bureaucratic elite’s assessment of this same mass of the people (as in the following provincial official view): "that the 'intellectual level of the ordinary citizen is not so high. . . .the ordinary citizen has little long-range perception,' and he is quite dependent on centralized authority" (p. 7). To what extent, not having been at least somewhat informed by the prismatic model, might we too easily accept such facile elite commentary, basing our assumptions as does Wright (1975) and undoubtedly most others on the insight of "community leaders" (p. 8)? Riggs demonstrates that the ruling elite in developing, modernizing, newly industrializing countries, may not be the most objective sources for inquiries made into the nature of that developmental process, into the causes of disruption in democratic
processing, or into the reasons for apparent failure of a society to move beyond hierarchically authoritarian systems. Explanation of bureaucratic interaction between developing societies and their respective exogenous development models; analysis of conflicts among expressed goals, laws, ideals and pragmatic realities; and insight into the relation of historical cultural experience to bureaucratic and political structure demand an internally consistent analysis, as this study has hopefully suggested the possibility of. To some extent, this study may have demonstrated that democratic modernization conflict in Korea's postwar experience was not so certainly due to the Korean people's expressed need for rule which was "essentially hierarchical, personalized, and authority-oriented" (p. 8), though many, past and present, would have us believe it was. Application of Riggs' nomothetic analysis has revealed a dramatically different explanation from that generally offered through culturally specific orientation. Moreover, application of prismatic hypotheses, drawing us to expect to discover specific underlying causal structures, which we in fact can readily uncover in the Korean case, in turn then led us to reexamination of the very psychocultural bases of presumptions which had depicted Koreans as democratically disabled or debilitated due to an ingrained mass adherence to central autocratic rule.
Examination of that history, importantly as it is currently being pursued within Korean public administration scholarship, suggests a psychocultural and psychopolitical reality much different from that interpretation or set of assumptions attempting to portray Koreans as willing participants in their own autocratic subjugation. That radically different perspective has been explored here in detail and from the vantages of many scholars. It may be valuable to point out that the reexamination of relevant data was instigated through application of nomothetic, empirically derived theory to the Korean development context. Insight provided through that theory application suggested interpretation of Korean experience at odds with culturally specific or relative positions derived from certain generalizations concerning Korean identity. Reexamination of relevant historical data appeared to not support the culturally specific generalizations attempting to explain postwar democratic stultification in terms of ingrained, mass Korean character traits or embedded cultural tendencies. Reexamination tended to suggest that Riggs' structural-functionalist, nomothetic interpretation offered coherent explanation and, moreover, pointed to causal factors in the Korean development experience (primarily elite manipulation in response to structural bureaucratic and other social institution opportunity created within the
prismatic situation) which had not been well perceived nor well attended to in the course of alternative views. Thus in offering satisfactory explanation which tended to make Korean postwar experience more coherent and congruent with that of other similarly developing societies, application of the prismatic model in turn, and possibly to even greater benefit, encouraged reexamination of culturally specific and pertinent data. This reexamination suggested generally accepted explanations of Korean development which appeared contradicted by application of Riggs' analysis had also little basis in historical, social, and political data concerning Korean long-term development process. Assumptions concerning Korean acceptance and desire for autocratic rule and dominance seemed especially ill-founded and derived from shallow suppositions. Remarkably, Korean experience and cultural formation concerning democratic institutionalization, political independence and modernization, pluralist democratic impetus, and resistance to authoritarian central rule provided a basis for cultural and political identity which, while fitting well enough with Riggs' explanatory model, seemed to suggest the irrelevance and misleading nature of most other explanation as was still applied to the Korean situation.

Despite the strong suggestion as carried forth in several ways through this writing that Riggs' model has
indeed proved revelatory and eye-opening in the Korean modernization, development, diffraction instance, it may be well to balance the interpretation through attending to whatever the prismatic society might entail which does not suit the Korean case quite so well.

A facet of Riggs' theory, the concept of pariah entrepreneurs, or those members of the prismatic society who develop economic wealth and power somewhat outside of the purview of the bureaucratic and social elite, presents. The pariah class in Riggs' model are outsiders in the sense of being incorporated only very tenuously into the prismatic social and political arrangement while remaining in essence alien to the social structure in terms of actual penetration to sharing in communal interaction. The pariah identity as outsiders establishes a certain advantage for them in relation to the prismatic elite. The advantage, on the surface the negative one of not being as a class able to penetrate to and join themselves with the core of the society, allows the pariah class to concentrate on economic development and accumulation of resources, not outside of the discretionary control of elite manipulation, but more or less freely at the indulgence of the elites, since the pariah class is not viewed as threatening due to its lack of access to social power structure. The prismatic elite can indulge the pariah class and concomitantly exploit its
wealth accumulation more or less at will. The pariah class functions purely at the discretion and forbearance of ruling prismatic elite power; its survival depends upon sustaining positive elite regard. Up to a point, the elite maintains a purely exploitative relationship with the pariah class, harboring elite capacity to sever the relationship and eliminate pariah power virtually without notice. In Riggs' analysis, however, as alluded to earlier in this writing, it is through the economic advancement of the pariah or outsider class that the eventual erosion of the elite rule and reversal of prismatic stultification of development will be founded. The elite downfall essentially emanates from the kinds of economic agreements entered into via the elite-pariah arrangements, specifying merely transitory working agreements, allowing similarly for pariah survival secured only by elite indulgence, and sustained primarily by elite access to the pariah economic production, and in substantial portion. As mentioned earlier in this study, economic cooperation eventually leads to decision center access, thus spreading governing dominance beyond the elite's exclusive power range, and thus re-initiating the power structure diffraction process, which is, in Riggsian terms, synonymous with modernization, democratization process. In allowing through economic arrangement specific access privileges to the pariah class,
in terms of economic structuring for wealth, and doing so because the pariah class is at once readily exploitable while also not perceived as threatening due to its social structure detachment, the elite creates, metaphorically, the Frankenstein's monster of its own demise.

The phenomenon of the emergence of the pariah class as a critically influential economic, then strategic political factor is essential to the wholeness of Riggs' model, as it is essential also to modern development process. Operation of the pariah class throughout 20th Century development instances can be consistently shown, with both Chinese and Indian minority populations carrying out the pariah functions perhaps most notably, and with greatest frequency. The difficulty in the Korean situation is that due to the near total homogeneity of the Korean population virtually no minority having anything approaching the wherewithal, initially in terms of mere numbers, to act as a pivotal economic factor exists. Yet in this writing it has been suggested that Korea in many ways, and in substance more than any other developing society, has adhered to the prismatic model. In terms of the pariah entrepreneur, it can be shown that Korea follows with continuing consistency Riggs' formulations. Moreover, just as Riggs' model suggested the appropriateness of reexamination of Korean developmental, political, and psychocultural formation,
both in the long and in the short terms (reexamination in terms of not only analyses contained in this paper, but also such reexamination as made within a major current emphasis of Korean public administration scholarship), since findings discovered through application of Riggs strongly indicated discrepancy and weakness amongst typically accepted generalizations derived from assumptions purportedly based on culturally specific data and analysis, the model would from a different tendency suggest that some construct corresponding to the pariah entrepreneur was operating within the Korean situation and that consideration and pursuit of such a construct would prove valuable. Thus the indication of Riggs' model concerning pariah entrepreneurship would induce reconsideration of the Korean economic development phenomenon designated as Jaebol. While not of course designating anything pariah in the sense of alien or foreign to the native milieu, since by all relevant consideration the intensity of Korean population homogeneity would logically forbid such a possibility, the suggestion that Jaebol and pariah entrepreneur are highly correspondent designations encompassed equally well within Riggs' model, with the one for Korea, the other for most other similar development phenomena, allows another avenue of analysis, opened through application of Riggs, which indicates the possibility of other whole ranges of
interpretation, analysis, and logical reconstruction of Korean development process. For example, in perceiving that Jaebol development corresponds to entrepreneurial enterprize of a pariah class or group of sorts, one sees first of all the remarkable division between ruling and ruled classes which had persisted for many centuries in Korea and had then apparently received tremendous revitalization within the constructs of postwar Korean prismatic realm. The division historically and in renewal had manifested in a chasm of separation so as to render non-elite classes, though economically viable and productively incommensurable, as so much outside the presumptions of power and privilege and social dictates as to transfigure them as alien, or pariah in their extent of subordination to elites. Thus, in this instance, application of Riggs' model extends to stringent clarification of continuing Korean class division. More importantly, however, concomitant appraisal of Jaebol formation as the Korean equivalent of a pariah class perpetuation, forces near total restructuring of thinking concerning this now dominant Korean economic class. In the sense that relationship between the pariah and elite ultimately transforms bureaucratic, administrative power so that modernization, development, democratization, and diffraction are reinstigated, a positive interpretation of Jaebol development and longer
term process of establishing administrative and political power access is made possible. Recent diffraction in Korean bureaucracy power structure toward more equitable and egalitarian power distribution and greater democratization process can be viewed, following Riggs, as necessary emanations derived from Jaebol compromises of elite long-term prismatic power bases and barriers.

Thus, even as an ostensibly important weakness in application of Riggs' prismatic model to Korean development, the implication of pariah entrepreneurship, is considered, the end result becomes greater opening to understanding of the Korean situation to Riggs' method of analysis based on empirical approach and nomothetic design. For the understandings of this writer and within the scope of the present writing, it seems premature at this juncture to suggest instances of inappropriate application of Riggs to Korean development. For the understanding at present of this writer, application of Riggs constitutes virtually the emergence of a new paradigm concerning Korean development phenomena. It seems that in the thinking likely to emerge from such application, at least for now, as the paradigm unfolds, the present writer will continue to see new possibilities of discovery and meaning in Riggs, rather than instances of anomalies or voids in application. Thus in closing, further application of Riggs to the Korean
development situation, as this writer hopes to later make, offers apparently multiple dimensions of meaning and reevaluation concerning the situation's many interrelated aspects.
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