An Analysis of Democratic Consolidation in South Korea

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AN ANALYSIS OF DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION IN SOUTH KOREA

by

Sangmook Lee

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AN ANALYSIS OF DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION IN SOUTH KOREA

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Western Michigan University, 1996

This thesis focuses on the process of democratic consolidation in South Korea. Under the assumption that South Korea’s democratic consolidation phase has not been completed, the thesis examines the problems and prospects of South Korean democratic consolidation in terms of its political, economic, and social aspects. In particular, from a comparative perspective on the Third Wave of democratization, the thesis deals with the changes, dynamics, and characteristics of South Korean democratization. Using a maximalist conception of democratic consolidation, the thesis analyzes how South Korean democracy is becoming consolidated in the political and socioeconomic spheres.

South Korea is undergoing a democratic consolidation process. The long-term prospect for South Korean democracy is bright. However, consolidating democracy is not easy job and it cannot be established in a short time. It is necessary to increase the government’s efficiency to manage sociopolitical conflicts and to drive reform continuously. Ultimately, when South Korea has established both political democracy and socioeconomic democracy, it will be a consolidated and stable democracy.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

From 1948, when an independent government was established in South Korea, "liberal democracy" has been the stated objective of all its governments. Although authoritarian governments ruled the country for approximately 30 years, democratic aspiration remained strong and intense (Han, 1987, p. 267). And while the unification of the Korean Peninsula is a long term goal, establishing democratic government is acknowledged to be the primary objective of the South Korean nation.

Since the mid-1970s the spread of democracy to so many countries in Southern Europe, Latin America, Asia, Eastern Europe, and Africa has been remarkable (Wiarda, 1993, p. 83). South Korea is no exception. In June 1987 South Korea experienced the first phase of democratization. Roh Tae Woo, then the presidential candidate of the ruling party (Democratic Justice Party), made his so-called 6.29 (June 29) Declaration, which fully and quite unexpectedly accepted the demands of an opposition alliance of party leaders and radical students, as well as intellectuals, progressive journalists, and clergy. They had called for

Amending the Constitution for the popular election of the President; lifting the ban on political dissidents including Kim Dae Jung [one of the political leaders of the opposition]; removing major restrictions on the basic rights of the press, publication, assembly and association; and reinstating the system of local autonomy (Paik, 1994, p. 733).
This event, of course, meant that the ruling elite of Chun Doo Hwan's authoritarian regime had succumbed to intensive and mounting pressures for democratization from the political opposition and the general public. The 6.29 Declaration provided the breakthrough for Korean democratization and South Korea started the process of democratic transition from authoritarianism. After the 6.29 Declaration, in October 1987, a new constitution was drafted that reflected the wishes of the democratic opposition and was supported by the ruling military elite. Since then, two consecutive presidential and three consecutive National Assembly elections have been held (Im, 1996, p.1). The new constitution adopted a direct popular vote for the President, abolished the right of the President to dissolve the National Assembly, and gave the National Assembly the right to investigate the activities of the executive branch. Indeed, by enacting the Law of Local Autonomy in April 1988, for the first time since 1960 the arena of electoral politics has expanded into local politics. Koreans could now elect the leaders of the communities where they lived.

The first phase of democratic transition, to some extent providing the legal and formal foundation for democracy, passed into the second phase of democratic consolidation with the reforms introduced by the Kim Young Sam government, inaugurated on February 25, 1993. Democratic consolidation is generally regarded as "the process by which democracy becomes so broadly and profoundly legitimate among its citizens that it is very unlikely to break down" (Diamond, 1995, p. 162). President Kim, who has led the fight for democracy throughout his lifetime and who enjoyed a high level of support (42%), called for the removal of corruption,
establishing civilian supremacy over the military throughout a firm military reform, the implementation of the real-name financial transaction system, and the amendment of politically-inspired laws. With his personal initiative and drive, Kim’s reforms have contributed to the consolidation of democracy by eliminating most authoritarian vestiges of government, both symbolic and substantive, by strengthening the legitimacy of the civilian government, especially by subordinating the military to civilian control, and by complementing the formal and legal aspects of democracy to create a climate for clean and frugal politics (Paik, 1994, pp. 734-35).

However, as many new democracies in Latin America and Eastern Europe have found, it is not a simple task for new democracies to make their fragile democratic regimes more stable. There are many “confining conditions” that impede democratic consolidation. For example, Diamond (1995) points out that confining conditions in consolidating democracy in Latin America are: limited political institutionalization, economic and social instability, a strong military, and a weak civil-society (pp. 193-232). South Korea’s confining conditions are similar and cover a range of economic, social, political, and cultural issues.

While the prime concern in the first phase of democratic transition is how to extricate the military from power and to install a democratic government through contested elections, the second phase of democratization focuses on the consolidation of new, fragile, democratic institutions and norms, i.e., which enable the people to internalize, habituate, and routinize the democratic rules of the game (Im, 1996, pp. 1-2). In addition, democratic consolidation is complete when political democratization,
preferentially treated in the earlier phase of democratic transition, develops into the socioeconomic democratization which guarantees economic equality and social justice. Political democratization provides the opportunity for social democratization and the success of social democratization can be attributed to the consolidation of political democratization. Finally, when the two aspects are harmonious, democratization in a country is completed (Ahn, 1994, pp. 1-3).

Although the second phase of the transition to democracy began with the inauguration of the current President, Kim Young Sam, it will take a long time for Korean democratization to be consolidated not only procedurally or formally (i.e., the institutionalization of political competition through free and regular elections) but also in the substantive (i.e., social justice and economic equality) elements of democracy. Indeed, like other new democracies, South Korea has to integrate socioeconomic reform with the democratization process. This is not an easy job. These two goals often produce friction in the earlier phase of the democratization process. In the case of South Korea, a high rate of economic growth, which became a very substantial cause of democratic transition from the authoritarian regime, has played the role of a confining factor for political stability. Accordingly, it seems that strong political leadership which can handle social conflicts and constantly drive political democratization is needed in the democratization process. As some scholars point out, political leaders play a very important role in the process of democratic transition (Di Palma, 1990; Huntington, 1991a; Karl & Schmitter, 1991; Burton, Gunther, & Higley, 1992; and Diamond, 1995). South Korea needs strong political leadership from its
political elite, with enough moral and conflict-solving ability to accomplish both political democratization and economic reform. The political elite's choices and strategies become decisive variables in the success of democratization.

The studies on Korean democratization have proliferated since the 6.29 Declaration in 1987. Until then, because of the long-lasting military-authoritarian regime, opportunity to discuss democratic politics had been limited. However, since the 6.29 Declaration, democracy has become the main subject of South Korean politics. In addition, the collapse of communism and development of Third World democratization encourages Koreans to recognize the meaning of democracy and the efficacy of the democratic system. Among the scholars of Korean democratization, Im (1995) has analyzed theoretical problems of the Korean democratic transition; Huntington (1991a) examined South Korea in terms of a third wave of democratization; and Diamond (1987) and Friedman (1994) analyzed Korean democratization, by comparing it with the East Asian experience. Some studies also compared Korean democratization with that of Taiwan because the two countries face similar political and economic problems (Diamond, Lipset, & Linz, 1987; Chey, 1993; and Eberstadt, 1992). On the other hand, studies on the process of democratic transition mainly focus on conditions required for the success of democracy, the causes of democratization, and the process and characteristics of democratization (Cotton, 1989; Scalapino, 1993; Ahn, 1994; Bedeski, 1994; Helgesen, 1995; and Lee & Moon, 1995).
Recent concerns about democratic consolidation have arisen following the inauguration of President Kim Young Sam. In evaluating democratic consolidation, a group of scholars using the "minimist conception" focus on political democratization, political reform, or the institutionalization of competition through elections (Ahn, 1994; Oh, 1994; and Paik, 1994). Paik (1994) insists that "the minimalist conception of democratic consolidation is appropriate in evaluating political change and reform in Third World countries" (p.732). By contrast, however, scholars using a "maximalist conception" are more concerned with procedural (or formal) democracy and substantive democracy. Their focus is more on economic and social democracy than political democracy (Chey, 1993; Im, 1996; and Mah, 1996). Im (1996) describes the "maximalist conception" as follows:

The process of democratic consolidation is not simply to institutionalize democratic political competition, but more broadly to stabilize, institutionalize, routinize, internalize, habituate, and legitimize democratic procedures and norms in the political, social, economic, cultural, and legal arena (p. 4).

Scholars using a "minimist conception" only focus on the contents of political reform and suggest some alternatives to political reform. In contrast, scholars using the "maximalist conception" focus on the process of democratic consolidation and analyze facilitating and obstructing factors to democratic consolidation.

South Korea has begun the process of democratic consolidation. As Im (1996) points out, South Korea has many factors facilitating democratic consolidation, such as economic affluence, ethnic homogeneity, religious tolerance, and civilian control over the military (pp. 8-18). However, South Korea also has many factors obstructing
democratic consolidation. As we can see in the experience of Third World democratization, the consolidation process is never easy. In fact, a number of weak, institutionalized democracies have failed, or are just surviving the democratic consolidation process. Newly democratizing countries tend to lack many factors that facilitate the democratic consolidation process, including market economies and civic organization (Shin, 1994, p. 137). Moreover, a nation experiencing the democratic transition phase does not easily move to the consolidation phase. The consolidation of new democracies usually takes decades or even generations to complete its course. Fragile democracies cannot be consolidated, while stable democracies are characterized by their ability to process conflicts successfully. From an empirical explanation of the third wave of democratization, the following questions can be addressed concerning Korean democratization: What kind of democracy does South Korea have? Will South Korea produce a more consolidated democracy? If so, how? And, what factors facilitate and obstruct the consolidation of democracy in Korea?

In this thesis, I focus on the process of democratic consolidation in South Korea. From a comparative perspective on the third wave of democratization, I deal with the changes, dynamics and characteristics of Korean democratization. As an approach to democratic consolidation, I use the “maximalist conception.” I concur that democracy will be stable and consolidated when democratic order is institutionalized in both the political and socioeconomic arenas. Accordingly, the scope of this thesis will cover not only political institutions but also socioeconomic democracy. In addition, I understand democracy develops through self-criticism. We should
constantly evaluate and examine the process of democratization. So, holding this critical position for the prospect of democratic consolidation in South Korea, I examine the dynamic process of democratic transition and consolidation, and analyze problems and prospects of democratic consolidation. Finally, because I agree that democratic consolidation depends on the political leaders' ability to successfully process and manage conflict, I also analyze the political leadership factor in Korean democratization.

In the second chapter, I analyze theoretical studies on the third wave of democratization. It includes a conceptual review, the causes and the modality of democratic transition, and the facilitating and obstructing factors of democratic consolidation. In the third chapter, I examine the characteristics that aid in understanding South Korea's peculiar political environment. This examination includes South Korean political culture, the partition of the Korean peninsula, and its political history. In the fourth chapter, I describe the dynamic process of democratization in South Korea in the context of the transition phase and democratic consolidation phase. Finally, I analyze the problems and prospects of the democratic consolidation process in South Korea. Here attention is given to political institutionalization, economic development, civil society, and political leadership. Hopefully, this study examining the process of democratic consolidation in South Korea will help to broaden our conceptual framework and also provide additional insight into democratic transitions in the Third World.
CHAPTER II

A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON THE THIRD WAVE OF DEMOCRATIZATION

The past two decades have witnessed extraordinary progress for democracy around the world. Diamond (1995) notes that "the number of states that qualify empirically as democracies (i.e., that are rated as 'free' in the Freedom House annual survey) has grown steadily from 42 in 1972 (the first year of the survey) to 52 in 1980 and 76 in 1994" (p. 171). With the collapse of communism, moreover, democracy has reached every region of the world for the first time in history. In The End of History, Francis Fukuyama (1992) suggests that capitalist democracy represents the final and highest stage in the development of human, political, and economic institutions. In particular, Huntington (1991a) points out that the present democratic transitions have taken place in countries in which the preconditions of democracy have not sufficiently matured. He calls this phenomenon the "Third Wave" of democratization.

Since 1987, South Korea has undergone democratic transition from authoritarian rule. The 6.29 Declaration of Roh Tae Woo, the former president, provided the breakthrough for democratization and the current President Kim Young Sam has contributed to democratic consolidation in South Korea. However, consolidating democracy is not an easy job and takes a long time. Many countries of Latin America failed to complete democratic consolidation because their economic and
political problems were so substantial (Gibson, 1989, pp. 159-203). South Korea also
counts many obstructing factors to its democratic consolidation process, e.g., low
institutionalization of political society, underdevelopment of civil society, and external
security vulnerability. Thus, to understand South Korean democracy, it is useful to
examine other theoretical studies on third wave democratization.

According to Huntington (1991a), "a wave of democratization is a group of
transitions from nondemocratic to democratic regimes that occur within a specified
period of time and that significantly outnumber transitions in the opposite direction"
(p. 15). The first long wave of democratization began in 1828, with the expansion of
democratic suffrage in the United States. It began to fade in the early 1920s with the
coming to power of Mussolini in Italy, giving rise to a "first reverse wave." A second,
shorter democratic wave began with the Allied victory in World War II and continued
until around 1962, incorporating a number of Latin American and newly independent
colonies. A second reverse wave, however, began, bringing widespread military and
one-party rule. The third democratic wave, which began with the overthrow of the
Caetano dictatorship in Portugal in April 1974, became a truly global phenomenon
during the 1980s, doubling by 1990 the number of democracies, with close to 39
percent of humankind living in relatively free societies (Huntington, 1991a, pp. 16-26).

The global expansion of democracy poses a fascinating challenge for social
scientists. Their main concerns are to examine the driving forces propelling this wave
of democratization, to reexamine the established theories which emphasize the
importance of socioeconomic and cultural factors in democratic development, and to
explore the ways in which new democracies can be sustained and consolidated (Shin, 1994, p.136). In particular, recent trends in the study of democracy have qualitatively changed, not only in conception but also in methodology.

Conceptually, the establishment of a viable democracy in a nation is no longer seen as the product of higher levels of modernization, as illustrated by wealth, bourgeois class structure, tolerant cultural values, and economic independence from external actors. Instead, it is seen more as a product of strategic interactions and arrangements among political elites, and conscious choices among various types of democratic constitutions, and electoral and party systems (Karl, 1990; Mainwaring, 1992; and Weffort, 1993).

In the 1960s and 1970s, the main concerns of many distinguished scholars were the necessary conditions for the emergence of a stable democracy (Lipset, 1959; Almond & Verba, 1963; Moore, Jr., 1966; and Dahl, 1971). In contrast, since the 1980s, many scholars have primarily been concerned with the dynamics of democratic transition and consolidation (Bermeo, 1990; Di Palma, 1990; Huntington, 1991a ; and Ackerman, 1992).

Methodologically, recent scholarship tends to identify and compare distinctive patterns of transition across different countries. Using cross-national comparisons, scholars seek to determine the relationship between strategic interaction and the type of democratic transition and between the pattern of transition and the type of democratic political system that emerges (Karl, 1990; and Karl & Schmitter, 1991). In addition, some scholars also try to compare those processes across time in order to
identify distinctive waves of democratization. The mode of historical comparison is employed as useful method to study the dynamics of democratization in a specific area or nation (Remmer, 1990; Huntington, 1991a; and Karl and Schmitter, 1993).

This chapter deals with theoretical explanations of the global trend toward democracy in recent years, i.e., the third wave of democratization. First, it begins with a conceptual review of democratic transitions. Second, it searches for the causes of democratization in terms of domestic and international factors. Finally, it focuses on dynamic processes of democratic transition in terms of the modality of democratic transition, and some factors affecting the prospects for democratic consolidation.

A Conceptual Review of Democratic Transitions

In general, democracy, as a form of government, means not rule by a person or a particular group without agreement from the citizenry, but rule that is representative of the mass public. Democracy is also based on a people’s reasonably free choice of their government or political leaders. In Democracy in Developing Countries, Linz, Lipset, & Diamond (1989) define democracy as follows:

....democracy denotes a system of government that meets three essential conditions: meaningful and extensive competition among individuals and organized groups (especially political parties) for all effective positions of government power, at regular intervals and excluding the use of force; a highly inclusive level of political participation in the selection of leaders and policies, at least through regular and fair elections, such that no major (adult) social group is excluded; and a level of civil and political liberties--freedom of expression, freedom of the press, freedom to form and join organizations--sufficient to ensure the integrity of political competition and participation (Linz, Lipset, & Diamond, 1989, p.
In the process of political changes, while liberalization means "the partial opening of an authoritarian system short of choosing governmental leaders through freely competitive elections" (Huntington, 1991a, p. 9), democratization involves holding free elections on a regular basis and determining who governs on the basis of these results. Democratization is a complex historical process, consisting of several analytically distinct but empirically overlapping stages (O'Donnell & Schmitter, 1986). Explicitly, it involves bringing about the end of the nondemocratic regime, the inauguration of the democratic regime, and then the consolidation of the democratic system. Among these phases of democratization, the transition and consolidation phases have received the most attention from the scholarly community.

By nature, the transition phase of democratization is regarded as a period of great political uncertainty. This phase entails the broader and more complex processes associated with the institutionalization of a new democratic set of rules for political life, so this stage is regarded as a hybrid regime. According to O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986),

The transition is the interval between one political regime and another... transitions are delimited, on the one side, by the launching of the process of dissolution of an authoritarian regime and, on the other, by the installation of some form of democracy, the return to some form of authoritarian rule, or the emergence of a revolutionary alternative (p. 6).

The main feature of this stage is that institutions of the old regime coexist with those of the new regime and authoritarians and democrats often share power, whether
through conflict or by agreement (O'Donnell, 1988, p. 283). The end of the period of
democratic transition is complete when a new democracy has promulgated a new
constitution and held free elections for political leaders with few barriers to mass
participation. Linz, Stepan, & Gunther (1995) suggest the following criteria for
democratic transitions: “a government comes to power that is the direct result of a free
and popular vote; this government has full authority to generate new politics; and the
executive, legislative, and judicial power generated by the new democracy does not
have to share power with other bodies de jure” (p. 78).

Scholars have used different definitions of democratic consolidation. These
definitions are based on two conceptions of democracy. One is a “minimalist
conception,” emphasizing procedural or formal democracy. The other is a “maximalist
conception,” focusing on the outcomes of politics, such as social justice and economic
equality.

Based on the Schumpeterian conception of democracy that equates democracy
with electoral competition which is held regularly, the minimalist conception of a
consolidated democratic regime can be defined as

The process of transforming the accidental arrangements, prudential
norms, and contingent solutions that have emerged during the
transition into relations of cooperation and competition that are
reliably known, regularly practiced, and voluntarily accepted by
those persons or collectivities (i.e., politicians and citizens) that
participate in democratic governance (Schmitter, 1992, p. 424).

Linz (1990) attaches a minimalist definition of democracy to the conception of
democratic consolidation. He states:
Opinions range from a minimalist conception to one which would include the development of all the institutions of the new democracy: all the patterns of interest mediation, the consolidation of a party system, the successful transfer of power to an opposition party, etc. In this author's view, a maximalist definition of consolidation will make it almost impossible to say that any democratic regime is ever fully consolidated and would lead to future crises being explained as a result of unsuccessful consolidation rather than the incapacity of the regime to confront them (Linz, 1990, p. 158).

Based on his view on conceptions of democracy, Linz (1990) insists that a consolidated democracy is

One in which none of the major political actors, parties, or organized interests, forces, or institutions consider that there is any alternative to the democratic process to gain power, and that no political institutions or groups has a claim to veto the action of democratically elected decision makers.... To put it simply democracy must be seen as 'the only game in town' (p. 158).

Linz & Stepan (1996) describe the more detailed state of consolidated democracy as follows:

Behaviorally, no significant political group seriously attempts to overthrow the democratic regime; attitudinally, the overwhelming majority of people believe that any further political change must emerge within the parameters of democratic procedures; and constitutionally, all actors become habituated to the fact that political conflicts will be resolved according to established norms, and that violations of these norms are likely to be both ineffective and costly (pp. 15-16).

Compared with a minimalist conception of democracy, many scholars adopt “outcome-oriented conceptions” of democracy, a maximalist conception of democratic consolidation, with the position that both political and socioeconomic democracy is needed for a country to be consolidated. This conception includes not only procedural
or formal democracy but also substantive democratic elements, such as guarantees of basic civil rights, democratic accountability and responsiveness, civilian control over the military, democratic and constitutional checks on executive authority, and punishing corruption and human rights abuses (Im, 1996, p. 3). According to Diamond (1995), democratic consolidation means the quality, depth, and authenticity of democracy in its various dimensions has been improved: “political competition becomes fairer, freer, more vigorous and extensive; participation and representation broader, more autonomous, and inclusive; civil liberties more comprehensively and rigorously protected; accountability more systematic and transparent” (p. 162).

However, as Huntington (1991a) insists, compared with a maximalist conception of democracy, the minimalist conception provides “the analytical precision and empirical referents that make the concept a useful one” (pp. 6-7). And much recent empirical research on democratization favors a procedural or minimalist conception of democracy (O’Donnell, 1988; Dahl, 1989; Linz, 1990; Huntington, 1991a; Valenzuela, 1992; Mainwaring, 1992; Burton, Gunther, & Higley, 1992; and Gunther, Puhle, & Diamandouros, 1995). Of course, many scholars with a maximalist conception of democracy have also tried to broaden the conception of democracy and strive for qualitative development of democracy in the world. After all, the two conceptions are quite heuristic, so their usage definitely depends on the scholars’ own points of view as well as their research goals.

On the other hand, it is difficult to distinguish the beginning of the phase of consolidation from the end of the period of democratic transition. After all, it is related
to scholars’ views as to how one knows when consolidation is complete. How then can the analysts determine if a regime is consolidated? Higley & Gunther (1992) hold that democracies become consolidated only when the elite consensus on procedures is coupled with extensive mass participation in elections and other institutional processes. Valenzuela (1992) also states that “it reaches closure when the authority of fairly elected government and legislative officials is properly established and when major political actors as well as the public at large expect the democratic regime to last well into the foreseeable future” (p. 70).

For more concrete definitions of democratic consolidation, the analysts suggest their own criteria on democratic consolidation. Linz (1990) points out that if certain institutions, such as the armed forces and the previous nondemocratic rulers, might attempt to exercise a veto or share power independently of the result of elections, those democracies could not be considered fully consolidated (p. 158). On the other hand, he denies the concept of peaceful alternation in government between parties as a criterion of democratic consolidation. In The Third Wave, Huntington (1991a) has proposed a “two-turnover test,” by which a democracy “may be viewed as consolidated if the party or group that takes power in the initial election at the time of transition loses a subsequent election and turns over power to those election winners, and if those election winners then peacefully turn over power to the winners of a later election” (p. 267). However, Linz (1990) insists that this argument seems “an unnecessarily strict interpretation, given that party hegemony often is durable, and that such alternation is the exception rather than the rule in democracies” (p. 159).
Gunther, Puhle, & Diamandouros (1995) suggest two indicators of democratic consolidation. One is the absence of a politically significant antisystem party or social movement. The other is the absence of a politically significant semiloyal parties and groups which "do not overtly reject the institutions or norms of a political regime, but rather, they maintain an ambiguous stance toward that regime" (p. 14). They consider fundamental agreement among politically significant groups, especially concerning the legitimacy of a particular set of institutions or rules of the game in a given democratic regime, as an important criterion of democratic consolidation. Accordingly, they think consolidation has not been achieved when a politically significant antisystem party or semiloyal organization exists in a given democratic regime (pp. 14-15).

Linz, Stepan, & Gunther (1995) analyze the extent of democratic consolidation of newly emerging democratic regimes in Southern European, Eastern European, and South American countries by using the following criteria:

* Structural: This overlaps somewhat with our definition of democracy. It posits that no significant reserve domains of power should exist that preclude important public policies from being determined by the laws, procedures, and institutions that have been sanctioned by the new democratic process.
* Attitudinal: When a strong majority of public opinion acknowledges that the regime's democratic procedures and institutions are appropriate and legitimate, and where support for antisystem alternatives is quite low or isolated from the prodemocratic forces.
* Behavioral: When no significant national, social, economic, political, or institutional actor spends significant resources attempting to achieve its objectives by challenging the regime's institutions or rules with appeals for a military coup or revolutionary activities, and when the prodemocratic forces abide by its rules and do not engage in semiloyal politics (Linz, Stepan, & Gunther, 1995, p. 79).
The Causes of Democratization

The forces for democratization currently operating in the Third World differ substantially from region to region and from one political system to another, as well as from one country to another and from one time to another. Scholars have recently focused on factors facilitating and obstructing democratization rather than the necessary or sufficient conditions so frequently used in earlier empirical research on democratic development (Huntington, 1991a; Hadenius, 1992; Diamond, 1992b; and Karl and Schmitter, 1993). They offer a number of general propositions on the causes of democratization as follows:

(1) No single factor is sufficient to explain the development of democracy in all countries or in a single country.
(2) No single factor is necessary to the development of democracy in all countries.
(3) Democratization in each country is the result of a combination of causes.
(4) The combination of causes producing democracy varies from country to country.
(5) The combination of causes generally responsible for one wave of democratization differs from that responsible for other waves.
(6) The causes responsible for the initial regime changes in a democratization wave are likely to differ from those responsible for later regime changes in that wave. (Huntington, 1991a, p. 38).

As more concrete causes of democratization, Huntington points out five major factors that have significantly contributed to the occurrence and the timing of the third-wave transitions to democracy:

(1) The deepening legitimacy problems of authoritarian regimes in a world where democratic values were widely accepted, the consequent dependence of these regimes on successful performance, and their inability to maintain "performance legitimacy" due to
economic (and sometimes military) failure.

(2) The unprecedented global economic growth of the 1960s, which raised living standards, increased education, and greatly expanded the urban middle class in many countries.

(3) A striking shift in the doctrine and activities of the Catholic Church, manifested in the Second Vatican Council of 1963-65 and the transformation of national Catholic churches from defenders of the status quo to opponents of authoritarianism.

(4) Changes in the policies of external actors, most notably the European Community, the United States, and the Soviet Union.

(5) "Snowballing," or the demonstration effect of transitions earlier in the third wave in stimulating and providing models for subsequent efforts at democratization. (Huntington, 1991b, p. 13).

From the five factors mentioned above, two sets of factors stand out as the most probable causes of the current democratization. One is domestic factors within a country. The other is international factors. For domestic factors, first, there is the steady decline in the authoritarian ruler's political legitimacy. As demonstrated in Eastern Europe and Latin America, many authoritarian regimes lost legitimacy simply because they have failed to solve the economic and social problems that allowed them to take power in the first place. Other authoritarian regimes, such as those in Chile, South Korea, Spain, and Taiwan, lost their political legitimacy as economic success and social change generated new interests and coalitions in a society demanding democratic change. Unable to meet new demands for political freedom and participation, these regimes could no longer justify their existence (Shin, 1994, pp. 151-52).
Second, domestic economic factors affected third wave democratization. According to Huntington (1991a),

First, the oil price hikes in some countries and Marxist-Leninist constraints in others created economic downturns that weakened the authoritarian regimes; second, by the early 1970s many countries had achieved overall levels of economic development that provided an economic basis for democracy and that facilitated transition to democracy; and third, in a few countries extremely rapid economic growth destabilized authoritarian regimes, forcing them either to liberalize or to intensify repression (p. 59).

Namely, economic development provided the basis for democracy and crises provoked by either rapid growth or economic recession weakened authoritarianism. Moreover, a higher level of economic development generates changes in social structures, beliefs, and culture that are conducive to the emergence of democracy. At the individual level, economic development gives rise to increasing education, and expanding income fosters more democratic norms, values, and behaviors. People become more tolerant of differences, and are more comfortable with opposing points of view. They also place a high value on freedom, are more interested and better informed about politics, more inclined to participate in politics and to join political organizations, more politically effective, and thus, more politically confident and assertive (Diamond, 1993c, p. 47).

External factors on democratic transitions from authoritarian rule could also be decisive in determining whether a polity becomes democratic or authoritarian. Democratic pressures from other countries and pressure from international organizations have weakened the physical basis of authoritarian rule by cutting off
economic and military aid. In particular, the European Community (EC) played a key role in the processes of democratization taking place in southern European countries, including Greece, Portugal, and Spain. For these countries, "membership in the Community was desirable and even necessary on economic grounds; to be a member a country had to be democratic; hence democracy was an essential step to economic growth and prosperity" (Huntington, 1991a, p. 87). During the 1970s and 1980s the United States was also a major promoter of democratization. U.S. diplomatic and economic pressure has been critical to the democratization in a number of countries. For example, President Jimmy Carter's campaign in favor of human rights had a significant impact. Carter's constant references to human rights, and the translation of this ideal into official U.S. policy eventually had a galvanizing effect that served to undermine the legitimacy of authoritarian regimes (Wiarda, 1993, p. 92).

Another external factor, the impact of "snowballing" on democratization, was clearly evident in 1990 in Bulgaria, Romania, Yugoslavia, and Albania. In Eastern Europe the major obstacle to democratization was Soviet control. However, once it was removed, the movement to democracy spread rapidly (Huntington, 1991a, pp. 171-72). In summary, the current wave of democratization is propelled by domestic and international factors that are connected, with the particular mix of the two factors varying from country to country (Shin, 1994, p.153).

In addition, some scholars also focus on "causers" of democratization (Linz, 1978; Di Palma, 1990; Karl, 1990; and Huntington, 1992). This means that in third wave democratization, political actors substantially contribute to the creation of
democratic regimes from authoritarian rule. According to Huntington (1991a), "a democratic regime is installed not by trends but by people. Democracies are created not by causes but by causers. Political leaders and the public have to act" (p. 107). However, many researchers actually focus on the political elite rather than the mass public because elites have played a far more significant role in democratic transitions where sufficient conditions for democracy were lacking. In his book, To Craft Democracies, Di Palma (1990) emphasizes the careful crafting of the rules of the game by the emerging political elite. He stresses "the importance of human action" rather than such preconditions for democratic rule as a high degree of economic development, an independent judiciary, or a tolerant political culture to make democracy possible (p. 9). Linz (1978) also points out that political actors are a necessary condition in the process of democratization. He says that political actors make choices that can increase or decrease the probability of regime stability (p. 4).

The Process of Democratization

The overall change from an authoritarian to a democratic regime usually involves two phases: a transition to democracy, and then a transition to a consolidated democracy. "The first transition," observes Mainwaring, "involves defeating authoritarianism and establishing democracy, while the second involves consolidating democracy" (1992, p. 296). Of course, the process of democratic transition is not easy. Moreover, a transition to democracy does not necessarily lead to democracy's consolidation. According to Valenzuela (1992), there is a complex relationship
between the two phases (p. 58). Compared with transitions to democracy having a simpler process, the consolidation phase is a complex process and usually takes decades.

The Process of Democratic Transition

For transitions to democracy, regarding the question of why transitions occur, O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986) point to "the emergence of a schism between hard-liners and soft-liners within regimes as the primary reason for the initiation of a transition" (p.19). Thereafter, the transition was seen to advance through a series of bargains between state and opposition elites that defined a modal pattern of negotiated transitions (Munck, 1994, p. 358). And as Huntington (1991a) states in The Third Wave, "the crucial participants in the processes were the standpatters, liberal reformers, and democratic reformers in the governing coalition, and democratic moderates and revolutionary extremists in the opposition" (p. 121).

To understand how transitions take place, many scholars classify variable modes of transition from authoritarian rule. Share (1987) develops a fourfold typology of transitions to democracy, based on two dimensions. "First, is the democratic transition brought about with the participation or consent of leaders of the authoritarian regime, or does it transpire without such participation or consent?" (p. 529). The former transitions are termed "consensual"; the later, "nonconsensual". Share (1987) states:

Consensual transitions entail at least some degree of political
continuity between the authoritarian and democratic period. Because authoritarian elites are willing and able to allow the birth of democratic rule, the legitimacy of the authoritarian and democratic regimes are not mutually exclusive.... Thus, consensual transitions usually avoid open confrontation between supporters of authoritarian and democratic rule.... Transitions to democracy that are initiated without the consent or cooperation of authoritarian rulers may be termed nonconsensual. In nonconsensual transitions to democracy, the legitimacy of authoritarian and democratic rule are mutually exclusive: Support for authoritarian rule cannot be reconciled with acceptance of a democratic regime (Share, 1987, p. 529).

The second dimension is the duration of the transition: “Does the transition occur gradually, transcending a single generation of political leaders, or is it a relatively rapid phenomenon?” (p. 530). These two dimensions produce the following two-by-two matrix (Figure 1):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pace of Democratization</th>
<th>By Regime Leaders (Consensual)</th>
<th>Against Regime Leaders (Non-consensual)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gradual</td>
<td>Incremental Democratization</td>
<td>Transition Through Protracted Revolutionary Struggle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Transition Through Transaction</td>
<td>Transition Through Rupture</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Rapid                   |                                 | a)Revolution  
b)Coup  
c)Collapse  
d)Extrication |

Figure 1. Types of Democratization From Authoritarian Rule.

However, because there are few cases of incremental democratization and gradual transition from authoritarian regimes, rapid transitions to democracy better describe contemporary transitions, such as “transition through rupture” and “transition through transaction” (p. 531). At this point, Share’s typology comes close to distinctions made by O’Donnell (1989) (transition by collapse versus transition by transaction) and Linz (1978) (transition through reforma versus transition through ruptura).

Mainwaring (1992) also classifies three paths from liberalization to democratization: (1) a transition through transaction; (2) a transition through extrication; and (3) a transition through regime defeat. First, a transition through transaction means that “the authoritarian government initiates the process of liberalization and remains a decisive actor throughout the transition. And this does not imply that the opposition plays an insignificant role in the process or that the government controls the entire process” (p. 322). Second, a transition through extrication means that “an authoritarian government is weakened, but not as thoroughly as in a transition by defeat. It is able to negotiate crucial features of the transition, though in a position of less strength than in cases of transition through transaction” (p. 322). Finally, a transition through regime defeat means that “a transition takes place when a major defeat of an authoritarian regime leads to the collapse of authoritarianism and the inauguration of a democratic government” (p. 322).

In fact, this typology essentially adds a third intermediary category to the overall distinction between reforma and ruptura that emerged from the stark contrast presented by the initiations of the Spanish and Portuguese transitions of the mid-
According to Mainwaring (1992), “this classification indicates differential positions of power in the negotiations and interactions between regimes and opposition, underscoring decisive differences in how much authoritarian regimes influence the transition process” (p. 322).

Based on Mainwaring’s threefold typology, Valenzuela (1992) tries to further classify the differences among the three categories for enhancement of their usefulness by turning the intermediate one into a distinct type. To generate a variety of types which are exemplified with approximate national examples, Valenzuela combines two dimensions: the modalities of the transition with the attitudes of the existing authoritarian rulers toward democratization (p. 75). His classification of transitions to democracy is in Figure 2.

Karl (1990) distinguishes among four possible modes of transition to democracy by two dimensions: one is “strategies of transition” and the other is “relative actor strength.” The cross tabulation of these distinctions produces four ideal types of democratic transition as follows (Figure 3): reform, revolution, imposition, and pact (pp. 8-9).

According to Karl (1990), in cases of Latin America,

Efforts at reform from below, which have been characterized by unrestricted contestation and participation, have met with subversive opposition from unsuppressed traditional elites, as the cases of Argentina (1946-1951), Guatemala (1946-1954), and Chile (1970-1973) demonstrate (p. 8).

And as another category of transitions from below, “revolutions generally produce stable forms of governance (Bolivia is an obvious exception), but such forms have not
### Change Occurs Through:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitudes of the last main authoritarian regime elites toward democracy</th>
<th>Collapse, Defeat or Withdrawal¹</th>
<th>Extrication²</th>
<th>Reform³</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prefer liberalized authoritarian regime but will accept democratization</td>
<td>Argentina 1983 Colombia 1958</td>
<td>Venezuela 1958 Argentina 1973</td>
<td>Poland 1989 Brazil 1980s South Korea 1987</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ Rules of the authoritarian regime are abandoned, and rulers cannot or opt not to negotiate conditions for leaving power.
² Rules of the authoritarian regime are abandoned, but rulers negotiate leaving power.
³ Transition occurs without breaking the rules of the old regime.

Figure 2. Modalities of Transition to Democracy From Authoritarian Rule.

yet evolved into democratic patterns of fair competition, unrestricted contestation, rotation in power, and free associability, although development in Nicaragua and Mexico may soon challenge this assertion” (p. 8).

In contrast, Karl (1990) insists that “the most frequently encountered types of transition, and the ones which have most often resulted in the implantation of a political democracy, are ‘transitions from above’” (pp. 8-9). In these cases, traditional rulers remain in control, even if pressured from below, and successfully use strategies of either compromise or force to retain at least part of their power. Of these two modes of transition, democratization by pure imposition is the least common in Latin America. Only Brazil (1974-) and Ecuador(1976-), where the military used its dominant position to establish unilaterally the rules for civilian governance, are included in this category (p. 9). Finally, democratization defined by relatively strong elite actors who engage in strategies of compromise have endured for a respectable
length of time in the cases of Venezuela (1958-), Colombia (1958-), the recent redemocratization in Uruguay (1984), and Chile (1932-1970) (p. 9). As a particularly good example of foundational pacts, Karl (1990) introduces the democratization of Venezuela as follows:

Here a series of agreements negotiated by the military, economic, and party leaders rested on explicit institutional arrangements. The military agreed to leave power and to accept a new role as an "apolitical, obedient, and nondeliberative body" in exchange for an amnesty for abuses committed during authoritarian rule and a guaranteed improvement of the economic situation of officers. Political parties agreed to respect the electoral process and share power in a manner commensurate with the voting results. They also accepted a "prolonged political truce" aimed at depersonalizing debate and facilitating consultation and coalitions. Capitalists agreed to accept legal trade unions and collective bargaining in exchange for significant state subsidies, guarantees against expropriation or socializing property, and promises of labor peace from workers’ representatives (Karl, 1990, pp.10-11).

For classifying the modes of transitions to democracy, in The Third Wave, Huntington (1991a) suggests three broad types of processes: "transformation," "replacement," and "transplacement." His three-way distinction is based on the balance of force between the government and the opposition. In particular, he points out the following three crucial interactions in democratic processes: those between government and opposition; between reformers and standpatters in the governing coalition; and between moderates and extremists in the opposition (p.123).

According to Huntington (1991a), in transformations, the interaction between reformers and standpatters within the governing coalition is of central importance. In particular, "those in power in the authoritarian regime take the lead and play the
decisive role in ending that regime and changing it into a democratic system” (p. 124).
He points out that a chance for transformation occurs as follows: when reformers are
stronger than standpatters; when the government is stronger than the opposition; and
when the moderates are stronger than the extremists. That is, transformation requires
the government to be stronger than the opposition. For example, the leaders of these
countries (Spain, Brazil, Taiwan, Mexico, and Hungary) had the power to move their
countries toward democracy if they wanted to (p. 125). In every case the opposition
was, at least at the beginning of the process, markedly weaker than the government.
He introduces the democratization of Brazil and Spain as the prototypical cases of
transformation. According to his explanation, “the Brazilian transition was ‘liberation
from above’ or ‘regime-initiated liberalization.’” And, “in Spain it was a question of
reformist elements associated with the incumbent dictatorship, initiating processes of
political change from within the established regime” (p. 125).

Replacement involves a very different process from transformation. In
replacement, the important interactions are those between government and opposition
and between moderates and extremists. The opposition eventually has to be stronger
than the government, and the moderates have to be stronger than the extremists
(Huntington, 1991a, p. 124). According to Huntington, “an authoritarian regime is
replaced when the government becomes weaker than the opposition. Hence
replacement requires the opposition to wear down the government and shift the
balance in its favor” (p. 143). In other words, democratization through a replacement
mode results from the opposition gaining strength and the government losing strength
Huntington (1991a) points out that replacement usually involves three distinct phases: the struggle to produce the fall, the fall, and the struggle after the fall (p. 142). First, students and the public play a central role in the process of the collapse of authoritarian regimes. Some forms of mass action involving student groups have taken place in almost every third wave regime change, and military disaffection is essential to bring down the regime (p. 145). Second, in the case of transition from personal dictatorship, the life of the regime becomes the life of the dictator (p. 143). The personal dictator is thus likely to hang on until he dies or until the regime itself comes to an end. Finally, after the fall, divisions appear among opposition groups and they struggle over the distribution of power and the nature of the new regime that must be established. (p. 148).

In transplacement, the central interaction is between reformers and moderates not widely unequal in power. In some transplacements, government and former opposition groups agreed on at least temporarily power sharing (p.124). That is, in transplacements, democratization is produced by the combined actions of government and opposition. Within the government the balance between standpatters and reformers is such that the government is willing to negotiate a change of regime, but is unwilling to initiate the change. Within the opposition, democratic moderates are strong enough to prevail over antidemocratic radicals, but they are not strong enough to overthrow the government (p. 151). In successful transplacements, the dominant groups in both government and opposition recognize that they are incapable of
unilaterally determining the nature of the future political system in their society. In other words, transplacements occur when the beliefs of both change. The opposition realizes that it is not strong enough to overthrow the government. The government realizes that the opposition is strong enough to significantly increase the costs of nonnegotiation, by encouraging increased repression. This would lead to further alienation of groups, the increased possibility of a hard-line takeover of the government, and significant losses in international legitimacy (p.152). The political process leading to transplacement is thus often marked by a seesawing back and forth of strikes, protests, and demonstrations, on the one hand, and repression, jailing, police violence, states of siege, and martial law, on the other (p. 153).

On the other hand, Huntington (1991a) also considers the potential effect of the preceding type of authoritarian regime on the transition process as shown in Table 1. In a fairly simplistic model of the linkage between prior regimes and modes of transition, he plots 35 cases of transitions from 1974 to 1990 according to the preceding type of authoritarian regime and mode of transition (p.113) From his analysis, he concludes that transformation and transplacement are the most usual forms of transition from both military regimes (thirteen of sixteen cases) and one-party systems (nine of eleven cases). Five of eleven one-party systems had transitions through transformation, as opposed to four through transplacement, and eight of sixteen military regimes had transitions through transformation, as opposed to five through transplacement. The strongest conclusion is that transitions through replacement are rare (six out of thirty-five).
Table 1

Authoritarian Regimes and Liberalization/Democratization Processes, 1974-90

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Processes</th>
<th>One-Party</th>
<th>Personal</th>
<th>Military</th>
<th>Racial Oligarchy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transformation</td>
<td>(Taiwan)*</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>(Mexico)</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(USSR)</td>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transplacement</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>(Nepal)</td>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>(South Africa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Mongolia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>El Salvador</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Replacement</td>
<td>East Germany</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Germany</td>
<td></td>
<td>Philippines</td>
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<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td></td>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention</td>
<td>Grenada</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(Panama)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenada</td>
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<td>Total</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Note: The principal criterion of democratization is selection of a government through an open, competitive, fully participatory, fairly administered election.

* Parentheses indicate a country that significantly liberalized but did not democratize by 1990.
* Indicates a country that reverted to authoritarianism.

Source: Huntington, 1991a, p. 113.
As we have seen from various modes of democratic transitions, most scholars emphasize the substantial role of political elites in the process of bringing out a democratic regime from authoritarian rule. This is related to a crucial idea that is well stated by Shin (1994): “democracy can be crafted and promoted so as to survive and grow even in a culturally and structurally unfavorable environment” (p. 161). Moreover, they think that the success of democratization is determined by political actors and their strategies. As a useful strategy for democratic regimes, most scholars point out a “pact,” meaning “agreement among a select set of actors which seeks to define rules governing the exercise of power on the basis of mutual guarantees for the ‘vital interests’ of those entering into it” (O’Donnell & Schmitter, 1986, p. 37). Of course, such pacts are initially regarded as temporary solutions intended to avoid certain worrisome outcomes and to pave the way for more permanent arrangements for the resolution of conflicts. According to O’Donnell & Schmitter (1986), “some of the elements of those pacts may eventually become the law of the land, being incorporated into constitutions or statutes; others may be institutionalized as the standard operating procedures of state agencies, political parties, interest associations, and the like” (p. 37).

In their analysis of modes of democratic transitions, Karl and Schmitter (1991) insist that the most successful formula for democratic transition has been negotiating pacts among elites (p. 280). O’Donnell & Schmitter (1986) also point out that “with the exception of Costa Rica, all of the unpacted democracies existing at different times in other Latin American countries were destroyed by authoritarian reversals” (p. 45).
So, pacts have been regarded as valuable tools for managing democratic transition. However, political pact making faces practical difficulties in the process of transition to democracy according to each country's political or economic conditions. For example, in his analysis of political pacts in the case of Brazil, Hagopian (1990) demonstrates that a fragile democracy like Brazil, having experienced a weak democratic tradition and two decades of military rule, cannot be consolidated and extended by political pacts alone (p. 153). He argues that the political pacts bargained by elites that made the regime transition possible limited the extension of democracy. That is, by restoring many sources of their political power to old regime elites as the price for their support for democratization, political pacts left the military with a substantial degree of formal and informal power over civilians, preserved clientelism, and undermined the ability of political parties to transform themselves into genuine transmission belts for nonelite interests (p. 147). He concludes that "in Brazil pacts did not broaden and deepen democracy, nor did the politicians who forged them create strong democratic institutions and resolve to adhere to democratic political practice" (p. 166).

For successful political pact making, Zhang (1994) suggests two crucial conditions: "the elites' autonomy during pact negotiations and their ability to enforce political pacts on the mass" (p. 109). In To Craft Democracies, Di Palma (1990) suggests some tactics for political actors engaged in pact making. Among them, one of the most important tactics is the timing of negotiating the pact. He emphasizes the need to reach an agreement on basic procedural rules expeditiously (pp. 76-108). On
the other hand, O’Donnell & Schmitter (1986) stress the importance of playing it slow and safe in democratic transitions. They believe that “pacts can play an important role in any regime change based on gradual installment rather than on a dramatic event” (p. 37).

The Process of Democratic Consolidation

Quite a few of the newly emerging democratic regimes are far from consolidated. They are merely surviving without consolidating. In particular, in the less developed regions, these fragile democratic regimes have experienced significant uncertainty over the rules of the game because of their terrible economic conditions during the 1980s (Karl, 1990, p. 16). Although many Third World countries have experienced transitions to procedural democracy, such as free elections with little barriers to mass participation, and meaningful party competition, this democratic change definitely does not guarantee democratic stability. Some democratic regimes have been either terminated by coups and other violent events, or they have gradually given way to single-party authoritarian regimes (Burton, Gunther, & Higley, 1992, p. 3). In particular, as O’Donnell (1992) points out, there are serious obstacles to the process of democratic consolidation. He states:

Among them [serious problems] we need to refer to the persistence of decidedly authoritarian actors who control important resources of power; the attitude, widespread among other actors, of neutrality or indifference regarding the type of political regime in place; and the prevalence in many social spheres of profoundly authoritarian patterns of domination (O’Donnell, 1992, p. 19).
As such, building a consolidated democracy is very difficult work, takes an extended period of time, and sometimes needs skillful, the strategic choices made by political elites. To clearly understand the process of democratic consolidation, it is necessary to look at some results of studies on the democratic consolidation phase.

While new democracies have become consolidated, there has been no scholarly consensus on substantive conclusions about the extent of consolidation of various democratic regimes. This is because their academic interests and objects of research have been different, in terms of problems resulting from the democratic consolidation process and some factors affecting the problems and prospects of democratic consolidation. The following section will focus on these aspects.

The Problems Resulting From the Democratic Consolidation Process

According to Morlino (1987), there are three possible results of the process of democratic consolidation: “a more or less complete consolidation; maintenance of the democratic regime; and a more or less sudden crisis that puts in jeopardy the preservation of the recently installed democracy” (pp. 76-7). But even if countries bring about one of the possible results above, they will have faced serious economic and social problems that may determine the future of their democratic regimes. If so, what problems do the new democratic systems confront?

As a central dilemma of democratization in Latin America, Karl (1990) suggests the relationship between survivability and “who benefits” from democracy. According to Karl, “the conditions that permit democracies to persist in the short run
may constrain their potential for resolving the enormous problems of poverty and inequality that continue to characterize the continent” (p. 13). Huntington (1991a) notes three types of problems that the new democracies have confronted in the democratic consolidation phase: “transitional,” “contextual,” and “systemic” problems (pp. 209-10).

First, transitional problems stemmed directly from the process of democratic transitions from authoritarian regimes. As concrete problems, Huntington (1991a) suggests the following:

The problems of establishing new constitutional and electoral systems, weeding out pro-authoritarian officials and replacing them with democratic ones, repealing or modifying laws that were unsuitable for democracy, abolishing or drastically changing authoritarian agencies such as the secret police, and in former one-party systems, separating party and government property, functions, and personnel (p. 209).

He also points out two key transitional problems. One is “the torturer problem” related to the problem of how to treat authoritarian officials who had blatantly violated human rights (pp. 211-31). The other is “the praetorian problem,” referring to the need to reduce military involvement in politics and establish a professional pattern of civil-military relations (pp. 231-53).

Second, contextual problems are endemic to individual countries. As these problems stem from the nature of the particular society, its economy, culture, and history, they obviously differ from country to country. Among them, Huntington (1991a) suggests eight major problems confronting new democratic regimes in the 1970s and 1980s and the countries in which those were most severe as follows:
(1) major insurgencies: El Salvador, Guatemala, Peru, Philippines;
(2) ethnic/communal conflicts (apart from insurgencies): Sudan, Turkey, India, Nigeria, Pakistan, Romania;
(3) extreme poverty (low per capita GNP): Bolivia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, India, Mongolia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Sudan;
(4) severe socioeconomic inequality: Brazil, India, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines;
(5) chronic inflation: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Nicaragua, Peru;
(6) substantial external debt: Argentina, Brazil, Hungary, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Uruguay;
(7) terrorism (apart from insurgency): Spain, Turkey;
(8) extensive state involvement in economy: Hungary, Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, India, Mongolia, Nicaragua, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Spain, Turkey (Huntington, 1991a, pp. 253-54).

Third, systemic problems stem from the working of a democratic system. These problems are basically related to characteristics of a democratic system. For example, there are stalemate, the inability to reach decisions, susceptibility to demagoguery, and domination by vested economic interests. Huntington (1991a) notes that the new democratic regimes would not be immune to these systemic problems (p. 210).

Some Factors Affecting the Problems and Prospect of Democratic Consolidation

Many scholars suggest common factors affecting the consolidation process of newly democracies as follow: historical legacy; the nature of the nondemocratic regime; modes of transition; international environment; and partial regimes. First, the legacy of past experience can significantly affect the consolidation process of a particular society. Morlino (1987) thus points to the political traditions of the country.
He notes that there are two specific aspects of those traditions. One is the form of
government. According to Morlino (1987), in the cases of Japan after World War II
and Spain during 1975-1976, the old power was transformed into a formal power.
Ironically, this resolution actually legitimized the new democratic regime among high­
ranking military officers and the most conservative social sectors. In contrast, the case
of Italy resolved in favor of a republican outcome through referenda, but some
monarchical components were still embedded in the real politics. The other aspect is
“the history of violent and conflicting experiences. Morlino insists that memories of the
enormous human cost of those past experiences were determining influences on the
elites’ willingness to compromise” (p. 65).

Gunther, Puhle, & Diamandouros (1995) emphasize the previous democratic
experience of the country as an example of the legacy of past experience. They point
out that

All four Southern European countries [Spain, Portugal, Italy, and
Greece] established parliamentary institutions during the middle to
late nineteenth century and, with the exception of Portugal,
experimented with different forms of democratic politics in the first
decades of the twentieth century. Outside of certain urban areas,
however, their “democracies” were often limited, clientelistic, and
segmented. The result was that in all cases the democratic
experiments foundered on the hurdles thrown up by late socio­
economic development and by conjunctural factors such as the First
World War and its aftermath, the appearance of fascism and
Marxism-Leninism as ideologies and models for emulation, and by
economic depressions (Gunther, Puhle, & Diamandourous, 1995, p.
399).

Related to previous democratic experience, Huntington (1991a) hypothesizes that “a
longer and more recent experience with democracy is more conducive to democratic
consolidation than is a shorter and more distant one” (pp. 270-71). O’Donnell (1992) also suggests that cases of redemocratization, such as Chile and Uruguay, have more significant advantages than those constructing a democratic regime for the first time. For example, parties and a party system are usually more readily reconstituted to operate in a democracy in such cases, and other political institutions, such as the organization of legislatures, the operation of the electoral system, and so on, fall more easily into place (pp. 5-11).

Second, the nature of the nondemocratic predecessor regime contributes to the character of the consolidation process. Among them, as Linz, Stepan, & Gunther (1995) indicate, the degree of pluralism observable in the nondemocratic predecessor regime is of critical importance for democratic consolidation. Linz, Stepan, & Gunther (1995) insist that the higher degree of pluralism tolerated and even fostered by authoritarian regimes constitutes a positive legacy of critical importance for the success of consolidation (p. 82-3). Another variable, the character of the ruling elites and elite coalitions in the predecessor authoritarian regime, also affects the process of democratic consolidation. For example, in some countries of Latin America and Southern Europe, the degree of military penetration affects their consolidation process. That is, the more the military is entrenched in the authoritarian regime, the greater the probability that the consolidation in that country will be problematic (Aguero, 1995). Moreover, Linz, Stepan, & Gunther (1995) argue that the hierarchical versus nonhierarchical nature of the military presence within the predecessor nondemocratic regime has an influence in the consolidation process in a
given country. They insist that an authoritarian regime ruled by a nonhierarchical military elite is more easily displaced from power, with far fewer complications for the consolidation process. By contrast, an authoritarian regime ruled by a hierarchical military elite, i.e., lower-ranking officers such as colonels, has certain characteristics that can seriously complicate or hinder processes of democratic consolidation (pp. 85-6). Finally, the degree of unity or divisiveness of a predecessor regime’s ruling elite can also affect the prospect for consolidation. As the Spanish experience demonstrates, “the presence within this elite of reformers willing to collaborate with moderate members of the opposition forces greatly enhanced the likelihood for a successful consolidation” (Gunther, Puhle, & Diamandouros, 1995, p. 401).

Third, the mode of democratic transition from authoritarian rule has a significant effect over democratic consolidation and induces various types of democracies. Based on her modes of transitions, Karl (1990) claims that there may be important differences between countries like Uruguay, a pacted transition, and Brazil, a unilaterally imposed transition. For instance, while pacted democracies made through compromise between powerful contending elites may be flexible to the future bargaining and revision of existing rules, democracies imposed by one dominant group, such as the military, have less room for permitting challenges from opposition groups. She also shows the possible consequences of various modes of transition in the cases of Argentina and Peru. Although two countries combine elements of several modes of transition, they have seemingly failed to establish democratic consolidation. From these empirical analyses, she classifies types of democracies which are largely
shaped by the mode of transition in Latin America as follows:

Democratization by imposition is likely to yield conservative democracies.... Pacted transitions are likely to produce corporatist or consociational democracies in which party competition is regulated to varying degrees determined, in part, by the nature of foundational bargains. Transition through reform is likely to bring about competitive democracies, whose political fragility paves the way for an eventual return to authoritarianism. Finally, revolutionary transitions tend to result in one-party dominant democracies, where competition is also regulated (Karl, 1990, p. 15).

Focusing on the causal role that elite settlement plays in transitions to democracy, Burton, Gunther, & Higley (1992) analyze relationships between elite settlement and democratic consolidation. They point out that there are two ways to establish substantial consensus among elites: “elite settlement” and “elite convergence.” Among them, in particular, elite settlements have two main consequences in the democratic consolidation process: “they create patterns of open but peaceful competition among major elite factions, the result of which historically has been a stable limited democracy; and they can facilitate the eventual emergence of a consolidated democracy” (Burton, Gunther, & Higley, 1992, p. 14).

Burton, Gunther, & Higley (1992) analyze the relations between types of democracies and the roles of elite settlement and mass mobilization. In transitions to consolidated democracy, as Figure 4 shows, elite settlement serves to stabilize the political environment by establishing a procedural consensus, institutionalizing behavioral norms that restrain expressions of conflict, and encouraging patterns of elite interaction that reduce animosities across traditionally divisive lines of cleavage. In addition, elites can demobilize their supporters and the opposition, thereby reducing
the possibility that polarizing incidents of mass violence will break out. They suggest democratic transitions in Costa Rica in 1948, Venezuela in 1958, Spain in the late 1970’s, and Uruguay’s democratic transition in the mid-1980s as examples (pp. 23-4).

Figure 4. Democratic Transitions With/without Elite Settlements.

Combining the modes of transition with the attitudes of the existing authoritarian rulers toward democratization, as Figure 2 demonstrates, Valenzuela (1992) suggests various types of democracies. First, the transition to democracy with the last ruling elites of the authoritarian regime favors the democratization which generates the least problematic processes of democratic consolidation. For example, democratic transition through reform with “super-soft-liners,” who not only favor the liberalization of authoritarian rule but are committed to democratization, is more likely to permit the same leaders who carry out the transition to retain leading positions in
the new democratic context. In this case, the two phases of democratization have
greater continuity. Second, in cases where the successful resolution of the process of
democratic consolidation is less likely, democratic consolidation will have a greater
probability of success and will occur more smoothly in the following situations:

If the outgoing authoritarian regime elites are highly isolated from
the nation's social and political forces, if political leadership willing
to participate in a democratic framework is available for all major
segments of opinion, and if the authoritarian regime collapses swiftly
in the absence of civil war or much internal violence (Valenzuela,
1992, p. 76).

Finally, democratic transition through reform with a hard-line authoritarian regime
leadership opposed to democracy usually generates unique and difficult problems for
the subsequent consolidation of democracy. In this case, there is a great deal of
continuity in the political elites and state officials who remain in place from the
authoritarian regime to the democratic situation. And, as democratic transition through
reform creates formal institutions and the organizational basis for exerting tutelage, the
process of democratic consolidation must proceed unavoidably through reform as
well. Moreover, its success depends on a favorable relative balance of political forces
within the new institutional structures, and the opportunities they offer to accomplish
the necessary reforms without abandoning their formal procedures (p. 78).

Fourth, the international environment has an impact not only on the transition
to democracy but also on the consolidation process. For example, in Eastern European
countries, international factors, such as the collapse of the nondemocratic regimes, had
a clear and direct impact on democratization. In particular, in some European
countries, including Spain, Portugal, Greece, Turkey, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, the strong support for democracy exhibited by such organizations as the European Community reinforces new democratic institutions and provides an incentive for them to sustain their democracy (Pridham, 1995, pp.201-203; and Huntington, 1991a, pp. 273-74).

Fifth, some “partial regimes,” defined by Schmitter (1995) as a bundle of diverse institutions linking citizens to public authorities, can affect the process of democratic consolidation. A partial regime includes not only the central institutions of representative government and the party system, but also interest associations and social movements (pp. 284-86). First of all, Pasquino (1995) analyzes the impacts of executive-legislative relations on the democratic consolidation process in Southern Europe. He concludes that a stable and more authoritative executive is more conducive to the internalization and institutionalization of rules and practices established during the transition than is a weak, fragmented, or indecisive government (pp. 281-83). For the partial regime encompassing parties and party systems, Morlino (1995) argues that parties and party systems contributed decisively to democratic consolidation in Southern Europe.

On the other hand, from analysis of the Spanish party system, he finds that the consolidation of a party system is not a necessary condition for the consolidation of democracy (pp. 341-45). However, he claims that if the key institutions of a democracy have not secured a sufficient level of legitimacy, a stabilized party system and well-developed party organizations can play a crucial role in consolidating
democracy (pp. 359-62). That is, a stabilized party system can stabilize and structure interactions among actors and groups in society, channeling that behavior into democratic institutionalized arenas with the capacity to contain conflict, and habituating individuals and groups into conformity with democratic rules of the game. Finally, discussing interest groups as partial regimes, in his article, Schmitter (1995) concludes that “political parties have clearly played a more important role in the transition and early consolidation phases in four countries [Italy, Spain, Greece, & Portugal]” (p. 313). However, as he indicates, the consolidation of the partial regime of interest intermediation is likely to prove highly relevant to the distribution of benefits, to policy-making processes and the performance of government institutions, and to levels of citizen satisfaction with their respective democracies.

In addition to other factors affecting democratic consolidation, Huntington (1991a) points out a correlation between the level of economic development and the existence of democratic regimes. He insists that a more industrialized, modern economy and more complex society and educated populace are more conducive not only to the inauguration of democratic regimes but also to the consolidation of democratic regimes (pp. 271-73). He also considers the relation between the transition process and consolidation. He hypothesizes that “a peaceful, consensual transition favors democratic consolidation” (p. 276).

In summary, this chapter has dealt with theoretical studies on the third wave of democratization in terms of its conceptions, causes, and dynamic processes, including the modality of democratic transition and some factors affecting the prospect for
democratic consolidation. A review on theoretical explanations of the third wave of democratization is helpful to understanding South Korean democratization, which is one example from the third wave of democratization. The existing studies on democratization in Latin America and Western European countries, which have experienced various types of democratization, provide a useful comparison for the prospect for South Korean democratization. From a comparative perspective on the third wave of democratization, the next chapters analyze South Korean democratization in terms of its political environment, dynamic processes, and the problems and prospects in the democratic consolidation process.
CHAPTER III

SOUTH KOREA’S POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

The Korean peninsula, approximately 85,000 square miles in size, is 600 miles from north to south and about 140 miles from east to west. The Korean peninsula is strategically located in the center of East Asia with the overpowering presence of China and the former Soviet Union to the north and Japan to the south. Accordingly, Korea has been a "critical spot of international rivalry" (Kim & Ziring, 1977, p. 353).

Korea was under Japanese colonial rule for 35 years from 1910 through 1945. Since 1945, when Korea was liberated by the Allied Powers in World War II, it has been divided into North and South. The division at the 38th parallel was originally temporary, for the purpose of accepting the surrender of Japanese troops by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. (Han, 1987, p. 27). However, the creation of two governments (1948) in North and South Korea has fixed the division of the Korean peninsula. Accordingly, until the Cold War ended, the Korean peninsula was an advanced base for the ideologies and interests of the two occupying powers. As a result, the two governments in the north and south maintained their peculiar political systems under the influence of two strong powers. As long as North Korea’s bellicosity is not softened, a state of tension on the Korean peninsula will remain one of the most decisive factors in South Korean politics.
This chapter deals with political considerations affecting South Korean politics in terms of political culture, the structural division of the Korean peninsula, democratic experiments, and an authoritarian legacy. To understand the recent Korean democratization process, it is necessary to explore the country's political environment. It provides useful information in analyzing the causes, problems, and prospects of Korean democratization.

Political Culture

Political culture is the set of beliefs and values concerning politics that prevail among both the elite and the mass (Diamond, Lipset, & Linz, 1987, p. 9). According to Almond & Powell, Jr. (1978), "political culture has been shaped by the nation's history and by the ongoing processes of social, economic, and political activity. The attitude patterns that have been shaped in past experience have important constraining effects on future political behavior" (p. 25). The political culture approach is a useful framework for analyzing the characteristics, problems, and prospects of Korean democratization. It is also necessary to explore both traditional culture and its change in recent time to properly understand the political culture of a country (Kihl, 1984, pp.107-14). What follows is an examination of two aspects of political culture in South Korea. One is the traditional political culture. The other is the changing political culture.
The Characteristics of Traditional Political Culture

Many Korean scholars have regarded "authoritarian political culture" as the dominant aspect of political culture in South Korea (Lee, 1982; Son, 1983; Ahn, 1987; Han & Uh, 1989; and Kim, 1990). Moreover, they see authoritarianism as a key feature of the Korean life experience. For example, Kim (1990) points out cultural factors of authoritarian political culture, such as the Confucian culture, the sadaecjuui (the principle of dependence on outside powers), quick temperament and violent emotions, the heukbaekronri (the way of thinking for discriminating between right and wrong), the consciousness of distrust, the confusion complex and the preference for stability, the anbo ideology (i.e., ideology that strengthens control over the people through the circumstance of security crisis) and the military culture, and factionalism (pp. 245-52).

Historically speaking, authoritarian political culture came from the Confucianism of the Korean Yi dynasty (1392-1910), which was made the official ideology of the state. This Confucianism stressed the superiority of the King and government officials. Confucianism established ethical standards of behavior and emphasized the principles of hierarchy in human relations (Kihl, 1984, p. 108). According to Ahn (1987), Confucian culture influenced Korean political culture as follows: (a) Confucianism emphasized obedience to parents and made social relations dependent on family or blood relations rather than on external organizations or systems; (b) Confucianism stressed the principle of hierarchy in all human relations; (c)
Confucianism emphasized governance by moral rule rather than by law or system. Social order was maintained by human relations and effective politics depended on a leader’s virtue rather than the political system; and (d) Confucianism placed importance on tradition and stability rather than on change which was perceived as disruptive (pp. 307-309).

During the period of Japanese colonial rule (1910-1945), Korea’s experience with authoritarianism was even more repressive and restrictive. Japan’s coercive bureaucratic government not only undermined and divided Korean society, but it also gave the Korean people a negative image of authority. The discontinuation of the teaching of Korean history, and the disruption of Korean self-rule under the Japanese colonial government brought about a crisis in the Korean’s view of their legitimacy as a nation (Shin, 1987, pp. 80-1). Also, because all aspects of Korean politics were controlled by Japan, the political consciousness of the Korean people developed a resistance to government, they became closed to others, morally constrained, generally harbored, and negative attitudes (Kim & Chey, 1976, pp. 124-26).

After independence from Japan, Korean governments did not discard the authoritarian elements embedded in the political experience. This is because an authoritarian elite consciousness combined with the passive obedience of the public. The perpetuation of authoritarianism, furthermore, was consciously pursued by Korea’s political leaders. Shin (1986) explains the political culture of political elites in Korea as follows: (a) boundless ambition for political power by political leaders and their self-righteous standardization, (b) the factionalism of political parties; (c)
politicians' stopping at nothing to gain their political ends, and (d) antagonistic relationships between the ruling party and the opposition based on the idea of discriminating between right and wrong, i.e. the idea of dividing everything into two parts (p. 283).

As we have seen, the Korean political culture was a hierarchical authoritarianism based on Confucianism. And its authoritarianism resulted from not only authoritarian political behavior but also the passive obedience of the public. Under the authoritarian political culture, paternalism and oppression have been invoked for political rule (Kim, 1990, p. 243). The decision-making process only needs a commander and a follower so that those who are close to political power can enjoy privilege and the people, as the object of political power, can only obey authority.

The Changing Political Culture

Political culture in a country is influenced by changes in its social structure. The Korean political culture has seen great changes in its various subcultures, such as the elite, the mass, the farmer, and the low-income groups (Shin, 1986, pp. 276-94). Since the early 1960s, Korean society has experienced rapid changes through economic development and modernization. South Korea has achieved a dramatic rate of economic growth through a state-led export strategy and low labor rates. The level of public education has increased because of constant enforcement of public education since 1945. Social mobilization has largely occurred through the development of
transportation, communication, mass media, and urbanization. These socioeconomic developments have influenced South Korea's change from an authoritarian to a democratic political culture.

Scholars have analyzed the changing political culture of South Korea through opinion survey data (Kihl, 1984; Kihl, 1985; and Lee, 1985). Kihl (1984) studied the political attitudes of contemporary South Korean society. According to his findings, "the urban elite and public are more active politically than rural residents" (p. 110). Kihl (1984) also insists that "urbanization and industrialization seem to have affected the political consciousness of South Korea's adult population and their willingness to participate more in politics" (p. 110). In the opinion survey data on Koreans' political consciousness from 1974 to 1984, Lee (1985) insists that during this period Koreans' political culture changed from an authoritarian and subjective one to a democratic and participant political culture.

Although the general level of Korean democratic culture has improved through industrialization and urbanization, authoritarian political culture coexists with democratic political culture within all parts of the society. The problems that authoritarian political culture has brought to the Korean political process are as follows. First, political elites have monopolized the political process and are reluctant for the public to participate. Instead, political elites have tried to maintain their power by abnormal means, such as mass manipulation and mass mobilization. As a consequence, horizontal communication between political leaders and the public was not permitted and trust was difficult to recover on both sides. Second, the general
public was isolated from politics so that its political efficacy became low. Third, authoritarian political culture made the social structure rigid so that the society became insensitive to new domestic and international changes. Fourth, the political party system was comprised of actor-centered parties rather than policy-centered parties because the authoritarian political culture operated under the principle of hierarchy in human relations. Finally, many political and social conflicts between political powers and social groups have occurred because political participation of the public was limited and not institutionalized (Ahn, 1987, p. 312).

The Partition of the Korean Peninsula

After the Japanese surrender to the U.S. and its allies on August 15, 1945, the Korean peninsula was temporarily divided into two occupation zones by the United States and the Soviet Union. The Red Army was present to accept the Japanese surrender north of the 38th parallel. American troops arrived in Korea south of the dividing line a month later. However, subsequent political disagreement between the two occupying powers on the unification of Korea made the temporary military division into a long term political and ideological one (Kim, 1971, p. 13). The failure to reach an agreement between the two occupying powers resulted in the emergence of two separate regimes on the Korean peninsula. On August 15, 1948, the Republic of Korea was inaugurated, and at almost the same time this government assumed authority in the south, the regime in the north, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, was proclaimed on September 9, 1948 (Kwak, Kim, & Kim, 1982, p. 2).
So, the 38th parallel, intended as a temporary demarcation line, became a boundary between two rival states, causing disillusionment among those Koreans who had struggled for the country’s independence and unity. The consolidation of rival political regimes in southern and northern Korea has profoundly affected political, economic, and social developments in both parts of the peninsula (Kim, 1971, p. 12).

Under the influence of the two rival powers, the two separate regimes in southern and northern Korea which emerged from the division each took its own way in state-building. In the early stage of the Cold War, South and North Korea came to a showdown over the opposing systems of government that had been implemented. This led to the tragic Korean War of 1950-53. Since the Korean War, the division has hardened and the two separate regimes have maintained their antagonistic stances, as well as competing ideologies. Moreover, in this quasi-state of war, the two regimes have entered into a fierce armaments race and have both regarded national security as the state’s principal priority (Kim, 1990, p. 475).

Since the division of Korea, the two regimes have used their military confrontation to suppress liberalization and to infringe on individual rights in each society. As Chung (1988) points out, the two regimes have appropriated the issue of reunification and have skillfully used a national security ideology to maintain their regimes’ stability. As evidence, he suggests that they have not tried to alter their antagonistic relations, except for a few formal contacts, and have ignored the impact of public opinion on Korean reunification (p. 361). South Korean authoritarian regimes have prolonged the life of their governments and clung to power by using an
anti-Communism posture. For instance, former President Park Chung Hee (1961-1979) revised the constitution (Yushin) to legitimate his permanent dictatorship, emphasizing the special circumstance existing in southern and northern Korea. Another example is that of former President Chun Doo Whan (1980-1987), who repressed the opposition and that segment of the public protesting his dictatorship, under the pretense of the crisis of the Keum Kang Mountain Dam attack by North Korea (Chung, 1988, p. 362). It is generally recognized that sustained antagonistic relations between South and North Korea have obstructed democratization in South Korea.

Kim (1990) has analyzed the political, social, and economic impact of the division of Korea. First, it caused the United States to assume greater responsibility for the security of South Korea during the Cold War. The United States stationed troops there and provided Seoul with military and economic aid. Second, authoritarian regimes strengthened their controls over society, and by emphasizing an anti-Communist ideology, they excluded the masses from the political process. Third, the government dominated the economy and controlled the market system. Fourth, the division of Korea caused a “pull factor,” i.e., inducing military coups, and a “push factor,” i.e., perpetuating military regimes. And fifth, the division of Korea ruptured the political process, producing sharply opposed left and right wings, i.e., establishment vs. anti-establishment; democracy vs. anti-democracy; conservatism vs. reform; capital vs. labor; unification vs. anti-unification; and pro-Americanism vs. anti-Americanism. These ideological conflicts threatened the very identity of Korean
society (Kim, 1990, pp. 483-95).

Political History

Since the beginning of the Republic in 1948, democracy has remained an elusive goal of South Korean politics. Although the country experienced a brief democratic interlude with the Second Republic (1960-1961), authoritarianism prevailed over most of its history. The major phases of South Korean history can be described as follows: (a) the “First Republic” (1948-1960) under the government of President Syngman Rhee, which became increasingly dictatorial; (b) the democratic interlude of the “Second Republic” (1960-1961), which was ousted in a military coup; (c) the earlier semiauthoritarian period (1961-1972) under President Park Chung Hee; (d) the later highly authoritarian Yushin (“revitalizing reforms”) period (1973-1979), which ended with the assassination of President Park; and (e) the virtual dictatorship of President Chun Doo Hwan (1980-1987) (Han, 1989, p. 267).

In June 1987, Roh Tae Woo, a presidential candidate of the ruling party Democratic Justice Party, made his 6.29 Declaration, and thereby provided the breakthrough for South Korean democracy. South Korea then began the process of democratic transition (1988-1992). A new constitution was drafted and political competition between the ruling party and the opposition parties was permitted. Later, South Korea moved toward democratic consolidation with the reforms of the Kim Young Sam government (1993-). It is necessary to examine the process of democratization and to understand the chances for its success. In particular, it is
necessary to explore the factors affecting democratic consolidation.

Democratic Experiments

From 1948 to 1987, South Korea had two democratic experiments, the First Republic of President Syngman Rhee (1948-1960) and the Second Republic of Prime Minister Chang Myon (1960-1961). The First Republic was established in 1948 after thirty-five years of Japanese colonial rule (1910-1945), followed by three years of U.S. military occupation government (1945-1948). The new government was born with a democratic constitution. It provided for "an extensive bill of rights was provided; the basic method of leadership selection was to be electoral; and there were provisions calling for separation of powers, and for checks and balances" (Lee, 1975, pp. 20-1).

The 1948 constitution, however, was subverted by President Rhee, who increasingly exercised autocratic power. President Rhee monopolized power through the police and administrative bureaucracy which were already well-organized from the Japanese colonial period. Under President Rhee, the democratic constitution was twice illegally amended, and violated numerous times. His dictatorship, "based primarily on coercive force and to some extent his personal charisma," (Han, 1989, p. 269) disregarded civil rights, rigged elections, repressed the opposition, and restricted freedom of expression.

Ironically, and in spite of these abuses of power, South Koreans were introduced to democratic experiences. The rise in democratic consciousness among the public was caused by the American presence and rapid urbanization. This
consciousness became a strong political force against the dictatorial government of President Rhee. In the fourth presidential election of March 15, 1960, Rhee tried to prolong his rule with a rigged election. This act caused a violent reaction from many city people, including high school and college students as well as urban-intellectuals. Massive protests forced Rhee to step down and a new democratic government was formed.

The Second Republic was led by Prime Minister Chang Myon. After the Rhee regime fell, a caretaker government (June 21, 1960 to August 12, 1960) adopted a new constitution, and changed the political system from a presidential to a parliamentary type. Chang Myon, the leader of "the new faction" of the Democratic Party, was elected Prime Minister. Chang Myon moved to dispose of the undemocratic vestiges of the Rhee regime. Persons responsible for rigging the March elections, for the killing of demonstrators during the April uprising in 1960, and for corrupt activities, were arrested and punished for their crimes (Kim, 1990, p. 214).

Chang Myon's government, however, from the beginning was beset with many insurmountable problems. First, because the new government owed its creation to public protests against the Rhee regime, it was expected to satisfy the immediate demands of the anti-Rhee forces. Their demand for severe punishment of those responsible for the bloody repression in April, could not be satisfied, and the court sentences disappointed the general citizenry, especially the students. On October 8, 1960, the Seoul District Court passed sentences on 48 Rhee officials accused of breaches of the National Security Law and the Presidential Election Law. Some also
were found guilty of capital offences. Only one defendant, however, received a death sentence, while others either were acquitted, given probationary sentences, or fined (Lee, 1975, p.26). When the light court sentences were made public, demonstrations and protests broke out in South Korea’s major cities. Startled by the intensity of the demonstrations, the National Assembly pushed through emergency legislation establishing a revolutionary court that was ordered to try former officials who were charged with brutalities and election rigging. The National Assembly also adopted “special revolutionary laws” for punishing “anti-democratic criminals” on December 31, 1960.

The Chang government, however, lost support from both sides, from its coalition partners, including intellectuals, liberal students, and anti-Rhee politicians, and from “conservative groups that had supported the Rhee regime and that could conceivably have been wooed to the side of the Democratic regime by offering them protection” (Han, 1989, p. 271). The Chang government could not effectively deal with the serious ideological and social cleavages between the conservatives who wanted an amicable settlement and the radical political groups who demanded harsh punishment for those persons they considered guilty in the deaths of the demonstrators (Han, 1974, pp. 212-15).

Furthermore, Chang Myon suffered from the ruling Democratic Party’s internal strife. In 1955, the Democratic Party was composed of persons from the old National Democratic Party, which was one of the opposition parties, and members of the Liberal Party, which had been alienated from Syngman Rhee. The former became the
"old" faction, and the latter, the "new" faction within the Democratic Party. Disputes between the two factions were based on personal issues and private interests, not different ideologies or socioeconomic status. After Syngman Rhee passed from the scene, the two factions vied for control of the party. Given irreconcilable conflicts, the "old" faction broke away from the Democratic Party and formed a separate opposition party called the New Democratic Party. The latter assumed the role of an opposition party. "The fact," observes Lee (1975), "that the ruling party failed to maintain internal unity gave rise to the popular feeling that the Democrats were too power-greedy and narrow-minded to place national interest above their partisan or individual interests" (p. 28).

While the Chang Myon government was fettered by divisive political problems, social and economic problems were left largely unattended, and the situation worsened. The economy experienced a shortage of capital and a rise in the price of major commodities (Han, 1974, p. 209). In addition, public and private sector corruption destroyed public confidence and the Chang government failed to find an effective response. The Second Republic therefore was short-lived and Chang Myon was forced from office and sought refuge in the United States.

South Korea's two early democratic experiments offered some lessons for the future. First, democracy needs more than democratic laws and institutions. It also needs the will and determination of political leaders, as well as the support of the public. Although the First Republic and the Second Republic had democratic constitutions, President Rhee ignored constraints on the uses power, and Chang Myon
could not restrain those who sought to press individual agendas. Too much power on
the one side and too little on the other destroyed both experiments.

Second, economic and social conditions are very important to the
democratization process. The second democratic experiment showed that democracy
could not be maintained without socioeconomic maturity. Even with political
democracy, the Chang government’s inefficiency, its inability to manage economic
difficulties and the resulting social instability were crucial factors in its fall.

Third, astute and honest political leadership is a key issue in promoting
democratic development. Although the First Republic had a democratic constitution,
President Rhee ignored it. In the Second Republic, Prime Minister Chang Myon
proved to be too weak as a leader. He did not secure his political base and he left
economic conditions unattended. He even neglected the role of military, and thus
succumbed to their aggressive use of power.

Finally, the public’s level of political consciousness was very low, but signs of
greater awareness could be seen in the urban protest movements. The failure of the
two democratic experiments proved to be learning experiences that had great
significance for South Korea’s political future.

The Authoritarian Legacy

South Korean politics were essentially authoritarian for the next 26 years,
from the time Major General Park Chung Hee came to power in May 1961 to the time
President Chun Doo Hwan peacefully transferred power to the next President Roh Tae
Woo in December 1987. Linz (1973) defines authoritarian regimes as "political systems with limited, not responsible, political pluralism; without elaborate guiding ideology; without intensive or extensive political mobilization; and in which a leader exercises power within formally ill-defined but predictable limits" (p. 185). South Korea's authoritarian regimes possessed all of these characteristics. They rejected political competition, disregarded civil rights, and functioned without a legitimate public mandate.

Major General Park Chung Hee came to power in May 1961 after toppling the constitutionally established government of Chang Myon. After governing for two years through a Supreme Council for National Reconstruction composed of military men, he retired from the army and was elected president in December 17, 1963.

The Park regime can be divided into two periods. The first is the time from Park's inauguration as president in 1963 to the sixth constitutional amendment of 1969, that allowed Park to run for a third term in 1971. Park regarded the restoration of social order and economic development as important goals. To this end, he banned political parties and suspended civil rights. Organizing a command economy, he called for national planning and export expansion. The armed forces co-opted civilian technical and bureaucratic specialists, and with their cooperation, the country enjoyed a period of economic growth. During this initial period, the Park regime allowed some competitive political activity but it also strengthened its power through reliance on the intelligence activities, especially that of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA).
The sixth constitutional amendment of September 1969 further dramatized the authoritarian nature of the Park regime. Park wanted to prolong his stay in office, but the urban intelligentsia was opposed to this action and student demonstrations again disturbed the peace in Korean cities. In the election of 1971 Park narrowly defeated Kim Dae Jung, receiving 53.2 percent of the votes cast, while Kim received 45.3 percent. But Park lost to Kim in the urban areas by 44.9 percent to Kim’s 51.4 percent (Henderson, 1987, p. 104). After his victory, Park felt that “his continued stay in office could be threatened under the existing electoral system despite the enormous advantages he enjoyed in the elections as the incumbent” (Han, 1989, p. 275). He therefore initiated a bloodless coup against his own 1963 constitutional system. Imposing martial law on October 17, 1972, the 1963 constitution was replaced by the Yushin Constitution and adopted in a referendum. The Yushin constitution provided for the indirect election of the president by a locally elected National Conference for Unification composed of military officers; appointment by the president of one-third of the 219-member National Assembly; an unrestricted number of six-year terms for the president; sharp reduction in the powers of the legislature and the judiciary, and the curtailment of civil and political rights by presidential decrees (Lee, 1973, pp. 99-101). The Yushin system enabled Park to monopolize power and establish one-man dictatorship. Although he envisaged remaining in power indefinitely, Park’s actions provoked the opposition which ultimately destroyed him. Nevertheless, from 1963 until 1975, Park’s government presided over a sensational economy which saw tremendous growth in export. But the character of economic opportunity permitted
greedy entrepreneur to enter into corrupt practices which caused an inflationary spiral
and increasing national debt that the government could not manage. Demonstrations
against the Park dictatorship began in 1978, and by 1979 they had spread throughout
country. Riots erupted in Pusan and Masan following the expulsion from the Assembly
of the popular opposition leader, Kim Young Sam. On October 26, 1979 Park was
assassinated by Kim Jae Kyu, the chief of Korea’s Central Intelligence Agency, and
eighteen years of authoritarian rule came to an end. Choi Kyu Hwa was elected
president on December 6, 1979, but by August 16, 1980 he was shunted aside and
General Chun Doo Hwan assumed control of the government.

The Chun Doo Hwan regime (1980-1987), followed the *Yushin* pattern and
sustained military rule in the country. General Chun Doo Hwan had led the military
Security Command under the Park government and his role in the army gave him the
power to arrest General Chung Seung Hwa, the chief martial law administrator, and
control the armed forces. Only the student population resisted Chun’s illegal takeover,
and they defied the junta’s declaration of full martial law on May 17, 1980. Chun
refused to listen to student complaints and he ordered the army to move forcefully
against the demonstrations. The army brutally suppressed the “Kwangju
Democratization Movement” in May 1980 and a new constitution, which retained
many of the key features of the Yushin Constitution, was approved in a national
referendum in October. Under this new constitution, Chun was elected president for a
seven-year term without opposition on February 25, 1981.
The Chun regime called for a new political order. It abolished all the old political parties, purged their leaders, and banned hundreds of politicians from engaging in political activity. Chun permitted a semblance of competition but his objective was the creation of a one party dominant system. Thus, in addition to his own Democratic Justice Party, he allowed the formation of several parties by political personalities who could not challenge the ruling junta. As in the *Yushin* system, Chun retained or strengthened the instruments of “power and control,” i.e., KCIA (renamed the National Security Planning Agency) and the Military Security Command (Han, 1989, p. 280). Moreover, the junta effectively controlled the press through the mandatory dismissal of hundreds of journalists, and the censorship of their newspapers. The monopolization of power, the aggressive use of physical force, and the unlimited power given to the police, the military, and KCIA destroyed all pretenses that South Korea was a developing democracy.

Due to both internal and external pressures, by 1985 Chun was forced to lift the ban imposed on the politicians and a new, independent opposition party, the New Korea Democratic Party (NKDP), was formed. In February 1985, this new opposition party won six-sevenths of the 184 elective seats in the parliamentary election. Given its electoral success, the NKDP mounted a vigorous campaign to liberalize the political scene. It called for amendment permitting the direct election of the president. Students, intellectuals, progressive Christians, and others supported the NKDP and their demands for democratic reforms could not be ignored. In February 1986 Chun agreed to revise the constitution, but he refused to transfer power, and the protests
against his regime intensified and spread. Using his dictatorial power, Chun declared he would suspend debate on constitutional reform, but this only added to the fury of the protest. His decision was met with near universal disapproval. The Chun government faced massive, prolonged, and violent demonstrations. The general rioting reached its peak after June 10, 1987 when Chun's party, the DJP, formally nominated Roh Tae Woo as the party's presidential candidate and forced the dictator to step aside. The Chun regime was ended by Roh Tae Woo's 6.29 declaration that incorporated virtually all the opposition's demands.

In summary, this historic overview of South Korea's military authoritarian regimes shows that even though army leaders held office by physical power alone, they could not quell the public's democratic demands. In the end it was the determination of the Korean people and their willingness to sacrifice everything they possessed, including their lives, that brought down the powerful rules. The authoritarian legacy, however, remained a patent element and democratic governments faced the difficult test of demonstrating that they could do a better job in not only promoting greater socioeconomic opportunity, but also managing national security.

South Korea's military authoritarian regimes left the following problems: First, the authoritarian regimes disregarded normal political procedure. They came to power through illegal military coups d'état and changed the constitution several times, always for their political advantage rather than the citizenry's benefits. Accordingly, constitutions were suspect and did not provide the required legal framework in critical situations. For example, "when President Park died the country did not even have a
legal framework within which a new leader or government could be chosen in an orderly way” (Han, 1989, p. 276).

Second, the authoritarian regimes were one-man-centered dictatorships in which the president monopolized power and subordinated the legislature and judiciary. They also focused on the output functions of the government, through the executive branch, denying the input functions provided by political parties or interest groups. As a result, parties could not attract the participation of high-caliber individuals, or induce strong association between the electorate and the organizations. Because political parties failed as the main medium in the struggle for power, the people had no alternative except to take to the streets in protest demonstrations and movements.

Third, the authoritarian regimes placed their emphasis on economic development as a way to justify their seizure of power. Park lifted the Korean people from poverty through high-speed industrialization, and Chun encouraged Korea’s economic development as an industrially advanced country. In fact, under the rule of the dictators, South Korea achieved astonishing economic growth, with an annual growth rate of nearly 10 percent over a twenty year period. This economic growth created “a substantial economic class that could become the mainstay of a democratic political system if and when it were established” (Han, 1989, p. 277). However, the regime’s economic policy for supporting big business, i.e., chaebol (conglomerates), caused another problem. This economic policy prevented the balanced development between big business and small business. In addition, the linkage of political authority and business gave use to extensive corruption in the sociopolitical system.
Finally, authoritarian regimes promoted the politicization of the military. Because the military found it relatively easy to topple civilian regimes, it became prone to intervening in politics whenever the occasion seemed to warrant their intrusion. The military culture, however, emphasizes uniformity of thought as well as order and obedience in personal relations. The military culture is contrary to democratic culture which emphasizes diversity, personality development, harmony, and a willingness to compromise. Moreover, military authoritarian regimes will more than likely use their physical power when seeking political advantage, and the confusion created by their intervention in national affairs serious questions concerning their national security responsibilities, indeed their capacity to defend the nation from external threats.
CHAPTER IV

A PROCESS OF DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS IN SOUTH KOREA

In June of 1987, South Korea began the process of democratic transition. The 6.29 Declaration of Roh Tae Woo, the candidate of the ruling Democratic Justice Party (DJP) in the presidential election of December 1987, provided the breakthrough for South Korean democratization. In July 1987, Roh Tae Woo and the opposition agreed to adopt a new constitution, which outlined the new democratic rules: a direct popular vote for the president; abolition of the right of the president to dissolve the National Assembly; and a provision that gave the National Assembly the right to investigate the activities of the executive branch. Since the promulgation of this constitution, South Korea has held two presidential elections and three general elections.

This chapter argues that by electing a civilian president (December 1992), South Korea has passed from the democratic transition phase into a democratic consolidation phase. President Kim Young Sam is the first civilian president since Chang Myon, and he has instituted both political reform and socioeconomic reform.

This chapter analyzes the process of democratic transition in South Korea in order to understand the problems of democratic consolidation, and to develop the principal features of future South Korean democratization.
The Democratic Transition Phase

South Korea's democratic transition phase lasted for five years, from Roh Tae Woo's 6.29 Declaration of 1987 to the December 1992 presidential election (Kihl, 1995, p. 465). As O'Donnell (1992) explains, authoritarian regression can occur through a "sudden death," via a classic military coup in the first democratic transition (p. 19). Although his explanation is based on the experiences of Latin American countries, it shows that the democratic transition process is uncertain and complex and that the possibilities for authoritarian regression are numerous.

In South Korea today the likelihood of authoritarian regression through military coups d'état is considered very remote. This is because South Korea's democratic transition emerged from a compromise arrangement between the old authoritarian elite and its political opposition. Moreover, South Korea's economic expansion has decreased the number of dangers that threaten a new democracy. However, the process of democratic transition is not a smooth one. Although President Roh was elected by direct public vote, his legitimacy suffered because he also had been a leader of the military regime that had earlier seized power. Moreover, Roh opened the country to democracy, but the process did not go fast enough for the public. To protest his tenure and guarantee his personal security after his retirement, President Roh formed a "grand conservative ruling coalition," which consisted of the President, Kim Young Sam, leader of Reunification Democratic Party, and Kim Jong Pil, the prominent figure in the New Democratic Republican Party. To understand the
dynamic process of democratic transition in South Korea, it is necessary to explore not
only the 6.29 Declaration of Roh Tae Woo, but also this ruling coalition.

The 6.29 Declaration of Roh Tae Woo

In the 6.29 Declaration, the authoritarian regime promised to restore
democracy and carry out democratic reforms, including the holding of a popular
presidential election (Kihl, 1995, p. 463). This was the beginning of the end for the
South Korean authoritarian regimes. Democratization began with the February 12,
1985 National Assembly election. After the Chun regime lifted the political ban on the
former politicians, the opposition forces coalesced into a single party, i.e., the New
Korea Democratic Party (NKDP). In the parliamentary election of February 12, 1985,
the NKDP captured 67 of the 184 elective seats and emerged as the major opposition
party. The emergence of a genuine opposition party with two strong leaders, Kim
Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung, changed the South Korean political scene. The NKDP
insisted on negotiations with the Chun regime, and demanded constitutional
amendments that guaranteed fair play. The authoritarian regime, however, adhered to
its stubborn stance against any democratic reforms, forcing the opposition to take
direct action.

The opposition brought its protest into the streets. It held a series of large
rallies in coordination with other party movements. It was only under the threat of this
nationwide protest that the ruling party agreed to meet at the negotiating table. The
initial negotiations between the ruling party, which insisted on a parliamentary cabinet
system of government, and the opposition NKDP, which insisted on "a presidential system in which president as chief executive would be popularly and directly elected," (Kihl, 1988, p. 5) failed to reach agreement. President Chun suspended the discussions, but his action precipitated vehement public protests that led to the Park Jong Chul incident wherein a student was killed by the police after having been tortured. The anger of the protesters could not be contained once this information was made public. All the social forces, including the opposition parties, the radical social movements, the white collar workers, and the students, now concentrated their efforts on the struggle to force Chun from power and to revise the constitution (Im, 1995, p. 144).

In the face of massive, prolonged, and often violent anti-government demonstrations, the Chun regime was limited to two choices. One was the use of the troops to quell the popular uprising. However, the military was reluctant to act, especially because the US was openly pressing the regime to moderate its behavior and accept the reforms. The Chun regime therefore chose the other option, namely, the 6.29 Declaration (Lee & Moon, 1995, p. 220). Roh conceded to the opposition’s demand for direct presidential elections, and South Korea entered the democratic transition phase.

What lay behind the democratization of South Korea in 1987? First, there was the economic factor which included rapid industrialization. In fact industry had grown so rapidly that serious structural problems developed and little consideration had been given to the production of quality manufactures. Moreover, an energy crisis in 1979 further
dislocated the South Korean economy. The government had pushed heavy chemical industrialization causing imbalances in resource allocations that negatively impacted other industries (Kihl, 1995, p. 463). These economic problems exposed the authoritarian regime to serious criticism and contributed to its demise. Economic growth also caused severe income distribution problems within the working class, and the inequities produced strains that carried through the entire society.

Second, the steady decline in the legitimacy of the authoritarian regime precipitated its fall. Because it failed to meet new demands for political freedom and greater public participation, the government could no longer justify its existence. In addition, because of the public’s antagonism to military rule, and especially to its repressive actions, i.e., the denial of human rights and political competition, the authoritarian regime could not bolster its legitimacy. The Roh regime failed in its efforts to win over the public because it was seen as self-aggrandizing and profligate.

Third, democratic transition was made possible by people’s power, in particular the persistence, strength, and determination of opposition party leaders who were allied with politically active students, intellectuals, labor union leaders, progressive journalists, clergy, and ideological dissenters (Han, 1989, p. 292). Although the people’s choice was often suppressed by the authoritarian regime’s police power, the people consistently chose the democratic position. The public gave momentum to democratic forces by supporting the opposition in the February 25, 1985 National Assembly election.
Finally, a change in U.S. policy toward the military dictatorship stimulated the democratic transition process. Contrary to Washington’s acquiescent support for South Korea’s previous military regimes, the US reduced its commitment to rightist military dictatorships. The fall of Marcos in the Philippines was a dramatic example of this shift in policy. The US publicly opposed the Chun regime’s use of the armed forces against the South Korean people (Im, 1995, pp. 149-50). As a consequence, the South Korean military hesitated in cracking down in the demonstrations and it did not discourage the democratization movement of 1987. Thus, U.S. influence in South Korean politics was a major factor in the democratization process.

The Grand Conservative Ruling Coalition

Democratic transition processes are uncertain and complex. This is because authoritarian elites still coexist with democrats and various demands of the public can erupt explosively. South Korea is no exception. After the opening of the democratic transition process, the continuously unstable sociopolitical situation created the need for a second political compromise between the ruling party and the opposition, i.e., the “grand conservative ruling coalition.” As such, the grand coalition was another milestone in South Korea’s democratic transition process.

On October 12, 1987 and after the 6.29 Declaration, then-ruling Democratic Justice Party (DJP) and the opposition parties agreed to a new constitution. Roh Tae Woo, the presidential candidate of the DJP, was elected the Thirteenth President in the presidential election of December 1987. However, the ruling party (DJP) failed to
secure a majority in the National Assembly elections held on April 26, 1988. National Assembly election results are shown in Table 2. Out of a total of 299 seats, the ruling party, the Democratic Justice Party (DJP), gained 125 seats, the first opposition party, the Party for Peace and Democracy (PPD), had 71 seats, the second opposition party, the Reunification Democratic Party (RDP), had 59 seats, and the third opposition party, New Democratic Republican Party (NDRP), won 35 seats. The election was judged fair and open and the political parties played a major role in the democratic transition process, notably by replacing the social movement forces (Im, 1995, p. 147).

Table 2

Distribution of Legislature Seats in the 1988 Parliamentary Election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Parties</th>
<th>Number of Seats</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Justice Party</td>
<td>125 (87/38) *</td>
<td>41.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party for Peace and Democracy</td>
<td>70 (54/16)</td>
<td>23.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reunification Democratic Party</td>
<td>59 (46/13)</td>
<td>19.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Democratic Republican Party</td>
<td>35 (27/8)</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party for the Korean people and Democracy</td>
<td>1 (1/0)</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independents</td>
<td>9 (9/0)</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>299 (224/75)</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* (The Number of Assemblymen in a Local Constituency/ Those in the National Constituency)
The election also made it possible for the opposition parties to block executive efforts at subverting the National Assembly (Lee, 1994, p. 150). This proved a fatal blow to the Roh regime and he was forced to cooperate with the opposition parties.

In the Thirteenth National Assembly, the opposition parties strongly urged the liquidation of all the legacies of the Fifth Republic, and they conducted hearings on such explosive matters as "the Fifth Republic scandal" and "the Kwangju incident." The former was related to the Chun family's irrationality and corruption. The latter was related to the Chun regime's undemocratic behavior on May 18, 1980 in Kwangju city. These two incidents were tied to the legitimacy of the Fifth Republic. When "the new junta" that included General Chun Doo Whan and Rho Tae Woo came to power in 1979, they attacked senior military offices and mercilessly repressed protesting Kwangju citizens. As a consequence of the National Assembly hearings on the uses of undemocratic power, Roh was compelled to break his ties with the Fifth Republic junta led by Chun Doo Whan. Roh's political support was limited and his weaknesses could not be overcome by his ruling party.

Roh's weak leadership resulted in sociopolitical instability. The proliferation of independent labor unions produced an explosion of labor disputes. Their size and power expanded nationwide. In 1989, the percentage of organized labor reached 72.9 percent for work places with more than 300 employees. There were 3,625 recorded labor disputes from June 1987 to the end of that year, 1,873 in 1988, and 1,161 in 1989, compared to only 265 in 1985, and 276 in 1986. As a result, during this same period, real wages for labor increased by an inflationary 14 percent in 1989 (Lee,
High increased wages exceeded the growth of productivity. And it made South Korea’s price competitiveness in the international market weak.

Social movements, including students, criticized the regime for failing to bring about distributive justice and substantial democracy. Their protests were more violent and they also followed a radical ideology, e.g., Marxism-Leninism, and some even projected the Juche ideology of North Korea’s Kim Il Sung. Thus, the ideological spectrum of South Korean society changed from pro-government vs. anti-government, to conservatism vs. radicalism. The spread of radical social movements conversely provided a sociopolitical milieu for the coalition of conservative. Because authoritarian regimes had infused the public with anti-Communism ideology for a long time, the South Korean public opposed Communism and other radical ideologies. Moreover, radical groups received little support from the public in the National Assembly Election.

The decline of crucial economic indicators accentuated the weakening of President Roh’s political leadership. As Table 3 indicates, the Gross National Product (GNP) increased by an average of 11.3 percent from 1987 to 1988 but decreased by 6.7 percent and 9.0 percent in 1989 and 1990, respectively. The current account balance recorded a trade balance decline to US$ 4,597.2 million in 1989, compared to US$ 11,445.4 million in 1988. The consumer price index increased by 7.1 percent in 1988 and 5.7 percent in 1989, contrary to 2.5 percent in 1985 and 2.8 percent in 1986, and 3.0 percent in 1987. The production index of the manufacturing sector declined from an average of 14.9 percent in 1985-88 to 2.6 percent in 1989.
### Table 3

South Korea's Principal Economic Indicators, 1985 - 1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Growth Rate of GNP (%)</th>
<th>Trade Balance (Million US$)</th>
<th>Consumer Price Index (%)</th>
<th>Production Index of Manufacturing (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>- 19.0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>4,205.9</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>21.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>7,659.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>19.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>11,445.4</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>4,597.2</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>- 1,854.3</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


After the opening of democratization, the Roh regime had little legitimacy as a democratic government because it was too closely related to the previous authoritarian regime. Moreover, Roh Tae Woo did not have a feel for democratic politics and he could not fulfill the expectations of the public, particularly its desire for political and economic democracy. In particular, after the summer of 1987, the explosion in labor disputes could not be controlled. Rho was less a reformer, and more a person determined to maintain the status quo. He could not control social conflicts and he
was forced to find a compromise formula with the opposition in order to restore sociopolitical stability.

The grand conservative ruling coalition was another compromise between the ruling party and the opposition parties in South Korea’s democratic transition process. The formation of the grand coalition was created in secret and without public participation. The arrangement therefore threatened the institutionalizing of the democratic transition, and some observers feared it set an undemocratic precedent. Nevertheless, the grand coalition broke the stalemate between the Roh government and the opposition. With this coalition the opposition parties and the Roh regime were able to manage a relatively smooth transition from authoritarian to representative government. Moreover, the opposition had its first chance to take power in 32 years.

The Mode of Democratic Transition

The modes of democratic transition are useful for understanding how democratic transitions take place in a country. It also helps to explain the process of democratic consolidation. This is because the features of the democratic transition process influence the pattern, content, and degree of the democratic consolidation process. Many scholars suggest variable modes of transition to democracy based on the pace of democratization (the main actor of democratization) the means of democratic change, attitudes of authoritarian regime elites toward democracy, strategies of transition, relative actor strength, and so on. According to the classifications of transitions suggested by Valenzuela (1992), South Korea represents
a "transition through reform" with the authoritarian elites' attitudes preferring a liberalized authoritarian regime. And, according to Karl's (1990) typologies, South Korean democratization was a "transition by pact," based on a compromise among political elites.

South Korea's opening to democratic transition in June 1987 basically represented a compromise between the authoritarian government and the opposition parties. According to Huntington's (1991a) typology, based on the balance of forces between the government and the opposition, the South Korean form of democratization was an example of "transplacement" in which the government made a concession and opposition groups accepted it in order to avoid mutual catastrophe (Ahn, 1994b, p. 162). Both the reform group within the government and the moderate opposition group felt that a total collapse of government would not serve their or the country's interests. Consequently, the two sides agreed to a proposal for the development of a democratic procedure. Under this form of democratization, while the reform group within the government made a concession to restore formal democracy, the moderate opposition group did not ask for the reform group's immediate exit from power, but rather took advantage of its relatively weak incumbency (Im, 1995, pp. 144-45). As a result, South Korea's authoritarian government not only survived but also maintained, to some extent, a major role in the democratic transition.

In summary, the South Korean democratic transition progressed through two political compromises between the government and the opposition parties. In addition, it recorded a precedent allowing for two peaceful transfers of power. This successful
transition was prompted by South Korea’s economic growth, but the economic factor also exposed the maladministration in the authoritarian regime and hence it advanced South Korea toward the next stage of democratic consolidation. Nevertheless, the transition through negotiations and pacts among political elites made it possible to sustain continuity in political, social, and economic policies. The new South Korean democratic government therefore was not confronted with a sudden and drastic change in the sociopolitical order. However, the democratic transition also guaranteed and sustained the privileges of the authoritarian elite and thus left a problem which succeeding democratic governments will have to solve.

The Democratic Consolidation Phase

South Korea’s democratic consolidation phase began with the inauguration of current President Kim Young Sam, the first civilian president in 32 years, on February 25, 1993. Leader of the Democratic Liberal Party (DLP), Kim Young Sam was elected the fourteenth President of South Korea in December 1992. As a civilian president, Kim Young Sam enjoyed a higher level of support (41.4%) through the most democratic election process in South Korean political history. The outcome of the election bestowed upon his government both the “legitimacy to rule” and the “strength” to lead the nation (Kihl, 1993, p. 419). Moreover, with a strong base in the National Assembly, in which the ruling party (DLP) had a stable base of support (149 seats out of 299 in the Fourteenth National Assembly election on March 24, 1992) and
with general acceptance from the social reform forces, Kim has pressed his new policy of "stability through reforms."

Democratic consolidation indicates step-by-step processes of substantial socioeconomic democracy as well as procedural political democracy (Kihl, 1995, p. 465). Kim's civilian government has forced both political and economic reforms. Realistically, it is impossible to achieve these goals in a short period, or by a president alone. South Korea needs more time and national effort if it is to become an advanced democratic country. All the same, South Korea has passed through an early stage of the democratic consolidation process, and considerable credit is given to Kim Young Sam. In order to explain the present state of South Korea's democratic consolidation process, this section deals with President Kim's reforms, i.e., the elimination of corruption, exerting civilian control over the military, and political and economic reform.

Eliminating Corruption

In cases where the old authoritarian power group's influence remains prominent in the process of democratic transition, there is a very slim chance that democratic reform will succeed. After he became president, the first task of Kim Young Sam was to decrease the authoritarian power group's influence and eliminate vestiges of dictatorial rule. Although he became president with the support of a Democratic Liberal Party (DLP), consisted of a large number of old authoritarian
politicians, he was able to introduce reforms because of his government was judged legitimate and he had strong public support.

Kim’s democratic reforms started with an effort to create “clean politics.” The reforms called for the removal of those public officials who had public records of illicit behavior. Kim was deter to keep the government free of corrupt practices, and especially money politics. Following his inauguration, the new president made public his personal finances as well as his family’s and he declared he would reject political funds from business establishments. Based on his own actions, Kim urged all high-ranking public officials to disclose their assets and to set high moral and ethical standards. He therefore had to remove three cabinet members who had unethically or illegally amassed fortunes while in public service before joining his cabinet.

Influential members of the ruling party (DLP) were also deprived of their seats for similar reasons while serving in the legislature. A principle of public officials’ asset disclosures also was created by the opposition parties in parliament, and to assure a legal for anti-corruption reforms in May 1993, the National Assembly enacted the Public Servants’ Ethics Law, a bill requiring public disclosure of the assets of lawmakers and ranking government officials (Kihl, 1995, pp. 470-71).

Kim’s purification program was strengthened even more through the newly revived Board of Audit and Inspection. Kim appointed Lee Hoi Chang, a former Supreme Court justice and a man widely respected for his integrity to direct this institution. The Board commenced its work by conducting a massive investigation of misconduct in personnel management and weapons procurement in the previous
authoritarian regime. As a result of these actions, former military authorities, including
the former defense minister, and former Chiefs of the General Staff of the Army, the
Air Force, and the Navy, were arrested for bribery. In addition, some of most powerful
and influential officials of the previous administration, including former President Roh
Tae Woo's National Security Advisor Kim Chong Hwi, Roh's former chief economic
advisor Kim Chong In, and Roh's ex-cabinet member and close confidante Park Chul
Un, were all indicted on bribery charges.

The judicial branch and the police administration were no exception. The Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, Kim Dok Ju, was forced to tender his resignation after it
was revealed he gained wealth through land speculation before he joined the court in
the late 1980s. This was followed by the resignation of many high-ranking judges and
police chiefs throughout the country (Kihl, 1995, p. 472).

In summary, Kim’s clean politics program reached from the President himself
to the legislature, the executive branch, and the judiciary. Using moral suasion, Kim
sought nothing less than the liquidation of the legacies of the previous authoritarian
regimes.

Civilian Control Over the Military

One of Kim’s outstanding reforms was establishing civilian control over the
military. Military intervention in politics had been an inhibiting factor in South Korean
democratization. As Valenzuela (1992) explains, the military is a “reserved domain,”
containing a fundamental ingredient of state power that is an obstructing factor in
Third World democratization. Accordingly, “placing the military under the authority of the elected government is a key facilitating condition for democratic consolidation” (Valenzuela, 1992, p. 87). In the weak civil society, the military was the strongest organization in South Korea and so it was able to influence domestic politics. After the collapse of the military authoritarian regime, South Koreans chose their first civilian government in 32 years. The military was the most difficult challenge confronting the new civilian president. However, Kim Young Sam managed to establish firm civilian control over the military.

Kim’s reform of the military was accomplished by purging most of the politicized military officers group, \textit{Hanahwa}, who, under preceding governments, had monopolized strategic posts and constituted the supporting base of Chun Doo Hwan and Roh Tae Woo (Im, 1996, p. 17). On taking office, Kim acted to remove the Army Chief of Staff General Kim Jin Young and Intelligence Commanding General So Wan Su. This was followed by the replacement of the field generals directly responsible for the protection of the government itself. In addition, under Kim’s purge, many \textit{Hanahwa} members with the rank of general were discharged or transferred to marginal posts, and others were denied promotions from the rank of colonel to brigadier-general. Along with the disbandment of the politicized organization, i.e., \textit{Hanahwa}, the military was thoroughly reorganized and placed under civilian control (Paik, 1994, p. 737).

In summary, Kim’s reform of the military was possible because of his newly acquired legitimacy as an elected president. By purging most of the political generals
associated with past regimes, President Kim made the military return to the barracks and restored professionalism in the military service. Moreover, Kim's decisive action decreased the possibility of the re-emergence of coup politics in the near future. His initiatives also played a facilitating role in the democratic consolidation of South Korea.

Political Reform

President Kim's political reform started by amending the "politics-related laws." To ensure clean and frugal election campaigning, three revised political reform bills, "the New Election Law," "the Political Fund Law," and "the Local Autonomy Law," were passed in the National Assembly's special session on March 3, 1994.

The New Election Law was written to ensure clean, frugal and free elections, and to preclude the money-dominated electioneering characterized by vote-buying, entertainment and gifts of travel packages that had prevailed in past elections. Under the New Election Law, the spending limit has been reduced to less than half of that set by the old law. For example, the maximum spending allowed for a National Assembly candidate during the legal campaign period is now set at US$65,000, down from the previous US$140,000. The maximum spending allowed for a presidential candidate is now set at US$25,000,000, down from US$35,000,000 (Paik, 1993, pp. 741-42). The New Election Law stipulates more open and freer campaigning, lifting restrictions and allowing individual speeches, debates, interviews and an unlimited number of volunteer campaigners. The New Election Law includes much stiffer punishments as well. For
instance, the election of a candidate will be ruled invalid if his or her campaign workers or family members violated election laws. Candidates whose elections are ruled invalid will be banned from serving in public posts or running in another election for ten years (Kihl, 1995, p. 479).

Revision of the Political Fund Law was also designed to promote fairness in political competition. In the past, political funds were unevenly distributed between the ruling party and the opposition parties (Kil, 1993, p. 424). The ruling party could formally receive much more funds than the opposition parties from the Central Election Management Committee. Moreover, because the ruling party's power was influential in the business sector, business establishments provided the ruling party with a great deal of funding. Thus, the ruling party had always enjoyed sufficient funds, while the opposition parties suffered from fund shortages.

The new Political Funds Law checks previous irrational political funds distribution practices and promotes fair political competition. Lee (1994) explains the characteristics of the new Political Funds Law as follows: (a) the state subsidy to political parties has been radically increased in its total amount and particularly in its allocation to the opposition parties; (b) a certain portion of the designated contributions, which were almost totally entrusted to the ruling party, is now also to be allocated to the opposition party; (c) the system of supporter organizations instituted for an individual candidate has a moderate limit on total fund-raising, allows for small contributions from many members, and requires the organizations to publicize their transparent usage and report regularly to the Central election
Management Office, and (d) measures for protecting the sources of funding for the opposition party have been introduced, such as an anonymous coupon system.

The new Local Autonomy Law has created a new era of local self-government. Although there were elections in 1991 for representatives of various administrative units down to prefectural and metropolitan city district levels, the central government continued to appoint governors and mayors. In contrast, this new law states that all executives and representatives at the local level are to be elected directly by voters (Lee & Sohn, 1995, p. 31). This law lays the basis for the government plan of reorganizing local administrative units. The new law empowers local governments to initiate important measures, such as the merging of cities and their surrounding countries (Kihl, 1995, p. 480).

On June 27, 1995 elections for all local offices, including those at the county, city, special city, and provincial level were held. South Korean citizens were given an opportunity to choose provincial governors, mayors of large cities, and heads of towns, counties, and wards (Koh, 1996, p. 57). By electing local administrative heads at various levels, the South Korean government is held more accountable to the voters at the grassroots level.

**Economic Reform**

The Kim government’s economic reform has begun with the well known real-name accounting system. On August 12, 1993, President Kim enforced the mandatory use of a person’s real name in all financial transactions by invoking an emergency
presidential economic decree. Although intended primarily as an economic reform measure, this policy caused tremendous waves in South Korean society. Given that politics-business collusion has been the most fundamental problem obstructing South Korean democratization, this policy provided a powerful means to break close ties between power and money and to achieve clear and fair political practices. This policy was designed not only to break the connection between money and politics but also to "eliminate the practice of an underground economy that was diverting money toward illicit and speculative investment" (Kihl, 1995, p. 476). Accordingly, with the real-name accounting system, secret funds can no longer be diverted for questionable uses in politics or in business.

The Kim government’s economic reform program is represented by his “new economy” policy which seeks to improve the standard of living for all members of society. Since the middle of 1980s, South Korean democratization has resulted in economic hardship, such as higher consumption and wage increases in excess of productivity gains. This has also brought about the loss of international competitiveness caused by higher labor costs. The only way to revive the South Korean economy is to strengthen its international competitiveness, and this can be done by developing a growth-oriented economy through increased exports. To achieve this goal, the Kim government has tried to ease various government controls and protectionist regulations. In addition, President Kim has called on business leaders to expand their investment programs and to strive for peaceful labor-management relations (Kihl, 1995, pp. 477-78).
In summary, Kim Young Sam has opened the democratic consolidation phase in South Korea. With his personal initiative and strong support from the public, he has moved to decisively reform politics. First, he eliminated the legacies of old authoritarian regimes. Although not completely accomplished, politicians of the authoritarian regime period have at least been exposed to public scrutiny. Second, he has succeeded in removing the military from politics. By eliminating the probability of political coups through civilian control over the military, elections have become the only way to form the government. Third, he has promoted clean and fair competition between the ruling party and the opposition parties by amending politics-related laws. Finally, he enforced the real-name accounting system to break the close ties between money and power.

President Kim Young Sam has provided the framework for democratic consolidation in South Korea. However, his reforms are just a start. It is not possible to eliminate all the undemocratic structures and behaviors of the old authoritarian regimes in such a short period. With his personal initiative and drive, however, he has moved political democracy and economic development along a determined path. Reform, nevertheless, cannot be accomplished by one president alone. Although the Kim government has reinforced the formal and legal aspects of democracy on the procedural-minimum level, substantial aspects of democratic development will be left to succeeding democratic governments in South Korea.
CHAPTER V

THE PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS OF DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION IN SOUTH KOREA

From the maximalist conception of democratic consolidation that includes political democracy as well as socioeconomic democracy, it can be said that South Korea has not completed the democratic consolidation process. President Kim has tried to establish a democratic framework. He has provided democracy on the procedural-minimum level to: eliminate authoritarian vestiges; establish civilian control over the military; amend politics-related laws; and introduce the real-name accounting system. However, Kim’s reform still has not reached deep enough to realize economic equity and social justice throughout the country.

If this is the case, can South Korean produce a more consolidated democracy? The answer is mostly positive. As Im (1996) points out, unlike many Latin American and East European countries that had socioeconomic conditions obstructing their new democracy, South Korea is in a relatively advantageous position. Im (1996) offers the following reasons for his opinion: (a) South Korea has a prosperous economy protecting the new fragile democracy from future uncertainties and the nostalgia for an authoritarian past; (b) South Korea has not suffered from ethnic conflicts in the post-transition period; (c) South Korea does not suffer from religious conflicts; (d) South Korea possesses an effective state superstructure that contributes to democratic
consolidation; and (e) South Korea has established firm civilian control over the military.

Nevertheless, South Korea faces obstacles and challenges that make the prospect of continued democratic consolidation far less optimistic. These can be described as follows: low institutionalization of political society, the underdevelopment of civil society, and its external security vulnerability (Im, 1996). Although democratic reforms performed by a civilian government have provided a legal and institutional setting for democratic consolidation, democratic institutions and laws are not yet deeply rooted in the political, social, and economic arenas. In particular, since South Korea went through the democratic consolidation phase, it has been faced with conflicts between the government’s efficiency and the continuing need for reform.

Even though democratic reform is proceeding, the people are not satisfied with the results and the ways of the reform. For instance, President Kim’s politics of reform was first achieved through his personal initiative rather than through institutions and laws, and the targets of reform tended to be peculiar to a region or person. Moreover, after democratic reform has succeeded, the people want their government to implement a more practical domestic and foreign policy agenda. Indeed, after a democratic government comes to power, its legitimacy is dependent on the efficiency with which it is able to carry out election promises and to achieve established targets (Rivas, 1995, p. 51). Accordingly, the future of South Korean democratic consolidation depends on how the democratic government harmonizes these tasks: (a) the government’s efficiency, and (b) continuous reform.
This chapter focuses on these two tasks. In terms of democratic reform, I analyze the problems and prospects of democratic consolidation in political institutions, economic development, and civil society. This is because South Korea still does not have adequate results from the political and socioeconomic reforms. If democratic consolidation is to make the people internalize, habituate, and routinize the democratic rules of the game and norms, the success of democratic consolidation depends on how democracy is deepened and internalized in each arena. As for the government's efficiency, I focus on political leadership because the government's efficiency depends on the political leader's choices and strategies in South Korean democratization. This is because the political leader's will for democratic reform, as well as his driving force, play important roles and their influence is substantial in the process of Third World democratic transitions.

Political Institutionalization

According to Dahl (1973), a key element of democracy is "the continuing responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citizens." And democratization is comprised of at least two significant dimensions: "inclusiveness .... the right to participate" and "public contestation.... the extent of permissible opposition, public contestation, or political competition." (p. 2). Under democracy no one can determine the outcome of competition. Political democracy is understood as the institutionalized process of plural and competitive political structures, guaranteeing civil liberty. Thus, establishing political democracy is possible through democratic
reform of the political institutions of the electoral system, political parties, and the legislature. This is because these political institutions have the necessary capacity to articulate, aggregate and represent the interests of their constituencies in the political arena (Im, 1996, p. 18). To consolidate new democracy, it is necessary for these political organizations to become deeply institutionalized. The consolidation of democratic rule depends on the development of political institutions that can effectively mediate policy debates and coordinate relations among contending social and economic interests (Haggard & Kaufman, 1995, p. 335). The consolidation of representative government implies a reduction in the personal discretion enjoyed by the executive and the greater accountability of elected representatives and interest group leaders (p. 335).

In South Korea, the institutionalization of fair electoral competition began with the presidential election of 1987. Since then, two consecutive presidential and three consecutive National Assembly elections have been held under the same rules. The institutionalization of electoral rules has increased expectations that democratic competition will be repeated regularly. Moreover, President Kim has promoted fairness in political competition through political reform bills, such as the New Election Law and the Political Fund Law. The new electoral laws aim to decrease election malpractice and secure fairness in the election system through equity in the value of votes. This change in the election laws is recorded as one of Kim's outstanding political reforms.
Nevertheless, the new electoral laws that were made by Assemblymen have already been violated by the same Assemblymen. For example, in the Fifteenth National Assembly election on April 1, 1996, politicians did not keep within the limit of established electoral expenditures. Although clearly stipulated in the new electoral law, the politicians claimed it was too difficult to adhere to, given the present political milieu which consists not of issue-centered political parties but of boss-centered political parties. While the purpose of the new electoral law was to provide clean, frugal, fair election campaigns, the political parties openly violated the electoral law. It can be seen from this example that the institutionalization of the democratic political process depends on the evolution of the political party system in South Korea. This section focuses on the problems and prospects of the political party system.

The Political Party System

In a democratic government, the political representative function is performed by political parties and party systems (Schmitter, 1992). Political parties reflect the public will and provide the crucial linkage between the citizenry and the state. They serve the following functions: "parties structure the popular vote, integrate and mobilize the mass of the citizenry; aggregate diverse interests; recruit leaders for public offices; and formulate public policy" (Mair, 1990, pp. 1-2). Accordingly, democratization cannot proceed without a strong, effectively functioning and competitive party system. Moreover, the institutionalization of the party system is
essential for democratic consolidation. The institutionalization of the party system refers to

The process whereby a political party structure is made operational in accordance with stipulated rules and procedures, enabling regular, hence predictable, patterns of political behavior, minimal trauma in power transfer, and a foundation for the effective development of policies as well as the application of justice (Scalapino, 1986, p. 1).

Unfortunately, an institutionalized party system has not yet been established in South Korea’s transition to democracy. Most parties still do not stand on a distinct ideological base but are dependent on specific individuals (Lee & Glasure, 1995, p. 368). Additionally, party competition most often tends to be limited because parties seek to transform political elites permanently into their own image. Political elites often change the party system after the election by merging or splitting existing parties (Kim, 1995, p. 196). In short, parties are ephemeral. No political party has retained its original name and even the Kim Young Sam’s organization, there is considerable shifting of loyalties. Han (1989) explains the reasons for the weakness of South Korea’s political parties and the party system in general:

First, a serious imbalance that exists between the bureaucracy (including the military) and political parties have hampered the development of the latter [political parties].... Second, parties have not been able to cultivate a stable following among the voters because, in the post-1948 period, there has been no room for ideological deviation from the officially accepted line on virtually all important issues, including unification, national defense, socioeconomic development, and management of wealth.... A third reason.... can be found in the many changes of regimes and constitutions that took place, usually through extraordinary measures by governments that came to power by nondemocratic means.... [A fourth reason] is the private nature of South Korean politics. Personal, factional, and regional rivalries are still deeply
embedded in Korean political behavior.... Finally, the government’s occasional banning of existing leaders from active political participation, as happened during the early Park as well as the Chun periods, makes the institutionalization of parties extremely difficult (Han, 1989, pp. 295-96).

A salient problem of the South Korean political party system cited by many scholars is “party bossism.” This means that political parties are managed by boss-centered organizations. The central characteristic of party bossism is: the party boss almost single-handedly creates (or dissolves) a political party at will. The “boss” manages the election by controlling the power to nominate party candidates of each and every electoral district, and “the successfully elected representatives arrive at the National Assembly and function like robots under the strict guidance and leadership of the party boss” (Yang, 1995, p. 20).

Im (1996) points out that “party bossism” is an impediment to the consolidation of democracy in South Korea. He says that the emergence of a durable party system is unlikely if party bossism is not eliminated. As Im (1996) explains: First, party bossism obstructs the growth of democratic responsiveness and accountability. Although elections are held regularly, elected officials do not keep the campaign promises made to constituencies but rather act on behalf of their bosses; Second, party bossism fosters “clientelism” in politics. The patron-client relationship formed between party bosses and followers nourishes corruption, particularism, personalism, nepotism, and patronage; Third, because party bossism is based on regionalism, it accentuates regional cleavages in politics. The effect of regional cleavages on electoral outcome has been so overwhelming that politicians frequently do not appeal voters with
programs and visions other than regional interests that are promoted by charismatic leaders (pp. 19-20).

A pressing task for the institutionalization of the political party system in South Korea is that political parties must become autonomous representations of political power and avoid domination by charismatic leaders. Political parties must establish intra-party democracy through intra-party competition for party posts, thus breaking boss-centered party management. Accordingly, the organizational structure of political parties must change from a top-down command and control hierarchy guided often single-handedly by the party boss to a bottom-up organizational structure based firmly on the politics of the grassroots (Yang, 1995, p. 20).

In restoring the political representative function of political parties, the development of reformist political parties can be expected. Since industrialization began, there have been expressions of social and economic interests by various social groups, including workers, farmers, the city poor, and the alienated classes. It is necessary for political parties to channel these group demands and aspirations through an orderly and legitimate process. However, due to the existence of two regimes in the Korean peninsula, the ideological spectrum of political parties has been limited. The existing political parties in South Korea have an ideological propensity toward conservatism or anti-Communism. Moreover, legal and institutional restrictions and prohibitions like the National Security Law have hindered the formation and development of reformist parties. For these reasons, political parties must be balanced
between conservative and reform positions by permitting a variety of ideological aspirations and by absorbing various demands of social groups into the intra-system.

The Legislature

The legislature sits at the center of democratic politics. It is the constitutionally designated institution for representing the public will and supervising the policy implementation of government activity. It is also the center of the law-making process (Blondel, 1990, pp. 186-207). While Western democratic politics developed with the legislature as a central institution, the legislature’s importance and role has often been disregarded in the political process in Third World. In South Korea, the legislature has not played an important role in political processes.

Under authoritarian regimes, the legislature’s function was minimized. The president had the authority to dissolve the legislature, the legislature’s power to inspect government offices was abolished, and the legislature’s annual session was fixed at 150 days a year by the National Assembly Law, especially during the Chun regime. As such, the legislature was seen as merely a rubberstamp for the executive’s plans. In addition, given frequent changes of government, the legislature often could not finish its term. For instance, the 4th, 5th, 8th, and 10th National Assemblies were dissolved by the “4.19 student revolution”, the 5.16 coup d'état, the yushin system, and the 10.26 event of 1979, respectively.

In the Roh regime, the new democratic constitution was distinctive for redressing these imbalances and improving the checks and balances between the
executive and the legislature. The legislature was empowered with the reinstatement of its function of overseeing the power of the president. The executive branch of the government was deprived of its authority to dissolve the legislature. However, the legislature has not yet been favorably institutionalized in South Korea. Confrontational politics remains the norm, especially when the ruling party has an overwhelming majority in the legislature. Paik (1994) explains the confrontational politics of the South Korean legislature as follows:

The ruling party has frequently relied on the measures of majority dictatorship to deprive the opposition party of its right to be heard. Examples of this include the single-handed organization of debate, omission of the due procedures of debate, and blitzkrieg (“snatching”) passage of a bill omitting the procedures. On the other hand, the opposition parties have employed the measures of minority terror as its means of obstruction, such as sit-in demonstrations, and filibustering to prevent the passage of a bill sponsored by the ruling party (Paik, 1994, p. 743).

Under the Kim Young Sam government, the legislature plays a supportive or marginal role by passing bills under the guidelines and initiatives provided by the President. The legislature has suffered a relative decline in its status vis-a-vis the executive because of President Kim’s strong leadership and because his stunning lead in pushing reforms overshadowed the work of the legislature.

On the other hand, on June 28, 1994 the law of the National Assembly was revised so as to improve the legislature’s activities. The law stipulated protection for the legislature against suspension when agreement among the political parties cannot be arranged. It also called for setting the basic legislative calendar (schedule) and the holding meetings of the Standing Committee twice during the recess of the main
session (Paik, 1994, pp. 744-45). The new revised law, however, has not been complied with by the Assemblymen themselves. For example, although the National assembly opening day was set for June 15, 1996, the 15th Assembly failed to convene. This delay was due to an old practice which had not changed from with new democratic reforms. Techniques of tolerance, negotiation, and compromise between the ruling party and the opposition parties have yet to mature.

Moreover, because the new Assemblymen lacked expertise in diplomacy, defense, environment, and public welfare problems, the legislature's check on the executive branch has not been performed. Therefore, a large majority of the bills presented in the legislature actually were proposed by the executive branch of the government (Park, 1995, p. 9). Thus, critical obstacles hindering the sophisticated development of the legislature was the elite political culture which preferred confrontational politics, and the party structure, which was dominated by party bosses. These two problems continue to undermine the politics of tolerance, negotiation, and compromise (Paik, 1994, p. 747).

A pressing task of legislature reform is that the legislature must secure its autonomy from the President and the political party leaders. But in order to accomplish this goal, the legislature must consist of an Assemblymen-centered rather than a party-centered institution. Assemblymen must freely vote their individual consciences, regardless of the party leaders' line. The more the legislature secures its autonomy, the better its ability to check the executive's power. The legislature also must develop an active law-making function by strengthening the Assemblymen's
knowledge of the job and improving his expertise. Toward this objective, it must be able to expand the Assemblymen-aide and staff system. Finally, the legislature must strengthen stipulations on ethical requirements and disciplinary punishment for offending Assemblymen.

Economic Development

Since the early 1960s, the South Korean economy has accomplished remarkable economic growth. Per capita income was merely $103 in 1963, but it rose to more than $10,000 in 1995. Merchandise exports surpassed the $100 billion mark for the first time in South Korea's history in 1995. In the process of industrialization, South Korea recorded the highest annual growth rate in exports: 25.1% (Koh, 1996, p. 60). South Korea in 1996 has the eleventh largest economy and is the thirteenth largest trading country in the world. South Korea is the world's second largest shipbuilder, fourth in electronics, sixth in steel and seventh among automobile producing countries (Im, 1996, p. 8).

Economic development has contributed to the opening of democratization and helped make the democratic transitions process smooth as well. As Im (1996) points out, South Korea's democratic transition was classified as "crises of success." The authoritarian regimes' successful economic development programs eventually became a crucial cause of their demise (Moon, 1988). Having accomplished successful economic development, they became historically obsolete and had to be replaced by democratic systems in order to meet new historical necessities such as more freedom
and more welfare for the masses. Moreover, a new democracy from "the crises of success" is in a relatively advantageous position for democratic consolidation. It has not faced the level and amount of dangers that threatens the new democracies in East Europe or Latin America. These regimes were classified as "crises of failure" democracies, and were forced to step down from power because they failed to accomplished economic development (Im, 1996, p. 5). Stable economic growth has become most important for long-term democratic stability and consolidation. This is because economic growth can reduce the frustrations and conflicts resulting from inequality or other social cleavages, and can thus mute the tendency to political alienation and the destabilizing conditions associated with social violence (Haggard & Kaufman, 1995, p. 325).

According to Im (1994a), in a country where democratic transition originated from a crisis of success, the main purpose of economic reform is the search for a more equitable distribution of the fruits of economic success (p. 124). Of course, continued economic growth is essential for democratic consolidation. After all, the consolidation of democratic rule depends both on economic growth and a broad distribution of economic benefits. The goals and effects of democratic consolidation in the economic arena are to weaken state power in the economy, to end big businesses' monopoly of economic benefits, to foster the development of small- and medium-sized businesses, and to search for more equitable distributive justice. Since his inauguration in February 1993, President Kim Young Sam has tried to implement a coherent economic growth strategy, both in quantity and in quality. He announced a new five year reform and
development program for a new economy, expanding the country's growth potential, solidifying the foundations of international trade, and improving the people's living conditions. His new economic policy began with the easing of government regulations on business and by encouraging free competition. As evidence, the government abolished the Economic Planning Board which had been the center of national economic policy-making since the early 1960s. This has been interpreted as strong willingness to reduce administrative regulations by slimming down government organizations (Bachman, 1995, p. 31).

From the beginning of his administration, however, President Kim was confronted with the structural problems which negatively influenced continued economic growth. It seems that the "enabling conditions" for high speed economic growth turns into the "confining conditions" for long-term continued economic development. To catch up with the Western industrial powers, South Korea launched a labor-intensive, state-led, and export-oriented industrialization. In particular, the state elite supported the big businesses, chaebol, by creating tax policies profitable to chaebol to propel export-oriented industrialization and protect them from foreign corporations (Bello & Rosenfeld, 1990). Favored business leaders in turn provided political funds to the authoritarian regime. As a consequence, South Korea's corporatist development strategy caused unbalanced development between big businesses and small- and medium-sized businesses in the domestic economy, and weakened the businesses' competitive ability in the international economy.
Moreover, since the beginning of democratization in 1987, South Korea's democratic transition resulted in higher consumption by the public, wage increases in excess of productivity gains (11.4% in 1987 compared to 4.2% in 1993), and inflationary pressures. The South Korean economy has faced increasing problems, both domestic and international. The protectionist mood in the developed economies and growing competition from ASEAN nations and China in labor-intensive sectors has been eroding South Korea's international market share (Bello & Rosenfeld, 1990). High wage increases, exceeding the growth of productivity, compounded by labor shortages, aggravate South Korea's price competitiveness in the international market. In addition, the legendary Korean work ethic continues to decline, as people increasingly avoid the so-called “3-D” categories of work (dirty, difficult, and dangerous) (Lee, 1993, pp. 39-40). As a consequence, these developments have created a crisis in the economy which forced the domestic economic structure to change from a labor-intensive industrial structure to a capital and skill-intensive industrial structure.

To overcome these economic difficulties, the Kim government had to woo the business community over to its new economic policy because the business community’s primary concern is focused on economic growth rather than on worker welfare, or distributive justice. President Kim called on the business leaders to expand their investment programs and to strive for peaceful labor management relations. He also promised to do away with unnecessary government regulations (Kihl, 1995, p. 478). Although President Kim has succeeded in severing undemocratic special ties
between the state and business through the epoch-making "real name accounting system" and clean government policy, the Kim government failed to overcome the structural problems of the South Korean economy.

President Kim's economic reforms have been criticized for their pro-business bias in the privatization of 23 government-controlled businesses, and in their invitation to take the bulk of Korea's social infrastructure projects, thereby providing lucrative benefits for the big business conglomerates (*chaebol*). They exacerbated the unbalanced development between the *chaebol* and small- and medium-sized enterprises. In the process of industrialization, the state's industrial policies were heavily biased in favor of big businesses. As a consequence, even with the liberalization of the economy, small- and medium-sized businesses cannot compete with the *chaebol* in the domestic economy. Moreover, medium-sized business owners' sources of funds have dried up because of the "real name accounting system," putting many on the verge of bankruptcy. Recently, a chain of bankruptcies of small- and medium-sized businesses gives a view of how unbalanced the industrial structure in South Korea has become.

President Kim's economic reforms also have been criticized for their labor policy, which has not substantially changed the priority of promoting workers' welfare. From his inauguration, he appealed to workers to share the burden in overcoming the economic difficulty (Mah, 1996, p.10). His labor policy has relied only on the moral persuasion of labor-management talks on wage disputes (Kihl, 1995, p.478). Although he recently suggested the revision of undemocratic labor laws preparatory to joining
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), it will be hard for the government's goal to be realized. This is because the government has shown preferential concern for economic growth through the big businesses' investment activities and the big businesses oppose the government's new labor-management policy, including permitting a plural number of labor unions.

With democratization and economic liberalization, the *chaebol* which monopolized various economic benefits during South Korea's remarkable economic growth period acquired considerable autonomy from the state. They are less dependent on preferential industrial policies of the state (Nam, 1995, pp. 367-8). For example, the Kim government's effort to regulate the monopoly of credit by *chaebol* so far has failed because of big businesses' vigorous opposition (Lee, 1993, p. 40). And the big business community, *Junkyungryun* (the Federation of Korean Industries), has also opposed easing unnecessary government regulations on businesses' activities. As such, widened business group's autonomy may cause the state to lose its control over business, on the one hand, and may make working people's rights and welfare shrink, on the other.

The globalization of the South Korean economy (*segyehwa*), which President Kim announced in December 1994, strengthens the influence of big business in the South Korean economy. In the era of globalization, the ability of the government to pursue development, full employment, or other national economic goals has been undermined by the power of capital (Im, 1996, p. 28). And because of globalization, which emphasizes business's productivity, competitiveness, profitability, and
efficiency, working people's welfare and distributive justice may be recognized as secondary issues. This is because in the era of globalization, threats of foreign competition are being used as a weapon by employers to hold down wages.

In sum, since the early 1960s, South Korea's export-oriented industrialization led by the state's progressive intervention in the economy has accomplished remarkable economic success. As a consequence, this success played an important role in the opening of democratization in South Korea. However, the structural problems which were caused by high speed economic growth have become a burden to the new democratic government. Accordingly, a pressing task of the succeeding democratic government is to achieve continued economic growth and a more equitable distribution of the fruits of economic success. These two goals, however, have a reciprocal, conflicting element. When new democratic governments focus on economic growth, the results of those policies bring about a weakening of economic equity and distributive justice. When the South Korean economy satisfies these two goals, the new democracy can be more consolidated in the economic arena.

Development of Civil Society

Development of civil society is closely related to that of democracy. It can be improved when social justice, including not only economic equity but also human rights and civil rights, are realized. In particular, under a pluralistic sociopolitical system, the strengthening of civil society provides a substantial base for stable democracy. According to Diamond (1994), civil society is conceptualized as “the
realm of organized social life that is voluntary, self-generating, (largely) self-supporting, autonomous from the state, and bound by a legal order or set of shared rules” (p. 5). It encompasses independent interest groups, civic organizations, churches, social movements, mass media, and cultural and intellectual networks acting collectively in the public sphere to express their ideas, passions, and interests, exchange information, achieve collective goals, make demands on the state, and hold state officials accountable. It is an “intermediary entity,” standing between the private sphere and the state (pp. 5-7). Civil society requires that the state be limited in the scope of its activities, that it be bound by law, and that it be effective in executing the laws which protect the pluralism of civil society and its necessary liberties (Shils, 1991, p. 9).

Diamond (1994) explains the democratic functions of civil society. First, civil society provides the basis for the limitation of state powers, hence for the control of the state by society, and for democratic political institutions as the most effective means of exercising that control. Second, a rich associational life supplements the role of political parties in stimulating political participation, increasing the political efficacy and skill of democratic citizens, and promoting an appreciation of the obligations as well as the rights of democratic citizenship. Third, it can also be a crucial arena for the development of other democratic attributes, such as tolerance, moderation, a willingness to compromise, and a respect for opposing viewpoints. Fourth, a richly pluralistic civil society will tend to generate a wide range of interests that may cross-cut, and so mitigate, the principal polarities of political conflict. Fifth, nonpartisan
election-monitoring efforts have been critical in deterring fraud, enhancing voter confidence, affirming the legitimacy of election results, or in some cases demonstrating an opposition victory despite government fraud. Sixth, a vigorous civil society widely disseminates information, thus aiding citizens in the collective pursuit and defense of their interests and values. Finally, by enhancing the accountability, responsiveness, inclusiveness, effectiveness, and hence legitimacy of the political system, a vigorous civil society gives citizens respect for the state and positive engagement with it (pp.7-11).

Since South Korea was liberated from Japanese colonial rule in 1945, the state has been remarkable for its strength. The state in South Korea clearly overpowers civil society with an impressive capacity to penetrate into society and mold the behavior of social groups and individuals (Koo, 1993, pp. 1-2). Under the authoritarian regimes, civil society was thoroughly suppressed by the state's coercive power. In particular, rapid industrialization which was led by the authoritarian regime played a negative role in the development of civil society. Under the justification of governmental efficiency, the representation of various interests in civil society was restrained in line with the first objective of the state, economic growth.

Since the mid 1960s, however, the socioeconomic conditions of South Korea have undergone drastic and fundamental changes. For example, in 1962, South Korea's per capita national income was $110, in 1990 it was $5,569, and in 1996 it is over $10,000. The agricultural sector's contribution to South Korea's gross domestic product (GDP) declined from 38 per cent in 1965 to 10 per cent in 1989, while
industrial and service sectors all increased during the same period from 25 per cent to 44 per cent and 37 to 46 per cent respectively. In addition, South Korea has also become an urban society. In 1965, South Korea’s urban population constituted 32 per cent of its total population, but in 1989 that jumped to 71 per cent. In 1960, only three cities in South Korea had a population over 500,000, but by 1990, six cities had a population over 1 million (Yang, 1995, pp. 10-11).

South Korea's fast economic transformation and urbanization has accelerated the process of occupational differentiation and the diversification of economic interests and engendered aspirations that are pluralistic. According to Choi (1993), through rapid industrialization, the structure of South Korean society was reconstituted in pyramidal form:

At the top rested the upper bourgeoisie favored by the political regime, high technocrats and bureaucrats in the public sector, and senior executives from the major firms, along with a collection of small-business owners. Below this elite lay the middle echelon managers, the petite bourgeoisie, and white-collar workers. And forming the huge base for this structure were the industrial and service workers, peasants, miners, fishermen, peddlers, the underemployed, the jobless (Choi, 1993, pp. 28-29)

Continuous economic growth and an uneven distribution of wealth has led to some degree of class formation and frictions over inequalities. In the process of industrialization, various social classes, such as the workers, farmers, urban poor, and the middle class, have emerged. These classes are divided into two categories. One is the lower economic strata, the other is the middle strata.
The lower economic strata consists of people who are alienated from power and from the distribution of the fruits of economic growth, and is composed of such groups as the workers, farmers, and urban poor. In the process of industrialization through the intimate collusion of the state and big business, the members of the alienated classes were required to sacrifice their economic interests and were prevented from having their desires expressed politically. Although the absolute income level of this class increased, the social and economic gap with other classes widened so that they felt relative deprivation and alienation from the sociopolitical system. As a consequence, this class grew up as a critical force against the authoritarian regime and provided the social basis for the expansion of civil society.

The middle strata is “comprised of mid-echelon functionaries in the state and private sector, urban professionals, intellectuals, and the self-employed” (Choi, 1993, p. 37). In the process of industrialization, this urban middle class has been increasingly oriented to accumulation and consumption, and has become more important for growth. Political liberalization and economic growth brought forth the mainstream middle class of civil society. This class plays an essential role in social reform in pluralistic society.

The movements of the civil society played a decisive role in the beginning of democratization in June 1987 in South Korea. The action of the civil society helped to remove authoritarian elites from office (Lee, 1993, pp. 358-9). The urban middle class pressed their challenge to the authoritarian state as members of student movements, churches, professional associations, trade unions, and civic associations. The
background of this civil society's activation at the societal level was economic development, industrialization, and urbanization which together created and strengthened interest groups and voluntary associations. At the individual level, increasing education and expanding income exposed the masses to the virtues of democratic civilization. The proliferation of autonomous associations and steady increases in the cognitive mobilization of the masses have seriously undermined the foundations of authoritarian rule (Shin, 1994, p. 152).

Since 1987 political democratization has opened a large arena for the development of civil society. The representation of various group interests which were suppressed during the authoritarian regime became explosive throughout the country. The "great struggle" of the workers showed salient change in the labor movement: "during three months (from July to September 1987) roughly 4,000 strikes at 3,311 workplaces with the participation of nearly 1.3 million workers took place, demanding the organization of labor unions, increased wages, workplace democracy, etc. Also during this short period, about 1,200 new unions were organized" (Lee, 1993, p. 359).

Peasant movements became more organized and militant, protesting against government policies which showed an urban bias at the expanse of the agricultural sector. Heightened pressure for opening the South Korean agricultural market from the United States provided an added impetus for peasant mobilization. In addition, the urban poor masses showed their collective solidarity by demanding the alleviation of substandard living conditions in the urban shantytowns and "moon villages." In addition, white-collar workers in the service sector also formed 11 loosely organized
occupational associations, to which 925 unions and 144,200 members belonged, to demand the improvement of working conditions and autonomy from state control (Koo, 1993, p. 157).

As the 1990s began, however, radical social movements slipped away and the middle class became increasingly conservative and somewhat hostile to the aggressive labor movement. This was because of the change in the international and domestic environments. Internationally, from the late 1980s, the Soviet Union disintegrated; Eastern Europe regained freedom of choice; and East Germany was absorbed by its Western counterpart. Domestically, there was a slowdown of economic growth and a narrowing of wage gaps between blue-collar and white-collar workers (Koo, 1993, p. 159). As a consequence, the middle class turned to the status quo or a new conservatism led by ideologically right and right-of-center groups, and new types of social movements closely related to the daily affairs of the public emerged. These “civil society movements” include green movements (encompassing anti-pollution, environmental protection, antinuclear, and peace movements), economic justice movements, feminist movements, and consumer protection movements. Characteristic of these movements is that they transcended class interests. Instead, issues and areas of concern in these movements are relevant to the society as a whole (Lee, 1993, p. 359-65). These movements are reformist in the sense that they are not fundamentally against the capitalist system but rather highlight distorted and unjust aspects of the system.
As mentioned above, South Korea's civil society was resurrected during the transition to democracy. Civil society played a major role in the transition to democracy in June 1987. After the democratic transition, the state was forced to loosen its tight control over civil society and to allow broader space for the civil society to organize (Lee, 1992). However, despite the quantitative growth of interest associations in civil society, South Korean civil society has problems in its internal structure and character.

In the transition process, the major work of civil society was to mobilize popular masses to topple the authoritarian state. But in the period of consolidation, the civil society movement has been compelled to transform itself into an institutional civil society: “to organize internal structure more predictably, to consult constituencies more regularly, to consider long term consequences more seriously” (Im, 1996 p. 24). However, in South Korea the proliferation of interest associations has not been translated into an institutionalized interest in politics. Interest associations have not developed institutionalized channels to mediate differences among them and to process their interests within the framework of representative institutions. For example, South Korea’s labor movements have been played by two sides. One is the organization of independent unions (democratic unions). The other is dismantling company unions (*oyong chohap*). They still stick at a leadership struggle of labor movements. And the social movements have not given up the strategies of “political radicalism,” “militancy,” “intransigence,” and “moral purism” (Im, 1996, p.25). Because of their unchanged strategies, these social movements lost the support of the masses. For
example, in the National Assembly elections of 1988, 1992, and 1996, no candidate representing radical social movement forces won a seat in the National Assembly and the movements thus failed to enter into the institutional political arena.

Civil society must function democratically in its internal processes of decision-making and leadership selection. Representation, transparency, accountability, and rotation of elected leaders within autonomous associations will greatly enhance the ability of civil associations to inculcate such democratic values and practices in their members. However, South Korea’s public interest groups do not have a democratic character in terms of their internal organization and their management. In South Korea there are two kinds of public interest groups. One is the interest groups which are organized and managed with strong support of the government. These groups’ leaders are appointed by the government and they show a top-down style of decision-making. The other is interest groups which are dominated by one person. In these groups, changes of leadership seldom happen. The organizational character of many public interest groups does not contribute to the development of civil society.

According to Diamond (1994), a coherent and stable party system contributes to the development of interest groups (p. 15). However, in South Korea, the fact that there have existed tensions between the North and South for fifty years negatively influences the forming of extreme leftist parties so that all the existing major political parties describe themselves as conservative or right-of-center on the ideological spectrum. As a consequence, these interest associations having a leftist ideology fail to establish institutional ties with political parties which can represent their interests.
Finally, the conservative nature of South Korea’s democratic transition is responsible for the underdevelopment of civil society (Im, 1996, p. 25). Because the new democracy emerged from a political coalition with old authoritarian elites, it inherited the main framework of socioeconomic policies of the preceding authoritarian state. In particular, labor and social welfare policy did not change. The democratic government’s labor policy still strongly excludes the interests of the working class. The Kim Young Sam government’s new economic policy is based on stabilizing the wages of the working class. The new labor laws still place important limitations on union organization and the political activity of unions. They put a ban on third party intervention, limit unions to one company-one union, and ban unions from political activity. These restrictions are barriers to the development of workers’ organizational strength (Mah, 1996, pp. 20-22).

In sum, South Korea’s civil society has steadily developed even under circumstances of coercive state power that maintained tight control over civil society. South Korean civil society has contributed tremendously to the shift from authoritarianism to democracy in the country, i.e., the April 19 Student Uprising in 1960, which toppled Rhee’s autocratic regime; mounting demonstrations by the public in Pusan and Masan in 1979, which were critical in causing the fall of President Park’s *Yushin* system; and the explosive citizens’ demonstrations of June 1987, which resulted in the beginning of democratization. In particular, during the 1980s, South Korea’s civil society grew significantly larger. With the economic success of South Korea’s business sector and a more liberal political environment, a pluralization of
interests has manifested itself in many different arenas of social life. Many voluntary associations were created and the differentiation of social classes developed further, thereby engendering relatively distinct class identities and class-based interest groups as well as a powerful working-class movement.

The strengthening of civil society contributes to the consolidation of South Korean democratization. It performs positive functions for democratic consolidation. For democratic consolidation, institutionalized civil society must play a strong role in checking state power and representing the public interests of communities. The pressing task of South Korea’s civil society is to protect the interests of the lower classes so that every class can receive equal benefits in the social arena. For this, civil society needs to strengthen its autonomy from state power. An “overdeveloped” state structure such as in South Korea does not necessarily require an underdeveloped civil society (Koo, 1993, p. 4). Civil society’s autonomy can be acquired through cohesive solidarity, more active social movements, democratic internal processes in decision making and electing a leader, and institutionalization.

Political Leadership

In the democratic consolidation process, the government usually becomes involved in a structural dilemma. The pressing tasks of the democratic government are to not only eliminate old authoritarian vestiges in order to create democratic political order, but also to satisfy the people’s demands for continuous economic growth and sociopolitical stability. However, these two goals cannot be instantaneously
accomplished. This is because a democratic government’s reform of politics does not bring forth specific positive effects over the short term. The public sometimes is not satisfied with the results of reform. To accomplish these two tasks, the government needs technical skills and strategies for soothing groups not content with its reforms. Governmental efficiency in problem-solving is essential for democratic consolidation. The democratic government’s success or failure depends on the government’s problem-solving ability.

In Third World democratization, the government’s ability to solve a large number of pressing tasks depends on the political leadership. The role of the political elite is emphasized not only in the democratic transition phase but also in the democratic consolidation phase. Under these circumstances that democratic institutions are not developed enough, political leaders’ choices and the active implementation of those choices determine the success or failure of the democratic process. The government’s efficiency can be understood as the political leaders’ ability to control the problems causing and creating the process of democratic transitions. Ultimately, the success of democratic consolidation depends on whether political leaders can successfully settle conflicts facing a government.

Diamond (1989) points out that the future of consolidating a new democratic system will depend on the capacity of the new political leaders to make the democratic system work in two distinct democratic phases (p. 45). In particular, according to Karl (1990), in the consolidation phase, political leaders need qualitatively different skills and commitments from those exhibited during the democratic transition phase:
These actors [political leaders] must demonstrate the ability to differentiate political forces rather than to draw them all into a grand coalition; the capacity to define and channel competing political projects rather than seek to keep potentially divisive reforms off the agenda; and the willingness to tackle incremental reforms, especially in the domains of the economy and civil-military relations, rather than defer them to some later date (Karl, 1990, p. 17).

Since the First Republic of President Syngman Rhee was inaugurated in 1948, the South Korean government has maintained a strong presidential political system, that is, with the exception of the Second Republic of Prime Minister Chang Myon. The presidents have exercised great power in the political process. During the periods of authoritarian regimes, abuse of the president’s power reached extremes. Political institutions were disregarded or used for the president’s political goals. And the president’s mind was the only source for devising policies and their implementation. Even in the civilian government of President Kim Young Sam, the president controls not only the executive but also the legislature through the ruling party which holds a majority in the National Assembly. As such, the president’s influence is still very prominent in South Korean politics. Accordingly, it is possible to understand the prospects for democratic consolidation in South Korea by analyzing the president’s leadership.

For democratic consolidation, socioeconomic conditions, such as continuous economic growth, the development of pluralistic political culture, and national integration, are important. However, these conditions must be pulled together by the political leader’s power of decision and action. The political leaders’ creative and skillful strategies are the determinant factor for the future of democratic government
because political leadership determines a nation's goals, selects its methods, and gives direction to its policies. Political leadership is the critical variable in democratic consolidation in South Korea.

The Kim government, as a civilian government which emerged from the public's support in a democratic election process, was able to free itself of the legitimacy complex which many authoritarian regimes suffered from. When he assumed office, President Kim emphasized the government's efficiency in several reform arenas. He produced remarkable results by reducing corruption, amending "politics-related laws," by imposing the "real-name accounting system," and establishing civilian control over the military. These reforms were made possible by Kim's strong will. Based on his own intuition and judgement, Kim's policy decisions were decisive forces in his drive to reform Korean politics. His reform program was marked by an element of surprise in that it even bypassed the president's close advisors. Lee (1993) calls Kim Young Sam's leadership pattern "positive action intention" (p. 12). He describes Kim's personality as one of action. In his article, "Characteristics and Patterns of Kim Young Sam's Leadership," Lee (1993) explains Kim's view on democratic leadership: "Kim Young Sam regards right decision-making and decisive practice as the crux of democratic leadership.... Kim himself emphasizes courage, will, resolute honesty, and a career in the struggle for democratization against authoritarian regimes. This is the virtue of a democratic leader" (pp. 8-9). President Kim has been criticized by some observes because his ruling style is too improvisatorial, and not institutionalized, because his leadership is based on intuition.
and lacks an officially institutionalized apparatus so that which those related to the
decision-making process can participate.

In the early stage of reform, President Kim’s personal intuition and his power of execution played an effective role in the transitional work that eliminated old authoritarian vestiges and established political competition. However, his leadership pattern does not fit the democratic consolidation phase. It still needs creative work to not only generate continuous economic growth but also the qualitative improvement of public life through economic equity and social justice. As Lee (1993) points out, Kim’s view on democracy is limited to political democracy. His main interest was institutional reform, such as the reform of the electoral system. In his democratization struggle process, he was mainly concerned with political problems, not economic and social problems (pp. 6-7). As a consequence, after coming into office, President Kim focused on political reform and he promoted economic growth, but he did not consider the question of substantive democracy, and how it involved improving the interests of all Korea’s classes.

South Korea has undergone democratic consolidation. A civilian president has introduced political and economic reforms. His leadership is based on his personal charisma as one of the opposition’s longtime leaders against the military authoritarian regime. However, if the consolidation process is not completed during his tenure, what type of political leadership will be needed to continue consolidating democracy in South Korea?
An opinion survey of members of the Fifteenth National Assembly explored the characteristics needed in a successor president (Chosun Ilbo, May 21, 1996). They considered "democratic leadership" the primary characteristic of a succeeding president. For other characteristics, they chose the president's capacity to manage the nation's regional and class integration, the president's vision on reunification, morality, economic mind set, international sensitivity, and his vision on foreign and national security. A most interesting point was their last choice, namely, the president's reform program. These data indicate that the next president should have management skills rather than reform ideas.

As can be seen from the survey data, South Korea's National Assemblymen want a future national leader to show democratic leadership in the decision-making process and political party management. Political reform, it appears, has been confused with the now passed transitional process. Kim Ho Jim (1990) reinforces these findings and points out the following elements as characteristics of democratic leadership: "leaders should decide policy through consultation with members of their organization. Leaders treat their followers as individuals so that both share human affinity. Communication between leader and follower is reciprocal and is made of method of persuasion and discussion" (p. 70).

In Summary, Kim's leadership is not enough to consolidate South Korean democracy when socioeconomic democracy is introduced into the equation. Although he accomplished some remarkable democratic reforms, he has not coped with the other more complicated problems facing his government, such as the distribution of
economic wealth and the improvement of lower classes' political rights. Political leadership in the democratic consolidation phase requires not only political reform but also the management capability to solve sociopolitical conflicts. When political leaders effectively manage a nation’s problems and avoid crisis, the government’s efficiency increases. On the other hand, political leadership should be democratic in its decision-making and implementation processes. Moreover, when political leadership is supported by political organizations, such as political parties, and the official staff of the president, it can have still greater possibilities. Of course, the most important goal is that democratic leadership must enjoy the people’s support, because without sustained popular approval democratic objective are not possible.
CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS

Summary

This thesis has focused on the process of democratic consolidation in South Korea. In particular, the thesis explores the problems and prospects of democratic consolidation in South Korea. From a comparative perspective on the Third Wave of democratization, I deal with the changes, dynamics, and characteristics of Korean democratization. Using the maximalist conception of democratic consolidation, I critically analyze how South Korean democracy is being consolidated in terms of political and socioeconomic democracy.

In Chapter II, I explored theoretical explanations of the third wave of democratization as academic background for analyzing the South Korean democratization process. This is because South Korean democratization can be explained by the general characteristics of the third wave of democratization. Since the mid-1970s, the global expansion of democracy has posed a fascinating challenge for social scientists. Their main concerns are to examine the forces propelling the third wave of democratization, to reexamine the established theories which emphasize the importance of socioeconomic and cultural factors in democratic development, and to explore the ways in which new democracies can be sustained and consolidated. This
chapter dealt with a conceptual review, the causes and modality of democratic transition, and the facilitating and obstructing factors of democratic consolidation.

In this thesis, democracy is understood as a means of rule for and by a particular mass of people, and is based on the people's relatively free choices in choosing their government and political leaders. In the process of political change, democratization involves holding free elections on a regular basis to determine who governs. It is a complex historical process that includes the demise of nondemocratic regimes, the inauguration of the democratic regime, and then, the consolidation of the democratic system. Among the phases of democratization, the transition to democratization entails broader and more complex processes that are associated with the institutionalization of new sets of democratic rules. The democratic consolidation phase is regarded as a process by which democracy is broadly assimilated and becomes the legitimate expression of the citizenry. It also involves behavioral and institutional changes that normalize democratic politics and narrow its uncertainty.

As for the causes of democratization, there are basically two sets of factors. One set is the domestic factors that shape and direct the country along a particular path. The other set is the international factors that encourage and reinforce the course chosen. Among domestic factors, the steady decline in the authoritarian system's political legitimacy, and the strength of economic development, affect the third wave of democratization. For external factors, there is the pressure from international organizations encouraging the process of democratization. Domestic and international
factors are inter-connected, and the particular mix of the two factors varies from one country to another.

The modes of democratic transition are useful for understanding how democratic transitions takes place in a country. They also help to understand the process of democratic consolidation. This is because the features of the democratic transition process influence the pattern, content, and degree of the democratic consolidation process. Many scholars classify various modes of transition to democracy based on the pace of democratization, the main actors of democratization, the means of democratic change, attitudes of the last main authoritarian regime elites toward democracy, strategies of transition, and relative actor strength.

To understand the process of democratic consolidation, it is necessary to examine some results of studies on the democratic consolidation phase. However, there is no scholarly consensus on substantive conclusions about the extent of consolidation among various democratic regimes. This is because their academic interests and objects of research are different, especially in terms of the problems encountered in the democratic consolidation process. There are the many factors affecting the problems and prospects of democratic consolidation. As for the problems resulting from the democratic consolidation process, Huntington (1991a) notes three types in the democratic consolidation phase: (1) transitional problems stemming directly from the process of democratic transitions, (2) contextual problems that are endemic to individual countries, such as ethnic conflicts, extreme poverty, chronic inflation, etc.; and (3) systemic problems stemming from the working of a democratic
system. Other factors affecting the problems and prospects of democratic consolidation are: the historical legacy, the nature of the nondemocratic regime, and the modes of transition.

In Chapter III, South Korea’s political environment was examined in terms of political culture, the partition of the Korean peninsula, and its still young political history. To understand the recent development in Korea, it is necessary to explore the political environments that provide insight into the causes, problems, and prospects of Korean democratization.

The political culture approach provides a useful framework for analyzing the characteristics, problems, and prospects of Korean democratization. It is also necessary to explore both traditional culture and its change in recent times. There are two aspects of political culture in South Korea. One is the authoritarian political culture, or traditional political culture. South Korea’s authoritarianism political culture came from the Confucianism of the Yi dynasty (1392-1910), which was made the official ideology of the state. During the period of Japanese colonial rule (1910-1945), South Korea’s experience with authoritarianism was even more demanding and restrictive. Japan’s coercive bureaucratic government undermined and divided Korean society. It also gave the Korean people a negative image of authority. Since its independence from Japanese rule, Korea has not discarded its authoritarian political system. Moreover, an elitist authoritarian consciousness is combined here with a largely passive and obedient public.
The other aspect of Korea's political culture has been described as pluralistic. Since the early 1960s, South Korean political culture has seen great changes in its various subcultures, such as the elite, the mass, the farmer, and the low-income groups. Socioeconomic developments influenced South Korea's changes from an authoritarian to a democratic political culture. Opinion survey data on Korea's political consciousness show that since the beginning of industrialization, Korea's political culture has changed from an authoritarian and subjective one to a democratic and participant political culture.

Since the division of Korea in 1945, the two regimes north and south of the 38th parallel have used their military confrontation as a political excuse to suppress liberalization programs and to restrict individual rights. In addition, the two regimes have exploited the issue of reunification and have skillfully used national security ideologies and policy to maintain their stability. Kim (1990) points out the following: First, the division of Korea caused the United States to involve itself in the security of South Korea; Second, South Korean authoritarian regimes strengthened their control over the public by emphasizing an anti-Communist ideology and by excluding the masses from the political process; Third, the state increased its influence and role in all parts of the country; Fourth, the division of Korea caused both a pull factor, i.e., the succession of military coups and a push factor, i.e., the sustaining and dominance of military regimes in South Korean politics; Finally, the division of Korea caused the ideological separation into left and right wing politics in South Korea.
Democratic experiments and the 40 years of authoritarian rule in South Korea were explored as background to understanding the consolidation phase currently undergoing in the country. From 1948 to 1987, South Korea had two democratic experiments, the First Republic under the leadership of President Syngman Rhee (1948-1960) and the Second Republic led by Prime Minister Chang Myon (1960-1961). The first government emerged with a democratic constitution, however, it did not usher in democratic politics. President Rhee exercised autocratic power, abused his privilege, and ruled the country through an elaborate police and administrative bureaucracy which had been developed during the Japanese colonial period. The second democratic experiment followed when the Rhee regime was brought down by protesting students and general citizens. Chang Myon was elected Prime Minister on July 29, 1960; however, his government proved inefficient and the second democratic experiment also failed. Chang Myon could not manage the republic’s economic and political problems, nor could it control the crowds that daily demonstrated in the nation’s metropolitan centers.

South Korean politics became absolutely authoritarian during the next 26 years, that is, from the time Major General Park Chung Hee came to power in May 1961 to the time President Chun Doo Whan peacefully transferred power to President Roh Tae Woo in December 1987. The authoritarian legacy proved a heavy burden for the succeeding democratic government. The authoritarian regimes had disregarded normal political procedure. They came to power through illegal military coups d’état and they had revised the constitution for their political advantage. Thus, constitutions
also became unpopular among the public and were not perceived as a legal political framework in ordering the lives of the Korean people.

South Korea’s authoritarian regimes were one man-centered dictatorships in which the president monopolized power and subordinated the legislature and judiciary to his will. Because they focused on the output functions of the executive branch, political parties could not attract the participation of high-caliber individuals, or establish strong ties to the electorate and major social groups. The authoritarian regimes, however, placed strong emphasis on economic development to justify their remaining in power. In fact, during the period of authoritarian rule, South Korea achieved astonishing economic growth. They promoted industrialization and development strong ties with big business interests. But, their economic policy also checked balanced development between large business enterprises and small businesses. In addition, linkages between political authority and big business induced corruption which spread through the sociopolitical system. The authoritarian regimes also promoted the politicalization of the armed forces. Because the military was instrumental in their coming to power, and in staying in power, the military grew accustomed to intervening in politics whenever it wanted to.

In Chapter IV, the dynamic process of democratization in South Korea was described in terms of the transition phase and democratic consolidation. South Korea’s democratic transition phase lasted for five years from Roh Tae Woo’s 6.29 Declaration of 1987 to the December 1992 presidential election. To understand the dynamic process of democratic transition in South Korea, two events in the
democratic transition process were examined: the 6.29 Declaration of Roh Tae Woo and the grand conservative ruling coalition. In the 6.29 Declaration, the authoritarian regime promised to restore democracy and carry out democratic reforms, including holding a popular presidential election. This proved to be the beginning of the end of authoritarian regimes in South Korea. The authoritarian regime eventually succumbed to the power of the aroused public.

The beginning of South Korea’s democratization in 1987 can be summarized as follows: First, the economic factor is regarded as the most important. Since the late 1970s, the economic performance of the authoritarian regime had yielded two structural constraints which led to the “crises of the regime.” One was the South Korean economy’s structural problems. A world-wide recession following the second energy crisis in 1979 negatively impacted the South Korean economy. In addition, the government pushed a heavy chemical industrialization policy in the late 1970s, thereby creating an imbalance in resource allocation. It produced an economic crisis. These economic problems finally revealed the limits of the authoritarian regime and created the momentum that lead to its demise. Another factor was that the economic growth achieved by the authoritarian regimes gave rise to economic problems among the workers. The economic equity issue caused strains that the authoritarian regimes could not adequately manage.

Second, the steady decline in the legitimacy of the authoritarian regime precipitated its own demise. Because it failed to meet new demands for political freedom and participation, it could no longer justify its existence. Third was the issue
of the people’s power, in particular, the persistence, strength, and determination of opposition party leaders in alliance with the popular sectors of radical students, intellectuals, labor union leaders, progressive journalists, clergy, and ideological dissidents. Finally, the change in United State’s policy toward the military dictatorship influenced the democratic transition process. Contrary to the United States previous support for South Korea’s military regimes, the US withdrew its support for the rightist military dictatorship and encouraged the forces of democratization.

After the opening of the democratic transition process, the continuously unstable sociopolitical situation created the need for a second political compromise between the ruling party and the opposition, i.e., the grand conservative ruling coalition. Ultimately, the South Korean democratic transition process was able to progress smoothly, with a relatively stable sociopolitical situation, due to two political compromises between the government and the opposition parties.

South Korea’s democratic consolidation phase began with the inauguration of the current President Kim Young Sam, on February 25, 1993, the first civilian president in 32 years. President Kim, a civilian president, opened the democratic consolidation phase in South Korea. President Kim’s series of reforms were examined, especially the following: eliminating corruption, assuring civilian control over the military, and political and economic reform. He also attacked the records of the previous authoritarian regimes, and although not completely successful, their excesses and corruption were at least exposed to public scrutiny. Kim succeeded in removing the military from politics, and reducing the probability of political coups. Thanks to his
efforts, civilian control over the military and popular elections have become the only way to form the government. The new president also promoted clean and fair competition between the ruling party and the opposition parties, and has encouraged fair play and free expression. Finally, he enforced the "real-name accounting system" to break the close ties between money and power. President Kim thus established the framework for democratic consolidation in South Korea; however, his reforms are just a start and South Korea still has a difficult road ahead. Indeed, one president, in so short a time, can not be expected to complete the process of democratization.

In Chapter V, the problems and prospects of the democratic consolidation process in South Korea were analyzed in the context of political institutionalization, economic development, development of civil society, and political leadership. Although President Kim encouraged political democracy on the procedural-minimum level, his reforms have not yet produced the much demanded economic equity and social justice.

The success of democratic reforms in South Korea will be measured by the depth of their internalization in the political, economic, and civil society arenas. Government's efficiency is another factor under review and Kim's political leadership is not the only element being tested. No longer dependent on the will of a single personality, the extended Korea government and all its functionaries are now judged by new standards of accountability in democratic Korea.

South Korea's democratic life is a mix of elections, political parties, and a responsible legislature. Although the new electoral laws decreased election
malpractices and assured a degree of fairness in the election process, the political parties have yet to with the electoral law. Political institutionalization is dependent on available political party system, but unfortunately, the democratic consolidation phase has yet to achieve this goal. Korea’s parties were formed by individuals and their members were more committed to a personality than an ideology. Moreover, political elites often changed the party system after an election by merging or splitting their parties. Scholars point to “party bossism” and boss-centered organizations as a central problem in Korean democratization. As Im (1996) explains: Party bossism obstructs the growth of democratic responsiveness and accountability; it fosters “clientelism” in politics; and it accentuates regional cleavages in politics because one of its bases is regionalism. He therefore argues that the institutionalization of the political party system in South Korea will not be possible until the parties become autonomous entities, free from the controls of charismatic leaders.

The South Korean legislature has yet to play an important role in the political process, and the political elites are not yet disposed to yield their authority to the people’s representatives. The new democratic constitution, adopted in 1987, addressed this problem and was supposed to improve the check and balances between the executive and legislature branches of government. However, the legislature remains a weak institution in South Korean politics. Confrontational politics are a throwback to a time when the ruling party had an overwhelming majority in the legislature. The ruling party frequently used its majority to deprive the opposition party of its right to be heard. In response, the opposition parties did whatever it could
to obstruct the work of the legislature. In a democratic political system, the
government party and the opposition must find grounds for cooperation and
accommodation. The current pressing tasks of legislature reform are: The need to
secure legislative autonomy and the strengthening of the Assemblymen’s knowledge
and expertise in procedural and substantive matters.

Since the early 1960s, the South Korean economy has achieved remarkable
economic growth. This success played an important role in the opening of
democratization in South Korea. However, in the democratic transition process, the
new government was confronted with structural problems which negatively influenced
continued economic growth. South Korea’s state-corporatist development strategy
causèd unbalanced development between big business and small- and medium-sized
businesses in the domestic economy and weakened industrial competitive abilities in
the international arena. Moreover, South Korea’s democratic transition resulted in
wage increases in excess of productivity gains. This development caused a change in
the country’s economic structure, shifting it from a labor-intensive industrial structure
to a capital and skill-intensive industrial structure. On the other hand, the economic
conditions of those alienated from the state-led industrialization process have not
improved. Accordingly, a pressing task of succeeding democratic governments will be
to achieve sustained economic growth and a more equitable distribution of the fruits of
economic success. When the South Korean economy satisfies these two goals, the new
democracy will be more successfully consolidated.
Since 1945, the state in South Korea has overpowered civil society with an impressive capacity to penetrate society and mold the behavior of social groups and individuals. Under the authoritarian regimes, civil society was thoroughly suppressed by the state’s coercive power. South Korea’s civil society, however, developed in spite of these restrictions, and during the 1980s it achieved new levels of growth. With the economic success of South Korea’s business sector, and a new and revitalized liberal political environment, South Korea is experiencing a pluralization of interests in many arenas of social life. Voluntary associations are being formed and the social differentiation is more noticeable. Distinct class identities and class-based interest groups, as well as a powerful working-class movement, are reshaping the South Korean socio-political scene.

The development of civil society is a major factor in the transition to democracy and the later consolidation phase. The state now is forced to loosen its control over civil society and to allow broader opportunities for the people to organize. However, despite the quantitative growth of interest associations, South Korean civil society still has problems of internal structure and character. The proliferation of interest associations has not been translated into an institutionalized interest in politics. Interest associations have not developed institutionalized channels for the mediation of differences, and interests are not processed within a framework of representation.

South Korea’s interest groups do not yet have democratic character in terms of their internal organization and management. Moreover, given sustained confrontation
with North Korea, leftist parties have never been formed and remain suspect. Thus, interest associations with leftist ideologies do not have institutional ties with any of the political parties.

Finally, because South Korea’s new democracy emerged from a political coalition with authoritarian elites, the political system inherited a socioeconomic framework associated with the authoritarian state. In particular, labor and social welfare policy have not changed. But the pressing task of South Korea’s civil society is to protect the interests of the lower classes so that every class can receive a share of the benefits in the social arena. Thus, the civil society must be strengthened against the influence of state power. Civil society’s autonomy can be acquired if it possesses cohesive solidarity, more active social movements, internalized decision-making processes, and effective leaders.

Since the First Republic was inaugurated in 1948, the South Korea government has maintained a strong presidential political system. The only exception was the Second Republic of Prime Minister Chang Myon. Korean presidents exercised absolute power over the political process. During their authoritarian regimes, political institutions were disregarded or used for the president’s political goals, the executive’s thinking was the only real source in devising policies. Even in the civilian government of President Kim Young Sam, the president controls not only the executive but also the legislature. So long as his party holds a majority in the National Assembly, the president will continue to dominate South Korea politics.
The prospect for democratic consolidation in South Korea was examined by analyzing Kim’s political leadership. In the early period of his tenure in office, President Kim emphasized the government’s capacity to introduce reforms in several arenas. He achieved some notable successes in eliminating corruption, amending the “politics-related laws,” by introducing the “real-name accounting system,” and by assuring civilian control over the military. These reforms were made possible by the leaders sheer determination, but they were also made possible by his clarity of judgement, his perseverance, and especially, the support he received from the Korean people.

But, President Kim is not above criticism and he has been attacked for his improvisatorial style and his inattention to institutionalized decision-making. In the early stage of his reforms, President Kim’s personal intuition played an important role in the transitional work needed to eliminate the old authoritarian elite. However, Kim’s pattern of leadership does not seem to fit the democratic consolidation phase which needs more creative thinking than that which he has demonstrated. If Koreans are to experience a better distribution of economic equity, and if they are to realize social justice, Korea’s future leaders must demonstrate they are completely free from the country’s historic political culture that has so long been rooted in authoritarianism.

The Future of South Korean Democratic Consolidation

South Korea has experience both democratic transition and democratic consolidation. The Kim Young Sam administration has performed salient political and
economic reform. The prospect for South Korean democracy is bright. There is a high degree of probability that South Korea may spontaneously accomplish both successful political reform and economic prosperity comparable to those in Western democratic countries. However, consolidating democracy is not an easy job and it cannot be established in a short time or by one person. It will be necessary to increase government efficiency and manage sociopolitical conflicts, while sustaining reforms. Just as Western democracy has developed through consistent self-criticism, so too the South Korean people have a role to play in safeguarding their young democracy by active and constructive involvement in the political process.

South Korean democratic consolidation must include not only political democracy but also socioeconomic democracy. In particular, when the distribution of economic wealth is more just and civil rights are fully realized, the South Korean democratic consolidation phase will be completed. But for more substantial democracy to occur in South Korea, political leaders must emerge who are capable of making rational choices and who make the kind of policies that benefit the nation. Sustained economic growth is also important, hence balanced development in both the industrial and agricultural sectors is vital to the nation’s democratic future. Finally, civil society will play an essential role in checking state power and in representing the public interest of the different communities.

Democratization and reunification are recognized as ultimate objectives of South Korean politics. These two goals are not contradictory, only the order of their implementation is in question. In the present situation, with the continuing military
confrontation between the two Koreas, democratization in South Korea is a positive step on the road to the reunification of the Korean Peninsula. Although past authoritarian regimes used the division of Korea to maintain their hold on power, a democratic government does not need such a strategy. A democratic government has the necessary popular legitimacy, and can better pursue reunification, knowing it has the support of the public. Finally, South Korea’s sustained political and socioeconomic stability may, in time, induce the people of North Korea to legitimize the democratic process now well underway in South Korea. Reunification of the Korean peninsula, therefore, waits on the success of democratization forces on both sides if the 38th parallel.
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