4-1999

The Machtpolitik Doctrine from Antiquity to Present

Brian Abendshein

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/masters_theses

Part of the Political Science Commons

Recommended Citation
https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/masters_theses/5016

This Masters Thesis-Open Access is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate College at ScholarWorks at WMU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at WMU. For more information, please contact wmu-scholarworks@wmich.edu.
THE MACHTPOLITIK DOCTRINE FROM ANTIQUITY TO PRESENT

by

Brian Abendshein

A Thesis
Submitted to the
Faculty of The Graduate College
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the
Degree of Master of Arts
Department of Political Science

Western Michigan University
Kalamazoo, Michigan
April 1999
Copyright by
Brian Abendshein
1998
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank Dr. Ritchie, Dr. Isaak, and Dr. Renstrom for their aid and guidance in researching this thesis. I would also like to acknowledge Dr. Penikis and Dr. Thorson, both formerly of Indiana University South Bend, for fostering my interest in political philosophy and encouraging my study in this field. All of these men have aided and influenced my work and for that I am very grateful.

Secondly, I would like to thank my colleagues April, Agi, and Carl for their words of encouragement and being there when I needed help or people to bounce ideas off of. Without them this would have been a much harder experience than it was. Thank you all.

Finally, I must thank my family for all of their love and support through all of my years of college. Their support has been unwavering and unconditional. Truly, without them none of what I have achieve would be possible.

Brian Abendshein
THE MACHTPOLITIK DOCTRINE FROM ANTIQUITY TO PRESENT

Brian Abendshein, M.A.
Western Michigan University, 1999

The thesis is an archival study of international relations. This thesis will analyze the Machtpolitik, or power politics, doctrine from its beginnings in Plato's *Republic* to the present day. In considering this evolution the thesis will seek to address the following three main questions. First, does traditional machtpolitik doctrine still exist today? Second, has the rise of democratic systems of government limited the effectiveness of diplomacy? Third, what are the causes of international instability? The debate over these questions in modern times is framed by three main factions: Idealists, Descriptive Realists, and Normative Realists. Each of these positions will be discussed in the thesis and the conclusion will present Friedrich Nietzsche as an unique exemplar of the idealist school.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .................................................................................. ii

CHAPTER

I. ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF MACHTPOLITIK ...................... 1
II. THE GREEKS AND CARL SCHMITT ............................................... 7
III. MACHIAVELLI AND HOBBES ...................................................... 18
IV. TWENTIETH CENTURY MACHTPOLITIK .................................. 31
V. NORMATIVE AND DESCRIPTIVE REALISM ............................... 42
VI. MACHTPOLITIK AND NIETZSCHE ............................................. 79

BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................................................................ 90
CHAPTER I

ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF MACHTPOLITIK

The twentieth century has seen the rise of the nation-state to near total dominance of the international order. While the tail end of the century has also seen the emergence of non-state actors, such as multinational corporations and non-governmental organizations with various objectives, it is still the nation-states that are the preeminent actors on the international level. Indeed, with events such as the breakup of the former Soviet Union, there are currently more states than ever before.

As long as there have been states, there has been a need for them to communicate with one another. The reasons for this are obvious; the demarcation of borders, forging alliances, settling disputes, and the ending of wars or their prevention are just a few of the reasons. These communications have become known as international relations. The study of international relations began almost simultaneously with the beginning of international relations themselves. The Greeks were among the earliest to record the process and results of states dealing with one another, both in war and peace. The best example of this is Thucydides' History of the Peloponnesian War. In his classic work Thucydides details the events of the war between Athens and Sparta, and while doing so he also analyzes the nature, sources and perceptions of power in the struggle.

Power is one of the main factors that affects how states deal with one another. Many aspects of a state contribute to its overall power; among them
are the military, economy, technological resources and size of population. In most cases the power that is the result of these factors is used for one purpose, to influence others. The following is a typical definition of power politics. "In its most general sense, power, politically speaking, is the capacity to bend another to our will."¹ Hans Morgenthau states his definition of power this way: "When we speak of power, we mean a man's control over the minds and actions of other men."² As we can see, both definitions could be applied to the affairs of states or to the affairs of individuals who are dealing with one another.

Power has been one of the most analyzed aspects of political and social life. The ability to control others has long been a temptation and a drive for humanity. Power can be used either for good reasons or it can be perverted and used for selfish reasons. This has been the dilemma of power and the reason that it is one of the most studied phenomena of politics, international relations, and interpersonal relations.

Plato and the Greeks sought to define what power was and how it could be used to build the best society for this world. Machiavelli's writings pertain to the use of power by a ruler to stabilize the state, retain his domain, and if he were of mind to, expand his power. Much of it also pertains to heads of state and the keeping of their power despite those who would challenge them. There is, however, a side of Machiavelli that is concerned with the moral life of men and seeks to educate men of the proper way in which to live. Hobbes, in his writings, described how power should be placed in a single sovereign if pandemonium is to be avoided and how the sovereign should then use this power in ruling his subjects. Although the scope has
changed over the centuries, the goals remain the same.

In the twentieth century, the debate over power politics and how power should be used has largely been characterized by the dichotomy between the idealists and the realists. The idealist position is a largely homogeneous one. Its members seek to describe a perfect international order or an individual state utopia. Woodrow Wilson's attempts to form the League of Nations is an example of the idealist school of thought. The idealists also view man ss inherently good, and it is from this position that they can postulate their ideal international order. In the conclusion, I shall present the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche as representative of idealist thought and as a possible, although highly unlikely, solution for the problems that are the subject of this thesis.

The realist side must, I argue here, be broken down even further into the schools of descriptive realism and normative realism. On the surface, this appears to be another dichotomous relationship, but this is not really the case. Descriptive realism seeks to describe the situation and use of power as it actually is without passing judgement as to whether it is right or wrong. Thucydides is the prime example of a descriptive realist.

The normative realist position cannot be as neatly characterized as the descriptive realist. Power politics, for much of its history, could be characterized by the machtpolitik position as exemplified by the Machiavelli of The Prince and Thrasymachus. Both Machiavelli and Thrasymachus proposed that whatever the stronger party was able to enforce upon the weaker, was the just course of action. They saw the world in terms of might making right, and there was no escaping this certainty. One of the last true proponents of
this position was Carl Schmitt. His philosophy, which will be discussed in Chapter II, was the last of the true machtpolitik doctrines. Machtpolitik has grown diffuse and diluted as this century has matured and as will be shown in the rest of the paper, the normative realists, too, have varying opinions and beliefs about what is important in looking at power politics and how things are viewed in light of power politics. It is also important to insist at this point, that not all members of the realist school are practitioners of machtpolitik. Normative realism is a much more complex world-view than what it appears to be from the outside, and the general tendency to lump all who postulate the primacy of power into a single position is incorrect.

There are several issues that must be addressed in looking at power politics in the late twentieth century. The first of these is whether machtpolitik still exists at this point in the twentieth century in its traditional strong descriptive sense, or has it been substantially transformed? I argue that while there are still strong remnants of the machtpolitik position, they have been radically transformed by the events of this century. Thrasymachus, Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Schmitt would no longer recognize the position that they once championed. Thrasymachus and Schmitt will be addressed in Chapter II, and Machiavelli and Hobbes in Chapter III.

The second issue is the struggle between diplomacy and democracy. While democratic societies have come to be the norm in our time, are they conducive to the proper conduct of international relations or do they make it harder to negotiate? Prior to and for the first part of this century, diplomacy was handled among elites following a set course of protocols. The advent of democratic societies now limits the powers of these elites to negotiate and has
introduced an element of uncertainty to international relations. Clearly, democracy has changed the way in which international relations are conducted. The question now is whether these changes are for good or ill. Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and Hans Morganthau feel that these changes are not for the best when considering the stability of the international order. I believe the evidence supports them, and these positions will be addressed in Chapters IV and V.

The third issue to be addressed is what are the causes of international instability. Is it the state system itself? Or is it the spread of ideology and nationalism? Or could it even be human nature itself? I suggest that none of these are solely responsible for the conflict in the world. Ideology and nationalism are the leading candidates with their ability to incite zealotry. Human nature is a close second due to, as Hobbes felt, man’s willingness to harm his fellow man. Last of the three would be the state system as it currently exists, and this is only because of it providing the fertile ground and a means to act out ideology and nationalism. These topics will be addressed in Chapter V also.

How does one explain the state of affairs that exists among nations? Hobbes, for one, refers to a State of Nature. In this condition all states are identical in behavior and the overriding concern is self-preservation and mutual hostility. Hobbes sought to apply this paradigm for behavior to individuals and states, the latter being the more probable application. The drive for self-preservation is embodied in the concept of the national interest when it is applied to the state. When states invoke the national interest, they are saying that the issue involved is of such importance that only those who
are most qualified to address it should do so. If the issue were mishandled, the very life of the state might be imperiled.

Given the state of relations in the world during the course of the twentieth century, one sees that morality as commonly understood has seldom been a major concern in the conduct of affairs of state. The Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union tends to confirm conclusions drawn from the historical record. Why this is the case is the question that is persistently addressed. In the following chapters, the role that morality plays in international relations will be examined. First, to understand its apparent lacking in most forms of international relations, and second, to understand why this is the case. Finally, to examine the possibility for increasing the application of morality to issues of international relations.

1 Kaplan, p. 445
2 Morganthau, p. 28
CHAPTER II
THE GREEKS AND CARL SCHMITT

The study of most sciences began with the Greeks, and the area that has become known as political science and its subsections, like power politics, is no exception. When considering the Greek views of power and international relations, two of the main sources of study are Plato's *The Republic* and Thucydides' *The History of the Peloponnesian War*. While both works address the issue of power it should be noted that the former is a much more theoretical work and the latter is a chronicling of actual events. Plato was the pre-eminent philosopher of his time. He was a student of Socrates and later was the teacher of Aristotle. While many of his ideas have been rejected over the course of time, he provided the springboard from which to proceed. Thucydides has been called the first historian, and his work set the standard for all future historical works.

Both of these men produced their works during the Peloponnesian War, and both participated in the war. Given this crucial event in both their lives, it becomes apparent in their writing that mental and external stability are of great importance to them. In a sense, both thinkers are searching for the ground upon which stability can be built, whether it be in individual lives or in the life of a state. It appears that to the Greek mind it is a combination of power and virtue that leads to stability.

The first book of *The Republic* is devoted to the issue of virtue. In it Plato, through the character of Socrates, is engaging in a discussion to determine what justice is. It is in this discussion that one first encounters
Thrasymanus and his view of what is just. The position that he takes may very well be the first recorded example of power politics. Thrasymanus states, "What I say is 'just' or 'right' means nothing but what is to the interest of the stronger party." The even simpler restatement of what Thrasymanus has said is that might makes right. This doctrine expresses the way in which power tends to be used. Those with the power dictate what is to be done to those who do not have power. Thrasymanus holds this to be true for any type of state: "That is what I mean: in all states alike 'right' has the same meaning, namely what is for the interest of the party established in power, and that is the strongest."

Socrates does not believe that this can be all that there is to justice and begins to challenge Thrasymanus' definition of justice. Socrates puts forward what would now be considered a traditional version of what is just; that men perform acts, not only self-interestedly, but also for the betterment of those that they aid. Socrates uses the examples of a doctor treating a patient and a ship captain commanding a crew. The benefit of their actions does not redound solely to them, but also to the patient and the rest of the crew and passengers. Thrasymanus feels that it is only by practicing injustice that one can hope to gain wealth and further power. Thrasymanus states:

So true is it, Socrates, that injustice, on a grand enough scale, is superior to justice in strength and freedom and autocratic power; and 'right', as I said at first, means simply what serves the interest of the stronger party; 'wrong' means what is for the interest and profit of oneself.

By the end of the first book Socrates has pointed out several flaws in the doctrine, but has not been able to totally refute it. Thrasymanus makes very little distinction between the sphere of the individual and the sphere of the state in regards to the benefits of practicing injustice. If the individual or the state is
stronger than those around it, its commands are right. Thrasymachus goes so far as to imply that if one were to disobey the orders of a stronger party, then the weaker one is in the wrong. Socrates' counter arguments make Thrasymachus' position somewhat unstable, but he cannot deny that in some circumstances 'might' does indeed make 'right'.

Thucydides, it seems, would also take issue with what Thrasymachus has said. Thucydides states, "Men seem to resent injustice more than violence; the former is regarded as unfair advantage taken by an equal, the later is compulsion applied by a superior." One might consider this statement as an attitude that would be widely held by citizens in a democracy like that of Athens, where all citizens were considered equal. Given the definition of power presented above, it would seem that the doctrine that Thrasymachus proposes would fall into the category that Thucydides labels as violence. Yet, both Plato and Thucydides regard the 'might makes right' position as injustice. This question of which of the two, injustice or violence, power politics as presented by Thrasymachus, may account for Socrates' inability to totally refute the doctrine. Also, it may represent the first distinction between the idealist and realist schools of thought.

The philosophy that Thrasymachus proposes is the foundation of the machtpolitik philosophy in that it attempts to propose that all relationships are power political relationships. Indeed, this has been a prominent position since the time of the Greeks and has continued to have proponents well into the twentieth century. The problem with the position that Thrasymachus takes is that it attempts to stretch too far. If he had stopped with just explaining all relationships as power political relationships, Socrates would have had an even more difficult time trying to refute the argument. However, Thrasymachus reaches
for something more. He seeks to say that those who possess power are infallible when commanding or making laws, merely because they have the power to do so. This is where the argument runs into trouble. Socrates shows us that just because one has power does not mean that one always uses power in the best way for oneself or others; and also shows that there are other reasons to wield power other than self-interest. Further, Socrates makes a persuasive case that in order to maintain this position, the dominant interests must compromise their own exclusive interests, fearing a reaction to extreme exertions of self-interest.

Socrates, in the later books of The Republic, establishes what he feels the virtues that men and states should have. He does this in the description of his ideal state. He also states what he feels justice truly is - all aspects of a state or man functioning in their prescribed way, doing what they are best suited for. For Socrates, when this is the case, a man cannot help but act in a just or right manner.

After the virtues and justice have been established, the other key to stability is power. Historian June Allison states; “Thucydides is concerned in the Archaeology with fundamental bases of power which can be applied universally. He found them to be money, ships, and governmental stability.”\(^5\) Since this statement makes it appear that we are trying to define stability by including stability in the definition, let us discuss the last aspect of the definition of power that Thucydides gives according to Allison. The government of Athens changed several times during the course of the war. It seems, however, that Thucydides feels that these changes were not the result of the failure of individuals in the government. He states; “The cause of all these evils was love of power due to ambition and greed, which led to the rivalries from which party spirit sprung.”\(^6\) It was individuals acting in non-virtuous ways in a quest to
secure power to themselves instead of the state's that caused the changes in the
government of Athens and not any failing of the governments themselves.
Without virtue, power itself cannot provide stability.

At the beginning of the war it was Athens that had all of these characteristics of power. The democracy had been functioning smoothly, her ports were always busy, her navy dominant, and her colonies provided a steady source of revenue. Due to these factors Athens had several victories early in the war.

Even with these advantages, however, Athens can still be seen to use tactics that seem to come straight from Thrasymachus. Thucydides describes the fate of Melos. Melos was a neutral colony of Lacedaemon, that became openly hostile to Athens after some of Athens more aggressive actions. The Athenian envoys order Melos to surrender because; “You know and we know, as practical men, that the question of justice arises only between parties of equal strength, and that the strong do as they can, and the weak submit.” Melos did not submit, and instead was defeated by Athens and all the men were executed.

After early victories by Athens, Sparta sought to end the conflict by negotiations on several occasions. Athens decided to pursue the conflict instead of negotiating. This resulted in the people of Athens being split on which course of action to pursue, which meant that Athens was less and less able to make critical decisions on how to conduct the war in a timely manner and opened the door to factional strife. It also resulted in the dismissal of generals that, while militarily successful, were undermined by ambitious citizens in Athens. It is this ambition that ultimately lost the war for Athens.

We can see what the results of these actions were. Athens fell from prominence and Sparta became the leader in Greek affairs. Athens had power to
spare at the beginning of the war. It was the lack of virtue that lead to her downfall. Sparta, in contrast, used the virtue of its leaders to carefully manage and cultivate its power until such time that they could defeat Athens. Overall, Sparta was more stable than Athens. The Athenian citizens forgot discipline and became overly ambitious. While they still had power, it was power without the direction provided by virtue, especially justice. Given the definition of justice that Socrates gave, if they had acted according to it, they would have acted the right way. The lack of virtue meant a lack of stability and as a result the loss of the war.

Thucydides makes qualified use of the assumptions that are made by Thrasymachus. He seeks both to put forward some ideas of what makes a state powerful, by chronicling how these things came into play in the war between Athens and Sparta, and to establish that Athens i.e., so all states, ruthlessly pursue their own interest in international relations, as witnessed by Athens' treatment of her confederated states. As stated above, Thucydides makes no statements of bias towards one side or the other, he just records the events as they happen. With his work, Thucydides sets the standard for all future histories that will be written. To describe the events as they take place and to do so without bias for any side involved.

The power political tradition that started with Thrasymachus continued, via Machiavelli and Hobbes, into the twentieth century. Carl Schmitt is the philosopher that best represents the machtpolitik doctrine in this century. In his principle work, The Concept of the Political, he puts forward a theory that proclaims that the political relationships of the state are the preeminent relationships, and ultimately the only ones of true importance. For him there are
no other considerations in politics than power. However, Schmitt also was a keen observer of the events occurring around him in Weimar Germany. In this aspect, one could also classify him with Thucydides as a descriptive realist.

Rune Slagstad's essay "Liberal Constitutionalism and its Critics: Carl Schmitt and Max Weber", George Schwab's book *The Challenge of the Exception* and John McCormick's article "Fear, Technology, and the State" provide analyses of the foundations of Schmitt's thoughts on power politics; and how power affects states both in international relationships and internally; as well as providing commentary on Schmitt's ideas.

Slagstad states that, for Schmitt, liberalism is the enemy, with its veiling of concrete political reality. "Political reality is not governed by 'abstract institutions and systems of norms', but ruled by tangible people and organizations." 8 Schmitt is seeking to present politics as it actually is, and must be. Schmitt feels that liberalism masquerades behind the cover of its institutions and norms to hide from the fact that power is what motivates politics. Much of his philosophy revolves around the idea of the "political" and the key decision that it makes; that of distinguishing between friends and enemies. Schmitt states,

The specific political distinction to which political actions and motives can be reduced is that between friend and enemy. This provides a definition in the sense of a criterion and not as an exhaustive definition or one indicative of substantial content. 9

It is apparent to Schmitt that as situations change friends may become enemies and enemies may become friends. This is why he establishes the political as a criterion and not a set definition. This can be linked to Hobbes and the loose alliances that he describes in his State of Nature. In Hobbes, due to the chaos of the State of Nature, no one can be sure that they can trust another.
The "political" is in many respects very similar to the State of Nature as envisioned by Hobbes. For most philosophers this conception has lost its appeal as a model for international relations, but not for Schmitt. Says Slagstad, "Schmitt, however, seeks to reintroduce the state of nature as the prevailing political position."\(^{10}\) In this type of environment a state or person must be constantly vigilant of the events and people around him, and ready to respond as is needed. Schwab says of Schmitt, "He observed that politics is a sphere which is constantly dominated by the necessity of drawing distinctions between friend and enemy (Freund und Fiend)."\(^{11}\) Indeed, it is this distinction between friend and enemy that is the sole province of the "political". "Thereby the inherently objective nature and autonomy of the political becomes evident by virtue of its being able to treat, distinguish, and comprehend the friend-enemy antithesis independently of other antitheses."\(^{12}\) The other antitheses that Schmitt speaks of are the other arenas of public participation in the liberal state; religion, economics, and art, etcetera.

It is the application of reason that allows Schmitt to make these distinctions between friend and enemy. The idea of the "political" and distinguishing between friends and enemies are the cornerstones of Schmitt’s philosophy. McCormick states,

"The political’ is irreducible to any other element. Indeed, Schmitt envisions the friend/enemy distinction as so fundamental and elementary that in the course of his argument he feels compelled at particular points to remark on the self-evidence of his thesis: ‘nothing can escape this logical conclusion of the political’."\(^{13}\)

Therefore, the "political" has become akin to the state of nature in which all are enemies of one another. Into this breach must step the state to give order and
protect its citizens.

In the Hobbesian state of nature man lives in a constant state of fear. Schmitt seeks to use this fear to provide the basis for the forming of the state. “In other words, fear is the source of political order. Human beings once confronted with the prospect of their own dangerousness will be terrified into the arms of authority.”14 This idea is a pure descendent of Hobbes’ thought. Schmitt, like Hobbes, believes that man is inherently inclined to evil. “For Hobbes, truly a powerful and systematic political thinker, the pessimistic conception of man is the elementary presupposition of a specific system of political thought.”15 It is now the duty of the state to protect its citizens from one another and outside threats. However, the state and those in control of it must be able and willing to make the distinctions between friend and enemy. This is one of the areas in which Schmitt’s criticisms of liberalism come into play. If liberalism does indeed cover and distort concrete political realities, it stands to reason that it will fail at some point to properly distinguish between friends and enemies. This could have catastrophic consequences for the state.

To enable the state to correctly make these distinctions, it must remain separate from and superior to the society which it governs. The means to this end is reason. Schwab states; “Schmitt’s understanding of objective reason is its capacity to distinguish friend from enemy, and the state’s ability not to succumb to civil society as such but to serve the entire nation rather than just sections of it.”16 Thus, the ability to distinguish between friend and enemy is used internally as well as externally to determine what is best for the entire state and not just what might benefit a particular special interest. “The state must stand above society as a quasi-objective entity, rather than help precipi-
tate civil war by existing as one subjectivity among others.”17

To summarize Schmitt’s political thought; he believed that one should not be disillusioned by anything that would distract one from seeing politics for what it is, the pursuit of power. The state and those leading it have a duty to all parts of society to ensure that the state is safe from external threat, in light of the “political” conception of international relations; and that it serve all members of the society equally. The functions of the state should not be hampered by things such as partisan politics, ideologies or considerations of normative morality.

Schmitt models some of his philosophy on Hobbes and Machiavelli’s conceptions of the reason of state argument. He makes considerations of power just as Machiavelli would have and seeks to describe and explain these power relationships in terms of the “political”. The “political” stands as his reformulation of the state of nature and serves to provide the fear that he feels is necessary to establish civil society and its subordination to the state, and to keep that society in place once it has been established. Schmitt fears the possibility of civil war just as Hobbes did. Schmitt dislikes liberalism because he feels that it prevents one from seeing and describing things as they actually are and this is not something that the state can afford to have happen given what is at stake. It is through the “political” that the state and its leaders can see things for what they really are and act accordingly.

After Carl Schmitt, as will be demonstrated in Chapter V, there are no clear inheritors of the machtpolitik position. The position has become very diffuse and cannot be clearly defined in the twentieth century. There are several, like Kissinger and Brzezinski, who seem to exemplify parts of the position, but
none are totally devoted to machtpolitik. As will be shown later, Kissinger is
closer to a true adherent of the position than is Brzezinski. Yet, Brzezinski is
crucial in the study of the field because he represents the transition from
machtpolitik to a wider perception of the issues that surround power politics
and international relations. Brzezinski is one of the first to raise the questions
regarding the role of ideology, nationalism, and human nature and how these
things lead to the difficulties that are ever present in international relations.

1 Cornford, p. 18
2 Cornford, p. 18
3 Cornford, p. 26
4 Thucydides, p. 63
5 Allison, p. 21
6 Thucydides, p. 190
7 Thucydides, p. 267
8 Slagstad, p. 112
9 Schmitt, p. 26
10 Slagstad, p. 115
11 Schwab, p. 51
12 Schmitt, p. 27
13 McCormick, p. 621
14 McCormick, p. 622
15 Schmitt, p. 65
16 Schwab, p. 57
17 McCormick, p. 625
CHAPTER III
MACHIAVELLI AND HOBBES

This chapter will present the philosophies of Niccolo Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes. These two philosophers represent the middle development of the power politic doctrine. A cursory reading of The Prince leads to the belief that Machiavelli can be considered the father of the machtpolitik doctrine. However, the Machiavelli of The Discourses presents a different aspect of the philosophy. It is this other side of Machiavelli that should make one realize that attributing the birth of modern machtpolitik to Machiavelli, is not quite accurate. As shall be discussed below, Machiavelli has another position that is concerned with the moral life of people, and ultimately, their individual felicity.

It is on the grounds of felicity that Machiavelli and Hobbes find commonality. It can be argued that the main thrust of Hobbes’ work was on the issue of individual felicity. Hobbes was ultimately concerned with social order and preventing the horrors of the State of Nature from occurring. It is the horror of the war of all against all that lead him to the sovereign of Leviathan. Hobbes was concerned with issues of power as they affected the founding and running of the social order. This and his ideas on how power relates with morality and the State of Nature will be discussed later in the chapter.

We turn first to the philosophy of Niccolo Machiavelli and shall also examine his place as a kind of transition point between the sides of descriptive realism and normative realism. For our purposes the main work of Machiavelli’s to be considered is The Prince, but as stated above The Discourses provide a
critical counterpoint to The Prince. In The Prince Machiavelli details the use of power in ruling a state as he believes one should. It is a work with a long history of controversy. Some hold it to be a totally immoral document, while others regard it as valuable and the first modern piece of machtpolitik.

The aspect of power politics that is most often linked with Machiavelli is the doctrine of “reason of state”. This doctrine endorses the use of any means to attain the stability of the state. It is this doctrine that gives Machiavelli the label of father of modern machtpolitik. It is upon further reading of Machiavelli that one discovers that Machiavelli’s conception of the reason of state only allows the prince to exercise it when the stability of the state is already at hand. The doctrine also had the effect of blinding Machiavelli to some of the things that have so come to affect states and international relations in this century: nationalism, ideology, and religious zealotry. Machiavelli saw the beginnings of nationalism in his observations of France, but could not envision the rabidity that characterizes so much of nationalism today. Also, he would never have foreseen the destructive powers of ideology and religion.

In The Prince, Machiavelli produced a work that he felt described what a new prince must do to successfully take control of a state and keep it. The circumstances that he wrote it under provide an explanation for the tone of the book. Machiavelli was a patriot of Italy and wanted to see it become strong and independent of the other nations that had been interfering in the affairs of Italy at the time. Machiavelli blamed the Papacy for much of Italy’s inability to successfully defend itself from the French and the Germans.

The content of The Prince, as stated above, is the course that a prince must take in governing his new state. For Machiavelli there are two main ways
that a prince may come to control a state. The first is by inheritance, the second is by conquest. While not ignoring the first means, Machiavelli spends most of the book focusing on attaining a state by conquest. He seeks to make his work reflect things as they really are and what steps should be taken to make things better. Sebastian De Grazia states in his book, *Machiavelli in Hell* that:

> His moral philosophy rests on man's essence and its degeneration; his political generalizations seek and rely on men as they act throughout history, as they have been and are, not as they may once have been in a hypothetical prehistory.¹

Machiavelli considered himself to be writing about how men were and not of ideal men. It is due to this insight that he recommends some of the harsher methods to secure power.

When a prince has taken a new territory by force Machiavelli recommends the extermination of all members of the former ruling family. This would ensure that there would be no others who could contest the right of the prince to rule in the new territory. He also counseled however, that the new ruler should strive not to change the old laws or taxes. This would provide his new subjects with a continuity and make them feel less threatened by the circumstances of a change in their ruler. These recommendations represent the practical use of power on two levels. The first is that the prince will have used his power in the body of a military to take control of the new state. This is the ultimate expression of power in bending another to one's will. The second level is much more subtle. The prince changes very little of how the state is governed to bring the people over to his side. Power is still exercised in bending the new populace to his will, but it is used as a scalpel in this case; not the bludgeon of an invasion.
The violence that Machiavelli recommends at this point is not performed without reason based in his observations of human nature as the following quote reveals.

Concerning this, it should be noted that one must either pamper or do away with men, because they will avenge themselves for minor offenses while for more serious ones they cannot; so that any harm done to a man must be the kind that removes any fear of revenge.²

This advice will, in Machiavelli's opinion, remove many sources of potential future difficulties. He also warns the new prince to be alert and look for things that may pose problems in the future and address them as soon as they come to his attention; "... for once problems are recognized ahead of time, they can be easily cured; but if you wait for them to present themselves, the medicine will be too late, for the disease will have become incurable."³ Taking control of one's own destiny is clearly advocated by Machiavelli. This is borne out in many parts of The Prince. He warns of the dangers of using troops that are not loyal to the prince personally; also, he cautions the prince against those that wish to play king-maker because they have power that could rival that of the prince himself. Finally, he praises the prince who has relied on himself to make events happen over those that have let Fortuna dictate the course that they have followed. He states, "... nevertheless, he who has relied upon fortune less has maintained his position best."⁴ For Machiavelli the proactive use of power by the prince is far better than the reactive use of power.

All of this requires a prince who can act when action is called for and can act in whatever manner is called for. It is this aspect of The Prince that seems to many to call for the prince to act in immoral ways. Machiavelli does not see this as immoral, but rather merely practical, the means of securing the prime good,
the state's stability. He states that the prince must be able to adapt to the situa-
tion. "I also believe that the man who adapts his course of action to the nature
of the time will succeed and, likewise, that the man who sets his course of ac-
tion out of tune with the times will come to grief." De Grazia expands on this
theme by saying:

To write of using qualities well or badly, emphasizes their possible util-
ity toward some end and their use according to some judgement. They
become means, tools, instruments, detachable from the person using
them. Each tool, each quality, and its opposite, too, can be picked up and
plied or left lying on the ground.

Thus, the prince is not immoral or even amoral. What he is and must be, is
willing to use the proper tool for the task before him.

Machiavelli also speaks to ambition in relation to princes and men in
general. "The desire to acquire is truly a very natural and normal thing: and
when men who can do so, they will always be praised and not condemned; but
when they cannot and wish to do so at any cost, herein lies the error and the
blame." Even though the word ambition is not expressly stated, it is what is
being discussed. Some ambition is normal and indeed, even viewed as good by
Machiavelli, but when one becomes ambitious beyond their capabilities to
achieve, that is when ambition becomes something negative and the cause of
many troubles. This leads once again to questions of morality and its relation to
the use of power.

Machiavelli's philosophy marks the very beginning of modern political
and moral philosophy and an evolution from the philosophies of the early
Greeks. The first major difference that can be spotted between the thought of
the two philosophies is the difference in the scale of which the philosophy is to
be applied. Plato's *Republic*, while a model that he felt all city-states should follow, can only be successful when used for a city-state. Trying to transpose it to a modern state would be nearly impossible. Thucydides's ideas of the concrete basis for power changed from the time of the Peloponnesian War to the time of Machiavelli. Machiavelli saw his writings in *The Prince* as things that were applicable to any and all who sought to rule. Machiavelli served as an ambassador for Florence and conducted affairs among the fledgling nation-states. He saw that France especially was developing a national identity; from which he predicted the coming of nationalism, and the rise of the nation-state. He felt that this was the future of all states, and he sought to emulate this trend in Italy.

The second difference is in the style of the leader. The philosopher-king of *The Republic* is by no means a saintly figure, but he is much more compassionate to his citizens than Machiavelli's prince. The philosopher-king does what he does because he has been trained to understand what justice is and how it is to be maintained. To this end he implements policies to ensure that each aspect of the city and each of the citizens is functioning as it and they should. The prince is implementing policy so that he might control territories that he has conquered with the only regard to his subjects being that they fear or love, but do not hate him. However, as will be shown shortly, this changes in *The Discourses*.

The third difference is in how the two ages view the felicity of the individuals in the state. In the Platonic view each citizen's felicity is maximized when they are performing the duties that they are best at. It is only those at the top that have the time or education to pursue other interests that would enhance individual felicity. Specifics regarding Machiavelli shall be given below;
however, in preface let it be said that the state envisioned by Machiavelli would have broad boundaries as to the paths that individuals could pursue to felicity. That as long as citizens are not opposing the prince and not disrupting the social order, they may pursue whatever course they desire.

In his aspect as a moral philosopher Machiavelli sought to address what would make a private person good given the fact that he held that men were at the very least predisposed to do evil. Of Machiavelli De Grazia states, "Niccolo the moralist writes of himself as a good man, urges others toward right conduct, and recognizes it as his duty to teach good." He recognizes that there are good and evil and endeavors to sway those around him to the path of good.

The felicity of individuals is important to Machiavelli. He is trying in some of his other works, both political and moral, to explain why men act in the ways they do and to encourage men to act in a moral manner, so that the felicity of all may be enhanced. De Grazia paraphrases from *The Discourses*, "If men set themselves in motion, the intrinsic cause of the motion is the recurrence and instability of their appetites and desires. The pursuit of gratification pushes men to incessant discontent." The solution that Machiavelli offers is moral education. He offers many institutions that may help in giving this moral instruction; religion, family, militia, and the state. Most important though, is the prince himself. The prince is Machiavelli's one man setting the good example that will influence all who see him. "... without the creation of one new ruler the city will never rest unless the goodness of a single man, together with his ability, maintains her freedom; ..." The theme of the character of the prince setting the character of the state is repeated in several other chapters of *The Discourses*. Indeed, if there is corruption in a city, the prince should look no
further than himself; "A prince should not complain of any sin committed by
the people he governs, for such sins of necessity come either from the prince’s
negligence or from the fact that he is stained with similar defects." Therefore, the prince must strive to set the good moral example for the people he
governs to ensure the character and stability of the state; which in turn, will
enhance the felicity of all who live there.

Machiavelli straddles the divide between descriptive realism and nor-
mative realism in the respect that he feels that all of the normative decisions
that he makes of how the prince should behave are based on what he has seen
and described of the way that people act. He sought to represent life as it was,
not as a theoretical paradigm. It was from his view of life as it is that he derived
his theories of how a prince and others should act and what actions they should
take to achieve their goals. He also exemplifies many of the main characteris-
tics of the machtpolitik school. It is the prince’s power that will determine what
actions he can and cannot take. It is power that will allow him to conquer new
domains and incorporate them into his realm, and once there keep them; and it
is power that permits the social stability which allows for greater felicity.
Machiavelli also understands that there are different ways in which power can
be used. These are the tools that De Grazia speaks of. As is shown above,
Machiavelli is deeply concerned with the felicity of people in general. The job
of the prince is to create an order in which people will be both free and safe to
pursue their felicity as they see fit. The state is there to educate, guide, and
protect. Not to dictate, unless the stability of the state is compromised by the
judgements and behavior of citizens.

The next step in the evolution of power politics and international rela-
tions is Thomas Hobbes. As shall be shown below, Hobbes presents a theory that explains how states come into being and what factors govern their interactions with one another. Also, Hobbes presents what he calls Laws of Nature; these laws give guidelines for interaction that are presented as a form of morality.

When considering how states are to conduct affairs among one another, it is first important to see how states came into existence and the functions they presume to satisfy. If one can understand the circumstances and the beliefs that formed the states as they are, then one may gain insight into why states behave in the manner they do. When speaking of a state we are speaking of an imposition of order on what normally would be a chaotic situation. It may not be as bad as the State of Nature that Hobbes envisioned, but chaos in the most extreme revolutionary doctrines is tolerable only in the short run. Thus, the first of the differences in the normative realist position that shall be discussed is the argument of Order by Artifice versus Order as Natural or Divine.

Thomas Hobbes presents a theory in which predictable human relations exist in nature and these natural tendencies of mankind can be found by man through the exercise of reason and systematic observation. Hobbes was writing on the eve of the Enlightenment, and has been called the first of the Enlightenment thinkers by some, and it is in this context that he values reason so highly. However, Hobbes relies on a particular form of reason that he called "Right Reason", which he defined as the act of reasoning that will lead one to the proper course of action. It is through the use of right reason that man will come to know the descriptive Laws of Nature and be able to work his way out of the State of Nature.
It is the State of Nature, and the escape from it, that is the centerpiece of Hobbes’ philosophy. While some have tried to argue that Hobbes believed that the State of Nature really existed, this is clearly not the case. Hobbes felt that if the State of Nature existed at all it was amongst states in competition with one another, or in the case of social incoherence. If anything on an individual scale were to approach a State of Nature, it would be the type of situation that exists when a country is wracked by civil war. The English Civil War was the backdrop against which Hobbes did much of his writing and therefore it is not surprising that it influenced what he wrote greatly, and stimulated his interest in Thucydides’ realism. It is probable that the reason Hobbes feared civil unrest so greatly and was willing to sacrifice much to the sovereign to prevent it, was the fact that he was forced to flee England during the war in fear of his life from both sides in the conflict.

Hobbes described the State of Nature as a place in which all men are equal in opportunity and all men have a right to all things due to the equality of opportunity. The equality of opportunity has often been characterized as even the weakest having the opportunity to kill the strongest because even the strongest cannot be totally alert all of the time, or prevail against transient coalitions of the weaker agents. The right of all men to all things easily creates many opportunities for conflict between individuals. If one man were to desire something that another man possessed, he would be within his rights to forcibly take the item from the other man. This state of affairs leads to the war of all against all. In this war every man fights for himself with the over-riding goal of all being self-preservation. Life in the State of Nature is “... solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.”
Hobbes saw the human ability to use “right reason” as the way in which men would rise up out of the State of Nature. It is the ability to use reason that Hobbes felt set men apart from the animals, even more than speech. Reason is available to all men equally, just as discussed with the equality of opportunity above. Men, using “right reason”, would be able to perceive the Laws of Nature. The first Law of Nature is “That every man, ought to endeavor peace, as far as he has hope of obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek, and use, all helps, and advantages of war.”

There are many other laws that can be deduced through reason, however, all of the laws of nature can be summed up in a negative form of the Golden Rule: “Do not unto others what you would not have them do unto you.”

Once men have deduced the laws of nature and are willing to follow them, they are ready to leave the State of Nature. To do this, Hobbes believes that men will enter into a contract with one another to form a society. This social contract is formed when the members of a group lay aside all of their rights, except for the right to self-preservation, to the sovereign that has been chosen from among them. The sovereign is imbued with the rights of all of these men and remains able to use all of the rights as if he were still in the State of Nature. The purpose of the sovereign is to provide for the safety of the members of the social contract. To this end Hobbes was willing to endow the sovereign with extraordinary power. Because, as he says, “Power if it be extraordinary, is good, because it is useful for protection; and protection provides secu-
rity. If it be not extraordinary, it is useless; for what all have equally is nothing." As long as he performs this duty well, the subjects may not question his right to rule. If the sovereign were to unjustly accuse a man of violating a law that the sovereign had made placing the individual's life in jeopardy; the threatened individual would have the right to defend himself against the sovereign by whatever means were available to him. Even with the possibility of the sovereign abusing the power that has been granted him by the members of the contracting group, life under the social contract is sure to be better than life in the State of Nature.

Hobbes' theory is clearly one of Order as Artifice. While the Laws of Nature are to be found by "right reason" the resulting society is one made by men. The power that the sovereign is given is total. The rights of all the members of the contracting group are given to the sovereign for the express purpose of securing the safety of the group as a whole. One can view a contracting group as a state. Thus, the conception of states competing with one another in a State of Nature system. Hobbes values power for the security that it can provide, not for the sake of power itself. Due to this factor, combined with the equality of opportunity in the State of Nature; one can say that while Hobbes is a practitioner of power politics, his ultimate concern is the felicity of individuals, which is expressed as self-preservation.

In conclusion, both Machiavelli and Hobbes appear on the surface to be embodiments of the machtpolitik doctrine. However, a closer reading of both men reveals that they are ultimately concerned more with the felicity that can result from the use of power rather than power itself. Machiavelli in his thoughts on how to educate men to act morally and Hobbes in his Laws of Nature seek to give men
moral guides to act by and by acting morally, to enhance the felicity of all.

1 De Grazia, p. 164
2 Machiavelli, TP, p. 496
3 Machiavelli, TP, p. 497
4 Machiavelli, TP, p. 501
5 Machiavelli, TP, p. 538
6 De Grazia, p. 306
7 Machiavelli, TP, p. 498
8 De Grazia, p. 73
9 De Grazia, p. 256
10 Machiavelli, TD, p. 222
11 Machiavelli, TD, p. 403-404
12 Hobbes, LEV, p. 183
13 Hobbes, LEV, p. 186
14 Hobbes, LEV, p. 190
15 Hobbes, LEV, p. 190
16 Hobbes, LEV, p. 190
17 Hobbes, M&C, p. 49
CHAPTER IV
TWENTIETH CENTURY MACHTPOLITIK

This chapter and the next will focus on the twentieth century and how the positions of idealism, realism, and machtpolitik have been viewed and evolved. Machtpolitik as mentioned above, has become diffused in this century with no one particular philosopher being as clearly identifiable with the doctrine as was Schmitt. The other two positions, idealism, and realism, account for much more of the current thinking on international relations and power politics.

At this point I feel it is necessary to reiterate the three topics that are the focus of this thesis. First, does traditional machtpolitik still exist at this point in the twentieth century? Second, how has the struggle between diplomacy and democracy affected international relations. Has democracy so altered the way in which diplomacy is conducted that diplomacy cannot hope to achieve anything meaningful? Third, what are the causes of international instability today. This chapter will look at the idealist school, examine the position of Reinhold Niebuhr, present the basics of Hans Morgenthau's philosophy and how it relates to Hobbes and Schmitt and present the basic arguments in the diplomacy versus democracy debate.

The idealist doctrine became popular in the wake of World War I, and can be exemplified by Woodrow Wilson and his efforts to form the League of Nations. He saw the League as the means by which to prevent any further conflicts on the scale of the war that had just ended. However, it quickly be-
came apparent that the powers that the League possessed were too few and too ineffectual to prevent further conflict. Another aspect that is prevalent in the idealist doctrine is the belief that man is inherently good and will be able, due to this nature, to overcome his instincts for aggression and other destructive behaviors. The United Nations has proven to be a more lasting testament to the beliefs of the idealists, but as shall be elaborated on later, even it is a rather ineffective body, especially when judged by idealist expectations.

One last aspect of the idealist position is that it is largely homogenous in its thought. For the most part, its members all seek the same things; better government, better living conditions, less conflict, and the enrichment of people's lives. Though the visions of utopia may differ to some degree, all share the belief that man is inherently better than what we, as a species, have exhibited so far. There are many things that may inhibit this from being the case and they will be discussed in more detail below. Part of the conclusion will be a discussion of Nietzsche as an eccentric, even radical, idealist. The form of his utopia is quite different than most others, as are the members of it.

The position of realism stands in opposition to that of idealism, yet it does not have the neat unified front of idealism. In fact, whereas the relationship between idealism and realism is dichotomous, we shall see that the relationship between the different aspects of realism is anything but dichotomous. Realism is divided, as I have argued, into descriptive realism and normative realism, and compounding the issue is the remnants of the machtpolitik position. Descriptive realism, like idealism, is fairly homogenous in its approach and doctrine. Descriptive realism seeks to describe the situation as it is without making many value judgements as to what the proper or correct course to fol-
low would be. Where realism becomes much more varied is in the school of normative realism. Normative realists seek to describe how events should happen and affairs of state should be conducted to ensure that a desired outcome is the actual outcome. Starting with a recognition of political reality similar to that of the descriptive realists they do make value judgements on events and the conducting of international relations.

States are complex entities in themselves and the complexity increases greatly when they interact with one another. This chapter and Chapter V will attempt to shed light on some of the aspects of states, as they relate to the three topics of machtpolitik as “might makes right”, diplomacy versus democracy, and the causes of international instability. Also, these chapters will try to present the realist position as it currently exists. One aspect of states and international relations that tends to get lost in the shuffle is how and when morals have a place in these affairs. It is the issue of morality and its role in international relations and how that role can be explained that will be the focus of the conclusion. Let us first examine Reinhold Niebuhr and Hans Morgenthaler and their positions of normative realism.

Reinhold Niebuhr in his book Christianity and Power Politics, uses the moral ethic of Christianity to make his argument about power politics. Niebuhr says, “Christianity is a religion which measures the total dimension of human existence not only in terms of the final norm of human conduct, which is expressed in the law of love, but also in terms of the fact of sin.” The law of love is the basic premise of the Christian ethic, and it says to love your neighbor as yourself. This ethic should lead people to act in unselfish ways. This is contrary to the position of philosophers who believe in egoism, like Hobbes.
However, Niebuhr quickly turns to issues of power. "The sins of pride and lust for power and the consequent tyranny and injustice are all present, at least in inchoate form, in individual life."\(^2\) The life of the individual is, for Niebuhr, a microcosm of national and international politics. Tyranny and injustice are evils that should be avoided if possible, and corrected if not. These conditions can be overcome however. "The way out lies in a transcendence of reason over force sufficient to regulate, equilibrate, arbitrate and direct the play of force and vitality in social life so that a maximum of harmony and a minimum of friction is achieved."\(^3\)

It would seem that given the principles of Christianity, that a state that was built upon them would be the best form of state to live in. Conflict in such a state would be rare and when it did occur, it would be resolved quickly without resort to the extreme measures that are currently used. There have been many dreams of this type of utopian state throughout history and many have tried to claim divine revelation as the source for their utopian plans; but the experience of life has fallen far short of these dreams. Niebuhr realizes that these utopian dreams are limited by the imperfections of man and his sinful nature. That even though the Bible describes what life will be like in Heaven, man cannot hope to truly replicate that here on earth. The best that man can hope for in the here and now is a state that follows the principles of Christianity and ameliorates the suffering of this world.

Hans Morgenthau in his book *Politics Among Nations* presents a position of what he calls "political realism". It is the basis that he uses to study international relations and the power struggles that dominate the international scene. Morgenthau’s principles of political realism echo Hobbes in *Leviathan*.
in that they both seek to find a structure that provides an explanation for hu-
man behavior and society. For Hobbes, the Laws of Nature provide the frame-
work, but the social contract is an artificial construct. Morgenthau states; “Po-
itical realism believes that politics, like society in general, is governed by objec-
tive laws that have their roots in human nature.”4 Thus, order is imposed by
and from nature itself. On this issue the two are truly different in thought. The
major similarity is in the use of reason to understand human nature and behav-
ior as well as the laws of nature to solve the problem of manufacturing the
international order. Morgenthau’s political realism provides the ground work
for his philosophy of which more will be said later.

The other side of the argument is that order is artificial and that it is
constructed by men and cannot be found lying around in nature just by the use
of reason. The majority of the twentieth century philosophers are on this side of
the argument. It is also important to note that Machiavelli takes this position as
well. He believed that the state had to be carefully constructed so that the prince
could properly rule over it and provide the stability that his subjects need.
However, for Machiavelli the only time that one could successfully use the ar-
gument of Reason of State was when the stability of the state was immediately
at hand. He is providing the push over the top when it is ultimately unclear
whether the push is at all needed. Machiavelli also sees the state and country as
two separate entities that are merely coexisting. In The Discourses, it is country
and a patriots love of it that should come first, then the organization of the state.

The other philosophers of the twentieth century; Henry Kissinger,
Zbginiew Brzezinski, Felix Oppenheim, John Stoessinger, and David Ziegler all
seem to follow Machiavelli’s lead that the order is artificial and is made by man
alone. Order on the international level is flawed for many reasons. The three main devices for keeping order in this century have been diplomacy, the balance of power, and the balance of terror. The viability of balance of power theory has been disproved by the events of this century, notably, of course, the First World War, and diplomacy and mutual terror have ascended as the chief means for establishing international order, but even diplomacy has been challenged to keep order in the latter part of this century. Both methods will be discussed later.

Regardless of which side of the argument one regards, it should be apparent that the costs of disorder have become increasingly more unacceptable in this century. Conflict is widespread and is instigated for almost any reason, with consequences of unpredictable magnitude. The bodies, be they intranational or international, whose duty it is to promote order and provide protection are becoming less and less able to deal with the problems that confront them. Either these bodies must be strengthened or new methods of promoting order must be found to avoid the descent back into Hobbes' State of Nature.

The last topic of this chapter is the question of whether it is preferable to have a single sovereign or a democracy. There are many levels of discussion to this issue. As will be shown in the next chapter, the conditions of democracy can have tremendous effects on how states conduct their foreign relations.

Normative realists differ extensively on the question of which type of government is better, democracy or a single sovereign. Clearly Hobbes and the Machiavelli of The Prince are in favor of a single sovereign. Morgenthau also falls into this position. Kissinger, Brzezinski, Zeigler, Stoessinger, Oppenheim, and Niebuhr all feel that democracy is the better form of government. This line
of discussion has been followed for quite some time and shall be continued into the foreseeable future.

Morganthau comes at the question from a different perspective than Hobbes and Machiavelli, but eventually comes to the same conclusion, that a single ruler is more desirable than a democracy. Morganthau was heavily influenced by Bismarckian Germany and held Bismarck himself in high esteem. Bismarck is perhaps the ideal of a single leader. While there was the German king, it was Bismarck who created the web about himself by which he controlled almost every aspect of German politics and policy.

It is the system of international relations that existed during Bismarck’s time that Morganthau and others have lamented the loss of in the twentieth century. Morganthau describes this change as a dissolution of values. “Two factors have brought about this dissolution: the substitution of democratic for aristocratic responsibility in foreign affairs and the substitution of nationalistic standards of action for universal ones.”5 The aristocratic system of conducting international relations has passed and the sense of paternalism that accompanied it has passed as well. The effects of nationalism become more pronounced in an environment where there are no truly shared standards as there were back during Bismarck’s time. Both of these changes serve to make it more difficult to conduct international relations in the twentieth century.

These changes in style of leadership also have another affect on international relations. “The fluctuation of the policy makers in international affairs and their responsibility to an amorphous collective entity has far-reaching consequences for the effectiveness, even for the very existence, of an international moral order.”6 The policy makers become beholden to an entity, that can and
often does, change its mind at a whim. Therefore, the policies become incoherent and contradictory. This confusion, Morgenthau feels, makes it increasingly difficult or impossible to have an international moral order. Without international standards, it becomes harder to impose sanctions on those states that have violated the international order.

Morgenthau's philosophy implies that a single sovereign will avoid many of the problems that have arisen in this century. The change in standards of conducting international relations in this century has been a direct result of the move from a single sovereign to more democratic states. This in turn can lead to instability on the international level. Clearly, this is not in the best interests of any members of the international community. A single sovereign, and a return to diplomacy as it used to be practiced, might be able to avoid the contradictions and confusion that seem to mark international relations as they stand currently.

On the other side are those who believe that a democratic system works best in construing the will of the people and then acting upon it. Many of those who place themselves on this side of the question are from societies that are traditionally democratic, and in the case of Kissinger and Brzezinski, have worked for the government of a democratic society. Democracy has seemed to prove itself as the most stable style of government that exists today. Its' main competitor, communism, has failed in almost every state in which it was the form of government, and those states have also turned to democracy instead of their centralized past.

There are several reasons that those who take the side of democracy do so. Among the first is that many people are reluctant to put the degree of power
that Hobbes would in a single person. The assumption is that one person cannot be trusted with that much power alone. That there needs to be others to share the power with. Niebuhr states, "Power must be held under democratic restraints because irresponsible power is always dangerous." Here Niebuhr has clearly stated the fear that a single person cannot be trusted with the immense power of a state. Even though Hobbes believed that through the use of reason the sovereign would not make bad laws, those like Niebuhr are not willing to take that chance. They believe that many people making a single decision will make a better choice than what a single sovereign will. That having several people involved with the decision making process will have the effect of moderating policies and will not overreact in intense situations.

Another reason that democracy is preferred over a single sovereign is that it is believed to represent the will of the people better and will be more responsive to the people than a single sovereign. The representatives that the people elect must be responsible to those people, because if they are not, they will not be reelected. Thus, the will of the people is expressed during the election of their representatives. Ideally, as the will of the people changes so will those who represent the people. Therefore, change in the government is achieved without a great period of upheaval that characterizes the power struggles that occur when a sovereign leaves office with no clear successor. The way in which democracy is practiced makes it a more stable form of government.

A third reason that democracy is preferred by some to a single sovereign is that it is believed that a democracy is better able to preserve the rights of the individual citizen. Many fear that under a sovereign, the rights of the individual will be curtailed or dispensed with altogether. This is less likely to hap-
pen in a democratic society, as the representatives of the people would prevent such things from occurring. In most examples of totalitarianism in this century, the citizens only have those rights that those in control allow them to have and those rights can be suspended or revoked at a moments notice. This cannot happen in a democracy. The process of making such decisions takes much longer to complete which allows those who are opposed to certain laws or policies to organize their resistance and influence those who are making these decisions.

Finally, it is believed that democracies are less likely to pursue foreign policy goals through the use of force than are dictatorships and other totalitarian states. So, not only are democracies stable in themselves, they are also perceived as stabilizing forces on the international scene. The proponents of democracy will say that they will not ask their citizens to fight and die for the state without good cause, such as the defense of the state. Critics of constitutionalism like Carl Schmitt and Max Weber will argue that democracies cannot ask their citizens to do these things because there is no means by which the democracy can compel its citizens to do so.

The ultimate goal of international relations is stability and an absence of hostilities between members of the international community. It appears that the states which are governed by democratic principles contribute to this stability by their very nature. Therefore, it seems that democracy should be preferred to a sovereign. However, where democracy tends to become unwieldy is when the international order has destabilized and open hostility is imminent. Democratic societies have to debate the possible courses of action and vote on which one the state will act on. The sovereign, on the other hand, can take unilateral action in the name of the state without the need for time consuming
debate. When time is in short supply, as it is in most crisis situations, this difference can be critical.

Democracy also places constraints on those who are conducting international relations for their state. Negotiators may reach an agreement with another state only to present the agreement to those in the democracy who have to approve it and have the agreement rejected. The result in situations such as this is that those negotiators now have less credibility when returning to the negotiation table. This lack of credibility will seriously affect how the negotiations proceed. Under the old system of diplomacy, that Morgenthau and others lament the passing of, it was understood that those involved in the negotiations spoke for their states and the agreements that they reached would stand when presented to the sovereign. The issue of how diplomacy has been changed by the forces of nationalism, ideology, and democracy will be discussed more in the next chapter, along with the two other main topics of the thesis.

1 Niebuhr, p. 2
2 Niebuhr, p. 13
3 Niebuhr, p. 62
4 Morgenthau, p. 4
5 Morgenthau, p. 241-242
6 Morgenthau, p. 246
7 Niebuhr, p. 85-86
CHAPTER V
NORMATIVE AND DESCRIPTIVE REALISM

The focus of this chapter will be on examining in detail the two branches of realist thought as they relate to the three main issues of this thesis. Briefly restated these issues are; does machtpolitik still exist; the adversarial relationship of diplomacy and democracy; and searching for the causes of international instability. Further comment on the answers to these questions found below will follow in the conclusion.

This chapter shall address the main issues that face power politics and normative realism today, building on the introductory discussion in the preceding chapter. The first is the divide between moral power politics and ordinary power politics. The second is exactly how much of the machtpolitik tradition remains in the twentieth century; which is a question that plagues normative realism much more so than descriptive realism. Normative realism is divided between the two points of view in regards to how morality should be included when making decisions that involve national security. There are well respected statesmen and philosophers on each side of the debate, as shall be seen below. This is the area that has not received a large amount of attention, but it is one of crucial importance now, and will continue to be in the future. Machtpolitik had been a much more common political position in the world until this century. The extreme changes that have occurred in this century I argue have weakened the plausibility of this view and it is important to determine just how much of this philosophy is still utilized by statesmen and diplomats.
The division between ordinary power politics and moral power politics leads to many other questions that form other divisions in the normative realism position, some of which will be discussed later. The divide in question here, however, is whether morality should be considered when conducting international relations or not. As this division is wide and can be rather vague, it will overlap with what has been said before and some aspects will be repeated later in the paper. The side of moral power politics is represented by Oppenheim and Morgenthalau. While the practitioners of ordinary power politics are Brzezinski, Kissinger, Ziegler, Stoessinger, Hobbes, and Machiavelli. Niebuhr, as I read him, straddles the line between the two and in doing so provides an excellent transitional figure.

The first of the two sides to be considered in this chapter will be ordinary power politics, which is solely concerned with the power relationships of a political system. The fathers of the position are Thrasymachus, Thucydides, and Machiavelli, and to an even greater degree Hobbes. They provided the conceptual groundwork that all that have followed have built upon. As seen earlier, Machiavelli gave birth to the modern form of realpolitik in The Prince. Hobbes' book Behemoth is his work about the English Civil War, and as it expands on themes that were brought out in Leviathan it is even more directly a work on power relationships and their results. In it he looks at the events of the War and also seeks to provide an explanation of why the war happened. What he finds to be the cause of the war is ambition. Hobbes had earlier formulated two definitions of ambition in Man and Citizen. The first definition is this: "The love of money, if it exceeds moderation, is called covetousness; the love of political power, if immoderate, ambition; for these perturb and pervert the mind."
have seen that political authority is not necessarily a bad thing to Hobbes, indeed, given the powers and legitimacy that he lavishes on the sovereign in Leviathan, political power is definitely seen as a good. However, if one seeks more power than one really needs, and if this desire is driven by utopian dreams, Hobbes feels that this corrupts that person and that corruption interferes with their ability to reason, making them unfit to rule.

The second manner in which Hobbes seeks to define ambition is in an analogy to the myth of Prometheus. It is as follows:

It seems the ancients who made that same fable of Prometheus, pointed at this. They say that Prometheus, having stolen fire from the sun, formed a man out of clay, and that for this deed he was tortured by Jupiter with a perpetual gnawing in his liver. Which is, that by human invention, which is signified by Prometheus, laws and justice were by imitation taken from monarchy; by virtue whereof, as by fire removed from its natural orb, the multitude, as the dirt and dregs of men, was as it were quickened and formed into a civil person; which is termed aristocracy or democracy. But the author and abettors being found, who might securely and quietly lived under the natural jurisdiction of kings, do thus smart for it; that being exposed still to alteration, they are tormented with perpetual cares, suspicions, and dissensions.²

It is from this passage that the concept of "Promethean Ambition" comes. The meaning of this definition of ambition gains more significance when viewing it in light of the struggles between Cromwell and Parliament and Hobbes' views on the two. He saw them as usurping the natural order of things and as a result, being burdened with all of the duties and responsibilities of the monarchy. Yet, with many making the decisions that had until then been made by one, the affairs of the state were not being conducted smoothly. The intrigues that resulted from the factions in the new government Hobbes would have likened to Jupiter's punishment of Prometheus. Therefore, Promethean Ambition
(or "vainglory"), including the realization of utopian moral schemes, is an ambition that outstrips one's ability to control what one has achieved.

One of Hobbes' greatest fears was that Promethean Ambition would come to be combined with the utopian dreams of one person or another. Utopian projects always seek to remake the world in a more "perfect" way. The main problem is that what one person considers perfect, another may consider hell. Hobbes feared that a person or group following a utopian dream would be gripped by ambition of the Promethean type and try to remake the world in their image whatever the cost, reason being unseated. A situation of this type would cause a great upheaval in the social order and may plunge the state into civil war. As has been noted above, this is the one thing that Hobbes most sought to avoid. The destruction of peace that would be wrought by this type of zealotry would be akin to the chaos of the state of nature and totally unacceptable for the advancement of mankind.

In reviewing both definitions, they both have in common an ultimate end that is not pleasant for those involved. The lack of reason affects the ability to make good decisions and the inability to control what is happening around oneself tends to lead to even more bad decisions. The final result of either form of ambition seems to be the guaranteed destruction of either what has been achieved through ambition, or the ambitious person and the overreaching movement.

One of the most common arenas for ambition to present itself is that of international relations. States compete with one another for scarce resources and for recognition at the international level. Less developed states seek to emulate those like the United States and Western Europe, who have robust econo-
mies and all of the benefits that result. In times past, armed conflict was the primary means of expressing this ambition. However, as mankind developed greater civility, diplomacy became the preferred stage on which to act out ambition and to resolve disputes. This situation came about under the aegis of the system of aristocratic government that was the norm in Europe. The birth of representative democracy has changed the way in which diplomacy is conducted greatly; as will be shown below.

In looking at how international relations and diplomacy have been conducted over the last two to three hundred years one wonders if morality was a concern that has been forgotten in the rush of time or have power political considerations come to dominate the affairs of states so much that morality has been squeezed out. Did the form of diplomacy that existed in the past allow for considerations of morality? Or was it only a carefully constructed image of moral consideration that has been mistaken for morality in the old system of diplomacy? As shall be shown shortly, the manner in which diplomacy is conducted has changed dramatically in a relatively short period of time. The advent of democratic societies has changed the way in which states conduct affairs with one another because of leaders now having to answer for their actions to an electorate at home.

Another issue in the change in form of diplomacy is that it now must be conducted with great urgency in many cases. With the advancement of technology in both the arenas of communications and weapons, it is more crucial that there not be any misunderstandings when diplomats meet in attempts to settle differences and prevent open conflict from occurring. As shall be discussed below, these and other factors combine to make it difficult to consider
moral ramifications of actions taken on the international level. Clearly, there was more time to make such decisions in the past; however, that does not mean that the morality of actions was considered. The question for today is whether or not the shift in the way that international relations are now conducted precludes moral issues from being discussed.

The two main tools of power politics are diplomacy and the resort to sanctions, including armed force. The topic of armed force will be addressed later in the chapter. For now all that will be considered is diplomacy.

In his book, American Foreign Policy, Henry Kissinger states that there have been a number of changes that have affected the way diplomacy is conducted.

The revolutionary character of our age summed up in three general statements: (a) the number of participants in the international order has increased and their nature has altered; (b) their technical ability to affect each other has vastly grown; (c) the scope of their purposes has expanded.3

The changes that have occurred in diplomacy due to these factors are truly dramatic.

The increased number of actors on the international scene has served to muddy the picture of how things really are. The break-up of the former Soviet Union and several of its satellites has created much chaos in the way things operate in Eastern Europe and Asia, making concrete information on what the current situation actually is hard to come across. This has also been repeated in Africa, with the continued conflicts there making reliable information a valuable commodity. This picture becomes even more vague when the new non-state actors, such as multinational corporations, are also thrown into the mix
with their own agendas; agendas partially beyond state control.

Technology has rapidly advanced this century. This rapid advancement has increased the speed of communications across the world. A message that once would have taken months to arrive at its destination may now only take a matter of seconds. Thus, diplomats and heads of state have greater access to one another. Some of the same technology that has increased our ability to communicate, has also increased our ability to destroy, and the speed with which destruction is visited. States now have the capability to strike at another on the other side of the world at a moment's notice.

The combination of the above two factors means that states and other actors on the international scene have much more to consider than in times past. All members of the international community are now to some degree concerned with the environment since we now know that an event, such as a nuclear meltdown, can affect large portions of the planet in addition to the place that it happens at. Such things were not considered even as recently as fifty years ago. States also have to be aware of the purposes of multinational corporations that have affairs all over the world. Many other organizations have also come to affect the ways in which states conduct their internal and international affairs.

All of these changes affect the manner in which diplomacy is now conducted. Kissinger, Morgenthau, G.F. Kennan, and others lament that the way in which affairs used to be conducted have faded into history. Under the old order, a group of diplomats could meet with one another and conduct negotiations given a set of protocols that all knew and accepted. Kissinger says; “A similar outlook about aims and methods eases the tasks of diplomacy - it may
even be a precondition for it. In the absence of such a consensus, diplomats can still meet, but they lose the ability to persuade."\(^4\) Brzezinski feels much the same.

... the probabilities are that a group of skilled practitioners of power, sharing a common outlook about the use of power and a common experience in the use of force, are likely to be the more adept at weighing the advice of intelligence and military experts, and at embarking with consistency on a selected course.\(^5\)

He is speaking of how domestic policy is made, however, it is very easy to extend this to the diplomatic arena; where he is in agreement with Kissinger.

John Stoessinger also views diplomacy as crucial to the conduct of affairs amongst states. He states; “Diplomacy may be defined as the conduct of international relations by negotiation. It is a process through which nations attempt to realize their national interests.”\(^6\) In this arena, the subtle, skillful use of power is favored above the brute force methods involved in open conflict. Stoessinger also feels that it is through diplomacy that the world community strives to maintain international order. Often the implication of the combined power of several states may serve to persuade a state to a different course of action that will prove more acceptable to the international order.

Stoessinger presents his opinion of the difference between the morality that he sees in international relations to the type of morality that is generally regarded to exist in personal relationships.

The crucial difference between interpersonal and international relations is not that the former permit moral behavior, whereas the latter do not. It resides, rather, in the fact that personal behavior is usually judged by an ethic of intention while that of the statesman is essentially one of consequence.\(^7\)

The difference is crucial. In interpersonal relationships, if one person does some-
thing and it does not turn out for the best, the person hurt by the action, with adequate time for retrospection can see what the other was intending to do and forgive the offending person for the result. While this is not always the case nor is it easy in interpersonal relations, it seems to be much more possible than in international relations. In international relations, the intentions of the diplomat do not count, it is only the result of their actions that is morally judged whatever the intention may be.

What are some of the conditions of today's international relations that make it so difficult to take into account morality and the intentions of other actors? First, there is the speed with which diplomacy must now be conducted. As was mentioned above, this might be the greatest factor. With the increased ability for an individual state to massively affect the international order, it has become necessary that solutions can be reached in a short amount of time. It has become more the norm than the exception that hostilities have been averted just hours before their outbreak than in times past. The rushed nature of these types of diplomacy certainly leaves little, if any, time to reflect on the moral issues involved. All that is considered is the power political goal of keeping the international order intact.

This need for swift resolution to disputes is a result of the second issue; the increased levels of tension that exist in the international order and how quickly these already heightened levels can skyrocket even further. A prime example of this type of situation is the Cuban Missile Crisis. An incident in the already high tension level of the Cold War, spiked the tension level up even further to the point where the world collectively held its breath. Although the threat of nuclear conflict has been reduced since that time, levels of tension
remain high as the mechanisms for maintaining international order start to break down and lose their effectiveness. Given the level of open hostility that currently exists in the world, it would seem safe to argue that increased tension has lowered the flashpoint for conflict. It is this heightened level of tension that necessitates that diplomacy be conducted at the breakneck pace that it is today.

The third factor that affects how much morality may be considered in conducting diplomacy is the secrecy in which negotiations take place. Under the old style of diplomacy, the negotiators could be relatively assured that they could conduct their affairs in secrecy so as not to be affected by outside influences. Today, while the concrete particulars of negotiations may not be known by the population at large, citizens of democratic societies are aware of what their governments are doing on the international scene. The abundance of news sources that are available to the average person today far outstrip those available even just sixty years ago, let alone a hundred and sixty years ago. The result is that even secret diplomacy is rarely truly secret any longer. Which means that, in democratic societies, the will of the people must be considered in the conducting of affairs of state. This consideration of the collective will of so many people makes it yet again much harder to consider issues of morality and intentions when conducting international relations.

David Zeigler in his book *War, Peace, and International Politics* also addresses issues of diplomacy even though the book largely focuses on armed conflict. He does feel that diplomacy is an effective tool to use in settling disputes among nations. Diplomats have served a huge role in the conducting of international relations for most of history. It is still the role of diplomats to represent their states to other states or in non-state organizations such as the
United Nations, and this does not seem likely to change in the immediate future.

Both Brzezinski and Stoessinger also seek to address the role that ideology plays in the conducting of diplomacy. Brzezinski feels the Cold War was primarily driven by the competing ideologies of the USA and USSR. Each side was driven by an ideology, yet they each found the ideology of the other abhorrent. Brzezinski states; “It is assumed that to be ideologically motivated is to be unrealistic, irrational, dogmatic, and fanatical.” Clearly, the common perception is that ideology will be an impediment to the conduct of diplomacy.

It is ideology that Machiavelli failed to take into account in formulating his philosophy. He was much more concerned with the aspects of building a national identity for Italy that he did not notice what a motivating force ideology could be. This is even more acute when one applies it to religious zealotry. Machiavelli saw the church solely as the institution that had kept Italy from becoming a nation and therefore at the mercy of France and Germany. He never would have foreseen events like those in Iran and the extremes that religious fundamentalism have gone to the world over; he was even silent of Europe’s entry in the sixteenth century into the horrors of the age of religious wars. Machiavelli would also not have understood the Nazi ideology and how that ideology came to dominate the entire state, blinding the vision of its leaders. Ideologies have taken on lives of their own at several times in this century and the results have been overwhelmingly negative when this has happened.

As stated above Niebuhr provides a transition from ordinary power politics to moral power politics. This is due to his firm belief in the Christian ethos and the fact that he still is willing to admit that power is important. Given his
Augustinian foundations of a morality based on Christianity and a pessimistic psychology, one would expect him to follow the doctrine of stark original sin as the cause for all of the woes of mankind. However, he takes a different track. It is not the fault of our nature, but rather our denial of our nature. "Man is a sinner not because he is finite but because he refuses to admit that he is. And there is no life which is not involved in this tragic self-deception." We are less rebels against God, as we are enticed by notions of perfection - Hobbes' "vain-glory" returns. Thus, sin is committed because we refuse to admit that there are limits to what we can do and how we can do them. What then are the results of this fact? Niebuhr would argue that the abuse of power is what results. This abuse of power would deprive us of true choice.

We never have the chance to choose between pure tyranny and pure freedom; we can only choose between tyranny and relative democracy. We do not have the choice between war and perfect peace, but only between war and the uneasy peace of some fairly decent and stable equilibrium of social forces.

This abuse of power creates hostility in the world, which given the Christian ethic is to be avoided at all costs.

Niebuhr feels that the morality that is practiced by people in democracies is inadequately equipped to deal with situations on the international scene when dealing with non-democratic or ideologically driven systems.

Since politics in general and international politics in particular never dissuaded a nation from a desired course of action, this simple moralism of the democratic peoples represents a rather naive application of principles drawn from the observation of individual behavior to the problem of collective behavior.

If this is truly the case, is it any wonder that the United Nations is hardly able to resolve any international disputes in a peaceful manner. The Christian ethic of
turning the other cheek will not work in the hostile environment of advanced conflict. As a response it will prove wholly inadequate and will probably lead to further aggression by the offending party.

Even given Niebuhr's belief in the Christian ethic, he at the end is forced to acknowledge that power is the main drive in international politics. "Every one else knows that all political struggles are power-political struggles, in the sense that contending forces avail themselves not only of rational and moral arguments but of whatever social power they control."12 The drive for power is increased as one achieves more power, and the power previously acquired is used to further the drive for more power.

What then are some conclusions that one can draw from the position of ordinary power politics? First, that all of politics, both internal and international, are power politics. All of the writers considered above will admit that in the final analysis all political behavior becomes a question of power and who can persuade whom.

A second conclusion is that diplomacy is the preferred method for the resolution of disputes. Diplomacy has been used for as long as history has been recorded, and while it has been radically changed in this century, it will continue to be used as the primary way for states to communicate with one another. Diplomacy may often be merely a prelude to conflict, but it is also the best way to resolve conflict.

Third, ideology and nationalism will continue to affect the perspectives of individual states. Brzezinski, in his book Out of Control, addresses the affects that ideologies have on states. He says; "Together, nationalism, idealism, and rationalism - interacting with the spread of literacy, industrialization, and
urbanization - created the brew which, when transformed, subsequently led to the monstrous metamyths of the twentieth century. Among the metamyths are Nazism and communism. These metamyths are destructive, and to the populace at large, they are important in and of themselves. However, these metamyths have no more depth than a bumper sticker and will eventually cause more problems than they solve. This is because the myth is a phantasm of true internalized belief. Communism at the end, had become nothing more than an institutionalized lie that could no longer sustain itself.

The metamyth that has enveloped the United States and many of its western allies Brzezinski calls permissive cornucopia, and it is a particularly insidious and debilitating myth. "The term 'permissive cornucopia' can hence be applied to a society in which everything is permitted and everything can be had." This, if anything, describes the condition that has come to be the norm in the United States. If somebody wants to do something, they do and the consequences be damned. The problem that accompanies this attitude is serious. It leads to a society and state in which there is no deep moral center that guides peoples' actions. If this attitude and lack of moral center permeates the general populace, how long can it be before our leaders are gripped by the same?

This is what Brzezinski feels that the result of all of this will be.

In the absence of some shared philosophical criteria that help to define the choice on behalf of which power is exercised, the sheer acquisition and then exercise of power then becomes haphazard, motivated mostly by self-interest and expediency, and driven by its own inner logic. Hardly an effective foundation upon which to mount an effective foreign policy.

The other side of power politics is moral power politics. This position has been expanded in the twentieth century by Oppenheim and Morgenthau.
As with Hobbes, Niebuhr, et al, this position is reluctant to endorse state pursuit of avowedly moral objectives. This reluctance is due to what they see as the likely outcome of combining morality with state politics and the resulting fervor that can take on the same tone as religious zealotry. An example of this type of situation is Iran under the government of the muslim fundamentalists. However, the positions that they take are better than the total lack of concern with morality that is exhibited by the position of ordinary power politics.

In *Politics Among Nations*, Morgenthau seeks to put forth a theory of political realism. When one sees a phrase like political realism, one would not expect to find a theory that embraces morality in any way. However, Morgenthau and a number of others, use it as a platform on which morality enters the arena of power politics.

When Morgenthau speaks of political realism, he has a set group of principles in mind. These points are crucial to understanding the positions that he holds and shall now be discussed. First, "Political realism believes that politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature." This echoes back to some of Hobbes' ideas on natural law and how its comes to be understood by man. These objective laws are available to all who are able to use reason. The laws will be revealed by reason, and can only be fully understood in the light of reason. Reason is the guide that helps to navigate the problems of international relations and will open the door for morality to enter the realm of politics.

The second principle seeks to address what Morgenthau views as some of the common fallacies that we tend to fall into when looking at issues of international relations and power. It is as follows. "The main signpost that helps
political realism find its way through the landscape of international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of power." Morganthau places considerations of power as the second principle in his theory of international relations, and for good reason. He states, "The concept of interest defined as power imposes intellectual discipline upon the observer, infuses rational order into the subject matter of politics, and thus makes the theoretical understanding of politics possible." It is this intellectual structure that allows one to avoid the fatal fallacies that Morganthau describes.

The fallacies that Morganthau describes serve only to cloud the issues of international relations, and prevent people from viewing things as they really are. The following two quotes lay out these fallacies. First, "A realist theory of international politics, then, will guard against two popular fallacies: the concern with motives and the concern with ideological preferences." Second, "A realist theory of international politics will also avoid the other popular fallacy of equating foreign policies of a statesman with his philosophic or political sympathies, and of deducing the former from the later." Morganthau believes that committing any of these fallacies will blind one to the realities of the international situation and lead to faulty evaluation and therefore, incorrect action.

The third principle of realism is: "Realism assumes that its key concept of interest defined as power is an objective category which is universally valid, but it does not endow that concept with a meaning that is fixed once and for all." In this statement Morganthau universalizes his concept of interest defined as power. This fact of universalizability is very important in later parts of Morganthau's theory. It is in the fourth principle that morality enters the realm
of realism. "Political realism is aware of the moral significance of political ac-
tion." Morganthau acknowledges that political actions can and often
will have moral ramifications or can be interpreted in the light of morality.

However, just as he acknowledges the role of morality in the fourth prin-
ciple, the fifth principle provides a warning about morality. The fifth principle
is as follows; "Political realism refuses to identify the moral aspirations of a
particular nation with the moral laws that govern the universe." Once again
Morganthau is warning against identifying a universal with a particular, just as
he did when refusing to give the concept of interest defined as power a fixed
definition. This principle also deprives nations of the claim that they are more
correct in their morality than another nation, thus, hopefully weakening inter-
national contention.

Each state has certain goals that they strive to achieve. As has been noted,
the two primary means that states use to achieve these goals are diplomacy and
armed conflict. In both cases power is exercised. Morganthau says of these
efforts; "Statesmen and peoples may ultimately seek freedom, security, pros-
perity or power itself. . . . But whenever they strive to realize their goals by
means of international politics, they do so by striving for power." In this
view all efforts and goals come to be characterized by the use of power. In
essence, everything on the international scene becomes a question of power.

If one goes by the assumption that all policies employed by all states are
nothing more than the striving for power, questions of international relations
become questions of who has the power and who is going to be able to keep
power. Yet, statesmen are not so crass as to put problems in this plain light.
Morganthau says that statesmen conceal this struggle for power. "That is to
Morganthau is saying that ideology serves both to sugarcoat and to amplify the truth of the matter. That the principles that we hold individually will not allow us to sanction the things that need to be done in the pursuit of power, yet they must be done or, in its pathological mode, to drive nations to self-righteous recklessness. So we hide the truth behind the ideology and make it the actor instead of ourselves. This is the only way in which we can accept some of the policies that states embark on. For example, if we in the United States had viewed the Russian people during the fifties and sixties as we do now, it is doubtful that there would have been a Cold War; it requiring that each view the other as an “Evil Empire”. It was the ideology that allowed both sides to hold incorrect views of each other and continue the struggle for power by whatever means that were necessary.

Morganthau also says that these struggles as they are played out in international relations so they are within the societies of individual states. Societies institute means to regulate behavior inside their boundaries. This is part of the authority of the sovereign in its attempts to protect individual citizens and their rights. However, Morganthau sees something else behind the laws and legal systems.

All the social instrumentalities and institutions relevant to the different competitive devices of society serve the purpose, not of eliminating the
struggle for power, but of creating civilized substitutes for the brutality and crudeness of an unlimited and unregulated struggle for power.\textsuperscript{27}

In this, one can see the influence of Hobbes and his view of how men behave in the State of Nature. When all are equal with no supreme force to keep them in check, they will prey upon one another without remorse. The struggle for power comes to characterize both international and interpersonal relations. Interpersonal relationships have more of an overawing force, social expectations and government laws, governing them; there is no such equivalent on the international level.

Morganthau begins his discussion of the role of morality in international relations with another warning for those who want to look at morality in light of political realism.

A discussion of international morality must guard against the two extremes of either overrating the influence of ethics upon international politics or underestimating it by denying that statesmen and diplomats are moved by anything but considerations of material power.\textsuperscript{28}

Morganthau is encouraging a balance when looking at issues of morality. One cannot use the explanation of all things as a struggle for power as a blunt instrument. Other things will motivate statesmen and people besides power. Also, as stated earlier, considerations of intentions are not to be looked at. However, there are many other factors that affect how morality is applied on the international scene. Morganthau feels that it is in this area that questions of the role of nationalism come into play.

In Morganthau's opinion nationalism has served as a particularly divisive force on the international scene in our time. In some ways, it could be considered responsible for the breakdown or shift in the way diplomats conduct their affairs. It is the influence of nationalism that has wrecked the univer-
sal view of international relations that was shared by diplomats up until this century. Morganthau states; “Actually the spirit of nationalism, once it had materialized in national states, proved not to be universalistic and humanitarian, but particularistic and exclusive.” 29 Thus, the doctrine of one nation, one state came to be. Morganthau feels that this doctrine has created many problems for international relations. Nationalism has combined with religious zealotry and fostered societal arrogance that makes conducting international relations much more difficult if not altogether impossible.

Morganthau also cites two effects that nationalism has on issues of morality. “First, there is the enormously increased ability of the nation state to exert moral compulsion upon its members.” 30 And, “Second, there is the extent to which loyalty to the nation requires the individual to disregard universal moral rules of conduct.” 31 Nationalism, then, has the net effect of bending its citizens to believe that their nation is right no matter what; and also of loosening the attachments that citizens may have to a higher moral order or their aspirations to a supranational power. This could be the reason for the failure of the League of Nations and the relative ineffectiveness of the United Nations; although the psychological cynicism of Hobbes and Schmitt hovers over all explanations. Morganthau states; “Finally, there is today, in consequence of the other two factors, much less chance for the individual to be loyal to supranational ethics when they are in conflict with the moral demands of the nation.” 32

We can conclude from the above discussion that Morganthau does not see morality as a mechanism to preserve peace and order mainly due to the fact that nationalism tends to twist moral claims made by any one state; and Morganthau will not allow any state to claim moral superiority given that the
claim is tainted by nationalism. This leads back to the other two methods mentioned earlier: balance of power and world public opinion. We have seen in our time that balance of power theory is insufficient to keep the peace among nations; World War I put the final nail in the coffin of the theory. Instead of preventing the conflict, the balance of power that existed served only to spread the conflict more quickly to the entire continent and eventually the world. Some might argue that the Cold War is an example of a balance of power situation. This can be disproved in two ways. First, a balance of power must have a third member to moderate the power of the other two. The situation that existed between the United States and the USSR was clearly a bipolar situation with no moderating third power. Second, the equilibrium that was present was due more to a balance of terror than a balance of power. Both sides knew that a direct confrontation would result in the decimation of both and neither was willing to risk the horrors that would result from such a confrontation. Thus, the balance of power was transformed into a balance with mutual assured destruction, the only device restraining open conflict.

That leaves the hope that world public opinion would be sufficient to prevent states from going to war or becoming aggressive in their behavior to other states. Of this idea Morgenthau says;

The two factors from which the mistaken belief in the existence of a world public opinion originates are the common experience of certain psychological traits and elemental aspirations which unite all mankind, and the technological unification of the world. What has been neglected is the fact that, everywhere in the world, public opinion with regard to international affairs is molded by the agencies of national politics.33

The glasses of nationalism and other ideological intoxicants, notably cultural and religious differences, cloud our perceptions of events and maybe prevent
us from seeing things as they actually are. Each nation is sufficiently different to have another view of what the situation actually is.

Therefore, the question now posed is if world public opinion is at all possible. Morgenthau replies in the negative.

Thus the contrast between the community of psychological traits and elemental aspirations, on the one hand, and the absence of shared experiences, universal moral convictions, and common political aspirations, on the other, rather demonstrates its impossibility, as humanity is constituted in our age.34

Further, "World public opinion, however, ceases to operate at all as one united force whenever a war threatens to break out which affects the interests of a number of nations."35 Therefore, world public opinion appears impossible due to the fact that as humans, we do not all share the same experiences and therefore view the same thing in many different ways and that states will not involve themselves in the censure of another state unless the act of aggression interferes with its own interests. With these weaknesses, it seems certain that world public opinion will never be a strong enough force to prevent conflict among states. It was not the outcry of the world that made Saddam Hussien remove his troops from Kuwait; it was the military might of several nations working in concert. However, even the coalition that defeated Iraq did not agree on all of the measures that were taken to do so, and not all of the states involved participated equally.

To sum up Morgenthau’s position. First, he proposes a realist view of international politics that necessitates all politics being viewed as power politics. Second, morality is to be considered, but just as everything else, it is to be viewed in balance with and in terms of the struggle for power. Also,
under a realistic view of politics, it is very hard to make moral judgements. Third, he laments the loss of universal ideas and morals held by diplomatic elites which once kept the world somewhat bound together. Now that they are gone, it is increasingly difficult for states to find common ground on which to build negotiations. The cause of this breakdown of universals is the rise of nationalism and popular politics and the ideologies that accompany them. It has weakened any attachments that people or states might have to something on a supranational level. In summation of the effects of nationalism Morganthau states:

Nationalism, identified as it is with the foreign policies of individual nations, cannot restrain these policies; it is itself in need of restraint. Not only has it fatally weakened, if not destroyed, the restraints that have come down to us from previous ages, it has also supplied the power aspirations of individual nations with a good conscience and a Messianic fervor.36

Felix Oppenheim’s positions of moral power politics is presented in Moral Principles in Political Philosophy and expanded upon in The Place of Morality in Foreign Policy. In the first book Oppenheim describes what he feels is the way in which morality should be viewed in political philosophy. He analyzes the positions of many philosophers past and present in search of a definitive way in which moral principles can be determined. The second book is more of a practical guide of when and how morality should be used by statesmen or a state in planning their foreign policies.

In Moral Principles, Oppenheim begins by rigorously laying out the dominant positions of how morality is viewed and those that have shaped the debate over morality. The book is characterized by metaethical questions, that Oppenheim is trying to resolve. Oppenheim says of this,
The two most important problems of metaethics concern (1) the meaning of value words such as 'good' or 'preferable' and moral terms such as 'right' or 'duty'; (2) the logic of moral discourse: Are moral principles objectively either true or false? If they are, by what method can such principles be justified? 

The two opposing views on whether moral principles can be objectively true or false are value-cognitivism and value-noncognitivism.

Oppenheim defines value-cognitivism by saying that; "... value-cognitivism affirms that valuational and moral statements are assertions about objective states of affairs and have, as such, cognitive status; that is, they are, and can be known to be, either true or false." As one can surmise, value-noncognitivism asserts the opposite. Here, however, is Oppenheim's definition.

Basic ethical principles have no cognitive status; they cannot be know to be either true or false because they are not true or false; and they are neither true nor false because they are not true or false; and they are neither true nor false because they do not affirm or deny that something is the case.

The one thing that Oppenheim says that value-cognitivists and value-noncognitivists agree on is judgements of rationality. He states;

Both cognitivists and noncognitivists agree that judgements of rationality do have cognitive status. Judgements of rationality concern the adequacy of the choice of a course of action or policy in view of attaining a desired state of affairs, judged on the basis of the information available to an actor in a given situation.

These types of decisions are not issues of morality and that is why the two sides can agree.

Oppenheim also lays out two other positions to frame the debate, Naturalism and Intuitivism. He says, "Naturalism in general holds that certain moral principles can be shown to be true by reducing them somehow to true descrip-
tive generalizations." A feat that is much easier said than done. Of Intuitionism, "Intuitionists agree with naturalists that ethical terms refer to objective characteristics, but interpret them as designating 'nonnatural' or 'simple' properties which cannot be further defined." These then are the four views that frame the discussion for the rest of the book.

Moral statements or judgements are viewed as "ought" statements, because they imply how something ought to be or how someone ought to act. Of these types of statements Oppenheim says; "In most cases, an 'ought' statements cannot be derived from another 'ought' statement alone but only from the former together with another, factual, premise." A second characteristic that Oppenheim feels all moral judgements should share is that they be universalizable. With these conditions and definitions in mind we shall look at Oppenheim's discussions of various moral philosophical positions.

Plato and his Theory of the Forms is the first that Oppenheim comments on. It is through knowledge of the Forms that Plato felt one would gain understanding of what is right and wrong. This knowledge of the Forms was not available to everyone and took training in those that were capable of perceiving them to truly understand them. Of Plato's system Oppenheim says;

I do not believe that Plato has provided an objective criterion for the truth of insights into the goodness of things in general and of political institutions in particular. I conclude, therefore, that Platonic insight, far from leading to objective ethical knowledge, is merely another name for anyone's subjective moral commitments.

The next position to be examined is that of Carl Friedrich and subsequently John Calvin. Oppenheim uses the positions as examples of the intuitive school.

Friedrich uses the term 'experience' to refer to the discovery of values as
of facts. However, his use of the expression 'value-blind' suggests the view that values and facts are not experienced in the same way, the latter are apprehended by our five senses and the former by a sixth, moral, sense. Any of the senses may deceive us and lead us into making mistaken judgements, whether of fact or value. Both kinds of judgements are nevertheless, objectively true or false.\(^{45}\)

Oppenheim dismisses this position with one short line. "To repeat, the parallel between statements of fact and value judgments does not hold."\(^{46}\)

Calvin argues that value judgements are revealed to man through the Bible as the word of God. It is a religious basis for the truth. The theory brings up many questions; including whether things are just because God commands them or does God command them because they are just. Of this religion based theory Oppenheim says; "Religious faith, feeling, and insight are a profoundly subjective experience and therefore cannot provide an objective ground for moral principles of politics."\(^{47}\)

Kant forwards the theory of the categorical imperative. It is a theory that has as one of its foundations the principle of universalizability, and an imperative must meet this requirement to be valid.

The categorical imperative is, according to Kant, rationally demonstrable and, for this reason, morally binding on all rational beings. . . . Compatibility with the one categorical imperative is therefore a sufficient condition for any principle of action to be a true moral one.\(^{48}\)

Oppenheim finds two main problems with Kant’s theory. First, that it does not rule out much as immoral behavior. Second, “Furthermore, to make no exceptions to a principle does not exclude the adoption of principles of exception.”\(^{49}\) Finally of the theory Oppenheim states;

So, if the categorical imperative is logically true and rationally demonstrable, it is so at the price of utter vacuity. It is a formal, not an ethical principle, and no substantive moral norms, such as the golden rule, can
be shown to be either compatible or incompatible with the principle of universalizability.\textsuperscript{50}

H.L.A. Hart presents a theory which is centered around outcomes and goals. The primary goal being to live peacefully with one another. Hart proposes that living in a society will successfully ensure this goal. Oppenheim criticizes this theory on the grounds that it is too general. He states;

Like the classical social contract theorists, Hart compares social and political organizations to voluntary associations, formed to carry out the purposes of all associates, in this case the survival of each. Now, a viable society is a necessary but by no means sufficient condition for insuring the survival of all.\textsuperscript{51}

This is evident from the fact that even in the best of societies, a crime like murder can still occur for the simple fact that agents of the state cannot be everywhere at once to enforce the rules of the society.

Oppenheim also makes some observations of Morgenthau's theory of how states decide on foreign policy. He characterizes Morgenthau as giving the statesman two choices for policies. They are acting in the interest of the state and acting morally. Given the realist position of Morgenthau, the state might be at risk if the statesman opts for a moral policy. Yet, this does not strictly go against the other choice. Thus, Oppenheim's main criticism of Morgenthau's theory is that the choices are too vague.

Oppenheim also takes issue with utilitarians such as Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill. Under utilitarianism it is argued that the policy to be pursued is the greatest good for the greatest number. It is clear however, that at some times the interest of the individual will not be the same as the will of the society. This is the crucial problem facing utilitarianism. Oppenheim also says; "The ideal observer theory purports to define the morally right in contradis-
tinction to the morally wrong, not the moral in contrast to the nonmoral."52

Lastly, Hobbes was a believer in natural law theory. Earlier on in the book, Oppenheim presented the problems with this position. The fact that it seems to be limited and overall, very subjective. Oppenheim believes Hobbes' conception of natural law to be much closer to rational choice theory than true natural law theory. Thus, Hobbes' theory is not a moral theory.

After all of these positions and others have been evaluated by Oppenheim, he offers his opinion as to which side of the cognitivist/ non-cognitivist debate is right. He believes that he has shown that none of the theories he has discussed have proven the cognitivist point, and he declared himself for the non-cognitivist point of view. He feels that the non-cognitivist is the only position that is compatible with any type of morality.

Much like Hobbes, Niebuhr, and Morgenthau, Oppenheim is wary of the effects that ideology can have on the international and domestic order. If a society is so entranced by an ideology, there is no telling what that belief might compel that state to do. This century has seen the results of such an intense identification with an ideology in Nazi Germany. While the end result was the destruction of Hitler's regime, the destruction and death caused by the religious-like fervor that the Nazis incited was the greatest that our century has known. While there were many factors that allowed Hitler to come to power it is clear that it was his ideology and ability to sell that ideology to the mass of the population of Germany and Austria that was the cause of the conflict. It is precisely this type of situation that Oppenheim hopes to avoid repeating by limiting the effectiveness and scale of morality in domestic and international affairs.
In *The Place of Morality in Foreign Policy*, Oppenheim addresses the issue of morality and the actions that states take directly. Oppenheim asks first if it is at all relevant to make moral judgements in this area. It seems logical to say that if individuals are held to some kind of moral standard in their dealings with other individuals, then surely states can be held to some kind of moral standard. Yet, Oppenheim is not sure if he is willing to call the considerations that heads of state make moral or immoral. He becomes concerned with the question of acting rationally. This is because, “Acting rationally (in a sense to be clarified) is the first defining characteristic of the concept of interest, including such related concepts as self-interest and national interest.” Oppenheim defines a rational course of action as one that is the optimal means to achieve the goal; i.e., means rationality.

One other distinction that Oppenheim makes is one between the nation and the state. The two concepts are most often found linked to one another, but here Oppenheim separates them. The nation tends to refer to ethnic and societal conditions in a territory. This is the door by which nationalism often enters questions of this type and creates much confusion. Oppenheim is solidly shutting this door. For the purpose of this work he is referring solely to the state. The state is the actor and sovereign entity. The other reason that he uses this conception is, “The proposed, valuationally neutral definition enables us to determine the national interest objectively - at least in principle.” Oppenheim also feels that acting rationally does not necessarily mean acting interestedly.

Given these definitions of important terms, let us now turn to the issue of the place of morality in international relations. As a general statement about moral principles, Oppenheim says;
An ethical statement in the area of international politics may proclaim the general moral principle that it is permissible (or obligatory) for states to pursue their national interest, or that it is wrong to do so if such action violates the duty to respect the norms of international law.\(^{55}\)

Thus, the state is bound by the concerns of international law in pursuing what is in its interest. This seems to be infringing on the sovereignty of the state. Indeed, this is what many states claim if they are accused of violating international law.

Oppenheim then says that there are two types of situations that states may find themselves in that make questions of the morality of their actions mute. These two situations are the practically unavoidable and the practically impossible. He defines the unavoidable as follows. "Accordingly, the expression, 'It is practically necessary of an agent to adopt a certain goal' will be defined as 'Anyone in the agent's position would normally find it too risky or difficult or costly to do otherwise.'"\(^{56}\) No other options exist that will bring about the successful achievement of a goal that are better than the way in which the policy is designed to achieve it. Practically impossible situations are just that. The policy to be pursued is not possible to achieve, so there is absolutely no point in trying to achieve it. Further, Oppenheim states, "'The inevitable and the impossible must be taken as given. What lies in between constitutes the appropriate scope for choice' - and for ethics."\(^{57}\)

Therefore, Oppenheim has defined the place of morality in foreign policy as the middle ground between those things that are inevitable and those things that are impossible. Oppenheim says, "Only when the agent has a practical choice is it relevant to advise him what he ought to do on moral grounds."\(^{58}\) As one can see, the situations that would allow for one to ask moral questions
or give moral advice are few.

Finally, the fact that Oppenheim is using rationality as the basis for the decision of when moral judgements are appropriate has interesting ramifications on foreign policy. First, he states; “To urge governments to pursue the national interest on moral grounds is to engage in a redundancy. To advise statesmen to pursue a goal incompatible with the national interest is to dissuade them from acting rationally.”59 This results from the national interest, by Oppenheim’s definition, being inherently rational. Second, “Its rationality is not only a necessary but also a sufficient condition for endorsing it, and there is no need to appeal to morality in addition.”60 If the policy is rational, then, in Oppenheim’s opinion, to counsel on the morality of the policy is pointless. Rational equals right.

Given the positions of Morganthau and Oppenheim, what is the outlook for moral power politics? It seems that even with the two men that the position is most identified with, see it as limited. Morganthau’s reliance on realism as the framework with which to work gives morality little concrete ground on which it can operate. The balancing act that he wishes to perform, packs morality back into a corner only to be used in small doses and only when it appears that appeals to morality will work. The combination of non-cognitivism and means rationality renders morality almost always subjective for Oppenheim. Also, he limits the proper scope of moral guidance only to those situations in which there is choice available. For both men, the pursuit of power must take precedence over that of morality.

Both seek to apply the principle of universalizability to moral questions and make it a qualification for making morally based decisions. It seems that
relying on universalizability as the yardstick in determining the scope of morality is inherently limiting. Yes, morals should be universalized as much as possible, but the situations that individuals and states often find themselves in are not always universal. They are specific to the individual or the state. Also, depending on the circumstance, the decision, be it morally guided or not, may be a one time decision that may never occur again and whatever the course of action taken, will not have future ramifications. If this were the case, can pursuing a moral action be said to violate Morgenthaler’s realism or Oppenheim’s rationality?

Morgenthaler also cautions the reader not to look at the intentions of the actor when judging the morality of an act. Stoessinger also points out the difference between the actions of individuals and states. That individuals can be judged on a basis of intention, while states are judged solely on a basis of outcomes. The distinction is crucial in viewing the way foreign policy is conducted. Even in interpersonal relations, intentions are very hard to judge, and it is not often that one can clearly tell what another's intentions for an act were. It is this difficulty that creates the necessity for the outcome based moral judgements of international relations. This could be a result of the idea that the conditions that exist between states are akin to the Hobbesian State of Nature.

Having discussed the differences between moral power politics and ordinary power politics, let us return now to the question of whether traditional machtpolitik is still being practiced in the latter half of the twentieth century. Briefly restated, the machtpolitik position that is being spoken of in this thesis is the machtpolitik doctrine as originated by Thrasyvallius in the first book of Plato’s The Republic. The doctrine as one finds it there is simply that ‘might
makes right'. Examples of this being the case can be found even in the writings of Thucydides. The idealists, having been discussed above, would find this doctrine abhorrent to their beliefs of human nature and how societies should be constructed. The realists of our time, while acknowledging the primacy of power, would quibble over what the aspects of power are; and in many cases fail to assess all of the things that affect power. Machiavelli failed to see the destructive consequences of nationalism and religion, and many in this century have failed to take these to factors into account.

It is clear that those who might still practice this doctrine will be found among the practitioners of ordinary power politics. The two figures that fit this mold best are Kissinger and Brzezinski. Both men served in important positions in the government of the United States in the last thirty years, so both men are familiar with the way in which affairs of state are handled at this time. It seems fair to say that Kissenger, while being a traditional diplomat, does not quite fit the mold of the practitioner of machtpolitik that Schmitt envisioned earlier in this century.

Brzezinski however, fits this mold precisely in his early writings and career. He has also changed his position in his more recent writings. Especially in Out of Control, Brzezinski breaks away from traditional machtpolitik doctrine. He seeks to address the increasing roles that ideology and nationalism have played as the century has progressed. Men, guns, money, and the like are no longer the only things that determine the power that a state has. Ideology, nationalism, and the willingness of those serving a cause to die for it are just as important as the traditional means of determining power.

The machtpolitik doctrine appears to have been altered beyond recogni-
tion from what it began as. Those who one can look to as examples of the position have changed their views as the times and international environment have changed. This is not to say that machtpolitik has been totally removed from the stage of international relations, however, it is clearly not the strong driving force that it was in the times of Bismarck and in the mind of Schmitt. The doctrine has been used less and less in this century because it is not able to deal with the changed situation as well as it once was able to deal with the affairs of states. Those who practiced the doctrine have recognized this fact and have adapted to the times and this adaptation has involved relying less on the traditional machtpolitik position.

As we have seen with Morgenthau and Oppenheim, issues of morality are not as easily dealt with as they may first appear when applied to international relations. Leaders of states are left to make moral decisions on the grounds of outcomes and thus all international morality is reactionary when it is practiced at all. Oppenheim and Morgenthau both seek to limit the claim of moral action in the international scene. With the sway held over most populations by ideology, religion, and rabid nationalism; if one state were able to claim moral self-righteousness, the consequences could be quite dire. States moved by these considerations would be truly disruptive forces on the international level. Morality would be perverted from the stabilizing force of the international order to a greatly destructive drive even more so than any other factor.

In conclusion, the machtpolitik doctrine no longer exists in the form presented by Thrasymachus. The doctrine has become more and more diffused over the course of the century, and its last true proponent was Carl Schmitt. While it is apparent that something is needed to provide a stabilizing force on
the international scene, morality is not likely to be the answer. As Morgenthau and Oppenheim point out, morality is potentially more destructive than ideology, religion, and nationalism. The remaining questions of the thesis will be addressed below.

1 Hobbes, M&C, p. 60
2 Hobbes, M&C, p. 224
3 Kissinger, p. 53
4 Kissinger, p. 55
5 Brzezinski & Huntington, p. 386
6 Stoessinger, TMON, p. 243
7 Stoessinger, TMON, p. 253
8 Brzezinski & Huntington, p. 17
9 Niebuhr, p. 63-64
10 Niebuhr, p. 75
11 Niebuhr, p. 102
12 Niebuhr, p. 107
13 Brzezinski, p. 23-24
14 Brzezinski, p. 65
15 Brzezinski, p. 205-206
16 Morgenthau, p. 4
17 Morgenthau, p. 5
18 Morgenthau, p. 5
19 Morgenthau, p. 5
20 Morgenthau, p. 6
21 Morganthau, p. 8
22 Morganthau, p. 10
23 Morganthau, p. 10-11
24 Morganthau, p. 27
25 Morganthau, p. 88
26 Morganthau, p. 89
27 Morganthau, p. 229
28 Morganthau, p. 230
29 Morganthau, p. 249
30 Morganthau, p. 251
31 Morganthau, p. 251
32 Morganthau, p. 252
33 Morganthau, p. 259
34 Morganthau, p. 260
35 Morganthau, p. 264-265
36 Morganthau, p. 328
37 Oppenheim, MPPP, p. 16
38 Oppenheim, MPPP, p. 21
39 Oppenheim, MPPP, p. 24
40 Oppenheim, MPPP, p. 28
41 Oppenheim, MPPP, p. 22
42 Oppenheim, MPPP, p. 23
43 Oppenheim, MPPP, p. 31
44 Oppenheim, MPPP, p. 58
45 Oppenheim, MPPP, p. 63
46 Oppenheim, MPPP, p. 64
47 Oppenheim, MPPP, p. 71
48 Oppenheim, MPPP, p. 86
49 Oppenheim, MPPP, p. 87
50 Oppenheim, MPPP, p. 88
51 Oppenheim, MPPP, p. 106
52 Oppenheim, MPPP, p. 143
53 Oppenheim, PMFP, p. 9
54 Oppenheim, PMFP, p. 14
55 Oppenheim, PMFP, p. 18
56 Oppenheim, PMFP, p. 27
57 Oppenheim, PMFP, p. 38
58 Oppenheim, PMFP, p. 39
59 Oppenheim, PMFP, p. 40
60 Oppenheim, PMFP, p. 61
CHAPTER VI

MACHTPOLITIK AND NIETZSCHE

This paper has sought to address three main issues. Does the machtpolitik position as exemplified by Thrasymachus and later by Schmitt still exist in the twilight of the century? Can diplomacy be conducted meaningfully by democratic states or has democracy crippled diplomacy as a means of preventing international hostilities? Finally, what are the causes of instability in the international order? These are questions with many different answers to them depending on what position the person being asked believes in. The main divisions I have discussed above have been the machtpolitikers like Thrasymachus and Schmitt, the idealists, the normative realists and the descriptive realists. It is the division between the idealists and the two realist positions that have had the most effect on how we perceive things in this century.

The question of whether machtpolitik still exists in our time is not as clear cut as one would hope it to be. The machtpolitik doctrine that I have discussed above is that of Thrasymachus in Plato's *The Republic*, who stated it bluntly as might makes right. In our time, Carl Schmitt is the only philosopher who can truly be said to have followed this doctrine. Schmitt sought to return to Hobbes' State of Nature as a paradigm for international relations and in a State of Nature conception, might does truly make right. The changes in the world over the second half of this century have greatly affected how we must look at this type of position. The conception of power that exists today is radically different than it was fifty to a hundred years ago.
The machtpolitik that Schmitt embraces and Bismarck practiced is no longer in existence. The position has continued, but it has become much more diffuse in this century. Kissinger and Brzezinski were perhaps the two figures that could be most closely associated with the machtpolitik tradition, but even they have softened their positions recently. Brzezinski especially has changed his position. He recognizes that ideology and the metamyths that he discusses have altered both how power is perceived and what constitutes power. More shall be said on this in addressing our third topic. So, what remains of the machtpolitik position that I have been discussing is very little, and almost does not resemble the doctrine as it was originally put forth. Brute force is still recognized as power in our time, but it is the other intangible things, like ideologies, that have altered power and transformed the machtpolitik position.

Chapter IV addressed the issue of diplomacy versus democracy in the form of the question of which type of government is preferable, the sovereign or a democracy? The main arguments for democracy are that it better represents the will of the people; that it provides a stable transition of power; that it better preserves the rights of the individual citizens; and that democratic states are less likely to pursue foreign policy goals through the use of force. All of these things are or are thought to be advantages of democracy. However, almost to a man, all of the philosophers that I have discussed above lament the loss of traditional diplomacy.

Under the old system of sovereigns, diplomacy was conducted by a certain set of protocols that all of those participating knew and followed. The Sovereigns appointed men of distinction to be their diplomats and had the utmost confidence in them to do their jobs and pursue and protect the interests of
the state. Ultimately, the final decisions were up to the sovereign, but with having such high confidence in his diplomats, a sovereign could probably just signed off on the negotiations. This is not the case in a democracy. Once the diplomats have negotiated a treaty, it must be reviewed and approved by a body that speaks for the people. In the case of the United States, it is the Senate that must approve treaties.

It is the above mentioned protocols of diplomacy that allowed diplomats of differing cultures to meet and discuss issues of great importance with the hope of finding a solution. Also, it was the protocols that provided a common ground and allowed for sides to influence one another. It is the loss of these protocols that is lamented by Kissinger, Brzezinski and others. Kissinger states; “A similar outlook about aims and methods eases the tasks of diplomacy - it may even be a precondition for it. In the absence of such a consensus, diplomats can still meet, but they lose the ability to persuade.”1 It is the ability to persuade that is crucial to diplomacy, and if it is lacking then nothing can be accomplished. Democracy and the rise of nationalism and ideology have served to make this much more difficult.

So, while democracy does many things for the individual citizen and provides internal stability, it is unable to deal with some aspects of international relations as well as a sovereign and the traditional methods of diplomacy. A sovereign can react in a crisis situation with much more speed and certainty than a democracy. Given the changes in the way states can affect one another, speed in decision making is becoming more and more crucial. Also, a system for negotiations that is not influenced by ideology is more likely to reach a solution than one in which ideology is rampant and creating intractable parties.
Like the issue of machtpolitik, there is no clear cut answer; both sides have their advantages and disadvantages. It is up to the individual to decide for themselves which form they think is better.

The ultimate goal of all international relations is to keep the international environment stable and keep conflict to a minimum if there has to be any at all. One can see however, that this goal is far from being met in our time. What is the source of this continuing problem? Is it the state system as it currently exists? Is it the influence of ideologies on the populations? Or is it human nature itself?

If we look at the State of Nature as Hobbes presented it once again, we shall see that the state system is merely a reflection of what individuals will do to one another if given the opportunity to do so. In Hobbes' opinion it is the state that prevents the worst of the tendencies of man from being constantly acted upon. Hobbes would feel that it is the lack of an authority to overawe the states that explains the conflict between states. This then, is a problem without an answer, because any of the attempts to create such an authority in this century have met with bitter disappointment, and all other methods that have been tried to prevent conflict have also failed.

Can we then place the blame for all of this at the foot of the ideologies, religious fervor, and rampant nationalism of this century? While they can explain a great deal of the reluctance to engage in a supra-national government, they do not, initially, have a life of their own. As the ideology gains adherents it will take on a life of its own, for good or ill. The Cold War once again provides a fine example of this type of behavior. However, something more must lie underneath the surface of the ideological beliefs. There must be something that explains why people can fall into these beliefs and be swept away by them.
This leaves us with human nature as the source of all the conflict and strife. One will accept this or not based on how one views human nature. If one believes along the lines of Hobbes, then this position will make perfect sense. Machiavelli and Hobbes saw that man is looking for guidance of some sort. This longing for direction can be exploited by those of a mind to do so. Hitler clearly did this in Germany and the result was World War II. This longing for direction or something to believe in gives ideology the door it needs to enter the human psyche and convert it to the purpose of the ideology.

What then is a solution to this problem of human nature inclining us to incessant conflict? The remainder of this conclusion will briefly describe the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche and apply it as a solution to this problem. Nietzsche’s grand project was the reevaluation of all values, by which he sought to improve the human condition. It is in this sense that one should consider Nietzsche when looking at issues of human nature and any attempts to modify or change it. Ultimately, it seems that a radical change in human nature is what is needed to change the face of international relations and bring conflict to an end. I shall present Nietzsche as an idealist in the sense that his solution cannot truly be hoped to come to pass. The scale of the project is too large and ultimately too radical, however desirable it may be.

The three works of Nietzsche that will be used in addressing the subject are Beyond Good & Evil, On the Genealogy of Morals, and Thus Spake Zarathustra. These books present the majority of Nietzsche’s thought on power and morality. The first step in evaluating Nietzsche’s thought and using it to tie together the loose strings of the power politic tradition, is to look at how Nietzsche defined power. The definition that the tradition has used for most of
its' history is power as the ability to influence the actions of another. Machtpolitik, as I have defined it, is solely concerned with what power can compel others to do on your behalf. These definitions are directed externally and seek to exert control over the actions and drives of another person or state. Nietzsche did not believe in this type of power. Walter Kaufmann in his book Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist says the following of Nietzsche’s view of this type of power. "Power here must evidently mean 'worldly power' and social success, making friends, and influencing people. Because men wish to have such power, they betray their destiny, fail to cultivate their physis, and conform." It is the last effect of worldly power that Nietzsche fights most against, the call to conformity. It is conformity and its effects that Nietzsche rails against. Conformity must be overcome by the exercise of the will to power and is crucial to the understanding of the distinction between master and slave morality.

Nietzsche does by no means seek to eliminate power as a consideration in the affairs of man. What he is striving to do is to redefine power into something more and better. Kaufmann states;

Power is still the standard of value - but this joy is the conscious feeling that is inextricably connected with a man's possession of power. Conversely, the man who experiences this joy is the powerful man - and instead of relying on heavenly powers to redeem him, to give meaning to his life, and to justify the world, he gives meaning to his own life by achieving perfection and exulting in every moment.

Thus, for Nietzsche, power is turned from something other directed to a self directed drive. The truly powerful man does not have to bend others to his will. His will is sufficient for himself, and mush like Machiavelli hoped, the one man will provide an example that other men may see and seek to emulate.

The main ideas of Nietzsche that are of interest in looking at power poli-
tics and human nature are the will to power and the distinction between master and slave morality. The will to power is crucial in that it is the foundation that Nietzsche builds much of his philosophy on. Nietzsche viewed the will to power as a drive in every living thing. The drive of the will to power makes all things strive to better themselves. In man, this is represented by the man who comes to control his passions. The man, who while he is able to feel passion, is not governed by passion. The self is something to be overcome. This struggle to overcome is at the core of Nietzsche's belief. It is the will to power that is ultimately responsible for all of the actions that we perform.

Master and slave morality is the distinction that Nietzsche made for different types of morality. While many believe that Nietzsche was radically anti-moral, nothing could be further from the truth. What is true is that he saw most of the morality of his time as being other directed and not in line with what he saw as the true nature of Christianity. Nietzsche said of traditional morality; “We believe that morality in the traditional sense, the morality of intentions, was a prejudice, precipitate and perhaps provisional - something on the order of astrology an alchemy - but in any case something that must be overcome.”

It is traditional morality that is slave morality. It is a morality based on belief in something transcendental, like God. Nietzsche also calls this type of morality herd morality. Another criticism that Nietzsche levels at slave morality can be seen in the following passage.

All these moralities that address themselves to the individual, for the sake of his 'happiness', as one says - what are they but counsels for behavior in relation to the degree of dangerousness in which the individual lives with himself, recipes against his passions, his good and bad inclinations insofar as they have the will to power and want to play the master; little and great prudences and artifices that exude the nook odor of old nostrums and of the wisdom of old women; all of them baroque and
unreasonable in form - because they address themselves to `all’, because they generalize where one must not generalize. From the quote above, it is obvious that Nietzsche would disagree vehemently with Morgenthalau and Oppenheim’s insistence of making universalizability part of a definition of morality. As Nietzsche states, there are instances where slave morality seeks to generalize, that cannot and should not be generalized. This is merely one aspect of the problem that Nietzsche has with slave morality. The other aspect of the problem is very similar to the problem that Nietzsche had with the state. He sees the state as stamping out individuality and that is also what he believes slave morality will do. It is a call to conformity and not to uniqueness. To Nietzsche, every living thing becomes unique as it exercises its will to power.

Master morality is achieved when one is no longer bound by the limitations of slave morality. The master moralist, the noble man in the following quotation, now depends upon himself to establish morals. “The noble type of man experiences itself as determining values; it does not need approval; it judges, `what is harmful to me is harmful in itself’; it knows itself to be that which first accords honor to things; it is value-creating.” The master moralist has exercised his will to power to achieve this heightened state in which he himself becomes the arbiter of what is good and what is evil.

Like Hobbes, much of Nietzsche’s theory is about the felicity of the individual. In *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, Nietzsche presents us with the idea of the ubermensch, the overman. Zarathustra is one of the overmen. He has overcome many obstacles due to the drive of his will to power and has become the passionate man who controls his passion and lives in the moment. It has been a struggle for Zarathustra to achieve this level of consciousness and he has lived
as a hermit for long periods of time in order that he may transcend the morality and the mind-set of the herd. The felicity for Zarathustra and those like him is complete in every way because they have transcended the boundaries of what society would have them conform to, both in becoming master moralists and in no longer desiring the material things that society says one needs to be successful or happy.

Nietzsche envisioned a society of ubermenschen that would be much like most of the other idealists visions of utopia. In a society of ubermenschen, all would have what they needed, without having to subjugate or deprive others, because of their heightened consciousness. Nietzsche sought to begin the process of establishing this type of society, but like his goal of the revaluation of all values, it never came to be.

Daniel W. Conway in his book Nietzsche & the Political eloquently presents an interpretation of the ubermensch in the context of a political society. As I have stated above, the ubermensch is the result of an individual exerting their will to power to become something more and better. Conway states; “Nietzsche’s attempt to retrieve the founding question of politics reflects his conviction that it is the business of politics to legislate the conditions of the permanent enhancement of humankind (BGE 257).” The felicity that the political order enables should be of such a degree that people are able to become what they are meant to be, ubermenschen.

Many have come to see Nietzsche as the embodiment of the nihilist position. This is not the case. Nietzsche laments that modern society seems to be on a course that will lead to nothing but nihilism, but he is trying to stop the descent. Conway states;
The Ubermensch thus constitutes Nietzsche’s general answer to the founding question of politics: ‘we’ should undertake to breed a type of individual whose pursuit of self-perfection contributes to the enhancement of humankind and thereby justifies our own existence. ‘We’ should undertake the establishment of a political regime that will in turn envision the Ubermensch as its unimaginable, singular product.8

Thus, Nietzsche transfers the burden of improvement from the one, Zarathustra, to the many of the society.

However, Nietzsche comes to the conclusion that society itself has become part of the problem. He even admits his own failings in finding a solution. Conway states;

He consequently concludes that presently there exists no macropolitical solution to the problem of decadence in late modernity. The ‘philosophers of the future’ may someday arrive at one, but Nietzsche himself, rooted inextricably in the decadence he so despises, cannot.9

What then is Nietzsche’s course of action to be?

Conway feels that Nietzsche reduces the scope of his project by distinguishing between what Conway calls the political macrosphere and microsphere.

I distinguish between the macropolitical (or institutional) and the micropolitical (or infra-institutional) incarnations of his perfectionism. The political macrosphere comprises the network of relations that obtain between a people’s institutions and its representative exemplars, while the political microsphere comprises those relations between a people and its representative exemplars that are not mediated by social institutions.10

It is in the microsphere that Nietzsche will operate to oppose the will to nothingness.

It is his specific task to convoke a gathering of those individuals who are best suited to survive the twilight of the idols, and to train these unlikely ‘heroes’ in the experimental disciplines that are most likely to stave off the will to nothingness.11

It is in the political microsphere that Nietzsche will strive to develop as
many ubermenschen as possible. This is where he will make his stand against nihilism and attempt to cultivate the evolution of humankind. The project that faces him is almost unapproachably large and daunting, yet Nietzsche does not shirk from what he feels is his duty. If he can help guide those who will become "philosophers of the future", then all of his efforts will have served a purpose. Even if he did not live to see it.

In conclusion, Nietzsche faced the decadence of modernity and the resulting nihilistic attitudes with a courage and a hope that many would not have attributed to him. While his goal of creating a society of ubermenschen has never come to pass and the problems that Nietzsche saw in his time have only seemed to become larger in ours, the idealist in all of us cannot but hope for the betterment of the future. Nietzsche had that hope amidst all of the adversity that faced him. We can give no greater tribute to Nietzsche, humankind, and ourselves than to emulate his hope.

1 Kissinger, p. 55
2 Kaufmann, p. 180
3 Kaufmann, p. 324
4 Nietzsche, BGE, p. 44-45
5 Nietzsche, BGE, p. 109
6 Nietzsche, BGE, p. 205
7 Conway, p. 6
8 Conway, p. 26
9 Conway, p. 46
10 Conway, p. 48
11 Conway, p. 47
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Niebuhr, Reinhold. Christianity and Power Politics New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1940.


