Parties and Realignment: The President’s Role in Political Party Realignment

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Kevin B. Dockerty
PARTIES AND REALIGNMENT: THE PRESIDENT’S ROLE
IN POLITICAL PARTY REALIGNMENT

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Using “The Youth-Parent Socialization Panel Study” that covers 1965-1982, the role of individual presidential candidates in bringing about changes in mass partisanship and party realignment is studied. Previous research has ignored the role of popular, prestigious, charismatic presidential candidates shaping and changing citizens’ partisanship. Historical political party realignments guide my research in showing the strong influence of the chief executive in realignment periods.

Following the work of Niemi and Jennings (1991) I expand on their issue model explaining partisan choice by creating a candidate-issues model to provide a more complete explanation of party identification. I specifically look at the presidential candidates of 1972 (Nixon and McGovern) and the candidates of 1980 (Reagan and Carter). Candidate thermometers provide an opportunity to expand on the previous explanations for realignment causes and processes.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS........................................................................................................ ii
LIST OF TABLES........................................................................................................... vi

CHAPTER

1. PRESIDENTS AND REALIGNMENT.......................................................... 1
   Presidential Realignment History................................................................. 2

2. PROCESS AND CAUSE.............................................................................. 8
   Partisanship................................................................................................. 8
   Political Socialization.............................................................................. 9
   Realignment Causes.................................................................................. 12
   Critical Elections.................................................................................... 13
   Secular Elections................................................................................... 14
   Dealignment............................................................................................ 17
   Presidential Effects.................................................................................. 18

3. RECENT REALIGNMENT FEATURES.................................................. 22
   Coalition Shifts....................................................................................... 23

4. DATA AND METHODS............................................................................. 27

5. MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS....................................................................... 41

6. CONCLUSION............................................................................................ 49

BIBLIOGRAPHY............................................................................................... 53
LIST OF TABLES

1. Distribution of Party Identification of Students................................................. 30
2. Combined Distribution of Party Identification of Students................................. 31
3. Cross-Tabulation of Two-Party Vote Choice with Party Identification,
   1964-1980 (% Republican)............................................................................... 32
4. Correlation Matrix of 1965 Variables................................................................ 34
5. Correlation Matrix of 1973 Variables................................................................ 36
6. Correlation Matrix of 1982 Variables................................................................ 37
7. Means of Candidate Thermometer Ratings...................................................... 40
8. Issue Regression Model.................................................................................... 42
9. Candidate-Issue Regression Model.................................................................... 43
CHAPTER 1

PRESIDENTS AND REALIGNMENTS

As the literature on realignment has grown, it has become more and more difficult to fully define the concept. However, the general consensus is that realignment refers to a major shift in the partisanship of the electorate. This can occur in a number of ways: switch in the dominant party, change in the party coalitions, infusion of new support, dealignment, and changes in party loyalty. Each historical realignment has manifested itself in a different way. Not only have scholars attempted to understand the process of realignment, but they have analyzed its causes. Researchers' focus on the causes has led them to several explanations: national crisis, new societal issues, the infusion of a new voting generation, and changes in party politics.

Primarily studies of partisan change have relied on the electorate's response to issues and events in interpreting electoral shifts. While issues do play an important role in determining how the electorate forms political opinions, the general public also turns to politicians for political direction. My hypothesis is that political candidates can indeed lead mass partisanship changes. Specifically, this occurs at the presidential level where attractive, appealing, charismatic candidates can lead to changes in the electorate. I am not arguing that issues and events do not play a strong role in bringing about mass changes in partisanship, I am only suggesting that these factors do not fully explain the realignment process.

The literature on party realignment, while extensive, is incomplete without an examination of the role of presidential candidates in the process. The difficulty lies in how to appropriately test the influence of the president on the electorate. Thus, the research question takes into account not only party realignment at the aggregate level, but individual changes in partisanship as well.

To attempt to study the role of presidential candidates I am using “The Youth-Parent Socialization Panel Study” conducted by Niemi, Jennings and Markus that covers
1965-1982. The panel study provides an opportunity to look at the same subjects over an extended period of time. We can study how their political feelings, and in particular their partisan feelings, have changed over that period due to a number of factors, including the actions of the president. The period of time covers the final administration of Lyndon Johnson, the Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations, and the first year of Reagan. Therefore this paper specifically looks at the period of the 1960s to the 1980s to better understand the realigning forces at work.

In this thesis I discuss the connections between presidential candidates and partisanship. In particular, I discuss the processes and causes of political party realignment. Following this discussion, I provide analysis of the Jennings and Niemi panel study of students over a seventeen-year period. Previous research on this subject has primarily focused on issue effects. I am attempting to explain mass partisan change as a result of both candidates and issues by creating a model to measure candidate influences on partisanship. I believe that insight into this area provides scholars with valuable evidence in realignment research.

Presidential Realignment History

Political scientists have noted that party realignments have been a regular feature throughout US history. Studying the realignment process is essential to a better understanding of the party system. It helps political scientists understand how parties operate and change, how mass portions of the electorate make decisions about elections and why, the impact of elites on realignments, and it gives us an opportunity to determine how groups within the electorate operate. It also plays a predictive role in helping us better determine what the conditions for realignment are. There is general agreement among the discipline that realignments occurred in several key elections: 1828, 1860, 1896, and 1932. About every 32-36 years there has been a realignment in the electorate; however, disagreement has existed since the 1960s over whether there have been further realignments since 1932. Many political scientists have argued that the 1960s initiated a realignment,
while others have contended that the realignment occurred in the 1980s. Still other researchers have supported the theory that dealignment currently describes the American party system. Each realigning era is unique but they do seem to all contain similar elements, one of which is a strong, innovative, popular president. In this section of the thesis I provide a historical framework for my presidential candidate theory of realignment.

The theory of realignment is typically associated with Key's (1955, 1959) seminal work on critical elections and secular realignments. Considerable work on realignment has been written since Key's 1955 piece, but few researchers have specifically looked at the executive's role in realignment. This seems to be a grave oversight when one thinks of the winning presidents in those critical elections. While Key (1955) did allude to presidential candidates' influence, other scholars have not picked up on it. Researchers have primarily focused on the impact of issues in realignment explanation. Some researchers briefly mention presidents in the realignment literature but they do not assign much of a role for these individuals.

Some scholars have suggested a possible realignment period of 1800. While this seems a stretch because of the infancy of the political party system, the 1800 election did usher in a period of domination by the Democratic-Republican party. Thomas Jefferson, the winner in 1800, would do as all of his successors did in realignment administrations, extend the power of the president and the nation. His purchase of the Louisiana Territory more than doubled the size of the nation; the purchase also flew in the face of his party's platform of a weak national government and states' rights. Jefferson's individual behavior as president set the tone for the Democratic-Republican party until the arrival of Andrew Jackson in the 1830s. Jefferson's presence could be felt throughout the period as it came to be known as the Jeffersonian Era and his party was often referred to as the Jeffersonians.

Rapoport (1997) provides a similar study to mine in looking at candidate effects on partisanship, in fact his study uses the same panel study data set of 1965-1982 and a very similar model to measure the effects of candidates and partisanship. However, his study primarily confines itself to showing the causal relationship between candidates and party identification. He fails to take his theory a step further and apply it to realignment. Both of our work produces similar results, however, my paper has a greater focus on partisan change leading to realignment.

Certainly Jefferson was the most influential factor in initiating a period of Democratic-Republican domination through the first 30 years of the party system.

Unlike 1800, there is a consensus among scholars that 1828 was a realigning election. Andrew Jackson defeated incumbent president John Quincy Adams in 1828 to begin a period of Democratic dominance up until the Civil War. "King Andrew" was an extremely powerful president who is responsible for extending the powers of the president as well as the entire executive branch. Lowi (1967) points out that Jackson would have a profound impact on the US political system, bringing about greater democratization and perhaps even "more important for the general course of political development, Jackson's strategy resulted in giving him and succeeding Presidents a base of power independent of Congress" (1967, 248). Certainly Jackson's strong leadership was responsible for solidifying Democratic control during that period. Like Jefferson, Jackson molded the Democratic party around himself. This period of history is known as the Jacksonian Period. He would set the tone for the Democratic party for the next 30 years. His platform would remain largely the stance of the Democratic party throughout the rest of the century, and his leadership is primarily responsible for establishing Democratic support in the South and West. Jackson's charismatic, country-boy persona were influential in the mobilization of support from farmers, small business men, and commoners. Jackson gathered support from all these groups, while remaining a wealthy businessman, by presenting a "down-home" image and strong centralized leadership. The Democratic party became the party of the common man as a result of Jackson's leadership.

The next critical realignment occurred in 1860 with the election of Republican Abraham Lincoln. While we cannot deny the role that Civil War and slavery played in bringing about this realignment, we must also analyze the impact that Lincoln had on the process. Lincoln extended the powers of the president and the bureaucracy in the face of war. As Milkis (1993) points out, Lincoln was able to succeed in the restoring the strong executive as the vital center of national politics. His strong leadership led the Union to victory and initiated a period of control by the newly-founded Republican Party. His leadership also cemented the longevity and stability of the Republican Party as a major party. The GOP is often referred to as the "party of Lincoln."
The 1896 election is an interesting realignment because of the issues that plagued the United States at the time, as well as the powerful development of populism in the Democratic Party. Previous research has concentrated on the issues of the day, perhaps ignoring the role that a strong executive played. This may be because Republican William McKinley ushered in this realignment in 1896; McKinley was largely a product of the times. A Republican in a period laissez-faire politics, McKinley was able to become the candidate of economic prosperity and business. His policy positions and the electorate’s perceptions of him were primarily a response to the extreme progressive popularity of his Democratic opponent in 1896 and 1900, William Jennings Bryan (Bibby 1992). Bryan would symbolize the Democratic party during this period, mobilizing support in the west and south, representing the plight of the farmers and miners. However, the size of his support groups were much smaller than the portion of the population represented by the Republican party, explaining why he lost the presidential election three times.

It seems quite possible that the lasting effects of the 1896 realignment may not have been so durable and sharp had Theodore Roosevelt not served for 7 years as the president from 1901-1909. Roosevelt assumed the office following the death of McKinley shortly into his second term. Roosevelt is an interesting case because he was not elected president initially, making him a possible example of how the president influences the electorate more than the electorate chooses to initiate these realignments on their own. Roosevelt was able to increase the power of the president yet again by increasing the power of the United States on a global scale with his motto: "speak softly but carry a big stick." Domestically his reputation as the "trustbuster" made him popular with labor. In an era of corruption in government and limited labor rights, Roosevelt was the person to whom the people looked for “vigorous national action” to deal with the social problems of the day (Ladd and Hadley 1978). Roosevelt was able to capture America's ideal of the "rugged individual,” setting an image for what Americans thought of themselves. His presence was influential in shaping not only the Republican party's foreign policy, but US foreign policy through the 1920s.

The 1932 election of Democrat Franklin Roosevelt brought about the New Deal Coalition and a realignment that shifted political dominance to the Democratic Party.
Roosevelt would have more of an impact on the national government than any president before or after. His strong, popular leadership allowed him to win four successive terms in office. Milkis (1993) finds that the legacy of the Roosevelt administration set a pattern for presidential politics that continues to operate through the presidency of George Bush. He points out that "even conservative Republican presidents, such as Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan, were loath to accept a limited executive role; indeed, they embraced the New Deal concept of presidential power" (1993, viii). Milkis concludes that Roosevelt's administration was influential in switching the focus of politics from parties to the president, specifically the focus from the Democratic party to Roosevelt.

While the focus of the New Deal realignment is Roosevelt’s 1932 election, Key (1955) argues that Roosevelt's victory was actually preceded by the 1928 Democratic candidate, New York Governor Al Smith. Smith was able to activate a shift toward the Democratic Party in the typically Republican northeast. He was able to accomplish this, not because of the issues of the election, but through his own personal attributes which led to a change in the party coalitions. Smith was Catholic and he was able to sway the Catholic vote to the Democrats. Before 1928, Catholics supported the Republicans, but Smith was the first Catholic to win nomination from a major party and Catholics flocked to support him. Smith marked a conversion of Catholics to the Democratic Party that, while diminished, still exists today. His appeal to "urban voters was not simply that he was of urban origin but that his Catholicism and Irish background stamped him as a champion of immigrants and children of immigrants" (Degler 1971, 138). Looking at the election results in all the New England states, Key finds that Smith's candidacy initiated a sharp and durable realignment of low-income, Catholic, urban voters of recent immigrant stock. Key's assessment of Al Smith's candidacy adds credence to the idea that presidential candidates have a strong influence on partisanship.

Joel Silbey (1991) believes that all of these realignment periods have profoundly different qualities and the differences tell us about the patterns between them. However, Silbey and others have failed to recognize the one pattern that all of these realigning elections did have: an exceptionally strong and persuasive president that ushered in each of these realignments. Wattenberg (1991) picks up on this possibility more than any other
researcher in arguing that the current system of government is marked by candidate-centered politics; no longer are the parties as strong or influential as they once were. Wattenberg makes the argument, perhaps not intentionally, that no realignment occurred from 1960-1980 because of the lack of a strongly popular president which represented the party in the voter's minds.

Party labels, though still intact and enduring for many voters, now often lack the depth and meaning formerly associated with them. While opinions about Reagan were sharply divided, opinions about the parties were not nearly so distinct. In contrast, when great historical figures such as Lincoln, Bryan, or Franklin Roosevelt polarized the electorate, opinions concerning them were quickly incorporated into the party images, thereby polarizing voters along partisan lines (1991, 2).

The distinction between the parties has grown since the 1980s with the Democrats taking on a more liberal stance and the Republicans a more conservative approach. Wattenberg goes on to argue that in the candidate-centered age presidential performance determines support rather than policy issues. Issues are no longer the key to realignment changes, presidents are.
CHAPTER 2

PROCESS AND CAUSE

In this chapter, I discuss the process of realignment, examining individual level changes in partisanship and the role of political socialization. I begin with this to help build the argument for how change occurs. Without investigating individual change it is impossible to completely understand why realignment develops. In the second part of this chapter, I examine realignment causes, exploring the different theories of what drives the realignment process. Specifically, I point out shortcomings in the current realignment theories by discussing the flaws of issue realignment theory and indicating how candidate-centered theory along with issues can provide a more complete explanation for realignment.

Partisanship

At the base of realignment studies is voting behavior and partisanship. While realignment is a product of aggregate partisan change, it would be neglectful not mention how voting behavior and partisanship develop. Understanding micro-level partisanship gives a better understanding of how mass partisanship changes take place. At the heart of realignment theories then we must consider party identification. As MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson (1990) state: "Party identification is the key concept of U.S. electoral research. Always in the forefront in the analysis of individual behavior and attitudes, it is all but obvious that its aggregate, the national partisan balance, should be a central barometer of the party system"(284).

The research on party identification provides a strong basis for my central hypothesis that candidates are important to mass partisanship changes. The work of several researchers (Franklin and Jackson 1983, Allsop and Weisberg 1988, Brody and Rothenberg 1988, MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson 1990) finds that candidate effects are
important to partisanship development and change. Most of the research on partisan change in this area has focused attention on changes during elections. Allsop and Weisberg found systematic changes in partisanship across the span of the presidential campaign in 1984.

Not all research has found partisanship unstable. Niemi and Jennings (1991) find that partisanship across generations is generally consistent following an initial dip in early adulthood. Jennings and Markus (1984) determine that partisan attitudes are largely explained by political experience. “With the passage of time, an individual’s repeated use of partisan orientations to interpret and organize political information and to guide electoral decisions should reduce the likelihood of those orientations being altered by isolated events or circumstances” (1001).

Turning to a macro-approach to party identification MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson (1990) find that macropartisanship is directly tied in with evaluations of the president. Most of their research focuses on the relationship between partisanship and presidential approval ratings. They find a strong connection between presidential approval and partisanship. However, they challenge the typical notion of realignment as a system of punctuated equilibriums where there are long periods of stability interrupted, only rarely, by a historical realignment. Their conceptions of macropartisanship follow the arguments of Carmines and Stimson (1981) and Petrocik (1981) that the party divisions are continually shifting. They conclude: “We must focus more clearly on the constancy of change. Rather than worry whether political changes are large enough to signal a realignment, we ought to wrestle with their cause and consequence” (1989, 300). My model attempts to answer the question of cause.

**Political Socialization**

Party identification is not the complete story on the process of macropartisanship change; how party identification develops and changes through socialization is very important. As Beck (1974) finds, psychological attachments to political parties emerge in elementary school and prove to be the most durable political attachment of an individual’s life. This connection does decrease somewhat following high school graduation as Niemi
and Jennings (1991) determine in their panel study, but the foundation of parental partisanship is strong throughout life. Beck sets out a theory of realignment using political socialization as the basis for his argument. My model also supports this effect over time. Beck highlights the importance of utilizing new voters rather than converting existing voters as important, similar to the research of Sundquist (1983), Carmines and Stimson (1981), and Petrocik (1981).

Beck (1974) believes the 1932 realignment was primarily due to new voters responding to the New Deal realigning phase, rather than experienced voters switching parties. The transition years between childhood and full adulthood are critical. These young citizens have not actually participated in electoral decision-making and may be more easily mobilized in a new partisan direction. Beck does not see this as a regular occurrence, however; instead, the preadult socialization, which is usually durable, "gives way under the impact of strong political forces for those who were in the transition years between childhood and full adulthood" (205). Following this period of transition, Beck finds that voters return to long periods of stability. The system cannot continually pressure voters for change. This theory explains the rather stable pattern of realignment every 32-36 years. The realignment generation mobilizes to change politics, followed by a period of insulation where the children of realignment are rather content and satisfied with the party system. This period is then interrupted to start the process over with another realignment generation made up of the children of "normal politics." Beck does admit that his model relies on the assumption that the typical differential between parents and children is the conventional twenty-five years.

A number of researchers (Wattenberg 1990, Sundquist 1983, Petrocik 1981) point to the continuing decline in partisanship and the general dealignment of the electorate that makes it much more difficult to study patterns of partisanship. Independents cannot be expected to have any connections to the parties, and thus, may vote for a different party in each election. Rahn, et al. (1990) also look at how voters develop and make partisan decisions; their social cognitive model relies on the impact of presidential politics. Voters

My model does show a reduction in the effects of parental identification throughout the study while the Niemi and Jennings model finds that parental partisanship decreases in importance after one wave and then plateaus.
turn to the most visible party member to determine their political feelings. They conclude that the president often determines vote choice. Voters develop these party associations cognitively in response to the president. As Strahan (1998) points out, the two presidents “who loom largest in the politics of the 1946-1996 period are Franklin Roosevelt and Ronald Reagan, both of whom left lasting imprints on American partisan politics” (35).

Other researchers (Norpoth 1987, Miller and Shanks 1996) have also looked at the effects of socialization and elections. Specifically, they discover that the 1980 election was a particularly important election for younger voters. Norpoth finds that there are a larger number of Republican identifiers in 1980 as opposed to previous elections. He primarily points to the shift of younger voters moving into the Republican ranks. This shift is evident in my data with a general move of panel respondents toward the Republicans over the life of the panel. Norpoth writes: "The youthful surge toward the GOP definitely marks a major disruption of the normal pattern of parental socialization. Young adults coming of age since 1980 have largely abandoned the predominantly Democratic identification of their parents" (1987, 387). If we assume that the Republican shift continues in 2002 then theoretically, as more Democratic New Deal-generation voters leave the electorate, the greater strength the Republican party gains. Ladd (1991) alludes to this factor as well, pointing out that as the Depression Generation grows older the Democratic support groups decrease. “The Republicans fare much better among those who have come of age politically in the late 1970s and 1980s, for whom the most vivid comparison is that of Democrat Jimmy Carter to Republican Ronald Reagan” (1991, 33).

A panel study approach to party identification provides the best indication of how people form their partisanship and why they change it. This allows us to better study first, how voters develop their party affiliations; and second, why they change their party attachments. If the president does initiate partisan change, the panel study can demonstrate the effect.
Realignment Causes

I now turn to realignment theories, which attempt to develop a relationship between changes in partisanship and its causes. The historical realignments of the past are rather difficult to analyze empirically. There is no available survey data prior to the 1950s to study because political scientists were not yet studying individual party identification in previous realignment years. The 1932 election is the only election where we have reliable election data from which to test theories of party identification. Sundquist (1983) points out that reliance on quantitative analysis of election returns provides severe limitations on research because it simply reveals what happened, not why or how. He calls for realignment researchers to use not only quantitative, but non-quantitative methods of study, because it is the only way that political scientists can study "content of partisan conflict from year to year, and the behavior of party leaders, conventions, caucuses, and candidates and their organizations and supporters" (1983, 15). These actors and events are the sources of the how and why of the realignment process. The panel study may be able to replace the problem of non-quantitative analysis of individual party leader roles.

One difficulty in studying realignment is that researchers don't know what to look for, as each realignment provides a quality of uniqueness. Sundquist offers five types of realignment scenarios. The first is no major alignment, possibly the dealignment of the 1960s. Second, realignment of the two existing parties whereby the parties develop new coalitions of support similar to the period of the 1960s. Third, the realignment of the existing parties through the absorption of a third party similar to the 1890s realignment. Fourth, realignment through the replacement of one party with a new party such as the Republican party in the late 1850s taking the place of the Whig party. Fifth, realignment through the replacement of both old parties. Looking at historical realignments, he argues we should not expect a current realignment to necessarily follow the patterns of previous realignments.
Critical Elections

In the first of Key's works he developed the "critical elections" concept. Using aggregate election returns, he discusses the forces that led to realignments in 1896 and 1932. He calls these elections "critical elections" where "there occurs a sharp and durable electoral realignment between parties" (1955, 16). These critical elections are not simply short-term changes in party strength; rather, they signal a lasting change in party loyalties. Sundquist (1983) supports this, pointing out that in some elections a party's position on particular issues or its recent past may attract or repel voters. But a realignment has not occurred when a voter "crosses the line to vote against the party he normally supports...unless he makes a lasting shift of party loyalty and attachment. If the shift is temporary, he is merely deviating" (1983, 5). Thus, it is hard to fully study durable changes in the partisanship of the electorate without using panel study data that offers a look at the same voters over a span of time. The absence of such data makes it difficult to study previous realignments.

Since the work of Key, political scientists have grappled with the idea of critical elections and party realignments. Walter Dean Burnham (1991) defines critical elections as "moments of intense, comprehensive, and periodically recurring systemic change in American politics. These movements will be more or less protracted depending on the level of development in institutional structure which exists at the time of their occurrence" (1991, 115). While the idea of critical elections was very useful for explaining realignment in voting behavior from 1828-1932, the lack of a "critical election" realignment in the 1960s caused many political scientists to explore alternative realignment theories.

In studying the current party system Petrocik (1987) believes that the declining voter turnout since 1960 may be a "pre-shock and a harbinger of a critical realignment that is yet to come" (1981, 158). Gerald Pomper (1971) also looks closely at the 1964 election, defining it as a "converting election." By this he means that the Democratic majority continued but the fundamental support bases changed. Pomper points to the coalitional shifts of 1964 as acting in a converting manner.
Another aspect of realignment seems to be the presence of a “cementing election” following a critical election. The elections of 1896 and 1932 are the most recent critical elections. However, what has often been overlooked are the elections which immediately followed in 1900 and 1936. Wattenberg sees these elections as instrumental in solidifying the change from the previous election. Wattenberg (1991) points out that the “Democrats in 1900 reacted to William Jennings Bryan’s defeat in 1896 by renominating him. Similarly, in 1936 the Republicans chose Alf Landon, who stood by the policies of Hoover rather than trying to dissociate himself from them” (1991, 11). This study offers more credence to the thought that individual presidential candidates play a strong role in shaping realignment. The cementing reelections offer more evidence of the influence of individual candidates.

Secular Realignment

Especially in response to the lack of a critical elections realignment in the past forty years, scholars have attempted to discover other explanatory theories for realignment. This has resulted in greater support for Key’s (1959) “secular realignment” theory. Key offers a clear description of secular realignment as:

A secular shift in party attachment may be regarded as a movement of the members of a population category from party to party that extends over several presidential elections and appears to be independent of the peculiar factors influencing the vote at individual elections... A movement that extends over a half century is a more persuasive indication of the phenomenon in mind than is one that lasts less than a decade (1959, 199).

Ladd (1991) has argued that there has been too much emphasis on the theory of critical elections. He argues against the typical realignment theories and instead explains movement in the electorate as part of the party system. He explains changes over the past forty years not as a realignment, but just as small changes in the makeup of the electorate and the parties. Following the theory of realignment behavior through small changes, Byron Shafer (1991) believes that there has not been a classic realignment since 1932 in the way others have defined it, but that there have definitely been changes in the New Deal alignments. He explains these changes writing that: "Realignment would thus not be like a
weather forecast which confined itself to reporting either tornadoes or no tornadoes. Instead, periodicity-temporal regularity—would be added to the notion, with specifics deduced from the preceding historical pattern” (1991, 63). He argues that political scientists cannot expect a full-blown realignment every 32-36 years.

Ladd and Hadley (1978) also point to the patterns of critical elections as too neat and orderly. They argue that political scientists cannot expect that realignments will be the same each time. They especially look at the New Deal coalitions and the subsequent coalitional changes that took place from 1932-1976. Political scientists have often gotten caught up in the New Deal realignment of the 1930s as the best example of a full-blown realignment. Much of the reliance on this case also relates to the fact that election data began to be collected in the 1930s, making it the most easily studied historical realignment. Ladd and Hadley believe that we cannot assume that all realignments have a similar rhythm, or that one party will always become dominant. They argue that the American party system is constantly changing and realignments take place over extended periods of time.

The shift of partisanship is gradual but persistent over time, thus significant in its overall change. One aspect that is taken into account by many researchers (Sundquist 1983, Carmines and Stimson 1981, Petrocik 1981) has been the role of new voters to the electoral system. These new voters have provided a stimulus to the electoral process, many times to one specific party. Carmines and Stimson find that many voters are already entrenched, however, new voters are often brought into the party system during periods of secular realignment where new issues and the positions of the political parties influence new voters strongly. These new voters can often sway the balance of the parties.

Petrocik (1981) looks at the role of these new voters due to generational changes, immigration and suffrage. He specifically designates low electoral turnout as an important prealignment condition. Electoral growth in the early 1800s due to easier voting requirements expanded the number of possible voters. The size of the electorate grew notably prior to the 1860 realignment. Immigration greatly increased the number of voters preceding the 1890s realignment, and the New Deal realignment was preceded by the women’s suffrage and increased interest in voting by many groups within the electorate. Thus, social and procedural changes may be the principal explanations for realignments, and
"historical transformations of the party system appear to be a consequence of electoral growth" (1981, 158).

Carmines and Stimson (1989) consider mass changes in party alignment may occur over an ambiguous period of time making it difficult to determine when the critical election was; they dispute the critical election theory of Key (1955) and instead use Key's (1959) theory of secular realignment to offer a theory of issue evolution. The theory explains changes in electoral behavior using the evolution of new issues that stimulate partisan change and new members replacing old members of the electorate. Key (1959) writes that "the rise and fall of parties may to some degree be the consequence of trends that perhaps persist over decades, and elections may mark only steps in a more or less continuous creation of new loyalties and decay of old" (198).

Carmines and Stimson's theory of issue evolution suggests that new issues shape citizens' partisan identifications. The theory of issue evolution relies on the infusion of new issues into the party system to initiate permanent changes in mass partisanship. Carmines and Stimson specifically look at the evolution of racial desegregation, focusing on the changes in the South from an issue perspective. They believe that "issues can bring about significant political change by producing slow, steady shifts in the partisan complexion of the electorate. Through gradual replacement of the electorate, political issues have the capacity to stimulate processes that... form new party alignments and to build new party groups" (1991, 108).

Carmines and Stimson go on to argue that the realignment that was expected in the 1960s did occur, just in the form of issue evolution, rather than in a critical election format. They point to the 1964 election specifically as having a permanent impact on partisan identification, focusing on this year because of the racial divisions that developed between the two parties. The issue of civil rights became the most salient issue in 1964, resulting in a polarization of the voters and the parties on the issue.

While Carmines and Stimson's research is valuable, I believe they may have understated the possible role of presidents and presidential candidates during this period. Certainly Kennedy and Johnson's changes in the Democratic party's approach to civil rights were extremely important in reshaping the parties. Likewise, Barry Goldwater's ardent
conservatism on a number of issues, including segregation, was instrumental in defining the Republican party as socially conservative. The parties largely adopted their 1964 candidate’s policy positions on civil rights, polarizing party positions along the lines of their candidates. Through 1960 the Republican party was more racially liberal than the Democrats, then in 1964 the Republicans took a turn to the right. Carmines and Stimson’s research finds that voters first identifying themselves with the GOP in 1964 tend to be much more conservative than first identifiers from any other year. Further, they find that up to 1964 new members of the Republican party tended to be more liberal than Democrats on race. Clearly Goldwater's position on racial issues and the Vietnam War were extremely influential on voters. Thus, while Goldwater lost the presidential race badly, his position on social issues would begin to define the Republican party and lead to the shift in the South. The Democrats had a significant number of conservative members within its coalition; however, this group began to move to the Republican side. The issues are important, but it also important how presidential candidates respond to those issues.

Dealignment

Another theory of partisan change is dealignment, the movement away from the parties. From the period of 1964 to 1976 there was general dealignment in the electorate as fewer citizens considered themselves strong partisans. Party identification went from 75 percent to 63 percent (Norpoth and Rusk 1982). Many researchers (Norpoth and Rusk 1982, Sundquist 1983, Petrocik 1981, Wattenberg 1990, 1991) have looked at the widespread dealignment of voters since the 1960s. Dealignment has led to decreased party attachments and an increase in Independents. The partisan decline has resulted in an increase in split-ticket voting, and a greater reliance on candidate-perception for vote choice.

Kristi Andersen (1976) attributes the dealignment to a dissatisfaction with the parties. She concludes that non-partisans have traditionally been apathetic to the political process, however non-partisans in the 1960s and 1970s are largely “a more principled” group of Independents which actively reject the political parties (95). Wattenberg (1990)
finds evidence to the contrary, however, arguing that voters have become neutral toward the parties.

Following the New Deal era of greater partisan identification, party identification declined with the emergence of candidate-oriented media campaigns (Wattenberg 1991). With the emergence of television as well as many other changes in the political environment, the 1960s would bring a great change to American politics. There was a greater reliance on the media for exposure during electoral races. This dealignment created a "window of opportunity for realignment by mobilizing the unaligned" (Wattenberg 1991, 562). The process of dealignment has provided an even greater influence to individual candidates in a media-driven era of performance-based politics (1991).

**Presidential Effects**

Candidate-centered realignment theory is the basis for my hypothesis within this thesis. My research illustrates the causal relationship between candidates and durable partisan change. Political scientists have recognized the importance of candidate images for some time; however, they have not provided analysis of the role of candidates and their images in realignment. Typically candidate evaluations have been primarily seen as projections of partisan bias, rather than causes of partisan bias. Rahn et al. (1990) find that candidate images are extremely important in determining voter choice. Their model finds that the professional and personal qualities possessed by a presidential candidate play a central role in vote choice.

Unfortunately, much of the research on the impact of elite behavior in initiating realigning changes in the party system has focused on local elite, judicial or congressional behavior rather than on the presidential level. But certainly if elite behavior is important at these levels it is important at the presidential level. Several researchers have looked at the impact of candidates in a broad fashion, often using individual presidents to explain temporary changes in electoral behavior rather than citing presidential candidates as durable realigning forces. Angus Campbell (1971) terms these type of elections as "deviating elections." He cites Dwight Eisenhower's electoral success in 1952 and 1956 as important
examples. He points out that in 1952 the number of voters identifying themselves as Democrat outnumbered the Republicans three to two. However, Eisenhower was elected twice in landslides. In these two cases, certainly candidate attributes were more responsible than party identification in explaining election outcome. Eisenhower's victories in the 1950s were a response to the candidate "which had little policy content and did not set interest group against interest group, class against class, or region against region"(Campbell 1971, 108). Eisenhower was also able to capitalize on the growing television era, as "the Man from Abilene."

While Campbell looks at the importance of candidates in individual elections, he contends that it is national crises that lead to realignment. "It is significant that neither Lincoln, McKinley, nor F.D. Roosevelt was a military figure, and none of them possessed any extraordinary personal appeal at the time he first took office. The quality which did distinguish the elections in which they came to power was the presence of a great national crisis..."(1971, 119). Unfortunately Campbell has missed the crucial linkage: for a durable shift in partisanship to occur, substantial portions of the electorate must change the party that they identify with. They do not do this because of crisis, they do this in reaction to the government's response to the crisis, and the president is usually the policy-maker which determines the appropriate crisis response. Party identification does not fully change until after the realigning president is elected, thus the president may have a strong role in changing party identification and this is reflected in subsequent elections. This pattern supports the argument for a 1960s realignment in response to the social issues of the previous twenty years, with a culmination of realignment in 1980.

Key (1966) provides the concept of the electorate acting as an "echo chamber." According to Key, "The voice of the people is but an echo chamber. The output of an echo chamber bears an inevitable and invariable relation to the input"(2). Thus, it is not necessarily national crises or issues that the electorate is echoing; rather, they maybe reflecting perceptions of candidates. This is further evidence of the partisanship influence of presidential candidates. Secondly, the assumption that realignments are merely products of national crisis is quite lacking in explanation. 1860, 1896, 1932 are not the only elections which took place in the face of national crisis. Any election of the 1840s through 1860 was
marked by a time of national tension over issues dividing the North and South. Similarly the election of 1916 was decided in the face of possible participation in World War I, 1952 the Korean War.

Wattenberg's (1991) analysis of the president's role fully illustrates the symbolic position of the president as party leader, and the power possessed by a character that may be the center of the political world for 8 years. He points out that because so much power is vested in the president, “the personal attributes of the candidates are clearly relevant factors to be discussed in the campaign. Even before presidential actions had immediate world-wide consequences, personal behavior and characteristics were often an important consideration”(1991, 80-81). Wattenberg's conclusion is that party politics have become correlated with presidential politics. While the parties have lost power, the president has gained power. Since the 1960 election of John F. Kennedy, the political system can only be understood as a candidate-centered political system.

Rapoport (1997) provides valuable research in the area of candidate-centered research; his work is similar to mine. Rapoport’s model shows a correlation between presidential candidates and partisanship. He also develops a causal model that provides evidence of the individual-level effects of candidates on party identification. His findings suggest an important role for candidate images. He specifically looks at the presidential candidates of 1972: Nixon and McGovern. His research shows a clear long-term effect of presidential candidates—both winners and losers—on party identification (1997, 196).

My model of candidate-led realignment relies on a presidential influence model. The model of presidential influence is a two-step process. First, it is developed through popular appeal, personal attributes, and prestige. Presidents and candidates can develop presidential influence throughout the campaign process, however candidates who ascend to the presidency have access to greater influence due to the extended public attention. Second, presidential influence can then be used to bring about durable changes in the party system through policy initiatives and response to crisis cementing their influence on the system. If these changes are strong enough they may initiate a realignment period, thus perceptions of presidential candidates will carry over to subsequent electoral decisions. Therefore, within this model candidates can bring about small changes to the party system, however
candidates who become president exert a greater influence. Moderate presidents may bring small changes to the system while influential presidents can bring durable, long-term change to the system reshaping the parties. Thus, candidates’ influence is important but limited, while presidential influence is more extensive and permanent.
CHAPTER 3

RECENT REALIGNMENT FEATURES

There is a lack of scholarly consensus on the changes in partisanship that took place in the 1960-1980 period. The panel study looks at the years 1965-1982, thus I am very interested in changes during this period. Political scientists have been searching for a realignment for the past 40 years. While research on the topic has increased greatly, agreement on the subject has certainly not. Many researchers have supported new realignment theories in response to the inconsistency of the 1960s and 1970s. This shows another limitation of realignment research: it depends on a historical perspective. It is difficult to define an election or election period as a realignment until well after the fact. For instance, several researchers (Miller and Shanks 1996, Petrocik 1987, Wattenberg 1990, Norpoth 1987, Sundquist 1983) termed the 1980 election as a realigning election. In many ways my study cannot directly test realignment in 1980, however, what the model does do is attempt to show the causal relationship between candidates and mass partisanship. This connection can then be used to draw conclusions regarding realignment.

I have largely discussed the role of popular presidential candidates, however the negative effects of candidates may also be durable. Those who fail to find a realignment in 1964 continue to be baffled because the electorate was "ripe for realignment" (Beck 1974). Also, the 1964 election produced a landslide victory of historic proportions for the Democratic party, but the election which produced such a strong mandate for the Democratic party was unsustained. By 1968 the Democrats were out of power in the White House, and in 1972 were handily defeated by the Republicans. I believe we can partly explain the failure of the Democratic party to wrap the electorate up into a solid, stable coalition of support by pointing the finger at Lyndon Johnson. As president, Johnson alienated voters, lied about the war and was a generally unpopular figure by the 1968 election.
Many researchers believe it is quite possible that the 1980 Reagan-Carter election did mark a realignment period; however, researchers have had a hard time confidently demonstrating that a realignment did actually occur. Most of the proponents of 1980 realignment argue that the changes in the coalitions of the parties during the period of the 1960-1980 changed the party's fundamental support groups. According to these researchers a realignment period may have begun in the 1960s followed by a period of dealignment, with increases of Independents (Sundquist 1983, Petrocik 1987). It appears, however, that changes in the coalitions of the parties took place in the 1960s, but they did not lead to a dominant party shift until 1980, when a period of Republican dominance was initiated. At the voter level, this is due to coalitional shifts and a move of the electorate toward a more conservative ideology, with the Republican party becoming more conservative and the Democrats becoming more liberal.

Coalition Shifts

As realignment research has developed, political scientists have turned to a more developed realignment theory looking at the movement of coalitions within the parties. Similar to the work of Carmines and Stimson on issue evolution, many researchers (Burnham 1991, Sundquist 1983, Norpoth and Rusk 1982, Petrocik 1987) believe realignments are a result of the emergence of new issues about which the electorate has intense feelings that cut across existing coalitions of party support. These issues are often a result of economic or social conditions that lead to fundamental changes in the party system. The changes may result in a reduction of the majority party's dominant position. Therefore, for a realignment to occur it does not necessarily depend on one party replacing the dominance of another party.

One of the greatest reasons for the changes of the 1960s and 1970s were regional changes in the coalitions that FDR united together for the Democratic base. Regionalism is a strong determinant of party identification (Key 1955, Petrocik 1987, Miller and Shanks 1996, Sundquist 1983). Similarly, like the crucial shift from Republican to Democrat in the Northeast during the 1920s and 1930s that strengthened the New Deal coalition, the South
played a key role in party changes in the 1960s and 1970s. Looking at the coalitional makeup of the parties from 1960-1980, the Democratic and Republican coalitions changed drastically, the social bases that developed by 1980 were completely different than what they were pre-1960. Southern realignment is the greatest reason for the change, but other groups also switched their allegiances.

The South, a Democratic stronghold since the Civil War, began to realign in the 1960s. Petrocik (1987) and Miller (1991) point out that changes to the electorate would not have been nearly as dramatic had it not been for the South. Support for this contention comes from Stanley and Niemi (1991), who analyze individual partisanship of group members and find that a 1960s realignment occurred centering around race and the South. When Southern Democrat Lyndon Johnson passed the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1965 Voting Rights Act, the Democratic party began to lose its hold on the white South (Carmines and Stimson 1981, Sundquist 1983).

With the move toward a more polarized party system, Southerners moved to the Republican party in a massive switch of at least 3 out of every 10 Southern nonblack male voters (Miller 1991). Petrocik (1987) looks at how realignment affected both Southern blacks and non-blacks, just in opposite directions. Without the growth of Democratic strength among blacks the Republicans would have taken a plurality of the voters in the 1960s. Not taking into account the black vote or migration, there was a 36 point shift in the South toward the Republican party (Petrocik). There was also a move of Northern whites toward the Republican party in the 1960s and 1970s. Miller (1991) observes that the North showed no significant changes in party identification until 1980 when whites in the Midwest and Northeast turned toward the Republican party.

The Republicans lost many liberal members in response to civil rights, however this ideological shift was not as great a loss to the Republicans as the loss of conservatives was to the Democrats. The shift in racial positions along with the ideological shift would reshape the party coalitions. Petrocik (1987) finds that the changes of the 1960s had completely polarized the parties by the 1984 election, when the parties had become distinctly opposed on welfare questions and policy differences had taken on a strong racial
dimension. Thus, Goldwater not only changed the Republican party in 1964, his leadership would provide a sustained change in the party.

The social changes of the 1960s and 1970s led to a Republican party that in 1980 represented the New Right (Sundquist 1983). The "New Right" is composed of groups responding to the moral and social issue changes of the sixties but did not fully organize into a social force until the 1976 election. Made up of white lower-middle class, anti-abortionists, and religious revivalists, they found a home with the conservative Republican party. While the Republican party was split in 1976 between Ford and Reagan, the Republican party united for the 1980 election and Reagan, the perfect candidate for the New Right, won the election ushering in the Republican realignment. The New Right was big part of the victory as the Republicans were able to shift the direction of anger of the middle class from the rich to the poor for the first time since the Depression-era. Shafer (1991) focuses on how Democratic party elites and Republican party elites reshaped their policy positions. Democratic elites increasingly supported progressive stances on cultural values and accommodation of foreign policy. Republican elites adopted a traditionalist stance on cultural values and a nationalistic foreign policy preference.

The Republicans finally succeeded in 1980 in unraveling the "political class coalition that Franklin Roosevelt had put together in 1934" (Sundquist 1983, 424). Just as the Great Depression and the subsequent New Deal changed the faces of the parties in the 1930s, so did many of the social economic conditions throughout the 1960s and 1970s. The change in party clienteles resulted in a "changed policy outlook of the parties so as to accord with the demands of the newly dominant groups within the respective party coalitions" (Norpoth 1987, 378). With the realignment of New Deal coalitions, the parties changed their ideological makeup. The 1960s saw a great change in the way that the American public viewed the parties (Miller and Shanks 1996, Wattenberg 1990). Democrats became synonymous with liberalism and the Republican party with conservatism. My model attempts to show that the presidential candidates were instrumental in these groups switching parties.

The literature discussed in this chapter provides an overview of realignment processes and causes. In the next chapter, I set up a model to measure the effects of
different realignment causes. I am attempting to show that presidential candidates are one of the causes of realignment. Relying on a issues model similar to Niemi and Jennings (1991), I compare issue causes with a model containing candidate evaluations and the issues. My hypothesis is that the candidate-issues model will prove more complete in its effects on party identification.
CHAPTER 4

DATA AND METHODS

In chapter 4, I provide a description of the data set and discuss the methods used in developing different models of study. Chapter 4 provides a series of tables depicting voting behavior within the sample which provides a better understanding of the respondents’ attitudes. I then discuss the correlations between issues, candidates and party identification. The data used in this analysis of partisan change comes from the “The Youth-Parent Socialization Panel Study” conducted by M. Kent Jennings, Richard Niemi, and Greg Markus. The researchers surveyed high school seniors and their parents beginning in 1965. The panel study was conducted over a seventeen year period and includes three waves of surveys: 1965, 1973, and 1982. Remarkably, the retention rates were exceptionally high for a panel study covering such a long span of time. Even in comparison with shorter panel studies the retention rate remains high, thus data bias as a result of panel mortality was minimal (Jennings and Markus 1984). “The Youth-Parent Socialization Panel Study” was chosen as the data set for this research effort for several reasons. The panel study provides 17 year longitudinal study that captures the political attitudes of the same group over critical period in their political development. What has largely been lacking in previous realignment research has been individual-level data covering a significant portion of life. This panel study is extremely useful because it provides an opportunity to analyze partisanship, electoral choice, and candidate evaluations by the same group of people over a 17 year period.

While panel mortality is low, it does affect the size of the data set. There are more respondents for the early waves which dropped out of the study later on. Because my

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5 Data for this research endeavor were conducted by M. Kent Jennings, Gregory B. Markus, and Richard G. Niemi. The Youth-Parent Socialization Panel Study, 1965-1982: Wave III. Conducted by University of Michigan, Center for Political Studies/ Survey Research Center. 3rd ICPSR Ed. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research [Producer and Distributor], 1991. I also used the 2nd edition of the data set: 1965-1973, conducted by Jennings and Niemi.
interest is in the effects of candidate-centered politics on individual-level dynamics, I have removed the data for those respondents who did not complete the panel, and relied only on the set of respondents who completed all three waves of the study. Also, because my primary interest is with candidate effects on individuals, I relied primarily on offspring data. Earlier research suggests the strong level of political attitude development during this life period. According to Beck (1974), the period of greatest partisan development occurs between the ages of 18 and 30. The panel study captures that age group rather closely with respondents in the last wave in between the ages of 33-36 (Rapoport 1997). The parental data for 1965 was collected to set a baseline influence on offspring partisanship; however, I do not take the analysis of parents any further. The expectation of studying the younger generation is that it will yield insight into the effects of presidential candidates on partisanship. My hypothesis is that presidential candidates will have a significant impact on party identification. Researchers have found that the younger generation has increasingly identified with the Republicans in the 1980s (Norpoth 1987, Miller and Shanks 1996).

Because I wanted to rely heavily on partisan influences, and initial influence of parent party identification on student partisanship, I merged the data so that students and their parents could be matched. The merged data allowed setting a baseline influence on partisan identification for offspring in 1965, based on their parent's party identification in 1965. Parental influence is not only a 1965 effect, but is an even greater measure of the influence of pre-adult socialization throughout the offspring's life. Thus, the parental influence was important before 1965 and continues to be important after 1965. However, because the offspring are moving out of their homes, and thus away from the direct influence of their parents, the 1965 partisanship is the height of their direct influence. For this reason I keep the parental influence measure as their 1965 partisanship throughout the study rather than using their developing party identification in the subsequent waves of the panel study. Party identification is coded 0-6, respondents were asked to rate themselves on a continuum as a Republican, Democrat, or Independent.

6The match was identified by using the file numbers of the student respondents and their parent's matching file number. I am grateful to Richard Niemi for explaining this process.
7The seven point scale is constructed as 0=strong Democrat, 1=weak Democrat, 2=independent-Democrat, 3=pure independent, 4=independent-Republican, 5=weak Republican, 6=strong Republican.
I set up two models. The first model is similar to the Niemi and Jennings (1991) issues regression model analyzing the effects of individual issues in party identification. Their research largely supports the issues-explanation for party identification. My issues model proves similar to Niemi and Jennings in finding that issues are important; however, my hypothesis is that while issues are important, they don't complete the partisanship explanation. My second model includes the influence of individual presidential candidates on party identification. This model simply builds on the first model, combining feeling thermometers of presidential candidates with the issues of the first model.

To provide a starting point for analysis, Table 1 presents the distribution of party identification over the three waves of the study. Party identification is set on a seven-point scale showing how individuals rated themselves in 1965, 1973, 1982. The data from this table are extremely telling in relation to the candidate hypothesis. The mean party identification moves from an average of 2.47 in 1965 to 2.59 in 1973. This movement toward the Republicans continues again in 1982 when the mean moves to 2.80. This follows closely the expectation of individual candidate effects. In 1973 Nixon had just received a landslide victory in the 1972 election and Watergate had yet to topple his popularity. In 1982 in the midst of Reagan's first term in office, the mean party identification goes up again. While many were happy with how Reagan was handling the issues at the time of the third wave interviews, his presidential popularity had slipped 5% (Rapoport 1997).

Also seen in the Table 1 data is the substantial drop in the percentage of strong partisans from 1965 to 1973. Some of this movement in partisanship can be explained by the dealignment in the 1960s and 1970s (Carmines and Stimson 1991). From 1965 to 1982 those respondents rating themselves as strong Democrats went from 17.1% to 8.3% while the percentage of strong Republican respondents also decreased marginally from 8.1% to 7%. Thus we can conclude that not only did dealignment hurt Republicans less, but stronger Republican candidates at the time of the panel study interviews may have helped deflect the effects of dealignment on the Republican party.

8 My candidate model is similar to the model created by Ronald Rapoport in a 1997 article: "Partisanship Change in a Candidate-Centered Era." My Candidate-Issues model produces different coefficients, partly due to the fact that he includes several different issue variables. His decision to use pairwise deletion leads to a different N for his model. While his model does contain different variables, he comes to similar conclusions as I do with my model.
Table 1
Distribution of Party Identification of Students

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1965</th>
<th>1973</th>
<th>1982</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strong Democrat</td>
<td>17.1%</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak Democrat</td>
<td>23.9%</td>
<td>25.7%</td>
<td>24.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Democrat</td>
<td>15.3%</td>
<td>16.0%</td>
<td>16.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent-Independent</td>
<td>12.6%</td>
<td>18.9%</td>
<td>12.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Republican</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
<td>12.3%</td>
<td>15.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak Republican</td>
<td>14.2%</td>
<td>12.7%</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong Republican</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mean        2.47*  2.59  2.80
Median      2       2     3
N           1123   1126  1089

* Party id measured on a 0-6 scale. 0=Strong Democrat, 6=Strong Republican. The mean of 2.47 reveals that respondents were in between Independent Democrat and Independent-Independent. Missing data is coded out of data in each year. Missing data for 1965=267, 1973=264, 1982=301.

If we combine the party ratings together, lumping strong, weak, and independent-leaning partisans together, the results again show a move away from the Democrats toward the Republicans. Democrats (including leaners) comprise 56.3% of the sample in 1965, but that number is down to 49.0% in 1982. Conversely, the Republicans move from 31.1% in 1965 to 38.8% in 1982. This movement is highly suggestive of the influence of strong candidates. It appears that most of the shift in partisanship occurred from independents becoming more Republican in response to several factors, including the strong candidacy of Reagan. The loss of support for the Democrats occurs primarily from 1965 to 1973 during a period of poor Democratic candidates and dealignment. However, the Republican base only marginally decreases from 1965 to 1973, moving from 31.1% to 30.3%. In 1973, young adults moved toward the middle, due in part to the lack of favorable candidate
choices.\textsuperscript{9} The number of independents increases from 12.6\% to 18.9\% from 1965 to 1973. The 1982 statistics show the shift of Republican supporters from 30.3\% to 38.8\% while the Democratic numbers stay essentially the same.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Combined Distribution of Party Identification of Students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=1123 for 1965, N=1126 for 1973, N=1089 for 1982. Responses coded as 0-2 were combined as Democrat; 3 coded as Independent; 4-6 coded as Republican.

A cross-tabulation of vote choice over the different levels of party identification yields interesting results. An examination of the vote choices of students from 1964-1980 points to a general shift toward the Republicans and a tendency for strong Republican support in the two years of dominating Republican personalities: 1972 and 1980. This point is important for the overall study, because of the placement of panel surveys immediately following these elections. Thus, we have the candidate feeling thermometers for these important elections, but we cannot compare these feeling thermometers with other elections involving less influential candidates, namely 1968 and 1976. Table 3 clearly shows a shift in the vote choice following the 1964 election. This lends credence to those researchers that support the hypothesis that a realignment occurred in the 1960s. Either way, Republican voting greatly increased following the 1964 Democratic landslide.

Republican voting preference is only 53\% for both weak Republicans and

\textsuperscript{9} According to data from a CBS Election Day Survey in 1972, 54\% of college students aged eighteen to twenty-four supported McGovern, a full 16\% higher than the general public (Ladd and Hadley 1978). However, survey data from presidential elections from 1952 through 1980 show that typically the youth vote for the Democratic nominee was consistently higher than the nominee’s overall vote percentage (Bass 1998, 251). CPS data for 1972 show Nixon with a 55\%-45\% advantage over McGovern among 22-29 year olds (Rapoport 1997, 193).
Republican leaners in 1964.\textsuperscript{10} This is extremely low if one looks at the Democratic numbers in any losing election, even 1980. The second point that is observed from Table 3, is that in the two candidate-centered elections of 1972 and 1980, all Republican-associated voters are particularly supportive of Republican candidates, with all of the voting percentages near or above 90%. Republican candidates also captured nearly 70% of the Independents in these elections. The measure of total Republican vote percentage for each election is particularly telling about the sample. Vote choice within the sample intensifies the direction of the general electorate. The sample moves disproportionately toward the winning candidate in each election in comparison with the general electorate.\textsuperscript{11}

Table 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strong Democrat</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak Democrat</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Democrat</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent-Independent</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Republican</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak Republican</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong Republican</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Republican Vote</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For 1964 election the party id and electoral choice is based off responses in the 1965 survey. Vote choice in 1964 relies on vote preference; the party id and electoral choice for the 1968 and 1972 elections is based off responses in the 1973 survey; the party id and electoral choice for the 1976 and 1980 elections is based off responses in the 1982 survey.


Only Republican and Democratic votes are included. Therefore, a larger sample of the vote is removed in 1968 and 1980 due to the effects of third party candidates George Wallace and John Anderson.

\textsuperscript{10} The 1964 measure of vote choice was based on the 1965 survey question: “If you had been old enough to vote in the election last year between Goldwater and Johnson, who would you have voted for?”

\textsuperscript{11} Bibby (1992) examines two party vote choice in the general electorate, his numbers indicate the following Republican voting percentages: 1964=39\%, 1968=43\%, 1972=61\%, 1976=48\%, 1980=51\%.
Parent's party identification in 1965 serves as baseline influence on offspring partisanship. Niemi and Jennings (1991) contend that adolescents enter young adulthood with a degree of inherited partisanship, and it is most evident at the last stage in life when parent and offspring reside together. High school seniors were only about 10 percent less partisan than their parents in the first wave (Jennings and Niemi, 1968). Beck’s (1974) research on the topic of political socialization is particularly useful in interpreting this data set. Beck contends that the socializing effects of parental partisanship on children’s party identification are strongest prior to the transition years between childhood and full adulthood. Following this break the parental link is weakened and issues become more salient in shaping partisanship (see also Niemi and Jennings 1991). However, Beck does point out that the socialization of the preadult years continues to play a reinforcing role throughout adulthood. Therefore parent’s party identification in 1965 provides an excellent measure of partisanship effects because of its continuing influence throughout life.

In addition to parent’s party identification, Niemi and Jennings include issue questions and a measure of ideology. Not all of these variables were asked during the first wave in 1965. However, two variables, school prayer and integration of schools, were asked in all three waves of data. The school prayer variable is a response to the question as to whether school should begin the day with prayer. I eliminated the missing data and

12 This is another area where my model is set up much differently than Rapoport. His model uses the offspring party identification in 1965 as a baseline effect. I on the other hand, use parental party identification in 1965 as a baseline partisanship influence. He provides insight into why he chose this direction with his research: “Although the data set used here clearly allows me to control for parental partisanship as well as respondent’s 1965 partisanship, I have not done so... I am looking at a different theoretical problem: how partisanship changes over time. For that purpose, the crucial baseline control is 1965 partisanship, and parental partisanship is not an appropriate control. I did, however, rerun my analysis with parental partisanship included. The results showed very little difference.” (1997, 1989-190). Rapoport’s logic seems flawed, here he states that his theoretical problem is different, that he is looking at how partisanship changes over time, but partisanship changes because of influences. These influences can be a number of things: issues, candidates, parental influence. By including parental partisanship, I can more accurately sort out the effects of these influences.

13 The parent’s partisanship was available for each of the other waves. If, as Beck contends, parental influence is only salient through childhood, the parent’s influence is best measured as the effect of the last period of childhood in 1965.

14 School Prayers Variable: “Some people think that it is all right for the public schools to start each day with a prayer. Others feel that religion does not belong in the public schools but should be taken care of by the family and the church. Have you been interested enough in this to favor one side over the other? (If yes) Which do you think -schools should be allowed to start each day with a prayer (scored 5) or religion does not belong in the schools (scored 1)?” Intermediate responses (volunteered) were scored 3. Intermediate responses were removed from the data set.
recoded school prayer as 0=no, 1=yes. The school integration variable from 1965 was similarly coded. Respondents were asked if they thought that the federal government should integrate schools; this was coded as 0=no, 1=yes.15

Table 4 provides a correlation matrix of the variables in 1965. Not surprisingly, the relationship between parent party id and student party id in 1965 is the strongest correlation between variables. There is also a significant relationship between student party identification and school integration. Students who are more Democratic are more in favor of school integration. The issue of school prayer is unrelated to party id in 1965.

Table 4
Correlation Matrix of 1965 Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1965 Party Id</th>
<th>Par PID</th>
<th>Schl PID</th>
<th>Pray</th>
<th>Sch Integration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1965 Party Id</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.615**</td>
<td>.026</td>
<td>-.161**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1123</td>
<td>901</td>
<td>934</td>
<td>935</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parent PID</td>
<td>.615**</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.017</td>
<td>-.042</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>901</td>
<td>1161</td>
<td>752</td>
<td>759</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School Prayer</td>
<td>.026</td>
<td>.017</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>-.109**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>934</td>
<td>752</td>
<td>944</td>
<td>801</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gov Int School</td>
<td>-.161**</td>
<td>-.042</td>
<td>-.109**</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>935</td>
<td>759</td>
<td>801</td>
<td>945</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

The 1973 survey added a series of new issue questions to the panel study. Continuing to follow the direction of the Niemi-Jennings issues model, I added two new variables to the 1973 model: liberal-conservative ratings and respondent's opinion on the

School Integration variable: "Some people say that the government in Washington should see to it that white and black [Negro in 1965] children are allowed to go to the same schools. Others claim that this is not the government's business. Have you been concerned enough about this question to favor one side over the other? (If yes) Do you think the government in Washington should see to it that white and black children go to the same schools (1) or stay out of this area as it is none of its business (5):" The "depends" responses volunteered by some respondents were removed from the data set.
Vietnam War. The question of Vietnam was recoded into yet another dummy variable, with 0=no and 1=yes. The liberal/conservative scale tests the self-placement of respondents on a 7 point scale with 0=strong liberal, 3=moderate and 6=strong conservative. The 1973 survey was also the first wave to ask respondents to evaluate the presidential candidates. Both of the candidate thermometers were based on a 0-100 scale, 0=strongly dislike, 100=strongly like.

Expectations are based on the results of the Niemi and Jennings (1991) findings. Parent’s party identification should drop in significance with this wave. The ideological scale should prove significant on all issues and work as direct barometer toward the candidates and the parties. As the 1970s moved on the parties became more ideologically polarized, and the panel should highlight this. The Vietnam question was not strongly tied into either party as the war began in the 1960s, however by the 1970s the issue has taken on a more partisan flavor. This is particularly seen in the positions of the candidates, as McGovern clearly becomes the anti-war candidate.

The correlations for 1973 are displayed in Table 5. The parental party identification influence on offspring party id continues to be significant, however its strength decreases from .615 to .397. The lack of correlation between parental party identification and the issues is particularly surprising. This suggests that the offspring’s issue attitudes have been formed independent of their parents and their positions on key social issues are not influenced by their parents in any consistent way.

The school prayer variable becomes significantly correlated with almost every other variable. This may be because the school prayer issue becomes more of a partisan question by 1973. The correlation between school prayer and government integration moves from -.109 to -.181, as the two issues become more tied to one another. Not surprisingly, the addition of Vietnam and the liberal/conservative scale prove significant as well. The early

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16 Vietnam variable: [Slightly different introductions were used in 1973 and 1982.] “Do you think we did the right thing in getting into the fighting in Vietnam (1) or should we have stayed out (5)?” Intermediate responses (volunteered) scored 3. I coded out the intermediate answers which only accounted for a minimal number of responses.

17 The liberal/conservative self-placement (1-7) was the standard CPS item. The liberal/conservative scale was recoded from 1-7 to 0-6.
1970s continue to reflect much of the turmoil of the time: the Vietnam War, the civil rights movement, and a number of other social changes in society.

Table 5

Correlation Matrix of 1973 Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1973 Par</th>
<th>PID</th>
<th>Sch Pray</th>
<th>Int Schl</th>
<th>Ideol Scale</th>
<th>Viet</th>
<th>McGo</th>
<th>Nixon</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1973 PID</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.397**</td>
<td>-.160**</td>
<td>.334**</td>
<td>.127**</td>
<td>.131**</td>
<td>.434**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1126</td>
<td>905</td>
<td>953</td>
<td>881</td>
<td>973</td>
<td>1030</td>
<td>960</td>
<td>960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parent PID</td>
<td>.397**</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>-.003</td>
<td>-.035</td>
<td>.054</td>
<td>-.049</td>
<td>.046</td>
<td>.092*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>905</td>
<td>1161</td>
<td>770</td>
<td>722</td>
<td>791</td>
<td>829</td>
<td>771</td>
<td>771</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School Prayer</td>
<td>.104**</td>
<td>-.003</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>-.181**</td>
<td>.278**</td>
<td>.168**</td>
<td>.108**</td>
<td>.261**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>953</td>
<td>770</td>
<td>961</td>
<td>764</td>
<td>824</td>
<td>885</td>
<td>810</td>
<td>810</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gov Int School</td>
<td>-.160**</td>
<td>-.035</td>
<td>-.181**</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>-.248**</td>
<td>-.048</td>
<td>-.109**</td>
<td>-.228**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>881</td>
<td>722</td>
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<td>888</td>
<td>767</td>
<td>818</td>
<td>746</td>
<td>746</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lib/Con Scale</td>
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<td>.054</td>
<td>.278**</td>
<td>-.248**</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.216**</td>
<td>.122**</td>
<td>.457**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>973</td>
<td>791</td>
<td>824</td>
<td>767</td>
<td>978</td>
<td>906</td>
<td>845</td>
<td>845</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>.127**</td>
<td>-.049</td>
<td>.168**</td>
<td>-.048</td>
<td>.216**</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.126**</td>
<td>.315**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
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<td>829</td>
<td>885</td>
<td>818</td>
<td>906</td>
<td>1036</td>
<td>881</td>
<td>881</td>
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<tr>
<td>McGovern</td>
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<td>.046</td>
<td>.108**</td>
<td>-.109**</td>
<td>.122**</td>
<td>.126**</td>
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<td>.373**</td>
</tr>
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<td>771</td>
<td>810</td>
<td>746</td>
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<td>881</td>
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<td>964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nixon</td>
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<td>.092*</td>
<td>.261**</td>
<td>-.228**</td>
<td>.457**</td>
<td>.315**</td>
<td>.373**</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>960</td>
<td>771</td>
<td>810</td>
<td>746</td>
<td>845</td>
<td>881</td>
<td>964</td>
<td>964</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Table 6

Correlation Matrix of 1982 Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1982 Party Id</th>
<th>Par PID</th>
<th>Schl Pray</th>
<th>Int Schl</th>
<th>Ideol Scale</th>
<th>Viet</th>
<th>Carter</th>
<th>Reagan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1982 Party Id</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.381**</td>
<td>.130**</td>
<td>-.306**</td>
<td>.496**</td>
<td>.181**</td>
<td>-.305**</td>
<td>.520**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
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<td>874</td>
<td>887</td>
<td>769</td>
<td>960</td>
<td>965</td>
<td>1087</td>
<td>1086</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parent PID</td>
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<td>1.000</td>
<td>-.056</td>
<td>-.092*</td>
<td>.136**</td>
<td>-.021</td>
<td>-.127**</td>
<td>.147**</td>
</tr>
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<td>N</td>
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<td>1161</td>
<td>736</td>
<td>644</td>
<td>786</td>
<td>810</td>
<td>906</td>
<td>907</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School Prayer</td>
<td>.130**</td>
<td>.381**</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>-.120**</td>
<td>.259**</td>
<td>.133**</td>
<td>.083*</td>
<td>.212**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>887</td>
<td>736</td>
<td>919</td>
<td>679</td>
<td>792</td>
<td>820</td>
<td>916</td>
<td>915</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gov Int School</td>
<td>-.306**</td>
<td>-.092**</td>
<td>-.120**</td>
<td>-.099**</td>
<td>-.310**</td>
<td>-.099</td>
<td></td>
<td>.173**</td>
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<td>N</td>
<td>769</td>
<td>644</td>
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<td>798</td>
<td>792</td>
<td>724</td>
<td>796</td>
<td>796</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lib/Con Scale</td>
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<td>.136**</td>
<td>.259**</td>
<td>-.310**</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.187**</td>
<td>-.199**</td>
<td>.480**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
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<td>786</td>
<td>792</td>
<td>698</td>
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<td>876</td>
<td>975</td>
<td>975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>.181**</td>
<td>-.021</td>
<td>.133**</td>
<td>-.099**</td>
<td>.187**</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.011</td>
<td>.253**</td>
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<tr>
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<td>810</td>
<td>820</td>
<td>724</td>
<td>876</td>
<td>1002</td>
<td>999</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carter</td>
<td>-.305**</td>
<td>-.127**</td>
<td>.083*</td>
<td>.173**</td>
<td>-.199**</td>
<td>.011</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>-.046</td>
</tr>
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<td>999</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reagan</td>
<td>.520**</td>
<td>.147**</td>
<td>.212**</td>
<td>-.196**</td>
<td>.480**</td>
<td>.253**</td>
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<td>975</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>1129</td>
<td>1131</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

The candidate evaluations for the 1972 election also show a strong correlation with the issues on every variable except parental party identification. Parental party identification only shows a significance for Nixon at the 0.05 level.\textsuperscript{18} As expected the 1972 candidate evaluations are very different on the liberal/conservative scale. While it was expected that

\textsuperscript{18} I ran a second correlation using a difference variable to capture the effects of Nixon and McGovern together. The significance of this variable was well below the two individual candidate thermometers in 1973. The difference variable was created by taking difference between the Nixon and McGovern variables. However, this is not the case with the 1982 survey data. The 1980 election difference variable for the candidates does show a stronger relationship than in 1972. However, the effects of the individual candidates continues to show a much more significant effect on the model.
Nixon would provide a high correlation because of the increasing conservatism of the Republican party, McGovern was expected to have a negative correlation with the ideology scale. However, this is not the case as McGovern’s ideology correlation is .122 meaning that he did receive support from conservative portions of the electorate. As respondents became more conservative they gave him greater support. The correlation between the candidates is .373, once again with the opposite sign than what I expected.

Expectations for the 1982 correlations are similar to the 1973 data with the exception of the liberal/conservative scale, where I expect a greater polarization of the issues and parties. I also expect that the influence of parent’s party identification will continue at the same levels as before similar to Niemi and Jennings (1991) findings.

The 1982 candidate correlation matrix displayed in Table 6 shows the electorate's polarization following the 1980 election. In 1972 the electorate perceived large differences in the issue positions of the two candidates, yet their general differences were more a product of their personal appeal than issue stands (see Table 7). The 1980 candidates’ correlation with one another is not significant; this is a deviation from the results of the 1972 candidates which showed a significant positive correlation between Nixon and McGovern. However, while ratings of the two candidates were not correlated with one another, their relationships to the ideological scale are much more split. Unlike the McGovern results in the 1973, Carter’s position on the scale is negatively correlated with ideology, meaning that Carter was viewed more favorably by liberals than McGovern had been in 1973. This switch in the correlation’s sign is congruent with many of the other variables. The correlation between Carter and school integration becomes positive at .173, however McGovern’s correlation with school integration is -.109. The issue has become more tied in with the parties. A final observation on the candidates, in 1973 and 1982 all relationships between the candidates and Vietnam are significant except Carter. In all likelihood there is no relationship due to his service in the Navy and the continued military buildup throughout his administration, even while his party became increasingly liberal on military affairs.

Interestingly, the 1965 parent party identification variable, which had been...
insignificant in 1965 and 1973 on the issues, develops a much greater significance on the issues in 1982. Parent’s partisanship has a significant correlation with every variable except Vietnam. This is a stark difference from 1973 when parent’s partisanship is only significantly correlated with student party identification. This is very surprising considering that research has shown a leveling off of influence for parents as their offspring become adults (Beck 1974, Niemi and Jennings 1991). Yet the correlations in column 2 of Tables 5 and 6 clearly point to an increasing correlation of student’s attitudes with their parents in 1982.

By 1982 the issue positions have become much more tied to the parties than they were in 1973 or 1965. By 1982 the issue of school integration is no longer just a civil rights issues but has presumably become an ideological question on the powers of the federal government as well. Thus, school integration’s correlation with ideology intensifies. This trend is seen with almost every variable along the liberal/conservative scale (column 5). School prayer has also become an important party issue by 1982. It is insignificant in 1965, presumably due to its lack of ideological content at the time, along with little discussion of the issue from the candidates. However, by 1973 it is significantly correlated with most variables but the biggest changes occurs from 1973 to 1982 in the correlation of parent’s partisanship and school prayer. The correlation moves from an insignificant -.003 to .381.

Assessing the changes that occur in the correlations over the span of the panel, it is evident that both parties’ positions on the issues changed from 1965 to 1982. A clear distinction between the Democrats and Republicans begins to emerge on the issues and ideology by 1982. This suggests that a secular realignment occurred during this period. As a result of the changing parties’ positions, the party coalitions shifted. Some groups switched parties, while other groups increased their party allegiances. This was especially evident in the South which responded to the issues of civil rights. White, conservative Democrats in South increasingly supported the Republicans in national elections.

In Table 7 the candidate thermometer ratings are examined. The evaluations provide interesting comparisons between the presidential candidates for 1972 and 1980. The difference for candidate evaluations for 1972 is especially wide. Unfortunately for McGovern, Nixon possessed a greater status in the minds of voters in 1972 with a mean
candidate evaluation of 56 and an evaluation over 60 from 42% of the sample. Conversely, McGovern received an abysmally low mean of 21 and the percentage of respondents who rated him higher than 60 was only 5%. Respondents in 1982 gave Reagan almost identical mean responses to Nixon in the 1973 survey. The difference between Carter and Reagan in overall mean is small, however favorable ratings over 60 for the two candidates clearly separate their popularity with the sample. Reagan’s percentage of favorable ratings is double that of Carter.

Table 7
Means of Candidate Thermometer Ratings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1972 Candidates</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>Stan Dev.</th>
<th>*Favorable Rating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>McGovern</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nixon</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1980 Candidates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Carter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reagan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Favorable rating included any rating over 60. Ratings given on a 0-100 scale.

The measures of standard deviation provide an interesting comparison between Carter and Reagan. Carter’s relatively low standard deviation is evidence of a lack of strong opinions toward him. On the other hand perceptions of Reagan are stronger both positive and negative. This follows the research of Wattenberg (1991) which contends that voters were polarized in their opinion of Reagan: those who liked him evaluated him extremely high, but his low evaluations were extremely low. The lower evaluations decrease his mean but his percentage of favorable responses is particularly high considering the relative competitiveness of the 1980 election. On the other hand, Carter’s evaluations are centered around the 50 mark, showing a general lack of strong opinions on Carter in either direction.
CHAPTER 5
MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS

Up to this point, I have primarily investigated the individual variables and their bivariate relationships with student party identification and one another. In chapter 5, I turn to multivariate models to determine the causal relationship between party identification and the issues. I begin by replicating the Niemi and Jennings (1991) regression model looking at individual issue influence, then I develop a candidate-issue regression model to fully investigate the effects of presidential candidates on long term party identification. Finally, I discuss the results of the issue-candidate model and the implications for realignment.

The first model (Table 8) is based on the Niemi-Jennings issue model for the same panel data set. Following Niemi and Jennings (1991), I set the baseline influence on party identification as the 1965 parent party id. As expected, offspring party identification is strongly connected to parent's party identification and is significant in all three waves. Parental influence also drops off in effect in the second wave and then flattens out in effect from 1973 to 1982. This follows the findings of Niemi and Jennings.

School integration also proves to be a significant issue. Research has shown that the issue of race is closely tied in with school integration (Carmines and Stimson 1981). The school prayer shows no significance in its relationship in any of the years. The addition of the Liberal/Conservative Scale and Vietnam proved to be significant variables. By 1982 the

My model is somewhat different from the Niemi and Jennings model, thus it yields some small differences due to several factors including: a different recoding pattern, removal of different missing data and the removal of the jobs variable from my model. This was removed because attitudes on it are closely tied to life stages, rather than political feelings (Niemi and Jennings 1991). The differences between our variable coefficients were minimal, providing confidence that my issue model allowed for replication of their issue model. Their model codes school integration 1=no, 5=yes; while my model codes it as 0=no, 1=yes. This seems like a much more efficient coding scheme. I followed this coding scheme for all dummy variables: school integration, school prayer, and Vietnam; 0=no, 1=yes. This difference in coding also affects the party identification variables; their code runs 1-7 while my code runs 0-6. This simply raised the constant by 1. There also is a difference in our n, as a result of my use of listwise deletion; their model uses pairwise deletion allowing for a greater n. Due to the problems of panel mortality, listwise deletion allows my model to accurately measure only those panel respondents who finished all three waves of the panel study.
ideology scale is extremely significant at .602. On the other hand, the Vietnam variable is only significant at the 0.05 level. In all likelihood this is because Vietnam is not considered a party issue but a general governmental issue. However, the Vietnam variable does increase in effect from 1973 to 1982.

Table 8

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1965</th>
<th>1973</th>
<th>1982</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.613**</td>
<td>.917**</td>
<td>.313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.178)</td>
<td>(.225)</td>
<td>(.231)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parent PID</td>
<td>.535**/.595</td>
<td>.296**/.371</td>
<td>.274**/.316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.028)</td>
<td>(.031)</td>
<td>(.032)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School Prayer</td>
<td>.020/.005</td>
<td>-.040/.011</td>
<td>.189/.048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.143)</td>
<td>(.150)</td>
<td>(.152)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gov Int School</td>
<td>-.582**/-1.129</td>
<td>-.255/-1.071</td>
<td>-.498*/-.132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.143)</td>
<td>(.145)</td>
<td>(.146)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lib/Con Scale</td>
<td>.351**/.260</td>
<td>.602**/.437</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.059)</td>
<td>(.056)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>.343*/.094</td>
<td>.430*/.089</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.150)</td>
<td>(.181)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

r2            | .376       | .255       | .435       |
Std. Error    | 1.54       | 1.53       | 1.43       |
N             | 633        | 502        | 433        |

Listwise deletion of missing data.
Unstandardized coefficient/ Standardized Coefficient; standard errors are in parentheses.
** Significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed test).
* Significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed test).
Dependent variable=offspring party identification for each survey year.
Table 9
Candidate-Issue Regression Model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1973</th>
<th>1982</th>
<th>1982 All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>.047 (.262)</td>
<td>.719* (.292)</td>
<td>.631 (.346)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parent PID</td>
<td>.290**/ .361</td>
<td>.224**/ .259</td>
<td>.233**/ .272</td>
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<tr>
<td>School Prayer</td>
<td>-.083/ -.022</td>
<td>.181/.046</td>
<td>.107/.027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gov Int School</td>
<td>-.007/ -.002</td>
<td>-.296*/ -.078</td>
<td>-.282/ -.074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lib/Con Scale</td>
<td>.189**/ .135</td>
<td>.313**/ .228</td>
<td>.308*/ .217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>.063/.017 (.160)</td>
<td>.221/.046 (.163)</td>
<td>.217/.045 (.178)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nixon</td>
<td>.024**/ .368 (.003)</td>
<td>.004/.061 (.004)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McGovern</td>
<td>-.001/ -.012 (.003)</td>
<td>.003/.042 (.003)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reagan</td>
<td>.026**/ .377 (.003)</td>
<td>.024**/ .339 (.003)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carter</td>
<td>-.017**/ -.178 (.003)</td>
<td>-.018**/ -.178 (.004)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

r2 | .363 | .560 | .558
Std. Error | 1.44 | 1.27 | 1.27
N | 418 | 431 | 357

Listwise deletion of missing data. Unstandardized coefficient/ Standardized Coefficient; standard errors are in parentheses. Dependent variable=offspring party identification for each survey year.

** Significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed test).
* Significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed test).
The Niemi and Jennings issues model proves useful but it does not go far enough in explaining partisan change. Niemi and Jennings freely admit that they rely on inferential evidence to make this causal relationship between issue preferences and partisanship, conceding that "it is virtually impossible statistically to sort out the precise causal mechanisms that govern relationships between the two. In addition, other attitudes, such as those toward candidates, may also play a role in partisan development"(306). Issues are important and show a causal link to partisanship, yet they don't explain the entire story. Candidates may help complete the picture.

For the candidate regression model I ran data for two different models: one measured the effects of the candidates individually as candidate thermometers, the second model measured the difference variables that were created for the correlation matrix. The first model proved more revealing, and showed a much greater significance than the difference model.\textsuperscript{21} Thus, I concentrate on the data results of the regression model containing the individual candidate thermometers.\textsuperscript{22}

The candidate-issues models are displayed in Table 9. The addition of the candidate variables produce immediate differences between the results of Table 8 and 9. There is a substantial change in the effect of parent party identification from the issues model to the candidate model with parent partisanship continuing as a strong influence. However, the effect of parent partisanship drops from the 1973 candidate model to the 1982 model.

\textsuperscript{21} One conclusion can be drawn from the difference model, the relationship between the candidates in any particular year is not a polarizing effect; that is, when evaluation of one candidate is high, evaluation of the other candidate is not necessarily low. This problem takes much of the explanatory value out of the 1973 model when using the difference variables.

\textsuperscript{22} If one compares my model with the Rapoport model, one will quickly see that the models are structured differently. The 1973 regression is similar in its setup, with the only telling difference occurring from a greater number of variables included in his regression model. Thus, I arrive at similar results with my candidate model. The difference in the two models occurs with the regression measures of the 1982 data. Rapoport is more interested in explaining the effects of the 1972 presidential candidates rather than looking at the 1980 election separately. I understand his attempt to measure the long term effects of candidates, but his selection of the 1972 election as a starting place is a divergence from my research direction. Rapoport is simply looking at long term candidate effects on party identification, not necessarily at the realigning possibilities with these individual candidates. Few would argue that Nixon or McGovern possessed any realigning powers; however, Reagan's victory in 1980 may have initiated a Republican realignment, or at the very least a move toward the right. Thus, Rapoport creates two regression models, neither of which is similar to my candidate regression model for 1982. His two models include a regression of both 1972 and 1980 candidates along with the parent's party identification variable. He leaves out the other issue variables from this model. His second 1982 model includes the 1982 issues along with the 1972 candidates. Thus, he fails to include any meaningful measure of the 1980 candidates with the issues in a single regression model.
moving from .290 to .224. This is a larger change than expected, especially in regard to the findings of Niemi and Jennings (1991). Their socialization research on the panel study indicates a plateau effect for parent's partisanship that is seen in my issues model but is not seen in my candidate-issues model. With the addition of candidate effects to the model, parent's partisanship shows a continuing decline in influence. The change of the parental effect in the candidate model may reflect the correlations between Reagan, Carter, and parent party id found in Table 6. Nonetheless, the addition of candidate variables changes the findings of the Niemi and Jennings (1991), leading me to conclude that candidates provide important partisanship influences which were previously explained as parental partisanship effects.

Looking at other variables, school prayer continues to be an insignificant issue on offspring party id as it was in the issues model. The only change in school prayer is that it becomes a Republican issue in 1982, moving from a negative coefficient to a positive one. Along side that issue progression, the parties had taken opposite positions on the size of government, with Reagan leading the Republican charge for devolution. Similar to the issue model school integration is not a factor in 1973. In the 1960s school integration was a civil rights issue but by the 1970s it became less partisan when other issues are controlled. However, by 1982 the school integration has taken a more partisan flavor, becoming an important issue once again along the argument of federal government power. While the school integration coefficient is significant in the 1982 candidate model, it drops off sharply from -.498 in the issue model to -.296 in the candidate-issue model model. Presumably this is a reflection of federalism issues tied in the with the candidates in 1980, especially Reagan's promise of devolution to the states. There is also a link of race to an overall conservative philosophy which developed with Goldwater’s 1964 position on civil rights that came to shape the Republican party.

Interestingly, the Vietnam variable, which was significant at the 0.05 level in the 1973 and 1982 issue models, is no longer significant in the candidate-issue models. Perhaps alluding to lack of partisanship within the issue. The liberal/conservative variable continues to be significant in the candidate models, however its effect is cut in half once candidate evaluations are controlled. This certainly takes into account ideological positions
of the individual candidates. As the 1980 candidates and parties became more ideologically polarized, so did voters, thus, the move of the liberal/conservative scale from .189 to .313. The increased influence of ideology in 1982 is likely a result of the increasing polarization of presidential candidates in the 1970s and 1980s, especially after Reagan came to be perceived as the quintessential conservative. This is a large jump, and a move that reflects the general movement of the electorate in the conservative direction. The differences in the parties that developed in the 1960s and 1970s were fully established in 1980.

Finally, the effects of the candidates prove a strong party identification indicator. In the 1973 wave only Nixon is significant with a standardized coefficient of .368, which eclipses the value of any other variable. In fact, excluding the value of parent party identification, the Nixon standardized coefficient is greater than double any issue or ideology. The McGovern variable shows no significance, however. This may be a reflection of the public’s perception of McGovern as a radical liberal rather than a liberal Democrat. The National Election Study for 1972 found that 25% of the sample viewed McGovern as an extreme liberal, almost five times more than saw Nixon as a extreme conservative (Rapoport 1997, 188). As a result, McGovern was seen less as a Democrat and more as a liberal. This difference in influence between McGovern and Nixon suggests that popular candidates have a greater effect than unpopular candidates. The 1972 election was not necessarily McGovern driving Democrats away from the party as much as it was Nixon luring Democrats toward the right. The result was an increase in Independents in the 1973 wave. Thus, candidate effects played a strong role in partisan perception for 1973.

The candidates in the 1982 wave are both statistically significant at the 0.01 level, with Reagan at .026 and Carter at -.017. These effects illustrate not only the differences between the parties but the differences between the candidates. Burnham (1981) describes this Reagan Revolution, pointing out that Reagan was not just another Republican along the lines of Eisenhower, Nixon, or Ford. "Ronald Reagan was and is the charismatic prophet of the now-dominant Right. He is clearly the most conservative president elected since Hoover won office in 1928"(1981, 99). While ideological ties to the presidential candidates existed in 1982 they do not fully explain vote choice in 1980. Burnham (1981) finds that only 11 percent of Reagan supporters voted for Reagan because "he's a real conservative"(1981,
In fact, Burnham notes that support for Reagan did not seem to be based on any tangible criteria beyond his personal appeal. When asked about policy issues, party identification, experience, or judgment, half of the respondents who felt change was needed were unable to give any reason. In fact, Reagan's highlights do not include important issue positions in 1980, but rather his personal appeal and charm. This provides strong support for my model. Even when we control for issues and ideology the candidates matter. Miller and Shanks (1996) agree that Reagan’s victory in 1980 was driven by his personal appeal while his victory in 1984 was driven by his policies. Initially Reagan’s charm and charisma were responsible for his support. However, four years later the voters were responding to Reagan’s conservative policy initiatives.

In looking at the candidate-issue model in comparison with the issue model, the candidate model proves much more predictive. The r-squared value for 1973 is .363 in comparison with .255 in the issue model. The predictive value of 1982 is even greater at .560 while the 1982 issue model is .435. The r-square differences between the models is quite compelling, meanwhile the standard error for the candidate-issue model is smaller in both 1973 and 1982. Thus, the candidate-issue model is much more complete in explaining the student’s partisanship than the issue model.

Taking the data a final step, I created a third candidate model for 1982 and merged it with 1972 candidate evaluations, to look at possible long term effects of Nixon and McGovern on 1982 partisanship. The results of the model displayed in column 3 of Table 9, showed very little change. Reagan and Carter continue to have a strong effect on the model, however there is no significance to the McGovern or Nixon variables. Nixon’s significant effect in 1973 has been erased by 1982. By 1982 he has been out of the White House for 8 years and has dropped out of the public’s eye as a result.

In sum, these models tell us many things about the process of partisan change. First, issues do not fully explain the story about partisan realignment. They do play an influential

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23 A New York Times poll did find that 54% of respondents felt that the US should take a harder stance toward the USSR and of those respondents 70% voted for Reagan. Of those who disagreed with this foreign policy, 64% voted for Carter. Thus, this may have been one area of issue preference for the individual candidates (Burnham 1981, 123).

24 Rapoport's 1973 Candidate-Issues model on 1982 partisanship has a similar insignificance, although he leaves out Reagan and Carter from the model.
role, however the presidential candidates are also important to the process of party change. Second, the relationship between candidates and issues is not simply causal in one direction. Issues do have an impact on the candidates and the electorate’s evaluation of those candidates, however the electorate’s response to those issues is often determined by the candidate’s response. For instance, citizens’ views on issue of school integration were in many ways a result of Lyndon Johnson and Barry Goldwater’s response to the issue. The candidates’ policies became their parties’ policies, and thus, supporters of Johnson’s policy took a Democratic position and Goldwater supporters took a Republican position. This was not a response simply to the issue, but also a reaction to the candidate’s response to that issue. Third, while presidential candidates do have an impact, the durability of that impact will often outlive the respondent’s recollection of the candidate’s role. In other words, the candidate initiates partisan change for the electorate but then the candidate may drop out of the electorate’s mind, even while the partisan change which they brought about continues. This is what the Candidate-Issue model tells us about Nixon. Nixon had obvious effect in the 1973 wave of data, but by 1982 his impact had died off. In a full-blown realignment the initiating candidate remains in the electorate’s mind and becomes a symbol of the party like Lincoln, Roosevelt, or perhaps Reagan.

It would be very interesting to have a fourth wave of data to test lingering effects of Carter and especially Reagan. Theoretically, if a possible realignment occurred in 1980 with the election of Reagan, the Reagan effect would continue to yield influence in the following panel wave. It is unfortunate that the panel study does not provide further data; certainly my model would be greatly enhanced with the addition of another wave. Other researchers have found similar evidence from the 1980s. However, they find that the changes do not all occur in 1980, but from 1980-1984. Unfortunately, the limitations of panel research hamper further study of this sample. Regardless of these problems it is evident that the 1980 election was a very strong defining election for the 1960s generation of voters.
CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

This thesis has provided evidence for the realigning possibilities of individual presidential candidates. Up to this point, only Rapoport (1997) had been able to create a useful model to test this hypothesis. Research in this area has been limited as researchers have focused on issues and the resulting shifts in partisanship. Again, I am not arguing against the impact of the issues in generating realignment changes, I am simply emphasizing the effects of presidential candidates in the process. Presidential candidates do impact partisanship changes. This partisanship development appears especially evident with the young voters entering early adulthood within the panel study.

Studying the realignment process is essential to a better understanding of the party system. It helps scholars understand how parties operate and change, how mass portions of the electorate make decisions about elections and why, and it gives us an opportunity to determine how groups within the electorate operate. It also plays a predictive role in helping us better determine what the conditions for realignment are.

"The Youth-Parent Socialization Panel Study" was instrumental in providing an avenue to approach the impact of candidates. Without a longitudinal study with the same subjects over an extended period of time, it is rather difficult to measure candidate effects on partisanship change. The models prove useful whether realignment occurred or not. They clearly show an effect of the candidates on party identification. This is seen especially in the differences between the issues model for 1973 and 1982 and the candidate models for the same years. In this era of candidate-centered politics it is not surprising that partisanship would be so significantly influenced by the candidates. Candidates help to shape the parties, not only in their platform and agenda but their general direction.

The effects of presidential candidates were evident in this study, but not in all instances. The 1972 election produced a significant effect for Nixon but a lower candidate
effect for McGovern. On the other hand, the 1980 election showed a strong impact from both Reagan and Carter. This seems at least partly due to the personal attributes of the candidates and points toward the realigning possibilities of Reagan. One cannot ignore the impact of Reagan on the party system. Even if a realignment did not occur, he has become the Republican Party's symbol of what a president should be. This is seen in the constant comparison of Republican presidential candidates to Reagan just as Democratic presidents are measured against Franklin Roosevelt.

Reagan and Nixon continue to provide an ideological direction for the GOP and Carter has continued to play a role in the Democratic party. Republican candidates have found it difficult to get out from under the shadow of Reagan, conversely Democratic candidates are still attempting to escape the association with McGovern, whose candidacy continued to play a role in the minds of voters when Newt Gingrich branded the Clintons as "McGovernicks" more than a quarter of a century after his candidacy.25

The research in this paper provides a further development in the realignment literature. The evidence for a candidate-centered party system adds to our understanding of the realignment concept. The large number of realignment theories which attempt to fully understand the process of mass partisan change must look more closely toward candidate effects. Certainly there is room for further research in this area, however this will certainly prove difficult considering the current limitations on realignment study designs.

Partisanship and the influences on it are important areas of political study that deserve continued attention. Issues continue to play an important role and should not be discounted. However, in the candidate-centered age the role of individual presidential candidates has something to add to the research. The findings in this thesis support my initial hypothesis that presidential candidates are active influences in realignments. Further, the research strongly suggests that there is evidence that strong presidential candidates can become symbols of the political parties, shaping the direction of the parties in the electorate’s mind. Historical realignments hinted at the possible impact of attractive, appealing, charismatic candidates who left indelible marks on the electoral scene. Looking at the realigning elections of the past (1800, 1828, 1860, 1896, and 1932), they all were driven

25Rapoport (1997, 188) mentions Gingrich's comments as well as Bush's 1992 attempt to link Clinton with Carter, Mondale, and Dukakis.
by a dominating presidential figure. My research lends considerable credence to this role of presidents in historical realignments and suggests that, as the political system becomes more dominated by candidate-centered evaluations, candidates will play an even greater role in partisan development and change.

Miller and Shanks (1996) contend that in 1980 the younger generation shifted their loyalty to the Republicans, then in 1984 older, better educated voters shifted toward the Republican party. They write that: "If the first phase of the realignment was tribute to the charismatic attraction that Ronald Reagan held for the less involved, less politicized voters, then the second phase seems to have engaged the more ideologically predisposed voters who had come to appreciate that Reagan really was a conservative Republican president" (1996, 166). The vote in 1980 may not have been ideologically-based, but by 1984 the voters had seen Reagan’s policies and agreed with them. Miller and Shanks’s analysis is completely supportive of the data I find in my model. The initial election of Reagan was primarily based on his personal charisma and general persuasiveness. This evidence is strongly supportive of my presidential influence model. Reagan was able to develop presidential influence through his popular appeal, charismatic charm, personal attributes, and prestige, resulting in the 1980 election victory. Reagan then used that influence to initiate policy changes and respond to the economic crisis of the time, building support and winning reelection in 1984. Finally, this influence and defining policy stance resulted in realignment.

My interpretation of the political events since 1960, particularly in the area of realignment, is that a secular realignment took place from 1960 to 1980. Small changes to the New Deal coalitions occurred in response to the civil rights movement, Vietnam, and the ideological polarization of the parties. Finally, the election of 1980 acted as a critical election where Reagan cemented the Republican realignment.

The research suggests that Reagan was an important durable factor in the party system. Twenty-two years after his first election the Republican party continues to espouse the policies of Reagan and hold him up as the standard-bearer for the GOP. The durability of the other candidates does not seem as strong. The final 1982 model containing 1973 presidential ratings points to decreasing impact of those candidates. Nixon’s influence in
the 1973 wave of data is undeniable, however his impact is insignificant by 1982. This lends greater support to the argument. Presidential candidates matter, some more than others; if they all were equally influential this research endeavor would be ill-conceived. Those with immense charm, charisma, and leadership skills prove more durable and often realigning, but typical candidates will provide an initial effect while in office putting their stamp on the party, and then drop out of the electorate’s consciousness.

Further research into the impact of individual presidential candidates will allow scholars to develop a more complete approach to party politics. While the limitations on realignment study are great, political scientists must strive to find ways to fully understand the causes and processes of partisan change. Issues continue to play an important role but the effects of individual candidates are significant and clearly portrayed in the candidate influence model of partisanship.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


