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Which Islam-Ism? Diversity in Islamic Society and Its Implications for Democracy

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WHICH ISLAM-ISM? DIVERSITY IN ISLAMIC SOCIETY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR DEMOCRACY

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This study aims to refute claims of Islamic exceptionalism in the midst of recent waves of democratization, thereby disproving assumptions of any incompatibility between democracy and Islam. My research will show that such sweeping assumptions gloss over significant, developmental democratic movements within Muslim nations as well as several uniquely Islamic supports for democratic ideals and institutions.

I begin by examining recent political activities conducive to democracy in Muslim states, by distinguishing between divergent principles in the Qur'an, some of which have been used by moderate, democratically-oriented Islamists, and by realizing the historical, political antecedents leading to a rise in radical Islamism in the 20th century, disaggregating the political versus religious causes for non-democratic elements in several Islamic lands. I then proceed with a quantitative analysis of contemporary conditions in all 46 Muslim-majority nations. I attempt a revision of indices used to measure democracy by focusing on institutional components and by averaging my Institutional Democracy Index (IDI) with other existing indices to create a more reliable Aggregated Democracy Index (ADI). Finally, a lack of correlation is shown between ADI ratings and measures of religiosity and Muslim population demographics, indicating the need to focus the discipline's attention on other causal factors of democratization.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

This paper focuses upon the measurement of democracy in Muslim-majority nations and providing evidence to refute notions of "Islamic exceptionalism"—namely, that school of thought that posits (a) democracy and Islam's incompatibility and (b) that recent waves of democratization have bypassed the Islamic world. The scope of the study centers upon demonstrating democracy's existence in several Muslim-majority nations and the lack of correlation between the degree of democracy found therein and either the percentage of Muslims in the population or the degree of religiosity expressed in mass surveys.

DEMOCRACY IN THE ISLAMIC WORLD: FRAMING A COMPARATIVE POLITICAL ANALYSIS

The growth and spread of democracy across the globe has been the subject of a great deal of research at least since the close of the Second World War. It has been posited by some as the solution to producing greater prosperity and economic growth.[1] It has been elevated as the solution for finding international stability and peace, presuming that consolidated democracies refrain from aggression toward other established democracies.[2] It has been praised as a support for political stability.[3] And, democracy has seen its share of proponents who tout it as a good in and of itself, as it is a system

[1] Joseph T. Siegle, Michael M. Weinstein, and Morton H. Halperin. "Why Democracies Excel," *Foreign Affairs* (September/October 2004).
[2] Babst, Dean V. "Elective Governments--A Force For Peace," *The Wisconsin Sociologist* 3 (1964) pp. 9-14. R.J. Rummel. *Understanding Conflict and War Vol. 4: War, Power, Peace* Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1979. Bruce Russett. *Grasping the Democratic Peace.* Princeton University Press: 1994. Doyle, Michael W. *Ways of War and Peace.* New York: W.W. Norton, 1997.
[3] Jack A. Goldstone and Jay Uldfelder. "How to Construct Stable Democracies," *Washington Quarterly* 28, no. 1 (2004) pp. 9-20.

premised on the institutionalization of political equality and civil liberty.[4] Whatever its justifications and regardless of the relative validity of such justifications, democratization has been a primary goal of Western foreign policy makers and non-Western, hopeful, reform- or revolution-oriented democrats alike in the wake of the World Wars, the demise of colonial power structures, and the crumbling of the Soviet "second world." A concern shared by both the former and latter groups is that of finding the most effective means of promoting their quest for democratization—the vehicle to transport entire populations into the democratic world without their ever having to leave their own national borders.

This puzzle has seen a renewal in its sense of urgency as public attention has been drawn toward the Islamic world during the last couple of decades. Whether founded or unfounded, the geographic region which is most often called to mind as symbolic or central to the lands of Islam is the Arab Middle East, a land wracked by periodic interstate and civil wars, popular uprisings, corrupt and autocratic states, exaggerated divisions of both extreme poverty and wealth, terrorist exporting ideologies, and a seemingly insurmountable cultural wall which has halted all efforts toward democracy and liberty. A problematic strain of democratization literature has proceeded to make such sweeping generalizations on the basis of a very limited set of characterizations of this region, positing a conflictual relationship between Islam and the potential, or lack thereof, for democracy. Many, primarily American scholars, have assumed an incompatibility between the supposed all-encompassing tenets of Islam on the one hand and the necessity of open competition and pluralism within liberal democracy. This neo-

[4] Marc F. Plattner. "Liberalism and Democracy: Can't Have One Without the Other," *Foreign Affairs* (March/April 1998). Amartya Sen. "Democracy as a Universal Value," *Journal of Democracy* 10.3 (1999) pp. 3-17.

orientalist or "clash of civilizations" model has risen in popularity within at least one strand of researchers, media figures, and politicians since the 1990s.

This study makes a modest attempt to demonstrate the weakness of arguments positing Islamic exceptionalism in the face of recent waves of democratization. I argue below that: (a) in balancing the views of neo-orientalists, political scientists must be cognizant of the many tenets within the foundations of Islam that may be supportive of modern democratic governance; (b) that there is a broad diversity in modern Islamist political thought ranging from liberal to moderate to radical; (c) that the rise of radical, violent, or oppressive forms of Islamism which may appear threatening to infant democratizing movements are best understood by historical structural and elite actor oriented antecedents within the last half-century; (c) that the recent waves of democracy have not been lost to the Islamic world, but rather by properly devising accurate measures of democracy, researchers can detect significant degrees of democratic practice in a variety of Muslim-majority nations around the world; and (d) in further refutation of the Islamic exceptionalist position, we find no significant relationship between the degree of democratic practice found in Muslim-majority nations and either "how Muslim" or "how religious" their populations show themselves to be.

A WORD ABOUT ISLAMIC EXCEPTIONALISM

At the outset of the 1990s, we encounter an article published in *The Atlantic Monthly* by prominent Middle East historian, Bernard Lewis.[5] In generalizing about the apparent distinction between the Islamic and the Judeo-Christian worlds with regard to differing dominant interpretations of the role of religion and politics and their united or

[5] "The Roots of Muslim Rage," *The Atlantic Monthly* (September 1990), pp. 47-60.

separate spheres, Lewis concludes, "This is no less than a clash of civilizations—the perhaps irrational but surely historic reaction of an ancient rival against our Judeo-Christian heritage, or secular present, and the worldwide expansion of both. It is crucially important that we on our side should study their heritage and understand their present, and that we should not be provoked into an equally historic but also equally irrational reaction against that rival."[6] Ironically, by making such a broad and haphazard generalization about a population that includes 1.3 billion of the world's six-plus billion people and extends geographically over at least three continents from Morocco and Senegal in the West to Indonesia in the East, from Albania and the Kyrgyz Republic in the North to the Comoros in the South, Lewis has done just that in focusing only upon a few of the surface features of Islam in the Middle East alone. Two years later, Frances Fukuyama attempts to explain the apparent inability of democracy's "third wave" to find success in transforming the Middle East as it had Eastern Europe. He also concludes that "in this part of the world, Islam has stood as a major barrier to democratisation."[7] In accentuating Islam as the prominent hindrance to democracy, Fukuyama ignores both a plethora of dynamic social, economic, and institutional factors in this region as well as the complex and diverse nature of political Islam itself. The following year, we find this line continuing in an article whose title, "The Clash of Civilizations,"[8] has come into common usage when labeling this particular school of macro-culturalist thought. Huntington posits that Western civilization is characterized by Western ideas—"individualism, liberalism, constitutionalism, human rights, equality, liberty, the rule of law, democracy, free markets, the separation of church and state"—which have had little

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[6] Ibid., p. 60.
[7] Frances Fukuyama. *The End of History and the Last Man*, London: Hamish Hamilton, 1992, p. 347.
[8] Samuel P. Huntington. "The Clash of Civilizations," *Foreign Affairs* (Summer 1993), pp. 22-49.

reverberation and complementarity in non-Western civilizations. In fact, he further contends that the intrusion of such ideas instead produces a backlash against the human rights mindset.

Just prior to and in the years following 2001, a symbolic and emotionally charged time in connection with the devastation wrought in the United States on September 11th and the subsequent "global war on terror," we were again presented with several prominent works, most notably by Bernard Lewis and Seymour Martin Lipset, which gave new momentum to the clash of civilizations model of, to borrow Huntington's catch phrase, "the West versus the rest." Bassam Tibi in a brief explanation of fundamentalism as a political concept writes, "Indeed, economic growth has contributed to the third wave of democratization worldwide—but not in the world of Islam. In most Islamic states rapid economic development, social dislocation, and sociocultural crisis have not given rise to democracy but rather to fundamentalism."[9] While the preceding statement is likely true in part, he goes on to make the rather unfounded and controversial claim that "...fundamentalism currently represents mainstream public choice in the world of Islam..."[10]

Still further, we again see doubt cast on the possibility for democratic culture to exist in the world of Islam where so many have argued that there has been no and can be no legitimate separation of religious law and state policy formation.[11] Lipset, while making the qualification that any culture has the capability of sustaining a democracy once established, argues that some cultures are more likely than others to adopt

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[9] Bassam Tibi. "Fundamentalism," *Political Philosophy: Theories, Thinkers, Concepts*, Seymour Martin Lipset, ed. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2001, pp. 98-102.
[10] Ibid., p. 100.
[11] See Bernard Lewis. *The Crisis of Islam*. NY: Modern Library, 2003, pp. 6-13.

democracy on their own. In stating that cultural transformation is one ingredient to consolidating a democratic transition, he writes that "culture per se must be an important factor in the success or failure of democracy."[12] Yet, he very concisely demarcates the image of the democratic culture, "There *is* a culture of democracy—a culture rooted in secularism, tolerance, liberal individualism, respect for an obeisance to the rule of law—and any culture that wishes to become democratic must swallow these values and adapt them to its own."[13] The implications of this definition for the world of Islam are obvious if one focuses on the value of secularism. The real question that remains, however, is whether this is in fact a critical element of democratic culture, or perhaps whether democracy may take on any number of relevant and workable forms in the face of varying degrees of popular and elite religiosity.

It is at this juncture that some convincing arguments may be required to draw in the more skeptical of readers, doubtful of analyzing meaningful democratic structures and culture in the context of the Islamic world. It is my contention however that, with a broader basis of literature and recent historical events, we can be hopeful of the prospects for democratization in the Islamic world. Or, as S.V.R. Nasr posits, "...the challenge of Islamic revivalism to the secular state and its views on and role in the democratization process are far more complex and nuanced than modernization theory suggests. Democracy may prove to be far more resilient before the challenge of revivalism than most observers concede. It is the contention of this article that the feebleness of democracy before the challenge of Islamic revivalism is not a foregone conclusion."[14]

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[12] Seymour Martin Lipset and Jason M. Lakin. *Democracy's Century*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2004, p. 198.
[13] Ibid., pp. 197-8.
[14] "Democracy and Islamic Revivalism," *Political Science Quarterly*, 110, 2, (Summer 1995), 261-285.

Cynics in this regard often cite the examples of attempted electoral democracy's failure and return to authoritarianism or civil war, or at least the production of undemocratic responses by otherwise ongoing democratic regimes, where Islamist opposition is strong—the outlawed Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in 1948 and again in 1954; the 1975 outbreak of civil war in Lebanon after an influx of Palestinian refugees and PLO members from Jordan; the 1992 military coup and subsequent civil war in Algeria after the rise in popularity and electoral victories of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS); the banning of the Refah (Welfare) Party in Turkey in 1998 for supposedly threatening the secular order of the Turkish state. However, a closer look at these historic events reveals an antidemocratic offensive trend on the part of ruling regimes, rather than a protagonist threat from Islamists. Al-Bannah's Ikhwan, at the time it was first banned in 1948, was more of a victory for Egyptian civil society—regarded by many as a prerequisite for sustainable democracy—than it was a threat to any democratic order (little semblance of democracy existed in Egypt at that time, and certainly none existed by the time the second ban was issued under the military regime of Nasser in 1954). The British had remained stationed in Egypt after de jure independence was realized in 1936, and they further ensured cooperation by installing British-friendly Wafd and Sa'dist governments during World War II. The British-Egyptian entanglement coupled with the Brotherhood's increasing insistence upon the withdrawal of the British, the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company, and de facto economic and territorial independence more reasonably explains the order to dissolve the Brotherhood in 1948 than does an assumption of an Islamist threat to the state of Egypt. Although this reform-oriented civic, family, social, and educational organization had developed a

Secret Apparatus of trained guerrillas, these were used against Israel in 1948, as opposed to directly confronting the Egyptian state which feared instead the momentum of an anti-British, popular civil society movement with membership reaching over half a million Egyptians. Richard Mitchell demonstrates that subsequent violence on the part of the Brotherhood was self-defensive:

> The Brotherhood never formerly became a political party or advocated the overthrow of the state by violent means. The violent acts were retaliatory and targeted at specific individuals. It maintained that the transformation of society was to come primarily from the transformation of the individuals within society.[15]

It was after the Egyptian Prime Minister, al-Nuqrashi, ordered the Brotherhood to dissolve in December of 1948 that the subsequent assassinations of al-Nuqrashi and then Brotherhood founder, Hassan al-Banna, took place.

Blame can also easily be directed at Muslim Palestinians and armed PLO insurgents for the 1975-1990 civil war in Lebanon due to the threat their presence posed to the sovereignty of the Lebanese state in the face of a potential attack by Israel. One must not forget however, that an unsuccessful attempt on the life of the Maronite leader of the Phalangist Party in Beirut on April 13, 1975, perpetrated by an unidentified group firing from a speeding car, was amplified by the Phalangist militia's massacre of 27 random and innocent Palestinians traveling on a bus that same day.

It is the case of Algeria though that is perhaps most significant here. President Benjadid strategically opened the political process after his single-party (FLN) state's legitimacy was threatened by riots in 1988. He did not anticipate the rise in popularity of the then legalized FIS. The sweeping success of the FIS opposition in the June 12, 1990 municipal and provincial elections even prompted reports praising "...the freest election

[15] Richard P. Mitchell. *The Society of Muslim Brothers*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993, p. 19.

in the Arab world in modern times, the ruling party has submitted itself to the electorate and accepted defeat," and claiming that "[c]ompetitive, multiparty politics in Algeria is here to stay, and perhaps it will serve as a model for the rest of the Arab world as well."[16] Unfortunately for democracy's proponents, history told a different story. Bernard Lewis has summarized the mindset which led to the demise of Algeria's short-lived democratic experiment by positing that democrats are at a disadvantage when faced with an Islamist opposition for the former embodies ideals of inclusiveness in political rights, whereas the latter, he supposes, have no such ideological obligation to reciprocate these values. Lewis goes on:

> On the contrary, their principles require them to suppress what they see as impious and subversive activities.
>
> For Islamists, democracy, expressing the will of the people, is the road to power, but it is a one-way road, on which there is no return, no rejection of the sovereignty of God, as exercised through His chosen representatives. Their electoral policy has been classically summarized as "One man (men only), one vote, once."
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> Clearly, in the Islamic world as it was in Europe, a free and fair election is the culmination, not the inauguration, of the process of democratic development.[17]

As FIS sat on the verge of gaining a majority in the National Assembly in December 1991, prior to the second round of parliamentary elections the military seized control, cancelled elections, deposed Benjadid, banned the FIS, and instituted military rule. What the reader must realize, however, is that there is little evidence to support Lewis' or the Algerian military's fears. Both have pointed to the precedent set by the nature of Khomeini's form of Islamic democracy in Iran, yet, Khomeini did not come to power through a process of open, competitive, multiparty elections initiated by reforms originating from within the incumbent regime.

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[16] Arun Kapil, "Algeria's Elections Show Islamist Strength," *Middle East Report*, 166 (September-October 1990), 31-36.
[17] Lewis. *Crisis of Islam*, pp. 112-3.

As the above cases illustrate, it is the secularist state's fear, perhaps premature, of what democracy might mean in the hands of an Islamic-based party that is to blame for democracy's breakdown. Even if the Algerian regime were to compromise with the opposition and subject itself to open elections again, it is unlikely that any such compromise could effectively quell unrest, nor the elections truly be open, unless it entailed a concession that the state has so far been unwilling to make—i.e., allowing the FIS and other banned religious parties to participate in the election competition. For, as John Waterbury has pointed out, Muslim organizations have no incentive to "voluntarily adhere to the rules of the game if they have no prospect of benefiting from them."[18] And still, the case of Algeria and the FIS remains the exception, for in the last decade and a half, purely conservative Islamist political parties have met overwhelming failure to achieve electoral majorities, or even coalition dominance, in such Muslim states that have begun to see political openings. Vali Nasr has so adeptly summarized the results in recent elections in five Muslim-majority states that it is worth quoting him at length:

> In Pakistan in 1997, the right-of-center but non-Islamist Pakistan Muslim League (PML) won 63 percent of the seats in parliament, marginalizing the Islamist party, Jamaat-e-Islami (JI). Similarly, in 2001 the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) captured 64 percent of the seats in parliament to sideline Bangladesh's own JI. In Turkey in 2002, the Justice and Development Party (AKP)—a group with roots in the world of Islamism but which has always abjured such Islamist hallmarks as the demand for state enactment of *shari'a*—won 66 percent of the seats in parliament; voters had a clear Islamist alternative before them in the form of the Felicity Party, and turned it away with no seats. In Indonesia in 2004, a cluster of center-right Muslim parties, the National Mandate Party (PAN), National Awakening Party (PKB), United Development Party (PPP), plus Golkar (the old ruling party), won 53 percent of the seats, as compared to 8 percent for the Islamist Prosperous Justice Party (PKS). In Malaysia in 2004, the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) won 49.7 percent of the seats while the Islamic Party (PAS) managed to pick up only 3.2 percent.
>
> Such results suggest that in these Muslim societies, the "vital center" of politics is likely to belong neither to secularist and leftist parties nor to Islamists. More likely to rule the strategic middle will be political forces that integrate Muslim values and moderate Islamic politics into broader right-of-center platforms that go beyond exclusively

[18] "Fortuitous Byproducts," in Lisa Anderson, ed., *Transitions to Democracy* (New York, 1999), 261-283.

> religious concerns. Such forces can appeal to a broad cross-section of voters and create a stable nexus between religious and secular drivers of electoral politics.[19]

Fortunately, two schools of thought offer hope for the prospects of democracy in the largely authoritarian or pseudo-democratic Islamic world. The first includes those transition theorists who have distanced themselves from Lipset's notion that numerous structural, social and economic conditions are prerequisites for democracy's existence.[20] These instead posit that it is possible for democracy to emerge and strengthen itself in an unfriendly, authoritarian environment as a result of struggles among nondemocratic factions who pragmatically and strategically constrain their future capability to take advantage of political office by transferring some of their power to institutions through constitutional negotiations.[21] Larry Diamond illustrates this hope in his conceptualization of democratic regime types. He distinguishes a pseudo-democracy from an authoritarian regime by the former's tolerance of independent, legal opposition parties, even where such parties have little fair chance of actually succeeding to turn the ruling party out of power. He points out, however, that "[i]f we view democracy in *developmental* terms, as emerging in fragments or parts, by no fixed sequence or timetable, then the presence of legal opposition parties that may compete for power and win some seats in parliament, and of the greater space for civil society that tends to exist in such systems, provides important foundations for future democratic development."[22]

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[19] Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr. "The Rise of 'Muslim Democracy'," *Journal of Democracy* (April 2005), pp. 14-5.

[20] Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," *The American Political Science Review*, 53, 1 (March 1959), 69-105.

[21] Adam Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America* (New York, 1991); Dankwart A. Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model," *Comparative Politics*, 2, 2 (April 1970), 337-63; John Waterbury, "Democracy without Democrats? The Potential for Political Liberalization in the Middle East," in Ghassan Salame, ed., *Democracy without Democrats?* (London, 1994), 23-47.

[22] "Is the Third Wave Over?," *Journal of Democracy* 7, 3 (1996), 20-37.

The second useful school of thought includes those who embed their theorization within the context of a political culture paradigm that recognizes both diversity within a broad cultural label and its dynamic propensity to evolve and adapt. Gabriel Ben-Dor writes that "...the future development of political culture studies may well be one major solution to the problem of linking macro- and micro-analysis, grand theory and the politics of individuals and groups." He goes on to note, however, that "...we do not yet have [in the cases of Middle East studies] a good systematic treatment of the problem of attitudes toward participation, its legitimacy, extent, forms, and limits in a general, comparative manner."[23] Ruth Lane likewise notes that "[c]ultures *are* sociological phenomena—...they exist ...*among groups or communities*. But cultures, especially political cultures, do not implement themselves as structural events that are independent of individuals; nor are they immune from the modifications that individuals may make over time."[24]

The political culture of the Arab-Islamic world, furthermore, has shown some promising characteristics with regard to its receptiveness to democracy. Moaddel, et al. have revealed rather interesting findings within an article published prior to the full release of data from the 2000-02 round of the *World Values Survey*[25] that demonstrate that the degree of religion that a state allows to penetrate both the political and private arenas of its domain is negatively correlated with the orthodoxy, religiosity, and anti-Westernism among its populace. In a comparison of Egyptian, Jordanian, and Iranian societies, they found that respondents in Iran, whose state has been the most penetrated

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[23] "Political Culture Approach to Middle East Politics," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 8, 1 (January 1977), 43-63.
[24] "Political Culture: Residual Category or General Theory?," *Comparative Politics* 25, 3 (October 1992), 362-87.
[25] The release of this most recent round of data from the *WVS* occurred in April of 2004.

by conservative Islam, are the least likely to view religion as very important in life; the least likely to think about the meaning and purpose of life; the least likely to identify themselves first as Muslims (as opposed to some other chosen self-identification of a more nationalist or political orientation); the most likely to identify themselves above all as nationalists; the least likely to participate in public religious services; the least likely to respond favorably to the sufficiency of religious authorities' response to their country's problems; the least likely to view Western cultural invasion as a very important problem; to have the same likelihood as U.S. respondents in describing themselves as religious persons; to prefer the lowest number of children as ideal; the most likely to view marriage as an outdated institution; the least likely to feel that a woman needs to have children in order to feel satisfied; the most likely to believe that a working mother can develop intimate relationships with her children; and the least likely to claim that a wife must always obey her husband. Their conclusion then is "that the state's cultural orientation and policies had determinate effects on the cultural trends in civil society …[T]he cultural intervention of different forms of intrusive secular ideological state contributed to the politicization of religion and the rise of Islamic fundamentalism," whereas the allowance for a religiously guided state that remains open in its civil society actually diminishes the likelihood of maintaining Islamic conservativism within its public.[26]

[26] Mansoor Moaddel and Taqhi Azadarmaki, "The Worldviews of Islamic Publics: The Cases of Egypt, Iran, and Jordan," *World Values Survey Publications* [on-line], 12 September 2002, <www.worldvaluessurvey.org/library/ index.html> (accessed on 09 April 2003).

Mark Tessler has also conducted a cross-national study, utilizing the 2000 *World Values Survey*, within the Arab-Islamic world.[27] He finds that contrary to the assumptions of those who suppose Islam and democracy to be incompatible, "...the influence of the religion depends to a very considerable extend on how and by whom it is interpreted."[28] He uses one two-item index and one three-item index in the survey measuring personal religiosity—the first, frequency of time spent at mosque and attendance of religious services apart from weddings, funerals, and christenings; the second, the religious characteristics deemed necessary for public office and whether religious leaders should influence how people vote—as his independent variables. Controlling for demographic characteristics, including age, education, sex, income, and the size of the town in which the respondent resides, he then measures the influence Islamic attachments have upon his dependent variables—general support for democracy and the belief that there are various problems associated with democracy, regardless of whether an alternative political system is more desirable. Three of his most important findings are that while there is very little variance in personal, self-described religiosity, there is a great deal of variance in actual religious practice and mosque attendance. Second, those with higher levels and those with lower levels of mosque attendance both have similar, substantially favorable, views about democracy. Finally, "...strong Islamic attachments do not discourage or otherwise influence support for democracy to any significant degree."[29]

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[27] "Do Islamic Orientations Influence Attitudes Toward Democracy in the Arab World? Evidence from Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Algeria," *World Values Survey Publications* [on-line], 13 November 2002, <www.world valuessurvey.org/library/index.html> (accessed on 09 April 2003).
[28] Ibid., p. 6.
[29] Ibid., p. 14.

While many still fail to recognize elements of democratic culture in the Islamic world today, still more contend that the process of democratization in the Islamic world is tenuous due to the lack of previous internal movements and prior experience with democracy with the exception of those constitutional and parliamentary systems imposed by European colonial powers. This has been a popular line of reasoning, for example, in explaining away the rocky transition seen in post-Saddam Hussein Iraq. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, for instance, asserted nearly six months after the U.S. invasion that Iraq "has no experience of democracy and representative government."[30] Adeed Dawisha has shown the fallacy in this line of reasoning, pointing out that Iraq experienced its first parliamentary elections in 1908 during roughly the same time period that constitutional movements were gaining momentum in Tehran and Istanbul. These were followed by an even more contested election in 1912. Iraq was then to experience the interruptive effects of the First World War followed by a British occupation in 1920. Contrary to the assumption that the British brought with them a model of democracy for the Iraqis to emulate, they instead imposed a monarchy upon the artificially demarcated territory. A caucus in Baghdad demanded that the King head a "democratic, parliamentary, and constitutional government," and when a year later no such representative assembly had yet been established, two political parties emerged to further demand that no treaty with Britain be negotiated until the assembly "is elected in complete freedom."[31] The British High Commissioner, rather than support the move to democratic governance, responded by banning the two parties, closing their newspapers, and harassing their organizers.

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[30] *Al-Hayat*, London, September 7, 2003, as cited in Adeed Dawisha's article, "Democratic Attitudes and Practices in Iraq, 1921-1958," *Middle East Journal* (Winter 2005), pp. 11-30.
[31] As cited in Dawisha, "Democratic Attitudes and Practices in Iraq," pp. 14-15.

Still, a constitution was promulgated and a constituent assembly, *al-Majlis al-Nuwab* (Chamber of Deputies), elected in 1924. Early political parties included the opposition parties, *al-Hizb al-Watani al-'Iraqi* and *Hizb al-Nahda al-'Iraqiyya*, which induced the ruling regime to form *al-Hizb al-Hurr al-'Iraqi*. A number of other political parties came and went during the subsequent decades surrounding popular political figures of their day. The Chamber of Deputies held a total of sixteen elections between 1924 and 1958, prior to the July military coup and the rise of Ba'athist power which led to the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein. The allusion to Iraq's early twentieth century experiences does not provide the only refutation of the assumption that Muslims entirely lack democratic inclinations, movements, or institutions. Just as evident are the number of recent democratic transitions in the Islamic world, during especially the last fifteen years, which have no direct or immediate correlation to former colonial powers nor to western impositions—Turkey (1980), Bangladesh (1990), The Comoros (1990), Mali (1991), Albania (1991, 1997), Indonesia (1999), Niger (1993, 1999), Nigeria (1999), Senegal (2000), The Gambia (1970, 2001), Sierra Leone (1996, 2002).[32]

The counter-argument to the rather pessimistic debate on the compatibility of democracy and the Islamic world may be summarized by a reaction to I. William Zartman's commentary on the supposed contradictions between Islam as a political force and the working reality of a democratic state.[33] While Zartman sees no absolute

[32] Renske Doorenspleet in *Democratic Transitions: Exploring the Structural Sources of the Fourth Wave*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2005, lists states that he perceives as having made transitions to democracy during a "fourth wave," 1989-2001, and those regimes which remained nondemocratic during the same period (p. 51). It is noteworthy that 9 of the 42 states (21%) to have made democratic transitions were within Muslim-majority nations, and that Muslim-majority nations accounted for only half (51%) of those states which remained nondemocratic.

[33] I. William Zartman. "Islam, the State, and Democracy: The Contradictions," in Charles E. Butterworth and I. William Zartman, eds. *Between the State and Islam*. UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001.

incompatibility of religion and democracy in their coexistence, he finds political religion and secular democracy to be irreconcilable:

> The political Islamist's goal is to change the constitution and take the defining terms for the state into his own hands. If he does this to a democratic state, the state is obviously no longer democratic.[34]
>
> To the political religionist, religion includes politics; those who do not acknowledge the fact or interpretation should be excluded from politics. ...To the secular democrat, politics excludes religion as a political principle (although not necessarily as an individual belief)...[35]

Such a narrow concept of democracy, however, may preclude any number of conceivable variations that may prove compatible within the Islamic world, and perhaps, even necessary to democracy's consolidation and sustainability in some instances.

The problem with Zartman's diagnosis stems from his restrictive conception of "political Islam." It is true that the Islamist views all arenas of society, including its governance, to be subordinate to the sovereignty of an almighty Creator-God. Yet, one must acknowledge those Islamists who seek to establish the pure society through the extension of democracy to the community of believers. The crucial distinction now becomes whether those who establish the procedural rules of participation either tolerate or exclude minorities in the form of nonbelievers and adherents to unpopular interpretations of the dominant Islam. If the path chosen is the former, then one must ask whether it is possible to sustain such an arrangement and maintain that Islam remains sovereign. I would posit that this is quite possible given the appropriate political culture.

Al-Wasat (the Center) offers an excellent example of such a party within the context of Egypt, where Islamic parties are officially prohibited and approval by a bureaucracy dominated by the secularist ruling party is required in order to legally

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[34] Ibid., p. 237.
[35] Ibid., p. 243.

participate in election campaigns. In an interview with two of the founders of the party, one of whom is an Arab-Christian and the other was imprisoned on accusations of trying to revitalize the illegal Muslim Brotherhood through al-Wasat, the Islamic identity of the party was described as a cultural, as opposed to a more restrictively religious, identity which all people of any ethnicity or religion in Egypt have in common. Abu 'Ila Madi Abu 'Ila posited that "Western countries, such as Germany, for example, have Christian Democratic parties. I have a Muslim friend in Germany who is a member of the ruling Christian Democratic Union (CDU). Al-Wasat is a civil party like the CDU—our culture is Islamic, while theirs is Christian."[36]

The example of political parties founded upon religious principles in non-Islamic settings is a legitimate one. The notion of a Christian Democratic or Christian Socialist party in modern Europe does not even cause the average Western liberal to raise an eyebrow. The foundation of such a party, at least in its beginnings, is that the religion commands the protection of certain forms of social relationships and the protection or aid of certain societal groups, such as the poor and disadvantaged. The program then sought would use the state's authority and institutions to create such a social order, even to the extent of forcibly extracting property and wealth from some members of society and using it for purposes that those members may wholly disagree with. Can this be considered undemocratic? Hardly. That a democratically elected state guided by religious principles should use taxation and legal authority is no less expected than a proclaimed atheistic, secular democratic state following the same line of action.

[36] Karim al-Gawhary, "We are a Civil Party with an Islamic Identity," *Middle East Report* 199 (April-June 1996), 30-32.

Let us shift back to the Islamic world. So long as the political Islamic state is democratically elected, accepts that minorities have a right to peaceful existence, equality under the law, and nondiscrimination in social and economic settings (including the right to practice a religion according to their conscience), that the state willingly subjects itself to popular accountability through regular future elections, allows for the open competition of oppositionist parties (including secular parties and those based on other religious philosophies), then such an Islamic state must be considered democratic—even if it favors, supports, and subsidizes its own faith and allows its policies to be affected by, or even guided by, Quranic principles and social values. If the state feels that its actions are simply in pursuit of the purer and better society, then it does not even seem unjustified to compel citizens of the minority to contribute resources to such causes—an argument that is not dissimilar to that disseminated by proponents in Western societies who justify reasonable limitations placed on individual freedoms or pursuits in the interests of the common good, or to the defender of the union shop that may legally require members and nonmembers alike to pay union dues, since its actions benefit even the would-be free-rider. So long as the minority maintains its freedoms of worship, expression, association, and fair democratic participation within this state run by a democratically elected religious party, then none of the criteria in Zartman's own definition of democracy have been violated.[37] A greater injustice would exist if the democratic order prohibited the participation of parties whose platforms were religious in their orientations. It may well be that this form of democratic, political Islam has the

[37] "Democracy is a political system in which sovereignty is held by the people, rulers are held periodically accountable to the ruled, minority rights (including the right to become the majority) are protected, and political competition among individuals and ideas is open and unfettered." In Butterworth and Zartman, ed. (2001), p. 233.

most potential among a culture that prides itself in the distinguishing characteristic of a moral superiority over the secular Western world.

THE CENTRAL PROBLEM—RECOGNIZING DEMOCRACY IN THE ISLAMIC WORLD

The fundamental issue underlying the above discussions concerns the question, "To what extent are Muslim-majority nations democratic?" Those that posit the third wave of democracy's general absence or failure to penetrate the Islamic world are at odds with those others who point to democracy's having made significant inroads in several of the nations mentioned above—Albania, Bangladesh, The Comoros, The Gambia, Indonesia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Turkey. Should any of these states be considered democratic? If so, to what extent; are they liberal and stable or illiberal and insecure? Are any of the above, or others overlooked thus far, beyond the early stages of transition and entering some degree of consolidation of democratic system legitimacy? What of other Islamic nations where various democratic structures are detectable, though opposition parties have yet to find victory and peaceful transferal of power—Bahrain, Burkina Faso, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Malaysia, Morocco, Pakistan, and Yemen. Should these be labeled "electoral democracies," "illiberal democracies," "pseudo-democracies," "semi-liberal authoritarian states," or are they simply to be lumped into the class of non-democratic autocracies that have yet to relinquish their stranglehold on the reins of power nor allow for legitimate opening in the realm of civil society opposition and political participation?

The crux of these questions requires us to pin down a workable, operational definition of democracy as concept. It further requires a means of systematic

measurement, comparison, and categorical labeling. There have, of course, been many attempts to disaggregate the concept of democracy. These have ranged from the rather vague and simplistic, such as Abraham Lincoln's Gettysburg definition—"a government of the people, by the people, and for the people"—to the extremely detailed index devised by Michael Saward which contains a total of 24 conditions within five categories.[38] There have of course been a number of definitions which have fallen somewhere within this broad range of specificity and exactness. Again at the more simplistic end, we find Joseph Schumpeter's position that any regime is democratic which has systems for "arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote."[39] Schumpeter's democracy provides a role for the people not to decide on individual issues, but to elect a body of persons, who will be entrusted with the full power to do the collective deciding for them, and to evict it by withdrawing support (failure to re-elect) if necessary at some specified future date. Regardless of the sort of decisions made in the interim period, such a state, in Schumpeter's mind, remains democratic.

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[38] "Democratic Theory and Indices of Democratization," *Defining and Measuring Democracy*, David Beetham, ed. London: Sage Publications, 1994, pp. 6-24. This index includes (A) Basic Freedoms: 1 – free speech and expression, 2 – free movement, 3 – free association, 4 – equal treatment under the law, and 5 – freedom to worship; (B) Citizenship and Participation: 6 – common and standardized means of legal membership, 7 – equal right to run for elective office, 8 – equal eligibility or probability to serve in non-elected decisional bodies, 9 – equal right to vote, 10 – citizens' votes must be decisive, 11 – mechanisms for citizens to vote directly on substantive outcomes, 12 – voting systems express true majority preference in multi-sided contests, 13 – election of representatives renewed at regular and specified intervals, 14 – conduct of regular opinion polls on substantive issues, 15 – a presumption that all issues will be decided by referendums, with clear guidelines as to what issues will not be put to a referendum, and 16 – all issues not expressly prohibited to majority decision must be decided by majority decision within various designated decision-making bodies or mechanisms; (C) Administrative Codes: 17 – Appropriate codes of procedures for employees of public bodies, 18 – regularly produced evidence that public decisions are being put into effect, 19 – time limits placed on the realization of public decisions, 20 – adequate appeals and redress processes within public bodies, 21 – freedom of information from all government bodies with the burden of proof in demonstrating the necessity to withhold full information resting with elected representatives; (D) Publicity: 22 – a regular, formal process of public notification of decisions, options, issues, and outcomes; (E) Social Rights: 23 – equal right to adequate health care, and 24 – equal right to adequate education.

[39] *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*, 1942, p. 269.

Perhaps the most widely excepted and utilized definition of democracy is found in Robert A. Dahl's seminal work, *Polyarchy*[40], in which he outlines eight institutions necessary for the full realization of democracy: (1) that policy and law makers be elected officials[41]; (2) free and fair elections; (3) inclusive and universal suffrage; (4 & 5) the right to run or compete for votes to be elected or re-elected for public office[42]; (6) free expression; (7) free association; and (8) alternative sources of information.

Larry Diamond, as previously mentioned, has taken us still a step further by positing a distinction between liberal democracy, nonliberal electoral democracy, pseudo-democracy, and one-party or no-party authoritarian regimes. In opting for this relatively complex labeling scheme, Diamond has rejected a dichotomous understanding of democracy as being existent or nonexistent in each case. Instead, democracy is recognized as a process in which any particular state at a given time may be relatively further ahead or further behind when compared to another state at that same point in time. His highest or most stringent of categories, the liberal democracy, he defines as follows:

> In addition to the elements of electoral democracy [a civilian, constitutional system in which the legislative and chief executive offices are filled through regular, competitive, multiparty elections with universal suffrage], it requires, first, the absence of reserved domains of power for the military or other actors not accountable to the electorate, directly or indirectly. Second, in addition to the vertical accountability of rulers to the ruled (secured mainly through elections), it requires the horizontal accountability of officeholders to one another; this constrains executive power and so helps protect constitutionalism, legality, and the deliberative process. Third, it encompasses extensive provisions for political and civic pluralism as well as for individuals and group freedoms,

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[40] *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1971.

[41] Dahl originally phrased this point in a manner that seemed to put the emphasis on either the policy itself or the institutions of policy making as having the characteristic of responsiveness. He later clarified this point, however, by explaining the necessity for responsiveness in the policy *makers*, cf. Robert Dahl, *Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982, pp. 10-11. For similar conclusions concerning the nature of regular elections in producing representativeness or responsiveness on the part of elected law makers, see R. Douglas Arnold's *The Logic of Congressional Action*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990.

[42] Note: I have combined these two attributes posited by Dahl due to the conflated nature of the apparent centrality in both of competing for public support in the quest for entry, or re-entry, into the elected bodies of the state.

> so that contending interests and values may be expressed and compete through ongoing processes of articulation and representation, beyond periodic elections.
>
> Freedom and pluralism, in turn, can be secured only through a "rule of law," in which legal rules are applied fairly, consistently, and predictably across equivalent cases, irrespective of the class, status, or power of those subject to the rules. Under a true rule of law, all citizens have political and legal equality, and the state and its agents are themselves subject to the law.
>
> ...if political authority is to be constrained and balanced, individual and minority rights protected, and rule of law assured, democracy requires a constitution that is supreme.[43]

For the purposes of this present work, I will conceptualize liberal democracy as being a regime type whose formal and informal institutional framework is derived from three core principles:

(A) Democratic institutions which support a free and fair, competitive electoral system based upon the tenet of representative government. Subcomponents of this principle include: making both the legislature and the chief executive accountable to citizens in regular, contested elections; providing for voter equality by granting universal suffrage, increasing the percent of the population that is registered to vote, and attempting to minimize vote fraud; ensuring the equal right to compete in elections by granting the right to form political party organizations without discrimination along ethnic, racial, linguistic, religious, gender, ideological, or territorial interests; and increasing the representativeness of the legislature by maximizing the direct correlation between voter preference and seat allocation and by keeping a reasonably low ratio of legislative seats to population size in order to promote a representative per capita formula that encourages a citizen's access to his or her representative voice in the government;

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[43] Larry Diamond. *Developing Democracy.* Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999, pp. 10-11.

(B) Rule of law. Note that this implies a rule of law in the sense of promoting a principle of limited government and a spirit of constitutionalism, values represented by the goals of the state's accountability to the public between elections, transparency of government transactions and deliberations, openness of information, freedom of the press, and ensuring that power holders abide by the specified scope of duties assigned to the public office they posses as opposed to abusing the privilege of power for personal gain. I am not conceptualizing the rule of law to include the principles of law and order and state security, for these may well be significant supports for a state's political legitimacy, but they are certainly not sure signs of democracy nor liberalism, as the most undemocratic states may prove very adept at controlling crime and unrest; and

(C) Civil liberties, such as freedoms of expression, assembly, association, worship, equal opportunity, privacy, property, movement, and freedoms from intrusions upon family life, arbitrary arrest and imprisonment, and excessive government intervention.

MEASURING DEMOCRACY: A LITERATURE REVIEW

There have been several indices developed in the fields of comparative politics and sociology that have attempted to measure and rank the world's countries, on either ordinal or interval scales, according to their degree of democracy. The most popular and commonly used is arguably Freedom House's "Freedom Index," published annually in its

Freedom in the World report.[44] This index assesses a country's recent social and political conditions, granting them a rank of 1 to 7 (a 1 indicating the greatest degree of freedom and a 7 the least) in both "political rights" and "civil liberties." From this they derive an average score and label the country as either "Free" (1.0 to 2.5), "Partly Free" (3.0 to 5.5), or "Not Free" (5.5 to 7.0). Larry Diamond has gone so far as to claim that "[t]he 'free' rating in the Freedom House survey is the best available empirical indicator of liberal democracy."[45] There are, however, several other indices developed as early as the 1950s which have attempted to accomplish this same goal. Furthermore, not all scholars within the subfield of comparative politics have readily agreed with Diamond's optimistic approval of the Freedom House index.

A number of valid criticisms have been offered concerning some of the more well-known democracy indices. I will here recall a few of these criticisms as well as offer my own insights into problems of conceptualization and methodological design. Some past indices have had limited scope in terms of the number of countries analyzed. The original Polity I dataset introduced in 1974 by Ted Robert Gurr was for the most part limited to European and Latin American countries.[46] Zebra F. Arat's 1991 index on the other hand focused only upon less developed countries (LDCs).[47] While such considerations of scope may well influence a researcher's decision as to whether to use data from a particular index, it is the question of validity due to the adequacy of the operational definition of democracy and the closeness of fit for indicators chosen to

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[44] Freedom House. *Freedom in the World: Country Ratings, 1972 to 2005.* Retrieved from http://www.freedomhouse.org/ratings/index.htm.
[45] Diamond, 1999, p. 12.
[46] "Persistence and change in political systems, 1800-1971," *American Political Science Review* 68:4 (December 1974), pp. 1482-1504.
[47] *Democracy and Human Rights in Developing Countries.* Boulder, CO: Lynn Rienner, 1991.

represent and measure democracy's various attributes that causes the greatest concern over indices chosen for a research design.

The latter concern over the settlement upon valid indicators of democracy is illustrated by several works written by Kenneth A. Bollen.[48] Bollen focuses the attention of researchers in this subfield upon three methodological issues—the need to clearly portray one's conceptual definition of democracy, the need to ensure that the measurable indicators in one's operational definition retain a closeness of fit to this conceptual definition, and the need to test for validity of these indicators by employing a confirmatory factor analysis and looking for high correlations among indicators in the model and to the latent variable they represent—i.e., political democracy. In his 1993 article, Bollen calls special attention to various indicators that have been included within existing indices which are only loosely related to democracy, such as voter turnout or political stability.[49] While these are both important political concepts in their own right, they are better left to studies of the impact of democracy upon such conditions or vice versa, rather than falsely assuming that such variables are determinants of democracy's existence. Voter turnout, as either the percentage of the adult population or the percentage of registered voters that actually casts ballots on election day, varies greatly within long recognized democracies, has been in some cases legally required of citizens (e.g., Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Cyprus, and Italy), and is often significantly higher for simple affirmation referendums and single-candidate elections in states which are widely recognized as having the least degrees of democratic

[48] "Issues in the Comparative Measurement of Political Democracy," *American Sociological Review* 45:3 (1980), pp. 370-90; "Political Democracy: Conceptual and Measurement Traps," *On Measuring Democracy*, Inkeles, ed., 1991, pp. 3-20; "Liberal Democracy: Validity and Method Factors in Cross-National Measures," *American Journal of Political Science*, 34:4 (Nov. 1993), pp. 1207-30.
[49] Bollen, 1993, p. 1210.

governance.[50] Indices that have incorporated voter turnout include those constructed by Daniel Lerner,[51] Arthur K. Smith,[52] Robert W. Jackman,[53] Philip Coulter,[54] Steven Stack,[55] and Tatu Vanhanen.[56]

Political stability is another condition that is often confused with democratic governance. It is one thing to assume that democracy does or does not create stability; it is quite another to posit that stability is a key indicator of democracy's presence. One need only think of the staying power demonstrated by some of the world's premier authoritarian states and the degree of law and order maintained within their borders (e.g., Libya 1969 to present) to realize the fallacy of this position. Yet, some indices have reserved the democratic classification for cases that have had lengthy periods of electoral performance, such as Lipset's practice of classifying Latin American states as democratic only if they have had a "history of more or less free elections for most of the post-WWI period,"[57] a forty year period at the time Lipset published his work. Granted, there is something to say for seeing consistency or coherence as evidence that a regime type has been accurately assigned. Such arbitrarily strict criteria, however, causes the researcher to downplay or miss the degrees of sporadic or developing democratic practice in transitional states. Others who have incorporated the variable, political stability, in their

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[50] For example, Ukraine's referendum in 2000 to increase to powers of the president and restructure the parliament had a turnout of 77.4% of registered voters, as opposed to the 60.2% turnout of registered voters in Canada's parliamentary elections that same year.
[51] *The Passing of Traditional Society*. Glencoe: Free Press, 1958.
[52] "Socioeconomic Development and Political Democracy," *Midwest Journal of Political Science* (1969), pp. 95-125.
[53] *Politics and Social Equality: A Comparative Analysis*. NY: Wiley, 1975.
[54] *Social Mobilization and Liberal Democracy*. Lexington: Lexington Books, 1975.
[55] "The Effects of Political Participation and Socialist Party Strength on the Degree of Income Inequality," *American Sociological Review* (1979), pp. 168-71.
[56] *Prospects of Democracy: A Study of 172 Countries*. London: Routledge, 1997.
[57] "Some Social Requisites of Democracy," *American Political Science Review* (1959), pp. 69-105.

indices include Phillips Cutright,[58] Smith (1969), Coulter (1975), Christopher Hewitt,[59] and Edward N. Muller.[60]

In his 1980 essay, Bollen also includes some discussion concerning the inconclusiveness surrounding the use of another group of indicators of questionable validity, those concentrating on measures of social justice—i.e., relatively equal distribution of wealth, public education, universal health care, or social welfare programs for the disadvantaged. Past research has produced mixed findings in this arena. Cutright[61] and Stack[62] both conclude that democracy does in fact significantly reduce income inequality, whereas Jackman (1975) and Hewitt (1977) both dispute such a relationship. Regardless of which pair of studies one finds more convincing, it must be recognized that these are two distinct phenomena with a causal or non-causal relationship—i.e., one is not an indicator of the other as they are not measuring the same socio-political phenomenon. Still, however, we find the inclusion of such indicators in both Saward's model mentioned above[63] and in Gastil's checklist of indicators of "Civil Liberties" which has long been a part of the basic framework for the Freedom House index.[64] Gastil has, according Bollen, made "clear that their object of study is political

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[58] "National Political Development: Its Measures and Analysis," *American Sociological Review* (1963), pp. 253-64.
[59] "The Effect of Political Democracy and Social Democracy on Equality in Industrial Societies: A Cross-national Comparison," *American Sociological Review* (1977), pp. 450-64.
[60] "Democracy, Economic Development, and Income Inequality," *American Sociological Review* (1988), pp. 50-68.
[61] "Inequality: A Cross-national Analysis," *American Sociological Review* (1967), pp. 562-78.
[62] "Internal Political Organization and the World Economy of Income Inequality," *American Sociological Review* (1978), pp. 271-2.
[63] Michael Saward. "Democratic Theory and Indices of Democratization," *Defining and Measuring Democracy*, David Beetham, ed. London: Sage Publications, 1994, pp. 6-24.
[64] Raymond D. Gastil. "The Comparative Survey of Freedom: Experiences and Suggestions," *On Measuring Democracy: Its Consequences and Concomitants*, Alex Inkeles, ed., New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publications, 1991, pp. 32-3.

not social democracy."[65] This begs the question, however, as to why if social democracy is not the object of study it is being conflated with a design to measure political democracy.

While the above are cases of including indicators better left alone, there are also those who have arrived at questionable decisions to exclude an indicator which has strong face validity, being so closely tied to the conceptual and operational definitions of democracy adopted by the researcher. Bollen's 1993 article for example seems to accept the conclusions made by Michael Coppedge and Wolfgang Reinicke in 1991 that it is not useful to include measures for the extent of the suffrage franchise.[66] Coppedge and Reinicke's 1991 study proposes to accept Dahl's two dimensions of democracy/polyarchy—contestation and inclusiveness—and yet, they retain only four indicators of the former dimension in their model, making a conscious decision to drop *universal suffrage* as an indicator of democracy. Their conclusion is that in the modern era even authoritarian states where no elections are held claim to provide universal suffrage for their citizens; therefore this indicator contributes little to the measurement of polyarchy.[67] What is questionable here lies in their coding procedures, not in the usefulness of the suffrage franchise as an indicator of democratic practice. Coppedge et al. fail to explain why they have chosen to rate such states as having universal suffrage when no recognizable segment of the population has any de facto suffrage at all. Just because a less than democratic chief executive claims to be democratic does not mean that a political scientist's measure of democracy must follow suit. If no elections are held, no suffrage exists, and such cases should be coded accordingly. There are also

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[65] Bollen, 1991, p. 9.
[66] Bollen, 1993, p. 1209.
[67] "Measuring Polyarchy," *On Measuring Democracy*, Inkeles, ed., 1991, pp. 47-68.

states which nearly reach the standard of guaranteeing universal suffrage, yet exclude a questionable segment of population. Israel, for example, excludes only the Arab residents of East Jerusalem from its elections, meaning that about three percent of the estimated adult population is excluded from otherwise universal suffrage at age 18.

A second variable that appears to have some conceptual confusion associated with it, leading to its exclusion from several models, is that of party competition. Dahl's 1971 two- dimensional conception is one of the most commonly adopted definitions utilized in popular models of democracy.[68] Yet, while Dahl's two aforementioned dimensions of democracy includes contestation, both Bollen (1991) and Coppedge et al. (1991) choose to exclude the party composition of the legislature. Bollen acknowledges that if legal prohibitions against parties exist this diminishes the status of democracy within a country, yet he posits that effective party competition as measured by the party composition of the legislature is not a valid measure, going so far as to state that "it is theoretically possible for a one-party state to respect political rights and political liberties."[69] It is true that having multiple parties does not guarantee political liberties, but on the other hand, the existence of a one-party state is indicative that political rights could not have been well respected either. The problem here is two-fold. First, Bollen has erroneously concluded that political rights are maintained in a state with only one effective party. If this is so, then it is Bollen's conception of "political rights" which is at fault, for if seats of political power—i.e., executive and legislative seats—are truly open to contestation, then such democracies will inevitably experience a diverse candidate

[68] Bollen (1991) uses "political rights" and "political liberties;" Gastil (1991) uses "political rights" and civil liberties;" Vanhanen (1997) uses "competition" and "participation;" and Axel Hadenius uses "elections" and "political freedoms" in *Democracy and Development*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
[69] Bollen, 1991, p. 9.

and/or political party scramble for such seats. On the other hand, if 100% (or even 90%) of the elective seats in government are filled with a single party, this indicates either de jure bans on contestation or party organization, severe electoral fraud in vote counting, institutional barriers to contestation such as unreasonably high thresholds to be placed on the ballot (e.g., a rather high vote gain by the party in a previous election), or de facto intimidation and persecution of opposition groups. An effective-parties indicator does not attempt to measure civil liberties, but it does account for political rights in the context of institutionalized, free and fair electoral processes. This may also be seen in ratio indicators of vote-to-seat allocation within a legislature, for a particular party's unusually disproportionate seat acquisition following an election relative to the percentage of votes cast in favor of the said party is a sign of electoral rules and/or their manipulation resulting in a seated legislature that is not reflective of the people's choice. Such measures are not overly discriminatory in the sense of demanding multi-party systems over two-party systems, but they do recognize that there must be two or more parties or oppositional coalitions for there to be a valid choice by voters in the electoral contest and that the victors in the election should closely mirror aggregate expressed voter preference.

Further, the Dahlian-style two dimensional conception of democracy, equally weighted, places too much emphasis on the long term fruits of democratic practice—i.e., personal freedoms and civil liberties—as opposed to the immediate evidence of working democratic governance.[70] In other words, democracy is first and foremost indicated by

[70] Cf. Godson E. Dinneya and Asrat Tsegaye. "Constructing a Cardinal Measure of Democratic Development in a Transition Polity: The Nigerian Example," *Canadian Journal of Political Science* (June 2004), pp. 347-373, on the problems of overemphasizing the civil liberties dimension when rating transitional states.

the political rights/contestation/free-and-fair elections dimension as well as a second dimension that indicates democratic practice in between, and leading up to, the next election—transparency and openness of information, accountability to the public, and prosecution of corruption or extralegal activities committed by the state. Most two dimensional indices fail to recognize the distinct nature of this latter attribute, failing to disaggregate openness of information and press freedom from their other two dimensions. In this sense, civil liberties or personal-social freedoms should be accounted for in indicators of a third dimension of political democracy. Such a three dimensional model is best suited to the operational definition of democracy adopted by the author of this work—i.e., those governing regimes which exhibit high degrees of (a) fair electoral institutions; (b) rule of law/accountability; and (c) respect for civil liberties.

A MODEL FOR MEASURING DEMOCRACY

At this point, I propose to measure these three principles of liberal democracy by devising an aggregated democracy index suitable for comparing the degree of democracy found in various states. I have devised an index which averages 14 component indicators of the first principle—i.e., democratic institutions (see Figure 1.1).

The choice of the 14 variables above may be understood as attempts to measure six institutional supports of democratic ideals. Obtaining a reasonable degree of popular sovereignty is a primary value sought after in the design of truly democratic regimes. The principle tool to accomplish popular sovereignty in modern republics has long been the holding of popular elections in which the state's top leadership and policy makers are held vertically accountable through subjection to the choice of voters. This first

institutional goal, vertical accountability, has been measured by variables one and four, as well as variables two, three, and five; the latter three follow the assumption that constitutionally designated elective terms of office should be short enough to provide voters with the opportunity to react to significant policy decisions and variations in performance on the part of the states leadership.

A second goal of electoral democracies is to provide for, or allow for, meaningful alternatives or choices on the voters' ballots. This principle may be summarily labeled contestation, for it is in contested elections that a voter is given the opportunity to either reward an incumbent leader for good past performance and meaningful promises for the future or to punish an incumbent's poor performance or lack of foresight and innovation by replacing him or her with a more appealing opponent. Contestation is measured through variables seven, ten, and eleven.

A third goal in democracies is the provision of inclusive participation. Participation is a matter of free choice on the part of citizens to exercise the right to voice their individual preferences, rather than the extent to which a citizenry actually chooses to vote in any given election. For this reason, variables fourteen and eight have been chosen as indicators that the state has chosen to reduce procedural or prejudicial obstacles to participation if a voter so chooses to exercise this right.

A fourth goal is that of ensuring the necessary connection between popular voice and state responsiveness. In other words, not only should the citizenry have the opportunity to express their preferences, but these expressions should be translated into meaningful results via the institutions of democracy.

Figure 1.1-- Democratic Institutions Index--Explanation of Variable Rating Scheme

(1) EXECUTIVE ELECTED: Yes, directly/popularly = 1; Yes, indirectly (as in cases of indirect election by a small subset of the population who are themselves elected and representative of the populace) = 0.5; No (to include hereditary acquisition, military seizure of power, or appointment by a small nonrepresentative and unelected subset of the population) = 0
(2) LENGTH OF EXECUTIVE TERM: ≤ baseline = 1; 101 to 199% baseline = 2 - (percent expressed as a decimal greater than 1, but less than 2); > 200% = 0
(3) TENURE OF INCUMBENT EXECUTIVE: (a measure of the democratic turnover of executive power expressed in years): ≤ baseline = 1; 101 to 199% baseline = 2 - (percent expressed as a decimal greater than 1, but less than 2); > 200% = 0
(4) % LEGISLATURE ELECTED: 0.0 to 1.0
(5) LENGTH OF LEGISLATIVE TERM: see note (2)
(6) TWO CONSECUTIVELY SCHEDULED ELECTIONS HELD: (two consecutive, legally or constitutionally mandated legislative or executive elections) Yes = 1; 1 held/cancelled = .5; No = 0
(7) CONTESTED ELECTION: ≥ 3 national parties running candidates or 3+ independent candidates running for the office of chief executive, or 3+ national parties running leglislative party list, or 3+ national parties fielding candidates in 1/4 or more states or electoral districts in a national election = 1; 2 party or independent candidates = .5; 1 candidate in "yes or no" electoral referendum or no candidates/no elections = 0
(8) SUFFRAGE: M + F: ≤ 18 years = 1; M + F: > 18 years = 1 - .1 per year above 18; M only = 0.5; limited to only a specific class or subset (other than gender) of the population = 1 - percent (expressed as a decimal less than one) of population without suffrage
(9) ELECTORAL REGULARITY: Percentage of votes invalidated in the most recent legislative election, or executive election the former vote data is unavailable; ≤ baseline = 1; 101 to 199% baseline = 2 - (percent expressed as a decimal greater than 1, but less than 2); > 200% = 0
(10) RIGHT TO COMPETE: No bans on (a) ethnic/racial, (b) gender, (c) religious, (d) communist/ideological, (e) territorial or linguistic nationalist/separatist parties or candidates = 1; 1 - 0.20 per categorical ban on parties or candidates; a 0.2 deduction will also be assessed for reports of extensive violence during elections and/or campaigns and voter/candidate intimidation
(11) NUMBER OF EFFECTIVE PARLIAMENTARY PARTIES: see the Laakso & Taagepera formula as it is presented in Arend Lijphart's Patterns of Democracy, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999, p. 68. $N = 1 / (\sum Si^2)$, where S = proportion of seats of the i-th party. Note: for the 36 consolidated democracies, average numbers for the 25 year period of 1971 to 1996 are derived from Lijphart's book (Appendix A, pp. 312-14). Note: This variable is calculated for Islamic nations using figures from the most recent legislative election. ≥ baseline = 1; < baseline = percent expressed as decimal less than one
(12) DIRECT IMPACT OF CITIZEN VOTE UPON SEAT ALLOCATION: Largest Party's % of vote ÷ % of seats held after most recent legislative election. 1:1 ratio = 1; 0:1 = 0; continuous scale in between these ratios
(13) RATIO OF REPRESENTATION: # of elected representatives per capita. ≥ baseline = 1; < baseline = percent of the baseline expressed as decimal less than one
(14) REGISTERED VOTERS AS A % OF THE VOTING-AGE POPULATION: Source: WHO: "Pop. by age, 2003"; Estimate = registered or enrolled voters ¸ (total popul. - ("0 to 1" + "1 to 4" + "5 to 9" + "10 to 14" + .6*"15-19")); ≥ baseline = 1; < baseline = percent of baseline expressed as a decimal less than one. Note: (?) indicates that the # of voters listed by all of three sources--Psephos, IFES, or national election agencies--exceeds the estimate of voting age population in 2003 using WHO statistics and the above formula of estimation.

Figure 1.1--Continued

BASELINE: The baseline score for variables 2, 3, 5, 9, 11, 13, and 14 are derived from the column average for the 36 consolidated democracies listed in Lijphart's *Patterns of Democracy* (1999). The scores recorded for the 46 Muslim-majority nations are then a measure of deviation from this mean. The other seven variables, however, will be coded independent of any pattern shown by the 36 aforementioned states.

COMPOSITE SCORE OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS (0 to 10) = for each country: [(∑v1...v14) ÷ 14] x 10 Note: 0 being the least degree of democratic institutionalization; 10 being the greatest degree of democratic institutionalization.

The voice-responsiveness goal is measured by variables twelve and thirteen. The former is a more obvious example the full relationship between the two facets of this goal, whereas the latter variable relates primarily to attempted assurance of the opportunity of the former facet, assuming that an elected official with a relatively small constituency will possess a greater ability to detect their preferences than would an official with an enormous number of voters to represent. The purpose of variable nine is to measure the institutional performance of the electoral process, assuming that an unusually high degree of invalidated ballots indicates procedural irregularities and therefore obstacles to a realization of the population's true voice.

Finally, variable six again recognizes that democratization is a process that is not fully accomplished upon a state's first free and fair election. Thus, this variable rewards states that have demonstrated forward momentum in this transitional and ongoing path toward a more consolidated and institutionalized democracy. The reader may note also that an arbitrary "best value" has not been chosen for variables two, three, five, nine, eleven, thirteen, and fourteen. Instead, a baseline score is established by averaging the scores for these variables among long-standing, widely recognized democracies in the world. The scores then calculated for Muslim-majority nations for each respective variable is a measure of the state's deviation from the democratic norm.

The index just explained is of course a measure of the institutional dimension of democratic governance. Rather than reject all of the other indices of democracy critiqued in the previous section, however, I posit that there is a complimentarity among at least several of the various indices, strengths that could be drawn upon to enrich my own model. Yet, this must be accomplished in the proper framework ensuring the proper weight of particular dimensions and following the proper means of aggregating the results so as to draw the most meaningful comparisons among states, not simply at the total aggregate level, but at the level of each separate dimension in the operational definition of political democracy. Thus, in order to temper any bias or subjectivity in my index, I will be averaging its outcomes with those of two other indices of democratic institutions: the University of Maryland's Polity IV Project of 2003 and Freedom House's Political Rights index from the 2005 "Freedom in the World" publication. As a measure of the rule of law, I will average the results of two indices: Transparency International's 2004 "Corruption Perceptions Index" and Freedom House's 2005 "Freedom of the Press Index." The measure of civil liberties will be based upon Freedom House's 2005 Civil Liberties index. Finally, an additional seventh index, the "Voice and Accountability" component of the 2004 edition of the World Bank's Governance Indicators, will also be averaged in as it is a rather comprehensive, composite index of all three principles of democracy which includes the ratings of up to 16 different indices and surveys from university research programs, nonprofit nongovernmental organizations, state agencies, and for-profit business consulting firms. Although each of these indices follows a unique rating scheme (0 to 13, -10 to 10, 7 to 1, 0 to 10, 100 to 0, 7 to 1, and -2.5 to 2.5 respectively) country ratings recorded by each of these indices will be converted to a

single scale of 0 to 10, with 0 indicating the least degree of democracy and 10 the greatest degree. The conversion score will ensure greater integrity in comparison and averaging among indices.

The end result for the Aggregated Democracy Index is an average of the seven indices with the greatest weight being given to the existence of fair and competitive democratic electoral institutions (three and one-third indices), the next greatest weight being given to the rule of law in the sense of accountability due to transparency within the government and openness of information (two and one-third indices), and the least weight being given to the measure of civil liberties (one and one-third indices).[71] To those who would question the decision to weight the democratic institutions principle in the index, as opposed to ensuring an equal weight be allocated to each dimension, I offer the response that democracy is first and foremost found in the presence of what may be labeled "electoral democracy," and though this is certainly not in and of itself the most desirable of democratic forms, without these institutions a regime type other than democracy is being described—perhaps, some form of liberal authoritarian or monarchial state. The rule of law is arguably the next most critical principle in that without it, the institutions of democratic governance will not, and cannot, function as they are intended. Furthermore, it is nearly impossible to require or expect a citizenry to effectively evaluate their state's performance and ideological compatibility through their vote without open access to information. Finally, civil liberties, while certainly no less important within the context of human rights and the pursuit of happiness, are simply the final element which

[71] Note that this explanation has posited that the World Bank's "Voice and Accountability" index has contributed equally to each category, as it includes measures of each of them.

transforms a simple electoral democracy into a liberal democracy, this being the progressive outcome hoped for in the ongoing process of transition and consolidation.[72]

Given that the Aggregated Democracy Index, as well each component index within it, is scored on a continuous interval scale, we should with some degree of confidence be able to compare the relative level of democratic practice among states. States will then be labeled as having (a) nondemocratic governance (possessing a score of 0 to 3.3), (b) pseudo-democratic governance (3.4 to 6.7), or (c) democratic governance (6.8 to 10). In other words, this study of democracy assumes a process-oriented perspective, finding it difficult to locate cases of purely democratic or nondemocratic governance. Additionally, I will then distinguish states within the third categorical label, democracies, according to whether they are in transitional or consolidated stages of democracy, the latter only being reached when (a) no significant, active antidemocratic, insurrectionary movements remain within their borders, and (b) the state has experienced its first peaceful transition between incumbent and opposition leaders through an electoral process.

On a final note concerning the methodology related to the design of the Aggregated Democracy Index, it is important to recognize the need to test for both internal and external validity by examining the correlation among variables included in the model—assuming that a high correlation among variables indicates a similar relationship between each and that which it is claimed to measure, the latent variable of political democracy.[73]

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[72] Cf. Dinneya et al., 2004.
[73] Cf. Kenneth Bollen. "Liberal Democracy: Validity and Method Factors in Cross-National Measures," *American Journal of Political Science* (Nov. 1993), 1207-30.

DEMOCRATIC CULTURE IN THE ISLAMIC WORLD

As democratization theory moves beyond infancy we look to its application within societies with increasingly divergent cultural assumptions, and these diverse beliefs and values are often assumed to have an impact on the potential for successful democratic governance. Inherent, for example, in the aforementioned debate concerning the compatibility of Islam and democracy is the question of what are the elements of mass culture that must be present in order to shore up support or legitimacy for a democratic system of public decision-making and resource allocation. Rather than intuit such relationships, however, we need to continue to critically question the import of political culture, to disaggregate its component features, and to analyze the causal forces behind a democratic culture's cultivation, transmission, maintenance, and transformation.

The conceptualization of "political culture" and its use as an approach to explain political reality has had a long and variegated history from the works of Plato to Montesquieu to Tocqueville. However, the 1950s and 1960s saw several prominent political scientists—Gabriel Almond, Sidney Verba, Lucian Pye, G. Bingham Powell, Jr.—in the modern era attempt to demonstrate the usefulness of the approach to explain the state of modernization, democratization, legitimacy, and effective governance during the years following the Second World War, and still more who analyzed the effects of political culture in the context of Marxist revolutionary politics during the 1970s, such as Richard H. Solomon and Robert C. Tucker.

The difficulties encountered by political scientists attempting to employ a culturalist approach have been primarily of two varieties. First, there have been inconsistencies in defining what constitutes political culture. The seemingly vague nature

in this approach which utilizes an almost umbrella-like concept lends itself to conceptual stretching, as has been the case with some of the less than scientific uses of political culture theory. Debate has attended to whether political culture is captured by cognitive knowledge, attitudes, feelings and evaluations, ideals, values, and principles, or in actual behavior exhibited by individuals or groups. Further discussion has addressed the merits of analyzing a mass culture as that supposed to be held by a particular nation, or whether inquiry would be better served when concentrating at the level of subcultures within and across national boundaries—i.e., tribal, ethnic, religious, elite, or social class subcultures. Pioneers in the field had also quickly become concerned over the indiscriminate use of the term "culture" in academic discourse, as exhibited in Sidney Verba's warning that it could become "a residual category casually used to explain anything that cannot be explained by more precise and concrete factors."[74] This concern of course is best remedied by an expressly disaggregated and consistently used operational definition of political culture. Arguably, one of the most commonly referenced definitions of political culture is that of Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba from there seminal work, *The Civic Culture*, "the specifically political orientations—attitudes toward the political system and its various parts, and attitudes toward the role of the self in the system."[75] Thus, the study of democratic culture necessitates a study of the beliefs, knowledge, attitudes, and judgments within a populace toward their political system.

In an effort to refute those claiming the culturally undemocratic nature of Islam, I test two hypotheses in response to Samuel P. Huntington's rather pessimistic summation of democracy in the Islamic world. Huntington writes, "A profoundly anti-democratic

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[74] "Conclusion: Comparative Political Culture," in Pye and Verba (eds.), *Political Culture and Political Development*, Princeton, 1965, p. 553.
[75] *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*, Princeton University, 1963, p.12.

culture would impede the spread of democratic norms in the society, deny legitimacy to democratic institutions, and thus greatly complicate if not prevent the emergence and effective functioning of those institutions."[76] He goes on to posit that although Islam has several features that are in congruence with democratic norms, the only Arab-Muslim country with some past success with democracy was Lebanon, where "40 to 50 percent of its population was Christian. Once Muslims became a majority in Lebanon and began to assert themselves, Lebanese democracy collapsed."[77] Huntington has made a profoundly unfounded assertion in this last statement, yet one with profound implications was it to be accepted as true. I hypothesize instead, however, that there is no significant correlation between the percent of Muslims in a population and the degree of democracy found therein, an assertion easily tested against the Aggregated Democracy Index calculated in this same chapter. As a further test of the Democracy Index as the dependent variable, I will identify the extent of the correlation between 13 indicators of religiosity in the World Values Survey concerning my eleven-country sample (see Figure 1.2). This second test recognizes that there may be a distinction between confessional affiliation and actual religious practice, adherence to scriptural precepts, or obeiance of clerical guidance. Thus, a test for the impact of religiosity on democratization may provide insight into an area of political and institutional activity that the relatively simpler Muslim identity would otherwise overlook.

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[76] "Democracy's Third Wave," *Journal of Democracy* (Spring 1991), pp. 12-34. Also reprinted in *Comparative Politics: Notes and Readings*, 8th ed., Bernard E. Brown and Roy C. Macridis, eds. NY: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1996, pp. 169-184.
[77] Ibid., p. 180.

Figure 1.2--Thirteen Indicators of Religiosity—World Values Survey (2000)

1. Religion is very important in your life. (A006, WVS: V9)
2. It is especially important that children be encouraged to learn religious faith at home. (A040, WVS: V22)
3. You spend time with people at your church, mosque, or synagogue weekly to once or twice a month. (A060, WVS: V30)
4. You have a great deal to quite a lot of confidence in churches. (E069, WVS: V147)
5. Apart from weddings, funerals, and christenings, you attend religious services once a month or more. (F028, WVS: V185)
6. Yes, you would say that you are a religious person. (F034, WVS: V186)
7. Churches in your country are giving adequate answers to moral problems and the needs of individuals. (F035, WVS: V187)
8. Churches in your country are giving adequate answers to the problems of family life. (F036, WVS: V188)
9. Churches in your country are giving adequate answers to the social problems facing your country today. (F038, WVS: V190)
10. Yes, you believe in God. (F050, WVS: V191)
11. You find that you get comfort and strength from religion. (F064, WVS: V197)
12. You agree or strongly agree that politicians who don't believe in God are unfit for public office. (F102, WVS: V200)
13. You agree or strongly agree that it would be better for [country] if more people with strong religious beliefs held public office. (F104, WVS: 202)

Secondly, political culture has never benefited from the simplicity in explanation produced for example in the concept of "rational utility maximization" in the rational choice approach. Culture is often used as a sort of interactive variable in that it is neither clearly the independent nor dependent variable in the preponderance of cases. It has been used as either an intermediate or intervening variable between others, or has taken a causal direction in some cases, but a dependent direction in others. This sort of flexibility—or inconsistency in the eyes of some—has led even the foremost political culturalists, such as Almond, to suggest that political culture was not so much a "theory," but "a set of variables which may be used in the construction of theories," and that it should continue to be "treated as both an independent and dependent variable."[78] The political culture concept when considered in isolation may be viewed as a suggestive

[78] Almond, "Intellectual History of the Civic Culture Concept," in Almond and Verba (eds.), *The Civic Culture Revisited*, Newbury Park, 1989, pp. 26, 28-9.

principle with heuristic value. It requires, however, the supplementation of other conceptual approaches to achieve more realistic applications and explanation.

Institutional theory provides just such an approach to explaining the existence of democracy absent overtly secular and recognizably civic cultures. Institutional theory, has been embodied in works by scholars such as Arend Lijphart, Benjamin Reilly, Douglass C. North, Robert H. Bates, Peter A. Hall, G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Christopher J. Anderson, Christina A. Guillory, James March, Johan Olsen, Terry M. Moe, Sven Steinmo, Kenneth Shepsle, Stephan Krasner, John Ferejohn, Morris Fiorina, etc. This is by no means a comprehensive list. Still, what most of these authors share in common is the belief that institutional structures and rules of both a formal-legal and informal-normative-social organization variety affect both individual and collective behavior. Further, given the lasting or durable nature of most institutional arrangements, these structures of incentives, constraints, and social pressures have the capability of either transforming or maintaining patterns of behavior and habits of mind. The implication for democratization theory is that once democratic and democracy-supportive institutions are in place, functional, and enforced, these institutions will have the capability of cultivating a complementary democratic political culture given a long enough duration in order to reshape popular justifications and encouragements for democratic activity and to habitualize democratic thought and action in the mass populace. The implication posited then for the democracies found in Muslim-majority nations follows a similar logic—principally, that it is worth objectively recognizing the degree of democracy present in states that may not appear to be heavily democratic in a western sense, for the institutionalization of various democratic practices may well serve to provide the ongoing

process of democratization a lasting foothold within such nations, a foothold that generally becomes entrenched and increasingly difficult to reverse with time.

WHAT LIES AHEAD: A CHAPTER OUTLINE

The above discussions have drafted a series of related arguments in understanding the past and present growth of democracy in the Islamic world. Having recalled the concerns posited by neo-orientalist and clash of civilizations theorists, we have begun an effort at refutation of some of these concerns which will be continued in the next two chapters. Chapter two deals head on with the assertion that democratic principles and values are foreign to Islamic culture by way of analyzing Islam's most foundational holy book, the Qur'an. In this chapter, I have detailed scriptural references concerning issues of tolerance, limited government, individualism, fallible interpretation, constraints upon the use of violence, justice, ending oppression and corruption, equality, leniency, truth, property, and socio-economic justice. The purpose of this chapter is to distinguish between Islamic justifications for political violence on the one hand and political interests that seek violence as a means and only then proceed to use a selective brand of scriptural reference in order to justify one's pre-existing political ideology. Chapter two also alludes to diversity in political Islamist thought, recognizing liberal and moderate strands as well as a radical strand, and provides for hope in the current and likely future of democracy's march into the Islamic world.

Chapter three deals directly with the mathematical models proposed in this chapter in the effort to measure existing democratic institutions and the tests for correlation between the degree of existing democracy and the degree of religiosity in a

11-country sample of Muslim-majority nations.[79] In chapter three, I more fully examine Islamic democracies utilizing the Aggregated Democracy Index (ADI) described above. Additionally, I utilize the ADI to refute the claim that democracy cannot or does not exist in Islamic cultures. This is done utilizing my test of the ADI against two measures of religiosity in all 46 Muslim-majority countries—(a) the percent of Muslims in the total population and (b) the 13 indicators of religiosity in the 2000 round of the World Values Survey for the 11-country sample from this list of 46 states.

Finally, chapter four offers a conclusion by way of summarizing the findings in this book and the contributions it has made to this strand of political research, noting also however the limitations in the scope of the study, and offering suggestions for further testing.

[79] The eleven-country sample from the 2000 series of the *World Values Survey* includes Albania, Algeria, Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Jordan, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Turkey. Azerbaijan, also a Muslim-majority nation, was left out of my sample, because over half of the questions in the religiosity index were not asked in this latter state.

CHAPTER TWO

THE ROOTS OF BOTH LIBERALISM AND RADICALISM IN THE QUR'AN: IMPLICATIONS FOR MUSLIM POLITICS

INTRODUCTION

Much post-September 11th, 2001 commentary and analysis of the politics and cultures of the Middle East have adopted long established, though misguided assumptions about the nature of Islam as a religion and political Islam as this religion's assumed effect upon movements and states in this region of the world. We repeatedly see the perception expressed on the part of American leaders that Islam has overarching values and doctrines that cultivate or shape the disaffected into radicals, often referred to as fundamentalists or Islamists or simply terrorists. Recall the interview in February 2002 with former Attorney General John Ashcroft by columnist Cal Thomas in which he allegedly said, "Islam is a religion in which God requires you to send your son to die for him. Christianity is a faith in which God sends his son to die for you." Add to this the statements made by Lt. Gen. William G. Boykin, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, in June of 2003. According to an *L.A. Times* article, in addressing a group of Christians, he was quoted as having said, "radical Islamists" hate America "because we're a Christian nation, because our foundation and our roots are Judeo-Christian." George W. Bush told *Time* magazine in an interview in August 2004 that the war on terror is a "long-standing ideological struggle." Again, in addressing the U.N. General Assembly on September 21, 2004, Bush claimed:

> These rights are advancing across the world. And across the world, the enemies of human rights are responding with violence. Terrorists and their allies believe the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the American Bill of Rights and

> every charter of liberty ever written are lies to be burned and destroyed and forgotten. They believe the dictators should control every mind and every tongue in the Middle East and beyond. They believe that suicide and torture and murder are fully justified to serve any goal they declare. And they act on their beliefs.[1]

Sentiments such as these hark back to a school of thought exhibited in such works as Bernard Lewis' article, "The Roots of Muslim Rage,"[2] and Samuel P. Huntington's "The Clash of Civilizations."[3] These two works express the sentiment that policy decisions, military and economic interests, political ideologies, nationalism, the nature of government regimes are all overshadowed presently by a more potent force embodied in a distinguishable sense of identity based upon religious or ethnic divisions. Both feel that there is an inherent cultural divide between "East" and "West"—i.e., between Western and Islamic "civilizations"—which promotes an "us" versus "them" mentality. Huntington posits that "In the Arab world, in short, Western democracy strengthens anti-Western political forces."[4] Rather than focus upon the concrete political decisions made by regime leaders concerning sovereignty, trade, alliances, wars, loans, and aid as the impetus for recent conflicts, these authors allow such actions to be subsumed within the blanket of cultural civilizations. The result of which allows Huntington to contrast the West's quest for liberalism and free markets with violence seen in Africa, the Mediterranean, Eastern Europe, the Indian subcontinent and the Austral-Asian islands. The latter phenomena, he summarizes with the claim, "Islam has bloody borders."[5]

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[1] "Transcript: At U.N., Bush Defends His Decision to Go to War," *Washington Post*. September 21, 2004.
[2] Lewis, Bernard. "The Roots of Muslim Rage," *The Atlantic Monthly*, v266, September 1990.
[3] Huntington, Samuel P. "The Clash of Civilizations," *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1993, v72, n3. Page numbers correspond to the 23-page version available on-line at http://alamut.com/subj/economics/misc/clash.html.
[4] Ibid., p. 8.
[5] Ibid., p. 11.

Undeniably culture matters. Religious identities have served as powerful tools to mobilize public sentiment and justify policy decisions. However, the chief problem with the "clash of civilizations" model is that culture becomes all encompassing, and therefore the profane world of politics becomes just another facet of the sacred world of religion. Furthermore, by viewing culture in terms of broad civilizations[6] one must associate diverse local cultures and ignore their important differences. When making policy decisions, as people such as President Bush, Lt. Gen. Boykin, or Attorney General Ashcroft must, it becomes increasingly difficult to distinguish between Arab Jews, Arab Muslims, Arab Christians, and Arab secularists; between conservative Muslims, moderate Muslims, reformist Muslims, and radical Muslims; between Muslims who view Islam as evolving in its application to modern society and those who feel its applications have remained constant since the first Islamic communities under the Prophet Muhammad; between Sunni and Shiite Muslims; between Shiite scholars who embrace a role in political leadership and those Shiite 'ulama who distance themselves from such roles; between those who feel that the Qur'an, hadith, and tradition are all equally applicable as law and those who feel that only those commands that are clearly prescribed in the Qur'an are infallible, thereby downplaying later doctrines; between those who allow their faith to influence their political sentiments and those who promote their political sentiments by co-opting selected elements of faith as a method of propaganda. The reality is that any of Huntington's "civilizations" is far too complex and divergent to be a single civilization at all.

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[6] Huntington disaggregates the world into only seven or eight regional ethno-religious civilizations, into which all of the world's people neatly fit—Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American, and perhaps African.

DISPELLING COMMON CONJECTURES ABOUT THE QUR'AN AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR MUSLIM POLITICS

Refuting the sort of arguments posited by such leading political philosophers, politicians and military officers as those mentioned above, requires an understanding of the basis of Islamic movements. The foundation of all Islamic movements, though their ends and means vary greatly, is by definition rooted in the foundations of that from which the groups' beliefs and justifications are derived—Islam itself. By this stream of logic then, to understand the fundamental principles of the Islamic socio-political organization one must look to the fundamental source of doctrine in Islam—the Qur'an. There are, of course, several other fonts of religious teaching in Islam—hadith (oral tradition concerning additional sayings of the Prophet), sunna (the example or traditions provided by the life of the Prophet), the judgments of the four rightly guided Caliphs (successors), the lives of the early generations in the first Islamic communities founded by the Prophet, the fatwas and longer explications of early medieval Islamic scholars, and the judgments of Shari'a (Islamic law) courts. However, there are disagreements among Muslims as to the weight that should be accorded to these latter sources in balance to the contents of the Qur'an, which is regarded as the infallible word of God imparted to His "seal" of the prophets, thereby completing the train of revelations from God to His people. Whereas the Qur'an provides a succinct collection of that which completes God's directly revealed guidance, later writings are to be questioned and critiqued in terms of authenticity of claims made, the historical and sociological context in which the authors wrote, the validity of content or intent, the appropriate process and need for ijtihad (interpretation) or ijma' (consensus), and the relative absoluteness of their temporal and spatial applications within Muslim communities today. For these reasons I have chosen to begin

from the Qur'an as the proper starting point for understanding both liberal and radical Islamists. I further posit that what chiefly distinguishes modern liberals and radicals in the Islamic world stems not from the sort of contiguous teachings in the early years that followed Muhammad's period of rule, but rather from the historical events that occurred in the modern period in which these prominent liberals and radicals arose. It is for this reason that, after an analysis of the Qur'an's most obvious teachings which lend themselves easily to political Islamists, I will then look directly to the writings of modern Islamic scholars and activists who attempted to adapt these Qur'anic precepts to the dilemmas of the modern Middle East.

In an effort to first dispel the sort of myths and oversimplifications that commonly arise due to the school of thought critiqued in the introduction above—that school which focuses on violent radicalism and assumes it to be inherent in the very nature of the Islamic religion in contrast to a supposed inherent benevolence and rational moderation in the Christian West—I propose to examine four assumptions often made about Islamic doctrine by providing several Qur'anic verses[7] which, when taken in context of other verses, and with a view of historical context, provide a more balanced approach to what may be fundamentals of political Islam—i.e., the application of Islamic values and precepts to the political realm of society. The four misconceptions I will address include: a) that Islam is intolerant of others; b) that Islam allows for no separation of "church" and "state," requiring all to be governed by theocratic religious law; c) that Islam is a war-like religion, promoting aggression, the killing of non-Muslims, and justifying terrorism; and d) that Islam holds no respect for individual liberties or human rights and is therefore

[7] All verses quoted or paraphrased it this essay have been taken from N.J. Dawood's English translation, *The Koran with Parallel Arabic Text*. London: Penguin Books, 1998.

nonconducive to liberal democracy. Given the limitations of a paper of this length, I again admit there may be a number of other references and verses which may be worth considering on the above topics. I propose, however, only to examine the spirit and fundamentals of Islam on the sole basis of its most holy book, the Qur'an, not upon how various early and medieval societies have chosen to implement its practice over the course of subsequent space and time. I, therefore, have chosen not to focus in upon later developments such as hadith nor the fatwas (opinions) of Imams or Shari'a courts prior to the modern period in which the problem of radical Islamism has presented itself. Still, I posit that many of those who make accusations of the religious fundamentalists' practice of relying upon a simple, narrow vision of life's purpose through a selective reading of the Qur'an are in fact committing the same error when they accuse Islamic culture of being the antithesis of the West, for they also have overlooked much of what the Qur'an demands of its believers.

Let me begin by acknowledging that certain verses in the Qur'an lend themselves to use by its critics. The accusation of intolerance is often supported by referencing the verse, "Believers, do not make friends with any but your own people. They will spare no pains to corrupt you. They desire nothing but your ruin" (3:118).[8] The assumption that all persons in predominantly Muslim societies must live under autocratic Islamic theocracies is perhaps derived from verses such as, "Believers, obey God and the Apostle and those in authority among you. Should you disagree about anything refer it to God and the Apostle..." (4:59) and "It is not for true believers—men or women—to order their own affairs if God and His apostle decree otherwise. He that disobeys God and His apostle strays grievously into error" (33:36). Those who tout Muslims condoning

[8] See also 5:51 and 60:1.

violence cite several variations of the verse, "Fight for the cause of God with the devotion due to Him" (22:78)[9] Finally, those who dispute Islam's compatibility with democracy and individual liberties like to refer to punishments deemed cruel in the eyes of the West like the amputation of a hand for theft (5:38) or the whipping of those convicted of adultery (24:2); the notion that Muslims are forbidden to resist governmental authorities (42:33); and the accusation of unfair treatment of women.[10] Yet, there are 114 suras (chapters) containing a total of 6,230 ayat (verses) in the Qur'an; to focus only upon these select few would overlook a vast amount of evidence for a more moderate and tolerant faith.

Before proceeding further, we should acknowledge what the astute reader has perhaps already recognized regarding the problems associated with arguments of this nature—i.e., the reliance upon selective proof-texting. Proof-texting provides its user the opportunity to discriminate amongst the entirety of a religious text, and focus all attention upon only those verses which provide support for preformulated polemical arguments. Thus, those of opposing viewpoints each may find his or her own seemingly contradictory proofs from the same body of scriptural or sacred sources of authority. Let me state clearly then for the reader that the purpose of this particular chapter is not to provide irrefutable proof of the tolerant and democratic nature of the Qur'an. It is simply an opportunity to offer due recognition to those aspects of Qur'anic Islam oft overlooked by the neo-Orientalist, "clash of civilizations" paradigm of understanding the Muslim world in the modern era. The author fully recognizes that neo-Orientalist politician or scholar, the radical or militant Islamist, and the liberal Islamist reformer will each find

[9] See also 2:154, 190-3, 216; 3:157; 4:74; 8:12, 17; 47:3; and 66:9.
[10] See 2:223; 4:3, 11, 34; 24:31; and 33:59.

their necessary proof texts within the Qur'an and attempt to utilize them to their own respective ends.

Assumption A: "Islam is intolerant of non-Muslims"

To start with, I present three arguments against the contention that Islam is an intolerant religion. First, there are numerous verses which recognize the unity of humankind, as all men and women are the creation of God:

> Have fear of your Lord, who created you from a single soul. From that soul He created its spouse and through them He bestrewed the earth with countless men and women. (4:1)
>
> Among His other signs are the creation of the heavens and the earth and the diversity of your tongues and colours. (30:22)
>
> You were created but as one soul, and as one soul you shall be raised to life. (31:28)
>
> You people! We have created you from a male and female, and made you into nations and tribes, that you might get to know one another. The noblest of you in God's sight is he who is most righteous. (49:13)

This last verse indicates that God does not favor one race over another, but finds favor with any who worship Him and live righteously: "Righteousness is not defined by facing East or West;" it is belief, generosity, alms, prayer, and steadfastness (2:177). Nor does the Qur'an promote the notion that because God delivered His revelations in Arabic, He must favor Arabs over others. Although it recognizes its Arabic character, it also notes that each "apostle We have sent has spoken only in the language of his own people, so that he might make his precepts clear to them" (14:4).

Secondly, the Qur'an frequently enjoins believers to be tolerant, not only of the righteous, but also of unbelievers:

> Why are you thus divided concerning hypocrites, when God Himself has cast them off...? ...if they keep away from you and cease hostility and offer you peace, God bids you not to harm them. (4:88, 90)

> The Apostle says: 'Lord, these men are unbelievers.' Bear with them and wish them peace. They shall learn. (43:88-89)
>
> It may well be that God will put good will between you and those with whom you have hitherto been at odds. God is mighty. God is forgiving and merciful. (60:7)
>
> God does not forbid you to be kind and equitable to those who have neither made war on your religion nor driven you from your homes. God loves the equitable. (60:8)

Thirdly, it makes specific provisions of tolerance towards Jews and Christians, those whom the Qur'an refers to as "People of the Book," indicating that they also received revelations from the true God through earlier apostles.

> He has revealed to you the Book with the Truth, confirming the scriptures which preceded it; for He has already revealed the Torah and the Gospel for the guidance of mankind, and the distinction between right and wrong. (3:2-3)
>
> There are among People of the Book some upright men who all night long recite the revelations of God and worship Him; who believe in God and the Last Day; who enjoin justice and forbid evil and vie with each other in good works. These are righteous men: whatever good they do, its reward shall not be denied them. (3:114-115)
>
> Believers, Jews, Sabaeans, and Christians—whoever believes in God and the Last Day and does what is right—shall have nothing to fear or to regret. (5:69)
>
> Be courteous when you argue with the People of the Book, except those among them who do evil. Say: 'We believe in that which has been revealed to us and was revealed to you. Our God and your God is one. To Him we submit. (29:46)

Thus, monotheists—Jews, Christians, Sabaeans of the Arabian Peninsula, and later Zoroastrians of Persia—are given special recognition and guaranteed their free co-existence within Muslim societies. In describing those who seek to convert Muslims and who continue to evangelize their faiths, the Qur'an enjoins Muslims to "Forgive them and bear with them until God makes known His will" (2:109).

Assumption B: "Islam requires an autocratic theocracy"

We will now turn to the task of refuting the next misconception—i.e., that Islam requires theocratic rule and religious precepts to be obeyed by all. Here I offer the

following four arguments for consideration. First, one should recognize that the Qur'an lays out specific prohibitions against forcing religious faith upon those who do not in their hearts and minds accept it. More clearly than either the Torah or the Gospels, the Qur'an recognizes that God's commands are directed at His believers and followers, and that others have the free will to reject His calling:

> There shall be no compulsion in religion. (2:256)
>
> Had the Lord pleased, all the people of the earth would have believed in Him, one and all. Would you then force people to have faith? (10:99)
>
> We well know what they say. You shall not use coercion with them. Admonish with the Koran whoever fears My warning. (50:45)
>
> Bear with what they [unbelievers] say. (50:38)
>
> Say: 'Unbelievers, I do not worship what you worship, nor do you worship what I worship. I shall never worship what you worship, nor will you ever worship what I worship. You have your own religion, and I have mine. (109:1-6)

Secondly, the Qur'an relieves Muslims of any guilt for there being unbelievers in their midst who continue to reject Islam. It states, "You are accountable for none but yourself" (4:84). Furthermore, it makes clear that a Muslim's only obligation to these unbelievers is to give them a warning (35:22) of the consequences of their unbelief—i.e., denial of paradise in Heaven and eternal suffering in the flames of Hell.

> To those who were given the scriptures and to the Gentiles say: 'Will you submit to God? If they become Muslims they shall be rightly guided; if they pay no heed, then your only duty is to warn them. (3:21)
>
> We have not made you their keeper, nor are you their guardian. Do not revile the idols which they invoke besides God, lest in their ignorance they revile God with rancour. Thus have we made the actions of each community seem pleasing to itself. (6:107-108)
>
> Whether We let you glimpse in some measure the scourge We promise them, or call you back to Us before We smite them, your mission is only to give warning; it is for Us to do the reckoning. (13:39)

Thirdly, we find several verses which indicate that the commandments and prohibitions laid out in the revelation to Mohammad were meant to be followed by believers alone. In Sura 35, verse 18, God tells His prophet, "You shall admonish none but those who fear their Lord though they cannot see Him, and are steadfast in prayer." Again in another chapter God proclaims that His prophet is to be a model of right living *for believers*: "There is a good example in God's apostle for those of you who look to God and the Last Day and remember God always" (33:21). In reference to the People of the Book, although Allah's Prophet must ensure the exercise of justice for all who live among him, he recognizes that "We have our own works and you have yours..." and that he seeks "no argument between us" (42:15).

Fourthly, the Qur'an acknowledges that even among believers, they cannot know all of what is in God's design, nor can they understand all of the revelations He has given them:

> It is He who has revealed to you the Book. Some of its verses are precise in meaning—they are the foundation of the Book—and others ambiguous. ...But no one knows its meaning except God. (3:7)
>
> Say: 'If the waters of the sea were ink with which to write the words of my Lord, the sea would surely run dry before the words of my Lord were spent, though we found another sea to replenish it.' (18:109)

The consequences of these verses are to cast doubt upon any who might claim that they have infallible authority in interpreting God's words and enforcing their application upon society in a universal manner.

Assumption C: "Muslims use the doctrine of jihad to justify their aggressive and war-like foreign policy"

The next misconception concerning Islam that must be dealt with is the insistence that its doctrines promote or condone violence against non-Muslims in the name of

"jihad"—i.e., to struggle for the cause of God. Here I offer three additional arguments. The first of these is the qualification that the Qur'an repeatedly makes to the command to fight for the cause of God. This qualification pertains to the justifications for such campaigns, for upon closer reading we find that this principle does not condone preemption. The most obvious, and hardly radical, of these justifications if self-defense:

> Fight for the sake of God those that fight against you, but do not attack them first. God does not love aggressors. (2:190)
>
> If you have patience and guard yourselves against evil, your Lord will send to your aid five thousand angels splendidly accoutred, if they suddenly attack you. (3:125)
>
> Permission to take up arms is hereby granted to those who are attacked, because they have been wronged. (22:39)
>
> If they [evil-doers] resolve to ruin you, We are resolved to ruin them. (43:79)

Jihad is further justified against those who attack God's religion itself by way of prohibiting or interfering with its practice. Here those waging a campaign in the cause of God may be the same who were persecuted, or they may be assisting fellow believers elsewhere who encounter such persecution:

> Drive them out of the places from which they drove you. ...But do not fight within the Holy Mosque unless they attack you there... (2:191)
>
> To debar others from the path of God, to deny Him, to expel His worshippers from the Mosque, these are more grievous than to fight in the Holy month. (2:217)
>
> Yet it is but just that God should punish them; for they have debarred others from the Sacred Mosque... (8:34)
>
> God has power to grant them victory: those who have been unjustly driven from their homes, only because they said: 'Our Lord is God.' Had God not defended some men by the might of others, monasteries and churches, synagogues and mosques in which His praise is daily celebrated, would have been utterly destroyed. (22:40)

Finally, jihad is also justified for reasons of resisting general oppression under the rule of a tyrant or in the name of the rights of a minority in the face of a discriminating and oppressive majority:

> And how should you not fight for the cause of God, and the helpless old men, women, and children who say, 'Deliver us, Lord from this city of wrongdoers [oppressors]; send forth to us a guardian…' (4:75)
>
> Remember when you were few in number and persecuted in the land, ever fearing the onslaught of your enemies, how He gave you shelter. He made you strong with His help… (8:26-27)
>
> Remember how the unbelievers plotted against you. They sought to take you captive or to have you slain or banished. They scheme—but God also schemed. (8:30)
>
> [Surely worthier is] He who answers the oppressed when they cry out to Him, and relieves their affliction. (27:62)

Having laid out the three basic justifications for jihad found in the Qur'an, my subsequent argument against viewing jihad as a radical doctrine surrounds the readiness Muslims must have to make peace with these unbelievers or persecutors once they have surrendered or repented. This principle is seen in the following three verses:

> …But if they desist, fight none except evildoers. (2:193)
>
> Believers, show discernment when you fight for the cause of God, and do not say to those that offer peace, 'You are not believers…' (4:94)
>
> If they incline to peace, make peace with them, and put your trust in God. (8:61)

These cautions mirror the same principles recognized in international conventions pertaining to conceptions of humanitarian laws of war—i.e., that prisoners of war be treated with a certain level of dignity, that one distinguish between combatants and non-combatants, and that the latter includes those who were previously combatants but have since laid down their arms. The similarities to international law are carried further by a verse which calls upon Muslims to acknowledge the differing levels of guilt between those who instigated their unjust attacks and persecutions versus those who were simply

following the orders given by persons of authority in their societies: "If you capture them in battle discriminate between them and those that follow them, so that their followers may take warning" (8:57). This latter principle may be logically carried further still to establish a clear prohibition against the killing of innocents during the course of such an armed resistance or struggle.

Finally, Muslims are called upon by their holy Book to consider alternatives to armed struggle when formulating their conceptions of jihad and acceptable ways of fulfilling their obligation to engage in it for a just cause. On the one hand, Sura 25, verse 51, "Do not yield to the unbelievers, but fight them vigorously with the Koran," offers a believer the option of struggling in the way of evangelization or convincing argument or diplomatic warning. Still another option, depending upon on the level of the injury caused by unbelievers, Muslims may simply forbear patiently, forgiving them, and following a variation of the golden rule:

> True servants of the Merciful are those who walk humbly on earth and say: 'Peace!' to the ignorant who accost them... (25:64) ...who are neither extravagant nor niggardly, but keep to the golden mean... (25:67) ...and do not kill except for a just cause (manslaughter is forbidden by Him)... (25:68)

Assumption D: "Islam is not compatible with liberal democracy"

Lastly, among the misconceived accusations directed at Islam, we must encounter and refute the claim that Islamic culture is a chief obstacle to the establishment and success of liberal democracy—i.e., democratically elected governance and the respect for individual liberties and human rights. On the contrary, we find numerous occasions within the Qur'an which instruct Muslims in many of the same core democratic values that are fundamental in western societies as well. To begin with, the principle of justice is an overriding theme throughout the Book. This is an important consideration, as a

sense of justice and fairness underpin many other democratic principles. Though the possible verses to select on this topic are many, consider these:

> God desires no injustice to mankind. (3:108)
>
> ...when you pass judgment among men, to judge with fairness. (4:58)
>
> Conduct yourselves with justice and bear true witness before God, even if it be against yourselves, your parents, or kinsfolk. (4:135)
>
> ...if you do act as their judge, judge them with fairness. God loves those that deal justly. (5:42)
>
> Speak for justice, even if it affects your own kin. (6:152)
>
> God enjoins justice, kindness, and charity to one's kindred, and forbids lewdness, reprehensible conduct, and oppression. (16:90)

We have already dispelled the misbelief that all must practice Islam in Muslim societies, but we can now go further in establishing that even among believers, the Qur'an does not require passive obedience to an authoritarian theocrat. On the issue of popular sovereignty and political involvement, we can refer to the concept of "shura," often translated to mean consultation. Sura 42, verse 38 makes it clear to believers that "Better and more enduring is God's recompense to those who [not only follow tenets of faith and do good and merciful works, but also] ...conduct their affairs by mutual consent..." The very next verse goes on to explain that God expects that believers, "when oppressed, seek to redress their wrongs" (42:39). This latter verse lays the groundwork for considering a principle in Islam similar to John Locke's Scottish Enlightenment concept of the people's right to revolution or the Jeffersonian idea, embodied in the "Declaration of Independence," of the establishment of government by the consent of the governed, the latter of whom retain the right to alter or abolish their government should it become destructive to their lives, liberties, or pursuits of happiness. Sura 20 contains a rather lengthy passage that describes the conversion of several of

Pharaoh's Egyptian sorcerers after their witnessing the miracles performed by Moses. After threatening them with torturous deaths, these converts call for Pharaoh to do his worst, for they will not obey him in his ignorance. Contemplate several other verses of resistance:

> Vain is your work. You build strong fortresses, hoping that you may last forever. When you exercise power, you act like cruel tyrants. Have fear of God... (26:13)
>
> Do not obey the bidding of transgressors who perpetuate corruption in the land and do no good at all. (26:150)
>
> Those who seek to redress their wrongs incur no guilt. But great is the guilt of those who oppress their fellow men and conduct themselves with wickedness and injustice in the land. (42:42-43)

Still another democratic principle is the rule of law and a sense of equality before it. We find such provisions within the establishment of equality among socio-economic classes, "Be they rich or poor, God knows better about both of them" (4:135), or among genders, "Women shall with justice have rights similar to those exercised against them..." (2:228). A subcomponent of ensuring the rule of law, however, is to ensure that public office-holders and the wielders of authority are not permitted to abuse their offices for personal gain. "Do not take another's property by unjust means, nor bribe judges..." (2:188).

Another important liberal value is a sense of limited government or a sense of reservation toward using power in a way which would deprive another of his or her life, liberty, or property. In order to check such tendencies, liberal societies value leniency, innocence until proof of guilt is established, mercy and pardon, and prohibitions against cruel or unusual punishments. For all of the protestations over the few verses which suggest their harsh punishment of crimes, recall that Islam is a religion founded upon the renewal of God's covenant with Abraham and Moses, the same covenant which produced

the Torah for the Jews. One need not look far within the Torah or Christian Old Testament for examples of such similarly harsh edicts against criminals, idolaters, blasphemers, and the lascivious. However, the same sort of tempered spirit of mercy that is present in these books is also present in the Qur'an:

> God decreed "eye for an eye," but if a man charitably forbears from retaliation, his remission shall atone for him. (5:45)
>
> If you punish, let your punishment be commensurate with the wrong that has been done you. But it shall be best to endure wrongs with patience. (16:127)
>
> Each one of them shall be punished according to his crime. (24:11)
>
> The adulterer and the adulteress shall be given a hundred lashes. (24:2)[11]
>
> But if you overlook their [spouses and children] offences and forgive and pardon them, then know that God is forgiving and merciful. (64:15)
>
> We said to him [Job]: 'Take a bunch of twigs and beat with it; do not break your oath.' We found him full of patience. (38:33)[12]

In order to ensure the guilt of those who break a contract or commit a crime, the Qur'an also places much stress upon a reliance on the testimony of witnesses and the sanctity of truth. Take for example the verse, "Witnesses must not refuse if called upon to give evidence. ...and let no harm be done to either scribe or witness." (2:282) or, "You shall not withhold testimony..." (2:283). Likewise, in the case of family law:

> If a man accuses his wife but has no witnesses except himself, he shall swear four times by God that his charge is true, calling down upon himself the curse of God if he is lying. But if his wife swears four times by God that his charge is false and calls down His curse upon herself if it be true, she shall receive no punishment. (24:7-9)

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[11] Some may wonder why I have used this verse as an example of mercy, but this should perhaps become clear to the reader if he or she compares this to the punishment of adultery called for in the Torah, for example, which prescribes that they both be put to death (Leviticus 20:10), or to the "honor killings" which are commonly carried out against daughters or wives in places such as Pakistan or India, as governments there turn a blind eye. Likewise, consider the Qur'an's mercy toward men engaged in homosexual conduct, should they repent (4:15).

[12] This example may also be confusing to the reader with out its context. Job is said to have made a rash oath to give his wife 100 blows; God allowed him to keep his oath sworn in His name (ref. 5:89) and show her mercy by giving her 1 blow with 100 twigs simultaneously. By analogy, this verse is used to permit the release from other such rash oaths.

Still other passages outline a sense of equality and protection provided women in what many accuse of being an altogether unjust status imparted upon this gender by their religion. In the eyes of God, for example, men and women are equal as either believers or unbelievers:

> Be they men or women, to those that embrace the Faith and do what is right We will surely grant a happy life… (16:97)
>
> He created for you spouses from among yourselves, that you might live in peace with them, and planted love and kindness in your hearts. (30:21)
>
> God has heard the words of her who pleaded with you against her husband and made her plaint to God. (58:1)
>
> Treat them [wives] with kindness; for even if you dislike them, it may well be that you dislike a thing which God has meant for your own abundant good. (4:19)

With regard to the reference made to polygamy made in Sura 4, verse 3, "…you may marry women who seem good to you: two, three, or four of them," one must first remember that polygamy was commonplace in much of the Mediterranean and Asian world and that a limitation of four wives was indeed an imposition of real reform in the 7th century C.E. Furthermore, recall that the Jewish Old Testament also contains references to this practice without any outright condemnation made in the scriptures. The Qur'an, on the other hand, goes so far as to caution against the practice on the principle of fairness and justice, "But if you fear that you cannot maintain equality among them, marry only one…" (4:4).

Another common criticism is that women are told that they must not display adornments, finery, or jewelry in public and should veil themselves (24:31 and 33:59). It should be clarified however that these verses refer again only to "believing women" or "true believers," not to unbelievers or non-Muslims. Likewise the proscription of women from public spheres without their family members, requiring instead their isolation in the

home, is largely unfounded in the Qur'an. The only verse which makes reference to such a practice, concerns the wives of the Prophet Mohammad, which is prefaced by the qualification that "you are not like other women" (33:32), thus basically absolving other women from this constraint.

Other basic rights outlined in the Qur'an include the right to privacy, individual property rights, the right to contract and trade, the right to asylum or protection, and the right to social justice by way of providing for the poor, destitute, orphaned, widowed, or divorced. Privacy as a right is embodied in the verse, "Believers, avoid immoderate suspicion, for in some cases suspicion is a crime. Do not spy on one another, nor backbite one another" (49:12). Asylum and conveyance to safety is guaranteed even an idolater according to Sura 9, verse 6. With regard to property, we have already read of the proscription against seizing another's property unjustly (2:188), but property rights are also guaranteed to orphans (4:3) and to women by way of legal inheritance or dowry (4:7, 4). As for contracts and oaths, we have already discussed the necessity of witnesses surrounding them; the Qur'an goes further, however, in warning Muslims not to break them even when it would be to their personal advantage, "Do not ...take oaths with mutual deceit and break them on finding yourselves superior in numbers" (16:92). Truth in trade is emphasized in the verses, "Give full measure, when you measure, and weight with even scales" (17:25), and "God commands you to hand back your trusts to their rightful owners..." (4:58). Finally, women are also guaranteed rights to contract in the area of divorce with a recognized right to seek remedy for an abusive or neglectful marriage, to maintain their right to retain their properties and to remarry as they please:

> If a woman fear ill-treatment or desertion on the part of her husband, it shall be no offence for them to seek a mutual agreement. (4:128)

> ...either retain them in honour, or let them go with kindness. You shall not retain them in order to harm them or to wrong them. (2:231)
>
> It is unlawful for husbands to take from them anything they have given them... (2:229)

Any sense of inferiority assigned to women by the Qur'an is not due to assumed spiritual or moral character; we have found many verses which note the equal stature of women in the eyes of God, both in terms of their worship and righteousness here on earth and their promised reward in heaven. Rather, verse 34 of the fourth Sura, seems to indicate that male superiority and the authority they therefore gain over women is due to their spending of "their wealth to maintain them." A logical postulation to derive from this line of thought is that in the present day, where more women are, and should be, allowed to pursue their ambitions in the marketplace, earning or contributing to their and their families' livelihoods, this sense of economic authority over them is diminished.

We would of course be remiss to neglect the parallel between one of the Qur'an's most prominent themes and that of modern conceptions of liberal democracy—their guarantee of socio-economic justice. Modern states throughout the world have increasingly focused concerns over equalizing both the playing field in the markets and the results transactions therein produce. Islam has perhaps a comparative advantage in this regard as its doctrines enjoined believers and their leaders to ensure social justice for the poor centuries before the arrival of communism or progressivism to the world's political arenas. The Qur'an makes repeated references to an alms levy; in discussing its proper redistribution, it has this to say:

> Alms shall be only for the poor and the destitute; for those that are engaged in the management of alms and those whose hearts are sympathetic to the Faith; for the freeing of slaves and debtors; for the advancement of God's cause; and for the traveler in need. (9:60)

Verse 4:3 above had made mention of providing for orphans until they reach an age of maturity. Verse 2:280 encourages believers to be patient with debtors who have difficulty fulfilling their payments, readily granting them a delay or even considering an exhortation to "waive the sum as alms." Similar to the alimony practices in other regions of the world, Muslims are also called upon to provide for the wives they divorce until they remarry:

> Provide for them with fairness; the rich man according to his means and the poor man according to his. This is binding on righteous men. (2:236)
>
> Lodge them [wives you are in the process of divorcing] in your own homes, according to your means. You shall not harass them so as to make life intolerable for them. (65:6)

Lastly, although the Qur'an, much as the Torah of Judeo-Christian heritage does also, acknowledges the practice of slavery, there are certain verses which lay a foundation for a sense of justice for those bound by this institution, "You shall not force your slave-girls into prostitution in order to enrich yourself," and for a sense that liberty is to be favored over the retention of a slave, "As for those of your slaves who wish to buy their liberty, free them if you find in them any promise and bestow on them a part of the riches God has given you" (24:33).

REMARKS

While the arguments above, and the existence of these many verses in the Qur'an as their evidences, cannot by themselves eradicate oppression, injustice, prejudice, or radicalism in the realities of our present-day societies, they can serve to mitigate some of the blame for such atrocities, steering us away from blanket generalizations and bigotry toward a just cultural practice which may, in the end, serve as the very foundation for

liberalism and democracy in the future of Middle Eastern societies. Certainly, there were chauvinistic tyrants among the Taliban of Afghanistan and similar such sexists in other present regimes. Certainly, there exists the real threat of terrorists in the form of al-Qaeda cells throughout the world. To understand their motivations, however, we must look beyond the religion to other causes of their prejudice and tendency toward violence. More immediate causes for such phenomena lie in the realm of state power struggles and hegemony, socio-economic disparity, the lasting injury of colonialism, the humiliation and denial of human rights in the context of Palestinian statehood, the quest to overturn oppressive governments who belittle the religion they hold dear by intrigues and corruption, and the influence of political ideologues who have selectively used elements of Islam to justify and advance their political causes by stirring the emotions of the disaffected and persecuted in these societies.

What the above discussion of the Qur'an provides is not an assumption that it is more liberal than illiberal, nor that it is more authoritarian than democratic. It simply brings to the front lines of the debates regarding political Islam an acknowledgment that there are Qur'anic supports for both democratic and nondemocratic practices on the part of both the state and society. It recognizes the inadequacies of explaining current global politics with a strictly religio-culturalist approach. For such explanations, more important than what the Qur'an actually says is how it is used by political and societal actors to justify various ends and means. Thus, to further understand Islamic politics, we must disaggregate the political movements within the Islamic world and understand the structural, institutional, and historical factors that surround each and give impetus for the Qur'an's use in serving divergent purposes.

Radical Islamists of the 20th century have derived their doctrinal justifications for the fight against Muslim rulers, the collective organization of jihadist campaigns, and the vision of global revolution against the non-Muslim from the medieval writings of an Islamic scholar, Ibn Taymiyya (1268-1328), as well as the late-20th century expositions bringing a limited revival of Taymiyya's worldview by Sayyid Qutb, Sa'id Hawwa, Shukri Mustafa, Dr. Ali Shariati, Ayatollah Khomeini, 'Abd al-Salam Faraj, Sheikh Kishk, and Osama bin Laden. It is important to understand though the historical and political circumstances which acted as intervening variables, creating a populace that was suddenly receptive to their message.

Disaffection with the West, as colonial powers following World War I, has at times discredited liberals who were seen as collaborators with hostile foreign states. A series of additional historical occurrences temporarily halted liberalism's limited progress at the mid-20th century—including the entrance of German National Socialism as an appealing alternative in the 1930s and 1940s (though this too lost appeal when it could no longer offer aid, patronage, or powerful alliances after its defeat in World War II); the destructive battles during both World Wars which encroached upon the soils of the Middle East and North Africa; the establishment of Israel, the displacement of Palestinian Arabs, and the defeat of Arab states in 1948; the rise of secular pan-Arab nationalism and the hope in Nasser's model of state capitalism; the rise of authoritarian militaristic regimes and periods of extensive political imprisonment; the humiliating defeat at the hands of Israel in 1967 which gave rise to a more nativist, religious fundamentalist, past-oriented Islamist sentiment; [13] the rise of modern terrorist activity through the Palestinian

[13] In addition to the effects of the imperialist intrusions of the West, the Zionist influx into Palestine, and the anti-religious repression under the Nasserist and Ba'athist regimes, several authors have pointed to the

nationalist movement; the fleeting promise of oil wealth in the Persian Gulf states; the symbolism enshrined in an Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979; the mobilization of an internationally supported jihad following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan during the 1980s; and finally the adoption of terrorist tactics by radical Islamist organizations in the 1990s. In short, the political and social turmoil in the region during most of the 20th century provides a logical explanation for the shortcomings of the first wave of liberalism in the modern Middle East.[14]

The obstacles to democratization are not rooted in the fundamentals of Islam. They are found in the "fundamentalism" of radicals spurred by political and economic circumstances. The solutions then to successfully aiding the process of democratization lie not in abandoning or isolating Islamists, but in the allowance for Islam's association with the state, and consolidation of democracy in the Islamic world rests in its institutionalization within a democratic political framework supported by inclusiveness, socialization and policy performance on the part of state actors and societal notables in Islamic nations. Advocates for progress and change must not displace Islamic culture rooted in the Qur'an and hadith. It is just these sorts of cultural characteristics which will

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extremely important effects that the 1967 defeat had upon the Arab-Muslim psyche. See Ajami, Fouad. *The Arab Predicament: Arab Political Thought and Practice Since 1967*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992. Ajami explains that while the Arab defeat by Israel in the 1948 war gave momentum to the modernizing, secular Arabists who dominated the 1950s and 1960s, their defeat in 1967 caused disillusionment and accusations that Nasser and the Ba'th were nothing more than a newer generation of reactionaries with a façade of revolutionary rhetoric. This in turn led to two movements within the Arab world: a) the rise of a territorial nationalism among the Palestinian people hoping to take their destiny into their own hands; and b) the reemergence of political Islam of a more conservative or traditional nature than the previous Islamic nationalist movements of the liberal age had been. The latter group tended to explain the '67 defeat in terms of Arab weakness derived from the abandonment of true Islam by both society and its leaders.

Emmanuel Sivan, *Radical Islam*, 1985, saw a similar phenomenon. He writes, "...many of the young recruits who flocked to the militant Islamic student associations (Jama'at) and to terrorist groups, did so as a result of soul-searching se off by the trauma of June 1967. Though haunted by the defeat, those new disciples learned to see in it nothing but a symptom; it is the root cause of the illness they had to strike at" (p. 47).

[14] Hourani, Albert. *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798-1939*, London: Oxford University Press, 1962.

and have proven resistant to such dramatic attempts at radical reforms. Reformers must instead recognize a necessary role for Islam in democratization, liberalization, and consolidation, finding its supportive values within the native culture. Early Arab liberalism of the 19th and early 20th centuries was misguided in its foreign orientation. For democratizing and liberalizing reforms to take hold, they must be rooted in the popular culture—i.e., Islam. Islamic democratization then must be a two-pronged effort. Leaders must continue to address and remove the socio-politico-economic conditions that provide radical Islamists with a focal point to rally around and recruit future extremists. These efforts can only be addressed through political and social restructuring and institution-building, educational reform, economic development, constitutionalism, and the rule of law. This first set of goals must be supplemented, however, with socialization efforts, inclusiveness, and a unifying civil religious practice that promotes "Islamic democracy" in which religiosity is not a hindrance to citizens, parties, and leaders, but a voting heuristic and a source of legitimacy. Past Arab secularist states have made serious errors in both forcing Islam out of the political sphere while not allowing for any effectual expression for Islamists through meaningful representative parliamentary bodies.

If anything, Islamists must be viewed as the most likely source or impetus for change within their world regions. As history has shown, both the numbers and capacity of Arab and Islamic liberals has been limited, if not impotent. Islamic liberals are likely to have a far greater capacity to effect meaningful influence after a democratic transition than to actually spur one into existence. Thus, both the native liberally-minded notables in the region and their sympathetic allies in the West must come to accept that democratic

transitions with any hope for drawing widespread legitimacy must be open to the input of popular Islamist parties. Islamists are hardly the primary impediments to democracy's full birth in the Middle East.

Marina Ottaway and Thomas Carothers[15] have posited that the fears held by both the West and by incumbent Arab regimes that a truly competitive and open democratic election would produce a tremendous electoral victory for an anti-democratic Islamist party who would proceed to take power and then dismantle the democratization process is a fear that is largely exaggerated and unfounded. They have pointed to limited or moderate successes for Islamic parties during the last decade in states that already hold elections of various levels of significance.[16] Taking the two most significant elections in recent Palestinian history, we find that in the 1996 National Council elections only four out of 88 seats were taken by recognizable Islamist candidates. In the 2005 presidential elections, the only two candidates with alleged ties or sympathies to Islamist groups were Abdel Halim al-Ashqar, who reportedly has ties to HAMAS, and Alsaid Barakah, who has allegedly supported Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Both of these individuals ran not, with the backing of strong Islamic parties or coalitions, but as independent candidates, together garnering only a combined 4.4% of the certified votes.[17] The 2005 elections in Iraq demonstrated a bit more success for Islamist-oriented parties. Yet, even there, the most conservative of these Islamist parties, the Shi'a-backed Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq, came to power not on its own, but within the United Iraqi

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[15] "Middle East Democracy," *Foreign Policy*, November/December 2004, pp. 22-28.

[16] Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, and Yemen. See also Vali Nasr, "The Rise of Muslim Democracy," ref. Chapter One, Footnote 19; and Saad Eddin Ibrahim, "Islam Can Vote, if We Let It," *New York Times* (May 21, 2005).

[17] For election results, see "Elections around the World," [online], <http://www.electionworld.org>, or the *IFES* "ElectionGuide.org" [online], <http://electionguide.org>.

Alliance—a coalition that contains the more moderate Islamist al-Daawa Party and the secular Iraqi National Congress made up largely of secularly-minded Shi'a, former exiles, and Kurds.

The point to be taken from this is well-stated by Ottaway, et al.:

> The presence of Islamist parties thus complicates the process of democratization. But Islamist parties are also integral to democratization because they are the only nongovernmental parties with large constituencies. Without their participation, democracy is impossible in the Middle East. The future of democracy in the region depends on whether a sufficient number of such parties moderate their political views and become actors in a democratic process, rather than spoilers in the present autocratic states, and whether incumbent governments stop hiding behind the Islamist threat and accept that all their citizens have a right to participate.[18]

Islamist political culture should not be viewed as an insurmountable threat to democratic transition any more than democracy should be viewed as the perfect fix for Islamic radicalism and terrorism. The surest sources of undercutting mass support for radical terrorism include legally inclusive avenues of nonviolent political expression, protest, and input, effective rule of law, public services worthy of public gratitude, socio-economic development that reaches a broader swath of the population, and the acceptance of mass culture by the state in ways that build a sense of pride and legitimacy for itself, not simply in the holding of periodic democratic elections. Yet, even when such mass support has been withdrawn from violent Islamists and transferred to those Islamists working within the political system, there can be no guarantee of a total cessation of terrorist campaigns. It must not be naïvely presumed that democracy must await the successful control of potentially radical groups, but nor should it be assumed the miracle

[18] Ottaway, et al., p. 26.

remedy for all social ills. Democracy should instead be seen as a good in and of itself, not dependent upon its presumed effects upon curbing radical Islamist violence.

The term Islamism has too often referred only to this radical school represented by Ibn Taymiyya, Sayyid Qutb, Ayatollah Khomeini, and Osama bin Laden. As previously revealed, there are in fact liberal and moderate Islamists, who also view Islam as intrinsic to addressing social issues in the Muslim world and to governing the Muslim people, and yet have various degrees of openness to their own Islamic versions of what we would label democracy and freedom. This latter group also has its roots in historical Islam and the guidance of the Qur'an. While it appears that liberalism's limited march into the Islamic world during the 19th and early 20th centuries had very little success in producing immediate democratizing reforms at the national level, it is significant that democratic thought and institutions have nevertheless made inroads into the Islamic world. Democracy is not as weak and feeble as some presume, for it has the capability to nurture its own support over time. Once experienced, its movement will never be completely lost of forgotten. Thus, at the turn of a new millennium, a century later than the last liberal age, the Islamic world provides a new context for studying the conditions for democratic support.

And so rather than to simply conclude with a deeper understanding of the notable elites whose radical Islamist messages gained widespread familiarity and popularity and of the more recent historical context which aided such a reception of their message, it is and should be the task of the political scientist prepared to continue following and predicting the developments within political Islam to ask the question, "Despite past periods of predominantly nondemocratic activity, what is the current status of democracy

and democratization in the Islamic world?" What remains of this study is to test the assumptions of compatibility between Islam and democracy through the quantitative model proposed in the first chapter. In the next chapter we will examine the degree of democracy currently existent in Muslim-majority nations as measured through a variety of indices and test for any recognizable relationship between such relative levels of democratic governance and two poignant variables emphasized as detrimental to democracy by the neo-orientalist and Islamic exceptionalist schools of thought: (a) how Muslim a nation is and (b) how religious a nation is.

CHAPTER THREE

MEASURING DEMOCRACY IN THE LANDS OF ISLAM

INTRODUCTION

The goal of this chapter is to detect any relational patterns between the levels of democratic governance and the religious demographics found in Muslim-majority nations. The means to accomplish this detection includes the utilization of existing indices of democracy, such as those produced by Freedom House, the University of Maryland's Polity IV project, and the World Bank. However, since these tend to lean heavily toward measures of liberalism and performance standards, they will be supplemented by a newly designed index focusing primarily upon institutional factors of democracy including the organizational structures of governance, the de jure rules of the electoral process, and the informal, de facto, or habitual operation of the electoral systems. The synthesis of the above measures produces an aggregated democracy index meant to average the strengths and weaknesses of each component index, thereby producing a more reliable and universal measure of democracy.

The null (H_0) hypothesis, that is the assumption to be refuted, may be stated, "A strong relationship exists between religious demographics and the degree of democratic governance in Muslim-majority nations as measured by the Aggregated Democracy Index (ADI)." The independent, or causal, variables in this hypothesis are the measures of religious demographics. In other words, the aim of this study is to show that the religious nature of the populations in the lands of Islam do not to any great degree determine or predict how democratic its governments, or if any such relationship does in

fact exist, then that relationship will be so weak as to make it insufficient as a singular explanation, or even insufficient as one of the primary causes, of variance in democratic or non-democratic governance. Religious demographics in this study will be measured in two fashions: (a) as an estimated percent of the population that claims to be Muslim and (b) as the general degree of religiosity within the population as indicated by responses to the 2000 series of the *World Values Survey*.[1]

An initial test of these assumptions is made by examining the patterns, if any, revealed in scatter grams (see Figures 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5) showing both the percentage of the population that is Muslim and the variations in democratic government according to three selected indices (Freedom in the World combined scores from Freedom House, Polity IV, and the Voice & Accountability Index from the World Bank's Governance Indicators).

[1] Ronald Inglehart, Miguel Basáñez, Jaime Díez-Medrano, Loek Halman and Ruud Luijkx, eds., *Human Beliefs and Values: a cross-cultural sourcebook based on the 1999-2002 values survey*, Mexico: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, S.A. de C.V., 2004.

Figure 3.1--Freedom House (CONV.) Ratings of Muslim Majority Nations, n = 46



Figure 3.2--Polity IV (CONV.) Ratings of Muslim Majority Nations, n = 46



Figure 3.3--World Bank Governance Indicators--Voice & Accountability (CONV.) Ratings of Muslim Majority Nations,
n = 46



Figure 3.4--Average Rating of Muslim Majority Nations by Three Selected Indices (FH, P-IV, WB-VA), n = 46



Figure 3.5--Average Ranking of Muslim Majority Nations by Three Selected Indices (FH, P-IV, WB-VA), n = 46



It is the lack of a linear relationship in each of the above figures that is noteworthy for our purposes. No distinctive relationship can be discerned among the Muslim demographic and the ratings nor the rankings given Muslim states by these three indices of democracy. It is not as if as the percentage of Muslims increased the rating or ranking given to each state increased or decreased by any predictable unit of measure. We have instead, what appears to be a rather random and unpredictable scattering of the countries across the charts. For the source data behind these charts, see Tables A through D in the Appendix.

THE INSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY INDEX (IDI)

As argued in Chapter One, democracy, or democratic governance, is not a single-celled organism—that is, it is a rather complex, multi-faceted arrangement of institutional and cultural norms that produce a diverse array of approaches toward realizing the underlying principle of popular sovereignty, or rule by the people. It was also argued above that the most fundamental or basic element for a functioning democracy is its institutions which support free, fair, and competitive elections based upon the tenet of representative government. A second priority of democracies must be the accountability of that elected government to its electorate through transparency of information and a general respect for the rule of law as demonstrated by the leaders' obeisance of their constitutionally or legally delimited roles. Finally, a third and still more grandiose facet is the democratic states' maintenance of a climate supportive of civil liberties and individual freedoms in addition to the common or public good. Each of the three levels becomes progressively more difficult to cultivate and maintain. Thus, the first tier or

story of the high-rise that is democracy is the institutions necessary for any meaningfully constructive democratization process, facilitating transition from less than democratic regimes to structures reflecting the belief in utility of a more encompassing role for the populace. The second and third stories are achieved as elected leaders more consistently display characters embodying the spirit of democracy in between its elections.

The usefulness in this conceptualization is its developmental nature. It allows for recognizing democracy in degree—that is, democracy is not truly or absolutely present nor absent, but only more or less present in relation to any other state. It further rewards those basic steps toward democracy seen in transitional states.

The Institutional Democracy Index (IDI) designed for this study includes measures for six institutional components of democracy:

1. Vertical Accountability—the systematic and regularly occurring opportunity for the population to choose its leadership, returning favored incumbents and replacing those who have fallen into general disfavor among the citizenry. Measures of vertical accountability in the IDI include: direct election of the executive (excele); the length of the executive term (exctrm); the length of the current or incumbent executive's tenure (exctnr); the percentage of the legislature that is directly elected (plgele); and the length of the legislative term (legtrm).

2. Contestation—an open electoral competition that makes no unreasonable preemptive exclusions of parties or candidates from the opportunity to run for public office, thereby providing both a meaningful choice for voters and a resulting government consisting of multiple parties and political programs to be worked out in the legislative and executive roles of the state. Measures of contestation in the IDI include: whether the

elections are contested by multiple candidates or parties (conele); the freedom from legal exclusion from contestation by reason of racial, ethno-linguistic, territorial-nationalist, religious, ideological, or other identity or political platform as well as from extensive violence and intimidation directed at contestation (rtcomp); and a competitive electoral process that seats multiple effective parties in the legislature (effprt).

3. Inclusive Participation—the extension of the elective franchise to the greatest possible proportion of the adult population both through the adoption of universal suffrage and through the elimination of overly burdensome obstacles to voter registration. Measures of inclusive participation in the IDI include: the extent of suffrage among the population aged eighteen and older (suffrg); and the percentage of the eligible population that are registered voters (regvot).

4. Representation, or Voice-Responsiveness Interaction—that the preferences expressed by the electorate through their vote is reflected as closely as possible in the allocation or distribution of public offices and seats in the legislature among competing parties or candidates. The responsive posture of a representative may also be facilitated by the provision of electoral districts that contain a moderate number of constituents, avoiding overly large constituencies per representative, which may lose some of the effectiveness of or opportunity for public voice. Measures of representation in the IDI include: the ratio of citizen vote to seat allocation to the majority or plurality party in the legislature (setall); and the ratio of representatives per capita (ratrep).

5. Institutional Electoral Performance—that voting process be carried out with a minimum of irregularities or opportunities for distortion of the true vote count. The measure of electoral performance in the IDI is the percentage of votes invalidated in the

most recent legislative election or executive election when the former information is unavailable (votinv).

6. Consolidation/Institutionalization/Habituation of Electoral Practice—that consecutively scheduled elections are held without delay or cancellation, creating instead the expectation of, and realization of, the regular subjection of the state to its people. The measure of institutionalization of electoral practice in the IDI is the score received for having held two or more of the most recent, consecutively scheduled elections (twoele).

Half of the variables in the IDI have clear implicit institutional standards. The highest scores are assessed for those who subject their executives to direct elections, hold 100 percent of their legislature accountable in elections, have held their last two or more consecutively mandated elections, provide voters with a choice of three or more parties or candidates on the ballot, extend suffrage universally to the population aged 18 and older, make no proscriptive judgments on the right to compete for public office, and provide a direct ratio of the percentage of vote received to the percentage of legislative seats attained.

On the other hand, the other seven variables are without a clear or obvious institutional standard, therefore there is a need to determine a baseline score or standard by which the Muslim-majority states assessed in a less arbitrary manner. I have chosen to utilize the example set by widely recognized, consolidated democracies across the globe for these latter variables. More particularly, I have chosen to average the results for these variables among the 36 long-standing democracies analyzed in Arend Lijphart's *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries*.[2]

[2] New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999.

Table 3.1--Institutional Democracy Index Component Variables: Establishing a Baseline Score with Lijphart's Consolidated Democracies

Country (n=36)	v1 Executive Elected	v2 Length of Executive Term	v3 Tenure of Incumbent Executive (as of Jan. 2006)	v4 % of Legislature Directly Elected	v5 Length of Legislative Term	v6 Two Most Recent Consecutively Scheduled Elections Held
Australia	0.5	3	10	100	3	1
Austria	0.5	4	6	100	4	1
Bahamas	0.5	5	4	71	5	1
Barbados	0.5	5	12	59	5	1
Belgium	0.5	4	7	86	4	1
Botswana	0.5	5	8	93	5	1
Canada	0.5	5	3	75	5	1
Colombia	1	4	4	100	4	1
Costa Rica	1	4	4	100	4	1
Denmark	0.5	4	5	100	4	1
Finland	0.75	5	6	100	4	1
France	0.75	5	11	64	5	1
Germany	0.5	4	1	90	4	1
Greece	0.5	4	2	100	4	1
Iceland	0.5	4	2	100	4	1
India	0.5	5	2	68	5.31	1
Ireland	0.5	5	9	100	5	1
Israel	0.5	4	5	100	4	1
Italy	0.5	5	5	100	5	1
Jamaica	0.5	5	14	74	5	1
Japan	0.5	4	5	100	4.67	1
Luxembourg	0.5	5	11	100	5	1
Malta	0.5	5	2	100	5	1
Mauritius	0.5	5	3	100	5	1
Netherlands	0.5	4	4	67	4	1
New Zealand	0.5	3	7	100	3	1
Norway	0.5	4	1	100	4	1
Papua N.G.	0.5	5	4	100	5	1
Portugal	0.75	4.5	5.5	100	4	1
Spain	0.5	4	2	92	4	1
Sweden	0.5	4	10	100	4	1
Switzerland	0.5	1	1	100	4	1
Trinidad and Tob.	0.5	5	5	54	5	1
United Kingdom	0.5	5	9	100	5	1
United States	0.5	4	5	100	2.75	1
Venezuela	1	6	7	100	5	1
Mean (Baseline)	0.5625	4.375	5.59722222	91.4722222	4.38138889	1

Table 3.1--Continued

v7 Contested Elections	v8 Suffrage	v9 % Votes Invalidated (Leg. Elec. unless indicated)	v10 Right to Compete	v11 Effective # of Parliam-entary Parties	v12 Impact of Citizen Vote on Seat Allocation	v13 Ratio of Repres-entation	v14 Registered Voters as % of Voting-Age Population	**CNTRY (n=36)**
7	1	5.2	1	2.19	0.8246	87971	88.33	Australia
9	1	1.45	1	2.72	0.9799	44359	91.03	Austria
3	1	0.93	1	1.68	0.7145	5422	72.96	Bahamas
3	1	0.2	1	1.76	0.7278	.5347	100	Barbados
11	1	5.4	0.8	5.49	0.9137	46951	92.2	Belgium
5	1	2.14	1	1.35	0.6698	27555	48.03	Botswana
6	1	0.97	1	2.35	0.8373	76585	90.72	Canada
4	1	11.62	0.8	3.64	1.0036	169519	86.03	Colombia
5	1	3.05	1	2.42	0.9437	71733	86.34	Costa Rica
14	1	0.8	1	5.11	1.0017	30115	95.37	Denmark
9	1	...	1	5.17	0.8982	26065	100	Finland
16	1	3.14	1	3.54	0.6442	66556	88.93	France
7	1	3.34	0.6	2.84	0.9563	120841	91.77	Germany
7	1	1.63	0.8	2.2	0.8255	36746	100	Greece
6	1	1.15	1	4	0.9645	4592	100	Iceland
20	1	0.01	0.8	4.11	0.9999	1320378	100	India
7	1	...	1	2.76	0.8454	17680	99.21	Ireland
13	0.97	1.64	1	4.16	0.9281	55748	100	Israel
20	0.97	8.32	0.8	5.22	0.818	60957	100	Italy
3	1	...	1	1.5	0.8985	32474	79.5	Jamaica
7	0.97	...	1	4.07	0.6989	175798	100	Japan
8	1	...	1	3.68	0.8948	7499	62.27	Luxembourg
3	1	1.02	0.8	1.99	0.962	4525	95.53	Malta
3	1	...	1	2.71	0.8133	17469	95.19	Mauritius
10	1	...	1	4.68	0.975	71967	95.47	Netherlands
8	1	...	1	1.96	0.9946	33134	95.76	New Zealand
10	1	0.43	1	3.61	0.906	27011	98.08	Norway
3	1	8.87	1	5.98	0.9758	47622	...	Papua N.G.
6	1	2.92	0.8	3.33	0.8739	45396	100	Portugal
12	1	1.96	0.8	2.76	0.9247	68759	97.37	Spain
7	1	1.53	1	3.52	0.9646	25573	96.12	Sweden
12	1	1.06	1	5.57	0.9673	29613	81.89	Switzerland
4	1	...	1	1.83	0.913	19027	100	Trinidad
3	1	...	1	2.2	0.6391	92189	95.39	United King.
5	1	...	1	2.41	0.8998	543572	96.62	United States
6	1	5.72	1	3.07	0.8869	151017	92.45	Venezuela
7.8333333	0.9975	2.98	0.944444	3.266111	0.8801361	101882.4	91.7874286	Mean (BL)

Table 3.1 above illustrates the ratings in each of the 14 variables constituting the Institutional Democracy Index (IDI) for the 36 countries chosen the create baseline scores for future use of the IDI. Thus, while the table displays the column averages for all fourteen variables, it is only the means for variables two, three, five, nine, eleven, thirteen, and fourteen that will be used in the creation of the IDI for Muslim-majority nations.

One interesting observation about the above table is in the diverse data produced for several variables among these widely recognized democracies, a fact pointing to the need for a flexible definition of what might be considered proper institutional arrangements for democracy. Compare, for example the executive term ranging from three years in Australia and New Zealand to the six-year term in Venezuela and a baseline executive term of 4.4 years. The tenure of incumbent executives ranges from one year or less in Germany, Norway, and Switzerland, indicating a recent democratic transferal of executive power, to the tenure of 14 years in Jamaica and 12 years in Barbados, with a baseline tenure of 5.6 years. The legislative term ranges from as little as two years in the United States for a portion of its legislature to as much as six years in India for a portion of its bicameral system, with an overall baseline of 4.4 years equaling that of the average executive term. Invalidated votes ranged from as little as 0.01% of the vote in India's 2004 parliamentary elections to as much as 11.62% in Colombia's 2002 bicameral legislative elections, with a baseline vote invalidation of three percent. The number of effective parties ranges from as few as 1.35 in Botswana to as many as 5.98 in Papua New Guinea, with a baseline of 3.27 parties. The ratio of representation ranges from as many as one for every 4,525 people in Malta to as little as one for every

1,320,378 people in India, with a baseline of 101,882 people. Finally, the level of registered voters spans from 48% of eligible population in Botswana to 99% of eligible population in Ireland, with a baseline of 92%.[3,4]

Table 3.2 displays the component variables and their ratings for the 46 Muslim-majority states of the world. Several descriptions are worth providing at this point regarding the ratings of these governments. A score of "1" for executive election indicates a country that directly elects its chief executive, as is the case in post-conflict Afghanistan, in Algeria, Azerbaijan, Chad, the Comoros, Egypt, the Gambia, Guinea, Indonesia, the Kyrgyz Republic, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Tajikistan, Tunisia, Uzbekistan, and Palestine. A "0.75" score, as in Iran, indicates a power-sharing arrangement between a directly elected executive and a powerful non-elected head of state. A "0.5" score, such as Albania's or Bangladesh's, would indicate a parliamentary arrangement in which the executive is indirectly elective via an elected, representative body. The "0.25" score in Somalia is reflective of the indirect election of an executive in exile that has no real de facto executive power, or in Syria, where the President is elected via a one-party popular referendum and then appoints the chief executive of his own accord. Finally the scores of "0" in Bahrain, Brunei, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkmenistan, and the United Arab Emirates all indicate situations in which executive power is vested in a non-elected individual who effectively holds their title for life.

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[3] Note that ten of the thirty-six countries received a score of 100% in this last category, because the number of reported registered voters exceeded any best estimate of eligible voter population utilizing World Bank and/or U.S. Census Bureau International Database population data broken down by age groups.

[4] Note also, that the actual IDI score, nor the ADI score, are presented in Table 3.1 as this table was simply a tool to gain necessary information for the building of these two indices for Muslim nations. For an actual finished index for the 36 countries above see Table H in the appendix.

Table 3.2--Institutional Democracy Index Component Variables for Muslim States

Country (n=46)	v1 Executive Elected	v2 Length of Executive Term	v3 Tenure of Incumbent Executive (as of Jan. 2006)	v4 % of Legislature Directly Elected	v5 Length of Legislative Term	v6 Two Most Recent Consecutively Scheduled Elections Held
CNTRY	EXCELE	EXCTRM	EXCTNR	PLGELE	LEGTRM	TWOELE
Afghanistan	1	0.8571	1	0.71	0.9226	0.5
Albania	0.5	1	1	1	1	1
Algeria	1	0.8571	0.7493	0.73	0.7971	1
Azerbaijan	1	0.8571	1	1	0.8587	1
Bahrain	0	0	0	0.5	1	0.5
Bangladesh	0.5	0.8571	1	1	0.8587	1
Brunei	0	0	0	0	0	0
Burkina Faso	0.5	0.8571	0	1	0.8587	1
Chad	1	0.8751	0	1	1	1
Comoros	1	1	0.7493	0.55	0.8587	0.5
Djibouti	0.75	0.7429	0.928	1	0.8587	1
Egypt	1	0.6286	0	0.86	0.7743	1
Gambia	1	0.8571	0	0.91	0.8587	1
Guinea	1	0.4	0	1	0.8587	0.5
Indonesia	1	0.8571	1	1	0.8587	1
Iran	0.75	0.5	0.392	0.88	0.8519	1
Iraq	0.5	1	1	1	1	1
Jordan	0	0	0.7493	0.63	1	0.5
Kuwait	0	0	0	0.77	1	1
Kyrgyz Republic	1	0.8571	1	1	0.8587	1
Lebanon	0.5	0.6286	0.5707	1	1	1
Libya	0	0	0	0	0	0.5
Malaysia	0.5	0.8571	1	0.76	0.8039	1
Maldives	0.5	0.8571	0	0.84	0.8587	1
Mali	0.75	0.8571	1	1	0.8587	0.75
Mauritania	0	0.6286	0.5	0	0.7656	0.5
Morocco	0	0.8571	1	0.55	0.4433	1
Niger	1	0.8571	0.7493	1	0.8587	1
Nigeria	1	1	0.7493	1	1	1
Oman	0	0	0	0.63	1	0.5
Pakistan	0	0.8571	0.7493	0.62	0.8062	0.5
Qatar	0	0	0.0347	0	1	0
Saudi Arabia	0	0	1	0	1	0

Table 3.2--Continued

CNTRY	EXCELE	EXCTRM	EXCTNR	PLGELE	LEGTRM	TWOELE
Senegal	1	0.6286	0.928	1	0.8587	0.5
Sierra Leone	1	0.8571	0.5707	0.9	0.8587	0.75
Somalia	0.25	0	1	0	0	0
Sudan	1	0.8571	0	0.75	1	0.5
Syria	0.25	0.4	0.928	1	1	1
Tajikistan	1	0.4	0.7493	0.66	0.8587	1
Tunisia	1	0.8571	0	0.6	0.7674	1
Turkey	0.5	0.6286	1	1	0.8587	1
Turkmenistan	0	0	0	0.5	0.8587	0
United Arab Emir.	0	0	1	0	1	0
Uzbekistan	1	0.4	0	0.55	0.8587	0.5
West Bank/Gaza	1	0.8571	1	1	0.8587	0.5
Yemen	0.75	0.4	0	0.73	0.6304	1
Mean	0.58	0.58	0.55	0.71	0.82	0.72

Table 3.2--Continued

Country (n=46)	v8 Suffrage	v9 % Votes Invalidated (Legisl. Elections unless otherwise indicated)	v10 Right to Compete	v11 Effective # of Parliam-entary Parties	v12 Impact of Citizen Vote on Seat Allocation	v13 Ratio of Repres-entation	v14 Registered Voters as % of Voting-Age Population
CNTRY	SUFFRG	VOTINV	RTCOMP	EFFPRT	SETALL	RATREP	REGVOT
AFG	1	0.2651	0.4	0	0.0498	1	0.9486
ALB	1	0.57	0.6	0.797	0.8575	1	1
ALG	1	0	0.2	0.995	0.6894	1	0.9887
AZB	1	0.8591	0.8	0.842	1	1	0.8367
BAH	0.9505	0.57	1	0	0.62	1	0.6135
BNG	1	1	0.8	0.662	0.6437	0	1
BRU	0	0	0	0.306	0	1	0
BUFO	1	0	1	1	0.9639	0.876	0.4938
CHD	1	1	0.8	0.593	0.62	1	1
COM	1	0.8926	1	0.435	0.62	1	0.5072
DJB	1	1	0.8	0.306	0.627	1	0.8409
EGT	1	1	0.4	0.599	0.62	0.979	0.7734
GAM	1	0.57	0.8	0.348	0.62	1	0.7542
GUI	1	1	0.8	0.52	0.8262	1	1
IND	1	0	1	1	0.9273	0	1
IRN	1	0.896	0.1	0.667	0.62	0	1
IRQ	1	1	0.8	1	0.8849	1	1
JRD	1	0.57	0.8	0.423	0.6362	1	1
KWT	0.2241	0.57	0.8	0	0.2127	1	0.85
KYG	1	1	0.8	0.495	0.753	1	0.9556
LEBN	0.784	0.57	0.6	1	0.62	1	1
LIBY	0	0.57	0	0.306	0.62	0.82	0.85
MALAY	0.9033	0	0.8	0.373	0.7068	1	0.85
MALDV	0.8649	1	0.4	0	0.2694	1	1
MALI	1	0	1	0.834	0.62	1	1
MAUR	0.5	1	0.2	0.484	0.6455	1	0.85
MORC	1	0	0.8	1	0.624	1	0.6778
NGR	1	0.9295	0.9	1	0.8944	1	1
NIGA	1	0.8322	0.6	0.635	0.8486	0	1
OMN	0.8993	0.57	0.8	0	0.62	0.5	0.6762
PAK	1	0.57	0.5	1	0.9884	0	0.9395
QTR	0	0	0	0	0	0.5	0.85
SAU	0.5374	0	0	0	0	0.199	0.85

Table 3.2--Continued

CNTRY	SUFFRG	VOTINV	RTCOMP	EFFPRT	SETALL	RATREP	REGVOT
SEN	1	1	1	0.54	0.6688	1	0.5344
SIRLN	1	0.57	1	0.505	0.9433	1	0.912
SOM	0	0	0	0	0	1	0.85
SUD	0.775	0.57	0.6	0.315	0.62	0.961	0.85
SYR	1	0.57	0.2	0.306	0.62	1	0.85
TJK	1	0.57	0.8	0.445	0.8965	1	0.8553
TNIS	0.9172	0.8926	0.2	0.466	1	1	0.8337
TKY	1	0.6913	0.5	0.567	0.5197	0.738	0.9736
TRKMN	1	0.57	0.1	0.306	0.62	1	0.85
UAE	0	0	0	0	0	0.5	0.85
UZB	1	0.57	0.4	1	0.9951	0.841	0.85
WBGZ	1	0.57	1	0.709	0.7929	1	0.8432
YMN	1	0.9362	0.8	0.471	0.7335	1	0.9784
Mean	0.83	0.57	0.58	0.51	0.62	0.82	0.85

An executive term of office of four years, such as such as that seen in Albania, the Comoros, Iraq, and Nigeria, would be most consistent with the baseline of "4.4," therefore you will observe that each of these states received a rating of "1" for this variable. On the other hand, a state with a term of seven years, as with Guinea, Syria, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Yemen, would receive a "0.4" rating, indicating that such a term was 1.6 times the baseline of "4.4." Further, scores of "0" indicate either de jure or de facto terms of life—e.g., Bahrain, Brunei, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkmenistan, and the United Arab Emirates. More peculiar cases included, Somalia, whose "0" score resulted from a complete lack of a functioning executive, and Iran, who received a score of "0.5" as power is shared between a president elected for a four year term—i.e., a rating of "1"—and a supreme leader elected indirectly for life—i.e., a rating of "0."

The baseline score of "5.6" for the incumbent's executive tenure most favored those states where the current executive has served no more than one, or to a lesser extent

two, terms of office. A tenure of five years or less, for example, would yield a score of "1," while a tenure of eight years would produce a score of "0.57," as is seen in Lebanon and Sierra Leone. It would require a tenure of office greater than eleven years to produce a "0" score, however several states have executives who have held the reigns of power for over 25 years—Egypt (25), Maldives (28), Kuwait (29), Oman (36), Libya (37), and Brunei (39).

The score for the percentage of the legislature elected is a bit easier to discern, as it is a direct reflection of the actual percentage. Eighteen states have a score of "1" indicating that the entire legislative body is directly elected, whereas the score of "0.55" in Morocco and the Comoros indicates that 55% of legislators are directly elected, and again a score of "0" for Brunei, Libya, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, and the U.A.E. indicate that legislative power is vested in a non-elected body.

The legislative term variable also carried a baseline of "4.4," thereby favoring most those states with legislatures subjected to election at least every four years. The vast majority of states either met this standard or came close with a five-year term, earning at least "0.86." The lengthiest terms in fact were six years in Yemen and a combined average of 6.8 years for the bicameral legislature in Morocco, producing scores of "0.63" and "0.44" respectively.

The sixth variable in the table, that indicating two or more consecutively scheduled elections have been held, displays a simple spectrum of scores: "0" for those where no elections have been held in recent years, "0.5" for those having held one election without interruption, and "1" for those meeting the standard of two elections. Libya was given a score of "0.5" for its elections are situated within a complex multi-

tiered system of local and regional bodies that fail to produce any directly elected national body and its elections are widely perceived to be manipulated from the top down. Oman was also given a score of "0.5" as its direct elections fail to produce a legislative body, having the purpose instead of electing one half of the bicameral system, the half that possesses only advisory prerogatives and completely lacks the authority to enact legislation. Mali would have received a full score of "1" for its two recent elections, however, its original 1997 election was invalidated by a constitutional court citing massive irregularities and were thus rescheduled for three months later.

Two thirds of Muslim states met the standard of universal suffrage at age eighteen. No recognition of suffrage was awarded those states entirely lacking legitimate, functioning elections—Brunei, Libya, Qatar, Somalia, and the U.A.E. Saudi Arabia was recognized for its efforts to begin registering voters for its first local elections, however suffrage in this particular state was limited to males, 21 and older, earning it a score of "0.54." Bahrain, Malaysia, Maldives, and Oman were also given reduced scores for holding off suffrage until age 21, Tunis for age 20. Kuwait received an even lower assessment due to its franchise laws requiring not only age 21, but also the necessity for demonstrating that one is either a native citizen or a naturalized resident citizen for at least 30 years. Lebanon's score is a result of its granting of suffrage to males aged 21, but requiring that female voters both be age 21 and have completed at least primary education. Finally, Mauritania's reduced score was the result of a 2005 coup that negated the effectiveness of any suffrage franchise.

The baseline score for the percentage of votes invalidated was three percent. Ten states were within this range, earning a full score of "1." The invalidated vote ranged

from as little as 0.6% in Senegal to more than 10% in Algeria, Malaysia, Mali, and Morocco. A percentage of more than 5.95, however would produce a "0" score in this column.

Only Bahrain, Burkina Faso, the Comoros, Indonesia, Mali, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Palestine earned a full score for the right to compete for public office in recent elections. Severe de jure or de facto restrictions were noted in Afghanistan (as of 2003, political parties that oppose Islam or promote racial, religious, or sectarian hostility are banned; further, as of 2005, political parties are not yet legally recognized, requiring candidates to run as independents); Algeria (political parties based on distinctive religion, language, race, gender, or region are prohibited, and extensive intimidation, violence, and disappearances have inhibited open contestation); Egypt (in addition to election-related violence, Egypt also bans religious and national-separatist parties); Iran (does not recognize formal parties, disqualifies those possessing ideologies contradicting the tenets of Islamic rule or national unity, commonly engages in political imprisonment of opposition candidates during electoral seasons); Maldives (while political parties have been allowed to register within the last year, Maldives has not yet witnessed an electoral competition involving such parties; furthermore penal codes prohibiting speech that provokes people against government, is derogatory toward Islam, or threatens national security are widely used to intimidate political dissidents); and various political violence and arrests and/or bans on religious, nationalist, ethnic, or variously ideological parties—or bans on parties altogether—were also assessed in Mauritania, Pakistan, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Furthermore, contestation was not recognized were no elections have been forthcoming.

The baseline score for effective parties, "3.27," rewarded those states where three or more political parties had representation seated in the legislature to various degrees—Algeria, Burkina Faso, Indonesia, Iraq, Lebanon, Morocco, Niger, Pakistan, and Uzbekistan. A strict two-party system would still receive a score of about "0.6"—Bangladesh, Chad, Egypt, Nigeria, Senegal, and Turkey—whereas one-party states would earn a score of about "0.3"—Brunei, Djibouti, the Gambia, Libya, Malaysia, Sudan, Syria, and Turkmenistan. A score of "0" in this column either indicates that no elections for the legislature are held or that no party members are seated.

The variable for seat allocation in the legislature rewarded states whose seated majority or plurality party most closely reflected, or were in direct proportion to, the expressed voters' preferences. Seat allocation scores of about "0.9" or more were seen in Albania, Azerbaijan, Burkina Faso, Indonesia, Iraq, Niger, Pakistan, Sierra Leone, Tajikistan, Tunisia, and Uzbekistan. Some of the worst scores reflect states were the ruling party possesses a grossly disproportionate number of legislative seats when compared to election results. States with a score of "0.3" or less included Afghanistan, Kuwait, and Maldives. Note that because Afghanistan's candidates did not run within political parties, its seat allocation score is the result of averaging the vote acquired by the winning candidates in each constituency.

The baseline score for the ratio of representation to population was 1:101,882. Any state with a ratio of representation less than this standard received a full score of "1"—31 states in total. While states with excessively large numbers of constituents per representative received progressively lower scores. The range of ratios ran from as close as 1:5,515 in Bahrain to as distant as 1:461,494 in Bangladesh.

Finally, the last component variable in the IDI assessed the percentage of the eligible population who were registered voters. The baseline score for registered voters was 92%. Thirteen states met or exceeded this standard. The range of registration percentages ran from 45.32% in Burkina Faso to 97.95% in Chad.

THE AGGREGATED DEOMCRACY INDEX (ADI)

Tables 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5 to follow (a) compile the component variables for the Aggregated Democracy Index (ADI), (b) convert each of their raw scores to a single 10-point scale to allow for comparison and averaging, and (c) thereby produce the resulting ADI respectively. Note that the mean rating for each index was used to fill in missing data: a Polity IV mean of –2 for Afghanistan, Brunei, Iraq, Lebanon, Maldives, Somalia, and Palestine; a Transparency International CPI mean of 3.2 for Brunei, the Comoros, Djibouti, Guinea, Maldives, and Mauritania; and a Freedom House Press Freedom mean of 67 for Palestine.

As indicated by the ordinal ranking in Table 3.5, Mali, Senegal, Albania, Turkey, Niger, Indonesia, the Comoros, Sierra Leone, Malaysia, Nigeria, Bangladesh, and Burkina Faso held the top quartile scores on the ADI, in that order. While the bottom quartile was filled by Pakistan, Mauritania, Qatar, the U.A.E., Brunei, Syria, Uzbekistan, Sudan, Somalia, Saudi Arabia, Libya, and Turkmenistan.

Table 3.6 makes our first comparison of the percentage of the population that is Muslim in each state to the ADI rating. Rather than go into more in-depth discussions of these results at this time, however, I would be remiss in failing to point out some revealing information in Table 3.7 about this first run of the ADI. Table 3.7 displays

Table 3.3--Aggregated Democracy Index Component Variables for Muslim States

Country (n=46)	Institutional Democracy Index (0 to 14)	Polity IV (-10 to 10)	Freedom House Political Rights Index (7 to 1)	Transpar-ency Intern-ational Corruption Percept-ions Index (0 to 10)	Freedom House Press Freedom Index (100 to 0)	Freedom House Civil Liberties Index (7 to 1)	World Bank Governance Indicators Voice and Accountab-ility Index (-2.5 to 2.5)
CNTRY	IDISUM	PIV1	FHPRI1	TICPI1	FHPFI1	FHCLI1	WBVA1
AFG	8.6532	-2	5	2.5	68	6	-1.35
ALB	11.3245	7	3	2.5	51	3	0.03
ALG	10.0066	-3	6	2.8	64	5	-0.91
AZB	12.0536	-7	6	2.2	72	5	-0.97
BAH	6.7540	-7	5	5.8	71	5	-0.73
BNG	10.3215	6	4	1.7	68	4	-0.69
BRU	1.3060	-2	6	3.2	75	5	-1.11
BUFO	9.5495	0	5	3.4	40	4	-0.38
CHD	10.8881	-2	6	1.7	73	5	-1.09
COM	10.1128	4	4	3.2	44	4	-0.14
DJB	10.8535	2	5	3.2	67	5	-0.85
EGT	9.6343	-6	6	3.4	68	5	-1.04
GAM	9.7180	-5	4	2.7	72	4	-0.59
GUI	9.9049	-1	6	3.2	73	5	-1.12
IND	10.6431	7	3	2.2	58	4	-0.44
IRN	8.6569	3	6	2.9	80	6	-1.36
IRQ	12.1849	-2	7	2.2	70	5	-1.71
JRD	8.3085	-2	5	5.7	62	4	-0.68
KWT	6.4268	-7	4	4.7	58	5	-0.48
KYG	11.7194	-3	6	2.3	71	5	-1.06
LEBN	10.2733	-2	6	3.1	60	5	-0.81
LIBY	3.6660	-7	7	2.5	95	7	-1.79
MALAY	9.5541	3	4	5.1	69	4	-0.36
MALDV	8.5901	-2	6	3.2	68	5	-1.07
MALI	10.6698	6	2	2.9	23	2	0.35
MAUR	7.0737	-6	6	3.2	65	5	-1.16
MORC	8.9522	-6	5	3.2	63	4	-0.55
NGR	12.1890	4	3	2.4	53	3	-0.12
NIGA	10.6651	4	4	1.9	52	4	-0.65
OMN	6.1955	-8	6	6.3	72	5	-0.9
PAK	8.5305	-5	6	2.1	61	5	-1.31
QTR	2.3847	-10	6	5.9	62	5	-0.79
SAU	3.5864	-10	7	3.4	80	7	-1.63

Table 3.3--Continued

CNTRY	IDISUM	PIV1	FHPRI1	TICPI1	FHPFI1	FHCLI1	WBVA1
SEN	10.6585	8	2	3.2	37	3	0.19
SIRLN	10.8668	5	4	2.4	59	3	-0.49
SOM	3.1000	-2	6	2.1	83	7	-1.58
SUD	8.7981	-6	7	2.1	86	7	-1.81
SYR	9.1240	-7	7	3.4	83	7	-1.72
TJK	10.2348	-3	6	2.1	74	5	-1.12
TNIS	9.5340	-4	6	4.9	80	5	-1.11
TKY	9.9769	7	3	3.5	48	3	-0.15
TRKMN	5.8047	-9	7	1.8	96	7	-1.9
UAE	3.3500	-8	6	6.2	72	6	-1.01
UZB	8.9648	-9	7	2.2	85	6	-1.75
WBGZ	11.1309	-2	5	2.6	67	6	-1.25
YMN	9.4295	-2	5	2.7	76	5	-0.99
Mean	8.75	-2	5	3.2	67	4.89	-0.92

Table 3.4--Aggregated Democracy Index Variable Conversions to a 10-Point Scale

Country (n=46)	Institutl. Democracy Index Convrsn. (0 to 10)	Polity IV Convrsn. (0 to 10)	Freedom House Political Rights Index Conversion (0 to 10)	Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (0 to 10)	Freedom House Press Freedom Index Conversion (0 to 10)	Freedom House Civil Liberties Index Conversion (0 to 10)	World Bank Governance Indicators Voice and Account-ability Index Conversion (0 to 10)
CNTRY	EIDI	PIV	FHPRI	TICPI	FHPFI	FHCLI	WBVAI
AFG	6.18	4	3.33	2.5	3.2	1.67	2.3
ALB	8.09	8.5	6.67	2.5	4.9	6.67	5.06
ALG	7.15	3.5	1.67	2.8	3.6	3.33	3.18
AZB	8.61	1.5	1.67	2.2	2.8	3.33	3.06
BAH	4.82	1.5	3.33	5.8	2.9	3.33	3.54
BNG	7.37	8	5	1.7	3.2	5	3.62
BRU	0.93	4	1.67	3.2	2.5	3.33	2.78
BUFO	6.82	5	3.33	3.4	6	5	4.24
CHD	7.78	4	1.67	1.7	2.7	3.33	1.41
COM	7.22	7	5	3.2	5.6	5	4.72
DJB	7.75	6	3.33	3.2	3.3	3.33	3.3
EGT	6.88	2	1.67	3.4	3.2	3.33	2.92
GAM	6.94	2.5	5	2.7	2.8	5	3.82
GUI	7.07	4.5	1.67	3.2	2.7	3.33	2.76
IND	7.60	8.5	6.67	2.2	4.2	5	4.12
IRN	6.18	6.5	1.67	2.9	2	1.67	2.28
IRQ	8.70	4	0	2.2	3	3.33	1.58
JRD	5.93	4	3.33	5.7	3.8	5	3.64
KWT	4.59	1.5	5	4.7	4.2	3.33	4.04
KYG	8.37	3.5	1.67	2.3	2.9	3.33	2.88
LEBN	7.34	4	1.67	3.1	4	3.33	3.38
LIBY	2.62	1.5	0	2.5	0.5	0	1.42
MALAY	6.82	6.5	5	5.1	3.1	5	4.28
MALDV	6.14	4	1.67	3.2	3.2	3.33	2.86
MALI	7.62	8	8.33	2.9	7.7	8.33	5.7
MAUR	5.05	2	1.67	3.2	3.5	3.33	2.68
MORC	6.39	2	3.33	3.2	3.7	5	3.9
NGR	8.71	7	6.67	2.4	4.7	6.67	4.76
NIGA	7.62	7	5	1.9	4.8	5	3.7
OMN	4.43	1	1.67	6.3	2.8	3.33	3.2
PAK	6.09	2.5	1.67	2.1	3.9	3.33	2.38
QTR	1.70	0	1.67	5.9	3.8	3.33	3.42
SAU	2.56	0	0	3.4	2	0	1.74

Table 3.4--Continued

CNTRY	EIDI	PIV	FHPRI	TICPI	FHPFI	FHCLI	WBVAI
SEN	7.61	9	8.33	3.2	6.3	6.67	5.38
SIRLN	7.76	7.5	5	2.4	4.1	6.67	4.02
SOM	2.21	4	1.67	2.1	1.7	0	1.84
SUD	6.28	2	0	2.1	1.4	0	1.38
SYR	6.52	1.5	0	3.4	1.7	0	1.56
TJK	7.31	3.5	1.67	2.1	2.6	3.33	2.76
TNIS	6.81	3	1.67	4.9	2	3.33	2.78
TKY	7.13	8.5	6.67	3.5	5.2	6.67	4.7
TRKMN	4.15	0.5	0	1.8	0.4	0	1.2
UAE	2.39	1	1.67	6.2	2.8	1.67	2.98
UZB	6.40	0.5	0	2.2	1.5	1.67	1.5
WBGZ	7.95	4	3.33	2.6	3.3	1.67	2.5
YMN	6.74	4	3.33	2.7	2.4	3.33	3.02
Mean	6.25	4	2.94	3.2	3.3	3.51	3.14

Table 3.5--Aggregated Democracy Index Ratings & Rankings for Muslim-Majority States

Country (n=46)	Aggregated Democracy Index (Sum Total)	Aggregated Democracy Index (0 to 100)	**Country (n=46)**	Aggregated Democracy Index (0 to 100)	ADI Ordinal Ranking	**Country (n=46)**	Institutnl. Democr. Index (0 to 10)	EIDI Ordinal Ranking
CNTRY	ADISUM	ADI	**CNTRY**	ADI	ADIO	**CNTRY**	EIDI	EIDIO
AFG	23.18	33.12	MALI	70.42	1	IRQ	9.42	1
ALB	42.39	60.56	SEN	67.44	2	NGR	9.42	1
ALG	25.23	36.04	ALB	61.58	3	AZB	9.32	3
AZB	23.17	33.10	TKY	61.54	4	KYG	9.09	4
BAH	25.22	36.03	NGR	59.46	5	ALB	8.80	5
BNG	33.89	48.42	IND	55.72	6	WBGZ	8.66	6
BRU	18.41	26.30	COM	54.94	7	CHD	8.49	7
BUFO	33.79	48.27	SIRLN	54.52	8	SIRLN	8.48	8
CHD	22.59	32.27	MALAY	52.17	9	MALI	8.34	9
COM	37.74	53.92	NIGA	51.05	10	NIGA	8.33	10
DJB	30.21	43.16	BNG	49.44	11	SEN	8.33	10
EGT	23.40	33.43	BUFO	49.29	12	IND	8.32	12
GAM	28.76	41.09	JRD	45.37	13	BNG	8.09	13
GUI	25.23	36.05	DJB	43.16	14	LEBN	8.05	14
IND	38.29	54.70	GAM	42.11	15	COM	7.94	15
IRN	23.20	33.15	MORC	40.34	16	ALG	7.86	16
IRQ	22.81	32.59	KWT	39.34	17	TKY	7.84	17
JRD	31.40	44.86	LEBN	39.33	18	DJB	7.75	18
KWT	27.36	39.09	WBGZ	37.24	19	TJK	7.67	19
KYG	24.95	35.64	ALG	37.06	20	GAM	7.66	20
LEBN	26.82	38.31	BAH	37.06	20	EGT	7.60	21
LIBY	8.54	12.20	YMN	36.71	22	BUFO	7.54	22
MALAY	35.80	51.15	KYG	36.66	23	MALAY	7.54	22
MALDV	24.40	34.85	GUI	36.56	24	TNIS	7.52	24
MALI	48.58	69.40	TNIS	36.01	25	GUI	7.43	25
MAUR	21.43	30.62	MALDV	35.87	26	MORC	7.11	26
MORC	27.52	39.32	EGT	34.45	27	SUD	7.00	27
NGR	40.91	58.44	IRN	34.17	28	YMN	6.91	28
NIGA	35.02	50.03	AFG	34.14	29	AFG	6.90	29
OMN	22.73	32.46	AZB	34.12	30	IRN	6.90	29
PAK	21.97	31.39	TJK	33.75	31	MALDV	6.85	31
QTR	19.82	28.32	IRQ	33.61	32	PAK	6.81	32
SAU	9.70	13.86	OMN	33.49	33	UZB	6.76	33

Table 3.5--Continued

CNTRY	ADISUM	ADI	CNTRY	ADI	ADIO	CNTRY	EIDI	EIDIO
SEN	46.49	66.42	CHD	33.29	34	SYR	6.52	34
SIRLN	37.45	53.50	PAK	32.41	35	JRD	6.29	35
SOM	13.52	19.32	MAUR	31.64	36	MAUR	5.77	36
SUD	13.16	18.81	QTR	28.32	37	BAH	5.54	37
SYR	14.68	20.97	UAE	26.73	38	OMN	5.14	38
TJK	23.27	33.24	BRU	26.30	39	KWT	4.77	39
TNIS	24.49	34.99	SYR	20.97	40	TRKMN	4.15	40
TKY	42.37	60.52	UZB	20.19	41	LIBY	2.62	41
TRKMN	8.05	11.49	SUD	19.83	42	SAU	2.56	42
UAE	18.71	26.73	SOM	19.32	43	UAE	2.39	43
UZB	13.77	19.68	SAU	13.86	44	SOM	2.21	44
WBGZ	25.35	36.22	LIBY	12.20	45	QTR	1.70	45
YMN	25.52	36.45	TRKMN	11.49	46	BRU	0.93	46
Mean	26.33	37.62		37.62			6.25	

Table 3.6--Aggregated Democracy Index & Muslim Demographics

Country (n=46)	% Muslim	Aggrtd. Democr. Index (0 to 100)	**Country (n=46)**	% Muslim	Institutnl. Democracy Average Convrsn. (0 to 10)	**Country (n=46)**	% Muslim	Democratic Practice Relative to Institutional Standards--(EIDI to ADI Differential) (-45 to 45)
CNTRY	PERMUS	ADI	**CNTRY**	PERMUS	EIDI	**CNTRY**	PERMUS	DEMPRA
AFG	99	34.14	AFG	99	6.90	AFG	99	0
ALB	70	61.58	ALB	70	8.80	ALB	70	2
ALG	99	37.06	ALG	99	7.86	ALG	99	-4
AZB	93	34.12	AZB	93	9.32	AZB	93	-27
BAH	81	37.06	BAH	81	5.54	BAH	81	17
BNG	83	49.44	BNG	83	8.09	BNG	83	2
BRU	67	26.30	BRU	67	0.93	BRU	67	7
BUFO	50	49.29	BUFO	50	7.54	BUFO	50	10
CHD	51	33.29	CHD	51	8.49	CHD	51	-27
COM	98	54.94	COM	98	7.94	COM	98	8
DJB	94	43.16	DJB	94	7.75	DJB	94	4
EGT	94	34.45	EGT	94	7.60	EGT	94	-6
GAM	90	42.11	GAM	90	7.66	GAM	90	5
GUI	85	36.56	GUI	85	7.43	GUI	85	1
IND	88	55.72	IND	88	8.32	IND	88	6
IRN	98	34.17	IRN	98	6.90	IRN	98	1
IRQ	97	33.61	IRQ	97	9.42	IRQ	97	-31
JRD	94	45.37	JRD	94	6.29	JRD	94	22
KWT	85	39.34	KWT	85	4.77	KWT	85	22
KYG	75	36.66	KYG	75	9.09	KYG	75	-19
LEBN	60	39.33	LEBN	60	8.05	LEBN	60	-4
LIBY	97	12.20	LIBY	97	2.62	LIBY	97	-4
MALAY	60	52.17	MALAY	60	7.54	MALAY	60	13
MALDV	100	35.87	MALDV	100	6.85	MALDV	100	5
MALI	90	70.42	MALI	90	8.34	MALI	90	8
MAUR	100	31.64	MAUR	100	5.77	MAUR	100	0
MORC	99	40.34	MORC	99	7.11	MORC	99	10
NGR	80	59.46	NGR	80	9.42	NGR	80	-4
NIGA	50	51.05	NIGA	50	8.33	NIGA	50	0
OMN	99	33.49	OMN	99	5.14	OMN	99	5
PAK	97	32.41	PAK	97	6.81	PAK	97	-3
QTR	95	28.32	QTR	95	1.70	QTR	95	8
SAU	100	13.86	SAU	100	2.56	SAU	100	-2

Table 3.6--Continued

CNTRY	PERMUS	ADI	CNTRY	PERMUS	EIDI	CNTRY	PERMUS	DEMPRA
SEN	94	67.44	SEN	94	8.33	SEN	94	8
SIRLN	60	54.52	SIRLN	60	8.48	SIRLN	60	0
SOM	100	19.32	SOM	100	2.21	SOM	100	1
SUD	70	19.83	SUD	70	7.00	SUD	70	-15
SYR	90	20.97	SYR	90	6.52	SYR	90	-6
TJK	90	33.75	TJK	90	7.67	TJK	90	-12
TNIS	98	36.01	TNIS	98	7.52	TNIS	98	-1
TKY	100	61.54	TKY	100	7.84	TKY	100	13
TRKMN	89	11.49	TRKMN	89	4.15	TRKMN	89	-6
UAE	96	26.73	UAE	96	2.39	UAE	96	5
UZB	88	20.19	UZB	88	6.76	UZB	88	-8
WBGZ	84	37.24	WBGZ	84	8.66	WBGZ	84	-13
YMN	99	36.71	YMN	99	6.91	YMN	99	6
	86	37.62		86	6.25		86	-0.07

Table 3.7--Correlation Coefficients Among the Institutional Democracy Index & Its Component Variables

. corr eidi excele exctrm exctnr plgele legtrm twoele conele suffrg votinv rtcomp effprt setall ratrep regvot

(obs=46)

	eidi	excele	exctrm	exctnr	plgele	legtrm	twoele	conele	suffrg	votinv	rtcomp	effprt	setall	ratrep	regvot
eidi	1.0000														
excele	0.7243	1.0000													
exctrm	0.8443	0.6697	1.0000												
exctnr	0.3103	0.0936	0.3414	1.0000											
plgele	0.8861	0.6319	0.6725	0.1907	1.0000										
legtrm	0.4500	0.2168	0.2530	0.0979	0.4875	1.0000									
twoele	0.7817	0.4856	0.6574	0.1163	0.7710	0.2608	1.0000								
conele	0.7623	0.4912	0.7599	0.1425	0.5918	0.3427	0.5600	1.0000							
suffrg	0.8548	0.5723	0.6427	0.1817	0.7971	0.4999	0.6105	0.6421	1.0000						
votinv	0.4909	0.3669	0.2868	-0.1669	0.4373	0.2412	0.3959	0.2812	0.4162	1.0000					
rtcomp	0.7119	0.4259	0.4828	0.1624	0.6882	0.3601	0.4942	0.5568	0.6187	0.2564	1.0000				
effprt	0.6521	0.3889	0.6125	0.2527	0.5138	0.0561	0.5051	0.5098	0.5211	0.0991	0.3615	1.0000			
setall	0.7518	0.4840	0.5552	0.0266	0.6044	0.2243	0.5821	0.5323	0.7084	0.4166	0.5522	0.7225	1.0000		
ratrep	0.1406	0.1547	0.0428	-0.1572	0.0762	-0.1458	0.0842	-0.0218	0.0529	0.1104	0.1855	-0.0751	0.0308	1.0000	
regvot	0.3974	0.2365	0.2665	0.2673	0.3639	0.4089	0.3676	0.1778	0.2991	0.2502	0.0419	0.2027	0.2352	-0.2054	1.0000

Table 3.8--Correlation Coefficients Among the Aggregated Democracy Index & Its Component Variables

. corr adi eidi pivcvn fhprcv ticpcv fhpfcv fhclcv wbvacv

(obs=46)

	adi	eidi	pivcvn	fhprcv	ticpcv	fhpfcv	fhclcv	wbvacv
adi	1.0000							
eidi	0.6253	1.0000						
pivcvn	0.8435	0.5500	1.0000					
fhprcv	0.9249	0.4195	0.7861	1.0000				
ticpcv	0.0051	-0.4075	-0.2940	0.0011	1.0000			
fhpfcv	0.8741	0.4273	0.6391	0.7985	0.0711	1.0000		
fhclcv	0.9372	0.5380	0.7085	0.8445	0.0431	0.8401	1.0000	
wbvacv	0.9150	0.3581	0.6544	0.9030	0.2325	0.8650	0.8969	1.0000

Table 3.9--Correlation Coefficients Among Muslim Demographics & the Aggregated Democracy Index

. corr permus eidi pivcvn fhprcv ticpcv fhpfcv fhclcv wbvacv adi dempra

(obs=46)

	permus	eidi	pivcvn	fhprcv	ticpcv	fhpfcv	fhclcv	wbvacv	adi	dempra
permus	1.0000									
eidi	-0.2460	1.0000								
pivcvn	-0.2784	0.5500	1.0000							
fhprcv	-0.1671	0.4195	0.7861	1.0000						
ticpcv	0.1817	-0.4075	-0.2940	0.0011	1.0000					
fhpfcv	-0.1875	0.4273	0.6391	0.7985	0.0711	1.0000				
fhclcv	-0.2432	0.5380	0.7085	0.8445	0.0431	0.8401	1.0000			
wbvacv	-0.1458	0.3581	0.6544	0.9030	0.2325	0.8650	0.8969	1.0000		
adi	-0.2374	0.6253	0.8435	0.9249	0.0051	0.8741	0.9372	0.9150	1.0000	
dempra	0.1071	-0.3217	0.2007	0.4906	0.5811	0.3715	0.3482	0.5737	0.3603	1.0000

the correlation coefficients among the Institutional Democracy Index and its component variables. The usefulness in examining such correlations lies in revealing a level of internal validity in the constructed index. Groups of variables that are moderately to highly correlated appear to be measuring the same latent variable. In this case the group of variables consists of the fourteen components of the IDI and the latent variable they propose to measure are institutions of democracy. One can debate about what the proper threshold is in order to state that correlation exists. Here, I will be utilizing the following assumptions:

- A correlation coefficient (r) of 1.0 indicates a perfect correlation as they share 100% of their variance in common with one another;
- An r of .87 to .99 shows high correlation: 75% to 99% of variance in common;
- An r of .71 to .86 shows moderately high correlation: 50% to 74% of shared variance;
- An r of .5 to .7 shows moderately low correlation: 25% to 49% of shared variance;
- An r of .32 to .49 shows low correlation: only 10% to 24% of shared variance;
- An r of .1 to .32 shows almost no correlation: 1 to 9% of variance in common;
- An r of 0.0 shows perfectly independent or uncorrelated variables and they share none of their variance with each other.

For all practical purposes, a correlation coefficient of less than, or equal to, 0.49 is virtually no correlation at all. However, so as to acknowledge any variable that may contribute important aspects to the index, variables with a correlation of less than 0.3 to

the IDI will be dropped from the index as they appear to measure a latent variable other than the democratic institutions outlined at the beginning of the chapter.

As Table 3.7 shows us, nine of the component variables are highly correlated to the IDI ($r \geq 0.71$): the percentage of the legislature directly elected, the extent of suffrage, the length of the executive term, having held two or more elections, fully contested elections, impact of election results upon legislative seat allocation, whether the executive is directly elected, an uninhibited right to compete for public office, and the number of effective parties seated in the legislature. Of the remaining five variables, only one does not meet the threshold of $r = 0.3$ to the IDI, the ratio of representation, or legislator to average constituency size, and will therefore be dropped from the index. This intuitively makes sense considering that although it was intended as a measure of the opportunity for voice-responsiveness among the populace and its representatives, in fact it unnecessarily penalizes a large country simply for being large and rewards a small country simply for being small.

Looking for further validity among the component variables of the Aggregated Democracy Index, we find in Table 3.8 that each of the indices included are moderately to highly correlated to the ADI with the exception of Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index (CPI) ($r = 0.0051$). Such a correlation coefficient in fact approximates nearly perfect independence from the latent variable in the ADI—i.e., democratic practice. Furthermore, the correlation coefficients between the percent Muslim and the ADI in Table 3.9 again points to the conclusion that the CPI's measures run counter to the rest of the indices in the ADI and therefore to the ADI as a whole. Thus, the CPI will also be dropped from the ADI prior to recalculations of the index.

For those looking at Table 3.9 for a different purpose, that is the test of whether the Muslim demographic is correlated to the measure of democratic governance, one finds a clear pattern. Although, perhaps at first glance we could assume that there is a negative correlation between the two, which would seem to contradict my previous arguments about their independence of one another, for a negative relationship would mean that as the percentage of Muslim population increases the measures of democratic governance decrease and vice versa, in fact the reader must pay attention not just to the negative sign preceding the correlation coefficients, but also to the strength of the relationship. Considering that all correlation coefficients between the Muslim demographic and the ADI or its component indices are less than 0.28, we can conclude that there exists virtually no relationship at all. The r-value of percent Muslim to ADI, for example, is only –0.2374, which means that among the 46 Muslim-majority nations in the world, their differing degrees of Islamic population and their differing degrees of democracy share only 6% of their variance in common. Based upon this initial running of the ADI, a step toward disproving the null hypothesis seems to have been taken. However, in an effort to further improve the ADI's ratings, the two aforementioned variables will now be dropped and the ratings recalculated.

Tables 3.10 and 3.11 present the results of the revised ADI,[5] and Tables 3.12 and 3.13 present the new correlation matrices for the revised index.

[5] See Tables F and G in the appendix for detailed calculations leading to these results.

Table 3.10--Revised Aggregated Democracy Index (Scores Converted to a 10-Point Scale)

CNTRY	EIDI	PIVCVN	FHPRCV	FHPFCV	FHCLCV	WBVACV	ADISUM
AFG	6.45	4	3.33	3.2	1.67	2.3	20.95
ALB	8.27	8.5	6.67	4.9	6.67	5.06	40.07
ALG	7.70	3.5	1.67	3.6	3.33	3.18	22.98
AZB	8.61	1.5	1.67	2.8	3.33	3.06	20.97
BAH	4.76	1.5	3.33	2.9	3.33	3.54	19.36
BNG	7.94	8	5	3.2	5	3.62	32.76
BRU	0.24	4	1.67	2.5	3.33	2.78	14.52
BUFO	7.44	5	3.33	6	5	4.24	31.01
CHD	7.61	4	1.67	2.7	3.33	1.41	20.72
COM	7.09	7	5	5.6	5	4.72	34.41
DJB	6.81	6	3.33	3.3	3.33	3.3	26.07
EGT	6.66	2	1.67	3.2	3.33	2.92	19.78
GAM	7.04	2.5	5	2.8	5	3.82	26.16
GUI	6.47	4.5	1.67	2.7	3.33	2.76	21.43
IND	8.96	8.5	6.67	4.2	5	4.12	37.45
IRN	6.74	6.5	1.67	2	1.67	2.28	20.86
IRQ	8.60	4	0	3	3.33	1.58	20.51
JRD	5.57	4	3.33	3.8	5	3.64	25.34
KWT	3.93	1.5	5	4.2	3.33	4.04	22.00
KYG	8.25	3.5	1.67	2.9	3.33	2.88	22.53
LEBN	7.46	4	1.67	4	3.33	3.38	23.84
LIBY	1.75	1.5	0	0.5	0	1.42	5.17
MALAY	7.35	6.5	5	3.1	5	4.28	31.23
MALDV	5.84	4	1.67	3.2	3.33	2.86	20.90
MALI	8.21	8	8.33	7.7	8.33	5.7	46.27
MAUR	4.67	2	1.67	3.5	3.33	2.68	17.85
MORC	6.89	2	3.33	3.7	5	3.9	24.82
NGR	8.66	7	6.67	4.7	6.67	4.76	38.46
NIGA	8.33	7	5	4.8	5	3.7	33.83
OMN	4.71	1	1.67	2.8	3.33	3.2	16.71
PAK	6.89	2.5	1.67	3.9	3.33	2.38	20.67
QTR	1.45	0	1.67	3.8	3.33	3.42	13.67
SAU	2.61	0	0	2	0	1.74	6.35
SEN	7.43	9	8.33	6.3	6.67	5.38	43.11
SIRLN	7.92	7.5	5	4.1	6.67	4.02	35.21
SOM	1.62	4	1.67	1.7	0	1.84	10.83
SUD	6.36	2	0	1.4	0	1.38	11.14
SYR	5.81	1.5	0	1.7	0	1.56	10.57
TJK	7.05	3.5	1.67	2.6	3.33	2.76	20.91
TNIS	6.65	3	1.67	2	3.33	2.78	19.43
TKY	7.34	8.5	6.67	5.2	6.67	4.7	39.08
TRKMN	3.26	0.5	0	0.4	0	1.2	5.36
UAE	2.19	1	1.67	2.8	1.67	2.98	12.31

Table 3.10--Continued

CNTRY	EIDI	PIVCVN	FHPRCV	FHPFCV	FHCLCV	WBVACV	ADISUM
UZB	6.20	0.5	0	1.5	1.67	1.5	11.37
WBGZ	8.12	4	3.33	3.3	1.67	2.5	22.92
YMN	5.96	4	3.33	2.4	3.33	3.02	22.04

Table 3.11--Revised Aggregated Democracy Index (Mean Scores & Muslim Demographics)

CNTRY	ADI	ADIRNK	EIDIRK	DEMPRA	PERMUS
AFG	34.92	30	31	1	99
ALB	66.79	3	7	4	70
ALG	38.30	20	17	-3	99
AZB	34.95	25	3	-22	93
BAH	32.26	34	37	3	81
BNG	54.60	10	7	-3	83
BRU	24.19	37	46	9	67
BUFO	51.69	12	21	9	50
CHD	34.53	27	10	-17	51
COM	57.35	8	16	8	98
DJB	43.45	13	18	5	94
EGT	32.96	32	22	-10	94
GAM	43.59	14	20	6	90
GUI	35.71	23	27	4	85
IND	62.41	6	6	0	88
IRN	34.77	26	22	-4	98
IRQ	34.19	29	2	-27	97
JRD	42.23	15	35	20	94
KWT	36.66	22	39	17	85
KYG	37.54	19	4	-15	75
LEBN	39.74	17	14	-3	60
LIBY	8.62	46	42	-4	97
MALAY	52.05	11	24	13	60
MALDV	34.83	24	33	9	100
MALI	77.11	1	12	11	90
MAUR	29.75	35	36	1	100
MORC	41.36	16	28	12	99
NGR	64.10	5	1	-4	80
NIGA	56.39	9	5	-4	50
OMN	27.85	36	38	2	99
PAK	34.45	31	25	-6	97
QTR	22.78	38	45	7	95
SAU	10.58	44	41	-3	100
SEN	71.85	2	13	11	94
SIRLN	58.68	7	11	4	60
SOM	18.04	43	44	1	100
SUD	18.57	41	29	-12	70
SYR	17.62	42	34	-8	90
TJK	34.85	28	19	-9	90
TNIS	32.38	33	25	-8	98
TKY	65.14	4	15	11	100
TRKMN	8.93	45	40	-5	89
UAE	20.52	39	42	3	96

Table 3.11--Continued

CNTRY	ADI	ADIRNK	EIDIRK	DEMPRA	PERMUS
UZB	18.94	40	32	-8	88
WBGZ	38.21	18	9	-9	84
YMN	36.73	21	30	9	99

Table 3.12--Correlation Coefficients Among the Revised Institutional Democracy Index & Its Component Variables

. corr eidi excele exctrm exctnr plgele legtrm conele rtcomp effprt suffrg regvot setall votinv twoele
(obs=46)

	eidi	excele	exctrm	exctnr	plgele	legtrm	conele	rtcomp	effprt	suffrg	regvot	setall	votinv	twoele
eidi	1.0000													
excele	0.7141	1.0000												
exctrm	0.8475	0.6697	1.0000											
exctnr	0.3309	0.0936	0.3414	1.0000										
plgele	0.8861	0.6319	0.6725	0.1907	1.0000									
legtrm	0.4704	0.2168	0.2530	0.0979	0.4875	1.0000								
conele	0.7719	0.4912	0.7599	0.1425	0.5918	0.3427	1.0000							
rtcomp	0.6980	0.4259	0.4828	0.1624	0.6882	0.3601	0.5568	1.0000						
effprt	0.6667	0.3889	0.6125	0.2527	0.5138	0.0561	0.5098	0.3615	1.0000					
suffrg	0.8571	0.5723	0.6427	0.1817	0.7971	0.4999	0.6421	0.6187	0.5211	1.0000				
regvot	0.4242	0.2365	0.2665	0.2673	0.3639	0.4089	0.1778	0.0419	0.2027	0.2991	1.0000			
setall	0.7553	0.4840	0.5552	0.0266	0.6044	0.2243	0.5323	0.5522	0.7225	0.7084	0.2352	1.0000		
votinv	0.4831	0.3669	0.2868	-0.1669	0.4373	0.2412	0.2812	0.2564	0.0991	0.4162	0.2502	0.4166	1.0000	
twoele	0.7798	0.4856	0.6574	0.1163	0.7710	0.2608	0.5600	0.4942	0.5051	0.6105	0.3676	0.5821	0.3959	1.0000

Table 3.13--Correlation Coefficients Among the Revised Aggregated Democracy Index, Its Components, & Muslim Demographics

. corr permus adi eidi pivcvn fhprcv fhpfcv fhclcv wbvacv dempra
(obs=46)

	permus	adi	eidi	pivcvn	fhprcv	fhpfcv	fhclcv	wbvacv	dempra
permus	1.0000								
adi	-0.2585	1.0000							
eidi	-0.2430	0.6855	1.0000						
pivcvn	-0.2784	0.8764	0.5680	1.0000					
fhprcv	-0.1671	0.9153	0.4270	0.7861	1.0000				
fhpfcv	-0.1875	0.8565	0.4321	0.6391	0.7985	1.0000			
fhclcv	-0.2432	0.9222	0.5377	0.7085	0.8445	0.8401	1.0000		
wbvacv	-0.1458	0.8742	0.3571	0.6544	0.9030	0.8650	0.8969	1.0000	
dempra	0.0583	0.3353	-0.2879	0.2602	0.5287	0.4356	0.4160	0.6062	1.0000

As seen in Table 3.12, the percentage of legislature that is elected, the extent of suffrage, and the length of the executive term remain the most highly correlated component variables to the resulting IDI (r = 0.85 to 0.89), and the length incumbent executive tenure, the percentage of registered voters, the length of the legislative term, and the percentage of votes invalidated remain the least correlated to the IDI (r = 0.33 to 0.48). The remaining six variables of course show moderate correlations in between these two groups. Still, all of the correlations to the IDI have increased after dropping the ratio of representation variable.

Within Table 3.13, we see the updated correlation coefficients among the Aggregated Democracy Index and its component indices. Superficially, these again appear to show a negative correlation to the Muslim demographic, yet as was noted above, none of these indices has a correlation of more than 0.28, meaning that at most these various measures of democracy share less than 8% of their variance with differing levels of the Muslim population demographic. The correlation coefficient of the percent Muslim to the ADI remains only –0.2585, indicating only 6.7% of shared variance. Thus, even in our improved index, we find that these two characteristics in Muslim-majority nations around the globe are independent of one another. Figures 3.6 through 3.9 show these patterns visually utilizing the scatter gram of ratings in both versions of the Institutional Democracy Index to the Muslim demographic and the ratings in both versions of the Aggregated Democracy Index to the level of Muslim population, respectively. Figures 3.8 and 3.9, concerning the ADI confirm what our correlation tests have already shown us, that is a lack of consistent pattern between the ADI and the percentage of Muslim population.

Figure 3.6--Institutional Democracy Index for Muslim-Majority Nations (n = 46)



Figure 3.7--Revised Institutional Democracy Index for Muslim-Majority Nations (n = 46)



Figure 3.8--Aggregated Democracy Index Ratings for Muslim-Majority Nations (n = 46)



Figure 3.9--Revised Aggregated Democracy Index for Muslim-Majority Nations (n = 46)



Figure 3.10--Measures of Democratic Practice Relative to Institutional Standards (n = 46)



Figure 3.11--Revised Measures of Democratic Practice Relative to Institutional Standards (n = 46)



Figures 3.6 and 3.7, however, appear to show a more distinctive pattern of negative correlation between the level of Muslim population and the institutional measures of democracy per the IDI. This serves to bring two things to our attention. First, it confirms that the ADI measures more than simply institutional factors of democratic governance. Secondly, it seems to show that many of the more Muslim nations in the world have not yet adopted institutional electoral, legislative, and executive structures conducive to popular sovereignty. While acknowledging this, however, it might be useful to call back to mind the real strength of this relationship as indicated in Table 3.13. The r-value of percent Muslim to the IDI is –0.243, which is actually an even slightly lower correlation than the former to the ADI. Thus, the lower levels on Figure 3.7 appear to overly distract us from the real randomness exhibited in the upper levels of the scatter gram. Discounting Brunei as an outlier (67% Muslim, 0.24 IDI), we find that only about 15 nations reside in the apparent downward trend in the lower reaches of the scatter gram, while the vast majority of nations sits above this trend at higher levels of institutional democracy ratings regardless of the percentage of Muslims in the populations concerned.

Figures 3.10 and 3.11, demonstrate a new variable for discussion, the differential between the IDI and the ADI, or what might be simply referred to as relative democratic practice, that is democratic governance relative to existing institutional environments in each state. The democratic practice measure is calculated by finding the difference between the ranking a Muslim nation receives in the IDI and the ranking the same nation receives on the ADI. Stated more clearly, it answers the question, "Given the particular institutional arrangements in the country at the time (IDI), how democratic are the state's

practices (ADI)?" This is an issue of first recognizing the potential for democratic practice afforded by the possession of certain democratic institutions, electoral rules, and experience with elections, and then determining whether a state is living up to that potential (producing a relative democratic practice—RDP in the Figures and DEMPRA in the Tables—score near "0"), exceeding it (a positive RDP), or failing to exhibit the degree of democratic governance that we would expect given its institutions (a negative RDP). Possible RDP scores range from –45 (that is an IDI of "1" and an ADI of "46") to a 45 (an IDI of "46" and an ADI of "1").

I would like to first make clear that the relative democratic practice is not being treated as an independent variable nor as a dependent variable. Its discussion serves only to make some interesting and somewhat useful observations about comparative democratic occurrences in Muslim states. The acknowledgment of this variable is simply an observation that we can distinguish between the institutional arrangements for democracy on the one hand, which is what the IDI attempts to measure, and the existence of civil liberties, press freedoms, equal access to justice and freedom from arbitrary judgment or persecution on the other hand, the latter being the additional sort of traits that the ADI includes in its measurement, whereas the IDI does not account for such things. It is possible then, that a liberal, non-democratic regime allows for a rule of law and a moderately vibrant civil society and that a nominally democratically elected regime shows poorly in the areas of pluralism, open civil society, and equality before the law.

While, the RDP has not been proposed as a test of the relationship of Muslim population demographics to democracy, it still provides us with another glimpse of an apparent lack of correlation between these two factors. We find, for example, that 20

Muslim states are approximately living up to expectations (an RDP of –5 to 5) of the level of democratic practice that their institutions would, or should, allow. Twelve more are failing to live up to institutional democratic expectations (-27 to -6). While fourteen states are exceeding institutional expectations for democratic practice (6 to 20). Iraq appears to have the worst democratic performance at the time of measurement, having an institutional ranking of "2," but an aggregated ranking of "29." Having such a high institutional ranking, we might have expected Iraq to perform much better on the ADI than it did. On the other hand, Jordan appears to be exceeding democratic expectations to the greatest degree, having an institutional ranking of only "35," but an aggregated democracy ranking of "15." Note that a ranking near or at "0" does not indicate more or less democratic, but only that the ADI and the IDI have ranked the state at about the same level, whether that rank be high (1 – 1 = 0) or low (46 – 46 = 0).

RELIGIOSITY AND DEMOCRACY

The second test of this study's hypothesis concerning religion and democracy in Islamic lands looks not at how "Muslim" is its population, but rather at how "religious" is its population. Each of the 46 nations in question possess a population that is 50% Muslim or more. In fact, the mean figure is 86% Muslim. The second model, however, analyzes the strength of expressed religious convictions in a large, random sample of the population as whole, Muslim or not. The decision not to control for religious affiliation was made on the basis of the assumption that the greater the democratic character of a state, the greater its composition and its programs are a reflection of the interests and values of the masses of the populace, rather than a mere plurality or narrow majority.

Thus, religiosity can be measured apart from particular confessional affiliations in the attempt to assess the degree of religion's public presence and social pressure upon the state.

Tables 3.14 and 3.15 show the raw scores within a sample of 11 Muslim-majority nations for 13 questions asked in three sections of the 2000 series of the World Values Survey. Viewing the average responses to each question on finds that questions one, four, six, seven, ten, and eleven showed the greatest consistency among the countries in predominantly affirmative responses, whereas questions two, three, five, eight, nine, twelve, and thirteen showed more variation in response among these several states. Note that this pattern is somewhat consistent with the nature of the questions in each of the above two groups. There is a general, characteristic difference between several variables across the two groups of questions. The first, more homogenous group, includes primarily vague affective attitudes toward religion—is religion important; do you have confidence in churches, mosques, or synagogues; are you a religious person; to churches, etc., provide moral answers; do you believe in God; do you find strength and comfort in religion? The second group of more heterogeneous responses involves questions looking for degrees of public religious action and religion's application to social politics—religious education; time spent at mosque, etc.; attendance at religious services other than social gatherings; religious answers to pressing social problems in the country; religious qualifications for public office.

As a whole, however, the Mean Religiosity Score (MRS) for each country appears to reflect the responses to a select number of variables in each of these two groups. Table 3.16 reveals that the most correlated ($r = 0.77$ to 0.9) questions to the MRS are seen in:

(a) religious importance; (b) confidence in church/mosque/synagogue; (c) belief in God; and (d) finding strength and comfort in religion—all from the former group; and (a) teaching children religious faith at home; (b) religious answers to social problems in the country; and (c) atheists are unfit for public office—from the latter group.

The correlation coefficient of the MRS to the ADI is –0.4124—i.e., that is little to no correlation at all (see Table 3.17). Interestingly, the correlation coefficient of the MRS to the IDI is only –0.0981, meaning that they share less than 1% of their variance in common. Figures 3.12, 3.13, and 3.14 reveal this pattern pictorially. If, for example, one were to remove the case of Albania from the scatter gram, considering it an outlier (MRS = 50.3, ADI = 67.5, IDI = 8.7), then it would be difficult to confidently assume that the almost nonexistent linear relationship of religiosity and democracy were either positive or negative.

Table 3.14--2000 World Values Survey--Measures of Religiosity:
Muslim-Majority States

Country (n=11)	Sample Size/Year	v1 Religion is Very Important (A006, V9)	v2 It is Especially Important that Children Learn Religious Faith at Home (A040, V22)	v3 Spend time at Church, Mosque, Synagogue, at least once a month (A060, V30)	v4 You have Quite a lot, to a great deal, of Confidence in Churches (E069, V147)	v5 Attend religious services apart from weddings, funerals, christenings at least once a month (F028, V185)	v6 Yes, you would say you are a Religious Person (F034, V186)	v7 Churches give your Country Adequate Answers to Moral Problems & Individual Needs (F035, V187)	v8 Churches give your Country Adequate Answers to Problems of Family Life (F036, V188)	v9 Churches give Adequate Answers to Social Problems facing your Country Today (F038, V190)
CNTRY		RELIMP	FTHHOM	TIMMOS	CONCHU	RELSRV	RELPER	ANSMOR	ANSFAM	ANSCTY
ALB	1000 (2002)	28	36	28	67	29	68	64	53	33
ALG	1282 (2002)	92	77	40	89	50	59	91	90	77
BNG	1499 (2002)	88	70	61	99	67	97	62	54	58
EGT	3000 (2001-2)	97	87	57	84	45	99	92	87	83
IND	1004 (2001)	98	93	90	96	75	84	79	77	64
IRN	2532 (?)	80	71	49	86	47	95	79	73	62
JRD	1223 (2001)	96	84	46	91	47	86	64	61	65
MORC	2264 (2001-2)	94	78	35	97	48	95	97	97	91
NIGA	2022 (2000)	93	68	92	95	95	97	79	79	73
PAK	2000 (2001-2)	82	86	55	88	91	91	62	49	45
TKY	3402 (2000-1)	81	47	55*	71	40	80	76	67	44
Column Mean	1930	84	72	55	88	58	86	77	72	63
EVS/WVS	118520	44	38	40	66	43	74	59	54	43

*Asterisk denotes an instance in which a question was not asked for the country in question. The column mean has been substituted for a blank cell in such cases.

Table 3.14--Continued

Country (n=11)	v10 Believe in God (F050, V191)	v11 Get Comfort & Strength from Religion (F064, V197)	v12 Agree to Strongly Agree that Politicians who don't Believe in God are Unfit for Public Office (F102, V200)	v13 Agree to Strongly Agree that it is better if more people with Strong Religious Beliefs hold Public Office (F104, V202)	Mean Religiosity Score
CNTRY	BELGOD	STRREL	UNFOFF	BELOFF	MRS
ALB	92	73	41	42	50.3
ALG	100	99	72	40	75.1
BNG	100	99	67	24	72.8
EGT	100	100	88	87	85.1
IND	100	100	87	47*	83.8
IRN	99	96	76*	47*	73.8
JRD	100	100	78	60	75.2
MORC	100	100	87	57	82.8
NIGA	100	98	81	87	87.5
PAK	100	96	95	17	73.6
TKY	98	93	61	56	66.8
Column Mean	99	96	76	47	**75.2**
EVS/WVS	87	74	37	38	

Table 3.15--Measures of Religiosity and the Aggregated Democracy Index

A Sample of Muslim-Majority Nations (n=11)	Mean Religiosity Score	Institutional Democracy Index (0 to 10)	Polity IV Index (0 to 10)	Freedom House Political Rights Index (0 to 10)	Freedom House Press Freedom Index (0 to 10)	Freedom House Civil Liberties Index (0 to 10)	World Bank Governance Indicators-- Voice & Accountability Index (0 to 10)	Aggregated Democracy Index (0 to 100)	Democratic Practice Relative to Institutional Standards-- (EIDI to ADI Differential) (-45 to 45)
CNTRY	MRS	EIDI	PIVCVN	FHPRCV	FHPFCV	FHCLCV	WBVACV	ADI	DEMPRA
ALB	50.3	8.7	8.5	6.7	4.9	6.7	5.1	67.5	4.0
ALG	75.1	7.7	3.5	1.7	3.6	3.3	3.2	38.3	-3.0
BNG	72.8	8.7	8.0	5.0	3.2	5.0	3.6	55.9	-3.0
EGT	85.1	7.4	2.0	1.7	3.2	3.3	2.9	34.3	-10.0
IND	83.8	9.0	8.5	6.7	4.2	5.0	4.1	62.4	0.0
IRN	73.8	7.4	6.5	1.7	2.0	1.7	2.3	35.9	-4.0
JRD	75.2	6.0	4.0	3.3	3.8	5.0	3.6	43.0	20.0
MORC	82.8	6.9	2.0	3.3	3.7	5.0	3.9	41.4	12.0
NIGA	87.5	9.0	7.0	5.0	4.8	5.0	3.7	57.5	-4.0
PAK	73.6	7.3	2.5	1.7	3.9	3.3	2.4	35.2	-6.0
TKY	66.8	7.9	8.5	6.7	5.2	6.7	4.7	66.0	11.0
Column Mean	75.2	7.8	5.5	3.9	3.9	4.5	3.6	48.8	1.5

Table 3.16--Correlation Coefficients Among the Religiosity Index & Its Component Variables

. corr mrs relimp fthhom timmos conchu relsrv relper ansmor ansfam anscty belgod strrel unfoff beloff
(obs=11)

	mrs	relimp	fthhom	timmos	conchu	relsrv	relper	ansmor	ansfam	anscty	belgod	strrel	unfoff	beloff
mrs	1.0000													
relimp	0.8988	1.0000												
fthhom	0.7848	0.8008	1.0000											
timmos	0.6131	0.4927	0.3640	1.0000										
conchu	0.7663	0.7489	0.7452	0.4553	1.0000									
relsrv	0.5451	0.4247	0.4676	0.7533	0.6100	1.0000								
relper	0.5694	0.4407	0.3829	0.4120	0.4817	0.4058	1.0000							
ansmor	0.5512	0.4320	0.2739	-0.0269	0.1858	-0.1888	0.0205	1.0000						
ansfam	0.6308	0.5126	0.3337	0.0591	0.3114	-0.1208	0.0340	0.9786	1.0000					
anscty	0.8141	0.7268	0.6084	0.1241	0.6425	0.0792	0.3241	0.8053	0.8709	1.0000				
belgod	0.8663	0.9694	0.8238	0.4612	0.7978	0.5343	0.4857	0.3326	0.4012	0.6632	1.0000			
strrel	0.8757	0.9884	0.8186	0.4379	0.7911	0.4321	0.4745	0.3964	0.4714	0.7185	0.9885	1.0000		
unfoff	0.8501	0.7907	0.9012	0.4236	0.6752	0.5976	0.5622	0.3450	0.3718	0.5951	0.8365	0.8014	1.0000	
beloff	0.4882	0.2929	0.0473	0.2985	-0.0165	-0.0901	0.2972	0.5250	0.5726	0.5247	0.1301	0.1946	0.1590	1.0000

Table 3.17--Correlation Coefficients Among Mean Religiosity Scores & Aggregated Democracy Index Ratings

. corr mrs adi eidi pivcvn fhprcv fhpfcv fhclcv wbvacv dempra
(obs=11)

	mrs	adi	eidi	pivcvn	fhprcv	fhpfcv	fhclcv	wbvacv	dempra
mrs	1.0000								
adi	-0.4124	1.0000							
eidi	-0.0981	0.6994	1.0000						
pivcvn	-0.4154	0.8667	0.7272	1.0000					
fhprcv	-0.3487	0.9864	0.6420	0.8288	1.0000				
fhpfcv	-0.2771	0.7360	0.3762	0.3743	0.7205	1.0000			
fhclcv	-0.4185	0.8517	0.3314	0.5146	0.8681	0.8452	1.0000		
wbvacv	-0.4628	0.8749	0.4025	0.5802	0.8851	0.7792	0.9504	1.0000	
dempra	-0.2366	0.2596	-0.4679	0.0542	0.3294	0.3413	0.5653	0.5265	1.0000

Figure 3.12--Institutional Democracy Index for Muslim-Majority Nations (n = 11)



Figure 3.13--Aggregated Democracy Index for Muslim-Majority Nations (n = 11)



Figure 3.14--Democratic Practice Relative to Institutional Standards (n = 11)



Table 3.18--Two-by-Two Matrix of Muslim Demographics and the Aggregated Democracy Index

ADI	% Muslim Population: Low	% Muslim Population: High
High	10	11
Low	16	19

n = 46 states

*Note: High and Low are divided at the mean for each variable (86% Muslim; 37.6 ADI)

Table 3.19--Two-by-Two Matrix of Religiosity and the Aggregated Democracy Index

ADI	Mean Religiosity Score: Low	Mean Religiosity Score: High
High	2	3
Low	3	3

n = 11 nations

*Note: High and Low are divided at the mean for each variable (75.2 MRS; 48.9 ADI)

Tables 3.18 and 3.19 reveal the lack of any significant relationship among Islam and democracy in the simplest manner by utilizing two-by-two tables. Table 3.19 is dealt with in short order, as we may recognize that the 11 cases found therein are nearly evenly distributed among the table's four cells, indicating no profound linear pattern between religiosity and democracy. If such a pattern had shown itself, we would expect to see either the most cases in the lower-left and upper-right cells for a positive relationship or

vice versa with the most cases in the upper-left and lower-right cells for a negative relationship. But, in fact, we see and even distribution amongst high and low religiosity and amongst high and low aggregated democracy ratings, implying that no recognizable correlation exists between the two factors.

Table 3.18 appears to be a bit more difficult to discern, as at first glance the lowest number of states is found in the cell representing low Muslim population and high democratic governance and the highest number of states in the cell representing high Muslim population and low democratic governance. Thus, those quick to jump to conclusions may assume an apparent negative relationship exists between the two variables. However, it could be argued that there are just too many exceptions to this pattern for it to be a valid generalization or conclusion about Muslim states. For example, there also appears to be a pattern among the opposite two cells—presuming that one has less democratic states as one moves to less than average Muslim proportions in the population—i.e., 11 high Muslim/high ADI states to 16 low Muslim/low ADI states. The only truly valid conclusion that we can make from Table 3.18 then is that, of the 46 Muslim states, 35 have less than average democracy ratings. Still, these 35 less democratic states are not concentrated in the highly Muslim category, but instead are nearly evenly distributed along this axis—16 of 26 (62%) below average Muslim populations are less democratic, and 19 of 30 (63%) above average Muslim populations are less democratic. This again shows us that in the lands of Islam, while there is certainly room for improvement in democratic practice, there is nonetheless virtually no relationship between how Muslim a country is and how democratic it is.

REGIME LABELS IN ISLAMIC LANDS

Figure 3.15--Summary of Government Typologies Among Muslim-Majority States According to the Aggregated Democracy Index

Democratic Governance (ADI of 6.8 to 10):
Mali, Senegal, Albania (n = 3)

Pseudo-democratic Governance (ADI 5.2 to 6.7):
***Having the greatest potential for a full transition to democracy:**
Turkey, Niger, Indonesia, Sierra Leone, The Comoros, Nigeria, Bangladesh, Malaysia, Burkina Faso (n = 9)

Pseudo-democratic Governance (ADI 3.4 to 5.1):
***Being either semi-liberal regimes while seriously lacking in democratic institutions or having the outward appearance of democratic institutions which are thwarted by de facto authoritarian governance:**
Djibouti, The Gambia, Jordan, Morocco, Lebanon, Palestine, Kyrgyz Republic, Algeria, Yemen, Kuwait, Guinea, Maldives, Azerbaijan, Iran, Chad, Tajikistan, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Egypt (n = 20)

Non-democratic Governance (ADI 0 to 3.3):
Tunisia, Bahrain, Mauritania, Oman, Brunei, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, Sudan, Syria, Somalia, Saudi Arabia, Turkmenistan, Libya (n = 14)

On an even more general or universal scale, Figure 3.15 classifies each Muslim state according to the third of the Aggregated Democracy Index into which it falls. The top third of the ADI (6.8 to 10.0) are labeled democracies, the middle third pseudo-democracies, and the bottom third non-democracies. It may be more useful to think of the middle group as constituting two sub-groups of pseudo-democracies: (a) those transitional democracies approaching fuller democratic status (ADI 5.2 to 6.7), and (b) those that have serious institutional and practical obstacles to overcome (ADI 3.4 to 5.1) before any meaningful and sustainable democratic transition can occur.

The note on which this chapter concludes, then, is that we have provided adequate standards and means of measurement for the detection of democratic governance in the

lands of Islam and found that seven percent of Muslim-majority states have reached full democratic status on the order of the 36 consolidated democracies that created our baseline for the Institutional Democracy Index. Another 20% of Muslim states fit the category of transitional democracies and should also receive the recognition due to them for their efforts to liberalize and democratize their societies. Given the numerous non-democratic, pseudo-democratic, and fledgling democracies that exist outside the realm of Islamic societies, and given the results summarized in Figure 3.15, we have provided solid evidence to counter the Islamic exceptionalist argument surrounding democracy's march across the globe.

CHAPTER FOUR

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A SUMMARY OF WHERE WE'VE BEEN

We have reached a point where we may answer three important questions alluded to in chapter one's discussions:

1. Has the Islamic world been left untouched by recent waves of democratizations?
2. Must Islam or Islamic culture be overcome to allow for democratization to occur?
3. Must democracy occur in a predominantly secular society?

The answer to each of these questions in light of the preceding research is an emphatic, "No."

We have demonstrated intervening variables in the Arab Middle East of the 20th century—World War I; European imperialism; successes of Zionist nationalism in the lands of Palestine; and the rise of militaristic, populist, secular-nationalist dictatorships—that led to the temporary demise of liberalization and democratization movements, as well as further political antecedents—Arab nationalist prisons; a crisis of identity following severe military and defeats; Cold War intrusions; state leaders who pushed for token liberalism while maintaining oppressive control over society; and foreign military presence in symbolic lands—that produced a brand of radical Islamism not seen since the Middle Ages, if ever. The understanding achieved in this section is that there is far more than religion or even religious fundamentalism driving modern Islamist violence.

We have taken note of internal Islamic supports for democratic ideals and institutions serving an equivalent purpose to those designs becoming common across the

globe. In this regard, we have also overcome reductionist, blanket generalizations laid upon Islamic culture by examining the real diversity in modern Islamist thought. Abdou Filali-Ansary, editor of the quarterly periodical *Prologues* in Morocco, sums this point up in the following fashion:

> The first group, on my view, consists of traditional religious scholars, whose expertise covers mainly the late written works of Islam law, and who remain faithful to the traditional worldview (combining premodern epistemological outlooks with traditional contents); the second group, radical Islamists, who combine traditional contents and premodern epistemological views with modern ideological attitudes; and the third, which I consider the most enlightened, those scholars who seek ways of reconciling modern epistemological views with a classical cultural and religious heritage.[1]

We next empirically detected high levels of democratic practice in several Muslim states including Senegal, Mali, Albania, Turkey, Niger, and Indonesia. Finally, we have established that there is no reliable correlation between democracy ratings given to Muslim-majority states and neither the extent of their Muslim population nor the degree of religiosity embodied in their nation.

The pressing question for many viewing new elections, or the prospect of them, in Muslim states is still, "How would democracy be transformed in the hands of an Islamist majority party?" The simplest, but most accurate answer, given the diversity in Islamism, is that it all depends on the nature of the particular Islamist party in question as well as the particular domestic and international political context pressing upon their society at the time. Should political rhetoric be driven by very real foreign, hegemonic presence within or near their borders---direct imperial rule or manipulation of subservient and dependent regimes; externally orchestrated or sanctioned coups; the establishment of military outposts; or, important economic resource extraction by or for foreign firms—

[1] "The Sources of Enlightened Muslim Thought," *Journal of Democracy* (April 2003), p. 26.

then, it is probable that an Islamist party, like any other variety of nationalist parties in a defensive posture, would react to such circumstances with some level of frustration, fear, or xenophobia, phenomena not uncommon in non-Islamic Western nations as well.

On the other hand, given opportunities for fair play on the global market, regional autonomy, and domestic sovereignty, Islamists are more likely to bring to their public offices just yet another brand of populist or morally conservative approach to national social or economic ills. Such approaches are better left to a sovereign electorate's right to trial and error than to either an internal military check upon democratically initiated reform or to external Western scorn, ostracism, embargo, or invasion.

Can we rule out the possibility of the "one-time, one-vote" scenario so infamously feared in Algeria's elections of the early 1990s? Of course not; it cannot be entirely ruled out for a particular country at a particular time any more than a plethora of other possible outcomes of democratically pursued political paths of change. However, two other factors are worth considering here. Islamist parties have rarely achieved majority or even plurality status via elections in those states allowing for a fair, competitive electoral race—Pakistan, 1997; Bangladesh, 2001; Morocco, 2002; Jordan, 2003; Malaysia, 2004; and Indonesia, 2004. Furthermore, in those instances where in Islamist party of some variety has won the reigns of executive and legislative power, as in Turkey's Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2002, the brand of Islamism has been moderate and democratically inclined by any outside standards. As Vali Nasr so aptly puts it:

> Such results suggest that in these Muslim societies, the "vital center" of politics is likely to belong neither to secular and leftist parties nor to Islamists. More likely to rule the strategic middle will be political forces that integrate Muslim values and moderate Islamic politics into broader right-of-center platforms that go beyond exclusively religious concerns. Such forces can appeal to a broad

> cross-section of voters and create a stable nexus between religious and secular drivers of electoral politics.[2]

Nasr goes on to point out that "depth of commitment to liberal secular values that democratic consolidation requires is a condition for Muslim Democracy's final success, not for its first emergence."[3] This is what makes the developmental approach to democratization so meaningful. Policy makers who hold off recognition of governments that are the product of reasonably fair, open, contested elections by electorates possessing universal suffrage are in effect deciding upon a policy of promoting democracy only when it results in the party they most favor, a condition that is hardly a shining standard for democracy's legitimacy.

Saad Eddin Ibrahim, chairman of the Ibn Khaldun Center for Development Studies in Cairo, Egypt and former candidate for president there, describes the influx of elections in places like Turkey, Morocco, Iraq and to a lesser degree Saudi Arabia and Egypt as signs that "this Islamic trend can no longer be ignored, neither should it be a source of panic to Western policy makers and pundits."[4] The message that proponents of democratization in Muslim lands, like Ibrahim, wish to send is that democracy and society both benefit from the inclusion of religious parties within the electoral process, or the practical experience of Islamist parties in the difficult work of governing a state. The likely benefits of such a decision of a lengthy period of time are threefold: (a) they allow a portion of the populace with rights to their own beliefs and expectations a largely peaceful civic form of expression, as opposed to relegation to a status of armed rebellion under repression and proscription; (b) it forces to test Islamist's lofty idealism and

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[2] "The Rise of 'Muslim Democracy'," *Journal of Democracy* (April 2005), pp. 14-15.
[3] Ibid., p. 15.
[4] "Islam Can Vote, if We Let It," *The New York Times*, May 21, 2005 (on-line) [http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/21/opinion/21ibrahim.html].

theoretical tenets within the context of messy bureaucracies, struggling economies, fickle constituencies, and global realities—an experience that is likely to temper any staunchly hard-line utopian rhetoric in favor of negotiation, compromise, and practical activity; and (c) it exposes, to the eyes of the masses, these would-be martyrs and saviors of the people to day-to-day setbacks and failures as well as any progressive successes in development and public service—the former have a demystifying effect that checks unwavering radicalism and trust, while the latter are to be congratulated regardless of whether a religious or secular regime is credited.

Such effects are potentially being seen in the recent election of Hamas to a majority of the Palestinian parliament in January 2006. In preparation for its first visit with a foreign head of state, Palestinian Ambassador Bakir Abdel Munem was sent to Moscow. Munem, referring to the past position of Hamas' unwillingness to recognize Israel as a legitimate state, told ITAR-Tass news agency in an interview, "...I think that Hamas may revise its stance in the interests of the entire Palestinian people."[5] It remains to be seen, at the point that I am writing, whether Munem's prediction will bear fruit, but the lesson in this illustration is that Hamas would have had no cause whatsoever to consider such a change in position had they not been placed in a position of governance though a direct expression of the vast majority of the Palestinian people in what was considered by outside observers a rather free and fair election.

Democracy has made significant inroads into the lands of Islam. Two conferences held in the last two years in the Middle East express this sentiment. The Arab Civil Society Forum held its meeting in Beirut in 2004 and a meeting of

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[5] Associated Press. "Envoy Says Hamas View of Israel May Change," *Washington Post*, March 2, 2006 (online) [http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/03/02/AR2006030200353.html].

international Arab businessmen was held in Alexandria in 2005. Both meeting produced documents calling for an opening of civil society and the political sphere to multiparty competition. According to an article published by satellite television network, al-Jazeera, The Beirut document:

> ...calls for Arab constitutions to provide the right for ideological, political, and party pluralism, but insists that parties should be based on the principle of citizenship, and that parties instigating or practising violence should be banned. It also calls on Arab governments to legalise the right of freedom of assembly for all groups and ideological and political forces within a democratic law and constitution.[6]

While the Alexandria document, "called for the peaceful transfer of power, but left this to the specific conditions of each Arab country. It also demanded lifting restrictions on the formation of political parties..."[7]

Likewise, similar sentiments were made in a more overtly Islamist fashion by dean of the shari'a college at Qatar University, Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, in an interview with al-Jazeera on May 16, 2004:

> Aljazeera: How is reform defined in Islam?
>
> Al-Qaradawi: Reform is turning the thing that is corrupt into something upright. It touches every aspect of society. A person can be reformed, so can a society, and even a whole nation. This is why as Muslims we welcome reforms. Muslims are urged to embrace reforms and to discard what is vice. In the Holy Quran, there are many narrations of God punishing nations that brought harm and vice to the world.
>
> Aljazeera: So reform is prescribed as an antidote to corruption. Can you elaborate on this?
>
> Al-Qaradawi: There are various kinds of corruptions which stand opposite to reform. First there is political corruption, the deceiving of the masses to serve authority; an example would be a journalist who uses his pen to tout for a leader, or an occupier who invades a country and revamps its political structure to serve his interest.

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[6] Dr. Mustafa al-Sayyid. "Democracy awakening in Arab world," *ALJAZEERA.NET*, May 16, 2004 (accessed on August 20, 2005) (online) [http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/304E377D-0D93-49DA-BF95-8E342649147A.htm].

[7] ibid.

> You also have economic corruption, a subject that the Quran has addressed as well. Those who misuse public funds for their own purposes while their people are undergoing extreme poverty are an illustration of this.
>
> Moral corruption is another problem that must be confronted and reformed. It can extend to engulf an entire society turning it into a nepotistic, nihilist, and morally loose one.
>
> There are also other forms of corruption that would include environmental corruption, the destruction of the beautiful Earth that God has created, and so on.
>
> Aljazeera: So, according to Islam, what is the individual duty to combat corruption?
>
> Qaradawi: We Muslims loathe corruption. We are urged to fight vice. This is why we should be the first to embrace reform...
>
> Aljazeera: Are we here talking about limited reform, provisional reform, or an all-encompassing change?
>
> Qaradawi: ...We must be very clear on this: What we seek is for the nation to be renewed from within, to stand up on its own feet, to carry its own message and achieve its own objectives...
>
> Aljazeera: You often advocate that, in order for any reform initiative to be successful, a few prerequisites are imperative. What are some of these conditions?
>
> Qaradawi: ...reform has to be implemented with the will of the people and by the people themselves, because it is them, in the final analysis, who covet reform and have to be satisfied with it once implemented and live up to its demands and responsibilities. We want reform to start from the people, not to impose reforms on them. This is why we must educate the public about their rights, make the people more aware of their responsibilities and convince them that they and only they have the right to choose, monitor and reprimand their leaders...[8]

Several of our conclusions are given affirmation in this example. Here we have a Muslim, a shari'a scholar no less, who finds Islamic supports for democracy in the modern world, including transparency of information, a rule of law, merit-based civil service, and conservation of natural resources for the public good. Further, he seeks such changes from within his own country without external manipulation or coercion. Finally,

[8] "Reform according to Islam," *ALJAZEERA.NET*, May 16, 2004 (accessed on August 20, 2005) (online) [http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/A27D1C86-9761-404D-BB04-A55CB58305EC.htm].

such changes must be democratically initiated and reconfirmed periodically by the people.

To return to Egyptian Saad Eddin Ibrahim, we encounter an insider's perspective of the state of things in the Islamic world. He writes:

> How do I rate the prospects for democracy in the Middle East? I think that they are surprisingly good. I am well aware of those who marshal evidence to show that instituting democracies and open societies in the region, or perhaps even in the larger Muslim world, is difficult or impossible. The difficulties are well known and undeniable. But they can all be overcome. In previous decades, authoritative voices said that Germany, Japan, Slavic countries, and even the Catholic societies would never, could never, be democratic. I am not speaking of popular prejudices here, but of high-level scholarship and expert consensus. Batteries of learned naysayers honestly believed that there was something about German, Japanese, or Slavic culture, or about Catholicism, that was fundamentally and unchangeably hostile to democracy and democratic values.
>
> Experience, of course, proved that these doubts were not as well founded as they seemed. At Ibn Khaldun Center, we are convinced that similar doubts about the potential for democracy in Arab cultures, the Middle East, and the Muslim world will ultimately prove just as feebly grounded.[9]

Our alternative assumptions, then, might be that Islam can, has, and will continue to create for itself its own versions of democracy in the Islamic world, versions which nonetheless demonstrate that they can live up to objective universal standards of democratic institutions. Islamic parties can and do provide meaningful civil society in the Islamic world. Islamic values in a democratic context provide the same sources of national unity and moral sanction for a sense of civic duty and divine blessing for the democratic experiment as that which is found in any other version of civil religious rhetoric in western Christian society. Finally, any true sense of democracy with the right to contestation and popular sovereignty must be open to both Islamic and secular parties and platforms.

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[9] "Reviving Middle Eastern Liberalism," *Journal of Democracy* (October 2003), p. 7.

RECOMMENDATIONS OF WHERE TO GO FROM HERE

If we accept that religiosity and religious population demographics have little to do with the outcomes and existence of democratic governance in Muslim societies, and yet admit also that there is much room for democratic transition in Muslim states that remain under non-democratic regimes, room for democratic expansion in the context of existent pseudo-democracies or newly, transitional ones, and room for consolidation in those few that have made full transitions to democracy, then we must still pursue the question of what factors are highly correlated with the latter success stories and may be encouraged in the former cases lacking in such conditions.

I will conclude with a few comments about what was not tested in my own model, yet should become the focus of future tests involving the Aggregated Democracy Index, the Institutional Democracy Index, or other such indices. Five potentially explanatory variables in democracy's success, that were unfortunately beyond the scope of this particular study, include variations in government stability, in economic development, in extractable natural resources (i.e., oil), in the nature mass civic culture, and in the character of elite political culture and social communication.

One could then, in a fairly simple fashion, adopt each of these five as independent variables that may cause, or at least be correlated to, varying ratings in the ADI. Take for example the following simple models for three of the factors mentioned in the preceding paragraph. The dependent variable (democratic institutions), that is the variable being influenced by some of other factor(s), in the first model would be represented by the Aggregated Democracy Index, while the independent variable, that is the cause of variation in the dependent variable, would be mass civic culture. This could be derived

from a conception of civic culture which contains seven measurable, component indicators—(1) attitudes toward popular sovereignty / participant orientations toward representative government; (2) inclinations toward civic activism and civil society in the forms of free expression, association, assembly, and petition; (3) attitudes toward truth, transparency, and public accountability; (4) patriotism, loyalty, system affect, and public service orientations; (5) feelings regarding the values of equality, respect for diversity, tolerance, justice, and social trust; (6) supportive attitudes toward the common or public good and the general welfare; and (7) progressive and reform orientations (as opposed to ultra-conservative, reactionary, or revolutionary orientations). This model could be tested within our eleven Muslim-majority nation sample utilizing 30 or more possibly related questions in the 2000 series of the World Values Survey, perhaps controlling for other possible influences, like gender, age, income, and the size of the town in which respondents live.

The second and third hypotheses could follow the same model, yet substitute two different independent variables. The second hypothesis might utilize economic development (measured perhaps by (a) variations in component industries—oil, mineral mining, forestry, commercial agriculture, subsistence agriculture, light and textile manufacturing, heavy manufacturing, electronic manufacturing and telecommunications, financial services and banking, tourism and luxury services—as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP); (b) the United Nations Development Programme's "Human Development Index," which ranks countries according to four indicators of modernity—GDP per capita in U.S. $ / purchase power parity; average life expectancy at birth; adult literacy rate; and educational enrollment—and (c) the World Bank's "Regulatory

Quality" component of its Government Indicators index, which rates national laws and practices toward business and trade activity) as its independent variable. Finally, stable governance / law and order (measured through a composite score derived from five indices—Polity IV's "Date of Most Recent Polity Transition," Political Risk Services' "International Country Risk Guide," and three components of the World Bank's Governance Indicators index: "Political Stability," "Government Effectiveness," and "Rule of Law") might serve as the third independent variable. The objective of course in this battery of testing is the hope of pinpointing the strongest correlated variables to the more pervasive occurrences of functioning democratic institutions in the Islamic world.

A fourth possible factor, elite social communication, presents still another model for future study. Thus far, we have intuitively followed a bottom-up or grassroots approach in testing whether elements in the population at large might effect the government's institutions and practices. It is also logical to assume, however, that elite decisions made at the upper reaches of social and political structures have a top-down transformative effect upon the mass population as well as upon the institutional rules of their societies. A model such as this asks how elite decisions communicated both through media and through legal rules and institutions produce not only the institutions themselves, but also possible learned affection for such reforms. In other words, "How can messages promoting democratic reform and mass experience with democratic structures produce long-term acceptance or legitimacy for such ideas and rules?"

FINAL REMARKS

Regardless of our knowing with certainty the primary causes of variation in democratic institutional practices among Muslim societies, nor of knowing precisely what produces the greatest mass cultural acceptance or legitimacy for democracy, we can be relatively certain that Islam alone is not the obstacle to be overcome. What this means for democracy's global proponents is that we must distinguish between policies that promote democracy and relatively unrelated policies that simply promote our own preferences concerning religious or secular cultural worldviews. If democracy is a good worth pursuing, then that particular brand of cultural imperialism must be laid aside so as not to cause unnecessary resentment and hostility on the part of its recipients. Democracy must not, has not, and will not wait for a unified, universal acceptance of the same paradigm distinguishing between state religion, civil religion, and separation of religion and state. Rather than insist upon the separationist standard, we all might benefit from Mark Juergensmeyer's insight that "Perhaps the West's first task is coming to terms with the phenomenon itself, and accepting the fact that religious nationalism, in one form or another, is here to stay."[10] The world must finally recognize the diversity in Islamist thought and Islamists' programs, for only then can its foreign policies sort out more clearly the practical, accomodationist approach best suited to the cultivation of democracy.

On a final note, I will humbly offer the reader a perspective on what possible contributions this study has made to the field of political research. First, and foremost, this study has been successful in its central aim, that is to provide solid evidence on which to refute the assumption that Islam or Islamic culture is to blame for any lack of

[10] "Religious Nationalism: A Global Threat?" *Current History* (November 1996), p. 375.

democracy that might be seen in particular regions of the world. Secondly, in the process of reaching this stated end, two new indices for the measurement of democracy were devised. The IDI attempted to consciously limit democracy ratings to the institutional arrangements surrounding competitive electoral processes, and the ADI offered a more balanced index that draws upon the strengths of both the IDI and other previously existing democracy indices, hopefully also balancing and thereby minimizing the weaknesses of each component index. Thirdly, a new variable (RDP) has been introduced which makes a measurable comparison between expectations for democracy based upon institutional antecedents met by a state on the one hand and the actual democratic practices and civil liberties maintained with in such a society on the other hand. Fourthly, a concertedly simple and straightforward measure of mass religiosity has been devised utilizing cross-national survey data. Finally, a recognition has been given to those Muslim states that exhibit measurable democratic governance in significant degrees as well as to those democratically-minded politicians, parties, and civil society movements that continue to give hope for democracy's progress in the lands of Islam.

Appendix A

Table A--Muslim-Majority Nations' Ratings by Three Existing Indices

Table A--Muslim-Majority Nations' Ratings by Three Existing Indices

Country	FH (PR,CL)	FH (COMB.)	POLITY IV (D,A)	POLITY IV (COMB.)	WBGI (V&A)
Afghanistan	5,6	5.5	...	...	-1.35
Albania	3,3	3	7,0	7	0.03
Algeria	6,5	5.5	1,4	-3	-0.91
Azerbaijan	6,5	5.5	0,7	-7	-0.97
Bahrain	5,5	5	0,7	-7	-0.73
Bangladesh	4,4	4	6,0	6	-0.69
Brunei	6,5	5.5	...	...	-1.11
Burkina Faso	5,4	4.5	2,2	0	-0.38
Chad	6,5	5.5	1,3	-2	-1.09
Comoros	4,4	4	4,0	4	-0.14
Djibouti	5,5	5	3,1	2	-0.85
Egypt	6,5	5.5	0,6	-6	-1.04
Gambia	4,4	4	0,5	-5	-0.59
Guinea	6,5	5.5	1,2	-1	-1.12
Indonesia	3,4	3.5	8,1	7	-0.44
Iran	6,6	6	4,1	3	-1.36
Iraq	7,5	6	...	...	-1.71
Jordan	5,4	4.5	2,4	-2	-0.68
Kuwait	4,5	4.5	0,7	-7	-0.48
Kyrgyzstan	6,5	5.5	1,4	-3	-1.06
Lebanon	6,5	5.5	...	...	-0.81
Libya	7,7	7	0,7	-7	-1.79
Malaysia	4,4	4	4,1	3	-0.36
Maldives	6,5	5.5	...	...	-1.07
Mali	2,2	2	6,0	6	0.35
Mauritania	6,5	5.5	0,6	-6	-1.16
Morocco	5,4	4.5	0,6	-6	-0.55
Niger	3,3	3	4,0	4	-0.12
Nigeria	4,4	4	4,0	4	-0.65
Oman	6,5	5.5	0,8	-8	-0.9
Pakistan	6,5	6.5	0,5	-5	-1.31
Palestine	6,6	6	...	...	-1.25
Qatar	6,5	5.5	0,10	-10	-0.79
Saudi Arabia	7,7	7	0,10	-10	-1.63
Senegal	2,3	2.5	8,0	8	0.19
Sierra Leone	4,3	3.5	5,0	5	-0.49
Somalia	6,7	6.5	...	...	-1.58
Sudan	7,7	7	0,6	-6	-1.81
Syria	7,7	7	0,7	-7	-1.72
Tajikistan	6,5	5.5	1,4	-3	-1.12
Tunisia	6,5	5.5	1,5	-4	-1.11
Turkey	3,3	3	8,1	7	-0.15
Turkmenistan	7,7	7	0,9	-9	-1.9

Table A--Continued

Country	FH (PR,CL)	FH (COMB.)	POLITY IV (D,A)	POLITY IV (COMB.)	WBGI (V&A)
UAE	6,6	6	0,8	-8	-1.01
Uzbekistan	7,6	6.5	0,9	-9	-1.75
Yemen	5,5	5	1,3	-2	-0.99
n	46	46	39	39	46
Range		7 to 2		-10 to 8	-1.81 to 0.35
Mean		5.10		-1.97	-0.92

Appendix B

Table B--Muslim-Majority Nations' Ratings on Three Indices, Converted to 10-Point Scale

Table B--Muslim-Majority Nations' Ratings on Three Indices, Converted to 10-Point Scale

Country	% Muslim[1]	FH (CONV.)[2]	POLITY IV (CONV.)[3]	WBGI-V&A (CONV.)4	RANGE
Afghanistan	99	2.5	4	2.3	1.7
Albania	70	6.67	8.5	5.06	3.44
Algeria	99	2.5	3.5	3.18	1
Azerbaijan	93	2.5	1.5	3.06	1.56
Bahrain	81	3.33	1.5	3.54	2.04
Bangladesh	83	5	8	3.62	4.38
Brunei	67	2.5	4	2.78	1.5
Burkina Faso	50	4.17	5	4.24	0.83
Chad	51	2.5	4	1.41	2.59
Comoros	98	5	7	4.72	2.28
Djibouti	94	3.33	6	3.3	2.7
Egypt	94	2.5	2	2.92	0.92
Gambia	90	5	2.5	3.82	2.5
Guinea	85	2.5	4.5	2.76	2
Indonesia	88	5.83	8.5	4.12	4.38
Iran	98	1.67	6.5	2.28	4.83
Iraq	97	1.67	4	1.58	2.42
Jordan	94	4.17	4	3.64	0.53
Kuwait	85	4.17	1.5	4.04	2.67
Kyrgyzstan	75	2.5	3.5	2.88	1
Lebanon	60	2.5	4	3.38	1.5
Libya	97	0	1.5	1.42	1.5
Malaysia	60	5	6.5	4.28	2.22
Maldives	100	2.5	4	2.86	2.5
Mali	90	8.33	8	5.7	2.63
Mauritania	100	2.5	2	2.68	0.68
Morocco	99	4.17	2	3.9	2.17
Niger	80	6.67	7	4.76	2.24
Nigeria	50	5	7	3.7	3.3
Oman	99	2.5	1	3.2	2.2
Pakistan	97	0.83	2.5	2.38	1.67
Palestine	84	1.67	4	2.5	2.33
Qatar	95	2.5	0	3.42	3.42
Saudi Arabia	100	0	0	1.74	1.74
Senegal	94	7.5	9	5.38	3.62
Sierra Leone	60	5.83	7.5	4.02	3.48
Somalia	100	0.83	4	1.84	3.17
Sudan	70	0	2	1.38	2
Syria	90	0	1.5	1.56	1.56
Tajikistan	90	2.5	3.5	2.76	1
Tunisia	98	2.5	3	2.78	0.5
Turkey	100	6.67	8.5	4.7	3.8
Turkmenistan	89	0	0.5	1.2	1.2

Table B--Continued

Country	% Muslim[1]	FH (CONV.)[2]	POLITY IV (CONV.)[3]	WBGI-V&A (CONV.)4	RANGE
UAE	96	1.67	1	2.98	1.98
Uzbekistan	88	0.83	0.5	1.5	1
Yemen	99	3.33	4	3.02	0.98
n	46	46	46	46	46
Range	50 to 100	0 to 8.33	0 to 9	1.2 to 5.7	0.09 to 4.83
Mean	86	3.17	4.01	3.14	2.17

Table B--Muslim-Majority Nations' Ratings on Three Indices, Converted to 10-Point Scale

Notes:

[1]CIA World Factbook, 2005.

[2]Freedom in the World Report, 2005; ranges from 7 to 1. Conversion: required an inversion of the scale and an equal redistribution from 0 to 10: 7 (FH) = 0 (conversion); 6.5 = 0.83; 6 = 1.67; 5.5 = 2.5; 5 = 3.33; 4.5 = 4.17; 4 = 5; 3.5 = 5.83; 3 = 6.67; 2.5 = 7.5; 2 = 8.33; 1.5 = 9.17; 1 = 10

[3]Polity IV Country Report, 2003; ranges from -10 to 10. Conversion: (PIV + 10) / 2

[4]World Bank Governance Indicators, Voice & Accountability Index, 2004; ranges from -2.5 to 2.5. Conversion: (WBGIVA + 2.5) * 2

Appendix C

Table C--Rankings of Muslim-Majority Nations Within Three Existing Indices (Converted to a 10-Point Scale)

Table C--Rankings of Muslim-Majority Nations Within Three Existing Indices (Converted to a 10-Point Scale)

%MUS	FH (CNV)	CNTRY	DEM.RANK	%MUS	PIV (CNV)	CNTRY	DEM.RANK	%MUS	WB-VA (CNV)	CNTRY	DEM.RANK
90	8.33	MLI	1	94	9	SEN	1	90	5.7	MLI	1
94	7.5	SEN	2	100	8.5	TKY	2	94	5.38	SEN	2
100	6.67	TKY	3	88	8.5	IND	2	70	5.06	ALB	3
80	6.67	NGR	3	70	8.5	ALB	2	80	4.76	NGR	4
70	6.67	ALB	3	90	8	MLI	5	98	4.72	COM	5
88	5.83	IND	6	83	8	BNG	5	100	4.7	TKY	6
60	5.83	S-L	6	60	7.5	S-L	7	60	4.28	MLY	7
98	5	COM	8	98	7	COM	8	50	4.24	B-F	8
90	5	GAM	8	80	7	NGR	8	88	4.12	IND	9
83	5	BNG	8	50	7	NGA	8	85	4.04	KWT	10
60	5	MLY	8	98	6.5	IRN	11	60	4.02	S-L	11
50	5	NGA	8	60	6.5	MLY	11	99	3.9	MRC	12
99	4.17	MRC	13	94	6	DJB	13	90	3.82	GAM	13
94	4.17	JRD	13	50	5	B-F	14	50	3.7	NGA	14
85	4.17	KWT	13	85	4.5	GUI	15	94	3.64	JRD	15
50	4.17	B-F	13	100	4	MDV	16	83	3.62	BNG	16
99	3.33	YMN	17	100	4	SOM	16	81	3.54	BAH	17
94	3.33	DJB	17	99	4	YMN	16	95	3.42	QTR	18
81	3.33	BAH	17	99	4	AFG	16	60	3.38	LBN	19
100	2.5	MDV	20	97	4	IRQ	16	94	3.3	DJB	20
100	2.5	MAU	20	94	4	JRD	16	99	3.2	OMN	21
99	2.5	AFG	20	84	4	PAL	16	99	3.18	ALG	22
99	2.5	ALG	20	67	4	BRU	16	93	3.06	AZB	23
99	2.5	OMN	20	60	4	LBN	16	99	3.02	YMN	24
98	2.5	TUN	20	51	4	CHD	16	96	2.98	UAE	25
95	2.5	QTR	20	99	3.5	ALG	26	94	2.92	EGT	26
94	2.5	EGT	20	90	3.5	TJK	26	75	2.88	KGZ	27
93	2.5	AZB	20	75	3.5	KGZ	26	100	2.86	MDV	28

Table C--Continued

%MUS	FH (CNV)	CNTRY	DEM.RANK	%MUS	PIV (CNV)	CNTRY	DEM.RANK	%MUS	WB-VA (CNV)	CNTRY	DEM.RANK
90	2.5	TJK	20	98	3	TUN	29	98	2.78	TUN	29
85	2.5	GUI	20	97	2.5	PAK	30	67	2.78	BRU	29
75	2.5	KGZ	20	90	2.5	GAM	30	90	2.76	TJK	31
67	2.5	BRU	20	100	2	MAU	32	85	2.76	GUI	31
60	2.5	LBN	20	99	2	MRC	32	100	2.68	MAU	33
51	2.5	CHD	20	94	2	EGT	32	84	2.5	PAL	34
98	1.67	IRN	35	70	2	SUD	32	97	2.38	PAK	35
97	1.67	IRQ	35	97	1.5	LBY	36	99	2.3	AFG	36
96	1.67	UAE	35	93	1.5	AZB	36	98	2.28	IRN	37
84	1.67	PAL	35	90	1.5	SYR	36	100	1.84	SOM	38
100	0.83	SOM	39	85	1.5	KWT	36	100	1.74	S-A	39
97	0.83	PAK	39	81	1.5	BAH	36	97	1.58	IRQ	40
88	0.83	UZB	39	99	1	OMN	41	90	1.56	SYR	41
100	0	S-A	42	96	1	UAE	41	88	1.5	UZB	42
97	0	LBY	42	89	0.5	TKM	43	97	1.42	LBY	43
90	0	SYR	42	88	0.5	UZB	43	51	1.41	CHD	44
89	0	TKM	42	100	0	S-A	45	70	1.38	SUD	45
70	0	SUD	42	95	0	QTR	45	89	1.2	TKM	46

Appendix D

Table D--Muslim-Majority Nations' Average Ratings & Rankings by Three Select Indices

Table D--Muslim-Majority Nations' Average Ratings & Rankings by Three Select Indices

CNTRY	%MUS	AVG.RANK	CNTRY	%MUS	AVG.RATING	DEM.RANK
SEN	94	1.7	MLI	90	7.34	1
MLI	90	2.3	SEN	94	7.29	2
ALB	70	2.7	ALB	70	6.74	3
TKY	100	3.7	TKY	100	6.62	4
NGR	50	5.0	IND	88	6.15	5
IND	88	5.7	NGR	80	6.14	6
COM	98	7.0	S-L	60	5.78	7
S-L	60	8.0	COM	98	5.57	8
MLY	100	8.7	BNG	83	5.54	9
BNG	67	9.7	MLY	60	5.26	10
NGA	80	10.0	NGA	50	5.23	11
B-F	83	11.7	B-F	50	4.47	12
JRD	94	14.7	DJB	94	4.21	13
DJB	94	16.7	JRD	94	3.94	14
GAM	90	17.0	GAM	90	3.77	15
LBN	60	18.3	IRN	98	3.48	16
MRC	99	19.0	YMN	99	3.45	17
YMN	99	19.0	MRC	99	3.36	18
KWT	75	19.7	LBN	60	3.29	19
MDV	100	21.3	GUI	85	3.25	20
BRU	50	21.7	KWT	85	3.24	21
GUI	85	22.0	MDV	100	3.12	22
ALG	99	22.7	BRU	67	3.09	23
BAH	81	23.3	ALG	99	3.06	24
AFG	99	24.0	KGZ	75	2.96	25
KGZ	85	24.3	AFG	99	2.93	26
TJK	90	25.7	TJK	90	2.92	27
EGT	94	26.0	BAH	81	2.79	28
TUN	89	26.0	TUN	98	2.76	29
AZB	93	26.3	PAL	84	2.72	30
CHD	51	26.7	CHD	51	2.64	31
OMN	99	27.0	EGT	94	2.47	32
IRN	98	27.7	IRQ	97	2.42	33
QTR	95	27.7	MAU	100	2.39	34
PAL	84	28.3	AZB	93	2.35	35
MAU	60	28.3	OMN	99	2.23	36
IRQ	97	30.3	SOM	100	2.22	37
SOM	100	31.0	QTR	95	1.97	38
UAE	96	33.0	PAK	97	1.90	39
PAK	97	34.7	UAE	96	1.88	40
SYR	90	39.7	SUD	70	1.13	41
SUD	70	39.7	SYR	90	1.02	42
LBY	97	40.3	LBY	97	0.97	43
UZB	88	41.3	UZB	88	0.94	44
S-A	100	42.0	S-A	100	0.58	45
TKM	98	43.7	TKM	89	0.57	46

Appendix E

Table E--Institutional Democracy Index Component Variables (Raw Scores)

Table E--Institutional Democracy Index Component Variables (Raw Scores)

Muslim-Majority States (n=46)	v1 EXCELE	v2 EXCTRM	v3 EXCTNR	v4 PLGELE	v5 LEGTRM	v6 TWOELE
Afghanistan	Y	5	4	71	4.72	1
Albania	I	4	1	100	4	2
Algeria	Y	5	7	73	5.27	2
Azerbaijan	Y	5	3	100	5	2
Bahrain	N	n/a	20.5*	50	4	1
Bangladesh	I	5	5	100	5	2
Brunei	N	n/a	39	0	n/a	0
Burkina Faso	I	5	12.5*	100	5	2
Chad	Y	5	16	100*	4	2
Comoros	Y	4	7	55	5	1
Djibouti	Y/I	5.5*	6*	100	5	2
Egypt	Y	6	25	86	5.37	2
Gambia	Y	5	12	91	5	2
Guinea	Y	7	22	100	5	1
Indonesia	Y	5	2	100*	5	2
Iran	Y/I	Life/4	9*	88	5.03	2
Iraq	I	4	1	100	4	2
Jordan	N	n/a	7	63	4	1
Kuwait	N	n/a	29	77	4	2
Kyrgyz Republic	Y	5	1	100	5	2
Lebanon	I	6	8	100	4	2
Libya	N	n/a	37	0	n/a	1
Malaysia	I	5	3	76	5.24	2
Maldives	I	5	28	84	5	2
Mali	Y/I	5	3*	100	5	1.5*
Mauritania	Y/deposed	6	22/1	98/dissolv.	5.41	2/2nd-dep/diss
Morocco	N	5	5.5*	55	6.82	2
Niger	Y	5	7	100	5	2
Nigeria	Y	4	7	100	4	2
Oman	N	n/a	36	63	3	1
Pakistan	I*(N)	5	7	62	5.23	1
Qatar	N	n/a	11	0	4	n/a
Saudi Arabia	N	n/a	1	0	4	n/a
Senegal	Y	6*	6	100	5	1
Sierra Leone	Y	5	8	90	5	1.5*
Somalia	I*(d.j.)	n/a	2	0	n/a	0
Sudan	Y	5	13	75*	4	(trans.)*/1
Syria	Pleb.	7	6	100	4	2
Tajikistan	Y	7	7	66	5	2
Tunisia	Y	5	19	60	5.4	2
Turkey	I	6*	4.5*	100	5	2

Table E--Continued

Muslim-Majority States (n=46)	v1 EXCELE	v2 EXCTRM	v3 EXCTNR	v4 PLGELE	v5 LEGTRM	v6 TWOELE
Turkmenistan	Ref./I*(N)	Life	16	50?	5	0/by ref;ext.life
United Arab Emir.	I(non-rep.)	5(d.f.-life)	2	0	2	n/a
Uzbekistan	Y	7	16	55	5	1
West Bank/Gaza	Y	5	1	100	5	1
Yemen	Y(cand.-I)	7	16	73	6	2
Baseline:	x	4.375	5.597	x	4.381	x

Notations:

v1: Y = Yes, directly elected executive; N = executive is not elected; I = executive indirectly elected by a representative or directly elected assembly; I (non-rep.) = executive indirectly elected by a non-representative, non-elected body; Ref./Pleb.= elected/confirmed by referendum or plebiscite; d.j. = dejure elected executive that does not rule de facto; Y/I = de facto power is shared by both a directly elected head of state and in indirectly elected head of government; I*(N) = power is shared between an indirectly elected leader and a non-elected leader

v2: n/a = indicates that there is no limit on the term of the executive; d.f. = de facto executive term

v3: * = an average of two leaders' terms

v4: dissolv. = an legislature dissolved following an election; * = discounting a second assembly that lacks de facto legislative powers; ? = estimate

v5: n/a = lack of a specified term for a truly elected legislature

v6: n/a = no free and fair elections held; * = indicates some notable problems with or controversies surrounding one of the two most recently held elections; dep/diss = deposed leader/dissolved legislature; by ref = elected by referendum; ext. life = term extended for life following election

Table E--Continued

v7 CONELE	v8 SUFFRG	v9 VOTINV	v10 RTCOMP	v11 EFFPRT	v12 SETALL	v13 RATREP	v14 REGVOT	**Muslim States (n=46)**
5*	Y	5.17	NP,R,E	0	0.0498	77095	87.07	Afghanistan
9	Y	...	R,E	2.6	0.8575	25190	100?	Albania
6	Y	10.46	R,E,N,V	3.25	0.6894	59752	90.75	Algeria
8	Y	3.4	V	2.75	1.0383	65873	76.8	Azerbaijan
4*	21	...	Y	0	...	5515	56.31	Bahrain
8	Y	0.8	V	2.16	0.6437	461494	93.62	Bangladesh
n/a	N	n/a	n/a	1	n/a	16610	n/a	Brunei
13	Y	7.5	Y	3.3	0.9639	114466	45.32	Burkina Faso
7	Y	2.5	V	1.94	...	58733	97.95	Chad
9	Y	3.3	Y	1.42	...	19180	46.55	Comoros
1	Y	1.8	V	1	0.627	7033	77.18	Djibouti
10	Y	2.37	R,N,V	1.96	...	104065	70.99	Egypt
5	Y	...	V	1.13	...	31316	69.23	Gambia
2	Y	0.9	V	1.7	0.8262	79127	100?	Guinea
5	Y	8.81	Y	7.07	0.9273	389548	100?	Indonesia
7	Y	3.29	NP,I,R,N,V	2.18	...	229243	97.38	Iran
12	Y	1.6	I	3.45	0.8849	90230	100?	Iraq
2	Y	...	V	1.38	0.6362	49818	94.65	Jordan
n.p./avg 5 I	21/nat.30	...	NP	0	0.2127	43663	...	Kuwait
6	Y	0.87	V	1.62	0.753	66811	87.71	Kyrgyz Rep.
5	M21/Fps	...	R*,V	7.2	...	29123	100?	Lebanon
n/a	d.f. N	...	n/a	1	...	...	...	Libya
4	21	27.23	V	1.22	0.7068	88581	...	Malaysia
4*	21	1.61	NP*,V,I,R*	0	0.2694	5715	100?	Maldives
24	Y	28.91	Y	2.72	...	73797	100?	Mali
6	Y/N	2.3	R,N,V,coup	1.58	0.6455	21736	...	Mauritania
7	Y	17.15	R	10.32	0.624	50568	62.21	Morocco
6	Y	3.19	R*	3.72	0.8944	101501	97.53	Niger
3	Y	3.48	N,V	2.07	0.8486	261813	96.75	Nigeria
6.5*	21	...	NP	0	...	21428*	62.07	Oman
14	Y	...	R*,V,coll.	5.56	0.9884	353230	86.24	Pakistan
n/a	N	n/a	n/a	0	n/a	20536*	...	Qatar
n/a	M/21	n/a	n/a	0	n/a	183489	...	Saudi Arabia
8	Y	0.6	Y	1.76	0.6688	92892	49.05	Senegal
9	Y	...	Y	1.65	0.9433	45584	83.71	Sierra Leone
n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	0	n/a	24724	...	Somalia
5	Y/-South	...	N,V	1.03	...	105873	...	Sudan
1	Y	...	I,V,quota	1*	...	70200	...	Syria
2	Y	...	V	1.45	0.8965	71497	78.51	Tajikistan
4	20	3.3	R,E,N,V	1.52	1.09	31666	76.52	Tunisia
11	Y	3.9	I,N,R*	1.85	0.5197	128569	89.36	Turkey

Table E—Continued

v7 CONELE	v8 SUFFRG	v9 VOTINV	v10 RTCOMP	v11 EFFPRT	v12 SETALL	v13 RATREP	v14 REGVOT	**Muslim States (n=46)**
1	Y	...	V,one-pty	1	...	31837	...	Turkmenistan
0	n/a	n/a	n/a	0	n/a	62120*	...	U.A.E.
2	Y	...	R,V,I	4.76	0.9951	118098	...	Uzbekistan
7	Y	...	Y	2.32	0.7929	27635	77.4	W. Bank/Gaza
2 cnd/1 pty	Y	3.17	V	1.54	0.7335	46966	89.81	Yemen
x	x	2.98	x	3.266	x	101882	91.787	Baseline:

Notations:

v7: # = number of national parties fielding candidates; n/a = no free and fair election held; n.p./avg. # I = not contested by parties, but the average number of independent candidates per constituency supplied; # cnd/# pty = number of candidates in a one-party election; * = other notable problems with contestation, such as a lack of operable political parties fielding candidates

v8: Y = universal suffrage granted at age 18 or younger; n/a or N = no de facto suffrage as no elections are held; 20 or 21 = universal suffrage granted at age 20 or 21 respectively; nat.30 = suffrage limited to native born citizen plus immigrants 30 years after naturalization; M = male suffage; F = suffrage for only females who have completed primary school; d.f. N = de facto lack of effective suffrage franchise

v9: n/a = no elections held; ... = invalidated votes data unavailable

v10: Y = no serious limitations on the right to compete in elections for public office; NP = no legal parties; R = limitations on either religious or anti-religious parties; E = limitations on ethnic or racially oriented parties; I = limitations on specific ideological parties; N = limitations on nationalist, regionally oriented or separatist parties; V = limitations on campaign activities due to significant political violence; quota = excessively limiting quota of votes in a prior election necessary to compete in future elections; one-pty = one-party electoral system; coll. = requirement for candidates to hold a college degree

v11: * = de facto one-party rule

v12: n/a = no legislative elections held; ... = election data unavailable

v13: * = calculation accounts for unelected delegates or elected representatives with only consultative, as opposed to legislative, powers; ... = total number of representatives unavailable

v14: ? = number of reported registered voters exceeds the calculated estimate of eligible voters; ... = registered voter totals unavailable

Appendix F

Table F--Revised Institutional Democracy Index

Table F--Revised Institutional Democracy Index

CNTRY	EXCELE	EXCTRM	EXCTNR	PLGELE	LEGTRM	TWOELE	CONELE
AFG	1	0.8571	1	0.71	0.9226	0.5	1
ALB	0.5	1	1	1	1	1	1
ALG	1	0.8571	0.7493	0.73	0.7971	1	1
AZB	1	0.8571	1	1	0.8587	1	1
BAH	0	0	0	0.5	1	0.5	1
BNG	0.5	0.8571	1	1	0.8587	1	1
BRU	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
BUFO	0.5	0.8571	0	1	0.8587	1	1
CHD	1	0.8751	0	1	1	1	1
COM	1	1	0.7493	0.55	0.8587	0.5	1
DJB	0.75	0.7429	0.928	1	0.8587	1	0
EGT	1	0.6286	0	0.86	0.7743	1	1
GAM	1	0.8571	0	0.91	0.8587	1	1
GUI	1	0.4	0	1	0.8587	0.5	0.5
IND	1	0.8571	1	1	0.8587	1	1
IRN	0.75	0.5	0.392	0.88	0.8519	1	1
IRQ	0.5	1	1	1	1	1	1
JRD	0	0	0.7493	0.63	1	0.5	0.5
KWT	0	0	0	0.77	1	1	0.25
KYG	1	0.8571	1	1	0.8587	1	1
LEBN	0.5	0.6286	0.5707	1	1	1	1
LIBY	0	0	0	0	0	0.5	0
MALAY	0.5	0.8571	1	0.76	0.8039	1	1
MALDV	0.5	0.8571	0	0.84	0.8587	1	1
MALI	0.75	0.8571	1	1	0.8587	0.75	1
MAUR	0	0.6286	0.5	0	0.7656	0.5	1
MORC	0	0.8571	1	0.55	0.4433	1	1
NGR	1	0.8571	0.7493	1	0.8587	1	1
NIGA	1	1	0.7493	1	1	1	1
OMN	0	0	0	0.63	1	0.5	1
PAK	0	0.8571	0.7493	0.62	0.8062	0.5	1
QTR	0	0	0.0347	0	1	0	0
SAU	0	0	1	0	1	0	0
SEN	1	0.6286	0.928	1	0.8587	0.5	1
SIRLN	1	0.8571	0.5707	0.9	0.8587	0.75	1
SOM	0.25	0	1	0	0	0	0
SUD	1	0.8571	0	0.75	1	0.5	1
SYR	0.25	0.4	0.928	1	1	1	0
TJK	1	0.4	0.7493	0.66	0.8587	1	0.5
TNIS	1	0.8571	0	0.6	0.7674	1	1
TKY	0.5	0.6286	1	1	0.8587	1	1
TRKMN	0	0	0	0.5	0.8587	0	0
UAE	0	0	1	0	1	0	0

Table F--Continued

CNTRY	EXCELE	EXCTRM	EXCTNR	PLGELE	LEGTRM	TWOELE	CONELE
UZB	1	0.4	0	0.55	0.8587	0.5	0.5
WBGZ	1	0.8571	1	1	0.8587	0.5	1
YMN	0.75	0.4	0	0.73	0.6304	1	0.25

Table F--Continued

CNTRY	SUFFRG	RTCOMP	EFFPRT	SETALL	REGVOT	IDISUM
AFG	1	0.4	0	0.0498	0.9486	8.3881
ALB	1	0.6	0.797	0.8575	1	10.7545
ALG	1	0.2	0.995	0.6894	0.9887	10.0066
AZB	1	0.8	0.842	1	0.8367	11.1945
BAH	0.9505	1	0	0.62	0.6135	6.1840
BNG	1	0.8	0.662	0.6437	1	10.3215
BRU	0	0	0.306	0	0	0.3060
BUFO	1	1	1	0.9639	0.4938	9.6735
CHD	1	0.8	0.593	0.62	1	9.8881
COM	1	1	0.435	0.62	0.5072	9.2202
DJB	1	0.8	0.306	0.627	0.8409	8.8535
EGT	1	0.4	0.599	0.62	0.7734	8.6553
GAM	1	0.8	0.348	0.62	0.7542	9.1480
GUI	1	0.8	0.52	0.8262	1	8.4049
IND	1	1	1	0.9273	1	11.6431
IRN	1	0.1	0.667	0.62	1	8.7609
IRQ	1	0.8	1	0.8849	1	11.1849
JRD	1	0.8	0.423	0.6362	1	7.2385
KWT	0.2241	0.8	0	0.2127	0.85	5.1068
KYG	1	0.8	0.495	0.753	0.9556	10.7194
LEBN	0.784	0.6	1	0.62	1	9.7033
LIBY	0	0	0.306	0.62	0.85	2.2760
MALAY	0.9033	0.8	0.373	0.7068	0.85	9.5541
MALDV	0.8649	0.4	0	0.2694	1	7.5901
MALI	1	1	0.834	0.62	1	10.6698
MAUR	0.5	0.2	0.484	0.6455	0.85	6.0737
MORC	1	0.8	1	0.624	0.6778	8.9522
NGR	1	0.9	1	0.8944	1	11.2595
NIGA	1	0.6	0.635	0.8486	1	10.8329
OMN	0.8993	0.8	0	0.62	0.6762	6.1255
PAK	1	0.5	1	0.9884	0.9395	8.9605
QTR	0	0	0	0	0.85	1.8847
SAU	0.5374	0	0	0	0.85	3.3874
SEN	1	1	0.54	0.6688	0.5344	9.6585
SIRLN	1	1	0.505	0.9433	0.912	10.2968
SOM	0	0	0	0	0.85	2.1000
SUD	0.775	0.6	0.315	0.62	0.85	8.2671
SYR	1	0.2	0.306	0.62	0.85	7.5540
TJK	1	0.8	0.445	0.8965	0.8553	9.1648
TNIS	0.9172	0.2	0.466	1	0.8337	8.6414
TKY	1	0.5	0.567	0.5197	0.9736	9.5476
TRKMN	1	0.1	0.306	0.62	0.85	4.2347
UAE	0	0	0	0	0.85	2.8500

Table F--Continued

CNTRY	SUFFRG	RTCOMP	EFFPRT	SETALL	REGVOT	IDISUM
UZB	1	0.4	1	0.9951	0.85	8.0538
WBGZ	1	1	0.709	0.7929	0.8432	10.5609
YMN	1	0.8	0.471	0.7335	0.9784	7.7433

Appendix G

Table G--Revised Aggregated Democracy Index (Raw Scores)

Table G--Revised Aggregated Democracy Index (Raw Scores)

CNTRY	IDISUM	PIV	FHPRI	FHPFI	FHCLI	WBVAI
AFG	15.7762	-2	5	68	6	-1.35
ALB	21.0090	7	3	51	3	0.03
ALG	19.0132	-3	6	64	5	-0.91
AZB	21.3890	-7	6	72	5	-0.97
BAH	12.3680	-7	5	71	5	-0.73
BNG	20.1430	6	4	68	4	-0.69
BRU	0.6120	-2	6	75	5	-1.11
BUFO	18.8470	0	5	40	4	-0.38
CHD	18.7762	-2	6	73	5	-1.09
COM	17.4404	4	4	44	4	-0.14
DJB	16.9570	2	5	67	5	-0.85
EGT	16.3106	-6	6	68	5	-1.04
GAM	17.2960	-5	4	72	4	-0.59
GUI	15.8098	-1	6	73	5	-1.12
IND	22.2862	7	3	58	4	-0.44
IRN	16.7718	3	6	80	6	-1.36
IRQ	21.8698	-2	7	70	5	-1.71
JRD	14.4770	-2	5	62	4	-0.68
KWT	10.2136	-7	4	58	5	-0.48
KYG	20.4388	-3	6	71	5	-1.06
LEBN	18.9066	-2	6	60	5	-0.81
LIBY	4.5520	-7	7	95	7	-1.79
MALAY	18.6082	3	4	69	4	-0.36
MALDV	14.6802	-2	6	68	5	-1.07
MALI	20.5896	6	2	23	2	0.35
MAUR	12.1474	-6	6	65	5	-1.16
MORC	17.9044	-6	5	63	4	-0.55
NGR	21.5190	4	3	53	3	-0.12
NIGA	20.6658	4	4	52	4	-0.65
OMN	12.2510	-8	6	72	5	-0.9
PAK	17.9210	-5	6	61	5	-1.31
QTR	3.7694	-10	6	62	5	-0.79
SAU	6.7748	-10	7	80	7	-1.63
SEN	18.3170	8	2	37	3	0.19
SIRLN	19.5936	5	4	59	3	-0.49
SOM	3.9500	-2	6	83	7	-1.58
SUD	15.5342	-6	7	86	7	-1.81
SYR	14.8580	-7	7	83	7	-1.72
TJK	17.3296	-3	6	74	5	-1.12
TNIS	16.2828	-4	6	80	5	-1.11
TKY	18.5952	7	3	48	3	-0.15
TRKMN	8.4694	-9	7	96	7	-1.9
UAE	5.7000	-8	6	72	6	-1.01

Table G--Continued

CNTRY	IDISUM	PIV	FHPRI	FHPFI	FHCLI	WBVAI
UZB	15.1076	-9	7	85	6	-1.75
WBGZ	20.1218	-2	5	67	6	-1.25
YMN	14.7366	-2	5	76	5	-0.99

Appendix H

Table H--Aggregated Democracy Index Ratings for Lijphart's Consolidated Democracies

Table H--Aggregated Democracy Index Ratings for Lijphart's Consolidated Democracies

Country (n=36)	Institutnl. Demcrcy. Index Convrsn. (0 to 10)	Polity IV Convrsn. (0 to 10)	Freedom House Political Rights Index Convrsn. (0 to 10)	Freedom House Press Freedom Index Convrsn. (0 to 10)	Freedom House Civil Liberties Index Convrsn. (0 to 10)	World Bank Governance Indicators Voice and Accntblty. Index Convrsn. (0 to 10)	Aggregated Democracy Index (Sum Total)	Aggregated Democracy Index (0 to 100)
CNTRY	**IDI**	**PIVCVN**	**FHPRCV**	**FHPFCV**	**FHCLCV**	**WBVACV**	**ADISUM**	**ADI**
Australia	8.02	10	10	8.2	10	7.8	54.02	90.03
Austria	9.41	10	10	7.9	10	7.5	54.81	91.35
Bahamas	8.42	9.8	10	8.6	10	7.28	54.10	90.17
Barbados	7.75	9.8	10	8.3	10	7.34	53.19	88.65
Belgium	8.47	10	10	8.9	10	7.7	55.07	91.78
Botswana	7.94	9.5	8.33	7	8.33	6.46	47.56	79.27
Canada	8.85	10	10	8.3	10	7.76	54.91	91.52
Colombia	9.03	8.5	5	3.7	5	4.06	35.29	58.81
Costa Rica	9.69	10	10	8.1	10	7.22	55.01	91.69
Denmark	9.62	10	10	9	10	8.18	56.80	94.66
Finland	9.39	10	10	9.1	10	8	56.49	94.15
France	8.23	9.5	10	8	10	7.48	53.21	88.68
Germany	9.00	10	10	8.4	10	7.76	55.16	91.94
Greece	9.08	10	10	7.2	8.33	6.82	51.43	85.71
Iceland	9.59	9.8	10	9.1	10	7.82	56.31	93.85
India	8.94	9.5	8.33	6.2	6.67	5.54	45.18	75.30
Ireland	8.51	10	10	8.5	10	7.6	54.61	91.02
Israel	9.54	10	10	7.2	6.67	5.92	49.33	82.21

Table H--Continued

CNTRY	IDI	PIVCVN	FHPRCV	FHPFCV	FHCLCV	WBVACV	ADISUM	ADI
Italy	8.31	10	10	6.5	10	7.12	51.93	86.55
Jamaica	7.65	9.5	8.33	8.5	6.67	6.08	46.73	77.89
Japan	9.13	10	10	8	8.33	6.96	52.42	87.37
Luxembourg	8.15	9.8	10	8.9	10	7.8	54.65	91.08
Malta	8.91	9.8	10	8.2	10	7.52	54.43	90.72
Mauritius	8.95	10	10	7.2	10	6.88	53.03	88.38
Netherlands	9.17	10	10	8.9	10	7.98	56.05	93.41
New Zealand	8.93	10	10	8.8	10	7.94	55.67	92.79
Norway	9.54	10	10	9	10	8.06	56.60	94.34
Papua N.G.	8.58	10	6.67	7.1	6.67	4.94	43.96	73.26
Portugal	9.53	10	10	8.6	10	7.62	55.75	92.92
Spain	9.22	10	10	7.8	10	7.34	54.36	90.60
Sweden	8.98	10	10	9.1	10	8.04	56.12	93.54
Switzerland	9.51	10	10	8.9	10	7.98	56.39	93.98
Trinidad	8.46	10	6.67	7.6	6.67	5.98	45.38	75.63
U.K.	8.22	10	10	8.2	10	7.74	54.16	90.27
United States	9.16	9.8	10	8.3	10	7.42	54.68	91.13
Venezuela	8.57	8	6.67	2.8	5	4.08	35.12	58.54
Mean	8.85	9.82	9.44	7.89	9.12	7.10	52.22	87.03