Lying: A Failure of Autonomy and Self-Respect

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Presented to the WMU Center for the Study of Ethics in Society

March 19, 1992
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Contemporary discussions of the morality of lying often incorporate considerations of autonomy and the principle of respect for autonomy. Although the conceptions of autonomy invoked are diverse, the usual concern is with determining which lies, if any, are compatible with respecting the autonomy of the person to whom the lie is told. When questions arise about the relevance of some lack of autonomy to an evaluation of the morality of a particular lie, what is at issue is the lied-to person's autonomy of lack of autonomy.\(^1\) In contrast, many Greek comments about lying, reflecting the Greek ethical emphasis on character and virtue, focus on the person lying. Individuals who resort to lies and deception are seen as unfree and/or as lacking in self-respect.\(^2\) My purpose in this paper is to elucidate the view, expressed in various Greek comments, that telling lies is ordinarily incompatible with one's own freedom and self-respect. This will involve bringing out the relevant Greek distinctions and relating them to several conceptions of autonomy. A secondary purpose is to briefly contrast some Greek concerns regarding lying with some contemporary ones.
I. Freedom vs. Unfreedom or Slavishness

The fundamental idea behind the Greek condemnation of lies to be discussed in this paper is that lies indicate a failure of control on the agent's part over that which ought to be within the control of an individual leading a life of human excellence. It is reflected in aphoristic statements such as the following: "To lie belongs to the unfree, to speak the truth to the noble."\(^3\) The relevant dichotomy is between the character and actions appropriate to the free or independent individual and the character and actions of the individual described as unfree or slavish.\(^4\) Unfreedom or slavishness is attributed to those who lie out of need, fear, or acquisitiveness or out of a desire for others' approval. It involves a lack of sufficient control over one's internal states and/or one's external situation. A failure of control may be due to a lack (e.g., of financial resources) or to the presence of some obstructive factor (e.g., excessive fear) or to a combination of the two. In contrast, free individuals have their needs, fears, and acquisitive desires, as well as their desire for others' approval, under sufficient control so that they eschew lies which are grounds for disgrace and a forfeiture of self-respect. Lying to others in order to please them by telling them what they want to hear rather than the truth is especially seen as
indicating that, at least to some extent, one's life and actions are controlled by other individuals and not by oneself. In contrast, being open and truthful shows one's independent control over one's life and actions.

To understand Greek conceptions of freedom and unfreedom as these are embodied in the contrast between free and slavish or unfree individuals, it is useful to begin with some typical Greek conceptions regarding slaves. Slaves are individuals whose lives are not their own but belong to others. As Aristotle describes them, slaves are living property -- instruments controlled and used by their owners. Disempowered and precluded from being self-determining, slaves are not permitted to either choose their own goals or to make the sorts of choices or voluntarily perform the sorts of actions which are grounds for respect. Furthermore, slaves are sometimes seen as motivated solely by desires to avoid bodily pain or attain bodily pleasures. Acting under orders, slaves may lie as well as perform other acts that those having self-respect would refuse to perform. Insofar as slaves perform such acts either for the sake of avoiding physical pain or for the sake of some bodily pleasure within the owner's power to bestow, slaves are seen as motivated in ways appropriate to animals but not to those living
worth-while human lives. Looked at from the standpoint of those who are free under the law, to be a slave is grounds for shame (although slaves themselves are sometimes seen as incapable of shame). But one has analogous grounds for shame if, being legally free, one performs some wrongful act because one is ordered to do so by one with superior power. The grounds for shame do not lie simply in the wrongness of the act performed but in the fact that in relation to the one wielding power one is marked as unfree so that one's condition is analogous to that of a slave. The contrast between being in control and being controlled remains fundamental when terms denoting slavery, freedom, and their cognates are used in marking contrasts other than a difference in legal status. Also fundamental in the contrasts is the idea that being free is a necessary condition for being worthy of respect.

Various aspects of the Greek conception of slaves are incorporated into the distinction between free and slavish or unfree individuals. First, just as slaves are thought to be motivated solely by a desire to attain physical pleasure or avoid pain, so, too, with unfree or slavish persons. Aristotle compares slavish persons with grazing animals and describes them as pursuing a life of animal-like gratification, dominated by physical pleasures,
such as eating and the pleasures of touch. Terence Irwin captures this aspect of the comparison between slavish individuals and slaves in a concise comment:

The slavish ... person is the one who cares about nothing beyond the satisfaction of his nonrational desires; he does not deliberate about changing them, but simply plans for their satisfaction. That is all a slave can do, and all a slavish person wants to do.

Individuals may be slavish in this respect for different reasons having to do with either (1) a lack of control over their external situation or (2) a failure of rational control over some obstructive internal states. Individuals who, like slaves, spend their lives in wearisome menial labors simply to supply their fundamental needs fall into the first category. Lacking external resources, they are compelled to devote all their energies to meeting bodily needs. Individuals in the second category are described as being the slaves of their appetites and passions. When such enslavement is extreme, one's capacity for rational judgment or for acting on the basis of such judgment may be severely diminished. But individuals with strong acquisitive desires for external goods needed to satisfy their passions and appetites also fall in this category even if they are adept in exercising their
reason in their pursuit of pleasures and their avoidance of pain. The restricted nature of their motivation, determined by their passions and appetites, constrains them from pursuing goods that are distinctly human.

In contrast, free individuals are seen as capable of other sorts of motivation and thus as not controlled by their appetites and passions. Faced with having to choose between performing some base act or accepting some painful consequence for its nonperformance, free persons choose the latter while unfree individuals choose the former.\textsuperscript{12} Part of the contrast drawn here between unfree and free individuals is that the former are and the latter are not such as to perform shameful, disgraceful acts simply in order to avoid pain or achieve pleasure. Unlike slavish individuals, free persons are characterized as being motivated by desires to avoid acting in ways which are grounds for shame as well as by desires to engage in activities which constitute human excellence.

The second way in which the Greek conception of slaves is incorporated into the distinction between free and slavish/unfree individuals is that just as slaves lead lives controlled by others and serve their owners' interests rather than their own, so, too, with unfree or slavish persons. The latter are seen as under others' control if they are overly
dependent on being liked or approved of by others or on various goods that are within others' power to bestow. Such a dependence may be due to the slavish person's being dominated by nonrational desires or by acquisitive desires for external goods, including not just material things but the honors that others can give or withhold. Odysseus' characteristic reasoning in Sophocles' Philoctetes, for example, marks him as having an "unfree mind" insofar as he advocates using lies and deceit, which are grounds for shame, in order to achieve successes that will enhance one's reputation. In their excessive need for what is not within their control, including others' approval, slavish persons can render themselves instruments of others' desires. Here again, individuals may be slavish for different reasons. External factors, such as poverty and lack of property, mark one as slavish if the result is that the way in which one spends one's time and effort, and, therefore, spends much of one's life, is determined by others. But even affluent individuals are seen as unfree or slavish when they are over-dependent on others' approval or on external goods (e.g., political offices and other honors) within others' power to withhold or bestow. One mark of such overdependence is one's willingness to let what others desire one to say or do determine one's actions, especially when
this involves doing something base. This aspect of the slavish person's character is epitomized in Greek condemnations of individuals whom they characterize as flatterers. It is useful to look in some detail at the Greek conceptions of flatterers since this character-type exemplifies the relation between lying, slavishness, and a lack of self-respect.

Theophrastus offers the following statement: "Flattery may be understood as a sort of converse that is shameful, but at the same time profitable to the one who flatters." Thus, those who flatter are not simply persons who tell others lies that might please them but individuals whose lying is a part of their attempt to make themselves agreeable to others for personal gain. Obsequious individuals who tell flattering lies simply in order to be liked and considered pleasant are also seen as base, but the term "flatterer" is usually used to characterize individuals who have ulterior motives for telling flattering lies. In Plato's Gorgias, Socrates describes flattery as base, deceptive, and slavish and the flatterer's verbal and other behavior as being in accordance with the values and beliefs of the object of his flattery rather than his own. Plutarch, too, stresses the flatterer's eschewal of self-determination:
The flatterer, since he has no abiding-place of character to dwell in, and since he leads a life not of his own choosing but another's molding and adapting himself to suit another, is not simple, not one, but variable and many in one ... and changes his shape to fit his receiver.16

Aristotle's portrayal of the flatterer fits this general picture. He describes a flatterer as someone who tells others lies that please them for the sake of personal gain, who pretends to be their inferior and to love them more than they love him, and who attributes "more than is proper and true" to the objects of flattery.17

Aristotle's contrast between the flatterer and the magnanimous, truth-loving individual who epitomizes human excellence is especially illuminating regarding the relation between slavishness and lying:

He [the magnanimous person] must be open in his hates and loves (for concealment is proper to fear) and he must care more for truth than for people's opinions and must be open in his speech and actions.... And he must be unable to let anyone, except a friend, determine how he lives his life; for to do so is slavish; and hence flatterers are always servile and base people are flatterers.18
This description contrasts the truthful, magnanimous person's control over his life and actions with the slavishness of those who conceal the truth or lie out of fear, out of a need or a desire for others' approval, or, given the usual understanding of the flatterer, for personal gain. In contrast to slavish persons, free individuals can be seen as being neither under the control of nonrational and acquisitive desires nor under others' control. Rather, they are sufficiently independent of goods that others can give or withhold so as to be free of any motivation to lie or perform other base acts in order to obtain those goods. Nor, as noted earlier, are free individuals so fearful of some harm that others have in their power to inflict that they are willing to do some wrong at another's command.

II. Diminished Autonomy and Lies

Although Greeks do not ordinarily apply the word "autonomous" ("living by one's own laws") to persons but to city-states, the Greek distinction between free and slavish/unfree character-types can be cast in terms of a contrast between autonomous individuals, on the one hand, and nonautonomous individuals or those with diminished autonomy, on the other. Several conceptions of autonomy are relevant to such a characterization.
(S1) **Autonomy as self-direction or self-determination.** Persons are autonomous in this sense if they and not others determine what actions they will perform, or how they will lead their lives in general. Control by others can take various forms. It can be coercive (as in the case of slaves and concentration camp inmates) or benevolent (as in the case of young children). Coercion can involve either the direct use of force or the threat of harm backed up by enforcement power. Slaves, of course, are paradigm examples of individuals whose lives are lived under others' control and, therefore, of individuals whose S1 autonomy is severely limited.

Initially, the Greek distinction between slavish and free persons does not seem to involve a distinction between those lacking and those having S1 autonomy. Therefore, diminished S1 autonomy does not seem to be the relevant factor when those who lie are seen as slavish or unfree. The flatterer's and obsequious person's lies, for example, are intended as a means to their goals and neither the choice of means nor the goals are *forced* on them by others by some threat of harm backed up by enforcement power. The same could be said of individuals whose poverty and pressing needs lead them to lie in order to secure some necessary advantage. Yet, as we have seen, Greeks identify
one aspect of slavishness with being under others' control and, therefore, slavish lies with a failure of S1 autonomy. The reason may be partly rooted in the Greeks' awareness of the extent to which one's lack of external resources severely diminishes one's power to control what one does with one's life. If, to take an extreme example, one person (A) can satisfy basic needs only by doing as B commands and working sixteen hours a day at menial, backbreaking tasks, B is seen as controlling A's life even if A voluntarily agrees to work for B. A's lack of control over how he lives his life is a function of both an internal state (need) and a lack of external goods which are within others' control. B's control, in turn, need involve no coercion of A but only control over what is necessary to alleviate A's internal state. If A's need is desperate enough and only B can alleviate it, it is B who determines just what A's life-long activities will be if A is to have a life at all. A, unlike a slave, subjects his life to another's control voluntarily so, to that extent, A, unlike a slave is self-determining; but A's S1 autonomy is severely diminished nonetheless. Here A's compromised S1 autonomy is due to both the paucity of A's choices and the power that B has to take advantage of A's "coercive" situation.
Some slavish lies involve analogous situations. Greek writings contain numerous examples of cases where not to lie is to run the risk of death or some other severe harm. In the most common example, the one being addressed has the power to inflict serious harm, or even death, if displeased with the information conveyed by the speaker. If under these circumstances, C tells D what C believes will please D rather than the truth, Greeks would see C's behavior as slave-like -- as showing D's control over C. Antisthenes' statement, "Whoever fears others is himself a slave," reflects this way of thinking. Here again, an internal state (fear) coupled with C's lack of control over the resources necessary to limit D's control over her are seen as diminishing C's autonomy to determine her actions. There is, of course, a significant difference between the cases of A and C. A acts in accordance with B's expressed orders. In contrast, if D orders C to provide relevant information and C gives a lying response out of fear, C is apparently exercising her S1 autonomy by not doing as D commands. The Greek perception of C's lie as evidencing her limited S1 autonomy may be related to the idea, expressed in various Greek comments, of the relation between being free in one's speech and not being under another's control. Free speech is repeatedly
linked not just with political freedom but with being in control of one's external situation in contrast with being under another's control. To the extent that one says not what one would prefer to say (e.g., the truth) but only what one is able to say without risking grave repercussions, one is seen as unfree. Greeks, as we have seen, extend this way of thinking to very different sorts of cases. Statements made by a politician are seen as controlled by his hearers rather than himself insofar as he tells his audience the lies they prefer rather than the truth in order to get their approval.

If diminished S1 autonomy is conceived this broadly, many of the lies that Greeks identify with slavishness and unfreedom involve diminished S1 autonomy -- a forfeiture of control over one's life and actions -- and are, thereby, grounds for shame and incompatible with self-respect. Many of the lies involving diminished S1 autonomy would be shameful even if they did not evidence a failure of autonomy (e.g., lies which harm friends or violate trust); but even lies which may not be shameful in themselves (e.g., lies which give pleasure, harm no one, etc.), are incompatible with self-respect if they are related to a failure of S1 autonomy.

(S2) Autonomy as internal self-government. Persons are autonomous in this sense if they are capable of making and acting on rational decisions
unobstructed by appetites, passions, or other internal states that interfere with rational decisions and actions. The virtue of self-control is often taken to characterize free individuals while lack of control is identified with being enslaved, slavishness, and a lack of "mastery." It is autonomy that is at issue when slavish persons' lives are dominated by their appetites or passions to the extent that these internal states preclude their acting in accordance with reason. Lies stemming from excessive fear, for example, might involve a failure of S2 autonomy along with lies told by lovers under the sway of passion or lies told by foolish individuals who do not understand the potential bad consequences of lying. However, not all lies told out of fear of serious repercussions need indicate a failure of S2 autonomy even if they involve diminished S1 autonomy. Lying to a powerful tyrant, may, under some circumstances, be the most rational thing to do, for example.

(S3) Autonomy as a disposition to act on distinctly human values rather than merely for the sake of achieving pleasure or avoiding pain. S3 autonomy might be characterized as follows using a short version of one of Thomas E. Hill, Jr.'s senses of autonomy: "Persons have autonomy in this sense ... only if they value and are disposed to bring about some states of affairs without expecting
that these states of affairs will bring them pleasure... or prevent pain..., or at least they do not value these states of affairs for the sake of the pleasure (avoidance of pain ...) which they expect will result." As we have seen, S3 autonomy is an important component in Greek characterizations of free individuals. It is conceivable, for example, that an intelligent, rational, controlled, and affluent hedonist, devoted to a life of maximizing physical pleasures, might be characterized as having both S1 and S2 autonomy. But such an individual would still be described as unfree if he is not disposed to pursue more distinctly human values. In the Gorgias, for example, Callicles may disagree with Socrates about the best life for humans to pursue and, therefore, about the noble and fine things that ought to be pursued; but he nevertheless considers those who never see themselves as worthy of fine and noble things as unfree, in contrast to those who pursue goals fit for free persons.

Many of the lies that involve a failure of S1 autonomy may also involve a failure of S3 autonomy. Lies told under duress may indicate a character governed by desires to avoid pain at the cost of human goods such as self-respect. Flattering lies told in the interest of acquiring material goods to satisfy desire for pleasure may show that one is disposed to pursue pleasure at the
expense of human goods such as honor and reputation. However, not all lies involving a failure of S1 autonomy need involve a failure of S3 autonomy. Some lies told under orders may be compatible with S3 autonomy, for example. One such case may be found in Sophocles' *Philoctetes* when Odysseus urges Neoptolemus to follow his orders and lie to Philoctetes in order to complete a mission whose success is necessary if the Greeks are to defeat the Trojans. The result for Neoptolemus, Odysseus argues, will be a reputation for wisdom and courage. Whatever the speciousness of Odysseus' reasoning, if part of Neoptolemus' motivation in initially following these orders is the enhancement of his reputation among his fellow soldiers, his motives are not reducible simply to desires to avoid pain or achieve pleasure. At the same time, Odysseus makes it clear that he is asking Neoptolemus to temporarily forfeit his S1 autonomy and to follow Odysseus' orders regarding the means to be used to achieve the requisite success. "Give me yourself for this short period of time," Odysseus urges, as he tries to convince Neoptolemus to act in accordance with Odysseus' values rather than his own since Neoptolemus himself considers lying to be ethically unacceptable and incompatible with self-respect.
(S4) Autonomy as an ideal human life. Each of the first three conceptions of autonomy captures some aspect of the Greek distinction between free and unfree/slavish individuals. But a fourth, more encompassing conception of autonomy is necessary for two reasons. First, someone might have a high degree of autonomy in one of these senses and yet lack one of the other forms. As Euripides' characters sometimes stress, one's legal status may be that of a slave, so that one's S1 autonomy is severely compromised, and yet one may have S2 autonomy if one's passions and appetites are under sufficient control so that one is willing to perform some sacrificial act out of concern for one's master or mistress. Thus a conception of autonomy inclusive of S1-S3 is necessary. Second, a person might have the other forms of autonomy and yet lack any significant opportunities to exercise that autonomy in pursuing those activities that constitute human excellence. Just what constitutes human excellence is, of course, subject to debate. Aristotle's approach is to think of human excellence in terms of self-realization and the activities involved in developing and using one's distinctly human capacities. To have S4 autonomy (i.e., to lead an ideal human life) a person must have S1-S3 autonomy and must exercise that autonomy in living a life of human excellence. S4 autonomy
best captures the broad sense of the positive pole of the free-unfree/slavish contrast used in characterizing the disposition, attitudes, and behavior of individuals deserving the highest respect. Given the broad sense of S4, any lie incompatible with the behavior of an individual living a life of human excellence involves a failure of autonomy and self-respect. The S1-S3 conceptions of autonomy, on the other hand, are useful in identifying the nature of the specific failure of autonomy at issue when some lie is told that marks one as unfree.

III. Greek Ethics and Contemporary Moral Philosophy

The preceding discussion illustrates some of the obvious differences between Greek ethical concerns and those found in contemporary moral philosophy. First, in contemporary discussions of the morality of lying, autonomy is usually considered a right -- a right of self-determination -- and a major concern is with the justifiability of benevolent lies that might involve usurpations of another's autonomy. What I have labeled S2 autonomy is brought into these contemporary discussions when they focus on the justifiability of lying to those whose S2 autonomy is diminished or severely compromised. Second, in contem-
temporary discussions, considerations of the grounds for respect and self-respect are usually entwined with claims about moral rights and moral status rather than with considerations of individual merit or desert. In contrast, in Greek ethical thinking, with its emphasis on what constitutes the best human life, whether one is worthy of respect depends on the life one leads and the character one exhibits in one's behavior. As we have seen, factors which are to a large extent a matter of chance (e.g., one's relative wealth or poverty and one's having the wherewithal to control others) are relevant in determining the extent of one's S1 and S4 autonomy and worth. Thus it is not surprising that in the Greek ethical context, some uses of lies that are seen as relatively nonproblematic in contemporary moral discussions might be seen as ethically problematic. These include (1) the use of lies (and other forms of deceit) in lieu of the use of force against those with greater power and (2) the use of white lies intended to make oneself pleasant to others.

In the first case, deceit is seen as a weapon resorted to by those who are typically under others' control (e.g., women and slaves) and, therefore, lack the S1 autonomy without which one lacks the grounds for self-respect. To be more powerful than your adversary is to be the one in control
while the use of lies indicates one's awareness of the other's greater power and control over the situation. Although it might be argued that the successful use of lies or trickery is itself an indication of one's ability to control the situation, the need to resort to deceit is an indication of one's comparative weakness in relation to one's adversary. But more important, perhaps, is the tension between a willingness to resort to lies against an enemy and one's having the type of character associated with S4 autonomy. Although lies are ordinarily harmful to the one deceived, Greek ethics incorporates the principle that one ought to harm one's enemies. Thus it would initially seem that the use of force and the use of lies against one's adversaries would be equally acceptable. However, various comments in Greek writings stress the importance of developing a coherent set of attitudes in regard to the use of lies and other forms of deceit. A later thinker, Plutarch, explicitly draws out the relation between deceiving one's enemies and developing wrongful habits:

Knavery, deceit, and intrigue, which do not seem bad when they are employed against an enemy, if once they find a lodgment, acquire a permanent tenure and are hard to eject. The next thing is that men of themselves employ these against their friends through force of
habit, unless they are on their guard against using them against their enemies.... It would be a wonderful achievement in disagreements and contentions with human beings for a man to be a noble, honest and ingenuous enemy ... so that in dealing with his friends he may always be steadfast and may keep himself from wrongdoing.31

Other Greek writings frequently emphasize that lying in one context casts doubt on the truthfulness of one's character in general.32 This last point is also relevant in regard to the second use of lies noted above -- white lies told to make oneself pleasant to others -- along with trivial boastful lies told with no ulterior motive. These latter sorts of lies can also be seen as incompatible with S1 autonomy since they indicate one's overdependence on others' approval. Furthermore, they can also indicate a failure of S2 autonomy. Since the trivial lies of both boasters and obsequious individuals may lead others to perceive them as having untruthful, untrustworthy characters, with all the possible bad consequences that entails, these lies would see to be examples of foolish rather than rational behavior.
Endnotes


3. Fragment attributed to Apollonius Delius in Stobaeus, 3.11.28.

4. In this paper I will not distinguish between uses of *eleutheros* and uses of *eleutherios* -- both terms will be translated by "free" -- although the former term is used to denote the legal status of a free person while the latter term is not. Both terms are used, however, in characterizing individuals as "free" in the senses to be discussed in this paper. Thus in Euripides' plays slaves can be described as having enslaved bodies but free minds. (See, for example, Euripides, *Helen* 726-733.) On *eleutheros*, *aneleutheros*, and their cognates see

5. Many of these generalizations do not apply to all Greek slaves; nor are they supposed to be beliefs held by all Greeks. Rather, they are ideas expressed in various writings. Furthermore, the link, for example, between being a slave and having the motivation attributed to slaves is a contingent one. See footnote 4 regarding slaves with different sorts of motivation.


7. On slavery being grounds for shame, see, for example, Demosthenes, "Against Timocrates," 123-24.

8. One expression of this view is found in Demophon's speech in Euripides' *The Children of Hercules*, 236-52.


12. See, for example, Demosthenes, "On the Chersonese," 50-51 and Euripides, Iphigeneia at Aulis, 919-34.
13. Sophocles, Philoctetes, 1006.
14. Theophrastus, Characters, 2.1.
15. Plato, Gorgias, 463a-c, 465b, and 511b-13c. See also Terence Irwin's comments on 463a-c in Plato, Gorgias, translated with Notes by Terence Irwin (Clarendon Press, 1979), 131-32.
17. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1127a6-12 and 1159a14-17. Aristotle does not explicitly state that flatterers lie but to attribute "more than is proper and true" to the object of flattery is to make false statements.
18. Ibid., 1124b26-1125a2.
19. An exception is found in Sophocles' Antigone, 821 where the chorus describes Antigone as autonomous.
20. Hill (cited in footnote 1) discusses various senses of "autonomy." I draw on his characterizations in formulating some of the following conceptions, especially in my conceptions of S3 and S4 autonomy.
22. See, for example, Euripides, Andromache, 153.

23. See, for example, Xonophon, Oeconomicus, 1:17-23.


25. Plato, Gorgias, 485c-e.

26. Sophocles, Philoctetes, 55-120.

27. In his notes on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics (footnote 10), Irwin comments, "Aristotle says less about the broader type of eleutherios because it is really virtue as a whole (i.e., the appropriate non-slavish attitude to happiness) viewed in a particular way (here it is similar to general justice, 1130a10)," 405. Irwin's comment reflects the broad construal of what it is to be a free person, construed in terms of S4 autonomy.

28. Hill (footnote 1) discusses variants of both S3 and S4 autonomy in his discussion of benevolent lies. Some benevolent lies are seen as morally problematic when they involve treating a person not as someone who holds a distinctly human value -- truth -- as an important value but as someone who values the avoidance of pain more (thus treating the person as lacking S3 autonomy). Others are seen as morally problematic if they involve depriving a person of the realistic picture of a situation necessary to leading a life of human excellence -- one in which one has rational control
over one's situation -- and thus compromising S4 autonomy.

29. Christina M. Korsgaard expresses the usual contemporary view that if one has to choose between lying and the use of force, lying is the better option. But she also notes that at least two thinkers -- Kant and Cardinal John Henry Newman -- disagreed with this view, seeing lying as the worse option. Christina M. Korsgaard, "The Right to Lie: Kant on Dealing with Evil," *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 15:4 (Fall 1986), footnote 12, 325-49.

30. On white lies see Sissela Bok, *Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private Life* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978), 57-72 and Joseph Kupfer, "The Moral Presumption Against Lying," *Review of Metaphysics* 36 (1982-1983), 103-26. Bok construes white lies very broadly so that they include the use of placebos and untruthful letters of recommendation. She is, however, critical of most uses of even the most trivial white lies although she does not present a well developed argument against the more trivial forms of white lies.

31. Plutarch, "How to Profit from One's Enemies," 91b-d.

32. See, for example, Demosthenes XXIV:133, Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 1417b36-1418a1, and Thucydides IV:86.
BIOGRAPHY

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