Cover Page Footnote
“Antique Power,” Digital Photography. By Elba Marcell Rivera Rodriguez, Department of Political Science, College of Arts and Sciences.
The Hilltop Review:  
A Journal of Western Michigan University  
Graduate Student Research

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Published by the Graduate Student Advisory Committee

Website: http://www.wmich.edu/gsac/publications.html

ISSN: 2151-7401

Cover Art: “Antique Power,” Digital Photography. By Elba Marcell Rivera Rodriguez, Department of Political Science, College of Arts and Sciences.
THE HILLTOP REVIEW:
A JOURNAL OF WESTERN MICHIGAN UNIVERSITY GRADUATE STUDENT RESEARCH

VOLUME 5, NUMBER 1
FALL 2011
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We are pleased to announce that The Hilltop Review is now available on an online journal data-basing system, Scholar Works: http://scholarworks.wmich.edu/hilltopreview. This allows articles in The Hilltop Review to be included in the results of online search systems such as Google. This data-basing system increases the profile of both the author’s research and the online presence of The Hilltop Review. Special thanks are due to Ochas Pupwe of the Graduate Student Advisory Committee (GSAC) and Maria Bundza of Waldo Library for getting this online system up and running. Also in the IT sector, both Ochas Pupwe and Raed Salih deserve credit for streamlining and updating the Hilltop Review’s GSAC website: http://www.wmich.edu/gsac/publications.html.

As always, the efforts of the chairs and directors of the various fields of academic research and science at WMU are indispensable to the completion of the peer-review process. The chair or director of each author’s home department is contacted and asked to suggest one faculty member and one graduate student who might serve as a peer-reviewer. The prompt response and helpful suggestions of the chairs and directors are gratefully acknowledged.

The completed peer-review forms are forwarded to the authors and each author completes a process of revise and re-submit. The authors are to be congratulated on their timely completion of this process and for taking advantage of outstanding feedback and criticism. I couldn’t be more thankful for the hard work of the peer-reviewers and quick turnaround with the papers they agreed to review. The members of the Editorial Board also read and copy-edited one paper each. Their thoughtful commentary undoubtedly has improved the overall quality of this issue of the Hilltop Review.

The support and assistance of GSAC members and the folks at the Graduate College are also gratefully acknowledged. Along with other programs that assist graduate students at WMU, The Hilltop Review is made possible with funds from the Graduate Student Assessment Fee.

Over the semester GSAC went through a rather exciting leadership change. Our former Chair, Joel Ravaleoharimisy, accepted a teaching job at a university here in Michigan and stepped down as Chair. Our former Vice Chair, Latasha Chaffin was elected Chair, and our former Support Specialist, Ochas Pupwe, was elected to the office of Vice Chair. Stepping in to fulfill the role of Support Specialist, Raed Salih, has been a welcome addition to the GSAC leadership team. So much for the changes in leadership at GSAC.

In this issue we have seven articles representing a good range of social and natural science here at WMU. This issue features articles from Political Science, Counseling Psychology, Public Affairs and Administration, History, Engineering, Music, and Sociology. For this issue we have also opened the page limit compared with previous issues. The authors have been able to more fully develop their arguments with the extra space, and the Review has benefited from the change in editorial policy. Our lead article, “A Rose by any other Name: State Criminality and the Limits of Social Learning Theory,” by Elizabeth Bradshaw, was selected by the Editorial Board as best paper for this issue. In addition to the honor of being voted best author
the first prize includes a monetary prize of $500.

The Hilltop Review looks forward to receiving and publishing more papers and artwork by graduate students at WMU. Moving into the future, there will be prizes for best papers and artwork for every issue of the Hilltop Review. We hope this incentive will increase the profile of the Hilltop Review here on campus as well as encourage more graduate students to consider submitting their work for review. There are also cash prizes for second and third place. A digital photograph by Elba Marcell Rivera Rodriguez, titled “Antique Power,” graces the cover of the Hilltop Review and won a $500 prize for best artwork. For the Call for Papers, see the end of this issue or our website: http://www.wmich.edu/gsac/publications.html
A ROSE BY ANY OTHER NAME: STATE CRIMINALITY AND THE LIMITS OF SOCIAL LEARNING THEORY

By Elizabeth A. Bradshaw
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Over the past thirty years, social learning theory has emerged as one of the top criminological theories of the time. Capitalizing on Edwin Sutherland’s differential association theory, social learning theory provided the means for a quantitative assessment of Sutherland’s propositions. Advanced largely by Ronald Akers, the vast majority of research conducted on social learning theory has been limited to self-report studies of adolescents and college students, largely due to convenience. The limitations of the methods developed to empirically test social learning theory combined with the difficulty of gaining access to people in positions of power, has been the primary impediment to testing the theory’s applicability to state and corporate criminality.

In contrast to social learning theory, Sutherland established the relevance of differential association to studying white-collar crimes early on by examining the law violations of corporate executives and CEOs. Yet social learning theory has lost this focus on crimes of the powerful, due in part to methodological restrictions. One suggestion for overcoming this limitation is to begin incorporating qualitative methods and data sources such as autobiographical, biographical and journalistic accounts to more thoroughly investigate the social learning process involved in state and corporate crimes. If a theory claims to be truly comprehensive, as Akers claims social learning theory is, then it must prove itself applicable to all populations, different types of criminal and delinquent behavior as well as more diverse methodologies. If it cannot, then it must be abandoned in favor of more versatile theories of criminal behavior which can adequately account for crimes in the street as well as crimes in the suite.

Differential Association Theory

At a time when psychological and biological theories of crime and delinquency dominated the study of criminology, Sutherland introduced the theory of differential association in the 1939 edition of his popular textbook Criminology. Locating the causes of criminality outside of the individual, differential association maintains that criminality is learned, just as any other behavior. Securing criminology as the domain of sociology, Sutherland had laid the groundwork for an exploration of the social factors which contributed to crime.

Laying out the nine principals of differential association which have been left unchanged since the 1947 edition of Criminology, Sutherland states that:

1. Criminal behavior is learned.
2. Criminal behavior is learned in interaction with other persons in a process of communication.
3. The principal part of learning criminal behavior occurs within intimate personal groups.
4. When criminal behavior is learned, the learning includes (a) techniques of committing the crime, which are sometimes very complicated, sometimes very simple; (b) the specific direction of motives, drives, rationalizations, and attitudes.

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5. The specific direction of motives and drives is learned from definitions of legal codes as favorable or unfavorable.
6. A person becomes delinquent because of an excess of definitions favorable to violation of law over definitions unfavorable to violations of law.
7. Differential association may vary in frequency, duration, priority, and intensity.
8. The process of learning criminal behavior by association with criminal and anticriminal patterns involves all of the mechanisms that are involved in any other learning.
9. While criminal behavior is an expression of general needs and values, it is not explained by those general needs and values, since noncriminal behavior is an expression of the same needs and values. (Sutherland and Cressey 1978:81-2)

One common criticism of differential association theory is that not everyone who comes in contact with criminals becomes criminal themselves. Overlooking the key terms “excess” and “differential,” this contention ignores the dual counteracting forces of definitions both favorable as well as unfavorable to law violation. Resulting from an overabundance of definitions favorable towards law violations compared to unfavorable ones, whether one becomes criminal or not depends on the patterns of behavior to which one is exposed (Sutherland and Cressey 1978).

Other prominent criticisms of differential association theory point to its failure to adequately define and operationalize “an excess of definitions favorable to law violations over definitions unfavorable to violations of law.” However, Sutherland and Cressey make clear that “the same objective definition might be favorable or unfavorable, depending on the relationship between donor and recipient” (1978:90). Furthermore, definitions are not uniformly weighted. Instead, definitions vary in frequency, duration, priority and intensity dependent upon when and in what sequence differential associations take place as well as the prestige of the source of patterning.

A reflection of the positivist orientation of criminology which values quantitative methodology, the most damaging criticism of differential association theory highlights its inability to determine the ratio of learned behavior patterns with any specificity. The impossible task of counting definitions favorable and unfavorable to law violation creates a theory which is ‘virtually unfalsifiable.’ Additionally, other research such as Cressey’s work on embezzlers found that individuals were often unable to determine the persons or agencies from whom they learned their definitions from, not to mention the frequency, intensity and duration of the encounters. More generally, differential association theory had been charged with oversimplifying the process by which criminal behavior is learned (Sutherland and Cressey 1978).

Social Learning Theory

Citing Sutherland’s failure to specify the process through which criminal behavior is learned as the primary impediment to empirical testing of differential association, Burgess and Akers (1966) apply principles from B.F. Skinner’s behavior theory (otherwise known as Skinnerian, operant conditioning or reinforcement theory) in an effort to remedy this issue. Behavior theory “differs from other learning theories in that it restricts itself to the relations between observable, measurable behavior and observable, measurable conditions” (footnote 132). Thus, an integration of behavior theory and differential association provided the means for empirically testing and measuring how crime is learned.

Most generally, behavior theory argues that operant behavior (the voluntary actions of the individual) and respondent behavior (involuntary reflex behavior) is shaped by stimuli...
such as rewards, punishments (positive and negative reinforcers), and the schedule of their distribution. Altering Sutherland’s nine principles of differential association, Burgess and Akers lay out their own seven propositions:

1. Criminal behavior is learned according to the principles of operant conditioning.
2. Criminal behavior is learned both in nonsocial situations that are reinforcing or discriminative and through that social interaction in which the behavior of other persons is reinforcing or discriminative for criminal behavior.
3. The principle part of the learning of criminal behavior occurs in those groups which comprise the individual’s major source of reinforcements.
4. The learning of criminal behavior, including specific techniques, attitudes, and avoidance procedures, is a function of the effective and available reinforcers, and the existing reinforcement contingencies.
5. The specific class of behaviors which are learned and their frequency of occurrence are a function of the reinforcers which are effective and available, and the rules or norms by which these reinforcers are applied.
6. Criminal behavior is a function of norms which are discriminative for criminal behavior, the learning of which takes place when such behavior is more highly reinforced than noncriminal behavior.
7. The strength of criminal behavior is a direct function of the amount, frequency, and probability of its reinforcement. (Burgess and Akers 1966:146)

Perhaps most reminiscent of differential association, the authors make clear that the learning of criminal behavior occurs in the group which is the individual’s primary source of reinforcement. Outside of the home, an adolescent’s primary peer group may serve this function. Comparatively, an adult’s primary peer group outside of the family could potentially be located where the majority of their time is spent; the workplace.

In subsequent revisions of social learning theory, Akers (1977) has included imitation (the act of engaging in behavior after observing that behavior) as part of learning processes as well. Additionally, the concept of neutralizations was also further developed from Cressey’s earlier references to “verbalizations,” “rationalizations,” and “vocabularies of adjustment and motives.” Akers claims that “these techniques function to make the delinquent acts seemed justified and deflect social and self-disapproval” (1977:52). Thus, an act which at one time may have been seen as deviant is justified to one’s self and to others as socially acceptable.

A reflection of its parent discipline psychology, behavior theory most easily lends itself to testing within controlled, experimental environments. As such, most research done on social learning theory has suffered an over reliance on quantitative methodologies and captive, controlled populations. Rendering the concepts of behavior theory applicable outside of the laboratory and into the social world has proved to be an arduous, if not impossible task.

Research on Social Learning Theory

Led by Ronald Akers, social learning theory has persist as one of the central theories within criminology. Much of the research done on the theory has been limited to drug and alcohol use, most frequently amongst adolescents and young adults, due to their concentrated, and largely captive statuses within schools, colleges, and reformatories. The ways in which social learning variables are operationalized and tested remains fairly predictable and uniform despite the growing history of the theory. Frequently, differential peer association, definitions favorable and unfavorable to crime, differential reinforcement and imitation are used as independent variables and paired with a specific deviant or criminal act as the dependent variable (Akers 1998).
The manner in which social learning variables have been measured also remains quite standardized. Take, for example, differential peer association; "typically, it is measured by number or proportion of friends who are involved in delinquent or deviant behavior, although modalities of association are sometimes measured" (Akers 1998:111). Definitions favorable and unfavorable, on the other hand, are most often gauged by evaluating attitudes, beliefs and neutralizing definitions towards a deviant or criminal act. Moreover, peer and/or parental approval or disapproval as well as parental sanctions, rewards and punishments are frequently used to measure differential reinforcement. Unadventurously, most of the research on social learning theory has closely followed these measures.

Akers (1998:112) boasts of the strength and the magnitude of the relationships between peer association variables and deviance throughout the literature. He even goes as far as saying “virtually every study that includes a peer association variable finds it to be significantly and strongly related to delinquency, alcohol and drug use, and abuse, crime, and other forms of deviant behavior” (116). He further asserts that “other than one’s own prior deviant behavior, the best single predictor of the onset of continuance or desistance of criminal and delinquent activity is differential association with conforming or law-violating peers” (116). “This impact of peer association is found so routinely,” Akers bolsters, “that it is no overstatement to say that it is among the most fully substantiated and replicated findings in criminological research” (116). However, within the research on social learning theory, little has been done concerning law violations committed by political and economic elites.

Over the years Akers and his colleagues have gathered a great deal of data in order to test social learning theory. With few notable exceptions, the vast majority of the research using social learning theory has examined alcohol, smoking, drug use and other delinquency among adolescents and college students. Moreover, the methodology used to measure social learning has been limited to surveys and self report data. Due to the difficulties of accessing people in positions of power, there has been no research which examines social learning as it relates to law violations committed by political and corporate elites. Within these parameters, the research on social learning theory has consistently demonstrated the strength of differential peer association (the primary variable measuring differential association theory), while showing weak support for differential reinforcement (the key variable distinguishing social learning theory from differential association theory).

The first fully specified model of social learning theory, the Boys Town Study as it came to be known (since it was funded by the Boys Town Center for the Study of Youth), was conducted by Akers, Krohn, Lanza-Kaduce, and Radosevich (1979) and would prove to be a source of data for years to come. Although their initial hope had been to recruit the sample from incarcerated juveniles, their access had been denied. Instead, the Akers and his team were left to draw their sample from school districts in Iowa and Wisconsin. Drawing from seven school districts, Akers et al. received completed questionnaires from 3,065 students in grades 7-12. The influence of imitation, definitions, differential association, and differential reinforcement variables on alcohol and marijuana use and abuse was examined (Akers 1998). Portraying the normative dimension postulated by Sutherland, the study found that peer norm qualities (proscriptive, prescriptive, permissive, or ambivalent content of its norms) towards alcohol and marijuana use had a stronger impact than both parental and religious norm qualities. In support of Akers’ claims, differential peer association, including peer norm qualities, proved to be the strongest predictor of adolescent drug and drinking behavior.

The Iowa Study provided Akers, Lauer, and Krohn with an opportunity to test social learning theory on adolescent smoking behavior. A longitudinal study of secondary school students including two junior high schools (grades 7-9) and one senior high school (grades 10-12) in Muscatine, Iowa (population 23,000) was conducted. In total, there were 2,194 students who participated the first year, 1,068 students who participated in the study for three
consecutive years and 454 students who participated for five years (Akers 1998). Using a similar measurement of differential peer association as the Boys Town Study, three of the modalities of association were measured by asking, ‘How many of your friends smoke?’ for friends known the longest time (duration), friends most often together with (frequency), and best friends (intensity). The response categories were none, less than half, more than half, and all or almost all. (Akers 1998:213)

Analysis was done using a LISREL model. In the first year sample, differential association variables including association/imitation and differential peer association had the strongest influence on adolescent smoking. Attempting to account for the influence of smoking in the first year of the study on subsequent smoking behavior, Akers concludes that the model was likely incorrectly specified in the three year sample. In the fifth year sample, the strong effect of differential peer association at time three was found.

Assessing the effects of adolescent smoking over a period of time is difficult, however, due to the sporadic and incidental experimentation with smoking for people within this age range. Even so, Akers (1998:232) contends that peer association was found to be the best predictor. In fact, knowing the smoking behavior of one’s best friends in the first year of the study is about as good a predictor of one’s smoking behavior in the fourth and fifth years as knowing one’s own smoking behavior in the first year.

Thus, differential peer association has demonstrated its relevance to adolescent smoking behavior. Additionally, this data was also used by Akers and Lee (1996), whose analysis yielded similar results.

An exception to the use of adolescents as research subjects, Akers, Cochran and Sellers (1989) apply social learning theory to alcohol use among the elderly. The sample consisted of persons 65 years and older living in two retirement communities (N=216 and 516) and two age integrated (N=352 and 326) communities in Florida and New Jersey. However, the authors do not make clear which communities were located in NJ, though it seems that the both age-integrated communities were located in FL. Although the samples from the age-integrated communities were randomly selected, the retirement community samples were not. If it is in fact the case that both of the retirement communities were also located in NJ, this further limits the generalizability of the results.

Differential association variables inquired about spouses definitions of alcohol consumption, family norms, friend’s norms, and differential peer association. In contrast to many of the studies on adolescents, differential reinforcement variables (balance of how drinking positively or negatively affects one’s social relationships, balance of perceive positive and negative effects, and perceived costs versus rewards) seemed to be more influential than the differential association variables. Interestingly, those individuals defined as problem drinkers are more likely than the average drinker to hold negative views towards heavy drinking (Akers 1998). In conclusion Akers et al. find that “…among adolescents use of alcohol is somewhat more socially conditioned and tied to peer contexts and reactions than among the elderly, for whom drinking appears to be sustained more by the effects of the alcohol itself” (1989:634). Thus, differential peer association and drinking seems to be less significant amongst elderly populations.

Exploring the relationship between gang membership and delinquency, Winfree, Mays and Vigil-Backstrom (1994) apply social learning theory to incarcerated delinquents in New Mexico. Boys ages 12 to 19 who were adjudicated and incarcerated in two institutions as well as a female institution were included (N=258). However, since the sample size is small
and only includes incarcerated individuals, the results are not generalizable. The authors found that “the most important social learning variable is the proportion of one’s best friends who are members of youth gangs, or peer gang members” (242). Thus, differential peer association was significantly larger than the effects of other variables. Regardless of age, gender and ethnicity, Winfree et al. find that differential associations and definitions predict individual delinquency.

Durkin, Wolfe, and Clark (2005) apply social learning theory to college students and binge drinking. Defining binge drinking as consuming five or more drinks in one sitting, the definition itself seems to include a great deal of variability depending on the context. Their sample consisted of 1,459 undergraduate students from four different institutions of higher education (two in the Midwest, one in the Mid-Atlantic region and one in the South). It is not specified, however, what types of institutions of higher education they include. For example, 30.7% of the sample resided with family members which may indicate that at least one of the schools is some type of commuter school. The difference in residency could substantially affect peers influence on drinking depending on the social setting (dorm vs. apartment vs. parents house vs. bar). The difference in institution types could also be correlated with socioeconomic status. The sample drawn was furthermore not randomly selected, and is thus not generalizable to the larger population. The authors found that “as predicted, binge drinkers were more likely than other students to associate with peers who also engage in this behavior. In fact, differential peer associations were the best predictor of binge drinking in the regression equation” (266). Again, differential peer association seems to stand out amongst the social learning variables.

Attempting to apply social learning theory to a new terrain of criminality, Skinner and Fream (1997) examine computer crime amongst college students. A multistage sampling procedure was used to obtain a sample of 581 undergraduate students at a major university in a southern state in order to access students in majors which would likely be more familiar with computers. Violations such as using or distributing pirated software, attempting to access someone else’s password or account, altering someone’s computer information without their permission or knowledge, or writing or using a program to destroy someone else’s computer data, were included as measures of computer crime. Skinner and Fream found that the two main social learning variables in this study, differential association and definitions, consistently influence all types of reported computer offenses. Differentially associating with peers who participate in computer crimes is the strongest predictor of piracy and the computer crime index. Definitions associated with adherence to the laws against these acts are significantly and negatively related to all types of computer crime and are the most important predictor of illegal access to browse. (510)

Once again, differential association with peers emerges as a significant variable. Furthermore, definitions unfavorable to computer crime law violations (including the law itself) being the strongest predictor, stresses the importance of recognizing the context in which these definitions are formed.

In “Social Learning and Structural Factors in Adolescent Substance Use” Lee, Akers, and Borg (2004) address a gap in the literature on the impact of social structure on social learning. Conceptualizing social structure as “… an arrangement of sets and schedules of reinforcement contingencies and other behavior variables” (17), the authors continue to neglect many of the more macro/institutional influences on social learning such as political economy, religion and education. Instead, Lee et al. include socioeconomic status, age, gender, family structure and community size as structural variables. They postulate that social
learning mediates the relationship between the structural variables and substance use amongst adolescents. Adding on the structural dimension to the Boys Town study conducted in 1979, the data is twenty-five years old and the lapse of time between collection and analysis likely decreases the relevance of the findings. Unfortunately, most of the relationships between the structural variables and substance use as mediated by social learning variables turned out to relatively weak. Although Lee et al. continuously claim that their hypotheses are confirmed, the relationships are quite week and social learning variables do not mediate a substantial portion of the relationship between structural factors and adolescent substance use.

Despite Akers’ claims of success for social learning theory, its application has been incredibly limited and its findings consistent in only one area: differential peer association. The core of differential association theory, associations with peers who hold favorable or unfavorable definitions to law violation is consistently the most significant predictor of crime and deviance out of all of the social learning variables. Ironically, this does not demonstrate the strength of social learning theory, but rather differential association theory. Differential reinforcement, which is perhaps the most quintessential concept setting social learning theory apart from differential association, only occasionally yields significant relationships to crime. If support is most consistently found for differential association variables rather than the others, then why does Akers’ social learning theory continue to be classified as distinct from Sutherland’s differential association theory? As long as research evidence continues to show support for elements of Sutherland’s theory rather than Akers’, then a return to the principles of differential association is needed.

Social Learning/Differential Association Theory and State Crime

With the exception of his social structure and social learning theory, Akers’ conceptualization of social learning theory has narrowly emphasized the relation of the individual to the group over the relevance of the group to the individual. Two sides of the same coin, equivalent attention must be paid to both the micro and the macro forces at work in the social learning process. While differential association is clearly concerned with the processes by which an individual comes to participate in crime, it also draws attention to the social context in which the behavior is learned; an element often neglected in the research on social learning theory.

It is impossible to examine an individual’s exposure to definitions favorable or unfavorable to law violations without granting attention to the social situation and differential organization in which the patterns take place. Stressing the necessity of analysis at the group level, Sutherland asserts that the important general point is that in a multigroup type of social organization, alternative and inconsistent standards of conduct are possessed by various groups, so that an individual who is a member of one group learns to accept the importance of success, while an individual in another group learns the importance of success and to achieve it by illegal means. (1978:94).

Although the individual may be central to Sutherland’s theory, the group context which the person is exposed to weighs heavily on criminality. Thus, criminality cannot be evaluated without assessing the individuals’ relationship and interaction with the group.

Demonstrating the significance of social organization, one of Sutherland’s earliest applications of the theory seems to illustrate its congruency with an organizational analysis of criminality. Integrating his concept of white-collar crime with differential association, Sutherland’s case study of the seventy largest manufacturing, mining, and mercantile corporations
demonstrates the applicability of differential association to organizational crime. He main-
tains that “white collar crime may be defined as a crime committed by a person of respectabil-
ity and high social status in the course of his occupation” (1983:7). Stressing the need to
study crimes committed by members of the upper socioeconomic class, the concept of white-
collar crime drew attention to the interlocking concepts of power and status which was absent
in criminological theories and research at the time.

It is unclear, however, why social learning theory did not embrace this orientation as well. Shedding light onto the reluctance of criminologists to follow in Sutherland’s footsteps, Friedrichs (2000) explains that

In part, this relative lack of attention can be attributed to the challenge of
gaining access to the politically powerful, their ability to conceal many of
their crimes, the complexity and broad scope of the illegalities involved, and
some ideological resistance to regarding government officials as criminal.

The problem of accessibility is one of the greatest limitations to studying crimes of the power-
ful. However, these difficulties are further compacted by the methods developed to empirical-
ly test social learning theory. The feasibility of administering a self-report questionnaire to a
random sample of corporate executives or government officials involved in criminal activities
is unrealistic. Therefore, social learning theory must move beyond its positivist orientation
and embrace a more qualitative approach.

Interestingly, Akers’ early writings on social learning theory illustrated its potential
for studying white collar and political crimes. Violations of law which aim to alter existing
public policy or power relations are defined as political crime (Minor 1975 in Akers
1977:238). In addition to those who which to alter the status quo from outside the political
system, political crimes “…may also be committed by people in governmental or other official
positions in the attempt to defend the status quo or change the system toward the direction
they want” (Akers 1977:238).

Akers (1977) only began to scratch the surface by conceptualizing the Watergate
scandal during the Nixon administration as a political crime and offering a social learning ex-
planation for it. Citing presidential tape transcripts and congressional testimony as evidence
of an organized conspiracy within the White House, Akers acknowledges the potential for
other types of data in testing social learning theory. By exploring the potential and actual re-
wards and costs of participation in the Watergate scandal as well as neutralizing definitions,
Akers reconstructs the social context in which the crimes took place. His analysis incorpo-
rates structural, organizational and interactional aspects of the scandal, a synthesis absent from
his subsequent research.

An Integrated Analysis

One form of white-collar crime, known as state-corporate crime, is the product of
illegal or socially injurious actions that result from the common pursuits of one or more insti-
tutions of political governance in coordination with one or more institutions of economic pro-
duction and distribution (Michalowski and Kramer 2006: 21). Providing a theoretical frame-
work in which to unite the interactional, organizational and institutional levels of analyses
with catalysts for action (motivation, opportunity and control), Michalowski and Kramer’s
(2006) integrated theoretical model of state-corporate crime is applicable to a wide variety of
white-collar crimes. Recognizing the reciprocal relationship between the interactional, organi-
zational and institutional contexts which influence crime, their model helps to address many of
the deficiencies of social learning and differential association theory by conceptually linking
the different levels of analysis. As they illustrate, and actions of the individuals who occupy positions in those units are conditioned by the requirements of the positions they hold and the procedures of the organization, on the other. Differential association, by focusing on the social relations that give meaning to individual experience, directs us to examine the symbolic reality derived from social interaction within bounded organizational niches. (2006:24)

The organizational norms, values and standard operating procedures must be learned by individuals who occupy organizational positions. Learning these definitions is essential to effective organizational socialization and must be adopted, at least tentatively, by individuals who wish to succeed. Thus, social learning/differential association theory can help to explain organizational socialization by showing how individuals take on the norms and beliefs of the organization.

After surveying the landscape of state-corporate crime research, Kauzlarich and Matthews (2006) identify a disparity at the interactional level of analysis. Research on state crime, corporate crime and state-corporate crime has tended to most often focus on the organizational and institutional levels of analysis, and has overlooked the significance of the interactional level. Citing the need to design studies for more fully understanding state-corporate crime at this level, they clarify that

Here we are referring to the ways in which the persons who occupy positions within state and corporate structures conceptualize their relationship to their work and their organization and how those individuals who are hurt by state-corporate crime come to grips with their victimization. (243-4)

To achieve this goal, they propose conducting qualitative interviews. Although this methodology might excellently capture the experience of victims of state-corporate crimes, it is not as well suited to understanding the perpetrators.

An Interactional Analysis of the Bush Administration and the Illegal Invasion and Occupation of Iraq

A perusal of recent state crime and state-corporate crime research readily reveals a repeat offender: the Bush administration. In addition to their many other illegal activities (human rights abuses at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay, illegal wiretapping, firing federal prosecuting attorneys, and creating false pretenses for war, amongst others), the Bush administration has been especially criticized for its criminality concerning the war in Iraq. As shown by Kramer and Michalowski (2005), the United States’ invasion and occupation of Iraq broke multiple national and international laws. A crime in progress, the illegal invasion and occupation was the end product of differential peer association with criminal co-workers. On a regular basis there continues to be human rights violations (both documented and undocumented) of monumental proportions as a result of the decision to invade Iraq. Although many of these abuses have been well substantiated within the literature (Kramer and Michalowski 2005; Kramer, Michalowski, and Rothe 2005; Whyte 2007; Welch 2009) as well as within the mainstream media, little attention has been paid to the process by which Bush administration officials came to actively or complicity participate in the illegal invasion and occupation of Iraq. Through a qualitative social learning/differential association analysis of the deviant interactions between members of the Bush administration, a better understanding of the learning process involved in state criminality will come about.

As noted by Friedrichs (2000), approaching individuals in politically powerful positions about their deviant or criminal behavior is a near impossible task. Just as Akers relied on
samples of juveniles out of convenience, state crime researchers are forced to rely on secondary sources to provide data. Conducting a qualitative interview or administering a self-report questionnaire to top officials within the Bush administration is an unlikely possibility. In order to validate any individual level account of differential peer association within the Bush administration, it is necessary to triangulate multiple sources of data. Drawing on autobiographical, biographical and journalistic accounts of interactions within the administration, it may be possible to get a sense of the definitions favorable and unfavorable to law violation.

Autobiographical accounts of experiences within the administration are the next best source to face-to-face interviews. Even though researchers are unable to ask the questions they want and author bias is a legitimate concern, a myriad of information about personal and organizational interactions is often revealed from a written first-hand account. For example, former National Security Council counterterrorism czar Richard Clarke’s autobiography Against All Enemies provides a scathing critique of his experience within the Bush administration. In other accounts (see also Clarke’s testimony to the 9/11 Commission), Clarke has made clear that loyalty to the administration is an inherent expectation that comes with any White House position; hence his book was not published until after his tenure. Additionally, former Secretary of Treasury Paul O’Neill has also published an account of his experiences titled The Price of Loyalty: George W. Bush, the White House, and the Education of Paul O’Neill in which he argues that the administration was looking for a way to invade Iraq as early as January 2001. Former CIA director George Tenet also wrote a book titled At the Center of the Storm in which he also suggests that administration officials were searching for a reason to go to war with Iraq even before September 11th. Autobiographies such as these can provide an inside look as to how officials became exposed to an excess of definitions favorable to violating national and international law in order to enter Iraq.

Biographical and journalistic descriptions can also shed light onto the interactions of Bush administration officials. Providing a detailed account of Bush’s inner circle, Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush’s War Cabinet allows for a consideration of the long-standing relationships between many top administration officials. Another account which might help to explain the influence of Karl Rove on the Bush presidency is Bush’s Brain: How Karl Rove Made George W. Bush Presidential by James Moore and Wayne Slater. These are only a few of the many fruitful sources of information on the inner workings of the Bush administration that can be used to gain a better understanding of the processes by which government officials come to learn criminal behavior.

Documents from government think tanks and other extra-governmental organizations could also contribute to a greater understanding of the ideological definitions used to justify and rationalize policy. The Project for a New American Century (PNAC), for example, is a neoconservative think tank which has provided support for many of the Bush Administration’s policies. Believing that American leadership, backed by military predominance, is needed throughout the world, PNAC aims to secure America’s global hegemonic position for years to come. PNAC regularly issues briefs, research papers, advocacy journalism, conferences, and seminars to educate government officials and citizens about their perspectives.

In September 2000, PNAC released a report titled Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategies, Forces and Resources for a New Century. Based off of a Defense Policy Guidelines of 1992 authored by then Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, Rebuilding America’s Defenses reflects many of the ideological beliefs of prominent neoconservative Bush administration officials including I. Louis “Scooter” Libby and Paul Wolfowitz, who were contributing project participants. Reports such as these can provide a better understanding of the specific definitions used to justify policy and action towards Iraq.

A more traditional source of data for state crime researchers, government documents are a tried and true source of information about the interactions of government officials that
nearly every case study of state criminality relies on. Presidential daily briefings, presidential signing statements, memos, emails (if they have not been deleted), as well as reports and testimonies from congressional investigations are crucial sources for understanding how officials come to learn illegal behavior often through seemingly legal practices.

Unexplored territory by researchers interested in state crime is face-to-face interviews with government officials. Unwilling to cross disciplinary boundaries, many social scientists have yet to explore this point of access to people in positions of political power. Journalists regularly interview and interact with government officials, often leading to groundbreaking stories about government corruption and scandals. If state crime researchers ever hope to be on the forefront of understanding crimes of the politically powerful then they must adopt journalistic methodologies. Adopting these approaches would also help to expose the public to definitions of criminality which include the crimes of the powerful. Until then, social scientific knowledge about the interactions and definitions of the political class will be stymied.

By triangulating many of these sources it will be possible to get a contextual sense of the definitions which were favorable to illegally invading and occupying Iraq. Searching for converging themes and links between officials might help to reveal the frequency, intensity and duration of these definitions favorable to law violations. Rather than focusing on the quantifiable aspects of differential association, a more contextual approach which explains not only the content of definitions, but the process by which they come to be accepted, is necessary.

**Conclusion**

Emerging from the difficulties of empirically measuring differential association theory, social learning theory has provided valuable contributions to criminology. Allowing for a quantifiable evaluation of the principles of differential association, social learning theory has been most often limitedly applied to convenience samples of adolescents and college students. If social learning theory is to be regarded as capable of explaining all types of criminal behavior, then its relevance must be tested amongst all populations, for different types of crime and deviance.

Thus far, social learning theory has been unable to demonstrate its applicability to crimes of the powerful as well as more traditional crimes. As Akers (1998) makes clear, “This impact of peer association is found so routinely that it is no overstatement to say that it is among the most fully substantiated and replicated findings in criminological research” (116). Much of the research done on social learning theory similarly echoes Akers contention. However, the explanatory power of differential peer association shows immense support for elements of Sutherland’s theory, not Akers’. If factors such as peer association and definitions reveal significance where reinforcement and imitation do not, then credence must be given to differential association, not social learning theory. Until more support is demonstrated for variables unique to social learning theory, a return to differential association theory, and the methodology it allows for, is needed.

As Kauzlarich and Matthews (2006) note, there has yet to be much research done at the interactional level of analysis using differential association theory within the hybrid state-corporate crime, as well as within its components state crime and corporate crime. Due to the difficulty in accessing politically powerful people, second hand sources of data are most easily obtainable. Triangulating autobiographical, biographical and journalistic accounts from people in positions of power with documents from governmental and extra-governmental organizations will help to produce a more valid and reliable contextual understanding of the learning contextual understanding of the learning process involved in state and corporate criminality.

Finally, raising issues of power and control within social science research, the over
reliance on vulnerable, captive and controlled populations does not show the strength of our research but rather the limitations of our methods. Moreover, restricting criminological inquires to state defined definitions of law violations facilitate the discipline’s dependence on the most vulnerable populations in society to gain a better understanding of criminality. If a theory claims to be truly comprehensive, then it must be able to explain all varieties of crime. We must therefore move beyond convenience samples of adolescents and college students as our objects of inquiry and critically examine the applicability of mainstream criminological theories to all forms of deviance displayed by all populations, regardless of social status.

References

ACADEMIC ACHIEVEMENT OF CHILDREN IN SINGLE PARENT HOMES: A CRITICAL REVIEW

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In the United States, almost half of all children by age 15 will have lived in a single-parent family (Andersson, 2002). The percentage of single-parent families has tripled in the past 50 years and has continued to be larger among Latino and African American families when compared to the general population (US Census, 2010). In 2000, 27% of all U.S. children were living in single-parent families; among African American children, 53% were living with only one parent (Sigle-Rushton & McLanahan, 2004). The vast majority of these single-parent homes are headed by women. DeBell (2008) reported that single-father homes represent only 7% of the total single-parent homes in the country.

Many authors have documented differences between children raised in father-absent (FA) and father-present (FP) homes (Balcom 1998; Biller 1970; Chapman, 1977; Daniels, 1986; Downey, 1994; Downey, Ainsworth-Darnell, & Durfue, 1998; Fry & Scher, 1984; Milne, Rosenthal & Ginsburg, 1986). Research has shown that FA children graduate from high school and attend college at a lower rate (Sigle-Rushton & McLanahan, 2004), perform worse on standardized tests (Bain, Boersma, & Chapman, 1983), and are more likely to use drugs (Mandara & Murry, 2006) than children from FP homes. Research has also shown that growing up without a father seems to have a greater negative effect on boys as compared to girls (Mandara & Murry; Sigle-Rushton & McLanahan, 2004).

A few researchers have focused on resiliency (Hunter & Chandler, 1999; Rutter, 1990) and the strengths of single parent (SP) homes (Amato, 1987; Hanson, 1986; Murry, Bynumm, Brody, Willert, & Stephens, 2001; Richards & Schmiege, 1993; Shaw, 1991). Hertes and Allen (2001) created a scale for measuring resiliency in youth and identified commonalities in SP homes where the children achieve academic success. For many years, theorists have suggested a greater emphasis on strength based research of families of all types (for a review see Giblin, 1996).

Despite calls for a greater emphasis on discovering strengths, the majority of research concerning single parenthood has focused on the disadvantages faced by children raised in the absence of their father. However, understanding the disadvantages focuses only on half of the issue: the other half is to understand the strengths and resiliency factors exhibited by children raised in a FA home. Although children raised in a home where a father is present graduate from high school and attend college at much higher rates than children raised in a fatherless home, nearly 70% of children from FA homes do graduate from high school and 50% of them attend college (Sigle-Rushton & McLanahan, 2004). There is a great need for research focusing on the strengths of these academic achievers from FA homes.

This paper will summarize current research, discuss problems with that body of work, and suggest areas for further study. Most of the studies reviewed are from the past twenty years and most are concerned with the academic achievement of children raised in SP homes. Although there is a large body of research, many studies have been flawed by similar factors and by the nature of the difficulty in measuring intrapersonal issues. Because there are flaws, there are many opportunities for further research and areas for growth.
Academic Achievement of Children in Single Parent Homes

Relevant Literature

There is a large body of research examining the dynamics of single-parent homes (for a summary see McLanahan & Sandefur, 1994). Studies relating to the academic achievement of children from single-parent homes are the main focus of this paper. Findings will be also presented concerning drug use and employment among young African American adults who were raised in single-parent homes. Two studies regarding adolescent resilience are summarized and a method for measuring youth resiliency is discussed. Finally, two conceptual frameworks are presented as well as a comparison of single-parent households from 11 countries leading to policy implications and suggestions for further research.

General Trends

Many studies have documented the challenges faced by single parents and the disadvantages of their children relative to children raised in two-parent households. Although some studies have been inconclusive, a large majority of studies reviewed show that children from single-parent (SP) homes score lower on tests of cognitive functioning and standardized tests, receive lower GPAs, and complete fewer years of school when compared to children from two-parent (TP) homes (Bain, Boersma, & Chapman 1983; Balcom 1998; Biller 1970; Chapman, 1977; Daniels, 1986; Downey, Ainsworth-Darnell, & Durfur, 1998; Fry & Scher, 1984; Mandara & Murray 2006; Milne, Rosenthal, & Ginsburg, 1986; Sigle-Rushton & McLanahan 2004). Even when controlling for economic and racial differences of the family, children from two-parent households outperform children from one-parent households across a variety of measures (Downey, 1994; Kim, 2004; Krein & Beller, 1988; Mulkey, Crain, & Harrington, 1992; Teachman, 1987). McLanahan and Sandefur (1994) summarize the research by writing:

Children who grow up in a household with only one biological parent are worse off, on average, than children who grow up in a household with both of their biological parents, regardless of the parents’ race or educational background, regardless of whether the parents are married when the child is born, and regardless of whether the resident parent remarries. (p. 1)

Father absence

Early research of single-parent homes focused on “father absence” (FA). The interest in FA homes was due to the large number of single-parent female headed households and to the influence of psychoanalytic theories that called attention to the importance of the presence of a father in the development of a child’s personality (Hetherington et al., 1983). In a 1970 literature review, Biller reported evidence showing a correlation between FA and juvenile delinquency. He also showed evidence that FA boys have more difficulty forming peer relationships and long lasting heterosexual relationships as compared to boys raised in a father present (FP) home. Chapman (1977) reported lower SAT scores among FA males compared to FP males, and Bain et al. (1983) showed that FA third graders performed significantly worse in reading achievement and scored lower in a measure of internal locus of control than FP children. In 1984, Fry and Scher found evidence suggesting poor ego development, low motivation, and an external locus of control among ten year-old children from FA homes. Daniels (1986), in her study of young African American men, discovered that the length of father absence from the home was the strongest predictor of future employment for the young men. In a more recent study, Mandara and Murray (2006) reported that boys raised in FA homes were much more likely to use drugs than were boys from FP homes.
In the 1980’s researchers began looking at SP households from a systems perspective and tried to determine exactly why children from SP homes were disadvantaged relative to children from two-parent (TP) homes. Milne et al. (1986) found parental expectations, number of books in the home, and income to be important predictors of academic achievement of SP children. In 1987, Teachman discovered four important “educational resources that play a significant role in determining level of schooling for both men and women” (p. 553-554). Downey (1994) built upon Teachman’s study and identified 11 key educationally related objects – a place to study, a daily newspaper, regular magazine, encyclopedia, atlas, dictionary, typewriter, computer, more than 50 books, calculator, one’s own room – whose presence or absence were predictors of children’s future academic achievement. Krein and Beller (1988) examined differences of the effect of living in a SP home on educational achievement by gender and length of parent absence. They found that the negative effects of living in a SP family increase with the total time spent in an SP home, and that the negative effects are greater for boys than girls. Mulkey et al. (1992) and Kim (2004) both reported that while family income is important, other factors have a greater influence on academic performance. They suggested that parental expectations, family size, and the quality of the parent-child relationship are stronger predictors of future academic success than income. Implications for future research will be discussed later in this paper.

**Boys vs. girls**

A number of studies have documented differences between boys and girls raised in SP homes. In their review, Hetherington et al. (1983) concluded that “the intellectual and social development of males may be seen as more adversely affected by living in one-parent homes than that of females from similar family circumstances” (p. 271). Studies published since Hetherington et al. have reported similar results. Fry and Scher (1984) discovered that the achievement motivation scores of boys declined significantly over a five year period of living in a SP home while the scores of girls in similar home environments remained stable. In 1998, Krein and Beller documented a significant negative effect of the number of years spent in a SP home on educational attainment for all groups except Caucasian women. According to their findings, Caucasian males spending 18 years in a SP home complete 1.7 fewer years of school as compared to Caucasian males spending 18 years in a TP home. African American males complete 1.26 fewer years of school, and African American females complete 0.73 fewer years of school when compared to their counterparts living in TP homes. For Caucasian women, the difference was only 0.03 years. In their recent study of African American adolescents, Mandara and Murray (2006) found FA to be a significant risk factor for drug use among boys but not among girls. They reported that African American boys in a FA home were almost six times more likely to use drugs than African American boys in a FP home, while the risk factor for African American girls was the same regardless of the number of parents in the home. Uncovering a reason to explain the greater negative effect of family disruption on boys compared to girls is a compelling future line of research and will be discussed later.

**Resilience and strengths**

Research regarding adolescent resilience and strengths of SP families was also reviewed. Basic inquiries into resilience have attempted to answer the question of why some
individuals from high-risk backgrounds thrive while others fail (for a summary see Rutter, 1990). Researchers have had difficulty defining and measuring resiliency and agreeing on specific individual characteristics of resilient individuals. In 2001, Hurtes and Allen successfully validated a self-reporting instrument designed to measure resiliency in youth know as the Resiliency Attitudes and Skills Profile (RASP). They determined that the RASP possessed an acceptable level of construct validity and could be used to measure resilience as a unique construct. Hurtes and Allen’s suggestion that the RASP needs to be further tested across a variety of youth subcultures will be discussed later. In addition to resiliency scales, some researchers have explored the strengths of SP homes (Amato, 1987; Hanson, 1986; Richards & Schmiege, 1993; Shaw, 1991). These researchers have identified strong parent-child communication, a network of community support, and high levels of adolescent autonomy as strengths of SP homes. The authors’ suggestions for further research will be discussed later.

Conceptual Ideas

While most research concerning the effects of single parenthood has been quantitative, there have been some qualitative and conceptual ideas presented. Drawing on his clinical experience, Balcom (1998) stated, “many adult sons abandoned by their fathers have difficulty developing and sustaining self-esteem, forming lasting emotional attachments, recognizing their feelings, or being expressive with their adult partners and children” (p. 283). He suggests father-son therapy sessions as a way healing the pain felt by both men. Downey et al. (1998) compared individualistic versus structuralist perspectives of gender as related to SP homes. Whereas individualistic theorists view the gender of the parent as necessarily important for the parent-child relationship because of immutable biological sex differences between men and women, structuralists claim that sex roles are not immutable inborn traits but rather evolve as a result of the different social situations faced by men and women. Downey et al. argued the structuralist position by showing that men and women behave similarly in the role of a single parent. Van Laar and Sidanius (2001) used social dominance theory to explain the poor academic performance of SP children relative to TP children. They suggested that SP homes have low social status and therefore possess fewer economic resources and face greater personal and institutional discrimination compared to TP homes. Van Laar and Sidanius also discussed the tendency of members of low-status groups to behave in ways that are consistent with and help to confirm negative stereotypes. Similar ideas were presented by Hetherington et al. (1983) regarding teacher evaluations and the tendency of educators to reward students for conforming to expectations. Hetherington et al. suggested that when students who are expected to perform poorly actually perform well, they receive negative attention from their teachers and are pressured to lower their academic performance. Lastly, Pong et al. (2003) compared the achievement gap between children in SP versus TP homes across 11 countries. They found that the United States had the largest gap between the academic achievement of children from SP versus children from TP homes. The authors concluded that national policies have offset the negative outcomes of single parenthood in other countries and that a more generous United States welfare policy could result in greater equality among all children.
Discussion

Research Limitations

Several problems have hindered research regarding single-parent families. Researchers have paid little attention to cultural factors or variations in life experiences and have instead focused mostly on White, middle-class individuals. Methodological issues, poor criterion definition, and the presence of confounding variables have flawed certain studies. Sampling issues have also limited the reliability and representativeness of certain results. Finally, statistical methods have been questioned in multiple studies and some authors have treated their findings as cause and effect rather than simple correlations between variables.

The majority of research about SP families has been conducted on White, middle-class families (for exceptions see Murry et al., 2001; or Toth & Xiaohe, 1999). This trend is disturbing because 52% of SP families are non-White and only 21% are considered middle-class (DeBell, 2008). When researchers have looked at non-White populations they have tended to focus disproportionately on low-income African American families. Although well intended, the over focus on low-income African American families leaves Latino, Asian, and other ethnic minority populations almost completely ignored. A broader sampling of families which more closely represents the true demographics of the United States is necessary.

Research about SP families has been flawed by methodological issues and a difficulty in defining certain factors. Researchers have often failed to identify the reason for parental separation. When the reasons have been accounted for, evidence has shown marital breakdown to be associated with the most negative outcome and parental death to be associated with the least negative outcome (Marsiglio, Amato, Day, & Lamb, 2000). The age of the child at the time of familial disruption and the length of disruption were often omitted in many of the studies reviewed. Finally, the presence of other adults in the house, or factors such as gender, age, and the developmental status of the child were rarely considered.

Sampling and statistical procedures used in many studies have contributed to problems in interpreting and generalizing results. In many studies, participants were selected based on their attendance at mental health clinics. These individuals may not be representative of the range of single parents because not all single parents seek clinical help. Samples of SP families taken at different times may distort or misrepresent the data. Another limitation in the existing literature is the overuse of comparing group means. Theorists have become more aware of the variability in SP families and acknowledge that comparisons of simple statistics such as mean GPA “have yielded little information on the intrafamilial and extrafamilial conditions that influence the impact of divorce on children” (Hetherington et al., 1983, p. 209). Finally, Marsiglio et al. (2000) discussed the prevalence and problem of shared-method variance in many studies of SP households:

Shared-method variance is present whenever researchers use the same source (fathers, mothers, children, teachers, or observers) for data on independent and dependent variables. This occurs, for example, when children report on (a) the amount of time spent with their fathers and (b) their self-esteem. Under these circumstances, shared-method variance tends to increase the correlation between variables, resulting in an overestimate of the true association. (p. 1179)
Although many researchers have studied SP households, very few have done so in a scientifically sound manner. Problems with sampling, difficulty isolating variables, and statistical issues have flawed many investigations. Perhaps most damaging to this body of research is the relative lack of ethnic and racial diversity among the individuals studied. Future proposals should attempt to answer these criticisms.

Suggestions for Future Research

There are several opportunities for future studies to add to the body of knowledge regarding single-parent homes and the effects of single parenthood on children’s academic achievement and educational attainment.

Past researchers have discussed the need for more longitudinal studies of disrupted families. Hetherington et al. (1983) has suggested the possibility that children in SP families initially suffer but then adjust and adapt over time; this process could only be documented with longitudinal research. Marsiglio et al. (2000) discussed the importance of realizing how parenthood may change a person over time and suggested studying the subjective experience of men as they become fathers. Balcom (1998) believed longitudinal research should be conducted that follows boys from FA homes as they grow into adults and become fathers themselves. Certainly many opportunities exist for more longitudinal research regarding family disruption and the effects on children.

Another area for further study is determining why single parenthood seems to be associated with greater negative outcomes for boys as compared to girls. Although many researchers have documented differences in academic performance between boys and girls raised in SP homes, very few have attempted to discover reasons behind the performance discrepancies. McLanahan and Sandefur (1994) presented a theory of male adjustment to divorce that claims that boys express their emotional pain in a more overt way than girls express emotional pain. They suggest that boys’ reaction to familial disruption most often includes defiant behavior while the response of girls is marked by depression and mood changes. More studies are needed which attempt to identify those factors in SP homes that result in poorer academic achievement among boys as compared to girls.

Very few researchers have looked at strengths and resilience of individuals from SP families. Richards and Schmiece (1993) and Murry et al. (2001) have called attention to the fact that despite many disadvantages, SP families often thrive. Hetherington et al. (1983) noted that several studies have reported childhood loss of a father in the family histories of gifted, extraordinary, and highly creative individuals. Further inquiry is needed to determine if there is any relationship between familial disruption and the development of creative thought. Lastly, the RASP, designed by Hurtes and Allen (2001) is a tool that has proven to be valid in measuring resilience among White, middle-class youth. As the authors suggest, the RASP needs to be further tested with non-White ethnic and racial groups and with non middle class youth. Further validation of the RASP is an important and tangible line of future research.

Finally, most researchers have investigated White, middle-class individuals and largely ignored Latinos, Asians, and other ethnic minority groups in the United States. Studies which have considered African Americans have disproportionately studied lower income families. Greater emphasis must be given to the study of non-White individuals. Concerning studies of African American SP families, attention must be paid to SP families who are not low income. As racial and ethnic diversity continues to grow in the United States, the need to understand all people becomes more important.
Conclusion

Single parenthood continues to be a reality for many adults and almost 50% of children born today will spend significant time living with only one parent. A large body of research has documented the disadvantages of children raised in single-parent homes relative to children raised in two-parent homes. Lower high school graduation rates, lower GPAs, and greater risk for drug abuse are only some of the negative outcomes associated with growing up in a single-parent home. However, despite the statistics, many children from single-parent homes do attain academic success. Unfortunately, relatively few researchers have followed Otto (1963) in researching family strengths. Scholars can help influence public policy by understanding factors which are associated with academic achievement and promote training, education, and advocacy programs which support single parents and their children.

As a discipline, Counseling Psychology has been among the leaders regarding issues of diversity and inclusion. Expanding our understanding of single-parent families beyond White, middle-class populations is crucial if we are to have significant impact on policy and be able to meet the needs of all people. Furthermore, as more and more gay men and lesbian women become parents there is a need to expand our research into the dynamics of single-parent families headed by sexual minorities. Counseling Psychology cannot afford to rest on its past achievements regarding diversity and inclusion, we must continue to expand our thinking and reach out to underserved individuals and families.

In addition to expanding the sphere of research beyond White, middle-class heterosexuals, the field must do more to understand the strengths exhibited by single parents and their children. Resilience as a basic construct can be much better understood as well as the parenting skills necessary to foster academic success. My own experience of living in a single-parent, first-generation US born, female-headed household was one filled with uncertainty at times regarding finances, my mother’s emotional availability, and the social stigma of not knowing my biological father. Despite the challenges, my mother successfully completed college, provided me with key educational resources, and set an academic example to follow. She planted a belief in me that with preparation, organization, and diligence, academic achievement is inevitable. Identifying the intuitive skills my mother, and other successful single parents have, and sharing those best practices with single parents in need can help to close the academic achievement gap of children from single-parent homes.

This paper has been a review and critique of research from the past few decades regarding single parenthood. While the economic and social costs of single parenthood have been well documented, the strengths of single parents and their children have been largely overlooked. Multiple areas for future inquiry have been suggested and it is the hope of this author that science can influence policy to ensure all children receive equitable resources and are given the opportunity to thrive.

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The Hilltop Review, Spring 2011
TRUST, BUT VERIFY: REAGAN, GORBACHEV, AND THE INF TREATY

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“Every man, woman and child lives under a nuclear sword of Damocles, hanging by the slenderest of threads, capable of being cut at any moment by miscalculation, or accident, or by madness. The weapons of war must be abolished before they abolish us.”
- John F. Kennedy

On December 8, 1987, President Ronald Reagan and General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev signed the Intermediate Nuclear Force Treaty (INF), which aimed to eliminate short and medium range nuclear weapons from their respective national arsenals. It was a small but significant step in the long process of easing Cold War tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union. However, when Reagan first took office in 1981, this outcome was far from inevitable, and by the end of 1983, relations between the United States and the Soviet Union were as fragile as they had been since the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. The potential for brinksmanship endured well into Reagan’s tenure, despite previous efforts at détente by both governments. The great success of Reagan and Gorbachev was their agreement in Geneva, Switzerland in 1985 to put aside all other policy issues and agree that, since it cannot be won, nuclear war must never be fought. This may see to be an obvious conclusion, but to put such an agreement into practice required eliminating the means of deterrence.

This paper is a discussion of the relationship between the deployment of two types of intermediate (medium) range missile systems in Europe, how leaders on both sides viewed the situation, and how the potential use of such weapons affected superpower relations during the last decade of the Cold War. These events led to the signing of the INF Treaty. I argue that the INF Treaty represents an agreement that the prospect of intercontinental annihilation trumps the reality of regional provocation. There is no need for short or medium range nuclear weapons when mutually assured destruction (MAD) is the foundation of a global nuclear peace. As a result, both leaders agreed to a verification schedule backed up by the potential for unilateral nuclear action if the treaty was violated. By eliminating an entire class of nuclear weapons, and significantly reducing the total number in existence, Reagan and Gorbachev decreased the likelihood of a nuclear domino effect exchange whereby a tactical or medium-range attack might lead to full-scale retaliation. In a modern retelling of the old paradox, to secure lawful enforcement of the INF Treaty, which aimed at preventing war, both nations reserved the right of mutually assured destruction.

The most recent Cold War scholarship tends to portray the positive personal relationship between Reagan and Gorbachev as key to building trust and understanding between the US and Soviet governments. Gorbachev is further singled out for his role in the partnership for two reasons. The first reason is chronological. Gorbachev was the last leader of the Soviet Union, and his time in office began after Reagan had already been elected for the second time. By this reasoning, Gorbachev is the difference maker because change happened on his watch. Similar arguments have been made about Reagan, too. This line of thinking is based on the idea that Reagan and Gorbachev were simply in office at the culmination of decades’

worth of policies on both sides, the totality of which initiated a shockingly abrupt end to the Cold War under Gorbachev, and the break-up of the former Soviet empire less three years after Reagan’s successor George H. W. Bush took office.2

The second reason Gorbachev’s contribution is emphasized is more complicated to isolate, but is more or less a result of Gorbachev’s personality, his intellect, and an openness to change. In describing the atmosphere just after the Geneva Summit, preeminent Cold War historian John Lewis Gaddis wrote:

Two years earlier [Yuri] Andropov had thought Reagan capable of launching a surprise attack. Now Gorbachev felt confident that the United States would never do this. Reagan’s position had not changed: he had always asked Soviet leaders to ‘trust me.’ After meeting Reagan, Gorbachev began to do so.” 3

By arguing that Reagan “had not changed,” Gaddis implicitly makes the case that Gorbachev was the only one of the two who could break the deadlock of mutual antagonism. On Gorbachev as an individual, Gaddis wrote, “He chose love over fear, violating Machiavelli’s advice for princes and thereby ensuring that he ceased to be one. It made little sense in traditional geopolitical terms. But it did make him the most deserving recipient ever of the Nobel Peace Prize.” 4

Historian Melvyn P. Leffler also portrays Gorbachev as the central figure, highlighting his intellect and internationalism. During the 1970s Gorbachev worked for the Communist Party on improving the Soviet agricultural infrastructure, which allowed him the rare freedom to travel outside the country, and, in particular, to the West. Gorbachev, Leffler explains, “liked talking to foreigners, exchanging ideas, and making comparisons between his way of life and theirs. He felt pride in the Soviet educational system. He believed his countrymen had better access to medical care and superior public transport system. But his travels abroad bred doubt.” 5 Leffler describes Gorbachev as “extremely personable and engaging, but he was also tough and intelligent.” His intellect allowed him to “recognize from the outset, that his domestic goals could not be achieved without readjusting Soviet foreign policy.” 6 In this observation, Leffler and Gaddis are in agreement. Gaddis argues that Gorbachev’s open mindedness freed him to “[sweep] away communism’s emphasis on the class struggle, its insistence on the inevitability of a world proletarian revolution, and hence its claims of historical infallibility.” 7

2 Historians Melvyn P. Leffler and John Lewis Gaddis discuss the importance of Gorbachev as an individual within the Soviet system based on his unique combination of intelligence and opportunity. Leffler and Gaddis each note that Gorbachev’s access to education, and foreign travel in particular, allowed him to make comparisons between life in the Soviet Union and life abroad. The observations Gorbachev made when traveling spurred his openness to change in an effort to raise the standard of living within the Soviet Union. After having seen three consecutive Soviet leaders die in office, Ronald Reagan finally found an enthusiastic negotiating partner in Gorbachev. Both Leffler and Gaddis argue that the two men truly liked one another. See: John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History (New York: Penguin Press, 2005) and Melvyn P. Leffler, For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, The Soviet Union, and the Cold War (New York: Hill and Wang, 2007).


4 Gaddis, The Cold War, 257.


6 Leffler, For the Soul of Mankind, 381 and 376.

7 Gaddis, The Cold War, 197.

The Hilltop Review, Fall 2011
After meeting Gorbachev in 1984, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher famously observed, “This is a man with whom I could do business.”

Gaddis and Leffler are representative of revisionist Cold War historians who have made the leap to post-revisionism. The opening of Eastern European archives, in addition to a running stream of memoirs, and the release of Soviet internal documents for public consumption, has infused a tangible sense of excitement to recent Cold War research. Today’s scholars have much greater access to information than ever before. Combined with a new emphasis on globalization in writing American History, that access has fed a growing number of Cold War reexaminations.

Historian Jeremi Suri has also written about the end of the Cold War. In a 2002 article, Suri explained the end of the Cold War by borrowing a concentric circle analogy from James Joll. In his description, Suri noted that Reagan was, “the man largely responsible for the crisis atmosphere” of 1983, but that after a series of tense events throughout the year, “Reagan made a decisive turn toward improved Soviet-American relations.”

Like Gaddis and Leffler, however, Suri also holds a special place for Gorbachev, arguing that:

Gorbachev understood that his hopes for improving the Soviet economy and the quality of domestic life in general required a peaceful international context. Continued Cold War competition would perpetuate that social stagnation he wanted to eliminate. Only extensive and unprecedented East-West cooperation could permit the allocation of resources necessary for domestic restructuring (perestroika).

Suri framed the relationship as one between two individuals who want the same thing, but approach it from two different directions. Reagan is the paranoid ideologue always searching for peace through strength, while Gorbachev is the pragmatist, willing to expend political capital in order to bring about change.

What all of these historians have in common is the belief that Reagan and Gorbachev were both men of their time and circumstance. They were both moral and rational, and they sincerely liked one another. The absence of pretension in combination with an open style of dialogue helped foster an honest rapport between the two, which in turn helped thaw Cold War tension from the top down. Their meeting, however, was far from inevitable, and the path leading to the INF signing date in December 1987 was fraught with near misses and real tragedy. From Reagan’s point of view, the Soviet SS-20 deployment during the late 1970s was a clear attempt to tip the balance of power in Europe away from the West. Once in office, he worked to respond multilaterally through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) by supporting a plan to match the Soviet nuclear threat.

**First Mover Advantage**

Proper balance is the key to enduring power relationships. For Europe in the early years of the Cold War, balance was maintained by measuring the overwhelming number of conventional Soviet forces against the American “nuclear umbrella” which protected NATO allies. That is, if leaders in the Kremlin decided to challenge the status quo by advancing militarily against Western Europe, American and NATO leaders could retaliate with nuclear weapons to offset their numerical disadvantage versus the oncoming force. However, this balance was based upon the idea that the Soviet military would be the aggressor. From Moscow’s point of view, NATO leaders’ first strike option was always nuclear, which meant a Soviet conventional force advantage was only as good as an enemy’s reluctance to use nuclear

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10 Suri, *Explaining*, 78.
weapons.

As weapons technology improved during the Cold War, this conceptual balance itself was shaken by the introduction of inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Since it was no longer necessary to be anywhere near a target in order to hit it, conventional forces were no longer a first-strike option when the expected retaliation is overwhelming missile retaliation. Under the threat of intercontinental MAD, the number of divisions the Soviets had in the European theatre was irrelevant, since ICBMs could be used as the great equalizer of the 20th century. The debate over what constituted “balance” and “security” in Europe, and whether or not the two were linked, was an ongoing one throughout the Cold War. One group of historians put it this way:

Thirty years of successful containment in Europe had never resolved the perennially divisive military dilemmas inherent in the [NATO] alliance. The heavy reliance on nuclear weapons, as the only effective and affordable deterrent and guarantee of peace, placed Europe completely under the decision-making power of the United States. Washington alone would determine how Europe would be defended during any hostilities.\(^{11}\)

The limited technology of jet bombers and artillery helped secure the initial NATO view of the balance, but considering the accelerated rate of research and development in the post-World War II world, it could never last.

The steadily increasing total number of nuclear weapons led to another serious Cold War concern: anti-ballistic missile technology (ABM). The desire to possess a reliable ABM system is directly related to the size of an enemy’s nuclear arsenal. If one side believed it could eliminate the other’s ability to counter attack by launching a first strike, then it would be rational to strike first. It is the ability to retaliate which maintains balance. If one nation began developing the ability to defend against a first strike, it would be in the best interest of a belligerent nation to launch an attack before the defense system was operational. Otherwise, once the defender’s shield is in place, they could strike with impunity. This is the logic behind the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 banning such technology, signed by Richard Nixon and Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev. The ABM treaty represents the spirit of détente, a lessening of tension between the superpowers. The US interpretation of détente was overtly shattered during the Jimmy Carter-Leonid Brezhnev years by Soviet interventionism in the Third World, and by the time Reagan took office in January 1981, there were proxy wars in Afghanistan, Nicaragua, and Angola.

In Europe during the détente period, Soviet leaders chose to deploy a new kind of missile, the SS-20. Its capabilities were astonishing: the SS-20 had a target range of three thousand miles, carried multiple nuclear warheads, and was capable of being launched from highly mobile platforms. The SS-20 deployment was a strategic move, a threat, that if either the US or any of its NATO allies attacked the Soviet Union or any of its Warsaw Pact allies, massive retaliation could be a reality for any or all of them, some within just a few minutes. In order to make their threat credible, the Soviet government made sure that the deployment was observable. There is no benefit to developing weapons of deterrence if the enemy you hope to deter cannot confirm the danger. The threat was then backed up by a promise that the SS-20s were defensive in nature, but would be launched in retaliation of a nuclear first strike against the Soviet Union or any of the Warsaw Pact nations. The promise of retaliation is a promise to do something that a rational or moral leader would not normally do: participate in nuclear war.

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The promise to use SS-20s was an observable, credible threat to regional security in Europe, and the world. In deploying the SS-20, the Soviet government shifted the balance. In 1981, former National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy wrote:

Experts have been found to doubt the comfort for Europe in each successive American doctrine, whether of massive retaliation, or flexible response, or the seamless NATO Triad. And Soviet threats of all sorts, political and military, conventional and nuclear, actual and hypothetical, have intermittently strained the balance. It endures.12

By November 1987, Moscow had deployed 470 medium range missiles, capable of striking from North Africa to Scandinavia, from either side of the Ural Mountains.13

Independent of the Soviet development of the SS-20, American military contractors designed a nearly equivalent missile system: the Pershing II. The history of the Pershing II research and development dates back to 1974, but the real import of the system was not relevant until 1979 when NATO approved basing of the Pershing IIs in West Germany in response to the SS-20 threat. However, two years passed before the program entered the production phase. By that time the Soviet military was integrating two new SS-20s per week into their arsenal.14

When viewed from the Soviet perspective, the Pershing II system was just as unsettling as the SS-20 system was to NATO allies. The Pershing II is also a ground-mobile, surface to surface, nuclear weapon system, but has a range of only one thousand miles. By deploying the Pershing IIs in West Germany, the target zone included every Warsaw Pact nation, as well as the highest concentration of Soviet civilians (west of the Urals), and Moscow itself. Former Secretary of State Alexander Haig recalled that Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, “made the expected point that the SS-20s and other Soviet nuclear systems targeted on Europe did not threaten US territory, but the Pershing II would be within range of major Soviet cities.”15 This situation is similar to putting the American eastern seaboard within range of Soviet nuclear forces which Washington argued was unacceptable during the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Because of the uneven research and development timelines of the two missile systems, the actual deployment of the Pershing II can be viewed, by logic of chronology, as a reaction to the deployment of the SS-20s, but this deployment was not guaranteed.

14 Alexander Haig, Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy (New York: MacMillan, 1984), 225. Considering this statistic comes from a former US Secretary of State, it should be read with some caution. However, the Memorandum of Understanding which accompanies the INF Treaty confirms that a rate of two deployments per week, starting in the late 1970s, could add up to the total of 470 by November 1987 outlined therein.
15 Haig, Caveat, 231.
There are, of course, at least two ways to react to any sequential move situation: action or inaction. Since the research and development of the two missile systems was independent, their existence alone cannot be considered as a reaction to the other. In military terms, Washington wanted the option of peaceful destruction of the SS-20s as a military threat. In political terms, by arguing for the elimination of the SS-20s, Washington was asking Moscow to retract its retaliatory promise implicit in the threat, which would return the balance in Europe back to the pre-détente status quo. In order to achieve that end, Washington had the choice to respond to the SS-20 deployment by either basing Pershing IIs in Western Europe (action, or hard line approach), or relying on the existing countermeasures already in place (inaction, soft line approach) and negotiate the elimination of the SS-20s from the existing position. The debate over how to return to the NATO preferred definition of balance in Europe split Reagan’s cabinet.

Soft Line vs. Hard Line

The soft line approach to removal of the SS-20 threat was called the Zero Option. The debate over the Zero Option effectively pitted Secretary of State Alexander Haig against Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger. In his memoir, Haig wrote that:

The fatal flaw in the Zero Option as a basis for negotiations was that it was not negotiable. It was absurd to expect the Soviets to dismantle an existing force of 1,100 warheads, which they had already put into the field at the cost of billions of rubles, in exchange for a promise from the United States not to deploy a missile force that we had not yet begun to build and that had aroused such violent controversy in Western Europe. Caspar Weinberger, in his enthusiasm for the Zero Option, could not concede this point.16

Haig suggested an aggressive response to the SS-20s as quickly as possible. If the US government were able to counter with deployment of the Pershing II system in a short period of time, then the Soviet government would be forced to react in kind, continuing the cycle of the existing arms race. By emphasizing the financial cost of SS-20 deployment over the danger it represented as a weapon, Haig shows that he was willing to accept the status quo MAD in order to fight the Soviets economically. He felt that Moscow could no longer match the US in financing the Cold War arms race, and this was a clear opportunity to attack the irrationality of their economic system, rather than the rationality of their leaders. Haig felt that the only way the Soviets would not cheat a verification treaty was if the US had a comparable threat to the SS-20 in the field.17

Early in the debate, Weinberger clearly saw the situation differently. Like Haig, he never doubted that the Kremlin would need some sort of incentive to destroy its SS-20s, but Weinberger felt that the mere existence of a comparable missile system would be enough, and that actual deployment would be unnecessary. However, Weinberger’s position was contingent on two points. He writes:

By the first of the two, the Soviets would not only remove the SS-20s, but would actually destroy them. That was important because the SS-20s were mobile. The other essential, I felt, to any treaty on any subject with the Soviet Union, was through on-site verification. Meanwhile, I did not feel we should stop our work on the Pershing IIs or the cruise missiles. I felt that there would be no possibility of the Soviets agreeing to take out their SS-20s, unless, and until, they had the kind of inducement that deployment of

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16 Haig, Caveat, 229.
17 Haig, Caveat, 229.
the Pershing IIs would bring.\textsuperscript{18}

Weinberger felt that existing systems were enough deterrence in the field, but wanted to prepare for, rather than commit to, future missile deployment. He had faith that submarine-based missiles, F-111 bombers, and Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile systems (ICBMs) would be enough incentive for Moscow to back down from this particular engagement, provided that Washington continued moving forward with the research and development of the Pershing II.\textsuperscript{19}

Haig warned Reagan that the Zero Option, “was a mistake that he would have to modify within the year.”\textsuperscript{20} Weinberger was pleased that Reagan at first favored the Zero Option, but later recalled, “Haig need not have feared, because to the President’s disappointment and mine, the immediate reaction was almost \textit{all} negative.”\textsuperscript{21}

If the Zero Option best represents the soft line approach, then the NATO Dual Track policy best represents the hard line point of view, with a caveat. The Dual Track was an attempt to combine both military (hard line) and political (soft line) policies. Track one was a direct deployment response to the SS-20. In December 1979, as noted above, NATO leaders approved the basing of Pershing II missiles in West Germany, and ground launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) in the Netherlands, Belgium, England, and Italy. In December 1981, the Pershing II program entered the production phase, and by June 1984, deployment of the first Pershing II battalion was complete.

Track two was an accompanying policy to Track one. Throughout the latter process Western leaders maintained an open position on negotiating the elimination of SS-20s with leaders from the Kremlin. By leaving the Soft Line approach open, both Reagan administration and NATO officials could claim to be advocates of pragmatic arms control at the least, and benevolent arms reduction at the best. If successful, the Two Track policy would achieve the NATO definition of balance either way. From the Soviet point of view, this was an aggressive move which put Moscow at risk of total destruction within ten minutes of a launch.

\textbf{The Public Sphere}

The Dual Track policy ostensibly showed that leaders in both Washington and NATO saw no change in the overall precarious nature of Cold War deterrence. The ultimate deterrence was the ability to retaliate against any first strike, whether it occurred in Europe or elsewhere. However, this position was terrifying to many Europeans, as well as people who held philosophical disagreements with the existence of nuclear weapons altogether. The only way to test if Washington would sacrifice New York for Paris is for Paris to be destroyed first – every time.

Since both Soviet and American governments made threats of full scale retaliation if an ally were attacked, MAD had to be considered a credible threat because of the cost of testing an opponent’s resolve. This line of thinking put an extraordinary amount of pressure on the US government to back up its allies with independent deterrents. If Western Europe was a target, then NATO allies needed to be able to strike back independently of the US, hence the necessity of NATO countries having Pershing II missiles and GLCMs on site. The question of whether or not American leaders were willing to risk New York to defend Paris could be eliminated by giving NATO leaders the ability to retaliate on their own. Failure by NATO to retaliate, or the incapability of retaliation, could still be overridden by the potential of Wash-

\textsuperscript{18} Caspar Weinberger, \textit{Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon} (New York: Warner Books, 1990), 337.
\textsuperscript{19} Weinberger, \textit{Fighting}, 340.
\textsuperscript{20} Haig, \textit{Caveat}, 229.
\textsuperscript{21} Weinberger, \textit{Fighting}, 341. Italics in the original.
ington to strike on their behalf with ICBMs. The basing of Pershing II missiles in Western Europe merely reset the regional balance of terror.

Palpable concerns over the use of nuclear weapons drove many people to demonstrate against their very existence. By 1982 people were marching by the thousands in Chicago, and hundreds of thousands in New York. The Catholic Bishops of America spoke out against the arms race as immoral. And by the end of 1982, the anti-nuclear movement was active in forty-three states. Europeans were just as concerned, if not more so, considering first strike possibilities. In just one month, the number of protesters in Bonn, London, and Paris numbered over half a million people.

A visual representation of the nuclear freeze movement was published in newspapers across the US in July 1985. The image shows a small, single missile silhouette representing all the bombs dropped in WWII contrasted against 6,667 tiny silhouettes representing the current collective nuclear arsenal of the world. The accompanying text included sobering statistics about the potential destructive power of the US and Soviet arsenals, encouraged people to contact both President Reagan and Secretary Gorbachev in support of upcoming summit talks, and asked, “How long can we live with the arms race?”

If Reagan’s hard line approach to the Cold War was terrifying to the people in the freeze movement, it was reassuring to people who believed in his concept of a position of strength. In a letter to the President in 1984, Charls Walker of the private interest group Committee on the Present Danger expressed his support for Reagan and his policies:

As you have long recognized, bad arms control agreements are worse than none at all. Equitable arms control agreements could play a part in insuring U.S. security—but whether the Soviets are prepared to enter into equitable agreements is subject to doubt. Today, with the military balance precariously tipped against us, America’s security is directly dependent on growing strength in our defense forces.

The idea that “bad arms control agreements are worse than none at all” was shared by many, but this concept holds inherent logical fallacies. This idea is a moralistic one, in which the US only participates in the arms race in a reactive way, rather than as the first cause. If there is a legally binding treaty, then both parties must answer to the letter of the law. But in the absence of a treaty, value judgments rule the day, feeding the nuclear hysteria rather than fostering peaceful negotiation.

Many Congressmen, both Republicans and Democrats, recognized this problem, and encouraged Reagan to make the necessary efforts to find common ground with Soviet leaders. Republican Senator Larry Pressler wrote to Reagan, pleading, “we owe it to the world” to negotiate, and that suspended talks “would not be in the interest of any nation.” Shortly thereafter, a group of Democratic House Representatives encouraged Reagan to be less confrontational, and more diplomatic. They argued that it was, “in the interest of all mankind that serious bilateral negotiations be resumed.”

A group of Republican Senators led by Malcolm Wallop and Jesse Helms co-signed a letter to Reagan regarding the administration’s policy of recognizing the parameters of the un-ratified SALT II treaty. They asked, “Shall you continue to abide unilaterally by treaties and agreements that the Soviets have violated and that have expired anyhow? Unilateral compliance is unilateral disarmament.” These Senators argued for the negative, and they rejected the tit-for-tat strategy of matching Soviet treaty infractions. Wallop, Helms, and the others agreed, “that option would give the Soviet Union control over what we do and don’t do, and, above all, keep our defense planning within a framework that is fundamentally wrong.”

Reagan, of course, agreed that a world free of nuclear weapons would be a world much improved. Yet the reality was that no one, no matter how much power they wielded, had the ability to simply call for the destruction of a nuclear arsenal. There were too many overlapping interests involved, and always the balance of power to consider.

This point is perhaps best summed up by former diplomat Miles Copeland in his seminal work, The Game of Nations. He writes, “when vital national interests are at stake, and when it is a question of seeing them endangered or bowing to some high moral principle, there is no question but that it is the high moral principle which will suffer.” The endangered high moral principle in this case is that the mere existence of nuclear weapons is immoral. The paradox is that if just one belligerent nation possesses nuclear weapons, it is immoral not to possess them for your own nation. This paradox of politics and morals is as old as time. In trying to serve the best interest of a nation in a world in which some other leaders behave immorally, behaving morally may put you at a disadvantage, and therefore threatens the best interest of your nation. Those who would behave immorally can manipulate predictable moral behavior. Reagan confirmed as much in his State of the Union address in 1985, stating, “We cannot play innocents abroad in a world that’s not innocent.” When it comes to the nuclear arms race, behaving morally is immoral when you are in a position of power, unless and until another nation has the capability of MAD, at which point morality once again takes over. This kind of theoretical wordplay is difficult to impart to the masses when the consequences of miscalculation could mean the end of civilization as they know it. Fear is much easier to convey than reason. In looking across the oceans at one another, both nations saw danger.

The Mirror Image

The years between Reagan’s first election and the ascendance of Gorbachev to General Secretary were some of the darkest days of the Cold War. The atmosphere led many people to believe that escalation was the only constant, and that the cruel teleological path of a nuclear arms race could only lead on one horrifying conclusion. Reflecting on the tension in early 1980s, Gorbachev wrote, “This was a time when many people in the military and among the political establishment regarded a war involving weapons of mass destruction as conceivable and even acceptable, and were developing various scenarios of nuclear escalation.” In his memoirs, Reagan recalled that, “I carried a small plastic-coated card with me, [which] listed the codes I would issue to the Pentagon confirming that it was actually the president of the United States who was ordering the unleashing of our nuclear weapons. The decision to

launch the weapons was mine alone to make."\textsuperscript{32}

Assume for a moment that Reagan’s statement about being solely responsible for ordering a nuclear strike is true, and that everyone from the top down would follow such an order. If the Soviets withdrew their SS-20s without some combination of threat or concession from Washington, they would appear weak, and lose credibility in their reputation as hardliners. In the absence of economic power, political will backed by military reputation is the strongest feature of any government, and therefore indispensable. Whatever the NATO response would be to the SS-20 deployment, short of nuclear war, Moscow could not blink. To do so would indicate less-than-total faith in the choice to deploy the SS-20s. In the resulting geo-political atmosphere, every situation involving either the US or Soviet Union was highly scrutinized and presented as proof of the others’ aggression or intransigence.

In the collaborative effort \textit{The Sword and the Shield}, historian Christopher Andrew describes the Soviet position early in the Reagan administration. Andrew writes, “In a secret speech to a major KGB conference in May 1981, a visibly ailing Brezhnev denounced Reagan’s policies as a serious threat to world peace.”\textsuperscript{33} At the same conference, KGB Director Yuri Andropov announced operation RYAN (\textit{Raketno Yadernoye Napadenie}, “Nuclear Missile Attack”). Andrew continues, “RYAN’s purpose was to collect intelligence on the presumed, but non-existent, plans of the Reagan administration to launch a nuclear first strike against the Soviet Union – a delusion which reflected both the KGB’s continuing failure to penetrate the policy-making of the Main Adversary and its recurrent tendency towards conspiracy theory.”\textsuperscript{34}

By 1983, Brezhnev had passed away and Andropov was the new General Secretary. Unfortunately, Andropov’s health upon entering office was not much of an improvement over Brezhnev’s later years, and the paranoid view of Washington continued unabated. In describing Andropov and the political climate of 1983, historian Vladislov Zubok writes, “On September 29, \textit{Pravda} published his ‘farewell address’ on Soviet-American relations. Andropov informed the Soviet people that the Reagan administration was set upon a dangerous course ‘to ensure a dominating position in the world for the United States of America.’”\textsuperscript{35} Previous to his duties as General Secretary, Andropov had been the longest serving head of the KGB, and he was well aware of the American government’s geopolitical strategy and capability. Based on American actions, not words, Andropov made a good point.

For his part, Reagan was all too happy to play the insult game, and consistently decried the Soviet Union in public. In a speech to the British House of Commons, Reagan warned that, “the march of freedom and democracy…will leave Marxism-Leninism on the ash heap of history.”\textsuperscript{36} In his first term, Reagan famously labeled the Soviet Union an “evil empire” and warned people not to “remove yourself from the struggle between right and wrong and good and evil.”\textsuperscript{37} George Kennan, the father of US containment policy called Reagan’s views toward the Soviet Union “intellectual primitivism.”\textsuperscript{38}

\textsuperscript{32} Ronald Reagan, \textit{An American Life} (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990), 257.
\textsuperscript{34} Andrew and Mitrokhin, \textit{Sword and the Shield}, 213.
\textsuperscript{35} Vladislov Zubok, \textit{A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev} (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 274.
Reagan also compared Soviet leaders to their most bitter of antagonists, the Nazis. For the Soviets, the greatest source of national tragedy and pride was winning the “Great Patriotic War.” In a March 1981 interview with Walter Cronkite, Reagan said, “I remember when Hitler was arming and had built himself up – no one’s created quite the military power that the Soviet Union has, but comparatively he was in that way.”39 It was not the only time Reagan associated the Soviets with their World War II adversary. In a speech to Congress, Reagan compared the Soviet communist influences in Central America and the Caribbean with German U-boats operating in the Gulf of Mexico during the early 1940s.40 In describing the current Soviet leadership as similar to Nazi leadership, Reagan was verbally salting the psychic wounds incurred by millions of civilians. As one historian has noted, “Probably no American policymaker at any time during the Cold War inspired quite as much fear and loathing in Moscow as Ronald Reagan during his first term as president.”41

The Year of Living Dangerously

In January 1983, Reagan made antagonizing the Soviets official policy when he signed National Security Decision Directive 75 (NSDD 75), titled “US Relations with the USSR.” NSDD 75 is the written representation of Reagan’s concept of a position of strength. The policy calls for the US to challenge the Soviet Union militarily, subvert the authority of the Kremlin within the USSR, and at the same time always extend an olive branch to negotiate should the first two points aggravate Soviet leaders to the point of exhaustion on any particular issue.42

The most successful portion of this policy, and also potentially the most dangerous, was its military strategy. In part, NSDD 75 reads:

- The US must modernize its military forces – both nuclear and conventional – so that the Soviet leaders perceive that the US is determined never to accept a second place or a deteriorating military posture. Soviet calculations of possible war outcomes under any contingency must always result in outcomes so unfavorable to the USSR that there would be no incentive for Soviet leaders to initiate an attack.43

This line of thinking is contingent upon two very precarious assumptions, the first of which is being able to guess how Soviet leaders “perceive” a situation, and, second, what their “calculations” might be if US policymakers correctly determined the answer to the first assumption. Reagan added to this policy in a statement to Congress in June 1985, when he said it was necessary to, “make it clear to Moscow that violations of arms control obligations entail real costs,” and that the US should continue with strategic modernization programs “as a hedge against the military consequences of […] Soviet violations of existing arms agreements which the Soviets fail to correct.”44

When the two doctrines are combined, the situation reads like this: if Washington guesses wrong on Soviet perceptions of any given situation, and then Moscow reacts in a way that US officials did not anticipate, then US officials reserve the right to respond in a tit-for-tat fashion based on the Soviet reaction, even though it was Washington’s failed model that al-

41 Andrew and Mitrokhin, *Sword and the Shield*, 242.
43 National Security Decision Directive Number 75.
ollowed for the unanticipated reaction. This “miscalculation” portion of Kennedy’s 1961 warning was a real possibility in 1983.

Growing concerns over the arms race combined with a brutal economic recession led to very low public approval numbers for Reagan during this period. After two years in office, the financial slowdown that Reagan had blamed on Carter was still lingering, which led some to question whether or not incurring a large national debt to finance a military modernization project was good policy. According to a Gallup Poll, Reagan began 1983 with a paltry 35% approval rating. In July 1983, Republican Senator Arlen Specter addressed this concern in a letter to one of Reagan’s national security assistants, William P. Clark. Regarding the prospects of a new arms control summit with the Soviets, Specter wrote:

Even if the summit did not produce an agreement, I do not believe it would ‘dash expectations,’ as some suggest. Rather, a meeting between the two leaders would demonstrate that both nations are serious about arms control. Such a demonstration is crucial, in my opinion, to maintaining public support for our defense build-up, strategic modernization, including the MX missile, and deployment of the Euromissiles.

By taking this position, Specter was effectively arguing that, in a democracy, informed public opinion is less desirable than manipulated public opinion. Specter felt that a mere façade of good faith negotiations would be enough to drum up public support for the real bargaining target of the administration: a position of strength.

The tension continued to rise into late summer of that year when a Soviet fighter pilot shot down Korean Airline Flight 007 over the Kamchatka peninsula in far eastern Russia. KAL 007 had gone off course and mistakenly entered Russian air space. The fighter pilot did not intend to kill civilians, and in fact thought he was shooting at an American military plane. The US regularly probed Soviet radar defenses, including in the area around Kamchatka where a major Soviet naval base was located. Tragically, after a series of technical and communications problems, in the black of night, the fighter pilot was ordered to shoot down the plane. Only afterwards was the real identity of the craft known. Western journalists and politicians alike criticized the attack as naked aggression, and a representation of the contempt for human life held by leaders in Moscow.

The timing could not have been worse. The KAL incident occurred in September, followed by weeks of demagoguery in the press. In the midst of all the posturing, both public and private, Reagan approved a ten day NATO military exercise called Able Archer ’83 from November 2 - 11. Author David Hoffman explains:

The exercise, Able Archer ’83, was designed to practice the procedures for a full-scale simulated release of nuclear weapons in a European conflict. The Soviets had long feared that training exercises could be used as a disguise for a real attack; their own war plans envisioned the same deception.

Able Archer was exactly the kind of operation that RYAN was meant to detect and counter, which only heightened tensions between the two nations, as well as the apprehensiveness of

48 Hoffman, The Dead Hand, 72-79.
European allies on both sides. In carrying out the exercise, NATO forces altered their message formats and moved non-existent forces to high alert status. KGB agents monitoring the communications and the exercise as a whole were shocked, and for a time believed that NATO was on the precipice of a first strike against the Soviet Union. In response, during the exercise, the Soviet Fourth Air Army was also placed on an increased readiness level, and combat air operations were called off for seven days in anticipation of NATO moves. Reagan was initially scheduled to participate personally, but after word of Soviet and allied apprehension got to the White House, he decided against it. The successful completion of a mock-nuclear missile attack only reinforced the idea that the scenario was a viable option for policymakers. Both sides believed the other was capable of a first strike.

Despite the mounting fear and polarization caused by the events of 1983, Reagan still clung to the NATO Dual Track policy, which necessitated Pershing II deployment. In response to a letter signed by sixteen Congressmen warning of the “increasingly dangerous” situation, a White House aide wrote on behalf of the Reagan, that the “President believes that making concessions just to get the Soviets back to the negotiations that they themselves broke off would only encourage further intransigence.” Reagan’s negotiating policy never changed. It was “no” to any proposal by the Soviet government that was less than the American starting position. Gorbachev, on the other hand, was the first of the two leaders to act on the recognition of both men that the exorbitant amount of time, money, and resources being used for an international arms race could be of far better use within the borders of their own country. Gorbachev believed the benefits to the Soviet Union from ending the arms race would outweigh any security concerns inherent in disarmament. This recognition, and acceptance, is what made Gorbachev so important in the INF Treaty negotiations.

Personality Goes a Long Way

The inability of Washington and Moscow to foster some level of trust between the two governments in the early 1980s is clear. Both nations were scared of what they saw on the other side of the world. The only reason that neither nation acted on their fear is the concept of MAD. An American economist and professor, Thomas Schelling, articulated this point in his book *The Strategy of Conflict*. Schelling wrote:

> There is a difference between a balance of terror in which *either* side can obliterate the other and one in which *both* sides can do it no matter who strikes first. It is not the “balance” – the sheer equality or symmetry in the situation – that constitutes mutual deterrence; it is the *stability* of the balance. The balance is stable only when neither, in striking first, can destroy the other’s ability to strike back.

The choice by Soviet leaders to deploy SS-20s within range of Western Europe, when taken from the NATO point of view, upset the regional stability of that balance. Open criticism on both sides, coupled with massive intelligence and military exercises like RYAN and Able Archer, only served to exacerbate the imbalance and inflame fear of a nuclear confrontation. Historian Melvyn Leffler explains, “Brezhnev had warned against another escalation of the arms race and even offered to reduce the number of Soviet SS-20s if the West would talk and not act. But NATO leaders moved ahead on 12 December [1979], saying they were wiling to

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50 Hoffman, *The Dead Hand*, 95.

*The Hilltop Review, Fall 2011*
talk but would not stop their plans to deploy 464 ground-launched Tomahawk cruise missiles in Western Europe along with 108 Pershing II intermediate-range ballistic missiles. Brezhnev and his colleagues were dismayed. The Americans were again seeking to negotiate from strength. Under Reagan, official US national security policy outlined in NSDD 75 meant that, in reaction to the SS-20 deployment, the only option for American policymakers was to respond in kind, and move forward with the Pershing II production and deployment.

Even before he took office, this was a point which Gorbachev understood all too well. In his memoirs, Gorbachev wrote:

The decision to deploy SS-20 missiles in Eastern Europe had reflected the style of the Soviet leadership at the time, decision-making fraught with grave consequences for the country. I had arrived at the sad conclusion that this step, fateful both for our country and Europe and for the rest of the world, had been taken without the necessary political and strategic analysis of its possible consequences. Whatever the arguments advanced at the time to justify the deployment of such missiles, the Soviet leadership failed to take into account the probable reaction of the Western countries. I would even go so far as to characterize it as an unforgivable adventure, embarked on by the previous Soviet leadership under pressure from the military-industrial complex. They might have assumed that, while we deployed our missiles, Western counter-measures would be impeded by the peace movement. If so, such a calculation was more than naïve.

In this single passage, Gorbachev demonstrates how history is never inevitable, but in hindsight, can seem over-determined. Before the NATO Dual Track policy of 1979, before NSDD 75 in 1983, and before Reagan’s statement to Congress in 1985, Gorbachev could see what he felt was inevitable unfolding before his eyes. When Reagan took office, he not only upheld the US agreement with NATO to respond directly to the SS-20 deployment, he encouraged a massive military buildup in order to show the Soviet leaders that he was happy to play the tit-for-tat game. To Reagan’s great credit, by 1985, he was also willing to play tit-for-tat on arms reductions.

In this way, it really did take Gorbachev to break the cycle of counter deployments, war scares, and paranoid living. Both Reagan and Gorbachev recognized the danger of perpetually testing the rationality of their governments in response to crisis. Unfortunately, Gorbachev was not the General Secretary until three consecutive Soviet leaders died while in office. As such, the possibility of continuity in already strained relations was made even more difficult by the reality of human frailty. Between the time Reagan took office in January 1981 to the time Gorbachev took office in March 1985, Brezhnev, Andropov, and Constantine Chernenko all passed away.

The rapid succession of Soviet leaders made it nearly impossible to build any kind of rapport between Reagan and his Kremlin counterparts. The stability of relations between Washington and Moscow was, from a certain point of view, dangerously reliant on the health of two men at any given time. In both political philosophy and physical vitality, Gorbachev represented a clear change within the Kremlin. At fifty-four Gorbachev was easily the youngest member of the Politburo. When he became General Secretary, Gorbachev was thirteen years younger than the average age of the voting membership. The INF Treaty is more than

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just a document: it is the written embodiment of Gorbachev’s policies and personality, based on a life spent in and out of the Soviet Union.

The INF Treaty
Treaties are contracts between nations, enforceable by war. In the nuclear age, breaking a treaty could mean disaster for every living thing on Earth. MAD is the foundation of the INF Treaty, and the foundation of MAD is rationality. Throughout the Cold War both governments tested the rationality of their policymakers by practicing brinksmanship. The Korean War, Taiwan Straits Crisis, Cuban Missile Crisis, and even Able Archer were all tests of rationality, which thankfully both governments continued to pass, at least on a macro level.

Following this analogy, if MAD is the foundation of the INF Treaty, then verification is the framework. As noted above, both threats and promises are strategic moves in a “game of nations.” But strategic moves, by definition, must also be decisions that a player, or in this case a national government, would not normally make. Initiating MAD is not in the best interest of a rational policymaker, and is therefore a credible threat.

The promise to eliminate nuclear weapons altogether is also something that a rational policymaker would not normally do, in part, because the United States and Soviet Union were not the only two nations with nuclear weapons. Although the INF Treaty is bilateral, the parameters take into consideration the global balance necessary beyond their own national interests. Most notably at the time, China, India, Pakistan, and Israel also possessed nuclear weapons. It would not be in the best interest of either the US or Soviet Union to completely dismantle their nuclear arsenal in a world where the lack of such weapons would be a geopolitical disadvantage.

The agreement by Reagan and Gorbachev that nuclear war could not be won only reinforced what generations of leaders before them understood. This can be confirmed by analyzing the INF preamble. The treaty reads:

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties, Conscious that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all mankind, Guided by the objective of strengthening strategic stability, Convinced that the measures set forth in this Treaty will help reduce the risk of outbreak of war and strengthen international peace and security, and Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, have agreed as follows:56

While both Parties agreed that nuclear war would be terrible for all people, they are not negotiating the elimination of all nuclear weapons. They are negotiating a “strategic stability” which will “reduce the risk” of nuclear confrontation. By eliminating short and medium range missiles from their arsenals, both Parties reduced the amount of contingencies available to policymakers who would otherwise consider nuclear war a possibility.

The INF Treaty is also loaded with language that speaks to the paranoid atmosphere that came to a crescendo during Reagan’s first term. Article V, Section Three reads:

Shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles shall not be located at the same elimination facility. Such facilities shall be separated by no less

than 1000 kilometers.\footnote{57}{“INF Treaty”, Article V Section 3.}

This provision is especially important because of the content found in the Memorandum of Understanding, which accompanies the INF treaty. The Memorandum contains a list of deployment areas and missile operating bases, complete with latitude and longitude locations. The location information makes targeting such facilities a matter of data entry. This information could be utilized to plan a first strike against the other party. If policymakers believed a first strike based on the location information, in combination with the capability of non-theater weapons to take out ICBM locations, were likely to result in the inability of the enemy to retaliate, then it would be rational to attack. By outlawing the possibility of a confluence of weapons in one theatre, the possibility of achieving a first strike advantage is lost, thereby maintaining balance.

Further proof of distrust is evident in Article XII, which deals with interference and obfuscation. Article XII, Section Two reads:

Neither Party shall:
(a) interfere with national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article; or
(b) use concealment measures which impede verification of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty by national technical means of verification carried out in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article.\footnote{58}{“INF Treaty”, Article XII, Section 2.}

Both Washington and Moscow were clearly concerned that their track records regarding espionage might reveal themselves in manipulating the verification process. If it could be proven that either side chose to act contrary to the provisions of this section, the treaty would be broken, and another escalation of nuclear tension would be likely to occur. Neither party wanted such an outcome, but the only way to enforce such a rule is embodied in the spirit of the treaty to begin with. That is, the point of the treaty is to reduce nuclear tension and the possibility of war, but only if sufficient non-European theatre ICBMs are held in escrow.

The escrow of ICBMs is guaranteed by one simple concept: the elimination of all nuclear weapons in the world does not preclude the ability to re-arm. Because of the risk involved in complete bilateral disarmament, and the cost in time and money to re-arm, it is not rational to eliminate all nuclear weapons from a national arsenal unless and until all nuclear weapons are banned and destroyed under unanimous international verification treaties. It is only rational to hold as many weapons as is absolutely necessary to deter a first strike attempt against a government’s own retaliatory capabilities. This was the goal of both Reagan and Gorbachev. The verification promises in the INF Treaty, backed up by nuclear capabilities in escrow, ensured that the only rational choice for both Reagan and Gorbachev would be to sign the treaty and reap the moral and political benefits.

To further guarantee that the treaty could not be superseded, Article XIV reads: “The Parties shall comply with this Treaty and shall not assume any international obligations or undertakings which would conflict with its provisions.”\footnote{59}{“INF Treaty”, Article XIV.} The INF was given most-favored-treaty status.

Regarding the internal debate between Haig and Weinberger, they both got what they wanted. Haig’s argument that the Soviet government would not negotiate until they faced a credible threat proved to be true. But Weinberger got what he wanted with the promise of verification. The NATO Dual Track policy was vindicated. By deploying the Pershing II
missiles to Western Europe, and simultaneously extending the offer of bilateral arms reduc-
tion, Reagan gave the Soviets incentive to remove the SS-20s. Agreement on verification did 
eliminate INF weapons from the European theatre, thereby returning the Cold War to the dé-
tente era status quo of proxy wars and interventionism. This allowed Reagan to maintain the 
policies of NSDD 75 without fear of nuclear confrontation. The strategic modernization pro-
cess, in combination with the INF Treaty, meant that the US had achieved unquestioned military 
hegemony in the world, confirming Reagan’s vision of a position of strength.

The INF Treaty was signed in the East room of the White House on December 8, 
1987. In time, the treaty led to the elimination of 1,846 Soviet SS-20s, and 846 American 
Pershing IIs. At the signing, Reagan said, “We have listened to the wisdom of an old Russian 
maxim, doveryai, no proveryai – trust, but verify.”

“You repeat that at every meeting,” Gorbachev replied.

“I like it,” Reagan said, smiling.

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MICROGAS TURBINE ENGINE CHARACTERISTICS USING BIOFUEL

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Introduction

Aviation fuels commonly used today are extracted from the kerosene fraction of the crude oil that is distilled between the gasoline and the diesel. Crude oil is not renewable and the world oil reserve is generally believed to be on the decline. In 2006, about 6.3% of the world’s refinery production was used for aviation fuel. (Nygren et al., 2009) At an estimated rate of 3% increase of fuel demand per year, aviation use alone will consume the world fuel production by 2026 (Nygren et al., 2009). Therefore, there is a need for the aviation industry to reduce its dependence on fossil fuels and, perhaps, replace them with alternative, renewable fuel. In addition, the use of fossil fuel negatively impacts the environment in many ways, including for example, the emission of pollutants and greenhouse gases. (Daggett et al., 2007) Some analyses show that the airline industry is responsible for roughly two percent of the greenhouse gases emitted globally. Biofuel is a fuel obtainable from biological material and can exist in the form of solid, liquid, or gas. Unlike fossil fuel, which is derived from fossils of biological material, biofuel is renewable. Biofuel also has the advantage of biosequestration of the atmospheric CO₂ and, therefore, helps remediate greenhouse gases and, possibly, climate change. (Bajpai et al., 2009) Studies show that fuel derived from biofuel emits at least 40% less CO₂ than current conventional jet fuels. Early biofuels were made from a variety of sources such as, sugar, animal fats, or vegetable oil. Biodiesel is one of the first generation biofuels that is produced from oils or fats using transesterification. Other examples include bioalcohols, such as ethanol, propanol, and butanol. One of the more common processes used to obtain these alcohols is fermentation of sugars by the action of enzymes in microorganisms. Others processes include the fermentation of starches or cellulose, which is more difficult due to their complex structures.

There are many other valuable sources of biofuel including biogas, which is produced through anaerobic digestion of organic material by anaerobes, bioethers, syngas, and solid biofuels (eg. wood, sawdust, charcoal). Algae fuel, also known as the third generation biofuel, seems to be one of the most promising biofuels today, particularly in terms of their high yields. Algae have been reported to produce thirty times more energy per acre than land crops. (Biodiesel, 2010) Moreover, algae are biodegradable and environmentally friendly. Algae fuel is suitable for aviation use because of its low freezing point and high energy yield.

The commercial scale production, uses and regulation of biofuel is yet to be realized by the aviation industry. Biodiesels are Fatty Acid Methyl Esters (FAMEs) and are absorbable by metal surfaces. This causes concerns as biodiesels can adhere to pipe and tank walls. Measures can be taken that replace the surface material with non metallic material that would not participate in a reaction. Biodiesel has been shown to react with compounds containing several different metals including copper, zinc, tin, lead, and cast iron. In addition to its effect on metallic compounds, prolonged use of biofuels may lead to the deterioration of the rubber components in the engine. (Zehra et al., 2009) The presence of rapeseed methyl esters in the engine oil can increase corrosive wear because of the acidity of the biodiesel. (Serdari et al.,
Rapeseed methyl ester fuel also causes the lubricating oil to age faster. Degradation due to the oxidation of biofuel can change the viscosity, acid value, and peroxide value. (Dunn, 2005) The shelf life of biodiesel are typically six months. (Yüksek et al., 2009) Another alternative fuel that has been studied and shows potential is nitrous oxide. The raw material is abundant and is harmless to the environment as the chemical reaction produces oxygen and water. It has a reported energy rating of 1864kJ/kg and a flash point of 850°C, compared to 38°C for JetA fuel. Due to its high flash point and the limitation of test engine operating range, nitrogen is yet to be extensively examined.

The B100 biofuel used in this study is a mixture of methyl esters of fatty acids. It is made from a combination of used oil feedstock such as restaurant oil. Table 1 shows a comparison of some of the properties of kerosene with that of the B100 biofuel. The heat of combustion is lower for B100 than that of kerosene. The kinematic viscosity of B100 is about three times higher than kerosene. The B100 fuel also has a slightly higher density as compared to Jet A-1/kerosene. This is due to the larger chemical structure of the B100 biodiesel than that of the kerosene, which affects the freezing point of the fuel, resulting in gelling of the fuel. Although we have not observed in the operation of our engine, these conditions can lead to engine operability problem and possible engine flameout. (FAA, 2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Property</th>
<th>Jet A-1</th>
<th>Biofuel (B100)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Density (kg/m³)</td>
<td>810</td>
<td>880</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distillation Range (°C)</td>
<td>177 – 300</td>
<td>&gt;200</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kinematic Viscosity 40°C (mm²/s)</td>
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<td>2.97</td>
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<tr>
<td>Heat of Combustion (MJ/L)</td>
<td>&gt; 35.1</td>
<td>32.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flash Point (°C)</td>
<td>&gt; 38</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freezing Point (°C)</td>
<td>-47</td>
<td>&gt;0</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Table 1. Comparison of fuel properties.

Engine Runs Setup

Figure 1 shows the micro turbojet engine that has been used as the test platform of the current study. The MW54 engine runs on a single spool radial compressor and a turbine. The combustion chamber is of the annular type with reverse flows for enhanced vaporization and mixing of the fuel mixture. This feature makes it particularly attractive to the current study. For operations, two types of fuel are used. Propane is used during the startup and kerosene for normal runs. The engine can operate in a manual start mode or automated start via an engine control unit (ECU). During a run, engine operation parameters and gas properties at the different stages along the air path can be measured.

The turbojet engine mounting bracket is secured to a tripod-like wood mount on a test bench. The cross sectional shapes of the three mounting legs follow that of the NACA0012 airfoil. All supply lines and electronic wirings are routed through the hollowed rear mounting leg to the lower deck of the test bench. The turbojet engine is mounted on the customized bracket that holds the exhaust gas temperature (EGT) sensor and load cell as illustrated in Figure 1.
A voltage output strain gage type of load cell is installed on the bottom plate of the engine mount to measure thrust. Figure 2 illustrates the placement of the load cell and the measurement technique used. The thrust line, $F_1$, above the pivot pins of the upper plate, where the engine is mounted, creates a moment that applies a force, $F_2$, directly onto the load cell. Using simple moment summation, the engine thrust $F_1$ can be calculated. To account for friction, calibrations are performed by transferring dead weights forces parallel to the propeller thrust line through a pulley system. We have also used the same setup to ensure the integrity of the engine mount to beyond the maximum obtainable thrust of the turbojet.

Engine exhaust gas temperature (EGT) is measured using a thermocouple. A case pressure port is installed with a digital pressure gage to provide a digital readout from the computer. A single fuel flow meter and a single fuel pump are installed on the engine fuel supply line.
FADEC ECU pre-programmed by WREN Turbines, incorporating a fuzzy logic-based control algorithm that adapts to the different engine parameters when it operates, monitors the engine run parameters and controls the fuel supply to the engine. It ensures that the engine operates within the programmed specification through engine speed (RPM), EGT, and throttle level. In case of an apparent inconsistency among the engine operating parameters that may indicate an abnormal engine run, for instance, between the RPM and the exhaust gas temperature, the ECU will automatically shut down the engine. A 0.5 inch steel plate is mounted perpendicular to the turbine plane of rotation, and away from the line of sight in front of the control room window.

Multiple LabVIEW programs have been developed in house to perform different tasks. (Liou and Leong, 2007) One of the LabVIEW programs developed is the Engine Control Interface (ECI) that will measure, manage, and control pneumatic valves, relays, and sensors. Data acquisition (DA) can be executed on demand through the ECI. Parameters displayed in the front-end LabVIEW program are provided by the ECU with a RJ45 connector through a serial port (RS-232) connection. This provides real time data to the DA, which is in sync with the ECU. This real time data can be stored in text file format. The throttle level on the ECU is controlled through the LabVIEW front end to provide a stable signal source. In case of a computer failure, the ECU will be able to detect and shut down the engine immediately to prevent a loss of engine control and other undesirable scenarios. A change of the throttle level in the LabVIEW front end triggers a signal sent to the ECU, which varies the power input to the fuel pump and the fuel flow to the engine, resulting in changes of engine RPM, pressure, EGT, and thrust. The fuel pump power is controlled by the ECU “fuzzy logic” system correlating a 1024 step division to the fuel pump power supplied to the ECU. With a calibrated throttle level, the ECU will regulate the fuel pump power according to the throttle level desired, while monitoring the RPM and EGT as feedbacks.

The fuel used in the present engine runs includes kerosene and its mixture with the B100 biofuel. The mixing ratio varies from 0%, which contains only kerosene, to 100%, which contains only the B100 biofuel. We have run fuels with mixture ratio of 0%, 5%, 10% and subsequent increments of 10% up to 100%. The fuel is mixed with Mobile Jet Oil II for lubrication purposes at a ratio of 20:1. The engine characteristics such as the thrust, RPM, fuel consumption, and EGT are reported in the following.

**Results**

The following presents the results of the turbojet engine runs using the various blends of the B100 fuel with kerosene at ten different mixing ratios, from kerosene only (0%) to B100 fuel only (100%). The data are collected continuously onto a spreadsheet using the LabVIEW program and then analyzed. Figure 3 shows the variation of the engine RPM with the throttle level in terms of its percentage of the full throttle. The engine speed increases linearly with the throttle level for all mixing ratios considered and the engine speeds are the same at the same throttle level. With the increase of the mixing ratio, or blending more biofuel with kerosene, the RPM value shows a flat region. This flat RPM values first appears at the highest throttle level tested and then becomes wider as the mixing ratio increases. The ECU fuel flow control was manufactured to operate the engine using kerosene as fuel. The high viscosity of the B100 biofuel demands higher fuel pump power at the same throttle position than that regulated by the kerosene-based ECU.
Figure 3. Engine speed variation with the throttle level.

Figure 4 shows the variation of the engine thrust with the throttle level. The engine thrust increases with the throttle level. The thrust values show a very consistent change with the throttle level for all blends of fuel. In Figure 5, the engine thrust is shown against the engine RPM. For runs with all of the various blending of the biofuels, the measured engine thrust varies in a consistent manner with the engine RPM, showing that the operational performance of the engine has not changed during the runs. Figure 6 shows the changes of the EGT with engine speed. The overall trends of the EGT variation are fairly consistent across all blends and all RPM. The temperature of the exhaust gas stream varies significantly with radial distance to the jet centerline. Since the thermal couple is only loosely fitted through a hole on the wall of the nozzle, the location of the temperature probe, being exposed to the high speed exhaust stream, can shift from one engine run to the next and causes the observed variations.
As mentioned earlier, engine characteristic data are continuously sampled by using the LabVIEW program front end that is used to run the engine. Table 2 shows a summary of the statistics of some of the quantities sampled over a period of time at a single throttle level. The distributions of EGT, thrust, and RPM have standard deviations (STD) of less than 1% of the mean values. Figure 7 shows the distribution of the occurring count of the sampled RPM data in the same time period.
The measured fuel volume flow rates are shown in Figure 8. The fuel pumped to the engine increases with RPM. This is observed for all mixing ratios, from 0% to 100%. There is an apparent downward shift of the total fuel consumption by volume, signifying a reduction of fuel consumed, with the increase of the mixing ratio. Recall that the 0% blend contains only kerosene and the 100% fuel blend only B100 biofuel. The fuel consumption decreases with the increased percent of the biofuel. The biofuel combustion at the relatively fuel-lean conditions is more complete and this can further reduce CO₂ emission. Figure 9 shows the correlation between the fuel consumption and the thrust produced. Engine thrust is seen to increase with the increased amount of fuel pumped to the engine for all the mixing ratios used. With the same fuel volume flow rate, the engine thrust increases with the increased percentage of biofuel used in the blending. For instance, at the fuel flow rate of 30 mL/min, the run using the B100 biofuel produced 200% more thrust compared to that by using kerosene. The heating value of the biofuel used is somewhat lower than that of kerosene. Therefore, the trend apparently indicate a more efficient combustion of the biofuel in the present engine.
The variations of thrust specific fuel consumption (TSFC) with the throttle level are shown in Figure 10. For the 0% fuel blend (or kerosene), the value of TSFC decreases by about 40% with the throttle level increasing from 10% to 90%. TSFC is also observed to decrease with the increased amount of biofuel in the fuel blend. The trend continues and the pure biofuel has the lowest TSFC at the three throttle levels tested. For example, at 50% throttle level, the TSFC value for the B100 biofuel run is 56% lower than that using kerosene.
The low TSFC of the engine when the B100 biofuel is used can be contributed to factors such as the higher cetane index found in the biofuel than in kerosene. (Schulze and Pinder, 2008) The higher biofuel viscosity has been found to improve the fuel-air mixing and result in a more complete combustion. (Ali et al., 1995) Studies have also shown a higher thermal efficiency for biofuel, which leads to a more efficient conversion of chemical energy to kinetic energy. (Habib et al., 2010) (Xuea et al., 2011)

Table 3 show estimates of the fuel costs for running the present turbine engine on three different blends of fuel, from kerosene to B100 biofuel, for one thousand hours. The estimated cost increases by a factor of about six between the cases of using the kerosene and the B100 biofuel. It should be noted that the estimates are based on our costs of purchasing the kerosene from a retail store and the B100 biofuel from a government-subsidized biofuel provider. Although the comparison may not reflect the true cost of the biofuel, the significant improvement of the engine performance in terms of TSFC using biofuel is reliable evidence for potential saving in cost.

Table 3. One thousand hours operation cost comparison based on a kerosene retail price of $2.11 per liter and B100 at $1.06.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fuel Blend</th>
<th>Cost</th>
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<tr>
<td>Kerosene</td>
<td>$11744</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50% B100-Kerosene</td>
<td>$4954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100% B100</td>
<td>$1883</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Figure 10. Engine thrust specific fuel consumption variation with fuel mixing ratio.
Concluding Remarks

The results presented showed that the turbine engine can operate and perform in a consistent manner when the various blends of fuel were used, producing the same amount of thrust at the same engine speed. The engine thrust specific fuel consumption was found to be significantly lower for the B100 biofuel than kerosene. The more efficient combustion of the biofuel represents a significant saving in the cost of running the turbojet engine. It also indicates a possible reduction of greenhouse gas emission from the engine. For future work, the contents of the exhaust gas can be sampled and measured. Such studies will provide a quantitative analysis of the emission content of the gas turbine engine runs on biofuels.

Acknowledgments

We appreciate the help from Dr. Javier Montefort in the Department of Mechanical and Aeronautical Engineering at Western Michigan University for his support in data acquisition.

References


**WMU Sunseeker Solarcar**

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The Hilltop Review, Fall 2011
The Art and Beauty of Flight

This picture nicely represents the art and gracefulness of flight with the beauty of sunset in a tranquil setting. In the picture is a powered paragliding, also known as paramotoring in the plains of Nebraska. The ability to fly both low and slow safely, the 'open' feel, the minimal equipment and maintenance costs, the portability, minimally regulated and requires no license are claimed to be this type of flying's greatest merits. Paramotors can be flown during any season of the year anywhere but not in high wind conditions which typically means at low Sun azimuths as shown in the picture of the para-glider gracefully flying into the sunset horizon, when wind turbulence is usually low.

WMU Sunseeker Solarcar

This picture was taken, at the racetrack the evening before the start of the North American Solar Challenge 2008 race in Plano, Texas. In this picture is the Sunseeker, Western Michigan University’s solar powered car that will race in the 2 week long, 2400miles long race from Plano, Texas to Calgary, Canada. Sunseeker was the only car in that race that feature a 2 electric motor drive system than the standard one electric motor drive system. Western Michigan University Sunseeker team brought back the sportsmanship award that year.

HOPE

This drawing—painted on the surface of one of the interior doors located in the first floor at East Hall—shows the preoccupation of people about the uncertain future of East Campus. In one way or another, it has kept awake my sensibility toward how educational institutions can affect community not only academically, but also personally, and how people consider education as a one of the foremost elements for progress. Location: East Hall, First Floor. Original painting by unknown artist.

ANTIQUE POWER (Cover)

Location: Political Science Collection, Second Floor, Waldo Library
These are one of the oldest books that can be found in the political science collection at Waldo Library. To have access to antique historical compilation is an enormous privilege which has allowed me to explore the old world through original sources.
LA NOCHE DE LOS MAYAS: A MISUNDERSTOOD FILM
AND ITS MUSIC

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Introduction

My interest in La Noche de los Mayas began to form when I read Cartas íntimas y escritos.¹ This is a recompilation made by Rosaura Revueltas of letters and writings by his brother Silvestre Revueltas. The book made every bibliographical research on Revueltas before 1982 meaningless and it is referenced in nearly all of the research conducted on Revueltas today. In his letters and writings Revueltas freely describes his thoughts and emotions with incredible detail. They contain first hand proof of how Revueltas composed his music and in some cases the reasons for it. It is only recently that scholars such as Eduardo Contreras Soto, Roberto Kolb and Robert Parker have worked meticulously on documenting his life and works to provide a fresh understanding of the mind of Silvestre Revueltas. Today’s research of Revueltas’ music points to the same direction; Revueltas’ pinnacle of compositional technique was in his film music.

The intention of this study is to explore and evaluate the film La Noche de los Mayas. I will research the making of the movie and what surrounded the production in 1939. In addition to this, I will seek a perspective of the music of Revueltas and its relation with the film. With this research I intend to acknowledge the importance that this film had in its time, and expectantly decipher the enigma that impedes its popularity today compared to other films of the ‘Golden Age’ of cinema in Mexico.

Silvestre Revueltas’ path to Film Music

Silvestre Revueltas once wrote, “The spirit of Mexico is deep within me.”² Historically Revueltas was mistaken for a composer who would incorporate traditional folk tunes into his music, but today this history is corrected. Unlike other composers of his time, Revueltas did not exploit Mexican folklore and music, but instead subtly formed a compositional style that is comparable to a ‘nationalistic’ compositional manner like that of Sergei Prokofiev or Dimitri Shostakovich to Russia. His music has gained vast popularity in contemporary music society, and it is the subject of research for many musicologists and musicians around the world.

Silvestre Revueltas (1899-1940) lived a life filled with emotions, passion and tragedy. Known to the world as almost certainly the greatest composer Mexico has produced, Revueltas was also one of the finest violin players of his time. At a very young age his talent was noticed, and eventually he was sent abroad to nourish his evident talent. Revueltas completed most of his studies outside Mexico thanks to his father who wanted only the best for his son. He then spent his youth in Chicago where he was accepted to study violin and composition at the “Chicago Musical College.” To this day a medal is held at the college in his honor for his achievements in excellence.

² “El espíritu de México está muy dentro de mí…”(All translations in this article are made by me unless otherwise noted.)

The Hilltop Review, Fall 2011
Revueltas came from a poor family and struggled all his life with this issue. He had to juggle his scholarly pursuits with a working life. Because of this, Revueltas played in many orchestras for film theaters to make ends meet. The experience that this provided was directly influential on his compositional career. From his first known musical writing, there exists an air of imagery and movement that would later in his life represent his musical form of composition. In the text *Mexican Movies in the United States: a History of the Films, Theaters, and Audiences, 1920-1960* Rogelio Agrasánchez describes how Revueltas moved from playing in these theaters to being commissioned to compose the music for them. Most of his films were later presented in the same theaters where Revueltas once performed.³

In his lifetime, he composed eight films scores in a period of five years. His first commissioned score was for the film *Redes* in 1935.⁴ The rapid success that the film attracted in combination with the quality of the music quickly provided Revueltas with a career in the film industry. Revueltas’ patriotism drew him to the nationalist themes that the films of this period evoked. All the film scores that Revueltas composed were for movies that served as government propaganda or films with a sense of patriotism and nationalistic pride for Mexico. Revueltas’ greatest achievement as a composer came from his ability to compose new music that evoked the Mexican spirit without using folksy or cliché tunes. In the course of the next few years, Revueltas rapidly became known for his film scores and was asked to write the scores for many of the new films being produced. These include ¡Vámonos con Pancho Villa! (1936), *Ferrocarriles de Baja California* (1938), *La Bestia Negra* (1938), *El Indio* (1938), *La Noche de los Mayas* (1939), *Bajo el Signo de la muerte* (1939), and ¡Que viene mi marido! (1940). In his text “La Música de Silvestre Revueltas para Cine y Escena,” Eduardo Contreras Soto provides a discussion on how Revueltas suffered from severe depression resulting from the death of his mother.⁵ For Revueltas this depression came at the peak of his compositional career in the film industry. Even though his final film scores produced income, he announced his retirement from film composing. Not long after, a complicated case of pneumonia, in combination with his alcoholism, took his life in October of 1940 at the age of 40.

### 1939: The Film Industry in Mexico

Between 1935 and 1938 work in the Mexican film industry grew intensely. This constant growth came to a halt in 1939 when the industry grew to a point at which it could no longer support itself. Based on the industry’s growth in previous years, it was expected that at least 100 movies would be produced in 1939 alone. The reality was that in 1939 only 39 movies were produced and most of these films were not released. The film’s producers were hesitant to present the film in theaters alongside the films being brought in from Hollywood. These films had an advantage over the films being produced by the Mexican film industry and the producers of the film were concerned about recouping their investments in the oversaturated market. To compensate for this, former president Lázaro Cardenas obliged every cinema in Mexico to expose at least one Mexican movie per month.

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⁴ Silvestre Revueltas composed the score for the film *Redes* in 1934-1935. It was released in the United States as *The Waves*.
With the excess films from the Hollywood industry hitting Mexico at their peak, only two films conserved a nationalist thematic pride. These two movies were Chano Urueta’s *La Noche de los Mayas* and *Los de abajo*. Urueta was indisputably the most talented director in the industry at that time. While other directors produced movies of foreign inspiration, Urueta did everything in his power to detach himself from the ‘great’ foreign productions and create a grand Mexican tradition.

1939 was definitely a very hard year for the film industry in Mexico. While Cardenas would try to satisfy the common people as well as the producers, the film industry in Mexico plunged. The effect was alarming. Producers were unable to finance their independent productions to the same extent as the film industry in other countries. At that time, Argentina rose in the film industry for its ability to finance their productions. This period produced over 50 movies, giving them, for the first time, the reins in the production of Spanish-language films. Meanwhile, the end of the war in Spain in 1939 lead to the revival of film manufacturing and gave Spain a corner on the market. In 1939 Mexico produced mostly low budget movies. This left a stigma on Mexican cinema of the period shadowing most of the movies produced this year.

Emilio Riera’s *Historia documental del Cine Mexicano 1938-1942* meticulously cataloged the events of the Mexican film industry and proves that although 1939 was a devastating year for the industry, Mexico’s National Film Committee, *Comité Nacional de Cine en Mexico* (UTECM), still saw the importance of a number of films from the year and acknowledged them with high honors. These honors included the awards for best movie to *La Noche de los Mayas*, best director to Fernando de Fuentes for *La Casa del Ogro*, best actress to Isabela Coron for *La Noche*, best photography to Gabriel Figueroa for *La Noche*, best music to Silvestre Revueltas for *La Noche*, best edition to Emilio Gomez for *La Noche* and best scenery Jose Rodriguez Granada and Roberto Montenegro for *El Capitán Aventurero*.6

*La Noche de los Mayas*

Conductor Jose Ives Limantour arranged Revueltas’ film score into an orchestral four movement suite and premiered it with the Guadalajara Symphony Orchestra on January 30, 1961. Many scholars who research Revueltas’ music question the authenticity of the work, though in essence it stays very much attached to what the film reflected. I will mention some audio examples and make reference to recordings of this arrangement; which is the version most often performed in concert halls today.7 Limantour arranged the suite using Revueltas’ original score. This explains why there is so much material contained in the suite that is not used in the context of the film. Limantour’s arranged suite is divided into four parts, just as the original film score. It is important to mention that Revueltas did not name these four parts, rather Limantour named them based on his judgment of what was happening during the film. Revueltas’ actual distribution contains only ‘cue’ spots and scenes markings. The first movement of Limantour’s arrangement is titled *La Noche de los Mayas* (Night of the Mayans), the second *Noche de Jaranas* (Night of ‘Revelry’),8 the third *Noches de Yucatán* (Nights of Yucatan) and last movement, *Noches de Encantamiento* (Nights of Enchantment). The music that

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7 A percussion cadenza was added in the final movement by Enrique Arturo Diemecke, the conductor of the *National Symphonic Orchestra of Mexico* 15 years ago with the permission of the Revueltas family.
8 The word ‘Jarana’ also refers to the name of a traditional dance which blend traditional and native influences.
appears in the film, mostly without any edition, is generally contained within the first and second movements of Limantour’s suite. The third movement is included within the context of the film, but is heavily edited by Limantour to produce a cohesive standalone movement. The fourth movement, however, is not heard within the film itself. The reason for not hearing any of the themes of the last movement is because the music was intended to highlight the ‘native percussion music’ of the film which, in the end, Urueta leaned more towards the use of Cornelio Cardenas’ ‘Mayan Melodies’ in a more diagetic fashion. The end of the last movement is a restatement of the theme of the first movement. This addition made by Limantour was to highlight how Revueltas repeats the first movement to end the movie.

The remainder of this study will focus mainly on the first and second moments of Limantour’s suite. The reason for this is that the first and second movements contain the least editorial work, leaving them the closest to the original film music of all of the movements.

The story of the La Noche is set in a Mayan tribe which subsists with very little awareness of the outer modern civilization. A hunter in the tribe named Uz (Arturo Cordoba) is in love with Lol (Estela Inda), a beautiful indigenous girl who seems to love Uz until the intrusion of a white explorer named Miguel (Luis Aldas). Miguel sells the ‘chicle’ trees which grow around the village that he and his envoy discover. This is where the love triangle happens. Miguel wants Lol, though there is never a sense of falling in love. In contrast to what the movie portrays, it seems that he rapes her and it isn’t until this point that she falls in love with him. This profane relationship provokes the wrath of the gods, which in the movie translates to draughts and hunger for the village. Once the elders become aware of this relationship, they determine that the only logic solution is to sacrifice Lol in order to keep the Gods content. The movie concludes with Uz killing Miguel. Lol commits suicide after witnessing Miguel’s death and ‘magically’ (or coincidental) it begins to rain, ending the curse of the village.

In Eduardo Contreras’ “Historia de La Noche de los Mayas y de su Música,” we understand the importance of La Noche de los Mayas being filmed in the unpopular Yucatan of the mid 1930’s. The importance that the film had over the people in Merida was overwhelming. The making of La Noche was probably the most important event that had happened in the city. Everything surrounding the film at the time was published and sometimes exaggerated in the local media. One of the most interesting headlines noted that the music for the much anticipated film was written by local composer Cornelio Cardenas. More importantly it stated that the music was already recorded and ready to send to the editing departments. Despite these headlines, Urueta had already asked Revueltas to write a score for the film. At the end of the production, Cardenas’ music plays a different role in the film. Cardenas music is used strictly in a diegetic role. Two very clear examples of this appear within the film. The first at (min. 00:51:13 to 00:54:25) were the villagers are playing the drums. This scene is designed to appear improvised, though it was written by Cardenas. The music that Revueltas wrote for this moment can clearly be heard in Limantour’s arranged suite at the beginning of the variations of the last movement (min. 1:20 and following). The second is where Lol is singing to Miguel in her ‘native’ language although Miguel seems not to understand what she sings (min.00:36:15 to 00:36:34). This scene also plays a significant conceptual role within the context of the film. Urueta’s use of a ‘Mayan’ folk song is related to the codices left by the Mayas that emphasis the importance of voice in Mayan culture.

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To highlight the reality of an undiscovered indigenous land, language plays a vital function in the narrative of the film. The whole movie is set in Spanish, though when the Mayans speak they do so in a poetic form. When the white people enter the village there is a translator from poetic-Spanish to Spanish. At first this seems slightly confusing because the first time this ‘issue’ is encountered one does not realize that the Mayans are actually speaking ‘Mayan’. As the movie moves forward, this theatrical approach to the language contrasts greatly when the camera is focusing on the villagers or the white men. Antonio Mediz Bollo, who wrote the novel for which the movie is based on, played an important role in the circumstance of the dialogues and use of theatrical gestures within the movie.

The opening credits feature an orchestral introduction by Revueltas. While it has become traditional to open a film with a grand fanfare, Revueltas chooses to open the film with a dramatic introduction, but he avoids the sense of a fanfare or march altogether. Example 1 demonstrates the equal importance of both the strings and the brass in the opening of the film. The credits emphasize, “Musical Illustration” by Silvestre Revueltas “Mayan melodies” by Cornelio Cardenas (min. 00:02:15-00:02:26) Both names appear in the same shot, side by side; today the music is credited mostly to Revueltas. Cardenas’ score seems to have been lost with-in the production of the film. Cardenas’ score was almost certainly never fully composed. Potentially, this could have even been set up as a publicity stunt to signify the local community and its relation to the film. During all the commotion in Merida, Revueltas was never mentioned until the end of the production of the film. There is no record of Revueltas actually being in the Yucatan during the filming, and certainly no headlines in any newspaper acknowledged him as the composer for the film. The only actual proof is a letter from Urueta to Revueltas asking him if he had received the material to compose the score for La Noche. If Revueltas was mentioned more often than Cardenas, the community in the Yucatan wouldn’t have supported filming in the ancient ruins. It was very important that the local entities permitted the shooting in the actual sites because they play a major role in the film.

Example 1. La Noche de los Mayas by Silvestre Revueltas. Movement 1, mm 1-4 11

One of the few prizes the film did not win was for scenery. This was because the sets were all genuine landscapes.\textsuperscript{12} Gabriel Figuero developed the photography of the film. The majority of the film gives the sense that the space used is very wide, though in reality most of the important scenes take place in closed spaces.

After the opening credits, the music contrasts to the majesty of the opening to a melodious tune emphasized by the flute and the violin section (Example 2). At this moment in the film, the camera is panning scenes of the Yucatan Peninsula. This is truly a precious moment in the Mexican cinematic tradition as the scenes of the ruins of Yucatan can never again be shot in such a ‘virgin’ state. Urueta’s goal in the film’s introduction was to be able to portray the innocence of the community of the Mayan village. Revueltas writes in his cue notes, “… Historic innocence of the native peoples of Mesoamerica.”\textsuperscript{13}

Example 2 \textit{La Noche de los Mayas} by Silvestre Revueltas. Movement 1. mm 29-33. \textsuperscript{14}

Arguably the most important moment in the film is when Miguel is allowed in the village for the first time. Miguel gives Lol a glance that is noticed by Uz from the background. This at first seems like an innocent scene; despite the fact that in the music is contrasted with a dissonant interjection by the tuba exactly in the moment that Uz’s acknowledges the moment occurred (min. 00:17:20-00:18:13). This is a key point in the film because it foreshadows the events to come. For example, two of Revueltas’ \textit{Noche de Jaranas} score examples contrast the upbeat cheery music of the strings with the descending second interval in the tuba. Most recordings of \textit{Noche de Jaranas} do not make a big deal out of this moment, yet in the film, the tuba can clearly be heard overpowering the strings (min 07:05–07:11).\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{12} The shooting in the film took places in the actual Mayan ruins in the peninsula of Yucatan; Chechenitza, Tulum and Cobá.
\textsuperscript{13} “…inocencia histórica de los indígenas de Mesoamerica.”
\textsuperscript{14} Example taken from Dissertation: Jonathan Borja. “Silvestre Revueltas’s \textit{La Noche de los Mayas}: His Music on Film and on the Concert Stage” Masters diss., University of Missouri-Kansas, 2002.
\textsuperscript{15} Silvestre Revueltas with WDR Sinfonieorchester Köln Semyon Bychkov, \textit{Noche de Jaranas}. \url{http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HTEh1A9Ur8E&feature=related} (Accessed April 2010).
Revueltas’ sensitivity in bringing out particular moments in his film scores is fascinating. Despite having only a short period of time to complete the music for La Noche, he was able to create an atmospheric blend that allowed for the diatonic sounds of the movie to be carefully balanced with the sensation of originality in the score. Although the majority of the film’s music is contained within the first thirty minutes of the film, its masterful craftsmanship begs for further analysis.

Conclusion

The film La Noche de los Mayas has barely survived the overwhelming attacks from the international film industry. Despite its popularity when it was premiered on Mexico’s Independence Day, the film has been reduced to just a memory of its music. While the film only persists outside of the Mexican mainstream, its music is gaining incredible popularity worldwide. The film La Noche is truly an undiscovered work of art waiting for its re-mastering. Though the film has lost much of its attractiveness, the second film premiered that same year, Bajo el Signo de la Muerte, has survived time and industry attacks alike. Bajo el Signo de la Muerte was also directed by Urueta and the music was also written by Revueltas. Two things made this film more popular. The budget used for this movie was far higher than that of La Noche de los Mayas, allowing to improve some influential aspects of the film. For instance, the sound recording and musician quality in La Noche suffered from a very low budget and is greatly reflected in the quality of interpretation of Revueltas’ score. Secondly, La Noche suffered from a low casting budget and couldn’t compare with the superstar lineup used in Bajo el Signo de la Muerte; the latter including legends like Mario Moreno ‘Cantinflas.’ Though Estela Inda’s participation in La Noche was formidable, she was still not recognized as a treasure of Mexican cinema until later in her career.

Limantour’s work with the music of Revueltas is pivotal to the survival of this music. If it wasn’t for his genuine interest in preserving the film music, much of the material gathered by Limantour would have been lost. Hindemith wrote his own arrangement of La Noche, but this is just a 15 min. arrangement of the film score. Still Limantour’s study on La Noche is much more focused, rounding up more of the visual content of the film, rather than just the musical.

I truly believe that the film will never gain a popularity after losing its momentum in the early 1940’s though I still think that La Noche is an essential part of Mexican films and its research will lead (and has lead) further research in the area of cinematography. The legacy left by the combination of Urueta and Revueltas to the film scene is unique and plays an outstanding role in film studies.

Bibliography


La Noche de los Maya

(Accessed Mar. 11, 2011)
A GENERATION OF ISOLATION: CUBAN POLITICAL ECONOMIC POLICIES

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Introduction

Economic society is defined mostly by the competitiveness of its private sector and the effectiveness of its economic policies. Nevertheless, understand the dynamics that lead a nation to economic development compels the analysis of other factors, which, it is de rigueur to point out, do not have an economic nature, but a significant influence on national economic strategies, i.e. history and government.

The history of developing countries, particularly their colonial experience, has a remarkable impact on their political and economic performance. The dynamics between colonies and colonizers constitute the basis in which the estate and its institutions were created. “The impact of colonialism on state formation was especially significant because most developing country states are the product of colonialism, and their respective forms were molded decisively by this encounter with more advanced political economies” (Kohli, 2004, 17). Consequently, it is not possible “to formulate adequate development theory and policy for the majority of the world’s population who suffer from development without first learning how their past economic and social history gave rise to their present underdevelopment” (Kanth, 1994, 149).

The state has the capabilities to improve economy, especially in developing countries, where the market does work with imperfections, and the “government is constantly asked to rectify market error or market inequity”. Moreover, in poor societies the private sector does not increase its operations if the government does not take participation in the national market (Lewis, 1984, 4). “Many neoclassical economists would accept that markets for technology development, manpower training, and credit to small firms and exporters may failure seriously enough to warrant some offsetting government intervention” (Wade, 2004, 12).

Therefore, two important questions arise: 1) can private sector reach efficiency without government provision? and 2) are public policies drawn to colonialism? The responses for these two questions will be addressed by the political and economic analysis of Cuba—a nation, which in the fifteenth century, was colonized by Spain during the maritime expeditions of Christopher Columbus, and after the Revolution—led by Fidel Castro, became in the twentieth century a totalitarian state-run economy.

Cuba is not only the largest island in the Greater Antilles, but also the only communist island in the Caribbean. This country has been governed by the Marxist-Leninist ideology for more than fifty years. Although the Cuban economy has not shown significant development since January 1, 1959, i.e. when the Revolutionaries came to power, it is presenting a new economic capability—the tourism industry, which could drive the nation to a moderate economic growth.

The tourism sector is the primary provider of foreign exchange earnings and employment in Cuba, exceeding agriculture—which since the old days of colonization used to be the economic leader sector. (Khrushchev, Henthorne, and Latour, 2007, 403). After the Second World War, Cuba presented a competitive economic environment, which in case of had being
conserved by the government of Fidel Castro, it would bring excellent opportunities to develop the Cuban economy; i.e. improve the industries (public and private), strength relations between state and private sector, increase international market operations, and enhance standards of livelihood.

The Cuban economy, in contrast to many economies at the time, was not dramatically affected by the war. Foreign entrepreneurs could find in Cuba an ideal environment for investment, e.g. the Cuban investment market was one of the most sustainable in Latin America and the Caribbean; the Constitution of 1940 guaranteed the protection of property in Cuba; the Cuban peso was at par with U.S. dollar; foreign exchange operations were not under state control, and the cost of living did not present important variations (Baklanoff, 1998, 268).

Nevertheless, despite this favorable economic scenario, Cuban development prospects proved to be unpredictable. As a Marxist-Leninist country, Cuba had isolated its people from globalisation and its economy from free market. Fidel Castro refuses to consider foreign industries and investment as the engine for economic growth. The foundation of his economic policies are based on the dependency theory of Andre Gunder Frank, which states that developing countries will not economically improve if they maintain “importing sterile stereotypes from the metropolis which do not correspond to their satellite economic reality and do not respond to their liberating political needs” (Kanth, 1994, 159).

Fidel Castro contemplates an agricultural sector protected by the state as the train that would take the Cuban economy straightly to development.

“Cuba is above all an agricultural state. Its population is largely rural. The city depends on these rural areas. The rural people won the independence. The greatness and prosperity of our country depends on a healthy and vigorous rural population that loves the land and knows how to till it, within the framework of a state that protects and guides them” (Fidel Castro, History Will Absolve Me, 1953).

Consequently, he believes that American economic intervention is not the key for economic growth. Nonetheless, American private capital proved to have the capability to improve the condition of living through its economic and political influence during the pre-communist period (Bernstein, 1966, 145). Atul Kohli bases his development theory on the role of the “state as an economic actor” and the importance of a close relationship between government and private sector in order to lead the nation to economic growth.

“Patterns of state authority (neopatrimonial, cohesive-capitalist, and fragmented-multiclass) including how the politics of the state are organized and how state power is used have decisively influenced the economic context within which private economic decisions are made” (Kohli, 2004, 2).

Based on the development theory of Kohli, the performance of the Cuban tourism, and the Marxist-Leninist government of Cuba, four leading questions guide this research: 1) can tourism lead Cuban economy to development? 2) do public policies alienate the tourism sector? 3) is the state of Cuba offering an attractive environment for foreign direct investment? 4) does the embargo of the United States restrain Cuban tourism?

This paper will be developed in five sections. The foundation of the Cuban economy during the Spanish colonization (1492-1899) will be described in section one. The golden years of the Cuban tourism (1952-1958) will be discussed in section two. The situation of tourism after the Revolution (1959-1969) will be explained in section three. The economic perspective of the embargo of the United States on Cuba (1963) will be defined in section four. The government tourism reforms will be presented in section five. The paper closes with some observations about the improvement and capabilities of the Cuban tourism sector and its
Tourism in Cuba did not develop as an economic sector during the Spanish colonization. "A study of the history of Cuba, both internal and external, is fundamentally a history of sugar and tobacco as the essential bases of its economy" (Ortiz, 1970, 4-5). Nonetheless, it is important to state that agriculture was not always the most prominent economic sector, and Cuba was not always an outstanding colony.

Christopher Columbus reached the island of Cuba on October 28, 1492—fifteen days after he landed for the first time in America. In his journal he described Cuba as follows: "I never saw a lovelier sight: trees everywhere, lining the river, green and beautiful. They are not like our own, and each has its own flowers and fruit. Numerous birds, large and small, singing away sweetly... It is the most beautiful island even seen..." (Simons, 1996, 77, 79). Even though Columbus named the new island Juana, in honor of the Prince, Don Juan, son of the Spanish monarchs (Isabella of Castile and Ferdinand of Aragon); it conserved its native name—the aboriginal people used the word Colba to refer the island, word that the Spanish understood to be Cuba (Wright, 1970, 5-6).

Nevertheless, the finding of Mexico—Hernán Cortés’ s expedition sailed from Cuba “in 1519 to conquer the Aztec Empire”, and the lack of minerals of the island would soon diminish the fascination for Cuba. Mexico and its abundant mineral resources seemed to promise a large treasury for the Spanish adventures and for the Catholic kingdom. However, despite the “exodus of population, decline of food production, and economic misery” caused by the expeditions to Mexico (Suchlicki, 1997, 21, 27-28), Spain maintained control over Cuba for naval strategy; “Havana had become the most widely utilized port for the repair of vessels in the Antilles, and one of the most widely utilized ports of call in its empire” (Cuban Economic Research Project, 1975, 1). During the naval period the Cuban economy was based on repairing and building ships, while the agricultural potential of the island was neglected (Ritter, 1974, 10).

Although sugar production was favored in 1529 by a royal decree, which protects sugar producers from foreclosure debt, sugar cultivation in Cuba presented slow growth compared to Jamaica, Haiti, or Barbados. This was caused by the following main reasons: lack of foreign capital; lack of promotion from abroad; difficulties in importing equipment; costliness of slaves’ imports, and lack of a rapidly growing market for sugar in Spain. Consequently, Cuba truly developed its agricultural capabilities by the 1750s when the production of tobacco was suited as the dominant Cuban export, and the word Havana was a synonym for quality cigar tobacco in much of Europe (Ritter, 1972, 10-11). However, it was not until the generation from 1834 to 1867 that Cuba became an important colony for Spain, when the sugar industry proved to be remarkably profitable, and made Cuba “the richest colony in the world” during that period (Alvarez, 2004, 5).

The Spanish colonization has four significant characteristics that explain why the island did not experience a prompt economic development, i.e. late abolition of slavery, weak labour legislation, high-cost of livelihood and great dependency on imports. "On October 7, 1886 the Spanish government abolished slavery on the island”; twenty-one years after the United States—on December 18, 1865 slavery was eradicated in the American nation (Simons, 1996, 122, 127).

It is important to state that “the slave labour was the factor that contributed most to the delay in the development of a labour movement as such” in Cuba. Sociedad Económica
de Amigos del País” (1793); “Sociedad de Socorros Mutuos de Honrados Artesanos y Jornaleros” (1857); “Asociación de Tabaqueros de la Habana” (1866) are the first labour organisations in the history of the colony, which were founded by Spanish workers who were concerned about the protection of their personal interests, but not engrossed in requesting to the Spanish crown the creation of a whole labour system to protect the entire Cuban labour population. After the conclusion of the Spanish power the labour legislation platform in Cuba was restricted by natural conceptions protected by Civil, Commercial, and Penal Codes. “The labour contract was accomplished by the mere consent of the parties and the only requirement was the term of the contract could not be set for lifetime”, according to the Civil Code, which also stated that “in cases of death or bankruptcy of the employer, his employees enjoyed the status of preferential creditors in the collection of their salaries and wages”. The Commercial Code established an “indemnity of one month of salary when the discharge affected commercial employees” and the Penal Code punished with one to six months in prison to anyone who were involved in any endeavor to change or reduce either the wages or the conditions of employment. By the nineteenth century, the low-income worker class used to live in “Solares” or “Casas de Vencindad”, i.e. large houses occupied by many families –one family per room (Cuban Economic Research Project, 1975, 22-27). The cost of livelihood at that time was considerably expensive.

“The cost of these rooms at the end of the century was $5.00 per month, on the average, and in solares with better conditions, up to $14.00. The rest of small houses in modest neighborhoods in Havana were about $20.00. The supply of water by means of aqueducts was available to only 16 percent of the dwellings on the island” (Cuban Economic Research Project, 1975, 27).

Mostly all the goods in Cuba were imported; “tools, paper, and even food-stuff were brought in from the outside”. Spain built a mercantilist economy, strengthening Cuba’s dependence on imports and “looking at the island as a producer of raw materials to satisfy the needs of the mother country” (Suchlicki, 1997, 27).

After independence Cuba did not have established a strong labour organisation system, an efficient commercial law, or a competitive industrial sector, and most of the people could not afford a decent livelihood. This particular situation of Cuba was not due to its previous condition of traditional society.

“One whose structure is developed within limited production functions, based on pre-Newtonian science and technology, and on pre-Newtonian attitudes towards the physical world. Newton is here used as a symbol for that watershed in history when men came widely to believe that the external world was subject to a few knowable laws, and was systematically capable of productive manipulation.” The Five Stages of Growth by W.W. Rostow (Kanth, 1994, 99).

But due to the own experience of Spain as a nation that has suffered from war and economic strives. “In 1486, when Columbus first presented himself at the court, the Crown was poor, heavily engaged in the last stage of the Reconquista” (Simons, 1996, 76). Therefore, Spain was not interested in building economic autonomous colonies in America –they were geographically located far away from Europe, and the Spanish empire was consolidating its political power and assuring the increment of its economic resources; with the “Moors expelled from most of the Iberian Peninsula and the unity of Spain achieved, the Catholic monarchs now looked to new horizons to expand their faith as well as their commercial interests” (Suchlicki, 1997, 14).
As a result, Cuba was merely considered as a provider of resources. The Spanish did not plan to make the island an extension of their kingdom; consequently, they did not transfer enough capital, knowledge or technology to improve the Cuban economy. Therefore, colonialism in Cuba generated the roots of a nation that would not find the guidance for a national economic prospective by itself, and sixty-two years after its independence Cuba would remain being a slave of its colonial history. “A socialist regime is here, but the fault is not ours, the blame belongs to Columbus, the Spanish colonizers” (Fidel Castro, 1961, May Day Celebration: Cuba is a Socialist Nation Speech).

Tourism in Cuba before Fidel Castro: The Golden Years

“No country can be politically and economically independent, even within the framework of international interdependence, unless it is highly industrialized and has developed its power resources to the utmost.”

- Jawaharlal Nehru

In the pre-Revolutionary era, the Cuban economy was characterized as being empowered by the new dominant nation in the hemisphere—the United States. In the nineteenth century, when Spain was losing power among its colonies in Latin America and the Caribbean, the Cuban economy was acquired by American firms, which maintained ownership and control until the Revolution (Thompson, 1997, 97).

Nevertheless, the origin of the American imperialism in Cuba goes back to the time when the island was pursuing its recognition as an independent republic. Despite the ten-year war (1868-1878) Cuba did not get its independence from Spain. There was an uncertain period before Cuba could be a liberated country. “On January 1, 1899, after the evacuation of the Spanish troops”, the United States became the new power nation in Cuba; placing a military government in the island until May 20, 1902; when Cuba proclaimed itself as an independent republic (Cuban Economic Research Project, 1975, 3-4).

This was the first American intervention in Cuba, and with it a political legacy came to being and controlled the state for more than thirty years, i.e. the Platt Amendment, “which until 1934 had been forced into the Cuban constitution in 1901 by the United States.” The purpose was to intervene Cuba as many times as it was necessary in order to protect “life, property, and individual liberty” in the new nation (Boorstein, 1968, 9). The Platt Amendment gave the United States a significant influence in Cuban politics, and consequently strengthened the confidence of American entrepreneurs to increase their investments in Cuba (Alvarez, 2004, 4,6). Therefore, the Cuban economy was dominated by American monopolies (Boorstein, 1968, 1).

The “Golden Age” of Cuban tourism (1952-1958) was during the government of Fulgencio Batista—a military dictator. His administration can be described as what Kohli defines cohesive-capitalist state::

- characterized by the top leadership equating rapid economic growth with national security, a highly centralized and penetrating public authority, state-controlled political society (though in close alliance with capitalist groups),
- and a highly interventionist state, with a good quality economic bureaucracy. (2004, 12)

Batista was known for his authoritarian regime, and for holding negotiations with American entrepreneurs, who enjoyed special treatment, i.e. having their interests considered as superior to those of the local workers. This was possible because at the time, Cuba did not possess competitive labor organisations—condition indered from colonialism; therefore, it
was impossible for Cuban workers be part of the economic development and implementation of planning (MacEwan, 1981, 128).

Although this situation promoted inequality within the Cuban society, the tourism industry represented a worthwhile sector. The American entrepreneurs were preparing Cuba for the anticipated Caribbean tourism boom of the 1960s, in which this nation would play a central role (Baklanoff, 1998, 272).

The investment strategy taken by the Americans was to double the existing hotel capacity in Cuba during 1952-1958. Foreign tourist expenditures increased from $19 million in 1952 to an annual average of $60 million in 1957-1958. The hotels The Habana Hilton, The Capri, The Habana Riviera, and The Nacional (all backed by U.S. owners) were very important in promoting Cuba internationally as a first class service provider (Baklanoff, 1998, 266).

Transculturation was one of the foremost factors supporting the improvement of Cuban tourism.

Transculturation is a term “coined by the Cuban anthropologist Fernando Ortiz in the early 1940s, and was created in order to explore the cultural dynamics in operation between Cuba and the metropolitan centres.” With the concept, Ortiz suggests, “a process of mutual interaction exists between cultures, despite the unequal distribution of power characteristic of transcultural relations” (Herrle and Wegerhoff, 2008, 251-252).

The Americans not only traveled to Cuba for regular vacation, they also adopted some aspects from the Cuban culture, making the voyage to the Caribbean island an endless paradiac experience, not to mention the promotion to visit the exotic country headed person-to-person by the Americans (Khrushchev, Henthorne, and Latour, 2007, 404). Tourism became the major source of revenue (U.S. dollars) and employment during the government of Batista. In 1957, the tourism sector produced more revenue than the tobacco industry, and was second only to sugar production in profits (Falcoff, 2003, 132-133).

Nevertheless, in 1958 the vulnerable political environment rose by the struggles between the rebel army (led by Fidel Castro) and President Batista interrupted the glorious period of Cuban tourism. Once again, the Cuban economy became a slave of its own history.

Economic development is not a process that occurs by itself, it is the result of an effective relationship between the government and the private sector. “State intervention aimed at boosting investor profitability is strongly associated with rapid industrialization” (Kohli, 2004, 7). Therefore, a country cannot evolve economically without political improvement. Moreover, there are four additional elements that determine the economic performance of any country: luck, geographical location, institutions, and culture and social capital (Lin, 9, 2009).

In the specific case of Cuba, the island was not lucky being colonized by Spain, which compared to Portugal or England, was less industrialized. Besides the Spanish empire did not consider the island as a prominent society. The geographical location of Cuba allowed it to be taken into consideration first by the Spanish for naval purposes, and later by the United States as a potential colony, or at least as a lucrative market.

The Cuban institutions were based on personalized, corrupt bureaucracy, and the Cuban culture was the result of a combination of Spanish and African influence, creating a heterogeneous population.

Even though these factors have the capability to determine the development of a
society, the role of the state, as Kohli states, can accelerate or impede economic growth. In the Cuban context, it is easy to understand why the Cuban tourism sector improved so rapidly during the Batista period, and why it declined quickly after Fidel Castro came to power. Cohesive-capitalist states have “proved to be the most successful agents of deliberate state-led industrialization in peripheral countries” (Kohli, 2004, 11).

Figure 1: Tourist Arrivals in Cuba, 1952-1959

In 1958 Cuba faced a Revolution against the government of Batista. The country was divided into two groups, both with contradictory political ideologies. Cuba was not longer the exotic island of the Caribbean. It was a dangerous war zone until the culmination of the Revolution.

The genesis of the Cuban Revolution was the affiliation of the President Fulgencio Batista with some members of the Mafia, e.g. Meyer Lansky, Lucky Luciano, and Santo Trafficante Jr. who were well-know for being part of the organized crime in the United States. “Lansky was paying Batista millions of dollars a year from mafia casinos in Cuba in return for a monopoly of the business” (Simons, 1996, 259). The construction of the hotel Riviera, for instance, was funded by Meyer Lansky and partially sponsored by the Cuban government with fourteen millions of dollars, money that could be used to improve the life of many Cuban citizens who lived in extreme poverty, especially in the countryside (History Channel, Declassified: The Godfathers of Havana (Documentary) March 23, 2006). During the dictatorship of Batista, “the Mafia funds airline companies to export cocaine” (Cuban National Archives; Records of the Cuban National Bank, file 192, number 6). At the end of 1959, the number of tourists in Cuba fell to approximately 175,000 (Khrushchev, Henthorne, Latour, Cuba at the Crossroads: The Role of the U.S. Hospitality Industry in Cuban Tourism Initiatives; Cornell Hotel and Restaurant Administration Quarterly 2007 48: 406).

Cuban Tourism after the Revolution: A Generation of Isolation

“Our understanding of the Revolution is more difficult than dying for the Revolution”
- Fidel Castro

On January 1, 1959, Cuba welcomed a new year and a new president—Fidel Castro. The victorious Revolutionary party replaced the past government of Batista. It was a perfect scenario to build a democratic and prosperous country. The new leader promised to work for the Cubans and with the Cubans. The former revolutionaries received international sympathy, and the world welcomed the re-born Cuban nation. Nonetheless, the sympathy for the
Revolution, especially from the United States, would rapidly end, when the younger half-brother of Fidel—Raul Castro, and his colleague Che Guevara solidified their affiliation with the Communist Soviet government (Khrushchev, Henthorne, and Latour, 2007, 405).

The foundation of the first communist country in the capitalist Caribbean found its roots in a special visit from the Soviet Union. On February 4, 1960 the Soviet representative Anastas Mikoyan arrived at Cuba and signed a contract with Castro, which was worth $100 million (US Dollars). The agreement was that the Soviet Union would buy 5 million tons of sugar within three years, and in exchange Cuba would receive petroleum (Khrushchev, Henthorne, and Latour, 2007, 405). Consequently, Cuba began a close relationship with the Communist Soviet government, and abnegated its commercial privileges with the United States.

On May 1, 1960 a new era began for the Cuban society. The nation embraced communism as its new political power. Fidel Castro was rigidly determined to maintain his Marxist-Leninist ideology. He made it very clear for the Cuban citizens during the May Celebration, but also for the international community, especially for the United States, when he emphatically stated: “If Mr. Kennedy does not like socialism, well we do not like imperialism! We do not like capitalism!”

The fact that Cuba had officially declared itself a communist country has two repercussions, i.e. the Cuban “government is intent on not returning to the past, where as a dependent capitalist country, it was subjected to external domination” (Saney 2004, 204-205), and the United States felt threatened by the possibility of a military attack from Cuba. By this time there was increasing political tension between the United States and the Soviet Union, and the “Cold War” period was well under way. Consequently, in April 1961 the United States President John F. Kennedy attempted unsuccessfully to invade Cuba and topple the government of Castro. In July 1963, the United States invoked a commercial block against Cuba (Khrushchev, Henthorne, and Latour, 2007, 406).

I believe there is not country in the world... where economic colonization, exploitation, and humiliation were worse than in Cuba, in part owing to my country’s policies during the Batista regime. I can assure you that I have understood the Cubans, I approved of the proclamation, which Fidel Castro made in the Sierra Maestra, when he justifiably called for justice and especially yearned to rid Cuba of corruption. In the matter of Batista regime, I am in agreement with the first Cubans revolutionaries. That is perfect clear. But it is also clear that the problem has ceased to be a Cuban one and has become international, that is, it has become a Soviet problem. I am the President of the United States and not socialist; I am the President of a free nation which has certain responsibilities to the free world. I know that Castro betrayed the promises made in the Sierra Maestra, and that he has agreed to be a Soviet agent in Latin America” (The United States President John. F. Kennedy during an interview by Jean Daniel, which was published on December 14, 1963 in the New Republic, pp. 15-20).

After the embargo of the United States, the tourism sector in Cuba decreased in a surprising manner. In the mid-1960s Cuba was receiving a miniscule three thousand foreign tourists per year (Khrushchev, Henthorne, and Latour, 2007, 406).

There is no reliable data about the performance of the Cuban tourism in the 1960s. Even so, it is reasonable to expect a significant decrease in state revenues from the tourism sector. During the first years of the Castro administration, tourism was not considered a lucrative business, but a racism engine. Therefore, it is not surprising that during the
Fidel Castro regime the industry of tourism lost its importance as economic sector, as it used to be during the Batista period. However, Cuban tourism was not neglected by the state for hedonism or simple obstinacy. The lack of direct state involvement in tourism has its origin in the racial conflict that the Cubans (especially those who descended from Africans) faced during the pre-Revolution government. Saney points out the perception of the Cubans toward tourism, according to Shakur:

...racist ideas and racist attitudes about the natives... People come down here with big money, with big money attitudes, and no respect for the people, no respect for the Revolution... So tourism industry makes a kind of attitude that does not do anything but reinforce white supremacist values, mentality, and power relations. You don’t see a lot of black tourists come into Cuba. It’s economic, so that power is associated with white people. (2004, 110)

The Revolution was the social rights agent for the black Cubans and for the first time since the colonial stage they considered themselves as Cuban citizens, with the capability to be active performers in national subjects. Saney presents Nicolas Guillén, an Afro-Cuban, and national poet, whose poem “Tengo” (I Have) summed up the significance of the Revolution for blacks in 1967 (2004, 102):

I have, let’s see:
that being black
I can be stopped by no one at
the door of a dancing hall or bar.
I have, let’s see:
that I have learned to read,
To count
I have that I have learned to write,
and to think
and to laugh.
I have that now I have
a place to work
and earn
What I have to eat.
I have let’s see:
I have what was coming to me.

The social improvement led by the Revolutionary government of Fidel Castro should be admired by all the nations around the world, as well as by social development scholars. According to the United Nations Development Programme, Cuba is the country number 51 in human development in the world (Human Development Report, 2011, 126).

Nevertheless, economic development is decisive in regards to increasing the quality of the popular welfare. MacEwan points out that many economic theorists, particularly neoclassicists, consider the Marxist-Leninist system in Cuba to be a suitable illustration to prove that is not possible to incorporate economic growth and economic equality, not in contemporary times, and not in a global market economy. He states that the social policies of Castro were not effective for the Cuban economy:

The problem faced by Cuba, and by other nations attempting to build socialism in the context of capitalist underdevelopment, has been how to accomplish the task of both transforming the productive forces of society and
transforming social relations. (1981, 127)

The economic future of Cuba based on its Marxist-Leninist ideology is unpredictable, but the social needs of Cubans are still heard by the state.

**The Embargo of the United States on Cuba: An Economic Perspective**

“Cuba does not intend to be a pawn on the global chessboard”
- Fidel Castro

Not only political subjects caused the embargo of the United States – the Cold War, but also economic matters did so. After the Revolution, the Cuban government confiscated – without any compensation – all the properties owned by the Americans; and doing that the Cuban authorities infringed the international commerce law. Therefore, the embargo of the United States was not only pursuing its political policy, i.e. force Fidel Castro to change its totalitarian government and hold democratic elections, but now an economic purpose was established – reintroduce a market economy in Cuba. “With a clear perception of anticipated consequences, Castro resolutely engaged in an extremely risky course of action, one that eventually would lead to a complete change in the character of the Cuban society and economy by creating an aberrant dependence on the Soviet bloc.” The United States has historically constituted a natural and complementary commercial partner for Cuba, being its principal provider of trade relations, financial assistance, direct investment, and technology transfer. (Horowitz and Suchlicki, 2001, 263-265). In economic matters, when Fidel Castro chose communism, he excluded the opportunity for Cuba to reinvent itself and develop its economic capabilities.

**Cuban Government Reform: The Return of Tourism**

“All openings have brought risks. If we must make additional openings and reforms, we will. But for the moment they are not necessary”
- Fidel Castro

The importance of tourism as an economic sector was reestablished in Cuba before the fall of the Soviet Union. In the mid-1970s Cuba was receiving a great majority of its visitors from countries friendly with the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, it was in the 1990s when the government of Cuba recognized tourism as a prominent economic sector (Horowitz and Suchlicki, 2001, 407-08). Therefore, the new “boom” of the Cuban tourism was after the Castro administration implemented its reforms during the mid-1990s. It is important to point out that these reforms were not political policies, and even though Fidel Castro applied some opening strategies to the economy, Cuba would remain a communist state.

“Several measures have been implemented in the past few months... Does this mean that we should abandon our socialist principles or our Marxist-Leninist convictions? On the contrary, we should to conduct ourselves as genuine Marxists-Leninists... At any rate, this does not imply... that this is a return to capitalism, or much worse, an insane and hysterical race in that direction” (Fidel Castro, July 26, 1995).

In the tourism sector, four innovative economic policies were taken, i.e. the Cuban government amended its constitution in 1992 to recognize and protect private property, in 1993 the Cuban government permitted the dollar to circulate legally for the first time since
1959, the Decree-Law 147 in 1994 created a new Ministry of Tourism, and the Cuban tourist agency (INTUR) and Cubanacán were broken up into a number of separate entities to render the state sector more agile (Falcoff, 2003, 136).

Figure 2: Tourist Arrivals in Cuba, 1974-1979
After these policies took place in Cuba, the tourism sector underwent great improvement. In 1979 the tourist arrivals in Cuba was close to 140,000. In 2005 this number was close to 2,500,000, presenting a huge increase of 17.85 times more than in 1979.

“In the past decade, Cuba has experienced the highest rate of growth in tourism arrivals to become the overall second most popular tourism destination in the Caribbean region and the second most popular regional destination for European travelers” (Horowitz and Suchlicki, 2001, 409).

The development theory of Kohli and its emphasis about the role of the state in economic growth becomes stronger through the Cuban case. The tourism sector in Cuba developed enormously after many years of stagnant growth. However, growth was possible when the government of Cuba realized that in order to improve the economy it should open its market to foreign direct investment.

Figure 3: Tourist Arrivals in Cuba, 1996-2005
The Cuban tourism sector remained remarkable during the four following years. In 2006 Cuba received a total of 2,150,000 tourists. In 2007 2,119,000 tourists visited the Caribbean island, in 2008 it increased to 2,316,00 and the next year Cuba received 2,405,000 tourists (World Development Indicators & Global Development Finance, The World Bank, 15 December, 2010).

In comparison to 2006, the number of tourist arrivals in 2007 decreased by 31,000 tourists. Though, next year that number would increase by 197,000. In 2009 the number of tourist arrivals presented a growth of 1.04%.
Figure 4: Tourist Arrivals in Cuba, 2006-2009

On the one hand, despite the accelerated growth of the Cuban tourism sector in the last years; the government of Cuba still has central control of the economy. The hospitality industry is struggling with the limitations imposed by the state due to the uncertainty about the Cuban government’s commitment to foreign direct investment, the government’s constraints on the operation of business, enterprises’ prohibition from managing human resources, the inability to pay workers in convertible currency and the United States sanctions (Ritter, 2004, 155-166).

On the other hand, Cuba has demonstrated that in case of open entirely its economy to free market it would improve the tourism sector at great scale. In 2005, Cuba was the second most visited island in the Caribbean, with 2,319,300 tourists, after the Dominican Republic’s 3,690,700 tourists (Horowitz and Suchlicki, 2001, 410).

Table 1: Comparative Caribbean Tourism Data

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<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>2,972,600</td>
<td>2,793,200</td>
<td>3,443,200</td>
<td>3,690,700</td>
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<td>1,414,800</td>
<td>1,478,700</td>
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Figure 5: International tourism, receipts (USD)

In 1995 the annual tourism revenues in Cuba increased to $1 billion (USD). At the end of 2005, it topped the $2 billion (USD) mark (Horowitz and Suchlicki, 2001, 410). Although this provides proof of economic success in the tourism sector, the Cuban economy remains in the shadow of a communist society, which does not allow a private sector to develop, and in which the state determines how the national market should function and
how negotiations should be held. “As long as the [economic] system doesn’t change, and private enterprise is forced to operate with so many controls, the Cubans will not really prosper” (Falcoff, 2003 138). Many of the Castro’s government policies fit perfectly in the dependency theory of Andre Gunder Frank, where developing countries retain their markets isolated from developed economies. Unfortunately, contemporary economy is based on close cooperation with the private sector, foreign investment, knowledge and technology transfer, international relations, and global market.

Concluding Observations

The colonial stage in Cuba constituted the foundation of a slow-growing economy, limited in most of the cases by a lack of foreign investment and technology transfer. The history of Cuba is clear evidence of the importance of colonization in economic development. For Cuba, the Spanish colonization meant to be the beginning of a society economically and politically dependent on foreign nations.

During the Batista regime Cuba revealed considerable economic growth, and was one of the principal commercial partners of the United States. The golden era of Cuban tourism was between 1952-1957—still under Batista administration. Most of the tourists were Americans, and the major investor in the tourism industry was indeed the United States. The improvement of the tourism sector in Cuba at that time was possible because of the cohesive-capitalist government of Batista.

After the Revolution, the Cuban economy changed drastically, moving from a capitalist system to a communist structure. The end of the commercial liaison between Cuba and the United States defined the start of an isolated generation, where tourism was one the most afflicted economic sectors. The tourist clientele during the Soviet period was only from Eastern Europe, and the Soviet Union did not invest in the tourism industry as much as the United States did during the Batista dictatorship.

The tourism sector could lead the Cuban economy to development because it has been the principal source of employment and foreign exchange earnings for the last fifteen years. The tourism industry is the primary force behind foreign direct investment in Cuba. In the last two decades, the service industrial has become the main economic resource for Caribbean countries as a whole, and Cuba has a strategic geographical location that makes the island a very attractive choice for the tourists.

The economic policies taken by the Cuban government alienated tourism from development for more than thirty years. The lack of foreign direct investment and a market economy made it difficult to improve this vital sector. Since the communist government took power, the state has been in complete control of the economy. The Castro administration did not consider tourism as an important economic sector. As a result this industry fell into a critical period where the state did not invest in the sector.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Cuba was economically unsponsored, and lacked a developed industry sector. Therefore, tourism seemed to be the best solution to face its economic crisis. The Cuban government had to make some reforms in order to offer an attractive and profitable environment for foreign investors. Even though the economic policies taken by Cuba allowed foreign direct investment, the tourism sector presented some limitations.

Cuba has a totalitarian economy, hence the state dictates the regulations about how investments in the market should operate, and it is the only mediator for all commercial negotiations. Cuba does not have a free market; therefore, the embargo of the United States is not the major cause of the limited performance of tourism in Cuba. It is clear that once Castro permitted the entry of foreign capital, the tourism sector showed a substantial improvement.
Then a question arises: can Cuba achieve economic development without making political reforms? It seems that the future of the tourism sector, as in the rest of the Cuban economy, must rely on a market economy, but the Marxist-Leninist ideologies of Fidel Castro are based on a centrally controlled economy. Cuba, originally named by Spanish colonizers as “the place of safety,” is not currently a safe place for economic development. The Cuban policies are essentially oriented to protect the interests of the state, which do not allow the private sector to flow completely free and naturally. If Cuba wants to become an economic successful nation, it has to wake up from its communist dream and embrace a capitalist reality.

Bibliography


Appendix A
Trajectory of the Tourism Sector in Cuba


<table>
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<tr>
<th>Period</th>
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<th>REVOLUTION</th>
<th>ISOLATION</th>
<th>SOVIET UNION</th>
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<td>1957</td>
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The Hilltop Review, Fall 2011
The purpose of this paper is to identify and examine union initiated obstacles that Social Security Administration (SSA) mid-level managers face in using discretionary power. Managers should be aware of the bounds in which they operate in order to adequately negotiate decisions, which ultimately seek to serve public needs and promote workplace democracy. In examining the limitations of discretionary power I emphasize the importance of contractual restrictions by focusing on the elements of collective bargaining and grievance resolution. The intent of contractual obligations is to promote participative leadership and equality. However when management is stripped of certain discretionary powers strong disincentives result, encouraging laissez-faire leadership. Awareness of hurdles that contractual restrictions and corresponding historic adjudicative actions will enable managers to alter their leadership style and approach, while resisting the temptation to resort to laissez-faire leadership.

Leadership

The definition of leadership is debatable among practitioners and scholars, and managers and the managed. Bass indicates that that the search for one true meaning of leadership is fruitless (2008). Rather, the definition stems from the interpretation of the observer in the context of the situation (Bass, 2008). Regardless of one’s perspective of leadership, few would argue that discretionary powers are an unnecessary element of leadership.

Managerial Discretion

Mid-level managers of the SSA who interact directly with front-line workers exercise discretion when they experience, think, judge, and then act (Arendt, 2003) (Weber, 1946). These managers must have discretionary limits to avoid possible abuses of the system, such as failing to adhere to the letter and intent of the law (Hibbeln and Shumavon, 1986), exercising arbitrariness, or allowing and/or promoting inequality (Davis, 1969). Conversely, managers must be allowed the flexibility to properly implement policies in an engrossed world of language confliction and political, supervisory, peer, public, and employee pressure (Hibbeln and Shumavon, 1986). Certainly a reasonable balance must be sought between absolute discretionary power and rules that enforce discretionary limitations.

In his 1969 book, administrative law scholar Kenneth Davis indicated that discretionary power should be monitored and controlled through administrative and judicial measures (1969). It is the administrators themselves, involved with the details of vague legislative policies, who should make the rules governing administrative procedures (Davis, 1969). The act of distributing this power to front-line workers is certainly instrumental in that workers are given a sense of ownership (Bass, 2008).

Similar to managers, front-line workers need appropriate levels of discretion in order to effectively complete tasks and successfully develop leadership skills (Lipsky, 1980). The manager must empower employees with the necessary tools that will enable them to meet management goals, while preserving agency quality, service, and excellence (Bass, 2008). There is a balance that must be met between management and employee discretion. By allow-
ing greater employee discretion the manager must freely, or through coercion, relinquish discretionary power. This loss of power often results in a reduction in the manager’s sense of achievement and recognition (Bass, 2008).

SSA Manager Discretion
As with most large public organizations, the SSA has policies which have evolved toward more narrowed definitions and implementations, reductions in discretionary powers of managers and workers, and subjugations of management and workers toward more defined bounds in which they must work (Social Security Administration, 2011). Front-line worker membership in the American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE), the primary unionized representative body of voluntary non-management SSA personnel, has historically been instrumental in securing decision making power, resolving passed losses of employee discretionary power. Unfortunately, in this swing of the pendulum, mid-level management has experienced further limitations to discretionary power to the extent that the overarching views of both management and employees are a mere semblance of previously existent leadership. And while the manager’s further development of personal leadership skills has declined, the importance on a narrowed focus of technocratic skills and parallel leadership has increased significantly. As a result, managers possessing poor negotiation skills with their union representative counterparts often resort to laissez-faire leadership, becoming managers who “bury themselves in paperwork and stay away from employees” (Bass, 2008).

AFGE/SSA Contractual Overview
Union representatives that managers must negotiate with are represented by the AFGE. The AFGE is comprised of 600,000 federal and D.C. government workers, with only 15% of these workers located in the D.C. area, and 1,100 Locals represented primarily by employees of the Department of Defense, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Social Security Administration (2011). A contract between the AFGE and the SSA stipulates the bounds in which management conduct activities (SSA and AFGE, 2005). Similar to the German system of unionization, managers are not members of the union (Dewitt, 1980) (SSA and AFGE, 2005). This is due to the fear that possible erosion of worker bargaining authority might ensue (Dewitt, 1980). Among many contractual obligations that management must adhere to, collective bargaining and grievance settlement are mid-level manager’s top priorities in the decision making process.

Collective bargaining has the advantage of promoting participative, rather than directive, leadership. In the 1920s the industrial union’s collective bargaining agreement started to be used in conjunction with Frederick Taylor’s scientific management principles (Fry, 1998). Applying Taylor’s framework, ideally decisions which involve employee fairness and equality would be decided collectively between the representative union member and the SSA manager without compromising agency efficiency or effectiveness. In practice Taylor’s principles take a back seat to union interests. Although Taylor’s principles may seem a bit antiquated today, the basic premise of the search for maximum productivity still remains essential in the private and public sectors. Union interests, however, do not seek productive efficiencies. Rather, they seek increased member involvement and bargaining leverage. Since unions only seek contraction, agendas that attempt to scale back union power or member base meet fierce union opposition.

In terms of AFGE members, the AFGE does accomplish the primary mission, “to improve the professional and personal lives of …members and to improve government services” (AFGE, 2006). This accomplishment is not without costs. The Federal Times reported in June of 2011 that a ban of official union activities during working hours was being sought by republicans due to an Office of Personnel Management report that indicated an estimated


$129 million was spent for 3 million hours of union activities in 2009 (Losey, 2011). The unavailability of workers due to union activities limits resources available to mid-level managers at a time when budget reductions due to the looming recession are ever present. Managers cannot achieve optimal performance through their staff if they do not have the ability to exert control over others through available resources (Henderson and Martin, 2001).

Backing union officials’ defense of SSA expenditures for union activities was Democratic Representative Stephen Lynch (Losey, 2011). He indicated that this time is spent toward “resolving workplace disputes, improving workplace safety and other working conditions, enforcing protections against discrimination, negotiating telework agreements, or creating fair promotion procedures” (Losey, 2011). The AFGE president, John Gage, furthered the agreement by suggesting that “eliminating official time would effectively spell the end of collective bargaining in the federal government” (Losey, 2011). This “all or nothing” approach is fairly common in negotiation procedures, yet is still an effective scare tactic. The result of a failure to change is a forced limitation on the ability for mid-level managers to use manpower towards their goals, thus suppressing the element of action in exercising discretion (Arendt, 2003) (Weber, 1946).

Contract Analysis

Developing mid-level manager’s leadership growth requires giving them the necessary resources that allow discretionary power (Maxwell, 1993). By discouraging personal growth mid-level managers are demotivated from achieving valid successes (Maxwell, 1993). In examining discretion of mid-level managers the Management Rights section of the most recent binding contract between the SSA and AFGE must be observed (SSA and AFGE, 2005):

Section 1. Statutory Rights
A. Subject to subsection (B) of this section, nothing in this Agreement shall affect the authority of any management official of any agency--
1. to determine the mission, budget, organization, number of employees and internal security practices of the agency; and
   2. in accordance with applicable laws--
      a. to hire, assign, direct, layoff and retain employees in the agency or to suspend, remove, reduce in grade or pay, or take other disciplinary action against such employees;
      b. to assign work, to make determinations with respect to contracting out, and to determine the personnel by which agency operations shall be conducted;
      c. with respect to filling positions, to make selections for appointments from-
         (1) among properly ranked and certified candidates for promotion;
         or
         (2) any other appropriate source; and
      d. to take whatever actions may be necessary to carry out the agency mission during emergencies.
B. Nothing in this section shall preclude any agency and any labor organization from negotiating--
1. at the election of the agency, on the numbers, types and grades of employees or positions assigned to any organizational subdivision, work project, or tour of duty, or on the technology, methods and means of performing work;
2. procedures which management officials of the agency will observe in exercising any authority under this section; or
3. appropriate arrangements for employees adversely affected by the exercise of any authority under this section by such management officials.

SSA managers represent the most trusted senior workers who generally begin their career as front-line workers. Yet, they are not able to exercise their wisdom without the filter of the representatives of their subordinates. This often subjects them to be categorized as the glorified mentor and the gatekeeper of hierarchical information. Their supervisors are in turn limited to evaluating performance of procedural metrics, including union grievances. The manager is forced to shift from the public preference of a customer centric organization to a customer centric organization bound by competing union membership agendas. Collectively bounds are incrementally narrowed through adjudicative victories and favorable legislative policy. Through a more fragmented process union members ultimately affect policy through exploiting the contractual obligations of workplace grievance resolution.

The Union Grievance

The process of settling grievances with union assistance has advantages for both the worker and the manager. The worker gets an opportunity to voice his disposition in cases where the worker may feel intimidated or lack critical communication skills (Devonish and Nurse, 2007). Grievance settlement also provides the employee with a method to solve contract violations without fear of repercussions (Devonish and Nurse, 2007). Workers also are able to redirect management agendas and ensure that the workplace justice is equitable (Devonish and Nurse, 2007). Management benefits from resolving disputes before work is inhibited or ceased (Devonish and Nurse, 2007). This outcome allows for prevention of higher turnover and the associated recruitment, selection and training costs (Devonish and Nurse, 2007).

Over involvement of union oversight can lead to negative outcomes of grievance settlements and unnecessary suppression of management control. This limitation of discretionary power affords incompetent employees a barrier of protection under the umbrella of the violated few. An AFGE attorney won a $100,000 award for punitive and compensatory damages for 14 year veteran Magnolia Littles in an arbitration case in June of 2010 (Erling, 2010). After receiving a 90 day suspension for approving a fraudulent payment, Magnolia claimed that other employees were involved who had not received suspension, and was therefore the victim of discrimination (Erling, 2010).

Another case that resulted in an unfavorable decision involved claims representative Uma Ashok who filed two separate actions involving claims of discrimination and harassment due to national origin and religion (Ashok v. Barnhart, 2003). Her first claim was filed on November 19, 1992 after she discovered the words “Bloody Indian” scribed on her jacket (Ashok v. Barnhart, 2003). Additional allegations resulted from Uma, eventually resulting in a final court decision by the United States District Court for The Eastern District of New York on October 30, 2003 (Ashok v. Barnhart, 2003).

The decisions and justifications of these cases are immaterial to the effect that they have on management discretion. It is often the process itself that has the most drastic outcome in changing management behavior. Both cases required increased expenditures by the federal government and decreased productive management time allocations. Strictly on the basis of preserving taxpayer dollars, one might conclude that the costs associated with legal proceedings outweigh the costs to reprimand or retain an incompetent employee.

These cases likely resulted in looming negative stigmas of the direct supervisors involved. A denial was the result of the second case, however, an 11 year period elapsed from the time allegations were first made and the decision was granted by a U.S. district judge. This is 11 years of possible promotions or appraisals leading to promotion in a competitive envi-
Managerial Response

Judicial review will affect relationship dynamics between front-line workers and management. Since managers are often embedded in SSA organizational culture for 10 or more years before reaching the first rung of the management ladder the tacit knowledge gained by mid-level managers from witnessing the judicial decision making process is at a fairly mature stage, so they tend to be well aware of and able to avoid potential pitfalls. Rooting in this knowledge is the incentive for mid-level managers to lay low, prevent friction, and limit decisions to those that have union support. The manager may be incentivized to practice passive management by exception, where “the leader intervenes only if agreements are not kept or subordinates’ standards fall below standards” (Bass, 2008, p.143). When the manager makes a conscience decision not to intervene in failed agreements and low standards laissez-faire leadership is taking place (Bass, 2008).

The cases presented and many others that have had similar results represent union victories, inevitably resulting in further increases of employee power and union support. Like any organization, resources are limited. Therefore, the swift victories are preferable, serving as advertising campaigns for the AFGE. A blatant attempt to secure membership is presented in the AFGE’s public release of Magnolia Little’s case in which attorney Patti McGowan boasts, “This is a first for an SSA local in arbitration, the unprecedented sums of damages awarded to our member should serve as a wake-up call. We won't let these blatant injustices to our members stand” (Erling, 2010). In addition to securing membership, these AFGE public releases serve to shape the minds of the workers destined for the management track.

Agencies tend to be responsive to adjudicatory and arbitration findings by reevaluating and reformulating administrative values and procedures (Ludd, 1986). Max Weber contends that legitimate legal-rational authority is upheld by administrative procedures (Fry, 1998). Subordination to authority is then directed from an “impersonal order”, not the manager (Fry, 1998, p. 28). And “legal authority exists only when legal order is implemented and obeyed in the belief that it is legitimate” (Fry, 1998, p. 29). When legality of authority is diminished by collective AFGE actions legitimacy of mid-level management decisions is similarly reduced.

Collective Bargaining

Mid-level management practices are also bound by the restrictions of collective bargaining in the use of monetary incentives to motivate employees to act in the interest of taxpayers. In October of 1988 the SSA piloted a budget/gain sharing program that divided local budget savings, based the previous year’s productivity, evenly into both the Social Security Trust Fund and monetary awards to be distributed at the discretion of mid-level management (U.S. DHHS, SSA v. FLRA, AFGE). The AFGE responded by filing a grievance indicating that the national collective bargaining agreement had been violated, indicating the SSA had failed to negotiate the implementation of the program (U.S. DHHS, SSA v. FLRA, AFGE). The decision reached by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit was an allowance for management to retain the discretion to determine the budget (U.S. DHHS, SSA v. FLRA, AFGE). However, the “procedures and appropriate arrangements” of budget allocations was ruled in favor of the AFGE (U.S. DHHS, SSA v. FLRA, AFGE, p. 1).

This case, among many, shapes management actions. According to Herbert Simon, given a person’s limited capacities, the decision maker will respond to select stimuli, particularly shaped by routines, habits or routine or creative problem solving (Fry, 1998). Managers use select “environmental stimuli” (Fry, 1998, p. 193) to exercise discretion when they experi-
ence, think, judge, and then act (Arendt, 2003) (Weber, 1946). Discretion is therefore limited when action is restricted by dominant stimuli. Only experiences, thoughts, and judgments which support union interests will result in viable actions; therefore, to increase efficient patterns of thought, the mid-level manager must realize cognitive bounds. The result is management’s “routinized and habitual responses”, while the “creative search activity” is minimized (Fry, 1998). In order to realize creative decision making SSA mid-level managers must successfully negotiate agendas in the arena of workplace democracy.

**Variables of the Magnitude of Participation**

Union initiated managerial bounds do spur the environment for workplace democracy to flourish. The magnitude of participation in the decision making process of a democratic workplace can be measured by examining five variables: extensity, scope, mode, intensity and quality (Mason, 1982).

First, the extensity, the proportion and absolute number, of workers who participate in decisions in the organization has increased as management restrictions have decreased (Mason, 1982). Although many front-line workers are not members of the AFGE, membership is not required to participate in the fruits that the AFGE and SSA contract binds management actions to. However, if participation were minimal the threat of work stoppages would cease to be a threat to the SSA; therefore, contract compliance would naturally have minimal impact on management decisions.

Second, the scope, the number and type of issues, of decisions are decided collectively relative to the decentralized structure of the SSA (Mason, 1982). Technology has played an instrumental role in allowing for more decision making capabilities to be made in a shorter time. The frequency and number of issues in the SSA can be decided by means of email and instant messages in a relatively short time. With limited available time not devoted to direct front-line customer service, managers are able to maximize collective buy-in.

Neil Chamberlain, who was the associate professor of economics and assistant director of the Labor and Management Center at Yale University, indicates that the scope of collective bargaining is often framed to explain that the area in which management discretion is most constricted is from the continually increasing power of the union (1951). He argued that the resulting decision is a “joint product” between management and the union, rather than a narrowing of management discretionary authority (Chamberlain, 1951, p.152). Yet, Chamberlain’s view stemmed from worker protection from “steel barons” and “coal kings” who subjected their workers to unsafe working conditions and low wages (1951, p. 156).

Third, the mode, the form of participation, often depends on the importance of the decision being made (Mason, 1982). Face to face discussions continue to be the most acceptable forum to make decisions that may result in significant change and require input from all members. Employees appreciate face to face decisions when news has a significant personal effect and the availability of immediate feedback is necessary. Conversely, the electronic messaging is a useful tool for routine matters requiring no urgency.

Fourth, intensity, “the psychological involvement of individuals in the act of participation”, of the decision is instrumental as a deciding factor for the outcome (Mason, 1982, p.155). Front-line workers who do not believe that a decision will result that makes a difference will often fail to adhere to the procedure being decided. Psychological involvement is also dependent on the worker’s perceived fairness of the outcome (Cohen-Charash and Spector, 2001).

Distributive and procedural justices heavily influence intensity in the workers interpretation of fairness (Cohen-Charash and Spector, 2001). Distributive justice is dependent on the workers perceived distribution of the quantity and quality of work (Cohen-Charash and Spector, 2001). When a worker perceives work distribution to be unfair the worker experiences “anger, pride, or guilt” (Cohen-Charash and Spector, 2001, p. 280). Procedural justice is
a perception of the fairness of the process that results are derived (CSpector, 2001). Included in procedural justice is the way employees view the mid-level manager’s process of communication (Cohen-Charash and Spector, 2001). Employees tend to perceived justified actions when mid-level managers incorporate politeness, honesty, and respect in their messages (Cohen-Charash and Spector, 2001).

Finally, quality, the impact in the workplace, of the decision also has a high impact on worker involvement (Mason, 1982). Participation in the decision and management buy-in contributes to the quality of the decision and is more likely to result in worker compliance. Decisions that often fail to be quality decisions are those that are hasty and formulated and delivered by one person.

Taking these factors into account allows for mid-level managers to evaluate the extent that workplace democracy is transpiring within their realm of control, and to attempt to suppress or promote further worker involvement in the democratic process. While there is not an adequate means to measure these factors, other organizations can be used as a basis for comparison. One could logically speculate that the intensity and longevity of union involvement in an organization positively correlates with workplace democracy and negatively correlates with mid-level management discretionary power.

Conclusion

Mid-level managers need to be aware of bounds of union contract agreements and past adjudicative actions in order to function successfully as a leader. The manager also must be aware of the bounds manifested in collective bargaining and the consequences of worker grievances in order to successfully negotiate preferred outcomes and avoid the pitfall of laissez-faire leadership. Finally, managers should be aware of the benefits of workplace democracy and the elements needed to ensure compliance.

References


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