<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Interests, Social Welfare Policy and Social Problems.</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOHN P. FLYNN</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Welfare as Coercive Social Control</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORMAN N. GOROFF</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Income Insurance: Some Implications For Political and Economic Inequality.</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOHN B. WILLIAMSON</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An Evaluation of the Case Against National Income Insurance</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOHN B. WILLIAMSON</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Sociology of the Inner-City Functionality for Practice</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IVOR J. ECHOLS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horatio Alger: The Persistence of a Ghetto Social Welfare Institution.</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAROL POLL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOHN M. GOERING</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opinions and Expectations of Nursing Home Administrators.</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JORDAN I. KOSBERG</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responses to Social Services Among the Urban Unemployed.</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WILLIAM W. PHILLIBER</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Premises for Planning in Appalachia</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RICHARD A. BALL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Work, Sociology and Social Diagnosis</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HARRIS CHAIKLIN</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
AN EXPLANATION - THE NEW SIZE OF THE JOURNAL

Our printers notified us that there would be a thirty percent increase in cost for printing and paper per issue beginning with this current issue. We were faced with three alternatives:

1. Raise the subscription rate by one third. This was rejected. We did not want to add to the inflationary pressures.

2. Reduce the number of pages by one third and save on paper. We rejected this because we wanted to maintain the maximum flow of information by our colleagues to our colleagues.

3. Reduce the size of the pages by reducing the print. Instead of using an 11x17 inch sheet of paper, we could use an 8½x14 inch sheet of paper. This would reduce the cost by one third, therefore enabling us to maintain our present low subscription rate as well as continue with the maximum number of articles.

The unanimous decision of the members of the editorial board consulted was in favor of the third alternative. The new format for the Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare is the result of this decision. We feel certain you will accept this as the most logical decision and continue to support the Journal with your subscriptions.

Introduction to Volume II No. 1

This issue includes four papers by Flynn, Goroff, Williamson and Echols which were presented at the Sociology and Social Welfare Division sessions at the Society for the Study of Social Problems Convention in Montreal, Canada this past August.

Flynn deals with three interrelated propositions in his paper. He suggests that self-interest is a dynamic in social welfare policy; that to characterize welfare exchange as a unilateral transfer obscures the inter-relationship between social welfare policy and social problems - social welfare exchange is bilateral; that perception of newly-found self-interests in alternative policies provides incentives to support new policy options.

Goroff maintains that social welfare is not the humanitarian benevolent expression that "we are our brother's keepers". Rather, he contends that it is an integral part of the coercive social control system developed to maintain the status quo in which the dominant classes of the society try to control those they define as potential, if not actual disrupters of the stability of the community.

Williamson's two articles were originally written for publication in successive issues. However, we decided to publish them together in one issue without making any changes. Williamson, in the first article, develops his proposal for a national income insurance plan to provide social insurance benefits whenever family or individual income falls below a specified level. In the second article, he attempts to anticipate and deal with the major arguments against the national income insurance plan.

Echols focuses her paper on an exploration of the variety of theoretical approaches which purport to provide a basis for understanding the dynamics of the inner city. She notes that her intent is not to castigate but rather to challenge the energies of thought and action once more towards potential cure rather than endless remedies for symptoms.

-1-
Poll and Goering in their paper seek to examine one specific social welfare institution in order to find answers to the question of whether there is any contradiction between the more or less permanent place of social welfare institutions in a ghetto community and the goal of changing and improving that same neighborhood. Although not specifically planned, Poll and Goering's article is an excellent companion piece to Echols paper. They seem to support, by the process of an analysis of a specific institution, basic points Echols makes.

Kosberg's paper concerns the question of the relationship between the attitudes of nursing home administrators and the specific characteristics of proprietary nursing homes. He found that generally administrators believed that their residents would seldom, if ever, be rehabilitated or restored to the point of being discharged to non-institutional settings. This attitude reinforced a custodial orientation for care and treatment. One wonders how much their attitudes and subsequent action create self-fulfilling prophecies.

Philliber attempted to find out why there is variation in responses to social services among the urban unemployed. He utilizes ten variables, knowledge of the services, degree of alienation, length of residence, income on last job, race, sex and age. "Knowledge that a service existed to help them find jobs was the prime factor determining use of the agency. However alienation and low ambition would prevent others from doing so, even if they too shared the knowledge." The analysis of the data provides interesting material for discussion. One wonders how Philliber's findings relate to Echols' paper.

Ball's article focuses on the traditions of many people in Appalachia and notes that our inability to perceive their value may be traced in part to a view of human history in which our own institutionalized means are seen as social necessity. "If we can replace our common reliance on a single developmental model with an approach emphasizing a diversity of social ends and a variety of acceptable means, we may be able to assist the Appalachian region to develop along it's own valid lines."

Chaiklin's paper explores the relationship between social work and sociology. He notes that the early collaboration between the two was fruitful, although it has not continued to the present. He traced the development of sociology and social work within the Universities and notes the divergence between the two. "The way to overcome the effects of the separation between sociology and social work is to build useful typologies."

It is highly probable that there will be colleagues who will take issue with the positions expressed by some if not all of the authors included in this volume. We welcome your thinking and would be happy to receive your manuscripts. It is through the process of dialogue that we will expand the boundaries of knowledge.
"Self-Interest, Social Welfare Policy and Social Problems"

John P. Flynn
School of Social Work
Western Michigan University
Kalamazoo, Michigan

Three propositions are explored in this paper which tie the connection between social welfare policy and social problems to the construct of pursuit of self-interest. The first is that self-interest (i.e., "self" as individual, group or organization) is a dynamic in social welfare policy formulation. The second proposition is that our characterization of the welfare exchange as a unilateral transfer obscures the inter-relationship between social welfare policy and social problems and that, rather, the social welfare exchange is bilateral. The third proposition is that perception of newly-found self-interests in alternative policies provides incentives to support new policy options. This conceptualization has useful implications for achieving egalitarian rearrangements in a social system. Some examples are provided below, after a discussion of the propositions.

Ideally, one might generally assume that there is a constructive relationship between the societal recognition of its social problems and the social welfare policies which give shape to its social welfare programs. However, it is hard to find any comprehensive theory of social problems and social welfare policy. Merton and Nisbet have observed on three occasions over the last decade that a comprehensive theory of social problems does not exist (Kitsuse and Spector, 1973: 407). Neither does one find a comprehensive theory of social welfare policy. Yet, in a modern society ostensibly committed to rational and democratic problem solving, the connection between social policy appears more serendipitous than planned.

Public and private social welfare programs are generally aimed at providing some consensual minimum standard of health and decency. Such programs are commonly assumed to be unilateral transfers of wealth from one population category to another, generally from the "top downward". The recognition of "upward transfers" has only recently received any popular recognition (Stern, 1973; Tussing, 1974) and the identification of reciprocal exchanges in welfare relationships has only recently received scholarly analysis (Pruger, 1973).

The writer wishes to gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Richard Boettcher and William Burian, School of Social Work, Western Michigan University, for critiquing earlier drafts of this paper.
This writer assumes that there is a reciprocal interdependence between the providers and the receivers of social welfare programs and explores one particular aspect of that exchange. A proposition explored here is that self-interest is a dynamic in social welfare policy formulation and that such a dynamic is founded on the basic assumption of reciprocal interdependence. The perception of newly-found self-interests obtainable in alternative social welfare policy options is examined here as a factor in inducing purposive policy change.

It is proposed here that the common characterization of the welfare relationship as a unilateral transfer has obscured the connection between the problem and policy. The late Richard Titmuss refers to social policy as relating to unilateral transfers (e.g., grants or gifts) and economic policy as relating to markets and exchanges and bilateral transfers (Titmuss, 1968: 22). On the contrary, conceptualizing the welfare relationship as being comprised of reciprocal exchanges forces us to look at the bilateral nature of policy benefits with social and economic policy being inseparable. Inasmuch as "downward" redistributive policies have received abundant attention, and while not denying the efficacy and promise of exploring the distributive effects of "upward" transfers, this paper will focus on the possibility that there are incentives held by those population categories who are in positions to influence policy change and who, coincidentally and concomitantly, are beneficiaries in provider roles.

The identification of those incentives which relate favorably to newly-found self-interests may hold some promise for a more equitable distribution of the burden of social problems and the benefits of social welfare policies. It is proposed here that policy change is likely to occur when those in advantaged positions are able to perceive newly-found self-interests and support the associated new policy options. This "principle of substitution" (see Zeckhauser and Shaeffer, 1968: 43) or principle of willingness, founded on the perception of self-interest, may provide a dynamic for policy change in situations where inequality and/or repressive policies heretofore relied only upon moral exhortation or legislative or judicial mandate for egalitarian relief.
The fields of social problems and social welfare policy are often thought to be ordered by the moral or humanistic motivations of those who legislate and/or manage the welfare system. The welfare system has also been observed to be influenced by the social control functions performed (Flynn, 1973). There is also considerable literature supporting the notion that "social" problems and the pursuit of policy solutions are related to another dynamic, i.e., the incentives associated with self-interest. We will now survey some of the "self-interest literature". Although reality is not neatly divisible into economic, political and social theory, the following section will provide the survey in that order, following an observation on social problems theory.

Social Problems Theory. Kitsuse and Spector reject the traditional social disorganization and value-conflict approaches to the study of social problems and offer a process approach to the subject. They view social problems as "the activities of groups making assertions of grievances and claims" with respect to some putative conditions. (Spector and Kitsuse, 1973; see also Ross and Staines, 1972). They argue that the subject matter of a process approach contains three elements: a theory of moral indignation, a theory of natural history, (Spector and Kitsuse, 1972) and a theory of interests, since:

any of the groups that participate in the process of definition do so in order to pursue or protect their own social, political, economic and other interests. (Kitsuse and Spector, 1973: 418).

Economic Theory. The literature of classical utilitarianism (as with, say, Jeremy Bentham) is entirely consonant with this view; that is, the main proposition is that, generally speaking, the greatest social good would be produced by pursuit of self-interest. Here, self-interest is seen as the dynamic explaining social action and the rationale for self-directed behavior and goal-seeking. (Heilbroner, 1967: 116-22 and Mencher, 1967: 63). Even Marx (albeit from the perspective of class consciousness) said that there was "a social class that was forced by the conditions of its daily life to fight for a self-interest which was also the common interest of mankind". (Harrington, 1972: 13).
Compare that view with the Hobbesian contention that "each member of society had a self-interest in limiting the unbridled egotism of his neighbors". (Harrington, 1972: 35). In this same context (i.e., that self-interest is the very warp or woof of the social fabric), Mencher recalled that classical capitalism, in the person of Adam Smith, insisted that self-interest motivations were "the foundations of social responsibility". (Mencher, 1967: 67).

Political Theory. Political theory, is, perhaps, a more prolific source of interest-oriented literature inasmuch as political behavior is, by definition, influence behavior. Generally speaking, the construct of "interest group behavior" is, by its very nature, suggestive of self-interest in political action. More specifically, however, the identification of incentives for self-interest can be found in the literature. (Clark and Wilson, 1961: Bernard, 1938).

Charles Lindblom has suggested that a more efficacious technique for purposeful intervention in the policy arena is the playing out of "partisan analysis"; that is, influence behavior is said to be more predictably effective when one policy maker identifies options which also serve the values of other policy makers to whom persuasion is directed. (Lindblom, 1968: 65, 95). In such conditions, the various policy goals of the parties involved are said not to be challenged.

In the interorganizational arena, it has often been noted that organizations act so as to protect, preserve or expand their domains, regardless of the service function assigned by the community or supra-system. (See Warren, 1971: Levine and White, 1961).

In studying power relationships in intraorganizational behavior, Etzioni has identified (among other types) an orientation toward organizational involvement on the part of members that is said to be "calculative". (Etzioni, 1961: 11-13). Such an orientation, said to be essentially an orientation of self-interest, was observed by Boettcher in his test of Etzioni's compliance theory in a welfare system (Boettcher, 1973).

More specifically, in terms of interracial group relations, self-interest incentives have been seen as a key dynamic in organizing political behavior. Carmichael and Hamilton, in exploring the viability of coalition-making, deal gingerly with the dangers involved in cooptation. Yet, they suggest that after first developing a strong
power base within the minority group, "all parties to the coalition must perceive a mutually beneficial goal based on the conception of each part of his own self-interest". (Carmichael and Hamilton, 1968: 77). In this same context, Norval Glenn has indicated that "self-interest is the most basic and important force underlying white policy and action vis a vis blacks". (cited in Burkey, 1971: 74).

Social Theory. Functional orientations in sociology, by virtue of their emphasis upon system requisites, perhaps run the risk of overlooking the more idiosyncratic incentives of social actors; that is, the focus is generally more upon system outcomes rather than incentives as inputs to social action in a system.

In one study of the incentives of local actors in social welfare planning and policy-making, a relationship was observed between the self-interest incentives of participants and the particular roles that some actors fulfilled in initiating social action. Initiators of community and region-wide planning activity in establishing mental health services were observed as being moved primarily by concrete, tangible or material incentives in which self-(i.e., personal, organizational or community) interests were to be served. (Flynn, 1973a).

William Ryan, in perhaps more caustic though no less accurate fashion, has called the latent functions of welfare liberalism into question. Ryan speaks of the function of "victim-blaming" in which the consequences of social problems are confusedly intercharged with the causes of social dysfunction. He states that liberal victim-blamers either change the poor man or "cool him out" so as to "reconcile [their] own self-interest" [with] the prompting of humanitarian impulses". (Ryan, 1972: 26). This, of course, is little more than a modern version of the ancient Pharaoh's maintenance of the "vissier" for performance of welfare functions or the medieval and later Christian perversion of "making oneself God's debtor". In either case, seemingly altruistic behavior serves the interest of the primary actor initiating the welfare relationship.

SELF-INTEREST AND SOCIAL WELFARE

The classical, common and pervasive view of social welfare's uniqueness among social institutions as a vehicle for unilateral exchange is no better illustrated than by Edmund A. Smith. Smith argues that social welfare as a social institution differs from other social institutions; that is, political, economic and religious/patriotic institutions are said to be expressions of collective
social concern for collectivities of populations. All individuals, in laying out and setting forth the laws, norms and labeling of social categories, are said to be collectively serving their own interests (e.g., "making America safe for democracy"; keeping "crime off the streets", etc.). Such a characterization is thought not to be true of social welfare institutions. Welfare institutions are, rather, thought to be the social expression of the collective concern for individual conditions (Smith, 1965: 17-23); for example, while the aged and/or permanently and totally disabled may rightfully lay claim to the privileges of dependence, the social relationship is assumed to be a unilateral exchange in that benefits accrue to the individual at the largesse of the collectivity. The only interest assumed to be served is for the needy individual, or, perhaps a hated dependent group. The self-interest of the collectivity as donor is generally not considered.

Assuming, again, that the welfare relationship should more accurately be cast as a bilateral or reciprocal exchange among actors, a reconceptualization of the exchange system is in order. This is to say that self-interest behavior on the part of actors is no different in the social welfare institutions. A case in point is provided by Gans in his enumeration of some fifteen functions of poverty (which, of course, at times gives rise to public assistance policies). Included among the functions of the poor and the phenomenon of poverty are the provision of a low-wage labor pool, the assurance of jobs for human service professionals, the maintenance of the status of the non-poor in the stratification system, and the contribution of the poor in stabilizing the political process, since the poor vote less and the political system is able to ignore them. (Gans, 1972). Hence, one might see here the bilateral or multilateral self-interests served for other than those generally assumed to be at the bottom and at the receiving end of social relationships.

A SELF-INTEREST MODEL

David Gil offers a useful model in developing a framework for social welfare policy analysis in the self-interest context. For purposes of this paper, only three aspects of that framework will be discussed here. The first aspect is Gil's position that the crucial dynamic for change is the education of the elite* to perception

*These actors are referred to as "elites" in Etzioni's sense of being those whose power subordinates the participation of others rather than in the context of a pyramidal power structure. Hence, those in positions of setting the parameters of policy are policy power elites, as with voters, public opinion makers and other, more typical conceptions of decision-makers.
of self-interest in policy change. The second aspect of the Gil model is the common domains of social policy. The third aspect is the mechanisms by which the domains of social policy are regulated. (Gil, 1970; 1973).

Perception of Self-Interest. The first major aspect of the Gil model, which essentially provides the nexus of this paper, is the contention that the source of energy for a value system in any society is the perception of self-interest; that is, the priority ranking of social values are reflective of the self-interests of its members. Assuming the validity of that point of view (and, indeed, the preceding discussion was devoted to surveying the literature for support from other sources), it is further contended that the major dynamic for policy change is the education of decision-making elites to newly perceived self-interests; that is to say that, if a public remains unchallenged or uninformed as to what its interests are, there is no chance for change in the institutionalized inequality of rights and statuses. However, if such publics can be educated to the recognition that many patterns and activities do not serve their (i.e., individual, group, organizational or community) interests, the potential for new and alternative, and possibly egalitarian, social policies is presented. In other words, such a conceptualization takes the reality of inequality and the hope of equality out of the arena of "zero-sum" games. Or, stated another way, equality is redefined as a distributable, rather than a fixed and finite, commodity.

The Domains of Social Policy. It is observed by Gil that there are three common domains over which social policy provides regulation. The first is the regulation of the over-all quality of life; the second is the regulation of the circumstances of living of individuals; the third is the regulation of the relationships of the society's members, in various groupings and in society as a whole. These three components of domain are, assumedly, never left to chance in any society. Their regulation is developed through laws, norms, customs and other patterned behavior.

Examples may be found in separatist and discriminatory public school systems, on the one hand, or in court-ordered desegregation plans, on the other; the nature of the domain may also be observed in the various behaviors of the Bureau of Indian Affairs in terms of how the rights of reservation Indians are variously exploited, protected or advocated.
The Mechanisms of Policy Alteration. In Gil's framework, the mechanisms by which the domains are altered or maintained are: 1) resource development, 2) status allocation, 3) rights distribution, and 4) the linkage between status and rights. Gil subsumes that which is generally referred to as economic policy under the more general rubric of social policy. In fact, the mechanisms of policy alteration, as they are played out, are said to often be determined by economic policies.

In the mechanism of resource development, a society's decisions regarding the development of its resources and its priorities are held to be the first means of regulation of domain. Social policies in this area may be seen as effecting the manner and extent to which life-sustaining and life-enhancing goods and services are developed and distributed. This mechanism is clearly illustrated in the federal government's interest being served by retaining water or mineral rights over Indian reservation lands. This fact was clearly noted by critics such as Senator Edward Kennedy regarding Wounded Knee in 1973 who obviously recognized the bilateral nature of the welfare exchange. (Wassaja, 1973). The residents need not to have been reminded, or course, as they were no doubt familiar with the problem.

Secondly, social policies are said to effect the manner and extent to which statuses are allocated vis a vis the social positions to which people are assigned. This second mechanism allocates individuals to positions and allocates the positions needing fulfillment to individuals. This process is manifested in manpower allocations, divisions of labor and the association of particular individuals and units with certain roles. This mechanism is manifest in the allocation of certain social categories to, say, migrant laborers, as with certain groups of southern blacks, southwest chicanos and Appalachian whites.

By the third mechanism (the distribution of rights) social policies are seen as the alteration of the legitimacy with which various actors in a social system may lay claim to the real and symbolic, and acquired and ascribed, rewards and entitlements. Examples of applications of the rights mechanism are found, explicitly, in the Civil Rights Act and minimum wage legislation; symbolic devices are found in alterations in labeling, as with "chairpersons", rather than "chairman", etc.
The fourth mechanism, the linkage between status and rights, is manifested in the manner and extent to which the rewards and entitlements become associated with particular statuses. That is, certain privileges and prerogatives become associated with particular roles and positions. An illustration of the linkage between status and right can be found, informally, in the practice of "if you're black, stay back". More formally, poll taxes and voter registration tests have patterned the claim to rewards and entitlements. Another example might be the right of the donor in welfare relationships to set the conditions of receipt (e.g., as with eligibility standards and moral codes of conduct). Another, yet obverse, example might be the right of beneficiaries in social insurance plans to lay claim to benefits, without question, once eligibility is established inasmuch as entitlement is established in advance (i.e., a universal characteristic of social insurance as opposed to public assistance).

In summary, social policy change may be defined as an alteration in any one or more of the four mechanisms. The maintenance of the current state of all four of the mechanisms is the retention of the status quo in social relationships. A change in any one provides opportunity for new levels of equality or inequality for individuals and social categories, groups, families, etc.

SELF-INTEREST AND EGOALITARIANISM

Several inter-related propositions regarding self-interest as a dynamic in social welfare policy have been pursued, above. Support has been drawn from social science literature and a model for studying social welfare policies has been reviewed. The bilateral exchange in social welfare relationships has been discussed, the self-interest dynamic has been observed in theory and example and a model aimed at the education of decision-making elites to newly perceived self-interests has been considered. In the balance of this discussion we will demonstrate the application to present day problems and policies.

First, some consideration is given to two fundamental differences in the conceptualization of egalitarianism; next, some examples from school desegregation and black-ethnic group similarities in voting behavior are examined; lastly, some speculative and hypothetical applications of the self-interest propositions are applied to the present condition of the American Indian.
Corrective vs. Redemptive Egalitarianism. This paper is not aimed at providing a rationale for a utopian scheme. Rather, it is aimed at exploring a proposition that self-interest is a dynamic in social welfare policy formulation. The proposition is pursued here in the spirit of distributive justice and not in the spirit of a utopian leveling of differences. In a critique of Rawls' A Theory of Justice, (Rawls, 1971), Charles Frankel makes the distinction between the two orientations quite clear (Frankel, 1973). Frankel notes that there are vast differences between what he calls "corrective egalitarianism" and "redemptive egalitarianism". Redemptive egalitarianism is said to try to solve the age old problem of evil; a transcendent harmony is seen as the end of social activity in which the moral imperative is the leveling of differences among people; in rather deterministic fashion, redemptive egalitarianism is said to be aimed at restoring things to their "original design".

On the other hand, corrective egalitarianism is said to be primarily concerned with distributive justice. In more indeterminant fashion, corrective egalitarianism would permit idiosyncratic differences and individual initiative, but not without justice. Frankel contends that the real question is:

which equality are you for, and what kind of inequality are you willing to accept as its cost.
(Frankel, 1973: 57).

Frankel generates some interesting speculative questions. First, he notes that some say that women cannot have equality as long as marriage, home and family are perceived as primary roles. Yet, how does one satisfy the individual who precisely wants those things in life? Does she become, then, the psychologically and socially disadvantaged person who is the target of leveling social policies. Or, as a second example, are "opportunities to kill oneself with cigarettes...less important than opportunities to kill oneself with overwork?" (Frankel, 1973: 57). Should we keep one category going with rebuilt hearts or repeated surgery or expensive drugs, and, [meanwhile], let another category starve? (Frankel,1973: 58).

Thinking in terms of the utility of educating the policy making elites to newly perceived self-interests, such questions, and such differences in the popular desideratum of which type of egalitarianism is desired, are crucial to which incentives are "salable" as new self-interests. The selection of newly perceived self-interests need not be seen as a baseline leveling but, rather, a choice among alternatives aimed at a more just egalitarianism.
The Incentives of School Desegregation. In a midwestern community involved in debate over the desirability of a public school racial desegregation plan then in effect, some examples of conscious and purposeful appeals to self-interest were observed. When local and state-wide organizations made efforts to persuade the public (i.e., community voting policy elites) of the disutility of school desegregation, a counter move was made by the prodesegregation groups. When it was clear that the state council of parent-teacher organizations was being pressured to endorse a resolution condemning "busing", the prodesegregation groups developed, distributed and interpreted materials clearly aimed at educating the policy makers to newly perceived self-interest while meeting in state conventions. For example, a one-page flyer was distributed, often in personal face-to-face contact, which made visible the benefits of the policy option (i.e., school desegregation). Benefits of the policy option of desegregation were identified, such as the fact that the particular school system had laid claim to over one-fourth of the total Emergency School Assistance Act funding allocated for the entire state in that particular year due to the community's instituting of the plan. The group made note of the opportunities to obtain specialized staff so as to provide individualized instruction and the realized opportunities in obtaining needed equipment. Perhaps the incentive appealing to the broadest range of self-interests was the noted reduction of violence and absence of school closings due to disturbances, which were inventoried and cataloged for the three years prior to the plan. The new awareness that, in the first year of the racial balance plan, no school had closed early and no child had to miss a day of school was exceedingly persuasive in its appeal to the self-interest of those deliberating on the proposed resolution, which was subsequently removed from agenda consideration.

Incentives of Black-Ethnic Voting Coalitions. It is commonly assumed that the political goals of ghetto blacks and clustered groups are non-distributable. In an analysis of voting data, Howard Palley concluded that:

in certain particular cases commonality of interests transcends ethnicity and seems to be related to class interests. If such perceived commonality can be combined with an issue emphasis that transcends class interest and emphasizes 'the common interest' in social development, a political strategy sufficient to bring about major social development will be achievable. (Palley, 1973: 252-3).
Noting that conflict among ethnic and class groups sharing common interests often contributes to their political impotency, Palley suggests that the perceived commonality offers the possibility of an intraclass and interclass coalition focused upon social development. While the potential requires further exploration, perhaps around selected promising issues, the data suggests that education to newly perceived self-interests is a useful dynamic in potential coalition.

Incentives for a new Indian policy. While native American Indians cannot accurately be referred to in the collective generality of a "new Indian policy", the sense here is that there may be egalitarian opportunities for a variety of reservation and off-reservation tribes and individual citizens to be obtained in identifying newly perceived self-interests for those who hold decision-making power.

For example, in seeing the federal government as a decision-making elite, the Department of the Interior recognized that it can no longer tolerate the embarrassment of not providing protection of Indian natural resources (e.g., oil and grazing lands) and in the unilateral exploitation of water rights. The Wassaja News has, ironically, pointed out that Indians fear termination of the special relationship they have with the federal government because this would mean an end to treaty obligations and "natives would be at the mercy of industrial and agricultural interests". (Wassaja, 1973b: 19). The newly perceived bilateral interests of Indians (i.e., resource control) and the federal government (i.e., image maintenance) may alter the posture of the Department of the Interior maintained since the federal takeover of Indian domains.

New contractual horizons between ranchers and industrial interests and various tribes cannot be dismissed lightly as utopian thoughts. While such possibilities would necessarily be approached with caution, we are reminded of the multilateral beneficiaries developed out of the cooperative activity of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA). The original TVA area was a forty per cent black population (Duffus, 1944). Although the benefits accrued to that group are certainly questionable, they are not inconsequential. To be sure, multivariate interests were variously perceived and realized in TVA, such as the multiplication of paycheck income, increased quality in food production, removal of the threat of flooding, business
income increases, less dependence upon government for residual care, etc. (Lilienthal, 1953). A review of history could be more than an intellectual exercise in search of new policy options. The potential here for multilateral self-interests to be served in "Indian nations" should not be ignored.

**IMPLICATIONS**

Contrary to common belief, social welfare policies aimed at the management of social problems can be seen as bilateral or multilateral transfers of wealth or privilege from one population category to another. Such policies are not only provided out of the largesse of dominant groups. Such policies alter the domains of life conditions which manipulate the patterning of statuses and rights among classes and categories of people and are far more than altruistic expressions of collective concerns for needy individuals.

A major conclusion offered by this review is that newly perceived self-interests, as they become possible and observable by dominant decision-making elites, is a potential dynamic for more egalitarian social welfare policy choices and outcomes. Preoccupation with altruistic explanations for social welfare programs, or continued reliance upon moral exhortation, have done little to alter the patterning of the relationship between social problems and social welfare policy. Perhaps we have made so little progress toward developing an integrated problem/policy theory since we have begun and continued with false propositions regarding altruistic incentives and strategies of moral exhortation. The self-interest construct may offer a useful reformulation of possible opportunities for egalitarianism in distributive justice in majority-minority interrelations.

**REFERENCES**

Bernard, Chester

Boettcher, Richard E.

Burkey, Richard

-15-
Carmichael, Stokely and Charles V. Hamilton  

Clark, Peter B. and James Q. Wilson  
1961 "Incentive Systems: A Theory of Organizations".  
Administrative Science Quarterly. 6 (September): 129-166.

Duffus, R.L.  
1944 The Valley and Its People. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

Etzioni, Amitai  
1961 A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations.  

Flynn, John  
1973a "Local Participants in Planning for Comprehensive  
Community Mental Health Centers: The Colorado Experience".  
Community Mental Health Journal. 9 (Spring): 3-10.

Flynn, John  
1973b "Social Control Components in Public Welfare and  

Frankel, Charles  
1973 "The New Egalitarianism and the Old". Commentary.  
56 (September): 54-61.

Gans, Herbert J.  
1972 "The Positive Functions of Poverty". American Journal  
of Sociology. 78 (September): 275-289.

Gil, David G.  
1970 "A Systematic Approach to Social Policy Analysis".  
Social Service Review. 44 (December): 411-426.

Gil, David G.  
1973 Unravelling Social Policy: Theory, Analysis, and Political  
Action Towards Social Equality. Cambridge, Massachusetts:  
Schenkman Publishing Company.

Harrington, Michael  

Heilbroner, Robert L.  
and Schuster.

-16-
Kitsuse, John I. and Malcolm Spector  

Levine, Sol and Paul E. White  

Lilienthal, David E.  

Lindblom, Charles E.  

Mencher, Samuel  

Palley, Howard A.  

Pruger, Robert  

Rawls, John  

Ryan, William  

Smith, Edmund Arthur  

Spector, Malcolm and John I. Kitsuse  

Stern, Philip  
Ross, Robert and Graham L. Staines

Titmuss, Richard

Tussing, A. Dale

Warren, Roland L.

Wassaja News

Wassaja News

Zeckhauser, Richard and Elmer Schaefer
The key concepts which require some basic definitions in the title are "social welfare, social control and coercion". For the purposes of this paper, social welfare is defined as those public programs designed to provide an individual who is in financial need with the resources (financial and/or in kind) to exist in our society. Social control refers to the entire range of actions and pressures which are designed to lead the individual to function within society without threatening to disrupt the social order. These actions and pressures are embodied in sanctions for enforcing group norms as well as in formal sanctions formulated through laws or administrative rulings. The sanctions are physical, material and/or symbolic [Etzioni, 1964]. Coercive refers to situations in which individuals either have no viable options available to them in making decisions or are required to conform to a specific classification or perform specific actions or desist from specific actions in order to obtain that which is an entitlement to resources and/or services. Kallen contends that coercion obtains whenever the action or thought of one individual or group is compelled or restrained by another through some form of physical or moral compulsion [Kallen, 1933]. There can be little doubt that the action of welfare recipients are frequently compelled or restrained through physical means, i.e., the level of assistance; and moral compulsions, i.e., the myths which define them as inferior.

In our abstract society [Zijerveld, 1970] social welfare is not the humanitarian benevolent expression that "we are our brother's keepers". It is an integral part of the coercive social control system developed to maintain the status quo in which the dominant classes of the society try to control those they define as potential, if not actual, disruption of the stability of the community. The stability of the community incorporates maintainence of the present inequitable power arrangements, the inequitable distributions of economic resources and inequitable life chances. Basic to the maintainence of the "stable social order" is the availability to the ruling class of force, the mechanisms of suppression and repression and control of those ruling ideas designed to justify the existing social arrangements. These ruling ideas are the myths and legends which frequently are referred to as knowledge designed to legitimate the social arrangements [Marx, 1961].

One of the most insidious myths is that there are "worthy" and "unworthy" poor. This classificatory system has a long history dating back to the English Poor laws. A sociology of knowledge approach to this myth in America
clearly demonstrates how the idea is related to attempts by the wealthy and their apologists to diffuse the tensions and conflicts arising from the imbalance of wealth between the elite and the poor.

Spearheading the drive to legitimate the inequitable distribution of wealth, by defining it as the will of God, were such organizations as the American Bible Society, the American Sunday School Union and the American Tract Society [Griffin, 1957]. Strongly influenced by Puritanism and Federalism, the people involved in these organizations believed firmly that "a minority of special attainments should supervise the majority" (Ibid pp.28). Bringing religion to the common people was important because "Christianity would help bridge over the dangerous chasm between the rich and the poor; so that instead of mobs and outbreaks destroying life and property, there will be between these two great classes a reciprocation of confidence and good feeling, as there will be also a ready harmonious interest in their immortal brotherhood" (Ibid pg. 34).

In 1847 Emory Washburn verbalized the basis of what was to become the criteria of the worthy and unworthy poor. He did this in the course of outlining what the American Bible Society needed to do to help preserve "good order in society". It was critical that it be shown "that rich Christians had a right to their wealth" and therefore there "would be no demand from the poor and debtor classes for a share of that wealth. Christians would certainly not rise against Christians; the poor would not desire the rich man's gold". The worthy poor were those who did not desire the "rich man's gold because they agreed that" rich Christians had a right to their wealth (Ibid pg. 37).

Three years later, the Reverend Gardiner Spring, preaching on behalf of the American Tract Society, sounded the Social Darwinian theory "that those who became rich by their own toil and economy had superior intellectual faculties and strength of character". Both they and those who inherited wealth had influence in the community because they deserved to have influence. They were men of 'mind', 'forethought', 'great practical wisdom', 'energy', 'integrity' and 'moral virtue' (Ibid pg. 37).

Thus we see how the concept of the "worthy rich" and its corollary the "worthy poor" and the "unworthy poor" became integral components of the rationale for the existence of the inequitable distribution of our economic resources. The superiority of the wealth, as outlined by Spring, implied the inferiority of the poor. The process of objectifying a human being by categorizing the individual as worthy or unworthy is symptomatic of our inhumane, alienated, abstract society. The unworthy poor challenged the right of the rich to their wealth.

Two recent studies illustrate the prevalence of the concept of 'worthy' and 'unworthy' poor. A study of the County Commissioners' view of poverty revealed that 66% believed that people were unemployed because they did not want to work. Only 22% believed that there were not enough jobs to go around. 82% believed that children from welfare families stay on welfare as adults because they inherited inferior talents from their parents [Ramsey and Braito, 1973]. The second study dealt with citizen attitudes towards welfare. The researchers note "The data consistently indicated that the extent to which a
respondent approved or disapproved of providing a welfare service depended on whether he considered the recipient worthy"... Finally, respondents considered provision of welfare assistance as a right, but only if the recipient is worthy [Ogren, 1973].

To be poor is to be inferior. To be inferior is a stigma. Matza notes, "attempts to clearly distinguish the disreputable poor from others who superficially resemble them are systematically frustrated because a certain element of disrepute attaches, even to the poor who are deemed deserving and morally above reproach. Poverty itself is slightly disreputable, being on welfare somewhat more so. The inner circle - the so-called hard core is not alone in living in disrepute. That feature is shared to some extent by all who are poor or on welfare. To the minor shortcoming of being poor is added the more substantial vice of requiring assistance and finally the major stigma of immorality" [1971].

To provide a complete catalogue of the coercive practices heaped upon the poor on welfare would require more space than is available in this paper. The Supreme Court in King v Smith decision (B92US309, 88 S Ct. 2120, 20L Ed. 2nd 1118, 1968) noted that "each State is free to set its own standards of need and to determine the level of benefits by the amount of funds it devotes to the program... that States participating in AFDC were free to impose eligibility requirements relating to the 'moral character' of the applicants." We would need to examine the requirements in all States and their practices to provide an exhaustive catalogue of coercive practices. We will cite a few examples as illustrations.

1. Clients on welfare are obligated, under penalty of not receiving assistance, to give up rights which members of nearly all status groups in society are entitled to, i.e., the right to privacy, the right to conceal parts of his role behavior from public observation (Coser, 1965). The welfare client must allow the welfare worker to visit the home. In Wyman v James, (400 U.S. 309, 1971), the Supreme Court ruled that although Mrs. James met the eligibility requirements, the Department of Welfare could legally close payments to the family because Mrs. James refused to make an appointment with the caseworker to visit Mrs. James' home.

2. The Welfare Department can tell a recipient how and where to live. In Wilkie v O'Connor, the Courts ruled that a welfare department may impose 'somewhat artificial' social conventions upon welfare recipients. Mr. Wilkie, the recipient, claimed he had a "right to sleep under an old barn, in a vest of rags to which he had to crawl upon his knees." He argued that he had a right to live as he pleased. The Court ruled against him noting "One would admire his independence, but he has no right to defy the standards and conventions of civilized society while being supported at public expense."

3. For those who have not had the opportunity to examine the Work
Incentive Program, the program appears to be extremely beneficial. Who could find fault with a program that provides incentives for work for welfare recipients? However, the program, in reality, provides neither work nor incentives to any degree. Rather, a very high measure of coercion is inherent in the Work Incentive Program. The rules and regulations (Federal Register, 1972) require "Every individual, as a condition of eligibility for aid under the State plan, shall register for manpower services, training and employment, as provided by regulations of the Secretary of Labor, unless the individual "is exempt because he or she is in one of six status exemptions." The consequences of not complying is stated as follows: "The needs of any individual who fails to register as required under paragraph (a) of this section shall not be taken into account in determining the need of the family and the amount of assistance, and assistance will be furnished to eligible members of the family."

4. "When money is allocated to members of any other status group in society, they have the freedom to dispose of it in almost any way they see fit." (Coser, 1965) The Welfare recipient does not have this freedom. They must account for their expenses and others decide whether the money is spent wisely or foolishly. The Supreme Court in Wyman v James case ruled "The State, working through its qualified welfare agency, has appropriate and paramount interest and concern in seeking and assuring that the intended and proper objects of that tax-produced assistance are the ones who benefit from the aid it dispenses."

5. In California, if a mother receiving aid to dependent children uses any portion of the grant to support a man 'assuming the role of the spouse' to whom she is not married, she may be charged with the crime of misusing the grant. (Reich, 1965) There are no such coercive controls on most other status groups related to how they can dispose of their funds.

6. In public housing, the Housing Authority can terminate a tenancy if they deem that the conduct of any member of the family imperils the morals of his neighbors or the community or violates accepted social norms. Who defines what imperils morals of the neighbors or the community and what are the accepted social norms that are violated? The ambiguity of these regulations allows for considerable coercion to occur in controlling the poor.

7. The utilization of sterilization as a means of coercion with welfare clients came to light in 1973. In the event that one may consider this an aberration, it is important to note that at least fourteen State Legislatures are considering legislation designed to coerce women receiving welfare to submit to sterilization. These attempts
to formally control "illegitimacy" and adding to the AFDC roles are probably unconstitutional under the equal protection section of the constitution. Nevertheless, since 1964, more than 1,000 women, most black and all poor, have been forced to submit to involuntary sterilization. (Note: 1973)

8. Welfare departments have attempted to coerce clients into particular modes of sexual behavior in the name of establishing "moral characteristics of eligibility." In the District of Columbia, the courts were faced with the question of whether the mother of nine must be denied aid because her estranged legitimate husband visited her too frequently. Mothers who are receiving assistance and give birth to an out-of-wedlock child have been charged that the latest pregnancy constitutes "neglect" of the previous children. Reich notes that "in no other area of entitlement such as social security or veterans benefits are there similar pressures to impose a moral code." (1965)

9. The most compelling restraint on the welfare clients stems from the inadequate level of assistance that is provided by the various States. The level of assistance compels them to live in particular places, to eat inexpensive carbohydrates, to dress in particular ways, and, generally, to bear the stigma of poverty in public. In order to receive any assistance, the recipient must be completely impoverished without any financial resources or property. This is due to the view that public assistance is charity. The Supreme Court in the Wyman v James case ruled "One who dispenses purely private charity naturally has an interest in and expects to know how his charitable funds are utilized and put to work. The public, when it is the provider, rightly expects the same." The view of welfare as charity and not a right, a 'grant or gratuity' not a debt permits the Welfare Departments to establish many regulations which deny the recipients rights and privileges enjoyed by other status groups in society.

These illustrations indicate the wide range of life experiences in which the poor on welfare are subjected to coercive pressures. An area which creates considerable conflict for the ethical social worker involves the relationship with the client.

The Supreme Court, in the Wyman v James case notes:

"The home visit, it is true, is not required by federal statute or regulation. But it has been noted that the visit is "the heart of welfare administration"; that it affords a "personal, rehabilitative orientation" unlike that of most federal programs; and that the "more pronounced service orientation" effected by Congress with the 1956 Amendments to the Social Security Act "gave redoubled importance to the practice of home visiting..."
The home visit is an established routine in States besides New York."

This was one of the points made by the Court in ruling against Mrs. James. The process of labeling the program rehabilitative serves as a shield against judicial scrutiny. The assumption that the goals of the program and the goals of the client are identical and that the caseworker is always acting in the client's best interests allows the worker to meddle in the most personal affairs of his client. This situation is insidious and permits abuses which are not scrutinized by the judicial. The recipient is afforded no legal rights against the caseworker's intrusions.

Even in situations in which the caseworker is a highly skilled, ethical, professional social worker truly concerned with helping the client, the worker's function as investigator is always potentially operative. "Whatever the initial intent, if in the course of a "routine home visit" the worker comes upon evidence of ineligibility or fraud, however, inadvertently, the worker is legally required to report it." (1970) In effect, all casework contacts have the characteristics of "searches" in that the worker possesses executive power or discretion and commits official incursions into the privacy of an individual.

The potential for coercion inherent in such a situation is great. In view of the fact that most recipients of welfare are powerless and frequently wholly ignorant of their legal rights under the program, the probability of coercive practices occurring that are never brought to light is high. There is a long history of caseworkers meddling in peoples' lives dating back to the "friendly" visitors of the early charity movement. The early charity movement was based on an extension of the myths about the inferiority of the poor. Josephine Shaw Lowell, founder of the New York Society held firmly to the conviction that "the usual cause of poverty is to be found in some deficiency - moral, mental, or physical - in the person who suffers." (Bremmer, 1956) The individualistic interpretation of poverty assumed that all was well with the social arrangements. This period was the highpoint of social darwinism, the remnants of which are very much part of our present day mythology (Hofsteader, 1955).

The individual social worker who has a great deal of difficulty reconciling the helping role with the investigative function in public welfare is defined as having problems with "authority". It is frequently assumed that the worker has failed to work through his or her feelings about authority figures in his own life and thus has problems dealing with the authority vested in his or her role as a social worker. (Towle, 1950) This psychological explanation denies the basic contradictions between the requirements of a helping person and an investigator. Rather than having to deal with the social structural problem, inherent in the contradictory demands, the psychological explanations place the problem within the head of the worker. The social worker is also frequently compelled to act because of threats of loss of job. It is ironic that the social worker who typifies the hero in fiction is frequently the one who breaks the rules on behalf of the client.

It seems that it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, for professional social workers to be part of a coercive social system without being coerced themselves. Yet as Dr. Weiss, professor emeritus of Philosophy at Yale, said, "Man is the only creature who can say and believe almost anything. Tables
and porpoises can't and God Himself won't." (1969)

The myth used by social workers to rationalize their participation in a coercive system is the belief that they are providing rehabilitative services. Silverman (1974), however, sees "relief and rehabilitation as being conflicting goals within the American social welfare system."

Social workers are becoming increasingly aware of the social control function they perform. Weisman and Chwast (1960) contend, "Social work treatment, whether casework or group work, is one of society's alternative ways of exercising social control of persons who manifest deviant behavior, although such services are not usually regarded in this way." Cowger and Atherton (1974) note "The real issue, then, is not whether social workers engage in social control. Clearly, they are engaged in it, as the term is defined sociologically. The questions are to decide what values to support and how to support them."

The concluding point in this paper is that social workers who are part of the current social welfare system do not have the real choice as to what values to support. The welfare system is designed to coerce the poor to maintain their proper place in society. The social worker is frequently required by law to act in ways that will keep the recipients in their place. Only a major restructuring of the public welfare system based on the principle that all human beings are entitled to an adequate level of financial assistance as a right and a societal debt will permit the social workers in the system a choice as to what values to support. Until that occurs, we are only creating a new set of myths which we want to believe. Welfare recipients can't and God Himself won't.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Robert H. Bremmer 1956


Lewis Coser 1965


Charles D. Cowger and Charles R. Atherton 1974


Amitai Etzioni 1964


Clifford S. Griffin 1957

Richard Hofstadter 1955
Horace M. Kallen 1933
Karl Marx 1961
David Matza 1971
Notes 1970
Evelyn H. Orgen 1973
Charles Ramsey and Rita Braito 1973
Charles A. Reich 1965
Matthew Silberman 1974
Charlotte Towle 1950
Paul Weiss 1969
Irving Weisman and Jacob Chwast 1960
Work Incentive Program 1972
Anton C. Zijderveld 1970
Notes 1973

"Relief vs. Rehabilitation: Conflicting Goals Within the American Social Welfare System," Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare, 1:4
"What Is Man?" This Week Magazine, November 2nd.
Federal Register, June 20, Vol. 37 No.119.
The Abstract Society, Garden City, Doubleday and Company.
"Sterilization - Newest Threat to the Poor" Ebony, October pp. 150-156.
Several co-workers and I have recently completed an evaluation of sixty-three anti-poverty programs and proposals (Williamson, et. al., 1973, 1974). This paper briefly describes the study and some of our findings by way of introduction to the presentation and defense of a national income insurance proposal. This proposal is a synthesis of three highly rated anti-poverty strategies. It would within a few years have a substantial impact on the extent of the economic inequality in the United States.

The 1960's was an era of experimentation. A wide range of anti-poverty strategies were proposed and many were tried. Of those since discontinued many were clearly ineffective, but others would, no doubt, have proven effective had they been expanded and continued over a longer period of time. This research is an effort to systematically examine what we have learned from the experiments of the 1960's in the hope that this experience will be taken in consideration in the formulation of future anti-poverty policy.

Many of the strategies we consider have been the subject of previous evaluations, some have been the subject of numerous such evaluations. But previous studies have often considered only one program and rarely consider more than a few. The contribution of our study is in its breadth.

The strategies we consider can be grouped into six general anti-poverty approaches: (1) income-in-kind, (2) income, (3) manpower, (4) education, (5) economic development, and (6) organization. The economic development approach includes strategies which would create jobs for the poor in response to local or national economic expansion. The organization approach includes those strategies which encourage the poor to act together and in cooperation with others so as to increase their political influence.

* I am grateful to Ralph Segalman for a number of valuable suggestions on an earlier draft of his paper. The article is based in part on a forthcoming book, Strategies Against Poverty in America (Williamson, et. al., 1974).
Our analysis has three objectives: (1) to evaluate the major anti-poverty strategies within each of the six preceding general approaches; (2) to compare strategies within each of these six approaches; and (3) to compare strategies across these six general approaches. For each of these objectives we make extensive use of a set of twenty-six dimensions (evaluative criteria). For example, we consider such dimensions as proportion of the poor who benefit, impact on the distribution of income, and extent to which recipients are stigmatized. A subset of eighteen of these dimensions are used to compute an overall rating for each strategy. For this purpose eight dimensions are excluded so as to reduce redundancy and to eliminate dimensions which cannot be used in an unambiguous way to argue for or against a specific strategy. For a description of the strategies evaluated, the twenty-six dimensions used in the evaluation, and a more detailed discussion of our methodology see Williamson, et al. (1974: 110-114, 190-200, 213-218; 1973: 409-444, 881-889).

Of the sixty-three strategies considered, the guaranteed income proposal of the National Welfare Rights Organization receives the highest overall rating. The NWRO has modified its proposal several times over the years. The version we consider includes a guaranteed minimum income of $6,500 per year for a family of four and would have cost approximately $52 billion in 1969. The tax rate on all other sources of income would be 67 percent until the breakeven point (the point at which the tax paid on all other sources of income equals the guaranteed income due) of $9,750 was reached.

The government as employer of last resort proposal is also highly rated. This proposal calls for efforts to find job placements in the private sector, but in addition guarantees a job to those who are unable to obtain employment. Of the existing federal programs considered, social security receives the highest rating. This program transfers more money to those who are poor or who would otherwise be poor than does any other income maintenance program (Green, 1967:20).

The NWRO guaranteed income proposal is one of several negative income tax proposals we consider. The negative income tax proposals are consistently rated higher than AFDC. The proposal we now turn to consider is referred to as national income insurance. It represents an effort to combine the strengths of social security, the negative income tax, and the guaranteed job into one integrated program which would be both politically feasible and effective in reducing the extent of poverty.
In recent years a variety of guaranteed income proposals have been made. There is little consensus as to the generic categories for the classification of these proposals, but the terms "negative income tax" (Friedman, 1962; Green, 1967; Lampman, 1970) and "credit income tax" (Rolph, 1967; Rainwater, 1973; Gans, 1973, Shostak, et al., 1973) are the most commonly used today. The basic distinction between the two is that the credit income tax calls for a reform of the entire income tax structure whereas other negative income tax proposals do not call for any changes in the tax structure above the breakeven point.

The income (or anti-poverty) insurance approach (Etzioni, 1969, 1970; Jencks, et al., 1972: 228-229) can be classified as a form of negative income tax. The approach differs from other negative income tax proposals in that there is some link with employment such as being financed all or in part by a payroll tax or basing benefits on past earnings. In this sense the approach can be compared with existing social insurance programs such as social security, unemployment insurance, and workmen's compensation.

The national income insurance plan presented here is so named because it would provide social insurance benefits whenever family (or individual) income fell below a specified level. Initially the program would provide a guaranteed income equal to 25 percent of the median family income adjusted for family size in the same way the Social Security Administration's poverty index is adjusted. All other income would be taxed at a rate of 50 percent until the breakeven point was reached. Above the breakeven point the current tax schedule would be used. Assuming that such a program was introduced in 1975 and the median income was $12,000 for a family of four, the guaranteed minimum income would be $3,000 and the breakeven point would be $6,000. Those with other sources of income of less than $6,000 would receive a net payment; many with incomes just above $6,000 would pay less tax than under the current tax system.

There would be no employment requirement for those unable to work due to family responsibilities, poor health, or age; but other recipients would be required to obtain employment in the private sector, to accept one of the guaranteed jobs that would be created by the government, or to participate in some form of alternative service (e.g. job training, adult education, VISTA, something similar to the old WPA's writers' project, etc.).

The program would originally add less than $10 billion to the federal budget. Half of this would be raised by a payroll tax similar to that presently used to finance the social security program. The rest would be financed out of general federal
revenues. A similar procedure has been proposed to finance Kennedy's national health insurance plan.

Central to the national income insurance plan is the provision for increasing the magnitude of the guaranteed minimum income. The level would be uniformly incremented from the original 25 percent to 50 percent of the median income ten years after the introduction of the program. The cost would increase to approximately $80 billion per year.

In the discussion that follows we consider a number of arguments that can be made in support of the national income insurance plan. Many of these arguments are equally applicable to other similar negative income tax and credit income tax proposals. The discussion is in this sense a review of the strengths of the guaranteed income approach to income maintenance. There are also a number of arguments that can be made against the national income insurance plan; they will be presented and evaluated in a subsequent paper (Williamson, 1975).

The national income insurance plan would be universalistic; that is, it would provide benefits to all poor persons. At present all anti-poverty and welfare programs in the United States are categorical; they provide benefits to certain categories of the poor while excluding others. One justification offered for this approach is that it encourages tailoring programs to the specific needs of various categories of the poor. This would in itself be a desirable characteristic, but when put into practice the approach serves to exclude certain categories of the poor. The major rational for breaking with the categorical approach is that efforts to restrict benefits to those who are clearly deserving inevitably lead to the exclusion of many who under careful scrutiny also turn out to be deserving. An obvious case in point is the exclusion of children living in families headed by able-bodied males. In contrast a universalistic program such as the national income insurance plan would assure that at least some benefits reach all of the poor.

The plan would eventually provide sufficient economic security to encourage long term efforts to become self-sufficient. When first introduced the program would not provide sufficient economic security to encourage such efforts. But as the level of the guaranteed minimum income increased, long range efforts would become increasingly common. When a family has to worry about where the money is going to come from for next week's groceries, little attention can be given to such luxuries as obtaining more education or training for a higher skilled job; but an assured steady income would in many cases free the family of such immediate economic worries. The potential gain to the rest of society is particularly clear with respect to those families which are presently in a dependent status and include one or more able-bodied workers.
Many workers remain in economically depressed areas with little demand for their labor due to fear of the economic insecurity involved in moving to an unknown region of the country in search of employment. A guaranteed income would provide at least some of these workers with the security they would need to seriously consider moving to another region in the hope of finding more suitable employment opportunities.

Critics of the national income insurance plan (and of guaranteed income plans more generally) would argue that the economic security provided is more likely to discourage efforts to remain self-sufficient than it is to encourage efforts to become self-sufficient. There is some evidence that those in the middle class tend to underestimate the work orientation of the poor (Goodwin, 1972a, 1972b). There is also evidence from the New Jersey-Pennsylvania negative income tax experiment which suggests that a guaranteed income of up to the current poverty line would have relatively little impact on labor force participation, particularly among males (Rees, 1974). But the evidence is not conclusive and in the absence of conclusive evidence, personal ideology becomes an important determinant of beliefs about the likely impact of a guaranteed income on labor force participation and work effort.

The plan would lead to a gradual improvement in working conditions and higher wages in many industries. It would free many of the poor of their present dependence on the low-wage labor market. To continue to attract workers, employers would have to increase wages and improve working conditions. This would lead to an increase in the cost of many of the services presently supplied by the low-wage labor market. It would also lead to the collapse of those industries which are dependent on the present pool of low-wage labor for their existence. Many of those leaving jobs in the low-wage labor market would be shifting to one of the government guaranteed jobs. Those who view virtually any kind of employment in the private sector as preferable to the creation of massive government supported employment programs will obviously look upon this shift in employment patterns unfavorably.

The plan would provide a focus around which the poor and near-poor could organize nationally. One objective around which the poor could organize would be efforts to get the level of guaranteed minimum income increased. This would be particularly crucial if an automatic mechanism for incrementation were not included in the original program. But even if the procedure suggested were included, the guaranteed minimum income would remain at 50 percent of the median income after that level had been reached. At that point the poor and near-poor could push for still further increase in the level of the guaranteed minimum income. The precedent of the preceding increments could be used to argue for still further increments. The poor could also push for a reduction in the 50 percent marginal tax rate on income below the breakeven point. The eventual goal could be to transform the curvilinear schedule of marginal tax rates into a progressive schedule starting at say 20 percent and increasing.
Such a plan would lead to a more equitable distribution of income in the United States. The low initial level of the guaranteed minimum income would have relatively little impact; but if appropriate mechanisms for incrementing the guaranteed minimum income were included, the eventual impact on the distribution of income would be substantial. A more equitable distribution of income would be valued by many for its impact on the distribution of scarce goods, services, opportunities, political influence, and the like. Some argue that a more equitable distribution would also contribute to reducing the extent of various forms of social pathology presently associated with poverty (Gans, 1973: 20-22).

The national income insurance plan would reduce the extent of both the absolute and the relative deprivation of the poor. However, even with improvement in the relative economic position of the poor, the psychological feeling of deprivation may remain high. Improvements in objective conditions do not necessarily lead to reduced feelings of deprivation because expectations can and often do increase at a more rapid pace than these improvements.

A more equitable distribution of income would clearly benefit those at the lower end of the income distribution. There would also be some benefits to those at the upper end. For example, spending presently associated with various poverty related social problems could be reduced. But it is unlikely that such savings would be considered worth the added tax burden to those in the upper income brackets. As much as the social reformer wants to argue that redistribution of income is in everyone's best interest, most of those who would as a result carry a heavier tax burden are not going to view redistribution in these terms. Since those with high incomes have a disproportionate amount of political influence, any efforts to markedly change the income distribution are going to face stiff opposition.

Two important questions remain to be considered. (1) Is it likely that a national income insurance plan or some other such negative income tax plan will be introduced as a federal program at any time in the near future? (2) If such a program is introduced, will it be just another liberal reform or will it lead to fundamental changes in the social structure and dominant value orientation of our society?

The negative income tax was originally proposed by Milton Friedman, one of the foremost conservative economists in the country. The approach was subsequently backed by the Nixon administration in the form of the FAP proposal. The major reason that the approach appeals to conservatives is that it would be considerably more efficient than the complex maze of programs for the poor that exists today. Many take the view that such a program could replace not only existing federal and state welfare programs, but in addition a number of others in such areas as housing, education, and manpower.
In short, the approach is viewed as a way to cut welfare spending.

The approach has also received support from liberals; Senator McGovern (1972) called for a form of the credit income tax in his bid for the Democratic Presidential nomination in 1972.\textsuperscript{2} To liberals the approach is viewed as less stigmatizing, more efficient, and more equitable than the present welfare system. It is viewed as a way to deliver more in the way of welfare benefit per dollar of federal welfare spending. Liberals are less likely to view the approach as a replacement for other social welfare programs and generally do not argue that the approach can or should be used to reduce the overall extent of social welfare spending.

The present welfare system is under attack from all sides. There is general agreement that the existing structure is not adequate for dealing with today's welfare needs. The negative income tax and the credit income tax are the only alternatives that have been seriously suggested as replacements for the existing welfare system. As we have seen there are strong arguments for these alternatives, from both liberal and conservative perspectives. In view of these considerations, it is not unreasonable to argue that it is only a matter of time before a negative income tax or credit income tax of some sort is introduced. Nixon's FAP proposal was rejected by the Senate, but it did pass the more conservative House by an almost two-to-one vote.\textsuperscript{3}

We now turn to the second question. If such a program is introduced, will it lead to fundamental changes in the social structure and dominant value orientation? Once a national income insurance plan or some other such guaranteed income plan is introduced, a situation will exist in which national mass political organization of the poor will be feasible on a scale never before possible. There have been several national organizations of blacks and there has been a national organization of welfare recipients, but there has never been a national organization of all the poor.

The existing maze of separate social welfare programs has made it all but impossible for the various segments of the poor to unify. But the introduction of a negative income tax would provide a clear source of common economic interest for all segments of the poor, including poor whites, poor blacks, the aged, the working poor, female headed families, the disabled, and other presently desperate segments of the poor.

Any such program will include as one component a guaranteed minimum income. It will be in the interest of all categories of the poor to push for increases in the guaranteed minimum income. Any such program will also include a relatively high marginal tax rate on earned income and many of the poor can be expected to support efforts to get this rate reduced. These two objectives will provide a focus for efforts to organize the poor. The goals will be clear and the
potential benefits obvious; there will be no need to appeal to distant and abstract ideological objectives.

For any politically feasible negative income tax plan the initial guaranteed minimum income will be low and the marginal tax rate on earned income will be high. In view of this, it is likely that there will be considerable support in the general population for a gradual increase in the size of the guaranteed minimum income and a gradual decrease in the marginal tax rate. Legislators will undoubtedly use such benefits to seek votes in much the same way they presently use increments in social security benefits.

However, such concessions no matter how small will increase the number of people below the breakeven point. This will increase the number with an objective economic interest in supporting the program. These concessions will reward the efforts of those working to organize the poor and encourage further organizational efforts. Since increments in the guaranteed minimum income can come in a wide assortment of sizes, it will be difficult to resist at least modest increases.

As the years pass and the level of the guaranteed minimum income increases, more and more of those at the lower end of the income distribution will become recipients, and what is equally important they will become politically united. First the poor will be united with the near poor and subsequently many of those presently in the working and lower middle classes will be united with them. The recipient population may eventually constitute a voting majority. Even before this point is reached, the recipients will become a major voting block. They can be expected to back reform legislation designed to undercut the control the rich and corporate interests have over government decision making. One form this may take would be restrictions on the size and source of campaign contributions. This segment of the population can also be expected to back legislation designed to reform the tax structure. Among such reforms might well be higher inheritance taxes and the elimination of various inheritance tax loopholes. These and other such measures will undoubtedly have a marked impact on the distribution of wealth and political power.

Suppose a negative income tax is introduced and it starts to have some of the effects outlined above, wouldn't the rich be quick to note the threat to their power and to take the necessary steps to emasculate the program if not to eliminate it all together? There is a good chance they would. But there is also a possibility that such efforts would fail. Once the program was introduced it would begin to gain momentum. The larger the recipient population became the stronger the resistance would be to efforts to cut it back. The rich might have to settle for short term efforts to stem the expansion of the program, and the forces contributing to expansion might well prove too strong to be permanently halted. Were the
program financed all or in part through a payroll tax in the way social security is presently financed, the benefits would be viewed as having been earned. This would considerably increase the permanence and legitimacy of the program. It would make it a program with potential benefits to a wide range of the income distribution, not just to those receiving benefits at any one time.

How about the middle income segment of the population, those who would not receive benefits from the program, but who would be paying higher taxes to finance it? Again this segment of the population, which at the outset would constitute a clear majority, might decide to push for elimination of the program and could succeed in this effort. However, it is possible that this would not occur.

When the program was first introduced, the cost would be low and the majority of those in the middle income range might well support it. But as the level of the guaranteed income increased, so would the cost. This would undoubtedly reduce the extent of support among nonrecipients. But this does not mean that opposition among nonrecipients would be universal. Many in the middle and upper income ranges are willing to support social welfare efforts which do not have any direct economic benefit to themselves. There is considerable variation in ideological orientation among those in this segment of the population and at least a substantial minority could be expected to support even a rather generous guaranteed minimum income level. The program would be safe as long as the number of recipients together with the minority of nonrecipients who support it remained a clear voting majority. Eventually the program would provide direct benefits to more than half of the voting population and would be freed of dependence on support from nonrecipients. When this point was reached the program would be quite secure.

A national income insurance plan would eventually have a major impact on norms and values. In particular the work ethic and related aspects of the individualistic value orientation which so pervades our society today would be undercut. The key to this impact would be the objective situation of substantially increased economic security for those with low incomes. Those who were willing to live at an unusually low standard of living could do so with very little work effort. While there would be an employment requirement, it is likely that many participants would do little more than put in their time. Also those who chose to drop out of the regular labor market would always know that there would be a job providing a living wage available should economic need force them to return to work.
This would lead to many other changes. Many workers would leave the most unattractive jobs. Some of these jobs would disappear altogether; others would be automated or come to pay considerably higher wages. Employers would be forced to pay much more attention to working conditions, the structure of work, and employee morale.

It is impossible to fully anticipate the forces that would be set in motion by the introduction of a national income insurance plan or other such negative income tax program. But it is clear that such a program would eventually lead to major shifts in the distribution of income, wealth, and political power. These changes would undoubtedly have a major impact on the dominant value orientation as well as on the social and economic structure of American society.

FOOTNOTES

1. More ambitious goals have been suggested. For example, Rainwater (1969) has proposed that the goal be to bring the lowest income category (guaranteed minimum income) up to within $1000 of the median income.


3. The FAP bill was defeated in the Senate Finance Committee by liberal votes. Many of those who most strongly opposed the FAP bill were in favor of greater benefits (Moynihan, 1973:15). Most of the liberal criticism centered on the work provision and the level of the guaranteed minimum income. I feel that a much more serious limitation was that it was to be restricted to families with dependent children; this provision would have considerably reduced its impact on the political unification of those at the lower end of the income distribution.

4. The result would be radical reform or in the words of Andre Gorz (1967) a non-reformist reform. For a discussion of the distinction between reformist and non-reformist reforms, see Gorz.
REFERENCES

Etzioni, Amitai

Friedman, Milton

Gans, Herbert J.

Goodwin, Leonard

Gorz, Andre

Green, Christopher

Jencks, Christopher, Marshall Smith, Henry Acland, Mary Jo Bane, David Cohen, Herbert Gintis, Barbara Heyns, and Stephen Michelson

Lampman, Robert J.

McGovern, George

Moynihan, Daniel P.

Rainwater, Lee

Rees, Albert

Rolph, Earl R.
1967 "The case for a negative income tax device." Industrial Relations 6, 2: 155-165.

Shostak, Arthur B., Jon Van Til, and Sally Bold Van Til

Williamson, John B.
AN EVALUATION OF THE CASE AGAINST NATIONAL INCOME INSURANCE

John B. Williamson
Boston College

In an earlier paper I outlined a proposal for a national income insurance plan and discussed the strengths of the approach (Williamson, 1974c). Income insurance is a special case of the negative income tax or more generally of the guaranteed income. Negative income tax proposals of any kind are open to a variety of criticisms from both the left and the right. The national income insurance plan is no exception. In the present paper an attempt is made to anticipate and deal with the major arguments against the plan. Many of these arguments are equally applicable to other guaranteed income proposals. For this reason the paper is in large measure an evaluation of the major arguments against the guaranteed income approach to income maintenance.

THE PROPOSAL

This section is a description of the national income insurance plan as previously outlined. The plan is so named because it would provide social insurance benefits whenever individual or family income fell below a specified level.

Initially the program would provide a guaranteed income equal to 25 percent of the median family income adjusted for family size in the same way the Social Security Administration's poverty index is adjusted. All other income would be taxed at a rate of 50 percent until the breakeven point was reached. Above the breakeven point the current tax schedule would be used. Assuming that such a program were introduced in 1975 and the median income were $12,000 for a family of four, the guaranteed minimum income would be $3,000 and the breakeven point would be $6,000. Those with other sources of income of less than $6,000 would receive a net payment; many with incomes just above $6,000 would pay less tax than under the current tax system.
There would be no employment requirement for those unable to work due to family responsibilities, poor health, or age; but other recipients would be required to obtain employment in the private sector, to accept one of the guaranteed jobs that would be created by the government, or to participate in some form of alternative service (e.g., job training, adult education, VISTA, something like the old WPA's writers' project, etc.).

The program would originally add less than $10 billion to the federal budget. Half of this would be raised by a payroll tax similar to that presently used to finance the social security program. The rest would be financed out of general federal revenues. A similar procedure has been proposed to finance Kennedy's national health insurance plan.

Central to the national income insurance plan is the provision for increasing the magnitude of the guaranteed minimum income. The level would be uniformly incremented from the original 25 percent to 50 percent of the median income ten years after the introduction of the program. The cost would increase to approximately $80 billion per year (Williamson, 1974c).

THE CASE AGAINST THE PROPOSAL

The plan would fuel the fires of inflation. Any program with a built-in cost of living increase tends to exert some inflationary pressure; the procedure called for in this plan which bases increases on changes in the median income would exert even greater inflationary pressure. In the not too distant past such a criticism would have been dismissed with the reply that appropriate fiscal and monetary counter measures could be used to keep the resulting inflationary pressure within reasonable limits. But the events of recent years suggest that inflation is more difficult to deal with than had been thought only a few years ago. The evidence that inflation has become a world problem makes an analysis which focuses on the inadequacy of measures taken by any one government somewhat suspect.

In defense of the national income insurance plan we can argue that the low initial guaranteed income and the provision that the level of this guaranteed income be incremented gradually are measures designed to deal with the inflation issue. The
impact of the original program would be minimal. The increase in the level of the guaranteed minimum income over the years would be sufficiently gradual to allow time to take measures to keep inflation to a politically acceptable level. In a period of high inflation one such measure might be the suspension of the provision for incrementing the guaranteed minimum income or a temporary shift to a more gradual method.

The procedure which has been suggested for incrementing the guaranteed minimum income is only one of several possible alternatives. It establishes two basic precedents. One is that the magnitude of the guaranteed minimum income be increased in some way each year so as to take into consideration increases in incomes generally. The other is that the gap between those at the bottom of the income distribution and the median income be gradually reduced.

A less ambitious alternative which might prove politically more feasible during a period of high inflation would be to increment the guaranteed minimum income so as to keep it at some specified percentage of the median income. This would lead to a gradual improvement in the standard of living provided, but it would not reduce the gap between the guaranteed minimum income and the median income. On the contrary, the dollar gap would gradually increase over time.

A still less ambitious alternative would be to include a provision for incrementing the level of the guaranteed minimum income so as to take into consideration increases in the cost of living. This would protect recipients against a decrease in standard of living due to inflation; but it would not lead to any improvement in living standards. Since the guaranteed minimum income in the initial proposal is substantially below the poverty line, this alternative would not achieve the objective of assuring at least a minimally adequate standard of living for all Americans at some point in the not too distant future.

Another response to the inflation argument against the national income insurance plan is to note that the existence of a program which would provide a guaranteed income adjusted for increases in the median income would reduce the need for keeping inflation low. A major reason often mentioned for keeping it low is to protect those living off a low fixed income. But many of these people would do better under the national income insurance plan with a moderate level of inflation than they would without it even if inflation were kept substantially lower.

One widely held theory is that any guaranteed income plan which would provide even a minimally adequate standard of living would be so inflationary as to be politically unacceptable. We do not at present have the evidence that would be needed to conclusively prove or disprove this theory. The national income insurance plan
represents an effort to start at a level which admittedly does not provide a minimally adequate standard of living, but to gradually improve this standard in an effort to test and hopefully disprove the theory.

The plan would seriously undermine work incentives. The work incentive question can be raised with respect to any guaranteed income proposal. The potential impact is greater for proposals which do not include an employment requirement. But even when there is an employment requirement, the economic security provided is likely to reduce work incentives for at least some workers. The existence of such a program would facilitate life styles based on frequent movement into and out of the labor force. It would reduce anxiety about economic security in the future and thus reduce the incentive to put money away for retirement or disability in old age. For those already retired such a program would reduce the incentive to live frugally and seek support from relatives in the effort to avoid public dependency.

While there is some concern about the impact of a guaranteed income on the behavior of the aged and substantial concern about the impact on the behavior of the poor, it is likely that the greatest concern would be with its impact on youth, particularly the disenchanted, non-dues paying children of the middle class. This group in growing numbers is partaking of AFDC and food stamps without reluctance. A common pattern is to obtain temporary employment and after saving some money to quit work until these funds are exhausted. The security of knowing that there would be a government job waiting would undoubtedly increase the number of persons adopting this life style. Any visible trend in this direction would prove very unpopular with middle America. Even a modest movement in this direction which was given extensive media coverage could lead to intense resentments among those who are committed to work and the work ethic. A marked cleavage would develop between those who chose public dependency and those who chose self-sufficiency. This in turn would lead to the demand that the program be rescinded or severely cut back.

Another aspect of the incentives debate is the potential impact on the work effort of those in the middle and upper income categories who would be bearing a substantial share of the program's cost. Persons in the higher income brackets would be subjected to an increase in their tax burden. This would reduce the economic incentives for hard work. From the perspective of the functional theory of stratification (Davis and Moore, 1945), the argument would be made that a reduction in economic incentives could result in a shortage of qualified persons willing to fill these positions of high responsibility in our society. However, available evidence from studies of the effects of high income tax rates on those in the upper income brackets suggests that any reduction in work effort
would be minimal (Sanders, 1951; Break, 1957; Barlow, et al., 1966; Green, 1967: 113-137).

The national income insurance plan was drawn up with the work incentive issue very much in mind. Initially the program would call for a very modest guaranteed minimum income. It would be a rare individual who would find living on the guaranteed income provided a viable alternative to a job that paid a decent wage. Also the plan includes an employment requirement. As has been mentioned, this does not eliminate possible disincentive effects, but it serves to discourage those who would prefer not to work at all. The program would be financed in part by a payroll tax similar to the tax used to finance the social security program; this would reduce the extent to which it was viewed as a welfare program. As the guaranteed income was increased, the potential for an impact on work incentives would also increase. But the provision that the increase be gradual would allow time to take steps to deal with any serious disincentive effects that might develop.

While there is no conclusive evidence that a program which provided a minimally adequate standard of living would not also involve substantial work disincentives, there is evidence which suggests that the work incentive problem would not be as severe as some would have us believe. Macarv (1970:220-226) has done an extensive review of the literature on work incentives and concludes that the poor will continue to work as long as there is a reasonable increase in disposable income for this work effort. There have been many studies of work motivation among manual workers and money is repeatedly found to be a very important motivator (e.g. Kornhauser, 1965; Dubin, 1958). This data has been used to argue that a guaranteed income would reduce work incentives. But this same evidence is also consistent with the conclusion that there would be very little disincentive. All we have to assume is that the worker would get money over and above the guaranteed income from his employment. This would be the case with the national income insurance plan.

The strongest evidence that presently exists to argue against the work disincentive hypothesis comes from the recently completed New Jersey-Pennsylvania negative income tax experiment (Rees, 1974). This study involved providing a negative income tax program for several hundred low income families over a period of three years. They found some reduction in work effort, but the reduction was small to the point of being quite insignificant, particularly among men. The impact was more substantial among women in families with a husband present. Caution is in order with respect to generalization from such a short term experiment, but it does provide the most compelling evidence presently available on the incentive issue.

All negative income tax proposals include a relatively high marginal tax rate on earned income below the breakeven point.
Proposed tax rates range from 33 percent (McGovern, 1972) to 90 percent (Theobald, 1963). The 50 percent tax rate associated with the national income insurance is not unusually high. However, the high marginal tax rate is certainly another aspect of the incentives debate. The most relevant data on this issue again comes from the New Jersey-Pennsylvania negative income tax experiment. That study finds that tax rates of up to 50 percent do not substantially reduce work effort (Rees, 1974). This is consistent with previous studies of the effect of high marginal tax rates on work incentives for those in high income groups (Sanders, 1951; Break, 1957; Barlow, et al., 1966; Green, 1967).

The plan does not assure movement from dependency to self-sufficiency. The employment provision is an effort to encourage self-sufficiency, but the provision calling for a government supported guaranteed job leaves open the possibility that many workers will develop poor work habits knowing that if they are fired from a job in the private sector, there will always be a government job available. Unless these government jobs were administered rather strictly, it is possible workers would develop work habits that were not at all suitable for jobs in the private sector. These poor work habits might well be passed on from one generation to the next. Were evidence to emerge that the program was fostering dependency, particularly intergenerational dependency, the program would become highly vulnerable to curtailment.

To minimize this source of vulnerability efforts would have to be taken to encourage long run self-sufficiency. One alternative would be through forms of alternative service (it will be recalled that this is an alternative to taking a guaranteed job or private sector job) which provide the job training and education needed for attractive jobs in the private sector. Another alternative is to create guaranteed jobs which provide experience and skills which are in demand in the private sector. While such measures would be appropriate, it is important to bear in mind that national income insurance is not being proposed as a replacement for the manpower and educational programs which are presently used to prepare people for self-sufficiency. Such programs would be retained and continue to meet a very definite need.

The plan would prove disruptive to the economy. In addition to the problems of inflation and reduced work incentives, both of which are potentially disruptive factors, it is likely that many who are presently in the low-wage "dirty-work" jobs would quit. Some of these workers would undoubtedly qualify for exemption from the employment requirement due to disability, age, or family responsibilities. Others would find the security and working conditions of a government guaranteed job more attractive.

-42a-
Many industries depend on paying low wages in order to remain competitive, particularly with foreign producers. The existence of a viable alternative for the existing pool of low-wage workers would lead to the collapse of many producers dependent on this labor source. This would be disruptive in many ways. It would contribute to the unemployment problem and put pressure on the government to increase the number of government supported jobs available. Many of the services and products presently supplied by low-wage industries would increase in cost or be replaced by higher priced more capital intensive alternatives. This would contribute to inflation.

The provision that the national income insurance plan start at a modest level is an attempt to deal with this problem. The gradual rate at which the guaranteed minimum income would be increased allows time for measures to deal with any disruption that might occur.

Any provision for automatic yearly increments in the guaranteed minimum income is politically unfeasible. It is no accident that there is no provision for automatic increments in social security benefits. Congress wants the power to decide when increments are made. Such increments are often used by incumbents as vote getters in election years. Congress also wants to take into consideration the general state of the economy. There would be pressure to limit increases in the guaranteed income if there were evidence that the program was substantially contributing to inflation, unemployment, or the collapse of certain industries.

The provision in the national income insurance plan for automatic increases in the guaranteed minimum income might well make it politically unfeasible. But if this provision were eliminated in the effort to increase political support for the plan, its potential long run impact on the distribution of income and political influence would be drastically curtailed. The dependence of the plan on there being a provision for automatic yearly increments in the level of the guaranteed minimum income and the likely strength of the opposition to such a provision is probably the greatest weakness of the plan.

A possible fall back compromise that would not entirely emasculate the program would be to replace the provision for an automatic yearly increment with a provision calling for increments to be voted on yearly by Congress with the goal of increasing the guaranteed minimum income from 25 to 50 percent of the median income within approximately 10 years. During periods of severe inflation the decision might well be to only make adjustments for increases in the median income; thus the guaranteed minimum income might stay at 30 percent for two or three years and the goal of a guaranteed minimum income equal to 50 percent of the median income might take 15 rather than 10 years to achieve.

-43-
The plan does not make provision for the needs of special segments of the population. For example, a person who is blind and poor may require a higher guaranteed minimum income than a poor person who is not blind, all other things being equal. A case can also be made for variation in the guaranteed income due to an individual based on age (Rainwater, 1973).

A major assumption underlying all guaranteed income proposals is that a flat benefit level should be adequate for most of those who are poor. But those who advocate such programs also admit that there would be special cases, particularly related to disability and medical problems, when a person would require more than the standard benefits. To this end some form of residual welfare program would have to be retained.

While it is true that the proposed national income insurance plan does not take into consideration variation in special needs, the program would go further toward meeting the needs of the entire low income population than does the existing public welfare system with its arbitrary variations in payment levels between states and categories of the welfare population.

The plan would encourage high fertility among those with the lowest incomes. Since benefits would be a function of family size, there would be an incentive for the poorest families to have many children. At a minimum there would be a reduction in the incentive to take measures to limit family size. This might lead to a marked increase in the relative proportion of the total population living in poor families or to the growth of a vast "welfare class".

The fertility argument against guaranteed income plans is based in part on the belief that many women presently on welfare are having illegitimate children in the effort to increase their welfare benefits. Feagin (1972) has carefully reviewed the available evidence and rejects this conclusion. A related misconception is that welfare families are large, whereas in actuality the average AFDC family includes only 2.6 children (Williamson, 1974a).

Another source of indirect evidence on the fertility issue is the data as to the effect of family allowances on fertility. A family allowance is a payment to a family based on the number of children in the family; the payment ceases when the child reaches adult status. The United States is one of the few Western nations without a family allowance program. Available evidence suggest that family allowances have little if any impact on fertility even when the conscious effort is made to use the allowance as a fertility incentive (Schorr, 1966:65-84; Vadakin, 1968:95-101). In most countries the family allowance benefits are quite modest and they are only available as long as there are children in the family. These factors limit the utility of this data source for
making estimates as to the possible fertility impact of a more substantial guaranteed income program.

Our understanding of shifts in fertility trends is far from complete. From past experience it is clear that economic factors can be important. It is entirely possible that the introduction of a guaranteed income plan, particularly a generous plan, could spark a reversal of the recent downtrend in fertility among the poor. But the indirect evidence that is presently available suggests that any impact the national income insurance plan might have on fertility would be insignificant.

Initially the plan would not provide even a minimally adequate standard of living. If we use the poverty line as a measure of adequacy, this criticism is quite valid. One reply is that the plan would increase the standard of living for many while decreasing it for relatively few. If this plan were introduced, it would replace several existing welfare programs including AFDC. In some states families would suffer a reduction in living standard unless a state program were introduced to supplement the federal program, but most of those who would be forced to live on $3,000 per year are living on less than that today. Another reply is that while several negative income tax plans have been proposed which would assure a more adequate standard of living, their cost generally makes them politically unfeasible. The national income insurance plan would not provide an adequate living standard initially, but within ten years it would provide a standard of living which would be substantially more adequate than that which would be provided by any proposal which is politically feasible today.

The plan would force the poor to do society's dirty-work jobs at very low wages. Gans (1972) argues that one of the functions of poverty for the nonpoor is to assure that society's dirty work gets done cheaply. Any guaranteed income program with an employment requirement has the potential for being used to force the poor to do unpleasant mental work for low wages. The alternative service option in the national income insurance plan is an effort to deal with this problem. If a variety of alternative service options are available to the recipient, the choice made is less likely to be perceived as forced labor. The availability of these options also serves as an incentive to those creating the guaranteed jobs, an employment option which will be competing with the alternative service option, to make these jobs attractive. The guaranteed income component of the plan will make it possible for recipients to move from one region of the country to another; this will further broaden the range of available job options.

Considerable stigma would come to be associated with participation in the program. The stigma would be greatest for those who chose to participate in the guaranteed job program or one of the alternative service options which was restricted to national income insurance recipients. The stigma would be greater
for these categories of recipients because their recipient status would be the most visible.

It is not possible to accurately predict how stigmatized the program would come to be. But public opinion data do exist which suggest that both guaranteed income and guaranteed job programs would be considerably less stigmatized than is the AFDC program (Williamson, 1974b). The following aspects of the national income insurance program should contribute to reducing the stigma associated with being a recipient: (1) the recipient would be able to hold a job in the private sector and receive an income supplement check in the mail in the same way pension and social security payments are received; (2) the program would be financed in part by a payroll tax thus contributing to a definition of the benefits as having been earned; (3) there would be no corps of caseworkers making unannounced visits associated with the program.

The payroll tax to be used in financing the program is highly regressive. Half of the funds for the program would be generated using a tax scheme modelled on the present social security tax. But as Pechman (1969) points out the social security tax is highly regressive. In 1968 the burden ranged for 7.6 percent for those in the under $2,000 per year income category down to 1 percent for those in the $50,000 and over category (Herriot and Miller, 1971). Since 1968 the payroll tax has substantially increased making the burden even less equitably distributed.

The major reason for proposing a tax comparable to the present social security tax to pay for part of the program is that it would contribute to the definition of the program as "income insurance" rather than as "welfare." This distinction is not minor. The American public is much more receptive to programs such as social security and national health insurance, which are viewed as benefitting all segments of the population, than to programs designed for or restricted to the poor. The poor stand to gain much more from programs that are designed for a wide spectrum of the population than from programs that are for the welfare population only.

The inequity of the proposed tax scheme could be substantially reduced if all sources of income (not just earned income) and if total income (not just the first $12,600 per year) were subject to the tax. The inequity could also be reduced by a gradual increase in the proportion of the burden financed out of general federal revenues. The provision that 50 percent of the burden be paid out of general revenues at the outset serves to facilitate such a shift.

The plan would do very little to alter the inequality in the distribution of wealth in America. Most of those who would favor a more equitable distribution of income feel that the extent of the inequality in the distribution of wealth is an equally if not more
important issue. The income insurance plan would have a substantial impact on the distribution of income, but very little impact on the distribution of wealth. Other strategies including higher inheritance taxes and the elimination of various loopholes in the present inheritance tax system would be more effective for reducing the extent of the inequality in the distribution of wealth. A possible modification of the proposal to deal with this criticism would be to include as taxable income an imputed income equal to 5 (or 10) percent of all assets above a specified level, such as $50,000.

CONCLUSION

In this paper an effort has been made to answer the major arguments against the national income insurance plan. Where evidence exists that can be used to evaluate the validity of these arguments it has been cited. Unfortunately this evidence is often quite indirect. As an advocate of income insurance and of the guaranteed income approach to income maintenance more generally, I would like to be able to conclude that all the major arguments have been considered, have been found wanting, and can now be dismissed. But such a conclusion is not warranted on the basis of existing evidence. Many unknowns remain to be worked out after a guaranteed income program is introduced. If such a program is introduced on a modest scale and gradually increased in scope, the opportunity to effectively deal with the problems that arise will be maximized.

To those who favor the guaranteed income approach but are unwilling to support the introduction of a program which does not assure a substantial guaranteed income at the outset (say a guaranteed income of at least 50 percent of the median income), I have two notes of caution: (1) The price of ideological purity could be an indefinite postponement of the introduction of a guaranteed income. It is all too easy for those who are not poor to urge those who are to wait until a more ambitious plan is politically feasible. (2) If an ambitious guaranteed income program were introduced at the outset, the risk of serious social and economic disruption would be high. The problems created might be sufficiently severe to force a rescinding of the program and to result in discrediting of the guaranteed income approach for years to come.
REFERENCES

Barlow, Robin, Harvey E. Brazer, and James N. Morgan  

Break, George F.  

Davis, Kingsley and Wilbert E. Moore  

Dubin, R.  

Feagin, Joe R.  

Gans, Herbert J.  

Green, Christopher  

Herriot, Roger A. and Herman P. Miller  

Kornhauser, H.  
1965  Mental Health of the Industrial Worker. New York: Wiley

Macarov, David  

McGovern, George  

Pechman, Joseph A.  
1969  "The rich, the poor, and the taxes they pay." Public Interest 17(Fall): 21-43.

Rainwater, Lee  

Rees, Albert  
Sanders, Thomas
1951 Effects of Taxation on Executives. Boston: Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University.

Schorr, Alvin L.

Theobald, Robert

Vadakin, James C.

Williamson, John B.
1974a "Beliefs about the welfare poor." Sociology and Social Research 58,2(January): 163-175.
Many aspects of the future seem imponderable, in the sense that they are impossible of reckoning, and into this category falls the plight of cities. That portion of the cities which is marked by physical blight, continuing property and human deterioration, and myriads of problems of survival—the so-called "inner city" is even more elusive of future prediction and remedy. Theoretician and practitioner alike appear to be enmeshed in an endless web of conceptual gossamer, and palliative ministrations to a relative few targets within their purview.

The intent of this paper, however, is not to castigate but rather to challenge the energies of thought and action once more towards potential cure rather than endless remedies for symptoms. To accept the underlying assumptions of a cure, is to affirm the possibility that man has the intellectual ability and the will to make substantial and lasting improvements in the human condition, and that social structuring can exist not primarily to regulate man but to fulfill him.

Further, by way of introduction, the fact that a word has been coined as part of the title for this paper, is a means of elaborating the notion that from a practitioner view, knowledge must be functional or designed for operation. Hence, *functionality means a design for operation.

State of Theory

It might be more appropriate to develop here some of the dilemmas of theory for there are many theoretical approaches which purport to provide a basis for understanding the dynamics of the inner city. Some of these are analyses of poverty, causal factors and manifestations, racial and ethnic differences as sources of conflict and tensions, cultural delineations of the social structure, impact of predominate and subordinate cultures upon lifestyles, institutional arrangements for the accommodation of residents of inner city areas, politics and power as factors in decision-making, self-determination; the list could continue ad infinitum. However, it is within this amalgam of concepts that value conflicts and discontinuities reside. These theoretical contradictions give rise to what Warren (1971) has called the diagnostic paradigm. He further suggests that of two predominant paradigms which are utilized, the first which places the explanation for the individual's social condition upon that individual's own characteristics and adjustment to the social arrangements of the societal conditions around him is most often applied. He concludes that the supporting-belief value system for this model is well elaborated, and that this accounts for the wide utility of
of that conceptual framework. The second paradigm which analyzes the social system and the social structure is not equally elaborated in a system of beliefs and values, hence, is less frequently used and does not lead to prognostications about changes which must be made in the social structure and institutional arrangements. The same view has been well articulated by Ryan (1971) in his "blaming the victim" analogy.

Thus the practitioner who wishes to apply scientific knowledge is presented with an array of concepts ranging from the earliest Biblical treatise on the eternal presence of the poor to the other polar position that if given opportunity persons can enter the democratic stream and articulate their needs and desires thereby instituting a change of conditions for improved living.

Many authors have in various ways promulgated the views that are associated with the use of a diagnostic paradigm of the type that stresses individual deficiency and individual triumph. The literature is replete with individual literary testimonials which lead towards the conclusion that given time and sufficient opportunity, most inner city residents can break out of their entrapment of poverty and social deprivation. To mention a few: Claude Brown received wide accolades for his autobiographical Manchild in the Promised Land, and he was neither the first nor the last to be acclaimed for "telling it like it is". Ethel Waters, a great entertainer, provided material for her life story, His Eye is On the Sparrow. For nearly a decade, there was a steady flow of this type of "confession" in literature that while the society had cheated these authors of their birthright, they had through sheer diligence, and repeated storming of the doors of opportunity risen above the hobbling circumstances which threatened to bind them. At this point it will have become apparent that much of the theory also has a distinct racial link, and the social message literature of the time both shapes and reflects the prevailing views about the causes of man's problem. To be Black and poor have become synonymous. What becomes obscured, then, is the fact that thousands of poor are non-Black, and poverty when numbered in the millions has no color bounds.

It is premature, however, to leave the arena of scientific theory as advanced by social scientists. The delineation of social systems theory helped in a shift towards emphasis of a functioning system as valid only when all subsystems are "go". The interrelatedness of the problems with dysfunctional aspects of the system are all too apparent. Social psychologists like Kenneth Clark wrote positions which led to the U.S. Supreme Court decision of 1954 to desegregate the public schools, and in his book, Dark Getto, Clark gives ample emphasis to the view that the conditions of a ghetto, inner city living, are not created by those who reside within. It is also a matter of paramount importance
to note that in the recent reversal of the desegregation position which was legitimated by law twenty years ago, there is abundant evidence that the systems of beliefs and values did not achieve a state of change as mandated by the law.

Theories of social change have always been concerned with politics and the social order. Few of them, however, have been revolutionary statements for change; if they are revolutionary they die of suppression or "benign neglect." Consequently, much of the theoretical conceptual material has emphasized an evolutionary character of politics with more and more persons from the lower echelons of society achieving the impossible dream of being elected to high political office. When this political evolution comes to the inner city, the expectations of residents are raised significantly. The little man catches a bit of the dream, campaigns for his preferred office-seeker, and upbraids his non-voting neighbors whose ideology dictates that they should refrain from suffrage in a system which they deem to be non-relevant. Once elected, the candidate-office holder, finds to his dismay that he cannot do any of the acts which he pledged and sincerely desired to promulgate in terms of social change. His constituency becomes quickly disillusioned with their impostor, and his political demise begins. If he is a Black Mayor of an American city, of which office holders there are nearly three hundred, the mayor acts boldly, keeps up a steady campaign against the forces which seek to constrain him, and perhaps carries on his own private war with his mutinous police department. If the official is a Congress person, he appears somewhat more likely to be allowed to function in concerted efforts with his Congressional colleagues, and in caucus may become quite astute at working to gain the support for legislation which affects the life of cities.

Theoretically, a political scientist such as Charles Hamilton writes that the inner city is merely a series of conduits through which economic resources are permitted to channel to give the illusion that residents have some clout and control over their own destiny. As the co-author with Stokely Carmichael of the first in-depths analysis of Black Power, Hamilton has subsequently fed into the theoretical stream much information about the linkage between economics and power, and has some well-worded notes of caution for those who espouse black capitalism as a means of advancing beyond the restraints of poverty and subjugation.

Those who are afflicted by the accompanying maladies of social oppression need services of various kinds. Primarily, these services have been social services delivered by private and public agencies. They have been social welfare instruments which means a very different kind of conceptual base and delivery than a social security or social insurance conceptualization. In reflecting back to the times of the '30's and the year 1935 as the beginning of a social security program
on the American scene, it is interesting that the inception of those services pointed towards a preventive guaranteed minimal standard of living for all citizens. However, with the passing of the Great Depression, other realities took precedence, and more and more the social services of the nation were geared to those with critical needs. Hence, the individual who achieves help must also achieve some form of client status and present himself as needing something that self-sufficient persons are not ordinarily expected to require.

At the same time the theoretical underpinnings hinged upon the self, self-mastery, individual achievement, and group participations with one's fellows, geared to promote consensus and harmony. So marked was the emphasis for a time upon agreement and consensus for action that the discontinuities of conflict on an international scale were totally inconsistent with the peace-and-harmony-at-all-costs views which were being embraced within communities. The loss of awareness of the creative possibilities inherent in conflict, and the absence of strategies for resolving tensions on a rational basis led to climactical expressions of human feelings through explosive riots and rebellion against the systems.

To recapitulate, various theories, models, and constructs aim to enlighten other theorists, as well as practitioners about conditions of core cities. These core areas are called by many terms—the inner city, the central city, the ghetto, "old" city and so on. However, the gaps in knowledge, the different underlying assumptions about man, and the lack of clear definition of the nature of the problems themselves leave abundant room for further study, more sensitive research, and partnership in the research enterprise.

Concerns of Practice

In the last ten years or less, an array of practitioners have crossed the threshold of intervention into inner city concerns. Disenchantment with professionalism which bore marked detachment from the lifestyle and crises of persons affected, caused widespread reaction from the "client" population. That reaction is evident even in the attempt at designating consumers of services proffered by less odious labels. Whatever the appellation given, the ranks of persons experiencing dysjunctive with the social system has steadily increased, and the most obvious concern is that the inner city has not shown improvement per in the material indicators of housing, business, employment, recreational outlet and others that are used to determine the positive- ness of life quality. A generalization which might prove valid with the combined researches available is that the "inner city" is not a place, geographically, or a timespan in the development of urbanism;
it is rather an institutionalized set of values and beliefs which keep society adversely stratified, and prevent modifications of any scope in the social structuring or resources available for persons to achieve a reasonable standard of life. The quality of life does not significantly and progressively improve for inner city dwellers. Drawing again from Warren's study of Model Cities programs, it was determined that those programs like other thrusts before addressed a segment of the population most amenable to change from deviance to conformity, and produced "graduates" with greater skills in confrontation, but with no real innovative alternatives to the existing systems.

Practitioners found themselves hopelessly buffeted between the two sides: those with power, and those without. The great expectations that marked the post-riots period dried up into frustration and rage at a service delivery network which was inadequately prescribed, underfunded, unevenly administrated, and had the same basic flaws of scientific fallacies as had characterized the earlier applied diagnostic paradigm.

Poverty funds that seemed to abound went in all directions, sometimes with excessively high administrative costs, other times into consumer-directed service delivery systems that replicated most of the errors of the developing profession of social work in its earlier stages. Despite some impressive successes, which might well have been serendipitous because of their spirit of adventure, studies of outcomes available to the field, and these are limited evaluative efforts, show that some drug addicts were helped by former drug addicts, some welfare recipients left the welfare rolls with the help of some other welfare helpers, and a goodly number of community programs made people bolder in articulating their concerns and approaching sources of help.

Without documenting these views singularly, it can be offered that student research in some schools of social work tend to support these assertions. To be more specific, one graduate student social worker who conducted a survey of agency services available to minority group residents in one model neighborhood area in a Connecticut city found that despite the geographical presence of social service installations aimed to conduct "outreach" services, there did not appear to be significant increase in services. Either no representation or underrepresentation characterized the Boards of Directors of most of the ongoing established social services agencies. Hence, by inference, the poverty programs were not a proving ground for movement into responsibility of continuing private agency programs.
Further, there was no substantial increase in the use of those services available to consumers, and no clearcut indication of better understanding of the potential help available through social service delivery.

It is particularly important to interpret these findings not as the woes of social work have sought to interpret—failure of social work as a profession, but rather as evidence that social services are the institutionalized arrangements of a sanctioning society which imposes considerable restraints upon the directions in which services can develop. When seed money for experimentation and innovation dried up prematurely, the ability to define the problem, address the problem, evaluate results, and feedback the experience was just beginning to take hold.

Practitioners must answer accountably to consumers, to entrepreneurs, to sources of power and control at the top of the economic bracket. It is an uneasy stewardship. The consumer experiences his uncertain job security, or fluctuating welfare grant, the funding body examines intangible results to find ways of slicing scarce resources, the social worker pledges advocacy to the client with an uneasy knowledge that institutional change is bigger than any avenues open—it is the whole ball of wax. Perceptive students clamor for the reinstatement of social reform and visionary leadership. Martin Luther King, Walter Reuther, and Cesar Chavez stride through the pages of history, and symbolically only a Chavez is left, weakened, numbed, and dismembered by the fray. Social work has its heroes too, and the martyrdom of a Goodman and Schwerner in Mississippi during the civil rights demonstrations or the tenacious leadership of a Carl Stokes, past mayor of a large city with roots in social work do not go unheralded.

Meanwhile, in more practical terms a faculty team picks up the work begun by the student and continues to research for Community Knowledge of Existing Resources and How the Community Defines the Adequacy of Social Agencies as a Forecast for Developing a New Plan or Service. (Battle et al, 1973)

A review of social work and social science literature reveals that professional workers are greatly concerned with the inadequacy of services, the imposition of "colonialism" upon inner city residents, and the imposition of incompatible values upon reluctant subjects. Dick Gregory, the tragi-comedian, puts it thus: "... you make me learn a different culture along with how to survive the rats and the roaches..."

In a summary comment of this section of the paper, which barely touches upon the complexity of concerns stemming from practice, the writer must venture an opinion based upon recent contact with practitioners from the international scene; the human problems which are herein explicated and inferred are universal problems, and sociology
of ghettoization does not confine itself within national boundaries. Hence, the approach to scientific inquiry, and the dissemination and application of knowledge must be as universal, granted of course the applied form is appropriate to the cultural patterns of the countries in which the knowledge is used. A moot point though it may seem, there have been some devastating examples of the importation of ethnocentric modes of intervention.

Setting Directions

In presenting future agenda, the challenge lies not so much in finding directions as setting out in those directions which we as a group of scientists of inquiry and application wish to go. By this time, it should be apparent that this paper espouses an irrevocable commitment to a partnership enterprise, whether one wishes to call it interdisciplinary, multidisciplined or otherwise. The research enterprise must always address itself to inquiry which has no immediate application, and in the interest of pure science which extends the basic knowledge about man. At the same time, however, it is the firm position of this paper that the times require an ongoing action-oriented research which can partialize a problem, posit a solution, try a series of interventions, and give evaluative feedback of results sufficiently soon to enable a change of direction as indicated. While there may seem to be certain inconsistence between this conclusion and the earlier assertions that social restructuring has not been a part of the commitment of the society, nevertheless, the position taken is that to achieve functionality or the design for operation required by the focus of this paper—the inner city—there must be movement towards developing knowledge about how institutional arrangements come to be, and how systems can be altered to provide more effective results. Before we can formulate the answers we must raise the questions.

A partnership of inquiry could set up fewer dichotomies of persons, and could move forward with the goodwill of those whom it seeks to serve. Permit me to quote, somewhat out of context, but for added enlightenment it is hoped: Dr. James A. Goodman, of the National Academy of Sciences, U.S.A. Chairman of one of the Commissions at the recent meeting of the International Conference of Social Welfare stated that

As many people as possible should be encouraged to participate (in research) according to their abilities.

The research carried out will depend on its context. Academic versus governmental auspice seems to indicate that academic tends to be too rigid and non-functional for social planners.
The task does not end with the report of the research findings; there should be a simplified summary of its conclusions, possible use and implementation.

He further stated that

an undigested voluminous quantity of research material exists in the world. There should be informed cooperation of people in the research that is going on.

There should be a quest for explication of the value system underlying the research. The elimination of poverty is a primary goal in human development, and cannot be achieved by economics alone. There must be movement towards the achievement of social goals.

The social researcher and economic planner must not be divorced from each other. There is a dearth of reliable information for planning and coordination of research between international bodies.

Research in social development has a low priority in different countries.

In conclusion, the sociology of the inner city requires the utmost of informed understanding by social scientists of every persuasion if the problems of poverty, racism, and social handicap are to be effectively eliminated. We have, in this author's opinion been too piecemeal, too particularized, and grossly undercommitted to any major societal change.
Notes

1. See, for example, Charles A. Valentine, *Culture and Poverty*, as a critique deals with the incongruities that arise out of different theoretical perspectives on poverty. The writings on poverty and cities is of course as inexhaustible list.

2. *The Negro and the City*, edited by Richard B. Sherman contains some of this information.

3. Talcott Parsons and Charles B. Loomis are two well known theoreticians of social systems theory. Loomis' specificity appeals to the writer of this paper.

4. Valentine's comments on Kenneth Clark's contribution to changing the traditional thinking, arising from E. Franklin Frazier's work, bear on this point.

5. The term *benign neglect* is most often attributed to Daniel Moynihan per his memo to President Richard Nixon suggesting that a possible response to civil rights demands of Black people might take that form. The American free press, during the Watergate investigations, reported that Howard Hughes had used the term prior to Moynihan's memo when directing his employees to take certain repressive measures to stem the tide of Black demands in the state of Nevada.

6. Some well-known religious sects such as the Black Muslims take this position.

7. Abraham Maslow's theory is an example, as well as the widely used work of Erikson and others.

8. Grace Coyle as a revered author of social work literature carries something of this message in the flavor of democratic participation in the society as an ideal for the individual. She is, of course, consistent with the hope and idealism of the era.

9. Read the several works and reports of riots in major American cities, notably Watts, Newark and Detroit.

10. A research study by Helene Levens of the University of Wisconsin was useful in synthesizing these ideas.

11. Some of the sociologists who understood the possible helplessness of the practitioner in the absence of systems change wrote about this. For example, Hyman Rodman's short paper in *New Perspectives on Poverty*, p.171.
Footnotes cont'd


13. Faculty research at the University of Connecticut by Rufus Battle, Jr., Ivor J. Echols, and Johnese Howard. Final report in preparation.

14. See Blauner in Bibliography.

15. See Gregory in Bibliography.

16. The author attended the XVII International Conference on Social Welfare, held in Nairobi, Kenya, July 14 to 20, 1974 in which many of the same practical concerns were discussed.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


Some Works on Ghetto Life Among Black People

In the *Social Work Journal*, Vol.17, No.3, May 1972 there are several good articles on the following pages 32, 44, 50, 59, 82, 88, 100, 106, 112.


(in the same as above)
"Reactions of Normal Children to Retardates in Integrated Groups" pg. 75 and "Comments on Currents: Up the Down Escalator With Welfare; Black Power and Community Theory; Another Myth?" pg. 121.


(same as above)

Herzog, Elizabeth "Is There a Breakdown of the Negro Family?" Social Work, Vol. 11, No. 1, Jan. 1966, pg. 3.


I was born, raised and graduated from high school in Watts ....Watts like other black ghettos across the country is for ambitious youths, a transient status....In one sense, I was the archetype of the ghetto child who through hard work and initiative, was pulling himself toward a better life. I was the example, the exception. It was my life that was held up to Watts youth to emulate ....
INTRODUCTION:

Despite the riots, radical movements and demands for community controls of the 1960's, social scientists and social workers have noted the perseverance of many non-radical, traditional institutions in ghetto neighborhoods. Some of these institutions, like settlement houses, still advance the ideas of hard work, honesty, competition, and individual achievement which are at the heart of the American dream. These institutions were often around long before the War on Poverty and appear likely to last long after its end. They, therefore, seem to be a reliable potential source of aid for many ghetto residents. The question at the heart of this paper is whether there is any contradiction between the more or less permanent place of social welfare institutions in a ghetto community and the goal of changing and improving that same neighborhood. How have these traditional organizations been able to survive during a period of heightened social consciousness and political action? What accommodations, if any, have they had to make? and what does this perseverance indicate about the political culture in the ghetto and the possibility of significant, even radical, change? Our answer to these issues will come from looking at the ideology, staff, budget, and Board of Trustees of one social welfare institution in New York: The Boys' Club.

METHODOLOGY:

The focus of this paper is on a Boys' Club opened almost fifty years ago, as a branch of the Boys' Club of New York founded in 1876 by E.H. Harriman. The Club under study is located in one of the largest multi-ethnic tenement areas of New York and has served approximately 2,000 boys every year since its opening.

The data for the study are based on four years of participant observation done from 1970 to 1974 as a by-product of volunteer staff assistance in the Club. In addition, formal and informal interviews were conducted with the staff, trustees, Boys' Club of America officials, parents of members, alumni, community residents and school officials on the views of the organization.

Additional background material concerning the specific Boys' Club under study in the context of the Boys' Club movement was gathered from a mail survey of the 53 oldest Boys' Clubs in the country. Clubs formed between the period 1860 to 1906. (The cut off date 1906 was chosen because that was when the national association the Boys' Clubs of America was formed to foster the development and expansion of Boys' Clubs.)

A compilation of primary source material including interdepartmental memoranda, Boys' Club staff reports, out of print and unpublished historical data, and office file material were also used as supplemental secondary source material.

* The authors wish to express their appreciation to Murray Hausknecht, Stephen Steinberg, and Peter Read for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
The official history of the Boys' Club written in 1969 stresses the fact that "the continued successful growth of the Boys' Club of New York will be assured as long as the Trustees, the staff, and the alumni continue to use the record of the past as a guide in planning for the future... This spirit is the same today as it was in 1876..." This section of the paper will include discussions of various perspectives on the spirit, ideology, or goals of the Boys' Club. The intention is to outline some of the intended as well as the unintended faces of the Club as they have been expressed and implemented in actual programs which bear on the question of persistence of conservatism.

Boys' Club commitment to the maintenance of the 1876 spirit of the original Club prompts a look at some of the important themes in nineteenth century thinking. "The rags to riches tradition" in nineteenth century thinking centered around the ethical maxims of industry, frugality and prudence -- in short, around the behavioral patterns enjoined by the Protestant Ethic. Men living by these rules were likely to be successful, men living in violation of them were certain to fail. Competition was morally right in that it insured the survival of the fittest -- whether in sports or in the stock exchange. Those who had succeeded had no obligation to help anyone who did not help themselves, in a curious blend of laissez-faire logic and Puritan stewardship.

Ragged Dick, a character created by Horatio Alger, was the nineteenth century hero who found aggressive striving along with luck and fortune to be paths of success. The advice given to Dick reverberates in Boys' Club literature:

There've been a great many boys begin as low down as you, Dick, that have grown up respectable and honored. But they had to work pretty hard fo' it. 'I'm willing to work', said Dick. 'And you must not only work hard, but work in the right way... determined not to steal or do anything mean or dishonorable, however strongly tempted to do so.'

The central image of this advice can be seen in a statement of Boys' Club philosophy which stresses: "a careful blend of the so-called homely virtues of honesty, patriotism, sportsmanship, religion, self-discipline and a wide awake awareness of pressures and problems confronting modern youth". One Boys' Club even gives out an annual Horatio Alger medal to the boys most closely emulating that nineteenth century hero. Boys' Club literature evokes a sense of the nineteenth century, rugged
individualism in which the hardened individual confronts and conquers the world, resisting temptation and staying on the right side of the law. The ideal boy is competitive, but a fighter tempered by virtue. The persistent reiteration of these ideals in Boys' Club literature and reports constitutes the ideological source of conservatism in the Club.

A CONSERVATIVE BOARD OF TRUSTEES

In addition to the importance of ideology in maintaining the conservative posture of the Boys' Club, at least one other element should be discussed to more clearly understand the sources of conservatism and the basis of their persistence. This element is the Board of Trustees of the Boys' Club.

All major policy and administrative decisions for the Boys' Club have been and remain controlled by a 49 member Board of Trustees. Former Vice-President Spiro Agnew has described these men:

"...You are successful products of the free enterprise system. You are representatives of our fine institutions and of the professional freedom that is enjoyed in the United States. Everyone of you, by virtue of his intelligence, his stamina and his fight, has attained a high plateau of accomplishment in some field — be it government, labor, law, the military, sports, or some other business or profession. In short, gentlemen, you are the establishment."

The "Establishment" leaders of the Club are drawn from elite, even "super rich" backgrounds and institutions. The present Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Club is, for example, the son of the Clubs' founder, whose family fortune derives from oil, banking, and railways. The Harriman family controls Brown Brothers, Harriman, a large Wall Street investment bank; fifteen of the Trustees of the Boys' Club either work for the bank or are executives with banks or brokerage firms doing business with the bank. Fourteen of the trustees are listed in Poor's Registry of Corporation Directors and Executives. Twenty are listed in Who's Who in America; and seventeen are listed in the Social Register. The last volume reportedly lists the top one tenth of one percent of upper class families. The trustees include present or former directors of the U.S. Steamship Lines, Chris Craft Industries, Milliken Woolens, Doubleday and Company, and Wellington Computer Systems.
While it has not been possible to learn very much about specific decisions made by the Board, their general duties were described to them. "A prime responsibility of the Trustees is to help manage the organization and see to it that it is adequately funded." Adequate funding would presumably include enough funds so that programs and staff could reach their objectives of developing boys with an aggressive, yet moral virility, and with a deep sense of respect for others, one's community, and society.

The Trustees have, however, opposed drawing on any funds from the Federal government, preferring reliance on general contributions and investment income for the roughly one million dollars a year needed to run the Club. This policy might have been acceptable in earlier times, but recent stock market losses and inflation have resulted in smaller returns from investment income. One consequence of the decline in income has been a freeze on expenditures. The Trustees, for example, recently turned down a request for a twenty-five cent an hour increase for one part-time worker. The Trustees argued that they could not afford to pay any part-time worker more than $3.25 an hour regardless of his education, skills, or effectiveness with the boys.

Little else can be learned about the operations and aims of the Board, largely because of the lack of self-evaluation and its secrecy in managing the Club. The Board is, however, clearly self-perpetuating. Individual Trustees are never removed from the Board, but remain on as actual or honorary members. New members are suggested by friends and join the ranks of a Board lacking accountability or responsiveness to the members of the Club. Ultimate responsibility for the Boys' Club is held neither by the staff nor by a body of members but by its self-perpetuating Board of Trustees.

The conservative nature of the Boys' Club stems partly from the nineteenth century origins of a wealthy group of industrialists and bankers whose heritage was formed under the benign auspices of laissez-faire economic theory and Protestant Social Darwinism. This heritage is expressed in a structure of decision making which concentrates all effective financial and administrative power in the hands of a group of men who are out of touch with the day to day realities of the "shameful poor" they profess to serve.

THE CONSEQUENCES

Having briefly discussed the ideology and structure of the Boys' Club, it is now possible to look at some of the effects of these ideas and structures on the staff and programs of the Club.
The real crunch in getting from ideas to practice comes first and foremost in the type of staff you are able to attract and hold for the operation of your program. The Boys' Club has six full-time professional workers to handle the daily needs of two to three hundred boys. Two of the six are administrators with substantial duties involved in keeping the Club running smoothly. The remaining four serve as department heads and guidance counselor, assisted by three other full-time workers. They are in turn assisted by twelve part-time workers and eight occasional volunteers. The two most senior staff, with masters degrees, have worked at the Club for twenty-five years, and earn approximately $16,000 a year. The four other full-time workers earn between $9,000 to $12,000 per year. The remaining workers earn from $2.75 an hour to a maximum of $3.25, without regular hours or fringe benefits like health coverage. Part-time workers may work three hours, twice a week and have their programs lengthened or shortened without prior notice. They are also not guaranteed work in the summer when the Club program is cut back. Due to the low wages and unstable working hours, most workers see their job as short-term, transitional work. One department head even said that such staff are not expected to work at the Club for more than one or two seasons, or to be able to support a family on their salary. Volunteers, who provide unpaid labor, undermine any bargaining power of the staff because it is understood that lower level staff can be replaced by a volunteer who will do the same work for free. The bulk of the staff who are responsible for the day to day supervision of boys are, therefore, largely young, inexperienced, untrained, and poorly paid.

The Club's commitment to provide "opportunities to develop emotionally, physically, socially, intellectually, and vocationally", for 2,000 boys is severely affected by the limitations of staff and budget. The primary result of these limitations is a basic division of programs into mass activities for the majority of members and special education for a select few.

About 100 boys have participated in the latter programs in which members endowed with "exceptional industry, motivation, leadership, quality, and sterling character" are tested for a scholarship program that can send them to private schools such as Andover, Phillips Academy, and St. Paul's. Such boys become the Ragged Dicks of the Clubhouse, entering an entirely different environment of learning—one that is designed to prepare him for a chosen career in the best possible way. The result of their hard work has opened the door to high positions in a widely divergent field of professions ranging from medicine, law and journalism. Only four boys, however, received such scholarships in 1973.
while another twenty to thirty have participated in an in-house remedial education program. Thus, while the ideology or goals of the Boys' Club proposes competent achievement and success for all, the structure of opportunities provided places for only four out of 2,000 members.

What, then, is happening to the other member of the Club while this selective educational training is taking place? Well over ninety-five percent of the members participate only in sports and recreation programs designed to bring "constructive order" rather than success to members' lives; to develop respect for the property of others, especially the Boys' Club, rather than to instill a sense of the virtue of competition. The majority of boys drift in and out of the Clubhouse, and from one activity to another, taxing the limited staff with simple custodial duties. Instead of "sound relationships" developing between boys and staff, the relationships are punitive and authoritarian emphasizing the rules against smoking, running, cursing, fighting, drugs, alcohol, girls, and other "ad hoc" offenses. Even the limited goal of instilling constructive order in the lives of boys, in an effort to "reduce vandalism" and serve as an after school alternative to juvenile delinquency, falls short of the mark under the weight of such a system as custodial control.

The failure of the Clubs' programs and staff to reach its minimal objectives seems even more surprising because its failures have been known for almost forty years. An evaluation of the Club's performance, published in 1936, warned that the Boys' Club was not effective as an alternative to juvenile delinquency for masses of boys. Nominal memberships, with boys joining for short, interrupted periods, resulted in the formation of few close relationships with the staff, and consequently a positive rather than a negative effect on delinquency. It was found that boys who were in the club the longest had higher, rather than lower delinquency rates than new members. Thrasher's recommendation that membership be restricted to expose boys to more in-depth, rather than mass activities and limited supervision, was never implemented. The Boys' Club continues to provide mainly mass activities and limited supervision. And while we have no direct evidence on delinquency rates our research tends to support the belief that Club members have records of delinquency and truancy in schools.

Neither the goals of individual success nor constructive order are sufficiently important to overcome the reluctance of the Board of Trustees to spend enough to deter rather than to enhance the risk of delinquency in the Clubhouse. The Board is accountable in its own words:
"If he (the boy) has built up a sound relationship over the years and if he truly gets something of value from the Boys' Club there is a very good chance he will stay on the right side of the law."\textsuperscript{23}

With so few chosen to succeed in programs of higher education, the vast majority of the boys seem to learn alternatives to individual achievement in the form of delinquency and crime as if to demonstrate their need to be outstanding - no matter what. The "right side" of the Club includes so few that the many who fail may wonder if rules and staff are only destined to keep them in their place.

**BOYS' CLUB CULTURE: MACHISMO AND ANTI-FEMINISM**

In addition to the above more or less intended aspects of Boys' Club programming, one additional factor needs to be considered in order to appreciate the unintended ways in which the Club sustains a conservative presence in the ghetto community. The first step in this unintended effect is the stress placed on displays of physical strength and manliness as signs of achievement in sports. "The Hornets are a great team, and for the first time in their lives these boys are performing as men ... each one puts in a hard half day of work every day... Given manly work to do, they receive the recognition that men deserve." Quiet, unathletic, non-competitive boys are deemed unmanly and in need of special remedial physical education. Achievement and performance become associated with manliness in a setting in which the culture of the Club members is already predisposed to glorifying masculinity. Well over sixty-five percent of the members are Puerto Rican or of Hispanic background which emphasizes the "cult of machismo."\textsuperscript{24} This cultural pattern stresses the importance of being "muy macho" or very virile, sexually aggressive, and domineering over women. Women in turn, are expected to be absolutely submissive with the prime task of bringing male children into the world. A girl who deviates from this role can bring disgrace to herself and her entire family. The Boys' Club reinforcement of this practice of sex stereotyping and machismo interferes with recent changes emphasizing the equalization of decision making powers, career opportunities and sexual expectations of men and women. The presence of such unintended "anti-feminism" in the Boys' Club is not likely to support their entrance into mainstream America but will likely enhance values which interfere with social mobility. The programmatic theme in the Boys' Club which supports "machismo" will more likely, therefore, strengthen the conservative thrust of Hispanic culture, further reducing the options of members to
successfully pass from the ghetto to the mainstream of American Society.

CONCLUSION

We are acutely aware of the limitations of the present case study and offer conclusions which can, at the same time, be seen as recommendations for others to compare our findings with similar social welfare institutions. The persistence of conservatism in the Boys' Club can be laid only partly at the foot of an ideology which stresses a nineteenth century concern with hard work, individual achievement and high virtue. The small and limited programs of higher achievement for an elite few only reinforce the sense of persistent inequality which is the clear and present hallmark of the ghetto. Constructive order becomes, in fact, a password for minimal supervision and containment, with the prospect that these auspices will foster nothing other than increased delinquency. The ever present history of delinquency and crime in the ghetto receives tacit, if not intended, support from a skeleton staff and meager programming.

The fundamental responsibility and credit for the persistence of the conservatism of the Boys' Club must be given to the Board of Trustees. Their policy of fiscal conservatism rejects the intrusions of outsiders, like the Federal Government, who might enforce unwanted standards of effectiveness or goal compliance, and leaves their staff, programs, and members at the mercy of an unaccountable and invisible portfolio of private investments.

The rejection of reform, in the form of smaller, qualitatively superior programs has left the Club without the excuse that it did not know it was failing. One can only suppose that the failure to reach even their own stated objectives to be an acceptable part of "doing good work", and gaining tax exemptions for charitable deductions. The Boys' Club seems destined to provide the rich with a means of selecting the very best and leaving the rest behind much as they have been since before the first Boys' Club promised to "win the battle against the streets" for the possession of the youth of the ghetto. The structure, financing, and philosophy of the Boys' Club combine in seemingly unintended ways to perpetuate rather than alter a system of inequality in which a little is given to the many by the few who control, leaving the rest to wonder where they went wrong.
FOOTNOTES AND REFERENCES


2 For an interesting case study see Ely Chinoy, Automobile Workers and the American Dream (Boston: Beacon, 1970).


6 Boys' Club of America, Good Kids Don't Grow on Trees, 1970.


8 The executive director of one of the clubhouses referred us to Ferdinand Lundberg's, The Rich and the Super Rich to find out about the backgrounds of the Trustees of the Boys' Clubs.


9 Being listed in Poors' indicates you are among the "top ranking corporation officials and business people". See the introduction to Poors Register of Corporation Directors and Executives, New York: Stanford and Poor Corporation, 1972.


Statement by the Chairman of the Board of Trustees, Minot K. Milliken, Special Report, 1971, p.2.


Boys' Club of America, 1972 *Salary Survey of Full Time Professional Workers in Boys' Clubs*. (pamphlet)


The Boys' Club of New York, *Education Program Profile*, 1969. (pamphlet)

A Short History, *op. cit.*

These are the same objectives of the first Boys' Club founded in Hartford, Connecticut in 1860.


From a comparative analysis of 214 nursing homes in the Chicago area, it was found that the nursing home field is composed of institutions with great variations in treatment resources available to the residents (Kosberg and Tobin, 1972). While the determination of organizational correlates to the extent of treatment resources was the major objective of the study, an exploration of the attitudes of a sample of nursing home administrators was undertaken in an effort to learn of possible relationships between attitudes and the characteristics of facilities.

There is a commonly-held assumption that not only the academic background of an administrator is related to the orientation and characteristics of the institution, but that the attitudes of the administrator are also of prime importance. That is, administrators with positive opinions of the client group will have better facilities than those with negative opinions. Similarly, administrators with low expectations of their clients' chances for improvement will provide less in way of care and services than administrators with higher expectations. Such conclusions have been reached by those interested in organizational theory or service provision, such as Etzioni (1964), Linn (1966), Terman (1965), Scott (1955), Kostick (1964), and Gottesman (1970).

It was the purpose of this exploratory endeavor to learn whether there were differences in the attitudes and opinions of administrators representing polar types of proprietary nursing homes and, if so, whether these attitudes might begin to explain the characteristics (i.e., extent of treatment resources) of the nursing homes. What was sought from this limited study were areas for further detailed analysis.

PROCEDURES USED AND SAMPLE DESCRIPTION

Random samples were taken from polar types of proprietary nursing homes analyzed in the study. It had been found that nursing homes rich in treatment resources were (1) large, (2) expensive and (3) cared for private or Medicare-paying residents. Nursing homes sparse in treatment

resources were (1) small, (2) inexpensive and (3) cared for welfare recipients. Five administrators were interviewed who represented nursing homes, measured to be rich in resources, which were (1) large ($M = 119$ beds), (2) expensive ($M = $531 per month for a semi-private room), and (3) caring for non-welfare recipients ($M = 80\%$ private and $15\%$ Medicare). In contrast, five administrators were randomly selected and interviewed from all nursing homes measured to be sparse in resources, which were (1) small ($T = 39$ beds), (2) inexpensive ($M = $250 per month for a semi-private room), and (3) only accepting welfare aid recipients. In addition, interviews were conducted with two administrators, randomly chosen from all administrators of facilities that were measured to be rich in resources, large, expensive, but caring for a sizable percentage of welfare aid recipients.

The administrators from large, expensive facilities caring for nonwelfare recipients will be called the RR Group (for resource rich facilities). The administrators of small and inexpensive nursing homes with welfare recipients will be referred to as the RS Group (for resource sparse homes).

For the RS nursing home administrators all but one had a high school education; all had been administrators for over three years at the home; and three of the five administrators were sole owners, one was salaried by the owner, and one was the president of the corporation which owned the home. With the exception of one administrator who was a clergyman and had previous experience in an institution for children, these administrators did not believe that they had any special training for their present positions as administrators. Of these five, two were men. All three female administrators were trained as nursing aides.

As for the RR nursing home administrators, one had completed high school, two had a bachelor's degree, one had a master's degree in business administration, and one was a lawyer with a background in economics. Three of the five administrators had come to the present nursing home within the past three years. Two of the administrators were salaried by the owners and the other three were all members of corporations which owned the homes. One administrator did not believe that he had any special training for his position, while the others all referred to seminars, courses, and previous employment providing them with special training and experience for their present positions. All five RR administrators were men.

Question areas were determined by three factors generated from the independent variables related to the extent of treatment resources found in the larger study, plus the additional area of perceived goals. The opinions and attitudes of the two groups of administrators were learned from in-depth interviews conducted by this writer. Assurance was given to each administrator that his or her name was picked at random, that the name of the administrator and institution would remain strictly anonymous, and that the interviewer was neither a representative of an agency nor a reporter in search of an expose. Every effort was made to relieve apprehensions and fears which would preclude complete candor on the part of the interviewees.
The following represents the consolidation of the administrators' responses. Occasionally direct quotations will be used as illustrations.

RESPONSES FROM ADMINISTRATORS

Organizational System. As could have been expected, each group of administrators stressed the importance of the size of their homes to the care which was provided, and minimized the disadvantages. The RR Group pointed out that their homes were profitable, efficient, and had the financial income to afford salaries of professional staff, services, and the equipment which was required of nursing homes. Only a large home could have sufficient cash inflow to afford improvements in care and upgrading the physical features of the home. The RS Group of administrators felt that the size of their homes was advantageous to the care of their residents. They believed that they were able to give personal and effective care to the residents, and that their institutions resembled (or were) a family or home, and that the needs and problems of each resident was known to them and under constant surveillance. "We are like a family here." "I am the father and the residents are my children." "If a resident isn't eating as usual, I know about it and find out the reason why."

Both groups of administrators believed that nursing home licensing requirements were useful, effective, and not stronger than good care demanded. The RS Group was generally in agreement in believing that the nursing home industry could not police its own and that there was a continuing need and role for federal, state, and local governments. There was some disagreement between the RR Group, as two administrators believed that there was enough governmental control over these private enterprises.

The RR Group saw the utility of nursing home associations and organizations, and belonged to them. Reasons given referred to the need for a unified lobbying voice ("There is strength in numbers.") and the dissemination of information and knowledge from these groups. The RS Group did not belong to such associations and organizations, and administrators felt that they could not afford to, and did not want to. They saw few, if any, advantages to be gained from memberships in nursing home associations.

Social Service System. The referral process was different between these two types of nursing homes. The need to maintain a reputation was very necessary for the RR nursing homes, as their potential residents (whose relatives played an active part in the referral process) "shopped around" for a nursing home. Residents in the RS nursing homes were on public aid and did not have the ability and "luxury" to indicate preferences following visits to several facilities, as did the more affluent group.

The process by which the decision was made for placement in a nursing home differed between the two types of nursing homes. For the RR homes, the family and physician were seen to play a role, while for those homes caring only for welfare recipients the existence of a bed in a home was believed to be the major (and only) criterion by which decisions were made. For this latter group, a reciprocal relationship was seen with
welfare departments. "We call them (the welfare department) when we have a vacant bed and they call us when they have a person who needs a nursing home."

Responses to the question of who must be satisfied varied considerably between the two groups of administrators. Generally, the RR Group believed that they had to satisfy (in one way or another) the families of the residents. This was not the case for the other group of administrators, who indicated that they had to satisfy public welfare requirements and public welfare workers. However, both groups of administrators admitted that both welfare workers and family members were unsatisfactory means for ensuring that good care would be provided. "Welfare workers are mainly concerned with making certain their records are correct." "The families look and smell, and are either satisfied or dissatisfied."

The RR Group felt that the high rates for care reflected (and resulted from providing) good quality food, high staffing ratios, and many services and programs. Homes caring for welfare recipients were seen as being "locked" into the welfare system and that it would be impossible to add resources to their homes without concomitant increases in assistance from public welfare. "If they want improvements, they ought to pay us so we can."

Health Service System. Both groups of nursing home administrators saw their institutions, to some extent, as being within the community medical care system and an extension of the hospital. The RR Group believed their institutions were substitutes for hospitals, for nursing home care was less expensive. The RS Group felt that they were caring for elderly persons who could no longer care for themselves, and as the residents were poor they had no alternatives. "Where else would they go? Who would care for them?"

The two groups were unanimous in their opinions that the nursing homes of the future would be large and complex. The RR Group saw an increasing need for public support of residents within nursing homes, as nursing care was increasingly expensive and few aged (or their families) could continue to privately pay for nursing home care.

Both groups of administrators believed that their homes were the final permanent location for the elderly residents, but for different reasons. The RR Group believed that the reason was due to the inability or lack of desire on the part of the family to provide care, while the other group of administrators felt that there were no other alternatives for their residents.

Goals. Neither group of administrators stressed rehabilitation for residents as a major goal for the institutionalized population. Administrators of RR homes implied that the admitting physician provides rehabilitation goals for each resident, but there was a feeling that an active program of rehabilitation is useless for the majority of residents, and that the best that could be done for the elderly is to keep them clean, comfortable, and provide for their medical and psychological needs. The
goals for care stated by the RS Group were more basic and included adequate food, cleanliness, happiness, and tender loving care.

When asked what could be considered as the major goal for their nursing homes, the RR Group stressed the need to maintain, or enhance, the reputation of their home (through the provision of good care and service). There was a failure to mention "profit" as the major goal of the organization. The responses by the RS Group can all be summed up by the term "survival." They did not believe they could operate any more effectively or efficiently than they were at present. "Rates stay the same, expenses go up, and requirements are increased." "We're being squeezed out of business."

Both groups of administrators felt that the societal goals for nursing homes were basically custodial. That is, they believed that they were relieving the family and society of the responsibility of caring for the elderly.

Deviant Cases. Several nursing homes were measured as large, expensive and rich in resources; yet, with sizable proportions of public aid recipients. It was hoped that useful information might be gained, by interviewing two administrators from such homes, in answer to the question of how these two homes were able to provide treatment resources with the number of welfare aid recipients they had (25% and 55%). Recall, the RS Group claimed they could not provide better care or more resources because of low Welfare reimbursement rates.

In both homes public aid recipients (for the great part) were residents for whom private funds had run out. One of the administrators pointed out that he just "didn't have the heart" to send the residents away after private funds had dried up, and so public aid payments were sought. It appeared that whether or not the residents were on welfare in these two homes, families were still interested and visited frequently. Therefore, it seems as though the figures on welfare recipients in nursing homes actually include two distinct groups; those who had always been on welfare in the nursing home and those who had become welfare recipients only after private funds ran out.

Two additional points of interest were learned. The first is that it is economically more desirable to seek welfare for former private paying residents than to attempt to fill all the beds with private residents. That is, full occupancy is the major goal and is more desirable than partial occupancy by only private residents. Finally, both the administrators indicated that while public aid rates were below costs, the revenue from private funds made up for this difference and allowed for both profit and good care.

ANALYSIS OF RESPONSES

The validity of information provided in any interview can be held in suspect, but often what is not said by the interviewee can be as important as what is articulated. In this regard, the relative failure of administrators to acknowledge any deleterious effects of large or small size indicates a certain lack of understanding about the relationship
between size of an organization and impact on the institutionalized population. Further, the satisfaction with present licensing requirements might also indicate an orientation toward the needs of the organization rather than the needs of the residents. This is supplemented by the attitudes of the RR Group that nursing home associations and organizations are valuable as advocates for the industry and enhance the status of the member homes.

An answer to the question of "who do you have to satisfy?" determines the major focus for an organization. Given this, the RS Group indicated that welfare workers had to be convinced that homes were meeting standards (although, at a most superficial level). The RR Group of administrators believed that they were catering to the families of residents (or to residents who were able to tell their relatives about their treatment in the institution). But whether discussing welfare workers or family members, both groups were seen by administrators to be unknowledgeable consumers. The lack of importance given to the role of physicians is interesting to note, for these are nursing care facilities and greater involvement might have been expected.

While nursing home administrators saw their facilities as extensions of hospitals, they believed that their residents would seldom - if ever - be rehabilitated or restored to the point of being discharged to a non-institutional setting. There was a tendency to "write off" the possibilities of any restorative efforts for the population served, and though their public relations literature referred to therapeutic staff and equipment and active programs of rehabilitation, it can be concluded that these references were for the sake of rhetoric (that is, business) rather than the residents.

Both groups of administrators saw their institutions as the final permanent dwellings for residents. Such opinions, coupled with scepticism toward the rehabilitation potential of the elderly, reinforces a custodial orientation for care and treatment. The administrators believed they were relieving others of the responsibility of caring for ill and elderly persons.

AREAS FOR FURTHER INQUIRY

It appears that proprietary institutions for the aged remain basically the same in their goals and care provided. However, the nursing home field is becoming composed of larger facilities charging higher rates for care. The industry will continue being its own advocate; yet, there are few - if any - advocates for the institutionalized population and their families.

The consumers of institutions are unknowledgeable and cannot discriminate between a good and bad facility. Too often it will be the rates charged, geographical proximity to family, or convenience for the resident's physician which will determine the nursing home to which an elderly person will go; not the characteristics of the facility or the level of nursing care provided.

There is a need for improved standards, training for administrators
and staff, and education of the general population and—especially—the consumers of nursing homes. Furthermore, if nursing homes are to be truly components within a community health care system, there is greater need for the interaction with and intervention by representatives of medical and nursing professions with these facilities.

Further research is needed into the relationship between attitudes of administrators and the characteristics of their facilities. Do characteristics conform to the attitudes and expectations of administrators? Or do the attitudes conform to what exists, perhaps as rationalizations, and might what exist be determined by the attitudes of others (i.e., owners, reimbursing groups, licensing organizations, etc.)?

The responses of those nursing home administrators interviewed tend to indicate that a different system exists for the residents in polar types of nursing homes. In those homes with private or Medicare residents, not only do the administrators claim that higher rates are necessary for the level and extent of care provided, but families and residents have retained the important consumer prerogative of selecting between alternatives. This results in the need of the institution to maintain a reputation by providing some semblance of good care and treatment. As these are proprietary facilities, the successful competition with other nursing homes is of paramount importance. It is believed that a basic method of upgrading these nursing homes is by making it good for business to provide good care.

From the attitudes of administrators caring for welfare aid recipients it was learned that they see little surveillance or control over their facilities. Residents in these homes (and their families) cannot afford alternate arrangements and administrators claim that low welfare reimbursement rates preclude the upgrading of care and extent of resources. This view is hardly new, and Penchansky and Taubenhaus (1965) have indicated that small nursing homes face "interlocking barriers" which are outside the control of the administrators, who care for welfare recipients with fixed systems of reimbursement. Nonetheless, the needs for advocates for the aged in these homes and for consumer protection are great.

Although this was but a limited exploratory study of the attitudes of nursing home administrators, hopefully it might serve as an antecedent effort for further research in the area. Given the limited number of interviews, the differences between and similarities within the two groups which were found in the attitudes and opinions of administrators is especially meaningful. Presently, we can only speculate as to the relationship between attitudes of this group and the characteristics of their facilities. But that the characteristics of the facilities and attitudes of administrators persist generally unchanged is a challenge for further exploration. That the institutionalized aged remain dependent upon these characteristics and attitudes necessitates urgent attention.

REFERENCES


In an urban environment the individual is unable to function independent of other people. To fill even basic needs for food, shelter, and clothing, he must successfully become a part of the social system. To assist people in obtaining these, programs have developed in the areas of employment, housing, health, and welfare as well as other areas related to man's life in an urban environment. The provision of these programs does not automatically insure that needs will be met. The individual still must make a positive response before a service can be delivered. A review of the literature shows that little is known about the factors which determine whether a person in need of assistance will use an agency designed to provide that service. This article attempts to narrow that gap by exploring several factors which possibly influence use of a social service agency.
Sample:

Between July and September of 1971 a survey was made of 506 residents drawn as a multi-stage probability sample of adults living in the Model Cities area of Cincinnati, Ohio. Model Cities neighborhoods were low income areas designated to receive special federal assistance largely in the form of social services administered by agencies. The primary purpose of the study was to determine the standard of living in the neighborhoods prior to the beginning of the federal program. The research was conducted by the Institute for Metropolitan Studies at the University of Cincinnati.

The average family income of respondents at the time of the survey was $301 per month with 76% receiving less than $400. Most of these incomes were fixed with 31% of the families drawing retirement pensions, 21% welfare benefits, and 14% disability payments. Homes were usually rented while only a small minority, 8%, were either buying or owned their place. Thirty-four percent of the heads of households not retired or disabled at the time of the survey were unemployed. Seventy-four percent of the respondents had failed to complete high school, and only seven percent had any formal education beyond the twelfth grade. Thus the sample is representative of the type of population social agencies are frequently designed to serve. It is therefore appropriate to study their use of these services.

Variables:

Before an individual can be expected to go to an agency he must first have a use for the service it provides. Once this need exists, it is reasonable to analyze variability in behavior among the potential clients. To limit analysis to people who could actually use an existing service, attention is focused on people with a particular need—the need for a job—and their use of the state employment service. The need for a job was determined by asking respondents if they were working full-time, working part-time, laid off, unemployed, a housewife, disabled, or retired. Those respondents who said they were either unemployed or laid off were classified as being unemployed. In addition, four people who had held their present jobs less than a year were included in the analysis. This made a total of 91 who could have used the state employment service in the year prior to the study.
The most obvious factor which might affect use of an agency, outside of need, is the knowledge that it exists. Before an individual can get help from an agency he must know that it is there and what service it provides. Eustace and Carol Theodore (1972) surveyed the population of a mid-Atlantic community to determine their awareness of a local poverty program organization. They found that while most people recognized the name of the agency, a sizeable number were unfamiliar with the services it provided. In particular residents living in the target area did not recognize the agency as a source of help. Floyd Fowler (1970) found similar results in a study of health care utilization among the aged. The implication is that many people might not use a service because they are unaware of it. To determine if respondents had sufficient knowledge they were asked if they had heard of the state employment service. If they responded yes, they were asked if they knew what kinds of things the agency did. Those who knew that the agency tried to find jobs for people were classified as knowing the service they needed was available.

Use of social service agencies may be further limited by alienation among potential clients. Alienation exists whenever an individual believes that he is powerless to influence others to meet his needs. Such a person would not expect agencies to respond to his request for assistance. Consequently he would not bother to use the service. Ira Harrison (1965) interviewed clients of a state employment service who had been classified by the agency as unemployable. He found that many of them expressed feelings of alienation and had only come to the employment service as a last resort. There was no way to determine how many people with similar attitudes never came at all. More recently, Seeman (1972) studied the relationship between alienation and knowledge-seeking among employed men. Those who expressed feelings of powerlessness avoided information about new careers and sources of training. Both of these studies reached the conclusion that perceived powerlessness limits the individual's search for knowledge about available services. For this study two separate measures of alienation were developed: (1) alienation from the political system, and (2) alienation from the community. Both scales focused on the individual's perceived lack of influence in the situation. Respondents were asked whether they strongly agreed, mildly agreed, mildly disagreed, or strongly disagreed with the content of four questions--two questions for each scale. Responses for each scale were then assigned numerical values and added together.
The extent to which the individual is socially isolated may affect the amount of use he makes of available services. One who is isolated has little contact with significant others and little participation in voluntary organizations. If knowledge about agencies is transmitted from person to person or through organizations which people join, anyone who does not have these contacts may not become aware of what services exist. Even if he is aware of the services provided, a person who is socially isolated may not be willing to use them. The same reasons which keep him from developing relationships with others may prevent him from going to an agency for help. Degree of social isolation is indicated by frequency of contact with friends or neighbors and by frequency of church attendance.

An individual's background may also be important in understanding his use of social services. Education and rural-to-urban migration are both variables related to the level of aspiration or ambition the individual possesses (Hannan, 1970). A person who stays in school through graduation or one who moves from a rural to an urban area has higher aspiration than someone who does not. This same ambition may cause the individual to go to an agency for help when he needs a job. However, if he expects the state employment service to only place people in medium or low paying jobs, then a person may not go to the agency if he thinks he could do better. In particular, respondents whose last jobs paid well may feel that they could get better jobs somewhere else than they could through the employment service. Finally, a person who has lived in the area longer has more chances to discover and thus be able to use the agency.

If a person believes that because of personal characteristics it may be difficult for him to get a job through the employment service, he may avoid use of that agency. People who fear discrimination because of their race, sex, or age may use other means to find a job.

**FINDINGS**

Although all 91 respondents were potential clients for the state employment service, only 36% had been to that agency for help in finding a job. This occurred despite the fact that the agency is located near the neighborhood surveyed. Need alone is clearly not a sufficient factor to cause people to use an available social service.

Table I shows that only 57% of the unemployed respondents knew that a state agency existed to help them find jobs. Since an individual could not be expected to go for help unless he knew about the agency, this may be the most serious factor limiting the service provided. This becomes even more apparent when attention is focused upon those respondents who reported knowledge of the service. Sixty-five percent of these people went to the agency in search of work. Lack of information limits the available service to a small proportion of potential clients although two-thirds of the unemployed with sufficient knowledge used the agency.

If a person feels alienated he may fail to use a social service because he thinks it will do little good or because he does not trust
TABLE I: EFFECT OF KNOWLEDGE ON USE OF THE STATE EMPLOYMENT SERVICE

| Probability of using employment service among unemployed | 36% |
| Probability of having knowledge of employment service among unemployed | 57% |
| Probability of using employment service among unemployed having knowledge | 65% |

Other people. Table II indicates that the measures of alienation in this study are moderately related to an individual's use of the employment agency. When alienation from the political system and from the community is low, a person is more likely to use available services. A person who is alienated may perceive himself as not fitting into the system. Other people are not believed to be interested in his needs, and he sees himself as incapable of influencing them. This creates a reluctance on his part to seek help from others. The result is that alienated people do not use the state employment service as often as those with low alienation.

Social isolation from the community, either through primary contacts or secondary associations, has little influence on use of the employment service. Despite the hypothesis that informal channels of communication are important sources of information in inner city ghettos, the data indicate that people who have more contacts with others do not make better use of available services (Table III). One reason for this may be the reliability of information obtained through informal contacts. Respondents were asked how often they felt that news and information they obtained from friends and neighbors was correct. Only 37% believed friends were always or usually correct, and 24% felt that way about neighbors. Given this, residents would not be expected to act in normal situations simply on the basis of what they hear through informal channels. Furthermore, 80% stated that either radio, television, or the

TABLE II: EFFECT OF ALIENATION ON USE OF THE STATE EMPLOYMENT SERVICE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure of alienation</th>
<th>r</th>
<th>Level of sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political alienation</td>
<td>-.164</td>
<td>.068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community alienation</td>
<td>-.174</td>
<td>.056</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
newspaper was their major source of information. As a result association with friends, neighbors, or church members does not increase use of available resources.

Both education and rural-to-urban migration increase the probability that an unemployed resident will use the state employment service (Table IV). People who fail to finish high school are reluctant to go to the agency for help. This may be because they believe that the only jobs available through the agency require the applicant to have a high school diploma. If this is the case there would be little motivation to use the service. A person who has dropped out of school before graduation frequently has low motivation to begin with. The situation is not limited to school but is part of a pattern of behavior. Once out of school the drop-out finds that the work available to him is low paying and uninteresting so he becomes discouraged over his inability to find a better job. In time he may quit and spend his time doing nothing. As a result he does not go to the state employment service or any other agency in search of new work.

People who have migrated to the city from farms and small towns more frequently use the state agency. These same people were initially motivated to move to the city, probably in search of work. If the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE III: EFFECT OF SOCIAL ISOLATION ON USE OF THE STATE EMPLOYMENT SERVICE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Measure of social isolation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contact with friends</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contact with neighbors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church attendance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE IV: EFFECT OF BACKGROUND ON USE OF THE STATE EMPLOYMENT SERVICE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Background factor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural-to-urban migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of residence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income on last job</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
individually who leave their homes in small towns to move somewhere else where opportunities are better have higher ambition than those who stay (See Hannan, 1970:101-120), then they may also have more ambition than the average resident who lives in the area where they move. Consequently, if they find themselves out of work they may try more things to find a job, including use of the state employment service.

People who have moved to the city from farms and small towns may use the employment service to find a job because they have no other alternative. Others who have lived in the city longer may know how to find a job on their own. However, the data indicate that use of the state employment service neither increases nor decreases with length of residence. Further, most of the migrants came to the area more than ten years before the survey. Together these findings demonstrate that increased use of the employment service among migrants is not a result of their newness to the area.

The amount of money respondents earned on their last job has little impact on their current use of the employment service. Although high paying jobs may be unavailable through the agency, few respondents have ever held such positions. Most of the people earned less than four hundred dollars a month on their last job, and all earned less than one thousand. Residents of low income neighborhoods are not the people who compete for white collar and professional positions which pay higher earnings. Irrespective of their past income the state employment service would still handle jobs with comparable pay.

Personal characteristics of the individual which might cause him to fear discrimination and avoid the state employment service have little actual influence on use of the agency (Table V). Respondents who are black go to the agency as frequently as whites, and women use it almost as often as men. Age also makes little difference in who seeks jobs through the service. Perhaps because it is a state agency people believe that they will be given an equal opportunity. In any case, fear of discrimination does not appear to be an important factor.

In summary, knowledge that a service exists to help them find jobs appears to be the strongest factor which determines whether unemployed individuals will use the state employment service. Only about a third of

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personal characteristic</th>
<th>$r$</th>
<th>Level of sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Race</td>
<td>-.010</td>
<td>.464</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>-.013</td>
<td>.452</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-.101</td>
<td>.172</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
the total potential clientele had gone to the agency in search of a job, but two-thirds of those who knew about the agency went. Alienation, whether from the community or the political system, is a second factor which affects use of the employment service. People who have a high sense of powerlessness are less likely to go to the agency for help. Finally, background factors which reflect levels of ambition are related to the frequency with which the agency is used. Unemployed respondents who had completed high school or who had migrated to the city from smaller towns made more use of the agency than did those who showed less ambition.

DISCUSSION

A better understanding of how these factors determine use of the employment service can be obtained by placing the variables in a path model. Path analysis forces us to consider interrelationships between the independent variables and treat them either as exogenous or intervening factors in the explanation. The standardized slopes, or paths, leading to the same variable indicate the relative direct contribution of each independent variable while the total effect is decomposed into its direct and indirect components.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>$X_1$</th>
<th>$X_2$</th>
<th>$X_3$</th>
<th>$X_4$</th>
<th>$X_5$</th>
<th>$X_6$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education ($X_1$)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural-to-urban migration ($X_2$)</td>
<td>-.104</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political alienation ($X_3$)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.080</td>
<td>.216</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community alienation ($X_4$)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.126</td>
<td>-.062</td>
<td>.322</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge of service ($X_5$)</td>
<td></td>
<td>.182</td>
<td>.216</td>
<td>-.175</td>
<td>-.186</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of service ($X_6$)</td>
<td></td>
<td>.183</td>
<td>.170</td>
<td>-.174</td>
<td>-.164</td>
<td>.672</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Means</td>
<td>4.01</td>
<td>1.65</td>
<td>4.81</td>
<td>5.62</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard Deviations</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>2.06</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Use of the state employment service results directly from knowledge about its existence. Strong evidence already cited supports the hypothesis that an individual will go to the agency if he knows that it provides a service he needs. It approaches, for all practical purposes, the criteria of a necessary condition. The path diagram in Figure 1 conforms closely to this prediction. Knowledge of this service has a strong influence on an individual's use of the state employment agency. Other variables have no direct effect but instead operate indirectly on use through knowledge. Together these variables explain almost half of the variance in use of the state employment service. It now seems possible to argue that the major factor influencing an individual's use of this agency is his knowledge about its existence. Obviously, no one can be expected to take advantage of this service if he does not know about it, but, more important, the probability is 65% that he will use it if he does have that knowledge.

To understand why some individuals use available social services and others do not, it is necessary to study how this knowledge is acquired. It is not accident or chance which determines who learns about available services, but it is the result of a process influenced by alienation and motivation. When unemployed an individual must go through an information gathering process where he collects knowledge about possible sources of jobs. This searching procedure centers around sources which are believed to be helpful.

Because someone with low alienation believes that the system will respond to his need, he should look to the government for available services. Someone else who has high alienation has little reason to seek ways in which the state can be of assistance. His efforts to find work will be through other sources which are independent of that system. As a result, alienation should influence the amount of information obtained about state services. The path model indicates that political alienation does have a direct influence on the attainment of knowledge, but alienation from the community has little effect. Political alienation is oriented toward the system which controls the state employment service. As such it becomes immediately salient in deciding whether to look to the government for help. The result is that only those who expect to find assistance become aware of available services. Community alienation, on the other hand, concerns the neighborhood in which the respondent lives. Its influence on the knowledge attainment process is much weaker because it is further removed from the political system. Individuals who are less alienated from the neighborhood have a slightly better chance of learning about the service, but the difference is too small to be important.

Unemployed individuals must also have the necessary ambition to find a job when they are out of work. This ambition is reflected in levels of education and migration. It is not easy to leave the area where one grew up and move to the city, nor is it easy to finish school when you live in an urban ghetto where drop-out rates are high. Those who do these things must have a desire to get ahead in life and sufficient drive to stick with it. This same drive increases efforts to find employment when they are out of work. The result is that people who
have migrated to the city from smaller towns and those who have more education develop greater knowledge of available services than do other respondents.

In summary, the path model indicates that use of the state employment service results directly from knowledge about its existence. This knowledge is not distributed randomly through the population but is obtained by individuals with high ambition and low alienation. The argument in this paper has been that unemployed persons must go through a job-hunting process to find new work. How hard they try to find sources of employment and how much they believe the system will help them determine whether they look to the state for help. The higher the ambition, the greater the number of places the individual will try; and the lower the alienation, the greater the probability that the search will be directed toward government sources. The result is that knowledge of available services is determined by levels of ambition and by levels of alienation.

CONCLUSION

This paper has studied factors which influence use of social service agencies. Residents of low income areas designated to receive federal assistance in the form of services were interviewed to determine the need for and use of such services. Those respondents who were classified as unemployed or laid off from work within the last year were selected for analysis. The use they made of the state employment service was then analyzed.

Knowledge that a service existed to help them find jobs was the prime factor determining use of the agency. Those who knew about the service applied for help while others did not. The conclusion that increasing knowledge about available services would increase use is a tenuous one. Obtaining knowledge about services is a first step in using them. Those who now get that knowledge may already have a willingness to use the service while alienation and low ambition would prevent others from doing so, even if they too shared the knowledge. If increased use of social service agencies is a desired objective, it may be insufficient to merely increase knowledge about what is available without also dealing with those factors which presently limit the amount of information the individual obtains.

FOOTNOTES

1. Appreciation is due Rob Ayers who assisted in the analysis for this report and the Institute for Metropolitan Studies who made the data available.

2. Other agencies located in the area also assisted residents in finding jobs. However, respondents did not use these agencies in place of the state employment service. Instead there seemed to be a large duplication of services limited to the same individuals.
REFERENCES


NEW PREMISES FOR PLANNING IN APPALACHIA

Richard A. Ball
West Virginia University

The Appalachian Region, particularly Southern Appalachia, has lived through several hundred years of frustration related to its history and geography. The history of the area has become better known during recent years, and it is a history of documented exploitation and socioeconomic disillusionment, a "biography of a depressed area" (Caudill, 1962). Geographically, the region has been regarded essentially as a barrier between the settled East and the fertile lands of the West, a place of rugged terrain and harsh conditions of life. This history and geography have played a large part in the problems which now afflict the region and which impede social change. It will be possible to plan wisely for the region only when these factors have been understood and when the goals of current social policy toward Appalachia have been re-examined. Since the deepest problems of socioeconomic development are frequently motivational (McClelland, 1961), having to do with modal forms of personality organization which are in turn rooted in the culture, and since a culture may be seen as a response to a set of environmental problems, perhaps it is best to begin with an analysis of the effect of the historical and geographic problems posed by the area and the cultural patterns which have generated in response to these problems.

It is apparent that the motivational structure characteristic of the Southern Appalachian folk subculture is quite different from that prevailing in the United States generally, so different that Weller (1965) has regarded the adherents of this "folk culture" as "yesterday's people." Their motivational structure constitutes both a problem and a possible solution. The basic problem here can be understood in terms of a distinction between "motivation-instigated" and "frustration-instigated" behavior. Such an understanding might do much to change our definition of the problems of the region, the means of solution, and even the goals of the planning process.

The Concept of Frustration-Instigated Behavior

Of the various motivational problems faced by social planners, one of the most serious is the recalcitrance of the very individuals whose lives they are attempting to "improve." At the root of this rigidity is the one common denominator in the experiences of all these people—in tense and prolonged frustration. To explain, to predict and to assist them in breaking the vicious circles in which they are trapped, one must appreciate the extent to which their activities and cultural patterns are frustration-instigated.

This distinction between frustration instigated behavior and motivation-instigated behavior was first outlined in an effort to explain
the results of animal experiments conducted by Maier (1949). While motivation-instigated behavior is influenced by consequences and can be understood through learning theory, frustration-instigated behavior is stress-induced rather than goal-oriented.

It is especially interesting that the conclusion developed by Maier in his laboratory experiments with animals was offered independently in one of the best known speculative theories of human civilization—that of the historian Arnold Toynbee (1946). Toynbee, of course, views civilization as essentially a "response" to "challenges" including the challenges of the natural environment, and he makes much of the idea that the challenges must be neither too mild nor too severe.

He describes the mountain people of Southern Appalachia as having "relapsed into illiteracy...poverty, squalor and ill-health" as result of environmental challenges which over whelmed their capacity for productive response (Toynbee: 1946: 149).

Toynbee has overstated the case, and this detracts from his thesis and makes it difficult to perceive the kernel of truth contained there. The truth is easier to see if generalizations are strictly limited to the folk subculture of the Appalachian Region. This folk subculture is the subject of the present analysis. Its adherents have been subjected to a history of unremitting physical, economic and social frustration. These people have been repeatedly blocked, pressured and defeated by their environment. The history of this frustration is described vividly by Caudill (1962) in Night Comes to the Cumberlands, where he writes that their past is "compounded of Indian wars, civil war, of intestine feuds, layered hatreds and of violent death." How have these people responded to such a history of physical and social frustration and defeat? Ford (1962: 9-34) interpreting data from the most comprehensive survey of the Southern Appalachians ever conducted, lists the principle cultural themes as (1) individualism and self-reliance, (2) traditionalism and fatalism and (3) religious fundamentalism. Weller (1965) gives special emphasis to individualism, traditionalism, fatalism, action seeking, fear psychology, person orientation, reference group domination and familism.

The description of the content of the Appalachian folk subculture is fairly complete, but many of the authors of these descriptions admit to difficulty in understanding and dealing with the values they have described. The values seem senseless and stubborn. Why are these people so little interested in improving their lives? Why aren't they more eager to leave their hopeless environment for urban areas of greater opportunity? Why the lack of ambition, the "episodic" view of life, and the inability to engage in sustained efforts? Certainly the recalcitrance of the mountaineer resists explanation in common motivational terms. The fatalism and apathy seem almost "Unamerican," and yet the region has ranked at the top in wartime troop deaths per capita, which to some suggests that these are the true patriots. Obviously, something is amiss with our standard categories of behavior analysis.
Previous work (Ball, 1968) has attempted to explain these puzzling characteristics by the concept of an "analgesic subculture," a way of life which has evolved by success in avoiding overwhelming problems rather than by attempting to cope with them. One such avoidance response, perceived by both Maler and Toynbee, is stereotyped or "fixated" behavior which becomes very rigid and inflexible under pressure. Other typical frustration-instigated response patterns include regression, aggression and resignation. These, together with other human responses, have evolved into a unique subcultural blend emphasizing the premises and preoccupations described by many observers of Appalachian life.

The regressive nature of behavior in the mountain folk subculture is apparent when regression is defined simply as a retreat to more childish or less mature action. The early work of Barker, Dembo and Lewin (1941) has clearly linked conditions of frustration with regression responses, and later studies have supported the hypothesis of a relationship. As has been argued in greater detail elsewhere (Ball, 1968) many of the behaviors commonly cited in descriptions of the Appalachian folk subculture can be viewed as examples of regression produced by frustration. These characteristics would include the lack of aesthetic appreciation, anti-intellectualism and the preference of anecdote over abstraction, the insistence on a literal interpretation of the Bible and the entanglement of religious fundamentalism with deep superstition, characteristics which led Toynbee to conclude that the mountaineer has "failed to hold his ground," that he has "gone down hill in a most disconcerting fashion," and that he has "relapsed" into conditions of barbarism. Both the "welfare syndrome" and "neurotic familism" may be treated in these terms.

Of the frustration-instigated responses described by Maier, neither fixation nor regression has received the research attention accorded to the frustration-aggression combination. Since the initial publication of the classic, *Frustration and Aggression*, (Dollard et.al., 1944) intensive study has been pointed toward and an elucidation of the connection between these phenomena. Aggression can be viewed as a response to frustration in which the aggression is an end product which relieves tension or "blows off steam" rather than a means to an end. Such frustration-instigated behaviors frequently create a "vicious circle" by which the striking out results in increased frustration. Feuding behavior, for example, seems to be representative of an aggressive response which, while providing the momentary satisfactions of revenge, eventually exacerbates frustrations.

In addition to fixation, regression, and aggression, the frustration-instigated behavior hypothesis would lead one to expect considerable resignation to the hostile conditions of Southern Appalachian life. Seldom is an expectation more fully realized; resignation, apathy, and fatalism are a major part of the Appalachian problem. Since resignation consists in giving up, it is clearly not representative of goal-oriented behavior. In fact, goals have receded and motivation seems largely absent. Resignation is not a means to anything; it is an "end of the line" behavior.
Such a response may be difficult for the planner to comprehend, but it is quite likely to provide some relief from the tensions of extreme and prolonged frustration.

New Directions in Appalachian Development

The inability of many planners to comprehend the values and actions of the "target population" is not primarily due to faulty logic but rather to tacit acceptance of dubious premises about human behavior. Social planners are themselves products of a life style in which rational, motivated and goal-oriented behavior is a dominant theme. To face any "poverty culture" is to repeat the experience of the anthropologist studying another society, except that the obvious differences of language and institutional forms alert the latter to his biases and force him to think in terms of the premises and patterns of the way of life under observation. Planners who are not prepared to recognize a different way of life find it difficult to relate to behavior which seems so "senseless" when seen in terms of their own rationalistic premises, and the results for social policy are sometimes disastrous.

One typical product of social policy is the "boomerang effect" by which there are unanticipated negative consequences, often connected with incorrect premises. One assumption implicit in much of the effort at initiating social change in Appalachia is that people may be stirred by exhortation and example and that under this increased pressure they will begin to alter their behavior in the desired direction. If the "analgesic subculture" thesis is to any extent correct, however, one would predict that such increased pressure will result in greater frustration and will produce even more rigidity--given the low probability of immediate and dramatic success. This result may be observed among those whose frustration thresholds have already been exceeded. In this case the "middle-class" way of life held out by the mass media and by the local "change agents" as an example becomes not a goal to strive toward but a source of further frustration. This is so since deprivation is relative to aspirations. It is no accident that the "revolution of rising expectations" throughout the world results from increased frustration springing from a sense of relative deprivation. Nor should we be surprised by the "irrational" aspects of this new sense of frustration.

Social planners, often unaware of the depth of such feelings, have attempted to manipulate their "target populations" in much the same way as they manipulate one another and, for that matter, themselves. These means of manipulation are built upon assumptions of simple rationality which hold that human behavior is essentially instrumental in its means-ends orientation and that modification is merely a problem of managing contingencies. Such a set of assumptions works well enough in propelling us toward our own ends in a relatively neat and "linear" fashion and in providing us the techniques by which we can manipulate others like ourselves. It is when we encounter those who have not organized their lives into neat means-ends packages that our plans collapse. Under these circumstances, what can be done?
One key to eventual improvement in the life conditions of Appalachia's people may lie in the socialization process. At present, for example, child-rearing practices in the folk subculture are heavily punishment-centered. Discipline is built upon a tradition that punishing an undesirable behavior is the best way to stop it. Research to date, however, indicates that punishment is a much less effective means than was once assumed. It is especially significant that punishing a frustration-instigated response seems to fix it even more persistently. If it is true that many of the values and behaviors characteristic of the folk subculture are of the nature of frustration-instigated responses, then it follows that attempts to correct by punishment will be counter-productive. Such effects may be observed not only in the interactions of parents and children but also in the disciplinary patterns to be found in Appalachian school systems and in other institutions of the region. The fundamentalist religious tradition, for example, holds the very meaning of life to be such that one must behave in order to avoid eternal punishment. What we find is a system of institutions by which conformity is gained at the expense of rigidified and self-defeating behavior, a social order where anxiety is fed until it becomes the source of an economics of scarcity and a politics of self-defense. Every institution—family, school, church, job and politics—is anxiety-centered, and each leads toward patterns of avoidance.

Following this analysis, the central task of the planner becomes the fostering of non-authoritarian social relations and the development of institutions in which order springs from the fact that actions are useful to the individual both instrumentally and symbolically, in which habits of behavior can build up out of that positive reinforcement "feedback" which research suggests is a more "natural" way to provide for self-organization, and in which threat is replaced with an opening of alternatives and possibilities. In terms of the socialization emphasis, the focus must be upon the children, but not exclusively so, for those involved must understand that unless adults are also led to such patterns of interacting, their relationships to the children themselves will be strained and "phony." The child may be reached through the family, school and peer group. Efforts must be mounted to support the newer patterns in each of these networks. Along with indigenous leaders and community workers, the mass media can be a crucial element. As a balance to the constant bombardment of middle-class life styles, it will be important to strengthen what might be called "mountain pride" in ways similar to those employed by some Black leaders in an effort to raise the self-esteem of the Black community. It ought to be even more simple to direct programs on mountain arts and folk heroes toward a population which lies within certain geographic boundaries than it is to provide such support to the Black identity throughout an enormous territory in which only slightly more than ten percent of available viewers, readers and listeners are Black. The beginnings of such attempts are present, especially through community festivals, public television, bookmobiles, etc.

The other institutions—religion, politics, and economics—are more relevant, although again not exclusively so, to adult programs.
There is much that organized religion can do. The religion of anxiety can be replaced by a clearer teaching of the New Testament, which is, after all, a gospel of hope and which is immensely applicable to the life problems of these traditional Protestant denominations and sects. The more escapist cults which feed the regressive and fatalistic tendencies inherent in the subculture will then have less strength. The "social gospel" can return in altered form and the church can become a more powerful force toward social change.

As to the political problems of Appalachia, much of the region is to a great extent controlled by external forces in the form of huge coal and land companies, leaving a situation in which local figures struggle over the power which remains. These struggles are intimately connected with a "scarcity politics" to which the "zero-sum game" model is especially applicable (Ball, 1970). The local political tradition is more nearly an individualistic "every man for himself" pattern in which politics is seen as the mobilization of power in a struggle for scarce resources than as a cooperative venture in which mutual trust can produce benefits to all. Since regional development cannot be imposed from outside, one part of the answer lies in returning power to the people of the region so that they can have an effect upon their own destiny. As the power is returned local leaders must be educated in its use, preferably by others from the region who have achieved some success. Political activists must be protected as they seek to break through systems based on patronage power with voter registration drives and "clean election" legislation.

The economic problems are closely linked to these others and, by virtue of the chronic disillusionment and frustration produced, lie at the root of the unfortunate pattern of subcultural response described earlier. The economy of the region is based on the extractive industries, mainly coal and timber. It is in the nature of mining that the economic base is slowly eaten away until the mine is abandoned, usually along with the community which had developed around it. "Strip mining" produces an even more obvious exploitation-abandonment cycle. The development of "clear-cutting" practices in timber can, unless carefully controlled, produce similar effects. The economic effects are obvious and do indeed resemble internal colonization. The psychological and social effects are less obvious, but there is reason to suspect that exploitative economics fosters certain personal and social orientations which interfere with cooperative relationships in a way which is as damaging to the delicate ecology of human interaction as to the more tangible systems of physical interrelationships usually termed "environmental ecology." Although coal and timber will continue to be vital to the economic base of Appalachia, it is important to develop economic programs which provide a base for cooperation and community. Development proceeding from the people of the region themselves will depend heavily upon a sense of unity, commitment and hope, and all of these are characteristics of populations with constructive rather than exploitative economies.
But Where Do We Really Want To Go?

The social planner tends to be very goal-oriented and his training supports his approach to problems in these terms. This orientation accounts for his difficulty in comprehending the behavior of those whose lives are not customarily so tightly organized into instrumental patterns of ends and means. All of this, however, says nothing about an equally serious problem, the question of valid goals in the first place. As social intervention becomes more effective and the probability of achieving developmental goals increases, we must give more attention to these ends. There is a good reason to believe that ends of Appalachian planners should be scrutinized even more carefully than their techniques.

If the goals of the planning are considered together, I submit that the vague vision of Appalachian Utopia very much resembles the ubiquitous middle-class suburb. When one considers the forms of education, occupation and family life toward which programs appear to be directed, this becomes even clearer. After all, what other model do we have? Furthermore, if we admit to some such vision, what could be wrong with it? Even given the inadequacies of the middle-class way of life, would not this be an improvement over present conditions among the "hard core" problem population of Appalachia? In terms of such indicators of the good life as income or health care, this is undoubtedly the case. But in other terms it is questionable. More to the point is the recognition that our options do not come down to a choice between Appalachian poverty and middle-class suburbia at all. There are many other alternatives, and the best of these are likely to lie in a direction which builds upon the strengths which can be found in the Appalachian way of life.

Some of these strengths are outlined by Weller (1965). In a few thoughtful passages in the last pages of Yesterday's People he pays tribute to the "deep feeling of belonging and of loyalty" and to the fact that the mountaineers "are at home here in a unique way." Having contrasted the "person-centered" orientation prevalent in the mountains with the "object-oriented" pattern typical of the larger society where the tendency is more to assign one a number, he goes on to point out that the inhabitants of the region are "not driven by the clock or the appointment book" nor by the "avid and grasping materialism which is apparent in some places" and that, for example, "the old are not shuffled off in a corner to die alone."

There are other virtues deeply inbedded in Appalachian traditions and sometimes these features which have become problems simply represent too much of a good thing. The problem of "extreme familialism" which I have described elsewhere (Ball, 1967) as a "clinging behavior in which many never really establish themselves as separate individuals" is a case in point. What has happened is that the adherents of the folk subculture have, in their need for some escape from the unending pressures upon them, attempted to extract from the family more than any human institution can render. The burden fell to the family precisely because it was one of the strongest and most rewarding of institutions.
Similarly, the easy pace of life may be regarded as a positive factor in itself, one which carries over into apathy only under inordinate pressure. It is therefore a mistake to fix the blame on the family and to come to regard it as a barrier to progress, just as it is wrong to equate the easy life style with laziness.

In order to avoid the ultimate fate of homogenized suburbia, it is necessary that our planners think in terms of "alternative futures." We must actually plan systems which are to develop in different directions, for only then will we be able to compare and select among them. The Utopian models, as offered by such writers as Skinner (1971), move in the opposite direction, substituting the ideals of order and control for those of diversity and flexibility. Little wonder that they bear a mark of totalitarianism.

Since the future is largely unpredictable in its specifics, we must keep our options open. We must plan with the goal of open options specifically in mind, and we must develop systems which probe various alternatives. At present almost all of the exploration is being conducted by those on the margins of established systems, without the help of these systems. So it is with the new movements in communal living, alternative educational possibilities, liberalized sex roles and the new view of work. The latter offers a good example of a different and perhaps healthier approach which has grown outside established institutions and which is anathema to most of them. Yet there is every reason to believe that this newer orientation may be more suitable to the future than the almost frantic emphasis upon competitive achievement which currently provides the thrust for our social institutions. Again, the last few unelaborated pages of Yesterday's People (Weller, 1965) reinforce the argument that our efforts should be directed toward assisting Appalachia's development as an alternative to our usual goals. Weller alludes to the "cybernetic age" which is to come and points out that when the newer problems of leisure become even more pronounced the mountain-ee whose life is not centered on a job may well be an example for the rest of society.

All of this most definitely does not mean to imply that the Southern Appalachian folk subculture should be left alone. Some have made this mistake. Being very sensitive to "outside interference" and deeply proud of that which is praiseworthy in this way of life, they have expressed considerable resentment toward any attempt to plan for the region at all. This perspective simply overlooks the fact that there are serious problems in the area and the possibility that they might be solved without the destruction of Appalachian traditions. In terms of the argument advanced above the problems are twofold. First, there are severe inadequacies in the basics of life; income, health care, education, etc. These must be solved, and the means are available if sufficient priority is assigned. Secondly, the basic patterns of frustration-instigated behavior must be attacked. This can be done through three coordinated means: (a) the reduction of environmental pressures which are implicit in the first problem, (b) fostering of desirable behavior patterns and institutions so that they provide rewarding rather than anxiety-based life experiences and (c) specific programs
which through the various social institutions teach and encourage flexible responses to the frustrations of life.

Conclusion

Just as there is much that the so-called "developed" societies can learn from their "underdeveloped" neighbors while engaged in a partnership directed toward improvement in the material conditions of life, so is there much that the larger American society can learn from Appalachia. The "hard-core" problem of the region, what has been referred to here as the "folk subculture," represents a distortion of certain basic patterns which in themselves have much to commend them. Individualism rather than other-direction, a feeling for tradition instead of a chronic novelty-seeking, and an orientation to existence ("being") as contrasted with a compulsion to achievement are inherent in the life of the region and are options which should be supported by social planners. The tendency to avoid status seeking and the detachment from work represent other characteristics which may turn out to be ahead of their time by being behind the times. That is, these modes of social interaction may be more basic than we have tended to believe. It would be ironic of the patterns of occupational "success," educational "performance," "deferred gratification," and repudiation of the "extended family" which action agents have been urging upon the region in one form or another for several generations turned out to be applicable only to the peak years of the Industrial Revolution with its unique population growth, highly congested urbanization and demand for heavy investments of labor. Yet something like this may be the case, and we should allow for the possibility.

Our inability to perceive the value of many Appalachian traditions may, then, be traced in part to a view of human history in which our own institutionalized means are seen as social necessity. A close look at our actual achievement and the price which has been paid calls both the ends and the means into serious question. Both the urban ghetto and the middle-class suburb have become something less than the promised land, and it is appropriate to observe that those who are busily intervening in the lives of others so often seem little pleased with their own.

Certainly part of the current planning bias lies in the tendency to mistake a distortion of a cultural pattern for a basic characteristic of that pattern. Many patterns of Appalachian life have been twisted under severe pressure, and the frustration-instigated behaviors which can be observed to characterize the folk subculture must not be regarded as necessary or even normal features inherent in the traditions of the region. The fact that the folk subculture as described is not representative of the entire region is proof of this. Elsewhere in Appalachia we can observe the traditions in their more normal form. If we can replace our common reliance on a single developmental model with an approach emphasizing a diversity of social ends and a variety of acceptable means, we may be able to assist the Appalachian region to develop along its own valid lines. Success here would provide the larger society with tangible alternatives to evaluate as it gropes toward the future.
References

* * *

Subscriptions to the Journal may be obtained by writing to:
Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare
University of Connecticut
School of Social Work
1800 Asylum Avenue
West Hartford, Connecticut 06117

Individual subscriptions are $7.00 per volume (4 issues)
Institutional or Library $10.00 per volume (4 issues)
Student $5.00 per volume (4 issues)

Individual copies of the Journal may be purchased at $2.50 per copy (include postage and handling).

Please include check with order.
The relationships between social workers and sociologists are almost unique among the professions. Although they started with common interests, from the beginning there was a division of labor between science and practice; between sociology and social work. Charles Horton Cooley, one of the great armchair sociologists, typifies this reciprocal association; he cites Jane Addams observations on juvenile gangs as evidence for his classic definition of primary groups.¹

This early collaboration was fruitful; it has not stood the test of time. The two occupations are similar enough so that the public, to their mutual pain, frequently mistakes one for the other. They prefer to emphasize their separation. This works to both professions detriment because it interferes with knowledge building. How this happens is most clearly seen in the lack of colleagueship between sociologists and social workers when they are university faculty members. A comparative analysis of educational organization and faculty norms will illumine the problem.

Sociologists are anchored in the academy. The great majority work in universities and generally have the Ph.D. In the problem areas such as criminology or the family there are a few separate schools and institutes modeled on the professional school. There is no great pressure to further develop this method of educating sociologists.

Social workers are not closely tied to the university. Many people without professional training are recognized as social workers. Many faculty members move between practice and academic appointments without seeing the university as the basis for their career. Professional schools tend to be physically isolated from the campus or in professional school complexes. Wherever they are they are socially isolated because the relative lack of scholarly production by the faculty leaves them without much standing in the university. If the faculty member has a degree beyond the professional masters it tends to be the doctorate. The field has a fear of being accused of intellectuality; in selecting and promoting faculty members there is a tendency to emphasize emotional qualities and community activities. There is no indication of any movement to make the preferred degree for faculty members the doctor of philosophy rather than the doctorate.

Sociology departments emphasize teaching and research which adds to theoretical knowledge. To be identified with applied problems is not the way to acquire academic prestige. Yet it is often difficult to separate theory building from practice in the "research" of many sociologists.² Sociologists mask their practice involvement by continuing to make contributions to the theoretical literature.
Social work schools are committed to quality teaching and research. Yet faculty members rarely engage in projects which involve them in direct practice. Few service innovations are identified as emanating from professional social work schools. Social work faculty use committee meetings to disguise their non-participation in practice research.

Departments of sociology have professors. At the graduate level students often select a school because of their desire to work with a particular professor. Students work with their professors on projects, publish with them, and in later years are identified with their mentor.

Schools of social work have few professors. Even at the doctoral level students talk about selecting a "good" school and not about the professor or the system of ideas they are interested in. Students are almost never known by the professors they studied under.

Finally, there is an educational continuity between what sociologists learn and what they do. What students acquire in school they continue to use the rest of their life if they become professional sociologists. What they can't do is demonstrate that their theories are meaningful.

There is little educational continuity in social work. The bulk of the student's learning effort is concentrated on acquiring direct practice skills. Social work is one of those incomplete professions where success is marked by how far one gets away from direct practice. The student is not acquainted with the ideas that will be most relevant to what he will do for most of his career.

This last point is the critical one for this analysis. The emphasis which sociologists place on university ties, theory construction, and on being professors and the corresponding dilution of these professional characteristics by social workers only reflects the structural differences originally built into both fields. Educational continuity is another matter. Sociologists are relatively cut off from a practice arena where they can systematically test their ideas over time and social work faculty is not utilizing theory which will help organize and substantiate practice.

Other fields have avoided the difficulties that stem from this partition. Clinical psychology is located in the same college of arts and sciences as sociology. About fifty years ago clinical psychology tried but abandoned offering the doctoral degree. It has shown little inclination to develop separate professional schools. Faculty in clinical psychology are expected to make contributions to the literature and to retain practice skill so that they can teach students. Most psychology departments have little clinics where faculty practice and supervise students. The best sociology can manage is a research lab. Clinical psychology faculty don't have the strictures against practice that concern their sociological counterparts.

Medical education is organized in ways that are similar to social work. To become a professor in a clinical field in a medical school one must develop and maintain practice skill and make contributions to the literature. In medicine as in clinical psychology opportunities for
direct practice are built right into the faculty members workload. This is not done in social work. Faculty members create the illusion of practice by supervising students and with something called consultation. At least the sociologist has research to fall back on. Social work faculty is doubly caught because it neither engages in direct practice nor scholarship.

No profession is satisfied with its educational structure and content and not all sociology and social work faculty and educational settings fit the ideal type just described in the comparative analysis. All professional educators and learners must solve the problem of balancing their commitments to learning, service, and scholarship. There are particular difficulties in sociology and social work that are related to the separation of theory building and practice in both fields.

Sociology worries about the quality of its instruction and the drag that comes from being so closely associated with undergraduate social work programs. It can point to verified empirical propositions which it accepts but it has doubts as to whether its theoretically based knowledge is cumulative. While the graduate student in sociology knows that what he has learned is imperfect he also feels that he has acquired the tools to achieve greater clarity in the future.

Social work would like to be concerned about the quality of its education. It is still at the stage where it questions whether it can present students with enough cogent material so that they can develop an adequate sense of professional identity and expertise. Social work students seldom leave school feeling that they are equipped to make a contribution to the profession; they expect to be supervised for several years.

The way to overcome the effects of the separation between sociology and social work is to build useful typologies. The principles of classification are scientific canons. To be systematized things must have something essential in common, only one theoretical position should be used as the basis for division, and the categories should be mutually exclusive and exhaustive. Wilkins has concisely stated the reasons why classification systems are needed. They chiefly relate to replicability:

If we require to communicate most effectively we should use the most common language consistent with the required degree of accuracy in communication. If we require to use thought processes, we should use any system of symbols which proves most effective. Eventually all researchers must submit to the trial by publication; they must be able to communicate their results so that a sufficient number of other qualified persons may examine their work.

The requirements for building diagnostic systems are not particularly difficult to understand. Typologies are not difficult to develop. Sociologists have produced so many that they have been published as bibliographical books. They don't seem able to get others, especially social workers, to use them consistently and in many situations so that efficient explanatory systems are developed.
Ideological considerations seem to persistently intrude. A large segment of both the sociological and social work communities are concerned about labeling, the medical model, anything else that might turn a concept into a reified personal characteristic. These are legitimate concerns but they can be met without stopping further scientific advance. No diagnostic system is definitive; they all are periodically revised. Brill says that typology building is important to a profession because:

It cannot usually progress further than the level of knowledge on which it is based, but by facilitating the examination of existing data and by creating the possibility of communication, it promotes the advance of human knowledge.\(^\text{10}\)

The pragmatic utility of classification for "brevity in communication, research, data storage and retrieval" are so important that any profession that abandons the attempt to improve its typologies compromises its future development.\(^\text{11}\)

Toch, who is cognizant of the dangers from misuse of typologies, says that, "Man is a stereotyping animal and needs to generalize in order to cope with reality." He offers two suggestions for overcoming ideological and ethical difficulties; one is that any classification system involve those who are being typed and the other is that classifiers have sufficient perspective so as to not become so attached to the labels they are creating that they can't change them as new information becomes available.\(^\text{12}\)

Every theory in order to survive must eventually prove useful. This means that the theory must be extensively tested in real situations; that is what practice is all about. If sociologists refuse to practice and social workers will not develop the skill to validate practice with theory the damaging divisions between the two professions will continue. Perhaps it is time to experiment with the "clinical sociologist" that Wirth wanted or the "hybrid" that Greenwood asked for.\(^\text{13}\)

As long as it is in the name of research sociology tends to accept practice by its members. Add to this its higher academic standards and one can conclude that sociology is in a better position than social work to make contributions to practice theory and technique. And to some extent this has been true. To cite but one example, in any textbook on juvenile delinquency the chapter on treatment will contain more references to treatment approaches developed by sociologists than to those by social workers. That is not academic snobbery, social work just hasn't produced. Greenwood put it this way:

Unless and until the social work profession develops typologies of its problems and procedures, its concepts will remain indefinite, its language loose, and its textbooks vague. It is worth pondering to what degree the well-known traumas of social work education are attributable to the psychiatric involvements that training entails and in what degree to the insecurities that unstructured subject matter and instruction must inevitably generate in social work students.\(^\text{14}\)
Almost a generation has passed since that penetrating assertion. Little has changed. The Family Service Association of America said in a recent policy statement:

In adopting service goals and in measuring effectiveness, social work must focus on the point where problems of individuals and families intersect with social conditions that inhibit their resolution. This requires complementarity of social work efforts on both sides of the equation.

It is our observation that many students do not achieve in graduate schools of social work a fundamental grasp of these points. They do not develop a commitment to, nor even an awareness of the need for, working with an adequate theoretical base for practice in usable form. Faculty members often lack enough knowledge of and skill in current practice to teach casework practice effectively. Opportunities in field work for using knowledge and skill in practice situations are too limited for students to achieve the minimum level of competence. They discover that education has not prepared them for the positions they seek.15

A new type of scholar-practitioner is needed; one who can contribute to both sociology and social work. To this point sociology has had the advantage because it has more of the needed people than social work; it just won't let them out of the closet. Social work has always been better than its own self-image. Lack of scholarship has hindered organizing and presenting the hard won knowledge which the field has acquired. The way to bring this scattered information together is by developing typologies which are refined in practice and common to both fields. Only then will sociology have cumulative knowledge and social work effective practice techniques.

Footnotes:


* * *

Manuscripts for the Journal should be submitted to Dr. Ralph Segalman, Department of Sociology, California State University, Northridge, California, 91324. Please submit three copies of the manuscript. The Journal welcomes a broad range of articles concerned with empirical research on social welfare, analysis of problems in social welfare, "think pieces" and others.

SPECIAL ISSUE —SPRING 1975

THEME: THE SOCIOLOGY OF ETHNICITY AND SOCIAL WELFARE

SPECIAL ISSUE EDITORS: JOAN WALLACE, HOWARD UNIVERSITY
SELIG RUBINROTT, UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT

SEND THREE COPIES OF MANUSCRIPT TO
JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL WELFARE
UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT
SCHOOL OF SOCIAL WORK
1800 ASYLUM AVE.
WEST HARTFORD, CONN. 06117

-107-

Publisher and Managing Editor:
Norman N. Goroff, University of Connecticut, School of Social Work

Editor:
Ralph Segalman, Department of Sociology, California State University, Northridge

Associate Editors:
Joan Acker, Department of Sociology, University of Oregon
A.K. Basu, Department of Sociology, California State University, Hayward
Herbert Bisco, Kent School of Social Work, University of Louisville
Thomas Briggs, School of Social Work, Syracuse University
John Brozman, School of Social Work, Michigan State University
Harris Chaiklin, School of Social Work and Community Planning, University of Maryland
Ivor Eichols, School of Social Work, University of Connecticut
David Gil, Florence Heller School, Brandeis University
Shimon Gottschalk, School of Social Welfare, Florida State University
Charles Guzzetta, School of Social Work, Hunter College, City University of New York
Joe Hudson, Minnesota Department of Corrections, St. Paul, Minnesota
Hubert A. Kelley, Academy of Health Services, United States Army
Stuart Kirk, College of Social Professions, University of Kentucky
Jordon Kosberg, School of Social Welfare, Florida State University
Florence Kaslow, Hahnemann Medical College, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Elaine Norman, School of Social Work, Fordham University
Albert Pierce, Department of Sociology, California State University, Northridge
Joan Wallace, School of Social Work, Howard University
John Williamson, Department of Sociology, Boston College

sociological abstracts

73 EIGHTH AVENUE
BROOKLYN, N.Y. 11215

PUBLISH AN ABSTRACT OF EVERY TALK OR PAPER YOU PRESENT AT ANY FACULTY, LOCAL, REGIONAL, OR INTERNATIONAL GATHERING

MICROFICHE YOUR DOCUMENTS FOR DISSEMINATION WITH A ROYALTY TO YOU

BREAK THE LANGUAGE BARRIER BY READING ENGLISH SUMMARIES OF DOCUMENTS ORIGINALLY PUBLISHED IN 19 LANGUAGES

BE AWARE OF WHAT IS DEPOSITED BY WHOM IN THE CLEARINGHOUSE FOR SOCIOLOGICAL LITERATURE

HAVE AT YOUR DISPOSAL 400+ SERIALS WITHOUT CLUTTERING YOUR SHELVES (WE ARE YOUR PERIODICALS LIBRARIAN)

RECEIVE ALL OF THE ABOVE FOR $100 (ASA RATE IS $85, MICROFICHE EDITION $35 IF YOUR LIBRARY SUBSCRIBES) & 1,600+ PAGES OF TEXT, A LISTING OF 7,000+ AUTHORS, & 21,000+ SUBJECT ENTRIES.

6 ways we can help you