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Flynn’s allusion to the notion of unilateral and bilateral transfers as a way of conceptualizing social welfare exchanges deserves further examination. In rejecting a "unilateral" in favor of a "bilateral" concept, he refers briefly to the late Richard Titmuss, but not to the substantial body of work which has been done by Kenneth Boulding and a group of leading economists, now organized into the Association for the Study of the Grants Economy.1

The grants economy, characterized by unilateral or one-way exchange, is seen as the regulator of the exchange economy, characterized by two-way exchanges. Both explicit and implicit grants (tax loopholes, tariffs, currency restrictions) have important effects on the redistribution of income which Boulding and others demonstrate, using the tools of modern economic analysis, is often not in the assumed direction, from grantor to grantees, but in the reverse direction. Thus, for example, the so-called Burton-Hansen-Helsham controversy, still raging among economists, indicates that the system of public education in the state of California actually redistributes income in favor of middle-class rather than low-income students. Internationally, so-called "foreign aid" is a leading example of what is frequently a reverse flow of benefits.

This concept has great potential utility for analyzing social welfare exchanges. One reason is that it brings in an important political or power dimension omitted from conventional economics. At the base of many so-called exchanges are what Boulding has called "The Economy of Love and Fear". Many transfers are forced transfers, in whole or in part. In fact, the cases of "pure love" or "pure fear" (or "tribute") are actually the defining cases, at either end of the continuum. A case of pure love (or free gift) (a 100% grant) seldom occurs, e.g. a gift from parent to child apparently out of love may well have implications over time, in terms of intergenerational transfers, which may later flow in the opposite direction. A case of pure fear (or tribute) is less hard to find. Boulding gives the example of the thief who says "Your money or your life" threatening a double deprivation. The more usual tribute case in modern times is the government qua tax collector, which collects from some and pays out to others, in the form of explicit grants or transfer payments, but more frequently implicit grants.

The basic transfer is not bilateral, but four-way, a two-way exchange of tangibles (goods, services, money) plus a two-way exchange of intangibles (love, fear, difference, etc.) A unilateral or grants transaction actually subtracts only one of the four lines of exchange (see diagram). What we are really talking about, then, are four-way and three-way exchanges.

![Diagram of exchange and grant]

-1-9- (Continued on page 154)
A HOLISTIC PERSPECTIVE ON CHILD ABUSE AND ITS PREVENTION

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In recent decades, child abuse has come to be considered a social problem of significant scope and has, therefore, attracted intense public and scholarly interest. Yet, in spite of efforts by scholars, professionals, government agencies, concerned individuals and organizations, and the media of public communications, misconceptions prevail concerning the nature, sources, and dynamics of this destructive phenomenon and concerning effective approaches to its primary prevention. Such conceptual shortcomings, and a related persistent failure to design effective policies and programs for the primary prevention of child abuse, seem to be due to a number of obstacles.

Obstacles to Development of Valid Theory and Effective Policy

Perhaps the most serious obstacle is the prevailing conception of social problems as isolated, fragmented phenomena, rather than as consequences of the societal context in which they evolve, and as related to, and interacting with, other social problems generated in the same societal context. This symptom, rather than source, oriented conception of social problems has caused scholars and social planners to consider child abuse as a separate and unique entity, to study it in isolation, and to design around it specialized policies, programs, and bureaucracies. We tend to deal in this way with all social problems, such as alcoholism, drug addiction, crime, mental illness, corruption, inflation, unemployment, urban decay, poverty, etc. The frustrating results of this fragmentary approach to social problems which are deeply rooted in the very fabric of our society, are too well-known to require detailed discussion: the problems tend to persist unchanged, or even to increase in scope, while the bureaucracies which study and deal with them tend to grow over time into major, separate industries, each of which would face "unemployment," were its "house-problem" overcome. Thus, one cannot help wondering whether these specialized, symptom-focused agencies are, indeed, committed to the eradication of social problems, or whether, perhaps, out of a symbiotic relationship with, and a myopic perspective on them, the agencies themselves become factors contributing to the perpetuation of the problems.

Another, equally serious, obstacle to understanding and over-
coming social problems is the tendency to interpret their causation and dynamics along single dimensions such as biological, psychological, social, economic, political, etc. The explanatory dimensions correspond, usually, to the academic discipline or the professional field of the investigators who suggest them. One suspects, therefore, that the interpretations reflect the credentials of investigators rather than the multi-dimensional nature of the phenomena. The long-standing controversy as to whether child abuse is caused by individual psychopathology of perpetrators or by societal forces is an apt illustration of the futility and absurdity of the single-dimensional approach to the causal interpretation of social problems. Such rigid, explanatory paradigms are derived from relatively closed thought structures of academic disciplines and professional groups, and reflect the "trained incapacities" and the vested research and practice interests of these disciplines and groups. They are unlikely to be correct representations of real human phenomena which are always multi-dimensional and which, therefore, do not fit neatly into the conventional division of labor among academic disciplines, university departments, and programmatic agencies.

It should be noted in this context that observations of cases which can be shown, reliably, to result from a specific factor, e.g. psychopathology, must not be interpreted as evidence against the possible operation of other causal factors, in other cases showing the same symptoms, or even as contributing factors to the observed cases. Such inferences would obviously not be logical.

One more obstacle to conceptual clarity may be understood as a special manifestation of the just discussed fallacious tendency to interpret social problems along single dimensions. In our society, this tendency seems definitely weighted in favor of individual, rather than social interpretations. William Ryan has labeled this process very aptly, "blaming the victim."* By positing individual factors as causal agents of such social problems as poverty, crime, corruption, addiction, and child abuse, attention is diverted from likely sources in the social fabric. Intervention programs are consequently designed to change individuals involved in, or affected by, the problems, rather than possibly pathogenic aspects of the social order. By blaming individual victims, or groups of victims, for the social problems they experience, and turning them thus into scapegoats, society as a whole is absolved from all blame and responsibility. No doubt, this conception of the dynamics of social problems is functional for the defense and maintenance of the social status-quo.

The last obstacle to be noted here is the tendency to define

social problems too narrowly, in descriptive rather than analytic-dynamic terms. Descriptive definitions are of limited utility in guiding investigations into the etiology of phenomena, and in developing measures for primary prevention, the effectiveness of which depends on a penetrating analysis of the sources and dynamics of the problems, and the identification and elimination of causal agents. It should be noted also in this context that definitions of social problems ought to incorporate explicit value premises in order to be conducive to the design of socially significant research, and to the generation of effective intervention measures.

A Holistic Definition of Child Abuse

In developing a holistic perspective on child abuse, freed of the obstacles discussed in the preceding section, one must first redefine this phenomenon in a comprehensive, dynamic manner. I have suggested such a definition in testimony before the Sub-Committee on Children and Youth of the U. S. Senate, at hearings, in March 1973, on the "Child Abuse Prevention Act" (S.1191). This definition includes also specifications of value premises and of the rights of children. Abuse is viewed as inflicted deficits, or gaps, between the specified rights and the actual circumstances of children, irrespective of the sources or agents of the deficits:

Every child, despite his individual differences and uniqueness is to be considered of equal intrinsic worth, and hence should be entitled to equal social, economic, civil, and political rights, so that he may fully realize his inherent potential and share equally in life, liberty, and happiness. Obviously, these value premises are rooted in the humanistic philosophy of our Declaration of Independence.

In accordance with these value premises then, any act of commission or omission by individuals, institutions, or society as a whole, and any conditions resulting from such acts or inaction, which deprive children of equal rights and liberties, and/or interfere with their optimal development, constitute, by definition, abusive or neglectful acts or conditions.*

In this definition, the dimensions of child abuse are derived from the stated egalitarian value premises and the related position concerning the rights of all children to optimal development and self-actualization. Obviously, if different value premises and a correspondingly different position on children’s rights were specified in a definition, the dimensions of child abuse would be modified accordingly, provided abuse is conceived of as an inflicted deficit between the specified rights of children and their actual circumstances of living.

Analytic Concepts

The holistic definition of child abuse presented above suggests the use of two related analytic concepts for studying the nature of child abuse and for developing effective policies and programs for its prevention. These concepts will be referred to here as "levels of manifestation" and "levels of causation" or "causal dimensions." The levels of manifestation identify the agents and the settings in which children may experience abuse, or, in terms of the holistic definition, in which the inflicted deficits between their rights to develop freely and fully and their actual circumstances become manifest. The levels of causation unravel the several causal dimensions, the interactions of which result in abusive acts and abusive conditions at the levels of manifestation. The distinction implicit in these analytic concepts, between the levels at which abuse occurs and the forces that underlie the occurrences is important, for these levels and forces are not the same. They do, however, complement each other and interact with each other in multiple ways. Moreover, interaction takes place also among the levels themselves, and among the forces. Clarifying the nature of child abuse means essentially to trace these multiple interactions among the levels of manifestation and the causal dimensions.

Levels of Manifestation

Three levels of manifestation of child abuse may be distinguished. The most familiar one is abusive conditions in the home, and abusive interaction between children and their caretakers. Abuse on this level consists of acts of commission or omission by individuals which inhibit a child’s development. The perpetrators are parents, permanent or temporary parent substitutes, or others living in a child’s home regularly or temporarily. Abuse in the home may be intentional and conscious or unintentional and also unconscious. Abuse may result from supposedly constructive, disciplinary, educational attitudes and measures, or from negative and hostile feelings toward children. Abusive acts in the home may be one-time events, occasional incidents, or regular patterns. So far, child abuse at this level of manifestation has been the dominant focus of scholarly, professional, and public concern with this destructive phenomenon.
A second level at which child abuse occurs is the institutional level. This includes such settings as day care centers, schools, courts, child care agencies, welfare departments, correctional and other residential child care settings, etc. In such settings, acts and policies of commission or omission which inhibit, or insufficiently promote, the development of children, or which deprive children of or fail to provide them with, material, emotional, and symbolic means needed for their optimal development, constitute — in accordance with the holistic definition — abusive acts or conditions. Such acts or policies may originate with an individual employee of an institution, such as a teacher, a child care worker, a judge, a probation officer, a social worker, or they may be implicit in the standard practices and policies of given agencies and institutions. In the same way as in the home, abusive acts and conditions in institutional settings may also result from supposedly constructive, or from negative and hostile attitudes toward children, and they may be one-time or occasional events or regular patterns.

Institutional child care settings such as schools are often perceived by parents as bearers of cultural norms concerning proper child rearing practices and discipline. Hence, when schools and other child care settings employ practices which are not conducive to optimal child development, e.g. corporal punishment and other demeaning and threatening, negative disciplinary measures, they convey a subtle message to parents, namely, that such measures are appropriate, as they are sanctioned by educational authorities and "experts." Influence flows, however, also in the other direction, from the home to the institutional level. Teachers and child care personnel will frequently adopt child rearing practices and disciplinary measures similar to those practiced in the homes of children in their care, on the assumption that this is what the children are used to, what they expect, and to what they respond. In this way, methods conducive, or not conducive, to optimal child development tend to be transmitted back and forth, and reinforced, through interaction between the home and the institutional levels.

When child abuse is viewed as inflicted deficits between a child's actual circumstances and circumstances that would assure his optimal development, it seems to be endemic in most existing institutional settings for the care and education of children, since these settings usually do not facilitate the full actualization of the human potential of all children in their care. Analysis of institutional child abuse reveals that this form of abuse is not distributed randomly throughout the population. Schools and institutions serving children of minority groups, children from deprived socio-economic backgrounds, handicapped children, and socially deviant children are less likely to facilitate optimal development of children's inherent potential than
schools and institutions serving children of majority groups, "normal" children, and children from affluent families and neighborhoods. However, even settings serving children from privileged backgrounds rarely encourage the optimal development of all children in their care. They, too, tend to inhibit the children's spontaneity and creativity, and to promote conformity rather than critical, independent thought. Only rarely will children in these settings develop all their inherent faculties and their unique individuality.

Worse though, than the educational system with its mind-stifling practices, its widespread use of corporal punishment and other demeaning and threatening forms of discipline, is the legally sanctioned, massive abuse of children under the policies and practices of the public welfare system, especially the "Aid to Families with Dependent Children" (AFDC) program. This system of grossly inadequate income maintenance - inadequate even by measures of minimal needs as published by the U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics - virtually condemns millions of children to conditions of existence under which physical, social, emotional, and intellectual development are likely to be severely handicapped.

Similarly destructive versions of legally sanctioned abuse on the institutional level are experienced by several hundred thousands of children living in foster-care, in training and correctional institutions, and in institutions for children defined as mentally retarded. That these settings of substitute child care usually fail to assure optimum development for the children entrusted to them has been amply demonstrated and, thus, does not require further documentation here.*

The massive manifestations of institutional child abuse tend to arouse much less public concern and indignation than child abuse in the home, although the abusive conditions and practices of public education, public welfare, and child placement are endemic to these systems, and are visible to all who care to see. Perhaps the enormity of institutional abuse dulls our sensibilities in the same way in which the fate of inmates of concentration camps, or of populations suffering from natural or man-made catastrophes, tends to arouse a lesser response than the killing of a single individual with whom we are able to identify.

Institutional child abuse is linked, intimately, to the third level at which child abuse is manifested, namely, the societal level. On this level originate social policies which sanction, or cause, severe deficits between the actual circumstances of children and conditions

needed for their optimal development. As direct or indirect consequences of such social policies, millions of children in our society live in poverty and are inadequately nourished, clothed, housed, and educated; their health is not assured because of substandard medical care; their neighborhoods decay; meaningful occupational opportunities are not available to them, and alienation is widespread among them. No doubt, these destructive conditions which result, inevitably, from the normal workings of the prevailing social, economic, and political order, and from the value premises which shape that order and its human dynamics, cannot fail to inhibit severely the development of children exposed to them.

Of the three levels of child abuse sketched in this section, the societal level is certainly the most severe one. For what happens at this level determines not only how children fare on the institutional level, but also, by way of complex interactions, how they fare in their own homes.

Levels of Causation or Causal Dimensions

Before discussing the causal dimensions of child abuse, it should be reiterated that the conventional dichotomy between individual and societal causation of social problems distorts the multi-dimensional reality of human phenomena. We know that psychological forces which shape individual behavior evolve out of the totality of life experiences in specific historical, cultural, social, economic, and political contexts. Individual motivation and behavior are thus always rooted in a societal force field. Yet societal forces are always expressed, or mediated, through the behavior of individuals, for societies cannot act except through their individual members. Clearly then, any human phenomenon, at any moment, involves both social and individual elements. In real life, these elements are inseparable. Their separation in theory is merely a product of scholarly, or rather pseudo-scholarly abstraction.

Based on this reasoning, child abuse, at any level of manifestation, may be understood as acts or inactions of individuals, on their own or as institutional agents, whose behavior reflects societal forces mediated through their unique personalities.

The most fundamental causal level of child abuse consists of a cluster of interacting elements, to wit, a society's basic social philosophy, its dominant value premises, its concept of humans; the nature of its social, economic, and political institutions which are shaped by its philosophy and value premises, and which in turn reinforce that philosophy and these values; and, finally, the particular quality of human relations prevailing in the society, which derives from its philosophy, values, and institutions. For, in the final
analysis, it is the philosophy and value premises of a society, the nature of its major institutions, and the quality of its human relations, which determine whether or not individual members of that society will develop freely and fully in accordance with their inherent potentialities.

To discern a society's basic social philosophy and values and its concept of humans, one needs to ascertain whether it considers everyone to be intrinsically of equal worth in spite of his or her uniqueness and, hence, entitled to the same social, economic, and political rights; or whether everyone in the society considers himself, and those close to himself, of greater worth than anyone else, and hence entitled to more desirable or privileged circumstances. The former, egalitarian philosophy would be reflected in institutional arrangements involving cooperative actions in pursuit of common existential interests. Every individual, and that includes every child, would be considered an equally entitled subject, who could not be deprived of his rights, exploited, and dominated by any other individual or group, and whose right to fully and freely develop his individuality would be assured and respected, subject to the same right of all others. The latter, non-egalitarian philosophy, on the other hand, as we know so well from our own existence, is reflected in institutional structures which encourage competitive behavior in pursuit of narrowly perceived, egotistical interests. Everyone strives to get ahead of others, considers himself entitled to privileged conditions and positions, and views and treats others as potential means to be used, exploited, and dominated in pursuit of his egotistical goals.

The quality of human relations and of human experience in an egalitarian social order would be essentially harmonious. A sense of true community and well-being would be shared by all. Economic institutions would be organized rationally, not for private profit and capital accumulation, but to satisfy everyone's real needs. Waste would be avoided, the environment protected, and natural resources preserved. Political institutions would be truly democratic and participatory; power would be equalized and decentralized; everyone would share equally in important decisions, and especially decisions affecting his existence. Clearly, all forms of domination and exploitation would be precluded, the scarcity and jungle mentality by which we now live would be overcome, and a true Commonwealth based on reason could evolve.

The quality of human relations and of human experience in non-egalitarian social orders is, typically, characterized by competitiveness.
and jealousies, individual isolation and loneliness, alienation, distrust, fear, and insecurity. These qualities are inevitable correlates of non-egalitarian, hierarchical, domineering, and exploitative social, economic and political institutions, which tend to be controlled by huge, centralized, and dehumanizing bureaucracies. Under such institutional structures, individuals cease to be subjects, or masters, of their own lives, and are turned into means for objectives far beyond their true existential needs. Real liberty and true self-actualization are not feasible in such social orders, irrespective of their ideological stances or window-dressings, be that ideology "free-enterprise-capitalism" and pseudo-democracy as in the United States and the so-called "free" world, or be it "state-capitalism" and centralistic pseudo-socialism as in the Soviet Union and several other so-called "socialist" countries.

This brief sketch of contrasting social philosophies, societal institutions, and modes of human relations suggests that full and free development of every child's inherent potential may be possible only in a society organized consistently around egalitarian and cooperative value premises, since the equal right to self-actualization is implicit in an egalitarian philosophy, while such a right is incompatible with a non-egalitarian philosophy. In a society organized on non-egalitarian and competitive principles, full and free development for all children is simply impossible as by definition, there must always be losers in such societies, whose chances to realize their inherent potential will be severely limited. Hence, significant developmental deficits for large segments of the population or high levels of socially structured and sanctioned abuse of children, are endemic in such societies.

A second, more specific, level of causation of child abuse may be intrinsic to the social construction, or definition, of childhood prevalent in a society. Obviously, this level is closely related to the first level. How does a society view its children, all its children, and how does it define their rights? How much obedience, submission, and conformity does it expect of children? Does it process children through caste-like channels of socialization into relatively closed and inflexible social and occupational structures, or does it encourage them, within limits of reason, to discover and develop their individuality and uniqueness, and to shape their lives accordingly? Obviously, optimal development of the inherent potential of all children is a function of the extent to which a society's processes of socialization are permeated with a commitment to such self-actualization for all. When this commitment is lacking altogether, or when it varies with such factors as sex, race, social and economic position of a family, etc., then differ-
ent children will experience varying deficits in realizing their potential. Presently, in our society, social policies which sustain different levels of rights for children from different social and economic backgrounds are a major, direct cause of many forms of child abuse on the societal and institutional levels, and an indirect cause of abuse on the family level.

A further causal dimension of child abuse is a society's attitude toward the use of force as a legitimate means for attaining ends, especially in inbalanced, interpersonal relations such as master-slave, male-female, guard-prisoner, and adult-child. The tendency to resort to the use of force for dealing with conflicts in our society seems to require no documentation here, nor does it seem necessary to document the specific readiness to use force, or the threat of it, as a means to maintain authority and discipline in adult-child relations in the public domain such as schools and other child care settings, and in the private domain of the family. The readiness to use physical force for disciplinary objectives is certainly endemic in our society.

It should be noted that the readiness to use force in general, and in adult-child relations in particular, is intimately linked to a society's basic philosophy and value premises, and to its concept of humans and their rights. A non-egalitarian philosophy is much more likely to sanction the use of force than an egalitarian one, since the use of force against other humans constitutes the strongest possible negation of equality. The use of force toward children is also related to the manner in which childhood, and the rights of children are defined by a society, and in turn tends to reinforce that definition.

As mentioned earlier, the use of force toward children is widespread in our society on the institutional and family levels. Attempts to limit and outlaw it in public institutions have had so far only limited success. It may be noted, in this context, that because of the compatibility between the use of physical force on the one hand, and an inegalitarian philosophy and competitive social, economic, and political institutions on the other, corporal punishment and the threat of it may actually be highly functional in preparing children for adult roles in an inegalitarian and competitive social order. For, were our children reared in a harmonious fashion without threats, insults, and physical force, they might not be adequately prepared and conditioned for adult roles in our inegalitarian, competitive reality.

Whenever corporal punishment in child rearing is sanctioned, and even subtly encouraged by a society, incidents of serious physical abuse and injury are bound to happen, either as a result of deliberate,
systematic, and conscious action on the part of perpetrators, or under conditions of loss of self-control. In either case, but especially in the latter, physical attacks on children tend to relieve tensions and frustrations experienced by the perpetrators. Clearly, then, these attacks are carried out to meet emotional needs of the perpetrators rather than educational needs of the victims, as is often claimed by advocates of corporal punishment.

The next causal dimension may be referred to as "triggering contexts." These contexts operate jointly with the societal sanction of the use of physical force in adult-child relations. Adults who use force toward children do not do so all the time, but only under specific circumstances which serve as triggers for their abusive behavior. In general, abusive attacks tend to be triggered by stress and frustration which may cause reduction or loss of self-control. Stresses and frustration may facilitate abusive attacks even without causing a reduction or loss of self-control, as long as the appropriateness of the use of force in child rearing is accepted, an acceptance which was shown to be widespread in our society.

One major source of stress and frustration for adults in our society are the multi-faceted deprivations of poverty and its correlates, high density in overcrowded, dilapidated, inadequately served neighborhoods; large numbers of children, especially in one-parent, mainly female-headed households; and the absence of child care alternatives. Having identified poverty and its correlates as one important triggering context of child abuse in the home, we may now note that social policies which sanction and perpetuate the existence of poverty among large segments of the population, including millions of children, are thus indirect sources of child abuse in the home. It should be emphasized, though, that poverty, per se, is not a direct cause of child abuse in the home, but operates through an intervening variable, namely, concrete and psychological stress and frustration experienced by individuals in the context of culturally sanctioned use of physical force in child rearing.

Poverty is not the only source of stress and frustration triggering child abuse in the home. Such abuse is known to occur frequently in many homes in adequate, and even affluent, economic circumstances. One other, important source of stress and frustration in our society is the alienating circumstances in most workplaces, be the work manual labor, skilled and unskilled occupations, or administrative, managerial, and professional work through all levels and sectors of business, academic, and government bureaucracies. A recent report by a task force of the U. S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare documented the seriousness of work alienation which is
experienced by constantly growing segments of the working population.* This government report is certainly not biased against the economic system of the United States. And yet, it reached similar conclusions to those voiced by many severe critics of this system in recent years. These conclusions are that the prevailing competitive and exploiting human relations in the work place, and its hierarchical and authoritarian structures, tend to cause psychological stress and alienation for nearly every working person. These pressures may lead to various forms of deviant behavior such as alcoholism, drug addiction, mental illness, white collar crime, etc. Perhaps the most frequent locus for discharging feelings of stress and frustration originating in the formal world of work is the informal world of primary relations, the home and the family. Conflicts between spouses are one form this discharge may take. Child abuse in the form of violent physical outbursts is another.

Here then, we identify once again a triggering context for child abuse on the interpersonal level, which is rooted deeply in societal forces, namely, the alienating quality of our society's economic and productive system complemented by the culturally sanctioned use of physical force in child rearing.

The final causal dimension of child abuse on the interpersonal level in the home and in child care settings is intra-psychic conflicts and various forms of psycho-pathology on the part of perpetrators. Child abuse literature is largely focused on this dimension and thus little needs to be said here to document it. However, what needs to be stressed is the fact that psychological disturbances and their manner of expression are not independent factors but are deeply rooted in, and constantly interact with, forces in the social environment of the disturbed individual. To the extent that psycho-pathology is not rooted in genetic and biochemical processes, it derives from the totality of the life experiences of the individual which are shaped by continuous interactions between the person and his social setting, his informal and formal relations in primary and secondary contexts. However, not only the etiology of intra-psychic conflicts and disturbances is conditioned, in part, by social forces, but also the manner in which these conflicts and disturbances are expressed in social relations is very much culture-bound. The symptoms of emotional disturbance and mental illness are not randomly generated phenomena, but derive from normal behavioral traits in a culture. These normal traits appear in exaggerated or negated forms in behavior which is considered deviant, neurotic, and psychotic. Hence, one may assume that in a society in which the use of physical force in general, and toward children in

particular, is not sanctioned, intra-psychic conflicts and psychopathology would less often be expressed through violence against children. It follows from these considerations that the "battered baby" syndrome and other forms of child abuse which are associated with psychological disturbances of one kind or another, are not independent of societal forces, although the perpetrators of these acts may be emotionally ill individuals. We are thus again led to the conclusion that abusive acts and conditions, irrespective of the level of manifestation, cannot be understood in terms of one specific causal dimension, but only in terms of complex interactions among the several causal dimensions sketched in this section.

Primary Prevention

According to a general conceptual model, primary prevention proceeds from identification toward elimination of the causal contexts from which specified, undesired phenomena derive. It needs to be realized that the prevention of undesired phenomena may result also in the elimination of other phenomena whenever such other phenomena derive from, or are part of, the same causal context. The likelihood of simultaneous prevention of several phenomena could lead to serious dilemmas in situations when some of the phenomena are desired, while others are considered undesirable, or when groups in a society differ in their respective evaluation of the desirability of the several phenomena. Decisions concerning primary prevention of social phenomena and of "social problems" are thus essentially political choices.

Turning now to the primary prevention of child abuse, we may begin by summarizing our conclusions so far. Child abuse, conceived of as inflicted deficits on a child’s right to develop freely and fully, irrespective of the source and agents of the deficit, was found to occur on several related levels: on the interpersonal level in the home and in child-care settings, on the institutional level through the policies and practices of a broad array of child care, educational, welfare, and correctional institutions and agencies, and on the societal level, where the interplay of values and social, economic, and political institutions and processes shapes the social policies by which the rights, and the existential realities of all children, and of specific groups of children are determined. The causal dimensions of child abuse are, first of all, the dominant social philosophy and value premises of a society, its social, economic, and political institutions, and the quality of human relations to which these institutions, philosophy and values give rise; other causal dimensions are the social construction of childhood and the social definition of children's rights, the extent to which a society sanctions the use of force in general and, more specifically, in the child rearing context, stress and frustration resulting from poverty and from alienation in the work place which may trigger
abusive acts, and expressions of intra-psychic conflicts and psychopathology which in turn are rooted in the social fabric. While child abuse, at any particular level, may be more closely related to one rather than another causal dimension, none of these dimensions are independent, and they exert their influence through multiple interactions with each other.

This analysis suggests that primary prevention of child abuse, on all levels, would require fundamental changes in social philosophy and value premises, in societal institutions, and in human relations. It would also require a reconceptualization of childhood, of children’s rights, and of child rearing. It would necessitate rejecting the use of force as means for achieving societal ends, especially in dealing with children. It would require the elimination of poverty and of alienating conditions of production, major sources of stress and frustration which tend to trigger abusive acts toward children in adult-child interaction. And, finally, it would necessitate the elimination of psychological illness. Because of the multiple interactions among the several causal dimensions, progress in overcoming the more fundamental dimensions would also reduce the force of other dimensions. Thus, transforming the prevailing inegalitarian social philosophy, value premises, and institutions - and the kind of human relations they generate - into egalitarian ones would also result in corresponding modifications of children's rights, elimination of poverty and alienation at work, and rejection of the use of force. It would indirectly influence psychological wellbeing, and would thus eliminate the processes which now trigger child abuse in interpersonal relations.

Effective primary prevention requires working simultaneously toward the transformation of all the causal dimensions. Fragmented approaches focused on one or the other causal dimension may bring some amelioration, but one should entertain no illusions as to the effectiveness of such piecemeal efforts. Even such important and necessary steps as outlawing corporal punishment in schools and other child care settings would have only limited, though highly desirable results. There simply is no way of escaping the conclusion that the complete elimination of child abuse on all levels of manifestation requires a radical transformation of the prevailing unjust, inegalitarian, irrational, competitive, alienating and hierarchical social order into a just, egalitarian, rational, cooperative, humane, and truly democratic, decentralized one. Obviously, this realization implies that primary prevention of child abuse is a political issue which cannot be resolved through professional and administrative measures.

Primary prevention of child abuse would result also in the prevention of other, equally undesirable and equally inevitable consequences or symptoms of the same causal context, including many
manifestations of social deviance. However, it would also result in the complete transformation of the prevailing social, economic, and political order with which large segments of our society are either identified or drifting along, because this order conforms to their accustomed mental sets, and because they seem reluctant, due to inertia, to search actively for alternative social, economic, and political institutions which might be more conducive to human fulfillment for all. Some or many members of our society may even be consciously committed to the perpetuation of the existing order, not realizing how destructive that order may be to their own real interests.

Whatever one's attitude may be toward these fundamental political issues, one needs to recognize and face the dilemmas implicit in them and, hence, in primary prevention of child abuse. If one's priority is to prevent all child abuse, one must be ready to part with its many causes, even when one is attached to some of them, such as the apparent blessings, advantages and privileges of inequality. If, on the other hand, one is reluctant to give up all aspects of the causal context of child abuse, one must be content to continue living with this social problem. In that latter case, one ought to stop talking about primary prevention and face the fact that all one may be ready for is some measure of amelioration.

Research

In concluding this essay on the nature and prevention of child abuse from a holistic perspective, some observations seem indicated on implications for research. Research, to be meaningful in a social sense, should derive from socially meaningful issues and should pursue imaginative hypotheses aimed at solving these issues. Far too often, scarce research resources seem to be wasted on essentially irrelevant studies which explore insignificant, fragmentary issues and pedestrian hypotheses, often with the aid of highly sophisticated research technology. These critical comments on the state of social research apply to a large part of past and present research on child abuse and its prevention.

The discussion in this essay of the levels of manifestation and the causal dimensions of child abuse does suggest a series of socially meaningful issues which could be addressed through social research. Likewise, the discussion of primary prevention of child abuse suggests one comprehensive hypothesis which could be explored and tested by means of properly designed research. The issues to be investigated are the validity of the causal model of child abuse and its several dimensions and their multiple interactions. The hypothesis concerning primary prevention states that societies which overcame the causal dimensions of child abuse identified in this essay would gradually free themselves of child abuse. These issues and
this hypothesis could be explored cross-culturally, historically, and experimentally. One could search for past and present societies and communities, whose philosophy, value premises, societal institutions, and human relations are relatively free of the posited causal dimensions of child abuse, and one could examine whether the incidence of child abuse on all levels of manifestation is indeed lower in these societies than in our own. Alternatively, one could stimulate and facilitate the emergence of communities organized on principles that preclude the hypothesized causal context of child abuse, and one could then observe whether the incidence of child abuse on all levels would decrease over time, and eventually cease altogether.

Less ambitious approaches to research are, of course, possible. However, if social research should guide us toward primary prevention, it needs to be designed around a causal model and a hypothesis concerning approaches to the elimination of the causal dimensions. Other types of research can guide only toward some form of amelioration, which may be all one is ready to engage in and which, of course, may have some utility as long as it is not misrepresented as a contribution to primary prevention.

Choices of foci for research turn out to be related to a scholar's fundamental social and political outlook, in the same way as attitudes towards primary prevention were shown to be essentially political. A researcher who accepts the prevailing social order is likely to select topics for study which will not threaten or challenge that order. On the other hand, a researcher who is committed to social justice for all, and who conceives of social science as a tool in the struggle for human liberation, will not hesitate to conduct studies of alternative social patterns and life styles which may thoroughly challenge prevailing assumptions, and which hold promise for a human existence freed of the many injustices of the prevailing social order, of which child abuse is merely one.

Note: This essay is based on the following books by the author and on a paper presented on June 17, 1974 at a conference on Child Abuse and Neglect at the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development.


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TOWARD A RADICAL REASSESSMENT OF SOCIAL WORK VALUES

By

Shimon S. Gottschalk

SYNOPSIS

Social Work's inherited statements of core values are excessively individualistic and politically conservative, posing a false dichotomy of individual versus society. "Maximizing individual opportunities for self expression", is criticized as an outdated, if not dangerous value stance. An alternative position is suggested which sets as the valued aim of all social work practice the enhancement within and among individuals and society of the capacity for sharing and reciprocity. The promotion of a just society and of individual well being are viewed as being inextricably intertwined.

The origins of American social work are to be traced to the Western, predominantly liberal-bourgeois traditions and aspirations of the late nineteenth, and early twentieth century. Social work has grown, and in many ways prospered under this banner. But the society and the world within which Social Workers practice is changing rapidly. Thus, the liberalism of yesteryear may quickly be transformed into the conservatism of today - by means of the simple process of non-change.

This paper is a first effort, a preliminary reexamination of some of the traditions upon which contemporary social work practice theory is built. Its aim is to reinterpret this tradition in the light of insights which, in this latter part of the twentieth century, might be denoted as emerging from a "new-liberal", i.e., a radical perspective. It will conclude with a suggested reformulation of the inherited core values of social work.

By radical is meant, quite simply, a perspective which is committed to the reexamination of the roots, the fundamental assumptions, the inherited wisdom of the past. The purpose is not necessarily to destroy or undermine existing institutions, but rather to critically reevaluate them and to reinterpret them without deference to prevailing arrangements of power and privilege, in order that they may more fully meet the demands of a new era.

The emphasis is on values because social work has constantly viewed itself as a value based profession. Social workers are the "professional altruists", committed to doing "the good", not merely the feasible.

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Social work is a profession of "humanitarianism in action". Everything social workers do as professional persons is, ideally speaking, reconcilable with a basic value stance.

Values are criteria for preference or choice. They are judgements, conceptions of desirable states of affairs which serve to justify proposed or actual behavior. As such, the truth or falsehood of a particular value stance is not subject to empirical research. Values are not to be confused with ethics. Ethics deals with standards of behavior or action in relation to others. Ethics tends to be more particularistic than values, applying to specific relationships at specific times, e.g. the relationship between men and women, or workers and clients. Ethics is based, in part, upon values, and it is subsidiary to them. Values, by contrast, involve judgments of ultimate concern which remain unmodified by specific circumstances.

The Core Values of Social Work

During the last twenty years, a number of attempts have been made within the social work profession to identify, if not codify, a statement of core values. In the Working Definition of Social Work Practice of 1958, under the heading of values, one central statement stands forth: "the individual is the primary concern of this society". As William E. Gordon, in his Critique of the Working Definition, indicated, the other value-related statements included in the Working Definition, do not, strictly speaking, constitute value judgements. Gordon subsequently offered the following alternative formulation:

"It is good and desirable for man to fulfill his potential, to realize himself, and to balance this with essentially equal effort to help others to fulfill their capacities and realize themselves."

An international seminar on values sponsored by the Council of Social Work Education in Honolulu, in 1966, came to a somewhat similar conclusion. The participants agreed upon a pair of statements each of which is expressed in the form of a balance:

"1. The worth and dignity of the individual as related to the well being and integrity of the group:

2. The progress and development of the individual and society, as related to the security of the individual and society."

Gunnar Myrdal, in his keynote address to the 14th International Congress of Schools of Social Work in 1968, suggested as a core statement of values, the universality of the "quest for social and economic equality
as the sovereign ideal of all major religions and philosophies. The International Congress, which was largely oriented toward the discussion of the theme of social work values, did not fully agree with Myrdal's statement. Many of the participants felt that this view of basic values was too materialistic; it did not sufficiently take into account spiritual values, such as human dignity and worth.

The United States report to this same International Congress, prepared by Mary J. McCormick, after reviewing a variety of viewpoints and issues, concluded that, "assuring to every human being the opportunity to attain his maximum potential... represents the consolidation of all values - from personal worth to self-determination; from freedom to social experience and social responsibility."

These are only a few of the statements which have emerged during the past two decades around the issue of core values of the social work profession. Of course there are others, such as the statement suggested by, Objectives of the Social Curriculum of the Future and the introduction to Goals of Public Social Policy and the first paragraph of NASW Code of Ethics.

What Seems to Be the Problem?

Reviewing these statements and the discussions which accompany them is somewhat like experiencing a baptism that does not cleanse. We are left with the feeling that personal intuition and conscience remain our primary guide to action. There are too many unresolved problems, among them the following:

1. If Social Work values need to be expressed in terms of a balance between individual and societal needs, then what is the principle in terms of which this balance is to be adjudicated? What are the indicators? What are the weights? In short, in a particular situation, how does one decide between individual good and the good of society?

2. There is elegance in a single economical statement of basic values such as McCormick's idea of opportunity to attain maximum individual potential. The advantage of such a unitary statement lies in the fact that one need not be concerned with issues of priority or of balance. All of the values are presumably subservient to, and derivable from this one. But are they? Does this not simply shift the burden of the question of priorities among values, e.g., the contest between freedom and security, to a different level of analysis?

3. To what degree can and should Social Work values coincide
with the values of the society at large? Werner Boehm, one of the grand architects of the social work curriculum, suggested that the coincidence between the two is not, and cannot be complete. If there are such differences, then what are the principles which underlie the distinction? Or more specifically, under what circumstances can and should Social Workers serve as agents of social control, and under what circumstances shall they act as agents of social change?

4. Of special importance to social workers is the issue of value dissensus between clients and workers. What shall the social worker do when there is value dissensus between him/her self and the client system? This question which gnaws at the very root of the theory of advocacy is not resolved by existing statements of core values. All professions appear to agree that public interest and client interest must regularly precede the interest of the particular profession and of the individual practitioner. But what shall the professional social worker do when he is convinced that what the client wants is wrong, that the client is preparing to act contrary to his (i.e., the worker's) core system of values?

5. What is the significance of values as related to other components of professional practice? For example, which has priority, commitment to social work values, or commitment to knowledge? There are some within the profession, such as Nathan Cohen, who consider values as the fountainhead and root of all practice. Others, such as Specht, appear not to agree. The latter considers an over-concern with issues of social justice to be one of the major threats to the survival of the profession. According to this view, the core of professionalism is not a set of values but specific, finely tuned practice skills.

6. On the day to day level social workers continually face conflicts between practical expediency and principle. Are principled values to serve as the primary criteria for all their actions, or shall the perceived institutional interests of the system they serve (i.e., agencies, professional associations, or society as a whole) be their primary professional guide?

The several issues which have been raised above are largely formal in nature; they deal more nearly with the structure and the internal logic of the statements of core values than with their substantive content. We make mention of them here without laying claim to the hope that they can all be satisfactorily resolved in the discussion which follows.
Individualism Revisited

Having identified some of the formal problems associated with the inherited statements of core values, let us now turn more specifically to a discussion of their substance.

On the whole these statements are highly person centered: the individual is the focus and society serves as the backdrop. Whereas the emphases differ, we repeatedly sense that, implicit within these statements is a view of the individual versus society. This is assumed to be the fundamental contest of life and the aim lies in discovering an acceptable but difficult balance.

Now this is a uniquely capitalistic conception of person and society, scarcely at variance with the views of persons historically as far apart as Adam Smith and Milton Freedman. Each individual is assumed to be in competition with all others and the collectivity exists primarily in order to assure and secure individual rights. The good life is a life of independence and self-sufficiency. The goal of social welfare within such a society is to encourage, promote, maximize self-sufficiency. It is often naively assumed that the sum of individual goods constitutes the good of the whole.

The idea of a dichotomy between the individual and society derives ample support from major traditions within the social sciences. Functionalism appears to have placed a greater emphasis upon society, its institutions, and their need for integration. By contrast, existentialist theory has stressed individualism. But in both traditions the issues are usually expressed in terms of a dualistic struggle.

For example, Talcott Parsons and his followers point to the contest between integration and adaptation. Philip Lichtenberg suggests that this dichotomy is implicit in most contemporary psychoanalytic theories: outer reality is usually viewed as a source of frustrations calling for the renunciation of individual, anti-social tendencies. Similarly, the currently dominant strain in political theory represented by Bannfield, Dahl, Lindblom, and others suggests that the public interest is a resultant emerging from the competition of all private interest with each other. Thus, the public interest also competes with every private interest.

Social Workers have rarely challenged the basic value assumptions upon which these contemporary social scientific views are built. They have dismissed out of hand the ideas of turn-of-the-century socialists such as Peter Kropotkin who suggested that the fundamental principle of life and society may well be thought to be cooperation, rather than competition. Instead of having associated itself with this or similar views, the social work profession has increasingly allied itself with theories of competitive individualism, or predominantly system maintaining functionalism, or both.
Thus, social workers have, for example, become champions of equality of opportunity, despite their awareness that in a socially highly stratified society this invariably leads to inequality of outcome. They know that when unequal persons compete, the stronger invariably wins.

The capitalist system and the values which support it have institutionalized a harsh concept of social inequality and the social work profession (though not all social workers) has, in effect, adopted it as its own. Despite all protestations to the contrary, Americans believe in inequality because they assume that this is what makes their system prosper. Social workers in their pragmatic search for legitimacy among established authorities have cooperated; they have not protested this view.

Functional social analysis and its implicit view of the individual versus society, perhaps precisely because of its close parallel with the concept of economic man (sic), is out of tune with many of the basic intuitions of social work practice. Social workers are intimately aware of the destructiveness of excessive individualism. Equally, though perhaps more subtly, they are aware that the most significant exchanges between one person and another, or one person and all others are not functional, not contractual, not material. The rules and principles of economics do not apply because love, and hope, and dignity, and creativity are not limited like scarce natural resources: the more love or hope a person is able to give, the more love and hope exists within the world. There is no necessary and inevitable zero-sum game in the primary relationships among human beings. There is no necessary and inevitable conflict between the individual and society because they compete as little as a flower competes with the soil or the bird competes with the sky.

The individualistic value stance is compatible with present social work practice only to the extent that it consists of a social service strategy. As has now been frequently suggested by scholars, the social services constitute in their essence, methods of social control, meeting the interests of established authorities and of the status quo. Within such a context, to do the good is to help maintain the existing order. In short, social services, though motivated by claims to social idealism and liberalism are, in essence, conservative.

But social work, since its beginning around the turn of the century, has had an additional, a broader vision which extends beyond the provision of social services. To the extent that social workers have been sensitive to the brutalities and injustices of our society they have been impelled to act for societal change. The principles which guide their practice are based upon the recognition that the madness is neither entirely in people's heads, nor totally beyond their (the people's) reach because of inexorable laws of politics and society. It would appear that a new statement of core values for the social work profession must be guided by these latter
insights, rather than by an outdated support of individualism.

The new humanism can no longer be equated with individualism, emphasizing the virtues of self-fulfillment, self-expression, and equality of opportunity. Rather, a renewed emphasis must be placed upon the realization that human beings humanize each other, that consciousness, and knowing, and establishing meaning and purpose in life are all necessarily social acts. There is no dichotomy, no conflict between individual and society in those areas which are of most fundamental concern to social work practice. The new vision of core values in social work must proceed from a conception of the individual inseparable from society.27

Not only as agents of social control, or as agents of individual liberation, but primarily as co-workers in the creation of a just society must social workers find their place. Within such a society (as well as within the struggle for such a society) the individual is viewed as both the creator and the created, the actor is both subject and object (e.g., the caseworker is, in part, client), the process is a part of the valued goal. Individual well being is possible only within a just society, and the just society is possible only where individuals are healthy and personally fulfilled.

The Just Society

While we have rejected the view of individual versus society, it is of primary importance that we not make the opposite error, the error of reductionism which assumes their systematic identity. The relationship between individual and society is one of reciprocity, but they are significantly different types of entities to which entirely different concepts of well being apply.

A group is more than a series of individuals; a community is more than a geographically confined collection of organizations; a society is more than a sum of institutions. The whole is always something more, and something different than the sum of its parts. This basic proposition of General Systems Theory lies at the root of the discussion which follows.28

Let us now return to a point alluded to only in passing above. A just society is not simply one that results from the interactional sum of socially functional, or mentally healthy, or of God-fearing, or self-actualized individuals. The revered American tradition which posits the social ideal of "the greatest good for the greatest number" is, in effect, based upon a false reductionist principle. Social work has in error identified with this tradition. As suggested above, the good is defined, "voted" as it were, as the maximization of individual desires, to the extent that these do not conflict with the desires of others. The just
society, according to this view, is a resultant produced by the expression of a multiplicity of individual desires.

There are at least three difficulties which may be associated with this doctrine. First, since the good is defined by the majority, and since the majority is, e.g., white and middle class, it is their good, not other people's good which will be socially defined as the good. Thus, we have the basis for cultural colonialism. Second, the doctrine is missing a distributive principle. Thus, increasing the total quantity of good available within society as a result of the maximization of individual desires does not guarantee that those who are at the bottom of the system will get their fair share. Social workers are, of course, intimately aware of the fact that an increase in national wealth has not automatically lead to a reduction of private poverty (sic). Finally, and perhaps most importantly, this doctrine is one which seemingly inevitably blesses the status quo. What is, is just and good. Given this orientation, it is inconceivable that the greatest good for the greatest number might according to some independent standard be considered "no good".

Social workers have been concerned with these problems for many years but their expressions of core values have provided them with little theoretical guidance. But this is the post-Eichmann, and the post-Mylai era. We know that the ethical standards which govern institutions differ in principle, not only in degree, from those which govern individuals. In their own eyes, both Eichmann and Lt. Calley at Mylai were convinced that they were fulfilling the moral imperatives implicit in their assigned roles. Yet there is no court of law that can properly judge the acts of these individuals in isolation, acting as if these were simply corrupt, morally debased individuals. In some sense we must be able to admit that it is the institutions which they served and the societies of which they are a part that are also evil. By the same token, if racism is a social problem then its solution lies not simply in arresting and reeducating the individual racist: somehow the entire society must also be taken to task.

Again we return to the question, what shall be the nature of a just society? Here the work of the philosopher John Rawls in his recent important contribution to moral philosophy, A Theory of Justice, promises to provide major support to the development of a new understanding of social work values. We will touch only on Rawls' major points.

Traditional moral theory distinguishes between the good and the right. For the 19th century Utilitarians such as Mills and Bentham, the good for society is the greatest net balance of satisfactions summed over all the individuals belonging to it. The right is defined as that which maximizes the good. William E. Gordon, in discussing the working Definition of Social Work Practice makes an analogous distinction. He distinguishes between value (the good) and knowledge (the right). For Gordon, values are
"the preferred", and knowledge is "the confirmed". For both Gordon and Utilitarians, the good is defined independently and prior to the right, which is another way of saying that the ends are defined prior to, and independently of the means.

Rawls disagrees with this view. According to his concept of "justice as fairness", the right precedes the good. Thus, the emphasis is on the structure of social institutions and on social processes rather than on the specification of particular goods. A just social system sets limits, it "provides a framework of rights and opportunities and the means of satisfaction within and by the use of which these ends may be equitably pursued."34 The central problem in specifying the nature of the just society, therefore, is to identify those social structures and processes which will achieve the good, however it is defined.

Rawls proceeds with this task by imagining what he calls the "original position". This constitutes a conceptual scheme wherein a group of rational persons is asked to decide upon the principles of justice from a position of personal neutrality. That is, none of the individuals participating in the decision has prior knowledge of his own, particular position within the social structure. Thus, he is unable to favor himself, or those who are socially allied with him, in making his judgements. Taking this stance, imagining the original position, Rawls arrives at the following key principles:

1. Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others.

2. Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both:
   (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, and
   (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.35

By liberty, Rawls means a certain structure of social institutions, a system of rights and duties which guarantee individual freedom and genuine choices. It is important to note that liberty inheres within the social system, not the individual. But liberty has no practical meaning except when it is utilized by individuals exercising their opportunities for free choice. Rawls suggests that the first principle, the principle of liberty, always has priority over the second principle. That is, liberty may never be sacrificed for the sake of equality.

Rawl's theory of justice offers some important advantages over the inherited theories of social justice with which the social work profession has been identified.36
1. What is right, what will lead to the good, is not subject to the "vote" of the majority. In other words, there are important limits to relativism.

2. A distributive principle is explicitly included which focuses upon the needs of those who are at the bottom of the social system, those who are least advantaged.

3. Because of its emphasis on the right, rather than on the good, this theory has the potential of relating directly to social work's primary concern with the values implicit in practice, rather than the goals of practice.

The principles of social justice are here suggested within a non-reductionist formulation: the just society is not simply an aggregate of good people who are considerate of each other. The just society does not compete, need to be balanced with, is not subsidiary to individuals and their desires. Especially important for social workers, professional persons oriented toward the facilitation of individual and social change, is the realization that the just society is not necessarily one which is maximally responsive to the desires of the majority. The standards of justice are established independently of the power of majorities - or minorities, for that matter. From a value perspective, the majority can be wrong and the "greatest good for the greatest number" may be "no good."

If this amounts to intellectual elitism, then let us admit it. Indeed, a certain amount of elitism is implicit in all professional practice. All professionals lay claim to knowledge and expertise which is beyond the ken of the majority. What reason is there to be different when it comes to the issue of professional values?

A New Beginning - Not the End

This paper has viewed social work as an expression and an outgrowth of late 19th and early 20th century Western capitalism. It has helped to sustain and expand the capacities for social control of an expanding, materially prosperous social order. In this sense, its success has paralleled the success of the society as a whole. In capitalism, the major emphasis upon individualism has served as an important foundation for both material prosperity and for a unique concept of personal freedom - freedom distinct from liberty and in competition with social responsibility. The social work profession has, in the main, chosen to ally itself with this view.

But our society is changing rapidly. The profession of social work needs to be prepared to confront the problems of a new society in which growth and progress are not inevitable. One of the major tasks imposed upon
social work and all professions is to fathom the impact upon Western consciousness of a non-growth economy. There are other indicators of change. Our society has moved from collective production to an increasing emphasis upon collective consumption as well. Private entrepreneurship has all but given way to corporate enterprise. The government has become the single largest employer. The service society has arrived, in that less than half of the work force is engaged in the production of goods. Less than twenty percent of the work force is engaged in manufacturing.

In the light of these changes we sense the imminent danger that our highly individualistic value system is leading us in the direction of an ever more fragmented social order, a society in which anomie has become the norm and in which social and economic inequalities are highly accentuated. Perhaps even more threatening is the likelihood that this society will quickly lead to the inauguration of greatly regimented, controlled, planfully totally integrated social order.

The alternative towards which we have been groping in this paper is one which attempts to break down familiar conceptual barriers and views the individual as inseparable from his/her society and world. The individual and society are reciprocally intertwined and the health of one demands the welfare of the other. Such a changed value orientation is more likely to serve the new liberalism of the post-modern era.

It is strangely unfashionable to speak in the language of ideals. Yet it is in the essence of any discussion of values that one must reach for idealized conceptualizations. Finally, valued ideals become criteria for decision making and action. Without further apology, therefore, let us suggest, experimentally, a new statement of valued goals for the social work profession:

The central and valued aim of social work practice is the promotion and enhancement within and among individuals and society of the capacity and opportunity for sharing and reciprocity.

The expansion and the sharing of all those most valued goods, such as love, wisdom, mutuality, beauty, dignity, and joy, etc., for which there is no economic market because there is and can be no scarcity, constitutes the essence of all practice relationships.

The capacity to create and share non-economic goods is intimately intertwined with, and contingent upon, the existence of a just social order and just social institutions within which economic goods are shared equally, which maximize liberty, and which are so structured as to champion the interests of the least advantaged in every social situation.
The next, and truly monumental task is to identify, discover, and invent those social and individual therapeutic methods and those institutional forms which derive from, and most nearly give expression to these valued ideals. There is no reason to believe that the task will be easy. The problems are theoretical, scientific, and most importantly, political. . . . But that leads us to an entirely new level of the discussion.

FOOTNOTES


4. Ibid.


18. This is a Western, not simply an American problem. For Simmel, the German Sociologist, Individual versus society was the central issue, The Sociology of George Simmel, Kurt Wolff, ed., New York, Free Press, 1950. It is a key issue for the Theologian Martin Buber, and has been the subject of numerous contemporary analyses of society. One of the more recent and most readable of these is Philip Slater's, The Pursuit of Loneliness, Boston, Beacon, 1970.


22. This does not mean to say that some very basic questions have not been raised, both from within and outside the profession. Among them, Donald Howard, Social Welfare Values - Means and Ends, New York, Random House, 1969; Bertram Gross, "The Benevolent Fascism," Social Policy, November/December 1970; Galper, op. cit.; Lichtenberg, op. cit.; In related areas see Charles Hampden-Turner, Radical Man, New York, Harper, 1971; Robert Heilbroner, "Economics as a Value Free Science," Social Research, 40:1, Spring 1973, pp. 129-143.

23. Peter Kropotkin, Mutual Aid, Boston, Porter Sargeant, republished 1955.

24. As we shall suggest below, equality of opportunity is meaningful only within a context where basic rights are guaranteed, within a social system that institutionally favors those who are least advantaged.
25. This paragraph is not to be misunderstood to mean that more equal distribution of material wealth is not important. The basic material necessities of life must be satisfied first.


30. These issues are examined in greater detail by Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem, New York: Viking, 1963.


32. Rawls, op. cit., p. 31.


34. Rawls, op. cit., p. 31.

35. Ibid., pp. 60, 83.

36. See especially the Introduction to, Goals of Public Social Policy, op. cit.

37. Bertram Gross (op. cit) fears that this will occur with the explicit help of human service professionals.
systematic, and conscious action on the part of perpetrators, or under conditions of loss of self-control. In either case, but especially in the latter, physical attacks on children tend to relieve tensions and frustrations experienced by the perpetrators. Clearly, then, these attacks are carried out to meet emotional needs of the perpetrators rather than educational needs of the victims, as is often claimed by advocates of corporal punishment.

The next causal dimension may be referred to as "triggering contexts." These contexts operate jointly with the societal sanction of the use of physical force in adult-child relations. Adults who use force toward children do not do so all the time, but only under specific circumstances which serve as triggers for their abusive behavior. In general, abusive attacks tend to be triggered by stress and frustration which may cause reduction or loss of self-control. Stresses and frustration may facilitate abusive attacks even without causing a reduction or loss of self-control, as long as the appropriateness of the use of force in child rearing is accepted, an acceptance which was shown to be widespread in our society.

One major source of stress and frustration for adults in our society are the multi-faceted deprivations of poverty and its correlates, high density in overcrowded, dilapidated, inadequately served neighborhoods; large numbers of children, especially in one-parent, mainly female-headed households; and the absence of child care alternatives. Having identified poverty and its correlates as one important triggering context of child abuse in the home, we may now note that social policies which sanction and perpetuate the existence of poverty among large segments of the population, including millions of children, are thus indirect sources of child abuse in the home. It should be emphasized, though, that poverty, per se, is not a direct cause of child abuse in the home, but operates through an intervening variable, namely, concrete and psychological stress and frustration experienced by individuals in the context of culturally sanctioned use of physical force in child rearing.

Poverty is not the only source of stress and frustration triggering child abuse in the home. Such abuse is known to occur frequently in many homes in adequate, and even affluent, economic circumstances. One other, important source of stress and frustration in our society is the alienating circumstances in most workplaces, be the work manual labor, skilled and unskilled occupations, or administrative, managerial, and professional work through all levels and sectors of business, academic, and government bureaucracies. A recent report by a task force of the U. S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare documented the seriousness of work alienation which is...
experienced by constantly growing segments of the working population.* This government report is certainly not biased against the economic system of the United States. And yet, it reached similar conclusions to those voiced by many severe critics of this system in recent years. These conclusions are that the prevailing competitive and exploiting human relations in the workplace, and its hierarchical and authoritarian structures, tend to cause psychological stress and alienation for nearly every working person. These pressures may lead to various forms of deviant behavior such as alcoholism, drug addiction, mental illness, white-collar crime, etc. Perhaps the most frequent locus for discharging feelings of stress and frustration originating in the formal world of work is the informal world of primary relations, the home and the family. Conflicts between spouses are one form this discharge may take. Child abuse in the form of violent physical outbursts is another.

Here then, we identify once again a triggering context for child abuse on the interpersonal level, which is rooted deeply in societal forces, namely, the alienating quality of our society's economic and productive system complemented by the culturally sanctioned use of physical force in child rearing.

The final causal dimension of child abuse on the interpersonal level in the home and in child care settings is intra-psychic conflicts and various forms of psycho-pathology on the part of perpetrators. Child abuse literature is largely focused on this dimension and thus little needs to be said here to document it. However, what needs to be stressed is the fact that psychological disturbances and their manner of expression are not independent factors but are deeply rooted in, and constantly interact with, forces in the social environment of the disturbed individual. To the extent that psycho-pathology is not rooted in genetic and biochemical processes, it derives from the totality of the life experiences of the individual which are shaped by continuous interactions between the person and his social setting, his informal and formal relations in primary and secondary contexts. However, not only the etiology of intra-psychic conflicts and disturbances is conditioned, in part, by social forces, but also the manner in which these conflicts and disturbances are expressed in social relations is very much culture-bound. The symptoms of emotional disturbance and mental illness are not randomly generated phenomena, but derive from normal behavioral traits in a culture. These normal traits appear in exaggerated or negated forms in behavior which is considered deviant, neurotic, and psychotic. Hence, one may assume that in a society in which the use of physical force in general, and toward children in

particular, is not sanctioned, intra-psychic conflicts and psychopathology would less often be expressed through violence against children. It follows from these considerations that the "battered baby" syndrome and other forms of child abuse which are associated with psychological disturbances of one kind or another, are not independent of societal forces, although the perpetrators of these acts may be emotionally ill individuals. We are thus again led to the conclusion that abusive acts and conditions, irrespective of the level of manifestation, cannot be understood in terms of one specific causal dimension, but only in terms of complex interactions among the several causal dimensions sketched in this section.

Primary Prevention

According to a general conceptual model, primary prevention proceeds from identification toward elimination of the causal contexts from which specified, undesired phenomena derive. It needs to be realized that the prevention of undesired phenomena may result also in the elimination of other phenomena whenever such other phenomena derive from, or are part of, the same causal context. The likelihood of simultaneous prevention of several phenomena could lead to serious dilemmas in situations when some of the phenomena are desired, while others are considered undesirable, or when groups in a society differ in their respective evaluation of the desirability of the several phenomena. Decisions concerning primary prevention of social phenomena and of "social problems" are thus essentially political choices.

Turning now to the primary prevention of child abuse, we may begin by summarizing our conclusions so far. Child abuse, conceived of as inflicted deficits on a child's right to develop freely and fully, irrespective of the source and agents of the deficit, was found to occur on several related levels: on the interpersonal level in the home and in child-care settings, on the institutional level through the policies and practices of a broad array of child care, educational, welfare, and correctional institutions and agencies, and on the societal level, where the interplay of values and social, economic, and political institutions and processes shapes the social policies by which the rights, and the existential realities of all children, and of specific groups of children are determined. The causal dimensions of child abuse are, first of all, the dominant social philosophy and value premises of a society, its social, economic, and political institutions, and the quality of human relations to which these institutions, philosophy and values give rise; other causal dimensions are the social construction of childhood and the social definition of children's rights, the extent to which a society sanctions the use of force in general and, more specifically, in the child rearing context, stress and frustration resulting from poverty and from alienation in the work place which may trigger...
abusive acts, and expressions of intra-psychic conflicts and psychopathology which in turn are rooted in the social fabric. While child abuse, at any particular level, may be more closely related to one rather than another causal dimension, none of these dimensions are independent, and they exert their influence through multiple interactions with each other.

This analysis suggests that primary prevention of child abuse, on all levels, would require fundamental changes in social philosophy and value premises, in societal institutions, and in human relations. It would also require a reconceptualization of childhood, of children's rights, and of child rearing. It would necessitate rejecting the use of force as means for achieving societal ends, especially in dealing with children. It would require the elimination of poverty and of alienating conditions of production, major sources of stress and frustration which tend to trigger abusive acts toward children in adult-child interaction. And, finally, it would necessitate the elimination of psychological illness. Because of the multiple interactions among the several causal dimensions, progress in overcoming the more fundamental dimensions would also reduce the force of other dimensions. Thus, transforming the prevailing inequitarian social philosophy, value premises, and institutions - and the kind of human relations they generate - into egalitarian ones would also result in corresponding modifications of children's rights, elimination of poverty and alienation at work, and rejection of the use of force. It would indirectly influence psychological wellbeing, and would thus eliminate the processes which now trigger child abuse in interpersonal relations.

Effective primary prevention requires working simultaneously toward the transformation of all the causal dimensions. Fragmented approaches focused on one or the other causal dimension may bring some amelioration, but one should entertain no illusions as to the effectiveness of such piecemeal efforts. Even such important and necessary steps as outlawing corporal punishment in schools and other child care settings would have only limited, though highly desirable results. There simply is no way of escaping the conclusion that the complete elimination of child abuse on all levels of manifestation requires a radical transformation of the prevailing unjust, inequitarian, irrational, competitive, alienating and hierarchical social order into a just, egalitarian, rational, cooperative, humane, and truly democratic, decentralized one. Obviously, this realization implies that primary prevention of child abuse is a political issue which cannot be resolved through professional and administrative measures.

Primary prevention of child abuse would result also in the prevention of other, equally undesirable and equally inevitable consequences or symptoms of the same causal context, including many
manifestations of social deviance. However, it would also result in the complete transformation of the prevailing social, economic, and political order with which large segments of our society are either identified or drifting along, because this order conforms to their accustomed mental sets, and because they seem reluctant, due to inertia, to search actively for alternative social, economic, and political institutions which might be more conducive to human fulfillment for all. Some or many members of our society may even be consciously committed to the perpetuation of the existing order, not realizing how destructive that order may be to their own real interests.

Whatever one's attitude may be toward these fundamental political issues, one needs to recognize and face the dilemmas implicit in them and, hence, in primary prevention of child abuse. If one's priority is to prevent all child abuse, one must be ready to part with its many causes, even when one is attached to some of them, such as the apparent blessings, advantages and privileges of inequality. If, on the other hand, one is reluctant to give up all aspects of the causal context of child abuse, one must be content to continue living with this social problem. In that latter case, one ought to stop talking about primary prevention and face the fact that all one may be ready for is some measure of amelioration.

Research

In concluding this essay on the nature and prevention of child abuse from a holistic perspective, some observations seem indicated on implications for research. Research, to be meaningful in a social sense, should derive from socially meaningful issues and should pursue imaginative hypotheses aimed at solving these issues. Far too often, scarce research resources seem to be wasted on essentially irrelevant studies which explore insignificant, fragmentary issues and pedestrian hypotheses, often with the aid of highly sophisticated research technology. These critical comments on the state of social research apply to a large part of past and present research on child abuse and its prevention.

The discussion in this essay of the levels of manifestation and the causal dimensions of child abuse does suggest a series of socially meaningful issues which could be addressed through social research. Likewise, the discussion of primary prevention of child abuse suggests one comprehensive hypothesis which could be explored and tested by means of properly designed research. The issues to be investigated are the validity of the causal model of child abuse and its several dimensions and their multiple interactions. The hypothesis concerning primary prevention states that societies which overcame the causal dimensions of child abuse identified in this essay would gradually free themselves of child abuse. These issues and
this hypothesis could be explored cross-culturally, historically, and experimentally. One could search for past and present societies and communities, whose philosophy, value premises, societal institutions, and human relations are relatively free of the posited causal dimensions of child abuse, and one could examine whether the incidence of child abuse on all levels of manifestation is indeed lower in these societies than in our own. Alternatively, one could stimulate and facilitate the emergence of communities organized on principles that preclude the hypothesized causal context of child abuse, and one could then observe whether the incidence of child abuse on all levels would decrease over time, and eventually cease altogether.

Less ambitious approaches to research are, of course, possible. However, if social research should guide us toward primary prevention, it needs to be designed around a causal model and a hypothesis concerning approaches to the elimination of the causal dimensions. Other types of research can guide only toward some form of amelioration, which may be all one is ready to engage in and which, of course, may have some utility as long as it is not misrepresented as a contribution to primary prevention.

Choices of foci for research turn out to be related to a scholar's fundamental social and political outlook, in the same way as attitudes towards primary prevention were shown to be essentially political. A researcher who accepts the prevailing social order is likely to select topics for study which will not threaten or challenge that order. On the other hand, a researcher who is committed to social justice for all, and who conceives of social science as a tool in the struggle for human liberation, will not hesitate to conduct studies of alternative social patterns and life styles which may thoroughly challenge prevailing assumptions, and which hold promise for a human existence freed of the many injustices of the prevailing social order, of which child abuse is merely one.

Note: This essay is based on the following books by the author and on a paper presented on June 17, 1974 at a conference on Child Abuse and Neglect at the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development.


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ETHICS SHOCK: TECHNOLOGY, LIFE STYLES AND FUTURE PRACTICE*

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"When you don't know where you are going, any road will take you there."  
Old Saying

During the past ten years a new movement has developed in the United States which has taken as its major emphasis the study of the future. The futureologists led by Kahn, Weiner, and Theobald, have projected a number of alternatives for the United States. The value of this movement has been: 1) to alert the country to the fact that change is occurring at an extremely rapid pace; 2) to provide a transdisciplinary view, not only utilizing projections from various disciplines, but illustrating the multiplier effect that the combination of developments from many disciplines may have on our society; and 3) to illustrate that we can, if we wish, and if we act soon enough, influence the change.

The purpose of this paper is to examine selected changes from the vast visions of possible change, most likely to have impacts on society which will have to be taken into account by social work. How will these changes influence our profession? And, what techniques and approaches will our profession have to construct in order to deal with the changes taking place? If we do not prepare, we too will find ourselves in shock - reacting on the spur of the moment, reeling without plan, purpose, professional means or goals to guide us. Weightless, we will drift, seeking a role in a


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society which needs help, but in which we make no impact. Clearly this would constitute failure to meet our professional responsibilities. We shall conclude by examining the potential of the ethical code of the profession as a source of guidance in dealing with these dilemmas and questions. In evaluating the code we shall consider the extent to which it meets the standards set in other areas for achieving a cognitive base for action. We shall propose that steps be taken to make it more scientific.

1. The Changing Quality of Life

Let us look first at the predictions in that broad area called "life styles." Currently in our country the fertility rate is below the replacement level because: 1) there are many more single women; 2) people are marrying at a later age; 3) more women and men are changing work styles; 4) people are more concerned with population problems; 5) abortions and abortion laws have been liberalized; 6) contraception has gained wider acceptance; and 7) not having children has come to be accepted.

The reduction of the importance of procreation has already had an important impact on human relations. Since 1960, the divorce rate has increased 80%. Marriage as an institution has been questioned by social critics including anthropologist Margaret Mead and psychologist Carl Rogers. Numerous plans for alternative marriage, or non-marriage contracts have been proposed; as divorce becomes more available or even an unnecessary formality, and as living together without marriage becomes normal, our concept of human sexual association may change. There will be many forms of marriage in the future, suggests Jessie Bernard, because people will continue to seek permanent intimate relationships. But the existence of many options may create mental health hazards. As the major function of procreation is downgraded, and in fact, not having children rewarded, permanent human links may cease, and heterosexual relations decrease.

The increase of child care centers at work, university, shopping centers suggests that more and more child-raising may become a non-family venture. Since there is likely to be more restriction on child-bearing, and therefore fewer children, the "community's" interest in children will increase. They will be the community's children, for the community may have selected which family would have "its" children. Radical change in family life style seems inevitable, and the social work profession will have to be prepared to be helpful to people without the human resources provided by the family.

Although locally our population is stabilizing, we can't ignore the drastic prospects of a world population explosion. A population doubling every thirty-five years, food production which can't possibly keep up, and a world with diminishing energy resources. The Limits To Growth does predict the end of our way of life if drastic steps are not taken. Population control is a major factor which must be dealt with. Yet, universally
the values of sub-groups immobilize most of the efforts to introduce the drastic steps that would be necessary to limit population.

It seems unlikely that the profession's concern with the poor will be made less problematic by the future. S. M. Miller in The Future of Inequality notes that "... the economy, if left to itself, will not lead to inequality reduction. Only deliberate public polity can lead to greater equality." The single most important factor will be a high employment rate. He points out, "... it is unlikely that the more well-to-do will support ... compensatory programs for the poor." Poverty will still be here and the gaps between rich and poor may widen.

At the same time, a major impact on life styles is the demands of women for equal rights. This will influence marriage contracts, child rearing practices, the job market and certainly both men and women's image of themselves and all this can mean to culture and life in our country. For example, will there by anything considered a "women's profession?" Will women only search out women doctors? Will men stay at home and bring up the children, etc.? It will be important for "little boys to learn to lose to little girls" and for little girls to learn there are other ways to achieve fulfillment than through maternity.

It is also important to note that by 2001, fifty percent of the people in the United States may be over the age of fifty. There will be a shrinking of the youth base and functional age will become more important than chronological age. The roots of future social problems which will confront social workers will grow out of the changing Nature of the quality of life.

2. The New Technologies

One of the most significant man-made technological developments, and one of the most awesome in recent history, has been the development of the computer. Its influence and its potential will touch almost all of us in many areas of our lives. We have all accepted its use to eliminate the paper work of banks, businesses and telecommunications. We have started to get concerned, however, about matters of confidentiality and how national and even international groups might misuse confidential material. A nationwide study of this problem has recently been completed. It notes that confidentiality has not been misused as yet, but that this is a potential danger.

There is, however, a "wonderful world of computers" which is being used to monitor hospital patients, diagnose and treat ailments, counsel students and job applicants, interview psychiatric patients, search out information, build highways, fly planes, land rockets on the moon and even play monopoly. Some of these developments, however, have displaced people
and created areas of unemployment. They tend to devalue human work and depersonalize human relations. Our profession needs to be prepared to offer people ways to achieve meaning and significance for themselves and their activities.

No discussion of new technologies would be complete without some exploration of potential developments in biology. Some scientists have claimed that they are now able to tell the sex of the unborn child early enough for the parents to decide whether or not they have a child of the desired sex, but others are developing techniques which will permit you to decide in advance which sex you prefer. The probable molding of future people "to order" is not an impossibility through a number of processes. Techniques to modify the I.Q., by either surgery or drugs, are in various experimental stages. Gene control and modification is an area of concern to mental health groups dealing with the retarded, the handicapped, and the mentally ill. For example, note this statement of a new ethic for the future by a former president of the American Association for the Advancement of Science:

No parent will in that future time have a right to burden society with a malformed or a mentally incompetent child.'

Control, however, is also of interest to groups interested in developing elites, or warriors, or workers. Think of the high division of labor of ants, for example, and project those possibilities onto planned human engineering.

Some of the most controversial developments, however, are related to the fact that sexual intercourse may no longer be necessary to have children. Many types of plans to raise the fetus, with or without a mother, in or out of the mother, with or without a father, are imaginable and are already being attempted in various laboratories throughout the world, and may be implemented within the next thirty years. Asexual reproduction is possible through cloning. Cloning permits the production of countless numbers of identical individuals from the same parents. Thus says Time Magazine "... the future could offer such phenomena as a police force cloned from cells of J. Edgar Hoover." 3

3. Behavior Control

To the minds of many writers, social workers have been involved in social control since they started using some of their counseling techniques with people. This is certainly the position of Perry London, who in his book, Behavior Control, argues that psychotherapy is a major effort at behavior control. 10 Historians would add, no doubt, that the Charity Organization Movement was the first scientific attempt on the part of
social workers to utilize behavior control techniques, prior to the development of non-directive counseling. London sees non-directive counseling as just one end of a continuum of control techniques with behavior modification further along the line, but part of the same stream.

We have generally favored "weak" controls, but "behavior modification" programs have favored stronger, more specific treatment, and the potential of the new "new technology" has opened new vistas in the area of "strong" controls. Although drugs have been used to modify individual behavior for centuries, new potentials for large scale control are suggested by psychologists such as Kenneth Clark, who proposed the use of drugs on our national leaders to "assure their positive use of power and reduce or block the possibility of their using power destructively." The new potentials include: psychosurgery techniques which are seen as a generally irreversible attack on the human brain - bringing to mind the infamous lobotomies, but emerging in this new scientific guise. Peter Breggin, a Washington psychiatrist, in reference to psychosurgical practices, says:

If America ever falls to totalitarianism, the dictator will be a behavioral scientist and the secret police will be armed with lobotomy and psychosurgery.

Although psychosurgery is meeting with increased resistance, it may yet emerge through efforts of crime fighters. The recent controversy over the proposed brain surgery of a murderer-rapist in Detroit is a case in point. But no less a therapist than Jerome Frank has advanced psychosurgery to control deviant behavior. Our profession must find ways to evaluate every type of therapy if it is to meet its responsibility to offer effective, ethical, human services to people in the future.

A less dramatic approach, but perhaps even more ominous are the experiments with brain implants. Aggressiveness can be reduced and these hostile actions controlled by oneself through a portable console unit, or by others through radio control. But aggressiveness can be induced as well. We could signal people to be aggressive or brave, and we could control large groups of people through programs monitored by computers. Although these experiments have generally been limited to lower forms of animal life, some trials have been attempted on humans.

It is also possible, of course, to have self-stimulating electrodes, these have even been used to control epileptic attacks and sleeping sickness. One can easily imagine people in the future, says Rosenfeld ..., wearing self-stimulating electrodes which might render the wearer sexually potent at any time; might put him into a sleep or keep him awake; ... that might curb his appetite; ... that might relieve him of pain; that might give him courage...
4. The Pursuit of Ethical Practice

Let us pursue the implications of some of these changes for our profession and test our own value choices. A great many of our clients will be:

1. Aged people who will feel their life is non-productive.
2. Women who feel role-less. They will be childless and husband-less. They will have been educated away from maternity, but with computer technology there may not be meaningful jobs for them either.
3. Men whose roles are modified by changes in women's roles and computer technology.
4. Those who cannot subordinate their individual ego to the group ego in ways required by the community's depersonalizing and de-humanizing "strong" controls.
5. Isolated persons who have no family or group. This will form the greatest number of our clients and it will call for the development of many more group treatment techniques, and temporary communities like those already being introduced, i.e., gestalt, reality therapy, transactional analysis, and synanon.
6. Those in need of genetic counseling.

Let us briefly look at some of the ethical decisions that may create some "shock" for us in the future. If we were to make decisions based on our current level of practice, and our current professional ethical code, how would we respond to the following?

- Having to carry out your welfare agency's policies, forbidding a family to have more than two children.
- Helping a volunteer agency board determine a policy as to whether embryos should be implanted in an unmarried mother or a lesbian who wants to have a child.
- Counseling young people into "specified" positions because that is a government priority for the next ten years.
- Deciding whether to recommend electrode implants for a parolee who does not seem to be responding to more traditional therapeutic approaches.

How can our profession prepare itself for intelligent professional actions in a world which may have values very much different from those we now hold dear?

An ethical code serves as a guide to practice based on the values and the knowledge of a particular profession. Although there is always some balance between the decisions we make based on our professional values and knowledge and our feelings, the stronger the knowledge base, the more that knowledge is likely to influence our decision and our ethical code.
An examination of the NASW's critique and guide to the Social Worker's Code of Ethics illustrates how "flexible" a beginning profession's attempts to insure client protection may be. It cloaks a minimal amount of knowledge in yards of velvet value statements. A lawyer, Robert C. Oberbilling, at an institute on technology and social work, expressed concern with "the failure of social workers to develop a comprehensive code of professional responsibility." He was aware of our code and adds,

The profession of social work has yet to discipline itself as to its ethical responsibilities ... For example, it would be unethical for me to accept employment by a board of a legal aid society that in fact attempts to direct how I should practice law on behalf of my client.16

The ethics of legal practice are clear because they are spelled out in specific terms which make possible clear judgments in concrete cases.

Two problems related to ethical decision making will plague us in the future: 1) the discrepancy between the development of our values and the development of our knowledge; and 2) the discrepancy between our professional values and those of the broader society.

Just as different countries react differently to technological change, due to their different levels of development, cultural heritages and their different needs and capabilities, so too professions will vary in their ability to accept and utilize technological innovations. The difference in the speed with which the medical profession has utilized computer techniques, contrasts sharply with that of the social work profession. A number of medical journals have been available related to computer use in medicine for years and they offer some observations of value to us. For example, within the allied medical professions, attitudes toward computer use is different for nurses and doctors, students and interns. Age seems to be a factor, but it is important to note that acceptance or rejection of the potential technology is not so much related to its usefulness as it is to the attitudes of groups which might make potential use of the innovation.

People's attitudes are reflected in their values; and values are reflected in choices. A profession must order its values in relation to the choices that are open to it. If my decision as to what techniques to use in helping people is restricted to either non-directive counseling or assertive approaches, the ordering is simpler than if it is opened to include behavior modification, gestalt, drug therapy and psychosurgery. In the latter case, I need not only reorder my priorities, but I must have a systematic way to explore and to come to terms with my own values and the profession's values given these new options.
Not only will our values influence what choices we accept, but the choice will depend on the foreseeable consequences of those choices. For that reason, not only must the profession assume a systematic approach to evolving its ethical code, but it must involve itself in long range planning and assessment. It cannot develop a code based on the current values and professional level. Experiences with technological change suggest that new innovations, if accepted, tend to replace earlier techniques entirely. This may mean that new methods of social change are already replacing our more traditional ways of helping.

The Social Work Code of Ethics evolved from accumulations of practice wisdom tied to the Rousseauian tradition of perfectability of man through reconstruction of the environment. The Code gives unqualified support to personal autonomy and reflects our humanistic disposition to view self determination as a paradigmatic law. Social work theoreticians mirror this orientation and at times our practice even carries out this belief. But there are also practice models within the social work profession based on a Hobbsian belief that man needs to be controlled and his personal autonomy limited as individual choice could be destructive to the individual and/or society.

These two philosophies, Rousseau vs. Hobbs, or Autonomy vs. Control, provide philosophically extreme models of social work. A dialectical tension between self determination and the collective good exists within the organizational structures of society in which social work functions are carried on. For although the profession is committed to respect the autonomy of its clients, child welfare workers will recommend removal of a child from parents who abuse and neglect their children; in correction systems, probation officers (often social workers) clearly limit the autonomy of the client; in public assistance programs, social workers prescribe specific behaviors for clients; in mental health settings, social workers limit many of the choices of the clients. In each of these settings, for good or for evil, social workers' ethical decisions have been based on what they thought, believed or felt, or on what the agency thought or believed was for the good of the client, agency, or society.

These decisions come out of practice wisdom, political expediency, and human uncertainty. The discomfort and anxiety associated with these ethical dilemmas frequently pushes social workers to becoming more zealous agents of social control. On the other end of the pole, social workers have encouraged individualistic behavior, creating problems for the social institutions and individual clients which are parallel to the state of ambiguity within the social worker. As we move into the future, ethical dilemmas involving conflicts between individual autonomy and social good will become increasingly exacerbating as the situations we confront become more complex.
Opportunities for choice in specific areas may become limited. In "The Tragedy of the Commons," Garrett Hardin shows how free choice in the use of a "commons" leads to its destruction.

As a rational being, each herdsman seeks to maximize his gain.17

As an egoist I think if I can add one more cow to the ten I already graze on the commons, I tend to gain all the profits I already enjoy plus one. Since the negative effects of overgrazing are shared by all, the negative utility for me in the short run is only an indiscernible fraction of that damage done to the commons by my one extra cow. I still enjoy a temporary net gain.

Hardin relates this clearly to population control but also shows how man's egotistic approach can only be regulated "by mutual coercion mutually agreed on." The freedom to breed freely, for example, cannot be permitted if we hope to maintain a life of dignity for the future. The ethical problem for social workers is clear: Can we support the right of choice for the number of children people want to have, or will we be guided by the good of the group? Hardin writes:

To couple the concept of freedom to breed with the belief that everyone born has an equal right to the commons is to lock the world in a tragic choice of action.18

These ethical problems are on the horizon; conflicts between confidentiality and the need to share information; conflicts between autonomy and the need to control individual behavior; conflicts between free choice and the need to limit the use of resources. How do we choose? Can we protect individual autonomy, or are we to become agents of strong social control? Or is our thrust properly towards maintaining the stance that each individual must have the right to decide individually how many children they will have, whether they will use what drugs, whether their confidences will be kept, and even whether they live or die. Von Neuman and Morgenstern state that it is not mathematically possible to maximize for two or more variables at the same time. We cannot maximize both individual autonomy and social utility. We must seek one, the other, or the proper common ground between individual rights and the social needs. Before we prematurely make a judgment, let us consider how we would view a worker who has referred a young man to a "gay liberation" group in 1940, 1960, now, and 1984. Hardin has also argued that how we view the morality of an act is a function of the state of the social system at the time.

We are already experiencing ethical shock in our profession in a very specific way. Our Code is not an adequate instrument for making the best decisions in situations emerging from forces of technological and social
change. Certainly it has functioned as a guideline for social work in the past, but it will not serve us in our future. The future will demand from social workers a more scientific stance towards decision making. As the world changes our old ways of coping or understanding need to change as well.

Dilemmas require hard analytical work. Behavior modification for some social workers is an anathema to the ethic of self determination, but seen by others as helpful to the individual and very beneficial to the community. The decision to use a particular therapy requires a scientific method of analysis. The scientific mode requires us to examine dilemmas from an objective, rather than ideological framework. This is not to say that we suspend our values, rather it is to suggest that we engage in ethical decision-making in a way that produces the "most correct" answer. Behavior modification then needs to be investigated by the profession in a hard scientific way, so that we can decide if it can be incorporated in an ethical practice model. As Robert Louis Stevenson said, "The truth that is suppressed by friends is the readiest weapon of the enemy."

The history of science, as interpreted by Kuhn, reveals that a new scientific paradigm is built when the older paradigm is unable to deal with the anomalies confronting it. At this point in history, a struggle ensues between the holders of the older paradigm and those of the new. The "traditionalists" continue to try to make the anomalies fit into the old paradigm, while the revolutionaries are using empirical ways to demonstrate the validity of the new model. Eventually, the traditional paradigm is dropped, and the scientists then accept the new paradigm. This is called revolutionary science.

Our code of ethics can, in a loose way, be perceived as a paradigm for ethical decision making. It is a weak guide because it is dated, ambiguous, lacks a statistical base, and does not give explicit guides for decisions relating to individual autonomy vs. collective good. Thus we are continually faced with situations which we must view as anomalous if we are to continue to look to the Code for guidance. The prospects of the future confront us with the prospects of even more anomalies for which traditional social work ethics no longer are adequate. Can a Code which cannot deal with present anomalies possibly deal with those of the future?

The pieces of the puzzle do not fit together any longer. Social work research consistently points out our lack of success in treatment and this implies we are faced with a new set of phenomena which our traditional paradigm cannot incorporate, our practice does not perform. The future is upon us, and our social work scientists need to recognize and accept that our old paradigm is no longer functioning and is incapable of dealing with new problems.
Kuhn suggests that it is the young people, or those new to the profession, that are instrumental in changing and developing the new paradigm. Perhaps some of the social work profession is viable and lively enough to engage in new social alterations. If our resistance impedes us rather than causes us to ask questions, hard questions, we shall no longer have a valid profession.

Never Do One Thing

Hardin maintains we must take a systems view of our life and activities on this "spaceship earth." Decisions that are made must be weighed in terms of the survival of our spaceship. If we take the matter of "choice to breed" for example, in a time when there is evidence that the population increase is a realistic danger to humanity, there cannot be a right to have as many children as you want. At a time when it was important to have population growth there was no limit that needed to be set. If we look at abortions as another example, we see that it may be indeed ethical to permit abortions at a time when the population is too large; and indeed, unethical when there is a threat of extinction. The concept proclaimed by the Women's Liberation Movement, for example, that "A woman should have the right to do what she wants with her body" is obviously only true under certain situations. What policies best suit our actual situation need to be considered in light of the individual's needs and the context of these in the total community environment.

Confidentiality presents ethical dilemmas. At what point is the secret between therapist and client too dangerous to withhold? We have seen patients confide a desire to kill who go out and kill a few people a week later. Or consider the case of the adolescent, confiding to the therapist that he intends to kill himself; what are our guidelines to be?

A test run with a case should be of help here. A young man tells a social worker that he is thinking about committing suicide. He originally asked the social worker if he could depend upon him to keep this information confidential. The social worker, perceiving the young man under stress, agreed. Now then, should the worker seeking consultation share the information with his supervisor? One possibility, of course, may be to talk in general terms about a Mr. X. Shall the social worker notify the client's family? The counsellor at the school that he is attending?

We might turn to the Code for help. In the Code, Principle 1:

I regard my first obligation to the individual or group served, which includes action for improving social conditions

is clustered with Principle 4:
I respect the privacy of the people I serve.

and Principle 5:

I use in a professional manner information gained in professional relationships.

One difficulty involved is in deciding which principle is more correct under what circumstances. How does the worker know which principle supersedes the other? Or for that matter, what are the true meanings of the principle? Would it be unethical to be "unethical" in an attempt to save his life? In this case we might be more concerned with good practice, but what is it?

A Framework

What we need is a framework for ethical decision making related to good practice. It might naturally start with many of the principles on which our profession is founded but would include a number of other basic items as well. One might be Frankel's suggestion that "... a decision is responsible when the man or the group that makes it has to answer for it to those who are directly or indirectly involved." That helps the professional understand what part he is playing in the system. It helps pinpoint his accountability as well as his utility. This basic concept might also help us recognize our interrelatedness on spaceship earth. There are no decisions that we make that do not influence countless others.

Another basic ingredient of our ethical framework might be the analysis of hundreds of practice incidents in which there were ethical questions or decision involved. These would serve as codified "real life" data which describe not only the practice but the results of the decision. Through this collection of evidence we might have some measure to assess the "best" ethical decisions for specific issues. At least it will give us some clues as to probability of success based on precedents. A computer could handle the processing of this data for us. With this type of information we would be in a position to know what risk of suicide is taken in preserving confidentiality and what the likelihood of prevention is through a breach of confidentiality. For we would have a rich cognitive base for comparison. We could even present this evidence to our clients so that they can be helped to make better decisions.

This is what ethical decision making means - submitting the problem to the tests of scientific reality. This means maximizing the number and variety of cases that we have available to us for comparison with the case being decided. It also means maximizing the number and variety of persons who agree in decisions of the type we are making. It means taking into
account all the evidence available, and seeking support for our decision from ethical theory. We could make an immediate improvement in the social worker's code of ethics by rooting it in discussions of actual cases that seem to fit the principles of the code well, and cases that are problematic, given the code. The NASW's critique of the Code discusses only typical cases. It's cases are undocumented and not capable of reexamination. Needless to say, the process of grounding the principles of the Code in actual cases would require modification of the code, and discussion of the hierarchical ordering of the principles in cases of conflict. These two steps, modification and hierarchical ordering, would be first steps toward a Code adequate for actual cases because it was tested out against actual cases. Systematic long term reevaluation and reconstruction of the Code and of ethical practice would require the participation of every member of the profession. Problematic cases would have to be made available to the best critical evaluation the profession can offer. For this to happen, social workers would have to take responsibility for upgrading the quality of their reporting to their professional community. The future imperative is to raise the level of our commitment by raising the cognitive status of our ethical processes.

Doubts may be held about the capability of the profession to use its knowledge of values to influence the direction of social change in a positive way. The ability of a profession to do this is enhanced by a strong knowledge basis. The medical profession has been successful in lobbying for mass innoculations and other public health measures partly because their proposals had solid cognitive backing.

Perhaps a good beginning is to urge social work educators to take seriously the teaching of ethics. The purpose of teaching ethics would include the socialization of students to the profession, learning the best values and providing students with methodological tools embedded in scientific methodology. Ethics needs to have the same status as courses in human behavior, social practice, or social welfare. Ethics needs to be moved off the esoteric shelf into the pragmatic world of active scholarship and professional responsibility.

Some fear that scientific ethical decision making would replace our value of humanity. The contrary is true. Scientific decision making is truly humanistic. It permits us to make decisions that are genuinely ethical, and permits the client to make real choices. It truly licenses us to serve humanity in the best professional manner. (There is no relationship between a more scientific approach to ethical decisions and a hasty introduction of semi-scientific results from the social sciences into social practice.)

The future professional will not only have to develop an effective ethical code, but he will have the additional task of advocating his code
in the face of growing technological advances and pressures to adopt these advances in his practice with people. Only the achievement of clear ethical agreements in the social work profession can hold welfare decision-makers accountable when they are under the pressures of political expediency and technological change.

Footnotes


7 The New Biologies, p. 37.

8 See for example, Leon R. Kass, "Making Babies - The New Biology and the 'Old Morality,'" The Public Interest.

9 Time Magazine, April 19, 1971, p. 45.


11 Psychology Today, January 1972, p. 84.


The grants economy concept thus combines in a brilliant form political and psychological dimensions which need to be understood in analyzing social welfare. A battery of statistical and econometric tools may be used. Those who are interested in the issue of coercion and social control have a new handle.

So far as the "self-interest" concept is concerned, the use of this as an explanatory device has long been discarded by economists. However, as Keynes once pointed out, our thinking tends to be dominated by the ideas of long-defunct economic thinkers.


x Solid lines represent tangibles; broken lines intangibles.

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THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF SMALL GROUPS:
RELEVANCY OF SOCIAL WORK PRACTICE WITH GROUPS

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Inclusion from the social sciences to broaden the knowledge base of social work is an accepted fact. In the professions' experience with group practice such reliance is not new, and extends at least to the efforts of Coyle who saw the usefulness of the small group field in social psychology as early as 1930.1 More recently, Hartford's book provides a text which bridges small group theory and social work practice with groups. 2 An examination of diverse conceptualizations of group practice reveals differential reliance upon small group findings.3

As the small group is increasingly chosen as the context and means for change, it would appear that this one major knowledge source from the social sciences, namely, the small group field, should be examined critically. Scarcity of this knowledge is not at issue, but the extent to which it is directly usable in practice for such diverse purposes as: (1) a means for changing individual behaviors; (2) a social unit engaged in neighborhood and/or community development; (3) task units within organizational contexts may be at issue.4

This article examines knowledge generated by the small group field within social psychology which should provide guidelines for continued use of findings, directions and cautions for research in social work, and a sociological perspective from which to view knowledge building efforts within social work. Critiques and consequences of practitioners drawing exclusively from psychoanalytic theory for explanations of phenomena and change strategies for diverse purposes are well known to those who primarily engage in dyadic interaction.5 Given this historical event, a look at the social psychology of the small group field is particularly timely as an initial attempt to develop a spirit of intellectual inquiry at least into one area of imported knowledge.

Using two sets of analytical concepts, the culture of the small group field is described. Findings are presented which suggest that the social context in which a researcher works interacts with and affects the results. Subsequently, certain socio-historical influences are extrapolated which appear to shape knowledge produced by the small group field. Two are selected; namely, the influence of wars and the influence of big business and industry. Relationships between these socio-historical influences and knowledge building in the small group field are examined. Finally, implications are drawn for social work. It is assumed that the genesis of knowledge is socially conditioned, and, as Mannheim suggested, the development of knowledge also is influenced by social processes.6
Culture of the Small Group Field

Leading journals and readers in social psychology were examined with the result that few critiques of knowledge development about small groups were located.\textsuperscript{7} Findings about small groups were found in McGrath and Altman's Small Group Research which analyzed 2,699 small group studies in the period 1910-1959 in the United States.\textsuperscript{8} Forty-nine of the 501 pages were devoted to a description and critique of the field. Interestingly, this section was added after the authors developed a classification system for small group studies; their initial impression from work on a classification system spurred them to a systematic inquiry leading to the critique. Findings presented in this section are based upon a sample of 250 studies. A summary of their work is presented since it provides some data from which social influences may be extrapolated.\textsuperscript{9}

Location and Support. Over 75\% of small group studies in McGrath and Altman's review sample were conducted by researchers affiliated with academic institutions. Some special financial support was acknowledged by over 80\%. Most of these funds came from governmental sources, predominately from parts of the defense establishment. Of all studies, over 50\% were supported by Navy, Air Force or Army funds (in decreasing order of extent of funding). McGrath and Altman speculated that the use of military and other governmental funds to support small group research was more common late in the time period covered than earlier. (The expansion of the total federal budget follows a similar time sequence. It is interesting to note in the Preface of their work, that credit is given to the Behavioral Sciences Division of the Air Force Office of Scientific Research for financial support to the research program resulting in the publication of their text.) Within the armed services, differences appeared between "in-house" as opposed to "extramural" research programs. The Air Force equally funded programs within the two general locations; whereas, the Navy primarily funded extramural programs located in the university settings.

Cottrell presented a paper at a meeting of the American Sociological Society in 1955 as a part of the session on Social Research With Reference to Defense Programs. He discussed the problem of in-house research programs as it related to knowledge building. Three major points were made which appear relevant today.

1. The productivity of research imagination and planning depends heavily on the conceptual climate within which it occurs.

2. There is a problem in planning a systematic, coherent research program when there exists an unintelligible allocation of the responsibility among various agencies of the government. Each agency carries its own budget and scientific research problems in this field. Scientific research problems cannot be cut and bent to fit bureaucratic budgets.

3. It is difficult to build upon and expand current knowledge in the field by those outside of government, since government
research findings are not immediately available when classified as secret.10

Rate of Production. Within the period examined (1910-1959), a sharp rise in the rate of production of small group studies occurred in the 1950's. As judged by the number of studies, the field grew tenfold in this period as compared with the total previous period. McGrath and Altman suggest that the trend has continued.

Research Settings. The experimental laboratory was the dominate setting for the conduct of work. Less than 5% of the studies examined were conducted in natural settings. As Swingle has pointed out, the laboratory social situation is artificially created by the researcher to manipulate variables under conditions of precise control to clearly observe behavior associated with the variables. Therefore, the laboratory situation does not claim nor should be assumed as a miniature simulation of real life social situations. Minimally, this suggests need for knowledge bridges from the experimental culture of the laboratory to the practice social work world.

Theory and Method. Beginning in the late 1940's and 1950's there was a noticeable decrease in emphasis upon theory in favor of methodology. (Important exceptions are found in the work of Thibaut and Kelley, Homans, Festinger and a few others.) Simultaneously, practically no studies were replicated, with the probable consequence of not ruling out false positives in the findings. Few researchers made any attempt to tie their work conceptually to any other work. Increased methodological rigor was in ascendency. This trend appears to have maintained into the decade of the 1960's as predicted, which resulted in more sophisticated designs and statistical analyses through utilization of computer hardware and greater awareness of the potential bias of the laboratory itself, particularly as transmitted through the experimenter.12 Such advances are welcomed by researchers in social work who, it is hoped, will appropriately reflect methodological refinements and use of advanced statistical tests to address the complex and multivariate nature of the phenomena of social practice, for such are only tools for theory development and refinement which will be useful for practice.

Publish or Perish. The norm of publish or perish influences knowledge building since the location of much of the work is carried out by academics in university settings. Publication is an important criterion for promotion and tenure decisions. One effect is heavy demands placed upon journals for article acceptance. It appears that editors have responded by making judgements about the degree of methodological rigor evidenced in the study and favoring those with a high degree. This may result in devaluation of substance vis a vis' method. "Thus paradoxically, our concern with the requirements of the commercial market has led to our emphasis on procedure rather than substance, for it is method, not concepts, that we are selling."13

Methodological rigor as such is certainly not to be devalued. But, as this emphasis is viewed simultaneously with an imbalance in theory building, use of
concepts inadequate or completely without definition, repeated study of the same
phenomenon identified by each researcher with his own label; then it would appear
that indeed theory and method are out of balance. Furthermore, the publish or
perish norm of the university community, quantitatively and not qualitatively
valued, is contributing to this against the university's own self interest in
attainment of a professed fundamental goal--generating and seeking knowledge.
Examination of bibliographies shows that the same study normatively appears in
several published forms; the original research report to the funding agency; paper
presented at a professional meeting; paper later published as a journal article;
and as a chapter in a reader appearing in each subsequent edition. A conclusion
should not be drawn that these criticisms are limited to the small group field; nor
only to social psychology in general or other disciplines, in fact, there is begin-
ing evidence to suggest a similar trend in the profession of social work.

McGrath and Altman suggest that small group researchers, as a result of the
commercialization of their research, engage in the research process in reverse
order; asking first the questions of uniqueness, techniques, methodology, and last
that of problem formulation. Furthermore, "instead of being creative inspired
artist-scientists, we are tending to become (and to breed through students) commer-
cial technicians who apply energy and resources to the production of products
(publications and renewed grants) rather than to the production of stimulating
ideas." 14

McGrath and Altman summarized the criticism of small group researchers by
labeling the values and norms to which they adhere as the "entrepreneurial ethic." 15
This ethic calls for:

1. Quantity at the expense of quality;
2. Rigor of method at the expense of creative
theoretical aspects of science;
3. Research funds at the expense of research ideas.

The entrepreneurial ethic says to the researcher as a creative artist, "paint
what sells. Paint for the highest bidder. Paint as fast and as furiously as you
can. Believe in what you paint. Get a good sales force and an efficient home
office behind you." 15

Ring views social psychology (in which the small group field rests) as domina-
ted by a conceptualization that he labels "fun and games in social psychology"
which is derived from the premise that social psychology ought to be and is a lot
of fun. The latter, however, comes not from the learning but from doing. Clever
experimentation on exotic topics with a zany manipulation seems to be the guaran-
teed formula for success. He suggests that implicit values result in guidelines
which produce this sort of research. Rules for the game are:

1. Experiments should be as flashy and flamboyant as possible.
2. If you can think of an effective manipulation fine; if you can
think of one that is also amusing, even better.
3. If the topic selected for study is itself prosaic, you should reconsider. If you go shead, at least study if cleverly.
4. Never make an obvious prediction.

Findings. Various means were undertaken to examine the findings of small group researchers to locate areas of interest and trends. The following observations were drawn from an examination of research reports, bibliographies, journals, and readers, and critiques of the field. Content analysis of titles of journal reports in a major bibliography was attempted to obtain a frequency count of variables studied. This procedure was abandoned, however since it was determined that major variables were not necessarily identified in the article title. In general, it was found that one or two independent variables are manipulated under controlled conditions and their effects are measured in relationship to a dependent variable in controlled laboratory settings. Most studies utilized college students as subjects. With the exception of Bales' work, few studies utilized examined the internal processes occurring within the groups, since before and after measures are usually obtained and inferences made to explain results.

Under the category of "Characteristics of Group Members," developed by McGratn and Altman, authoritarian attitudes was a popular study variable. Their analysis of this set of studies showed that inconsistent results were obtained in relation to a variety of other variables. Favorable outcome variables were labeled group task, group performance, group productivity and group efficiency. Frequently studied independent variables were group processes of competition and cooperation. Group conflict rarely was studied within a group and dealt with infrequently on an inter-group basis. Leadership was also a study favorite, comparing differences in results around group satisfaction and/or productivity under conditions of authoritarian or democratic leadership modes. This work follows in time the publication of The Authoritarian Personality. Smith comments on the current vogue of research on the risky-shift phenomenon as an example of fads engendered in part, by aspects of graduate training patterns, pressures for publication, and academic advancement that serve a "self-perpetuating priestcraft rather than the advancement of science." The field is described by Ring as being in a state of intellectual disarray; findings are spewing outward rather than building upward into a cumulation of knowledge. He described social psychology as a field composed mainly of frontiersmen, but with few settlers.

Small group studies, then usually have the following characteristics:
1. Highly controlled experiments in laboratory settings.
2. Subjects who are college students;
3. Manipulation of one or two variables with observation of the results on one;
4. Before and after measures with inference as to process;
5. Concepts poorly defined both conceptually and operationally;
6. Minimal attempts to tie concepts into any theoretical
7. Methodological sophistication;
8. Questionable statements of generalization.

Furthermore, examination of the findings in terms of their clustering as to content suggest clear socio-historical influences which are examined in the next section.

Socio-historical Influences

Clusters of interest by small group researchers appear in sequential relationships to certain identifiable historical events. Such a relationship is examined with respect to two selected events—the influence of wars and the rise of big business and industry.

The Influence of Wars. The most well known and comprehensive works immediately from World War II are the volumes of *The American Soldier.* Far less in scope, but noticeable in frequency and directly related to wars, are specific small group studies as exemplified by the following:

"Civilian Morale and the Training of Leaders" (1942)
"Forecasting Officer Potential Using the Leaderless Group Discussion" (1952)
"A Study of Leadership Among Submarine Officers" (1953)
"Social Influence on the Aircraft Commander's Role" (1955)
"Group Norms Among Bomber Crews: Patterns of Perceived Crew Attitudes, 'actual' Crew Attitudes, and Crew Liking Related to Aircrew Effectiveness in Far Eastern Combat" (1956)

As noted earlier, a preponderance of financial support from the federal government and, in particular, the Navy, Air Force and Army sections was found. Here are found examples of the probable interrelationship of historical events, funding support, and knowledge building. Such studies may have provided the basis for asking additional questions which are then pursued in a systematic way. An example is the work of Schein who reported that his conceptual model about the maintenance of social relationships grew out of his studies of Chinese Communist techniques of controlling civilian and military prisoners during and after the Korean conflict. All too often, however, studies appeared to be isolated events rather than as a link opening up new or testing known ideas about small group behavior.

Additional clusterings of interest can be identified which are traceable to the forms of communication and of their content deemed important to a war-time society. Studies related to influencing attitudes and behaviors of people to gain their support to the war effort and/or help them withstand enemy onslaughts can be located. These studies dealt with propaganda, psychological warfare, and brain-washing. Lewin's famous study, comparing the effectiveness of the methods of lecture versus discussion as measured by behavioral change, stemmed from the
scarcity of regular meat cuts. The outcome variable was the number of housewives (gate-keepers) who increased their purchase of less popular but available meat cuts. 24

Reference was previously made to The Authoritarian Personality, which, containing the F (facism) scale among others, was used frequently by small group researchers. This major work itself signals another area of interest. Many efforts were made to examine and explain the Anti-Semitic Behaviors of a mass of people, particularly in Germany, which led to the persecution and annihilation of millions of Jews just prior to and during World War II. In the United States a large body of this work was conducted, often engaged in by German-Jewish refugee scientists. Various attempts were made by social scientists in general and by the small group researchers, in particular, to measure the extent of and knowledge about the development of prejudicial attitudes and behaviors. Initially focused on Jews, the content of the work later focused on blacks. 25 Examples just presented on content categories demonstrate the interrelationship of knowledge building and the pervasive influence of wars.

The Organization Man. The decade of the 1950's has been described in many ways. Characteristics to be dealt with here are some effects of the increase of big business and industry, and the shift of the population to the suburbs from the city. The work of Homans is interesting to examine in time sequence as it appears to shift in content from the influence of war to the influence of the profit-economy period of the decade. Examples which support this trend are:

"The Western Electric Researchers." in Fatigue of Workers: Its Relationship to the Industrial Production. (1941)
"Human Factors in Management" (1946)
"A Conceptual Scheme for the Study of Social Organization" (1947)
"Status Among Clerical Workers" (1952)

It is not surprising, therefore, to find that a work of some theoretical influence upon small group researchers was produced by him in 1958. "Social Behavior as Exchange." 27 Within the context of a capitalistic economy, elementary forms of behavior or, interactions between men in their purest form, are postulated as a system of exchange whereby each person acts rationally to maximize his profit by decreasing costs and increasing rewards. (Profit = Rewards - Costs)

Problems and applications which appear of interest to large corporations are examined by small group researchers. Some examples are: performance in alone and together situations; evaluation of group decisions as against individual decisions in terms of risk-taking and quality; and forms of communication systems in hierarchies. The studies simulate task-oriented groups.

Applied use of small group findings by business through academic consultants and through management consultant firms continues. No attempt will be made to trace the development and influence of what is known as the National Training Laboratory at Bethel, Maine. In brief, however, this organization has influenced both knowledge building and the application of knowledge about small groups. By
the late 1950's and continuing into the 1960's, emphasis was on application instead of research. Through groups variously called process-oriented or sensitivity-training groups improvement of human relations has been the professed goal. An examination of these conceptualizations of group, given their overwhelming support by business can only lead one to suspect that the primary function was to keep workers happy and satisfied in their work so that the corporate machinery would run smoothly and profits would increase. Small group studies which focused on instrumental activity as a means for increasing efficiency as found in earlier periods of time appear to have shifted to an emphasis on the affective aspects of group interaction to accomplish a similar goal.

The move to and the creation of the suburbs by white middle and upper income families drastically altered social relations and it occurred simultaneously with the rise of "the corporation." Criticism of some of the effects was found in songs and in books by writers who pointed to the period as one of conformity. Conformity as a variable of interest in small group research shifted from the dependent variable to the independent variable; that is, studies early in the decade appeared to focus on how to induce conformity and later studies appeared to focus on the effects of conformity upon selected group and individual variables. One could speculate that small group researchers shifted their efforts from gathering data to support the existing social order to a position of criticism of the social order.

No examination of the 1950's should exclude attention to the rise and acceptance of structural-functional sociological theory as developed by Parsons. 28 His central postulate of equilibrium appears highly congruent with the general tenor of the times. The theory influenced the work of Bales whose conceptualization of the group interaction over time, phase shift movement, also rests upon equilibrium. 29 Not to be overlooked, Parsons, Bales, and Homans were colleagues at Harvard University. Their work in totality reflects a climate of ideas of the 1960's.

Technology. Some beneficial effects for small group researchers of developing technology have been more accurate measures of variables, and computer programs for analysis of data which permit inclusion of more than a few variables in each study to provide a greater approximation to real life situations. Smith, however, points out that resulting literature provides us with descriptions of statistical interactions and not of social interactions. 30 It has been argued that the imbalance between methodology and theory has serious knowledge building consequences. No matter how sophisticated the methodology, "research guided by irrelevances can only end up by being irrelevant." 31 It appears that we have methodological sophistication for its own sake in an era when emphasis upon technology is highly valued.

Knowledge produced by small group researchers has been examined within a socio-historical context. No claim is made that this examination was exhaustive in terms of knowledge nor in terms of all socio-historical influences. However, from an examination of the publications derived from the field in relationship to major social influences during one span of time in the United States, a clear interaction
of the two is apparent.

Gergen would argue that such a relationship should be expected, for social psychology is primarily an historical inquiry dealing with social facts that are largely non-repeatable and which fluctuate over time. Therefore, to expect social psychology (and, therefore, the small group field) to accumulate knowledge in the usual scientific sense is erroneous, since knowledge cannot transcend its historical context. If the study of social psychology is primarily an historical undertaking, then he suggests alterations in direction for work, including the small group specialty. One suggested avenue is research which focuses on behavioral stability, from a perspective of a continuum of historical durability. This approach would attempt to identify those processes highly susceptible to historical influence ranging to those more stable social processes. The focus would require suitable different methodologies than those usually employed by the field. Theory building efforts would be required to deal with the interrelation of events over extended periods of time.

A description of the small group field clearly demonstrates influence from sources of funding, location of knowledge building efforts, and norms of the university and professional affiliations. This description suggested that larger social forces were at work. An analysis of content areas was undertaken with their relationship to selected social forces identified within the last three decades. From this examination one can only conclude that an intellect, floating free from social existence, appears not to have created nor developed knowledge in the small group field. Is this to be expected in any field?

Conclusion

A social psychological analysis of the small group field provides cautions in at least two general areas; namely, the validity of the findings and the generalizability of the findings. The selection of problems investigated may primarily be a function of social influences upon the researcher. The findings, therefore, may be invalid due to the social time-boundness of the characteristics of samples studied. For example, findings obtained from Harvard sophomores in 1953 may be invalid for Harvard sophomores twenty years later due to changes in that student population. Additionally, tasks introduced into the experimental situation to provide the content or stimuli to generate the interactions investigated could invalidate findings for later use because of the inherent nature of their obsolescence. Furthermore, relatively recent recognition of the probable influence of the experimenter upon results warrants skepticism. Finally, the larger social context of academic settings within which most experiments were conducted must be examined for possible influences upon investigator/subject interaction (faculty and students) at least in terms of informal communication channels, statuses, and relative power.

From reading Abstracts of Doctoral Dissertations in Social Work, it is apparent that very little research about group practice is conducted as compared with other areas within the profession. Similarly, social work journals publish rel-
atively few reports of research which is in disproportion to the use of groups in practice and to the emphasis upon groups in the graduate professional education of social workers.

The artificial nature of the laboratory setting compared with social work practice phenomena is sufficient to suggest that direct statements of generalization to social work are inappropriate. Attention has been directed to the use of college age subjects. However, it may be profitable to speculate what identifiable subject characteristics were essential to the variables under study and then consider whether or not these characteristics hold for the social work population and problem to be investigated. Research questions may be significant in the small group speciality, but may be essentially ill-conceived for group practice.

Prior analysis of findings highlighted clusters of variables of particular interest. Noticeably lacking in the basic design of the experiments was the inclusion of an influence person who might resemble a social worker. If response to warnings about experimenter effects includes explicit intervener attempts, then a major deficiency for minimal generalization to social work will have been modified. Furthermore, continued use to methodologies which obtain before and after measures to infer internal group processes rather than direct observation and analysis of the internal processes themselves, may not only be invalid, but retards needed knowledge development for the small group field and for applicability to social work.

It is clear that knowledge building through research is required to transform findings from the artificial nature of the laboratory to more nearly replicable social work practice instances. Such a process should maintain methodology in its appropriate place as a tool. It is obvious that importing knowledge from the social sciences into social work should not be engaged in uncritically, but with full awareness of the power and the flaws of each concept or set of ideas. Familiarity and critical examination of the ideas as known in their field of origin is at least a requisite for initial use.

An analysis of the small group field may leave one with a strong repugnance toward the guiding values which are starkly revealed. Silverman wrote that from 1956-1964 little use was made of these findings by social group workers as revealed in a study of the social work literature. Recent popular group practices of the experiencing and "touch and go" variety pay minimal attention to group level concepts except for norm adhering behaviors which are highly valued and stringently enforced. Combined with prior emphasis upon psychoanalytic constructs as applied to groups, the era of reductionism may be in full-flower in group practice in social work. Some would argue that the values implicit in the concepts upon which this form of practice is based are more consonant with social work professed values and, therefore, more "legitimate" knowledge from which to draw. Such pious words, however, need examination in light of recent huckstering by educators and practitioners in social work. The "entrepreneurial ethic" of the social psychologist may be alive and thriving in the "Well-Being Institute" of today. Given that both the genesis and development of knowledge is socially conditioned, then
we must conclude that a sociological analysis of social work—its knowledge base and its practice—would also reveal our social-boundness and hidden values.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

7. Two journals were examined for this specific purpose for the years 1959-1972. These journals, The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, published by the American Psychological Association and Sociometry, published by the American Sociological Association, contained no such articles. They were chosen for examination because of their sponsoring affiliations and because of the high quantity of publication by small group researchers. These two journals accounted for approximately thirty-two percent of the studies cited in journal form as found in A. Paul Hare, Handbook of Small Group Research (New York: The Free Press 1962), References: pp.416-496. The total number of references cited was 1,385. Excluded for purposes of determining the percentage of publication by these two journals were all non-journal references—books, papers, mimeo reports, research reports, monographs, and unpublished doctoral dissertations. The exclusions reduced the reference number to 1,094. Of this number, 133 citations were in Sociometry and 217 in the Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology. It is recognized that the latter journal

9. Ibid., pp. 49-98
13. McGrath and Altman, op. cit., p. 87
14. Ibid., p. 86
15. Ibid., p. 92
16. Ring, op. cit. pp. 116-117
19. Smith, op. cit. p. 92
20. Ring, op. cit., pp. 119-120
24. Kurt Lewin, "Focus Behind Food Habits and Methods of Change," Bulletin National Research Council, 108 (1943), pp. 35-65. (This famous study also appears in most social psychology readers. Given recent meat purchasing experiences, it will be of interest to watch for recurrence of this study in some form.)
25. This work is voluminous. Two examples of its development are cited.
29. Bales and Strodtbeck, op. cit.
30. Smith, op. cit., p. 94
31. McGrath and Altman, op. cit., p. 120
The Myth of a Population Explosion in America: 
Implications for the Social Welfare Profession*

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In the past decade, the concern over a hypothetical "population explosion" has become an increasing preoccupation in growing segments of the American public. Terms such as "standing-room-only-world," "demographic catastrophe," "future doomsday," etc. have become common, and the work of organizations such as Planned Parenthood, Zero Population Growth, and countless other agencies has centered around this supposed threat to continued human existence. Paul and Anne Ehrlich have set forth the general position on "overpopulation" stating: "The explosive growth of the human population is the most significant event in the past million millenia... Mankind itself may stand on the brink of extinction; in its death throes it could take with it most of the other passengers of Spaceship Earth. No geological event in a billion years... has posed a threat to terrestrial life comparable to that of human overpopulation." (Ehrlich and Ehrlich, 1970:cpl)

America's popular literature is similarly filled with such apocalyptic forebodings. Joyce Brothers, in her advice column, is perhaps more subtle than the Ehrlichs, but her position is clear. In response to a question of a reader who wished to know whether having more than two children was selfish, Brothers writes, "Perhaps... the threat of overpopulation continues to be a worldwide problem. If you are sure that you and your husband could enthusiastically care for more than two, a larger family may be right for you. But why not consider adopting an unwanted child?... By adoption you could have the large family you want--and at the same time have the satisfaction of knowing that you are contributing to the solution of a serious problem." (Brothers, 1973:78)

Many other examples of society's concern with the question of population could be cited, but the point has been made. There is little question over the existence of a rampant population explosion, and most

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of the debate centers around possible actions which would stop it. Understandably then, few professionals within the field of social welfare have raised the issue as to whether overpopulation in America is mythical or real. The actions of the profession over the past years have assumed the "a priori" existence of the problem, and the profession's interest has revolved around discovering acceptable measures for alleviating it.

This analysis challenges the assumption of such a population explosion in American society. The authors realize that such a challenge places them among a distinct minority of social scientists, but that is the risk willingly taken, and an attempt will be made to buttress the arguments with both historical and current data which argue that there is no population explosion in American society.

The decline in America's fertility behavior since 1800 serves as a useful starting point. Table 1 presents historical data relevant to the number of children under 5 years of age per 1000 women in the prime child-bearing years (ages 20-44).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Black</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1800</td>
<td>1342</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1810</td>
<td>1358</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1820</td>
<td>1295</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1830</td>
<td>1145</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1840</td>
<td>1085</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1850</td>
<td>892</td>
<td>1087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1860</td>
<td>905</td>
<td>1072</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1870</td>
<td>814</td>
<td>997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1880</td>
<td>780</td>
<td>1090</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>685</td>
<td>930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>666</td>
<td>845</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>631</td>
<td>736</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>604</td>
<td>608</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>506</td>
<td>554</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>419</td>
<td>513</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>587</td>
<td>706</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>469</td>
<td>543</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The data for white women extends back to 1800, for black women to 1850. In both groups there has been large-scale drop in the number of children. For white women the number has dropped from 1342 children per 1000 women in 1800 to 469 per 1000 in 1960; for black women the number has fallen from 1087 per 1000 in 1850 to 543 in 1960. In scanning these data, the reader may note the continual process of fertility decline throughout American history, with the exception of the 1950-1960 data which relate to the World War II baby boom. As will be noted momentarily, the post 1960 data on birth patterns indicate that this temporary rise lasted but a few years (1946-1957) and since then, the process of a long-term secular decline in fertility patterns has reappeared. Consequently this secular decline represents a transition from a large family structure to a smaller one.

The data in Table 2 help illustrate the current trends in America's birth rates which are now the lowest in our entire history surpassing the previous low points which were recorded in the Depression. Table 2 shows that present birth rates have been steadily decreasing since the height of the baby boom (1957). In fact, the decline since 1957 has been rather steep, from 25.2 to our present 1973 rate of 15.0 (see Table 2).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Crude Birth Rate*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>30.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>29.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>27.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>25.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>21.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>18.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>19.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>20.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>23.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>24.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>25.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>25.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>24.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>24.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>23.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>23.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>22.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>21.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>21.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>19.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>18.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>17.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1969 17.8
1970 18.3
1971 17.3
1972 16.4
1973 15.0

* Annual births divided by mid-year population divided by 1000.

Source: Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1972 Table no. 8, p. 10; also various Current Population Reports of U.S. Census Bureau for post 1970 data

It should also be added that America's present population growth rate is virtually below the replacement level. The fertility rate necessary for replacement is 2.11 mean children and the rate for 1973 was 1.90. Hence, the possibility of stable, or even negative growth presents itself. (Schmerck, 1974:1ff)

These data help explain some of the panic in demographic circles, for the rate of 25.2 in 1957, if continued, would have meant that the U.S. population in the year 2000 would have been over 400 million. One observer, Valerie Dillon, discusses this as follows: "It is this projection to which Americans are reacting today. What they haven't yet realized is that a decline since 1957 brought birth rates to their lowest point in American history." (Dillon, 1972:4) Furthermore, the recent decline in our birth rate in the past seven years have resulted in the Census Bureau drastically lowering its estimates of our population in the year 2000. Instead of earlier predictions of our future population at approximately 400 million, the present forecast is in the vicinity of 260-280 million people.

These data on our current birth rate decline are complemented by the data in Table 3 which illustrate the general fertility rate for the nation for specific years since 1935. The general fertility rate is a more powerful measure than the crude birth rate, and it helps amplify the data presented in Tables 1 and 2 (see Table 3).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>General Fertility Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>77.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>79.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>85.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>106.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>118.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>121.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>123.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1958  120.2
1959  120.2
1960  119.1
1961  118.4
1962  113.2
1963  109.4
1964  105.8
1965  97.3
1966  91.8
1967  88.1
1968  86.1
1969  86.2
1970  88.0
1971  81.9
1972  73.4
1973  69.3

* Annual births per 1000 females 15 to 44 years of age.

Source: Statistical Abstracts of the United States, 1972,
Table no. 8:10 and Statistical Abstracts ... 1973,
Table no. 9:11, also annual reports of National Center for
Health Statistics, Census Bureau provided the 1973 figure.

Analyzing these data more closely, it can be noted that there is
general acceptance within demographic circles of the view that the levels
of fertility among various socioeconomic groups in American society are
converging, particularly in view of the noticeable declines in the fer-
tility patterns of the lower-socioeconomic groups. This decline in the
fertility of the lower class in spite of the slight rise in the fertility
of the higher socioeconomic groups has had the impact of considerably
narrowing the historical social class fertility differentials.
(Matras, 1972:323)

The racial differences in American fertility patterns are also
converging. Currently (1970 data) black rates are higher than white rates,
but these differences are partly spurious, if one controls for level of
education. Thus, black fertility is greatest among women with low levels
of education, far more so than white women in the same category. But black
and white women with high school education have about the same level of
fertility. However, the fertility of black female college graduates is
far lower than white female graduates (1.4 mean children vs. 2.1 children
for white females). (Matras, 1973:325)

How does one then explain these decreasing levels of fertility in our
population? Firstly, analyzing census data, it should be stressed that a
far larger proportion of our female population is remaining single than in
previous eras. In 1970, 44% of women at age 21 were single, compared with
35% in 1960. Even more significant is the proportion of women (ages
35-54) with educations beyond college who never marry which, at present,
is approximately 19% (U.S. Census, 1970:Tables 1 and 4). Also of
importance is the later age of marriage for American females, and recent
information from the Census Bureau suggests not only that an increasing
number of American women will remain single, but the remainder will
marry at later ages than earlier age cohorts. (Panic, 1972:8). For
example, 38% of women in 20-24 age groups were single in 1973 compared
to 28% in 1960 (Birth Rates, 1974). In discussing this "fertility
recession" Donald Bogue has said he "finds it impossible to foresee a
chain of developments other than the slow but steady decline of birth
rates. (Birth Rate, 1971:78)

Of equal importance is the number of American women favoring large
families and the data in Table 3 confirm that this number has dropped
considerably since 1967. The projection of a fertility decline is thus
supported by the fact of a decline in number of children wanted by
American women (see Table 4).

Table 4
Percentage of Women in Various Age Groups
Who Wanted Four or More Children 1967 and 1971*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>1967</th>
<th>1971</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) 21 - 29 years old</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) 30 - 49 years old</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) 50+</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) Total</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Gallup Poll, 1971; cited in V. Dillon, "Will the Real Population
Problem Please Stand Up?" East Brunswick, New Jersey: Bureau of
Family Life, Diocese of Trenton, 1972, p. 4.

*A Census Bureau Survey [June 1971] showed that the birth expecta-
tions of young married women declined from previous years. The average
number of total births expected by wives in the 18-39 age bracket was 2.8,
a decline from the 3.1 average reported in a similar survey in 1967; see
MORE: The Interfaces Between Population, Economic Growth and the Environ-
data reported in Social Indicators 1973 (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1974) report that since 1965 the average number of
children expected by Black women (18-24 years) dropped from 3.4 to 2.4,
and from 3.1 to 2.2 for white women.

Consequently, the combination of these factors, more women remaining
single, more women marrying at later ages, the growing number of women
favoring smaller-sized families--suggest that American society is nowhere
near the demographic apocalypse portrayed by a number of respected
publicists. In view of these factors, it can be concluded that Malthusian
brinkmanship thinking can not be validated by current data.

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This decrease in fertility, if sustained, will have a profound impact on America's population, particularly in the dependent age categories (under 15 and over 65). Firstly, the nation will have proportionally fewer children under 15 years of age than in earlier eras. In 1970, for example, there were 15% fewer children than in 1960 in the 5 and under age category, and this trend will be accentuated in future years. Secondly, the fertility decline implies a higher median age for our population; in 1972 it was 28 and this will rise to 38 in the next generation if the present birth rate is sustained in future years. This consequently means that our death rate, which is now 9.4 per 1000 will rise substantially, since the higher ages have higher mortality rates than the lower ones. Thirdly, by 1980 it can be expected that there will be approximately 18% more people in the 65+ age category than in 1970. Fourthly, in relation to our central cities, we can expect lower absolute populations in 1980 than in 1970 because of high out-migration to the suburban ring.

In spite of these factors, critics constantly argue that we are still, as a nation, overpopulated and that the decline in the current birth rate is of minor importance. Thus the nation should be very much concerned with such factors as the future food production of America, the high density so evident in the nation, the industrial pollution created by large populations, etc. Again, it can be argued that these are invalid arguments. Firstly, America's capacity to feed its existing population cannot be seriously questioned. Until very recently a large food surplus had been produced and the cost of merely storing the surplus was staggering. Farmers have been paid, by way of federal subsidy, simply not to grow food! The real problem here is not food production, but its distribution wherein means must be developed to channel surplus food to those in the population who need it (inner city residents, the aged, rural poor, etc.). The internationally-noted agricultural economist Colin Clark says that the U.S. population could continue to increase at its present rate until the year 2000 and still have large food surpluses. (Dillon, 1972:4)

Secondly, the nation is far from overpopulated in relation to its available land area. Table 5 compares America with other nations and the data contained therein confirm that the United States is one of the least densely populated countries with a density of 57 people per square mile (see Table 5).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>Persons per Square Mile</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>710</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Germany</td>
<td>627</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>590</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Essentially, the difficulties here are not related to the density of the nation as a whole, but rather are due to the distribution of our 210 million people. Of these 80% live on 10% of our land, 70% on 2% of the land. Furthermore, a review of the data in Table 6 shows the growth and change in our population distribution since 1950. These data indicate that most of the recent population growth in American metropolitan areas has taken place in what sociologists call the urban "fringe." In fact, since 1960 the population of central cities grew by six percent, while the contiguous areas within metropolitan areas (SMSA) grew by 27 percent (see Table 6).

Table 6

Growth of the Suburban, Central City and Non-metropolitan Population of the United States 1950 - 1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>243 SMSAs</td>
<td>94,600</td>
<td>119,600</td>
<td>139,400</td>
<td>68.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>central cities</td>
<td>53,800</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>63,800</td>
<td>31.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>outside central cities</td>
<td>40,800</td>
<td>59,600</td>
<td>75,600</td>
<td>37.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>urban</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>43,000</td>
<td>59,200</td>
<td>29.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rural</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>16,700</td>
<td>16,400</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-metropolitan areas</td>
<td>56,700</td>
<td>59,700</td>
<td>63,800</td>
<td>31.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>urban</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>22,300</td>
<td>26,400</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rural</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>37,400</td>
<td>37,400</td>
<td>18.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In addition, if this trend of concentration and centralization continues, 50% of the nation's population will live in one or the other of two huge urban regions one of which is the area encompassing the region from Boston to Washington which will join the area running from Chicago.
to Pittsburgh, the second of which is on the west coast of the United States will include the area between San Francisco and San Diego, California. (MORE, 1972:12) Hence, the need for de-centralization of these huge metropolitan areas is apparent. For those living in these areas, it is understandable to see why they consider the United States to be one of the most densely populated areas on earth! The population density of New York's Manhattan Island, for example, in 1970, exceeded 67,000 persons per square mile. (Statistical Abstracts, 1972:23, no. 22) Donald Bogue has argued that the population of America could easily double and it would help immensely if these metropolitan areas were more decentralized.

Thirdly, the relationship between population growth and pollution is complex since the American life style presupposes that a value on material consumption and the resultant problems of this choice cannot be simply blamed on population growth. It's just as logical to argue that the amount of pollution can be better reduced by lower material consumption on the part of the nation than by lower fertility! Conrad Tauber, former associate director of the U.S. Census Bureau, has stated this in the following way:

The recent public concern with environmental problems has often confused the element of population growth with the consequence of the way in which we live. Economic and social factors are more important than population growth in threatening the quality of American life. (MORE, 1972:20)

Also, the apocalyptical writers often equate lower population size with economic growth in the nation. Perhaps the opinion of the French demographer Sauvy might be useful in this respect for he argues that if limiting population growth enriches a country then France should be the richest on earth, since it attained population control long before the other industrialized nations! (Clark, 1946:276)

Hence, the arguments that the United States risks chaos because of overcrowding, dwindling food potential, and irreversible atmospheric pollution, etc. cannot be supported since the empirical data suggest otherwise. Yet why do these arguments constantly arise in discussions of population phenomenon? Why then do the advocates of population control, whether it be via contraception, sterilization, abortion or euthanasia, ignore the data which suggests that the United States can easily accommodate increased population growth? Why are alternatives such as re-distribution of population through in-migration, greater decentralization of urban centers, more equitable distribution of wealth and natural resources, etc., consistently ignored in favor of emotional, even hysterical approaches?

These questions must largely remain unanswered, but it might be hypothesized that the Malthusian underpinnings of the crisis position comes closest to a reasonable answer. Malthus, writing in 1798, reasoned that in human society two indisputable variables were operant: food
increases in an arithmetic ratio (e.g., 1, 2, 3, 4, 5) while population increases in a geometric ratio (e.g., 1, 2, 4, 8, 16). Hence while the number of mouths grows geometrically, cultivable land grows only arithmetically. The result is inevitable and logical: the number of people is bound to outstrip the amount of food in a given population.

Yet even though Malthus' theory has been demonstrated to be incorrect--primarily because the pace of urbanization and industrialization since 1798 have circumvented his paradox--it still remains extremely powerful in the United States. Americans, just as did Malthus, tend to see the source of all human poverty and misery in individual inadequacies. Hence, the problems which beset American society--whether they be crime, alienation, or poverty--are consistently and incorrectly associated with population growth. If only the individual would control the size of his progeny, then society would see the slow dissolution of its problems--so say the neo-Malthusians. Their pessimism is always associated with a profound sense of utopian idealism. Hence, solutions must always be personal and for this reason neo-Malthusians have a great deal of difficulty in examining other approaches on population questions. This is particularly true of other positions such as the Marxian position and the Roman Catholic position--both of which are diametrically opposed to each other in their principal assumptions, but both of which see economic and social justice as the solution to population "problems." Neo-Malthusians cannot understand these other stances since they are unable to break away from the land-people ratio relationship inherent in Malthus' argument.

Implications for Social Welfare

The data which have been cited in Table 1-6 have obvious policy implications for the field of social welfare since they suggest a rapidly changing demographic situation within the United States. As such, the social welfare professions should put their human and economic resources "where the action is." This action will presumably entail the shifting of emphasis from former needs to new evolving needs. Yet what will these future human needs entail?

To answer this we might look at the major age distributions of our population and, in so doing, divide them demographically into their three major component parts: dependent children population (ages 0-15 years), active adult population (ages 15-64) and dependent aged population (65+). The transition from a relatively high birth rate to a lower one in the past 15 years, and short-range projections of an even lower birth rate than the present one--each of these factors implies that the dependent children grouping will be relatively less important than the active adult and dependent aged categories. This is already apparent in 1974 where the impact of the declining fertility rate has been strongly felt in elementary school enrollments, teacher training programs, child adoption services and dozens of similar programs geared towards service to youth. It will become more apparent as the low birth rate cohort of the late 1960s and early 1970s age and approach adolescence. Here demographic projections indicate a declining high school enrollment and eventually
a fairly pronounced negative impact on college enrollments. Similarly adolescent service units will be affected as they experience a declining "clientele," a decline which may have little to do with the type and extent of service which they offer to adolescents!

These changes may not necessarily be negative changes since a good portion of social welfare service programs have been traditionally overwhelmed by the enormity of the needs of their respective client populations. With a projected decline in the number of children, for example, the typical family service agency, child guidance clinic, pre-school nursery program, etc. should be enabled to provide more extensive assistance to those in need. Assuming that the financial support for these agencies remains relatively constant, and the clientele diminishes, the resultant professional attention to that clientele should be maximized. Such an assumption of financial stability might be outside the control of the respective agencies, however!

An analysis of the second grouping, the active age population, suggests the continued increase in its number. Since its members are already present in American society, and since migration to and from the nation is relatively small, the forecast for this group is somewhat simplified. As the baby-boom children mature, they will demand services which are geared toward their needs. In 1974, the entire baby boom is in the active adult grouping. As such, they will need everything from employment to additional ski resorts! The bulk of this age cohort 15 entering the post-college age brackets. Their employment possibilities are dimmed somewhat since so many of them have been seeking positions which traditionally have been hard to fill. Hence, for example, there is presently a glut of newly trained elementary school teachers seeking teaching positions in schools beset with declining enrollments; the social work profession will increasingly feel this pressure as young adults previously geared to teaching begin to seek positions in social service agencies. As this competition continues and even increases, it is conceivable that certain groups (e.g., ethnic and social minority) will be at an even greater disadvantage than at present. Because of supply and demand considerations, those better equipped in terms of education, family background, etc. will be in a better position for the ensuing competition.

Those adult-age individuals at the higher ages in this category (e.g., 35+) will presumably be at less of a disadvantage. Since much of America's employment pattern is based on some system of seniority, this group may be "locked in" secure positions, from which they can conceivably immunize themselves from the increasing competition of their younger colleagues. Yet this advantage may be short-lived since the tension between the two groups may necessarily resolve itself in things such as early retirement, periodic review of job abilities, shorter work weeks for the older workers, etc. Those units within the social welfare profession specifically relating to employment policy, trade unionization policy, guaranteed annual income policy, and minority hiring policy should be alerted to these future possibilities.
The third grouping, the dependent aged population, represents the area which should have the greatest future need, and therefore the greatest attention from the social welfare field. Since the number of aged is presently increasing both in relative and absolute terms, the profession should immediately initiate programs geared toward the needs of the aged. These programs will involve a greater emphasis on senior citizen clubs, higher social security payments, more adequate medical and dental care, better nursing home facilities, etc. Also, the changing demographic picture will necessitate the profession's providing consideration to those dependent aged not serviced by nursing facilities, senior citizen clubs. Careful provision must be made for the group so that its needs are met. Also to be considered is the differential life expectancies of males and females. In 1971, the average life expectancy for males was 67.4 years, while for females the expectancy was 74.9 years. (Social Indicators, 1973:Table 1) Consequently, there will be, as there now are, an absolute "excess" of females at the higher age brackets. How will they be provided for? How will the increasing difficulty of loneliness resulting from the death of a husband be handled? Will facilities for the aged be able to handle the unbalanced sex ratio wherein male residents become something of an oddity? Again these are current problems, and their severity can only increase in future years.

In substance, the social welfare professions should be primarily prepared to gear their programs towards the active adult and dependent aged populations. This presumably will entail less of a proportional emphasis on the needs of youth in the dependent children population category. While these latter needs are great, there should be a relaxing of the strains among the dependent youth in years to come.

Secondly, the profession as a whole should be somewhat suspicious of the claims of the advocates of a population explosion here in America. Granted it is difficult for a profession which is comprised of so many different constituencies to take such a stance, either pro or con; however, when various vested interest groups begin to translate slogans such as "stop at two," or "none is fun" into a call for legislative curtailment of large families, then the profession, or sizable segments of it, will be compelled to take a position; when various demographic crisis groups argue that we'll starve if we don't stop at two children and that as a consequence we must adopt everything from abortion on demand, to euthanasia, then social welfare professions should have enough intellectual integrity to question the underlying fallacies inherent in such statements.

It might be noted in passing that numerous bills have been introduced in both Congress and state legislatures relating to population control. For example, in Hawaii a bill was introduced in the state legislature requiring the sterilization of every women giving birth to her second child. In addition there is the perennial question of mandatory contraception or sterilization of those too poor to support their families. (Dillon, 1972:3)
In 1973 the Alabama legislature passed a law permitting the sterilization of mental patients with their consent or with the consent of the institution's administration if the individual is incompetent to make such a decision. We should note that a similar measure was introduced in Nazi Germany under Reichsführer Rüdin whereby all schizophrenic, manic-depressive, feeble-minded patients etc. were to be sterilized by surgical operation. This sterilization law was enacted in 1933, and by 1936, the famous "Nuremberg Laws" were in full force, paving the way for the "legal" elimination of Jews, Gypsies, and other "non-Aryan" groups. Where will social welfare professionals stand on these issues? If the majority of the profession is convinced that America faces a genuine demographic crisis simply because of the rhetoric of the prophets of doom, then it will be difficult for this number not to support these proposals.

Hopefully this analysis has aired the other side of the argument currently voiced in both academic and non-academic circles. Population questions are intricately related to space, sustenance, technology and social organization and by attempting to interrelate these factors, the authors hope that they may have minimally assisted the profession in examining the myth, rather than the reality, of a population explosion in the United States.

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A critical shortage of trained social workers, a restructuring of the social services, and a national policy of employing the poor in human service organizations have all led to the introduction of large numbers of minority-group and low-income non-professionals into social service employment during the last decade. The social work profession has affirmed the necessity and desirability of this trend, not only as a means of solving the manpower problem but also because these new entrants to the field of social work are indigenous to the client groups which social work seeks to serve and they have attributes and skills which enable them to work effectively with these groups. There is some evidence that the process of professionalization which social work has undergone since its nineteenth century origins has tended to alienate it from these groups.

In order to provide opportunities for lifelong careers rather than mere dead-end jobs for the new nonprofessionals, career ladders have been established which will permit advancement to full professional status through formal education. These developments present a dilemma for social work educators, since there is much evidence which suggests that professional education not only provides the skills and knowledge deemed necessary for professional practice but it also
serves the purpose of socializing new entrants to the professional culture. This being so, how are these particular entrants going to be socialized to the professional culture without seriously impairing the special attributes and skills which they are said to bring to the social services?

This paper will examine the sources, nature and implications of this question in the hope that such an examination will yield insights which will suggest ways in which this dilemma might be resolved. Some social work leaders have suggested that the new entrants be helped to gain full command of social work knowledge and skills without undergoing the formal professionalization process. This development, should it occur, would add a unique chapter to the growing literature on the sociology of the professions.

In order to understand the problem and why it has arisen at this particular time, it is necessary to review its historical antecedents.

The profession of social work has a dual and philosophically conflicting heritage. One of its roots lies in the nineteenth century charity organization societies which were concerned about the moral and spiritual welfare of the poor, directing their efforts toward helping the individual to organize his life better in order that he might not remain dependent on the bounty of public or private charity. The other root of the profession is to be found in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century social reform movement which was concerned with societal conditions which produced poverty and distress. The social reformers sought to have some impact upon the causes of social problems rather than focusing on the weaknesses of individual social casualties.

Of course, none of the sources of a person's distress—whether individual, societal, or a combination of these—can be ignored and social workers have always acknowledged the need to be cognizant of all factors. However, it is clear that, while one may acknowledge the importance of all elements in a situation, one need not necessarily give them equal weight.

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The history of social work reflects an unresolved conflict between the two views of man and society which underlie its major concerns. Certainly, there are other segments and special interest groups within the profession but emphasis upon individuals or upon social systems as the locus of change represents the most marked cleavage among social workers.

The charity organization tradition finds its present-day counterpart in the clinical or therapeutically-oriented segment of the profession while the social reform tradition is exemplified by the community-organization or social-action element. The dominance of the former group can be closely related to the process of professionalization which social work has undergone during this century. As Harold Wilensky and Charles Lebeaux have observed:

... Casework, of course, is only one of the specialties of social work, but it is so dominant that it is doubtful that there would be any such identifiable entity as professional social work without it. Emphasis on casework evolution can index the evolution of the whole profession.2

Wilensky and Lebeaux cite a publication of the Council on Social Work Education which reports that, in 1956, 86 percent of all social work students were being trained in casework method while the remaining 14 percent were divided among group work, community organization, administration, and research.3

Like all the newer professions, social work has been preoccupied with its status in the professional hierarchy.4 Since Abraham Flexner asked, "Is Social Work a Profession?", at the 1915 National Conference of Charities and Corrections, social workers have striven hard to demonstrate that they have all the necessary attributes of a profession. While acknowledging the important role which social work could play in society, Flexner found himself forced to
conclude that it was not a profession since it lacked a unique knowledge base and methods of inquiry which could be systematically transmitted. He saw social work as an intermediary between the established professions and those classes of people who needed help in making use of their services.  

Flexner's evaluation of social work's epistemology did not discourage social work leaders from exhorting their colleagues toward greater professionalization. In fact, it seems to have stimulated more vigorous efforts in that direction, if it had any effect at all. At the same 1915 Conference, Felix Frankfurter, a lawyer, suggested that social work follow the example of the older, established professions by upgrading the educational requirements for entry.

By 1923, some 26 schools of social work were in operation in the United States and Canada. The major concern of educators at that time was the need to expand the educational endeavor beyond the narrow one of preparing people for the "fairly well-defined agencies of relief, aid, and administration or oversight." The reform component had all but disappeared and efforts were being made to develop the theoretical base of the casework method. Porter Lee, Director of the New York School of Philanthropy, was able to report, with some satisfaction, to the 1929 National Conference of Social Work that social work had changed from being a "cause" to being a "function." By this he meant that social workers offering organized social services in a skillful and systematic manner. The emergence of psychiatry, especially the psychoanalytic branch, provided an additional thrust toward a focus on the individual, his strengths and weaknesses, and his intrapsychic conflicts.

If we accept the point of view of Ernest Greenwood and others that there is a continuum along which occupations are dispersed according to the degree of professionalization which they have achieved, rather than alternative points of view,
we might conclude that a fair degree of professional-
ization has occurred in social work. Social workers
claim to have developed a theoretical base of
knowledge and a repertoire of practice skills which
derive from this knowledge. They have achieved
control over access to this knowledge through
accreditation of professional schools. The profes-
sional association controls, to some degree, social
work practice through certification of qualified
practitioners. However, in spite of all of its
efforts, social work has remained a relatively low-
status profession. Its knowledge base, in common with
most of the social and behavioral science professions,
is at once too broad and too vague. As Harold Wilensky
has observed:

"... All occupations in the human relations field
have only tenuous claim to exclusive competence.
This results not only from their newness, uncertain
standards, and the embryonic state of the
social and psychological sciences on which they
draw, but also from the fact that the types of
problems dealt with are part of everyday life.
The lay public cannot recognize the need for
special competence in an area where everyone is
'expert'."

Speaking specifically about social work's plight,
Charles Dollard observed that it "has had to fight a
constant rearguard action against the pervasive
notion that any man with love in his heart can do
the job."\footnote{13}

More severe critics of social work deny its
claim to any unique body of knowledge. Proponents of
this point of view would relegate it to the status
of a semi-profession within Etzioni's typology which
differentiates the life-and-death and knowledge-
producing professions, like law and medicine, from
the service-giving or knowledge-using professions,
such as nursing and teaching.\footnote{14} As Flexner
observed, social workers very often function in an
auxiliary role in relation to other higher-status
professionals and this fact has tended to negate any claim to professional authority. Public identification of the social worker with a low-status clientele has added to social work's status problems since a profession with a predominantly low-status clientele is unlikely to be accorded high status by the dominant groups in society. Finally, the threat to the status quo implicit in social work's social reform heritage—regardless of the relatively small part which it has played in recent social work practice—has tended to differentiate it from the higher prestige professions which, according to Lipset and Schwartz, are "among the more conservative elements in society" in that they manifest "satisfaction with the status quo and opposition to change."15

The relative ineffectiveness of social work's attempts to achieve high status as a profession notwithstanding, its efforts in that direction have had some unfortunate consequences. Its efforts to gain status by emulating the higher-status professions, most notably the medical specialty of psychiatry, and its concentration on the refinement of practical skills of the therapeutic variety have resulted in alienation from its major client groups—the poor and minority groups—with whom these skills are not particularly helpful. Reflecting on this trend, Bertha Reynolds has observed that, while most social agencies do not deliberately establish policies which lead to an avoidance of serious social problems, it is nevertheless "easy to refine one's techniques to the point where only relatively refined people can make use of them."16

During the 1960's a number of manpower studies were carried out which focused attention on the existing and projected critical shortage of professional social workers. Department of Labor statistics indicated that "roughly four out of five persons employed as social workers lack the two years of graduate social work training . . . established as the prerequisite for professional status."17 Most of these studies concluded that the best hope for coming anywhere near a solution to the manpower shortage lay in more efficient use of nonprofessionals.18
Most of the 'nonprofessionals' who were carrying out social work functions were holders of bachelors' degrees in various disciplines. Faced with the possibility that manpower policy for the welfare services might be formulated without its participation, since its members formed such a small minority within the social welfare complex, the social work profession quickly moved to establish undergraduate programs in social work, making the bachelor's degree a professional practice degree. Accreditation of undergraduate programs by the Council on Social Work Education has now begun. This development reflects an awareness of William McGlothlin's admonition that, "The place of the professions is seriously threatened by shortages which require society to turn to nonprofessionals for the services it requires." It also indicates an awareness that "the exclusion of those with lesser credentials frees them from control by the standard-setting organization."

Concurrently with the development of bachelor's level professional education, large numbers of the poor and minority group members have been introduced into social service organizations in service-giving roles. This movement received its main impetus during the mid-1960's when federally-sponsored anti-poverty programs required local social service organizations to recruit substantial numbers of poor community residents in order to be eligible for federal funding. The experience of the professionals with the indigenous nonprofessionals in these programs convinced many of them that the poor, the disadvantaged, and members of minority groups had a special contribution to make to social service provision. Countless articles appeared in the professional journals during the mid- and late-1960's, urging greater use of such personnel in the social services. The special contribution which the indigenous nonprofessional was purported to make was his ability to form helping relationships with low-income and minority-group clients, to understand their life situations and life situations and life
styles, and to help them utilize the services which were available to them. In short, the helping professions, social work among them, were forced to "concede that noncertified, less trained personnel can meet manpower needs, bridge gaps with clients, and provide service organizations with skills congenial to client populations." The nonprofessionals were able to do this, Grosser, Henry and Kelly have suggested, because they have not been subjected to the professional socialization process which "may carry specific disabilities to perform the very service for which one is presumably certified." Grosser, Henry and Kelly note that, while professionalization does not specifically exclude the talent to work with groups like the black lower class, nevertheless, "the long, hard socially mobile route to such certification may well incapacitate many for just such encounters."

While the original federal anti-poverty programs were concerned primarily with the creation of immediate employment for the poor and their involvement in the provision of health and welfare services within their communities, it soon became clear that this new cadre of personnel would not, and should not, be satisfied to remain indefinitely in entry-level jobs. Opportunities for advancement to higher levels of responsibility had to be created if the anti-poverty program was to be more than a token gesture. It was not sufficient simply to create jobs; it was necessary to develop life-long careers for the poor. On-the-job training could help upgrade job skills but genuine career advancement would depend on the credentialization which could be provided only by recognized institutions of higher education.

The rapid development of the community colleges during the 1960's coincided with the emergence of the "new careers for the poor" movement and many of these colleges initiated associate-degree programs for nonprofessionals in a variety of human service occupations, including social work. Linkages were established between these community college programs
and the developing baccalaureate programs in social work, thereby creating a career ladder which would enable persons entering at any level to advance to full professional status. In 1968, the Council on Social Work Education issued its first publication in relation to community college programs in social work, and in 1970 it issued guidelines for the design and implementation of these programs. Although it is not quite ready to assume responsibility for the accreditation of community college programs, the social work profession is certainly taking steps to bring them under its professional wing and its publications reflect an implicit assumption of responsibility for all levels of social work education.

These developments contain a built-in dilemma for social work. It has refined its techniques to the point where it has ceased to be able to work effectively with its primary client groups. It has introduced representatives of these client groups into service-giving positions and affirmed their key role of providing a bridge between the profession and its clients. It has established career ladders which will permit these nonprofessionals to advance to full professional status. But, is there not a risk that, as the indigenous nonprofessional is assimilated into the professional culture, the special attributes and skills which he brings with him will be impaired?

The literature on professional socialization throws some light on this question. Socialization, according to Robert Merto and others, refers to the learning of social roles. Describing this process as they observed it occurring in medical students, Merton and his associates state that:

... socialization refers to the process through which he (the student) develops his professional self, with its characteristic values, attitudes, knowledge, and skills, fusing them into a more or less consistent set of dispositions which govern his behavior in a wide variety of professional (and extraprofessional) situations.
Sanford Dornbusch talks about the two-fold process of socialization as it occurs in a military academy—the transmittal of technical knowledge and the instilling of an outlook considered appropriate for members of the profession. Although there are various routes to the practice of law, Dan Lortie asserts that socialization of the neophyte lawyer is a central concern of all educational and post-educational experiences.

The importance of 'reference groups' to the socialization process is implicit in all of these writings and it is made explicit by David Gottlieb in his description of the socialization processes which are at work in American graduate schools:

... socialization is seen as any development which entails the modification of the self through the acquisition of personality characteristics through contact with significant others.

In none of these studies were clients included among the neophyte professional's "significant others"; almost invariably, the profession—symbolically, institutionally, or personified in specific individuals—was the referent of the neophyte. Melvin Seeman and John Evans found, in their study of attitude changes during internship, that medical interns showed a marked change toward in-group members, in this case senior physicians, along with greater social distance between the interns and other groups, including patients.

Ernest Greenwood gives what is perhaps the most emphatic summary of the professional socialization process:

To succeed in his chosen profession, the neophyte must make an effective adjustment to the professional culture. Mastery of the underlying body of theory and acquisition of the technical skills are in themselves insufficient guarantees of professional success. The recruit must also become familiar with and learn to weave his way through the labyrinth of the professional
culture. Therefore, the transformation of the neophyte into a professional is essentially an acculturation process wherein he internalizes the social values, the behavior norms, and the symbols of the occupational group. 39

When we consider the implications of these statements we would have to conclude that those nonprofessionals who are capable and motivated enough to climb the career ladder are likely to find themselves caught between intolerable role demands. Unless the expectations of the profession should change, the indigenous nonprofessional can only resolve this conflict by rejecting one or other of the referents—the client group or the profession. In either case, his bridging function is negated.

Since a profession requires control over its members, according to William Goode, "precisely because its judgments do not coincide generally with those of clients," 40 it is hard to see how the negative results of professionalization of the nonprofessional can be avoided unless the social work profession reverses or, at least, modifies its attitude toward the achievement of a high level of professionalization. Greenwood has observed that "all social workers are not uniformly enthusiastic about the professionalization of social work." 41 Bisno, Reynolds, and Wilensky have all warned, in one way or another, that professional status could only be bought at the expense of abandoning social work's social reform heritage. Apparently, some social workers are not prepared to pay that price. Bertram Beck has explicitly called upon social work to "desert the traditional pattern of growth of a profession." 42 Affirming social work's traditional identification with the underprivileged and its historical commitment to social reform, he places responsibility on social work for helping those who come into the field without formal education to gain maximum command of social work knowledge and skills without necessarily undergoing the typical socialization process.

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If . . . we can welcome new recruits into the social work fellowship and help them to gain maximum competence through a variety of life experiences, then we may not only ease our manpower problem but also make an enormously valuable contribution to an open and free society.  

If such an occurrence were to take place, it would indeed be an extraordinary development. Social work would be the first occupational group to undergo a process of de-professionalization. However, at a time when reputable sociologists are proposing strategies for de-bureaucratizing large complex organizations in order that they might become more responsive to human need, the idea of some form of deprofessionalization, with the same intent, may not be entirely fanciful.

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3. Ibid., p. 313.


8. Ibid., p. xi.


11. See Harold L. Wilensky, "The Professionalization of Everyone?" American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 70 (September 1964), pp. 137-158. Wilensky's thesis is that few occupations achieve the authority of the traditional professions, such as law and medicine, and that calling the newer occupational groups professions tends to obscure their unique structural forms.

12. Ibid., p. 145.


29. See Pearl and Reissman, *op. cit.*

30. Donald Feldstein, *Community College and Other Associate Degree Programs in the Community and Social Services* (New York: CSWE, 1970).


43. Ibid., p. 77.

TRANSFORMING THE ORIENTATION OF A HEALTH ORGANIZATION THROUGH COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT

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INTRODUCTION OF THE CASE

Health organizations have been oriented to meeting needs and fulfilling demands which are perceived and defined by physician providers (Freidson, 1970; Stevens, 1971). Organizational goals, services, structures, and processes of operation were formulated in accordance with the interests, values, and concerns of provider-members. Latent to this provider orientation was the assumption that professional members were the ones most qualified to determine what was best for the organization and for its consumers (Freidson 1971). In recent times, however, numerous social changes have occurred on a societal level and within the institution of medicine (Hepner, 1972; Somers, 1971; Rosengren and Lefton, 1969). These changes have encouraged consumers to challenge the provider orientation of health organizations and to ask whether providers or consumers should determine the actions of the organization (Berki and Heston, 1972; Zola and McKinlay, 1974; Corey et al, 1972).

It is within this context that the Penn Urban Health Services Center at the Graduate Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania sought to develop a consumer orientation through the mechanism of community involvement. To move toward attaining this goal, Penn-Urb established a Community Involvement Committee (CIC) which had two charges:

1. to develop a mechanism by which information could be exchanged between the health organizations and the community.

2. to develop a mechanism for effectively involving the community in the process of planning and developing Penn-Urb.
It was hoped that through the fulfillment of these two charges, Penn-Urb and its community could increase their awareness and understanding of each other and become more responsive to respective needs and demands.

METHODS

This case study is based on data gathered through a variety of methods: 1) a content analysis of several hundred pages of documents including minutes of meetings, reports, letters, and memoranda; 2) over fifty focused interviews with key members of Penn-Urb, Graduate Hospital, and the community; and 3) participant observation of approximately fifteen meetings of the CIC and over twenty relevant meetings of the Penn-Urb staff. The study covers a one year period, from the establishment of the CIC in September 1972, through a process of internal committee development, to a point of tension between the CIC and Penn-Urb at the end of the summer of 1973.

HISTORY OF THE COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT COMMITTEE

The following discussion summarizes the five major points in the development of the CIC.

1. Membership of the Committees

Community and health organization members were recruited for the CIC. Community participants included representatives from the socially and economically heterogeneous urban population surrounding the Penn-Urb Center. Three general types of participants can be identified: affluent professional and white collar workers, a poverty group that was predominantly Black, and blue collar workers who were ethnic-Americans. Institutional participants included representatives from Penn-Urb, resource consultants from the sponsoring University, and members of the Graduate Hospital.

2. Self Education

The CIC became acquainted with the objectives and programs of Penn-Urb and the demographic characteristics of the community.
3. **Representation on Penn-Urb Committees**

Penn-Urb had invited the community to participate on its twelve planning committees. Community participation was important in order to insure consumer inputs in developing the concepts of the Penn-Urb program. The CIC voted to send representatives to the committees; this plan was never implemented.

4. **Writing Bylaws**

The CIC decided to write a set of bylaws to guide its activities. This action was taken for two reasons: 1) the CIC would have a definition of itself; and 2) this formal and official structure, bylaws, was to provide a method by which community representatives could be selected for the Penn-Urb planning committees.

5. **Presentation of Bylaws to Penn-Urb**

It became clear that the bylaws which were formulated and adopted by the CIC were not bylaws for the guidance of the CIC but bylaws for the governance of Penn-Urb. Penn-Urb told the CIC that they would consider the bylaws but could not adopt them immediately.

**PROBLEMS LATENT IN COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT**

Several significant and complex problems were latent to the efforts to transform the orientation of a health organization through community involvement. These problems led to tensions and conflict which had consequences for the relationship between Penn-Urb and the community. These problems included: 1) membership; 2) the burden of the past; 3) goals; 4) methods of community involvement; and 5) power. These problems are analyzed as follows:

1. **Membership**

The viability and effectiveness of a group are influenced particularly by two factors: 1) the characteristics of members and overall composition of the group, and 2) motivations for members to participate actively in the group's affairs (Barnard, 1968; March and Simon, 1958). Both of these factors proved to be critical for the community.
Community members for the CIC were recruited on the basis of several criteria: they were representative of the heterogeneous nature of the community surrounding Penn-Urb and Graduate Hospital; they were committed to improving health care; and they were not overextended by too many other responsibilities. These community members, however, lacked certain important characteristics. They did not represent a critical mass of established and powerful constituencies and organizations (Lazarsfeld, 1962). They lacked a sufficient base of support and leverage for engaging in a dialogue with a superordinate organization, Penn-Urb of the Graduate Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania.

It became difficult to maintain the motivation of members to participate actively in the group's affairs. Community members had many other responsibilities which required their time and energies. Their regular jobs, family obligations, and commitments to other civic, social, and religious organizations were high priorities which competed with the CIC and Penn-Urb. Other personal constraints that affected participation of community members included child care costs and arrangements, transportation to meetings, and work schedules.

Certain activities of the CIC also caused members to reduce participation, and in some cases, to withdraw altogether. Some members became frustrated by the slow pace of activity of the CIC and its lack of input into the Penn-Urb planning process. The interest of some declined when they were not nominated for office, when they lost elections, or when certain leaders became dominant. Participation decreased because of poor communication about dates and hours set for meetings. Different interpretations of the charge given to the CIC by Penn-Urb and disagreement over the content and intent of the bylaws were other sources of stress for community members.

2. The Burden of the Past

The participants entered this experiment laden with a variety of attitudes, values, and beliefs that had developed out of their past experiences. This burden of the past had consequences for behavior in the subsequent new situation, the relationship between Penn-Urb and the community.

Graduate Hospital had a general reputation within the community as being a "butcher hospital" and a "poor people's hospital" which was not sensitive to community needs and slow to change. Community representatives to the CIC had participated in other attempts at community involvement with Graduate, the
public schools, service agencies, city government, the police, and other organizations. Many were disillusioned by these experiences which they came to view as tokenism, academic exercises, and futile efforts. Graduate Hospital members of the CIC were uncertain about participating because of previous unsuccessful in-house attempts to make the hospital more responsive to community problems and needs. Some of the Penn-Urb staff were skeptical about the CIC because of past experiences in which community involvement hindered the development of needed health programs.

This burden of the past distorted and determined the reality of the present and became a handicap in relationships.

3. Goals

Improvement of the quality of health care delivered to consumers was the collective goal which united the participants. Although individual motivations for participation varied, all participants viewed the Penn-Urb program as an opportunity to meaningful and significant involvement in bringing about the goal of improved health care.

The collective goal was made up of many different specific goals which were of varying importance to the participants from the community, Penn-Urb, and Graduate Hospital. Disagreement developed among these three parties about the specific goals which were to be pursued by the CIC as a whole. This lack of consensus caused another dilemma: How could the CIC maintain participation of individual members while working on goals which were significant to some members but not to others? Many members did not cooperate on certain goals and some stopped participating altogether when their goals were not given high priority by the CIC as a whole.

Another dilemma related to goals was the emergency of organizational anomie (Durkheim, 1933, 1951). Improving the quality of health care was an abstract and difficult objective to achieve. Members of the CIC did not have positive models from past experiences which could guide their present actions and expectations about the future. Penn-Urb was an innovative organization which was still developing essential systemic characteristics such as norms, differentiation of roles and functions, and integration. Expectations about what could be accomplished were unlimited, timetables for actions were undetermined, the meaning of concepts was unclear, and the means to reach goals were unknown. When it became increasingly apparent that goal attainment was going to be a time consuming
and complicated process, members of the CIC became discouraged and disillusioned.

4. Methods of Community Involvement

Another problem which affected the relationship between Penn-Urb and the community was the confusion that developed over the two different methods for community involvement. An independent method was utilized by Penn-Urb whereas a cooperative method was followed by leaders of the CIC.

Several key Graduate Hospital members and community members of the CIC thought that the committee had been functioning in a cooperative relationship. They believed that members of Penn-Urb, Graduate Hospital, and the community were working together to determine the actions of the CIC and Penn-Urb. In contrast, the Penn-Urb staff thought that the independent method was being used to formulate a relationship between Penn-Urb and the community. Penn-Urb believed that members of the health organization (Penn-Urb and Graduate Hospital) and the community came from various backgrounds, held differing points of view, and had different obligations and responsibilities. Therefore, Penn-Urb and the CIC should develop independently their own identities, objectives, and structures for operation.

Both parties, Penn-Urb and the CIC, thought that their respective actions for bringing about community involvement had been fair, reasonable, and appropriate. Both parties were hurt by the tensions that resulted from the confusion about the method being used.

5. Power

Power, that is, the ability to influence and control organizational decisions, became problematic in the relationship between the CIC and Penn-Urb. The different definitions of organizational structure and the conflicting orientations to power held by the two parties led to misunderstandings between them.

The CIC saw itself as the focal or hub committee to which the other planning committees of Penn-Urb were linked.
In contrast, the organizational model used by Penn-Urb differed significantly.

Disagreements developed between Penn-Urb and the CIC regarding the organizational relationships of these committees and their power, authority, and responsibilities.
OUTCOME

The above problems disrupted the relationship between Penn-Urb and its community and evoked controversy concerning the fulfillment of the charge to the CIC. Penn-Urb was not convinced that the CIC had accomplished its task or fulfilled its charges. Penn-Urb was not certain that the CIC had developed a mechanism by which information could be exchanged between the institution and the community. Penn-Urb was disappointed that the CIC had not become involved in the Penn-Urb planning process through participation on the planning committees. In contrast, the CIC felt that it had tried to offer significant inputs to Penn-Urb by writing bylaws and electing officers for Penn-Urb. The CIC was disappointed that Penn-Urb was not more receptive to community inputs and unhappy that the proposed bylaws and officers were not approved by Penn-Urb. As a consequence of these difficulties, Penn-Urb and the CIC suspended their formal relationship. Both parties sought other mechanisms for consumer involvement in the health organization.
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March, James and Herbert Simon  

Rosengren, William and Mark Lefton  

Somers, Anne  

Steven, Rosemary  

Zola, Irving and John McKinlay  