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This essay explores the relationship of social policies and of policy-relevant societal values to social development. Its thesis is that the scope, direction, and quality of the social development process are largely shaped by the social policies and the dominant value positions of societies.

Social scientists and others using the concepts social policies and social development, tend to attach different meanings to them. Hence, it is necessary to begin with an explication of my conceptions of these terms and of the societal processes to which they refer. Furthermore, since such explications are usually not value-neutral I will first specify the value position from which my conceptions derive.

This value position may be summarized as follows: All humans, everywhere, despite their manifold differences and their uniqueness as individuals, should be considered of equal intrinsic worth. Hence they should be deemed entitled to equal social, economic, civil, and political rights, liberties, and obligations. Societal institutions on local and translocal levels, should assure and facilitate the exercise of these equal rights, and the free, autonomous, and authentic development of all humans. All humans should be considered "subjects," none should be treated as "objects" or "means." Hence no human should dominate, control, and exploit other humans.

Socially structured equality should not be interpreted, vulgarly, as arithmetic equality or uniformity. Rather, it is to be understood as a guiding principle to be implemented creatively through flexible institutions, designed to assure to all humans throughout the life-cycle satisfaction of their unique needs, and actualization of their unique individuality, subject to constraints implicit in population size, aggregate wealth, and level of overall development.

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Social Policies*

Social policies may be thought of as clusters of rules or as institutionalized guiding principles maintaining a social order. These rules and principles evolved throughout the history of human groups. They reflect choices and decisions made by successive generations striving to satisfy basic biological and emerging social and psychological needs as they pursued survival in the context of relative scarcities. Social policies reflect stages in human evolution beyond total dependence on instinctual dynamics and randomness in human behavior and relations. They represent significant steps beyond the trial-and-error stage of the struggle for survival. Social policies are products of the human capacity to reflect on experience and reality and on the existential imperatives encountered by all human groups, to devise systematic answers to these imperatives, and to pass these answers on from generation to generation. Eventually, social policies evolved into patterns or blueprints for societal existence, organization, and continuity.

With time, social policies, like other products of the human mind which are transmitted among generations and experienced in the course of socialization as social reality, tended to take on a life and dynamics of their own, and to exist independently of the humans whose choices created them. Consequently, social policies confront subsequent generations as powerful forces that shape life and reality and that act as constraining influences on the development of new approaches to the solution of existential problems. Their sources are no longer remembered, and the more independence they acquire with time, the more resistant to change they are likely to become. Frequently, they are not even identified as social policies but are referred to as "customs," and "traditions." Quite often, also, they are viewed as "laws of nature," as eternal and inevitable and not subject to critique and change by a present generation.

Yet humans in any generation ought to realize that behind any particular set of social policies are human choices at certain stages of history, choices which produced one possible model for organizing human existence and survival based on insights and knowledge available at the time. The choices made, and the patterns resulting from them may not have been the best possible answers even at the time they were made, nor are they necessarily the best pattern for sub-

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sequent generations including the present one. Hence, optimally, each generation should claim its right and responsibility to re-examine transmitted social policies in the light of present circumstances and knowledge, and in relation to currently held values which may differ from the value premises underlying past choices.

As for substance, social policies always represent solutions to the following fundamental, existential problems which any human group must resolve in some way:

1. What resources to select for development from the natural environment in order to assure survival and to enhance the quality of life?

2. How to organize the production of goods and services needed for survival and the enhancement of the quality of life; or, more specifically, how to design and maintain a division of labor, including preparation of individuals for, and their allocation to, specific sets of work tasks so as to assure a smooth performance of all the work necessary for generating the goods and services deemed needed by society?

3. How to divide or distribute among members of society the aggregate product of their aggregate labor, the goods and services generated for survival and for the enhancement of the quality of life; and, related to the distribution of concrete goods and services, how to distribute among members of society honor and prestige, civil liberties, and political rights?

As a society develops and, over time, institutionalizes specific solutions to these fundamental, existential issues, it determines, indirectly, the circumstances of living of every individual member, and of every group. For the circumstances of living of individuals and groups are largely a function of the activities they engage in, or the work roles they perform, the concrete goods and services they receive, and the honor, prestige, civil liberties and political rights they may claim. Furthermore, in shaping the circumstances of living of individual's and groups, social policies also determine the nature and quality of human relations in a society, since reciprocal relations among individuals and groups tend to be a function of their respective roles and rights. Finally, the overall quality of life, or the existential milieu prevailing in a society, is also shaped by its social policies since that quality may be understood as the aggregate of individual circumstances of living, the resulting quality of human relations, and the quality of the environment which, in turn, results from the interaction of humans with their natural habitat.
Summarizing then, social policies are conceived of here as rules or guiding principles for maintaining a social order, reflecting choices and decisions evolved over time concerning: the selection and development of life-sustaining and enhancing resources from the environment; the division of labor or allocation of work statuses and roles in a society's aggregate system of work and production; and the distribution of goods and services, honor and prestige, civil liberties and political rights. Together, through their interactions, these developmental, allocative, and distributive decisions and processes shape the circumstances of living of individuals and groups, the quality of human relations, and the overall quality of life or the existential milieu of a society.

Values

A second concept which requires explication here is that of values. Theodorson's *Modern Dictionary of Sociology* defines a value as

An abstract, generalized principle of behavior to which the members of a group feel a strong, emotionally toned positive commitment and which provides a standard for judging specific acts and goals......

......they are often regarded as absolute, although the formation and apprehension of values evolve in the normal process of social interaction......*

Values may also be thought of as early layers of social policies. Their origin, evolution, and dynamics are nearly identical to those of all social policies. They differ, however, from other social policies in the level of generality and abstraction, and in the extent to which their origin in human choices is no longer realized. The sources of values are frequently projected onto non-human, supernatural powers.

Analysis of the substantive content of many values suggests that they derive from basic choices compatible with the perceived interests of entire societies, and/or the perceived interests of groups who gained influence, power, dominance, and control over the rest of society. Eventually, values evolve into powerful factors legitimating established interests and maintaining the status-quo of social orders which is shaped by these interests. Values are usually guarded and disseminated by priestly and other elites involved in processes of


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socialization and social control. Over time clusters of related and mutually reinforcing values became integrated into internally coherent ideological systems, which constitute constraints on, and often insurmountable barriers to, the malleability of social policies and social orders. Social policies will generally conform to prevailing ideologies and to particular constructions of social reality implicit in such ideologies, and, in turn, will reinforce the ideologies as decisive forces in society.

Value Dimensions Relevant to Social Policies

In studying social policies and their relationship to social development one need not concern oneself with every possible value, but only with value dimensions which are likely to affect developmental, allocative, and distributive decisions, decisions which have been identified in the preceding discussion as the key-processes of social policies. Values influencing these key-processes may be appropriately referred to as social-policy-relevant value dimensions.

The most significant value dimension from a social policy perspective is that of equality-inequality. In developing resources, a society may assign equal or unequal importance to the needs of all its members and segments. It may design a system of division of labor, and may allocate work roles within that system on the basis of equal or unequal access and assignment. And finally, it may distribute goods and services, honor and prestige, and civil liberties and political rights on equal terms as universal entitlements to all, or, on unequal terms, as differential rewards for different role and status clusters, access to which is restricted differentially.

Whether or not a society will employ equalitarian criteria in its developmental, allocative, and distributional decisions will depend on its concept of humans: Does it consider all individuals to be intrinsically of equal worth in spite of their uniqueness, and hence entitled to the same social, economic, civil, and political rights; or do individuals in the society consider themselves, and those close to themselves, of greater worth than anyone else, and hence entitled to more desirable or privileged circumstances. The former egalitarian philosophy would be reflected in institutional arrangements involving cooperative actions in pursuit of common existential interests. All individuals would be considered and treated as equally entitled subjects who could not be exploited and dominated by other individuals or groups, and whose rights to develop their individuality freely and fully would be assured and respected, subject to the same rights of all others. The latter, non-egali-
tarian philosophy, on the other hand, is reflected in institutional structures which encourage competitive behavior in pursuit of narrowly perceived, egotistical interests. All individuals and groups strive to get ahead of others, consider themselves entitled to privileged conditions and positions, and view and treat others as potential means to be used, exploited, and dominated in pursuit of egotistical goals.

It should be noted here that the value dimension equality-inequality is not a continuous one, for while there are degrees of inequality which may be increased or decreased, there are no degrees of equality. A distribution or allocation is either equal or unequal, and humans may be deemed equal or unequal in intrinsic worth. Therefore, the notion of "more equality" which is used frequently in political discourse by reform-minded persons is intrinsically self-contradictory. Inequality, on the other hand, is a continuous dimension and it is, therefore, appropriate to speak of increases or decreases in inequality. This distinction is important in order to avoid confusion in political thought and action, and in order not to interpret the advocacy of "more equality" as commitment to equality. More equality merely means a different level of inequality: it is thus a veiled commitment to the perpetuation of the guiding principles of inequality and privilege.

Two additional value dimensions need to be considered here because of their relevance to developmental, allocative, and distributional processes:

Cooperation -- competition; and
Collectivity-orientation -- self-orientation.

These two dimensions are related to, and interact with each other. They are also related to, and interact with the earlier discussed value dimension, equality-inequality. However, the relations among these three dimensions are not fixed. They vary in different societies and at different times in the same society.

The dimensions cooperation -- competition and collectivity-orientation -- self-orientation are continuous variables, which means that societies may be located at extreme or intermediate positions with reference to these dimensions. The dominant value orientations of specific societies usually involve unique combinations of cooperation and competition, and of collectivity-orientation and self-orientation in the context of equality or different levels of inequality. Different societies may thus be visualized as located at different positions in a three-dimensional value space.

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Collectivity-orientation, it should be noted, is not a negation of individuality and self-actualization. It is however, a negation of "rugged individualism," which is a value orientation that disregards the rights of others to self-actualization. Collectivity-orientation may, in fact, be a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for the full and free development of everyone's individuality.*

Social Development

Based on the conceptions of social policies and of social-policy-relevant value dimensions presented here, social development may be thought of as a specific configuration of social policies, chosen consciously by a population in accordance with egalitarian, cooperative, and collectivity-oriented value premises, aimed at enhancing systematically:

-- The overall quality of life or the existential milieu of the entire society;
-- the circumstances of living of all individual members and segments of the society; and
-- the quality of all human relations.

Understood in this way, social development involves philosophical, biological, ecological, psychological, social, economic, and political dimensions. In contradistinction to conventional, yet by now outdated, notions of economic growth and development, the central criterion for evaluating social development is evenly shared, balanced progress of the entire population of a region, or of the globe, towards enhanced collective, segmental, and individual wellbeing. Genuine social development seems, therefore, predicated upon the conscious acceptance, and systematic implementation, of a configuration of developmental, allocative, and distributive social policies, the interaction and combined effects of which would be conducive to the comprehensive objectives specified here.

Social Policies for Social Development: General Considerations

First among social policy clusters essential for social development is the identification, selection, and development of an appro-

ropriate range and mix of resources, sufficient in quantity and suitable in quality, to satisfy the basic biological and the social and psychological needs of the entire population. Policies for resource selection and development should preclude greedy, exploitative relations to the habitat of a population, as well as all forms of waste and destruction of real wealth which consists of land, water, wildlife, vegetation, natural raw materials, humans and human products. Such policies would involve effective measures for conservation and recycling of the natural resource basis of life while deriving sustenance from that base. Related to these policies would also be measures aimed at achieving and maintaining a dynamic balance of natural resources, the prevailing scientific and technological capacity to produce life-sustaining and enhancing goods from these resources, and the size of the population.

Next, social development is predicated upon policies conducive to effective and efficient organization of productive processes for the transformation of natural resources by means of human creativity and labor into the goods and services required to sustain and enhance the life of the population. Policies organizing the productive processes include also policies dealing with the education and preparation of society's "human capital," the release and development of the available creative physical and intellectual potential of people of all ages. Policies in this domain must also deal with the conservation, maintenance, and renewal of means of production, and with the allocation and investment of human resources and capital to the various branches of production. There is also need for policies concerning the size and location of productive units, the scope of production in various branches and units, the manner in which production and production units are controlled, and production decisions are made by those working in the units and by various local, regional, and transregional groups and institutions. Finally, in this domain, policies are needed to facilitate cooperation, coordination, integration, exchange, and joint planning among the separate production units, branches of production, the aggregate productive enterprise in a region, and units, branches, and aggregate economies in other regions all over the globe.

Since, by definition, social development is concerned with enhancing qualitative aspects of human existence, as much as it is concerned with quantitative aspects of production, it is predicated also on policies resulting in a division of labor that is cooperative rather than competitive, psychologically enriching rather than alienating, non-exploitative, flexible, and fair. Such a division of labor would also involve equal recognition and equal rewards for every type of work, and whenever feasible, rotation of workers among roles which differ in intrinsic rewards. Finally, such a division of
labor would involve equal rights for all to participate in the productive enterprise of society, and hence would eliminate the absurdity, so prevalent in competitive, profit-motivated societies, of unemployment of workers, land, and plants while human needs remain unmet, and production is out of step with these needs.

Needless to say, social development, as conceived here, is also predicated upon flexible, egalitarian distribution to all members and segments of society of the concrete wealth produced by their labor, upon equal access to the human services it administers, upon equal civil liberties and political rights, and upon according to all equal recognition, honor, and prestige. It follows that implicit in genuine social development are patterns of role allocation and rights distribution which conform to the notion "to each according to need, from each according to capacity."

Finally, social development is predicated upon avoidance of exploitation and domination of humans and natural resources in other parts of the globe. All forms of exploitation and domination beyond a given society's boundaries inevitably negate and destroy internal processes of social development since foreign exploitation and domination always involve exploitative and domineering human relations within a society by powerful, ruling elites toward large segments of their own people. Internal and external exploitation and oppression complement and reinforce each other. They are manifestations of the same underlying principles and dynamics, to wit: a commitment to inequality, and hence, a readiness to use other humans as means or objects in the greedy pursuit of hegemony, privilege, and profit for oneself, one's tribe, or one's nation. Genuine social development can never result from such attitudes and actions, only imbalanced pseudo-development -- illusions or caricatures of true social development. The alienating and oppressive internal milieu of societies who were, or are, practicing colonial or neo-colonial exploitation and oppression, reflects these contradictions. It demonstrates the incompatibility between social development, understood as equalitarian enhancement of the quality of life for all, and the practice of exploitation at home and abroad in pursuit of mal-distributed, imbalanced economic growth.

It should be noted here, that while foreign exploitation and domination in any form are incompatible with genuine social development, foreign trade among societies living in different parts of the globe is not, as long as such trade involves voluntary exchanges of different types of resources on the basis of equality among trading partners. Such exchanges as well as all forms of mutual aid among neighboring and distant peoples are apt to promote the social development of all participants.
Social Policy Strategies Towards Social Development

Considering the conceptions of social policies, social policy relevant value dimension, and social development articulated so far in this essay, what specific social policies can be expected to set in motion, and maintain the momentum, of processes of social development? When social development means evenly shared, balanced progress of entire populations towards enhancement of the circumstances of living, the quality of life, and the quality of all human relations, it is predicated upon social policies shaped by a humanistic, egalitarian, and democratic philosophy. For evenly shared progress can materialize only when social policies are designed, consciously, to treat every human as a subject of intrinsically equal worth, entitled to equal social, economic, civil, and political rights, liberties, responsibilities, and recognition. Hence, whenever institutional structures and dynamics of a society are in conflict with such a philosophy, initiating, and maintaining the momentum of social development requires fundamental transformations of the institutional order and of the value premises that sustain and reinforce that order.

Productive resources as a public trust: What then, is the meaning, in terms of specific social policies, of such fundamental transformations of the institutional order that would be conducive to genuine social development? It means, above all else, that the productive resources of a society, its land, water, and other natural resources, its machinery and factories, as well as its accumulated stock of scientific knowledge and technology must not be owned or controlled by individuals or by small segments of the population, and must not be used to secure privileged circumstances of living for propertied classes or other powerful groups such as bureaucratic elites, intellectual elites, etc. These sources of all wealth must be transformed into, and maintained in perpetuity as, a collectively owned and democratically controlled public trust or "common-wealth," appropriate shares of which would be allocated for use, not for ownership, to people working and living by themselves or in groups. The public trust of productive resources would be administered and preserved in a manner that would assure everyone's participation throughout life as equally entitled decision maker, producer, and consumer, using everyone's capacities, and satisfying everyone's needs for goods and services. Privately owned property would be limited to goods destined for personal use, such as clothing, homes, household appliances, etc., and for personal consumption, such as food.

Allocation of productive resources: Next, social policies, conducive to social development, should establish priority rules concerning the allocation of productive resources, to assure that goods
and services which meet the basic needs of the entire population for food, homes, clothing, health, education, communication, etc., are produced in appropriate quantities and quality before less essential goods and services are produced. Policies should also promote balance among population size and needs, ecological considerations, and the reality of ultimate limits of natural resources, by prudently adjusting birth rates, and by precluding all avoidable waste and destruction of natural resources and human capacities. Such waste and destruction may be inevitable when processes of production are shaped by dynamics intrinsic to the drive for profit and the accumulation of privately controlled wealth. When production will be geared systematically to meeting the needs of a population through a stable and balanced supply of high quality, long lasting goods and services, producers would no longer need to engage in economically irrational practices, induced now by the competitive scramble for market shares and profits, such as artificially inflated and manipulated levels and patterns of consumption, model changes involving, not improvements, but meaningless, marginal variations, transitional and arbitrary fashions, built-in obsolescence, deceptive advertising and image building aimed at generating artificial, and often harmful, needs and status symbols, etc.

**Harmonizing agricultural and industrial production:** Another policy strategy essential to social development is the promotion of balanced integration of agricultural and industrial production. A steady and reliable supply of nutritious food is obviously a sine-qua-non of social development. Accordingly, policies that sacrifice the production and supply of food and the quality of village life by shifting humans and natural resources from rural-agricultural toward urban-industrial development which primarily benefits the perceived interests of established, powerful, wealth-holding elites, are clearly counter-indicated. Such policies usually result in mass migration from potentially healthy rural environments into urban slums, traditional breeding grounds for human misery, exploitation, and manifold human and social pathology. While conventional economists tend to argue that the benefits of concentrated and accelerated industrialization, in accordance with capitalist principles, would, in time, trickle down to all segments of a population, history, since the industrial revolution in Europe and North America, as well as over recent decades in Asia, Africa, and South America, suggests that this theory has never really worked, and that whatever benefits result from such industrialization, tend to flow away from working people who produce them and who bear a heavy cost/upward, towards privileged, and frequently unproductive, segments of societies.

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Industry: servant or master? To assure compatibility between industrial and social development, industry must never be considered an end in itself, nor a means toward the generation and accumulation of privately controlled wealth. Instead, industry would have to be designed as a powerful instrument to serve the well-being of the entire population, rather than people being used as tools to serve the well-being of profit-oriented industry. Accordingly, social development oriented policies should facilitate geographic dispersion of industry throughout a country to where people live, and to where raw materials and sources of natural energy are easily available. Furthermore, policies should steer industrial production primarily toward the high priority needs of the population, food, homes, clothing, health, education, communication, etc., and away from wasteful production of non-essentials. Locating industry in villages, small towns, and regional centers, and relating it to the needs of such communities, rather than exclusively locating it in, and relating it to, major metropolitan centers and their distorted needs; transforming the function of industry from serving the interests of privileged groups to serving the interests of all people; and finally, transferring responsibilities for directing industry from private, absentee owners and their representatives to workers, consumers, local communities, and the democratic institutions of society, can be expected to facilitate the harmonious integration of industrial enterprises into the agricultural base of the population, into both rural and urban life, and thus into processes of genuine social development.

Related to industrialization is also the question whether productive enterprises should be organized along labor-intensive or capital-intensive principles. This policy choice would have to depend in any particular instance on the relative availability of human and other resources at given stages of social and technological development. As with all other policy issues, the decision criterion should be the common interests of society, broadly conceived, rather than narrowly defined criteria of profitability. Hence, the optimal solution, to be promoted through appropriate social policies, should involve full employment of all available human resources in constructive, meaningful, and intrinsically rewarding productive activities, supported by tools, machinery, science, and technology to enhance effectiveness and efficiency, to eliminate unhealthy and damaging aspects of production, and to reduce hard and unpleasant labor as far as is compatible with prudent conservation of the environment and its natural resources.

Restructuring work: employing human resources to meet human needs: Some further observations seem indicated here concerning policies which would shape the organization and the quality of work
and the division of labor in a manner conducive to social development. The most fundamental principle in this context ought to be that everyone is entitled, and has a responsibility, to participate in the aggregate labor of society. This means that whatever the total amount of labor which society requires to sustain and enhance its way of life, be that amount large or small, it is to be shared evenly among all members of society. Human unemployment and the waste and alienation resulting from it would thus be abolished.

Another important principle in this context is that all occupations within a rationally designed system of production and services ought to entitle individuals engaging in them to roughly equal rewards in terms of claims against society's aggregate product, as well as in terms of social recognition or prestige. Such equal shares of returns to all workers would reflect the premise that all work is necessary in generating the aggregate social product, that it consequently represents a necessary service to society, ought to be considered of equal intrinsic worth to society's well-being, and should entitle workers to equal circumstances of living.

While, then, all work roles of a rationally designed system of production and services would be deemed equally important, and hence equal in worth, the experience of individuals engaging in different occupations would, nevertheless, vary widely in quality. Moreover, different individuals are also likely to develop preferences and talents for different types of work. All this means that different levels of intrinsic satisfaction would result from different occupations for individuals of like capacities and inclinations, and that differences in talents and taste among individuals would be additional sources of variation in experience. Since work roles ought to be allocated in a manner providing roughly equal returns and satisfaction, these differences inherent in occupations and people ought to be considered and compensated for through social policies that structure the division of labor in society, including the choices of, the preparation for, and the access to different work roles.

These considerations of work in relation to social development reveal a multiplicity of potentially conflicting objectives which need to be reconciled through appropriate social policies. Before suggesting such policies, the objectives will be briefly restated:

-- all tasks a society considers necessary to sustain and enhance its way of life must be carried out by, and hence allocated to, some individuals;
-- all members of a society are entitled to, and responsible for, a share of society's total work load;

-- all occupations necessary to sustain and enhance a society's way of life are to be deemed of equal intrinsic worth, and should entitle individuals engaging in them to equal claims against the aggregate social product, and to equal social recognition;

-- work ought to be directed by the workers themselves, and ought to be meaningful, constructive and a medium for self-actualization, while always serving also the interests of the community; individuals should be free, as far as possible, to choose occupational roles in accordance with their capacities, talents, tastes, and interests.

Policies to organize work and distribute rights: Appropriate combinations of the following policy measures should overcome the conflicts and contradictions implicit in these objectives. Firstly, production should be directed by the workers performing it, and the production processes should not be split into minute, repetitive, and meaningless units, so as not to destroy opportunities for expressing individual craftmanship and creativity, and for deriving a sense of pride and accomplishment while producing goods or services of high quality and aesthetic value. Secondly, unhealthy, dangerous, heavy, unpleasant, and routine work should be performed by machines before other, more desirable work is mechanized. Thirdly, work considered less desirable, or undesirable, which cannot be mechanized for various reasons, ought to be shared evenly by all. This could be accomplished by allocating specified stages of the life cycle to the performance of such less desirable tasks, or by taking turns in undertaking these tasks throughout life. Fourthly, opportunities ought to be provided to change one's occupation at various stages of life, to engage in different occupations at the same time, or to rotate among different roles over time. Special efforts ought to be made to overcome the prevailing, nearly absolute separation between physical and mental work, and the differential social valuation of these work domains. Next, access to preparatory channels for all occupations ought to be completely open to all, and all vestiges of role allocation by way of caste or class channels or by sex must be eliminated.

Finally, the distribution of rights, or of claims to shares of society's aggregate wealth and product ought to be completely separated from the division of labor. Rights and claims ought to be distributed as universal, equal entitlements rather than as task-specific, differential rewards. Everyone ought to be entitled to a roughly equal share to satisfy all socially sanctioned needs through-
out life by virtue of being a contributing member of one's community and society, irrespective of the type of work one engages in.

Conducting public affairs: Another essential component of a strategy for social development, the last to be discussed here, though its role is crucial, is policies that shape the conduct of public affairs, the patterns of governance, leadership, and decision-making. As conceived in this essay, social development implies that choices and decisions affecting the circumstances of living of people be arrived at in a thoroughly democratic fashion, with everyone who may be affected by a decision being informed about all relevant aspects, and having an "equal voice," that is equal rights, opportunities, and power in determining the outcome. Representative democracy, when practiced in an essentially inegalitarian context of interest group competition, falls, inevitably, short of these criteria. Hence it needs to be transcended, and replaced by political institutions conducive to participatory democracy. The basic units of such political institutions would not be isolated individuals, but self-governing community groups, small enough to permit close personal relations, yet large enough to assure economic viability and social continuity. They could be producer-consumer collectives or merely neighborhood groups. They would share social, economic, cultural, child-rearing, educational and recreational functions and concerns. These groups would vary in size and in internal patterns and life styles. They would be linked in local and translocal networks or federations which, in turn, might form more encompassing, democratic macro-structures. Coordination and integration among these many entities would be achieved through local, regional, and trans-regional representative assemblies. These assemblies would have to be designed in a manner that would assure full and informed participation of all units and levels in decisions shaping their existence. Issues for deliberation and decision could originate at any level, but would always have to be examined on all levels so that local and trans-local perspectives would be taken into consideration and reconciled before decisions are reached.

Such a multi-level, political system of decentralized, yet coordinated and integrated, self-governing groups could not function effectively, unless every unit accepted egalitarian and collectivity-oriented value premises as primary decision criteria for all issues, and refrained from competitive interactions derived from a scarcity mentality and a zero-sum model. Commitment to egalitarian values, and the emergence of non-competitive attitudes would lead to cooperative approaches in sharing and allocating productive resources, and in producing and distributing goods and services, setting thus in motion a process of plus-sum dynamics towards a reality and mentality of evenly shared adequacy and well-being.
Egalitarian-democratic institutions will not endure without widespread political awareness and conscientious involvement in public affairs, facilitated by an unobstructed flow of relevant information. Such political institutions could, therefore, not sanction claims for secrecy and confidential, privileged communications concerning public issues. For if people are to be free and their own masters, and if they are to share equally the responsibilities and entitlements of citizenship, then individuals assigned to public service roles for a specified time, must under no circumstances be permitted to withhold information from the sovereign people. It should be realized in this context that behind all claims for secrecy and privileged communications lurks, usually, an evil purpose involving either the defense of existing, unfair and unjust conditions, or the intent to create, and benefit from, such conditions. Just and fair objectives and purposes, on the other hand, can always be discussed and confronted openly among equals.

Leadership in an egalitarian-democratic commonwealth means service to people, not control and rule over people. It involves performance of a set of tasks deemed necessary by society to maintain and enhance its way of life. The social value of these tasks is equal to that of all other tasks deemed necessary by society. Hence individuals assigned for a time to the performance of leadership functions should not be entitled to privileged circumstances of living, but should share the same life style and the same rights to goods and services as all other members of society. If leadership roles are defined as service functions not entitling individuals performing them to special rewards in the form of additional goods, services, and prestige, people will be less eager to assume these roles and to hold on to them. It may, in fact, become difficult to recruit volunteers for leadership roles, as their performance would require commitment of much extra time and effort. Hence, these roles may eventually have to be filled by assigning everyone to take a turn.

It remains to be noted that qualifications for leadership roles are not as extraordinary and as rare as people in inegalitarian, competitive societies assume, and as leaders and their promoters pretend. In such societies, leaders, invariably, come from or are selected by and represent the interests of, wealthy and powerful population segments. Furthermore, leadership roles in such societies entitle those who perform them to considerable privileges. Finally, these roles are also a source of patronage and corruption. Once secrecy and confidential, privileged communications are abolished, and with them the monopoly on information about public affairs, which political and economic elites now maintain, individuals who keep informed on public affairs, and will participate in their community
groups in the study and disposition of public issues, will soon develop the skills necessary for dealing with such issues, for representing their groups, and for assuming leadership positions. As with many other tasks that are monopolized in the prevailing social order by various powerful groups, the real issue concerning leadership roles seems to be access and opportunity rather than unique qualifications and abilities. It should also be emphasized that in an egalitarian-democratic system the nature of leadership roles will be different, and less complex than in the context of centralized, manipulative executive power. The political institutions of egalitarian, participatory democracy will be designed in a manner that will preserve the right and responsibility of the people to make all decisions on policy in their community groups, and in their representative assemblies on local and trans-local levels. Accordingly, the primary responsibility of leaders will be the faithful execution of the people's decisions. They will be administrators, not powerful rulers.

Summary

The specific policies which have been presented here as necessary components of a strategy toward social development are not isolated fragments. They are not independent of, but complement, one another. Their combined impact should bring about the fundamental transformations of social values, structures, and dynamics implicit in the notion of social development. What unifies these policies is the underlying humanistic, egalitarian, democratic philosophy, according to which all humans are intrinsically of equal worth, are entitled to equal rights in every sphere of life, and may not be exploited or dominated by other humans. The policies were developed by consistently applying these values and principles to the major domains of human existence and social organization, namely, the control and allocation of all productive resources, the design of productive processes and criteria for production priorities, the division of labor and the organization and valuation of work, the distribution of rights and claims to shares of the aggregate social product, and, finally, the design of political institutions.

There are, of course, conceptions of social development which differ fundamentally in underlying assumptions and values from a humanistic, egalitarian, and democratic conception. Adherents of such alternative conceptions will often acknowledge humanistic, egalitarian, and democratic values as ultimate goals, but will not use these values as guiding principles and evaluative criteria when formulating policies in the present. This avoidance tends to be rationalized as being "realistic and practical," while insisting on
social justice here and now is being labeled as "utopian, naive, and impractical." Such realistic and practical approaches to social development mean that, while humans would be treated as equals some time in the future, socially structured and defined inequalities are to be accepted as a given aspect of present reality. They must not be questioned or challenged on a fundamental level, but must be reckoned with, adjusted to, and incorporated into policy formulation for social development. The result of such pragmatic development policies is, at best, an illusion of social development, pursued for the benefit of relatively small, yet economically and politically powerful elite groups, through exploitation and domination of economically and politically powerless majorities of the population.

History all over the world suggests that such "pragmatic" compromise approaches to social development which acquiesce in established inequalities and injustices, do not work, however well-intentioned their advocates may be. They do not work for exploited majorities whose basic needs remain unsatisfied and who continue to be oppressed and alienated. Nor do these approaches work in terms of the real, long-range, human interest of the power and wealth controlling minorities. The reason for the failure of these development policies is the intensification of intra-societal conflict which usually accompanies their implementation, and which may be inevitable in view of the economic, social, and psychological dynamics generated in an inegalitarian, competitive context, and its scarcity, zero-sum mentality. The human and economic costs of maintaining an established, inegalitarian social order tend to increase exponentially in spite of sporadic patchwork efforts to save that order from collapsing. Sooner or later this process tends to reach levels of massive breakdown. To refer to this self-defeating process as social development is, of course, absurd.

The conclusion of these considerations seems inescapable. Social development, like human freedom and dignity, is indivisible. It simply cannot be secured for segments of a population at the price of exploiting and oppressing other segments. It can be achieved only for all together, or for none at all. Either all are free and equal, brothers and sisters in a universal process towards social development, or none will gain freedom and fulfillment.
APPENDIX

The purpose of this Appendix is to present a framework which should be helpful when analyzing actual and newly proposed social policies in terms of their appropriateness for social development as conceived in this essay. The framework should be equally useful in efforts to generate appropriate alternative social policies.

The framework consists of a set of descriptive, analytic, evaluative, and synthetic items, the purpose of which is to discern the consequences of given policies and policy clusters, to examine the extent of correspondence between these consequences and the requirements of social development as articulated in this essay, and when indicated, to generate alternative policies which fit these requirements.

Since social policies differ in scope and focus, not all items of the framework will be relevant in the analysis of every policy. However, while certain items are not applicable to certain policies and would be omitted in an analysis, all social policies and policy clusters can be analyzed in terms of their suitability for social development by following the items of the framework.

The framework for the analysis and synthesis of social policies for social development is based on an earlier published, general framework for the analysis and synthesis of social policies.*

Framework for Analysis and Synthesis of Social Policies for Social Development

A. Descriptive Section: Issues, Objectives, Values, Consequences

1. issues dealt with by the policy, their nature, scope, distribution, and dynamics;

2. policy objectives concerning the issues (overt and covert);

3. policy-relevant value positions underlying the objectives (overt and covert);

4. theoretical premises underlying the strategy of the policy;

5. population segments at whom the policy is aimed primarily, their size and characteristics;

6. short and long range, intended and unintended consequences of the policy for target and non-target segments of the population;

7. overall investment costs of the policy in terms of human and other resources.

B. Analytic Section: Implications of the Policy for Developmental, Allocative, and Distributional Processes of Society

1. qualitative and quantitative effects on the selection and development of life-sustaining and enhancing resources, goods, and services;

2. effects on the organization of production and the division of labor, or on the criteria and procedures for selection, preparation, and assignment of individuals and groups to statuses and roles within the aggregate of societal tasks and functions;

3. effects on the distribution of rights (entitlements, rewards, and constraints) concerning goods and services; recognition, honor, and prestige; civil liberties and political rights;

4. consequences of modifications effected by the policy in developmental, allocative, and distributional processes for:

   -- the circumstances of living of individuals and groups (objective, subjective, relative to others);

   -- the quality of human relations among individuals, groups, and society as a whole; and

   -- the aggregate quality of life or existential milieu.
C. Evaluative Section: Correspondence Between the Consequences of
the Policy and the General Requirements of Social Development

1. relevance of the issues addressed by the policy, and their
degree of priority, in terms of the central evaluative
criterion of social development, namely, evenly shared,
balanced progress of an entire population toward enhanced
individual, segmental, and collective well-being;

2. correspondence between overt and covert policy objectives
and the general objectives implicit in the central evaluative
criterion of social development;

3. correspondence between overt and covert policy-relevant
value positions underlying the policy objectives and the
egalitarian, cooperative, and collectivity-oriented value
positions upon which genuine social development is
predicated;

4. correspondence between consequences of the policy for
target and non-target population segments and the general
requirement of social development for evenly shared,
balanced progress of an entire population towards enhanced
individual, segmental, and collective well-being;

5. correspondence between effects of the policy on the
selection, development, utilization, and investment of
resources and the requirements of social development
for balanced, non-wasteful resource development,
utilization, and conservation, geared to basic biological
and complex social and psychological needs of people and
the size of the population;

6. correspondence between effects of the policy on the
organization of production and the division of labor and
the quantitative, qualitative, and organizational aspects
of production and work upon which social development is
predicated;

7. correspondence between effects of the policy on the
distribution of social, economic, civil, and political
rights and the requirement of social development for
flexible, egalitarian distribution of these rights;
8. correspondence between consequences of the policy for the circumstances of living, the quality of human relations, and the aggregate quality of life and the general requirement of social development for evenly shared and balanced progress of the entire population with respect to these existential dimensions;

9. correspondence between consequences of the policy for transnational economic and political relations and the requirements of social development for avoidance of exploitation and domination of humans and natural resources in foreign lands and for equalitarian terms of foreign trade.

D. Synthetic Section: Generation of Alternative Social Policies in Conformity with the General Requirements of Social Development
Introduction

During the decade of the 1960's there was continually increasing interest in the programs of public welfare. This interest sprang from several sources. Citizens, always worried about welfare expenditures, developed resurgent concern. Recipients, long a quiet group, became more active, forming the National Welfare Rights Organization. And then there was the rediscovery of poverty as a social problem, and a realization that very many Americans were poor, many more than anyone had somehow realized.

The general interest in poverty and the measures used to relieve it had an effect on the academic community, generating some sustained and critical attention to public welfare by people other than those identified with the social work profession for the first time in many years. Of particular interest were the rates of welfare utilization and the amount of money the client on welfare received. The purpose of this paper is to review literature in the area of welfare utilization analysis, to present some new data in the area, and to present a hypothetical model which accounts for some of the differences in the data, and provides an integration of the mechanism used by welfare agencies to deal with the multiple contingency situation they face.

Four Studies

In an early report, Dawson and Robinson reviewed the public assistance programs within the context of state politics, and looked at welfare expenditures in relationship to socio-economic factors, "need", and some "political correlates." They found that social factors (urbanization, industrialization, foreign born, per capita income) were related positively to welfare expenditures. Using three measures of "need" (infant mortality, children without both parents, and youths not finishing schools), they found that "the extensiveness of welfare programs varies inversely with objective need."3

Gordon, looking at New York City, came to the conclusion that while there was much unmet need in the city "... the largest source of the increase in welfare stemmed from the increase in real grant levels..."4 This conclusion is based, however, upon a single city, and should be carefully considered as to its applicability to the...
nation as a whole. It represents, further, the public fear of conservatives, as well as perhaps the secret concern of liberals, about the effects of benefits which become "too adequate."  

Collins, in an extensive study, covers all the welfare programs. At some points, her results are different from those of Dawson and Robinson. Specifically, for the ADC program, she finds that per capita income has negative relationships to the per capita ADC expenditures, in contradistinction to the positive relationships found by Dawson and Robinson on total welfare expenditure (although Collins continues to get negative results with four federally aided programs combined). Further, using a somewhat different measure of "need" (per cent of children living with mother only, 1960), Collins finds assistance positively related to need as opposed to Dawson and Robinson's negative relation.

Perhaps the most complicated study is the one by Kasper. Looking only at General Assistance Rates, he attempts to develop a predictive model using residual unemployment ("the unemployment rate during the recent past"). These rather than the "differences in the average levels of payment in the states seem to be the major explanation of interstate variation in the proportion of the states' population receiving General Assistance."  

Looked at as a group, the studies are enlightening as well as puzzling. It is not surprising that beginning studies in a new area produce some contradictions. And it is not our purpose here to engage in critique. But there are some deficiencies which are common to them all, and which deserve consideration.

A primary area in which the current studies lack specificity is in providing regional controls. On many variables, the influence of region is well known. In the welfare field, one would not expect this influence to be any less. Therefore, in the data we present, four regions -- north central, north east, south, and west are also presented separately. The rather large differences we found not only in means but in correlation coefficients suggests this specificity would have been useful.

One other distinction seems necessary as well. Kasper anticipates it in his comment that "Although it seems there is a more clear-cut relation between the rates of GAP and the levels of payment in states which offer little assistance, we make no attempt at an explanation." The general level of the states' wealth certainly affects both the amount of need and the capacity of the state to meet need. Further, there is a "willingness" aspect observed through the degree to which a state is willing to tax itself to provide for welfare. While we have as yet no comprehensive measures of states on this variable, the very least one can do is divide the states into high and low
per capita income groups, and inspect, within each group, the interrelations of welfare and social variables. This we have also done.

A second area in which more discussion is needed lies in assessing the degree to which the program meets "needs." Dawson and Robinson, for example, argued that the program was not responsive to need as they measured it. Yet prior to this type of analysis one is required to assess, in a macro-system sense, the degree to which the program is meeting its mission. Particularly, we need to know how adequately the program is meeting the "demand" for its service. In some cases, such as telephone service, there is relatively little distance between the demand and the supply. In other cases, such as public welfare, there is a great gap between the potential enrollees and the actual recipients. The dimensions and meaning of this gap need to be explored.

Thirdly, the studies generally use a kind of macro-micro analysis pattern looking at the broadest measures of social structure and predicting the mean grant level for an assistance program. There is, of course, nothing in principle wrong with this style of analysis. In this case, however, the mean grant level, or the recipient rate, are all variables which are connected to the county office. To a degree at least, the relationships between the large scale system variables on the one hand and the average measures of use and payment on the other are mediated by an organizational level. People can be switched from one program to another if funding becomes problematic. At least one decision which administrators face is whether to fund many people at low levels or fewer people at higher levels. While we cannot now measure the impact of organizational structure directly, it is important theoretically to understand the interrelatedness of utilization, appropriation and, to an extent, service (as measured by caseload) because of their common organizational locus.

A fourth point worth taking into consideration is that welfare agencies in each state must and do secure a budget from the state legislature. Expenditure rates which exhaust this appropriation too soon may create problems. Kasper mentions this point in passing, noting that "...welfare agencies may be operating under a fixed budget." This may well introduce a series of constraints into the management of public assistance which has hitherto been unclear. In fact, as we will discuss later, it seems quite possible that the elasticity of the funds available for public welfare is much less than the elasticity of potential and actual demand.

Finally, the studies perhaps necessarily, miss the critical variable of change in the public welfare rates. During the sixties, and especially for the AFDC program, there were significant increments in the size of the programs. This increased pressure on the program
was alone sufficient to stimulate much discussion of the applicant rate, apparently under the assumption that these increments were "odd." But any study today would have to include a measure of the increments in the rates, as well as the level of the rates.

The purpose of this research report, then, is to add to the developing literature some exploration of the rates of public assistance in the various states in relation to each other, to the funding of public aid, to change in the number of applicants, and to the level of services provided under the program. In this case, service is defined as the number of cases per AFDC worker. In looking at these rates and their relationship to the societal (or state) context in which they exist, we shall attempt to take into account some of the difficulties with the previous studies.

Data and Method

For the fifty states and the District of Columbia a number of variables developed which were relevant to the public welfare system. We decided to focus on the AFDC program exclusively for several reasons. It is, of course, the program within which the largest average increments have occurred. Also, it is the program which, over all, is surrounded by the greatest controversy. The public is relatively willing to support the blind (Aid to the Blind), the aged (Old Age Assistance), the disabled (Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled). To a lesser degree, the public is willing to provide short term aid to people who are not covered by any federal category (General Assistance). Serious difficulty occurs, however, in the program for Aid to Families with Dependent Children with overtones of indolence and promiscuity which the public seems to instantly assert characterize the families. Finally, in a short treatment, looking at all five programs would have been prohibitive.

Basically, the approach presented here is correlational. A regression study has been undertaken expanding on the data developed here.

In line with the comments we made on the other studies, we have presented results for four regions (North East, North Central, South, and West). Also, because we believed that the fiscal capacity of the state was of importance in many ways for the welfare programs, we divided the states into two groups -- High and Low -- on the basis of per capita income. Using the mean per capita income of $3,200 per year as a point, we created two groups of 25 "rich" and 26 "poor" states respectively.

Findings

The Poverty Gap

As a first step in looking at welfare structure, we are
interested in knowing how closely the program comes to meeting the need for welfare assistance. There is no direct measure of people in need. However, the 1962 City-County Data Book does report the percent of families with incomes under $3,000 in 1959. This figure can be considered to be a population at-risk, and although the entire number would not be eligible for assistance, many would be, or could be. Hence, it provides a well-known, uncomplicated measure of poverty in the state against which the efforts of the program can be considered. Since the AFDC program is for families, there is a nice articulation of populations. The relevant data are presented in Table 1.

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These data are quite striking. For the nation, 23.5% of the families had incomes under $3000 in 1959. In 1967, there were 2.56 AFDC cases per 100 families. There is, of course, a discrepancy in the years. Nonetheless, there is still a significant gap, suggesting a rather large number of people who are in need, and who constitute a "pressure" on the public welfare system of a constant sort. It also means, as we shall see, that one can observe increases of 100% or more, and still be at a very low level of adequacy. It appears that our citizenry has never realized just how far from meeting needs the program was. People become shocked at large increments in utilization, large from the perspective of the program, but small in respect to the potential user.

The results by region and income are interesting as well. It is immediately clear that there are large differences in the distribution of poverty throughout the state groups, ranging from a low of 15.8% in the North Eastern States to a high of 32.9% in the Southern States. And, by definition, states high in per capita income have less poverty than those with low per capita income, 16.0% to 30.4%.

The rates of utilization, however, show some interesting shifts. Despite the fact that high and low per capita income states have radically different rates of poverty, their rates of assistance utilization are almost identical. This suggests that, regardless of benefit levels, poor states are making a relatively greater effort or are forced by the pressure of the greater numbers in need to do more. The correlation coefficients between the level of poverty and level of utilization suggest a similar theme. Interestingly enough, poor states show a positive relationship (.300) between level of poverty and utilization, while rich states show a negative one (-.269). It implies that within poor states, as the proportion of poor increases, there are modest increases in those on assistance.
In rich states, however, as the proportion of poor increases, the number on assistance shows a slight decrease. As we shall see later, there is apparently some trade-off between rate and benefit. Within poor states, increasing levels of utilization is associate with lower grants; within rich states, increasing utilization levels brings higher grants. It is not the case that poor states actually do more than rich states. Their greater "response" is relative, and at a very low level. Hence the greater poverty gap becomes an element of pressure in the system, to which there must be some response, and there is. But the response is actually quite inadequate.

**Pressure and Adjustments**

Pressure on the state welfare system comes, in one way, through the number of people using welfare. It has increasingly come as well through increased applications and thus increased welfare utilization. There has been considerable speculation about the cause of the increments experienced during the 1960's. Some have argued that the political pressure developed by the National Welfare Rights Organization has been a potent factor. Others have seen loosening eligibility through court decision and agency rule changes as key. Still others have argued that better benefit levels themselves have made welfare a better bargain, and induced people to leave whatever they were doing and become a welfare recipient. Doubtless each, as well as other factors are involved. However, two factors -- state climate as represented by region, and the massive pressure on the program as a result of the poverty gap seem of first order salience. Relevant data are presented in Table 2, which shows the interrelationships by region and state income of utilization and change.

**Table 2 About Here**

It is clear overall that the rate of increase in use of the AFDC program between 1964 and 1969 was very heavy. Nationally, there was a sixty percent increase, ranging from a low of 56% in the south to a high of 80% in the northeast. Interestingly enough, the rate in rich states was 20% higher than in poor states (69% to 51%).

These rates of increase are high, and one can easily see how, taken independently of any sense of the location of the total program in the system, they would be alarming. However, despite the magnitude of these rates, the AFDC program meets only a small amount of the potential demand. Significantly enough, that area with the greatest poverty -- the south -- shows the second lowest rate of increase (56%)
while the northeast and west, with relatively lower rates of poverty, show relatively higher increments (80% and 62%, respectively). It appears that a poor person living in the south would do well to make the investment (if he could) to travel north. These regional differences make clear that the fight over residence requirements makes some real differences to the state and potential users.

It should be remembered, however, that the large rate of increase evidenced in the northeastern group would not bring its welfare rates (See Table 1) up to that of the south, even if the south had had no increments. In this sense, it is the west, with the second lowest rate of poverty, the second highest rate of utilization and the second highest rate of increment, which becomes the area doing the relative most.

The correlation coefficients between increments and the level of poverty and utilization are presented in Table 2 as well. Nationally and regionally, there are only modest relationships between utilization and increments. However, in the northeast and west, change is positively related to utilization (.228 and .121) while in the north central and south groups, the relationship is negative (-.302 and -.258). One factor which the former state groups have in common is relatively low poverty levels, suggesting that perhaps wealthier state groups would be more tolerant of increments. This notion is supported by the coefficients in the rich and poor state groups. Within the rich states, there is a positive relationship between use and increment (.460) while in the poor states the relationship is negative (-.359). It may well be that poor states have certain maxima which can't be exceeded for financial reasons. Thus, in the poorer states, a higher level of utilization means that there is little room for change and increase. In the rich states, however, it could be that higher rates of use inspire more to use welfare, something for which the richer states have a higher tolerance. They may have as well a somewhat greater willingness to "help out" based upon a more adequate fisc.

This rate of change then, combined with the level of utilization, creates a pressure on the public welfare system. It is important to keep in mind though, that the weight of those increases, even at levels which exceed 50% is simply a slight manifestation of an immense latent pressure, which, to some extent, welfare administrators had been dealing with all along. However, rates of use and change are only one component of the situation. Another important part is how much people receive.

**Appropriations**

The adequacy of the program depends not only upon how many people are receiving some payment, but on the amount of the payment they are receiving. And the payment, as we and others have suggested, is related to the level of utilization and the degree of change. Relevant data are presented in Table 3.
For the nation, in 1968, the average welfare appropriation, per person, under the AFDC program was $37.00. There are, as expected, important regional variations. Grants range from a high of $49.34 in the northeastern states to a low of $25.12 in the south. One sees as well, the expected difference between rich and poor states. Despite the similarity of rates, the grants in the poor states average $29.49 as opposed to the grants in the wealthy states of $44.84.

The correlation coefficients are equally interesting. First, there does appear to be a relationship, though in varying intensity, between the grant and the degree of change. For the nation and the sub-divisions represented here, there is a positive correlation between these two variables. It ranges from a low of .044 in the west to a high of .724 in the northeast. We should immediately note, however, that the quick assumption that increased grants bring more people into welfare deserves the closest scrutiny. Indeed, it appears equally plausible that as more people apply and are accepted, more needs present themselves, resulting in higher grants. It is doubtless true, and wrong to deny, that a better benefit picture makes the program more appealing; but we should not use this "common sense" argument without thought, especially because the relationship between appropriation and utilization present a somewhat different picture.

For the nation, and several of the subdivisions, the relationships between utilization and appropriation are negative. It suggests an inverse relationship between the level of use and the grant. Where grants are lower, utilization rates would be higher. However, the relationship is not quite this clear. While an inverse relationship may characterize some areas, it does not characterize all. In regions with the highest, and lowest grants, there is a positive relationship between rates and grants. Using the rich and poor states as a basic pattern (southern states merge into the poor states) higher levels of utilization are positively related to grants for such states while in poor states the reverse is true. Generally, one might think of a situation in which the grant acts as a control in the rate of use. However, in the more wealthy states, there is greater ability to provide more adequately and hence, this control does not become operational. Indeed, as welfare departments attempt to improve the adequacy of their appropriations, this may well act to bring in some others, which may, over time, require the invocation of controls.22 We come back once again to one of the central difficulties faced by the assistance program -- it is so far from meeting needs that it continually faces a qualitative-quantitative dilemma.

"Service"

One aspect of program quality, of course, is the adequacy of the grant. Another one, and one much in dispute, is personal counseling.
service implicit in the use of a caseload administrative structure. We cannot, of course, assess the quality of the interaction between worker and client. However, using the assumption that the smaller the caseload, the more helpful the worker is likely to be, we can look at caseload levels. It would be appropriate to do this because caseload is something of interest to the welfare professionals as well. Relevant data are presented in Table 4.

Table 4 About Here

It should be understood, in considering the data of Table 4, that Federal guidelines for reimbursement require that a caseload of 60 is necessary. Hence, the national average of 65 shows the influence of this policy. And the range is only between 58 and 74. Further, it is useful to remember that the correlations behave in the opposite way than we are used to because the lower the caseload, the better things supposedly are. Hence the negative signs in many of the numbers.

Looking at Table 4, several points become clear. First, there is overall a "positive" relationship between appropriations and caseload, between increasing clients and caseload, viz., as the appropriations increase and the number of people serviced increases, the caseload decreases.

What is also interesting is that the level of utilizations is less clearly related to service than the previous variables. In four cases, there is a positive (negative) relationship. In the remaining three cases, caseloads increase as utilization increases. And finally, the relationship between the level of poverty and the provision of service is quite clear -- as poverty increases, so does caseload, with the single exception of the north central state group.

The rich and poor states show an expected pattern. As the former group provide higher grants, experience higher utilization and greater increments, service improves. Poor states have a similar pattern interrelationship to appropriations and change, but shift on utilization and poverty levels, where service deteriorates as they increase.

In general, it seems reasonable to conclude that positive orientations toward the provision of service are related to positive orientations toward adequate funding, toward greater tolerance for increased use and higher levels of use. If an area is positively disposed on one, it is likely to be positively disposed on another at least up to a point. Service, like the other variables in this respect, seems negatively related to the level of poverty. This general group of findings suggests that we should look at the ability and willingness of the states to fund welfare programs.
The Willingness and Ability of States

The concept of "willingness" and ability, however important, are difficult to measure. As a beginning attempt, we have used three measures -- the personal income per capita, 1968, state and local taxes, per capita, 1967, and public assistance expenditures, amount per $1000 personal income. Generally, it seems that the broadest measure of ability would be the wealth of the state. Willingness could be assessed by the amount that was actually expended, in relation to income. However, intermediate between the ability and the willingness measures is something which in a sense assesses both ability and willingness -- taxes, measured here by state and local taxes, per capita. In general, it seems that the first consideration in the amount which the state makes available for welfare would be the wealth of the state. The level of wealth, and the general willingness of the state to tax itself for any and all purposes, provides the pool of money from which the welfare money must come. Given the tax funds, public welfare interests, as other interests, must compete for allocations. Data relevant to these considerations is presented in Table 5. It becomes clear immediately that there are important differences in the capacity of the states to provide money for public welfare purposes.

Table 5 About Here

Indeed, the differences to us validate the initial separation of states into rich and poor. In the rich states, the mean personal income per capita is $3,697 while in the poor states it is $2,768. This difference, of just under $1000 per capita, is a very great one, and certainly means that poor states are not just in a statistically different group from rich ones, but have significantly less resources. In terms of state and local taxes, the rich states show greater willingness to pay more. State and local taxes are $334 per capita in the rich states, and $155 in the poor ones. And there is the expected difference in the amounts of welfare expenditures in relationship to the wealth of the state. More is expended in rich states than in poor ones. This simply suggests that rich states are not only more able to spend money, but more willing. It may well be that the greater ability is the cause of the greater willingness. It may also be that in a situation of relatively greater security, people are inclined to be a little more "charitable." The correlational data support this contention to a degree. The correlations between wealth and taxation are considerably stronger for poor states than for rich, which implies that poor states tax themselves relatively more than rich ones, although less in dollar amount. However, the relationship between tax and welfare monies is just the reverse. In that case, the rich states exhibit a stronger relationship between tax and welfare monies (.570) than poor states (.152). This suggests that rich
states are relatively more willing to spend for welfare than poor states. 24

Ability and willingness, however, need to be translated into actual welfare-tangible figures. Hence, we must look at these variables in relationship to poverty in general and then to utilization, change, appropriation and service. Relevant data is presented in Table 6.

Table 6 About Here

Initially, it is clear that poverty is negatively related to both ability and willingness. This finding is almost tautological, given the definitions, but is not as absolute and complete as one might have expected. For example, the level of poverty accounts for approximately 64% of the variance of per capita tax in poor states, and 4% of the rich states. Yet the level of poverty has essentially the same relationship and a very modest (though negative one) one on expenditures.

The relationship of utilization to ability and willingness is an interesting one. Nationally, there is essentially no relationship between utilization and ability. Yet as we break it down it appears that in rich states, ability and utilization is positively related (.554) and in poor states, it is negatively related (-.428). It seems that within wealthy states, as wealth increases, so does utilization. However, within poor states, increments in wealth are related to decreases in utilization. Given the fact that there is a positive relationship (.240) within the poor state group between public assistance expenditures per capita and the average appropriation, it could well be that poor states try to provide somewhat more money, at the expense of greater scope. This interpretation is supported by the correlations with change. Both ability and willingness have weaker relations in poor states than in rich ones.

Perhaps the most clear-cut relations would be expected between the fiscal indicators of ability and willingness at the state level and the actual appropriations. And indeed, the correlations are quite strong, as social science data go. Perhaps the interrelationships between ability and willingness can begin to be understood by inspecting the line of relationships between per capita income and appropriations. Overall, the relationship nationally of .657 implies that a reasonable relationship exists between state wealth and appropriation. Looking at the rich and poor controls, however, it seems that rich states have a weaker correlation than poor states (.125 vs. .516), suggesting that the wealth of a state is far less important
in determining grant levels in rich than in poor. These data support the previous inference that the wealthier states go for broader coverage, while the poorer states try to increase the grants (recalling that wealthier states have higher grants anyway).

The willingness to tax seems to be a powerful variable in relationship to appropriations, judging from the strength of the relationships. In states with a high per capita income, the relationship is lower than in the less fortunate states (.494 to .730). Again, it implies that willingness counts more when the ability is low.

Discussion and Implications

The results seem to make clear that one of our original suspicions, that studies of public welfare appropriations and utilization require regional and contextual controls seems amply supported. Even the apparently simple question of whether or not the program is meeting "needs" becomes complicated. In the overall sense, there is a clear gap between potential enrollees and the actual cases receiving assistance. Yet within this context, poor states apparently are trying, though inadequately, to respond. The difficulty lies in the fact that the poorer the state, the greater the need, and the less the resources with which to meet the need. The distinction between rich and poor states, with the different welfare behavior they express, bears this out. And it explains part of Kasper's finding, that relationships are more clearcut in states with little assistance.

To us, one of the most salient factors in the research is the gap between people receiving aid and those who potentially could use some aid. The existence of this large gap has, we think, a host of implications for the welfare system, implications which are largely ignored by other analysts.

First, it upsets the illusion that, because a program exists to help alleviate poverty, it must come somewhere close to the goal. As has been previously noted, we as a country simply have not come to grips with the real extensivity of financial need. Hence, as we think about the problem, we are surprised at extant levels of utilization, annoyed at the level of appropriations, and aghast at large increases in either. Automatically, we assume that people are leaving the work force in droves, that there is widespread cheating, that people are receiving too much money, and that social workers are "soft" and "bleeding hearts." The fact that over twenty percent of American families in 1959 were surely poor, and that this figure itself under-represents the number of children in need, somehow never permeates. And we have all been guilty of "under recognition." It seems most appropriate, therefore, to consider appropriations, utilization and change within a framework of great pressure and for practical purposes, almost complete inadequacy. Welfare administrators simply do not have the resources to deal with the problems of financial need in the context.
around them. The exact nature of this context, along such dimensions as the extensiveness of need, the level of utilization to which the state has become accustomed, the willingness and ability of the states to provide welfare funds, may differ, and does differ. It is for that reason that studies which consider the overall rate on a macroanalytic basis become contradictory. For hypothetical purposes, let us present an overall model of welfare operations which can perhaps account for some of the variations and uncertainties.

We shall begin with the understanding that the basic element in the welfare system is the money which the state has to use. The sources of welfare monies are three -- federal, state, and in some general assistance programs, local. And for purposes, here, the sources are only state and federal. There are different calculi involved in each of the funding sources. The basic element is that the federal monies come on a case supplement basis, with a limit per case but theoretically no total dollar limit. State money is part of the total state budget, passed upon by the legislature.

Based upon some estimates of "need" the state welfare department will submit its requests to the legislature, along with the other departments in the state. At this point, several considerations external to welfare enter. Welfare appropriations must compete with other programs for a limited amount of state dollars. In poor states, the problem of competition becomes especially acute, and even more serious because the poor do not have representatives in the state capitols lobbying for their interests. Further, our general ideology about the poor means that welfare administrators would be unlikely to ask for an amount which would have adequacy and extensivity. There is a sort of subjective limit to budget increases which is difficult to surmount, and this general hesitance only augments a specific hesitancy insofar as the welfare program is concerned. After some wrangling, a budget is accepted. Generally, it is what the department received the previous year, plus or minus a small amount. This appropriation is surely less than would meet need. But this is the money available, and this is the money with which the administrator must work.

One very important feature of the state allocation is that it appears relatively inelastic, viz., that there is relatively great difficulty in getting additional appropriations if the money runs out. There is no way other than calling a special session of the legislature. Invoking an extraordinary session of the appropriations machinery is a risky business under the best of circumstances. To do so for a group which is unpopular simply opens the whole situation up to "flack" at best, and could result (and has) in punitive changes in the program aspects governed by the state. For most practical purposes, then, the fiscal inelasticity means that the state department of welfare has to live within, or very close to, the budget approved by the legislature. This in turn means that the state budget is an effective parameter on state welfare spending. Given the set amount of money,
the state department can give more people less or fewer people more. If it gives more people more dollars and begins to run out, then it's in trouble.

The fiscal inelasticity, however, would not be a serious problem if the program were closely articulated to the need for its services. In that case, there would be small overruns which could probably be handled by the state departments of social services without much trouble. However, the situation with public welfare is exactly the opposite. We have shown that there is a serious chasm between those people helped by the program, and those who might be potential enrollees of the program. Certainly, there are important proportions of people who could be on welfare, but who, at any given moment in time are somehow "making out" without applying. This group constitutes a direct pressure on the organization (See Table 1). Then there is a larger proportion who at any given moment in time may not be eligible, but who, depending upon even slight changes in their personal and social circumstances, could well become eligible. Both these groups are very elastic. Hence, the elasticity of the "demand" or "need" is great, depending upon a variety of factors which the departments of social services cannot control. This is suggested by Table 2 which shows rather modest correlations between prior use and change. We thus have a situation where, depending on economic conditions, the presence of a strike, a spell of inclement weather, or whatever, can bring a number of additional people to the doors of the public welfare office making application for welfare benefits.

One further problem needs noting. Welfare administrators and professionals, like other people running programs, constantly seek to improve their program. One type of improvement in the program is to make the grants higher, and to cover more needs in existing grants. However, as this is done it is likely to make the program more attractive, and hence, draw more people from "making out" status onto the roles. This is perhaps one of the reasons for the positive correlations between change and appropriation, relationships which are higher than between change and utilization. It does seem that states try to respond, though poor states do so more inadequately. This can explain in part the bitter truculence which often erupts when clients and state fiscal officers get together. The clients point to the real, palapable inadequacies of the program, in both adequate and coverage terms. Officers of the state point to the degree of responses in both these terms which has been made, and to the limitations of the state fisc. Both are right. Across the board, intrastate increments in appropriations and increments in enrollees (change) are positively correlated (Table 3). It is true as well (Table 2) that the relationships between intrastate increments (change) and poverty are all negative. In sum, then, the department of social services operates in a situation defined by minimum to low elasticity on the fiscal ("supply") side, and medium to high elasticity on the need ("demand") side. Attempts to make the
program more fiscally adequate for the recipients means that such increases in supply as the administrators can negotiate will make the program more attractive to nonenrollees, increasing applicant rates, and putting stress on the ability of the program to meet demand at the new, higher level. Negotiating these troubled waters is one of the main jobs of state welfare administrators and their county counterparts.

Several options are available to welfare personnel in dealing with the complex situation of differential elasticity which we have been discussing. One pattern we observe is an inverse relationship between the rate of use (between states) and the grant. This obtains in northcentral states and in western states, and in low income states, and, in a mild way, for the nation as a whole (Table 3). This is the difficult choice between helping more people with fewer dollars, or fewer people with more dollars. Steiner comments

To put it another way, states may either stretch a fixed state appropriation to cover whatever number of categorical assistance applicants are found eligible.... But this does not assure payment to the client of a fixed amount because state funds may be finite and states may therefore pay clients less than fully budgeted need. States may not establish waiting lists in public assistance, but they may divide their money into smaller shares for more people.30

Another alternative, of course, is to seek more money. Success here depends on the ability and willingness of the state to provide more money, and there is some evidence from the tables that the more wealthy the state is, the more likely it is to be able and willing to increase coverage and benefits. However, there are, we are sure, maxima here which even wealthy states will not exceed. Especially as economic conditions cause higher prices and lower tax revenues, competition for the tax dollar will increase. If historical examples are followed, welfare is almost surely one of the first to endure "economies."31 This is virtually certain to be true when the "effect" of programmatic improvements is to create increments in the number of people using welfare, or the number of people using welfare brings forth new needs. This appears to be the case in high income states. Those states which have higher appropriations have higher use. However, it should also be noted that there are positive relationships between utilization and appropriation in the south and the northeast, the poorest and richest segments of the country, respectively. It suggests that the relationship between appropriations and utilization is curvilinear. In poor states with high poverty and low benefits, needs are great, and increments in utilization and grants are positively related. Increments in appropriation are not great. In the northeast which is the wealthiest area and spends the most for welfare, increments also bring more people onto the roles. In one case, greater pressure operates; in the other, greater willingness. So for diffe-
rent reasons, the poorest and the richest attempt to secure more money, while those in the middle effect some kind of "trade-off" between grants and appropriations.

**Summary and Conclusions**

One point should now be clear, viz., that easy answers to the question of "response to need" will simply not be forthcoming. The programs of welfare assistance in this country, which operate through the state and county welfare departments, (and these do not include all "welfare" programs by any means), attempt to meet need insofar as they can respond to it. However, the picture is a complex one, and must begin with an understanding of the great gap between program enrollees and potential needy. Within this context, it appears that attempts are made, within the state itself (and county), to balance needs, resources, adequacy, extensivity into a sort of continuing calculus. Hypothetically it appears this calculus is one of negotiating between inelastic fiscal support and an elastic need for welfare aid.

In developing the final picture for any state, the ability and willingness of the state to provide welfare benefits seems to be a factor. In general, states with relatively lower poverty levels and higher incomes have a greater willingness to provide benefits, which in turn results in more adequate coverage and greater rates of increase. It is probably better to be poor in a rich state than in a poor one.

In any case, it is the complexity of the interrelationships, rather than their simplicity that is impressive. It is clear that one program alone does not provide sufficient data -- we must ultimately consider all the programs -- federally aided and general assistance as well as such federal programs as housing, veterans benefits, etc. We can expect to find interprogram adjustments as the states try to balance out help to the various categories of eligibles. Our early thought that direct relationships between macro economic and social indicators and simple rates ignored the transactional activities of the welfare department seems to be borne out, and points to intensive study of the local welfare unit as a key element in much of the welfare process.

Assistance in developing this research was provided through a grant by the Horace Rackham School of Graduate Studies, the University of Michigan. Special thanks is given to Thomas D. Egan, Director of Research and Statistics, Department of Public Welfare, State of Montana. Phillip Booth, William Neenan, John Pﬁeffer and Penelope S. Tropman critically read earlier drafts.
FOOTNOTES

1. For one good study, see (Steiner, 1966).


5. Indeed, this old fear prompted the principle of "less eligibility" in Europe and England. In the words of Baron von Vought, of Hamburg, Germany, written in 1776, "It was our determined principle to reduce this support lower than what any industrious man or woman in such circumstances could earn; for if the manner in which relief is given is not a spur to industry, it becomes undoubtedly a premium to sloth and profligacy..." in Karl de Schweinitz, England's Road to Social Security (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1961), 92. In 1968, Kasper speculates that "Perhaps one result of receiving welfare assistance for a long period of time (or living in a neighborhood with many welfare recipients) is an increased preference for leisure relative to work." Kasper (1968:87, fn. 2 & Table 5:156).

6. Collins (1967:126 Table 6); Dawson & Robinson (1968:404 Table 10).

7. Collins (1967:126 Table 6); Dawson & Robinson (1968:402 Table 9).


9. Kasper (1968:94). He uses a dummy variable, 1 = eastern and northern states; 0 = rest.


12. This is the usual case, although there are some states which have the federal programs separate from the General Assistance Program, etc.

13. For example, Banfield comments: "And by keeping the effective demand for benefits within manageable bounds, it (the welfare bureaucracy) could also make feasible higher payment levels than could otherwise be allowed without swamping the system." He adds
14. A study is underway which has distributed extensive questionnaires to a national sample of county welfare directors. As the results become available, we will have a better understanding of this "transactional organization". For some study of these areas, see Sarri, et. al. (1970). Also, see Rosemary Sarri, Wolfgang Grichting and John E. Tropman, "Client Careers in State Departments of Social Welfare" unclassified report, Social and Rehabilitation Service, Department of Health, Education and Welfare (March 1969).

15. Kasper (1968:94). In our judgement he misses the significance of this point, however.

16. In a larger study, the author has welfare rates for all five programs for a sample of 350 counties within the United States. The research is currently in process. And looking at the inter-correlation matrix of the five programs for all counties, 1969, shows that the rates of utilization are positively correlated. Hence, one indicator program can be selected with a somewhat greater feeling of confidence. See, Sarri, et. al. (1970:167 Table 3:11), and Tropman (1974, 1975).


Low states are: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, Wyoming.

18. This figure has some "two adult" families, which would be ineligible but would tend to underreport families with large numbers of children who would be eligible.

19. Using the suggested figures by Mollie Orshansky (viz., $3,000 for a family of 4) 38.9 million persons (22.1% of the population) were in poverty in 1959. By 1966, this figure dropped to 15.4% which still constitutes a formidable pressure on the public aid system. Encyclopedia of Social Work, (1970) Table 16, p. 1580.

20. See Table 3.

21. Also, they tend to be the states with higher costs of living.

22. That is, that rich states may be more willing and able to tolerate higher grants than poor states, but they are not without any limit at all.

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23. Welfare money, of course, comes from the state and the federal government. However, the federal supplement comes on a per case basis, and hence, the basic calculus is determined by the amount of money the state provides.

24. Phillip Booth notes that the contrast between the condition of poor and rich is more visible and more extreme in rich, rather than poor states, leading perhaps to more public support.

25. The different marginal matching ratios between Federal and State grants may have an impact here.


27. There may be a "pecking order" for programs as well, with certain ones, education for example, having first priority.


29. One special device favored by state legislatures is the ceiling or upper limit on a grant for one or another program.


31. The actual budget may not be cut, but it may have to service more people. One first step legislators often take is to redefine need. Several states (New York, for example), have reinstituted residency requirements.
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1975a The Welfare Calculus, Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare (Summer)
1975b The Welfare Threat (unpublished, University of Michigan)

Wildavsky, Aaron
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Poverty (a)</th>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>Northeast</th>
<th>North-Central</th>
<th>South</th>
<th>West</th>
<th>High Per Capita Income</th>
<th>Low Per Capita Income</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent of families with incomes under $3000, 1959&lt;sup&gt;1&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>23.45</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>30.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utilization (b)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFDC cases per hundred families, 1967&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>2.56</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>1.89</td>
<td>2.92</td>
<td>2.66</td>
<td>2.54</td>
<td>2.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Correlation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty and utilization, r&lt;sub&gt;ab&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>-.00</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>-.27</td>
<td>.30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


TABLE 2: Percent Change, Aid to Families With Dependent Children (AFDC) Cases For a Five Year Period, Between June, 1964 and June, 1969, For All States and the District of Columbia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Change (c)</th>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>Northeast</th>
<th>North-Central</th>
<th>South</th>
<th>West</th>
<th>High Per Capita Income</th>
<th>Low Per Capita Income</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent of change, AFDC utilization, between June 1964 and June 1969</td>
<td>+60.0</td>
<td>+80.0</td>
<td>+47.0</td>
<td>+56.9</td>
<td>+62.4</td>
<td>+69.1</td>
<td>+51.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Correlations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utilization and change $r_{bc}$</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>-.30</td>
<td>-.26</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.46</td>
<td>-.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty and change $r_{ac}$</td>
<td>-.32</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>-.43</td>
<td>-.56</td>
<td>-.42</td>
<td>-.16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Calculated for each state from figures in Welfare in Review for June 1964, 2, 9 (September, 1964) and June, 1969, 7, 9 (November & December, 1969).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Appropriations (d)</th>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>Northeast</th>
<th>North-Central</th>
<th>South</th>
<th>West</th>
<th>High Per Capita Income</th>
<th>Low Per Capita Income</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Grant per recipient, 1968</td>
<td>$37.00</td>
<td>$49.34</td>
<td>$42.54</td>
<td>$25.12</td>
<td>$38.93</td>
<td>$44.84</td>
<td>$29.49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Correlations**

| Appropriations and change \( r_{cd} \) | .33    | .72       | .37           | .31   | .04   | .26                    | .20                  |
| Appropriations and utilization \( r_{bd} \) | -.06   | .51       | -.10          | .13   | -.04  | .26                    | -.30                 |
| Appropriations and poverty \( r_{ad} \) | -.32   | -.06      | .21           | -.00  | .11   | -.27                   | .30                  |

1 Average Grant, per recipient, *Welfare in Review*, 6, 6 (November & December, 1968) p. 29.
## TABLE 4: Level of Service to AFDC Families (Caseload) for the Nation and Subdivisions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service (s)</th>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>Northeast</th>
<th>North-Central</th>
<th>South</th>
<th>West</th>
<th>High Per Capita Income</th>
<th>Low Per Capita Income</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cases per worker, 1967</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Correlations

- **Service and appropriations**
  - $r_{ed} = -0.64$  
  - $r_{ec} = -0.40$

- **Service and change**
  - $r_{ec} = -0.68$

- **Service and utilization**
  - $r_{eb} = 0.03$

- **Service and poverty**
  - $r_{ea} = 0.63$

---


Note that while decreasing caseloads mean that service is better, this relationship arithmetically produces minus (-) signs on many of the numbers. Hence, these "negative" correlations are socially "positive".
TABLE 5: Ability, Willingness and Response of States in Funding Welfare for the Nation and Subdivisions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ability and Willingness</th>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>Northeast</th>
<th>North-Central</th>
<th>South</th>
<th>West</th>
<th>High Per Capita Income</th>
<th>Low Per Capita Income</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personal income per capita 1968 (f) 1</td>
<td>$3,224</td>
<td>$3,573</td>
<td>$3,350</td>
<td>$2,868</td>
<td>$3,329</td>
<td>$3,697</td>
<td>$2,768</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State and local tax per capita 1967 (g) 2</td>
<td>$294</td>
<td>$322</td>
<td>$303</td>
<td>$243</td>
<td>$335</td>
<td>$334</td>
<td>$155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expenditure, 1967 on public assistance per $1000 or 1966 personal income (h) 3</td>
<td>$41</td>
<td>$51</td>
<td>$39</td>
<td>$32</td>
<td>$45</td>
<td>$48</td>
<td>$34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Correlations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Correlation</th>
<th>Value</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personal income, per capita and state and local taxes, per capita r fg</td>
<td>.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State and local taxes per capita, and welfare expenditures r gh</td>
<td>.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal income per capita and welfare expenditures 1966 rfh</td>
<td>.31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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2 Ibid, #
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Correlations</th>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>Northeast</th>
<th>North-Central</th>
<th>South</th>
<th>West</th>
<th>High Per Capita Income</th>
<th>Low Per Capita Income</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poverty and Wealth $r_{af}$</td>
<td>-.84</td>
<td>-.91</td>
<td>-.86</td>
<td>-.92</td>
<td>-.76</td>
<td>-.56</td>
<td>-.77</td>
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<tr>
<td>Poverty and Tax Effort $r_{ag}$</td>
<td>-.79</td>
<td>-.42</td>
<td>-.16</td>
<td>-.90</td>
<td>-.73</td>
<td>-.22</td>
<td>-.83</td>
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<tr>
<td>Poverty and Welfare Effort $r_{ah}$</td>
<td>-.27</td>
<td>-.31</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>-.22</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>-.01</td>
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<tr>
<td>Utilization and Wealth $r_{bf}$</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.38</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.55</td>
<td>-.43</td>
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<tr>
<td>Utilization and Tax Effort $r_{bg}$</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.69</td>
<td>-.22</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.56</td>
<td>-.22</td>
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<tr>
<td>Utilization and Welfare Effort $r_{bh}$</td>
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<td>.83</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td>.52</td>
<td>.65</td>
<td>.25</td>
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<tr>
<td>Change and Wealth $r_{cf}$</td>
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<td>.22</td>
<td>-.12</td>
<td>.54</td>
<td>.52</td>
<td>.41</td>
<td>.32</td>
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<tr>
<td>Change and Tax Effort $r_{cg}$</td>
<td>.42</td>
<td>.65</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>.46</td>
<td>.47</td>
<td>.54</td>
<td>.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change and Welfare Effort $r_{ch}$</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>-.14</td>
<td>.39</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td>-.08</td>
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<tr>
<td>Appropriation and Wealth $r_{df}$</td>
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<td>.81</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.74</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.52</td>
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<tr>
<td>Appropriations and Tax Effort $r_{dg}$</td>
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<td>.90</td>
<td>.77</td>
<td>.69</td>
<td>.37</td>
<td>.49</td>
<td>.73</td>
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### TABLE 6: (continued)

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<th>West</th>
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<th>Low Per Capita Income</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Appropriations and Welfare</td>
<td>.52</td>
<td>.72</td>
<td>.57</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>.52</td>
<td>.60</td>
<td>.24</td>
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</tr>
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Introduction

As the clinical social worker to seven young divorced mothers I began to wonder why the lives of these women had become so remarkably unbearable. I compared the experiences of the women who were coming to me for group psychotherapy with about thirty similar divorced mothers who were also members of the West Side Jewish Community Center of Los Angeles. All the women were experiencing similar difficulties. I also explored some of the literature about the problems faced by divorced mothers. This essay is the culmination of my research. It summarizes some of my conjectures about the disadvantaged social status of the divorced mothers of the West Side Jewish Community Center.

Punishment is a strong word and yet I believe it is the application of punishment that explains the disadvantaged social position of the divorced mothers.

I intend to use both a dictionary and a behaviorist definition of punishment in my analysis. Webster gives the following definition of punish:

a): to impose a penalty on a fault, offense, violation.

b): to inflict a penalty for the commission of (an offense) in retribution or retaliation.

The behaviorists define punishment as either the presentation of an aversive stimulus, or the withholding of a potential reward, following a response.

In the balance of the paper I analyze why divorce becomes the onerous behavioral response, the offense committed by our thirty-seven divorced mothers, and how their divorced status elicits the specific punishments listed below. It is important to note that the punishments imposed upon the divorced mothers exemplify either the presentation of aversive stimuli, or the withholding of potential rewards. These punishments are inflicted by individuals
independently, and by individuals as the representatives of social institutions. More specifically, these punishments of the divorced mother take the form either of the paucity of adequate resources and services for her, or placing barriers in the way of her meeting many of her basic needs. It is hypothesized that the punishments are inflicted both consciously and unconsciously. The following are some of the specific punishments that I believe are experienced by the divorced mothers; these are intertwined in this essay's cause and effect analysis:

second class social status; social ostracism; becoming tabu; victimization by vendors of goods and services; depersonalization into a sexual object; recruitment into prostitution; pressures to relinquish children resulting in a loss of maternal self esteem; denial of, or strings attached to, meeting dependency needs; denial of economic subsidies; denial of basic services; social and recreational, day care, homemaker, counseling.

I believe that the divorced mothers become recipients of these punishments on an interpersonal level because they threaten many person's intrapsychic equilibrium around such issues as sexual roles, role of the nuclear family, and investments in monogamous marriage. I also believe that, even though many divorced mothers become the breadwinners of their family, as a group they tend to be lesser consumers of goods and services;\(^5\) again in payment for this fault representatives of some, if not all, economic and social institutions, flagellate the divorced mothers.

I hope that my analysis and its conclusions will provide hypotheses about the punishment of divorced mothers that can be tested by researchers. The absence of knowledge about divorced persons is a paradox in view of the current enormity of the problems. The Los Angeles Times\(^6\) reports that 16 million Americans are or have been divorced; 800,000 couples were divorced between January 1973 and August 1973. The newspaper goes on to report that one out of three marriages today will end in divorce. With so many of them in our midst it is almost shameful that society as a whole is largely ignorant about divorced persons; even therapists, usually married themselves, says Krantzler\(^7\) as quoted in the Los Angeles Times, have only an intellectual understanding of the utter desolation and paranoia that besets virtually all divorced people. Therefore, one of my primary reasons for writing this paper is to provoke research about the plight of the general population of divorced mothers.
Another important reason for writing this paper is to offer specific suggested programs and specific interventive strategies for social workers who plan to work with divorced mothers. The final section of this paper recommends such programs and interventive strategies.

Study Sample

At the outset let me delineate my study sample. The thirty-seven divorced mothers I have chosen to study are white lower middle, and middle class women between the ages of twenty-five and forty. Thirty of the thirty-seven mothers are Jewish. Perhaps these women may have different experiences than divorced women of other ages of their own class. Perhaps their experiences may also differ from those of divorced women of other ethnic groups and other classes. Their experiences differ from the widowed, who have no choice about their being single. All the women I am writing about feel some guilt about the failure of their marriages because they belong to a generation socialized into a religious "till death do us part", view of the marriage bond. The fact that social provision for widowed mothers through the federally sponsored Social Security Act exceeds that for divorced mothers provided by local welfare agencies may be society's way of excusing widows for their state while holding divorcées culpable for theirs.

To repeat, the women studied were also known to me either as my therapy clients or as members of the West Side Jewish Community Center of Los Angeles.

This study then is based upon a sample of divorced mothers who have sought out either social services, or therapeutic assistance, or both, for their problems.

Now that I've delineated my study sample as white, predominantly Jewish, middle class divorced mothers between the ages of twenty-five and forty, let be describe their problems.

Problems

The Fifth Wheel Syndrome

Commercial enterprises, churches, and schools sponsor many
events for unmarried teen-agers and young adults to encourage courtship and marriage. Contrast the services provided for teen-agers and young adults with "$3-pay at the door-singles parties in tacky restaurants" provided for the single and the divorced. The paucity of socializing opportunities for divorced mothers, the fact that most adult activities in our society are couple oriented forces divorced mothers into dependence upon their married friends: Unattached men are scarce in her twenty-five to forty year old age range and the matchmaking of her friends may be one of the divorced mothers few means of meeting one. An awkward situation can be produced when the match may be mismade because of incompatible sexual, social, intellectual or other interests. The divorced mother also seeks the companionship of intact families because in this fashion, at least for a time, her children are part of a family again.

In a world designed for couples the "fifth wheel" often sits like a mother-in-law in the back seat of the car of one of her sets of coupled friends, as she is delivered to a party. Punishment in this case takes the form of the subtle second class assignation of the back seat occupant, which she may feel either through her being subtly ostracized from the conversation or her sensing a condescending tone about her participation in it.

Even though the divorced mother may be willing to subject herself to being the "fifth wheel," even though her coupled friends tend to split into groups of all men and all women at their parties and social gatherings, there is a reluctance to invite the divorced mother because in general divorced women are viewed as seductresses.

Before we discuss the problems of the divorced mother being perceived as a seductress, let us leave the topic of the "fifth wheel" syndrome by looking at one of the ultimate ironies of our couple oriented society as described in Gail Parent's best seller, "Sheila Levine is Dead and Living in New York." As part of her suicide plot designed as a means of seducing her boyfriend into marriage, Sheila, the perennial "fifth wheel" wishes to cause minimal hardship for her surviving loved ones and so attempts to buy her own final resting place. The cemetery owner informs Sheila that plots are sold to couples only; she must purchase two plots in order to be buried in one.

The Seductress

Since many marriages are unstable the divorced mother can be
perceived as a threat to both her male and female married friends. Her divorce may be viewed as permission for her friends to take the same step. Behavioral patterns such as hysteria, suicide, and divorce have a tendency to become contagious. For many women of the generation to which the divorced mothers of this study were socialized, divorce remains pejorative because of the religious sanctions which were once imposed against it. At present, however, secular approach afford many examples of divorce, and thus makes divorce more permissable. The divorcee nonetheless becomes feared as a symbol of the potentiality of the dissolution of one's own marriage.

Many of her women friends are afraid that the divorced mother will seduce their husbands. An example of this was told to me by a colleague. After a woman neighbor became divorced, the men on her block found themselves accompanied by their wives when they departed for work. A corollary to this story was told to me by a divorced mother. She reported that after her divorce many of her friends' husbands dropped in for coffee. For reasons which will be discussed shortly it seems that the unprotected status of the divorced mother may tend to loosen a man's inhibition against the possibility of the divorced mother becoming his sexual partner.

At times the divorced mother herself, and the men with whom she comes in contact regress into adolescent sexual patterns. Because of her failure in marriage, the divorced mother often feels an exaggerated need to prove her sexual attractiveness and gives off more numerous seductive signals. Adolescent oriented men see her as an easy mark. After all, the divorced mother has already been a sexually active woman, probably desires sexual intercourse, and in his grandiosity, the adolescent man sees himself as the generous provider of the divorced mother's sexual needs.

Punishment of the divorced mother perceived as a seductress often takes the form of a kind of abuse practiced by adolescents. One divorced mother hungry for male companionship went on a blind date with a man recommended by her friend. Later that day she called me telling me hysterically that she's never been subjected to such humiliation. The man had driven her to Sausalito, twenty miles from her home, and then proclaimed either she go to bed with him or he would leave her stranded. Evidently her friend had misjudged the man she recommended and I had to meet my divorced friend and take her home.
The divorced mothers in my therapy group have all informed me that in Los Angeles all too many men no longer ask to take a woman out for a date. The man invites himself to the divorced mother's home for coffee and sexual intercourse and not necessarily in that order. In the movie "Blume in Love", Blume loses his potency after his divorce. His psychiatrist suggests ever so subtly that Blume may wish to try "sports fucking" to regain his virility. Both divorced men and divorced women may regress and experiment with this adolescent proving of one's sexual potency with its commensurate potential denigration of self esteem for being part of an object relationship rather than entering into an interpersonal human relationship. Becoming depersonalized into a sexual object therefore may be another form of punishment to which the divorced mother is subjected.

Another form of punishment which the sexually active divorced mother encounters is the physical punishment of her body because of the increased possibility of her contracting venereal disease. Each of the five mothers in my therapy group had a bout with some form of venereal disease. These more or less bourgoise middle class women suddenly find themselves on a clinic line suffering all the humiliation of their poorer sisters after they discover they have trichomoniasis, gonorrhea, or syphilis. One mother reported that she attempted to inform her sexual partner that he may have gonorrhea. His response to her was, "You fucking cunt, you're trying to shake me down".

At the Mercy of Materialism

The divorced mother receives no dispensation for living on about one half her former income. Even before her debts mount and her financial fluidity diminishes, perhaps in anticipation of this event, the divorced mother discovers that she must relinquish all her credit cards; her divorce has earned her a credit rating of zero. At a time when finances become most pressing many divorced mothers cannot turn to parents or relatives because of the dependency strings which would in all probability be attached to a loan or a gift of money. Some divorced mothers feel that asking for money means more degradation than facing financial disaster. Yet, with lessened income, the house or apartment usually needs repairs, the automobile breaks down, and medical and dental problems arise--the bills arrive relentlessly. One attractive divorced mother reported that when she told her daughter's orthodontist that she would now have difficulty paying his bill he suggested that she seduce one of her sugar daddies to pay the bill. While this mother didn't succomb to this suggestion
of prostituting herself, other divorced mothers do. Making her vulnerable to recruitment into prostitution is but another form of the punishment of the divorced mother.

Whereas in many cases a former husband can be, and is, a buffer, all too many divorced women are subjected to the ruthless exploitation of many vendors of good and services.

Although the recent phenomena of mothers rather than fathers giving up their children in divorce may be related to the liberation of women, many women give up their children because the family retains a greater financial capacity to provide for the children. This reason is offered in addition to the more obvious possibility that the father may be the better parent. One mother who placed her teen-age daughter in a foster home resented her daughter's weekend visits cause she didn't have the money to provide for her daughter's board and care. This particular mother screamed out to her therapy group peers, "If I'm ever to be reincarnated God, please don't bring me back as a mother." Subsequent therapy revealed that she had buried many of her maternal feelings. Although there were other problems involved, this particular women with a past history of deprivation chose to spend what little money she possessed on herself rather than to spend it on her daughter and then resent her.

The financial pressure which forces many divorced mothers to part with their children and suffer a loss in their maternal self-esteem is offered as another example of the punishment of divorced mothers.

Before moving to the explanatory underpinnings of all of these problems faced by divorced mothers, many of the previous remarks compel me to say a few words about the women's liberation movement.

Many members of the women's movement speak about the increased number of social policies designed to protect divorced mothers and they speak about the ever increasing capacity of divorced mothers to protect themselves. Although, in my estimation, these points are correct, it is dangerous to allow value wishes to be perceived as reality. Some members of the women's movement behave as if the goals and objectives of the movement have been achieved to a greater degree than current facts support. I regret to say that the problems I am reporting probably reflect not only the day to day realities of the mothers I am writing about but also probably reflect the day to day realities of divorced mothers generally. The paragraphs to follow attempt to explain from a broad social-psychological perspective,
the impact of at least five thousand years of history upon the present problems faced by most divorced mothers. To me it is ahistorical to believe that the current struggles for the equality of women will be achieved in the immediate foreseeable future merely because of the recent revival of this crusade. I ask persons concerned about the women's movement to please perceive this paper as a potentially plausible description of what is so as to be better prepared to bring into being what ought to be.

**Psycho-Social Causes of Punishment**

**Intra-Psychic Problems of the Divorced Mothers**

Although this paper emphasizes the infliction of punishment upon the divorced mothers, it is important to be aware of the intra-psychic difficulties many of them seem to share. Their intra-psychic problems probably predispose them to becoming the targets for punishment. The psychological problems they have can also be found among many of their unmarried and widowed sisters. It is my belief that because she has failed in her marriage the divorced mother is inordinately oppressed for having her particular set of psychological difficulties. The intra-psychic problems to be enumerated are primarily those of my therapy clients. My readings about divorced mothers in general, my contact with divorced mothers at the West Side Jewish Community Center, seem to confirm that many of the intra-psychic problems of divorced mothers in therapy are shared by divorced mothers in general. The generalizations I will state in the paragraphs which follow, however, apply only to the sample of thirty-seven divorced mothers who were members of the West Side Jewish Community Center.

Many of the divorced mothers had some difficulty in accepting their femininity. One very attractive young woman for example stated that her father would have preferred her to have been born a boy. His sons are not as bright as she is and he wished she could have been his successor as the owner of his business. It is my clinical impression that one of her underlying conflicts is being a woman yet wishing she could be more masculine and business like. Other divorced mothers also had underlying conflicts because their fathers had openly expressed preferences for sons rather than daughters.

Many divorced mothers revealed that they had negative feelings about their bodies. For some their sisters were preferred as prettier. One attractive mother whose occupation was actress and model flagellated herself at times because she was not as busty or bustier than many of
the women whom she viewed as competitors.

Another intra-psychic common denominator for many of the women in my therapy group was the paucity of significant involvement with parents. Some of the women had spent many years of their youth in foster homes and orphanages; others had to cope with non-giving step parents or non-giving biological parents. One woman described her parents as constantly battling. Many times the police stopped her parents from continuing their knife or frying pan wielding attacks upon each other. This particular woman is still trying to erase the psychic shame of being known to her neighbors, relatives, and friends as the daughter of the couple that staged the neighborhoods most spectacular marital battles.

A problem shared by those who had particular problems with their fathers was a tendency to seek older men as lovers and husbands. One woman was quite explicit about her sexual attraction to her narcissistic rejecting father. She expressed her thoughts about her conscious preferences for older men by saying, "If this is oedipal I feel good about it so why should I change it." This pattern did change during therapy, however, and she is currently dating men closer to her own age range.

Because of the problems enumerated, many of the women selected their first husbands either for the purpose of resolving problems of identity or to bolster their low self esteem, or to satisfy their hunger for a father. Others married the first reasonably acceptable man on the scene for the purpose of escaping from their abhorrent families. The husbands selected were wanting as exemplars of either psychic strength, or psychic health, or both, and the probability of divorce was exceedingly high at the outset of the marriages.

Generalized Fears Aroused in Others

The exaggerated tabu like avoidance of the divorced mother by many of her married friends suggests that her person symbolizes some deep threat to their psychic equilibrium. The analysis of the fear the divorced mother arouses in others will be developed from the perspective of the incorporation of sociological phenomenon into intra-psychic entities.

It is necessary to review our anthropological knowledge about the origin of monogamous marriage in order to understand the social threat a divorced mother may pose for both married men and for married women. According to the classic study of the family by
Bachofen, monogamous marriage came into being in the period between savagery and barbarism. Bachofen stresses that one of the most significant revolutions in history was the transition from mother right to father right. In exchange for her deliverance from group marriage and from its concomitant oppression, caused by a denser population which increased her responsibilities, and in exchange for her deliverance from being available as a sexual partner to the community of men who did not belong to her gens, women invented monogamous marriage.

Bachofen and Engels both stress that in a most unfair exchange women bound themselves to monogamous marriage while men did not. Men institutionalized prostitution and the double standard to preserve their sexual prerogatives of the era of group marriage. Simultaneously, in the rudimentary capitalism of barbarism, all accumulated material property was owned by males because of father right. As Briffault states it, the only economic asset women retained in the transition from mother right to father right was sex. Thus by giving up most of her economic assets, the bases for social power under capitalism, women chose powerlessness in exchange for monogamy. Furthermore, Davis writes that in western capitalistic society the sexual intimacy of a man's wife also becomes his economic property. The powerlessness of women is thus doubly concretized in monogamy: sexual intimacy one of women's few remaining sources of economic and social power, and their material economic assets all become their husbands' property. In this exchange the husband protects his wife from other males who may seek her out as a sex partner. The husband thus symbolically and actually protects his wife from again becoming a member of the community of women available to those men who have not in reality given up the right of group marriage.

It has been conjectured that the male's protective role in this exchange has a biological base. Horney for example suggests that females of all animal species seem to be less needy sexually than males and the males therefore develop various physical and social devices for keeping females available as sexual partners. It is possible that some of the recent essays that equate male and female sexual proclivities describe behaviors which in essence are alien to the natural instincts, of the sexes. Psychology has taught us that culture can counteract instinct, but at the price of the weakening of the instinct. To support this argument I offer the following information. Male baboons have an apparent biological predisposition to protect all female baboons and children from attacks. Despite
full cognizance of the danger of translating animal behavior into human behavior, from a biological perspective, it appears that for purposes of sexual intimacy and the continuity of family life, females may be biologically programmed to be protected while males may be biologically programmed to be their protectors.

In his "Totem and Tabu" Freud ingeniously re-acquaints us with the notion that an individual's neurotic behavior can be conceptualized as regression by him to the more primitive tabus of an earlier stage of development of his particular society. For this paper this principle can be generalized to state that in current society monogamy co-exists with more primitive marital forms. I hypothesize that the divorced mother may symbolize for both sexes a potential regression to the group marriage of barbarism. The logical question that arises, if this conjecture is valid, is why the divorced mother's regression to the status of group marriage poses such a deep intra-psychic threat to married persons of both sexes?

Specific Intrapsychic Fears Aroused in Married Women

Many married women fear their female divorced peers because they symbolize their own potential return to the onerousness and degradation of group marriage. One of my clients, for example, is ensconced in a tortuous marriage. She fears divorce because she doesn't want to be like her divorced neighbor whom she feels chooses to date many men to satisfy both her sexual needs and her needs to avoid loneliness. Many married women friends of the divorced mothers also fear them as potential seducers of their husbands. Again, I remind the reader about the married woman who accompanied their husbands to their cars when they departed for work because one of their female friends on the block and recently become divorced. It is almost commonplace knowledge that many divorced women become increasingly seductive in order to obtain renewed confirmation of their sexual and personal attractiveness. In reporting about the behavior of women in the age range of the population I am studying, the twenty five to forty age range, Gebhard states that divorced women exceed widowed women in the frequency of both intercourse and orgasm. It is because the divorced woman is more likely to have had an unsatisfactory marriage during the last years of her marriage, says Gebhard, that she is more likely to have experienced extramarital coitus. Gebhard goes on to say, "In this sense the divorced had a 'head start' on the widows who had no ready made sexual partners. In this age group, reports Gebhard, divorced women in contrast to widowed women are more likely to seek solace in purely sexual relation-
ships. Especially when the divorced mother's marital problem was sexual, either because her sexual appetite was greater than her husband's, or he was impotent, or both, she can find a friend or friends ready to serve her ungratified sexual needs. The male case workers of Jewish Big Brothers of Los Angeles report that more seductive signals are emitted from divorced women and divorced mothers than from widowed, married, and single women clients. The married woman, therefore, who may be concerned about some of her own sexual shortcomings, and who is aware of the increased seductiveness of many divorced women may fear that her husband is susceptible to being seduced by the recently divorced mother in her neighborhood.

The divorced mother may become a symbol of dependency for her married compatriots again stirring up the dread of regression to this status. For those women whose parents' pattern has been to give their children money or meet their children's dependency needs with strings attached, the prospect of regression to dependency becomes ominous. The anticipated alternative for the married women with this kind of background should they become divorced, and should they refuse parental support would be for them to become welfare recipients, also a dreaded dependency status.

Let us leave this rather brief discussion about the fears the divorced mother may stir up in married women for the moment and move ahead to the fears divorced mothers may stir up in married men.

**Specific Intra-Psychic Fears Aroused in Married Men**

After divorce, a mother no longer enjoys the zealous and jealous protection of a man. In a sense she is in a weakened almost defenseless state in relation to male sexual and aggressive impulses. Freud reminds us that we have the impulse to direct our sexual and aggressive drives against less powerful persons in the community. Society codifies behaviors designed to protect the weak, the dying, the sick, children, women in general, divorced and widowed women in particular. The divorced mother stirs up the primitive sexual and aggressive drives of some married men placing the men in an anxious state because of the conflict engendered between their impulses and their consciences. As a corollary to this point the discomfort such a conflict produces for these men may provoke them to further degrade the defenseless divorced mothers in vengeance. Reik explains this phenomenon when he says that we can hate someone because he or she is seen as the cause of loosening some of our more primitive impulses.
Now that we're moving closer to a discussion of the primitive threats the divorced mother may symbolize for men, it can serve as a lead into a subject deserving special attention, namely, the more deeply unconscious, more deeply significant intra-psychic threat the divorced mother may symbolize for both men and women. I refer to the notion that the divorced mother may be unconsciously perceived as either a castrator, a destroyer of life, or both. This is the subject of our next paragraphs.

Fear of Women as Castrators and Destroyers

Even if the fault is not hers, simply because her marriage has failed, many men view the divorced mother either as a female who fails to bolster male adequacy, or as a female who is a psychological castrator of males, or both. For persons of both sexes this fear of of women as castrators has deep psychological roots says Horney. She speculates that because women give life, psychologically, they can also be perceived as capable of taking it away. A discussion with one of my female students has led me to believe that the gravity of this responsibility may have been one of the unconscious causal factors of the shift from mother right to father right. I happened to have mentioned Horney's statement to my student and her spontaneous concerned comment was, "What an awesome responsibility." "I don't want to be responsible for that." The shift to father right may have been an unconscious choice women made to share this responsibility with men. It may have been women's means of attempting to ward off unconscious aggression by men toward women because of their supposed power over life and death.

The divorced mother may also be perceived as the destroyer of a relationship with her husband. She may be perceived as the destroyer of her family. She may reinforce fear of her by both men and women as a destroyer. The divorced mother probably wishes to ward off any connection with these capacities for the purpose of resecuring the safety of her projected position in relation to men.

Let us now broaden this intra-psychic analysis into a macro-system analysis in order to understand why the divorced mother is subjected to many degrading and humiliating experiences in her encounters with many societal institutions.

Social Sanctions

In a most provocative article Greenfield asks why materialistic
American society places such exaggerated importance upon romantic love. Romantic love is almost a national psychosis says Greenfield. Romantic love is the exception to the rule, the psychosis we allow, according to Greenfield, in order to produce consuming units known as families.

Evidence has already been cited which suggests that the middle class divorced mother becomes a lesser consumer of economic goods and services. The Los Angeles Times cites examples of middle class couples who refrain from becoming divorced because they foresee that they cannot financially manage the cost of maintaining two households, alimony, and child support. The Times article also highlights the fact that the woman's liberation movement has influenced some judges to render decisions which lessen a husband's financial obligations to his family. The Times cites one case where the husband's earning were thirty five thousand dollars a year and where the judge ruled that the wife and children should be supported for only three months, because the wife was capable supporting herself and the child. In addition to the "liberation" aspect of this type of ruling another rationale for this kind of decision is that judges wish to make financial support of ex-spouses and children comfortable enough to avoid the father's desertion. When the latter occurs it forces families onto the welfare rolls. Whether she receives some support from her husband or becomes a welfare recipient, the divorced mother and her now single parent family consume less economic goods and services than when they constituted an intact family.

It is because she is a lesser consumer and is somewhat defenseless in an economy not exclusively yet sufficiently controlled by males that she is sometimes denied credit, cheated, and is generally written off as an economic second class citizen.

Now that I have discussed my causal hypotheses about the humiliation, degradation, and outright ostracism, the punishment subtly and sometimes not so subtly inflicted upon divorced mothers, what interventive strategies are implied for social workers who attempt to help these women?

Interventive Strategies

Intra-Psychic Level

After divorce, women usually experience fragmentation of their
relationships to their significant others. In all too many cases parents are not sources of help or comfort because of potential dependency entanglements. As discussed earlier many friends are too threatened themselves to offer themselves to either support or even to listen to the problems of their divorced friend. The divorce, the withdrawal of significant others, the descent into a somewhat lower class position, all these losses become devastating blows to the woman's self esteem. These losses place the women into the paradoxical position of being at her lowest ebb having the need to grieve about her losses, with no one to talk to about them. As Fosburgh quoted Krantzler in the Los Angeles Times:

There are no services for the divorced, no courses on how to start a new life, no counselors to help you adjust to being single.

As mundane as obvious and as common sensical as it may sound, one of our first provisions for divorced mothers on an intra-psychic level should be the availability of psychotherapy for little or no cost. The West Side Jewish Community Center of Los Angeles, for example, supplemented the fee of a licensed clinical social worker to provide assistance to the greater than expected number of recently divorced mothers the Center discovered it was serving.

Provision of Societal Protection

Thus far we have been talking about how divorce places middle class women into a lower economic status. As part of a discussion about social provision for divorced mothers, it will be helpful to keep in mind that most successful social policies are those designed to serve persons of all social classes.

Like her financially handicapped poorer sister the rich divorced mother desperately needs assistance. Although coping with divorce is probably easier for a wealthy divorced mother, paraphrasing Will Rogers' comment about American's going to hell in automobiles, the wealthy divorced mother is probably going to her own form of hell, albeit in a beautiful house and as an owner of Porsche, Mercedes, or Rolls Royce. Even wealthy women who justifiably welcome divorce find themselves suffering many of the same problems experienced by divorced mothers of other social classes. An additional problem for many wealthy women is an inability to obtain the reliable services necessary for managing their business matters and estates. Social provision of services, therefore, must be provided for divorced mothers of all social classes.
The manner in which some of the divorced mothers I studied successfully cope with their problems offer clues for the provision of services to divorced mothers in general. The more successfully adaptive mothers take the initiative and move out to both single and married persons. Intuitively they seem to engage in their own counter-transference to the social world and say, "No, I am not tabu for all the reasons you attribute to me." "I will not be irrationally dependent upon you for financial, emotional and social assistance." "I have enough strength within myself to join you as an independent social equal." One divorced mother hosts frequent Saturday night socials. These serve to keep this woman surrounded by friends. This woman is fortunate enough, however, to receive enough income from her wealthy father, from her husband, and from her employer to be able to pay for her Saturday night parties. With these clues in mind we can attempt to develop policies for social provision for all divorced mothers.

If divorced mothers are being punished by society because they become lesser consumers of goods and services, the provision of money and social services to help re-integrate these women into society becomes crucial. Goode's research documents that most divorcees remarry. In order to assure this event with minimum damage to these women's psyche isn't it wise to give them the financial wherewithal to again rejoin the mainstream of couples as consumers? Provision of social services and money may achieve the same re-integration into society with less pain to divorced mothers than some of our current punitive attempts to achieve a similar result.

It is because many of the abuses she experiences result from her incapacity to wield economic power that the provision of money to divorced mothers is of primary importance. To assure the safety of whatever money she is awarded or does possess, consultation services would help her cope with legal matters, purchases, repairs, and the various other services she may require.

Since the socialization of most women does not include learning how to do their own repairs, it is suggested that an agency be established whose mission would be the provision of repair persons for divorced mothers. This service would be similar to the homemaker services provided for incapacitated mothers.

According to Toffler divorce should lose its perjorative status because it is increasingly becoming a transitional state. As one of my colleagues put it perhaps we should celebrate divorce as a commencement with as much ceremony as we do the commencement of
marriage. In order to give the divorced mother opportunities to re-
main in contact with, or to re-enter the social mainstream, or both,
settlements community centers, commercial enterprises, and any other
pertinent organizations should be encouraged to provide facilities
where singles and divorced persons can meet and perhaps eventually
mate. The "Parents with Partners" idea could be extended and viewed
as a core as opposed to a peripheral social service agency program.

The programs suggested are designed to increase the divorced
mother's capacity to defend herself against some of the punishments
mentioned throughout this paper. In many cases the adequate pro-
vision of resources and services may increase the divorced mother's
possibility of re-marriage if this be the life style of her choice.
In any event social provision should be designed to increase the
divorced mother's capacity to re-enter the social mainstream as
person first, and as consumer second.

Support of the woman's movement should strengthen the possi-
bility of achieving some of the aforementioned programs. The over-
riding contribution of the woman's movement, however, maybe the
equalization of the responsibility and power of men and women.
According to Engels\(^3\) it will be only after women become emancipated
from male domination and from male exploitation and truly become
equal that monogamy can become a reality.

I conclude this paper about the punishment of divorced mothers
by individuals and society by paraphrasing some remarks by Karen
Horney:\(^3\)9

Stop psychologically burning divorced mothers at the
stake. Because each of us is vulnerable, the flames
put to divorced mothers may ultimately lick back and
consume us as well.

**FOOTNOTES**

1 Many articles mentioned in Schlesinger's annotated bibli-
o-ography about divorced mothers were explored. The specific
reference to Schlesinger's book is: Schlesinger, The One Parent
Family (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969)

2 Hereafter the terms "divorced mothers" will refer to the
thirty-seven divorced mothers who were members of the West Side
Jewish Community Center of Los Angeles, California.


5. Bernard reports that women in divorced status are in low income brackets with a median income in 1960 of $2640. Also see pp. 19-20 of this paper. Bernard, Jesse "No News but New Ideas" Divorce and After, Bohanan, Paul. ed. (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1971) p. 8.


7. Ibid.


10. Fosburgh. op. cit.


14. Ibid.


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17. Horney. op. cit. p. 117


22. Ibid

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid.

25. Miller. op. cit. p. 82.

26. Reported to the author by Professor Bernice Shinoff of the University of Southern California School of Social Work and a field work supervisor at Jewish Big Brothers and by Harry Pannor, Executive Director of Jewish Big Brothers of Los Angeles.

27. Freud. op. cit.

28. Miller. op. cit., p. 73.


30. Horney. op. cit., p. 117.


32. Bernard. op. cit.
35 Fosburgh. *op. cit.*


38 Engels. *op. cit.*

LOW INCOME, ETHNICITY, AND VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATION INVOLVEMENT*

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ABSTRACT

Data on voluntary association participation among low-income members of major ethnic groups in the U.S. are reviewed. Low-income blacks are most likely to participate, followed by (2) whites and Mexican Americans and (3) Italian Americans and Puerto Ricans. Reasons for these ethnic differences are considered. More general factors affecting voluntary association patterns of low-income persons are also considered, and a means for increasing their voluntary association involvement is suggested.

Participation in voluntary associations has been shown to have a number of important effects, including increased likelihood of voting and other political activity (e.g., Sallach et al., 1972), acquisition of useful social skills (e.g., Lyden and Thomas, 1969) and development of a more positive self-image (e.g., Aberback, 1969). These effects are especially meaningful for lower income individuals, regardless of ethnicity. In addition, voluntary association activity is generally viewed as a necessary ingredient in community organization.

Williams et al. (1973:637-638) recently noted that "the literature related to the extent of participation among minorities is one of the most confusing." The relatively high participation rate of lower income blacks has been difficult for sociologists to explain, given the repeated research finding that voluntary association rates generally vary directly with income and other measures of socio-economic status.

Voluntary association researchers first suggested that black social participation may be in some measure "compensatory" in nature—reflecting an attempt to fulfill needs which cannot readily be filled in the larger society. According to this theory, those in lower-status positions affiliate and participate in voluntary associations for prestige, ego enhancement, and achievement restricted or denied them in the larger society (Williams et al., 1973:638). A related interpretation, recently suggested by Olsen (1970), is that members of a given ethnic community are brought together in associations as a result of

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heightened mutual awareness and cohesiveness. The latter may be stimulated by pressures exerted against ethnic community members by outsiders. Both the compensatory theory and the ethnic community theory are in opposition to the "isolation theory," which views ethnic group members as essentially marginal in the larger society, unaware of the functions of social participation, and hence unlikely to be association participants.

This paper will first review evidence concerning differential voluntary association involvement among major ethnic groups in American society. The discussion which follows focuses primarily on involvement in associations other than church and unions, since affiliation with these two types of organizations cannot always be viewed as strictly voluntary in nature.

ETHNIC VARIATION IN VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATION INVOLVEMENT

Overview of Existing Data

The urban setting generally appears more conducive to involvement in voluntary associations than the rural setting. However, research conducted in metropolitan settings has produced a considerable range in estimates of voluntary association involvement on the part of lower income individuals (and among individuals at higher status levels as well). Much of this variation appears to follow ethnic lines.

Findings since the late 1950's in regard to black/white voluntary association differences suggest that when socio-economic status is taken into account, the rate of affiliation among blacks is at least equal to, and often exceeds, the affiliation rate among whites. Lenski (1961), in his analysis of the impact of religious institutions on secular social institutions in Detroit, found that within each social class black Protestants who were active churchgoers were almost identical in their voluntary association participation (excluding union membership) to white Protestants who were active churchgoers. Correspondingly, black non-churchgoers were almost identical in their participation to white non-churchgoers.

Analysis of a generally low socio-economic area of Long Beach (the lowest on occupation and education levels of nine such areas of grouped census tracts in the metropolitan community--also a very low median family income) indicated that 53% of the blacks and 42% of the whites held membership in at least one voluntary association (church and union memberships included). Limiting the analysis to blue-collar workers in the area, black rates of affiliation with church-related voluntary associations were much higher than white rates. The difference was also rather pronounced for memberships in non-church-related associations (unions included)--38% of blue-collar blacks and 24% of blue-collar whites held such memberships (Dackawich, 1966).

The evidence from these studies is that participation on the part of lower
income blacks exceeds that of lower income whites. More recent research by Orum (1966) and by Olsen (1970) gives a similar picture for voting and political organization membership as well as participation in other voluntary associations. Similarly, Williams et al. (1973) report significantly higher rates of participation in voluntary associations among blacks than among whites who are similar on occupation, education, and other structural characteristics.

Apparently, the tendency for lower income blacks to be more active than lower income whites in voluntary associations has become more pronounced in recent years. Olsen (1970) compared data collected in 1957 for the Detroit Area Study with data taken from the 1967-68 Indianapolis Area Project. In both studies, black participation exceeded white participation when persons of similar socioeconomic status were compared; however, Olsen observes that this trend was apparently not as strong in Detroit in 1957 as in Indianapolis in 1968. He suggests that the "ethnic community" interpretation of blacks' voluntary association participation was becoming increasingly relevant by the late 1960's. Olsen also notes support for this thesis in his finding that blacks who identified as members of an ethnic minority tended to participate more actively in associations than non-identifiers. At the same time, Olsen notes support for the "compensatory" explanation of blacks' voluntary association participation in that racial barriers remain a significant fact of American life--informally if not formally. Thus, "...the compensation and ethnic community theses undoubtedly offer complementary, not contradictory, explanations of the tendency for blacks to participate more actively than whites of comparable socioeconomic... levels in many social and political activities..." (Olsen, 1970:696). Williams et al. (1973) concur with Olsen's conclusion.

Few data exist for comparing voluntary association involvement of other low-income ethnic group members with involvement of the low-income native white population. Gans' (1962) examination of Italian-American life in Boston's West End, where the socio-economic level was generally low, established that the large majority of residents did not participate in community organizations; apparently, church and peer group adequately served their needs. Puerto Ricans living in Spanish Harlem are described (Sexton, 1965) as rarely participating in the local Civic Association and never in the Council for Community Planning; block clubs, political clubs and unions are described as having been quite unsuccessful in drawing in area residents. However, how these groups compared to low-income whites in the same areas is not known.

Williams et al. (1973) have reported voluntary association data for Mexican Americans and Anglos living in Austin, Texas. Their data indicated that Mexican Americans were not significantly different from Anglos in social participation after variables such as education, occupation, and home ownership were taken.
into consideration. A recent study of below-poverty-level families living in both metropolitan and nonmetropolitan areas found that voluntary association rates among Spanish-speaking families were equal to or higher than the same rates among white families (Kutner, 1974). Thus, the "isolation theory" does not seem applicable to affiliation patterns among Spanish-speaking groups. At the same time, the significantly lower participation rates observed among Mexican Americans as compared to blacks remains a "major problem for future research" according to Williams et al. (1973:644).

Suggested Links Between Ethnicity and Voluntary Association Patterns

Based on the studies of voluntary association participation just reviewed, lower income groups can be ranked from most likely to participate to least likely to participate as follows: 1) blacks, 2) whites and Mexican Americans, 3) Italian Americans and Puerto Ricans.

As noted above, high participation by blacks can be viewed as the joint product of a desire to express ethnic identity (the ethnic community theory) and of a wish to gain access to social, economic and/or political rewards which are otherwise blocked (the compensatory theory). For example, both of these explanations seem to apply to the emergence since 1970 of black Lions clubs in Washington, D.C. Despite the history of a large black population in that city, the emergence of black clubs did not occur until after the city's riot of the late '60's, which signalled heightened ethnic identity. The fact that black membership in the Lions organization is segregated by neighborhood clubs indicates that there is not full access to the "rewards" of service club membership in that metropolitan area.

Lower income whites can be expected to participate in voluntary associations less conspicuously than lower income blacks, having neither the incentive of expressing ethnic identity nor of compensating for societal rewards denied them on the basis of race. On the other hand, Mexican American participation, it seems, should reflect these two incentives. Pride in own ethnic community is a more recent development among the Mexican American population ("La Raza,..." 1973); Williams et al. (1973) have predicted an increase in this group's voluntary association rates as feelings of ethnic community identification increase. However, because of a number of historical and demographic differences in the relative situation of Mexican Americans and blacks in our society, as well as differences for members of the two groups in ease of "passing" in a predominantly white society, neither the ethnic identity nor the compensatory impetus is likely to be the same for both groups.

Williams et al. (1973) have also predicted an increase in voluntary association participation among Puerto Ricans (and American Indians) if their sense
of ethnic identity increases. As with Mexican Americans, however, it seems unlikely that this group would experience the same incentives to participate as would black Americans of lower income status. In addition, Glazer (1963) observed that for the large Puerto Rican population residing in New York City, an effective substitute for the functions of voluntary associations was the Office of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico which organized the city's Puerto Rican community and provided services to it.

Finally, it has been suggested that the needs of Italian Americans in Boston were effectively served by their church and peer group—thus their low level of participation in other community organizations. At this point it seems appropriate to cautiously note the potential significance of the fact that this ethnic group, as well as Puerto Ricans and Mexican Americans, are likely to be members of the Catholic Church, which typically demands a high level of religious involvement from its members. According to Marx (1967), however, low religious involvement is likely to characterize blacks who affiliate with militant associations. Thus, Catholicism may provide a significant alternative to ethnic community assertion in the form of joining associations. Greeley (1974:181) has recently asserted that communal participation, i.e., membership in civic organizations, working with others to solve community problems, forming a community organization, etc., is "a specifically Protestant form of political participation."

More general reasons for relatively low voluntary association rates among lower income persons are suggested below.

**IF LOWER INCOME INDIVIDUALS DO NOT PARTICIPATE, WHY IS THIS TRUE?**

The position taken in this paper is that affiliation with voluntary associations is a complex phenomenon dependent to a certain extent on social and ethnic status but also on a number of other factors. At any level of the social structure it is useful to inquire into the forces discouraging and encouraging social participation. In view of the democratic role in society which voluntary associations are assumed to be capable of playing (e.g., Rose, 1954) and of the relation of voluntary associations to community organization goals, it is especially important to inquire into factors which may act to reduce motivation of lower income individuals to participate in such organizations. As with analysis of migration patterns, a "push-pull" framework seems useful. What is it about the individual that pushes him or creates a desire in him (or, oppositely, stifles desire in him) to affiliate with organizations? At the same time, what does the organization do to make membership and activity especially attractive to him or easier for him?

Lesser ability on the part of lower income individuals to perceive any personally functional significance of membership has rather frequently been
noted. A contributor to a collection of studies on the American workingman sums this up well: "...lower-status individuals knowing less about abstract matters... display less interest in and less desire for changing things... individuals at this stratum do not generally participate for reasons of status aspirations or because of a sense of civic responsibility, but only when they see the necessity for doing so...

(Cousens, 1964:230). At the same time, research by the same writer indicated that reasons such as lack of time and energy were ones frequently verbalized as explanations for non-joining, but more basic reasons included lack of familiarity with the mechanics of becoming affiliated with associations and inability to fully comprehend the stated goals of associations. The latter factors are as much related to insufficient "pull" being exerted by organizations as they are related to personal deficiencies.

Involvement in informal networks of social relationships (with relatives and neighbors) has been shown in some cases to be extensive among the lower strata (e.g., Cohen and Hodges, 1963; Cousens, 1964), and people who share strong family and neighborhood ties may not feel the need to turn to formal organizations. Attitudes existing within the immediate neighborhood concerning the appropriateness of voluntary association involvement may serve as positive or negative "push" factors for lower status individuals as well as for other status levels (Bell and Force, 1956). Limited research on factors related to affiliation by blacks with militant associations suggests the importance of such variables as degree of job support (Ross and Wheeler, 1971) and distinctive features of particular metropolitan centers (McWorter and Crain, 1967) in addition to low religious involvement and ethnic community identification.

Organizations themselves must assume the bulk of responsibility for their success in recruiting members and encouraging widespread activity among members. Blue-collar working-class residents of Detroit gave "never-having-been-asked-to-join" as their main reason for not having joined a block club--an organization supposed to be directly oriented to the local community. Less than 20% of the potential membership were members of school clubs in this same area; parents reported feelings of frustration generated by overly complex programs and by members' apparent lack of interest in them, and the leadership of these clubs apparently could not successfully orient activities to potential members' needs (Cousens, 1964). Unfavorable evaluation of the existing structure of organizations has been reported by other researchers as well. Factory workers in a New England city of 30,000 justified their lack of organization affiliation with the charge that "top cliques" too often dominate organizations in order to promote their own interests (Gordon and Anderson, 1964). Gans (1962) found in Boston that clique domination of organizations did in fact exist in the West End and that, in general, organization membership was attractive only when it
afforded an opportunity for peer group activity not available elsewhere. Similarly, the factory workers in the New England city expressed the conviction that an organization must be composed of the "right crowd" or it is not worth belonging to.

Most importantly, an organization must be perceived as an instrumental in meeting at least some needs of potential members. The first groups to achieve any significant level of activity in Spanish Harlem were ones whose main concern centered on economic issues such as obtaining jobs for residents (Sexton, 1965). In Michigan, farmers who were bargaining association members or "potential members" (those who had indicated willingness to sign a contract) were found to be more frequently dissatisfied than were nonjoiners (those unwilling to sign a contract) with their income from farming (McCalla and Feltner, 1967).

In addition to exerting "pull" on potential members, organizations may need to work at ways of insuring that all members are drawn into some degree of activity—e.g., a committee chairmanship within a certain length of time after joining. In the writer's own research on Lions clubs, no less than 46% of the membership of a club had held at least one office, even when the analysis was restricted to members of less than five years who belonged to large clubs (70 or more members) and who were of lower socio-economic status (Gates, 1965). This particular organization thus provides an impressive example of a voluntary association's ability to encourage active participation.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF WIDER PARTICIPATION IN VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS AMONG LOWER INCOME INDIVIDUALS AND RELATED IMPLICATIONS FOR COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION

Voluntary associations are frequently regarded as crucial vehicles for accomplishing individual, community and societal change. This view of the functions of voluntary associations has been particularly characteristic of governmental and philanthropic programs having the goal of improving the quality of life among disadvantaged population groups.

The specific level of association involvement most conducive to community problem solving has received little research attention, probably because the individual benefits of participation (increased social skills, more positive self-image, etc.) are generally assumed to be so important. The prevailing philosophy has been "the more participants the better." As Specht (1966:78) has pointed out, however, "decision-making, social planning, and social action can involve only a minute portion of any community. Many other means must be established to strengthen the whole fabric of life in low-income communities."

McClure (1974) has recently observed that virtually no attention has been given to the possible relation between neighborhood characteristics and participation in voluntary associations among blacks, and suggests that participation
should be viewed as a result of interaction between specific characteristics of individuals and neighborhoods. One of the most important aspects of black neighborhoods which should be considered, according to McClure, is the extent to which they are heterogeneous or homogeneous in education, income, occupation, and family structure. The former type of neighborhood is frequently created by residential segregation patterns while the latter is best epitomized by the public housing project. A third type of black neighborhood, which might be termed a "neighborhood of choice," is still very rare. The three neighborhood types are likely to differ markedly in voluntary association patterns and community organization goals since their incentives to assert ethnic identity and/or to compensate for various deficiencies are likely to differ.

Assuming that it is desirable for individual or for community development to supplement informal social relationships with at least some involvement in formal associations, a suggestion for increasing involvement among the lower income population can be offered. If organizations furnish sufficient "pull," it is quite possible that individuals who already belong to one or more associations (church, if nothing else) can be made interested in additional affiliations. Organization goals must be defined and interpreted in terms that are specific and reach lower income individuals on a personal level. Organizations which are oriented to the local community, function to cope with community problems, and, at the same time, remain sufficiently uncomplicated in structure are most likely to be attractive. Such organizations have the potential to generate interest and enthusiasm among lower income persons thereby encouraging them to assume responsibility for problem solving at the local-neighborhood level. Some assistance from professionals and/or agencies outside the community may be needed to locate potential members and to train them for participation and leadership, although this cannot substitute for "grass-roots" involvement and commitment.

FOOTNOTES

1. As used in this paper, the term "involvement" includes both affiliation with, and participation in, voluntary associations. An effort is not made in this paper to separate affiliation and participation or level of activity. Such an effort is not made for two reasons: 1) the literature on voluntary associations does not consistently make this distinction; 2) among lower income individuals, the fact of "being a member" may be as socially significant as active participation at higher income levels.

2. Church and unions are mentioned only when they are not separated from other voluntary association memberships in a particular study, or when membership in these two types of organizations is correlated with member-

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3. Unlike the concentration of blacks in large urban centers, persons of Spanish heritage live in every state of the union. Many in the Southwest are migrant workers. Thousands live in official anonymity, classified as illegal aliens.

4. Ross and Wheeler (1971) found that church membership was a good predictor of additional memberships among blacks in Tampa, Florida.

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We define social action as a strategy to obtain limited social change at the intermediate or macro levels of society which is generally used in nonconsensus situations and employs both "norm-adhering" and "norm-testing" modes of intervention.¹ In this formulation, the key concept is social change. This paper proposes to explore certain aspects of social change as they apply to social action.

The discussion is divided into two parts. The first is a brief summary of pertinent social change theory, presented as background for part two in which are presented and discussed certain propositions about planned change that are critical to any social action endeavor. This treatment, obviously, will not cover every subconcept of social change that is applicable to social action. Nor does it include a direct discussion of power, crucial as this is for social action; that requires a separate treatment of its own. Only five concepts are selected and discussed: social movements, crisis, conflict, resistance to change, and legitimacy.

Implicit in the above definition is the idea that social action is a strategy neither for revolutionary change nor for altering the behavior of individuals and small groups. Rather, it is for change in that interstitial area which goes beyond the daily modifications of interpersonal and small group behavior, but stops short of fundamental and radical transformations in the social structure. The purpose of social action is not to effect changes in the personality system or in the routine administration and management of formal organizations, but in the programs and policies of organizations and institutions. Moreover, social action directs itself to changes within social systems rather than changes of social systems themselves. "Change within the system refers to change that does not alter the system's basic structure . . . . Change of the system is any change that alters the system's basic structure."² In this sense, social action is liberal, rather than what Boguslaw calls radical social action.³

Change through social action differs from other forms of change. Being purposive change, it is distinct from natural or accidental change even though the latter also may have social and political consequences. It is a strategy of planned change, not a spontaneous, unpremeditated or accidental intervention in societal processes.
It likewise differs from those changes that occur as a result of cumulative innovations in technology, ecological and demographic shifts, urbanization, industrialization, and modernization. Furthermore, it differs from such other methods of planned change as social planning and community development.\textsuperscript{4}

The aim of social action is not per se and directly to change people's values and attitudes, however important this may be for lasting change, but to modify the policies and priorities of social, economic and political institutions. In this sense, it is social action, and not cultural or psychological action, although, except for analytical purposes, such a distinction is sometimes hard to maintain.

The nature of social change is greatly disputed. Equilibrium theories, conflict theories, evolutionary theories, and rise and fall theories seek to explain social change in their own particular terms. That there is a lack of consensus on the definition is understandable, given the many variables that must be embraced: change is wrought by natural forces as well as by human effort; it is both adaptive and maladaptive for the society, or adaptive for some parts of the society and maladaptive for others; there is large scale and small scale change; its pace is rapid or slow; its time span short or long; here it is ephemeral, there of lasting duration; it may be marked by a continuity or a discontinuity in the societal process; it may affect only one or many parts of the social system simultaneously.

Depending on their purpose, background, available data, predilections and selection from among this range of variables, theorists have stressed the influence of legal or economic forces, science and technology, demography, values and value conflicts, ideology, leadership, political forces, urbanization and industrialization, education, mass media, conflict, social movements or social planning as key causes of social change. Today, therefore, most sociologists hold that a variety of factors cause, expedite, impede, and prevent change. The appeal of grand theorists and classical explanations notwithstanding "there is no reason to suppose that all knowledge that would ever excite human interest can be included in one single, simple law."\textsuperscript{5} Unlike the law of gravity, as far as we now know, there is no one law of social change.

Subscribing to a multifactor explanation of social change, however, forces us to face the humbling fact that our present knowledge consists, to a considerable degree, in classifying and interrelating the many variables that affect the course of change. It means that it is impossible to give a rule of thumb as to how to effect change. As there is no single, usable theory of social change, the best that can be done at this stage in the development of the art is to offer certain propositions, the understanding of which is, one hopes, useful to the social actionist. This is what we will attempt.

**Social Movement**

The first proposition concerns the close relationship between social action and social movements. Many phenomena characteristic of social movements are also characteristic of social action, and the goals of the latter frequently consciously con-
tribute to the goals of the former. It is perhaps because social action and social movements have so many similarities that social actionists often find themselves supporting social movements. Insight into the genesis, sources, types, ideological foundations, organizational structure, and the career of social movements is thus valuable for the social actionist, for social movements are social action writ large.

Social movements are "socially shared demands for change in some aspects of the social order." They are based on the assumption that collective action can be more effective than the isolated activities of individuals. They depend on a group's shared values and objectives, and grow strong on generalized beliefs that challenge extant ideologies and institutions. Participants in social movements are thrown together in a common cause and a sense of membership in a group that usually develops its own structure and a division of labor between leaders and followers. They largely come from those groups who are dissatisfied with at least part of the dominant social order, and who challenge the legitimacy of prevailing values and institutions. They precipitate public controversy, crystallize issues, and at times polarize the citizenry. To be successful they must not simply reject existing values and institutions but propose a counter ideology and vision of how certain aspects of the society should be reorganized.

Social movements, thus, serve many social purposes: they force a crystallization of public opinion and promote a sense of solidarity among participants; they heighten the personal stake of citizens in the commonweal and provide a training ground in organizational leadership; when successful, they result in an accommodation between the demands of the participants and the rule systems of major social institutions. And even when they fail, they fulfill a broad educative function and inject into the society at large the ideologies and beliefs that fathered them.

Crisis

The second proposition concerns the role of crisis in social change. Although not always a necessary or sufficient condition, crisis often creates the demand for and facilitates the acceptance of change. The function of crisis in inducing change has received considerable attention in the literature. And this throws us into another sociological controversy. There is no unanimity among students of the subject as to whether the sources of change lie within the structure or are entirely extrinsic to it.

We think there is evidence to support the view of Parsons that "the potential sources of structural change are exogenous and endogenous -- usually in combination." Whether its originating conditions are internal or external, change is often preceded and accompanied by a situation of crisis and tension. In its simplest sense, crisis is a condition in which the human being, group or organization is no longer able to continue its accustomed way of behavior. Crises are interruptions of habitual ways, occasioning a loss of control. They demand that individual and group attention be aroused to meet an unusual situation. Agony in crises lies in this, that they demand full consciousness and attention to an event that threatens to sweep away

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the habitual ways we have for maintaining control over ourselves and the things around us. For this reason, during periods of crisis a group more readily accepts change and the intervention of a change agent who proposes to reduce the agonizing, to direct to new goals, to establish new programs and priorities, and to regularize life again.

Consistent with his theory of change, Nisbet insists that crises are always preceded and precipitated by a historical event which is invariably external to the social structure itself. Moore, on the other hand, argues that tensions or strains are often the "probable sites of change." Both views may be valid. We suggest that what is important to recognize is that tensions and crises are fertile soil for social change whether they originate internally or externally to the social system in question.

In suggesting a correlation between crises and social change we are not implying a causal connection, but simply that crises do tend to generate conditions that are sufficiently discomfiting as to precipitate change. It is the probability of a crisis situation inducing change that led recent strategists of social action to create conditions in which business as usual could not proceed. Norm-testing change tactics such as disruptive demonstrations rest on the likelihood that they will create crisis. It must be remembered, however, that resolving the crisis through change will not necessarily restore an equilibrium; change itself will almost certainly produce new crises and tensions just as it may have reduced past crises and tensions.

Conflict

The third proposition is that significant social change, involving as it invariably does a redistribution of power and privilege, rarely avoids conflict. "A conflict exists whenever incompatible activities occur." It arises from many sources: from scarcity of resources like money and status, or differences in information, beliefs, goals and values, or from different desires, interests, perceptions and priorities. Dahrendorf accounts for conflict ultimately in the authority relationships that obtain in every social structure. "The structural origin of such group conflicts must be sought in the arrangement of social roles endowed with expectations of domination or subjection. Wherever there are such roles, group conflicts... are to be expected." Social action usually seeks to realign that arrangement of social roles and scarce resources. When the action is contested and opposed, as it frequently is, the issue is joined and conflict ensures.

Conflict as a strategy does not invariably lead to the intended change. Coser's distinction between realistic and nonrealistic conflict is well known. Conflict may be so vague, meaningless and unlocalized, and so nonrealistic, as to be dysfunctional. Nonrealistic conflict is pursued, not as a rational means to achieve a change goal or as part of a planned strategy, but simply as a release of aggressive tension, and so is pursued as an end in itself.

Deutsch makes a distinction between constructive and destructive conflict.
Constructive conflict is not unreigned, but teleologically controlled. Destructive conflict has a tendency to escalate indiscriminately. Its consequences are difficult to predict, it courses beyond control, losing connection with its original purpose, it expands in numerous dimensions. The initial goal is displaced, the process of scapegoating let loose. A Gresham's Law of Conflict comes into play in which harmful and dangerous elements drive out those forces that seek to keep conflict within reasonable bounds. So called "absolute conflict" in which the end is the annihilation of the opponent rather than a mutually agreed upon settlement, is rarely, if ever, functional. Enduring conflicts of this kind are excessively costly for society and not the business of social action. If conflict is deemed necessary, cessation of conflict through a resolution and agreement by both parties is equally necessary. In employing conflict as a planned strategy, therefore, the social actionist should incorporate as part of the plan some concept of its settlement and constructive resolution, and this will usually, if not invariably, be through some form of compromise between the parties in conflict.

When used as a means to a known and attainable goal, conflict can be both functional and constructive. To use conflict in this way the social actionist must be able to pinpoint the issues that divide so that the boundaries of the fight can be clearly established; he must also recognize and clarify the basic areas of interdependence between the contending parties. Conflict is essentially an interactional process between parties who are interdependent. They need one another. Their interdependence defines, as it were, the ground rules for the contest; it enables the parties to become polarized over the precise issues and to stake out their positions without introducing goals, means or issues that are destructive; and it permits them to test one another and engage in a struggle with reasonable assurance that the entire social system in question will not fall apart.

In fact, the social system may, as a result of the conflict achieve a higher unity. Constructive conflict rationally pursued presupposes that the contending parties have accepted some rules governing their relationship and their hostilities. Out of the conflict can come a new set of norms governing their relationship and the society at large. As Coser observes, "By bringing about new situations, which are partly or totally undefined by rules and norms, conflict acts as a stimulus for the establishment of new rules and norms." This form of conflict can be socially constructive, offering the prospect, once it is resolved, of a closer and more meaningful bond between the conflicting parties.

Resistance to Change

The fourth proposition concerns the factor of resistance to change. Whenever social action pursues a course of significant social change, resistance to the change will be encountered, and must be contended with. Significant social change is invariably met with hesitation, ridicule, suspicion and rejection from powerful groups in the society. This is expected since social change of any consequence adversely affects the life situation of some groups. Resistance is behavior to prevent change or to protect an individual from the effects of change. The effects may be real or imaginary. Mechanisms of resistance exist both within the personality and the social system. The social system resists change, using such mechanisms as: (1) conformity
to norms, social norms performing for the social system the same resistance function that habits perform for the individual; (2) systemic and cultural coherence, the attitude that, since all the parts of the system are interdependent and attempts to change one part may have unforeseen detrimental side-effects, all innovations, therefore, should be resisted; and (3) rejection of outsiders, who are suspect of having different values and norms and so their proposals for change are not seen compatible with the social and cultural system in question. In general, as Allen summarizes, social systems tend to resist innovations which interfere with their basic needs of pattern maintenance and tension-management, adaptation, goal attainment and integration.

Resistance is stiffest among the vested interests, as they were dubbed by Veblen. The vested interests are fundamentally concerned with retaining the existing pattern of rewards and sanctions which are embedded in the established system of role expectations. These rewards and sanctions with their consequent gratifications for the vested interests may be in the political, economic or social realms. According to Parsons, the phenomenon of vested interests pervades all social change, change being possible only by overcoming the resistance of vested interests. "It is, therefore," he says, "always essential explicitly to analyze the structure of the relevant vested interest complex before coming to any judgment of the probable outcome of the incidence of forces making for change."

Equally pervasive and perhaps even more deeply entrenched are the guardians of traditional and, especially, sacred values and group ideals. It is, therefore, crucial to know and gauge a society's commitment to moral precepts and sacred beliefs as well as to organizational patterns. As Ryan says, "Innovations are generally tested against this 'moral order,' to assess their consistency or inconsistency and their supportive or destructive consequences for these aspects of life which are held dear and inviolable." This testing of innovations against accepted social norms is applicable to the secular as well as the sacrosanct; no change in any social unit escapes it.

Failure to recognize the stubborn persistence of cultural and organizational norms handicaps from the start the change efforts of the social actionist. Nothing perhaps is more important than that he clearly understand the norms of the organization and the value orientation of the social unit with which he is working. Otherwise he may find that he is totally unable to establish his authority with the change target. For him, therefore, the following questions are crucial: what values does the group hold most sacred? what norms and structures are most established and guarded? what functions do they serve? why are they adhered to with such persistence? will they facilitate or obstruct the change-goals? who are the guardians of the established norms?

It is worth noting that much of the literature on resistance to change comes either from the field of psychotherapy, in which resistance serves as an ingredient in the therapeutic process, or from the field or organizational and industrial psychology where the resistance of personnel is considered an obstacle to higher productivity and is thus sought to be reduced by educational and morale boosting efforts.
Likewise, cultural anthropologists and rural sociologists have pointed out how people in the developing countries have resisted technological innovation, as being in conflict with traditional values, and how mass educational programs have attempted to persuade them to integrate modern technology into their traditional world views. Social actionists face a different kind of resistance than clinical therapists, organizational psychologists, and cultural anthropologists. They face such groups as the economic and social elite, policy makers in public institutions and politicians that represent many powerful interest groups. How to reduce the resistance of these groups, when both the intended and perceived outcome of the effort is a redistribution of power, is something on which less is conclusively known and more systematic information is needed.

**Legitimacy**

A fifth proposition deals with one critical aspect of the concept of power, and that is its legitimation. Since social action is a vigorous questioning of the legitimacy of some aspect of the existing social order, the social actionist must establish his own legitimacy as a change agent. To carry this through to its successful termination in new change goals, he must establish his legitimacy with two groups: the underprivileged on whose behalf he seeks more power and resources, and the change target from whom he seeks to wrest some power and privilege. The underprivileged, although they may have most to gain by change, generally also stand the most to lose. The condition of most underprivileged could be worse as well as better, so that Marx's cry "you have nothing to lose but your chains" is not adequate to create a following and evoke a mandate to lead. The underprivileged more than others have been duped by high pressure salesman selling the London Bridge. They are not without mistrust of medicine men who walk out of the middle class with their utopian wares. The underprivileged want bread and butter on the table now, which utopias seldom promise and rarely deliver. What can the social actionist really and surely deliver? His hopes for gaining legitimacy with the underprivileged rest on his response to that question.

As for the change target, on whatever base the social actionist chooses to rest his claim to introduce change—tradition, rationality, charisma, or some combination thereof—he cannot effectively challenge those in positions of power without having legitimated his own role as a change agent. As indicated above, a group reserves its most stubborn resistance to those changes that are perceived to be incompatible with the traditional order and value system, and which seem to violate the most cherished and "sacred" cultural norms. A change agent must establish the compatibility of his goals with the larger value system of the group. Therefore, he must not only specify what he wants in terms of an action goal, but also clearly state the basis on which he rests his authority to change the established order in moving toward that goal. He needs to be clear himself and to answer precisely the following questions: by what authority does he act? what in him, in his program, and in his course of action, is he asking them to legitimize? to what order of authority are they likely to respond: traditional norms and customs, law and rationality, intellectual leadership and expertise, economic self interest?

Notwithstanding precise and clear answers to these questions, the social actionist may nevertheless expect that his questioning of existing norms will not go unre-
It is ironic that the rebuff is likely to come from both friends and enemies. That shrewd observer of politics, Machiavelli, noted this more than 450 years ago in a passage on changing a state's constitution. His statement has equal validity for any major change.

The innovator makes enemies of all those who prospered under the old order, and only lukewarm support is forthcoming from those who would prosper under the new. Their support is lukewarm partly from fear of their adversaries, who have the existing laws on their side, and partly because men are generally incredulous, never really trusting new things unless they have tested them by experience. In consequence, whenever those who oppose the changes can do so, they attack vigorously, and the defense made by the others is only lukewarm. So both the innovator and his friends are endangered together.

Conclusion

While the literature on the subject of social action is not extensive, there is a long history of articles and books that stretches back to the early decades of this century. Most of these pieces are either exhortations to greater involvement or descriptive presentations of social action and the stages that it generally encompasses. Only recently are serious attempts being made to study it conceptually and to relate it to its social science moorings so that it may serve as a more reliable instrument of planned change. This essay has attempted to contribute to this conceptual understanding. Techniques and tactics, and skill in using them, are obviously important in social action, but tactical skill must be joined to understanding and judgment. Effective planned change, ultimately, is a blend of intellectual analysis and skill in action. As Weber said of politics, it is "made with the head, but it is certainly not made with the head alone." This paper has stressed the head, the importance of intellectual analysis as a prerequisite to successful action. It points to the necessity of conceptually grasping the frequently complex fabric in which social action occurs. That fabric includes, among other major components, social movements, crisis, conflict, resistance and legitimacy.

One of Karl Marx's memorable dicta is: "Philosophers have interpreted the world; the need however is to change it." Over a hundred years have passed, a review of which makes us add to the Marxian dictum: the need is still to change the world, so let us understand it.

Notes and References


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THE MYSTIQUE OF EXPERTISE IN SOCIAL SERVICES:
AN ALASKA EXAMPLE

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A prime social service target group in urban Alaska is the Alaska Native (Aleuts, Eskimos, and Indians). Natives' recent urban migration represents a severely stressful transition, not only from rural to urban, but from one culture to another, and from one set of class and racial definitions to another as Natives learn that poverty and minority racial status are far more stigmatized in the cities than in the villages from which they come. These transition stresses are accompanied by serious problems of poverty, unemployment, underemployment, and attendant social and emotional disorders.

Because of the severity of the Natives' urban transition, I conducted a study of the responses of Anchorage social agencies to this client group. This paper deals with one facet of that study—social service technology for solving problems of urban Natives. I asked, what knowledge is available to social workers about urban Natives and how do they acquire and use this knowledge? I found that social workers' knowledge about urban Natives is even more limited than that for other client populations, and that social workers adapt to this limited knowledge base by promoting a mystique of expertise that has far reaching consequences for agency practices and client outcomes.

In this paper I shall examine the roots and manifestations of the mystique of expertise, its consequences for agency evaluation practices, and its consequences for clients.

The data for this paper, collected during 1973, stem from interviews with social agency administrators, social workers, and clients. Because even a small place like Anchorage (borough population was 143,000 in the summer of 1973) has myriad social agencies, I had to limit the number of agencies to make the study manageable. I arbitrarily eliminated agencies providing services for physical health, corrections, education, and children and youth (except for Aid to Families with Dependent Children and child protection). I focused on agencies providing services for mental health, income maintenance, manpower and training, housing, and social services (in its narrow concept of services traditionally provided by social workers). I identified
twenty-five agencies in these categories whose clienteles included at least 15 percent Natives. This comprises the agency sample plus two others that serve a large number but small proportion of Natives.

I interviewed thirty-three administrators and forty-six social workers from these twenty-seven agencies. I use the term "social worker" to designate those who have face-to-face contact with clients in the implementation of social services. The social worker sample includes twenty-one persons who bear the title "social worker," twenty-three persons who call themselves counselors, and two welfare eligibility workers.

Whites predominate in the staffing of the agencies. Only three of the twenty-seven agencies are Native-run; one is black-run; the rest are run by whites. Except for those in Native-run social agencies, all but two of the social workers in the sample are non-Native.

I and two research assistants also interviewed fifty clients from the sample agencies. Most of the clients interviewed had experience with several sample agencies. We used focused interviews, asking a standard set of questions but varying the order of the questions and the emphases of the interviews in line with special interests, experiences, and expertise of informants. Interviews lasted from one to three hours.

Roots and Manifestations of the Mystique of Expertise

It is widely known that social agencies lack a knowledge base for rehabilitating the poor; that knowledge base is even more deficient for urban Natives. Social work and psychiatric training provide little relevant background, and virtually no Native-serving social agency in Anchorage furnishes staff training in cross-cultural understanding, reflecting in part the lack of content for such training. Social and psychological theories about American Indians are not well enough developed to provide a foundation for expertise in the treatment and rehabilitation of Natives.

Considering that most social workers enter their field precisely because of an interest in helping people, I wondered why, in the absence of a firm body of knowledge, they did not turn to their Native clients for an understanding of Native people; all the social workers in the sample have considerable contact with Native clients. Yet, I found this practice to be nearly non-existent; social workers simply do not view clients as a reliable source for information about Native culture.
The reason for this, I believe, is that reliance on clients for information about themselves would expose the social workers' lack of expertise. This does not mean that social workers are dissembling when they assert an interest in helping clients, but that other values also influence their actions. As Friedson noted in an insightful analysis of professional values:

The occupation being the source of focus of this commitment, the individual is naturally concerned with the prestige of the occupation and its position in the class structure and in the market place. Thus empirical studies of undergraduate aspirants to the major professions find them to be not only interested in helping people ... but also interested in the high income and prestige they expect from their professional careers. Such findings seem to belie dedication and are treated by many analysts of professions with either silence or embarrassment.6

I found that it was not only a question of the operation of both sets of values but of the priority social workers assign them. While the majority of social workers in my sample complained bitterly about the many constraints frustrating their helping goals, when I asked why they remained on their jobs, they generally always referred to satisfactions gained from relatively high salaries and occupational position. Clearly, those who remain in the system give higher priority to career interests than to helping clients when these two goals conflict. Because advancing their careers requires promoting the prestige and reputation of their profession, social workers tend to promote the mystique of expertise rather than to help clients when such help threatens to expose the mystique.

Since social workers' occupational position and status, indeed, the very marketability of their skills, rests on claims to professional expertise, they face a dilemma. How, in the absence of technical expertise, do they prove their claim to it. They must assert their expertise not only to maintain their occupational position and status but also to achieve an inner sense of coherence and integration, which requires resolving this dilemma.

One of the chief means social workers use for resolving this dilemma is the substitution of ideology for technical expertise, expressed in the tendency to interpret Natives' problems and behavior from their own white middle class cultural perspective. The cultural bias in social work has been widely recognized. For example, Brager and Barr wrote: "The technology of social work like that of other educative professions is culturally bound and inflexible. The profession, inevitably owned and operated by middle class persons, has failed to take into account not only the differing needs but the differing style of low income persons."7

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Social workers showed no reluctance to discuss their interpretations of Native culture and behavior, but most talked about it in pejorative terms as deviations from their own culture, the superiority of which few questioned. Even some of the counter-culture staff members did not question the superiority of dominant society values regarding work, time, and money. Only one social worker, a black, emphasized the strengths in Native culture, placing special emphasis on Natives' valuation of family closeness, cooperation, sharing, and mutual aid. Most of the rest saw Natives only through their own cultural lenses as the following quotes illustrate:

Natives have no long range goals. They don't understand anything about planning for the future.

Natives don't understand the world of work. They don't understand our orientation to time, they have no clock orientation; they don't even have much experience, most have never done anything but fish.

Natives have been improperly socialized. They haven't even been socialized to drink properly.

Natives have no psychological awareness; they don't know how to verbalize or express their emotions.

The use of these culturally biased generalizations serves not only to convince social workers that they are knowledgeable about Natives and Native culture, but also that Natives are not a reliable source of information about themselves. Part and parcel of the social workers' cultural bias is the belief that Natives are social and psychological cripples. This belief effectively discredits Natives, in the eyes of social workers, as sources for information about their culture. In the few instances I knew of in which Natives volunteered feedback about their social agency experiences, social workers ignored it. Simeone, an Aleut resident of an alcoholic rehabilitation center and a very articulate assertive person, did inform staff members about practices he found culturally alienative, such as the expectation to directly expose actions and feelings about which he was ashamed. I later asked one of the counselors in the facility about his and other counselors responses to Simeone's confidence. He answered: "It doesn't matter what they (Native clients) say because our central task is to teach them how to verbalize and express emotions; nothing can deter us from that." The point here is not whether Simeone's ideas about effective treatment were right or wrong, but that the staff ignored them.

Social workers employ other distancing devices to insulate
themselves from client feedback. They require clients to meet them on their turf where Agency and social workers' rules, definitions, and interpretations of problems prevail. Under these circumstances there is little opportunity for social workers to learn about Natives' history, attitudes, urban adjustment problems, how they behave in a natural setting such as their homes (most home visits are for the purpose of investigation), and how Natives feel about agencies' services and social workers' behavior. This type of social worker control over interaction with clients has become so habitual that it operates nearly automatically, and social workers have come to think of it as natural rather than as a system for insulation. The pervasiveness of the insulation was revealed by a social worker after she was jolted out of this pattern of interaction. When accompanying a Native client to a meeting, she was surprised to discover the many subtle, demeaning ways Natives are socially excluded in an interracial social situation. For the past ten years that she had worked with Native clients, she had been largely unaware of this painful day-to-day reality in the lives of Natives.

In addition to insulating themselves from client sources of information, social workers also tend to affirm their status as expert by socializing clients to a role of humble supplicant. Social workers achieve this by treating clients in ways that degrade them. In his study of total institutions, Goffman presented compelling evidence about the pervasive process of mortification to which patients in mental hospitals are exposed, involving stripping patients of their rights, possessions, affirmation, satisfactions, and defenses. While less extreme in most of the agency settings I studied, I observed a similar process of mortification. Social workers delve into the most intimate details of clients' lives; for example, questions about their sex lives and last menstrual period. They tend to impugn clients' veracity by detective-like probing, an approach encouraged by administrators concerned about cautious distribution of resources. To weed out ineligibles, social workers question and demand proof of clients' allegations, and in some instances, spy on clients by seeking information about them from neighbors and other agencies. Clients are humiliated by these practices as the following quotes show:

They asked me over and over again and time after time why I left my husband and I told them because he was living with another woman. They didn't believe me. That was the hardest part for me. It blew my mind. I couldn't believe what was happening. They tore
up my application right in front of my eyes and threw it in the trash. They didn't believe a word I said ... (These experiences) made me suspicious about people. I decided I had to test everyone because you have to be leery about who to trust.

They make you feel like a beggar. Keep asking questions like why aren't you working, why aren't you this, why aren't you that. Don't they know if we didn't need help we wouldn't be there. We Eskimos aren't beggars. Oh maybe when we're drunk we beg, but only from each other. Why do they want to make us feel so low down.

Social workers think all Eskimos are dumb or drunks. They treat you that way even before they know you, always telling you what to do as if we can't figure it out for ourselves. And if you don't do what they tell you, then they threaten you, told me if I didn't go for treatment they would send me to jail, so I went to treatment where they told me if I didn't cooperate more they would send me to jail.

If clients want agency services, they learn to submit to these mortification processes and act the role of humble supplicant. Most social workers' image of the ideal client is one who does not complain and who shows appreciation. Such clients pose no threat to the worker's self-image as expert.

Mystique of Expertise and Evaluation Hiatus

Clearly, since social workers lack expertise, they and their agencies cannot risk systematic evaluation of their efforts. Local agencies and their parent organizations depend as much as social workers on the claim to professional expertise; their legitimation and financial support hinge on it; a systematic investigation of the effects of social services on clients threatens to expose the mystique of expertise. Consequently, an absence of expectations or requirements for systematic evaluation of social work success pervades the social service system at all levels. (Manpower and training agencies are exceptions, although their evaluations are generally limited to records of number of enrollees, placements, completions, and drop outs, and include virtually no follow-up.)

This is not to suggest that agencies evaluate no aspects of their work but that they eschew evaluating the effects of their services on clients. The kinds of activities agencies do evaluate--budget, number of recipients, number of staff, and use of staff time--serve as symbols for success which
deny the reality of widespread failure. In some instances the kinds of activities evaluated pose direct obstacles to helping clients, defeating the very goals evaluation is designed to effect. In an analysis of statistical record keeping in a state employment agency, Blau points out the powerful influence these evaluation criteria have on workers' behavior and some of the dysfunctions of these criteria.

The dysfunctions from current evaluation practices are quite apparent in public welfare where error rates are a central criterion for evaluating workers' performance. The emphasis on error rate stems from federal government surveillance (quality control) involving periodic investigations of errors. The discovery of errors in case openings that exceed the allowable 3.5 percent rate can result in the loss to the state of as much as $40,000 in federal matching funds for each error. This evaluation criterion applies not only to eligibility workers who make the decision on applications but also to social service workers. While constrained by law from conducting direct investigations of recipients, for example, seeking information about a client from a bank or neighbor, an implicit injunction to "catch chiselers" operates among both social workers and eligibility workers. This emphasis on error rate generates social worker attitudes of suspicion toward recipients and leads them to act aggressively in their attempts to trap clients. By applying this evaluation criterion to social workers' performance, agencies create pressures for social workers to behave in alienative ways that clearly undermine their helping goals.

Whether or not agencies provide financial assistance, staff members are generally evaluated on use of their time. In state agencies, staff members must keep records of number of phone calls, memos, letters, conferences, and client contacts. They are also evaluated in terms of grooming, staff relations, and quality of work. The "quality of work" criterion usually functions ritualistically. Supervisors were generally unable to articulate the criteria they apply to evaluate quality of work and became uncomfortable and at times angry when pressed on this point. A typical reply was: "Well, it depends on the worker, on his strengths and weaknesses. You have to get a feel of the person. I can't tell you what criteria I use." I encountered not a single instance in which supervisors systematically evaluated quality of work in terms of workers' success with clients. Thus, while busily engaged in the act
of evaluating, agencies avoid the central test of their worth—success with clients.

I do not mean to minimize the obstacles to evaluating social service effectiveness. Agency objectives are often intangible or stated in such global terms that they belie measurement. It is difficult to select indicators of success. Is an alcoholic who increases his sobriety cycle from three days to two weeks a success? Is the placement of a child abused by his parents in an inadequate foster home a favorable outcome? Is the placement of a seasonally employed Native on a demeaning year-round job a successful outcome? But the existence of technical obstacles only explains why evaluation of social service success is difficult, not why agencies do not try to overcome these obstacles and devise as adequate systems of evaluation as possible.

The most compelling explanation of agencies' resistance to evaluating the success of their efforts with clients is fear of exposure of multiple failures. Although few administrators or social workers overtly acknowledged this fear, I found abundant evidence of it on a covert level. I encountered considerable defensiveness when I asked administrators and staff about their evaluation system. I found this question to be more sensitive than any others. Several informants abruptly changed the subject when I asked about their evaluation systems. One responded by jumping from his chair and making tea after which he invited another staff member to join us, and the issue was lost. Several others replied in an accusatory voice as if I were suspect for asking the question: "I don't believe in using figures or statistics where human beings are concerned." Still others charged me outright with having asked a loaded question. There was other evidence: staff gave more contradictory information on this issue than any other; the assertions of some administrators and staff members about evaluations and agency effectiveness were vigorously contradicted by others as well as by clients.

This evaluation hiatus in social services, that is, the avoidance of assessing success with clients, protects social workers and administrators from equating directly with their deficiencies in technology and knowledge. It also protects them from exposures that could jeopardize their professional standing and organizational funds. In these ways, the evaluation hiatus masks this agency pathology.
Consequences of Mystique of Expertise for Clients

The mystique of expertise finds expression in the substitution of culturally biased conceptions for genuine understanding, the discrediting of Natives as sources of information or feedback, socializing Natives to a stigmatized status, and avoiding evaluations that could serve as a basis for correcting these agency pathologies. These practices often have devastating effects on clients. About one-third of the clients in the sample exhibited social and psychological pathologies that could be attributed in part to manifestations of the mystique of expertise.

Cultural biases often give rise to agency policies and practices that consistently undermine Natives' sense of worth and integrity. Consider the Alaska State Housing Authority regulation prohibiting visitations to tenants that extend beyond two weeks. John, an older Eskimo resident of a low cost housing unit in Anchorage, was baffled at trying to figure out how to handle an anticipated visit by his mother. How could he tell her to leave after two weeks when traditional Native hospitality entails open-ended welcome. This same regulation forced him to refuse a request for a home from his daughter's high school friend from the same village. This girl had become very depressed in her white boarding home. John was very eager to give her a home but housing regulations forbid it. Shortly after the girl learned this, she dropped out of school and returned to the village. This regulation runs counter to the very basis of Eskimo norms regarding hospitality and to the system of mutual obligations. Rather than building on such strengths in Eskimo culture, public housing policies disregard and even degrade them, depriving an Eskimo like John of even the opportunity to actively transmit these positively valued traditions to his children and, of course, depriving John of a basis on which his esteem and sense of pride depends.

White-run alcoholic rehabilitation facilities provide other illustrations of culturally biased practices. Many workers in these agencies show little awareness of cultural difference in the meaning attributed to drinking. In many Native villages, drinking has become a dominant symbol of group solidarity. This is quite apparent in the Aleutians, the culture area with which I am most familiar. After the Russians introduced alcohol in the mid-eighteenth century and in the same period prohibited ceremonials, Aleuts appear to have substituted the drinking bender for aboriginal ceremonials. Aleuts drank to celebrate the end of fishing or hunting season, a holiday,
a name day, or simply when a batch of home brew matured. In the past, drinking was seldom accompanied by violence or other community disruptions; non-drinking adults watched over the children of drinkers. But when traditional social structures and institutions disintegrated as a consequence of white contact, drinking became progressively less controlled. Today Aleuts, as well as other Natives, express ambivalent attitudes toward drinking. On the one hand, it constitutes a primary symbol of group solidarity; on the other, it threatens to incapacitate individuals from performing social roles. But the point here is not whether the drinking represents a clear-cut positive cultural value to Natives, but that social workers generally fail to understand the meaning of drinking to Natives.

One difference in meaning is that while Natives usually do not see drinking as comprising their total identity, social workers tend to define them as if it were. When Natives are not drinking, they work or engage in other activities, and they view each other in terms of these activities. In a village I studied where drinking was widespread, villagers identified only one of their number as alcoholic. However, when Natives are found drunk on Fourth Avenue, the Native drinking center in Anchorage, police frequently refer them to alcoholic rehabilitation centers where they are defined as alcoholics and treated as if that were their totality.

Once in the treatment facility, in addition to being labelled alcoholic, Natives may also be labelled emotionally defective because they organize and manage their emotions differently from white professionals. Natives tend to place a high value on avoiding overt expressions of negative affect, usually managing such emotions in indirect and covert ways. Aleut cultural norms, for example, strongly disapprove of complaining, worrying, or dwelling in troubles. "Get up and do something" is the common Aleut injunction to a complainer or worrier. Getting drunk may be considered a more honorable way to handle troubles than fretting or complaining. But most treatment facilities, following the principles of insight therapy, emphasize direct expression and exploration of emotions, especially anger, an orientation that is culturally alien to many Natives. Those who fail this expectation are sanctioned, usually in subtle ways, and treated as if they are emotionally defective. Simeone, whom I mentioned earlier in relation to giving the agency feedback about culturally alienative practices, said: "The women have it easier than we do. All they have to do is shed a few tears to get the counselors off their backs. But we have to lose our tempers or stand up publicly in front of strangers at AA meetings and demean ourselves by chest beating."
That runs against our cultural grain. We have only a shred of pride left and that wipes it out." To be labelled alcoholic and emotionally defective for behavior that is culturally acceptable is a mortifying experience and also dysfunctional for adjustment to the cultural peer group.

I do not mean to deny the importance of drinking problems among Natives or to criticize agencies for addressing these problems. Nor do I mean to imply that the cultural issue is the only relevant one in the treatment of Native drinking problems. Some of the dysfunctional features of alcoholism are universal. But I do mean to suggest that treatment that fails to take into account Natives' cultural patterns and attitudes toward drinking is doomed from the outset, and furthermore, it creates additional problems for Native drinkers by stigmatizing them and defining them in culturally alien ways.

Examples of culturally biased definitions and practices appear to be flagrant in child welfare services. Some of the most disturbed members of my sample began their careers as agency clients many years ago when they became victims of the uninformed, culturally biased social work practice of removing Native children from their homes and villages. Indeed, the abduction of Indian children by social agencies has reached scandalous proportions nationwide. In a recent survey the Association on American Indian Affairs reported that in states with large Indian populations, 25 to 35 percent of all Indian children are removed from their families and placed in foster homes, adoptive homes, or institutions—and over recent years the problem has been getting worse. I encountered this practice in an Aleut village I studied where public welfare social workers, confusing poverty and cultural difference with social deprivation and psychological abuse, removed nineteen Native children in a fifteen-month period. This represented nearly one-third of the minor children in the Native community. In addition to the trauma of being separated from their families, these children faced enforced migration to strange and distant places; most of these children are placed in urban foster homes and institutions. This practice, which affected 14 percent of my client sample, set in motion a chain of traumatic events. Here is Tatiana's story.

When she was five years old, a public welfare social worker visiting her village removed Tatiana and her seven siblings from the home while the parents were away drinking. The social worker was apparently unaware that drinking is acceptable in many Native villages and that non-drinking adults frequently keep an eye on the children of drinking parents. In any event, when the parents
returned home that evening, they found the house empty and no one in the village knew the children's whereabouts. In response to the parent's desperate plea on the shortwave radio for information about the children, the public welfare agency contacted them, explaining that they removed them only temporarily and would return them in several weeks. Only one child was ever returned to the parents. Another was given for adoption. Four were dispersed in separate urban foster homes and institutions. Only two remained together, Tatiana and her sister, placed in an urban children's institution.

About seventy boys and girls, predominantly Native, lived in Tatiana's institution. As it was isolated from the town, the inmates seldom had the chance to socialize with town children. The Christian group that ran the home was quite restrictive, prohibiting televisions, comics, and many other activities in which ordinary children engage. Tatiana and the other children in the home shared a burning desire to find out how other "normal" children lived. When the children reached their early teens, they began to rebel against their restrictive environment, frequently running away from the home to join town children. There were so many runaways, Tatiana said, that the home was closed.

Tatiana was then placed in a succession of white foster homes, but her needs were no better met in these settings and she continued to run away from the homes, joining peers in the town. (State regulations for foster homes, based on middle class standards, render most Native homes ineligible for foster care licenses.) When her social worker called her a tramp because of her runaways, Tatiana said she decided to try to convey to the woman what her life had been like. "I thought she would help me if I could make her understand what it felt like to be taken from my parents when I was five, separated from my brothers and sisters, living apart from other kids my age in the town, and then placed in strange homes that made me feel uncomfortable and frightened." But Tatiana's efforts only angered the social worker who rejoined, "No excuses for your wildness, you are incorrigible." And promptly she filed incorrigibility charges against fourteen-year-old Tatiana.

Since there was no youth detention center in town, Tatiana was placed in the adult prison to await court hearing. Not only frightened and bewildered, but ashamed to her core because, although she did not understand how she came to be considered a criminal, she figured she must be rotten through and through, Tatiana slashed her wrists. But this had no apparent affect on hastening the court hearing. Tatiana spent five months in the adult prison awaiting her hearing, after which she was sentenced to seventeen additional months.
in a juvenile correctional facility in another state. Upon her return to Alaska, although no charges were pending, Tatiana was placed in an Anchorage youth correctional facility.

Tatiana felt an uncontrollable rage. She began to fight her peers, sometimes with knives, and spent most of her seven months there in solitary confinement. Then a probation officer took special interest in her case and advocated and won her release.

I met Tatiana shortly after her release. Her chief concern was that her rage would continue to erupt in uncontrolled ways. She confided her recent attempt to stab her boyfriend.

Tatiana said that of the seventy children with whom she grew up in the institution, all but five are alcoholic or drug addicts, some are prostitutes, and most have been in and out of jails. Of the entire group, Tatiana said she is the only one holding a steady job.

Tatiana's experiences, as well as those of other clients, show how the agencies tend to operate in self-fulfilling ways. By treating clients as worthless and subjecting them to mortifications, clients come to behave in ways that fulfill agencies' preconceptions and biases. In essence, agency pathologies become transformed into individual pathologies as clients internalize the agencies' view of them, or resisting it in the way Tatiana tried, as clients face rages that threaten violence.

**Summary**

Social workers and administrators tend to mask the inadequacy of their knowledge base by promoting a mystique of expertise rather than directly pursuing knowledge. They are discouraged from acknowledging their limited knowledge for several reasons. It threatens social workers' professional authority and standing, and thereby undermines their ability to market their skills. It also threatens administrators' authority and professional standing which hinges on the claim to professional expertise. Further, it threatens organizational survival if funding sources become convinced that agencies lack the knowledge for achieving their goals.

In the absence of adequate technical knowledge about the Native client group, social workers tend to substitute ideology, that is, their own class and cultural perspectives. They protect themselves from evidence that contradicts their
biased perspectives by discrediting Natives as sources of information about themselves and thereby insulating themselves from Native feedback. To further affirm their status as expert, they socialize clients to the role of humble supplicant.

The system for promoting the mystique of expertise is perpetuated by the failure to evaluate success with clients. Parent organizations and administrators pose virtually no requirements or expectations for evaluating workers' success with clients. The mystique, thus protected, is an entrenched agency pathology which becomes converted into client pathology as clients internalize the agencies' culturally biased, derogatory view of them.

FOOTNOTES

1. This study was funded by the Community Service and Continuing Education Program, Title 1, Higher Education Act of 1965.

2. This paper is adapted from one section of my report, The Urban Native Encounters the Social Service System (Fairbanks University of Alaska, Institute of Social, Economic and Government Research, 1974).


4. The research assistants are Nettie Peratrovich and Jane Reed.

5. There are some exceptions to this. Alaska Psychiatric Institute has involved its staff in collecting and discussing date collected by staff in field trips to Native villages. Other agencies may give an occasional seminar or workshop on cross-cultural relationships.


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HUMANISM AS DEMYSTIFICATION

by ALFRED McClung LEE, Professor of Sociology Emeritus, Brooklyn College and the Graduate School, The City University of New York

Under a variety of labels, many academic disciplines focus on the unsettling impact of fresh and vivid interpersonal experiences upon pre-existing beliefs and behaviour patterns. Reference is to philosophical discussions of sophism and humanism, historical theories about frontier influences, anthropological interest in culture shock, psychiatric concern with empathy and with perceptive listening, and sociological analyses of marginality, uses of participant observation and life-history data, and clinical studies of social behavior. Their significant similarity is that they are all discussions of demystifying influences on social thought and action. They are demystifying in the sense that they tend to translate the distant, the abstract, into immediate, specific, and personal terms. They throw traditional patterns into contrast with what is here and now and with quite different traditional formulations.

When this demystifying impact can be constructively absorbed, it moves individuals from—even tears them out of—a cultural context. It furnishes opportunities for the re-examination of value commitments, of ways of viewing oneself and others, of ways of behaving. It draws attention 'to the relative, unstable and conflicting character of political institutions, social usages, religious beliefs and even moral standards and ideals.' It makes for greater creativity and cosmopolitanism—when it is constructively absorbed. It can stimulate others to pointless cynicism or rebellion.

One of the two fragments remaining from the extensive writings of Protagoras of Abdera is often said to encapsulate the fifth century B.C. humanist and sophist viewpoint: 'Man is the measure of all things, of the existence of things that are, and of the non-existence of things that are not.' The first clause of this statement in particular has been echoed down through the ages by humanists as well as by their critics. In contrast with his own commitment to essences and absolutes, Plato quotes Socrates as speaking satirically about sophists. He said they argued out of the 'superfluity of their wits.' Plato also has Socrates caustically pontificate that for Protagoras—secretly, among his own disciples only and not in statements 'to the common hear': 'all things are said to be relative . . . out of motion and change and admixture all things are becoming relatively to one another, which "becoming" is by us incorrectly called being, but is really becoming, for nothing ever is, but all things are becoming.' This Platonic sneering, this anti-intellectualism, is a sample of the innuendos with which elitist philosophers have tried to destroy the teachings of such sophists as Protagoras, the one who 'gave a philosophic basis to Democracy.'
Who were these people? Those called sophists, the 'wise ones,' came to Athens some five centuries before our era and then later to Alexandria chiefly from the Greek frontiers in Ionia (Asia Minor) and Magna Graecia (South Italy). The settlers on those frontiers were adventurers and fugitives from wars against invaders of Greece. Generations there had had culture-stripping and culture-rebuilding experiences in their relations with diverse tribes. They had had direct participation in social change—in other words, clinical experiences with social and cultural reorganization—thrust upon them. This gave to at least a few a creative marginality in their intellectual stances, especially when they went to the great centers of commerce and learning. Theirs was intelligence coloured by culture shock, a reflection of perceptive listening to others from quite different backgrounds. They had participated in expanding trade and colonization, and in diverse personal intimacies that included exogamy. For them, traditional tribal values had been mediated or replaced by more cosmopolitan interpersonal and community identifications. The main mission of the sophists, as it appears in retrospect, 'was to teach, to clear up the mind of Greece, to put an end to bad myths and unproven cosmogonies, to turn thought into fruitful paths. . . . The whole movement was moral as well as intellectual, and was singularly free from . . . corruption and lawlessness.' Toward the gods, the sophists could be at least agnostic. As Protagoras put it, 'With regard to the gods I cannot feel sure either that they are or that they are not, nor what they are like in figure; for there are many things that hinder sure knowledge, the obscurity of the subject and the shortness of human life.'

Protagoras's ideas were as outrageous to the Platonists as they have been ever since to anxious seekers after dependable bases for authority upon which to erect controlling and controllable ideologies. 'The truly modern attitude towards most questions singularly resembles the general point of view of the Sophists. It has taken humanity well over two thousand years to recover from the influence of post-Sophistic thought and to get back into this salutary frame of mind.' Sophist ideas, such as those mentioned, contain the main thrusts of humanizing experiences, the experiences which have from time to time in human history contributed such invigorating and demystifying impacts upon social thought.

During its long subsequent history in social thought, humanism as a term has shared the following characteristics with those used to label other major generalities: It is shiftily, and it is sticky. It has had many definitions. It has been alleged to adhere to almost all sorts of other ideas, and it has also been shown to be opposed to each of them—whatever it was! These problems of the term can best be seen by realizing that it most accurately labels not a body of doctrine but a kind of mind-changing social experience. It is a recurrent ingredient in social movements, not a specific idea or social philosophy.
Basic to this sense of humanism as humanizing experience are one-to-one confrontations and then friendships with quite different sorts of people. It depends upon those relationships being continuing enough and egalitarian enough to result in the development of a degree of efficiency in intercommunication and at the same time of a reciprocated ability to empathize. Granted such relatively intimate contacts, this type of experience tends to dissipate notions of personal and group superiority. It opens new perspectives on human talent and worth. It can even reveal to those who are patient the human bases upon which mankind has been stumblingly developing the beginnings of participant democracy.

Humanism has figured in a wide range of religious, political, and academic movements. As such, it has been identified with atheism, capitalism (especially of the laissez-faire brand), classicism, communism, democracy, egalitarianism, naturalism, positivism, pragmatism, relativism, science, scientism, socialism, statism, symbolic-interactionism, and supernaturalism, including versions of ancient paganism, Hinduism, Buddhism, Judaism, Roman Catholicism, Protestantism, and Mohammedanism. It has also been rationalized as being opposed to each of these. It has served as an ingredient in movements against each. And these terms do not at all suggest all of humanism's ideological and social associations.

That humanism has had so many adventures is, on the one hand, a tribute to the persistent human inclination to suspect or to perceive that the problems of life are actually human responsibilities—for better or for worse. This recurring tendency, on the other hand, has preoccupied generations of theorizers who have tried to anaesthetize the humanistically tempted into depending rather upon either a supernatural agency or, as that imagery has grown pale, upon an all-controlling natural order far beyond human control or manipulation.

When defined as simply and as etymologically as possible, humanism refers to 'thought or action in which human interests, values, and dignity are taken to be of primary importance.' It is thus a preoccupation with what is most relevant, significant, and important to human beings. It is concerned primarily with individuals, with human expression and creativity, with human society and socializing, and with people's ability to persist and to flourish. This kind of thinking has emerged and has had great influence at times when international migrations and commerce were bringing people of diverse backgrounds into close contact with one another—in situations of participant observation and of perceptive listening.
Along with supernaturalism and naturalism, humanism has been called 'one of three rival claimants to philosophic allegiance.' Notions of anthropomorphic agency, notions of an unconscious and automatically acting natural system, and notions of humanism are three germinal threads that run through recorded human thought. Each implies a basis for its own authentication as well as a criterion for the rejection, reinterpretation, or incorporation of the two others. Since social theorists so often find it plausible and rewarding to mix two or three of these threads, their separate characters are difficult to detect, spell out, and discuss. To a degree, it must be done—if it is to be done at all—rather arbitrarily, in terms of ideal types. At any rate, in its simplest notion, humanism humanism as a fresh and more accurate expression of interpersonal experience typically has implications unsettling to the status quo in any society. It is critical of and often antagonistic to both supernaturalism and naturalism in their myriad forms. Especially in this century, humanism provides bases to criticize the dehumanizing and depersonalizing implications of both the natural sciences and absolutist metaphysics. When humanist perceptions are absorbed into a supernatural or a nature-centered ideology, they lose this annoyingly critical potential. In such an unstable mix, the composite can appear to become a prop for the status quo.

Supernaturalism concerns itself with ways to cope with aleatory elements in life through providing recourse to magical, spiritual, or divine powers. In doing so, it offers explanations of life and nature that go beyond objective verification through sense experiences, that develop notions of a more or less integrated supernatural agency rationally in control and available for special dispensations to those satisfying the prescriptions of the related cult. Verification arises from fantasies, dogmatic claims, and coincidences. On such bases, adherents have erected poetic and powerful structures of theory, ritual, organization, enticing promises and services, and thus social control. With the growth of democratic and scientific tendencies, supernaturalists have also taken up selected naturalistic rhetorics. This is an attempt to cope with the critical and anti-authoritarian potentials of existential humanism. Religion thus becomes identified with human welfare on earth as well as in the hereafter, and scientific findings are claimed to be congruent with newly re-rationalized divine laws. In this latter sense, 'natural law' is divine law.

Naturalism focuses upon the perception of nature and the discovery of nature's laws. In this perspective, even though it be that of an enterprise necessarily carried on by and presumably for people, men and women have no special places within it. They are merely members of a passing animal species, sometime parasites on a small planet. Individual advocates of naturalism, in order to soften the starkness of the view they put forward, often suggest identities and relationships with supernaturalism and humanism. Impersonal nature thus becomes slightly anthropomorphized into something 'not too different' as it were
from 'enlightened views of divinity.' They may even use the term, God. Curiously enough, that anti-humanist advocate of naturalistic determinism, the psychologist B.F. Skinner, has so rationalized his behaviouristic position that he was hailed as '1972 Humanist of the Year' by a religious body calling itself the American Humanist Association. In Skinner's philosophy, 'What is being abolished [by the nature-centered] is autonomous man—the inner man, the homunculus, the possessing demon, the man defended by the literatures of freedom and dignity.' He approves this effort and has joined it as one of its leaders. Just how such a dedication can be squared with something to be called 'religious humanism,' with human aspirations and humanizing experiences, it is difficult to understand. Since people are admittedly parasites on a small planet, their preoccupation has to be with the needs of people in confrontation with cosmic processes, not merely with acquiescing to the mandates of those processes.

Both naturalism and humanism are necessarily based on scientific findings, as principal current exponents of both now contend. To emphasize this point, many humanists like to refer to themselves as scientific or naturalistic humanists in order to avoid confusion with Roman Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, or academic 'humanists.' The term naturalistic humanism does not at all imply an acceptance of such a position as that of Skinner. Both the nature-centered and the people-centered theorists interpret scientific findings in terms of their own needs and aspirations. The egalitarian and libertarian temptations of humanist experiences and their demonstration of the relativity of values to individual, group, and changing subculture and culture scare many psychologically and socially insecure people. Like supernaturalism, nature-centeredness places responsibility outside the individual, outside of humanity. The will of God becomes the consequence of natural processes as perhaps revealed by 'the utterly impersonal problem solutions of the computer,' to quote R. Buckminster Fuller's naive statement of faith. Fuller then adds: 'Only to their superhuman range of calculative capabilities can and may all political, scientific, and religious leaders face-savingly acquiesce.'

Humanism is heady stuff. As social experience, it can tempt thoughtful men and women to throw into question their cultural heritage of supernaturalism or nature-centeredness as an exclusive or predominant frame-of-reference for thought and action. When they attempt to do so, however, they often try to carry along as much of their previous intellectual baggage as they can, and this often confuses their new orientation to life and living. Compromise statements compound themselves and eliminate the controversial and even revolutionary aspects of the humanist temptation. Belief in the controlling power of the supernatural is so great that many skeptical theorists, with little or no faith in a deity themselves, agree with Nicolo Machiavelli (1469-1527) that 'there is no greater indication of
the ruin of a country than to see religion condemned.' He asserted that, with rulers maintaining religious forms in a convincing manner, 'it is easy to keep their people religious, and consequently well conducted and united.' It was only with the emergence of a statist need for unity in spite of religious diversity that that child of the eighteenth century Enlightenment, the United States of America, finally adopted the separation of church and state as a constitutional principle. Thomas Jefferson, the provision's main sponsor, had reduced divinity in his own thinking to abstract naturalism labeled theism. Actually, in effect, a secular religion of statism was to replace such awkward and outworn instruments of control as the Church of England. As is currently evidenced by the religious-sectarian colourations of struggles in Northern Ireland, in Canada, and even in the English and Scottish industrial cities, the British have yet to follow that United States precedent; as imperfectly implemented as it is in the United States, it has freed the country from much anguish in such terms.

As has been indicated, the dawn of the historical meanderings of humanism is usually placed, for lack of more ancient documentation, in the Greece of the fifth century before our era. As taught by the sophists, humanism gave much of Greek literature its people-centered and universal character. After humanism's great days in Athens and in Alexandria, its second and more continuing center, there are jumps to the Muslim and Jewish flowerings in North Africa during the fourteenth century and to Italy during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Greek learning and the findings of such inveterate travelers, readers, and commentators as Ibn Batuta and Ibn Khaldun made the North Africans a bridge between the humanist past and the Renaissance. Dante, Petrarch, Boccaccio, and others expressed humanist views in part through reviving interest in the Greek classics and in part through their own imageries and theories. But in those periods, in the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century, and in recent humanist-oriented literature, painting, philosophy, social science, and even 'religion,' humanism has resisted thoroughgoing conceptualization as a philosophical system. It has not yielded such systemic constructs as have supernaturalism and naturalism. On the contrary, it has frequently intruded on such system-building and unsettled or even destroyed it. This demonstrates the critical and processual character of humanizing experiences and humanist philosophizings. It is accurately and inclusively seen as an intellectual and social process. It is a consequence of intimate exposure to diverse types of human beings. It arises out of human empathy and sympathy, out of an awareness of common humanity and a common fate. It is an unfolding of a knowledge and appreciation of and a concern for human affairs through direct practical or 'clinical' experience in social change.

This may all seem very well when viewed historically and in rather abstract terms. what does it mean in social thought today?
Why is humanism still so controversial even among students of human sciences such as sociology and social psychology? What does it do to the security some of us find in pretentious methodologies, fancy terminologies, and elegant theoretical constructs? Let us get at these questions by looking briefly at five somewhat related social developments, all called 'humanist.' These are: (1) liberal humanism, (2) Marxian communism, (3) 'religious' humanism, (4) humanistic psychology, and (5) humanist sociology. It is useful to discuss the first two—liberal humanism and Marxian communism—as background for the other three—'religious' humanism, humanistic psychology, and humanist sociology—because the latter arose out of the former and have problems somewhat similar to them. There is no point in going so far afield as to discuss Roman Catholic and Protestant humanism. It would be much more relevant to add a discussion of the impact of humanizing experiences on painters and of humanist fine art upon social perception generally. From Pieter Bruegel (1525-1569), El Greco (Domenikos Theotocopoulos, 1541-1614), William Hogarth (1697-1764), and Francisco de Goya (1746-1828) to Diego Rivera (1886-1957) among the many great moderns (including newspaper cartoonists—to mention only a few superb examples—the record is most impressive.

1. Liberal humanism became, in the nineteenth century, a recourse of intellectuals who were repelled both by communism and by naturalistic evolutionism as a justification for unbridled "free enterprise" capitalism as well as by supernaturalism. The position was and is a complicated one. It is compounded of values traditionally embedded in European-American middleclass ideals. These values glorify compromise, gradualism, civil liberties, and fair play. They are the values of those who would be both societal stabilizers and surrogates of societal morality. In consequence, its adherents find its more outspoken and critical exponents—albeit non-communist and non-capitalist-extremist—difficult bed fellows. Illustrations of such thorny spokesmen are Anatole France (Antole Francois Thibault, 1844-1910). By contrast with their more culture-bound contemporaries, they help to characterize liberal humanism. Others who would be equally useful as examples are John Dewey (1859-1952), Thomas Mann (1875-1955), Albert Einstein (1879-1955), and Albert Camus (1913-1960), to mention but a few of the many.

France and Twain had had deep and varied humanizing experiences that led them to rethink radically the views they had received as to man's lot and then to bespeak their criticisms of society and of man as they found them. Neither was handicapped much by formal education. France finally did pass his examinations for the university laureate, but his preparation was largely informal; he browsed in his father's bookstore and talked with all sorts of people in Parisian cafes and streets. Twain, on the other hand, was a gradeschool dropout who educated himself in newspaper shops, river boats, bars, billiard parlors, and mining camps, and through all sorts of reading. As each
grew older, his disillusionment with the status quo and his compassion for the oppressed and for all mankind increased. Each criticized not only avowed upholders of outworn social institutions but also other liberal humanists who took compromising stances. Toward the end, France even turned his back upon liberalism and became a communist. As human affairs have grown more chaotic in this century, liberal humanists have multiplied in numbers, and many have become increasingly caustic and radical. (For a recent list of leading humanists so labeled, see the international signers of "Humanist Manifesto II."

In the great French tradition of Rabelais, Montaigne, Moliere, Voltaire, and Renan, France gloried in his skepticism. As he saw it, "The word is used as synonymous with negation and futility. But our great skeptics were often the most affirmative and courageous of men. They repudiate only negations. They attack those who trammel intelligence and will. They fight against ignorance which debases, against error which oppresses, against hate which kills. . . . The most skeptical of thinkers, meditating on the futility of the eternal flux of the universal, on the ineffectualness of poor mankind and on the absurd sufferings which it inflicts on itself during its brief, dreamlike existence, are filled with a profound compassion for their fellows. From this compassion to a fraternal love is but a single step. Their pity is stirred, and those who believe themselves forever detached from everything lose themselves in the combat to rescue their unhappy brothers." Such was the credo and apologia pro sua vita of one of the greatest of French novelists, the author of Penguin Island (1908) and of The Revolt of the Angels (1914), a staunch defender of Captain Alfred Dreyfus, and an opponent of World War I. Interestingly enough, both France and Twain were authors of books dealing with Joan of Arc—as was that other skeptical humanist, George Bernard Shaw. Her glorification of the human spirit, her willingness to confront the decadence of church and state, thrilled them all.

In a sense, Twain was the greatest and most authentic product in literature of the American frontier. As background for him, it is instructive to think of the significant parallel drawn by the historian F. J. Turner: "What the Mediterranean Sea was to the Greeks, breaking the bond of custom, offering new experiences, calling out new institutions and activities, that, and more, the ever retreating frontier has been to the United States directly, and to the nations of Europe more remotely."

Life France, Twain built his popular fame upon his virtuosity as a storyteller. His thoroughgoing people-centeredness was the special ingredient with which he, like France, permeated all of his writings. As with France, Twain's skepticism made many intellectuals and even many liberal humanists react unfavorably. The author of Tom Sawyer

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(1876) and Huckleberry Finn (1884) also wrote What Is Man? (1904) and The Mysterious Stranger (1916), two books that emphasize the profundity of his 'children's books.' As the leading analyst of Twain's work notes, 'He was not merely the artist of American youth and the past; he was surely our most mature and wisest of artists whose acerbity and profundity alike were ringed about with the imperishable comic spirit. In his age he only became freer, bolder, more open and honest, more emancipated both socially and sexually, from the taboos of his epoch which, at base, his spirit had never accepted.'

Many of those who have attempted in this century to shape what they call secular and liberal humanism differ from such "irresponsible" writers as France and Twain. The philosopher P.C.S. Schiller (1864-1937) tried to create an academically respectable humanism. He identified his doctrine as a variant of pragmatism, the movement launched by Charles S. Peirce (1839-1914) and William James (1842-1910). His humanism 'was essentially,' as he said, 'a protest against the dehumanizing and depersonalizing procedure which seemed to characterize both the natural sciences and absolutist metaphysics.' He located his metaphysics "intermediate... between naturalism and supernaturalism" and came to substitute the term voluntarism for humanism as a label for his philosophy. On the other hand, such writers as the essayist Paul Elmer More (1864-1937) and the scholar Irving Babbitt (1865-1933) shied away from the unsettling egalitarian implications of humanism. Both preoccupied themselves with the problem of order and its maintenance in social relations. They sought compulsions toward such order in mystical inner experiences similar to those of religious devotees but stimulated nontheologically by tradition, interpersonal relations, and thought. The contributions of Schiller, More, and Babbitt to the humanist movement in social thought have thus not been weighty.

2. Marxist communism had among its humanist starting points G.F.W. Hegel's 'exaltation of man's endeavor "to understand the world, to appropriate and subdue it to himself"' and his 'clear willingness to commit the sin of pride on behalf of man.' It also owed much to Karl Marx's own awareness of how the proletariat had performed during the French Revolution. Marx observed that the proletariat no longer need be written off as dependent and deferential. He took it to be the aggressive and dependable instrument for the revolutionary overthrow of capitalism.

The increasingly popular appeal of natural science and its freedom from ecclesiastical controls apparently made naturalism most enticing to Marx. In his early exuberance, he asserted: 'Communism as a fully developed naturalism is humanism and as a fully developed humanism is naturalism. It is the definitive resolution of the antagonism between man and nature,
and between man and man.' He arrived at this view by claiming that 'atheism is humanism mediated to itself by the annulment of religion, while communism is humanism mediated to itself by the annulment of religion, while communism is humanism mediated to itself by the annulment of private property.' At this early stage, Marx thus appears to be people-centered and not yet to have moved on to a nature-centered societal determinism. It was in this early period of humanist preoccupation that Marx and Engels wrote their famous *German Ideology*, based upon 'men, not in any fantastic isolation or abstract definition, but in their actual, empirically perceptible process of development under definite conditions.' This view made history cease for them to be 'a collection of dead facts.'

Two involvements appear to have diverted Marx from following out fully and without compromise implications of a people-centered orientation. These were (1) his vocation as an agitator for social change and (2) his evident conviction that human considerations do not provide in themselves adequate bases for ideological authority or allegiance, that he also needed—or had to accept—what he took to be the mandates of an overriding scientific naturalism.

Marx's vocational complication led him to such contentions as that the revolution of the proletariat should best and most likely begin in the British Isles. As he asserted: 'The English have all the material prerequisites necessary for the social revolution. What they lack is the spirit of generalization and revolutionary fervour.' He predicted that an Irish revolt would provide the starting point and leverage for that revolution. A more intimate knowledge of English humanity and its accumulated and internalized social controls would have made him far less optimistic in his assessment of his vocational opportunities to agitate revolution successfully in that country. That communist revolutions would succeed in such relatively undeveloped countries industrially as Russia and China was apparently not seriously entertained by Marx and Engels.

Once Marx had mixed nature-centeredness or nature-determinism and its imperatives (as he saw them) with his humanism and had given them greater weight than the people-centered, he visualized historical processes as having sufficient precedence over individual rights and wishes to achieve the transformations of society he thought to be necessary. This gave his philosophy a kind of dehumanizing determinism in his more 'mature' phase. As he summarizes its, his dialectical process regards every historically developed social form as in fluid movement, and therefore takes into account its transient nature not less than its momentary existence; . . . it lets nothing impale upon it, and it is in its essence critical and revolutionary.
Nurtured by such skeptics as France and Twain and by such revolutionary theorists as Marx and Engels, humanism survives in an increasingly objective and radical form to become the significant ingredient in European-American intellectual currents. Three of its developments, now to be briefly examined, have many of the problems of both liberal and Marxian humanism. These problems are chiefly the temptations of scientistic naturalism and of the forcing of a redefinition of the middleclass molds in which many of humanism's spokesmen have been shaped and thus intellectually limited and even distorted.

3. Religious humanism is an organizational offshoot of liberal humanism, born chiefly of a need felt by educated parents to provide their children with a substitute for supernaturalist church schools. It has grown as a friendly heresy within the Unitarian-Universalist denomination. In addition to those congregations and fellowships of the Unitarian-Universalist denomination which are avowedly humanist, religious humanism's most ecclesiastical manifestations are the Ethical Culture Societies and the local units of the American Humanist Association.

As with Marxians, many religious humanist spokesmen have both nature-determinist and vocational biases. These biases complicate even further their middleclass anxiety to be respectably plausible to many people and to gain a kind of legitimacy through identifying with societal morality as they interpret it, a morality of the 'future.'

Reference has already been made to the nature-centered bias exhibited in an official act of the American Humanist Association. Readers of that organization's periodical, The Humanist, which is also the organ of the Ethical Culture Societies, find it to be a persistent theme. In contrast, Curtis W. Reese, as a respected leader of the general movement clearly observes that religious humanism 'has withstood tons of volumes designed to show how man is in the grip of fate, or subject to the iron law of physical determinism, or molded by purposes of which he is unaware, or blown like a broken reed by the winds of the centuries.' He affirms that 'the nature of the world is such that human intention and activity may play the determining role in human enterprise, subject only to the conditioning factors of the environing situation.'

The vocational bias of religious humanists is a more subtle problem. Concern with it leads Paul Blanshard to warn against bringing 'humanism under the sentimental, all-purpose umbrella of religion.' He wants humanists rather to dedicate themselves to the promotion of such useful projects as birth control, including abortion at will, and legal equality for unbelievers and to the struggle against parachial (tax support for parochial schools) and prayer and Bible-reading in tax-supported schools. He opposes such efforts as that of the philosopher J.H. Randall, Jr. to expand the vocation of the religious humanist to include 'the humanistic
interpretation of traditional religion.' Randall wants 'to bring into the forefront the relatively humanistic core that has been overlaid with supernatural ideas.' Perhaps even though such efforts as that proposed by Randall are likely to be so sloppy as to be indefensible intellectually, they have their uses in social therapy, in the continuing struggles to liberate the minds of people. 57

Religious humanist organizations have remained small, but their their relations with the great humanist intellectual and social movements and their contacts with organized religion have made them bridges of interpretation. Their greater freedom to take up proposals for social changes has made their spokesmen sources of ferment in religious thought and social philosophy. They have thus helped to provide liberal humanism's creative voices with broader audiences and with a degree of organizational support with which to withstand supernaturalist and other pressures.58

4. Humanistic psychology is the creation of scientists influenced by the liberal humanistic tradition and by their own humanizing experiences, who have been nagged by questions of the relevance of their discipline's findings to the solution of everyman's human problems. It has roots in the pragmatism of Peirce and William James and in the psychic probings of Sigmund Freud, his followers, and some of his antagonists. In part, it became a reaction against the biological determinism of such writers as Julian S. Huxley59 who saw humanism as a call to man 'to do the best he can to manage the evolutionary process on this planet and to guide its future course in a desirable direction.' To accomplish this, he said, 'fuller realization of genetic possibilities becomes a major motivation for man's efforts, and eugenics is revealed as one of the basic human sciences.'

In a debate, Carl Rogers as one of the principal current proponents of humanism in psychology agreed with B.F. Skinner 'that the whole question of the scientific control of human behavior is a matter with which psychologists and the general public should concern themselves.' As the sciences of biology and psychology develop, they are exhibiting frightening potentialities. Rogers focused his differences with Skinner on answers to these questions: 'Who will be controlled? Who will exercise control? What type of control will be exercised? Most important of all, toward what end or what purpose, or in the pursuit of what value, will control be exercised?'60

For Skinner, the answers to these questions lie within the mystique of science and scientists. He asserted: 'I cannot quite agree that the practice of science requires a prior decision about goals or a prior choice of values.' Whether or not such a choice is required, he does not weigh adequately the significance of the fact that such choice is made either for or by the would-be scientist. It is never dodged. The unwitting acceptance of culturally or organizationally set goals is scarcely to be
condoned in social science as a basis for avoiding responsibility in the name of an illusory value-free ethical principle. Skinner contends that when we trust scientists the whole problem of the control of power is really on its way to being solved for the greater good of human survival. 'If we are worthy of our democratic heritage we shall, of course, be ready to resist any tyrannical use of science for immediate or selfish purposes.' By the time such 'tyrannical use of science' becomes obvious to anyone, however, controls developed by psychologists or biologists might well have rendered mass resistance impossible.

On the other hand, Rogers is vividly aware that scientists are people. He recalls how German rocket scientists worked for the Nazis and then for whichever major power—U.S.S.R. or U.S.A.—captured them. As Rogers notes, 'If behavioral scientists are concerned solely with advancing their science, it seems most probable that they will serve the purposes of whatever individual or group has the power.' In other words, 'the scientific control of human behavior' would be in grave danger of 'the denial, misunderstanding, or gross underestimation of the place of ends, goals or values in their relationship to science.' Rogers therefore contends that the choice of values 'will forever lie outside the science which implements them; the goals we select, the purposes we wish to follow, must always be outside of the science which achieves them. To me this has the encouraging meaning that the human person, with his capacity of subjective choice, can and will always exist, separate from and prior to any of his scientific undertakings.'

So as not to make these comments on a complex and promising humanist development too long, another exponent can be quoted. Sidney M. Jourard contends: 'When researchers are transparently pledged to further the freedom and self-actualizing of their subjects, rather than be unwitting servants of the leaders of institutions, then they will deserve to be and to be seen as recipients of the secrets of human being and possibility.' He adds: 'This is not the death of "objective," scientific psychology. Rather, it may prove to be the birth of a scientifically informed psychology of human persons.'

5. **Humanist sociology** is not new. Like humanistic psychology, it is an offspring of intimate interpersonal experiences, of nagging problems of scientific relevance to everyman's human concerns, of the liberal humanist movement, and of a scientific ethic dedicated to the satisfaction of curiosity and of desire to serve people rather than merely to build a profitable cult. Like liberal humanism generally, it has had a constant struggle with the limiting influences of middleclass ideals, mores, and organizations as well as with pressures from other classes. It has also benefited from those ideals, mores, and organizations as well as from those pressures, especially from the pressures of the less well-placed classes. Those who have tried to push sociology toward a humanist orientation have had to confront the seductions of special interests, of scientism, of sentimentality, of humane panaceas, of irrelevant but prestigious methodologies, and of pretentious theoretical fretworks.
They have done extensive surveys, in the collection and analysis of life-history materials, in other types of participant observation and perceptive listening, and most effectively in the clinical study of social behavior through personal involvement in social planning and action.

In his famous study of London at the end of the nineteenth century, Charles Booth's great contributions were not his statistics, according to Robert E. Park, but his realistic descriptions of the actual life of the occupational classes—the conditions under which they lived and labored, their passions, pastimes, domestic tragedies, and the life-philosophies with which each class met the crises peculiar to it. Booth's descriptions made these studies a memorable and a permanent contribution to our knowledge of human nature and of society. Such accurate and intimate data helped to demystify London slums; they made more realistic thinking about them possible.

Extensive participant observation, perceptive listening, and clinical experience in social action convinced W.I. Thomas that he could not 'believe in... comparisons between physics and sociology,' in other words in scientism; 'you never have the same experimental control of a situation.' The sociologist has to be satisfied with 'high degrees of probability.' Thomas's studies of intimate life-histories and of their contexts and his personal involvement in social struggles led him to that demystification of sociological research that lent such distinction to his career. To quote him again: 'The case study method and the "natural history" method must not only precede the more scientifically acceptable method in order to produce realistic hypotheses and indicate what units should be defined and isolated; they must also be used as a general background of reference to the more limited statistical findings, which lead to the inferences which must be constantly checked for validity against the large mass of material not yet analyzable.'

Participant observation, perceptive listening, and experiential involvement in social action are old, somewhat recognized, but difficult procedures to employ in social exploration, critical re-evaluation of social theory, and theory modification. Basically, their advocates counsel: Sit down and talk with people with quite different backgrounds from your own. Then, and above all, see how they actually behave in significantly challenging social action situations. Try to comprehend how the other persons sense their lives, thoughts, social worlds. This takes time, patience, and more than a little mind-stretching. Put aside as much as you can, they suggest, the common exercise of self-congratulation that you are not as your interviewees are—not so bound by tradition, so stupid, so gullible, so manipulated by the mass media, so inadequate, so 'disturbed,' so 'pathological.' As the advocates of these methods advise, try gently to help informants forget their psychological barriers.
against self-revelation. This can take place concomitantly with your own breaking down of your own barriers against hearing and understanding—in their terms—what those interviewed have to tell you. Then attempt to conceive as well as you can what it would be like to be living those other persons' lives. Sometimes this can only be done, to the extent that it can be done, by working with them as equals to cope with mutually recognized social problems.

How many have had mind-stretching experiences such as W. E. Whyte went through when he was working on his Street Corner Society in South Boston? Recall what complicated procedures he planned for his study, the research team he thought he would need, all the rest, and then how instead he went into the field alone and began his clinical study of the social behavior in which he came to participate. His head many times ached from culture shock, but he learned far more than he might have had he carried out his a priori plan of research. His book vividly introduces its readers to the highly organized life of an Italo-American neighborhood.

After such humanizing experiences, the stereotyped ideas with which we 'handle' a different sort of person start to crumble. The black business operator or migratory Chicano worker or American Indian militant or even the colleague in a different specialty or status talks quite differently about many things than we do, but the longer and more candidly we converse the more sense that talk makes. Through an egalitarian search for common goals, males and females might open up new worlds of understanding of the other sex, but this does not often happen. We do not enter into such a relationship in an egalitarian manner, and thus we do not have opportunities to depart from stereotyped role patterns in our speaking and hearing. We hold fast to our sex roles and sex stereotypes. A pimp or a thief or a homosexual or a drug pusher or a schizophrenic can reveal worlds of 'reality' that make our own worlds take on surprisingly altered characters—social scientists though we might be. No wonder that a whole rash of new discussions of psychotherapy exploits the consequences of new levels of perceptive listening to individual problem-racked people.

What is so unusual about the humanizing experiences obtained in participant observation, perceptive listening, and the clinical study of social behavior? Are not at least the first two well entrenched in the texts on social research methods? Are they not even something of a current fad again in social problems research in spite of propaganda by scientific positivists that they are more journalistic than 'scientific'? Why are these methods so consistently opposed or defined into useless rigidity by proponents of scientism, commercialization, and academic bureaucratization? Have not realistic novelists, careful journalists, and ethnologists given these procedures vivid exemplification and interpretative validation for many years?
The stress here is not just upon the usefulness of these procedures in an occasional research project. They are basic to the processes of humanizing and demystifying all social thought in a tradition that stretches back to the Greek sophists. This is not at all to suggest the rejection of such widely held scientific criteria as accuracy, representativeness, relevance, internal consistency replicability, and clarity of statement. On the contrary, as Glenn Jacobs points out, 'Such a view presumes a radical empiricism in place of scientism, a disciplined skepticism about any substitute for man as his own measure.'

Perceptive involvement in social action, with its products of culture shock and intellectual marginality, is our basic humanizing and demystifying influence in social thought about people and society. Even specialists in ancient history or extinct languages see a new vibrancy in their subjects from expanding their experiences with living individuals and groups. The students of current social affairs who return from their field work to their libraries and computers are not the same as the ones who went forth. Fortunately, for all their simplicity and for all their utter complexity, these humanizing procedures constantly press fresh views of changing humanity and society upon the attention of those engaged in thinking about the human lot.

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Notes


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4 Ibid., 474.


6 Ibid., 163-164.


19 The term, academic, is added because classicists and other specialists in 'humane letters' have long been called 'humanists.' This is an inheritance from the fifteenth century Italian distinction between the study of the sacred (studia divinitatis) and of the humane (studia humanitatis), the humanities. See Coates and others, op.cit., 4.


27 Coates and others, op. cit., chap. 1.

28 Reference here is not to a medical "clinic," but to a similarly instructive, actual social situation.

29 Lee, Multivalent Man (New York: George Braziller, 1966), chap. 22.


32 Glenn Jacobs, 'Convergences of Artistic and Sociological Insight in the Paintings of Pieter Bruegel,' Sociological Abstracts, XX, 6 (October 1972), xxv-xl.


39. Mark Twain, The Mysterious Stranger, ed. W. M. Gibson (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), This is a more authentic edition than the original 1916 one.


41. Schiller, op. cit., 542-543.


45. Ibid., 213.


50 Lee, 'Efforts at Revolution in Ireland,' op. cit.


52 Italics added; Marx and Engels, 1959, op. cit., 146.

53 Ethical Culture Societies tend to have programs of meetings resembling those of Christian churches; American Humanist Association local units vary in program but usually have monthly speakers or discussion sessions plus the work of action committees on social concerns.


55 Blanshard, op. cit.

56 J. H. Randall, Jr., 'Communication,' The Humanist, XXXIII (March-April 1973), 36.

57 Lloyd and Mary Morain, Humanism as the Next Step (Boston: Beacon Press, 1954); E. H. Wilson, 'Liberal Religion's Unfinished Business,' Journal of the Liberal Ministry, XII, 3 (Fall 1972), 3-15.


61 Ibid., 345, 348.


63 Skinner and Rogers, op. cit., 338, 345.


73 Jacobs, ibid., ix.
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