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When War is Peace: Peacebuilding in an Era of Warfare

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When War is Peace: Peacebuilding in an Era of Warfare

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Rome had originally been founded by force of arms; the new king [Numa] now prepared to give the community a second beginning, this time on the solid basis of law and religious observance. These lessons, however, could never be learned while his people were constantly fighting; war, he knew well, was no civilizing influence, and the proud spirit of his people could be tamed only if they learned to lay aside their swords. Accordingly, at the foot of the Argiletum he built the temple of Janus, to serve as a visible sign of the alternations of peace and war; open, it was to signify that the city was in arms; closed, that war against all neighboring peoples had been brought to a successful conclusion. Since Numa’s reign the temple has twice been closed: once in the consulship of Manilius at the end of the first war with Carthage and again on the occasion (which we ourselves were allowed by heaven to witness) when after the battle of Actium Augustus Caesar brought peace to the world by land and sea. Numa himself closed it after first securing the goodwill of all the neighboring communities by treaties of alliance.

— Livy, The History of Rome from Its Foundations, 27 BCE (I.18)

Writing at the outset of the Roman Empire and at a time when the living memory of the Roman Republic was still strong, the Roman historian Livy opens his monumental history of the rise and decline of the republic with an invocation of a traditional narrative about its foundation. Livy recounts how the Roman state began as a monarchy “founded by the force of arms.” The king wanted to encourage his people to pursue peace and not war and so he built the Temple of Janus whose open doors meant the city was at war and closed that the city was at peace. Seven hundred years later, the doors of the Temple of Janus had only been closed three times, once during Numa’s reign (715-673 BCE), once after the first war against Carthage (ca. 392 BCE), and once following civil war and the victory of Augustus Caesar over Mark Antony and the Roman Senate’s capitulation to Caesar’s demand to be declared emperor in 27 BCE. The force of Livy’s narrative is to convey to his readers that the Roman people have rarely enjoyed a state of peace since the founding of their state some seven and a half centuries earlier.

I begin this paper by drawing attention to this narrative, because it seems that in a global world, the prospects for peace and the symbolic closure of the Temple of Janus seem as remote as ever. Today, the world system is rapidly being integrated in a process of globalization. A key component of this system is the institutionalization of warfare on a

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1 This paper was presented at the Young Scholars Peace Conference at the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, the University of Notre Dame. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Michigan Political Science Association meeting at Aquinas College, October 30, 2015.
global scale. This constant state of war is made possible by the processes of globalization, which as the British political scientist Mary Kaldor summarizes, “involve transnational networks, based on political claims in the name of religion or ethnicity, through which ideas, money, arms, and mercenaries are organized. These networks flourish in those areas of the world where states have imploded as the consequence of globalization” (2001, 2). In short, the time is rapidly approaching when it will no longer be possible to close the doors of the Temple of Janus and celebrate a period of global peace.

To understand the new geopolitical reality and the possibility for peace today, I build on Sidney Tarrow’s 2015 Hyneman Lecture at the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, “Seeking Peace in Wartime, Opposing War in Peacetime: Dilemmas in Activism in an Age of ‘New Warfare.’” Tarrow’s lecture focuses on how the new era of warfare has made it difficult to form meaningful and lasting peace movements in a world locked into a perpetual “war on terror.” Tarrow provides four reasons that a successful peace movement has been unable to form: “new war,” military-industrial complex (MIC), national security state (NSS), and party politics. In this paper, I discuss these challenges to a global peace movement and add an additional factor related to a global regime of warfare preventing the possibility of peace on a global scale: the international arms industry. Here I begin the task of constructing a map of the current global regime of warfare by focusing on the international arms industry. Corporations, states, and non-state actors are profiting from the proliferation of arms across the globe. Is it possible to build international institutions which can regulate the international arms industry and its interrelationship with national governments around the world?

A first step in constituting an international regime of peace is to construct a reliable cross-national map of the global order supporting continuous warfare. I examine the case of the conflict in Syria as a demonstration of the truly global nature of the conflict and the way that a multitude of state, corporate, and non-state actors are profiting from the war. I develop a case study of the war in Syria in order to highlight the nature of “new war” and the complexity of the situation, including the issue of arming rebels by the U.S. and other states. I follow Mary Kaldor’s (2012) account of a “globalized war economy,” and her call for a “cosmopolitan politics” to regulate it. Along with Kaldor, I argue for the building of an effective international regime of peace to regulate the global war industry. With Kaldor and Tarrow, finally, I argue that the power needed to establish and maintain such an international regime for peace will depend on an effective peace movement that crosses state borders and effectively works against the dominance of the international arms industry.

“New War”

In her book New and Old Wars, Kaldor argues that a new way of understanding war after 9/11 is needed if violence and conflict are to come to an end in the 21st century. The problem here is that policy makers, including decision makers in the military, are basing their thinking on an outdated paradigm of modern warfare where “the preferred technique is spectacular aerial bombing or rapid and dramatic ground manoeuvres which reproduces the appearance of classical war for public consumption but which is rather clumsy an instrument for influencing the reality on the ground” (2007, 3). This type of warfare goes back to the World Wars and has been most recently used by the U.S. in its wars against the Iraqi state in 1991 and 2003. This is the “old war” paradigm and it fails to reach its goals because it has misunderstood the nature of what Kaldor calls “new war.” In Table 1, I summarized the differences between “old war” and “new war” as described by Kaldor (2007, 2012).

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2 This talk can be accessed on YouTube at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4yTjZCXzWrA; last accessed October 29, 2015.
Table 1: Characteristics of “Old War” and “New War”

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<th>Old War</th>
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<td>Interests of Organized Crime (Drugs, Looting)</td>
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<td>The Politics of Exclusion (Fear, Terrorism, Genocide)</td>
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<td>Mobilizations</td>
<td>Greater Cost in Resources Logistics</td>
<td>Apply Ready-Made Technology</td>
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<td>Project Power Easily in Local Settings</td>
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<td>External Funding by Like-minded Groups</td>
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“New wars,” as Kaldor says, “have political goals. The aim is political mobilization on the basis of identity. The military strategy for achieving this aim is population displacement and destabilization so as to get rid of those whose identity is different and to foment hatred and fear” (116). This is what Kaldor means by the “politics of exclusion” where local groups seek to expel those who do not share their identity and goals for the future. For Kaldor, incidentally, this is a major explanation for the increasing waves of refugees leaving these war torn areas in Africa and the Middle East (107, 114-115).

Just War Theory and “New War”

In March of 2003, a timely article by Neta Crawford was published in the first issue of Perspectives on Politics. Crawford’s article was timely in that it was published the same month that the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq began. In “Just War Theory and the U.S. Counterterror War,” Crawford argues that classical just war theory is no longer an adequate test of the legitimacy of claims for going to war (jus ad bellum) or for legitimate conduct during a war (jus in bello). As summarized by Crawford, there are six criteria that make up jus ad bellum (or universal rules for the right to go to war), and two universal principles that apply jus in bello (or rules while engaged in warfare):
** Jus Ad Bellum:**
- Criterion #1: Is the War Acceptable?
  - Yes: Self-Defense and Preemption
  - No: Aggression and Preventative War
- Criterion #2: The Pursuit of Peace and Reconciliation (7)
- Criterion #3: War Must Be the Last Resort
- Criterion #4: Only Competent or Legitimate Authorities
  - Classically Understood as Sovereign States.
- Criterion #5: Only If Success is Probable
- Criterion #6: Overall Good of the War Should Outweigh the Harm

** Jus In Bello:**
- Criterion #1: The Proportionality Criteria
  - Violence in Proportion to the Aims of War.
- Criterion #2: Discrimination – To Avoid Injuring Noncombatants
  - “Unintended Consequences”

This discussion is still relevant, as Crawford points out, since the classical understanding of just war theory is “the dominant ethical framework with respect to war – taught at military academies and articulated in international law and the U.S. Code of Military Justice” (2003, 6). Crawford’s focus is on the so-called “war on terror” or what she calls “counterterror war” and how it constitute a new form of warfare that does not easily conform to classical just war theory. I extend Crawford’s argument about the fact that classical “just war theory” is no longer adequate today. A good example is Criterion #4, which traditionally sees the actors involved in decisions of war and peace as nations and states. But in a situation of “new war,” there are many other actors including non-state actors that must be brought into the analytic frame. Also, an underlying premise of classic just war theory is that there are two mutually exclusive conditions: the state of peace and the state of war. As Crawford points out, “in the view of just war theorists, war is an interruption of potential human community, a disruption of peace” (7; Walzer 2015). The problem with this long-standing dichotomy is that under these terms peace cannot be achieved in today’s world. The world is engaged in global warfare, not “total war” but persistent, low-intensity, and deadly conflict. In its current configuration, moreover, this global regime of violence and warfare is increasing in capacity and does not appear to have any serious check on the continued growth of its power. Like traditional just war theory, the symbolism of the Temple of Janus may no longer apply, that is, without the emergence of a truly global peace movement made up of dense networks of overlapping movements all sharing as one of their goals the goal of world peace.

No Peace Movement in an Age of New Warfare?

The comparative political scientist Sidney Tarrow recently gave the annual Charles S. Hyneman Lecture of the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame. The title of Tarrow’s talk, “Seeking Peace in Wartime, Opposing War in Peacetime: Dilemmas in Activism in an Age of New Warfare.” Tarrow’s title also brings to mind the seemingly paradoxical proposition that the American state is “making war in what at home feels like a time of peace.” For a divided public with little personal contact with the ongoing “war on terror,” it feels like the U.S. is at peace. The media, Tarrow mentions in passing, is largely complicit in perpetuating this illusion of peace at home. The idea of opposing war in a time of peace is indicative of current geopolitical realities in a dual sense. First, it points to our interconnectedness as global citizens, and the fact that even if our home nation state is not officially at war, it is still possible to oppose the war-making behavior of
other state and non-state actors. Second, it points to the global level of analysis and to one of its fundamental characteristics, i.e., constant warfare. Tarrow’s title maps onto this distinction. The phrase “seeking peace in wartime” corresponds to the goal of the peace movement under the old paradigm where war was easier to understand and locate in a definite place and against a certain enemy state; while the phrase “opposing war in peacetime” corresponds to the new paradigm representing the difficulty of conceptualizing a movement for peace after 9/11 and increasingly so after the election of 2008 (Heaney and Rojas 2015, discussed below). The title of Tarrow’s lecture also points to a central reality in the world of global affairs, which is to say that the world has become a global village and one in which a state of war is constant. In this globalized and globalizing setting of new war, Tarrow suggestively points out how in the past it was enough to “seek peace in wartime.” Today one can still protest the state of war in one’s country, but it has also become necessary to “oppose war in peacetime.”

The first major challenge to the formation of a global peace movement is the failure to understand the nature of “new war.” A major part of Tarrow’s analysis concerns the distinction between “old” wars and “new” wars. Here Tarrow is following the work of Kaldor on the phenomenon of “new wars” which she characterizes as a qualitatively new form of warfare emerging after the end of the cold war and consolidating after 9/11 and the “war on terror.” In Tarrow’s view, the war in Vietnam is an example of “old war.” This war could be brought to a close through conventional means, which according to Tarrow, consisted of a composite peace movement which was made up of opponents of a military draft for the war in Vietnam, a civil rights movement, and a pacifist movement, all of which were able to work together and galvanize toward the shared goal of ending the war in Vietnam. In contrast, “new war” is characterized by the absence of a military draft, lower U.S. causalities, non-state actors and “asymmetric warfare” (see Table 1).

The second challenge identified by Tarrow to explain the lack of an effective peace movement is the strength of the military-industrial complex (MIC) today and as newly recounted in Rebecca U. Thorpe’s (2014) The American Warfare State: The Domestic Politics of Military Spending. Thorpe argues that the MIC has spread throughout the country over the last fifty years, creating a situation of local dependence on the arms industry and so-called “defense” dollars. Thorpe argues that the distribution of centers for arms production in the context of federalism and democratic elections virtually guarantees continued Congressional support for the arms industry in the U.S. This local dependence translates into citizen support for the arms industry which influences the behaviors and attitudes of their representatives in their state capitals as well as in Washington, D.C. In short, Thorpe argues that the reason that the “war on terror” is so hard to protest is because warfare has become part of the American way of life, and to such an extent that to protest perpetual war is to challenge what it is to be American.

Reliance on the MIC is evident in the behavior of the formal institutions of the American political system. In the first place, summarizing Thorpe’s argument, a large number of Congressional districts are dependent on, in Tarrow’s terms, “making war in a time of peace.” In addition, the president has played a pivotal role in the perpetuation of warfare in what may feel like a time of peace at home. Since 2008, the American president has continued many of the policies of his predecessor, and even extended ways of warfare that make the fact of a state of war less and less transparent at home. These new practices include internet surveillance, including large-scale domestic spying by the NSA and the creation of CIA “dark sites,” as well as the militarization of the borders and police force through the Department of Homeland security. These executive agencies are joined by the Department of Justice who have come up with definitions of “torture” and “enemy combatants” which legitimate an aggressive foreign policy known as the “war on terror” (All three are executive agencies; SCOTUS and the DC Circuit are also complicit). Up to and continuing after the Snowden leak, these practices have had a stifling effect on domestic debate; especially as mediated
through the mainstream media. The practices have further dampened debate and made it hard to conceptualize the true scope of the state of war in the U.S. is the executive privilege known as the “state secrets doctrine” and the increased persecution of whistle blowers under president Obama.

In addition, Tarrow brings in Linda Wiess’s (2014) *America, Inc.* Weiss’ argument is similar to Thorpe’s only she focuses on what she calls the “National Security State” (NSS), which goes beyond the military- industrial complex by focusing on the intersection between government and technology industries. Institutionally, the NSS is made up a variety of actors from the president to the DOD, NASA, DOE, CIA, ONR, DARPA, NIH, NSF, the US Army, and more. In Weiss’ terms, the “NSS is a wholly new postwar creation that is geared to the permanent mobilization of the nation’s science and technology resources for military primacy” (2014, 4). The goals are technological superiority and “I/T Leadership;” which are brought about through government support of various private and semi-private agencies.

A final reason discussed by Tarrow that anti-war folks have found it difficult to congeal into a successful movement is partisan politics. Tarrow points out, bringing in the institutional forces in the U.S. political system, that whatever movement for peace existed in the early to mid-2000s was severely dampened after 2006 when the Democratic Party won back the House of Representatives. The peace movement was dealt a virtual death blow in 2008 when the Democrats won the presidency. This story is recounted by Heaney and Rojas in their 2015 book *Party in the Streets*. Heaney and Rojas begin their book by asking what happened to the peace movement that had galvanized around ending the war in Iraq in the late 2000s. In January 2007, nearly one-hundred thousand protesters gathered at the Washington Monument to press their demands for an end to the war in Iraq. Heaney and Rojas report the common refrain that “the 2006 elections were a mandate for peace” (2015, 1). These elections had returned unified congressional control to the Democrats which forced Republican president George Bush to rethink his foreign policy and “war on terror.” These anti-war protests soon dissipated, however, and after the 2008 elections brought unified Democratic control under the leadership of president Obama, the peace movement all but disappeared.

Heaney and Rojas focus on the relationship between party politics and protests movements and argue that party identification, which is built up over a lifetime of socialization, trumps “movement identity” which tends to be temporary and fleeting (5). The focus of Heaney and Rojas’ analysis is the development of what they call a “partisan identity theory of mobilization” in which there is a symbiotic relationship between protest politics and partisan politics. In short, what happened to the anti-Iraq war protests was that the Democratic Party gained power in Washington, D.C. and this fact was sufficient for a majority of protesters that they ceased being mobilized. Thus, when the Republicans were in power up until the 2006 election, there was synergy between the Democratic Party and the peace movement, which worked in opposition and for similar goals. The same is true of the synergy between the Republican Party and the conservative movement known as the “Tea Party” (6). It is interesting to note in passing, that during the current period of divided government, there has been very little large-scale activism in the U.S. organized around the goals of peace.

The mainstream media continued to follow the administration’s lead supporting the wars and rarely criticizing the ongoing “war on terror” in all its manifestations. Indeed, as Tarrow points out, the bulk of the calls for peace came from isolated activists including the so-called “party in the streets.” This is a reference to Heaney and Rojas (2015) who also discuss the spontaneous movements that came to make up the so-called “Occupy Wall Street” over the period 2006-2008. Unfortunately, as recounted by Tarrow, these movements were not successful because they were made up of isolated networks and not tightly-nit coalitions of like-minded activists. There was no convergence, moreover, within the Occupy movements on the issues of war and peace. Other activist activities centered on legal action using the
court system to press for change. In Tarrow’s reckoning, isolated networks and disassociated legal actions are not enough to effect a successful movement for peace.

Tarrow has identified four factors which he argues have held back the formation of a lasting and powerful peace movement that might resist war and violence around the world today: “new war,” MIC, NSS, and party politics. It feels like there is no war to protest and if we cling to the “old war” paradigm it is very hard to conceptualize the ongoing state of war in the U.S. In short, the American political system has changed into a system in which it is possible, in Tarrow’s terms, to “make war in a time of peace.” The new state of global warfare is not easily conceptualized in traditional terms and requires a more international and global effort if we are to witness the symbolic closing of the doors of the Temple of Janus. Once again, a viable crosscutting peacebuilding movement made up of dense networks of activists from around the world appears unable to form. How is it possible to oppose war in peacetime? I will return to this central question of Tarrow’s in my conclusion. In the next section, I build on Tarrow’s work by adding the global arms industry, which I argue also works against the prospects for peace in the world today.

**Global Arms Industry: What?**

In this section, I begin a “regime analysis” of the global arms industry. The goal is to map out who the actors are at the state and non-state level as well as internationally. Two relevant variables in determining the makeup of the global arms industry are the buyers and the sellers. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), “the five biggest [arms] exporters in 2010-14 were the United States, Russia, China, Germany and France and the five biggest [arms] importers were India, Saudi Arabia, China, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Pakistan” (2015, 1). The five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, Russia, China, France, the U.K., and the U.S. plus Germany and Italy make up approximately 85% of all international arms sales (Stohl and Grillot 2014, 3). According to SIPRI, “a little over two-thirds of the companies in the Top 100 for 2013 are headquartered in North America or Western Europe. They accounted for 84.2 per cent of the total arms sales in the period from 2010 to 2014” (XX). The top five exporters of weapons was dominated by the U.S. with 31% of the international share, followed by Russia (27%), China (5%), Germany (5%), France (5%), the U.K. (4%) (Wezeman and Wezeman 2015). The top five countries with highest military expenditure were the U.S. ($610 billion), China ($216 billion), Russia (84.5 billion), Saudi Arabia (80.8 billion) and France ($62.3 billion) (Perlo-Freeman et al. 2015, 2). These figures clearly show that the international arms industry is big business which continues to supply the demands of the major powers to increase their military power with respect to their rivals in the international arena. But these numbers do not give a complete picture of the political economy of the international arms industry and of the true driver of the international demand for weapons supplied by arms producing companies.

In the U.S., Congress creates a budget allocating funds to the DOD and other agencies which then spend that money on upkeep, salaries, and upgrades including new weapons systems. These weapons are usually supplied by a private company which is contracted by the DOD or other agencies to manufacture and deliver weapons systems and other arms. Six of the top ten arms companies in 2013 were American and include such names as Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Raytheon, Northrup Grumman, General Dynamics, and United Technologies. For example, Northrup Grumman recently won a contract to build the next generation of bombers for the U.S. Air Force (Cohen 2015).

The best source I found to date is Rachel Stohl and Suzette Grillot’s (2009) *The International Arms Trade*. The authors begin by observing that when a lot of media attention is focused on weapons of mass destruction (WMD), this focus misses the fact that conventional weapons “cause a far more deadly and current threat – one responsible for
hundreds of thousands of deaths a year” (2009, 2). Conventional weapons are those that do not belong in the category of WMD such as guns, ammunition, rockets, and vehicles like tanks and aircraft. The international trade in these weapons is very profitable and one that is “engaged in by virtually every country around the world” (2). These weapons are far more deadly than WMD since they are actually used in conflicts around the world. Indeed, as Stohl and Grillot put the matter, “these weapons are used to kill people in countries experiencing conflict and in countries at peace, and [they] contribute to cycles of violence, trapping communities in endless fighting and bloodshed” (7; Walzer 2015).

One difficulty of Stohl and Grillot’s analysis is the relative dearth of available data on international arms transfers (9). This is especially true for information on the specific companies and agencies involved in the sale or “transfer” of arms from one country to another. Stohl and Grillot compensate for the lack of information by summarizing the export and import of weapons in terms of nation states. Thus, an important part of the picture is missing, which is how and why arms are produced by companies and sold to countries in the first place. Stohl and Grillot’s story picks up after the arms have been purchased by national governments. At this point the arms are either used to provide new or replace old equipment to national militaries and law enforcement agencies. As a consequence of these upgrades, old weapons are often stockpiled and these stockpiles are often a source of international arms transfers. It is also possible that the original purchase of weapons from a company may be for the purpose of stockpiling and future sale to other countries. Stockpiles of arms can be a valuable source of capital in times of declining revenue. For example, in a post-Cold War world, Stohl and Grillot recount how, “in pursuit of profit, countries began to sell weapons to traditional allies as well as the potential enemies of these allies” (29). The authors provide the example of the former Soviet republics, “in desperate need of hard currency with the sudden disappearance of economic support from the Soviet Union, many former Soviet republics and satellites began to sell previously restricted weapons to countries outside the former Soviet bloc” (29). The Russian Federation also got into the global arms trade and depleted its own stockpiles by selling them “to anyone willing to pay the price, exporting MiG-29 fighter jets to China, Syria and Malaysia in the early 1990s” (29-30). Russia is not alone in increasing its sales of weapons, and after 2001, Stohl and Grillot observe, “the United States has led the post-11 September arms extravaganza, increasing its exports dramatically, as well as existing its existing arms trade policy to fit what it considers to be a new security environment” (34).

Example of the War in Syria

The case of the war in Syria illustrates the complexity of “new war” and draws attention to the way that the global arms industry has negatively impacted the prospects for peace in the region. Iraq and Syria are the least peaceful countries in the world according to the 2015 Global Peace Index (Iraq is 161 out of 162 and Syria is 162 out of 162). The civil war in Syria has been ongoing for four and a half years and estimates of the death toll range between 200,000 and 250,000 deaths in that time. According to the U.N. there are 7.6 million Syrians who are internally displaced and 3.8 million refugees – now the world’s largest population of refuges.

At the level of the nation-state, there are a multitude of actors involved in the Syrian civil war. Both Russia and Iran are actively supporting the ruling regime of Bashar al-Assad. Assad

When War is Peace

has been accused of a number of human rights violations including using indiscriminate bombings of the population as well as the use of chemical weapons. But where did the Assad regime get its weapons? One prominent example in the news is the military support of the Russian government who has a record of contracts with the Assad regime and continues to supply it with arms including surface to air and surface to ship missiles (BBC News, 2014). Iran, who is under U.N. arms sanctions banning the sale of arms to other countries, has reportedly been using covert channels to ferry weapons and supplies to the Assad regime. On the opposition side there are at least nine different state actors supplying different groups of rebels including: Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Libya, the European Union (EU), the US, Turkey, Jordan, Iraq, and Lebanon. The governments of these states have supported different factions depending on their own goals for the region further deepening the crisis and making the prospect for peace in the region quite remote. There are several different rebel groups fighting the Assad regime ranging from the more fundamentalist Islamic State (IS) to the more secular Free Syrian Army (FSA). There are also Kurdish fighters active in the area who are fighting extremist elements like IS. Qatar has sent weapons via Turkey and has supplied more “hardline rebel groups” while Saudi Arabia is actively supporting more “nationalistic and secular factions” of the FSA (BBC News).

After its recent civil war, the Libyan state has proven to be “a key source of weapons” for rebel groups in Syria. According to the U.N. Security Council’s Group of Experts “heavy and light weapons, including man-portable air defence systems, small arms and related ammunition and explosives and mines” have been transferred from Libya to rebel groups in Syria (BBC News). According to James George Jatras of the website Antiwar.com, the U.S. was at least aware of large quantities of weapons leaving Libya destined for Syrian rebel groups. In 2012 a large weapons shipment was sent to the FSA via Turkey. “Those weapons are most likely from Muammar Gaddafi’s stock,” Jatras reports, including “about 20,000 portable heat-seeking missiles – the bulk of them SA-7s – that the Libyan leader obtained from the former Eastern bloc. Reuters reports that Syrian rebels have been using those heavy weapons to shoot down Syrian helicopters and fighter jets” (Jatras 2015). Many of these weapons were sold to Libya by France in 2004, and as Stohl and Grillot observe, these sales “consisted of anti-tank missiles worth $230 million and radio communication equipment worth $175 million” (2009, 1). Shortly thereafter, “Gadhafi visited France – his first trip to the West since he renounced terrorism and nuclear weapons – and announced a $14.7 billion deal for conventional weapons and nuclear reactors. The deal included Rafale fighter aircraft, military and attack helicopters, air defence radars, patrol boats, and armoured vehicles” (1). An important question to ask from this paper’s perspective, but one that will have to await future research, is where did these weapons come from in the first place? In other words, is it possible to trace the path of these weapons from manufacturer to the battlefield in which they are used?

The U.S. and E.U. member states have been active in supplying more secular rebel groups like the FSA. As of 2013 and with the help of the CIA, a large quantity of arms was transferred from a stockpile in Croatia after the 1990s Balkan War (BBC News). These arms “had been sold to Saudi Arabia, and that multiple planeloads had left Croatia since December 2012, bound for Turkey and Jordan” (BBC News). Turkey and Jordan then allowed the weapons to be transferred over their borders with Syria. The border between Syria and Iraq is now quite porous and arms are routinely transferred from supporters of the largely Sunni rebels by their compatriots in Iraq; as well as Al-Qaeda in Iraq reportedly has been supplying the al-Nusra Front, an extremist rebel group fighting in Syria (BBC News). Finally, there have been reports of the Sunni community in Lebanon supporting rebel groups with arms and money (BBC News). Many of these weapons have been discovered and captured on the battlefields of northern Iraq and Syria. Many of these weapons came from the Iraqi Army which surrendered to IS in northern Iraq in June of 2014 (Chulov and Lewis 2014). Indeed, a
recent report by Conflict Armament Research (2014) studied ammunition caches captured from IS fighters and found that it came from a variety of countries including the U.S., Russia, and China. The larger question remains, however, what companies manufactured this ammunition and what path did it take before ending up in the hands of IS fighters in Northern Iraq and Syria?

**Conclusion**

Of all the enemies to public liberty war is, perhaps, the most to be dreaded because it comprises and develops the germ of every other. War is the parent of armies; from these proceed debts and taxes … known instruments for bringing the many under the domination of the few…. No nation could preserve its freedom in the midst of continual warfare.

— James Madison, *Political Observations*, 1795

[Our country] will avoid the necessity of those overgrown military establishments which, under any form of government, are inauspicious to liberty, and which are to be regarded as particularly hostile to republican liberty.

— George Washington, 1796 *Farewell Address*

We are not, however, a warlike people. Our historic goal is peace … We maintain strong military forces in support of this supreme purpose, for we believe that in today’s world only properly organized strength may altogether avert war.

— Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953.

Tarrow begins his lecture by noting how the peace movement that helped end the Vietnam War in the late 1960s and early 1970s was successful because it was not a singular movement but instead was made up of a dense network of multiple movements who shared a common goal. Vietnam, America’s “most inglorious war,” Tarrow argues, was challenged by a peace movement that was characterized by a plurality of movements or a “composite movement.” Today, although the U.S. government continues to fight its “war on terror” on multiple fronts, it is not confronted with an effective opposition, one that can bring together multiple social movements powerful enough to challenge the ongoing state of war.

Since the successful peace movement that helped end the Vietnam War in the early 1970s, there have been no new examples of successful anti-war movements. Why is this the case? In the first place the U.S. is the largest purveyor of war and enabler of warfare around the world. There are really multiple wars going on, several that conform to the traditional nation-state model of warfare, e.g. Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan, as well as the ubiquitous “war on terror” conforming to the newer models of war and warfare after the cold war and 9/11 (Kaldor 2007). So why, after fourteen years of warfare and the “war on terror,” is a viable peace movement unable to form?

Tarrow’s answer is multifaceted. To begin with, he points out the ambiguous nature of the current state of warfare in the U.S. The ambiguous nature and meaning of the “war on terror” ensures that would be pacifists and other proponents of peace find it difficult to

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4 Thorpe (2014, 3) quotes both Madison and Washington in the Introduction to her first chapter “Perpetuating the US Military Economy.”
conceptualize concrete and effective pathways to protest the seemingly perpetual state of warfare. The American public finds it difficult to understand, much less to find the motivation to protest the ongoing state of warfare. This is the case for a multitude of reasons. In the past, the enemy was easy to identify and proponents of peace could focus on, for example, ending the war against the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong. Today, in the “war on terror,” there is no traditional state actor to focus on and this makes it difficult for an anti-war movement to mobilize. The paradigm has shifted from warfare between nation states to one where a much more powerful state is fighting non-state actors in what is known as “asymmetrical warfare.” There is also the perceived futility of protest movements. There is no more apt example of the futility of contemporary protests against the ongoing state of war in the U.S. than the 2003 global protests against the beginning of the Iraq War. More than 2.5 million Americans protested this war, and many millions more protested around the world. These protests, of course, were all for naught, as the U.S. war machine invaded and occupied Iraq in March of 2003.

In Tarrow’s analysis, what is needed is a genuine form of civil society activism in which activists form composite, durable and overlapping coalitions around a broad range of interrelated issues such as fighting against the national security state, domestic spying, diminished civil rights and liberties, drone warfare, imperialism, hegemony, international arms industry, etc. In Tarrow’s understanding, a genuine peace movement will take the shape of an onion with a core and periphery and not a singular movement. What is needed, moreover, is to combat what Tarrow calls “infrastructural power,” characterized as “pluralism from the top and a state that regulates participation.” It is necessary to combat this form of state power which increasingly makes a genuine peace movement hard to imagine. It will certainly require more than internet mobilization, since this type of “event mobilization” cannot be sustained as it is incapable of generating interpersonal trust (Tarrow 2005, 2012; Putnam 2000). Instead, one needs both online and offline mobilization. “Best of all,” Tarrow says, “is to have real mobilization and simultaneous online mobilization.” Despite ongoing efforts of the so-called “global justice movement” and activism on the internet and social media, there is still an absence of an effectual peace movement today.

War is a global venture and there are many powerful actors including states, non-governmental organizations, corporations, and non-state actors who profit from warfare. Building off Tarrow, I identified five challenges to the formation of a genuine global movement for peace. The vision provided in this paper is not a happy one. International relations is understood as a constant state of conflict, and increasingly so in era of globalized warfare. How does this portrait of the international arena change the way we think about the prospect for building a viable and lasting international regime for peace? What happens to the prospects for peace in an era of globalization when local constituencies are dependent on the MIC and are reluctant to organize against the international arms industry?

To combat these forces militating against genuine and lasting movements for peace today, Kaldor argues for a “new form of cosmopolitan political mobilization” (2007, 121). This movement for a global cosmopolitan politics seeks to find solutions to violence and war in partnership with local populations. “What is needed is a new form of cosmopolitan political mobilization,” Kaldor continues, “which embraces both the so-called international community and local populations, and which are capable of countering the submission to various types of particularism” (121). In all conflict zones, Kaldor argues, there are “islands of civility” and “zones of peace” in which national and international organizers can work in order to establish and maintain peace in the wider region. As Kaldor says, finally: “In all zones of violence.

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5 Of course, an interesting potential counterpoint to the lack of a specific state to focus on is the Islamic State (IS) which is trying to carve an Islamist state out of portions of the failed states of Iraq and Syria.
there do exist civil society groups who care about the public interest who campaign for security and justice although they are often the first to be targeted. The challenge is now how to bring their voices into the discussion about the construction of new rules of peace.”

International activists for peace must also demand that more international and regional institutions are formed which can police terrorism and other criminal activity rather than using military force and further compounding the problems that lead to extremist violence in the first place. This is the gist of Kaldor’s call for a “new cosmopolitanism” which “is based on inclusive, universalist, multicultural values and the politics of particularist identities” (2007, 7). These particularist identities are cosmopolitan in the sense that they are both local (and “particular”) while also being global, universal, and multicultural. A cosmopolitan politics respects individual rights, maintains both local and international law, seeks to reestablish legitimacy in the cases of failed states like Syria and Iraq and changes the focus from “peace keeping” to “cosmopolitan law enforcement” (7, 12). Especially important is restoring legitimacy to local political structures while preventing the outbreak of future wars. Peacekeeping is an example of an old war paradigm attacking a new war situation which only makes matters worse (138). In a 2012 lecture titled “The New Peace,” Kaldor puts her argument for a new cosmopolitan politics in the following terms:

I am arguing for international law that prohibits the use of force … Those responsible for the attacks are to be arrested where possible rather than killed … When terrorists are treated as enemies in a war, they are elevated and legitimized. In the case of drone attacks, for example, it is not just a problem that mistakes are made and civilians sometimes get killed; more importantly, it escalates the violence. It provides an argument and justification for mobilizing more recruits to extremist causes.

In the current context of global warfare, we see that nations will continue to fight, and so a first step must be to shift the discussion to one of strengthening international institutions given the fact of a powerful global regime of warfare. To accomplish this task will require a sustained and lasting global peace movement that includes transparency in arms sales as one of its demands. In an era of “new war” and increasing global warfare it is essential that the strength of the arms industry in the U.S. and elsewhere is added to the list of demands which might bring together a cross-national network of densely interconnected groups working toward the ultimate goal of world peace.

**Future Research**

Future research will involve comparative studies where the arms industry in various countries is analyzed and their influence on global politics is assessed. For example, I might extend Thorpe’s (2014) analysis of the MIC in the U.S. to the other major arms producing and exporting countries like Russia, China, Germany, France, and the U.K. In addition, there are two other items on my agenda for future research in the area of peace studies. First, more research is needed on how international institutions can be created and/or strengthened to bring the global arms industry under international oversight and subject to its regulation. Second, it would be interesting to look at the actions of the international arms industry in light of corporate-state crime theory.
References


