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THE WELFARE STATE WITHIN THE MILITARY

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Much has been written concerning the extent to which contemporary industrialized societies meet the accepted criteria of a "welfare state". By contrast, the literature on the welfare aspects of the military as an institution within societies is comparatively sparse. Yet internally, military establishments often exhibit many welfare state attributes. Within the military's organizational territory and authority, members are provided with a wide spectrum of comprehensive universal entitlements—social, economic, occupational, educational, and medical. The formal parameters of the U.S. military establishment's welfare entitlements give the undeniable appearance of a bonafide welfare state whose provision is significantly more benevolent and equitable than that provided to the nonmilitary. As with all welfare systems, however, the unique welfare state within the military has developed more in response to its own perceived organizational needs and requirements than to a rational assessment of the "real" needs of those it serves—military personnel and their families.

In this sense, the military welfare state reflects the organizational imperatives, constraints, and ambiguities common to diverse forms of welfare provision, which are inevitably generated by the contradiction between the genuine social welfare needs of recipients and the survival requirements of the provider. Therefore, an analysis of military social welfare in the context of the military environment should provide insights not only into the nature of social provision in the military, but into welfare structures generally. This brief investigation may also illuminate an aspect of the welfare/warfare problem only infrequently addressed.

The military welfare state, however, is an unusual case, because of the nature of the military establishment's primary manifest function in the society, and therefore of its organizational goals. The military is mandated to provide an adequate and acceptable response to the society's definition of what constitutes major threats to its security in the external environment. Even more narrowly, its responsibility is to afford protection in an international environment which has historically been characterized by the threat of physical force, as compared with the dangers inherent in international economic and political competition.

Therefore, the goals of the military establishment are highly specialized: the development of superior defensive, offensive, and deterrent capability. In pursuing these goals, the military has been vulnerable to all the organizational requisites characteristic of social systems generally, as well as to their special elaboration in large scale bureaucratic systems. Most significant among them are the maintenance of internal order and morale, and the securing of the
organization's safety in the external environment—in this case, the civilian sector. The way in which these requisites are viewed by those in authority determine the military's needs and requirements. Social welfare entitlements to individuals and families are considered part of such requirements. Factors such as the increasing demands of members' changing societal conditions, alterations in the bureaucratic structure, changing definitions of national security, and technological breakthroughs, have modified the definition of survival imperatives in the direction of expanding the military welfare state.

Our thesis is that this welfare state is not in actual practice what it purports to be. There are serious inequities and constrictions which have eroded military social provision, largely because the organizational goals which significantly shape this system are clearly servants first of warfare, and only secondarily of real welfare.

The General Dimensions of the Military Welfare State

Although most of the data on military social services are primarily descriptive of the U.S. Army, formalized social provision to all branches of the armed services has comprehensive features. Walter Friedlander's article describes the many universal entitlements which apply both during and beyond the period of service, involving literally cradle to grave benefits. These are: income maintenance, job provision, housing provision, recreational benefits (both social and rehabilitative), medical-dental care (for service personnel and their families), social work services for individuals and families, psychiatric diagnosis and treatment, on-the-job training, vocational training, readjustment allowances for veterans formerly employed or self-employed, educational and training subsidies (GI Bill) and education for dependents overseas, disability benefits (economic compensation, medical care, pensions, subsistence allowances, special aid for the blind, deaf, and amputees, after-care in halfway houses, nursing homes, and outpatient clinics), business and home loans, life insurance, retirement pay, death pensions, educational benefits for veterans' survivors, and burial services for indigent veterans. These welfare benefits and services, representing an enormous national expenditure, are theoretically provided to all members of the military for whom they are relevant, within the restrictions of the hierarchical military ranking system.

In this sense, the welfare state within the military establishment is an intriguing paradox. It seems more beneficent at all levels than its civilian parallel, while functioning within a caste-like stratification system which is structurally much less flexible and socially mobile than its nurturing society. It is at the same time more collectively equitable and more individually constraining. In the non-military sector, governmental responsibility has traditionally involved "residual" definitions of welfare, in contrast to the military application of "institutional" definitions. The former view suggests that "social welfare institutions should come into play only when the normal structures of supply, the family, and the market break down," whereas the latter holds that social services are "normal, first line functions of a modern industrial society." Despite the
broader definition characteristic of the military, welfare is accompanied by immense physical jeopardy in wartime, and considerably more in peacetime than in most parts of civilian society. And it is an interesting case of uneven formal governmental definitions of human needs within different sectors of the society.

The formal distinction between residual and institutional definitions, however, is moot. The existence of the military welfare state is indirectly dependent on an expropriation from the civilian welfare system, in the sense that national priorities have in recent history essentially involved a transfer of scarce goods from domestic programs to defense. It is important to note that certain important categories of needs created but unmet by the military also inevitably deplete the resources of civilian social and health services.

Within this context, our purpose is to concentrate on two general categories of entitlements within the military welfare state: occupational benefits and income maintenance; and social services to individuals and families. In each case, it will be our objective to examine some of the explicit purposes and implicit effects of military social provision.

The Military Welfare State: Occupational Benefits and Income Maintenance

Government job creation and guaranteed annual income have been goals of liberal reformers in responding to the problems of stimulating the economy, reducing inflation, lowering unemployment, and dealing with poverty. However, the military is rarely thought of as an authentic government job or income maintenance system. For many, it has been the employer of last resort, but for low-income minorities it has often been viewed as the employer of maximum opportunity. And for a significant number it has provided civilian jobs directly underwritten by the military budget. There is no question but what the military subsidizes a substantial portion of the potentially unemployed, and provides unskilled, semi-skilled, technical, supervisory, and managerial jobs for many members of the society. Furthermore, income and fringe benefits are competitive with the demands of organized labor in the private civilian sector. Job security is assured within a different set of limits from the civilian employment system, but the limits are similarly dictated by what kind of behaviors are considered destructive of the goals of the employer. The military formally offers more extensive occupational benefits than many civilian employers, in terms of job training, vocational training, special educational programs, and after-service educational and training grants for skill upgrading. Retirement benefits allow the serviceperson the possibility of civilian employment in middle age, supplemented by a guaranteed income (even though highly related in amount to the military ranking system). Early retirement, combined with reserve status, would seem to provide both more economic and occupational flexibility in one's lifetime than the civilian labor market.

The important question is whether the military is providing, in actuality, occupational and economic welfare. The following selected examples reveal
discrepancies and inequities in these entitlements within the military welfare state.

Minority and Low-income Military Personnel

In the early years of the Vietnam War, black leaders actively encouraged recruitment from the ghetto into the armed services, in the interest of increased occupational and economic mobility in the society. This was premised on findings which indicated that WWII veterans were enjoying economic superiority in civilian career competition vis-a-vis their nonveteran cohort. It was also recognized that racial integration in the U.S. military had in some ways progressed further than the parallel process in civilian life, both chronologically and in degree. Badillo and Curry explain this phenomenon in terms of the Armed Forces' reliance on "meritocratic" criteria in the assignment process, which reflected "the preoccupation of military elites with rational and bureaucratic efficiency." However, though these criteria were equitable, many of the occupational and income outcomes for ethnic minorities within the military were not.

By the late 1960s nearly 20% of Vietnam combat units were black. More significantly, blacks and other minorities, and low income whites, were markedly over-represented in combat casualty rates. Differential casualty figures were reinforced by the disproportionately high battle death rates for volunteers as compared with draftees. That the major variable was socioeconomic status more than ethnic identity was supported by several studies which concluded that the assignment process was highly contingent on socioeconomic background and tended to channel individuals from lower-class backgrounds into positions more susceptible to combat casualties.

However, the same factors that diminished the importance of race as a criterion for decisions about assignment, worked to increase the significance of those attributes of the socialization process which correlated (economically and educationally) with ethnic status. The military's use of essentially culturally-biased achievement variables to assess potential competency, which employed the occupational, educational, and income levels of parents as indicators, was discriminatory in outcome. Ethnic minorities and low income whites have been most likely to score low on all three. There is generally an unbalanced competition between the skilled and unskilled for noncombatant tasks, and this is exaggerated in so far as those military specialties which involve the greatest exposure to danger are also those requiring the lowest level of preservice training and ability. Through the occupational stratification of personnel, these factors have resulted in inequities in the application of the military welfare state's formalized occupational entitlements. The stratification process has tended to reward those who have been advantaged in civilian society, and has resulted in disproportionate injury and loss of life for certain groups of personnel in wartime.

Upward mobility in the civilian occupational structure by way of the military not only depends on the acquisition of increased job skills, to which combat skills...
have traditionally provided little or no contribution, but also on leadership opportunities not equally available in the civilian labor market. The more desirable leadership positions have been difficult for minorities and low-income personnel to obtain. The proportion of black officers, for example, remained statically low even after civil rights gains became evident in the civilian occupational structure. As late as 1974, although 14.4% of the armed forces were blacks, only 3% of blacks were officers.16

Even the range of noncombat skills acquired in the armed services have had little transfer value (real marketability) in the civilian labor market, and for the previously disadvantaged this has been especially so.17 Although successful re-entry to the civilian manpower system from the military has been complex to analyze and interpret, it is significant that in 1972 the average unemployment rate for Vietnam-era veterans was 6.7%, while the total average rate for men 16 and over was 4.9%; and still in 1974 it was 11.3% for Vietnam-era veterans and 9.1% for the total male civilian labor force. The average unemployment rate for minority and low income veterans in each case was significantly higher.18

The incomes of ex-military personnel reflect the same discrepancy. A study analyzing a large random sample of veterans and nonveterans found that by 1970 there was a persistent differential in earnings between Vietnam-era veterans and non-veterans, a differential which increased with the size of the income category. For example, though 26% of nonveterans were earning at least $10,000 only 14% of veterans were doing so, and while 10% of nonveterans were earning at least $13,000, only 4% of veterans were doing so. Only 6% of nonwhite veterans were earning at least $10,000 and only 1.9% were earning at least $13,000.19 Although it is plausible that the differences in incomes reflected the differential return of veterans to the educational system--i.e. those not returning to college, graduate school, or training programs having less ability to earn--this is not an adequate explanation.

The military welfare state's theory of educational readjustment has had a strong relationship to the institutional commitment to occupational and income maintenance. The purpose of the GI Bill was explicitly to subsidize the education of the veteran to compensate him for time lost during military service. The assumption was that education was clearly related to occupational mobility and increased income. However, veterans' educational benefits for Vietnam-era veterans have till very recently been considerably less in absolute value than those for WWII veterans. Only 20% of these veterans (compared with 50% after WWII) were using the GI Bill in 1969. Thus those who needed the entitlement most--minority and low income veterans--were effectively prevented from using it. As the political struggle to increase these benefits began to have an impact, the utilization rate had increased to 46% by 1973, still with a lower rate for disadvantaged veterans. The consistent opposition of the Veterans Administration to increasing educational benefits, and providing veterans services on campuses, illustrates the subservience of the military welfare state to the organizational priorities of the larger military establishment.

A huge, heavily financed bureaucracy, whose budget is one of the largest of
any federal agency, the VA is officially committed to the delivery of the military welfare state's social benefits to a substantial segment of the ex-military population, yet its lack of responsiveness to Vietnam-era veterans—in particular minorities—indicates the relative unimportance of service delivery once personnel are no longer necessary to the functioning of the military. This disinterest of the VA in the special educational readjustment problems on campuses basically hostile to war participants, and non-nurturing toward the coping problems of minority veterans little prepared for the culture shock of movement into the higher educational system, has increased the problems of this group of GI Bill users.20

Therefore, although income and occupational maintenance benefits appear nominally superior to those of civilian society, and even extend beyond the time of service, for minority and low income military personnel there are obvious contradictions in their application. Certain efforts have been made to redress this inequity. Project Transition, a six-month predischarge training program initiated in 1967 to ease re-entry, though an excellent concept, failed to provide the services promised. The Department of Labor's manpower training programs, which utilized veterans' preference and minority preference guidelines, tended to involve veterans in dead-end low-skilled jobs. State employment systems yielded little help for the sizeable number of combat veterans with few technical skills, those who had been in a holding operation in low-skilled military jobs, and for disabled veterans. The National Alliance of Businessmen's job program, specifically for veterans, provided longer-term jobs with greater opportunities for upgrading, but placed only a small proportion of those veterans unemployed.21

The major difficulty could not easily be resolved: the specialized occupational needs of the military are responsive first to running an effective war machine, not to enhancing industrial growth or achieving full employment in the civilian sector. Though supporting defense-related industrial growth is of vital concern to the military, and a significant portion of the gross national product is consumed by the military establishment, industrialization concerns and labor market conditions are not considered within the military's area of responsibility. Consequently, easing the transfer of ex-military personnel to civilian industry, or increasing the utility of their skills to civilian industry and business is not an instrumental goal.

Military Retirees and Civilian Occupational Re-entry

Though a universal entitlement, the opportunity for occupational retirement considerably earlier than in civilian life is in actuality a meaningless benefit for non-career personnel, a sizeable group in wartime. For career military, however, it theoretically allows a shift to the civilian labor market cushioned by the military retirement pay subsidy. As "real" welfare, it is a mixed blessing. Even when the individual's military-acquired skills are considered useful by businesses and industries, these personnel have been in strong competition with better established, more organizationally senior, and more union-integrated rivals for scarce jobs. Bureaucratic management styles and procedures differ, and new
behavioral expectations are hard to identify and learn. Dumas emphasizes the
difficulties in the conversion of technical scientific and engineering skills for
peacetime industrial use. In addition, the very protectiveness of the military
welfare state has increased the vulnerability of retirees to culture shock in
re-entry to civilian life.

Also, military retirement typically occurs at a stage of the family life cycle
which demands complex adjustments for multiple family members. No adequate prepara-
tion is provided systematically within the military for confronting the new re-
socialization process which is required by this group. The lack of response by the
military to what becomes of personnel after retirement is somewhat similar to the
civilian sector, but the latter occurs to the retiree at a much later chronological
age and stage of the family life cycle, and therefore is within a very different
cultural context.

Many retirees--both officers and enlisted men--have experienced periods of
unemployment and have often needed to take jobs which were not equivalent to the
skill level and prestige of their former military positions. Many have returned to
academic programs for retraining in fields in which they may not have extensive
prior knowledge or experience, and in which they are in competition with much
younger students with more current backgrounds. These transition experiences have
been genuine life crises for many ex-military personnel and their families.

The paternalism inherent in the military welfare system is evident in the
sense of isolation from the rest of the society felt by many of these newly-
returned retirees. The residues of public anti-military attitudes complicate this
sense of separation. As a group, these personnel and their families have unmet
needs which eventually involve the use of civilian welfare resources and which con-
stitute a hidden defense-related cost which effectively reduces the national social
services allocation to other groups of recipients.

On the other hand, for those retirees at the top of the military hierarchy,
the retirement subsidy represents a sizeable income. Moreover, the prestige of
their former positions has tended to be retained in civilian life. Since contacts
made while in the military, with government and corporation bureaucracies, have been
substantial--and since their specializations have been more translatable and more
in demand--these personnel have not only enjoyed disproportionate benefits within
the military welfare state, but have in many instances displaced civilian personnel
from important positions.

Women in the Military, and Occupational Entitlements

Women have constituted less than the 2% quota for female military personnel
since it was authorized at the close of World War II, and have always been a volun-
teer army. However, it should be mentioned that women have to a significant extent
made the mounting of modern mass-mobilization wars possible through occupying the
work force positions of men absorbed into the military, positions which were
critical to the production of weapons and war supplies and to domestic survival.

By 1975, with the gradual shift to an explicitly all-volunteer force, women constituted 4.5% of all military personnel on active duty, including academic cadets. Historically, women in the military have been excluded from direct combat roles and significant administrative jobs, and have typically been relegated to nursing, and routine supervisory and clerical jobs. They have experienced much stronger occupational segregation than in the civilian labor market. As Goldman comments, "the military is the epitome of a male-dominated establishment." Charles Moskos terms it "a vestige of male sanctity."

Nevertheless, the military made strong promises to upgrade and increase female career options in the 70s—that is, to improve the occupational benefits of the military welfare state where women were concerned. This represented more than an appreciation of the changing role of women in civilian society. It reflected, Goldman says, a new perception of women personnel as a necessary technical labor resource. It also, she contends, symbolized an appreciation of the necessity of broadening sex roles because of the increased emphasis on administration, logistics, communication, and deterrence. Organizational, professional, and recruitment changes were needed by the military.

But there has been little real movement on the part of the military to systematically incorporate women into military operations and other key military assignments. The military still does not perceive as an organizational imperative the adoption of a value system which would permit substantial movement toward real occupational equality for women personnel. Goldman comments that the context of military practices, and the nature of the military system, "presents [for women] a case of the search for equality without the opportunity of similarity of specialization or task with their male counterparts."

Women are therefore likely to continue to experience significant organizational resistances and role strains. Goldman claims these cross pressures mirror many forces: formal allocation limits on the overall number of women in the armed forces, the sex typing of professional and occupational roles, civil service requirements which emphasize equity-producing promotion criteria, powerful elaborate standards for promotion which tend to penalize the most gifted and creative of both sexes, the existence of sex-segregated occupational associations within the military, the marginal access of women officers to military social life, the trend toward managerial authority side by side with the crisis-prone organizational reality which centralizes control and hampers the extension of women into authority positions, the increasing emphasis on specialization but the persistence of rewards for being a generalist, and the ranking system which tends to separate the position from the person. The net outcome for women is the disparate promotion of women officers.

Apart from this inequity in the application of occupational and income benefits, women are likely also to continue to have difficulty with what Goldman terms the "sexual symbolism" which permeates the military because of the communal nature of
the military environment, a setting in which work and residential roles overlap. Such symbolism has an obvious impact on occupational life. In this respect also, job provision and income maintenance have fallen short of real welfare. And Goldman concludes that women are destined to continue to have problems in an institution whose major function is the management of violence.

The military provides jobs and income maintenance for personnel in order to produce an efficient, effective deterrent and offensive capability in the interest of national security. Adequate occupational and income maintenance, tied to other benefits which would be very costly to individuals outside the military, provides a necessary incentive to perform the tasks required by the military organization, to reduce potential unrest within that system, and to compensate for the dangers in military service and for the high level of regulation of the behavior, attitudes, and life styles of military personnel. Therefore, military welfare is at once protective and controlling. And within these occupational and economic entitlements there are significant inequities in pay, occupational status, the sophistication of tasks, the technological level of skills, and the rewards and risks involved in membership in the military welfare state.

Military Social Services to Individuals

The United Nation's definition of social services as "organizational activities whose purpose is to further a mutual adjustment of individuals and their social environment" has special meaning within the military establishment. That social environment is quite circumscribed, not only in wartime but in peacetime, and the mutual adjustment process is skewed: individual personnel and military families are required to do the major part of the accommodation. To illustrate this latent aspect of social service provision, we will narrow our analysis to psychiatric and social work services to individuals and families, and to particular examples within these.

Mental Health Services During and Following War

Symptoms of maladjustment to military life represent a major organizational problem for the military both in peacetime and most critically in combat situations during war, just as the incidence of mental illness constitutes a serious social problem for civilian society. Both sectors of the society associate considerable costs with inadequate individual adjustment, both in organizational efficiency and in the capacity to implement primary goals. However, different limits of tolerance and distinctive definitions of deviant behavior have been characteristic of the more restrictive and demanding military environment. Individual adjustment has been viewed within "the institutional and situational demands of [military] duty." The main indices of successful adaptation have been an absence of disciplinary problems in peacetime, and a low breakdown rate in war, rather than more objective measures of psychological health. Therefore, the prediction and prevention of this form of maladjustment gradually became the major function of military psychiatry. This is not inconsistent with the military's continued acknowledgement of the impact
of combat stress on the fighting capability of personnel.

The history of professional services to individuals has therefore responded to the military's changing perceptions of its needs in producing an effective fighting force. The origin of professional counseling was in 1918 when the Red Cross provided social workers to aid in the diagnosis, treatment, and after care of soldiers with "functional neuroses." Early in World War II, the emphasis was on psychiatric screening of draftees and enlistees to determine unfitness for combat prior to absorption into the military, the purpose being to select only those capable of high performance within current military requirements. As the war increasingly demanded greater militarization of the population, and the loss of potential personnel through screening was sizeable, a shift occurred in the direction of retaining within the military not only those defined as most able but also those with psychiatric disorders who were "capable of performance at any reasonable level."

To sustain this broader definition of military capability during heavy mobilization, psychiatric and social work services turned toward a 'social psychiatric' concept of combat disorders "involving mental hygiene services, consultation to command, and preventive psychiatry." The nature of prevention and treatment became tied to the proper use of combat personnel by the command structure. Considered most important in prevention were the duration of exposure to a given combat situation, the nature of the prior training, and the length of the tour of combat duty. These were seen as variables manipulatable by command personnel in reducing the incidence of combat-related mental disorders. The main elements of the treatment approach became immediacy--the necessity of implementing treatment as early and as close to the lines as possible; expectation--treatment carried out with the anticipation that the soldier would return to combat; simplicity--treatment focused on the combat circumstances producing the condition rather than on predisposing factors in the past; and centrality--the availability of a psychiatric staff where psychological casualties were evacuated. These concepts were used to some extent in WW II, but largely due to the different nature of the wars, they were the exclusive guiding principles in Korea and Vietnam. The central purpose was to maintain all personnel in a combat-ready frame of mind.

This reshaping of military psychiatry around changing organizational imperatives produced a substantial expansion in the military welfare state through new interventions. Psychotropic drug medication was only one example. The extension of social services was credited by many with the significantly lower breakdown rate reported in the Vietnam War. However, this apparent increased responsiveness to the coping problems of individual military personnel, particularly in combat, must be examined in a larger context.

Breakdown rates have always suffered from diverse definition and interpretation, and considerable measurement error. They reveal, usually to an unknown extent, as Borus suggests, the soldier's "past history of coping, the flexibility and variety of the coping repertoire he has established in adjusting to past
transitions [crises]. Borus views coping within a remarkably military-type model as "a process of struggle, as in warfare, when the individual must mobilize his resources and allocate them to offensive, defensive, and systems-management operations to ameliorate significant stress."

What is also revealed in breakdown rates, however, is the relative successfulness of military socialization. Basic combat training, for example, is designed to place the soldier under selected physical and psychological stress, and strongly emphasizes the acceptability of overt expressions of hostility and violence under combat circumstances. Many of the tenets of Maslowian "self-actualization" are deliberately eroded. Conformance to military requirements takes precedence over the development of personal values independent of the organization. Personal pacifist tendencies and attitudes supporting cultural relativism, for example, are negatively sanctioned. The degree of psychological stress experienced by different personnel is therefore related not only to combat conditions per se, but to the whole milieu in which both the majority of one's peers and the helping professionals have been socialized to support the "healthiness" of certain personal attributes over others.

In addition, other factors were felt to have made a strong contribution to the low breakdown rate: the degree of cohesiveness felt by the combat group and its sense of identity as a unit, the way in which the unit perceived the adequacy of its leadership, the episodic nature of the fighting, the absence of psychological rewards for evacuation to rear areas, the widespread use of drugs, and perhaps most significantly the rotation system. Some quarreled with these interpretations. Savage and Gabriel, for instance, proposed that cohesion, discipline and professional leadership in Vietnam exhibited several major indicators of disintegration: the replacement of traditional officer stereotypes with managerial noncombat role images, the troubling intermingling of combat and noncombat personnel, and the destruction of primary military groups due to the rotation system. But differing explanations of the low breakdown rate ignore a more basic question: to what extent did the social services within the military welfare state, which contributed to reducing mental breakdown, actually increase the mental health of members of the military in wartime?

It is deceptive to view the psychological health of combat personnel in any other context than an environment which generates far greater fears, anxiety, and guilt--and much more psychological brutalization--than most civilian life situations. Though a minority of personnel gain self-identity and personal integration through combat roles, this form of wholeness has questionable connotations. Some of the behavior expected of personnel by the military in wartime is clearly illness-producing, by civilian psychiatric standards. And among military personnel these expectations are differentially illness-producing, inasmuch as a higher proportion of low income and ethnic minorities experience combat. Therefore a reduction in certain symptoms of clinical illness under severe stress must be analyzed in terms of the life quality of military personnel.
It is important in this respect to discuss briefly the unexpected rate of "civilian readjustment breakdown" which occurred among a significant number of Vietnam veterans. The complicated matrix of delayed symptoms was titled "the post-Vietnam syndrome" by civilian psychiatrists. Shatan and Lifton identified its basic themes as a strong tendency to experience episodes of terror and disorientation, threat-avoiding mechanisms appropriate to combat carried over to civilian relationships, a distrust of establishment psychiatric and social work services, guilt and undischarged grief over those killed and injured, and a pervasive feeling of victimization by military and government agencies and by hostile public attitudes toward the war. The military took little interest in this phenomenon, treating these problems as "non-service-connected disabilities," thus making services within the military system and the Veteran's Administration unavailable to this group. The civilian welfare system was poorly prepared to treat men with unique post-combat and civilian transition problems, and coped deficiently with this group of clients. Meanwhile the difficulties involved in the veteran's occupational and educational integration increased the severity of the syndrome. The military welfare state was far more capable, potentially, of developing a meaningful pre-discharge and post-discharge counseling program around this problem. But the military bureaucracy, which needed to resocialize civilians to lower their normal control over violent impulses in combat, did not feel an equally strong obligation to deal with the inevitable personal consequences of such training and experience. In returning to a society which had been undergoing considerable social change in the direction of increasing alienation toward such personal warfare credentials, veterans found that both the military and civilian welfare systems treated readjustment problems with benign neglect.

**Drug Abuse Services**

The use of drugs during the Vietnam War posed a sufficient threat to combat effectiveness and the maintenance of morale and order in the armed forces to stimulate the introduction of new preventive and rehabilitative services. Though Jones and Johnson claim that "drug abuse became an evacuation syndrome paralleling in scale the loss of manpower due to 'war neurosis' in the early stages of World War II," others hypothesized that there was a marked relationship between the low breakdown rate and the enhancement of coping abilities through non-addictive drug use, particularly marijuana. Bourne discussed the physiological effects of drugs in alleviating stress symptoms. Bey and Zecchinelli took the position that marijuana had indeed served as a coping device in Vietnam. Roffman suggested that "it is within the realm of possibility...that moderate marijuana use for some soldiers—perhaps for most soldiers [in Vietnam]—reduces the likelihood of mental illness [and] personality disorganization." He proposed that marijuana use may have assisted some service-men with "healthy efforts at coping with a hostile environment." Saunders felt illicit drug use, rather than arising from character disorders, was for some a rational means of dealing with military life in Vietnam.
The military's labeling of the level of drug use as seriously disruptive, and its institutionalization of treatment services, was therefore largely a reactive response to fears of reduced combat performance, rather than an interest in determining the extent of the problem or its consequences for individuals. That this was the case seems borne out by the paucity of military research on drug use, and the secrecy with which Defense Department data were handled. Consequently much of the research has been retrospective, methodologically poor, and the results contradictory. The better data suggest that drug use was quite extensive, though far less than some reports had indicated. And it was estimated that only approximately five percent of servicemen in Vietnam were physically addicted.

The data unequivocally suggest that the majority of drug users were first introduced to drugs in Vietnam. Marijuana use was most extensive, the higher incidence rates being among younger servicemen, those of lower rank, single persons, personnel with urban backgrounds, and ethnic minorities. There was higher use in the field than in base camp areas, and somewhat more use in combat areas than rear areas. Serious adverse reactions attributed to marijuana use occurred in only a very small proportion of chronic heavy users. There was a surprisingly high rate of remission of drug use upon return to civilian life.

A close relationship existed, then, between the conditions of war and the fluorescence of a social problem, particularly in a war where drugs were readily available and where certain personnel at relatively high levels of the military hierarchy were actually involved in illegal purchase and distribution. Those in authority in the military, however, viewed the problem mainly in terms of social control, and largely for this reason drug treatment services were generally inappropriate and ineffective. More seriously, the application and utilization of these benefits were uneven, and the consequences for individuals seeking or assigned to them revealed the ambivalence with which the military power structure defined the role abuse played in strengthening or weakening combat units.

Chemical dependency was responded to within changing and arbitrary sets of criteria. The identification of those "needing" services was often dependent on the command personnel's perception of the value of a particular unit in meeting immediate troop requirements in combat, irrespective of the level of drug abuse within it. If behavior within a unit appeared to involve disciplinary problems, and the unit was not essential to military operations, individuals were often more likely to be channeled to services. This sorting of drug abusers into social services frequently resulted in less-than-honorable discharges. Because the extent of the abuse reported within units varied considerably among commanding officers, discharges were sometimes based on idiosyncratic evaluations of the amount and chronicity of drug use.

Even under the drug abuse amnesty program, publicized by the military as an important additional social service, many self-confessed addicted personnel were stigmatized with such discharges. The special treatment programs under the amnesty program were, in actual practice, not made available to many who needed them. The
data on discharges suggested that the disproportionate number of minority veterans who received less-than-honorable discharges based on drug abuse, was in all probability related to the high proportion of black personnel in combat units. The discharge review process, formally available for reinstating veterans benefits, was implemented successfully in less than 1% of the cases where review was requested, and applications piled up for months and sometimes years prior to a hearing.\textsuperscript{49}

As a result, insurmountable difficulties were created for many veterans in gaining civilian employers' trust and in dealing with the double-bind in civilian society: labeling both as a participant in an unpopular war, and as a potentially problematic reject from military service. The evidence strongly supported the claim that some drug-connected less-than-honorable discharges were related more to black militancy than to chronic drug abuse. Because the overwhelming majority of discharges were administrative rather than given through the court martial procedure, only minimum due process protection was available. In addition, "general" discharges, which fell within the honorable category and therefore did not involve a loss of benefits, nevertheless officially stigmatized the returning veteran in civilian society, and reduced his employability. The defining of the individual as "unsuitable" for military performance had broad connotations to civilian employers, far beyond the ability to adjust to military combat. Furthermore, those veterans re-entering civilian life with a genuine drug abuse or alcoholism problem, developed in Vietnam, were denied by their discharges the treatment specifically developed to respond to their needs. Moreover, they were deprived of the educational and training benefits which could have provided healthy support for re-entry.

Taussig suggests five basic criteria for evaluating the entitlements of welfare systems: the adequacy of benefits, cost-effectiveness, horizontal equity, preservation of incentives, and absence of stigma.\textsuperscript{50} Drug abuse entitlements proved to be inadequate, relatively ineffective, inequitable, alienating, and stigmatizing. This was so mainly because they were provided within the organizational limits of the military environment and were not the servant of real welfare.

Social Services in Peacetime

In peacetime, and away from combat zones in wartime, the pattern of utilization of psychiatric and social work services within the military also discloses inequities in the military welfare state, which correlate with the structural characteristics of the military establishment. For example, differential "acceptability" has been traditionally attached to different types of individual problems. In practice this has meant that those with drug and alcohol problems have had the least access to social services, those with medical problems the highest, personal problems have fallen in between, and problems involving protest behavior have been completely excluded from the welfare state.\textsuperscript{51} The discrepancies in the value judgements associated with different clusters of behavioral "symptoms" have been discriminatory in outcome, favoring those traits which are in conformance with desirable organizational outcomes. As mentioned previously, the withdrawal of certain social service entitlements are likewise linked with "unacceptable behavior" by these standards.
The decision not to make full use of needed entitlements is also constrained by the rigid stratification system which helps define the criteria for upward mobility. Janowitz has documented the highly competitive promotion path of the career officer, emphasizing the intensity of that competition particularly at the mid-level and higher level ranks. He points out that serious jeopardy is involved in the promotion board's notice of possible blemishes to the individual's suitability for shouldering responsibility. One such blemish can be the implication that the individual has sought or needs to obtain help with personal problems. These problems, by contrast with physical symptoms, are considered controllable, and controllability is related to promotional adequacy in a traditional, male-oriented system. This pressure effectively limits the use of counseling and treatment benefits by officers: it is occupationally safer to seek help from non-military personnel or from military personnel on an unofficial basis. In some cases, this has led to black market services which benefit only one category of military personnel and undermine services to others. Because of strict occupational stratification, enlisted men do not frequently work through the ranks to officer status, and tend not to be (by self-selection) as career oriented. Consequently they have not been as constrained by military norms to avoid the use of these entitlements. Nevertheless, these values also create strains for enlisted personnel.

More insidious is the tendency of the military to view lack of conformity to the proper definition of behavior in superior-subordinate relationships, and to the performance of appropriate combat roles, as an index of military unsuitability. An example of the command structure's concern about the latter is the existence of the Air Force Human Reliability Program. This program attempts to identify and remove individuals considered "unreliable" from critical assignments. Such individuals may or may not need help, yet the negative consequences of seeking help may inhibit the individual from securing much needed assistance and support.

Definitions of appropriate sex role behavior also play a part in the access to and use of psychiatric and social work services. As in civilian life, the presence of symptoms is much more an acceptable rationale for women seeking help than for men, as the dependency inherent in asking for help is more consistent with traditional sex role definitions. However, this inequity is exaggerated in the military welfare state by the much stronger emphasis on the virility and personal ego strength of male personnel, which has been a persistent machismo norm within military systems long before Sparta. This context also affects the utilization of services, as they are provided predominantly by male military professionals whose values tend to be compatible with traditional sex role expectations. The special strains which women experience in the military are often not recognized as legitimate problems for which healthy coping repertoires are needed, and the emphasis is placed on the adjustment of the woman to the generally male-dominated requirements of the organization.

The point we wish to illustrate is that the norms and values of the military "culture," and the social structure of the military "society," create serious inequities in how responsive military social provision has actually been to the needs of individuals functioning within it and making transitions from it. The purpose
of military social services is more clearly related to the suitable performance of military tasks and to internal order--within the primary goal of maintaining an efficient, effective war machine--than to the usual definitions of mental health and illness followed in non-military settings.

Social Service Entitlements to Military Families

The armed services have only gradually become a familistic institution, in the sense of giving attention to the families of military personnel. This change has been in response to developments in the larger society, among which have been the general increase in the percentage of persons living in family units and the growth in medical and contraceptive technology. Trends within the military have also been operative: a consistently lower divorce rate than in the outer society, and a reduction in the average age of active-duty personnel. The particular position of the military in an advanced industrialized democracy has meant that caretaker personnel have increasingly demanded a similar family life style to civilians.53

However, the main objective of social services to families has been to prevent family disruption, based on the assumption that the family is a critical support system for military personnel. This notice of the military function of the family has in large part been a response to the realities of the civilian divorce and separation rates, new sexual values and sex role definitions, and new family configurations. Janowitz has commented that there has been a growing recognition that a breakdown in family relationships is a threat to military performance, and asserts that the military has come to believe that "the solution of family problems is essential for professional solidarity."54

Until recently the average number of children in military families has steadily increased. Military families have been characterized by younger wives, younger children, and fewer wives employed outside the home, than their parallels in non-military society. This too has increased the demand for additional services and has supported a modification of the military's view of its priorities. At the same time there has been less stigma attached to acknowledging family problems, as they are not interpreted as being as controllable by military personnel as individual personal problems, chemical dependency, or incorrigibility.

Though an increase in benefits followed from changing evaluations of the family's importance, there has been a scarcity of policy development and research within the military on the actual needs of military families. Janowitz and Little have identified some of the major areas of stress as residential mobility, changes in women's roles, loosened ties with conjugal families and communities, a decrease in family allegiance to the military, and retirement transition.55 Little comments that "the esoteric occupational culture" of the military, and its forced family ties with the father's occupation and associated organizational activities, is a distinctive feature of the military family which has had positive, but in net effect negative effects.56
The family separations which are related to military mobility patterns are to some extent unique, and personnel must sometimes make a choice between rank and family. A sizeable percentage of married personnel do not live with their families, and for a majority of military families this means separation from relatively young children and reduced participation in their early socialization. Spouses attached to tactical or combat-ready units have difficulty establishing regular family interaction patterns. This tends to impose a double-parent role on the remaining parent and has often led the family to redefine itself in the matriarchal direction. Stanton points out that there are also outcomes in loss of ties with the more supportive elements in the military community, excessive dependence on relatives, infidelity, and efforts to seek help outside military social services. "The military," he says, "shares the dubious honor with a few other occupational groups and institutions of being a pioneer in the trend toward parental absence that has emerged in U.S. society."57

Frequent and often unexpected family relocations are conditions of life rather than chance occurrences in the military, and are the source of potential family problems. There is evidence that family members often try to reduce the painfulness of relocation by avoiding deeply-felt extended kinship attachments, or by engaging in non-intense short-lived personal relationships. Residential instability also interrupts long-term medical care and children's schooling. From a mental health standpoint, evidence has suggested that those wives most alienated from the military find mobility most stressful. Though some studies suggest that family relocation has had little significant adverse effect on the mental health of younger children, emotional deprivation has indeed been an outcome in individual cases. In particular, the effect on adolescents is problematical. Mobility separates them from important peer supports for their own identity, and increases their dependence on parents at a time when independence is a cultural requirement of the maturation process. Foreign assignments, though often economically desirable, usually carry with them inevitable cultural shock for all family members, yet little counseling or prior orientation to the new environment--or services around the anticipation of family problems likely to occur in another society--are provided.

The dramatic change in job and environment discussed earlier for career military facing retirement, has important family implications. Given the comparative youthfulness of military families, retirement tends to occur for many career personnel at just that family cycle point which involves large adolescent adjustments.58 In addition, at a time when most civilians are reaching the height of their earning period and productivity, 50,000 military retirees per year are entering the mainstream of the civilian occupational structure. The difficulties experienced by the inevitable transfer of the husband's anxieties and pressures onto the family, and the strains the family feels directly in accommodating military and civilian values, have affected change in military policies toward the family.

These policies have been translated into specific services. The recognition of family relocation problems led to the Army Community Service, a comprehensive program to develop an organized system for bringing together all available military
and civilian resources for the relief of personal and family problems. Wiest and Devis have described it as "a spectrum of humanitarian and mental health approaches which are designed to meet the human needs of a highly technical, highly mobile, multimission military population in cultural transition crises." The Air Force instituted the Family Service and Dependent Assistance Program to aid families in resettling while husbands were on active duty. Another Air Force program, titled Children Have a Potential, responds to handicapped children and their parents.

The Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services, publicized as a national health insurance plan for the military, involves a significant array of family services, as well as medical care and individual counseling. The recent extension of this program subsidizes outpatient psychiatric treatment and social work services for military personnel and their families in civilian mental health agencies and facilities. It is a unique case in which military territoriality and control have been sacrificed in order to secure another goal, that of preserving the family as a supportive milieu.

But CHAMPUS is a cogent example of some of the deficiencies in military-sponsored social services to families. It was developed in the context of a continuing shortage of military psychiatric and mental health professionals. It has been criticized by Congress beginning in 1970 for program mismanagement, only a few of the thirty-one recommendations made by Congress having been implemented in the five years of its operation. Military families have felt little precedence for trust in the confidentiality of records, and those at the higher ranks have still avoided practitioners in any way related to the military. Personnel on isolated posts and families on foreign assignment have not had access to the services. The values within which military families have typically been socialized, and their formal loyalty to a specialized occupational route to success, have mediated against moving out to nonmilitary professionals who likely share a public hostility to military service. Yet in seeking help within the military, they have been hampered by the primary expectations of professionals for preserving the family as an integrated group.

One of the major difficulties is that many of the family problems, to which this part of the expansion of the military welfare state has reacted, are actually generated by the nature of the organizational objectives of the military. These strongly affect the environment in which families must function. The development of services has therefore been both a military requirement and a protective response to the changing norms for family life over which the military has little control. In many cases, the net effect has been insufficient to compensate for the superimposing on family life of a structure geared to warfare.

The Military Environment and Social Welfare Professionals.

Within the framework of the narrow view of personal adjustment in the military, it is important to identify the roles played by military psychiatrists and
social workers. The Army has over 80% of all active duty social workers within its ranks. Wiest and Devis claim that Army social work has constituted nearly all of military social work services since World War II. However, in 1969 this involved only approximately 300 professionally trained social workers on active Army duty.

Though military psychiatry developed rapidly in World War II, a substantial expansion did not follow. The traditional psychiatric model was not entirely compatible with the military environment. Some writers have felt that social work actually flourished in the military setting, largely because of its emphasis on the inter-relationship of the individual and the environment. Social workers tended to expand the scope of services beyond the individual to the family and community, and increased the diversity of professional roles. They became involved in integrating social work services into a total medical care program. The significant point is that social workers had skills which the military increasingly needed. Nevertheless, an inescapable tension existed between the professional training, ethics, and objectives of professionals, and the organizational requirements of the military.

Daniels, in a series of articles which examine the role of the psychiatrist in a military setting, concludes that psychiatrists have tended to be "agents of the military bureaucracy" and therefore unable to serve their clients in the same fashion as their civilian counterparts. "When problems of conflicting interests arise," says Daniels, "the psychiatrist may be placed in a quandry. What is best for the patient may be the opposite of what is best for the system. Such problems arise most dramatically in times of combat." She claims also that the psychiatrist is directed by military goals to maintain an individual's fighting capability. His professional code directs him to support his client's efforts to become a healthier, more self-actualized person. The professional's choice between these conflicting pressures has crucial consequences for individuals.

On the one hand, the professional--psychiatrist or social worker--is a gatekeeper who must prevent the individual's exit from combat in wartime--due to neurosis, psychosis, character disorder, drug addiction, dissenting behavior, alienation. In peacetime, the professional is to perform a social control function in reducing potential disruption which could interfere with the achievement of military goals. As General Westmoreland so revealingly stated, the helping professional plays "a personnel management consultant type role."

On the other hand, the military psychiatrist, psychologist, and social worker are to be advocates for the individual's own integrity and wholeness. The professional codes of these professions are committed to the health and continuing growth of the individual, somewhat in isolation from the cultural demands placed upon him. This role, however, is often sacrificed within the military environment. Robert Lifton feels, for example, that during the Vietnam period military psychiatrists, social workers, and chaplains--in their role as "ultimate authorities of the mind and spirit"--rationalized and justified the ordering of combat personnel into a situation that was both unnecessary and immoral. "Helping" the soldier...
remain in combat, and sometimes to participate in war crimes, psychiatrists sometimes served to erode the soldier's capacity for moral revulsion and guilt. Therefore he says that chaplains and psychiatrists "formed an unholy alliance not only with the military command but also with the more corruptible elements in the soldier's psyche." Lifton feels this produces a "counterfeit universe in which pervasive, spiritually-reinforced inner corruption becomes the price of survival." In such a universe in Vietnam, he insists, conscientious professionals become equally entrapped in an organizational commitment to war, and were profoundly compromised.

Professionalism itself may be partly to blame. The image of professionalism gradually shifted as the society changed, first from a personal commitment, to the development of general principles, and finally to specialized kinds of knowledge and skills. Lifton suggests that the latter contained risks: "hierarchical distancing, medical mystification, and psychological reductionism" that tended to undermine ethical responsibility. This is perhaps vastly overstated, but what Lifton fears is critical—that the process of professionalism has involved a move in the direction of "technique devoid of advocacy," away from a process of "advocacy based on faith." The advocacy he has in mind is moral choice in support of humane principles of psychological health and growth, in which professionals are engaged in considering the nature and consequences of their real objectives.

The main problem for the professional in the military—which is not so for civilian professionals—is the strong pressure to mold individuals into an effective fighting force, both bureaucratically and tactically. The professional is no more immune to the rewards and sanctions involved in pursuing these objectives than other military personnel. There is perhaps an even stronger tendency on their part to rationalize the objectives of the system, because to remain within the military requires some prompt resolution of the conflict between individual growth goals and military goals. Through such a process, the military welfare state tends to become a servant of the military establishment.

Conclusion

In this article, we have analyzed a comparatively specialized issue—the impressive system of institutionalized universal and comprehensive entitlements which form what we have termed a welfare state within the military. We have built our case on the premise that in all social systems—of whatever size or complexity—action tends to become organized around critical requisites for the system's continuity and survival.

In being selective in illustrating our main ideas, certain important aspects of the existing military welfare state have not been covered. We have not discussed many of the continuous and emerging needs of military personnel which have not been met by existing benefits and services. We have not anticipated the welfare problems and possibilities in the all-volunteer force.

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Another limitation is implicit in our approach, which judges the military welfare state against three criteria: the extent to which it is in practice what it formally purports to be, the way in which it compares with the nature of civilian social provision, and the degree to which it provides optimum life quality for its members. The latter is admittedly perfectionistic, but a criterion to which all welfare systems should ultimately be made accountable. In this judicial process, however, we have focused on the abundant weaknesses in military welfare, rather than on its strengths.

Our major thesis has been that the military welfare state tends to become shaped in the service of the dominant survival goals of the military establishment: the maintenance of an adequate level of deterrent capability and of internal order. In this context, military social provision has provided both incentives to perform necessary organizational tasks, and sanctions to control behavior in the interests of adequate performance. This has involved serious contradictions and inequities which interfered with individuals' real welfare.

The military establishment, like other bureaucratic structures in modern history, is characterized by what Coleman has termed relatively autonomous "corporate actors." For such corporate actors, he says, "the wants and interests of persons...constitute only constraints on a path of which the goal is corporate survival and growth." This, he contends, biases the direction such organizations take. Organizational decisions about the development and use of resources are "more and more removed from the multiplicity of dampening and modifying interests of which a real person is composed...and more and more the resultant of narrow intense interests of which corporate actors are composed."
Footnotes

1. Welfare state is here defined as Wilensky has developed that concept, the essence of which is "protected minimum standards of income, nutrition, health, housing, and education, assured to every citizen as a political right." Evidence suggests, says Wilensky, that many welfare states are financed by somewhat regressive contributory and tax schemes "but do produce substantial income redistribution and on the whole are likely to be egalitarian in net effect." He claims that the welfare state represents the convergence of urban-industrial societies toward some common "post-industrial condition," despite the diversity of its forms. However, he carefully distinguishes between the welfare state and the "real welfare" of people in societies, and suggests a set of indicators for measuring the impact of the welfare state on real welfare and equality. See Wilensky (1975, preface).

2. It should be clarified that by "real welfare" we mean satisfaction of the higher order needs of people for social esteem, recognition, and self-actualization. This is additional to the usual concept of "well-being" as the satisfaction of the basic essentials of life--adequate food, housing, and other material goods. Real welfare emphasizes less tangible values; for example, a sense of achievement in one's work, a sense of fulfillment of one's potential. Though welfare has come to be defined in terms of the material resources an individual can command, we are suggesting that it also be measured in terms of life quality. For a well-done and provocative study which attempts to measure dimensions of life quality in American society, see Campbell et al. (1976).

3. For a classic discussion of system requisites, see Parsons (1937).

4. See Friedlander's article in this journal.

5. In fiscal 1975, veterans' benefits and services were estimated to be $15.5 billion, which is just under 5% of the entire federal budget, and does not include the very substantial budget for retirement and disability payments to career military personnel. Only the national defense budget, civilian public welfare, medical care, and interest on the national debt account for larger portions of the federal outlay. See The U.S. Budget in Brief (1976).


7. In 1975, approximately 15% of the non-white civilian labor force was unemployed, a much higher proportion than for whites. This differential prevailed during the Vietnam War as well. It is not unrelated that the proportion of blacks in the armed services increased from 8.2% in 1965 to 14.4% in 1974. This reflected differential deferment for education between whites and nonwhites, as well as enlistments. Those unemployed but not able to seek education or training were most vulnerable to the draft as well as to the pressure for enlistment. The result was military employment of a sizeable portion of the unemployed. See Statistical Abstracts of the U.S. (1975).

8. For example, in 1974, out of the total U.S. employment force (including the military) approximately 3% were persons employed within the armed forces, another 3% were civilian personnel working for the armed forces, approximately 1% were civilians working for federal defense-related agencies, and approximately 4% were civilians working in defense-oriented industries. See U.S. Bureau of
In 1975, the average salary of enlisted men was $8,000 and officers $18,000, apart from the array of other life-style-supporting services available to military personnel. See Department of Defense, Average Annual Military Pay Rates (1960-1975).

It was understood that the selective process in WWII involved personnel of higher prior educational background and socio-economic status, however.


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See Badillo and Curry (1976).

This has been amply documented in various sources. See also Zietlin et al. (1973).


Badillo and Curry, op.cit.

In 1965, 9.5% of the total armed forces were black but only 2% were officers. By 1972, 11.9% were black but still only 2.4% were officers. Less than a 1% increase occurred between 1972 and 1974, despite a 2.5% increase in blacks in the service. See U.S. Department of Defense, Office of Equal Opportunity, The Negro in the Armed Forces (1962-1974).

Some investigators have pointed out that over 80% of enlisted personnel's positions in the military were in occupations which accounted for only about 11% of the civilian male labor force.


For a specific discussion of this situation, see the testimony of Joseph Garcia before the Subcommittee on Readjustment, Education, and Employment, U.S. Senate (1972, pp. 517-524). As an example, in the state of Washington, Employment Security was placing only approximately 3% of all job applicants in 1971 in jobs lasting more than three months. Emergency Employment Assistance jobs and NABS jobs provided slightly more marketable skills and more continuous jobs, but the percentage placed was again very low, particularly for minority group members.

Ibid.

See Dumas' article in this journal.

Between 1960 and 1972, the peak year for the Army was 1972—women constituted 1.9% of total army personnel on active duty. For the Navy, the proportion peaked at 1.5% in 1972. For the Air Force, 1972 revealed a substantial increase to 2.2%. In the Marines, the highest proportion, 1.2%, was in 1972. By 1975, however, 4.5% of all military personnel on active duty were women. It is significant that these figures include academic cadets. Statistical
For example, during the most intense Tet offensive fighting between 1965 and 1966, only 12 patients were hospitalized or excused from duty out of every 1000 soldiers. The highest rates in Vietnam were approximately 1/10 of the highest rates in WWII, less than 1/3 those of the Korean War. See Blalock (1973, p. 9). Eric Gunderson (1976, pp. 68-69) states that during the Vietnam War the psychiatric incidence rate for Navy enlisted men remained stable at 1000 per 100,000 strength per year, and varied widely by rank (higher for enlisted men than officers), by sex (higher for female enlisted personnel than male), by age (higher for age 17-18 than for 21-35 enlisted personnel), and technical specialty (higher for those in nontechnical jobs, higher for those among hospital ship crews and medical staffs than combat ship crews). The rate for the Marine Corps enlisted personnel more than doubled between 1966 and 1969 from 1000 per 100,000 per year, to 2,100 per 100,000, during the peak of intense and sustained fighting with heavy casualties. These rates, Gunderson says, are still considerably lower than WWII and Korea.
in Vietnam. Approximately 10% of the regular narcotics users reported continued use after return to civilian life. In terms of actual drug addiction, however, the study indicated that approximately 20% of narcotics users were likely addicted in Vietnam, but over 90% apparently stopped using narcotics after return. Approximately 60% of these regular users did continue to use other drugs, particularly marijuana. Among men introduced to marijuana in Vietnam, over 80% did not continue to use it on return. Ladinsky suggests that drug use reflected not only the availability of drugs, and peer pressure to use them, but served a psychological function in the context of an unusual war environment. See Ladinsky (1976, p. 450).

49. See the Congressional testimony of Joe Garcia (Garcia, 1973, pp. 522-523).
51. See Connolly's article in this volume.
53. This information on family patterns within the military is based on Goldman's excellent article in The Social Psychology of Military Service (1976, pp. 119-132).
54. Janowitz, op.cit.
56. Little (1971).
57. Stanton (1976, p. 142). The discussion of family mobility and separation contributed heavily to this section.
58. Little comments that for this reason "the socialization process of the child in the military community is relatively incomplete." (1971)
60. Wiest and Devis (1971, pp. 319-345).
62. Wiest and Devis, op.cit.
63. The Air Force had only forty-two, and the Navy tended to depend heavily on chaplains. See Bevilacqua and Morgan, op.cit.
64. See Bevilacqua and Morgan and Wiest and Devis, op. cit.
65. See Daniels (1972, p. 155).
66. Westmoreland, U.S. Army article.
67. Lifton (1976, pp. 45-64). This article provided many of the ideas articulated in this section.
68. Lifton feels the psychiatric principles of immediacy, proximity, and expectancy, which were to facilitate combat personnel's successful integration into the group life of their units effectively undermined personal integrity in judging one's own ethical behavior in the combat situation. (1976).
Bibliography


As we move toward the decade of the eighties we are becoming increasingly aware of the difficulties and realities of economics on a national level. More and more we, as a people, are faced with difficult choices concerning the services that we either demand of our government or which government deems it necessary to provide.

Although it is an oversimplification, our Constitution mandates that government always follow to some degree a "guns and (not or) butter" philosophy in its preamble provisions dealing with "common defense" and "general welfare." We have though paid dearly, in economic terms, for attempting to follow such a fatal "guns and butter" philosophy during the Vietnam conflict. Faced with the untenability of the above non-choice planners, elected officials, and others must take a hard look at current and future allocation of resources in order to maintain some semblance of "living within our means."

It is the purpose of this article to examine one area in which there could be a re-distribution of financial resources and to advance suggestions concerning the implementation of programs.

It has been my observation that during the last 15 years the Department of Defense has introduced a variety of programs which may be viewed purely as ventures in social welfare. My thesis is that these programs are (a) unnecessary, (b) disproportionate in terms of resources expended vs. benefit received and (c) are not philosophically in keeping with either social welfare values or the values of the military establishment.

I intend to confine my remarks to three programs: Project 100,000, Project Transition, and the Medically Remedial Enlistment Program. While it is true that two of these programs have been phased out (Projects 100,000 and Transition) the precedent for their use has been set and programs of a similar nature could be initiated at any time.

Let us first examine the basic premise which underscored two of the programs (100,000 and Medical Remedial). That premise was a need for additional manpower during the initial stages of the Vietnam involvement.
Project 100,000 was initially instituted in October 1966 in two phases. The first phase was designed to bring into all branches of the armed forces individuals who would otherwise not be qualified for enlistment because of unsatisfactory scores on the Armed Forces Qualification Test. The second phase which began in February 1967 was the Medical Remedial Program which was designed to enlist those individuals with single correctable medical conditions.

What both programs basically offered was an opportunity for individuals who could not otherwise qualify for military service to enlist. However, these programs, while aimed at meeting manpower needs during a critical time, were also social welfare programs. One of the components of Project 100,000 was described as preparation training. This was basically remedial education for the enlistees under this program and was estimated by the GAO to cost 8 million dollars in Fy 70. Additionally, the cost of remedial education in other types of training after basic training for the Project 100,000 personnel in Fy 70 was estimated to cost 3.5 million. In other words, in one Fy the Department of Defense spent 11.5 million dollars in extra training cost for individuals who did not meet the military's own standards.

The social planner might speculate that this money might have been more effectively utilized in some type of vocational education program, for over 34% of the Project 100,000 enlistees ended up in combat arms branches which offered no readily transferable civilian job skills. In other words, the DoD was offering very expensive remedial education in order to prepare an individual to be a combat soldier. We can only speculate as to whether these individuals would have enlisted if alternative training had been available out of the military. This speculation leads us therefore to the "harder" question of whether a social welfare service should be offered as an enticement for military service if it is not available outside of the military alternative. I think not.

Let us pause in our examination of the first category of Project 100,000 to view the second category, the Medical Remedial Program. Although Project 100,000 (category 1) has been phased out, category 2 is still with us. Basically this program allows individuals with relatively minor medical problems, most of which require surgical correction, to enlist in the military, have their problem corrected at a Basic Training Center and then enter a Basic Training cycle. Applicants must be mentally qualified.

One again we are faced with the situation of offering a social welfare service (health care) as an incentive for enlistment. This is an unequitable situation. Many of the medical problems which this program addresses are the type of problems which affect the nature of the work that an individual might perform and I can find no reason why military service should be a contingency for obtaining the service. The Medical Remedial Program is still
with us and will become more expensive to operate as all costs continue to spiral.

Both Project 100,000 and the Medical Remedial Program were initiated during an era of military conscription. While they were not eminently successful, they did provide a pool of manpower. For example, by July 1968, less than two years after initiation, Project 100,000 had enlisted 125,152 men in all branches of the military and 87,700 in the Army alone. If this type of program had to be offered during a period of active conscription I would conclude that the potential for it, or a prototype, being resurrected during a period of non-conscription and poor recruiting is high.

What would its resurrection mean? First, it would indicate that the Defense Department was embarking upon a program of social rehabilitation, an area in which it has no mandate. Second, it would indicate that "X" amount of national resources were being channelled into this program. Third, I would contend that programs such as Project 100,000 and Medical Remedial are representative of a type of double jeopardy in that individuals who are basically unequipped with key coping skills are thrust into a highly competitive environment in which they will be even less able to cope.

Let us examine each of these contraindications in turn. I would define "a program of social rehabilitation" as any program which is designed to provide individuals with remedial skills or capabilities which they would not be able to obtain without the benefit of the program. In turn these skills or capabilities would enable the individual to achieve or attain something that would not be possible had not the remedial action been taken. Paradoxically the job of the military establishment in this country is to defend the country from all enemies, foreign and domestic. There is no requirement in the constitutional provisions, which establish the maintenance of a standing Army, that this Army also provide its members with benefits concerning remedying of deficiencies which would have prevented them from serving in the Army in the first place. Many years ago the military in this country was literally highly over-worked and grossly underpaid. The professional soldier was viewed by the average citizen as a mercenary, a ne'er-do-well, and generally as an individual who could "not make it on the outside." Therefore it was acceptable since the government was in essence doing the man a favor by permitting him to serve, to pay him less than a living wage and to provide him with a certain amount of in-kind benefits to supplement that wage.

Since 1964 military pay has been on the up-swing and is now tied closely with pay within the industrial sector of the economy and in many respects exceeds pay in those vocations not subject to the federal minimum wage. I therefore maintain that there is no need to offer a variety of expensive and elaborate social welfare type incentives in order for a man to serve his country or to simply choose the military as an occupation.
The military will argue that the elimination of the draft has made recruiting extremely difficult and that were it not for the elaborate system or fringe benefits some of which are admittedly of a social welfare nature, there would be no real incentive for a man to serve in the military since he could obtain the same monetary rewards in the civilian economy and not suffer the potential hardships and dangers associated with military service. However the military, to put it quite simply, has no mandate either constitutionally or statutorily to offer social welfare incentives for military service. The second contraindication concerns the amount of money which is channelled into these programs. During FY 68, 69 and 70, the Army either spent or proposed to spend some 29.2 million dollars on Project 100,000 alone.\(^5\) This is an enormous sum when we consider the fact that there is no data to validate that the individuals enlisted under these programs were any better or worse off in the long run than if they had not enlisted. I would contend that this money could have been more effectively utilized if added to Manpower Training, Vocational Rehabilitation or some other existing program, rather than used in a fragmented fashion by the Department of Defense. Based on the rate of inflation and on the 68 through 70 figures, we might reasonably conclude that should the Department of Defense choose to embark on another course similar to Project 100,000, it would entail costs probably double that previously cited. In addition to the actual and projected cost associated with Project 100,000, the cost associated with the Medical Remedial Program could be channelled into already established programs on health care delivery such as family planning, pre- and postnatal care, and early childhood screening and probably attain a much greater cost benefit factor than that associated with simply correcting physical deficiencies in order to make individuals acceptable for military service.

Concerning the idea of double jeopardy, one Department of Defense publication indicates that Project 100,000 permitted the military services to utilize "adequate personnel -- not the optimum or the best -- and assume the additional cost in order to obtain the benefit of upgrading these individuals."\(^6\) The publication further goes on to state that the individuals who participate in this program will be not only "better soldiers but more useful, productive and self-assured citizens."\(^7\) That is rhetoric. Let us look at facts. Of the initial study group in Project 100,000, 15.6% were still in the first two ranks of the military hierarchy compared to 7.4% of individuals not taken in under Project 100,000 during the same period.\(^8\) This figure alone indicates that Project 100,000 individuals were not competing at a level equal to those individuals who entered the military through the normal channels. Additionally a quote from a recent article concerning the performance of individuals who enter a high stress environment such as the military with a proven record of inability to cope in the civilian environment underscores my point. (A resigning company grade officer states:) "So much time and manpower is virtually wasted trying to help people who actually do not want help. This includes criminals present and past and..."
juvenile delinquents. As an officer I am expected to redeem these people, to erase 17 to 20 years of ingrained dishonesty and apathy often at the expense of worthwhile men.  

We know empirically that 24% of the Project 100,000 personnel ended up in the infantry. Another quote from a resigning company grade officer indicates the result of that type of assignment. "The present practice of assigning to the infantry only those recruits who have uniformly low intelligence (must stop). Contrarily recruits with high verbal abilities should be assigned to the infantry, since they will be the most qualified to understand and give orders, and most confident when speaking to a group of men."  

The military establishment is perhaps the only form of work in which an individual can be severely punished for the commission of offenses which in a non-military job would result, at worst, in the loss of the job. There is no argument with the necessity of discipline, particularly among troops whose exposure to combat is imminent. However, I would contend that individuals who have demonstrated significant difficulty with authority and structure in the past, i.e., high school dropouts, etc., are going to continue to demonstrate those patterns in military service and no effort oriented toward upgrading large numbers of these individuals on a mass scale can expect to be effective in changing the behavior patterns of significant numbers of them. We therefore find that the individual who has exhibited a marginal adjustment to life stress when placed in the military is literally subjected to double jeopardy. The stress situations have not lessened, if anything they will have increased and the individual will demonstrate a parallel correlation in his ability to cope with them.  

Before we begin to look more closely at the philosophical issues involved in the military's venture into social welfare, let us examine briefly the final program, Project Transition. Project Transition was established in April of 1967. "The primary purpose of Project Transition (was) to provide educational, vocational and job counseling for enlisted personnel prior to release from active duty."  

The GAO report to Congress concerning management deficiencies in this area indicated that the program was showing too much emphasis on educational upgrading and not enough in accomplishing the original purpose of the program which was to simply smooth the transition from military to civilian life. Granted there is a fine line concerning mandate when it is obvious that transition from military to civilian life is going to be hampered by lack of education, however, the purpose of this program was not to provide remedial education but to assist the individual in developing or repackaging his marketable skills. The hooker in this arrangement is that the training took place while the individual was on active duty and continued to receive his full pay, allowances, and benefits while being taught some usable skill. This is nothing more than a camouflaged form of public assistance. If in fact the purpose of the military is to provide
job training, then substantive changes must be made within the statutes that govern the military. Project Transition was expensive. It was programmed for 16 million in Fy 69 and 19 million in Fy 70. These are actual training costs; this does not include the pay, allowances and supporting funds for those individuals whose services for all practical purposes were lost to the military.

It would seem that once again we find certain social welfare benefits being offered as a contingency for having military service, not on the basis of need. I would contend that if the cost for Project Transition could have been channelled into other programs and the men released early, the same benefits could have been obtained at less cost to the taxpayer.

I have attempted in the previous discussion to demonstrate that the military has increasingly utilized soft social welfare incentives in an effort to entice individuals to serve. I have not touched upon the idea of the combat arms bonus, the G.I. Bill education benefits, or the active duty tuition assistance and high level education opportunities offered to those who remain on active duty. The basic issue in all of this is whether or not military service is so repugnant that we as a nation must attach to it an entire series of elaborate and attractive buffers in order to make it a viable alternative for our young. The entire concept of the draft has been and continues to be a volatile political issue and there are sound arguments both for and against its abolishment and re-instatement. Military conscription is in itself obviously not the answer. However, there have been a number of viable arguments advanced for mandatory national service. Such a national service could probably be financed at least in part from the abolishment of expensive incentives as a reward for military service. It would strike at a time when many young people are "turned off" to the idea of further higher education and would offer them a viable alternative to initial competition in an overcrowded job market. Military service would be one alternative of national service. Such a program would offer the opportunity for health care services to be provided, for educational remedial work to occur and for young people to solidify those values which will be necessary for a productive adulthood. It is obvious to me that the current course of heaping benefit upon benefit for military service is reckless and will eventually peak out from the sheer force of economics alone. There is no indication that we are receiving better soldiers for more money. The American people are faced or will be faced with hard choices and the type of army that they want will be one of these choices. We have strong empirical validation that massive ventures into social welfare such as Project 100,000, Project Transition and the Medical Remedial Program are, to say the least, not eminently successful in meeting our military needs. Rather, they have channelled off large sums of money and extensive amounts of effort to operate them.

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Some critics would argue that these programs are not inordinately expensive when compared to the sums spent on social welfare in general. In a sense that argument is valid but it is not germane. The issue is not money per se, but who should receive and disburse the money. My thesis is that the military has no business in social welfare. If the Pentagon cannot meet its manpower needs on the basis of its intrinsic attractiveness including early retirement, pay, tax-free allowances, etc., then it should go before the Congress and acknowledge its difficulties.

The military's need to pursue social remedial programs as a manpower source speaks to another area of problems which is beyond the scope of this paper but which has major implications for social planners. Those problems were clearly documented in Eli Ginzberg's works in 1959 and indicate that we have come precious little closer to bringing a large segment of the population to a level of health and literacy that they are capable of serving the nation. This failure of all of our institutions to "provide for the general welfare" underscores the futility of the military's foray into the social welfare arena. In the future there must be firm provisions to prevent the military from offering remedial or transitional services. There are existing agencies a plenty to provide these services.

There is nothing dishonorable about military service per se. What has tended to dishonor it are inconsistencies ranging from draft deferments to cover-ups; and social welfare ventures only lead to further tarnishing of an already battered image.

The competition for scarce resources will grow in intensity as our national priorities shift. This competition is, to an extent, necessary given the nature of our politico/economic system. However, the competition can be made more equitable if those of us who are advocates of effective social welfare programs will constantly remain on the alert and speak out loudly against institutional infringement in our area of expertise.

Footnotes
2 Ibid., p. 16.
3 Ibid., p. 7.
4 Ibid., p. 6.
5 Ibid., p. 16.

7Ibid.


10Ibid., p. 25.

11Comptroller General, Report to the Congress, Need to Improve Project Transition Management by the Department of Defense, Dec. 1969, p. 3.

12Ibid., p. 12.


In the United States after the wars of the 19th century, particularly after the Civil War, no professional social workers existed who could have cared for the wounded soldiers and civilians or for the disabled veterans. But in Europe, during the war of France and Italy against Austria, in 1859, the foundation of some services for the wounded soldiers of the three involved nations were laid by a Swiss banker, Henry Dunant of Geneva who arrived by accident on the evening of the bloody battle in Solferino (Italy) and started to help bandaging some of the bleeding victims of this fight. When he recognized that he and his valet were not able to provide aid even to a small number of the many wounded, he went to the surrounding villages and persuaded a number of peasants to help him and his servant to bandaging other injured soldiers. He also continued his journey and asked the commanding general of the Italian and French armies to send soldiers and physicians to help the injured. As a consequence of this experience, Dunant published the story of this fact "Un Souvenir de Solferino" which was sent to several European monarchs, including the wife of Emperor Bonaparte in France and Queen Louise of Prussia and stirred public opinion in several countries to the recognition that aid for war-wounded persons was necessary. These actions led to the foundation of the "International Red Cross" in Geneva in 1864, which afterwards employed social workers, nurses and physicians who assisted injured persons in wars and natural catastrophes.

Although the International Committee of the Red Cross invited the United States to join the International Red Cross organization, Congress refused in 1864 to do so. Only in 1882, the foundress of the American National Red Cross, Mrs. Clara Barton, was able to persuade the Congress to join the International Red Cross. The international agency, in the meantime, had engaged social workers, nurses and physicians of the participating nations and had helped the victims of wars and natural disasters in Europe. However during the First World War (1914-18) American social workers and volunteers, in addition to British, French and Swiss workers were actively engaged in services to war-wounded persons and to prisoners of war, helping people of both warring nations. The most spectacular relief actions were conducted in France, Belgium, Italy and Greece, and institutions for the treatment of wounded and sick persons in Switzerland as a neutral country were widely used. Not only workers of the American Red Cross were helping in this period, but also American and British members of the Friend Service Committees (Quakers), of the American Relief Administration organized by the Government under the direction of the later President Herbert Hoover, the Near Eastern Foundation, the Save-the-Children Fund, the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, the World Young Women's Christian Association and Young Men's Christian Association and other philanthropic and religious charities.

After the first world war, in 1921 the International Migration Service in Geneva (Switzerland) was founded especially to help refugees and families of prisoners-of-war.
who did not return to their native homes to join their husbands and fathers. This agency, now renamed "International Social Service" with headquarters in Switzerland (Geneva) and New York and cooperating with local travelers' aid services employs trained professional social workers and helps also in adoption procedures for children of American citizens and foreign women, particularly after the war in Vietnam. The "Unitarian Service Committee" (Boston) gave medical aid and training of social workers in European and African countries who were badly needed after the numerous wars in Africa and in Europe after the second world war in 1945. Under the auspices of the League of Nations and more recently of the United Nations and their affiliated organization, UNICEF, World Health Organization, Food and Agricultural Organization and others, social workers have been assigned to various relief actions after wars and natural catastrophes. Numerous social workers have been helping in the rehabilitation and health services in East Asia after the end of the wars between Japan and China and the occupation of most Asian and Pacific countries by Japan. Finally in Japan itself, social workers have assisted in the repatriation of prisoners of war and wounded soldiers as well as in the development of modern social services and training of social workers.

Among the social service programs directly related to wars, the War-Veterans Services are the most prominent. In earlier periods of history those services were extremely limited. For instance in England, France and Germany the resources were so meagre that veterans roved the countries as gangs, robbing and killing peasants who refused to give them alms. Consequently, the Elizabethian poor law of 1601 for the first time in England included veterans among those groups which should receive relief from the parish where they had resided before their disablement in war service unless their families were able to assist them. Similar provisions in other European nations were the rule until the later part of the 19th. century. In the United States, the Continental Congress maintained after the declaration of independence the measures for veterans of the preceding colonial period, providing land grants for building a homestead, a small pension for disabled veterans, and institutional care for those seriously disabled that they felt unable to live in the community or with their families. Similar conditions continued until World War II. During this war the universal draft had for the first time in the United States transformed millions of civilians into veterans and the mass of them gave them sufficient political power to request new legislation which gave them new essential priviliges compared to the civilian population.

War Veterans are entitled to receive as monetary benefits "disability pensions" for all service-connected disabilities leading to permanent, total invalidity; and "disability compensation" caused by any service-connected disability; "retirement pay" after leaving military service; also temporary benefits for veterans discharged before able to find full employment, called "readjustment allowance" for unemployed and for formerly self-employed veterans; "death awards" for widows and minor orphans of veterans and special "death pension awards" under circumstances to survivors of veterans whose death was not service-connected. Educational benefits for veterans included "subsidies" for further education, studies and training, providing tuition, books, equipment and needed expenses, such as board, rent, lodging and travel. "Vocational training aids the veteran in finding employment and the disabled veteran
in addition to his disability allowance by a special "subsistence allowance". Veterans Benefits are administered by the Veterans Administration with its central office in Washington, D.C., and 13 regional branch offices.

Medical benefits to veterans are free hospitalization in veterans' and other public and private hospitals, medical and dental care, in emergencies immediate hospitalization, prosthetic and other needed appliances, and recreational facilities to help in rehabilitation. Blind veterans are entitled to seeing-eye dogs and electronic equipment; legless veterans to a special automobile; deaf veterans to vocational training in rehabilitation centers, veterans suffering from nervous illness to psychiatric therapy, and all disabled veterans to after-care after hospitalization in halfway-houses, foster homes and nursing homes, and in out-patient clinics. In most states additional medical and rehabilitation services for veterans are available which allow for treatment by private physicians and psychiatrists. Old veterans in financial need are entitled to unlimited hospitalization.

Social services by trained social workers and volunteers for veterans are counseling in personal, family, and economic questions, and advice for adjustment and on medical treatment ordered by the medical staff. The service includes rehabilitation and vocational training, information on preferences in civil service employment, tax and license fees, burial services for indigent veterans. Several states in USA also grant guarantees for the purchase of a business, a homestead and land, and educational supplements for children of veterans.

The Charter of the United Nations states in Article 1 that the purpose of this organization is the prevention and the removal of threat of war and to achieve international cooperation with respect for human rights and fundamental freedom for all human beings. Unfortunately they have not realized these purposes so far so that we have still to consider which social work functions are necessary after warfare and demilitarization. Within the framework of the international organizations discussed above the "High Commissioner for Refugees" is particularly concerned with aid for victims of war, displaced persons, widows and orphans of military personnel and civilians. These services were instituted after the special "International Refugee Organization" of the United Nations was liquidated in 1951. In addition to the High Commissioner's office in Geneva, the United Nations established after the 1947 Near East war still two additional agencies: "The Relief Fund for Palestinian Refugees" and the "United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees" (UNRWA). These organizations unfortunately have not been able to solve the problems of those refugees in settling them among the Arab nations nor to achieve their rehabilitation as far as the masses are concerned.

The other organizations of the United Nations are still trying to help war victims and orphans in many respects, by health care services, emigration counseling and assistance, children's aid, and social and economic community developments in the poorer nations. Social workers interested in international services are encouraged in most industrial nations such as Great Britain, France, Switzerland, Canada, and the United States by conferences and seminars under the auspices of the "International Council on Social Welfare", the "International Association of Schools of Social Work", the "International Federation of Social Workers" and the national professional...
social work organizations of these countries, and of Australia and New Zealand. Regional conferences and seminars of those organizations are helping to increase the interest and the participation of social workers and volunteers in social services for victims of wars.


*3 Friedlander, *op. cit.*, p. 3-5.


ALIENATION OF YOUTH AS AN UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCE OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE IN AFRICA

Illustrations from the Ethiopian Experience

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The development of global competition between Russia and the United States led to a dramatic diversion of the resources of the United States to military and quasi-military programs. Some of the objectives of the competition were to maintain United States influence and power over its empire in the Middle East and Africa: to monitor the Red Sea; to have a presence near Egypt, especially in view of the development of the Aswan Dam by the Russians; to have proximity to its Asian colony, Israel; to keep watch over its oil in Saudi Arabia; to establish and man satellite tracking stations which were necessary to compete with Russia in space; and to maintain a presence in Africa in order to safeguard its interests throughout the continent.

Ethiopia is geographically strategically located to enable the United States to accomplish the objectives stated above. Additionally, until recently its head of state, Emperor Haile Sellassie, held tremendous prestige, and was quite pro-western in his allegiances. Ethiopia was also the African headquarters of the Economic Commission for Africa, and the headquarters city for the Organization for African Unity. A military presence, therefore, was mandatory in Ethiopia if the United States was to stand up to the Russian challenge in that part of the world. This presence developed from its inception in the middle 1950's to the point that in 1970, the assistance to the military alone equaled the dollar amount of all other types of assistance to all the other nations of Africa. This did not include the support of the official United States military activities in Ethiopia. So, it can be seen that the United States invested heavily in military programs in that country.

One of the interesting items to note is that investment and assistance funds from all sources to a country usually follow rather than precede the political decision to invest militarily in a country. Foundation money, developmental assistance money such as AID grants; even assistance from other countries and the

1This paper was initially drafted following a three year assignment of the author at the then Haile Sellassie I University, Addis Ababa; now, the National University of Ethiopia.
United Nations followed upon the decision to invest in military assistance in Ethiopia, when it became clear that it was necessary to safeguard our interests in that part of the world.

Nothing much had happened in Ethiopia since the Italian occupation of the 1930's to encourage it to depart from its traditional modes of organization and behavior, until the decision of the 1950's by the United States to invest militarily in Ethiopia. Following upon the heels of that, the National University was established; Ethiopian Airlines came into being; public education was pushed for development from kindergarten through the twelfth grade; efforts were begun to establish an economic infrastructure; agricultural modernization was pushed; health programs utilizing western methods were organized; and so on. Even though there was much reservation about all this change among the elders, nobility, clergy and politicians, the push toward modernization went on apace anyway. It is the thesis of this paper that the decision of the United States to develop and strengthen its military presence in Ethiopia for the reasons cited was the single most important factor in accounting for the eventual alienation of youth in Ethiopia, which in turn became the dominant factor for the current revolution taking place in that country. As to whether this form of destabilization and its consequences is more functional than dysfunctional is a matter this writer cannot answer. Only time can tell. But the point of the paper is that the U.S. military are the modern missionaries without their either knowing or admitting same; for they in their presence in a country like Ethiopia to implant and reform military programs inevitably trigger changes that fundamentally alter the characteristics of all aspects of the social order. Let us then turn to a brief description of the process which took place in Ethiopia in the alienation of its youth, a major precursor of the current revolution there.

Ginsberg states that there are between 22 and 23 million persons living in Ethiopia. One-third of the population falls in the range of ages 15 and 59. The number of persons with a tenth grade education or more number 25,000. This select group of 25,000 are located almost without exception in the cities, where the scarce educational, welfare, employment, opportunities are found. Ginsberg estimates overall literacy at 5.7%. Fifty-two percent of the urban males are literate; 16% of the urban females are literate. Seven percent of the rural males are literate, but the rate is declining. The literacy rate of rural families is almost nil. 2

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These figures show that Ethiopia is a nation of young persons, which is a situation similar to other developing nations of sub-Saharan Africa. The figures also show that only a very small group from those under 21 years of age are at present able to move into the ranks of the educated elite. The creation of a coterie of educated elite is a key requisite for development, and the ability of a modernizing nation to produce and utilize this coterie is one of the important indicators of that nation's ability to initiate and sustain the modernization process. Ethiopia has difficulty in this regard, for Ginsberg states that with a population increase of about 2% per year, Ethiopia is becoming a nation of an ever increasing proportion of young persons, without much change in the near future in the ratio of the skilled manpower to the total age group. It can be said, then, that up to this time, only a very few of the young people in Ethiopia have been touched by the forces of modernization in any real sense. Most of them still live as they have been doing for centuries past. This highlights the importance of this small group of the educated elite, for it is from here that the individuals come who carry the responsibilities and leadership for the current and future efforts toward modernization. Alienation of this group, therefore, will have a deleterious effect out of proportion to its size on any effort toward modernization.

In the pre-industrial society, where age is a positive value, children are subservient to their elders. They are an economic asset to the extended family. Most aspects of the pre-industrial societal structure are congruent with this value, and minimal disruption results. Young persons are dispersed throughout the population, for they remain in their homes and villages, and cannot act with any social force, as they can when they are collected in the cities in organizations such as schools, and in collectivities such as gangs and teams.

But with the advent of the U.S. military programs, complete with hardware, personnel, and most importantly, the western ideology, new ideas and technologies were available for inspection, discussion, learning, and adopting. The U.S. military personnel are particularly vocal, moreover, about the blessings of the western technology, and usually equally contemptuous of the non-industrial state of affairs in countries like Ethiopia where they may be stationed. Military personnel are also predominantly young. Their sumptuous level of existence is not lost upon the local population, especially the young, who then contrast this existence with the prospect of their own, should their situation continue the same. In fact, the military in Ethiopia lived much better than any other of the U.S. citizens that lived and worked there. They had their own commissary, which had all the foods available in the U.S. supermarkets, they brought in their own cars, which in themselves created great excitement among the populace; they had

3At this point in time, Africa has the highest birth rate of any of the major land areas of the world. See Molnos, Angela. Development in Africa - Planning and Implementation. Ford Foundation Circular #3, April 1970. Part II, p. 20.
housing allowances which enabled them to live in some of the best houses in the city, and they were able to employ a large number of servants. All this largesse was available from the highest ranking to the lowest ranking member of the U.S. military, and when observed by the local populace, made a profound impression upon them.

The ideology of the high standard of living is possibly the most powerful that has yet been developed, and when combined with the missionary zeal for its dissemination by U.S. military personnel, and the eagerness of the young people of the developing country to accept it, something must change. The important point here is that military personnel from the United States, even though they are ostensibly in the foreign land only to care for the mission there, do carry out a missionary function by spreading their ideas about the appropriate way of life to the local population, especially, as has been stated above, the youth.

The western rational, scientific ideology which the military espouse states that man can know his world, that this world is orderly, that if man studies his world, he can manage it and exploit its resources to his own ends. By contrast, most adult Ethiopians believe that the world, including man and his society, is created by God, maintained by God. Man's task is to ascertain God's plan for the world, and then follow it. Young persons have no right to question these assumptions, but should believe what they are told by their parents, priests and rulers.

The western ideology is activist, rebellious, individualistic. In contrast, that of the majority of adult Ethiopians is passive, collectivistic, conformistic. When young persons learned of these ideas new to them, this created a certain amount of conflict in them. Furthermore, if they attempted to behave in accordance with these new ideas, they found themselves in conflict with the major organizational units of the society, such as the church, the family, the economic system, government; those structures that existed in large measure to maintain the strength of the then current ideological, stratification, and power systems of the social order. When young persons stated that these institutions were not performing to support the new ideas they espoused, or their proposed techniques for utilizing more effectively the resources of the country, these young persons raised inevitable fears among those who strove to keep things as they were, and who resisted the implications of change for all the sectors of the social order. Therefore, since the voices of the young persons were not heard, they either withdrew into their own subcultures, or became strident in their criticism, and radical in the changes which they advocated. Seldom did they retreat into the beliefs and behavior to which their elders subscribed.

Of course, the situation becomes further complicated because it was by no means lost upon the rulers of Ethiopia that the United States has tremendous power because of its advanced technological system. They longed to remain as powerful as they could, and were not without threats both from internal as well as external sources to the maintenance of that power. So, the rulers were eager also to adapt the western technology to their own ends. One of the first things they
were told, especially the Ethiopian military personnel, was that for a man to be technologically proficient, he must have education. In fact, the men who now rule Ethiopia were among the earliest to be educated by the U.S. military in the late 1950's and the early 1960's. They were sent to military training schools in the United States during this period, and then came back to modernize the Ethiopian army. They also came back with ideas about how their countrymen should live, how rulers should behave, how industrial capacity should be developed, how resources should be distributed. This, it turned out, was knowledge dangerous to the status quo.

The ruling class was not slow to grasp that for their power to be enhanced, they must modernize. But to modernize, they must teach the populace how they should live for this to be accomplished. So, a massive public education program was begun from grade one through the university, to create a manpower pool of technically proficient members of the society to carry out this task of modernization. Since it is difficult to change the ways of the adults, because they have a stake in things as they are, and are not amenable to the control that needs to be exerted in educational activities, the programs concentrated on the young.

Elementary schools up to grade six were initiated in most local communities, and young persons lived at home while attending these schools. But following grade six, those who persisted in their education had to live in the nearest city where the more advanced facilities were located. This meant that they had to leave home, live with their peers in some kind of dormitory arrangement, and be freed from the influence of their family, and the local elders.

It is the cities that have always been the spawning grounds of social change, and the situation in Ethiopia was no different. It is the urban youth in Ethiopia that were the concern of the authorities. It is the urban youth that rebelled and experimented with western strategies; not the rural youth that form the bulk of the population. It is in the city where the young people could escape the tyranny of the extended family, could congregate in schools where they are the majority in a cultural as well as in a social psychological sense. It is because of this loosening of the hold of the traditional social institutions on young people that they were able to identify with their kind, develop their own class and subculture, and look at the world in their own terms. Thus, they were able to take positions in relation to themselves and their world because of antecedent changes that operated to make this possible. In turn, this situation set up considerable incongruencies, from which arose the challenges of youth to the status quo.

Certainly, educational efforts of the modernizing African states were not set up to result in the disaffection of those to be educated. These efforts were initiated to further the cause of modernization, to build a manpower pool by which modernization could be accomplished. When one of the most visible immediate results of this immense commitment of resources was the rebellion and radicalization of youth, the leaders of these nations became somewhat disillusioned.
with results of these efforts. Both the indigenous and foreign advocates of change failed to understand that change, when it did come, was not even, was not readily more functional than previous modes of social behavior, occurred in some sectors of the society before occurring in others, and above all, was resisted by the current forms of social organizations as long as these forms had any effective hold upon the individuals of the society.  

Culturing borrowing, and imposition, when done, is seldom even attempted to be tailor made to the requirements of the borrower, either by the borrower, or by the exporting faction. The educational system in Ethiopia is a case in point. In the first place, since it is a direct transplant from the United States, its objectives are not clear as they relate to Ethiopia. Does the elementary level of educational development aim at universal education? If so, to what end? Does the secondary level aim to be somewhat selective, and build a base of the technical manpower pool? If so, with whom, and for what technologies? And just what are the aims of the university? To develop a status organization that can compete with foreign organizations, copy foreign patterns; or to turn its attention to the building of a manpower pool that will be committed and prepared to do the job of modernization of the nation? What planning between education and the other sectors of the society—such as welfare functions—is going on to give cues as to what tasks must be accomplished, how resources can be allocated to accomplish priority tasks, and just how manpower can be trained, in sufficient numbers to carry out these tasks?

The inability of men to control the course of change in modernizing societies leads to problems such as the one under discussion in this paper. Educational programs are seldom introduced to be relevant to the requirements of the modernizing society. Western medicine is seldom introduced accompanied by population control measures. Economic planning seldom coordinates the development of the agricultural and the industrial sector. Welfare programs seldom take into account the mass rather than the individual nature of social problems of development.

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4 At the same time that Emperor Haile Sellassie I, then the Chancellor of the Ethiopian national university, made his commencement speech to the graduating seniors in July, 1969, reciting the challenges to them for development, 500 students, 10% of the student body, were languishing in jail, a postscript to the riots then occurring at the university.


Military programs seldom take into account domestic implications. Young people are usually the first to realize the irrelevance of their education, the frustration of being overwhelmed with too many of their own age group, the inattention to problems of rural areas as modernization is attempted, and the preoccupation with problems of the individual sick, crippled, poor, to the neglect of the attack on the factors in the society giving rise to these problems. If young people see few attempts to rectify these inequities which affect them as much at first hand as any group in the social order, they will fail to understand the value of modernization, and the relevance of individual enterprise in their lives, inhibiting them from investing themselves in the efforts to modernize as they are exhorted to do by those holding power at the time.

Alienation of youth is a universal phenomenon in states in sub-Saharan Africa, all of whom are attempting to modernize their production and distribution systems. This alienation is a novel situation with which the national leadership of these states must deal. Their reactions to this alienation often provoke measures that exacerbate and prolong the condition, leading to extreme measures on both sides. The challenge of the appearance of the subculture of youth to these nations is not to eliminate it, which is impossible, but to use it to further progress, and as preparation for leadership for development.

Any prolongation of the age at which young persons are readmitted into the adult mainstream of the social order will aggravate their feelings of marginality, and thus further the development of a separate subculture. Since this subculture is set up to defend against the adult society, its characteristics will be negative in reference to the adult world. Thus, the sooner the adult society can absorb these young persons into their own structures, the less will be the degree of alienation of this portion of the society, and the less the disruption and tension that will result. However, this can only be accomplished if the economy can absorb those qualified to enter it; if the educational system is organized to prepare appropriate numbers for appropriate tasks; if the family and the religious institutions instill values in the young that will commit them to the modernization of the society; and if the political and welfare systems can oversee the planning, the coordination; and develop quickly enough the administrative efficiency to integrate all the disparate social elements required for development.

In most cases this cannot be accomplished, for change in developing countries does not proceed evenly any more than it does in the industrialized countries of the world. It is often easier to introduce new activities in a country than it is to modify existing ones, and this important fact often is the basis of the alienation which this paper addresses. Education in the organized sense did not exist before extensive western incursions into Ethiopia, so it was relatively easy to develop. But religious, political, and distributive systems did exist, with all their supporters among the leaders and the powerful who retained their power and leadership by maintenance of things as they were.
When the rulers realized what kind of monster they had created in their midst, one which threatened their very existence, they naturally became disenchanted with the results of the efforts to modernize, especially as it was reflected in the school system. It was here that the struggle localized itself. The focus became the political rulers, the clergy, and the elders of local communities against the students. Riots became common at the university at Addis Ababa, in the large high schools in headquarters cities in the outlying regions. Force was used on both sides, schools were closed, and students were killed, injured and incarcerated. Alienation was engendered and intensified on both sides, and something had to give.

The retreat of the old ruling class from its former enthusiasm for modernization meant also that it had some misgivings about further modernization of the armed forces. When this occurred, both Ethiopian as well as U.S. military personnel became alarmed, for it meant a lessening of their power and influence, as well as the standard of living of the local military. For the U.S. military it could mean the lessening of control of the defense of the country, which in turn could mean the lessening of control of power in the area to further its aims as an arm of U.S. foreign policy. With these two very powerful forces also alienated from the old ruling class in addition to the youth, the days of the political status quo were numbered. The only question was not whether a revolution would happen, but when it would take place, and in what form.

It is now apparent that the United States educated Ethiopian military personnel have seized the political power, but their important preoccupation is still to develop the means to control the alienated youth. In order to do this, as stated above, they must find the means to integrate the youth into the main stream of the culture. In a modernizing society this is a herculean task, for there are not the automatic forms of control yet developed that exist in our own society to coopt the dissidents and make them work for the major values of the society. But, if the current regime cannot accomplish this task, then it too is doomed to be replaced, for the youth of Ethiopia are too numerous, too well organized, and presently still enough alienated to be ignored. Youth of Ethiopia, then, constitute a major problem in maintenance of societal stability when that society is in the process of technological development.

During the years that the author lived in Ethiopia, he was haunted by the ethics of exportation of the ideology of technological development, especially as it took place in such uncritical, ethnocentric, and aggressive form, principally by the U.S. military personnel residing there. It is the contention of the author that the military as an important arm of the United States is responsible for initiating what is going on in Ethiopia today. It was a major factor in exporting the ideology, the knowledge, the artifacts, of technology that led up to the instability that ensued and that still exists.

Is this by-product of our foreign policy and our commitment to military strength functional or dysfunctional to the parties to the process, both in the long and the short run? Could more positive results have been achieved with other
initiatives such as tailor making programs which the Ethiopians could apply themselves; letting them develop their own technology in reference to other industrial nations rather than to our own; or, permitting them to live as they had been doing for centuries, if this is what they wished.

The core of the issue that disturbs the writer is that there did not seem to be self determination of the Ethiopian people in relation to modernization. If left alone to make their own decision, perhaps they would have decided to modernize, but then the writer is certain they would have done so at a much slower pace, with less instability, and possibly with technological assistance from other developing countries that had recently been through the problems which Ethiopia now faces.

The writer would like to have seen what direction and form technological development would have taken had the United States been oriented toward welfare rather than warfare in reference to its assistance to Ethiopia.

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HUMAN SECURITY OR NATIONAL DEFENSE: THE QUESTION OF CONVERSION

by Bruce Birchard
Philadelphia Yearly Meeting Friends Peace Committee

How can we convert the enormous human, financial and technological resources currently committed to military illusions of "national security" to programs and institutions which provide real human security? That is the central question of this paper.

Our military spending is excessive. The amount of money required for the military defense of the United States is a controversial matter, but many experts have estimated that less than half of our current military budget would suffice. In 1972, George McGovern proposed paring the military budget to $55 billion by 1976. In 1971, The National Urban Coalition, in its book, Counterbudget: A Blueprint for Changing National Priorities (Benson and Walman, 1971), argued that a military budget of $50 billion would be adequate in 1976. If we eliminated all forces designed to project American power abroad and prepared solely for the military defense of the territorial United States, military expenditures could be lowered still further. Shifting to a nonviolent defense strategy would probably lower the cost even more (cf. Boserup and Mack, 1974).

When the war in Southeast Asia ended, most Americans expected quite reasonably that the military budget would decline. In 1967, Charles L. Schultze, then Director of the United States Office of the Budget, estimated that the fiscal dividend accruing to the United States after the termination of the Southeast Asian war "should lie in the range of $35 to $40 billion," and that this fiscal dividend should be used to help solve the problems of poverty, provide full employment, an expanded health care and social security program, and perhaps reduce or redistribute taxes (Schultze, in Gordon, 1968: 16, 19). In actuality, the government posted a deficit in budget receipts over outlays of $3.5 billion in 1974. The deficit is expected to rise to $51.9 billion in Fiscal Year 1976, according to government estimates. Each year since 1968 the national budget has increased with ever larger appropriations for the military. President Ford asked for $107.4 billion for the defense budget in 1976. This is over $15 billion more than in fiscal 1975, the largest peacetime increase in the history of the nation. For fiscal 1978, according to the New York Times of September 15, 1976, the Pentagon is seeking a military budget of about $130 billion.

Although companies such as Rockwell International, one of the big ten in the military contracting business, claim that military spending has decreased from 58 percent of federal tax revenues in 1953 to 29 percent in 1975 (Rockwell Interna-
tional, 1975), the truth is somewhat different, as Table 1 shows.

Table 1: Breakdown of the Proposed FY 1976 Federal Budget, Excluding Trust Funds, by Spending Category (Source: Friends Committee on National Legislation Newsletter, March, 1976).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category of Spending</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Percentage of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military Spending: includes 75 percent of the interest on the national debt and veterans' benefits.</td>
<td>$132 billion</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Resources: includes education, training, employment, social services and health programs.</td>
<td>51 billion</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Non-Military: includes environment, energy, natural resources, housing, community development, 25% of the interest on the national debt, science, space, international affairs, law enforcement and justice, government, revenue sharing, commerce and transport.</td>
<td>61 billion</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income Security Programs: includes food stamps, unemployment and disability insurance, old age retirement and several small programs (e.g. black lung benefits).</td>
<td>24 billion</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$268 billion</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There has been a slight decrease in the percentage of the federal budget committed to the military, mainly because of the growth of income security and human resource programs since 1955. The portion of the controllable federal budget, however, is far higher than the 29 percent claimed by Rockwell International.

Rockwell and other Pentagon supporters are able to claim that the proportion of the federal budget spent on the military has decreased dramatically only because the federal government began including federal trust funds (notably Social Security, Highway, and Railroad Retirement Trust Funds) in the federal budget totals in 1968. Trust funds should not be lumped together with other, controllable federal budget expenditures since trust funds are made up of our money, collected through special taxes and held in trust for us by the government. If we remove these funds from the figures for the federal budget, as has been done in Table 1, military spending still consumes 49 percent of the administratively controlled federal budget.

In the pages that follow, I shall explore several fundamental questions about conversion and human security. These questions fall into four areas: 1) the benefits of converting the military-industrial complex to production and services meeting human needs; 2) examples of successful economic conversion, which demonstrate its technical feasibility; 3) an assessment of the obstacles to conversion from "liberal" and "radical" perspectives; and 4) consideration of strategies for change. In the latter context, I shall report on some tactics adopted by the national campaign to stop the B-1 bomber.
The Domestic Benefits of Conversion

In addition to possible international benefits resulting from conversion (decelerated arms race, decreased national reliance on violence to solve international conflicts), at least three domestic benefits are likely to accrue to the American people from a major conversion program: 1) more money, production and services for meeting human needs; 2) increased employment opportunities; and 3) a reduced rate of inflation. I shall examine each of these benefits in turn.

More money for meeting human needs

Much federal money could be converted from the military to the human services portions of the federal, state and community budgets. For example, The National Urban Coalition’s Counterbudget details the programs that could be supported in health care, housing, mass transit, rural development, agriculture, environmental control, education, law enforcement and criminal justice. (Benson and Wolman, 1971). Seymour Melman, in The Permanent War Economy (1974), gives the costs of dozens of questionable military projects and describes city, state and federal human needs programs of equivalent expense that have had to be terminated or were never started due to lack of funds.

The average thirty-year cost of the $92 billion B-1 bomber system alone to each congressional district in the United States would be $210 million. A study by the Peace Conversion Task Force at LaSalle College in Philadelphia indicated that, if the B-1 program were terminated, any of the following needs could be met with the $210 million saved by each congressional district.

Table 2: Socially Useful Expenditures Equal to the Average Thirty-Year Cost of the B-1 Bomber System to Each Congressional District (Source: Peace Conversion Task Force at LaSalle College, 1976).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Socially Useful Program or Service</th>
<th>Approximate Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Provide fifty percent of the costs of child care for 9,300 children for thirty years.</td>
<td>$210 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pay the operating expenses of a new high school level skills center providing vocational training for 800 students per year for forty years.</td>
<td>$210 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operate twelve 600-pupil middle schools for thirty-five years.</td>
<td>$210 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance the construction of 11,000 new low-cost family homes.</td>
<td>$210 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operate seventy neighborhood paramedic units for thirty years.</td>
<td>$210 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purchase 300 new subway cars.</td>
<td>$210 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The elimination of this one costly weapon could help many communities meet the needs of their citizens more adequately.
One area of the federal budget bears particularly close scrutiny with regard to the military/civilian spending balance. This is the federal investment in research and development. Such spending amounts to only 15 percent of federal expenditures, yet its importance should not be underestimated since it directly affects future investment and production.

In 1976, $23.5 billion was budgeted for the Federal Research and Development Program. Only one fourth of this amount was for programs strictly oriented to meeting human needs. Of the 1976 total, $10.6 billion (45 percent) was for the military, $3.5 billion (15 percent) for space, $4.3 billion (18 percent) for the Energy Research and Development Administration (E.R.D.A.), and $5.1 billion (22 percent) for all other agencies (Priorities, March, 1976).

Some of NASA's space work and E.R.D.A.'s energy research either directly or indirectly help meet human needs. The space effort, for example, may yield important "spin-offs" in the fields of medicine and solar power. E.R.D.A. is conducting research on various energy technologies. Nevertheless, the largest item in the E.R.D.A. programmatic budget for 1976 was $873.5 million (20 percent of the total E.R.D.A. budget) for producing new nuclear weapons (Priorities, March, 1976).

Seymour Melman estimates that one half to two thirds of all American research scientists and engineers are working on military-oriented technology (Melman, 1972). Conversion should include shifting research and development funds into areas in serious need of technological development such as mass transit, solar power, low-cost housing, environmental protection and health care.

The devotion of such an inordinate share of our resources to the military has led to the stagnation and depletion of many of our once-strong civilian industries. According to Melman, many U.S. civilian industries (e.g. electronics, machine tool, railroad, textiles and consumer products such as sewing machines, cameras and typewriters) are not only failing to compete abroad but also losing the domestic market to foreign competition (cf. Melman 1970 and 1974). Until the 1960's, these industries remained competitive, despite higher American wage scales, because of high productivity due to continued technological innovations. Conversion would bring the necessary funds, brains and skills to these industries, helping us to meet many of our people's needs for better products at lower prices.

Changes in the economic relationships advocated in radical conversion plans are aimed at meeting human needs more fully. New forms of ownership and management involving worker and/or community control might encourage a stronger orientation to meeting the needs of surrounding communities. Conversion to a socialist system, which emphasizes planning to meet the needs of its citizens rather than making the highest possible profits, would both lessen the pressures for military spending and increase spending on human security, according to radicals. (See the section on "Obstacles to Conversion: The Radical Critique" in this paper.)
Increased employment opportunities

Another benefit of conversion would be the generation of hundreds of thousands of jobs for the people of the United States. This contradicts widely-held assumptions that military spending is good for the economy and for employment in particular—an assumption which is buttressed by corporate and Pentagon propaganda but not supported by the facts.

The Bureau of Labor Statistics of the United States Department of Labor (BLS) provides the most comprehensive information available on the U.S. economy. The BLS finds that one billion dollars spent on military sectors of the economy creates 33 percent fewer jobs than would be created by increased personal consumption resulting from a tax cut. Specifically, one billion dollars invested in the military generates 75,710 direct and indirect jobs, whereas a one billion dollar tax cut would generate 112,363 jobs (BLS, as quoted in Priorities, June, 1976).

After analyzing the relationships between 132 different industrial sectors of the U.S. economy, the Bureau of Labor Statistics was able to demonstrate what demands would be made upon each sector of the economy by spending in a particular area. Analysts know how many jobs are generated per dollar spent in each sector; therefore, they are able to predict how many jobs would be generated by expenditures in various industries and services. Table 3 summarizes their findings.

Table 3: Direct and Indirect Jobs Generated by One Billion Dollars in Final Demand in Various Economic Sectors (Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, as cited in Priorities, June, 1976).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic Sector</th>
<th>Mean Number of Jobs Generated per Billion Dollars of Final Demand</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military: includes aircraft, electronics, ordnance, missiles, petroleum products, shipbuilding and repairs.</td>
<td>76,000 jobs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machinery: includes farm, metal-working and general industrial machinery.</td>
<td>86,000 jobs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government: includes state, local and federal.</td>
<td>87,000 jobs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation: includes railroad, local and inter-city transit and transportation equipment.</td>
<td>92,000 jobs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction: includes new residential, non-residential, public utility and highway construction as well as maintenance and repairs.</td>
<td>100,000 jobs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Consumption: resulting from a $1 billion tax cut and including retail and wholesale trade, food products, motor vehicles, clothing, petroleum products, communications and personal service sectors.</td>
<td>112,000 jobs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health: includes services, hospitals and instruments.</td>
<td>139,000 jobs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education: includes educational services.</td>
<td>187,000 jobs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, a $10 billion shift in government spending from military to other areas of the federal budget would result in "a net increase of 245,420 job opportunities" (BLS, 1975: 110).

A similar conclusion was reached by the Public Interest Research Group in Michigan (PIRCIM). Their findings are reported in detail in the article by Marion Anderson appearing elsewhere in this issue. PIRGIM calculated that the $80 billion military budgets during the 1968-1972 period cost Americans 840,000 jobs each year. Simply returning that $80 billion to taxpayers via a tax cut would have enabled them to spend more on such items as clothing, food, homes, services, education and their state and local governments. This would have generated 840,000 more jobs per year than would have been lost due to the complete termination of the military (PIRGIM, 1975).

Another investigation, by the Center for the Continuing Study of the California Economy, indicated that conversion would not be as drastic a blow to the California employment picture as generally believed. Their report states that California—which receives 15 to 20 percent of all Department of Defense contracts and gains more jobs from military spending than any other state except Texas—would suffer a mere one percent increase in unemployment if military spending were cut by 50 percent over a ten-year period, even if no compensatory programs were initiated (Priorities, June, 1976).

Finally, a study by Chase Econometric Associates, a Chase Manhattan Bank subsidiary commissioned by Rockwell International to analyze the economic impact of producing the B-1 bomber, found that alternative government expenditures or a tax cut would generate more jobs than the B-1 program. The Chase study indicated that an equivalent government expenditure on housing would generate 67,000 more jobs than B-1 production, a public works program 40,000 more jobs, and a tax cut 19,000 more jobs than B-1 production (Adams, 1976).

Why is military spending so unproductive in generating jobs? Most military work is very capital-intensive. The cost of materials is high, as exotic metals are needed for alloys and tremendously sophisticated technology for production. Salaries in military-oriented companies are high. According to a 1962 Department of Labor study, 59 percent of the employees in military-oriented electronics firms were highly paid engineers and executives, while only 30 percent of the employees in civilian market-oriented electronics firms held these positions (as reported in Raich and Finkelhor, 1972: 185).

Most contracts for military goods are let on a cost-plus basis, and relatively few are decided solely on the basis of competitive bids. In a cost-plus contract, the government guarantees the corporation a profit on the item produced equal to a certain percentage of the costs of producing that item. If a corporation makes every effort to cut costs and increase productivity, it may be able to produce, say, tanks for $500,000 each. If the government guarantees a 10 percent profit on costs, the company will make $50,000 on each tank. On the other hand, if it builds new laboratories, adds elaborate equipment, pays higher salaries to its
managers and encourages inefficient production practices, its costs may rise to $750,000 per tank, and the company will make $75,000 profit on each one. This encourages higher costs, of course, for the greater the costs, the higher the profits. Such high costs and profits decrease the amount of money going for jobs under military contracts.

Thus, by its capital-intensive, inefficient nature, military spending swells the unemployment rolls rather than generating jobs that are needed by millions of our citizens.

Overcoming inflation

The third benefit of conversion for the domestic economy would be the amelioration of the high rate of inflation. Many economists have argued that military spending is a prime cause of inflation. Melman, for instance, stresses that military spending buys products which immediately leave the marketplace. They have no "use value"; they can neither be consumed nor used in the production of other goods. The machinery, materials and power that are used in military production come from other segments of the economy which, however, receive nothing productive in exchange. This puts an upward stress on the prices of all goods (Melman, 1972: 315-316).

Another economist, Edward S. Herman, finds that military spending contributes to inflation in several ways:

1. Deficit financing: In order to hide the high cost of military weapon systems and wars from the public, Congress, under pressure from the military-oriented corporations and the Pentagon, often approves the expenditure of billions of dollars on the military which are not covered by tax revenues. As a result, the federal deficit rises and inflation increases.

2. Reduced social output: For every billion dollars spent on the military, there is a billion dollars less for meeting the demands of citizens for better housing, parks, environmental protection, schools, and services. Says Herman:

   In recent years, governments have not had enough revenue via politically feasible tax collections to expand (or even maintain) social services to meet the needs of a growing population, so that they have had to borrow (i.e. run deficits)....And workers have not had a satisfactory growth of income given the direct tax drain to finance a part of the war, plus the indirect inflation tax, so we have had pressures for many wage increases in excess of productivity, with further inflationary consequences. In brief, the drain into military boondoggles has reduced the output available for constructive social expenditures and real wage increases, and thereby indirectly contributing to increased deficits and more rapidly increasing money wages, both accelerating price increases (1975: 12).

3. The technology drain: As noted earlier, the heavy drain of scientific and engineering talent into military research and development has made U.S. civilian industries less productive, and this contributes further to the "reduced social output effect" on inflation.
4. The corruption drain: The military-industrial complex includes corporate executives and presidents, Pentagon brass and key politicians who work together to meet each other's needs (exchanging personnel, making campaign contributions, awarding cost-plus contracts, locating bases and weapons contracts in key Congressional districts). High rates of guaranteed profits, cost overruns and high prices for the materials required and the items produced all contribute to inflation.

Conversion from military production to production and services meeting human needs, particularly if a "social-industrial complex" is not created in the process, should therefore decrease the inflationary pressures in our economy.

The benefits of conversion should thus include an increase in the funds available for meeting human needs, an increase in the number of jobs for Americans seeking employment and a reduction in the rate of inflation.

The Technical Feasibility of Economic Conversion

If the benefits would be so substantial, we should consider whether or not conversion is technically feasible.

One of the early conversion success stories comes from Alabama in 1933. The Muscle Shoals Nitrate Plant had been an important source of munitions for World War I. In 1933 it was turned over to the Tennessee Valley Authority and developed into a center for research on and development of fertilizers.

On a larger scale, much of American industry converted to weapons production at the outbreak of World War II, then re-converted to civilian production at the end of the war. Over 75 percent of the automobile industry, for instance, switched to the production of tanks and armored vehicles in 1940, then returned to making automobiles in 1945.

This re-conversion was facilitated by long and careful planning on the part of government and industry alike, for re-conversion was accepted by those in power as an urgent national priority. Pent-up consumer demand and the long experience of the converting firms in the civilian market also contributed to the success of the effort.

Can careful planning lead to successful conversion today? Ironically, the most substantial contemporary program of conversion is guided by the Department of Defense. Since the Department of Defense is frequently obliged to close federal military bases, and since they wish to minimize the impact this has on the surrounding communities (partly for obvious public relations reasons), an Office of Economic Adjustment (OEA) was opened in 1961 to help communities whose economies were adversely affected by the closing of federal military installations. In 1975, I visited the OEA office at the Pentagon and talked extensively with one of their regional directors.
The Office of Economic Adjustment is the staff arm of the President's Inter-Agency Economic Adjustment Committee. It is comprised of some twenty multi-disciplinary professionals plus supporting staff. Upon notification that the Pentagon intends to close or significantly reduce work at any of its installations, the OEA notifies appropriate officials in the affected community of the assistance they can give. If the community requests their help, the OEA works with community leaders to initiate a study of the impacted area and create a community task force. This group, with some advice from the OEA, then develops a comprehensive plan for the conversion of surplus Defense Department property to civilian usage and/or the development of other economic potential. Such a plan may provide for: 1) needed community facilities, such as a vocational-technical institute, college, hospital, sewage treatment plant, airport or recreation center; 2) a more diverse industrial base by developing a new industrial park, making surplus military buildings available for industry, providing the requisite services for new industries (e.g. increased water supply, improved access to highways), advertising pre-existing inducements to industry or developing them when necessary (e.g. a tool-making plant); 3) job training to upgrade or enhance the skills of local workers; 4) assistance to small business people; and 5) the development of tourism or recreation potential.

The Office of Economic Adjustment is especially concerned with generating employment to compensate for the loss of civilian jobs due to the closing of a Department of Defense installation. According to the "Summary of Completed Major Adjustment Projects, 1961-1973," the OEA has reviewed its assistance efforts in nearly one hundred and thirty communities since 1961. The impact of realignment and closures in these communities ranged from the loss of fifteen to twelve thousand civilian jobs. The loss of military personnel and income added to the economic dislocation in many areas. Taken as a whole, in the sixty-one communities in which the OEA had terminated its assistance by 1973, 82,000 civilian jobs were lost due to Department of Defense cutbacks. In executing their conversion plans, however, these communities have generated 162,000 new jobs. This is a 2 to 1 ratio of jobs generated to jobs lost. Only seven of the sixty-one communities affected lost more civilian jobs than they gained.

One of the communities hit most suddenly by the closing of a military installation was Salina, Kansas. In November, 1964, the Pentagon announced that the Schilling Air Force Base near Salina would be closed seven months later. A total of 4,700 military and 327 civilian jobs would be lost. Quick action by the community involved planning civilian uses for the base and acquiring the federal property and $1 million of equipment at substantial discounts. Within one month of the base closing, a new vocational school and the Kansas State Patrol Academy opened in former base buildings. Much of the acreage was developed for industry. The OEA report states:

Seventy-three businesses and other non-defense related activities on the former base property now employ 3,050 people--almost ten times the number of civilians employed by the Air Force there. Within just one year after closing, private sector employment had replaced all jobs lost (The Defense Office of Economic Adjustment, 1975: 34-35).
By 1966, Salina was able to renovate a portion of the old Air Force facilities and begin operating them as a municipal airport, covering the costs with receipts from the industrial property on the former base.

The OEA's "Summary of Completed Major Adjustment Projects" concludes by stressing that the communities with which they have worked have succeeded in achieving "a more diversified and growing local economy, new business and industrial firms within the communities, a significant stimulus to the local tax base, and an opportunity to secure new public facilities and improved public services. With few exceptions, the communities have continued their local growth and development long after the immediate adjustment period itself."

Many industries would be affected by widespread conversion. Substantial proportions of them could convert to civilian production with little technical difficulty. Shipyards, which get approximately 70 percent of their work from the Navy, could design and build modern vessels for the outmoded American fishing fleet. Their ability to build large metal structures could be used in fabricating steel mills, oil refineries, desalination plants, prefabricated housing, barges, sea-mining equipment and hydrofoils (Shearer, 1973: 6-7).

Airframe manufacturers depend upon the government for at least half of their business. They have skills and machinery needed for the development and production of rail and rapid transit vehicles, low-cost housing modules and small bridges. Aircraft engine production facilities could produce engines for mass transit vehicles, electrical generating plants, gas pipelines and refineries. The electronics industry, also heavily dependent upon the Department of Defense and NASA for contracts, could be doing more work on road, rail and air traffic control devices, medical diagnostic and monitoring equipment and educational aids (Shearer, 1973: 6-8).

One recent example of conversion within the private sector is the Boeing Vertol plant. Located south of Philadelphia, it converted much of its plant from the production of helicopters for use in the Vietnam war to the production of trolley cars as the war wound down. Boeing Vertol is the only company in the country producing trolley cars, or "light rail vehicles," and they have received orders from many cities. Unfortunately, conversion was not planned far enough in advance to avoid firing much of the Boeing Vertol workforce, despite the efforts of the United Auto Workers Local 1069 to interest the Boeing management in converting to the production of low-cost modular housing units. "Think how many housing units we would have to build to make as much money as we do on one helicopter," a Boeing executive was reported to have told John Taylor, then president of the United Auto Workers Local 1069 (Philadelphia Bulletin, 2/9/71: 3).

Since consumer demand today is not what it was in the post-war period, military industries cannot expect to find substantial untapped markets in consumer goods as they did in the late 1940's. Melman, in his study of alternatives to military markets for converted military-oriented industries, found that the promising new markets were primarily in the areas of largely neglected public responsibility,
including mass transit, housing, water supply, refuse disposal and recycling, environmental protection and health care (Melman, 1965).

These markets require considerable production of goods such as mass transit vehicles, modular housing, water purification and delivery systems, recycling machinery, and medical prosthetics and monitoring devices. Meeting these needs would also generate demand for personnel in the service sectors of the economy. Since some highly specialized industries and portions of some less-specialized firms could not find sufficient markets for non-military goods to keep all their employees working, however, conversion plans must provide for substantial retraining and relocation of employees of military-contracting firms and members of the armed forces.

In 1970, Lloyd Dumas published a study entitled "Re-Education and Re-Employment of Engineering and Scientific Personnel" which found that approximately 500,000 scientists and engineers would lose their jobs if military-oriented companies converted to civilian production. According to Dumas, "Almost all of these men and women could, within a re-education period of one and a half years or less, qualify for and find employment in six major areas: high school teaching, construction, pollution, transportation and public utilities, food and related products, and various agencies of the federal government" (as quoted in Melman, 1970).

The most comprehensive conversion plan to reach Congress was offered by Walter Reuther, then President of the United Auto Workers, in 1959. Entitled Swords Into Plowshares, this plan called for a 25 percent tax on military profits, the proceeds from which would be held in a trust fund by a government conversion commission. Any worker who was laid off, down-graded, given a shorter work week or forced to relocate due to cutbacks in military contracts would be compensated with money from the trust fund. His or her income and all benefits would be maintained at a level equal to his/her average for the previous two years.

Money in the trust fund would also be available to corporations which wanted to convert from military to civilian production. To secure funds, a company would have to gain approval from the conversion commission for a detailed conversion plan. The fund would then help the company finance the conversion process. The beauty of the plan is that money for conversion would come from corporate profits, not workers' pockets, in such a way that corporations would have an incentive to convert. Only through converting could a military-oriented company draw upon money in the fund and stop paying the 25 percent tax.

Certain flaws in this plan are obvious. Reuther did not specify how military profits were to be calculated, and corporate members of the military-industrial complex have many ways of calculating profits to make them look small. Equally significant, without a clear process for putting working people and representatives of citizens' groups on the conversion commission, the commission would be dominated by corporate and government power-holders who know all too well how to protect their own interests.
In sum, the study of past conversion efforts—the Muscle Shoals Nitrate Plant, the post-World War II experience, the Office of Economic Adjustment projects, the Boeing Vertol facility—indicate that economic conversion is technically feasible. This does not mean that a widespread conversion program in the United States would not be disruptive, for these efforts either involved single plants and communities or, in the case of industry-wide re-conversion following World War II, took place under special circumstances (high consumer demand and the extensive experience of the converting industries in the civilian market). However, the studies and the plans developed by Seymour Melman, Lloyd Dumas and the United Auto Workers strongly indicate that, with careful planning, a major national conversion program could be implemented without traumatic disruptions and dislocations.

Obstacles to Conversion: The Liberal View

If conversion is technically feasible and so many benefits would accrue, why has it not been implemented?

Liberals hold that Pentagon militarists, in collusion with large military contractors and key Congressional figures, have prevented the United States from embarking on the path of economic conversion and reaping its benefits.

Melman describes the military-industrial complex as one large organization with a "state management" located in the Pentagon. This management was rationalized by former Defense Secretary Robert McNamara. During the early 1960's, McNamara organized a number of offices and thousands of people within the Department of Defense to centralize the management of military industry through the allocation of contracts and the policing of ongoing work. According to Melman, the Assistant and Deputy Secretaries of Defense comprise the "board of directors," the Secretary of Defense is the "president," and the President of the United States is its "chairman of the board." This state management effectively controls all significant decisions about obtaining capital, what and how much to produce, the price and distribution of the product and how production shall be organized (Melman, 1972: 313-314).

In Melman's view, the Pentagon controls the military-industrial complex. Therefore, an enlightened citizenry and Congress only need to break the Pentagon's grip upon this large sector of the economy in order to begin the conversion process. With Congressional guidance and careful planning, conversion could then be accomplished with no changes in the system of American capitalism. In fact, Melman sees the system of "Pentagon capitalism" as an aberration in an otherwise sound free-enterprise system.

This is not to say that liberals see no political obstacles to conversion. They stress that the Pentagon-oriented military-industrial complex has developed its own style of operating—a style which will not work in the civilian market. Military-oriented corporations have none of the marketing organization or experience which is essential in the more competitive civilian market. Their sales
effort is designed to deal with one customer—the Pentagon. One well-known aspect of this effort is the employment of former military officers and Pentagon personnel by military-oriented firms. Extensive lobbying of the Congress and Pentagon, outings and vacations for important Washingtonians at corporate expense and other features of the military-oriented corporate sales pitch are well-known.

Conversion from military production to civilian production would thus require a fundamental change in marketing strategies and structures. This change is sure to be resisted by the companies involved. The failure of some conversion efforts stems at least in part from this difficulty, and these failures in turn have strengthened the determination of many corporations to lobby against the change.

Many liberals also recognize the role which military spending has played as a government-controlled Keynesian "balance wheel" in the domestic economy. They argue, however, that other forms of government spending would prove equally effective in regulating demand. Paul Samuelson states simply:

If there is a political will, our mixed economy can rather easily keep C + I + G (Consumption + Investment + Government) spending up to the level needed for full employment without armament spending.

There is nothing special about G (Government) spending on jet bombers, intercontinental missiles, and moon rockets that leads to a larger multiplier support of the economy than would other kinds of G expenditures (as on pollution control, poverty relief and urban blight) (as quoted in Edwards, Reich and Weisskopf, 1972: 179).

Samuelson notes that there may be a political obstacle to such conversion, and he locates it in "an economically illiterate electorate" which may less reluctantly use the tools of the new economics for war rather than peace."

Likewise, the National Urban Coalition states:

High levels of defense spending are not needed to prop up our economy. The huge backlog of other needs is more than adequate to fill any gap in aggregate demand—after appropriate conversion and retraining measures—left by reductions in defense spending (1971: 253).

This and Samuelson's statement indicate a recognition by liberals of an economic obstacle to conversion, namely, the role which military spending plays in generating demand and creating employment. However, they do not see the need for anything more nor less than the political will of the electorate and its representatives to re-allocate government monies to new priorities and help affected industries make the required technological, structural and marketing changes.

Obstacles to Conversion: The Radical Critique

Radicals present a different analysis of the structure of the economic and political system and the distribution of power within the United States. Most insist that the capitalist system requires militarism and high military spending. They argue that capitalism cannot accommodate economic conversion from military to
Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy, in their classic *Monopoly Capital*, present the basic argument. (The analysis of the monopoly capitalist system on this and the next page is drawn almost exclusively from *Monopoly Capital*, pages 27-215). They begin with evidence that, in the present-day American capitalist system, most industries are dominated by a few giant corporations which are much more able to maximize their profits than individual entrepreneurs and smaller companies ever were. Quoting from an earlier paper by James Early, Baran and Sweezy examine the goals of modern corporations:

The major goals of modern large-scale business are high managerial incomes, good profits, a strong competitive position and growth. Modern management does not view these goals as seriously inconsistent, but rather, indeed, as necessary, one to the other. Competitive strength and even survival, management believes, require large innovations and substantial growth expenditures in the rapidly changing technical and market conditions of the present day.... For well recognized reasons, management wishes to minimize outside financing, so the funds for most of these expenditures must be internally generated. This requires high and growing profits above dividend levels. So, too, do high managerial rewards. High and rising profits are hence an instrument as well as a direct goal of great importance (1966: 37-38).

The pursuit of profits is certainly not a new feature of American capitalism. However, the enormous corporations and conglomerates that dominate our present-day economy differ in at least two important ways from individual capitalists and smaller companies: they can operate within a longer time frame, and they are able to calculate more rationally. These factors enable the giants to avoid dangerous risks and adopt a "live and let live" approach to their corporate competitors, particularly within the old, established industries.

Such corporate power and policies have led to a situation in which corporate giants in any one field have an interest in seeing that the profits of the industry as a whole are as large as possible. This restricts price competition. Though direct collusion in fixing prices is rare, "price leadership," often by the most powerful firm, is common. Thus, when U.S. Steel initiates an increase in the price of steel, other companies either follow suit, or U.S. Steel drops its increase. It is highly unusual, on the other hand, for a company in an established industry to lower its prices since, once its competitors followed suit, the result would be lower profits for all.

Rather than competing over prices, say Baran and Sweezy, corporate giants compete in their efforts to cut costs through technological innovations, the control of cheap sources of raw materials (often abroad), and relocating in less developed countries where they can exploit cheap labor pools. They also compete, through advertising and sales efforts, to capture a larger share of the existing or growing market. Little of this competition, however, results in lower prices for consumers.
The result of these policies is the strong and persistent tendency of the economic surplus (profits) to rise. Some of this surplus can be absorbed by the personal consumption of capitalists. However, the historical trend, according to B ran and Sweezy, is for dividends to rise more slowly than profit margins, so consumption takes a steadily lower proportion of corporate profits over time.

Economic surplus can also be invested. However, since corporations will not make investments that lower their profit margins, larger investments generally lead to larger surpluses. This tendency is exacerbated by depreciation allowances which are often sufficient to finance a large part of necessary investments, and by the bias against introducing radical new technologies which would require extensive capital and disrupt established production processes. Thus, accelerating growth eventually outstrips profitable investment opportunities, investment declines, and so do income and employment. A recession or depression begins.

One other avenue of surplus absorption is still open, however: government taxation and spending. This brings us to the question of whether or not spending on human services and civilian industries can serve as well as military spending to generate demand and absorb the economic surplus.

Radicals insist that, within the present-day capitalist economy of the United States, only military spending can sufficiently stimulate the economy. They cite at least three important reasons for this claim. First, only through military spending can government pump massive sums of money into the economy without competing with the private sector. Though spending on human and community needs could absorb tremendous amounts of money and generate jobs and income, powerful interests oppose this. A program to provide low-cost housing to poor Americans would threaten landlords and the construction industry. Rapid transit systems compete with automobiles and hence are opposed by the powerful oil, automobile and associated industries. A government role in providing health care to those who need it is fought tooth and nail by the profit-oriented medical establishment. Examples could be multiplied. The raising of armies and deployment of weapons is unique in that it threatens no private enterprise.

Secondly, the government provision of adequate human services and the maintenance of employment opportunities for all people threatens the business elite. In such a society, business would find it difficult to get workers for low-paying, unpleasant jobs. This would add to their costs and decrease their profits.

Finally, it is only through military spending that government can waste enormous sums of money and yet avoid public criticism. When the Pentagon quietly dismantled its once-controversial Anti-Ballistic Missile system in 1976 after spending $6 billion on it, scarcely a word was heard. Weapons and armies are unique among tax-funded programs in that they can be scrapped as obsolete after ten or twenty years of service. It is hard to imagine investing billions of tax dollars in a mass transit system, then quietly declaring it useless six years later and dismantling it.
The public accepts such waste for at least three reasons: 1) fears about communism have been constantly stimulated and can be easily manipulated; 2) few people can compare the functions of a bomber or tank to something which they use, and, therefore, few can comprehend the absurdity of its high cost; and 3) no one feels that she or he is supporting the needs of someone else at her/his own expense, since the military ostensibly exists to protect (serve) everyone, not just the poor, or the farmers, or welfare mothers.

There is plenty of evidence in recent history for the radical view that military spending alone can adequately fill the need for additional demand in the capitalist economy, given the political constraints inherent in the capitalist system. President Roosevelt's efforts to pull the country out of the Depression during the New Deal only partially succeeded, for even in this desperate situation, capitalist restraints on competitive government spending were too strong to allow for a level of spending sufficient to restore the economy to full capacity. Only the massive spending engendered by World War II could accomplish this.

Radicals also argue that the ability of the United States to project power abroad through a large, heavily armed military is important to many owners and managers of big business. Most corporations oppose foreign governments which favor rapid democratizing economic and social changes (e.g. nationalization of industry, land reform). The corporate elites generally favor more authoritarian governments which guarantee "stability," a "safe investment climate," and freedom from "interference" from labor unions. These governments (e.g. South Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, Iran, South Africa, Brazil, Chile) are supported by American arms, technicians and advisors.

Since the experience of Vietnam, the United States and its corporate leaders rely less on actual armed intervention (though that threat still exists, as the Angola revolution demonstrated). Rather, say the radicals (and even some members of Congress), the United States is arming client governments to carry out the violent repression of revolutionary forces whose policies would threaten United States investments. The arms industries and counter-insurgency expertise developed by the American military-industrial complex are both necessary to this effort. The fact that most American military spending serves to project U.S. power abroad is no accident. Extensive conversion would threaten this capability.

Domestically, the military-industrial complex brings additional benefits to the business elites who contributed so much to its growth. Hundreds of our largest corporations get a tremendous amount of business and profits from military contracts. Estimates of the profitability of these contracts range from a 1971 Government Accounting Office figure of 56 percent on a sample of 146 completed projects (as reported in DuBoff, 1972: 11) to a figure of 17.5 percent derived by former Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Murray Weidenbaum from a sample of large military contracts let between 1962 and 1965. In contrast, the average rate of return on investment in civilian industry is 10.6 percent (Reich and Finkelhor, 1972: 187).
There are several reasons why profits are so high in military work. For one thing, many military industries are dominated by a few giant corporations which exercise near-monopolistic control over the field (e.g. aircraft, shipbuilding). For another, contracts are seldom let solely on the basis of the lowest bid. A third reason is the practice of contracting on a cost-plus basis, as explained in the first section of the paper.

One reason for high profits in military work deserves special attention. Many military contractors use government-owned plants and equipment in their work. As of July, 1970, over $14 billion worth of industrial production equipment and plants were used by private military contractors. In 1967, General Electric and North American Rockwell (now Rockwell International) held more than $100 million worth of publicly-owned capital goods, according to a General Accounting Office report. The use of these facilities, of course, cuts costs and raises profit margins (Shearer, 1973: 2). Many military companies now calculate their profits as a percentage of sales rather than a percentage of their investment for this reason. Such a procedure makes their profits appear smaller. This violates normal accounting procedures as well as the traditional capitalist view that profits are a return on investment, warranted by the risk involved in the enterprise.

The government subsidizes the military corporations in other ways as well. When Lockheed faced bankruptcy several years ago, the government bailed them out with a guarantee of a $250 million loan. In 1972, the Navy bought $1.7 million worth of stock in the Gap Instrument Company when cost overruns on Navy equipment threatened it (Shearer, 1973: 2).

A final boon to the upper class brought by military business is the generation of more high status, lucrative jobs than civilian business. The proportion of scientists and engineers employed per value of product is one per $150,000 in the military sector, one per $750,000 in civilian electronics industries, and one per $2,000,000 in the automobile industry. Twenty-one percent more of every dollar in military contracts goes to salaries and wages than in civilian-oriented production, and yet, as we have seen, military spending generates fewer jobs (DuBoff, 1972: 14). Military spending thus contributes proportionately more to the wealth of the upper classes than does civilian spending.

To summarize the differences between the liberal and radical analyses of the obstacles to conversion, liberals see the military-industrial complex as a distorted enclave in a potentially sound capitalist economy. They believe that control of this enclave resides in the Pentagon. They argue that spending on human needs in civilian sectors of the economy could generate needed demand just as effectively as military spending and that this could be done with no fundamental change in the overall economic system. Many hold that the blame for not converting lies with the electorate since, after all, ultimate power in our democracy lies with the voting public.
Radicals believe that the military sector of the United States economy is not an isolated enclave. On the contrary, they insist, it reaches deep into and operates on the same principles and with the same goals as other sectors of the economy. As a result, it is strongly supported by most members of the business and financial elite. The military-oriented sector is not a distortion of the capitalist system, since the capitalist's primary goal is to maximize profits and enlarge the power of their class—a goal which is all too admirably met by military spending.

The radicals also reason that the long-term trend of steadily growing economic surplus resulting from the basic capitalist drive for increasing profits makes some form of government spending necessary. Because the capitalist system rules out substantial government spending which would compete with private interests, only military spending can "fit the bill" in such a large way.

Finally, radicals do not believe that power is distributed in such a way that the public can simply be educated to vote for conversion. Rather, they argue, the upper class of business and government leaders has tremendous power to influence the votes of Congresspeople and the opinions of the American people. No fundamental change, such as economic conversion, can be carried out without re-distributing power more equitably among the people of the United States.

Radicals conclude that significant conversion from military spending to industries and services which meet serious human and community needs is impossible without converting in the process to some form of socialist economic system. A system based on maximizing profits rather than meeting people's needs is structurally and politically incapable of widespread conversion.

**Strategies for Change**

One's strategies for conversion depend upon whether one accepts the liberal or the radical analysis of militarism and military spending.

Liberal strategies stress the development of conversion plans by government, industry and labor analysts on the one hand and education of the electorate, Congress, unions and industry on the other. Seymour Melman's extensive studies into the conversion process and new markets for military-oriented firms (cf. Melman, 1965, 1970 and 1974) are a good example of this. The work on retraining displaced defense workers reported by Melman's colleague, Lloyd Dumas (in Melman, 1971) is another example.

Most liberals recognize the enormity of the task. Conversion would have to be made a national goal with the full energies of political, business, labor and professional leaders behind it to succeed. The effort would cost much money and create considerable dislocation and difficulty in industries which are accustomed to serving a single customer (the Pentagon) with extensive subsidization and high profit guarantees.
Melman has taken the liberal conversion message to Washington, to industry and to the public. In 1969, for example, he testified on the subject of "Postwar Economic Conversion" before the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare. He stressed the importance of advance planning "not only in private firms, but among trade unions and professional associations of the relevant industries, and in city, state and federal governments" (1969: 9). He urged Congress to begin by passing a bill proposed by Senator McGovern which would have established a federal conversion trust fund. The bill was modeled after the Reuther proposal described earlier in this paper. It called for a federal conversion commission to administer the fund and, in doing so, encourage and facilitate the conversion process.

The radicals' strategy differs from that of the liberals in at least two important respects: 1) Radicals believe that a successful conversion strategy must include the development of publicly-owned and controlled service and production industries and a transition to a socialist economic system. 2) Radicals insist that we must organize a mass base for conversion in order to counter the power of the ruling elite, whom radicals see as united in their support for military spending.

Derek Shearer, writing in Working Papers (Summer, 1973), stressed the need for planning that includes "government spending to serve as a Keynesian balance wheel in the economy." "I propose," he continues, "that these plans and programs should be based on the notions of community controlled economic development and publicly-owned production authorities at the state, regional and national level (1973: 2).

Strategically, this may sound like a retreat from radical calls for total revolution. It stems, however, from a realistic appraisal of the current situation in the western world. During the past decade, some radicals expected the capitalist system to topple from the weight of Vietnam, inflation, unemployment and unmet human needs. Today, most radicals conclude that, whether or not the system finally collapses from its internal contradictions, the Left must struggle for significant change in the meantime.

In Strategy for Labor, Andre Gorz argues that radicals can work for their vision of a new society through a step-by-step process of "radical structural reforms." Reforms can be revolutionary, he stresses, if they involve a shift in power. Specifically, a revolutionary reform should meet the following criteria (this interpretation of Gorz is based on remarks in an unpublished paper by Paula Giese written in 1973): 1) the reform improves the lot of the working class (or some segment of it) at the expense of the ruling class; 2) the struggle for the reform gets people organized on a mass basis to demand change rather than allowing representatives of the elites to bargain for lesser improvements; 3) the reform is implemented and administered by those whom it benefits; 4) the effort involved in winning the reform brings people together into structures of communication and democratic decision-making; and 5) the struggle raises class consciousness. A strategy for organizing around a series of such reforms would be a truly radical strategy, argues Gorz.
To return to Shearer, he sees the creation of community-controlled, publicly-owned service and production industries as an important revolutionary reform for the United States. Such a program would enlarge the power of non-capitalist groups and institutions in our society. Since hundreds of millions of dollars worth of government-owned plant and equipment are already used by military contractors, why not start there? (Shearer, 1973).

A good example of such a demand is the proposal by the Stop the B-1 Bomber/National Peace Conversion Campaign to convert the El Segundo plant used by Rockwell International to develop the B-1 bomber. The El Segundo facility is owned by the government. It is located near Los Angeles, which suffers from the lack of a rapid transit system. As indicated earlier, the human and technological resources of an airframe assembly plant are readily convertible to the design and production of mass transit systems.

The Stop the B-1/Peace Conversion Campaign has proposed that the publicly-owned El Segundo plant be converted from the manufacture of B-1 bombers to work on a mass transit system for Los Angeles. This work should be done under the direction of a new, publicly owned "Southern California Transit Authority." Capital for the enterprise could come initially through a federal grant representing a small portion of the money saved by terminating the B-1 program. Control should be exercised by a board selected by the people of the region or their elected representatives.

United States experience with the Tennessee Valley Authority and publicly-owned utilities can provide Americans with valuable insights into structuring such public control. The experience of many European countries, both western and eastern, can tell us a lot about the advantages and problems of different forms of public control. On a smaller scale, the experiments with community-development corporations and workers' cooperatives should be instructive.

The next step in a radical strategy for conversion could be public acquisitive of any private firm (or military sector of a large, diversified firm such as General Electric or RCA) doing 75 percent of its business with the government. Another possible candidate for takeover and conversion is the runaway shop. As many multinational corporations leave their workers and communities in the lurch by shifting production to foreign facilities, their domestic plants could be appropriated by the state or local government.

Many radicals are interested in the concept of worker-controlled industries. Part of their conversion strategy is to develop worker-controlled boards which would oversee the management of the factories or workplaces. Many experiments in worker and union participation in management are urgently needed.

Radical strategies for conversion often incorporate other demands which meet some or all of the Gorzian criteria for radical reforms. Many demand that corporations "open the books." Corporate accounts are among the world's best kept secrets,
as became clear when Congressional committees tried to investigate alleged profit excesses in the oil industry. Although all corporations must release reports on their financial activities, the complexity of their operations and the absence of any clear, standard accounting procedures allows them considerable room to maneuver. Barnet and Muller state that many multinational corporations keep separate books for different purposes. They also claim that government regulators are years behind in understanding complex corporate accounting procedures (Barnet and Muller, 1974).

George Lakey suggests that a conversion campaign draft legislation requiring that every corporation doing more than five percent of its business with the Pentagon open its accounts to the public (1975: 16-17). Such a demand should be coupled with the establishment of standard accounting procedures by the Government Accounting Office. If implemented, a small measure of corporate power would be broken, and the public would be better able to exercise meaningful control.*

The Reuther proposal for a conversion trust fund overseen by a federal conversion commission has also been suggested as an element in a radical conversion strategy. In testimony before the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare in 1969, Walter Reuther, then President of the United Auto Workers, said in part:

What the outline proposes, in essence, is that a proportion of each contractor's profits from defense production be required to be set aside as a conversion reserve to be held in a government trust fund.

Monies deposited in the trust fund would be released to carry out a conversion plan filed with the government by the contractor and to pay certain types of benefits to the contractor's workers to minimize hardships they might suffer during the transition to civilian production (1970: 17).

In commenting on this proposal, Paula Giese suggests confiscating 100 percent of a corporation's profits on military production, as calculated by standard Government Accounting Office auditing procedures. She also would insist that the conversion commission include working people from affected plants, paid for their time out of the trust fund. In addition to considering the technical and economic feasibility of proposed conversion plans, she believes that the commission should examine the usefulness and desirability of the products to the general public, the "humanizing" of the production processes and the environmental effects of both the new industrial activity and the goods produced (Giese, 1973).

All radical proposals for conversion strategies, like the liberal strategies, begin with the need for education and consciousness raising. The radical process must include an analysis of the present system of monopoly capital and the military-industrial complex, a vision of a more just and democratic society, and ideas about how to get from here to there. Many radicals stress the value of structuring *

For those interested in pursuing this approach, Open the Books: How to Research a Corporation is an excellent manual on how to research your local corporation, corporate subsidiary, bank or real estate company. It is available from Urban Planning Aid, Inc., 639 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge, MA, 02139.
empowering experiences into the educational process itself (e.g. by making this process a thoroughly democratic one).

As a reflection of its concern for economic and social justice, a radical conversion campaign could enter coalitions with the thousands of neighborhood, city-wide, state and national organizations struggling to meet human needs, establish economic justice, end sexual and racial exploitation and initiate socialism. Such coalitions could struggle within the arena of legislation and electoral politics, through the development of alternative institutions and through nonviolent direct actions.

One campaign which has tried to organize around the issue of conversion is the Stop the B-1 Bomber/ National Peace Conversion Campaign. The American Friends Service Committee and Clergy and Laity Concerned initiated this effort in 1973. It has involved hundreds of organizers in an effort to stop the B-1 bomber (mainly through public pressure on Congress), expose and challenge the military-industrial complex and promote peace conversion. Many of those associated with the campaign held the radical view of militarism and conversion, others a more liberal one. While enlisting the support of tens of thousands of liberal Americans, many organizers tried to introduce a more radical analysis, and sometimes strategy, to the struggle.

In addition to trying to stop the B-1 bomber from going into production, the Stop the B-1/ Peace Conversion Campaign tried to use the B-1 bomber as a means of approaching the conversion issue. Since the B-1 is so costly and ineffective, even in conventional military terms, it has led people to question the system which proposed and wants to produce it. The B-1 program includes many classic features of military contracting: low job generating potential, the drain of billions of dollars ($92 billion) in tax money from pressing human needs, the use of government-owned property, cost over-runs, heavy corporate lobbying and public relations efforts. A campaign to stop the B-1 almost necessarily exposes these.

Most of this campaign's conversion work has been educational. One tactic has been particularly successful. Many campaigners have organized peace conversion fairs, or "Fair Shake Festivals." In the Northwest section of Philadelphia, for instance, a group of neighborhood people and I estimated how much money their community would pay if the B-1 system were built--approximately $19 million. We then approached local organizations with this information and asked them to join us in a Festival to demand a "fair shake" for all. Each participating group prepared a booth in which it demonstrated the kind of work it was doing to meet the needs of the community and how it could use the millions of dollars which could be "returned" to Northwest Philadelphia over the next thirty years if the 6-1 program were terminated. Over forty organizations, ranging from peace groups to the Germantown Home and School Association, participated.

The B-1 bomber has proved to be a good "handle" for the conversion issue. As the President and Congress reach a final decision on B-1 production, however, many
organizers are developing conversion programs around local issues or institutions. One such program is the Mid-Peninsula Conversion Project in California's Santa Clara County. Corporations in this county hold more military contracts than those in any other county in the United States. The project is reaching out to disaffected engineers and workers at many of these military plants through leafletting, a monthly newspaper, meetings and support groups. One group of engineers left Lockheed and formed a small solar energy company with assistance from the project.

Many local conversion efforts are being initiated by B-1/Peace Conversion Campaign organizers. Inquiries about these programs can be addressed to: American Friends Service Committee, Peace Education Division, 1501 Cherry St., Philadelphia, PA, 19102.

As people become more concerned about the power of our enormous economic and government institutions and about the serious human problems in our well-endowed nation, the potential for meaningful change grows. Struggles to meet human needs, establish sexual, racial and social justice, empower the oppressed, oppose unfair taxes, create democratic economic structures and develop alternative institutions all contribute to human security, which indeed should be the fundamental concern of any conversion program.

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Southwest Region of the American Friends Service Committee.

ECONOMIC CONVERSION, PRODUCTIVE EFFICIENCY
AND SOCIAL WELFARE

Lloyd J. Dumas, Associate Professor, Columbia University

Introduction

Traditional economic theory holds that there is a tradeoff between inflation and unemployment, and that accordingly price stability (i.e. 0% inflation) can only be achieved at the expense of increased unemployment, while full employment (corresponding to an unemployment rate of about 3%) requires acceptance of an ongoing inflation. In 1960, the noted economists Paul Samuelson and Robert Solow published an analysis of annual data for the period 1933-1958, from which they quantitatively estimated this tradeoff. It was their rough estimate that the elimination of inflation would require acceptance of a 5%-6% rate of unemployment, while the achievement of full employment would impose a continuing 4%-5% rate of inflation. In a later study, Lawrence Klein and Ronald Bodkin looked at quarterly data from 1948-57 and concluded that an unemployment rate of 6.9% would have to be maintained in order to achieve price stability, thus implying a slightly more severe tradeoff.

The fact is that over the last several years, inflation and unemployment have both been persistently near, and often substantially beyond, these high tradeoff limits simultaneously. During the calendar year 1975, the U.S. national unemployment rate was averaging 8.5% at the same time the consumer price index was rising by 6.5%. Something had clearly changed in the U.S. economy to produce this unprecedented high inflation/high unemployment situation. The question is what?

An important part of the answer lies not in the events of the last few years by themselves, but rather is rooted in a much longer process of cumulative economic deterioration stretching over the past few decades. Furthermore, this process does not derive from a fatal flaw in the workings of the U.S. economic system. It is neither necessary nor inevitable. Rather it is the unintended result of a conscious decision, with broad popular support, to adhere to a system of national priorities which has given primacy to the development and maintenance of a sector which is particularly unproductive from a purely economic viewpoint -- the military. When the U.S., for the first time in its history, entered into a protracted era of high military spending following the close of the Second World War, it sowed the seeds of the economic decline whose bitter harvest it is just beginning to reap.

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The initial section of this analysis traces the mechanism by which the persistence of high military spending has played a major role in producing the economic deterioration underlying the present U.S. recession/inflation, and highlights the implications of this deterioration for social welfare. The second section deals with the nature of the serious economic and political barriers that have developed to the reversal of this economic and social decline. Finally, we consider the kinds of policies which should be effective in overcoming these barriers and accomplishing the transition from military to civilian orientation which is a necessary pre-condition of a serious and successful effort to improve the economic and social welfare of the people of the United States. Some of the plethora of conceivable productive uses of the resources freed from the military are discussed.

The Economic Effects of Military Spending

The idea that persistently high defense spending could play a major role in producing economic decline flies in the face of one of the most deeply ingrained and widely held economic beliefs: that a capitalist economic system benefits from (or at the very least is not harmed by) high levels of military expenditure. From the far left to the far right, there seems to be consensus on this one point. But the fact that a belief is deeply ingrained and widely held does not make it true.

Interestingly enough, Adam Smith, regarded as the father of rough and tumble laissez faire capitalism, did not share this view. On the contrary, Smith apparently saw military spending as economically parasitic, writing in his epic The Wealth of Nations (published in 1776):

"...the whole army and navy are unproductive labourers... Such people, as they themselves produce nothing, are all maintained by the produce of other men's labour. When multiplied...unproductive hands, who should be maintained by a part only of the spare revenue of the people, may consume so great a share of their whole revenue, and therefore...encroach...upon the funds destined for the maintenance of productive labour, that all the frugality and good conduct of individuals may not be able to compensate the waste and degradation of produce occasioned by this violent and forced encroachment."

There are essentially four reasons why the maintenance of high levels of military expenditure in the U.S. over the past thirty years has produced both inflation and unemployment. These are: (1) the economic nature of military goods; (2) the way in which military procurement has been conducted; (3) effects on the international balance of payments; and (4) effects on civilian technological progress.
Each of these is now considered in turn. 6

The Economic Nature of Military Goods. Military goods are those products purchased by the military which are to some degree specialized to military use. Thus, tanks, rifles, bombs, fighter planes, etc. are military goods, while milk, meat, detergents, etc. purchased by the armed forces are not.

Military goods so defined are peculiar in that they neither contribute to the present standard of living (as do consumer goods, housing, health care, etc.) nor to the economy's capacity to produce and distribute "standard of living" goods and services in the future (as do industrial machinery, trucks, warehouses, factories, school buildings, etc.). That is not to say military goods are useless, but merely that they do not augment the present or future standard of living in the way that the various consumer goods, producer goods and social services do, and thus do not possess the same kind of economic usefulness. However, despite the fact that they do not produce economic value in the above sense, they do require valuable economic resources for their production, and therefore impose a real cost on society. This cost is best measured not purely in terms of money, but rather in terms of the sacrifice of the economically useful social and economic goods and services that could have been produced with the labor, materials, energy, machinery, etc. which were instead devoted to military production.

Because the money paid out to the producers of military goods does not call forth a corresponding production of goods and services which can be purchased by business firms and consumers, the conditions are created whereby there may be an excess of demand relative to supply of goods. If this occurs, it will produce pressure toward a rise in the general level of prices, i.e. inflation. This potential contribution to inflation is the easiest part of the military spending problem to handle for two reasons: (1) it is only a serious problem when employment is full or near full; and (2) it can be offset, say by raising taxes sufficiently to remove enough money from the rest of the public to balance the flow of funds being spent on military goods. However, during periods of full employment, the money flows for the military have not been fully offset, and so have contributed to producing inflation. For example, during nearly all of the latter part of the decade of the 1960's, when the U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War was intensifying, the unemployment rate was under 4%. 7 Military spending was not offset, and between 1965 and 1969, the rate of inflation more than tripled. 7

Military Procurement Practices. Whatever the payment formula formally written into major defense procurement contracts, they have all in practice been what are known as "cost plus" contracts. 9 These are
contracts in which the producing firm is paid an amount equal to its total cost of production (whatever that eventually turns out to be) plus a profit. Operating under such a system, the firm involved not only has no risk, but also has no incentive to hold its costs down. To the extent that the firm wants to increase its sales revenue, it will have a very powerful incentive to run its costs up in order to achieve the highest possible payment for its product.  

Combining this incentive system with the very large amounts of money made available for military procurement year after year by the Congress has created a situation in which military industry has bid up the prices of key resources. Chief among these are engineering and scientific personnel, and some grades of highly skilled production labor. Aside from its direct effects in increasing the cost of these resources to civilian industry thus adding to the pressure toward inflation, the purchasing power of defense firms, backed by their rich customer (the Federal Government), has completely preempted a substantial amount of some of these resources, with serious long term effects on the health of the civilian economy.

For example, by one crude and conservative estimate nearly one-third of all the engineers and scientists in the United States were engaged in defense-related work as of 1967.11 Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Murray Weidenbaum had earlier put the figure at 52%.12 The pre-emption by the military of such a large fraction of what we will subsequently see is a critical resource in a modern industrial society, cannot fail to have significant effects on the functioning of that part of the economy that produces goods and services which do contribute to the standard of living and the quality of life.

International Balance of Payment Effects. From 1893 through 1970, year by year the U.S. had a balance of trade surplus, i.e. the U.S. exported a greater value of goods and services than it imported. Since exports bring foreign currency into the U.S., while imports send U.S. dollars abroad, if this had been the only aspect of the U.S.' international transactions, there would have been a considerable accumulation of foreign currencies (or gold) in the U.S., and a comparative shortage of U.S. dollars abroad. Consequently the U.S. dollar would have been one of the strongest (if not the strongest) currencies in the world. However, the balance of payments includes not only money flows related to trade, but all other international money flows as well, and the U.S. balance of payments has been in continuous deficit for many years.

What role has U.S. military expenditure played in this situation? It has affected the U.S. international economic position directly through outflows of U.S. dollars for defense expenditures abroad, and indirectly through its effects on the balance of trade, chiefly via
its influence on the competitiveness of U.S. civilian industries in foreign and domestic markets.

In the table below are presented some basic U.S. Department of Commerce data which bear on the direct effects of military expenditures abroad and on the U.S. international financial situation. We note that the entire cumulative balance of payments deficit for the period 1960-1970 (inclusive) was $35 billion, whereas over the same period, total direct defense expenditures (net after military sales abroad) were more than $30 billion. Hence, U.S. military expenditures abroad accounted for 86.6% of the entire U.S. balance of payments deficit during that period.

During the years 1955-1970 (inclusive) there was a huge inflow of foreign currencies into the U.S., represented by a cumulative balance of trade surplus of nearly $62 billion. But during those same years, net military expenditures abroad were responsible for an outflow of dollars from the U.S. amounting to more than $43 billion. The outflow of U.S. currency owing to military spending abroad thus wiped out 69.9% of the balance of trade surplus, 1955-1970.

Perhaps an even more striking fact is that total net direct defense expenditures abroad over the entire 20 year period from 1955 to 1974 were more than 10% greater than the total balance of trade surplus.

These comparisons greatly understate the magnitude of U.S. defense expenditures abroad, because they do not include outright U.S. grants of military goods and services. Since they involve no international flows of currency, these gifts of military equipment and services are not involved in the balance of money flows. However if included, the total of almost $34 billion worth of such grants recorded during the years 1960-1974 would increase the military expenditure figures given for that period by more than 80%.

It is clear from these data that direct outflows of dollars in the form of U.S. military expenditures abroad played a major role in destroying the favorable balance of trade surplus, and contributed to the severe weakening of the U.S. dollar. This substantially raised the price of imported goods (including oil) upon which the nation’s business and consumers have become increasingly dependent in the past few years. This massive outflow of military spending abroad has directly and substantially contributed to the generation of inflation within the domestic U.S. economy.

Military Expenditure and Civilian Technological Progress.

Technological progress is one of the cornerstones of modern industrial society. It is often seen as a kind of unidirectional force, which presses onward, almost with its own imperative, compelling
### U.S. Military Expenditures Abroad and the International Balance of Payments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Balance of Trade ($millions)</th>
<th>Balance of Payments ($millions)</th>
<th>Net Direct Defense Expenditures Abroad ($millions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>2,897</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>2,501</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>4,753</td>
<td>11,571</td>
<td>2,627</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>6,271</td>
<td>12,667</td>
<td>2,466</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>3,462</td>
<td>11,643</td>
<td>2,835</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>1,148</td>
<td>6,028</td>
<td>2,503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>4,892</td>
<td>-3,667</td>
<td>2,752</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>5,571</td>
<td>-2,252</td>
<td>2,596</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>4,521</td>
<td>-2,864</td>
<td>2,449</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>5,224</td>
<td>-2,713</td>
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<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>6,801</td>
<td>-2,696</td>
<td>2,133</td>
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<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>4,951</td>
<td>-2,478</td>
<td>2,122</td>
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<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>3,817</td>
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<td>2,935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>3,800</td>
<td>-4,683</td>
<td>3,226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>635</td>
<td>-1,611</td>
<td>3,143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>607</td>
<td>-6,081</td>
<td>3,328</td>
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<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>2,603</td>
<td>-3,851</td>
<td>3,354</td>
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<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>-2,268</td>
<td>-21,965</td>
<td>2,893</td>
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<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>-6,409</td>
<td>-13,829</td>
<td>3,621</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>955</td>
<td>-7,651</td>
<td>2,316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>-5,528</td>
<td>-19,043</td>
<td>2,159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>48,703</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>54,263</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**
1. Problems of data availability and comparability complicate a more complete analysis over the entire post World War II period.
2. Exports-imports, merchandise, adjusted excluding military (minus implies deficit)
3. Net liquidity balance (minus implies deficit)
4. Direct defense expenditures - military sales (does not include military grants of goods and services)

people to adjust themselves to the kind of world it produces.

Actually nothing could be farther from the truth. There is nothing mystical about the development and application of new technical knowledge -- it is merely the product of individuals, trained in the appropriate scientific and engineering disciplines, trying to solve the problems toward which their attention is directed. Technology has no initiative of its own, nor is it unidirectional. Its advance can be accelerated or slowed by altering the magnitude of resources devoted to that purpose. It may be channeled in many different directions by changing the nature of the problems set before the engineers and scientists who develop it. Technology is not a single lane road down which we must travel at a speed beyond our control. It is a complex interconnected network which is explored at a pace and in a pattern largely determined by social decision, within the limits placed upon us chiefly by the availability of appropriately trained engineering and scientific personnel.

The critical functions of civilian technological development in a modern society are to enhance the quality of products available and to improve the efficiency with which these products are produced. Here the word "products" is defined broadly to include not merely manufactured goods, but rather the whole range of goods and services, power supply, transportation etc.

As the cost of labor, fuel, raw materials, machinery and other productive resources rise over time, they exert an upward pressure on the cost of producing any given product, and hence on its price. The only way this pressure can be relieved, i.e. the only way the production cost per unit of product can be held down in the face of rising input costs is by finding more efficient ways of utilizing these inputs. If, for example, an improved production technique were developed which allowed us to produce 10% more output from the same combination of inputs we had been using, we could offset up to a 10% increase in the cost of every input by implementing this technique, and therefore hold production cost steady despite the rise in labor, fuel, etc. costs. Accordingly there would be no cost pressure to raise the product's price. Thus cost increases can be offset by increases in the output produced per unit of input. This latter quantity is known as productivity.

Particular attention is often focused on the rising cost of the labor resource, and therefore on the behavior of its potential offset, labor productivity. Civilian technological progress plays a crucial two-sided role in the improvement of labor productivity. On the one hand, direct improvements in production techniques increase the output obtainable from a given amount of labor. On the other hand, technological progress in the industries that produce the machinery and equipment used in the production of all goods and services make the
purchase of that machinery and equipment more attractive to all pro-
ducers by holding down its price (through improvements in production
techniques) and enhancing its quality. As labor prices rise, the
availability of relatively inexpensive high capability machinery will
lead producers to purchase more and better machinery, thus increasing
the output produced per worker. Therefore, both directly and in-
directly civilian technological development plays a vital role in
maintaining the economy's ability to offset higher labor (and other
resource) costs, and removing the "cost-push" pressures toward infla-
tion.

We have noted that between one-third and one-half of the engi-
neering and scientific personnel in the U.S. have been directing
their attention to the development of technology oriented to military
uses. The magnitude of this diversion is even greater than these
quantitative estimates indicate, since the combination of high pres-
tige and high pay associated with military-related work have tended to
attract the top-ranking graduates in the various disciplines into this
area. The pre-emption of such a large portion of the nation's tech-
nological talent by the military cannot fail to have a strong adverse
impact on the rate of civilian technological development.

The argument is often made that the technology developed in the
pursuit of military oriented goals can also be applied to civilian
purposes. To be sure there is some occasional "spillover". But what
is found is strongly conditioned by what is sought. Advances in ci-
vilian technology, whether they be improved techniques of power gener-
ation or food preservation, will typically be found faster and at a
much reduced expense if they are pursued directly. Furthermore, to
the limited extent spillover exists between military and civilian
 technological developments, it operates in both directions. At any
rate the acid test of the high spillover argument is essentially an
empirical one: if it is true, then the pre-emption of technological
resources should not have substantially diminished the rate of civil-
ian technological progress.

By early 1976, the indications of decline in U.S. civilian tech-
nological development were so manifest that they could no longer be
ignored by either business people or the science establishment. The
February 16, 1976 issue of Business Week carried an article entitled
"The Breakdown of U.S. Innovation", the introduction of which includ-
ed the following, "...from boardroom to research lab, there is a
growing sense that something has happened to American innovation...
the country's genius for invention is not what it used to be." The
following month, the release to Congress of the seventh annual report
of the National Science Board, the governing body of the National
Science Foundation, was reported in the New York Times under the head-
line "U.S. Science Lead is Found Eroding". The news account began,
"The international predominance of the United States in science and
technology has suffered erosion in the past 15 years..."16

Several years earlier, a special report in Business Week de- tailed the increasing difficulties being encountered by industry after industry in the U.S. as a result of the decline of U.S. civil- ian technological progress. U.S. heavy machinery builders were running into fierce foreign competition on price and design as early as the early 1960's. U.S. companies increasingly licensed the rights to European developed technology in such high technology industries as chemicals and electrical equipment. In shipbuilding and electrical power transmission, American firms adopted improved methods de- veloped by Swedish firms. In steel manufacture and in construction, U.S. industry lagged behind Japanese and European industry in the application of improved techniques.17

The economic and social effects of this civilian technological retardation are very serious. Since civilian-oriented technological progress is a key element in the productivity process, which is in turn critical to the economy's cost-offsetting capability, the slowing of that progress directly implies that rises in the costs of labor, fuels, materials, etc. will increasingly result in higher production costs for a whole range of products. In the case of goods and services produced by private enterprise, these production cost increases must eventually be passed along to consumers in the form of higher prices.18 In the case of governmentally provided transportation, health care, educational and other social services, taxes will have to be increased to pay for increased costs, direct charges that may in some cases be levied on users of these services to cover a portion of their cost will have to be raised, and/or services will have to be curtailed.

Publicly provided or subsidized social services, which would not normally be expected to experience substantial cost-offsetting tech- nological progress in the absence of this military diversion of technologists, e.g. education, suffer considerable cost-push inflationary pressures as a direct result of the retardation of civilian technological progress elsewhere. The cost of every material input they require, will be rising because of the failure of technological advance in the industries which produce those inputs.

The failure of the cost offsetting mechanism implied by the military's pre-emption of a large share of the nation's engineers and scientists thus clearly leads to a substantial and ongoing inflation. But, at the same time, it also plays a major role in generating un- employment. On the one hand, the rising costs of publicly provided economic and social services may persuade or compel state and local governments to curtail these services because of the real or perceived intolerance of their constituents for tax increases sufficient to
maintain them. This directly results in the loss of jobs by those individuals who were formerly engaged in providing these services.

The rising prices of domestic private producers of goods and services make their products less and less competitive in both foreign and domestic markets, especially relative to those foreign producers in nations which continue to place sustained emphasis on the development of civilian-oriented technical knowledge. The relative loss of markets by domestic producers to foreign firms, both in the U.S. and abroad, results in cutbacks in domestic production which in turn generate unemployment even in the face of relatively high product demand. Hence extraordinary situations of simultaneously high demand and rising unemployment can develop, such as the existence, in July 1971, of 16% unemployment in Detroit (and near 10% in Michigan as a whole) during the best auto sales year in the nation's history to that date.19

The loss of foreign markets by U.S. producers shows up as a decline in exports, the loss of domestic markets as an increase in imports. But falling exports and rising imports result in a deterioration of the balance of trade. So it was in 1971 that the balance of trade finally turned against the United States, after more than three-quarters of a century of continuous annual surplus. Clearly this further aggravated the balance of payments deficit, weakened the dollar and hence constituted yet another indirect contribution of the military to inflation.

Faced with a progressive inability to offset high resource costs, particularly that of labor, U.S. business firms began moving their operations to areas in which labor costs were much lower than in the U.S. This substantially aggravated the nation's unemployment problem. A few of the numerous examples of this "export" of jobs from the U.S. are the loss of 2000 machinists' jobs in Utica, New York as a consequence of General Electric's transfer of its operations to Singapore between 1966 and 1972; General Instrument's closing of plants in Massachusetts and Rhode Island and subsequent hiring of more than 7000 workers in Taiwan; and the complete transfer of all of its consumer electronic components manufacturing operations overseas by Westinghouse.20

Thus, for a number of reasons the decline in civilian technological progress resulting from the relative concentration of U.S. technological talent on military research is perhaps the most important of the severe inflation and unemployment generating effects of the past three decades of persistently high military expenditure. It has resulted not merely from the gross military pre-emption of engineers and scientists, but also from the feedback effect that pre-emption has had on engineering and scientific education in the United States. This feedback has to some extent affected even those technologists who
have opted for civilian-oriented research.

Social Welfare Implications of the Economic Effects of Military Spending. To the extent that an individual's income rises at least as fast as the price level, that individual will be partly protected against the erosion of his or her ability to purchase goods and services. Hence, that person should be able to maintain or improve that part of his or her material standard of living that is related to the direct acquisition of those products in the marketplace. However, any individual whose income is not keeping pace with the inflation will experience a lessened ability to buy goods and services and thus a reduced standard of living. Those living on essentially fixed incomes will suffer the most severe decline.

For various reasons, the people whose incomes rise the most slowly or are totally fixed, tend to be those lowest on the economic ladder to begin with, e.g. the elderly, the chronically unemployed, the unskilled. And for such individuals, the loss of purchasing power resulting from inflation is not merely a source of inconvenience or discomfort, but of real deprivation.

The inflation-related rise in the cost of state and local public services, such as fire and police protection, education, mass transportation, health care, etc. particularly in the presence of continued diversion of the lion's share of discretionary Federal funds to military programs, must lead to higher taxes and/or increasingly severe cutbacks in services provided. Curtailments in such essential services diminish everyone's well-being both in the short and long run. The economically underprivileged, because they lack alternatives, tend to be the most dependent on publicly provided services as well as direct public support. They are most severely burdened by state and local governmental cutbacks. Those in the economically middle class undergo a two-sided squeeze, bearing a large part of the growing tax burden required to cover the rising costs of state and local services, while not being sufficiently wealthy to protect themselves against at least some of the service cutbacks without real sacrifice (say by removing their children from deteriorating public schools and placing them in high quality private schools). Even higher income individuals suffer as a result of reduced police and fire protection.

As to unemployment, the economic damage caused by sustained high military spending is again disproportionately borne by those least able to economically cope with it. Low income workers are in that status partly because of a lack of skills, partly because of various types of ethnic discrimination, and partly because they are either unorganized or organized into relatively weak unions. They are normally considered the most marginal laborers, and are accordingly the first to be laid off as production is reduced in response to lowered sales.
Another very important social effect which has developed as a result of the unemployment effects of prolonged military emphasis is the potential for reversal of the labor force gains made by some ethnic minority groups and women during the past decade. The widespread, nearly pervasive practice of laying off those workers with least seniority first has put at greater risk all those who have made recent penetration into employment areas formerly closed to them.

Unemployment always diminishes not only the economic and social welfare of those who are unemployed, but also of society in general. It represents a failure to develop and fully utilize labor, and as such implies the sacrifice of a part of the potential contribution to economic and social wellbeing of which that resource is capable.

Ongoing excessive inflation, high unemployment, rising taxes, curtailment of basic and essential state and local government services, a continuing deterioration of a substantial part of the nation's economic and social infrastructure -- these are the legacy of thirty years of excessive military expenditure. Far from being economically beneficial, high defense spending has been a cancer on the economy and on the society. And like a cancer, the damage it does will compound as long as we permit it to persist.

The Nature of the Conversion Problem

It is perfectly possible to return the economy to its previous civilian orientation without producing severe economic and social dislocations during the period of transition. But there are real economic, political and social obstacles to overcome. The nature of the distortions produced in the economy by the long term emphasis on military expenditure are such as to require structural intervention to correct. Simple macro-economic policies like manipulating the money supply, cutting taxes, offering investment tax breaks to business, etc. may be helpful, but they cannot conceivably come near being sufficient to produce a smooth transition. We will see why, as we consider, in turn, some of the major components of the conversion problem.

The Conversion of Engineers and Scientists. Since so much of the economic damage inflicted by high military spending has resulted from its adverse effects on civilian technological progress, the successful conversion of engineers and scientists from military-related to civilian-oriented research is especially critical to rebuilding the nation's economic strength. Since society has an enormous investment in the training of these individuals, it would be extraordinarily wasteful to merely find any sort of civilian job for them. For both these reasons, we will assume that the conversion process is required to provide these engineers and scientists with the kind of civilian work which utilizes their skills.
A very important part of the problem of converting technolo-
gists to civilian research is rooted in the differences between re-
quirements for successful military and civilian technological develop-
ment. Present day high technology military products are extremely
complex, and are designed with an effort to squeeze every possible
ounce of performance out of the product. Whether or not this extra
performance capability actually has military significance, the pre-
sumption that it does clearly underlies the practice of weapons re-
search and development. 23 This has led to the assignment of large
teams of technologists to the design of weapons systems, each, in
effect, developing and designing a part of a part. Accordingly, the
need to become expert in a very narrow range of knowledge has led to
extreme specialization of engineers and scientists engaged in mil-
tary-related work. In addition, the extreme priority attached to
military funding, combined with the common practice of procuring wea-
pons on an effectively cost-plus basis and the pressure for even small
increments in weapons capability, has led to a virtually complete de-
emphasis on the cost implications of design. In fact, more expensive
designs will certainly result in increases in sales revenue and typi-
cally in profit as well to the firms which generate them.

Successful design for the civilian market place, on the other
hand, requires very heavy emphasis on the implications of the speci-
fic design for the cost of producing the ultimate product. This im-
plies that designers, rather than being extremely specialized, should
have a fairly clear concept of the overall design of the product and
the interactions of its subcomponents. This, together with a basic
understanding of the effects on cost of modifying the design in one
way or another, will enable them to trade off changes in one part of
the design against changes in the other to achieve desired product
performance at the lowest possible cost. Keeping production cost down
enables the price to be kept at a level which will make the product
attractive to potential customers, and hence bring expanded sales and
profit to the firm.

Because of these differences, engineers and scientists performing
defense work must be retrained and re-oriented before they can be
successful in civilian research and development. They do not need to
be completely retrained because much of what they already know is al-
so required for civilian work. But their overspecialization needs to
be undone and they must be sensitized to the cost issue, and thus put
in touch with civilian design realities.

The conversion process must also be extended to the educational
institutions responsible for the training of engineers and scientists.
These institutions have, altered their curricula to emphasize spe-
cialization, especially in areas and sub-areas of interest to the mil-
itary, and strongly de-emphasize training in cost-related matters.
Instruction in mundane civilian-oriented areas like, for example,
power engineering was curtailed or eliminated, particularly at the 'best' schools. All this was an appropriate institutional response to the changing shape of the high-pay/high-prestige opportunities available to their graduates. And yet, these changes meant that even those engineers and scientists who did go directly into civilian areas were to some extent less than optimally trained for the development of civilian-oriented technological progress. Therefore, this response served only to exacerbate the deterioration of U.S. civilian technology and thus the nation's economic problems.

The inability of military-oriented engineers and scientists to move into civilian-oriented research and development without conversion retraining is indicated by the commonly observed tendency of technologists, laid off because of the termination of a defense contract, to either move to another geographic area in which defense firms have just received new contracts, take jobs which do not involve engineering and scientific work or simply remain unemployed until the contracts return. This tendency has been read by some as an indication that civilian technology is not starved by the diversion of engineers and scientists to military areas as we have argued, since they are not "grabbed up" by civilian industrial research programs when they do become unemployed. But, that the failure of these technologists to be readily absorbed into civilian industry is due to the inappropriateness of their training and not an overall lack of demand is illustrated, for example, by the development of a critical shortage of engineers qualified to design new power plants reported in the early 1970's, side by side with the existence of an unemployed pool of military-oriented engineers.

Management Conversion. The management of military industrial firms operate in a very different atmosphere from that which prevails in civilian-oriented enterprise. Defense firms have, in practice, only one customer -- the United States Government. They cannot sell their products to civilian customers in any case, and can sell to foreign governments only with the direct and specific approval of the U.S. Department of Defense. Even so, weapons sold to foreign governments were originally designed, developed, and produced for sale to the U.S. Government.

The one-customer orientation produces a very different sales and marketing situation from that faced by civilian firms. Rather than knowing how to run an effective electronic and print media advertising campaign, how to survey markets for public acceptance of a new product line, how to price a product for penetration into new markets or expansion of existing ones, etc., it becomes critical to know the minute detail of the Armed Services Procurement Regulations, to develop good working relationships with key government procurement personnel, and to be able to lobby effectively with members of the Congress.
Another critical difference is that the single customer does not itself have to sell its product in a market place. It does not therefore have to worry either about the effects on the ultimate price of its "product" of paying too much for the goods it buys, or the danger of its being forced into loss or bankruptcy by a drop in its sales if the equipment it purchases does not perform well.

This strongly interacts with a third critical factor, the extremely high priority accorded to defense procurement, currently supported by at least national public acquiescence, if not implicit consensus. This not only assures that the Defense Department will continue to be a very rich customer, but also that its purchase decisions will be readily validated by both the Congress and the President. Thus, the wealthy customer that military industry services faces no economic market test, and only the very loosest political constraints.

The net effect of these last two factors has been to guarantee at least higher revenues and typically higher profits to those military firms which are most effective in running up the cost of the products which they are contracted to produce, often regardless of whether or not these products perform as they were supposed to. A management operating in such milieu will become very effective at finding ways of producing at high cost. But this sort of management training and experience is completely inappropriate to successful operation in civilian markets, where holding costs down, is the crucial skill.

One of the most striking examples of the contrast between the way in which products get produced for military as opposed to civilian markets lies in the comparison of the Boeing 747 and the Lockheed C5A cargo plane. Both of these are jumbo jets of roughly comparable size, but the Boeing was designed and produced for sale to the airlines and the latter for sale to the Air Force. The 747 is a smooth flying, highly reliable aircraft flown daily by nearly every major airline in the world, and is as energy efficient when fully loaded as a Volkswagen beetle carrying only its driver. The C5A has been plagued by severe operating difficulties including cracking of the wing pylons, crash-producing failures of the rear cargo door, and considerable landing gear problems. The Air Force has acknowledged that a cargo version of the 747 could carry a larger payload than the C5A. In 1971, the 747 sold at about $23 million per plane, the C5A about $60 million per plane. Furthermore, wing defects on the C5A which reduced its estimated service life by more than 70%, were projected to cost $1.3 billion to repair, nearly doubling the original cost estimates for the program.

That managements of military firms are rewarded for high cost, despite low product quality and poor performance, is illustrated by the following listing of article headlines excerpted from the New York Times:
(1) "Nine Spy Planes Lost in Crashes, Pentagon Says" (March 23, 1970) -- these planes were developed by Lockheed.

(2) "X Factor Continues to Raise Luftwaffe's Starfighter Toll" (July 4, 1972) -- report of the 154th crash of this plane, designed by Lockheed.

(3) "Lockheed's Step Is Costliest Ever: $800 Million Write-Off on Tristar..." (November 23, 1974) -- report of loss by Lockheed in its development of the L1011 commercial jet.

(4) "Lockheed Says $22 Million Went to Officials Abroad" (August 2, 1975) -- payments to foreign officials and political organizations to obtain weapons contracts.

(5) "C5A Jet Repairs to Cost 1.5 Billion" (December 5, 1975)

(6) "Lockheed Rises to Top as Defense Contractor" (December 11, 1975).

All this involves the same defense firm that was given a $250 million loan guarantee by the Federal Government.

Nowhere but in military industry could a management avoid financial disaster, much less achieve ascendancy, by performing so poorly, for so long. Clearly, one cannot expect managers accustomed to operating in a situation in which there is no risk, high costs are not merely tolerated but become the path to success, and only one rich customer need be serviced, to operate successfully in risky, cost sensitive, multicustomer civilian markets without substantial retraining and re-orientation. When unconverted military industrial managers have turned their attention to production of civilian products for state and local governments, the results have borne a striking resemblance to their military operations in both cost and performance. Consider, for example, the Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) system in San Francisco whose prime contractor was the Rohr Company, a firm which made its reputation in aerospace and related operations. Although the system was supposed to be in operation by 1968, prototypes were still crashing in 1971.31 A few weeks after it opened in 1972, the computer-controlled network experienced a number of breakdowns, including one instance in which a train "failed to slow down at the end of the line, barreled through a sand barrier, and did a nosedive into a parking lot."32 As of late 1975, up to half the cars were out of service at any given time, "causing delays and standing room only for San Francisco commuters, who have dubbed it Bay Area Reckless Transit."33 By 1971, estimates for the cost of the system had grown from $792 million to $1.4 billion.34

There is little question, that whether military oriented managements are turned to the supervision of the production of goods and services sold in the civilian market place or for civilian use by government, they must be retrained and re-oriented as a prerequisite for successful conversion.
Conversion of Production and Low-Level Administrative Workers.
With the possible exception of a few highly skilled workers, the
primary problem in channeling production and administrative workers
into civilian oriented work lies not in the need for re-education,
but rather in the numbers of people involved. By 1971, at least
six million people in the United States were directly employed in
military-related work -- 3.8 million by the Pentagon, and another
2.2 million by military-oriented industry. Clearly, the bulk of
these employees are production workers and low level administrative
employees, including clerical workers.

Re-orientation to the standards of work of civilian enterprises
will undoubtedly be required, and it is possible that additional voca-
tional training will be required for some of these employees. This
latter training is not so much to undo the effects of having been em-
ployed in military-related work as such (as in the case of engineers,
scientists and managers), but rather to bring their skills into more
perfect congruence with the best civilian opportunities available.
The transition problem is simpler here because of the less involved
nature of the re-education required, but more difficult because many
more people are potentially involved.

The fact that many of the workers involved in defense production
are unionized also presents a barrier to conversion, to the extent that
the leaders of these unions take an inordinately short term and paro-
chial view. The problem is that the civilian re-employment of the
workers displaced by cutbacks in military expenditures may involve
their transfer into industries or lines of work in the jurisdiction
of unions other than those to which they currently belong. Because
this tends to reduce the membership of defense industry related unions
to the extent that it occurs, the leaders of these unions have an in-
centive to oppose this transfer and thus potentially the entire eco-
nomic conversion process, pressing instead for continued high military
spending. Such a position tends to be attractive to the membership
of these defense unions, since it appears to be in their direct, short
term interest. But, as we have seen, continued high military expendi-
ture is economically destructive, and in the longer term its inflation
and unemployment-generating effects hurt defense workers as well as
the large numbers of nondefense workers who constitute the vast major-
ity of the U.S. labor force. It is therefore only in the most, nar-
row, nearsighted and parochial sense that any union membership bene-
fits from the continuation of high defense spending.

Capital Equipment and Facilities. Some of the industrial equipment
and facilities currently employed in the service of the military are
sufficiently general purpose in nature to be directly usable in civil-
ian-oriented work. But some, such as certain types of extremely high
capability machine tools, specialized shipbuilding facilities and
military bases are not so directly transferable. To the extent that
some of this machinery suffers primarily from the excessive cost related with its excessively high performance capability, the equipment should be usable for civilian operations if some sort of special write-offs or tax breaks are allowed to overcome the cost penalty.

Those industrial facilities which do not so much possess excess capabilities as the wrong capabilities will have to be reconstructed, but that cannot be effectively done until specific plans have been developed for the particular alternative purpose to which those facilities are to be turned. Similarly, military bases are unlikely to be appropriate, without some degree of alteration, for efficient performance of a civilian oriented activity.

Intra-Regional Concentration and the Conversion Problem. Military bases and the facilities of military-industrial firms are not spread evenly throughout the United States, but are rather concentrated in certain areas within the various regions of the country. Every major section of the country contains some geographically small pockets of major military or military-industrial employment. Examples include the San Francisco Bay area, parts of Long Island, Seattle, and the Boston-Cambridge area. This combination of high concentration and geographic dispersion has important political and economic implications.

Politically, one would be hard-pressed to devise a geographic pattern which would provide better leverage. The Congressional representatives elected by constituencies which include one or more of these pockets, feel themselves compelled to support military programs that they perceive are in the interest of the people by whom they were elected, providing them with continued employment. They come to believe, that their continued election depends upon the effectiveness with which they can aid in at least maintaining, if not expanding the flow of military funds to their district. Accordingly, they may become salespeople for the military industry in their area.

Through the usual type of legislative agreements, the support of these legislators from various key areas for various military programs becomes multiplied into broad Congressional support for the funding of virtually any program the military can put forth. Legislators who do not go along can be punished by merely withdrawing military funds from their areas (e.g. by closing bases, cancelling contracts), or switching promised new funding to other regions. In the absence of prior serious conversion planning, this kind of "cold turkey" cutoff of funding will produce real economic difficulties and this is not conducive to re-election.

The primary economic implication of the geographic pattern of military-related facilities is that macroeconomic policies such as income tax reductions and money supply increases cannot cope with the problem of stimulating the economy so as to effectively produce a
smooth absorption of the resources freed from military use into civilian activities. Such policies average their effects broadly over the nation. But what is required here are policies which will reach specifically into these pockets of military concentration and redevelop them. Only in this way can the temporary economic dislocation which accompanies any major structural change be held to a minimum, and the economic reconstruction of the United States thus accomplished without real hardship.

**Policies for Successful Conversion**

An economically and socially successful conversion process requires considerable planning and preparation. First, a careful analysis must be performed to identify appropriate civilian alternatives into which the resources released from military-related activities may be effectively channeled. Second, a program for efficiently preparing the resources for their new civilian-oriented functions must be carefully developed. Finally, in the case of the human resources involved, various social services must be provided during the period of transition including income maintenance, employment services, and relocation and educational assistance where required. We shall consider each of these problems in turn.

**Civilian Alternative for Military-Related Resources.** In a broad policy sense, it is not at all difficult to identify economically and socially productive alternatives for the employment of resources now devoted to unproductive military use. One need only consider those vital social services and important areas of the economic infrastructure that are either presently in an advanced state of decline or clearly undergoing serious progressive retrenchment. Urban mass transit, housing, intercity rail transportation, police and fire services, mental and physical health care, standard education and vocational training, special education, care for the elderly, day care, etc. all would benefit enormously from a transfusion of resources from military programs, and that would clearly produce a major increase in the nation's economic and social welfare.

It is possible to get a very rough but concrete idea of the kinds of tradeoffs which exist between military and civilian programs by comparing the funding requirements for a series of specific alternatives. A list of a dozen such tradeoffs is presented below:

1. Impounded federal housing funds, 1972 = $130 million = 8 F-14 aircraft
2. Vetoed EPA plan to de-pollute the Great Lakes = $141 million = 1 B-1 bomber plus 1 DD963 destroyer
3. National solid waste treatment program = $43.5 billion = B-1 bomber program
4. Unfunded program to upgrade rural American life = $300 million
(5) Child nutrition programs funding cut = 69 million = 2 C-5A aircraft
DE-1052 destroyer escorts
(6) To bring all Americans above the poverty line, 1971 = $11.4 billion = B-1 bomber program, low estimate
(7) To eliminate hunger in America = $4-5 billion = C-5A aircraft program
(8) Philadelphia 1971 schools deficit = $40 million = 2 F-14 aircraft plus 2 Main Battle Tanks
(9) Graduate fellowships funding cut, 1973 = $175 million = 1 nuclear attack submarine
(10) 1973 cities' needs to rebuild blighted areas = $3 billion = 1 nuclear aircraft carrier, equipped, and escorts.
(11) 1972-73 cut in federal mental health budgets = $65 million = 1 C-5A aircraft plus 5 Huey helicopters
(12) Construction of a 584 bed general hospital in San Francisco = $41 million = 1 B-1 bomber

Besides such directly socially conscious alternatives, general re-direction of resources into the production of "standard of living" goods and services, from machine tools to bubble gum, would revitalize the civilian economy. This revitalization would play a major role in creating the conditions under which the goal of full employment without significant inflation becomes economically achievable. And major gains in social welfare would clearly follow this kind of economic re-development.

But while broad prescriptions are important from the viewpoint of policy and perspective, an effective conversion process requires the detailed specification of particular alternatives for each facility, and each area undergoing this transformation. Let us assume that we are focusing on the development of specific civilian alternatives for a particular industrial facility or military base complex. What do we do?

The first step is to analyze the nature and quantity of all the productive resources involved in the transformation: the types and numbers of machines and their capabilities, the sorts of buildings (including their layout), the skill and experience mix of the labor force, and the characteristics of the site, including its size, terrain and location. The second step is lay out a list of alternatives whose requirements for productive resources most closely correspond with what is currently available, as indicated by the resource analysis of the first step. Seeking alternatives which best match the capabilities of the present mix of resources minimizes dislocation and disruption by reducing the need for labor force hiring, firing, and retraining, and new equipment purchases. This tends to minimize the social cost of transition, as well as its direct financial cost.

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Furthermore, playing to the strengths of existing capabilities also increases the probability of success in the new activities. To some extent, the initial resource analysis will in itself, suggest at least broad classes of feasible alternatives. For example, a manufacturing firm which owns considerable metalworking equipment and employs a fair amount of machinists would be more likely to convert successfully to the manufacture of metal office furniture or railroad cars than to the production of detergents or cosmetics.

We should not conceive of this list of alternatives in purely industrial terms. Public and private nonmanufacturing projects, in areas such as pollution control, education, transportation, etc., are also major alternative productive uses of resources. For example, it may well be that the prime civilian-oriented use for a particular naval facility may be as a major sewage treatment complex, medical center, or new university campus, rather than as an industrial park. It would be a serious mistake to think too narrowly at this critical stage of developing alternatives.

Finally, the "success potential" of each of the alternatives should be evaluated. In the case of conversion of industrial facilities to civilian production this primarily involves a study of what is called the "marketability" of the product, which involves an analysis of the demand for the product at the ranges of price that would permit a sufficient margin of profit (after covering costs) to make this product line attractive to the producer. In the case of public or non-profit projects, the evaluation should involve an analysis of the social need for such a project in that region, as well as its estimated cost. In either case, the accuracy and realism of estimates of both one-time conversion costs and subsequent continuing post-conversion production costs play a critical role in determining the feasibility and attractiveness of any proposed alternative.

To the extent that there is less than a perfect match between the labor requirements of even the best civilian alternatives for a given military enterprise and its pre-conversion labor force, there may be a need to channel some of the labor force into productive civilian activities wholly outside of that particular enterprise. For example, it is extremely unlikely that all, or even most, of the engineers and scientists currently employed by military industries would be required for any reasonable civilian alternative activities to which these industries would turn. This is no particular problem, in the sense that there are many civilian activities outside these particular converted industries in which the services of such personnel would be of great value. We need to think in terms of sufficient alternatives to productively re-employ all of the resources (particularly labor) released from military activity, and not simply sufficient alternatives to convert present military bases and military-industrial firms into civilian facilities.
Preparing Resources for Conversion. Conversion of the labor resource requires different amounts and kinds of retraining and re-orientation depending on the original function of that resource in the military-related activity. Personnel employed in the development of technology, i.e. engineers and scientists, will as has been argued, generally require despecialization training in their fields, along with re-orientation to the cost implications of their work. The specific course work required, however, will differ somewhat depending upon the particular new civilian direction in which any given individual will be heading. For example, mechanical engineers who will become involved in the development of urban mass transit systems should not follow exactly the same program as those who will be designing home appliances. Therefore, in order to avoid one of the most common fatal flaws in well-intentioned occupational training programs -- training people into areas in which insufficient employment opportunities exist -- it is necessary for planning purposes to know what civilian employment opportunities are available. This is one of the reasons why the analysis of civilian alternatives discussed just previously is a key prerequisite for successful conversion.

It is important to understand that for any given individual a specific program, built around his or her past experience and training, and tailored for entry into the area that he or she prefers (given the available opportunities), can be developed by direct personal consultation with an educational advisor. What is needed for general conversion planning purposes is a clear idea of how many people from each field and level of education will be involved, and which broad areas of opportunity will exist for absorbing them into productive civilian activity. In this way, sufficiently accurate estimates may be made of the time, funding, and personnel requirements of this conversion retraining to permit an effective, intelligently designed re-education program to be developed.

The educational component of the conversion process for management decision makers will on the whole be somewhat simpler because it can be considerably more general. Within limits, the kind of re-orientation to cost minimization and civilian type marketing, sales, etc. functions they require will be valuable to them regardless of what civilian activity they subsequently manage. At least insofar as formal training requirements are concerned, there is a greater similarity between effectively managing a paper manufacturer or computer company, than between effectively designing appliances or rail systems.

Existing business schools will probably prove competent to accomplish the kind of management re-orientation required. Existing engineering schools, however, will themselves require some redirection before they can effectively accomplish the required re-education of technologists. Though it might involve some trauma, there is every reason to be confident that these institutions can make the necessary
changes without excessive delay.

Individuals in production and lower level administrative functions can most probably be given the kind of re-orientation to civilian standards of performance they might require in an on-the-job situation. Formal occupational retraining will be needed only to the extent that the best civilian alternatives available to them in the economy at the point of conversion require somewhat different skills from those which they currently possess. It is undoubtedly a good idea, to provide some vocational retraining programs for such individuals, but it is unlikely that these will need to be anywhere near as intensive or extensive as the programs for engineers, scientists and managers. Even so, clear knowledge of the civilian alternatives available is once again critical to the economic and social effectiveness of retraining.

Preparing capital equipment and facilities for conversion is primarily a matter of assessing in detail what changes in layout, direct equipment and facilities, and supporting equipment and facilities are implied by the chosen civilian alternative. Given such an assessment, it should not be difficult to estimate both financing requirements and the time needed from start to finish for the actual physical conversion. This will in turn enable development of a financial plan, as well as effective coordination of this phase of the resource conversion process with the others.

Transition Support Services. Workers undergoing occupational transition, whether or not it is part of a process of conversion from military to civilian economy, must find ways of connecting with new job opportunities, getting whatever retraining is necessary, financing a move when relocation is required, and keeping body and soul together during the period between jobs. The burden of meeting all these needs can be greatly eased by the availability of appropriate social services.

Not all of the workers involved in the conversion process will be changing employers, and those who will not do not have to worry about locating new job opportunities or maintaining their income. They may or may not require retraining, and probably will not require relocation, but even when retraining or relocation is necessary it should be possible to finance them at least partially through employers, though perhaps with some public supplementation.

Those individuals who must change employers will generally have much greater need for social services. Besides direct income maintenance assistance, they will likely require temporary public replacement of some employment fringe benefits -- in particular group medical and dental insurance plans. An effective public program of employment
services will be critical in making them aware of the nature and location of the new employment opportunities which best match their skills. Along with counseling services, this will be of vital importance in enabling them to plan whatever specific retraining they may need. In addition, the employment service will facilitate the process of direct placement of dislocated employees into new jobs. To make the transition even smoother, the government could provide special or other incentives for employers to sign conditional employment contracts with potential employees during this period that in effect guaranteed the prospective employees a job with that organization upon successful completion of a mutually agreed upon program of retraining. In this way, individuals requiring retraining that could be expected to stretch over a period of from six months to a year would have some assurance that undertaking training into a particular area of civilian expertise would provide them with attractive re-employment.

Aside from any direct government benefits, private enterprises (whether businesses or private nonprofit institutions) would gain from the increased certainty in planning such agreements would imply.

Operating the entire conversion process along the lines suggested will tend to minimize the amount of geographic relocation required. This is important because moves over extended distances tend to be very disruptive of family and friendship ties. While people develop social roots after living in an area for a prolonged period, their ability to re-establish roots in a new area should not be underestimated. This is particularly true of young people, who often actively seek a new area in which to live and grow. In fact, the general population of the United States is normally highly geographically mobile. For example, in 1970 more than 40% of the U.S. population lived in a different house than that in which they lived in 1965, and nearly 45% of this group had moved to a different county or a different nation.

At any rate, the high degree of geographic concentration of military-related facilities virtually guarantees that some relocation will be required for some individuals. This is particularly true for engineers and scientists since they are concentrated within pockets of defense industry much more highly than they would be likely to be in any civilian-oriented industry. But, the engineers and scientists who work in military industry have already developed a pattern of extraordinarily high geographic mobility as a result of their occupational need to follow the shifting defense contracts. So the prospect of one more move, coupled with the enhanced likelihood of future geographic stability, should not be, for them, an overly difficult thing with which to cope.

Expenses incurred in relocation for the purpose of re-employment in a new area are already tax deductible as a matter of course. Supplemental government relocation allowances for one time, conversion—
connected single moves, along with aid in locating new housing, should go far in further easing the difficulties of relocating for those who must do so.

It is extremely important to the successful revitalization of the U.S. economy and society that the conversion process have a defined end. In order to avoid establishing new kinds of unhealthy dependencies, any effective conversion process must be designed to put itself out of business. The permanent existence of a very small version of the machinery for easing economic transitions may be of real value in a dynamic economy, but great care must be taken to avoid giving birth to large, new, self-perpetuating conversion bureaucracies.

Developing a Consensus for Conversion

As long as this nation remains a democracy, no process of economic conversion requiring the broad intervention of government can hope to be successful without the development of a political consensus to support it. This was true for the conversion to a military-oriented economy, and it is just as true for the conversion back to a civilian economy. The present consensus supporting the continuation of high levels of military expenditure derives primarily from two widely held beliefs, one economic and one military: (1) Military expenditure is economically necessary and beneficial; (2) Expansion in the quantity and quality of weapons systems and other components of national military forces increases national security. Both of these beliefs are wrong, in the most straightforward sense of the word -- they are simply at variance with the facts. It is for this reason that I believe the education of the general U.S. population to the objective economic and military realities of the present world is a critical pre-condition to the development of broad-scope support for the process of economic conversion discussed here.

Attention has been focused in the present paper on the economic side of the issue. It has been argued that the actual economic effects of sustained high military expenditure are highly destructive, and that these effects go far in explaining the unprecedented simultaneous high inflation/high unemployment which has become a fact of life in the U.S. With respect to weapons of mass destruction, the expansion of military systems reduces the security of the nations engaged in building up their forces, because they become increasingly endangered by their own weapons. There is a great need for further exploration of both these areas of research, and perhaps even more critically for the popularization of the arguments and evidence developed by such work.

There is neither any need nor any value in conducting the educational process required for the development of a conversion consensus in a propagandistic fashion. I believe the clear presentation of the
objective facts, the logical linkages between them and their implications is more than sufficient to break the power of the illusions that have so long supported the continuation of high military expenditure.

In order for this educational process to have the maximum chance for success, it should not be completely confined to the presentation of scholarly treatises and the writing of journal articles. It must stimulate debate not only at conferences of academicians, but also at political gatherings, in school classrooms, union meetings, mass media programs, etc. Such grass roots debate is in the best traditions of U.S. democracy, and should at the very least raise the awareness of the public with respect to these critical issues.

It should be pointed out that the development of plans for the conversion of military-oriented resources to civilian activities is of considerable value even in the absence of a curtailment of military spending. Since military contracts periodically shift from one place to another, it would clearly be in the best interests of the workers in defense industry to have detailed plans for turning to the production of civilian-oriented goods and services when military contracts are terminated or lost by their firm. In this way, they could avoid being laid off until the defense contracts return. The availability of such ready plans is also an advantage to society in general because it permits some productive purpose to be served by these workers between defense contracts, and avoids the need to pay them unemployment compensation. Thus, it would make sense for unions to support at least conversion planning, even if they were not initially willing to support full-scale economic conversion.

As a rough estimate, the entire economic conversion process can be expected to take from two to four years. It will involve a great deal of detailed planning (mostly on a local basis) and careful implementation, at the cost of a considerable investment of time and effort. However, the economic and social benefits which will accrue as a result of this investment are truly enormous. The smooth and efficient transition to a civilian-oriented economy can be accomplished, but it requires nothing less than a national commitment to insure its rapid and successful completion.

Footnotes

1. Full employment is defined in this way rather than as corresponding to 0% unemployment in order to allow for various forms of "frictional unemployment", including the temporary unemployment of those in transition between jobs. These are felt to be inevitable in a dynamic economy, and different in kind from the unemployment represented by increases in the unemployment rate beyond this base.
2. Their analysis was rather casual, and their estimates were characterized by the economists themselves as rough approximations. See Paul A. Samuelson and Robert M. Solow, "Analytical Aspects of Anti-Inflation Policy", American Economic Review (May 1960), p. 192.


5. Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, Modern Library (1937), pp. 315 and 325-6. Smith was not writing solely of the military, but also included the king and his court, and the "ecclesiastical establishment", among others, in his category of unproductive labor.


9. For example, the Air Force's C5A transport plane, which experienced a $2 billion cost overrun (i.e. excess of actual cost over original cost estimates) was produced under a firm "fixed price" contract. Payment was simply adjusted upward to cover the overrun. Thus the "fixed price" was fixed in name only. For a fascinating and detailed account of the operation of military procurement procedures in the case of the C5A and several other major weapons systems, written by a former Air Force Deputy for Management Systems in the Pentagon, see A. Ernest Fitzgerald, The High Priests of Waste (New York: W. W. Norton, 1972).

10. For a straightforward theoretical comparison of the effects of sales maximization and profit maximization on production costs under various contractual payment formulas, see Lloyd J. Dumas, "Payment Functions and the Productive Efficiency of Military-Industrial Firms", Journal of Economic Issues (June 1976).

11. Footnote 11 appears at end of list.


14. Interestingly enough, at least two of the developments most commonly cited as major examples of beneficial civilian fallout from military-related technology programs -- Pyroceram (made by Corning Glass Works), a material used first for missile nose cones and later for cookware, and medical telemetry devices -- were in fact products of long civilian technological development programs which spilled over into military applications. (See Edwin Diamond, The Rise and Fall of the Space Age (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1964), pp. 64-65.)

It is curious, however, that none of the advocates of the spillover benefits of military technology ever seem willing to accept the argument, which follows directly from the same logic, that if the transfer of technology between these two sectors is so high, we could just as well concentrate our resources on civilian technological development and let military technological advance proceed as a result of spillover.


18. In an industry in which firms were making substantial profits, the cost increases could be absorbed for a time by the firm by its acceptance of lowered profits, though this could not be done indefinitely. However, firms which are earning substantial profits normally do so as a result of their possessing some degree of control over their markets, and to the extent that they have such market power they will be able to enforce a pass-along of costs in the form of increased prices. Firms under severe competition, on the other hand, will tend not to have a substantial enough profit margin to absorb higher costs, and so will be compelled to pass them along as higher prices. Thus in any case, over the long term higher costs lead to higher prices.


21. To be completely protected, the dollar value of all assets owned by that person (e.g. stocks, bonds, savings accounts) would also have to be rising at least as fast as the rate of price inflation.

22. A rough estimate for the year 1967 was that the complete termination of all defense work would have released scientists and engineers with an aggregate total of nearly 8,000,000 person-years of education (see Lloyd J. Dumas, op. cit. 1970, p. 313).

23. I would argue that, at least as it applies to nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, many of these performance improvements not only have no direct military significance, but actually introduce complexity which renders weapons systems less reliable, thus reducing national security. It is rather like designing a device which slightly reduces the sound produced by the detonation of a dynamite stick, at the expense of making it more likely to accidentally explode in one's face.


26. In fact, most foreign sales of arms are apparently funneled directly through the Defense Department, which buys the weapons from U.S. manufacturers and resells them to the foreign governments involved. (See Michael C. Jensen, "U.S. Arms Sales Are Complex", New York Times, April 15, 1975).


32. Ibid.


35. It is only a rough idea because it focuses on money rather than resources.


37. In 1968, I roughly estimated that more than 95% of the engineers and scientists who would have been released from their place of employment even in the event of a total elimination of military activity could have been re-employed productively in areas such as urban renewal, teaching and transportation. (Lloyd J. Dumas, op. cit., 1970, pp. 313-320.)


11. For a straightforward theoretical comparison of the effects of sales maximization and profit maximization on production costs under various contractual payment formulas, see Lloyd J. Dumas, "Payment Functions and the Productive Efficiency of Military-Industrial Firms", *Journal of Economic Issues* (June 1976).
Have you been wondering why all the ideas you learned in Economics I haven't been working? Why the forecasts made at summit meetings of economists seem to go wrong? Why the U.S. economy, in utter disregard of all the rules of classical economics, suffers rising inflation and rising unemployment at the same time?

Well, there are reasons. Reasons that establishment economists have not wanted to face, and still refuse to face, because the great myth of the last three decades would then be exposed. The myth is that we are so rich, so productive and so favored that we can have both a huge and growing military establishment and simultaneously a healthy society replete with booming industry and all the social services we need.

This myth, born of a brief experience, and nurtured by those whom it benefitted has pervaded the American scene since 1945. People emerged from World War II with this experience imprinted in their minds: Five years ago they were standing in lines outside that said "No Help Wanted." The war came, some went into the Army, some went to work in war production, but everyone went to work. Moral: wars, or at least military spending, is good for the economy.

A number of big companies learned something too. They learned that cost-plus contracting is the businessman's bonanza. Just get that contract, and rake it in. Cost-plus means you get a guaranteed profit. In fact, if the price of overhead, materials, or labor goes up, you make even more money as Uncle Sam--i.e. the U.S. taxpayer--not only will absorb the extra cost, but increase your profits. A 10% profit on a $100 million contract is $10 million, but if expenses go up and you have an overrun, 10% of $200 million is a profit of $20 million.

The big corporations which had been making record profits during the war were loathe to get off the gravy train and go back into the more uncertain joys of free enterprise, where you didn't always make money. In fact, sometimes you lost it.

So, in 1948, the National Security Council, a small group of Presidential advisors closely tied to the Pentagon, met and decided in secret that from then on, into the indefinite future, 10% of the GNP should go to the Pentagon for personnel and for arms production.

This momentous decision to allocate not a fixed sum of money, not a budgeted amount, but a percentage of the GNP, was unique in American history. From it have come many of the strains and the troubles this nation has experienced in the three decades since World War II.

Since 1950, over two-thirds of the top technical and scientific talent of the U.S. has worked for the Pentagon and its contractors. This drain upon civilian industry is one of the reasons why we have not fully developed...
alternative sources of energy, first-class high speed trains, and adequate housing at reasonable costs. The people to do this research have been busy elsewhere. They have been designing missiles, "smart" bombs, and flights to the moon.

The economy could survive the strain of this drain-off of talent for some years. We were the only major industrial nation to emerge from the war in 1945 not only unscathed but with a newly tooled and booming industrial plant. However, as the years passed and the Common Market nations plus Japan retooled their plants, we began to meet even stiffer competition in world markets. We became increasingly expert at building arms, while they were building ships, trains and the whole array of civilian goods. It is no accident that when the Shah of Iran was making his vast outlays, he bought military aircraft from us, but an entire system of electrified trains from the French.

As federal taxes were being pulled in huge quantities from the industrial states and, through military contracting and payrolls, redistributed to the South and West, the Northeast, and Middle Atlantic and the Industrial Midwest began to decline. Michigan, for instance, pays over $16 billion in taxes but gets back only $9.6 billion in federal spending, a loss of $6.4 billion. This means that $1,000 per person in the Detroit area is sucked off to Washington never to return in any form—social security, HEW, education—anything. That money is gone, a net loss.

Even states as rich and productive as New York, Ohio, Michigan, and Illinois cannot sustain this kind of loss decade after decade without showing signs of the severest strain. The 1976 Detroit municipal budget deficit of $100 million is what the Pentagon takes out of Detroit every three weeks. And Detroit is now suffering an unemployment rate of about 30%.

The high taxes paid over the years and redistributed to the military and hence to the Sun Belt states have also had depleting effects upon civilian industries. They simply have not had enough money to reinvest. Unable to buy the newest machinery and faced with the high wage demands of American unions, many companies have moved their operations abroad to lower wage areas, thus accelerating the decline of many cities. George Meany, an unreconstructed Cold Warrior, instead of attacking the root problem, shouts loudly for protective tariffs which no doubt would have the same salutary effect on American industrial production the Smoot-Hawley tariff had in 1931.

The industrial depletion, closing factories, and declining income in civilian industry has been inexorably followed by more poverty, anger and despair. As job opportunities are reduced for the middle class, a sort of "bumping" goes on in which college-educated young people drive cabs, wait tables, and tend bars, thus displacing working class young people to the unemployment lines.

But everyone isn't suffering equally. The states with large amounts of military industry and huge military bases have been the beneficiaries of this redistribution of taxes. During the years that Lyndon Baines Johnson occupied the White House, the military contract going to Texas quadrupled from $1 billion to $4 billion. Georgia, doubly blessed with Rep. Carl Vinson presiding over the House Armed Services Committee and Sen. Richard Russell chairing the Senate Armed Service Committee, is similarly dotted with bases and lucrative contracts. A quick reference to the accompanying U.S. map will show which states have been gaining money and jobs during these years.
So, two big changes took place in the American economy between 1950 and 1975: the movement of capital and technical talent from the civilian sector of the economy into the military sector; and the movement of tax money from the industrial states of New England, the Middle Atlantic states, and the industrial Midwest into a belt beginning with Virginia and going south and west to California.

Strange economic symptoms have shown up during the past decade. Inflation, historically low in the U.S. except in wartime, has risen to unprecedented heights. Bouts with wage and price controls have been a little like giving aspirin to a patient with pneumonia: the fever goes down temporarily and masks the causes of the disease, while the patient's condition continues to deteriorate. The second system of a decaying economy-unemployment—remains stubbornly high in just those cities which once were Meccas for the poor of Europe and the South.

The industrial depletion described above is one of the causes. The other is the Defense Department budget itself. Spending money on the DOD has the unique characteristic of simultaneously causing unemployment and inflation. Inflation results because people are being paid to produce products which no one can buy. After payday, workers in military factories go out and buy from the same stock of food, housing, and medical care as do the rest of us. But their work has not increased the common stock of needed goods and services. The prices for all these items are therefore bid up—hence, inflation.

Spending money on the military causes unemployment because fewer jobs are created for each billion dollars spent on the military than if the money were spent in any other way.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Jobs created by:</th>
<th>If spent to create</th>
<th>If spent to create</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$1 billion spent in civilian sector</td>
<td>65,000 jobs$5</td>
<td>100,000 jobs$7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$1 billion spent in military sector</td>
<td>55,000 jobs$6</td>
<td>79,000 jobs$8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jobs foregone by spending on the military</td>
<td>10,000 jobs</td>
<td>21,000 jobs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If money were taken out of military contracting and—either through a tax cut or reallocation to other governmental programs—put toward civilian needs, the nation's economy would benefit. Depending on exactly how the money were spent, this could create at least 10,000 more jobs per billion dollars transferred and possibly 20,000 or more.

If instead of military contracts we reduced the number of armed forces personnel, both civilian and military, and used the same money to hire more firemen, teachers, state parks personnel, and other state and local government employees, the economy would gain 21,000 jobs per billion dollars transferred.
Thus, each billion dollars which has gone to the Pentagon over the years has cost the economy a minimum of 10,000 jobs. The $104 billion Defense Department budget requested by President Ford in 1976 will cost the economy over 1,000,000 jobs.

The combination of factors—the widespread acceptance of the myth that military spending was good for the economy; the anxieties caused by the Cold War, Korea, and Vietnam; and the symbiotic relationship of the military and its contractors—has allowed the rise of the Military-Industrial Complex. Institutionalized in the Pentagon, the CIA, the National Security Agency, and the armed forces lobbying organizations, it grew and prospered virtually untouched and unmolested until Vietnam.

President Johnson perhaps personified the hope and the contradictions of mid-century America. Born poor, he ascended to the White House determined to do something for the Blacks and the poverty stricken of our country. Yet the "machismo" tendencies, which so often have led men to war, made it impossible for him to say no to the advisors urging him into Vietnam, thus simultaneously destroying his Great Society and his presidency.

Johnson could not or would not face the fact that he had to make a choice: The Great Society or Vietnam. His deception extended even to his own advisors. He never allowed Secretary of Defense McNamara to tell the Council of Economic Advisors how much the war was costing. Their predictions, upon which much economic policy was based, were erroneous. This, of course, exacerbated economic problems then, and since.

By 1965, a considerable portion of the society had been co-opted either by choice, by geography, or by economic circumstances into the Military-Industrial Complex.

A number of unions with membership working in military industries could always be counted on to plead vigorously for a continuation of their current contract or to press for a new one. Military, management, and the unions were thus united in their desire to continue and increase military spending. When a major portion of a union is pleading for more contracts, it becomes difficult for the top officers to lobby against the military budget as a whole.

This dilemma, combined with George Meany's well publicized support for every type of military expenditure and venture, made most of the labor movement quiescent until Vietnam.

Many academics were also silent. If you inquired you would find out that a neighbor in the physics department had just gotten a nice DOD contract, or that a social science department was hoping to get a little research money from the Air Force. Presidents of great universities scrambled to get on the contract gravy train, and then screamed when dumped off unceremoniously as the war in Vietnam consumed all the available money.

However, enough of academia was either not getting much contract money, or was touched by the anguish of their students being drafted to fight in a war they abhorred. Many colleges and universities became major bastions of resistance to the war in Vietnam. So the universities were only partially co-opted, but it took Vietnam to jar them loose from their contract-fed complacency of the fifties and mid-sixties.
With cities and states, the splits became more evident every year. Southern and many Western mayors are all for a continuation of high military spending. The Northern and Midwestern mayors—faced with layoffs, unprecedented deficits, and fiscal crises—finally, in 1976, passed a resolution saying that the cities should get as much money as the Pentagon. Except for a occasional ideologue, the split here is predictable: the mayors whose cities get the military money think that the present arrangement is fine; those who don't want a change.

Members of Congress follow similar lines of thinking. Some, like Sen. Robert Griffin of Michigan, or Sen. James Buckley of New York, will vote for every nickel that the Pentagon wants no matter how much it hurts their states. Others, like Proxmire of Wisconsin or Bayh of Indiana display a sustained and healthy skepticism toward the voracious demands of the Pentagon. They realize that as the Pentagon prospers, their states decline.

Let us examine briefly some big American institutions and their stands on the Military-Industrial Complex.

Business has historically been sympathetic to Pentagon demands, although many individual businessmen are not. The trade union movement is split with some portions now aware of the military's economic stranglehold. Churches, except for the historic peace churches and the actions of the main line denominations during the Vietnam war, have remained largely quiescent.

The universities now contain a good many faculty members who came of age politically during the events of the sixties, and who have a new and more realistic view of the society. They do not, of course, form a majority of university presidents, deans, or department heads. Most professional associations do not see this as a big concern. However, the layoffs of teachers are becoming so severe in many areas that the National Education Association and some local and state teachers' organizations may be ready to move.

Congress is split. As in the early days of the Vietnam war, many more Representatives and Senators are against a growing military than will vote against it when appropriations time comes. There is not, however, the deep ideological Cold War mentality that was so pervasive during the fifties and early sixties. Key votes, such as on the B-1 bomber appropriation, are now down to a 10 vote margin in the House instead of 200 to 300 vote margins of a few years ago.

So where is the soft spot in all this armor? We may now be coming to an era of new attitudes. A new look is needed at the budget of the Department of Defense, that $100 billion annual bill that gets handed from the Pentagon to the White House to the Congress to the American taxpayer. There is now skepticism about one keystone to approving these monstrous sums year in and year out—the argument that it created jobs, that it was good for the U.S. economy.

Two years ago, I found the facts to disprove this argument, to unmask it for the myth it was, and to turn the tables on the contractors, the generals, and the highly paid lobbyists who make so free with our tax money.

One day while reading the manuscript of a new book, I came across a statistical regression analysis showing over a thirty-year period what happened to various sectors of the economy when the military budget went up or down. Professor Bruce Russett of Yale had done an analysis which showed the following:
Table 2. Expenditures Foregone by Sector of the Economy for each Billion Dollars Spent on the Military

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Expenditure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$187,000,000 on services</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>163,000,000 on durable goods</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>128,000,000 on state and local government consumption</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>114,000,000 on residential structures</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>110,000,000 on producers durable equipment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>97,000,000 on exports</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71,000,000 on non-durable goods</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68,000,000 on non-residential structures</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48,000,000 on federal civil purchases</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25,000,000 on imports</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If Dr. Russett could show how much money was not spent (foregone) for these sectors of the economy, it seemed that it might be possible, with a careful methodology, to show how many jobs were foregone in each of these sectors. After about nine months of work, we computerized the data and, at one a.m. on a freezing Michigan February night, the MSU computer began to spit out the data, state by state.

Until we added up the totals on a state by state basis, we never knew whether the Pentagon's spending created or cost more jobs in the nation as a whole. We had factored in the pay of uniformed and civilian military personnel in each state, and all the jobs created by military construction and military industry in each state. We subtracted all the jobs lost in durable goods, non-durable goods, services, residential construction, nonresidential construction, and state and local government as a result of tax money syphoned off to the Pentagon budget. So we ended up with a net figure for the U.S., and for each of the fifty states.

We found that the military budgets of around $80 billion from 1968 to 1972 had cost the economy 844,000 jobs. Each additional billion dollars to the Pentagon caused about 10,600 jobs to disappear. We also found that 60% of the population live in states which suffer a net loss of jobs when the military budget goes up.

The results are even more dramatic when viewed regionally. The Middle Atlantic and the East North Central states together lose over one and one-quarter million jobs. The Great Plains states lose. The South Atlantic and West Central states, on the other hand, gain over one-quarter million jobs.

The state-by-state figures on net jobs foregone take on a more human meaning when compared to their average employment during the years studied. For five of the largest industrial states—New York, Illinois, Michigan, Ohio, and Pennsylvania—the jobs foregone because of high Pentagon budgets averaged 85% of their total unemployment between 1968 and 1972. This means that military spending had an enormous impact upon their unemployment insurance costs, their welfare expenditures, and the state services never provided because of a lowered tax base and higher social welfare costs. The relationship of jobs foregone to unemployment in each of the states which suffer a net loss of jobs is shown in Table 4.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Number of Jobs Foregone or Gained</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>-426,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>-174,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michigan</td>
<td>-172,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>-146,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pennsylvania</td>
<td>-127,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wisconsin</td>
<td>- 72,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indiana</td>
<td>- 57,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Jersey</td>
<td>- 53,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minnesota</td>
<td>- 47,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tennessee</td>
<td>- 40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iowa</td>
<td>- 37,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Massachusetts</td>
<td>- 35,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oregon</td>
<td>- 35,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>- 23,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Virginia</td>
<td>- 22,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nevada</td>
<td>- 15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arkansas</td>
<td>- 12,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connecticut</td>
<td>-  9,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louisiana</td>
<td>-  9,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vermont</td>
<td>-4,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nebraska</td>
<td>-4,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idaho</td>
<td>-4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maine</td>
<td>-3,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delaware</td>
<td>-1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wyoming</td>
<td>-1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Dakota</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missouri</td>
<td>+1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montana</td>
<td>+2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhode Island</td>
<td>+4,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Hampshire</td>
<td>+5,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arizona</td>
<td>+7,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maryland</td>
<td>+8,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alabama</td>
<td>+9,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Mexico</td>
<td>+10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Dakota</td>
<td>+10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kentucky</td>
<td>+14,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kansas</td>
<td>+16,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mississippi</td>
<td>+17,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utah</td>
<td>+19,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington</td>
<td>+25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colorado</td>
<td>+25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alaska</td>
<td>+29,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oklahoma</td>
<td>+32,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Carolina</td>
<td>+33,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Carolina</td>
<td>+36,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawaii</td>
<td>+38,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>+55,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virginia</td>
<td>+56,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>+97,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>+133,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

UNITED STATES TOTAL: 844,000 jobs.

-604-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Number of Jobs Foregone</th>
<th>Average Number of Unemployed Persons</th>
<th>Jobs Foregone as % of Unemployment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>426,000</td>
<td>382,000</td>
<td>112%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>174,000</td>
<td>191,000</td>
<td>91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michigan</td>
<td>172,000</td>
<td>230,000</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>146,000</td>
<td>171,000</td>
<td>85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pennsylvania</td>
<td>127,000</td>
<td>207,000</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wisconsin</td>
<td>72,000</td>
<td>83,000</td>
<td>87%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indiana</td>
<td>57,000</td>
<td>92,000</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Jersey</td>
<td>53,000</td>
<td>175,000</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minnesota</td>
<td>47,000</td>
<td>71,000</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tennessee</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>68,000</td>
<td>69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iowa</td>
<td>37,000</td>
<td>41,000</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Massachusetts</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>143,000</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oregon</td>
<td>33,000</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>23,000</td>
<td>90,000</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Virginia</td>
<td>22,000</td>
<td>41,000</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nevada</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>14,000</td>
<td>107%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arkansas</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connecticut</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>83,000</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louisiana</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>79,000</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vermont</td>
<td>4,400</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nebraska</td>
<td>4,200</td>
<td>19,000</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idaho</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maine</td>
<td>3,800</td>
<td>24,000</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delaware</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wyoming</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Dakota</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Of the 60% of U.S. citizens who live in states which suffer a net job loss, the overwhelming majority of them live in highly industrialized states which do not contain large military bases.

During the period studied, 1968-1972, most of the New England states were net loss states. Only Rhode Island and New Hampshire showed slight gains. The region as a whole lost about 42,000 jobs annually. This was true even when Connecticut was getting heavy military contracts because of the Vietnam war, and Massachusetts was getting substantial contracts for research and development.

In the Middle Atlantic region, every state lost, with New York losing more jobs than any other state in the country—an astounding 426,000. New Jersey and Pennsylvania lost heavily even though they received substantial military contracts and both states host some military bases. The losses they sustained in civilian industrial production, coupled with the very large number of jobs which they had to forego in services and state and local government, resulted in 53,000 jobs foregone in New Jersey and 127,000 in Pennsylvania.

The Great Plains states showed a more varied picture. Although the region as a whole showed a net loss of 60,000 jobs, some states gained. The industrial belt suffers the worst: 621,000 jobs were foregone in the East North Central states of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin. This region, the industrial heartland of the nation, showed a net loss of over 360,000 jobs just in the industrial sectors of its economy (durable and non-durable goods). With relatively few military bases to compensate and a very substantial number of jobs foregone in services and state and local government, this region was the hardest hit in the nation.

The states which showed net gains in jobs from military bases and industry form a geographic band which begins in Maryland and extends south to Georgia (Florida is excluded), west to California (excluding Louisiana), and north to Washington (omitting Oregon).

The South Atlantic region, which includes Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, West Virginia, and Florida, gained 142,000 jobs. Delaware, West Virginia, and Florida lost jobs; the other states gained heavily. Virginia, North and South Carolina and Georgia had almost 427,000 military personnel stationed within their borders. Over 105,000 military personnel were living in Florida, but their presence was not sufficient to overcome the large job losses in residential construction and services.

Texas led the West South Central section with a net gain of 133,000 jobs. Texas was receiving an average of $2.5 billion worth of military contracts during these years, generating about 88,000 jobs a year. There were also 247,000 uniformed and civilian military personnel stationed there each year. Therefore, Texas' net gain was large, the largest in the nation. Oklahoma also gained, about 32,000 jobs. Arkansas, however, lost almost 12,000 jobs during each year of the period studied.

Washington, with both troops and contracts, and Alaska and Hawaii, with large military bases, were all net gain states. Only Oregon of the Pacific Coast States lost jobs—33,000 of them.
It is important to analyze, both by state and overall, the totals by sector of the economy.

Jobs Foregone by Sector of the Economy.  
Annual Average, 1968-1972.15

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Gross Jobs Foregone</th>
<th>Military Jobs Created</th>
<th>Net</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Durable Goods</td>
<td>-796,000</td>
<td>+806,000</td>
<td>+ 10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Durable Goods</td>
<td>-353,000</td>
<td>+ 52,000</td>
<td>-301,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residential Construction</td>
<td>-428,000</td>
<td>+ 58,000</td>
<td>-370,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Residential Construction</td>
<td>-253,000</td>
<td>+ 11,000</td>
<td>-242,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>-1,528,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>-1,528,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State &amp; Local Government†</td>
<td>-1,012,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>-1,012,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Jobs foregone in industry, services, and state & local government: -3,443,000

Uniformed and non-uniformed military personnel employed in the United States. +2,599,000

NET JOBS FOREGONE NATIONWIDE -844,000

Thus, the construction industry loses over 600,000 jobs when the military budget is $80 billion. There are over 1,500,000 fewer jobs in services and over 1,000,000 fewer jobs in state and local government.

If a person lives in a net loss state and wishes to find out how many jobs a one billion dollar rise in DOD spending will cost, simply take the net loss figure for that state in the table and divide by 80. For New York with a 426,000 job loss, the loss per billion dollars is 5,500 jobs. Thus President Ford’s demand for a $104 billion Pentagon budget will cost 146,000 more jobs in New York state, or a total net loss of 572,000 jobs.

This data is, of course, politically significant. It can be used in a number of ways. Senators, Representatives, mayors and candidates for public office can all be asked before and after elections and on specific votes if they really want to cost their own constituents jobs. Elected officials are very sensitive to this. In preparation for testimony before the House Armed Services Committee last winter, I did an analysis of the Congressional District of each member of that committee who came from a net loss state. I found the following:

1 $80 billion was the average DOD budget for the years studied, 1968-1972.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Congressman and Party</th>
<th>Location and State</th>
<th>Number of Jobs lost in District Due to an $80 Billion Military Budget</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rep. F. Edward Hebert, D.</td>
<td>New Orleans, Louisiana</td>
<td>1,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep. Samuel Stratton, D.</td>
<td>Albany, Schenectady, N.Y.</td>
<td>8,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep. Lucien Nedzi, D.</td>
<td>Detroit, Michigan</td>
<td>10,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep. Robert Mollohan, D.</td>
<td>Wheeling, Parkersburg, W. Virg.</td>
<td>6,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep. Les Aspin, D.</td>
<td>Racine, Kenosha, Wisconsin</td>
<td>7,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep. Bob Carr, D.</td>
<td>Lansing, Jackson, Michigan</td>
<td>8,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep. Tom Downey, D.</td>
<td>Suffolk County, New York</td>
<td>9,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep. David Treen, R.</td>
<td>New Orleans, Louisiana</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep. George O'Brien, R.</td>
<td>Chicago, Joliet, Illinois</td>
<td>8,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep. Robin Beard, R.</td>
<td>Memphis, Clarksville, Tenn.</td>
<td>4,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep. Donald Mitchell, R.</td>
<td>Rome, Utica, New York</td>
<td>9,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep. Elwood Hillis, R.</td>
<td>Anderson, Marion, Indianapolis, Indiana</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I released these findings to the Washington press corps and to the Congressmen's local newspapers on the morning of my appearance. By the time I appeared, many of the fifteen Congressmen had been inundated with calls from their hometown newspapers, "Mr. Price, I understand that your votes are costing us 7,800 jobs a year." Both incumbents and challengers have used similar analyses, based on the data in my study, in electoral campaigns.

Governors and mayors from net loss states, if they understand this data, can also be expected, even urged, to bring pressure on Congressional delegations to vote against excessive military expenditures.

Unions whose members are suffering considerable unemployment are often responsive when they understand the problem. Rank and file members want to know the causes of their economic troubles, and are open to ways of curing them. Most of the 1,500,000 member United Auto Workers, the construction workers, the ILGWU, teachers unions, and the many other non-military unions lose jobs because of high Pentagon budgets. The nation's fastest growing union, AFCSME (American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees) has taken leadership in educating its members and the public about this problem.

Union leaders are using this data to make three main points:

1) There is enormous waste in the military budget. There are more officers now with a 2,000,000 member peacetime army than we had in an 11,000,000 member army during World War II. There is no need to increase the overkill. Terminate cost-plus contracting--it makes a few executives rich and causes you to be overtaxed.

2) We are overtaxed. All (yes, 100%) of the U.S. personal income tax between 1960 and 1974 went to the Pentagon. A federal tax cut would allow more income to be voted for state and local taxes and to be spent by individuals as disposable income. Both uses of the money would create more jobs.
3) We must have conversion legislation. This would simultaneously deprive the Military-Industrial Complex of some of its most vigorous lobbyists—union members who fear unemployment—would help the economy.

The responses on the part of union audiences have varied from warm to enthusiastic.

The mystique of the generals and of the Pentagon is gone, buried in the mud and despair that was Viet Nam. The cities and the country are crying out for change. The data which are presented can be used in homes, in union halls, in elections, to destroy the keystone of the MIC. America is waking up to the realization that billions for the Pentagon means millions of unemployed.

2. Dr. Milton Taylor, Economics Department, Michigan State University.


12. Empty Pork Barrel, p.3.


15. Empty Pork Barrel, p.3.
SOCIAL WELFARE AND SOME IMPLICATIONS OF NON-VIOLENCE

Mulford Q. Sibley
University of Minnesota

A new journal has made its appearance. It is called Soldier of Fortune and is devoted to the concerns of "professional adventurers"—that is, to those who would like to become hired violent fighters in various parts of the world. The journal opens its columns to their advertisements: "Ex-marine seeks employment as mercenary, full-time or job contract, prefers South or Central America but all offers considered." "Experienced mature fighter/seeks assignment anywhere...."

In defending his journal from the charge of encouraging brutality, the founder says: "After all, booze is brutal, cars are brutal, sex is brutal. There's a need for guns and explosives, and for adventure in foreign lands....Sure, some of the guys who buy it are flamboyant, devil-may-care people, and some are brutal, but life is brutal, isn't it?" The editorial board is composed of specialist heads of departments: thus there is a "knives editor," a "terrorism editor," and so on.1

The new journal simply reflects a prevalent extensive commitment to violence throughout the world and particularly in the United States. Ruth L. Sivard, author of the recently published World Military and Social Expenditures, 1976,2 dramatizes this devotion against a background of eroding education and social welfare and of poverty on a gigantic scale. Thus the world as a whole expends each year some $300 billion on preparation for war and about 60 million persons throughout the globe owe all or a substantial part of their livelihoods to the military. During all the period of the SALT talks, armaments continued to increase. In two years of the negotiations, the United States added 2,000 nuclear weapons to its stockpile (the number went up from 6000 to 8000 strategic nuclear devices). In the same period, the Soviets escalated, too, although at a somewhat lesser rate. Total nuclear weapons in the world increased from two in 1945 to some 12,000 today. Even with such agreements as the nuclear test and non-proliferation treaties, armaments continued their upward climb.

In this country, two-thirds of all national government employees work for the Department of Defense. And the great bulk of the national debt was accumulated for warfare, not welfare.

The United States furnishes arms to a wide variety of countries—to both Jordan and Israel, for example; and the sales (perhaps $12 billion during the current year) continue to mount, government authorities often defending them on the ground that they help correct the international "imbalance" of payments.

Domestically, of course, we need only remind ourselves of what is familiar to every well informed person. Police armaments have escalated during the past five years, crimes of violence show little indication of sharply declining, and the
kinds of subtle yet terrible violence reflected in the disintegration of cities have mounted. And social workers are thoroughly familiar with the increase in child abuse.

A variety of conditions, of course, contributes to these phenomena. The arms race, while it exacerbates violence, also reflects international social and political tensions. Police violence, although it probably does nothing to abate violent crime as a whole, reflects the genuine concern of citizens for the escalation of violence in general. The advertisements in Soldier of Fortune can perhaps be connected with a kind of distorted desire to find life exciting—an effort to break out of our bureaucratized civilization, an endeavor to discover in killing and intrigue the adventure so often lacking in a complex technological world.

The pioneers in social work were, of course, familiar with wounds inflicted by violence in their time and at the same time with the futility of utilizing violence to heal those wounds. Leaders like Jane Addams and Lilian Wald saw the poor and the powerless as victims of a violent world—a world which could be met, not on its own terms, but only under the guidance of a radically different ethic. They had a vision of humankind which was far in advance of the views prevalent in their generation. Thus Jane Addams refused to be deceived by the argument that World War I could in any way contribute to the cause of democracy and peace, even though she was often ridiculed for her position.

In our day, those devoting their lives to social welfare have a special responsibility to think through the implications of war and violence—and of non-violence—for individuals, for groups, and for nations. Among the questions they should ask themselves are: Why should we be expending 6 to 7% (and upwards of 10% a bit earlier) of our Gross National Product on the military, as against about 1% in the last days of Calvin Coolidge as President? What is the relation, if any, between the commitment to violence and the starvation of social services? Is there a connection between domestic violence and public commitment to the international arms race? What are the respective faiths of violence and non-violence?

It is to the latter question that this paper is centrally devoted, although in the process we shall be referring to several of the others as well. We maintain that while disintegrating institutions, conflicts within the psyche, and many other factors are, of course, important in accounting for the violence of our world, still that world would not exist without a profound if often unarticulated faith in the efficacy of violence. Likewise, while the achievement of a nonviolent world will depend upon many institutional and psychological factors, it cannot be attained unless and until we think through and commit ourselves to a basic faith in non-violence. The issue, in other terms, is between two faiths—on the one hand, a devotion to certain myths which sustain violence; on the other hand, and in sharp contrast, confidence in a series of reverse propositions. We escalate the arms race because of a faith; and the only way in which we can
de-escalate it will be to develop a counter-faith from which a non-violent world will emerge.

What are some of the central elements of this faith in non-violence and its implications for the practical issues confronting society?

We deal with this question by first turning to a provisional definition of non-violence; then suggesting some implications of non-violence for personal relations; and finally, examining its meaning for the social and political world. Throughout, we shall be insisting that we cannot have it both ways: we cannot combine social welfare, in the long run, with reliance on violence; nor can we develop a non-violent society in the absence of an expansion of social welfare in its several dimensions. And we can no more usher in a world of social equity through violence than we can speak of "hot ice."

1.

As a kind of provisional or working statement, we may suggest that non-violence is a view, reflected in practice, which insists that in human relations--whether personal or socio-political--we respect human beings as ends in themselves and that we so intend and act that we do not seriously injure them in body, mind, or spirit. There are two basic elements in this statement: (a) that we do not intend to injure seriously or irremediably; and (b) that we seek intelligently to engage only in those actions which will in a particular situation not injure in fact. Gandhi used the word ahimsa, without harm or injury. We are suggesting that intentions are never enough; one also has a duty, insofar as one can, to select consciously and with knowledge only those methods which are likely to lead to the goal of "harmlessness." This implies that we have a broad and sophisticated awareness of what the often-complicated consequences of a given act are likely to be.

The statement, of course, bristles with ambiguities. So long as life exists, for example, and no matter how careful we are, our means may sometimes lead to violence. Does this mean that we should therefore give up the attempt to be non-violent? Of course not. For inaction, by seeming to tolerate the violence built into the status quo, might itself be encouraging a violence-prone society.

Then, too, the statement in itself says nothing about "force" and "coercion," which are themselves very ambiguous terms. Sometimes "force" and "violence" are equated. We are not doing so. Force and coercion of some kind--physical, intellectual, spiritual, economic, social--would seem to be inseparable from human existence, as are "individuality" and "conflict." But not all physical force or coercion, for example, is violent. When it is used under restrained and circumscribed conditions for the purpose of benefiting the individual involved or at least for ends which do not entail his serious injury, it may be legitimate: the context of the act is vitally important. When I forcibly pull a child from the pathway of an automobile, I am not being violent, any more than when I carefully
but forcibly keep a temporarily deranged person from slashing his wrists. When a policeman pushes two potential antagonists apart, he is not being violent but rather is endeavoring to prevent violence. Acts of these kinds are to be sharply differentiated from, let us say, the bombing of a city, the killing of a "criminal" by the State (euphemistically called "execution"), or the toleration of social conditions which lead to gross disrespect for human personality. Shooting a public official in order to reform society cannot be equated morally with refusal to co-operate with his illegitimate acts. Both torturing a prisoner and conscientiously boycotting a dime store may be regarded as coercive; but surely there is an important moral distinction.

Applying tests of these kinds, of course, is not always easy. But the drawing of lines in any application of ethical norms is never without its hazards. All we can expect of ourselves as rational beings is that we endeavor to be clear in our own minds about the standards we are seeking to apply and as well-informed and intelligent as possible in implementing those standards.

But it is extremely important that we have standards of some kind; and the quest for criteria of non-violence is one which seeks to recognize this importance. Violence itself may often be due to the fact that we have few if any standards, so that when we are confronted by a crisis situation we often succumb to the pressures of the moment which make for violence.

Both from a general viewpoint and particularly from the perspective of social welfare, it is important to recognize the significance of what is called institutionalized violence. Built into the structure of institutions themselves may be patterns of severe exploitation and inequity which undermine the norms we have sought to suggest. A revolutionist hurling a bomb may be protesting an institutional structure more violent than his own act. The advocate of non-violence must be fully aware of this; and while he will repudiate the methods of the revolutionist, he will sympathize with his objectives. Non-violence does not imply passivity. Indeed, it suggests constant activity against injustice, exploitation, war, and militarism but only by means which differentiate themselves from the spirit of these phenomena. Thus the worker against injustice will not employ methods which themselves tend to encourage injustice (perhaps of another kind); and the advocate of peace will not use war in a futile effort to gain his end. To wage war tends to produce more war; to kill or to threaten to kill (whatever the excuse) encourages the desire to kill, not the impetus to respect human life.

2.

Now it is with some such conception of non-violence that we approach the question in terms of personal relations. The ethic of non-retaliation is an exemplification of the notion of non-violence: I shall not reply in kind to your failure to show respect for me as a person. If we are seeking the "rehabilitation" of an individual, we ourselves must be impeccable by setting the standard for non-retaliatory action. We cannot teach a thief to be honest by stealing from him; a person to be loving by exemplifying hate; or a victim of an exploitative social sys-
tem to gain self-respect by treating him as if he were not worthy of respect. The only hope is to make a kind of leap of faith and to see in the thief a person who can transcend his past; in the person consumed by hatred an individual who has possibilities of exemplifying love; and in the victim of exploitation, one who can rise above his low self-esteem if only others treat him not so much as the man he is but as the man he can be. In all these situations, imagination is an important ingredient of non-violence and non-retaliation. The unimaginative individual is one who cannot see beyond the present to the potential. There will, of course, be failures if we act in this manner; but the failures will be far greater if we implement the reverse attitude.

One of the interesting but unsolved problems (at least it would seem difficult to subject to a scientific test) is the effect of public violence on the domain of personal violence. If the State and public officials are committed to an ethic of retaliation or of violence, is it not reasonable to assume that their prestige will affect the ways in which we treat one another in private relations? If the State threatens to wipe out Moscow under certain circumstances, why is not this a kind of moral license for me or my organization to threaten to obliterate my enemies under specified conditions? When a gang "rubs out" the leaders of an opposing organization, it may be reinforced in its action by the fact that the government "rubs out" its international supposed enemies. After all, what is the difference morally between a plan to kill Castro or thousands of Japanese in Nagasaki and a scheme of the "Cosa Nostra" to liquidate physically those who challenge it? During the Vietnam War, I remember asking a social psychologist whether there was a relation between the terror bombings and massacres being carried out in Vietnam under the auspices of the government and the seemingly increasing disrespect for human life within the United States. His reply was that he saw every reason for assuming this to be true. Confucius would apparently have given the same answer, for much of his political philosophy is rooted in the notion of the ruler as "exemplar." The Emperor in his official acts must set the example for his subjects in their private relations; for while institutional authority—that which goes beyond any given ruler—is important, still if the ruler himself sets the wrong example, how can one expect his subjects to act rightly?

At least this is a hypothesis worth considering.

To be sure, the incidence of public violence may also be affected by the prevalence of private violence. The police become more menacing in response to the growth of crime; and reliance on international weaponry is part and parcel of the ethos of private violence. We can admit all this and still plausibly contend, however, that the probability is that the influence is heavily weighted the other way. Rulers and political systems carry with them the prestige and the authority of a whole society and so there is a tendency on the part of private individuals to conclude that if a thing is permissible in public action, it must also be morally acceptable (if not legally so) in private affairs. There is some evidence, for example,—although it should not be considered conclusive—that, other things being equal, countries enforcing the death penalty encourage murders. We do know that the death penalty apparently does not discourage killing.
We might also observe that insofar as we already adhere to the ethic of non-violence in private relations, it is not primarily as the result of threats by the police but rather because, to a very widespread extent, even in a violent culture, most human beings have the faith, exemplified in habit patterns, that all human beings are capable of love and intrinsically worthy of respect. Generally speaking, if we trust the other person, he will justify that trust; and while there will be many exceptions to this rule, without its presence anything resembling a human community would be impossible. Insofar as the police are "effective," it is because a sufficient level of community exists to make them so.

Implicitly, the profession of social work is committed to the notion of non-violence in personal relations, else it denies its reason for being. Whatever the context might be, it, above all professions, should be anchored in the faith that there is that within each human being, however it may have been suppressed or concealed by institutionalized exploitation and violence or psychological factors or misfortune, which makes for the possibility of rationality, love, and non-violence. One way of uncovering this quality is for others to see it even before the individual is aware of it himself. The individual can regain his or her self-respect if others show their respect for him not as he apparently is in the existential situation but rather as he can become. When he is at length aware of others' respect and confidence, demonstrated through actions and not merely talk, he will eventually re-discover his own worth and rebuild his own respect. Whether the individual be a murderer, a welfare mother, a poverty-stricken child, or an individual distraught by psychological conflicts and guilt, a key factor in the philosophy of social work is the restoration of self-respect. And this can be accomplished only in close association with the principles of non-violence.

But so closely are public and private realms associated in the modern world that the very basis for non-violence and self-respect in personal relations is heavily conditioned on our attempting to implement the principle in the public realm as well. So long as we are strongly committed to the ethos of violence in politics and the organization of society, we shall be limited in what we can do to develop justice and non-violence in the private sphere. This is true first of all because, as we have suggested, the public example will tend to affect practices in the realm of personal conduct and, secondly, because heavy commitment to violence will, both financially and psychologically, deprive social welfare broadly conceived (social work, education, mental health, and so on) of indispensable resources of scarce goods and equally essential resources of spirit and morale.

In a celebrated passage, the late R.H. Tawney comments, in the context of sixteenth century economic development, on the human race's proclivity for wasting its substance through violence and war:

Mankind, it seems, hates nothing so much as its own prosperity. Menaced with an accession of riches which would lighten its toil, it makes haste to redouble its labors, and
to pour away the perilous stuff, which might deprive of plausibility the complaint that it is poor. Applied to the arts of peace, the new resources commanded by Europe during the first half of the sixteenth century might have done something to exorcise the specters of pestilence and famine, and to raise the material fabric of civilization to undreamed-of heights. Its rulers, secular and ecclesiastical alike, thought otherwise. When pestilence and famine were ceasing to be necessities imposed by nature, they re-established themselves by political art.

The sluice which they opened to drain away each new accession of superfluous wealth was war. 3

Tawney's observations about the sixteenth century are fully applicable to the past century and a half of modern history. We might even expand the analysis: not only does war drain away the "surplus" of wealth, but it also frustrates social reform and tends to promote social chaos. Violent revolutionary forces are released and family life is disrupted.

The problem of non-violence in the public order is whether we can reverse these historical trends. It will not be easy, for even the history of the United States, which we have often thought of as relatively immune from many of the main currents of world history, reveals the tendency.

Recall, for example, American experience in the twentieth century. The early part of the century was characterized by considerable expansion of the economy and, after 1913, by important social reform measures which, had they been continued, might have resulted in some genuine re-distribution of wealth and power. But these possibilities were frustrated when the country entered World War I, which greatly enhanced the resources and power of the wealthy and brought an end--as do most wars--to any desirable social reforms. Perhaps all this might have been justified, according to some, had the war accomplished much that was worth-while; but it did not: it neither made the world "safe" for democracy nor brought about a situation in which war was less likely in the future. And the resources destroyed by the war, whether in the United States or elsewhere, were staggering. A monetary world cost estimate of $400 billion scarcely does justice to the fact that many of these resources were irreplaceable; and it speaks not at all of the tens of millions of human lives wiped out.

Or again, World War II came to the United States after a period of social reform--some of it surely desirable--which the war promptly halted while providing a facade of "war prosperity." The destruction wrought by World War II was far greater than that of World War I and the net benefit to the world or to the United States even more dubious. Psychologically, perhaps, American entry could be partly interpreted as an effort through war to counteract or plaster over the failure to take the United States out of the Great Depression without war. The war virtually eliminated unemployment, which was still 9 million at the end of 1939,
but at a fearful price.

But no more than World War I did it make the world "safe for democracy." While it appeared to destroy one "totalitarian" system—that of Nazi Germany—it did so at the price of greatly expanding the power of another—the Soviet Union. And its temporary solution for the problem of unemployed men and women—in the war the solution was that men were employed blowing other men and natural resources to bits—was followed by chaos and many smaller though often ferocious wars throughout the earth. While the violence of the war helped force Hitler's death, it left many of the basic issues confronting mankind unresolved or exacerbated. A tyrant died but tyranny proliferated. The war gave birth, moreover, to the atomic bomb, which has cast its shadow over the entire period since World War II.

During the period between 1961 and 1964, there seemed to be some promise again of using vast potential resources for human welfare, through the "war on poverty," the development of civil rights, and imaginative schemes like some of the housing programs. But again the potential was in considerable measure frustrated when the United States began its massive violence against Vietnam—at an ultimate cost of perhaps $150 billion. And after the war—as has been usual in wars from ancient to modern times—came the inflation which eroded the savings of millions of the poor and middle classes and, accompanied by another "recession," severely restricted possibilities for social justice. And the Vietnam war, like its predecessors, gave no evidence that it had improved the lot of humankind in any significant ways.

During the Vietnam War, it was first believed that we could have both "guns" and "butter." But it soon became evident that, whatever the possibilities from a strictly economic and financial point of view, in terms of psychology it was difficult if not impossible to combine the huge commitment to violence with serious efforts for social welfare.

And now, in the post-war period, educational budgets do not keep pace with inflation, the war against poverty continues to be undermined, and social service work in many of its most vital aspects is curtailed. Moreover, numerous sections of the central cities remind one more and more of urban areas that have been bombed or otherwise destroyed in war. Yet the shopping list for armaments continues to grow.

To be sure, we are told that military violence and its threat promote "security." But the meaning of this statement is not at all clear. If it implies that once we have a certain level of "over-kill" (the ability, let us say, to wipe out the "enemy" five or six times over), we shall no longer be fearful and can halt the arms build-up, it would seem obviously to be a false proposition; for it would appear that the higher our arms levels, the more fearful we become that they are not high enough. Expansion of armaments, far from reassuring us, seems to stimulate still more expansion. The greater the "over-kill" capacity, the more we feel the need for additional and even more monstrous weapons. It is almost certain
that a citizen of the United States feels far more insecure with respect to external "enemies" than the citizen of a third or fourth rate "power" like Denmark.

Perhaps, though, possession of great arms in face of the enemy's escalation will deter from war. But this would seem very unlikely. While we can never prove beyond the shadow of any doubt that large armaments and arms races do not prevent war, since there are so many variables, the experience of the arms race before World War I is not reassuring. Far more plausible is the proposition that if a nation prepares for war through arms escalation, it will eventually be tempted to use those arms.

But if war does come, it may be urged, surely great armaments will tend to prevent invasion and to protect human beings. But there is little if any evidence to show this, particularly in the modern age. In World War II, for example, both Denmark and Norway, with tiny military forces, were invaded; but so were Germany, France, Poland, and the Soviet Union, with huge military establishments. As for protecting human life in time of war, even the best military "defense" cannot prevent millions of deaths: in the United States, for example, writers speak in terms of fifty or more millions. Under these circumstances, it is a mockery to speak of the military preserving human lives.

We argue, then, that build-up of armaments in today's context promotes fear and insecurity among citizens of Great Powers, including the United States; that large armaments will not deter from war but, on the contrary, will probably constitute a temptation to initiate it; and that once a nation enters war large armaments give no assurance whatsoever that the country will not be invaded or that millions of its citizens will not die. Armaments, in other words, have very little to do with "security." On the contrary, they probably exacerbate insecurity.

But if we reach this conclusion, it would seem to be useless to maintain military forces. If their existence does nothing to allay fear, probably cannot deter from war, and can neither prevent invasion nor protect human beings, it would seem unreasonable to retain them.

In other words, if we are convinced that public violence and its threat are not only immoral but inefficacious (in terms of worth-while objectives), then a nation is foolish to rely on them even if other nations choose to do so. Willingness and readiness to disarm unilaterally would seem to be a part of practical wisdom as well as a requirement of any commitment to non-violence as a moral principle.

Just what might unilateral disarmament imply in terms of details?

The policy might conceivably begin with a public announcement of what is contemplated. A government just elected on a platform of unilateral disarmament would state that it had lost all confidence in military violence and was determined during the course of, say, five years to divest itself of all military weapons. It would invite representatives of all countries to observe the process. Among the
first steps would be abolition of the CIA and other secret intelligence agencies. Then gradually, year by year, armaments in all categories would be reduced. Gradualness would be desirable to permit orderly economic and social adjustments.

Meanwhile, as part of the process, there would have been an announcement that the resources saved by unilateral disarmament would not lead to a reduction in taxes but rather to alternative expenditures on what might roughly be called "social welfare"—education, counselling services, exportation of skills to develop trained manpower in parts of the world requesting it, rehabilitation of cities, and the organization of a system of non-violent resistance to any invasion. There might be a pledge to devote approximately one half of all present military expenditures to international purposes (under the control of an international agency) and one half to domestic goals for a generation. This would mean that each year during the disarmament process, about 10% of existing "defense" expenditures (over $10 billion) would be contributed for world purposes and 10% to rehabilitating a sorely disintegrating domestic society. At the end of five years, each segment would be receiving at least $50 billion annually for a minimum of at least a quarter of a century.

If one attempts to spend $50 billion for non-military purposes, even in an age of inflation, one is startled by what one can buy. For example, one could support 200 large universities; or provide 12 million full scholarships for college students; or establish some half a million to a million substantial day care centers; or pay the salaries of more than three million special education teachers to stimulate gifted children and assist the retarded; or furnish over three million social workers in such fields as psychiatric social work, family welfare, and many others; or finance between three and four million national park attendants; and so on. One can work out one's own calculations and no matter what they are, they must be astounding. And these are figures only for the domestic side; an equal sum would be available for the international and it would probably go even further.

Sometimes it is argued that without heavy emphasis on "defense" and on war preparation the unemployment problem would necessarily be much worse than it is today. But the fact is that, on the average, a given sum expended in the civilian sector will produce more employment than if used by the military. Moreover, civilian employment tends to be less inflationary than "defense" employment. Explains an economist who has studied the problem: "I think economists would generally agree that it is a misconception that defense creates more jobs.... Defense, particularly modern defense, is a high technology business. Defense production tends to require more highly skilled people but to employ fewer people per unit of output that civilian industry. It also puts pressure on prices. It creates buying power, but does not produce goods that can be bought in the market.... High defense spending for these reasons has an inflation-inducing effect." 6

We cannot predict with any exactitude, of course, what reactions a program of unilateral disarmament by a major nation would provoke. But one thing would seem
to be certain: the situation of today, based as it is on competitive armaments and an almost irrational confidence in military might, would be drastically altered both psychologically and sociologically. In many parts of the world, including the Soviet Union, there would probably be strong domestic pressures to emulate the United States in its unorthodox actions; for it is notorious that the clamor for more consumers goods in Russia and elsewhere is already very strong. A unilateral initiative of this kind might, in fact, lead to competitive disarmament. But even if this response did not occur, the unilateral disarmament would continue, on the premise that it was soundly based, both in morality and in terms of practical efficacy.

Those with a deep commitment to the principle of non-violence would hold, of course, that a policy of this kind would be far more effective as a national defense measure than all the armaments we presently possess. But whether or not one agrees or disagrees with this conclusion depends in part on how one thinks of "national defense." Here we define it roughly as "The preservation and enhancement of human life and of the basic morally defensible institutions and practices of a nation." This definition would exclude from the term international economic exploitation, military power as an end in itself, or the quest for dominion over others. The new utilization of the resources formerly devoted to the military would defend in a number of ways: first, moral duties to mankind would be much more emphatically recognized than today and a by-product of this would probably be that any possible justification for invading the country (always a specter for those insisting on military national defense) would be reduced to the vanishing point; secondly, the new outlook would understand that perhaps the greatest menace to the life and institutions of a people comes from within rather than from without--from deteriorating cities, hopeless young people, absence of constructive challenges, unemployment, inadequate education, human alienation, and so on;7 thirdly, the policy, by confining "defense" to vindication of those things that are worth-while and excluding those objectives which make for injustice would clearly see that genuine peace and national defense depend on the establishment of justice.

Part of the policy, of course, would be provision for non-violent resistance to any possible invasion or occupation. Those committed to non-violence would believe that if other elements of the policy were implemented, the necessity for non-violent resistance would be remote. Nevertheless, provision would be made for it, as an aspect of the whole scheme.

Basically, non-violent resistance would be a program in which several thousand selected individuals would be highly trained to lead the population in campaigns of non-co-operation with invading or occupying forces. Strategies and tactics involving the strike, the boycott, and the withholding of moral support would be planned for; and training would be rigorous. No occupying force can long hold a country if non-violent non-co-operation is widespread and if human beings are willing to die (but not to kill) for their country. The whole training of non-violent resisters would be premised on such propositions. If one
leader were to be killed by the army of occupation, the "game plan" of non-violent
resistance would provide for immediate succession of another. The professionals in
non-violent resistance would, of course, guide the non-professionals in the tac-
tics to be used. The budget would include an item of, let us say, $5 billion a
year for non-violent resistance training. One of the military service academies
would be retained to help educate leaders of the new strategy. 8

Does a policy of unilateral disarmament involve risks? Of course. But we
contend that the risks are far fewer than those entailed by a commitment to violent
defense. It could be that under a scheme of unilateral disarmament, some nation
would become utterly irrational and seek to invade the country. But surely
this is much less likely than with present policies. In an atmosphere of com-
petitive armaments, irrationality is much more apt to erupt than in one where a
prominent nation has renounced violent defense. What possible purpose would be
served by a military invasion of the United States? After all, it would already
be sharing its resources on a large scale, would have indicated its non-aggressive
intention by unilateral disarmament, and would have opened all of its genuinely pub-
litical business to world scrutiny. If under these circumstances another nation still
contemplated invasion, it would have to weigh the costs of occupying a country in
face of the most effective form of resistance, that of the non-violent type.

The notion of unilateralism is, we are contending, entirely compatible with
hard-headed military and political realism. The unrealistic, in fact, are those
who think that preparation for military violence has anything to do with national
defense. After studying military history for a lifetime, the late Walter Millis,
perhaps the United States' greatest twentieth century military historian, main-
tained that "a good theoretical case can be made for the proposition that a
unilateral divestiture...would in fact redound more to the real security and wel-
fare of the American people than any other course..." 9 While Millis thought that
the American people were not yet ready to accept such a policy, this did not
detract from its soundness; and one might well ask Walter Millis why, if he
could be convinced of its soundness, the American people could not be.

A policy of unilateral disarmament within the context suggested here would
greatly strengthen the health, welfare, and spirit of the American people--surely
one of the central objectives of genuine national defense. In a context where
"defense" is largely identified with military violence, the tendency is to forget
the limitations of military power and at the same time the possibilities of non-
violence. The public mind, moreover, is split--on the one hand, it repeats that
its objectives are peace and non-violence; on the other hand, it devotes a sub-
stantial proportion of its resources to means which are the antitheses of these
objectives. This hardly makes for a state of public mental health. In a context
of unilateralism, this split public personality would be eliminated and the very
"nakedness" of the country in terms of possessing military weapons would tend to
produce a psychology of security. Every encouragement would be given to non-
violent solutions. Once faith in military violence had been completely eroded,
the way would have been paved for a commitment not dependent on the shallow faith
in violence.
In personal relations, we often say: "Jones was utterly disarming," meaning that he was not close-minded, not fearful, and not aggressive; instead, he opened the way to full communication with and understanding of others. A like principle might apply in the context of unilateralism. The nation would be literally disarmed and would therefore be disarming, with consequences not unlike those we think of in personal relations. This is not to equate personal with corporate relations in all circumstances but simply to suggest that in the context of disarmament a similar consequence would probably follow.

It should be emphasized, of course, that unilateralism is dependent on a basic change of attitudes and values in the country as a whole. It would not "work" if substantial segments of the population continued actively to commit themselves to violence. It would entail, in other words, a fundamental alteration of public opinion. It should be emphasized, of course, that unilateralism is dependent on a basic change of attitudes and values in the country as a whole. It would not "work" if substantial segments of the population continued actively to commit themselves to violence. It would entail, in other words, a fundamental alteration of public opinion.

To be consistent, too, it would need to be accompanied by other measures exemplifying non-violence in the public arena. For example, the police would have to be disarmed and individuals, too, would have to renounce their "right" to bear arms. Any thought of "capital punishment" or killing by the State would have to be eliminated; and some of the worst outrages going on under the name of "prison" would need to vanish. We should also have to reduce the gap between lowest and highest incomes. Not that all these transformations would need to come about immediately but rather that they would be seen from the beginning as essential if policies of non-violence were to be fully implemented.

Overly simplifying, we can say that there are two basic views of the State and of law. One thinks of them as repressive--as essentially existing to suppress the evil in man. Here the accent is on force and negation and even violence. The other view would see the State and law as potentially positive--as devices for helping to release the good in human beings and to organize the community in such a way that evil is overcome not by repression but by so accenting the constructive that the darker side of human nature fades into the background. The notion of non-violence would obviously fit into the latter paradigm, as would, if the interpretation of this paper is correct, the philosophical foundations of social work.

Obviously, both of these paradigms are present in the State and law of our day. When law facilitates the making of agreements, the organization of public enterprises for public benefit, and arbitration procedures, the second is obviously involved. When it sends a person to a prison which will obviously not "reform" him, the first is present. When the State provides an educational system, the second is predominant; when it orders me to kill, the first is ubiquitous.

The task of those committed to non-violence in the public realm is to explore all of the avenues open through the second paradigm and to insist that the conception of non-violence, contrary to writers like the late Reinhold Niebuhr, is applicable not only to personal matters but also to group relations and in politics. In the process of attempting to implement the second paradigm
imaginatively, social workers and others strengthen not only the cause of non-violence but also that of social welfare in its broadest dimensions. But they should be consistent: non-violence is a philosophy which must be applied universally and not in such a way that some areas of human life are exempt from its impact. We cannot consistently promote it in personal relations and then attack it by supporting violence and its threat in the international sphere.

4.

We began by calling attention to some of the striking exemplifications of the modern world's faith in violence and suggested that non-violence implies a counter-faith. We then explored the elements of that counter-faith in terms of defining it; of suggesting its application to personal relations; and of outlining a few of its implications for the public sphere.

We have not denied that a gigantic leap is necessary to move from the faith in violence to the counter-faith of non-violence. Nevertheless, we stressed that in most relations of life, even today, there is at least a semi-commitment to non-violence. Our task, whether as social workers or as citizens, is to extend that faith into areas where up to now it has seemed unthinkable.

FOOTNOTES


4 Which does not include such "indirect" costs as war pensions, care for the war injured, and similar war-related expenses.

5 Herman Kahn's older work, On Thermonuclear War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960) is still a useful source for projecting probable fatalities in any large-scale war.


7 Arnold J. Toynbee in his A Study of History stresses that the civilizations he studied disintegrated primarily from within rather than as a result of external pressures. Thus the main "enemy" of the ancient Greek cities consisted of internal factors rather than of a menace engendered by Persia. And Roman civilization was basically "overthrown" not by the "barbarians" but by such phenomena as internal political decay, alienation, social corruption, and rank injustice.


Niebuhr tended to distinguish the possibilities for morality in personal relations from potentialities in group or political relations, particularly in Moral Man and Immoral Society (N.Y.: Scribner, 1932) but also in many other works. In terms violence and non-violence, his expectations for groups and nations were much lower than those for individuals. While he makes an important point in emphasizing that institutions and organizations are not persons and cannot be said to be capable of love, still it is also true that individuals (who admittedly are capable of love and non-violence) work within the frameworks of institutions and organizations and have the capacity for transforming the latter. There would be no groups if individuals did not exist; and while group life has an autonomy of its own, still, we may say to Niebuhr, the attitudes and convictions of individuals surely have an impact on the group, and their ideals, however "impossible," can change the nature of group relations.
"Wars will end when men have ceased to fight" was a popular slogan of the anti-Vietnam War movement. It sounded quite practical and almost true on its face. However, we now have considerable information about wars and how people have refused to fight, and the relationship between them is not well described by this phrase. The specific military technology in use, the social organization of military authority, and the division of labor in producing war, all make a difference in the possibility of stopping a war by many refusals to fight. Campaigns emphasizing this tactic may even strengthen the organization of military authority. This seemed to be the case in the anti-war campaigns directed at crewmen of attack aircraft carriers.

In 1971 and 1972 there were campaigns to stop the sailing for Vietnam of the USS Constellation, the USS Kitty Hawk and the USS Coral Sea. These were studied along with a later series of strikes of 130 Black sailors on the Constellation, a racial fight of over 200 on the Kitty Hawk and the anti-war movement defense of a sailor charged with sabotage on the USS Ranger (Connally 1976). The study was based on documents produced by people involved in maintaining authority as well as in resisting it. These accounts and analyses appeared in military journals, GI papers, campaign literature, daily newspapers and in a report of Congressional investigation of this resistance. Navy manuals and handbooks on ship organization and authority practice were also studied.

STOP THE SHIP CAMPAIGNS

The Kitty Hawk and Constellation campaigns in San Diego were directed at the community as well as the sailors on the ship and included a city-wide straw vote to "keep the Connie home." The organizers announced that they would use 'non-violence' as their method of resistance, and consistent with this, individual conscientious objection to military participation was encouraged. A community peace group sponsored a project house as a campaign center and social gathering place. Another group offered para-legal counseling for enlisted people at a downtown store front and published a GI paper, Up From the Bottom. The campaigns involved months of organizing on and off the ships with meetings, rallies, folk and rock concerts, leafleting and publicity. Following the eventual ship departures, nine men in one case and eleven in the other took 'sanctuary' in local churches instead of returning to their ships. Each time they were arrested and flown to the ships. They were eventually discharged after some time in prison. Church sanctuary was used to make a moral statement against the war and encourage others to resist. It was also used to establish the sailors' claims to discharge as conscientious objectors.

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The campaign literature, GI, and underground press gave a libertarian analysis of military authority and the Vietnam War. Along with the arguments against the war and the humanistic accounts of suffering, there was ridicule of named senior NCO's and ship's officers. Their insistence on deference, their regulation of haircuts and their officiousness at inspections were all complained of. Specific orders were cited as self-serving for the NCO or officer or as harassment of the men.

The Coral Sea Save (Stop) Our Ship Campaign (SOS) in the San Francisco Bay Area differed from the San Diego campaigns in that the early organizing was not publicized in the civilian community. The campaign literature was more anti-navy than anti-war, non-violence was not specifically approved as a method and consciencious objection and the use of church sanctuary were not encouraged. Solidarity in action with other enlisted people was urged. It was expected that large numbers of the crew would simply not return to the ship when it was ready to sail. When the ship did sail, SOS people claimed over 250 sailors had purposely missed the ship. The Navy claimed there were only the usual number of UA's (Unauthorized Absences), thirty-five.

BLACK UPRISINGS

The racial fight on the Kitty Hawk and the series of strikes on the Constellation happened without prior planning. On the Kitty Hawk the fight began while the ship was in action off Vietnam. Blacks were leaving a meeting where they had protested the handling of discipline related to a shore fight in the Philippines, and as they left some walked through the hanger deck where they were met by a line of advancing marines. Some picked up hardware and fought, others ran through the ship shouting "they're killing our brothers." This precipitated a general fight of over 200 sailors that lasted for a number of hours and produced serious injuries. The initial attack by marines was the result of a confusion in orders between the captain of the ship and his Black executive officer (House Armed Services Committee 1973). Many of the charges were reduced, when, much later defense attorneys and civilian groups protested.

The strikes on the USS Constellation developed after a series of meetings of Blacks to consider grievances including a rumor that undesirable discharges were to be given to certain Blacks. At the last of these meetings, representatives were sent to the Captain to ask him to meet with them. He refused, was asked by other representatives and continued to refuse. One hundred and thirty Black sailors stayed at the meeting place, the main mess decks, all night. The ship was ordered into San Diego and in the morning the sit-in group agreed to go ashore, expecting to receive a hearing for their grievances. The shore discussions were not satisfactory to the 'strikers' and five days later they were ordered to return to the ship. One hundred and twenty-nine men met on the dock, held their own muster and flag salute and refused orders to board the ship, and instead sat down on the dock for six hours until the Navy promised to meet their conditions. In addition to the Captain, his superiors in the Pacific fleet and the Chief of Naval Operations and the Secretary of the Navy were involved in the decision. The men boarded busses
and expected to arrive at one base for settlement. They found instead that they had been separated into three groups and taken to three different bases where they were individually given hearings, charges and relatively mild punishments.

There was a Congressional investigation of these two Black uprisings and the report was soon made public. It blamed the Chief of Naval Operation's policy of "permissiveness" and the Blacks for the trouble. Reports from the Black participants and their supporters were carried in the daily press and in GI newspapers and underground papers. Their complaints were against institutional racism in the Navy. They identified certain of their respective captain's policies as adding to this but they located discrimination in the institutional system for assignments of specialties, training and punishments. They thought this happened as a result of the use of civilian records for decisions on punishment, promotions, assignment and discharge and was compounded within the Navy by racially biased personnel evaluations.

IDEOLOGIES OF AUTHORITY

Officers, who wrote articles and letters in their journals about these resistance events and the practice of military authority, used one of two well developed ideologies. Each ideology included prescriptions for practical actions thought necessary to establish and maintain authority; and each justified authority, that is, the right of a few to demand compliance of many (see Bendix 1960 for this definition of ideology). One of these was a militarist perspective similar to what Vagts has identified as militarism (1937) and the other resembled the managerial ideology of civilian corporate management (Janowitz 1960). It is necessary to consider how these two ideologies affected actual practice of authority on the ships to understand how the resistance actions, in turn, affected navy work.

The militarist ideology assumes that authority is manifested by an inferior's exact obedience to a superior's commands in a face-to-face setting such as the old navy sail ships. Heroes of the old sailing days are often quoted. The maintenance of caste differences are thought necessary for military discipline. Officers are believed to comply as gentlemen who value honor and who are devoted to their country and the Navy. Enlisted people, on the other hand, only cooperate because they are trained in obedience and fear punishment. Militarists think the differences in pay, quarters, personal services and privilege are appropriate and also necessary to maintain discipline. They complain of efforts to increase the "habitability" of enlisted quarters on the ships.

Senior NCO's, particularly chief petty officers, are set apart as more responsible and more deserving than lower rated enlisted people. They have direct authority over the crew although subordinates do most of the supervision. They are responsible for the living arrangements of the sailors as well as for the direction of work. For instance, there are detailed rules even about the way sailors' clothes are to be folded and stacked within drawers. The personal neatness and haircuts of sailors are also subject to navy standards. Militarists
expect chiefs to get compliance by being "tough." They worry that some chiefs may become "nice guys" in a mistaken effort to be liked by their crew.

Orders, coordination and information are expected to go through a chain of command. Appeals, protest or additional information from lower levels are to go up the chain step-by-step. The use of this chain is seen as absolutely necessary for the integrity of the authority of the particular officer at each level. Communications from level to level involve rituals of personal deference. Enactment of these rituals are interpreted as evidence of the superior's authority. If there are lapses in deference or outright refusals or avoidance, then authority is thought to be in mortal danger: sailors will observe that the superior does not have absolute power to produce obedience and become disobedient themselves. Authority is thus a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy that only works so long as there is unanimous agreement that it does.

The managerial ideology is very different from this. It identifies authority as the administration of institutional processes so that they result in compliance of personnel. Control is essentially by manipulation of career opportunities and possibilities of unfavorable discharges. The relationship between ranks is to have the appearance of cordiality. "Teamwork" is often used to describe the social situation. The senior NCO's are expected to refrain from being authoritarian, but they are nonetheless held responsible for the administration of the work and control of the personal living behavior of enlisted people. There is a de-emphasis on military caste: both enlisted people and officers are thought to work on the same basis, career opportunity.

The actual control mechanisms are impersonal and do not rely on face-to-face interactions. Orders come as paper authorizations for work assignment, transfer, promotion, pay, leave and discharge. It is the content of each person's personnel file that is the key to opportunity or punishment rather than face-to-face negotiation. Each file includes evaluations by the immediate superior, past records of test results, training, experience, history of disciplinary actions and school and court records from civilian life. Compliant behavior is necessary if the enlisted person or officer wishes future promotions or to ward off unfavorable assignments, punishments or discharges. In addition to control by this channeling of behavior, counseling programs and group sensitivity workshops are used to reduce discontent or, "turbulence," as the managerial officers refer to it. The existence of covert surveillance is also publicized as a further persuasion to compliance.

Besides these two ideological 'recipes' for authority there is the actual organization of the work and living situations on the ship. The organization plan was originally based on the militarist organization of sailing ships, where there was face-to-face command (Melville 1850). As technological changes occurred, modifications were made in work organization. Some changes were informed by the managerial perspective, others were simply ad hoc efforts to solve problems presented by the new ship technology. Today work on the huge aircraft carriers consists largely of maintenance of complex machinery and electronic and electrical systems.
The skills for doing the various jobs are not widely understood or shared among the crew. On the old sailing ships each sailor had a well rounded understanding of the total work involved in sailing and the skill to accomplish much of it. An officer could give a general order and expect his men to know immediately how to do it. The work today is divided into simple tasks and job skill is acquired through training and from manuals and specifications by the manufacturer of the equipment. Technical bureaus off the ship also issue instructions. The actual work orders for an individual may be on a printed card which specifies what to do, where to get the tools and how to put them away. In this way many jobs are assigned and completed without direct person-to-person contact. There still are occasions for face-to-face commands on modern aircraft carriers, but these happen more often during the supervision of living arrangements such as in inspection of quarters or of person, than in the doing of the actual work.

**AUTHORITY VIEWED FROM THE RANKS**

Enlisted people often criticized the administration of navy authority; they pointed to arbitrariness and officious actions of NCO's and officers; they called career navy people "lifers" derisively; they considered many orders as exploitive and based on aggrandizement of the officer's career rather than for practical need for the work. They particularly objected to the controls on personal living, haircuts and deference etiquette. They saw all of these as humiliating; however, in spite of this libertarian critique their basic idea of how authority works was the same as the militarists! They assumed that power of navy authority depended on their use of the etiquette of deference and their obedience to face-to-face commands.

The Black movement sailors shared some of this anti-authority view but identified channeling by manipulation of career opportunity as the fundamental method of control. Their analysis developed as part of the identification of institutional racism. The Black movement sailors, then, clearly shared the managerial model of how authority was constructed.

**RESISTANCE PRODUCES CONFLICT BETWEEN MANAGERS AND MILITARISTS**

The anti-war campaigns, the Black movement action and the general anti-authoritarian mood of enlisted people had an indirect effect on authority. The Chief of Naval Operations at this time was Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, a strong spokesperson for the managerial ideology. There had been a serious drop in reenlistments in the Navy, and Zumwalt had ordered a series of reforms to make the Navy more attractive and to solve the "retention" problem. The reforms, which were labeled, Z-Grams, modified certain regulations known as "chicken regulations" that were generally considered harassing for enlisted people. The Z-Grams were not intended to encourage political expression of enlisted people or to make changes in the naval hierarchy. Several of the Z-Grams were explicitly directed against racist practices. These included establishment of race relations councils that could carry information up the naval hierarchy without going through the chain of command.

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These reforms created problems with the traditional militarist practices of authority. Many militarist officers and NCO's were more alarmed at the occasional rudeness, grudging cooperation and frequent infraction of the rules of deference etiquette than they were by the direct anti-war actions. When a sailor failed to salute they viewed their authority as under attack. Their ideology of authority prescribed immediate and forceful action in response to these threats. When Zumwalt's policies prevented these responses, he and the managerial position of permissiveness that he represented to them, came to be seen as a serious threat to naval authority. The senior NCO's were in the position where there was the most pinch. They were responsible for seeing that their crews were prepared for inspections and that the many exact regulations were followed. Under the managerial policy of Zumwalt they were to continue to carry out these responsibilities but at the same time they were to avoid alienating the enlisted people. They were the last link in an authoritarian system as they passed on unwelcome orders from above for reasons unrelated to the immediate interests of the crew. It wasn't easy to get compliance by persuasion. They had depended on their own toughness and on its being backed by officers. Zumwalt's managerial policies threatened to deprive them of this support.

Black uprisings of themselves were not seen by militarists as a direct challenge to authority. The militarist ideology does recognize this kind of threat, but there are prescribed responses to it, that is, punishment. The really serious problem to them was the managerial leadership which prevented the punitive action they thought necessary. Militarist ideology does not recognize a valid basis for Black solidarity or a problem of injustice in how Blacks are treated by the Navy. Militarists interpreted Black resistance as evidence of the danger of permissiveness. They believed punishment would have worked both as prevention and as control. Because they were not in complete charge they were saved a test of this. Failures at ship level could be blamed on their hands having been tied by higher managerial authority.

The Kitty Hawk fight and the Constellation strikes had deeply alarmed the CNO (Chief of Naval Operations) and his managerial group. These events encouraged them in their view of the absolute necessity of eliminating racism. Zumwalt publicly blamed his top officers for not taking vigorous actions to eradicate it. Militarist admirals counter-attacked. They asked for support from Congress and got a Congressional investigation. The Congressional committee found in the militarists favor and declared that the problem was permissiveness not racism. Various recommendations from a militarist point of view were made such as to tighten dress codes, lengthen training and restrict recruitment (House Armed Services Committee 1973). In spite of this report and the eventual incorporation of these measures into the Navy, the managerial officers continued to be in charge of personnel policy where they made decisions on promotions, retirement and discharge for officers as well as enlisted people.

The practical results of this internal fight in terms of navy-wide insecurity of NCO's and officers and the effects of this on their work must have been considerable. There were many complaints from officers on the ships. The basic cause of
these tensions was the resistance of enlisted people, but they produced this quite unintentionally. Authority was shaken not by withdrawal of subordinates' participation in the construction of authority, but by uncertainty about the basis of authority among those who were expected to exercise it. This was the indirect impact of the anti-war and Black movements on the naval hierarchy.

DIRECT EFFECTS OF ANTI-WAR TACTICS

The anti-war movement in the Navy probably added strength to the civilian peace movement but produced virtually no direct effects on navy participation in the war. The direct purpose of the campaign had been to stop the ships from bombing Vietnam. The anti-war movement simply assumed that individual and group challenges to authority in face-to-face situations would lead to immobilization of the ships as enlisted people either left the Navy or refused to cooperate. How was this to be brought about?

Quitting The Navy: Conscientious Objection

Some non-violent resisters refused on grounds of conscience to continue work in the Navy. By doing this with the use of church 'sanctuary' they also managed to get excellent publicity for the civilian peace movement and civilians became supportive of UA's and deserters as well as the sailors who resisted openly. But when anti-war sailors applied for conscientious objector discharges they also were following the paper procedures established by the military. As more people applied for this status and as court cases developed, the procedures were formalized and widely recognized by ship officers. The steps for getting conscientious objector status usually involved disobeying a specific order followed by a sentence of one or more months in the brig. The paper history of this entire application, order refusal and acceptance of punishment were all necessary for the final discharge to be authorized. The managerial leadership did not really object to these people leaving the Navy. The conscientious objectors were thus very obedient as they followed the forms. This legitimatized the navy procedures.

Quitting The Navy: Walking Away

Some servicemen went UA or deserted altogether. This may have been more of a practical problem for the Navy and a challenge to its legitimacy. Movement enlisted people and the ex-GI's in the movement debated these tactics. Going UA rather than taking sanctuary was encouraged in the campaign aboard the Coral Sea. Sanctuary offered good initial publicity but the later arrests and final disposal of the resisters could be manipulated for the Navy's benefit. This happened to the Kitty Hawk resisters. Navy negotiation convinced the movement people behind them to drop publicity in order to get the men discharged without extra punishment. Some of the movement people thought that large numbers of UA's might actually interfere with the ship's sailing; however, an excess of men are assigned to ships as part of military planning for battle losses and, in addition, extra personnel can be quickly sent from shore bases and other ships. Only if there were a widespread walk-out throughout the Navy could a ship be held up for lack of
personnel. Another problem with Unauthorized Absences is that reports of the number who are gone are questionable. It was impossible for the SOS people to know the total of UAs in the Coral Sea campaign. The Navy reported 35, they reported 250. Sailors on the ship would have certainly noticed if any of their buddies were missing, but they did not have communication networks across the ship to add this up to a perceived challenge to legitimacy of authority.

Quitting The Navy: Getting an Early Discharge

Other servicemen tried for an early discharge from the Navy. Discharges before a term of enlistment expires are allowed under certain conditions including conscientious objection. For instance, the Navy may give administrative discharges for physical or mental disabilities and "for the good of the service." Sometimes a sailor could qualify for a disability discharge or convince the Navy that he would be less harmful to them out than in. Doing this was rather tricky because certain transgressions could lead to a long jail sentence or a punitive discharge. Careful use of navy rules and knowledge of the Navy's options were necessary in order to avoid this. Anti-war groups regularly provided para-legal counseling to make it easier for enlisted people to confront the military and, hopefully, to get out. The counseling service was backed by consultation with civilian attorneys and was organized nationally with updating of materials, counselor training workshops and reports of recent court decisions. Counseling services were in continual demand, they were the most popular offering of the anti-war movement.

To some extent the counseling upheld the legitimacy of the Navy as counselors explained how to carefully follow regulations. As sailors learned their rights many became more 'uppity.' There was a proliferation of 'sea lawyers,' an increase in court cases and discharges. This alarmed the militarists, but not the managerial leaders, who themselves used discharges to get rid of political organizers and other troublesome persons. It did become necessary for the Navy to augment their legal personnel.

Attacking Military Law

In addition to helping servicemen to secure discharges, legal defense was provided to many anti-military GIs. The defense usually challenged the military for not following their own procedures or challenged the military code for denying the constitutional rights guaranteed to all citizens. When the Navy attempted to press charges as an object lesson to GIs, the movement made it difficult by skillful defense and sometimes by successfully appealing the case to civilian courts. However, in some cases, movement publicity and defense probably led to a more severe sentence than if the case had been defended quietly (Sherill 1970; Finn 1971).

The steady challenge to military practice and military law resulted in changes in practice and in the Uniform Code of Military Justice (the military law). Militarists were again alarmed by the court decisions that limited punishment and
procedures of charging and sentencing, but managerial officers simply worked out other ways to punish, for instance administrative procedures could accomplish the same result. The skillful use of "building a record" in a troublesome individual's personnel file could lead to a punitive discharge.

**Raising Consciousness**

The anti-war people capitalized on the widespread anti-lifer sentiments. They tried to build a stronger anti-military consciousness among enlisted people by publishing GI newspapers and establishing GI anti-military social centers. Although both militarists and the anti-war enlisted people reported an increase in anti-military consciousness together with a decline in observance of deference rituals in face-to-face interaction with officers, this did not interfere with navy authority. The militarists thought it would; however, and put more pressure on chiefs to get the sailors to act with proper humility and discipline.

No effort was made by the anti-war movement to gain the support of these chiefs. This may not have been a realistic possibility. In any case, it was not tried. Instead the anti-war tactics attempted to create opposition to them by face-to-face 'uppityness'; but this, apparently, did not affect the ability of the Navy to participate in bombing in the Vietnam War. What 'uppityness' did was to push senior NCO's toward stronger support of the militarist position in the inside battle between managers and militarists.

The managerial officers dealt with anti-war and anti-authority organizing on several levels. They avoided any acknowledgement of resistance or of libertarian criticism. The situation was referred to as "turbulence" in the fleet. The anti-war argument, not having been recognized, did not have to be dealt with. The anti-authority sentiments were expected to be reduced by the Z-Gram reforms, a quiet way of handling the problem; however, paper manipulation was the major tactic. As enlisted men or young officers were thought to be successful in organizing a ship, they would be transferred or discharged by paper authorizations without fuss and without risking the reaction of a solidary group. Through the control of channels of communication the administration could prevent any effective feedback to the resisters and isolate potential sources of trouble within the ships. In addition, personal counseling and police and secret service surveillance were increased.

**THE BLACK CHALLENGE TO AUTHORITY**

The Black movement presented a much more serious challenge to naval authority and particularly to managerial forms of control. It was much less readily handled by 'managerial' strategies than the anti-war movement. It took the form of a direct withdrawal of cooperation of a kind that the anti-war movement would have liked to achieve but never could. Black resistance did actually threaten naval authority directly and the Navy even found it necessary to slightly modify its plans for ship movement as a result. The fight on the *Kitty Hawk* was a situation temporarily beyond managerial control. A group of men actually fighting
throughout the ship had a potential for interrupting the bombing runs of the planes on the flight deck. The sit-down strike on the mess deck in the Connie and the later dockside strike in which the Blacks held their own muster and flag salute was even more challenging because of the solidarity of the group, and in the second strike because of their use of a parallel authority structure. Paper manipulation could not handle these immediate situations.

Furthermore the charge of racism in career administration was a direct denial of managerial legitimacy. The promise of career opportunity was not simply one among many rewards offered by the managerial system of control: it was its basis. The contingencies of career were what they manipulated. The promise to deliver job training or a career in the Navy on a basis of equal opportunity was their justification for authority. As Blacks openly and with much publicity insisted that they had not shared this opportunity, managerial legitimacy was brought into question. The measures available within the managerial system of authority were likely to confirm the Black critique of the Navy as discriminating against them. Direct measures of control of the kind that the militarist ideology would recommend tended to exacerbate the situation. A different response, to correct the situation directly by meeting Black demands for the elimination of racism in the Navy, was made difficult because of the entrenched racist position of the militarists. The managerial method of handling the situation was to promise, not to threaten, but later to divide the group. Solidarity was further weakened by separate trials and mild punishments. The latter tended to diffuse protest by the civilian Black community. But the potential for Black challenge to Navy authority continues.

RESISTANCE AND SOLIDARITY

Both Black and anti-war movements of enlisted people shared common problems of organizing. Enlisted people were dispersed throughout the ship as well as on different ships with little opportunity for contact. Communications were controlled by the naval authorities and there was continuous surveillance and active repression of potential trouble. In this situation, however, Black consensus was crucial to organization and coordinated action. Roberta Ash in her model of movement action has stressed the need to investigate the link between shared conditions and the emergence of collective actions (1972). Black individual experiences result in a shared interpretation common to members of the group. The effectiveness of the Black movement in coping with a highly controlled and repressive context can be understood in these terms. Black enlisted men already shared 'Black experience' as civilians. They shared the experience of having believed recruiters when they promised equal opportunity and they also had similar disillusionment as they found they were assigned to the least desirable jobs. When later on the ships the use of Black power gestures and Black haircuts were outlawed their indignation was shared. It was not necessary for them to talk to each other to find this out. Their recognition of their common situation included recognition of common understanding. As the stories of the shore fight of the Kitty Hawk crewmen and the punitive discharges of the Constellation reached Blacks, there was one response, anger. Neither long discussions, social gatherings, charismatic leadership nor persuasive argument were needed for action. The only question was what to do. On the Kitty Hawk even
this was not a question. The situation was perceived as attack, and self-defense was the common response.

What the Blacks did in both events was to create mutinous situations unprecedented in American naval history. The Navy was able to gain control but not until some hours and days of delicate management. I think this ability of Blacks to act together rested on the solidarity of common understanding as well as on shared identity. "Consciousness raising" occurs during recruitment to identity movements and may take considerable time, but once the new movement replaces the established ideology, the pieces fall into place. New situations can be correctly interpreted from the new view without consultation with other members.

This form of shared interpretation was not available to anti-war sailors. The anti-war position had not developed as part of a common civilian experience or even identical military experience. There were some shared elements of a positive expectation of life in the Navy followed by disappointment as military methods were encountered. The content of the expectations and the later re-orientation varied. There was a shared anti-military view but this was not interpreted as fundamental to their own life situations. The anti-war perspective centered on a concern for other people who were suffering and dying in Vietnam. Action was based on a recognition of complicity in harming them. Individual soul searching was necessary to produce this insight as well as imagination in making the connection between daily navy assignments and the bombing of people. This also required vicarious participation in others' oppression. All of this went on in individual imaginations rather than as a shared actual experience. Even though there was 'talking with each other' it couldn't approach the shared understanding available from common direct experience.

The anti-war sailors did not respond to attempts to block their organization with indignation and anger as did the Blacks. They were aware of some direct oppression but they felt this was as a consequence of their organizing and they didn't feel that it was extremely unfair. They protested their treatment and often took legal action on the basis of their constitutional rights, but they were not indignant nor surprised when the Navy made countermoves. There was even a minor sense of triumph because the Navy had noticed and been annoyed with their actions. People who had developed opposition to the war and were taking serious resistance actions had often experienced emotional anguish as they reached their decisions to act, but by the time of actual confrontation this was usually diffused. They were more likely to meet the events with a sense of tragedy than of anger.

To activate the anti-war resistance it had been necessary to do continual organizing, individual counseling and building of community support. The straw vote to keep the Constellation home included votes of twenty-two percent of the crew. The nine who took sanctuary were less than one percent of the crew. There were occasions when large numbers of anti-war protestors came together including meetings on the ship, but these did not develop into resistance. Even when arrests were made at the sanctuary churches there was not more than symbolic resistance. The anti-war appeal to conscience does not seem to be an adequate base for mass
resistance. It may prepare people for action as individuals on the basis of conscience, but spontaneous cooperative action can only be taken if there is social interaction continually supporting the mutuality of understanding. Such supportive interaction is not necessary for resistance based on common experience and shared identity.

CONCLUSION

In spite of an anti-authoritarian mood among enlisted people, individual resistance, absences without authorization, many applications for discharge and a large civilian peace movement, the anti-war campaigns were not successful in stopping or delaying carriers from returning to the Western Pacific theater and continuing their role in the bombing of Vietnam. Anti-war tactics that included use of legal and administrative channels did not challenge managerial control. The navy managers developed an administrative procedure for handling conscientious objectors which was effective in avoiding adverse publicity and at the same time was a means of removing potential sources of troublemakers.

A better understanding of the social construction of naval authority might have produced other, perhaps more effective, tactics. The anti-war protesters did not distinguish between the situation of enlistedmen on a modern aircraft carrier where their technical work was far removed from a battlefield and separated within the ship from face-to-face contact with superiors while working, and that of enlisted men in the infantry in Vietnam (Jay and Osnos 1971) or the long-ago sailors of the old navy (Melville 1850). The effect of resistance actions depends at least in part on the relevance of the specific tactic to the actual way that authority is constructed and maintained. As it was, the anti-war tactics probably tended to consolidate naval authority rather than produce more resistance.

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Warfare and welfare are usually assumed to serve contradictory ends and to be rooted in antithetical values, institutions and dynamics. In this essay, I propose to challenge this notion and to advance, instead, the thesis that, in spite of significant differences between them, warfare and welfare serve, nevertheless, identical and complementary functions, and are both rooted in identical societal values, institutions and dynamics.

As with other phenomena which are considered to be "social problems," such as poverty, crime, unemployment, inflation, mental illness, etc., but which are merely by-products of the "normal" workings of certain social systems, warfare and welfare can not be understood and overcome unless their philosophical and institutional roots and functions are first unraveled. This requires studying warfare and welfare from a holistic-evolutionary perspective which treats social, economic, political, psychological, and ideological dimensions of human societies as variables rather than as constants, settled once and for all. When warfare and welfare are explored in this fashion and are placed within the context of universal existential processes, the extent to which they tend to fit the internal logic of certain patterns of these processes should become discernible, and their presumed inevitability can then be de-mystified.

What, then, are the general functions of warfare and welfare, and from what philosophical roots and values do they derive? To explore these questions, I will focus first on welfare and then on warfare.

Welfare as a Societal Institution

In discussing welfare I am concerned primarily with formal, institutionalized practices as reflected in social policies and services of "welfare-states," whether the services are administered directly by units of government, or indirectly by government-chartered, "voluntary" agencies. I am only tangentially concerned with attitudes and acts of spontaneous and systematic cooperation and mutual aid within families and among friends, neighbors, and members of communities. There is historical and philosophical continuity and interaction between cooperation and mutual aid, and welfare-state policies and services. However

for purposes of the present exploration, I am concerned with aspects of welfare state policies and services which differ, in a fundamental sense, from acts of cooperation and mutual aid. For these differences contain the clues to the philosophical roots and societal functions of welfare as an institution.

Acts of spontaneous and systematic cooperation and mutual aid represent transactions among individuals and groups of essentially equal social, economic and political standing. They derive from a sense of mutual caring and responsibility, a shared human and community identity, common perceptions of interests, and value positions tending toward equality, liberty, self-reliance, cooperation, and collectivity orientation. Implicit in these acts is respect for the autonomy and individuality of all those involved, helpers and helped alike. The function of spontaneous and systematic cooperation and mutual aid is to compensate individuals for temporary or extended handicaps or disadvantageous conditions inherent in certain stages of the life process, or caused by natural phenomena and by the vicissitudes of living. The aim of such cooperation and mutual aid is to assure normalization of circumstances and fullest possible integration and participation in community life of those affected by adverse circumstances.

Policies and services of welfare-states, on the other hand, involve usually transactions among individuals and groups of essentially unequal social, economic, and political standing. While these services can be, and often are, administered in a humane fashion, and while they can, and often do, improve the circumstances of deprived and disadvantaged individuals and groups, their underlying function is, nevertheless, to serve as a balance-wheel for social orders based on injustice, privilege, force and structural violence. The values implicit in, and promoted by, welfare-state policies and services are inequality, domination, competition, and self-orientation. To support these assertions I will first clarify my understanding of the terms "welfare state" and "welfare," and will then sketch the evolution, dynamics, and social philosophy of welfare states. Welfare states are states in which:

1. the majority of the population are excluded from free access to, and use of, natural and human-created, productive resources;
2. such access and use are controlled by a small segment of the population who own productive resources, and/or by a state bureaucracy on behalf of the "people-as-owners;"
3. the majority of the population can not be self-reliant through, and self-directing at, work since they depend on "employment" by private and/or public owners and controllers of productive resources who also determine most aspects of production and work;

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4. a system has been instituted for distribution, in kind or through money, of "essential" goods and services to "unemployed" or otherwise needy segments of the population, and for allocation of work roles under specified circumstances.

Goods and services distributed, and work roles allocated, in accordance with institutionalized arrangements of welfare states constitute the "welfare" portion of the provision system of these states. Welfare provisions vary widely among welfare states at any point in time, and over time within each welfare state, in terms of type and scope, circumstances of eligibility, and characteristics of eligible segments of populations.

Modern welfare states vary also in economic and political institutions and philosophies. They include oligopoly-capitalist democracies such as the United States, mixed capitalist-socialist democracies such as western and northern European states, and state-monopoly-capitalist, socialist states such as the Soviet Union and certain eastern European states. A common characteristic of modern welfare states, irrespective of economic and political institutions and philosophies, is the emergence of large, hierarchically structured bureaucracies who administer the welfare services of the state and who regulate the access of dependent individuals and groups to needed provisions, services and/or work roles. People in welfare states tend to develop a sense of dependence and insecurity in relation to the work context and to welfare services. Also, since the institutions and philosophy of welfare states sanction and promote manifold inequalities among individuals and groups in society, human relations tend to be competitive, individuals and groups act selfishly, and the existential milieu is alienating and not conducive to human self-actualization.

Modern welfare states tend to be industrialized, urbanized and secular. They are often labeled "developed." However, while industrialization, urbanization, secularization, and "development" have been important factors in the evolution of many modern welfare states, they are not essential aspects. Different variants of welfare states predate those processes and many contemporary welfare states rank low on some or all these dimensions. It seems that the only essential aspects of welfare state societies are dispossession and separation of most people from productive resources, legitimation of such expropriation and separation as "law and order" by the state, and institutionalization of compensatory and control mechanisms by the state to protect the status-quo and, simultaneously, to assure the survival of a dependent, but conforming, population.
The Evolution of Welfare States

All social orders are creations of the human mind and of human actions, or rather of the thoughts and actions of countless humans communicating and interacting through space and time. Social orders emerge through the gradual institutionalization of collective responses to existential imperatives intrinsic to the human drive to survive in natural settings which are always characterized by relative scarcities of life-sustaining resources, and which always require human work to secure such resources. Essentially then, different social orders are different solutions to the same existential problems, namely, to satisfy the biological, psychological, and social needs of their members. Societies can, therefore, be compared and evaluated in terms of the extent to which they succeed or fail to satisfy these needs.

There are four related existential domains for which social orders must evolve institutional structures and dynamics to assure their continuity and viability: management of resources, organization of work and production, distribution of rights, and governance. Parallel to their institutional structures, social orders require a "symbolic universe" which interprets, justifies and sustains these institutions, shapes the consciousness of people, and also interprets nature, the supernatural, the concept of human nature, perceptions of interests and value positions relevant to the institutional order. The legitimation of the social order, socialization into it, and social control of individuals living in its orbit, are the result of mutually reinforcing interactions of a society's "material" institutions and "symbolic universe".

Before describing the emergence of institutionalized welfare and the evolution of the welfare-state, some observations are indicated on the notion of self-reliance. Self-reliance is the opposite of dependence and thus the real antidote of welfare, since dependence is the condition which leads inevitably to the institutionalization of welfare measures. The self-reliance of individuals and of human groups is possible when they are in a position to satisfy their needs by producing for themselves life-sustaining and life-enhancing resources. In order to produce needed resources, individuals and groups must have free access to, and free use of, natural resources such as land, water, air, sunlight, minerals, wildlife, vegetation, energy, and human-created resources such as tools, scientific knowledge, technology and skills, for all production involves bringing together natural resources, human-created resources, and human capacities. Self-reliance then requires freedom to bring these components together in ever new combinations.

It is important to note that self-reliance does not require that individuals or groups produce everything needed for their existence, for self-reliance is not the same as self-sufficiency or autarky. However
self-reliance is predicated upon exchanges among different individuals and groups of their respective products on fair, non-exploitative, flexibly-equalitarian terms. Rough measures for fair exchanges are the equivalence of efforts invested in products, the importance of products in terms of a hierarchy of human needs, and the degree of scarcity of natural resources used in production.

Institutionalized welfare measures commonly associated with the welfare state are rooted in societal processes, structures and dynamics which first undermined, and eventually prevented altogether, opportunities for genuine independence and self-reliance on the part of major segments of populations. The evolutionary process leading to this outcome will now be sketched.

The first and most fundamental step in the fateful process which eventually destroyed opportunities for self-reliance for the majority of individuals in many human groups, and which then led via charity to the welfare state, was the establishment by individuals of claims to exclusive control over territories and natural resources on these. This step was also the beginning of a process leading to warfare and the warfare state. Appropriations for use by one individual and his family was one feasible, and sensible, approach to solving the issues of resource management and provision during early stages of human evolution. The purpose of this solution was to assure owners and their relations a steady flow of life-sustaining, needs-satisfying provisions, and thus to reduce existential insecurity. This choice, at the dawn of human history, became gradually the root of the powerful institution, ideology and dynamics of exclusive property rights, the archetype and core of many ancient and modern societies.

The choice of individual appropriation of life-sustaining resources was by no means inevitable, nor is it inherent in human nature as is often erroneously assumed. There is ample evidence throughout history, all over the world, that many human groups created social orders using an opposite principle, according to which life-sustaining resources of nature should not be appropriated by individuals for exclusive use and control, but should be freely available for use by all members of a group to sustain and enhance everyone's existence. Hindsight suggests that this egalitarian, cooperative, collectivity-oriented approach to solving issues of resource management and provision constituted a far more sophisticated choice than appropriation for exclusive individual use of resources especially when these alternative approaches are compared and evaluated in terms of the extent to which human needs are satisfied throughout a population, and in terms of efficient use of scarce resources.
The principle of private property as a basis for individual security has had significant institutional, ideological, psychological, and behavioral consequences for human groups who evolved their social systems around that principle. Since owning land and other natural and human-created resources was considered desirable, owning more such property came to be considered even more desirable. This attitude, and actions based on it, led to efforts to increase one's holdings, to the emergence of an acquisitive, selfish, and competitive mentality, and to human relations shaped by these practices and mentality. As long as enough resources were available for everyone to appropriate a sufficient share to assure his existence, this system worked adequately. However, when all available resources had been appropriated, the mentality and dynamics of acquisitiveness and competition caused people to try to increase their holdings by taking from others by force and cunning.

As the holdings of some people increased while those of others decreased, a new, serious problem emerged: Who would work with the natural resources to assure the continuous production of needed provisions? Up to that stage in evolution everyone had worked with his own resources preserving thus his independence and self-reliance. Yet, as the holdings of some individuals increased, they could no longer put them to effective use, working by themselves. Besides, there was also the problem of guarding and defending the holdings amassed in competition with others who constituted an ever present threat, especially since their own holdings were no longer large enough to sustain their existence through work. One ingenious solution to these complementary dilemmas seems to have been to induce the losers in the competition for property to work on, and to guard, the property of the winners. In this way, additional human capacities would be available to the owners of property, while the owners, in turn, provided work opportunities and a limited share of life-sustaining products to those who had lost control of sufficient natural and human-created resources, to sustain themselves, and who had consequently nothing left but their own human capacities. This arrangement became the second major step on the road to dependence and welfare, for it gradually accomplished the complete structural separation of major segments of the population from the real sources of genuine freedom, independence, self-reliance, and self-determination through self-directed work, namely equal access to, and use of, productive natural and human-created resources and facilities.

In passing, mention should be made here of an early variation on the themes of increasing property holdings and recruiting a willing work force from among expropriated segments of the population. This variation was the organization of expeditions for the purpose of expanding control over territories and resources beyond the domain of one's own group and recruiting by force an enslaved work force from among the inhabitants of conquered lands; that is, institutionalized warfare emerged.
An essential next step on the road to the welfare-state were efforts to condition and control the property-less and severely deprived masses of slaves and workers on whose work everyone, including the property owners, depended for survival. The solution to this difficult problem was found in hierarchical organization of work and authority which involved a fine gradation of privilege and power filtered down to workers as inducement for loyalty to their masters, the owners of property. This system resulted in multiple divisions of the work force into competing vertical segments and horizontal strata which received different material and symbolic rewards and power, exercised different levels of authority, and developed different interests, life-styles, aspirations, motivations, reference groups and loyalties.

One further important mechanism for solving problems of conditioning and controlling the work force was to withhold opportunities for work and survival from a sizable segment of the work force, except in times of war. The ever present prospect of unemployment and its disastrous existential consequences posed a constant threat, especially to the lowest layers of the work force, those who were expected to perform the least desirable work. That threat, and the frequent experience of actual unemployment, developed not only into a major mechanism for disciplining the work force but also for keeping the shares of workers in the aggregate product of their work relatively low, ensuring thus the continuation of wealth accumulation on the part of owners.

The developments sketched here schematically in an oversimplified manner have taken thousands of years. They were far from smooth and were accompanied by fierce conflicts and struggles within and among various human groups. Empirical evidence of the stages mentioned in this sketch can be found throughout the history of many civilizations all over the globe. However, with time a societal pattern began to emerge with which we are now very familiar, a social order in which the ownership and control of natural and human-created wealth are concentrated in the hands of a small segment of the population while the rest of the people are essentially deprived of productive resources except for their human capacities which, in the case of most of them are usually not fully developed. Those who own no property can not be self-reliant through self-directed work, the fruits of which they may enjoy proudly. They are forced to depend for their existence on work opportunities provided by property owners on terms that suit the owners' interests to further increase their wealth and control through profit-generating, rather than needs-satisfying, use of productive resources. Furthermore, the propertyless work force continues to be divided into countless layers and interest groups through differential rewards, opportunities, and penalties built into the system, and they are forced to compete among themselves to obtain the rewards and avoid the penalties. Sex, race, ethnicity, nationality, age, formal education, certification, and licensing are all used to increase the internal divisions of the work force, and to prevent its unification and organization around its under-
lying, true existential interest: to liberate the productive
resources and facilities in order to achieve self-reliance,
freedom and self-determination through self-directed work.

Most now existing social orders have come a long way from
the earliest steps of appropriation of territories and natural
resources. They evolved through many social, cultural, scientific,
and technological stages, from a gathering and hunting economy to
agriculture and industry, and from slavery to serfdom and wage-
labor. However the basic organizing principle of property rights
and relations has remained relatively constant as the core of the
changing social-economic orders. Those who managed to own and
control productive resources appropriate for the time and develop-
mental stage of their societies gained usually also political
influence and power. This, in turn, enabled them to assure the
legitimacy of the established divisions of wealth, division of
labor and organization of production, and distribution of goods,
services, civil and political rights, and social recognition and
prestige. Those who gained political influence and power also
created the concept, the institution and the ideology of the state,
the central function of which became to assure and protect the
status-quo of privilege, injustice, inequality, domination and
exploitation in every sphere of life, which had emerged over
hundreds of generations. The state defined the status-quo as
"law and order" and thus legitimated the results of ages of law-
lessness and disorder, injustice, force, violence, and cunning.
The state was committed to maintain and defend the established
order by all possible and necessary means, including covert and
overt force, against any attempt to bring about significant
changes in the prevailing distributional patterns, policies, and
processes.

Certain aspects of the "symbolic universe" and of the conscious-
ness and psychology of people, which evolved in interaction with
the institutional developments sketched above, should now be noted.
The emerging social orders came to be thought of as "natural" and
as the only "right" orders. Eventually they were interpreted as
the "will of God," and their rulers were believed to hold office
"by the grace of God." Priesthoods, at first hesitatingly, and
later enthusiastically, bestowed their blessings and full support
on established orders and affirmed the sanctity of private property
and its guardian, the state, in spite of contrary prophetic messages
in the Scriptures and other sacred sources.

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Humans were thought to be unique, at the peak of nature, apart from the rest of nature rather than harmoniously integrated into it, nature's masters designated by God. These notions led in time to an exploitative attitude toward natural resources, and to mindless waste and destruction. Human nature was thought to be evil, and, indeed, humans displayed evil attitudes toward one another, and tended not to trust others. Furthermore, humans came to be thought of as unequal in worth and as entitled to different rights, depending on the amount of property and power they managed to acquire. Success in the acquisitive drive was interpreted as indication of superior qualities, as evidence of virtue and of God's blessing, and hence, as a basis for social recognition and prestige. Conversely, failure in the acquisitive drive was interpreted as due to individual shortcomings, to sinful ways, to God's condemnation and rejection, and, hence, a basis for societal contempt, disapproval and rejection.

Life itself came to be viewed as a permanent contest in a zero-sum game, with everyone struggling "to get a larger piece of a finite pie." People developed selfish, inegalitarian and competitive attitudes toward one another and a jungle mentality of mutual fear, suspicion, and mistrust, envy and jealousy. They came to view themselves as subjects and everyone else as potential objects to be used and exploited. They manipulated one another pragmatically, in accordance with "the rules of the game" for their individual ends. They related to one another through formal roles rather than as whole, feeling and caring human beings. They became lonely, isolated and alienated. To compensate for their emotional deprivations they escaped into substitute gratifications, illusions, drugs, alcohol, and mental ills.

Attitudes toward work came to reflect the emerging institutional contradictions. Originally, work was respected as an important source of human wealth and as the means for human survival and for the enhancement of the quality of life. There was also pride in a well executed job and the resulting product, and enjoyment of the fruits of their labor. These original and functional attitudes towards work, the original work ethic, were destroyed when people were expropriated, their access to resources and productive facilities was subjected to control by others, direction of their work was removed from them, and products were taken away from the producers, in short, when work became exploitative. These developments caused work to be viewed as an unavoidable chore and evil. The joy of creativity had gone out of it. Besides when owners of wealth began to withdraw from work and to develop a cult of leisure and an ethic of work avoidance, according to which engaging in physical labor was debasing and demeaning of the person, negative attitudes toward work began to permeate the consciousness of the population. Henceforth,
people tried to work as little as possible and to shift work onto others, especially when it was intrinsically unpleasant and dangerous. Gradually also, in order to increase output, profit, and efficiency measured by economic criteria only, most work processes were structured in a manner that undermined the possibility of intrinsic gratification. Work became boring, mind-killing, and offensive to the senses. Using the worker's intellect at work became counterproductive, an obstacle to speed and efficiency. Furthermore, work took place within the general competitive context of the struggle for survival and advancement and within hierarchically structured huge bureaucracies. This too added to the oppressive experience of work and increased alienation from work and frustration from the unrewarding human relations of most work places.

Clearly, institutional developments had resulted in massive disincentives to work. To counteract these trends a work-ethic had to be resurrected on an illusionary base. The only real work incentive given the institutional reality and ideological developments, was the fear of starvation. To this a myth had to be added, according to which hard work was a direct road to success and wealth as well as an indirect road to salvation, for after all, work was "sacred". With the aid of this myth the commitment to work on the part of those who had to work was to be shored up. There was enough truth in this myth to render it believable in spite of overwhelming contrary evidence. And so the myth continued to survive and to sustain exploitative work processes of a production system where labor, a function of humans, is employed by capital—lifeless matter, in the interest of the owners of capital. This production system is a far cry from a mode of production fitting the original work-ethic, a system where whole humans freely employ resources to advance their existential interests.

Having sketched the institutional evolution and the symbolic universe of social systems organized around privately owned and controlled productive resources and facilities, the functions of institutionalized welfare policies and services in such societies can now be spelled out. Essentially, institutionalized welfare fits into such social systems as a safety-valve or balance wheel. It constitutes an effective and even "efficient" line of last defense which can be adjusted flexibly to changing circumstances and to recurrent threats to the systems stability.*

Social orders fitting more or less the dynamics discussed here have caused throughout their evolution, and continue to cause at present, immense suffering of many millions of propertyless and income-less human beings. When people have no wealth and when

their income ceases, or is insufficient to sustain a minimal existence because of age, illness, accidents, death of bread-winners, unemployment, low wages, lack of education and skills, discriminatory practices, etc., all of which are quite "normal" occurrences in these societies, their very survival would be threatened, unless they received voluntary aid from relatives, peers, neighbors, and other caring individuals, or unless some formal institutional mechanisms are established to assist them. No doubt institutionalized charity and welfare are rooted partly in the neighborly, humanistic response to suffering, in a common human identity, in a collective sense of guilt, and in a desire to stop suffering and to satisfy human needs. Yet these humanistic elements were never strong enough to bring about an open challenge to the systemic roots and forces which render dependency and its correlates and consequences inevitable.

Yet institutionalized welfare does not merely refrain from confronting and challenging the structural obstacles to self-reliance and human liberation which are inherent in the social orders of welfare states. Being themselves created and maintained by these social orders, welfare institutions and their policies and services aid in many ways in the preservation of these social orders and their ideologies. A central function performed by the welfare system is the pacification of suffering and oppressed groups during periods of potential rebellion, a cooling off of potentially explosive moods. No doubt, were the entire welfare system to cease to function tomorrow, those now dependent upon it for sustenance and survival could not be stopped from rebelling and from severely threatening the prevailing social order. Clearly then, by assuring through the welfare system an utterly inadequate mode of existence for masses of deprived individuals and groups in the population, the privileged segments of welfare-states succeed to assure the maintenance of the existing inegalitarian order at relatively little cost.

Further contributions which the welfare system makes to maintenance of the prevailing social order of welfare states are the socialization and control of marginal segments of the work force. These people are blamed through the ideology of the welfare system for their failure to be self-supporting and self-reliant in a context which is structured to prevent them from ever becoming self-supporting and self-reliant. They receive some minimal aid from the welfare system in a dehumanizing manner that tends to undermine their self respect. That aid is kept systematically below the level of the lowest going wages, and as soon as some undesirable jobs become available assistance is withdrawn and people are forced back into the marginal positions of the productive system. This kind of

assistance is actually an indirect subsidy to businesses who depend on this marginal work force. Frequently, also, the welfare system provides more direct subsidies to businesses, through tax-cuts and wage support for "manpower" training programs, in accordance with a theory according to which benefits would "trickle down" to poor segments of the population from stimulation of business activity and greater profits.

The controls used to discipline the marginal segments of the work force reach, however, far beyond those directly affected. Segments of the work force slightly above these marginal segments live under the constant threat of being pulled down to the welfare level unless they work diligently at their jobs. The treatment of those receiving welfare is designed to deter those slightly better off from ever applying for welfare and to differentiate themselves in any possible way from welfare recipients. The only way to stay off welfare and off unemployment compensation is to hold on tightly to available jobs, however frustrating these jobs might be.

It may be noted in support of the characterization of institutionalized welfare as serving primarily system-maintenance functions that even progressive proposals for welfare reform such as massive income re-distribution do not challenge the principle of private ownership and control of productive resources, which is the central obstacle to human liberation and to the establishment of an egalitarian social order in which alone people can regain self-reliance and self-determination. Further evidence comes from welfare states with the most liberal welfare policies and services such as the Scandinavian countries. These societies too, maintain privileged segments within their populations and although the circumstances of the non-privileged segments tend to be far more tolerable than in less developed welfare states, the fundamental issues of human liberation, namely, free access to productive resources, self-reliance, and equality of rights to free and full-development and self-actualization through self-directed work, remain essentially unresolved.

Summing up the discussion of institutionalized welfare in the context of welfare states, we found that the key institutions of human existence in welfare-state societies function in a manner which assures privileged conditions in all spheres of life for a small segment of the population at the top of a finely graded pyramidal social structure, and enforced dependence and severe deprivation for a fairly large segment of the population at the bottom of the pyramid. People between the group on top and that at the bottom find themselves in a continuous competitive struggle to move upward and to avoid being pushed downward.
The severe deprivation experienced by those at the bottom has often been interpreted as violence inherent in the very structure of the system, a form of violence that does not destroy life with a single blow, but which obstructs the full and free development of the life potential of many millions of people through the "normal" processes of the social order. Many minds and souls are slowly being killed as one of the externalities of the workings of welfare-states. Moreover, not only the most severely deprived segments suffer from this "violence of peace". The whole order seems to be maintained in balance, and everyone's development seems inhibited, by ever present latent force and by ideological indoctrination. It is highly unlikely that human beings would otherwise submit themselves voluntarily to conditions of severe injustice which prevent the full actualization of everyone's human potential.

The policies and services of institutionalized welfare in the welfare state were shown to fit into this system like a hand fits into a glove. Welfare is an essential component of a broad range of mechanisms through which the inegalitarian, oppressive and covertly violent social orders of welfare states pacify, condition, and control their populations, and defend and perpetuate their social systems. Clearly, these systems could not survive without elaborate defenses. The conclusion is inevitable: a central function of institutionalized welfare is the defense of privilege, the perpetuation of dependence and injustice, and the prevention of genuine self-reliance. Its roots are a philosophy, consciousness, values and dynamics of inequality, acquisitiveness, selfishness, domination and competition.

Warfare as a Societal Process

While welfare tends to destroy human life potential slowly and somewhat covertly, warfare employs overt, destructive force and violence for the same objectives, the attainment and defense of privilege at home and abroad. Warfare, although its dynamics and ideology are not less complex and contradictory than those of welfare, may nevertheless be less difficult to comprehend, since its roots, functions, and values are usually less disguised.

As indicated, when discussing the evolution of the welfare-state, claims to exclusive ownership and control of territories and natural resources are likely to have been first steps on a course that has often led to warfare. Such claims by individuals and groups of humans imply the establishment of a privileged position in relation to others. If others respect such claims, and if similar claims by others are also respected, no conflict leading to warfare need arise, especially if every group manages to sustain its existence on the territory it claimed, and if exchanges of different goods and raw materials take place among different groups on fair, egalitarian terms.
History suggests, however, that relations among humans all over the globe were frequently defined and perceived in conflict terms and many groups permitted their conflicts to erupt into "cold" and "hot" warfare, rather than settle them by attempting to redefine the context in common human interest terms.

Conflicts that lead to warfare were always related to efforts to defend or increase existing privileges with respect to control over territories or natural and human resources, to establish such new privileges, or to challenge privileges and claims established previously by other groups. It seems that the declared causes of warfare were hardly ever valid in an objective, absolute sense. Rarely if ever, was warfare the only available course toward survival and enhancement of the quality of life for the groups involved. However, in the subjective perception of those involved warfare usually was viewed as the only alternative open to them.

Warfare is more likely to be initiated by human groups who developed internally in accordance with inegalitarian and acquisitive institutional patterns and values, than by egalitarian and cooperative societies. Warfare in such cases is merely an extension outward of the behavioral patterns and the mentality that shapes internal human relations and institutions. Inegalitarian, acquisitive groups, as we have seen, are divided and polarized internally and will often engage in internal "civil" wars. Extrapolating the conflict model of human relations, and of the life context in general, unto external relations appears to them perfectly logical and natural. When those in power in such groups present an external war as being in the interest of the whole group, or in the "national interest," they are consciously or unconsciously distorting reality. While they may believe their own claims, warfare is unlikely to ever be in the true existential interest of those who are induced or forced to do the actual fighting. Those who do derive advantages from warfare are less likely to do the actual fighting. For the only ones who tend to come out of warfare with advantages and increased privileges are rulers, planners, commanders, providers of war supplies, and owners of productive resources. The fighting men, the ones who take the risks and losses, are usually members of propertyless groups who also tend to be deprived and oppressed during "peaceful" periods at home. External warfare may also be used to deflect public consciousness from internal grievances and from intense internal conflicts between small, powerful, dominant elites, and the rest of the population. At such times, phrases like "national security" and "national interest" become important codewords and myths. Illusions of "national unity" are fostered and people's minds become confused as to the real dynamics of the situation. Appeals to nationalism prior to and during times of war, usually succeed to interrupt efforts concerned with real internal problems of a population, partly, also because warfare tends to eliminate unemployment and thus can create illusions of prosperity.
Presumed threats to the national security and suspicion of foreign secret agents, and of foreign enemies, are also handy excuses for secret, and, at times, open repressive measures at home, and for equating internal critics and opponents with foreign enemies which makes it more easy to deal with them as enemies.

This brief discussion of selected aspects of warfare suggests that it is always related to the creation, maintenance and protection of privilege, occasionally for an entire group, but usually for the privileged segments of groups organized on inegalitarian, acquisitive principles, and guided by conflict and zero-sum models of human relations and human existence. Such human groups are usually organized as formal states, and they are thus the very same social systems we encountered under the label "welfare-states" in the preceding discussion. Clearly, warfare serves identical and complementary ends to welfare and both derive from the same roots, dynamics, values and ideology. Both have also domestic and foreign versions. In the case of welfare, the foreign version is called "foreign aid" which comes never without strings, the strings being protection of the selfish interests of the donors and their privileged circumstances. In the case of warfare, the domestic version is forceful repression of rebellious groups and civil wars, which are intended to maintain the status-quo of privilege at home.

Warfare and welfare also interact in many ways and thus reinforce each other as they pursue their common objectives, at times jointly, at other times separately. It is perhaps not mere coincidence that the warfare establishment and the welfare establishment operate through similarly structured bureaucracies, that they tend to use a similar vocabulary, e.g. "target populations," "intervention strategies," "war on poverty," etc. and that top officials will move in the United States, a leading example of the warfare-welfare state, from the Department of State, to the Department of Defense, and from there to the Department of Health, Education and Welfare and finally to the Department of Justice, the one that defines institutionalized injustice as the "law of the land".

The warfare and welfare state is designed to perpetuate inequality and injustice among humans at home, and among the peoples of the world abroad. It employs a multi-dimensional approach to defend the privileged circumstances and the corresponding power relations which emerged over generations through systematic elaborations on the simple principle of private ownership and control of scarce productive resources.

Epilogue

What suggestions can be derived on the basis of this depressing analysis of the roots, functions, dynamics, values, and ideology of the warfare and welfare state?
Problems of welfare can not be fully comprehended, nor overcome effectively, within the context of currently dominant conceptions of the welfare state which treat the fundamental organizing principles of the social order as constants. Welfare state reforms however comprehensive, merely introduce new variations on the underlying theme of managing dependence and preventing genuine self-reliance. Such reforms can not solve the fundamental problems, although they may ameliorate deprivation and are thus desirable in these limited terms.

Real solutions to welfare must begin with a radical redefinition of the issues, goals and values. Dependence must be related to its causes in the manner productive resources are now owned and controlled, work and production are organized, rights and responsibilities are distributed, and decisions are made and implemented. There is only one solution to the welfare state: to abolish its institutionalized version by liberating productive resources and assuring access to these resources to all humans on equal terms so that they may become free, independent, productive, and self-reliant citizens of self-directing, democratic and cooperative communities.

Problems of warfare too, cannot be overcome without fundamental redefinitions of the issues. Here too, amelioration that moves toward disarmament or reduction of war threats is desirable, but is only a temporary answer. Issues of warfare cannot be solved by degrees but only by qualitative changes. Like in the case of the welfare state, the underlying causes must be confronted and eliminated. The causes were identified as competitive pursuit of privilege at home and abroad. Hence the answer is the elimination of all privileges and equalization of access to the world's resources for all the world's people within a context that stresses the underlying common existential interests of all humans everywhere. Not surprisingly, the solutions to warfare and welfare are identical since their roots, functions, dynamics, and values were found to be identical.

Finally, it seems that solutions to issues of warfare and welfare require the gradual transformation of the welfare state and its alter-self, the warfare state, since states are the guarantors of privilege and injustice. The competing welfare-warfare states which now dominate the world with disastrous consequences for the quality of life of all humans, including the most privileged segments, and which threaten the chances of survival of humankind, will have to be transformed into a coordinated, egalitarian, cooperative federation.
of self-reliant, free communities, each directing its own affairs and life-style through genuine democratic processes, each guaranteeing to its members equality of rights and responsibilities, and all participating in exchanges of raw materials and human-created goods and knowledge on fair, egalitarian terms.*

These then are the logical conclusions of reasoned analysis. Transforming this logic into new existential possibilities, in spite of overwhelming odds, is the crucial task for political practice by humanistic movements committed to genuine liberation and self-actualization for humans everywhere.

A DISARMED WORLD: PROBLEMS IN IMAGING THE FUTURE

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One of the major handicaps to scholars, activists and would-be policy makers associated with the post-World War II peace research and peace action movements has been the inability to construct coherent and believable images of a post-military-industrial United States society. Even at the height of the economics of disarmament studies in the 1960s the most that economists could demonstrate was that disarmament could take place without severe economic dislocations, and that resources released from arms could be used for improving the global standard of living. The new peace research movement was also producing books in the sixties showing that it was possible to replace a technology of warmaking with a technology of peacemaking, but what the new society would look like, no one could spell out. A week-long seminar on Images of a Disarmed World held in Denmark in the summer of 1963 generated a great deal of analysis by the socialist and nonsocialist economists participating, but not one word about what the future would look like. This was typical of such seminars in that decade.

If any intellectual discipline today could contribute to imaging a disarmed world one would expect that the new field of future studies would do this. Yet futurists as a group, with two important exceptions, have to date failed signally to come up with such images. The exceptions are the World Order Models Project of the Institute of World Order, which includes disarmament as one of the values to be incorporated in its models of preferred future worlds and the futurists associated with the international peace research movement. These scholars represent a specialized branch, however, rather than the mainstream, of futurists. The general failure of futurists to deal with disarmament is to a considerable extent because their techniques involve projections based on past trends in a select class of variables, from which disarmament is excluded. When futurists whose expertise is in weaponry provide insight into future handling of world security systems, the tendency is to predict weapons breakthroughs rather than disarmament proposals.

It is ironic that public debate on two major policy issues in the United States today: (1) whether to aim for a no-growth economy and (2) whether to go all-out in the development of nuclear power sources, hardly touches on one major U.S. energy constraint: military commandeering of fuel sources. The energy that goes into protesting civilian nuclear energy seems disproportionate to the paucity of protest over nuclear weapons. Only when hitherto non-nuclear states want nuclear plants is concern expressed over military uses of nuclear energy.

Given the general lack of discussion of arms policy, public debate on alternative futures for the year 2010 seems woefully incomplete. The resolution proposed recently at the June 1976 national mayor's conference suggesting that national arms expenditures be reduced and the resulting savings be channeled as aid to U.S. cities...
as a better investment in national security than weaponry, may foreshadow more realistic imaging of alternative futures on the part of policy makers in the future. On the whole, however, since technological futurists can only visualize a future world based on a power structure substantially similar to that of today, they leave armament levels carefully to one side.

In a sense, American society is trapped by its own rhetoric at this point in history, since we have dealt with the pain of the numerous contemporary social upheavals by talking a great deal about alternative futures. In practice, few persons can imagine anything between the present way of life and catastrophe. The "alternative futures" explored turn out to be elaborations of present ways of life based on a series of miraculously appearing technological breakthroughs. The other type of alternative future, involving recycling, the simple life and a back-to-the-land movement, certainly has some serious exponents, but more people like to read about it than do it. A well-thought out concept of disarmament, either as a process or as a social condition, does not accompany any of these alternative future images.

Does it matter whether we can create mental constructs of a disarmed world or not? Is it not enough that we develop some sense of being in touch with ameliorative processes and then work ahead realistically with one-year, two-year and five-year plans? Is not this the way social "evolution" actually works? The answer to this question depends on one's reading of history.

The reading of history given by the Dutch sociologist Fred Polak, one of the first major twentieth century futurists, tells us that over the millennia those societies have flourished that have generated visions of something quite different than the immediately experienced reality. These visions have historically been subject to a process of social selection that leaves the field to certain images having a powerful capacity for social resonance. These images act as generators of social energy and actually draw societies toward their realization. In the macrohistorical Image of the Future, Polak shows how each great civilization of the past has been shaped by resonating images of the future that preceded it. In bringing us to the twentieth century, Polak pictures a decline in the West of that imaging capacity through the very realization of the potent images of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment. Planning, the socialist world's gift to this century, has squeezed out the visioning process and we are left with moment-ridden societies. It is nevertheless not too late, says Polak, to regain the visioning capacity by recognizing what we have lost and consciously cultivating it again.

We might well ask, why bother to reconstitute the visioning capacity if it is only to lead us anew to where Enlightenment visions have already brought us? A critique of past imaging indicates that the bulk of past images seem to present themselves in the language of conquest: conquest of nature, of territories, of people, of ideas. We have experienced a great deal of conquest imagery, in our learning of history, in the sequence of conquest empires rising in the lands bordering the Mediterranean and in Asian lands over the last five millennia, and more recently in Europe and the Americas. Any history book provides a wealth of materia
on kings and kingdoms, of wars of expansion, of technologies of resource utilization that accompanied them, and technologies of social organization that made the administration of new territories possible.

What if the last wave of conquest imaging that led to the industrial revolution should turn out to be an evolutionary dead end? Are all images of the future conquest images, or only some of them? Pessimists would say that we have two alternative dead ends ahead: destruction or decay. Hazel Henderson writes of the danger that the end-game of industrialism might be the condition of the entropy state,

a society at the stage when complexity and interdependence have reached such unmanageable proportions that the transaction costs which are generated equal or exceed its productive capabilities. In a manner analogous to physical systems, the society winds down of its own weight and the proportion of its gross national product that must be spent in mediating conflicts, controlling crime, underwriting the social costs generated by the "externalities" of production and consumption, providing ever more comprehensive bureaucratic coordination, and generally trying to maintain "social homeostasis," begins to grow exponentially. 10

Such a society must eventually peter out from exhaustion of all social and physical resources. Most of the ameliorative technologies produced to deal with contemporary American problems are thought likely to hasten the entropy state.

Yet many of us will intuitively reject the notion that industrialized societies are at a dead end. This intuitive rejection of the entropy state concept is based on something more profound than a denial of the problem of running out of fossil fuels. We have lived with concepts of progress and development and the power of specialization and differentiation for so long—they can't be simply erased. The intuition that there are human continuities that carry us through drastic changes is sound, and forms an important part of the critique of "futures thinking." It may be that the historical record can provide us with other sets of images of the future besides the conquest images, constructs that have retained some kind of cultural viability through the centuries of conquest and might provide a resource for visualizing futures that minimize violence, are more conserving of the planet, and offer higher levels of human welfare.

It is obviously impossible to provide a complete survey of non-conquest images of the future contained in the historical record in this paper. However, even a cursory glance at materials from antiquity reveals recurring images of human beings living peacefully together "in a garden." In this garden there is abundance, there is sharing, there is joy. The nomads of the Middle Eastern deserts, the Greeks who farmed the stony soil of Attica, and the Norse who farmed even stonier soil by the North Sea, all knew the image of the abundant and peaceful garden. Both nomads and settled folk had the image. Sometimes these images
are of a golden age in the past, sometimes they represent visions of a coming age or an after-life. What is interesting is that they all have in common an idea of human togetherness and sharing; fighting to kill or take captive is eliminated from the scene. One might label these legends cultural potentials for peaceableness. They are in various ways reflected in the ideal social order of each imaging society, in its laws, and in its treaties with other nations after wars. The fact that such images come from well-known warrior societies makes them all the more interesting. It is noteworthy that these images are describing warriors who have become androgynous beings, embodying the nurturant and the assertive traits of humanity.

Sacred Images of the Peaceable Garden

Spencer gives us the dream of universal peace of the ancient Romans in the passage "all loved virtue, no man was afraid of force. no war was known. peace universal reigned amongst men and beasts." Before the Romans, the Greeks posited a place to which warriors sometimes found their way. Meneleaus, returning from the Trojan Wars, was told that the gods would take him to the Elysian fields where a "fresh singing breeze blows from the sea and renews the spirits of men." Aeneas, actually taken to these groves, "saw the founders of the Trojan State...and gazed with admiration on the war chariots and glittering arms now reposing in disuse...". The Norse knew of such a place, to be found at the center of the universe in the Plains of Ida. From its great hall, Valhalla, Odin sent women who had been earthly heroines to bring in fallen heroes from earth to a paradise of alternate feasting and fighting which represented a compromise scenario for the peaceable kingdom.

In Hindu mythology, replete with many warriors and battle scenes, Vishnu appears as Kalki at the end of the present age of the world to destroy all vice and wickedness, and restore mankind to virtue and purity. The theme of restoration of goodness on the earth is also the theme of ancient Jewish prophecies, "and they shall beat their swords into plowshares." The Christian vision of the good place in Revelations centers around the river of life whose fruit and leaves were for the feeding and healing of nations. In the Islamic vision, God has recompensed his people with a garden. The delights of fountains, shade trees, soft breezes and abundant food change behavior such that "should an ugly word fall from someo'n's lips...the answer from the other shall be nought but 'peace, peace.'" The fact that all these images of the good place appear as gifts of the gods in diverse traditions, takes nothing from the significance of the fact that a non-militaristic welfare state was conceived as desirable in the intellectual imagination of antiquity.

Images of Peace in Statecraft

However, images of a just and peaceful social order are not confined to the religious domain, to the utterances of prophets and priests. In every age, there have been rulers and advisers to rulers who have seen as their secular task the creation of an envisioned social order in their own domains and beyond,
through the creation of just and peaceful relationships with the peoples around them. Less celebrated than the practitioners of Realpolitik throughout history, they have nevertheless made their mark on every century.

King Hammurabi, who ruled in Babylon from 1730 to 1685 B.C., issued a Code of Laws which stands as one of our earliest evidences of the responsibility of governments for a beneficent social order. Hammurabi described himself as one who caused “righteousness to appear in the land...that the strong harm not the weak.”

Iknahton and Nephretite, who rules Egypt from 1375-? to 1358-? B.C., made the decision to withdraw their troops from their conquered lands, leaving only ambassadors to represent them. All the lands were given autonomy, Iknahton and Nephretite retaining only advisory control in a structure that was essentially a federation. The federation lasted until Iknahton's death. From 776 to 168 B.C. the Greek City States made one effort after another to form leagues to control their own militarism, though they had little success.

Yet those struggles bore many fruits. Many centuries later, Aristotle purportedly conceptualized the world as a garden in which justice rules this world.

King Darius, who rules Persia from 522 to 486 B.C., had inscribed on his tombstone that "it is not my desire that the weak man should have wrong done to him by the mighty; nor...that the mighty should have wrong done to him by the weak." While the Greek City States sought to create order among themselves, and Darius sought to create order by conquest, China was undergoing a similar struggle. Out of the Chinese struggles came the writing of four great ancients: Lao-Tzu, Confucius, Mencius, and Mo-tsu, each of whom questioned the need or validity of violence and warfare. They looked beyond a simple acceptance of human conflict to theoretical principles and actual behaviors that would lead to a just and peaceful social order with shared abundance. Lao-Tzu in the sixth century B.C. warned against war as an instrument of social policy.

India also struggled with acute problems of social disorder in these centuries, and by the third century B.C. Emperor Asoka foreshowed the sword as an instrument for implementing the right. In his edicts he announced that all men were as his children, and he wished for all peoples the good and the happiness that he wished for his children; he valued neither gifts nor honor so much as "the promotion of spiritual strength among men of all religions." In abjuring conquest after his earlier military exploits, he announced that "conquest can be regarded as having been really no conquest at all because it was characterized by killing, death, or the captivity of the people."

The image of the world as a family, and of the relationships between states as ultimately resting on the mutual acceptance of familial responsibility among all human beings, is never totally absent from formulations about the human polity from the sixth century B.C. on. The Roman Emperor Marcus Aureliius expressed it this way during his reign, from 121 to 80 B.C.:
If our intellectual part is common, the reason also, in respect of which we are rational beings, is common: if this is so, common also is the reason which commands us what to do, and what not to do; if this is so, there is a common law also; ... if this is so we are members of some political community; if this is so, the world is in a manner a state. For of what other common political community will any one say that the whole human race are members.\textsuperscript{27}

With the coming of Christianity the struggle to affirm world community and peaceableness in a world habituated to violence did not lessen. Many advocates of necessary violence and the just war have been found in both non-Christian and Christian societies from the very beginning of the new era up to this present time. By the second century Tertullian was sending men who would not serve in the army.\textsuperscript{28} By the fourth century St. Augustine's acceptance of "God's wars," and the "just war" based on analogies from the Old Testament\textsuperscript{29} set the pattern for the holy wars of the crusades, yet the voice of nonviolence was never wholly absent in the Christian church.

Islam, sharing the same holy book, the Old Testament, with the Jews and the Christians, experienced the same division over the role of war in establishing a just social order. The doctrine of the Jihad, the holy war, must be seen over against the many injunctions in the Koran to prefer for one's brother whatever one prefers for oneself; and to do good, not evil.\textsuperscript{30} The crusades brought out all the unresolved conflicts in the religious teachings of both Christianity and Islam, and showed the difficulty both of understanding visions embedded in other cultural formats, and of translating utopian images into human strategies.

Women, who in every society have had a special part to play in bridging the gap between ideal and reality in their role as childbearers and nurturers of families are rarely mentioned in chronicles of war. There were women's voices lifted among Moslems and Christians alike during the Crusades, however. The often hidden role of women during and after war can be discerned by the seeker of images of peace in the history of the queens of ancient Babylon and the royal women of the Holy Roman Empire. In Europe's Dark Ages, Christian queens tamed warlike kings and built a network of monastic centers of learning and healing that were to contribute substantially to the great cultural flowering of the later Middle Ages. Great peace queens arose in small European principalities during the religious wars that tore Europe apart in the sixteenth century. In North America in 1457, the Council of Matrons of the Iroquois accepted the task of nominating the Civil Chief of the newly founded Peace Confederacy of the Iroquois. The Constitution of the Five Nations committed the tribal leaders to casting their "weapons of strife" into the "depths of the earth," thus establishing peace among a united people.\textsuperscript{32} Each political effort to create a peaceful social order beyond the borders of the nation state foundered on the incapacity of existing institutions to produce the order visualized. Yet the concept of a new warless social order continued to evolve.
From the Old Images of Peace to the New:
A Pluralistic Universality

The images of peace in the ancient world were images generated within one culture, and based on that culture. Even the gentlest and most nonviolent of the images assumed the acceptance of a certain world view. And when the ancients used the term world, they knew very little of what they meant. They knew very little of the world in its geographic and cultural immensity. Even Cruce and Grotius who by the seventeenth century had begun to use the new information coming in from the increased contact with the Americas, Asia, and Africa, in their work of mentally constructing a peaceful world order, still visualized a world based on the model of the Christian nations of Western Europe.33

Europe was the center of the new "world club," and would simply invite all other nations into the club. The charter for that club was being built up gradually out of such major social achievements as the English Bill of Rights in 1689, the Virginia Bill of Rights in the new world in 1776, and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man in 1789. It was constructed out of the various efforts to end the slave trade by the great powers from 1776 until 1890, at which time a sixteen-nation multilateral agreement to end slave trade was signed. The charter was built by way of interventions and treaties to protect minorities that evolved during various minority persecutions in the latter part of the nineteenth century, and by conventions about the treatment of the wounded beginning in 1864. Other nations were admitted to the public law of Europe, but it was still Europe's law.

The first major breach in the all-European character of the world club (by then including both Eastern and Western Europe) came in 1899 at the First Hague Peace Conference, with the participation of the ancient Asian states of China, Japan, Persia and Siam. At the Second Hague Peace Conference in 1907 Latin American republics began to play a part. With the founding of the League of Nations in 1919, Middle Eastern nations became active, including particularly Egypt and Iraq. At this point socialist images of the future began taking political shape in Eastern Europe, making visible long-ignored differentiations of economic-based class interests, as well as already acknowledged differentiation of cultural and religious interests. The next major breach came with the founding of the United Nations in 1945, which now has 219 units relating to the world organization as members or territories.

What has this brief historical survey demonstrated? That side by side with the conquest tradition, which in its western industrialized form has brought us face to face with the alternative possibilities of nuclear destruction or a petted-out entropy state, there is another set of traditions about the peaceable welfare state. Those traditions are in two forms: (1) sacred images of the good society and (2) political experiments on the part of visionary statesmen and stateswomen. The richness of both the visions and the experiments makes it
possible to utilize them as a resource in revitalizing the lagging creativity of our own futures—imagining in relation to a more peaceful and just society.

Social Welfare Professionals as Creators of Peaceable Futures

Demilitarization of an advanced technological society in a tightly interdependent militarized world presents problems at many different systems levels and cannot be separated from the demilitarization of the world as a whole. Yet the pressing need to decentralize, and to localize human production, distribution, support services and social defense, requires that we learn to think locally and globally at one and the same time. One of the most promising images of a peaceful future world to come out of the twentieth century, dealing directly with the challenge of global localism, is David Mitrany's Working Peace System. Parts of this vision of a series of functional global networks to provide for humanity's health, education and welfare needs were published as far back as the 1930s. His vision of service-oriented networks providing so effectively for human needs that states will wither away has always been treated as very naive politically. Nevertheless, we have witnessed in this century a tremendous growth in transnational nongovernmental networks, all of them providing human services and cultural enrichment of one kind or another. There are now roughly 3000 of these transnational networks where in 1900 there were only a couple of hundred of them.

At the national level, resource crunches will continue for all first world countries including the U.S., and some federally administered services may well begin to collapse in the next decade. Social workers will be in a unique position because of their rootedness in local communities and their membership in a large number of transnational nongovernmental networks, to begin experiments now with developing nonhierarchical communication channels inside these networks. Nongovernmental institutional structures are fairly rudimentary in the 1970s. To the extent that they are formalized they often tend, by default, to be traditional in organizational format. They are linked with the UN but are not administered by its agencies. Compared to governments, they have few vested interests to protect. Innovation now, while they are still fluid, will be more possible than later. As they come to be more heavily used they will become more heavily institutionalized. Local centers of these service networks will be able to link with local, cultural and ethnic separatist groups which are increasingly on all continents showing their desire to be disassociated from the nation state systems into which they have been more or less forcibly assimilated in recent centuries. Where terrorism and violence has not yet erupted, these support networks may provide alternative and nonviolent ways to accommodate desires for autonomy of these separatist groups. This will be true in much of Europe and the Americas, and parts of Africa and Asia. Where violence is already tearing apart an unwillingly "integrated" society, these networks offer the possibility of rebuilding local community independently of governmental assistance in the future.
Disarmament is not likely to be adopted as national policy by any major power in the near future. Increasing unwieldiness and ineffectiveness in both military and civilian governmental structures can be anticipated. Given the insecurity, fears, and economic uncertainties of both major and minor powers today, the U.S. included, the time is very ripe for the creation of a variety of images of a post-nationalist world based on a variety of nonviolent solutions to the problems of economic productivity, social defense and human welfare. The Mitrany image represents one possible future. The world order models of the Institute of World Order, using various combinations of Mitrany's functionalist networks, transnational associations, UN agencies and other organizational innovations, provide others. They all have in common an emphasis on nonviolence and local autonomy.

The rate of social innovation in the late twentieth century is extraordinarily high, and has been little recorded as a macrophenomenon. Most of these innovations are byproducts of other problem-solving efforts, but may take on increasing importance in the twenty-first century. Take for example the peacekeeping forces of the UN, created on an ad hoc basis from crisis to crisis over the past twenty years, which now stand revealed through Charles Moskos' research as having produced a constabulary ethic and a nonviolent behavioral repertoire in a group of soldiers all trained for combat. The new behavior was produced in the field, independently of prior training, national, cultural or class background, or any other differentiating social variable. It is out of such discoveries that we will forge the less violent society of the twenty-first century.

The work of imaging new institutions and new futures must accompany experimentation with the possibilities of existing nongovernmental and intergovernmental networks, and the creation--where necessary--if new ones. These are the types of transition activities that will overcome the feelings of helplessness and social paralysis that are bound to accompany the decline in quality of governmental functioning for the rest of this century. These same activities will help to bring about new types of social order more suited to human needs and world resources in the twenty-first century.

Footnotes


3International Study Seminar sponsored by the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom and supported by UNESCO.


7A reading of the Ecologist, an English journal representing these same movements in a far more resource-depleted society than the United States, reveals the same lack of attention to the specifics of a disarmed world.

9 For a further discussion of this see Elise Boulding, "Futuristics and the Imaging Capacity of the West," in Human Futuristics ed. by Magoroh Maruyama and James A. Dator (Honolulu: Social Science Research Institute, University of Hawaii, 1971), pp. 29-53.


12 Macpherson, Four Stages of Man, p. 123.


15 Micah 5.


21 UNESCO, Birthright of Man, p. 115.

22 UNESCO, Birthright of Man, p. 27.


A study of the most recent *Yearbook of International Organizations* (Brussels: Union of International Associations, 1974) will give an idea of the scope of activities and services undertaken by these networks.
A very partial and incomplete listing of world separatist groups, collected as part of a long-term project to study separatist movements in all world regions, indicates 80 separatist organizations in 37 countries that have stayed nonviolent, and 56 separatist groups in 28 countries that now use terrorism (Elise Boulding, research in progress, 1976). Many of these groups span a number of national borders, and many have support networks around the world of non-ethnics who contribute financially to their work.

FORWARD TO OUR ORIGINS: SOCIAL WORK SKILLS AND POLITICAL ACTION IN THE CURRENT CRISIS

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A Glimpse Back

The last decade of the 19th century and the years prior to World War I was an exciting and fruitful period in United States history. It was a time of unrest, but characterized by vigorous discontent, not cynicism or despair. There was an aggressive optimism that fostered confidence in social action, even to the belief that poverty could be abolished. The failure to achieve that goal remains our burden today, but to have begun the struggle then was a significant step. It was the developing profession of social work that initiated that battle against poverty.

From the 1890's to 1917 there was a rapid spread of reform and social legislation, and social workers were there. The names -- Addams, Devine, Kelley and Wald -- are but a few of those remembered. Tribute was paid by United States Senator Robert F. Wagner, Sr., who said that "one could not overestimate the central part played by social workers in bringing before their representatives in Congress and in State Legislatures the...insistent problems of modern life."

Social workers, along with populists, socialists, city reformists and progressives, were struggling to establish programs and institute policies which would mitigate the negative effects of industrialization, urbanization and laissez-faire. Social workers recognized the tie between social conditions and economic forces. They responded to the impact of the social sciences. They instituted surveys of social institutions. Legislation was seen as a means of attaining social welfare goals. Action organizations, on a national level, were established. In 1910, Jane Addams stated social work's goal to be "raising life to its highest value." At that moment in history, and again in the depression of the 1930's, through the leadership of Bertha Reynolds and her colleagues, the challenge was met. Where are we now?

Eduard Lindeman posed the question in 1946. "What part are we playing in determining the direction in which America is moving, with the clear presumption that we must be involved in both the movement and its direction?" In 1951, the American Association of Social Workers offered an answer. The AASW Standards for the Professional Practice of Social Work stated that social work should be responsible for "modifying or reshaping social and economic institutions which are inimical to the attainment of democratic goals."

The Current Crisis

The reshaping and recreating of those institutions, our professional charge of almost twenty-five years ago, remains as the task in our current crisis. The present plight of our economy, of our cities, of our social service system demands basic change. We need the skill, and the courage, to take on that responsibility.

We are in a desperate depression despite euphemisms to the contrary. Each day
we see how hard the economy hits the individuals, the families and the communities
with whom we work. There is a chilling fear that the slump is to be long-term, and
severely and permanently damaging. Nationally, there are indications that the so-
called "recession" of 1975 looks and feels like the depression of the 1930's. In
Detroit, a quarter of a million auto workers are unemployed. Busloads of people
have left that city to look for work in southern towns. In Boston, over one
hundred demonstrators, angered over proposed cuts in the welfare budget, stormed
the Massachusetts House Chambers.

The financial solvency of New York City is threatened. Layoffs of municipal
workers, cutbacks in funding of programs, rescindments of capital projects are all
orders of the day. There is talk of default and of bankruptcy. There is a lack of
confidence in the city, in the system, in ourselves.

Unemployment is at 9.2%. Even more disturbing is the record 1.2 million who
are the "discouraged workers wanting jobs, but who have given up looking." And a
further measure of the depth of our trouble is the 33% jobless rate for Black teen-
agers. The Federal Administration insists it is concerned, but can do nothing with-
out regenerating inflation. This is recklessness, not caution. Such a policy pro-
duces tension, resentment and trouble.

A bleak picture is on view in most communities throughout the country. One
wonders how families manage without, or even with, unemployment payments. There
are no statistics on how many families have been left without income from a job and
without benefits either. Of the 8,567,000 unemployed in June, 6,181,000 were draw-
ing some kind of compensation. We know nothing about the remaining two million and
more, except the assumption that they are mostly young people. Those who are on un-
employment compensation average $69.00 per week, hardly adequate for decent living.
An additional aspect of the problem is revealed by a recent Labor Department survey
which showed that of unemployed married men, 59% had wives also unemployed or not in
the labor force. The latter category refers to housewives, the largest group of un-
paid workers in our society.

Anyone working with jobless people is aware of the difficulties and disruptions
which permeate their lives. A recent bankruptcy in New York City's Bronx County
cause two hundred employees to lose their jobs, many after 25 years with the firm.
This group of Black and Hispanic workers, whose families numbered almost 1,000 peo-
ple were forced into unemployment when efforts to save the business failed.

Aside from the casework skills and referral knowledge required to assist those
families, it was necessary to have an understanding of the economic factors involved
and essential to possess the political leverage needed to move elements of the
business community and the city, state and federal governmental system. The Borough
President's office provided guidance to the workers and their families, direction to
those in the public and private sectors attempting to save the business and leader-
ship in pressing for financial and political support.

The effort failed because the economic interests were not prepared to finance a
workers' cooperative; an approach which had become the only feasible one for success.
And so we contribute to the extension of poverty, rather than to the expansion of
opportunity. Nationally, as locally, we allow failure. The social venture we called "the war on poverty" was "too limited in means, too timid in ideas" to have any significant impact. We remain too timid, too limited.

The intent, we were told, was to close the gap between rich and poor. Quite the opposite has occurred. Inequalities in earnings in the United States have widened since 1950.

In 1958, the bottom decile of the population had 14% of mean earnings; by 1971 its relative position declined to 8.6%. During the same period, the top decile improved its position from 197% of the mean to 263%.

A further demonstration of this inequality is seen in the fact that 18.9% of the population hold 76.2% of the wealth. The wealthiest, the top one percent, own 26% of all private wealth. Thus, our present scene, one of depression and dismay, is also one of dramatic distance between economic classes -- the rich and the poor. For those at the bottom, those we label "clients," life is hard and unfair.

It is in the cities of our country where most of our people live; and our cities are in deep trouble. But the hard and unfair life is in the suburbs and rural areas as well. It is a condition of our society itself. Physical decay, an aging population, drug abuse, a rising crime rate, and increased unemployment know no geography. The problems are most intense and visible in our densely crowded, older and poorer central cities.

The nation's troubled cities cannot recover by themselves and the Administration in Washington seems to be willing to let them sink. As usual, the poor are chosen to pay, by cutting the services they need. Social service programs are denied or restricted due, the President states, to the inflationary impact of the funding. The economy's improved health will come about by reducing taxes paid by corporations and their shareholders, declares the Secretary of the Treasury. He proposed a plan to reduce corporate profit taxes by $7.5 billion a year, or more than 10%, over a six-year period, beginning in 1977. The humanitarian concern which gave rise to the approach is explained by the Secretary, who stated that "corporations are people."

One segment of the nation's economy appears to remain viable. This summer the Congress agreed on a military procurement measure that authorized preliminary funding for production of a B-1 strategic bomber costing $84 million a plane and construction of a $1.2 billion nuclear-powered cruiser for the Navy. The cruiser project has since been dropped but the total amount appropriated for weapons was $25.8 billion for the current fiscal year. That is about one-quarter of the total defense budget. With expenditures for armaments at such levels, our priorities are apparent. But a society's stability -- both economic and psychological -- cannot rest on its ability to produce weapons.

No single factor is sufficient to judge whether we are financially and mentally healthy, but one measure of a society's worth is the way in which it treats its older citizens. On that score we do poorly. The record reveals shameful deficiencies in income levels, housing, nutrition, health care, and perhaps most damning, a lack of
a dignified role in society.

Another measure is the quality of health care and, here again, we do not do well. "Whether poor or not, many Americans are badly served by the obsolete, overstrained health system which has grown up around them, helter-skelter, without accommodating...to changing technology, expanding population, rising costs and rising expectations."13

The cost of medical care in the United States is rising more rapidly than the cost of living. A major cause of that increase is the reluctance of Blue Cross and Blue Shield to impose cost controls on doctors and hospitals. A recent study by the Associated Press indicates that billions of dollars could be saved annually if Blue Cross would implement one of its original objectives to keep costs down. Health care delivery, as well as its economics, is determined by the private sector which controls Blue Cross and Blue Shield. The eighty-two million people covered have nothing to say about the running of the 144 plans throughout the country. Each Blue plan is dominated by doctors and hospital officials, or by laymen chosen by medical societies.14

"Surely the care given to children is a measure of a good society. But good care for children cannot be given by a poverty ridden, disease ridden, crime ridden, despairing adult population. Nor can it be given by adults who find no meaning to life beyond the purchase of equity in a suburban house from which their children will move away, leaving their lives, once narrowly devoted to their own children alone, empty and meaningless."14a

As our deficiencies and inequalities become more apparent, we reach what Daniel Bell calls "the end of American exceptionalism."14b We are not what we foolishly believed ourselves to be. Our dominance in world affairs is ending; there is no manifest destiny; there is no mission. We have not been immune to the corruption of power. We have not been the exception.

Our common value is hedonism - the thoughtless pursuit of what we think is pleasure, the idea of consumption and exhibition of our middle class culture - and that provides no common purpose or common faith, only bewilderment.

Social Work Skills and Political Action

Whatever human services we assess in an attempt to measure our commitment to improve individual and community well-being, we find a basic lack. It is evident that the vast majority of people served by the social service system will not be able to improve their conditions in life without a redistribution of wealth and power in our society.

The poor need money, jobs and power on a large scale; all three require equally large shifts in the political, as well as the economic relationships between the poor and the rest of society. The only way to manage the current crisis of increasing -- and perhaps permanent -- unemployment and poverty is redistribution.

It is in this campaign for the redistribution of wealth and power that social
work has a significant role. This is the time to carry out the responsibility Lindeman identified. This is the time to act on the AASW charge to us. In this effort, there are new skills to be learned and old skills to be revitalized. Political action is the requirement and social workers must be ready and able. "No longer can social workers not be involved politically."  

Social workers must help to create a coalition of forces to carry on the fight they began at the turn of the century — the struggle to abolish poverty and to provide a living standard of the highest quality for all. To succeed in that struggle, we must identify our enemies as well as our allies. We must recognize the seriousness of Lorenzo Traylor's observation in reaction to HEW's businessman's approach to social welfare. "It is precisely the businessman's attitude and his lack of concern for the plight of others that has contributed to the conditions which make the welfare system so desperately needed."  

The newly elected President of NASW, Maryann Mahaffey, has stated what our role should be. "The problem in America," she declared in her 1975 address to the Delegate Assembly, "is that the overwhelming majority of people in policy making positions are oriented to the bureaucracy, to profit and to products. We, the social workers of this nation, are people oriented. That's why our input is crucial."  

Powerful forces hostile to a humanitarian philosophy are in our society. They fear democracy, freedom, equal rights and equal opportunity. It is a false idea that the good society results automatically from technology and so-called "free enterprise." The chief battle of our times is not with an external enemy; it is with ourselves and our institutions.  

Social work must play an active, aggressive and militant role in the political arena. Politics is an indispensable activity in a democracy. To ignore political turmoil around social work issues is to do a disservice to the field.  

Our political program derives from what we know people need. Beyond an improved system of social service, beyond greater accountability, we need basic change. "We need tax reform and redistribution of wealth, power and income, so that full employment, at socially useful jobs, can be provided in the public sector of the economy."  

The skills to achieve our political program are attainable. Social workers must be able to speak with knowledge and understanding of the social and economic issues of our time. We must be familiar with the structure of our social institutions, the nature of our social forces, the functioning of our economic system.  

Social workers must possess full knowledge of our political arrangements. The organization of governmental activity, the role of political parties, the action of political movements must be studied and well known. We must have the ability to assess the scene quickly, formulate policy positions and fight for them on any level of government.  

We must develop the talent to devise optional courses of action. We must learn to create "up front" and "fall back" positions. Of special importance is the need
to identify allies on an issue and be creative in developing alliances.

We must know how to organize and mobilize local groups. We must become skillful negotiators. We must be able to speak and to write with passion as well as with precision. We must be forceful and flexible, imaginative, inventive and innovative. We must maintain our sense of purpose and direction. We must, as has been said of Richard Titmuss, be "ideologically rooted but not doctrinaire."

A commitment to planning should be part of our ideology. The crisis in our nation, characterized by unemployment and inflation, has created a new interest in economic planning. Legislation has been introduced in the Congress proposing various forms of planning. "The time has come to develop a truly home-grown American form of national economic planning...a planning approach that will be American in character and democratic in nature."

Social workers should take an active role in support of national economic planning and incorporate social planning into the program. Social planning provides an experimental approach to means. It allows for the abandonment of ineffective methods and their replacement by new or modified ones which may be treated in relation to changing social conditions. If a laissez-faire orientation continues, we will be faced with the burden of unchanging means in a world of constantly changing circumstances.

None of the fundamental problems of the aged, the chronically ill, the physically and mentally handicapped, as well as the unemployed and under-employed, will be met unless social work adds its strengths to the development of national and local planning of the highest order. We can recognize the philosophic definition of planning given our experience as practitioners -- "The method of creating new wholes out of parts which have become so fractionalized as to have lost their functional relevancy."

The basic principle of democratic planning is "an awakening in the whole people of a sense of common moral purposes. Not one goal, but a direction. Not one plan, once and for all, but the conscious selection by people of successive plans."

It has been said that all improvements start with an act of dissent, an act of non-conformity. The story of human advance is the story of the unconventional which has become commonplace, of the untried which has become routine, of the non-conformity which has become customary.

What is needed is adventure in ideas—a creative rebellion against tradition and the status quo, when these are obstacles to human welfare.

Social work is not rising to the challenge of the times. It is too routine and unimaginative. Something good which characterized early social work pioneers has been lost. We must regain that early heritage and adapt their fighting spirit to our time.

Our time is a time of crisis. It is not merely a fiscal crisis; it is another dysfunctional phase of our economic system. What has been and is now crisis becomes a condition, under which our social service structure suffers in a special way.
who utilize those services are those who are most hurt. The financing of public services through investment by profit-making interests eventually benefits not the poor, but the rich.

What we require is a change in our economic system from profit purpose to people purpose. Let us advocate such a change to a socialism in the great tradition of Eugene Victor Debs.

"We tend to forget that preparation of life in a democracy involves more than a narrow concept of adjustment. It necessitates knowledge of political, economic and social institutions, attitudes toward them, skill in utilizing them, and skill in changing them if they prove to be inadequate...In a rapidly changing world we must be courageous in interpreting the changing scene and equally courageous and radical in testing our new methods and new hypotheses which reflect the stream of changes."26

FOOTNOTES

4. AASW, Standards for the Professional Practice of Social Work, 1951, p.3.

14b. The Public Interest, October 1975.

15. Maryann Mahaffey, President, NASW, in her address to the 1975 Delegate Assembl


INFLUENCING WELFARE/WARFARE PRIORITIES THROUGH THE NEW BUDGETARY PROCESS

Ann Blalock

In the previous article, Weinert challenged social workers, and other professionals in the area of social welfare, to commit themselves to greater collective political action in the interest of substantial social change. He suggested that there are many options for movement in that direction. This article briefly discusses one incremental option within the established political system, intervention within the new Congressional budgetary process. This is not an insignificant strategy. Its purpose is to influence the way the national budget is constructed. The budget incorporates to an important degree the society's prevailing definition of its priorities. Furthermore, future policy alternatives are vitally affected by budget decisions, as mandated budget authority strongly restricts future social policy alternatives.

Therefore, an understanding of the meaning of the new Congressional Budget Act and some of the problems in its implementation is critical to developing an effective strategy for impacting that process. The Act offers a significant opportunity to individual citizens and organized groups to change the direction of national priorities, among them welfare and warfare. It provides a relatively fixed time schedule around which collective action can be organized, and it identifies the individuals and committees necessary to approach. A strategy built around this process is appropriate to the social work profession. Many social welfare professionals are excellently qualified to perform the policy analysis tasks and to construct the crucial political coalitions which support this kind of intervention. Social workers' knowledge of domestic needs, and of the strengths and weaknesses of existing social service delivery systems, place them in a privileged position to utilize the innovations provided in the new Act. Moreover, the implications of their mobilizing around the budgetary cycle can extend well beyond the territory of the federal budget itself.

Background of the New Budgetary Process

The federal government is the most significant financier for the military and welfare sectors of the society. It is estimated that in fiscal '78 federal defense allocations will be approximately 130-150 billion, and social welfare expenditures approximately 190-240 billion. Responsibility for the research, planning, and management of such enormous federal outlays is constitutionally shared among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government. The Constitution proposes a set of initiatives and constraints within this responsibility, to be translated into national administrative law. However, the actual relationship among these branches has been uneven, and the budgetary process less than open.
The search for more effective budgetary methods in Congress was stimulated in contemporary history by controversy over national priorities, including warfare/welfare, and by the impoundment of funds. It was an undeniable legacy of Watergate. However, there has been a perennial consciousness that Congressional budget reform was critically needed. Much has changed in the two centuries of American governmental existence, but the formal division of responsibilities has remained intact. Money expenditure was to be a two-stage process: first the Congress would appropriate funds, and only afterwards would the executive spend them. Not only was Congress to decide how much would be spent, but more importantly for what purposes.

The demands of this essential role of Congress were admittedly not being met by past policies or methods. As long as the federal budget was small, it was rational for Congress to control expenditures by means of line item appropriations, and restrictions on the shifting of funds among categories. But the tremendous growth of the federal budget has required a broadening of the units of appropriations and more transfer flexibility. As the federal budget increased in size and importance, a growing inequity in influence evolved between the executive and the legislative branch.

The formulation of the President's budget recommendations employed the analytic expertise of a large and powerful budget staff with vast informational sources, a resource particularly exploited during the Watergate period to enhance executive authority. The effect was disadvantaged Congressional competition with the executive. Over-burdened staffs of individual committees were forced to rely primarily on executive agencies for information. Whereas the President had an eighteen month period to develop a budget, Congress was required to compress crucial budget decisions into a few months, and often became dependent on continuing resolutions as a means of funding federal agencies and programs. As program and financial policy-making became more concentrated in the executive, the budgetary process grew more fragmented in the Congress. The inevitable consequence was a serious imbalance of power. This became translated into welfare/warfare terms because Presidential budgets tended to emphasize a heavy commitment to the military, which Congress was unwilling or unable to challenge.

Therefore, a severe erosion occurred in Congressional capability for assessing program priorities effectively, and in establishing overall budget policy. Congress was clearly not able to decide among competing claims on the budget in a comprehensive manner. The basic assumption in the growing movement for budget reform was that the federal budget had in actuality become the primary tool for determining governmental goals, and was progressively passing beyond Congressional control. Not simply its growth, but more so the directions it would take, were at stake. The augmentation in the portion of the budget which was relatively "uncontrollable under existing law, magnified the significance of the issue. It was becoming increasingly more difficult to deal with carryover balances where appropriations, outlays, and budget authority failed to mesh.
The search for improved budgetary methods ultimately settled within the Joint Study Committee on Budget Control. Out of months of deliberation over alternatives, the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 surfaced into law. The Act radically modified the Congressional budget process, and provided controls over the presidential impoundment of funds. It established new Budget Committees in the House and Senate, responsible for setting federal budget priorities, and created a new Congressional Budget Office. The primary intent of the legislation was to re-establish Congressional power over the federal budget. The outcome has been to provide new citizen access to the policy analysis and decision-making process, and to introduce greater transfer possibilities into revenue allocations.

The Content of the New Process

The new budget process requires an unprecedented effort simply in meeting the series of negotiation deadlines in the mandated timetable for decision-making, beginning October first and ending the following September 30th, a timetable which essentially constitutes a stringent set of policy guidelines. The public visibility of this timetable allows for its strategic use. The process requires the following steps: 1) prior to the regular Presidential budget presentation, the President must provide a budget which projects expected outlays in the upcoming fiscal year, assuming all programs are to be carried on at the same levels without policy changes; 2) the first concurrent resolution of the Congress then makes explicit the specific levels of budget outlays and new budget authority, both in total and for each of sixteen major functional expenditure categories. This involves the amount of any deficit or surplus, the recommended levels of federal revenues, and the public debt ceilings. When finally negotiated and passed, this resolution sets the overall budgetary parameters for the Budget Committees; 3) the Committees are then to work toward completing action on bills that provide new budget authority and spending authority; and 4) the second concurrent resolution reaffirms or revises the first concurrent resolution, and any differences between the House and Senate must be reconciled by the end of September. Thus the new Act has presented challenges to historic positions, and compelled the Congress to make distinctive policy decisions.

The most profound role defined for the new Congressional Budget Office in the Act was the development of an annual report that not merely identified alternative levels of spending, revenues, and tax expenditures, but discussed national budget priorities, including "alternative ways of allocating budget authority and budget outlays for the fiscal year among major programs or functional categories, taking into account how such alternative allocations will meet major national needs and affect balanced growth and development in the U.S." As with the Brookings analyses, the report was to speak to objectives, priorities, and alternative choices, but not to specify preferred alternatives among the feasible options.

Successful implementation of this commitment of the Congress to accrue greater power over the federal budget was considered related to the pragmatic requirement that Congress install what Walter Williams has termed a "new institutional process"
that would significantly alter the previous balance of power in governmental decision-making, and assemble the high level staff needed to make expert information and analyses an integral part of this process.\textsuperscript{10} The new CBO was viewed by political policy analysts as an essential tool in making this substantial shift in Congressional life style, in particular its anticipated role in information analysis in the service of setting national budgetary priorities.\textsuperscript{11} Crucial to its success, they predicted, was a staff comparable to that of the executive branch in size and substantive diversity, in professional competence and wisdom, in political and bureaucratic management skills, in information synthesizing and processing technology, and in collective influence. It also had to exhibit the capability of providing at optimum times the products of its efforts to the House and Senate Budget Committees. The premise was that the executive branch's enjoyment of superiority in the effective use of policy analysis had been the major variable in the power inequity.

Developing such a staff proved a challenging task. But there have been an array of other problems in implementing the Act's intended purposes, not least among them the level of utilization of the fruits of such policy analysis by individual Congressmen, the extent of their commitment to the long-range view which lies at the core of competent policy analysis, and the depth of their perception of the need for analysis of non-incremental alternatives.\textsuperscript{12} The latter is a measure of the will of Congress to participate intelligently in what Lindblom has called "the partisan mutual adjustment process" in a democracy.\textsuperscript{13} In the case of federal budget decisions, this adjustment process required changing complex relationships in Congress' external organizational environment that in turn involved intricate internal changes. Inasmuch as such basic changes contained costs to particular Congresspersons, the pattern of history has been one of resistance to such change.\textsuperscript{14} The primary struggle with the executive branch has therefore been complicated by the inevitable struggle within the Congress. The lack of clearly specified decision-making roles for the new organizational structures within the Congress, goal conflict and territoriality problems between "old" and "new" structures, a lack of coordination and cooperation in the relationships between pre-existing and new staffs, and differences in the methodology used for performing essential policy analysis tasks, were formidable problems anticipated to plague full implementation of the Act.\textsuperscript{15}

The Trial Run

The nine-month "trial run" of the new budget process was completed with the passage of a concurrent resolution in December, 1975, which established spending limits for the remainder of fiscal 1976. This provided an opportunity to more clearly evaluate whether Congress could actually agree on budget spending limits, deficits, whether the Budget Committees could become part of the power hierarchy and more importantly whether the process was capable of yielding a reasoned consideration of priorities rather than simply limited debate over budget figures. Assessment of the trial run revealed both the great potential of the Act and some of the anticipated conflicts between the demands of the new legislation and the
pre-existing authority structure of the Congress, "its privileges, style of opera-
tion, and staffing patterns." It therefore identified likely impediments to the
effectiveness of public strategies for influencing the budget process.

Deep differences surfaced between House and Senate perceptions of the new
budgetary process—in terms of its intent (budget control versus setting budget
priorities), and the qualifications of the CBO staff (Congressional trustworthiness
versus analytic credentials). There were differences in leadership strength, and
the nature of the internal conflicts within the new committees. Though it tested
whether the new process would produce Congressional budget control, the trial run
did not really test whether the more basic purpose of the Act, general Congres-
sional budget reform had been realized. Nevertheless, the trial run was generally
considered to indicate an important positive flexibility, a capacity for learning
and modification—largely through the actions of the Budget Committees.

The CBO, as a non-partisan analytic unit serving the entire Congress, was
viewed more critically. Though the staff was considered excellently qualified,
it performed no major policy analyses during the trial run, and its economic fore-
casting, which emphasized economic stimuli to combat recession rather than eco-
nomic restraint to control inflation, had diverse results. This was not un-
related to Congressional concerns over the staff's potential power. The general
consensus, however, was that its leadership was being looked to as a major influ-
ence on future governmental economic policy. Furthermore, the CBO had developed
an analytic staff comparable in expertise (and nearly in size) to those in the
executive branch. Williams credited it with establishing "the base to do compe-
tent economic forecasting, sophisticated budget analysis and policy analysis,"
which he feels are the key parts of the process of developing more responsible
government. The net assessment was slightly more than a moderated optimism about
the outcomes of the first full budget cycle beginning October, 1975, with all the
deadlines of the timetable in force.

The First Implementation of the Full Cycle

On schedule, the House-Senate Conference Committee approved on September 10,
1976, a federal budget ceiling of approximately 413 billion for the fiscal year
beginning October first, settling on a deficit of 50.6 billion. The ceiling in
this Second Concurrent Resolution reflected only minimal differences between the
House and Senate versions. The budget compromise raised 362.5 billion in revenues
and provided 451.5 billion in new budget authority, some of which would be spent
in future years. Both Congressional versions involved essentially all the money
President Ford requested for defense, but provided for more than he requested for
jobs and other domestic programs, and rejected 10 billion in newly-proposed tax
cuts. Negotiation had successfully produced a concrete collective decision within
the timetable.

On the surface, such similar Budget Committee conclusions lacked the transpar-
ency that would reveal the truer machinations of the new budget process which
committed the Congress for the first time to a study of the aggregate effect of all new legislation having an impact on spending. The House Budget Committee's chairman, Brock Adams, claimed that the final Congressional budget differed sharply from the approach favored by the White House, emphasizing programs to fight unemployment and rejecting some of the President's initiatives in the area of taxes and domestic programs. Not all analysts agreed with his assessment. The balance of power had clearly been redressed to some extent. More critical, however, in terms of the effectiveness of the first full cycle in implementing the main intent of the Act, was to critique the extent to which the Congress had taken responsibility for setting national priorities.

Some analysts felt that the Pentagon lobby, and the political makeup of the Senate and House Budget Committees, interfered with this primary responsibility, giving the balance of power to conservative Republicans and southern Democrats. Congressional leadership was also faulted for sacrificing policy to process. Senator Mansfield, for example, was quoted as saying "I do not intend to vote for any amendment no matter how meritorious...I intend to support fully what the Budget Committee has recommended because if we do not, then I think we might as well abolish it, and go back to our old ways."18

The Transfer Amendment

On April 29, 1976, prior to the development of the First Concurrent Resolution, Representative Holtzman, Conyers, and Ottinger jointly proposed a transfer amendment to the House Budget Committee's first resolution, a resolution which had contained the largest increase for military expenditures in peacetime history--an 11 billion increase in budget authority and 8.7 billion in outlays. The critical importance of this amendment is that it asked for a substantial shift of budget authority and outlays from one functional category to others: from defense to domestic programs. Such an amendment was made possible, and even desirable, within the context of the new process. It demanded that the House Budget Committee go beyond a concern for simple budget control, to a change in the rank order of national preferences. It took the unequivocal position that the Committee had not discharged its mandated obligation to provide rational alternatives to the President's definition of priorities, a definition Holtzman felt was tragically narrow and unresponsive to human needs. The Holtzman amendment, and its destiny in the Budget Committee, is illustrative both of the strength of the new Act and of the resistances to its full implementation.

However, in proposing a transfer amendment, Representative Holtzman was actually implementing the intent, and maximizing the flexibility, in the new budget process: she was insisting on an official re-allocation of national revenues.19 Even though the amendment was rejected, its impact was catalytic. It served as a general legislative model for future transfer amendments, both within the Congress and among the organized public. It suggested that a very
sophisticated understanding of the welfare/warfare tradeoff was essential, as well as a careful preparation of the case for change in commitments among budget categories. It revealed the necessity of forming political coalitions in support of this change. And it identified the time period in the new budgetary process which was most significant to affect.

Several organizations and coalitions have since drafted their own transfer amendments around the social service/defense issue, which they hope to use as one intervention in the federal decision-making process. The Coalition for a New Foreign and Military Policy has recently drafted a transfer amendment to the First Budget Resolution suggesting specific cutbacks in budget authority for defense, and a transfer of the majority of this amount to domestic programs related to economic recovery. The Friends Committee on National Legislation has also directed energy toward using a transfer amendment as a strategy for altering national welfare/warfare priorities.

It is time for social welfare professionals to take appropriate parallel action. Sixteen functional policy areas within the budget are delineated within the new Act, and political intervention with respect to the categories most related to the interests of particular groups can be productively mounted. The NASW has recently developed a set of specific policy positions on a large number of national priority issues. This represents an important tool in organizing a concerted effort to affect the political process through the budget cycle. Professionals working in the social welfare field would fail to make maximum use of this opportunity to impact the political system if they neglected to communicate expert opinion to relevant Congresspersons at the most critical junctures in the budgetary timetable. To plan a rational political strategy around the timetable in fact suggests a new approach in the profession's efforts to have a genuine influence on social policy.

Conclusion

The federal budget in many ways mirrors our predominant value system as a society. There is serious question as to whether that set of values has tended toward an enlightened form of humanism or has placed a disproportionate political value on destructive capacity. A somewhat novel opportunity has been provided by the Act for collectively and individually communicating reasoned, well documented policy positions to key decision-makers at vulnerable and receptive times in the political process. These are periods in which the profession and individual citizens can feel they are making some measurable impact on American social policy.

Below is the Congressional budgetary timetable for your consideration and use as a strategy for social change. Within this framework, the most important contacts will be the new House and Senate Budget Committee chairmen and committee members, and perhaps most significantly the new Congressional Budget Office staff.
STAGE I: CONGRESS SETS BUDGET TARGETS

November 10: President Submits Current Services Budget.

Submission of the Current Services Budget represents the initial step in the new eleven-month budget timetable. The budget projects the cost of maintaining current Federal programs at existing levels through the next fiscal year, adjusting spending to take account of economic projections. In this way, it provides Congress with an early look at anticipated shifts in Federal program costs resulting from such factors as inflation, pay raises and changes in beneficiary levels.

15th Day After Congress Convenes: President Submits His Budget.

The President must now include in his annual budget complete spending and revenue projections for the next five years. He must also set forth the anticipated levels of tax expenditures for this period.

March 15: Appropriations, Legislative, and Joint Committees Submit Spending and Revenue Estimates to the Budget Committees

Each standing committee of the House and Senate, the Joint Economic Committee, and the Joint Committees on Atomic Energy and Internal Revenue Taxation, must submit by this date its views and estimates of the aggregate spending and revenue levels in the Congressional budget for matters within its jurisdiction. Reports of each standing committee must also contain its estimates as to the spending levels either authorized or provided in legislation it intends to become effective during the next fiscal year.

April 1: Congressional Budget Office Submits Annual Report to Budget Committee

The Congressional Budget Office was established to provide the Budget Committees, and Congress, with a non-partisan source of budgetary and fiscal analysis.

Each year the CBO director is required to submit to the Budget Committees a comprehensive report on the next fiscal year's budget. The report must include an analysis of fiscal policy, a discussion of national budget priorities, and alternative ways of allocating budget authority and budget outlays.

In addition to its annual report due April 1, the CBO is required to provide the Budget Committees on a regular basis with information, data and analysis on budget-related matters.

April 15: Budget Committees Report First Concurrent Resolution

The House and Senate Budget Committees must each report by this date a First Concurrent Resolution on the next fiscal year's budget. The Resolution sets forth appropriate levels of total new budget authority, total outlays, total revenues, Federal deficit or surplus and public debt.
The Resolution also sets appropriate levels of new budget authority and outlays for each of the budget's functional categories: national defense, agriculture, income security, etc. (Budget authority is authority provided by law to enter into obligations which generally result in immediate or future outlays of governmental funds. Outlays are the actual Federal payments which result from budget authority.)

The Committee reports accompanying the First Concurrent Resolutions must include a tax expenditures budget which enumerates such expenditures by functional category.

May 15: Final Day for Reporting of Legislation Authorizing New Budget Authority

It is not in order for either House to take floor action on measure authorizing the enactment of new budget authority for the coming fiscal year unless that measure has been reported in that House by May 15. This rule applies to both new program legislation and legislation re-authorizing existing programs.

May 15: Congress Completes Action on First Concurrent Resolution

The May 15 deadline applies to final adoption of any House-Senate conference report on the First Concurrent Resolution.

The joint explanatory statement ("statement of managers") accompanying a conference report on a Concurrent Resolution on the Federal Budget must include an estimated distribution of the appropriate new budget authority and outlays on the basis of committee jurisdiction (this allocation by committee jurisdiction is termed "crosswalking").

The Appropriations Committee in each House is required to further allocate the new budget authority and outlay totals among its subcommittees' jurisdictions. Other committees having jurisdiction over measures providing new budget authority must also make allocations by subcommittee or by program. These allocations must be reported promptly to each house.

Subsequent Concurrent Resolutions on the Budget

At any time after the First Concurrent Resolution has been agreed to, the two Houses may revise the Resolution by adoption of a subsequent concurrent resolution on the budget.

STAGE II: CONGRESS CONSIDERS INDIVIDUAL BUDGET MEASURES

May 15: Congress Begins Floor Action on Spending and Revenue Measures

It is not in order for either House to consider any measure providing new budget authority for a fiscal year, new spending authority to become effective during a fiscal year, a change in the level of revenues of public debt limit to become effective in a fiscal year until the First Concurrent Resolution for that fiscal year has been adopted.
This rule does not apply to measures providing new budget authority which first becomes available, or a change in revenues which first becomes effective, in a fiscal year following the fiscal year to which the Concurrent Resolution applies.

Spending authority, as defined in the Act, represents any of three kinds of "backdoor spending"—legislation previously enacted outside the normal appropriations process. These are contract, borrowing, and entitlement authority.

Contract authority is the authority to enter into contracts or other obligations prior to an appropriation. Such legislation does not provide funds to actually pay such obligations; it has required a subsequent appropriation to liquidate them.

Borrowing authority is statutory authority that permits a Federal agency to incur obligations and to make payments for specified purposes out of borrowed funds.

The Budget Act "closes the backdoor" as far as both contract and borrowing authority are concerned. (The Act places more limited restrictions on the granting of entitlement authority.) It requires that any measure providing new spending authority of these types contain a provision limiting such authority to the amounts provided in advance by appropriations acts.

Entitlement authority is legislation that requires the payment—the budget authority for which is not provided for in advance by appropriation acts, of benefits to any person or government meeting the requirements established by such law.

The Act places two restrictions on this form of backdoor spending:

--that all new entitlement authority not become effective before October 1 of the calendar year in which the measure is reported by committee;

--that any such measure requiring new budget authority in excess of the subcommittee and committee allocations associated with the most recent Concurrent Resolution must be referred to the appropriations committee of that House. The appropriations committee is then required to report such a measure within 15 days or be discharged from further consideration of it. (The appropriations committee has jurisdiction to report amendments to such measures limiting the total amount of spending authority it provides.)

*Exceptions: The above restrictions on new spending authority do not apply to Social Security Act trust funds; trust funds where 90% or more of the receipts represent earmarked taxes (received under specific provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954); amendments or extensions of the State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972 (General Revenue Sharing); mixed-ownership or wholly-owned government corporations, or where the spending consists exclusively of proceeds from gifts to the U.S. for a specific purpose.

7th Day After Labor Day: Congress Completes Action on Spending Measures

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STAGE III: CONGRESS ESTABLISHES BUDGET LIMITS

The Second Concurrent Resolution required by the Act must either revise or reaffirm the budgetary targets set in May.

September 15: Congress Completes Action on Second Concurrent Resolution

Reconciliation Process:
To the extent necessary, the Second Concurrent Resolution may also specify the extent to which budget authority, spending authority, revenues, or public debt limitations within the jurisdiction of particular committees should be changed. In these cases, the Resolution will direct such committees to determine and report out measures needed to accomplish such adjustments.

September 25: Congress Completes Action on Any Reconciliation Measures

Should the Second Concurrent Resolution contain a "reconciliation" provision as described above, the committee or committees receiving such directions must report recommendations promptly. If only one committee receives a reconciliation direction, it reports such a measure directly to the floor. Should more than one committee be directed to make such recommendations, these are reported to the Budget Committee of this appropriate House, and the Budget Committee must then report these recommendations to its House without any substantive revision.

Neither House may adjourn until action on the Second Concurrent Resolution, together with any reconciliation measures, has been completed.

Legislation Subject to Point of Order:
Once Congress has completed action on the Second Concurrent Resolution and any necessary reconciliation measure, it is not in order for either House to take floor action on any measure providing new budget or spending authority, or reducing revenues, should the enactment of such measure cause the total new budget authority or total outlay level set forth in the Second Concurrent Resolution to be exceeded or its revenue total to be undercut. In enforcing this procedure, budget aggregates and the projected costs of legislation shall be determined on the basis of estimates by the Budget Committee of the appropriate House.

October 1: New Fiscal Year Begins

(The source of the entire text of the budget timetable is a recent memo from the Senate Committee.)
FOOTNOTES

2. See Public Law 93-334, 93rd Congress, July 12, 1974, Legislative History section.
3. Annual increases in federal expenditures have been 15-20 billion, more than was spent in the first century of American government.
4. The 1921 Budget and Accounting Act vested the President with the responsibility to prepare and transmit to Congress an annual budget, in the nature of a recommendation. It equipped the President with a Budget Bureau and established the General Accounting Office.
5. The official estimate is that 75% of the budget is relatively uncontrollable, and uncontrollables are the fastest rising part of the budget, claiming each year a larger share of new funds. See PL 93-344, op. cit.
6. By outlays is meant how much money will be obligated in a particular year—not how much will be spent then. By authority is meant authorization to agencies to spend in future years.
8. Ibid.
9. The Brookings Institution annually publishes books analyzing the federal budget.
11. Ibid.
12. See Charles Schultze, The Politics and Economics of Public Spending. (The Brookings Institution, 1968). He points out that a significant number of policy decisions in recent years have indeed been non-incremental—i.e. have departed sharply from past practice, or have required large increases or decreases in the allocation of resources to a particular area. These kinds of policy alternatives, Schultze contends, are most in need of explicit expert study.
14. Williams, op. cit.
15. However, Williams points out that observations of the policy analysis process in government since 1965 indicate that attempts toward greater rationality, though occurring in agonizingly slow steps, have had a substantial, positive impact on decision-making.
17. Ibid.
18. See the Holtzman context and testimony in this journal.
WHICH SIDE ARE YOU ON?

The sabres rattle
(on one side of the Hill)
as military finery
homes
to their Glory
of Destruction,
of wantonness,
and waste,
of human needs,
and cities,
and homes.

The Other side
Speakers clearly
of Construction!
To heal,
to unify the lands,
to plant
seeds of love
upon which
our wasted youth
to grow,
to sow care,
which
beings could reap
and re-sow,
again,
for their labor.

But it's People!
Multitudes!
Everywhere!
(no matter their station)
who identify
with others,
as one human race.
It's People!
who move mountains.
People!
cross the seas.
And only
People!
You and I!
who
can Make the Peace!

- Olga J. Northwood
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Call for Papers

The Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare will publish a special issue on symbolic interaction and social welfare. Papers should reflect the application of a symbolic interaction perspective to issues of importance in social welfare. Especially desired is work which highlights the distinctive aspects of symbolic interaction in application including papers which emphasize the meaning of using the person as a unit of analysis, methodological and substantive papers on the life histories of "social persons", and those which explicate the emphasis on change, freedom, and democracy contained in the philosophy on which symbolic interaction theory rests. Papers should be sent to both editors of the special issue with a covering letter indicating that they represent a submission for the special issue on Symbolic Interaction and Social Welfare.

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Harris Chaiklin, School of Social Work, University of Haifa, Mount Carmel, Haifa, Israel (use overseas air mail)

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