Eighteen Leading Social Critics Comment: What is the Real Threat to World Peace and Social Security?

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What is the real threat to world peace and social security? Is it the prevalent ideology of violence, aggressive nationalism, and militarism? Or is it the maldistribution of resources, technology, and social welfare benefits? How much of its national budget must the U.S. allocate to military expenditures? How can the national budget priorities be changed so there is a more realistic funding of social programs? Do we face as great a threat of nuclear annihilation in the '70's and the '80's as we did in the early '60's?

These are some of the questions the editors asked of 96 "experts" on the warfare-welfare problem. In all, 18 persons responded to the invitation, including 22% of the social scientists (N=11), 10% of the writers and editors (N=1), 25% of the executives of peace organizations (N=5), 10% of the elected government officials (N=1), and none of the military leaders. The names and affiliations of participants are indicated on the following page.

The report that follows faithfully attempts to reproduce the opinions of these respondents on five of the questions asked. Other findings of the survey appear elsewhere in the Journal.

QUESTION 1. Despite the ending of the war in Southeast Asia and a general lessening of tensions among the major world powers, there has been a great increase in military expenditures in the United States. How much of its national budget must the U.S. allocate to military expenditures to guarantee its security in the world today--What is your estimate?

National security by military means is no longer a viable policy for the United States. With few exceptions, this is the strongly held opinion of the experts on warfare-welfare problems who responded to the survey. It is their estimate that modern weapons systems, e.g., intercontinental ballistic missiles carrying thermonuclear warheads, cannot defend this country from attack because if such weapons were used they would inevitably bring about retaliation and our demise. Furthermore, they say that the present U.S. policy of thermonuclear deterrence is a constant threat to our existence and the survival of the human race. It is unable to give us or others a sense of security. In fact, the fear of technological breakthrough generates a continuous search for new weapons of increasing destructiveness which create an escalating and immensely costly nuclear arms race.

One of the erroneous assumptions underlying the present commitment to building a vast military machine is that national security is exclusively or even primarily a military matter. These respondents consider a society with a strong economy and dedicated to social justice of prime importance. In this perspective, national...
security is more likely to be realized in a society which treats people in a fair and humane way than one that is committed to a "will-o'-the-wisp" search for national security by ever-increasing military expenditures. A fair and humane society would serve as a model for other countries to emulate.

There are many risks associated with a national policy of thermonuclear deterrence, according to the respondents, such as hidden, irrational, or accidental attacks and theft by terrorists or hostile governments. With the proliferation of nuclear
weapons, there is decentralization of control and a greater risk of human error and miscalculation.

The respondents estimate that military expenditures need to be cut drastically by: $25 billions (Gulick); $30 to $40 billions (Clark); $57½ billions (Dumas and Rosen); and $75 to $85 billions (Camson and Snyder). Herbert Gans suggests a cut in the military budget by over 90%—this would mean a reduction for the Pentagon (not including military-related expenditures) from its present $113 billions "to $5 to $10 billions." But he points out that such a recommendation is "mere fantasy" because "no leader has enough power to neutralize his or her own military establishment, and my fantasy ignores the geopolitical and other group factors that push nations into war or belligerence."

David Gil and Mulford Sibley recommend that no funds at all be provided for military purposes because the armed forces today are unable to guarantee the national security. In addition, Mulford Sibley notes that one major obstacle preventing such a turnabout is our enslavement to "the mythology that military violence and its threat can somehow provide security for human beings and democratic institutions." Also:

"With the elimination of the armed forces, all expenditures budgeted for military functions in the national budget should be transferred to functions meeting genuine human needs at home and abroad." (Gil)

However, Morris Janowitz suggests a relatively small cut of $7 to $8 billions. This would mean, according to his view, that the Pentagon's budget would be "reduced over the years ahead to 6 or 7 percent without endangering national security."

Others call for an immediate cut of $40 billions in military spending and the elimination of two specific programs: the multi-billion dollar weapon systems, the B-1 Bomber and Trident (missile) submarine (Clark).

Still others did not specify the amount of military cuts, and Albert Schreking cautions that military spending is larger than it appears. For example, many military and military-related programs (e.g., veterans' benefits, about 80% of the national debt, etc.) are hidden under other categories in the Federal Budget.

"... about two-thirds of our national budget have been allotted to the military in recent years, and that the Nixon-Ford administration has been juggling figures to support their false contention that there has been an increasing share of our national budget for what they call 'human resources'."

Several examples are cited:

"Payments from Social Security trust funds have been included under the latter heading [human resources]; so have also been payments to war veterans, while money expended for military purposes in interest for war debts and for the space program has been juggled away from the 'defense' designation."
In summary, the consensus indicates the need to reduce significantly military and military-related (hidden) expenditures in the Federal Budget. The reason is evident: the present U.S. overkill posture not only would destroy our adversaries but also ourselves and the rest of the world. Moreover, a decision to use such weapons, according to the respondents, would be an insane decision that would bring down upon us and the rest of the world Armageddon.

Therefore, it becomes a primary goal to end the arms race, to support peace initiatives for meaningful cutbacks in arms production and stockpiling.

QUESTION 2. Given the quantity and distribution of world resources, do you think it possible for any single nation by itself to provide for both its social security and national defense at the same time? Is the policy of both guns and butter a feasible one for the United States today?

Only two respondents give an unqualified positive response to this question: Walter Friedlander's affirmative answer is with no further comment, but Morris Janowitz adds:

"The U.S., or any advanced industrialized society, could adequately provide both for Social Security [social programs] and national defense. This is especially the case for the U.S., where the basic issue is that of reducing unemployment and especially increasing the proportion of the gross national product allocated to investment and capital goods. In the developing countries, the task of raising the standard of living is staggering, but in no sense is it critically related to the level of military expenditures in those countries. Reduction in the level of military expenditures would be desirable but would hardly produce the necessary changes in the social and political institutions of these countries required for effective societal change."

Associated with several other ostensibly affirmative answers are comments which significantly change their initial positive responses. An example of this is:

"The key to doing so [providing both adequate social and military security], however, is understanding realistically which level and composition of expenditures on military forces are actually effective in providing good military security, and which are either useless or counterproductive. Presently the military sector commands far too great a share of the nation's limited resources. A policy of 'unlimited guns and butter' is not feasible for the U.S. today--but a policy of 'security and butter' is." (Dumas)

Alfred Lee and Pauline Rosen believe that providing both adequate social and military security might be possible for the U.S. for a limited period of time. But both agree as military expenditures escalate, social programs are crippled or wiped out. Very recent experience seems to bear out this contention:
"Guns and what they control become progressively more costly and lead to the loss of colonial and neocolonial controls as well as to the destruction of the nation's own internal morale. Our Korean and Vietnam ventures have, for the time, taught a lot of rank-and-file Americans how costly such imperialistic efforts are, but our politicians do not appear to have ceased being tools of international adventurers." (Lee)

Nine respondents give an unqualified "no" to this question. Their general reasoning is:

"No country, even the richest, can realistically undertake a military/foreign policy of playing world policeman and running an arms race in nuclear weapons, and, at the same time, meet complex domestic needs. In theory, guns and butter are possible. In practice, guns prevail because governments generally are willing to pay for the resources--both physical and human--that go into military preparations." (Gottlieb)

"Without regard to other nations, I believe the U.S. can provide for both its social security and its national defense at the same time if, and only if, national 'defense' is not national 'offense'. Assuredly, the continental limits of the U.S. can be adequately defended, while at the same time, provision can be made for the legitimate social and economic requirements of our people. In the classic sense I do not believe that we can have both guns and butter." (Clark)

The remaining seven respondents state explicitly that a policy of both "guns and butter" is not feasible, appropriate, or politically possible for the U.S. (Gil, Gulick, Harris, Snyder, Sibley, Costigan, and Schrekinger) Sibley identified the basic incompatibility between the two policies:

"Guns, whether possessed by individuals or States, are a heart-thrust at welfare and bread and butter. The gun mythology so characteristic of the United States, whether in the form of so-called military defense or in that of individual weaponry, simply has to be eroded. We have to choose between guns and butter. But it should not be a difficult choice since guns cannot feed us, clothe us, house us, or protect us."

In summary, with only two exceptions, the respondents believe that it is not possible to have an adequate military defense and provide for the social needs of the American people. Adequate military defense and provision for social needs are in irreconcilable conflict because human and natural resources are limited.

Most respondents realize that military defense in the thermonuclear age is not only prohibitively costly, but also there is no defense against such barbaric instruments of indiscriminate mass destruction. With this recognition, these respondents advocate moving resources from the military to the civilian sector. They make a priority choice for using scarce resources to meet some unmet social and economic needs.
of tens of millions of Americans and billions of our neighbors. The results of such efforts would bring some semblance of social justice on the planet in which we all live.

QUESTION 3. Is it possible to have an equitable redistribution of the world resources without recourse to war and the threat of war?

All respondents answered in the negative. These answers, however, reflect two different but related ways of looking at the question. One perspective emphasized the need for major changes by peaceful means of the status quo to effect a more equitable distribution of the world's resources, but recognized that such changes are unlikely because of the political climate and related factors. (Clark, Costigan, Dumas, Friedlander, Gamson, Harris, Levy, Rosen, and Schrekinger)

The other perspective stressed the reactionary nature of modern war. War not only serves to perpetuate present inequities, but also creates many new ones. (Gil, Gottlieb, Gulick, Janowitz, Lee, Sibley, and Snyder)

Only in a theoretical or abstract sense can this question be answered positively; when political and related factors are weighed, the question must be answered negatively. This conclusion was reached by our respondents because they believe that an equitable redistribution of the world's resources is realizable only in a reconstituted international framework. Numerous statements represent this view:

"It is entirely possible to have equitable distribution of world resources without recourse to war or threat of war. However, this will take far more skillful multi-lateral diplomacy than either the U.S. or the countries of the Third World are engaging in at present. In essence it requires a far stronger role in international affairs by the U.N." (Clark)

"Theoretically, it is perfectly possible [to have an equitable redistribution of the world's resources], but this would involve international planning and cooperation on a scale that seems unlikely at present." (Costigan)

"It is economically possible through the development and expansion of mutually beneficial, non-exploitive trade, and some international transfers, though considerable time may be required. But as to whether it is politically possible, that is a different matter entirely." (Dumas)

The theoretical versus the practical dichotomy is echoed:

"It is possible to have an equitable distribution of the world's resources without recourse to war, if the international community could move rapidly toward a New International Order which guarantees to all nations the right to develop and use their own resources." (Rosen)
World Public Expenditures, 1974

In 1974 only education, by a narrow margin, took more public revenue than arms programs. Public spending for the health care of 4 billion people was 60% of military spending. World economic aid was under 1% international peacekeeping outlays far less than 1% of military expenditures.

World Military Expenditures

Cumulative 1960-1974

$2,608,000,000,000


World Economic Aid

Cumulative 1960-1974

$125,000,000,000


Consumer Prices

Index: 1960 = 100

Developing nations

Developed nations

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The lack of an appropriate consensus and the absence of the necessary world institutions to bring about an equitable redistribution of the world's resources are clearly recognized, but few respondents attempt to identify what needs to be done to make this possible. However, they do not hesitate to condemn modern war because its results would destine the human race to a new form of barbarism where even more gross disparities of wealth would exist between nations than at present.

According to Lee:

"Given the nature of the principal power centers of the world, it is highly unlikely that an equitable distribution of world resources can come about without recourse to war. Such a war would be of such destructive and revolutionary magnitude that it would achieve results far different from those presumably sought. It would probably return humanity to a lower technological level of barbarism than the present one."

The double-edged nature of the modern war machine is well-stated in this brief quotation:

"In the age of nuclear weapons, recourse to war would likely destroy many of the resources themselves. The threat of war will likely lead to widespread waste of resources in needless military preparations." (Gottlieb)

The validity of the first statement in the above quotation is easily understood, but the same thing cannot be said about the last statement. Even if the world is lucky enough to avoid a man-made catastrophe, humankind is still faced with the spectacle of unimaginable amounts of both natural and human resources being ravenously devoured by an unsatiable war machine which is not under rational control.

War and the threat of war require huge military expenditures and a resulting drain not only on this country's but also the world's limited resources. The dimensions of waste are better understood when considering the amount of human and natural resources expended not only in waging war but also in maintaining the Nixonian "structure of peace." War seen in this light becomes of primary concern to the conservationist; not only war, but preparations for war, are conservation issues.

Joseph Harris believes the present U.S. economic system and related foreign policy are the primary barriers preventing the shift of resources from the rich to the poor countries:

"Equitable redistribution of the world's resources from ownership and control by large corporations to the control of the working people of each nation is possible, but not inevitable, without recourse to war and threat of war... If the U.S. government could be forced to keep its hands off other nations, peaceful change would become the rule rather than the exception."
And, along similar lines:

"In the abstract it would be possible to distribute . . . the world's resources equally. However, in fact, large amounts of these resources are controlled by different countries and different multinational corporations which have demonstrated that they are unwilling to give up their fiefdoms without resort to violence. Therefore the answer . . . is no, although the source of violence will be found in those who already dominate world resources and who will seek to expand their control of them." (Levy)

Lloyd Dumas and William Gamson offer a glimmer of hope for change by peaceful means of the present imbalance of the world's resources:

"If we are talking about a pure redistribution of resources, that would require that these individuals living in the more developed countries would have to voluntarily undergo considerable reduction in their own standards of living in order to enhance the material quality of life of people in the less developed countries. It seems doubtful that they would ever do so, and it is difficult to blame them for offering resistance. However, if, instead, we are talking about the convergence of the standards of living in the world's nations over time by faster growth of the less developed relative to the more developed countries . . . a supporting consensus could be developed peacefully and without coercion. I don't know that such a consensus should be expected to develop automatically, but it certainly could be developed.

"It would also be helpful to put greater emphasis on the developments of technologies associated with resources which are already fairly equitably distributed. Solar energy is probably the outstanding example. Sunlight is probably the most equitably distributed and abundant energy resource available. It cannot be monopolized, cartelized, or otherwise restricted or embargoed, either internationally or intranationally. The full development and dissemination of solar technology would provide even resource-poor nations with at least the critical energy resources required for economic development and the continued operation of modern technical society." (Dumas)

"War is unlikely to be the means for redistribution of the world's wealth because the have-nots are unlikely to fare very well in such conflicts, given that they are militarily weaker as well as poorer. Probably the best hope for redistribution comes from internal movements and forces within the peaceful and wealthier countries." (Gamson)

QUESTION 4. Do you think that nuclear annihilation is and will be as great a threat in the '70's and '80's as it was in the early 1960's? Is civilian defense against nuclear annihilation possible?
Of the 16 respondents answering this question, 13 believe that the threat of nuclear war will be as great (4) or greater (9) in the 1970's and 1980's as it was in the 1960's. Only three thought it would be less of a threat; the reason given is the lessening of tensions between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. (two of the respondents specifically mentioned detente). But two of these respondents believe that nuclear proliferation is increasing the danger of a nuclear war being launched by smaller nations who have recently acquired nuclear capability in the form of licensed nuclear power plants provided by the established nuclear powers.

The 13 respondents who see imminent dangers in the present thermonuclear arms race cite numerous reasons for the heightening of world tensions and the ominous threat of nuclear destruction. They range from mistrust of present leadership and attitudinal changes toward nuclear war to current nuclear strategies. Of the threat of nuclear war, Senator Joseph Clark makes this observation:

"This is because of the short-sighted and stupid diplomacy on behalf of not only the Soviet Union and the U.S. but also of the many of the dictatorships in other nations . . . I call attention to the statement of five nuclear scientists at MIT and Harvard, who recently declared the threat of nuclear warfare is increasing, not decreasing."

Paralleling the above statement, Richard Levy says:

"As long as people like Nixon, Ford, and Kissinger are in a position to plunge the world into nuclear catastrophe, the possibility of such an occurrence cannot be ignored. With regard to the U.S., I feel the change in Administration will make little difference in the likelihood of nuclear war: Kennedy brought us to the brink in Cuba; Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, and Ford all viciously bombed Southeast Asia. Nixon perhaps was more dangerous in some ways, due to his mental instability; Ford, on the other hand, is perhaps more dangerous because of his 'quiet' conservatism and his desire to be 'resolute', e.g. the Mayaguez slaughter."

Lloyd Dumas comments on the significant attitudinal changes occurring during the past three decades which have increased the dangers inherent in the present nuclear arms race:

"It seems as though people, having lived with nuclear weapons longer, have become less afraid of them. An entire generation, not yet born at the time of the [atomic] bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, has grown to maturity. Children in their infancy at the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis are now in their mid-teens. The trauma of the conventional war in Vietnam diverted attention from the nuclear arena for the better part of a decade. All this may have led to a combination of ignorance and diminished fear of nuclear annihilation which is not justified by hard military and political reality."

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Several respondents emphasize the recent dangerous shift in U.S. nuclear weapons strategy. The comments of Admiral La Roque and Lloyd Dumas are illustrative:

"In addition to building increasing numbers of new weapons, the Pentagon has initiated a series of significant and dangerous changes in U.S. nuclear weapons' doctrine. These doctrinal changes will make nuclear war more likely and increase the danger. . . . The new U.S. nuclear doctrine involves, first, increased emphasis on counterforce and the desirability and possibility of fighting small nuclear wars, and second, increased emphasis on possible first use of both strategic and tactical nuclear weapons in response to aggression in Europe and Asia. The idea of limited counterforce wars--or a selective limited Soviet first strike against a few U.S. missile silos--and a comparable U.S. response--is an extremely dangerous idea. There is no way nuclear war can be kept limited. . . . We and the Soviets have no actual combat experience with such wars, and the idea that we can actually fight such a war is the product of academic theorists with no significant military experience. . . . The U.S. has no way of determining that a nuclear attack is in fact limited, and military prudence would likely result in rapid escalation of such a limited war." (La Roque)

"The resurrection of the strategic doctrine of 'counterforce' or 'pre-emption', i.e. first strike destruction of enemy [nuclear] weaponry, has clearly increased the danger of general nuclear war. The easiest way for an enemy to assure that its deterrent (or first strike) force will not 'be destroyed' by a pre-emptive attack is for it to launch its weapons before the attack force arrives. Thus, the brilliant counterforce strategy has merely succeeded in providing an incentive for the enemy to move its finger closer to 'the button' and to press it more readily when serious confrontation occurs. . . . In addition, scenarios and strategies for fighting 'limited' nuclear wars have apparently proliferated despite the fact that no one has yet been able to offer a persuasive logic for how such wars can be prevented from degenerating into all-out nuclear holocaust. But the more we play with these limited war scenarios, and the more we fantasize about being able to fight limited and hence 'acceptable' nuclear wars, the more we are at risk of fooling ourselves into believing our own fantasies. Under these conditions the 'unthinkable' act of purposely precipitating a nuclear war becomes 'thinkable', and this is an extraordinarily dangerous situation." (Dumas)

Several other factors are seen as perpetuating the fears and anxieties associated with the continuing nuclear arms race: the increasing numbers of nuclear weapons, with more people having access to them; the increase probability of accident, miscalculation, and unauthorized use. (Gottlieb, Janowitz, Rosen, and Snyder) Also, Alfred Lee believes nuclear annihilation is not only "likely to become a greater threat, but it is likely to be linked with even greater horrors still germinating in our laboratories, possibly in the areas of novel poisons and diseases."
Several respondents refer to civilian defense, but in several instances there is a lack of clarity on what that term means. In these cases the term "civilian defense" is interpreted as civil defense. The latter, of course, is commonly understood to mean comprehensive planning and preparations for protecting a civilian population from nuclear attack by planes or missiles. Gorman, Gottlieb, Janowitz, and Snyder unanimously agree that civil defense cannot protect a nation from nuclear attack, in fact may even tend to provoke it. This point is dealt with by Edward Snyder:

"... A determined civil defense program might well make an attack more likely if viewed by the 'enemy' as part of a first-strike policy. If by 'civilian defense' you mean a nation organized along lines of non-violent resistance, that policy might well prevent a nuclear attack from occurring and be at least as feasible a way to defend against aggression as the present bankrupt military defense policy."

A similar view of civilian defense is embraced by Mulford Sibley:

"The only hope against nuclear annihilation is the destruction of this mythology [of the efficacy of military violence] and reliance solely on non-violent means of 'defense'. Non-violence means--the promotion of justice and the organization of non-violent resistance--cannot guarantee security, to be sure, but they are far more compatible with it than threat of military violence. The question is one of where we pin our faith. Both reliance on violence and reliance on justice and non-violence involve acts of faith and a measure of uncertainty. On the basis of historical experience, however, it seems to me that reliance on justice and non-violence is a more justifiable faith than confidence in military might."

All respondents recognize the immense dangers involved in the present nuclear arms race and see the risks increasing unless there is a reversal of present policies. Several concrete proposals are made to reduce the level of present nuclear stockpiles and the number of delivery systems. Albert Schrekinger proposes:

"There is an increasing threat to life on this planet, even from the proliferation of 'peaceful' uses of nuclear energy, until safe ways have been found for the operation of nuclear plants and for the disposal of nuclear waste. To safeguard human and any other life on this planet, first a world-wide moratorium on any kind of further construction of nuclear energy plant is necessary. Simultaneously, serious steps must be taken towards complete universal disarmament as the top priority in the gradual complete disarmament, as a vital part of the development toward an international order of peace and welfare. In the meantime, international compacts need to be made for effective controls against any abuses of nuclear devices for violence against human beings."

The Hon. Joseph Clark lists several initial steps:

1. A comprehensive nuclear test ban.
2. Elimination of all land-based nuclear delivery systems and their warheads.
4. Stop all trade in arms to other countries.

A third list is made by Admiral Gene La Roque:
1. All nuclear powers renounce the use of such weapons against countries that do not possess them.
2. A "no first use" agreement among the present nuclear powers.
3. The U.S. should announce that under no circumstances will it be the first to use nuclear weapons.
4. Both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. take immediate steps to limit and reduce their stockpiles of nuclear weapons.

QUESTION 6. How can the national budget priorities in the United States be changed so that there is a more realistic funding of social programs?

Eleven of 14 respondents believe that a political movement or new political party is necessary to bring about changes in national budget priorities to provide adequate funds for social programs. Present priorities are determined by groups which shape and control the decision-making processes; thus it is possible for them to promote their interests successfully. However, there is no common agreement of how these processes work.

Some tend to see power residing with established institutions and political structures; others see power abiding with less clearly definable groups which are outside or marginal to the established political processes. Regardless of these differences in perception and analyses, all believe that if you want to determine budget priorities then it is necessary to be in a position to influence these priorities by having access to the decision-making processes; access, of course, is not limited to being a part of the formal power structure. Clark, Costigan, and Janowitz believe significant changes can be achieved by working through the established political parties and structures.

"The national budget priorities can be changed only by the strongly expressed will of the people, manifested in the elections for Congress, the Senate, and the Presidency." (Clark)

In contrast, "broader political processes" are seen as necessary for social change and the desired budget priorities. William Gamson believes that the process involves "... more than electoral and other established institutional means, and includes social protest and social movements as well." David Gil expresses this view:
"Changes require a political movement committed to work for them for a long time. Social systems are intrinsically conservative. To overcome a prevailing order, one has to overcome the dominant consciousness and definitions of interest of the people which maintain it. This is an extended process."

Sibley and Lee believe that a new political party or a different economic system are vehicles for social change:

This "... will probably require a broadly based new political party no longer tied to the cliches and evasions of the two major parties. The party will have to be divorced from the war machine and will have to be critical of the citadels of an economy which is not designed primarily to serve human needs. Basically, the party should be pacifist." (Sibley)

"As long as our elected officials depend upon special interest donors to win elections, our national budget priorities will continue to represent--as they do now--those special interests. The situation can only be changed through democratizing the control of the means of production and of the means for the provision of services in this country. That means a change to democratic socialism." (Lee)

The need for a broad political movement or a new political party is also shared by Gans, Gulick, Harris, Levy, and Schrekinger.

Eleven respondents emphasize the important role of public education in reshaping national budget priorities. Sibley describes how this would work:

"Only by a vast expansion of our educational efforts, particularly in the adult education area [will the desired changes take place]. This will entail the efforts of millions of unpaid persons and considerable sacrifices of money and time. Essentially, we have to debunk certain mythologies while at the same time building the constructive case for a welfare society. . . .

"... Most of us, in one way or another, still labor within the framework of such mythologies as that military defense defends; that somehow there is something wrong about making 'welfare' central; that human beings must be goaded by threat of starvation to get them to work; that all technological development benefits mankind."

Two important problem areas where concentrated educational efforts are needed are identified by Gans:

"First, . . . every society develops the social programs that benefits its dominant power blocs. In the U.S., the business community is surely still one of these blocs, and it gets plenty of the social programs that benefit it, i.e. low taxes, tax loopholes, and government subsidies. Second, I do not
think there will ever be sufficient political support for social programs of
the kind you ask about until people discover that such programs are essential
to them--either being deprived of them, or by obtaining them at a very high
quality, as they define quality. Until then, people will continue to think
of government spending as waste and as a deduction from income they can spend
privately."

One of the sources of undue political influence not specifically mentioned, but
assumed by the respondents, is the military establishment. How the military in-
fluences the political processes in this country is one of the important questions
that need to be answered; it is of primary concern of individuals in groups work-
ing for social change in this country. Former Senator J. W. Fulbright several
years ago wrote of the influence of the Pentagon on public opinion in his book,
The Pentagon Propaganda Machine. This study not only needs to be brought up to
date, but also new ground needs to be broken. Some examples are: What roles do
retired officers' and veterans' organizations play in promoting military spending?
What role does the C.I.A. play in our domestic politics in promoting the need for
a strong U.S. military posture? How can we get our Congressmen or Senators to
vote against military appropriations when many of their constituents hold jobs
directly or indirectly supported by such funds? How can we get rid of this self-
perpetuating system (the tie between Congress, the Pentagon, and the people)?
What roles do institutions and associations (Chambers of Commerce, Unions, Profes-
sional Organizations, Trade and Defense Contractors' Associations, Universities
and Colleges, and many others) play in moulding public sentiment in support of a
big military establishment?

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