January 1978


Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/jssw

Part of the Social Work Commons, and the Sociology Commons

Recommended Citation
Available at: https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/jssw/vol5/iss1/1

This Complete Issue is brought to you for free and open access by the Social Work at ScholarWorks at WMU. For more information, please contact maira.bundza@wmich.edu.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Editorial

A Political Economy Critique of the American Welfare State
GERBEN DeJONG .................................................. 1

Social Control or Social Wage: On the Political Economy of the "Welfare State."
PAUL ADAMS .................................................. 46

The "Casework Notebook": An Analysis of Its Content
LESLIE B. ALEXANDER
PHILIP LICHTENBERG ............................................. 55

The Measurement of Personal Influence in Organization and Community
ROGER A. LOHMANN ............................................... 66

Receiving Help: Management Strategies of the Handicapped
NANCY A. BROOKS ................................................ 91

The MSW and the MPA: Confrontation of the Two Professions in Public Welfare
THOMAS H. WALZ
HARRY J. MACY .................................................. 100

Parity, Family Size Preference and the "Value Stretch"
VIRGINIA ALDIGE HIDAY
STEVEN POLGAR .................................................. 118

The Guns or Butter Issue: Trends in American Public Opinion, 1935 - 1976
DARREL MONTERO ................................................ 135
EDITORIAL

The tradition involving editorials in Journals is to provide the editor the opportunity to elaborate on why the particular articles in the issue were chosen and how they tend to supplement, compliment or contradict one another.

In this editorial we want to thank all the many people who have contributed to the success of this endeavor. Our editorial board has labored long and hard. Our contributors are very important. Their efforts enable us to have the fine articles we publish. Most important are our subscribers, for without their support this Journal could not exist. This Journal receives no subsidy from any source. We are not affiliated with any dues-paying association. Our only source of income is from our subscribers.

As a non-profit endeavor we aim to provide opportunities for all our colleagues to communicate with one another in the most economical fashion possible. The reason this volume is being printed on pink paper is that we were able to negotiate with our printer a contract that enabled us to maintain our subscription rate within the slightest increase possible. This is the first increase in the five year history of this Journal.

We hope you will continue to find this Journal useful in your work. We ask you to help us by encouraging a colleague and your institution to subscribe.

Have a good year.

For all of us associated with the Journal—

Thank you.

Norman N. Goroff
Editor
A POLITICAL ECONOMY CRITIQUE
OF THE AMERICAN WELFARE STATE*

Gerben DeJong
Brandeis University

ABSTRACT

Despite its rapid expansion over the last decade, the American welfare state appears unable to remedy many of the social problems it has been designated to solve. In many instances, the welfare state has become as much a part of the problem as the solution. Unfortunately, most proposals to reform the welfare state do not go beyond the liberal-conservative conception of the welfare state as a backup to the capitalist market system. This conception of the welfare state is part of a larger commitment to a free market-pluralist ideology that singles out certain social phenomena as problematic and limits the range of interventions considered acceptable. Thus, the welfare state's ideological commitments create a built-in tendency to maintain the status quo.

Political economy is presented here as a particular analytic perspective that challenges the values and assumptions of the free market-pluralist ideology and thus offers a critique of the American welfare state that cannot be formulated within the free market-pluralist conception of reality.


I would like to thank Reginald K. Carter, David G. Gil, Elliott Sclar, and Roland L. Warren for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article.
I
INTRODUCTION

Many individuals and groups have acknowledged that various sectors of the American welfare state are in need of reform but few, except the most conservative, have been willing to declare that the present welfare state is fundamentally unsound. This pessimistic assessment is a far cry from the optimism that ushered in the Great Society a decade ago. The underlying assumption of the Great Society was that our social problems could be remedied with a quantum expansion of the welfare state. During the past ten years (1965-1975) we have seen the American welfare state expand by $165.2 billion in constant dollars. (See Table 1.) In 1965 the welfare state comprised 11.8 percent of our gross national product. Ten years later it was 20.1 percent. Yet our social problems have not withered away. In fact, it seems as if our social problems increase in proportion to the size of the welfare state.

Consider two examples. First, in the area of income support we have observed that the public assistance and social service programs authorized under the Social Security Act have fostered increasing economic dependency despite their avowed goal of making people economically self-sufficient. In 1965, 7.1 million people received public assistance payments. Ten years later, that figure more than doubled to 15.5 million (U.S. Social Security Administration, 1976:66&70). Second, in the health care industry we have seen how Medicare and Medicaid have contributed to the rising cost of medical care thus threatening to price middle income groups out of the health care market. The income protection goals of Medicare

---

1Many other features of the health economy are also contributing to the rise in the cost of medical care. Perhaps a more accurate interpretation would be to say that health care providers have taken advantage of the opportunities in Medicare and Medicaid to raise costs. Nevertheless, the real spurt in the medical care component of the Consumer Price Index did start in 1966, the year in which Medicare and Medicaid became effective. (See, for example, Stuart, et.al, 1973:49-52; U.S. Social Security Administration, 1976:79-80, Tables M-40 and M-41). Some argue that it is the relative price increase of medical care and not the absolute increase that is important. From that perspective, Medicare and Medicaid are not seen as contributors to medical cost inflation, but instead,
TABLE 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social Insurance</td>
<td>$10.3</td>
<td>$18.1</td>
<td>$32.1</td>
<td>$44.2</td>
<td>$73.4</td>
<td>$123.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Aid</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>40.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health &amp; Medical&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>13.1&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>16.6&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veterans Services</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>16.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>44.2</td>
<td>68.3</td>
<td>78.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Other</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total WSE</td>
<td>49.1&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>60.0&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>87.0&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>121.3&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>195.7&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>286.5&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNP</td>
<td>549.9</td>
<td>698.0</td>
<td>824.6</td>
<td>1,030.8</td>
<td>1,281.6</td>
<td>1,424.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WSE Percent of GNP</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
<td>8.6%</td>
<td>10.6%</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
<td>15.3%</td>
<td>20.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<sup>a</sup>This figure is somewhat misleading. For example, Medicare and Medicaid expenditures are listed under social insurance and public aid expenditures respectively.

<sup>b</sup>Includes small rounding error.
and Medicaid have been frustrated. The elderly who were assumed to be among the major beneficiaries of these programs now spend the same proportion of their own income for medical care as they did before these programs were introduced.

There have been two basic responses to the problems of the welfare state. There is the conservative response that seeks to dismantle the welfare state. Conservatives see the present situation as an exoneration of their original position that the welfare state should never have come into existence in the first place. Liberals look at the present situation with a false sense of self-confidence: program failure is seen as proof that either not enough resources were allocated to do the job or that programs were poorly administered.

Although an increasing number of "liberals" have become philosophically disillusioned and are beginning to echo the "conservative" refrain of self-reliance and fiscal frugality, the welfare state is not about to collapse. First, many within the liberal establishment are dependent on the generosity of the welfare state for their own economic well-being. They are the professionals and service providers. They are not likely to recommend solutions or reforms that are inconsistent with their own economic and professional interests. Second, the social problems the welfare state addresses are real ones. In the absence of an alternative, government must continue to ameliorate these problems the best it can. Failure to do so is to risk increased social conflict.

Thus we are presented with two alternatives: less of the same or more of the same. Yet, more and more of us have a nagging suspicion that the problems of the welfare state are more complex than that suggested by either of these two points of view. It is my contention that the conservative and liberal critiques of the welfare state are severely limiting and thus do not offer meaningful solutions. The conservative and liberal conceptions only address the symptoms and fail to deal with the underlying system that has made the welfare state necessary in the first place.

are seen as one step along a long-term trend. This particular analytic perspective is evident in Heagy, et al., (1976:20-23).

For a discussion on this point, see Harris (1975:19-22, 464-465).
II
THE FREE MARKET IDEOLOGY

Liberalism has sometimes been called the welfare state's official ideology. However true this statement may be, the differences between liberals and conservatives are small relative to their common commitment to the free market system. It is this commitment that shapes the welfare state and defines its role in society. Because of its call for governmental intervention in the capitalist market system, liberalism is usually not thought to be a free market ideology. But this is to overlook the fact that liberalism takes the market system as its point of departure. It believes that economic and social dislocations are inevitable as the market adjusts to new pressures and as the market moves to greater efficiency. The role of government in the welfare state is to meet the needs of those who become the casualties of these adjustments. There is nothing intrinsically wrong with the market system but government is needed to modify capitalism in order to minimize socially destabilizing inequities.

It is the thesis of this article that the American welfare state cannot be understood apart from its commitment to the free market ideology that views the welfare state as a backstop to the capitalist market system. The welfare state's ideological commitments define both the problems and methods deemed appropriate for intervention. Most efforts attempting to analyze the shortcomings of the welfare state fail because they seldom go beyond the self-limiting assumptions of the welfare state's ideological commitments. By challenging the values and assumptions of these commitments, political economy -- as a particular analytic perspective to be described later -- offers an analysis that enables us to understand the failures of the welfare state. Our failure to shift the debate to these underlying values and assumptions in large part accounts for our inability to deal with the problems of the welfare state.

Because the political economy critique of the American welfare state cannot be wholly separated from its analysis of free market ideology, it is necessary to describe in some detail the various values and assumptions of that ideology.

Individualism

Free market ideology begins with certain assumptions about the nature of humans and their relationship to the larger society. It
assumes that people are basically selfish, acquisitive, and act primarily in their own self-interest. Such self-interest is said to be rational: each individual seeks to maximize pleasure and minimize pain. This utilitarian principle is the cornerstone of modern consumer demand theory. In the parlance of neoclassical economic theory, "man" is a utility maximizer: given a choice between two commodities, A and B, an individual will choose those quantities of A and B that will maximize "his" utility subject to the constraint of "his" income.

No value judgement can be made about the validity of each person's interest. Each person is the best judge of his or her own interests; individual utility is a personal matter. The satisfaction which one individual receives cannot be compared to that received by a second individual. In other words, interpersonal utility comparisons are not possible.

Individual self-interest is also the basis for determining societal well-being. Each person advances the community's interest by pursuing his or her own interests. Put the other way around, the community's well-being is seen as a mere aggregation of individual well-being. The importance of this lies in the fact that since interpersonal utility comparisons cannot be made, there exists no a priori or rational basis for income redistribution. Thus, redistribution tends to be limited to the most severe forms of income deprivation.

Perfect Competition and its Modifications

Individual self-interest is translated into aggregate social well-being through the vehicle of the competitive market. A market is said to be competitive when certain criteria are met. If all are met, then the market is considered to be "perfectly competitive." The criteria for a perfectly competitive market are: (1) rational self-interest, (2) perfect knowledge by buyers and sellers of all present and future market conditions, (3) open access -- ease of entry and exit into the market, (4) smallness -- no buyer or seller sufficiently large to affect the price, and (5) undifferentiated products.

Of course, these assumptions and conditions are never fully attained in the real world. Nonetheless, to the extent to which they are partially attained, it is felt that a sufficiently competitive situation exists in which individual self-interest is, over time, translated into aggregate social well-being. In cases
where the criteria are severely violated, such as monopoly and oligopoly, it is usually held that these instances are isolated or are necessary to the "public interest" as in the case of public utilities.3

Free market economics has always been sufficiently robust to find some analytic justification for the existing distribution of economic power. Yet the perfectly competitive market remains the strictest construction of the free market ideology and the analytic point of departure. Perfect competition is not only normative for economic theory but also for political theory. Perfect competition has its political analogue in the theory of democratic pluralism where nearly identical assumptions obtain.

**Democratic Pluralism**

According to the pluralist model, the American political process is one in which competing interests organize into groups to rationally pursue their own interests by bargaining in the political market place. The market is governed by certain rules or "a procedural consensus."

The rules of the political market constitute the assumptions of the pluralist model. One of the rules is that there be freedom of entry and exit into the political market place. The open access assumption requires that there be no single group capable of denying other groups their right to participate in the political process. In the pluralist model, power and control are sufficiently distributed to prevent any group from becoming dominant, an

---

3 Although monopoly, oligopoly, and other market models require that the assumptions of perfect competition be relaxed, these models or modifications do not pose a fundamental threat to the neoclassical paradigm since all the tools of marginal analysis -- that are so central to the methodology of contemporary economics -- are still applicable.

Additional adjustments have been made to the perfect competition model in the theory of countervailing power. According to this theory, large and highly structured industries are not a matter of special concern because "...private economic power begets the countervailing power of those who are subjected to it" (Gailbraith, 1956:4). Countervailing powers tend to neutralize each other. Strong labor unions neutralize the power of oligopolistic industries; organized buyers neutralize powerful sellers. (Continued...)
assumption closely related to the premise in perfect competition
that no buyer or seller is sufficiently large to affect the price.
When one group seeks to advance its position by forming coalitions
with other groups, countervailing coalitions or forces are likely
to develop.

Bargaining is to the political process what bidding is to the
economic market. Because no group is sufficiently dominant in the
bargaining process, the various parties must compromise. By moving
to some compromise the system tends over time to be Pareto-optimal:
it will tend to make some groups better off without making others
worse off. Pareto-optimality is not a second-best solution but
the optimal solution. It constitutes the point of equilibrium -- the
point at which political and social harmony is achieved. Equilibrium
is the embodiment of the public interest.

In the pluralist system, the oscillations around a given issue
are fairly narrow always tending toward equilibrium. Changes are
seldom drastic but tend to be incremental or marginal. Such a
system is said to be self-regulating and inherently stable. The
automatic and mechanistic character of both perfect competition and
pluralism led Lowi (1969:47) to conclude that "[t]he hidden hand
of capitalistic ideology could clasp the hidden hand of pluralism,
and the two could shake affirmatively."

In the pluralist framework, the state is a neutral party to
the competition and the bargaining. The role of the state is to
enforce the rules of the game; to step in as an umpire only when
things get out of hand. The state acts as a stabilizer when the
system's automatic stabilizers malfunction.

The result, then, is a kind of market
equilibrium or invisible hand that
harmonizes the interests of all. The
harmonious whole is now simply made up
of a few neutralized giants rather than
numerous atomistically competitive small

The countervailing power theory demonstrates the adjustments
free market ideologists are prepared to make in order to preserve
a particular world view.
The neutrality of the state extends to the pluralist conception of the welfare state. The role of the welfare state is not to take sides, as for example, in the competition between labor and management or in the relationship between doctor and patient. It only acts as the supreme intermediary. By providing food stamp benefits to strikers it allegedly takes sides in labor-management disputes. On the other hand, by limiting its role to that of a financial intermediary in the Medicare-Medicaid program, the welfare state does not intrude in the doctor-patient relationship.

The pluralist model is also considered normative for decision making within the welfare state. The welfare state is seen as an entity comprised of competing interest groups -- consumers, providers, taxpayers, public interest organizations, and others. Much of welfare state policy is achieved through a bargaining process that is later ratified as a fait accompli by the Congress or another "neutral" authority having the power to enforce the terms of the agreement.

A broader political economic conception of society leads one to reject this view of pluralism and the welfare state. According to the political economy critique, the free market-pluralist conception of the welfare state obscures important social and economic realities that ultimately compromises the effectiveness of welfare state services.

III
CRITIQUE OF THE WELFARE STATE & ITS IDEOLOGY

As the term implies, political economy generally refers to the study of the interrelationship between politics and economics. Political economy, as I use it here, also refers to the study of that interrelationship but in a more specific sense: I am referring to a specific analytic paradigm that has developed over the last decade within the economics profession as a reaction to the excesses of neoclassical theory.

As an analytic paradigm, political economy has relied heavily on Karl Marx's critique of capitalism and has also borrowed from other traditions and disciplines. Although I may not agree with all the assumptions of political economy, I believe that as an analytic frame of reference, political economy does enable us to go beyond the limits of conventional social policy analysis.
To describe all the elements that make up the political economy paradigm is to go beyond the purpose of this article. Nonetheless, the political economy literature (Behr, et al., 1971; Gintis, 1972; Gordon, 1965; Gurley, 1971; Peabody, 1971; Sweezy, 1971; Weisskopf, 1971; Zwerg, 1971) suggests four main points around which we can organize our discussion of the welfare state: (1) class conflict and view of social change, (2) historicism and view of social consciousness, (3) alienation and view of labor, and (4) communitarianism and view of the individual. Together, these four rubrics offer us a framework for both a critique of the free market-pluralist ideology and a critique of the welfare state. In later sections of this article, the effectiveness of political economy as an analytic tool will be demonstrated from two selected sectors of the American welfare state.

Class Conflict and Social Change

The major drawback to the free market-pluralist world view is that it fails to take into account the fact that wealth and power are unequally distributed within the social system. It consistently views individuals and groups as having equal access to the political and economic decision making process. A central fact often ignored by pluralists is that those who come to the political marketplace with disproportionate economic power usually have the intellectual and political dexterity with which to maintain if not extend those advantages in the bargaining process. Pluralism ignores the economic basis of the political process. It assumes that the political arena is economically neutral. It is not. Interest group politics are usually loaded in favor of well-established minorities. As Schattschneider (1975:34-35) pointed out: "The flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper-class accent."

The exclusionary nature of the pluralist system also accounts for much of its conservatism. A pluralist system that oscillates within a few degrees of the point of equilibrium is not likely to tolerate large fluctuations in political thought or ideology.4

4 Political economy rejects the equilibrium thesis of free market-pluralist ideology. As observed here, the free market ideology assumes that there are harmonies of interests and then investigates the tendencies toward equilibrium. It assumes that change is gradual and nondisruptive. For political economy the concepts of conflict, struggle, and dialectic are most central. It assumes that under
Those already in the system have a vested interest in making sure that the equilibrium is not upset. Pre-existing power or class relationships are reinforced through marginal changes.

Put another way, the free market-pluralist ideology suffers from a basic inconsistency in its assumptions: the open access and rational self-interest assumptions are mutually exclusive. It is always in the interest of incumbent groups or classes to prevent incipient competitors from entering the market. Hence, the market, whether it be political or economic, has an inherent tendency to be monopolistic where one class or set of groups seeks to set the terms for another.

As a product of an economically loaded political process, the welfare state inevitably reflects the class tensions and economic differences that underly the political arena. The welfare state in large part serves the interests of those who are able to preserve their advantages in the political arena.

The notion of class differences is especially pronounced in the relationship between providers and recipients of welfare state
capitalism, the relationship between people are inherently antagonistic rather than harmonious.

According to Marx, class conflict and antagonism are rooted in the labor theory of value and in the social relations of production. Marx observed that owners of capital appropriated to themselves a certain portion of the exchange value of the working person's labor. He considered this exploitation by one class in society of another class to be the basic source of social conflict. Marx did not limit class struggle to owners and nonowners of capital. He saw class conflict as a phenomenon that permeated all social relationships, not merely those that center around the means of production. The political economy paradigm sees class struggle as extending to all groups who benefit disproportionately from the system versus those groups who continue to lose. Although many professionals and members of the intelligentsia are not owners of capital they owe "...their position, prosperity, and superior knowledge and education to privileges inherent in the capitalist system" and therefore become apologists for that system.

-11-
services -- a relationship that will receive considerable attention in later sections of this article. It is usually the providers, not the recipients who set the terms for the provision of health and welfare services. Despite their altruism, providers generally come from economically advantaged groups and are the main proponents of welfare state services in the political process. They tend to recommend intervention and service delivery strategies that are consistent with their professional interests. Welfare state services are often provided for the convenience of providers rather than consumers. Class differences are also intrinsic to distinctions such as doctor and patient, and social worker and client. Professionalism among welfare state providers has the latent function of maintaining class differences. These observations should lead us to wonder who the real beneficiaries of the welfare state are.

But class distinctions affect the welfare state in a more fundamental way. The welfare state helps to sustain a low-wage, marginal and sporadic labor force. Contrary to the protestations of business about the high cost of the welfare state, it remains in the interest of business to have a surplus population that can be hired at substandard wages. Directly or indirectly, business benefits from the existence of a welfare state that provides a wage supplement and what Galper (1973:37) calls "a back-up 'fringe benefit' program" for capitalism's residual labor force.

The welfare state is also an important instrument of social control. By making an economically surplus population dependent on its services, the welfare state is able to regulate and control the lives of those it purports to serve. Even while championing the cause of self-determination, service providers play a sinister game of social control in the professional-client relationship. The welfare state has also been used to stem the tide of social unrest. Recall the domestic pacification programs of the 1960's when services were rapidly expanded in the inner city after the so-called "ghetto riots."

The concept of class conflict is essential if we are to come to terms with problems such as income distribution, poverty, racism, sexism, or many of the other problems we are confronted with. At their root, each of these problems entail some form of exploitation by one group or another. Once a group or class has obtained advantages at the expense of another, it will seek to maintain those advantages, even covertly, through the welfare state which allegedly is designed to mitigate social disparities.
Thus, contrary to the free market-pluralist conception, the state is not a neutral party to the competition or a neutral regulator but a partisan of class interests. The role of the welfare state is not neutrality but one of stability in order to preserve the vested interests of advantaged groups or classes. Social welfare programs constitute but one instrument by which the state preserves the hegemony of the dominant classes.

Conventional political theory has tried to demonstrate its relevance to problems such as poverty and racial discrimination. The solution implicit in pluralism was to get the poor and disenfranchised into the arena -- hence, the passage of voting rights legislation, the development of community action agencies and the creation of model cities programs that were geared toward "maximum feasible participation." Although new groups were admitted to the political arena, they did not bargain on an equal footing; the arena as we have said was not economically neutral. The "screaming" and the "yelling" that at times characterized the participation of these groups only spoke to their powerlessness. They had no chips to cash in or favors to give out.

Academic economics has also tried to demonstrate its ability to deal with problems such as poverty and discrimination by looking at these problems as issues of inadequate human capital formation or as distortions in the labor market where individual labor is paid less than its marginal product. When looking at the problem of welfare versus work, neoclassical economic theory treats the problem as a special application of the income-leisure trade-off ignoring the larger issue of the inability of our economic system to provide sufficient work at an adequate wage.

In both political and economic theory, the analysis is reduced from the macro-societal level to the micro-individual level. Implicit in this reductionism is a view of social change. It places the burden of change on the individual, not society. Even in interest group theory, it is assumed that the deficiency rests with the inability of individual group members to organize and participate. Conventional political and economic analysts both ignore the fact that powerful class interests have a vested interest in keeping certain groups disorganized and dependent. It thus becomes easier to blame the victim, not society.

Historicism and Social Consciousness

If class conflict has its origin in the economic order, it should follow that ones perception of class interests or ones class
consciousness also has a material basis. Said Marx, "It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but, on the contrary, their social existence determines their consciousness" (quoted in Hunt, 1972:36). For political economists, the social and economic context is indispensable to understanding the ideas and ideologies that sustain a particular ordering of social reality.

Much of political economy's critique of the free market ideology is based on the observation that the ideology arises from a particular social and historical context. The free market conception of reality did not emerge out of a social and economic vacuum, nor did it emerge out of some historical void. For Marx, both the social and historical context were important as expressed in the concept of historical materialism. It was from this perspective that Marx developed his analysis of capitalism both as a social system and as an ideology.

Conventional economics, for example, tends to be very ahistorical. It examines economic and political phenomena independent of their historical context. Most economists do not see the world as changing. To quote Gorden (1965:124):

It is, I think, remarkable compared to the physical sciences that an economist's fundamental way of viewing the world has remained unchanged since the 18th century...it is a tribute to the supremacy of purely positivistic intellectual forces that such has been the case.

Moreover, neoclassists fail to see capitalism as only one form of economic organization that arose in a particular historical period. Many economists assume that some form of market economy has always existed. As a result, the history of economic thought has diminished as an important component of many American graduate programs in economics.

This same disregard for history and social context has all too often characterized the analysis of the welfare state. Like other public policies, the welfare state has emerged from a particular social economic context. The German welfare state started under Bismark as an attempt to head off even larger demands for social reform. In this country, the welfare state has gone through two
major periods of expansion: first in the 1930's and later in the 1960's. Both were periods of social unrest. As we shall see in later sections of this paper, there have also been other important forces that have shaped various sectors of the welfare state.

There is, however, one type of historical analysis that does creep into many studies of the welfare state. It is one where the welfare state is seen as the final form of social and political organization. The welfare state according to this perception is seen as the culmination of a long evolutionary process whereby raw unadulterated capitalism is tamed and harnessed to serve important social goals. This point of view affirms capitalism and fails to see welfare state capitalism as only one form of social organization emerging in a particular historical period. It is a culture-bound interpretation of the welfare state.

Alienation and Labor

Implicit in the income-leisure trade-off model used by economists to determine the effects of welfare and taxes on work, is an assumption that work is distasteful and lacks utility. Consequently, individuals only engage in work to earn income that gives them utility. It is true that much of work in modern society is distasteful. However, the distastefulness is not inherent in the work but in the social organization of that work. A wage dependent labor force sells its time for income upon which it can survive. Such a work force will be alienated from the time it spends at work. Our social system fails to see that work is more than a means of making money. It is also indispensable to individual self-realization and self-worth.

In a capitalist society, labor is merely another expense of production much like raw materials and machinery. Labor is reduced

---

6 The expansion of the early 1970's must be seen as part of a momentum that was begun in the 1960's.

7 This historical perspective can be seen in some of the essays included in a compendium edited by Charles I. Schottland (1967). A more conspicuous example is found in a work by Walter I. Trattner (1974) entitled From Poor Law to Welfare State: A History of Social Welfare in America. The title of Trattner's book suggests an evolutionary progression as well as a historical one.
to a commodity to be bought or sold like any other means of production. Man becomes a means, not an end. Under these circumstances people become alienated from their work. They no longer see work as a creative extension of themselves. Capitalism, with its emphasis on cost minimization and economies of scale, usually calls for a high division of labor. The final product does not contain the identity of the individual but the trademark of the organization. The individual surrenders his or her identity to the organization. S/he becomes identified by his or her organizational affiliation, not by his or her worth as an individual human being.

Although an individual's loss of control and autonomy has its origins in the capitalist wage system, it does not end at the workplace. Alienation begins to characterize other social relationships as well. Individuals feel powerless to determine the course of their lives or to affect the social policies that shape the quality of their lives. The ultimate degradation occurs when individuals become alienated from themselves and reduce themselves to commodities to be exchanged in the market. As Fromm (1967:129-130) put it:

His body, his mind and his soul are his capital, and his task in life is to invest if favorably, to make a profit of himself. Human qualities like friendliness, courtesy, kindness, are transformed into commodities, into assets of the "personality package," conducive to a higher price on the personality market. If the individual fails in making a profitable investment of himself, he feels that he is a failure; if he succeeds, he is a success. Clearly, his sense of his own value always depends on factors extraneous to himself, on the fickle judgement of the market, which decides about his value as it decides about the values of commodities. He, like all commodities that cannot be sold profitably on the market, is worthless as far as his exchange value is concerned, even though his use value may be considerable.

Thus, the market is not only the means by which goods and services are exchanged, but also becomes the standard by which individuals measure their own self-worth.

There is little in the arsenal of welfare state services to combat the pervasive effects of alienation. In fact, the welfare state is an accomplice to this social evil in two ways. First, its services are directed at transforming individuals into commodities (otherwise known as "rehabilitation") to be exchanged
in an impersonal market that channels them into low-level unfulfilling types of employment. Second, its services are provided by large impersonal bureaucracies that are in many ways the ultimate models of routinization and alienation. As long as the welfare state remains primarily committed to the maintenance of the private market and the supremacy of the profit criterion, it does not stand a reasonable chance of correcting problems that result from the alienation inherent in the capitalist system.

**Communitarianism and the Individual**

Capitalism not only undermines the individual, but also the community upon which the individual depends for much of his or her well-being. Community ties are considered inefficient in a capitalist market system. Capitalism requires a mobile population that is ready to move from job to job and place to place. Family and community loyalties are seen as barriers to the free movement of labor. From this perspective, welfare state policies serve two ends. First, they are instituted to provide certain social protections -- such as income support and social services -- that were once provided by extended families, religious parishes, or other community networks. Second, they are designed to facilitate the mobility of the work force. In this sense the welfare state is an indispensible chamber maid serving with dustpan and broom to clean up the mess made by the capitalist market system.

We are remiss, therefore, to look at the problems of the welfare state solely in terms of their programmatic deficiencies. Instead, we must focus our attention on the economic system that has generated the problems for the welfare state to solve. The welfare state is, however, fair game to the extent to which it incorporates the values of the economic system and thus perpetuates the problems created by capitalism.

Liberal apologists see the welfare state as a "cushion to the shocks of industrialism" (Frankel, 1967:208), that come as an inevitable and necessary by-product of economic development. According to Frankel (1967:208), a "growing and innovating industrial society cannot be composed of individuals so dependent on family and local associations that movement will cut them loose from all their social moorings." Implicit in this observation is a subtle assumption that economic and community development are
somehow mutually exclusive. They are not. The error in liberal reasoning is to mistake the necessities of industrialism for the consequences of capitalism. There is nothing in industrial development per se that is inherently incompatible with community development. There is something, however, in capitalism, as a special form of industrial development, that is inherently incompatible with community development.

Capitalism and its free market ideology have no conception of community. It does, however, have a very limited and narrow conception of society. Society is seen as a mere collection of autonomous individuals, each seeking his or her own interests. Social well-being is defined in terms of the individual: it is, as we observed earlier, merely the sum of each individual's utility function. Society is reduced to an aggregate social welfare function. It is nothing more than an aggregation of individuals getting as much as they can for themselves.

A rejection of individualism is not a rejection of individuality. The well-being of the individual is inseparable from the well-being of the community at large. The community has definition and integrity of its own; it is not merely a collection of individuals. The community is an environment that nurtures individual development. Communitarianism, as one might call it, is not a demand for excessive conformity as some fear, but is an invitation for mutual support. By contrast, capitalism and competition are often destructive of important human values.

If we achieve our successes in a competitive relationship with others, we will need to be on guard against them for fear that they'll try to take our gains from us... We will necessarily assume a guarded and uncomplimentary view of others that is destructive to the achievement of important human values, namely community, human warmth, and social integration (Galper, 1975:37).

---

8 I am reluctant to ascribe this assumption personally to Frankel. Although a defender of the welfare state, his defense is a qualified one. Nor is Frankel totally unaware of the welfare state's origins in capitalism. However, his description is typical of those used by many other liberals. Because his choice of words was particularly good, I elected to quote him here.
In short, capitalism, with its emphasis on competition and individualism, fosters ill-will that is destructive of societal and individual well-being. Community and mutual trust promote both societal and individual development.

* * *

In the next two sections, we will apply the framework we have developed to two different sectors of the welfare state: (1) Medicare and the health care industry, and (2) social services under the Social Security Act. The limits of space require that we be selective, but I believe that these two examples should help to demonstrate the utility of political economy as a tool of policy analysis. Moreover, I will try to show how free market assumptions tend to confuse issues and thus often lead to inappropriate, if not false, policy conclusions.

IV

MEDICARE AND THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY

At the time of its passage in 1965, Medicare was considered a triumph of the liberal establishment. It represented the culmination of a 30-year struggle to implement some form of social security-based financing for health care. The struggle was often a bitter one that demonstrated the power of the health care industry to dictate the terms of the debate.

The use of the word "struggle" suggests the presence of a strong ideological component in the Medicare debate. Medicare was perceived to be a "redistributive" policy "which reallocates benefits and burdens among socioeconomic groups" (Marmor, 1970:107ff). Redistributive policy debates tend to polarize groups in fairly-well identified ideological camps and tend to attract groups that have only a marginal interest in the outcome of the debate. For example, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, which had only a peripheral interest in national health care policy, eagerly joined forces with other members of its ideological fraternity, such as the American Medical Association, and others who fought the adoption of Medicare. To use Lowi's (1964: 701-711) terms, redistributive issues tend to separate "money-providing" and "service-demanding" groups along fairly well-defined class and ideological lines and thus take on a moral and symbolic significance that arouses groups that have only indirect vested interests.
Most academicians who have analyzed the Medicare debate tend to focus on the conservative-liberal dichotomy that pitted the health care industry and its allies against organized labor, the aged, and administration spokesmen. Analysts tend to concentrate on issues such as the degree to which government should intervene in the private health care market; the extent to which federal rather than state government should be responsible for the financing of health services; the degree to which public welfare or social insurance methods of financing should be used; and the range of benefits to be included. Moreover, great attention is also given to the strategies used by various actors in the debate. Though these issues are not trivial, emphasis on them tends to produce an analysis which presumes a set of values and assumptions common to both proponents and opponents of Medicare. This in turn narrows the range of alternatives considered "relevant" to the policy debate. Because the same concerns are present in the current national health insurance debate, a reevaluation of the Medicare debate from a political economy perspective is most relevant and instructive in understanding some of the health care policy issues confronting us today.

As in other social policy issues, the common denominator between liberals and conservatives in the Medicare debate was their fundamental commitment to the capitalist market system. At no time during the course of the debate did Medicare's proponents suggest that government be the ultimate provider of medical care, as in a national health service. The purpose of Medicare was to provide financial access to a market comprised of private health care providers.

**Drawing Up the Sides**

The main differences between advocates and opponents of Medicare was the extent to which government should intervene in the private medical care market. Opponents of Medicare had almost unlimited faith in the private market to automatically adjust to new needs and new demands. The market was prepared to meet the demands of the sovereign consumer. The large number of uninsured aged did not pose a fundamental threat to this ideology of the free market. The opponents of Medicare took comfort in the fact that increasing numbers of America's aged were obtaining private health insurance. This trend confirmed the basic soundness of the market; the market was adjusting. It was only a matter of time. Under a self-corrective system, governmental intervention would have only negative
effects. (The post-Medicare rise in medical costs has been used as
a vindication of this argument.) Government would only distort the
"true" preferences of the consumer and blunt the initiatives of
health care providers.

Opponents willingly admitted that there were some who could not
participate in the open market. However, the reason for this failure
did not reside in any shortcoming of the market, but in the inade-
quacies of the individual. For those unable to acquire needed
services through the market, there was always the beneficience of the
provider, i.e., charity medicine.

Other opponents of Medicare stretched this rather restrictive
free market perspective to argue that government does have a residual
role: it should subsidize the cost of care for those without the
requisite means to participate in the open market. Even this less
restrictive point of view accepted the inadequacy of the individual
rather than the shortcomings of the market as the basis for failure.
These opponents of Medicare supported a residual welfare approach
to the financing of health care as expressed in the Kerr-Mills and
Medicaid legislation. They merely substituted the public paternalism
of welfare medicine for the private paternalism of charity medicine.
But their creed remained the same: the government that governs least
governs best.

The protagonists in the struggle had a somewhat different per-
ception of the role of government. They espoused the liberal notion
that government was needed to correct a market that was not meeting
the needs of the entire population. Organized labor and the aged
looked to government to guarantee health benefits that were efficiently
but unevenly distributed through the private sector. Throughout the
Congressional hearings, one could hear the refrain "We have the best
system of medical care in the world, but some cannot afford it."
This assumed that the problem was on the consumer side of the market,
not the provider side. By changing the demand side of the equation,
Medicare supporters hoped to correct whatever imbalances existed.

Private Entrepreneurial Medicine Reinforced

Medicare in its final form represented an amalgam of these
different views. Government would guarantee the payment of medical
services acquired by social security beneficiaries, but would not
interfere in the delivery of physician or hospital services. In short,
Medicare became a publicly-financed system of medical care provided
by private practitioners who were still allowed to make their profit.
Payments would be made through traditional financial intermediaries. The freedom of choice in a "pluralist" health system would remain undisturbed.

With Medicare, the capitalist system of American medical care was not only preserved but reinforced. Physicians and hospitals received what some would call a blank check. Physicians were guaranteed full payment at "usual and customary" rates and hospitals were guaranteed full reimbursement. The health insurance industry was preserved and emulated. The insurance industry was relieved of the most difficult and burdensome problems involved in insuring the aged. Instead, the insurance industry acquired government as its patron by obtaining the statutory right to function as the financial intermediaries for hospital costs under Part A, and as the insurance carriers for supplementary medical service costs under Part B. Few utilization controls or quality controls were placed on providers. Rather, the burden of controls was placed on the consumer in the form of certain exclusions and in the form of deductibles and co-payments.

How is it that instead of destroying private entrepreneurial medicine, Medicare actually strengthened the capitalist system of American medical care? What does this outcome and other features of the Medicare legislation tell us about the validity of the free market-pluralist construction of reality? What explanations does political economy have to offer? How do the outcomes of the Medicare legislation demonstrate the ability of the free market ideology to support class interests? What purposes or functions does the free market ideology serve?

The most important function of the free market ideology is that it diverts attention from the health care provider. It effectively removes the burden of change from the health care system, thereby leaving the distribution of economic and political power within the health care system undisturbed. Thus, the free market ideology serves the class interests of the health care provider. To understand how the free market ideology is able to deflect attention away from the health care system, a careful analysis of free market concepts and assumptions is required.

Consumer Sovereignty

One fundamental concept in free market thinking is the doctrine of consumer sovereignty. This concept asserts that it is the consumer who ultimately determines what goods and services are
provided in a free market system. Intended or not, consumer sovereignty was one of the key premises of the Medicare legislation. Given the shortcomings of the private health market, all the solutions were directed to the consumers of health care, not the providers. The problem was financing, not structural change. There was an unchallenged assumption that by changing the demand side of the equation, that changes in the supply side would be automatic. Like their adversaries, the proponents of Medicare were seduced by the mysterious gyrations of the hidden hand.

However, in the health care market, unlike many others, the provider, not the consumer, is sovereign. It is the physician, not the patient, who prescribes the drugs, orders the X-rays and lab tests, arranges the surgery, and discharges the patient from the hospital. The doctrine of consumer choice serves a very useful purpose in that it shifts the burden from the provider to the consumer. It is interesting to observe that the utilization controls provided by the Medicare legislation were not placed on the physician (that would be interfering in the practice of medicine), but on the consumer in the form of deductibles and coinsurance. The sovereignty of the physician went unchallenged.

Perfect Competition & Pluralism

In an earlier section of this article, we observed that perfect competition is the most rigid interpretation of the free market ideology where the following conditions obtain: rational self-interest, perfect knowledge, open access, smallness, etc. We also noted how perfect competition has its political analogue in the concept of democratic pluralism. These same concepts are often used by health industry apologists to describe the character of their industry.

According to the pluralist concept, there is in the distribution of economic and political power an effective balance of different participating forces -- the medical profession, the hospitals, the trade unions, the private agencies, etc. -- which represent the plurality of interests that compete within the system. These forces operate under the watchful eye of the democratic state, and achieve, as a result of competition, a rough equilibrium in which everybody has power and no one has, or can have, too much of it (Navarro, 1973:230-31).

But to describe the health sector as perfectly competitive and pluralist is inaccurate: The health industry violates nearly all the
assumptions of perfect competition and pluralism, especially those of perfect knowledge, open access, and smallness. Knowledge is unionized and is considered the sole domain of the physician. Entry into the market is controlled by the medical profession through its control over medical training, licensure, and specialty certification. The assumption of smallness is also false, although the concept of solo practice obscures this basic reality. Solo practitioners are part of a larger network of providers whose respective domains in the health industry are quite interdependent. The solo practitioner usually has hospital privileges and access to other services that make him an integral part of a larger establishment whose well-being is closely connected with his own professional and economic interests. The basic values of private entrepreneurial medicine are supported and reinforced by the high priests of university-based medicine who control medical teaching institutions, the foundations, and much of government-sponsored medical research. The interests of the various sectors of the medical establishment are virtually inseparable. These overlapping sectors exhibit a pattern of behavior that is more monopolistic than competitive. The monopolistic character of the medical establishment enables it not only to determine who shall enter the market and the type of practice, but also the system of payment, the type of organization, and the overall price of care that will prevail in the health industry. The various sectors of the health industry may from time to time disagree among themselves, but their common interests are sufficiently strong to effectively set the terms of the health care debate, especially when their political adversaries share many of the same assumptions.

Summary

Thus, the Medicare legislation demonstrates the ability of the free market ideology to obscure the real nature of the health care industry. But as we have seen, the political economy critique goes further. Not only does it hit at the basic invalidity of the free market conception, but asks what class or special interests benefit from this conception. By focusing on the underlying distribution of economic and political power in the health care market, as we have here, political economy offers an explanation for the outcomes of the Medicare legislation that cannot be developed within the pluralist framework. Because it assumes that the political arena is neutral, the pluralist framework tends to overlook these economic and political disparities and how these imbalances are reflected in policy outcomes. Moreover, political economy challenges the pluralist theory that government is a neutral umpire in the on-going competition between consumer and provider interests. It also undermines the revisionist theory that the welfare state exists as a countervailing force to
the power of the private market. The political economy critique suggests that Medicare has helped to make the welfare state an ally of the capitalist health care system, if not its captive.

Application to the National Health Insurance Debate

Almost all of the same issues that surfaced in the Medicare debate have re-emerged in the national health insurance debate of the last several years. Some two dozen national health insurance proposals have been introduced in the 94th Congress. Still the ideology of the free market continues to dominate and set the limits of the debate. None of the bills under serious consideration proposes a national health service or an alternative that deviates markedly from the market approach. Only the Kennedy-Corman Health Security Plan more directly confronts the dynamics of the existing health market, but the plan is considered by many to be too far removed from the mainstream of current thinking to survive serious compromise.

We have observed the symbiotic nature of the relationship between ideology and social structure. The mutual dependence of free market ideology and private entrepreneurial medicine appears to be as strong today as it was a decade ago when Medicare was enacted into law. Moreover, the ideology of the free market continues to obscure economic and social reality as it did in the Medicare debate. Today, defenders of the present system merely substitute the word "pluralism" ("our pluralistic health system") for the words "private medicine," giving the present arrangement a ring of legitimacy that even appeals to the system's critics. Pluralism has become the new code word for leaving matters as they are. Pluralism in the health industry is a fiction. It speaks to a diversity that does not exist. A political economy critique is desperately needed if we are to penetrate and go beyond the rhetorical flourishes of the free market-pluralist ideology that dominates the current national health insurance debate. Unless a more radical assessment is forthcoming, we are likely only to shore up the present health care system, with all its inequities and disparities intact.

V

SOCIAL SERVICES UNDER THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT

The Social Security Act authorizes funding for a large number of social service programs that are intended to help welfare recipients and other groups become or remain economically self-sufficient. These programs include day care, family counseling, work training, adult
foster care, home help services, educational services, family planning services, child welfare services and many others. Funds for these services are usually funneled from the federal government to state public welfare departments, who in turn administer these services as a complement to their income maintenance and medical assistance (Medicaid) activities. State public welfare departments have the option of also acting as financial intermediaries by having these services administered on a contractual or on a "purchase-of-service" basis with private social welfare agencies or other state agencies.

In December 1974, Congress passed H.R. 17045, otherwise known as Title XX of the Social Security Act. The creation of Title XX was, in part, an attempt to consolidate the various service programs that previously were rendered under other titles of the same act. It also represented the culmination of a concerted effort on the part of the social welfare establishment to reduce federal administrative discretion that had proven to be hostile to the rapid growth of social service expenditures. Since Title XX is the statutory basis for many social service programs, we shall often use the terms "Title XX" and "social services" interchangeably.

Our purpose here is to demonstrate how the ideologies of individualism and the free market come to expression in the social services field. The social services area is loaded down with shibboleths that tend to obscure its real ideological and class commitments. Underneath all the rhetoric of "helping others," "self-determination," and "self-sufficiency" are fundamental class antagonisms that compromise the effectiveness of social service programs. Moreover, it is my contention that the social services constitutes an industry with specific economic and political behaviors often overlooked by conventional economists and mainline pluralists.

Commitment to Individualism and Free Market Values

The social service provisions of the Social Security Act have always been sold to the Congress and the public as a means of "helping people get off welfare." Despite the utter failure of social service programs to actually do so, social services continue to be seen as an alternative to the dependency fostered by public assistance programs.

---

9A more complete discussion on the struggle between the federal government and the remainder of the social welfare establishment will be presented in a later portion of this section.
Social services are intended to impart the necessary motivation and skills that will induce individuals to leave welfare and become self-sufficient by participating in the private market. Thus, the social services becomes one of the ways in which society inculcates individualism and free market values to certain social classes.

Few can argue against self-reliance, but self-reliance is usually defined in a narrow way that is ultimately destructive of important human values. Social service intervention strategies assume that a person is, or should be selfish, acquisitive, and competitive. Such behaviors are seen as the means by which individuals can achieve success, material well-being, and happiness. Those individuals who do not exhibit such behaviors are singled out as problematic and as "unmotivated" and in need of social services. Unselfish and nonaggressive behaviors are often considered deviant. Thus its altruistic rhetoric notwithstanding, the social services industry fosters attitudes and behaviors that are consonant with capitalistic free enterprise values, but are often inconsistent with values that are necessary to human and social well-being.

Commitment to the Perpetuation of Class Antagonisms

Intended or not, social services also exploits interclass and intraclass antagonisms. Social services are seen as an investment in human capital that will enable individuals "to get ahead." But social service programs fail to ask a more fundamental question: "Get ahead of whom?" Thus the social services enable welfare recipients to compete with each other for the few menial jobs that are available. Even when the private economy is expansive, the simple fact of the matter is that there are too few jobs at the lower end of the employment market. The placement of social service recipients often can only be accomplished at the expense of displacing an equally qualified person whose economic status is also marginal. Simply stated, there is "no room at the bottom." Hence, the social services strategy permits the other classes to retain their social and economic prerogatives. Social services are a nonthreatening approach to the amelioration of social problems. It is a strategy that removes the burden of change from those who are most equipped to those who are least able to redress social disparities.

Those few who are able to get ahead often do so at the risk of accepting the values and commitments of the social stratum to which they aspire. One class is thus able to co-opt members of another leaving the existing social structure only marginally changed, if at all. Inequities tend to be reinforced, not ameliorated.
There is another, more fundamental, class antagonism -- the conflict between service professionals and their clients. The professional-client relationship is predicated on a basic inequality between the two people involved. The quest for professionalism among social service workers can only be obtained at the expense of deepening this inequality. At the heart of professionalism is an attempt to maintain or extend vested interests. The purpose of professionalism is to preserve class privilege. Professionalization institutionalizes values and assumptions that are conducive to the maintenance of class differences. Ironic though it may be, social service professionals support the very class antagonisms that are endemic to the problems they seek to solve.

The exigencies of today's labor market for social service professionals makes the maintenance of class differences even more critical to the worker-client relationship. A tight labor market makes social service professionals acutely aware of how tenuous their position in society really is. They begin to realize that the distance between worker and client is not as great as first believed -- a realization that can be threatening to the sense of self-worth of the professional. Such a threat unveils the extent to which class distinctions are critical to the maintenance of professional self-worth. Instead of seeing that the worker and the client share a common predicament with common social and ideological origins, the social service professional works even harder to maintain his/her status in society and, in so doing, helps to undermine the self-actualizing potential of the clientele s/he serves. Client dependency is an inevitable outcome of services rendered by a profession that is, one way or another, committed to the maintenance of class differences. And a constricting labor market that exacerbates professional insecurities provides additional incentives for client dependency.

One characteristic of a profession is its determination to find new domains in which it can establish itself as a legitimate authority. During periods of retrenchment and shrinking labor markets, there is an additional incentive to carve out new domains that yield new clientele. This pressure is evident in the Title XX legislation in two ways. First, Title XX requires each state to engage in a comprehensive "needs assessment" -- a method by which the social service establishment can justify their existence and expansion. Second, Title XX allows each state to provide services to individuals and families with incomes up to 115 per cent of the state's median family income. Prior to Title XX,
service dollars were more narrowly focused on welfare recipients.\textsuperscript{10}

By extending its population base, social service workers are able to preserve their professional status, not to mention the increasing professional prestige that allegedly accrues when serving a more middle class clientele. Thus, even within the ranks of the social service professions are class distinctions based on the types of clientele that are served.\textsuperscript{11} In this manner, social service professionals have accepted the larger society's definition of class differentials as the basis for their own rankings. By incorporating society's class antagonisms into their own professions, social service workers become the carriers of the disease, the symptoms of which they seek to ameliorate.

Another threat to the professional security of social service workers is the growth of "paraprofessionals" whose ranks are often made up of former welfare recipients. During periods of nearly unlimited demand for professional social service personnel, professionals strongly advocated the development of subprofessional level staff, mainly to alleviate them of work considered undignified for professionals. This attitude was reflected in the separation of income maintenance and

\textsuperscript{10}Prior to the introduction of Title XX, HEW regulations (May 1973 regulations) required that services be restricted to those who were welfare recipients in the previous three months or those who were likely to become recipients in the coming six months, but whose income did not exceed 150 percent of the state's cash assistance standard. These regulations implemented the $2.5 billion ceiling on federal social service expenditures as authorized by the Revenue Sharing Act of 1972. The Act contained a requirement that at least 90 percent of social service expenditures be spent on applicants for, or recipients of, public assistance. A few exceptions to this requirement were allowed.

\textsuperscript{11}Child welfare, because it has a more middle class distribution of clientele, has always been considered a more prestigious area of endeavor than providing services to public assistance recipients. Elitism of this nature continues to be a chronic problem in some quarters of the social services industry. In state government, for example, there has been constant pressure to establish separate departments for children despite all the rhetoric about integrated services. Although there may be sound public policy reasons to establish separate youth-oriented departments, professional elitism continues to be strong undercurrent in such issues.
social service programs several years ago. Separation allegedly would remove the burdensome paperwork of eligibility determination and allow professional social service workers to do the "real" work of client rehabilitation that was more in keeping with their professional image. Separation and other policy changes have helped to swell the ranks of subprofessionals and now, ironically, threatens the very professional image they were intended to sustain. The growth of subprofessionals has helped to break down the myth that only social service professionals possessed a unique body of skills needed for client rehabilitation. In short, the growth of subprofessional level workers creates additional pressures for the maintenance of class differences.

The ahistorical character of social science research and thinking has also penetrated the schooling of social service professionals. All too many social service workers have forgotten or never learned of their professional origins in the friendly visitor of the Charity Organization Movement (COM) of the latter half of the 19th century. The COM often reeked with class prejudice and maternalism. According to the COM philosophy, the poor were wayward children whose condition was due to certain inbred character deficiencies. All the poor really needed was sympathy, tact, patience, and wise counsel. The role of the friendly visitor was to provide the necessary wisdom, friendship, and above all, the moral uplift that was needed to bring people out of their destitution. The friendly visitor was usually some upper crust matron who had few socially legitimate outlets for her time. The COM philosophy found a smug basis in social Darwinism, which provided an intellectual justification for social inequality and the theory that poverty was caused by personal frailty. The COM believed that friendly visiting and not almsgiving would cure the sloth and immorality of the lower class. As recently as the early 1960's, the social service establishment in support of the 1962 service amendments (of the Social Security Act) argued that what the poor needed was rehabilitation in order to leave public assistance -- a small historical footnote to indicate that class consciousness has been very much at the cutting edge of social service philosophy. The language of the friendly visitor era may appear crass by our standards today, but the jargon of rehabilitation and self-determination is merely one attempt to give underlying class antagonism professional legitimacy.

Commitment to a Mixed Public-Private Social Services Industry

Prior to the adoption of the service amendments in the 1960's, most social service activity took place in the private domain. Many private social service agencies had their beginnings in the COM near the turn of the century when American capitalism was at its unbridled peak.
They were often the creation of some wealthy benefactor who wished to be known for his generosity to the lower classes. Private agencies were often funded on a haphazard basis, reflecting the whims and pet social intervention theories of their wealthy sponsors. After World War I, as the competition for private funding intensified, federated fund-raising organizations, such as the Community Chests, were established. Federated funding was also an attempt to bring greater uniformity to the administration of private social welfare services.

However, federated funding has never been a sufficient source of financing for private agencies which responded to their own organizational imperatives to solve new problems and find new clients. As its financial base proved insufficient, the private sector looked to public funding. In many parts of the country, private child welfare agencies, for example, have had a long tradition of being funded in part by juvenile courts for services provided to wards of the court. The various service amendments to the Social Security Act represented a quantum leap in the public financing of all social services. The result has been the creation of large multibillion dollar public-private industry.

Generally speaking, private agencies have engaged in two types of public financing: (1) reimbursement -- where a public agency will reimburse private agencies on a case-by-case basis, and (2) contracting -- where public agencies will contract with a private agency on a lump-sum basis. In the second instance, private agencies have the potential to expand their base of operation four-fold. Under Title XX, the federal government is prepared to match, under certain conditions, each private agency dollar with three federal dollars. Private agency growth potential is, of course, limited by federal and state regulations and by the total number of federal dollars available to any one state.

Analogy to the Military Industrial Complex

My choice of the word "industry" to describe this public-private consortium is a deliberate one. The market characteristics of this industry in many ways resemble the behaviors of the so-called military-industrial complex. Most social welfare professionals would not appreciate this analogy with the armed services industry, since they do not wish to think of themselves as mercenaries as the munitions and

---

12 The special conditions are set forth in 45 CFR Sec. 288.54.
arms manufacturers are thought to be. But because their livelihood is so dependent on the public till, private agencies and their industry leaders often engage in economic and political behaviors not altogether different from that found in the military-industrial complex. Moreover, as in the armed services industry, the social services industry is marked by a high degree of inbreeding of personnel between the public and private sectors. Although there may appear to be a fair amount of antagonisms between the public and private sectors, both sectors usually present a united front when marching to the public trough.

**Economic Assumptions of the Social Services Industry**

Conventional economists have pretty much ignored the social services industry, in part because it does not conform to the neat and rigidly defined models of competition, oligopoly, etc., even though various components of the industry do have such market characteristics. Neoclassical economics in particular has a way of either (1) excluding important economic phenomena that cannot be understood within its analytic framework, or (2) cramming economic reality into models that provide a distorted analysis. Economists appear less able to cope with this type of mixed public-private economy mainly because of the large political component that cannot always be reduced to an arithmetic production function or a demand curve. Hence, a critical perspective that makes the political component explicit and a point of view that is sensitive to its economic underpinnings is needed if we are to understand the complex network of programs that we call the social services industry. Political economy is especially qualified to provide that critical perspective.

In applying the political economy critique to social services as an industry, we must begin by examining the validity of the assumptions that have shaped public policy toward the social services industry. The purchase-of-service philosophy is based on two unexamined assumptions: (1) that the private sector (market) can do it better, and (2) that an element of consumer choice and competition exists when public agencies purchase services from several private agencies. In most instances, neither assumption is valid.

The notion that the private sector can do it better is a persistent one in public policy formulation. Private social welfare has been strongly influenced by the ideological persuasions of its capitalist benefactors. However valid this notion may be in some sectors of the American economy, it is utterly false in many quarters of the social services industry. The very need for public funding often demonstrates the inability of the private sector to do its job. Public dollars
have often been used to shore up the "private" sector and in so doing have preserved many of its structural weaknesses. Inefficient private organizations have thus been subsidized -- a practice not altogether different from bailing out Lockheed!

The concepts of consumer choice and competition are also largely false. In some areas, markets are too small to support more than one social service provider of a kind. Even when several providers are available, it is the referring agency, and not the consumer, who makes the choice. In many cases, the consumer is too dependent to make informed choices. An eight-year old ward of the court is hardly in a position to determine what child welfare facility is most appropriate and a physically handicapped adult is not in the best position to shop around for the best adult foster care facility. Moreover, the important decisions about how long a client should be seen or how long a client should be kept at a residential care facility is often left to the provider, not to the client or the supervisory public agency.

Institutional Care & Social Control

The most expensive sector within the social services industry is private institutional care. Institutional services are intended to assist dependent children and adults who require intensive supervision and care outside of their own home. Institutional care services are usually purchased on a reimbursement basis where per diem charges are assigned according to a negotiated cost formula. This reimbursement procedure is loaded with economic incentives that create serious distortions in the placement market and foster client dependency. Since reimbursement policies are established according to per diem costs, private institutional care agencies have an incentive to keep their beds full in order to cover overhead and other fixed costs. Serious supply shortages often result, forcing public agencies to purchase care on a beds-available basis, not on a client-need basis. Hence, the determination to guarantee a constant flow of income creates a powerful economic incentive for private agencies to retain their clientele and to maintain a measure of client dependency. The same incentives are evident in the health care industry, where hospitals and nursing homes retain patients to guarantee income. Whether it be health or social services, the same basic law applies: utilization rises to meet capacity.

Even more sinister are some of the complex inter-account billings that result in cross-subsidization and other market distortions. These financial mechanisms usually work in the direction of underpricing expensive out-of-home institutional care and overpricing cheaper in-home care. These market features create incentives to move people
Pricing policies in the social services industry serve important social control functions as well. Since most social services clientele are drawn from the lower classes and since most decision makers identify with more powerful interests, the pricing policies of the social services industry also provide an economic justification for one element in society to set the terms of societal participation for another.

The Staying Power of the Social Services Industry

Immense political pressure can be applied in forcing public purchasing agencies to keep private institutions economically viable. Public agencies often have the power of licensing to exercise control over the private sector but most public agencies are reluctant to enforce the sanctions inherent in that power. To explain this phenomenon, we need to recall our analogy to the military-industrial complex. By spreading its installations and contracts among numerous congressional districts, the armed forces are able to call upon a powerful political constituency when its pet projects are challenged. Private agencies are similarly dispersed. When challenged by state authorities, they are often able to call upon their respective representatives to apply the necessary countervailing pressures. Equally powerful is the ability of private agencies to disguise their economic interests in the bleeding heart rhetoric that often accompanies the promotion of child welfare services or the concerns of old age.

What might, or what does, a pluralist conception of this industry look like? A pluralist would probably see a series of countervailing forces in the services market -- clients, private agencies, financial intermediaries, and others -- none of whom could dictate the outcome of the bargaining process. The pluralist conception has often been incorporated in rate setting commissions and various advisory committees customarily made up of representatives from sectors listed above. Although the pluralist conception may describe much of the activity that takes place inside the designated arena, the arena is often short-circuited by private power. In many states, private providers have

---

13 For example, one midwestern state had a policy of charging county juvenile courts for the cost of maintaining a delinquent youth in state-operated institutions. In determining a per diem rate, the state would consider the cost of all types of residential care -- training schools, foster homes, group homes, etc. In order to keep the training schools reasonably full, the state would establish a per diem
organized into groups, attend political fund raisers, and cultivate the good graces of legislative leaders in a manner that resembles the lobbying efforts of our well-worn analogy, the military suppliers. Also, private agencies are often represented by the rich and the powerful under whose philanthropic beneficence private agencies are governed. Private agency boards of directors share many of the same class interests that characterize legislative leaders. Its alliance with special class and economic interests allows private agencies to appeal their cause in arenas where others are not always represented.

Our description suggests that private providers are able to set the terms because of their superior position in the competition. Accurate as this may be, it can also be misleading. There are issues around which the various parties -- client groups, private providers, and state authorities -- will present a united front. The Nixon Administration's attempt to curb the growth of social service expenditures offers a good example. A large expansion of social services took place beginning with the release of the 1969 social service regulations that were designed to implement the 1967 amendments. Much of the expansion was due to a liberalized matching policy that allowed new groups to be served and that enabled private agencies to expand their programs. In 1971, the Nixon Administration attempted to put a clamp on this expansion and succeeded in placing a $2.5 billion ceiling on social service outlays with an amendment to the Revenue Sharing Act of 1972.

When HEW first issued new regulations to implement the new expenditure ceiling, it cut at the heart of the public-private agency nexus by excluding certain services and by disallowing private donated funds as a source of local matching. A large cry went up to Washington from all sectors of the industry who saw the regulations as an assault on their economic and organizational well-being. HEW received some 208,515 comments during and after the formal 30-day comment period, not to mention the pressures applied to individual members of Congress.

rate considerably below cost for training schools and a per diem rate considerably above cost for community-type facilities, in effect under-pricing institutional care. All of this was accomplished through little-known and difficult-to-understand interaccount billing procedures.

14 Otherwise known as the State and Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972, P.L. 92-512.
The Congress was forced to intercede and acted to rescind the introduction of the new regulations. After considerable debate, Title XX was spawned to permit the kind of state discretion that would preserve the interests of providers and others, albeit in the name of the New Federalism.

This episode illustrates how deeply vested the interests of the social services industry have become. It also suggests that future federal social service policy will increasingly be dictated by the needs of providers than by the needs of clients they purport to serve. Especially during periods of retrenchment, the first priority will be the preservation of the industry itself. Building, staff, equipment, etc. are considered fixed inputs; clients are variable inputs in the production of human services. When money becomes scarce, you try to cover your fixed costs and scrimp on the variable costs. It is when retrenchment begins to hit fixed costs that the cries of alarm increase several-fold. It is my conviction that during the cycles of social service expansion and contraction -- although the long-run curve is one of expansion -- that during periods of expansion, it is the provider who gains the most and that, during periods of contraction, it is the client who loses the most.

The Persistence of Failure

An increasing body of evidence continues to show that social services have failed to solve the problems they have selected as their domain for intervention (Rossi, 1969:225). Sometimes problems are ameliorated, but in most instances, there is no discernible change and, in some instances, the change is for the worse. Despite the overwhelming record of failure, the social services establishment attempts to explain away failure in terms of inadequate budgets and staff. The social services industry seems to have an endless ability to call upon new fads and treatment theories that require new outlays of budget and staff, each promising a panacea that does not materialize.

Political economy rejects the industry's own analysis of failure. Our analysis here suggests two basic reasons for failure in the services industry. First, social services support the very values and institutions that cause the social problems they are intended to ameliorate. Their commitment to individualism and capitalist market values ultimately undermine the very values that are necessary to human and community well-being. Second, the professional and economic interests of social providers result in serious goal displacement: client-oriented goals become secondary to the organizational and professional maintenance functions of social service providers. Much of this displacement has its roots in the maintenance of class antagonisms. Contrary to liberal
ideology, the interests of clients and the social services state are not always harmonious. Harmony is an illusion created by providers and professionals who purport to speak for the interests of the socially disenfranchised. Thus, as long as social services are administered on terms established by provider interests, there is little likelihood that the social service programs will be able to successfully impart the life-enriching values and services sought by its consumers.

VI
CONCLUSIONS & SOLUTIONS

Conclusions

This analysis should not be construed as an unqualified assault on the welfare state and the private market. The welfare state does contain "residues of communal tendencies toward mutual and collective responsibility" (Gil, 1975:18). Moreover, the private market can serve important social goals. Instead, our concern has been with the values and assumptions of the free market-pluralist ideology that sustains the present conception of the welfare state. An analysis of the welfare state that does not penetrate these underlying values and assumptions must resign itself to trivialization and a concern with small and marginal issues that characterizes much of present-day social policy research.

The emphasis on values and assumptions is based on a belief that they contain a self-fulfilling logic that must eventually reveal itself in policy outcomes. The characteristics which the free market ideology ascribes to an individual are especially self-fulfilling; i.e., individuals take on the characteristics that are assigned to them. If a person is assumed to be selfish, s/he will in one way or another act that way. Finally, unexamined free market assumptions such as consumer sovereignty, perfect knowledge, and open access, etc., can lead to erroneous and misguided policy prescriptions as we have observed in the health and social service industries.

Political economy's concern with class conflict, social consciousness, alienation, and the community offers us the opportunity to see that the welfare state does not operate in a society that is always harmonic and conducive to meeting human needs. A political economic analysis suggests that a welfare state that incorporates the values of a capitalist market system cannot remedy the serious inequalities and other social problems created by an acquisitive and competitive society. Moreover, the concept of class conflict in particular should help us to understand that interest group politics is a zero-sum game where
one socially disenfranchised group often gains only at the expense of another without realizing their mutual interest and common predicament.

Solutions

Does political economy offer us a prescription for the problems of the American welfare state? Yes it does. Unfortunately, the welfare state is so enmeshed with society's other political and economic institutions that it becomes difficult to single out the welfare state as a target for change. Our analysis of the health and social service industries indicates that we must reject the free market apologists' almost exclusive focus on the demand side of the equation and instead, concentrate on the supply side. The important issue is not so much what consumers like or dislike but who controls the supply, i.e., who controls the resources.

Public regulation has frequently been looked to as a means of controlling the supply side of the private market. The history of public regulation in the United States has been a spotty one where the process of regulation has often been dominated by provider and corporate interests. The question then remains: Are there effective changes and strategies consonant with the political economy critique that can be implemented given present political realities?

In the interest of brevity, I would like to answer this question with an illustration from one of the areas we discussed earlier in the article -- the health care sector of the welfare state. Navarro (1974) has proposed several changes directed at the issue of who controls the supply side of the health care market. He proposes to make the planning and regulation of health care a public one instead of a private one, albeit with a twist. Public planning and regulation would be geared to (1) controlling the geographical and specialty distribution of health practitioners, (2) controlling capital outlays and operating expenditures, and (3) controlling the quality of health care. To avoid the pitfalls that usually accompany public regulation, Navarro makes two recommendations: (1) that regulatory bodies be made administratively dependent

---

15 Free market-pluralist apologists often implicitly assume that the existence of a market equilibrium also implies that the demand and supply sides are roughly equal in their power to determine where the point of equilibrium will be. The condition of equilibrium often conceals large economic and social inequalities.
on planning agencies, and (2) that planning councils -- the policy bodies of planning agencies -- represent the communities they serve by being comprised solely of democratically chosen "citizen-laymen," not providers.

The thrust of Navarro's proposals is to move the planning and regulation of health care from the dominance of medical care professionals to the control of lay people. The emphasis on lay persons represents a departure from present practice where advisory groups and planning bodies are made up of providers and other individuals who share many of the same class values and interests of providers. In short, Navarro is not suggesting consumer participation but citizen control.

Navarro calls his plan, "institutional democracy." Implicit in this concept is a skepticism of a regulatory and decision making process that is now loaded in favor of provider class interests. He does not favor governmental ownership of health care facilities. The National Health Service experience in Great Britain has shown that public ownership does not always guarantee public control, especially when appointees to regional health authorities are drawn from the ranks of bankers, business executives, real estate interests, physicians, military personnel, and other professionals.

Generally speaking, those who share the political economy perspective are not always agreed as to how things should be changed. However, political economists do share a common belief in the need for groups and communities to have a more meaningful role in determining how public services are rendered. This belief is misplaced unless significant changes are also accompanied by a transformation of social consciousness that makes individual self-actualization and community well-being among the primary criteria in social policy decision-making. This much remains certain: important social goals are not the singular achievement of a mechanistic, self-regulating market or its ally, the welfare state. Individual and community well-being is too important to be left to the beneficience of an invisible hand.

REFERENCES

Dahl, Robert

Derthick, Martha

Falk, I. S.

Frankel, Charles

Friedman, Milton

Fromm, Erich

Fuchs, Victor R.

Galbraith, John Kenneth

Galper, Jeffry H.


Gamson, William A.
Gil, David G.  

Gintis, Herbert  

Gordon, Donald F.  

Gurley, John W.  

Harrington, Charlene  
1975  "Medical Ideologies in Conflict." Medical Care 13 (November): 905-914.

Harris, Seymour E.  

Hesgy, Thomas C., Theodore Marmor, and Donald A. Wittman  

Hunt, E. K.  

Kuhn, Thomas S.  

Lowe, Adolph  

Lowi, Theodore J.  

Mandel, Ernest

Mandell, Betty Reid (ed.)

Margolin, Steve

Marmor, Theodore R.

Marx, Karl

Marx, Karl and Friedrich Engels

McCord, David

Navarro, Vincente

1974 "A Critique of the Present and Proposed Strategies for Redistributing Resources in the Health Sector and a Discussion of Alternatives." Medical Care 12:721-741.


Nichols, David
Peobody, George E.
1971 "Scientific Paradigms and Economics: An Introduction."
The Review of Radical Political Economics 3 (July):1-16.

Polanyi, Karl

Rossi, Peter H.

Rubenstein, Hiasaura

Schattschneider, E. E.

Schottland, Charles I. (ed.)

Skolnick, Alfred M. and Sophie R. Dales

Smith, Adam

Solow, Robert

Steiner, Gilbert Y.

Stevens, Robert and Rosemary
Stevens, Rosemary

Stockman, David A.

Stuart, Bruce C., et al.

Stuart, Bruce C. and Lee A. Bair

Sweezy, Paul M.

Trattner, Walter I.

U.S. Congress

U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Ways and Means


U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee
U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Finance

U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
1973 Statement of the Honorable Casper W. Weinberger before the U.S. Senate Committee on Finance. (May 8)mimeo.

U.S. Social Security Administration

Veblen, Thorstein

Wallich, Henry C.

Weisskopf, Walter A.

Zweig, Michael
SOCIAL CONTROL OR SOCIAL WAGE:
ON THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE "WELFARE STATE"

Paul Adams
School of Social Work
The University of Texas at Austin

Discussion between liberal apologists for the "welfare state" and their radical critics has tended in recent years to focus on the question of "social control." In this area the corporate liberals and social democrats (the "welfare statists") are weak. They talk of the "welfare state" as if, at least in principle, it represented the collective assumption by society of responsibility for the basic needs and dependencies of its members. Insofar as "social control" is relevant for them, it has to do with society's exercise of restraint over the selfish pursuit of private profit.

Radical critics of the "welfare state," on the other hand, point to its controlling and system-maintenance functions, but often neglect the real benefits it provides. They have exposed the police officer, the guard, or (to use the old Wobbly term) the head-fixer behind the caring smile of the social worker, the teacher, and the therapist. Even the provision of material benefits--social security, public welfare, health and housing subsidies--is seen as reinforcing or regulating market forces in the interests of order and efficiency, rather than modifying them to meet human need. Where conservatives have seen "creeping socialism," radicals have seen the intervention of the capitalist state to stabilize and reinforce the system.

To remain on this terrain in a period of economic instability, fiscal crises, welfare cuts, and the general collapse of New Deal liberalism in the face of these developments, is an indulgence. It reflects a one-sided and therefore inadequate understanding of the "welfare state." Government social welfare programs do certainly have a social control function, but they in many cases also constitute part of what may be called the "social wage." My purpose here is to distinguish these elements, to draw attention to the concept of the social wage and some of its difficulties, and to draw some political conclusions.

I want to begin with certain conditions which are necessary for the accumulation of capital. Starting with the simplest possible model of capitalism as a mode of production (that is, a way in which people cooperate together to produce the means of life), we can see that the owners of capital must pay for the labor-power they buy at least a certain minimum. This must be enough to ensure the maintenance and reproduction of labor-power at an adequate level of health, education, and security. Adequacy is here a matter of what is required at a given level of technological and cultural development to produce an efficient work force. These capital costs of production include the maintenance not only of the presently active labor force but also of past and future workers. They must, that is, be sufficient to support the worker and his or her family. If the worker is to be fit for the job, and the work force is not to be depleted, capital must pay at least a certain minimum for the labor-power it hires.
We can imagine these costs being met entirely in the form of wages. Workers would then have to provide for their own immediate needs and those of their dependents (including their education), as well as insuring against the needs and dependencies of sickness, accidents, old age, unemployment, and so on—all from their paychecks.

On the other hand, workers must produce for their employers not only the value of their own labor-power (that is, enough to cover the costs of its production), and not only enough to cover wear and tear on physical plant, etc., but also a surplus which, if the product can be sold and certain other conditions met, will enable the employers to reinvest, buying more machinery or hiring more workers. Out of this surplus, however, various expenses must also be met, including those of the capitalists' own living and the hire of their personal servants. More significantly for our purposes, these expenses include the costs of maintaining the social conditions in which production and accumulation can proceed on the basis of capitalist property relations. We can imagine each capitalist meeting these expenses individually, hiring not only his/her own managers and security guards, but also ideologues and propagandists, private army, police, and human relations experts.

Historically, however, both the capital costs of production and the expenses of ensuring its taking place under capitalist relations have been met in part, an increasing part, through the state. This is so clearly the case with regard to the expenses of production that the state may be defined as that social institution with the primary function of maintaining order and harmony in the relations of production. The mechanisms for carrying out this function include army, police, courts, state bureaucracy, and schools insofar as they serve an ideological or "head-fixing" purpose. In whatever form these aspects of the state's activity are financed, they constitute in essence taxes on capital. That is, they are part of the price that capital has to pay for the maintenance of the system.

On the other hand, the state has also increasingly socialized the wage system, in the sense of taking over from individual capitals part of the task of providing for the production and reproduction of labor-power. Put differently, the worker's standard of living depends not only upon what he or she takes home in his or her paycheck, but also upon the goods and services provided by the state. Indeed, according to one minister in the British Labor government, Barbara Castle:

The most important part of the standard of living of most of us depends on the great complex of services we call "public expenditure." They are not only the key to the quality of life; they are the key to equality...The great advances...have come...from better education, better health services, better housing and better care of the old, the disabled and the handicapped in life.3

Castle gives special emphasis to that 60% of "public expenditure" which, in the government's calculations, goes to the "social wage." She goes so far as to claim that

-47-
"the taxman is the Robin Hood of our time, taking from those who can afford it the means whereby we can pay every worker the wage that really matters, the social wage."4

The social wage, as I am using the term, does not include all public expenditure. It is defined as those costs of labor-power which take the form of benefits and services provided by the state, and is distinguished both from other forms of wage paid directly by the employer (take-home and fringe benefits) and from other types of state activity (policing or "system-maintenance," as well as non-labor, or constant, social capital costs). The social wage is not, of course, co-extensive with government social welfare expenditures. These support a wide range of activities which may have either a "social control" function (helping to police the existing social and economic order) or a social wage function (providing real benefits to workers and their families which improve their standard of living); or they may combine both functions.

When we move from the apparently clear distinction between social control (social expenses of production) and social wage (the labor element of social capital costs), to particular cases of social welfare expenditures, the problems multiply. Governments which employ the concept of the "social wage" (these include Russia and New Zealand as well as Britain) tend to use it ideologically, to disguise the coercive or policing aspects of certain state activities. Thus, the British government calculates the social wage as the amount of current and capital public spending on a number of programs for each member of the working population. These programs include not only social security (both "insurance" and assistance programs), health, education, and certain subsidies, including food, nationalized industries' price restraint, and transportation—but also, law and order!5 The assumption is evidently that the primary function of the forces of law and order is the preservation of the lives and property of the working population.

James O'Connor, in The Fiscal Crisis of the State, distinguishes capital costs of production from expenses of production and describes how both have increasingly been socialized.6 In dealing with specific programs, however, he assigns social security insurance programs to the former category but "welfare" (assistance) programs to the latter. Here the assumption appears to be that welfare clients constitute a "surplus population" who exist outside production but must, from a capitalist viewpoint, be kept alive in the interest of public order. This may, in part, be correct. But most welfare clients have worked before going on welfare, and will work again when they are off, while many continue to work while receiving benefits. In 1973, only 22% of recipients of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) had never been employed. Indeed, AFDC has been seen as the functional equivalent for low-paid work of maternity leave benefits in the better paid sector of the economy, or as a poor person's unemployment insurance.7 In any case, the dependent children aided by the program will in most cases enter the (secondary) labor market though they may well face long periods of unemployment: the cost of raising them is part of the cost of reproducing the labor force, rather than an expense of maintaining a permanently surplus population. At the same time, AFDC clearly does have strong

-43-
social control elements. Piven and Cloward argue that public welfare functions to maintain order and to regulate the labor market. While social insurance also functions this way, AFDC recipients are subject to an extraordinary degree of coercive social control over their lives as a condition of receiving aid.

Education and personal social services are areas where it is particularly difficult to separate social control from social wage elements. Real benefits may be provided which constitute an enhancement of the recipient's standard of living, while reduced provision may constitute a cut in real living standards. While teachers and social workers provide these benefits, however, they may at the same time act as policing agents through the exercise of more or less open coercion or as ideological agents for the transmission of dominant norms and values.

Further difficulties arise when one attempts, as the British government is doing, to quantify the social wage and measure increases and decreases in it. Very large rates of increase may appear—in a recent *Times* (London) article was headed "Social Wage Trebled in Six Years"—without there being any real improvement in the level of provision made to individual recipients. The increase may go entirely to cover the effects of general inflation, as well as disproportionate increases in land costs and interest rates, increased drug prices or payments to physicians, or increases in numbers of recipients due to such factors as higher unemployment, or a higher proportion of the old and young in the total population. An adequate empirical measure of the social wage would need to include only those forms of provision which constitute (or to the extent that they constitute) real benefits rather than policing expenses—and this is a political question to which we cannot expect to find a satisfactory answer from any existing government. It would also need to record and aggregate real, physical improvements or declines in the quality and quantity of provision. I do not know whether these problems are soluble. The political importance of the social wage, however, does not depend on its calculability.

In specific social welfare programs, I have suggested, social control and social wage elements may be inextricably entangled. The distinction is important nonetheless. Those who see all social services simply and inherently as policing or social control activities and for whom that is a condemnation, have no obvious grounds for opposing cutbacks in social welfare expenditures. Radicals would presumably have no objection to cuts in funding for the army, police, or Central Intelligence Agency. How is social welfare different?

It is different, in my view, because cutbacks in social welfare expenditures can amount to a disguised wage cut and be part of a government strategy to hold down personal and social consumption in order to maintain profitability and encourage investment. Such a strategy is difficult to resist, the more so if it is not perceived as an attack on workers' living standards. Cutbacks in education or health and welfare programs are not as direct or obvious (unless they involve transfer payments) as a reduction in one's take-home pay. They tend to affect most those least able to resist: the old, the young, the disabled, the sick. In the United States
especially, it is possible to present such cuts as an increase in the proportion of one's earnings which are disposable by oneself rather than by the state, even though they may in fact constitute an overall reduction in living standards.

The concept of the social wage draws attention to the fact that social security, education, health programs, and welfare are as much part of the real income of working class families as the paycheck. The income is disposed of by the capitalist state on behalf of those families, who exercise neither individual nor collective control over it, but a cutback is a reduction in real income for all that.

Given the obvious advantages of the social wage as the locus for an attack on consumption, it is somewhat surprising that the British Labor government should, in the course of such an attack, seek to give the concept wide currency. In part, its doing so reflects the uneasy co-existence of a real, if misguided, concern with social justice on one hand and a commitment to maintaining the competitiveness and profitability of British industry in a hostile world on the other. The "Joint Framework for Social Policies" developed by the Central Policy Review Staff for the government emphasizes the importance of developing an index of the social wage. But it does so in the context of a need to rationalize and prioritize social expenditure in a period of economic difficulty. That is, cuts must be made, so let us ensure that what is left goes with maximum effectiveness where we consciously decide it should go. (In a similar vein, the last Labor government, of 1964-70, introduced its incomes policy with much discussion of how the better off workers should restrain themselves so that more could go to the lower-paid. In the event, wage controls proved effective only against the weaker and lower-paid sections of labor. In general, advances by lower paid workers occur in the wake of and depend on the gains won by stronger and better paid sections of workers. In this case, too, we may be confident that business, not those in greatest need, will benefit from the prioritizing of cutbacks.)

Furthermore, the policy of relying on the cooperation of union bureaucrats to induce acceptance by their members of cuts in real wages, despite its current success, is uncertain and inadequate. The social wage provides another line of attack, and one which can be made to appear very reasonable. Government ministers and civil servants have pointed out the rapid rises in the social wage, while failing to mention some of the reasons for them discussed above. Thus Chancellor of the Exchequer Dennis Healey in his April 1975 Budget speech said that the social wage now amounted to £1000 for every adult member of the working population in Britain, and observed that the "social wage has been increasing very much faster than ordinary wages--much faster than prices too." The Central Policy Review Staff's report notes that public expenditure has been growing faster than production as a whole, and expenditure on social programs has been growing faster than the rest of public expenditure.

"This," it affirms, "cannot go on." In this context it is to the government's
advantage to make the social wage visible, so that workers and others will feel personally responsible for the country's economic troubles and recognize the necessity of cuts in social spending so that inflation can be reduced and the economy restored to health.  

Cutting the social wage, then, is one way in which a government can try to switch resources from consumption to investment. It has many advantages, but is nevertheless a dangerous strategy because it translates the struggle over wages and profits from the economic to the political sphere. In doing so, it breaks down the reformist barriers between the economic and the political, between struggles over wages and conditions on one hand, and political power on the other. Many kinds of state intervention, from the use of police to break a picket line to the imposition of wage controls, involve workers in conflict with the state as well as the employer. The social wage has assumed such importance in the last forty years that the defense of living standards now leads beyond a conflict with employer over wages and conditions, and only incidentally with the state insofar as it actively intervenes. It also involves a struggle over social policy, over what proportion of the total social product should go to what purposes and who should decide. As both opponents of capitalism like O'Connor and supporters like Daniel Bell have pointed out, this increasing politicization of the economy holds dangers for the system in terms both of generating unmettable demands and of undermining the legitimacy of the market. What they usually have not pointed out is that while the economy has been politicized the state has in turn been increasingly subordinated to the demands of the economy. The competitive drive to accumulate capital is no less compulsive, and no less the central dynamic of the system, for being increasingly international in form, or for involving the state. Competition has not become subordinate to political decision-making, but rather the reverse. Governments are more and more held responsible for the functioning of the economy, but subject as they are to the pressures of international competition, they have less and less room to maneuver.

As governments, especially in Europe, have attempted to solve the problems of their economies by cutting the social wage, so they have elicited a more generalized and political response from workers. In recent years, with the faltering of the twenty year post-war expansion and stability, workers have found that they cannot make gains, or defend what they have, by relying on union bureaucrats or fragmented and localized struggles. They can no longer rely on being able to make up for reduced public provision with increased fringe benefits or higher wages as they did in the 1950's and 1960's. They are still far from a unified, class-wide political response, even in countries with a stronger socialist tradition and more socialist militants. But the experience that neither shop-floor militancy nor the negotiations of labor leaders have prevented the closure of schools and hospitals, or the decline of provision for the aging, has produced different kinds of action by industrial workers. In 1974, dockworkers, coalminers and others struck in support of nurses during their pay dispute in England. Construction workers went on strike in support of higher old age benefits in 1972, also in England. In Italy there have been major strikes over housing and social security, and other actions against rent, bus fare, and food price increases. These struggles have sometimes involved elements of
workers' control. That is, workers on the job and as consumers have demanded and in some instances taken some control of their "social" wage—not only how much it should be but how it should be spent. The demand for workers' control of the social wage is, of course, a quite different demand from that of the conservative "individualist" who wants it largely eliminated in favor of the individual paycheck, or higher corporate profits. This is true even though both demands express, from different perspectives, a suspicion of the state and its bureaucracy.

A one-sided emphasis on the social control aspects of the welfare state, then, leaves one ill-equipped for the actual battles which have to be fought in defense of social welfare programs. Cutbacks in social expenditures have to be opposed as strongly as if they were reductions in wages (although successful opposition to such cuts requires that the reformist separation of the economic--trade-union--from the political--Labor Party, etc.--struggle be overcome, and that the economic power of working people be politically organized and directed). This does not imply uncritical acceptance of social welfare programs in their present form, including their coercive "social control" aspects. Indeed, defending the social wage involves conflict with the state which is its guardian, but which at the same time subordinates it to other priorities. An effective defense is likely to bring that guardianship into question.

FOOTNOTES


2 Of course, one may ask of any actual social formation, to what extent is capital subsidized by (rather than paying for) women's labor in the home. cf. Jean Gardiner, "Women's Domestic Labour," New Left Review, 89 (January-February 1975), 47-58. But this and related problems do not affect the very basic distinction I wish to make.


4 Ibid. The quote is from the Financial Times, 8 July 1975.

5 Hansard, 22 April 1975.


13 Fine and Harris, in their critique of Ian Gough ("State Expenditure in Advanced Capitalism," *New Left Review*, 92 (1975), 53-92), reject the concept of the social wage and the notion that social services are an 'integral part of the real wage level of the working class.' Such a notion, they argue, rests upon a rejection of the law of value. The payment of wages by capital involves the exchange of commodities with equivalent values, whereas the state's social welfare provisions do not involve such an exchange of equivalents but instead is primarily determined by political struggle (Ben Fine, Laurence Harris, "State Expenditure in Advanced Capitalism: A Critique," *New Left Review*, 98 (1976), 96-112). But employers do not pay the full equivalent value of the labor-power they hire in the form of wages and fringe benefits. Part of the costs of the production of labor-power has been "socialized" via the state. At present, American auto companies pay a substantial proportion of their wage bill in the form of voluntary health insurance premiums. If these premiums are eliminated in favor of a national health insurance program along the lines of the Health Security Act, would the value of an autoworker's labor-power suddenly drop? No, the employers would have to pay for their workers' health care via a tax instead of a premium, and they might thereby succeed in shifting part of their costs on to other sections of capital. It is not that the law of value is wrong, as Gough believes. The shift in labor costs from individual employer to capitalist state is simply part of the process of "socialization" of capital, that is the process of the bureaucratic collectivization of capitalism, in which the law of value is partially negated, but on the basis of the law of value itself.


18. Counter Information Services and Community Development Project, Cutting the Welfare State (Who Profits), London: CIS, CDP, n.d. This special report unfortunately includes various items (such as defense) in their calculation of the social wage which the government excluded in its claim that every adult worker receives 1000 in social "wages."

19. "The total social wage rose as a proportion of consumption from a third in the early 1950's (33% in 1955) to two-fifths in the early 1960's (40% in 1963) to a half in the late 1960's (53% in 1969) to three-fifths in the early 1970's (59% in 1973) (Hansard, 15 July 1975)."


23. Owners of capital, especially smaller and more conservative ones, tend to see the state as a drain on their investable resources and as encroaching on their individual prerogatives. Insofar as the state functions to maintain the environment in which they can operate, however, it is for them a necessary evil. For workers, on the other hand, this necessity does not exist.
THE "CASE WORK NOTEBOOK": AN ANALYSIS OF ITS CONTENT
by
Leslie B. Alexander, Ph.D. and Philip Lichtenberg, Ph.D.
Graduate School of Social Work and Social Research
Bryn Mawr College

Introduction

Although the contemporary trend of the unionization of both professional and non-professional social service workers merits careful examination of both socio-structural and ideological dimensions, the following study is confined to a historical analysis of the professional, more specifically, casework interests of a group of professional social work unionists in the late 1930s, early 1940s. The method of content analysis is used to examine several major themes within a regular section, "The Case Work Notebook," of the journal, Social Work Today, which was the major theoretical organ of the social work union movement.

Historical Context

As was true of other white-collar unions which were being formed in the early 1930s; for example, those among engineers, office workers, architects, draftsmen, public service employees, newspaper reporters, and writers, social work unionists in both the public and private sectors had a radical political image. For example, the social work unionists endorsed such leftist groups as the Councils of the Unemployed, and such radical legislation as the Workers Unemployment and Social Insurance Bill. They were definitely committed to direct, partisan, and leftist political activity. Taken as a whole, the union movement was certainly to the left of the settlement movement of the Progressive Era, which has traditionally held the preeminent position in the history of social work reform. Although the emphases varied, the union movement in voluntary social work always had a three-pronged approach: a basic concern for the traditional union issues of improved wages, hours, and conditions of work; a definite commitment to professional growth and improved service to clients; and a concern for the broader social issues of the day.

It should be stressed that it was professional caseworkers who both spearheaded and formed the largest professional contingent among the social work unionists. This is interesting, particularly in light of the popular line of argument which equates the drive toward professionalization with an automatic inhibition of reform activity. In this popular view, the professional mystique dictates a narrowly clinical, neutralist approach to social work which de-emphasizes social action.


However, the unionists who wrote the "Case Work Notebook" articles, analyzed in this study, were strongly identified as professionals: holding membership in the American Association of Social Workers; reading professional journals; graduating from professional schools; and attending professional meetings, such as the National Conference of Social Work and the National Conference of Jewish Social Work. An important justification for analyzing the "Case Work Notebook" articles, then, is to gain some understanding of how or whether professional social work radicals translated their leftist ideological views into daily casework practice.

As noted previously, it was the journal, Social Work Today, launched in April 1934 by social work unionists in New York, which remained the theoretical organ of the social work union movement until the demise of the journal in the spring of 1942. Although never enjoying the financial stability, the large circulation or the current notoriety of the Survey, another progressive, yet less radical journal of the same period, Social Work Today are instructive. The noted social welfare historian, Clarke Chambers, stated:

When the rank-and-file movement in 1934 established a journal of its own, Social Work Today, edited by Jacob Fisher of the Bureau of Jewish Social Research and guided by such big names in social work as Gordon Hamilton, Edward C. Lindeman, Ira Reid, Roger Baldwin, and Mary Van Kleeck, the Survey faced competition to the left to which it remained sensitive throughout the rest of the decade until the radical journal folded in the early years of the Second World War.4

Bertha Reynolds, a noted social work educator, theoretician and radical, had the following to say about the demise of the journal in 1942: "... When it was gone, a light went out of social work which has never been rekindled."5

Social Work Today was devoted to the concerns of all workers, whether in the public or private sector. It was published monthly, excluding June, July, and August. Although Social Work Today was a very polished and sophisticated magazine, generally about thirty-two pages in length, finances were always precarious, necessitating a good deal of volunteer effort throughout its history.

Many influential persons in social work and the broader progressive community, such as Roger Baldwin, Gordon Hamilton, Edward Lindeman, Harry Lurie, Marion Hathway, Wayne McMillen, Ira Reid, Bertha Reynolds, Frankwood Williams, and Mary Van Kleeck, were active supporters of and frequent contributors to the journal.


4Chambers, p. 160.

In addition to frequent articles on labor, on developments among other white-collar organizations, on various New Deal programs, and on social action, Social Work Today had regular sections devoted to book reviews, correspondence, and trade union news. The latter section, called "Rank and File," was filled with news and tidbits from organizations across the country. An additional section, entitled "Case Work Notebook," devoted to direct practice issues, was added in October 1936.

"Case Work Notebook"

Geared to the caseworker in both the public and private sector, the "Case Work Notebook" was a regular monthly feature of the journal, usually no more than two pages in length. This section dealt with a range of topics: from the casework relationship, to child placement, to intraprofessional relationships (e.g., how to collaborate with psychiatrists, psychologists, etc.), to supervision. Although some of these selections were more theoretical than others, their usual focus was descriptive: to keep readers abreast of the latest advances in technique and theory within the field. In general, they portrayed a staunchly democratic, non-patronizing approach toward clients.

There was a special Committee on Professional Content (later called Committee on Technical Content), responsible for this Department of Social Work Today. If the author of a particular section was not specified, its authorship was attributed to this Committee. Committee membership as of February 1937 included Naomi Colmery, Helen Kepler, Pearl Miller, Clara Rabinowitz, Mary Rittenhouse, Lillian Shapiro, Ella Wallace, Esther Ziv. As of October 1939, Edith Beck was listed as Chairman. Other members were: Herbert Aptekar, Jeanette Axelrod, Naomi Colmery, Jacob Hechler, Elizabeth Hiett, Margaret Kauffman, Rose Max, Helen Harris Pearlman, Callman Rawley, Claire Schwarts, Rebecca Shankow, Lillian Shapiro and Pearl B. Zimmerman.

The majority of the articles (35 of 48), however, were attributable to a single author. Many of these authors, including Dr. Esther Menaker, Clara Rabinowitz, Marcel Kovarsky, Jacob Hechler, Edith Beck, Jeanette Axelrod, Frank Greving, and Robert Gomberg, were connected with various Jewish agencies in Brooklyn and New York City. The only authors representing academic social work were Dorothy Hutchinson and Fern Lowrey, both Instructors at the New York School of Social Work.

---

6Note that the "Case Work Notebook" appeared in all but the following three issues of Social Work Today: December 1939, June-July 1940, and October 1940. No explanation was given for the omissions.


Methodology and Theoretical Discussion

Three basic content analysis schemes were developed for this study. The first, which evolved from the data, consisted of using each article as the basic unit of analysis and sorting the articles into general themes. All of the forty-eight articles, except for one, could be sorted according to four major themes. (See Table A.)

Two other schemes were developed by the authors to organize what seemed to be significant concerns in the articles; these rating schemes were then applied to the data. In these instances, the unit of analysis was a phrase rather than the entire article. The first scheme was an authority scheme (see Table B). The second scheme was an equality scheme (see Table C).

The two investigators first rated the articles separately, and then met to decide how well the ratings agreed. When a rough sense of reliability was established, the schemes were used by a third rater, Celeste Davis, on all the material and her ratings were checked in group discussion. No formal reliability study was completed.

The debate in social work over unionism versus professionalism in the 30s can be seen in terms of the effort to define authority for social workers, in the guise, sometimes of power and sometimes of responsibility. Unionism defined authority in terms of collectivity, yet accepted hierarchy, in which management was presumed to have authority, some of which was to be wrested from management by struggle. Unionism defined the social workers as worker over against management, as the recipient of (typically) unjust authority. Professionalism, on the other hand, defined authority in terms of personal responsibility on the part of the caseworker, of sponsorship for that responsibility, social limits to it, training necessary for its allocation, and so on.

Following Kenneth Benne,\(^\text{10}\) authority is seen as the fundamental underpinning of human interdependence. Authority consists of mediations which enable community functions. For the achievement of goals in which more than one person must endeavor, authority is necessary.

Democratic authority enables community functions through means which provide freedom and individuality to the members of the community. Authoritarian authority enables community functions through means which dampen the freedom and individuality of members of the community. (We assume, as Benne does, that freedom and individuality can exist only in community. We reject, as he does, the "liberal" view that freedom and individuality are independent of or over against community.)

Equality is a comparable concept to authority in that it is concerned with community. David Gil's analysis of social equality and social inequality parallels Benne's differentiation of democratic authority and authoritarian authority. According to Gil: "The principle of social equality derives from a central value

\(^{10}\)Kenneth Benne, A Conception of Authority (New York: Russell and Russell, 1971).
premise, according to which every individual and every social group are considered to be of equal intrinsic worth, and should, therefore, be entitled to equal civil, political, social and economic rights, responsibilities and treatment, as well as subject to equal constraints."

Gil stresses that social equality implies genuine liberty and that it aims at actualization of individual differences in innate potentialities, therefore, at individuality within and through community.

Results and Discussion

1. Thematic Analysis.

TABLE A. ANALYSES OF MAJOR THEMES OF THE ARTICLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Nature of Casework.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Dynamics of worker-client relationship (indication of scope of casework problems it deals with, techniques, goals of, hostility, resistance, etc.).</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Worker as instrument of agency and larger society.</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Worker and client in alliance against agency and larger society (unions, mass movements, etc.).</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Relationship of casework to other professional services (psychology, teaching, psychoanalysis, medicine, etc.).</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Similarities and differences of casework in the public and private sector.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Issues in supervision.</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Miscellaneous.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Number of Articles</strong></td>
<td><strong>48</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As enumerated in Table A, almost one-half (48%) of all the articles were classified as describing the dynamics of the worker-client relationship. Although concern with this aspect of casework practice had been elevated to an important position during the 1930s both by the publication of Virginia Robinson's influential book, *A Changing Psychology of Social Casework*, in 1930, and the influence of developing theories of psychiatry and psychology on casework, it is somewhat surprising that only one article could be classified as dealing with the effects of unions and mass movements on clients (see category 1C).

Given the ideological bent of the union movement, more references to the importance of both mass movements of clients and the unionization of social workers as necessary adjuncts for effective casework would have been expected. As it was, only perfunctory reference was made to such forms of organized activities. One obvious conclusion is that the radical ideological perspective of these unionists was not integrated into their direct practice. Rather, primary concern was with advancing professionalization along more traditional technical lines,


such as through supervision, inter-professional relationships, and the worker-client relationship. Minimal attention was paid to the impact of a leftist political perspective on direct practice implementation. In other words, the "Case Work Notebook" had disappointingly little to say regarding the integration of a wide, leftist political perspective into casework practice.

2. Analysis of Authority

At a first approximation in the study of authority, two issues were most important. First, observations were divided according to whether the caseworkers were described as being guided by authority or were authorities guiding others. Were they subjects of authority, and in this sense subordinate, or were they renderers of authority, superordinates? Second, distinction was made between "just" authority, which would foster individuality and freedom in collective effort, and "unjust" authority, which would diminish these. In effect, democratic authority was compared with authoritarian authority.

The rating scheme and frequency of ratings are presented in Table B. The major headings in the scheme stemmed from the general theoretical interest as noted in the preceding paragraph. The subheadings were derived from the materials as the content was rated, much as the themes were inductively decided. In 71 of the 115 instances rated (62%), the caseworker was the authority figure. This figure actually underestimates the concern of the authors of the Case Work Notebook with the superordinate status of the caseworker and the professional use of that status. Ten of the 19 instances rated "Caseworker subjected to higher authority--Just Authority" were descriptions of the functionalist argument that the proper origin of any caseworker's authority derived from the agency. It is ambiguous in this thought whether the caseworker is controlled by the agency or empowered by the agency. Clearly, there was more attention directed toward how to be an authority than how to deal with problematic authority that impinges upon the worker.

Furthermore, the main trend pertained to just authority rather than unjust authority. The modal rating (49) refers to the caseworker as a just authority figure. In addition, most of the instances of caseworkers as unjust authority figures were statements of negation: caseworkers were warned not to use authority in an unjust manner.

Descriptively, the following were representative types of statements concerning the caseworker as a just authority:

"... if public workers can investigate applications for relief on the basis of eligibility with real sympathy for the applicant, and then administer the money, help their clients to use other community resources as needed, encourage them by a show of interest in their expressed and apparent situation, they are performing a kind of casework which is basic to any other."

"An authoritative role is taken only after careful study by the worker of the client's personality has shown that he is too conflicted to make wise judgments for himself, or for the time being is too upset or confused to take responsibility for his own problem"
A. Caseworker(s) subjected to higher authority
1. Just authority.
   a. Just authority impinges upon caseworker (caseworker as receiver). \((N=15)\)
      1) Environmental or social reality as authority force. (3)
      2) Charter of institution (its nature, function, etc.) as authority force.
      3) Administration as authority force. (1)
      4) Expertise as authority force. (1)
   b. Description of caseworker's response to just authority (caseworker as actor). \((N=4)\)
      1) Worker submits to agency function. (1)
      2) Worker chooses higher authority to align with. (1)
      3) Worker deals with authority actively (e.g., uses supervision). (2)
2. Unjust authority.
   a. Unjust authority impinges upon caseworker (worker as receiver). \((N=16)\)
      1) Environmental or social reality as authority force. (3)
      2) Charter of institution (its nature, function, etc.) as authority force. (6)
      3) Administration as authority force. (5)
      4) Expertise as authority force. (2)
   b. Description of caseworker's response to unjust authority (caseworker as actor). \((N=5)\)
      1) Worker submits to agency function. (1)
      2) Worker chooses higher authority to align with. (2)
      3) Worker deals with authority actively. (1)
      4) Worker circumvents higher authority. (1)
   c. Other \((N=3)\)
B. Caseworker(s) as authority figure
1. Just authority.
   a. Authority as function of agency or client's problem and needs. (7)
   b. Professional's qualities defining the authority. (15)
   c. As authority, move environmental forces in support of client. (2)
   d. As authority, help client master reality. (11)
   e. As authority, behave in particular ways in caseworker-client transaction. (7)
   f. Other. (7)
2. Unjust authority.
   a. Authority lacks grounding in function of agency or client's problem and needs. (3)
   b. Non-professional behavior in authority force. (7)
   c. Misuse of lack of expectable use of environment in support of client. (1)
   d. Help client avoid reality (e.g., treat inner life only). (6)
   e. As unjust authority, behave in particular ways in caseworker-client transactions. (6)
   f. Other

Totals

\(-61-\)
"The chiseler is considered in his human motivation rather than in his customary role as scapegoat for assaults upon relief standards."

"Earnest, thoughtful practitioners ... have shown that they are aware of the importance of realities and have directed their energies toward the fostering of a 'therapeutic' life situation for their clients. They consult with teachers, principals, group-leaders, to encourage better understanding of a particular child, to foster a 'therapeutic approach' for him."

"Finally, we have the worker who, irrespective of her fundamental sympathy with or rejection of the Workers Alliance, has succeeded in resolving her conflicts and has accepted dealing with organized clients as a legitimate part of her total responsibility. ... She does not take it as a personal affront if her client seeks aid from this outside source. ..."

"The worker ... would need to be free from an obscuring identification with his client as well as from an inflexible agency policy."

"A worker, therefore, who consciously uses her ability to stand away from the client psychologically, to be detached to the point of being quite different from the client, or even to be for the client a sounding board against which he tests his ambivalence or indecision,--has found an invaluable tool in a controlled objectivity. In similar manner, identification, with its content of warmth and acceptance, has tremendous technical possibilities."

Knowing that social work was institutionalizing its professionalism during this period, it is not surprising that the Case Work Notebook emphasized the caseworker as a just authority. From the descriptive material it can be seen that democratic interests were expressed; and their assessments can be recognized as relevant today. Indeed, the students who worked on this research found these documents quite contemporary and relevant.

But it is true, also, that the Case Work Notebook appeared in a journal that was started by those endeavoring to change society and to deal with the working conditions of social workers themselves. Given this context, it is reasonable to expect more instances in which caseworkers were advised about the nature of unjust authority commonly faced and the best kinds of actions for handling these pressures. The materials and services allocated by society were very limited, and the institutions for administering social services were hardly democratic. Few caseworkers were setting the policies in the agencies where they worked, or even were participating in policy discussions. Most caseworkers were being asked to do impossible tasks, as they are asked to do today. Yet, of the 115 instances of authority rated, only 25 (22%) referred at all to the unjust authority that impinges on caseworkers.
Of these relatively few instances where attention was directed to unjust authority, the larger proportion can be seen as basically complaints. That is, they are descriptions of the way in which society or the agency allocates little and asks much (too little money, too large a caseload or too little authority given). There are only five occasions in which caseworkers are advised about actively dealing with unjust authority (A₂b ratings).

Every caseworker, as caseworker, is subordinate as well as superordinate for significant proportions of daily life. The failure to provide guidance to caseworkers in respect to their subordinate functioning represented a conservatizing trend: not only was professionalism with its presumed autonomy seemingly favored over unionism in the Case Work Notebook, but a buying into the system was promoted by implicitly causing caseworkers to privately absorb the influences of unjust authority.

Not only the infrequent reference to dealing with unjust authority carried this bias. In about a third of all the unjust authority statements, the idea was implicit that caseworkers, in their non-casework lives, as citizens, as political people off the job, could struggle for a better society as a means for handling the unjust authority impinging on them. Yet the authority forces were impeding the casework activity itself. A self-administered powerlessness, adopted through depoliticizing of the casework task, is manifested through these statements.

The findings on authority can be summarized thusly:

The progressive aspect of the Case Work Notebook resided in its analyses of caseworkers as authorities who function in a democratic manner.

The conservatizing aspect of the Case Work Notebook lay in its failure to positively instruct caseworkers in dealing with unjust authority and in its politically demobilizing thrust.

3. Analysis of Equality

In the first approximation of the study of equality, two major issues and their interaction were of interest. First, observations were divided according to whether caseworkers and clients were equal or unequal with respect to being affected by larger social forces. A second major consideration was whether or not caseworkers and clients were equal in terms of acting upon larger social forces. These two issues were joined together in a variety of combinations for each rating.

Table C presents the basic rating scheme developed and the results of its application to the material. As compared with the authority scheme, where there were a total of 115 ratings, there were only a total of 73 equality ratings. Equality, then, while an important preoccupation, was somewhat less important to the unionists than authority.

In over one-half of the instances (combination of Rating Numbers 1, 2 and 3 = 42 or 50%), caseworkers and clients were seen as equally affected by larger social forces. This is a strong equalitarian thrust, which represents a radical political orientation being incorporated into direct practice to some degree.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Equality of caseworker(s) and client(s) in respect to being</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>affected by larger social forces and in respect to acting upon larger</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>social forces.</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2a. Equality of caseworker(s) and client(s) in respect to being</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>affected by larger social forces, but no reference is made to</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>acting upon larger social forces.</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2b. No reference is made to caseworker(s) and client(s) in respect</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to being affected by larger social forces, but equality of</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>caseworker(s) and client(s) in respect to acting upon larger social</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>forces.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3a. Equality of caseworker(s) and client(s) in respect to being</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>affected by larger social forces, but inequality in respect to</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>acting upon larger social forces.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3b. Inequality of caseworker(s) and client(s) in respect to being</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>affected by larger social forces, but equality in respect to</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>acting upon larger social forces.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4a. Inequality of caseworker(s) and client(s) in respect to being</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>affected by larger social forces, but no reference is made to</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>acting upon larger social forces.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4b. No reference is made to caseworker(s) and client(s) in respect</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to being affected by larger social forces, but inequality of</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>caseworker(s) and client(s) in respect to acting upon larger social</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>forces.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Inequality of caseworker(s) and client(s) in respect both to</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>being affected by larger social forces and in acting upon larger</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>social forces.</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. No decision on equality or inequality is possible.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The modal responses (17 in each case) were represented by 2a (equality of caseworkers and clients with regard to being affected by larger social forces) and 5 (inequality of caseworkers both as affected by and in acting upon larger social forces). These results seem contradictory and, in fact, can be interpreted as representing the debate over whether or not professionalization renders workers and clients unequal.

The transition point in such an interpretation between No. 2a and No. 5 is 3a (equality of caseworker and client in being affected by larger social forces, but inequality in terms of acting upon them. This category received 11 ratings.

Although caseworkers and clients are considered equal in being affected by larger social forces (42 ratings), other ratings (combination of No. 3a, 4b, and 5 = 30) reveal considerable belief in the inequality of workers and clients in terms of their ability to act upon larger forces. The assumption is that workers are superior or more powerful in relation to affecting the outside world. Such a response represents the failure of the workers to deal with their own
relative impotence, which is verified by their union participation and played out in their ideology generally. This result explains to some degree the lack of a sense of affinity with clients in social movement activity, noted in the Thematic Analysis. This result also provides another instance where professionalization serves to segregate workers and clients, providing workers with the illusion that they are more powerful than they, in fact, are.

Some examples of equality ratings are the following:

"... caseworkers are more comfortable in discussing this program in terms of family preservation than in openly accepting it as an undesirable measure of economy. Why are caseworkers so adept in finding good professional reasons for these rejections? Is it our fear that relief clients would benefit from advantages usually denied other young people? ... Are we afraid to face the fact that given such an opportunity ... we would find family life a much more disintegrating function than we would like to think?" (Rating: 2a)

"It is her heightened awareness of the destructiveness of the influences in her client's life that has often lead the caseworker to fight fiercely for his rights, to plead, cajole, to "casework" the people with whom the client comes in contact ...." (Rating: 5)

"Social workers can obtain help for themselves in watching and meeting the pain of others through a recognition that the service they represent may be the way out for the client ...." (Rating: 3a)

Conclusions

It would seem that the findings document a basic ambivalence within the unionists in the 1930s and 40s, an ambivalence tied to the union-professional debate and to the political aspects of social work practice. The unionists were progressive, as manifested by their attention to democratic authority and to caseworker-client equality. Yet they were also conservative, and the conservative trend came to increasingly dominate their writings in the practice area, as outspoken political radicalism dominated their other writings.

The following can be placed on the progressive side:

1. The unionists emphasized that caseworkers must take on responsibility and must work with craftsmanship and pride in worker-client relationships, not as ancillary personnel but as important, primary helping figures.

2. They began to define caseworkers as democratic authority figures, and they spelled out how democratic authority looks in practice.

3. To some degree, they described the equal buffeting society gives to workers and clients alike; the basic control that the system exerts over all its members.
On the conservative side are countervailing factors:

1. These caseworkers justified their responsibility as doing the work of society, as legitimated by conventional society, and as empowered by forces dominant in the system.

2. Although they alluded to unjust authority and to struggle against it, they failed to explore this issue, to share their wisdom, or to mobilize this kind of endeavor as part of casework practice.

3. They reflected a tendency to divorce themselves from clients by a sense of superior capability in dealing with the larger world. It was not that caseworker and client together could think through solutions more adequately than either could do alone, but that caseworkers alone held the keys to insights and solutions.

Maybe all this is contained in the fact that most of the journal concerned policy and politics, while only this small section and a few articles over the years attended to the social work practice of the members. Casework was considered to be segregated from political action.

What was true for the authors of the "Case Work Notebook" is true of many social workers today too: they are also attached to the status quo and yet eager to bring a new system into existence. The ambivalence in these writings is paralleled by the ambivalence in the field today. Through critical appraisal of the authoritarian and inequalitarian side of the Case Work Notebook writings, lessons are to be learned for current application. It is possible for young social workers to know and to build upon the positive contributions from these vital professional unionists. It is also possible that new times permit the rectification of the omissions, compromises and false directions that undermined their promise of achievement.
THE MEASUREMENT OF PERSONAL INFLUENCE IN ORGANIZATION AND COMMUNITY

Roger A. Lohmann, Ph.D.
University Of Tennessee

ABSTRACT

Discussions of personal influence in situations in communities and organizations are ordinarily abstract and theoretical. In this paper, a practical method for the measurement of influence in interactional terms is developed. The approach combines the use of Likert scales, sociometric techniques and a simplified version of "blockmodeling" using mathematical matrices. The method is outlined using a hypothetical social service agency with a seven-member staff.

Introduction

Despite the interests of its founder, the late J.S. Moreno, in social reform, the practice of sociometry has not made substantial inroads in the thinking of social practitioners in the post-war period. It is the purpose of this article to outline a procedure, based upon sociometric methods of data collection and an analytic method using matrices first suggested by Festiger in 1945, to measure personal influence in social situations in communities and formal organizations. This problem of influence is central to the on-going concerns of those Moynihan has characterized as "professional reformers." Thus, any procedure which addresses this central issue should have intrinsic interest and potential significance for these applied social scientists operating as "change agents" in various community and organizational settings.
Problem

Considerable progress has been made in recent years in social science handling of the seemingly intractable problem of power and its correlates. Of particular interest to this article have been the efforts of a group of "behavioral" political scientists to forego the concept of power, in favor of the more definable, observable, and behaviorally measurable concept of "influence." In general, however, these efforts have not sought to go beyond the definitional and observational question to the equally interesting issue of the quantitative measurement of personal influence.

Influence can ordinarily be seen as a situational and interpersonal emergent of strategic interaction. The exercise of influence involves interpersonal behavior in which interactants have agendas of motives and intentions which may or may not be apparent to others. In such interactional episodes, one party to the encounter can ordinarily be assumed to have included within a vocabulary of motives an intent to change, reinforce, clarify, or in some other way affect, the behavior or the attitudes of the other, or of observers who are also parties to the situation. In many influence situations, all interactants may be seeking to influence each other, simultaneously. Two possible exceptions must be noted here, since they require separate treatment: One involves the situation in which one party to an interaction is unintentionally influential upon another; for example, the eminent public figure whose "casual conversation" with a young person aids the latter in making a career choice. Such cases often involve status differences or other situational characteristics which convince one of the interactants to only partially reveal the "true" impact of the interaction to the first, thus obscuring the latter's view of the situation. The second case involves the special situation in which both interactants are seeking to influence the "audience" of observers rather than one another.

Communication is an underlying social process basic to all efforts at influence—whether they involve face-to-face encounters or mass communications. Although the exact relationships involved in the communication of influence on either level are not entirely clear,
certain fairly standard configurations have been identified. Dahl, for example, says that most authorities agree on the following bases of influence: 1) money and credit; 2) control over jobs; 3) control over the information of others; 4) social standing; 5) knowledge and expertise; 6) popularity, esteem, and charisma; 7) legality, constitutionality; 8) ethnic solidarity; and 9) the right to vote. In other words, any person or group who could be rated high on any one of these dimensions would ordinarily be regarded as more influential than a person or group rated low.

Two major issues are immediately raised by this "resource" conception as a basis for the measurement of influence. The first is the question of "weighting": in situations involving two or more of these categories of potential influence, how are we to consider their relative effects. How much influence, based upon control over jobs, equals how much influence based upon social standing? This is a problem which is not immediately solvable at present, and as a result, the method outlined here will seek to avoid the weighting problem entirely. Rather than relying upon a weighting scheme, which would be itself dependent upon the establishment of an "objective" criterion or scale, the method outlined here relies explicitly upon the informed judgements of those actually involved. It is, in that sense, an "intersubjective" rather than an "objective" measure of influence, and should be recognized as such.

The second major problem raised by the current understanding of influence involves the question of interpretation of the configuration of influentials and influences in situations involving more than two persons. The most widely discussed examples of such situational regularities in community and organizational studies respectively are the concepts of "power structure" and "formal organization", usually represented as hierarchies of roles or positions. Students of influence have generally been highly critical of the concepts of power structure and formal organization, but have generally left unanswered the question of what, if anything, a large number (or, more correctly, sequence) of influence-interactions "add up to." One of the major problems, of course, is the great likelihood that in reality, such "chains of influence" do not correspond very closely with the neat, logical and symmetric "structures" of a formal hierarchy implied by both the models of power structure and formal organization. (See Figure 1)
The question of a measurement approach for influence will be dealt with through the use of a rather loose concept of "influence networks" consisting of sequential influence-interactions in a fixed time period. Use of the term "network" here is intended to convey a sense of the great likelihood of a large number of different sequential combinations of influencing--some "structured" (or "systematic") and others merely episodic and situation-specific.

The method outlined below appears to have very interesting, practical possibilities as a "data collection" or "intelligence gathering" technique for planners, decision-makers and others for whom information about the distribution of influence is a matter of importance. For such actors, the existence and unique structure of an influence network is a highly problematic concern. Although the necessary conceptual simplifications detailed in this presentation are primarily to facilitate purity, the method itself may be rendered more sophisticated and useable quite readily. At present, the single greatest conceptual simplification necessary in the study of influence would be the assumption of an "open" awareness context in which everyone involved is more or less aware of the efforts at influence of others in the situation. Needless to say, a closed context is infinitely more difficult to collect valid, reliable data on. However, the possibilities for use of this approach in relatively open contexts--such as small towns or small social agencies of the type discussed below--should not be minimized.

Methodology Overview

In the following pages, a procedure is set forth for ascertaining the existence of networks of influence in social situations, for determining the structure of such networks, and for estimating fluctuations in the strength of influence "flowing" from person to person through the network. The measurement procedure itself is grounded in the mathematics of matrices (matrix algebra), although it is not necessary for us to venture far into that domain in order to establish the case for the procedures employed here.

The basic elements, or tools, employed in this method will be a square matrix sufficient to record the entire set of interactions relevant to a situation as a set of diads. Each actor, whether person or organization, is represented by a unique row and column of the
The second basic tool is a scaled questionnaire or other data collection instrument suitable for generating at least ordinal (and, preferably interval or ratio level) data. In the more sophisticated approaches mentioned above, practitioners may substitute various unobtrusive measures for the questionnaire. We shall begin our investigation with the questionnaire, and use the matrix to analyse data which are generated. Conceptually, preparation of the questionnaire and the matrix go hand in hand, since the size of the matrix also determines the population to whom the questionnaire will be distributed. The question of sampling in this context becomes extraordinarily complex and difficult; and therefore, we shall assume throughout that the questionnaire will be administered to a 100 percent sample—to all the relevant parties to the situation.

Situation

For purposes of illustration, let us assume that we wish to assess the patterns of influence in a small social agency. Assume, for example, a seven-person staff (say, in a small clinic, family service agency, or the like) consisting of a director, assistant director, and five service workers each with clearly defined responsibilities. One works only with small children, one with alcoholics, one with adolescents, etc. We shall be concerned immediately with the problem of determining whether these staff members attempt to influence one another (generally or in specific situations), the overall pattern of influence exerted, and the level of influence exerted or attained by each person involved.

Immediately, we face one of the crucial questions in the measurement of influence: Do we wish to determine the exact influence applied in a given set of interactions (when a new client sought help from the agency last Tuesday) or to estimate generally the "influence position" of various persons engaged in recurrent interaction? The question of influence-in-general, is essentially an exercise in historical prediction, so that we must recognize from the very start a certain tentative nature to such predictions. Consequently, we are most often likely to employ this approach in specific situations, where some possibility of generalizing exists.
Let us assume what is a fairly typical case in organizations: One of the staff members (call her Carol) has proposed an innovation in the staff operation (say, proposing a new "program" of services to the board of directors). A second staff member (call him James) has learned of the proposal, and countered with a second proposal that a different program be submitted to the board at its next meeting.

The issue of which of the two proposals to submit must be resolved by the director (Stan) since it is his responsibility (recognized by all concerned) to prepare the agenda for board consideration. Moreover, he has decided to submit only one for reasons of his own. The problem he faces is a classic decision problem: On what basis is he to choose among alternatives? The problem facing the others in the situation (the Assistant Director, Tony, and the other three service workers, Eunice, Steve, and Bette) is a different one, however. If the question is momentous for example, or even if it is not, they may not wish to commit themselves to a losing proposition. On the other hand merely as speculation, they may wish to guess how things will come out. From their vantage point (and ours), it seems unlikely that the issue will be resolved solely on rational grounds. For one thing, they obviously cannot "enter his mind". Also, as is often the case, there is no clearcut evidence upon which to determine that one or another of the proposals is superior. If anything, this is an "apples and oranges" problem; there are no clearcut criteria for settling the matter on its merits. It seems likely, therefore, to all parties and most observers, that the question will be resolved through the exercise of influence. (In that, it is a very common organizational problem indeed!) Thus, if we can determine the predominant patterns of influence, we can predict the likely outcome: If Carol has been very popular with the director (call him Stan), as well as highly regarded in the community for her expertise, and Jim has not, but has instead been regarded as something of a crank, tolerated only because he will be retiring in four years, the influence question may be fairly straightforward. Popularity, reputation, and expertise, after all, important sources of influence according to the literature.

By contrast, if our assessment (and the assessments of Tony, Eunice, Steve, and Bette) has it that Carol and Jim are quite evenly matched in their influence with Stan the question becomes a dead-heat.
Uncertainty prevails, and we shall just have to wait and see. It is in situations such as this that the influence-measurement methodology suggested above may be most useful: cases in which decisions are to be made based upon influence, and where grounds for rational choice among alternatives are unclear. For the matrix procedures outlined should allow us to take two important steps:

1. First, to test the hypothesis that Carol and Jim are about even in their influence with Stan.

2. To systematically assess other patterns of influence involved in this situation. In particular, we shall be interested in the influence of the non-participants in this situation (Tony, Eunice, Steve, and Bette) and the indirect influence potential through them for Carol and Jim, respectively, to affect Stan.

To begin with, then, we shall visualize the situation involved in terms of a 7 by 7 square matrix like the following one:

**Figure 1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Stan</th>
<th>Tony</th>
<th>Eunice</th>
<th>Carol</th>
<th>Steve</th>
<th>Bette</th>
<th>Jim</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stan</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tony</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>K</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eunice</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carol</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steve</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bette</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jim</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

-73-
The conceptions we shall employ here are that each box or cell of this matrix shows a single possible influence diad between two staff members. The cells read horizontally indicate the effects of a single staff member upon each of the others, while reading the cells vertically reveals the total set of influences upon a given staff member.

Figure 2
Agency As A Heirarchy

Stan

Tony

Eunice Carol Steve Bette Jim

For purposes of illustration, the "x" in the above table illustrates the assumption of the classic heirarchy hypothesis of organization theory shown in Figure 2. It is assumed, in this case, that on any given matter, Stan (and only he) "influences" Tony and Tony influences the remaining five staff members.

Reproduction of matrix of this type is often a complex and difficult business, however. We may convey essentially the same information in a slightly revised format (called a "blockmodel") simply by constructing the matrix with a "0" in an empty cell and a "1" in a cell where a relationship exists. In this form, the above heirarchy is shown as follows: 14

```
0100000
0011111
0000000
0000000
0000000
0000000
```

The matrix approach has the effect of abstractly separating the "influences upon" each person from the "influences exerted" by that person allowing determination of the direction of influence. Such
Directionality is one of the most desirable features of the matrix method, as we shall see below. It provides us with a reasonable means of constructing serial or "chain" effects of influence. It is not always desirable, however. We cannot, for example, identify "barriers" in the influence system. Nor are we always able, using this blockmodel to zero in on the exact "pressure points"; those persons who are most central to the influence patterns involved. One very handy way of getting at each of these is through the use of the matrix transpose. The transpose of any matrix is defined as the matrix which is attained by substituting rows for columns and vice versa. The transpose of the matrix above, for example, is:

```
0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
```

By subtracting this transposed matrix from the original, as follows, we get an estimate of the "net effect" of influence. Positive values indicate the exertion of influence, negative numbers indicate "receipt" of influence and zeros in this case may be either no influence or (as we shall see below) a neutralization or cancelling of effects:

```
0 1 0 0 0 0
-1 0 1 1 1 1
0 -1 0 0 0 0
0 -1 0 0 0 0
0 -1 0 0 0 0
0 -1 0 0 0 0
```

Examination of the rows and columns of this matrix using these conventions confirms what we hypothesized above: The director alone is involved in influence efforts (the rest of the cells are empty) through the assistant director, and the negative numbers suggest that there is no active resistance (counter-influence efforts) from those...
being influenced. Subtraction of a transpose from a matrix, then, is a practical means of assessing "net influence" in situations.

We can identify the various "pressure points" involved in a situation by addition. By summing the rows and columns of the original matrix, we are able to estimate total influence exerted, and total influence upon, each person respectively. Thus, in our example, summing the rows reveals that the director influences one person; the assistant director five and each of the other staff members none; while the director is influenced by no one; the assistant director by the director only; and each of the other staff by one person (the assistant director). Major questions of transitivity arise with this procedure when an interval scale (such as the one employed below) is substituted for the nominal scale used here. Can we suggest, for example, that a row or column score of 26 is "twice as much" influence as a score of 13? Great care is needed in interpretation of the results.

An interesting possible interpretation at this level is to compare row or column totals with the total score attained by summing row totals (a "column vector") and column totals (a "row vector") as in the following:

```
0100000 1
0011111 5
0000000 0
0000000 0
0000000 0
0000000 0
0000000 0
0000000 0
0111111 6
```

By converting either row or column totals to percentage ratios of the total, this figure provides us with a crude index of the approximate "centrality" of each figure in the influence effort.
For example, there were a total of six interaction diads in the classic heirarchy, and the assistant director was involved (as influencer) in five of them. Clearly, he is a very influential figure in this situation as viewed from the vantage point of the classic heirarchy approach. Instead, receipt of influence is uniformly distributed among participants. They also suggest, interestingly enough, that the director is only as influential as the rest of the staff, while the assistant director looms large.

Let us try, now, to apply these insights using the blockmodel approach to a situation more real than that represented by the classic heirarchy hypothesis. Essentially, this involves speculation about the presence or absence (as well as the direction) of an influence relationship in each of the 49 diads suggested by our matrix. Assume, for example, that the director considers it part of his responsibility to attempt to influence each of the staff on important questions. We may show this in the blockmodel as a row vector as follows:

0111111

(Assuming, of course, that the issue of his influencing himself is moot, and therefore inserting a "0" in the diagonal--an assumption also followed in the other cases.)

The assistant director, in turn, may be less uniformly influential. Assume, for example, that he is more popular with the women than with the men staff members and as a result more likely to exert influence upon female staff members in this situation. That would produce the following row vector:

0011010

Staff member Eunice, in turn, is part-time and generally unconcerned about matters of agency governance. In this (and most) situations, she can be counted on to attempt to influence no one:

0000000
Carol, on the other hand, will at least make an effort (leaving aside for the moment, how effective or strong) to influence everyone:

1111111

Steve is a staff member whose influence is asymmetric with Tony's. That is, he ordinarily avoids the female staff members as much as he possibly can, and therefore can be counted upon to influence only the males on the staff.

1100001

Bette has a classic, heirarchical vision of the organization, and therefore she sees no need to influence anyone other than Stan and Tony:

1100000

Finally, Jim, as the author of the counter-proposal can likewise be counted upon to attempt to influence everyone:

1111111

Putting all of these assumptions together, then, we get the following configuration (including column and row totals).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>0111111</th>
<th>0011010</th>
<th>0000000</th>
<th>1111111</th>
<th>1100001</th>
<th>1100000</th>
<th>1111111</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4544344</td>
<td>28</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Through this procedure then, we have estimated that there will be a total of 28 influence-diads in this situation, and that in terms of efforts to influence, the key actors are likely to be Carol and James, the authors of the proposals and Stan, the director. Nothing surprising there! However, we have confirmed that this approach is apparently faithful to our assumptions. When we examine the column
totals, however, it is mildly surprising to learn that more attention (measured in diads) will be devoted to Tony, the assistant director, than to any other staff member! Further, even though we have said that Eunice plays no active role in agency affairs, it appears she will probably receive as much attention in influencing efforts as Stan, Carol, Bette, and Jim; while Steve, as a price for avoiding the female staffers, will likely receive less attention than anyone else on the staff.

Now, to test for "net influence" let us subtract our matrix from its transpose as follows:

\[
\begin{array}{cccccc}
0111111 & 0001111 & 0110000 & 1111111 & 1100000 & 1111111 \\
0011010 & 1001111 & 1101001 & 1001001 & 1101001 & 1011001 \\
0000000 & 1101001 & 1101001 & 1101001 & 1101001 & 1001101 \\
1111111 & 1101001 & 1101001 & 1101001 & 1101001 & 1101001 \\
\end{array}
\]

\[
\begin{array}{cccccc}
& 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 2 \\
0111111 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 2 \\
0011010 & -1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & -2 \\
0000000 & -1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & -4 \\
1111111 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 3 \\
1100000 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
1111111 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
\end{array}
\]

Based upon this calculation, we can make several predictions about the "net effect" of influence in this situation. The first is the presence of an equilibrium of influence exerted and received in the sense that the total sum of influence is zero. This is less important, however, than the fact that an estimate of the net sum of influence exerted upon each person can apparently be derived in this manner.

Secondly, we can make certain other predictions about individual participants based upon these data. For example, by defining the direction of the values of the resultant matrix as indicative of whether or not each participant in a diad attempted to influence the other without an effort at counter-influence (1), was influenced without countering (-1) or engaged in mutual efforts at influence (0) we can identify the likely influentials in this situation.

Further, by one additional step (subtraction of the "total" row vector matrix from the "total" column vector matrix), we can determine which participants came out ahead - in the sense of influencing more
people than they were influenced by, and which did not. The procedure, of course, automatically screens out "0's" or "dead heats", in which both parties attempted to influence each other. For the raw scores, such data may be obtained by subtracting the original row vector matrix from the column vector matrix. This procedure, in this instance, yields:

\[
\begin{array}{ccc}
-2 & 2 & -4 \\
1 & -2 & 3 \\
4 & -4 & 8 \\
-2 & -3 & 3 = -5 \\
0 & 0 & 0 \\
2 & 2 & -0 \\
-3 & 3 & -6 \\
\end{array}
\]

**Interval Scale**

From this point, it is a relatively straightforward matter to devise and administer an interval scale for assessing the relative strength of influence exerted by the various parties. Two predominant approaches are likely: On the one hand, the analyst might seek to develop a questionnaire-based "influence scale" taking into account each of the major items included in the definition above. The other approach, to be used here, involves the use of a Likert-Scale, in which subjective assessments of probable influence are converted into ordinal-level data.15

The scale employed for illustration here consists of five items, estimating in rank order the amount of influence expected in a given situation: The values are:

0 - Influence unknown or undetermined
1 - No apparent influence
2 - Casual acquaintance
3 - Mutual self-respect; some influence likely
4 - High loyalty probably
5 - "In the pocket" (Controlling influence certain)
We can apply this scale to the construction of the data matrix in the manner already illustrated, with the possible additional intermediate stage of administering a questionnaire to determine values. (A questionnaire of this type would involve essentially a modified form of sociometric question, and should be given to each of the participants orally or in writing.)

If one were attempting to develop an influence scale of the type mentioned above, the questionnaire would be essentially factorial in design with each question intended to sample a portion of the domain. In that case, use of the items identified by Dahl as "bases" of influence would probably prove very useful. Use of the Likert-Scale technique, however, would probably involve only a single question of the following type:

1. "Please rate the degree of general influence you have with each of your co-workers, using the following numerical ratings: (Select the item which most closely corresponds with your true relationship with that person.)"

   1 - I have no apparent influence with this person.
   2 - We are casual acquaintances, but agree on many things.
   3 - He/she listens to what I say. We can usually work something out.
   4 - He/she will usually go along with what I suggest.
   5 - He/she does what I ask.

In situations involving a large number of persons, a qualification may also be appropriate, as follows:

"Please identify only the persons you actually know, or know of. Indicate "O" for those who are unknown."

Finally, to employ the procedure of cross-checking responses, and establishing their general reliability, a third question might also be in order.
2. "Please rate the degree of general influence that your co-workers have upon you: (without looking back to your prior responses) select the statement which most accurately describes your relationship with each person:

1 - This person has no effect upon me.
2 - We know each other, and I would listen if they tried to persuade me of something.
3 - This person usually has some good points, and I listen whenever possible.
4 - This person is very reasonable, and I seldom disagree.
5 - I always do what he/she asks.

Again, for purposes of illustration, assume the following pattern of responses: On the initial run, Stan indicated that all of the staff scored "5" ("they always do as I say"). When pressed, he indicated that what he had in mind were the "big issues" by which he seemed to mean questions clearly within his authority as director. On the question of the new program choice (where he felt caught between Carol and Jim) he indicated the following response pattern:

0543443

These responses are interesting in two respects: In Stan's opinion, Tony is completely loyal--the prospect of his disloyalty is out of the question. Secondly, he indicated that whatever choice is made, he fears the loser (Carol or Jim) will "jump ship" and take the matter directly to the board. Hence, he scores them low.

Tony, as indicated previously, has better relationships with female than with male staffers as suggested in his responses:

3044342

Eunice, part-time staff member, feels that she is a veritable isolate in the agency, as indicated by her responses:

3201121
Carol, by contrast, is confident of several staff members, but still uncertain of Stan:

354053

(Note that she apparently feels she can even influence Jim, the author of the counter proposal!)

Steve, as we suggested earlier, is not likely to be very effective with the full-time female staff members, who dislike him. He is, however, largely unaware of their views toward him and consequently scores his influence uniformly:

4444044

The interviewer initially disagreed with this assessment but was unable to do anything about it. The problem could be resolved by comparing responses on question 2 with the first question. If each staff member rates not only their own, but all staff members' influence, we could compute a mean score and major deviations from the mean can then be "red flagged" for special investigation as a part of the analysis. In Steve's case, let us assume that this resulted in an adjustment to this scores as follows:

3441013

(If there is doubt about the acceptability of such adjustments in a particular study, identical operations can be performed on both the unadjusted and the modified matrices as indicated below, and the resultant predictions compared.)

Bette, as expected, responded in conformity with her hierarchical vision, and likewise, her scores had to be adjusted. Below are her unadjusted and adjusted scores:

4411101 4333304

Finally, Jim, the author of the counter proposal scored himself as follows:

4441330

-33-
Altogether, we have the following blockmodel:

\[
\begin{array}{cccccc}
0 & 5 & 4 & 3 & 4 & 3 \\
3 & 0 & 4 & 3 & 4 & 3 \\
3 & 2 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 2 \\
3 & 5 & 4 & 0 & 4 & 5 \\
3 & 4 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 \\
4 & 3 & 3 & 3 & 0 & 4 \\
4 & 4 & 4 & 1 & 3 & 0 \\
\end{array}
\]

\[
20/23/23/13/18/19/16
\]

Again, several things are immediately apparent. First, Stan (score = 23) and Carol (24) are roughly equal in their apparent ability to influence staff on this issue, while Jim (19) lags several points behind. This may be portentious of the final outcome, particularly if Carol should win Stan over (in which case, Jim would appear to be no match).

Further, as suspected, Eunicet (10) is not likely to influence anyone in this situation; not only does she rank last among ability to exert influence (row totals), she also has the lowest of all scores in each individual column. Interestingly, however, she is tied at the top of recipients of influence with Tony (column totals of 23 each). While Carol, perhaps due to her partisanship, ranks lowest at 16 (the person the staff collectively feels least likely to influence).

When we compute the row totals of the difference matrix, as previously, a clearcut prediction emerges: Carol is likely to be most influential overall. She has "positive" influence with all staff members except the director with whom she is an even match.
Further, Stan siding with Jim against her might be unwise, since she still would have strong support (a net score of 2 or higher) among four other staff members. Finally, Eunice's negative position here is further illustrated by her row score (-13) and the fact that her influence is not numerically superior in a single diad. She is clearly at the bottom of the pecking order in terms of influence!

**Influence Structures**

In addition to the diadic relations of influence shown, we are also able to use the matrix format to estimate some elementary "structures" of influence involving three or more persons. For example, if we concentrate, for a moment, only on cells with a value of "5" in the original matrix, we see the following pattern:

```
0500000
0000000
0000000
0500050
0000000
0000000
0000000
```

This pattern is suggestive of two fairly stable and interlocking coalitions among the staff members. Stan and Tony form one, and Carol, Tony, and Bette the other. Tony's position in this situation is obviously critical (and apparently at odds with Stan's assessment of him!) Whatever influence is generated around and upon Tony, however, is not likely to be transitive (that is, passed on to another) since neither Carol (3) nor Stan (3) are influenced by him to the degree that they influence him (5). He is, in that sense, the end of the line. Furthermore, Tony may well face problems of divided loyalty if Stan and Carol disagree in this situation, since both rate him as completely loyal.
A quite different pattern emerges when we examine the combined scores of "5" and "4":

0540440
0044040
0000000
0540450
0440000
4000004
4440000

By adopting a simple search procedure, we can begin to develop the complex patterns inherent in the data: Move laterally along a row until a significant cell (i.e., a score of 4 or 5) is located. Then, move to the corresponding row and identify significant "second order" linkages to the initial row. From there identify "third order" linkages, etc. Ordinarily, such a procedure should be followed until a dead end is reached, or a loop is made - that is, the original, or "first order" row is again identified. Two methods of elaborating such loops are possible. If, on the one hand, one is interested in a direct "path" of influence, (such as the first strong relation encountered in each row, only one row should be selected.) For purposes of notation, we can identify each of the elements in this "string" as a vector of the values with letters corresponding to the first letter of each name for easy identification. In the above example, that would produce a third-order vector leading nowhere ($S^5, 4^1, O^3$). The only loop leading from Stan back to him is the "path" of influence with Bette forming the second-order vector ($4^S, 4^B$).

The second method of identifying these various chains of influence is with the use of sociometric diagrams revealing the full range of possibilities, as follows:
It is clear that there are no isolates in this influence scheme. Generally, however, in situations involving substantial numbers of persons, such diagrams are often unwieldy, and the analyst may have better luck with the vector and subscript notations, or with simplified diagrams showing only the relevant chains of influence:

Stan → Tony → Carl → Bette → Jim

Whether it is possible, in such circumstances, to estimate the transitivity of influence (i.e., how much influence Stan inadvertently might exert upon Bette—and upon himself—through this chain) cannot be assessed from this hypothetical example. The possibilities do indeed appear intriguing enough to warrant further analysis.

Conclusion

The purpose of this article was to set forth a measurement procedure for assessing influence in social situations. In particular, we were concerned with measuring influence in communities and formal organizations. Two sets of procedures were presented and discussed. Data were generated using sociometric questions with forced responses to Likert scales. These data were then analysed, using matrices. Analysis of the data were suggestive of a number of tentative conclusions. The first and foremost was the seeming feasibility of the procedure. Secondly, this procedure was able to correctly identify "key influentials" in the hypothetical situation, as well as identify the existence of two interlocking coalitions of influentials, whose common member was the least influential in each coalition. Fourthly, a procedure for assessing "indirect influence" (roughly interpretable as "the influences upon those who are influential upon me") were noted.) Finally, through presentation of the data in a conventional sociogram, it was detected that there are no true isolates in this particular situation (from the standpoint of exerting or receiving influence) despite the fact that initially one of the participants (Eunice) was said to be. The procedures reported here appear to offer a theoretically interesting and methodologically practical basis for assessment of the existence, and character, of influence in social situations.

The major limitation of this technique, at present, would be the question of its validity. Specifically, it seems highly possible that in many community and organizational situations, participants would be
unwilling to provide honest responses to sociometric questionnaires. In other instances, participants may simply be unavailable. One optional approach, of course, is for the observer to estimate responses, based upon available observational data. Or, it may be possible to construct unobtrusive measures to substitute for the questionnaire. In any event, it seems highly likely that this sociometric method could be employed in measuring patterns of influence in a host of settings.

References


   Daniel P. Moynihan. "The Professionalization of Reform." The Public Interest. 1.1. (Fall, 1965) 6-16.


   For a unique effort to treat influence as the "currency" of authority, see Warren Ichman and Norman Upholf. The Political Economy of Change. University of California Press. 1969. 84-86.


12. The "names" used are wholly fictitious and used for purposes of illustration. Since the processes involved are inherently social, names seemed preferable to either letters or numbers.


15. Selltiz, et. al. 418-419.


17. Coalition in this context refers to intersecting influence diads with at least one common member.

18. The issue of the transitivity of influence is highly complex. In most research models where "influence" would be cast as either an "independent" or "dependent" variable, however, the issue is simply foreclosed by the design.
RECEIVING HELP: MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES OF THE HANDICAPPED

Nancy A. Brooks, Wichita State University

ABSTRACT

The social act of helping is presented from the recipient's viewpoint. Interview material from handicapped adults and contributions from the literature on helping provide insight to the helped person's management and interpretation of being helped. Techniques employed in the management of help are described. Alternative strategies and interpretations are available to the helped person; receiving help is not necessarily demeaning as social norms suggest. The interaction between helper and helped person is the central concern.

As more people with disabilities become active in their communities more occasions are likely to arise which will require able-bodied strangers to give assistance to those with handicaps. How can the handicapped manage these helping situations without being demeaned?

Most studies of helping situations have emphasized the perspective of the helper rather than of the recipient. Factors such as sex, social class, and power of helpers have been studied (Berkowitz and Friedman, 1967; Schopler, 1967; Bryan and Test, 1967; and Schopler and Bateson, 1965), but the assumption has generally been that persons receiving help are passive recipients of whatever help might come their way.

An exception to this view of the recipient has been contributed by Davis (1961). He has examined the methods by which handicapped persons cope with stigmatization and found that they attempt to direct social interaction with the able-bodied in ways which will encourage equal relationships. However, in helping situations the limitations of the handicapped are likely to be emphasized. Resolving the conflicting needs of acquiring help while maintaining equality calls for management of the situation.

In order to explore the elements of helping situations from the handicapped person's viewpoint the literature on helping was reviewed and in-depth interviews with handicapped individuals were conducted. As informants they described how they manage the
situations of receiving bodily assistance from strangers in public places and how they interpret that help. A purposive sample of ten informants was used, each informant having a different handicapping condition.\(^1\) Six males and four females were interviewed. The informants ranged in age from 16 to 75, their educational achievement ranged from a few years of schooling to a Master's degree, and their duration of handicaps ranged from eleven to 58 years. Only two informants were married.

THE RECIPIENT'S PERSPECTIVE OF THE HELPING SITUATION

A prevailing theme was heard throughout the interviews; these handicapped people place great value on their independence and often exercise it through control of the helping situation. One man expressed this attitude by saying, "Generally, I don't like being a helped person, but if I can be helped on an equal basis, that's fine." The informants define the helping situation as one in which they participate. They do not always see themselves as passive recipients, nor do they see receiving help as a necessarily demeaning social behavior.

The informants openly admitted their needs for help. Some admitted to having had a period of resentment about being helped if they had been disabled in adulthood, but at the time of the interview, all accepted the necessity of being helped as a fact of their lives.

Obtaining Help

The person needing help is capable of transmitting social cues through speech, mannerisms, facial expressions, or, in the case of the handicapped, by utilizing the handicap in such a way as to elicit empathy toward his or her distress. Of course, the recognition of these cues by the potential helper depends upon the likelihood that such cues transmit shared meanings (Cardwell, 1971).

All respondents stated that they knew how to obtain help and often did so. Those having visible handicaps revealed an awareness of the legitimation process (Haber and Smith, 1971), when

---

\(^1\)These conditions were: deafness, polio paralysis, mental retardation, blindness, speech impairment, brain damage, multiple sclerosis, emotional disturbance, cerebral palsy, and spinal injury.
they reported that the cane of a blind person, a wheelchair, or other equipment, would be useful signals for eliciting help. One woman commented that, "You get to depending on the wheelchair to bring people--to get to people--to help you...." A man observed that, "People feel sorrier for you if you have a cane or wheelchair." Although these objects make eliciting help easier since they eliminate the need for explanation, all informants felt very capable of making direct requests for help ("I just ask"), and they often do provide explanations with their requests.

Perceiving Helpers' Motives

People with handicaps are sensitive to their helpers' motivations and attempt to comprehend them. As one person explained:

"We handicapped people are always wanting other people to understand us. I often wonder if we understand them.... I often read in the literature that they get the feeling at first that it might happen to them, and that makes them feel bad.... I like people, and I don't like the idea that I make some people nervous and upset, but that's the way it is."

Although most helpers are perceived to be well-motivated and enjoying the helping interaction, the handicapped experience occasional difficulties in resolving their own desires for independence and the desires of able-bodied people to help. Management strategies used by the handicapped often proceed from a recognition of such disparate definitions of the helping situation. Rather than relinquish their independence, they attempt to control the help given them. When the handicapped perceive that helpers sincerely wish to give assistance, they may attempt to accommodate their helpers' wishes. One man offered this insight:

"We should put on the other guy's shoes and look at it [sic] from his angle. Here's a guy who wants to help and he doesn't know too much about my handicap. I've got to be careful how I handle the situation. I think the main thing to remember is we need to treat people as we want to be treated."

The informants also expressed an awareness of helpers who were helping out of pity or obligation, and such help was not willingly accepted. Another perceived motive for giving help was that, "It's their way of saying I'm glad it's you and not me."
Ladieu et. al.(1947) found that the handicapped gave positive evaluations to help offered as a normal politeness or as a contribution to the recipient's independence. Help which was perceived as condescending or threatening to independence was negatively evaluated.

Before the helping act begins, the handicapped person is engaged in an interpretation of social information which will allow him or her to determine whether to continue the given interaction and how to proceed through the helping situation.

Managing Help

Once interaction has proceeded to actual helping behavior, most informants said they often consciously contribute to the helping act. People with handicaps acquire skills which permit them to function efficiently, and these skills can be taught to helpers. Most informants concurred that helpers should be instructed how and when to help. One person stated bluntly, "None of them don't know nothing about when I need help." Other informants noted that even some professionals do not know how to help without insulting people with handicaps. Here the handicapped complained about professionals assuming that one handicap indicated the likely presence of other handicaps or treating the handicapped individual as an average case rather than as a unique person.

Informants agreed that the able-bodied generally seem happy to give assistance, but helpers often must be supervised, since they may not know how to help. Briefing helpers in the procedures necessary for overcoming social as well as physical obstacles contributes to the recipient's stature as an equal in this interaction process (Davis, 1961).

A person disabled in adulthood must learn to accommodate the role of helped person despite possibly negative evaluations he or she holds concerning that role. Being an object of aid is inconsistent with values of independence and self-reliance, and recently disabled adults perceive that they may be demeaned by helpers who also hold these values (Thomas, 1966). When the disabled person learns to manage help he or she becomes capable of asserting adult characteristics and restoring a sense of self-respect.

A strategy for managing help which minimizes the concern for others' evaluations is to avoid being helped, and this strategy is frequently utilized. Several persons stated that they would forego a desirable activity in order to avoid uncomfortable helping situations. Situations were interpreted as being uncomfortable
if helping required an unusual effort or if a relationship would be complicated by an unequal distribution of obligations. Explained one person, "It's not that I refuse to accept being handicapped, it's just that...I have control over my life style enough that I can keep myself out of most situations that require help...and I prefer it that way." Attempts to minimize help are consistent with the high value placed upon independence.

**Acknowledging Help**

After the help has been received, the informants concurred that gratitude should be shown. That appreciation should be expressed was recognized as ordinary politeness, but an appropriate acceptance was also seen as reinforcement for helping behavior in general. Several persons expressed thoughts similar to this: "Accept help graciously. Thank them very nice [sic], and then go on. If you don't thank them, maybe somebody will come along who needs more help than you do, and this guy might not help them. He'll remember that I didn't appreciate it."

Gratitude was seen as a worthwhile investment since handicapped persons wish to continue receiving help and perceive that others might benefit as well. Acknowledging help also serves as a useful signal for ending that particular situation. By selecting a particular time to express appreciation, the recipient indicates that the helping transaction has been completed.

**THE MEANING OF BEING HELPED**

Informants to the present study contributed alternative interpretations of receiving help. These interpretations tended to emphasize the beneficial aspects of being helped. One positive effect of being helped is that helping behavior can stimulate other social interaction, e.g., "It's made me a lot closer to people. I'm more approachable. The mere fact that they want to do something for me--I've made an awful lot of friends that I probably wouldn't have if I could see." Not only does receiving help stimulate interaction, it also gives the helped person an entree to the "good" side of people, which is likely to make interaction more pleasant.

Secondly, these handicapped people believed that they could take the upper hand in helping situations because they can choose to be helped and direct how they are helped. The informants did not support Goffman's proposition that the able-bodied have sold the
handicapped a "line" which designates well-adjusted handicapped
persons as those who receive help passively and in so doing relin-
quish control of the helping situation (Goffman, 1963). An alter-
native to this interpretation of receiving help is that the re-
cipient allows helpers to receive the gratification of helping
another person.

A further meaning applied to receiving help concerned the
possibility of acquiring secondary gains. People with disabilities
may utilize their special circumstances to acquire advantages. Re-
questing help which is not needed, asking for lowered standards of
responsibility, and demanding disproportionate allotments of atten-
tion are practices utilized by handicapped persons who seek to
manipulate helping situations.

Helpers may rightly become indignant with anyone who manipu-
lates their good intentions. But in the context of this paper, the
achievement of secondary gains underscores the capability of
recipients to redefine the helping situation. That is one of sev-
eral alternative strategies available to people who receive help.
If they do not adopt the passive recipient role, they allow them-
selves choices in defining the helping situation according to the
circumstances, such as:

1. They may use the helping situation as an opening for fur-
ther interaction.
2. They may assert that they are the benefactors, by giving
helpers the opportunity to help.
3. They may attempt to manage when, how, and by whom they
are helped.
4. They may develop secondary gains.

DISCUSSION

Gouldner discusses a generalized moral norm of reciprocity
which is germane to the topic of helping behavior (Gouldner, 1960).
This norm stipulates that: 1) people should help those who have
helped them, and 2) people should not injure those who have helped
them. Furthermore, the norm requires that those people one has
helped should help in return, and that if one wishes to receive
help from others, one must help them.

Fulfilling these obligations may not be possible for some.
For example, people with handicaps may not be able to reciprocate
a benefit. Gouldner has recognized that likelihood and suggests
another standard for helping which he calls the norm of benefi-
cence (Gouldner, 1973). Under this norm, some are allowed to get
something for nothing. Those who receive help get no reward and remain dependent on the decisions of others to help.

Darley and Latané (1970) argue that norms are insufficient explanatory factors for helping behavior. They propose that participants in a helping situation construct their roles within a rather wide set of guidelines. This possibility leaves the helping situation open to negotiation during which the helper and recipient transmit social cues to one another and helping proceeds from the negotiated relationship. It is this view of helping as a complete social transaction which introduces the helped person as a participant capable of eliciting, accepting or rejecting, managing, and acknowledging help.

This view also redefines the meaning of being helped. Although handicapped recipients of help may not be able to fulfill the norm of reciprocity, they may avoid dependency upon the norm of beneficence by taking an active role in helping situations. Of course, utilizing alternative definitions of the helping situation could be seen as rationalization which explains away the strain of receiving help. But having alternative definitions does provide choice in role-taking. If recipients of help do not perceive themselves as being demeaned, they may select other responses to the situation.

What is important here is that the introduction of the recipient's perspective has transformed helping into a complete social act. Handicapped persons in need of help are party to a social transaction which requires awareness of the helper's motives and an ability to obtain and manage the desired interaction, namely, help. The techniques for deriving satisfactory help are social skills; experienced handicapped people could teach their techniques to the recently disabled.

Furthermore, this perspective of helping as a social act does not permit handicapped people to escape from the responsibility of participation. Although they will encounter difficulties in perceiving others' motives and in developing their own repertoires of management techniques and interpretations, these obstacles are surmountable.

Helpers of handicapped people should note that this perspective de-emphasizes the handicap and the mechanics of help. The interaction between helper and helped person is the central concern.

Professionals should be aware of the process through which the helped person contributes to or hinders attempts to help. They can encourage clients to participate in the helping process and
teach them skills for managing help. A mutual awareness of the negotiation process in which the motives, behaviors, and benefits of both parties are being constructed should facilitate a more effective helping relationship.

REFERENCES

Berkowitz, Leonard and Philip Friedman

Bryan, James H. and Mary A. Test

Cardwell, Jerry D.

Darley, John M. and Bibb Latané

Davis, Fred
1961 "Deviance disavowal: the management of strained interaction by the visibly handicapped." Social Problems IX: 120-123.

Goffman, Erving

Gouldner, Alvin W.

Haber, Lawrence D. and Richard T. Smith

Ladieu, Gloria, Eugenia Hanfmann, and Tamara Dembo

Schopler, John
Schopler, John and Nicholas Bateson
1965 "The power of dependence." Journal of Personality and

Thomas, Edwin J.
1966 "Problems of disability from the perspective of role
THE MSW AND THE MPA: CONFRONTATION OF TWO PROFESSIONS IN PUBLIC WELFARE

Thomas H. Walz
Director, School of Social Work
The University of Iowa

Harry J. Macy
Chairperson, Department of Social Work
Ball State University

ABSTRACT

From its inception in the 1930's, public welfare has emerged as a major service industry commanding a sizeable portion of the public tax dollar. Concomitant with growth and size and expenditure has come the federalization of the program. In the face of a series of changes—the growth of welfare, added administrative complexity, and the emergence of new economic function—public welfare's identification with social work was weakened. Correspondingly, and perhaps logically, its identification with public administration has been strengthened. In this paper, there is exploration of the changes leading to the confrontation between social work and public administration within public welfare. A comparative analysis of this confrontation is undertaken, and the methods of conflict resolution between the professions are explored. The principal purpose of the paper, however, is to draw attention to the argument, stimulate further debate about this course of events, and encourage some public policy direction in public welfare.

The Emerging Confrontation: An Overview

Since its inception in the 1930's, public welfare has emerged as a major service industry, commanding a sizable
portion of the public tax dollar. In 1968, the combined federal outlays for social security programs amounted to $51 billion. By 1973, this expenditure had increased to over $100 billion. In terms of clients served, for one program alone (AFDC), the number of recipients increased from 5,349 million in 1968 to 10,980 five years later.\(^1\) Expenditures in the public welfare sector have in fact grown so large that the economic aspects of the program now threaten to supplant its original social welfare orientation. In line with neo-Keynesian theory, recent policy decisions seem to suggest that public welfare is being transformed into a mechanism for economic stabilization.\(^2\) It has become difficult to ascertain at this point just who the real "client" of public welfare is: the welfare poor or our shaky economy.

Concomitant with growth in size and expenditure has been the federalization of public welfare, a trend paralleled by other actions of the federal government in assuming greater control over the general market structure. The development of this central role of government in determining the nature and extent of economic growth policies is commonly referred to as "political capitalism." Thus, we will argue that public welfare has been made subject to political capitalistic policies.

Such policies within public welfare are not difficult to find. Ceilings are placed on the public social service budgets to limit budget deficits; long-term unemployed persons are shifted from inadequate social insurance programs (unemployment insurance) to top-heavy categorical assistance programs (AFDC); and welfare benefit levels are allowed to rise or fall according to varying inflationary and recessionary trends. Public welfare seems to be both a "victim" of the state of the economy and a "tool" used for its stabilization. The aggregate of policy decisions in HEW since the Nixon years would support this hypothesis.

From these twin trends--economic manipulation and increasing federalization of public welfare---have come a drastic
reorganization and restructuring of welfare agencies. A cursory look at the growth of public welfare over the last 40 years shows this to be so.

Public welfare was originally a "social welfare" program, closely identified with the social work profession despite the small numbers of MSW's in its early administration. Invented as a means of dealing with "mass poverty" in an industrial society, public welfare required a poverty-serving profession. Social work was society's choice for this mission.

However, in the face of a series of changes—the growth of welfare, added administrative complexity and the emergence of the economic function mentioned above—public welfare's identification with social work has become more tenuous. Correspondingly, and perhaps logically, its identification with public administration has been strengthened.

Organizational changes growing out of the re-definition of the proper function of public welfare have, in turn, produced a new occupational structure. A number of specific changes of this sort are evident. Although we will elaborate on these later in our discussion, let us list them briefly at this point:

1) The public welfare bureaucracy has been expanded, and its organization and administration have been further "rationalized."

2) New management-type personnel (MBA's, MPS's, CPA's, etc.) have been introduced into public welfare administration.

3) These managers have been moved to the top and center of the welfare administration, and have assumed a corresponding importance in policy making.

4) Social workers have been moved down in the public welfare administration, and their roles have been
redefined so that they no longer occupy a central place in the functioning of public welfare. 4

Framework for Analysis

As hypothesized at the outset, the confrontation of social work and public administration in public welfare was an inevitable outcome of changes in public welfare function. In all probability, these changes are a microcosm of larger transformations occurring elsewhere in society. The dominance of the bureaucracy (the large corporation) as the preferred means of delivering goods and services in our society has resulted in a particular approach to administration, and has further established new power relationships, leading to conflict between those whose expertise lies in service to clients and those whose expertise lies in service to the institution. When the business of public welfare was social welfare, the social workers dominated; as the business of public welfare has become more "economic," the public administrator has come to dominate.

As a way of exploring the differences in orientation between the social work and public administration professional, we have chosen to draw upon two recent (though quite dissimilar) works: Daniel Bell's The Coming of Post Industrial Society and Robert Pirsig's Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance.

Bell and Pirsig: Two Complementary Perspectives

Daniel Bell, a Harvard sociologist, has developed a theory on the nature of current social change which can be used to explain the rising tension between social work and public administration in public welfare. Bell argues that contemporary social change can be understood through the analysis of three "axial principles" governing modern social development. These three catalysts of change are identified as (1) the economizing principle, (2) the participatory principle, and (3) the self-actualizing principle. 5
The first of these, the economizing principle, is defined as the principle of maximizing production while minimizing cost; it is essentially an econometric concept which places ultimate value on optimizing production through maximum efficiency. Thus, it stresses the administrative goals of maximization, optimization, standardization, and rationalization. Bell sees the economizing principle as a guiding force in the development of the economy, technology, and the restructuring of occupations. The economizing principle is a carry-over from the industrial period that has become more extreme because of the greater potential for rationalizing production through new machine and organizational technologies. The economizing principle explains the growing interest in applying "scientific" approaches to management and planning; hence, the current popularity of the professional public administrator in public welfare.

Bell's second axial principle, the participatory principle, explains changes in the political relationships between people in post-industrial society. It is evidenced by a series of human rights movements that have pushed the society toward more focused egalitarianism. Increasingly people show disdain for hierarchy and privilege. Though racism, sexism, and meritocratism are still prevalent, they are abhorred in principle. Many recent developments in public welfare, such as welfare rights movements and collective bargaining trends, are easily explained by the participatory principle.

Bell's third principle, the principle of self-actualization, is seen as a prime force in redefining modern culture. The search for personal growth and fulfillment (Bell's definition of self-actualization) is an important catalyst behind many popular social movements (e.g., personal growth fads). If the work worlds might be characterized by the economizing principle, the "after work" world seems better characterized by the self-actualizing principle. For many persons, there is a growing concern about the costs to personal growth and fulfillment that are experienced in the name of greater production and efficiency.
As Bell points out, these three axial principles are not easily reconcilable. Policy decisions based on economizing principles (e.g., efficiency) have severe human costs. The giant corporate bureaucracy creates an environment of frustration for both producers and consumers even though it affords desired "economies of scale."

Public welfare is replete with examples of the trade-offs taking place between these principles. The federalization of adult categories and the standardization of benefit allowances, for example, make for greater rational planning and easier economic management of income security programs, but at the expense of individualization of the program and humanization of its service delivery. In effect, important service goals are compromised by rationalizing welfare administrative behaviors.

The application of economizing principles in public welfare also affects the locus of decision making. Until recently, line workers had considerable discretionary authority in administrative matters. But in a highly rationalized, standardized, large-scale program, decisions tend to be made higher up in the hierarchy and are more likely to be reprocessed as downward directives to lower-level direct-service workers. This changing focus of decision-making produces a realignment of power, except where the professional group dominating the direct service level also happens to control management.

Unfortunately, it is difficult to find equal evidence of an aggressive application of the principles of participation and self-actualization in public welfare. Where such evidence is found, we often find practice in conflict with policy. Many current welfare reforms, from the worker and client perspective, are produced through collective bargaining (i.e., political force), not through willing administrative policy action. To a degree, most social conflict in post-industrial America can be understood as a clash of these axial principles. Their translation into priorities by social workers and public
administrators respectively tells us much about the two professions in terms of their value differences and the bases of their confrontation.

The standard textbooks in public administration generally support the position that the function of public administration is to implement public policy (political values) as effectively and rationally as possible. As one textbook writer puts it, "The passion for accountability gives public administration much of its distinctive character." This is the language of the economizing mode.

Public administration is almost exclusively based on a large organization model of service production and delivery. This presumes the need for a highly professionalized, corporate style of management. The public administrator is consequently schooled to accept and give priority to the economizing principle. This orientation is not surprising, since public administration was invented in the 1920's as a response to the growth in scale and complexity of public institutions and their rising importance in society.

Social work, on the other hand, places a low priority on efficiency. The fact that it has chosen to support its professional identity through a casework model is a clear illustration of its limited emphasis on "quantitative production," for casework is a notoriously inefficient method for dealing with large-scale human problems. What critics fail to recognize is that the social work profession is rooted in the values of democracy and self-actualization--values with which its professional vocabulary is replete. Felix Biestik's book on the casework relationship, for example, stresses principles that approximate Bell's principles of participation and self-actualization.

Further perspective on the confrontation of the two professions in public welfare can be gained from Robert Pirsig's popular semi-fictional work, Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance. Here, an imaginative use of metaphor permits the reader to understand and appreciate two distinct approaches.
to modern administration (based on the traditional classic and romantic views of reality). The philosophic traditions of the classicist and the romanticist are characterized by the riders, (father, son, and two friends) their attitudes toward their cycles and toward cycle maintenance. The narrator is represented as a person reconciled to the world of technology, a rider who regards his cycle as more than a machine object. For him, the cycle is a scientific system, rationally designed to produce a whole greater than its parts. The joy of the machine is not only in its riding, but in understanding it design and caring for its operation. The ecology of man and machine is seen as essential and fulfilling. Through the use of mini-essays (Chautauquas), the author identifies this attitude as that of the classic or scientific view.

Another set of cyclists, a drummer/musician and his wife, are presented as romantics. They regard the cycle only as a machine object, created to give pleasure and to provide transportation; however, they have no regard for the scientific nature of its design, nor are they oriented toward its care and maintenance. Any breakdown in the machine produces for them only frustration and irritation. Lacking any ecological relationship to the functioning of their machine, they feel themselves helpless in the face of the machine's imperfections. With neither scientific mind nor disposition, they retreat from a world that is dominated by machine-science and controlled by complex social organization. The romanticist is presented as out of harmony with the directions of post-industrial society.

We use this example to show the contrasting philosophical traditions from which social work and public administration grew. There is strong evidence that social work fits the "romantic" view in modern society, while public administration is patterned after the "classic" view.

Pirsig's novel carries the argument beyond the aforementioned dialectic. The narrator is portrayed throughout as a man
seeking to reconcile these two opposing views. He recognizes reality as something more, something that requires the convergence and integration of the rationality of the classicist and the intuitive understanding of the romanticist. Whether either narrator or author is completely successful in this effort is debatable. Nevertheless, the novel raises the question to which we address ourselves here: Can the differing perspectives of the social worker and the public administrator be integrated into a more balanced philosophy and method of public welfare administration?

Philosophical/Historical Tradition

Social work as a profession has its roots in the Judeo-Christian tradition of religious humanism. And, although it was established to cope with the casualties of industrialization, its early models were the church and the family.

Reform sociology and humanistic psychology have been social work's principal theoretical antecedents. Social work has more often pursued a course guided by ideology and values than by scientific empiricism; and it has never succumbed to the lure of logical positivism. Social work, in short, has been more art than science, despite efforts to build a practice theory upon the loosely tested hypotheses of an eclectic social science.

In contrast, public administration originated in the scientific tradition, and tries to apply the principles of science to complex human organizations. In the 1920's, Taylor and others developed a theory of human systems based on the paradigm of the machine system. Public administration found its disciplinary and theoretical antecedents in political science and business administration. More recently, economics and planning have been drawn into its curriculum. To a lesser extent, sociology and psychology are included, as electives, in the education of the public administrator.

Public administration, created as a way of dealing with the administrative complexity of large public institutions, has
lacked a strong ideology, other than that of science. Its main concern has been to remain objective in the implementation of political values.

**Client Orientation**

To the social worker, the client is always a "person," and, as history would have it, the weaker and more vulnerable person in the industrial world. The worker-client relationship, usually thought of as therapeutic, has been a traditional emphasis in the profession.

Even where social work developed methods related to group work, community organization, public policy and research, the central concern was on how to help the individual through these approaches. Personal growth and self-actualization of the individual and/or the family unit has been the service goal of social work. During the 1960's, with its stress on social reform and social action, a number of professionals moved away from the medical (treatment) model towards an advocacy model; however, by the 1970's this movement had largely disappeared,\(^\text{15}\) and the majority of the profession had returned to a clinical emphasis. Social workers traditionally have been most comfortable in a close, highly personalized service relationship with clients; consequently, the profession has attracted recruits who wish to carry on this tradition.

The public administrator's client orientation is less easily defined. The theoretical content of public administration centers on organizational life as if the organization itself were the client. While the organization is supposedly the means through which public values are translated into programs, practice suggests that the building and maintenance of a well-run machine can easily become the end rather than the means.

For the public administrator, the concept of client also includes the general public, in the belief that public
agencies are obligated to reflect the public interest. Also included as client is the policy maker, since he/she is the person to whom the public administrator is immediately accountable.

The public administrator is not usually hired to increase, expand, or improve the quality of public welfare services and money payments; nor are such services or expenditures highly valued by the general public or most public policy makers. Service goals are generally in conflict with the efficiency orientation of the public administrator.

The relationship of the social worker and the public administrator, respectively, to the public welfare client differs in proximity, intensity, and function. The social worker, who dominates the direct service line, is nearest in organizational location to the client; this proximity breeds considerable intimacy (relationship) which (given the functional role of the social worker) can easily be converted into advocacy behavior on behalf of the client. Conversely, the social worker is loosely bound to the center of bureaucracy and is often hidden from the exercise of many of its controls (e.g., what happens in a home visit remains largely unknown to agency management).

The public administrator dominates the managerial level, and is consequently located at the greatest distance from the client, shielded from potentials of intimacy and frequently reminded of loyalty to the organization by policy-making superiors. Client interests are often weighed against some ambiguous standard of the public interest. While many public administrators are advocates of client interest, this does not come naturally to a profession lacking strong identification with welfare clients.

When viewed from the client's perspective, the social worker is more gate-opener than gate-keeper. The reverse is true of the public administrator. Again, this can be stated only in general terms, since there are exceptions on both counts.
The tools of social work are relationship skills, informational and referral skills in locating accessible specific resources for client use. Often involve an ability to manipulate to free some resources for the client. This previously mentioned, has involved the individual and has, in the main, employed the casework casework method/practice theory is based upon.
an understanding of human behavior and human motivation; it focuses on personal interventions that alter motivational and behavioral patterns (e.g., helping clients with decisions about jobs, marriage, relationships with children). Social workers whose practice theories and methods go beyond an individual focus are nonetheless highly client-oriented.

The public administrator, by contrast, has been schooled in political, organizational and economic theory as well as in management science. Practice methods are based on administrative techniques and skills, ranging from budgeting procedures to personnel management. Current approaches make heavy use of computer-based data processing for accounting, planning, and decision-making. Interpersonal skills are stressed in so far as they help the administrator relate to policy makers and the general public, and to handle consumer and employee grievances and dissatisfaction.

It is interesting to note that while the computer and other management science technologies have become common tools for the public administrator, they remain an enigma for many social workers. This is another illustration of Pirsig's thesis.

Language—Communication

The language of social work reflects its origin in reform sociology, humanistic psychology, and the everyday language of clients. Public administration, on the other hand, uses a language borrowed from the disciplines of political science, business administration, economics, and, more recently, computer science. Public administration is at home with the language of science; social work is more comfortable with the expressive language of feeling (the language of the romanticist).

Language is important since it shapes our very thoughts and feelings. Thus, the language gap between the two professions inevitably produces conceptual and communicational difficulties. These will continue to increase as long as the gap remains unbridged.
Power Shift

The balance of power in public welfare is shifting from social work to public administration. At the state and county levels this appears to be happening less through a "replacement" strategy (the removal of social workers) than through an "add-on" strategy (building new power units around the functions of management, planning and evaluation). At the federal level, however, there appears to have been a wholesale replacement of social work types with management types in the policy-making and regulatory sectors. The occupational makeup of HEW has changed considerably since the inaugural days of the Nixon administration.

This power shift is a microcosm of a phenomenon occurring in the entire macro-organization world. As Bell argues, the coming of the post-industrial society has created a new power elite built around those who control management knowledge and information. It is information and knowledge, Bell claims, not wealth and property, that is the source of power in high technology society. Professional managers are in demand in all of the larger institutions. Increasingly, they need have only expertise in management science; less consideration is paid to their substantive knowledge of the "service product" of their agency. This is a triumph of style over content.

The general public, while uncertain about the capacity of bureaucracy to produce and deliver goods and services, has generally accepted the proposition that "service" production and delivery can be improved by greater rationalization and professionalization of its management. The current "management-accountability" trend, given much support in the post-Watergate years, reflects the belief that better management can solve most of the ailments of our institutions, including the higher growth rate and cost of public welfare.

We need only recall the impact of a similar trend in 1962 (which expanded the profession of social work in public
welfare) when increases in social services were expected to be public welfare's panacea, to realize what the probable outcome of the current trend of rationalized management approaches will be in welfare. But for the moment, the management/planning professions are riding high and can be expected to continue to do so in the immediate future.

Social work's response to the power shifts in public welfare will be mixed. There is evidence that a large number of social workers at the administrative level will support the management trend and adopt the public administrator's vocabulary and skills. Others may leave or be asked to leave and will move on to more hospitable environments. A few die-hards will remain and fight the trend. These last will be casework types, persons experienced in client advocacy, or the young romanticists who have little affection for the bureaucracy and its rationalized approach to management.

The intensity and strength of the confrontation between social work and public administration professionals will depend heavily upon the grit and capacity of those who choose to stay, and on the evaluation of the success of the management approach both by the public and by policy makers. Failure to reduce welfare costs and caseloads could destine the professional management approach to an early demise.

It is unlikely that the public administrator will choose to share in the perspective of social work, even though some recent public administration literature suggests the need for a new ethic to guide the moral choices faced by workers in that field. Since there is little in the academic or work experience of public administrators to suggest that they will adopt some other position, any integration of perspectives which might occur will probably be the result of one-sided efforts by significant numbers of social workers attempting to take on the appearance of public administration. Should this happen, it will be due in part to the heavy bombardment of public welfare functionaries at all levels by management/accountability training and thinking. Never
before in the history of public welfare has there been a more aggressive campaign to resocialize social workers in this manner.

Probable Future

Although social work in the traditional sense may to a certain extent be co-opted by public administration, we feel that increasing confrontation rather than reconciliation will characterize the future relationship of the two professions. Our position is supported by several factors:

First, many direct service workers have become disen-chanted with the "rational" approach to administration, planning, and evaluation. Not only does it go against their grain, as we have seen, but it also reduces their professional autonomy. (With data analysis and processing technologies, even unimportant decisions are being made higher up.)

Second, little is being done to discipline or control the sentiments of lower echelon staff members. The force of resistance will probably grow and will be expresses in future collective bargaining efforts.

Third, clients themselves will add to the growing tensions between workers in the two fields which serve them. Although the client group may consist largely of the unwanted and the victimized, it is nonetheless increasing in size; and its members are becoming more sophisticated in organizational advocacy. Coalitions which channel worker disenchantment and client unhappiness could upset the neatness of the ration-ally administered welfare state.

Thus, unless the values of participation and self-actual-ization are made the highest principles of public adminis-tration, we cannot accept the turning over of the public welfare system to professional administrators. It is our conviction that the welfare client is best served by workers motivated primarily by concern for their fellow man, not by a slavish devotion to the abstract principles of "rational" economizing or bureaucratic efficiency.
FOOTNOTES


4Through the separation of services from money payments, most social workers have been relocated in the service sector or have been translated into new-type personnel for the Income Maintenance Section. In some states, the separation is so complete that a different county director heads each unit.


6The references to "public administrator" do not refer exclusively to those holding M.P.A.'s, but include a wide category of business majors, accountants and planners who identify with the M.P.A. orientation. Likewise, references to social workers go beyond the M.S.W.'s in welfare. We feel that those outside the terminal professional training still tend to identify most closely with one or the other orientation and hence, justify the rather loose use of professional label in this analysis.

7Bell, *op. cit.*


9Ibid.


12 Ibid.


15 An observation expressed at a recent meeting of the Deans and Directors of Schools of Social Work.

PARITY, FAMILY SIZE PREFERENCE AND THE "VALUE STRETCH"

Virginia Aldige Hiday
North Carolina State University at Raleigh

Steven Polgar
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

ABSTRACT

A two-wave survey of women in their reproductive years living in poverty areas of New York City is used to investigate family size preferences among the poor. The hypotheses that parity affects family size preference and that current parity affects future parity are supported. Implications for future trends in family size preference and for family planning programs are discussed.

Most explanations of differential reproductive patterns are based upon the assumption of a direct and one-directional causal link from desired family size to actual family size (Figure 1, A) (Easterlin, 1969; Freedman, 1974; Namboodiri, 1970; Votey, 1969). Underlying this assumption is a "motivationalist" view of reproductive behavior (Polgar, 1972). While it is usually recognized that voluntary natality regulation does not operate perfectly, the extent and complex causation of failures in family planning have not been given sufficient attention in most studies of differential birth rates.

We argue that besides family size preference affecting parity, two additional causal mechanisms are operative (Figure 1, B): 1) parity affects family size preference (lines a); and 2) present parity affects future parity (line b). Furthermore, we argue that the concept of "value stretch" (Rodman, 1963) informs the relationship between desired and actual family size among the poor. To investigate these relationships in this paper we examine preference and parity differences in pregnancy experience over a two-year span among women of low income neighborhoods in a metropolitan area.

A number of studies in social psychology have emphasized that behavior influences attitudes at least as often as attitudes determine behavior (Deutscher, 1973). Yet, most demographic analyses neglect
Figure 1: Two Causal Models of Preference and Parity

A:
\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Preference} & \rightarrow \text{Preference} \\
T_1 & \rightarrow T_2 & T_2 & \rightarrow T_3 \\
\text{Parity} & \rightarrow \text{Parity} \\
T_2 & \rightarrow T_3
\end{align*}
\]

B:
\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Preference} & \rightarrow \text{Preference} \\
T_1 & \rightarrow T_2 & T_2 & \rightarrow T_3 \\
\text{Parity} & \rightarrow \text{Parity} \\
T_2 & \rightarrow T_3
\end{align*}
\]

the causal effects of actual childbearing on expressed family size preferences. When environmental circumstances (or physiological problems) reduce the likelihood of successful natality planning, the probability that actual family size will significantly affect desired family size is particularly strong; having unintentionally reached higher parity levels at an early age may influence people to revise their stated family size preferences upward (and problems of sterility downward).

In the United States use of effective contraceptives and voluntary abortion, and success in planning a family have been found to be directly related to such measures of social status as income and education (Jaffe and Guttmacher, 1968; Ryder and Westoff, 1971; Whelpton, et al., 1966; Whelpton and Kiser, 1958). Because couples with low levels of income and education tend to have larger stated family desires and expectations than those of average or higher socioeconomic status (Namboodiri, 1974; Ryder and Westoff, 1969; Whelpton, et al., 1966) as well as more births, it could be argued that the poor and near-poor want to have large families. If this were the case, the increase in public and private expenditures for family planning services for the medically indigent in the last decade might have been largely irrelevant for changing natality among the poor. Indeed, such a line of reasoning has been advanced by some writers (Blake, 1969).
This argument, however, ignores the possibility of behavior influencing attitudes on the one hand, and the obstacles to voluntary control over reproduction among the poor and near-poor on the other. Statements about desired number of children may have been higher on the average among the poor than among others in large part because many poor couples of a given age or marital duration already have more children than the non-poor.

There is considerable evidence that many women living in poverty areas are at risk of having children at an early age and in rapid succession, through an early age at initiation into sexual activity, early marriage, and inadequate access to high quality family planning services (Jaffe and Guttmacher, 1968; Furstenberg, 1971; Zelnick and Kantner, 1972). Early and rapid childbearing leads to relatively high parity levels by the time the woman is in her mid-twenties, with many years of reproductive capacity left. Higher parity itself then may contribute further to the obstacles to regulating childbirth. The added burden of several children when trying to maintain a household in a poverty environment may have a negative influence on contraceptive used, resulting in additional unintended births. Thus, expressed preferences among the poor concerning family size, after three or more children have already been born, may well reflect resignation in the face of reality rather than a value position divergent from the non-poor.

Hyman Rodman has described such a process as it occurs among the lower class for aspects of life other than family size. He terms it the "value stretch." Rodman argues that a large portion of the lower class holds the same values as the middle class; but when they find them impossible to attain, "stretch" them to include other choices which are adaptive to the circumstances under which they live (Rodman, 1963).

Like Haney, et al. (1973), we think it worthwhile to follow the implications of the "value-stretch" for reproductive behavior and attitudes. We hypothesize that poor people have essentially the same family planning desires as the non-poor. Insufficiently able to regulate their natality, these couples "stretch" their values in the direction of the actual reproductive experience. Poor couples who have more than two or three children, therefore, would change their desired number of children upward to a compromise figure between the number they have and the average number wanted in the larger society - i. e., 2 to 3 (Blake, 1974).
Support for the operation of a "value stretch" in shifting attitudes toward actual experience in reproduction may be found not only in the positive relationship between desired and actual number of children (a finding that could as well support the explanation that desired family size causes actual family size), but also by the non-linearity of that relationship (Bauman and Udry, 1973; Bumpass and Westoff, 1970). In the early stages of family building the number of children desired generally exceeds the number actually born. When parity approaches the society-wide average of 2 to 3 children wanted, the desired number of children exceeds the actual number born, but when parity exceeds the societal norm, family size preference falls below the actual number of children already born. Furthermore, the higher the parity above the norm, the greater the difference between desired and actual numbers of children. This phenomenon, of course, is found not only among poor couples in the United States, but in a number of other populations as well (Freedman, et al., 1972; Hawley and Prachuabmoh, 1966).

Additional support for poverty and high parity inducing a value stretch in family size preference is found in studies which show a sizeable reduction in the negative association between education and desired family size when parity is controlled (Ryder and Westoff, 1971). Also, surveys have shown that stated number of unwanted births increase as parity increases and as socioeconomic status declines (Bauman and Udry, 1973; Bumpass and Westoff, 1970; Whelpton, et al., 1966).

The concept of "value stretch" implies a somewhat different set of psychological processes than the "rationalization" of births when family size is different than was desired at an earlier point in time. The term "rationalization" refers to the presumption that an "unwanted" birth has after the fact become a "wanted" one (or vice versa) in the mind of an individual parent. The value stretch hypothesis, by contrast, assumes that in a sub-group of society where it is often very difficult to behave in accordance with the dominant values of society (in this case having a family with two or three children), the values are stretched (in this case, to say that three or four or five children are also acceptable). While rationalization would predict a linear rise in the number desired as the number born increases, the "value stretch" concept would imply an increasing discrepancy between actual family size and number desired as parity increases beyond the third birth; this is because the "stretching" involves a compromise between society-wide values and the alternative values (which are less desirable but not rejected entirely).
At the same parity level that value stretch begins operating on stated family size preference, so also does parity itself become a factor in effective family size regulation. Besides all of the obstacles to regulation of natality found in the environment of the poor, women with three or more children have the added obstacles associated with their large family size. High parity and low income have been found to limit a woman's ability to plan and organize her life in areas besides childbearing. Hiday (1975) found among a sample of low income urban women that as parity increased there was a decrease in ability to organize and run a household to satisfy family needs. A study of mother's management and child care in England reported a marked decline in efficiency with both increasing family size and lower social class (Douglas and Blomfield, 1958). Difficulties in organizing a household, resulting from a combination of the stresses of poverty and large family size, could also affect resort to family planning services and contraceptive practice, causing nonuse, ineffective use or inconsistent use of natality regulating methods. Thus, for at least some people living in poverty, failure in natality regulation affects parity, which — in turn — leads to changes in family size preferences and further use of contraception (c.f. Frisancho et al., 1976).

RESEARCH DESIGN

Interviews were conducted in 1965 in four New York City health districts (in Bronx, Brooklyn and Queens) with 1187 Black, White, Puerto Rican and West Indian women between the ages of 18 and 39, who were residing in randomly selected households. The health districts were chosen on the basis of their designation as a "poverty area" and/or their having the lowest average incomes in the borough, willingness of a neighborhood agency to provide space for family planning services, and absence of any contraceptive clinic in the vicinity. These criteria were established for the purpose of testing a mobile service family planning program (Polgar, et al., 1966).

In 1967, 624 of the panel respondents in the 1965 survey were reinterviewed, along with a new sample of 264 women of the same age and family status from a comparable health district. The original sample was reduced by exclusion of 189 women found to be permanently infertile and 20 women outside the age limits. Although we attempted to trace within New York City respondents who moved from their 1965 residence, an additional 354 women were not possible to locate again. No significant differences were found between those lost and those reinterviewed by ethnic group, education, work status, or interviewer.
However, panel loss was significantly greater among three groups: women not married, women from the poorest group (less than $2600 a year family income), and women who were born in urban areas or whose spouses were born in urban areas (or both). If women in these three groups systematically vary in childbearing attitudes and behavior then our results may be somewhat distorted.

Annual family income was below $3900 for 35.4 percent of our sample, between $3900 and $6500 for 43.1 percent, and above $6500 for 21.5 percent. Education was also relatively low: 31.1 percent held a grade school education or less; 35.4 percent had some high school; 26.6 percent completed high school; and 6.9 percent had attended college.3

Because these data were collected for purposes other than testing the effects that parity has on family size preference and future family growth, and because the data are no longer accessible for thorough reanalysis, we were forced to work with previously prepared tables. Hence, the reader will note the new sample is included only in Table II and that different parity categories are used in Table I and Figure 2 than in other tables.

FAMILY SIZE PREFERENCES

The questions for eliciting information on attitudes toward family size included: 1) (in 1965) "Would you like to have any (more) children?"; 2) (in both 1965 and 1967) "If you were starting your family, how many children would you want altogether?"; and 3) (in 1967) "How about your (husband/boyfriend) -- would he like to have any (more) children?" Table I presents a summary of the responses to the first question. Our results are in line with previous research. The proportion of respondents wanting more children declines with increasing levels of parity. These results, controlled for age, are significant ($p < .001$). Approximately 60 percent or more women within each age/parity group want no more children. Desire for no more children is especially marked among women at parity levels above two. Spouses' reported desire for more children (data not shown) significantly declines with increasing parity as well ($p < .001$).

Data on desired number of children (if starting reproductive life anew) at the time of the second interview are summarized in Table II. The relationship between parity and family size preference is positive and nonlinear. Among women below 35 years of age, desired number of children is greater than actual number of children up to parity 2; while at parity 3 or more, the desired number is less than actual
### TABLE I: PERCENT WOMEN WANTING MORE CHILDREN IN 1965 BY PARITY AND AGE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parity*</th>
<th>Age &lt; 25**</th>
<th>25-34***</th>
<th>≥35</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-1</td>
<td>90.8</td>
<td>73.6</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>42.6</td>
<td>43.9</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4+</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>602</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By chi square analysis:

*Parity effects controlling for age are significant (*p* < .001).
**In age groups <35, parity effects are significant (*p* < .001).
***In age group ≥35, parity effects are significant (*p* < .001).

Because of small expected frequencies, these data were collapsed with analysis done for parity ≤ 2 and parity > 2.

### TABLE II: MEAN NUMBER OF CHILDREN DESIRED IF STARTING AGAIN IN 1967 BY PARITY AND AGE IN 1965

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parity*</th>
<th>Age &lt; 25**</th>
<th>25-34***</th>
<th>≥35</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4+</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>831</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By two-way analysis of variance correcting for unequal cells, F test:

*Parity effects controlling for age are significant (*p* < .001).
**Age effects controlling for parity are nonsignificant.
***Interaction effects are significant (*p* < .05).
number (except among parity 3 women 35 years and over). As expected, women who have more children than the society-wide average number of two or three children wanted raise their desired number. As the actual number of children rises the desired number is also raised; but so does the gap between actual and desired numbers.

This still leaves open the question of how family size preferences change over time as a result of changes in parity. Our reasoning leads to the expectation that the birth of additional children to women of parity three or above will lead to an increase in stated family size preferences, but to a lesser level than would be the case if such births were retrospectively "rationalized" as wanted. To investigate this hypothesis we studied responses on the number of children desired if starting again, by 1965 parity and by pregnancy experience in the interim between the two interviews, for women who had two or fewer children and for women who had more than two children.

At the time of the first interview women who were to have an additional birth did not desire significantly more children than women who were to have none in the interim, regardless of parity. The expected difference between the two groups of women in desired number of children in the second interview is significant in the predicted direction for women with more than 2 children (p<.025); and, as expected, there is no significant difference between the two groups of women with two or fewer children. Figure 2 depicts the progression upward in desired number of children and the increasing gap between desired and actual number of children after parity three. This pattern is as predicted in terms of the value stretch concept: family size preference does not predict interim births, but rather interim births which raise parity also significantly raise family size preference for women who have more than the societal norm of 2-3 children.

FAMILY GROWTH

Besides poverty and high parity leading to "value stretch" in family size preference, we argued that poverty and large family size would also make the practice of family planning difficult. We expected our high parity respondents to have more births between 1965 and 1967, and in particular to have more accidental births. Both of these expectations were fulfilled. Among all respondents pregnancy experience controlled for age increased significantly with parity (p<.05). Since some of our respondents wanted to have more children and were not attempting to limit births, we separately analyzed those whom who stated in the first interview that they wanted no more children. Table III
FIGURE 2: MEAN NUMBER OF CHILDREN DESIRED IN 1967 IF START AGAIN BY PARITY IN 1965 AND 1965-1967 PREGNANCY EXPERIENCE

a----women with no additional births in 1965-1967 interim
b----women with additional births in 1965-1967 interim

By difference of means test:
For women with $\geq 3$ children, the difference in desired number between a and b is significant ($p < .025$).
For women with $< 3$ children, the difference in desired number between a and b is not significant.
presents these results by 1965 parity and age. The incidence of pregnancy increases significantly with parity when age is controlled (p < .01). These pregnancies among women who stated two years earlier that they wanted no more children represent failures in attempts to regulate family size.

**TABLE III:** PERCENT BECOMING PREGNANT BETWEEN 1965-1967 AMONG WOMEN NOT WANTING MORE CHILDREN IN 1965 BY PARITY AND AGE IN 1965

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parity</th>
<th>Age &lt; 25**</th>
<th>25-34**</th>
<th>≥35***</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-1</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4+</td>
<td>58.8</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>371</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By chi square analysis:

*Parity effects controlling for age are significant (p < .01).
**Within age groups <35, parity effects are significant (p < .05).
***Within age group ≥35, parity effects are nonsignificant.

Because of small expected frequencies, these data were collapsed with analysis done for parity ≤2 and parity > 2.

Our findings describe approximately the same proportion of unwanted births as the data of Bumpass and Westoff (1970). They estimate one-fifth of all births to be unwanted; however, their estimate for unwanted births to the poor and near-poor (32%) is higher than ours. Their measure of unwanted births was based on several questions and was not asked prior to the birth of the child. Given the increase in services available, it is quite possible that couples in poverty areas of New York City were somewhat more successful in family planning in 1965-1967 than poor couples in other parts of the country in 1960-65.

In 1967 we also asked respondents who became pregnant in the interim between the two interviews if those pregnancies were intended or unintended ("Did you want to get pregnant at that time, or did it just happen?"). Table IV presents the responses to this question. Among women under the age of 35 years, the incidence of unintended pregnancy increases with increasing parity (p < .001). Unintended
pregnancies represent a very high proportion of all pregnancies (60.9 percent) ranging among parity and age groups from a low of 33.3 percent to a high of 100.0 percent. Because this table includes both women who in 1965 said that they wanted more children and women who wanted no more children, the unintended pregnancies combine "number failures" and "spacing failures."

TABLE IV: PERCENT STATING PREGNANCY UNINTENDED AMONG ALL WOMEN WHO BECAME PREGNANT BETWEEN 1965-1967 BY PARITY AND AGE IN 1965

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parity*</th>
<th>Age &lt;25**</th>
<th>25-34***</th>
<th>≥35****</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-1</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>68.0</td>
<td>54.5</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>58.8</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4+</td>
<td>90.9</td>
<td>71.4</td>
<td>76.9</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N 86 72 16 174

By chi square analysis collapsing the data and analysis done for parity ≤2 and parity >2:

*Parity effects controlling for age among women under the age of 35 are significant (p < .001).
**Parity effects within age group <25 are significant (p < .001).
***Parity effects within age group 25-34 are nonsignificant.
****Parity effects within age group ≥35 are nonsignificant.

When unintended pregnancies were cross-tabulated against the respondent's desire for more children stated at the time of the first interview, reporting an unintended pregnancy was found to be more frequent among the women who in 1965 said that they wanted no more children (number failures), than among those who said they wanted more (spacing failures), 76.2 percent, 46.7 percent respectively. Of all unintended pregnancies the majority, 60.4 percent, were number failures.

These reports of unintentional pregnancies, though high, are likely to represent an understatement of total family planning failures. Admitting failure is difficult. Both retrospective rationalization and embarrassment vis-a-vis the interviewer would contribute to the probable undercount of couples who were not successful in family planning. One way to compensate for this is to include with unintended
TABLE V: PERCENT WOMEN WITH PREGNANCIES EITHER STATED AS UNINTENDED OR RATIONALIZED AMONG ALL RESPONDENTS WHO BECAME PREGNANT, BY PARITY AND AGE IN 1965

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parity*</th>
<th>Age&lt;25**</th>
<th>25-34***</th>
<th>≥35****</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-1</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>72.0</td>
<td>81.8</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>88.2</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4+</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>94.3</td>
<td>92.3</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By chi square analysis collapsing the data and analysis done for parity ≤2 and parity >2:

*Parity effects controlling for age among women under the age of 35 are significant (p < .001).
**Parity effects within age groups < 35 are significant (p < .001).
***Parity effects within age group ≥35 are nonsignificant. Because of the small N, these data were collapsed with Fisher's Exact Test done for parity ≤2 and >2.

Those pregnancies which occurred to women who said that they wanted no more children at the time of the first interview but at the second interview stated that their pregnancies were intended. Family planning failures rise from 60.9 percent to 72.4 percent of all pregnancies by this calculation (see Table V). For women below 25 and 25-34 (there were only 16 pregnancies among those over 35) parity is positively associated with accidental pregnancy (p < .001). It is possible that some of the pregnancies we are counting as rationalized represent a genuine change of opinion by women either between first interview and pregnancy or after experience with the previously undesired child. On the other hand, any error on this side should be more than compensated by the error of undercounting spacing failures among women who wanted more children.

USE OF NATALITY REGULATING METHODS

It was expected that women at lower parity levels would regulate their family size and spacing intervals by greater use of contraception and greater use of effective methods than women at higher parity. This was not the case among our sample. We studied contraceptive
use by parity and age at the time of the first interview. There were no significant differences by parity. Two years later, at the time of the second survey, there were still no significant differences between parity groups when age was controlled (data not shown). Thus, neither contraceptive use nor use of effective methods can explain the difference in unwanted births. Although there was a tendency for women at parities 2 and 3 to report greater use of abortion, these data were not considered adequate for statistical analysis (see Polgar and Fried, 1976).

We cannot adequately assess the consistency of contraceptive use from our survey data. As we find no differences by parity in the use of effective methods, and yet find significant increases in unintended and rationalized pregnancies with higher parity, we must assume that at higher parity levels contraceptive use is less consistent (or abortion less frequent). Since desire for additional children declines with parity, it would appear that larger family size interferes with consistent use. Among a sample of urban white couples Bumpass and Westoff (1969) found that after the birth of a second child and after reaching the desired number of children, the efficacy of contraceptive practice substantially improved. Our sample is considerably different with its restriction to women living in poverty areas, and its inclusion of nonwhites and unmarried, separated and divorced women. Perhaps it is the combination of poverty conditions with high parity which interferes with the efficacy of contraceptive practice (and—under pre-1973 conditions—lowered the probability of a successful abortion). And perhaps it is knowledge of this effect which causes both Black and White women of the lower class to report an expected number of children greater than their desired number (Preston, 1974).

**SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION**

Among women in poverty areas in New York City, parity was found to negatively affect desire for additional children, and positively affect family size preference and subsequent natality. The argument that low income women have more children because they really want more is questioned. Although stated desired family size may in general be higher on the average among low income couples than among others at parity levels above two, in this study only a relatively small proportion of low income women said they wanted more children.

The stated number of children desired was higher with increasing parity. However, in contrast to a linear increase in preferred family size that would be predicted on the basis of "rationalization" with
increasing parity, we found a non-linear increase with an increasing gap that is more compatible with the "value stretch" concept of Hyman Rodman. Women of parity three and above who had another birth during the two-year study period reported higher family size desires in 1967 than those who remained at their 1965 parity level. An additional pregnancy had no such effects among women with two or less children. Our data supplement those of Haney et al. (1973) who found among a sample of southern, urban, Black females that social class was negatively associated with "value stretch" as measured by the range of family size preferences. Although they did not test for interaction, they found that the differences between poor and lower middle income women were greater at parity levels above two. Although our data support a value stretch explanation of family size preference among low income women, the study was not designed to test such a hypothesis. More studies, exploring both the psychological phenomena involved in "value stretch" and their implications for attitudes and behavior related to childbearing, would be worthwhile.

A primary purpose of public and private subsidized family planning programs is to reduce unwanted births, particularly unwanted births among those who do not have adequate access to comprehensive medical care. Our findings support the need for such services. Over the two-year period of 1965-1967 the large majority of our sample's pregnancies were unwanted. Our findings suggest that it is important for family planning services to reach low income women before their first pregnancy or early in the childbearing period. The pressures brought by poverty and high parity seem to impede the translation of desires to regulate childbearing into effective family planning. The expansion of high quality family planning services to the poor and the spread of newer methods of contraception and abortion in the years since this survey have reduced the risk of unintended births. As ability to regulate pregnancy increases among the poor, especially in the early stages of reproductive life, one can expect a decrease in their stated desired number of children. Thus, we would not be surprised if the inverse relationship between income and both actual and desired number of children in the U.S. will soon be greatly reduced, or even reverse direction.

FOOTNOTES

1. The main thrust of the argument is directed to the exclusion of women opposed to family planning and women already practicing adequate methods in estimating the need for contraceptive services of the poor and near-poor. See Blake and Das Gupta, 1972, 1973.
2. Color-ethnic designation was "other" or not ascertained for 2.5 percent of the sample. For earlier reports on this study see Polgar et al., 1966; Polgar and Rothstein, 1970; Polgar and Hiday, 1974; Hiday, 1975; and Polgar and Fried, 1976.

3. Although the sample included women whose income and education exceed the limits of common definitions of poverty, their residence in a poverty milieu permits their description as women of low socioeconomic status.

4. There has been much discussion in the literature over the relative merits and psychological meaning of different questions about family size preferences (Coombs, 1974; Abernathy and Imrey, 1975; Namboodiri, 1970; Ryder and Westoff, 1971; Terhune and Kaufman, 1973). We prefer not to engage in such discussion in this paper, and instead elect to choose two measures: one which refers to the respondent's desire for more children under present circumstances, and one which allows the respondent to imagine undoing her present parity, beginning afresh. Question number three permits a tapping of the husband's/friend's desire for more children under the couple's present circumstances.

5. Only 16 of the women over 35 became pregnant in the interim and 14 of those stated that they wanted no more children prior to this pregnancy and/or that the pregnancy was accidental. Two desired births among women over 35 does not allow variance over four parity levels; therefore, no significant differences could be found in Tables IV and V for women over 35.

REFERENCES

Bauman, K. E. and J. R. Udry

Blake, J.

1974 "Can We Believe Recent Data on Birth Expectations in the United States?" Demography 11 (February):25-44.

______, and P. Das Gupta

Bumpass, L. and C. F. Westoff


Coombs, L. C.

Deutscher, I.

Douglas, J. W. B. and J. M. Blomfield

Easterlin, R. A.

Freedman, R.

L. C. Coombs and Ming-Chen Chang

Frisancho, A. R., J. E. Klayman and J. Matos
Furstenberg, F. F.
1971 "Preventing Unwanted Pregnancies Among Adolescents." 

Haney, C. A., R. Michielutte, C. E. Vincent, and C. M. Cochrane
1973 "The Value Stretch Hypothesis: Family Size Preferences in 

Hawley, A. H. and V. Prachuabmoh
1966 "Family Growth and Family Planning: Response to a Family-
Planning Action Program in a Rural District of Thailand." 

Hiday, V. A.
1975 "Parity and Well-Being Among Low-Income Urban Families." 

Jaffe, F. and A. Guttmacher
1968 "Family Planning Programs in the United States." 
Demography 5:910-23.

Koch, G. G., J. R. Abernathy, and P. B. Imrey
1975 "On a Method for Studying Family Size Preferences." 
Demography 12 (February):57-66.

Namboodiri, N. K.
1970 "On the Relation between Economic Status and Family Size 
Preferences when Status Differentials in Contraceptive 
Instrumentalities are Eliminated." Population Studies 24 

1974 "Which Couples at Given Parities Expect to Have Additional 
Births?" Demography 11 (February):45-56.

Polgar, S.
1972 "Population History and Population Policies from an Anthro-

, et al.
1966 "The PPFA Mobile Services Project in New York City." 

-133-


This paper examines the responses to national opinion surveys taken between 1935 and 1976 on questions related to the federal government's role in providing social welfare programs and recent survey findings on defense spending. The paper's major findings are that:

1) in general, the public supports the basic concept of providing aid to the needy through the government but shows less consistent support when specific spending proposals are mentioned; and

2) as the share of the federal budget allocated for defense spending has been decreasing, polls have shown an increasing proportion of the public expressing support for greater defense spending.

The paper concludes with observations on the balance between the public's attitudes toward spending for social welfare programs and spending for the military. The central conclusion is that it appears that the American public wants "guns" and "butter", and are likely to want some sort of balance between the two.

Observers of social institutions and processes have noted that in democratic societies only a small proportion of the public is familiar with the issues about which most policy decisions are made (Key, 1961; Truman, 1951; and Dickinson, 1930).

Dickinson (1930:291) claims:

The task of government...is not to express an imaginary popular will, but to effect adjustments among the various special wills and purposes which at any given time are pressing for realization. These special wills and purposes are reflected in the small cluster of opinions that develop within the larger uninformed and inattentive public.

Key (1961) asserts that broad popular sentiments control public policy indirectly. While the public may have no position on specific issues or questions of policy, he assumes that vague sentiments of "fairness," "justice," and "policy propriety", held by the general public, guide government officials in making day-to-day decisions. Key also argues that there is a "layer of political activists or influencers" between the general public and the government, composed usually of lobbyists or heads of pressure groups or professional organizations. This layer, he contends, deals most directly with government officials on specific policies and in turn influences and mobilizes public opinion on crucial issues.

I wish to thank Charles Grantham, Tara McLaughlin, and L.K. Northwood for their valuable comments and generous assistance provided in the revision of an earlier draft of this paper.

I would like to gratefully acknowledge the following organizations for their generosity in providing me with access to their data: the American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup Poll), Louis Harris and Associates, the Roper Organization, the National Opinion Research Center, the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan, the Minnesota Poll, the Minneapolis Tribune, Opinion Research Corporation of Princeton, N.J., and CBS News.

-135-
While we essentially agree with this view that the public is not familiar with specific details or issues involving public policy, we hold that the public does have sentiments as to whether governmental decisions are fair, just, or appropriate. In an excellent review of American public opinion from 1936 to 1970, Simon (1974) observes that in contrast to the public’s ambivalent or negative attitudes toward some domestic policies, the American public manifested a stronger and more consistent approach toward most major pieces of social welfare legislation. Old-age pensions and social security have received the most widespread and consistent public opinion support among various social welfare issues. As an indication of this support, shortly before the formal passage of a program of social security in January 1936, the public was asked whether it favored government old-age pensions for needy person. Eighty-nine percent answered “yes” (American Institute of Public Opinion, in Simon, 1974).

This paper traces public opinion on some of the major social welfare issues from the mid 1930s to 1976. The topics discussed were chosen because poll data are available over extended periods of time and because they concern areas of general interest that directly affect people’s day-to-day lives.

Data Sources
Glen (1972), Hyman (1972), Massarik (1967), Cantril (1947) and others have indicated the problems, prospects, and potentialities of secondary analysis using existing public opinion poll data. Glenn (1972:140), for example has cautioned that:

For the inexperienced researcher, there are a number of pitfalls in the secondary analysis of existing data on political attitudes. For instance, he may apply statistical tests that are not appropriate to the sample design, fail to take into account the considerable systematic bias in the earlier poll data, or use national survey data for inappropriate purposes.

While we are cognizant of these methodological limitations and problems, we note that Glenn and his associates have successfully used such existing data to seek answers to a wide variety of salient topics (Glen and Zeldy, 1970; Glenn, 1972).

The data for the present paper are based upon published public opinion polls from the American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup Polls), Louis Harris and Associates, the Roper Organization, the National Opinion Research Center, the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan, the Minnesota Poll of the Minneapolis Tribune, Opinion Research Corporation of Princeton, N.J. and CBS News. The data were collected on national samples of adult populations.

A formal statement of these polling organizations’ sampling techniques and procedures is found in Gallup (1976). The data are generally reliable as sample survey results. The record of response stability and accuracy on general political and social issues across several decades is remarkable. For example between 1936 and 1972 Gallup’s findings regarding presidential elections reveal that the final prediction of the winner’s total deviated an average of 2.4 percent from the reported popular vote. The largest deviation (6.8 percent) occurred in 1936 before improvement in sampling techniques.

For the purposes of this study, we employ the definition of public opinion set forth by Simon (1974:7), who defines it as the verbal responses that a representative sample of adults in the United States has made to various questions about national policy put to them by experts who tell us that these are the important issues of the day. We also accept the broader working definition of Bryce (1962:50), who suggests that public opinion is “the aggregate of views men hold regarding matters that affect or interest the community.”

We now turn to the essential findings of our study.

Findings
Fiske (1975:257) has noted:

A quirk of history probably robbed scientific polling of the chance to track one of the most spectacular shifts in American philosophy in recent history. When polls first appeared in 1935, the populace was six years from the stock market crash and in the lowest depths of the Depression. The early-to-rise-and-early-to-bed thrill and work ethic may well have made an
about face just before the pollsters appeared on the scene. It must have begun to dawn on people that hard work and dedication were not always insurance against unemployment and poverty at a time when there were actually not enough jobs to go around. It is tantalizing but fruitless to speculate about the old-time status of private charity in the public mind, but for the taxpayer to take on public welfare was certainly a novel concept.

What the pollsters do know, as Erskine has noted, is that by the mid-thirties people had turned to the government to help provide jobs and relieve economic hardships. In 1935, a Roper poll found that more than three-quarters of Americans thought the government “should see to it that every man who wants to work has a job.” In 1938, Gallup reported that seven out of ten approved the idea that government had a responsibility “to pay the living expenses of needy people who are out of work.” In 1939, Roper likewise found seven in ten saying “the government should provide for all people who have no other means of subsistence.”

Although the wording of poll questions began to vary as the role of government in welfare became more universally accepted, there is no evidence of any basic subsequent changes in opinion. In January 1975, when unemployment again soared, Harris reported that eight in ten backed President Ford’s proposal “to provide federal jobs for the unemployed when unemployment exceeds six percent nationally.”

Paradoxically, despite such steady support for the general concept of government responsibility for those without jobs, specific public welfare programs have frequently been controversial. For example, the idea of a negative income tax has never caught on. Yet the Nixon Plan was popular because of the President’s insistence that able-bodied people must work rather than accept a guaranteed income.

To examine the formulation that there has been support for the general concept of a federal welfare role but disagreement over specific programs, let us examine evidence of results for each type of question, both general and specific. The specific areas we cover are questions on federal programs or proposed programs to provide unemployment benefits, to provide guaranteed work, and to provide a guarantee income.

Attitudes Toward Government Obligation to Human Needs. When queried in 1939, 1940, 1946, 1947, 1948, 1964, 1969, and 1973, approximately two-thirds of Americans supported the general notion that the government has a responsibility to provide for all people who have no means of subsistence. Sixty-nine percent supported this position in 1939, while 68 percent agreed with the statement as recently as 1973 (Table 1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Yes, Favor</th>
<th>No, Oppose</th>
<th>Depends, No Opinion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Do you think our government should or should not provide for all people who have no other means of subsistence? (Roper for Fortune) 1939: June</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Do you think the government should provide for all people who have no other means of obtaining a living? (Roper for Fortune) 1940: March</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946: November 21</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947: January</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948: November</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Now I’m going to read some things you sometimes hear people say, and ask whether, in general, you agree or disagree. The federal government has a responsibility to try to do away with poverty in this country. (Gallup) 1964: September-October</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4. Do you tend to believe or not believe in the following statements that have been made by some people? Government must see that no one is without food, clothing or shelter. (Harris) 1964: October 5............................................ 68 n.a. n.a.

5. Do you personally favor or oppose an all-out effort by the federal government to get rid of poverty in this country? (ORC) 1969: December 15........................................... 73 16 11

6. Here are some statements some people have made about the way different levels of government should operate in this country. For each mark an X for whether you tend to agree or disagree. The federal government has a deep responsibility for seeing that the poor are taken care of, that no one goes hungry, and that every person achieves a minimum standard of living. (Harris) 1973: September ........................................... 68 27 5

These data reveal a remarkable consistency in the level of support for this general policy regarding the role of government in welfare. The range of positive responses is surprisingly small, from a low of 65 percent in a 1940 Roper survey to a high of 73 percent reported in Roper polls of 1947 and 1948 as well as an Opinion Research Center study in 1969.

It may be noted that the wording of the questions shifted slightly to reflect the concerns of the times. In the forties, the questions were asked in terms of "providing for people who have no other means of subsistence," while in the surveys taken during the sixties and in 1973, the questions dealt with "getting rid of poverty" or seeing "that no one goes hungry." The substance of the question is essentially equivalent in both periods, but it seems likely that in the forties the needy were thought of as those out of work because of temporary economic dislocations following the war, whereas in the sixties the focus was on racial minorities who had seldom shared in the nation's prosperity. It is interesting that no question of this sort was reported during the more quiescent decade of the fifties. Apparently the issue was not a very active topic of discussion during that period.

Attitudes Toward the Role of Government in Providing Unemployment Benefits. During the period from 1938 to 1974, a cross-section of the American public was asked what they felt the role of the government should be regarding provision of unemployment benefits. Clearly the questions asked during this period were not identical. They ranged from very general items to specific questions about particular proposals. For example, in January 1938 Gallup asked a cross-section of the American population: "Do you think it is the government's responsibility to pay the living expenses of needy people who are out of work?" More than two-thirds (69 percent) of the respondents surveyed replied "yes." By contrast, the support for specific proposals of financial aid for the unemployed dropped to half of that level. In September 1945 Gallup asked a representative national sample: "would you be willing to pay higher taxes to give unemployed person up to 25 dollars a week for 26 weeks if they failed to find satisfactory jobs?" Only 34 percent said "yes," while 54 percent said "no."

Public support for various unemployment proposals ranges from 21 percent of the public queried in August 1944 by Gallup concerning unemployment benefits for war workers to a high of 84 percent of those interviewed in April 1943 by NORC regarding their support of social security compensation. It is clear that the first proposal was considered by many to be a government give-away program to a specific
In this case war workers—while the second proposal is a broad-based contributory self-help program. The latter two factors may in part explain the differential support of these proposed programs. It is also interesting to note that a proposal to give returning soldiers unemployment payments was favored by nearly four times as many respondents as the proportion favoring payment to war workers. Clearly veterans were regarded as a special case during this period.

In sum, fully two-thirds of the public over a wide time span have supported the general concept of limited unemployment benefits, whereas there has been less public support for programs which are not broad-based nor self-help in nature.

Table 2
Attitudes toward the Role of Government in Providing Unemployment Benefits, 1938-1974

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Yes, Favor</th>
<th>No, Oppose</th>
<th>Depends, No Opinion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Do you think it is the government’s responsibility to pay the living expenses of needy people who are out of work? (Gallup) 1938: January 9</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938: July 2</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. After the war, do you think the federal government should or should not provide job insurance for everyone? (Roper for Fortune) 1942: September (Business executives only)</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. The Social Security law also requires some workers to save money so they will get money from the government in case they lose their jobs. Do you think this is a good idea or a bad idea? (NORC) 1943: April</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Should the government give war workers money if they find themselves out of work when the war is over or nearly over? (Gallup) 1944: August 18-23</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Would you be willing to pay higher taxes to give unemployed persons up to twenty-five dollars a week for twenty-six weeks if they fail to find satisfactory jobs? (Gallup) 1945: September 6</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Congress is now considering a law which would give more unemployment compensation to persons without jobs so that some would get as much as $25 a week for 26 weeks. Would you like to have your congressman vote for or against this bill? (Gallup) 1945: September 8-13</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Have you heard or read about President Truman’s proposal to pay more money to unemployed workers so that some of them would get as much as twenty-five dollars a week for twenty-six weeks? If YES (82%): Do you favor or oppose President Truman’s proposal? (Gallup) 1945: October 3</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 2 (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Yes, Favor</th>
<th>No, Oppose</th>
<th>Depends, No Opinion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8. How do you feel about unemployment benefits? Should the period</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>during which unemployed workers can collect these benefits be extended,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>or not? (Gallup)</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965: February 14</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. President Ford has put forth a program both for curbing inflation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and for getting the country out of the recession. Let me read you</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>some key parts of what President Ford has proposed. For each, tell</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>me if you favor or oppose it. Give an additional 13 weeks unem-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>employment insurance to those who have used up their benefits.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Harris)</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974: December 23</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Attitudes Toward the Role of Government Regarding Guaranteed Work, 1935-1975

In January 1943, NORC queried a cross-section of the American public as follows: "Do you think that one of our aims should be to see that everyone in this country has a chance to get a job after the war?" A remarkable 99 percent favored this proposal (table 3). As in the case of unemployment benefits reported earlier, we witness a remarkable level of support for the general notion of full employment. This finding contrasts markedly with the results of another representative national sample queried concerning a specific work program. In August 1944 Gallup asked a sample survey: "If there are not enough jobs in private industry to go around after the war, should the WPA be started up again to give work relief to the unemployed?" Fewer than one-half (44 percent) of those interviewed supported this proposal.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Yes, Favor</th>
<th>No, Oppose</th>
<th>Depends, No Opinion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Do you think our government should or should not see to it that every</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>man who wants to work has a job? (Roper for Fortune)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935: July</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939: June</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Do you think that one of our aims should be to see that everyone in</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>n.o.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>this country has a chance to get a job after the war? (NORC)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943: January 11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Do you think it is a function of government today to see to it that</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>substantially full employment is maintained? (Roper for Fortune)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944: May (Business executives only)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. If there are not enough jobs in private industry to go around after</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the war, should the WPA be started up again to give work relief to the</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unemployed? (Gallup)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944 August 16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3 (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Yes Favor</th>
<th>No Oppose</th>
<th>Depends, No Opinion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5. Do you think it should or should not be up to the government to see to it that there are enough jobs in this country for everyone who wants to work? (NORC) 1945: September</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. A nationwide cross-section was asked whether they agreed or disagreed with this statement: The government in Washington ought to see to it that every one who wants to work can find a job. (SRC-M) 1956: September-November</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958: September-November</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960: September-November</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. A nationwide cross-section was asked whether they agreed or disagreed with this statement: I think the government should give a person a job if he can’t find another job. (McClosky, 1968:176) 1964</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Some people say that if there are not enough jobs for everyone who wants one, the government should somehow provide the extra jobs needed. Others say that the government should not do this. What is your opinion? (NORC/SRC-M) 1968: January-March (Urban white opinion)</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Another proposal is to guarantee enough work so that each family that has an employable wage earner would be guaranteed enough work each week to give him a wage of about $161 a week or $3200 a year. Would you favor or oppose such a plan? (Gallup) 1968: May 23-28</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968: December 5-10</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Some people have proposed that the federal government guarantee a job to every American who wants to work even if it means creating a lot of public jobs like during the depression. Would you favor or oppose such a job guarantee plan? (ORC/Gallup, Fagin, 1971) 1969: December 15</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. When people can’t find any jobs would you be in favor of the government putting them on the payroll and finding work for them such as helping out in hospitals or cleaning public parks or would you be against this idea? (Gallup) 1972: June</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3 [continued]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes. Favor</th>
<th>No. Oppose</th>
<th>Depends</th>
<th>No Opinion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>79</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

12. President Ford has proposed creating a Community Improvement Corps to provide federal jobs for the unemployed when unemployment exceeds 6% nationally. Do you favor or oppose such a federal program to give productive jobs to the unemployed? (Harris)
1975: January 16 .................................

The difference between support for general principles and specific proposals does not appear to be as sharp in responses to questions dealing with guaranteed work as on questions discussed previously. With a few exceptions, the majority of those polled gave affirmative answers to both general and specific questions.

Some specific proposals, such as the Gallup question in 1968 concerning assurances to wage earners that they would have enough work to earn at least $60 a week, were favored by more than 70 percent of those polled. Some general questions, such as that asked by McClosky in 1964, gained support from less than a majority. Still others, such as that posed in the Michigan Survey Research Center poll in 1960, earned a bare majority of support.

There appears to be little relationship between survey responses and levels of unemployment at the time of the survey. For example, the McClosky poll, which found less than majority support for a general proposition, was taken when the unemployment rate was 5.2 percent, while much higher levels of support were shown in 1968 and 1969 polls, when the unemployment rate was considerably lower—3.6 percent in 1968 and 3.5 percent in 1969.

Attitudes Toward the Role of Government in Providing a Guaranteed Income, 1965-1973. The issue of a guaranteed income is a relatively new one, at least in terms of the availability of cross-sectional poll data. One of the first questions on this topic was asked in September 1965 by Gallup: "It has been proposed that instead of relief and welfare payments, the government should guarantee every family a minimum annual income. Do you favor or oppose this idea?" Fewer than one person in five (19 percent) of this national sample supported this proposal. However, when mandatory employment training or work was coupled with a guaranteed annual income, nearly eight persons in ten supported the proposal. This was shown by a Harris survey in 1969 in which people were asked whether they favored or opposed "the Nixon welfare plan, which would give every family on welfare $1,600 a year with a provision that anyone able to work either enter a job training program or get a job." With few exceptions public support regarding a guaranteed annual income is generally lower than the other areas where government might conceivably intervene (table 4). Perhaps, these proposals fly in the face of a still firmly ingrained Protestant work ethic. It appears clear that a guaranteed income has little support unless coupled with mandatory training or employment.

Table 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Yes, Favor</th>
<th>No, Oppose</th>
<th>Depends, No Opinion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. It has been proposed that instead of relief and welfare payments, the government should guarantee every family a minimum annual income. Do you favor or oppose this idea? (Gallup)</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1965: September 16-21 .............................
Table 4 [continued]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2. Our income tax system is often looked upon as a method of taking money from people to pay for the cost of the government. Some experts have come up with a plan under which the income tax system would be used to give money to poorer families. The way the plan would work is that any family whose income was below $3000 would be given money by the federal government to raise its income to $3000. Would you favor or oppose such a plan? (Harris) 1967: August 7 ...........................................</th>
<th>Yes, Favor</th>
<th>No, Oppose</th>
<th>Depends, No Opinion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>28</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 3. People were asked whether they favored or opposed "the Nixon welfare plan—which would give every family on welfare $1,600 a year with a provision that anyone able to work either enter a job training program or get a job." (Harris for Life) 1969: September ........................................... | 79         | 13         | 8                  |
|                                                             | 51         | 38         | 11                |

| 4. People were asked whether they favored or opposed "a federally guaranteed minimum level of income, with a bottom of $3,000 a year for a family of four." (Harris for Life) 1969: September ........................................... | 30         | 61         | 9                  |

| 5. Some people have said that instead of providing welfare and relief payments, the federal government should guarantee every American family a minimum yearly income of about $3,000. Would you personally favor or oppose such an income guarantee? (ORC/Gallup; Feagin, 1971) 1969: December 15 ........................................... | 57         | 33         | 10                 |

| 6. Here's how the proposed Nixon welfare program would work for a family of four where the head of the family is willing and able to work. The least a family could receive is $1600 a year plus food stamps. As the family earned more of their own money, welfare payments would be gradually reduced and when the family reached $3,920, welfare payments would stop. Does this sound like a good idea or a poor idea? (Minnesota Poll) 1970: April 23 (Minnesota opinion) ........................................... | 33         | 60         | 7                  |

| 7. I would like to read you some present or proposed government programs that affect the economic lives of individuals or business. For each, tell me whether you approve or disapprove. A guaranteed annual income plan which would assure a minimum income to a family whether anyone worked or not. (Harris) 1970: November (youth opinion nationwide) ........................................... |            |            |                    |
8. If you were given enough money to live as comfortably as you would like for the rest of your life, would you continue to work or would you stop working? (NORC) 1973: March (Labor force only)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Continue to work</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Would stop working</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know, no answer</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is, nonetheless, interesting to observe that some of the surveys do show a majority in favor of a guaranteed income plan. Specifically, the 1969 Harris survey which found that 79 percent favored a program tied to mandatory work also found that as many as 51 percent supported a minimum income even when not accompanied by mandatory work. Similarly, in 1970 the Minnesota Poll found that 57 percent of that state’s residents approved of a minimum income plan independent of mandatory work. Minnesotan, of course, has a reputation for having a somewhat more liberal populace than most other states, which may help account for the higher level of support than shown in other surveys on this question.

General findings regarding trend data on the role of government in welfare suggest that general support exists for the principle that every American should be assured a basic subsistence level, as well as being assured employment. However, when the public was queried on specific government programs in specific dollar amounts, support was less consistent, falling below a majority on some surveys.

It appears that, in general, Americans support the idea of governmental programs to assure subsistence for the needy until questions of specific spending levels or increased taxes arise. Then the support becomes much weaker, although it is not wiped out entirely.

Attitudes toward Defense Spending, 1969-1976. In light of our analysis above regarding the level of support for government intervention in various welfare programs, it is interesting to observe that a Gallup survey conducted during January and February 1976 revealed that public support for defense spending has increased to the highest point recorded over the last seven years. Twenty-two percent of those surveyed said they felt that “too little” is being allocated for defense in the budget. This represents an increase of 10 percentage points from 1974 (table 5). The sharpest change in views since 1974 has come about among those with a college background. In 1974 only 8 percent of the college group said “too little” was being spent on defense budgets while in February 1976, the figure was 24 percent. This brings the college-educated group roughly into line with those of lesser education levels on this issue.
Table 5
Attitudes toward Defense Spending, 1969-1976

Question: "There is much discussion as to the amount of money the government in Washington should spend for national defense and military purposes. How do you feel about this: Do you think we are spending too little, too much, or about the right amount?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>January 30 - February 2, 1976</th>
<th>Too Much</th>
<th>Too Little</th>
<th>About Right</th>
<th>No Opinion</th>
<th>Change since 1974 in percent saying &quot;too much&quot;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NATIONAL</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>- 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEX</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>- 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>- 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RACE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>- 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-white</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>- 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDUCATION</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>- 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>- 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade School</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>- 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REGION</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>- 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midwest</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>- 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>- 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>- 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Under 30</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>- 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-24 years</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>- 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-29 years</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>+ 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-49 years</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>- 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 &amp; older</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>- 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INCOME</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$20,000 &amp; over</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>- 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$15,000-$19,999</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>- 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$10,000-$14,999</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>- 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$7,000-$9,999</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>- 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$5,000-$6,999</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>- 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$3,000-$4,999</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>- 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under $3,000</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>- 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POLITICS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>- 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>- 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soc. Democrat</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>- 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Democrat</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>- 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>- 8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

-145-
Table 5 [continued]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RELIGION</th>
<th>Too Much</th>
<th>Too Little</th>
<th>About Right</th>
<th>No Opinion</th>
<th>Change since 1974 in percent saying &quot;too much&quot;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>- 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>- 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCCUPATION</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional &amp; Business</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>- 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical &amp; Sales</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>- 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual Workers</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>- 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Labor Force</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>- 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CITY SIZE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,000,000 &amp; over</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>- 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500,000-999,999</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>- 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50,000-499,999</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>- 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,500-49,999</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>- 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under 2,500, Rural</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>- 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor Union families</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>- 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Labor Union families</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>- 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPENDING ESTIMATE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-$29 (correct)</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-$19 (correct or near)</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-$9/40-$99 (too high/low)</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Comparative data not available.

In assessing the current findings and trends, it is important to bear in mind that the proportion of the budget earmarked for defense has changed in recent years. The 1976 budget called for approximately $101.1 billion for defense, or about 26 percent of the total budget, compared to a share of 33 percent in 1972. It is also important to note that earlier lower assessments regarding government spending for military purposes must be evaluated within the context of the widespread lack of support for the United States involvement in the Vietnam conflict. Therefore, these earlier reports regarding defense spending simply may have been votes against United States involvement in Vietnam rather than reflecting general opinion in support of defense spending.

As a matter of interest, only a handful of those polled actually knew what share of the federal budget went to defense spending. Seven persons in ten admitted they had no idea, and only 7 percent of those responding actually came close to the correct figure. However, the attitudes regarding defense spending of those who admitted their ignorance of the actual spending level or guessed wrong, were remarkably similar to those who knew the approximately correct figures. This appears to be an example of the workings of a general public sentiment as to the “fairness,” “justice,” and “propriety” of policies.

As reported in Table 5, a Gallup survey in January 1969 showed that a majority (52 percent) reported that “too much” was being spent on defense. That figure decreased fairly systematically each of the ensuing years including 1976 when just slightly more than one third (36 percent) felt too much was being allocated for defense purposes.
Typology of "Guns" or "Butter" Proponents

"Butter" Proponents. In order to develop a useful typology of those respondents who believe that the United States is spending too much on defense, we examined the data in Table 5 to identify background variables (e.g., sex, race, education, etc.) on which there was a spread of 10 percentage points or more between those respondents showing the greatest support and those showing the least support for this position.

Out of the 11 characteristics reported in Table 5, the following demographic characteristics seemed to be related to differences in levels of support:

- **Region**: Midwesterners were more likely to feel too much was being spent on defense (42 percent), while Southerners were least likely to feel that way (31 percent).
- **Age**: Those under 30 were much more likely than other age groups to feel that the defense budget was too high.
- **Income**: Forty-five percent of those with annual incomes less than $3,000 felt defense spending was too high, compared with only one-third of those earning $10,000 and above.
- **Occupation**: White-collar workers and professionals were more likely to favor reductions in defense spending than their blue collar counterparts.
- **City Size**: Those living in cities of one million population or more were most likely to feel the defense budget was too high.

"Guns" Proponents [those favoring more defense spending]: Nationally, a little more than one person in five felt defense spending was too little. Those most likely to hold this view were men, those who live in the South, and persons 50 years of age or older. The other demographic characteristics showed little variation on this question.

"Guns and Butter"

We have found that one-fifth of Americans in a recent survey feel there should be more defense spending. We have also found that sizeable majorities, in general, favor some governmental involvement in welfare programs, although there is less consistency on specific programs. The conclusion we can tentatively draw is that a sizeable proportion of Americans want both guns and butter.

Results of a recent survey shed light on this matter. In February 1976, the Harris Survey asked a sample of Americans for their views on whether the welfare system should be entirely given over to the federal government, as some Democratic governors have urged, whether it should be run entirely by each state, or whether the current federal-state partnership should be maintained. Also, the survey asked whether the respondents felt the issue of the welfare system was a serious problem or not.

While 80 percent of the national sample said they felt the problem was serious, and large numbers were critical of the way the system now works, "Most of the public is against handing welfare back to the states or having it taken over by the federal government. Instead, a plurality prefers continuing to have welfare costs shared by the states and the federal government," according to the Harris poll results.

Respondents in the Harris Survey directed three major criticisms at the way welfare now works: Nine out of ten believe many persons on welfare could be working instead of receiving welfare; nearly as many feel there are too many on welfare who cheat to get money to which they are not entitled; and 64 percent feel the criteria for receiving welfare are not tough enough.

This seems to support the conclusion that, although Americans generally accept the idea of government aid for those in need, they nevertheless apparently want to keep a balance between expenditures on welfare programs and those for other purposes.

Summary and Conclusions

Employing national poll data, the results of American public opinion toward the role of government in social welfare and in defense spending has been examined. There had been considerable stability of public
opinion on the general topic of welfare; the public supports it in general, but is less supportive of specific types of welfare spending. The nature and stability of long term public opinion of the American public regarding the role of the federal government in the design, funding, and implementation of national social welfare programs is remarkable. While a majority of Americans generally support the basic principle behind social welfare, however, it is the structure of social welfare programs with which they appear to take issue. That is, people are concerned with how, how much, and to whom the benefits are distributed.

While a majority of Americans support the general concept of social welfare programs, at the same time the percentage of Americans desiring an increase in military budgets has increased to an all-time high since 1969. The data do not seem to support a "guns or butter" conclusion but rather seem to suggest the American public wants "guns and butter."

The question of national priorities has always been a primary one for policy-makers. The role of public opinion in determining the levels of spending for different purposes in a limited national budget is of course an indirect one; Congress and the executive branch must debate many issues on which the general public has little information. But, as Simon (1974:222) has pointed out:

(The) On domestic issues, particularly those of the bread and butter variety, the public is not only reasonably well informed and prepared to express an opinion, but has on many occasions led or prompted the Congress or the President toward passage of a program that might otherwise have been delayed for months or years. Welfare legislation concerning minimum wages, social security, medical programs, are examples of issues on which public opinion has preceded and prompted government action.

The issues we have considered do not all enjoy such strong public support. The information we have reviewed can be a guide to what most people would find acceptable—namely, a humane welfare system which is at the same time efficient, combined with a level of defense spending that is perceived to be not far different from that of recent years.

References

Bryce, James
Cantril, Hadley
Dickinson, John
1930 "Democratic Realities and Democratic Dogma," American Political Science Review 24, 283-309.
Erskine, Hazel
Fragin, Joe R.
1971 American Attitudes toward Poverty and anti-Poverty Programs, a final report on NIMH research grant MH 15917, May.
Gallup, George
Glenn, Norval D.
Glenn, Norval D.

-148-
Glenn, Norval D. 
Glenn, Norval and Richard E. Zody 
Hyman, Herbert 
Katz, Daniel 
Key, V.O. 
Massarik, Fred 
McClosky, Herbert 
Simon, Rita James 
Skolnick, J. 
Truman, David B. 
Watts, William and Lloyd A. Free 
Wilensky, Harrold L. and Charles N. Lebeaux 