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COMMUNITY ASSESSMENT SCALES:  
THE STATE OF THE ART

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Community development activities are founded on the assumption that citizens have some concept of a "good community" toward which they want to move. Attention needs to be given to how community developers can determine citizen values and attitudes about the type of community that they want. Community assessment scales (CAS's) have been used as one means of measuring community attitudes and desires.

This paper explores the state of the art of the development and use of CAS's. The conclusions are that there has been only minimal use of CAS's and that there are many conceptual and methodological problems with the existing scales.

It is suggested that CAS's, if properly designed, could be useful and practical tools for community development.

Community developers are constantly seeking to mobilize people to improve the quality of life in the communities or neighborhoods in which they live and work. Most community developers operate with unspoken -- and perhaps unclarified -- assumptions about what kind of community they desire or believe that the people in the community desire.
It would seem apparent that if community developers are serious about wanting to enable a community to fulfill its own goals for itself, they would want to discover, by some systematic means, what the citizens want the community to be -- how they define a "good community" (23). One of the means that has been used to achieve this end is survey research designed to identify people's preferences about various aspects of community life -- either how they evaluate present aspects of their communities or what kinds of improvements that they would like to see in their communities.

We surveyed the literature in several disciplines to analyze the various kinds of community attitude survey instruments that have been developed. In selecting the "community assessment scales" to be analyzed, we included only those that sought to measure fairly broad aspects of the community. We excluded, therefore, scales that focused only on specific, limited aspects or institutions of communities.

We found, first of all, that relatively little research has been directed toward measuring citizen attitudes toward the community. We were able to identify only twenty scales. (We will not analyze all twenty scales, but only illustrative ones within each of the categories we have developed.) Some had apparently never been used in research studies (or the results have never been published) and in other cases the research was reported but the scales were not presented. Many of the available community assessment scales were extremely rudimentary.

We also found that the content of the scales was seldom related to clear definitions of the central concepts used nor to theories which would identify the major variables which should be considered in developing a concept of "good community." Only a few scales organize the responses into sophisticated analytical categories and are cognizant of the methodological problems inherent in this type of research.

In the following analysis of community assessment scales, we divide the scales into three categories. Each category
reflects a particular set of concerns, a distinct purpose, and a specific orientation to quality of life in a community; we try to make these underlying orientations explicit. Then we describe the content of specific scales within each category -- the types of questions and formats used to obtain the data. Finally, we discuss conceptual and methodological problems and explore the potential for using community assessment scales to help citizens identify community development goals.

TYPES OF SCALES

The three categories we developed to delineate different types of community assessment scales were: (a) Urban Planning Scales, which focused primarily on the physical and ecological aspects of the community; (b) Intergroup Relations Scales, which focused on class, status, and suburban/urban differences; and (c) Social Institutions and Social Milieu Scales, which focused on attitudes toward various community institutions and aspects of community spirit, cohesion, and commitment.

A. Urban Planning Scales

1. Purpose/Orientation

A majority of the available community assessment scales were developed in the context of the urban planning process. This should hardly be surprising. The urban renewal/redevelopment process, whether in the form of developing new communities or in renovating existing communities, necessarily involves the question of how residents, or potential residents, perceive that community.

Physical planners have not always made this affirmation, however. The struggle within the profession is whether the planners know better than the residents what factors contribute most to community cohesion and to the happiness of its residents. Neighborhood residents have often rejected the concepts and priorities of the planners. As Lansing and Marans (14) observed,
"widespread resistance to planning proposals, particularly urban renewal projects, seems to indicate that citizens and planners disagree over what a high quality environment may be." Evidently planners have been slow to accept Mel Ravitz's (22) statement of twenty years ago, that "increasingly, physical planners are coming to recognize that to be effective sound physical planning must be related to the accepted wants and needs of neighborhood residents." Thus community assessment scales serve as a means of narrowing the social and cultural gap between the "experts" and the residents.

Some specific examples of the research in this category will illustrate the diversity of purposes. Lansing, Marans, and Zehner (14, 15, 25) undertook a comparative study of planned new towns and unplanned suburban communities. Zehner (25) explained that the project was undertaken "to see if differential satisfactions were related to identifiable aspects of the environment that would be amenable to manipulation by planners." This particular group of studies measured the attitudes of residents who were either contemplating, or had recently made, a major change in residential location. Thus, it involved a conscious choice between alternative communities.

The Booth (3) study of "Metropolitics" in Nashville, Tennessee involves a somewhat different planning issue: the adoption of a unified governmental structure for the entire metropolitan region. The author sought to identify sources of resistance to the metropolitan plan. Metropolitan consolidation, it should be noted, has long been an important issue for urban planning.

The Lansing and Hendricks (13) study arose from an attempt to develop a comprehensive transportation and land use policy for the Detroit metropolitan region. The authors sought "to provide planners -- and political decision makers -- with information needed to develop workable plans which are consistent with the needs and desires of the citizens and with their patterns of behavior."
Ravitz (22) reported on two surveys used in neighborhood planning. One of the studies concerned a neighborhood where a conservation and preservation project was underway. It sought to determine what aspects of the neighborhood the residents were most and least satisfied with, in order to establish priorities for the project.

These illustrations demonstrate the diversity of purposes for community assessment scales used in urban planning. Their focus is similar, however. They tend to emphasize the physical and ecological aspects of community. They concentrate on attitudes toward the type and availability of housing and the travel time between residences, workplaces, and shopping areas. These issues reflect the traditional orientation of urban planners on the more manipulable physical characteristics of community rather than the more elusive social aspects.

2. Content of the Scales

As previously mentioned, many of the scales used in studies we found cited are either not published at all or would be difficult to obtain. For example, Ravitz (22) discusses two studies, neither of which is available in an easily accessible form. Thus we have selected for illustration of the content of urban planning scales, three of the scales that were discussed in some detail in a book or journal article.

Lamanna (12) developed one of the most elaborate scales in his study of value consensus. He included thirteen items, divided between the general categories of Physical Values and Social Values. Physical Values included: Accessibility (distance to schools and shopping centers); Amenity (the number of parks, quietness of the neighborhood); and, Mobility (the quality of sidewalks, roads, etc.). Social Values included: Status (socio-economic level of the population and the image of the community vis-a-vis other communities); Autonomy (the ability to be oneself and
to be free from the scrutiny of others); Sociability (the friendliness of people and the proximity of friends); and, Heterogeneity (the diversity of the resident population).

Lamanna sought to discover the relative importance of the various aspects of community life in the overall assessment of the community. He found that "considerably more importance is placed upon the social values than upon the physical values." The Lamanna scale did not measure attitudes toward the physical appearance of the community, the quality of social services, or the degree of participation in community institutions.

Lansing and Marans (14) defined "neighborhood quality" in terms of the Physical, the Social, and the Symbolic. Physical aspects included housing style, landscaping and the proximity of services. Social aspects included the friendliness of neighbors and the ethno-religious-economic composition of the population. The Symbolic aspect dealt with community's sense of identity and its prestige relative to other communities. The authors did not publish their scale, but it appears that most of the items dealt with the physical aspects of the neighborhood.

The Lansing and Marans study included a comparison of ratings by community residents and professional planners. Significantly, they found only a moderate degree of agreement (bivariate correlation coefficient, \( r = .35 \)) and indicated that social factors were more important to residents than to planners.

Booth (3), in his study of metropolitanization, presented respondents with a list of eight "values" and asked them to list the three which would be most important to them in choosing a place to live. The items, ranked by the number of times mentioned by respondents, were:

Desirable and healthy neighborhood in which to raise children
Better property values for the money
Closeness to big stores, to work and to professional services
Good municipal services, e.g., sewers, sidewalks, police and firemen
Less politics, less red tape and less corruption in public offices
Lower taxes
Opportunity for civic participation
Fashionable and stylish neighborhood

B. Intergroup Relations Scales

1. Purpose/Orientation

Several studies focused on the relations, or perceived relations, between different groups within communities. Implicit in these studies is the effort to resolve differences and promote community integration.

A number of studies in this group are concerned with questions of class and status. Bauman (2), for example, investigated the relationship between status inconsistency and community satisfaction, operating on the premise that "persons with inconsistent statuses are more likely to experience dissatisfaction with the community than persons with consistent statuses." Hetzler (11) focused on the relationship between social mobility and the political outlook of residents, while Durana and Eckart (6) investigated the effect of social rank on community attitudes.

Another group of studies within this category investigate issues related to suburbanization. Morgan (19) studied the relationship between social rank and attitudes toward suburbanization, while Munson (19) investigated the question of why certain residents chose to live in the suburbs rather than the inner city. The Morgan and Munson studies resemble the urban planning studies in that they focus on the choice between alternative communities; however, the primary concern in the Morgan and Munson studies was the absence of
social integration on the metropolitan level. Munson made his problem/policy orientation explicit: he sought to "facilitate the proper focus of attention of city planners in their efforts to cope with the exodus-from-the-city movement." Morgan sought to promote community integration by aiding "those in policy-making positions who are searching for ways to close the gap between suburbia and the central city."

The inner city-suburb studies, which arise from a concern over the absence of community integration, raise an important methodological problem for all community assessment efforts: the problem of defining ecologically what one means by "community." We shall return to this question later.

2. Content of the Scales

The studies by Bauman, Munson and Morgan utilized relatively unsophisticated attitude scales. Bauman (2), for example, asked "considering everything, would you say you are satisfied or dissatisfied with this city as a place to live?" Respondents indicated their attitude on a five-point likert-type scale. Munson (20) utilized open-ended questions on such subjects as: the "most-liked" and the "most-disliked" features of the community; reasons for moving to the present location; the attributes of the "good neighborhood" and the "bad neighborhood," and so on. Morgan (19) began by asking "what do you like about living in (a suburb)?" and "are there any reasons in particular why you might not want to live in Oklahoma City?" He then followed these general questions with a series of questions about attitudes toward more specific issues.

Several studies attempted to measure the respondent's "satisfaction" with the community. Hetzler (11), for example, used four scales measuring satisfaction with the town, satisfaction with the general economic opportunities within the city, satisfaction with the city's industries, and satisfaction with the city's government. The author's published article, however, does not describe the specific content of the scale.
items; nor does he define precisely what is meant by the term "satisfaction."

C. Social Institutions and Social Milieu Scales

1. Purpose/Orientation

A large body of literature exists which measure attitudes toward particular community institutions such as schools, the police, etc. While these studies are not the concern of this review, a few do include attempts to measure the attitude of residents toward the community as a whole.

In one of the earliest attitude scales developed, Bosworth (4) sought to measure "progressive" and "unprogressive" political attitudes with reference to specific community policy issues. His scale includes a number of questions designed to measure the respondent's attitude toward the community as a whole. Fessler (7), meanwhile, sought to measure the degree of community solidarity and the extent to which that was expressed in institutionalized behavior (in this instance, farmer cooperatives). This study also measured the respondent's assessment of community institutions in general. The New York State Citizen's Council (21) in 1952 developed an extremely simple rating schedule designed to assess the perceived needs of the community. The ABT Associates (1) included four questions concerning the community as a whole in their attitude survey related to the Small Schools Project in Rural Areas.

These scales also tend to focus on the degree of participation in the community institutions and on factors such as community spirit and interpersonal relationships. Thus, like the intergroup relations category, they are concerned with the issue of community integration and cohesion, but without the assumption of specific types of group differences and without the specific goal of resolving these differences.
2. Content of Scales

Bosworth (4) divided sixty items among three subscales: Community Services; Community Integration; and Civic Responsibility. His scale emphasized participation and receipt of services. Using a likert-type scale, he asked interviewees to respond to statements such as "communities have too many youth programs," and "a progressive community must provide adequate parking facilities."

Fessler (7) divided forty items among eight major areas of community life: community spirit, interpersonal relations, family responsibility toward the community, schools, churches, economic behavior, local government, and tension areas. Using a likert-type scale, respondents were asked to assess the degree to which individual statements accurately described their community.

The New York State Citizen's Council (21) scale consisted of ten items, each focused on a different institutional area of community life: education, housing and planning, religion, equality of opportunity, economic development, cultural opportunities, recreation, health and welfare, government, and community organization. The scale was published as a recommended tool by the Citizen's Council and there is no published research that utilized this scale.

The scale developed by the ABT Associates (1) contained four questions, arranged in a logical progression. It asked respondents to indicate: 1) how important they considered different areas of community life; 2) the degree to which they participated in the operations of these different areas; 3) how satisfied they were with the services they received; and 4) whether or not they felt they had an equal opportunity to receive benefits and services. Each of the items asked the interviewee to respond on a likert-type scale to fifteen different aspects of community life: schools, jobs, public welfare, local government, health services, environmental protection, housing, economic...
institutions, social services, communications, media, transportation, criminal justice systems, recreation, churches, and family life.

THE RUSSELL SAGE STUDY

Before turning to methodological problems, we must discuss briefly a very thorough and comprehensive study of how people feel about the quality of their lives. The Russell Sage Foundation supported research by Angus Campbell, Philip Converse, and Willard Rodgers, all affiliated with the Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan. Their book, The Quality of American Life: Perceptions, Evaluations and Satisfactions (5), includes the complete 45 page questionnaire that was used to gather the data. They were concerned about people's "sense of well-being."

The questionnaire, as well as the organization of the book, reflects their division of this sense of well-being into several "domains": residential environment, the nation, work, marriage and family life, and personal resources and personal competence. Each domain includes several aspects of personal and community life. For example, residential environment included questions on housing, public institutions and services, and climate. Personal resources and personal competence included money, education, occupational status, physical fitness, social support and affection, intelligence, and command of goods and services.

It might be said that the residential environment questions constituted a community assessment scale. However, the authors make clear the interdependency of the various domains, which suggests that the concept of a community assessment scale needs to take these other domains into consideration in trying to determine how people feel about a community and what they want in a community. The lengthy questionnaire would be difficult to use in community development or planning activities, but it represents a major step forward in the development of a usable scale—and includes an extensive discussion of the theoretical foundation for the scale.
There are several methodological problems with the community assessments scales that we have described. One of the most crucial problems is that "community" is not clearly defined in most of the scales--nor are clear distinctions drawn between "neighborhoods" and "communities". Consequently respondents may answer questions with one concept in mind while the researcher had quite another. Also, this lack of definitional clarity makes comparisons among research studies virtually meaningless. Researchers who propose to undertake future assessment must be cognizant of this problem and give attention to the discriminatory power of their survey instruments.

Similar vagueness and multiple meanings are present in the use of the term "satisfaction." Some scales define it fairly specifically, for example, as effective participation in specific organizations or as receipt of particular services. Other studies define satisfaction in terms of personal perceptions and feelings, sometimes related to specific aspects of the community such as housing, parks, streets, etc., and other times related in more abstract notions such as safety and community spirit. Precision in the definition of "satisfaction" is important both to the clarity of the findings and to intra-study comparisons.

Durand and Eckart's article (6) raises two other methodological problems of note. One is the problem of self-selection. They argue that "most people probably select neighborhoods for residence which they expect will maximize their satisfaction with life in the community." Consequently it is difficult to get a full picture of the impact of a particular ecological context upon residents. Those who would definitely not like a particular location choose not to live there.

One problem of Durand and Eckart's discussion of self-selection is that it assumes that all people have the resources to make effective choices. We know that this is not the case and many people are forced to accept less satisfactory (or unsatisfactory) alternatives may not express their real desires.

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The other methodological problem raised by Durand and Eckart is the static quality of most of the research. Since the data is usually based on information gathered in a single point in time, the measures fail to take into account the affects of the dynamic impact of either long-term changes in the neighborhood structure and composition or temporary distortions of attitudes caused by dramatic episodes.

Finally, there is the problem common to all studies based on attitude tests, namely the uncertainty about the extent to which expressed attitudes are translated into overt behavior. The studies by Lansing, Marans, and Zehner (14, 15, 25) have the advantage of being aimed at people who had just undergone or were about to undergo a change in residence, so they were testing attitudes that had or would actually shape behavior in residential choices.

THEORETICAL PROBLEMS AND POTENTIAL

The theoretical problems with community assessment scales are much more serious than the methodological ones, in that they raise questions about the basic assumptions of the studies. Most of the scales do not explore basic value issues such as those presented by Warren (23). Nor are the items clearly derived from value options so that citizens can express preferences which indirectly reflect alternative value choices. In fact, there is little evidence that the researchers have conceived of the scales as tools for building theory related to concepts of a "good community." The concept of the "good community" could then be used to evaluate various policy options which will either reinforce or diminish the realization of those values, to organize citizens to press for changes that will move the community toward its ideal.

It is unlikely that community assessment scales will serve this function, however, as long as they continue to be used simply to test community response to (or to justify) specific program and policy proposals. Community developers and others with interest in the broader issues of
what constitutes a "good community" will need to take leadership in the design and use of these potentially useful barometers of citizen values and ideals. Proper use of community assessment scales could serve to establish the goals for community developers.
REFERENCES


Recent discussions of planned social change have organized interventive strategies into models which identify underlying philosophical assumptions, value orientations, and political perspectives. Two papers published in 1965 can be taken as the beginning of this model-building discussion: Richard Walton proposed a dichotomy between attitude change and power strategies, and Roland Warren outlined a continuum from collaborative through campaign to contest strategies. In the subsequent literature, three publications stand out as major formulations of models of planned social change. What is particularly striking is that each develops a trichotomous typology of change strategies. Jack Rothman (1968) formulates the Locality Development, Social Planning, and Social Action models; Robert Chin and Kenneth Benne (1969) formulate the Rational-Empirical, Normative/Re-Educative, and Power-Coercive models; and James Crowfoot and Mark Chesler (1974) formulate the Countercultural, Professional-Technical, and Political models.

The models developed in each of these major publications parallel one another. It is clear that each is describing roughly the same three perspectives on planned change. Crowfoot and Chesler use the term "meta-strategies" to emphasize the underlying assumptions that provide the basis for distinguishing among the models, but they do not ask whether there is a theoretical grounding for these three and only three meta-strategies. It is conceivable that these are just three of several models that might be identified.

Interpreted in terms of a theoretical framework put forth by Jürgen Habermas, the three meta-strategies can be seen to represent three basic dimensions of human society. For Habermas, there are three fundamental conditions or media through which social systems are maintained: interaction, work, and power or domination. All human societies use these means to resolve the problems of preserving...
life and culture. Corresponding to each of these media are the human "interests" in mutual understanding, technical control, and "emancipation from seemingly 'natural' constraint." Derived from these human interests are the systematic sciences of human action: the historical-hermeneutic sciences, the empirical-analytic sciences, and the critical sciences. The major typologies, therefore, do not merely present three of a long list of possible models of strategies for planned change. They represent fundamental dimensions of social life, and may well be exhaustive of possible alternatives if stated in a sufficiently general form (see Table I).

Chin and Benne achieve the most general formulation of the approaches to planned social change with their Normative-Reeducative, Rational-Empirical, and Power-Coercive models. These correspond to Habermas' media of human systems maintenance of interaction, work, and power, and to the human interests in mutual understanding, technical control, and emancipation. The need for what Habermas calls an historical-hermeneutic approach to human interaction is apparent in Chin and Benne's statement of the assumptions of the Normative-Reeducative model:

Intelligence is social, rather than narrowly individual. Men are guided in their actions by socially funded and communicated meanings, norms, and institutions, in brief by a normative culture. At the personal level, men are guided by internalized meanings, habits, and values. Changes in patterns of action or practices are, therefore, changes, not alone in the rational informational equipment of men, but at the personal level, in habits and values as well and, at the sociocultural level, changes are alternatives in normative structures and in institutionalized roles and relationships, as well as in cognitive and perceptual orientations.

Rothman labels his models within a narrower tradition of the social work profession's approaches to community organization practice, but his model of Locality Development clearly falls within a Normative-Reeducative approach, particularly in the sense of community development as field education. From this perspective it is apparent that Crowfoot and Chesler have drawn their Countercultural model too narrowly. It is only one approach from a variety of change strategies based within the sphere of culture,
TABLE I
HABERMAS' MEDIA OF HUMAN SOCIAL SYSTEMS AND MODELS OF PLANNED SOCIAL CHANGE

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<td>Interaction (mutual understanding)</td>
<td>Locality Development</td>
<td>Normative-Reeducative</td>
<td>Countercultural</td>
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<td>Work (technical control)</td>
<td>Social Planning</td>
<td>Rational-Empirical</td>
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<td>Power/Domination (emancipation)</td>
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and therefore it fails to attain the level of generality of Chin and Benne's Normative-Reeducative model.

Crowfoot and Chesler's Professional-Technical and Political models, on the other hand, correspond well in generality with Chin and Benne's Rational-Empirical and Power-Coercive models. Both sets of writers agree that the Empirical-Rational/Professional-Technical approach emphasizes scientific and technical knowledge acquired and utilized by experts within bureaucratic organizations. Rothman's model of Social Planning identifies an important professional tradition within this framework of instrumental rationality. Similarly, the Political/Power-Coercive models point to the importance of political and economic power in the perpetuation of inequality and privilege. Rothman's Social Action model includes a number of political change approaches ranging from Alinsky-type organizations to broader social movements.

The models of planned social change are strategies based on different understandings of the underlying roots of social problems. Converging with the models of planned change, therefore, are explanatory or causal models of poverty and underdevelopment. Charles Valentine contrasts two models used by social scientists to explain the persistence of poverty in advanced industrial societies. One is a subculture of poverty model, which he terms the "Self-perpetuating Subsociety with a Defective, Unhealthy Subculture;" the other is an internal colonialism model, which he terms the "Externally Oppressed Subsociety with an Imposed, Exploited Subculture." Valentine also offers an eclectic synthesis of his two types, the "Heterogeneous Subsociety with Variable, Adaptive Subcultures." In my previous work on the Appalachian case, I have suggested that the subculture of poverty model (as exemplified by Jack Weller's *Yesterday's People*) and the internal colonialism model (as developed by Helen Lewis and associates) need to be supplemented by a regional development model which rationalizes those scientific, technical, and professional approaches of such organizations as the Appalachian Regional Commission. Such a model might be termed, in Valentine's vocabulary, as a Heterogeneous Subsociety with Inadequate Resources and Adaptive Elites. The relationship of these causal models of poverty to Habermas' framework and models of planned social change (using Chin and Benne as the most general presentation) is outlined in Table II.
| **TABLE II** |
| MODELS OF PLANNED SOCIAL CHANGE RELATED TO EXPLANATORY MODELS OF POVERTY AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT |

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<tr>
<th>Models of Poverty and Underdevelopment</th>
<th>Habermas (1965)</th>
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<td><strong>Medium (and Type of Science)</strong></td>
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<td>Interaction (historical-hermeneutic)</td>
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<td>Chin &amp; Benne (1969) Models of Planned Social Change</td>
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<td><strong>Reeducative</strong></td>
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<td>Valentine (1968) Models of Poverty</td>
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In a study of poverty in the non-metropolitan South, George Thomas identifies two additional causal explanations of poverty, the genetic and the scarce resource models. In practical terms, both are non-social, representing the extremes of a continuum from the sub-individual to the ecological. The genetic explanation asserts that poverty is biologically rooted in inferior genetic traits. The scarcity thesis holds that resources are inadequate to provide affluence or abundance for all, at least in this historical period, and that poverty for some is an unavoidable outcome. Both of these explanations place the sources of poverty beyond human intervention in the short run. Certainly neither is supported by enough evidence to be taken seriously for the advanced industrial countries, and the scarce resource thesis needs to be carefully qualified even on a world scale.\footnote{1}

It is tempting to characterize the subculture of poverty, regional development, and internal colonialism models as, respectively, conservative, liberal, and radical models of barriers to social change. While this would contain a substantial amount of truth, the description would be misleading in one respect. The underlying meta-strategies are not, strictly speaking, mutually exclusive alternatives. All societies have to be concerned with each of the three modes of interaction, technique, and domination. Habermas' framework provides a basis for viewing cultural and communicative adaptation, technical planning, and redistribution of power as potentially complementary aspects of social development.

To assert the possibility of complementarity is not to deny that the models have ideological uses. The subculture of poverty model is well known for its conservative bias, but it is only one example within a broader range of explanations rooted in the tradition of cultural idealism. Affirmative cultural approaches are the obverse side of the coin from the pejorative tradition. Although they come to opposite conclusions about the virtues of the traditional subculture, they are contending on the same turf.\footnote{2} The regional development model, and its professional-technical strategy for change, can be seen from Habermas' perspective as resting within the contemporary technocratic image and ideology of science. As John Friedmann points out, the regionalism movement of the 1930s, as personified by Howard Odum and others, was rooted in cultural idealism. The new regionalism of the 1960s, as represented by the Appalachian Regional Commission, discarded this grounding in favor
of the technical reason of neoclassical economic theory. In a period of extensive public disillusionment with the role of private business in our society, the prestige of the professional planner with technical expertise has been substantially enhanced. As Habermas notes, "technology and science themselves in the form of a common positivistic way of thinking, articulated as technocratic consciousness, began to take the role of a substitute ideology for the demolished bourgeois ideologies." In the words of Trent Schroyer, "Contemporary science and technology have become a new form of legitimating power and privilege . . . . the scientific image of science has become the dominant legitimating system of advanced industrial society." Without a broader critique of power and domination, the regional development and rational-empirical models serve as a rationalization of existing structures of privilege.

This synthetic framework helps explain why writers widely considered to be champions of a certain development model or change strategy also draw on other models. To take an example from the Appalachian case, Harry Caudill is best known for his description of the Cumberland Plateau as an example of colonialism, but in Night Comes to the Cumberlands he also paints a pejorative picture of the subculture of the eastern Kentucky poor. In one essay Caudill appears to embrace many aspects of the regional development model, while in a recent work he has reemphasized a genetic explanation. From the other side, Weller is best known for his subculture of poverty characterization in Yesterday's People, yet he recently described Appalachia as "America's mineral colony." Such examples can be viewed as cases of inconsistency, confusion, or conversion. They can also be seen, at least in part, as attempts to grapple with the complexity of analyzing the problems of Appalachian development.

To suggest that a dialectic of mutual interaction takes place among the modes of culture, technique, and power is to argue for a more sophisticated model of the origins and perpetuation of inequality in advanced industrial societies, and a correspondingly elaborate strategy for planned social change. In a recent work Habermas suggests a model for the analysis of advanced capitalist societies which focuses on the structure of the economy, the role of the state, the system of legitimation, and class structures. I have mentioned some of the issues raised by the model for the Appalachian
case in my earlier discussion. The conspicuous empty space in Table II suggests we are missing a strategy of planned social change which would follow from an elaborated analysis of advanced industrial capitalism. Such a successful democratic socialist strategy is yet to be developed by the Left in North America and Western Europe. Efforts to attack the persistent problems of poverty, inequality, and privilege in advanced capitalism will remain partial and fragmentary until a strategy is devised adequate to the challenge of simultaneous activity in the realms of culture, technique, and domination.

FOOTNOTES


7 For example, I do not think that Stockdale's model of "Advocacy Planning" adds a new dimension as fundamental as Rothman's models; see Jerry D. Stockdale, "Community Organization Practice: An Elaboration of Rothman's Typology," Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare, 3 (May 1976), 541-551. In Habermas' terms, Stockdale's Advocacy Planning shares an "emancipatory interest" and a critique of power and domination. The ambiguity of the advocate planner's role is developed in Frances Fox Piven, "Whom Does the Advocate Planner Serve?" Social Policy, 1 (May/June 1970), pp. 32-35. The alternative roles of the planner may be best understood in terms of the "contradictory location within class relations" of the planner who is often an employee at one level or another of the state bureaucracy. The advocate planner attempts to serve the interests of subordinate classes rather than the dominant class; see the explication of this idea in Erik Olin Wright, "Class Boundaries in Advanced Capitalist Societies," New Left Review, No. 98 (July-August 1976), 3-41, also available as Reprint 219 of the Institute for Research on Poverty of the University of Wisconsin--Madison.

8 Chin and Benne, p. 43.


11 George Thomas, Poverty in the Nonmetropolitan South: A Causal Analysis (Lexington, MA: Heath, 1972). In addition to the genetic and scarce resource models, Thomas outlines the culture of poverty, opportunity, and maldistribution explanations. The latter two can be reconstructed to mesh with our regional development and internal colonialism models. On the scarcity thesis, see Nathan Keyfitz, "World Resources and the World Middle Class," Scientific American, 235 (July 1976), pp. 28-35.


16 For a glimpse of Caudill in a relatively optimistic mood, expounding regional developmentalism, see "Jaded Old Land of Bright New Promise," Mountain Life & Work, 46 (March 1970), pp. 5-8; rpt. in Appalachia in the Sixties, ed. David S. Walls and John B. Stephenson (Lexington: Univ. Press of Kentucky, 1972), pp. 240-246. His genetic and subculture of poverty arguments are apparent in Night Comes to the Cumberlands (Boston: Little, Brown, 1962), pp. 1-31 and 273-301, but are strongly emphasized in A Darkness at Dawn: Appalachian Kentucky and the Future (Lexington: Univ. Press of Kentucky, 1976), which begins with the sentence, "Every person and society is a product of two factors, genes and culture."


MAINTAINING GOALS IN A MUTUAL-BENEFIT ASSOCIATION*

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ABSTRACT

Mutual benefit associations have been frequently found to confront two major problems: membership apathy and oligarchical control. The organization presented in this paper solved those two problems in unique ways. First professionals employed by the organization were kept in subordinate roles when key policy decisions were made by the lay board. Secondly, the organizational structure did not match the reward structure, i.e., salaries of supervisors were often lower than those of the professional staff. Finally, the organization operated on the principle that each of its programs should be taken over by other organizations and were successful frequently enough with this policy that no program became imbedded within the organization so no one group could gain hegemony.

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The organization studied here is a local chapter of a national voluntary association for the benefit of retarded children. Beginning in the early 1950s parents of retarded children were drawn together for the purposes of providing, through mutual assistance services for their children not available through other community agencies.\textsuperscript{1} Initially, these parents were concerned with establishing schools. As the association grew, additional activities by various chapters encompassed a wide range of services for retarded children. Today the association has local, state, and national offices that coordinate activities. It is a federated structure, organized at the local level with a high degree of autonomy for the local chapters. This study is concerned with the operations of one chapter. The conclusions drawn about this chapter are not necessarily applicable to other units of the association. A broader comparative analysis would offer some interesting tests of the findings reported here.

Although there is no uniformity in the use of terms such as complex organization, formal organization, and bureaucracy, sufficient consensus exists to permit examination of the phenomenon without elaborate explanations. There has been attempts to differentiate among types of organizations, but there is no commonly accepted typology. The selection of any one over another depends upon the problem to be considered. The typology developed by Blau and Scott offers the best orientation to the organization under study here.\textsuperscript{2} They divide formal organizations into four types of focusing upon the prime beneficiary.

1. 'mutual benefit associations,' where the prime beneficiary is the membership;
2. 'business concerns,' where the owners are the prime beneficiary;
3. 'service organizations,' where the client group is the prime beneficiary; and
4. 'commonweal organizations,' where the prime beneficiary is the public-at-large.\textsuperscript{3}

The organization examined in this paper fits their description of a mutual-benefit association. In the first place, individuals who share a common problem, retarded offspring, founded the association with the avowed purpose of obtaining help for their specific needs, even though they cast their problem in a broader societal framework. Secondly, ultimate authority rests with the members, each of whom had equal rights within the organization, including
eligibility for elected and appointed office.

Mutual-benefit associations are confronted "with two main problems: membership apathy and oligarchical control." Apathy is a problem insofar as the members, as the major beneficiaries, need to contribute their energies so that the organization can perform its tasks. Withdrawal of members from active participation jeopardizes the effectiveness of the organization. At the same time an effective organization must have some internal division of labor. This involves the delegation of authority and establishment of differential positions within the organization.

It is the purpose here to demonstrate how one organization handles these problems. The major emphasis will be on the internal delegation of authority and the problem of oligarchical control as posed by the creation of a hired staff. The question of apathy will be treated only as it pertains to that control.

The association chapter we studied began with a small group of parents who wanted to establish a school for their retarded children. From this rather modest beginning, the chapter has grown into an organization that has about 1500 members and employs approximately thirty full-time workers with an annual budget of over $300,000. It runs a state-accredited school, a sheltered workshop, and various recreation programs for both children and adults.

Three organizational divisions are distinguishable. Standing in the middle is a membership composed primarily of parents of retarded children. From this membership the various offices of the chapter are filled, e.g., the board of directors, operating committees, representatives to state and national conventions. Another division is the Association-Aides, volunteers who are organized into groups throughout the city and are responsible to the board of directors. For the most part the aides do not have retarded children and serve primarily as fund raisers and dispensers of information. Association-Aide chapters, while linked together in a loose federation, mostly operate independently of the association. While dedicated to the goals of the organization, the Association-Aides emphasize social events. The last division, and the one that will concern us in detail, is the paid staff, including administrators, psychologists, social workers, and teachers, these employees, all appointed by the board, man the administrative offices on a day-to-day basis and operate the school and sheltered workshop.

II

The growth of bureaucratic structures within an organization can increase its rationality and efficiency, it can also lead to tensions and strains generated by the requirements of bureaucracy which run counter to the goals of the organization. "Running an
organization, as a specialized and essential activity, generates problems which have no necessary (and often opposed) relationship to the professed or 'original' goals of the organization." The internal problems and their solutions cause the organization to alter its activities. "Then, since these activities come to consume an increasing proportion of the time and thoughts of the participants, they are - from the point of view of actual behavior - substituted for the professed goals."

These observations on organizational behavior raise the question of how the organization studied has been affected by the development within its structure of a service and administrative division staffed by professionals and organized bureaucratically. There is an organizational chart with neat lines connecting the various branches of the services: authority and decision-making flow along these lines. The operations are routinized, rules exist, and attention is paid to these rules. Technically competent persons fill the organizational slots and perform their duties with some autonomy. Teachers, social workers, psychologists, administrators, and secretaries are chosen on the basis of skill. The services are operated in accordance with policies that preclude preferential treatment to any portion of the client population.

The association shows certain distinctive features in its structure that limited the influence of the service division and in turn helped maintain the goals of the organization as originally conceived. We shall begin with two major characteristics of the organization as a whole and then report several characteristics of the service and administrative division that will help explain how this particular mutual-benefit association has been able to pursue its initial goals. In the last section we will draw some conclusions about this organization that might have application to other organizations and point to some problems for future research.

III

One key to this association appears to be a balance between the use of professionals and continued parental involvement. The members are aware of the need for systematic organization procedures, the benefits of bureaucratic efficiency, and the strategy of using skilled personnel in agency's services, yet they are unwilling to delegate authority on certain issues to the paid staff. One illustration: to get state financial support for their school, it is necessary to be accredited, which requires the employment of certified teachers. These teachers, however, do not have control over school admissions and other relevant decisions in the operation of the school.
The relationship between parents and professionals was particularly strained early in the organization's life. As it was reported to us, many professionals told parents of retarded children to forget them, to institutionalize them, to get them out of the family so their presence would not adversely affect the rest of the household. The parents who became active in the association believed something more could be done for their children. The lack of sympathy these parents found among doctors, psychologist and social workers prompted some of them to reject whatever assistance was available, since the assistance was regarded by the parents as too negative.

The association got underway without professional assistance and prides itself on its independence from professionals. It organized a school, developed fund-raising activities, began education programs in the community—all without employing a professional staff. Not that this policy did not incur some animosity with other agencies, but this has served only to reinforce their attitudes toward professionals. The parents discovered through experience that they could create an effective organization despite their lack of professional training. Their experience re-enforced their original attitudes to the point where the parents are now unwilling to move aside to let the professionals run the organization. They realized that even without professional assistance programs can be developed to foster their goals.

The services the agency provides are now professionally staffed and the membership is justly proud of these services. Although the initial hostility to professionals has continued to some extent throughout the history of the association the parents have evolved a cooperative relationship with their professional staff. As long as the professionals are willing to accept membership hegemony in most areas, they are welcome in the organization.

The function of the service division has been a major concern for the association since its inception. When the original school was organized, the first and most obvious question was which children were to receive the services. Some fair admissions mechanism had to be worked out, since members had more eligible children than could be accommodated in the proposed school. Very early in the minutes of the board "the question was raised by one of our members if we couldn't get a school together for our children. He felt that the need is immediate, and it is hard to see ten years of probably waiting, for by that time his child—and our children—will be past the age of school." On the other hand, the first president stated: "I have tried to stress at all meetings that we can never afford to take a selfish view of our problems. Our appeal to the public has been on the basis of the retarded child as a 'forgotten child'...
We must all be united and single-minded in our goal to advance the welfare of all retarded children." The issue, in short, was whether the services were for children of chapter members or for any child who was retarded.

Although the issue is still very much alive, the chapter has maintained its services on a space-available basis rather than restricting them to children of members. This policy decision was based on several considerations. In the first place the chapter realized that its potential resources could never cope with the needs of all the retarded children in the city—over 20,000 children altogether. The only viable alternative was to find a place for these children in existing community services, to modify these services if necessary so that any retarded child could be cared for.

The members realized, too, that operating only for their children had other consequences. If the chapter limited access to its services, it would not be able to carry effective education and fund-raising campaigns to the larger community. To secure general public support required a less exclusive admission policy. Finally, the chapter members are concerned with retardation as it affects all children, and they are willing to be the spearhead in efforts to gain support and understanding in the wider community.

This chapter, as well as the state and national association, has incorporated this attitude into its major goal of "procuring, not providing, services." Under this banner the association has developed its policy of opening up other community agencies to handicapped children. It operates on the basic assumption that, while handicapped children have special problems, they should not be excluded from receiving benefits and services of community institutions. The association argues that these children can be helped and help should come from the community as a whole. Exclusion in the past from community institutions has been the result of misunderstanding, stupidity, and prejudice. That situation is intolerable and must be rectified.

The policy of making services available to anyone who applied regardless of membership status was not readily accepted by all members. The minutes contain continuous reference to the struggle. Five years after the school was founded we note the following in the minutes: "Mr. Abbott brought up the fact about parents who are not paying full tuition, not being active in our organization, whether these children should be given preference for admission. It was decided not to show any favoritism." Still five years later we find the same debate. "It is the opinion of the Executive Committee that the Association policy should make membership mandatory for parents or guardians of all" who receive association-sponsored ser-
vices. Before being passed, the motion was amended so that any individual unable to afford the membership fee would be granted a "special membership." In practice, however, eligibility for services is not dependent on any kind of membership.

Not only has the association refused to be exclusive in its admission policies, it has also guarded against pressures from supporting agencies. For example, a private charity that had supported the agency for several years requested preferential treatment for two children it wished to sponsor. "After much discussion, it was moved by Mr. Abbott that we adhere strictly to our Intake Policy without any thought of change or favoritism." The private charity immediately suspended its support.

Some members have also withdrawn when they found out that they were not necessarily going to get association services just because they were members. Yet the organization has not been faced with dissolution on this account. The receipt of services as a motivation for membership may have been an initial impetus for some, and the loss of non-preferential treatment may have been a reason for withdrawing. But the organization has continued nevertheless to grow without showing favoritism. In addition, those who organized the association or provide services for their children have, in large part, remained active in the agency even after their children were no longer eligible for the services. The organization therefore receives support from parents who realize that they may not directly benefit from the services the agency provides. While Katz reported a decline in parental interest with "increasing bureaucratization and professionalization," the decline of interest of parents in the retarded children's association he studied was much less than the other self-help agencies.11

IV

We have referred in the foregoing discussion to the association's primary goal of procuring services for retarded children. We have shown, nonetheless, that the association actually provides a wide range of services and a great deal of effort is expended to raise funds for this major budget item. The services, moreover, are operated through a bureaucracy.

But the association regards provision of services as a temporary measure until they are offered elsewhere. Their services are seen more as demonstration project or pilot programs rather than as permanent activities. As an educational technique, the demonstration project serves to call attention to the possibility that retarded children can be helped. On the one hand, the association thus helps parents of retarded children to realize that their children can learn. The association has found many parents poorly
informed about retardation itself. On the other hand, the demonstration projects have successfully proved to the rest of the lay and professional community that retarded children are capable of being trained. The association has shown that even with limited resources something can be accomplished.

As an organizational strategy, the demonstration projects provide a fulcrum for the association to pry open other agencies in the community to accept these children. The demonstration projects are developed with the goal of getting some other agency to adopt them. The association has decided what these children need and seek to have these needs met. It has concluded that others have failed to assume responsibility in this area, among other reasons, because of disbelief that anything can be done for retarded children. The strategy, as the executive director describes it, proceeds as follows: "While we are looking for a place to get it (a service) filled, we show first it can be done by our pilot program. So we have a selling point—we can go and we can say to these people: 'Look, we've been doing this—we know it can be done.'"

The strategy stands on two legs. One is the success of the agency in providing services that really work. If the agency were unable to start a service that it believes should be a community responsibility, it could not easily persuade others to take over. "By starting a school, by starting classes, by starting workshops, by showing that if you took the time, by believing that everyone has some potential and that if properly trained, if given the opportunity to develop that potential, they would." In this way the agency seeks to prove its claim for services. This is the first leg of the strategy.

The second is even more critical for the argument we are presenting. The association, to maintain its major objective, must be ready to relinquish a given service when another community agency agrees to take responsibility. Unless the association does relinquish services, we would have to conclude that the bureaucratic segment of the association has become entrenched.

The association has, indeed, dropped services and modified others, as other agencies have assumed the task. When the association was organized, for example, no public school facilities were available for retarded children. The original association school provided a program for the least retarded children who were eight years of age or older. The success of this program was the basis for the association's case to the city's board of education that the school system could offer classes for these children. The school system did begin to open classes for the older retarded
children, and the association immediately cut out its services to them. It proceeded to launch a new program for younger and more severely limited children and again to obtain from the school system more classes. Its current program centers on even younger children and shows signs of being as effective as the others.

The association's recreation program followed a similar pattern. Begun as a demonstration project, the recreation program received recognition from other agencies who were willing to cooperate with the association. The association gladly shared responsibility and credit with the cooperating agencies for several years, constantly shifting more and more of the program onto the shoulders of the other agencies, until it was able to withdraw altogether. In the process of the association's recreation director, a paid staff member with eight years of service, was let go when his assistance was no longer required.

The strategy of relinquishing implies a terminal point in the organization's demonstration and services activity. Procurement of an ever-increasing number of services outside the agency means that eventually all services will be available elsewhere, and one important function of the agency will disappear. When and if no more demonstration projects are needed, when these handicapped children are adequately serviced in the community, some of the active members feel the agency can be dissolved. In the words of one: "When you've accomplished your purpose, you fold your tent and leave. You leave, that's all. You've done it—you've done your job. You've succeeded. Then retire."

Whether or not this will occur remains to be seen. In discussing the possibility of dissolution the executive director said, "Why should we think that we're so much better than other agencies. Look at polio, the polio foundation should be out of business. There is no more polio. So what do they do? They begin to look around for another cause. But there are people there that have vested interests." The situation in this agency is somewhat different. The local chapters are far more important to the retarded children's organization than are the local chapters in the National Foundation.12

The association may well continue beyond its service-providing period. What will replace the service activity? Probably an increase in its watchdog function. The parents of the retarded will no longer be as concerned with getting the services as they will be in protecting and improving what they have obtained. Most of the present formal bureaucratic staff, however, will no longer be needed and its probable demise is of major importance for this analysis. We will return to this point. Let us now consider other aspects of
the association that inhibit the paid bureaucracy from dominating the agency.

Career lines are promotional paths with known mobility expectations, characteristic of bureaucratic structure. It has been noted that a bureaucratic hierarchy is a "congealed model of the career pattern. It provides a set of steps through which the individual may advance, a promotional horizon for motivation of those lower downs." An employee is able to assess his/her position; he/she knows who is above him/her and who is below him/her in the organization. He/she expects that growth in experience, continuous and faithful service, will be rewarded by movement upward within the organization.

The association in question, however, does not encourage the development of careers. In the first place it does not offer elaborate fringe benefits. Its pay scale is low in comparison to other agencies, and the security of tenure is not available. The employment posture of the association was announced by the executive director: "If they want security, let them get a civil service job."

Such a policy does not lead to long-term employment. Examination of the payroll records of the agency for the last ten years indicated the length of service of the professional staff. Roughly speaking, the mean was just over three years and the median just over two years. The high turnover means little career development among professional staff occurs within the agency.

Careers within the agency are otherwise limited by distribution of authority and rewards within bureaucracy. Authority follows the hierarchical structure; the reward system does not. The executive director, for example, holds the highest administrative position in the association, but receives a lower salary than the director of the workshop and school. Other inconsistencies between rank and salary were also found in the pay records. Whether or not this practice is a consciously executed policy, it eliminates a certain amount of striving for promotion. The association, in general, ignores the detrimental efforts that its reward system can have on employee morale. Geared as it is to programs that are highly flexible and dispensible, it treats all such problems as temporary. This policy no doubt contributes to the high staff turnover, but it does not apparently limit the organization's effectiveness in accomplishing its goals.

Characteristically, the association has failed to build into its bureaucracy any definite lines of succession. For example, the executive director has an assistant immediately adjacent to his/her position. The Personnel Committee of the Board of Directors re-
viewed this position and carefully considered the title. The title of Assistant Director was rejected in favor of Administrative Assistant because "implicit in the title Assistant Director is that when the executive director moves out...logically he should move in." And this, it was decided, did not apply. The elimination of clear lines of succession within the organization, and disparities between rank and compensation reduce the tendency toward career development and bureaucratic entrenchment in the association.

The association also utilizes professionals in its organizational slots, another element that may help retard the development of an entrenched bureaucracy. As has been argued a "major factor affecting degree of bureaucracy in the agency is the proportion of personnel that is strongly committed to a profession." The presence of professionals in a bureaucracy can increase or decrease bureaucratization, but "that in the balance the reduction effect may be stronger." The reasoning on this point is that a professional has a code of ethics developed outside the bureaucratic structure and adherence to this code can have unbureaucratic results. The professional role and the bureaucratic role may be in conflict.

Blau and Scott conclude with a slightly different emphasis that professionals will be less loyal to a bureaucracy than other staff personnel when the opportunities for professional advancement are more readily found outside the bureaucracy than within it. It has also been suggested that professional career lines may cut across agencies. Many a professional moves through a series of employers as he/she advances in his/her career.

The absence of orderly careers, a factor whose presence is often cited as increasing rigidity and efficiency, contributes to the association's ability to maintain its primary goals. As long as staff positions are not filled by the same person for any duration of time, it is impossible to build vested interests in the position.

VI

We have shown how bureaucratic structures function in meeting internal organizational demands. These functions can have consequences that impinge upon stated organizational goals. The literature suggests that organizations, while created for "specific ends" or "to attain specific goals," may encounter difficulties because of conditions that obtain in actual operations. In particular, when a broad membership delegates authority to a corps of specialists, these specialists may act in ways detrimental to the fundamental purpose of the organization as conceived by its members.

There is one feature of the association for retarded children that distinguishes it from other organizations of the same type, namely, the continued dedication of members to the organization.
Barber, reporting on apathy in voluntary associations, argues that participation in such organizations has a lower priority than family and job obligations in our society. The stigma of having a retarded child continues, however, even after some services become available. This helps weld the parents (or members) together; moreover, it keeps them active in the association. We would hypothesize a decrease in intensive participation by these parents if they believed their children, and they themselves, were more accepted in the society at large.

An organization founded by volunteers in which the volunteers continue to play an active role is less likely to lose its major focus than an organization where the authority for operations is delegated to a paid staff. As long as the paid staff is kept subordinate to the volunteers, they cannot take over critical decision-making that reduces the members' control.

The decision of the members not to limit access to the services to only their children diminished the possibility the membership would develop a vested interest in providing services rather than procuring them for all retarded children from the community at large. The association by this action protected itself from internal cooptation. The point is, of course, that it did, in fact give up certain services when other community agencies began to provide services the association has been providing.

The relinquishing mechanism provided the way in which the organization divested itself of services. The relationship between the services and the association is a relationship Gouldner identifies as asymmetrical. He argues that most organizational analysis employs the concept of interdependence among parts. Granting interdependence, he does not assume symmetry will also be present. Rather "there are varying degrees of interdependence which may be postulated to exist among parts of the system." Parts of a system may be removed from the system without jeopardizing the system. "Functional autonomy directs attention to the possibility that any part may have little, as well as great, need for another, and that the mutual need of parts need not be symmetrical." It is precisely this situation that exists in the organization we studied. The services are much more dependent upon the association than the association upon the services. Any given service has a strategic value to the organization, but it can be replaced by another or none at all. Initially, the services had far more importance to the members than they came to have as the association became successful in getting services provided elsewhere.

Members of the service staff were expendable. This policy could be detrimental to further recruitment of a professional staff except the association does not project operating services into an
undetermined future. The personnel policies in fact reinforce its public stance of procuring rather than providing services. If the association were more concerned with building a permanent staff and services, it could be accused of abandoning its primary goal. Besides, once it has been successful in obtaining particular services elsewhere, it need not worry about staffing these services again.

The relinquishing of services also precluded career advancement and the development of some vested interests. The association does not hide its policy, so employees are well appraised that "success" means termination of employment. The employment of professionals further facilitates the ability to relinquish services. The professional as an employee is attuned to job mobility. He/she has a transferable skill that has a fairly broad market. Movement from agency is not detrimental to his/her career interests and may even facilitate them. A professional is less enamoured with bureaucracy, so the lack of a bureaucratic work setting is not necessarily deleterious to his/her performance. Finally, once the agency successfully relinquished one service, the probability of future relinquishing increased. The process became institutionalized.

The mutual-benefit association, as it becomes established and seeks to implement programs and policies, needs a more formal structure. But it need not necessarily follow that the paid functionaries come to dominate the organization through processes commonly found in such organizations. The case study presented here showed how hegemony over the paid staff can be maintained. We discovered that there were two bureaucratic structures operating; one composed of the parents and one composed of paid personnel. The bureaucratic structure staffed by parents of retarded children had not delegated sufficient authority to the other to cause it to lose substantial power within the organization.

We found that the parents were able to use the administrative and service division for specific purposes. The relationship between the parents and the administrative and service division was asymmetrical making the former less dependent upon the latter than vice versa. The association has also limited the development of careers. For example, the reward system and authority system were not parallel, making promotions less desirable. Employing potentially mobile professionals also contributed to lowering vested interests in the job. Finally, the willingness to slough off a given service and its staff keep important decision-making in the hands of the members.
Footnotes


3. Ibid., P. 43.

4. Ibid., p. 45.


7. Katz notes in his study of four parent-organized self-help agencies that the impetus for organizing was the perception on the part of the parents of "inadequate medical knowledge, insufficient interest and attention by professionals, lack of treatment facilities and research programs." A similar situation existed prior to the foundation of the agency studied. Katz, op. cit., p. 111.

8. Parents taught the first school classes.

9. Katz reports that self-help agencies often encountered difficulties because of a "lack of knowledge or indifference of their staff members to the more highly 'professionalized' outlook characteristics of the trained staff of other community agencies." Katz, op. cit., p. 99.

10. Italics added.

12. There is a clear cut separation of activities in the National Foundation. Local chapters are prohibited from sponsoring research for example. This division of labor does not exist in the retarded children's association. See David L. Sills, The Volunteers: Means and Ends in a National Organization (Glencoe, Illinois, The Free Press, 1957), pp. 72-75.


17. Barber, op. cit., p. 486.


19. Ibid.
LIVING AND ACTING IN AN ALTERED BODY: A PHENOMENOLOGICAL DESCRIPTION OF AMPUTATION

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Abstract

Adults with recent amputations are often perceived as suffering from post-operative depression and phantom limbs. These states are frequently seen as failures in "adjustment" since there are often few physiological involvements which curtail daily functioning. This perspective is seen as compatible with major American values of pragmatism, individualism, and a mechanistic medical model. We suggest here that problems in daily living and the phantom limb are not "mental" aberrations but rather reflections of a radically altered lived experience. The performance of the actor is significantly changed and can be discussed as a function of changed experience and style. This perspective draws upon the work of phenomenology and dramaturgy and suggests a changed philosophical approach in physical rehabilitation. A brief application of the model is also presented.

Most of the literature written on the behavior of amputees is psychological in orientation. For example, early reactions to the amputation by a group of amputees were categorized by Simon and Albronda (1967) as including disbelief, stunned feelings, fear and panic, anger, grief, relief, guilt, and revulsion. Another study, determining amputees' readiness to accept the stresses of prosthetic restoration, categorized personality types such as the undisciplined, the emotional neurotics, the blamers, the fearful, and the isolated and depressed hypochondriacs (Weiss, 1960). Levin (1961) found that denial and phantom limb are associated manifestations of amputation rather than cause and effect.

This explanation of behavior occurring after an amputation supports three major American values and models for behavior: pragmatism, individualism and the medical model. These social constructions are examined here and alternate models (phenomenology and dramaturgy) for explaining the behavior of amputees are suggested.

Amputation: The Existing Literature and View

Amputations occur with the severing of one or more body parts. In this study, amputations of the limbs are the focus of interest because they comprise the major part of the literature, and they exhibit patterns
and problems similar to those occurring with amputations of other body parts, such as the breast and nose.

Amputations are primarily found in the adult as a result of vascular disease, trauma, or malignancy. The distribution of amputations is often further stratified by age. Vascular disease is responsible for a large number of amputations in the geriatric population. (Aitken, 1961.) A disproportionate number of young people are involved in accidents causing amputations, and malignant tumors affect all ages.

One of the major post-operative problems associated with amputations is the phantom limb and its accompanying pain. The persistence of "feeling" in the amputated limb has been a frequently encountered difficulty, affecting recovery and prosthesis fitting. One study of over 7,000 amputees treated during a twelve year period found that all amputees at one time or another suffer some phantom pain, although not all have persistent stump pain (Canty and Bleck, 1958). Many theories of its origin, cause and elimination have been put forth: local stump irritation (Canty and Bleck, 1958), a psycho-physiological entity (Frederiks, 1963), and psychopathology (Frazier, 1966). Problems associated with adjusting to the amputation have also been discussed as a function of changes in body image (Saxvik, 1965; Fischer and Cleveland, 1968).

Improvements in surgery and the development of more "life-like" and flexible prostheses have characterized the treatment of amputations. The potential for improved techniques in replacing human parts and functions is even greater. Murphy (1965) cites some of the challenges: increasing knowledge in biology, medicine, surgery, and engineering; "tissue-friendly" materials; infection resistant passage of inert material through the skin; reliability; minimum bulk; and developing the appropriate size and appearance.

Reading this medical literature, one finds the concept of a "mechanistic" medical model radically enacted. (See a discussion of the model in Freidson, 1975; Szasz, 1974; Scheff, 1966; Dreitzel, 1971). Body parts are discussed without reference to "being". Potential bodily responses such as pain or infection are "problems of management."

When the human is reintroduced he is discussed in terms of his "acceptance" or lack of acceptance of the amputation. As mentioned above, this state is determined by the individual's "psychological" response. He is measured and evaluated in terms of his ego strength, adaptability, and qualities of honor, courage and dignity. Succinctly, he must be a "strong individual."
This individualized interpretation is supported by the ubiquitous advice to learn to "cope" with one's handicap (Fink, 1967; Kerr-Cohn, 1961; Jones, 1972). This emphasis on individualism permeates our society (Parsons, 1951; Williams, 1960) and our myths (Cawalti, 1974).

Rehabilitation is oriented towards emphasizing the remaining skills and functioning (Rabinowitz and Mitsos, 1964; Safilious-Rothschild, 1970). It is this emphasis on functioning which so aptly combines many threads of American culture: pragmatism, individualism and the medical model.1

Pragmatism is one of the few unique American philosophies (Konvitz and Kennedy, 1960). It combines an optimistic view of man and science: science can be usefully applied to improve the situation of mankind. It is a philosophy that underlies physical rehabilitation.

Functioning in daily life is the major goal of rehabilitation. This is operationally defined as the ability to work and maintain self-care. These goals are operative for all of the occupations associated with rehabilitation; the physicians and specialists, the nurse and the therapists: occupational, physical, speech, vocational and recreational. When the patient is technically able to function and does not do so, or does so poorly, then the "client" is referred to a psychologically oriented "counselor" (e.g. psychologist, social worker or psychiatrist). This pattern of action is particularly important for the amputee. Many, if not most, amputees are capable of functioning in a manner similar to that prior to the amputation.

An investigation into the effect of amputation upon employment in the record of 4,000 users that were scrutinized showed that, of those amputated above the knee, 65 percent returned to the same or similar work, 13.5 percent became financially better off, 16.5 percent obtained less remuneration, and 5 percent were unemployed or under training at time of check (Kelham, 1958:335).

A similar but slightly lower rate of employment is found with amputations of the upper limbs (Kelham, 1958). Usually physiological, sexual functions, mental awareness, speech and other "biological" capacities are "unaffected." Changes in behaviors associated with these life skills are considered, therefore, to be changes in one's "mental" attitude.
Phenomenology and Dramaturgy

The above model is obviously built upon a Cartesian dualism between mind and body (see Yankelovich and Barrett for an extensive discussion of the paradigm and its use in ego psychology, 1970). It is this arbitrary division which is attacked and resolved by phenomenology. The emphasis is on lived experience, and, most importantly for us, on the lived body (see Wild, 1964; Strauss, 1964, 1966; Zaner, 1964, 1965; Merleau-Ponty, 1963; De Waelhens, 1967). The experience of the world is enacted through and in one's body. The changes wrought by an amputation, therefore, are immediately interpreted as a function of a new lived experience. With phenomenology, daily, physiological functioning is not the major criterion for analyzing the effect of the amputation. The multiple changes initiated in one's experience can be further articulated using a dramaturgical approach to "map out: alterations in one's life-world (Schutz, 1962; Deegan and Stein, 1977).

Before proceeding further in this discussion, it is necessary to define what is meant by a dramaturgical approach. This is a perspective where man is an actor with parts to play on the stage of life. He has roles, scenes, settings and scripts to order the action. Most importantly for the amputee, he has a performance to enact; he has a style to fit his presentation (see Burke, 1969, 1969; Goffman, 1959, 1961, 1963; Strauss, 1959; Stone, 1963, 1959). For the amputee, he is an actor in a new body. The script goes on but he has entered the scene as a new performer. The most fundamental change has occurred. The most intimate part of the performance has changed: the body of the performer.

Here is no mere faux pas, no minor change in lines or scenes. The amputee is not taught to end one portion of the script or action, nor is he aided in entering a new setting. Instead, he is pushed into the same scene, given the same lines and parts and told to "adjust".

With this metaphor we can vividly see the consequences. The amputee must "carry on" the action while rewriting and redirecting. Simultaneously, a new style and performance must be learned. To appear awkward on stage "spoils" the performance (Goffman suggests it may "spoil" the identity, 1963: b), although it continues. Emphasis on the continuity and not on the quality blinds the actor and his partners. Although the script goes on, the performance has changed, and if the performance is bad, the actor is blamed. A new role is then assigned: the neurotic, the weak, the depressed. In time, the "label" (Becker, 1963) may become permanent and, in fact, the actor has a new, negative role. He is moved off center-stage and relegated to a minor character.
This scenario can obviously be altered through the recognition that many amputees live a new performance after an amputation. Therefore, "rehabilitation" should provide a "script" which helps in re-writing the style of the actor and dealing with the changed experience. One of the most unusual experiences then becomes ready to be discussed (and not merely "treated"): the phantom limb.

The sensation of a missing part is a dramatic example of the unity of the actor. This unity cannot be mechanically treated. The body, the living experience, emphatically denies the "social construction of reality" supported by the medical model. The attempt to categorize and label a deep human experience as one of "neurones and neuroses" is a major factor in generating "the problem of adjustment."

The phantom limb experience points directly to questions of the self and its embodiment: "Is part of me gone?" "Am I less me?" "Who am I if not my body?" The living experience of one's being in an absent part can be seen, then, as a fundamental question of identity and self (see Stone, 1959, 1962 for a discussion of self and appearance). To apply these questions to a dramaturgical framework: who am I if not this actor? the person with this performance? With the significant continuation of functional capacities which were previously enacted in a different body, it is "normal" to expect continued experience in an amputated part. Major portions of the self have continued and this continued act supports the continued expectations.

To look at the phenomenon of the phantom limb in yet another perspective, placing the experience as a primary criterion for action and "rehabilitation" it becomes part of the total experience of an amputation rather than an "abnormal" adjunct to the medical removal of a limb. The medical model dictates the meaning of the experience. In phenomenology, the experience would dictate the meaning for the theoretical interpretive model.

Application of the Model

There is a direct need for theoretical elaborations and conceptualization of the rehabilitation process which avoid pitfalls of present models. A step towards new working models is exemplified in this article and several others (Deegan, 1977a, 1977b, Psathas, 1977). Since most of the helping professions associated with rehabilitation use psychological models of behavior, it is consistent that a sociological model is absent in their applied approaches. Therefore, once sociological theoretical frameworks are developed, the application of these frameworks can be undertaken in hospital and clinical settings, but most importantly,
in training rehabilitation personnel.

Application of these concepts in small groups is needed to enact concrete performances. In addition, many programs or personnel may be drawing upon the model elaborated here and a search should be made to bring practitioners and theoreticians together. One possible structured resource that has been actively engaged in social learning is rehabilitation therapy. For example, at the hospital where the author did her dissertation research they had a program for teaching amputees dancing skills at Arthur Murray's. Participant observation at such sessions and interviews with the participants and teachers would provide a significant basis for constructing a more elaborate foundation for developing and applying the model suggested here (see Deegan, 1975, pp. 137-78 for a discussion of socialization and rehabilitation). A growing body of literature could be developed from these initial studies to help others in applying this model. As a brief introduction to some methods for doing this, a program of action is suggested here.

Group Settings

Many recent movements to change basic life orientations and belief systems have drawn upon a self help, peer-learning model. People with shared lived experiences can often explain the alterations in their worlds in a more realistic manner than "experts" trained to interpret that change. The use of group leaders is strongly suggested. Such organizers could lend structure to a group setting composed of recent amputees who have lived in different settings prior to their disability. After some initial discussions and mutual observations, training sessions could be organized around specific work and social setting problems: for example walking, sitting, dressing, shaking hands. Criticisms and suggestions for change could be more easily offered by people who actually share the experience, especially in such a sensitive area of evaluation. Making this a learned, shared experience rather than an isolating, often humiliating one, would be the goal. Films of awkward movements could be made and used for discussions of options leading to new methods of handling embarrassing situations, and new ways to learn good self presentation.

Obviously, using the dramaturgy model, role scenarios could be devised and acted out. Self-help groups would provide relatively "safe" areas in which to experiment with actions resulting from inexperience in coping with an altered body. Discussions of such exercises would be keyed to role and acting concepts as well as the individual experiences of the "actors." Discomfort, elation, dismay and humor
are all possible responses. Comparisons of these staged actions and
everyday actions could then be made.

After a period of work with amputees only it would be desirable to
have families and friends participate. The same model emphasizing group
experiences, social expectations, and learning behavior could then be
stressed. It would be vital that such groups not degenerate into group
therapy sessions; i.e., locating problems primarily as a function of
personality. Since the psychological model dominates outside the
rehabilitation setting as well as within it, this would be a constant
strain at first.

Individual Learning

The group process could operate in conjunction with individual
consultations and aids. Some people might find groups intimidating
and need to search out new behavioral cues and roles on a one-to-one
basis. The direct use of dramatic metaphors in this interaction is
suggested for the model developed in this paper. Since sociologists
are most interested in group dynamics and structure, primary emphasis
will be placed on the group environment presented above rather than on
individualized application of a shared, social process. A significant
part of the "clinical" sociology exchange would be devoted to the int-
egration of the individual into everyday life. Emphasis would be given
to people immediately interacting with the amputee in face-to-face
situations.

The Sociologist as an Applied Practitioner

Sociologists are becoming increasingly aware of possibilities for
sociologists as providers for human services. (See for example,
Gouldner and Miller, 1965; Street and Weinstein, 1975; Glass, 1977).
Of course, the most established model for a combination of theory and
practice (praxis) emerges from the Marxist tradition. The description
of alternative theoretical models is very recent and the combination of
these new frameworks with sociological practice is in its infancy. With
the present model, all of the physical rehabilitation training done with
the sociologist would proceed under the a priori assumption that the
"phantom limb" experience exists and that there is a need for a new
vocabulary to express the reality of and response to this experience.
Phenomenological/dramatists would then search for theoretical constructs
as well as practical methods for interpreting and acting on this assump-
tion. More concrete paradigms for theory and practice than that offered
here would necessarily emerge from the exchange between everyday action
and scientific research.

Conclusion

This paper has addressed itself to adults' responses to amputations. It has shown that our view of amputations is grounded in three major American values: individualism, pragmatism, and a mechanistic, medical model.

We have suggested here that these social constructions of reality (Berger and Luckmann, 1966) ignore the experience and performance of the amputee. Instead of determining "functioning" in a mechanistic manner measured by physiological capabilities, the concept of "functioning" should include one's total reality experienced in a lived body. Radical changes in one's lived body would be expected also to cause radical changes in one's everyday life. This different reality is naturally new, and frightening, particularly since it may hold a "stigmatized" role for the actor. Comprehension of this reality points to new directions for the generation of more positive "cues" and "acting lessons" as part of physical rehabilitation.

A brief presentation of possible applications of the model was presented in order to show the changed physical rehabilitation program which would result. These suggestions are exploratory and a more elaborate model and its application depend upon the lived experience of both amputees and sociologists with a phenomenological/dramaturgical praxis.
FOOTNOTES

1 Extensive bibliographies on amputations and amputees are available. This provides an excellent, cross-disciplinary introduction to the literature (See Amputees, Amputations, and Artificial Limbs, 1969, 1971).

2 For an analysis of the contradictions inherent in the rehabilitation goals, see Deegan 1977b, 945-49.

3 Discussions of the negative consequences of a physical disability are frequent. For an in-depth analysis of "stigma" see Goffman (1963).

4 Although role playing and sodiodrama appear to be similar models to that suggested here differences between these methods for group teaching and a dramaturgical theory needs to be established. Such a comparison is beyond the scope of this paper, but a few examples can be given. Dramaturgy is more than role playing. When one's personal, sexual and financial statuses are threatened, role enactment is of vital concern. Lived experience, not just an enactment of someone's possible experience, is a fundamental assumption of our model. Social expectations are constraints, they are part of objective reality, but different dramas can exist within those boundaries. The dramaturgical model suggested here is also a factor in explaining the phantom limb which challenges the dominant social construction of reality of this experience. (See pp.
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Almost since the beginning of Black history in America there have been differences of opinion as to what the role of Blacks should be in reference to the criminal justice system. In the beginning these differences centered around the issue of cooperation or resistance to the slave system and a criminal justice system that guaranteed slavery *durante vita.* Now, while the issue is no longer slavery, Blacks continue the debate over cooperation versus resistance to the criminal justice system. What should the role of Blacks be in reference to the criminal justice system? Can Blacks be of greater assistance to other Blacks by working within the system? Does working within this system imply support for it? Is resistance to the system a viable alternative to Blacks? Are there realistic alternatives to the present criminal justice system? Do Blacks have a choice as to what their role is or will be in this system? The pages that follow address the very complicated issue of Black involvement in a criminal justice system that many have labeled as inimical to Black development in America.
American society and its basic institutions operate within a time tested framework of both class and racial subordination for its Black citizens. However, it is within the American criminal justice system that we see this class and race bias in its most heinous form. Edwin M. Schur, for example, takes the rather unique position that it is the American society that is in fact criminal. It is criminal by virtue of its unequal distribution of wealth, its glorification and justification of violence abroad, and its racism, sexism, and classism at home. Similar views are held by Black scholars such as Dr. James A. Joseph, who in an article in the Black Scholar stated, "Inadequacies in the distribution of wealth and power in the American society provide the basic deterrence to justice." Both Hamilton and Carmichael, and Kenneth Clark give more detailed analysis of this class and race bias in their works. Even Blacks working within the criminal justice system are beginning to voice their recognition of these inequities. For example, at a 1975 black correctional workers conference in California a featured speaker began his talk by stating, "the justice system in America is criminal." This comment brought on wholesale approval in the form of prolonged applause, amens, laughter, and other forms of non verbal approval. At first glance, this apparent agreement with the speakers condemnation of the criminal justice system is somewhat misleading in view of the way in which black workers are involved, and are attempting to be involved, in its administration. For example, out of a total police population of 362,396, Blacks number less than twenty-five thousand. The situation is even more critical when it comes to the judicial system. Out of a pool of 21,000 judges, only 250 are black and the majority of these are in the federal court system. The situation in Washington, D.C., a predominately black city, gives a clear picture of what Blacks are up against.

After decades in which Washington's courts had no more than one black judge, there are now 15 black men and women among D.C. Superior Courts 44 judges, two blacks on the nine judge D.C. Court of Appeals, four black judges among a total of 15 on the U.S. District Court Bench and one Black judge among the nine on the U.S. Court of Appeals.

In both correctional institutions, social work, probation, and parole, the numbers of blacks are grudgingly being increased. After the urban disturbances of the 1960's, the Kerner Commission recognized the value of increasing the number of blacks in police work and other social control agencies. This, coupled with recent meager gains through civil rights and affirmative action legislation have afforded upwardly mobil blacks employment opportunities. So, what we begin to see is a situation where blacks in search of the good life increasingly find themselves working in public agencies concerned with social control and regulation.

Robert Blauner makes the following observation concerning this issue:
Since the racial colonialism of the United States is embedded in a context of industrial capitalism, the colonized must look to the economy, division of labor, and politics of the larger society for their individual and group aspirations.\textsuperscript{10}

What we observe then is a situation where Blacks, like other colonized people throughout the world, attempt to better their condition individually, while at the same time protecting the collective interests of the dominate white society.

The following comments by Staples suggests, in part at least, the futility of Blacks working within existing governmental structures:

Those members of the power elite charged with maintaining racial harmony have apparently decided on a policy of neocolonialism for the black community. Black leaders who are responsible to them and committed by working within the system are gradually replacing the white authority figures as leaders or members of the police force, military, prisons, welfare systems, etc. No fundamental changes have been made in institutional values or functioning but the replacement of whites with blacks tends to underline the resistance of blacks to institutional oppression, especially those who viewed it solely as a racial issue.\textsuperscript{11}

One only has to examine the increased number of black workers in prisons, police organizations, probation, and social work to get some understanding for the merits of Staples' position. Without getting into an extensive debate on the issue here, there are significant numbers of Blacks, many of whom work in the criminal justice system, who are committed to the system. They justify their position by focusing on the need for change. They are concerned with the way the system functions and how the results impact on Blacks caught within it. Their contention is that it is strategic to attack the system from within to have maximum impact.

This concern for change within the criminal justice system is having an impact not just on Black workers, but on their white colleagues, and indeed, upon the system as a whole. One only has to point to the large number of Black caucuses, and Black parallel organizations springing into existence throughout the country to get some measure of the concern being expressed.\textsuperscript{*} These groups, for the most part, are focusing

\textsuperscript{*}There is presently several Black police workers associations in the U.S., a National Association of Black Social Workers, and California has taken the lead in being one of the first states to form a Black Probation and Parole Officers Association.
on the role of the Black worker in the criminal justice system, and are beginning to demand change in the content, structure, and philosophy of that system. The term "system" may be inappropriate in this context since one of Webster's definitions is "a regular orderly way of doing something." Those familiar with criminal justice in this country would generally classify it as anything but "regular and orderly."

While there is presently no uniform thrust, Black organizations throughout the country are beginning to demand their unique position in the area of criminal justice. Typically, these Black organizations are demanding: (1) more input into decision making, (2) the appointment of more Black and minority personnel, (3) a shift in philosophy in reference to punishment and rehabilitation, (4) a more positive recognition of the distinctiveness of Blackness and, (5) a commitment to reduce societal criminal acts against the individual. While these concerns are couched in a Black perspective, the advocates believe serious attention to them will lead to a better, more progressive criminal justice system for the society as a whole.

On the other hand, there are those who take the position that the American criminal justice system is little more than a tool of internal colonialism. They argue that the system works as an instrument of coercion, deterrence, regulation and, above all, control. While Frantz Fanon, Charles Hamilton and Stokely Carmichael adhere to this colonialism position, Robert Staples has reintroduced it by suggesting that the criminal justice system is one of the mainstays of a colonial system that politically distributes a particular type of justice through the use of police, prisons, and other institutions. Staples is particularly critical of the complicity of the political states and the judicial system in failing to prosecute and convict police officers accused of brutality toward Blacks.

In a 1971 article that appeared in the Black Scholar, Robert Chrissman went so far as to refer to all Black people as "outlaws." He states, "We are most subject to arrest - and the most frequent victims of crime. Over 40% of prison inmates in the State of California are Black. More blacks than whites are executed in the United States." (More on this later).

What we see then is a dilemma for Black people that make decisions difficult at best and dangerous at worst. The objectives here are to analyze the criminal justice system from a Black perspective, to clarify issues as they relate to Blacks and other minorities in the system, and to propose new courses of action so that criminal justice can become more positively meaningful and respected within Black communities throughout the country.

One of the basic concerns of many Blacks working in the criminal justice system is to make the system more pertinent to the needs of Black people, both as practitioners, clients, and victims. In relating
American criminal justice to the Black experience, one is immediately concerned with some of the demands made by the profession on the Black worker. There is an urgent need to understand the dilemmas arising from Black workers operating within the structure and philosophy of the criminal justice system.

The ever accumulating body of evidence against the workability of the present criminal justice system, especially as it relates to Blacks, lays a favorable foundation for the consideration of alternative structures. Alternative institutional mechanisms, properly constructed could insure Black input and veto power at both the policy planning and implementation levels. While such proposals initially will seem somewhat bizarre to the traditional bureaucratic manager, there is enough sociological and psychological inferences available to substantiate the assumption that environmental conditions, cultural isolation, racism, etc., have created differences in reality as perceived by Blacks and whites.17,18,19,20

In short, those taking this position are of the opinion that Black expertise is not being properly utilized, and that for reasons of racism, politics, and economics, Blacks are relegated to positions subserviant to white planners and administrators. Furthermore, they argue that Black attempts to gain better positions in existing institutions often work to camouflage the need for different approaches to problem solving.

Blacks in Public Social Services

Blacks who have been through the American higher educational system find themselves disproportionately represented in professions dealing with the public sector, i.e., teaching, social work, and corrections. For example, according to Time (June 17, 1974), in 1970, 39% of the nation's professionals were employed by federal, state, and local governments; but 60% of black professionals held such posts.21 A 1974 study completed by the U.S. Department of Commerce makes the following facts available:

Blacks make up about 6 percent of the workers in both wholesale and retail trade; and finance, insurance, and real estate, in contrast to 21 percent of the workers in personal service industries, including private household; 14 percent of the workers in hospitals and other health services; and 12 percent of the employees in public administration.22

It is rather ironic, but Blacks gravitate to these so called "opportunity giving" positions because of a long history of denial and rejection in the private sector. It is ironic simply because those who have been denied opportunities in the private sector (Blacks) are employed in the public sector where they often are called upon to regulate the behavior of others (Blacks) who have also been denied opportunities. In effect, Blacks gaining middle class status through integration of public agencies are invariably faced with conflicts in relation to how they
interact with lower status Blacks who may depend upon, or be forced under the domain of public services. For example, the Black probation officer, in carrying out his duties, is expected to take action against a probationer under his supervision who knowingly frequents the company of felons (a condition of probation in most states). In reference to the Black probationer, this condition of probation creates an extreme conflict in many instances. Because of his race, socio-economic status, and the additional stigma of being on probation, his options in regard to living arrangements, support, friends, and employment are limited. In carrying out his duties, the probation officer is expected to enforce this condition of probation, yet the probationer is often forced into violating it. This, or similar situations exist in the welfare system where indigenous community workers are called upon to "make the system work better," or where eligibility workers or welfare workers are forced to deny eligibility to Blacks who may not "technically" qualify for assistance. These conditions often mean that Black professionals, both willingly and unwillingly, by the nature of their job assignments are forced to stand in the path of the will and interests of poor Blacks. In short, the integration of Blacks into the public employment sector often creates or perpetuates class conflict, i.e., middle class Blacks against lower class Blacks.

As more and more Blacks enter the field of public human services this class issue increases in importance. This, coupled with the question of whether it is possible for Blacks working within traditional social agencies to help other Blacks, is it a matter of them helping only themselves, or is it possible to help both themselves and other Blacks simultaneously? Robert Blauner, in Racial Oppression in America, and Stokeley Carmichael and Charles Hamilton in Black Power take the position that working within these institutions of colonialism only act to strengthen racial oppression. In fact, Blauner points out that "the key institutions that anticolonialists want to take over or control our business, social services, schools, and the police." Blauner further states that the Black community is unique in the ways that white educators, policemen, social workers, politicians, and other functionaries have exercised economic, political, and administrative control from the outside. Whites have controlled the so called Black ghettos from outside, and are now beginning to use Blacks to do the same thing. Increasingly, we can also say that Blacks who integrate these structures also live outside Black communities.

To suggest that Blacks working in the area of human services are perpetuating the colonialist condition is a serious charge, a charge that merits further investigation, but at the same time a charge which is extremely anxiety provoking for Blacks in corrections in particular. Let us consider this dilemma.

If, in fact, these agencies are instruments of colonialism and Blacks were able to withdraw, would the effects of colonialism be re-
duced? Some argue that if one participates in a structure causing problems for Blacks, then in fact he is the problem. Others argue, rather convincingly, that Blacks do in fact make conditions better. On the other hand, these arguments may be rather academic. It is unrealistic to expect that Blacks would be able to withdraw even if they were conclusively proven that these agencies were instruments of colonialism working against the best interest of Blacks?

Jobs in the correctional field, for better or worse, have afforded Blacks quasi-middle class status, no matter how precarious it may be. Since most of these positions are civil service positions they have afforded Blacks a limited form of institutionalized upward mobility. This Black mobility is also evident, if not significant, in such professions as firefighting, social work, and teaching. This means a decent standard of living and at least the illusion of security. This is not something that is taken lightly or given up easily. In a recent issue of *Harpers*, Lewis H. Lapham in an article entitled "The Capitalists Paradox" stated: "To a greater or lesser extent we are all greedy and frightened children, and if the possession of money comes to mean the difference between life and death, then how is it possible to blame people for whatever they do to obtain it?" While a few may accept such an analysis and abandon their positions, the bulk of the Black population, whether they accept this analysis or not, will feel compelled to remain in their positions.

While there is merit in talking about a Black value system, and taking action in the interests of Black people, often these concepts are too abstract to the average person, especially when weighed against the concrete realities of the reward and punishment mechanisms available to the dominant society. In very harsh terms there are many Blacks who will stand on principal and conviction, but there are still many whose reality dictates that their actions are directed toward achieving the rewards found within the system, the system supported by white society. This is a complex issue that may be neither Black nor white, but has to do with man's basic drive to survive and meet his most immediate needs in a capitalistic society. Unfortunately, when it comes to meeting basic needs, often one man's feast is another man's famine. These concepts, to this point, are relative to where one finds himself in relation to others.

Unfortunately, Black theoreticians and analysts have gone only halfway, they have analyzed situations, but have not proposed immediately viable solutions, or at least solutions that are easily embraced by the Black population as a whole. Because of an absence of Black group power and the presence of white prerogatives, Blacks are invariably constrained in their selection of work opportunities. While some progress is being made, Blacks simply are not presently able to offer other Blacks working in human services alternative work situations. Robert Blauner has noted that racial privilege exists in all of our basic institutions and, expresses itself most graphically in the labor market and the structure of
occupations. He further suggests that the key to white racial domination in the United States has been their special advantage in the labor market. While most people may spend little time on these considerations, we live in a society based on privilege and this tends to preface many of our daily activities. Until Blacks can answer the question of where will we work if not within white controlled institutions, any analysis of the conditions of Black people is only partially useful.

Since many Blacks in the human services, especially the criminal justice area, are not willing to blanketly accept the position that working within white controlled institutions is counter productive to the Black condition, it appears necessary to look at the argument in favor of such a stance.

Law and Ethnic Perrogatives

One of the difficult things for most Black Americans to totally comprehend, but which many have some knowledge of, is the fact that the structural arrangements of the United States have been forged by, and in the interests of the dominant white cultural groups. Harold Cruse states it clearly in the Crisis of the Negro Intellectual. "The White Anglo-Saxon Protestants, the White Catholics, and the White Jews are the three main power groups in America under the political and economic leadership of the WASPS." He goes on to indicate that "the American constitution was conceived and written by White Anglo-Saxon Protestants for a White Anglo-Saxon society." Turner and Starres support this idea with their belief that societies established on the principal of inequality produces superordinate classes with dominant beliefs that rationalize the structure and outcome of the system. Duberman refers to Blacks as occupying a class system in the United States because they are economically deprived and politically castrated by the dominant group. To get further feeling for this structural inequality one must look to the role of culture in a complex, heterogeneous society.

In theoretical terms we can say that interaction between members of dominant and minority groups are determined by culture. The minority and the dominant groups reference point in any interaction is invariably culture. Vander Zanden suggests that, "the guideposts of the culture are norms. Norms constitute generally accepted, sanctioned prescriptions for or prohibitions against, various types of behavior." When various ethnic, racial and class groups are forced together, if we are to maintain an ordered society, some rules, some methods of administering them must be established. This has become so commonplace until it seems obvious to even the most casual observer. The not so obvious however, is how we go about determining what will be enforced and by whom. According to Jacobs in Justice in America, "administering justice means that norms are being enforced in an even handled way so that the same standards are applied to all citizens." When we cut through the idealism of Jacob's supposition, we must determine who decides what cultural norms
get formalized, and in which manner. What this has meant in this society, and in most societies where there are subordinate and superordinate groups interacting, is that the dominant group has its cultural norms formalized. The subordinate groups are forced into a position of accepting the formalized norms (laws) of the dominant society. The more significant of these norms are enforced by the courts, embodied in the statutes, and in the tradition of the community. Over the years we have gotten so accustomed to subjugating ourselves to these cultural guideposts until both minority and dominant groups have integrated them into their cultural behavior patterns. Kramer, in the American Minority Community, makes the following statement in reference to this point:

The dominant group by definition embodies the prevailing way of life, it controls access to values that are now desired by others, but still too scarce to be shared, by defining criteria of social eligibility. By declaring ineligible those with differing characteristics, the dominant group limits their life chances and thereby creates a minority situation.

Put in terms of values, Gil suggests that they (values) derive from basic choices compatible with the perceived interests of groups who gained influence, power, dominance, and control over the rest of society. Eventually, values evolve into powerful factors legitimating established interests and maintaining the status quo of social orders which is shaped by interests.

The white prerogative of having its groups cultural norms formalized is indeed a privilege. Blauner suggests that this privilege white Americans enjoy is extremely advantageous to them and disadvantageous to Blacks.

The disadvantages in these areas because of white privileges are most graphically obvious in the Black Americans peculiarly unfavorable position in relation to the criminal justice system. Here it appears that white privilege again reigns. For example, the following information taken from "The Social and Economic Status of the Black Population in the United States" reflects in concrete terms how white privilege expresses itself in the criminal justice system:

Nearly 142,000 persons were confined in local jails in this country as of mid-year 1972. Black inmates numbered 59,300 and comprised 42 percent of the jail population...Black inmates were generally young (under 30), poorly educated and unmarried (single, divorced, separated, or widowed). Also sizable proportions were low-paid wage earners or unemployed prior to their arrest...Among those on appeal, the average sentences are generally longer for blacks than for whites for all crimes of violence... Eighty-one black persons were on death row in this...
country as of December 31, 1972. In relation to their proportion of the population, blacks were overrepresented among the death row population accounting for exactly one-half of the total of 162 persons under sentence to death... In the 38 year period prior to 1968, there were 2,066 black persons executed under the civil jurisdiction in the United States and that comprised 54 percent of the 3,859 persons put to death over the period.40

The point for those in the human services, especially correctional workers, to grasp here is that the laws of the society in which we live are the formalized cultural norms of the dominant white population, i.e., white protestants, white Jews, and white Catholics. These laws, in most instances have been instituted to maintain, protect, and refine privileges of the white society. While many blacks are protected by these laws, and in other ways are advantaged by them, we must not lose sight of the fact that the law and its administrative arrangements in this country have been designed by white power groups to establish, maintain, and refine their privileges. Often we have a difficult time understanding this, especially when we see what appears to be many blacks making it in the system. What we must remember however, is that 33 percent of America's black families fall below the poverty level... About 5 million blacks collect some form of public welfare payments... and that the total number of black families headed by females has also increased to about 34.5 percent.41 While some would argue that these conditions are caused by poverty, ignorance, and cultural deprivation, there is a growing accumulation of evidence that suggests that blacks find themselves in a disadvantaged position in society because of the dominant society's ability to define and label,42 and because of the structure of American society that favors the dominant group.

While the above conditions have become well known, more subtle practices are just beginning to come to light. To give an example of how some practices can have a detrimental impact on blacks, let's take a look at a process that has been in existence for years now in the juvenile court system. In juvenile court proceedings, especially in California, we have traditionally taken the position of "let's treat the juvenile and not the offense." While on the surface this liberal sounding doctrine is great, what we have been able to determine is that by treating the juvenile instead of the offense, we have systematically given black youth more involvement with the courts, more detention, longer detention periods, more probation, and longer probation terms in ratio to their proportion of the population. This greater involvement with the criminal justice system on the part of youth is undoubtedly related to his reduced opportunity in socially accepted avenues, and therefore, many suggest that it is only natural that blacks would have more contact with the legal system. While there is truth to this to some extent, it could also be argued that since most law enforcement personnel, es-
especially judges are white and from a particular cultural background that they do not possess the necessary background and insight to properly "treat the juvenile", especially when he is Black. Why is it that we do not label the judge as culturally deprived when he is unable to pick up on the assorted cultural nuances often exhibited by Black youth in the court setting? Many a Black child has incurred the wrath of judges by their non-traditional dress, their "sullen demeanor," their inability to "look the man in the eye", and their appearance of "indifference." These cultural differences, coupled with family structure, living arrangements, school records, prior history, and even mode of dress are often so alien to the probation officer and the judge until it is almost impossible to "treat the juvenile." To be unable to "treat the juvenile" then is a structural weakness related to racism and the selection process of the Black youth caught up in the system, yet this process catapults many a Black youth down the road to a life of adult crime. William Ryan refers to this process of blaming those who are least able to defend themselves as "blaming the victim."43

To further substantiate the Black man's particular relationship to the law we could point the finger at former San Francisco mayor Alioto's Zebra edict, (stopping and questioning all Black males). This practice was put into effect in the effort to apprehend murder suspects who were identified by survivors of attacks as being "Black". At a higher level we notice the federal government's reluctance to vigorously enforce the law in relation to busing or even former President Ford's appearances on national television in opposition to court-ordered busing. Large numbers of Blacks view this as the government's abandonment of the civil rights movement and the rights of Blacks to a fair and decent standard of living in this country.

Haywood Burns, the National Director of the Conference of Black Lawyers, shares the following penetrating remarks regarding the Black man's position in relation to the American legal system:

Whereas white Americans are accustomed to viewing the law as an historical vehicle through which liberties have been progressively expanded, black Americans have experienced law in quite another fashion. From the very first, American law has been the means by which the generalized racism in the society has been made specific and converted into the particularized policies and standards of social control.44

This is not an attempt to justify Black crime, or to suggest that there are no acts for which Blacks should be punished, because it is painfully clear that there is some need in this area. Data gathered as of 1973 indicates that "blacks were much more likely than whites to have been the victims of violent crimes; the victimization rate was
47 per 1,000 population for blacks as compared to 32 for whites.”45 To further support the need in this area, we only need to refer to the rather dramatic title of Why Blacks Kill Blacks by Alvin Poussaint,46 Black Rage by Grier and Cobbs,47 or The Wretched of the Earth by Franz Fanon.48 If we add the less dramatic but equally pervasive crimes of unscrupulous realtors, car salesmen, and other merchants that are enacted against the Black community, then it becomes quite clear that Blacks also have a right to be concerned about crime. Blacks in just about every socioeconomic position scream for law and order, but this is not the issue here. The relevant issue, or issues, have to do with the purpose of existing laws, their fairness to Blacks, and Blacks working within administrative bodies that enforce these laws. While there is a need, and while jobs in the area of corrections do pay relatively well in comparison to other possibilities in the human services, is this the place for Blacks to focus their energies? Can Blacks have an effect on police, courts, adult and authorities, and parole boards when these bodies all tend to be administered from the top down? In other words, in the places where decisions and policy are made, few if any Blacks are represented. This is an increasingly important issue to more and more Blacks as they come to the realization that whites, are well intentioned as they may be, have a difficult, if not impossible, time seeing things from the same perspective as Blacks. It is almost an impossibility to have an impact on decisions affecting Blacks if Blacks find themselves continually in positions where they can only react. Access to decision making positions is the key type of change Blacks are looking for in the criminal justice system. Actually, it is even more complex than just access, because even with access it is possible to outvote or to veto the actions and decisions of Blacks. As equally important as access, is the ability to influence and in some instances to control the decisions made or to be made. One could easily say that it is extremely naive to expect that white society is going to give up control of any part of the criminal justice system, or for that matter, any system. While there may be truth to this, it does not negate the fact that one of the surest ways to insure that institutions will serve Black people best is to see that Blacks control them. So, if control is not possible at the present time this should not prevent Blacks from seriously discussing it or beginning to formulate intermediate strategies leading to this control. Others take the position that even thinking about controlling something “belonging to whites” is an exercise in futility, and the only answer is to establish separate institutions and alternatives for Blacks.

A Dilemma

The difficulty Blacks working in the criminal justice system have with formulating a clear position in relation to what their attitudes and behavior should be in relation to the system is undoubtedly related to the rewards-retribution mechanism, the acculturation process, and the closely related status of their position. Peter I. Rose had some
relevant ideas in relation to this acculturation process and black people:
The black experience in America is unique—t has no real parallel. And black Americans are unique. Paradoxically, blacks may well be at once the most estranged and the least foreign of all the citizens: most estranged because of their special history, which began in sub- forms of segregation; least foreign because, ironically, having been cut off from their native roots, they had few guides but those of the master and his agents. This is not to say that no Africanisms survived. Of course they did. Still most black Americans, for good or ill, were imbued with many of the same goals and aspirations of those of the dominant group.49

This socio-historical process coupled with the rewards-punishment mechanism makes it exceedingly difficult to make clear choices, because in reality the choices are so clouded and, in many instances, downright dangerous.

While many Blacks adjust to their work role in this society, and some never seriously question it, the position of Blacks working in the criminal justice system is a difficult and peculiar one worthy of a great deal of study. Long, et al. have the following thoughts about this adaptation:

In adapting to this setting, Blacks perpetuate the harmful environment and also develop hostile feelings in response to discrimination thus adding their own punishment to that inflicted by whites. The caste system maintains a cadre of whites and middle class blacks who function in a refined or brutal way to preserve the system.50

So what we see is a complicated push-pull, love-hate situation where blacks are trying to integrate the criminal justice system, the system initially resisted their inclusion, and then selectively included them throughout the system at the lower and mid management levels. This coupled with the "good" of the money to be made in the system, and the "bad" of a system that has worked in a detrimental way in regard to Blacks makes choices more difficult as Blacks become more conscious of their blackness and how it relates to the criminal justice system in this country. This Black awareness coupled with white resistance and control has created a climate of tension and apprehension where either change or extreme conflict is inevitable. Hylan Lewis makes this point with appropriate bluntness:

The pressure to change not only structure, but the control and accountability of service institutions are clearly related to the new consciousness of Blacks and to the related emergence of the fact and concept of acute black consciousness.51
The problem is, however, that change in a capitalistic system tends to be conservative and incremental and when it comes to the condition of minorities more geared toward containment and appeasement than true social reform.

While the above pages have raised some serious issues in reference to the criminal justice system and Black involvement within it, this system in one form or another will undoubtedly be with us for some time to come. Since Blacks will surely be a part of it, there is an impelling need to understand its purpose, how it works, and who it serves. A thorough analysis may lead to the conclusion that Blacks can serve no useful purpose working within this system. On the other hand, such an analysis may support the position that structural changes in strategic areas of the system, coupled with philosophical shifts could make it viable to the population as a whole. Still another thought for consideration is the possibility that any analysis, no matter how focused, will not be enough to drastically shift the level of Black involvement in the criminal justice system. For better or worse many Blacks view it as their lifeline, their way of surviving in a hostile environment that offers so few options.

The Double Bind for Black Social Workers

In addition to the difficulties suffered by Black workers mentioned above, there is an additional problem for Black social workers shared with the profession in general. Mainly, social workers in the criminal justice system have been traditionally viewed with suspicion, indifference, and even hostility. In a system whose social welfare function is questionable at best, social workers are frequently supervised and directed by non social workers. In police departments, when and if social workers are found, they tend to be employed on specially funded projects and are rarely in key decision making positions regarding day to day police activities. While probation officers have a good deal of authority in the courts there are two factors that frequently limit them in carrying out social work values. First, and most obvious is the fact that most probation officers are not trained social workers and, secondly, judges have ultimate authority over the decisions of probation officers. In the prison setting, social workers are so few in relation to the prison population as to render them virtually useless. For example, at the Philadelphia Prison System, social workers report that they are assigned the names of prisoners alphabetically. The lists are so long it is impossible to do anything but wait until a prisoner presents them with problems. While such a pairing of prisoner to social worker may have some administrative merit, it leaves many unanswered questions in regard to its effect in any treatment process. In short, we have non social workers supervising social workers in the justice system. The objectives of the non social workers often conflict with the goals (values) of the social work profession. While it has been argued that social work is in collusion with the criminal justice system to maintain social control, it at least has a code of ethics that states in part, "I regard as my
primary obligation the welfare of the individual or group served, which includes action for improving social conditions." While there is growing debate over just which individuals or groups social work serves, when we look at the justice system it becomes clear that it serves none well.

For various reasons the pre-delinquent, the delinquent, the adult offender, the imprisoned adult offender, and the released adult offender all tend to suffer from inadequate positive social intervention. On the other hand, as the number of policemen hired increases so does the crime rate, with the newest treatment scheme comes increased recidivism rates and the costs of incarceration continues to rise.

There is a growing body of evidence suggesting that the criminal justice system in America is corrupt and unjust. With social work, and Black social workers in particular, demanding more involvement in it, many observers liken such an effort to the futility of rushing into a burning building.

If such an analysis has any validity at all, it may suggest intensified social work efforts in less traditional criminal justice settings. Social workers have an obligation to push the troubled criminal justice system more in the direction of community based corrections. Such programs and concepts as halfway houses, screening programs, work release, crime prevention and diversion programs must be looked at as serious components of the criminal justice system. Presently, when such programs exist they tend to be federally funded and at rates that doom most to failure.

For the Black social worker, community treatment programs could, and often do, mean getting in on the ground floor of a positive approach to corrections. According to Prassel:

Community treatment serves as the normal means of attempting corrections. Offenders, juvenile or adult, should be channeled into individual programs through probation, aftercare, or parole. Diverse forms of treatment available through a multitude of agencies can then provide care, assistance, and supervision.

In addition to the treatment possibilities in community treatment approaches, there is the added possibility of Black leadership and direction in such efforts. Since funding for such efforts traditionally come from governmental bodies there is still the problem of Black-White confrontations over what programs should be funded and at what level.

The present system continues to exist, in part at least, because of vested interests of select groups that are rewarded by its existence. As social workers we have an obligation to work against these interests and for the welfare of Blacks, other minorities and the oppressed in general.

A Framework for Criminal Justice System Analysis

Arguments presented to this point have been intended to demonstrate
that Blacks working within the criminal justice system are indeed a unique group, with a unique relationship to a system that has had a unique relationship to Blacks in American society. Arguments for and against the future of Blacks working in the criminal justice system are worthy of much thought and intense examination, but a basepoint for this examination must be established. There is a need to be able to identify the relevant components of the system and how they function in reference to Black people. Then, knowing thoroughly how the system acts on, against, or for Blacks can be a take off point for acting on the system. Sure, we all say we know the system works against Blacks, but do we really? To best get at how the system impacts on Blacks, a simple framework for analysis would appear to be appropriate.

The framework proposed here would be one that basically asked the following questions in reference to Blacks in the criminal justice system:

1. What is the extent of Black involvement in the criminal justice system?
2. Who has authority?
3. How is this authority used in relation to Blacks?
4. What is the outcome from the usage of this authority?

By focusing on these areas it is anticipated that information can be attained to either support calls for changes in the structure of the system in reference to Blacks that no matter how good the economic rewards, their involvement is too high a commitment to make.

The effort here is not to present an all inclusive examination of the issues surrounding Black involvement in the criminal justice system. To the contrary, it is believed that by beginning the discussion others will join in a detailed analysis of the system and the alternatives available to Blacks within it.

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Footnotes

15. Robert Staples, Introduction to Black Sociology, New York,
31. Ibid., p. 8.
36. Ibid., p. 22.
41. Ibid., p. 175.
ABSTRACT--Evaluative research has not kept pace with developments in the theory of social planning and the philosophy of science. If evaluation is to contribute to social planning, evaluators must recognize that planning is a political process. The method of systemic perspectivism may be able to provide a means of combining the virtues of general systems theory with a perspectivistic view of objectivity, allowing for a transactive planning which involves the public.

My purpose here is to describe what I consider to be the major problem facing evaluative research and to indicate one direction by which we might develop a methodology capable of providing a reasonable solution. The problem has to do with the place of evaluation in the planning process. Social planning as we have known it has tended toward one of two extremes; either the process has been characterized by a rather chaotic eclecticism influenced by all sorts of questionable motives, or it has followed a highly centralized, "social engineering" approach. The former is clearly inappropriate, but the latter is itself a matter of increasing social debate. What we need now is a new vision of social planning and a methodology of evaluation which augments it.

Social engineering was developed in a time of rapidly centralizing institutions which maintained a reality hegemony. These institutions dominated planning because they had stepped into a near vacuum with clear goals, a confidence born of faith in the application of technology, and a sense of their own power. Today it is different. Our goals are now matters of political negotiation. We have begun to realize that purely technological solutions may sometimes pose serious moral dilemmas. And some of the old arrogance of power is gone. Still, as long as the evaluator remains a technician who does the bidding of the politician and the professional planner, we are not likely to see genuinely sophisticated evaluative research or to witness the day when it becomes a truly integral part of planning. It is therefore necessary that the evaluator look beyond his traditionally narrow province and concern himself with the larger issues of planning and even with the philosophy of
science. He must understand that the planning process is political rather than technical, and instead of complaining about this fact of life he must learn to see it as appropriate to any society which presumes to become a democracy. If he accepts this view, he must seek to shift his own role so as to broaden and deepen the functions of evaluation. Recent developments in the philosophy of science suggest that this shift might be accomplished through a method of systemic perspectivism. To understand what is entailed here, we must first consider developments in the theory of social planning and then turn to questions of the philosophy of science. Social planning is the key to the evaluation question, for evaluation must be an integral part of the planning process. The philosophy of science may provide us with some new answers.

Developments in the Theory of Social Planning

Since our conceptions of evaluative research are embedded in our general views of planning, it is well to begin with the latter. What we discover is that some very significant changes are taking place in the theory of social planning. These changes are reflected in a repudiation of the social engineering model and in an increasing emphasis upon distributive equity (Webber, 1965) and societal learning models (Dunn, 1971). What these newer approaches have in common is an appreciation of the difference between functional rationality and substantive rationality in planning. Functional rationality attends to the efficient relation of means to given ends. It is the province of the "expert," and its guiding principle is efficiency. It rests upon the complicated assumption that there is always one best way of dealing with a situation, that this is synonymous with technical efficiency, and that technical efficiency rests upon the ability to control all relevant factors. The consequence is allocative planning, based on the distribution of limited resources among a number of competing users (Friedmann, 1973:52). Examples of the results of such a narrow orientation may be found in the increasing number of carefully documented studies of the actual consequences of cost-benefit analysis (CBA) and planning, programming, budgeting systems (PPBS) (McKeen and Anshein, 1965; Rivlin, 1969; Schick, 1971). These apparently precise techniques are usually nothing but a means of legitimating and fine-tuning decisions which have already been made.

The definition of evaluation as measurement of the outcome of a "social experiment" is an unrealistic remnant of social engineering. It can be traced to the older view which required only technicians capable of testing the efficacy of means and to a reluctance to face several harsh facts of life. To begin with, the evaluator rarely has much control over the "experiment" (Ball, 1977). There are particularly trea-
cherous pitfalls associated with evaluative research, which, unlike the
sheltered laboratory work so characteristic of the older sciences, often
finds itself in non-cooperative, actively resistant and sometimes delib-
erately misleading environment (Gouldner, 1965).

The issue of causality represents another serious set of questions
which must eventually be faced, simply because the notion of unilinear
cause-effect has little relevance in a complicated, interdependent and
rapidly shifting social milieu (Ball, 1977; Weiss and Rain, 1969). The
singling out of "independent" and "dependent" variables in such cases is
largely a matter of which segment of a chain of 'events' is selected for
study. That is why Katz (1971:56), citing the increasing importance of
social research in Supreme Court decisions, has entered a plea for a
"model by means of which scholars may direct themselves explicitly to-
ward the investigation of the empirical and logical foundations alleged
to justify the causal inferences that underlie the official policy under
investigation." He argues that much official policy may rest upon "dis-
honest pretensions" and that one function of policy research is to "un-
mask" the causal fallacies upon which these pretensions rest. We encoun-
ter the same problems when we turn from a discussion of "causes" to an
examination of "effects." The focus upon effects defined as "primary",
along with an insensitivity to the secondary and tertiary effects of a
given policy, represents one of the most serious violations of the prin-
ciple of distributive equity central to recent theories of democratic
social planning (Webber, 1965). Which effects are to be considered
primary?

Finally, there is the unpleasant fact that the evaluation criteria
themselves are often selected by someone else in terms of his own defini-
tion of "success" and "failure". Suchman (1967:61), classifies the
criteria according to which the success or failure of a program can be
evaluated in terms of effort (input assessment), effectiveness (output
assessment), impact (output relative to need), cost effectiveness (in-
put to impact ratio) and process (descriptive and diagnostic analysis
of the process by which results are produced), but maintains that the
study of process is really not an inherent part of evaluative research
(Suchman, 1967:21). Those who do express some interest have tended to
equate process evaluation with rudimentary administrative monitoring
(see, for example, Rossi and Williams, 1972:110). One reason for the
skeptical attitude of many experienced politicians and administrators
toward current evaluation research is their realization that the tech-
nical approach captures only a caricature of the political and social
realities with which they must deal (Rock, 1965). There is certainly
limited practical value to the findings derived through the orthodox
designs. If we are very fortunate, we may learn what has happened, but

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the question of how it happened goes unanswered except for our often simplistic assumptions about the variables which are "independent" and those which are "dependent." If the policy is a "failure" it may not be clear just why, and even if judged a "success", we have no reasonable certainty that we can repeat the process.

In contrast to the technical narrowness of functional rationality, substantive rationality rests upon intelligent insight into the behavior of complex system as a whole, including a grasp of its ambiguities. It is concerned with the ends of action as much as with the means. It is in the broadest sense political rather than technical. Substantive rationality makes possible innovative planning which is concerned with larger questions of change and is characterized by an accent upon the merging of planning and action activities. It leads us to a process of "transactive planning" based upon involvement of all concerned (Friedmann, 1973). A proper social planning process is really an information processing system. The better the information and the more effective the processing, the better the planning decisions.

We need better ways of getting information. Social planning has long been characterized by institutionalized selective perception. The process has been organized so as to give planners certain information. Some means must be found to make transactive planning a reality, so that all communication lines are open and attention is paid to the diversity of goals which is to be found in a complex, modern society. I believe that evaluative research has a major part to play here.

We also need to improve our information-processing, our sequence of decision-making. At the present time we find that decision-makers are relatively isolated from immediate environmental feedback. They are sheltered from the consequences of their decisions. We must open up this process at every stage of development. Evaluative research may also be our most important asset in this struggle for more effective means of collective learning.

Evaluative Research and the Philosophy of Science

Our preoccupation with social engineering in the traditional sense springs partly from our suspicion of "subjectivity." Evaluators are much concerned with the problem of subjectivity, and a great deal has been written over the issue of value-neutrality. Indeed, social engineering makes much of the possibility that it can be handled through a purely positive science which will eliminate the subjective element. Social planning, however, involves value judgements, and there is no way around this. Moreover, these questions of values cannot be separ-
ated from the so-called "objective" facts of a situation. Vickers (1965: 40) has put it very effectively:

An appreciation involves making judgements of fact about the "state of the system," both internally and in its external relations. I will call these reality judgements. These include judgements about what the state will be or might be on various hypotheses as well as judgements of what is and has been. They may thus be actual or hypothetical, past, present, or future. It also involves making judgements about the significance of these facts to the appreciator or to the body for whom the appreciation is made. These judgements I shall call value judgements. Reality judgements and value judgements are inseparable constituents of appreciation...The relation between judgements of fact and of value is close and mutual; for facts are relevant only in relation to some judgement of value and judgements of value are operative only in relation to some configuration of fact.

As Kuhn (1973) has reminded us, the history of science discloses a tendency to elaborate and sanctify the dominant paradigm until it constitutes the very definition of science, setting the legitimate range of inquiry, identifying research targets within that range, and dictating appropriate methodology. The social engineering approach to planning rests upon a positivist framework which assumes the existence of an objective reality external to us and of an "objective" expert who can describe it (Kolakowski, 1969), and this is the same epistemological framework which undergirds our contemporary notion of evaluation. It is assumed that experts have access to the sphere of absolute reality by way of strategies of quantification and experimentation (Kolakowski, 1969). Unfortunately, the tendency to attribute to this realm of "truth" a unitary nature (Holzner, 1968) and to conceive of it as absolute and eternal, static and changeless (Kolakowski, 1969) tends to produce a reification of one point of view as the scientific truth of the matter. This bias has interfered with the development of methods of equitable evaluation, which may be defined as evaluative research which includes the best possible representation of the diverse viewpoints to be found in a highly differentiated, "open" society (Ball, 1977). The "truth" turns out to be the version preferred by a certain segment of society.

Recently, however, we have begun to appreciate the extent to which social life is an actually constructed reality (Berger and Luckmann, 1967; Holzner, 1968). Friedmann (1973) makes this notion central to his
theory of transactive planning, emphasizing the viewpoint as developed by Mannheim (1936). At the same time, some research methodologists have begun to stress the same orientation (Sjoberg and Nett, 1968). Although one can hardly expect a new paradigm to emerge full-blown, it may be worthwhile to consider general directions. At this point, it appears that evaluative research might benefit greatly by explicit recognition of the extent to which reality is socially constructed through the "intentionality" of actors whose meanings are formed in a matrix of "inter-subjectivity" (Berger and Luckmann, 1967). The merits of such an approach are that it is politically sensitive to the changing nature of social reality and that it emphasizes the political process which facilitate or impede planned change.

The approach with which we are dealing has been called perspectivism (Mannheim, 1936). It must not be confused with epistemological idealism. This misunderstanding would appear to be the result of Husserl's emphasis upon attention to phenomena as they "appear" to us, bracketing the question of whether or not they are "real." There has been a great deal of confusion here. Strasser (1963:296-302) shows that this "phenomenological impressionism" is essentially a "degeneration" supported by tendencies toward a merely "suggestive" or "literary" approach and criticizes the way in which phenomenology "came to be considered as an uncritical intuitionism." Referring to this trend as a "strange attitude of mind," he points out that "no attention was paid to the fact that the naiveness of seeing, which received so much praise, could not even be genuine, for authentic naiveness is not aware of itself" (Strasser, 1963:297). Far from denying the existence of the world, perspectivism insists that all thought must be treated as "situated" in the world. Unlike the vulgarized versions of phenomenology which have become so popular, perspectivism insists with Heidegger that some method is needed precisely because the phenomena are not immediately given.

Although Mannheim gave us a new basis for social planning, he did not succeed in providing a satisfactory methodology beyond an emphasis upon the importance of substantive rationality and faith in the possibilities of a "detached intelligentia" which could learn to think in perspectivistic terms. The problem, then, is to find a method which will allow us to take account of social diversity. This would appear to require that we accept some sort of "processual model" of social systems. Following Buckley (1967:17), we may regard the processual model as an underdeveloped paradigm with a long history extending from the work of Whitehead, Einstein, Dewey and Bentley in physical science and philosophy to that of Marx, Simmel, Cooley and Thomas in social science. As Buckley himself has stressed, this model is most clearly exemplified by general systems theory (GST).
The "perspectivism" of Mannheim and the "Biperspectivism" of GST (Laslo, 1972:119) stress a holistic approach and the epistemological importance of perspective rather than the isolation of analytical variables assumed to be independent of perception. Instead of arguing over the importance of subject vs. object, both attempt to concentrate on relationships in the form of interplay between the two, and both emphasize feedback loops rather than "causes." Sutherland (1974:55) quotes with approval the following statement:

Analysis has to proceed at two levels: that of phenomenology, that is of direct experience, encompassing perception of outside things, feeling, thinking, willing, etc., and of conceptual constructs, the reconstruction of direct experience in systems of symbols, culminating in science, it being well understood that there is no absolute gap between precept and concept, but that the two levels intergrade and interact (von Bertalanffy, 1967:94).

The "reconstruction of direct experience in systems of symbols" is another definition of GST. A combination of perspectivism and GST provides a method which may be designated as systematic perspectivism.

Since I have dealt with this method elsewhere (Ball, 1977) there is no need to go into much detail as to the actual practice of systemic perspectivism. What I am concerned about here is its applicability to the newer vision of social planning. It is especially applicable to the notion of societal learning, because one would expect information exchange to open a variety of feedback loops, leading to more efficient mapping of perceived reality and an emerging consensus as to its nature. Information is in fact sometimes defined as that input which increases order. Only when the public is deeply involved in mutual learning through some sort of transactive planning is it possible to open up information flow. Social engineering actually tends to close off information, giving a surface appearance of order which only serves to hide the disorder beneath.

My own experience, including evaluations of Community Action Agencies developed during the War on Poverty, assessments of curriculum impact, and evaluation of criminal justice programs, suggests that systemic perspectivism might be a powerful tool for policy studies. During the evaluation of one Community Action Agency, policy was seen not as an "experiment" (which implies tight control, clear resolution of the causality problem, and the power of the experimenter to select the experimental criteria) but rather as a new component introduced within an ongoing system. It became clear that the program of the Agency was signi-
ficantly affected by such external variables as the pattern of power in
the local community and that these forces had to be identified and their
effect somehow assessed. The approach which was worked out has been de-
scribed in detail elsewhere (Ball, 1970). It led to the construction of
a model of coalitions of power which represented a system operating in
accordance with specific rules but shifting its internal structure with
variations in issues, with disagreements endemic to the system itself,
and with the inputs of suprasystems external to the local community.
Different definitions of events were held by different factions, but the
foundations of these perspectives could be determined. The planners were
occasionally among the least objective participants in the "experiment."

Such an approach means that we move to make the neglected question
of process our central area of inquiry, using the merely technical ques-
tions of effort, effectiveness, impact, and cost effectiveness as subsidi-
ary aspects of the process itself. Such an approach would allow us to
direct the unrealized potential for evaluation to every stage of social
policy. Evaluative research has so far tended to be of little help here,
being generally limited to the implementation stage and the measurement
of input-output differences. This conception of evaluation is not based
upon an analysis of the data requirements underlying sound public policy,
but is simply the logical outcome of adherence to the social engineering
tradition. What is urgently needed is research and development with an
emphasis upon the development of more effective means of problem defini-
tion and policy formulation. We must deal with the entire process.

Evaluative research must itself be evaluated primarily in terms of
its applicability to contemporary planning problems and not as another
interesting academic exercise. Opportunities appear to be most promis-
ing if the evaluator can see research neither as the simple testing of
a priori hypotheses nor as an unguided "exploration," but as a continu-
ous self-corrective process of successive approximations leading toward
"grounded theory" (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). Among other things, this
means that theoretical sampling, a technique by which the process of
data collection is controlled by the emerging theory, must be employed
as a complement to the usual statistical sampling based on pre-selected
criteria. As I have tried to explain in greater detail elsewhere (Ball,
1977), the evaluator who studies process must use a flexible methodol-
ogy which combines the traditionally respected virtues of the detached,
rigorous data manipulating technicians with the practical abilities and
concerns of the skilled craftsman (Mills, 1959), the data gathering
opportunities of the strategically placed and highly trained participant
(Bruyn, 1966), the probing orientation of the clinician (Gouldner, 1965),
the skepticism of the investigative journalist (Sjoberg and Miller,
1973) and even the opportunistic hypothesis formulation of the detective
(Sanders, 1974). This will make him of greater value to the planner.

Conclusion

The new emphasis in social planning takes us away from the older social engineering tradition and toward a transactive planning which involves the public more closely. Planning is increasingly understood as a political and not a technical process, as a question of societal learning rather than imposed solutions based upon the selective perception of a technical elite. This change makes even more important the transition from positivism to a view of society as a socially constructed reality, a transition which is at the core of the contemporary philosophy of science. It means that the perspectivism of Mannheim can be taken not only as a basis for social planning, but also as a basis for its evaluation. Evaluative research can also draw upon general systems theory. The combination of these two traditions provides us with a systemic perspectivism which can greatly broaden the functions of evaluative research, so as to assist at every stage of social planning.

It is important to emphasize the distinction between systemic perspectivism and the technical "systems analysis" approach to social planning. The latter represents social engineering. It is a "new utopianism" in the sense that it carries the social engineering tradition to extremes, tending to emphasize efficiency over the humanitarian values of traditional utopian thought (Boguslaw, 1965). GST has now developed beyond the extremely mechanistic positivism of systems analysis. Integrated with perspectivism, GST may actually provide a means of transcending the epistemological and sociopolitical pitfalls of systems analysis without sacrifice of rigor.

Systemic perspectivism may allow us to take account of our lack of experimental controls, avoid spurious causal attributions, and assume a more politically sophisticated stance with respect to criteria selection. Even if we could attain it, do we really want to make the public into "subjects" for experimentation? We can continue to maintain the fiction here, or we may candidly acknowledge the lack of experimental controls and accept the components of social policy as open systems rather than closed experiments. A systemic perspectivism is capable of this, especially if the entire process is subjected to study. It will also allow the planners to involve the public fully without fear that this will "bias the experiment." There is no doubt that such a stance would subject many evaluators to pressures which technicians are not usually called upon to face. But unless the truth is acknowledged and means are found to operate in the light of reality, evaluative research will lose its leverage as a means of affecting public policy.
As to the problem of causality, systemic perspectivism stresses the extent to which "cause" and "effect" are matters of perspective. GST tells us that reality is reciprocally related through feedback processes, and these feedback processes involve a combination of value judgements and reality judgements. What social planning must do is put the two together. Technical social engineering will not help us with this sort of problem, but evaluative research which deals with the entire planning process can tell us a great deal.

It should be clear that different goals and assessments of means need not be viewed relativistically. Given that different groups observe social reality from different perspectives, it is still possible that some have a better vantage point than do others. If evaluation can be extended to the study of secondary and tertiary effects, it will be possible to provide those concerned with valuable information which may serve to clarify or even alter their perspectives. In this sense, information increases freedom of rational choice and may actually be thought of as a basis for a more objective value judgment by all concerned. This then is societal learning at its best. Although the subjective element cannot be eliminated completely, it can be rendered more objective to the extent that assumptions can be brought nearer alignment with reality as perceived by a system willing to expose itself to environmental input. Systemic perspectivism can facilitate this. It is as a whole a method of evaluative research almost ideally suited to the new problems of social planning and the new theories which offer political rather than technical solutions.

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THE LABELER AS AN INFLUENCE ON LABELING OUTCOMES*

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ABSTRACT

Focusing upon labeling processes at the level of interpersonal relations, this paper points out the general inattention to the labeler as an influence on labeling outcomes. In addition, recent empirical findings suggest not only that labeler variables may be associated with outcomes, but that different labelers are influenced in different ways by different factors in their interpersonal labeling. Consequently, an effort is made to incorporate knowledge from social perception theory into the labeling perspective in order to enhance our understanding of interpersonal labeling processes. Several labeler related variables which might be expected to influence labeling outcomes are suggested.

One of the major assumptions made by the labeling perspective is that the deviant label is applied discriminately to rule violators (Becker, 1963; Schur, 1971; Quinney, 1970); that is, while the deviant status may to some extent be earned, it may also be ascribed on the basis of characteristics of the subject other than his or her own deviant behavior. This paper focuses upon labeling processes at the level of interpersonal relations and, specifically, sources of variance in how and upon what bases the deviant label is applied. Particular attention is given to labeler related variables that may affect the labeling outcome.

The existing literature in the area of interpersonal labeling is reviewed briefly, noting a general lack of attention to the labeler as an influence on labeling outcomes. In addition, an implicit assumption of existing labeling theory, that all labelers operate in basically the same way, is called into question on the basis of recent empirical evidence. Accordingly, a revision of the theory of interpersonal labeling is proposed incorporating knowledge from the areas of person perception and cognition. The result, hopefully, will increase the theoretical understanding of labeler related influences in interpersonal labeling, and will also provide a more realistic basis on which to conduct further empirical investigations.

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THE CURRENT STATUS OF INTERPERSONAL LABELING THEORY

Investigations of interpersonal labeling

Much of the existing theoretical and empirical literature investigating biases in the labeling of rule breakers focuses upon status characteristics and/or other non-deviant behaviors of the labelee. For example, studies of informal and formal processing of deviants have usually focused upon labelee characteristics such as age, sex, race, social class and prior offense record (Short and Nye, 1958; Piliavin and Briar, 1964; Gould, 1969; Williams and Gold, 1972; and Cohen, 1974). Another group of studies investigating the determinants of police discretion in encounters with deviants included the physical appearance and demeanor of the labelee in addition to status characteristics (Skolnick, 1966; Wethman and Piliavin, 1967; Westley, 1970; Black and Reiss, 1970; and Garrett and Short, 1975). In a somewhat related vein, Dion (1972) examined the relationship of the physical attractiveness of the child to deviance labeling by an adult evaluator, and Shoemaker, South and Lowe (1973) found that the facial expressions of labelees sometimes influence others' judgements of guilt or innocence.

Other studies have taken a more situational perspective and have found that variables such as the presence of witnesses (Reiss, 1971; Black and Reiss, 1970), departmental policy and procedures (Cicourel, 1967; Wilson, 1968) and perceived risk to the community may differentially influence the labeling outcome.

The studies cited thus far have focused primarily upon the status characteristics and other non-deviant behaviors of subjects as potential determinants of labeling. Some writers have suggested, however, that such studies are too static and erroneously assume the labelee is a passive reactor in the labeling process. More specifically, the labelee may behave in such a way as to disavow or otherwise "manage" his public presentation of self (Davis, 1961; Goffman, 1963). Lorber (1967) characterizes the behaviors of the labelee as a "performance" intended to moderate the labeling outcome of the interaction. In an interesting observational study of the behavior of the visibly handicapped, Levitin (1973) illustrates how actors may seek to alter their public identity based upon the actual nature of the disability itself and the social context of the encounter.

The Influence of the Labeler

Interestingly, although attributes and behaviors of the labelee (e.g., social status, race, prior record, demeanor, performance) and situational factors (e.g., organizational procedures, presence of witnesses) have been considered to be potential influences on
labeling, there has been very little recognition of the importance of the labeler on the outcome of the interpersonal labeling process. One exception is the work of Scott (1970) on the construction of conceptions of stigma by professional experts. In that paper Scott asserts convincingly that both the prevailing cultural values and the professionalization and advanced training of the labeler may influence the labeling outcome. Outside the labeling literature per se, however, studies of person perception and clinical judgement regularly include the labeler as an important determinant of the labeling outcome (Tripodi and Miller, 1966; Moos and Clemes, 1967; Sarbin, et al, 1960).

Generally speaking, most empirical investigations also have ignored the influence of the labeler on labeling outcomes. Several studies are notable, however, by their explicit attention to the labeler. Steffensmeier (1974), for example, found that high-dogmatic adult subjects expressed more favorable attitudes toward law and order (e.g., "the courts have gone too far in making rules which protect the rights of people who get into trouble with the law") than did low-dogmatic subjects. Mitchell and Byrne (1973) found that under certain conditions high authoritarian jurors felt more certain of the guilt of the defendant and recommended more severe punishment. Case and Lingerfelt (1974), in a study of the effect of professional training on diagnostic judgements, concluded that increased training and experience were positively associated with the tendency to apply negative labels. Thus, preliminary evidence suggests that certain personality characteristics and the training and experience of the labeler may systematically affect the labeling outcome.

Several recent studies have been undertaken to assess the extent to which labeler related variables aid in the explanation of labeling discrepancies with respect to the anti-social behavior of children. The original hypotheses in these studies asserted that labeler variables such as authoritarianism, Machiavellianism, cognitive complexity, professional training, and general expectancies would be systematically related to labeling discrepancies. The findings supported the hypotheses in several instances. Specifically, it appears that professional training (Gingerich, et al, 1976), specific training in the labeling task, and labeler expectancies (Gingerich, et al, 1977; Gingerich, 1975) are related to the accuracy of behavioral labeling. Further, the authoritarianism of the labeler also seems to be associated with labeling discrepancies (Gingerich, 1975). Thus, there is some additional evidence to suggest that variables related to the labeler, as well as the labeelee and the labeling situation, contribute to our understanding of the labeling process in interpersonal relations.

Along with the labeler variables mentioned above, some of the more standard variables such as the race, social status, and prior
record of the labelee were included. Although these variables were
expected to be moderately associated with labeling discrepancies,
such was not the case. While these findings were not inconsistent
with some of the prior research which showed little or no relationship
between status characteristics and official labeling when offense is
held constant (Reiss, 1971; Black and Reiss, 1970; Black, 1970),
additional analysis was undertaken to determine if any alternative
explanations might emerge.

The Nomothetic Assumption in Labeling

The original design and analysis of the research set out to
predict labeling discrepancies for all labelers as a group. (Gingerich,
1975) That is, it was assumed that the same variables (e.g., social
status, race, prior labeling) would be useful in explaining
discrepancies for all labelers and that the direction and magnitude of
their influence would be essentially similar across all labelers. In the
course of the post hoc analyses, however, it became clear that this
assumption was not warranted. To the contrary, the data suggested
that different labelers were influenced by different variables in
different ways in their interpersonal labeling. Thus, it appeared that
several (but not all) labelers were influenced by subjects' race, but
whereas one labeler saw blacks as more anti-social than they were,
another saw whites as more anti-social than they were. The grouped
analyses, which examined the effect of subjects' race for all labelers
together, failed to show this relationship apparently because the
opposite effects of race for the two labelers cancelled each other
out. A similar situation obtained with subjects' social status and prior
labeling; both variables were influential for some labelers, but in
different ways. Thus, the post hoc empirical analyses suggested that,
although some variables are not significantly related to interpersonal
labeling when averaged across a group of labelers, they may have
significant relationships for individual labelers taken separately. This
research provided additional support, then, for the possibility that
labeling outcomes are influenced in part by labeler related variables.
Perhaps more importantly, it also suggested that the effects of
labeler related variables were somewhat unique or idiographic to each
labeler. Although existing labeling theory could accommodate the
earlier finding rather easily, it seemed to make no provision for the
possibility that different labelers functioned differently. Consequently,
it seemed important to try to develop a more adequate
theoretical formulation of interpersonal labeling, focusing more on
the labeler and his or her internal cognitive structure. Fortunately,
this topic has received considerable attention within psychology.
What follows, then, is largely an effort to apply existing person
perception theory to labeling theory, hopefully with the result of
enhancing our understanding of labeling processes at at the level of
interpersonal relations.
A THEORY OF INTERPERSONAL LABELING

The Cognitive Structure

The discussion which follows takes the view that interpersonal labeling is one form of perception in general, and person perception in particular. In addition, interpersonal labeling is viewed largely as an internal process; thus, the focus is primarily on what goes on inside the labeler as contrasted with variables in the external world.

A useful model of the perceptual process, called the "lens model", has been developed by Egon Brunswik (1952, 1956) and is shown graphically in Figure 1. The distal stimulus refers to the labelee, his characteristics and behaviors. The second component is the cognitive structure of the labeler. The cognitive structure contains the concepts or hypotheses which, according to rules of

cognitive structure

(labeler)

distal stimulus (labelee)

terminal stimulus (the "label")

Figure 1. The lens model of the labeling process. Adapted from Brunswik (1952).
combination, are used to classify or categorize the cues given off by the labelee. The final component of the lens model refers to the outcome of the labeling process, the label itself. To summarize, the cues given off by the initial stimulus (the labelee) are attended to and processed according to the cognitive structure of the labeler, with the outcome that the stimulus is or is not labeled as an instance of the category.

The lens model of interpersonal labeling places primary emphasis on the labeler and his or her cognitive structure. This is in marked contrast to the usual emphasis in interpersonal labeling theory on the status characteristics of the labelee. But while the lens model is a useful heuristic of the labeling process, it leaves unspecified the nature of the cognitive structure, the concepts or categories it contains, and the rules of combination employed.

The Category System. One aspect of the cognitive structure which is of primary importance for understanding interpersonal labeling is the category system of the labeler (Lofland, 1969). A category consists of a class or group of people or things which are similar in one or more ways. Categories are defined by their criteria or bases for membership. Specifically, categories of people may be formed on the basis of one or more of three kinds of criteria: the attributes (e.g., race, sex, age) or behavior (e.g., demeanor, dress) of the labelee or the behavior of others toward the labelee (e.g., arrest, commitment, scapegoating).

Categories vary according to the number and configuration of the criteria which define them. This is sometimes loosely referred to as the objectivity or subjectivity of the category or the degree to which it is directly observable. Theoretically, categories defined by relatively few and directly observable cues (e.g., height, sex) should be subject to less labeling error than more complex categories which require more inferences on the part of the labeler (e.g., aggression, psychosis). Thus, the characteristics of the category itself will to some extent determine the accuracy or reliability with which it can be applied.

Each perceiver or labeler has his or her own system of categories. Some of these categories may be largely personal and unique to the labeler, whereas other categories are socially defined and thus are shared to some extent by other labelers. Further, the criteria for a given category may be more or less unique to the individual labeler. For example, while there is some commonality among labelers on the criteria that define the category "delinquent," each individual labeler nevertheless may retain some uniqueness in his criteria. Theoretically, then, one source of variation in the labeling process has to do with the particular set of categories the labeler
employs and the criteria for each category. Both of these factors may be more or less unique to each individual labeler.

Rules of combination. At some point in the perceptual process, the labeler combines the cues given off by the labelee to form a judgement about the labelee, e.g., the labelee is "delinquent". What is not clear, however, is the way in which labelers combine cues. It appears that sometimes a linear model (e.g., additive or averaging) best explains the decision process, but in other cases a configural (e.g., patterned or Gestalt) model is more explanatory (Warr and Knapper, 1968). These differences are reflected in alternative definitions of deviance: the behavioral definition of delinquency uses a linear additive model whereas the syndrome definition appears to use a configural model (Hirschi, 1969).

The relevance of combinational rules for understanding interpersonal labeling is that different labelers may use different rules of combination. For example, one labeler may define delinquency behaviorally and combine cues in an additive fashion while another may employ a pattern model as in a syndrome definition of delinquency. Further, labelers who use a summative model may use different weights for the various cues, resulting in differences in the degree of delinquency ascribed to the individual.

Rules of Inference. The rules of inference determine which, if any, additional categories will be attributed to the labelee (Weldon et al, 1975). Lofland (1969) refers to this phenomenon as a clustering of categories. That labelers do infer additional properties to labelees is readily seen. For example, if we observe a male youth who is disrespectful of authority, unruly, and of lower social status or ethnic minority, we might categorize him as delinquent. If so, the label is inferred from the presence of other presumable categories, not from directly observed delinquent acts. It is still unknown whether these rules of inference follow a logical model or a probabilistic model or some other less systematic model, or whether individual labelers have their own unique rules of inference.

The importance of the concept of rules of inference is that it provides a theoretical explanation for certain kinds of errors in labeling. For example, the over-representation of the poor and minorities in social control institutions may reflect rules of inference that such individuals are more likely to be deviant, or in the past have been found to be deviant, rather than the fact that these individuals are deviant now. Thus, interpersonal mislabeling may reflect incorrect rules of inference or too much reliance upon inferences from related categories rather than direct observation of criteria relative to the category of interest.
The foregoing has outlined in highly schematic form the rudiments of the cognitive structure of the labeler. In addition to the cognitive structure itself, however, a variety of other factors may influence interpersonal labeling. Some of these factors influence the cognitive structure directly whereas others have to do with the amount and kind of cues emitted by the labelee in the situational context.

Sources of Variance in Interpersonal Labeling

Experience. No doubt one of the most important influences on interpersonal labeling is the experience of the labeler, particularly in the form of training or education. One effect of such experience is to increase and further specify the category system within the cognitive structure of the labeler (i.e., the dimensions and degree of discrimination) and perhaps to specify the rules of combination and the rules of inference. This is particularly true in professional clinical training where considerable emphasis is placed upon classification systems and the indicants or criteria for diagnoses. Thus, for example, the clinical psychologist has a highly developed cognitive structure regarding categories within the referential domain "psychopathologies" whereas the lay person does not. This is not to say, however, that there is high agreement between psychologists as to the criteria or rules of combination for categories such as schizophrenia or character disorder (Stuart, 1970). Nevertheless, theoretically it should be possible to train for a high level of agreement and, consequently, relatively high reliability in the application of the category.

Personality Traits. Another potential source of variability in the labeling process is the relatively stable personality traits of the labeler. Three such traits which might be expected to influence labeling are authoritarianism, dogmatism and cognitive complexity. Authoritarian or dogmatic labelers may make less accurate judgements because their need for clarity and certainty may lead to premature closure in the labeling process (Adorno, et al, 1950; Jones, 1954; Steffensmeier, 1974). Authoritarianism or dogmatism would be expected to influence labeling only to the extent that not all relevant data are immediately present and easily combined to reach a judgement. Cognitively complex labelers have more dimensions in their cognitive structure and the ability to make finer discriminations along those dimensions, thus they would be expected to be more accurate in their labeling (Bieri, et al, 1966; Bieri, 1961). The influence of cognitive complexity would be moderated to the extent that training develops or further delineates the cognitive structure of the labeler. One additional labeler related variable which may be associated with labeling outcomes is threshold, defined as the
propensity to attribute behaviors to subjects based upon limited information (Reed and Jackson, 1975).

Motivational Factors. Different categories within the cognitive structure may have different salience for the labeler. These differences may in turn affect the outcome of the labeling process. The hypothesis-testing theory of perception advanced by Bruner (1951, 1957) and Postman (1951) provides a model for incorporating motivational effects on the labeling outcome. According to this theory, perception is a three-phase process. It begins with a hypothesis (in the cognitive structure of the labeler) that influences not only what the labeler sees but also what he looks for. Next, the labeler takes in and processes cues from the distal stimulus relevant to the perceptual hypothesis. Finally, the labeler seeks to determine whether the distal stimulus confirms the hypothesis, that is, whether it is an instance of deviance. If so, the perceptual process is concluded. If not, the hypothesis is revised according to the learning that took place in the "trial-and-check" phase, and the entire process is repeated until a stable percep or label is formed.

Perceptual hypotheses might be thought of as labeling hypotheses of the labeler which "serve to select, organize and transform the stimulus information that comes from the environment" (Postman, 1951: 250). They develop from past experience and their strength is a function of several determinants: (1) the frequency of past confirmation, (2) monopoly — the fewer competing hypotheses, the stronger the present one will be, (3) cognitive consequences — the more consistent with theory, the stronger it will be, (4) personal consequences — the extent to which the hypothesis reflects the goals of the labeler, and (5) social consequences — the extent to which a given hypothesis is in agreement with the hypotheses of other labelers. According to Bruner, the stronger the perceptual hypothesis, the greater the likelihood that it will become aroused and therefore influence the labeling process. Further, less congruent information will be required to confirm it and more contradictory information will be necessary to refute it.

The significance of the hypothesis-testing theory of perception is clear. When one is trained to see deviance, is paid to identify and treat it, has seen it often, and is reinforced personally or by colleagues for identifying it, the likelihood increases that one might "see" or label deviance that has little or no objective basis.

The Situational Context. The social ecology of the labeling interaction can also influence the outcome. The most obvious effect has to do with the availability of cues. For example, to what extent does the context restrict access to the relevant cues. Within certain
limits, the more information the more accurate the judgement can be. A positive kind of situational influence comes from the demand characteristics present in the environment (Orne, 1969). Factors such as organizational or policy constraints may require the labeler to use certain categories or apply them according to predefined ways. This may be particularly true in social control processing agencies such as the courts where operating procedures may have a major impact on labeling. In fact, the presumed over-riding effect of organizations' operating procedures may in part account for the disregard of the individual labeler in labeling outcomes. The influence of others present in the environment may also bring pressure on the labeler to make an inaccurate judgement, as in Asch's (1952) well-known studies of impression formation. The effect of the environmental context in conjunction with the behavior of the labelee is explicitly taken into account in attribution theory (Jones, et al, 1972; Kelley, 1973). Here the emphasis is upon the person-situation pattern of cues and its effect on perception, particularly the attribution of causality for the actor's behavior.

**The Emergent Interaction.** One additional and potentially significant source of variation in interpersonal labeling relates to the emergent aspects of the labelee-labeler interaction itself. The labeling process is a situational, dynamic and highly interactive process (Prus, 1975). In actual interactions, labelees are also labelers, and labelers are labelees. Thus, each influences the symbolic and labeling processes of the other, over and above the cognitive structures that had pre-existed, in ways that no doubt are real but are essentially unpredictable. The implication of this is that while it may be possible to improve considerably our understanding of interpersonal labeling processes, it will never be possible to predict a priori the specific outcomes with complete accuracy.

**CONCLUSION**

In contrast to the usual emphasis on labelee characteristics and organizational processing, the present paper has focused on the labeler as an equally important influence on labeling outcomes. Specifically, attention has focused upon the cognitive structure and processes within the labeler that may affect interpersonal labeling. While much of the theory and research on labeler influences originated in social psychology, there seems to be no inherent problem in incorporating it into labeling theory. Rather, it appears that the labeler, and particularly the internal processes occurring within the labeler, was simply overlooked in most labeling theory.
In addition to the importance of the labeler generally in predicting outcomes, there is growing evidence that individual labelers differ in how and on what bases they label others. Some of the dimensions along which labelers might be expected to be unique are suggested, but the specific ways in which labelers differ is still largely a matter of speculation.

The implications of the above are several. First, investigations of labeling, particularly at the level of interpersonal relations, must attend to the sources of variance related to the labeler. Thus, while it may be important to consider status characteristics of the labelee and other situational factors, it is likely that the effects of such external variables will in turn be moderated or influenced in some way by each labeler. Although these suggestions recall the long-standing idiographic versus nomothetic controversy (Allport, 1962), there is already some precedent for incorporating individual differences in predicting labeling outcomes and, indeed, such an approach gives promise of enhancing considerably our understanding of labeling processes.

NOTES

1 The approach taken in this paper assumes the positivist view that deviance and labeling are two independent but related processes; that is, an act can be categorized as deviant on the basis of predetermined, agreed-upon criteria which are independent of immediate social reactions. Thus, Lemert (1951) talks about the warranted portion of the social reaction, and Scheff (1974) refers to the magnitude of societal reactions that are independent of the patient's psychiatric condition. While this view of deviance and labeling is counter to the subjective or phenomenological view taken by other labeling theorists (Quinney, 1970; Lofland, 1969), the investigation of the differential application of deviant labels necessarily presupposes some objective standard of deviant or potentially deviant behavior. For a more thorough discussion of the issue of warrant in labeling theory, see the recent article by Rains (1975).

2 Arthur D. Shulman was instrumental in suggesting alternative hypotheses and methods of statistical analysis of the data.

3 Space limitations permit only a highly selective and simplified presentation of the relevant theory and research in the area of person perception. For a more thorough review which is more cognizant of the subtleties and complexities of the perceptual aspects in interpersonal labeling, the reader is referred to Weldon, et al. (1975). General sources on person perception include Bruner and Tagiuri (1954), Hastorf, et al (1970), Jones, et al (1972), and Tagiuri (1969).
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THE WORKER/CLIENT RELATIONSHIP: RELEVANT ROLE THEORY

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ABSTRACT

The historic concept of "friendly visitor" has blurred the distinction of professional and personal in worker/client relationships. Current social trends and social problems as well as recent theory applications in practice have made these distinctions harder to identify and maintain. Role theory can be used to analyze behavioral indicators of objective and subjective components of relationship.

Relationship Revisited

In social work no term has been used more frequently, but less defined, than relationship. Mary Richmond, in Social Diagnosis, did not deal directly with the concept and only hinted at it in arguing that the purpose of the social worker is to influence and to know the client in order to serve. More recently, Halmos has described this as the worker using his "personality to find out, to understand, and to learn." Prior to and during the period of Richmond's work, the concept "friendly visitor" was used instead of relationship. The association of the terms friendship and relationship led to confusion about what constituted a professional relationship. The confusing association persists and is epitomized by Boyer's statement that the
professional self necessitates the worker becoming "a friend to the client, but not a friend of the client." \( ^5 \) Freud, soon after publication of Richmond's Social Diagnosis, began to influence the practice of social work in this country, and one of his major efforts was to objectify the relationship between the worker and client. Later Otto Rank influenced social work practice through the work of the "functionalists" which subjectified relationship and made it the center and purpose of social work practice. To this day, workers trained in this theoretical model speak of all social work practice in the context of relationship as opposed to the "diagnostic school" which views relationship as a tool in good practice. \( ^6 \)

All the writings since have been an attempt to balance the objective and subjective components of relationship. Objectivity implies the worker not losing sight of factors such as client needs, problems, resources, and motivations while working to ameliorate weaknesses in psycho-social functioning. Subjectivity, on the other hand, has been characterized as the worker acting out his personal values, needs, and motivations to focus on factors more significant to him than the client. In this context, Hamilton views professional relationships not as just friendly associations, but controlled behavior towards the end of serving the psycho-social needs of clients. \( ^7 \) Biestik defines relationship in terms of its purpose in helping the client achieve better adjustment between himself and his environment. \( ^8 \) Perlman argues that, upon entering social work, the worker is required to face up to relationship for the first time. For her, professional relationship involves two persons with some common interest who interact with feeling. \( ^9 \) Perlman goes on to discuss professional relationship through drawing examples from ordinary human interactions. Without defining relationship as such, Hollis describes it as a means of communication, a set of attitudes, and a set of responses expressed as behavior. She places emphasis on the worker's positive involvement to promote continued commitment on the part of the client while arguing that a bland uninvolved attitude leads to client discontinuance. \( ^10 \) In elaborating on attitudes, she draws on the work of Garrett and makes the distinction of realistic and unrealistic. These concepts are explained as appropriate and inappropriate reactions to the situation on the part of the client and the worker that contain elements of transference and countertransference.

Recent writers have not deviated much from these earlier conceptions except to place more emphasis on objectivity as a crucial component of relationship. This is probably due to increased emphasis on the scientific approach to and professionalization of practice. The
emphasis on the concept of objectivity in relationship is illustrated by the repeated use of the term in one form or another in the writing of Brill,12 Boyer,13 Goldstein,14 Pincus and Minahan,15 Kadushin,16 and Siporin.17 The trend in conceptualizing relationship has been in the area of viewing it as special and identifying the uniqueness, while at the same time recognizing the common characteristics that are shared with other forms of human relationship. Social work relationships are generally viewed as purposeful, client-need oriented, time limited, honest, genuine and realistic, and unequal. The element of inequality serves as the basis for heavy emphasis on objectivity which is usually discussed as the degree of involvement or professional distance the worker must appropriately maintain. All of the above-mentioned commentators on relationship approach the subject from the standpoint of professional objectivity and use the term specifically except Kadushin, who discusses the same principle but uses the alternate term of "disciplined subjectivity."18 The integration of aspects of professional relationship with objectivity is perceived as accomplishing the purpose of the relationship by the worker maintaining objectivity and stability through "... a certain degree of emotional and social distance, and a greater degree of authority and control, self-awareness and self-discipline..." than is expected of the client.19

The purpose of this paper is to explore, through empirical referents and the use of the sociological concept of role distance, appropriate degrees of objectivity in social work professional relationships. Using the perspective of sociological role theory to explain relationship, the specific concept of role distance is applied to what does and should take place between worker and client. In recent literature, social workers have been attempting to apply various theories of human behavior to practice. In this effort, relationship is rarely discussed in connection with these theories. The trend, intended or unintended, is to discuss separately relationship and application of theory to practice. This paper is an attempt to discuss relationship within the context of a theoretical perspective. Role theory is used because of its emphasis on the varying abilities and capabilities participants bring to a role, and their own unique interpretation of the role which determines their style of interaction. Role theory places emphasis on expectations evident in micro social units, and it ultimately attempts to account for types of role performance by individuals.20
Role Theory and Relationship

The smallest unit of social structure is a norm which is required or acceptable behavior for a given interactional situation. Norms provide standards for behavior as well as standards for judging behavior. Roles are clustered subsets of norms that refer to expectations for individuals who hold a particular position in a group. Roles assume relationship since every role presumes some counter-role. The term role has been differentiated as conventional roles dealing with broad, structural conceptions of everyday performance, and interpersonal roles that define unique human interaction in specific roles and the resulting expectations. Interpersonal roles will be the focus of our analysis of the worker/client relationship. Kinch has described relationship as parallel to Cooley's formulation of primary and secondary groups. Primary relationships involve an atmosphere in which involved individuals exchange intimate knowledge, act and react with some degree of spontaneity, and provide realistic conceptions of themselves and what others expect of them. Primary relationships possess an element of quality and involve a degree of unique emotional attachment. Secondary relationships are based on a necessity of cooperation that exists for the fulfillment of aims or goals of the individual participants. Secondary relationships usually involve interaction of short duration with little emotional or personal involvement. Social workers engage in both types of relationships. Depending upon the setting and how the situation is defined, some workers engage exclusively in primary or secondary relationships, while other practitioners alternate between the two forms. A para-professional, food-stamp interviewer in a welfare department engages exclusively in secondary relationships with clients, while a psychotherapist in private practice is more likely to develop only primary relationships with patients. A caseworker in a welfare department or a mental health clinic is found to use both types, depending upon the situation. Frequently, workers who only have brief contact with clients mistakenly minimize the importance of relationship, while social workers who interact with clients over long periods of time tend to overemphasize the importance of relationship.

Primary social work relationships can be associated more with psychotherapeutic efforts to change personality and patterns of social relations, while secondary relationships deal more with provision of concrete, tangible services. Both types involve varying emotional, temporal, and structural elements. The emotional element is best conceptualized as having objective and subjective components that determine the degree of authenticity which has been described by Levitsky.
and Simkin as a "State of individuation, of truly being one's self."\(^{25}\) Authenticity can be operationalized as the appropriate role blending of objectivity and subjectivity through professional closeness and professional distance. In the objective mode, the worker maximizes professional closeness and personal distance, while in the subjective mode, personal closeness and professional distance are maximized. Using such a framework for relationship, we have the basis for distinguishing helping relationships and other ordinary and extraordinary relationships. So that the objective quality of a practitioner's professional relationship will set the tone of interaction with a troubled client which will differ from the conversation that might take place with a similarly troubled relative. The social worker might feel more competent in the former, but much less comfortable in the latter.

**Role Embracement, Role Distance, and Relationship**

The relevant degrees of objectivity and subjectivity in professional relationships are difficult to assess and are highly variable given the nature, quality, structure, and duration of the relationship. The problem can be approached from the concepts of norms, roles, and role distance. Social workers are trained to perform according to certain norms, and there are professional expectations regarding role performance. The social worker is expected to treat the client with dignity and respect, accept his right to self-determination, insure his confidentiality, guarantee his privacy, and not judge his behavior. In the role of social worker, the practitioner is to demonstrate warmth and acceptance, show interest and understanding, be genuine, and intervene at a level appropriate to the client's needs. These expectations are not necessarily associated with subjective relationships. All of us enter personal relationships where we do not make pledges of confidentiality or privacy, do not show understanding, do not act genuine, and do not directly intervene. So that objective relationships frequently demand more of us than subjective relationships in terms of performance and involvement. A crucial question in an objective relationship becomes: how much of the self are we going to make available to the situation? Goffman refers to this as role embracement and explains that, "To embrace a role is to disappear completely into the virtual self available in the situation, to be fully seen in terms of the image, and to confirm expressively one's acceptance of it. To embrace a role is to be embraced by it."\(^{25}\) Objectivity is expressed in many forms in social work training to regulate the degree to which the worker embraces the social work role so that the norm against "over-identification" is not violated;\(^{25}\) but in theory, this is more
easily described than it is attained in practice. Goffman calls this expressed separateness between the individual and his role, role distance. The person performs the role but uses certain behaviors to control and limit the extent to which the role is embraced. The extreme of this formulation would be the social worker who is attached to or assigned the role and fails to embrace it, such as the social worker who conceives himself as a warm, loving, giving person, but who is actually cold, rejecting, and destructive. Role distance is maintained through such behaviors as nonchalant competence, style of dress, diverting conversation, making jokes, and acting visibly bored. At the other extreme, professional subjectivity is that aspect of social work practice that finds the worker losing sight of his function and professional role and expectations to the extent that his own needs, concerns, and desires enter into the relationship at an inappropriate level.

While it has not been discussed as such, professional role distance has been a subject of concern in recent literature. Writers have been pointing to more active involvement on the part of the worker to promote change in clients as opposed to the more detached worker emphasized in the Freudian conception. The shift has been away from the traditional interpretative model where the aloof worker offers interpretation, insight, and comment, to an experiential model where the worker is actively engaged in the growth and change process. This new conception has been emerging without concomitant development of adequate behavioral referent for the worker to use as an assessment measure of appropriate level of "making the self available to the situation." Stebbins, building on the work of Goffman, has developed the dichotomous distinction of "major and minor role distance" that can be helpful in determining appropriate levels of objectivity in social work practice. Major role distance refers to the attitudes and behaviors that occur in highly threatening situations, while minor role distance develops in moderately or slightly threatening situations. In a major role distance posture, the worker can respond with professional detachment, or go to the other extreme of total involvement and take over by relating the situation to himself. A worker's account of his response to a patient's statement of suicidal threat in a group treatment situation involving seven depressed patients illustrates a possible differentiation of major and minor role distance:

Near the close of this group session, Mary said she again felt the desire to do away with herself. These same kind of feelings had perviously resulted in her
hospitalization. She felt that a re-hospitalization would not help, refused to consider that as a possibility, and admitted that during her last hospitalization, she had to struggle against taking a razor blade and slashing her wrists while on a weekend visit home. She was overwrought because she felt 'going back to the hospital would not help and nothing was going to change at home.' The group members were at a loss to help Mary. The group seemed to be looking to me to say or do something. I remember feeling like saying, 'You know, there is a strong possibility Mary will do away with herself before we meet again next week. We might not ever see her again. I hope this is not the case, but it could happen. Does anybody want to say anything to Mary in case we don't see her again?' What I have learned about working to keep people from doing harm to themselves and others prevented me from acting on my true feelings, and the only genuine recourse I felt I had in the situation. My values and feelings were in conflict. Instead of acting on my feelings, I feebly encouraged Mary by saying, 'See you next week!'

In this situation, the worker engaged in major role distance to deal with a highly threatening situation. If the worker could have moved to a minor role distance position and acted on the authentic feelings of the professional self, it is possible that the entire situation could have been restructured to the point other group members would have been able to express concern for the patient and demonstrate that there was genuine regard and caring for her.

Within major and minor role distance, Stebbins identifies the subcategories of true and false role distance behavior. In true role distance behavior, the expectations are genuinely disliked and expressed, while in false role distance behavior, the actor attempts to create the impression he disapproves when he is actually attracted to the expectations. So that a true role distance would be appropriate when a child-abusing client seeks approval of such behavior from the worker. The worker is put in a more difficult position in false role distance when, for example, a young marijuana user seeks the sanction of the worker. When the worker has been or is a marijuana user, false role distancing becomes an issue, because frequently, the client's expectations are sought as approval through asking the worker, "Do you do drugs?" If the worker admits to past drug usage, he is fearful of
becoming too identified with the client, and if he denies drug use, he takes the risk of being rejected or dismissed as being "straight" and unable to understand. Appropriate false role distance involves expressing to the client serious concern about heavy drug dependence, and at the same time, communicating acceptance of and concern for the drug-dependent client. This form of role conflict is especially found among paraprofessional drug counselors since the clients and workers are alike in age, cultural background, and developmental life struggles.

False role distancing is frequently appropriate in social work relationships but often hard to maintain. As inflation-induced deprivation increases, societal alienation spreads, and bureaucratic complexity promotes frustration and confusion, the worker frequently experiences many of the same problems encountered and articulated by the client, opening the way for the worker to totally embrace the role and join in intellectualizing the negative aspects of modern society rather than constructively using the relationship to promote change and growth that benefits both client and worker. The following case record excerpt illustrates this point:

During the initial interview, Jane described how she thought she was taking the right step by divorcing her husband of eight years. She had struggled through college while caring for a family and received much opposition from her husband, who held no value for education. Upon finishing college, she realized she and her husband had 'grown apart' and had seen this coming for a long time. She became depressed when she could not get a job and upon applying for many jobs, she was required to take a typing test. Interviewers frequently offered her jobs far below her qualifications and salary requirements to support herself and her children. She became so frustrated she 'stormed out' of an interview yesterday and cried all night before coming here today, submerged in regrets and a feeling of failure. As the session progressed, I found myself emotionally withdrawing from the room. It was a really strange feeling until I suddenly realized I had gone through a similar stage myself and was responding to seeing my recent past experience in this person. I reflected upon some of the similar interviews I had in seeking a social work position. At first I felt like just unloading with all my experiences and joining her in attacking the
system and its treatment of women, thought better of it, composed myself, and simply stated I understood before telling her I could work with her around organizing the job-hunting efforts. I asked her to bring her resume to the next appointment and assured her I could provide help in how to handle interviews where her qualifications were not appropriately recognized by potential employers. I did share that I had a similar experience and was able to resolve it with help. She expressed relief and renewed hope.

In this situation, the worker avoided total role embracement, consciously injected objectivity into her role, and engaged in minor false role distance in order to be effective in helping the client.

Role distance in professional relationships generally takes three forms: attitudes, expectations, and behaviors. Using these three areas in connection with major/minor and true/false role distance, relationships can be analyzed and worker/client interaction assessed. Attitudes, expectations and behaviors are interrelated and influence each other. Verbal expressions of workers that reflect attitudes and expectations can be used to indicate role distance. For example, some worker comments we have observed from interview content analysis are: "If I were in your shoes, I am not sure I would feel that way"; "Let me try to set aside my values for a minute"; "You have had it rougher than me, but ..."; "If you want my professional opinion ..."; and, "What you described is common among people who have drinking problems." Language itself is a social act, and these examples, in one way or another, convey to a client a certain role distance recognized by the worker; but at the same time, the first three statements indicate efforts to contract or expand the role distance to relate more directly to the client and his problem. Extreme statements of role distance are expressed by some workers in the absence of the client and demonstrate the attitudes as well as the expectations of the worker: "You really can't do anything for these people [clients], because they don't want to do anything for themselves," or "You have to start with the premise that they [clients] all lie, then you will be okay." There is no role embracement here, and one can picture easily the nature of the relationship the worker, who holds these attitudes and expectations, has with clients.

Behaviors that indicate maximum role distance are placing a desk between the worker and client, using large rectangular tables for
groups with the worker sitting at the "head" of the table, an office full of bookcases with texts on the shelves, having the client sent or brought to the interview room, placing degrees on the office wall, and use of last names. Behaviors that lessen role distance are worker and clients sitting face-to-face without obstacles between them, greeting clients in the waiting room and personally escorting them to the interview room, use of first names, and conducting interviews in the client's home. Certain attempts to verbally overcome role distance can have the opposite of the desired effect. The worker who uses the colloquial and specialized vocabulary and jargon of the client creates an artificiality that can deter development of an effective relationship. Instead, the worker should use ordinary, natural language that is free of technical and professional terms that might be meaningless to the client. There are indications that natural or true role distance contributes to the change process. Halmos discusses this aspect of relationship by calling attention to research in support of Homans' hypothesis that interacting individuals tend to become more alike over time. If there is to be conscious use of the professional self to promote change in the client, then the worker must offer the client a differential model for identification at given points in the relationship. This view in part deviates from the traditional social work belief that the more similar the worker is to the client, the more likely the client is to invest in the relationship. Tessler and Polansky's research produced results that raise questions about this traditional view because they found that dissimilarity led to greater verbal accessibility. From a role theory perspective, we are not surprised at this finding, and a young, black social worker's comments illustrate this point:

When I went to work here at the clinic, my supervisor decided to start me off by giving me all black clients since, as she put it, "I could identify the problems more easily and accomplish more in less time." I agreed and really thought it would be so easy for me, and I was relieved that I didn't have a lot of white clients to start out with. Well, it was terrible. It was a mistake. Since I was black, the clients felt they didn't have to explain anything. They would get angry because I didn't know exactly what they were talking about. I even had one client tell me I was dumb. After awhile, my supervisor realized the problem and gave me a mixed caseload; but in the meantime, I was so frustrated, I almost quit.

If this supervisor and worker would have used role distancing proposi-
tions to analyze the situation and could have developed some appropri-
ate role distance behaviors, a great deal of frustration could have 
been avoided.

Conclusion

It is believed by the authors that a professional relationship is an essential component and tool in offering aid to clients, but the worker must come to grips with what Halmos has called "The paradox of a noninvolved involvement."34 The concept of role dis-
tance has been used to describe what is considered appropriate degrees of sharing and interaction on the part of the worker. Much study re-
mains in terms of explicating how modern theories of human behavior as applied to social work practice view relationships. No systematic comparative analysis of Freudian, Existential, behaviorism, and sys-
tems theories has been done with respect to relationship. With the explosion of diverse human behavior theories, social workers have been preoccupied matching their practice with theory. Attention needs to be given to applying and developing these theories by relating them to practice. We have attempted to do this through use of role theory and the concept of role distance. Such applications need to be expanded, especially in the case of role theory, since it lends itself to analysis of worker/client relationships. Additional propositions taken from role theory such as role conflict (conflicts among expectations), role strain (impossibility of meeting all expectations), and anomie (lack of clear expectations)35 need to be elaborated in the context of social work practice. Also, the concept of role distance needs to be studied in relation to client behavior and interaction with the worker. Comprehensive theoretical applications of this nature can contribute significantly to further understanding of the social work relationship.

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SOCIAL WELFARE INTEREST GROUPS:
AN UNDERUTILIZED RESOURCE
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ABSTRACT

This paper addresses the need for increased political activity by the professional social work community in order to enhance its own status and to promote the growth of the social welfare institutions required by our clientele. It is not a polemic but an attempt to bare the relationship between social welfare bureaucracies and the political system. The results of a study on interest group behavior are reported. Social workers, as an interest group, can be more effective in advancing the goals of the profession if they have a better understanding of the political process and thereby maximize the impact of their limited resources.

Form has noted that there has been an impressive growth in welfare institutions in America, despite the political reticence of welfare professionals and the political apathy of their clientele.¹ He attributes the growth to worldwide and domestic pressures articulated by many poorly organized groups that recognized that the existing mechanisms could not address the problems facing society. Once the bureaucracies were created to administer the programs, professional social workers validated the services by training their personnel in schools of social work and by staffing the agencies but then proceeded to "strike a neutral pose" in line with traditional norms governing professional behavior.²

A contemporary view of social services in an industrial society equates expanded programs with productivity
increases, and a rise in living standards. Services are not seen as transitory but necessary to the functioning of a modern society. In this sense they are supportive of the social and economic order but are nevertheless under attack by conservative groups that purport to have similar goals. In a rapidly expanding economy, social services may keep abreast of expansion in other areas but during periods of slow growth or stagnation, they are prime targets for curtailment. Neutrality at that time may be consistent with one's view of professional role but is it consistent with client need or even professional self-interest? I think not.

This paper addresses the need for political activity by the professional community. It is not a polemic but an attempt to bare the relationship between social welfare bureaucracies and the political system, and to increase our understanding of the role that interest groups play in the process. The latter objective is achieved by reporting the results of a study conducted on social welfare interest groups. While the professional association has increased its political activity of late, some observers have expressed the view that the majority of social workers will not participate. Form shares this view for he believes that the profession "tends to breed a type that is timid, conservative, unimaginative, and easily co-opted by the tough-minded." At best this view is impressionistic and it is important to keep in mind that the same things were once said about teachers. Few would now characterize teachers and their associations as apolitical and there is no reason to believe that social workers could not change their image if they were convinced that it was in their best interest to do so.

A Pluralist Perspective of the Political System

Zald's contribution to a "sociology of community organization" is helpful in demonstrating how agencies shape professional practice and how in turn their activities are
curtailed by internal and external events. The political science literature adds to these insights by spelling out the role of bureaucracies in political decision-making which not only includes their clientele but other actors and interest groups as well. From the pluralist's perspective, the bureaucracies share power with other actors while they continually strive for a state of autonomy. No single elite dominates the governmental or political system. The system is seen as being vigorously competitive with numerous contestants vying against one another for the prizes that are an out-growth of political activity.

Sayre and Kaufman noted that there are a multiplicity of decision centers consisting of two parts: "A 'core group' at the center, invested by the rules with the formal authority to legitimize decisions....and a constellation of 'satellite groups' seeking to influence the authoritative issuances of the core group." Interest groups are satellite groups, in constant competition or in alliances with each other, pressing their claims on the core groups presiding over the decision centers of the general organs of government.

Utilizing an example of a welfare department in a large city, this pluralistic view of decision-making may be schematically stated as depicted in Figure I. This paradigm, with a few modifications, can be replicated for other subsystems of the political system like housing or education. While no single elitist group rules over all these subsystems, each subsystem attracts its own elites that specialize in that area of interest. Ordinarily these elites govern without much interference from outsiders. However, when a good deal of conflict is generated over a policy issue, decision-making is opened to public view and new actors become involved. Political actors may have legal authority to intervene or exercise their influence informally. Their roles are modified by the rules of the system which enhance the competition among them and confer advantages to some and not to others. The rules include:
1. State and Federal Constitution
2. State and Federal Agency rules and regulations
3. State and Federal Court decisions
4. State and Federal statutes
5. Customs or informal arrangements.

To maintain a degree of autonomy in this highly competitive atmosphere, bureaucratic officials seek allies to temper the intrusion of other actors (especially those in the executive and legislative branches) in their internal affairs. Rourke states:

A first and fundamental source of power for administrative agencies in American society is their ability to attract outside support. Strength in a constituency is no less an asset for an American administrator than it is for a politician, and some agencies have succeeded in building outside support as formidable as that of any political organization. The lack of such support severely circumscribes the ability of an agency to achieve its goals, and may even threaten its survival as an organization.9

The clientele of an agency, that is, groups whose interests are strongly affected by an agency's programs10 are natural sources of support and opposition. Interest groups sometimes prefer to work in the bureaucratic rather than the legislative arena where they may have less influence. Bureaucrats also have discretion in administering their programs due to the ambiguous language of some legislation and the discretionary powers specifically granted to agency officials by the legislature.11 Therefore, groups that are interested in the implementation of programs must have influence at the bureaucratic level.

While the administrative power evolves from technical knowledge, expertise, and sources other than mobilized interest groups, these groups do provide a unique source of support. Sharkansky describes interest group aid as follows:
...First, the group can take a position on an issue which coincides with a position held by administrators, but which administrators cannot take publicly because it would offend their chief executive or important members of the legislature. Second, interest groups can support an agency's request for funds or statutory authority with the executive and the legislature or can help the agency resist undesirable directives from the executive or the legislature. An interest group can make an argument and build public support for a position that cannot be articulated by an administrator who is currently the target of executive or legislative hostility."

**Study Design**

A definition of terms is essential before one embarks on a study of interest groups. According to Truman, an interest group "refers to any group that, on the basis of one or more shared attitudes, makes certain claims upon other groups in the society for the establishment, maintenance or enhancement of forms of behavior that are implied by the shared attitudes." This definition is broad and designed to be consistent with his attempt to explain everything that happens in the political system in terms of groups. If "shared attitudes" become the significant criteria, then everyone can be theoretically affiliated with an interest group - government officials, elected leaders, the unorganized, and the like.

Eckstein calls this approach to the study of political behavior metaphysical:

As used by its more extravagant exponents, group theory tends indeed to come nothing more than a language, based on the plausible but arbitrary metaphysic that in politics the ultimate "real", the component alike of individuals and institutions,
the unit which really "acts" and underlies ideas, is the group - not individuals, interactions, institutions, or larger political systems. Nothing can escape the clutches of this metaphysics if only one stretches it far enough, but precisely because of this nothing is illuminated by it either. 14

Schattschneider agrees with this assessment and attempts to set boundaries or limit the scope of the subject in order to distinguish it from other subjects. He begins by differentiating between public and special interests. The former "refers to general or common interests shared by all or by substantially all members of the community." 15 This is consistent with the "community of interest" thesis, a requirement of a democratic society. The implication of special interests is that only a few people or a faction of the community share that interest. 16 If this distinction is not made and attempts are made to explain everything in terms of special interests, the subject loses its boundaries and could lead to the conclusion that people have a special interest in the public interest.

The next step is to limit the subject even further. Schattschneider suggests that the field of study should be the organized, special interest groups and "leave the rest to someone else". 17 The advantages of this approach are obvious; they are known, identifiable and recognized and they are all exclusive. The study of the subject becomes manageable if the researcher focuses on those groups with a demonstrated interest in politics evidenced by formal organizations having memberships, bylaws and officers.

This view does not attempt to explain all political behavior nor does it assume that all interests are articulated. Pressure group politics "makes sense only as the political instrument of a segment of the community. It gets results by being selective and biased; if everyone
got into the act the unique advantages of this form of organization would be destroyed, for it is possible that if all interests could be mobilized the results would be a stalemate. 18

It is possible to further refine the definition of interest groups by distinguishing them from pressure groups and attempting to classify them by objective characteristics or by shared attitudes. This exercise may prove productive in other studies but not this one. The focus suggested by Schattschneider - the formally organized, special interest group - was the unit of observation in this study.

Arriving at a definition of interest groups, it now became necessary to observe their political activity. The years between 1968 and 1972 in New York City were chosen. Four issues with educational and broad social welfare concerns were selected and each conflict was contested in a different arena (e.g., the legislature, the courts). The issues remained on the public agenda for a long period of time, thereby giving groups an opportunity to become involved if they chose to do so.

In keeping with Schattschneider's suggestion, the interest groups chosen for study had the following characteristics:

1. They were formally organized and exhibited a degree of stability and cohesiveness over time (at least one year). Ad hoc groups were not considered.

2. They all demonstrated an interest in the issues based on past behavior.

3. They were citywide organizations.

In all, nineteen organizations19 were chosen that could be categorized as civic, educational, religious, civil rights, ethnic or economic groups. Some would fit comfortably under more than one designation. Attempts were made to
get a broad representation of organizations, but it is not known if they are truly representative of all interest groups in the city. If the selection of a representative sample was attempted, important groups who were intimately involved in the incidents being studied may have been eliminated.

The data were gathered from interviews with the staffs of the interest groups which usually involved more than a single visit to each agency and more than one staff member being interviewed. In addition, interviews were conducted with businessmen, staff members of public agencies, union officials, lobbyists, attorneys, city employees, and members of the state legislature. An unstructured open-ended schedule was used. Additional data were gathered by reviewing agency reports, memoranda, pamphlets, and press releases.

Questions

Questions that were explored in the study include:

Do interests inevitably lead to political activity? Under what circumstances do groups become involved or refrain from becoming involved in issues? What are the determining factors that lead groups to work in one decision-making arena as opposed to others? Why do some groups specialize while others choose targets of opportunity? What is the nature of their relationship with other groups and how does the new association affect their autonomy? What tactics do groups use to gain access to decision-makers and decision-making centers? With what frequency and degree of intensity? What factors determine the tactics? Is the activity of any group roughly proportional to its stake in the issue? Do economic groups tend to promote their interests with greater intensity and frequency than ideological groups?

Findings

A summary of the findings follows:
Determinants of Interest Group Activity

Table I lists the nineteen interest groups and their involvement or lack of involvement in the four incidents studied. Involvement here is judged to be significant activity. Effectiveness is not a criterion, but a press release or letter to a legislator is not enough to qualify.

A quick glance at the table suggests certain patterns developing. Only half the groups were involved in any one of the incidents under study. But these are not significant factors in themselves, and additional probing is necessary to give meaning to the table. It is clear, however, that no one factor determined the course of participation for all groups, and the decision to become involved or to refrain from such involvement was based on many factors that will be explored below.

Economic interests engendered a stronger response than educational or civil rights concerns among the interest groups.

A case could be made for almost all groups having an equal stake in the issues based on their professed aims as organizations. But obviously intervening factors curbed the activities of some of the groups. Nevertheless, the economic groups overcame the barriers barring participation of other groups and made it their business to become involved.

Interest groups intervention is determined by the nature of the issue as perceived by the group and a desire to maintain a consistent organizational self-image.

One of the factors that depressed activity was the nature of the issue. If conflict was inevitable, and disruption possible, and the issue is perceived in that manner, some groups remain on the sidelines. They do so for the following reasons:

First, there is the problem of controversy. Some groups
established themselves as alternatives to conflict groups and resist all pressures to become "militant" or take a stand on controversial issues. They feel that their effectiveness is compromised when they are perceived by their target groups as being controversial. Their aim is to gain concessions from the system as it is and to take advantage of the changes brought about by other groups.

Second, there are groups that are not repulsed by controversy as such but who have few of the tools with which to affect the outcome of a contest. This is not a matter of resources but a choice of operating styles.

Internal conflict over an issue limits both an organization's ability to respond and the intensity of its activity.

The amount of organizational resources had little impact on a group's decision to become involved in an issue.

Resources are generally considered to be a major determinant of interest group activity. But the evidence here indicates that the lack of resources had little impact on the decision to enter or not to enter the fray.

Intensity of activity is determined by whether a group is a single purpose or multi-purpose organization and whether its posture is defensive or offensive.

Single purpose and multi-purpose groups could be seen as synonyms for primary and secondary interests, and in a sense they are. However, the concept of objective interest as opposed to perceived interest comes into play. Objectively most of the groups had a primary interest in the issue, but they did not all see it that way. Those organizations that perceive the issue as one of many curtailed their activity, and the intensity with which they participated accordingly.

Intensity of activity is also related to whether groups are offensive or defensive. The defensive groups felt
they were under attack and protected their interests in every arena.

The choice of arenas by interest groups is determined by an organization's operating style and its desire not to break with traditional roles; the dominance of one professional group with its selective perspective on issues and strategies; and lack of leadership sophistication in more than one arena.

Interest Group Tactics

The choice of tactics is directly related to a group's influence in the political system as well as other factors like leadership sophistication, organizational style, rules of the arena, and resources.

Many of the factors that determined group involvement in particular arenas have a bearing on the tactics used by groups. An organization will use tactics that are consistent with its self-image. The lack of resources will eliminate some options. Some arenas will curb the use of tactics that are acceptable in other arenas. And leadership sophistication will account for the variety and effectiveness of the tactics used.

Over the years some groups have developed relationships with governmental bodies that have resulted in consultation rights. These groups by and large do not feel estranged from the system. But the sixties saw the introduction of new groups to the political system whose interests were not always represented before. These groups did not share the confidence implied by the behavior of other groups regarding the system's responsiveness. Therefore, their tactics were designed to gain access to decision centers barred to them in the past or to attempt structural changes that would not perpetuate their inferior political status.

In response to the civil rights street demonstrations,
government provided the resources to enable new groups to be formed, thus revealing a sometimes overlooked relationship between interest groups and decision-making centers. Interest groups are instrumental in establishing new policies and new policies lead to the formation of new interest groups.

**Non-governmental interest groups do not constitute a countervailing force to governmental interest groups.**

The non-governmental interest groups were not a significant political force on major issues. Although they collectively possessed greater resources, they were too fragmented to be effective. As autonomous units they are dealt with individually and easily handled. Acting alone, they are overly conscious of their lack of resources when seeking to influence a multi-billion dollar agency or a prestigious legislative body.

The big issues are therefore left to the big actors - the United Federation of Teachers, the large bureaucracies, City Hall, and the State Legislature. The blacks and Puerto Ricans found themselves in this company only because their existing groups coalesced, and they opened up participation to the unaffiliated. This move gave them parity in street demonstrations, but they were less successful in other arenas.

Almost without exception the groups were led by intelligent, sophisticated people who worked long hours and were committed to organizational goals. They ranged programmatically from those who dabbled in everything to those who were so planful that they could not react organizationally to changing situations. The expectation was that each of the little projects that consumed their time and resources were cumulative and that together they affected larger policy areas. That conclusion cannot be drawn from the evidence gathered in this study, but one thing is clear, non-governmental interest groups did not constitute a
countervailing force to governmental interest groups, either in New York City or in Albany. Their activities can be justified in any number of ways, but the field is controlled by the big actors.

Conclusion

For our purposes, interest groups can be seen as falling into the following categories:

a. Public and private agencies
b. Social welfare educators
c. Social welfare professional organizations
d. Client groups
e. Groups whose main interest is other than social welfare

Political activity by social workers usually involves the first three categories but the latter two are less frequently utilized. The findings in and by themselves do not offer a blueprint for interest group mobilization, but they do offer clues concerning their behavior that agency executives can exploit.

This strategy is not without its perils. There is a legitimate concern that control over agency programs or the appointment of key personnel will be lost in exchange for interest groups support. Some agency executives have relinquished some control or have granted interest groups veto power over the appointment of some personnel but the preponderance of evidence indicates that administrators dominate these relationships. While any strategy is accompanied by risks, inaction can hardly be considered void of hazards. Year after year aspiring politicians advance their careers by attacking welfare and social service programs while agency administrators stand alone in the political arena whispering their denials. Both agencies and clients lose under these conditions.

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NOTES


8. See Figure I in Appendix I


12. Sharkansky, Public Administration, p. 184


19. The Organizations are listed in Table I in Appendix II.


APPENDIX I
Figure 1
A PLURALIST VIEW OF DECISION-MAKING

Political Climate  Masses  Rules of the Game

Governmental Interest Groups  Federal Government (HEW)  Interest Groups

Media

Other City Departments  City Council  Mayor

Interest Groups

CITY DEPT. of WELFARE

State Legislature  State Director of Welfare

Political Parties

Political Climate  Masses  Rules of the Game

-433-
### APPENDIX II

#### Table 1

**INTEREST GROUP INVOLVEMENT IN PUBLIC ISSUES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organizations</th>
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<th>Issue 2</th>
<th>Issue 3</th>
<th>Issue 4</th>
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<td>No</td>
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<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>No</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
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<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
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<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council of Supervisors and Administrators</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>United Parents Association</td>
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INTERAGENCY CONFLICT, POWER, AND SANCTIONING SYSTEMS:
AN ALASKAN EXAMPLE

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Abstract

The covert processes in the interagency system in Anchorage social services is the subject of this paper. The emphasis is on (1) conflicts between explicit goals of planning and rationality in social services and covert or hidden goals concerning protection of organizational jurisdiction; (2) the structure of interagency power; and (3) the socialization and regulation of member agencies' behavior. The data for the study derive from focused interviews with agency administrators and staff members and observations at community planning meetings. The major finding of the study is that the explicit goals of rationality, integration, and planning in social services are subverted by other hidden goals concerning member agencies' organizational survival interests. The domination of these hidden goals shapes the interagency power, control, and sanctioning system.

Introduction

Understanding the covert processes in the interagency system in social services is the issue of this paper. The interagency system refers here to both formal planning groups and informal but systematic interaction in the local social service community. The dominance of covert processes in the interagency system was revealed in the course of research on the impact of Anchorage social agencies on urban Alaska Natives (Eskimo, Indian, and Aleut).* As part of that research, we examined the interagency system in terms of (1) conflicts between explicit goals of planning and rationality in social services and covert or hidden goals concerning protection of organizational jurisdictions; (2) the structure of power; and (3) socialization and regulation of members.

*This paper is adapted from one section of a report on the impact of Anchorage social services on urban Natives (Jones, 1974). The Anchorage social service study was funded under the Community Service and Continuing Education Program, Title I, Higher Education Act of 1965.
Methods

Data for this paper, collected in Anchorage, Alaska in the summer of 1973, derive from observations of four community planning groups and interviews with thirty-three administrators and forty-six staff members, many of whom participated in these planning groups. The four planning groups are: Ad Hoc Committee on Child Abuse, Social Services Planning Group, Alcoholism Interagency Management Group, and Anchorage Manpower Planning Board. We used focused interviews which were intensive and in-depth, lasting from one to three hours; in some instances, informants were interviewed on two or more occasions.

Goal Conflicts

Agency administrators and social workers representing administration are the primary participants in interagency planning in Anchorage. Their actions in planning groups reflect the operation of two sets of values. On the one hand, they are committed to the professional goal of trying to increase the rationality and effectiveness of the social service system. This commitment prompts them to initiate or to join in interagency planning. On the other hand, they want to protect their own agency's jurisdiction. This interest frequently induces them to oppose efforts to make services more rational and effective. Individual participants usually resolve this ambivalence by placing highest priority on planning goals when their own agency jurisdictions are not threatened, and highest priority on organizational survival interests when their territories are endangered (Chetkow, 1967, 271-282, and Marris and Rein, 1969, note the powerful influence of jurisdictional interests in planning).

Participants' fear that planning activities threaten their own jurisdictions has a powerful influence on the planning process. It is common for planning groups to assess the adequacy of member agencies. But this very act poses a threat. Although members of an agency, let us say agency A, may be well aware of the inadequacies and limitations of their services, they fear public exposure for several reasons. First, public exposure carries the implication that workers delivering the services are inept. Second, repeated exposure could and has induced planning groups to recommend defunding a service. This occurred in both the Alcoholism Interagency Management Group and the Manpower Planning Board. Third, exposing inadequacies of a service could prompt planning groups to sponsor the establishment of a new agency for this purpose. The new agency may
perform the service better than agency A or it may assume responsibility for related services, in both cases, threatening to reduce agency A's jurisdiction. These threats engender conflict between and within individuals, reflecting the incompatibilities between the rational goals of planning and hidden goals regarding members' organizational survival interests.

The meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee on Child Abuse dramatically illustrate this conflict. The Committee was organized by persons concerned about gaps and inadequacies in the child protection unit in public welfare. The unit is so understaffed that workers must handle a substantial portion of their work by telephone. In addition, the unit suffers from a dearth of necessary resources. The Ad Hoc Committee identified an acute need to organize the following supplementary services: hot line for families in crisis, crisis nursery, emergency shelters, emergency foster homes, and parent aides to stay in clients' homes and help families over crises.

The central contest in the group was between representatives of welfare and those who pressed for the establishment of supplementary services sponsored by other agencies. A borough health department representative sought the Committee's approval for a child protection unit to be administered by the borough. It included a child protection coordinator, crisis nursery, and family aide program. A church-sponsored agency, Alaska Children's Services, solicited Committee approval for a crisis hot line to be accompanied by a mobile team that visited families in crisis on the spot.

The persistence with which representatives of welfare opposed these proposals suggests the force of organizational survival interests when threats to jurisdiction are perceived. Welfare representatives countered every proposal with commonly asserted objections -- new services would lead to a duplication of services, they would confuse clients about which service to call in an emergency, they would promote the use of untrained social workers (welfare workers themselves are not trained social workers). When these arguments failed to convince other members of the Committee, representatives of welfare fell back on their legal authority to handle child abuse cases, implying that the state would not grant authority to services not sponsored by the welfare department. This veiled threat also failed to convince proponents of new services. Finally, in a more direct assertion, representatives of welfare urged the Committee to adopt its goal of strengthening the existing welfare department rather than starting competing services. No one objected in principle to strengthening the existing welfare service, but years of experience convinced members that the need for adequate child protection services is so acute that it cannot await the outcome of
the long, arduous, and usually hopeless process of changing the rigid welfare system. The conflict between proponents of new child protection services and representatives of welfare was not resolved during the period of this research or for a relatively long period after it.

Conflict Containment

Conflicts such as the above are perceived as very threatening to group members, and they devote strenuous efforts to containing it, at least in its overt manifestations. Participants' efforts to contain the conflict take the form of avoiding issues that seriously threaten group cohesion, focusing instead on less controversial and less important issues. Bachrach and Baratz (1970) propose the concept, "the non-decision" to characterize this process. This pattern of conflict avoidance gives planning a ritualistic quality where members go through the motions of planning with little consequence to the existing organization and delivery of social services (Warren, 1973:361 makes a similar point).

In the four planning groups observed, if an issue threatened to disrupt the group, members tabled it or handled it under the table rather than to covertly confront it. Members generally inhibited expressions of hostility, treating each other with politeness and respect regardless of animosities that smoldered beneath the surface and that were confided during the research interviews. In some instances, the congeniality observed reflected long standing friendship ties between members. But more importantly, this style of consensus politics reflected the reality that participants are part of the same system and have to protect the same interests. If one agency's jurisdiction can be reduced or weakened, then so can any other's. So everyone tends to play the same political game for fear their turn is coming. Thus, planning becomes a ritual rather than a medium for reform.

The Structure of Power

Planning participants' complicity in maintaining consensus at the costs of the express goals of planning seems to reflect their recognition of the underlying realities of interagency power relations. While there is no formal, publically acknowledged power structure in the interagency system, there is an informal, implicit one stemming from the degree of dominance and subordination in agencies' relations to each other. All agencies are interdependent
in the sense that they rely on one another for continual flow of referrals (customers) which nurtures the entire social service industry. But there are also differences in degrees of dependence between agencies. Agencies with very limited resources are more dependent on agencies with large resources than vice versa. If the limited agency antagonizes an agency with larger resources, the latter can and does in some instances retaliate by refusing service to its referrals. This practice is suggested by the ubiquitous care with which administrators from small agencies avoid antagonizing those from more powerful ones even though they may claim, in private conversation, to abhor some of the practices of the more powerful agencies. There is also verbal testimony to this practice. For example, an aggressive program director in a recently established alcoholism facility who is also a member of a minority group charged complicity among some of the groups involved in alcohol treatment who refused service to his referrals. He believed this was due to his having antagonized members of the Alcoholism Interagency Management Group by playing an outspoken, truth-telling role, thereby challenging the style of consensus politics.

Agencies with large resources also exert control over other agencies through manipulation of funds and contracts. The Bureau of Indian Affairs and state welfare grant a number of contracts to other agencies. If these agencies with contracts antagonize their sponsors, they risk jeopardizing their funds. Negotiations at the Ad Hoc Committee's meetings reflected this implicit power relationship. Members could not afford to antagonize public welfare for three reasons. First, since most member agencies are small scale and frequently refer to welfare, the success of their efforts requires maintaining harmonious relations with welfare. Second, some of the member agencies are directly funded by state welfare. Third, the Committee depends for its very legitimacy on state welfare which has accorded it official status as the planning group for child protection. The recognition of this underlying power relationship profoundly shaped the outcome in Committee deliberations. Initial efforts to supplement welfare services in child protection were rather quickly dropped, and the planning group proceeded to deal with less threatening issues such as public information. Thus, consensus politics was achieved.

Socialization and Regulation of Members

Up to this point, we have discussed goal conflicts and inter-agency power relations in formal planning groups. The socialization and regulation of members is apparent not only in formal planning
groups but also in informal but systematic interactions in the social service community, which we consider part of the interagency system.

While members of established agencies seem to accept the political realities of the interagency system, representatives of newer agencies, such as the program director in the alcohol treatment facility, sometimes challenge them. The very existence of the newer agencies bespeaks challenge; for example, Native-run social agencies are in business precisely to redistribute social service resources. Regulation of this challenge becomes a central task of the interagency system.

The interagency system's efforts to socialize new members involves transmittal of three expectations. New members are expected to accept (1) their limited jurisdictions without trying to expand them in ways that further impinge on other's territories, (2) the existing power structure in social services, and (3) the prevalent leadership style of consensus politics.

The processes by which expectations are transmitted is subtle and frequently invisible. It becomes highly visible, however, when sanctions are invoked against new agencies that fail to become properly socialized. The most striking illustration of this process is a Native-run social agency's relations in the interagency system, both in planning groups and in the larger social service community.

Challenge to the Interagency System

In 1970, encouraged by Nixon's policy statement on Indian self-determination and the Bureau of Indian Affairs' policy regarding contracting Bureau services to Indian groups, Cook Inlet Native Association, the largest Native organization in the state, sought to establish itself as a provider of social services for Natives. To this end, it applied for a contract to operate the Bureau's general relief program and later, for the Bureau's employment assistance program. Neither of these contracts was awarded. But in 1972, the now defunct Anchorage Community Action Agency funded Cook Inlet Native Association to operate an urban Native center. The Urban Native Center subsequently received a Bureau contract to operate a transportation service for enrollees in a manpower training program and an Indian Health Service contract to administer the health aide program in the Cook Inlet region. With these contracts and with funds from the Community Action Agency which enabled it to establish social service, manpower and airport assistance programs as well as a craft shop and recreation center, Urban Native Center was in business. But the Center was not satisfied with this narrow juris-
diction. Conceiving itself as a comprehensive social service, it sought additional funds and contracts for providing more services regardless of the extant distribution of service domains.

The Center posed a strong challenge to the existing power structure in the social service community when it assumed leadership for organizing a planning council without consulting recognized and established agency leaders. Shortly after this effort by the Center, established agencies joined forces and organized a competitive group, the Social Service Planning Group, which ultimately absorbed the one started by the Center. Center representatives' activity in the new group continued to challenge the status quo. For instance, Center representatives demanded the establishment of a low income board. Since the new group was established in part to ward off control by low income groups such as the Center, it was not likely to support the proposal for a low income board. Nevertheless, because it is unpopular to oppose participation by the poor, members of the new group did not openly reject the proposal. Instead, they covertly subverted it by failing to follow through on the plan for each member to bring low income persons to subsequent meetings.

The Center challenged the status quo in interagency power in other ways. At the same time that it held a Bureau contract, the Center's regional corporation filed a suit against the Bureau's parent organization, Department of the Interior, regarding a land claims suit. Center leaders thought this act may have seriously alienated the Bureau.

The Center's conflicts were not confined to older established agencies; they also occurred with more recent agencies such as the Community Action Agency. The latter had also been a "have-not" agency, but at the time of this study, having gained some acceptance by the established social service community, it tended to behave similarly to it when dealing with the Native Center. Although Community Action was only one of the Center's funding sources, it insisted on having the authoritative role. The Center objected to this. One conflict between the two groups centered around firing prerogatives. Both groups insisted on having the final authority to hire and fire Center personnel. Another conflict concerned the composition of the Center's Board of Directors. Ironically, at the same time that the Center was agitating the Social Service Planning Group to establish a low income board, the Community Action Agency was demanding greater representation by the poor on the Center's Board. The Center considered its all-Native board about as representative of Alaskan poor as a board can be; the Community Action Agency, however, required the Center board to have 51 percent poor instead of the usual one-third poor, and to have actual poor instead of the usual requirement for representatives of the poor.
In addition to challenging the power structure in the interagency system, the Native Center also violated the prevailing style of consensus politics by playing a defiant, truth-teller role. Although Community Action Agency staff frequently played a similar role, its leadership was unwilling to accept defiance from its delegate agency, expecting Center representatives to be appreciative suppliants. When Center representatives charged the Community Action Agency with imposing impossible standards regarding a low income board and subjecting them to undue harrassment, a Community Action Agency official asked them how they dared defy him when he controlled the purse strings. "We'll give it a darn good try," a Center official replied. In recounting this incident to me, the Community Action Agency official cast out his arms in a gesture of despair, saying:

"How can they be so foolish as to bite the hand that feeds them? It would be irresponsible for me to continue funding people who don't know how to get along in this world. I think I'll freeze their funds."

And forthwith, he did just that.

Clearly, the Native Center was not behaving in conformity with the roles prescribed for it. It would not accept a role as supplicant, appreciative of the limited jurisdiction it had gained. It challenged the existing power structure in the interagency system. And it would not accept the prevailing leadership style of pretending a harmony that did not exist.

Interagency Sanctioning System

In response to this socialization failure, the interagency system invoked sanctions against the Center. While it is difficult to prove that a particular outcome is due to a specific sanction, the combined effects of agency responses to the Center in 1973 were to threaten its very survival.

The most potent sanction, of course, is defunding. After freezing, then restoring, then threatening defunding for 1973, the Community Action Agency finally gave the Center reduced funding, eliminating the Center's social service program, representatives of which were among the most outspoken challengers of the interagency status quo.

The Native Center also lost its Bureau of Indian Affairs contract for transportation services, and according to a letter the Center received from the Bureau in 1973, its applications for con-
tracts to operate Bureau employment assistance and general relief programs were not to be granted. After explaining that the Bureau contracts office was understaffed and unable to process contracts, the letter states:

...you must certainly be aware of the nature and volume of work generated by the contract process... in your interests and ours, we have no wish to initiate an enterprise destined to failure (Bureau of Indian Affairs Juneau Area Office to Anchorage Urban Native Center, July 6, 1973).

Further, all seventeen proposals for services submitted by the Center to funding agencies were rejected. Speculating about the reasons for the uniform rejections, a Center official said, "I think our troubles began after our regional corporation filed a legal suit against the Department of Interior."

Defunding and rejection of proposals are not the only sanctions applied against the Center. A campaign of gossip to discredit the Center was widespread within social service circles. Although charges against the Center concerned events that are common in all agencies, they were presented as uncontroverted evidence of the Center's incompetence. When asked about the Center, many administrators and staff rejoined with accusations against it. Said one administrator:

"They're sick, they're devious. It's because they are so insecure. They're not trained, you know, and that makes them supersensitive and defensive."

Lack of training and incompetence were common charges against the Center staff, yet the majority of people implementing social services in Anchorage are not trained social workers. Agencies seem to have little trouble accepting untrained personnel in their own agencies, and incompetence has not become an issue in those agencies. Another charge against the Center focused on conflict between Center administrators and a Center staff member. This conflict was a major topic of conversation in social service circles and was treated as a unique phenomenon, yet I encountered no agencies that were free of internal conflict.

This discrediting tactic against the Native Center proved very effective. Few agencies referred clients there. When asked about their reasons for failing to refer clients to the Center, respondents invoked the standard criticism of incompetence and lack of training (few had ever visited the Center). In effect, then, a boycott was
imposed against the Center, weakening its potential for attracting new funds and contracts.

Later, after the research for this study was completed, the local sanctions against the Native Center became ineffective because of federal policies. The growing federal emphasis on Indian self-determination proved a more powerful factor than the local inter-agency system, and funds from the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Indian Health Services, and other federal agencies became available to the Native Center. Without these federal policies, the Native Center would not likely have survived.

In sum, the sanctioning system in the Anchorage interagency system operates both formally and informally, and the two modes are closely intertwined and complementary. Funding and contractor agencies impaired the Center's functioning by withdrawing or refusing funds, and the informal interagency system further undermined the Center by a discrediting tactic that stigmatized the Center and excluded it from the interagency referral system.

The Anchorage interagency system, in both formal planning and informal agency relations, is engaged in a very active process of regulating behavior of member agencies. This regulation serves to protect the interests of established agencies in the community more than to promote the express goals of planning -- integrating and rationalizing social services. Planning tends to assume the form of a ritual not because bureaucrats have a special inclination for ceremonies but because of the predominance of their interests in protecting their domains and the interorganizational status quo. The social service community operates as an interagency system in socializing members to the realities of interagency power and the norms of consensus politics, and regulates behavior by imposing sanctions against recalcitrant or rebellious members.
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