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TOWARD THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF THE SOCIAL POLICY PROCESS

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What is it that the citizen buys each year when he pays his taxes?

He buys a set of promises from those who govern. The first promise is "to organize the common activities of the society for the good of the individual or the whole" (Webster, 1976, p. 497). The power rests in organization; where there is no organization there is no government. Second, the government promises "to exert a determining or guiding influence over expenditures and the availability of choices." Third, it promises to keep "a straight course, under proper control, or in smooth operation for the good of the individual or the whole." Finally, it promises "to exercise continuous sovereign authority, especially to control and direct the making and administration of policy."

Thus, what a citizen expects from his government, what he hopes he is buying with his taxes, are a set of public social policies that are benevolent, sound, and reasonable. And a public social policy may be defined as the promise that the government makes to its citizenry.

Throughout the years the taxpayer in the United States has become skeptical about what he is getting for his money. For example, in 1978, the average tax collected by the federal government from every four-person household was $5,104, according to the statistics of Tax Foundation, Inc., reported in the Seattle Times of March 6, 1978 (Brandon, Rowe, and Stanton, 1978; W. Cohen, 1978). This does not include the high local and state taxes on food, property, and income. Taxes continue to go higher and higher each year, and the taxpayer--squeezed by price inflation which is rising more rapidly than his paycheck--is beginning to demand an accounting.

What is the money being spent for, and is there a sound reason for this? What the taxpayer wants to know is whether government social policies are benevolent, sound and reasonable?

The purpose of this paper is to reflect on the nature of social policies and the public policymaking process. It is demonstrated that public social policies tend to accrue an aura or ideology of benevolence that is only partially warranted, and that may be quite misleading to policy analysts and citizenry. The major thrust of the paper is to consider the social policy process as a strategy for public decision-making. As such, properly organized, it can provide an alternative and complementary strategy to electoral politics and protest movements. To be effective as a strategy, three major barriers must be overcome: the lack of openness in the public policy process, the active discouragement of citizen participation, and the failure to evaluate policy outcomes. Some notions are advanced about how social policy analysts and researchers can improve their work and thereby assist in the democratization of the process.
What is the Nature of the Public Social Policy Process?

There are seven general characteristics of the public policy process frequently identified by its analysts. These are presented in this section of the paper.

1. First of all, it should be noted that usual definitions of public policy do not stress the implied promise contained in government social policy. Thus a policy is considered as the formal statement of the guiding goals and acceptable procedures governing a plan of organized action. Unlike an impromptu command or suggestion, it represents a reasoned decision. It embodies "a definite course of method selected from among alternatives and in the light of given conditions to guide and determine present and future decisions (Webster, 1976, p. 890).

According to Gil (1973, p. 12), policies lead to, but need not be codified in formal legal instruments. They are merely the "guiding principles or courses of action adopted and pursued by societies and their governments, as well as by various groups or units within society . . . Specific policies govern, or are intended to govern, specified domains of society or its subunits."

2. Policies, however, are not simply the property of governmental units. They may be formulated by individuals or groups that are nongovernmental in character, and they may be implemented by any unit or subunit of society. In general, policies, whether formulated under private or government auspices, overtly or covertly, are public in character. They are intended to influence the activities of government, some sector of society, or the people as a whole. Thus, in a democracy, governmental policies are usually accorded a review, and are intended to be "of the people, by the people, and for the people." The extent to which this is a true statement is moot. Nevertheless, the public character of such policies is strongly sanctioned both by tradition and legislative mandate. No definition of policy was found by the author that does not embrace this assumption.

3. At its point of inception, the policy act represents an agreement or compromise among the individuals or parties engaging in the decision making. Moreover, it is shaped and compromised by subsequent interpretations given it, and through the activities required for its implementation. Thus a social policy is more than a formal statement per se; it is a normative process. The policy itself is not simply an inert instrument through which social changes flow. For example, an important social policy, such as the Social Security Act, has acquired an independent status of its own. While formally instituted in the legislative bureaucracy, it has become a part of the culture and tradition of the United States. In this way, policies over time, in general, exhibit both the characteristics of directed social change and growth. They are planned, negotiated and accumulated on the basis of the decisions with which an organization is confronted. The author makes the same distinction between social policy and social program as does Tropman et al. (1976, p. xiii): "Policy is seen as a source of action or intended action conceived as deliberately adopted, after a review of possible alternatives, and pursued or intended to be pursued,"
while a social program is adapted to achieve a certain set of limited objectives and goals. Social program relates only to a small part of the social system in which we live. Social policy is of a much broader nature. It relates to a series of programs aimed at achieving some objectives and goals. It relates to the social system in its entirety.

4. The establishment of a policy is a collective attempt to deliberately shape or guide the social changes that are taking place in the organization and the environment, and to assure that there will be a desired outcome. As such, the policy process is an attempt at directed social change. And all policies are developed within an organizational context which is dynamic and changing.

The policy attempts to shape subsequent action not only by specifying the ends towards which the efforts are directed. It also places restrictions on the means to be employed in the plan of organized action. The restrictions are specified in the statement of "acceptable" principles and procedures to be employed in affecting the outcomes.

5. Every policy embodies theories of problem formulation and solution. However, the policy is not simply a solution to a specified problem. The policy encompasses appropriate modifications in the key processes which transform a given condition into a social problem. Thus, the social changes induced and guided by policy are intended to modify the social conditions per se to assure that such social problems are ameliorated, removed or prevented (L. K. Northwood, 1966, pp. 8-9). Policy has a much broader objective than simple problem-solving. While most policy analysts would agree with the point of view expressed in this paragraph, many of them emphasize the latter three stages of the policy process which are described in the following section while they ignore the first stage. By downplaying the initial problem solution stage of the policy, analysts tend to discount the trial-error character of the process; they underplay the real social conflicts that are engendered around social policies. Therefore, it is safe to say that no significant social policy has been introduced and institutionalized without the support of a mass movement and in the teeth of important mass opposition.

6. Generally, every enduring policy becomes transformed and institutionalized during the processes of its formulation and implementation. It assumes a charter of its own, a social structure for its personnel, auxiliaries and beneficiaries, and a collective will to survive that resides in its culture and practices. And every enduring policy also helps to generate its opposition.

The four critical stages in the institutionalization process are (Gil, 1973, pp. 36-55; Gilbert and Specht, 1974, pp. 14-20):

I. The problem/solution stage, which embodies questions of the following order: Which of the many domains of concern to a society constitutes the focus of the policy? What is the problem? Whose problem? What conditions require change? What is the solution?
II. The goals/objectives stage, which involves winning sufficient public support for the policy, and which answers questions such as: Who benefits and who does not? How would the policy affect this domain in substantive terms? How would society as a whole be affected by the substantive consequences of the policy?

III. The Planning/implementation stage, which spells out how the benefits are to be provided and with what hypothesized effects. A key question is: What effects may be expected from the interaction of the policy with various forces within and without society?

IV. The review and evaluation stage, which assesses both the policy's performance and achievements. Such questions are asked as: What alternative policies could be defined to achieve the same or different policy objectives concerning the specific domain? Was the planned change efficient and effective? Can it be accomplished more efficiently and effectively by another means?

7. A final characteristic of public social policies, and of social welfare policies in particular, is the aura of benevolence with which they are invested. This ideology of benevolence has many positive functions, but it also can be quite misleading and non-productive. The author is in accord with the commonly held belief that social welfare policies ought to be directed toward improving the human condition and with solving serious social problems. However, the stated intention of the policy is often at variance with its known effects and consequences (Northwood, 1977, 1978). Therefore, a policy should be characterized as benevolent only after careful analysis is made of the policy in action, and whether it achieves the desired outcome of improved social conditions for its designated beneficiaries and the society as a whole.

For these reasons, this section is devoted to an examination of the ideology of benevolence and the part it plays in the characterization of social policy. In particular, we will be concerned with the assumption that all policies of the political state, called the "welfare state" or the "welfare society," are benevolent social policies simply because of their auspices.

How does the ideology of benevolence come to permeate social policy?

First of all, this is a natural process. Most of the terminology employed in the discussion of social policies is already made up of words and concepts which are positively valued in the society such as: social, social welfare, beneficiaries, problem-solving, responsibility in planning, effectiveness, efficiency, user satisfaction, equity, equality, well-being, volunteerism, altruism, and so forth. Social planning is conceived of as an active effort to do something thoughtfully and rationally; and that is better than doing nothing. Social policies, ipso facto, are "social reforms" because they involve an alteration in "bad" existing conditions. Thus, the suggestion of beneficence is implied in the label "social reform."

Furthermore, to be enacted and implemented, social policies must win public support. They are frequently formulated in rhetoric that evokes traditional values, national pride and community solidarity. The policy objectives are
transformed into slogans for public consumption. These slogans may characterize a single social policy where no enabling legislation has come into existence, or they may characterize a single social program which is not guided by a comprehensive framework of social policy. Where there are both social programs and a comprehensive framework of policy, the nation with this implementing machinery is sometimes called a "welfare state" or a "welfare society."

For example, it is sometimes forgotten that "The Welfare State" had its origins in the times of war and, in fact, has been characterized as a "war strategy." The Parliament of Great Britain commissioned Sir William Beveridge to draw up a plan for the reform of social services in June, 1941, when the bombs were falling in the streets next to Westminster. The plan called for the maintenance of full employment, comprehensive free health care and rehabilitation services, and social insurance from the cradle to the grave. By 1945, the term "Welfare State" had achieved popular currency. Titmuss, the eminent welfare historian, characterizes this movement as "an imperative for war strategy . . . that the war could not be won unless millions of ordinary people, in Britain and overseas, were convinced that we had something better to offer than had our enemies--not only during but after the war (Titmuss, 1969, p. 82).

The outline of the "Welfare State" in the United States took shape somewhat earlier and for somewhat different reasons. Romanyshin (1971, p. 159) reports that the "New Deal" measures of the 1930's:

... were designed to preserve the capitalistic system from total collapse. Establishing measures of income security, social legislation in this period also served to bolster a badly shaken economy and to preserve rather than dismantle the market system. One may indeed say that social welfare is, in fact, the answer of liberal capitalism to the challenge of socialism.

These propagandistic uses of social policies impose an added imperative to mitigate possible conflict and opposition, and to present the policy in glowing and positive terms which testify as to its progressive character and benevolence.

By far the most frequently used strategy for incorporating an ideology of benevolence is the practice of social policy analysts to build into their definitions of the social policy process desirable procedures and desirable outcomes. Thus, for T. H. Marshall (1967, preface), social policy is "the policy of governments with regard to action having a direct impact on the welfare of citizens, by providing them with services of income." For both Titmuss (1968, p. 188-89) and Marshall, social policy flows from the state's right to interfere with individual freedom and economic liberty to promote the welfare of the whole population (Baumleier and Scholl, 1977, p. 1454). Pusic (1969) defines social policy as "the quest for equalization under conditions of growth," and Boulding thinks of it as "the sum total of public policies that underpin and strengthen the "integrative system" in any society (Rohrlich, 1977, p. 1465)." Where the nature of the desired outcome is assuring the happiness, prosperity or well-being of any society, the policy is called "social welfare policy." It is postulated that social welfare policies are intended to improve the conditions of life of the
public in general and to alleviate the distress of the poorest and most disadvantaged.

Moreover, for Gil (1973, p. 13):
Social policies are a special type of policies, namely, policies which deliberately pertain to the quality of life and to the circumstances of living in society, and to the intra-societal relationships among individuals, groups and society as a whole. And any specific social policy, irrespective of its unique content, objectives and scope, is thus one discrete instance of this type of policies.

It is a shared "common domain" that identifies a social policy and differs it from policies in general.

Another way of conferring benevolence on social policies involves the prior labeling of the political state as a "welfare state." Once having accorded this label, the social programs and policies are accorded benevolence without testing whether the designation is warranted or not. This dubious process is followed by Blanche Coll (1977, p. 1503) in her assessment of social welfare in the United States. The existing policy framework is cast in an image of benevolence, which ignores the reality described in the third part of this paper. For Coll:

The welfare state, which emerged in all western democracies after World War II, is characterized by a large complex of interlocking preventive and protective laws and organizations, designed to provide, at the least, universal access to the mainstream of society. . . . In affluent countries, such as the United States, social welfare includes considerably more than assuring the necessities to support life. Inherent in the philosophy of the welfare state is the ever present, active assistance to individuals and groups to facilitate their attaining and maintaining a respectable life style.

Whereas, Coll merely asserts the benevolence of the United States as a "welfare state," Miller and Clark (1977), following Wilensky (1975), have attempted to prove that the United States is not a "welfare state laggard" in comparison with other modern industrial nations. The authors start with a statement that (Ibid., p. 382) "it seems obvious that the United States is not meeting the welfare needs of all its citizens in an adequate and equitable manner." However, after an analysis of the trends in national spending for warfare and welfare, they conclude that "the United States actually spent more in welfare state programs than would be predicted for a country of its description, at least for 1966 (Ibid., p. 398)." Not a single word in the article questions the "benevolence" of the national priorities, and not a single comparison is made of the discrepancy of the "welfare state" objectives and the achievement of these objectives.

The easy way that certain policy analysts have conferred benevolence on almost every policy of "welfare states" located in the United States and Western Europe, and, in contrast, have denigrated almost every social policy in the countries of Eastern Europe, has led to much criticism and also to much misunderstanding about the nature of social welfare and social policies.
For example, the conservative "supporter" of the "welfare society" in Great Britain, William Robson, denies that a benevolent program of protections, entitlements and benefits can exist in countries of a socialist persuasion because they lack the "social freedom" which is an "essential ingredient of the welfare state" (Robson, 1976, p. 16). At the same time, he deplores that Great Britain has not yet achieved the status of a "welfare society" because of misguided interpretations of principles of equity and equality, economic redistribution, central planning, nationalization and public ownership, collective bargaining in the public sector, and so forth.

On the other hand, David Gil, a progressive social welfare analyst, views all welfare state policies and services as characterized by "inequality, domination, competition and self-orientation" (1976, p. 147). That is, in essence they are non-benevolent. They are designed to "pacify, condition and control their populations, and defend and perpetuate their systems" (Ibid., p. 161). There is only one "real solution" to welfare: "to abolish its institutionalized version by liberating productive resources and assuring success to these resources to all humans on equal terms so that they may become free, independent, productive and self-reliant citizens of self-directing, democratic and cooperative communities." Is it too much to ask of Gil that he outline workable alternatives in other terms than a statement of basic values and philosophy?

What Robson and Gil have in common is a philosophic stance, albeit differing in content, which grows out of their own personal experiences and their assessments of the social conditions in which they are situated. However, it is hard reality in an imperfect world that requires a much more concrete and scheduled program of policies and practices if policies are to be made beneficial and if reform is to be consummated.

What Are the Criteria of Benevolence

How, then, can a test of the benevolence of a social policy be made empirically? As indicated earlier, it is not sufficient merely to have indicators of intention in the initial statement of goals, objectives and "acceptable" operating procedures for the policy; there must be tests of actual performance and actual outcome. A policy must be sound and reasonable in order to achieve its effectiveness. Furthermore, policies which are unsound and unreasonable cannot be benevolent for the society as a whole in the long run. Therefore, we incorporate criteria of social effectiveness and efficiency into the test of the benevolence of a policy.

Gilbert and Specht (1974, pp. 39-46) point out that there are three "core values" that shape the design of social welfare policy, and which provide some of the criteria by which it may be judged as benevolent or not. The three core values are equality, equity and adequacy.

Equality relates to the outcome of the benefit allocations proposed in the policy. Are the benefits allocated in such a way as to equalize the distribution of resources and opportunities available in the society?

Equity is the value which prescribes "that people receive that which they deserve based on their contributions to society, modified by considerations
for those whose inability to contribute is clearly not of their own making (Gilbert and Specht, p. 41). The question must be asked: Do the benefits actually go to beneficiaries designated by the policy? Of course, there are many "equitable inequalities" that are normatively sanctioned, according to Gilbert and Specht. For example, preferential treatment is accorded veterans, and in unemployment benefits that vary in proportion of prior earnings. There is always some debate over who should receive preferential treatment. Most social welfare policies single out the poorest and the most disadvantaged sectors of society for preferential treatment. In the case of the United States, however, the "iron rule" of the English Poor Law of 1834 still prevails, that is, that the benefits given the poor and the needy shall not exceed "the situation of the independent laborer of the lowest class." This provision is intended to assure that able-bodied recipients support themselves by their own work rather than depending on government welfare.

At the same time, the provision of limited or inadequate benefits to the poor directly contradicts the third core value listed by Gilbert and Specht, that of adequacy. Adequacy refers to "the belief that it is desirable to provide a decent standard of physical and spiritual well-being, quite apart from concerns of whether benefit allocations are equal or differential according to merit" (Ibid., pp. 41-42).

The three core values of equality, equity and adequacy provide some of the criteria for the evaluation of the benevolence of social policy. In essence, they answer the question: Does the social policy achieve distributive justice? A social policy that does not achieve distributive justice is hardly a benevolent policy.

There are three other important criteria that relate to benevolence of social policy. They refer to the "acceptable" principles and procedures for implementing the policy. They are the principles of social effectiveness, efficiency and democracy.

The simplest definition of effective is "capable of producing a result" (Webster, 1976, p. 362). A socially effective policy is one capable of producing the desired outcome with a minimum of undesirable side effects. Thus, a policy aimed at eliminating, preventing or mitigating a social problem condition must have at its disposal the resources necessary to produce the desired effects. The resources include manpower, finances, organization, social controls and the knowledge of how to combine these and other elements into workable strategies.

The validity of any measure of social effectiveness is affected by the scope assigned to social welfare practice. Some analysts conceive of social welfare practice as simply a "benefit-allocation mechanism functioning outside the market place" (Gilbert and Specht, 1974, p. 28). Thus, they restrict their analysis to the activities of social welfare agencies and organizations per se. Everything else, the economic, political and cultural activities of the broader society, are considered "externalities" which, to be sure, have an effect on social welfare practice, but which are not subject to the controls built into the policy.
The rationale for such a narrow definition of social policy is based on the assumption that social welfare practice typically involves a non-monetary, reciprocal exchange between recipients and society via the welfare agencies, whereas the market system operates on a much different basis—that of buyers and sellers, exchanging concrete goods and services, usually in direct cash transactions for private profit. While it is true that there is a marked difference between market transactions and those that occur in welfare programs, it is also true that the market activities vitally affect the social welfare. In reality, people and social services respond to the market conditions in many vital ways. As Marshall (1972, pp. 19-20) has observed:

The central function of welfare, in fact, is to supercede the market by taking goods and services out of it, or in some way to control and modify its operations so as to produce a result which it could not have produced itself. In contrast to the economic process, it is a fundamental principle of the Welfare State that the market value of an individual cannot be the measure of his right to welfare.

The claim of the individual to welfare is sacred and irrefutable and partakes of the character of a natural right . . . but the citizen of the Welfare State does not merely have the right to pursue welfare; he has the right to receive it, even if the pursuit has not been particularly hot (Marshall, 1965, p. 268).

Therefore, social policies should be constructed which have as their central focus the alteration of conditions that prevail in the private market. And these policies are sound welfare policies because they are designed to improve the social welfare for particular categories or the society as a whole. Policies which follow the narrow guidelines can only hope to shuffle services and programs within existing agency orbits, and their social effectiveness is limited. They depend on the dubious benevolence of private entrepreneurs to reform the economy and the society, while the agencies concentrate their focus on social programs that are allegedly responsive to human need and concentrate on building integration and a sense of community in an unjust society.

The second criterion refers to the efficiency of organization in the implementation of policy. Efficiency is a standard in which the performance of the organization is compared with its cost in time, money and energy (Webster, 1976, p. 465). In order to measure efficiency it is necessary to search out the underlying principles on which the system of services is rendered, to challenge their plausibility and validity, and to examine the consequences of pursuing programs based on these principles (Rein, 1970, p. 463). No new policy is proposed that does not promise improvements in the efficiency of the organization and cost effectiveness—these are highly regarded as beneficient societal values. Furthermore, where these principles are coupled with procedures that allow for freedom of choice, freedom of dissent and citizen participation in the provision, delivery and review of services, there is seldom disagreement among users, professional persons or the public in general. The ideology of benevolence is, then, incorporated into the means of execution of the policy.
The final criterion of the benevolence of a social policy is derived from an examination of how the policy is implemented. The criterion is called democracy. There are many meanings of the term in the context of social policy.

First of all, democracy means that there will be provisions for effective citizen participation in all phases of the social policy process. Representative democracy is a form of organization which provides the mandate and the procedures for formally involving the people and their representatives in the policy process. But as organizations grow in size and complexity, the day-to-day participation in the process of governing becomes more attenuated, and special forms and procedures need to be instituted. These vary greatly depending on whether the primary purpose of participation is to give or get information; to facilitate conjoint planning or decision making; to permit review or sanction; or to mobilize the people in the organization and delivery of services. A democratic social policy process involves all these strategies.

Second, democracy refers to the openness of the policy process. Too many policies, too often, are formulated behind closed doors. The information on which policy is based is not often easily available to the public; or it is shrouded in secrecy; or it is scheduled for release in insufficient time and quantity to permit careful study; or it is released after the fact when the initial guiding decisions have already been formulated. Since policies, and governmental social policies in particular, are essentially a public process, it is essential that the information processes be organized in such a way that they are open to the general public and their representatives, easily accessible, and presented in a scheduled way so that the policy choices and procedures are real and understandable.

Third, social policies affect human life. There are many considerations of choice which affect the manner in which the policy is implemented. For instance, the values of privacy, dignity, work, independence and participation influence the criteria of eligibility, the forms of social provision, the design of delivery, and financial arrangements. If all individuals are to be treated as equal members of society, the allocation of benefits should avoid shame, stigma or excessive bureaucratic rigamarole. Where provisions are offered in forms which, necessarily, must restrict the individual's choice, these must be weighed carefully in scale of the public welfare. The freedom to dissent and to advocate must be preserved. Furthermore, on issues concerning local autonomy vs. centralized control, the values inherent in local autonomy should be carefully considered. During the policy process it may become necessary to sacrifice some aspects of cost effectiveness and efficiency in order to achieve the beneficient practice of democratic participation and social effectiveness.

In summary, all six criteria should be observed in the assessment of social policies, and together they form the basis on which a policy can be adjudged as benevolent, sound and reasonable. The leading questions that should be asked of a social policy are as follows. Questions 1 and 2 pertain particularly to the benevolent character of the policy; question 3 to its soundness; and question 4 to its reasonable character.
1. Does the policy achieve distributive justice as measured in terms of equality, equity and adequacy? Does the policy improve the social conditions of the designated beneficiaries?

2. Does the policy allow for the broadest form of democratic participation consistent with the achievement of the desired outcome? Does the policy conflict with or render void an essential principle of democratic government?

3. Is the policy socially effective; does it facilitate the desired outcome? If not, why not? Are sufficient resources allocated to the implementation of the policy so that it can be socially effective? Are sufficient controls placed on the problem producing conditions such that the desired outcome can not be obtained? Does the achievement of the desired outcome also result in producing effects that are worse than the original problem conditions? What can be done about this?

4. Is the policy efficiently organized, administered and financed?

The United States as a Welfare State

It is instructive to identify a few of the areas in which the United States has developed ameliorative social programs during the recent years, but, as yet, has failed to construct comprehensive social policies to guide their activity.

Some typical welfare state goals are to provide "full employment" without discrimination for all members of the society who are willing and able to work, and to regulate the economic system in ways that will assure a "decent" standard of living with social security "from the cradle to the grave." To what extent has the United States--the most affluent "welfare state"--assessed the need for, and formulated comprehensive social policies to achieve these goals? The following assessments are drawn in large part from official government documents and the analysis of "experts" published in the Encyclopedia of Social Work (1977), the authoritative sourcebook of the National Association of Social Workers in the U.S.

Child Welfare Policy. There is no comprehensive national policy concerning child welfare (Kahn, 1977, pp. 104-105).

No comprehensive survey of the status of American children exists. . . . There are no reliable data about child abuse and neglect, despite widespread publication of alleged rates by advocates of expanded programs to correct abuse.

U.S. social policy, based on free-market and minimalist intervention ethic, lacks general family allowances, which are common in most industrialized countries. . . . In the U.S., some working women may have modest paid maternity leaves and others have none. In Western and Eastern European countries, generous paid maternity leaves are common. . . . This country lacks the universal public health monitoring and medical care coverage for children that most other industrialized countries have. . . . Public housing programs are fewer than in most
other industrialized countries. One compensating factor for the less adequate services in this country is that Americans have a higher level of personal disposable income, which allows those with an adequate income (underline added) to purchase the goods and services they need.

Family Policy. There is no comprehensive national policy concerning families. "In spite of the lip service given to the sanctity of the family as the basic and most important social unit, there is no national policy or commitment to substantiate that value" (Giavannoni and Billingsley, 1977, p. 407).

"The United States has the reputation of having the highest divorce rate in the civilized world, and, with a few partial exceptions this appears to be true" (Leslie, 1977, p. 378). One out of six children under age 18 lived in one-parent families in 1974, and Paul Glick (1978, p. 53), Senior Demographer of the U.S. Bureau of Census, estimates that, given the current trends in divorce and separation, "45 percent of all children born in 1977 will spend a significant length of time as members of a one-parent family before they reach the age of 18."

More mothers in one-parent families worked in March 1978 than in two-parent families, 58.6 percent as compared with 47.8 percent (Bureau of Labor Statistics Report 531). Furthermore, a Special Labor Force Report (Hayghie, 1976, pp. 13, 18) demonstrated that women had to work in order to survive, and to help their family "ameliorate the impact of the combination of inflation and recession on family income. . . . Wives contributed an average of 26 percent of their families' wage and salary income. . . . in March 1975."

Welfare of the Aging. "While scientific advances in the twentieth century have enabled more human beings to reach old age, there has been a severe lag in meeting their social, health and economic needs. In effect, longer physical life too often (in the U.S.) is accompanied by loss of dignity and social death" (Brody, 1977, p. 74).

Life expectancy at birth increased from about 47 years in 1900 to 71.9 years in 1974. At the turn of the century the over-65's represented about 4 percent of the total U.S. population; today they comprise about 10 percent. By the year 2000 it is estimated that there will be about 30.6 million people over 65 in the U.S. This is a phenomenal growth in the aging population.

However, "older persons have half the income of their younger counterparts. . . . In 1974 about 43 percent of the aged couples could not afford the costs of the theoretical budget for retired couples prepared by the Bureau of Labor Standards for a modest but intermediate standard of living" (Brody, 1977, p. 57).

"American values such as achievement and success, activity and work, efficiency, practicality and progress are antithetical to old age in that the social roles assigned to the elderly do not mesh. . . . Existing social service systems are mostly inadequate and inappropriate to the needs of the elderly. . . . Advances have been made in . . . (the) coordination of practice, research, education, policy and planning, but there is still a lag
in accumulation of knowledge about aging, in its communication to practitioners, and in its translation into policy and planning" (Brody, 1977, p. 58).

Health Policy. "The hazard of income loss because of sickness or injury, the problems of families with overwhelming medical debts, and the tragedy of medical care postponed or neglected because of ignorance or because of prohibitive costs in money or time lost from work have long been a central concern of social welfare policy" (Piore, 1977, p. 526).

"By 1976, expenditures for medical care... amounted to more than $118.5 billion. Between 1959 and 1974 personal health care expenditures rose from $10.1 billion to $90.3 billion. About 46 percent of the total rise is attributed to price increases" (Piore, 1977, p. 529, 530). From 1977 to 1978, in one year, the costs rose by about 15 percent. Although "two-thirds of these costs are met by third parties--government, private health insurance and philanthropy," it is estimated that "40 million Americans remain outside both the public and voluntary health benefit coverage programs" (Ibid., p. 539).

There is growing consensus on the need for a national health insurance system, but neither Congress nor the medical profession have taken the necessary steps in that direction. "Currently the U.S. ranks 14th among the nations of the world in infant mortality, which is widely considered a proxy measure of the health status of a nation" (Ibid., p. 535). "Despite the common view of the U.S. as progressive, countries such as France, England and Wales and Sweden have longer life expectancy at birth for both sexes" (Brody, 1977, p. 56). And there are clear health differences by race in the U.S. In 1973, for example, the average life expectancy of non-whites was 65.8 years as contrasted with 72.2 years for the white population in the country as a whole (Piore, 1977, p. 535).


There were 25.9 million persons below the poverty level in 1975, comprising 12 percent of all persons. Between 1974 and 1975 the number of persons below the low-income level increased by 2.5 million or 10.7 percent, reflecting the continued inflation and sluggishness in the economy. For example, during this period the poverty thresholds increased 9.1 percent reflecting the changes in consumer prices, whereas personal income per capita increased only 7.5 percent. In addition, the average annual unemployment rate rose from 5.6 percent to 8.5 percent and the number of persons who exhausted their unemployment benefits increased from 2.0 million in 1974 to 4.3 million in 1975. The increase of 2.5 million low-income persons during the 1974-1975 period was the largest single year increase observed since 1959, the first year for which poverty data were available. . . .

Between 1974 and 1975, the increase in the number of persons below the poverty level was quite pervasive, occurring for both Black and White persons, for persons of Spanish origin, and for the young as well as the elderly. Particularly large percentage increases were observed for Whites, persons under 65 years, and husband-wife families.
While changes have been effected in "absolute poverty" as measured by the poverty threshold, very little has been accomplished by further income equality in the nation. Using the simplest measure of income distribution—the share of the annual income received by portions of the population ranked by income—the lowest 20 percent of the population has never varied from a 3-4 percent share, while the highest 20 percent has always received about 44 percent (U. S. Bureau of the Census, 1977). The economic conditions which produced this situation shortly after World War II have persisted up until the present time. Despite the War on Poverty and other governmental efforts of the past decades, there has been no general reduction in income equality from 1947 to 1975. Apparently, there will be no economic "welfare reform," promised by Presidents Johnson, Nixon, Ford and Carter, without a substantial restructuring of the American economy (Northwood, 1978).

A similar assessment could readily be constructed in the social policy areas pertaining to housing, education, nutrition, community services, transportation, environmental protection, legal services, the criminal justice system, and in almost every facet of the life of the society.

The formulation of social policy and the choosing of goals involves making priority choices. It is myopic not to consider military expenditures as a social policy choice. As history has proved, the selection of military policies has many damaging effects for social development, not the least of which is the reduction of resources available to fund social programs and implement social policies (Northwood, 1977). Such a political perspective leads to a key question about the policy process. One may ask: "Who is winning and who is losing, and what goods (money, status, power) are they winning or losing by this or that policy decision?" (Tropman et al., 1976, p. 10). This political question is central and should be used to analyze any policy proposal (Boulding, 1967; Hillsman, 1976).

In 1976, U.S. Congresswoman Elizabeth Holtzman commented that military spending in the proposed budget for 1977 "accounted for one-quarter of all spending, almost 50 percent of all Federal revenues not earmarked for trust funds, and 70 percent of all 'controllable outlays'" (Holtzman, 1977). She proposed that military spending be reduced by $10 billion and the funds be diverted to a variety of social programs to relieve the effects of inflation and unemployment, and to provide support for health, education and welfare; services to the youth and the aging; mass transit construction; and crime prevention. Her proposal failed to receive enough votes for passage. Similar attempts were rejected by Congress in 1977 and 1978. However, the campaign to shift national priorities continues to receive popular and legislative support. At the same time military budgets grow steadily. And as the U. S. continues to arm itself, it has also become the leading arms exporter in the world. According to the U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the United States delivered a total of $31.6 billion worth of arms to foreign countries between 1965 and 1974, or just under 50 percent of all arms traded on the international market (U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1976, p. 73).

In 1954 the New York Times called the United States a "reluctant welfare state." Twenty-five years later a more appropriate designation would be the "Warfare-Welfare State."
There are many legal and quasi-legal means of affecting how the government is run in a democracy. Among the quasi-legal means frequently employed by most people at some times in their lives are tax evasion and bending or breaking the law. But most people engage in government legally by observing the spirit of the law, exercising the vote, or serving in office. In addition, they may protest what they consider to be an injustice, petition their elected representatives or other governmental functionaries, or otherwise enter the social policy process either directly through some form of government sponsored citizen participation, or indirectly through their activity with political parties, civic organizations, and social movements. All of these latter, legally sanctioned activities, make up the social policy process.

In this paper we have emphasized the thesis that the public social policy process, in essence, is a vehicle through which government can, and should be, democratized if it is conducted appropriately and toward that end. The social policy process has the potential for focusing attention on the major social problems and the serious shortcomings of the society. Through it, ameliorative programs can be proposed in the context of alternatives which can be assessed in terms of the available resources and the desired outcomes. It has the capacity of generating information about the success or failure of a particular program, why this is so, and how it can be altered to be more effective. Thus, the policy process provides one basis for evaluating the general effectiveness of government. This is much different than choosing among candidates or officeholders merely on the basis of their promises, the usual practice in a representative democracy.

Properly organized, the social policy process can facilitate democratic government. The electoral process, on the one hand, allows the citizenry at fixed periods of time--the time of elections--to select the men and women who occupy the formal positions in elective bodies, and who enjoy the rights and responsibilities for guiding the policy process. In contrast, social policy process is continuous and ongoing. It provides a channel of immediate access of the citizenry to the machinery of government. It involves the direct participation of the citizen, not his representative. Furthermore, it allows the specialized expertise of the participant to be brought to bear on the policy. The specialized expertise may derive from participating in the program, such as a welfare recipient or a service professional.

As pointed out in the paper, the social policy process is not conducted in this democratic way in today's modern "warfare-welfare state," the United States. The purpose of this section of the paper is to identify some of the barriers to the democratization of the social policy process. Three barriers are identified. They pertain to (1) the openness of the social policy process; (2) the relative uninvolvment of the citizenry in the process, especially of the primary users and social professionals; and (3) the absence of near-absence of systematic, comprehensive evaluation of social policies.
The Openness of the Social Policy Process

As the third section of the paper demonstrated, there are few, if any, comprehensive guiding social policies of relevance to the type of issues with which the "welfare state" is supposed to be concerned: employment, inflation, health, education, welfare, housing, the social security of children, families, and the aging.

In the absence of such policy and for other reasons, the government engages in endless committee activity devoted to fact-finding about social problem conditions. Thus, it is safe to say that no nation is as well equipped as the United States with information about the prevailing problems of the society. However, this information is not brought to bear in effective programs to remove or prevent the society from suffering the consequences of the problems. Occasionally, a committee report may lead to the establishment and/or funding of an ameliorative social program. However, the history of such efforts demonstrate conclusively that such programs have attained a modicum of effectiveness only when they have been accompanied by the insistence of mass movements. These movements largely have exerted their influence through mass protest and through the ballot box rather than through the internal workings of the social policy process.

The most successful social policies in terms of their effectiveness have been concerned with military and economic development. The federal government has consistently and regularly allocated some $1.5 trillion to military expenditures during the past three decades (Sivard, 1977). With the allocation it has achieved, not without tremendous waste of funds and resources, the greatest military power that the world has ever known. Whether this great military power provides adequately for the nation's security is a debatable point.

The economic development has been furthered and fostered through the military and other programs, particularly through fiscal policy which provides subsidies to business and industry, and which exempts them from the payment of tens of billions of dollars in taxes each year. For example, corporate income taxes in 1944 provided 33.6 percent of the total federal income in tax revenues, whereas, by 1974, it was only 14.6 percent (Brandon, Rowe and Stanton, 1976, p. 22). Economists Joseph Pechman and Benjamin Okner (1974) calculate that if all the special tax breaks were eliminated, we could cut the income tax rates by an average of 43 percent. Wealthy individuals who now effectively reduce their tax bills by more than 43 percent would then actually pay more, while the majority would pay less. Moreover, net interest payments on the national debt of $650 billion accounted for 14 percent of the domestic baseline expenditures in the U.S. in 1977 (Schultze, 1976, p. 345). This may be considered as a direct subsidy to individuals and corporations who own most of the government bonds.

In making its budget decisions and in the review of its operating procedures, the federal government has understandably been reluctant to expose its policy making machinery to the public view, or even to the scrutiny of Congress in general. Much of the information which guides social policy is secret or accessible to only a few highly placed individuals. For years the military budgets were simply rubber stamped by
an acquiescent Congress while almost every social program, which issued out of committee after prolonged debate, was subjected to further detailed examination and criticism. For example, during the Nixon "imperial presidency" dozens of social programs were vetoed, and when they were repassed by Congress over the presidential veto, the enabling funds were diverted or impounded. This situation came to a head in the Watergate Era when Congress passed legislation to enable its review of budgetary matters and to restrict the scope of the presidential veto (Gartner, Greer, and Riessman, 1973; Northwood, 1977, unpublished). Subsequently, President Carter has challenged some of these Congressional restrictions as excessive and unconstitutional. Meanwhile, Congress attempts through the courts to secure access to information about the covert activities of the CIA and the FBI in order that they can perform adequate budgetary review as to the nature and effectiveness of these activities.

But much of the policy activity of Congress is not of such a sensitive nature that it must be protected from the public. However, the ordinary procedures of Congress preclude widespread public participation. On many issues, the body simply goes into "executive session" which forbids participation by outsiders. Moreover, hearings on proposed policy changes are held at the whim of the committee chairman to which proposals are submitted. The committee hearings often occur in Washington, and at times that are convenient to its members, not the public. Furthermore, the legislative processes by which a bill is enacted are complicated, and not understood by many of those who wish to be heard. There is not time enough for everybody to participate who wants to.

The volume of legislation is massive, too much for any congressman to absorb by himself. Furthermore, Congress has "disabled itself" by the way control is exercised over expenditures: revolving funds are established; government corporations are created; the refusal to prohibit transfers between appropriations; the authorization of the use of departmental receipts without the limitation of amount; the voting of lump sum appropriations (O'Connor, 1974, p. 114).

As a result of these and other complicating procedures, the process of governing becomes more and more indirect. Congressmen become more dependent on the polling process as a source of information. They hold informal meetings with organized constituencies which are far removed from the decision making process. They come to rely on the people who are close to them for advice. Among these are the paid legislative representatives of special interest groups, who can afford to maintain offices near the action, who are more-or-less skilled in legislative and political persuasion, and who have the resources to perform personal favors or offer other incentives in return for the legislator's vote. There are probably hundreds of effective lobbyists representing business, military and economic interests for every advocate of consumers and health, education and welfare agencies. Even the latter are often more sensitive to the issues and concerns of the professionals than they are to the needs of the poor and the disadvantaged.

In the discussion so far, the reference has been to the social policy process at the national governmental level. A similar account could be constructed of the state and local levels--with a similar result. To be sure, there are ways in which the policy process differs at these levels. In general, legislators are more accessible, more informed about local
problem conditions, and more responsive to mass persuasion which can be organized more easily in the local area. Furthermore, most officeholders depend upon a home area for their election, and they tend to listen to home town voters more than others. However, local and state governments do not have at their disposal massive national resources often required for the solution of serious social problems. Consequently, there has grown up a traditional division of labor among governmental units in which issues of the social welfare are usually considered to rest in the domain of national government. Thus, they may be ignored by local governmental units.

The Discouragement of Citizen Participation

One of the unfortunate consequences of this relatively closed system of policy making has been the discouragement of citizen participation both in the electoral and social policy processes. For example, Walter Dean Burnham (1970) conducted a survey of the voting turnout in 20 leading "western" nations between the years of 1945-1969. He found that an average of less than 60 percent of the eligible voters participated in elections in the United States as compared with an average of 83.3 percent in the balance of the nations. While it is said that a large proportion of Americans belong to at least one voluntary association, perhaps half the adult population of the United States, very few are "active" in organizations that involve themselves in "politics," perhaps one in seven persons (Smith and Freedman, 1972, Chapter 4). Labor unions are frequently considered as effective channels for influencing social policy. However, in the United States during the period 1950-1970, the labor force increased by 20 million persons, but unions enrolled barely one-quarter of that number, a very low proportion in comparison with trade union membership in the industrialized nations of the world (Anderson, 1974, p. 164).

Thus, the great majority of the people are not affiliated with voluntary associations with a particular interest in the policy process. At the same time, in every city, town and hamlet of the nation a small proportion of the population is actively engaged in such efforts, and in many organizational forms. Perhaps the most influential are the political parties and associations, the organized trade unions, business, commercial and professional associations, the churches, the single and multiple issue movements that emerge around particular sectors of the population (women, minorities, the aging); particular issues (taxation, peace, protection of the consumer or the ecology), or particular activities (sports, religious culture, hobbies). All of these are more or less active when the social policy affects their area of interest. In other words, with a few notable exceptions, they do not have a sustained and scheduled relationship with respect to the public policy process. In fact, the political participation by voluntary associations and their members is actively discouraged by the government in several effective ways. First, there are restrictions on the political activities in which government workers may engage imposed by many governmental units. In addition, associations which are politically active may have their tax exempt status cancelled; and they are required to pay higher postal rates. Furthermore, political surveillance and other forms of harassment have been used by the government during recent years.
activities that run counter to the prevailing administration. The ambiguous definition and uneven enforcement of such provisions does not mitigate their chilling effect.

The voluntary associations which are involved in public policy making and administration have a particular relationship to the government agencies with which they are associated. Some are given access to the means of policy making and administration, and some are not. Warner (1973, pp. 253-254), who has reviewed the empirical literature on the subject, comments: "Both policy and administration are essentially political processes, and therefore mediation by voluntary associations requires competition in political struggle." Some voluntary associations are "captured" or "coopted" by the administrative agency; in some instances, the reverse occurs. In any case, the special working relationships "differ markedly from the general image of voluntary associations as 'free standing' units of society that appeal to public agencies for consideration of particular points of view, as well as to mobilize public opinion and 'educate the public'." Where voluntary associations take on a public or quasi-public character, few of them have adequate machinery for public accountability when they take on public functions. For example, business and professional associations may be accorded the right to accredit or police the activities in their area of expertise, yet turn out to be more responsive to their colleagues than to the society.

Although federal regulations are more cognizant of, more numerous, more developed, and more consequential toward citizen participation than they were a decade ago, "a single, explicated uniform and consistent federal policy concerning citizen participation has neither been established legislatively or administratively." That is the conclusion of Hans Spiegel, who reviewed the subject in 1971. Furthermore, he points out that:

The federal administration at its highest levels favors citizen participation that is congruent with and not disruptive of municipal and federal program management, (and it) opposes citizen participation that results in citizen control over, as contrasted with citizen involvement in, any key aspects of programs. (Spiegel, 1971, p. 14)

The federal record of support for citizen participation is in accord with this conclusion. As a case in point, Pivin and Cloward have been leading advocates of "disruptive strategies" to force bureaucratic agencies to meet the needs of the poor and the disadvantaged. An agency following this strategy instituted "massive rent strikes" and "mass claims for welfare benefits" (Pivin and Cloward, 1971). For a time, the agency was supported by federal grants and a large national foundation. These funds gradually disappeared. This example is not atypical; it is a general rule. Therefore we conclude that it is unlikely that the federal government will finance any significant reform unless the class composition of the governing bodies change.

Pivin writes (Pivin and Cloward, 1974, p. 340): "As localities lose their political autonomy, the forces that remain viable will be those capable of exerting national influence." And that influence will be exerted through organizing citizen participation around progressive social policies with or without government support and funding.
Failure to Evaluate Policy Outcome

The effectiveness of social policy can only be measured with certainty if there is a systematic evaluation of the outcome of the process. Without this evidence one cannot be sure of what effects and consequences were actually produced by the policy, and whether these were the desired ones. Even where the outcome is thoroughly and systematically assessed, there is room for doubt and uncertainty, given the level of development of the research technology in social evaluation. But without the application of the science that exists, speculation remains rampant, and the hope of the society to be guided by social policies that are benevolent, sound and reasonable is a pipedream and a narcotic.

What the measurement of the outcome can produce is reasonable information whether the policy actually affected the lives of the designed beneficiaries and whether the designated problem conditions were somewhat ameliorated. Outcome measurement can tell us whether the policy had little or no desired effects, or, instead, contributed to worsening conditions. Finally, it can provide useful evidence to indicate a different line of social intervention.

It should be remembered that the evaluation of outcome differs from the evaluation of performance, which is concerned with efficiency in the organization and administration of policy. Thus, it is entirely possible to be very efficient in performing activities that may satisfy the consumer and the producer, but be worthless in producing the desired effects.

There are very serious questions about whether any social program, let alone a social policy, has ever been evaluated systematically in terms of its efficiency and effectiveness in the United States. The reasons for this are many.

In the first place, social programs are primarily considered by congressmen as a vehicle for distributing money or services to designated persons or districts rather than a way of testing the soundness of a social policy (D. Cohen, 1972). While lip service is given to the policy, and it may provide a persuasive rationale for the passage of legislation, many congressmen are more concerned with getting something done immediately for the electorate than with the evaluation of long term effectiveness. Thus, where evaluation is required by the enabling legislation, usually this pertains to the efficiency in costs and administration, which can be measured immediately.

Second, social programs are frequently drafted in terms that stress legal, administrative and fiscal restrictions while the plan of organization and intervention is expressed more generally in order to allow for innovation. Moreover, since programs may be instituted simultaneously in many areas and under widely differing auspices, it is difficult to manage their evaluation, even where responsibility for this is kept in federal hands. Although the research evaluation may be centrally administered, the data are collected locally where the action takes place. There are dozens of sources of variation and error that exist where there is no standardized design and methodology, and the data are collected and analyzed by persons with insufficient knowledge, skill and motivation. All of these variations and errors will occur in the implementation of broadscale social programs.
The complex problems of evaluation have been discussed by Alice Rivlin (1971) and others (Haveman, 1977; Rossi and Williams, 1972; Caro, 1977; Weiss, 1972). Her conclusion is that:

Neither social service systems nor government programs are organized to generate information about their effectiveness. Furthermore, new techniques or combinations of resources are not tried out systematically so that their effectiveness can be evaluated. Until programs are organized so that analysts can learn from them and systematic experimentation is undertaken on a significant scale, prospects seem dim for learning how to produce better social services.

Furthermore, she doubts that systematic experimentation can be devised, organized and funded by the federal government for reasons such as the following: First of all is the large dollar cost of experimentation. Besides costliness, there are many ethical questions such as: Does society have the right to take risks with the lives and well-being of individuals in the name of experimentation? Can services be provided to some people and not to others in the name of experimentation? If legal and moral questions can be answered satisfactorily, there are many technical research problems to be solved, such as appropriate sampling, replication and the control of extraneous variables. A major barrier is the long time it takes from the initiation of the study to the production of usable results in policy-relevant forms. Rivlin notes that "experiments may become substitutes for action or excuses for inaction" (p. 118).

Despite these disadvantages, Rivlin believes that, "the federal government should follow a systematic experimentation strategy in seeking to improve the effectiveness of social action programs." Her approach is to decentralize the authority for making evaluations of effectiveness. First of all, the local community should be held accountable for how federal dollars are spent with rewards being bestowed on local agencies which produce more efficiently. To be sure, there are difficulties in this strategy because local sponsors might be influenced to bias their research methodology and findings to assure a steady flow of federal investment. However, this might be partially overcome by the federal government developing and refining performance measures, defined in terms of the program outcomes, which would be instituted and monitored at the federal level.

Moreover, Rivlin advocates experimenting with mechanisms prevalent in the private market economy for certain programs. For example, instead of federal support to public education in general, vouchers might be provided to parents who could choose the school in which they would enroll their children. Such a voucher system would "accentuate existing problems of income equality" if the parents chose to pay the premium required in addition to the government voucher to send their children to more expensive schools, offering richer curricula, smaller classes and more elaborate facilities. But this outcome might be controlled through providing larger vouchers to poor children, and in other ways.
Even though economists know that the private market "does not work perfectly in the private sector," Rivlin (p. 134, 138-139) notes that there are offsetting benefits:

Perhaps major national manufacturers would invest considerable sums in new educational techniques, hoping that they could be proved more effective and then sold to schools seeking to enhance their attractiveness to students. These companies, however, would tend to invest in hardware and materials on which they could retain exclusive rights through patents and copyrights. There might be serious neglect of methods and approaches that, while conceivably more effective than hardware, could be easily copies without compensation to the original developer.

Rivlin's comments are not atypical. They characterize the orientation of the government analysts toward social programs and social policies. First, they recognize the essential need for outcome evaluation if any adequate measure of effectiveness is to be obtained. Then they raise a host of technical, moral and political problems that explain why such measures have not been instituted in the United States, and which render them unlikely in the future. Third, they tend to shift the responsibility for systematic evaluation from federal to local authorities. Finally, they reaffirm their faith, albeit with reservations, in the efficacy and the benevolence of private market mechanisms as the best way to do the job.

Critics of this line of reasoning are quick to note that the failure to evaluate the effectiveness of social programs and social policies is closely related to the reluctance of the government to open up its policy machinery to critical inspection and with its efforts to discourage citizen participation in the policy process. The three factors are intertwined and interrelated. Therefore, any realistic program to democratize the social policy process in America will have to engage in political reform to be successful. This does not mean that small measures cannot be taken now to improve every facet of the process, but that, in so doing, attention must also be directed to improving the social policies that govern the policy making machinery.

A Modest Agenda for Social Policy Researchers

Researchers and scholars, no matter what their field of inquiry, are expected to be guided by the standards and ethics which pertain to scientific inquiry and its conduct. This means, among other things, that they work to assure the validity and reliability of their research, and that they share the methodology and findings in ways that promote the growth and development of science and scientifically guided practice. Furthermore, when working with human subjects, they are required to employ a variety of safeguards which protect people from unfair manipulation, exploitation, embarrassment, or harm.

In addition to these standards, researchers and scholars have an increased responsibility when they deal with social policy issues. We have stressed the functions of social policy for achieving benevolent, sound and reasonable changes in the society through the enhancement of the democratic problem solving process. It is the responsibility of the social policy
analyst to conduct his work in such a way that these democratic potentials are maximized.

Donald N. Mitchell (1970, p. 3) has posed this issue nicely in the question: "Who has the right to do what to whom, on what grounds?" Thus, there must continue to be an ever-present challenge to sources of legitimacy and authority in society. Mitchell sees this as one of the important roles of the voluntary association in society. In this paper we postulate that it is the responsibility of every worker in social welfare organization to review his/her activities from time to time in the perspective of the issues raised by this question, including especially the social policy researcher. To meet this added responsibility, the following modest program is proposed for social policy researchers and scholars:

1. Understand the nature of the public social policy process and its potential for democratizing government.

2. Conduct research in ways: that maintain the openness of the public policy system with respect to quantity, quality, accessibility and timing of information relevant to policy formulation and decision-making; that facilitate the organization and scheduling of citizen participation in all activities of the process; that require the clear specification and measurement of the desired outcomes for all policies.

3. Identify the implicit and explicit value assumptions that underlie social policies, and elaborate both the positive and negative effects and consequences of a policy and its implementation.

4. Explore the potentials of working with non-governmental organizations, voluntary associations, and social movements interested in improving the distributive justice for the user and the consumer.

This paper has begun the analysis of the nature of the social policy process and its potential for democratization. But much remains to be done. To begin with, it is necessary to root out the conservative ideology that automatically accords benevolence to government social policies and to the policies of the "welfare state." The works of Galper (1975), Gil (1973, 1976), O'Connor (1973, 1974), Romanysnin (1971, 1974), Bailey and Brake (1975), Roby (1974) Cloward and Pivin (1971, 1974), Mandell (1975), Castells (1977) and Titmuss (1962, 1969, 1974) are helpful in this respect, among others. However, there are many themes in this body of writing which belittle the importance of social planning and the social policy process as necessary vehicles for democratization, with which the author does not agree. Time does not allow a detailed analysis of this important subject.

Furthermore, there are many small reforms that can be made in the practice of policy and the policy making machinery which can facilitate major reform if this is not lost sight of in the tinkering process. Policy researchers can enter the struggle right now by improving their current research and organizational techniques.

For example, where data are collected firsthand as in social surveys and systematic observation, the process can be scheduled in ways that information is given to the respondent as well as information obtained from the
respondent, if not prior to data collection then immediately following. It is possible to use citizen review panels before, during and after the data collection. These have relevance both to improving the research and informing the public. Where data are gathered strictly from secondary sources, the same potential exists for citizen review and interpretation. Furthermore, the information process should be organized and scheduled so as to promote conjoint planning and decision making.

Policy related research typically has been associated with the management echelon of organization. However, there is no inevitable reason why this needs to be so. Of course, management frequently is the sponsor or funder of such research and often controls access to the data. Therefore, it may be difficult, or seemingly difficult, for the researcher to institute an open policy stance. Thus, it would seem that the researcher is faced with a moral problem when he opposes management policy. There are many alternatives available to the researcher in such cases. What the author is arguing for is that the researcher take the moral stance that public policy is an open process and that he guide his behavior accordingly. The resourceful researcher can usually devise procedures for circumventing onerous restrictions. The motivated researcher can usually manage, over time, to organize his research activities in ways and in settings which are conducive to his interests and amenable to the open policy (Kim and Wellons, 1976).

It should be recognized, however, that with growing specialization and bureaucratization of research and the settings in which it is done, the work is so fragmented that many of the personnel are not even aware of the policy implications and the policy uses to which data are amenable. Furthermore, the difficulties of organizing and scheduling citizen participation in the research process may seem like an obstacle or barrier to productivity, unnecessary work for meager results, or a task beyond the scope of the researcher or for which he is ill-prepared to manage effectively. In addition, he may never have questioned the utility or benevolence of his work—that is what he is paid to do. These many reasons underscore the necessity for raising the consciousness of those engaged in social welfare work, and especially the researchers engaged in evaluation of social programs or social policy.

One way of doing this is to clearly spell out the desired outcomes and beneficiaries of the research. Another, more preferable way is for the researcher and the scholar to put their skills and talents to use with organizations which are clearly directed toward achieving distributive justice for the consumers and the users of social policy. By association with the disadvantaged sectors of society, the researcher and the scholar can acquire a better understanding of the problem conditions and a realistic knowledge of what is required for their amelioration. Too many professionals forget whatever experiences they may have had in the past that impelled them to seek ameliorative change, and they begin to shape their work according to the status quo expectations of their sponsors.

But it need not be this way! Of course, it will require a political struggle to realize the democratic potentials of the social policy process, just as it requires a political struggle to elect good men and women to office and to keep them oriented toward distributive justice. The current high cost of running for public office effectively places this option beyond
the means of most people. This makes it imperative that the social policy process be kept open and democratic in its means and ends. In this, social policy analysts, at least, can play their part in helping bring about a better tomorrow.
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WILL CARTER'S WELFARE REFORM PLAN REFORM WELFARE?:
EVIDENCE FROM EMPIRICAL RESEARCH

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ABSTRACT

This paper introduces the central dimensions which have emerged in the current welfare reform debate. They include adequacy, work incentives, family stability and cost. The last legislative session introduced a new group of "welfare reform" proposals, each attempting to address these critiques of the current welfare system. Considering four major bills including Carter's Comprehensive Program for Better Jobs and Income on the basis of recent research findings, results in a tentative preference for Carter's plan. It addresses the major reform dimensions better than the others and would result in modest improvements. Nevertheless, true reform is unlikely to be achieved by any of these approaches if more fundamental intervention in the labor market is not taken.

The welfare reform debate has been rescued once more by the Carter Administration from the domain of academics and the social welfare community. It has resided there since its ignominious fall from favor after the defeat of the Family Assistance Plan (FAP). In the new round of public discussions very little of its fundamental content has changed in over a decade. Indeed, the central issues of debate and the ideological positions which seize them have remained remarkably unscathed by the multitude of important social and economic changes which have occurred over the last decade.

Though the prevailing concerns of welfare reform have remained relatively unchanged, the political climate in which reform must take place has altered considerably. Years of seemingly uncontrollable inflation and unemployment, coupled with a view that government cannot work, have soured many on the value of large government policies and programs. This is reinforced by the recent onslaught of taxpayer revolt against government spending and the attendant fraud and mismanagement perceived as an inevitable counterpart of government programs.

At the same time, however, considerable progress has been made in
the state of social science knowledge. Several income maintenance experiments have been completed, analyses of longitudinal data sources circulated, and a variety of important social science evidence on the nature and determinants of poverty permit a more informed discussion of the policy options.

Nevertheless, politics and research continue to be inextricably bound to one another and the current interpretations of the relationships of recent research findings to proposed bills for welfare reform have not been completely satisfying. This paper will attempt to assess the value that current research findings have for selecting among the major welfare reform proposals.

These dimensions represent those which political debate has identified as critical. They do not represent the full array of values or goals around which social planners might design an optimal system. Rather, they address the more practical and less idealized dimensions which policy analysts are required to consider in constructing a welfare reform plan acceptable to a reluctant constituency.

A brief description of the major legislation currently under consideration will be presented. Finally, the results of empirical research will be applied to an assessment of the degree to which existing proposals can be expected to address the major welfare reform issues. Will the welfare reform plans as conceived reform welfare in response to these concerns? The paper will conclude with a discussion which explains the often inappropriate and inadequate use of the growing body of social science research in designing and evaluating welfare policy.

ENDURING ISSUES IN THE WELFARE REFORM DEBATE

Adequacy

The first dimension or goal currently considered in the welfare reform debate is the adequacy of current benefit levels. Proponents of welfare reform generally point to the great disparity in the level of current benefits available to similar families in various jurisdictions. Attempts to establish a floor of income eligible families nationally have been part of the reform movement since FAP. Critics argue that benefit disparities are inherently inequitable and impose undue hardships on participating families in low paying states. Some have argued that interstate disparities encourage the migration of eligibles from low benefit to high benefit states. Further, many argue that the failure of most states to provide benefits at a level consistent with the federal poverty line results in an unacceptable level of suffering and hardship when national policy has for some time been concerned with poverty reduction. Fewer than twenty-six states currently pay AFDC benefits as large as 2/3 the federal poverty
families for whom the wages of the male head were inadequate to lift them from poverty, dissolving their marriages (either real or feigned) would make them better off. The woman would then be eligible for AFDC as head of a family. Whatever additional income sources the former spouse could provide would make them still better off.

The welfare system, it has been argued, has thus provided the incentive for economically rational families to split up. Further, since no federal cash program covers poor single individuals, it is also claimed that poor women have an incentive to bear illegitimate children in order to meet the eligibility requirements for AFDC. Critics of the current system often observe that AFDC discourages poor young women from marrying the fathers of their offspring by rendering them ineligible for any assistance if they did.

Finally, many have suspected that granting higher benefits with increasing family size in the AFDC program results in an implicit incentive for welfare mothers to bear more children than they otherwise would. This pro-natalist orientation of the current welfare system is believed by some to result in larger families and increased dependency.

Issues related to the perverse incentives for family composition under the current AFDC program are becoming increasingly central to the assessments of alternative options for welfare reform. Each major policy initiative currently awaiting legislative consideration has taken this alleged impact of the current system for granted, offering changes which are assumed to reverse the increasing family dissolution apparent under current arrangements.

**Costs**

Concern about program costs in the existing income maintenance system influence legislative response to almost every element in the design of a welfare reform alternative. A particular dilemma in the welfare reform debate involves the cost implications of the tradeoffs between benefit adequacy and benefit uniformity. Establishing a uniform level of benefits nationally, without making current recipients worse off, requires setting a floor of benefits at a level as high as are currently paid in states more nearly approaching the poverty standard. This results in an extremely costly program, since dramatic increases in benefit levels are required to bring low-paying states to this level of adequacy. The less costly option, that of establishing a uniform floor of benefits at a far more modest level, compromises the adequacy of benefits in all states. When additional goals such as increased overage are included, the dilemma becomes worse.
standard and as many as ten provide less than 2/3 the federal poverty standard when the value of food stamp bonuses is included.

Not only the generosity and uniformity of benefits is included when the debate addresses adequacy, but implicit in these discussions is coverage. Twenty-four states deny benefits altogether to two parent families and no federal program exists to cover singles or childless couples. In states which have an AFDC-UF program, eligibility rules often exclude many needy families from participating. Of the 11.8 million non-elderly poor* in 1967, 6.7 million remained poor even after welfare transfer income (CBO, 1977). Though many families are made better off by welfare, many other families do not have resources (welfare and non-welfare income) which approach the national poverty standard. These facts are even more dramatic when one recalls that the federal poverty standard is based on the Department of Agriculture's lowest level budget capable of producing a nutritionally adequate diet. Critics are not, then proposing extravagant benefit levels when they speak of adequacy based on this standard (though they are often accused of such).

Work Effort

Another issue of considerable importance in all discussions of welfare is that of work effort. Critics of the current system argue that the system discourages work in a variety of ways and, indeed, that the system itself breeds continued dependency. No other issues appear to loom larger than those concerning work in current or previous welfare reform debates. In fact, almost all changes throughout the 1960's of the Social Security Act have been made in response to the perceived lack of work effort among recipient family heads. Two major changes were made during that period in order to increase the labor force participation of recipients. One was a mandated Work Incentive Program (WIN), which required employable recipients to register for work training or work placement. Failure to do so could result in withdrawal of benefits. Similarly, provisions for day care services, though limited, were made to permit mothers of small children to register for training to work. The Talmadge amendments required welfare mothers of children over six to register for WIN.

Thus, an attempt to require work as a condition of continuing eligibility was institutionalized in the existing welfare system in AFDC. The Food Stamp Program also included a work test. Other efforts to encourage work were legislated through a reduction in the benefit reduction rate on earned income and more liberal procedures for deducting work expenses in calculating benefits. Analysts had argued that a dollar reduction of benefits for each dollar of earning provided a

*below 100% of the poverty line
strong work disincentive for participating families. Indeed, it meant that, with modest wages, families would be no better off by working than they would be by not working. The Social Security amendments in 1967 reduced the "tax" on earnings to 67 percent, while permitting working recipients to retain the first $30 of monthly earnings without any reduction of benefits.

Concerns about work effort, however, were not quelled. WIN slots were limited and so were day care slots. Welfare case loads were growing dramatically even as national unemployment rates were quite low. Enforced work was viewed by many as a necessary component of any further welfare reform. Other critics and analysts began to discover that although the benefit reduction rate of AFDC was 67 percent, many recipients of AFDC were also participating in a variety of other cash or in-kind programs. Many of these programs, such as food stamps and public housing, had their own benefit reduction rates on earnings. Thus, the actual cumulative marginal tax rate effective as a function of the additive rates from several programs could result in benefit reductions of as high as 100 percent or more for each dollar of earnings. The work disincentive effects of this were thought to be substantial. Many critics of the current system, therefore, argue for a single comprehensive cash program with a more modest tax rate.

Economists, while recognizing the potential work disincentive effects of benefit rates, have also pointed to the work disincentive effects of high guarantees. The guarantee is the level of benefits available to an eligible family with no earnings. Those whose exclusive priority is very strong work incentives favor both low tax rates and low guarantees. A high guarantee, it is argued, competes with prevailing wages and thus, the cost of not working may be very small for a low wage worker eligible for a high guarantee. The debate over the appropriate levels for both the guarantee and the tax rate in a reformed welfare system has been at the center of academic and legislative discussions since FAP. The difficulty of reaching compromises involves the marginal impact that particular tax rates and guarantees have on a variety of other critical priorities in welfare reform, including adequacy, program costs, family stability, and equity.

**Family Stability**

The concern with family stability predated the welfare reform initiatives of the Nixon administration. Witnessing increasing AFDC caseload growth, policy makers and analysts began to observe that, increasingly, the poor and the "dependent" were female-headed families. Explanations of the increasing number of female-headed families generally included the incentives in current AFDC programs for family break-up. A minority of states at that time had seized the federal option to offer an AFDC-UF program which covered intact families with an unemployed father. Even in states which had such a program, eligibility criteria precluded participation of low-wage workers who were employed more than 100 hours a month. Therefore, for many needy
The cost constraints at the national level are reinforced by the problems experienced by many of the older cities and states in which large numbers of the poor and welfare recipients live. Many cities and states, particularly in the Northeast and Midwest, are facing increasing welfare costs at a time when economic growth is declining markedly. Indeed, these older cities and states are experiencing declining revenues and population while demands for public and social services are increasing. Most of these localities resist federal initiatives which will require any further financial commitments from their dwindling public treasuries. In fact, cities such as New York, Boston, Detroit and Chicago are supporting legislative initiatives which seek to relieve the fiscal burdens which now threaten to overwhelm them.

Current financing arrangements for AFDC and Medicaid apportion state-federal shares on the basis of a federal formula which compares state median income to national median income. Several states then apportion intra-state shares by city or county. New York, to cite an extreme but important case, is required to finance a full 25 percent of its welfare and Medicaid costs through its own revenues. These expenditures constitute the second largest budget category for the City. Thus, despite all the dimensions on which welfare reform might be judged, program costs and fiscal relief to states and localities may emerge as one of the critical criteria on which the potential for legislative enactment will be judged.

Before considering the usefulness of the Carter Plan and the other competing pieces of welfare reform legislation in addressing the issues of adequacy, work, family stability and costs, it is necessary to emphasize the complexity of these dimensions. The most difficult problem in designing any social policy is the multiplicity of goals which planners are simultaneously attempting to maximize in a single program. Nowhere is the case more dramatic than in the design of income maintenance programs. Competing goals, in this case, means that maximizing any one may result in minimizing another. To take a simple example, policy planners have for some time been committed to minimizing the work disincentive effects implicit in an income transfer program. At the same time, they may be required to minimize increasing program costs.

The work disincentive effects allegedly promoted by the existence of a high marginal tax on earning (high benefit reduction rate) can theoretically be mitigated through tax rate reduction. Though a lower tax rate on earnings may reduce the labor force withdrawal of participating families, at the same time it serves to increase dramatically program costs. It does this for two reason. First, a lower tax rate results in recipient families receiving benefits at higher levels of income than they otherwise would. The level of income at
which benefits fall to zero (the break-even point) is higher under a lower tax rate. Second, not only do participating families receive continued benefits at higher levels of income, but the number of families eligible for benefits at higher levels is far greater than at lower levels, given the current distribution of income. Thus, the simultaneous goals of maximizing work incentives while minimizing program costs cannot be achieved. Planners must necessarily trade off acceptable levels of work effort for reduced program costs or the converse. It is obvious that the larger the number of goals, the more complex the nature of the trade-offs. Unfortunately, these issues are rarely resolved at the level of the analyst. Indeed, they generally fall within the domain of political expediency.

CARTER'S WELFARE REFORM PLAN VS. THE COMPETITION

Evaluating any piece of social legislation requires a complex analysis which includes not only an assessment of the projected outcomes, given a set of goals, but also a marginal analysis of the trade-offs between the costs and benefits of alternative means toward the achievement of those goals. It is beyond the ambition of this paper to carry out such an effort. Instead, the discussion will limit itself to a more general review of current research findings regarding a few key elements in the welfare reform debate. An attempt will then be made to assess the wisdom of the major legislative approaches to welfare reform, given the results of recent research.

Comprehensive Approaches

Conventional distinctions between comprehensive approaches and incremental approaches to welfare reform are useful in grouping the current available proposals in only the grossest way. A recent paper by Levy (1978) suggests that a more useful approach would be to see the current legislative options as a continuum on the basis of the resources they provide and the reorganization they require.

The first two bills calling for "comprehensive reform" are Carter's Plan for Better Jobs and Income (H.R. 9030) and the revision of this bill introduced in Feb., 1978, by the Special House Subcommittee on Welfare Reform (H.R. 10950). The two bills which call for "incremental reform" include the Welfare Reform Act of 1978 (H.R. 10711), introduced by Representative Ullman, and the Job Opportunities and Family Security Program (S. 2777), sponsored by Senators Baker, Bellman, Ribicoff, and Danforth.

The Administrations proposal for Better Jobs and Income is characterized by three major components: (1) comprehensive case assistance which establishes a national floor of income for all families or unrelated individuals; (2) a jobs component which mandates 1.4 million public service jobs for all adults in families with children "expected to work" but who cannot find jobs in the private market; and (3) an expanded Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) for low-income
workers employed in the private market.

The case component would consolidate a variety of existing programs, including AFDC, AFDC-UF, SSI and Food Stamps. In addition, it would provide federal coverage for groups currently ineligible for assistance under existing federal assistance programs, such as childless couples, single individuals, and two parent low-income families. The bill also established two benefit tiers based on whether family heads are "expected to work" or "not expected to work." Those not expected to work include the elderly (over 65), the blind, the disabled, single family heads with children under seven. One adult in all other households would be expected to work, including one adult in two-parent households, single individuals and childless couples, and single parents with children under 14. Single parents with children between the ages of seven and thirteen would be expected to work part-time.

Those who head families but who are not expected to work would be eligible for benefits on the upper tier which vary by family size and other demographic characteristics related to need. Examples of the benefit levels available to those on the upper tier would include $2500 for a disabled or aged individual with no income, $3750 for a similar couple, and $4200 for a single parent family of four with at least one child under seven.

Those expected to work would be eligible for reduced benefits on the lower tier. For example, a family of four in which an adult member was expected to work would be eligible for a benefit amount of $2300. After an eight week job search, if no private employment could be found or placement in a public service job arranged, the family would move automatically to the upper tier. (The Subcommittee proposal reduces this period to five weeks.) If an adult expected to work were employed in a private sector job, the $2300 supplementation would begin to be reduced by a benefit reduction rate of 50 percent up to a break-even of $8400. In addition, an adult on the lower tier who is working would be eligible for an expanded EITC. For example, for a family of four this would amount to 10 percent of earnings up to $4000, 5 percent up to $9100, and would be reduced by 10 percent above $9100. At $15,650 the credit would fall to zero.

The Carter Plan thus integrates income support systems for the working and the non-working poor. It establishes a national floor of income support and makes jobs in the private sector more desirable than public jobs, while still offering work to those who cannot find private employment. It provides federal financing while offering incentives for state supplementation of basic income support levels. In addition, though a description will be omitted here, there are dramatic changes in administration and state-federal responsibilities,
as well as innumerable regulations, including how income is defined, over what period it is measured for benefit calculation, definitions of filing units, allowable asset limits, deductible work expenses and other important design features.

The Subcommittee proposal, while similar, alters financing arrangement, state-federal responsibility, and the rules and procedures applicable to the aged, blind and disabled. Federal costs of the Subcommittee proposal are now estimated to be substantially higher than the $19.14 billion first-year cost attributed to the Administration proposal.* It reduces, however, the costs to the states from what it would be under the Administration plan.

**Incremental Approaches**

The Ullman proposal falls under the more "incremental" approaches to welfare reform and, indeed, has a more limited range of goals. Its major reform feature concerns setting a minimum cash value of AFDC and Food Stamps for families with children, while retaining existing SSI coverage for the aged, blind, and disabled. Food Stamp coverage for single individuals and childless couples would continue in its current form. The bill seeks to achieve welfare reform by modifying current programs. It mandates AFDC-UF for all two-parent families in all states, while simultaneously requiring minimum benefit levels for both AFDC and AFDC-UF. The benefit levels in the bill, however, do not vary by family size. The proposal also expands the Earned Income Tax Credit. The credit is 30 percent of earnings up to $5000. The credit remains constant at $1000 between $5000 and $7500. It is then reduced by 13 percent as earnings rise above $7500, until its value falls to zero at $15,200.

In addition, the Ullman bill provides modest resources ($5.07 billion) for the creation of approximately 560,000 jobs to be administered by the WIN program. First priority of jobs is given to principal wage earners in two-parent families who are unemployed and have been receiving AFDC-UF for 16 weeks. A variety of other administrative features are also contained in the Ullman proposal. First, there is a provision which adjusts state minimum benefit levels to reflect changes in the state's median income over time. It utilizes retrospective accounting which requires recoupment of excess benefits from families whose monthly income on which benefits were based is not reflective of annual income. Because the Ullman bill maintains to a greater extent than the previous proposals continued federal-state partnership in the administration and financing of welfare efforts,

*cost estimates for the Administration proposal differ dramatically depending upon the assumptions used. The figure cited is a CBO projection for FY 1982. The Subcommittee Bill is projected to cost $20.22 billion in FY 1982.
cost estimates indicate that for FY 1982 estimated federal cost will be between $8 and $9 billion while state and other levels of government will assume costs of about $6.5 - $8 billion. These estimates were made by the House Ways and Means Committee.

The Baker-Bellmon bill (S. 2777) is roughly similar in nature to the Ullman bill. Its goals for reform of the current system are far more modest than the comprehensive proposals. It seeks first to achieve a minimum benefit standard for families with children, while maintaining existing SSI coverage for the aged, blind, and disabled, and retains Food Stamp coverage for childless couples and single individuals. It has far less emphasis on putting recipients to work in public service jobs and requires no substantial administrative reorganization or program consolidation.

Specifically, it would mandate AFDC-UF in all states. Minimum benefits for AFDC and AFDC-UF would be tied to the federal poverty standard and would vary by family size. The benefit standards include the value of food stamps. This level would be 60 percent of the poverty standard. Based on current standards, minimum benefit levels for a family of four would be $3875 (AFDC cash standard is $1764 plus a food stamps value of $2111). The benefit levels would rise in response to the impact inflation has on the poverty standard over time. In addition, goals are set which would require benefits to increase to 65 percent of the poverty standard by 1985.

The bill changes the current EITC for the working poor by setting an earnings limit equal to the poverty line. The credit would equal 15 percent of earnings up to that point and phase it out by 20 percent of all earnings over the limit. The poverty standard for 1978, as currently projected, is $6350 for a family of four. Under this bill the maximum credit for a family of four would be $952 with earnings of $6350. The breakeven level would be reached when earnings are above $11,100.

Unlike any of the previously reviewed proposals, the Baker-Bellmon bill authorizes no resources for the creation of public service jobs. In fact, the bill would cut back the existing level of Title VI CETA jobs from the existing level of 750,000 to 375,000 in 1982. These remaining jobs would be reserved first for principal wage earners in two-parent families receiving AFDC-UF for at least 90 days. Any remaining jobs could then be filled by single-parent household heads or others unemployed for at least 26 weeks. The bill does, however, authorize resources to provide incentives for private job creation through a tax credit or job voucher for private employers willing to employ a former assistance recipient. There would be a ceiling on the maximum credits permitted and regulations prohibiting the displacement of regular workers. No employer could receive both
credits and vouchers simultaneously. The bill, therefore, provides no systematic reorganization or dramatic changes in existing programs. It seeks modest goals through marginal reform much like that of the Ullman bill.

The brief descriptions of the major existing proposals for welfare reform are probably less important individually than they are as a group. None is likely to be enacted in its current form. They are probably more important as a group because they represent the current range of thinking among policy makers and because the form they take indicates a variety of underlying diagnoses of the current system and the nature and causes of poverty and dependency. Recent research has provided a considerable mass of findings which is beginning to reveal new perspectives on poverty and dependency. The dimensions of the welfare reform debate reviewed earlier can be usefully applied through the consideration of what the empirical data indicate will be the likely impact of any of these new proposals. The remainder of the paper will concern itself with evaluating the impact of the various types of reform proposals on the status and behavior of the poor.

THE WELFARE REFORM BILLS AND THE RESEARCH

Research on the behavior of welfare recipients in response to existing and proposed income maintenance programs have been financed and initiated to a large degree by governments at the local, state and federal level. Most research has been motivated by government concern about growing case loads and rising costs. It is, therefore, not surprising that questions related to work effort have dominated the research agenda. As we will discuss in the concluding section, inadequate consideration of exogenous labor market determinants of work and welfare patterns means that existing research may place far too much significance on the independent impact of changing the parameters of income maintenance programs.

Nevertheless, the preponderance of research has contributed significantly to our understanding of the importance of using policy analytic approaches in assessing proposed programs. Using research finding does help to avoid unanticipated consequences often associated with past program changes. (see Sanger, 1979)

Adequacy

All the major bills deal to some degree with the claim that current programs provide inadequate benefits. Each sets a national floor of benefits for the populations which it seeks to cover. The Ullman bill and the Baker-Bellmon bill, however, limit proposed coverage exclusively to families with children. The Adminsitration bill and the Subcommittee bill not only seek to establish a minimum floor of income but also to cover all individuals regardless of family composition.
exclusively on the basis of need.

The underlying research question in determining the adequacy of existing proposals is, what will the distribution of income among poverty families look like after the enactment of any of the programs? Benefit levels alone have been an inadequate measure of economic well-being for all recipient families since, in existing programs, most families do not depend on AFDC benefits as their only source of income. Recent research has been showing, for example, that the incidence of multiple benefits is quite common (Bernstein, et al., 1973; Lyon, et al., 1976) and that if the cash value of all in-kind benefits were included in calculations of resources available to recipient families, many more would be enjoying command-over-resources equal to or exceeding existing poverty standards (Lyon, et al., 1976). Clearly, the situation is not the same in all states. This remains one of the problems; adequacy of existing benefits varies profoundly.

Not only are multiple benefits and the values of in-kind benefits important in determining the adequacy of existing benefits, but so too is the degree to which many recipients have access to other sources of income. A recent study using longitudinal data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) revealed that when "ever Welfare" families (headed by women) were followed over time, evidence was found of substantial serial and simultaneous work and welfare mixes. Except for some long-term dependent cases, women while on welfare over the seven years of the study, had between 25 percent and 33 percent of their total family income derived from earnings. (Rein, 1977) Of all low income women who headed families over five years of the study, 77 percent worked at some time (Hausman & Friedman, 1975). This suggests that the value of welfare benefits at zero income may not be an entirely useful measure of the adequacy of the resources available to all potential welfare recipients. The value of benefits available at zero earnings is, however, a useful and accurate reflection of economic well-being for those groups in which the incidence of earnings from work or from other forms of assistance are not substantial. For those groups, such as the aged, blind, and disabled, the value of Food Stamps plus SSI benefits is an appropriate measure on which to evaluate adequacy.

The descriptions of the proposed reform programs above failed to indicate the degree to which they would encourage state supplementation of the federal floor of benefits. This inducement to states might be a significant determinant of the level of adequacy provided by each program. However, while the degree of state supplementation is likely to affect how the adequacy of proposals may be judged, it is also likely to extend the existing criticisms of lack of uniformity. State supplementation incentives will make it advantageous for states to
assume responsibility for increasing federal benefit levels, but there are regional disparities in the degree of commitment to social welfare expenditures. Short of mandating state supplementation, any incentive scheme is likely to perpetuate existing regional disparities in welfare effort.

There are considerable uncertainties which exist in estimating the comparative level of adequacy implicit in each of the proposals reviewed. The first depends on the level of work effort of participating families. It was mentioned above that female heads of families have a strong connection to the labor market. Nevertheless, their hours of work are generally less than male heads of low-income families. Male heads of low-income families have very strong attachment to the labor force. Ninety percent of non-white males and ninety-seven percent of white males work. They, in general, work extensively and have average hours of work near or above average hours for the labor force as a whole (Levy, 1976).

The composition of eligibles is therefore important in determining adequacy of benefit levels. Access to additional sources of income and the probability of seeking and finding work varies among different demographic groups. Work, it has been found, is far more pervasive among traditional welfare eligibles than has previously been appreciated. Many view, however, that the degree of compulsion and penalties regulating work, as well as the availability and provision of public service jobs, will also affect the average income available to eligible families and individuals.

The Administration proposal and the Subcommittee revised version provide most promise for increased adequacy. Because the proposals do not maintain traditional categorical distinctions, presumably coverage would be universal and participation rates would likely be quite high. Distinctions would be made, however, between those expected to work and those not expected to work. The adequacy of benefits available to those not expected to work are reasonably simple to estimate. Without state supplementation the guarantee for a family of four would be 2/3 the poverty standard. This level of support would be higher than existing entitlements for AFDC and Food Stamps in ten states. Current benefits available in all states for combined SSI and Food Stamp entitlements for the aged, blind, and disabled exceed the Administration proposal's benefits of $3750 for a couple and $2500 for an individual. The Subcommittee proposal provides for the retention of benefit levels for the aged, blind, and disabled as a separate component at current levels.

Supplementation therefore becomes central for these groups in assessing their relative level of well-being under these comprehensive plans, as compared to existing programs. The Administration bill encourages supplementation by absorbing 75 percent of the additional
state costs required to raise the state minimum benefit level to $4717 or about 3/4 of the projected 1978 poverty standard. Further encouragement is provided through a federal cost assumption of 25 percent of the expenditures states assume to raise minimum benefit levels to $6350, the projected 1978 poverty standard.

Similar inducements are provided for supplementation for those groups expected to work under the Administration and Subcommittee proposals. There would be a 75 percent assumption of costs by the federal government for states which raise the guarantee for workers during their job search period from the federal minimum guarantee of $2300 to $2583; the same would apply for a state which raised the minimum benefit level for those expected to work, when no jobs were available, from the federal guarantee of $4200 to $4717. The Subcommittee proposal, however, pays 75 percent of the state cost of raising the guarantee from $4200 to $4700 and 25 percent from $4717 to the poverty line or the state's current level of AFDC plus Food Stamps, whichever is higher.

Though the costs are assumed by the federal government at up to 75 percent for state supplementation to $4717, it should be emphasized that currently, in many of the lowest paying states, federal cost sharing for welfare programs is often as high as 83 percent. Nevertheless, these are often the states where benefit levels remain the lowest in the country. Further, even at a 75 percent rate of federal matching, $4717 remains lower than the combined value of AFDC and Food Stamps in many of the most generous states. Therefore, the level of adequacy for those not expected to work is likely to be increased in some states, while there is some indication that there will be places where families will be made worse off under these proposed benefit levels, even with the incentives for state supplementation.

For those expected to work, the situation is likely to be better under these proposals. Since the guarantee is less likely to be considered apart from earnings for these recipients, and because research shows that these groups work extensively, the combined value of benefits and wages will probably provide a more useful measure of adequacy (after considering the tax rate). Both bills contain a large jobs component with a strong EITC for those employed in private sector jobs.

A recent study (Sulvetta, 1978) has estimated the impact of the Administration proposal on benefits for the poor. Tables 1 and 2 compare the status of both those expected and not expected to work under current programs and the Administration program. Based on a family of four where an adult is expected to work, comparisons can be made with existing benefit levels for those assumed to be employed in public sector jobs under the Administration proposal.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Unit</th>
<th>Current Program Benefits</th>
<th>PBJI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low-Benefit State</td>
<td>Median-Benefit State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single Individual</td>
<td>$ 624</td>
<td>$ 624</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aged, Blind, or Disabled Individual</td>
<td>2,356</td>
<td>2,688</td>
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<tr>
<td>Couple with no children</td>
<td>1,128</td>
<td>1,128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aged, Blind, or Disabled Couple</td>
<td>3,539</td>
<td>3,980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-Parent, 2-Child Family</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>with 1 Parent Incapacitated</td>
<td>3,444&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>5,164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-Parent, 2-Child Family</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>with Head Unemployed in AFDC-UF State</td>
<td>3,444&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>5,164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-Parent, 2-Child Family</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in non-AFDC-UF State</td>
<td>2,040</td>
<td>2,040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-Parent Family with 3 Children over 13</td>
<td>3,444&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>5,164</td>
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<tr>
<td>1-Parent Family with 3 Children Age 7-13</td>
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<tr>
<td>1-Parent Family with 3 Children under 7</td>
<td>3,444&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>5,164</td>
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</table>

1. Annual benefits include food stamps, SSI, and AFDC where applicable.
2. Assumes AFDC and SSI benefits = to level paid by South Carolina.
3. Assumes AFDC benefit = to that paid in Maine. Maximum annual AFDC amount paid for a family of 4 in 1977 was $3,768. SSI payments were $2,254 per individual and $3,768 per couple. See table 5 for an explanation of benefit composition.
4. Assumes AFDC and SSI benefit payments = to that paid by New York. Maximum AFDC annual amount paid for a family of 4 in 1977 was $5,712.
5. See table 9 for component breakdown.

Source: Sivertsen 1978.
TABLE 2
Comparison of Existing Benefits and Proposed PBJI Benefits
when Head of Family Is Expected to Work and Is Employed
at Minimum Wage in Private Sector Job

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Unit</th>
<th>Current Program</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Annual</td>
<td>Annual</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Annual</td>
<td>Annual</td>
<td>Total</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Benefits</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>6,964</td>
<td>5,512</td>
<td>1,920c</td>
<td>7,432</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1,452a</td>
<td>6,964</td>
<td>5,512</td>
<td>1,920c</td>
<td>7,432</td>
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<tr>
<td>Single-Parent Family with 3 Children Age 7-13</td>
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<td>4,776b</td>
<td>7,534</td>
<td>2,756</td>
<td>2,576d</td>
<td>5,332</td>
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</table>

Note: Assumes 1978 projected minimum wage of $2.65 per hour, or $5,512 for full-time employment, $2,756 for half-time employment.

a. Includes earned income tax credit of $249 plus food stamp benefit of $1,203. Earned income tax credit calculated as \(0.1(4,000) - 0.1(5,512 - 4,000)\). Food stamp benefit calculated as \$2,040 - (0.3(5,512 - (720 + 900 + 0.2(5,512))).

b. Includes earned income tax credit of $276, Maine AFDC benefit of $3,768, plus food stamp benefit of $734 calculated as $2,040 - 0.3(6,524 - (720 + 900 + 0.2(2,756)). This assumes that allowable child care deductions more than cover the loss in AFDC benefits due to earnings.

c. Cash benefit of $1,444 plus earned income tax credit of $476.

d. Cash benefit of $2,300 plus earned income tax credit of $276 computed as 10 percent of income up to $4,000. Although benefits are reduced by 50 cents for every dollar of earnings, an annual child care deduction of up to $1,800 for one child and $3,600 for two or more children is permitted.

Source: Sulvetta, 1978; p. 41
The degree of impact is related to whether or not male-headed families reside in states which currently operate an AFDC-UF program. For those families in states where no such program exists, the joint value of wages at the level of the minimum wage and cash benefits would make them far better off. In fact, expected value of wages and cash benefits would result in income in excess of the poverty standard. For those residing in states which operate an AFDC-UF program, their status would still be substantially improved by the administration proposal.

For those family heads expected to work who find private employment, even at the minimum wage, the situation is far better still. Table 2 indicates that when the value of AFDC or AFDC-UF benefits are combined with both Food Stamps and the current value of the EITC, working family heads in private employment are still far better off under the Administration proposal than they are under any combination of existing transfer programs. The only exception to this is for the single parent household assumed to be working part-time. Current benefits for it are substantially better under current arrangements than under those proposed by the Administration.

The critical factor here, in terms of the average adequacy of proposed benefits, is the fact that coverage would be greatly increased as compared with existing programs. Though comparisons have been made with family heads in states with AFDC-UF, it should be clear that participation rates are quite low in these programs, even in states which have them. For example, for large numbers of low-wage workers residing in states with no AFDC-UF programs, benefits available include only the value of Food Stamps and the current EITC. No other cash benefits are currently available to the working poor in those states. Indeed, even in states operating an AFDC-UF program, monthly employment in excess of 100 hours excludes any participation for families with working heads, even if their income is quite low. Coverage of the working poor, whether in families with children or not, clearly results in raising substantially the aggregate level of adequacy of command-over-resources for millions of currently ineligible families.*

The Ullman proposal and the Baker-Bellman proposal fall far short of the Administration and Subcommittee proposals on the basis of the adequacy of benefits provided. Neither extends coverage to

* The benefit levels used are the median benefit levels paid in a representative state paying moderate benefits (e.g. Maine).

* The Subcommittee proposal goes even further in insuring an increased level of adequacy by proposing to legislate the indexing of welfare benefits for changes in the cost of living.
childless couples or individuals. Both retain the Food Stamp program which restricts the use of a large part of the total value of benefits available to food, exclusively. Both bills mandate AFDC-UF coverage in all states. The Ullman proposal restricts participation to these families if their monthly income exceeds $350. It would permit a federal AFDC-UF benefit level of $200 per month ($2400 per year) for male-headed families with no income. Aid would be available for a maximum of 17 weeks at federal expense if no public service job were available. States would be required to extend aid for an additional 35 weeks at their own expense. States would be permitted to supplement the federal minimum of $200 per month by as much as $150, but the costs of doing so would be entirely their own. Retaining the Food Stamp program would result in an estimated yearly benefit level for a two parent family of four of $4080. These restrictions must be seen as particularly harsh given the fact that all minima and maxima are not adjusted, as in the previous proposals, for family size. The result, therefore, is obvious. Total benefit levels for intact families, though higher than are AFDC and Food Stamp benefits currently available in seven states, do not go far enough in approaching the poverty standard. Large families, a major cause of poverty among the working poor, will be made the worst off among both intact and female-headed families.

Adequacy, it has been argued, can be judged best for those expected to work, based on the expected value of both wages and benefits available. The Ullman proposal allocates $5.07 billion for public job creation (approximately 560,000 jobs). These are to be administered through the WIN program. This compares with an estimated 1.4 million jobs budgeted to be created in the Administration proposal. The Ullman bill gives first priority to male heads of intact families already receiving AFDC-UF who have been receiving assistance for 16 weeks. The jobs are therefore largely reserved for those who, after a relatively long search period, still remain unemployed. Wages would be at the minimum wage and credits would be available to private employers willing to hire WIN registrants.

In general, benefits are available only to families with children and those already eligible for SSI. Benefit levels mandated are low in comparison with the comprehensive proposals, as is the proposed increase in the EITC. No substantial incentives exist for state supplementation and the proposed level of job creation appears low. WIN has not had a very strong history of success in training and placement of its registrants and there are no indications that they are now either equipped to undertake or capable of undertaking substantial job creation, even with the proposed mandate to contract with CETA prime sponsors. The lack of benefit adjustments for family size appears particularly harsh, based on recent research indicating that among the working poor this appears to be a major source of hardship, even for those employed in stable jobs. (Levy, 1976).

The Baker-Bellman bill is even less generous in most respects
than the Ullman bill. It also retains existing programs but mandates AFDC-UF. Far from removing the 100 hour eligibility criterion which now results in such low participation among families with an unemployed father, the Baker-Bellmon bill merely retains the troublesome "notch" problems at a new level by setting an eligibility requirement of income less than 130 times the minimum wage for benefits for families with an unemployed parent—($3445). This results in ineligibility for families with income in excess of $3445. This appears to be the case regardless of family size.

Benefit levels would be set at 60 percent of the poverty standard. This would include the joint value of Food Stamps and mandated state minimum benefits. This requirement, however, causes benefit levels to vary with family size. For an AFDC family of four the 1978 cash standard of combined value of AFDC and Food Stamps would equal a total benefit of $3875. This exceeds the current state benefit levels of only five states. This benefit standard would apply to both AFDC and AFDC-UF households. SSI would be retained in current form. A target date is set for 1985 to increase mandated minimum benefit levels to 65 percent of the poverty standard.

Though benefit levels are quite low, generous incentives for state supplementation would exist. Any state now paying above the federal minimal level mandated would be required to retain current levels; (i.e. current recipients would not be made worse off as they would be under other proposals.) Federal cost sharing which now bases the federal rate of cost assumption on the relationship between state median income and the national median income would be modified from the existing range of 50 - 83 percent in the following manner: in 1980 the federal cost share would rise to 120 percent of its obligation under the existing formula. It would increase to 140 percent in 1981 and 160 percent in 1982. This would occur until a state's level of benefits reached the official poverty standard, after which any additional benefit increases would be exclusively assumed by the state.

Provision for public job creation is even less than under the Ullman proposal. The Baker-Bellman bill would retain current resources for providing the existing level of CETA public service jobs through 1979. At that point the allocations would decline over a four year period to reach a level of only 250,000 slots in 1983, providing that the national level of unemployment does not exceed 6 percent. The major instrument that the bill proposes for job creation is a system of either job vouchers or job credits for private sector employers who hire AFDC recipients unemployed 26 weeks, provided that they pay the prevailing wage and that there is no job displacement.

Based on the conventional level of adequacy established by the
federal poverty standard, no bill yet proposed insures that minimal level of adequacy. Only the Administration and Subcommittee bills insure this level of adequacy for those who are working. Further, the Ullman and the Baker-Bellmon bills exclude from any more support than current programs provide, large numbers of childless couples and single individuals. Though the incremental bills increase the present value of the EITC now available, neither bill insures a job for those expected to work. None of the bills totally resolves the difficult problem of wide national variation among states in their benefit levels. Though all do set a minimum floor under that part of the population to be covered, in both incremental bills the floor is so low that most states already pay that minimum level of benefits.

Substantial incentives exist for state supplementation in all but the Ullman bill. But state supplementation is ultimately a mixed blessing. It may result in disparities in benefit levels regionally. States which have traditionally been more generous in their commitment to welfare support will probably remain so, while those states which have not been so generous in their commitments will probably retain their traditionally low levels of support.

Throughout, an effort has been made to compare the value of existing benefits to those proposed for different groups in the competing proposals. No mention has been made of the important contribution that the value of in-kind benefits now available to welfare eligibles through Medicaid might have. The Medicaid dilemma, and how it will be resolved, has important implications for comparing proposed income transfer systems to the existing one. Presumably, the incremental proposals would retain existing Medicaid eligibility to participating families. The value of these benefits has been shown to be substantial. (Lyon, et al., 1976) The comprehensive proposals have not attempted to extend Medicaid eligibility to groups which would for the first time become eligible for income transfers under their proposals. Many suspect that this will result in undue hardship and implicit inequities in the value of benefits to similarly situated families within the new program; that is, those eligible under existing programs will remain eligible under the reform proposals, but those newly enfranchised will have no such option. If states are required to assume all responsibility for Medicaid to new eligibles, the costs may be tremendous. It will encourage further state disparities as well as interfere with state supplementation incentives. The Subcommittee and Administration proposals have left this question unresolved because of the expectation that national health insurance will soon make it a moot point. In the meantime, however, it weakens the adequacy of the proposals while retaining a troublesome "notch" often criticized as part of the existing system.

The goals of simultaneously providing an adequate level of resources and universal coverage are not met by any of the major legislative
proposals. Nevertheless, the Subcommittee and Administration proposals make a dramatic effort in beginning to approach those goals. The problem of making judgments in a vacuum about a particular goal in welfare reform becomes obvious. Economic theory and empirical research point to the danger of high guarantees. Work disincentive effects and costs must be traded off against adequacy. The next section will begin to place the relative merits of these competing goals in perspective. Though adequacy remains a critical factor in any attempt to design and evaluate a new income transfer system, additional concerns weight heavily in determining the optimal mix of program parameters.

Work Effort

No issue in the welfare reform debate has received more attention in the popular media or research community than that of the work effects of the welfare system. Four multi-million dollar income maintenance experiments have been undertaken for the primary purpose of estimating the level of labor force withdrawal which is to be anticipated under a reformed welfare system. A considerable amount of non-experimental research has also been done for this purpose.

Economists argue that two basic elements in an income maintenance program affect the work effort of program participants; the guarantee and the benefit reduction rate (tax rate). These two program elements influence how recipients will assess the attractiveness of work. Experimental research and non-experimental research on both the current and proposed systems have revealed significant relationships between reduction in work effort and the size of the guarantee and the tax rate. (Appel, 1972; Watts, 1974; Garfinkel, 1974; Cogan, 1978; Keeley, et. al., 1977)

Most of the research has shown that male heads of families respond the least to changes in these program parameters, followed by female heads of families. Wives of working heads (secondary workers) generally respond more immediately and dramatically to changes in the "cost of work" than do either of the other groups. By and large, male heads of families have a strong attachment to work and changes in the guarantee and tax rates seem to have a significant effect for only a small portion of them. (Preidman and Hausman, 1977)

The other finding for which there is wide support is that labor force withdrawal is more likely for those groups with lower normal income. Thus, we would expect a greater reduction of work at a given benefit level and tax rate for those groups where normal income is the lowest. But since there are far greater concentrations of families as we move up the income ladder from, say, $1000 to $5000, the danger of substantial reduction in work effort is contained within a smaller group of families.
Many have been particularly concerned about the unmeasured work effects of the current welfare system. The value of many cash and in-kind benefits often results in high implicit guarantees. Recent research in New York City demonstrated that the value of multiple benefits packages that many families received was far higher than they could generate through work. (Lyon, et al., 1976) Similarly, the cumulative marginal tax rates which result from multiple benefits are suspected of providing severe inhibitions to labor force participation among eligible families. (Hausman, 1974) Many of the existing disincentives and costs of a categorical and multi-program system go unmeasured. The size and cost of projected reductions in work effort from a reformed system may therefore seem greater when compared to the present system than they actually are.

The dominant group on welfare nationally is the female-headed family. New proposals which extend coverage to male-headed families are creating the largest amount of concern among researchers and policy makers because of the uncertainty of their projected labor response. Profound labor force withdrawal as a result of new income maintenance programs is feared for a variety of reasons. Work disincentives could result in a decline in national output, in the projected income (and thus, well-being) of the target population and, most dramatically, in the projected cost of any new program. More important is the moral conviction, strongly held in this country, that work ought to be stringently encouraged, if not demanded.

The most recent data on the effects of a reformed welfare system have come from interim reports from the five year Income Maintenance Experiment in Seattle-Denver. It reported labor supply effects which were large and significant. Although it was not possible to distinguish among the specific labor supply responses of families exposed to different guarantees and tax rates, it was possible to generalize about the impact of a negative income tax program in general. The results are consistent with those found in non-experimental cross-sectional studies. (Keeley, et al., 1977) Husbands were found to reduce their labor in response to the program by 5.3 percent, wives by 22.0 percent and female heads by 11.2 percent.

Legislative debates during this round of welfare reform proposals, as in past rounds, recognize the work disincentive effects of any income transfer system. Those who react most emphatically against promoting any labor supply decline, at any cost, often call for strong administrative components, in any new legislation, which create compulsion to work. The view that the work test is the proper vehicle to combat the implicit work disincentives in an income maintenance program has persisted for virtually hundreds of years. In view of the lack of any solid empirical support for the effectiveness of administration compulsion to work (Evans, et al., 1975, Stevens and Austermann, 1975; Stevens, 1974), and the tremendous
resource commitment necessary to attempt to enforce it, it is curious that it remains a politically necessary component in all proposed programs.

The Administration and Subcommittee proposals are comprehensive systems with universal coverage. Presumably a universal approach would eliminate many of the expensive and inestimable work disincentive effects of the highly decentralized, categorical, and administratively complex system of state and local welfare programs which currently exist. The costs of labor force withdrawal in a universal system must be weighed, ultimately, after netting out the perverse and highly costly behavior induced by the current maze of problems.

Nevertheless, the Administration and Subcommittee proposals are sensitive to the political debate and empirical evidence related to work effort. For those expected to work, during the job search period the head of household who is searching for a job is ineligible for benefits. The effect of this provision is, of course, to remove a known work disincentive (high guarantee) during the precise time when one would wish a recipient's work effort to be the strongest. If work is not found within eight weeks (five weeks in the Subcommittee proposal), the family would be eligible for the full support available for families who are not expected to work. The guarantee at this upper tier would be 2/3 of the poverty line.

The benefit reduction rate would not exceed 50 percent \* of earnings for those expected to work. In addition, benefits do not begin to be reduced until earnings reach \$3800. For those on the lower tier, therefore, benefits are not reduced at all until earnings exceed \$3800. Provisions for state supplementation specify that a total benefit reduction rate can never exceed 52 percent for combined federal and state supplemental benefits. To insure that cumulative rates do not exceed this maximum, the EITC does not begin to be phased out until earnings exceed the break-even point for benefits. Clearly this results in providing benefits from the EITC to families whose incomes are higher than the poverty line. The target efficiency of this scheme is lower, but the work disincentives of higher tax rates within the 48-52 percent range, including the federal payroll tax on earnings.

\*The level at which most research suggests compromising work disincentive effects against program costs.

\**Most tax rate maxima reported in this section come from recent calculations made by the Urban Institute (Levy, 1978).
For those not expected to work, the maxima are similar, with the exception of state supplemental benefits which are permitted to be reduced as rapidly as 70 percent for each dollar of earnings. Overall tax rates, however, may not exceed 71 percent for this group of recipients whose work effort is of less concern.

The Subcommittee proposal does not recognize in its provisions the same importance of work disincentive effects and has different provisions for tax rate maxima than does the Administration proposal. For those expected to work, the maximum tax rate, including state supplemental benefits, may rise as high as 70 percent. The EITC, unlike that of the Administration proposal, reaches its maximum level of benefits at a substantially lower level of earnings. Thus recipients may still be receiving cash benefits when the 6 percent reduction rate begins for the EITC. Total tax rates, therefore, may be quite high. They remain at about 64 percent when the EITC is increasing and can reach 82 percent when it is phasing out. Similar ranges face those groups not expected to work.

Neither bill, it was mentioned earlier, deals with the problem of the Medicaid "notch" which results in loss of all Medicaid eligibility when a dollar of earnings puts recipients above the break-even level. The implicit marginal tax rate for those who lose all Medicaid eligibility can, therefore, be several hundred percent. It is not clear at this state, however, how many recipients will be eligible for Medicaid in the first place, since there is no provision to allow initial Medicaid coverage to those recipients who would not be eligible under the existing system.

Both bills have a "strong" work test. The first part of the work requirement is facilitated by a distinction by category between those expected to work and those not expected to work. The criteria for classification are based, for the most part, on clearly identifiable demographic characteristics. It is not clear, however, how disability will be determined and how standards of judgment can be applied uniformly. This is, of course, a major national problem in the operation of the disability insurance program.

Though the need for complex administrative regulations is minimized, uniformity of eligibility standards for the upper tier will doubtless be subject to national variation and unavoidable administrative discretion.

Failure to accept work by the principal earner in both bills results in a reduction in benefits; that is, the part of the grant allocated for the principal earner is deducted from the total family grant. For a family of four, the benefit standard would be reduced from $4200 to $2300. Enforcement of the work requirement is not too difficult for those seeking public service jobs. But for jobs in the
private sector the problem remains as difficult as existing enforcement of the work test in AFDC-UF and Food Stamps programs. It is quite simple for individuals to make themselves appear undesirable to a potential employer at a job interview. This type of work evasion is impossible to monitor or control. Administrative machinery set up to attempt to enforce a work test is expensive and complex. Attempts at doing so in state and local program administrative levels have not been successful in altering work behavior of recipients in existing programs. (Evans, et al., 1975)

Recent research has shown that work is substantial even for welfare recipients. (Rainwater and Rein, 1976) Hausman and Friedman (1975) point out that even among those 3–4 percent of the participants in the New Jersey Income Maintenance experiment who did not work, it was health problems, not distaste for work, which determined their employment status. Most of those who have studied unemployment spells among low income workers have found that most of them ultimately return to work. Thus, the question remains whether a work test is likely to alter either the incidence of unemployment from job separation or the length of unemployment spells. The issue is whether the costs of effective monitoring of a work test, when the results in labor force participation are apt to be quite small, are worth the displacement of resources from other more effective forms of employment assistance.

The Ullman bill and the Baker-Bellmon bill retain many of the work disincentives which exist under the current system due to multiple benefits from a multiplicity of programs. Nevertheless, certain incremental changes are proposed to deal with many of the egregious criticisms of the current system. The Ullman bill does nothing to alter the guarantee facing those expected to work during a job search period; this is potentially more of a work disincentive than under the comprehensive plans' lower benefits during job search. Nevertheless, maximum federal benefit levels are lower than in the other two proposals and do not vary by family size (a potentially weaker work disincentive effect is therefore present for large families, however unintended). The bill does eliminate a strong work disincentive present in the current program, the 100-hour rule governing male-headed intact families. Provisions for recoupment of yearly benefits (which results from basing yearly benefit calculations on earnings from one month) provide potential increased disincentives.

The Ullman bill establishes a tax ceiling for AFDC and AFDC-UP at 60 percent, whether or not benefits are supplemented by the states. Food Stamps (with a benefit reduction rate of 20 percent for incomes less than $7400 and 40 percent above) are sequenced such that Food Stamps benefit calculations consider both increases in earnings as well
as decreases in AFDC or AFDC-UF benefits. This helps the problem of additive tax rates. The EITC supplements earnings up until $5000 and phases out at a 13 percent rate above $7500. All of these rates, combined with the federal payroll tax of 6 percent, result in maximum rates for two-parent families of about 54 percent below $5000 and 74 percent between $5000 and $7500. The rates for female-headed families are similar but slightly higher.

The work test remains basically unchanged from that of the existing system. The principal wage earner in two-parent families and female heads with children over six are required to register for WIN training and job search activities. If these groups expected to work fail to register or fail to accept a bona fide job offer, the family is disqualified for AFDC and Food Stamps. If the female head failed to register, she would be disqualified, while payments for her children would still be made, but to a third party.

The same administrative difficulties exist with enforcement of these work regulations as currently exist and which were described for the comprehensive proposals. Their inclusion in all the proposals, therefore, must be taken as a political price necessary to achieve support in a conservative Congress. Similar requirements were ultimately included in the abortive reform attempts of FAP, with no additional confidence among planners or administrators in their necessity or effectiveness.

Of all the proposed legislation, the Baker-Bellmon bill responds the least with specific provisions to alter the work disincentive effects of a reformed welfare system. It provides for a single benefit level, even during job search. It does nothing about the "notch" effect of the 100-hour rule, since it merely replaces a rule based on hours with one based on earnings. And, finally, it provides additional work disincentives through the provision for benefit recoupment.

Benefit reduction rates in this bill, which result from a combination of AFDC and AFDC-UF rates of 67 percent, the current Food Stamps rates, and 20 percent reduction of the EITC above the poverty line, and the federal payroll tax, reach a maximum of 66 percent above the poverty line and 101 percent above the poverty line (as the value of the EITC declines). These rates, in general, apply to both two-parent families and female headed households. As in the other proposals, no provisions are made to deal with the Medicaid "notch." Work requirements are similar to those in the Ullman proposal.

Work incentives through low tax rates and low guarantees are unlikely to have the desired impact when jobs for welfare eligibles are simply not available. It is therefore important to consider the
strength of the commitment toward job creation in evaluating the respective impacts the various proposals have on work effort. The Administration proposal provided the strongest work incentives of all the proposals currently under consideration. The low tax rates, combined with the two-tier system, whatever its complexities in administration, provide the strongest work incentives of any of the bills. The work test, it has been argued, may be seen as unimportant in effecting work effort, but may have a substantial impact on costs and indirectly drain resources away from more effective employment assistance.

The provisions for 1.4 million jobs in the Administration proposal goes further in recognizing the limitations of the existing job market for the low wage workers than any of the others. Though it is beyond the scope of this paper, serious problems may arise in designing proper jobs and providing training which will lead to ultimate employment in the private sector. The current list of jobs to be designed does not seem to be entirely appropriate for the target population. Nevertheless, the combination of program parameters and the jobs components appears to be most consistent with what current research has been suggesting are necessary components of a reformed system. The concerns expressed by those who find the level of labor force withdrawal in the recent income maintenance experiments disturbing, are probably unfounded in a universal system where no dramatic changes in benefit levels are likely. Indeed, it appears that if all of the social costs of the current categorical system are netted out, the costs of the reformed universal system may seem quite modest.

Family Stability

During the 1960's the rapid growth of the AFDC caseloads motivated concern about the program's impact on the incidence of female headship and marital instability. The design of the program seems to support the view that the program itself encouraged, through financial incentives, marriages to break up or be postponed. This view was explained through reference to program eligibility requirements which excluded support in many states for families with an unemployed male. Restrictive eligibility requirements in states which did operate an AFDC-UF program provided additional incentives to break up existing marriages or not form them in the first place, so that a female family head could become eligible for income support.

The research has not resolved very clearly the precise validity of these concerns. Indeed, a variety of data sources has yielded contradictory results. (Cutright and Scanzoni, 1973; Honig, 1973; Bernstein and Meezan, 1975; Sawhill, et al., 1975; Hoffman and Holmes, 1976) This section, therefore, will describe the emerging theories
of the impact of income transfers and program design on issues of family stability rather than attempt a proposal-by-proposal comparison, as in the previous sections. An attempt will be made to review the trade-offs in the current system against those in a reformed system, without detailed references to the specific provisions of each of the major proposals.

The decision to marry or to dissolve a marriage is based on a complex combination of social, psychological, and economic factors. Most of the research on the effect of income maintenance systems on these decisions has concentrated on the economic determinants. Among those studies which have found a positive and significant relationship between AFDC and marital instability, the variation explained is always quite small (e.g. Hoffman and Holmes, 1976; Bernstein and Meezan, 1975).

Nevertheless, the emerging economic theories which attempt to explain the incidence of family instability among those on welfare often emphasize two competing economic relationships. One is called the "independence effect," which relates to the finding that female income (or income producing capacity), as well as the access of women to alternative sources of income (i.e. AFDC), relieves the economic pressure to remain married or to marry. Several researchers have revealed the existence of this effect. The second effect, known as the "income effect," relates to the finding that at higher levels of income the incidence of family disruption appears to decline. This is often explained by the recognition that at higher levels of income the interpersonal strains caused by economic insecurity and negative views about the male role performance are relieved. The table below lays out the relevant hypotheses and the expected influence that universal and categorical income maintenance systems are likely to have based on the hypotheses.

Proponents of a universal income maintenance system, like the negative income tax, have argued that it will remove the existing incentives for family splits which are motivated by economic need. A universal system which bases eligibility for transfers on income alone (and without any family composition requirements) has been thought to remove incentives for family break-up among needy families who wanted to meet the eligibility requirements for income support.

The most recent results of the New Jersey Negative Income Tax Experiment and the preliminary findings from the Seattle-Denver Income Maintenance Experiments have produced considerable confusion. In general, the experiments showed, contrary to expectation, higher levels of marital dissolution among experimental families than among comparable controls. Control families were permitted to take advantage of existing welfare programs. A recent study which has had a considerable impact on the debates over the Administration's proposal in committee points to the danger of inducing even greater family instability by instituting a universal income (Bishop, 1978)
### TABLE 3 HYPOTHESES ABOUT ECONOMIC VARIABLES AND MARITAL STATUS CHANGE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theory</th>
<th>Relevant Income Variable</th>
<th>Marital Disruption</th>
<th>Expected Influence of Income Maintenance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic strain</td>
<td>Family Income</td>
<td>Low income strains family relationships</td>
<td>No effect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband's role performance</td>
<td>Husband's income (relative to some standard, as perceived by the wife)</td>
<td>Wife's gains from marriage are positively related to husband's income</td>
<td>No effect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female independence</td>
<td>Wife's income from earnings or public transfers</td>
<td>Wife's own income provides alternative to husband's support</td>
<td>Increases disruption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female head's income influences gains from marriage</td>
<td>Female wage, other female income</td>
<td>Female independence rises with own income, reducing the probability of marriage</td>
<td>Increases independence, delaying marriage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female head's income influences gains from marrying her</td>
<td>Female wage, other female income</td>
<td>Attractiveness rises with female head's own income, increasing probability of marriage</td>
<td>Depends on whether aid terminates at marriage*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potential mate's income influences female head's gains</td>
<td>Total income of suitable partners</td>
<td>Probability of marriage increases with income of suitable partners</td>
<td>No effect. Aid unavilable to males.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Ad for children in an AFDC unit does not necessarily terminate upon marriage. If the stepfather does not adopt the children, aid continues. However, aid does terminate for the mother so the father must contribute something or the family will suffer a net loss in income.

Explanations about what caused greater levels of family disruption among the experimental families than the controls usually take two forms. The first points to weaknesses in the experiments themselves, such as non-random attrition. Further, many have suggested that the results of the experiments are site-specific and cannot be generalized to a national program. The other attempts to explain that the findings are of a more theoretical nature. A closer look at the Seattle-Denver results reveals high rates of family break-up at low levels of support when compared to the controls, but comparable or lower rates at higher levels of support. These results may be showing that at low levels of support the female "independence effect" dominates but at higher levels of support the "income effect" dominates. Therefore, far from suggesting that a negative income tax should be abandoned, the results may be suggesting that a negative income tax at a more generous benefit level should be instituted.

Others have interpreted the findings differently. It may be that the stigma of AFDC constrains women in unhappy marriages from dissolving them, by inhibiting them from applying for AFDC. The lack of stigma in a universal system may therefore provide these women with a non-stigmatizing option for escape. (Bradbury, 1977)

The income maintenance experiments provided experimental families with a considerable amount of program information about the rules and regulations of participating. Some researchers have argued that the experimental families, unlike the controls, were aware that they would be eligible for continued benefits even if their marriages were to end. This information may have reduced the costs that those in unhappy marriages might have perceived in dissolving their marriages. (Hannan, et al., 1977) Alternatively, it may be that the new participation of a working male household head in income supplementation under the experiment undermines the female's view of his role performance. That is, the receipt of income supplements may be viewed as a signal by some families that the husband is a failure and, when he is not able to fulfill his role as breadwinner, marital tension results. (Bishop, 1978)

These explanations remain largely unresolved. The table above demonstrated the degree to which categorical programs or universal programs are hypothesized to effect marriage and separations. Categorical programs appear to have any incentives for family dissolution. Universal programs appear to provide incentives for both decreased and increased marital dissolutions.

The cash component of the Administration bill and the Subcommittee bill generally constitutes the archetype of a universal negative income tax program. However, the distinctions made between those who are expected to work and those who are not, provides a potential for
increased marital dissolution. Though there is no punishment through withdrawal of benefit eligibility for intact families, there is an implicit incentive for male heads assigned to the lower tier to abandon their families. Their families would be eligible for benefits at the upper tier without the male head. Hausman and Freidman (1977) suggest that we consider the following example: A two-parent family of four with at least one young child, and where neither parent works, is assigned to the lower tier. They are eligible for $2300, but if the husband leaves, the remaining one-parent family moves to the upper tier where they become eligible for $3600, or a substantial gain in benefits. In addition, the separated husband may be eligible for benefits as high as $1100 if he cannot find a job. There exists, therefore, as in AFDC, a strong financial incentive for the family to dissolve. The incentive among all eligibles is to move to the tier where the benefits available are higher. However, this is a dramatic and particular example which is not likely to be as universally profitable as is the incentive in the AFDC program.

The view described above that providing income supplements to an intact family signals the failure of the husband as a breadwinner, is minimized in the comprehensive proposals through the provision of jobs and, for those employed, an increase in the value of the EITC. This sort of income supplement is likely to be less stigmatizing since it is available at relatively high levels of earnings and this form of supplementation may be viewed as part of the tax system rather than the welfare system.

Finally, decisions about marriage and divorce are important long-range decisions. The immediate effect of the income maintenance experiments may not be borne out over the long run in a new system. Indeed, the option to leave a bad marriage may be facilitated by the availability of income support. It may not, however, precipitate such decisions over the long run. (Ross and Sawhill, 1975)

The added incentives in the current system for illegitimacy, though not supportable definitively by the research, are removed in the comprehensive proposals with increased coverage to include single individuals. The pro-natalist orientation which provides increased benefits with increased family size remains. Nevertheless, no research to date has provided convincing evidence that welfare mothers currently increase their family size for the purpose of increasing their welfare grants. (Presser and Salsberg, 1975) Results from the New Jersey negative income tax experiment revealed no significant difference between the experimentals and controls in their level of fertility. (Cain, 1974)

The incremental proposals modify somewhat the incentive for family dissolution by mandating AFDC-UF in all states. Nevertheless,
the Baker-Bellmon bill constrains eligibility for two-parent families with an arbitrary earnings limit. This is a potential destabilizing factor. However, if the stigma effect of welfare does indeed operate to inhibit the female independence effect, retaining the present welfare system in these bills probably will act to stabilize marriages.

If the independence effect dominates at lower levels of support and the income effect dominates at higher levels, the more generous benefit levels of the comprehensive proposals may operate to stabilize marriages. Further, it has been suggested that in programs with high marginal tax rates a male head (principal earner) may leave the family to protect his earnings. (MacDonald and Sawhill, 1978) The lower tax rates in the Administration proposal may inhibit family dissolution for this reason.

Much of the impact of the various proposals on family stability is mere conjecture. The empirical evidence and the theory are not consistent. A more important issue may be whether some additional family break-up is worth the price for reform. Few of these studies have provided any evidence on the nature of the marriages which dissolved. Bernstein and Meezan (1975), in a small sample of New York welfare mothers, did provide this kind of evidence. Many of the women in the dissolved marriages reported a high incidence of drug addiction, alcoholism, violence, and infidelity among their departed spouses. As a matter of public policy, permitting women in unhappy marriages the financial option to leave their husbands, may not be such a bad thing. Marital stability, for its own sake, does not appear to be a suitable dictum nor a sufficiently critical priority for which adequate support and equity ought to be compromised. Indeed, withdrawal of all income maintenance support is likely to increase female dependence on marriage, thereby increasing marital stability. It is not, however, reasonable to compromise the other important goals of income maintenance reform for the continuation of marriages of unknown quality. Finally, it is not at all clear whether such fears will be realized in a new program. Evidence appears mixed and the alternatives are not terribly attractive.

Costs

Although critically important issues of public policy are raised by the current crop of welfare reform bills presently before Congress, it is likely that many decisions on program content will be subordinated to considerations of program costs. The recent description of President Carter’s principles for National Health Insurance reflects the overriding priority that questions of national economic health will have in determining any new social programs. Indeed, the proposal conditions the timing of phasing in national health insurance on the state of the national economy.
All the critical dimensions of welfare reform addressed in the previous sections may ultimately rest on their cost rather than any loftier concerns such as equity or adequacy. Small changes in program parameters can have a very significant impact on overall program costs. For example, the higher the guarantee and the lower the tax rate in any proposed cash assistance program, the higher the cost of the program. Lower tax rates and higher guarantees result in extending the break-even level of income. Therefore, benefits continue to be paid to families with higher incomes. As the break-even increases, given the current income distribution, larger numbers of families concentrated at higher levels of income become eligible for benefits. Therefore, the lower tax rates and the higher guarantees of the Administration proposal represent substantially larger resource commitments than either of the incremental bills.

Data on labor force withdrawal from the Seattle-Denver Income Maintenance experiment has been a great help in simulating the program costs of a reformed system. (DHEW, 1978) Labor force withdrawal can be estimated, using experimental results on the basis of proposed tax rates and guarantee levels. Further, recent results have shown that variations in program participation rates are related to these program parameters. Both of these considerations influence the ultimate cost of a program.

Additional factors which have significant impacts on program costs are the number of persons eligible for benefits and the length of time an eligible recipient is required to wait until he or she is placed in a public service job. (Levy, 1978) The number of eligibles is dependent first on the break-even level of income as determined by the guarantee and the tax rate. Equally as critical is the proposed program coverage. Obviously, whatever the guarantee and the tax rate, if the coverage is quite limited, such as to families with children exclusively, the costs will be far less than if coverage is universal.

The Administration and Subcommittee proposals propose coverage to all low income families. Included in eligibility for cash assistance will therefore be groups who are now only eligible for Food Stamps. Benefit levels in these comprehensive proposals are higher than Food Stamps benefit levels for these groups and absolute benefit levels are higher for cash assistance than for AFDC and AFDC-UF recipients in some states.

Levy (1978) points out that the incremental bills are concerned with the more limited coverage of AFDC and AFDC-UF populations. Though both bills expand AFDC coverage, by setting a minimum national benefit standard and mandating AFDC-UF in all states, they also move a number of AFDC recipients into public service jobs. "The net result is a decrease in cash assistance (as distinct from public service wages)
going to the poor. A similar effect exists in the Administration and Subcommittee bills but it is more than offset by the new groups who are eligible for cash assistance." (p. 12)

The Administration and Subcommittee proposals require a relatively short job search period before eligibles can be placed in public service jobs. The Ullman and Baker-Bellmon proposals require considerably longer job search periods (16 weeks for the Ullman bill and 90 days for the Baker-Bellmon bill). Considerable variations exist in the resources allocated for public service jobs, though all the bills claim to provide them for all eligibles. The difference in waiting period influences the number of jobs required and this, in turn, distinguishes the amount of resources required to provide the necessary jobs. Given the differences in the definition of eligibles and the length of the waiting periods, a substantial determinant of overall program costs can be explained by the job component. Indeed, as Levy has demonstrated, the differences in the cash and jobs components of the four bills account for most of the total difference among their total costs.

A variety of specific rules and regulations which have not been described in previous sections may also result in significant changes in program costs. Decisions about the period over which income will be counted for benefits determination (the accounting period), the maximum benefit level a family can receive as their family size increases, the limitation on assets, rules governing disability determination, the method of indexing benefits for changes in the cost of living, and a myriad of other program features all influence aggregate program costs. Often, small changes in these features can have profound cost implications.

Table 4 presents a breakdown of estimated new (net) federal program costs for each of the proposals. The interest here has been to calculate incremental costs or total cost minus the offsets produced by reductions in other programs. (Levy, 1978) Clearly, these are only crude estimates. A variety of assumptions were necessary, including the projected state of the national economy and the amounts states will choose to supplement federal benefit levels.

The Subcommittee proposal has the largest overall program costs but by no means the highest level of fiscal relief for the states and localities. The Ullman proposal and the Baker-Bellmon proposal are the least costly, but they do not provide the same level of new fiscal relief to the states. In fact, the Baker-Bellmon proposal provides fiscal relief consistent with that projected for the Administration proposal.
TABLE 4
BREAKDOWN OF NEW FEDERAL PROGRAM COSTS FOR ALTERNATIVE WELFARE REFORM PROPOSALS, 1982*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Administration Bill</th>
<th>Subcommittee Bill</th>
<th>Ullman Bill</th>
<th>Baker-Bellmon Bill</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) New funds in cash assistance and food stamps</td>
<td>$2.68</td>
<td>5.53</td>
<td>-.55 to -.95</td>
<td>-2.01**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) New funds in public service jobs &amp; the WIN program</td>
<td>11.03</td>
<td>11.42</td>
<td>5.07</td>
<td>3.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) New funds in the Earned Income Tax Credit</td>
<td>2.07</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>3.33</td>
<td>3.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) New funds in tax credits and wage subsidies for private sector job creation</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>1.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) New fiscal relief</td>
<td>3.36</td>
<td>2.21</td>
<td>1.0-1.5</td>
<td>3.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) Total 1982 costs</td>
<td>19.14</td>
<td>20.22</td>
<td>Approx. 9.0</td>
<td>9.33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The data on the Administration and Subcommittee bills can be found in a cost memo sent from Alice M. Rivlin, Director of CBO, to Rep. James C. Corman (undated). The data on the Baker-Bellmon bill can be found in a cost memo sent from Rivlin to Sen. Henry Bellmon (undated). In particular, the Baker-Bellmon bill costed by CBO did not include regulations for "recoupment," the process by which welfare recipients repay some or all of their AFDC and Food Stamp benefits if their annual income is above a set level.


** This number will be lower (more negative) when benefit recoupment is taken into account.

Source: Levy, 1978; Table 1, p. 11.
Several analysts of the Administration proposal have suggested that extreme caution must be exercised in accepting the cost estimates of the proposal. (Miles, 1978; Freidman and Hausman, 1977) Both the Administration proposal and the Subcommittee proposal require totally new administrative structures. In particular, the jobs component requires entirely new machinery for job creation, job placement, and monitoring and enforcement of the work test. No experience to date provides comparable data necessary to estimate the national costs of such a large scale undertaking with this kind of target population.

It is extremely difficult, and perhaps somewhat misleading, to make judgments looking at these comparative program costs in isolation. Even assuming that the estimates reflect more or less what actual program costs will be, the real question remains whether or not twice as much is achieved by double the expenditures from the Administration and Subcommittee bills as compared to the Ullman and Baker-Bellmon bills. The previous sections have stressed the very modest changes that the incremental bills are likely to have. Because we have more experience with existing programs, it is easier to estimate the relative impact of these modest changes. The comprehensive bills are quite costly and are attempting more universal changes. They also attempt major goals with which we have had far less experience and the impact of which we can predict with far less certainty. Nevertheless, it appears from all of the analyses of human waste and suffering, as well as of the perverse incentives and administrative complexities in the existing system, that considerable weight is added to the argument that fundamental change is required.

Though program costs are likely to have a critical impact on legislative action, it is probably well to remember that they reflect the actual qualitative distinctions in program goals and potential outcomes. Whether or not such social goals can dominate the debate on the relative merits of competing strategies may rest on a variety of exogenous economic factors such as the state of the economy. Current analysis of the present political climate indicates that welfare reform of a comprehensive nature does not occupy a priority position among the majority of legislators. Though both the Administration and officials at DHHS have taken considerable pride in their effort to design their legislation in response to the best and most recent results of empirical research, the political process is unlikely to commit the amount of resources required for passage.

CAN WELFARE BE REFORMED?

There are two ways to answer the question of whether or not welfare can be reformed. The first attempts a strictly programmatic analysis which addresses the program criticisms of the current system. Based on the analysis of current research findings, it appears quite likely
that with the necessary political and resource commitment many of the most disturbing features of the current welfare system can probably be marginally rectified. The Carter plan, though not without its weaknesses, makes the best legislative attempt to date to address these problems rationally.

The implicit endorsement of a Carter-like plan is conditioned in this paper exclusively on the degree to which it maximizes the goals which have emerged as central to the current political agenda. No attempt has been made to evaluate the criticisms leveled upon it by other important interest groups. For example, critics from the social welfare establishment reject the Carter plan as real reform based on its punitive treatment of those expected to work during their eight week job search. In addition, benefit levels below the poverty line and the insistence on a work test are viewed as distasteful if not unacceptable by those whose assumptions for reform include values derived from socialist notions of a mature welfare state.

Though the author is aware of these alternative values for assessing welfare reform approaches, it has not been the goal of this paper to consider goals other than those which have emerged as central to the political debate. More extensive analysis of these questions would, however, be critical to a final endorsement of any major approaches to poverty reduction.

Nevertheless, a second way to answer the question about whether Carter's plan constitutes true reform involves a more important institutional analysis. Though the legislative debates continue to place undue concern on issues related to work effort, recent research on low income males has shown their work effort to be substantial. (Levy, 1976) The real problems for these workers are low wages and large families. Other research on the secondary labor market has indicated that many low income males will never achieve adequate income because labor market segmentation precludes their access to employment in those industries where on-the-job training and "ladders" for upward mobility are available. (Doeringer and Piore, 1971).

Welfare reform of the universal sort typified by the Carter plan attempts to respond, through income supplementation, to the consequences of these market imperfections. It does not, however, attempt a more fundamental reform of the determinants of low wages and poverty which go to the very root of the market system. Provision of public service employment responds to an immediate problem of insufficient jobs. No attempt has been made to alter the incentive and reward structure in the private market which determines the structure of wages and the level of employment. Though Administration
spokesmen continue to argue that placement in public service jobs is only temporary, and that the expectation is that low income workers will move swiftly from public to private employment, there are no indications as to how this will occur without more fundamental changes in the economy.

Welfare reform of a programmatic nature is clearly indicated. Any advanced industrial economy will have those individuals and families who cannot provide for themselves. Providing an equitable, decent, and non-stigmatizing system for income support is incumbent upon a nation which claims to adhere to principles of the modern Welfare State. Nevertheless, there has always been an inherent conflict in the United States between the goals of the Welfare State and the goals of a capitalist economy. Fear of interfering with the labor market has always constrained social policy initiatives. One of the current debates over whether wages paid for public service employment should be set at the level of the minimum wage or the prevailing wage focuses on just such conflicts.

Strongly held ideological positions about work and income support have required all legislation to include politically motivated components (e.g. the work test). The compromises struck between real efforts at poverty reduction and politically acceptable reform continue to be uneasy. Nevertheless, it is unlikely in a period of growing conservatism and skepticism about any government initiative that a more radical type of reform than that represented by the Administration's reform proposal is realistic. Based on the comparative analysis of the current legislative alternatives, it is likely to achieve a variety of modest but important social reforms.*

*Regrettably at the final editing of this paper, a new and less ambitious plan has been introduced by the president. Far from achieving the modest goals of PB&J, it resembles far more closely the incremental bills reviewed here. Legislative analysts argue that even this pared down version ($5.7 billion) has little likelihood of passage in the present political climate.
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The "Guestworker" as Metaphor: In clarification of social-economic contradictions and systemic crisis.¹

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"... denn es ist wahr, dass jeder Arbeiter im Kapitalistischen System ein Gastarbeiter ist."²

In May 1979 the French National Assembly passed legislation giving the government sweeping powers to expel foreign workers. Yet neither the government nor the employers really want to send most of the immigrant workers home, and thereby lose them as a source of cheap labor for both public and private enterprise. It is likely that the employers hope to use the new legislation to keep foreign workers in a state of permanent insecurity, to discourage them from protesting against their low pay, poor working conditions and the racism they encounter daily. Indeed, employers would like to see foreign workers treated as a separate category of second-class citizens, without the rights of French citizens. This attempt to divide the workers is a subtle attempt to confuse French workers into believing that French society is providing charity to support foreign "intruders" and that this in turn is the cause of the current economic crisis.³

This effort contends that the plight of the "guestworker" can be applied toward clarifying the political-economic and social contradictions inherent in crises of "late-capitalism."⁴ The rationale for what follows lies in the argument that the "problems" of foreign workers in Western Europe do not remain solely relevant to or caught within a particular geographical or conceptual frame. A better understanding of the "guestworker" can conceivably shed light on inter-linked policies of the extant system of inequalities within which international labor migrations obtain.

Background

The social history of industrialization is that of mass movements from country to town; international labor migration is a special case within this general pattern. While "migration" is in essence a social
process, international labor migrations are in major part a consequence of unequal economic development.5

Labor migration is a form of development aid given by the poor countries to the rich countries. Traditional colonialism took labor (in the form of slaves) as well as natural resources from the countries it dominated. Today, neocolonialism extracts capital from the underdeveloped countries in various ways, the main one being trade on terms fixed by the developed countries. The transfer of human resources in the form of migrant workers is an important part of this transaction. Migration belongs to neocolonialism's system for exploiting the wealth of the Third World.6

The conditions faced by the migrant represent a reality that is often harsh: politically he is disenfranchised; socially he is subjected to the most visible and severe forms of xenophobia and economically he often labors without employment or "survival" security. To understand the plight of the individual foreign worker, his family and the sending/receiving nations, is to grasp the migration for employment phenomenon.

International Labor Migrations

Andre Gorz notes: "There is no country in Western Europe where international labor is a negligible force, or even a marginal quantity fluctuating within the economic conjuncture."7 One cannot grasp the fact of the growing importance of the immigrant worker in the wage-earning, working population of every country in Western Europe (and beyond) without starting from the position of the immigrant labor force in the structure of social contradictions and the role given to it by the historical development of the dominant element in this structure, namely, capital in its "late phase" of accumulation and internationalization.

Since international labor migrations are essentially a socio-economic phenomenon (i.e., intake of foreign workers into an economy is geared to the economic capacity to absorb them), economists generally explain migrations by the "law" of supply and demand. Within the "free-trade" paradigm—believed by classical writers to be the best of all possible worlds—"international movements of capital and labor were regarded as largely a domestic affair."8 Classical writers did not even develop a theory of international labor migrations. "It is widely asserted," observes Nikolinakos, "that there is no need for a special theory to explain migrations."9

This (supply-demand) concept is allied to the fundamental ideas of classical and neo-classical economic theory, according to which economic laws
create a harmonious world in which everything functions in the best possible manner. 10

The "best possible manner" is not, however, the net result of supply and demand at the international level. Myrdal has shown that it leads to the polarization of development: a "north," toward which the factors of production move, develops; while a "south," areas out of which the factors of production move, continues to decline. 11 In post-WWII experience it is obvious that capital is not attracted by the prospects of low wages and high profits alone. It requires, in Nikolinakos' terms: "security of tenure (political factors) and guaranteed profits (monopoly position)." 12 Supply demand theory alone leaves unexplained the fact that some countries were unable to go through the same development process which characterizes labor importers like West Germany, France and Sweden.

Migration is multi-faceted: (a) it is the movement of a population within or between countries; (b) it is an individual phenomenon affecting the lives of entire families; (c) it is a class phenomenon involving the ranking of masses of human beings; (d) it is a structural phenomenon. The structural importance of alien workers is explained by societal choices concerning the organization of production (i.e., spatial concentration in areas regarded as most profitable). 13 A political-economic consequence of this type of organization is uneven economic development between sectors and regions. It derives from the clearly stated logic of capital and the division of labor it commands according to the imperatives of profit maximization. 14 Labor concentration at the national and international level is determined by the growth of capital. Neither labor concentration nor uneven development--to the extent there is a different dynamic attached to the terms--derives from the distribution of natural resources in the world. The countries of emigration are not by definition "poor in material riches and rich in human resources." They are so because of relationships of dependence enforced by powerful economic interests. 15

The structural fit of emigration-immigration is not within the manpower needs of the economy alone. Immigrations are not purely conjunctural and not as highly sensitive to economic recession as suspected. One has but to examine the size of the immigrant labor force in the most productive sectors and its position in the working population as a whole. Obviously, the less-developed countries of Southern Europe and Northern Africa represent a superabundant supply of labor--the principal source of the "reserve army" of labor for the "north." The "north" needs the "reserve army" because agricultural populations, for example, in West Germany (7.5%), no longer form an important source of labor. Old people, women and children also lose some of their significance as reserve. School leaving age rises, women remain used for cheap child care and housekeeping and in theory, old people are more certain of recovering some type of pension. 16
Since the process of replacing labor by capital is expensive in the short run, and therefore limited, and since a certain percentage of semiskilled and unskilled workers is also necessary in highly automated firms and other branches of the economy, the import of foreign workers promises to remain a lasting phenomenon. Actually, one may pause to appreciate the "genius" of a process which creates a virtually inexhaustible pool of reserve labor at a physically safe distance from the industrial cities, across national boundaries.

In 1978 the slums of industrial cities were missing in Sweden and West Germany. The housing conditions of the best skilled and educated migrants seemed almost adequate. On the surface, at least, there appeared little crime, little unrest among workers, little unemployment. Antony Ward, however, describes a discovery which, although not surprising, is disenchanting.

To find the slums of West Berlin, Düsseldorf (Gothenberg, Malmö), one must travel south to the impoverished towns and villages of the Algarve, of Andalusia, Calabria and Anatolia. Here is the home of West Germany and Sweden's "reserve army," in conditions of poverty as bad as those in our traditional Harlems. And the people there, while they may receive some income from their direct or indirect involvement in the industries of the north, enjoy almost none of the indirect benefits of industrial capitalism.\(^7\)

Well into the 1960's it was taken for granted that the massive outflow of workers from the developing countries was beneficial for everyone. The flexible response of foreign labor to changing demand conditions was regarded as ideal for immigration countries. Emigration was felt to provide unemployment relief and much needed foreign currency.\(^8\) The 1967 recession cast costs against the benefits for labor senders and receivers. Importers like W. Germany and Sweden became aware of the structural significance and implications of immigration, i.e., the infrastructural and cultural costs to be met. Doubts were raised with regard to the relief of unemployment and the purely beneficial nature of remittances. The policy problem for countries like France became centered around (a) how to fill extant labor market gaps so that both micro and macro-economic profitability remained assured without (b) detriment to a strained social situation; and, (c) without infringing basic human rights (the "guestworker" issue was beginning to draw notice in the international press).

**Mobility and "Dirt"**

Ulrich Freiherr von Ginanth, chairman of the Committee on Foreign Labor of the Employers Association (FRG), observes: "The great value of the employment of foreigners lies in the fact that we have at our disposal a mobile labor potential. It would be dangerous to limit this mobility through a large scale assimilation policy."\(^9\)
There can be little doubt that the "guests" of industrial society are afraid to organize. In a sense, the migrant knows he won't be employed long enough to enjoy long-range victories, pension and health plans. "If every German in the Federal Republic believes that the migrant worker can be expelled whenever it suits the German convenience, so too does every migrant." National labor laws provide for anything but the feeling of security. While paragraph 120 of the West German Labor Code gives the migrant the right to social benefits enjoyed by Germans, paragraph 10 of the same code provides that the worker may be expelled for lack of self-support (and therefore ineligible for benefits).

An effect of this mass of unskilled migratory labor has been the acceleration of the seemingly universal tendency of capitalism to divide labor into every simpler and mind-separate operations. "Skilled jobs are divided into simple components which can readily be taught to workers who have never before stood at the production line. Thus, the pattern of demand changes towards the skills available or their lack." This economic division tends to be reflected in social divisions between the migrant workers and the native working class.

Castles and Kosack describe the split of the "working class" into two, highly differentiated segments: the nationals who speak the language and enjoy whatever measure of civil rights and social welfare the society provides. They are well organized into unions which enjoy a degree of political power and they work in jobs which require some minimum skill or training, or which are comparatively clean and involve little physical strain. In contrast, the migrants do the jobs which are dirty, dangerous and which require physical strength and less skill and training.

It is relatively simple to dwell on migrant workers and dirty jobs. A great amount of heart-wrenching writing has been published about it; yet, for the most part, it fails to explain why migrants accept what the indigenous working class will not. Are migrants naturally submissive? Is it because of their extreme need?

Castells finds the key to answering these basic questions in the fact that it is possible to treat the migrant workers as individual wage-earners whereas the relationship if the indigenous working class with capital (in labor importers like Sweden and W. Germany) is established collectively through the labor movement. The utility of immigrant labor to capital derives primarily from the fact that it can act toward it as though the labor movement did not exist, . . .

One has but to turn to the legal-political status of the foreigners and their consequent political-ideological isolation to understand the inferiority of their position vis a vis capital i.e., their limited
capacity for organization and very great vulnerability to repression. As well, dirty jobs are not surrendered by the working classes in Sweden or FRG because they are "dirty" but because they are less well paid and less well attached to benefit packages. When dirty work is well paid, nationals do it. "Immigrant workers do not exist because there are arduous and badly paid jobs to be done, but rather, arduous and badly paid jobs exist because immigrant workers are present or can be sent for to do them." Capital can't do without "arduous jobs" or the migrant to do them and that is why the migratory mechanism is "designed" to achieve not just the balance between the supply and demand of labor but the perpetuation of the dependency relationship between capital and labor--the center and the periphery. As Nikolinakos observes, it is the internationalization of labor through the expansion of migration which reflects the inherent thrust of capital towards securing this relationship. The ingenious part of this--from the point of view of capital--is that the migrant worker is pitted not against capital in the struggle to get social security, for example, but against the national and international state apparatus of capital in order to meet its demands. Of consequence, the problem is seen as a welfare state policy issue and not as systemic in nature.

The poverty of the "south" and the insecurity of the worker must be seen not as a geographic accident or historical artifact, but as the continuing effect of an international "system" which simply defines national borders as anachronistic. The economic forces which now produce comforts in Stockholm and Stuttgart are simultaneously sustaining the historical poverty of Cordoba and Messina. Always in motion, the migration mechanism draws more and more underdeveloping countries into the system. Antony Ward describes the system as three tiers deep. Black Africans migrate to the Mediterranean countries so that Mediterranean workers can be set free for exploitation in the "north."

One can conclude that international labor migrations are a major force towards the perpetuation of international imbalance--and they appear part of a self-feeding system. Second, international labor migrations are supported by an international, institutionalized system of discrimination anchored in legislation regarding foreigners and in interstate agreements. The psychosocial and survival problems of the aging migrant, for example, can only be understood within the framework of political economic analysis and this system of institutionally "necessary" discrimination.

The fate of individuals is determined by the laws of accumulation. (Those "laws" obviously obtain for internal as well as international migrations). To the extent the migratory mechanism is to be humanized it is only in so far as it will enable capital to ward off political-social unrest that would appear to endanger the system. "Progress then, may seem to be made in one or another detail: shorter waiting time for
unemployment benefits; easier access to family aid. Such small steps may encourage the careless observer to believe that there is definite movement toward the ultimate goal of equality for migrants. But the situation is fundamentally bound by powerful interests (priorities and values) which will prevent the realization of either extreme--full assimilation or full exclusion."31

Note on the "Equality" Solution

Equality is the overt policy response of nations to the systemic and systematic discriminations practiced upon migrant workers.

"The language in which it is applauded by the powers of this world sometimes leave it uncertain which would horrify them most, the denial of the principle or the attempt to apply it.32"

Equality of opportunity is, of course, a classic capitalist concept. The essential inquiry revolves around what is being equalized. Equal opportunity can be toward equal oppression; equal treatment can be toward equal manipulation and regulation; equal rewards can be toward equal material hardship; equal social participation can be toward powerlessness. International labor migrations demonstrate clearly that capitalism requires international inequalities as a precondition for its existence.

The intent of equality objectives of migrant worker legislation is simply a more random distribution of inequalities for nationals and non-nationals. The message is consistent: if you start from a position of inequality--among nations and between "foreign" and indigenous labor--you end up with continued inequality. Equality retains its throne on the condition that it refrains from meddling with the profitable business of the factory and the market place.33

Crisis and Guestworkers

In a certain sense, the "equality" solution to the "problems" of international labor migrations is symptomatic of the crisis which foreign workers illuminate. According to Habermas, "crises arise when the structure of a social system allows for fewer possibilities for problem solving than are necessary to the continued existence of the system."34

We are experiencing a structural crisis in the allocation of raw materials and labor power within a world market. This is the source of international labor migrations and it is the migrant worker--who experiences the immigration dilemma as critical for his continued existence, and simultaneously threatens his own social identity--in a title role of crisis. Unequal allocation of raw materials and labor power--socially structured and sanctioned inequalities--have evolved as a key balance mechanism of the historical conditions, social hierarchy, scale of values, of first world nations. The "equality solution" merely controls any imbalance threat from the third and fourth worlds.
Most "developed" countries have concerned themselves with justifying and explaining national and international inequalities in such a way that the majority of the population (those who by definition are not privileged) accept it as morally right. They have busied themselves with legitimating inequalities. The ideology of equality of treatment (whether for migrants or not) attempts to cope with an extant social condition (internationalization of capital and the need for cheap labor) with justifications derived from the status quo and it shields extant society against its own alternatives in the sense it denies the historical limitedness of any given social condition.35

The argument is that international labor migrations are not a conjunctural phenomenon linked to supply-demand manpower needs of expanding economies but a structural tendency of "late capitalism." This structural tendency is explained, in part, by uneven development but primarily by the internal dynamic of late capitalism. Uneven development explains only why people emigrate; it does not explain why nations like France and West Germany provide jobs for migrant workers even in conditions of unemployment. Neither does it explain why the dominant classes of labor importing nations introduce a social and political element (migrants) whose presence contradicts their ideology and necessitates more complex mechanisms of social control. "... the extent of immigration and the strategic role of immigration in the European economy has to be explained, not in terms of the technical demands of production, but by the specific interests of capital in a particular phase of its development."36

The central role of the migrant worker is to regulate economic crises—crises endemic to late capitalism. Capital needs the regularization of immigration but sees to it that the meeting of real needs is totally inadequate and fragmented. "It is a policy of control (manipulative compassion) and minor modifications concerning immigration, sometimes paternalistic in the economic sphere, always repressive (dissuasive) in the political sphere."37 Immigrants cannot succeed in imposing a demand of equal rights for that would mean they could no longer play the role they are assigned by the needs of late capital’s low-wage, work-intensive, "reserve army." Migrant workers confront foreign systems with claims and intentions that are, in the long run, incompatible with the extant system’s goals. This is a fundamental contradiction.

The essence of this fundamental contradiction is consistent with Habermas' "crisis:" international labor migrations pose more problems than the national systems can solve without surrendering elements that up to that point belonged to their "structural continuity." Solving the migrant worker problem requires at least momentary and partial surrender of state nationalism in the granting of rights toward social and economic security. Nations like France and West Germany have agreed to at least a portion of these external demands—in the short run—in order to cope with system maintenance problems. "Equality" is offered to the migrant as a mechanism to prevent an interruption of the process of accumulation—an interruption which would take the form of capital destruction.
Historically, the state assumed and remains the compensator for the dysfunctional consequences of the accumulation process—especially for those consequences which elicited politically effective reactions. Thus the state evolved through various stages of compensatory intervention: granting trade union rights, marginal improvements in wages, working conditions, health, education and social security. The state replaces the market to relieve the social and material costs which result from private production.

For the migrant within this system, the progressive satisfaction of his needs by the technological mechanism of production and enormous possibilities of consumption increase his consent to incorporation in this way of life. "Everyday life" experiences of the migrant reinforce and internalize the seemingly immutable nature of late capitalist social order. What confronts the guestworker is not simply a deception but a specific and socially determined reflection of a mystified reality. The "reality" says all the fundamental relations between men in the production process of their material life can be no different.

Yet, the continuous growth of per capita income which has heretofore legitimated persisting material (and international) inequalities and has bought the migrant, albeit at low, work-intensive wages, appears no longer possible because the limits to growth have become visible. The multiple economic crises of the seventies are intensifying middle-class resistance to both the presence and equitable treatment of "guest workers." The system of international labor migrations faces a "legitimation vacuum"—providing symbols of participation and an illusory equality are not enough.

If the foreign worker is forced to define his situation in terms of his power to shape the conditions in which he lives and to change those conditions according to his needs for "self-actualization," he is bound to recognize that power is absent. And if migrants define their situation in terms of their power as social individuals over their collective social existence they see that capitalist democracy—which offers equality of treatment—is devoid of content.

The establishment of a "social policy" which attempts to legitimate inequalities or to make-up quantitatively what is lost qualitatively moves toward counter-effectiveness. "It is not that the pressures of want have been eliminated—far from it—but rather that these have been supplemented by a discontent which cannot be touched by providing more prosperity and jobs because these are the very things that produced this discontent in the first place." Essentially, the international state—in concert with the national state—cannot provide stronger legitimations for the foreign worker's lack of autonomy and security as long as it leaves intact the capital infrastructure and its priorities: the "generators of inequalities."

The market system breaks down. Its collapse is in its inability to put together human beings, capital and land in order to produce factory level of output for the world. At the international
real issue may be how long the "international state" and the national state can remain compatible with the needs and purposes of capital.

That question is buried deep beneath the celebration of Western democracy, the free world, the welfare state, the affluent society, the end of ideology and pluralistic equilibrium. To have posed it even a few years ago would have appeared ludicrous or perverse. The response is demographic, social, political and psychological. The response to crisis is a "multiplicity of cooperating remedies." Nothing short of everything is really enough. Implied is the move beyond the social system which no longer offers possibilities of problem solving. New choices based on different values must be confronted.

We can make different social choices concerning the allocation of natural resources, the social division of labor and the distribution of rights for a world commonwealth. The crises tell us it is time to choose again, that we are not caught in the immutable downflow of events over which we have no control. The basis for our new choices requires, however, the right political motivation.

And the basis for that political motivation should be that not only do we share a common origin, but, inescapably, we share the same destiny. It is a destiny that the human race is now capable of choosing.

Footnotes


4. "... to use the expression 'late capitalism' is to put forward the hypothesis that, even in state-regulated capitalism, social developments involve contradictions or crises." Jürgen Habermas, Legitimation Crisis, (Boston, Beacon, 1975), p. 1.


8. "The exportation of laborers from old to new countries, from a place where their productive power is less, to a place where it is greater increases by so much the aggregate produce of the labor and capital of the world. It adds to the joint wealth of the old and new country." Brinley Thomas, *Migration and Economic Growth*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), p. 11.


27. Gorz, "Immigrant Labor."

28. Castells, p. 54.


33. Ibid., p. 103.

34. Habermas, p. 2.


36. Castells, p. 44.

37. Ibid., p. 56.


TOWARD A FULL EMPLOYMENT POLICY: AN OVERVIEW

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ABSTRACT

Unlike more advanced welfare states, the U.S. has not committed itself to a full employment policy: the full dimensions of unemployment are not revealed and the "manpower" programs reflect a welfare philosophy. While constraints to such a commitment remain formidable, the developments around Humphrey-Hawkins may be a start.

Unemployment—Some Dimensions of the Problem

In order to be counted as unemployed by the present system of collecting data, which utilizes the monthly Current Population Survey, one has to be not working and must have actively searched for work during the previous four weeks. The interviewees are not asked directly whether or not they are unemployed. Discouraged workers, the under-employed, minorities, women, youth and older workers who might want to work, and perhaps would be job-holders or job-seekers in another economic climate, are ordinarily not reflected in the figures. (1)

Data collected in the survey is extrapolated as a percentage of the total labor force and is given as the unemployment rate. Current usage of the term "full employment" is an arbitrary number; it is the amount of unemployment considered reasonable and acceptable by the Council of Economic Advisors and others, and varies over time. In 1945, it was figured at 3%, in 1955 it went to 4%, and now it is thought of as anywhere between 5 and 5½%. (2)
Many economists consider the unemployment figures as unreliable and implausible, and challenge the prevailing method of counting the unemployed. Some claim further that it is not just a question of statistical inaccuracy, but that particular economic and social philosophies are involved in the choice of methodology. (3)

Inclusion of the groups mentioned above would significantly alter the official 5.7% rate given for June, 1978 (down from 8.5% in 1975). The numbers involved would at a minimum triple from roughly 5 million to 15 million or more. The unemployment rate for blacks generally runs about twice that of whites and the rate for minority youth is probably somewhere between 5 to 8 times as high. Including the marginal groups would not only alter the overall rate but would highlight the disparities within the potential labor force.

The sweeping negative impact of prolonged unemployment is generally acknowledged. From an economic perspective there is lost production, a reduction of purchasing power, a drag on the economy, a downward pressure on wages, budget deficits along with a clamor to reduce services and public subsidies at the very time they are most sorely needed. For individuals and families it can mean feelings of failure, worthlessness and discouragement; it also means loss of skills, unstable families and a greater dependence on public assistance. Recently, correlations have been made between unemployment and mental illness, suicide and coronaries. Divisions and tensions grow as competition for scarce resources increase. Clearly we are dealing with something very basic in regard to the human condition. (4)

Full Employment Deferred: Focus on the Disadvantaged

With the memory of the mass unemployment of the great depression in mind, liberal Senators introduced a full employment bill even before World War II had ended. The contrast between the full employment of the war years and the bread lines of the depression was too glaring to ignore. The original bill stated that "all Americans able to work and seeking work have the right to useful,
remunerative, regular and full-time employment, and it is
the policy of the United States to assure the existence
at all times of sufficient employment opportunities..." 
Mechanisms for implementation were built into the bill.

After a year of debate opponents of the bill forced
important revisions. The Employment Act finally legislated
in 1946 was relatively toothless. The words "full employ-
ment" were eliminated and a vague statement of intent was
substituted. The President is required to submit an
annual report to Congress assessing developments in the
field. (The "Manpower Report of the President" became
"The Employment and Training Report of the President" in
1976.) Any resulting positive action stems more from the
political and economic views of the President and the
Congress than from any national goal or commitment mandated
by the legislation. (5)

The relatively lively economic activity following
World War II dispersed the coalition that had been pressing
for full employment legislation and led to what Garth
Mangum referred to as the "1946-1961 recess in employment
and manpower policy in the U.S." While it is beyond the
scope of this paper to examine any programs in detail,
we will list the major ones for the purpose of identifying
basic trends and goals. (6)

Despite recessions and surges of unemployment, it was
not until 1961 with the passage of the Area Redevelopment
Act providing small sums to depressed areas that any
intervention targeted on the unemployed began. This was
quickly followed by the Manpower and Training Act of 1962
to retrain mature, experienced family heads. The Vocational
Training Act of 1963 focused on youth, while the more
familiar Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 (War on Poverty)
offered a number of programs; Urban Corps, Job Corps,
Work Experience and Training. (Operation Mainstream and
New Careers were added later.) The Work Incentive Program,
begun in 1967, was designed to equip AFDC mothers with
marketable skills and help them move into the labor
force. (7)
Thus far it is clear that the goals of the manpower legislation were to make the unemployed more employable through education, re-education, training, rehabilitation, etc. The focus was on the supply side of the equation.

It was only with the economic downturn of 1970-1971 with its rising unemployment that attention began to be directed toward what is euphemistically called the "cyclical problem." A minor effort to increase the supply of jobs was initiated by the Emergency Employment Act of 1971 which allocated funds for the creation of state and local jobs. This counter-cyclical measure was to end in two years. Target groups were specified.

The Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) signed into law in 1973 was designed to provide "job training and employment opportunities for economically disadvantaged, unemployed and under-employed persons to enable them to secure self-sustaining, unsubsidized employment." It reflected dissatisfaction with the fragmentation, categorization and centralization of the previous programs and began to serve as the umbrella for employment and training legislation. The Job Corps became Title IV of CETA. As unemployment continued to rise, Congress passed The Emergency Jobs and Unemployment Assistance Act of 1974 "which added a temporary one billion annually for public service employment under a new Title VI of CETA." (8)

Still another response to the recession of 1975 when unemployment reached a high of over 9% was the Public Works Employment Act passed in 1976 over President Ford's veto. This act made two billion available for construction grants under the auspices of the Department of Commerce. Further revisions and additions included a large increase in the public employment sector and the Youth Employment and Demonstration Projects Act of 1977.
Critique of U.S. Policy

The late E. Wight Bakke's critical observations of manpower policy made in 1969 directs attention to what is still the pivotal issue. Bakke did not quarrel the concept of providing services to the disadvantaged; he saw this as a positive social welfare step. However, he vigorously challenged the limited mission and focus which he feared would remain the norm. He questioned the premises that dominated policy, namely that manpower programs should be "primarily concerned with the supply of labor and its placement," and secondly, that it be "concerned predominately with the development of the most disadvantaged and poverty-stricken portion of that supply."

"The overall function of manpower policy and practice in the total effort to provide a stable and increasingly productive economic foundation for national strength and development, as well as for the economic well-being of the American people, has all but lost sight of in the concentration on projects labeled "manpower" designed to relieve poverty and hopefully to reduce the chances of riots in the urban ghettos." But "unless the programs designed to relieve poverty are recognized as only part of the manpower function...the manpower function of government will remain what it is actually becoming, a sophisticated form of public assistance." (9)

Manpower policy, narrowly defined, does not create jobs. It may help train and rehabilitate while what is required are policies and programs that create demand as well as supply and match the two. For significant impact, it must be integrated into a total national effort for economic growth and stability. Without such an effort it is extremely unlikely that the least employable can be helped since the economy will remain one in which a relatively high unemployment rate is acceptable, and which is recession prone. The change in terminology from "manpower" to "employment" by official agencies is to be welcomed; it not only reflects the large percentage of women in the labor force, but is also more correctly describes the goals and boundaries of the field. (10)
The above comments can be illustrated by comparing the missions of policy in Europe to those of the U.S. While the effort in Europe is directed toward stabilizing and expanding employment through economic growth and balance utilizing a range of interventive techniques, the main objective in the U.S. has been to deal remedially with unemployment to provide client services to marginal workers to increase their employability. One attempts to prevent unemployment and the other to deal with the consequences; one is centered on institutions and the other is client-centered. The broader policy views all workers both employed and unemployed as the target population, while the narrower and residual concentrates on the disadvantaged among the unemployed. (Cross-national comparison of unemployment rates present thorny problems because of different methods of collecting data and the great differences in resources, geography, level of technology, etc. However, average unemployment rates have generally been regarded as higher in the U.S. than in Western Europe). (11)

The differences in trends and direction between Europe and the U.S. became visible in the 1950's and continued to develop. The divergence noted above must be modified only slightly as the U.S. began to utilize public employment, as a counter-cyclical device in the 1970's, but only on a temporary basis and with strict conditions of eligibility. (12)

Political and Theoretical Constraints

A commitment to full employment brings in its wake an acceptance of economic planning. Or to put it another way, a full employment policy is one facet of democratic planning for a productive, balanced economy. Planning for a stable, growing economy means unity of action for specified goals. Of necessity this would require the various interventive mechanisms - monetary (budget, expenditures, taxes), fiscal (interest rates, bank reserves, open market operations), loans, stimuli to investment and productivity, public employment, control of inflation, public ownership, etc. - to be harmonized and directed toward specified economic goals.
Obviously there is still formidable opposition to governmental peace-time planning in the U.S. and to any trend that appears to be a further departure from laissez-faire. Planning for full employment in particular is enmeshed in what appears to be an esoteric economic debate wherein there is a supposed trade-off between employment and inflation. Ideological differences and the prevailing political ambivalence is reflected not only in inaction and in fragmentary programs, but also in contradictory policies, tight money to slow growth (and perhaps induce recession) on the one hand, versus attempts to increase employment through public jobs on the other.

Deep political, philosophical and class differences are reflected in the debate on unemployment. Conservative and main-stream economists, Carter appointees, as well as Ford appointees, define inflation as the major enemy and claim there is a trade-off between inflation and unemployment so that any attempt to cure the latter will increase the former.

Leon Keyserling, former Chairman of The Council of Economic Advisors in the Hearings Before The Joint Economic Committee, argued that in addition to the failure to plan, we have done badly because "stagnations and recessions have been repeatedly contrived, responsive to the "trade-off" theory that higher employment and greater resources use bring more inflation and that higher unemployment and more deficient resource use bring less inflation. Even today, an adequate program of economic restoration is being estopped by this false theory." Not only was this viewed as immoral because it allowed many families to suffer distress and humiliation while allowing the comfortable to buy more, but the "empirical evidence for more than twenty years is that a healthy economy generates far less price inflation than a sick economy." (14)

The "trade-off" theory is clearly in the tradition of the "dismal science." When tenaciously held it means that there is nothing society can do to alter the "natural" order. In fact, as Malthus and Ricardo pointed out in their time, failure to accept the inevitable and struggling against nature in fact worsens the condition of the suffering. The assumptions regarding the sanctity of
market are difficult to give up despite shifting contexts. One might point to the quadrupling of oil prices, the unfavorable trade balance, the growth of multi-nationals, price-setting by monopolies, the world shortage of agricultural products, declining industries, etc., as impacting prices, but to little avail. (15)

The Movement and The Humphrey-Hawkins Bill *

The current movement for full employment gathered momentum as a response to the 1974-75 recession with its sharp increase in unemployment. Leadership on a national scale has been provided by the National Committee For Full Employment (an educational organization) and the Full Employment Action Council (an action group seeking passage of the legislation). Co-chairpersons of both organizations are Mrs. Martin Luther King and Murray Finley, President of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers. The first annual conference, held in 1975, brought together over 500 individuals representing 150 national organizations.

The breadth of the movement is reminiscent of the coalition that supported FDR and the New Deal. Mrs. King remarked at the first conference that "perhaps the most encouraging aspect of the conference today is the impressive span of groups and organizations... It is not often that organized labor, black and minority organizations and political figures and representatives from the church, business, liberal and academic communities, as well as political figures from both parties find themselves joined together in a single room confronting a single issue." (16)

While labor continued to play a strong role on this issue as it has in the past, an added dimension to the movement is the important voice of the Congressional Black Caucus. Congressman Hawkins told the 1975 conference that "the experience of my own Subcommittee on Equal Opportunities taught us that in fighting for equal employment opportunities for women and minorities we could not win without full employment." (17)

* The Humphrey-Hawkins Bill was signed into law by President Carter on October 27, 1978.
A full range of activist programs from lobbying at the national level to grass-roots organizing and education has been under way. It is estimated that from September 4 to September 10 in 1977, a week designated as Full Employment Week by the national organizations, over one million people in 300 cities and towns were actively involved. A steady stream of educational and organizational material flows out of national headquarters.

Just as the broad coalition for full employment is a reminder of progressive coalitions of decades ago, so the obstacle course facing proposed legislation appears to be similar to that fared by the 1946 Full Employment Bill.

The Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act (which at this writing has been passed by the House and is awaiting action by the Senate) would amend the 1946 Full Employment Act by mandating more specific commitments and by installing more highly structured planning mechanisms. The bill establishes as national policy the right of all Americans to full opportunities for useful employment. A major goal set forth in the legislation is the achievement of a 3% unemployment rate for those age 20 and older and a 4% rate for those over 16 within five years of the passage of the act.

The President would be required to recommend numerical goals for employment and unemployment, as well as goals for production, productivity and real income, in his annual economic report. He would also be required to specify the programs and policies necessary to reach these goals. The Congress, Budget Committees and the Federal Reserve Board would participate in the planning process to help assure an integrated and coordinated plan.

While the importance of the private sector is conceded, the bill lists a variety of options such as public works, public service employment, counter-cyclical measures and special programs targeted on youth. Last resort public jobs could be made available by the President. While the stress is on "full employment," the bill acknowledges the danger of inflation and includes a number of anti-inflation provisions that are viewed as consistent with the attempt to achieve full employment as defined in the bill. (18)
The bill, so briefly summarized above, represents a compromise reached after weeks of difficult negotiations between the bill's sponsors and the Carter Administration. A White House summary pointed up the bill's commitments to "reasonable price stability." The original contained stronger language in regard to the right to a job, less administrative discretion, short-range target dates and less emphasis on inflation. The principle that full employment policy be accorded an absolute priority had been watered down. Critics of the bill in its present form argue that it need not add a single job.

On the other hand, its supporters see it as an essential first step. They point out that "the legislation would hold Congress and the President accountable for the first time, for the achievement of specific, understandable, numerical economic goals "and that full employment would still be designated as a national priority." The strategy therefore is to prevent further weakening of the bill by legislative amendment. George Meany perhaps summed up the situation by expressing support for the bill but warning that follow-up action is needed to "translate the promise of this bill into reality." (19)

Social Work and Full Employment

An examination of the statements, literature and activities of the social work profession indicates, with some exceptions, a minimal involvement in the campaign for a full employment policy. A notable exception was the publication of Manpower and Employment: A Source Book for Social Workers by the Council on Social Work Education under the editorship of Margaret Purvine in 1972.

Purvine commented then that although manpower and employment had become increasingly the subject of public social policy, they have "received little attention from social work in recent decades. The profession's concern with the subject has been primarily confined to the need for manpower within the profession itself." Yet "both the individual and the social effects of work or the lack of work fall clearly within the purview of social work." (20)
Despite this seemingly definitive statement there is some ambivalence. Noting the criticism directed toward the overwhelming emphasis on the "supply" side, the editor states that this is understandable since "to effect broad changes in the demand for labor requires knowledge and agreement about the effects of macro-economic forces, as well as a structure for comprehensive planning and a commitment to its use, a combination which raises political issues beyond the scope of this volume." (21) This view assumes a body of precise technical knowledge which social workers perhaps cannot master and a political and economic consensus which will probably never exist... not in the foreseeable future anyway. History suggests that priorities, goals and political biases are decisive, that the most expert can in fact only help maximize performance toward the desired social objectives.

The role of social work is viewed from a service delivery perspective. Manpower programs open up vast new arenas for service delivery. The profession can bring to bear its skills in new settings and develop new relationships between service systems. The thorny policy issue is at best a very poor second (although it may be decisive in shaping the services).

The 1977 Delegate Assembly of the NASW, meeting at a time when unemployment had just reached its highest point since the depression and when allies were attempting to build the broadest possible coalition behind the Humphrey-Hawkins Bill, passed resolutions on thirteen public policy issues. The employment issue was not among them. (22)

As the political process continues, there can be no doubt that social work, not only concerned about "picking up the pieces" but also in seeing to it that there are fewer pieces to pick up, will become more heavily involved. Indeed, we have a special contribution to make. (23)
Discussion

Just as the events of the 1930's forced the abandonment of the prevailing mode of thought and ushered in new interventive efforts and new economic concepts, so the current era will of necessity have to do the same; and just as the U.S. was least prepared to combat the recession because of the absence of any social income, so it is least prepared to deal with full employment because of the absence of serious employment policy and planning.

The possibility of the Full Employment and Growth Act of 1978 remaining lifeless and going the route of its predecessor, the Full Employment Act of 1946, is a strong one. The full employment coalition and its allies face a most difficult task in pressing for the implementation of Humphrey-Hawkins. Political opposition at this time is shared up by a conservative ideology that accepts the concept of an employment-inflation trade-off. There is a willingness to accept recession inducing policies in the illusion that therein lies a cure to inflation. The emphasis on tight money through the raising of interest rates and increasing bank reserves is likely to continue for some time despite its ineffectiveness and the persistence of stagflation. This slow growth, or no growth, outlook prevents any intervention for significant job creation on the part of government. New initiatives will more likely than not remain sophisticated modes of public assistance.

Failure to act will increase the disproportionate burden carried by the poor for the malfunctions of the economic order. It will tend to foreclose significant reforms in other areas and make future interventions more and more difficult. An economy based on scarcity rather than growth will inevitably mean cuts in social spending. Larger and larger numbers of people will become disillusioned and become more amenable to the message of the proponents of growth and full employment. Hopefully we can speed up the process.
FOOTNOTES


9. E. Wight Bakke., The Mission of Manpower Policy, W.F. Upjohn Institute For Employment Research, 1969, pgs. 3, 4. This last observation seems to be confirmed by the tendency of the Nixon and Carter welfare reform plans which seek to bring parts of the unemployment problem under the public assistance umbrella.


12. Students of social policy probably have already detected aspects of the selective-universal debate that has permeated discussions of social service provision. Some caution should be exercised in that the manpower-employment question cuts across traditional fields in a unique way. The boundary issue is an important one.


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23. One type of contribution social work can make is illustrated by the community organization work carried on by the Center for Social Policy and Social Services of the Adelphi University School of Social Work. The Center chose full employment as an issue to concentrate on in 1975, and initiated the formation of and provided leadership for the Long Island Coalition for Full Employment. The Coalition, with 55 affiliated organizations representing some 250,000 people, has participated vigorously in the national effort.
ABSTRACT

This paper employs an analytic framework based on organizational incentives to explain the failure of recent welfare reform efforts. The data consists of observations, interviews, and routine in-house reports collected on a federally funded program, Project STAR. The project was developed with the aim of mobilizing lower-class and minority families of the mentally retarded in support of reform of mental retardation services in five cities in the U.S. A service-inducement strategy was pursued by the reform organization to overcome the difficulties of enticing lower-class families of the retarded to participate in organizational activities. This strategy appears to have had several unintended consequences on the reform project. The concern with identifying and providing social services became a major preoccupation of the reformers. To the extent to which parents did participate because of the receipt of welfare benefits, this diminished the reform organization's autonomy relative to the existing welfare network. A further impact of this service-inducement strategy was political demoralization of the parents of the retarded. The "service" focus appears to have attracted parents the least predisposed towards community change. Once involved in the organization, the impact of organizational activities was of reinforcement of this predisposition. Analysts of welfare reform organizations need to pay greater attention to the cooptative impact of welfare benefits. The data suggests the failure of community mobilization can be explained by the organizational incentives used. The problem reform organizations face is in finding the proper mix of purposive, material and solidary inducements which both recruit and retain participants, at the same time allowing the pursuit of mobilization goals.

INTRODUCTION

An underlying thrust of social policy in the United States
has been to ensure access to the policy-making process of social groups in society. In the case of unorganized social forces, the poor and minorities, the role of government has been to politically mobilize the communities in which they live. (Greenstone and Peterson, 1973). Community organization as a public policy has assumed that professional reform organizations can mobilize unorganized social forces into voluntary associations for social action. With few exceptions, however, efforts at community mobilization of the lower-class have met with little success. (Clark and Hopkins, 1968, Rose, 1970, Helfgot, 1974). This paper examines the internal dynamics of a national effort to mobilize lower-class families of the mentally retarded. It is argued that the mobilization strategy of the government-sponsored reform organization provides an explanation for the failure at community organization. The organizational incentives offered to promote community participation among the poor lead to de-politicalization and demoralization. Rather than promoting participation in the institutions of society, government-sponsored mobilization efforts may well foster dependency and social fragmentation. The organization to be analyzed is Project STAR. The organization was developed with the aim of mobilizing lower-class and minority families of the mentally retarded. The group, once organized, was expected to provide a setting for social reform of the social welfare service sector.

**METHODOLOGY**

The study utilizes three methodological strategies: observation, historical records and lengthy personal interviews. The multiple approach adopted in this study was taken, in part, because no single source of data could provide all of the information considered necessary for a vivid analysis of the problem under consideration. (Bouchard, 1976)

For a number of years the author was Research Director of Project STAR. This position provided a particularly strategic position to observe the origin and implementation of this major welfare reform effort. In the role of Research Director the author had complete access to the files and records associated with the development and operation of the project. The position also offered the opportunity to meet and establish friendly relationships with professionals and community representatives in the five cities in which STAR functioned.
SOCIAL POLICY AND MASS SOCIETY

The movement towards the extension of social welfare in the United States has been continuous but slow. With these changes, explanations for the expansion of social welfare have increasingly been of concern for social scientists. Arguments about the causes of the expansion of welfare are varied as well as ideological. In a seminal work Gronbjerg (1977) identifies a number of reasons for the growth and transformation of social welfare. In one sense, the expansion of social welfare is a direct response to poverty. In this "stratification" approach, welfare has developed as a way of helping the unfortunate in our society. Social welfare problems have increased as the public became aware of and concerned with the presence of poor people in our society. Social welfare is a way of responding to poverty and economic dependency.

The welfare expansion can also be viewed from the larger perspective of sociological theories about mass society. The expansion of social welfare is a further step in the extension of "citizenship". The expansion of welfare programs extends the concept of citizenship to include not only political participation, but "economic" citizenship as well. The definition of social welfare has been enlarged so as to encompass conditions other than just stark deprivation. The extension of social welfare becomes part of a larger process of modernity rather than a reflection of the objective needs of the population.

This drift toward encouraging participation by heretofore excluded segments of the population has been developed by Shils (1975) in his discussion of "mass society". According to Shils there is a trend toward the inclusion of sub-groups of the population into the central value system and the cultural symbols of society. This has occurred primarily through the expansion of education, social welfare, and mass communications. Public education, radio, television and social welfare have made possible a closer tie between the central institutions of society, and widely diffused social groups. Citizenship within this perspective, includes access of the various groups in society to the political processes by which social policy is developed.

Historically public policy and the public interest have been defined in terms of the organized interests in society. Theodore Lowi (1969) suggests in his inquiry into public philosophy,
Organized interests pretty much fill up and adequately represent most of the sectors of our lives, so that one organized group can be found effectively answering and checking some other organized group as it seeks to prosecute its claims against society... it is assumed that "counter-veiling" power usually crops up somehow.

The "process" of policy formulation is elevated as the justification for a particular policy. The ends of policy and their consequences becomes a forgotten issue. Governmental action, according to this public philosophy, is to ensure access of the various interests in society to the policy-making process, and to ratify the agreements and adjustments worked out among the competing groups. (McConnell, 1966)

MENTAL RETARDATION REFORM

This "mass society" view of social welfare places into perspective the myriad goals and activities of government-sponsored reform organizations. Poverty, rather than being a situation to be eliminated, has become instead a status around which an interest needs to be organized. Social welfare programs, especially those known as "community development", have focused on organizing the poor. Since the poor and racial minorities are seen as an unrecognized force in society, public policy has focused on creating the formation of an organized interest among them. Drawing on a sociological orientation and interest-group political theory, government policy has experimented with community organization and group action to restore a sense of "community" to low-income individuals.

A pluralist view of policy formation explains the content of social welfare policy towards the mentally retarded. Mental retardation policy reflects the activities of organized interest groups in society. The mobilization of middle-class parents of the retarded together with the power of professional medical groups has led to a proliferation of public and private welfare programs with an emphasis on helping a tiny segment of the mentally retarded. (Albee, 1968, Segal, 1970, Fontana, 1978) The programs are based on the assumption of organic damage and permanent deficiency. (Mercer, 1973) This encompasses only a small number of the mentally
retarded. The group which is ignored or "disenfranchised" are basically poor, non-white and mildly retarded. Their mental retardation status is due in some cases to depressed environmental conditions. The large number of minority and lower-class individuals in the "mildly" retarded category has also been attributed to mis-labeling. The President's Committee on Mental Retardation (1968) has expressed the view that a number of the retarded may in fact be "six-hour retarded children".

We now have what may in fact be called a six-hour retarded child-retarded from 9 to 3, five days a week, solely on the basis of an IQ score, without regard to his adaptive behavior which may be exceptionally adaptive to the situation and community in which he lives.

Thus, a mental retardation status may stem from culturally biased instruments. This perspective on mental retardation depicts minority and lower-class retarded as victims of exploitative social, political and educational institutions.

National concern in the late 1960's and 70's with the convergence of race, poverty and mental retardation led to government-sponsored efforts to organize lower-class parents of the retarded. The ultimate objective would be to maximize their influence in welfare and educational policy formation. Developing a level of indigenous organization was seen as a necessary ingredient for interest formation. As Shorter and Tilly suggest (1974) individuals are not magically mobilized for participation in some group effort regardless of how angry they feel...their aggression may be channeled to collective ends only through the coordinating, directing function of an organization.

It was within this context that Project STAR was developed by the President's Committee on Mental Retardation and the National Urban League, and funded for three years by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. The reform project emphasized the need to extend the rights of "citizenship" to lower-class families of the retarded. The project was funded to promote the participation of minority and lower-class individuals in the formulation of programs and services for the retarded; to change the discriminatory
processes involved in labeling minority children as retarded; and to increase the involvement of lower-class and minorities as consumers of welfare services for the mentally retarded.

COMMUNITY MOBILIZATION STRATEGY

The community organization efforts began in five cities in 1971. Each of the five sites were awarded approximately $100,000 a year for each of the three years. In each project there was a director, two social workers, two para-professionals, and a clerical staff. Each local project was to recruit a group of 100 minority and lower-class families of the retarded. The "social action" activities were to be developed by the project staff and families of the retarded, while social services were to be provided by existing welfare organizations in the community.

Once the reform project began its operations, the immediate task was to recruit lower-class parents of the mentally retarded. The first contact with potential members was geared primarily to mobilization purposes. Most observers have noted the difficulties of organizing individuals holding a negative status in society. (Turner, 1968) Joining an organization of welfare clients might be viewed as associating oneself with a status one hopes to escape. In addition, the parents were asked to identify with a group of lower-class parents of the mentally retarded—who were negatively stereotyped in society. The common notion of the poor as "disadvantaged" or "deprived" presented a further unappealing reason for association. Recruitment would probably have been hampered by the self-guilt that burdens many parents of the mentally retarded. An example being a mother in one city who indicated to the staff that her retarded child was "god's punishment for my evil past".

Obstacles to joining the reform organization were also presented by a kind of economic rationality of the poor. Mancur Olson (1965) has suggested a keen logic on the part of the lower-class when weighing social participation.

If the members of a large group rationally seek to maximize their personal welfare, they will not act to advance their common or group objectives unless there is coercion to force them to do so, or unless there is some separate incentive, distinct from the achievement of the common or group interest, offered to the members of the
group individually on the condition that they help beat the costs or burdens involved in the achievement of group objectives.

These obstacles to inducing social participation suggested to the community organizers of Project STAR a mobilization strategy geared to tangible inducement. The reform organization became interested in creating an image of the organization as a sure source of welfare benefits. It was expected that the project would assume importance to the families of the retarded as a conduit for various social and health services. The information and referral services, plus extensive follow-up on referrals, insured there would be a tangible return for participation.

In their first encounter with parents, Project STAR organizers described the reform organization, its local sponsorship, and its goals. The key to success was seen as the ability to convince parents they could get better welfare services for their children only if they joined Project STAR. This was accomplished by showing the potential member the improvements in services (e.g., re-testing for IQ, welfare services, employment programs, etc.) that might result from involvement in STAR. After reviewing the services with the potential member, the STAR staff then proceeded to discuss the parent's experiences with social welfare agencies in the community. They were asked "How helpful were health and welfare agencies in providing assistance to your retarded child?" After some discussion, the parents were asked the crucial question, "Would you like to join with other parents of children having limited capacity in working towards making the agencies more helpful to low-income families?" The organizers found that many parents were quite willing at this point to express an interest in participation. About three quarters of those contacted during this initial recruiting drive indicated an interest in working together with other parents to improve services. After several months of canvassing the neighborhoods, the goal of 100 families per project site was reached.

MAINTAINING ORGANIZATIONAL PARTICIPATION

The willingness of low-income parents to participate in the reform projects, as evidenced by their response to the recruiting drive, is not an unusual response from this segment of the population. Kraft and Chilman's (1966) review of research into organi-
ing low-income parents indicates that the problem lies not in soliciting an interest in participation, but in bringing the social action program into actuality. The recruiting drive tied together the receipt of material incentives, i.e., health and welfare services, with purposive incentives, i.e., the stated goal of social mobilization and social reform. Why did the parents express an interest in joining STAR? Studies of neighborhood organization among the lower-class suggest that large numbers of poor people can be induced to join voluntary associations, but only in a very restricted set of circumstances. Saul Alinsky's (1946) community drives have been predicated on the expression of hostility and conflict.

The community organizer digs into the morass of resignation, hopelessness, and despair, and works with local people in articulating (or rubbing "raw") their resentments...When those prominent in the status quo call you an agitator, they are completely correct; that is, in one word, your function, to agitate to the point of conflict.

This approach may experience difficulty with welfare clients. Studies of the experiences of welfare clients indicate a relatively high level of client-satisfaction with their case workers. Handler (1971) indicates that this is probably due to the fact that when welfare recipients apply for benefits, they come not as rights-bearing citizens claiming what is entitled to the, but as supplicants. Bailes' (1974) history of the National Welfare Rights Organization suggests that agitation was not a necessary ingredient in eliciting initial participation. What was necessary was the concreteness and individual impact that welfare benefits usually precipitate.

Translating the stated willingness to participate into direct involvement in organizational affairs became a problem for the mobilization efforts. The early history of STAR was characterized by efforts to maintain the interest and involvement of the parents in the activities of the reform organization. An early report from one STAR city (1973) expressed this difficulty of organizing parents of the retarded into groups to discuss their common problems with the welfare system.

A parent group of Chicano families is having a difficult time becoming stable. Many of the Mexican -
American mothers cannot leave their home during the evening due to custom, and their families are large, making it very difficult for mothers to leave during the day. STAR workers are providing babysitters when possible, but again, a feeling of doubt exists with these mothers even concerning this service. We are starting to provide extensive individual services (casework) to these families. We are encouraged by the response to this service.

In response to the precarious position of the parent discussion groups, the attention of organizers became directed towards providing increased material benefits to the parents as an incentive towards their participation.

The major benefit that STAR had to offer the lower-class parents was its organizational linkage to existing health and welfare organizations. There were extensive formal and informal relationships that the project had developed with the local human service network. In order to carry out the promises made to deliver welfare benefits, the project staff began to spend most of their time in referral of clients to local service agencies. Records kept at the project sites indicate there were over 1500 referrals for services during the first two years of operation. (STAR, 1973)

The demands that this placed on the project is evidenced by the amount and range of activities to follow up on the referrals. To facilitate the delivery of services to the parents, the staff were involved with escorting parents to service agencies, and participating in meetings with the parents and service agency personnel.

This benefit-inducement strategy proved to be an effective incentive towards parents' participation. The strategy worked in that parents started to come to meetings held in the project's offices. The meetings, however, of necessity focused on the basic social problems of the families. A report from one city gave the following assessment of the parent groups:

As the number of participating families increased, the social workers established the first four of Project STAR's planned 8-10 groups. Much experimentation was used to improve member turn-out and group effectiveness. The groups were still in their rudimentary forms, but a start had been made. However, it is still too early in the first stages of the project to report on the best method of conducting the parent groups. We have
found that the staff must first concentrate on any basic problems essential to the survival of the family before its members will agree to regular meetings. Basic problems of existence need attention before the families can begin to branch out into means of bringing about institutional change. (STAR, 1973)

Other project sites were experiencing similar problems of maintaining organizational participation. The dilemma of staff time being monopolized by service delivery activities is documented in an early report from one site.

Sixty percent of the total project time was spent in face to face contact with families of retarded children in pursuit of individual and group referrals. (STAR, 1973)

Parents came to the reform project with a multitude of problems and requests for assistance. Table 1 records the distribution of requests for services made to Project STAR.

TABLE I. Request for Services From Project STAR: 1970-1972

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE OF REQUEST</th>
<th>FREQUENCY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intervention with School System</td>
<td>11.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have Retardate tested or re-tested</td>
<td>14.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational training or employment for retardate</td>
<td>21.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summer camp placement</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job for family member</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food, clothing, housing or financial assistance</td>
<td>10.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistance with welfare department</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counseling</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remedial Education</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health Care</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Services</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100% (438)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Clearly the overwhelming majority of problems brought to the attention of the reform project has little to do with the political issue of mis-labeled minority children. Only fourteen percent of the requests
were related to the possible mis-classification of a child. The remaining requests had to do with routine social welfare services.

Although social services proved useful in promoting attendance, they also had limitations. Welfare benefits and information had a short lifetime. They could be given to the same person only once. Once the parent received a welfare service, she no longer needed the organization. Thus, the receipt of a specific service by a parent exhausted the influence of that service as an inducement to participation. This presented the reform project with a constant dilemma of scrambling to come up with new methods to maintain the parents in the organization. After welfare benefits lost their drawing power, staff turned toward other incentives to retain parent participation. For example, in the early part of 1971 nine meetings were held in one city with parents of the retarded in attendance. The meetings consisted solely of an audio-visual presentation illustrating methods and techniques for child-rearing. In the similar vein, other parent groups provided a forum for the "Childhood Stimulation Program" of a local University. The staff gave a demonstration on education toys and books for young children. The meetings focused on methods to stimulate pre-schoolers' communication skills.

In all of these inducement techniques, the effort was made to offer certain benefits in the form of information and access to social programs for those who made continued contributions to organizational activities. This became a problem in that the staff were unable to continually link parent meetings or other organizational activities to the receipt of material benefits, or even to information about such benefits. The result was a search for new methods to induce participation. The reform project started to provide "side"benefits and intangible rewards to participants.

The national office of STAR and the local projects had sizeable amounts of money earmarked for "travel and conferences." The national office had $44,000, while local projects had $2000 each year in their travel budgets. The money began to be used to "reward" active participants with free transportation, lodging, and other expenses for conferences and meetings around the country. Parents were sent, together with staff, to attend conferences in Denver, Montreal, Anaheim; Chicago, St. Louis and San Francisco. Although this inducement proved attractive to the parents, it had distinctive drawbacks. Providing free travel, room and board ran into thousands of dollars a year. In comparison to social welfare services, this was not an expense that the reform project could transfer to local social welfare agencies. The expenses of service- inducements
were mainly borne by local welfare organizations, who provided the welfare benefits. Travel expenditures, however, were borne directly by Project STAR. This type of participation incentive was a major drain on organizational resources, limiting its widespread usage. It therefore, had a limited impact because its use was restricted to proportionally few parents in each project.

A less obvious, but by no means unimportant factor in participation, was the attraction of solidarity incentives. (Clark and Wilson, 1961) Solidary incentives are basically intangible in the sense that the benefit has no monetary value, and cannot be easily translated into one that has. These inducements include the act of associating and socializing with members of a particular group. For some of the parents in the reform project, a factor in participation was the attraction of meeting friends (or potential friends), or at least fighting loneliness and boredom. The relative importance of these motives is difficult to measure and undoubtedly varied from member to member, project to project. However, the project appeared to be a way of socializing with one's peers. In one city, for example, the monthly parent meetings were great social occasions, at which refreshments (coffee, cake, etc.) were shared. Parents would often stay after the meeting to gossip and socially intermingle.

While the friendship and social inducements did not create a financial drain on the organizational resources of Project STAR, reliance on them as an inducement for participation had certain costs. There usually were no more than a handful of members who were attracted by this incentive. For those members who were getting together primarily to have a good time, there was little reason to engage in reform or issue-orientated activities. Similarly, those who were primarily motivated by friendship or a desire to end boredom were probably less likely to view racism as a cause for their family's problems. They thus were less responsive to the reform objective of building a level of indigenous organization among low-income parents of the mentally retarded. (Bailes, 1972)

SOCIAL SERVICES AND ORGANIZATIONAL AUTONOMY

The activities developed to entice members of poverty groups to participate in community activities appear to have had several unintended consequences on the reform project. A service-inducement strategy was pursued by the social reform organization to
overcome the difficulties of enticing lower-class parents of the mentally retarded to participate in organizational activities. Since STAR was not equipped to provide the services itself, it was forced to rely upon referrals to the existing social welfare organizations for these benefits. Therefore, to the extent to which clients did participate because of these welfare benefits, this diminished STAR's autonomy relative to the existing welfare network. Litwak and Hylton (1962) have suggested that organizational autonomy is dependent upon two factors: interdependency and standardization. Interdependency between organizations occurs when one organization must take another into account if it is to accomplish its goals. The dependency of STAR on welfare agencies for its internal incentives to lower-class parents tied its mobilization goals to the actions of local welfare organizations. Standardized actions refer to behavior which is repetitive in character. The daily routine nature of client referrals between STAR and the local welfare network established a type of organizational linkage that did not previously exist. Organizational relationships between Project STAR and the established welfare agencies that were to be reformed presented a series of constraints that limited STAR's ability to move towards the goal of institutional change. Clients became involved in STAR because of the promise of services. Demands for services were thus coming from both clients and staff. The service-inducement strategy required the ready accessibility of an array of services from the local welfare network. This presented a problem of organizational conflict of interest. The failure to implement reforms can no doubt be explained in part by this dependency. The desire to mobilize the parents of the retarded through the use of welfare benefits generated pressure on the staff. In a real sense, a choice had to be made between confrontation or mobilization. To publicly confront the welfare organizations on their programs and policies would threaten the accessibility and supply of organizational resources that were being used to mobilize the parents. Thompson and McEwen's (1958) analysis of organization-environment interaction suggests that the operative goals of an organization are influenced by a "field" of organizations. While this has been amply demonstrated in economic analysis, the case materials from STAR suggest that the impact can be seen with social welfare reform organizations pursuing multiple goals.

The emphasis in providing service-inducements deflected the use that was made of the meetings between parents. Rather than politically mobilizing lower-class parents, techniques and gimmicks to foster participation in the groups became a major preoccupation of
STAR staff. Since welfare benefits were some of the most effective and cheapest devices, they came to consume an ever increasing proportion of the time and thoughts of the project staff. As Selznick (1960) suggests, solutions to day-to-day problems in organizations often become substituted for the original or professed goals of the organization. This was the dilemma that confronted Project STAR. The preoccupation with welfare services as a means of retaining parents deflected from community organization and became the operative goals of the reform project. The project moved away from a concern with the mobilization of lower-class parents to a primary focus on individual parents and their welfare needs. Table 2 records the number of parent-group meetings held in 1970 through 1972 and the number of referrals for services made on behalf of parents during this same time period.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR OF PROJECT</th>
<th>NUMBER OF PARENT GROUP MEETINGS</th>
<th>NUMBER OF REFERRALS FOR SOCIAL WELFARE SERVICES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>515</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>624</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The inverse relationship between the number of service referrals and parent-groups meetings, documents the movement from a mobilization to a service referral focus for Project STAR.

The shift in emphasis that took place occurred without a conscious decision on the part of the staff or the leadership of the organization. The data in Table 2 indicates the wide variation between official and operative goals. Perrow (1961) suggests that operative goals tell us what the organization is trying to do, regardless of what the official goals say are the aims. The evolution of STAR into a basically service-related organization was mainly a reaction to internal pressures without a reference to a concrete model of where the organization was going.

SOCIAL SERVICES AND CLIENT DE-MOBILIZATION

A number of observers have noted that one of the primary
functions of social welfare is social control. Galper (1975) suggests that social services foster particular behavior patterns in clients, both as a condition of usage and as a consequence of service. The basis of his criticisms is the notion that social services are structured as to service the labor market. The Social Security System is an example of a social welfare benefit that compensates for the inadequacies of the labor market and ties people firmly to it. For a variety of social service programs, a return to work status might well be taken as the operational definition of success. The emphasis on work is not the only area in which social conformity is emphasized by social welfare. The rules and regulations of many programs have functioned to regulate client behavior. Regulations have been used to influence sexual conduct, family relations, rights to privacy, budget expenditures, and so on. As one observer noted, being on welfare means the loss of control over one's life. (Mandell, 1975)

The case materials from Project STAR suggest a further impact on clients---demoralization. The maintenance demands of the parent groups, aside from imparting an organization focus on individual service needs of lower-class parents, also appear to have attracted members of the lower-class the least predisposed towards community change. Once involved in STAR, instead of promoting a frame of reference among the parents that was conducive to community mobilization, involvement in the parent groups appears to have had an opposite effect. If they were to be effective in mobilizing parents of retarded children, the STAR organizers needed to enhance a "collective" orientation among participants. If the effort were successful, instead of giving priority to their own private interests, the parents would adopt a view that their interests are tied to the interests of others in a similar situation. The parent groups would provide an opportunity for parents to reinforce each other in efforts to better their social conditions. In addition to this collective orientation, mobilization of the parents would require that participants take a critical or questioning attitude toward the mental retardation status assigned to their child. This was clearly one intended purpose of the groups—to help create situations that exposed the processes that led to a disproportionate number of minority children being labeled as mentally retarded.

In order to get a sense of the impact of group-participation on the perceptions of the parents in the reform organization, a measure of "collective orientation" was utilized. Sumati Dubey (1971) has developed a scale to measure a collective perspective
among lower-class individuals. This variable suggests a larger conceptual scheme to account for basic strategies that the lower-class could adopt to improve their social and economic status. Blum (1965) and his associates posit two possible strategies: individual or collective mobility strategies. A person with an "individual" mobility orientation would believe that the individual is responsible for his plight, and it is he who is responsible for changing it. Consequently, it is his interest which is of paramount importance, not the interests of the lower-class as a social group. An alternate response to individual mobility is "collective" mobility. This strategy would encompass the belief that one's own conditions cannot improve unless additional economic resources, social power and the like are made available to all members of one's social group. As a measure of this variable, the following five items were used to operationalize "collective" orientation:

1. Without sit-ins, lie-ins, and picketing, welfare clients will not get adequate financial help.
2. The only way for welfare clients to get what they want is to organize themselves in a united front.
3. Non-violent demonstrations, like picketing or sitting-in, are the best way for the poor to get what they want.
4. The only way for the poor to improve their condition in American society is to fight violently with the power structure.
5. People treat you right only when they know you can strike back at them.

Respondents were defined as either "individualist" or "collective" depending upon whether they received high or low scores on the scale.

Our measure of participation in the parent groups was based on the attendance records of parents kept by the project staff. There were two categories created to differentiate among the participation rates of parents: never attended, or attended more than one-quarter of all the meetings. It was assumed that attendance at more than one of four meetings would allow the group to have an impact on the participant. Table 3 records the relationship between attendance at parent meetings and the view that one's interests are tied to a larger social group.
TABLE III. Parent Group Participation and Social Problem Orientation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOCIAL PROBLEM ORIENTATION</th>
<th>PARENT GROUP PARTICIPATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Never Attended Meetings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individualist</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collectivist</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100% (64)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If we examine the two groups of parents, those that never attended a meeting, as opposed to those that attended more than one-quarter of all the group meetings held, we notice some differences. The parents who never attended a meeting apparently have a higher collective orientation than those who were participants. In other words, they are more likely to view social change as a collective enterprise. Fifty-five percent of the non-attenders could be considered as having a collective orientation, compared to only forty percent of those who attended the meetings somewhat regularly.

To infer a causal relationship between attendance at meetings and an individualist orientation toward social problems is probably premature. As table 3 suggests, there were a large proportion of parents, 45 percent, who were "individualists," even though they never attended meetings. What we might be witnessing is a process of self-selection. The service activities developed by Project STAR to increase participation might have selectively attracted members of the community that were least predisposed towards a collective solution to social problems. If this were the case, then the impact of the group was probably one of reinforcement.

Another area existed where there was a relationship between attendance at parent group meetings and social orientation. This was the question of whether parents were critical of the retardation label assigned to their child. The parents were asked whether there was any doubt in their mind that their child was retarded. Parents who indicated some uncertainty were asked to explain the basis of their doubt. Those parents who were uncertain gave a variety of reasons for their doubts, such as, "child was not tested
adequately", "child just slow, not retarded," "child retarded because he/she is black or poor," "observation of child outside of classroom." Those that were "uncritical" had no doubt about their child being retarded. Table 4 records the apparent impact of attendance at parent group meetings and criticisms of retardation status assigned to their child.

**TABLE IV. Attitude Toward Mental Retardation Status and Parent Group Participation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ATTITUDE TOWARD MENTAL RETARDATION STATUS OF CHILD</th>
<th>GROUP PARTICIPATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NEVER ATTENDED</td>
<td>ATTENDED MORE THAN ONE-QUARTER OF ALL MEETINGS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critical</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncritical</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

100% (66) 100% (116)

Apparently the parents who attended meetings regularly showed more of a disinclination to view their child's retardation status as a political or racial phenomenon. Those who attended the meetings were less aware of the processes that lead to minority children being labeled as retarded, or at least did not believe that such processes applied to their child.

Any inferences we develop from these data are tentative. The relationships displayed in the tables, while not statistically significant, are analytically suggestive. The data suggest that analysts of social welfare reform organizations should pay greater attention to the cooptative impact of welfare benefits. It appears that the social welfare benefits delivered to STAR parents might have had the unintended effect of reinforcing an already apolitical orientation among lower-class parents. Those who were "active" parents appeared to be less sensitive to the issue of mis-labeled minority children and less supportive of a social strategy of collective action. Although there are no direct data to explain this apparent relationship, a number of theoretical formulations do lay a groundwork for an understanding.
TOWARD A THEORY OF POLITICAL DE-SOCIALIZATION

Cloward and Piven (1965) have highlighted the role of welfare services in socializing welfare clients to a conservative political stance. They argue that client passivity and conformity are encouraged by conditional welfare benefits without adequate procedures for appeal. In general, welfare bureaucracies have been granted discretion in the distribution of various benefits. Handler's (1972) study of welfare policy and federalism suggests that the flexibility or looseness of the welfare system at the lower levels of administration can be understood as a general agreement between the central government and the local community that the "moral reform" of the poor be handled at the local levels. This suits politicians and administrators at the higher level since they are more than willing to avoid taking a stand on controversial questions. The result has been to allow the lowest level of administration to make what are, in effect, decisions as to eligibility for benefits. The regulations governing many welfare services are, therefore, shot through with discretion. In this situation welfare clients are at the mercy of individualized, ad-hoc discretionary decisions.

The discretionary power of welfare organizations is enhanced by the connection between expertise and welfare benefits. The distribution of welfare benefits has increasingly been seen as requiring expert skills. This approach is exemplified by the changes in welfare services during the 1960's. A series of amendments to the Social Security Act promised a reduction in poverty through an intensive effort of trained and skilled caseworkers. However, beyond prescribing that in order to qualify for federal funds, a social worker could not carry more than 60 persons, little was said of the relationship between caseworker and client. The precise nature of the intensive service and how social workers' activities were to reduce dependency were never clarified. (Gilbert and Specht, 1974) This linkage between expertise and benefits extends further the discretion of social welfare organizations over clients. The "scientific" basis of knowledge and techniques has had the effect of shielding welfare bureaucracies from a review by political leaders and public groups.

The enormous discretionary power of welfare bureaucracies over the distribution of benefits has the potential of being an instrument of social control. Ordinarily, a group gains power and increased public benefits through organization, conflict, and political machinery. Today's poor, however, are able to secure benefits through passivity and acquiescence. For example, a number of
observers of health services have noted the relationship between sick role behavior and the receipt of services. The more like a helpless object the patient is, the easier it is for the medical staff do their work. Lorber's (1975) study of hospitals suggests that for the sake of the smooth and efficient operation of the institution, medical personnel encourage "uncomplainingness" and "undemandingness" in patients. A study of dying patients also found efforts at social control. Nurses scolded, reprimanded, and avoided patients who asked lots of questions, created emotional scenes, or refused to cooperate with hospital routines. (Glaser and Strauss, 1965).

The increased involvement with welfare organizations following participation in the STAR parent groups may have exposed parents of the retarded to influences that reinforced political demoralization. Bureaucratic procedures reinforce the premise that the poor have few rights. The discretion inherent in the distribution of welfare benefits allows the bureaucracies the freedom of arbitrary action. Once the poor have internalized this view of welfare, they become accepting of the vague administrative procedures and conditional benefits. The manipulation of benefits is a powerful mechanism of social control. It can take the form of either the withdrawal of essential resources as punishment for dissent, or selective appeasement, as when certain benefits are granted to the leaders of a community, while the grievances of the larger group remain. Political demoralization appears to occur since the welfare recipient is likely to be overwhelmed with a sense of powerlessness, frustration and resignation. The arbitrary procedures and actions contribute to alienation. The individual moves through life no longer experiencing himself as the master of his own destiny. When this occurs, the client sinks into a state of political and social inertia.

The types of social welfare benefits offered to STAR parents may have possibly contributed to political demoralization. The benefits they received were ones which were not linked to acceptable social roles. Rather, the client categories by which the welfare agencies defined eligibility were "non-roles." Gilbert (1970) suggests that client dependency and fragmentation are reinforced through the use of isolative benefits.

This reinforcing is done by defining eligibility for benefits in terms of unacceptable role categories or non-roles: the clients are unwed; uneducated, unemployed. They are also
unlikely to form groups that associate them with the role failure such a categoric status represents. Collective action is stymied.

CONCLUSION

Our study of the internal dynamics of Project STAR suggests the utility of an analytic framework based on organizational incentives as a way of studying welfare reform organizations. The major attraction of Project STAR to the lower-class parents of retarded children was the receipt of welfare and health services. The reform project can therefore be described as dependent upon material incentives. Administrators of such organizations are under great pressure to obtain the resources that will provide an inducement to participation. The preoccupation with material incentives from local welfare agencies can account for the eclipse of community mobilization.

Analysis of the incentive system also provides a possible explanation for the failure to successfully organize lower-class parents of the retarded into social action groups. In multi-purpose organizations such as STAR, the organizations' reform goals are not an important incentive and have little impact upon participation. This explains the reluctance of parents to be involved unless there were tangible gains to be made. Given the relative unimportance of the stated mobilization objectives, the organizers were able to be tactically flexible in the types of rewards offered to parents, e.g., services, travel, sociability, etc. The preoccupation with maintaining material incentives, however, resulted in scant attention being paid to the political functions of social services. The price of organizational maintenance was the necessity to adopt activities which may have in the long run, proved inimical to community mobilization. The exposure to increased welfare services through the parent groups appears to explain, in part, the diminished collective orientation of parents and their willingness to accept the mental retardation label assigned to their child.

The reliance on welfare benefits rather than ideology as an incentive for participation was recognition of STAR's weak political position to effect changes in the welfare system. Social change, implied in the ideology of community mobilization, would have been painfully slow, or even an impossible task, given the resources of the reform project. Reforms in intelligence testing and in services for the mentally retarded were only in small part amenable to change from the local level. Most of the mental retardation organizations
in the five sites were part of national and state associations. Local efforts to reform them would most likely have produced minimal reforms in programs for the lower-class retarded. STAR was, however, in a strong position to deliver on the promise of welfare benefits. Its linkages with community agencies made the supply of service-incentives predictable. This was, therefore, a more secure inducement for participation than the promise of institutional reform.

This analysis of one attempt at interest-formation among lower-class families of the mentally retarded suggests a "rational" behavior on their part. The case materials further suggest the failure of community mobilization can be explained by the organizational incentives used. Project STAR's problem appeared to lie in finding the proper mix of purposive, material, and solidary inducements which both recruit and retain members of the lower-class, at the same time allowing the pursuit of mobilization goals.

From the Project STAR experience it appears that the use of welfare benefits to organize lower-class communities may well reinforce passivity and political inertia. This may explain in part, the apparent failure of recent reform efforts to mobilize the poor and extend their social and political rights.

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SOCIAL WELFARE AGENCIES AND SOCIAL REFORM MOVEMENTS:
THE CASE OF THE SINGLE PARENT FAMILY

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Abstract

To a greater extent than before, social welfare agencies are emphasizing social change over direct services. A social reform movement is a mechanism by which societal and institutional change may be accomplished. The relationship between social welfare organizations and social movements has not been clearly defined. The sociological theories of Smelser, Turner, Killian and others on collective behavior and social movements provide a useful knowledge base for welfare organizations and professionals espousing social reform goals. The single parent family population is discussed as a group with the potential to generate into a social reform movement.

Today many social welfare agencies have reemphasized social reform and institutional change as their major organizational goals. Agencies that formerly stressed direct service activities and individual case objectives now focus on social change activities and broader system-oriented objectives. A social reform movement is one way by which institutional change may be accomplished. However, the connection between social reform movements and social welfare organizations and the professionals employed in such organizations has not been studied explicitly. In the following paper, this relationship will be considered, first through a summary statement on the theory of social movements, and second through an examination of the strengths and limitations of social agencies in instigating a social movement and in assisting the movement once it is underway.
Knowledge of this sort would have been useful in describing how social welfare organizations could have provided a greater amount of assistance to national and local Welfare Rights Organizations a few years ago. Social welfare professionals were involved in assisting the Welfare Rights Movement, particularly in linking local welfare rights organizations to the national unit. Although the Welfare Rights Movement has dissipated today, other social issues will undoubtedly continue to trigger the collective concern which leads to social reform movements. A single parent family movement is one such possibility.

As a group, single parents have a constellation of problems: economic, employment, social, child care, and housing. The reported differential in need between one and two parent families in these areas suggests a need for broad institutional changes. The diversity and scope of need for this group would diminish the effectiveness of a purely direct service approach. If a large scale social movement of single parents can be instigated and proves to be an effective vehicle for improving the overall social conditions of single parents, an organizational structure would be established. One parent families could use that organization from that point on, to implement more specific sociological changes (e.g., the Women's Movement can be mobilized for specific issues such as improved day care or increased educational opportunities for women in a relatively short period of time).

Vattano has described how a general movement such as the power-to-the people movement has caused greater consumer participation in the social services and the emergence of nonprofessional self-help groups. In this paper, we narrow the focus to a very specific movement and reverse the casual process by examining the role that individual self-help groups could play in a single parent family movement. We assume that self-help groups of single parents acting together could lead to a recognition of the need for societal system changes and the beginning of a single parent family movement.

It may seem ironic to some that social agencies faced with implementing social reform goals are participating in direct service activities such as assisting in the development of self-help groups. However, we must be clear at the outset that direct service activities per se do not lead to social movements. Certain conditions must be met before direct service group processes can be defined as self-help group processes and before self-help groups link together to initiate a social movement. Furthermore, there is the more basic question of whether there is any proper role for the social service agency and the human service professional in self-help groups. Self-help groups derive much of their power from the interest of members in assisting one another and continued professional involvement might usurp the self-help power base. In addition, we will raise question about the proper role of the social service agency in a social movement.
Our interest in defining the one parent family phenomenon as a social reform movement was instigated by developments in England and in Canada. In England, voluntary associations of local self-help groups such as Mothers in Action and Gingerbread have brought attention to the common disadvantages of the single parent status. The writings of social policy professionals such as Wynn and Marsden recorded the common needs of one parent families and, as a result, the Finer Commission was established to study the socio-legal conditions of the one parent family and make family policy recommendations. Single parent associations have exerted their influence to see that the recommendations of the Finer Commission are implemented.

In Canada, voluntary associations of single parent families such as Toronto Single Parents Associated or the Vancouver Single Parents Association have been organized. A number of studies have been conducted to publicize the social conditions confronting single parents. As far as we can determine, these single parent organizations developed from self-help groups of single parents acting together to change social conditions for the single parent family.

In the United States, the closest thing to a national voluntary association of single parents is Parents Without Partners; however, this organization has often been criticized for emphasizing social activities over social change activities. The one parent phenomenon has not been defined by Parents Without Partners as a social movement. Other than a recent study on the economic conditions of female headed families, no national policy research has been undertaken on the single parent phenomenon in this country.

All indications suggest that social issues related to the single parent family could be defined in terms of a social reform movement. The question under study in this paper is "Can a social agency instigate a social reform movement?; or, "Are there certain activities a social agency might perform after the movement has developed which might add to its success?"

THEORY OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

Collective Behavior

In sociological theory, a social movement is located in the class of social actions broadly categorized under the term collective behavior. We will discuss definitions of collective behavior and then identify the distinctive characteristics of a social movement as a special type of collective behavior.

Collective behavior has been defined as "mobilization on the basis of a belief which redefines social action." Collective behavior encompasses a wide range of events including a panic, a riot or a social movement. The discussion of the theories of collective behavior in this paper will center on two major theorists, Smelser and Turner.
Smelser views collective behavior as the outgrowth of a popular desire to do something about a situation that has created stress for a number of individuals. He feels that structural strain is the underlying condition of an episode of collective behavior. Generalized beliefs are present and facilitate the collective understanding of the condition. This eventually leads to social action in response to the strain. Other conditions he identifies as contributing to particular episodes of collective behavior include: a precipitating incident that confirms the belief; the mobilization of participants for action; and, finally the collective action itself.\(^1\)

Turner notes that episodes of collective behavior appear when conventional norms fail or weaken in an ambiguous situation that provides an opportunity for individuals to interact.\(^1\) A situation leading to the establishment of a new norm and a new definition of the situation to which the norm is applied can arise only when conventional norms are neutralized. The "emergent norm" develops as part of the new interaction and it determines the direction and intensity of crowd behavior. Turner's theory assumes that individuals experience social pressure to conform to the emergent norm.

There are several general concepts which are common to both Smelser and Turner's discussions of collective behavior. First, a strain of some sort or another is a necessary condition that determines episodes of collective behavior. Second, the process of communication under conditions of strain is important. Third, collective behavior is not seen as the behavior of aggregates of unrelated individuals but the behavior of collectivities.

Each theorist sees the determinants of collective behavior somewhat differently. The theoretical emphasis differs in that Smelser's theory is from a cultural perspective while Turner's theoretical emphasis is social structure. Smelser and Turner each began with a different initial focus. Smelser's theory looks to explain social movement, the most structured form of collective behavior. Turner began by explaining the activities of the crowd, a less formally organized type of behavior.

**Social Movements**

A social movement is a distinctive and more highly developed form of collective behavior. The distinguishing characteristics of social movements include: (1) a sense of group identity among participants; (2) sustained enthusiasm; (3) a considerable degree of organization and division of labor; (4) members' activities which are disciplined rather than chiefly impulsive; (5) a conscious effort to bring about the new social and cultural forms.\(^1\) Social movement is defined as "a collectivity acting with some continuity to promote or resist a change in the society or group of which it is a part."\(^1\)

A social movement has consequences for the larger social system. To be successful a social movement must result in significant social change.
significant social change initially may become social movements later on. A movement may contribute to social change through "forcing the established structure of the society to come to terms with it and its values." There the larger social system may eventually respond by incorporating some features of its program into the existing institutions.

There are many theories which attempt to account for the emergence of a social movement. The common elements of each theory will be presented in this paper. A social movement is usually studied as a developmental process. Elementary episodes of collective behavior develop into social movements under certain conditions. Social strain is a necessary precondition for the development of a social movement; but, social strain alone is not a sufficient cause of a social movement. Social change activities must develop.

If the social order fails to meet the individual's needs or provide a stable framework from which to carry on activities, the individual will seek to challenge the social order. If the individual's dissatisfaction is shared by others in the society a social movement may develop. Further, there must be a "vision, a belief in the possibility of a different state of affairs." Thus, strain within the social structure must exist and be a common experience for many individuals, who are willing to act toward change.

Rush and Denisoff also identify strain within the social structure and a willingness to act for change as the essential elements in the development of a social movement. For a temporarily organized public to develop into a social movement the necessary elements are: (1) a consciousness of dysfunction related to a social problem, and (2) the mobilization of action to ameliorate the problem.

As another necessary determinant of a social movement, the generalized belief of collective behavior must develop into shared values. Abel separates values into two dimensions, "the issue" and "the ideology." The issue is the groundwork upon which individuals may organize some collective program, but if such action is to become a social movement, concerned opposition is not sufficient. A collective plan, an ideology, must be developed, for without the ideology, action cannot be maintained.

Jackson suggests that even if the above conditions of social strain, social change activities, and shared values are present, a substantial social movement may still not develop. For progression of an organized social movement there must be an effective linking of like-minded people over an extended area into one group whose image and action can be effectively coordinated. There must be leadership which will be followed by individuals from a variety of local areas and as formal organizations that can operate from a communitywide rather than a local base. The ideology and program must be suitable for rallying the protestors and need to be widely disseminated through channels of communication. The public image of the movement must gain substantial and growing strength, promising tangible accomplishments in the near future.
Having briefly outlined the characteristics of collective behavior and social movements, we return to our original question. Is it possible for a social welfare agency to instigate a social movement? 

As with any formal organization, a social agency has a pattern of activities for which it is accountable. As described in the sociological literature, a movement itself is a very complex phenomenon. Therefore, predicting the emergence of a social movement is a tenuous proposition. A social agency could not guarantee the initiation of a particular movement and does not have ultimate control over whether or not the movement develops. Rather, the agency would need to pursue a number of social issues which could develop into reform movements. However, a welfare agency has a well established structure which tends to limit its flexibility. This hinders the ability of the agency to quickly shift direction, for example, from issues related to welfare rights to issues related to the single parent family. Agency professionals on staff who are experts in welfare rights could not immediately become experts on the single parent family.

For an agency to help instigate a movement, agency professionals or board members must support an emerging norm at an early stage of development—the stage of generalized belief. To lend assistance in initiation of a movement requires some risks board members and staff may be unwilling to take. In the formative stages of a movement, the agency might need to help in planning and instigating precipitating incidents (mass demonstrations, public rallies, etc.) A welfare agency charged with representing some general population of people would most likely support such activities only if a new norm were emerging quickly and becoming readily accepted.

Assuming the new norm did become readily accepted, social service professionals who are especially skilled at organizing and mobilizing consumer groups could prove useful to the leaders of the emerging movement, even in its initial stages. However, if the identified groups were to establish an obvious and open dependence on social welfare organizations, the initial trust of the movement might be dissipated. This is especially true as reform movements of interest to social agencies would be those movements which attack the existing social service structure. The social welfare agency, of course, has vested interests and could benefit from co-opting the movement early on, for instance, by suggesting incremental changes within the social service structure when more dramatic and comprehensive changes are called for.

After the incipient movement develops, a social agency is more likely to be of assistance. As the movement establishes its own formal organization and division of labor, the movement becomes more structurally consistent with the social welfare agency. At that point, agency professionals would be more likely to participate. The following are three examples of how a social agency might share channels of
communication, resources or leadership training with members of the movement.

Social agencies have accumulated experience and expertise in using a variety of communication channels. They frequently issue press releases, have facilities to print materials, and can get news coverage or radio time. The social movement literature indicates accessibility to communication is an important criterion in the success of the movement. This would enable a social agency to gain public attention to the needs of the group, make members of the group aware of the activities and engage their support, enable them to easily reach large numbers for particular events, i.e., mass rally, planning sessions, and so forth.

Social agencies have at their disposal financial resources and thus can provide, at least initially, needed funds. Funds are often difficult for those engaged in a movement to secure and much energy would need to be exerted by the members of the movement. Unsuccessful attempts at fund raising could detract from the success of the movement. Resources would enhance the image of the movement and give the impression of a successful rather than a floundering endeavor. Immediate resources would enable the movement to establish a formal organization headquarters, obtain telephones, send out mail, and so forth.

Effective leadership is vital to the birth and development of a social movement. Effective leadership helps to structure and coordinate activities of the collectivity, and this is a key element in determining if a social movement has arrived. Although it often appears that the leadership is directed by one person, more often it may be a group of individuals acting together. Leadership requires various skills and attitudes which would be nearly impossible for one person to assume. Killian identifies three types of leadership: the charismatic leader, who creates the movement and its ideas and whose personal qualities draw support from others; the administrative leader, who is concerned with developing a practical strategy for the attainment of the goals; and the intellectual leader, who elaborates and justifies the values of the movement. Social agencies could train individuals to assume some of the necessary administrative and intellectual leadership roles. A social agency could also identify a charismatic individual in the community. Agency training might also be appropriate in this case, provided it does not interfere with the development of the individual's charismatic qualities.

In addition to structural consistency between the movement and the agency, there is some functional consistency between the goals of a social agency and a movement. Social agencies have a history of involvement with social reform issues. The "new" social agency should provide leadership and direction for efforts aimed at social and legislative change. Agency involvement may be appropriate in spelling out the policy changes which are needed. However, social movements often call for radical social change. Those participating in the movement sometimes engage in illegal or violent activities. And so, even at a later stage in the development of social reform, participation may present a dilemma.
for the agency. Agency involvement depends upon the degree to which radical social change is sought. In the social welfare sector, this means to what degree the existing social service structure and the practice assumptions of social service professionals are challenged. It is easiest to illustrate this by returning to the example of a single parent family movement.

A SINGLE PARENT FAMILY MOVEMENT

The characteristics of a single parent family movement have been evident in England where self-help groups of single parents have organized into voluntary associations calling for social reform. Assuming the initiation of a one parent family movement in this country, could a social agency assist in the initial development of such a movement? This depends upon two interrelated factors: 1) the degree to which the existing social service structure and practice assumptions of social welfare professionals are being challenged; and 2) how quickly the new norms of the movement are becoming accepted.

Part of the ideological core of a single parent movement directly challenges the assumptions of social welfare professionals and social scientists, namely, that one parent families are "disorganized", "unstable" or "broken" families. In England, single parents in the movement report they were reluctant to even seek social services for fear of being judged as abnormal or unstable by social service professionals.

...the social service system (is) ingrained with a patronizing complacency that the individual is psychologically inadequate—not the system...24

The social service worker is often the embodiment of professional distance and callousness that has led single parent self-help groups to emphasize personal interaction and subjective experience. Self-help groups generate their own power from portraying the service they provide as an alternative to traditional social services. A close relationship between the self-help group and the social agency could lead to a reduction in the self-help power base and the co-optation of the self-help leadership. Although both the self-help group and the human service professional may be needed in an integrated human service network, the day when they can both function in a spirit of close cooperation may never come.

If social welfare professionals participate with members of the social movement in formulating position papers and policy statements, professional values may move the ideological core of the movement to a more conservative position. For instance, when the Finer Commission reported the inadequacy of social services for single parents, it recommended a traditional remedy—greater coordination of social welfare services,25 rather than a basic re-thinking of the rationale upon which social services to single parents are based. Also, while the Finer Commission recommended that single parents did not need specialized services for fear
of developing fragmented services, it might be useful politically if members of a single parent movement took a separatist stance and argued for specialized service structures tailored to their unique family status.

For social agencies that have recently shifted from clinical to social change goals, the clinical orientation of social welfare professionals can also present problems in linking with the movement. Social service professionals may be tempted to offer single parents direct service or access to services as part of the negotiation process. Agency professionals may emphasize self-help groups which focus on personal problem-solving or therapeutic goals rather than groups which emphasize social advocacy and social change goals. This "method lag" in agencies that now emphasize social reform can be problematic as agencies attempt to provide assistance to social movements.

Assuming greater acceptance of the norm and if basic social services assumptions are not under attack, there are many areas of agency and professional expertise and power that would be useful to leaders of a single parent movement. Knowledge about group development, identification of self-help members who would make good leaders, and the use of agency facilities may be needed and shared after the movement has developed. Interrelationships are much more problematic in the earlier stages of social reform.

CONCLUSION

In this paper we have briefly explored the theoretical dimensions of social movements and the possible consistency between these dimensions and the characteristics of social welfare agencies. We have found that the more obvious advantages of an agency's interrelationship with a social movement exist after the movement had gained a degree of social acceptance rather than in the initial stages of social reform. Furthermore, participation by social service professionals depends upon the degree to which traditional social service assumptions and practices come under attack.

In the initial stages of a movement, the social agency professional must be a sensitive diagnostician of social processes and be able to recognize a willingness on the part of potential members of the movement to participate in substantial social change. Since it is impossible to predict the beginning of a social movement with any certainty, the service professional should be allowed to pursue a number of social issues which could conceivably develop into reform movements. The social agency must maintain a low profile in laying the foundation for the later development of a connection between the agency and the movement. Assuming this is possible, staff of the agency can assist in the organization of consumer groups and in the planning and documentation of incidents and events that call attention to the movement and the unequal societal treatment given to its members. Agency board members and professional staff would most likely offer more support under conditions of rapid
societal change as the generalized beliefs of the movement gain acceptance and develop into an emerging norm and when basic assumptions of social work practice are not being challenged.

After a social movement gets off the ground, service professionals will find members of the reform movement engaging in some familiar processes such as building a formal organization and establishing some division of labor among its membership. Members of the movement might be advised to seek agency expertise, provided that staff of the welfare organization recognize how the organizational structure of a reform movement differs from the structure of a traditional social agency. Bureaucratization would interfere with the need for rapid social change. Social agency staff could also provide the movement with needed community support, introduce the members of the movement to the use of mass media, assist in the development of value statements and action platforms, and provide leadership training.

On the other hand, we wonder if social welfare organizations which often pride themselves on rational social planning and planned social change can participate with flexibility and freedom in a social process that is more art than science. Traditional social agencies may not be willing to risk radical social change, participation in violent or illegal social action, or the questioning of basic assumptions of social work practice. Human service professionals who are more expert at diagnosing client rather than system problems would be less effective at advancing a particular cause. However, we must recognize that the burden of overcoming these incongruities between social agencies and social reform movements should rest with the social work profession and the social service agencies. After all, it is the profession and the agencies, not the membership of social reform movements, who have recently reemphasized social action and social reform goals.
NOTES

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HISTORIC TRENDS IN THE DELIVERY
OF SERVICES TO TEENAGE PARENTS

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ABSTRACT

This paper will examine the political, social, and economic fac-
tors which underlie the transition in services from unwed mothers to
teenage parents over the past 15 years. The experience of agencies in
the Boston area serves as the basis for this case study. Data have
been collected from open-ended interviews with key service providers
who have developed and implemented policy related to adolescent
parents.

The findings indicate that, prior to 1960, agencies were respond-
ing to what was perceived as individual problems or circumstances. Il-
legitimacy was thought to be an unconscious attempt by white middle
class women to fulfill psychological needs. The rediscovery of poverty
resulting in the expansion of human services, and the declining utili-
zation of maternity homes due to changing social attitudes relative to
abortion and childbearing led to the creation of comprehensive service
programs for adolescent parents. Unlike their predecessors, these pro-
grams were designed to serve a younger, black population that planned
to keep its infants. The reorganization of the service system, how-
ever, still failed to address the problem of white working class ado-
lescents who comprise the greatest number of teenage parents.

The last 15 years have witnessed the creation of a vast array of
specialized services for pregnant adolescents. Prior to the develop-
ment of such programs, little help was available to this group. Some
youthful pregnant girls found assistance in the maternity homes that
worked cooperatively with child welfare agencies. These programs were,
however, designed to provide shelter for a group of largely white,
middle class, past-adolescent women who had become pregnant out-of-wed-
lock. Casework services at these homes sought to encourage the mothers
to release their infants for adoption so they could be raised in a more
advantageous environment and the mothers could resume their "normal
life course" following delivery. Since most of the residents were over
In marked contrast, the 1960's and 1970's saw the development of comprehensive service programs specifically designed for pregnant girls who were still of school age and who in most cases planned to keep their children. School age mothers had been found to be at greater risk than women who bore their children later in life (Klerman and Jekel, 1973; Furstenburg, 1976; Presser, 1978). These young women and their children suffered worse medical outcomes. They typically dropped out of school, and they were faced with the problems of completing their own adolescence while raising a young child. As a result, the comprehensive service programs offered a combination of medical, educational and social services throughout the prenatal period to help alleviate the consequences of adolescent childbearing.

In order to explain this shift in service delivery it is necessary to consider what happened during the sixties that resulted in the redefinition of three aspects of the service delivery system: (1) of the problem, from illegitimacy to adolescent parenthood; (2) of the service population from white middle class young women who planned to place their infants for adoption to low income, primarily minority, adolescents who plan to raise their own children; and (3) of the service needs, from intensive casework around the issues of loss and fulfillment to a comprehensive approach including medical, educational, and social services.

Certainly one factor which led to these changes was the rapid increase in the number of pregnancies and deliveries to school age women (Baldwin, 1976). Much of the current literature on teenage pregnancy has placed the main issues of the field in the context of changing demographic trends. It is common for articles to begin with a statistical description of patterns of adolescent sexuality and reproduction. A publication of the Allan Guttmacher Institute (1976) goes so far as to speak of adolescent pregnancy as an "epidemic". While such studies adequately document the extent of need, they do not explain the shape services take at a particular time. If one is to understand both the development of new models of services to school-age parents and the problems for which solutions still must be found, it is necessary to look beyond demographic changes and to examine the impact of social movements.

It is the contention of this paper that the black protests in the sixties and the women's movement both shaped the response to the rapid
increase in the number of adolescents bearing children. Black protests greatly influenced the redefinition both of the problem and of the population which was to receive the newly defined comprehensive services; further, the women's movement helped to create new options for those women who had previously gone to maternity homes to conceal an out-of-wedlock pregnancy. A review of the situation also demonstrates that one group is still not receiving comprehensive services. These are white, working class adolescents whose births far outnumber those of blacks. Similarly, their exclusion from the service sector must be analyzed in terms of these two social movements.

BLACK PROTEST

By 1960, the economic and social dislocation which had begun during the preceding decades had been brought forcefully to the attention of the American public. Books such as Harrington's *The Other America* not only documented the extent of poverty in the United States, but also demonstrated the association between poverty and race. Over a 20-year period more than one quarter of the black population had migrated from the South to Northern industrial cities. During the same period, black unemployment rose to a level two times greater than white.

The dislocation of black families was also marked by growing social unrest. Following the 1954 Supreme Court decision in *Brown v. the Board of Education*, the civil rights movement developed a strong, active base in the South. By the early sixties, the movement had come North. The ghetto protests started with demonstrations against disparities in social conditions and ended in several summers of rioting.

The government responded to the growing disturbances with social legislation. The programs sought to address economic and social inequities by attacking what were perceived as the psychological and social factors causing poverty. First, programs such as Head Start were designed to alter the social conditions which reinforced an individual psychology of poverty. Second, efforts such as the Community Action Programs addressed the institutional practices which sustained individual dependence on the social system.

Pregnant adolescents were viewed as victims of the poverty cycle and welfare colonialism. Adolescent parenthood was believed to be one of the factors which reinforced the frustration and apathy associated with ghetto life. Campbell's (1968) often quoted statement about the certainty of an adolescent mother's future is an excellent example of this fact:
"The girl who has an illegitimate child at the age of 16 suddenly has 90 percent of her life's script written for her. She will probably drop out of school, even if someone else in her family helps to take care of the baby; she will probably not be able to find a steady job that pays enough to provide for herself and her child; she may feel impelled to marry someone she might not otherwise have chosen. Her life choices are few, and most of them are bad. Had she been able to delay the first child, her prospects might have been quite different..." (p. 238)

In addition, the pregnant adolescent was confronted with nonresponsive social institutions. Social service agencies were uninterested in adolescent mothers who planned to keep their children because they did not conform to the psychological theory which guided their work (Morisey, 1970). School policy, whether official or sub rosa, was to exclude pregnant girls from the classroom because the schools were not prepared to cope with the issue of teenage sexuality (Howard, 1972). And out-patient obstetrical clinics of busy city hospitals did not have the time to provide the supportive services teenagers needed (DeVise, 1969).

The development of the Webster School in Washington, D.C. in 1963 heralded a new approach to adolescent pregnancy (Howard, 1968). Like the anti-poverty programs, comprehensive service programs such as the Webster School were designed to overcome the personal and institutional barriers which confronted pregnant adolescents who for the most part, were low income and black. In practice, this meant that the young women received extended prenatal care to decrease medical risk; continued schooling to achieve economic self sufficiency; and emotional support to sustain them during a potential period of crisis.

The situation in Boston followed this developmental model. The impetus for organizing the city's first comprehensive service program came from a social worker at the Boston City Hospital, located in the black ghetto. The worker noticed that the prenatal clinic was serving a large number of adolescents who had been excluded from Boston schools. Working with a local social service agency and eventually the Boston School Department, she was able to organize CENTAUM, a program for pregnant adolescents which received funds in 1963 from the Office for Economic Opportunity. In a pattern which paralleled programs in many other communities, CENTAUM utilized the resources of several agencies to organize an alternative situation where a young woman could receive medical, educational and social services throughout the prenatal period.
The services organized in Boston subsequent to CENTAUM reflected the same pattern in terms of the scope of the problem and the population to be served. In 1969, funds from the Legal Enforcement Assistance Act were used to organize the Kennedy Home, a residential program for twelve adolescent mothers, who had been adjudicated delinquent, and their infants. The purpose of the home was to teach the mothers alternative life styles while providing a healthy environment for the infants during their first year of life.

The third Boston program which received funds from the Massachusetts Department of Education was also organized by a staff member of the Boston City Hospital. This program was developed for high risk adolescents who fell between the cracks of the service system. They were not "attractive" to the traditional social service agencies because they planned to keep their children, and they were not eligible for CENTAUM because they had already dropped out of school. This program, like CENTAUM and the Kennedy Home, provided an alternative structure for adolescents primarily from the black community.

Despite the obvious need for their services, none of these three programs survived. After a few years of serving relatively large numbers of young women, the Boston City Hospital withdrew support from CENTAUM, declaring that it was the responsibility of the Boston School System. Eventually, CENTAUM was absorbed by one of the programs described in the following section of the paper. The Kennedy Home ceased operating in 1973 due to fiscal mismanagement by its sponsoring agency. The Boston City Hospital program for high risk teens was not refunded by the Department of Education because it appeared to duplicate the services offered by CENTAUM.

Although these initial programs did not endure in the following years, new comprehensive programs which reflected subsequent changes in social policy were organized to take their place. During the sixties, the problem of adolescent pregnancy had been redefined as a result of growing Black protest and the policy of the Great Society. It was no longer the stigma of illegitimacy which concerned the social planners, but rather the contribution of adolescent parenthood to the poverty cycle and the inability of the service system to meet the needs of the population at risk. Black teenagers appeared to suffer the worst consequences in terms of poor medical outcomes, incomplete education and unstable social relations. The government had responded to newly perceived needs of the black community with a series of social action programs, including comprehensive service programs for school-age parents. These programs had ultimately been designed to ameliorate, if not alleviate, the consequences of poverty.
WOMEN'S MOVEMENT

While black protest influenced the redefinition of social problems and therefore the scope of services and population at risk, the women's movement must be examined to determine how young women from the white middle class who had formerly used maternity homes, coped with unwanted pregnancies. Their withdrawal from the social service sector is closely associated with the changing economic and social conditions which gave rise to women's liberation and ultimately to another method of responding to an unwanted pregnancy. The women's movement reemerged in the sixties out of an awareness of the subjugation of women in American society. Although women were becoming increasingly more active in the labor force, they were continually confronted by discriminatory practices in employment opportunities and wages. Not only did women find themselves exploited in the workplace, but they also became sensitive to the exploitation in their daily lives. The traditional roles of wife, child raiser, and housekeeper were perceived as ways in which women were oppressed, isolated, and infantilized.

Female activists believed that the strengths and skills of women were not being recognized. Through collective action, they felt they could achieve the changes which were important to their lives. Although women were divided between the liberal feminists, who were attempting to overcome the barriers that kept women from competing economically and politically with men, and the women's liberationists, who called for more sweeping change in terms of the social relations which shaped existing institutions, these two groups were united on the question of abortion rights. Their protest took the form of lobbying, demonstrations, and underground networks for women seeking illegal abortions.

As in the case of the ghetto revolts, the government slowly responded to the growing pressures of the women's movement. In 1967, Colorado liberalized its abortion law. In 1970, New York and Washington, D.C. both legalized abortion upon demand. Finally, in 1973, the Supreme Court ruled that states could not interfere with a woman's right to an abortion up to the age of viability.

Initially it was white middle class women who were most affected by the Supreme Court's decision. Members of this group had formed the backbone of the women's movement and the protest for the legalization of abortion. These women who had economically been able to utilize the services of the maternity homes or secure illegal abortions, could now seek them legally. Several studies have shown that white college
educated women are more likely to terminate an unwanted pregnancy by abortion than are non-white, non-college educated women (Moore and Caldwell, 1976; Rosen, 1976). This pattern has been reinforced by current legislation which prohibits the use of federal funds for all abortion related activity (CARASA, 1979).

Although there are no accurate figures regarding the utilization of abortion services in Boston, several factors suggest that they serve a large portion of white middle class women. Three of the four free standing abortion clinics are located in middle class neighborhoods: Two in Brookline, a white suburb adjacent to Boston, and one in Boston's most fashionable shopping district. Also, these clinics have continually resisted serving Medicaid patients. Their arguments are based on inadequate fees, slow payment, and excessive requirements for documentation.

The legalization of abortion services undermined the basis of the maternity homes by creating a new option for adolescent and young women confronted with an out-of-wedlock pregnancy. The decline in maternity home utilization in Boston, following the legalization of abortion in New York is well documented. The number of residents in the homes operated by the Salvation Army, the Crittenton Hastings House and the Catholic Archdiocese dropped by one half to three quarters. The child welfare agencies saw a similar decline in the number of infants placed for adoption.

Confronted with this decline, the homes reevaluated their role in the provision of services to unwed mothers. The Salvation Army changed its focus entirely and used its Booth Home as a center for juvenile offenders. Crittenton Hastings House and the Catholic Archdiocese independently decided to concentrate most of their staff and funds on the operation of day programs for pregnant adolescents from the inner city, while maintaining their residential programs on a smaller scale. Since the women's movement had effectively created a new option for the management of out-of-wedlock pregnancy among their former white middle class clients, these agencies moved in the direction urged by the federal government and advocacy agencies. They redefined their purposes, their target population, and their services and created comprehensive service programs for a population consisting largely of black pregnant teenagers who planned to keep their babies.
PROBLEMS STILL TO BE RESOLVED

While comprehensive service programs in Boston and elsewhere seem to serve primarily minority and poverty group adolescents, and abortion clinics apparently manage the needs of the white middle class adolescents and young women, few programs address the needs of a group which can be loosely characterized as the white working class. Granted, the working class was not politically visible during the sixties when social services were realigned and therefore, may have been disregarded in the development of new social service models. However, because births to white teenagers far exceed in number those to blacks, this group cannot continue to be ignored. In Massachusetts in 1970, there were 8,705 births to white women 19 years and under and 1,091 births to black women in this age cohort, even though the black birth rate exceeds that of the whites (Annual Report of Vital Statistics, 1970).

The literature on school age parents pays little attention either to the paucity of white working class adolescents in comprehensive service programs or to the ways in which this group meets the needs of adolescent pregnancy. Apparently, social services are available, although differing in quality, both to those who are capable of purchasing them out of pocket and to those who are subsidized by third party payments. Those persons, however, who support themselves but are "social service indigent" find it difficult to obtain essential services. Both the social service agencies and the abortion clinics, for example, initially served middle class women who could afford to purchase services, and later provided services to low income blacks who were subsidized by the State.

It appears that working class families have learned to care for their own pregnant adolescents without the aid of supportive services. This decision seems to reflect the working class' attitude towards social services. Mayer and Timms (1970) found that working class women only sought services if their informal networks proved inadequate. Even then they were not satisfied with the insight oriented therapy provided by the social welfare agencies because their problems seemed to be rooted in their financial situation, and not their psyches. Working class attitudes towards social services can also be seen in the current movements which oppose further expansion of the welfare state. The anti-busing and anti-abortion groups have both found their leadership within the working class.
CONCLUSIONS

Any evaluation of the trends in providing services to teenage parents must view both the inclusion of low income blacks in service programs and the legalization of abortion as positive expansions of the human service system. The continued exclusion of the working class from the service system, however, must be seen as a failure to meet the needs of a major social group. Unfortunately, very little is known either about the reasons for their exclusion or the ways in which they cope with adolescent pregnancy and parenting. Research must be directed toward determining the needs of these young people and programs acceptable to their life styles must be developed. Their large numbers make it impossible to ignore them and still claim to be making progress in ameliorating the problems of adolescent parenthood.

NOTES

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REFERENCES


CALL FOR PAPERS

SYMPOSIUM SECTION ON SPOUSE ABUSE IN THE
JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL WELFARE

Spouse abuse, or as it is referred to as, wife battering, has become an issue of increasing public attention and scientific inquiry during the last five years. Sociologists, psychologists, and social workers have begun the difficult task of unravelling the causes and effects of spouse abuse. It is the intent of this "section" in the Journal to present an up-to-date "state of the art" account of current research, theory building, and/or intervention efforts.

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