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Child-Care Usage Patterns as Estimates of Child-Care Need.  
NANCY HENDRIX
THE SELF DISCLOSURE OF CLINICAL SOCIAL WORKERS

Herman Borenzweig

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
SCHOOL OF SOCIAL WORK

Introduction

My interest in this study arose from what I believed to be the discrepancy between the conventional wisdom about self disclosure and its occurrence in the practice of clinical social work. Bradmiller's study, one of the few studies about self disclosure in the practice of social work, found that persons with masters degrees in social work (MSW's) disclose significantly more to their colleagues than do undergraduate social work majors. The MSW's in Bradmiller's study self disclosed to clients at a lesser rate than they did to other target persons. Bradmiller interprets her study, "........ most simply as an indication that social workers are not knowledgeable about the use of self disclosure in the helping relationship."

In the State of California, however, there is a surplus of experimentation with many modes of implementing psychotherapeutic services. Some of these advocate and practice plentiful
self disclosure. Some clinical social workers practice within these self disclosing theoretical models. Different theoretical models spell out a range of clinicians' self disclosure from its being forbidden to its being a key ingredient of the therapeutic interaction. "The controversy over self disclosure," says Weiner,³ "has polarized about a continuum from the "nude" position to the 'neutral' position". The Marathon group therapist can exemplify the 'nude' position while the Rogerian (Carl Rogers himself has departed from this position)⁴ can exemplify the 'neutral' position. While Freud was closer to the neutral position, Weiner⁵ cites examples of Freud's self disclosure. Freud's willingness to disclose about himself was tempered by his belief that if the friendly relations between patient and therapist overstep a certain boundary, this will work against therapy.⁶ It has been reported⁷ that in his later analyses of patients, Freud was unable to speak because of the prosthetic device that had replaced the part of his jaw that was removed because it was cancerous—he could merely nod un uhs—and this was interpreted by some of his followers to mean that the therapist should say as little as possible.

My subjective impression of the "oughts" of more orthodox psychoanalysis continues to be one of a paucity of self disclosure. Similarly, the Freudian and Ego psychological influences upon social work would lead one to assume that most clinical social workers would also tend to minimize self disclosure.

Hamilton,⁸ established a norm for self disclosure in case work with the following words:
Personal questions directed towards the interviewer may indicate interest in the worker—a growing sense of relationship, but perhaps more often they represent an area of emotional concern—a way of projecting one's own problem onto the worker. The client asks personal questions about the interviewer which indicate uncertainties about himself. They may be answered simply and quietly and so disposed of, but often it is best to turn the question back so as to see what was really the client's idea when asking them. In therapeutically focused interviews this is almost always necessary. It does not really help or reassure a client to know about the interviewer, who is there to understand and help him. The worker must keep in mind that his purpose is professional and should gently recall the client into the appropriate relationship—"I think I can help you best if you will go on with what you were just saying," or something of that sort. Inexperienced workers who have let the interviewing ball go into the net often take refuge in personal chat. This deflects the professional purpose and confuses the client. This is not to say that at the beginning of an interview or when making a visit "small talk" may not take place in a friendly way, but one should proceed as rapidly as possible to the business of the interview......
Hamilton's quote is the only explicit one the researcher could find in the social case work literature about self disclosure. It is for this reason I have repeated it so extensively. However, because of the crossfertilization from modes of therapy advocating increased self disclosure, its rate among social workers has also probably increased. I gathered this impression attending workshops, listening to colleagues present their cases for consultation, and reading books and papers about self disclosure.

The study, therefore, attempts to assess the current quality and quantity of self disclosure of clinical social workers in the State of California. The implications of the findings for the practice of clinical social work will be discussed in the concluding section of this paper.

Methodology

Previous research about therapist self disclosure listed the following categories of disclosure: demographic; personal information; similar experiences; disagreements with a client's stated position; "here and how" aspects of the therapeutic encounter. The research also suggested that the timing of self disclosure needed study. A questionnaire was constructed to assess the above mentioned categories and the timing of self disclosure by clinical social workers.

As of September 1979, the population of clinical social workers in the State of California was 5,979. The questionnaire was mailed to a random sample of 200 clinical social workers.
By the closing date of return 81 or 40% of our sample returned the completed questionnaires. Given this return rate, despite the randomness of our sample, it is safer that our findings and conclusions be utilized to describe how persons in our sample self disclosed rather than our findings and conclusions be generalized to all clinical social workers in the State of California.

The questionnaire contained fourteen questions about specific content areas of clinicians' self disclosure that required rating on a five point scale: always, often, sometimes, rarely, never. These specific content areas of clinicians' self disclosure are listed in Table 2.1. The questionnaire also contained opened ended questions about the quality and quantity of clinical self disclosure per se, as well as the timing and perceived effectiveness of disclosures. Face sheet information--age, ethnicity, marital status, years since obtaining the masters degree, years of employment as a social worker since graduation, present work setting, theoretical frame of reference, as well as other similar information found listed on Table 2.3.---was also solicited by the questionnaire. All the face sheet variables (independent) were crosstabulated via a Chi square test with our fourteen questions about the content of clinicians self disclosure (dependent variables). A new variable was constructed for each respondent by adding up the total score for the fourteen content areas of clinicians self disclosure. The sample was then divided at the median into high and low self disclosures; these groups were also crosstabulated with all the independent variables. Throughout the statistical analysis the .05 level of probability was utilized. Henceforth the findings of this statistical part of the study will be distinguished from the responses to the open ended
Findings

Statistical Findings

Tables 1.1 through 1.7 describe the characteristics of our sample. An additional statistical test of the proportion of males in our sample (38.7%) when compared with the proportion of males in social work in the United States (37%)\(^{12}\) revealed no statistically significant difference. This test was performed to ascertain that at least the distribution of sexes in our sample compared favorably with the distribution of the sexes in the profession as a whole. While Anglo Americans and Jewish Americans constituted 87.6% of our sample, the percentages for the minority clinicians were: Mexican American 2.5%; Other Hispanic American 1.2%; Afro American 3/7%; Asian American 2.5%. Given the higher proportion of these minority groups in Los Angeles alone, one can surmise an underrepresentation of minority persons in the sample.

In Table 1.4 medians were listed for those variables that served as the independent variables for the median test that was performed with our dependent variables—the fourteen categories of clinicians' self disclosure (These are listed on Table 2.1 through 2.3).

It is interesting to note that with the exception of a few variables, most of our sample answered that they would sometimes
self disclose about the categories of self disclosure listed in Tables 2.1 through 2.3. The frequency distributions of the data led the researcher to believe that the later crosstabulations would reveal few statistically significant differences. The writer's hunch proved to be correct. More will be said about the crosstabulations that were significant in the next paragraphs.

Crosstabulations

Because of the preponderance of "sometime" answers in response to the frequency of self disclosure about the fourteen categories of clinicians self disclosure that was our dependent variable, an adjustment was made in performing the median test. Usually one would leave out the responses to the answer "sometime" and combine the "always" "often answers indicating high self disclosure and combine the "rarely" "never" answers indicating low self disclosure. If the writer had left out the "sometime" answers there would be too small an N and too many of the cells of the Chi square test would have been less than five, rendering any statistical results questionable. Since one previous study reported that moderate and low self reporting therapists tended to be viewed similarly by clients since it is acceptable research practice, and since the writer wanted to see how strong self disclosure was in our sample, throughout the crosstabulations the "sometime" answers were combined with the "rarely" and "never" answers to form our low self disclosure variable. The procedure just described biased the results against high self disclosure. Therefore, only in those areas where self disclosure was strongest would a statistically significant relation occur.
The results of crosstabulating eleven independent and fourteen dependent variables plus the summary score for the fourteen dependent variables are listed in Table 2.3. The reader will observe that the crosstabulations confirmed the writer's original hunch stimulated by the frequency distributions. Most of the sample was similar in self disclosure responses; most of the crosstabulations were not statistically significant. The meaning of the significant findings are to be found in Table 2.3 and the Notes to Table 2.3.

There were only three categories of clinical social workers' self disclosure where there was not even one statistically significant relationship between the dependent and the independent variables (Table 2.3). Regardless of age, sex, ethnicity, date of birth, etc., the persons in our sample tended to be similar in their self disclosure about their age, previous work experience, and professional reactions to their clients. There was at least one statistically significant relationship for each of the twelve remaining categories of clinical social workers' self disclosure. The reader will notice (Table 2.3) that the therapist's religious orientation emerges as an almost taboo area of self disclosure. This is followed closely by the therapist's sexual orientation, and, the clinicians' sharing with their clients any information about a death in their families. Looking at the columns of Table 2.3, the reader will observe that one's theoretical orientation related significantly to clinicians' self disclosure about their sexual orientation or a death in their families. Clinical social workers with more of a Freudian orientation tended to disclose less to their clients about their political, sexual, and personal orientations. Also, clinical social workers who received their masters degree in social work prior to and including the year
1967 were compared with persons who received their degrees after 1968. Both groups were significantly low in self disclosing about their sexual and religious orientations. On all variables (Summary score of 14 items), as one might expect, Freudian oriented clinicians tended to be lower in self disclosure when compared with clinicians whose orientation was somewhat other than Freudian.

The earnings of the clinician made a difference for any variables (Table 2.3; Notes Table 2.3). Upper income professionals were more apt to disclose about marital status; family composition; death in the family; and on all fourteen categories (Summary score of 14 items). Lower income clinicians were more prone to self disclosing about their place of birth than upper income clinicians. Both high and low earners didn't want to share any information about their personal finances with their clients. While higher earners had a higher self disclosure index score, females and Freudians tended to have a low self disclosure index score.

The implications of the statistical findings as well as the implications of the responses to the open ended questions, the next section of this paper, will be discussed in the concluding paragraphs of the paper.

Phenomenological Findings

It is important to remind the reader that the responses to the open ended questions lack statistical significance. They merely describe how persons in our sample responded to the open ended questions about self disclosure,
Clinicians in our sample were divided about their own utilization of self disclosure as indicated by their responses to most of the issues raised by the open ended questions. Some patterns emerged. Clinical social workers were reluctant to self disclose if they felt that by doing so they would be yielding to client manipulations. Workers were particularly concerned about the client avoiding therapy by provoking them to self disclose. A consistent theme emanating from most of our respondents was that the clinician had to be aware of both clients' motives for eliciting workers' self disclosure and their own motives for disclosing. Only one respondent in our sample thought that the clinical social worker should never self disclose.

While some therapists felt more comfortable disclosing when transference was positive, others felt the self disclosure would provoke a positive transference. Some self disclosed only to their healthier clients and were most concerned about self disclosing to psychotic clients. Others reversed this process. While some clinicians believed that self disclosure at the beginning phase of therapy helped to build a therapeutic relationship, others felt the opposite.

The content areas clinical social workers felt most comfortable self disclosing about were as follows. Many therapists talked to their clients about some of their own problems with loneliness, the single life, aging, and other developmental issues of adulthood. Many talked freely about their marital status, the composition of their families, their parenting, their education, and their work. The most significant content area for sharing was grief work around significant losses either through separation, divorce, or death.
Those clinicians who were more positive about the utilization of self disclosure thought about doing so for many reasons. Probably the most important reason given for self disclosing was as a method of universalizing the problem for clients. The self disclosing respondents tended to do so in the middle phase of therapy when clients were more fully engaged and tended to increase the quantity and the quality of self disclosure in the termination phase of therapy when clients were more fully engaged and tended to increase the quantity and the quality of self disclosure in the termination phase of therapy. Therapist trust in their clients was another criteria for self disclosure. Many of our social workers disclosed to clients they felt were similar to themselves. One therapist was quite frank about self disclosing to gain the client's approval. In most instances of self disclosure the motivation was to encourage therapeutic rapport. It was felt that therapist self disclosure would encourage real person, equalitarian relatedness between the clients and clinicians. As one respondent wrote:

I'm not a blank screen; if I'm to be a mirror for them, they're entitled to see my cracks.

Conclusions

The sample of respondents in this study can be described as "guarded' self disclosers. Whether or not this describes the population of clinical social workers for the State of California, given that our return rate of 40% is too small from which to generalize, must be left to others to ascertain. The findings of the study can be viewed as "sensitizing".
Our research should point the conventional wisdom toward accepting that a good deal of self disclosure by the therapist, albeit guarded, takes place in the confines of the clinician's office. If this is so perhaps the findings of this study can be a beginning for helping us develop the proper disciplined utilization of self disclosure in the practice of clinical social work specifically and in social work generally.

It is my conclusion that many of the content areas of low self disclosure reflected the clinicians' reluctance to diminish what they believed to be their charismatic power vis a vis their clients. These content areas include: a death in their family; a minor health problem; sexual, religious, and political orientation; and their own financial status. For many to be too human meant giving up their therapeutic authority and their therapeutic advantage. And yet, those clinicians that self disclosed felt, in congruence with Bradmiller's findings, mentioned at the outset and elsewhere in this paper, that therapists' self disclosure made them more human to their clients and helped to build the therapeutic relationship. An interesting follow up study that could test the validity of self disclosure building therapist-client rapport may be to attempt to assess the outcome results of high and low disclosures. This has been suggested by another study and is once again suggested by the findings of this study.

When therapists felt more secure they tended toward greater self disclosure. Some of the areas they felt more comfortable about included information about the composition of their families, their marital status, and a somewhat higher inclination to disclose about all the categories of self disclosure as determined by the
The open ended questions revealed that all the respondents in our sample, save one, self disclosed. Our respondents were split in their views about the wisdom of self disclosure at each phase of the treatment sequence: beginnings, middles, and endings. Grief, loss, parenting, and the developmental tasks of adulthood emerged as content areas where therapists increased their self disclosure.

Returning to the statistical data, the reader is reminded that only three of our fourteen categories of clinicians' self disclosure failed to crosstabulate statistically significantly with at least one of our independent variables. These three categories were: age, previous work experience, and personal reactions to the client. The other eleven categories crosstabulated statistically significantly with at least one or more of our independent variables (Table 2.3). The reluctance of self disclose about other content areas expressed as percentages of our sample who were reluctant to do so, is illustrated in Table 2.2. Several taboo areas of self disclosure emerge. These are: religious, sexual and political orientation; a death in the clinician's family; and countertransference reaction.

It is my philosophic belief that no content area should remain absolutely taboo for clinicians' self disclosure. One of my reasons for so believing are the studies which report that therapist self disclosure increases client self disclosure and builds therapeutic rapport, both of which are desirable therapeutic
objectives. The other reason for my stance is based upon Jung's approach to therapy. This requires some elaboration.

Jung\textsuperscript{18} viewed the therapy session as an alchemical vessel. Neither therapist nor client could predict what "prima materia" what content consciousness and unconsciousness would bring to that interactional process called the therapeutic interview. Jung\textsuperscript{19} describes how he sat one of his young adult patients on his lap and told her stories, danced with her, and by using these modalities helped her find her way back to health. We clinicians are the heirs of the witch doctors:\textsuperscript{20} it is our task to deal with the dark underside of our society and culture. This latter point is translated into Jung's theory when he states that the first phase of therapy usually consists of the client exploring his or her shadow.\textsuperscript{21} Based upon the research and Jungian theory it is my opinion that no content area of self disclosure should be anathema to the social work clinician.

Let me share with you some of my conclusions about why clinicians failed to self disclose about some of the content areas that persons in our sample viewed as most threatening to them.

Countertransference is usually written about and viewed in its negative aspects by most clinicians. Some authors\textsuperscript{22} offer positive prescriptions for the effective utilization of the therapist's countertransference. It can make clinicians aware that the reactions they are having to their clients may be the same effects their clients induce in others. Given that the expression of countertransference is a form of clinical projection, Jung\textsuperscript{23} warns against being too defended against our projections because oversensitivity to them, "may easily act as an impediment to our
relation with others for there is then no bridge of illusions across which love and hate can stream off so relievingly." Our study seems to contain a contradiction. Countertransference is frowned upon by most of the persons in our sample and yet self disclosure is reported. It can be argued that self disclosure is at least projection and at most countertransference, faulty or not. Given this contradiction it is my belief that the persons in our sample responded to the term countertransference as a dirty word and opted to answer in a manner reflecting their best professional foot forward.

Given the secularism of our society, and given the logical positivist stance of most clinical theories, one could almost predict that our sample would be reluctant to self disclose about their religious beliefs. As reported earlier in this paper, Freud's difficulty in speaking because of the prosthesis on his jaw led his followers to overinterpret his behavior as modelling therapist neutrality. Certainly politics and religion must then become areas where the therapist is reluctant to self disclose. Writing about his analysis with Freud, Wortis reports many conversations where he talked to Freud about Judaism and communism. It is my belief, based upon what fellow clinicians have shared with me in conversation, that clinical social workers increasingly recognize and are beginning to work with the spiritual dilemmas their clients speak about in therapy. With reference to politics and consistent with my theme throughout, politics like any other content put into the alchemical vessel has archetypal meaning for the client's psyche. Political content like any content can be analyzed for its meaning to the client. It is probably the therapists' fear of
revealing too much about their own religious and political preferences, ipso facto their own humanness, that leads them to close off these content areas.

There are many reasons why therapists may withhold information about their sexual orientation. Of course therapists whose sexuality deviates from the societal norms may fear losing their clients if their sexual preferences were known. Similar to what one study\textsuperscript{25} reports about revealing being single to a client, therapists may be concerned that sharing their sexual preference may be viewed as their suggesting personal or sexual relationships with clients. Even those persons in our sample who scored high for self disclosure were wary about indiscriminate self disclosure and were acrupulously concerned that it be in client's behalf. The sexual orientation of the therapist can be approached within similar responsible parameters.

A future conference of Jungian analysis will focus upon money and its role in therapy. Similar to sex first, death second, money seems to be the third taboo subject that will probably emerge from the closet as legitimate content for therapy. Clinicians withholding information about personal finances may be counter-productive. This is probably particularly true if clinicians' reasons for doing so may be to maintain secrecy about how well they are doing if their clients are less affluent than they are, or may be to maintain a pseudo superordinate authority stance if their clients are more affluent than they are.

A theme that may provide an explanatory overview for the avoidance of all the aforementioned topics by clinicians is that they can
be just as much a part of the mass psyche as their clients. This point is not new and has been made earlier by Fromm when he wrote about therapists wittingly or unwittingly becoming the agents of conformity. Jung was concerned about how "Our fearsome Gods have only changed their names: they now rhyme with--ism". The "isms" create a mentality where the individual is perceived to be an anonymous interchangeable member of the collective, a mere contributing unit of a mass organization. And, says Jung, "looked at rationally and from outside, that is exactly what he is, and from this point of view it seems positively absurd to go on talking about the value of the meaning of the individual." By withholding information about themselves in all the content areas just discussed, clinicians reflect how they both conform to the mass psyche and perpetuate it. Their "ism" is a "professionalism" with its concomitant admonition to avoid self disclosing about subjects such as death, sex, politics, and finances. This removes them from meeting the individuated needs of their clients. Such clinicians have come a long way from Freud's admonition to give to society that which is due society and to give to the individual that which is due the individual. It has also come a long way from Freud's practice which included judicious self disclosure. Wortis describes many such examples from his analysis with Freud. The "wolf man" Freud's famous analysand of 1910-1914, recalled several self disclosures made by Freud:

Once during an analytic hour Freud told me that he had just received word that his youngest son had broken a leg skiing, but that luckily it was a mild injury with no danger of lasting damage. Freud went on to say that of his three sons, the youngest was most like him in character and temperament.
In addition Freud once spoke to the "wolf man" about another one of his patients, lent money to the "wolf man", complimented him by saying it would be good if all his pupils could grasp analysis as well as him, and gave his opinion in literature from time to time.

In conclusion this study has confirmed by hunch that clinical social workers self disclose in their practice. One can say that the pendulum has swung back to the self disclosure stance of the early pioneers of the profession. When Jane Addams lived at Hull House her very presence midst her clients, including the laundry she hung out to dry, was the manner in which she self disclosed. When the friendly visitors visited self disclosure by the worker seemed an appropriate tool in helping clients. The neutrality of clinical social workers was a product of poorly applied psychoanalysis. Minuchin writes that when analyzing the transference neurosis was the goal of therapy, neutrality was the appropriate clinical stance; when change in family structure, ipso facto enhanced individual social functioning is the goal of therapy, the active involvement of the therapist is the appropriate clinical stance. Within this stance Minuchin self discloses as an important part of therapy. In addition to Minuchin's theory, theories such as the Existential, Jungian, as well as others also advocate the judicious use of self disclosure by clinicians. We know from previous studies that therapist self disclosure indices client self disclosure. Further research is needed, however, to ascertain the relationship between client self disclosure and the outcome of therapy.

Although I cannot generalize from the random sample in this
study because of the 40% return rate, the study suggests, however, that clinical social workers guardedly self disclose. If it has become an ingredient of therapy in general and clinical social work in particular, it behooves us to develop the appropriate use of self disclosure. If we do it, let us do it well. Beginnings toward such development have been suggested throughout this paper and can also be found in the body of the study from which this paper has been derived.

I close by allowing one of our respondents to speak for himself about the judicious use of self disclosure by clinical social workers. He says:

Overall I view self disclosure like spice in cooking--a little bit goes a long way--and it should embrace not overwhelm. Cooking like therapy is an act that is learned through experience and an unknown quality. Mostly its use is dictated by the situation. One may love garlic but not in cherry pie.

FOOTNOTES


2Ibid.

Ibid. pp. 10-11.

Ibid. p. 11.

Ibid.

Dr. Norman Mirsky, "Talk About Sigmund Freud", University of Southern California, Hiller Foundation, April 9, 1980.


My thanks to Kay Bliss, Michael Griffin, Janice Hazeltine, Sara Jiminez McSweyn, Virginia Tapanes Perrin, and Julie Tutelman for their help in doing this research.

Ibid. Appendix.

My thanks to the Board of Behavioral Science Examiners of the State of California for lending us their mailing list which made this study feasible.


14 Herman J. Loethes, Donald G. McTavish, Descriptive and Inferential Statistics (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc. 1976), p. 549. My thanks to Dr. Barbara Solomon of the University of Southern California, School of Social Work who referred me to this text and helped me with this research problem.


TABLE 1.1: CHARACTERISTICS OF SAMPLE BY SEX

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Percent of Sample</th>
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<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>38.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>60.5</td>
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<td>No Answer</td>
<td>1.2</td>
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<td></td>
<td>100.0</td>
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<td>(N=81)</td>
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TABLE 1.2: CHARACTERISTICS OF SAMPLE BY ETHNICITY

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<tr>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Percent of Sample</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anglo-American</td>
<td>58.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jewish-American</td>
<td>29.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexican-American</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Hispanic-American</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afro-American</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian-American</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australian</td>
<td>1.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>99.9</strong></td>
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<td>(N=81)</td>
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TABLE 1.3: CHARACTERISTICS OF SAMPLE BY MARITAL STATUS

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<th>Marital Status</th>
<th>Percent of Sample</th>
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<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>50.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Single</td>
<td>13.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Divorced</td>
<td>27.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Separated</td>
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<tr>
<td>Living Together</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>100.1</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=81)</td>
<td></td>
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TABLE 1.4: CHARACTERISTICS OF SAMPLE BY YEAR OF BIRTH, MSW CONFERRED, YEARS OF SOCIAL WORK PRACTICE SINCE MSW, YEARS OF CLINICAL PRACTICE, AND EARNINGS FOR THE YEAR 1979.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Range</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Year of Birth</td>
<td>1938 1952 1910</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year MSW Conferred</td>
<td>1968 1976 1947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years of Practice since MSW</td>
<td>10 32 2 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years of Clinical Practice</td>
<td>10 32 2 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earnings for 1979</td>
<td>$20,000 $75,000 $1,500</td>
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### TABLE 1.5: CHARACTERISTICS OF SAMPLE BY WORK SETTING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Work Setting</th>
<th>Percent of Sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Private Practice</td>
<td>19.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Agency</td>
<td>25.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Agency</td>
<td>37.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Institution</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Work Setting</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Answer</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>99.9</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>(N=81)</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 1.6: CHARACTERISTICS OF SAMPLE BY FIELD OF PRACTICE OF WORK SETTING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field of Practice</th>
<th>Percent of Sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mental Health</td>
<td>60.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family &amp; Child Services</td>
<td>19.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Work Education</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Organization/Public Administration</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Field of Practice</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Answer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>99.8</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>(N=81)</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 1.7: CHARACTERISTICS OF SAMPLE BY PSYCHOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IN CLINICAL PRACTICE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Psychological Orientation</th>
<th>Percent of Sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Freudian-Based</td>
<td>32.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ego Psychological</td>
<td>23.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rogerian/Client-Centered</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Behavioral</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eclectic</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Behavioral &amp; Ego Psychological</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Orientations</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Answer</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.2</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>(N=81)</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### TABLE 2.1: CATEGORIES OF THERAPIST SELF-DISCLOSURE AND DEGREE OF WILLINGNESS TO SHARE THIS INFORMATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category of Therapist Self-Disclosure</th>
<th>Percent of Therapists</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>always / often / sometimes / rarely / never / no answer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marital Status</td>
<td>35.8 / 27.2 / 25.9 / 7.4 / 2.5 / 1.2</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Composition of Family</td>
<td>29.6 / 23.5 / 23.5 / 18.5 / 3.7 / 1.2</td>
<td>99.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Orientation</td>
<td>8.6 / 6.2 / 18.5 / 28.4 / 35.8 / 2.5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minor Health Problem</td>
<td>13.6 / 7.4 / 43.2 / 23.5 / 11.1 / 1.2</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Orientation</td>
<td>17.3 / 6.2 / 27.2 / 30.9 / 17.3 / 1.2</td>
<td>100.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>24.7 / 17.3 / 37.0 / 16.0 / 3.7 / 1.2</td>
<td>99.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Finances</td>
<td>1.2 / 4.9 / 11.1 / 23.5 / 56.8 / 2.5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Place of Birth</td>
<td>30.9 / 16.0 / 30.9 / 16.0 / 4.9 / 1.2</td>
<td>99.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexual Orientation</td>
<td>23.5 / 4.9 / 23.5 / 16.0 / 30.9 / 1.2</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous Wk Experience</td>
<td>32.1 / 24.7 / 34.6 / 7.4 / 1.2 / 0.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Death in Family</td>
<td>18.5 / 13.6 / 28.4 / 24.7 / 12.3 / 2.5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countertransference reaction</td>
<td>2.5 / 8.6 / 19.8 / 38.3 / 27.2 / 2.7</td>
<td>100.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional reaction</td>
<td>18.5 / 39.5 / 28.4 / 8.6 / 1.2 / 3.7</td>
<td>99.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal reaction</td>
<td>3.7 / 19.8 / 34.6 / 29.6 / 9.9 / 2.5</td>
<td>100.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(N=81)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>% of Therapists Always or Often Disclosing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>19.7% Personal Finances</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34.5% Countertransference reaction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35.8% Political Orientation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51.8% Religious Orientation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53.1% Sexual Orientation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60.5% Personal Reaction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63.0% Death in Family</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65.4% Minor Health Problem</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77.8% Composition of Family</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>79.1% Place of Birth</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80.3% Age</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90.1% Marital Status</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90.2% Professional Reaction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91.4% Previous Work Experience</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 2.2**: Categories of Self-Disclosure in Increasing Order of willingness to disclose.
Key:  NS = No Significant; SL = Significant in the Direction of Low Self Disclosure; SH = Significant in the Direction of High Disclosure.

**TABLE 2.3: CROSS-TABULATION OF CHARACTERISTICS OF SAMPLE AND CATEGORIES OF SELF DISCLOSURE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics of Sample</th>
<th>Worker's Sex / Ethnicity / Marital Status / Date of Birth / Yr MSW / Yrs Wk / Yrs Wk / Bar / Theo / Work / Practice Setting Since MSW Since MSW</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marital Status</td>
<td>NS  NS  SH1  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  SH2  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Composition of Family</td>
<td>NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  SL3  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Orientation</td>
<td>NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minor Hith Prob.</td>
<td>NS  NS  NS  SL  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Orientation</td>
<td>NS  NS  NS  SL4  SL5  SL6  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Finances</td>
<td>NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  SL7  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Place of Birth</td>
<td>NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexual Orientation</td>
<td>NS  NS  NS  SL8  NS  NS  NS  NS  SL9  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous Wk: Experience</td>
<td>NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Death in Family</td>
<td>NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counter-Transference Reaction</td>
<td>NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  SL10  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional Reaction</td>
<td>NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Reaction</td>
<td>NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  SL12  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary score of 14 items</td>
<td>SL13  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  SL14  SL15  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 81  P ≤ .05
NOTES: TABLE 2.3:

1--with married more disclosing
2--with upper income more disclosing
3--with upper income more disclosing
4--early degree holders more disclosing
5--with those more experienced more disclosing
6--with those more experienced more disclosing
7--with lower income more disclosing
8--with early degree more likely to disclose
9--with non-Freudians more disclosing
10--with upper income more disclosing
11--with non-Freudians more disclosing
12--with non-Freudians more disclosing
13--with males more disclosing
14--with upper income more disclosing
15--with non-Freudians more disclosing
CALL FOR PAPERS

Articles and essays are now being solicited for a forthcoming issue (late 1982) on "The Political Economy of Social Work." Possible topics include (but are not limited to): the class character of social work in the United States; the position of social work in the U.S. occupational hierarchy; the social worker's role as producer in the political economy; the influence of political economic factors on (a) the nature, purpose and structure of social work services; (b) the nature of social work method; (c) the nature of social work education; (d) the definition of the knowledge base of social work practice; the impact of ideology on the social work profession, social work services or social work education; and the organization of social workers as workers.

Papers should not exceed 18-20 typed, double-spaced pages in length and should use standard citation and bibliographic notation. Please send three (3) copies of papers to Dr. Stanley Wenocur and Dr. Michael Reisch
School of Social Work & Community Planning
University of Maryland at Baltimore
525 West Redwood Street
Baltimore, Maryland 21201

The deadline for receipt of papers is December 31, 1981.

Please address all inquiries to Drs. Wenocur and Reisch at the above address.
ABUSERS OF CLIENTS OF WOMEN'S SHELTER:
THEIR SOCIALIZATION AND RESOURCES

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ABSTRACT

This is a study of men who abuse women. The respondents were residents of a shelter for battered wives during 1977-1978. The study assesses the effect of the abusers' social resources and socialization experiences on their use of violence against the respondents. Abusers with military experience and criminal records used a greater number of different types of violence against their victims than their counterparts without these socialization experiences, and the relationships are specified by the abusers' socioeconomic resources.

The number of shelters for battered women in the United States is growing. Marshal and his colleagues (1979: 14) estimate that while there were less than 10 shelters throughout the country by the end of 1974, by 1979 there were 79 shelters. Since 1979 this growth has continued, a result in part of the assistance now available to shelters from federal agencies concerned with various aspects of domestic violence (CETA, LEAA, Social Security Programs) (Kremen, 1979: 92), as well as from state and local governments and private and corporate gifts and contributions. Nevertheless, in spite of this large outlay of funds and heightened social concerns, we know very little about the abusers of battered women who come to shelters. It is the purpose of this short note to begin to study some of these men by assessing the effect of social resources and socialization experiences on their use of violence against their wives.

A number of scholars have observed that the recourse to violence in family relationships is more likely to occur when individuals are exposed to its use: socialized as to how and when violence is effective and indoctrinated with justifications for its exercise as well as sensitized to situations that are thought to demand it (Straus, 1978). Sprey, for instance, notes (1975: 66: see also
Brown, 1974: 265) that mere physical strength can be expected to be more of a resource in families in which its application to solve conflicts is not culturally prohibited than in their counterparts.

Goode (1971; see also Steinmetz and Straus, 1974) also suggests that domestic violence by men against women can be thought of as a resource whose probable use is conditioned by the extent to which other social resources—which can be conceived as "bases" for social power in families—are available. In his view, violence is least likely to occur when other resources such as occupational prestige, a steady job, education, or verbal ability are available (Goode, 1971: 26-32). From Goode's perspective we can expect greater amounts of violence when these types of resources are poorly developed or minimally present.

Some studies support Goode's ideas. Gelles (1972: 122-123) found couples where the husband was a high school dropout had the highest levels of conjugal violence compared to persons in other educational levels. Komarovsky (1967: 366) found the same group to use violence more often in situations of conjugal conflict. O'Brian (1971) concluded that husbands who were educational dropouts at any level of schooling used overt violence more often than other husbands in his sample of divorce applicants. Levinger (1966) found that almost twice as many working-class women as middle-class women indicated physical abuse as a reason for seeking a divorce.

It is the purpose of this paper to test whether or not the effect of these variables is interactive. The impact of the socialization towards violence experienced by these men—such as crime or military service—on their marital relations can be presumed to be mediated, among other things, by their social resources. Violence against their wives can be hypothesized to be more frequent as these other social resources—e.g., occupational prestige, education, work history—decline in the presence of abusers' earlier experiences with violence. Contrarywise, it may be that the effects of such socialization experiences can be neutralized at certain levels of socioeconomic wellbeing.

In view of the preceding remarks, and to test the presumed interactive effect, two hypotheses are examined in this research note: H1: Abusers' occupational prestige, education, and number of weeks worked during the prior year are inversely related to the number of different types of violence used by the abusers against the victims; H2: Abusers with military experiences and criminal records use a greater number of different types of violence against their victims than their counterparts without these experiences (and these relationships are specified by socioeconomic resources).

PROCEDURE

The respondents in this study are adult female victims of conjugal violence temporarily residing in Phoenix House, a shelter for battered women located in Columbus, Ohio. Facts about the abusers are examined with emphasis on their education (highest grade attended), occupational prestige, work experience
The nature of the violence between spouses during the year prior to the incident for which the women came to Phoenix House is assessed so as to study violence patterns during a relatively long period of time. The extent to which the women reportedly experienced different modes of violence—such as pushing, slapping, kicking, and choking—during this prior year form the "range of violence scale" employed in the analysis.¹

The sample is nonrandom. All residents of the shelter during late 1977 and early 1978 were asked to participate in the study on a voluntary basis. Forty-four cases filled the questionnaires in sufficient detail to be used in the analysis. Thus, tests of significance are inappropriate, and are not used in what follows. The emphasis is upon the direction and strength of association among variables as measured by Somers's D (asymmetric).

There are important similarities between the abusers in this study and the population of abusers of clients of women's shelters through the country. The respondents themselves are quite similar in important social and demographic characteristics to the national population of shelter clients (Back et al., 1979: 26-29). As is true for the country as a whole, more than half of the women and their abusers in the sample are under 30. Moreover, the majority are not well educated. Slightly less than half of the abusers do not have a high school education (X = 10.9 years of school). Occupationally, as is the case nationwide for this population, the prestige score of abusers is low, with a mean prestige score of 29.2 (which corresponds to precision machine operatives, salesmen, and wood finishers) (Harris, 1978).²

RESULTS

The first hypothesis is not supported by the results of this study. The relationships between different indicators of socioeconomic status, such as the abuser's occupational prestige, educational achievement, and the number of weeks worked the prior year and the range or variety of violence which the abusers employed against the women are so small as to be negligible (not shown). For instance, the Somers's D for the first of these zero-order relationships (with occupation) is .19—a coefficient which is, contrary to the prediction, both relatively small and positive. Similarly, the corresponding coefficients for education and number of weeks worked by the abusers the year prior to the stay of the women at the shelter are .26 and .02 respectively.

The second hypothesis, however, is partially supported by the results. Of the two zero-order relationships (of abusers's military experiences and criminal records with the variety of violence used by the abusers), the latter is sizeable (Somers's D = .43) and both are in the expected direction; those with criminal records, and to a lesser extent their counterparts with military experiences, tended to use a greater variety of violence.

(TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE)
The relationship of violence and military experience is much weaker (Somers's $D = .15$). This zero-order relationship is specified, however, by the extent of social resources available to the abusers. In support of the second hypothesis, Table 2 A, B, C, shows that abusers tended to use a greater range of violence against the women when they had, both, military experience and low levels of education, occupation and weeks worked.

(A TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE)

A similar specification effect can be observed with the abusers who had a criminal record and low occupational prestige (Table 2D); they too tended to use more different types of violence against the women (Somers's $D = .64$). Contrary to the prediction, however, neither of the other two indicators of social resources (education, weeks worked the prior year) affected the zero-order relationship between the abusers's criminal records and their violence toward the women.

CONCLUSION

We need large representative random samples of the population of shelter users and their abusers to try to replicate the findings of this work that the domestic violence experienced by these women is increased by certain socialization experiences and social deprivations of their abusers. This needed research would also begin the study of a number of other issues such as family power, kin networks, and household structure which would permit the development of appropriate welfare public policies and techniques of therapeutic interventions aimed at the problems of families identified as affected by domestic violence in this segment of the population.
FOOTNOTES

1 The violence scale (CT) proposed by Murray Straus (1979) is ineffective with these data, since there are too many types of violence which are not on Straus's scale, and the ranks are disproportionately assigned. Straus's scale and the range of violence scale which is used in this report, however, are highly correlated (Somers's D = .815 for the previous year). In the range of violence scale, the number of different violent acts are ranked in five categories (0-1, 2-3, 4-5, 6-8, and more than 8). The maximum number of different types of violence experienced by one of the respondents is 14. This scale measures the range of abuse, i.e. the number of different types of abuse experienced by the victim during the year prior to the final incident. A simpler frequency of violence scale is not used since it would necessitate a greater dependence on respondents' recall of their domestic violence during an extended period of time. To minimize this problem they were asked whether or not they experienced various acts of violence instead of how many times they experienced each of these acts.

2 The majority of abusers who worked were employees of private businesses. Four had their own businesses and four were government employees. Eight did not work during the year preceding the incident. Indeed, eleven of the 44 abusers in this study had a disability limiting the type or amount of work they could do. A composite picture of the abuser reveals a rather poorly educated male working for a private company. He has married once, has served in the armed forces and professes a religion. 19 of the 44 abusers have a history of emotional or mental health problems; 21 have criminal records.

The battered women were asked information concerning the abusers parents but the most striking fact is the large number of women who did not know much about their abusers' past. Twenty-seven of the 44 victims did not know if the abusers' parents had been separated, 25 did not know the fathers' highest grade of education, and 24 victims were not aware of this information for the mothers of the abusers. Sixteen of the victims were not aware of their fathers-in-law's occupation. Likewise, 15 of the victims did not know their mothers-in-law's job. One woman in the sample did not know where her husband worked. A study of communication between these couples seems warranted.
Table 1. Military Experience, Criminal Records and Range of Violence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Different Types of Violence (previous year)</th>
<th>Military Experience</th>
<th>Criminal Record</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low 0-1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High 9-14</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somers's D</td>
<td>.154</td>
<td>.429</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cases with missing data excluded from table.
Table 2. Military Experience, Criminal Record, and Range of Violence Under Conditions of High and Low Resources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Different types of violence (previous year)</th>
<th>A. Education</th>
<th>B. Weeks Worked</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Experience</td>
<td>Yes No</td>
<td>Yes No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-3</td>
<td>0 2 0 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-5</td>
<td>0 2 3 0 0 2 3 0 0 2 3 0 0 2 3 0 0 2 3 0 0 2 3 0 0 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-8</td>
<td>2 4 3 2 2 3 5 3 2 3 5 3 2 3 5 3 2 3 5 3 2 3 5 3 2 3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High 9-14</td>
<td>4 1 7 4 7 3 4 1 7 3 4 1 7 3 4 1 7 3 4 1 7 3 4 1 7 3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somers's D</td>
<td>.73333 0.03297 0.48615 0.04615</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Different types of violence (previous year)</th>
<th>C. Occupational Prestige</th>
<th>D. Occupational Prestige</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Experience</td>
<td>Yes No</td>
<td>Yes No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-3</td>
<td>2 1 0 1 0 3 0 1 0 3 0 1 0 3 0 1 0 3 0 1 0 3 0 1 0 3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-5</td>
<td>2 2 1 0 1 3 0 1 1 3 0 1 1 3 0 1 1 3 0 1 1 3 0 1 1 3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-8</td>
<td>3 3 4 2 3 3 2 4 3 3 2 4 3 3 2 4 3 3 2 4 3 3 2 4 3 3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High 9-14</td>
<td>5 2 6 2 6 0 5 3 6 0 5 3 6 0 5 3 6 0 5 3 6 0 5 3 6 0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somers's D</td>
<td>.21296 0.1000 0.63636 0.26389</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cases with missing data excluded from the table.
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ABSTRACT

This article first briefly reviews the history of public housing in the United States since its inception in 1937, noting that growing obsolescence of public housing units, the deterioration of inner-city neighborhoods surrounding public housing projects, racial tensions, and inflation have aggravated public housing problems in recent years. Moreover, public housing tenants are no longer predominantly white, upwardly-mobile, two-parent, working-class families, but predominantly non-white, non-mobile, female-headed, lower-class families. The remainder of the article presents the findings of a 1978 field survey of public housing in the United States conducted by the Department of Housing and Urban Development in preparation for its Public Housing Urban Initiatives Program. This survey revealed the number of "troubled" projects and their major characteristics, identified and explained the principal variables causing these projects to be labeled "troubled," and, finally, assessed the impact of a variety of remedial intervention strategies proposed by HUD field office personnel. The author concludes that, in the balance, the positive aspects of the public housing program in the United States outweigh its negative features. There are problems with inconsistent regulations at the federal level, with site selection, with fraud and crime, with management-tenant relations, and with underfinancing, but the system has also responded fairly well over the past forty years to the demand for low-income housing and to changing tenant expectations in terms of the structure of public housing units and their amenities, besides incorporating new housing technologies and architectural styles.

Since America's public housing program was launched in 1937, approximately 1.5 million units have been built at 10,000 projects which are managed by 2,700 public housing agencies and serve an estimated 3.5 million low-income persons (Jones, Kaminsky, and Roanhouse, 1979). The history of the program can be divided into three distinct periods: 1937-1948, 1949-1974, and 1975 to the present. When the Housing Act of 1937 was passed, 12 to 14 million persons were unemployed and millions more were working at depressed wages. At the same time, new housing starts had fallen to only ten percent of the pre-depression level so that substandard dwelling units constituted a large proportion of the total national housing stock. Consequently, the federal government's objective in the Housing Act of 1937...
was to stimulate the economy by eliminating slums and replacing them with safe, decent, and sanitary low-cost housing in stable, working-class neighborhoods. During and after World War II, existing public housing projects were opened and new ones were constructed for war-industry workers and the families of servicemen. Throughout the first period of its history, 1937-1948, the demand for public housing was high, construction met the demand, and the program was not only financially solvent but socially successful in terms of serving working-class and temporarily poor families, both of which were generally characterized by stable internal relationships.

During the second period of its history, 1949-1974, however, the public housing program in America underwent a drastic change in the sense of becoming the haven for the poorest and least stable segments of the population. First, when slum clearance was introduced with the urban renewal program of 1949, public housing became by law the chief relocation resource for displaced persons and families who could not afford housing in the private market (Bingham, 1975). Secondly, homeownership requirements were liberalized by the Housing Act of 1949 so that lower-middle class families could afford housing in the private sector, reducing or eliminating their demand for public housing. As a consequence, public housing tenants gradually changed from a predominantly white, upwardly-mobile, two-parent, working-class population to a predominantly non-white, poverty-stricken, non-mobile, lower-class population. The issue of the "problem family" began to dominate management concerns, as did the financial squeeze created by increased operating expenses on the one hand and the limited rent-paying ability of poorer tenants on the other.

During the 1950's and 1960's, several other factors combined to produce a negative impact upon public housing: (1) the growing obsolescence of public housing dwelling units; (2) the deterioration of the inner-city neighborhoods surrounding public housing projects; (3) rapid escalation of operating costs due to inflation; and (4) racial tensions and increased crime in and around public housing sites. The crowning blow to public housing, however, was the Housing Act of 1969 which mandated that no public housing tenant would pay more than 25 percent of his/her income for rent, resulting in a shortage of public housing agency revenues which was not immediately compensated for by federal funds. Then, with the federal housing moratorium of 1973, new construction of public housing virtually came to a standstill (Welfeld, 1977).

In 1975, however, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) instituted the Performance Funding System to provide all public housing agencies with the subsidies essential to efficient management, and it framed tenant selection policies designed to ensure a broad range of incomes among the families living in public housing projects. HUD reaffirmed its commitment to public housing in 1978 with the launching of the Public Housing Urban Initiatives Program whose purpose is to enhance the quality of life in the most seriously troubled public housing projects. Indeed, the first major activity undertaken by HUD under this program was a field study to determine the number of "troubled" public housing projects in the United States, to delineate their major characteristics, to identify the principal variables causing projects to be labeled "troubled" and to ascertain the major explanations for these problem variables, and to assess the impact of a variety of remedial intervention strategies. The field study integrated four sources of both qualitative and quantitative information about problems in public housing projects:
HUD's field office files which have extensive project-level data; (2) the informed judgments of HUD's field office staff responsible for the daily monitoring of the public housing program; (3) interviews with a wide variety of housing experts; and (4) visits to selected "troubled" projects by HUD's Central Office research teams, one of which included the author.

The Condition of Public Housing Projects in the United States

The data sample for the HUD field study, which was considered sufficient for statistical purposes and on which estimates of the condition of the nation's public housing inventory were made, consisted of 719 projects. HUD field office staff members were asked to rely not only on their firsthand knowledge of specific projects and their problems, but on the data in project files, to rate the overall condition of each project in the sample, using a five-point scale: (1) very good, (2) good, (3) marginal, (4) bad, and (5) very bad. For analytical purposes, however, projects rated as bad or very bad were grouped together as "in bad overall condition," while projects rated as good or very good were grouped together as "in good overall condition." All projects rated as marginal were classified as "in average condition." By weighting the projects in the sample, the following general evaluation was made of all the nation's public housing projects: (1) 75.5 percent were rated "in good overall condition"; (2) 20.7 percent were rated "in average condition"; and (3) 3.8 percent were rated "in bad overall condition" (Jones, Kaminsky, and Roanhouse, 1979).

The likelihood of bias on the part of the field office evaluators—either positive bias to make their offices appear to be doing a good job in the housing area or negative bias in the hope of increasing their office's share of public housing resources—was minimized by the fact that they were not directly responsible for the condition of the public housing projects in their geographical jurisdiction and by the fact that the project data in the field office files upon which their judgments were partially based were supplied by technical experts such as financial and management analysts, construction engineers, and occupancy specialists. Moreover, field office personnel were told to assess each project within the context of local standards in order to avoid concern at the time of data analysis over the issue of regional variations in ratings of public housing project condition—i.e., that a project defined as bad in Louisville might be considered good by field office personnel in Chicago. In other words, regional variations in ratings were not only anticipated but encouraged.

A second measure of the condition of public housing projects in the United States was obtained from delineation of the most serious problem areas at each of the 719 field sample projects by HUD field office personnel. This assessment, like their ratings of the overall condition of the sampled projects, was based not only on their firsthand knowledge of the relevant public housing agencies from their regular physical inspections and overall monitoring of particular public housing sites, but on the project files which contain public housing agency reports on finances and occupancy and summaries of management reviews. As Table 1 indicates, the most serious problem areas at the 719 field sample projects were as follows (Jones, Kaminsky, and Roanhouse, 1979): (1) the availability and cost of project services, which was cited 59 percent of the time among the top five problem areas; (2) the
efficacy of HUD subsidies, policies, and monitoring activities—cited 46 percent of the time among the top five; (3) the physical and social attributes of the surrounding neighborhoods—cited 43 percent of the time among the top five; (4) the characteristics and behavior of the project tenants—cited 40 percent of the time among the top five; (5) the structural quality of the projects—cited 37 percent of the time among the top five; (6) the quality of project management and maintenance—cited 34 percent of the time among the top five; (7) project site design—cited 32 percent of the time among the top five; and (8) project involvement by local government—cited 28 percent of the time among the top five.

TABLE 1
THE MOST SERIOUS PROBLEM AREAS AT U.S. PUBLIC HOUSING PROJECTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Problem Areas</th>
<th>Percentage of Times Listed as One of Five Most Serious Problems</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Availability and Cost of Project Services</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficacy of HUD Subsidies, Policies, and Monitoring Activities</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical and Social Attributes of the Surrounding Neighborhoods</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Characteristics and Behavior of Project Tenants</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structural Quality of the Projects</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality of Project Management and Maintenance</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Site Design</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Involvement by Local Government</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Looking at the research data on problem areas in public housing in greater detail—that is, by noting the frequency with which 133 specific characteristic public housing problems was mentioned, the author made the following observations: (1) "Fuel availability and rates" was by far the most frequently cited specific problem under the problem area, availability and cost of project services, being listed 28 percent of the time as one of the five most serious specific problems. The closest
that any other specific problem came to being cited as frequently—13 percent of the time—was "insurance availability and rates." (2) Under the problem area, efficacy of HUD subsidies, policies, and monitoring activities, "the number of HUD monitoring staff" and "failure of HUD's Performance Funding System to include certain public housing agency (PHA) needs (notably, security)" were both cited as being among the five most serious specific problems more than any others—each 9 percent of the time. Moreover, it is not surprising that, under the same problem area, two closely related specific problems—"adequacy of the HUD operating subsidy level" and "conflict between HUD's policies of serving low-income or mixed-income tenants in public housing and PHA economic self-sufficiency"—were both cited 8 percent of the time as being among the five most serious specific problems. (3) "The inadequacy of social services—hospitals, child care, schools, libraries, and recreation" and "the dearth of transportation facilities" were both cited as being among the five most serious specific problems more than any others—each 8 percent of the time—under the problem area, physical and social attributes of the surrounding neighborhoods. (4) The two problems most frequently cited as being among the five most serious specific ones under the problem area, characteristics and behavior of project tenants, were "the predominance of very low-income tenants"—cited 9 percent of the time—and the "predominance of single-parent, female-headed families"—cited 8 percent of the time. (5) Under structural quality of the projects, "the general housing structure (walls, floors, windows, doors)" and "insulation" were the two specific problems most frequently cited as being among the top five—each 5 percent of the time, but "roofs" as a specific problem was ranked in the same way nearly as often—4 percent of the time. (6) Under the problem area, quality of project management and maintenance, two specific problems were both cited 8 percent of the time as being among the top five—"the adequacy of modernization funds for capital improvements" and "firmness in dealing with rent payment delinquency"; two others—"coordination of community-based services for the benefit of project residents" and "the non-existence of a preventive maintenance program"—were both cited 6 percent of the time as being among the top five specific problems. (7) The three project site design area problems cited most frequently as being among the five most serious specific ones were "the number and density of buildings on the site" (mentioned 8 percent of the time); "the absence or inadequacy of amenities—swimming pools, play areas, and parking facilities" (cited 7 percent of the time); and "the lack of defensible space to provide a sense of privacy, security, and controlled access" (cited 6 percent of the time). Finally, under the problem area, project involvement by local government, each of three specific problems—"poor delivery of public services—i.e., police, fire, roads," "poor delivery of social and community services—i.e., health, education, welfare, recreational, cultural," and "local political interference in the hiring, promotion, and firing of public housing project staff"—was cited 4 percent of the time as being among the five most serious specific public housing project problems (Jones, Kaminsky, and Roanhouse, 1979).

Finally, by combining the HUD field office personnel's project condition ratings—projects in good overall condition, projects in average condition, and projects in poor overall condition—with the number of serious problem areas in each of these settings, as shown in Table 2 (Jones, Kaminsky, and Roanhouse, 1979), it was possible to identify three categories of public housing projects in the United States—troubled projects, relatively untroubled projects, and untroubled projects.
TABLE 2

PROJECT CONDITION AND NUMBER OF SERIOUS PROBLEM AREAS
AS A PERCENTAGE OF ALL PUBLIC HOUSING PROJECTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Condition</th>
<th>Number of Serious Problem Areas</th>
<th>Total Percentage</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Two or Fewer</td>
<td>Three or Four</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Projects in Good</td>
<td>67.3</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Condition</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Projects in Average</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Condition</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Projects in Bad</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Condition</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Projects</td>
<td>83.0</td>
<td>13.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus, troubled projects are those in bad overall condition (3.8 percent of all projects) and projects in good overall or average condition with five or more serious problem areas (1.4 percent and 1.5 percent, respectively) which constitute 2.9 percent of all projects. This means that only 6.7 percent (3.8 percent + 2.9 percent) or approximately 700 of the nation's 10,000 public housing projects, accommodating about 15 percent of all public housing tenants, can be classified as troubled. Relatively untroubled projects are those in average condition with fewer than five serious problem areas, which constitute 19.2 percent of all projects (13.9 percent with two or fewer problem areas and 5.3 percent with three or four problem areas), and projects in good overall condition that have three or four serious problem areas (6.8 percent of all projects), for a combined percentage of 26 percent. Untroubled projects are those in good overall condition with two or fewer serious problem areas or 67.3 percent of all projects. It is quite obvious, therefore, that 93.3 percent of our nation's public housing stock can be classified as either relatively untroubled (26 percent) or untroubled (67.3 percent). Nevertheless, as stated earlier in this article, the Department of Housing and Urban Development launched its Public Housing Urban Initiatives Program in 1978 with the expressed purpose of enhancing the quality of life in the most seriously troubled housing projects of the United States.
Characteristics of "Troubled" Public Housing Projects in the United States

The stereotypic public housing project in the United States is one which is large (having over 200 units), old (being over 20 years old), located in an urban area, and occupied mainly by families. Moreover, this stereotypic public housing project is characteristically thought of as a "troubled" project. Data collected in the 1978 HUD field survey of public housing in the United States, however, revealed that these public housing stereotypes are neither completely accurate nor inaccurate. On the one hand, stereotypic projects constitute only 8.3 percent of all public housing projects and account for only 27 percent of all "troubled" projects. Moreover, only 8.8 percent of all family projects in our nation's public housing inventory are rated as "troubled." On the other hand, the overwhelming majority of "troubled" projects (92.1 percent) are designed for family occupancy, although only 71 percent of the total public housing inventory in the United States is designed for this type of occupancy (the remaining 29 percent of the total public housing inventory is designed for elderly tenants). Another significant fact is that although single-parent and female-headed households each constitute only 26 percent of all public housing households, they comprise 46 percent of the households in "troubled" projects (Jones, Kaminsky, and Roanhouse, 1979).

The HUD study also revealed that 75 percent of all "troubled" public housing projects are located in urban areas, although only 64 percent of the total public housing inventory in the United States is located in urban areas. Several kinds of "neighborhood criteria" also distinguish "troubled" public housing projects. For example, although only 30 percent of the total public housing inventory is located in neighborhoods with a minority population exceeding 50 percent, 57 percent of the "troubled" projects are situated in such neighborhoods; although only 13 percent of all public housing projects are located in neighborhoods where multi-family housing constitutes more than 50 percent of the housing stock, 39 percent of all "troubled" projects are located in such neighborhoods; not only are 42 percent of all "troubled" projects located in neighborhoods rated as "high crime areas," but 56 percent are located in neighborhoods whose police protection is generally regarded as poor or fair; and, finally, only 19 percent of the "troubled" projects have access to high quality public service facilities such as employment information, counseling, day care, health, and recreation centers (Jones, Kaminsky, and Roanhouse, 1979).

In terms of size, "troubled" projects have, on an average, about three times as many units as "untroubled" projects—290 versus 106 units, but it is unclear whether or not this situation is a reflection of a whole series of other characteristics that tend to be highly correlated with large projects. For example, large projects tend to have less controllable environments, to feature high density housing, and to be located in urban areas and in middle- or lower-income minority neighborhoods that lack many amenities and offer poor quality public services. "Troubled" projects are also larger in terms of the number of buildings, averaging 33 buildings per project in contrast to only 19 buildings in the average untroubled project (Jones, Kaminsky, and Roanhouse, 1979).

Although there is a positive association between the age of public housing and the probability of its being "troubled," the survey data revealed that the difference between older and newer projects in this regard is not large. In combination with
other characteristics, however, project age has a more positive association with the probability of trouble. For example, older family projects have a greater probability of being "troubled" than newer family projects. Moreover, although small, older family projects outnumber large, older family projects by a two-to-one margin, the large, older family projects are more than four times as likely to be "troubled." In fact, the older and larger family projects are more likely to be "troubled" than projects with any other combination of age, size, and design characteristics.

Analysis of the Major Problems Affecting "Troubled" Public Housing Projects in the United States

The problems facing "troubled" public housing projects in the United States fall into four major categories:

1. **Financial problems** that reflect rising project expenses, low rental income, and the alleged inadequacies of HUD's Performance Funding System.

2. **Physical problems** that encompass design flaws (including project sizes and densities), structural deficiencies, and inadequate maintenance.

3. **Managerial problems** that represent the failure of HUD, public housing agencies, and project-based management personnel to establish and implement adequate operational policies and procedures.

4. **Social problems** that include crime, drug abuse, the absence or inadequacy of public services, and negative neighborhood conditions.

These four problem categories do not operate independently, however. A financial problem like inadequate funds, for example, may preclude the effective delivery of basic maintenance services, and the failure of a public housing agency to establish and implement effective tenant selection and eviction policies may induce severe social problems like crime and vandalism. While "troubled" projects experience problems in all four categories, HUD's 1978 field survey of its public housing inventory revealed that physical and social difficulties were most frequently reported, although financial problems were also quite severe. More specifically, the major variables which cause a public housing project to be "troubled" are: (1) building structure deficiencies and inadequate heating and/or plumbing systems associated with advanced project age; (2) a large number of high density buildings; (3) location in neighborhoods with predominantly minority populations and multi-family housing, high crime rates, inadequate police protection, and minimal human service programs and social amenities; (4) lack of defensible space; and (5) management difficulties, including problems with deviant and dissatisfied tenants and with inefficient and expensive maintenance. Although many HUD field office personnel expressed the opinion that public housing agency management often lacks an appropriate mixture of resources, skills, and commitment to address these multiple problems, it is more likely that a certain portion of perceived "management problems" stems from the weight of other problems facing troubled projects and that
another portion stems from poor management itself. In sum, for one reason or another, public housing agency management is a severe problem in "troubled" public housing projects (McHugh, 1979).

Although, as was pointed out earlier, "troubled" public housing projects constitute only 6.7 percent of our nation's total public housing inventory, public housing is frequently cited as one of the foremost fiascos among the "visionary" social programs adopted over the last forty years (Maloney and Thornton, 1980). The popular image of public housing projects as complexes of ugly reddish-brown brick, high-rise apartment buildings standing starkly amid barren open spaces in the ghettos of our large central cities persists because many such projects still exist. These older projects are not only a current public relations problem, but a monument to the mistakes of the past when they were built hurriedly as sort of "halfway houses" where the poor could stop briefly on their way "up" socio-economically. Such accoutrements as interior doors, adequate light fixtures, and even toilet seats were omitted in the name of economy, and, frequently, elevators did not stop at every floor (Liston, 1974). Extensive renovations have been made at some of these projects to provide modern kitchens and bathrooms, to enlarge the apartments, and to landscape the open space surrounding them. But much more of our nation's antiquated public housing stock needs to be "updated" or rehabilitated. Consequently, these older, high-rise projects are a tremendous financial burden on local public housing agencies today, for construction and maintenance costs have skyrocketed with inflation in recent years.

Older high-rise public housing projects are also crime-ridden, especially with vandalism, murder, rape, arson, and robbery. The high incidence of crime and violence in public housing projects has supported the contention of some critics that government agencies should terminate all their programs to house the poor (Moore, 1969). The rationale goes something like this: "these housing projects have been built at taxpayers' expense. The apartments are surely far superior to the tenants' previous housing, but the tenants don't appreciate what has been done for them. They vandalize the buildings and prey upon one another. Therefore, the government ought to forget the whole business and save the taxpayers' money. The poor should go to work, save their money, and provide for their own needs, just like everyone else."

In response to such a line of argument, it should be emphasized, as was done earlier in this article, that many public housing projects with high crime rates merely reflect the deteriorating neighborhoods in which they are located. Moreover, while expensive security programs have been launched by some public housing agencies to reduce the invasion of their projects by criminals from the areas surrounding them, their effectiveness has been greatly restricted by the fact that local police departments frequently reduce to a minimum their surveillance of these housing projects following the introduction of such programs. Typically, there is also considerable jealousy and friction between the local police and public housing agency security personnel.

The negative impact of deteriorating neighborhoods on the quality of life in public housing could be greatly reduced and, perhaps, even eliminated if public housing agencies possessed greater power to select desirable sites for their projects. Some students of public housing believe that one answer to the problem of site selection is to make public housing agencies full-fledged taxpayers (Prescott,
1974). At present, their housing projects are exempt from local property taxes, the chief source of municipal revenue. Although public housing agencies pay their respective municipalities 10 percent of their net rental income in lieu of taxes, the revenue thereby created is no longer adequate to enable local governments to provide police and fire protection, garbage collection, street cleaning, and health, education, and welfare programs for the increasing number of poor people in public housing at a time when the cost of all these services has risen drastically. It is a well-known fact that many cities in the United States have approached the point of bankruptcy in recent years.

If public housing agencies became tax-paying entities, they would suddenly become more attractive to local governments and their citizens because they would be a financial asset rather than a financial liability. As a consequence, they would find it much easier to secure larger and more desirable sites for their projects, and city officials would be encouraged to provide a higher level of public services to their tenants. At present, public housing agencies are quasi-independent branches of local government. In fact, there can be no public housing program in a city unless local governing officials sign a cooperative agreement with the local public housing agency, and before each new project is begun, they must submit an executive review report toHUD which may comment on any aspect of the proposed project. Moreover, in several states, including California, voter approval is needed through a referendum before a proposed public housing site is approved. Such procedures, which have made site selection for public housing projects vulnerable to political expediency and the changing whims of public opinion, have typically resulted in the selection of marginal sites that are offensive to the fewest people—generally in the midst of deteriorating ghetto neighborhoods. The location of public housing projects in the United States would greatly improve if local housing agencies were granted the power to choose the best economically and socially feasible sites and if an appropriate court or regional planning commission would review the selected sites to guard against any abuses by the housing officials. This would result in more low-rise projects located in attractive neighborhoods with ready access to public transportation, good schools, shopping centers, and other important community facilities (Rent and Rent, 1978).

Quite understandably, architect Oscar Newman, who is famous for his concept, "defensible space," is more concerned with the relationship of building and site design factors to crime and other problems in public housing than with the impact of outer-environmental factors like the surrounding neighborhood. Newman contends that architects have made several notable mistakes in designing public housing projects. First of all, large high-rise buildings are conducive to crime because they house so many tenants that anonymity prevails. Tenants who do not know one another by name tend to be relatively unconcerned about what harm they themselves or others may inflict upon their neighbors. Moreover, such buildings are usually full of angled corridors and blind public areas where the majority of crimes are committed, and the staircases required by fire regulations provide criminals with alternate means of escape. One technique whereby Newman has proposed to create "defensible space" in public housing is by having no more than six apartments opening onto a common hallway inside the buildings. On the outside, he suggests that fences, play equipment, benches, attractive lighting fixtures, and name plates can be very effective in engendering a feeling of personal occupancy and a concomitant desire to
defend one's residence against both intruders and fellow tenants who threaten the quality of life there. Finally, Newman maintains that privacy is a luxury which middle- and upper-income apartment dwellers can enjoy without incurring grave risk of victimization, because they can afford to hire doormen and to install expensive security systems, but privacy is a liability in public housing. Therefore, instead of buildings at public housing projects typically opening onto inner courtyards, Newman believes they should open onto streets and public sidewalks where the flow of automobile and pedestrian traffic tends to deter potential criminals (Newman and Franck, 1980).

A final public housing problem which warrants more discussion here is the difficulty management often experiences in satisfying tenants' demands. In the past, when residence in public housing was regarded as only a brief interlude on the road of social mobility, this was not an issue, but it has become a major one since the 1970's when public housing began to become permanent living quarters for many families. Public housing tenants now want better crime control, more efficient maintenance, and a wider range of social services—needs to which they believe project managers as a whole are unresponsive. It is frequently charged that public housing management personnel are predominantly white and middle class, while the tenants are predominantly black and poor, so that the former do not understand or empathize with the latter's problems (Liston, 1974).

Public housing agencies have responded to this allegation by stating that predominantly white, middle-class management personnel exist mainly in smaller communities with relatively small minority populations and in a few very large cities where public housing managers' salaries are extraordinarily high. They also contend that, irrespective of their racial identification, management personnel tend to receive all the criticism for any real or perceived deficiencies at public housing sites because they are the most visible and accessible scapegoat for the tenants. In reality, however, many tenant problems stem from inconsistent HUD policies regulating public housing. For example, the demands of HUD's social service-oriented divisions have often conflicted with those of its fiscal management division, so that while HUD has continually requested local housing agencies to provide increased tenant services, it has frequently not permitted them to spend the money required to render these services (Meehan, 1979). Consequently, good communication between public housing managers and tenants is extremely important, so that tenants will understand and accept the conflicting pressures to which local housing agencies are subject and, hence, the limitations on their authority and ability to act. Better still, tenants might join with local housing agency officials to bring pressure on HUD to improve its public housing policies and regulations.

Another common problem faced today by public housing management personnel is the "weeding out" of cheaters and criminals from among public housing tenants. If some tenants reported their full incomes, including that portion which comes from illegal sources such as welfare fraud and rackets, they might have to pay higher rents or they may become ineligible for public housing altogether. Unfortunately, such tenants do prevent legitimately poor families from securing public housing. It is also true that some public housing tenants commit crimes against their neighbors who, in turn, demand that management evict these predatory residents (Scobie, 1975). Frequently, however, headline-grabbing campaigns to crack down on deviant public housing tenants does more harm than good. What is needed is more emphasis on the
positive. It is amazing, for example, how much has been written about the infamous Pruitt-Igoe and other notorious high crime projects and how little publicity has been given to the many smaller projects, consisting of highly attractive clusters of one- and two-story townhouses and garden apartments surrounded by lawns, trees, and playgrounds, which uninformed passersby would not even recognize as public housing. It is also regrettable that so much public indignation is aroused by the relative handful of cheaters and alleged "shiftless ne'er-do-wells" in public housing who live off the tax dollars of wage-earners, and that so little positive sentiment is elicited by the many more working poor, children, elderly and widowed persons who benefit so greatly from public housing.

In the balance, it seems that the positive aspects of the public housing program in the United States outweigh its negative features. There are problems with inconsistent regulations at the federal level, with site selection, with fraud and crime, with management-tenant relations, and with underfinancing, but the system has also responded fairly well over the past forty years to the demand for low-income housing and to changing tenant expectations in terms of the structure of public housing units and their amenities, besides incorporating new housing technologies and architectural styles. We can anticipate that, under the impetus of HUD's Public Housing Urban Initiatives Program, still more improvements will be made in our public housing program in the years ahead, some of which are suggested in the following section of this article.

Principal Solutions to Problems Affecting "Troubled" Public Housing Projects in the United States

After identifying the major problems affecting "troubled" public housing projects in the United States, HUD's field office staff assessed the expected impact of various remedial intervention strategies. The strategies which were rated as being most likely to have a positive impact were the upgrading of project physical conditions; improvements in management's project operation and in its relationships with tenants; and neighborhood revitalization programs. To better project physical conditions, the HUD field office staff not only recommended elevating the skills of project maintenance personnel, but the undertaking of major structural and design changes capable of enhancing the safety and livability of public housing projects (Struyk, 1980). Management strategies, which were directed primarily at the social problems of "troubled" public housing projects, stressed the importance of improving the income, attitudes, and emotional stability of project residents through job training (Stillman and Murphy, 1977), counseling, and crisis intervention programs, of establishing more effective methods of dealing with deviant tenants, and of providing better law enforcement services to combat crime and vandalism. Finally, comprehensive physical and social revitalization of deteriorated surrounding neighborhoods was judged essential to improving the quality of life within "troubled" public housing projects.

As Table 3 indicates (Jones, Kaminsky, and Roanhouse, 1979), seven of the ten interventions proposed by the HUD field office personnel as being among the five best actions for resolving the problems of "troubled" public housing projects related to projects' physical environment (proposals 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9), the most unique of
TABLE 3
PROPOSED INTERVENTIONS FOR "TROUBLED"
PUBLIC HOUSING PROJECTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proposed Intervention</th>
<th>Percent of &quot;Troubled&quot; Projects for which the Intervention was Ranked as One of the Five Best Actions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Institute vigorous tenant selection, screening and eviction policies and procedures.</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Provide adequate funding to eliminate deferred maintenance backlog and to allow for preventive maintenance in the future.</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Carry out substantial rehabilitation of structures.</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Adapt buildings and grounds to &quot;defensible space&quot; concept.</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Increase rental income.</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Provide adequate modernization funds.</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Provide incentives/disincentives to encourage tenant care of project property.</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Allow underutilization of units in order to reduce population density.</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Catch up on deferred maintenance and keep maintenance current.</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Undertake neighborhood revitalization effort to reverse physical and social blight of the surrounding area.</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
which was the suggestion to allow for the underutilization of dwelling units in order to reduce population density. The field office personnel did not believe, however, that physical improvements alone hold the key to the revitalization of "troubled" public housing projects. What emerged from an analysis of their assessments and recommendations is that making such improvements is an essential first step, but that interventions to improve public housing agency and project management, tenant satisfaction and safety, and neighborhood conditions will also be required before "troubled" projects can be substantially improved. It is significant, for example, that, as Table 3 indicates, the institution of vigorous tenant selection, screening, and eviction policies and procedures was most frequently cited as being among the five best means of solving the problems of "troubled" public housing projects, being selected by the HUD field office staff for 23 percent of the "troubled" projects.

Summary

The first section of this article reviewed the history of public housing in the United States from its beginnings in the late thirties to the present and discussed the factors which have changed its inhabitants from predominantly white, upwardly-mobile, two-parent, working-class families to predominantly non-white, non-mobile, female-headed, lower-class families. The Housing Act of 1949 which inaugurated urban renewal and liberalized homeownership requirements, the Housing Act of 1969 which mandated that no public housing tenant would pay more than 25 percent of his/her income for rent, and the public housing construction moratorium of 1973 were cited as the major federal government actions which have had a negative impact upon public housing. But the growing obsolescence of public housing units, the deterioration of inner-city neighborhoods surrounding public housing projects, racial tensions, crime, and inflation have aggravated the problems of public housing in more recent years.

The remaining four sections of the article presented the findings of a field survey of public housing in the United States undertaken in 1978 by the Department of Housing and Urban Development under its Public Housing Urban Initiatives Program, the purpose of which was to determine the number of "troubled" public housing projects, to delineate their major characteristics, to identify the principal variables causing projects to be labeled "troubled" and to ascertain the major explanations for these problem variables, and to assess the impact of a variety of remedial intervention strategies. The four sources of qualitative and quantitative data about the representative sample of 719 public housing projects were: (1) HUD field office files; (2) the informed judgments of HUD's field office staff responsible for the daily monitoring of the public housing program; (3) interviews with a wide variety of housing experts; and (4) visits to selected "troubled" projects by research teams from HUD's Central Office, one of which included the author. A combination of the field office personnel's "overall project condition" ratings and their "problem severity" ratings, based on their perception of the degree of impact of 8 problem areas and 133 more specific problems on the 719 sample projects, resulted in the finding that about 7 percent or 700 of the nation's public housing projects, accommodating 15 percent of all public housing tenants, could be classified as "troubled." The study also revealed that 92 percent of the "troubled"
projects are designed for family occupancy and that female-headed families consti-
tute 46 percent of the households in "troubled" projects. Seventy-five (75) percent of
the "troubled" projects are located in urban areas, 57 percent in neighborhoods
with a minority population exceeding 50 percent, 42 to 56 percent in neighborhoods
with high crime rates and inadequate police protection, and 81 percent in neighbor-
hoods with inferior social services. It was further revealed that older and larger
family projects are more likely to be "troubled" than projects with any other
combination of age, size, and design characteristics.

The principal variables responsible for projects' being considered "troubled"
were: (1) building structure deficiencies and inadequate heating and/or plumbing
systems associated with advanced project age; (2) a large number of high density
buildings; (3) location in predominantly minority, multi-family residential neigh-
borhoods with high crime rates, inadequate police protection, and minimal human
service programs and social amenities; (4) lack of defensible space; and (5) man-
agement difficulties, including problems with dissatisfied and deviant tenants and
with inefficient and costly maintenance. Although many of the hurriedly and cheaply
constructed old, high-rise project buildings have been modernized, these constitute
a relatively small percentage of our nation's antiquated public housing stock. The
remainder not only perpetuate the negative popular image of public housing, but they
are a financial burden on local public housing agencies because of inflated main-
tenance and repair costs today. Old, high-rise public housing projects are also
plagued with crime, but in many instances this situation may be explained by the
invasion of the projects by criminals from adjacent deteriorating neighborhoods.
Moreover, when these projects attempt to prevent such invasions by hiring security
personnel, they often alienate the local police, who subsequently reduce their
crime prevention activities in and around the projects to a minimum. Consequently,
the net impact on the projects' crime rates may be negative.

It has been suggested, however, that if local public housing agencies became tax-
paying entities, they might find it much easier to gain local government- and
citizen-support for their selection of larger and more attractive project sites
in law-abiding neighborhoods and that city officials would be encouraged to provide
their tenants with a higher level of public services. Rather than attributing crime
at public housing projects primarily to outer-environmental factors like the sur-
rounding neighborhood, architect Oscar Newman blames building and site designers'failure to provide for "defensible space," the lack of which may be evidenced in
one of four ways: (1) the anonymity at large, high-rise projects either prevents
tenants from reporting crimes they observe or induces them to prey upon their neigh-
bors; (2) large, high-rise buildings tend to be full of angled corridors and blind
public areas which shelter criminals; (3) too many apartments opening onto common
interior hallways and lack of exterior territorial boundaries militate against a
sense of personal occupancy and a desire to defend one's residence; and (4) build-
ings opening onto inner courtyards rather than onto streets and public sidewalks
creates crime-inviting privacy.

Management problems became another major area of concern in public housing after
the 1970's when an increasing number of families began to make public housing their
permanent residence, to demand greater participation in project management, and to
expect a wider range of social services in addition to better crime control and
more efficient maintenance. The establishment of good communication networks
between management and tenants has become extremely important so that management personnel cannot be accused of being unconcerned about their tenants' problems and so that tenants will understand the multiple pressures to which local housing agencies are subject and, hence, the limits on management's ability to satisfy tenants' demands. A final management problem which has been frequently exaggerated by the media is that of "weeding out" cheaters and criminals from among public housing tenants. It is unfortunate that so little publicity is given to the many more non-deviant working poor, children, elderly and widowed persons who benefit greatly from taxpayers' support of public housing.

In view of the preceding analysis of "troubled" public housing sites' major problem areas, HUD field office personnel concluded that the following remedial intervention strategies would most likely have a positive impact upon these projects: (1) major structural and design changes to enhance the safety and livability of the projects; (2) upgrading the skills of project maintenance personnel; (3) the provision of better law enforcement services; (4) the institution of vigorous tenant screening, selection, and eviction policies and procedures; (5) the establishment of job training, counseling, and crisis intervention programs aimed at improving the income, attitudes, and emotional stability of project residents; and (6) the comprehensive physical and social revitalization of deteriorated surrounding neighborhoods. Thus, while there was consensus among the HUD field office personnel that making physical improvements is a prerequisite to alleviating the problems of "troubled" public housing projects, strategies to improve public housing agency and project management, tenant satisfaction and safety, and neighborhood conditions were considered essential to completing the task.

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SERVICES AREN'T GOODS: POST-INDUSTRIAL PRINCIPLES FOR POLICY DESIGN

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ABSTRACT

As the United States moves from an industrial society to a post-industrial society, fewer people are engaged in the production of goods, and a majority now produce services. The processes of designing and producing goods and services are radically different. This differences calls for innovation in both the structure of the work setting and the policies which govern work in the society as a whole. The article examines differences between goods and services and proposes a new model for designing and producing services, as well as new principles for social policy for service production. The model and principles are illustrated with examples in health care.

INTRODUCTION

An industrial society and a post-industrial society may be distinguished in terms of the predominant product which most workers create. In an industrial society most workers produce various forms of tangible goods. In a society which may be called post-industrial a majority of workers produce intangible services of various forms. The products comprising the service category vary considerably. Some, such as trade, transportation, and finance, are ancient, though technological changes have altered their form over time. The growing number of workers who provide a range of personal and professional services represent both the incorporation of traditional services into the market economy and the innovation of increasingly specialized services. In these contexts the concerns of a distinctly post-industrial society may be illustrated by the most rapidly growing service activities: health, social welfare, and information processing. What these services share in common is their role in connecting persons in some way and, in most cases, some personal contact between the service worker and one or more clients.

The process of producing services is different from the process of producing goods, and the principles involved in designing services are different from those involved in designing goods. However, the design and production of services suffer from a peculiar "cultural lag." Even though an increasing majority of workers are involved in producing services, the model used for designing the services which they produce is still in most instances a model more appropriate for the design of goods. Consequently, service workers are limited in their ability to provide services which are effective for their clients. As more and more workers are involved in producing services, it is essential to develop a model for designing their pro-
ducts which is appropriate to service production. More broadly, it is essential to develop a system of institutional supports which provide service workers with the resources necessary to produce effective services.

The scope of this article can be described by discussing briefly the nature of a design process. In the production of either a good or a service a worker is guided by an explicit or implicit model for designing the product. The design model provides principles to be followed in designing goods or services. Accordingly, the model may be considered a policy for design. The product of the design policy is the design of a good or a service. The process of following this design model or policy to produce a good or a service may be called, simply, a design process. The process of creating or designing a model or policy to guide design may be considered a process of meta-design. Products of a meta-design process include various sets of procedures, or policies, which may be followed in designing models for goods and services. The principles which govern the meta-design process may be considered to constitute a meta-policy.

Thus it is possible to speak about policy at two levels. One kind of policy governs the design (or production) of goods or services "on the line." The other kind, referred to as a meta-policy, provides general guidance for the design of goods or services throughout an entire organizational system. In this context it is possible to speak, for example, of a federal meta-policy for the design of goods or services. For stylistic reasons, examples of policy on the first level will be referred to here simply as "design models." Examples of policy on the second level will be referred to simply as "policies" (even though they are really meta-policies).

The article will first identify the design model most commonly used in the design of goods. Next, the article will point to significant differences between the production of goods and the production of services. On the basis of these contrasts the article will describe a design model appropriate for the design of services. Finally, the article will examine the requirements for a social policy to provide the resources necessary to carry out the service design model in service production settings.

PRINCIPLES FOR THE DESIGN OF GOODS

The basic principles of a common model for the design of goods may be found concisely stated in the chapter titles of a recent book on engineering design (Glegg, 1969):

1. the design of the problem;
2. the design of the designer;
3. the design of design/the inventive;
4. the design of design/the artistic;
5. the design of design/the rational;
6. safety margins.

First, the designer should make certain that the problem to be solved is itself designed appropriately. The problem should be identified clearly, so that the designer can understand what is problematic and can see what criteria must be met for the problem to be considered solved. Crucially, the problem should be set up in such a way that it permits solution. An explicit but insoluble statement of
the problem is useless.

Second, the designer should be conscious of the influence of the designer on the design outcome. The designer should consider the personality and style of the designer and the interpersonal setting in which the designer will work, insofar as they affect the design product. The designer should seek to maximize the influence of designer styles most likely to solve the design problem.

Third, the designer is ready to get on with design itself. Inventive, artistic, and rational approaches to design are all useful. Part of the process of discovering a solution may depend on unforeseeable insight. An aesthetic sense may help where design requirements cannot all be stated fully in advance. And there is never a good substitute for straightforward rational thinking to get from design criteria to a design solution.

Finally, it is always wise to leave a safety margin for error and the unknown, because even the best-laid design process is likely to encounter both.

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN GOODS AND SERVICES

Services differ from goods in a number of ways which suggest that this design model may be less useful for designing services than for designing goods. The description of services here applies most directly to personal and professional services, although it touches on aspects of other services as well. The service work described involves characteristics of the activities of a wide range of practitioners, including teachers, health care workers, architects, attorneys, social workers, administrators, planners, and engineers. For stylistic reasons all these people will be subsumed in the label "service workers."

The basic difference between goods and services is that a good represents a static product, whereas a service is a dynamic process. A good is completed when a worker has performed certain operations on raw materials. The good can then be placed on a shelf or in a showroom for potential users to examine. These potential users can see the good in finished form and need only decide for themselves whether they have some need for it. They are free, as a salesperson might say, to take it or leave it.²

In contrast, a service consists of a process of interaction between two or more persons. For example, they may be a teacher and a student, an architect and a client, or a physician and a patient. In the process of this relationship—which may be called, for example, learning, designing, or healing—the service worker and the client work at solving a problem brought by the client. The service consists of this problem-solving process, as well as whatever solution may be designed in the process. One view of services distinguishes them as "hard" or "soft" according to the tangibility of the solution designed. Where the solution consists of new information, insight, learning, or other personal change, the service may be labelled a "soft" service. In contrast, where the solution includes such things as monetary payments, food, shelter, or employment, the service may be labelled a "hard" service. Yet the interpersonal relationship which leads to the choice of some particular solution for the client's problem is similar for both. The problem-solving facet of the service continues for as long as the service relationship goes on.³ The problem solution, depending on its nature, may extend beyond the termination of the service relationship. Thus it is not possible, as with a good, to look over a number of finished service products before selecting
This difference between goods and services in the nature of the product reflects significant differences in the process of producing goods and services. The production of a good requires that a worker take certain actions in relation to certain inert materials to mold them into a product. The production process is governed by technical rules, and the worker dominates the raw materials. The production of a service requires that a worker enter into a personal relationship with one or more other persons who actively participate in the process of rendering a service. The process of producing the service is regulated by social norms endorsed by the actors, and the service worker participates in a contractual relationship with active service recipients.

The production of a good does not require interaction between producer and user. The production of a service not only requires but resides in interaction between "producer" and "user." This difference implies something further. In relation to a good it is possible to differentiate clearly a producer and a user. In relation to a service this differentiation is, at best, not clear. No service worker, for example, whatever his or her competence, can produce a service without a client. There cannot be teaching, for example, without a student. Further, effective design and production of a service require active participation of the client with the service worker. A physician, for example, cannot heal a patient who does not want to improve. In the service production process, then, it is difficult to differentiate one actor who is sole producer of the service and one actor who is the recipient of the service. In the service relationship all participants may be considered producers of the service in that their participation is necessary for the service to be delivered. It is reasonable to call the client the recipient of the service in that he or she receives some solution for a problem, but the label "recipient" should not imply that the client participates passively. Indeed, the client usually initiates the service relationship.

In the ideal process of producing goods of a particular kind, every single good should be in all significant ways identical to every other good. Every clock or every automobile of a particular model should be identical with every other. Mass production is considered appropriate because large numbers of people are considered to have identical needs with regard to telling time or moving from place to place. In contrast, the ideal process of producing services is one in which every service is unique. Each teacher-student relationship or each attorney-client relationship is in some, albeit frequently small, way different from every other. Each service relationship is supposed to be unique because every service provider and every client is a unique person, and their relationship brings together a unique combination of needs and competences.

This difference has implications for measuring the quality of goods and services. In the production of goods, because the production process is expected to be uniform and all products of a particular kind identical, quality may be measured by taking samples from a batch of products at any given point along or at the end of the production line. If the samples are found to be good or bad, then the same may be considered true of the batch as a whole. Measuring the quality of services is far more complicated. Because the production of each service is considered dependent on the nature of the interaction between service worker and client and because each service product is expected to be unique, measuring the quality of services requires somehow assessing each service relation-
ship. At the least, both service provider and client should provide an evaluation of the quality of service. Further, because a service is a dynamic process, rather than a static product, a single evaluation of the service at the end of the service relationship may be insufficient to measure the quality of the service. Pragmatically, insofar as the service worker and client are interested in producing a high quality service, they may want to make periodic assessments of the service as their relationship progresses, in order to ascertain that the service is good and to make any needed improvements.7

This latter point suggests that the learning required to produce a service is significantly different from that required to produce a good. In order to produce a high quality good, learning about potential users' needs and ways of satisfying them should be substantially completed before production begins. This is all that seems required by the conventional conception of a good. In addition, the practical cost of investment in mass production capital supports this orientation. The appropriate learning process for producing goods is the engineering design process outlined earlier. In the production of goods the primary place for learning is a design process which is conceptually and temporally separate from the production and delivery processes. After designers have learned which design will solve the design problem, succeeding processes of producing the design and delivering products are straightforward and do not normally require learning.8

In contrast, the learning which is most directly related to assuring the quality of a service must take place during the production of the service—in the process of interaction between service worker and client. Development of skills prior to the establishment of any service relationship contributes to the effectiveness of the service. Yet which of the skills which participants bring to the service relationship will be most important in producing a high quality service can be learned only during the production of that service. At least as important, both the service worker and the client may learn new skills and insights which are crucial for making their service relationship effective only after they have entered and worked in the service relationship for some time. As in the production of goods, crucial learning may be said to take place during a design process. But, in sharp contrast to the production to goods, this design process cannot be separated from the production or delivery process. Only by tentatively producing and delivering services within the relationship can the service worker and client learn which service design most effectively helps the client.

In short, the design model or process which is appropriate for the production of goods is not appropriate for the production of services. In the production of services the design process itself, the service relationship, must begin before anyone can identify or design the problem which the service relationship should be designed to solve. Further, the process of "designing the designer" has a peculiar quality. Although participants in the service relationship can take steps to prepare themselves for effective service work prior to entering the relationship, they can acquire a full understanding of what qualities will be required of effective service designers only after they have engaged each other in the service relationship. Finally, the distinction between the design or image and the actual product is unclear when services are involved. One moment a participant in the service relationship forms an image of an activity composing an effective service and in the next moment acts on that image, both
to create its interactive counterpart and to learn whether the image has validity in action. The processes of designing the problem and designing the designer are inextricably part of the process of designing the design, and the process of designing the design is intertwined with the process of producing the product, or service.

PRINCIPLES FOR THE DESIGN OF SERVICES

It is necessary to identify a design model for services which is different from that for goods. This model should include a set of rules or principles which participants in a service relationship should follow in order to design a service which will effectively solve a client's problem. Ideally, the service relationship is entered into freely by both the service worker and the client. The relationship is terminated after some long or short period during which the service worker and client feel that the problem at issue has been solved. Because the service relationship is a social relationship, its content includes both rational and nonrational material, and participants in the relationship will be motivated and affected by this material regardless of whether it is made explicit. Clinical evidence suggests that interpersonal problem-solving is impeded by a failure to admit nonrational material to examination. Hence in order to design effective solutions for problems, a service relationship must permit--but need not require--the service worker and client to acknowledge and respond to any parts of their interaction which either of them deems relevant to designing a service to solve the problem(s) at issue.

However, although every service relationship should permit responses to any rational or nonrational component of the service relationship, relatively few service relationships may require extensive concern with nonrational interpersonal material. Many service problems may be relatively simple, and more than a superficial inspection of interpersonal material may be both unnecessary and a diversion. Pragmatically, many problems may require relatively quick solution, and they may not permit much attention to interpersonal material. For many of these problems the likely cost of ignoring interpersonal material is low.

Another way to characterize this service relationship is as one kind of temporary problem-solving system. The process of learning in temporary systems has already been studied (for example, Argyris and Schon, 1974; Bennis, Benne, Chin, and Corey, 1976; Bennis and Slater, 1968; Jun and Storm, 1973; Miles, 1964; Mills, 1967). This evidence should help to identify a learning or design model appropriate for service relationships. In the temporary system participants both learn and, in so doing, learn how to learn. At the point when they conclude that they have learned what they set out to learn, they have succeeded in designing the learning process. Observers of the development of personal relationships in temporary problem-solving systems note that relationships in these systems typically progress through modal stages. Whatever the duration or purpose of the system, its participants normally move through similar identifiable stages. The length of the stages in a particular relationship is conditioned by participants' perceptions of the expected purpose and duration of the relationship. The character of these stages has been variously described by different observers. One formulation (Tuckman, 1965) of the stages which small groups typical of service relationships
go through identifies four modal stages: (1) forming, (2) storming, (3) norming, and (4) performing. These four stages comprise a process of learning within a group. This process, repeatedly observed in temporary small interpersonal relationships, reveals a model for learning or design which differs from the engineering model. To begin with, the establishment of a working relationship for the design, production, or delivery of a service is not taken for granted, as it may be with the production of goods. In the process of designing (producing) goods, designers (for example, industrial workers) get together and commence working because, so the model suggests, they are already committed to the design problem and want to get on with the process of solving it. Although for some services the design process is rather easily initiated, for others there is ambivalence about entering into the learning process at all. The beginning of any relationship--forming--involves asking questions simply about who is in the relationship and who is outside it. Participants may get together with an ambivalent commitment, at least, to establishing some relationship. However, often the client hesitates to enter the service relationship because of a feeling of guilt or embarrassment about "having" the problem which the service relationship is intended to solve. A worker and a client may seek to clarify who besides themselves may be in the relationship. For example, a physician and a patient may be in the service relationship. What about the physician's partner or the patient's colleagues or family? In many service relationships these questions are quickly resolved, though in some, particularly consulting and counseling relationships, they may take some time to clarify.

If the service worker and client are able to establish a working relationship, only then will they be able to begin to clarify what task or design problem they will work on. This is a stormy process. The participants may have entered the relationship with related but often quite contradictory notions of their purpose for getting together. They may have seriously conflicting expectations of one another. They begin to test each other to see what each considers the purpose of the relationship to be. As part of this challenging, they attempt to find out what each wants to contribute to the relationship and what each can contribute to the relationship. Frequently this process revolves around the client's efforts to test the competence, expectations, and loyalty of the service worker before revealing to the worker what the client perceives to be the real nature of the client's problem. For example, does the physician expect the patient to make a change in life style? Does the client expect the management consultant to take responsibility for solving major organizational problems? At other times this testing may involve the worker's efforts to ascertain whether the client is prepared to accept the efforts of the worker in good faith. For example, is the client seriously committed to acting on a decision reached by the worker and the client, or is the client "shopping around" among workers or only passing time?

After a period of comparing and testing assumptions about the purpose of the relationship, participants may gradually come to some consensus about the purpose of the relationship--norming. They may finally settle on some description of the problem which they are to solve together. The storming process may have led participants in the relationship to decide that the real problem which they expect the service to solve is not the problem which was presented when the relationship was initiated. The problem which the participants finally settle on as the design
problem for their relationship may truly have been unknown to any participant before they joined a relationship. Persons who have had experience in service relationships may even explicitly anticipate that the design problem will emerge only after much discussion, but they still will not know for certain in advance what the problem will be. In addition, the storming process may simply have permitted them to deal in some way with nonrational interpersonal issues which took priority over the basic problem which the service relationship was formed to solve. For example, a physician may quite cogently explain to a woman why breast surgery would be an essential treatment for cancer, but until the physician and the patient can resolve the patient's ambivalence about listening to the physician and acceptance the definition of the problem, the patient will not be persuaded to undergo even life-saving surgery. Similarly, a teacher may provide a very logical explanation of the axioms of geometry to students, but if students are still concerned about testing their teacher's competence, they will not be ready to learn and will not hear the teacher.

Finally, once the service worker and the client have agreed on the goals of their relationship, they are ready to begin performing, or working on problem-solutions which will meet those goals. It is important to note, however, that the process of learning to design solutions for human problems is inconsistent and uneven. Some problems may have relatively straightforward solutions once they have been identified. For example, once a physician and a patient have agreed that removal of certain tissue is crucial to the patient's well-being, they may move directly, even if painfully, toward surgery as a solution. Other problems may be more complex and involve a great deal of experimentation, trial and error, and inductive learning. A teacher and a student may agree that it is essential for the student to learn to read, but they may have to experiment with several methods for a long time before the student learns to read. They may have to work their way through a process of testing hypotheses, discovering unseen sub-problems, experimenting with solutions for various sub-problems, learning from these experiments, and so forth.

This uneven process can be described more explicitly. It may involve some regression and progression back and forth through re-norming, re-storming, and re-forming before the problem is solved. Although performing can take place only after some amount of forming, storming, and norming, these processes may not be definitely separable in time. Any particular activity may involve tasks relating to several stages at once. This process may be most clear in a deliberately psychotherapeutic relationship, but it appears to take place in more elaborate or more straightforward form in a wide range of service relationships, regardless of the substantive service area.

This four-stage pattern of development is widespread among small group relationships like those in which services are designed and produced. Apparently participants in these relationships at least subconsciously repeatedly "choose" this pattern because it enables them to deal with both rational and nonrational material that affects the solving of problems within the relationship. This pattern amounts to a tacit model for the designing of services. The frequent "choosing" of this structure for the problem-solving process represents a process in which many participants in diverse task-oriented interpersonal relationships have at least subconsciously developed the same basic model for the design of a service to solve a problem.
If this model of development were made explicit as a model for a service
design process, it would have the following steps:

1. designing the design group (forming);
2. designing the conflict over the design problem which the
design group will work on (storming);
3. designing the design problem (norming);
4. designing the design (performing), including being willing
to experiment with designs, experiment with re-designing the
problem, experiment with re-designing the conflict over the
design problem, and experiment with re-designing the design
group, all experiments being made with the purpose of learn-
ing how to design the design.

THE ROLE OF THE SERVICE DESIGN MODEL IN PRACTICE

It appears that two design models influence a service design process. The
model just described is drawn inductively from empirically observed problem-solving
relationships. Evidence suggests that, at least on a subconscious level, this model
actually governs the process of problem-solving in a great number of service relation-
ships. Yet this model is rarely presented by either service workers or clients as
the process which they would like to follow or the process which they believe they
actually follow.16

Insofar as either service workers or clients offer any model for the service
design process, the model usually resembles the engineering model more than the
service model just described. At the least, the engineering model, probably be-
cause of its reputed effectiveness in designing goods, is considered an ideal for
design generally, whether goods or services are involved. In addition, both the
professional training and the conditions of practice for most service workers re-
forces a tendency to follow the engineering design model.

A primary concern of the service worker as a professional problem-solver is
to reassure the client that the service worker can provide a solution for any prob-
lem. Professional training provides service workers with a repertoire of techniques
which in the past have provided solutions for clients' problems. The service worker's
ability to perform these techniques is a basic requirement to support any claims to
professional status. The professional service worker, then, brings into practice a
number of tested solutions which he or she will attempt to match with problems which
clients will present. Over time, service workers, in order to accommodate their own
and clients' desires for the worker to contribute to the solution of problems, tend
to select a clientele with whom their repertoire of techniques and personal styles
will "work."17

Two aspects of these conditions of practice reinforce a tendency for the
service worker to seek to follow the engineering design model. First, the wide-
spread cultural supports for this model make it the most persuasive way in which
the service worker can present to the client the procedures which the worker will
follow. After all, it is a tested engineering method, and no clients want to
believe that there is any uncertainty about whether his or her problem will be
solved. Second, insofar as the service worker has taken some care in selecting
a clientele with whom his or her repertoire of techniques will bring satisfaction,
going through the engineering design process with the client will "succeed," in
providing the client with satisfaction. The degree to which the process and the techniques carried out are effective in solving the client's problem will depend on the skill and sensitivity of the service worker and the client.

Thus service workers' and clients' belief in the normative value of the engineering design model leads them to attempt to follow it in service relationships. However, empirical study of temporary problem-solving systems suggests that, at least on a subconscious level, the relationship between service worker and client is governed by the service design model just described. The way in which service design actually proceeds probably represents a syncretism of the two models, in which the conscious engineering ideal is subconsciously adapted to carry out the tasks required in the service model described here. 

IMPLICATIONS OF THE SERVICE DESIGN MODEL FOR DESIGNING SOCIAL POLICY

The prevalence of the tacit four-stage design model implies that service relationships will be effective in problem-solving to the degree that they explicitly acknowledge and accommodate participants' needs to accomplish certain interpersonal—and nonrational—tasks in the process of designing services. The remainder of this article examines the requirements of a social policy for services which would provide the resources necessary for the service design model to be followed in diverse settings. The model is illustrated with examples from health care.

Elaborating the Service Design Model

The first step in developing principles for a service policy involves elaborating the service design model and incorporating it into settings where services are produced. To begin with, it is necessary to translate the general description of stages to be followed in designing services into specific practices which may be carried out in particular service settings. What it means to design the design group, for example, is likely to be significantly different in elementary education, city planning, and emergency medical care. Similarly, the range of available problem definitions may differ greatly, for example, in accounting, employment counseling, and architecture. Workers and clients will need to identify specific procedures which correspond to the general service design principles in particular settings.

Further, both designing these new procedures and carrying them out—designing the design, or the solution for the problem—will require the development of new techniques, skills, and ways of thinking. Service workers and clients will need to appreciate the importance of following the service design model in order to design the services which they want. In addition, they will need intellectual, emotional, and interpersonal skills for working through the design process productively. General education should include training in these areas, where students now learn only the engineering design model.

It will be necessary to identify the characteristics of a service design setting which will be most conducive to carrying out the design process creatively. Above all, the setting should permit learning—about who should be involved in the design process, about the nature of the problem, and about possible solutions for the problem. The setting should bring together a wide range of skills. The setting
should permit flexibility in designing the design group, designing the problem, and in designing solutions. These general requirements must be translated into specific arrangements in specific areas. For instance, the range of skills necessary to design a service is certain to be different in architecture and in social work. In each case, service workers and clients together should identify the crucial characteristics of the work setting.

The contrast between this service design model and the engineering design model may be illustrated in the health care field. Most traditional medical care follows the industrial, or engineering, model of design. First, it is usually taken for granted that the physician will be the sole designer, or decision-maker, regarding the problem and its solution. Commonly, a physician meeting a client uses established medical criteria for clinical decision-making to define the client's problem. The client is asked for information to help the physician define the problem, but the client is not invited to participate in defining his or her problem. The client's participation is not considered necessary, since all clients are considered to be similar in relevant—that is, medical—respects, and medical criteria are considered sufficient for defining any client's problem. The use of medical criteria for defining a client's problem leads to definitions of the problem in terms of medical injury or illness. These criteria tend to exclude social or psychological definitions, just as they tend to minimize the possibility that the physician will find no problem.

Once having defined the client's problem, the physician, as sole designer, examines his or her techniques and prescribes a treatment, or solution, in terms of one or more of these techniques. The physician is likely to take an accounting of his or her techniques before making a final judgment about the definition of the client's problem. In this way, the problem is likely to be defined in terms which permit the physician's self-perceived expertise to constitute the solution. Further, these treatment techniques are likely to involve the physician acting on the client, who receives treatment without participating actively in either the selection or the implementation of the presumed solution for his or her problem. The physician's selection of a solution from available techniques is considered appropriate on the assumption that any technique is expected to have an identical effect on every client. Throughout, the physician tends to follow a model of independent practice, in which he or she makes decisions about design of the service without consulting either the client or other health care practitioners.

Dentists, optometrists, nurses, and other health care practitioners tend to follow a similar model of design, or problem-solving, with differences residing primarily in their power to act autonomously from other practitioners.

In contrast with this industrial, or engineering, model of design in health care, the service model is in use in a small number of primary health care settings (for example, Beckhard, 1972; Beloff and Weinerman, 1967; Golden, Carlson, and Harris, 1973; Hollister, Kramer, and Bellin, 1974; Levy, 1966; Parker, 1977; and Stitt, 1967). In these settings, the identity of the designer is not pre-determined, except that it is understood that the "designer" will comprise the client and one or more health care practitioners. In primary care, the "service worker" is usually not an individual but a team, commonly consisting of a physician, a nurse, a social worker, and perhaps a nurse-practitioner, a psychologist, or allied health practitioners. When someone enters a primary care center with a problem, one worker talks...
with the client and comes to a decision about which specific practitioners would be most appropriate to work with the client in formulating and solving the client's problem. In this consultation the intake worker may be able to make a specific assessment of the nature of the client's problem, or the worker may make the judgment that the problem lies generally within the expertise of the team of workers whom the intake worker designates. For example, if the problem is assessed as a serious medical problem, the "designer," or health care team, may be constituted of a physician with appropriate collaborators, working with the client. If the medical problem is considered to have social or psychological concomitants, the active health team may include a psychologist, a nurse, a social worker, or some combination of these practitioners as their skills would suggest. If the problem is initially assessed as a relatively simple medical problem or as a problem requiring social interventions, the health care team may not include a physician but may be constituted of a nurse, a social worker, and the client. The team then works with the client in resolving questions about responsibilities, making a final definition of the problem, in designing a treatment which may solve the problem, and in implementing that treatment.

This arrangement combines a diversity of skills and resources with flexibility in the manner in which they are brought together in the design process. Expertise on call at the center includes different types of technical specializations, as well as different types of psychological, interpersonal, and social skills. This range of resources permits several types of flexibility. First, it is possible to make an open choice about the composition of the designer on the basis of the client's problems. In addition, it becomes possible to allocate different roles on the design team—for example, leadership in clinical decision-making, team management, or primary contact with the client—to workers with different skills. Further, this range of expertise permits greater discretion in defining the client's problem. Finally, the diversity of skills supports greater freedom in designing a solution for the client's problem.

It is essential to note that, although this example is drawn from the field of health care, neither the appropriateness nor the possibility of this type of flexibility is restricted to this field. This approach is no less applicable in such fields as social work, city planning, or, even, engineering.

**Identifying System Policy Characteristics**

Once the components of the service design model have been elaborated in a number of settings, generalizations can be drawn from these examples to identify the characteristics of a policy which would be necessary to govern a system of resources which could support the requirements of specific service design settings. In thinking here about a social policy for services, it is helpful to return to earlier discussion of differences between the production of goods and the production of services. For goods the production process is separated conceptually, temporally, and organizationally from the design process. The workers who produce goods receive a design for their product from other workers who have developed the design. There is no need for personal contact between producers and designers. Because the major uncertainty confronting designers concerns their ability to solve problems within the bounds of uniform laws of nature, the design process may be centralized. In practice, the uneven distribution of raw materials,
the uneven distribution of markets for goods, as well as administrative problems in managing large production centers, lead to various amounts of decentralization in different industries. Yet, however production is organized, production workers in each location will follow a standard design and will require a standard set of skills and resources, which they will combine in standard production procedures.

In the production of services the production process is conceptually, temporally, and organizationally joined to the design process. Services which are appropriate to clients' needs can only be designed on the "production line." The persons who produce a service are the same persons who have designed the service. Insofar as services must be unique to fit the unique circumstances of clients, their production must be decentralized as widely as clients are dispersed. Because service designers participate in the production of services, and because the major uncertainty in the design of services stems from the unique characteristics of each client, service design must also be decentralized.

The basic difference in principle between a policy for the design of goods and a policy for the design of services, then, is that a goods policy may be centralized and uniform, whereas a services policy must be pluralistic and decentralized. In past practice, however, service policies have been much like goods policies: centralized and uniform. One reason for this concerns the financing of services. Central governmental units or large corporate enterprises have financed many of the services. Taking a lesson from the mass production of goods, these units have operated on the premise that uniform central policy will lead to the most efficient use of resources. Efficiency, it has been assumed, leads to cost-effectiveness. This assumption is crucial in a sector where production is highly labor-intensive and, consequently, each unit of output is relatively expensive. For these units a uniform service policy facilitates both performance monitoring and cost-accounting. A second reason for the development of uniform central service policies concerns the professionalization of service workers. In many service areas workers with particular skills have organized to claim exclusive expertise and exclusive authority to practice problem-solving. Insofar as they are successful in gaining monopolistic control over practice in specific service areas, then the techniques which they wield and the resources which they use become identified in people's thinking as the only "proper" solutions for problems in these areas. This view is supported by the expectation derived from the production of goods that, in fact, any problem may have only a single or a narrowly defined solution. As an example, problems in the broad area of health become associated with the limited repertoire of "solutions" which the medical profession can offer.

Current national service policy reflects these influences. Service legislation and program guidelines are uniform and generally not sensitive to even regional differences in conditions. Such policies leave relatively little discretion to service workers and clients who enter into service relationships far from the site of policy-making. Yet, if the evidence of temporary problem-solving systems is valid, this kind of uniform central policy places real limits on the effectiveness of services. Efficiency may be realized at the cost of effectiveness. If service policy-makers have a commitment to designing service systems which effectively solve clients' problems, then they need to consider principles for a system in which service design is pluralistic and decentralized. Principles for the design of such a policy would include the following.
Principles for a Service Policy

Fundamentally, service design settings should include a diversity of human skills and tangible resources, so that service workers and clients may make use of whatever skills or resources they believe would help them to define or solve the clients' problems. This requirement contrasts with present policies which, following an industrial design model, provide a narrow range of skills and resources for service settings. The settings should be located in such a way as to maximize geographic, economic, cultural, and communicational access of potential clients to service relationships. Policy-makers presently reflect concerns from the marketing of goods by looking primarily at geographic or economic access. This requirement of broad accessibility implies that an effective service system will have to support a greater pluralism of settings than at present. In practice, many clients' problems will be similar, and the skills and resources required to work on them will be similar. This does not mean that a narrow range of skills and resources will be required. Rather, experience suggests that a common relatively wide range of skills and resources may be appropriate for many problems. The necessary variety of settings will be limited.

It is important that skills and resources can be flexibly combined as needed in any particular service relationship. This means, first, that a large pool of skills should be potentially available for any service relationship. This pool should include skills which are relatively specialized and skills which are infrequently used. In addition, it should be possible to combine any of the skills in the pool in any service relationship. These requirements contrast with present policies which draw sharp boundaries between "problem areas" and narrowly define the skills and other resources to be used to deal with problems in each "area." These divisions, which may be appropriate in the mass production of variously differentiated goods aimed at different parts of "consumers," are inappropriate for the production of services designed to treat human problems reflecting the actions of whole personal systems. Each problem may be in some way unique and may require some peculiar combination of skills for its resolution. Relatively specialized, infrequently used skills may be made available to a large number of service relationships by organizing workers with these skills into "pools of competence." The competence pools would be home bases for specialized service workers, and individual members could be brought into particular service relationships when their skills were instrumental. The cost and relative scarcity of these skills may require a certain amount of centralization, but what is important is to get the skills from centers into service relationships as easily as possible.

Both the accessibility of skills and the flexibility of their combination should be supported by educational programs which prepare service workers to use a wide range of skills and to work in teams with others similarly trained. The implementation of any service policy rests in the actions of the service workers. This requirement contrasts with present occupational training policies which concentrate on developing relative specialists who work with minimal active collaboration. Service workers must understand the service design model, must be able to work in interdisciplinary service teams, and must be willing to acknowledge limitations in their personal expertise.
The contrast between these service policy principles and the use of industrial principles for policy design may be illustrated in the health care field. Most current health policy is characterized by principles of industrial specialization. First, federal health policy has tended to set forth at the beginning a list of problems to be used for defining the problem when a client appears before a service worker. Federal research programs, promoted by medical practitioners and institutionalized by the National Institutes of Health, focus on specific disease entities. Each disease is examined in isolation from other diseases. Moreover, most of the research is biomedical research, which examines physiological or anatomical issues in isolation from the social, psychological, and environmental conditions of the persons who may contract diseases. Further, this view of health problems tends to preclude social definitions of health problems. Finally, this focus on disease entities as health problems minimizes attention to organizational issues, such as those related to designing or managing health care systems. Thus federal policy strongly tends to limit definitions of clients' problems which will be used when clients present themselves to health care workers.

Further, the training of health manpower, the designers of problems and the designs which will solve clients' problems, reinforces this tendency. Health care practitioners—for example, physicians, nurses, social workers, pharmacists, and dentists—are each educated in separate programs. Each type of program receives federal support from a distinct funding source, and each program responds to distinct standards set by separate certifying and licensing boards. This separation in education has several effects. First, graduates from a program in a particular field emerge as more or less uniform products. For example, most physicians resemble other physicians in their diagnostic orientation and skills, and they are likely to take pains to distinguish themselves from nurses. In addition, this separation produces practitioners who focus on specialized problems and who work in intellectual, if not social, isolation from other practitioners who focus on different problems. Consequently, any group of practitioners is likely to permit a narrow range of definitions of designers, problems, and potential solutions for problems. Moreover, the practitioners are unlikely to be inclined to collaborate with other practitioners who could, with them, offer a broader range of possible problem-definitions, skills and designs of solutions. Thus a combination of federal policy and the political actions of health care occupations tends to restrict the range of designers, problems, and designs which will be available in working on health problems.

A service policy which conformed to the principles set forth in this article would contrast with this current pattern of policy in a number of significant ways. First, the variety of definitions of problems which could be knowledgeably applied to clients' problems should be expanded by a restructuring of national research priorities. Biomedical research should be supplemented by sociomedical research. Health research should respond and correspond to trends in problems experienced and described by clients coming to health care workers. For example, research on cancer should be reoriented from studies of animals' responses to injections of foreign substances to studies of people's responses to repeated contacts with occupational and environmental health hazards. Mental health research should be reoriented from studies of the chemical reactions associated with psychiatric diagnoses to studies of personal stress reactions to poverty, the work environment, and the social environment. Expertise about a wider range of problems would
permit greater choice for health care workers and clients in defining problems and in selecting designs of possible solutions for problems.

In addition, the education of designers, health care practitioners, should be reformed to increase the skills available and the flexibility with which these may be applied to problems. The small number of primary care programs, most of which receive some amount of federal support, offer a suggestion of an alternative model of practitioner education. In these programs physicians, nurses, sometimes dentists, sometimes pharmacists, sometimes nurse-practitioners, and sometimes social workers train together. At present, concerns about maintaining separate professional identities tend to limit the amount of course work which is done collectively, the readiness of workers to collaborate with one another, and the democracy of decision-making about problems and designs for their solution. In addition, these programs tend to be inter-professional within a biomedical view of health problems, and the influence of practitioners with psychological or social expertise tends to be limited.

In order to implement the spirit of these primary care programs, in order to increase the availability of skills and the flexibility with which they are combined, the following reforms are essential. The education of health care workers should focus on clients and their experienced problems, rather than on either discrete disease entities or on distinct practitioner turfs. This change would require current health practitioners to reconsider their traditional division of expertise and to redefine their skills and responsibilities. While practitioners might retain different labels as indications of differences in expertise, more common classroom study and clinical training would permit greater intellectual and practical collaboration in working with clients. This education should include not only cognitive skills and knowledge, but also interpersonal and organizational skills, enabling practitioners to define and carry out collaborative roles with others as part of a problem-solving team. These skills should include the ability to assess which skills are appropriate for different problems and who should be included in the active team when different problems need to be solved (for example, Golden, 1975 and 1976; Parker, 1972; Rosoff, 1978). These changes in the education of health care workers should be accompanied by a revision of state licensure laws in order to permit health workers to use any of their skills in situations where the skills are needed.

Further, national, state, and local changes in the organization of health care services should be made to improve clients' access to this increased range of skills. Current proposals to organize health care services within local regions according to the "levels of care" which they provide (for example, Parker, 1977; Roemer, et al., 1975) provide useful models. In these models, workers who can respond to the range of most commonly presented problems would be most numerous and most widely dispersed. The geographic dispersion of these primary care facilities would also permit localization of variations in skills needed to respond to problems which are common only in certain areas. These settings should include not only medical, but also psychological and social services, or they should have clear working relationships with other practitioners providing any of these services. Workers with less frequently utilized and more specialized skills would be less numerous and more centralized. These are the pools of specialized competence from which skills and resources may be drawn by local service organizations on the relatively infrequent occasions when they need such resources.
Supporters of this model have sometimes used it to streamline the channeling of clients into more specialized services, but the model does provide a basis for developing a pluralistic system in which relatively few clients come into contact with "levels of care" beyond the simplest necessary.

Implementation of such a model would require strong public political and financial support for a variety of primary care settings. Implementation would require persuasion of facilities providing more complex skills and resources to accept referrals from primary care facilities only after workers and clients there have assessed the clients' problems and considered designs for solutions. Several alternative strategies implementing this model have been proposed. One strategy favors the creation of more competition among service workers and facilities, on the premise that clients can acquire the information to make intelligent choices among workers (for example, National Academy of Sciences, 1974). This strategy is sometimes discussed in connection with proposed antitrust action against organized medicine, in order to make competition possible (for example, Havighurst, 1974 and 1975). Coordination of the system of workers and facilities might still be necessary by an external agency. Another strategy favors the creation of a national health service which would be built on decentralized decision-making about education of practitioners and provision of services (for example, "The Health Service Act," 1979).

As with the elaboration of the service design model, it is important to emphasize here that, although these examples refer to the health field, they have reasonable counterparts in other service areas as well.

Any service policy must facilitate communication among service settings to permit the learning necessary to improve service design. Program monitoring and evaluation must be designed not simply to keep accounts and establish records of past efforts. Information must be collected in a form which enables service workers and clients to learn from past and current service design efforts. Service workers should be able to learn about innovative practices which have worked in other settings. Similarly, failures, regardless of any attendant misfortune or embarrassment, should be publicized in such a way that service workers and clients may learn to avoid actions which are not likely to solve problems. This kind of communication may require central organizational support to connect different service settings, but it should not have such central control over communication that useful information does not move. Deciding which information will help other service settings learn to design services will itself be a product of learning.

It is possible that these principles for the design of services may lead toward a rise in the cost of services, but that outcome is not a certainty. Improvement in quality control measures should make it easier to determine whether a particular expenditure is contributing to the solution of a client's problem. The actual cost of services will depend on the productivity of service workers and clients together. This collaboration, in turn, is likely to make possible levels of outcomes which the traditional organization of services would not have permitted, regardless of the costs invested. These seem to be the basic challenges for developing policy for a society where an increasing proportion of the population are involved in the production of services. After all this is said, what is done will depend on the commitment of citizens to learning to improve the quality of services produced and the quality of their lives.
1. This transformation can be observed in the recent history of the American economy. Two possible distinctions may be drawn between goods-producing workers and services-producing workers. The first, a sectoral definition, would distinguish workers by the products of their employers, regardless of what the individual workers themselves may do. Such a definition indicates that, whereas in 1900 68 per cent of workers were employed in goods production and 32 per cent in service production, by 1947 the proportions were approximately even, and in 1979 the proportions were reversed: 68 per cent were employed in service production and 32 per cent in goods production. An occupational definition would distinguish workers by their individual products, regardless of what their employers may ultimately produce. Such a definition indicates that, whereas in 1900 36 per cent of workers were occupied in producing goods (manual workers), 38 per cent of workers were occupied in farm work, and 27 per cent were occupied in producing services (white-collar and other service workers), by 1960 service producers made up more than half the labor force, and in 1979 the proportions were distinctly reversed: 64 per cent of workers were occupied in producing services, 33 per cent were occupied in producing goods, and 3 per cent were occupied in farm work (Bell, 1972, p. 168; Monthly Labor Review, 1980, pp. 65, 69, 70; Reich, 1972, p. 178). Although the two definitions do not count exactly the same workers, the trends they record are similar and pronounced. For more extensive discussion of these trends see Bell (1973), Fuchs (1966 and 1968), and Kleinberg (1973).

2. This is the conventional view of goods. One might actually argue quite differently that the article which is placed on the shelf is not the completed good, that the completion of the good requires some person to take the article and incorporate it in some way into his or her life. The ultimate nature of the good, then, would be the way in which it is used in someone's life. Further, the good could never be considered fully completed or its nature finally defined, insofar as its use and meaning for the user would vary from time to time. The employment of interior decorators and similar consultants indicates people's endorsement of this latter view.

3. Indeed, the problem-solving element of the service may continue even after direct personal contact has ceased, insofar as the client(s) may have internalized parts of the service worker(s) in the relationship. This frequently occurs in consulting, counseling, and healing.

4. However, the conditions under which workers follow technical rules are shaped by social norms set formally by labor-management negotiations or by management decree or informally by members of a work group.

5. In an ideal form this is a fully democratic or egalitarian relationship. However, this does not mean that all participants may not recognize that the service worker has special expertise and skills which should be taken into account in producing the service. Moreover, in certain service relationships, such as surgery, it is quite appropriate for the service worker at specific times to take an active role while the client assumes a passive role. What is crucial is that the service relationship represent a contractual arrangement freely entered into by both service worker and client.
6. Further, ideally, the client should initiate the service relationship. This condition implies that the service relationship is established to seek a solution for a problem perceived and experienced by the client, not the service worker. This requirement would minimize the instances in which a service worker initiates a relationship to deal with "problems" of deviance not experienced by clients. Exceptions to this condition may be reasonable if someone is demonstrably not competent to assess his or her interests or if someone represents a clear threat to the well-being of others.

7. In the literature on the evaluation of service programs, a distinction is customarily drawn between a process evaluation and an outcome evaluation (for example, Attkisson, Hargreaves, Horowitz, and Sorensen, 1978). There are two reasons for this dual focus. First, in the production of both goods and services, there is an instrumental relationship between acts in the process of production and subsequent products, and in both cases a monitoring of these instrumental acts can provide information about the likely quality of latter products. However, in the case of services, the relationship between acts in the process of production and end products is more conditional and varied than in the case of goods, and a closer monitoring of the production process is necessary for anticipating the quality of end products. Second, in the case of services, unlike that of goods, the actions in the process of production are part of the product. In this sense, a distinction between process and outcome is an artificial distinction carried over from the process of producing goods, and the distinction retains meaning primarily of a chronological kind. Conventions in the service program evaluation literature tend to mimic the goods production process by defining "process" measures in terms of specified actions of service workers and defining "outcome" measures in terms of specified conditions of clients. For reasons given in the preceding analysis, this approach to evaluating services misrepresents the process and the purpose of producing services.

8. More accurately, they involve primarily initial learning about how to produce the product. Although producers of goods are prepared to solve problems which crop up in production, they do not anticipate learning that the design itself should be different. The design was settled on in the design process, prior to production.

9. Clearly, the temporal lag between an image of a problem solution and action to create that solution is shorter for "soft" services than for "hard" services, because the former are in some way "contained" in the service worker and client, whereas the latter must normally be acquired from a third party.

10. Sometimes the service worker and client may terminate their relationship after concluding that they cannot solve the problem together.

11. The body of clinical literature carries this message. Two examples at different levels of analysis are illustrative. Laing (1970) has provided an intricate analysis of the complexities of interpersonal relationships and the ways in which nonrational material complicates ostensibly straightforward problems in these relationships. Argyris and Schon (1978) have described and analyzed the ways in which unspoken motives and assumptions hinder problem-solving in large-scale formal organizations.

12. Some examples make this clear. Many traditional services, such as transport, commerce, and finance, may be designed and produced with minimal attention to
interpersonal dynamics, although the merchant or financier who does pay attention may be likely to reap greater gains. Nevertheless, the requirements of the personal transactions involved are simple and easily satisfied. Personal and professional services offer a contrasting example. Counseling may depend crucially on exploring interpersonal material, even if this exploration process takes considerable time. Professional or business consulting may depend on a sensitivity to interpersonal dynamics insofar as they affect the possibility of solving the client's problem qua professional or business problem, but this consulting may be undermined by a focus on depth material called for in psychotherapy. Indeed, Caplan (1964) carefully draws this distinction for professionals considering engaging in mental health consulting. Qua mental health consultants, they are concerned with the client's professional problems, but not in any direct way with the client's personal problems. Medical and other healing relationships may require some attention to non-rational interpersonal dynamics, because altering these may contribute to the healing process. Frank (1963) describes at length the importance of the physician's interpersonal persuasion as a basic component in the healing of the patient. Legal, architectural, and engineering consulting relationships may require attention to interpersonal dynamics to the extent that the service worker and client can trust and understand each other sufficiently to work on a problem which refers principally to matters outside their relationship.

13. This formulation does not include termination, or, to be consistent, unforming. Any service relationship, clearly, must come to an end. For other formulations of atages of group development, see Bernstein (1965).

14. Perlman (1957), who pioneered a problem-solving model for social casework, has made this observation about worker-client learning in the casework relationship:

Problem-solving implies that both the caseworker and his client are simultaneously and consciously, though differently, engaged in problem-solving from the first. In problem-solving activity there is no implication that treatment [designing the design] waits on study [exploring facts] and diagnosis [designing the problem]. Rather, the client's adaptive mechanisms are involved from the beginning in working upon the difficulty he has brought. Fact-finding jointly with the client may in itself be an operation which clears and orders his perceptions. The client's sharing and working-over of his feelings, and the impetus of help given him to know and think about his attitudes, behavior, needs, and goals, are in themselves an experience and exercise of adaptation (pp. 61-62).

15. For example, Schmuck and Schmuck (1975) have described in considerable detail the ways in which nonrational interpersonal processes penetrate and influence the "rational" process of teaching in a classroom.

16. Social workers, for example, may be more likely to identify or espouse this model than many other service workers. Accountants, planners, and engineers, on the other hand, may be the firmest believers in the validity of the engineering model.

17. Freidson (1970) indicates that with physicians, for example, this process of selecting a clientele with whom the practitioner can expect to be consistently "successful" is more or less conscious. He argues that the conditions of
professional practice, where the service worker is expected to produce a solution for a problem, lead most workers to select clientele and working conditions where they stand the best change of providing services which are acceptable to clients.

18. The relationship between the engineering model and the service model may be conceptualized in terms of Argyris and Schon's (1974) distinction between "espoused theory" and "theory-in-use." The former consists of public descriptions of practice, whereas the latter involves principles which are implicit in actual practice. Although espoused theories may accurately describe theories-in-use, the two frequently conflict. Actors have a tendency to describe their practice in terms which may be more rational, ethical, or consistent than the reality. The best description of the theory or model which governs social activities, Argyris and Schon contend, is one constructed inductively from self-conscious analysis of action by participants in social relationships. In these terms, the engineering model may be characterized as a commonly espoused theory, whereas the theory-in-use in service relationships is strongly influenced by the service model.

19. Michael (1973) has provided general discussion and specific examples of both individual and organizational requirements for learning in problem-solving.

20. This description emphasizes tendencies in physicians' training and practice but, clearly, does not describe all physicians. This characterization draws in part on Freidson (1970).

21. This relationship is characteristic of "soft" services, whereas it may differ somewhat for certain "hard" services. For instance, in the case of food provision the workers who produce the food which solves the client's problem are not the same as the persons who have gone through the problem-solving process of identifying the food as a solution for the client's problem.

22. Noteworthy exceptions are revenue-sharing and block grant programs, although even these programs have had guidelines which have restricted the uses to which federal funds could be put locally.

23. The term is Schon's (1973). He discusses at length the issues raised here.

24. Freidson (1975) has examined physicians' practices to see how social policies are translated into actual service delivery. He has found that the customary behavior of physicians, conditioned by their formal training, has led to the provision of services which differ significantly from those intended in policy statements.

25. There are exceptions to this tendency. For example, some of the research programs of the Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Administration look at sociomedical and social health issues, as well as organizational issues. Some of the research programs of the Health Resources Administration examine organizational issues. Health Systems Agencies are expected to focus on disease entities in assessing the health status of their populations but are also permitted to examine sociomedical and organizational issues. However, HSA's are restricted, as Kennedy and Burlage (1980) show, by the requirement that they concentrate efforts on regulating medical facilities, which correspond more to biomedical disease entities than sociomedical health issues.

26. Feldstein (1977) has incisively described the sociology and politics of this separation of types of health care practitioners.
27. Golden's (1976) analysis of the levels and types of skills required for providing primary care indicates that many tasks traditionally considered within the domain of a single occupational group involve skills accessible to many practitioners.

28. Although licensure laws in certain areas are essential to protect clients from harm by unskilled practitioners, current licensure laws have frequently been drafted to protect practitioners from competition from other practitioners. For example, physicians' opposition to civilian medical practice by former military medics who performed capably on battlefields indicates that considerations of turf may be as important to many service workers as considerations of the skills necessary to provide services to clients. This issue is discussed by Feldstein (1977).

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As a minority group, American Indians have the distinction of being the smallest and the poorest. Their cultural diversity and unique relationship with the United States government set them even further apart from other minority groups. A subgroup of Native Americans about which little is known and even less has been written is the Native American elderly. This group is the focal point of this paper.

This paper reviews selected works by anthropologists, psychologists, social workers, health care professionals, and Native Americans. The intent is to identify and assess the formal and informal support systems to which the Native American elderly have access. Identified needs of the elderly will be contrasted with what is available via these formal and informal systems. Informal systems are identified as those natural support systems such as the nuclear and extended family, peer groups, and cultural systems, while formal systems are the products of governmental policies and the service delivery systems emanating from them. Attention is given to the impact these policies and services have on this sector of the American population.

Stephens, et. al. (1978) discuss the importance of the informal support system for the elderly. In their study of informal support systems among White, Black, and Mexican-Americans they state that

... the analysis thus far suggests that informal social supports are of great importance in sustaining continuity of identity and for preserving mental health in later life (pp. 34-35).

They found that a confidant was an important social support as was the extended family in times of need.

Their findings can provide a frame of reference as one looks at Native American elderly as they experience rapid social change that requires the assistance of an informal support system in order to survive. Among their findings were:
1. As informal support increases, so does planned engagement, orientation to the future, zestful engagement, child-centered participation, leisure activity, and activity with friends.
2. As informal support decreases, alienation and depression increase.
3. The stereotyped view of the alienated and withdrawn elderly is more a result of loss of support systems than the aging process.
4. There is a weak relationship between informal support and the number of children one has or the number of individuals in a household.
5. There is a strong positive relationship between attendance at religious services and organizational membership.
6. More support was found in age-homogeneous neighborhoods of aged peers.
7. Fewer supports were found in heterogeneous age groupings and those with fewer older persons.

DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS

American Indians comprise less than $\frac{1}{4}$ of 1% of the total United States population or approximately 763,600 people. Of this number, 43,800 are 65 years of age or older. Thirty-six percent of this group still speak their mother tongue. It is estimated that by 1980 there will be 130,626 Indians on reservations 45 years old or older (Grundlach, et. al., 1977; Williams, 1978).

The diversity of a group this small is remarkable. The number of tribes to which American Indians belong was listed in the 1970 Census as over 500. There are 300 languages, and nearly 300 reservations, each with its own distinct culture and lifestyle (Levitan and Hetrick, 1971; Farris, 1976; Bell et. al., 1976).

There are considerable differences in living arrangements of Native American elderly when compared with the population in general. For the latter group, 27% of the elderly live alone; 51% live with their spouse; 2% live with non-relatives; 5% live in institutions (Rogers and Gallion, 1978). Indian elderly are more likely to live in 2 or more person households in rural areas: 65% for Indians vs. 60% for others (Williams, 1978). They are four times more likely on the reservation and two times more likely in urban areas to live with extended families as their non-Indian counterparts. Approximately 43% of the Indian elderly live in urban areas. Fifty-eight per cent of these are females living alone near their children or grandchildren. Nine per cent of those in urban areas live with three or four generation households while that figure goes to 17% for those living on reservation (Association of American Indian Physicians, Inc., 1978).
The elderly living on reservations are found in widely scattered areas, some of which are very remote and isolated. Their housing tends to be traditional which means no indoor plumbing, electricity, or running water. Their isolation is made even greater by the absence of transportation and usually poorly developed road networks (Williams, 1978).

American Indians have a generally youthful population, 8 years younger in median age than the population as a whole. The average life expectancy at birth during the 1950-70 period increased 5.1 years from 60 to 65 years of age. In 1970 the average life expectancy was equal to that of non-white races or about 7 years less than that for whites (Williams, 1978; American Indian Nurses Association, 1978b). However, Grundlach, et. al., (1977) states that in 1967 the average age of death among Native Americans was 46 years of age.

The median income for Indian families (1970) was $5832 or 57% of white median income. Black median income was 61% of the white median. The 1970 Census classified one-third of American Indian families poor. Thirty-six per cent of them received government assistance. Unemployment of Indians in the 45-64 range is nearly three times that of non-Indians and nearly double for elderly Indians when compared with their non-Indian counterparts. Interestingly enough, in spite of the above statistics, suicide and alcoholism rates are below the norm for the white population over the age of 65 (Williams, 1978: Association of American Indian Physicians, Inc., 1978; Grundlach, et. al., 1977).

Although no general statistics were found regarding the selection of marriage partners for American Indians, Peterson (1972), in his study of the Mississippi Band of Choctaws, states that Choctaw rarely marry outside the community. When they do, they generally assimilate into the non-Choctaw group.

THE FAMILY KINSHIP NETWORK

While modernization and mobility of the twentieth century puts increasing strain on Native Americans, the family system remains the key support for the Indian elders. "American Indian family networks assume a structure which is radically different from other extended family units in Western society" (Red Horse, et. al., 1978, p. 67).

Red Horse (1980b) describes aspects of the American Indian family that sets it apart from the traditional, westernized nuclear family. In addition to being the cornerstone of the Indian society,

[i]: serves as a repositor for value orientations that guide human behavior, as a transactional milieu for life span socialization, and as a basic catalyst for cultural revitalization (p. 62).
Also, significant non-kin can be incorporated into the family system. These family structural patterns provide for periods of self-reliance balanced with mutual interdependence from birth to old age.

The family plays an important role in helping members adjust to life's major problems. When problems occur such as reduced income, sickness, aging of spouse, divorce or separation, those most affected are generally absorbed into the more stable family units of their nearest relatives (Nybroten, 1976).

Blood and clan ties are the strongest relationships between individuals. This network of blood and clan relationships provides a broad base of resources upon which to draw (Blanchard and Unger, 1977, p. 313).

The only information found running counter to this family support theme is an article by Cooley, et. al. (1979). Their work was among the Apache, whom they describe as having a highly individualistic culture in which the elderly were left to fend for themselves. Many elderly were subject to neglect and indifferent treatment by their families. They were frequently victimized by their relatives.

The extended family network has been found to have a direct impact on health care and utilization of services. The success of the medicine man, for example, often lies in his ability to include the family and/or community in his approach to the care of the individual. Indians generally believe that family involvement is integral to recovery (American Indian Nurses Association, 1978b). Murdock and Schwartz (1978) looked at the relationship of family structure and the use of agency services by elderly Native Americans. Among their findings that directly related the family to service usage were:

1. The level of perceived service needs, awareness of service agencies, and use of agency services are higher for those living in extended family settings.
2. Family structure appears to be an important factor in the provision of services to Native American elderly.
3. Those living with children or as couples have much higher levels of perceived needs.
4. It is unclear as to what role the extended family members play in assisting the elderly in obtaining services.

One of the greatest strains put on the family kinship network has been the migration of younger Indian members to urban areas, primarily to seek employment and improved standards of living. Many of these hope to earn enough money to allow them to return to their rural settings of origin and live in comfort. Ties are maintained with those left behind so that in case of failure they can return home. It should be noted that rarely do people move
directly from rural to urban settings. The movement is usually made by slow progressive stages which may take several generations (Wax, 1971). This migration to urban areas was given impetus by the Bureau of Indian Affairs Relocation Act of 1952. This act "... hoped to assimilate the Indians into the mainstream of the population by encouraging them, with promises of training and jobs, to move to the cities" (Hanson, 1980, p. 478). It is estimated that 10,000 Indians leave the reservation each year and move to urban areas (Farris, 1976).

Migration to the city has created inter-generational conflict. Although family structural patterns have not changed with the move from the small reservation community to the urban or metropolitan areas (Red Horse, 1980), the older Indian does not understand the need to leave the reservation and earn a living (Pierre, 1971).

As 43% of the Indian elderly currently live in urban areas, it is easy to see the impact which urban migration has on them, their family relationships, and living patterns. This movement received significant attention in the literature (American Indian Nurses Association, 1978a, 1978b; Grundlach, et. al., 1977; Wax, 1971; Levitan and Hetrick, 1971; Farris, 1976). Four types of elderly urban dwellers have been identified: 1) stable urban dwellers; 2) latecomers, following children or grandchildren; 3) transients who migrate to and from the reservation; 4) isolates living in the midst of the inner city.

John G. Red Horse, et. al. (1978) examined the family behavior of urban American Indians. They found that migration has not changed their traditional relational values, that the extended family network has remained a constant. The patterns this network takes differ. They describe three distinct lifestyles within the urban setting:

(1) a traditional group which overtly adheres to culturally defined styles of living, (2) a non-traditional, bicultural group which appears to have adopted many aspects of non-American Indian styles of living, and (3) a pantraditional group which overtly struggles to redefine and reconfirm previously lost cultural styles of living (p. 69).

These family patterns of living influence attitudes toward the utilization of formal helping system networks. Only the bicultural group was seen as being able to relate to professional caregivers. They found 90% of their Indian respondents in the Minneapolis-St. Paul area indicated a preference for receiving services from Native American service providers.

In Grundlach, et. al.'s (1977) study of Indian families moving to urban areas, those who moved with Bureau of Indian Affairs relocation assistance has substantially higher levels of
economic welfare. Those who migrated without relocation assistance were worse off than those who chose to remain on the reservation.

Two sources were found to be at variance regarding housing patterns in urban areas. Farris (1976) indicated that Indians do not tend to congregate in urban ghettos. This was seen as facilitating their move into low income, white neighborhoods. Wax (1971), on the other hand, states that Indian migrants to cities, given the opportunity, cluster together residentially. They elaborate distinctive institutions which are neither traditional nor urban middle class which allow a meaningful existence in a new environment.

Out-migration of the young tends to leave behind elders with inadequate natural support systems to sustain them on the reservation. This often leads to institutionalization, a problem that will be discussed in more detail later.

Another significant support for the elderly that has received very little attention in the literature is religion. Zychowicz (1976) studied American Indian teachings as a philosophical base for counseling and psychotherapy. She found Native Americans have a strong belief in a higher being and the individual's immortal spirit. A total equality for all creation is assumed.

Life is seen as a process where specific persons and events are not considered more important than the total unfolding of that process, although each person and event plays a specific role that is important to that process (p. 5847).

Time is viewed in a non-linear sense. Past, present, future are seen as having equal value. The feeling of oneness with the universe affects behavior in most aspects of life.

The religious foundation permeated actions and provided strength as well as the societal attitude that was necessary in order to meet the demands of a rigorous life (p. 5847).

The oneness of religion, family, and the land is unlike any other group in American society (Blanchard and Unger, 1977). Red Horse (1980a) describes family life as being inseparable from religion and medicine. "Indians are taught that their life carries the spirits of their ancestors and this tradition is passed through the elders" (p. 491).

In a study by the American Indian Nurses Association (1978b), the importance of religion is discussed in the context of long term care of the elderly. There is a very close relationship between medicine and religion. It is important that health workers understand and accept a tribe's cultural health practices and demonstrate an awareness of various tribal customs. It is most important to be aware of a tribe's rituals pertaining to death.
These differ widely among the various tribal groups and a lack of knowledge or understanding can lead to an unintended offense. This report gives several examples of tribal differences and how they might be handled.

SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF NATIVE AMERICAN ELDERLY

The desire by elders for traditional living patterns can create health problems in housing and sanitation. Dietary habits create problems in that traditional foods are high in carbohydrates, fats, and salt; while being low in protein, minerals, and vitamins. This results in a number of nutritionally related diseases: obesity, diabetes, gall bladder, hypertension, and dental disease. Accurate health data concerning elderly Indians is lacking, especially for those living in urban areas. (American Indian Nurses Association, 1978a, 1978b; American Indian Physicians, Inc., 1978). There is a striking absence of programs to attack these health problems. The physician's report goes on to discuss how city health services are bound up in "redtape" to the point they become virtually inaccessible. Health care problems are compounded by the Indian's low income which puts this need last on their list of priorities.

Mental health problems present a unique challenge. The diagnosis of mental illness is often very difficult because the beliefs, traditions, and cultures of the observer and the patient are different.

It seems justifiable to conclude that there is a problem with mental health of the elderly Indian. The extent and impact of this problem, and the factors relating to it cannot yet be precisely determined. (Association of American Indian Physicians, Inc., 1978, p. 17).

Legal assistance is needed by the elderly for two reasons. First, they are culturally unique. Second, they are controlled by a dual set of laws.

Protective services are cited by the nurses' study as another need. Indian elderly are not exempt from neglect and abuse. Many of the abuses suffered by the elderly are alcohol related.

GOVERNMENTAL POLICIES AND PROGRAMS

Policies and programs are viewed as one aspect of the formal support system. The other, services and service delivery, will be discussed separately.

Social needs of the American Indian elderly have not become a systematic focus of legislative action, although there are indications that movement in that direction has begun. In their article, Stephens, et. al. (1978) look at how governmental policy interferes with Indian family life, even to the point of aiding and abetting its destruction. One statistic they use to drive this point home is that 25%-35% of all American Indian children
have been removed from their homes and placed with Anglo adoptive homes, foster homes, or institutions. This particular problem has been addressed by the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (P.L. 95-608). For two views on the impact of this legislation see Fischler (1980) and Miller, et. al. (1980).

Wilkinson (1980) sees a direct relationship between governmental policy and the decline of the Indian family. Divorce, once a rarity, is now rising. He sees federal government programs as playing a large part in exacerbating these problems. He states these programs often display no understanding of tribal cultural patterns, disrupting relationships which serve as the key to tribal unity, solidarity, and existence.

The Department of Interior through the Bureau of Indian Affairs has the major responsibility for the American Indian. It is the contention of Farris that

The Department . . . is primarily concerned with the management, conservation, and development of the nation's water, fish, wildlife, mineral, forest and part, and recreational resources. Almost as an afterthought it added, 'It also has the major responsibilities for Indian and territorial affairs' (Farris, 1976, p. 495).

His article goes on to discuss how the bureaucratic nature of the BIA and its absolute control thwarts efforts to effectively serve the American Indian population on the reservation. The non-reservation Indian is ineligible for BIA services.

Problems stemming from the Indian's unique relationship with the federal government through the BIA was echoed in the 1971 White House Conference on Aging ("Report of the Special Concerns Session on the Elderly Indian, 1971). The report indicated that because of this unique Indian-government relationship most of the Indians did not participate in any type of retirement program: co-retirement plans, insurance plans, investing income in property, or in many cases, Social Security. The tragic implications of this for the Indian elderly are obvious.

Pierre (1971) adds that everything in the Indian's life, his status, his reservation, his rights and privileges, and his local government is controlled by the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Governmental policies over the years have resulted in . . . the destruction and disorganization of Indian communities and individuals, a desperately severe and self-perpetuating cycle of poverty for most Indians and the growth of a largely ineffective and self-perpetuating bureaucracy (Grundlach, et. al., 1977, p. 465).

Large public income maintenance programs such as unemployment insurance, workmen's compensation, and the variety of programs offered through the Social Security Administration are designed in
such a way as to offer little help to minorities such as the American Indian (Farris, 1976).

Other legislative acts affecting the American Indian are House Concurrent Resolution 108, adopted 1953, and other laws relating to termination of government control and supervision over Indian properties and services to tribes (Pierre, 1971; Levitan and Hetrick, 1971); P.L. 84-959, which is designed to assist in the development of jobs for Indians (Pierre, 1971); the Self Determination Act (Farris, 1976); Social Security Act, Titles II, IV, XVIII, XIX, XX (American Indian Nurses Association, 1978b); P.L. 94-63 which is designed to provide project grant money for home health care programs (American Indian Nurses Association, 1978b).

Pierre (1971) best describes the dilemma faced in dealing with the American Indian. He states that many well intentioned non-Indians who recognize and respect the underlying philosophies of the Indian way of life, often urge the Indian to retain their old ways while at the same time exhorting the federal government to improve Indian health and standards of living which cannot be accomplished without affecting the old ways they wish to preserve.

SOCIAL SERVICE NETWORK

It is in relation to the delivery of social services to the Native American elderly that the nature of the delivery system, the professional and non-professional within that system, are tested—and found wanting.

In looking at the delivery system it becomes clear that services and supports are provided for the elderly, to some degree, as long as they remain on the reservation. Even then, gaining access to those services is not assured. Two factors impinging on this, the nature of the family network and the availability of transportation, were already discussed.

Other problems related to access are discussed by Murdock and Schwartz (1978). They cite the lack of information on needs and service utilization patterns of Native Americans. Furthermore, there exists little evidence indicating the role many important aspects of the Indian social structure plays in conditioning (1) the recognition of the need for specific types of services; (2) the awareness of the sources of the required services; (3) the use of such services (p. 475).

In their study of reservation based elderly, Murdock and Schwartz found many areas of critical service needs in which the awareness of service agencies was low. Also, in those areas where the level of felt need was high, there were fewer service agencies available to meet them. It is interesting to note that the highest percentage of respondents surveyed identified as a social service need, "attend tribal meetings."
Their findings:

1. Elderly Native Americans have low levels of perceived needs and low service usage.

2. The status of being on a reservation affects both the range of services available and the ability to utilize them in that these factors are outside their control. The freedom to search out new services is restricted.

3. No effective service delivery system has yet been developed that reaches all elderly Native Americans who must live alone.

Fischler (1980) identifies another problem in the social service network—understaffing. Many social service providers have caseloads of more than 100. This is compounded by high rates of staff turnover and paucity of American Indian professionals. There is often a duplication of services in one area with a second being completely missed. "Reservations suffer from both an absolute lack of services and poor coordination of services that do exist" (p. 347).

Rogers and Gallion (1978) studied the Pueblo Indian elderly. They found that service delivery systems, which are set up to serve the general population who characteristically lack an extensive kinship network, are not effective in taking the surrogate family role for the Pueblo elderly.

Some suggestions found in the literature for improving service delivery include the take-over of the services by native groups (Blanchard and Unger, 1977), and/or coordination of services through one agency, the tribal government (American Indian Nurses Association, 1978a).

One of the first steps to improve services to the urban Indian elderly would be to eliminate those eligibility requirements that exclude them as users of the social service system. Another would be to clarify their legal status (Carpenter, 1980). Holmes, et. al. (1979) suggests that it is important to locate services within neighborhoods as transportation and availability are major determinants of service utilization. The hiring of Native American staff will increase the attractiveness of a service by removing a major barrier—language. They found the greater the percentage of minority staff employed by an agency, the greater percentage of minority clients served. One other tactic they found useful in reaching the elderly client was door to door canvassing of neighborhoods. However, Bell et. al. (1976) comment on the difficulties encountered in outreach activities, i.e., identification as to who is an Indian and the tribal differences that exist among the various groups.

Wilkinson (1980) found many programs developed to deal with Indian problems tend to fragment the family and tribe. What he proposes is a family approach to service delivery, one which totally supports its existence and function.
A final delivery system which has received little coverage in the literature is long-term care, both institutional and community-based. Increasing longevity of the Native American and the continued out-migration of younger family members to urban areas seem to make this system of service delivery more important as time passes.

The 1971 White House Conference on Aging, through a report by the Special Concerns Session on the Elderly Indian (1971), found that current funding systems for nursing homes were designed in such a way that Indian people has very little chance to obtain those facilities. Some states refuse to license homes on the reservations because of jurisdictional problems. Because there is a lack of representation on boards, Indians have no say regarding the allocation of Hill-Burton funds. Those boards, for the most part, ignore Native American needs.

The one report that addresses the problem of long term care was prepared by the American Indian Nurses Association (1978b). Their focus was on the long-term care living continuum. It was the Association's feeling that traditional definitions of long-term care have proven to be inadequate in that they focus on institutional care and not on preventive, ambulatory, or other service delivery models.

Home health care services were discussed. It was pointed out that some tribes were beginning to develop their own home health agencies. These efforts are most appropriate for a culture that supports the position that the elderly should remain in their own home.

The report goes on to discuss ways to plan for community care. They describe day care centers that provide a variety of culture-specific activities that may well include members of the younger generation.

The report points out that within the last decade there has been a decline in the number of elders living with their families. Once these elderly are sent away to nursing homes they lose their purpose for living and die. The nursing home setting presents a unique challenge in the delivery of social services, especially as it seeks to reverse this feeling of "lost purpose."

A major problem the elders have with the nursing home setting is the intense isolation they feel. These homes are often some distance from the reservation and provide little in the way of a familiar cultural environment. Few, if any staff, speak their language and the food is not what they are used to eating. Several examples are given by the Nurses Association as to how these homes could be modified to incorporate more culture-specific elements.

A most important area that could be easily overlooked in long term care facilities has to do with the bathing and grooming rituals of particular tribes. Special considerations must be taken and suggestions are given as to what to be cognizant of regarding
who is to do what activities, i.e., washing, disposal of hair, nail clippings, etc. One example cited was the desire of the Navajo to have hair found in combs properly disposed of, not just discarded.

The report summarized the state of the art:

There are a lack of planning methodologies, guidelines, and manuals available in a practical and useful format that could assist tribal planners in assessing their long term care needs (American Indian Nurses Association, 1978b, p. 42).

SOCIAL SERVICE PERSONNEL

The people who serve at the interface of the client and service system are of vital importance. It is at this point that the best social service delivery network can fail. The literature addresses to a limited degree the role and function of these men and women.

Beauvais (1977), in his study of cross-cultural counseling, found the number of physicians and other health professionals who were willing to work in low income, rural areas were never enough to meet the need. Those who practice among the Native Americans do so for only short periods of time. Few remain over five years. Brown (1976) found that physicians wanted to set up practice in a community which reflected the income level to which they aspire and the ethnic group of which they are members. She cites a study by Markson which found, in a geriatric screening process, physicians tended to turn away persons of low income, ethnic minorities, or those who did not look like them.

Farris (1976) addresses the need for more social work intervention with non-reservation Indians. To enhance the delivery of services to this neglected segment of Native Americans he proposes the recruitment and training of Native Americans as advocates. These individuals would have the professional and cultural knowledge and skill to bridge the "500 year ethnocentric gap" (Farris, 1976, p. 496).

Red Horse (1980b) points out the importance of understanding Indian family structure and development in planning and implementing social service programs. He sees social service delivery as being grounded on two basic assumptions: 1) an understanding of characteristic structure among American Indian extended family systems, and 2) the inseparable linkage that exists between family and culture, individual mental health and the sense of self that is derived from an historic culture transmitted through the family.

Red Horse goes on to describe Indian family development as having three major life-span phases:

1. Being cared for. This phase has its initiation in the naming ceremonies which provides the individual with a cultural map and spiritual sustenance. The naming serves to establish a supportive network for children and
provides for personal contact between children and name-sakes, which is expected to occur on a regular basis.

2. Preparing to care for. This phase develops during adolescence. It is a period during which the adolescent sorts out the mutuality of family relationships. The adolescent experiences considerable self reliance and personal decision making while, at the same time, the phenomenon of family dependence and its obligations remain.

3. Assuming care for. The essence here is the provision of a continuity of world view through attachment to elders. Young people are often observed "adopting grandparents" as a part of this phase.

In a second article, Red Horse (1980a) warns social service providers of the need to tailor their offerings to reflect Indian family structure. Specifically, provide services and programs that integrate the generations, not to develop programs that isolate elders from children.

Edwards and Edwards (1980) address the issue of working with individuals and groups and provide some guidelines. Social workers should move slowly, identify problems and procedures clearly, make commitments regarding situations in which they have control, follow through consistently, and use client strengths appropriately in order to help develop feelings of trust and establishing professional relationships (p. 500).

They go on to say that introspection is not part of the Indian culture. Many Indians react to new situations by being passive, and when intervening the worker should learn to use specific culture techniques. For example, when discussing one who is deceased, it is wise to use a term to refer to that person (mother, father, brother, etc.) rather than use the individual's name.

This article provides other pertinent information regarding social work practice with Indians.

The mental health needs of American Indians are addressed in an article by Ryan (1980). "... American Indian and Alaska Native people still have the lowest levels or the highest rates of adverse mental health indicators of any population group in the United States" (p. 507).

Ryan's focus is primarily on research and how information fails to be applied in program development. He describes the failures of research:

1. Much of the research is not relevant to program development and problem solving.
2. Communications is a problem, between researchers and subject and between researchers.
3. Methodology and instruments have not always fit the culture being studied.
4. Research findings often are not communicated back to the community studied, thus, the information is not put to use.

5. Research conducted by non-Indians often fails to consider important aspects of values, customs, languages, and other cultural attributes.

SUMMARY

It has been the intent of this paper to review the current literature on Native American elderly. The framework used is one in which the structure and function of formal and informal support systems were identified and evaluated. It can be said that there is a dearth of literature addressing the Native American elderly. What literature does exist gives support to the idea that this minority group still suffers the most, that informal support systems are weakening, and the formal support systems often seem designed to hasten their demise. Health care and social service personnel receive little exposure through the literature which, undoubtedly, reflects the exposure to culturally relevant material they receive in their training. When taking the literature available on Native American elderly in toto, and the response of human service professionals to their plight, it can be said that they are truly the FORGOTTEN AMERICANS.

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FACTORS AFFECTING THE ECONOMIC STATUS OF ELDERLY CHICANOS*

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ABSTRACT

This paper identifies and discusses factors affecting the economic status of elderly chicanos. These factors include historical factors, labor force participation, familial support systems, and human services utilization. Implications for policy are addressed.

Introduction

Recent national popular magazines and other publications have started to recognize the growth of Chicanos** as the largest disadvantaged minority group in this country. However, in spite of this new attention to this group, their economic plight remains a serious one. For example, the 1970 United States Decennial Census showed that almost one-fourth of all Chicano families in this country were living in poverty, twice the national rate.

Chicanos have been labeled an invisible minority or a forgotten minority due to the lack of government attention and intervention on their behalf. A major effect of this neglect is that Chicanos have received little special attention in the development or implementation of antipoverty programs designed to reach the poor. Contributing to the problem of non-recognition is the fact that over 85 percent of all Chicanos reside in the Southwest (California, Texas, Arizona, New Mexico and Colorado), constituting a regional minority, in contrast to a national minority such as Blacks (Grebler, et al., 1970; Briggs, et al., 1977). Bullock concurs, noting that

An appalling and almost universal indifference to the problems of this group has been reinforced, until recently by the general


**The word "Chicano" is used for United States Citizens and permanent residents of Mexican origin.
inaccessibility of data on employment, educational and cultural patterns of Americans of Mexican descent. Only in 1950 did the Bureau of the Census initiate a consistent series of reports on the "Spanish Surname" populations, a category which approximates the Mexican-American totals for the five southwestern states (Bullock 1964:37).

The relatively low economic status of the Chicano is of major concern. According to the 1970 United States Decennial Census, 24 percent of "all Mexican American families in this country are in poverty, a proportion twice as great as in the total population" (Urban Associates 1974:vii). For the total United States population, family income was determined to be $9590, but for Chicanos, family income was only $6962, making Chicano income only 73 percent that of the total population. For the total United States population, per capita income was $4716, compared to $3139 for Chicanos (Urban Associates 1974:vii).

Age-specific research on elderly Chicanos is even more limited than is that on the general Chicano population. As can be noted in the proceedings of the Special Senate Committee on the Aged Hearings (held in Los Angeles, El Paso, San Antonio, and Washington, D. C. in 1968 and 1969), the federal government depended on individual subjective opinions interspersed with only a few limited research studies for policy analysis and development in regard to this group. The individual opinions expressed in the proceedings are, for the most part, untested and, at times, contradict testimony presented by other parties testifying before the same committee (Senate Hearings, 1968-69).

Gilfix addresses the issue of white/minority elderly differences:

To a disconcerting extent, we have lost sight that minority elders have special needs; they are poorer than Anglo elders, they are more dependent on public benefits, and yet may be least able to obtain those benefits, they are more susceptible to consumer abuses and most significantly, suffer from a legacy of racial discrimination that is typically exacerbated by entering elder status (Gilfix, 1977:7).

The limited data available support Gilfix's observations, that the Chicano elderly have been ignored. Of all elderly Chicanos (ages 65 and over), 37 percent are poor, a proportion 11 percentage points above the national rate for all older people (Urban Associates, 1974:vii). Perhaps the fact that elderly Chicanos account for only 4 percent of the total Chicano population, compared to all percent elderly in the total population (Grebler et al., 1970:123), contributes to policy makers ignoring their plight.

Twenty-four percent of all elderly Chicano males are still in the labor market (U.S. Census: Persons of Spanish Origin, 1973:75). Yet, income differentials are striking between Chicanos, Blacks and Whites. Some 84 percent of the elderly Chicanos had incomes under $3999, compared with 65 percent Whites and 87 percent of
Blacks. On the other hand, there were less than 13 percent Blacks whose incomes were above $4000 (U. S. Census: Persons of Spanish Origin, 1973:75 and U. S. Census: Population Characteristics, 1973:836-837). With respect to income Chicanos tend to fall between whites and Blacks, their rates more often being closer to those experienced by Blacks.

Out of the large number of Chicano elderly who work, 43 percent still work full-time, with an additional 28 percent working between 27 and 49 weeks annually (U.S. Census: Persons of Spanish Origin, 1973:95). It also appears that the workload of Chicano elderly does not lighten with age: those who work are concentrated in unskilled worker positions (U.S. Census: Persons of Spanish Origin, 1973:95). Non-farm laborers account for 19 percent, while farm workers account for an additional 20 percent of Chicano elderly who work. Sixteen percent are service workers while only 5 percent are managers and administrators (U. S. Census: Persons of Spanish Origin, 1973:95).

Focus of Paper

What are the factors that have contributed to the economic status of elderly Chicanos? Very little is known in this specific area, especially about historical factors, labor force participation, work history, familial support systems, and human services utilization, especially of the Social Security System in this country.

The areas of education, the administration of justice, migratory patterns, and communication problems have been studied to a greater degree, and together with the knowledge in the above areas, they combine to present a multifaceted portrait of a subgroup whose age-related problems are compounded by a multitude of other factors.

The purpose of this paper is to explore several propositions regarding the economic status of elderly Chicanos:

1. Internal colonial attitudes and actions toward Chicanos have prevailed since the United States victory over Mexico in the United States War with Mexico which ended in 1848.

2. Negative experiences with U. S. Immigration and Naturalization service agents, the U. S. Border Patrol, the Texas Rangers, and welfare departments during the Great Depression and later during the economic recession of the 1950's have made elderly Chicanos hesitant to apply for human services to which they are entitled.

3. The proximity of the Mexican border has been convenient to the American agribusiness and related concerns interested in manipulating Mexican and Chicano labor. In essence, there has been an elastic labor supply in existence for the United States industry.
4. Educational opportunities for the elderly Chicano cohort have been unequal and have contributed significantly to the Chicano's low socio-economic status.

5. For a majority of the elderly Chicano cohort, Spanish is the language of choice, and lack of fluency in English by this group has contributed to the non-utilization of services offered by human services agencies.

6. The Chicano elderly's work experience and movement from rural to urban has minimized their eligibility for maximum Social Security benefits.

7. The Chicano family is committed to helping its elderly, but such contributions, in kind or cash, are small due to the Chicano family's low socio-economic status and low income. In addition, there is concern that the extended family does not exist as it once did for Chicanos.

8. Anxiety about their legal status in the United States and an attitude of deference has limited the elderly Chicano's participation in politics in the United States.

**Discussion of Factors**

The lasting effect of the United States War with Mexico (1846-48) was that Chicanos would be treated as "a conquered people." (Acuna 1972:19). Briggs adds that "A stamp of social inferiority was imposed throughout the Southwest that operationally was similar to a system of overt segregation." (Briggs et al., 1977:4). The beliefs of Anglos that they were superior (and having proven it in their minds in the war with Mexico), and the reluctance of Chicanos to abandon their culture and language contributed to the continued colonization and exploitation of the Chicano in the United States.

The Mexican Revolution of 1910 broke the system of peonage in Mexico, and the massive exodus of poor people (which included the present elderly Chicano cohort) began. The rationale for this exodus was obvious: higher pay in the United States for unskilled work. However, the United States has always been able to maintain control over this group through tactics which have kept the Chicanos in a tenuous state with regard to the legality of their status in the United States.

A particular event which impacted on the presently elderly cohort was the forced repatriations during the Great Depression. It has been documented by several historians that whenever Chicanos applied for public assistance in Los Angeles and

**"Anglos" is used for all white persons who are not of Mexican origin.**
elsewhere, they were deported in favor of saving welfare monies for "deserving citizens." (Hoffman, 1974; McWilliams, 1933; Bogardus, 1970.) It is suggested that the mental scars from that particular incident remain and have impacted negatively on elderly Chicanos' hesitation in applying for human services benefits to which they may be entitled.

It should also be noted that the proximity of Mexico to the United States has, in the past, provided an alternative to unemployment compensation or other services for unemployed Chicano workers during times of economic recessions in the United States. This pattern of increased deportation during these periods has continued with regard to undocumented workers.

Discrimination has followed the elderly Chicano into the educational arena. The elderly Chicano may have been denied any kind of education were he in the United States in his childhood years. In an extensive report on de jure segregation of Chicanos in Texas schools, it was found that many parts of the state of Texas did not originally admit Chicanos to public educational institutions. When Chicanos were first admitted to public schools in Texas around 1902, school authorities relied on the 1876 Texas Constitution which stated that "separate schools shall be provided for the white and colored children and impartial provision shall be made for both," and established separate schools for Chicanos commonly known as "Mexican Schools." (Rangel and Alcala, 1972.)

Even after that, the levels of public education available to Chicano children were not the same as those of Anglo children. For example, an onsite review team from the U. S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare found that the Pecos (Texas) Independent School District had a policy of not permitting Chicanos to go beyond the 6th grade before 1938 (Rangel and Alcala, 1972). In another case, the exclusion of Chicanos from the high school was a finding of fact in Perez V. Sonora Independent School District, Civil No. 6-224. (N. D. Tex., Nov. 5, 1970.)

There should be no question but that discriminatory practices against the present elderly Chicano cohort in public schools are responsible for the statistical finding that shows that 65 percent of this Chicano cohort has less than five years of schooling, therefore, making this group functionally illiterate. (U. S. Census: Persons of Spanish Origins, 1973:55.) In contrast, there were only 13 percent of elderly white males who were functionally illiterate. (U. S. Census: Population Characteristics, Vol. 1, 1973:627.)

The correlation between educational attainment level and level of labor force participation has been strongly established. It is further suggested that, in the case of elderly Chicanos, the effect of the rather low educational attainment level on employment has been compounded by lack of written and verbal English language fluency, lack of skills, cultural differences, and discrimination in the workplace.

Differentials in wages between Anglos and Chicanos have been found in the labor market which were neither due to either educational level or occupation, but merely to the fact that Chicanos were of a different ethnic or national origin than their
Anglo counterparts. In a study on full-time male workers, ages 20 to 40, in a predominantly urban setting, Chicanos were found to earn about $900 less than Anglos, when educational and occupational levels were controlled. "Mexican Americans earn less because they are Mexican Americans, not Anglos." (Poston and Alvirez, 1973:703.)

Beyond this discrimination in the labor market, culture also played a part in the family income differentials. Not only were Chicano women not likely to be working if they were married, but even if they did, they contributed little to family income because of the similar factors to those previously discussed that influenced their male counterparts. (Briggs et al., 1977:31-32.)

The transition of the elderly Chicano cohort from farm work to living and working in the cities has also impacted their economic status. It should be noted that in 1930, 45 percent of Chicano males were employed as either farmers or farm laborers. (Fogel, 1968:23.) By 1970, the percentage of Chicanos in these categories had been reduced to 9 percent. (Briggs 1977:71.)

Influencing the present economic status of the elderly Chicano is the fact that the initial Social Security Act of 1935 did not include coverage of farmers or farm workers. Coverage of these categories of workers did not come about until the 1950's. As a consequence of this initial failure to cover farmers and farm workers, elderly Chicanos have been receiving disproportionately lower benefits than their Anglo counterparts. Stepanovich (1976) found that the Spanish surnamed beneficiaries in the five Southwestern States were receiving cash benefits averaging $86 per month, compared with $116 per month for the non-Spanish surnamed group. In other words, the Spanish surnamed were receiving 26 percent lower benefits than the non-Spanish group. (Stepanovich 1976:48-53.) Some 82 percent of the Spanish surnames were OASI beneficiaries, while 89 percent of the others were in this category.

Contributing to the fact that there were fewer Chicanos receiving social security benefits are several factors: failure to meet the minimum number of quarters required, irregular work patterns, failure of some employers to report social security earnings to the Social Security Administration, lack of knowledge about securing benefits, and possible fear about applying for such benefits. An additional problem has been that some elderly Chicanos have held several social security numbers, and tracing of these has been difficult, if not impossible. (Senate Hearings, 1968-69:56, 57, 125, 258.)

Given what is known about the economic status of this group, it appears that persons who are going to be receiving minimal or no social security benefits feel that they have to continue in the job market to meet minimal shelter, clothing and nutritional needs. It is believed that many poor Chicano elderly who were not eligible or receiving minimal social security benefits are being helped by the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program. However, indepth information on the impact of SSI on this group is not available at this point.
The area of elderly Chicanos and private pensions is nonexistent in terms of research. It is speculated that Chicanos occupy the kinds of low level, common laborer jobs that generally do not have private pension plans. This particular area requires extensive research in relation to Chicanos because the lack of any kind of private pension program during their labor force participation history would almost insure inadequate income levels during retirement years for elderly Chicanos.

Beyond social security, SSI, and private pensions, continuing research must be performed on human services in general. Human services are available for the elderly Chicano throughout the Southwest, although at varying levels. Policy developers will have to examine the nonutilization or underutilization of existing services, taking into consideration cultural differences, language problems, immigration fears, illiteracy, geographical location of services and other considerations.

Beyond traditional forms of economic support, e.g., work, pensions, the question of family support for the elderly Chicano is an outstanding one. The extended family concept is generally applied to the Chicano family as an important aspect in determining sources of emotional and financial support for elderly Chicanos. However, according to the 1970 decennial census, only 9 percent of Chicano families were extended families which included grandchildren or parents of the head of household, with a concentration of these in Texas and the rural areas of the Southwest. (Urban Associates, 1974:42-3.)

Pechman, Taussig and Aaron point to the shift from a rural economic and social base to an urban one as a major reason for the disintegration of the extended family (Pechman, Taussig and Aaron 1968:30). If there is an inverse correlation between increased urban settings and decreased numbers of extended families within the Chicano community, then the Chicano extended family, as traditionally perceived, is now a thing of the past.

The major point to be made in the relation to this subject is the changing nature of the Chicano family. "As families become smaller, as family ties loosen, the aged Chicano undergoes increasingly severe psychological and economic problems." (Henry Santiestevan in Senate Hearings, 1968:69:590.)

Conclusion

The composite portrait of the elderly Chicano which has been presented is of a person whose socio-economic status is compounded by the multiple effects of age. It would be erroneous to make assumptions about situations which may no longer exist for the Chicano elderly. For example, it cannot be assumed that the Chicano family can care for its elderly without appropriate support systems. Variations in Chicano lifestyles, particularly between urban and rural areas, must also be noted. Assumptions cannot be made that because elderly Chicanos are almost nonexistent in extended long-term care facilities, that this is due to culture. An assessment has to be made about the interaction of cultural values with the economic situation of the family unit.
The whole area of human services provision has to be addressed in extensive research. The degree to which services are available versus the degree to which they are perceived to be accessible by the potential client group is a major question which must be addressed.

Beyond this, the whole issue of the appropriateness of existing services to elderly Chicanos must be assessed. Of particular import to the economic status of the elderly Chicano is his experience with the social security system, both as contributor into the system and as beneficiary. The interaction of life expectancy, years of covered employment and survivor benefit variables in relation to this group require exploration. The paucity of empirical studies, with the exception of those by Schmulowitz (1973) and Stepanovich (1976), invite further research into the economic situation of the present elderly Chicano cohort and future cohorts of Chicano elderly.

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THE FUTURE OF WELFARE PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES: FOUR APPROACHES*

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ABSTRACT

There are many theories which attempt to explain why the United States has become a welfare state. Four main approaches can be distinguished which focus on 1) the maintenance of social order; 2) welfare as empowerment; 3) welfare as an expression of egalitarianism; and 4) welfare as contributing to economic growth.

Similarly, there are many predictions about the likely future of the welfare state. They can be related to the four approaches which analyze the welfare state's historical origins and current function. The aim of this article is to clarify the debate about the future by relating the different predictions to these alternative approaches.

Introduction

The combination of an economic recession, the start of a new decade, and a national political turn-around has provoked a great number of analyses and predictions concerning the likely future of the welfare state. Its threatened demise under the onslaught of budget-cutting legislatures seems to have brought about a belated realization; namely, the United States has indeed become a welfare state, if an uneasy one, but it may not be able to afford this luxury much longer. In the face of economic stagnation, most analysts predict cutbacks in government services, with the central question being whether the response of those affected will be "turmoil" or "acquiescence" (Miller, 1980). By contrast, some suggest that instead of fiscal retrenchment only a new round of increased governmental expenditures, supported by a coalition of far-sighted businessmen and the poor, will prove feasible (Sweezy, 1979). Others accept the inevitability of cutbacks, but suggest trade-offs may be made, whereby a decrease in direct welfare services is offset by an increase in overall employment or non-monetary benefits (the New Republic, 1979).

As with all predictions, only time will tell for sure which ones are correct. However, it is possible to make a preliminary assessment by evaluating their

*I am grateful to Janice Weiss, Jim Pitts, Nancy DiTomaso and Robert Mier for their helpful comments on this paper.
assumptions. These predictions generally are not arbitrary, but are based on analyses of how the welfare state has come about historically and what it currently is. By examining their historical bases, one can judge the likely accuracy of the predictions. This article will delineate four different theories of the origin and expansion of the welfare state. Subsequently, I will show how predictions about the future of the welfare state are related to these four approaches. Ultimately, the correctness of each historical analysis might be evaluated to assess the likelihood of the future developing in that particular way. Such an evaluation is a task beyond the scope of this article. Its aim is to clarify the debate about the future by relating the different predictions to alternative historical analyses of the welfare state.

Approaches to the Welfare State

Four approaches to welfare and the concept of the welfare state can be distinguished.

1) The "social order" approach interprets welfare as the minimum largesse which the ruling strata of society must extend to maintain social order. By doing so they strengthen their own position vis-a-vis the ruled.

2) The "empowerment" model sees welfare not as something granted at the discretion of the ruling strata, but as concessions won by the beneficiaries in the course of a structural conflict. These benefits contribute further to the strength of the recipients.

3) The "equality" approach suggests that state welfare activities are an expression of egalitarianism and reflect a society-wide commitment to some form of equality.

4) Finally, the "economic growth" model focuses on the contribution of state welfare activities to economic growth, rather than seeing them as a voluntary or forced drain on economic resources.

Each of these four approaches will be discussed in detail below in the following format. First, the main structure of the argument will be developed; then I will briefly suggest what might constitute a test of the accuracy of each approach, and what it defines as the main problem of the welfare state. Finally, by way of example, each approach will be used to interpret various aspects of housing policy.

Approach No. 1: The maintenance of social order

One important political philosophy of the state has conceived of the state as "night watchman" (Briggs, 1961: 221), in which laissez faire is the general rule and the state act as the ultimate guarantor of social order. This includes the state's establishment of the judiciary, its foreign diplomacy, and defense. It also includes the provision of certain benefits to the poor to abate any threat they may pose to the
health and security of the upper classes or the stability of the social order. However, this assistance is not seen as having any direct economic purpose; it simply imposes a certain cost on the economy.

This perspective has been advocated by conservative ideologies as representing the proper role of the state and of a welfare system. However, it has also been put forth as a historical description of the origin of the state welfare activities. Whether going back to the Elizabethan Poor Laws or merely to the beginning of the Industrial Revolution, the role of the state in this perspective is seen as one of cleaning up after the ravages of economic dislocation, or minimizing the danger of a rebellious lower class.

The by now classic statement of this position is Piven and Cloward's oft-cited argument that "relief arrangements are initiated or expanded during the occasional outbreaks of civil disorder... and are then abolished or contracted when political stability is restored... Relief policies are cyclical--liberal or restrictive depending on the problems of regulation in the larger society with which government must contend" (Piven and Cloward, 1971:xiii).

A similar point is made by Edwards (1972) who, after analyzing the persistence of inequality in the face of many programs ostensibly aimed to eradicate it concludes:

...the welfare system cannot be viewed as a meaningful attack on inequality. Historically, it has never played that role. From the English Poor Laws of the sixteenth century to the Family Assistance Plan, welfare programs have simply kept the poor from becoming too poor, that is, from becoming rebelliously poor..." (Edwards, 1972:251).

The main problem for the state, in this perspective, is to determine how much intervention might be too little, insufficient to stabilize social order; or too much, constituting unnecessary expense or threatening the work incentive.

This approach provides the basis for certain inferences, whose accuracy could be used to assess the validity of the approach. These inferences relate mostly to the level of expenditures for welfare programs and its relation to social unrest. However, social unrest is difficult to measure other than by the activities of protest groups, etc., demanding more benefits. This makes this approach sometimes hard to distinguish from the second one, the "empowerment" approach. Regardless of what benefits are granted, it can be claimed either that a) they were demands won by the beneficiaries (the empowerment approach) or b) they constituted "repressive tolerance" and were the minimum necessary to maintain social order. This issue will be taken up again later.

As an example of this approach, the origin of governmental housing policy has been interpreted as an attempt to alleviate the overcrowding which caused epidemics to occur. Other programs are seen as seeking to destroy areas which could be used as sources of power by poor people. An early example is the urban renewal executed in 19th century Paris by Hausmann which was concerned precisely with considerations
of military strategy. More recent strategies of ghetto dispersal through urban renewal have also been interpreted as attempts to dilute potential political strength. This perspective sees the shifts in policies between public housing, urban renewal, subsidized construction, or consumer subsidies as manifestations of the technical problem of finding the correct mechanism. For instance, Harvey (1977) suggests that policies continually change because opposition invariably develops to any program.

Approach No. 2: Empowerment of the poor

In this approach the state is seen as a set of institutions concerned with maintaining the existing economic system on behalf of a relatively small set of people. However, the state is not all-powerful and is forced, occasionally, to give in to the demands of other groups. Welfare programs are seen as increasing the power of the poor who are the beneficiaries. Since dominant groups generally do not give up real power voluntarily, the extension of such benefits to the poor can, in this view, only come about as a result of active demands on their own behalf.

The anti-poverty programs in the 1960's serve as a multi-faceted example here. Some aspects can be seen as benefits achieved by the poor through their own efforts, rather than as ameliorative attempts by a conscience-stricken nation. At the same time, the true value of these programs can be considered to lie in the focus they provided for the organizing of the poor. The resulting organizations, such as the National Welfare Rights Organization, were subsequently able to obtain even more benefits (Piven and Cloward, 1977).

Within this perspective there are at least two tendencies, which sometimes overlap. One is the Marxist approach, the other is more pluralist, at least in the short run. In the Marxist view the state is the executive of the bourgeoisie (acting with more or less independence) and all current welfare programs are essentially concessions by the bourgeoisie to ensure continued smooth operation of its dominance. In this sense these reforms have a dulling effect on the antagonisms in society and therefore delay the chance for a coming to power of the working class. This does not differ from the analysis as discussed under the "social order" approach. However, at the same time these expanded welfare programs may have an unforeseen effect. Concrete programs are often the only type of socialism that people can understand; thus they may offer a vision of an alternative to capitalism. Additionally, these programs raise expectations and demands which may ultimately pose an insurmountable problem for the capitalist state, and create a revolutionary situation (George and Wilding, 1976:1-2-103).

Most organizers of the poor within the Community Action Program or the National Welfare Rights Organization espoused, publicly at least, a more pluralist view. Their notion was that the poor were effectively disenfranchised in a political system which operates through interest groups. By becoming organized, the poor would become able to participate in the new format of American politics.

As with the first approach, this one gives rise to the inference that welfare services will be expanded when the level of political activism among potential
beneficiaries is greatest. In order to assess the accuracy of the inference and distinguish it from the similar one in the social order approach, it is essential to determine to what extent the new benefits which are granted actually reflect the demands.

Using this approach to analyze, for example, current housing policy, one could interpret the Community Reinvestment Act as a result of communities' anti-redlining campaigns. Similarly, the shift from urban renewal to rehabilitation could be interpreted as due to the organized resistance of those affected. A few other programs, such as the increasing concern with displacement, might be claimed as victories for the poor. More importantly, however, organizing efforts around housing issues could be seen as a contribution to the development of stronger organizations of the poor.

Approach No. 3: The idea of equality

The third approach is heavily informed by the notion of equality. T.H. Marshall and Gunnar Myrdal give the clearest exposition of the relationship between equality and the welfare state. Marshall (1950) describes the development of citizenship as first including civil rights, then political rights, and finally, social rights. The last refers to the right to welfare or well-being, regardless of an individual's economic market value. Marshall relates this right to industrial development, arguing that the relationship between status groups in society changed when productive capacities were expanded and money incomes rose. This lessened some of the differences between groups and opened up access to the same types of goods to everyone. This social integration in turn changed the attitude towards welfare from one concerned with abating the obvious dangers and nuisances of destitution, to one that questioned inequality itself.

This mixture of intellectual reasons (the idea of equality) and institutional ones (changes in the economy) also appears in Myrdal (1960). He discusses the welfare state in the general context of state planning. In a democracy, he states, the power of the majority is effectuated through the state apparatus; however, in individual dealings most people remain subject to the control of the relatively small group who have the most economic power. The tendency is, therefore, for state intervention to grow, and for it to be egalitarian in nature. Thus, the joint commitments to democracy and equality presumably contribute to the development of the welfare state.

Among institutional reasons, Myrdal concentrates on two factors. One is the erosion of the free market, in which competition prevented any one actor from having undue influence. This erosion compelled the state to intervene. Second, the idea of state intervention was generally accepted during crises such as wars. These temporary interventions often became fixed features that remained even after the original motivation had disappeared.

In this view then, state welfare activities can either be seen as the result of the use of the state apparatus by the democratic majority, as Myrdal argues, or as the result of humanitarian or liberal motives on the part of an elite. In either
case, the key point is that welfare programs are considered as the rational implementation of a commitment to equality. While there is no direct economic purpose to this action, it is considered equitable to use some of the economic surplus to rectify inequalities which are at least partially caused by the economic system.

This approach represents the most frequent public justification for welfare activities by the state and appears in the United States as early as the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. Progressivism in the early part of this century was an influential embodiment of this approach, as were the public pronouncements accompanying the War on Poverty. Within these historical movements the notion of equality might mean a presumed equality of legal rights, an equalization of opportunities, or a striving for equal outcomes by differentiated treatment. These distinctions could be used to differentiate further various proponents of the equality approach; however, this issue will not be developed here.

The main problem for the welfare state in this approach is to control the level of services so that it grows no faster than the economy as a whole. A second set of problems relates to the implementation of welfare programs. These programs function in a market economy, where rewards are presumably based on productive capacity; in welfare programs, however, benefits are supposed to be divorced from an individual's market value. This gives rise to problems regarding pricing of services, the issue of in-kind versus cash benefits, stigmatization, and the equity achieved in the distribution of services.

Unlike the first approach, which related expanded welfare activities to social unrest, this perspective suggests that welfare programs will expand when needs increase and decline when needs decrease. Alternatively, the exigencies of financing these programs might suggest that they will expand during periods of economic growth and decline when growth declines. Other tests of whether this perspective is indeed the one informing welfare policy would be measurements of the extent to which inequality is indeed reduced by these programs, and who exactly the beneficiaries are. Of course, this is limited to the extent that outcomes do not always reflect goals or motivations.

In housing policy this approach is reflected in the Housing Act of 1949 which affirms the right of every citizen to decent, safe, and sanitary housing. A commitment to equal opportunity in housing and mortgage lending also fits in with this approach. Advocacy of housing allowances for the consumers of housing is similarly appropriate, since the stigma associated with living in known publicly subsidized housing is obviously anti-egalitarian.

In many ways this perspective has provided the background for most work in the field of housing policy. As Peter Marcuse states:

In the field of housing the view that government policies are addressed to meeting real housing needs or solving housing problems had pervaded the mainstream of professional literature for the past 30 years. On this basis efforts are made to determine the nature and scope of housing needs, their
origins, the mechanisms by which they must be dealt with. Evaluations gauge the results of housing programs against the goal of providing adequate housing for all, and recommendations proposed to better achieve that goal are thought to contribute to improved housing policy (Marcuse, 1978:21).

In other words, policies, like urban renewal, are described and analyzed in terms of their presumed contributions to better housing conditions. When these are obviously lacking, this is seen as a problem of inadequate operational knowledge or subversion by other interests.

Approach No. 4: Welfare as economic motor

In the previous perspectives, state welfare activities were essentially considered to be a burden on the economy, to be financed out of the economic surplus. In contrast, the fourth approach suggests that these state actions are in fact generators of economic surplus. Welfare programs are seen here as an outlet for the economic surplus which is generated, as a source of profits themselves, but even more importantly, as ultimately contributing to the productive potential of industry. Although Keynesian economics obviously begins to move in this direction, it still regards state intervention as a temporary measure to maintain aggregate demand, not as a continuous essential feature of economic growth.

The most detailed work on this subject has been done by O'Connor (1973). In his view, expansion of the state budget has three main sources. The first is the socialization of private costs of production, or the increased role of the state in sponsoring technological advances, education, and economic infrastructure improvements. Second, the social costs of private production, such as pollution, urban sprawl, and economic dislocation, have also increased. Third, there is a greater need to stabilize the economic order. As the economy becomes more oligopolistic, the myth of free enterprise becomes harder to sustain and requires more expenditures for the legitimation of corporation hegemony. Technological change also increases structural unemployment and thus necessitates more subsistence payments. However, these can be structures so as to encourage retraining or relocation. According to O'Connor, the main beneficiaries of this expansion are the oligopolistic industries, large unions, and government workers. Social expenditures should be on the rise to the extent that these sectors are able to influence state policy. However, there may also be tendencies to cut back on those programs which contribute least, or less directly, to ultimate productivity increases.

This approach is reflected, for instance, in the call for national economic planning. People such as Land Kirkland, president of the United Auto Workers, and Felix Rohatyn, of New York's Municipal Assistance Corporation, favor governmental intervention, rather than laissez-faire, to bring about renewed economic growth.

Applied to housing, this perspective has been used primarily by the left in analyzing the conjunctural and growth-generating function of housing policy. This encompasses many of the subsidy programs for new housing. Well-known by now is the analysis of urban renewal as opening the way for an expansion of the corporate and
commercial functions of the central city (Castells, 1979). Similarly, and unlike
the "empowerment" approach, this approach would interpret the Community Reinvest-
ment Act and the increased availability of rehabilitation subsidies as instruments
of gentrification, rather than as a reflection of residents' empowerment.

The future

The extent to which anything particular should be expected to happen during the
1980's depends on how severe one thinks the fiscal crisis of the welfare state is.
If the current situation is seen as no more problematic than anything previously,
then there is no reason to predict any dramatic changes. Whichever approach one
believes to be an accurate description will continue to be so, and the welfare state
will continue to operate along familiar lines. After all, many of the problems and
solutions of 1970 are still with us unresolved and unimplemented: concern with
fraud and effectiveness; the negative income tax; work requirements and training pro-
grams; poverty and poor education. If we muddled along since 1970, why not muddle
along until 1990?

According to this "there is no crisis" view, demands for federalization will
continue, and will continue to be stymied by the issue of federal versus local con-
trol. Efficiency and accountability will remain popular as concepts, with little
certainty about how to measure or achieve either. Some highly visible cutbacks may
have to be made in response to taxpayers' revolts, but most areas of government
intervention will remain untouched and continue to expand. If this view is correct,
predicting is not a very interesting activity.

However, if one believes that there is a crisis which demands a substantial
commitment to some solution, then the future becomes more important and interesting.
What people think should happen to the welfare state is not nearly as interesting
as what people think will happen. What will happen depends on which of the four
approaches described most accurately reflects reality, or will gain strong support.
The remainder of this paper will take each approach in turn and describe, on the
basis of various predictions, what would happen during the '80s if that particular
approach were the correct description of reality. In other words, what is likely
to happen if welfare state activities are indeed dominated by a "social order" per-
spective? What if the "empowerment" perspective is the most accurate one? This
analysis is based on the United States; specific responses and proposed measures
will differ in other countries, based upon their particular situation, strengths
and weaknesses. Similarly, if the situation in the 1980's in the United States
changes drastically, because of a major war, for instance, or major new oil dis-
covers, emphases and specifics will certainly change.

1. The Future: the maintenance of social order

In this perspective, there are two main problems for government during the
present fiscal crisis. One is how to make cutbacks in a wide variety of programs
and services without risking too much social unrest. The other side of that is how to convince recalcitrant taxpayers and their representatives of the need for a continued minimum of welfare services.

Expectations vary as to how severe a cutback will take place. At one extreme the cutbacks are painted as a total surrendering by those in power of even the pretense of rehabilitating or integrating the poor. The latter would simply be left to their own devices, administered and controlled by social service managers. This is reflected in expressions such as "the pariah city" (Hill 1976:42), "the city as reservation (Long, 1971), and "the city as sandbox" (Sternlieb, 1971). However, these seem to be "straw man" scenarios, rather than serious predictions.

Less extremely one would expect selective cutbacks to take place where they are least likely to generate opposition, such as in health care; some expansion might even take place in those services more directly aimed at quieting discontent, such as unemployment compensation (Miller, 1980). To increase further the selectivity of benefits, users charges are likely to be introduced in more and more areas (Burnham, 1980). Free or subsidized services have long been criticized by neo-classical welfare economists as wasteful. Pricing them would prevent over-consumption and allow a better assessment of relative preferences. Free or subsidized services, especially if available to everybody (such as public transportation) constitute a hidden state subsidy to many who don't need it nor need it to be pacified; thus it is a waste of governmental resources. Ultimately, this approach predicts a redefinition of the role of the state with regard to legitimization and socialization. The family will be expected to take over (or take back) many of the socialization and caring functions it has relinquished. This will be the justification behind cutbacks in daycare, youth programs, care for the elderly, etc.

Again, the main problem for the state, according to this approach, will be to find a happy medium between too much austerity, risking riots or more, and too little, risking taxpayer discontent as well as more economic trouble ahead. However, since the latter is less disastrous in the short run, there will be strong tendencies to err on that side, rather than risk extensive unrest.

2. The future: empowerment of the poor

Few of those who believe that the expansion of welfare results from citizens' pressure from below foresee much progress along these lines during the 80's. Some anticipate a decade of "crisis and turmoil" (Miller, 1980) in response to cutbacks in services and payments. The political balancing act which government has to engage in, as described in the previous section, will at times provide opportunity for small gains. At the same time, the political organizing associated with the turmoil may lay a basis for subsequent more lasting advances.

Changes of a less dramatic nature are depicted by Milton Kotler (1979), although here there is a thin line between prediction and wishful thinking. He believes that many neighborhood and community organizations have now reached a sufficient level of independence from local government, effectiveness of operation, and internal democracy,
that they could take over from government extensive service delivery responsibilities. In his view this would be compatible with a budget-cutting mood, because these grassroots organizations are presumably more efficient than government, better able to elicit private money and volunteer effort, and better at selecting appropriate levels and targets of services. "If neighborhood and community organizations are not brought into the process of service delivery and development during this period of budgetary tax restraint, there will be an erosion of economic well-being. Neighborhood and community organizations with their proven governing ability have a timely responsibility to fill the gap and sustain the general economic and social level of the American people" (Kotler, 1979:43).

Along somewhat similar lines, Castells has predicted that people will more and more "opt out of inflation" by forming their own cooperatives for food, housing, child and health care, etc., substituting non-monetary exchange wherever possible (Castells, 1979). Thus, both Kotler and Castells anticipate forms of self-help and community control to expand, rather than contract in the face of the fiscal crisis.

There are other trends which reflect the possibility of increased benefits through people's action, even in the face of cutbacks. For instance, political or community control over plant closings and relocations seems likely to grow. Along with this sensitivity to investment issues, union members and municipal employees are likely to demand a more socially responsible and beneficial policy regarding their pension fund investments (Percy, 1980).

Another field in which similar changes are likely to occur is that of housing. The pressures of escalating energy and maintenance costs make private low-income rental housing more and more a thing of the past, as in many Western European countries it already is. Community organizations are increasingly in the position to take over the ownership and/or management of such housing. Alternatively, since elimination of the profit factor alone does not make this housing economically viable, it may become publicly owned (Stone, 1980). In either case there are more chances for an increase in control and benefits for the residents than under private ownership.

In sum, this perspective sees welfare services during the '80s under severe attack. However, the retrenchment will also generate resistance which may be channeled not only to hold on to what currently exists but also to advance in new directions.

3. The future: the idea of equality

As with the empowerment approach, those who see the welfare state as a reflection of ever-increasing equality anticipate severe problems due to budgetary constraints. However, while some anticipate that cutbacks will generate protests and perhaps some "empowerment" for those most affected, few predict a continuation of welfare state activities along liberal lines. Liberals more than any other political grouping have been divided now that a choice seemingly must be made between economic growth and the pursuit of equality. The normative liberal tendency is likely to be forced into alignment with one of the other three approaches. This is already evident
in the growth of the "new-conservatives", centered around such ex-liberals as Irving Kristol, Nathan Glazer and Daniel Patrick Moynihan.

The equality approach has always set much stock by legal guarantees of rights, which can often be extended without any budgetary consequences. It is possible that this tool will be used more and more to replace monetary benefits. Examples would be the extension of workplace democracy, ERA, environmental restrictions, citizen participation, accountability of public employees, etc. Just as during the 1950's American labor unions gave up power claims in exchange for wage increases, European unions have already begun to demand workplace democracy in exchange for wage restraint (Logue, 1979). With appropriate modifications for the American situation, a similar development could be expected in the United States.

Even those who continue to call themselves "liberals" accept the need for cutbacks. For instance, an editorial in The New Republic argues that liberals should be willing to accept reductions in social programs such as legal services and the deductibility of mortgage interest, as well as the abolition of the minimum wage. However, in exchange there should be a guaranteed minimum income and a full-employment policy. Other measures which are seen as promoting equality without overburdening the budget are the elimination of price supports and trade barriers, the expansion of health and environmental regulations, and making the health industry competitive (The New Republic, 1979). Again, this is more a normative statement than a prediction; there are few hopeful liberals.

The assumed goal of welfare policy in this approach is some form of equality or equal opportunity. Lenkowsky notes that as equality of opportunity became established through the satisfaction of basic needs, liberals shifted their goal to equality of outcomes (Lenkowsky, 1979). Regardless of the truth of any part of Lenkowsky's observation, it suggests that liberals may make use of the flexibility of the concept of equality by defining it so it encompasses whatever happens.

4. The future: Welfare as economic motor

Within this perspective the existence of an economic crisis is fully accepted. However, wholesale budget reductions are not seen as the answer; the approach is closer to the old "spending yourself out of a recession", but with a new twist.

Sweezy notes that sharp reductions and the repression needed to contain the subsequent unrest would be too costly for many members of the upper (middle) class. Neither would they solve the problem of over-accumulation, which would reappear as soon as full employment is approached again. Rather than cutbacks, some form of increased consumption is necessary. Sweezy anticipates a possible alliance between the working class and far-sighted parts of the ruling class, similar to the coalition which produced the New Deal (Sweezy, 1979). During the election campaign, John Anderson and George Bush were representatives of this approach, while Reagan fits more into the "social order" approach. The Reagan-Bush presidency has of course emphasized the latter and retitled it "supply-side economics," which assumes that the economy will rebound automatically as soon as the state reduces its burden of taxation. It remains to be seen whether a high level of state expenditures is not inevitable to accomplish the desired "reindustrialization".
Now, if state expenditures are to be more consciously harnessed for economic growth, they will have to be effectively and efficiently used. This "rationalization" affects the nature of the expenditures and their overall management. The key words relating to the nature of the expenditures are "triage" (or "creaming") and "leverage". Triage means that expenditures and programs will be aimed where they can be expected to have the greatest pay-off, rather than where human needs may be greatest. Thus, job training for the cyclically unemployed, with obsolete skills, is more likely than training for the hard-core unemployed; and subsidies for new construction or housing rehabilitation are more likely in areas with a chance at gentrification than in the central ghetto. The latter example also points to the importance of leverage; state expenditures will be made where they have the greatest chance of providing an incentive to private investments.

In terms of the management and control over state activities there seems to be a trend towards increased private sector involvement. Some of this is expressed in the notion of "partnership" which has become so popular in development projects. For instance, CETA programs which involve placement in non-public jobs have recently been placed under the authority of local Private Industry Councils, made up of business representatives. An even more striking imposition of corporate methods and controls has occurred in New York City and Chicago. In the wake of fiscal crises emergency control boards dominated by banks and other businesses were given extensive authority over city expenditures in New York, and the school system in Chicago. Another example is the "rationalization" of social services (Patry, 1978), i.e., the attempt to bring scientific management to the human services.

Probably the most complete version of corporate management of social programs is offered by City Venture Corporation, a profit-making subsidiary of Control Data Corporation and some others. City Venture acts as a combination urban renewal agency, developer, and management company. It realizes large-scale commercial, industrial, and social service projects in depressed areas, combining government grants and private investment. Its philosophy is that there is money to be made in poor neighborhoods, but that government does not have the capability to put together large enough projects to make the social investments pay off (City Venture, 1979).

Conclusion

There is near-universal agreement that the problem of stagflation is the crucial one to solve for the 1980's, and that it cannot be ignored, not even by liberals or the left. For instance, Milton Kotler, executive director of the National Association of Neighborhoods, writes: "It would be a mistake to exempt our neighborhood and community organizations (even some in low- and moderate-income and minority communities) entirely from the growing consensus for budgetary and tax restraint" (Kotler, 1979:38). Similarly, leftist planner John Mollenkopf says: "Neighborhood activists must rise above the junior version of pork barrel liberalism which the last several decades of government policy have frequently led them to adopt. They must also take taxation, consumption, and inflation issues far more seriously by developing programs which respond to working people's real needs in these areas" (Mollenkopf, 1979:25). Other writers' positions in this respect have been noted above.
As a second point of agreement, all four perspectives discussed foresee that the more cutbacks are made, the more likelihood there will be of protest and activity along the lines of the empowerment approach. Given that situation, a much safer course for capitalism is to follow the "economic motor" approach, with liberal doses of "equality" verbiage as justification. This combination deals much more constructively with the question of legitimation than the "social order" approach by offering both economic growth and increased equality, as opposed to repression. However, whether the selective rendering of benefits under the "economic motor" approach will be adequate is an open question. It may merely represent the latest version of Keynesian economics, no more able to keep the system going than the first one was.

The mixture of elements from each of the approaches which we are likely to see in the years ahead, points out that while these approaches can stand on their own analytically, none provides a complete working model of society. Which model best describes the dominant trend shifts over time and with the policy areas studied. Therefore, the debates between adherents of the different approaches often have a hollow ring to them: their arguments are usually based on different periods or different subjects. When this is not so, evidence is usually presented for one case only--the United States, for instance--making conclusions hard to prove or disprove. Nevertheless, if properly specified by time and subject the debate is useful for showing how certain aspects of the welfare state developed. Ideally, this can then be used as the basis for predictions about the future. For this to occur, however, there must be agreement on the terms of the debate. The four alternative approaches presented here should help clarify that debate.

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"THE REAGAN ELECTION AND MANDATE: THEIR FISCAL POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR THE WELFARE STATE"*

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ABSTRACT

This paper has three main thrusts. The first searches the Reagan campaign, the 1980 Republican Platform, the election and survey results to determine whether or not Reagan can creditably lay claim to a mandate for his social policies. The second thrust investigates the 1982 Reagan spending and taxing programs. Our purpose here is to ascertain if those policies denote major new directions in U.S. social policy. Our third purpose involves an assessment of the Reagan fiscal policies upon the U.S. economy.

This study concludes: (1) Reagan can claim a mandate for much of his social policies, (2) the Reagan fiscal policies are a significant departure from the national policy of the recent past, and (3) the consequences of the Reagan policies of the future are so negative that his policies will require reversal -- either by his administration or a new administration following his defeat or retreat.

From mid-February to mid-July of 1981, the interval between the Reagan speech articulating his budget cuts and the Reagan budget victory in the House, the cry went up the hill to the Capitol and across the land that the Reagan cuts were responsive to a clear demand from voters and mandated by the election of 1980. Phrases such as voter demands and election mandates are political symbols. Their definitions are not consistent, but are determined by the time and content of the political debates with which they are associated. Two early purposes of this paper are: (1) to apply a definition to these terms and phrases and (2) to search the evidence of the 1980 presidential campaign and election to assess whether they could be said to have expressed the voice of the nation on the question of federal social services spending.

Symbols are powerful tools in politics (Edleman, 1964). The use of uniforms, icons, martyrs, emblems, furnishings, architecture, music and countless other items to secure and maintain respect for authority has long been noted. Words and phrases are also powerful tools in the policy process. Key phrases from political speeches have often had an impact upon national policy directions. Notable examples of this phenomena were contained in the Gettysburg Address, the Cross of

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Gold convention mover from William Jennings Bryant, Franklin Roosevelt's first inaugural and war declaration, Kennedy's confident and comforting inaugural address and the prideful -- if ambiguous and disrupting -- call for Black Power during the Civil Rights Movement. Mandates have often been claimed for previous national election victories. Among these were the New Deal, the Fair Deal, and the Great Society. The Reagan claim is in that category.

The claim, accepted as creditable, that one's policy positions are the will of the people and legitimated by electoral victory is a compelling political strategy. In a functioning representative system, such a claim puts a would be recalcitrant legislator under considerable pressure to conform. Flaunting "the will of the people," in face of the continual need to seek reelection requires considerable political confidence, or an indifference to early retirement, or a sense of reckless abandon.

That Reagan won the psychological strength of this strategy, on the tax and budget cuts, is undeniable. He united his party's various congressional elements to single-minded support of his proposals and weaned sufficient strength from those Democrats in the House of Representatives; although many of the latter had long been allies of the Republicans on economic issues and may also have been motivated by the conservative congressional victories and media focus on the Moral Majority. Even prior to the key votes, he gained the opposition's acceptance to the great brunt of his proposals and then his forces went on to gain victory on almost all of the marginal issues as well. The argument can be made, and will be made later in this article, that the content of these victories was a major change in the thrust of social services. That argument, however, can not and does not diminish the political significance of those victories. In the contexts of time and power, the political success of these victories rates very close to that of FDR's 100 days (Newsweek, 1981a).

Perhaps in terms of "Realpolitik" a mandate is a mandate if, and only if, the claim to the phenomena succeeds in the policy process. Most analysts have desired a more probing measure of such concepts. One such measure was put forward by a committee of the American Political Science Association in 1950 (Committee on Political Parties, 1950). Directed by the membership of that association to formulate a statement of the elements necessary to the attainment of a responsible political system, the statement essentially contained three points. While the committee primarily addressed political party systems, the standards they produced, with minor modification in wording, can also be used to measure possession of a policy mandate. The following three points are offered as our measure of the presence or absence of a mandate.

1. Candidates must formulated clear policy positions.
2. Candidates and the political institutions they control must campaign on those policies.
3. Victorious candidates must dedicatedly seek the enactment and implementation of their enunciated policies.

The essence of these goals is the requirements to say what you're going to do, to stick by what you said, and to try to do what you said you would do. By examining the campaign positions of Reagan and the Republican platform, produced under his control, we will attempt to assess how well Reagan pursued these
requirements to verify his claim of an electoral mandate. We will also attempt to carry this analysis one further step by looking at the election results and available public opinion reports in the effort to determine if the voters were hearing the Reagan messages and voting with reference to these messages. We are thus asking did Reagan's behavior permit the claim of a mandate and did the voters realize that they were legitimating such a claim.

IN SEARCH OF A MANDATE

President Reagan and his allies clearly asserted a mandate claim for the budget framework they carried to Congress in the Spring of 1981. Reagan, in historic western style, staked his claim early in the quest for a budgetary mother lode. In his televised budget message he referred to the 1980 election as a "mandate for change" in governmental spending patterns and later in that address he personalized his use of this symbol by using the phrase, "our mandate" (Newsweek, 1981b). In the following 150 days until the administration was to attain its sweeping House victory on the Gramm-Lotta vote the message of mandate was peppered at Congress in countless speeches and statements by the President, and his supporters from rostrum to rostrum across the U.S.

Not all analysts shared the meaning that the White House found in the election. Among those that demurred from mandate interpretation were those associated with the Eagleton Institute of Politics. This group, under the leadership of Gerald Pomper, a leading scholar of electoral analysis, was the first to get into print with a protracted account of the 1980 presidential election (Pomper, 1981). The Eagleton group saw the 1980 election as a vote of no confidence in Carter and not a vote of confidence in Reagan. In their words, they wrote:

"Overall, there is no reason to accept the election outcome in 1980 as indicating a conservative tide in this country, even though the elected candidate was clearly known and perceived by a majority of the electorate as a conservative." (Pomper, p. 115).

and again they said, "The new President does not have a mandate for conservative policies; instead, he has a mandate to be different from Jimmy Carter." (Pomper, p. 117) and finally they declared, "There is no ideological mandate for the Reagan administration." (Pomper, p. 116).

The Primary Campaign. The 1980 primary season gave us a reversal of the normal pattern of little or no competition and infighting from the incumbent's party (Pomper, p.1). By contrast the Republican nominating contest was marked by relative serenity. Reagan was the early leader and, except for several good efforts by Bush in the New England primaries, Reagan's dominance was never challenged. As a result Reagan was under little pressure to lay out a clear position (U.S. News and World Report, 1980a). In the early going Reagan stayed very close to the same speech he had been giving since 1964, attacking the bureaucracy, the USSR, praising private enterprise and calling for deductions in taxes on inheritances and savings accounts (U.S. News and World Report, 1980b). Some specifics became clearer in the primary period. Reagan had embraced the Kemp-Roth tax outline and called for restraining federal spending by cutting
"expenditures, employees, new programs, fraud and abuse." (U.S. News and World Report, 1980c). The move to block grants was also foreshadowed by repeated reference to giving state and local governments responsibility for many state and local programs then in federal hands (CQ Weekly Reports, 1980a). In general terms Reagan did announce his coming assault on social services spending during the primaries but details were too sparse to permit the foretelling the social impact.

The Republican Convention. Some aspects of the July gathering suggested some moderation of the conservative Reagan position. Among these were the mere fact of meeting in Detroit, the honoring of Republican moderates on the stage, the film biography of Reagan which stressed his labor credentials and the opening, later aborted, to Ford on the Vice-Presidential nomination. But the convention was firmly in the control of the Reagan forces and the platform confirmed and extended the hard conservative line. The following excerpts suggest little ambiguity. We were told, in the section on taxes and government, "federal spending ... is now over 21 percent [of GNP]. We pledge to reduce it ..." and "By increasing economic growth, tax rate reduction will reduce the need for government spending on unemployment, welfare and public jobs programs." (Congressional Record, 1980, p. 28). From the section on welfare we hear that the then current programs were "degrading, dehumanizing, wasteful, overlapping, and inefficient programs that invite waste and fraud but inadequately assist the needy poor." "Those features of the present law, particularly the food stamp program, that draw into assistance programs people who are capable of paying for their own needs should be corrected." "We support a block grant program that will return control of welfare programs to the states..." (Congressional Record, 1980, p.5). No assisted group--blacks, women, Hispanics, the handicapped--was given hope for support; rather the Kemp-Roth tax cuts would produce a healthy economy that would bring income to all. Political platforms are campaign documents and for such a document this one spoke with remarkable clarity. Even those who denied that Reagan secured a mandate in his election got the message when they wrote that the platform "was a clear repudiation of the welfare state." (Pomper, p. 51)

The Campaign for the Presidency. While the GOP platform, carefully crafted by the Reagan forces, did, with reasonable clarity, seem to provide the base for a Reagan mandate claim, the follow-up campaign provided few details through the ensuing months. Reagan was under increasing pressure to fill in the details from the Democrats and sectors of the media. The mandate issue during this period turned on one speech, delivered in Chicago before The International Business Council, on September 9. Douglas E. Kneeland of the New York Times (1980a) indicated the importance given this address by labelling it "a long-waited major speech on the economy." Later the prestigious National Journal (1981) said, the Reagan White House staff pointed to the Chicago speech, along with the November victory, as the basis of the mandate claim for their budget program. The major print media correctly reported the significant budget cut figures. These were Reagan's claim to cut the FY 81 budget, as requested by Carter, two percent and additional cuts up to seven percent by FY 84 with the belief that the cut by that year (1985) would actually be 10 percent. After the speech, unnamed Reagan aides were said to have indicated that these cuts would amount to $13 billion dollars in FY 81 and $64 billion by FY 84 at seven percent or $92 billion dollars at 10 percent.
Key portions of the nation’s establishment national press choose to label this speech moderate. Lou Cannon, on the front page of the next day’s *Washington Post* (1980), declared that the speech was "far more modest than his campaign rhetoric over the past several months implied." Cannon went on to say that undesignated Reagan advisors believed that the speech would protect Reagan from Carter charges "that a Reagan administration would drastically cut the federal budget." Steve Ratner for the *New York Times* (1980b) found it significant that Reagan had not claimed that the tax cuts would pay for themselves, that Social Security would not be cut and that Reagan would not support a national health program. *The U.S. News and World Report* (1980d) also pointed to the lack of a claim that tax cuts would pay for themselves, stressed cuts would come from cutting waste and inefficiency rather than changing entitlements and thus seemed to support the view that the speech moderated the previous Reagan positions. Even the usually nonjudgemental *CQ Weekly Report* (1980b) declared that Reagan backed away from earlier claims of a "massive overhaul of government programs" in terms of shifting authority to lower level governments.

These press interpretations are important. If the speech was moderate then the claim for a mandate is weakened. Additionally these are pace setting media outlets, the networks and other reporters take cues from these elite sources (Crouse, 1973 and Patterson, 1976). If they read Reagan's program as moderate their influence through the broader media could have served to mislead the voting public. We can get some feel for the substance of these claims by looking at some quotes from the speech as taken from the full transcript as published in the *New York Times* (1980c). The transcript provides us with the following quotes, "We must move boldly, decisively and quickly to control the runaway growth of Federal spending." and "We must keep the rate of growth of government spending at reasonable and prudent levels." On the point of restructuring the government the phrase was, "More, more administrative authority to the states." Perhaps the media pack had heard these words so often that they took consistency for moderation. More interestingly they ignored the hoped for 10 percent cut in spending by FY 84 even though they reported it. Nearly a $100 billion dollars hardly seems moderate. It must also be said that Reagan did not say entitlements would go uncut, he said necessary entitlements would not be taken back. Nor was it said that Social Security benefits would go uncut. It was said that the system would attain integrity and benefits would become meaningful. Uncut indeed!

The General Election. Five presidential elections in this century are usually rated as landslides; these were Hoover over Smith, Roosevelt over Landon and Wilkie (in 1940), Johnson over Goldwater, and Nixon over McGovern. In those elections the victor received over 60 percent of the total vote and lost no more than five states. Reagan's victory was not quite up to those standards but it was close. He carried every region of the nation and lost only four states. He attained 56.6 percent of the two-party vote and this, as we shall see later, would probably have been higher without Anderson in the race.

Carter became the first Democrat and the third incumbent of the century to fail to gain reelection. Save for Hoover's victory, the landslide candidates were all incumbents. Moreover, Reagan took strength away from every category of normal Democratic support, and from Carter's 1976 victory, except among black voters. Of
the past 12 elections McGovern was the only Democrat to get a lower percentage of the two-party vote than Carter. Reagan even carried the South against a native born, born again, Democratic incumbent President. Reagan got 51 percent of the total vote to Carter's 41 percent and Anderson's seven percent. That is the only figure that keeps Reagan's victory from qualifying as a landslide.

Many have sought to deny the presence of policy significance in the Reagan election. Some pointed to turnout and maintained that a 53 percent voter turnout renders Reagan a minority President and invalidates any claim he may make to a policy mandate. We must note that the turnout for the 1932 and 1948 elections were lower than the 1980 rate. By this reasoning Roosevelt and Truman would have even less claim to policy change. Additionally, the 1980 turnout was only marginally lower than the preceding two. Low turnout in 1980 would appear to relate to longer term factors than the Reagan, Carter, Anderson, Clark and Commoner alternatives.

Anderson provides another thrust against mandate. This position claims that either a Carter victory or a much closer election had Anderson not been on the ballot. Survey data throws dust in the eyes of this effort as it holds that more of the Anderson voters would have voted for Reagan than Carter had they been the only choices. Carter would have been a minority winner even if he had gotten all of the Anderson vote in some special electoral college confirmation producing a victory in that odd, if venerable, institution.

The CBS/NYT Exit survey did demonstrate that 25 percent of the voters said they made their minds up on which candidate to support in the last two weeks of the election, a figure reported as the highest measured over the six elections but very close to the 1976 figure. Still Reagan comes off well here as 22 percent of his voters fell into this category compared to 23 for Carter and 45 for Anderson (Public Opinion, 1981a).

Reagan also received the edge on personal appeal. The survey reported that 24 percent of the respondents replied they were mainly voting against other candidates, but of the Reagan voters only 18 percent took this position while the comparable figures for Carter and Anderson were 25 and 49.

The preponderance of the evidence from these statistics cannot--of themselves--deny Reagan's claim to a mandate.

Budget Policy During the Transition. Between the election and Reagan's budget address on February 9th there were clear indications that raids into the proposed Carter budget might go further than the campaign positions had indicated. While the nation's attention was heavily drawn to the hostage release negotiations in the early part of this period, the presidential transition groups were giving serious attention to the FY 81 and FY 82 budgets. Casper Weinberger, head of the budget policy transition group, was the first to signal this new dimension by indicating that their budget might be $26 billion dollars below the Carter proposals (Time, 1980a). David Stockman repeated this position upon the announcement of his designation as head of the Office of Budget and Management by saying that the cuts might go beyond the 2 percent earlier announced by Reagan (Time, 1980b). In an interview just before Christmas, Reagan suggested that some "unnecessary entitlements" may have been found when he said, "But there can be a tightening up of regulations that make it legitimately possible for people of rather fair income
to continue getting certain welfare grants." (Time, 1981). However, by the time of Reagan's first Presidential press conference it became clear that the campaign position was going to be adhered to and this was firmed up in the budget message which put the FY 81 cuts at $15 billion and those for the following year in the $40 to $50 billion range.

Without knowing motives, this reinstatement of the campaign position did deny opponents of the cuts the ability to attack the claim of mandate on the grounds that the asked for cuts went beyond those announced during the campaign. It also became clear to many observers that the Reagan forces might have an easier time than earlier thought in getting their budget package through Congress. The Economist (1981) noted that Congress was not spoiling for a fight saying, "...the Democratic House of Representatives is in a chastened, conservative mood and even liberals such as Mr. David Obey, a representative from Wisconsin, thinks Mr. Reagan's programme should be given a chance." The administration was seeking almost exactly what Reagan had said it would in his Chicago campaign speech. Hence, the mandate affirmation can not be denied on the grounds of program shifts.

What the Public Heard. The provided criteria for the mandate claim do not require that significant numbers of citizens be aware of, or even desire, an elected official's program. What is required is that the official, when a candidate, make clear the program and adhere to it after assuming office. Even so it may be useful to review the available measures of public reaction. The attempts can not be precise as survey timing, question wording and question choice do not always neatly lend themselves to queries of secondary research; but some indications of the public mood regarding cuts in social services can be assessed. This problem is no where clearer than on the matter of what the citizens were hearing and perceiving about the campaigns and particularly where candidates stood upon issues. Only one survey incidence was discovered bearing upon the issues of this inquiry. A CBS/NYT Poll taken at the time of the Anderson-Reagan debate asked if either of those two candidates favored decreasing domestic spending. Forty-nine percent of the respondents named Reagan while only 17 percent designated Anderson. In the same survey 69 percent said Reagan favored tax cuts. These figures are subject to many interpretations. We can be alarmed that half of the sample was ignorant of Reagan's position or delighted that half knew that position. Comfort can be taken in the difference between the reported Reagan-Anderson positions on the grounds that those who knew were not guessing wildly. There is also the matter that there was a 40 percent more accurate appraisal of Reagan's tax cut position than his spending position (Pomper, p. 107).

It appears to us that, more than anything else, this matter raises the question of how the public learns about campaigns. For many years it has been consistently reported by citizens that about three-fourths of them secure most of their political information from television and that, by almost the same high margin, they have more faith in the integrity of television reporting than any other media (Feigert and Conway, p. 365 and Roper, 1976). At the same time studies and commentaries have drummed a steady beat of criticism at television news shows for ignoring the substantive issues raised in political campaigns (Patterson and McClure, p. 21). These criticisms point to, and document, the contention that the brunt of television campaign coverage is directed toward candidate personality,
candidate blunders, and the campaign as a game—that is who is winning and who is losing. While the subject of public clarity is secondary to this analysis we can not fail to note, that under the circumstances of media coverage in this nation, it may be amazing that almost 50 percent of the public correctly got Reagan’s message a few weeks before the election.

Public Opposition to the Cuts. It is reasonably clear that citizens do not sense that they have become remarkable more conservative. The CBS/NYT Poll found that the number of respondents, on a forced response question, designating themselves as conservatives increased from 18 percent to 20 percent from 1976 to 1980. This slight two point increase is within the margin of error and certainly carries no clear indication of a conservative direction in the nation (Pomper, p. 107). That same report provided data stating that only four points more of the 1980 respondents wanted domestic spending cut over the 1976 respondents. A July 1979 study by the Opinion Research Association adds support to the contention that the nation is not massively moving to a conservative position. Its findings demonstrated that a majority of Americans felt entitled to a wide range of social services: 90 percent felt entitled to adequate public transportation, 85 percent to guaranteed work for the willing and able, 59 percent to free graduate and professional schooling, 55 percent for free doctor and hospital care for all and 53 percent for free dental care (Public Opinion, 1981b, p. 16).

The 1980 National Opinion Research Center’s study adds more evidence on this point. NORC respondents did not think the government should cut spending on services such as health and education by a margin of 43 to 31 percent. Those same respondents took a liberal position on income redistribution by reporting that the government should reduce income differences at a 44 to 31 percent difference (Public Opinion, 1980a, pp. 22-23). Even as President Reagan was preparing his budget message to the nation in February 1981 there were discordant notes from the Gallup-Newsweek Poll findings. It found pluralities saying the Federal government was spending too little on highways, urban development, child nutrition, and farm price supports (Newsweek, 1981c). These indicators all suggest that Reagan and the Republicans will be in deep political trouble if their programs do not bring noticable prosperity to a broad range of American citizens.

Readings of Reagan’s popularity also suggest that his grip upon the national emotions is ephemeral. Even in the campaign a Time poll, completed two weeks before the election, placed Reagan 13 percentage points behind Carter and only one percent ahead of Anderson on confidence in the ability of the three candidates in the handling of the economy (Time, 1980c). Similarly, a study of the popularity of recent first year presidents informs us that Reagan’s popularity, at similar points in time, was four percent below that of Nixon and Carter and 10 and 11 percent below that of Kennedy and Eisenhower respectively (Germond and Witcover, 1981). The Reagan honeymoon was either not as long or not as warm as that of his predecessors. Finally the media widely noted an increased public disapproval of Reagan. Gallup reported Reagan’s approval rose nine points between January and March, while disapproval climbed 11 points (Gallup, 1981) and in August the AP/NBC News poll found a low 55-42 approval-disapproval split (Newsweek, 1981a).

We find, in sum, indications that the nation had not suddenly or permanently become conservative, that not all the Reagan spending cuts have strong support and
that the Reagan charm is subject to deterioration. We shall see, on the other
hand, that there are also notable areas of support for the Reagan domestic program.

Public Support for the Cuts. One survey development that had Republican
leaders gleefully talking about was the increase in the percentage of voters
identifying themselves as Republicans. For many years that figure had been in the
low 20's. It has been on the increase in 1981. Confining ourselves to one service
for question standardization and monthly results, we utilized the CBS/NYT poll. In
1980 the monthly average for Republicans was 22, for Democrats it was 42.
Democrats had been losing ground for more than a decade but to Independent status
rather than to Republicans. In January 1981 the Republican identification showed
growth and reached 26 relative to the Democrats 34. These numbers assume more
drama when the portion of respondents saying they were independents is distributed
on a second question asking if they lean more to one party or the other and, if
yes, which party. Viewed this way, the 1980 figures were Democrats 53, Republicans
34 and the similar April 1981 figures were a startling 54 to 41. The White House
pollster actually put the Republicans in the lead by one point at 40 to 41
(Public Opinion, 1981c).

For many voters the state of the economy was important during the 1980
election. Although we earlier saw one survey giving Carter highest marks on
the economy, the NBC-AP Survey, two weeks prior to election day had the public
placing Reagan two to one over Carter on being best at solving economic problems
(Public Opinion, 1981a). Reagan got 60 percent of his vote from those saying that
inflation was the worst problem they faced and 64 percent from those saying that
their financial position had worsened in the past year (Pomper, p. 87).

A 1980 NORC study indicated that Reagan had the public with him on some social
service spending cuts by finding only 14 per cent of that sample said we were
spending too little on welfare (Public Opinion, 1980a). That finding is confused
by a latter Harris Survey (March, 1981) that has 72 percent, up from 68 in 1973,
saying that the government should see to it, "that the poor are taken care of, that
no one goes hungry, and that every person achieves at least a minimum standard of
living." (Public Opinion, 1981d). Who can doubt the power of language?

After Reagan's February budget speech, Gallup-Newsweek Poll found respondents
reporting that they had a more favorable impression of Reagan since the election to
16 percent less favorable, the rest being undecided or having constant feelings on
the matter. Over two-thirds of this sample felt Reagan had been successful in
persuading people on the need for spending cuts and a strong plurality of the
sample agreed with the Reagan position that government spending caused inflation
over other items like oil costs, personal spending, wage demands, interest rates
and business profits. Highest on respondents lists for cuts—in order—were food
stamps, postal services, job programs, and arts-humanities programs. Finally, 57
percent thought it likely that Reagan would get inflation under control (Newsweek,
1981c). In March, 1981 59 percent of a Harris sample said they agreed with the
statement that, "The best government is the government that governs the least."
That was up 21 points from 1976 and 27 points from 1972 (Public Opinion, 1981d).
An April Gallup survey found a new optimism about the future five years hence with
46 percent saying they would be better off to 29 seeing things worse. In 1979
those figures were 24 for better to 43 for worse. In that same survey, for the
first time in three and one-half years, more Americans reported being better off than in the previous year than worse off. While 42 percent of the respondents thought they might be hurt by the Reagan cuts, these people approved of the cuts by 31 to 14, the remainder giving no usable response.

What Then of a Mandate? In the traditional sense Reagan had his mandate. The program was clear, it was a part of the campaign and it has been written into policy. Others will argue, using survey data, that there was no mandate (see: Memo from Cope, 1981). Our reading of the survey data goes both ways. The data are far from clear and either side of the controversy can claim comfort, if not truth.

It is important to remember that the process has just begun. Even before sweetening the tax cut proposal Reagan was going to have to get $74 billion more out of the budget to meet his own projections and assumptions for balancing the budget. Balancing the budget is a high goal for his administration and the public has steadily said that achieving that goal is more important to them than a tax cut (Public Opinion, 1980a). With the vote buying--auction swollen--additions to the tax measure, the cuts will have to be even deeper if the budget balancing pledge is to be reached.

THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S BUDGET AND TAX CUTS

Most sociologists see federal budgetary decision making as unrelated to their basic interests and concerns (Padgett, 1981). There is, however, both a long standing historical (Goldsheid, 1917 and Schumpeter, 1918) and contemporary interest (O'Connor, 1973 and Bell, 1976) in fiscal sociology. Joseph Schumpeter summed up this concern best,

The fiscal history of a people is above all an essential part of its general history. An enormous influence on the fate of nations emanates from the economic bleeding which the needs of the state necessitate, and from the use to which its results are put ... Fiscal measures have created and destroyed industries, industrial forms and industrial regions even where this was not their intent, and have in this manner contributed directly to the construction (and distortion) of the edifice of the modern economy and through it of the modern spirit. But even greater than the causal is the symptomatic significance of fiscal history. The spirit of a people, its cultural level, its social structure, the deeds its policy may prepare--all this and more is written in its fiscal history, stripped of all phrases. He who knows how to listen to its message, here discerns the thunder of world history more clearly than anywhere else.

The public finances [therefore] are one of the best starting points for an investigation of society, especially though not exclusively of its political life ... Notwithstanding all the qualifications which always have to be made in such a case, we may surely speak of a special set of facts, a special set of problems, and of a special approach--in short, of a special field: fiscal sociology, of which much may be expected (1954, pp. 6-7).
The main concerns of fiscal sociology are to discover the principles governing the volume and allocation of the Federal and State finances and expenditures and the distribution of the tax burden among various economic classes.

In this section of the paper we will analyze the Reagan (1981) and Carter (1981) budget and tax proposals. As most informed citizens know, the debate surrounding Reagan's cuts use the Carter 1982 budget as a baseline. We will also look specifically at the federal Health and Human Services budget (Schweiker, 1981) where most of the social welfare cuts are centered. Before beginning, however, a few caveats are in order.

The time frame in which this paper was prepared prohibited a detailed analysis of the final outcome of Congressional action. We were forced to use Reagan's proposed rather than actual cuts. Although this may create slight distortions, analysts agree that the Reagan administration got most, if not all, it wanted from Congress. We will introduce modifications where there are substantial changes. Second, there is, at this time, no actual budget for the fiscal year 1981. Reagan modified Carter's 1981 budget with immediate cuts in health services, CETA jobs, etc. The budget is smaller, but by how much and in what specific areas will be determined later. Third, there is always risks in ex ante cost effectiveness or cost benefit analysis. The precise levels and types of unemployment or reduced education and human services can at this stage only be roughly estimated. Ex post facto analysis is much safer but not appropriate for the questions at hand.

The most widely accepted theory in the literature on state budgets is incrementalism. Briefly stated the best predictor of next year's budget is this year's budget. This theory emphasizes the structural rigidities induced by bureaucratic politics and standardized operating procedures (Lindblom, 1961; Wildavsky, 1964; Davis, Dempster and Wildavsky, 1974; and Dye, 1981). The dominant image which emerges from the incrementalist line of research is that of a very inertial and buffered institutional system which extrapolates deterministically from t to t + 1 because of organizational stability and bureaucratic procedures (Padgett, 1981). R²s in excess of .9 have been obtained by simply regressing federal allocation decisions on earlier decisions (Sharkansky, 1967).

Incrementalist theory is not without its critics (Natchez and Bupp, 1973; Schullman, 1975; and Harlow, 1968). In general researchers have loosely defined what is an incremental change and what is a substantial change. The high R²s are produced in part by the statistical procedures that are used (Brouthers, 1980).

The Reagan administration, when pressed by reporters or critics, has adopted an incremental defense. Reagan has claimed he is not cutting Federal welfare programs. He is only stopping the rate of growth. Similarly it is claimed that the largest tax cut in U.S. history is simply an attempt to stop bracket creep and slow the rate of growth in federal taxes.

In order to determine whether the Reagan administration's budgetary and taxing policies are a dramatic or incremental departure in fiscal sociology we will use two measures of incrementalism to compare budgets. The first will be used to compare Carter's FY 1982 budget with Reagan's FY 1982 budget. Normally incremental changes are considered rather small shifts with the figure of 5 percent frequently used. We decided to define an incremental shift in the two budgets to be plus or minus seven percent.
The second measure of incrementalism compares Reagan's FY 1981 budget with his FY 1982 budget. An incremental change from one year to the next is defined as the estimated change in the GNP deflator, plus or minus 5 percent. The GNP deflator is a more conservative estimate of inflation than either the Consumer Price Index or the actual rate of change in the federal budget during the 70s. In Reagan's budget message the GNP deflator is 8.3 percent. The 5 percent margin of error represents a generous allotment for specific program shifts. An incremental increase in the Reagan 1982 budget from the Reagan FY 1981 revised budget would be within the range of a 3.3 to a 13.3 percent increase with the inflation added.

Table 1 reports budget outlays by function four different budgets—the actual 1980 budget, Reagan's 1981 revised budget, Carter's 1982 budget and Reagan's 1982 budget. The percent changes in each of these four budgets is also reported. Looking first at the total budget outlays in 1982, it is clear that Reagan's $44 billion, or 6 percent cut, represents an incremental shift from Carter's 1982 budget. The percent change from Reagan's 1981 and 1982 budgets of 6.1 percent also represents an incremental shift according to our previously determined definitions.

The aggregate fiscal goal of budget outlays is not nearly as interesting as the budget cuts or additions for particular government functions. The last column in Table 1 reports the percent changes between the 1982 Carter and Reagan budgets. Spending for national defense, health income security, veterans benefits and general government represent incremental increases or decreases. All the other categories of spending had substantial cuts that fell outside the definition of an incremental change. Among the biggest losers were: energy (27.5 percent), national resources and environment (15.0 percent), commerce and housing (61.7 percent) and education, training, employment and social services (25.2 percent).

One of the smallest changes that Reagan made in Carter's FY 1982 budget was spending for national defense, representing only a 2.4 percent increase. This slight change may come as a surprise to many. The reason the budget outlay increase looks so small for defense in 1982 is that Carter dramatically increased defense spending after the first year of his administration. Carter's budget for national defense jumped from $135.9 billion in 1980 to $184.4 billion in 1982 or a 35.7 percent increase. Carter's 1981 budget increased almost 8 percent in real terms (inflation plus 8 percent) over his 1980 budget. For 1982 and beyond his administration projected a real annual increase in funding of 5 percent per year. His nondefense budget outlays decreased in real terms.

Carter and Reagan's defense budgets are very similar. Both Carter and Reagan wanted generous pay increases for military as compared to federal civilian personnel. Both wanted improved combat readiness by correcting shortages in critical spare parts and training funds. Both wanted to modernize strategic, conventional and rapid deployment forces. Carter wanted Trident submarines and missiles, procurement of Cruise missiles and modification of the B-52 and development of the MX missile. Plus he wanted tanks, armored vehicles, helicopters, better defense systems, additional fighters and attack planes and 80 additional combat ships by 1986. Cargo ships and additional airlift aircraft were also part of his military budget.

Reagan only added a few additional items to Carter's extensive shopping list.
Added were a new manned B-1 bomber, reactivation of battleships, a nuclear aircraft carrier and strengthened intelligence capabilities. The Reagan administration is anticipating a real annual increase of 8 percent per year. This targeted goal extends beyond our definition of an incremental change. With respect to Reagan's budget outlays the initial changes represent an accelerated program from Carter's already accelerated defense spending. The 1980 national defense budget was $135.9 billion. Reagan's projected 1986 defense budget is $342.7 billion or a 152 percent increase. Because the national defense budget outlays represent a sizeable increase in spending, nondefense programs have to absorb much larger cuts than Reagan's aggregate fiscal goal of a 6 percent decrease.

The percentage figures in the next to the last column in Table 1 can be used to compare changes in Reagan's FY 1981 and FY 1982 budgets. An incremental change for two consecutive years would be a change that fell within the range of 3.3 percent to 13.3 percent. Again the results are mixed. Spending for general science, space and technology, agriculture, health, income security and interest on the national debt fall within the incremental range. Defense spending which represents a 16.5 percent increase or a change from $162.1 billion to $188.8 billion is the largest increase and represents more than an incremental shift. All other budget outlays by function are actual decreases from the 1981 budget representing sizeable cuts when measures of inflation are taken into account.

Table 2 reports budget authority by agency. Although budget authority may not reflect actual expenditures, the information helps those of us who think of the federal budget being allocated to particular bureaucratic agencies. The last column in Table 2 reports the percent change by agency between the Carter and Reagan budgets. In this table the extent of Reagan's dramatic changes in the budget is demonstrated clearly. Only a few agencies had budgets that represent incremental shifts—legislative branch and the judiciary, health and human services, the state department, veterans administration, office of personnel management and the combined category of smaller agencies. All other budget shifts fell outside the incremental range of -7 to +7 percent. Only military defense spending came in high. Other budgets had sizeable reductions. Some of the big losers were: agriculture (-14 percent), commerce (-32.3 percent), education (-27.6 percent), energy (-18.5 percent), housing and urban development (-24.1 percent), interior (-24.4 percent), labor (-24.6 percent), transportation (-20 percent) and the environmental protection agency (-73.6 percent).

The next to the last column in Table 2 reports the percentage differences between Reagan's 1981 and 1982 by agency. The pattern is very similar to the above figures. Most allocations to agencies were nonincremental. The biggest gainer was military defense spending (25.2 percent). The biggest loser was, again, the environmental protection agency (-53.3 percent).

With few exceptions, theories of incremental budget changes based on bureaucratic politics and standard operating procedures, or based on the Reagan administration's rhetoric, cannot withstand the hard reality of the meat-cleaver approach to categories of nondefense federal spending by the office of the Budget Director, David Stockman and his associates. The data reported represent broad budgetary categories. Smaller budgets within these categories may reflect even deeper cuts in select programs.
Briefly we can conclude from this initial analysis that defense spending was the only area spared in the reconciled budget action. In the areas of nondefense spending the so-called "safety net" programs have received only slight increases or decreases in Reagan's FY 1982 budget. The big losers are regulatory agencies. The Reagan administration's first major offensive on the federal purse has been directed toward reducing regulations that affect domestic commerce. The short term effect holds out the promise of billions in profits to corporations and businesses.

Before comparing Carter and Reagan's proposed tax cuts and specific recommendations for the Department of Health and Human Services it is instructive to report some additional similarities and differences between Carter's and Reagan's planned expenditures. Both wanted to cut unemployment benefits by changing the rate used for triggering extended benefits. Both wanted to cut federal employment in civilian jobs by 45,000. Both wanted federal employee retirement programs indexed once, rather than twice a year, and the inflation index modified. Both wanted cuts in child nutrition programs and food stamp allotments. Both wanted to reduce waste, fraud and abuse in welfare and health programs. Specific welfare programs targeted for budget cuts are among the following:

- eliminating bonuses to hospitals for provisions of routine nursing services to medicare beneficiaries,
- repealing low priority medicare/medicaid expansions that were recently enacted,
- expediting recovery of disallowed state medicaid claims,
- establishing financial penalties to deter abuse of medicare and medicaid programs,
- adopting competitive bidding for medicare contractors,
- adopting competitive bid purchasing for selected medicare and medicaid equipment and services,
- repealing loans and bonuses for medical training and personnel,
- retaining current food stamp deductions,
- targeting child nutrition subsidies to the most needy,
- reforming and simplifying the aid to families with dependent children (AFDC) program and improve the child support enforcement program,
- reforming the railroad retirement program to help restore solvency,
- cutting social security, and
- cutting select veterans benefits.

Both administrations recognized the need to cut federal on and off budget direct and indirect loans that offer below market and/or guaranteed loans to a wide variety of special groups. Both recognized the need to simplify and consolidate Federal grants to state and local governments.

In the area of energy policy there were both important similarities and differences. Carter placed more emphasis on support for energy research and development in technologies that the private sector would not finance, more emphasis on energy conservation in public and nonprofit enterprises and more research on the environmental effects of energy production and use. Reagan wants to deregulate and decontrol natural gas, as well as oil, and supports nuclear research and developments like the breeder reactor.
Carter had a much stronger commitment to basic research. His 1982 budget provided a 4 percent real growth in basic research for all federal agencies and a strong commitment to improve the scientific technology in the nation's universities. The Reagan administration wants to limit research to those subjects that have a strong potential military or business application.

Carter wanted to temporarily resolve the social security trust fund problem by legislation that would allow the three major trust funds to borrow from each other. Carter maintained a commitment to remedying youth unemployment, maintaining the Job Corps and extending medical coverage to 2 million children and pregnant women. Carter maintained a vague commitment to a national health care plan to cover the estimated 22 million Americans lacking any private or public health insurance coverage and another 60 million lacking adequate basic coverage or protection against catastrophic medical expenses. An essential prerequisite was health care costs containment legislation.

After a detailed examination of Carter's and Reagan's budgetary proposals and programs it is clear that support for the New Deal programs, their extensions and Great Society Programs that characterized the liberal welfare state abated before Reagan took office. Carter, as the most fiscally conservative Democratic President since Wilson, wanted to contain most expanding entitlement programs. Reagan Republicans preferred a meat-axe approach to reduce federal growth, regulation and control in the short run, while gutting entitlement programs as federal revenues decline as a result of tax cuts. Both were in partnership with conservative Democrats and Republicans who make up a large majority of both the House and Senate. The initial military budget increases indicate we are well into an expanded Cold War.

Tax Cuts. Table 3 reports the actual budget receipts in 1980 and Carter and Reagan's estimated receipts for 1982. Reagan's tax proposals were consistent with his campaign position. The two biggest Reagan cuts from the FY 82 Carter budget were individual income taxes, $43.5 billion, and excise tax cuts of $12.7 billion. The total tax cuts in Reagan's budget were estimated at $61.5 billion.

Reagan's individual tax cuts are the most radical fiscal policy change from the previous administration. The policy is radical in two ways. The size of the individual tax cuts is unprecedented. The total cumulative tax cuts will be $286.1 billion by 1984. The tax cuts are also inequitably distributed. When Reagan's tax cuts are fully implemented two-thirds of the benefits will be realized by those earning over $30,000 and one-third would go to those earning over $50,000 who represent 5.2 percent of the taxpayers. Put in different terms someone earning between $15,000 and $20,000 would get a tax cut over three years of $1,200. The tax break for a person earning over $200,000 for the same period is $74,545. Because the tax reductions apply to tax rates rather than the absolute amount of taxes paid, taxpayers in the upper-income brackets benefit most. Indeed, there was, within the ideological shift to supply-side economics, a strong commitment to cut taxes for the wealthy to stimulate investment. According to this supply-side theory, benefits are to trickle down through income groups as the invested capital expands economic activity.

The Carter forces had resisted strong pressure for personal income tax cuts. They expected resources to increase substantially over 1980 because of the
assumptions of economic activity and bracket creep for many taxpayers. It is clear from Carter's budget message that sizeable personal income tax reductions were resisted because they were considered to be inflationary, past experience indicating that individual tax cuts would be spent on goods and services rather than saved and invested.

The Reagan administration proposed reducing the marginal tax rates for individuals by 10 percent each year for the next three years, beginning in July 1981. Compared to the previous tax law, tax rates would be reduced by 5 percent for calendar year 1981, 15 percent for calendar year 1982, 25 percent for calendar year 1983 and 30 percent for calendar year 1984. Congressional action modified these targets slightly by setting back the starting dates and reducing the overall tax cuts to 25 instead of 30 percent. Beginning October 1, 1981, tax rates would be cut by 5 percent, followed by two successive cuts of 10 percent on July 1, 1982 and July 1, 1983. The law also provides indexing of personal income taxes by 1985, tying personal income rate to inflation, thus reducing bracket creep. How income taxes could be indexed to inflation without indexing military and nonmilitary federal spending, profits, prices and wages remains a fiscal mystery.

Both the Carter and Reagan administrations wanted substantial reductions in corporate tax burdens. This is consistent with the long-range trend. Federal receipts from corporations have declined steadily and substantially as a proportion of the overall tax burden. Under Carter, the deductible schedules associated with the windfall profit tax was expected to reduce corporate income tax receipts by $11 billion. A proposed constant rate of depreciation for plants and equipment and an 8 percent tax credit for social security taxes, paid by corporations, would have reduced corporate taxes by $9.7 billion.

The Reagan administration proposed a faster write-off of capital expenditures under the 3, 5, 10 plan. Expenditures for auto, trucks and equipment used in research and development could be depreciated in 3 years. Other machinery could be depreciated fully in 10 years. The initial savings to business was estimated at $9.7 billion in 1981, growing to $59.3 billion by 1986. Congress modified Reagan's proposal to a 3, 5 and 15 plan.

In order to save banking and savings and loan associations from financial collapse, Congress adjusted Reagan's tax proposals. Individual retirement accounts have expanded in amount and coverage. Savings and loan institutions were temporarily allowed to sell special all savers certificates that offer a tax-free yield equal to 70 percent of the interest rate on one-year treasury bills. This provision will make it extremely difficult for state and local government to borrow in the tax-exempt bond market. Both programs will be competing for the same investment money.

The Reagan administration did not alter or reduce the regressive social security tax schedule. Although the cap will be raised from $25,900 in 1980 to $38,700 in 1984, sizeable incomes higher than these figures remained taxed at a lower rate. Low income workers pay social security taxes on all of their income. High income workers are only taxed on part of their income.

Excise taxes are the second priority for cutting. It should be noted these taxes will increase substantially from 1980 in both budgets. The additional excise receipts under Carter were to be generated by the windfall profit tax, taxes levied...
on liquid fuel burned in vessels utilizing commercial waterways, increase in motor fuels tax from 4¢ to 14¢ a gallon, other highway, airport and airway taxes. The Reagan administration secured reductions in the rates of oil windfall profits tax and highway trust taxes. In other respects Reagan's excise tax proposals were vague or similar to Carter's.

The remaining tax receipts in Table 3 are very similar. Congress in acting on Reagan's 1982 proposals did significantly increase tax-free gift allowances from $3,000 to $10,000 and more than tripled the estate exemption allowance from $175,625 to $600,000 by 1985. Some critics have argued that gift and estate taxes have been virtually abolished.

Health and Human Services Budget. On March 10, 1981 the Reagan administration released the Health and Human Services (HHS) budget. The budget stated three principle goals. The first was maintenance of the federal commitment to protecting and serving those most in need. This goal refers to the so-called "safety net" programs which are: Medicare, Social Security benefits, basic unemployment compensation, AFDC, Supplemental Security Income and social obligations to veterans. The second goal was the slowing of federal spending growth by targeting resources on the most pressing domestic priorities while reducing waste and abuse. For example, between 1972 and 1982, the HHS budget almost quadrupled, growing from $67 billion to $251 billion. Entitlement programs accounted for 95 percent of the increase. The third goal was to restore the state and local governments to full and effective partnership in the federal system by consolidating dozens of categorical grant programs into four Federal block grants with fewer Federal regulations on spending.

Contrary to widely held opinion, the 1981 rescissions and 1982 budget cuts in HHS programs are smaller than many other categories of funding. Table 4 reports the composition of the HHS budget for 1980, 1981 and 1982. HHS spending amounts to 37 percent of the federal budget in 1982 and its share is scheduled to grow to 41 percent by 1984. In comparison to Carter's 1982, budget the Reagan administration cut 13.4 percent from all other nondefense departments, but only reduced the HHS budget by 3.5 percent. The Reagan budget cut $5.9 billion from Carter's HHS budget, but compared to CETA, OSHA and the Environmental Protection Agency, HHS did not get goared as severely.

Table 5 reports the 1981 HHS rescission proposals from Carter's budget. The rescissions total $746 million. Most of these cuts were in the Public Health Service ($679 million) while the remainder was spread across areas of HHS.

Throughout the document there are questionable assumptions and arguments for eliminating programs and speculation on how the free market system of medical care delivery are effective alternatives. For example, grants and loans for Health Maintenance Organizations should be phased out because prepaid health care delivery systems work effectively. Evidently, Reagan's planners ignored the 22 million people that have no medical coverage. The HHS budget states "the supply of health professionals has increased significantly over the past 20 years and the need for further Federal incentives to increase the overall national supply no longer exists" (Schweiker, p. 10). This assessment does not set well with critical shortages of trained nurses in many community hospitals.

Table 6 reports Reagan's legislative savings for the 1981 and 1982 budgets.
One billion in savings was anticipated in eliminating the $122 minimum social security benefits. The Reagan administration argued that most of the 3 million recipients of this benefit were double-dippers. Subsequent reports indicated one-third or less fall into this category. Congress refused to pass this provision in the 1982 budget, but has been asked to revisit the issue. Currently, educational benefits of up to $278 a month are paid to full-time students aged 18 to 22 who are children of retired, disabled, or deceased workers. This program will be gradually phased out. The elimination of the lump-sum $250 death benefit--except for entitled survivors, which in the past went to morticians--may lead to body stacking in city morgues. Tightened disability insurance means that only those who worked 1 and 1/2 out of the previous 3 years in covered work would hold eligibility.

Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) will be cut 1 billion from Carter's 1982 budget. These cuts, as well as the child enforcement reforms, reflect two major changes in welfare policy. The first is a full-fledged return to a Social Darwinist philosophy about those receiving assistance--blaming the victim. The second will turn social welfare agencies into social control agencies policing the poor. Legislative proposals for AFDC involve:

* Earned income tax credits will be treated as income in calculating benefits.
* Eligibility caps will be capped at 150 percent of the state's need standard. (Note: those standards are notoriously out of date and have not taken inflation into account.) Work related expenses will be standardized at $75 and child care costs capped at $50 per child a week.
* States are required to count the income of all household members in determining AFDC eligibility and payment.
* States are required to periodically check recipients earnings and other eligibility requirements.
* Payments will be terminated for children at age 18 and eligibility terminated for persons participating in labor disputes.
* States will be required to establish "workfare" programs which require recipients in categories expected to work to accept private sector jobs or community work assignments.

The Child Support Enforcement Program assists states in enforcing the support obligations of absent parents to their children, locating absent parents, establishing paternity and obtaining child support payments. The Reagan administration proposes that:

* States be authorized to collect spousal support when court orders include support for a child's caretaker relative,
* An amendment to the Bankruptcy Act to prohibit the discharge of child support obligations,
* The Internal Revenue Service will be required to intercept Federal income tax refunds to collect child support arrearages,
* States will be given monetary incentives for the support payments they collect.

Nonpayment of child support is a widespread problem. However, low income wage earners frequently lack money to make court ordered payments. It is like getting
blood from a turnip. The savings expected are $173 million. Yet, it costs over three times that amount to administer the program. In short, most of the money saved in collections of child support will be offset by the heavy administrative costs. This is clearly an example in which government will be jumping with both feet on the backs of low wage earners—at great cost—to reduce eligibility for AFDC and other programs.

The Reagan administration wanted large scale cuts in both medicaid and medicare programs. Because of the lack of effective cost containment, medical expenses have increased more than 15 percent per year the last five years. The Reagan administration imposed a 5 percent cap on increased expenditures for 1982 to save $1 billion. Medical expenses were also trimmed over $4 billion by reducing payments to nursing homes and repealing several amendments that extended the scope of programs. Among these are: nonroutine dental services, separate alcohol detoxification facilities, nursing home benefits, medicare coverage for pneumococcal vaccine.

The Reagan administration proposed to consolidate 89 federal programs into four federal block grants to states and communities. The costs of 1981 grants was $8.8 billion and were to be reduced to $6.6 billion. This 25 percent reduction is estimated to be closer to 35 percent if inflation is considered. Congress only agreed to consolidate 37 percent of the 89 grants—most in smaller programs.

It had been assumed by state governors that as much as 10 percent of the cuts could be saved by reducing federal red tape. However, an Associated Press poll of State governors reports that governors intend to pass Reagan's budget cuts straight through to the public. The governors unanimously plan to make cuts (Associated Press, 1981a).

ASSESSMENT

After reviewing Reagan's election mandate and his budget and taxing policies, it is necessary to make an assessment. It is clear those policies were popularly mandated. From the perspective of fiscal sociology, it is also clear that neither the self-proclaimed incremental changes declared by his administration or the most wide-spread theory of budgetary decision making applies. The macroeconomic planning engineered by the Federal government has entered a new era.

Because Reagan's first 200 days focused almost exclusively on domestic economic policy, many observers were dazzled by the early Reagan achievements. If that dramatic performance was not going to produce political, economic and social fallout, we could sit back and enjoy the awing spectacle. In fact, Reagan's "Realpolitik" agenda catches us all too close to the blast to avoid seeing or becoming casualties.

Although Carter may have been the most fiscally conservative Democratic President in this century, Reagan is more radical. Reagan's mandate, his budget proposals, and Congress' legislation are a radical departure from the New Deal welfare state policies developed since the mid-30's. The proposals and actions are driven by ideological convictions in supply-side economic theory.

The application of the theory or ideology of supply-side economics is a great sociological experiment with an entire political economy. Like most ideological
movements, supply-side economics borrows heavily from the past. Reagan's government is attempting a last-ditch application of monetarist, laissez-faire and neo-classical economics. Like most ideologies there is little pragmatic experience or factual support for the major tenets of the belief system. Republican Senator Howard Baker called Reagan's policies a "Mississippi River-Boat gamble." Like most ideologies proclaiming universal good news, it serves the interests of a particular identifiable group. In this particular case the new policies are designed to benefit a "so-called" oppressed class which had their freedoms restricted—the rich (Galbraith, 1981; Heilbroner, 1981).

One objective is to assess the impact of Reagan's policies over the next three years. We will begin by outlining the major tenets of Reagan's supply-side economics, and then, see what the application of these same tenets has meant for the Thatcher government in Britain and project some consequences for the United States. We are convinced that the supply-side cure for contemporary industrial economies will kill the patients before the medicine works. We assume the planners in the Reagan administration are not stupid, and therefore, will modify their policies as negative shocks replace ideological hopes.

The first major tenet is that the money supply has expanded too rapidly, resulting in too much money chasing too few goods. The theory argues that if you control the supply of money by allowing it to increase only as income and output increase, inflation will be brought under control. Tight credit provisions and high interest rates, imposed by the central banking system, are expected to control the growth and flow of money.

The second tenet requires cutting taxes at all levels and encouraging market forces to work as freely and flexibly as possible. This policy is believed to lead to the restoration of incentives so that hard work pays, success is rewarded and genuine new jobs will be created in an expanding private sector of the economy. The wealthy corporations and individuals who benefit from the tax cuts are expected to invest their money in plants, equipment, markets and jobs in the United States.

The third tenet is that government spending, particularly increased government spending à la the Laffer curve, is a drag on the economy. The way to reduce inflation and slow economic growth is to reduce federal programs. The growth of government is a menace. The Federal government should reduce its role in supporting education, welfare and the arts. It is assumed private philanthropy will pick up the slack caused by reduced Federal involvement.

The fourth tenet is that excessive government regulation shackles business investment and profits while increasing administrative and legal costs in complying to Federal regulations. For example the U.S Chamber of Commerce surveyed 350 businesses to determine the worst Federal regulations. Five government agencies—EPA, Labor, Energy, HHS and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission were singled out as overseeing the worst 20 regulations. Most of the regulations involve hazardous waste and chemicals, air and water pollution standards, drugs, mining safety and energy policies. However, affirmative action guidelines, prevailing wage laws, worker safety and pension plan rules were also singled out. These programs cost business billions annually (Associated Press, 1981b).

The last tenet is often more implicit than explicit. By-products of other policies create unemployment and direct interventions are to be used to discipline
labor. Labor costs and labor contracts are held to be excessive. Higher rates of unemployment are believed to discipline workers resulting in reduced demands and harder work, increased productivity and profits. The government is expected to take a tough bargaining stance and use legal and military sanctions against "greedy" workers.

These tenets have been used by Thatcher's conservative government in Britain. This provides an opportunity to test whether supply-side theory works in practice. It should be noted from the outset that there are differences between the U.S. and Britain. Britain is self-sufficient in oil and should remain so for 10 years. The U.S. economy is much larger and more diversified. Britain has suffered from industrial senility compared to the more modernized competitive economies. The U.S. has a much larger defense industry. Finally British external exchanges of goods are governed by the Common Market and other treaties to a greater extent than U.S. external exchanges. Nevertheless, supply-side economics has not worked in Britain. The same experiment in the U.S. could have more or less severe effects on the political economy.

When Thatcher took office in 1979 her government enacted the same combination of policies Reagan has proposed. The short range effects have been just the opposite from what was predicted (Cripps, 1981; Callaghan, 1981; and Coutts et al. 1981). When Thatcher took office inflation was running about 8.5 percent. It jumped to 20 percent in the first year and has only fallen to about 11 percent recently. In Britain the high interest rates have not significantly discouraged borrowing. Corporations on the verge of bankruptcy have had to borrow more, not less. The pound sterling increased in value on international money markets, but this hurt export trade during a period of falling international demand and the pound has since dropped. There have been two major tax cuts for the wealthy; however, industrial output is falling at an almost unprecedented rate. Money is not being rapidly invested in domestic capacity to manufacture advanced equipment and components. Heavy investments take time to produce new products, demand accessible markets, and are not undertaken at great risks. Britain is not undergoing reindustrialization but deindustrialization. In Britain, government spending cuts have lead to unemployment levels not experienced since the depression. Unemployment is increasing rapidly toward 13 percent. Government welfare expenses, as a result of high unemployment, have gone up, not down. Recently Thatcher offered a $1 billion emergency jobs program in an effort to discourage the extensive rioting in English cities. Coutts et al. (1981) argue that collective bargaining rights are too institutionalized to effectively discipline workers unless drastic enforcement methods are successfully applied.

A similar mix of unholy disasters is likely in the short term in the U.S. It has been argued that monetarist policies will not work a cure in the U.S. because there is no empirical causal link between money supply and inflation. Given the rapidly expanding diverse forms of credit over the last 15 years, it is doubtful the government can control the amount and velocity with which money circulates. If the flow of money is not significantly reduced, high interest rates contribute significantly to inflation. If the money supply is rapidly reduced, then it becomes extremely difficult to borrow the money for economic growth without passing on the costs of borrowing. Witness the collapse of the housing industry and rapidly rising prices.
Economists are split over the effects of the tax cuts. Low and moderate income families will spend 95 percent of their cuts rather than saving or investing. A healthy percent of the tax savings will be used to pay the increasing costs of energy associated with the deregulation of domestic natural gas and oil. Some savings will be offset by increasing social security taxes. One of the most serious drawbacks is that the tax cuts are not targeted to encourage direct investment in U.S. plants and equipment. Money can be invested overseas or invested in business mergers. Oil companies have spent only a small percentage of their windfall profits in drilling new wells. Instead, they are buying other corporations which does not create new jobs. If we assume business executives have been working hard, tax cuts will not be a major incentive to try harder, particularly when demand for goods is weak.

One argument that supply-siders use for the tax cuts is the Kennedy-Johnson tax cut in 1964. It is believed that if you stimulate the economy via a tax cut, you automatically increase prosperity. In short, the government can gain money by cutting taxes because the government stimulates so much activity that tax collections go up. The Kennedy-Johnson tax cut occured under a different set of conditions. The cut was preceded by several years of capacity building investing in people (education and training) and in plants and equipment. There were effective wage and price guidelines. The underlying rate of inflation was 1 percent, not 10 percent. There was also a sizeable increase in demand because of the Vietnam War (Marshall, 1981). Even if all the questionable supply-side assumptions about investment are granted, the trickle down theory is a very costly way to generate jobs. The Reagan administration is predicting that 3 million new jobs will result from the $750 billion tax cuts. That is more than $200,000 for every job. In contrast CETA jobs cost less than $10,000 and other public works jobs less than $50,000 (Marshall, 1981).

The long range tax cuts and indexing could throw the economy out of kilter, raising the national debt dramatically through unbalanced budgets. The Reagan administration badly underestimated the impact of the tax cuts on the federal deficit. Only draconian measures eliminating entitlement programs like social security or large military cuts can give the administration any chance to meet its budget balancing schedule.

Cuts in nonmilitary spending will have little effect on inflation, will increase unemployment and will also increase mental stress, disillusionment, a sense of helplessness and human misery that could turn to anger and organized destructive protest. Ray Marshall (1981) estimates that raising unemployment to lower inflation one point would cost $200 billion in national output. The AFL-CIO estimates that 1 1/4 million jobs will be lost as the result of just the first full year of Reagan's budget cuts.

Significant cuts in federal regulations would provide substantial business savings, but at an enormous cost to the environment and citizens health. Many of these programs should be maintained either through government subsidies to cover substantial portions of the costs or through targeted tax breaks. Cuts in nonenvironmental areas are likely to mobilize large constituencies of blacks and labor in opposition.

In contrast, the budget increases in military spending are likely to be
inflationary. Military spending increases supplies of money with no increase in goods and services. The defense industry is not competitive. Sixty percent of all defense procurement is from a sole source. Moreover, Congress has recently passed legislation freeing defense contractors from the same cost accounting procedures used for nondefense contracts.

At this time it is too early to determine whether the Reagan administration's stance toward the air traffic controllers will set the pace of contract negotiations and discipline labor. We do know the administration maintains it will see it through. This policy threatens air traffic safety, will take 21 months to get back to normal and cost billions of dollars and thousands of jobs.

It will be extremely difficult to manage a complex macro economy with simple supply-side theories. If Reagan persistently follows the policies his administration has initiated, we feel safe in predicting that the following will occur by the end of FY 83 (October 1, 1983):

- Official unemployment rates will go up to 10 percent or more.
- Inflation will remain at double digit levels and possibly go over 20 percent.
- Interest rates will remain high and possibly go above 25 percent for short periods.
- There will be additional business failures, like Chrysler. Small business bankruptcies will continue to rise. More and more corporations will be pounding on the government's door for special financial breaks.
- Many already over-extended financial institutions will not survive.
- Federal budget deficits will rise to $80-100 billion.
- There will be no significant business expansion in the U.S. economy outside the defense industries, a few small speculative fields and luxury goods.
- Reagan will either reverse his economic policies with some massive Keynesian demand influx or take many supply-side Republicans and Democrats with him out of office in 1984.
- Additional attempts to cut entitlement programs will be proposed to the 1982 Congress.
- All bets are off if the U.S. enters a major international war which would provide the justification for the expansion of the federal budget and the national debt.

CONCLUSIONS

This paper has addressed three major questions concerning the social spending and budgeting policy pursued by Ronald Reagan in the first six months of his presidency. First, we asked if Reagan had the claimed mandate for those policies. We then addressed the social spending cuts and their interaction with the tax cuts, asking if those Reagan directions marked a significant departure from former policy or fell into the ranges of continuing incremental change. Finally, we drew some implications about the broader impact of the Reagan fiscal policies respecting the nation's economic future.
The first thrust required investigating Reagan's campaign positions, the 1980 Republican platform, the election and relevant public opinion survey results. Literature on political symbolism and political responsibility provided the conceptual framework for this discussion. In the second thrust we turned to the fiscal sociology literature and the budgetary theories of incrementalism to provide a base for investigating the actual nature of the Reagan social spending program. Federal budget documents were analyzed to provide the test for determining if Reagan's policy was significant or merely an incremental departure from past policy. The final section on assessing the implications of the Reagan policies over the next three years required an overview of supply-side economic doctrine, a review of the results of the application of that doctrine to Britain by the Thatcher Government and a comparison of the Reagan tax cut impact to that of the Kennedy-Johnson cuts in 1964.

On the first issue we conclude that the Reagan-Republican campaign met the most widely accepted criteria of democratic political responsibility, thus justifying the mandate assertion. Reagan's electoral victory was decisive and broad based. It missed only one criteria of the items normally used for notation as a landslide. Survey results were found pointing both ways on support for the spending cuts, the ambiguity providing Reagan with a semblance of, at least temporary, public support.

Our findings on the Reagan spending cuts indicate that on most functions the differences between Carter and Reagan FY 1982 budgets were beyond normally defined incremental limits, thus signaling significant new directions in national policy. Those differences prevailed in spite of a pronounced conservative direction in Carter's FY 1982 budget. Broad sectors of the nation's under-privileged and under-powered citizens will be adversely affected by these changes. Moreover, the worst is yet to come if the administration continues to pursue its goal of balancing the budget by 1985, or even if it merely tries to reduce the budget deficits to the levels of the Carter years. Such efforts will require even deeper cuts in future budgets, a necessity of even greater proportions as a result of a tax package that may cut federal revenues by more than $280 billion over the next three years (Newsweek, 1981d).

We found, as is common knowledge and clearly in keeping with supply-side doctrine, that the tax cut has a heavy bias to the rich and corporate-industrial-commercial sector. Ironically, if the cuts work the predicted supply-side miracle of creating new employment sufficient to solve all social problems, the miracle would come at a cost far greater than that associated with Keynesian job creation solutions.

Our assessment for the future is dire indeed. The supply-side tenets of tight money, tax cuts, reduced governmental spending, minimal governmental regulation and wage worker sacrifice have wreaked havoc in Britain. We recognize national differences, but also see the possibility that those differences may cause even worse results in the American economy. The tax cuts were deeper than projected. This development, coupled with increased military spending, can only mean larger deficits. The increased borrowing will increase money supply and perpetuate continued high interest rates. The resulting inflation will dampen productivity, increase unemployment and cause increased commercial bankruptcies. The result will
be difficult for almost all but especially the under-privileged, just recently freed from the most grinding aspects of poverty. As the tax cut implications became clear even nonliberal elements of our society were beginning to awaken to these implications (See: Newsweek, 1981d and New York Times, 1981).

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**Comparative 1980-1982 U.S. Budget Outlays by Function (in billions of dollars)**

**Table 1**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>3.4</td>
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<td>3.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>9.0</td>
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<td>7.3</td>
<td>6.3</td>
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<td>4.2</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 2**

**Comparative 1980-1992 U.S. Budget Authority by Agency (in billions of dollars)
TABLE 3

COMPARATIVE 1980-1982 U.S. ESTIMATED BUDGET RECEIPTS BY MAJOR SOURCE
(in billions of Dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Individual Income Taxes</td>
<td>244.1</td>
<td>331.7</td>
<td>288.2</td>
<td>-43.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporate Income Taxes</td>
<td>64.6</td>
<td>64.6</td>
<td>62.4</td>
<td>-2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Insurance Taxes</td>
<td>160.7</td>
<td>214.7</td>
<td>214.5</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and Contributions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excise Taxes</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>69.6</td>
<td>55.7</td>
<td>-13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estate and Gift Taxes</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Custom Duties</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous Receipts</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>-1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>520.0</td>
<td>711.8</td>
<td>650.3</td>
<td>-61.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 4
COMPARATIVE 1980-1982 HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICE BUDGET OUTLAYS
(in billions of dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1980</th>
<th>1981</th>
<th>1982</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social Safety Net Programs</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Security</td>
<td>$117.1</td>
<td>$137.8</td>
<td>$154.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medicare</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>41.1</td>
<td>47.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aid to Families with Dependent Children</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supplemental Security Income</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td>$165.5</td>
<td>$194.0</td>
<td>$216.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Percentage of Total</strong></td>
<td>83.9%</td>
<td>84.7%</td>
<td>86.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other HHS Programs</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medicaid</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>17.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health Programs, including Health Block Grants</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benefits for Coal Miners</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Development Services Block Grant and Head Start</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy and Emergency Assistance Block Grant</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugee and Entrant Assistance</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td>$31.8</td>
<td>$35.1</td>
<td>$34.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Percentage of Total</strong></td>
<td>16.1%</td>
<td>15.3%</td>
<td>13.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total, HHS Outlays</strong></td>
<td>$197.3</td>
<td>$229.1</td>
<td>$250.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### TABLE 5
1981 HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES RESCISSION PROPOSALS
(Budget authority in millions of dollars)

#### Public Health Service

**Health Services Administration (HSA)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary Health Care Centers -- Research and Demonstrations</td>
<td>$6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home Health Services</td>
<td>$4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maternal and Child Health, Training and Research</td>
<td>$6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Planning</td>
<td>$6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHS Hospitals</td>
<td>$34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buildings and Facilities</td>
<td>$2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian Health Facilities</td>
<td>$9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total, HSA</strong></td>
<td><strong>$65</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Centers for Disease Control (CDC)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Health Incentive Grants</td>
<td>$27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk Reduction and Health Education</td>
<td>$2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Environmental Hazards</td>
<td>$1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupational Safety and Health</td>
<td>$19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>$1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total, CDC</strong></td>
<td><strong>$50</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**National Institutes of Health (NIH)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Cancer Institute</td>
<td>$25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Heart, Lung and Blood Institute</td>
<td>$24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Institute of Arthritis, Diabetes, Digestive and Kidney Diseases</td>
<td>$11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Institute of General Medical Sciences</td>
<td>$21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Institute on Aging</td>
<td>$11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>$34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total, NIH</strong></td>
<td><strong>$126</strong></td>
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</table>

**Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Administration (ADAMHA)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mental Health Research and Training</td>
<td>$29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mental Health Services</td>
<td>$39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug Abuse Research and Training</td>
<td>$1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Drug Abuse Services</td>
<td>$31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alcoholism Research and Training</td>
<td>$1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alcoholism Services</td>
<td>$52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction and Renovation of St. Elizabeths Hospital</td>
<td>$2</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total, ADAMHA</strong></td>
<td><strong>$135</strong></td>
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</table>

**Health Resources Administration (HRA)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Health Planning</td>
<td>$24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health Professions Education - Capitation</td>
<td>$72</td>
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<tr>
<td>Health Professions Education - Start Up</td>
<td>$2</td>
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<tr>
<td>National Health Service Corps Scholarships</td>
<td>$16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health Professions Student Assistance Loans</td>
<td>$16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dental Health Education</td>
<td>$7</td>
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</table>
## 1981 Health and Human Resources Rescission Proposals

(Budget authority in millions of dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Public Health/Health Administration</th>
<th>-10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary Care - Family Medicine Residency and Training</td>
<td>-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Care - General Internal Medicine and Pediatrics</td>
<td>-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Health Professions Initiatives</td>
<td>-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health Professions Education Improvement and Development Projects</td>
<td>-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nurse Training, Institutional Assistance</td>
<td>-41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nurse Training, Student Assistance</td>
<td>-22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program Support</td>
<td>-1</td>
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<td><strong>Total, HRA</strong></td>
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</table>

### Office of the Assistant Secretary for Health (OASH)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Health Maintenance Organizations</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total, OASH</strong></td>
<td><strong>-31</strong></td>
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</table>

| Public Health Service, TOTAL | **-679** |

### Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA)

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Program Management:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professional Standards Review Organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research, Demonstration and Evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total, HCFA</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Office of Human Development Services (OHDS)

| Administration on Aging Social Services | -10 |

### Refugee and Entrant Assistance Programs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Refugee Assistance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cash and Medical Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary Agency Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuban Program Phasedown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services for Certain Applicants for Asylum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Refugees</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total, HHS | $-746$ |
### TABLE 6  
**LEGISLATIVE SAVINGS INCLUDED IN THE BUDGET**  
(outlays in millions of dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social Security</th>
<th>1981'</th>
<th>1982</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eliminate Minimum Benefit Payments</td>
<td>-$50</td>
<td>-$1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eliminate Student Benefits</td>
<td>-35</td>
<td>-$1,030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eliminate Lump Sum Death Benefit except for Entitled Survivors</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tighten Disability Insurance Recency of Work Test</td>
<td>-5</td>
<td>-120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institute a Disability Insurance Megacap</td>
<td>-5</td>
<td>-87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eliminate funding of Vocational Rehabilitation Program</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adopt Retrospective Accounting System in SSI</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Round OASDI Benefits to Nearest Dime</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pension reform</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-1</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Aid to Families with Dependent Children reforms</strong></td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-$1,009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Child Support Enforcement reforms</strong></td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Medicaid:</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Interim Medicaid Cap</td>
<td>-100</td>
<td>-$1,043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collection of Medicaid Disallowances</td>
<td>-270</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Savings from Medicaid Cap</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Medicare:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Elimination of Medicare Nursing Differential</td>
<td>-35</td>
<td>-250</td>
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<tr>
<td>Repeal of Medicare Benefit Expansions included in the Reconciliation Act</td>
<td>466</td>
<td>-736</td>
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<tr>
<td>Eliminate Utilization Review</td>
<td>-8</td>
<td>-66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Money Penalty</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medicare Contractor Initiative</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Require Medicare Processing of Railroad Retirement Board Claims</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less Frequent Certification Survey</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encourage Federal Processing of Medicare-Medicaid Claims</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eliminate End Stage Renal Disease Networks</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>-$42</td>
<td>-$5,878</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**1981’ 1982**
STRATEGIES FOR CRIME REDUCTION IN PUBLIC HOUSING

Mary Jo Huth, Ph.D.
University of Dayton

ABSTRACT

Many recent studies have revealed that not only are residents of public housing the most vulnerable segment of the American population in terms of criminal victimization, but that even in projects where the actual incidence of crime is not high, a great fear of crime prevails, especially among the elderly tenants. There is general consensus among crime prevention experts that crime reduction programs in public housing must utilize an integrated set of measures, including: (1) physical design, security hardware, and maintenance improvements by management; (2) increased organization of tenants around crime prevention issues; (3) employment of unemployed tenants—both youths and adults—on the rehabilitation of their projects; (4) establishment of on-site crisis intervention and other social service programs; (5) better cooperation between public housing security personnel and the local police; and (6) more public-private agency investment in the upgrading of public housing projects and their surrounding neighborhoods. The Department of Housing and Urban Development's two-year, $40 million Anti-Crime Demonstration in Public Housing launched in 1979 is the first attempt by the Federal government to wage such a comprehensive attack on crime and its attendant problems in our nation's most neglected residential areas.

Crime and Fear of Crime in Public Housing

Crime statistics, citizens' reported fear of crime, and the altered behavior that this fear engenders all point to crime as a social issue of great magnitude in the United States today. Since the early 1960's, the rate of all serious crimes (murder, rape, burglary, robbery, aggravated assault, grand larceny, and auto theft) has doubled, and that of violent crimes (murder, rape, aggravated assault, and robbery) has risen even faster. The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration in the Department of Justice, however, maintains that official police statistics reflect less than half the total number of crimes committed (McVeigh, 1978). Moreover, not all segments of the American population are equally vulnerable to criminal victimization; numerous studies sponsored by the Department of Housing and Urban Development have made the point that residents of low- and medium-income public housing developments are the hardest hit. A 1977 Law Enforcement Assistance Administration study, for example, revealed that while the incidence of robbery nationally was approximately 6.5 cases per 1,000 population, the number of robberies in selected public housing projects ranged from 21.8 cases per 1,000 population at Cincinnati's Millvale project to 114.1 cases per 1,000 population at Baltimore's Murphy Homes project. Similarly, while the incidence of assaults nationally was approximately
25.3 cases per 1,000 population in 1977, the assault rate at the Nickerson Gardens project in Los Angeles was 49.8 per 1,000 population (Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, 1977).

In several public housing projects studied by Brill, Rosenthal, Perlgut, and others, there is evidence that even where the actual incidence of crime is not high, a great fear of crime often disturbs the residents. Brill's 1975 study of four public housing complexes in Boston found that "very dangerous" was the way 75 percent of the residents described waiting for a bus alone at night; 71 percent, going to shopping areas at night; 60 percent, riding the elevators in their public housing complexes at night; and 59 percent walking down the hallways in their public housing complexes at night. In addition, 40 percent of the residents considered it "very dangerous" to be alone in their own apartments at night (Brill, 1975a). As a result of such fears, Brill discovered that 87 percent of the residents kept their front doors locked at all times; 64 percent did not go out alone at night; 62 percent tried to keep their children inside their apartments at night; 50 percent restricted nighttime visitors; and 47 percent did not shop at night (Brill, 1975a). Thus, the area in and around public housing often becomes the territory of those who do not have to be afraid—the criminals, whose safety is guaranteed by a high level of fear in the potential victims around them. Fear of crime is an especially severe problem among the elderly. Lawton, Nahemov, Yaffe, and Feldman (1976) contend that not only does anxiety about possible victimization make the elderly actually become more vulnerable, but it detracts from their feeling of well-being and results in their not carrying out a wide variety of activities that are common, everyday occurrences for most Americans. In this sense, both crime and fear of crime are major factors reducing the quality of life for all public housing residents.

Guidelines for Developing Crime Prevention Strategies

There is tremendous disagreement among the residents, managers, and security personnel in public housing, as well as among government officials and nationally recognized experts on crime and crime prevention, regarding the causes of, and the solutions to, crime and the fear of crime at public housing projects. There is agreement, however, that just as there are multiple causes for these problems, a variety of strategies must be employed to ameliorate them. More importantly, it is recognized that not only do types of crime and crime rates differ from one public housing complex to another, but so does the mix of physical, social, and other contributing factors. Therefore, a critically important aspect of any crime reduction effort in public housing is to determine the unique combination of causal factors at each project. Moreover, since several interrelated factors constitute the public housing environment in which crime and fear of crime occur, a comprehensive crime prevention approach is required—one composed of an integrated set of physical, social, and management strategies that will reinforce each other in deterring potential offenders and in reducing the vulnerability of potential victims.

Three Correlates of Crime in Public Housing
Physical Factors

There is general agreement in the literature that the structure of the physical environment can either reduce or enhance the probability of a crime being committed and can either limit or facilitate the detection of offenders. Physical characteristics that encourage "territoriality," that create "defensible space," and that promote "access control" have been the subject of much crime-environment research. The literature begins chronologically with Elizabeth Wood's *Housing Design: A Social Theory* (1961) in which the author contended that the physical characteristics of public housing complexes minimize communication and informal gathering among residents and thereby preclude the development of a sense of community. Later, in 1961, Jane Jacobs expanded on this theme in her book, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*. Her central hypothesis was that there are two essential conditions which must be present in order for streets, neighborhoods, and residential areas to be safe: (1) "natural surveillance" or "eyes on the street" and (2) continuous and multiple uses of neighborhood facilities which create overlapping patterns of pedestrian movement and thereby keep "eyes on the street" at all times of the day (Jacobs, 1961). Eight years after Jacobs' book, in 1969, Schlomo Angel wrote:

> The physical environment exerts a direct influence on crime settings by delineating territories, by reducing or increasing accessibility through the creation or elimination of boundaries and circulation networks, and by facilitating surveillance by the citizenry and the police (Angel, 1969).

Since the early 1970's, the number of researchers and practitioners writing about the relationship between physical environment factors and the incidence of crime and the fear of crime has grown tremendously, but they all share certain basic assumptions: (1) the physical environment can be made relatively crime-proof by means of specific "target hardening" measures and by its overall design; (2) changes in the physical environment can alter the behavior of residents in ways which increase the likelihood that offenders will be impeded and/or apprehended; and (3) the combined effect of the above two factors can be made even stronger if consideration is given to the social correlates of crime and if residents are actively involved in planning and implementing crime prevention programs.

One of the physical factors repeatedly cited as a contributor to crime within and surrounding public housing complexes is the existence of areas where surveillance by residents, management, or security personnel is severely restricted—i.e., portions of the grounds which are not observable from windows, poorly lighted areas, unmonitored stairways, and obscure basement entrances. Many empirical studies have documented the inverse relationship between level of surveillance opportunities and crime rates (Angel, 1969; Brill, 1975a; Dietrich, 1977; Luedke, 1970; Molumby, 1976; Newman, 1972, 1975, 1978; Pope, 1977; and Repetto, 1974) and others have concluded that the lower the number of surveillance opportunities in a given neighborhood, the higher the residents' fear of crime (Malt, 1973). However, there are two limitations to the strategies employed to increase surveillance opportunities—physical design changes such as more strategic window placement, additional lighting, and relocating children's recreational areas and amenities such as laundry rooms in highly visible areas near paths and walkways: (1) the offender must
perceive that his risk of apprehension is increased by such alterations in the physical environment and (2) the residents, management staff, and security personnel must react to the crimes they observe.

A second category of physical factors commonly cited as contributing to crime at public housing sites includes inadequate door locks, windows that are too low or too close to adjacent dwelling units, and the absence of electronic surveillance equipment such as burglar alarms. The limitations of installing "target hardening" devices to correct such deficiencies, however, are that potential offenders may eventually figure out methods of circumventing them and that the barricade appearance they present may actually increase residents' fear of crime. Moreover, because they address only one type of criminal activity—forcible entry or burglary, "target hardening" measures which are not complemented by other crime prevention strategies may simply displace crime from inside dwelling units to the grounds surrounding them.

A third physical factor which is a correlate of crime in public housing is lack of access control to the grounds and to the residential buildings, a condition which Brill calls "penetrability." His 1976 study of the Millvale public housing complex in Cincinnati, for example, showed that the two highest crime areas in the project were near the perimeter of the site where there was no access control to prevent nonresidents from easily moving on and off the grounds (Brill, 1976a). That same year (1976) Phelan's study of security for middle-income townhouse complexes also concluded that a barrier along the periphery would constitute an important security feature, and Molumby, finding that open access was a contributor to crime in a university housing complex, recommended that gates and fences be strategically placed around the complex (Phelan, 1976; Molumby, 1976). Thus, there is considerable agreement among experts in the field of residential security that physical boundaries at a residential site, whether they are symbolic, like low walls or landscaping, or real, like high fences, inform the nonresident potential offender that he is passing through a barrier from a space which is public and where one's presence is not questioned to a space which is private and where one's presence requires justification.

The above argument also applies to controlled access to the residential buildings on public housing sites. In addition to advocating technical equipment such as intercoms and buzzer systems for this purpose, Brill and Newman contend that only a limited number of residents should share the same entry or space outside an entry in order to increase the likelihood of personal recognition and association as a means of reducing crime (Brill, 1976b; Newman, 1973a, 1975). This technique, called "clustering," has not only been implemented by Brill at the Millvale public housing project in Cincinnati and by Newman at several public housing complexes, but has been suggested in some of the literature as a means of increasing a sense of territoriality and social cohesion among public housing residents and, hence, of increasing offenders' perceived risk of apprehension.

As in the case of "target hardening" measures, however, there are also several limitations to strategies designed to improve access control to public housing grounds and buildings: (1) peripheral barriers like high fences and shrubbery may improve access control at the expense of reducing surveillance opportunities, as they often serve as hiding places for offenders; (2) the efficacy of symbolic barriers like low walls and shrubbery in deterring offenders, especially at night,
is highly questionable; (3) electronic access control devices for buildings, like intercoms and buzzers, are frequently in need of repair and are susceptible to vandalism by youths living in and around public housing projects.

A fourth physical factor which the literature identifies as a potential contributor to crime at public housing projects is the lack of adequate circulation patterns—i.e., pathways and walkways for the movement of people within the sites. The problem of inadequate circulation patterns has been discussed primarily by Newman (1973b, 1975) and Brill (1975b), both contending that uncontrolled circulation at public housing projects allows potential offenders to walk near the doors and windows of first floor apartments and of other physically vulnerable places. The literature also suggests that inadequate circulation patterns at public housing projects limit surveillance opportunities; prevent effective access control; stifle attempts to define specific areas on the project grounds; and, in general, increase the vulnerability of the project to potential offenders. One way of addressing this problem has been to channel pedestrian movement through a public housing complex in a controlled, easily observable manner by a system of walkways surrounded on either side by shrubbery to limit disregard for the designated route. However, since there is no evidence in the literature that pedestrian circulation control alone will effectively address the problem of crime in public housing, most practitioners use this strategy only in combination with other modifications of the physical environment discussed in this section.

A fifth crime-provoking situation cited by many residents of public housing projects is the necessity of their waiting a long time for public transportation at isolated and poorly lighted bus stops. Brill’s (1975a) surveys of residents at four public housing developments in the Boston area revealed that 75 percent of them considered waiting for the bus alone at night "very dangerous." The principal strategies offered by Public Housing Authorities (PHAs) for dealing with this problem include moving bus stops closer to places where people congregate, increasing the lighting around them, and other surveillance improvement measures. The major limitation surrounding such strategies, however, is that they cannot be carried out independently by a PHA, but must be initiated by the local public transportation department and be implemented by several other public agencies. A second limitation is the paucity of evidence in the literature as to what specific strategy has the greatest impact on reducing the very high fear of crime that public housing residents do feel with regard to waiting for buses alone at night.

Social Factors

The three social factors most often cited in the literature as major contributors to crime in and around public housing sites are a low degree of social organization, minimal social cohesion, and weak informal social controls. Social organization in this context may be operationally defined as the amount of group activity in which tenants participate, the existence of recognized leaders and the extent of informal interaction among the tenants, and the degree to which alienation, distrust, and anomie are present. The indices of social cohesion are the number and intensity of friendships among public housing residents, the real and perceived levels of actual and potential helping behavior, and the extent of social isolation felt by the residents. Informal social controls are norms and enforcement mechanisms that are
developed and implemented on an ad hoc basis among public housing residents. Brill, after conducting studies at eleven public housing projects between 1974 and 1977, made the following general assessment of their "social climate":

Social relations ... are marked by distrust; few people dare to rely on one another. The social posture of the residents is basically defensive and insular [and] this feeling often extends to the Housing Authority, the local public agency responsible for managing the project. [As a result], Housing Authorities have not been able to involve tenants sufficiently in the management process. Yet, resident discontent over this issue is prevalent, as well as over the general quality of management services delivered by the Authorities. Moreover, residents tend to perceive these deficiencies as signs of their social isolation and neglect (Brill, 1977).

Rainwater (1970), Rosenthal (1974a), Wilson (1975), and Montgomery (1977) have also written about the low levels of social organization, cohesion, and informal social controls at public housing projects. The literature is likewise consistent about the relationship between this situation and high crime rates at many public housing projects, as expressed succinctly by the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals:

Indeed, with each citizen looking out for himself only, there is no community, no strength in numbers, but rather a fragmentation that can only serve to embolden criminal elements (National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, 1973).

To enhance the "social climate" of public housing projects, Brill suggests the development of tenant organizations and the holding of group meetings at which residents would elect representatives and hall captains, establish anti-crime councils, and make decisions about a wide range of issues relating to the social environment. Rosenthal suggests the use of "community service organizers" (CSOs) to function as non-uniformed security personnel, to organize resident group meetings, and to serve as a liaison between residents and management and between these two groups and the local police. Acting upon these suggestions, several Public Housing Authorities have instituted crime prevention education programs to reduce the fear of crime as well as the actual incidence of crime and to increase the residents' capacity to protect themselves and their neighbors. In addition, residents of several public housing projects have implemented a variety of protective services such as escorts for tenants who must leave their apartments at night, neighborhood crime watches, apartment checks for residents who are out of town, phone calls to residents who are afraid of being victimized, hot lines to improve communication between residents and security personnel, and victim-witness programs which guarantee protection to residents who are willing to testify against offenders. Some of these strategies necessitate interpersonal contact and group-oriented protective behavior, while others develop leadership and authority structures among residents and the "internal resolve" as well as the capacity to act collectively when dealing with the problems of crime and fear of crime. It should be recognized, however, that such anti-crime strategies not only require a considerable amount of implementation time, but are
often difficult to manage and can even generate conflicts among residents as well as between residents and management.

A fourth social factor which several experts (Newman, Rosenthal, Wilson, and Krop) believe contributes significantly to crime in and around public housing sites is a lack of proprietary interest and an accompanying feeling of "territoriality" among the tenants. Proprietary interest and a feeling of "territoriality" mean that the tenants of a housing complex identify with their residential environment, are willing to make a personal investment toward improving the quality of life there, and desire a sense of control over their "turf." As Rosenthal (1974b) points out, proprietary interest and "territoriality" are both essential ingredients for the development of a sense of community, the lack of which contributes to minimal or negligible interaction, discourse, and helping behavior among residents of public housing projects. The strategies proposed for promoting proprietary interest and "territoriality" at public housing projects include physical design mechanisms like the clustering of dwelling units to reduce the number of persons sharing a common entrance, thereby controlling access, and the social programs described above in the social organization-social cohesion-social control discussion, plus the provision of employment and organized recreational activities for youths. Rosenthal (1974b) even suggests a "community promenade" whereby the residents of the several areas comprising a public housing project would simply knock on doors and introduce themselves. While most of these approaches could be expected to significantly reduce the fear of crime at public housing sites, it is less certain that they would reduce the actual incidence of crime.

A fifth social problem associated with crime prevention at many public housing sites is the lack of a sufficient number of trained security personnel to patrol the complexes on a 24-hour basis, so that Housing Authorities often resort to volunteers—both youth and adult patrols—to supplement their regular security forces. Ideally, as in Chicago, Pittsburgh, and New York City, all public housing security personnel, both commercial and volunteer, would be trained at police and sheriff academies so that they would not only possess the technical skills required by the job, but would be culturally sensitive to the needs of the populations they are serving and would be capable of establishing good working relationships with local law-enforcement personnel. Security personnel who are not willing to communicate with residents on a helpful social basis as well as in the traditional law-enforcement-officer role will not be trusted by residents and, hence, will not be successful in dealing with the problems of crime and the fear of crime among public housing residents. In the absence of formal "sensitivity training" for all security personnel at a public housing site, team policing, where at least one member of each pair of security personnel working together has a broad cultural awareness of the resident population, may be quite effective in controlling crime.

Brill's research at eleven public housing projects (1974-77) provides the bulk of the empirical evidence that public housing tenants perceive a sixth social factor as contributing to crime in their residential settings—namely a serious shortage of social service programs. This is understandable in view of the fact that 60 to 90 percent of the residents at three Boston sites considered alcoholism and drug abuse to be serious problems in their settings (Brill, 1975a), and respondents at other public housing sites revealed that problems such as depression and the lack of homemaker and day care services for children of working mothers were also burdensome
for many tenants, especially for single, female household heads. Brill hypothesizes that all these problems contribute directly to crime insofar as the residents with drug, alcohol, and employment-related problems may commit crimes in order to secure money, and that they contribute indirectly to crime by reducing the potential for social cohesion and self-protective behaviors to limit residents' vulnerability to offenders. Therefore, in conjunction with physical design changes, Brill (1973) recommends the expansion of social services, including crisis intervention programs, at public housing projects and the training of tenant leaders and management personnel to render such services in order to promote the following objectives: (1) to improve social organization among the residents, (2) to alleviate residents' social problems, (3) to reduce residents' vulnerability to crime, and (4) to reduce the incidence of crime itself over a period of time. Based on his research in public housing environments, Rosenthal (1974c) also suggests expanding social services in these settings in order to reduce crime.

A seventh commonly-cited contributor to the problems of crime and fear of crime at public housing projects is a lack of supervision and organized activities for youths, especially in view of the large number of children and the prevalence of poor, mother-headed households in these residential settings. The literature provides a long list of strategies to address youth problems in public housing environments, including the following:

1. Organize a "proxy parent" system whereby parents' friends would take over the supervision of their children on a regular basis.
2. Follow up chronic truancy cases residing in public housing projects through daily evening visits with their families.
3. Provide vocational training and job placement programs for youths.
4. Employ youths to deliver needed social services to older public housing residents who, in turn, might serve as role models.
5. Employ youths as youth security patrol personnel.
6. Refer youths in public housing to all available private and public volunteer youth programs.
7. Provide supervised cultural and recreational activities for youths.

The logic behind such strategies is compelling, for studies have shown that programs providing employment opportunities and organized activities for youths can significantly reduce crime rates (National Urban League, 1978; U.S. House of Representatives, 1978). However, designing activities in such a manner that youths will be interested in participating in them is not an easy task. Moreover, in public housing complexes where much distrust exists between youths and Housing Authority officials, securing youths' support for and cooperation with these strategies may be next to impossible.

A final social factor frequently cited as a major contributor to crime in public housing projects is the high rate of unemployment among the adult tenants. Public Housing Authorities across the country report unemployment rates that are ten times the national average, and the weight of empirical evidence reveals a strong positive correlation between this employment situation and high crime rates. In 1970,
then—Attorney General Ramsey Clark (1970) stated that crime serves as one of the primary means of earning a livelihood for the urban poor in the absence of employment opportunities; using macro-economic data (i.e., national unemployment rates), Brenner (1976) found a positive correlation between property crime, delinquency, homicide, and the unemployment rate; and the House Subcommittee on Crime reported in 1978 that nearly 50 percent of the persons arrested the previous year in Washington, D.C., were unemployed at the time they committed a crime (U.S. House of Representatives, 1978). Public Housing Authorities may use several strategies to reduce unemployment among their residents, both as an end in itself and as a means of reducing crime. One strategy is to hire residents to work on projects directed toward the solution of various physical and social problems at public housing sites, employing them as auxiliary security personnel, as social service aides, as rehabilitators of project property, or as liaisons between the residents and the management. Another strategy which may be utilized to relieve unemployment among public housing tenants is to establish employment counseling and job development services in public housing projects. Given the close links which many Public Housing Authorities already have with the public employment and training programs under the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA-1973), the start-up and implementation of such programs should not entail many difficulties.

Poor Public Housing Management Practices

The third and final category of factors which the literature suggests contributes to the problem of crime in and around public housing projects may be labeled poor management practices, the most negative of which is the lack of adequate and stable funding sources for public housing security programs. Local Public Housing Authorities rely on a variety of funding mechanisms to staff their security programs: (1) their own operating funds; (2) Security Program funds and Community Development Block Grants from the Department of Housing and Urban Development; (3) Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (Department of Justice) grants; (4) CETA (Department of Labor) grants; (5) General Revenue Sharing funds; (6) local, county, and state government matching grants; and (7) local training opportunities provided as a contribution by local law enforcement agencies. The use of such a variety of funding sources, many of which provide financial assistance for only one year, contributes to the fluctuating size of Public Housing Authority security forces, discourages intensive training of personnel, and militates against the long-range planning of security operations. A few Public Housing Authorities avoid this problem by using local law enforcement agency personnel to patrol their sites, either through a contract or a non-monetary arrangement with the local, county, or state government.

Another management-related problem is lack of effective communication between public housing security personnel and local law enforcement agencies. There appears to be consensus in both the literature and among those who live and work in public housing projects that this problem contributes to the incidence of crime and the fear of crime experienced by the tenants. One strategy for correcting this situation is to redirect all crime-reporting calls from public housing residents and security personnel to a 24-hour central police dispatcher by means of an emergency telephone dialing system. To promote better coordination of the crime prevention efforts of public housing security personnel and local law enforcement
Finally, Rosenthal and Newman have suggested that public housing managers frequently lack the capability to appropriately place tenants within their projects and to evict those who engage in anti-social behavior, including crime. In regard to tenant placement, the literature shows, for example, that elderly public housing residents are victimized more often in settings where youths are present than in complexes comprised entirely of the elderly. Therefore, Newman (1976) has suggested that the elderly either be housed in different public housing projects from families with children or in segregated areas within the same projects. He also makes the point that having persons of uniform life style and age reside together promotes resident recognition, social interaction, and social cohesion. On the other hand, if the elderly reside apart from families with children, important elements of surveillance and informal social control may be lost. Glaser contends, for example, that the interaction of the old and the young in public housing projects can have the effect of deterring anti-social behavior because of the potential for caring attitudes to develop between members of the two groups and because the elderly may serve as role models for the youths (Glaser, 1978). This argument seems to favor allowing the elderly, if they so desire and if they are made aware of the higher probability of victimization, to live in public housing shared by other groups. As regards more stringent eviction policies as a means of reducing crime and fear of crime in public housing projects, they may not only be difficult to implement and manage, but their legality may also be questioned. The Public Housing Authority of Columbus, Georgia, has stated the problem as follows:

"Recent court cases, revisions to the landlord tenant laws, and the Legal Aid Society have virtually destroyed our traditional tool, eviction. Since we must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of undesirable tenants, we must have at our disposal a trained staff of investigative and enforcement personnel" (National Association of Housing and Redevelopment Officials/Department of Housing and Urban Development Conference, 1978).

Political problems could also arise for a Public Housing Authority if it evicted a tenant who could not readily secure another place to live for financial, racial, or other reasons.

Summary and Conclusions

This article has shown that not only have rates for all serious crimes doubled in the United States since the early 1960's, but that rates at public housing sites are often two to twenty times higher than the national rates for the same crimes. Moreover, even at public housing projects where crime rates are not remarkably high, a great fear of crime prevails among the tenants, especially the elderly ones. As a result, many residents of public housing restrict their activities to such a degree that their quality of life is drastically reduced.

Five physical factors frequently cited in the literature as potential contributors to crime at public housing projects were discussed: (1) restricted surveillance of certain areas within the projects; (2) insufficient "target hardening" measures to
prevent burglaries; (3) lack of controlled access to project grounds and buildings; (4) the absence of controlled pedestrian circulation routes; and (5) insecure public transportation waiting facilities. Various strategies were proposed for correcting these physical deficiencies, but their limitations were pointed out as well.

A low degree of social organization, minimal social cohesion, weak informal social controls, lack of proprietary interest and a feeling of "territoriality," an insufficient number of properly trained security officers, a shortage of social service programs, lack of supervision and organized activities for youths, and high unemployment rates were the eight social factors discussed as major contributors to crime at public housing sites, and, as in the case of the physical factors, appropriate strategies suggested by experts in the field of crime prevention were cited and assessed.

Finally, the impact of three negative management practices on crime in public housing was discussed: (1) unreliable funding sources for public housing security programs; (2) ineffective communication between public housing security personnel and local law enforcement agencies and failure to coordinate their crime prevention efforts; and (3) lack of tenant placement and eviction policies and procedures. The literature contains many fewer strategies to correct these crime-inducing factors, however, than to correct the physical and social crime-contributing factors. This is not surprising, perhaps, in view of the tremendous disagreement among residents, managers, and security personnel in public housing, as well as among government officials and nationally recognized experts on crime and crime prevention, regarding the causes of, and the solutions to, crime and fear of crime in public housing. In the final analysis, the most valid statement that can be made about crime reduction programs in public housing is that a comprehensive approach is essential—one consisting of an integrated set of physical, social, and management strategies that will reinforce each other in deterring potential offenders and in reducing the vulnerability of potential victims.

The Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Demonstration Program in Public Housing announced by the Department of Housing and Urban Development on May 10, 1979, represents such a comprehensive approach. Funding for the two-year program, which was legislatively mandated by the Public Housing Security Demonstration Act of 1978, is now more than $40 million. Of the total funding, approximately $33 million has been obligated to fund anti-crime demonstrations by twenty-seven (27) Public Housing Authorities with 1,250 or more dwelling units, and approximately $7 million to fund such demonstrations by twelve (12) Public Housing Authorities with fewer than 1,250 units. The thirty-nine (39) Public Housing Authorities were selected from approximately 170 applicants in an open competition among PHAs which required them to propose anti-crime strategies addressing seven program areas: (1) improved PHA crime prevention management and maintenance; (2) physical design and security hardware improvements; (3) increased tenant participation, leadership, and organization relative to crime prevention issues; (4) increased employment of tenants, especially youths; (5) crime-related social service improvements; (6) improved support from the local criminal justice system, especially the police; and (7) more local public/private funding partnerships which target not only on the immediate public housing projects, but on the surrounding neighborhoods. These strategies are to be developed and implemented by means of the broadest possible cooperation among PHA management personnel, tenants, local government agencies, and Federal government agencies.
Thus, $20 million of the total $40 million program funding is in HUD modernization loan authority funds and $2.25 million in HUD Community Development Block Grant program funds; $8 million is being contributed by the Department of Labor (DOL) under its Youth Community Conservation Improvement Projects (YCCIP) Program (authorized by Title IV of the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act of 1973) to provide jobs and training for the unemployed youths in public housing projects; the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) is contributing at least $1 million from its Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention and $340,000 from its Victim/Witness Program; and the Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Administration (ADAMHA) is adding $500,000. Local matches, all of which are for non-hardware anti-crime strategies, total slightly over $8 million (Department of Housing and Urban Development, 1980). This innovative program is the first attempt by the Federal government to launch a comprehensive attack on crime, urban blight, and many personal, social, and economic problems in the most needy residential areas of the United States--our nation's public housing projects.

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ASSessing part-time education in an M.S.W. program

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abstract

Because of the dearth of debates on the merits of full-time vs. part-time M.S.W. education, some findings on law-school part-time education are reported, together with the results of an empirical study which compared the achievement of part-time and full-time social work students. Given the same opportunities, part-time students do as well as full-timers.

In spite of a continuing demand for part-time programs from individuals and groups interested in pursuing graduate studies in social work, and in spite of the proliferation of part-time MSW programs in various schools of social work, there has been a virtual absence of debate on the merits of such a program in the social work literature. A careful search of several social work journals published during the past 15 years fails to reveal any discussion of the issue.

The failure to discuss such a vital issue related to professional social work education may rest on the long-established but seldom articulate assumption that part-time studies are somehow inferior to full-time. This assumption in turn seems to rest on the notion that while knowledge from the behavioral sciences could be acquired by students through independent reading, extension courses and part-time programs, the one crucial ingredient that cannot effectively be imparted in part-time education is the "socialization to the profession (which) requires an in-depth encounter with social work practice over a period of time."2 up until the middle of the 1980's this "in depth encounter" had been interpreted by the Council on social work education to include at least one year of full-time residence for all MSW students.

Recently the Council issued proposed revisions of procedures and standards for accreditation of baccalaureate MSW programs.4 The proposed revisions no longer make the year's full-time residence an absolute requirement for accreditation and concomitantly for MSW studies. If accepted, the new CSWE standards effectively allow for the inclusion of part-time programs in curricular options.5 This will be a most welcome new factor in the accreditation standards since it will allow many wage-earning heads of households and others who cannot afford full-time attendance to matriculate in MSW curriculae.
In spite of contemplated changes the proposition that full-time social work education is, for any reason, better than part-time has gone unexamined for many years. One does not find any clear cut statement of a rationale for preferring one type of program to the other. In fact, there have been no social work studies supporting the proposition that full-time education produces better professionals than would part-time programs.

Since the social work literature has not addressed itself to the issue of part-time studies, it is worthwhile to examine part-time programs offered by the legal profession. Legal studies were chosen for a comparison since they most closely approximate MSW studies of various practice based, professional curriculae. Law schools require three years of full-time study and include (but do not require) practicums in their curriculum.

For many years American law schools have maintained part-time legal education programs which are mostly offered during evening hours. Indeed, in recent years, part-time law training programs have proliferated. For example, several years ago the New Jersey legislature mandated part-time programs in the two State law schools. More recently, the Wisconsin legislature has required the State University Law School there to undertake a part-time program. These actions have in part reflected a desire to accommodate the great demand for legal education by expanding the use of facilities and by opening educational opportunities to meritorious candidates who are already working, supporting families, or otherwise unable to undertake full-time studies.

The development of part-time legal education has been accompanied by great controversy. "Night" law schools have always been held in low regard, and the prestige of full-time law schools with part-time programs tends to diminish. The great private university law schools such as Harvard, Yale and Columbia to name a few, have shunned part-time education for a variety of reasons.

The history of legal education represents a development from clerkship in a lawyer's office to part-time studies, culminating in the full-time university law school with a full-time faculty. It is understandable that part-time education has represented a retrogression from hard-won university-oriented gains. Indeed, at one time the prestigious Association of American Law Schools threatened to exclude part-time law schools from membership. It was also suggested that part-time students be limited to specialized programs so that they could not compete with the graduates of full-time programs. But these approaches were eventually resisted and defeated as anti-democratic.

In contrast to the social work experience, the merits of part-time vis-a-vis full-time legal education programs have been extensively debated and studied. The results of a recent study commissioned by the American Association of Law Schools are revealing and of significance to social workers. This study, known as the "Kelso Report", examined part-time legal education in 179 American law schools. A major finding was that, for the most part, part-time programs do not command the resources of the full-time programs, especially in respect to faculty, research
resources and counseling availability. The attrition rate of part-time law students is nine times that of full-time students.

The most important finding, however, came as a surprise to many legal educators. This was that where part-time students had available to them an equivalence of teaching, research and other resources, they performed as well as, and sometimes better, than full-time students. Performance in law schools was measured by rank in class and withdrawal from school because of academic deficiencies. Additionally, impressionistic performance data was obtained through interviews with deans and faculty. The factors which account for the better performance of the part-time students include their greater maturity, experience and activation.

The Kelso study also found that career patterns (as measured by income, and type of employment reported by alumni) and the rate of successful performance of part-time students were more closely related to rank in class and to the level of educational resources available rather than to whether students attended a full-time or part-time program.

Because of the increasing demand for part-time social work education the time has arrived for a closer exploration of unexamined and untested assumptions about the merits of part-time education. Is full-time social work education in fact superior to part-time study or is this proposition an artifact of snobbism tied to the higher socio-economic status of those who can afford to go full-time? This study reports the results of an empirical examination of this question.

Background

In 1974 the Rutgers University School of Social Work established an experimental part-time program (PTP) which did not necessitate the year's full-time residency, in response to recommendations and requests from within and without the University. Recommendations came, for instance, from the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education and the University Committee to Study Post-Baccalureate Education. Requests came from alumni groups and from numerous individuals who could not afford to enroll on a full-time basis. These requests and recommendations reflected shrinking scholarship and student stipend funds, a burgeoning inflation, and the increasing desire of many women to enter the professional labor force.

It was stipulated that members of the PTP either be women with family responsibilities or others, especially minority group members, who were heads of household and who needed to continue earning salaries. An admission ratio was established to the effect that only one PTP student to every 7 FTP students be admitted on an annual basis. PTP students were required to complete all class and field requirements in a period of four years. Special field placement arrangements such as block placements and evening and weekend placements were made available to the PTP students. For the most part the PTP students were integrated into classes already attended by full-time program (FTP) students. In most instances faculty could not distinguish between FTP and PTP students.

In its fourth year of operation, at a time when the PTP had graduated a total
of 38 students, this study was undertaken, comparing FTP (Full-Time Program) and PTP graduates, in order to examine the effectiveness of the experimental program. A decision was made to survey alumni, rather than current students. Alumni can report only retrospectively on their curricular experiences, but are in a position to evaluate how well their programs prepared them for professional practice.

Method

The study sample consisted of all 38 PTP graduates who had graduated by December, 1977, and a randomly selected group of 43 FTP graduates, matched only by year of graduation. Data for the study were collected from available student records and from questionnaires.

Student records yielded demographic data, grade point averages, admission ratings, number of courses taken each term and information pertaining to employment and volunteer work prior to matriculation. The questionnaires requested data pertaining to current employment, earnings, and asked for retrospective information regarding number of dependents during MSW studies, satisfaction with class, field, advising and other components of their MSW programs. The follow-up mailings were sent to all alumni in the sample.

Findings

Sixty alumni returned completed and usable questionnaires, a return rate of 75 per cent. In order to determine whether there were substantial differences between those who replied to the questionnaire and those who did not, data from available student records were compared for these two groups. There were no significant differences between the repliers and the non-repliers except for the fact that the repliers were older (Table 1).

| Table 1
| Differences Between Repliers and Non-Repliers (N=81) |
|---------------------------------|-------------|-------|
| Repliers vs. Non-Repliers       | Chi Square  | d.f.  |
| FTP vs. FTP                     | .03         | 1     |
| Method Major                    | 2.50        | 3     |
| (casework, groupwork, c.o., administration) |           |       |
| Age                             | 12.30       | 3*    |
| Gender                          | .03         | 1     |
| Ethnicity                       | 2.22        | 3     |
| Admission rating score          | 2.77        | 3     |
| Undergraduate grade point average | 6.54      | 2     |
| MSW grade point average         | 4.99        | 2     |

*Significant at p < .006
There were few differences between the FTP and PTP alumni. The differences that emerged were expectable, a function of the built-in admission requirements (Table 2).

There were, of course, significant age differences. The PTP alumni were older \((p < .0001)\), a finding consistent with the findings of recent nationwide surveys of part-time programs in social work, in law, and in higher education. PTP alumni were more likely to be women \((p < .01)\) who had heavier family responsibilities while they were students than was the case with FTP students. PTP students had more dependents \((p < .0002)\), most of whom were school and pre-school children living at home. Twenty-five percent of PTP students as compared to 9% of FTP students had children under six years of age. Forty-five percent of PTP students, as compared to only 9% of FTP students, had children whose ages ranged from seven to fifteen years.

Differences between the two groups were also evident in their marital status \((p < .005)\). Thirty-five percent of FTP alumni were "never married" at the time they were students, but only 3% of the PTP graduates were never married. Of the PTP group, 21% were either separated or divorced as compared to 3% of the FTP students.

TABLE 2

COMPARISON OF PTP AND FTP ALUMNI
(N=81)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Comparison Areas</th>
<th>Chi Square</th>
<th>d.f.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
<td>2.47</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Method Major</td>
<td>2.17</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>6.35</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marital Status While Student</td>
<td>12.16</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Dependents While Student</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age of Youngest Child While Student</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age of Oldest Child While Student</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current Income</td>
<td>2.43</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># of Transfer Credits</td>
<td>5.74</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undergraduate Grade Point Average</td>
<td>0.377</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admission Ratings</td>
<td>3.02</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSW Grade Point Average</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># of Years Employed Prior to Matriculation</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># of Years in Volunteer Work Prior to Matriculation</td>
<td>3.27</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

X Significant at or above \(p < .01\) level
XX Significant at or above \(p < .001\) level
The two groups did not differ significantly along the following dimensions: residence; ethnicity; method major; undergraduate grade point averages; admission ratings; and credits at the graduate level and from BSW studies which were transferrable toward their MSW degree.

No significant differences between the two groups existed in respect to work and volunteer experiences prior to matriculation. The modal group in each program had no prior social work employment (35% of the FTP and 45% of the PTP students). Most entering students had had experience in volunteer work (77% of PTP and 87% of the FTP group).

Members of both groups performed equally well during their MSW studies, receiving the same grade point averages at time of graduation.

How satisfied were alumni with various aspects of their educational experience? It had been postulated that the PTP group would be somewhat less satisfied since they had to fit work and family responsibilities into time devoted to their studies and had less time to interact with fellow students and faculty than their FTP counterparts did. Nonetheless, the PTP alumni did not differ significantly from the FTP alumni on any of the eleven satisfaction dimensions which were examined. These included satisfaction with learning opportunities in class and in field, advising, opportunities to interact with students and with faculty, participation in committee work, course selection, field options and school related but non-academic activities (Table 3).

| TABLE 3 |
| CURRICULUM SATISFACTION DIFFERENCES BETWEEN FTP AND PTP ALUMNI (N=59) |
| Satisfaction Areas | Percent Satisfied |
| | Full Time | Part Time |
| Learning opportunities in field agency | 87.1 | 93.1* |
| Field instructor as teacher | 83.9 | 92.9* |
| Patterns of classroom scheduling | 87.1 | 68.9* |
| School based advising | 74.2 | 65.6* |
| Opportunities to interact with faculty | 87.1 | 65.5* |
| Opportunities to interact with other students | 90.3 | 79.2* |
| Opportunities to participate in committee work | 83.9 | 70.4* |
| Opportunities to participate in non-academic activities | 80.7 | 70.4* |
| Opportunities to take independent study courses | 76.6 | 77.8* |
| Field options | 77.4 | 79.3* |
| Preparation for current job | 86.7 | 81.4* |
| Taking own program all over again given the chance | 77.4 | 53.6* |

$x^2 = \text{N.S., 3 d.f., } x^2 = \text{N.S., 6 d.f.}$
Both groups agreed in their ratings on how well their program had prepared them for their current jobs (Table B). Alumni from both programs obtained employment quite readily after graduation: 88% of the FTP and 84% of the PTP alumni found jobs within one month after graduation and almost all obtained employment in social work.

There were no significant differences between the groups as far as their employment auspices were concerned. Of the alumni who reported employment in social work, 52% worked for State and Local governments, 34% for voluntary, non-sectarian agencies, 9.5% for voluntary sectarian agencies and 4.5% were in private practice.

There were no significant differences in respect to job functions of alumni. Of the FTP alumni who were employed in social work, 43% reported that casework was their most important function, 22% reported group work, 4% community organization, 9% supervision, 13% general administration and 4% reported it as research.

In line with a previous study conducted at the Rutgers Graduate School of Social Work we observed that shortly after graduation many alumni switch practice methods. In other words, alumni begin to practice in methods other than those for which their graduate studies had prepared them. Here too no significant differences were observed between the groups. Of all alumni surveyed 100% of the administration majors described their primary function as administration; 64% of the caseworkers described it as casework, 33% of the group workers continued to practice primarily as such while only 10% of the community organization majors were practicing in their field.

The modal earnings (also the median income) of both groups are also similar: 37% of FTP and 37% of the PTP alumni report income in the $11,000 - $13,999 range. Twenty-three percent of the FTP and 26% of the PTP alumni earn in the $14,000 - $16,999 range, while 27% of the FTP graduates as compared to 15% of the PTP group earned $17,000/year or more.

No differences in attrition rates have been observed between the two groups. Attrition rates (which include data for students who registered but never showed up for classes, and students who left school for academic or personal reasons) amount to 10% each year for FTP and PTP students. This is in sharp variance to the high "night school" attrition rates reported by the law schools.

Conclusion

The findings of this study suggest that, given the same opportunities the performance of social workers trained in part-time programs is comparable to that of graduates of full-time programs. These opportunities should include the integration of part-time students into full-time program classes and the provision of comparable advising and research programs. Our data indicate that the long-standing, implicit resistance to part-time social work education may not be based on the merits of the graduates' performance but may be linked to other considerations. These may include the slightly higher costs inherent in PTP programs; for example, more advising, the scheduling of courses outside of the usual weekday and day-time
hours and new patterns for scheduling field experiences. However, in balance the benefits accruing from the inclusion of part-time students in the MSW curriculum seem to outweigh its costs.

Notes and References

3. Ibid., Recommendation #1.
5. Ibid., p. 9, paragraph 5:
   The graduate program shall offer as one among any program designs, a program design of two full-time academic years of professional education, including a practicum, leading to the master's degree.
8. Ibid., pp. 10-11.
10. Since the CSWE stipulates in its Manual of Accrediting Standards for Graduate Professional Schools of Social Work, (New York: CSWE), 1971, that "At least one of the two years required (for the completion of the MSW) shall be taken in full-time residence," p. 18, the Rutgers Graduate School of Social Work requested a waiver of the year's residence.

13. Although the differences are not statistically significant, the FTP had attracted more Black students (23%) than the PTP (11%). This is because there are more scholarship resources available to minority group members in full-time programs than in part-time programs.

CRIMINAL JUSTICE STUDENT VIEWS OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: 
THE IMPACT OF EDUCATION AND SELF-SELECTION AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 
FOR THE HUMAN SERVICES

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Bernard Jerome McCarthy, Ph.D. 
Jacksonville State University 

ABSTRACT

The present study examines criminal justice student views of the criminal justice system. The purpose of the research is to investigate issues surrounding the influence of self-selection and criminal justice education on the opinions of criminal justice students toward the criminal justice system.

The research suggests that students choose criminal justice careers in part because their personal philosophies mirror the conflicting objectives of the criminal justice system. Criminal justice education seems to influence criminal justice student views of the criminal justice system, but in a direction that may make the transition to employment in criminal justice agencies a more difficult process.

It is recommended that criminal justice and social work education include efforts to equip students with the understanding and skills needed to utilize what they have learned in human service agencies. Such preparation should include internship opportunities and coursework in organizational behavior and organizational change strategies.

The Impact of Criminal Justice Education

Criminal justice education and criminal justice students have been the subject of considerable research in recent years. Much of this research has focused on the nature and impact of criminal justice education, or more specifically, police science education, on police attitudes and performance. Most of the empirical investigations have indicated that both police and the community may benefit from increasing the educational level of police officers. The benefits of increasing the educational level of police officers are reported to be both far-reaching and diverse, including:

1. Decreased dogmatism, authoritarianism, rigidity, conservatism and tolerance for minority groups;
2. Higher job aspirations, increased promotions and better performance in the police academy;
3. Fewer discipline problems, lower turnover and reduced use of sick days;
4. Decreased reliance on official criminal justice sanctions;
5. Increased perception of danger;
6. Tolerance of variety and excitement on the job.¹

Many of the preceding studies compared police officers who had attended, or were attending college, to police officers with no college experience; it was generally assumed that distinctions between the two groups could be attributed to the affects of higher education on police officers. A number of writers have pointed out the fallacy of this assumption, and the methodological weaknesses of research that attempts to measure the affects of higher education without considering pre-college differences between college educated and non-college educated police (Ingraham and Johnson, 1973; Weiner, 1974). These weaknesses are compounded by the varying definitions of criminal justice education and coursework employed in these studies (Bowker, 1978). The fact that similar positive results have been achieved in studies examining widely diverse forms of criminal justice education (ranging from two-year vocational programs to four-year academic programs) and levels of coursework (including students with less than one year of coursework as well as persons with undergraduate degrees) may well indicate that self-selection exerts some influence on attitudinal and behavioral distinctions between college educated and non-college educated police.

Comparisons of Criminal Justice and Non-Criminal Justice Students

The influence of education vs. self-selection has also been examined in empirical research that approaches the issue from a different perspective — comparing college students majoring in criminal justice to college students majoring in other fields. In 1973, Ingraham and Johnson compared students majoring in law enforcement and criminology to non-criminal justice majors enrolled in criminal justice classes. Although the comparison focused on a number of dimensions, their assessment of student views of the criminal justice system revealed some of the most interesting findings. All students generally supported the "treatment or helping philosophy of crime control," and criminology students were more treatment oriented than either of the other two groups (Ingraham and Johnson, 1973:49). At odds with this finding were the students' views on deterrence. All groups felt that deterrence should receive more emphasis as a means of crime control; the law enforcement, and to a lesser extent, the criminology majors, supported this position more frequently than non-majors. Thus, it appears that criminal justice students, including both law enforcement and criminology majors, to varying degrees support the conflicting objectives of treatment and deterrence for the criminal justice system. All of their research led Ingraham and Johnson to conclude that:

There is something in the nature of self-selection at work attracting to the fields of law enforcement and criminology (corrections) students with differing philosophies and objectives in life, philosophies and objectives which are at least somewhat consistent with the role attributions and operating philosophies of the agencies toward which the students' career aspirations are directed (1973:51).
A more recent study by Fabianic (1979) also found differences between the views of criminal justice and non-criminal justice students. Criminal justice students and students from other departments of a university were compared on the use of their support for civil liberties. Criminal justice students were found to have the highest mean libertarianism score, followed by social work, social science and humanities students; nursing, education and general studies students had the lowest libertarianism scores. This research adds a new dimension to the data on criminal justice student views -- citizen rights and due process protections; criminal justice students supported these issues more strongly than non-criminal justice students. Because students in Fabianic's comparison group were enrolled in other university programs, he concluded that criminal justice education probably influenced the views of criminal justice students.

The ability to generalize from the preceding research is limited by sampling techniques that were not designed to provide generalizable findings (Ingraham and Johnson, 1973). Additionally, the preceding data is purely descriptive in nature; no tests of statistical significance were performed in either study. Both studies were undertaken in comparable settings -- four-year, non-vocational criminal justice programs, but they employed different comparison groups. Based on this preliminary empirical foundation, the present study attempts to further explore student opinions toward the criminal justice system and the influence of education and self-selection on these views. In addition to considering differences in viewpoint between criminal justice majors and students from a random sample of university courses, in-service/preservice status and the number of criminal justice courses completed will be examined for influence on criminal justice student views.

METHODS

A questionnaire, originally developed and published in the Bill of Rights Newsletter in 1974, was administered by full-time faculty to all students enrolled in their basic courses of criminal justice, juvenile justice, corrections and law enforcement at the University of North Carolina at Charlotte; the administration occurred during the second week of classes, Fall, 1979. The UNCC Criminal Justice program employs a mixture of the professional and social science curricula described by Tenney (1971) and primarily enrolls preservice students. Most students pursue a concentration in general criminal justice, corrections or law enforcement; a smaller number concentrate their studies in criminal justice planning. All criminal justice courses require students to have achieved junior status.

A total of 158 students completed the questionnaires. This number represents 36% of the students enrolled in criminal justice courses during the fall semester. The 115 criminal justice majors who completed the questionnaire represent 52% of the junior and senior students majoring in Criminal Justice at UNCC. These criminal justice majors serve as the focus of this analysis and will hereafter be referred to as the criminal justice students.

The same questionnaire was also distributed to the instructors of 25 courses (including labs and single person independent study courses) randomly selected
from the junior and senior level courses appearing in the UNCC Fall, 1979 Course Schedule. Questionnaires were administered and returned by 21 instructors. A total of 308 questionnaires were completed by the university students.

DESCRIPTION OF THE SAMPLES

Seventeen percent (17%) of the criminal justice students and 14% of the non-criminal justice students were non-white. The criminal justice students were equally divided between males and females, while the non-criminal justice students showed a higher percentage of male students: 58% as opposed to 42%. Twenty-two percent (22%) of the criminal justice students were full-time employees of the criminal justice system; 41% were not employed and most of the remaining held part-time jobs. Non-criminal justice students had similar rates of unemployment; they were less likely to hold full-time jobs (13%) and more likely to be employed on a part-time basis (48%) than the criminal justice students. One-fourth of the criminal justice students were enrolled in their first criminal justice courses that semester; 30% had previously taken between one and three criminal justice courses and 45% had taken four or more.

FINDINGS

Criminal Justice Student Opinions

Criminal justice students generally feel that too many criminals are freed by the courts because of technicalities (Table 1). They do not view pretrial release as a dangerous practice, although their opinions are somewhat mixed. The students are more certain that ex-offenders do not require the close supervision of police -- almost three-fourths held this position. These positions seem to support the philosophy of non-intervention for defendants and those who have "paid their dues." Due process protections at adjudication seem to receive a less favorable evaluation.

Student views of the functions and objectives of the criminal justice system appear to be conflicting. The students generally agree that fear of punishment is the best means of deterring crime, but they also believe that prisons and jails are schools of crime and that criminals need counseling and education for jobs. They even supported, albeit by a relatively narrow margin, the use of probation for all but violent offenders. The students' acceptance of punishment as an effective deterrent would appear to be incompatible with their more treatment-oriented sentiments.2

On more general issues, students strongly supported the equitable treatment of all persons by justice system officials and favored showing more interest in victims of crime. Considering the seriousness of various criminal acts, they tended to view white collar offenses that may injure or defraud the public as seriously as selling dope, and favored comparable treatment for persons who commit these crimes.
Table 1
Criminal Justice Student Views of the Criminal Justice System

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opinion</th>
<th>Student Response as Percentage of Total Responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Too many criminals are set free by the courts because of technicalities in the law.</td>
<td>Agree: 78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It's dangerous to release people on bail because they can then commit other crimes while they wait for their trials.</td>
<td>Agree: 29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ex-convicts can't be trusted; to protect society they should be closely watched by the police.</td>
<td>Agree: 10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear of punishment is the best way to discourage criminal acts.</td>
<td>Agree: 49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prisons and jails are schools of crime, teaching inmates to be better crooks when they get out.</td>
<td>Agree: 59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most criminals come from broken homes and poor backgrounds. What they need is help such as counseling and education for jobs.</td>
<td>Agree: 65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Except for violent criminals, probation is a better penalty than prison for those who break the law.</td>
<td>Agree: 45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In a just society, the police, judges and others in the system must treat everyone the same whether they are black, brown or white; rich or poor.</td>
<td>Agree: 89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It's time we stopped worrying so much about criminals and showed some interest in the victims of crime. They're the ones who really suffer.</td>
<td>Agree: 59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selling unsafe cars, toys or toasters is just as serious as selling dope; those found guilty of such offenses should be treated in the same way.</td>
<td>Agree: 49%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. The total number of students responding to each question was 115. All percentages have been rounded.
Comparison of Criminal Justice and Non-Criminal Justice Student Opinions

The comparison of criminal justice and non-criminal justice student views of the criminal justice system focused on the dichotomous variable of student agreement/disagreement with each of the 10 opinion items. It was decided that distinctions as to decision/indecision on the issues identified were inappropriate for this study, because they would be difficult to interpret and might well confuse distinctions associated with the nature of student views. Chi-square tests of significance were performed on all 10 items.

Only two comparisons revealed significant differences between criminal justice majors and non-criminal justice students at the p < .05 level or better. Criminal justice majors were significantly less likely to reject the practice of pretrial release on the basis of offender dangerousness and more likely to support probation for all but violent offenders (Table 2). These distinctions seem especially meaningful because they represent a strong rehabilitation/reintegration orientation, an aversion to incarceration and support for one of the most widely debated practices in the area of due process guarantees for defendants. It should be noted that all comparisons between criminal justice students and non-criminal justice students revealed this same pattern of association -- criminal justice students supporting treatment and due process issues more strongly than non-criminal justice students; only two comparisons, however, achieved statistical significance.

The Influence of Preservice/Inservice Status and Criminal Justice Coursework on Criminal Justice Student Opinions

The criminal justice student's preservice/inservice status and the number of criminal justice courses he or she had completed were examined for their influence on student views. Chi-square tests of significance were performed on the dichotomous variable agreement/disagreement with each of the 10 opinion items. No assessment revealed an association between preservice/inservice status and student opinion significant at the p < .05 level or better. Two assessments revealed an association between the number of criminal justice courses a student had completed and his views of the criminal justice system. Students who were enrolled in their first criminal justice course were more likely to agree that a "fear of punishment is the best way to discourage criminal acts" than students who had previously completed one or more criminal justice courses (Table 3). In fact, there seems to be a linear relationship between the number of courses taken and a declining belief in the effectiveness of punishment as a deterrent.

The number of criminal justice courses completed also influenced student perceptions of the seriousness of white collar crime. Students who had never before completed a criminal justice course were less likely to view "selling unsafe cars, toys or toasters" as comparable to selling dope than students who had completed one or more courses in criminal justice.
Table 2
Comparison of Criminal Justice and Non-Criminal Justice Student Views of the Criminal Justice System

It's dangerous to release people on bail who are accused of crimes because they can then commit other crimes while they wait for their trials.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Student Group</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Criminal Justice Majors</td>
<td>33 (41%)</td>
<td>47 (59%)</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Criminal Justice Students</td>
<td>142 (62%)</td>
<td>87 (38%)</td>
<td>229^a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Except for violent criminals, probation is a better penalty than prison for those who break the law.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Student Group</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Criminal Justice Majors</td>
<td>51 (59%)</td>
<td>36 (41%)</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Criminal Justice Students</td>
<td>100 (44%)</td>
<td>127 (56%)</td>
<td>227^b</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Totals refer only to the number of students who responded agree/disagree. All percentages have been rounded to the nearest whole number.

a $x^2 = 9.5745$, $p < .002$.

b $x^2 = 4.7792$, $p < .028$. 
Table 3
Number of Criminal Justice Courses Completed and Criminal Justice Student Views of the Criminal Justice System

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Criminal Justice Courses Completed</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>17 (85%)</td>
<td>3 (15%)</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One to Three</td>
<td>18 (67%)</td>
<td>9 (33%)</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four or More</td>
<td>21 (53%)</td>
<td>19 (48%)</td>
<td>40^a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Selling unsafe cars, toys or toasters is just as serious as selling dope; those found guilty of such offenses should be treated in the same way.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Criminal Justice Courses Completed</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>8 (38%)</td>
<td>13 (62%)</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One or more</td>
<td>48 (66%)</td>
<td>25 (34%)</td>
<td>73^b</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Totals refer only to the number of students who responded agree/disagree. All percentages have been rounded.

^a x^2 = 6.2306, p < .044.

^b x^2 = 4.0954, p < .043.
DISCUSSION

Treatment vs. Deterrence

An examination of the present study in light of prior research reveals several potentially meaningful findings. First, criminal justice majors appear to have conflicting views of the objectives of the criminal justice system. Although they are generally treatment-oriented and have negative perceptions of the impact of incarceration, they nevertheless support the use of deterrence as a crime control measure. It may well be that the conflicts long viewed as endemic to the criminal justice system or inherent in the roles of particular criminal justice officials (e.g., probation and parole officers) may lie within the minds of persons attracted to the field of criminal justice prior to their employment in that field. It is plausible that this particular conflict in perspective distinguishes criminal justice majors from persons studying in other "helping" fields such as social work or mental health. It may further distinguish law enforcement from corrections students within the field of criminal justice, as indicated by Ingraham and Johnson's research (1973).

On the other hand, the conflict between the objectives of treatment and deterrence may be more a difference in emphasis than a general philosophical debate. When the results of the research were discussed with the student respondents, many of them reported perceiving no necessary conflict. They generally supported the use of punishment for persons who chose to commit criminal acts without extenuating circumstances; it was hoped that such punishment would serve a deterrent function. Education, training and counseling were considered appropriate when the offender's problems or deficiencies served as mitigating factors. Conflicting viewpoints became apparent only when individual case histories were discussed. Although there was a tendency to classify certain crimes as requiring punishment or treatment, an examination of offender case histories frequently produced disparate judgements regarding the extent to which circumstances were mitigating.

Further research is needed to identify individual and situational characteristics that influence judgments regarding mitigating factors (e.g., the characteristics that lead one individual to view unemployment as mitigating the crime of theft while another person perceives no legitimate extenuating circumstance). Much of the criminological coursework in criminal justice education examines determinants of criminal behavior that, in a different context (such as a sentencing hearing), may be viewed as mitigating factors. A focus on the impact of criminal justice education on judgments regarding extenuating circumstances may prove more productive in our effort to evaluate the results of learning than the more superficial focus on treatment vs. deterrence.

Criminal Justice and Non-Criminal Justice Students

Second, criminal justice majors appear to be more willing to strongly support the philosophy and practice of rehabilitation/reintegration and to oppose incarceration than non-criminal justice students. They also seem more willing to accept pretrial release for persons accused of crimes than their student peers, a finding that supports Fabianic's conclusions on student support for civil liberties. Both
distinctions appear meaningful because of the precise nature of the opinion items and the overall pattern of the association between criminal justice and non-criminal justice student views. Criminal justice majors seem more willing to support rehabilitation/reintegration objectives and due process protections than non-criminal justice students.

The Impact of Employment in the Criminal Justice System

Employment in the criminal justice system seems to have no bearing on the views of criminal justice students toward the criminal justice system. This finding is difficult to interpret because the pre-employment and pre-college opinions of the students are unknown. Additionally, the length and type employment may be influencing the student's attitudes in unknown and varying directions. Although this lack of a relationship between employment and opinion is somewhat puzzling in view of prior research and clearly merits additional attention, it would seem inappropriate at this time to unquestioningly assume that viewpoints must change in direction as a result of employment in the criminal justice system. Employment may serve instead to strengthen or weaken pre-existing attitudes.

The Impact of Criminal Justice on Education

Finally, the number of criminal justice courses a student has completed seems to have a fairly specific impact on student attitudes. Perceptions of the seriousness of white collar crime increase and views of the effectiveness of deterrence appear to decline with increased coursework. These findings seem meaningful because of the considerable attention devoted to the impact of white collar crime and the effectiveness of deterrence in criminal justice literature and debate. Instructors in criminal justice may be reflecting this emphasis in their courses, attempting to inform about white collar crime and its impact, since it generally receives little attention or understanding from the general public, and to instruct students regarding the empirical literature on deterrence, which generally indicates that deterrence merits little confidence as a crime control measure.

Considering the issues of self-selection and education, it appears that criminal justice majors may well be self-selecting their careers on the basis of their own philosophies regarding what the criminal justice system should and should not be doing. Their philosophies seem to complement the goals, if not always the practices, of the criminal justice system. The criminal justice students are distinguishable from non-criminal justice students on the issues of their support for rehabilitation/reintegration and due process guarantees; these distinctions do not seem to be the product of criminal justice education. Instead, criminal justice education seems to be "enlightening" students and modifying their perceptions regarding what offenses can harm society and what measures have some degree of success in controlling crime. In effect, criminal justice education appears to be producing better informed future employees of the criminal justice system.

However, one potential dilemma seems fairly evident. If students choose criminal justice education and careers on the basis of views on deterrence and rehabilitation that complement criminal justice system goals, and then learn that deterrence holds (or is believed to hold) little promise as a crime control measure, how
will they adapt to employment in agencies in which the use of official authority for deterrence purposes is an unquestioned policy? Having become more treatment-oriented because they are less deterrence-minded, will they modify their newly learned views, attempt to restructure their roles, or reject empirical studies that provide findings they cannot seem to use?

Implications for the Human Services

It is obvious that the preparation of students for careers in the fields of law enforcement, corrections and other human services is a very complex undertaking. It requires an acknowledgement of student objectives in entering their chosen fields and an understanding of the probable impact of employment in the criminal justice system on the educated student. The transition from student to employee status is already addressed by educational programs that provide students with internship opportunities in criminal justice and social service agencies. However, exposure to "the real world" alone is not enough to equip students with the tools they need to manage this critical transition. Such exposure is essential, but it is only a preliminary step in the educational process.

Criminal justice education can "program" students for "burnout" or it can provide students with the understanding and skills required to use what they have learned. An understanding of organizational behavior and organizational change strategies is invaluable to the prospective employee; it may also be the "missing link" that enables the inservice student to utilize the information and ideas that he acquires. Coursework in these areas may serve as catalysts to employee self-direction as well as organizational change. Without such catalysts, the impact of education may be muted, if not negated, by the force of the status quo.

Providing criminal justice and social work students with an understanding of organizational behavior can also benefit criminal justice and social service agencies. A well-educated employee with good intentions, who possesses little understanding of bureaucracies and the functioning of persons in organizations, may do a disservice both to himself and his colleagues. His or her impatience with the difficulty, slow pace and limited objectives of change may lead to carelessly planned efforts to "speed the process along." Such efforts may impede the change process and encourage recalcitrance on the part of co-workers. A more knowledgeable employee can facilitate and promote realistic change in a more positive manner.

The future of criminal justice education may well depend on our willingness to continue to define, evaluate and redefine the nature of our effort. In recent years, the struggle has focused on the appropriateness of academic and vocational coursework, and the relative benefits of social science, liberal arts and professional curricula. Future struggles may well focus on developing and evaluating methods to ensure that whatever is learned can be used, a task inherent in human service education.
NOTES

1 For a review of the affects of criminal justice education on police performance, see Bowker (1978): Empirical research on police performance reviewed here includes: Dalley (1975); Finckenauer (1975); Geary (1970); Guller (1972); Sanders (1977); Smith, Locke and Walker (1967); Smith, Locke, and Fenster (1970); Sterling (1972, 1974); Trojanowicz and Nicholson (1976);and Weiner (1976).

2 All students were not equally committed to the objectives of deterrence and treatment. However, regardless of the students' position on deterrence (fear of punishment is the best way to discourage criminal acts), 43-46% of the students supported probation for all but violent criminals and 64-68% agreed that offenders need counseling and educational programs. It appears that the same students who support treatment objectives also support deterrence. In other words, supporting deterrence does not seem to affect the students' support of treatment objectives.

3 The students perceived an abundance of mitigating factors; two-thirds believed that "most criminals come from broken homes and poor backgrounds" and need "help such as counseling and education for jobs."

REFERENCES


DETERMINANTS OF PRIMARY GROUP ASSISTANCE DURING UNEMPLOYMENT*

Martin D. Hanlon, Ph.D., Queen's College of the City University of New York

ABSTRACT

In recent years much research attention has been given to the role of primary groups in ameliorating stressful life events. However, little is known about what factors determine the amount of assistance people receive from relatives and friends during a situation of crisis. This is the focus of the present study.

The data base is a sample of public sector workers who were involuntarily laid off from their jobs.

The data revealed that respondents received considerable assistance from parents and friends—the two primary group types included in the analysis—during the period of unemployment. Objective economic deprivation, indexed by the difference in family income during and before the period of unemployment was not a major factor in how much assistance was received. But the response to unemployment measured by cutbacks in personal consumption was significantly related to receiving assistance. Age was an important determinant of parental assistance but not assistance from friends. Frequency of social contact with parents and friends were also important determinants of the amount of assistance received. The implications of the findings are discussed.

In the past two decades the study of primary groups has emerged as a serious focus of sociological theory and research. This academic interest in kinship, friendship, and neighboring could be termed the "rediscovery" of the primary group in that it parallels the concerns of an earlier generation of scholars. As described by Katz and Lazarsfeld in their volume, Personal Influence (1955), social scientists had begun to document the continuing importance of primary groups in modern industrial society as early as the 1920's. Perhaps the most enduring work of this early period is the "Hawthorne" research which led to the critical discovery of the role of informal groups in industrial settings (Roethlisberger & Dickson, 1939; Katz & Lazarsfeld, 1955; Blumberg, 1973).

The emphasis on the functions of primary groups continues as a major theme in

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*Data for this paper were collected as part of a study on public sector unemployment which was funded by the Center for Research in Career Development of the Columbia University Graduate School of Business and by grant #91-36-77-27 from the U.S. Department of Labor.
contemporary research. One of the most significant of recent trends is the analysis
of the supportive role of primary groups in times of crisis within the individual
life cycle. Studies have examined primary group assistance during the recovery
period following a first heart attack (Croog, Lipson & Levine, 1972); in the wake
of job layoff (Gore, 1973; 1978); during post-partum recovery (Nuckolls, Cassel,
& Kaplan, 1972); and in the context of recurrent problems of childbearing, house-
hold finance, and employment (Lebowitz, Fried, & Madaris, 1973). Much of this
research has focused on one or another variation of the following question: do
individuals with a strong and active network of kin, friends, and neighbors report
more favorable mental and physical health outcomes following a stressful life
event than individuals who lack such a support system? Although the range of
conceptual frameworks and measurement approaches used in these studies has been
quite diverse the results have been notably consistent: primary group support
does make a significant contribution in buffering the impact of stressful events.

However, despite the substantial and growing empirical evidence linking
primary groups to individual well-being, very little is known about what these
groups actually do. The specific forms of assistance rendered by kin, friends
and neighbors are given little consideration in most studies. Improving the
measurement of assistance is limited by conceptual disagreements. Some theorists
view social support as essentially emotional in nature; others stress the more in-
strumental and tangible elements of support (Pinneau, 1975; Caplan, 1979). Another
issue is the reliance on self-report evaluations of the perceived helpfulness of
primary group members as surrogates for objective indicators of support--illus- 
trating a general lack of concern for the content validity of the concepts used to
index primary group assistance. Moreover, few data exist on the determinants of
support. Most existing research has used the support concept as an intervening 
variable--a moderator of the relationship between stressful events and morbid-
ity outcomes. Consequently, little attention has been given to individual, group, and
situational factors which affect the provision of assistance.

This study represents an attempt to deal with these more problematic issues in
primary group research. Its major objective is to clarify the nature of primary
group support by analyzing the determinants of assistance received from specific
primary group types--parents and friends, in this case--during the course of a
single type of life crisis--the period of unemployment following involuntary lay-
off from a job.

Parents and friends were selected for three principal reasons. First, the
existing literature has emphasized parents and friends to a greater degree than
other types of primary groups. Since the research focus of this study covers un-
charted terrain, I felt it advisable to anchor the present investigation to a
relatively secure knowledge base. Second, the exploratory interviews which pre-
ceeded the data collection phase of the study described here made it clear that
parents and friends were considered to be the most salient and important providers
of assistance during the period of unemployment. Third, ties to parents and friends
differ in important and fundamental ways; thus, one might expect consequent
Differences in the processes governing the flow of assistance.

DATA AND METHODS

The data for this study were gathered through survey interviews with a sample of municipal and state employees who were laid off during a period of financial crisis in a large eastern city in late 1976 and 1977. Complete lists of laid off employees were made available through the State Civil Service Commission and other public agencies. Initially, the design called for a systematic sampling from the compiled lists. Pre-test interviews, however, made it clear that many of the layoffs occurred only on “paper.” That is, many employees who left their jobs were quickly rehired on other budget lines. Other laid off employees were on official leaves of absence. Therefore, a strict probability sampling procedure would have produced a heterogeneous and substantively confusing aggregation of individuals.

The revised strategy was to develop and apply a set of exclusion criteria. Computerized information on maternity leaves, other leaves of absence, voluntary quits and rehiring data allowed the research team to cull out most of those who were not eligible. At the end, 340 persons survived the exclusion criteria. Of these, 251 (73.8%) were interviewed. Thus, the sample was not drawn to represent a clearly defined population; rather, it was constructed on the basis of “caseness.” As indicated, close to three quarters of those who were eligible were eventually interviewed.

The sample consists primarily of white collar service workers. Probation officers, corrections workers, high school teachers, and direct patient care workers were the major occupational groups represented. Much of the previous research work on the personal impact of unemployment has focused on instances of “plant shutdowns” involving industrial workers. The nature of the sample should be kept in mind in interpreting the data to be presented and their comparability to the results of other studies.

Measures and Procedures

During the interview, persons were asked if they had received one or another of fifteen specific types of assistance during the period of unemployment. The fifteen assistance items were derived from a content analysis of previous, generally narrative studies of the psychological impact of unemployment (Bakke, 1940a, 1940b; Komarovsky, 1940; Cavan, 1959; Levin, 1975) and from the open-ended interviews carried out during the pre-testing phase of this research study. To provide some claim to content validity, items were selected for inclusion on the basis of frequency of citation. The assistance types included financial aid of various kinds, information services, and moral support. The actual assistance items are presented in Appendix 1. In the present study, the total count of assistance types received from parents and from friends provide the basis of the
major dependent variables. Thus, the possible range of both variables is from zero to fifteen.

Since little is known about the factors which determine the amount of assistance people receive during a period of crisis, my approach was to cast a relatively wide measurement net. Several sets of factors were considered. In the next section, each of the measures will be described and the rationale for their inclusion will be given.

Social-Psychological Measures

An initial assumption was that apart from the objective need for assistance and the relative availability of aid sources, the amount of assistance a person actually received would be influenced by psychological factors. Some persons may be more predisposed to seek out or to receive assistance than others. Thus, in order to measure the structural determinants of receiving aid, it is important to analyze possible covariance due to social-psychological differences. In all, three measures were selected to gauge their influence.

The Srole Anomia Scale and its variants represent one of the most widely used social-psychological measures within the discipline of sociology (Srole, 1956; Struening & Richardson, 1965; Neal & Rettig, 1967; Barton, 1971). Controversy exists over whether anomia is a psychological characteristic of individuals or a property of social structure (McClosky & Schaar, 1965). In this study, it is used in the former sense. Specifically, highly "anomic" individuals were assumed to have greater difficulties in affiliation than individuals who are less anomic, which would in turn have a negative effect on seeking and receiving assistance. Since one of the established correlates of anomia is a social isolation (McClosky & Schaar, 1965; Aiken, Ferman & Sheppard, 1968), this assumption would appear reasonable. The four anomia items used in the study were taken from the NORC General Social Survey (Davis, 1977). Since the items were substantially intercorrelated, they were combined into a single unweighted scale with a reliability coefficient (Cronbach's $\alpha$) of .66. The items are presented in Appendix 2.

The scale of interpersonal trust was developed as an indicator of the capacity for political involvement and was later used as a predictor of the utilization of government service programs (Katz, Gutek, Kahn & Barton, 1975). The scale is based on the assumption that an individual must have a certain amount of faith in human nature in order to participate in service-related transactions. In the present study, interpersonal trust is used in a comparable sense as a measure of a person's capacity to make use of primary group resources during a time of need. The three items which comprise the scale were highly correlated ($\alpha = .78$). They are presented in Appendix 2.

Muir and Weinstein's Social Obligation Scale (1962) is intended to gauge how much the implicit rules of economic life carry over to the realm of social
obligation; that is, whether being obliged to someone who has performed a favor is seen as a form of debt with the specific duty of repayment. In adopting the Muir and Weinstein framework for the present study, the assumption is made that viewing favors in terms of indebtedness would be negatively related to receiving assistance from others. The three Muir and Weinstein items selected as appropriate for the present study proved to be moderately reliable ($\alpha = .62$) and are presented in Appendix 2.

**Background Characteristics**

Previous research on parental aid to married children has shown an inverse relationship between the age of the married child and the amount of aid provided (Sussman & Burchinal, 1962; Adams, 1964). It is not known whether or not this relationship holds for the unmarried or if age affects the amount of assistance rendered by friends. To explore these issues, the age of the respondent was included as a predictor variable in the analysis.

The number of dependents was included on the assumption that financial responsibility for others increases vulnerability to the stress of unemployment, which in turn amplifies the need for primary group assistance.

**Characteristics of the Individual's Primary Group Network**

There is an extensive literature on the correlates of frequency of contact with and geographical proximity of primary group relations (Litwak, 1960; Reiss, 1962; Stuckert, 1963; Adams, 1968; Aiken & Goldberg, 1969; Klatsky, undated). Findings from these studies provided the basis of two hypotheses: first, net of all other factors, individuals who socialize frequently with members of their primary group will receive greater assistance than more isolated individuals; second, proximity to sources of aid will have a positive impact on receiving aid.

**Economic Deprivation**

Detailed information was obtained on the person's financial status before, during, and after the period of unemployment. All significant income sources, including a second job, spouse's job, recurrent income from investments or trusts and total income from government transfer and insurance programs were aggregated into a summary measure of income per month. From this, an income replacement ratio was computed, which is the proportion of the respondent's regular income from all sources available during the period of unemployment. The median income replacement ratio for the entire sample was .55, indicating that the average respondent lived on slightly more than half of his or her usual income while unemployed. This figure is consonant with reported national data (Fields, 1977). It was hypothesized that the lower the income replacement ratio (i.e., the greater the economic deprivation), the more likely it would be that primary group resources would be called upon to help maintain financial integrity.
Perceived Impact of Unemployment

Respondents were asked a series of questions about changes in consumption and financial cutbacks made during the period of unemployment. These were combined into a single consumption cutbacks scale (\( \alpha = .77 \)). Persons who reported a greater number of cutbacks were assumed to have had more incentive to turn to primary group members for assistance than persons who were less affected by unemployment.

A second indicator of perceived impact was a two-item scale measuring the degree to which the person felt closer to or more distant from friends and relatives as a result of being unemployed. The closeness scale was moderately reliable (\( \alpha = .55 \)).

The items defining both measures are included in Appendix 2.

RESULTS

The Scope of Assistance from Parents and Friends

In Table 1, data are presented on the percentage of respondents receiving assistance from parents and friends for each of the fifteen assistance types. The percentage base differs, since only 214 of the 251 respondents in the sample reported one or both parents living at the time of layoff.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assistance Type</th>
<th>Parents N=214</th>
<th>Friends N=251</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gift of money</td>
<td>32.1%</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-sign on loan</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loan of money</td>
<td>14.4%</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporary job</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information about a job</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>25.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Childcare help</td>
<td>12.6%</td>
<td>9.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advice on unemployment office</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
<td>36.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advice on government services</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
<td>15.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advice on economizing</td>
<td>34.1%</td>
<td>15.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Help in selling something</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Getting professional help</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Providing a nice time</td>
<td>34.1%</td>
<td>47.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bought something</td>
<td>32.7%</td>
<td>15.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provided moral support</td>
<td>71.2%</td>
<td>79.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provided help in making plans</td>
<td>33.5%</td>
<td>49.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The data clearly reveal a substantial flow of aid from parents and from friends, as well as great variation in the frequency of reported assistance. Also, as the data indicate, there are major differences in the forms of aid provided by parents and friends. Parents are much more likely to give financial assistance while friends are the major providers of information related to job search, unemployment benefits, and government services. Significantly, a substantial majority of respondents reported receiving moral support from parents or friends. The mean number of assistance types received from parents was 2.87 (s.d. = 2.15). The mean for assistance from friends was 3.29 (s.d. = 1.93). The focus here now turns to the major predictor variables of the study.

Social Psychological Factors and Primary Group Assistance

Associations between the three social psychological measures included in the study—the anomia scale, the scale of interpersonal trust, and the Muir and Weinstein obligation scale—and the amount of assistance received from parents and friends are presented in Table 2. Gamma scores were computed to measure the relationship between each of the social psychological scales and the amount of assistance received. The significance level was determined through the Chi-square statistic.

Table 2. Associations Between Social Psychological Measures and Amount of Assistance Received from Parents and Friends (Gamma Scores)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Parents (N=189)</th>
<th>Friends (N=237)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anomia</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpersonal trust</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social obligation</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The data in Table 2 indicate that there is practically no relationship between psychological characteristics and the amount of assistance received from either parents or friends. In all instances, the relationships failed to achieve statistical significance on the Chi-square test. The general finding held true when the sample was broken down by sex, race, and family type. Given the absence of any convincing bivariate relationships, the three social psychological measures were not included in subsequent multivariate models.

Next, the level of assistance received from parents and from friends were separately regressed on the remaining four sets of variables: background characteristics, characteristics of the primary group network, economic deprivation, and the perceived impact of unemployment. A hierarchical regression strategy was used. The respondent's background characteristics, being clearly antecedent with respect to the other variables were entered into the equation first. F-tests of the increment in predictive power at each inclusion stage were computed for the sets of
variables rather than for individual variables, as a means of reducing the risk of Type I errors due to repeated significance testing (Cohen & Cohen, 1975, 162-165).

The results of the regressions of the total amount of aid provided by parents and friends on the four sets of independent variables are presented in Tables 3 and 4, respectively. In accordance with the hierarchical strategy, the increment to $R^2$ at each stage represents the net statistical contribution of the entering variable set after the total effect of all preceding variables has been partialled out.

Table 3. Predictors of Aid Received from Parents During Unemployment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables Entered</th>
<th>Multiple R</th>
<th>$R^2$</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of Financial Dependents, Age</td>
<td>.285</td>
<td>.081</td>
<td>2.08</td>
<td>7.39*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proximity, Frequency of Contact</td>
<td>.331</td>
<td>.110</td>
<td>2.05</td>
<td>5.10*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income Replacement$^+$</td>
<td>.338</td>
<td>.114</td>
<td>2.06</td>
<td>4.23*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumption Cutbacks, Closeness to Primary Groups</td>
<td>.456</td>
<td>.208</td>
<td>1.96</td>
<td>6.09*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Multiple R</th>
<th>$R^2$</th>
<th>$R^2$ Change</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>BETA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of Financial Dependents</td>
<td>.007</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.040</td>
<td>.026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.285</td>
<td>.081</td>
<td>.081</td>
<td>-.071</td>
<td>-.261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proximity</td>
<td>.311</td>
<td>.097</td>
<td>.015</td>
<td>.074</td>
<td>.051</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency of Contact With Parents</td>
<td>.311</td>
<td>.110</td>
<td>.031</td>
<td>.212</td>
<td>.170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income Replacement$^+$</td>
<td>.338</td>
<td>.114</td>
<td>.004</td>
<td>-.002</td>
<td>-.025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumption Cutbacks</td>
<td>.390</td>
<td>.152</td>
<td>.037</td>
<td>.490</td>
<td>.171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closeness to Primary Groups</td>
<td>.456</td>
<td>.208</td>
<td>.056</td>
<td>.300</td>
<td>.241</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$^*$P < .05

$^+$Income replacement is expressed as the ratio of total income during unemployment to total income before unemployment. Thus, the lower the ratio, the greater the relative deprivation during unemployment.
Table 4. Predictors of Aid Received from Friends During Unemployment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables Entered</th>
<th>Multiple R</th>
<th>R²</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of Financial Dependents, Age</td>
<td>.107</td>
<td>.012</td>
<td>1.93</td>
<td>1.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Close Friends, Frequency of Contact With Close Friends</td>
<td>.269</td>
<td>.068</td>
<td>1.88</td>
<td>3.34*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income Replacement +</td>
<td>.294</td>
<td>.086</td>
<td>1.87</td>
<td>3.45*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumption Cutbacks, Closeness to Primary Groups</td>
<td>.425</td>
<td>.181</td>
<td>1.78</td>
<td>5.67*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Multiple R</th>
<th>R²</th>
<th>R² Change</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>BETA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of Financial Dependents</td>
<td>.055</td>
<td>.033</td>
<td>-.124</td>
<td>-.008</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.107</td>
<td>.012</td>
<td>-.012</td>
<td>-.056</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Close Friends</td>
<td>.170</td>
<td>.029</td>
<td>.698</td>
<td>.115</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency of Contact Close Friends</td>
<td>.261</td>
<td>.068</td>
<td>.222</td>
<td>.286</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income Replacement +</td>
<td>.294</td>
<td>.087</td>
<td>.008</td>
<td>-.096</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumption Cutbacks</td>
<td>.387</td>
<td>.150</td>
<td>.640</td>
<td>.246</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closeness to Primary Groups</td>
<td>.425</td>
<td>.181</td>
<td>.198</td>
<td>.169</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*P < .05
+
Income replacement is expressed as the ratio of total income during unemployment to total income before unemployment. Thus, the lower the ratio, the greater the relative deprivation during unemployment.

As indicated in Tables 3 and 4, the predictor variables account for 20.8 percent of the variance in assistance from parents and 18.1 percent of the variance in assistance from friends.

With one exception, each set of predictor variables is significant for both parents and friends. Taken as a set, background characteristics--number of financial dependents and the respondent's age--have little effect on the amount of assistance received from friends. This is not the case with parental assistance. Here, examination of the standardized regression coefficients of the two variables in the set reveals that almost all the strength is carried by age. Younger unemployed persons receive considerably more aid from their parents than older persons.

However, the influence of age may be confounded by other factors, particularly
marital status. Within the sample, younger persons may be less likely to be married and consequently, they may be socially and psychologically closer to parents and more likely to be recipients of parental aid. The relative contributions of age, marital status, and possible interactions between these variables were assessed through a two-way analysis of variance using age (dichotomized at the sample median) and marital status as the independent variables and the total amount of parental aid as the dependent variable. The results are presented in Table 5.

Table 5. Table of Means for Assistance Provided by Parents: Respondent Sex by Marital Status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Married</th>
<th>Unmarried</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Young</td>
<td>( \bar{X} = 3.18 )</td>
<td>( \bar{X} = 3.43 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>s.d. = 1.95</td>
<td>s.d. = 2.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(N = 62)</td>
<td>(N = 48)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Old</td>
<td>( \bar{X} = 1.91 )</td>
<td>( \bar{X} = 2.82 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>s.d. = 2.05</td>
<td>s.d. = 2.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(N = 66)</td>
<td>(N = 38)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The analysis of variance results in Table 5 indicate that age has a significant main effect on the amount of aid received from parents (\( F = 11.83; p < .001 \)) while marital status does not, although the mean assistance scores for unmarried respondents, both young and old, were higher than for the corresponding married subgroups. Interaction effects were absent (\( F = 1.161; p > .05 \)). Thus, the evidence supports the interpretation that age, not marital status, is the principal factor which influences parental aid giving.

The number of reported financial dependents had a weak impact on the amount of assistance received from friends, and almost no impact on the amount of assistance received from parents. Analysis of residuals and further regressions to assess possible nonmonotonic relationships were carried out; again, the influence of number of dependents was negligible. To assess if the heterogeneity of sample masked possible subsample level relationships the analysis was repeated for the subsample of married males with one or more children who earned more than one-half of the total family wage income. Due to the limited size of this subsample of "traditional" families (N = 89), the full set of independent variables other than number of dependents was entered into the hierarchical regressions as the first level of inclusion. This minimized the regression degrees of freedom used. Number of dependents was then introduced; again, the variable made no substantive contribution to improving the prediction of the amount of assistance received from parents and friends (\( F = 0.16 \) n.s. and \( F = 1.08 \) n.s., respectively). It might be noted that restricting the heterogeneity of the sample significantly improves the predictive power of the model as a whole. Specifically, 39.8 percent of the variance in assistance provided by parents and 32.9 percent of the variance in
assistance provided by friends are accounted for within the subsample.

As the data in Tables 3 and 4 reveal, proximity to sources of primary group assistance and frequency of contact make a significant contribution in predicting assistance from parents and from friends. There is a difference in magnitude, however. Taken together, these two indicators of the strength of primary group affiliation accounts for approximately 15 percent of the explained variance in parental aid and 31 percent of the explained variance in assistance from friends.

Tables 3 and 4 show that economic deprivation, indexed by the income replacement ratio, has a significant relationship to the amount of aid provided by parents and by friends. However, in both cases, the significant F ratio for income replacement is largely an artifact of its inclusion level and its colinearity with the consumption change variable. When the latter is introduced into the equation, the semi-partial for income replacement is considerably reduced. Thus, the two indicators of potential economic hardship included in the study, the number of dependents supported by the unemployed individual and the income replacement ratio have little substantive impact on the total amount of assistance received. Further analysis using a measure of the amount of financial assistance from parents and from friends led to similar results.

As described above, the consumption cutbacks scale measures how much persons felt compelled to reign in spending during the time of unemployment. The closeness scale provides a measure of the degree to which persons felt closer to or more distant from kin and friends. Both are indicators of the perceived impact of unemployment on the person's everyday life. From Tables 3 and 4 it is apparent that both measures are strong predictors of the amount of assistance received. Taken together, they account for 44 percent (.094 ± .208) of the explained variance in aid from parents and 52 percent (.095 ± .181) of the explained variance in assistance from friends. The relative influence of the two measures on the estimation of assistance differs between parents and friends. Consumption cutbacks were more important in determining aid from friends; perceived closeness was a more important determinant of parental assistance. Since the two measures are only weakly related (Pearson r = -.10) it would appear safe to conclude that the coefficients are relatively stable and that the difference is a substantive one.

DISCUSSION

The findings of this study underscore the importance of primary group assistance during life crises and are consonant with the thrust of previous research. Parents and friends provide significant amounts of assistance during periods of unemployment. Analysis of qualitative data gathered in the study shows that the types of assistance rendered by parents and friends are usually quite distinct from and complementary to support provided by formal organizations. Financial assistance, for example, often takes the form of a "spot" loan or gift of money, targeted to meet specific emergency obligations--to keep the telephone from being shut off or to buy clothes for the next round of employment interviews. Primary
group assistance is often what might be termed "strategic" support. Therein lies much of its importance; for it is precisely these kinds of emergency aid which are not provided for by established programs of unemployment assistance.

Some of the other findings reported here were less expected. The data reveal that the amount of assistance received from parents and friends during the period of unemployment following involuntary layoff is largely unrelated to objective economic stress, as indicated by the ratio of household income during unemployment income prior to the unemployment period. It might be the case that for the sample as a whole, the level of deprivation was not severe enough to force individuals to seek out help from kin and friends. Primary group assistance was helpful but it was not strictly necessary. For everyone, social insurance benefits provided a margin of safety against economic deprivation. The public sector workers studied here faced a much more benign situation than their counterparts from previous eras; the grim narrative accounts of joblessness during the great depression make this clear (Bakke, 1940a, 1940b; Bird, 1966; Terkel, 1970; Jahoda, Lazarsfeld & Ziesel, 1971). Future research should examine the impact of economic deprivation across samples characterized by qualitatively distinct unemployment experiences--comparing for example, workers exposed to temporary unemployment during slack periods in an otherwise healthy industry with the victims of a plant closing within a tight labor market.

The evidence presented in this study suggests that it was the expectations of economic hardship, of sensing "the wolf at the door"--an often-used phrase--that determined perceptions of the need for assistance. Many remarked that the most difficult thing about being without work was the pervasive feeling of uncertainty which came from not knowing if a call-back to the job was possible or what would happen once unemployment benefits were exhausted. Thus, perceptions about the potential severity of unemployment shaped the behavioral response: persons who sharply cut back on consumption expenditures in anticipation of serious deprivation were also inclined to seek out assistance from parents and friends.

The data also reveal that frequency of contact with primary group members is directly related to the flow of assistance during the period of unemployment. Social contact seen as a form of "investment" has a measureable payoff in times of crisis. However, the present data do not rule out a contrary hypothesis: that the provision of assistance created closer ties with parents and friends which were manifested in greater frequency of contact. Clearly, future research in this area should be longitudinal and must be sensitive to such confounding and possibly non-recursive relationships.

As stated earlier, age is a determinant of parental aid. Younger persons receive considerably more aid from their parents when out of work than do older persons. This finding is consistent with previous research on parental aid to married children, including the work of Sussman and Burchinal (1962) and Adams (1964). In these studies, however, length of marriage rather than age was the independent variable.
Since age and economic status are related, one might surmise that younger persons receive more assistance than older persons because the former are financially less secure. But in the present sample, the inverse relationship between age and the amount of assistance received from parents remained strong after the effect of financial status—indexed by family income before unemployment—was partialled out. This suggests the play of normative expectations, in this case, that parents should provide assistance to their offspring as a matter of course, override considerations of objective need as a determinant of level of assistance. This question warrants further careful study.

In contrast, age was not a factor in determining the amount of assistance from friends. There is no theoretically compelling reason to expect that age would be important here, and there are no comparable existing data. Further systematic analysis of the determinants of assistance provided by each of several types of primary groups should be an important objective of future research.

Appendix 1. Listing of Assistance Types

During the time I was unemployed, my parents/friends:

1. Gave me a gift of money
2. Co-signed a loan for me
3. Gave me a loan of money
4. Gave me a temporary job
5. Told me about a temporary job
6. Helped me to care for my child (children) without pay
7. Gave me advice on how to apply for unemployment or deal with the unemployment office
8. Gave me advice on how to obtain other government services
9. Gave me advice about economizing
10. Helped me to sell something to raise money
11. Helped me to find professional advice for emotional troubles or worries
12. Went out of the way to provide a nice time for me or visited me more often
13. Bought me or lent me something which I would have bought for myself if I had been working
14. Gave me moral support when I needed it
15. Helped me to make some decisions about my future plans

Appendix 2. Selected List of Items Used in Construction of Predictor Variables

I. Social-Psychological Measures

A. Srole Anomia Scale. Would you more or less agree or disagree: (1) In spite of what some people say, the lot (condition) of the average man is getting worse, not better. (2) Most public officials are not really
interested in the problems of the average man. (3) These days a person doesn't really know whom he can count on. (4) Most people don't really care what happens to the next person.

B. Scale of Interpersonal Trust. (1) Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful, or that they are mostly just looking out for themselves? (2) Do you think that most people would take advantage of you if they had the chance, or would they try to be fair? (3) Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?

C. Social Obligation Scale. (1) Do you feel more obligated if you ask someone for a favor or if they offer it to you without asking? (2) Do you feel as obligated to do a favor in return for someone in the family as you would someone outside the family? (3) In general, do you feel closer or less close to someone you owe a large favor to?

II. Perceived Impact of Unemployment

A. Consumption Cutbacks Scale. To what extent did you change your spending on: (1) groceries; (2) clothing; (3) entertainment; (4) books, records, or hobbies; (5) entertaining at home; (6) travel or vacationing; (7) eating out in restaurants; (8) savings or investment plans? Did you: (9) move to a less expensive apartment or house in order to save money; (10) have difficulty keeping up with monthly payments on credit purchases; (11) put off any medical or dental care for yourself or for a member of your family; (12) sell any major possessions to pay off debts or to help meet expenses?

B. Closeness Scale. Very true to not at all true: (1) I felt closer to my friends while I was unemployed; (2) I felt closer to my relatives while I was unemployed.

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ORGANIZATIONAL RESISTANCE TO SERVING THE DISADVANTAGED:  
THE CASE OF A STATE EMPLOYMENT SERVICE  

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The University of Toledo  

ABSTRACT  
Maintaining the commitment of public agencies to serve the disadvantaged persists as one of the most vexing problems in public affairs. This study places in an historical perspective the commitment of the Wisconsin State Employment Service (WSES) to serve the disadvantaged during the late 1960s and the retreat from this emphasis in the 1970s. The WSES displays a tradition of tension between operating-level employees who aspire to serve a job-ready clientele, and top decisionmakers who, from time to time, sense a need for direct service to the disadvantaged. The study suggests that effective service to the disadvantaged depends upon continuous, centralized control, which is cognizant of the organizational dynamics inherent in serving this segment of society.

INTRODUCTION  
For the past 15 to 20 years, national employment and training policy-makers--in Congress, the executive branch, and in the private world of consulting--have made effective service to the disadvantaged one of their major goals, save for a very notable lapse during part of the Nixon administration. This goal has been thwarted, however, by public and quasi-public agencies at the operating level. The agencies do not maintain service to the disadvantaged at the expected levels. Although national policymakers have changed the employment and training system a great deal over the past 20 years, they have not found the key to overcoming the local obstacles to effective service to the disadvantaged. Increasingly, one suspects that the key involves disputes over clien-
tele. Policymakers project their enthusiasm for helping the disadvantaged onto the employees at the operating level who must deliver the services—a fatal flaw, according to this historical analysis of the Wisconsin State Employment Service (WSES, now the Wisconsin Job Service). This study demonstrates that operating-level employees of one state employment service have almost continuously sought to "upgrade" their clientele while state policymakers have periodically directed a return of program emphasis to the disadvantaged.

The U.S. Department of Labor developed an interest in a comprehensive state employment service policy for the disadvantaged in the early 1960s. In 1966, it made a significant commitment with a Human Resources Development (HRD) policy which mandated that the local offices of the public employment service expend their major efforts to help the disadvantaged become job-ready and find jobs. Although the state employment services receive virtually all of their funding from the Department of Labor, they retain considerable autonomy. Most state services exercised their autonomy and resisted the HRD policy bitterly and successfully. A few states, like Wisconsin, accepted the HRD policy and attempted to implement it. Employer reluctance to hire the disadvantaged was the reason why many local offices resisted the policy. For the employment service, employers constitute a "critical constituency which cannot be changed" (Holden, 1966: 946). Without their good will and job orders, the local offices make no placements. (Part of the HRD policy was to promote employer relations and employability development of clients.)

In 1971, the Nixon administration ended the Department of Labor's HRD policy. The public employment service officially returned to its labor exchange role, although many states had never left it. However, the Department of Labor did not give up on the disadvantaged. With the passage of the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) of 1973, the department shifted its concern for the disadvantaged to the more than 400 prime sponsors which would be created under the act's authority. Although administratively responsible to the state and local elected officials, this extremely decentralized system of prime sponsors is charged with carrying out national policy. By the time CETA came up for renewal in 1978, many observers felt that the system had served the financial needs of mayors and city managers more than the employment and training needs of the economically disadvantaged. One sophisticated statistical study of CETA public service employment (PSE) indicates that after five or six quarters, all the federally funded PSE jobs substitute for or replace jobs funded by municipalities (Johnson and Tomola, 1977; Nathan et. al., 1979). In the old Title II and VI PSE portions and Title I (which was to provide employability development to the unemployed, underemployed, and economically disadvantaged), CETA was serving a much smaller proportion of disadvantaged than the law and the program requirements mandate (National Commission for Manpower Policy, 1978: 5; Mirengoff and Rindler, 1978: 203).
Scholar-consultants for the Department of Labor have puzzled over the low level of services to the disadvantaged under CETA. For example, Mirengoff and Rindler (1978: 206-12) examine several factors which affect the choice of participants, but do not investigate the attitudes of employment and training agency personnel toward serving the disadvantaged. Their recommendations would significantly increase service to the disadvantaged only if operating personnel devote their efforts to the disadvantaged. Carl Van Horn blames the Department of Labor and its regional offices for the lack of attention given to the disadvantaged. He then concludes that "the policy of decentralizing authority to the local level still has the potential for being the best approach to manpower program delivery..." (Van Horn, 1978: 181). However, decentralization does not reconcile with the need for the Department of Labor to direct local office personnel to increase attention to the disadvantaged, especially if they resist serving that clientele.

In response to CETA problems, the Congress significantly centralized the program by increasing federal controls in the 1978 renewal (P.L. 95-524). While the House committee with responsibility for the CETA amendments avoided a direct charge of large-scale substitution by local governments, it nevertheless "considered it essential to directly address the problem" and took "five specific steps to control substitution" in the amendments, including limits with regard to the length of PSE employment for individuals, wage supplements, type of employment, etc. (U.S. Congress, 1978: 2-3). For the problem of too few disadvantaged in the CETA program, the 1978 renewal clearly distinguishes programs for structural unemployment from those for countercyclical unemployment. Eligibility for the former (the new Title II) is limited to the economically disadvantaged. Eligibility for countercyclical programs include somewhat more relaxed income and employment-status criteria. The first-year result of these stiffened federal requirements, as the Department of Labor noted, is "a dramatic increase in the

1 In 1978, the formal definition of an economically disadvantaged individual was: A person who is either (1) a member of a family that received public assistance; (2) a member of a family whose income during the previous 6 months on an annualized basis was such that the family would have qualified for public assistance if it had applied or did not exceed the poverty level or did not exceed 70 percent of the Bureau of Labor Statistics' lower living standard income level ($11,546 for a family of four in 1978); (3) a foster child on whose behalf state or local government payments are made; or (4) a client of a sheltered workshop, a handicapped person, a person residing in a prison, hospital, or other institution or facility providing 24-hour care, or a regular outpatient of a mental hospital, rehabilitation, or similar facility, where such status presents significant barriers to employment.
proportion of disadvantaged persons enrolled" in the new Title II PSE and tabular material indicates greater numbers of disadvantaged in Title VI programs (U.S. Department of Labor, 1980: 19, 354).

Whether or not these 1978 commitments to the disadvantaged will be sustained during the Reagan administration is problematical. On the one hand, the Reagan administration is calling for an end to the two PSE programs: Title IID, which primarily serves the economically disadvantaged and was targeted in fiscal year 1981 for 250,000 jobs at a cost of $2.4 billion, and Title VI, the countercyclical PSE for persons with somewhat higher incomes and less lengthy periods of unemployment which was targeted for 200,000 unemployed persons at a cost of $2.0 billion (U.S. Executive Office of the President, 1980: 234). On the other hand, the Reagan rationale for the CETA reduction is to eliminate substitution and to "return CETA to its original purpose of improving the ability of low-income persons to get jobs" (The New York Times, Feb. 20, 1981: A11-A16). This is consistent with his February 6, 1981 pledge from his address on the state of the nation that "our spending cuts will not be at the expense of the truly needy" (The New York Times, Feb. 6, 1981: A12). The obvious problem is that conducting employment and training programs for the truly needy without PSE places a burden on the private sector to hire the very individuals who have heretofore been unable to compete in the private labor market. That burden will require a willing private sector and a commitment to serving the disadvantaged by the professionals in CETA that will be very difficult to sustain.

A growing body of literature points to the difficulty of sustaining employee commitment to economically disadvantaged and socially or psychologically troubled clients. A study of social services for welfare clients revealed that, contrary to professional opinion, new employees offer more and better services to clients than those with longer tenure. Veteran employees grow disenchanted or frustrated with their work, with a consequent drop in the level of services (Randall, 1975: 197-98). Although the term was not used in that study, the behavior is consistent with the "burn-out" syndrome which is now receiving attention among health and social services researchers.

Discussion of burn out is a sensitive matter because its causes reflect either on the inadequacies of the professional or the disagreeable traits of the client. Professionals may be disinclined to accept the stigma of the former, but to accept the latter denigrates the clients and offends many in the helping professions. Yet it is myopic not to regard the economically disadvantaged and the socially or psychologically troubled as difficult, frustrating, and stressful individuals to work with. One researcher knew that he had "touched a sensitive nerve" by the volume of correspondence from practitioners to an article he had co-authored on burn out (Warnath, 1979: 325).
The employment service differs fundamentally from many other social agencies in the set of responses to difficult and frustrating clients which are available to their employees. In most health and social agencies, the characteristic responses include: minimizing time spent with them, frequent sick leave, increased use of alcohol, tranquilizers and drugs (Maslach, 1976: 16-22); emotional detachment from clients, treating them in a dehumanized way, becoming less effective on the job, becoming more bureaucratic (Daley, 1979: 375-79); and a loss of idealism, a sense of being on an endless treadmill, and a dread of meeting with the day's schedule of clients (Warnath and Shelton, 1976). In legal services, lawyers display a high rate of turnover and many admit that they plan to leave because they are "getting burned out" (Handler et. al. 1978: 63-67). In the schools, increasing problems of discipline, student violence, unsupportive administrators and the perception of community disinterest in education have caused many teachers to burn out and leave the profession. For those who stay, teaching has often "become a matter of survival, of finding ways to prevent job stresses from becoming unbearable" (Cerra, 1980: B1). In the health and social services generally, notes Maslach (1976: 20), it is "bitterly ironic that clients should be such outcasts in a profession that would not exist without them" But the employment service is different. It can change its clientele.

While the burn-out literature gives reason to expect employee stress in providing employment services to the disadvantaged, there is unanswered in the manpower literature this fundamental question: Is there inherent in the provision of employment and training services an inevitable disenchantment, frustration or distaste for serving the disadvantaged which causes employees to seek an upgraded clientele?

One way to answer this question is to examine historically the operations of a manpower agency which has a progressive reputation for service to the disadvantaged. A persistent tendency to shift service away from the disadvantaged toward more job-ready classes in such an agency would be strong evidence that such a tendency would be found in any employment and training agency.

THE WISCONSIN STATE EMPLOYMENT SERVICE

WSES has long been a highly regarded agency with a reputation for progressive administration. Yet, from its origins as a skeleton of a

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2 Officials with long experience in the United States Employment Service and in the Interstate Conference of Employment Security Agen-
system with four small offices, a handful of central office staff and a budget of a few thousand dollars to its present shape of 70 local offices staffed by professionals and a large, efficient central administration, this study will show that local office employees continuously strive to upgrade their clientele. Only as a result of direct pressure from state administrators do the operating-level employees provide services to the disadvantaged. Because state policymakers only occasionally returned services to the disadvantaged, the clientele has alternated between the disadvantaged and the job ready. As a result, there is frequently tension between policymakers and operating-level employees.

The Wisconsin State Employment Service was born out of a reaction to the exploitation of the disadvantaged of the day. Before the turn of the century, the hiring process for a significant share of the Wisconsin labor force occurred in saloons. Labor agents paid saloon proprietors to round up workers in a process in which "the fraud and extortion... became notorious," according to an early retrospective study by the Wisconsin Industrial Commission (1913b: 195). Other private employment agents operated by retaining interpreters who would assemble gangs of non-English-speaking immigrants. Agents delivered the crews to employers for sizeable fees which were split three ways: among the interpreters, the private agents, and the officials of the employers doing the hiring (Wisconsin Industrial Commission, 1913a). The victims of these abuses were the disadvantaged--the unskilled, often immigrant workers, who frequently ended up in the lumber, railroad and ice camps of the state.

Throughout this study, attitudes and behaviors are ascribed generically to local office personnel when the actual data come from the reports and statements of local office managers. In as much as managers frequently are promoted from within and the local office is often a close-knit system of attitudes, expectations, and behaviors, local office managers are reasonably representative of the local office personnel on matters reported in this study. Michael Lipsky's (1973: 109) study of "street-level" bureaucrats leads him to say: "Basic bureaucratic attitudes towards clients appear to be a function of the worker's background and of socialization on the job (emphasis added)."
These abuses outraged many citizens in the state, especially after the Panic of 1893. Until then, Wisconsin, with a very large percentage of immigrants, contained a significant nativist sentiment to restrict immigration and to impose limitations on immigrant voting (Thelen, 1972: 18, 87), which blocked meaningful action for the disadvantaged. The panic of 1893, which reached depression proportions in Wisconsin, profoundly diminished that prejudice. With poverty everywhere apparent, many groups shrugged off their nativist attitudes, reduced their moralistic crusades against alcohol, prostitution and gambling, and concentrated their energies instead upon structural reforms which soon flowered into Progressivism. Historian David Thelen (1972: 149-50) remarks upon "the enthusiasm with which workers, immigrants and Populists contributed to the new cause" of structural reform in the state. 

Several unsuccessful attempts to license private employment agencies (Wisconsin Industrial Commission, 1913b: 195) gave impetus to the efforts to set up competing public employment service offices to provide job-seekers with an alternative, non-exploitative system. The city of Superior responded first by creating an office in 1899. With no other cities following suit during the next two years, the state took action in 1901 during the LaFollette administration by enacting legislation (Laws of Wisconsin, 1901, Ch. 420) empowering the State Commissioner of Labor to open public employment offices. A single justification dominated the legislative debate over this bill--the need to curb abuses of the disadvantaged by private employment offices and their agents (Hurst, 1964: 480-81). Shortly after passage of the law, the commissioner opened an office in Milwaukee and assumed operation of the one in Superior.

ALTERNATING CLIENTELE

During the formative years of the Wisconsin system (1901 until the U.S. involvement in World War I), the clientele consisted of the unskilled, frequently immigrant, laborers for whom the WSES had been created. As did the private agents, the public employment service placed many of them in railroad, lumber, and ice camps (Milwaukee Citizens' Committee, 1931: 7). In Milwaukee, the advisory committee to the local office reported that, from 1901 to 1911, that office served only unskilled occupations (Milwaukee Citizens' Committee, 1937: 5). From 1912 to 1917, common and casual placements represented 61 percent of

* An increasing sympathy for the disadvantaged was just one cause of demands for structural reform. Another was fear. For newspaper accounts of tramps overrunning a county, committing arson, assault and other violence in the 1880s, see Michael Lesy (1973).
total WSES placements, indicating a high proportion of known unskilled placements. In addition, some unknown percentage of the remaining labor placements were unskilled (Wisconsin Industrial Commission 1913b: 198; A.J. Altmeyer, 1932: 248). Clearly, the early employment service placements served the clients for whom it was created.

Yet, local officials worked to swing the operations toward a more skilled clientele. An experimental office for skilled workers was created during a period of high unemployment in Milwaukee in 1911 (Milwaukee Citizens' Committee, 1937: 5). In 1913, the superintendent of the Milwaukee office, which had a good national reputation (Kellogg, 1933: 30), spoke proudly of a new clientele comprised of more skilled workers (Wisconsin Industrial Commission, 1913b: 207):

As proof of the increased efficiency of the office under its reorganization, the previous tendency of the bureau to handle only the lowest paid, most casual, the least attractive work has been overcome to a considerable extent. Employers are most ready to use the office in filling the better class of positions and as a result the better grade of workmen become regular applicants at the bureau.

To counter this propensity to seek an upgraded clientele, A.J. Altmeyer (1932: 264), influential advisor and longtime Secretary to the Industrial Commission argued:

Many persons have deprecated this [that the offices handle primarily unskilled labor], some going so far as to say that only "bums" and "down-and-outers" patronize the public employment offices.... The labor market for skilled laborers is so constituted that direct methods of bringing the man and the job together can be depended upon to a larger extent than in the case of unskilled labor. Therefore, the offices are probably performing the greatest social service when they do handle unskilled labor primarily.

Nevertheless, local offices wanted and worked for an upgraded clientele. From 1917 to 1932, common and casual labor continued to account for 61 percent of total placements (Altmeyer, 1932: 248; Wisconsin Industrial Commission, Biennial Report(s), 1926-1940). But the unskilled clientele was decreasing rapidly by the end of this period, having dropped to 50.5 percent in 1930. In 1931, when the statewide percentage plunged to 42.6 percent, the Milwaukee office and the Milwaukee Citizens' Committee on Unemployment (1931: 7) boasted of its more skilled clientele and virtual elimination of the casual labor service:

The gradual displacement of unskilled labor by improvements in the technique of industry has been of far-reaching importance. The number of transient laborers
handled by the office has dwindled to smaller and smaller numbers during recent years. The employment office is no longer able to furnish any large number of casual labor jobs and workers of this class have turned to institutions like the Transient Service Bureau, the Rescue Mission, and other agencies which specialize in caring for them.

If the Industrial Commission directed employment service offices to cater to the unskilled laborer, the Milwaukee office clearly ignored the policy.

Labor market conditions obviously influence employment service operations. Local offices, however, retain considerable discretion in their actual response to the conditions. Thus, the Great Depression, which respected no class as it threw people from all walks of life out of work, was taken as an opportunity by local office personnel to upgrade the clientele. At its height in Wisconsin, applications for work showed a four-fold increase over 1928, while placements suffered a 67.4 percent decline from 1929 to 1932.

The local offices seized the opportunity provided by the increased numbers of better qualified applications. The Milwaukee office proudly noted the development of its higher-quality clientele:

Conditions of the past few years . . . . [have] raised the standard of the type applying. No longer is the Public Employment Office considered a service for laborers only; artists and artisans, technicians and doctors are numbered among those who file their application for employment opportunities (Milwaukee Citizens' Committee, 1935: 5).

The specific problem facing the employment service when the number of applicants increases and job orders decrease is how to allocate the few jobs among the many applicants. Milwaukee's solution to this problem was described by the local office (Milwaukee Citizens' Committee, 1932: 9) as follows:

The former practice of placing applicants on the basis of fitness for the job or position had to be modified by giving consideration to the applicant's economic necessities.

In practice, the term "economic necessities" becomes, all too easily, a euphemism granting advantages to middle- as opposed to lower- or working-class applicants, again demonstrating the direction in which operating personnel drift.

As the United States entered World War II, President Roosevelt requested that governors transfer their state employment services to the federal government to improve the recruitment and allocation of the na-
tion's manpower. Federalization was completed by January 1, 1942. The war forced local offices to broaden their contacts and relationships with personnel and other management officials of most large manufacturing concerns. This resulted in high placements nationally and in Wisconsin. These high placements persisted beyond the postwar reconversion in November, 1945, when the states resumed control over the local offices.

The period 1947 to 1960 witnessed a gradual deterioration of the prominent role achieved by the employment service during World War II. In this period the service met with public apathy and congressional economizing. Placements declined nationally and in Wisconsin, in part, because of a drop in employer contacts. While total employer contacts were decreasing, however, close examination of Wisconsin activity data reveals that special services for favored employers increased. For example, the number of tests administered annually by local offices (an activity now considered employer-oriented and detrimental to minority group interests) in each year of the 1960s was more than double the rate of the early 1950s (Wisconsin Industrial Commission, Biennial Report, 1952-1954; U.S. Department of Labor, Annual Report(s), 1966-1974).

National employment-service policymakers expressed dissatisfaction with the performance of local operations and attempted to provide more direction from 1954 to 1958 by singling out various groups, mostly disadvantaged, for priority attention. These groups included the veterans (who already had a statutory right to preferential treatment, but who now would receive additional service), youth, the physically handicapped, older workers, ex-prisoners, potential apprentices, Indians, and members of other minority groups and professionals with the then much heralded network of professional placement offices (Adams, 1969: 42-44). With the exception of the professionals and perhaps the veterans, disadvantaged individuals comprised the bulk of the designated groups. Top policymakers were attempting to reorient the employment service to devote more resources to these groups. The effort failed because the policymaking framework, which emphasized easy placements (Haber and Kruger, 1964), remained unchanged. A bigger and bolder effort, developed within a different policymaking framework, would come less than a decade later.

After the rediscovery of poverty in the early 1960s and a host of anti-poverty acts, policies and programs, the national employment service was roused to action. With a major redirection of policy in 1966, the USES mandated Human Resources Development (HRD) for implementation by state and local services.

Human Resources Development was designed to reach the disadvan-
taged, improve their employability, develop jobs for them, and place them on those jobs. According to the Department of Labor, HRD was a large-scale effort to shift the orientation of the public employment service from an employer-oriented screening agency to an applicant-oriented one, designed to develop the employment potential of those most needing employment help (U.S. Department of Labor, 1967).

In order to ascertain the sentiment of local office employees to the disadvantaged in the late 1960s, the focus shifts from the written to the spoken word because, by then, everyone was more conscious of language that contained words or thoughts of prejudice. Government agency employees, among others, had "cleaned up" their written statements, regardless of their attitudes. Therefore, three years after the HRD orientation appeared, the author interviewed the local office managers. Considerable anti-HRD sentiment remained, as nine managers of the 23 interviewed (out of 24 total) expressed considerable hostility to the new responsibilities of concentrating service on the disadvantaged. One manager protested: "The employment service has moved into areas where it has no business."

Without deprecating the work of employees at the operating level, they did enjoy close, amiable relationships with employers. Several managers unabashedly posed as spokespersons for a cherished system, absolutely crucial to which are America's employers:

This is a capitalistic system--I mean that private enterprise is the backbone of our country and they do the hiring of most people.

For a host of reasons, not all of which related to the effective functioning of the employment service, managers such as this one wanted to maintain those close, amiable relationships with employers. HRD, however, severely strained those relationships by forcing upon employers the very applicants they have traditionally rejected. In objecting to the emphasis on the disadvantaged, a manager said bluntly, "I'm employer oriented: our market is the employer." A second, complaining about state central-office controls, said: "The state does not appreciate the

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5 The formal definition of disadvantaged in 1969 specified persons who were poor, unemployed, or underemployed and met one of the following criteria: (1) school dropout, (2) member of a minority, (3) under twenty-two years of age, (4) forty-five years of age or over, or (5) handicapped. The definition of "poor" parallels that of the United States Social Security Administration. In 1968, for example, a non-farm family of four was considered poor if its annual income was $3,300 or under (U.S. Department of Labor, 1969: 1150.O1B).

6 For other studies using information from these interviews and exploring related administrative questions, see Randall (1973 and 1976).
fact that we have to live with employers in the area." A third opined:
Some people in the state office are not aware of the elementary fact that the employment service has not created one damn job. We need to pay more than lip service to employer relations.

Managers and employees find the disadvantaged to be a difficult, frustrating, often exasperating clientele. For example, a manager exclaimed that:
The people in the state office want us to serve those who should be referred to other agencies. We are expected to serve people that Vocational Rehabilitation has given up on!
Although the kinds of jobs often available to the disadvantaged may offer little incentive for them to be good workers, their poor work habits and attitudes and lack of motivation mean that a mostly middle-class employment service prefers not to work with them. This was certainly true of the manager who fretted that the attention given to the disadvantaged could stigmatize the employment service:
The stronger the employment service's emphasis on the disadvantaged and the more we impress this on employers, the greater is the risk of gaining the stigma of a relief agency.
Racism, too, is an unspoken, but ever-present factor. For example, one manager mentioned that some ES employees found it distasteful to drive black disadvantaged clients to potential employers, which is often required for successful job placements.

A statistical view of WSES shows a significant response to the HRD policy during this period. Although placements plummeted from 79,046 during the pre-HRD fiscal year 1965 to 36,308 in fiscal 1971, this was not bothersome initially to state policymakers because of their belief that nondisadvantaged or job-ready individuals could find work with minimal employment service help. Testing, which is not very useful for the disadvantaged, dropped during this period. The number of applicants remained about the same, and counseling, which is a necessary employment tool for many of the disadvantaged, increased (U.S. Department of Labor, Annual Report(s), 1966-1974).

For two years, the Nixon administration continued the HRD policy. Then, in 1971, with placements and employer contacts still down and employee resistance to HRD persistent, the Nixon administration sounded the official retreat from the HRD policy (U.S. Department of Labor, 1973: 13). This turnaround was confirmed by passage of the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act of 1973 (P.L. 93-203), which directed that the employability-development functions of the U.S. manpower policy be administered by a decentralized system of prime sponsors separate from the public employment service. The public employment service lost
its position as presumptive deliverer of manpower services and was relegated to a simple labor exchange which could compete—if it chose—for subcontracts with the prime sponsor.

To implement the turnaround, the national office drastically revised the state employment service funding arrangements by developing the balanced placement formula (now the resource allocation formula), which forced states to shift attention away from employability development of the disadvantaged to straight placement activity or face the loss of staff positions.

Wisconsin officials, who had been among the most committed of state employment service officials to the HRD policy, were slower to respond to the nationally mandated reversal than most states and suffered staff losses. (Many states had failed to adopt the HRD policy in the first place.) But the resistance of operating level personnel combined with budgetary and other pressures from the national level led to a state policy to return to the labor exchange role, which was clear by 1975 (Wisconsin Department of Administration, 1975; II-151). In just under ten years, the Wisconsin State Employment Service repeated the cycle.

CONCLUSIONS

The tension inherent between administrative and local office personnel throughout the history of the Wisconsin State Employment Service helps to explain recent failures to provide adequate service to the disadvantaged. The agency grew out of a desire to eliminate abuses perpetrated by private agents. It was a new agency, created to serve the disadvantaged. But throughout its history, operating-level personnel have endeavored to upgrade the clientele, while, from time to time, higher level officials have attempted to redirect the efforts of the service back to the more disadvantaged workers—those least able to help themselves obtain jobs.

A short time perspective would make it look as if the Human Resources Development policy and subsequent retreat was a unique organizational phenomenon of an old-line agency, whereas in fact it represents one cycle of a recurring phenomenon—that of a clientele shifting from disadvantaged to job-ready. Occasionally, higher level officials (those who created the service originally, A.J. Altmeyer of the Industrial Commission staff, federal officials developing the HRD policy or state officials accepting the HRD policy) direct the service toward the disadvantaged. Almost always, however, the operating level staff strive to serve an upgraded clientele. Because this tension exists throughout the development of the Wisconsin State Employment Ser-
vice, it clearly resides inherently in the employment service function and not in the peculiar organization size or structure of a given period.

If not entirely laudable, the position of operating-level personnel is explainable. Part of the appeal of working for the employment service stems from the opportunity to develop contacts with community influentials--officials in area businesses. As long as the employment service refers qualified, competent, and job-ready individuals, employers respond with job orders and amiability. However, pressing the disadvantaged onto employers puts a severe strain on the agency-employer relationship, potentially depressing the number of job orders.

In addition, an emphasis on the disadvantaged forces employment service personnel to deal with persons often frustrating and exasperating to serve. The disadvantaged often have poor work habits and attitudes; a short time horizon which lowers the value of training programs for them; and physical, mental, and other disabilities which make them difficult to place. Initial enthusiasm for working with them can burn out, yielding a calloused, bureaucratic behavior seemingly insensitive to the real needs of the disadvantaged or an effort to upgrade the clientele.

The lesson of this study for manpower--and for other social-policy making and implementation for the disadvantaged—is important. Quite simply, the realities of a federal structure for a manpower system make permanent service to the disadvantaged extremely difficult because of the inevitable autonomy of state agencies. Close federal-state-local relationships, including considerable direction, control, encouragement, and social support from the federal government are vital. Otherwise, local employment and training personnel are isolated in the communities, buffeted by local pressures predominantly against an emphasis on the disadvantaged. In this environment, they naturally give expression to their own disposition to upgrade the clientele.

Against this background, the loss of federal support and tools (especially PSE) for employment and training programs for the disadvantaged in the Reagan administration, despite statements about the "truly needy," leads to the observation that CETA prime sponsors will find the temptation to upgrade their clientele nearly irresistible during the Reagan years.
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SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS: A NEW TOOL FOR UNDERSTANDING INDIVIDUAL AND FAMILY FUNCTIONING*

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ABSTRACT

During the last decade, social work, along with the other helping professions, has moved toward conceptualizing practice within a social systems framework. Intrapsychic variables are still important but, increasingly, the emphasis is on the clients' intimate social network as both cause and solution of a wide range of social problems. It is now widely believed that clients' well-being is enhanced when system functioning is enhanced (Gitterman and Germain, 1976).

Most of what social workers know about social systems theory comes from the sociological literature, particularly the social action system of Talcott Parsons. Although this orientation has great heuristic value for social work practice, it has been limited in its ability to generate new practice theory because of its high level of generality. For social workers, like sociologists before them, Parsonian systems theory has proved so difficult to operationalize that the hoped-for linkages and the anticipated development of new theory from the general theory have not materialized (Pfouts and Galinsky, 1976).

The authors believe that an important movement towards clarification of system properties and relationships is currently under way in the form of social network analysis. In recent years, a number of researchers from a variety of disciplines have explored the use of social networks and the specific properties of those networks as a means of operationalizing and expanding upon our intuitive understanding of the importance of social bonds. The result of this effort is a growing body of knowledge which draws not only upon systems theory but also upon previous research in other areas such as kinship, support systems, adaptation to stress, organizational theory, and information exchange.

The Meaning of Social Network

The concept of a social network was first employed by the anthropologist J. A. Barnes in his pioneering study of a Norwegian island parrish (Barnes, 1954). In defining network, Barnes said:

Each person is, as it were, in touch with a number of people, some of whom are directly in touch with each other and some of whom are not... I find it convenient to talk of a social field of this kind as a network. The image

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I have is of a set of points, some of which are joined by lines. The points of the image are people, or sometimes groups, and the lines indicate which people interact with each other. We can, of course, think of the whole of social life generating a network of this kind. (Barnes, 1954:43)

The concept of social network lies somewhere between the sociological emphasis on group and the social anthropological emphasis on social structure. Crucial for our purposes, however, is the fact that these complex images of the chains of persons with whom a given person interacts have measurable structural characteristics. Network analysis follows these interactions so that the unit of analysis in network research becomes not individual behavior nor even the dyadic linkages but, rather, the social context in which the individual behaviors and dyadic linkages occur. The model cuts across the domains of politics, kinship, and formal groups to look specifically at the series of linkages which may form a basis for the mobilization of people for specific purposes in certain situations (Whitten and Wolf, 1973:720).

Types of Network Analysis

Various researchers have employed the concept of network analysis for a wide variety of purposes. A comprehensive attempt at outlining these usages has been made by Sarason and his colleagues (Sarason et al., 1977).

1. One major grouping includes those authors who have studied the effects of different types of network structure on the behavior of individuals. In this type of research, network structure is conceptualized as an independent variable. Elizabeth Bott initiated this research approach in her landmark study (1957) of 20 English families. Bott found that the degree of segregation in the marital roles assumed by married couples varied with the "connectedness" or "knit" of the network. Tightly connected, closely knit networks, in which there are many relationships among the component units independent of the central person, in this case husband or wife, were associated with a greater degree of separateness in the marital role functions of the couple. On the other hand, married couples whose combined networks were loosely knit and less connected tended to demonstrate similar role functions.

2. Network structure has also been cited as a key factor in differentiating families at risk from those families who appear to be well-functioning. Garbarino (1977) found the absence of an adequate structure (social network) for the provision of feedback and support to be one of the necessary conditions for child abuse in families. He noted the degree of reciprocity of network contacts as particularly crucial. Wahler et al. (1977) found mothers in high-risk families, as opposed to low-risk families, to have networks virtually void of friends, with a majority of network contacts initiated by others.

3. Another focus of research has related network structure to help-seeking behavior, especially looking at the proportion of friends versus kin composing the network. McKinlay (1973) found that utilizers of health-care facilities tended to rely more on networks composed of friends and neighbors than did under-utilizers, who relied more on networks composed of relatives. Similarly, Salloway and Dillon (1973) found that individuals with larger family (as opposed to friend) networks had far greater delays in utilizing health-care services. Hammer (1963), focusing on slightly different structural variables, found that more tightly connected networks were highly correlated with hospitalization for psychiatric symptoms.
4. Social network structure is also related to the ability to handle stress and crisis. Finlayson (1976) found better outcomes for heart patients whose wives acknowledged a wider range of network support, while Nuckolls et al. (1972) found a relationship between "social resources" and lack of complications in pregnancy. Tolsdorf (1976) found important structural differences in the networks of a matched sample of psychiatric and medical patients, with those of the psychiatric patients being more sparse and utilized less frequently. A sophisticated extension of this viewpoint is the study of networks as they relate to various life stages. Walker et al. (1977) discussed the role of social networks in bereavement and offered evidence suggesting the need for different types of networks for the widow, depending on the stage of the crisis. While a small, dense network may be most effective in providing initial support, such a network is unlikely to meet needs for additional social contacts or information later on. Lowenthal and Haven (1968) described the importance of certain types of network relationships in the health adaptation of the elderly, particularly the presence of one intimate relationship or confidante.

5. Network structure has been shown to have an important influence on individual behavior in the area of the diffusion of information. A number of authors have pointed to the utility of loosely knit networks with a low degree of connectedness for finding out about important resources (Craven and Wellman, 1973; Granovetter, 1973; Lee, 1969; Travers and Milgram, 1969).

6. Still another area of research analysis is an assessment of the influence that individuals have on the interpersonal environment surrounding them. In this case, social conditions are seen as independent variables affecting network characteristics (Gottlieb, 1975; Kaplan et al., 1977; Murphy, 1976). Network is thus used as a dependent variable in this research approach.

7. Finally, some important work, of particular interest to clinicians, has been done in the area of recognizing natural helping networks as an alternative means of service provision. While not our focus here, it is a practice application of network theory which offers definite promise to social work, and it has been spoken to most eloquently in the writings of Collins and Pancoast (1976). Another application is that employed by a growing group of practitioners who utilize "network therapy" as a method for working with troubled families (Gatti and Colman, 1976; Speck and Rueveni, 1969). One of the leading proponents of this modality, Ross Speck, encourages the involvement of all network members in the event of a crisis in the life of any one member.

Social Network Components

The wide array of literature suggesting the relationship between network structure and individual functioning becomes meaningful in light of our ability to systematically assess specific network components. These components may be divided into structural (anchorage, range, density, and reachability) and interactional (content, intensity, directedness, and frequency) characteristics (Mitchell, 1969). Structural Characteristics

Anchorage refers to some specified individual whose behavior the observer wishes to interpret (Mitchell, 1969:12). Networks are social interaction systems centered on a person or a coalition of persons. This central person or group is generally referred to as "ego."
Range refers to the number of persons included in the network. At one extreme are theorists such as Barnes (1969) who see a network as unbounded, including an unlimited number of persons, so that everyone in the social universe is in the network as a result of a constant series of linkages. At the other extreme is the set of definitions employed by more applied authors who have used such limiting criteria as the number of people with whom ego has contact at least once a month, or the number of people who are considered "important" to ego (Brim, 1974; Luikhart, 1977). A bridge between these two viewpoints is offered by Boissevain (1968) who outlined three different levels of range, seen as concentric circles which center on ego. The first consists of those persons, whether friends or relatives, with whom ego is on closest terms, and is referred to as the "intimate" network; the second is composed of people known less well and relied on less heavily, referred to as the "effective" network; the third is composed of people whom ego does not know but whom he could reach through members of his intimate or extended network. The first two categories are finite, while the third is unbounded and infinite.

Density refers to the degree to which individual members of a client network are in touch with other members and ultimately speaks to the question of how tightly knit a particular network might be. Density appears to be most crucial in determining network impact (Bott, 1957; Granovetter, 1973; Hammer, 1968; Walker et al., 1977; Wellman et al., 1973). A convenient measure for density is provided by looking at the number of linkages in the network divided by the number of possible linkages. The formula for computing density is

\[ \frac{a}{n(n-1)/2} \]

where \( a \) is the number of linkages and \( n \) is the network size (Tolsdorf, 1976).

Reachability refers to the ease with which ego is able to contact another network member. This may be a function of actual physical distance, or it may be an artifact of the situation in which ego knows one network member only through another member. For social workers, reachability has particular meaning in relation to the availability of network members for mobilization in specific problem situations. A close and important tie that is 600 miles away may or may not be adequate support in an ongoing stressful living experience.

Interactional Characteristics

Content refers to the meanings which persons in a network attribute to their relationships. Mitchell (1969) spoke in terms of the purposes for which links are established. Content is frequently delineated by differentiating ties based on such factors as kinship, friendship, neighborhood association, professional help, and occupation. Another approach focuses more closely on the specific function of network ties, ranging from economic assistance to categories of support, advice, and feedback. Kapferer (1969) distinguished these two conceptualizations by the terms "relationship content" and "exchange content." In addition to describing the nature of the network ties, content is discussed with reference to whether a linkage contains only one content area (uniplex) or more than one content area (multiplex). Multiplex relationships are believed to be more influential and important for the focal person (Boissevain, 1974). The proportion of multiplex relationships is determined by dividing the number of multiplex relationships by the total number of network ties (Tolsdorf, 1976).
Intensity or strength of a link in a personal network refers to the extent to which the individual experiences obligations or feels free to exercise the rights implied in linkage with another person. Kapferer (1969) noted that some relationships are intense because of multiplexity in content (e.g., friendship), while others are intense and uniplex because of moral values with which they are invested (e.g., kin ties). Nonetheless, especially in network relationships based on affection and consensus, rather than kinship obligation, higher multiplexity is indicative of individuals finding it worthwhile to maintain more than one kind of link with one another.

Directedness addresses the question of whether or not network relationships are reciprocal. Asymmetrical relationships may be indicative of status differences, and this has important implications for the effectiveness of a particular link. Tolsdorf (1976) outlined this phenomenon most graphically in his finding that psychiatric patients, compared to a control group of medical patients, received many more functions than they provided. Wahler et al. (1977) showed similar findings with high-risk families.

Frequency refers to the number of contacts among people within a network. While a high frequency of contact does not necessarily imply high intensity among linkages, some minimum criterion of frequency is often employed in an effort to determine the size of a personal network.

The Present State of Social Network Research

Because social network analysis is still in an early stage of development, many theoretical and methodological problems remain unresolved. A major difficulty lies in the multitude of conceptualizations of network characteristics and the variety of techniques used in measuring them. Network analysis is only now beginning to move out of its infancy of definitional confusion and idiosyncratic, ex post facto interpretations of data into a stage of greater theoretical clarity and standardized techniques of analyzing and comparing networks. It is an encouraging sign that researchers from a number of countries and a wide range of disciplines, including social work, have recently formed their own informational network with a bulletin entitled Connections, in which research in progress is reported and discussed, and a journal entitled Social Networks, both of which are published at the University of Toronto.

There are essentially two methods used to represent social networks on paper. The first, a graph, is a picture of a network, using points on a page to represent the units and lines to represent the links. The second, a matrix, uses corresponding columns and rows to represent each member of the network. As network analysis has become more sophisticated, matrices are increasingly being used for mathematical analysis (Doreian, 1974).

It appears likely that as social network theory continues to mature, the relatively simple methods of network analysis that are now widely used will be increasingly supplemented by more rigorous diagraph analysis. Currently, concepts and methods taken from graph theory and other branches of topology are proving to be very useful, particularly in analyzing those network components that are of interest to both mathematicians and social network theorists (e.g., reachability).

At the present time, social network research is in a state of flux and nobody can foresee the extent to which the promise it seems to hold will be fulfilled.
Perhaps the most exciting aspect of this new approach for social work faculty and students is the possibility that what is now a relatively primitive method may develop into a powerful source of social work knowledge about interventive strategies with troubled individuals and families.

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CHILD-CARE USAGE PATTERNS AS ESTIMATES OF CHILD-CARE NEED

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ABSTRACT

Child-care utilization studies are often used to estimate the need for future child-care. The author stresses the limitations of the use of past patterns to judge future needs. Specifically, the article focuses on the reliability and validity of measures of usage and satisfaction with various child-care modes, errors in study design, lack of conceptual clarity, and problems of the correlation of child-care modes and other variables.

One obvious way to estimate future needs for child care is to look at patterns of child care used previously. How many children are currently enrolled in educational day-care centers? How many youngsters are kept by relatives? Which families have babysitters? These are just a few of the questions asked when predictions must be made about child-care needs.

Much of the advice federal policy makers are getting about the extent of the need for child care in the U.S. is based on what may be called utilization studies. (cf. Hofferth, 1978; Hill, 1978; Shortlidge, 1977) Social scientists using for the most part survey research methods have sought to determine where America's children stay during the day and have based their calculations of future needs on straight-line projections from present-day usage of child-care facilities. In addition, some students of the need for care have used studies of usage patterns to generalize about the nations' preferences for forms of care.

Few would quarrel with the importance of gathering and analyzing information about the forms of child care currently utilized. What is lacking in much of the concern with such patterns is an awareness of the limitations of this particular type of data both as an indication of preference and as a reliable predictor of future needs.

The discussion of some of the projects which have sought to estimate need is under-taken not as a comprehensive critique of the studies, but in order to focus on methodological pitfalls and to indicate why an overreliance on the measures would be unwise. Specifically the focus will be on reliability and validity of measures of usage and satisfaction with child-care modes, errors in study design, lack of conceptual clarity, and
problems with external validity, i.e. the correlation between choice of child care mode and income.

Research on day-care arrangements have given varying estimates of the frequency of use of various modes of care. Part of the reason is the use of different measuring instruments. Results vary from one study to the next depending on the form of the questions asked, the definition of the population, the operationalization of concepts, etc. Thus the question of reliability of measures of day-care usages such as those summarized by Hofferth (1978), Hill (1978) and others is a serious one. Reliability of measuring instruments is often a problem in social science research. What is striking about the lack of reliability in the research on child care is the amount of confidence placed in the measures in the face of the patent unreliability of the instruments.

A second serious concern which arises from a survey of utilization studies is that of validity. If a measure does not in fact measure what it purports to measure, testing hypotheses or making predictions based on such a measure will result at best in useless findings, at worst in misleading conclusions. The major problem with validity in the utilization studies has been the confusion of the measurement of preference for certain types of child care with the measurement of utilization of specific modes of care.

Any attempt to equate choice among existing alternatives with preferences for child-care options fails the first test of face validity. Susan Woolsey (1977) for example blurs the distinction. She points out that data on child-care arrangements made under present conditions are not rigorous. Woolsey, however, is concerned with the politics of child care and, in her desire to counter those who argue for policies she opposes, slips into assuming that mothers prefer whatever care they in fact get. The basic flaw in the assumption that a person wants what he or she chooses is that a person may not be aware of alternative choices or that the desired option may not exist or may exist in such limited supply or at such distance or cost that it cannot be seriously considered. The problem is partly that choices about child care reflect an interface between supply and demand. To treat use patterns as demand is a mistake; to further treat usage as preference is compounding the error.

Some analogies may be helpful. In some developing countries where mortality rates are still relatively high and sickness among children is commonplace, people express a great deal of satisfaction with medical care simply because they have no basis for comparison. Would we say that people in such countries prefer to see their children sick simply because better medical care is out of their reach? Did people prefer walking to transportation by car in the early days of the automobile? If only 5% of the population used cars at first,
might that not have something to do with the cost and availability of the product? (cf, Halachmi, 1979.) Whatever the benefits of walking for our health and whatever the advantages of witch doctors over the AMA, it should be clear that when choices are limited, preferences inferred from them are dubious.

The movement from measures of usage of child-care modes to an assumption of preference for those modes would be easier to make if there were well-designed studies measuring satisfaction of users with the care received. The fact that users were satisfied with a certain form of care would not mean that they preferred that form of care, but the argument that they did would be strengthened. In the child-care study done for Head Start in the Office of Child Development by Unco, Inc., (U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 1976) an effort to measure satisfaction with care was made. The results are often reported as evidence that children need no child care which they are not already receiving. Clearly a sizeable logical leap has been made. In view of the wide citation of this result, it is important to note that the possible answers to all of the satisfaction questions were biased toward "satisfaction." The ordinary Likert scale beginning with "very satisfied" will end with "very dissatisfied." The actual list used in the child-care satisfaction section of the survey ranged only from "very satisfied" to "dissatisfied." Such a scale inevitably results in skewing scores away from dissatisfaction. The questioners did not ask about the adequacy of the setting for child care nor about satisfaction with care in general. They questioned the mother rather about her satisfaction with the caregiver. Few mothers in the Unco study reported dissatisfaction with the individual who was helping them to care for their child. In fact, it is possible that mothers were very happy to have found some form of child care and were not about to complain to strangers who were offering no other alternatives. Such possibilities need to be considered.

A final caveat in interpreting the results of the limited satisfaction measures available is the consideration of difficulties a mother may have trusting an interviewer with doubts that she has chosen the best for her child, especially in light of the fact that other options may not have been available. The questions are necessarily sensitive ones and may provoke emotional responses. Concern about the extent to which working mothers might have guilt feelings led researchers in the Head Start study to ask respondents how they felt about leaving their children with others while they worked. Unfortunately, many of the questions were negatively phrased and might induce guilt as well as measure it. Mothers were asked, for example, to react to such statements as "Mothers who work are guilty of child neglect."
Another limitation that may plague studies which measure child-care patterns is an incomplete specification of the population. Among the utilization studies quoted by researchers seeking to measure child-care needs is the 1974-1975 census study (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1976). A major drawback of this study is its failure to include children under three, a major portion of preschool children. Another problem is that data that is usually presented on child care using census material tends to eliminate figures on the use of preschools, nurseries, and other educational care including Head Start. Mothers were asked only about arrangements for care for children while children were not in school. Material is available elsewhere in census reports on preschool attendance but is not a part of the tables reporting child-care usage. The fact the children getting educational care are not counted as children receiving child care is confusing to the casual reader and has apparently mislead even experienced researchers. The result is a serious undercount of the use of group care and tends to make percentages of alternative forms of care questionable. The seriousness of this peculiar way of splitting up the data on child care is underlined by the fact that nearly half of the children in the age category studied by the census used kindergartens or nursery schools (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1978).

Thus far we have focused on limitations of utilization studies which arise because of measurement problems or research design. Other pitfalls await the researcher who moves to the stage of analyzing statistical data gathered on usage patterns. The groundwork for difficulties in analysis are usually laid in inadequate data and design, but pointing to specific examples of data analyses will help to emphasize how errors can compound each other. Russell Hill and Greg Duncan employ multivariate analytic techniques to investigate the importance of several variables on choice of child-care mode using 1973 and 1974 data (Duncan and Hill, 1975, 1977). They group the independent variables into three sets: variables reflecting location, those considered tastes, and those concerned with price and income. In a more recent study which refers to the two analyses, Russell Hill points out that "the model is misspecified in the sense that both important variables are omitted and our inferences about how tastes affect choice may be misleading as we cannot observe some of the basic factors which reflect qualitative differences among the modes (Hill, 1978:534)."

Part of the difficulty that Hill and Duncan have with specification of the model and operationalization of the variables seems to arise from a lack of conceptual clarity. Concerns about the quality of a child-care program or distinctions based on the purpose of programs are classified as matters of taste. Thus educational differences between various child-care modes are said to be differences in consumer taste.
Another area of conceptual difficulty is a confusion of supply and demand. Choices of child-care mode may be indication of the supply of certain modes as easily as an indication of a demand for those modes. If babysitters are abundant, schools may be utilized less, or vice versa. Hill is aware of the confusion of supply and demand and points out the problem. What is important and neglected however is the impact of such confusion on the validity of conclusions based on utilizations studies.

The way that errors in research design make interpretation of results extremely problematic is illustrated by one finding about location. When the authors find that Southerners and Westerners are more likely to choose day care centers than people in other regions (Hill, 1978), they are led to face frankly the issue of the effect of supply on decisions about arrangements. Since the supply of centers is greater in the South and the West than elsewhere, the more extensive usage of centers in these regions may simply reflect the difference in supply. Thus, Hill and Duncan cannot say whether the demand differs because of the supply or because Southerners and Westerners have a special affinity for center care or both. Too often the matter is not as clearly posed and the assumption that choice reflects demand alone is unquestioned.

A final important consideration that arises when analyzing data based on utilization studies in the area of child care is the effect of income on choice of child-care modes. While simple logic would dictate that income is one major variable determining choice among options such as care by relatives versus care by a live-in babysitter or care in a private nursery school, logic sometimes gets lost in the complex and often inappropriate analysis of the matter.

The 1974 Gary Income Maintenance Study has been cited as evidence that income is not an important factor in choice of child-care mode. It is argued that when poor people are given access to free or subsidized child care they turn it down. No one argues that the study is an exemplary one. A few facts may help to put the Gary study in perspective and encourage caution in future experiments. The research was based on a small, geographically limited sample. Many of the families in the sample had no children. Forty percent of the eligible families had no preschool children. Nearly half of the families with preschool children were offered only a 35% subsidy, and the number of families who had free access to child care was too small for analysis (Shaw, 1974).

Confusion about the effect of income on child care arrangements is compounded by more sophisticated analyses than the experiment gone awry in Gary. A synthesis of multivariate analyses of modal choice by Cottingham (1978:11) argues that the price of formal modes of child care is not
an important factor in the choice of such modes. The analysts come to this conclusion by a curious arithmetic. They subtract the wife's income in two income families from the total family income and use only what they call net-family income in their analysis of the effect of income on choice. Thus they say that while the wife's income may be positively related to the use of formal child care, family income is not. What they mean is that the husband's income alone is not sufficient to explain choice of child-care modes. The question of why the effect of total family income is not measured is not addressed. Surely it is total family income that is meant when we ask whether income affects a family's choices without specifying any particular source of income.

Russell Hill (1977:47) points out that none of the studies which he reviewed, including those multivariate analyses later studied by Cottingham, "explicitly test for differential modal choice by income class. To do so would require a national sample of families of all income classes and an interactive model which formally tested for the independent and interdependent effects of income and several other socioeconomic factors which affect modal choice (Hill, 1977:46)."

In the absence of such a national sample and interactive model, logic can take us a long way. At a price as low as $7 a day or $35 a week, center care would cost $1820 a year per child if used each week. If we remember this, we can see that it is illogical to suggest that poor families have the same option to choose center care, for instance, as rich families. Part of the confusion may be based on the fact that wealthy families who could afford center care might choose such care or they might choose the sometimes more expensive option of paying a sitter or housekeeper in the home. In the first case they are choosing formal care, but in the second, informal care. A second complicating factor tending to suppress the logical relationship between income and choice might be the present subsidization of care. Since researchers do not study only those low income parents who are not eligible for Head Start and other similar programs, some studies show some poor families using center care. Such evidence seems to show not that income is irrelevant to choice, but rather that it is so relevant that low income parents must receive help in order to be able to choose. It should be clear at least that few of the children of the 2.3 million working women whose husbands had incomes below $7,000 (U.S. Department of Labor, 1977:9) could easily choose center care were their husbands the sole bread winner. Separating the husband's and wife's income may be useful in order to demonstrate the greater sensitivity of child-care mode to the woman's income, but the failure to look at total income makes little sense.
John Kushman (1979, 544) complains that economic analysis of the child care market has been limited. In a careful study of the market in North Carolina, he argues persuasively that any analysis of center care should be enhanced by a separation of child care centers into government, voluntary (non-profit) and proprietary (for-profit) centers. Specification of type of producer may clarify to some extent the matter of the relationship between income and choice.

In sum, if policy makers are to be able to put confidence in figures which social scientists have given them on child care, not only must researchers be careful to present data on child-care usage patterns that are valid and reliable, but the analysis of such data must reflect an awareness of its limitations. Janet Boles (1980:347-48) in "The Politics of Child Care" focuses on the inadequacy of the child-care data base as an important barrier to child-care policy formation. In particular, we must acknowledge that until we have better inventories of the supply of child care, assumptions about the demand for care based on usage patterns will lack credibility. Furthermore, we must be reasonable in our analyses of the effect of income on usage patterns, using quantitative techniques to elaborate effects without losing sight of the problem we are addressing. More caution in making generalizations on the basis of limited data will not insure that any particular policy recommendation will be followed but it should, in the long-run, increase the reliance intelligent planners place on our advice.

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